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Developing a climate of equal opportunity in large systems: a case study of the United States Navy's equal opportunity race relations program.

M. Frances Baldwin

University of Massachusetts Amherst

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DEVELOPING A CLIMATE OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN LARGE SYSTEMS A CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY'S EQUAL OPPORTUNITY RACE RELATIONS PROGRAM

A Dissertation Presented
By
M. Frances Baldwin

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

February 1983

School of Education
DEVELOPING A CLIMATE OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
IN LARGE SYSTEMS A CASE STUDY OF THE
UNITED STATES NAVY'S EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
RACE RELATIONS PROGRAM

A Dissertation Presented
By
M. Frances Baldwin

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Member

Mario Fantini, Dean
School of Education
DEDICATION

To my parents Willie and Mary Baldwin who "made a difference" in the direction of my life.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

These pages reflect the influence of many persons upon my life and my way of viewing the world. This includes countless members of the United States Navy, many of whom are cited in the text of the study or in the bibliography. In any work of this type, however, there are those whose contributions and influence is of a nature that does not lend itself simply to bibliographic citation. Theirs is influence of intellectual stimulation, support comfort and encouragement: Commander Byron Wiley, Lieutenant Commander Bobby L. Randall, Admiral Charles Rauch and Admiral Elmo Zumwalt. Their eagerness to provide access to otherwise unavailable people and documents; and their efforts to help me to understand Navy structures, processes and norms greatly enhanced the quality of this study and, in fact made it possible for a civilian to explore, with candor, a sensitive issue. In addition to expressing my gratitude to specific individuals I also wish to acknowledge the spirit of support throughout the United States Navy Bureau of Personnel. I hope that my treatment of this subject represents and respects the integrity of that organization.

To my chairperson Donald Carew and members of the committee who have been at once intellectually confronting and emotionally supportive over a period of years I owe more than I can adequately express. And finally I am grateful to Norma Jean Anderson who introduced me to the United States Navy EO Program and thereby made it all
possible, and P. Bertrand Phillips who taught me invaluable lessons for working with people and organization.

In all cases, these persons' influence was offered, not imposed and therefore I alone stand responsible for the final result.
ABSTRACT

DEVELOPING A CLIMATE OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN LARGE SYSTEMS
A CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY'S
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY RACE RELATIONS PROGRAM

September 1982

University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Directed by: Dr. Donald Carew

The author uses a framework developed by J. Victor Baldridge (Power and Conflict in the University, John Wiley, New York, 1971) to present a case study of equal opportunity programs in the United States Navy. The study is presented in the context of a complex systems change effort.

For organizations attempting to create a healthy EO climate the author suggests that the most important part of any strategy for long term effect is to identify the primary means of power and control in the organization and to address EO through that channel, secondly she suggests that EO is a political phenomenon and must take into account the political dynamics of the organization. In addition she recommends attention to the following: organization culture and environment; systems perspective; on going assessment and strategic planning; long term planning; historical patterns of change in the
organization; the need for strong leadership; and defining EO to include selection and inclusion assimilation and integration into the mainstream of the organization. Finally she concludes that an organization has accomplished an EO climate when it has spanned the "program" stage and EO efforts are replaced by efforts of good management.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

... Organizations are tools for shaping the world as one wishes it to be shaped. They provide the means for imposing one's definition of the proper affairs of men upon men.

Charles Perrow (1972)

"Twenty four hour days and seven day weeks do not seem enough as long as our brothers, our sisters and our children are dying and we can reach out to try to stem the tide."

Statement from the Corporate Brochure of Curber Associates

The United States Navy was established in 1798. Like other military organizations, in the early history of this country the Navy was held in high regard by society. Boys became men by serving in the Navy; it was an expression of loyalty and commitment to one's country. Political leaders were most often men who had served with honor, in the military.

In 1972 Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations described the mission of the Navy:

To maintain the sea-going capability for strategic deterrence; to maintain control of the seas in order to keep vital
life lines open and, if necessary, for overseas projection of our armed forces; and to maintain our naval presence whenever it is required overseas.

Theorists give the military three broad roles: an instrument of foreign policy; a constabulary force; or it may perform general administrative functions not necessarily of a combat nature (Glover, 1974).

One of those non-combat functions has historically been sociological. The Navy has been seen as an institution which provides social and academic development. David Rapaport (1971) observed that the most important function of the military occurs when it serves as a school where the citizens can learn appropriate social and civic virtues.

People of color (minorities) have played a role in the history of the Navy dating back before the Revolutionary War (1775-1778) when the formal Navy had actually not been established. The military, however, is as much as any institution a mirror of the social structure in this country (Janowitz, 1960). The minority experience has been significantly different from that of whites. The formative years of the Navy as an institution occurred when slavery was legal in the United States so the practice of racial discrimination in housing, promotions, career development opportunities, and fighting forces in the active Navy was taken for granted.

The account of the military experience of minority people described in this study might be compiled from the archives of any American institution; industry, education, art, even the church.
Relative to mission and purpose the United States Navy has been an effective organization in spite of the fact that it has embraced racism for nearly two hundred years. In fact, racial discrimination only became a "problem" for the Navy as it received attention in the larger society in the 1960's.

In the late 1960's, then Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara launched an intensive recruitment program, Project 100,000 which was designed to increase the number of minorities, especially Blacks, in the Navy. Many of the Young Blacks recruited through that program were born in the early 1950's and grew up learning racial pride; for them civil rights activism was a way of life. So in the early 1970's the United States Navy was faced with large numbers of young Black recruits who were not assimilating well into the military culture. The presence of this "new breed" coupled with the ripple effects of the Civil Rights movement in this country stimulated a period of turbulence and change for the Navy. This study examines the management of the issue of race relations in the Navy from 1775-1974 and the programs and processes used to address the problems associated with this issue.

In the Fall of 1974, the United States Navy began implementation of the Equal Opportunity Race Relations (EO/RR) - Phase II. Phase I, 1972-1974, will be discussed in detail elsewhere in this study. The following are descriptive statements of this program that establish its relevance to systems change theory:
1. The program was conceived as a system-wide effort, designed to impact upon the organizational lifestyles of a total Navy of more than 500,000 people.

2. Active planning and designing of Phase II over the past year pooled the resources of some of the nation's top social scientists, and has responded to the input of Navy personnel at all levels.

3. The locus for change in this program is policy. The Navy has developed equal opportunity policy, broad in scope and supported by a well-planned program for implementation.

4. Policies and directives focus on the reward system of the Navy.

5. The program is based upon a conceptual organizational change scheme involving structured inventions for all fleet and shore commands.

6. Implementation strategies and related policies were promulgated by the Chief of Naval Operations.

7. A two-year time line has been established for implementation. Success of the program, however, has been defined as that time when the nature of the substance of EO policies, educational goals, and role requirements have become engrained into the system.

8. An independent consulting firm, The Systems Development Corporation, was contracted to manage evaluation of the program.

9. Approximately 150 Naval personnel were trained to deliver an educational component which prepares managers and significant others for their roles in the program.

This study addresses two subjects: our understanding of large systems change and the need for models to address issues of race/relations more effectively in organizations.

The behavior of large organizations and race relations are two subjects about which we find current literature burgeoning by the day. Most social scientists agree, however, that in both areas
research has only begun to make some promising inroads. This study is designed to contribute to these research topics.

This research is guided by four objectives:

1. To report the conditions leading to the establishment of EO policies and directives in the Navy.

2. To report the development process of race relations programs and policies in the United States Navy.

3. To describe present policies and directives for EO in the Navy.

4. To present guidelines for creating a climate of equal opportunity in organizations. These guidelines will consist of issues and structures which may be used by any organization for creating EO climates.

The format for this dissertation will be a case study modeled after the work of J. Victor Baldridge (1971).
Significance of the Study

This study examines the makings of a program that involves two important themes of this century related to our attempts to live and work with people in organizations.

The two major ideas which the Navy EO/RR Programs embrace are: (1) institutional racism, the subordination of people of color in American organizations and (2) systems change strategy, a tool for improving the quality of life in American organizations. The importance of racism for the author rests in the fact that it imprisons us all, and functions as a barrier to personal, social, economic and political advancements. The systems approach to social change is substantive and all-inclusive enough to be highly applicable to changing large-scale people problems in organizations. The author values this potential very highly in change technology.

The equal Opportunity/Race Relations Program applies systems theory to the issue of racism. This study was undertaken, therefore, as a means of crystallizing the quality of our understanding of this application and to communicate it to others who might find it useful.

Beckhard and Harris (1977) have described what constitutes a large systems change strategy:

We define a large systems change strategy as a plan defining what interventions to make where, by whom, and at what time in order to move the organization to a state where it can optimally transform needs into results in a social environment that nurtures people's worth and dignity. Managerially this
means defining the kinds of expertise that need to be brought to bear to help with the change, identifying people in the organization who need to become committed to the change; establishing a timetable and specifying priorities in procedures, rewards, policies, and behaviors; establishing a system of evaluating progress toward a new state; and providing education in skills needed to both operate in the new condition and manage the change.

In 1969, Beckhard identified criteria for the effective process of changing organizations: (1) it is a planned change effort; (2) it involves the total system; (3) it is managed from the top; (4) it is designed to increase organizational effectiveness and health; and (5) it is implemented through planned interventions in the organization's processes. Within the past ten years, the scope and structures put forward by Beckhard have been corroborated by other theoreticians and practitioners such as Katz and Kahn (1973); Dalton, Lawrence, Greiner (1970); and Wilson (1973).

Knowles (1969) described institutional racism as: the structures and practices in organizations that provide career opportunities for some, while not providing the same for others. The selective distribution of goods, training, skills, medical care, formal education, political influence, moral support and self-respect, productive employment, law, decent housing, are all manifestation of institutional racism.

A lot of ambiguity surrounds the issue of equal opportunity in the large organizations of this country. The flood of affirmative
action programs and hiring practices which sprouted in the 70's has probably produced as many variations and values as there are organizations involved. The one thing these programs have not produced is a change in the EO climate. Most represent piecemeal changes. It is important for researchers, legislators, and administrators to become much more concrete as to what the targets and criteria are for a healthy climate of race relations.

The significance of this study is that it addresses the problem of piecemeal approaches to EO by laying the groundwork of a model for the institutionalization of EO and improved race relations in organizations. Knowledge of the processes involved in changing the climate of the Navy has applicability for other branches of the Department of Defense, as well as civilian organizations such as public school systems where race relations have continued to be a great source of disruption and haphazard change in the past two decades.
Limitations of the Study

The author has been intimately involved in the design and initial implementation of the EO/RR Program. This fact will probably function as both a strength and a limitation of the study.

As a civilian consultant to the Program during the formative years of Phase II, her participation and observations have been an invaluable contribution to this study. She had extensive exposure to the Navy as an organization through key program element across all levels, access to several shore and administrative establishments, as well as the opportunity to visit aboard two major Navy vessels, the USS KITTYHAWK and the USS CONSTELLATION both aircraft carriers. There were many hours of informal discussion with Naval officers during extensive work periods. She also had the opportunity of formally interviewing several high level officers including Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., the former Chief of Naval Operations ("the man who changed the Navy") who spearheaded the major moves that led to the changes in social priorities in the Navy.

The author therefore brings to this study some positive perceptions and assumptions about the quality of the program strategy and content which could be blinding to her view of things.
Research Methodology

Kurt Lewin, a famous social psychologist and pioneer in organizational change theory once wrote: "a social organism becomes understandable only after one attempts to change it." This study is designed to contribute to our understanding of large systems behavior. The approach will be to study the change processes of the Naval organization in the area of equal opportunity. The purpose is to conceptualize these processes involved in reaching the existing stage of EO policy, and to identify the targets for change which the Navy deemed critical to accomplishing its goals.

The research method for this study will be a case study using an adaptation of J. Victor Baldridge's Political Model (1971) for studying organizational change in the governance of New York University in the 1960's.

The case study has five elements related to the policy forming process (See Figure 2).

In his study of the governance system at New York University (NYU) Baldridge "attempted to replace the classic beaucratic model for empirical organizational studies with one which more adequately dealt with the complexity of the organization." The format includes five areas of focus which in Baldridge's determination represent an analysis of political and sociological dynamics central to the change process in organizations:

Social Context Factors
Interest Articulation
Legislative Transformation
Policy Formulation
Policy Execution

The organization of the data under these topics sometimes called for an element of judgment on the part of the author. Categorization was not always clearly discernible by Baldridge's criteria. Consequently the format was modified to best protect the interest of the model and objectives of the study. All of the original topic areas have been included but arranged differently.

A section titled Equal Opportunity Climate Factors has been added to provide adequate historical context. Policy Formulation and Policy Execution have been combined to accommodate the fact that in this study the organization moved so freely and frequently between formulation of policy and execution of policy they could not be comprehensively differentiated for discussion.

The major period of policy execution occurred beyond the period of study therefore data they may have completed in this area was not available.

The following lists show the different presentations of topic in the two studies:

**Baldridge**
- Social Context Factors
- Interest Articulation Groups
- Legislative Transformation
- Policy Formulation
- Policy Execution

**Baldwin**
- Social Context Factors
- Equal Opportunity Climate Factors
- Interest Articulation
- Legislative Transformation
- Policy Formulation and Execution
A Simple Political Model
It is also the opinion of the author that the difference in scope of the two studies accounted for this phenomenon. The Navy study was very large in scope and generated a sea of information partially because of the design or conceptualization and partially that the topic and the size and history of the organization dictated on inherently large amount of data. The model therefore provided an efficient and comprehensive mechanism for sorting (criteria for what was to be defined as relevant) and for organizing and presenting a large amount of information.

The culture of the military system is probably not as well known as the university system so the author has made a more thorough attempt to build a social context for the reader.

Race relations and equal opportunity are topics often laden with myths and poorly documented case materials which accounts for the decision to provide a factual and thorough description of EO as experienced in this organization specifically.

Data gathering activities for this study included the study of documents, participant observations, and interviews.

1. Documents

Documents used included: official written communications that transpired between policy makers and personnel at all levels of the organization, particularly the famous "Z-Gram," a communiqué introduced by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt when he was Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and through which he pronounced guidelines feedback and requisitions. Numerous research studies, reports, newspaper articles, statistical analysis showing the stratification of minorities in the rank system, personal communications between
ranking officers, historical reviews, Congressional reports, narratives of noteworthy speeches, and the author's personal notes.

2. Participant Observations

As a civilian consultant to the Program the author was exposed to materials and groups, formal and informal observations provided context information relative to the organization as well as the program.

During that four year period the author made visits of one week to three months each to the following:

Navy Race Relations Training School
Naval Air Station
Key West, Florida

Bureau of Naval Personnel
Program Development
Washington, D. C.

Human Resource Management Center
Naval Station
Memphis, Tenn.

Naval Air Station
Phase II Training School
Cheltenham, Md.

Naval Air Station
Moffett Field
Mountain View, Ca.

Naval Training Center
Human Resource Management Center
San Diego, Ca.

Human Resource Management Center
Naval Air Station
Alameda, Ca.
3. Interviews

The author conducted the following interviews:

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<tr>
<td>Master Chief Willie Coleman</td>
<td>Navy Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Minority Affairs Ofc.</td>
<td>San Diego, Ca.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff-Human Resource Mgt. Prog.</td>
<td>March 20, 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty Ofc. Othan Monday</td>
<td>Navy Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Minority Affairs Ofc.</td>
<td>San Diego, Ca.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS Kittyhawk</td>
<td>February 10, 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff-EO/RR Program</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Loren Moore</td>
<td>Amherst, Mass.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Member</td>
<td>May 21, 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources Mgt. Prog.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Bobby Randall</td>
<td>Navy Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Member</td>
<td>San Diego, Cal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EO/RR Program</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radm. Charles Rauch</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst. CNO</td>
<td>Bureau of Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Goals Program</td>
<td>May 19, 1975</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bureau of Naval Personnel</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Capt. Byron Wiley</td>
<td>Bureau of Naval Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Manager</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal Opportunity/RR</td>
<td>May 19, 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Naval Personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, Jr.</td>
<td>U. S. Navy Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired CNO</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 13, 1975</td>
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In each interview the following format was used:

1. Interviewee received a copy of the dissertation proposal in advance, along with a description of interview format and objectives.

2. An overview of the materials was presented.
3. Interviewee was asked to describe the following from his experiences and perspective,

A. groups (internal and external that influence equal opportunity activities and decisions and their means of expressions

B. chronology or historical perspectives of how EO policy was conceived and formulated (and received) including

- time (year)
- differentiation of Phase I and Phase II activities
- issues, conflicts surrounding the policy-making and implementation process.

4. Interviewee was asked to recommend other data sources.

Each interview was recorded by cassette tape. Interviews lasted 45 minutes to two hours. Several persons brought documents to the interview.
Delineation of Chapters

Chapter I introduces the dissertation as a study of a complex systems change effort. A context is created by an introduction to the issue of institutional racism in the Navy's history. This chapter also describes the research methodology, the significance of the study and delineates the chapters.

Chapter II creates a perspective for the study by tracing the development of complex systems change technology for early experiments with personal growth training on the 1940's to the more advanced organizational change strategies used in the early 1970's. This history parallels the developmental stages of the EO Program conducted by the U. S. Navy during the period of the study.

This chapter also presents a unique history of the minority experience in the U. S. Navy drawn almost exclusively from Navy archives; a candid view of the history upon which the EO Program was built.

Chapters IV, V and VI present the core of research data collected for this study.

Chapter III, Social Context Factors, includes a description of the Navy as an organization. It is a discussion of the sociology of the military environment; open systems characteristics; tradition; patterns of change; and, the reward system.
CHAPTER II

This dissertation captures the developmental process of two concepts. It is a vivid reflection of the development of the field of planned changes in organizations; starting with the personal growth approach and moving to a more comprehensive approach of permanent systems change. The study is also a "how to" in equal opportunity. It sets an example for managers of large organizations who wish to create a climinate of equal opportunity. It illustrates the need to build EO into the realities of life in each organizational situation. Planned change and EO are brought together as process and content.

The objective of this chapter is to create a context for the case study by reviewing two areas of the literature; (1) the development of the conceptual underpinnings of organizational change efforts showing the origin and evolution of the technology used by the U. S. Navy in its EO efforts and (2) a candid history of the experience of minority people in the United States Navy highlighting racism not as a societal problem but specifically as it was experienced within the naval organization, and the slow progress that EO efforts have had in this country especially Federally supported programs.
There was a desire for redistribution of power and grassroots participation in planning both in the public and private sectors. The Vietnam War was a clear demonstration that power-oriented change strategies would not work. Thus, environment was a major impetus for a new concept of planned organizational change in the sixties.

The development of planned organization change parallels the growth of the applied behavioral sciences (ABS) which include social psychology, psychology, sociology, and anthropology and according to some, political science and economics as well (Bennis, 1966). A specific category within the social sciences, ABS seeks to study human behavior and apply the results of those efforts toward the betterment of humanity. One of the staunchest contemporary advocates of this linkage between science and action has been Bennis.

In the sixties Bennis saw an emerging action role for the behavioral scientist (Bennis, 1963). He and his colleagues Kenneth Benne and Robert Chin sought to relate expert knowledge to action. They believed that it was proper for men of knowledge to influence action, but they also observed that when this influence was exercised the results was not satisfactory. At the same time, they saw that men of action were unsure, being afraid that their methods were becoming obsolete under rapidly changing conditions. While Bennis et al. acknowledged that there were incompatibilities between men of knowledge and men of action, they believed that the gap could be bridged and that the vehicle was the application of behavioral science findings to planned change efforts. Bennis linked five major areas of
contribution of behavioral science to planned change: (1) personality theory, (2) interpersonal dynamics, (3) group behavior, (4) intergroup behavior, and (5) organizational behavior. (Bennis, 1963).

There has been some disagreement with Bennis' belief in the potential contribution of the behavioral sciences. Robert Blake and Jane Mouton four years earlier (in 1962), after studying an organizational change effort, concluded that "the behavioral sciences have accomplished little of systematic character in the direction of achieving change in situations of organized human activity." (Blake, Mouton, 1962). Nevertheless, the prevailing attitude today is that the applied behavioral sciences and, specifically, the field of planned organizational change can and will continue to be used to manage change efforts.

**Parentage of the Planned Change Field**

**Kurt Lewin: The Practical Theorist**

The conceptual heritage of planned organizational change lies primarily with Kurt Lewin, a social scientist in the thirties and forties. While Lewin is best known for his field theory of personality, he also made major contributions through his related notions about social change, force field analysis, action research, and group dynamics. Douglas McGregor, Rensis Likert, Chris Argyris, and Bennis built on Lewin's concepts. (Marrow, 1969) After Lewin's untimely death in 1947, his colleagues, Leland Bradford, Ron Lippitt, Marian Radke, Benne, and others, carried on his work in group dynamics,
action research, laboratory training, and social change.

Lewin devoted his life to building a conceptual bridge between theory and practice. He once said there is nothing so practical as a good theory and was called the "practical theorist" by his biographer, Alfred Marrow. For Lewin the linkage between research and action came through a process called action research (AR) in which research on social behavior (individual, group, or organization) leads to further social action through a continuing cycle of (a) planning, (b) execution, (c) reconnaissance fact-finding, (d) re-planning, (e) execution, etc. The process demands that the researcher and social actor participate in full and equal roles.

The planning stage of AR starts with a general idea. Next, an overall plan is developed and a decision is made on a first action step. The plan is executed and is immediately followed by reconnaissance much like an airplane observing after a bomber attack. In the reconnaissance phase the action is evaluated and discrepancies between the desired and actual are determined, forming the basis for plan modification or replanning. Then the cycle of planning, action, and reconnaissance fact-finding is repeated.

Lewin stressed that those involved in social action should be responsible for the reconnaissance fact-finding and not leave it to the researcher to insure that the data obtained will be realistic and be used. This involvement of researcher and social actor adds an additional dimension to the process--commitment through participation. Lewin believed and
proved that those who participate in deciding a particular action will likely have a commitment to consequent action (Lewin, 1951).

Another of Lewin's concepts, field theory, explains how changes in individuals, groups, or organizations take place. One aspect of the theory states that organizations tend to be in a state of quasi-stationary equilibrium where an existing combination or field of forces are counterpoised in dynamic tension. The implementation of any change begins with an analysis of the nature and strength of the forces which are producing equilibrium. There are two types of forces -- restraining and driving. When the strength of one or more of the forces is changed, an imbalance is created and there is movement or change with a new balance being attained. Thus, change strategies include removing or reducing one or more restraining forces that held back the desired movement and/or adding or increasing one or more driving forces in the desired direction. Lewin noted that increasing the driving forces alone will increase tension in the system producing greater emotionality, aggression, and conflict. However, if the restraining forces are decreased concurrently the system will reach a new equilibrium point and the desired change with less tension.

Another aspect of Lewin's concept of change is that change follows a specific process of unfreezing, change, and refreezing. This notion was illustrated by Lewin in his study of food-serving habits during World War II. One objective of the study was to get housewives to change their food-serving habits. Three groups were given lectures on new foods while three others engaged in a participative group
decision making process on the subject. In the group decision method it was acknowledged at the outset that individuals had resistance to change. This approach sought to remove counter forces within individuals; that is, to unfreeze the custom. During this unfreezing process people began to realize that change was desirable. Then, the change or adjustment in habit could take place within the group (finding a new balance in force field terms). The group's decision to change food-serving habits was then refrozen at a new level and permanency set in as a new force field was established (Lewin, 1947). This process of unfreezing, changing, and refreezing is the cornerstone for change efforts at individual, group, and organizational levels.

Lewin's work also focused on creating change by using the group as the basic building block. In the food habit study, for example, Lewin found that it was easier to change individuals in a group than to change them separately. The strategy, then, was to change the group standard and individuals would follow suit. Results of the food habit study showed that 32 percent of those involved in the group decision making method changed their food-serving habits, while 3 percent of those exposed only to lectures on new foods changed their habits (Lewin, 1943).

Training, Lewin believed, was an important tool to bring about change. While conducting a workshop for community leaders in 1946, Lewin formed the first T-group (training group) almost by accident. People were brought together to discuss problems and were observed by the trainers who would review their observations privately after
the session was over. However, in this case the community leaders asked permission to sit in on the feedback meetings. Lewin and the others agreed, producing the first situation where people reacted on the spot to data about their own behavior. Lewin realized that this type of feedback on group interaction was a rich learning experience and offered a process of group building which could be transferred to back-home situations.

Clearly, Lewin's contributions to planned organizational change are substantial. He believed in a close linkage between theory and practice and between participation and implementation, developed a model of change which utilized the group as a change vehicle, and pioneered T-group change technology.
The Group Dynamics Movement

Originating in the thirties, modern group dynamics is concerned generally with the interaction between and forces affecting group members in a social situation. The term group dynamics has several meanings. First, it may be used to identify something that is happening in all groups at all times, describing complex forces with dynamic aspects, the nature and direction of which are determined by forces within the group. This view of group dynamics examines how groups form and change, their structure and processes, and how they affect individual members, other groups, and organizations. In this sense group dynamics is a field of inquiry. (Cartwright, Zander, 1960). A second view, normative in nature, deals with how a group should be organized and conducted, stressing democratic leadership, member participation, and cooperation. Group dynamics can also be looked at as a set of techniques such as role playing, brainstorming, group therapy, and T-groups which are examined and applied to form effective groups. All three of these views of group dynamics are important to the study of planned organizational change.

While Kurt Lewin is generally credited with being the father of modern group dynamics, (Luft, 1970) there were several other important early influences on its development.

As a field, group dynamics emerged from the thirties as a subunit of the social sciences which placed heavy emphasis on empirical research. The field had interdisciplinary relevance as social psychologists, cultural anthropologists, political scientists, and
others began to study groups, focusing on the dynamics and interdependence of change, resistance to change, coercion, power, cohesion, attraction, and rejection. There was excitement and hope that findings would have applicability to social practice. (Cartwright, Zander, 1960).

By World War II the social sciences had enough assumptions about groups and research techniques to permit empirical research on group functioning. A second influence by the end of the thirties came from the growth of such professions as social group work, group psychotherapy, education, and administration, each of which focused interest on groups.

The Hawthorne research undertaken by Elton Mayo at the Western Electric Company during the late twenties and thirties was the third important influence on the field. These studies showed that there were relationships between individuals and groups that affected production. The group dynamics movement of the late forties and fifties emerged from this background.

Lewin's contributions to group dynamics began in the mid-thirties while he was at the University of Iowa. Seeking to understand groups better, he either conducted or sparked studies on leadership, communication within groups, intergroup relations, morale within groups, group productivity and its determinants, and problem solving. He also contributed heavily to publication in the group dynamics field. (Lewin, 1947).

It was Lewin's concept of field theory that helped greatly in defining group dynamics. This concept put forth and defined the intricate set of interactions and forces which comprise group
behavior and which offset both group structure and individual behavior. In addition, it holds that group behavior is a function of both the individual and the social situation in keeping with Lewin's linkup of the individual and his/her environment.

Lewin's grand design was to improve society by focusing on and developing a general theory of group behavior. He believed that a better understanding of collective behavior might show how groups could be made to serve more socially desirable ends. In 1945 Lewin succeeded in establishing a Group Dynamics Center at Massachusetts Institute of Technology to continue the research begun at Iowa. In the Lewinian tradition, the Center south to blend pure research and practical application. Key staff members included Ron Lippitt, Leon Festinger, Marian Radke, Dorwin Cartwright, and John R. P. French. MacGregor was also at MIT and was heavily involved in the Center's activities.

Lewin's work in group dynamics was carried on by a number of his colleagues after his death. Cartwright, prominent among them, became director of the Research Center for Group Dynamics when it was moved from MIT to Michigan and, with Alvin Zander, published the first comprehensive book on group dynamics in 1953. (Cartwright, Zander, 1953).

The crescendo of activity in the group dynamics field during the fifties emphasized the importance of work groups and laid the groundwork for their role in planned organizational change. In 1957, Cartwright and Ron Lippitt summarized the thinking about groups:

1. Groups are inevitable and are found in all
parts of the world,

2. Group decisions often can produce greater changes to individual behavior than can be brought about in isolated individuals,

3. Groups mobilize and broker powerful forces that affect individuals,

4. Group interaction, cohesiveness, membership, and intergroup competition apply group pressure to individuals influencing individual behavior and choices,

5. Groups can produce both good and bad consequences, and group pressure in cohesive groups may result in higher or lower productivity, and

6. Thorough understanding of group dynamics can help us enhance desirable consequences and inhibit undesirable ones -- knowledge is power, the power to change behavior. (Cartwright, Lippitt, 1961).

With youthful vigor the group dynamics movement channeled much of its energy into laboratory training which was "an educational strategy based primarily on experience generated in various social encounters by learners themselves and which aims to influence attitudes and develop competencies toward learning about human interactions." (Schein, Bennis, 1965). The motivating force behind laboratory training was the National Training Laboratory (NTL) and its first director, Leland Bradford.
By the sixties, laboratory training had become the most prominent planned organizational change technique. With its usage came a rash of effectiveness studies wherein laboratory training was assessed for its ability to re-educate individuals and change organizations. Results of the studies show individual change more likely than organizational change. (Buchanan, 1972).

Team building, which focused on improving effectiveness of work groups, grew out of the laboratory training techniques. Gradually, by the seventies team building had replaced laboratory training as the most prominent planned change technique. The group dynamics movement provided the conceptual foundation for both of these techniques.

**Lippitt, Watson and Westley:**

*Planned Change Defined*

Much of the post-1960 literature on planned organizational change uses Lippitt, Watson, and Westley's book, *The Dynamics of Planned Change*, (1958), as a point of departure. The book represents a formalization and elaboration of work that was started by Lewin in the thirties. Ron Lippitt, one of his colleagues, working at the University of Michigan Research Center for Group Dynamics with Jeanne Watson, Bruce Westley, and others, focused on applying Lewin's three-phased change process (unfreezing, change, refreezing) to organizational change. The major contributions of Lippitt, Watson, and Westley were three-fold: (1) they gave the "discipline" of planned change its
initial shape and direction, (2) expanded the Lewinian change concept into a five-phase process, and (3) articulated a key role for the behavioral scientist in organizational change processes.

Lippitt, Watson, and Westley provided an initial definition of the field of planned change. The authors differentiate between change and planned change. The former refers to changed states of affairs toward good or away from bad. In organizations changes occur in many ways. For example, a system may internally decide on and implement change or it may occur through the normal processes of maturation and development or the system may change to accommodate environmental demands. Lippitt et al. point out that these kinds of change are different from planned change which they say "originates in a decision to make a deliberate effort to improve the system and to obtain the help of an outside agent in making this improvement." (Lippitt, Watson, 1958). The decision to begin planned change may come from within the organization itself or from an outsider who observes the need for change. They further define the field as dealing with problems in psychological processes, intergroup and intergroup processes, problem solving procedures, and process of social structure as opposed to structural reorganization or technological change. They specifically do not include change which takes place without the aid of an outside change agent or where the change is involuntary or coercive as being planned change. (Lippitt, Watson, 1958).

The second and probably most significant contribution of Lippitt et al. is their development and articulation of a Lewin-based...
change process shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2
Lippitt, Watson, and Westley's Change Process

1. Realize need for change
2. Establish change relationship
3. Work toward change
4. Generalize and stabilize change
5. Achieve terminal relationship

This five-step process is explained in detail below:

Phase I -- Development of a need for change: The change process begins with problem awareness; however, this awareness is not necessarily translated into a desire for change. First, there needs to be confidence within the organization that a better state of affairs is possible; then a belief that external help both relevant and available. The presence of these two factors will allow the move from problem awareness to desire for change.

Phase II -- Establishment of the change relationship: In this phase, the relationship with a change agent is initiated and solidified. The organization seeks someone who will identify and empathize with its problems and needs as well as maintain his/her objectivity and different perspective. A central part of this phase is the contract between the parties as to expectations ground rules, time, and outcomes. The quality of the relationship between the change agent and organization is the key to the project's success.
Phase III -- Working toward change: This phase has three subphases: (a) clarification or diagnosis of the problem, (b) establishment of active goals, and (c) transformation of intentions into change efforts.

(a) Problem clarification or diagnosis: Data is collected using a variety of strategies which the change agent then actively sifts through and arranges. While the whole process starts with a felt need or problem, during this subphase there is changing and broadening of the problem based on the data collected.

(b) Establishment of active goals: The change agent's diagnostic insights are translated into possible actions and then definite intentions to change. The client often experiences motivation problems at this point when it realizes traditional patterns will have to be discontinued to allow change. There is also anxiety about failure because of attempting new behaviors or procedures.

(c) Transformation of intentions into change efforts: Lippitt et al. note that the active work of changing is the keystone of the whole change process. In this subphase the client continues to need substantial support from the change agent. Care must be taken not only in
implementation but also in gaining supportive acceptance of the changes from subparts of the system. Feedback which may be difficult to obtain must be sought from the client system regarding the change consequences.

Phase IV -- Generalization and stabilization of change:
This phase is crucial because the change often disappears after the specific effort ceases, allowing the client system to lapse back into old ways. Generalization of the change to other parts of the system, support of procedural changes by structural modification, positive evaluation, and/or rewards help the system "lock in" the change.

Phase V -- Achieving a terminal relationship: Often at this point the client system is dependent on the change agent. However, in most cases the client has learned sufficient problem solving skills to proceed alone. If additional changes are desired, the change agent may continue. Sometimes, internal consulting positions are created. In summary, Lippitt, Watson, and Westley took the conceptual work in Lewin and packaged it for popular consumption. They articulated a planned change agents, creating a powerful tool for client systems.
Seeking to build on the work of Lippitt, Watson, and Westley and to define further and unify the field of planned change, Bennis, Benne, and Chin edited *The Planning of Change* in 1961. This 765-page volume included eighty-four articles and was grouped into four parts: (1) The Roots of Planned Change; (2) Conceptual Tools for the Change-Agent, Social Systems, and Change Models; (3) Dynamics of the Influence Process; and (4) Programs and Technologies of Planned Change. The compilation contains contributions from a variety of disciplines and perspectives and places them under the common rubric of planned change.

The term planned change was defined by the authors as "a deliberate and collaborative process involving change-agent and client systems. These systems were brought together to solve a problem or, more generally, to plan and attain an improved state of functioning in the client system by utilizing and applying valid knowledge."

A deliberate, collaborative process, one of the three key ingredients of planned change, refers to the relationship established between the giver and receiver of help. Bennis et al. list six features which distinguish this relationship: "(a) a joint effort that involves mutual determination of goals; (b) a 'spirit of inquiry' --a reliance on determination based on data publicly shared; (c) an existential relationship growing out of the 'here-and-now' situation; (d) a voluntary relationship between change-agent and client with either party free to terminate the relationship after joint consultation; (e) a power distribution in which the client and change-agent have
equal or almost equal opportunities to influence the other; and (f) an emphasis on methodological rather than content learnings."

Collaboration has an important value to the authors for two reasons. Change is best accomplished by facilitating the client's use of his/her own data which usually surfaces only after a trusting, collaborative relationship is developed. Secondly, collaboration helps overcome fear of and resistance to change in the client system.

Second, Bennis et al. include the change agent and client system in the definition. The change agent is any person used by a client system to assist it in improving performance, while the client system, an individual, group, or organization, is the party asking for help and desiring change. Bennis et al. believe that the Lippitt et al. definition of change agent, a person brought in from outside the client system, is too narrow, citing three reasons: (1) client systems have potential resources for instituting their own planned change programs, (2) client systems need to continually adapt and change so as to have internal capability, and (3) outside change agents have ties to their own social and moral system which may limit their effectiveness.

Valid knowledge is the third important element in the author's definition of planned change. The requirements of valid knowledge are that it must be comprehensive, looking at individual and group behavior within institutional environments and their interrelationships. It must also be selective, using only values, ethics, and moralities appropriate for local situations. Finally, valid knowledge must be
usable, containing data the client can understand, manipulate, and evaluate.

Beyond its expanded definition of planned change, the book had several thrusts significant to the field's development. First, it traces the roots of planned change by drawing from such scholars as Karl Mannheim, Robert Merton, Alvin Gouldner, Max Lerner, and Ron Lippitt. Concerned with conceptual tools for the change agent, the authors build upon the work of Talcott Parsons, Lewin, Harry Stack Sullivan, Carl Rogers, and McGregor, as well as their own resources. Of the thirty-five concept-related articles, over half are written by people influenced by Lewin, indicating both the orientation of the book and the significance of Lewin's heritage.

The book emphasizes the author's concern for the influence process. They assume that if planned change is to take place a relationship must exist between persons or groups where one of the other party (or both) utilize some form of interpersonal operation to induce the other to do, feel, or think that which the influencer believes is desirable. They rely on Lewin's theory of the important effect of groups on individuals in the change process in their discussion of influence.

Only 20 percent of the book is devoted to techniques and much of that deals with small groups. Few articles relate to organizations. This indicates the relatively uni-dimensional nature of change technology in the early sixties.
The authors of *The Planning of Change* wrote for a specific audience, the change agent. Also, in the tradition of Lewin and Lippitt et al. the book provides conceptual material and techniques for behavioral scientist change agents to go into the practical world and ply their trade. The book speaks to practicing managers only to a limited extent.

To sum up, Bennis et al. followed the direction of Lippitt et al. and drew together the disparate elements of a field in its infancy. They provided a more specific, concise view of planned change, setting the stage for growth.

**Mann and Neff: Combining Theory and Practice**

While Bennis, Benne, and Chin were working in the Boston area, Floyd Mann and Franklin Neff were working with the Lewinian change theory at the University of Michigan's Foundation for Research on Human Behavior. In spring 1959 the Foundation held a conference attended by practitioners and university researchers to review current knowledge about change in organizational settings and to draw attention to the need for research on planned change.

At the conference Mann and Neff's change concepts were applied to four case studies. In seminar settings practitioners and social scientists commented, analyzed, and drew generalizations from the cases using the Lewin-Lippitt change process.

In addition to further articulating Lewin's theories, the seminars served to bring social scientists and practitioners together
hopefuly to forge a stronger bond between theory and action and to operationalize the force field concept to individuals exposed to change.

The seminars also sought to apply theories of change to large-scale social systems, a relatively unexplored effort until then. An outgrowth of the conference was Mann and Neff's book, _Managing Major Change in Organizations_ (Mann and Neff, 1961), which addressed the following problem: How can change be managed efficiently and with reasonable concern for the personal feelings and rights of all?

Despite these contributions to the planned change field, the Mann and Neff project appears to have had limited direct impact at the time. In retrospect, however, its key thrusts have been picked up by others and are now important elements of the field.

**Warren Bennis: Birth of a Salesman**

During the sixties Warren Bennis emerged as perhaps the most prominent, prolific, and outspoken social scientist active in the field of planned change. His contributions fall into four categories: reporting and advocating, consulting, theorizing, and questioning.

Based at Massachusetts Institute of Technology during much of the sixties, Bennis was a prolific writer on planned change and its technology, organization development. His books had a significant impact on the field both because little had been written before 1960 and because the publications were timely, providing both academicians and practitioners with material when the field was growing rapidly.
Bennis was also active as a consultant to organizations involved in change programs and worked with many people important in the field including Argyris, Bradford, Kenneth Beckhard, Schein, and McGregor. His consulting showed him the theoretical and practical problems associated with planned change, leading him to advocate further conceptualization of the field and to re-examine its development.

In his role as theoretician, Bennis's main contribution to the definition of the field has been elaborated earlier. Another contribution is his argument for the necessity of planned change. Also, a student of society and organization, he predicted the demise of bureaucracy due to the rapidly changing world, as discussed in Chapter I. Its replacement would be by "organic-adaptive" systems which operate according to basic democratic principles such as full and free communication, reliance on consensus, influence based on technical knowledge not power, encouragement of emotional expression, and mediation of the conflict between the organization and the individual. In his book Changing Organizations, Bennis enumerates the problems these principles are presenting in contemporary organizations such as: sources and distribution of power and authority, integration of individual needs and management goals, management and resolution of conflicts, appropriate responses to changes induced by the environment, and growth, decay, and revitalization. (Bennis, 1966).

By comparing organizational effectiveness to mental health, Bennis, sought to expand the dimensions used to identify and measure
it. Heretofore, he argued, organizations were measured only on performance (profit, cost, productivity, and output) and satisfaction (morale, motivation, mental health, and cohesiveness). Three additional qualities were needed: (1) identity—clear definition of mission, (2) reality-testing—ability to perceive the world and organization correctly, and (3) adaptability—learning how to learn and change. Planned organizational change was intended to move organizations toward fulfilling all of these conditions.

As a critic, Bennis saw, while viewing the field of planned organizational change, a number of key deficiencies. They included lack of theoretical content in change models, overemphasis of interpersonal and group factors as opposed to the cognitive processes of problem-solving, paucity of good measures of change, lack of methods to trace change dynamics in organizations, ineffectiveness of T-groups' transference of learnings back to organizational settings, uncertainty that new organizational values such as participation, openness, and collaboration would lead to improved performance, indecision over the boundaries of the change effort, total organization vs. top management group, and inadequate preparation of change agents for this important calling. These concerns, raised by one of its most active and staunch supporters, helped to shape and improve the field.
Summary

The planned change field moved from birth in the forties to a robust youth in the sixties. Its conceptual heritage is traced from Kurt Lewin who contributed field theory, a change process, and notions about change in individuals and groups to the field. The group dynamics movement combined with and extended Lewin's theories by developing laboratory training techniques. After twenty years of incubation, the field of planned change was given direction by Lippitt et al. in 1958. From that point the field quickly took shape, meeting the needs of a rapidly growing, changing society. The Planning of Change, published in 1961, drew together disparate parts of the field and defined planned change as a conscious, deliberate process employing behavioral science technology to solve societal problems through collaboration between a change agent and client system. Mann and Neff reemphasized Lewin's belief in the need for close collaboration between the social scientist and practitioners and began to apply theories of change to large-scale social systems. Warren Bennis, more than any other behavioral scientist, provided leadership, energy, and self-criticism for the growing field during the sixties.
Development of the Planned Change Field

Definition and Conception

Both Lippitt et al. and Bennis et al. use the term planned change restrictively describing change processes as those which meet criteria such as valid knowledge and collaborative relationships between change agent and client system. Some writers were even more restrictive. For example, Dalton defines planned change as "any significant alteration of the behavior patterns of a large number of the individuals who constitute that organization." (Dalton, 1970). It is not planned change if other than behavior or attitudes are the change target.

There were moves in the opposite direction as well. Some writers use planned change generically to designate any deliberate effort at changing. Garth Jones defines planned change as a projection of a course of action which moves organizational affairs from one state to another. He suggests that while the power relationships of principal actors (change agent and client) need to be fairly equal, other constraints of the Lippitt-Bennis definition are not required. (Jones, 1969). Leavitt's model of planned change is also broader than Lippitt-Bennis, who he believes are only concerned with change in the people category. While Leavitt does not specifically define planned change, he includes four approaches in his discussion: technology, structure, task, and people. (Leavitt, 1965). His view of planned change, developed in 1964, expanded the academic view of
what comprised planned organizational change.

It is clear, however, that all of the writers cited differentiate planned change from changes which are natural, haphazard, or accidental.

In the twenty years since its inception planned organizational change has moved through youth and adolescence to maturity. While the basic definition has remained the same, some profound, salutary changes have occurred in the past five years.

1. Organizations are no longer considered a single class but are differentiated as to service industries, public bureaucracies, and volunteer organizations.

2. There is now major concern for social ecology of interinstitutional relationships and boundary transactions of the organization.

3. Emphasis has shifted from reduction or elimination of conflict to understanding and managing it to obtain its positive effects.

4. More direct confrontation of the power exists rather than underplaying it and stressing the facilitative role of the leader.

5. There is a realization that new, more effective, hard-nosed strategies will be necessary to elicit change as opposed to stressing that organizations will get it together through
trust and collaboration. (Bennis, 1976).

The preceding and other emerging perspectives result in part from a rapidly changing environment: the agony and frustration of Viet Nam, the pursuit of equal rights by minorities, women, handicapped and aged, Watergate, the rise of Third World nations, and the OPEC oil squeeze. The world has become more complicated and more interdependent. In turn, organizations are buffeted by new forces, making planned organizational change even more challenging than it was in the past.

Planned organizational change does not have critics at both conceptual and operational levels. Crowfoot and Chesler place Bennis, Benne, and Chin in the professional technical school of thought which "stressed the intellectual expertise of selected classes of people and their ability as well as their right to make decisions and plans for others in order to be helpful." (Crowfoot, Chesler, 1976). They argue that this type of planned change has contributed to the established goals of economic and organizational growth as opposed to stimulated qualitative organizational change. Crowfoot and Chesler define two other perspectives: political, which stressed organization of mass power, legitimate office, and mobilization of elites and is derived from the works of Alinsky, Lewin, and Machiavelli; and countercultural, which is redemptive in character, emphasizing the unfolding nature of man and communal organization as the building blocks of a new unalienated society and comes from the works of Fromm, Slater, Buber, and Schutz.
Bennis et al. respond that "our paradigms of planned change (or organizational development) desperately need to be broadened to account for the needs, aspirations, anger, and concern of outside interests groups and internal pressure groups and caucuses and to incorporate models of change which are more innovative." They seek to operationalize this desire by including broader, more diverse articles in the third edition of The Planning of Change.

Another recent criticism has been leveled at planned organizational change by Edgar Huse, author of a comprehensive organization development text (Huse, 1975). In this text, Huse distinguishes between managed and planned change. Managed change involves the active participation of the organization, group, or individual in making things happen that are in the best interests of both the individual and the organization. They are directed at bringing about planned, organized change in order to increase organizational competence. He sees planned change as only one of three approaches to managed change, the other two being intervention theory and method and action research.

Huse equates planned change to the Lippitt, Watson, and Westley model but does not use either the Lippitt or the Bennis definitions. He believes that: (1) planned change places a greater emphasis on immediate, specific changes and problem solving than internalization of changes into the organization, (2) it does not
stress research about results or about validating the model, (3) the Lippitt typology is seldom followed in practice, and (4) planned change tends to rely on one intervention, particularly packaged programs, resulting in emphasis on content rather than process. His definition is more general and is couched in more popular terms. Though one includes Huse's three approaches within managed change, the end product differs little from the Bennis definition. Nevertheless, Huse's criticisms of the planned change approach appear valid.

French, Bell, and Zawacki (1978), provide a contemporary view of the field that uses the term organization development rather than planned change. French et al. see OD as normative, prescribing how planned change in organizations should be approached and implemented. They define OD as planned, sustained, and overall strategy, involving deliberate entry, using a collaborative relationship between the consultant and client, and targeting changes in people. Clearly, this definition is very similar to the Bennis et al. definition of planned change. It appears that planned change is being replaced by organization development as the more common term describing the field. In this dissertation the terms are used interchangeably.

In summary, the definition of planned change over the years has received strong leadership from Bennis, Benne, and Chin. They defined the field in 1961 and elaborated on that definition in 1969 and 1976. Yet, there is no unanimity. Leavitt and others conceptualize planned change more broadly. In order to develop a better understanding of planned change, attention must be directed in
future sections to theories, strategies, approaches, processes, and techniques.

Bennis proposed that the need for a theory of changing includes the following:

1. Manipulable variables -- accessible levers for influencing the direction, tempo, and quality of change and improvement,
2. Variables which do not violate the client system's values,
3. A reasonable cost factor,
4. A reliable basis for diagnosing conditions facing the client system,
5. Clear intervention phases that the change agent can use to estimate termination of the relationship,
6. Communicability to the client system, and
7. Conditions which allow assessment of the appropriateness of the theory for different client systems.

The discussion of whether a theory of planned change/OD exists accelerated in the seventies. Harry Levinson argues that there is no systematic body of professional knowledge about OD, but two other writers differ with him. Sashkin points out that there is a theoretical basis of OD, citing the work of Lewin, Coach and French, Cartwright, Lippitt, Watson, and Westley, and Kolb and Frohman.
French et al. argue for the works of Lewin, Cartwright, Schein, and Katz and Kahn as conceptualizations of the field of planned change. At best, there appears to be agreement that there are a number of theories of planned change and organization development, but no definitive theory exists.

Perhaps the most significant contribution to the theoretical field in recent years has been made by Dunn and Swierczek, who suggest using practice to develop theories of planned change, because it is generated directly from experience acquired from social research. They examined planned change theory and developed eleven hypotheses which they then used retrospectively to analyze a sample of sixty-seven cases of planned change efforts. Of the eleven hypotheses, results show that low to moderate empirical support exists for three, those involving collaboration and participation in change efforts.

While some authors caution that the results of the Dunn study are based on a limited case sample, the findings suggest discrepancies between leading planned change theories and available records of experience. Hopefully, as the sample is broadened and this method of theory building is further utilized, a more definitive theory of planned change will emerge.
Strategy

The strategy of planned change ranges from the general plan for the change effort based on one's conception of man to what approach, what process, and what series of techniques to employ.

Its development in the literature can be traced first from the meta-theoretical level which deals with assumptions about man and human behavior. Chin and Benne's article, which is the most significant of the few written on this issue, discusses three general change strategies based on meta-theoretical assumptions: rational-empirical, normative-reeducative, and power-coercive.

Rational-empirical change assumes that man is rational and will follow his self-interest once it is revealed to him. Change proposed by an administrator or consultant will be adopted if it can be rationally justified and if it will offer benefits to those affected. This general strategy is well suited to the expert consultant or engineering model of change.

Normative-reeducative change strategies assume man is rational and intelligent, but patterns of action and practice result from sociocultural norms and commitments on the part of individuals to these norms. Thus, change in man comes not exclusively from the cognitive level but often from a more personal level of habits, attitudes, and values. Employing this strategy entails changing people's normative orientation.

Power-coercive strategies are based on a compliant view of man which holds that those with less power accede to the will of those
with more. These strategies seek to use political and economic power to achieve the change goals proponents have decided are desirable. This application of power, both legitimate and nonlegitimate, comes in a number of ways: (1) such means as economic boycott, strikes and negotiations, and moral persuasion, (2) political institutions (passage of a law), and (3) recomposition and manipulation of power elites; e.g., C. Wright Mills' power elite).

Chin and Benne's contribution to planned organizational change is a clear articulation of the relationship between meta-theoretical assumptions and general change strategies. In other words, if you believe "A" about human behavior, then general strategy "B" can be employed. Until their article the choices were either unclear or couched in terms of individual managerial style (e.g., McGregor's Theory X - Theory Y, Likert's four-system model, and Blake and Mouton's managerial grid).

More specific development of strategy came from the theoretical work of Lewin, Coch and French, and the group dynamics movement. Their work emphasizes reducing resistance to change through groups using laboratory training which in turn changes organizations. The work of these early contributors focused on strategy as well as theory, perhaps to the detriment of the development of theoretical foundation of the field.

In further elaborating general strategy, there was a need to determine specifically what to change and how to go about it. This led to development of various change approaches and processes.
In the sixties development of strategy became still more specific. Larry Greiner, representative of this trend, was concerned about what works in the organization. He developed a list of conditions which differentiate successful changes from less successful ones. In 1969 Richard Beckhard wrote a book on strategies of planned change, using both theoretical and case study materials, that outlined conditions necessary for a successful change effort.

The pioneering organizational change work at TRW Systems done by Sheldon Davis has been a model and inspiration to other practitioners. David added to the growing literature on strategy in 1967 when he authored a popularized case study on his experiences with organizational change efforts at TRW. His emphasis also was to talk about what worked in the organization.

Over the past decade much attention in the planned change field has been directed to the development of change techniques. Consistent with this trend has been the definition of conditions under which certain techniques should be used.

The strategy of planned organizational change has moved from a focus on its meta-theoretical and theoretical basis where strategy is conceived of in the broadest sense to a concern (perhaps even preoccupation) with technique. This has occurred largely as a response to the practical need to deliver a successful end product—organizational change.
Approaches/Targets

Much attention has been directed to "approaches" to planned organizational change. The term approach refers to what and/or who is being changed; that is, the target of change. Harold Leavitt visualized organizational change in terms of four interrelated approaches: task, structure, technology, and people. Task refers to the organization's reason for being and all of the subtasks that exist in complex organizations. Structure includes systems of communication, systems of authority, other roles, or work flow. Technology is comprised of problem-solving inventions like work measurement techniques, computers, or other machines. People refers to the members of the system and their behavior. Leavitt suggests that while approaches to organizational change may begin with one variable, change usually results in compensatory or reactive change in others. For example, the introduction of a new technology such as a computer may cause structural change (e.g., in the communication system or work flow), changes in people (numbers, skills, attitudes, performance, and activities) or even changes in task definition. Ideally, these secondary changes are intended and foreseen, but sometimes they are not. Figure 3 is a diagrammatic presentation of the Leavitt variables and their interrelationships:
Approaches to change, Leavitt observed, differ in the amount of emphasis and the ordering of these four variables. The approaches also differ in the causal chains by which they intend to bring about change. For example, structure is often altered to change people in order to improve performance. Some human relations approaches seek to change people in order to change structure or technology to improve performance. Also, Leavitt argues that all three approaches (excluding task which is assumed to be constant in more cases) conceivably could be used to solve the same problem. One might see a modification of structure such as decentralization, or a change in technology (e.g., computerization), for a change in the way people relate to one another such as a sensitivity training program proposed as the solution to one problem.

Leavitt's work offers several contributions to the field of organizational change. First, as indicated earlier, he presents a broader view of organizational change than many of his contemporaries who were emphasizing the people approach only.
Second, he constructed a four-variable typology which provides a framework that he and others could use to discuss, analyze, and evaluate individual approaches. Finally, Leavitt, in essence, presented a systems view of organizational change efforts.

Though each of the three major change approaches (again excluding task) have undergone a lengthy developmental process which is described in detail by Leavitt, only summaries of these along with the systems approach which has been developing more recently will be provided here.

**Structure as an Approach/Target**

This approach is derived from classical organization theory which held as its objective the clear definition of functions and authority to accomplish tasks efficiently. It is grounded in the early writings of Henri Fayol, Luther Gulick, Lyndall Urwick, James Mooney and Alan Reilly, and, more recently, the works of Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, Ernest Dale, and Peter Drucker. The greatest impact on organizational change, however, has come from management consultants who used these concepts as a foundation for change efforts.

Another branch of the structural approach is social engineering advocated by the so-called interactionist school which emphasizes changes in interactional structures to improve attitudes, morale, behavior, and output. A third type of structural approach is sociological, and is addressed by Charles Perrow (1970), Jerald Hage, and Michael Aiken (1970). According to them, organizational change
takes place by altering role definitions, role relationships, and behavior.

**Technology as an Approach/Target**

The genesis of the technological approach was Frederick W. Taylor's scientific management in 1911 which relied on empirical work measurement to change procedures and equipment to increase efficiency. Other early contributors were Harrington Emerson, Lillian and Frank Gilbreth, and Henry Gantt. In organizations scientific management first became industrial engineering with its time and motion studies. After World War II operations research, which utilized sophisticated mathematical techniques, became the watchword of scientific management.

**Behavior (People) as an Approach/Target**

The objective of the people approach is to attain increased organizational effectiveness through improved managerial resources. The approach developed from the human relations school of management with the Hawthorne studies of the thirties and has gone through several phases. The first was manipulative, addressing the question, How can we get people to do what we want them to do? and was generated by the work of Lewin, Dale Carnegie, Lester Coch, and John R. P. French. (1948). A second phase was the power equalization approach whose early influences were Carl Rogers' client-centered therapy and the group dynamics movement. Later, power equalization models were developed by Lippitt et al., McGregor (participative management), (1960).
Likert (leadership styles), (1961), Argyris (interpersonal competence) (1962), and Blake and Mouton (managerial grid). (1964).

This change approach seeks increased organizational effectiveness by simultaneously relating the social system to changes in technological and/or structural system changes. A second objective is to assure organizational systems (particularly structure and technology) to the environment. The change foci are varied: work groups, methods and procedures, work flow, and linkages between people and technological subsystems.

A branch of the systems approach to change called socio-technical systems originated at the Tavistock Institute in England in the fifties with writers such as Elliot Jacques, Cyril Sofer, Fred Emergy, Eric Trist, Joan Woodward, Tom Burns, G. M. Stalker, and A. K. Rice. In the United States Robert Blauner, Paul Lawrence, and J. W. Lorsch follow this perspective.

Organizations are viewed as integrated wholes composed of elements and parts. The elements can be classified as human, structural, goal, and technological. Organizational parts include departments, agencies, bureaus, goal-attainment, adaptation, production, and support. As an open system an organization also carries out a dynamic interaction with the environment in order to survive and grow, receiving inputs from it and providing outputs to it. Since the environment is subject to continuous change, organizations establish feedback mechanisms to deal with these changes. (Ulku, 1969).
Katz and Kahns' work, *The Social Psychology of Organizations* (1966), which relates systems theory to organizations, emphasizes the systemic nature of organizations, and, consequently, the advisability of dealing directly with organizational variables rather than individual or group properties in isolation. In other words change in organizations must be approached on a total social system basis where subsystems are interdependent and must deal with the environment which it affects and is affected by.

Michael Tushman (1975), is a key spokesperson for the contingency approach to change, another branch of the systems approach. He begins with Leavitt's four-variable typology which he divides into two areas: people and structure (combining Leavitt's structure and technology). Tushman's thesis is that each of the two approaches alone is deficient. The people approach (psychological in nature) ignores or assumes constant such factors as organizational size, technology, and environment. Further, he finds a bias toward individual change, minimal results based on empirical studies, lack of transferability back home, and doubts that training alone can bring about change.

Similarly, the structural approach used alone is deficient. The Tavistock studies have illustrated the need to consider both technical and social systems in order to implement change effectively. There is a sociological bias to the structural approach which defines individual interaction in terms of roles and minimizes psychological aspects of a social situation.
In summary, approaches to planned organizational change during the past twenty years have undergone three major alterations. The first came in 1964 when Leavitt suggested his four-variable typology. This broadened the horizon from what defined by Lippitt et al. and Bennis et al., serving to open up the field to include structural, technological, and task change, in addition to behavioral change. The Leavitt contribution also set in motion the second alteration -- a systems approach to change which is now a well-accepted alternative in the literature. Finally, there is growing interest in a contingency approach to change as exemplified by Tushman.

Processes

Another important element in planned change is the process or series of actions or operations that lead to change itself. Most change processes are based on Lewin's action research concept and this three-step process (unfreezing changing, refreezing) articulated by Lippitt, Watson, and Westley. Three trends in the development of processes have been evident: (1) elaboration of the Lewinian process to explain and encourage change in individuals, (2) application of it to organization-wide change, and (3) development of a linkage between processes and strategies of change.

Development of the first trend which utilizes the people approach to planned change has depended on the necessity for change in individuals' beliefs, attitudes, and values as its cornerstone. Using Lewin as a point of departure, Schein developed a three-stage

Schein's conceptual scheme addresses individual changes of a basic nature; that is, changes which involve a person's self or identity and occur during socialization or therapy, for example. He emphasizes the problem of having individuals unlearn something before new things can be learned, since most changes involve giving up attitudes or behaviors integrated with the self and highly valued. Resistance arises because changing implies that the previous behavior or attitude was deficient. In this first step, called unfreezing, these defenses aroused in the individual "must be made less operative, circumvented, or used directly as change levers."

When the equilibrium has been upset and the resistance reduced, the individual will seek information which will be utilized to re-establish equilibrium. This is the process of seeking, processing, and utilizing new information to form new behaviors and perceptions which is the second stage, changing.

Finally, the individual must fit the new behavior or attitude with other existing attitudes and integrate the changes into significant on-going relationships. This refreezing is essential for the change to endure. If the change doesn't fit, the cycle of unfreezing should be initiated again.

The main contribution of Schein's scheme is that it provides a model for individual change which identifies change mechanisms step-by-step. It elaborates a process for the people approach school which sees organizational change as the result of individual change.
Working with the second trend, Louis B. Barnes approached the problem of changes in organizations first by focusing on who would be changed, believing that individuals' response to change was critical to the success of organizational change. He then developed an organizational change framework with this perspective.

Larry Greiner (1967), followed the strong emphasis in the sixties of making practical use of concepts. Part of the research focus was to evaluate organizational change efforts and to generalize from them. Greiner surveyed eighteen studies of organizational change, looking for "successful" and "less successful" change patterns and reported ten conditions which differentiated successful changes from the less successful. He found that successful changes follow sequence which has a Lewinian base. Operationalizing his findings, Greiner developed a six-phase change process as depicted in Figure 4.

Writing from a people-oriented, power equalization approach, Greiner also argues that successful change depends on a redistribuition of power within the organizational structure. By this, he means a significant alteration in decision-making practice toward greater use of shared power which occurs through a developmental process of change, involving a number of phases.

The third trend in development of process leading to change has been aimed toward managers and the change strategy that they ought to employ. Representative of this is the work of Kenneth Benne and Max Birnbaum. (The Planning of Change, 1969). They exhort managers saying "those who have managerial functions in organizations
must analyze and predict impending changes and take deliberate action to shape change according to some criteria...The planning of change has become part of the responsibility of management in all contemporary institutions...." The authors also rely on Lewin to explain change dynamics, using force field analysis and the three-step model, and offer strategic principles to managers.

Techniques

It is not within the scope of this dissertation to treat planned change/OD techniques in a detailed fashion. However, some knowledge of them is important for an understanding of the field and its development and how that development influenced the navy social changes efforts. This portion focuses on the developmental activities of the sixties, while a succeeding section identifies major current techniques. Specific descriptions are included in Appendix A.

Bennis, Benne, and Chin suggest that the technology or instrumentation section of the planned change field falls into three categories: (1) training, (2) consultation, and (3) research (data collection) and feedback.

Training is viewed as an action-enabling step that is the teaching of skills and knowledge necessary to carry out an action. An organization which feels some deficiency in the conduct of its business may decide to go to school to learn better ways of doing things. Education or training is an attempt by behavioral scientists to meet this kind of organizational need.
Figure 4
Greiner's Change Process

PHASE 1
Pressure on Top Management
Arrears
To Take Action

PHASE 2
Intervention At the Top
Reorientation To Internal Problems

PHASE 3
Diagnosis of Problem Areas
Recognition of Specific Problems

PHASE 4
Invention of New Solutions
Commitment to New Courses of Action

PHASE 5
Experimentation with New Solutions
Search for Results

PHASE 6
Reinforcement from Positive Results
Acceptance of New Practices

Unfreezing
Changing
Refreezing

STIMULUS of the Power Structure
REACTION of the Power Structure
Consulting is viewed as "an interpersonal relationship between a client-system and change agent (consultant), in which the latter tries to help the former solve a problem." Various forms of "advice-giving" are the life-blood of the consultant. Sometimes, the advice takes the form of recommendations drawn from the expert knowledge of the consultant developed from studying other systems. This type of consulting has been termed the engineering model by Alvin Gouldner (1956), and fits with the structural change approaches of the classical management school.

Another method is for the consultant to stimulate, assist, and support the client in developing, applying and evaluating his own advice. This model is termed clinical by Gouldner and is the generally accepted change agent role of the planned change literature.

Applied research, the third category of technology, is a tool for evaluating results through feedback about the validity of consulting and/or educational efforts. Research is also used to obtain information about what is going on in the system. In this case the consultant enters the system, collects data, and reports it to the client.

In ideal form "consulting leads to adequate diagnosis, training to internalization of prerequisite skills, and research to evaluation of the two prior steps." Clearly, these three technology sectors are related and often blend together. Training, for example, frequently involves problem solving as well as internalization; research may involve training and consulting.
Current State of the Planned Change Field

This look at the planned organizational change field has shown rapid growth, terminological confusion, and greater emphasis on technique than theory.

The field has enjoyed rapid growth during its thirty years of existence. Its Lewinian conceptual framework has stimulated a variety of theories and strategies of participation, commitment, group development, and resistance to change, and a growing number of change processes. But even greater growth has occurred in the number and variety of techniques.

Growth of the field has been accompanied by terminological confusion. It is difficult to determine the difference, if any, between planned change, organization development, organizational improvement, and managed change. "Techniques" are called "approaches" and "approaches" are called "strategies" or "processes." This confusion makes it difficult to communicate particularly to managers who are considering a planned change effort and compounds the inescapable problem of how to communicate about feelings, trust, collaboration, openness, and values in an organizational world which is cognitively oriented. The vocabulary of planned change confuses and scares people.

There is no unifying theory of planned organizational change. This is neither surprising nor damaging to the field at this time. A unified theory during such a growth period could restrict creativity. The disadvantage is that the field lacks theoretical direction and
general parameters. The recent work by Dunn is applying grounded theory to planned change is a positive remedial step.

Development of theory has been slow because of the rush toward development of techniques. Consequently, we may be moving toward a triumph of method over purpose. This is not to say that the proliferation of techniques and the recent emphasis on elaboration of the Lewinian change process have not been positive. To the contrary. They indicate industry, creativity, health, and aggressiveness which will help the field to measure up to its task of improving organizational effectiveness. The recent renaissance and adaptation of the action research process in the public sector has been a particularly exciting development.

The field's theoretical development has also been retarded by its conceptual and methodological heritage. Spawned from the applied behavioral sciences, planned organizational change emphasizes behavioral as opposed to structural or technological change. The idea is to change peoples' behavior. The people will then make structural, technological, and other changes. The founders (Bennis, Benne, and Chin; Lippitt, Watson, and Westley) and their successors (French, Bell, and Zawacki) have made limited movement toward accommodating other points of view. Their stance has been largely responsible for the behavior vs. structure dichotomy that has plaqued the field for fifteen years. The movement toward systemic and contingency approaches to change appear to be rectifying this problem and are likely to be the wave of the future.
Further, it is important to note that the planned organizational change field has been partially coopted in the seventies. This has come about through organizations' unrelenting search for greater profits. The temptation has been to try a few techniques, to get a quick fix. This practice, though causing growth in planned change technology, cannot be called planned change.
The Minority Experience in the
United States Navy 1775-1973

This overview of the experience of minority people in the United States Navy is presented to establish a context for this study, and to introduce the issue. The materials found in this section draw, almost exclusively, upon military documents, the depth and scope of which could not be found in the cursory treatment of minority people in the literary history of this country.

In 1973 the population of the United States Navy was nearly 600,000 people. Of this number, 65,000 were minorities (people of racial groups other than Caucasian); more than half of the minority group were Black. The second largest minority population was Filipino.

Minorities have played a significant role in the history of the United States Navy dating back before the Revolutionary War (1775-1778), when the formal Navy had actually not been established. (Sessions, 1974). They have fought in every major American conflict and have come away with a substantial share of its citations and decorations even when subjected to discriminatory treatment.

The late 60's and early 70's were marked by a series of racial disturbances in the Navy when Black sailors attracted national attention by openly resisting discrimination. Racism in the Navy appears to have spanned two centuries. The history of those years needs to be known and understood for purposes of this study.

There are five minority groups in the United States Navy today: Blacks, American Indians, Malayans, Mongolians and Hispanic Americans.
The titles designated ethnic groups are constantly changing. For purposes of this study, the author will use the following names:

- **Blacks** - referred to as Negroes in dated materials
- **American Indians**
- **Filipinos** - sometimes designated Malayans as that is the reference used by the Navy
- **Japanese** - sometimes referred to as Mongolians
- **Hispanics** - all Spanish-speaking Americans

Until very recently Hispanics were not designated as a cultural group in the Navy. Their military history is basically unrecorded, as an identified group. The author acknowledges the presence of this group; however, references will not be made to their contributions due to this lack of information.

**Filipinos**

The history of Filipinos in the United States Navy is obscure even though their participation dates back to the early 1900's. During World War I (1914-1918) 25,000 Filipinos enlisted and served this country. (Griggs, 1973). This was the largest such population during the period covered in this study. In subsequent years their entry into this country was restricted; there were no formal integration policies and the military was an entry vehicle for future citizenship.

In the early years of World War II (1934-1945), approximately 5,000 Filipinos were still enlisted. Those who were not already a part of the military were ineligible for the draft and were in fact
considered aliens. Approximately 7,000 additional Filipinos were made eligible as a result of a 1940 protest for their right to serve. They were placed in an all-Filipino regiment in California.

In the early post-war period this country signed the first United States/Filipino agreement. Filipinos were drafted in large numbers and channeled into the stewards rates where they replaced Blacks who had filled those jobs from 1932-1942 when it was the only rate open to them (Blacks).

In 1952 the Navy Advocate General signed T1AS2931, a military agreement which stated that the United States would recruit 1,000 male Filipinos between the ages of 18 and 30 annually. They would be eligible for assignment to duty both ashore and at sea with eligibility to re-enlist and retire as United States citizens. (The Rudder October, 1974). This agreement was amended twice before 1973. The first amendment increased the number recruited annually to 2,000; the second amendment expanded recruitment to other branches of the military.

As with all military career people, the Filipinos were immersed into a total military culture that affects not only the service man or woman but the entire family. Blaszkowski (1973), summarized the following as problem areas experienced by Filipinos in the Navy.

(1) culturally biased entry and promotional examinations.

(2) discrimination based on accent. Filipinos were often disqualified for leadership positions because of their accents.
(3) disproportionate numbers of cooks and stewards, which did not allow development of their potential and limited their preparation for good jobs when they returned to civilian life.

(4) limited number of promotions. In 1972 there were only 80 officers among a Filipino population of 20,446.

Filipinos and their families were subjected to humiliating and demeaning situations especially in housing and legal matters. The language barrier was frequently used as a means for exploitation.

**Japanese (Mongolians)**

In 1973 there were 1,000 Mongolians in the Navy. The most prominent features of their history that I reviewed were the conditions under which they initially volunteered their services. Their naval experience began with the Spanish-American War, 1898-1902 (Griggs). History records the death of seven Japanese sailors in 1898 who were aboard the Battleship Maine destroyed in Havana Harbor. Others were listed aboard United States warships in the Battle of Manila Bay 1898.

When the United States went to war with Japan, Japanese-Americans were put in the precarious situation of fighting for a country that was hostile against people of their race and simultaneously fighting against their families in the Japanese forces. The generation of Japanese of age to serve at that time were the Nisei (second generation Japanese). To begin with, the Navy and Marines had changed the classification of all Nisei to 4c (aliens not eligible to serve)
thus imposing blanket exemption from the draft. The Nisei resented this act deeply. (Finklestein, Sandifer and Wright, 1971). Many of those who were eventually allowed to serve came directly from concentration camps in the United States where many Japanese Americans were detained until after the war.

**American Indians**

Many Indian tribes allied themselves with the British in the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. (Griggs, 1973). Others sustained a cautious neutrality waiting to see what would come; a few tribes declared themselves on the side of the Americans. American Indians have participated in every major war since the Revolutionary War and received recognition for valor. Like other minorities, the Navy became, for the American Indian, a channel into the larger American society. Many did not return to their tribes after military stays. Figures obtained from reservation drafters and enlistees show that the larger number of Indians participating in the United States Armed Forces have been in the U. S. Navy. Few records are available to describe in any detail what their Navy experience had been.
Black Enlisted Men

Military records include more extensive accounts of the Black Navy experience. Consequently the author will present a more detailed overview of the history of Blacks in the Navy which embraces a substantial history of the development of the U. S. Navy itself, and probably simulates in many ways the experiences of all minority groups.

Logan (1974), described records of Blacks dating as far as 1775 when many slaves and bondsmen served their country in the military. At the outbreak of the Revolutionary War in 1775, the United States was not yet in existence and the colonies had no navy. Vessels previously used for transportation and trade were outfitted with equipment for war at sea. Many of these ships, some of which were captured and destroyed by the British, were manned by men of color. (Hailey, 1973). In the Navy's first sea fights of the Revolutionary War, 1500 Black Americans served their country manning boats, working sails, loading guns and piloting coastal vessels. The Navy needed warpower desperately, and in keeping with the times, often resorted to increased numbers of Blacks, even though they were the least preferred human resource. Hailey (1973), relates: "commanders were often forced to rely on Blacks because of shortages or desertions among the crew." Blacks were enslaved at this time and were not considered men. Most of the thirteen states promised freedom money and land to Black slaves who fought, therefore, many volunteered. Although some had patriotic motives, freedom took precedence, according to Hailey. Whatever the motives, Blacks, entered in the
ships books without distinction of race, distinguished themselves in the Revolutionary War, some of whom, subsequently reclaimed by their masters, died in slavery.

In 1798, the permanent Navy of the U. S. was formalized with the building of the first official ships, the Constitution, the United States and the Constellation. At the time, there was a ban against the development of Black sailors aboard ships, issued by the first Secretary of Navy, Benjamin Stoddert. (Logan, 1974), (Wiley, 1968) and (Session, 1970). A few Blacks were known to have served on ships; however, because of the Navy's loose compliance with Congressional orders, Blacks enlisted. This inclination toward non-compliance affected minorities, sometimes positively and sometimes negatively.

It was during the Revolutionary War that the involvement of Blacks as a desperate move to supplement white male fighting forces began a mentality that prevailed through the War of 1812. The conditions of their involvement was situational; they were consistently referred to by (and in) derogatory terms and given the less desirable jobs whenever it was possible to make such a distinction. Sometimes limited facilities did not allow for separate living and working facilities. Generally, however, they lived in separate, substandard facilities. In the War of 1812, Black men comprised about one-sixth of the Navy population and made up nearly 20% of the crews of some ships. Under extraneous conditions, they often distinguished themselves in heroic plays for this country.
Slavery, both as a moral issue and as the focal point of the Southern economic system and cultural pattern, was an important causal factor to the Civil War (1861-1865). Military necessity, as in previous wars, gave Blacks the "opportunity to fight." It was not until the Civil War that Blacks were made a permanent part of the military establishment. (Session, 1970).

Nearly one quarter of the Union fleet was Black, and of the 3,220 casualties, 800 were Black (Wiley). While the conditions of their service were unusual, numerous Blacks were decorated for heroic performance, among them:

Robert Blake received the Medal of Honor, the nation's highest military award, for bravery for his performance aboard the Union gunboat, Marblehead, December 25, 1863. Blake was the first of four Blacks to receive this honor during the Civil War.

Robert Snualls, a slave pilot, became commander of the Confederate ship, Planter, for his heroic actions in delivering the ship to the Union Army. Many years later, a camp at Great Lakes Training Center, Illinois designated for the training of Black recruits, was to be named in his honor.

With the advent of the Spanish-American War, the first hint of segregation in formal Naval policy made its appearance. (Wiley, 1968). Although Blacks served extensively throughout the fleet, it was decided that in the future they were to be strictly limited to the lower ranks. By the time of World War I, this small seed had grown full bloom and the 10,000 Black men who volunteered for Naval Service
during this period were relegated to duty as messmen. Segregation policies curtailed the opportunity for Blacks to distinguish themselves by valorous service as they had done for nearly one and a half centuries.

At the end of World War I, a period of general disarmament, all Black enlistments were stopped. In 1932, the Navy began accepting Blacks again for messmen duties only. The position was defended by a declaration that "the enlistment of Negroes other than as mess attendants leads to disruptive and undermining conditions." (Wiley, 1968). This position came under strong attack by civilian and military groups alike. The Navy defended, "The policy of not enlisting men of the Colored Race for any branch of the Naval service but the messmen's branch was adopted to meet the best interest of general ship's efficiency.... This policy not only serves the best interests of the Navy and the country, but serves as well, the best interest of Negroes themselves."

In 1941, in the face of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States went to war with Japan. Messman Second Class Dorie Miller distinguished himself as a hero when he manned one of the ship's anti-aircraft guns (with no gunnery training, he shot down two of the attacking aircraft). Miller received the Navy Cross, which is the Navy's highest award for gallantry. Another mess attendant, Leonard Harmon, also received this award posthumously. In keeping with Naval tradition that destroyer class ships are named for Naval heroes, the USS HARMON was later named to honor his memory.
After the beginning of the war, Blacks began their first protest against the discrimination the Navy had shown toward them. They were still assigned, for the most part, to the messman branch. To meet the requirements of combat conditions, every man aboard ship was trained to be utilized at battle stations in emergencies. Blacks were therefore trained at many jobs other than their ratings allowed, which afforded them the opportunity to join their shipmates in actual combat, but did not change their official status. (Logan, 1974).

The early 1940's seemed to mark a pivotal point in formal segregation policy of the armed forces. The Selective Service Act of 1940 included the provision that "in selection and training of men under this act and in the interpretation and execution of the provisions of this act, there shall be no discrimination against any person on account of race or color." The effects were not immediate. Many government and military officials did not regard this legislation as an order to desegregate the military. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox announced that Blacks could still serve only as mess attendants. Because of this stance, a large number of Negroes were rejected from the Navy, even though the monthly quota of draftees was on the incline.

In 1942, the War Manpower Commission, backed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, ordered an end to the policy of designating Blacks as messmen; the Navy was forced to accept a percentage of the Black draftees in all general service ratings.

Desegregation policy on entry procedures did not mean an integrated Navy in the 1940's. Secretary Knox subsequently stipulated
that Blacks would be trained in segregated schools, housed in segregated quarters, utilized in segregated units and would not be permitted to serve on sea-going vessels. All of those guidelines were, in fact, implemented for several years. In 1943 the Navy was receiving 12,000 Black draftees a month and there simply was not ample room for so many men in shore establishments. During this period, Christopher Smith Sargent, a young lawyer who had left Dean Acheson's law firm to work with the Navy's manpower division, became the prime architect of a series of innovations designed to destroy racial segregation in the naval service. As lender of the "Special Programs Unit," Sargent ran into opposition. By skilfully managing his resources and relying on connections with several open-minded people in influential positions within the department, Sargent's unit demonstrated that segregation was the source of a massive waste of manpower, and soon affected a complete about-face in the Navy's racial policy. This would not be the last time a bright, young, liberal-minded man, relying on connections with open-minded people in influential positions, would "affect a complete about-face in the Navy's racial policies."

When Secretary Knox died in Office in April, 1944, James V. Forrestal, a man of far more liberal outlook and attitude, was named in his place. Under Forrestal's leadership many sweeping changes occurred in fairly quick succession.

Segregated advanced training schools were entirely abandoned in 1944. The following year the Navy took the next logical step and abolished segregated basic training. In August 1944, the crews of
twenty-five auxiliary ships were desegregated. Blacks were, however, still restricted from combat ships, and no auxiliary vessel was supposed to exceed a ten percent ratio of Black to White personnel.

Finally on February 27, 1946, general service assignments without restrictions were opened to Blacks.

Black Officers

The first Black officers were commissioned in 1944. Handpicked by several people in high places, the original sixteen candidates, from Black training camps such as Hampton Institute, Virginia, commenced an intensive ten-week indoctrination program. In the middle of the training period, despite the fact that posted records indicated that all of the candidates were making satisfactory progress and maintaining good scholastic averages, it was announced that only twelve of the sixteen would be commissioned.

On March 17, 1944, with no fanfare, twelve young men became the first Blacks in history to hold formal commissions in the United States Navy. Wiley (1968), relates: "The historic ceremony consisted of a handshake from the officer who conducted the swearing-in in his office." This was apparently quite minor in an organization of rituals and ceremonies such as the Navy.

Progress was certainly not without pain. Black officers were studiously kept out of responsible positions and consistently subjected to personal affront. They were denied access to the local officers' club, one of the main avenues of social contact with fellow
officers. These restrictions had been imposed by Commander Daniel W. Armstrong, who had also been instrumental in setting up inadequate curriculum guidelines for Black training camps. When Armstrong was transferred to new duty, his practice of segregation of officers was immediately dismissed.

It seems important to note that throughout the accounts of policy implementation relating to desegregation, it mattered tremendously who the officer in charge of execution of the policy was and what attitude he held toward Blacks. Non-supporters could distort the intent of any policy by the manner in which they chose to implement it.

By the end of World War II, there were sixty Black officers (including two women (Waves) on active duty). The original intent had been to use these officers in training Black recruits and to command all Black units. Shortly after the first group had been commissioned, however, James Forrestal became Secretary of the Navy and began reshaping racial policies. As the number of Black officers increased, the number of billets (positions available) originally intended for them decreased. Most were assigned to small vessels, such as patrol craft and tugs, or to duty overseas, usually serving with forward area support units primarily engaged in stevedore work (the loading and unloading of ships). When the war ended, the future for the Black officer looked rather bleak. All but four of this group of twelve left the Navy and returned to civilian life.
There were only four Black officers in the entire Navy at the end of World War II; the time when we might expect to see Black flag officers in the United States Navy was extended into the future.

Although they had attended the Naval Academy at Annapolis as early as 1872, it was not until 1949 that the first Black, Wesley A. Braun, successfully completed the requirements for graduation. Braun had entered the Academy in 1945 following nomination by Congressman Adam Clayton Powell. The number of Black academy graduates has increased slowly, consistent with the slow pace of successful integration of all facets of Navy life. In 1950, the number of Black Annapolis graduates and officers had not increased significantly, (Wiley, 1968), and continued through 1968 to be a slow process.

On January 31, 1962, Lieutenant Commander Samuel L. Gravely, Jr. assumed command of the USS FLAGOUT, a destroyer escort. Gravely later became the first Black line officer to attain the rank of Captain, was the first Black admiral, and is presently Commander of the Third Fleet in the Pacific. Command at sea is, and has always been, the most coveted of assignments in the Navy. It places a man in a position of such absolute authority that the assignment really has no comparable counterpart in either civilian life or in any other area of the military service.

The increase in the number of Black officers in the Navy was eventually facilitated through the NROTC (Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps) Program. Testing under segregated conditions was not allowed (as had been the accusation in some Southern states), and NROTC
units were established in predominantly Black colleges.

Another source of Black officers was the program MORE (Minority Officer Recruitment Effort) established in September, 1967. MORE was designed to heighten interest in various officer programs among all minority groups, especially Blacks. The program directed commanding officers of all NROTC units to conduct minority recruiting, not only on their own campuses, but at all schools in the vicinity. Major entry points to commissioned service were the Naval Academy and the Officer Candidate School. The latter was designed primarily for students who did not have access to NROTC units. In 1965, the Bureau of Naval Personnel began introducing academy prospects from minority groups to the Department of Defense for screening and nomination for sponsorship. Remedial preparations were also made available to potential candidates through the Naval Academy Preparatory School. In 1968 Blacks began obtaining commissions through the Navy Enlisted Scientific Education Program. Under this plan, selected enlisted personnel attended a civilian university under Navy sponsorship and were commissioned upon graduation. Prior to 1966 there had never been more than seven Black midshipmen in an academy class. There were twelve (12) in the class of '66 and fifteen (15) in the class of '72. In 1966, Midshipman Anthony Watson became President of the Naval Class of 1970. Blacks were increasing their numbers and roles in the United States Naval Academy. In 1968 there were 300 Black Officers on duty.
Legislation

The 1940's marked the beginning of legislation to bring an end to a segregated Navy. In December, 1945, Secretary Forrestal ordered an immediate end to discrimination in the administration of personnel. In February, 1946, general service assignments without restrictions were made available to Blacks. In July, 1948, Hubert H. Humphrey, a then little-known politician, helped force through one of the strongest civil rights planks in history. One of the actions for which it called was "equal treatment in the service and defense of our nation." On July 26, 1948, President Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order 9981. The opening remarks state, "It is essential that there be maintained in the armed services of the United States the highest standards of democracy, with equality of treatment and opportunity for those who serve in our country's defense." The order was to be put into effect "as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale."

The order also created the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services. Known as the Fahy Committee, after its chairman Charles Fahy, this group was to check on the practices of all branches of the military to determine, "in what respect such rules, procedures and practices may be altered or improved, with a view to carry out the policy of this order."

The committee, although concerned with the low number of Blacks in the Navy, particularly officers, made note that the Navy had
progressed from a policy of exclusion of Blacks from general service to one of complete integration in general service, in only five years. It made several recommendations, one of which was that the Navy, in its relations with the public and the press, should put greater emphasis on its policy to use Blacks on the same basis as Whites (Logan, 1973).

The Navy was receiving increasingly more criticism from various external sources about its racial policies.

Growing pressure from forces such as Thurgood Marshall of the NAACP and A. Phillip Randolph and his labor union, forced the U. S. Navy, as well as other branches of the armed forces, to seriously consider total desegregation. The Fahy Committee and the Naval personnel collaboratively drafted and adopted a six-point plan for working on the problem of segregation in 1944:

1. Issue a policy statement on minorities.
2. Try to attract Blacks through publicity.
3. Encourage Black participation in the NROTC.
4. Permit transfers out of the Steward Branch.
5. Change Chief of Stewards to CPO (Chief Petty Officer, the title assigned others of comparable rank).

The Navy, we should note, was meanwhile the only branch of the military in which desegregation was an established, official policy. The Air Force was in the process of preparing such a policy; the Army was still strictly opposed to a non-segregation policy, using as its position, "the Army is not an instrument for social

In the late 1940's and early 1950's, the Navy accelerated efforts to improve its image by increasing its complement of Black officers and enlisted men. Teams of officers visited Black high schools and colleges in southern states. The results of this effort were minimal. A study by the Urban League (1968) indicated that presentations made to approximately 11,000 students resulted in 303 applicants, and only a small portion of these successfully completed the admission examination. The Navy was unable to overcome the deep-rooted suspicions generated by its early policies of racism. Lack of response and the expense involved forced suspension of these visits after the Korean War began in 1950.

The Korean War (1950-1953), marked a period of successes and failures in the story of military desegregation. Blacks were an essential part of the naval forces; Black forces were seen in ships of every class, engaged in ratings of every type, and continued to claim commendations and honors for heroism.

Housing

As late as 1952, minorities in the Navy have historically lived in segregated housing. Navy Under Secretary Francis P. Whitehair officially sanctioned the use of segregated facilities for civilian workers at Southern naval bases. Whitehair proposed that segregation was the custom, and in some cases the law, in Southern communities. It was Representative Adam Clayton Powell who voiced strong protest
to this act. He publicly issued a direct challenge to President Dwight D. Eisenhower to live up to his campaign promises on desegregation of armed forces. Eisenhower employed Secretary of the Navy Robert B. Anderson to solve the problem.

In 1962, President John F. Kennedy established a Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces. A year later the report of that committee led to the issuance of a Defense Directive which for the first time squarely enunciated a policy against off-base as well as on-base discriminatory treatment of servicemen. (Clifford, 1968).

The Defense Department stopped accepting rental listings from civilian landlords who refused to treat all men and women in uniform on an equal basis in 1963. In 1967, commanders were told to seek out landlords and to urge them to rent to all servicemen without regard to color, pointing out that if they refused, servicemen and women would not be authorized to deal with them at all. In 1967, only 30% of landlords nationwide were on the Department of Defense non-discriminatory housing list. (Clifford, 1968). By July, 1968, 84% of the nation's landlords had been added to the list, presumably the result of strict enforcement by the Department of Defense on housing for minorities.
Summary

Each minority group studied faced the contradiction of fighting for a country that embraced racial norms of which they were the victims. Generally, they have utilized the military as a vehicle for socio-economic mobility. Bowerman and Campbell (1965), found that the military offered a career for Black men which compared most favorably with available alternatives. The improved nature of their participation has, I suspect, been intended to demonstrate their manhood and general self-worth.

Between the Revolutionary War and the 1948 Desegregation Order, minority people played a significant role in the history of the United States Navy. Many were decorated for bravery with medals and awards, and today several vessels carry the name of minority heroes, which in the Navy culture is a great medium of recognition. The minority contribution has not gone unnoticed, at least within the military institution. It was my perception, in fact, in studying this history, that the Navy establishment found it easier to recognize minorities as heroes than to recognize them as worthwhile human beings in those earlier days, judging from the detailed accounts of their participation and bravery.

The involvement of minorities was generally centered around crisis and wars, so that milestones of their military history are recalled around the major wars in this country's history.

The Civil War period represents a time during which Blacks were exploited as Navy Men. Beyond the period of
their freedom and for the next seventy years, Blacks were used as reverse manpower to supplement inadequate numbers of Whites. They were channeled into the less desirable jobs and restricted from the type of visibility that may have served as avenues for attaining rank. Like other minority groups, Blacks were programmed to view participation in the military as a privilege. Less of the history of Filipinos, American Indians and Orientals was documented. These groups have all shared the socio-economic motivation for involvement in the military. For some it was even more basic; they often sought citizenship in a country with a promising future.

The turning point in discriminatory practices came in the 1940's in the form of congressional legislation and the establishment of short term programs by Congress, the Department of Defense and the Navy. Laws were aimed at desegregation in military policy which basically affected the professional elements of Navy life. The programmatic efforts were initially designed to increase the minority population, especially in terms of Blacks males. Subsequent programs focused on career advancement and social norms.

A decade of legislation resulted in a desegregated Navy, at least in principle. Social changes were difficult to legislate; therefore, for years to follow, the prevalence of institutional racism was quite evident in the Navy. Black men served 169 years before the first officer among them was commissioned. Blacks and Filipinos were generally seen in jobs such as stewards, cooks and deck hands until very recently. Even though laws prohibited segregation in the Naval
Academy, Blacks were in attendance there 67 years before the first successful Black graduate was seen. The area of promotion seemed to have been one of the more rigid barriers to break down. Between 1966 and 1972, the number of Black graduates from the Naval Academy increased from seven (7) to fifteen (15), and in 1968, Navy records showed only 300 Black officers in the total population. In 1973 minorities accounted for only 1.66% of officer's positions above Warrant Officer I, and 131,890 of the enlisted ranks. All of these statistics have been drawn from the Bureau of Naval Personnel official records.

It is important to note the parallel between rank and rate in the Navy structure. Rate assigns the vocational area of specific job title. In terms of professional growth, it has been equally significant for minorities to gain access to the more professional jobs (rates) such as engineering, aviation and medicine. Literally thousands of professionals in civilian life received their training in Navy schools.

In 1948, 95% of the Blacks in the Navy were stewards; 20 years later, 95% of Blacks were in ratings other than steward. In 1972, only half of the Filipino population served in the steward rate, whereas almost 100% of them served historically.

The author shares the view of those contemporary social scientists who view institutional behavior as critical to the understanding and elimination of racism. It is therefore important to point out that the minority experience in the Navy, in terms of their inclusion (and exclusion) into the hierarchy and reward system, was
even more important perhaps than the personal discomfiture.

In 1972, minorities could be found in practically all facets of Navy life, but in a rather limited way. Subsequent parts of this study will show that racism was still prevalent, though more subtle interpersonally, stronger institutionally, than in earlier years.

Most minorities who remained in the Navy for long periods of time were able to realize the economic security they sought, but experienced varying degrees of success in career goals and social acceptance. The Navy has been a difficult place for them to demonstrate courage and self-worth. The antagonistic life styles described here were certainly not limited to the Navy; this institution was simply a microcosm of the greater American society.

This overview has been presented to appraise the reader of the foundations upon which the current climate for equal opportunity was built. Those military personnel who are professional Navy men brought some rather oppressive experiences to the EEO program in 1974.
CHAPTER III

SOCIAL CONTEXT FACTORS

This chapter answers the question posed by Baldridge: "what are the social conditions which promote the formation of divergent values and interest groups?" The author selected the following as factors relevant to the social context of the United States Navy: Mission, Authority and Structure; Individualism and the Organization; Isolation; Personal Responsibility and Cohesion; The Profession of Arms; Prestige and Symbolism, The Workplace and Patterns of Change. These characteristics of military sociology define the nature of the milieu and subculture which influence all associations with the military. It is important that the civilian have at least superficial comprehension of the culture which frames the focus of this study; the social setting into which the concept of equal opportunity was interjected.

The introduction of equal opportunity programs occurred in an environment strongly influenced by the larger society, but with some very distinct differences. The differences encountered in the service environment are fostered by military tradition, maintained by organizational process and strengthened by those who seek, and are successful in, a military career. The forces at work within the military environment result from tradition, process and people involved and the dynamics created as these forces interact (Glover, 1974).
The Formal Bureaucratic System

The Bureau of Naval Personnel 1973 statistics show a Navy population of 548,879 people. This figure does not include the thousands of civilian employees who at least peripherally must be considered a part of the immediate environment as defined for this study.

The Navy has a rank, hierarchical structure with the central leadership and power based located in Washington, D. C., the nation's capital; reporting to the Department of Defense, the U. S. Congress, and of course to the President of the United States who is Commander in Chief of the Military.

All major policy, budgetary, and operational decisions are made in Washington, where divisions and departments are represented by a team of high-ranking officers.

Navy operations have a geographical differentiation: the Atlantic Fleet, the Pacific Fleet, and European Fleet which administers all shore and fleet commands with the United States as well as foreign territories. This division represents one element of the complexity of the organization (others include mere size and mission). The Atlantic command, operating out of the Eastern United States, and the Pacific, operating out of the West, are major subsystems and each has very distinct characteristics.

The author has had frequent discussions with Navy officers who experience these subsystems as two different organizations. The consequence is that operations, programs, and policies are interpreted and implemented differently. Over a period of time "the Navy" becomes
a rather naive phrase. A superficial way that this difference gets characterized is: the Pacific command tends to be formal, thorough and academic in its "modus operandi" while the Atlantic command is more expedient and efficient.

The foregoing represents the author's interpretation of discussion and behavioral description made with Navy members as well as her personal observations while working in the organization.

The United States Navy, established in 1798 and modeled after the British Navy, has historically maintained a primarily white male leadership. The Navy has been successful in its responsibility to defend this country. When one thinks of the relationship between the mission of the organization and the goals of the equal opportunity/race relations program, it is well to remember that, in essence, the Navy has filled its role for nearly 200 years in a racist environment. This reasoning could obviate the connection between racisms and command readiness, a premise upon which the program was built.

The values of the organization are couched in phrases such as "command readiness," "command efficiency," "discipline," "respect and obedience of authority," "internal order," "loyalty," "military appearance," and "Navy tradition." If the author was more familiar with the language of military purpose the above could be networked into a value statement which shows the interconnection of the foregoing phrases, each of which implies behavioral prescriptions. An example might be: "maintaining military rank distinction between officers and enlisted men is necessary for discipline; and discipline
is necessary or pertinent to command readiness."

For the purposes of this study, the author will treat the Navy as a bureaucracy; that is presumably not subject to extensive argument, however, a description and definition of bureaucracy is included to support this contention. Etzioni (1964), quoted a statement by Max Weber which clearly depicts the tensions experienced between the Equal Opportunity Program staff and the organization especially during the formative stages:

The high rationality of the bureaucratic structure is fragile; it needs to be constantly protected against external pressures to safeguard the autonomy required if it is to be kept closely geared to its goals, not others.

There was the constant threat of conflict of interest between the goals and values of the organization, and the pressures of the larger society mirrored by minority members of the organization; consequently the organization was constantly protecting itself.

The description by Weber of the features of a bureaucratic structure as presented by Etzioni provides a framework for discussion of organizational behavior in the Navy and helps to build the context for this study:

Weber spelled out in considerable detail the features of the bureaucratic structure. They all specify what makes a highly rational structure.

1. "A continuous organization of official functions bound by rules." Rational organization is the antithesis of ad hoc, temporary, unstable relations; hence the stress on continuity. Rules save effort by obviating the need for deriving a new solution for every problem and case; they
facilitate standardization and equality in the treatment of many cases. These advantages are impossible if each client is treated as a unique case, as an individual.

2. "A specific sphere of competence. This involves (a) a sphere of obligations to perform functions which have been marked off as a part of a systematic division of labor; (b) the provision of the incumbent with the necessary authority to carry out these functions; and (c) that the necessary means of compulsion are clearly defined and their use is subject to definite conditions." Thus a systematic division of labor, rights, and power is essential for rational organization. Not only must each participant know his job and have the means to carry it out, which includes first of all the ability to command others, but he also must know the limits of his job, rights, and power so as not to overstep the boundaries between his role and those of others and thus undermine the whole structure.

3. "The organization of officers follows the principle of hierarchy; that is, each lower office is under the control and supervision of a higher one." In this way no office is left uncontrolled. Compliance cannot be left to chance; it has to be systematically checked and reinforced.

4. "The rules which regulate the conduct of an office may be technical rules or norms. In both cases, if their application is to be fully rational, specialized training is necessary. It is thus normally true that only a person who had demonstrated an adequate technical training is qualified to be a member of the administrative staff . . ." We examine below the full import of this statement by Weber. It suffices to say here that he thought that the root of the authority of the bureaucrat is his knowledge and his training. Not that these replace legitimation, but his command of technical skill and knowledge is the basis on which legitimation is granted to him.
5. "It is a matter of principle that the members of the administrative staff should be completely separated from ownership of the means of production or administration... There exists, furthermore, in principle, complete separation of the property belonging to the organization, which is controlled within the spheres of the office, and the personal property of the official..." This segregation, which Weber applied to other elements of the status, such as the segregation of the bureaucrat's personal residence from the organization, keeps the official's bureaucratic status from being infringed by the demands of his non-organizational statuses.

6. In order to enhance this organizational freedom, the resources of the organization have to be free of any outside control and the positions cannot be monopolized by any incumbent. They have to be allocated and reallocated according to the needs of the organization. "A complete absence of appropriation of his official positions by the incumbent" is required.

7. "Administrative acts, decisions, and rules are formulated and recorded in writing..." Most observers might view this requirement as less essential or basic to rational organization than the preceding ones, and many will point to the irrationality of keeping excessive records, files, and the like, often referred to as "red tape." Weber, however, stressed the need to maintain a systematic interpretation of norms and enforcement of rules, which cannot be maintained through oral communication.

Mission

The mission statement of the Navy is quoted from Z-Gram #104 issued by Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, January, 1972:

To maintain the sea-going capability for strategic deterrence; to maintain control
of the seas in order to keep vital life
tines open and, if necessary, for ose-seas
projection of our armed forces; and to
maintain our naval presence wherever it is
required overseas.

Military theorists and sociologists give the military three
broad roles: an instrument of foreign policy; a constabulary force;
or, it may perform general administrative functions not necessarily of
a combat nature (Glover, 1974).

To the civilian, the layperson, the United States Navy represents
a career choice and military protection both in times of war and in
times of peace.

Authority and Structure

At the very heart of military existence is structure, rigid
organizational process and authoritarianism. In his summary of the
military ethic, Huntington (1957) included, "it stresses the supremacy
of society over the individual and the importance of order, hierarchy,
and division of function. The importance of centralized authority and
structure has been a natural growth within the military as in most
large organizations, although the form is particularly severe within
the military." This importance has been brought on primarily by
rotation and turnover. In an organization which experiences frequent
rotation of its personnel and attrition of its forces by demands of
war and society, structure and order become important pillars. And
this type of organization in turn is maintained not by individuals or interpersonal relations but by an emphasis on rank. The individual is not important; rank and position are elevated for purposes of maintaining the hierarchy intact.

This emphasis on authority has its impact on interpersonal communications. Abrahamson (1972) stated that "stress on authority as in interpersonal relations as well as political conservatism and emphasis on religious values are the three primary elitist perspectives of the military. And like the elitist qualities of the military ethic the stress on authority is reinforced by recruitment and selection. Those already favoring a military environment are those likely to be recruited and selected. Therefore the 'military mind' is reinforced by those who are attracted because they already generally favor the military ethic."

As in many institutions the ethic suffers because through the organization process, it has been carried to an extreme. It is not the necessary order, structure and authority which speaks poorly of the military but the extreme of these qualities. Ackley (1972) describes the extreme rather clearly when he explains the "crushing weight of technology" and the "fascination for the concrete." Order, structure and authority reach their lowest point when they result in "endless paper forms which seem in league to swamp the time and the very inclination to think." The habitual process of the institution too often reduces order and structure to unnecessary discipline, rules and routines, issued not for any necessity but to
fill the void created by previous rules and routines.

Janowitz however offered some hope. In his 1960 writings he created the military with a "shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion and group consensus." Twelve years later Abrahamson supported this finding and emphasized the increasing trend toward manipulative command. He credits this trend to the emerging military emphasis on managerial skills.

**Individualism and the Organization**

One of the strong factors of the military environment is its tendency to elevate the organization at the expense of individualism. A strong emphasis in military training is placed on group success. The Naval officer is under significant influence from this training to subordinate individualism. Kurt Lang (1972) points to "limits in the ability of officers and noncommissioned officers to look after the welfare of their men." He sees the military supervisor caught in the middle between consideration for their subordinates and the demands on them to produce results in a military environment. Another difficult hurdle is that of displaying or utilizing unique styles of leadership and recognition of the individual.

Another factor of significance is the military drive to seek internal order by elevating the organization at the expense of its people. When society is torn by military crisis the military reaction in many cases has been to ignore that crisis and concentrate on
immediate military goals not liking to the objects of civilian unrest. This is not happening in the Navy in the 1970's, a fact which for many is hard to accept; and which makes the EO/RR Program somewhat more acceptable and palatable than it would have been some years ago.

William Simons (1965) deals with two additional facets of military life which tend to play down individualism and elevate the organization. Simons recognizes a liberal trend in military officers and their education, but indicates that this trend is overcome by the nature of military training and the highly visible value of individual loyalty to the group. The constant training by group tends to elevate the group above concern for the individual. Simons also cites organization loyalty as perhaps the highest military virtue.

Military theorists have identified a generally pessimistic view of man held by military organizations. Huntington (1957) says:

The existence of the military profession presupposes conflicting human interests, and the use of violence to further those interests. Consequently the military ethic views conflict as a universal pattern throughout nature and sees violence rooted in the permanent biological and psychological nature of men. As between the good and the evil in man, the military ethic emphasizes the evil.
Abrahamson (1972) supported Huntington in his evaluation of the military images of human nature. Abrahamson says that the military officer generally thinks that man cannot learn to avoid war and that the proportion of people holding this pessimistic view increases as we move from samples of civilians to reserve officers. Ackley (1972) treats the military image of human nature with even less optimism than either Huntington or Abrahamson. Ackley sees this Hobbesian view on the part of the armed forces as having deleterious effects on man's future efforts to improve himself.

**Isolation**

Another relative characteristic of the military as an institution is its tendency to recruit from its own social classes and thus strengthen its social base. This form of social inbreeding has a tendency to reinforce the organization at the expense of the individual. Janowitz (1959, 1960) treats this repeatedly in his work in the late fifties and early sixties, as one of his central themes. He also indicated at that time a decline in this tendency which he associated with increased social mobility.

Of all the factors involved in this acceleration of social change probably that most affecting the military is isolation. (Glover, 1974). It is simply no longer possible to isolate any military unit for extended periods of time. Even the longest Navy deployments now include the artifacts of the parent society at least on a part-time basis. Military demands are still made of our sailors,
but the chances are slim of any but the raw recruits spending their off-duty hours at military pursuits.

To say that isolation has been drastically reduced is not to say that the military is free from isolation. This periodic isolation is a phenomenon which enables the military to remain trained to develop the cult which can ask great sacrifices and even attempt to incorporate social reforms as a part of its own ethic. In looking at increased social awareness in the military we should also be aware of the isolation involved in the all volunteer concept. Some critics of this concept fear a gradual return to the separation of the military and society. Ackley (1972) credits the military leadership when he says "the military faces renewed isolation, but under the deliberately appealing guise of greater professionalism and higher pay, i.e., the volunteer concept. It seems significant also that the military leaders and thinkers, in Ackley's view, are not nearly so enamored of this prospect as are their civilian leaders.

**Education and Leadership**

In the pursuit of a climate of equal opportunity the Navy turned instinctively to education, even though the organization embodies many forces which are inherently contrary to education when the objective is social (Lang, 1972). The environment of the parent society demands the attempt of education toward equality, yet the military environment imposes organizational restrictions and mores which argue not only against the success of social education but even
the attempt itself.

In Phase I of the program especially, naval officers faced the experience of race relations education with the contradictory stamp of the profession.

The navy's reliance on education, predominant in the attempt to solve its problems of inequality is fully supported by tradition. Education is stressed by the military and is a matter of professional pride as well as leadership in the society. (Glick, 1971). To educate the Navy's leaders to foresee and solve their own problems and to lead society by the pen as well as by the sword is a long standing and strengthening position with the military. (Masland, 1957). With the original emphasis on technical education and the increasing attention given to organization and management sciences it has been accepted that these areas are not only of interest to the military but in fact are educationally pursued by military men.

The social sciences are, on the other hand, just gaining acceptance. David Rapoport observed that the most important function of the military occurs when it serves as a school where the citizens can learn appropriate social and civic virtues. Huntington (1962 stated: "In the early 70's we saw the Navy placing great emphasis on this role. This internal emphasis is supplemented by the Department of Defense support of social research." Glick (1971) points out that, of the approximately $1,679 million total federal funds for psychological and social science research during the period 1961-1968, approximately $215 million went to the Department of Defense.
While the military hierarchy recognizes and supports a social role, middle and lower level managers of the Navy prefer to support social research while not actually becoming involved. (Glover, 1974). To educate and train former civilians to acceptable service standards in military skills has long been a necessity but managers balk when placed in a position as a "healer of society's ills." The lesser task of curing society's ills is left to civilians. Janowitz (1960) attributes to the Navy "the highest concentration of officers who believed that the military were superior to civilians." Reflective of this attitude of superiority is preference of the naval officer to engage in technical education, an area in which the military is recognized as a leading institution.

One resistance, then, to social awareness may be that of the military subconsciously trying to hang on to a military tradition and not bend to social pressures to become what it regards as a "social healer." But the reality is that while the Navy need be neither a constabulary force nor a social healer, it must inevitably accept a role in the social movement of a society that is at least theoretically moving toward more homogeneity. The military is as much as any other institution a mirror of the social structure in this country. (Janowitz, 1960).
Personal Responsibility and Cohesion

Professional and organizational solidarity has been a continued theme of Janowitz's view of military sociology. In his 1964 writings he assesses the capacity of the military to adopt or resist change as largely due to group solidarity. This solidarity occurs because of professional and personal identity with organizational goals and actions and is subsequently reinforced by peer pressure. And, as explained in previous sections of this chapter, many of the organizational dynamics support this solidarity and resistance to change.

The naval officer feels personally responsible for goals and actions in an organization which has continually reminded him of his position as a commander and a manager. His professional anxiety is aroused by his feelings of closeness with the fellow members of his unit or organization. One form of this professional anxiety is peer pressure levied across unit boundaries to ignore or disclaim any challenges to organization goals and actions. Another form is the tendency by members of a particular unit to disclaim these injustices because they fear the loss of the hard won solidarity and cohesion.

The Profession of Arms

This section has dealt with the characteristics of the military environment (or institution) and their impact on the naval officer (target population of the EO/RR Program). Those characteristics form the outline of the organization, but what of the subculture that
is developed by the interaction of men with the institution? What characterizes the milieu in which officers perform their duties? Many of the characteristics described so far are found in all large organizations. This section will discuss those characteristics particularly formed within the profession of arms, a profession whose reason for existence is the management of the potential for violence.

Popularism has been a strong force in military tradition. The relationship of the solider and his training to his civilian counterpart has long been an issue. The attitude of acceptance of civilians toward the military in the 1950's and early sixties was slowed and soured by the Viet Nam War. The targets of criticism were not only the military but those civilian leaders who were closely related with military policy and even the execution of military operations. Since My Lai, the violent reactions have subsided but some authors say an even more dangerous separation of the society and its military has occurred. These people view the all volunteer concept during this period of a powerful military with great alarm. It may not deserve this emphasis but Ackley says, "At the very least such a radical change could have the effect of making permanent the chasm once again opening between the military and its parent society."

At the heart of professionalism, the third strand of tradition, stands four tenets which constitute the military ethic. (Lang, 1972). This ethic is reflected in the professional view of war, man, politics and power. The naval officer is infused with these views as his career progresses. His reactions to all situations reflect
these professional ethics:

War is a science and the exclusive province of the military. Civilians are left the less heroic tasks of administration.

Man is smaller and less worthy than the societies and causes he serves. Individualism is scorned.

Politics are renounced. It is not the place of the military to involve itself in politics. Once national policy is made the military will ensure its execution.

Power is superior to commercialism. The virtue of the military is the guiding light for a society which has lost its way among the myriad causes.

These are the extreme or "pure" military views but they make their point. An institution whose tradition is based on these values and whose tradition is strong is not immediately transformed into a role of social responsiveness and involvement.

Of course, all officers do not assimilate military ethics to the same degree. Assimilation depends on background and training, particularly the latter. Officer candidates undergoing more lengthy and intense training prior to commission demonstrate a higher degree of Navy culture assimilation than do those whose route to commission is of shorter duration or less intense. There is also strong correlation between this assimilation and opportunities for long and successful careers. For all but the most senior ranks this correlation holds. The very senior officers of the services tend to be less authoritarian and dogmatic in their outlooks and to have greater
perspective and a reputation for innovation. (Lang, 1972).

The military profession directed by politicians, led by innovators and heroes and managed by those infused with tradition and the military ethic, tends toward a distinct managerial style. Janowitz (1960) saw a marked change in military managers. He described the change as moving from "traditionalism" to "initiative and continuous innovation." Kurt Lang further modified and refined Janowitz's description of the military mind as one committed to "trend-thinking" and "a tendency for innovation to occur at the margins." These characteristics give the military its strength -- and many of its weaknesses. The effort of equal opportunity/race relations education was undertaken in a time when these forces were not only strong but were under close scrutiny by the parent society.

Prestige and Symbolism

Prestige and status symbolism is overtly utilized in the military to differentiate rank and authority reinforcing the value placed on the latter. The consequence is an internal class system which gets expressed in designation of uniforms, housing, educational opportunities, entertainment facilities, career, mess facilities, as well as ritualist ceremony (salute, standing, etc).

This section has been included to highlight the impact of these traditions on the military environment.

A critical operational unit in the Navy is a command, which may be a ship and its crew or it may be a stationary support operation
such as a hospital and staff, school, engineering unit or construction unit. The command is an interdependent subsystem which is heavily influenced by the larger system, but maintains its distinct norms, mission and standards of operation.

The author has selected to describe the social structure aboard a Navy ship as an illustration of symbolism as a climate factor.

In addition to the obvious differences between ranks in pay and uniforms, status is most often expressed in three areas: the amount and east of obtainable liberty time; the elaborateness of sleeping accommodations and the elaborateness of eating accommodations. (Downs, 1972).

Without detailing the gradations between ranks, the situation is best illustrated by comparing the facilities of the captain and an apprentice seaman. The cabin near the bridge. A special detail of mess attendants and cooks prepare and serve his meals and bring his snacks on the bridge if he requests them. He eats alone at a time when he decides, although he may, by tradition, invite a junior officer to dine with him. In port the captain can leave the ship at will and remain ashore until the vessel sails.

The apprentice seaman lives in a bunkroom. He must maintain his own possessions in a small locker. His food is provided at regular meal times during which he must stand in line, be served on a tray, eat at large tables and wash his own mess gear. His snacks are limited to night rations issued to night watches by the galley, candy
and other snacks may be purchased after a long stand in line. His liberty is rigidly controlled by a rotation system and except in emergency he has little chance of getting more free time. Between these extremes are a number of gradations in cabin size, number of cabin mates, type of bunk and locker, and messing facilities.

A communication system of old-fashioned voice tubes and pneumatic tubes is designed to carry orders from senior to junior officers and reports from junior to senior. There is, however, no real provision for senior officers to discover actual conditions on lower levels except through the reports of juniors. These reports become formalized and are of very little value in determining actual reactions and attitudes. Juniors, furthermore, are extremely reluctant to bring problems to a senior because it reflects on their ability to handle the situation. There is little direct contact between officers and enlisted men in working or informal situations. Officers seldom enter enlisted men's quarters except during inspection, and enlisted men are permitted in officers country only on duty. In addition, senior officers are isolated from juniors by the fact that they live separately and by the formality of wardroom dining. The captain of course does not dine in the wardroom and is even more isolated from upward communications.

In problem situations the junior officer who receives a complaint from his men is often reluctant to bring the problem to the department head. The department head is reluctant to bother the executive officer. Only when a problem becomes major does it receive
serious attention on levels of higher ship-wide authority.

This problem of adequate feedback is endemic in naval service and a great deal of enlisted lore is concerned with attempts on the part of the captain to find out what's going on. Official channels seem to block upward communication of the attitudes and reactions of enlisted men from reaching officers on the highest levels.

Aboard the U.S.S. Constellation --
A Feel for the Workplace

The information in this section has drawn from formal studies of the military organization related to; values, philosophy, structure and people; their characteristics, orientation and training. The later section on symbolism gives some feel, though narrowly, for the workplace.

The most unique or unfamiliar military work setting from a civilian perspective is probably aboard a Navy vessel, or on site at a military base, especially in a foreign country or combat area.

Most of the investigator's experiences with the Navy occurred in Washington, D. C., in the stereotypical civil service grey/green buildings in the District or in rather comfortable office buildings in Arlington, Virginia; and sometimes at military bases (Florida, Maryland, Tennessee and California). This provided some perspective, though limited, on the living and working environment. Consulting visitations in the equal opportunity program were generally extended periods of three weeks to three months. Frequently, the consultant
lived in base facilities among military activities. One military
co-worker, in view of my work on this study, felt that it was important
to round out this experience with a visit aboard a ship. Such a visit
was arranged aboard the U.S.S. CONSTELLATION, which was docked at
Coronado Island outside of San Diego, California, on January 25, 1975.
The CONSTELLATION, an aircraft carrier, was the site of a major racial
incident in October, 1972, a description of which appears in the
section on Interst Articulation. The details of that visit are best
shared exactly as they were journalized immediately following the
Sunday morning experience. The following is from that journal:

The U.S.S. KITTY HAWK and the U.S.S.
CONSTELLATION stand side by side at the
docks at Coronado like two grey metal
expansive hotels. When you board of course
it is more like entering a military city with
all experiences (eating, sleeping, working)
connected by narrow circular steep stairways.
"Aboard ship" seems like a world of its own.

The CONSTELLATION is a carrier, transport-
ing airplanes, vessels and weapons. So I'm
surrounded by hangors, airstrips, and I see
firing equipment perched on the decks. My
escorts are a young seaman attached to the
CONSTELLATION and Lieutenant Bobby Randall
who was assigned to the CONNIE two years, but
completed his assignment at the onset of the race riots. He was the minority affairs officer on the CONSTELLATION at that time.

The green metal monster softens when you visit the gallies with colorful round tables and the wardrooms with dark panelling, table cloths, individual table settings. One wall of the wardroom (officers' eating quarters) is donned with an expensive silver serving outfit donated by the State of Washington. This, I am told, is used on special occasions. When these heavy pieces are removed from the ship they are moved only by a specially assigned Marine group. The rationale was not given, I called it ritual/tradition. A gigantic punchbowl which forms a large boat represents the elegance of the multi-piece collection.

The purpose of my visit is to enter the real world of the fleet where the Phase II Equal Opportunity Race Relations Program will be delivered, and to acquire some appreciation of that atmosphere. So we do not discuss the incidents of the early 70's, instead
Lieutenant Randall explains functions and climate. For instance, the two upper levels are narrowed and enclosed with tinted green glass windows. He describes what it is like to be called from a lower deck by the commanding officer. You rush up flights of narrow grey steps which are located in different places on each level. You stand by the side of the CO and discuss the racial climate as planes can be viewed through the tinted glass.

Getting caught up in an intriguing atmosphere of courtesies, discipline and just the metal mass itself, left me in awe. As we left the ship, Lt. Randall pointed out plaques paying tribute to approximately 30 men who burned to death in a fire off the docks of Manhattan during construction of the CONSTELLATION. I think, "bugles, pomp, and circumstance."

It was Sunday and the men wore civilian clothing. There were young Blacks dressed in stylish clothing, wearing large afro hair styles. Some of the men wore uniforms, but they were all obviously off duty. The wardrooms were the most
heavily populated areas which I visited (some areas were off-limits) officers sat around in uniforms watching television sets encased in the dark panelled walls (neatly). Uniformed men manned the entrance and were extremely courteous to us as we left; to Lieutenant Randall as an officer, to me as a "lady." As I left the ship I looked back at the CONSTELLATION and the KITTY HAWK and thought, "So this is where it all happened, this is the world of Navy men in action. Very impressive."
The ships looked noble, strong, massive.

Patterns of Change

In a study of innovation in the Navy, Davis (1967) identified three critical time periods in the change patterns of that organization: (1) that period which begins when for the first time within the organization, some individual proposes that the Navy attempt to develop a new technology; (2) the appropriate decision makers decide to go ahead and commit the Navy to the research and development stage; and (3) conceptualization or invention of the proposed innovation.

Davis notes that stages one and two take place primarily within the organization; stage three takes place between the Navy and some external group or organization.
Randall (1975) cited five steps in the change process when the change is sociological: exploration of the issue; educational or training phase; program development which includes pilot testing a model; operationalizing and finetuning to Navy specificity; and finally, institutionalization. These sociological stages, from the investigator's observations, were experienced and easily detectable in the Equal Opportunity Program.

Davis concluded that technological innovations are generally spearheaded by some one person who is strongly committed to the idea; he characterized this person as the "innovation advocate."

The innovation advocate in the Navy is usually a man in the broad middle ranks (lieutenant, commander or captain); age 30-40. He identifies strongly with the nation's interest. He is in full vigor of his professional years; energetic; hard-driving and confident of success.

The advocate is seldom the inventor of the innovation that he is promoting but he usually possesses a uniquely advanced technological knowledge pertinent to the innovation that is not generally shared within the Navy. The innovation advocate is a zealot.

He seldom pays any attention whatsoever to the way in which his crusading efforts may
influence his personal career in the Navy or elsewhere. He has already enjoyed a prominent career; is accustomed to winning (some have suffered).

The advocate's first step is usually to try to enlist supporters from among friends and colleagues at his own rank level (horizontal political alliance).

The second step whether or not he achieves success in step one, is to recruit supporters in key positions of authority and power at higher levels (vertical political alliance). Davis notes that a strong vertical element appears to be absolutely essential. In an organization such as the Navy with a strong, tight, hierarchical structure and authoritarian patterns, things simply are not achieved by means of grass-roots movements alone, no matter how strong.

The innovation alliance seldom seeks or even admits extra-organization supporters or allies unless this appears necessary as a last resort. Davis' research reveals patterns against involvement of outsiders. Extra organizational allies can be counter-productive.
Advocates have suffered later in their careers for "premature" involvement or tolerance of unsolicited extra organizational allies.

The advocate usually sells his idea as a better way to perform some well established Navy task or mission. Davis notes that innovation usually means change -- it is easier to sell the idea if the scope and magnitude of changes are minimized during the selling period.

Counter alliance emerges within senior rank level and builds strength by acquiring members at gradually lower rank levels.

Counter alliances usually argue that it will cost too much (not to appear to be against progress).

Counter alliances argue (like the innovator) in terms of established task and mission - not in terms of new conceptions of international policies, grand military strategy, tactics, etc.
Davis concludes that the internal setting which provides stimuli for innovation and shape the innovation process within the Navy is built on: "naval officers subculture; traditional patterns of doing things supported by a traditional set of values and beliefs which are in part derived from broader American patterns of action and values; but in part distinctive to the Navy."

Summary

Social Context Factors described the military culture creating the setting for the non-military reader. This section ties together those distinct characteristics of the United States Navy which form the backdrop for racism and for the efforts in equal opportunity to eliminate racism. The Navy is described as a rather rigid bureaucracy dedicated to tradition and comprised of a set of structures, philosophies and values which have over a period of time proven effective in the accomplishment of its mission. The mission is put forth as the criteria for all decisions; organizational demands receive priority over individual needs and a hierarchical authority structure is strongly maintained. Change in the Navy is basically an educational process.
CHAPTER IV

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY CLIMATE FACTORS

This section is an overview of the racial climate in the Navy in the early 70's. Four sets of data have been included to delineate the scope and nature of the problem.

1. A review of a study of institutional racism in the Navy which reports the perceptions of a sample population on organizational practices and available opportunities.

2. A report from the Black Retention Study Group convened by the CNO October 1972 which lays out comprehensively the nature and extent of racial problems.

3. A summary of interviews and observations developed by the investigator.

4. A review of Navy statistics which compares population to promotion and discharge patterns by race, and the percentages of minorities in different occupations.

Predictors of Race Discrimination in the Navy (Pecorella, 1975)

The details of the Pecorella study are reviewed here, including rationale, for the design, methodology and findings; all of which illustrate some dimensions of the concept of institutional racism as it was manifest in the U. S. Navy in the 1970's.

The two major factors examined in the Percorella study were: (1) organizational practices and (2) available opportunities. The rationale:
The operating policies and practices of an organization determine to some extent the economic, psychological, and social opportunities available to its members. It is the members' perceptions of organizational practices, and their perceptions of the opportunities these practices do or do not make available to them which most directly affect their choices as to how to behave in the organization.

Organizational practices and available opportunities can be combined to provide an indicator of institutional racism by examining the relationship between the two factors for various racial groups. More specifically, if for whites present organizational practices make available many, and deny few, opportunities while the opposite is the case for Blacks, such practices are discriminating against Blacks.

The total size of the study was 2,552 officers and enlisted Navy personnel from 38 different Navy sites, ships and shore stations, from both coasts, including southern and northern locations.

An exclusive population of all volunteer Navy (AVN) enlisted men was used in the report because the racial composition of this group has been found to be strikingly similar to the racial composition of the total U. S. Navy. To compile a representative sample Pecorella excluded females and warrant officers because they were such a small
percentage of the total sample. Regular officers were excluded because 14.2% of the whites were officers while 1.4% of the Blacks and 1.8% of the other minority races were officers. The final sample included 2,039 enlisted personnel, of which 84.3% were white, 6.9% were Black and 7.9% were of other races.

The racial groups were substantially different in several respects:

**Age:**
Blacks tended to be younger than whites and "Others." Secondly, more personnel in the other category were over the age of 37 than were Blacks and whites.

**Education:**
Blacks tended to be less educated than whites and others.

**Community:**
Fewer blacks than whites and others came from rural areas and suburbs, while more Blacks than whites and others came from large cities.

**Region:**
A much larger proportion of others than whites and Blacks came from regions outside the U. S. mainland. In addition, over half of the Blacks came from the south, while most whites came, in about equal numbers, from the east, south, midwest, and west of the U. S.
Present Rank Rate: More whites tended to have intermediate rank ratings while more Blacks than whites and others have the lowest rank ratings.

Four major sets of variables were subjected to study: organizational climate, available opportunities, demographic characteristics, and behavior intentions relevant to organizational outcomes.

Three issues pertaining to institutional racism in the Navy were covered: (1) relationship between organizational practices and available opportunities, (2) relationships between available opportunities and intention to remain in the Navy, and (3) moderating effects of demographic characteristics on these relationships.

The following findings were reported:

1. Blacks and others experienced on-the-job discrimination that whites did not.

2. All three racial groups indicated that Blacks as a collective experienced discrimination in the Navy.

3. Minority groups received fewer status rewards and advancement opportunities than whites as evidenced by objective data. These 1972 statistics were cited:

14.2% of whites were officers
1.4% of Blacks
1.8% of others
26.9% of whites had E-1 to E-3 ratings
47.5% of Blacks
38.3% of others

36% of whites advanced slowly through rate/rank system
59% of Blacks
64% of others

34% of whites initially acquired skills training
13% of Blacks
11% of others
Race appeared to be a significant factor in the allocation of organizational reward to the disadvantage of minority groups, according to the findings of this study. Two levels of discrimination were reported:

1. Personal discrimination -- experienced in one's work setting.
2. Collective discrimination -- experienced and perceived by minorities as a whole in the larger system.

Advancement opportunities and job challenge were best predictors of discrimination and opportunities for whites; social relations, advancement opportunities and job challenge were predictors for Blacks; and comfort and advancement for others. The study also reported some significance between personal discrimination and intention to re-enlist in the Navy (for Blacks and whites more than for others). Relationship between opportunities provided and re-enlistment intentions were higher for whites.

Report of the CNO Retention Study Group

When queried on climate factors, interviewees and co-workers almost invariably referenced the report of the 1972 Black Retention Study Group. It was their feeling that this report embraced the most thorough and comprehensive elements of the minority experience for that time period and probably represented years of sentiments unexpressed. A synopsis of this report, written by Terry Johnson (1972), as it appeared in the Cruiser-Destroyerman, a Navy publication, is being appended.
The group's major conclusion was that the Navy was failing to take responsibility or accept ownership of minority affairs and race relations problems; that responsibility for these problems were being delegated to minority affairs officers and other representatives.

Findings and recommendations were grouped under four themes:

1. Failure of the Navy to accept problem ownership.
2. Incompatibility of being a minority and Navy too.
3. Non-representation of all minorities.
4. Classification/placement of all minorities.

Manifestations of Institutional Racism in the Navy which impacted the Climate in the 1970's.

This is a summary of some observations which expand upon the information provided in this section. Basically minorities experienced racism in the following ways.

- the continuous awareness that historically they were not privileged to participate freely in the major rewards provided by the organization especially in the areas of: training, promotions and choice of occupations.

- the continuous contradiction of Navy policies and practices as they were reported to be and the personal and collective experiences of its minority members.

- the degradation of personal instances of racism encountered in the day to day experiences of minorities in sometimes subtle and sometimes overt manner, but almost invariably in a manner for which the chain command offered little rectification.
Elements of the climate which proved problematic for minorities with whom the investigator interacted were:

Minorities have not historically had equal access to the major rewards provided by the organization, especially in the areas of promotions, training and occupation choices.

To request the day to day privileges, a sailor must submit a "chit." The chit is a standard form that calls for certain information about the applicant and the situation i.e., the problem should be described comprehensively, and concisely. The Navy values crisp, concise delivery, probably because of the mass of paper work that gets generated with the population size and the bureaucratic procedures. If the sailor does not form to these guidelines, the chit may be denied. In numerous discussions regarding this procedure, which gets to be a central means of communicating one's wishes, naval personnel have described to the investigator instances in which cits were destroyed repeatedly because of unsatisfactory grammar, incompletions, lack of clarity and sometimes interpersonal conflicts between an officer and enlisted person. First of all the process is basically pedagogical and thereby generates and perpetuates the dynamics usually engandered in this type subordinating relationships.

Because of the strength and reinforcement of the chain of command it became imperative to know how to use the system and sometimes how to evade it. Very often minorities did not have that know-how. There were obviously much such procedures which theoretically provided the mechanism for the successful management of oneself within
the organization. These practices only became bias in the way they were implemented, bias was in the human factor.

Another system which was reportedly exploited was psychiatric diagnosis and care. Outspoken, assertive persons were channeled into psychiatric programs and often discharged for medical reasons. Aggression was treated as an illness in minorities and generally not tolerated in the military.

The weaknesses of the testing system are discussed elsewhere. In addition to the lack of content validity to the testing purposes the investigator spoke with minorities who were tested under less than favorable conditions, i.e., following strenuous activities, at an unannounced (or not previously announced) time which would have allowed the testee to be refreshed and rested; in an uncomfortable environment; and sometimes the importance and use of test results were played down or completely misrepresented.

It seemed as if this oppressive behavior was sustained for many years, first of all because the general military milieu was not affected; and, there were very few minorities in positions of power to counter this type of informal system manipulation.

Chief Willie Coleman (1975), identified the following sociological examples of discrimination:

1. Service clubs were staffed primarily by whites and the level of service was often poor and offensive.

2. Housing was being assigned on discriminatory basis along racial lines.
3. The commissary was hiring the wives of whites only (a few Filipinos were to be found in the storage room jobs).

4. Navy exchanges (stores) did not store literature, foods and beauty aids for non-whites.

5. Base-employed barbers did not know how to cut Black hair.

Admiral Zumwalt responded to the question regarding climate factors in this way:

A combination of things happened:

bringing in minority personnel at the bottom of the pyramid both officers and enlisted and having them look up and get a perception of institutional racism -- almost total majority personnel at the top (and that was racist), created tensions. When there were only a few (3-5) Blacks on a destroyer they tended to disregard the slights and prejudices, when there were 30 to 35 they began talking about conditions and we began feeling the vibrations. And although the Skipper (commanding officer) had the tools to deal with it, on some ships, particularly the bigger ones, they didn't. There was significant performance on the part of some leaders in dealing with it and there were significant failures on the part of others.
The Non-Assimilated Black Sailor of the 1970's

Not all Navy personnel assimilated military ethics to the same degree, according to Lang (1972). He associates assimilation with background and training, especially the latter. Officer candidates undergoing more lengthy and intense training prior to commission demonstrate a higher degree of Navy culture assimilation than do those whose route to commission is a shorter duration or less intense. Lang also found strong correlation between this assimilation and opportunities for long and successful careers. In the late 60's and early 70's there was an increasing number of young Black sailors who demonstrated early in their careers a low degree of Navy culture assimilation, very unlike their predecessors.

Petty Officer Monday (1975), related his description of a young Black entering the Navy in the early 70's as "coming from an economically deprived area of the nation's cities; a much more aware individual. Those entering in the early 70's had been born in the 50's, a time period when as a society we faced great racial turmoil, and these young men grew up with racial consciousness, unlike their predecessors in the Navy."

A major source of the "non-assimilated young Black sailor" was Project 100,000, a recruitment program introduced during the McNamara administration (late 60's) designed to increase the number of minorities, especially Blacks in the Navy (Monday, 1975). Prior to the project, the organization acknowledged the fact that its recruitment process screened Blacks into menial jobs; did not attract
high calibre officer candidates and was therefore maintaining a low minority population with very few officers emerging. In an effort to promote Project 100,000, the test score requirement for entry and placement was adjusted and an intensified recruitment advertising program in minority-intensive institutions, media, and communities was launched.

In their survey of Navy personnel the Vroom Study Group (1972), quoted a frequent criticism of the effort by minorities: "The Navy's recruiting advertising appears to promise more than the Navy delivers ... an enlisted man was promised X and he got Z. Not only did he get Z but both Z and X were oversold." The resulting feelings of anger, resentment, hostility, appressiveness and hopelessness were intensified in a situation where these young men had made a long-term commitment.

In their study of attitudes aboard Navy ships, Brunis, James and Jones (1975), sampled 39,139 enlisted men from 20 ships. The average Black sampled (among other demographic features) was more likely to have come from an urban background (city over 250,000) and was less likely to have received advanced training.

Monday, Lang, Brunis, James, Jones referred to the presence of a critical and perhaps fairly new population coming into the Navy in a compressed time period who did not fit the model asserted by Janowitz, Glover and others; and who in fact would probably not appear in officers training in his career.
The Vietnam War

The racial climate was intensified by the fact of the War. The toughest period of the entire decade of the Vietnam crises for sailors coincided with the greatest expressions of discontent. (Zumwalt, 1975). Massive overdeployments after the invasion across the DMA March 30, 1972; the largest number of ships ever deployed in the entire war, and from the smallest base of ships since the Navy had been so badly cut back; men overworked; ships undermanned and undermaintained; almost no domestic support for the war effort.

The impact of high commitment and over extension was confirmed by Officer Monday(1975), Lieutenant Randall (1975), and others who described the frustration of overlapping tours, tired and distressed men and a hostile home country. This situation created more than the usual tensions of confinement aboard a ship for long periods of time.

Navy Statistics - Population, Discharge, Occupations

A factor which strongly influenced the equal opportunity climate, and which was repeatedly voiced by minority personnel, related to non-judicial punishment, promotions and occupational choices. Minorities complained that non-judicial punishment impacted on them proportionately more often than on whites, and that minority members of the organization received a lower proportion of honorable discharges and a higher proportion of general and undesirable discharges (The Rudder The Race Relations Newsletter; July, 1974, p. 30).
In 1975 Commander Wiley stated in an interview that:
"primarily non-whites were in the less desirable jobs; the scutbut, least productive jobs that don't lead very far professionally."

Most of the regarding climate factor presented so far has been in the form of soft data. This section presents hard data which seems to substantiate organizational practices which created the need for equal opportunity policy in the Navy during the period under study.

**Glossary of Military Terms Used in Tables**

**Bad Conduct Discharge (BCD)** - a discharge or involuntary separation which may result from cases litigated through the court martial system.

**Undesirable Discharge (UD)** - an administrative discharge awarded for less severe infractions not meriting court martial.

BCD's and UD's on the record of an armed forces veteran negatively impacts that person's employability and separation benefits.

**General Discharge (GD)** - a "regular" discharge, without honor, awarded upon the completion of a tour of duty; full benefits are awarded. Informally this type discharge has negative connotations from within the organization.

**Unknown** - refers to those persons whose race was not identified on records.

**Warrant Officer (WOI - CW04)** - a grouping which represent the transition between enlisted personnel and officer grade. This group
has been recognized for technical competence in their work and are attempting to qualify for junior officer rank. In the civilian world of work this group compares to the general foreman.

**Junior Officer** - Ensigns (Ens), Lieutenant (Lt), and Lieutenant Junior Grade (LtJG).

**Senior Officers** - Lieutenant Commander (LcDr), Commander (Cdr), Captain (Caap), Rear Admiral (RaDM), and Admiral (Adm).

**Flag Officer** - Admirals and Commandants. This is the most senior eschelon whose presence is symbolized by the display of the United States Flag.

**Statistics on Population and Discharges**

**Discharge and Enlisted Population Tables - 1972 - 1973**

Table A shows the racial composition, by number and percentage of enlisted population of the Navy for 1972 and 1973. Tables B and C list the percentage of each type of discharge awarded to each racial group. The impact of these statistics can be determined by comparing the percentage of total population of a racial group with the percentage of each type discharge.

In 1972 Blacks and Indians received a disproportionate number of less than honorable discharges than their membership would indicate when compared to percentages of the white population. Blacks received 12.9% of the bad conduct discharges when they represented only 6.4% of the Navy population. Indians received 1.4% of the undersirable discharges and 0.4% of the general discharges when they represented
## DISCHARGE AND ENLISTED POPULATION TABLES

### TABLE A - ENLISTED POPULATION BY RACE

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<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Population</th>
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<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Fiscal Year 1973</th>
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<td>Black</td>
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### TABLE B - PERCENTAGE OF EACH TYPE OF DISCHARGE AWARDED TO EACH RACIAL GROUP FOR 2ND HALF FY 72

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>White (89%)</th>
<th>Black (6.4%)</th>
<th>A. Indian (0.2%)</th>
<th>Malayan (4.2%)</th>
<th>Mongolian (0.2%)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCD</td>
<td>83.9%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>86.0%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>GD</td>
<td>86.8%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
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### TABLE C - PERCENTAGE OF EACH TYPE OF DISCHARGE AWARDED TO EACH RACIAL GROUP FOR FISCAL YEAR 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>White (87.29%)</th>
<th>Black (7.67%)</th>
<th>A. Indian (0.24%)</th>
<th>Malayan (4.60%)</th>
<th>Mongolian (0.20%)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Population</td>
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<td>0.1%</td>
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</table>

Bureau of Naval Personnel 1975
only 0.2 of the population. The percentage of less than honorable discharges awarded whites was consistently less than their membership in the total population.

In 1973 the degree of disparity in these figures for the Black population was slightly decreased. Even though the Black population increased slightly the percentages of less than honorable discharges actually decreased slightly.

In the Malayan population the trend in 1973 was just the opposite. The percentage of BCD's tripled in one year even though the population increased by only .4%.

These statistics reflect the hard facts of how less than honorable discharges were awarded during the period critical to this study. No generalizations can be drawn regarding more long-term patterns of discharges; the investigator would assert however that generally this information substantiates that minorities tended to receive a disporportionate percentage of the less than honorable discharges.
Minority Representation in the Officer Corp - 1973

Table D shows the distribution of racial groups in the United States Navy officer corp for 1973. Based on these figures only 1.66% of the officers were minorities in a year when they represented more than 12% of the total population. Fewer minorities were promoted into the officer corp than their membership would indicate prior to 1973.

Table E is a breakdown of officer ranks by race. The larger number of white officers cluster around the ranks of lieutenant and lieutenant commander (the demarcation between junior officer and senior officer). Minority officers cluster around the rank of ensign (entry level) with very few appearing in the senior ranks and only one minority flag officer in 1973.

These figures reflect the fact that minorities have only recently entered the officer corp in significant numbers. Based on the investigators information minorities who were previously promoted often did not remain in the Navy, but found careers outside. This tends to be consistent with Pecorella's findings of a correlation between the experience of personal discrimination and intention to re-enlist in the Navy.

Table F shows a distribution of enlisted personnel by race and rank for 1973. The patterns in the promotion of minority and whites between the ranks of E-2 and E-7 seem quite comparable to the population patterns i.e., there is a balance in the percentage of each racial group by rank when compared to respective populations.
There is however, a considerable reduction in the numbers of minorities appearing in the ranks of E-8 and E-9. The investigator does not have substantial evidence to explain conclusively the drop off in promotion at the more senior levels, however, the promotion procedures seem quite relevant to this occurrence.

The procedure for promotion between rates between E2 and E-7 involves the following three steps:

1. application by the enlisted person
2. written recommendation by the immediate supervisor
3. participation in Navy-wide testing competition.

Promotions are granted to a designated percentage of the higher scoring applicants.

The procedure for promotion between E-7 and E-9 involves the following four steps:

1. application by the enlisted person
2. written recommendation by the immediate supervisor
3. personal interview and evaluation by a panel of senior officers (not including the supervisor)
4. Navy-wide testing competition.

Promotions are granted to a designated percentage of the higher scoring applicants.

The human factor introduced in the later process could affect the promotion of minorities to the more senior enlisted ratings.
OFFICERS ON ACTIVE DUTY IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY
AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1973

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<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
<td>0.31%</td>
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</table>

TOTAL MINORITY OFFICERS
(BLACK, AMERICAN INDIAN, MALAYAN, AND MONGOLIAN) 1131

PERCENTAGE OF MINORITY OFFICERS 1.66%

SOURCE: BUPERS NMIS - REPORT 5310-0371-0Q N21 12/31/73-01/17/74
OFFICERS ON ACTIVE DUTY IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1973

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% 97.61% 1.20% 0.02% 0.13% 0.31% 0.73% 100%

SOURCE: BUPERS NMIS - REPORT 5310-0371-0Q N21 12/31/73-01/17/74
### ENLISTED PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY

#### AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1973

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</tbody>
</table>

| %    | 86.82%    | 8.11% | 0.26%      | 4.61%   | 0.20%     | 100%  |

**SOURCE:** N211 MAPMIS 5414-4107 E Q 02-02-74 12/31/73
Distribution of Enlisted Personnel by Rating and Occupational Group 1973

The information in Table G has been included to reflect the degree of equal access minorities were afforded to all occupations in the Navy. For that purpose these statistics are not particularly revealing.

More than half of the Malayans in the Navy in 1973 worked within one occupational grouping, Administrative and Clerical, which includes the steward rates. Malay were 4.6% of the total population and 16.54% of this particular work force. This seems to corroborate with numbers, the contention that historically Malayans were channeled into the steward rates.

In two of the highly skilled areas: Electronics and Precision Equipment, minorities made up scarcely 3% of the work force. These are among the more professional and preferred work areas.

More critical to the study, however, are the details of how these statistics came to be. The investigator had limited access to this type of information, three pertinent examples have been listed below:

1. The percentages shown in the Construction Group reflect the tendency of civilians in that trade to enter the Navy, more than the training patterns of the Navy. Generally, enter the organization with training and credentials in the trade, the Navy does it, actually train in this area.
2. Just looking at the figures in the Aviation Group, minorities seem to be proportionately represented, however, if the nature of the different ratings were spelled out we would find that many of the jobs in the aviation group are less than desirable, "scutbut" jobs and many are filled by minorities.

3. In the Medical Group minorities are highly represented. The investigator was able to determine that these numbers were actually influenced by the situation of the Vietnam War in the late 60's and early 70's. There was a high percentage of casualties resulting from the War placing high demands on the medical forces. During crisis times such as these, it seem that racial restrictions were relaxed and minorities were accepted in increased numbers to handle the deficit.

The figures therefore do not necessarily reflect what would be the usual pattern of employment in the Medical Group. For the period under study however, minorities were well represented in this group.

This discussion is intended to lend credence to the value of exploring the more informal dynamics operating within an organization as a means of understanding organizational behavior. It is not intended as a critique of the presentation of data by the Bureau.
### DISTRIBUTION OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL BY RATING AND OCCUPATIONAL GROUP AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1973

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<td>0.22%</td>
<td>0.81%</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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| II. Ordinance Group |     |       |       |       |       |       |
| FT     | 396  | 4    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 402   |
| FTB    | 926  | 23   | 3    | 4    | 3    | 959   |
| FTG    | 3818 | 102  | 5    | 11   | 16   | 3952  |
| FTM    | 2648 | 73   | 5    | 10   | 16   | 2752  |
| GM     | 184  | 7    |      |      |      | 191   |
| GNG    | 3490 | 376  | 23   | 34   | 1    | 3924  |
| GMM    | 855  | 33   | 2    | 2    | 2    | 894   |
| GMT    | 1289 | 52   | 2    | 4    | 1    | 1348  |
| MN     | 491  | 14   | 1    | 1    | 1    | 508   |
| MT     | 1269 | 30   | 3    | 1    | 4    | 1307  |
| TM     | 3884 | 177  | 4    | 8    | 2    | 4075  |
| TOTAL  | 19250| 891  | 49   | 76   | 46  | 20312 |
|        | 94.77% | 4.39% | 0.24% | 0.37% | 0.23% | 100%  |
### DISTRIBUTION OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL BY RATING AND OCCUPATIONAL GROUP AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1973

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>0.40%</td>
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</table>

| **IV.** Precision Equipment Group |           |       |            |         |           |       |
| IM      | 401       | 12    | 1          | 4       |           | 418   |
| OM      | 319       | 7     | 1          | 1       | 1         | 328   |
| PI      | 7         |       |            |         |           | 7     |
| **TOTAL** | 727      | 19    | 2          | 4       | 1         | 753   |
|         | 96.55%    | 2.5%  | 0.27%      | 0.53%   | 0.13%     | 100%  |

| **V.** Administrative and Clerical Group |           |       |            |         |           |       |
| CS      | 2658      | 897   | 11         | 937     | 19        | 8122  |
| CTA     | 1034      | 26    | 1          | 2       | 2         | 1063  |
| CTI     | 849       | 7     |            | 1       | 1         | 857   |
| CTM     | 1730      | 14    | 3          | 1       | 1         | 1748  |
| CTO     | 1708      | 37    | 4          | 1       | 1         | 1750  |
| CTR     | 2065      | 31    |            | 6       | 1         | 2103  |
| CTT     | 1950      | 40    | 2          | 2       | 1         | 1995  |
| DK      | 1098      | 101   | 9          | 916     | 4         | 2119  |
| DP      | 3198      | 141   | 9          | 105     | 15        | 3468  |
| JO      | 521       | 26    | 2          | 11      | 1         | 561   |
| LN      | 253       | 18    |            | 6       |           | 277   |
| NC      | 426       | 29    |            | 15      |           | 470   |
| PC      | 790       | 127   | 1          | 33      | 5         | 961   |
| PM      | 6799      | 418   | 20         | 515     | 16        | 7768  |
### Distribution of Enlisted Personnel by Rating and Occupational Group as of 31 December 1973

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Summary

Equal Opportunity Climate Factors describes the pressure points in the Organization, sources of tension between the perceived culture and the culture experience by minority members. This section includes both hard and soft data that illustrates institutional racism in the areas of promotions, discharge and career development. A disproportionately higher percentage of "less than honorable" discharges fewer promotions, and limited career possibilities were given to minority members of the Navy. These areas are, of course, central elements of the Navy system of reward and sanction. The systematic use of these sanctions over a period of years constitutes institutional racism. This contention is supported by BUPERS statistic and the authors' observations. The University of Michigan Study reviewed in this section indicated race as a significant factor in the allocation of organizational rewards to the disadvantage of minority groups; that minorities experienced personal discrimination and that there was a correlation between personal discrimination and intention to re-enlist. All of the findings were reported by minority and non-minority subjects.

Finally, a report from a 1972 study group summarizes the nature and extent of racial problems in the Navy; and describes the superficiality in the management of the problem.
**CHAPTER V**

**INTEREST ARTICULATION**

Baldridge identifies two major interest groups in complex social systems:

**Authorities:** Those people in the organization who make binding decisions for the group. The critical problems for this group are the implementation of decisions and the achievement of goals.

**Partisans:** People in the organization who are significantly affected by decisions. The critical issue for partisans is social influence.

The authorities make the decisions and try to control the partisan groups; the partisans try to influence the decisions and perhaps even attempt to overthrow the authorities.

The interest articulation groups which are activated on the issue of equal opportunity in the Navy were:

- Commanding Officers
- Admirals
- U. S. Congress
- Department of Defense
- Minority Enlisted Personnel
- Civilian Advocacy Groups

The admirals, the Congress, and the DOD were clearly in the authority category; the minority officers and enlisted personnel were
clearly partisan groups. The commanding officers, however, were not an easy group to fit into Baldridge's categories. In relationship to the admirals, the commanding officers were partisans; in relationship to enlisted personnel they were clearly authorities because they were making the decisions that affected the immediate behaviors. When the context is narrowed to a command or a particular situation, these roles are clear; when the context is the total Navy, roles overlap.

This chapter describes those activities of each group which seemed to exert pressure on the organization in terms of race relations.

The composition of each group was influenced by the investigator's information and access. The authority group is composed of white males only, which reflects accurately the top decision-making structure in the Navy.

The partisan groups are predominantly Black. It was the Blacks, it seems, who staged the outward expression of discontent. Other minority groups maintained low profiles and usually worked through outside organizations. This factor influenced the subsequent programs and policies. Most of the latter were targeted for the Black population.

Commanding Officers

Commander Bryon Wiley reflected on the power of the commander officer:

There is a misunderstanding about the power points in the organization. One of the things that civilians did not understand was the title
CNO. He isn't really chief of naval operations; to the extent that he is a member of the joint chiefs of staff he does figure into what goes on, but commander in chief is very anonymous in the operations. Frequently civilians felt that when the CNO said something it would automatically be done, which is not the case. The CNO is far away and the further away from Washington the more a program gets diluted. You respond to what your commander tells you to do.

In the interview session, Admiral Zumwalt consistently referred to the commanding officers as "our leasers." Commanding officers were often cited as the persons who made the difference.

As in other organizations the leader sets the tone and in the Navy that leader was obviously the commanding officer who orchestrated face to face, day to day operations.

This group articulated interest through their leadership styles and were probably influenced by their personal stances on racism.

Admirals

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., has been referred to in the media as "the man who changed the Navy." He became chief of naval operations in 1971, a three year position. Within the first six
months of his tenure he identified a number of people problems and became the "innovation advocate" for a human resource development program through which he introduced a new style of leadership into the organization. The impact of his style was felt immediately throughout the organization, up and down the chain of command. Minorities saw new guidelines that enhanced their lives and careers; middle managers felt new responsibilities and expectations as leaders, much of which was inconsistent with their years of experience as military managers; superiors in the Congress and Department of Defense tested and challenged the new admiral's approach for congruence with military tradition.

The admiral described his introduction to the race issue in the 1975 interview with the author:

Insofar as my own transformation is concerned what really was the energizing force for me ... I had for years thought that the Navy was doing its job in providing equal opportunity. There was only vague knowledge of discontent, but there was always discontent in every interest group. So even though I had never considered myself neither prejudiced nor racist but rather supportive of equal opportunity, it was just one of those things that was not high on my worry list, until we began the concept of the retention boards designed to look into all of
our problems; sometimes destroyer crews, officers, at other times enlisted personnel from the submarine force were invited to the board. Time came when the suggestion was made that we get together a group of Blacks and their wives -- and I was absolutely shocked to discover the emotion with which these people really took us on about the institutional racism which existed, and began to recite chapter and verse ... and then to discover through this very effective mechanism that there were things that I had not been aware of such as the failure to supply soul and beauty aides and the little institutional discriminations that just represented disregard, ignorance and lack of interest. And when I began to feel and perceive the problems then we began to get the thing energized and of course created the usual resentments that a dedication to integration creates. Two way resentments began to build and bloomed into the disturbances in November, 1972.

Subsequent to the first Black retention study group, follow-up boards were assembled and the Admiral began sending out Z-Grams which he described as "just a way of getting people's attention and focus on an issue." He then began to build what he referred to as an institutional approach: the Chief of Personnel was asked to put
together a race relations program as expediciously as possible. When that office projected a two-year time line to get such a program into operation the Admiral re-tasked them, requesting that they use outside resources to meet his time boundary.

Admiral Zumwalt became very outspoken and demonstrated a strong commitment to the EO effort. His commitment was demonstrated through his challenging of the system; his use of policy, the most powerful tool -- the very locus of control in the organization; and the staffing of newly created EO positions with persons who had demonstrated not only an interest in race relations, but influence in terms of Navy policy. His public commitment was to the total elimination of every vestige of racism, personal and institutional, from the Navy.

Admiral Charles Rauch was assigned Project Manager to the Human Resources Development Program by Admiral Zumwalt in 1971. Of his initiation he reported: "We were primarily attempting to learn all that we could about race relations, couple that with what we learned about cross-cultural relations from Vietnam." Admiral Rauch described his personal learnings in this way:

You see I don't think very many people realize the degree of racism that existed in the Navy, I certainly didn't. The complete lack of understanding and awareness on the part of the power structure which is 99 and 44/100 percent of the Navy, of the fact that there was any trouble.

We had never thought to ask and minorities had the
attitude of why tell you, you're not going to do anything about it. Some of us in the power structure were out and out blatant racist, if you will, enlist, feeling superior to other races.

I began to see things that were perhaps right before my eyes all of the time but I never saw them. It became clear to me that the Navy was not going to solve its problems until we got whites and Blacks together, sat down and discussed this as a gut issue, perhaps even emotionally. I didn't want to get into sensitivity training but I knew we had to get a dialogue going if we were to accomplish anything. The Navy was not going to solve this problem with our standard training with age old type of classroom training and degrees. I was convinced and I am still convinced today, and no one will ever convince me otherwise, until we got Blacks and whites together sitting, talking nothing was going to happen. I thought we were going to get a better compliance if we got people really understanding what the issues were.

Admiral Rauch's perception was to be reflected in the first race relations training program, Phase I, which did structure small
group interaction (and racial confrontation) in heterogenous groups across cultural, rank, and occupational lines. People did begin to deal with each other at a gut level, compliance was not affected significantly.

Admiral Rauch continued in his position as project manager throughout Phase II which was more of a systems change model than Phase I. He managed program and policy development in the same assertive manner as the NCO promulgated them.

In addition to exerting aggressive leadership in this area both Admiral Rauch and Admiral Zumwalt were visible participants; an example was their participation in the first race relations seminars held for flagg officers in Washington.

Admiral Draper Kauffman was not a part of the decision-making structure at this time, however, he was involved in field implementations. Kauffman was credited with resolving some of the issues following the racial disturbance at Great Lakes, Illinois in 1969. Admiral Rauch described Admiral Kauffman as "probably the most aware admiral that has ever gone through the Navy." In a personal letter to Admiral Zumwalt, Admiral Kauffman expressed his views on race relations in the Navy. His letter, appendicized in this study, reflects the type of informal support system which was probably not uncommon among Flagg officers.
The Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives of the Ninety-Second Congress appointed a special subcommittee to investigate the disciplinary problems in the Navy, which had occurred just months prior to the date of its formation.

This subcommittee, chaired by Representative Floyd B. Hicks, convened on November 20, 1972; completed 2,565 pages of transcripts of testimony, and assembled a large volume of reports, directives, and military investigations. On January 2, 1973 the subcommittee submitted its findings to F. Edward Hebert, chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

This summary reflects the spirit and findings of that report. Excerpts from the subcommittee's original report have been included in the appendix of this study which detail events, responsibilities and recommendations.

The context within which the subcommittee defined its task gets captured and communicated in the introduction and rationale of the final report by such phraseology as: "concern in the House Armed Services Committee over relaxed discipline in the military science," "erosion of good order and discipline," "sabotage of Naval property," and "the questioning of lawful orders."

The essence of the findings was: (1) that the vast majority of Naval personnel were performing their duties loyally and efficiently, (2) there was no evidence of institutional racism in the Navy, and (3) that the incidents which has transpired aboard Navy ships
resulted from a deteriorating military ethos manifest in the Navy's approach to equal opportunity, management, and management training during the time in question. Relative to item three (3), the problems or grievances which had been asserted by minorities, primarily blacks, were represented as "misunderstandings, fostered and fanned by a small group of skilled agitators within the rank of young Black seamen.

The seventeen (17) specific findings as they appeared in the report were:

1. The subcommittee finds that permissiveness exists in the Navy today. Although we have been able to investigate only certain specific incidents in depth, the total information made available to us indicates the conditions could be service-wide.

2. The vast majority of Navy men and women are performing their assigned duties loyally and efficiently. The subcommittee is fully aware and appreciative of their efforts. The cause for concern, however, rests with that segment of the naval force which is either unwilling or unable to function within the prescribed limitations and up to the established standards of performance or conduct.

3. The subcommittee has been unable to determine any precipitous cause for the rampage aboard U.S.S. KITTY HAWK. Not only was there not one case wherein racial discrimination could be pinpointed, but there is no evidence which indicated that the Blacks who participated in that incident perceived racial discrimination, either in general or in any specific, of such a nature as to justify belief that violent reaction was required.

4. The subcommittee finds that the incident aboard the U.S.S. CONSTELLATION was the result of a carefully orchestrated demonstration of passive resistance within a small number of Blacks, certainly no more than 20-25, in a well-organized campaign, willfully created among other Blacks the belief that white racism existed in the Navy and aboard that ship.
The subcommittee, again in this instance as with the incident aboard KITTY HAWK, found no specific example of racial discrimination.
In this case, however, it is obvious that the participants perceived that racial discrimination existed. Several events were made to appear as examples of racial discrimination when in fact, such was not the case.

5. Testimony revealed that one of the triggering devices for the dissident activity aboard CONSTELLATION was a misunderstanding, particularly among the young Blacks, which led them to believe that in order to reduce the number of personnel aboard the ship to the authorized level, general discharges were about to be awarded to 250 Black crew members.

In fact, the ship was in the process of reducing its complement by 250 personnel in order to make room for the air wing personnel who would embark prior to the forthcoming combat deployment. At the same time the captain had directed that certain records be reviewed and that those he considered troublemakers, if they qualified for administrative discharge, be notified of the ship's intent to commence processing of the required paperwork.

It is unfortunate that this latter discharge procedure was initiated against six crewmembers in one day without adequate explanation of the justification for such action -- especially since all six were Black and this promoted the feeling that racial discrimination was the cause. In addition, the lack of counseling pertaining to the poor performance marks received by those being considered for administrative discharge caused notification of pending discharge to serve as traumatic incidents to those who were to receive them. There is strong evidence, however, that these misunderstandings were fostered and fanned by a small group of skilled agitators within the ranks of the young Black seamen.

6. The subcommittee was informed that a review, conducted by Naval Personnel Research Activity, San Diego, has found no racial discrimination in the punishments awarded by the Commanding Officer, U. S. S. CONSTELLATION.
The subcommittee found no evidence that the conclusion was in error.

7. Discipline, requiring immediate response to command, is absolutely essential to any military force. Particularly in the forces afloat there is no room for the "town-meeting" concept, or the employment of negotiation or appeasement to obtain obedience to orders. The Navy must be controlled by command, not demand.

8. The subcommittee found that insufficient emphasis has been given to formal leadership training, particularly in the ranks of petty officers and junior officers.

9. The generally smart appearance of naval personnel, both afloat and ashore, has deteriorated markedly. While the subcommittee appreciates efforts to allow maximum reasonableness in daily routines, there is absolutely no excuse for slovenly appearance of officers and men in the Navy uniform and such appearance should not be tolerated.

10. There was no formal training of the master-at-arms force. There was no effective utilization of the Marine force. Certainly there was no contingency plan for the coordination of these two forces in events such as these. Once the activities started there was no plan which could have acted to halt them. The result was to let them wear themselves out.

11. The members of the subcommittee did not find and are unaware of any instances of institutional discrimination on the part of the Navy toward any group of persons, majority or minority.

12. Black unity, the drive toward togetherness on the part of Blacks, has resulted in a tendency on the part of Black sailors to polarize. This results in a grievance of one Black sailor, real or fancied, becoming the grievance of many. Polarization is an unfortunate trend and negates efforts since 1948 to integrate the military services and to stamp out separation. This divisive trend must be reversed.
13. Non-military gestures such as "passing the power" or "dapping" are disruptive, serve to enhance racial polarization, and should be discouraged.

14. After the incidents on KITTY HAWK and CONSTELLATION, a meeting was called by the Secretary of the Navy of all of the admirals in the Washington, D. C., area in which the CNO spoke to the failure of the Navy to meet its human relations goals. Immediately thereafter his remarks were made available to the press and sent as a message to all hands. Because of the wording of the text, it was perceived by many to be a public admonishment by the CNO of his staff for the failure to solve racial problems within the Navy. Even though this was followed within 96 hours by Z-Gram 117 which stressed the need for discipline, the speech itself, the issuance of it to the public press, and the timing of its delivery, all served to emphasize the CNO's perception of the Navy's problems. Again concern over racial problems seemed paramount to the question of good order and discipline even though there had been incidents on two ships which might be characterized as "mutinies." The subcommittee regrets that the tradition of not criticizing seniors in front of their subordinates was ignored in this case.

15. The Navy's recruitment program for most of 1972 which resulted in the lowering of standards for enlistment, accepting a greater percentage of mental category IV and those in the lower half of category III, not requiring recruits in these categories to have completed their high school education, and accepting these people without sufficient analysis of their previous offense records, has created many of the problems the Navy is experiencing today.

16. The reduction of time in recruit training from 9 to 7 weeks, thus sending those personnel who do not qualify for advanced training in "A" schools from the street to the fleet in less than two months, appears to result in inadequate preparation for shipboard duty.
The investigation disclosed an alarming frequency of successful acts of sabotage and apparent sabotage on a wide variety of ships and stations within the Navy.

Admiral Zumwalt (interview 1975) viewed the subcommittee as one: "set up to investigate the Navy; set up to demonstrate that there was no racism in the Navy and that the whole problem was liberal permissiveness. It's the most fantastic thing you've ever seen. They come out with the assertion that there is no evidence whatsoever of racism in the Navy, something I don't think you could say about the Vatican itself. There has got to be racism in every organization. If you can get Admiral Rauch to show you the raw testimony as opposed to the scribbled print which the committee came up with, it is fascinating to see the extent to which they went to change the evidence."

The investigator was not allowed access to the raw data, it was classified information, but Admiral Rauch did affirm the perception voiced by Admiral Zumwalt, and supplied the final report referenced here.

The subcommittee report was generally regarded as ludicrous by military personnel with whom the investigator interacted. These were, however, all members of the Human Goals Program staff, a group which generally demonstrated a high level of commitment to the program objectives. Perceptions of naval personnel not directly involved in the program were not available for comparison.

The investigator makes the following observations relative to the subcommittee report:
1. The report seemed not to allow for the possibility of error or fault on the part of Navy. The system was projected as almost flawless in the entire course of events.

2. There was an implicit assessment of a contingency of young Black sailors as persons with malicious intent; low motivation; misfits to military standards.

3. The strong language employed, such as "sabotage" and "mutiny" communicated the seriousness with which the committee viewed the incidents, a message which was passed on to the Congress.

4. There was clearly a reprimand of the CNO for his relaxation of military protocol in several areas of operation.

Any application or results of the subcommittee report to the Navy is not known by the investigator. It appears, however, that the report represented high level bureaucratic maneuvering to the military image. First and foremost, the text of the report seems unbelievable when one considers all of the information available regarding the social climate, structure and practices of the Navy in race relations. For an instance this report followed closely on the heels of a Department of Defense admonishment that the Navy was the slowest of the armed forces in providing race relations education to its members. Also, had the decision-makers at the House level acted directly on the information included in this report, it would have obviously taken another hundred years to launch an EO program and EO policy of the scope to be seen in the Navy, within a year of the publication of the subcommittee report.
Minority Officers

On December 31, 1973, there were 1,131 minority officers (1.6% of the minority population in the Navy) on active duty. Eight hundred nineteen (819) of this group were Black; 94 were female, and most of the minority group were junior officers.

The behavior prescribed for a naval officer was discussed in an earlier section by Janowitz, Lang, and others. Promotions are central to the reward system of the Navy, so we can safely assert that this group had experienced some measure of success in the organization, and had demonstrated some assimilation into the Navy culture.

As a group, these people were consciously absent from all accounts of open expressions of discontent. Some of the persons who fall into this category filled human relations type positions and thereby worked through the system to improve the climate for themselves and others.

Chief Coleman (interview 1975) saw the Black officer operating pretty much within the system; he indicated that in his several years as a counselor and minority affairs officer he had never gotten a complaint from an officer. "I personally had as much pressure on me as a seaman did. I don't know whether this group don't recognize their pressures or whether they don't want to rock the boat because of their careers. An officer in a career pattern was less likely to complain."

Several of the minority affairs officers (a role that became ineffective after a while) subsequently staffed equal opportunity
training programs, where they were observed by the investigator to be outspoken, assertive and perceptive; however, most of them lacked the rank and authority to have far reaching influence beyond the impact they made on the program.

**Enlisted Personnel**

This was the most vocal group throughout the racial crisis. Commander Wiley observed: "the further down the chain of command you are, the more quickly you except things to happen."

Prior to the 1972 incidents, this group had historically channeled its grievances through the system except when outside influence was needed; then they wrote to Congressmen, the Black Caucus, and to the Black Omsbudsman Admiral.

Coleman (1975), described one group that organized to counter the treatment of minorities in the judicial process. "All non-whites organized a club, paid dues which they used to refund monies paid out in fines (captain's masts) to members. They were highly organized against the commander. This type of organizing was highly unusual."

This type of activity gained momentum in 1972 when the racial climate was tense. It was primarily the enlisted personnel who filled the visible roles of open resistance to the Navy system in 1972.

The racial disturbances of 1972 were not, however, the first in the Navy's history. In 1943 a group of Blacks in the 10th NCB (a construction group) staged work slow downs and hunger strikes to
protest the conditions under which they were working. The case went to the White House and was handled by Thurgood Marshall. The NAACP became involved. Nineteen (19) Blacks were discharged from the Navy as a result of this incident.

In the fall of 1972 there were three incidents aboard three Navy ships within a 30 day period.

U. S. S. KITTY HAWK. Approximately 100 Black and white personnel were involved in an incident on October 12. Twenty-one personnel were charged with assault and rioting. Thirty-three persons were injured. The carrier was on duty and enroute to (or from) Vietnam.

U. S. S. HASSAYAMPA. In a disturbance aboard ship on October 16, four white personnel were injured, eleven Blacks were charged.

U. S. S. CONSTELLATION. One hundred and twenty sailors refused to return to the ship, which was docked at San Diego for repair of malfunctioning equipment. This incident occurred on November 4. The men gathered on the dock, stated their grievances and created a stand-off with the commanding officer. They were declared in unauthorized leave status, temporarily reassigned to shore stations until hearings concerning their grievances and violations could be held.
Each of the ships involved carried 3,000 to 5,000 men. They were all on active assignments with the Vietnam war. The incidents, said to be unrelated, occurred in Subic Bay, Vietnam and San Diego. All of those charged (primarily Blacks) were tried in military courts except in those cases where the accused chose to exercise their right to civilian counsel in which case that option was provided. Large numbers of Blacks received demotions and dishonorable discharges. The incidents attracted extensive attention from the public, the media and the high echelon in Washington, which looked in the shock at this unprecedented violation of Navy protocol.

**Civilian Organizations**

Several minority and human rights organizations monitored consistently the progress of minorities in the Navy. Commander Wiley (1975) reported: "There is pressure from these groups even when there is not a particular problem. They are asking for progress reports around specific issues such as retention, promotion, recruiting and the percentage of non-whites in preferred work areas." This type of inquiry was usually addressed to the DOD which would task each branch of the military to respond. The most active groups were:

1. The National Newspaper Publishers Association. This group is made up of Black and Spanish newspaper and magazine publishers.

2. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The NAACP spent more than $100,000 in legal fees defending people involved in the racial incidents of 1972, a role it has played since the early 1940's.
3. **The National Urban League.** In addition to an ongoing monitoring function, this group became very strong advocates for Black sailors during the racial disturbances.

4. **The American GI Forum.** This is a predominantly Chicano group which monitored bi-lingual training and recruitment procedures designed to attract Spanish-Americans into the military.

5. **The American Civil Liberties Union.** The ACLU was frequently involved in challenging specific cases.

6. **The National Black Congressional Caucus.** Individual members of the Caucus were frequently sought out by Black personnel to litigate cases and support causes.

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**A Chronology of Interest Group Activities**

**Described in this Section**

1943  
First racial disturbance in the Navy.  
80th NCB at Trinidad.

1968  
Growth of human relations programs, varying in nature and support from one command to another.

1969  
Racial disturbances at Great Lakes, Illinois.

1970  
Admiral Rauch appointed project manager for Human Resource Development Program.

1972  
First Black Retention Study Group convened

CNO tasked Bureau of Personnel to develop first racial relations program.

Phase I -- Race Relations Program started.

Racial incidents aboard ships.

External pressure groups activated.

CNO ordered acceleration of Race Program.

Hicks Committee appointed by Congress.
Legislative Transformation

Baldridge describes the Legislative stage as the point at which bodies respond to pressures, transforming the conflict into politically feasible policy and clarifying existing policies.

There were in fact no new policies resulting from the pressures brought to bear on the decision-makers. What the Navy did experience however, was an acceleration in both program implementation and the execution of existing policies. This difference in the findings of the Baldridge study and the current study is discussed in detail in the next section Policy Formulation and in Chapter VI.

Several policy revisions seem to have resulted from the emphasis EO in the early 1970's.


The Equal Opportunity Manual was already the major policy document, during the period of heightened conflict and demonstrations by different interest groups. The manual was however revised to reflect the expanded scope of commitment to equal opportunity in the organization. The revisions were almost exclusively the insertion of clearer delineation of responsibilities and "how to's" complementing required behaviors described in the document. The guidelines were already all-inclusive, thorough, and actually impressive.
2. The revision of curricula in all officer training schools to include a component in race relations. The curriculum revisions were intended to provide prospective officers with a basic awareness of race relations. This new practice was consistent with the degree of responsibility relative to people programs designated to officers in the Zumwalt regime. Program was accelerated after the 1972 conflicts created a shortage of people to deliver the program to the field. Through the officers' schools hundreds of officers received advanced training they may not have otherwise received.

3. Clarification by the CNO of his position on EO.

Immediately following the racial incidents aboard Navy ships in 1972, Admiral Zumwalt called a meeting of all Flagg officers in Washington. The following is an excerpt from that presentation. In the text of that presentation the Admiral introduced the idea of EO criteria as a part of the fitness criteria for promotion of senior officers; a requirement which was subsequently incorporated in Navy policy and which represents a critical move toward institutionalization of equal opportunity in the U. S. Navy.

The three factors described were interspersed in a broad collection of concurrent activities which would be placed in other
categories of the Baldridge model; these have been cited because they occurred in response to the pressure brought to bear on the system by interest groups described in the section on interest articulation. Even though the author cites only three legislative actions it is important to note that each of these has extensive ramifications.

**Summary**

Interest Articulation Groups describes internal partisan and authority groups; and external (civilian) groups that shared a common interest: influencing the management (or lack of management) of equal opportunity in the Navy. This section describes each group's efforts to put pressure on the system either to maintain the status quo or to bring about change. The interest groups that played an important role in EO were: commanding officers, admirals, the U. S. Congress, the Department of Defense, minority officers, minority enlisted personnel and civilian advocacy groups such as the National Urban League and the Black Congressional Caucuses as well as individual congressmen.

Legislative Transformation describes three examples of how interest group pressures actually influenced new legislation. The three instances cited each involved modification or revision of existing policy or practices. They also had far-reaching implications for the direction and range of EO policy and program implementation in the immediate future.
CHAPTER VI

POLICY FORMULATION AND EXECUTION

This chapter accomplishes three things, it: (1) sets the context for understanding EO policy formulation by discussing the function of policy in the governance of the Navy, (2) describes the origin and intent of EO policy historically, up to 1973, and (3) describes the guiding, influencing and responsive behaviors associated with EO policies (those behaviors which Baldridge classifies as political).

Baldridge describes policy formulation as the critical element of his political model. He also suggests examination of the political dynamics associated with policy formulation as a new and meaningful approach to understanding organizational behavior.

He states:

We selected policy as the central focal point, for major policies commit the organization to definite goals, set strategies for reaching those goals and in general determine the long-range destiny of the organization.

... In light of its importance, policy becomes the center of the political analysis.

... It seems safe to argue that the vast majority of organizational studies up to this time
time have concentrated on the policy execution stages and the question of the most efficient way of carrying out policy. It seems important that a political analysis address itself to problems and issues that have not been well covered before. For that reason our attention is focused primarily on the policy formulation side of the issue. Thus we stress the political dynamics and processes that lead up to the formulation of policy rather than the more bureaucratic and routine processes by which policy is executed. Incidentally, this is the reason that the term "governance" is used in this research rather than "management" with its overtones of technical efficiency. The author therefore focuses this chapter on political reactions that occurred within the Navy and which can be associated somehow with EO policy.

Baldridge also differentiates between major policy and routine directives; emphasizing the former. He describes major policy as including strategies for reaching policy goals. When we discuss EO policy in the Navy we must also discuss programs. Much of the language and intent of people related policy is couched in detailed programmatic prescriptions for compliance. For an instance, the major EO policy statement for the organization is OPNAVINSI 5354.1 The Equal Opportunity Manual; a 37 page document which spells out the
overall policy and specific responsibilities for persons in different roles, as well as compliance criteria in key areas where discrimination has been experienced. This document is supported by educational/consultancy program which is comprehensively written in a double-volume manual. EO policy in this study fits rather precisely Baldridge's definition of major policy.

Not unlike policy formulation in the New York University proceedings, policy formulation in the United States Navy is a dynamic process. Paradoxical to Baldridge's premise however, EO policy formulation in the Navy did not impact on the climate or behaviors. There were significant policies written for two decades before the intent was realized. Policy formulation was very routine to the way the organization defined and governed itself; new policy did not automatically impact behavior. Additionally, relative to EO there was not a direct causal relationship between the racial conflicts of the '70's and the issuance of major policy. The Navy experience with conflict and policy formulation is less linear than in the NYU experience. The current study, therefore, will examine the political dynamics, first that make this differentiation so; and secondly, examine dynamics occurring during a critical time period (1971-73) when the organization fluctuated between varying stages of policy formulation and execution.
Policy Formulation in the Governance of the U. S. Navy

The locus of control in the U. S. Navy is policy. Policies, directives and instructions originating from multiple sources and levels in the organization prescribe and systematize behaviors i.e., tell people what they should be doing. In true bureaucratic form the Navy creates rules whenever new situations arise for which some written guidelines do not exist. Decision-making in the organization is theoretically based on an extensive set of rules which promote the mission of the organization.

In the Baldridge model a critical area of inquiry has to do with decision-making authority: "who has the right to make decisions?" Baldridge contends that the answer to this question limits, structures and performs how the decision will get made.

In the hierarchical organization of the Navy, the focus of authority is easily defined, the decision literature clearly identifies the appropriate decision-makers.

The major internal decision making sources are the: Department of Defense (DOD); Chief of Naval Personnel; Secretary of the Navy; Chief of Naval Operations; and the type Commanders (commanders in chief of Atlantic, Pacific, and Europe). Except for the latter, policy from each of these sources has far-reaching consequences. The first complexity surrounding policy formulation and execution is the volume of directives put into the system. Additional elements of the complexity of these processes might be:
1. size of the organization and adequacy of the communications systems.

2. authority associated with the source.

3. relevance of the issue to the command.

4. relevance of the issue to military tradition and mission.

5. scope of responsibility factor.

The organization has been described as bureaucratic; and decentralized structurally and geographically. Getting the same word to all concerned with a reasonable time period seems like a paramount task. In moderate size organizations communications get lost, distorted and misinterpreted.

Commander Wiley has been quoted earlier on the "distance from Washington" and how this impacts decision and policy implementation. Within the command, policy promulgated by the CNO out of Washington may receive low priority due to the commanding officers discretion on the issue.

Admiral Rauch (1975), indicated that the CO receives stacks of directives telling him what he should be doing so it becomes a question of priorities and the priority for the CO is often defines by the most urgent problems. In terms of equal opportunity policy Rauch states: "when people are being oppressed and you don't know anything about it, that's not high priority; keeping engines going may be a higher priority. If however, you have a race riot on your hands you get this thing out (referring to the E. O. Manual) and take a look."

In 1972 the issue of equal opportunity probably attracted
more attention than ever before in the history of the Navy. It is important that we note in this study, however, the EO policy and program development did not begin in 1972. In fact, had the then existing guidelines had any force or influence, certainly the racial incidents of 1972 would not have occurred; the racial climate would have been quite different.

The historical overview in Chapter I makes reference to a series of temporary policies governing the treatment of minorities:

1. The United States-Filipino Agreement of the 1930's
2. Policies limiting numbers and ranking of Blacks
3. The Selective Service Act of 1940 banning discrimination in the selection and training based on race or color
4. The 1946 policy for general service assignments without restriction
5. Executive Order 9981 calling for total desegregation of the Armed forces
6. The DOD directive of 1963 abolishing the use of off-base housing facilities which discriminate against minorities; as well as the abolishment of discrimination in base housing.

These policies initially focused on the question of inclusion; once restrictions of enlistment based on race and color were abolished issues of training, occupational assignment and patterns of promotion and discharge became themes of military policy and remained so until the 1970's.
By 1971 numerous EO policy and programs had been written and implemented in varying degrees. Table is an example of the type of EO policies that were in effect during a given time period. Policy development is a fairly organic process; as the needs changed policies were developed, eliminated or incorporated into larger units. This process became even more fluid when Admiral Zumwalt introduced the Z-Gram; quick, direct, communication of orders, directives and situational reports. The Z-Gram was also used to monitor the equal opportunity activities during the admiral's four years in office 1970-1973. He issued a total of 121 Z-Grams many of which were incorporated into permanent, major policies before he left office.

Why is it that EO policies existed as early as 1881 with strongly lettered policies within the Navy in the 1970's; yet minority people experienced oppression throughout this entire time period?

So far the investigator has attempted to establish the idea that equal opportunity was a low priority issue for the movers in the organization prior to 1971-72.

In addition the investigator would like to note that the problem under study is institutional racism which is both structural and ideological. To effect structural changes is a much simpler task than to effect change in ideology which embraces the individual's values, beliefs and attitudes. This has not proven to be an impossible task for the military. Militarism as we discussed it in early sections of this chapter is certainly an ideology for the career Navy officer. The teaching of military ideology to career officers as
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<th>Directive</th>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>SECNAVINST</td>
<td>June, 1968</td>
<td>Discusses the National Urban League Veteran Affairs Program.</td>
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<td>SECNAVINST</td>
<td>October, 1968</td>
<td>DOD Fair Housing Enforcement Program.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECNAVINST</td>
<td>April, 1969</td>
<td>Equal Opportunity Manual Outlines specific areas of equal opportunity policy.</td>
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<td>OPNAVINST</td>
<td>October, 1969</td>
<td>Equal Opportunity in Off-Base Housing Program.</td>
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<td>OPNAVINST</td>
<td>July 30, 1970</td>
<td>Support of domestic action program - Promotes Navy assistance in Community Minority Affairs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALNAV 51</td>
<td>December, 1970</td>
<td>Race Relations and Equal Opportunity, Solicits support of Navy EO Programs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Z-Gram 66</td>
<td>December, 1970</td>
<td>Express CNO support of EO, and establishes several new Navy-wide programs.</td>
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<td>ALNAVINST 27</td>
<td>May, 1971</td>
<td>DOD Race Relations educational requirement.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Off limits sanctions. Discriminatory facilities the declared off limits by appropriate Commanding Officer.</td>
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</table>
Recreation Activities and Entertainment for Minorities.

EO within the Navy. All inclusive directive applicable to all Navy personnel and civilian employees/contractors.

Establishes EO requirement for promotion.

Reaffirm Navy commitment to EO in Off-Base Housing.

Basic Minority Affairs and Human Relations Program Manual

Instruction issued by the Secretary of the Navy.

Instruction from the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

Instruction from CHO.

Apply to both fleet and shore establishments.

Instruction from the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet.
studied by Janowitz (1960) and Lang (1972) is a teaching process that is intermeshed throughout all facets of the Navy officer's life a conditioning; a successful process. If the Navy officer is to learn equal opportunity as a way of the military it would need to be treated with equal thoroughness.

Another way of interpreting the "policy without action syndrome" is in systems concepts. Systems boundaries affect the process by which outsiders enter and become members of an organization. They may be physically with the organization for some time before crossing the psychological boundary. Psychological separation within an organization is maintained by visible symbols: uniform dress, insignia speech etc. Minorities as a group actually were experiencing limited levels of membership in the Navy; had not been psychologically accepted to full membership.

In discussing this issue Admiral Zumwalt stated:

"What we had before (referring to the original EO Manual) was a document which I'm sure would have withstood scrutiny as a total commitment and yet a document which was not felt and perceived by many people including the CNO. The problem with the document early on was that it was lip service. It is exactly what happens when people go to church on Sunday and promise themselves that they are going to be good Christians and by Monday morning they've forgotten all about the Bible."
There appears to be at least three driving forces contributing to policy formulation in the Navy decision-making milieu:

1. conditions for which policies do not exist; policies upon which decisions can be based

2. conditions which potentially jeopardize combat readiness; which might redirect the focus between men and mission.

3. conditions which threaten the military image in domestic relationships as well as overseas diplomacy.

A trend in EO policy execution, which in fact has political implications, is non-compliance in the Navy. This was true for policies issued from the President of the United States; it was true for policies issued by the CNO; it was true for policies supporting racism as well as policy which was designed to improve conditions for minorities.

On the other hand the formulation of policy has been routine spontaneous and effective.

Equal opportunity and equal access are goals which extend to all Navy personnel, not just minorities. In its broader context equal opportunity is a right extended to all members of the organization; because minorities have not enjoyed that right to the degree that whites in the organization have, the Navy now has an equal opportunity program to remedy the situation. When we take this fact into consideration most major policies related to people in the organization provide for equal opportunity. The United States Navy Regulations issued by the Secretary of the Navy supports the equal
opportunity effort in the Navy. Navy Regs are all inclusive and cover behavior codes of every type; what to do when captured by the enemy; design and purposes of all types of ceremonies, authority and responsibilities of different ranking officers under every condition or circumstance one might think of. The section of Navy Regs most often utilized in the EO program was Chapter II which covers "Rights and Responsibilities of Persons in the Department of the Navy." This chapter covers such regulations as "Oppression or other Misconduct by a Superiord," "Leave and Liberty," and "Responsibility Concerning Marijuana, Narcotics and Other Controlled Substances" and Records of Fitness.

Another major policy supportive and closely related to equal opportunity policy is the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The section of UCMJ most frequently referred to in the EO program is Chapter II which covers Court-Martial, Jurisdiction; Non-Judicial Punishment; Pre-Trial Procedure and all articles covering legal code for Navy, Marine and Coast Guard Forces.

The first EO Manual was promulgated in 1969. In 1972 the first educational components were established to support compliance. The training (educational) components are most commonly referred to as the Equal Opportunity/Race Relations Program - Phase I and Phase II. For the time period covered in this study the most recent program was Phase II. The history of the development of this program represents an important element of the current study.
In 1972 Admiral Zumwalt in response to his new sensitivity to racial climate tasked the Bureau to develop a race relations education program. When the Bureau projected a two-year design and development period the Admiral proposed going outside of the Navy's education and training procedure to get the program on the street as soon as possible. The new educational program was under the administration of Admiral Rauch who indicated in interview with the investigator his wish to get sufficient Black input to the program. Several small civilian contracts were let before the major contract of approximately $6 million dollars was let to Curber Associates of Washington, D. C. Curber was a Black-owned consulting firm. The President of Curber, Dr. P. Bertrand Phillips was at that time a reputable educator and organization consultant who received his Ph.D. from Columbia University. A group of military and civilian personnel collaborated to provide the conceptual base for the first educational program for the Navy. Included in that group were: Admiral Rauch, Bill Norman (the minority advisor to the CNO) Commander Robert W. Bedingfield (a Navy chaplain very instrumental in implementation of the Human Goals Program), Chief Pete Fulton and Gordon Fisher of the Navy; Dr. Phillips was assisted by Dr. Norma Jean Anderson, Assistant Dean for Student Affairs, University of Massachusetts at Amherst who had for several years served as Dr. Phillips' senior consultant on numerous Federal contracts; and Ms. June Caldwell, a consultant with broad experience in Federal programs and organizations.

This group was eventually joined by a corp of very skilled
military and civilian consultants from around the country who staffed
the Navy Race Relations School at Key West, Florida.

The following is a description of the Race Relations Education
Program Phase I which was implemented 1971-1973. This description is
a reproduction of the Navy program materials.

The Race Relations Education Program is a component
of the Human Resource Development Project (Pers-6c) and
is chartered to confront and eliminate individual and
institutional racism through education in the Navy. The
program has been tasked to design, implement, and
coordinate race relations education programs throughout
the Navy.

The major organizational elements are:

1. Project Office (Pers-6c1l), Washington, D.C.
   This office has cognizance and responsibility
   for the overall program. Its primary mission
   is program design, consultancy and coordination.
   The office is scheduled to be disestablished by
   1 July 1974, and the billet for sponsorship of
   the race relations education program will be
   incorporated into Pers-62.

2. Human Resource Management Centers (HRMC's) at
   Newport, Norfolk, San Diego and Pearl Harbor.
   The primary mission of the race relations teams
   at the centers is to provide training and
   consultancy to commands within their geographic
   area. On 1 January 1974, the centers will become
   CINC assets and no longer be under BUPERS control.

3. Race Relations Education Specialists (RRES). There
   are 702 RRES billets throughout the Navy (officer
   and enlisted). These personnel must complete an
   eleven week training program comprised of seven
   weeks at the Defense Race Relation Institute (DRRI),
   Patrick AFB, Florida and four weeks at the Navy
   Race Relations School (NRRS), Memphis, Tenn. RRES
   team numbers are full-time specialists who conduct
   race relations training and provide consultant
services to their command on race relations matters.

Recognizing that different personnel have dissimilar needs at various stages of their careers, the project office has modeled multi-level education program. Race Relations Education is, or will be, provided at all enlisted and office accession points out and at in-service professional schools of significant duration. The format will vary from accession points, through fleet training, to professional schools.

In addition to that training provided in formal schools, there are two education programs available through the local HRDC:

A. Executive Seminar - a three day intensive experience in race relations for upper management personnel. It is designed to provide assistance in problem identification, recognition, and acceptance; self examination by command of its profile in race relations and designing a preliminary action program for the command. The group process method is employed and group size is limited to 25 participants.

B. Upward (Understanding Personal Worth And Racial Dignity) - designed for middle management personnel (enlisted and officer) and deals with the issue of racial attitudes, presumptions and prejudice, both individual and institutional. UPWARD terminates with the development of an action program.

The race relations education program is designed to be an iterative process. It begins with the conduct of UPWARD (middle management) seminars for approximately 5% the command personnel. Executive seminars are then begun and completed, utilizing information
and material developed during the UPWARD sets. The necessary remaining
UPWARD seminars are then completed.

In order to implement education programs the project office
maintains relationships with the following other commands:

A. OPNAV - coordination for curricula inputs to officer
education programs (OCS, NROTC, Naval Academy, PG School, and Naval
War College). When liaison is authorized by OPNAV, workshops with the
specific school staff are arranged to design curriculum.

B. CINCs - Liaison with CINCPACFLT, CINCLANTFLT, and
CINCUSNAVEUR is being established to provide for location and priority
of manning of RRES billets, discussion of program needs, progress, and
required assistance.

C. CNT - Same as A for enlisted programs (DRRI, RTC, SSC).

D. Other Washington offices involved in equal opportunity:

1. Special Assistance to the CNO for Minority
Affairs (OP-006). This office coordinates all efforts
in the area of equal opportunity for the Navy and provides
program support for the Race Relations Education Program.

2. Chief of Naval Personnel Equal Opportunity
Office (Pers-61). This office functions as an advisory
body for the CNP and the Bureau on matters of plans and
policies and their impact on equal opportunity, conducts
visits, on a periodic basis, to various Navy commands to
evaluate the racial climate, especially after an incident
with racial overtones, and is the action office at the
Bureau level, responsible for policy and programs in
support of the Minority Affairs Assistants throughout
the Navy. 6c and 61 are in constant contact and feed
each other valuable data on various situations around
the Navy and also work to coordinate the activity and
energy of the Minority Affairs Assistants and Race
Relations Education Specialists so as to bring a
unified effort for equal opportunity to the Navy.
A FLAGG Seminar was eventually added to the curriculum for the training of officers above the rank of Flagg officers.

Phase I was developed about the same time as the Defense Race Relations Institute (DRRI) was opened at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida. The purpose of DRRI was to provide a core curriculum race relations educational program to (1) develop content and methodology for the DOD educational program, and (2) to train a corp of race relations instructors who would both teach and train others to teach. The overall goal of the DRRI educational program as stated in its program description was to teach majority and minority group members how to resolve racial and ethnic conflicts by peaceful means.

All military groups were tasked to put together teams to go to DRRI for training. Phase I (Navy) trainers were first sent to DRRI where they learned content and methodology for race relations education; this training was followed by attendance at the Navy Race Relations School (Key West Florida) where the curriculum was training and facilitation skills in the specific content of Phase I.

Phase I design began in 1971 and took its final form and content in 1972 successfully exposing 50-75% of the Navy Personnel to an intensive race relations educational experience through three seminars. While the exposure attempts of Phase I were successful they were accompanied by some problems which hastened the Navy's move from the educational seminar approach to Phase II, a more comprehensive organizational change approach. The unacceptable features of Phase I training claimed by officers were both real and imagined, and clouded
the benefits of the experience (Glover, 1974).

There were serious differences of opinion on the ideal content and methodology appropriate for a race relations program for Navy personnel. It is the author's perception that the primary problem with Phase I was that it posed rather severe conflict with the traditional sociological forces and military ethics which we have discussed in this study. The fears most commonly expressed related to personal stress; the weakening of military discipline and weakening of the chain of command.

When one takes into consideration the scope of the task; delivery of a race relations program into a large complex and traditional system which is experiencing turbulence - some problems may be expected. The RRES's were highly committed students and many of them brought both formal and natural talents to the experience; yet, a few weeks of intensive training is still limited preparation for the job. Some RRES's simply lacked the expertise and experience required to deliver the program under the given conditions.

The program was in fact outside of the Chain of Command in many ways: junior officers were cast in a role that often lead to personal confrontation of senior officers; there was extensive civilian input; much of the material presented was written in behavioral science jargon; and the setting which facilitated the seminar objectives, violated military tradition for educational experiences.

The Systems Development Corporation was the contractor for the evaluation component. The primary weaknesses of Phase I as cited in
that agency's report of 1974 were:

1. Phase I had varied degrees of effectiveness with persons of different rates and ranks.

2. It generated a limited number of affirmative action plans (this was designed to be a primary outcome).

A general assessment was that the goals of equal opportunity were not promoted to the degree desired by the sponsor's office.

The program did accomplish somewhat smaller milestones however.

The following assessment is quoted from the SDA evaluation:

It is evident that the Race Relations Education Program was effective in increasing awareness of:

- Personal worth and racial dignity
- Inequities in opportunity for minority personnel
- Racial discrimination in the Navy
- Differences between potential and actual effectiveness of individuals, groups and programs in improving race relations in the Command.

Furthermore, the program promoted:

- Agreement among Blacks and whites on important command racial issues
- Personal commitment to the elimination of racism within all Navy sectors.
- More positive overall attitudes toward the Navy demonstrated by participants than by non-participants in programs.

The greatest benefit to the program observed by this investigator and corroborated (as a benefit) by Glover (1974) was the level of commitment and professionalism of the military trainers. This seemed
to have grown out of a phenomenon associated with the contracting agency which merits attention as an influencing political dynamic.

Dr. Phillips of Curber Associates, personally impacted those early efforts in Navy race relations training by his personal style. Bert as he was familiarly addressed by all who worked with him, worked an average of 15-18 hours everyday. He was untiring, hard-driving and exuded competence and professionalism. He set forth high performance standards for himself, his staff, military staff, military trainees, and most importantly for top decision-makers in the program. He was very persistent in pushing the leaders to higher levels of goal directed activities and decisions. He scheduled long days of highly structures tasks and outcomes; and this became the model for Phase I training and implementation; high standards, high commitment.

Dr. Phillips' personal commitment to the elimination of racism his competence and charismatic manner combined to provide a very influential force in the delivery of Phase I to the U. S. Navy. He was emulated by the RRES's; his influence was thereby felt throughout Phase I and Phase II.

The thinkers behind the race relations program: Zumwalt, Rauch, Bedingfield, Wiley, Bagley and numerous others at all levels of the Navy agreed that the objective of awareness had been satisfactorily reached within a significant population; however, they also agreed that the Navy was not changing its behavior organizationally on the issue of racism. It was this realization which defined the need for Phase II.
These seeds of discontent with the accomplishments of Phase I germinated early in the life of the Program (Winter, 1973) and Phase II was actually born in the minds of the decision-makers long before it was to become a reality. Commander Bedingfield wrote in April, 1974:

Phase I was significantly successful in raising the awareness levels of the Navy in regards to its organizational behaviors, practices and policies. That awareness was in a very limited way translated into action. That lack of action, or more specifically the non-translation of learning into an affirmative and responsive redirection of organizational values and goals in Phase I, became the driving issue for Phase II.

The translation of awareness/expectations into action was limited for two specific reasons:

1. Skills through training were not provided and,

2. The bulk of training time, in the Black format, was spent in challenging and raising awareness levels, which in itself was a task of gigantic magnitude. The time frame of 18-30 hours was of itself educationally delimitating.

Further, Phase I had limited impact on particular elements of the Navy population, precisely those who were in prescribed power positions and who have invested maximal energy and yet have derived a lesser amount of return on the investment (E-7 through E-9, Warrant Officers).
Therefore the two basic principles of Phase II which are a continuum of Phase I objectives, are to integrate learning with organizational norms for prescribed change, and to target and tailor the learning experience into specific power populations.

Transition from Phase I to Phase II

Commander Byron Wiley stated three factors contributing to the discontinuation of Phase I

Absence of System Change

1) recognition that the program was not effecting change within the organization

Insufficient Evaluation

2) the SDS Impact Survey of Phase I was very subjective limiting feedback to the degree of receptivity expressed by seminar participants

Congressional pressures

3) there were congressional pressures on the Navy to justify the "man hours" and dollars used to run what they saw as a sociological program and "certainly not within the preview of what a military organization should be doing." (Wiley, 1975)

Internal Resistance

4) a significant force within the Navy saw the total effort as outside of those issues with which the military should be concerned.

The data-gathering and strategy-building for Phase II occurred in four formal settings:

In the Summer of 1973 a conference including Navy personnel from the Human Resource Management Centers, Navy Race Relations School
Staff, Human Goals Project Office Staff, and some civilians from the contractors' office met at NRRS which at that time had been relocated at Memphis. This group build upon the strengths and weaknesses of Phase I to form the conceptual groundwork for Phase II. The desired reluctant behaviors for individuals and the organization were described through a task analysis.

October, 1973, the Bureau hosted a conference to begin to draw together a conceptualization and definition of required resources and skills necessary to implement the tasks/behaviors generated in the summer conference.

December, 1973, the Bureau held a third conference in Washington inviting Commanders in Chief (CINCS), the Chief of Navy Education and Training (CNET), personnel from NRRS and DRRI. The product of this group was:

1. Learning objectives for Phase II
2. Statements of common vision and direction for Phase II
3. Policy and strategy requirements.

It was this conference which structured the baseline information substantiating all further work for Phase II. (Bedingfield, 1974).

In April, 1974, a Policy and Strategy Conference was convened in Washington, D. C. This conference determined the organizational support systems that would be required for Phase II as it moved into the field. All work and planning to date was presented to a professional resource panel made up of numerous experts in the fields of EO and
organizational change; for the purposes; validation and direction. The one-week conference brought together in a philosophical for the direction of Phase II, while providing at the same time guidance for the systematic approach to the accomplishments of the goals of elimination of racism and the providing of equal opportunity for all members of the Navy.

All four conferences fit into a three week curriculum writing conference which ended on April 24, 1973. The curriculum represented the last piece of a three-part strategy: policy and strategy; personnel requirements; and curriculum supported by a development schema.

Phase II was introduced into the fleet and operating units via the same strategy in 1975: first by an official pronouncement and documentation; secondly by the preparation of human resources; and thirdly through the vehicle.

In 1974 Commander Bedingfield described Phase II as having: "a theoretical base and practical model adequate to the task. It not only bridge the gap between awareness and action, it is the vehicle by which equal opportunity can become a reality for the U. S. Navy, through command oriented, implemented, monitored and evaluated action.

Description of Phase II EO/RR Program

Phase II represents a macro approach to institutionalizing equal opportunity in the U. S. Navy; a systems intervention which is designed to work equal opportunity into the fiber of the organization.
By Baldrige's definition the program is a strategy for implementing policy (the E. O. Manual and supportive directives). The program based on policy is modeled after the Kolb-Fromann intervention strategy for implementation in individual commands. The cumulative effect is that, if successful the organization will have changed structurally to embrace equal opportunity.

The following excerpts from the Sponsor's Guidelines (pp 111-1 and 2); Phase II Equal Opportunity Race Relations Program - Volume II provide an introduction and orientation to the program content. A full description of Phase II is included in the Appendix P:

The most important feature of the Phase II EO/RR Program is that all commanders, commanding officers and Navy personnel are both responsible and accountable for addressing policies, procedures and practices that wittingly or unwittingly contribute to discrimination or treatment resulting in less than full equal opportunity.

... Data on Phase I from both feedback and external evaluation indicates significant success in achieving an increased awareness in both majority and minority personnel. It also shows a much smaller improvement in corrective affirmative action. Additionally the data indicates that the program did not provide for sufficient involvement of supervisory personnel. Full involvement and support of these personnel is required for the development and implementation of command and individual actions to
counter racism and to support equal opportunity.

The Phase II EO/RR Program addresses this data in several ways. It provides for full involvement of the chain of command in program implementation. It also builds on the awareness and affirmative action developed as a result of the initial Race Relations Education Program. Unlike Phase I, which required seminars of specified length for all command personnel, Phase II requires individual and organizational actions to support the provisions of the Equal Opportunity Manual.

Political Dynamics associated with the transition from Phase I to Phase II

The politics surrounding the transition from Phase I to Phase II were probably less intense because Phase II was seem by many as the lesser of two evils. The EO Program was never welcomed with open arms by the larger population in the Navy, however, Phase II was more congruent with the system, i.e., used more Navy language; objectives were more relevant to mission. The emphasis was a shift to the organization as opposed to the individual; and Navy personnel were more visibly utilized. The investigator was one of fewer than twenty (20) civilians involved in the writing and training of Phase II as opposed to Phase I which used probably three times as many civilians in various capacities.
This section covers those dynamics and activities which stand out in the investigator's perception as pertinent to the political forces affecting program development in Phase II. The political dynamic of this period are significant because it represents a pivotal point in the EO effort in the Navy. The move from Phase I behavior to Phase II behavior was a move from a micro approach in which policy was almost of no value to a macro approach the very design of which moves the organization toward institutionalizing EO as organizational behavior.

During the development of Phase I the Navy needed assistance of civilian behavioral science practitioners to get the program implemented. In spite of the DRRI which employed both military and civilian faculty to provide a cognitive base for race relations training, there was not an internal capability for: writing an experiential curriculum, and training skills in small group dynamics. In addition, the topic itself was tension-provoking and the selected methodology was new to Navy educational approaches; outsiders assumed a certain amount of credibility for objectivity that Navy personnel could not have engendered.

For the development and implementation of Phase II military personnel were far more resourceful in that the skill requirements of Phase II stimulated those required for management training and organization development technology used in the Human Resource Development Program.
These factors contributed not only to less resistance but spoke to the move toward institutionalization.

**Choice of Language Used in Phase II**

A conflict emerged between program writers (military and civilian) and high echelon officers regarding the name of the program. The decision-makers felt the program should be referred to as an equal opportunity program. The rationale for this preference was that the program should be consistent with Navy documents in language and form, for an instance, they preferred "equal opportunity" because that was the name attached to the major policy document.

There were two factions represented among the military program staff at that time. The RRES's who worked in Phase I, and the HRMS's none of whom had worked in Phase I. The HRMS's were brought aboard because of their expertise in organization development techniques. The former RRES's especially, expressed concern throughout the writing and development period that the whole element of confronting racism directly (as experienced in Phase I) was diluted if not lost by the broader context of the Phase II design. In Phase I the Navy trainers coined the phrase "counter racism" a concept first introduced by Robert Terry in his book *For Whites Only*. Terry (1971) presented a hierarchy of personal participation in institutional racism. The preferred stat is called counter racism which implies affirmative assertive behavior toward the elimination of racism.
The RRES's wanted Phase II to be named a Counter Racism Program to maintain the momentum of Phase I relative to personal commitment to the elimination of racism.

Admiral Rauch reflected on the language conflict in the 1975 interview, stating: "Blacks have been taught to be distrustful of whites; they feared whites would take the easiest way out and "equal opportunity" would be tantamount to non-racist (a neutral term in the Terry hierarchy). . . . 'affirmative action' (AA) is the same as counter racism in my opinion, however, in the private sector AA has lost its impact.

The investigator participated in some rather emotional discussions on this issue before a compromise was reached. The program was named the Phase II Equal Opportunity/Race Relations Program. This decision was made by those in charge and passed on to the program staff.

Changes in the Delivery System of the Program

Between 1971 and 1974 Curber Associates was the major contractor for the program. In 1974-75, the Navy issued the Request for Proposals, the Curber contract had expired. The new contract was awarded to a new agency. Immediately the program staff experienced conflicts; lines of allegiance were formed. The new agency was White owned; a Black man managed the Navy contract and like Curber employed a multi-cultural staff of consultants. A further complication of this issue was timing. Curber had participated in the conceptualization and
development of the new program and the new contractor came aboard just at the point of implementation (training Navy specialists); there was an issue of ownership around content and form.

No formal process was devised to manage the social dynamics of this transition; the interpersonal dynamics manifest themselves in the process which was already under a microscope by the organization. This was one of several stressful times for the investigator.

A second set of dynamics was created by the decision to build an interface and collaboration between Phase II and the HRMD Program. The goals, tools and skills for the two programs overlapped and this step was not only rational and efficient; but represented a plus for Phase II because the HRMD program had for some time been accepted as a useful management support and was basically institutionalized into the management system of the organization. The feelings of ownership and competition distracted from the work of getting the first groups of EOPS through the school and demonstrating the quality and appropriateness of the program uppermost in the politics of the program success at that time.

A third set of problems emerged relative to the retraining of RRES's as EOPS'. Phase II was a consultancy model while Phase I had been a group dynamics model; implicating a total new and broader set of skills. The question of the competence of RRES' for Phase II delivery became quite political. The Project Office faced a delicate decision: if RRES' were not used the Office would be accused of taking the program away from a group of highly committed people who
impacted the organization significantly. Women in the Navy have adopted and adjusted to a male oriented organization.

The treatment of women in the Navy was not strongly emphasized in Phase II, it again received perfunctory treatment. A separate EO program "Women in the Navy," an educational component supported by policy was pronounced in 1975-76 stimulated by a growing emphasis on women issues both in the larger society and the Navy responded more systematically to this subject.

**Policy and Accountability**

Perhaps the most powerful dynamic surrounding Phase II was the clearly legislative foundation in which the program was grounded and the intended integration into the chain of command.

The program was a means; policy execution was the end; so that commanding officers were offered a program to illustrate how policy compliance could occur; and to structure implementation evaluation and accountability into command operations.

And finally the energy and movement with which the leader in the organization championed the cause and concurrently, appressively, advanced compliance and accountability.
Political Dynamics Which Influenced Policy Formulation/Execution

Three factors seem to have been critical in the formulation and execution of EO policies in the 1970's:

1) the use of support or kinship system concept in leadership,
2) the willingness of the leadership in the Navy to test and challenge the system,
3) the mythology of power in Washington, D.C.,
4) the rechanneling of energies from policy formulation to policy execution,
5) change in delivery or system.

Support/Kinship System. When Admiral Zumwalt began to formally create structures to support himself he sought out two types of people to work in the power structure: people who were themselves personally receptive to equal opportunity in the Navy and those who were prepared to work out of an advocate posture within the organization.

There were two examples: first his selection of Admiral Rauch to project manager for the Human Goals Program. Zumwalt and Rauch shared common views on the need for a substantial effort to strengthen the total human dimension of the organization.

The investigator observed what seemed to be a network of supporters/advocates of multi-cultural backgrounds in key positions throughout the EO program. This group felt like a kinship system; a personal alliance.

The second example was the creation of task forces and commissions to provide support and feedback. Once the admiral began
his knowledge base with the Retention Board, he decided he needed a mechanism for keeping himself informed so he created the position for a special assistant, a billet filled by Lt. William Norman, a Black man who had been very active and effective with the Retention Board concept.

Another support system was created in the form of the CNO Action Committee. This was an adhoc group of Flagg officers whose purpose was continuous examination and work on problems and issues of concern to the Office of the CNO. To build this committee, the CNO identified those officers who were most influential in terms of Navy policy. This group's primary value was the interchange between representatives of key offices high in the chain; it also created a direct line of influence between the CNO and those respective officers represented.

The Admiral attempted to create the same type of support for Commanding Officers throughout the Navy by providing a special assistant function through the minority affairs officer position. A 1971 directive created a special billet in each command for a MAO. In an article published in the Cruiser-Destroyer 1971, Admiral Zumwalt is quoted as describing the position as an "enacting job." For a while the minority affairs officers functioned as intended. Some of the officers with whom the investigator interacted felt quite effective both in their relationships with minority group members and with the commanding officer. Others felt less effective. When the general sentiment was shared that the responsibility for minority affairs had shifted from the commanding officer to the minority affairs officers, in too many
situations, that position was discontinued and the functions incorporated into the role of the Human Relations Council.

Challenging the System - Leadership Mode of the CNO

Admiral Zumwalt's style as a leader was a significant factor in the formulation and execution of EO guidelines and programs during his four years in office. His leadership in this area was pervasive perhaps a prerequisite to his success.

The following is a direct quote from the Admiral's comments in interview with the investigator in 1975:

I don't think that there was ever any intention in the Navy to go back and undo what had been done; but there was an awful lot of thinking that this tokenism we can go along with as long as it doesn't get any worse, is the kind of attitude which I think characterized the Navy's approach to the problem; we don't have a single Black admiral; less than token number of captains and commanders in the Navy; and we had less than a percent of our officer corp of minority background; less than 4 percent of the enlisted corp; without a major jigging of the system it would have continued on about that level, we were on a sort of plateau and what one had to do was shiver the system and get it started back up the incline again.
In the broad the overall thought of our personnel changes which included equal opportunity and included the elimination of the so called mickey mouse and try and provide enlightened leadership; the fact that re-enlistment rates improved dramatically from 10 per cent to 30 per cent during my four year period and the fact that we were able to bring in high quality recruits of both minority and majority background kind of was the bottom line indication to the old guard that in the total what we were about made sense, and that was the reward system.

The admiral's comments reflect his high level of competence, which logically accounts for his indepth insights into the workings of the organization, his orientation to strategy and political thinking and maneuvering. Foremost in his approach to the issue of EO was his willingness to challenge, "jigger" the system.

The "system" in the U. S. Navy translates the chain of command. One of the behaviors which characterized Admiral Zumwalt's leadership as CNO was his willingness to extend or test the chain of command. There were several ways in which this practice was used in the effort to promote human resource utilization and the human condition in the Navy.

When Admiral Zumwalt appointed Admiral Rauch to the position of Program Manager for the Human Goals Program, that program was automatically placed in the office of Admiral David Bagley, Chief of Naval
Personnel. The CNO had direct authority over all Navy activities. Personnel matters, however, such as the Human Goals Program are delegated to the Bureau. The CNO handles directly the technical side of Naval operations. In 1971 Admiral Rauch was given a dual reporting relationship; he reported to both Admiral Bagley and to Admiral Zumwalt. This gave Zumwalt direct influence and feedback to the people program which was obviously quite important to his administration. This, as confirmed verbally by Commander Wiley, was an unusual reporting relationship.

The Z-Gram message system discussed earlier was outside of the system. It functioned to expedite fast and authoritative communications which would have taken much longer to handle through the regular policy process.

The Mythology of Washington, D.C.

For the seaman and even for some commanders Navy administration in Washington, D.C. is as foreign as it would be for a civilian. For field personnel the primary contact with Washington is indirect, through directives, bulletins and publications. Interaction with Washington is also untimely. Often by the time Washington responds to an issue in the field, the response is irrelevant. It was the observation of the investigator that field people felt that the Washington staff was generally out of touch with the field. The most respect channel of communication was the fleet commander (Atlantic, Pacific and Europe) whose office was local enough to be relevant.
The fleet commanders would often duplicate messages coming out of Washington under their own signature to generate interest and response. This factor caused equal opportunity policy and programs to be diluted as were most programs and policies coming to Washington.

While this modus operandi contributed to the success of the EO Programs, it was not without problems.

First and foremost, there were media reports and unverified rumors that the Congress did make deliberate attempts to release Admiral Zumwalt from his position as CNU; Congressional tolerance for his maverick style wore thin.

Secondly, the career aspirations of many military personnel associated with the program were negatively impacted. For senior officers the system, informally, simply did not reward them. Those who continued with the program for any length of time found themselves outside of the career path and not in the main access stream of the Navy professional. Many of these officers predicted this outcome (in discussions with the author) and chose to act on their personal commitment to the issues addressed by the EO/RR Program.

Junior officers found themselves playing catch up; very few received promotions they may have otherwise earned in the same time period working within their designated rates. Admiral Zumwalt lamented this point in the interview (1975):

Some of the people who were in the vanguard of this program in the Navy are probably at hazard as far as their professional careers are concerned. I hope that in the broad they will be recognized as people who were following the then, policy and that they will be rewarded.
It worries me that those officers and enlisted personnel who committed themselves to the fight for EO, both Black and white, are at hazard.

It is the author's observation that the factors (some of which were politically motivated and some were just rational) which did the most to validate Phase II were the following:

1. A basic thrust inherent in all activities associated with the program was to strengthen the chain of command. Generally this was accomplished through the strategic positioning of responsibility into the authority structure. The CO was given the ultimate responsibility. The EOPS role was purely consultative. This represented a significant recognition of the relationship between the EO effort and the Mission of the Navy.

2. Conceptually and through the selective use of language the program was made Navy-specific. Behavioral science jargon was replaced by military or management terminology both of which were more acceptable in the Organization.

3. Proper protocol was observed at all times in the administration of the program; trainers and participants in workshop activities were instructed to observe proper dress and military etiquette at all times.
4. A key factor in the involvement of a command in Phase II implementation was the construction and monitoring of an EOQI (Equal Opportunity Quality Indicator). The EOQI illustrates statistically the actual progress of the command in those areas which have been identified as critical dimensions of EO in the Organization: paygrade, upward and lateral movility, military justice and retention.

5. The intervention is intended only to initiate policy execution; the implementation of Phase II in its entirety continues indefinitely through a cadre of internally trained resources who continue to assess progress and provide training. It is the responsibility of the Commanding Officer to monitor on-going activities with follow-up assistance from the EOPS.

The significance of these items rest not only in accepted theory and practice in the field of organization change; but also in contrast to Phase I activities which set the psychological context within the organization for Phase II.
Execution of Phase II Program

The Phase II Program was launched in late 1974 when the first EOPS were trained and sent out to field operations to assist commanding Officers in compliance with the spirit and guidelines of the Equal Opportunity Manual. The immediate goal was to provide 350 trained EOPS who would in a 2-3 year period make individual contracts with commands throughout the world.

An account of the execution of Phase II is beyond the scope of this study. It seems appropriate to end this chapter however with a prognosis for the success of the program. When the author interviewed Admiral Zumwalt he had been in retirement for approximately one year and studying the project from the sideline. When asked his outlook for the execution of EO policy he stated the following: "It's too early for me. My only information is from officers who come up to me; they are now in watchful waiting. My hunch is that we made a big surge forward from 1970 to 1974 and we may be in a period of consolidation work. I hope that we are not losing ground; my hunch is that we are not at the top now, we have a ways to go."

Admiral Rauch was actively involved in getting Phase II operational. His prognosis for Phase II was probably best captured in a speech he gave at the closing activities commencing training for the first class of EOPS. The following are selected excerpts from Admiral Rauch's presentation.
"Phase II is probably one of the biggest efforts and most all encompassing with the greatest amount of fleet representation in the design of something that's being introduced from the Washington level that has ever been done - be it hardware or a people program."

"We cannot fail. This is very similar to the nuclear power program. It's going to make a significant impact on the Navy if it is successful, or if it fails it will be catastrophic. Now there are three benefits the country gets as I see it from a successful Navy Equal Opportunity Program. One is that the country has a better weapons system in that it has a more effective Navy. Second, we are hopefully sending not only enlightened people and more aware people back to society as they return and reach the expiration of their enlistment, but people who will have had experience in countering racism and actively promoting equal opportunity programs. And then thirdly, I still think this one of the big efforts in a large institution like this in the country, and if it's successful, ... and I know it will be, other
institutions can learn.

The program was initiated with some immediate milestones for success. Admiral Rauch in collaboration with the Undersecretary of the Navy (Potter) set the following milestones for the first two years (1974-1976):

Undesignated strikes would be reduced to 35% if successful, almost all minority enlisted personnel at E-3 and above would be working toward some specific career goals.

The population of minorities in lower ranks would be reduced by 2% increasing the numbers of promotions.

Sixty percent of all minorities leaving the Navy would receive honorable discharges.

The implications were that the organization immediately committed itself to identified targets for institutional change.
Summary

Policy formulation and Execution covers those issues which initially struck the author as the compatibility between the Navy project and the Political Model. This chapter describes the significance of policy in military governance and the emphasis which the model places on the role of policy in organizational change. Special attention is given to the fact that significant policies existed for sometime in the U. S. Navy with no enforcement. The consequences of the prominence given the issue of race relations by the CNO and a series of racial incidents prompted the acceleration of policy execution. Educational programs in EO provided the stimulus for policy execution. Phase I was a racial awareness training program which provided small interaction group workshops. This program was successful in heightening the awareness of personnel at all levels to instances of personal and institutional racism in the organization. An assessment of the Phase I program indicated that it was successful in accomplishing a rather narrow spectrum of a much broader goal. There was social awareness but no significant structural changes.

Phase II was conceived and developed to extend the accomplishments of Phase I; to broaden the scope of the effort i.e., to integrate EO into the chain of command. When the Phase II Program was launched in 1974 the sponsoring office and the Navy leadership expressed confidence that the management of EO was about to change. (See speech by Admiral Rauch in Appendix).
Andras Angyal (1941) stated that psychiatry is the application of a science that does not exist. We continue to ask ourselves in this field if social science is a science. One issue with which we struggle is the relationship between inquiries based in qualitative data and inquiries based in quantitative data.

The case study has several disadvantages that make it less than an ideal method. First concentration on only one case makes it virtually impossible to make use of contrasting situations. Had this study compared several or many approaches to change in a generic sense or to major changes in the approach to EO, the parallels and differences between would most likely have provoked useful insights. This type of contrast is missing from the case study. The second weakness is the problem of "typificality" or "generalization."

Researchers always hope to find results that can be applied i.e., generalized to many situations, not just to the one they're studying. While there are numerous learnings from this study certainly the Navy is not a typical organization, it is in fact unique.

Baldridge states that the real value of a case study is to provoke ideas about a new way of viewing the world, to fill in an idea and provide food for thought, and to make suggestions about pieces of actions that might be fruit for study. The objective of
this chapter is to identify my learnings and to present them in a manner that other organizations might consider when faced with the challenge of creating a climate of equal opportunity.

But first some comments about the Baldridge model, and about the experience of participant observation. Two characteristics of this model the author characterize as strengths. First the five distinct elements: social context factors, interest articulation, legislative transformation, policy and execution of policy focus the research. Secondly, at least for the purposes of this study the focus is on political dynamics and the use of policy adds a quality to the case study that is often missing so the author was actually forced to address core issues in a manner that otherwise may not have occurred. This model can be valuable to the field not only as a framework for conducting a study but also as a strategy for intervening and changing systems.

The experience of being a participant and observer in the Navy experience brought life to the research. The author gathered data as events occurred rather than after they occurred which allowed for significant proding for understanding. Because the military personnel were aware of the study and endorsed the approach, they willingly sought out and provided resources. Then there was the experience of personal investment in the effort which contributed to an over definition of the research design sometimes and probably create a bias in the author's perception of the value of the effort.
Conclusions and Summary

Neither Phase I nor Phase II of the Navy Race Relations Program accomplished its goals. A significant change occurred in the Navy as a result of the program. Combined, the approach, the process and results has been a unique example of a comprehensive change effort in a complex, open system.

There has been observable social change in the Navy since 1971 in the areas of cultural awareness and the Navy's responsiveness to a multicultural population. An extensive educational base has been established, numerous EO policies have been created and enforced. Most significantly EO and Affirmative Action have been integrated into the reward and policy systems of the Navy, and EO is closely identified with command readiness. In the culture of the Navy these are measures of success.

Continuity has been a problem in this effort. Successful system change in this instance called for continuity in perspective and in the commitment of leadership. Leaders and persons in key positions in the Navy change positions frequently. Meanwhile a major foundation of the Race Relations Program was the strong commitment of leadership. The program needed continuous assessment and update. The Navy organization is also an organism that continues to change - as it does the goals and strategies of the program continue to change. The author observed that even though the assessment occurred between Phase I and Phase II it was not recognized as a successful and natural effort, it was seen as corrective and
compensatory and momentum and perspective were last.

*Change Technology Related to the Infrastructure*

Change Technology must be consistent with the infrastructure of the organization. This has been for the investigator a key revelation in this study.

The locus of control in the United States Navy organization is policy - the organization is governed through policy. Policy prescribes lifestyle, dress, behavior, careers, rewards and punishment. When the Navy went outside its boundaries to the civilian behavioral science looking for a method to address, EO issues the methodology they used reflected the growth of the field. In 1970 theoreticians were describing organizations as open systems but few practitioners had converted that set of theory to technology, so Phase I of the Program was strictly an awareness effort. As a first step it seemed quite appropriate as the framework for the total effort it was somewhat naive.

What we learned in the transition from Phase I to Phase II is that the technology or change strategy must reflect the governance system and culture of the organization. In an organization where the locus of control was power and governance through policy it was necessary to build the change effort congruent with that context. In the Navy this was legislative not humanistic.

In Phase II the charge appealed to "good management" and productivity by illustrating the consequences of discrimination on
command readiness, and it was command readiness that the program was designed to enhance.

For change in EO in practices in system requires strategic planning that takes into consideration the formal and informal structures, administrative technical and human subsystems.

The role of strong leadership in organization change was affirmed in this study. It is the belief of this author that there are two dimensions to change one related to structures and strategies and another related to motivation and personal commitment of key characters. The author believes therefore that the impetus for social changes that occurred in the Navy between 1971 and 1982 was the chief executive officer who in 1971 personally used the power of his office to declare war on racism in the United States Navy.

Strong leadership is needed for system changes in EO practices.

For organizations that are attempting to change the EO climate the author recommends the following:

(1) a systems approach to the effort, taking into account all interrelationship within the organization and its environment. The identification of internal and external interest groups is one way of including environmental elements

(2) ongoing strategic planning that takes into account the culture qualities of the organization especially political dynamics

(3) plan for the long term even though the short term nets immediate benefits.

(4) the support and commitment of key leaders
(5) Identify the locus of control in the organization whether it is formal or informal written or understood and consider how EO can be integrated or associated with that dimension.

(6) Study the historical patterns of change in the organization and recognize them in strategies for future change.

(7) Recognize that EO is a process that begins with the selection and involvement of people of color and women and continues with the assimilation and integration of these members into the mainstream of the system.

(8) Recognize that as you attempt to change the organization deliberately, it continues to change naturally. Reassess efforts frequently and adjust goals and objectives that are obsolete addition to strategies. Don't look for a finite end, change in changing.

(9) The involvement of skilled people preferably as a member of the organization who has knowledge of organization as well as the application of behavioral science technology.

(10) Recognize that EO efforts are successful and complete when programs and special considerations are no longer necessary and the issue is identified as good management.
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GLOSSARY

ALNAV  -  All Navy (Message to Everyone in the Navy).
BUPERS  -  Bureau of Naval Personnel
CINCLant  -  Commander in Chief Atlantic
CINCPac  -  Commander in Chief Pacific
CINCPacFlt  -  Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
CinCUSMavEur  -  Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe
CNO  -  Chief of Naval Operations
DOD  -  Department of Defense
DRRI  -  Defense Race Relations Institute
EXEC  -  Executive Officer
EOPS  -  Equal Opportunity Race Relations Specialist
EO/RR  -  Equal Opportunity Race Relations
EOQI  -  Equal Opportunity Quality Indicator
Flag Officer  -  Admirals and Commandants
   Their presence usually recognized at Military
   sites by display of U. S. Flag
JG  -  Junior Grade
LantFlt  -  Atlantic Fleet
LCdr  -  Lieutenant Commander
MAA  -  Minority Affairs Assistant
NAS  -  Naval Air Station

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NAVOP - Message from the Office of CNO
OPNAV - Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
SitRep - Situation Report
UCMJ - Uniform Code of Military Justice
Z-Gram - (Zulu NAVOPS) - Messages related to policy or guidance emanating personally from the CNO identified with a "Zulu" series message designator.
INTRODUCTION

This Executive Summary provides an overview of an evaluation study conducted by the System Development Corporation to assess the United States Navy Race Relations Education Program. Specifically, it summarizes the objectives, scope, major conclusions and recommendations of the impact and effectiveness of this program on Navy personnel.

OBJECTIVES

The principal objectives of this evaluation were to assess:

- the effectiveness of the Navy's Race Relations Education Program in meeting defined program goals.
- those program areas in need of modification.

SCOPE

The assessment of the Navy Race Relations Education Program was based on the comparison of data collected during two separate time periods: one in the spring of 1973 and then again in the fall of 1973. During the April-May 1973 time period, 112 commands were interviewed and survey data collected from 5,659 personnel who had not participated in a formal Navy Race Relations Education Seminar (Executive/UPWARD). In September-October 1973, 108 of the original commands were revisited and interviewed and survey data collected from 4,541 of the original survey respondents. Of those respondents, 1,323 had directly participated in a seminar between April and October 1973, with the remaining 3,218
not having done so. The conclusions and recommendations presented in this summary are based upon comparison between those who had and had not participated in a race relations seminar over the intervening time period.

CONCLUSIONS

It is evident that the Race Relations Education Program was effective in increasing awareness of:

- Personal worth and racial dignity.
- Inequities in opportunity for minority personnel.
- Racial discrimination in the Navy.
- Differences between potential and actual effectiveness of individuals, groups and programs in improving race relations in the command.

Furthermore, the program promoted:

- Agreement among blacks and whites on important command racial issues.
- Personal commitment toward the elimination of racism within all Navy sectors.
- More positive overall attitudes toward the Navy (than nonprogram participants).

It is also evident that the Race Relations Education Program was less effective in fostering immediate affirmative action towards improved equal opportunity, specifically the program appeared to have:

- Affected white senior enlisted and officer personnel less than other surveyed personnel.
- Generated a limited number of command Affirmative Action Plans.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon the foregoing conclusions, evaluation of the impact of the Navy's Race Relations Education Program, SDC provides the following recommendations for program modifications by appropriate echelons of the Navy Chain of Command;

- Increased efforts should be directed toward achieving full cooperation from senior enlisted and officer personnel in the acceptance of the personal worth of individual uniqueness, value potential, and in the establishment and implementation of policies and procedures geared to guarantee equal opportunities within and across all Navy sectors and echelons.

- To maximize the increased awareness of racial discrimination in the Navy, efforts should be made to incorporate accountability for corrective actions in operational practices, policies, and procedures, etc. Specifically, clear and precise guidelines should be provided to all commands by type command for developing standardized procedures for:
  - increasing emphasis on the need for, and development and implementation of Affirmative Action Plans.
  - posting equitable assignments of personnel to work detail rosters
  - providing formal striker procedures

SUMMARY

In summary, although seminars have produced desirable effects of increasing personnel awareness of personal and institutional racism, the minimal indication of change in policies and practices does not
reflect this new awareness. To promote such changes, as well as to increase racial awareness, future training should provide increased emphasis on the implementation of change within the framework of disciplined, efficient, orderly and ethical Navy operations.
Problems in the Navy—
Ships Carry
Society’s Ills
in Microcosm

ANY person subject to this code... who with intent to
usurp or override lawful
military authority refuses, in concert
with any other person or persons,
to obey orders or otherwise do his
duty or creates any violence or dis-
turbance is guilty of mutiny...

That wide-ranging mandate, con-
tained in a 1951 congressional act
setting up the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice (UCMJ), gives the Navy
plenty of leeway in disciplining
wrongdoers.

But perhaps this section of the
UCMJ was meant to be somewhat
vague. Strictly speaking, mutiny in
the Navy has meant forcibly tak-
ing control of a ship away from the
commanding officer. Mutiny is al-
most the ultimate nautical sin, the
most heinous offense next to treason
itself.

Although the U.S. Navy now finds
itself in a difficult period, recent dis-
orders aboard ship do not constitute
mutiny. They do, however, reflect
problems peculiar to naval life, and
magnifications of problems afloat.

A ship, whether an aircraft carrier
with a 4,000-man crew, a buttoned-up
nuclear submarine or a patrol craft,
is a floating microcosm of society.
Cut loose from the world, perhaps
steaming off Yankee Station in In-
doctrine waters for months at a
time, she carries within her steel
hull all the ills and torments of a
troubled mankind in the 1970s.

Worse, such corrosive problems
grow even rougher when the men
involved dwell in close, uncomfort-
able quarters; where routine chores
can be grindingly monotonous;
where assembly line duty is a way-
of-life from sunrise to sunset;
where shore-side amenities, like
women and liquor, are totally un-
available.

True, the cat-o' nine-tails has long
since disappeared from the arsenal
of punishments. Nor does the Navy hang criminals
from the yardarm after a shipboard
court-martial, as was the case in
1812 when Midshipman Philip Spence-
er, son of the secretary of war, met
this fate with two others for con-
spiring to seize the brig Somers,

Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr.
Navy doing essentially what it does, has asserted somewhat
in the press.

In July, 1911, the naval ammunition depot at Port Chicago, Cali.,
blew up with two ships exploding. Over 200 persons, mostly black car-
riages, were killed. When the base commander ordered the survi-
ors back to work, the company was cleared, 50 declined to lend
its ammunition.

Most of the "mutiling" were brought. However, the issue was be-
gleést by newsmen, including representatives,
and their stories helped in great measure to have the charges reduced to "refusal to obey
lawful orders."

The Navy is in the midst of a new and deeply troubling period
shipboard disturbances that seem chiefly from racial and civil rights issues.

In October, a riot broke out among blacks and whites on the carrier Kilt-
y Hawk, then bound for Vietnam. Four sailors were killed, 250 others
were injured badly enough to be air-
lifted to hospitals. Twenty-five crew-
men were wounded.

A naval officer, Hassanampa, experi-
enced a similar fracas in Sable Bay, the Philippines, that seems to be

Early in November, 129 black crewmen and 12 whites aboard the carrier Constellation joined in a
"sit-down strike" on the deck of the ship when their
Pay went unpaid. They held a second sit-down when orders came out after the carrier returned to base.

Capt. J. D. Ward summoned them before the ship's board—
the lowest form of shipboard disciplina-

ry procedure under Navy Regulations.

About one fourth were discharged from the Navy, the rest given fines, demor-
tions or additional duty as punish-
ments.

None of these events, nor the inci-
dences of this shipboard violence
being occurring with dangerous fre-
quency of late, can be classed as mu-
titude of attention, it was made to take
time to handle it. The ship was brought in, disem-
kokted— in the words of a Constellation
crewman— "to air our views and
tell the unions what was actually
happening."

Ward refused to confer with the officers. This may well have been a mistake, although he must have had his reasons. It is unargua-
ble that work stoppages on combat
ships are not only illegal, but poten-
tially hazardous to the vessels them-

Article 1245 of Navy Regulations
states: "If any person in the naval
service considers himself oppressed
by his superior, he shall report such
oppression under proper authority."

"(Vexatious, frivolous or false) reports are impermi-
nable, and the complainant liable
to disciplinary action."

Article 1251 allows "any person in the Naval Establishment (to)
advise the Secretary of the Navi
g day a complaint to the pro-

Moreover, as the U.S. Navy Insti-
tute’s definitive Command at Sea ob-
serves: "The men of our ships are
free citizens of a free nation, and
that they have contracted to
serve in the Armed Forces under
certain freely-won conditions...
...in no way diminishes these
truths."

It is not often thought of, but the social structure of our (family) ships closely resembles the social structure prevailing in our country. As in our national society, where the pre-
dominant middle-class group fits be-
tween the much smaller upper and
lower classes, there is a predominant
group on board... existing be-
tween the extremes of the captain and the (lowest) seaman.

That applies also to combat ships.

Adm. John Jervis, British
flotilla commander in the late 18th
century, declared: "Discipline be-

In the wordroom. I can not
the remitt. It is the incorrect con-
verisons of the officers and the
presumptuous discussion of the or-
ders they receive that produces all
our ill."

Says Command at Sea: "The "New
Navy" cannot and will not operate
successfully without restraint,
pression (and knowledgable criti-
where warranted) within the
officer cadre."

Right there lies the key to the al-
ment currently plaguing the one-
class Navy.

Adm. Eino R. Zumwalt Jr., head of
naval operations, inherited what
he termed a "lily-white racist Navy
years ago, and promptly sought to
nely tackle the situation.

"There is no easy way. Much of the
problem springs from the fact that
less than 6% of the Navy's total per-
sonnel, and less than 1% of the offi-
cers, are black. At times this is
may be remedied to some degree,
since 12% of new enlistments are
black.

But Zumwalt's zeal to bring harmony
among the races (and increase the propor-
tion of blacks) was not
universally shared. Some hard-line
admirals, ships' captains and chief
petty officers who are virtually un-
animous below decks) resented the
"good old days," when blacks waited tables, stoked boilers,
battered and cooled, still appealed
to them.

Thus, when Zumwalt laid down the
law to all admirals in Washing-
ton after the Constellation affair, he
used blunt language:

"Disciplining derives revere or
response which lacks commitment
from the heart—no matter how cor-
rect and essential."

As a reactionary is a man who
puts an order in a drawer and for-
gets it.

"Equal means exactly that,"
summed Zumwalt, "Equal."

Command at Sea says: "The Na-
vy's policy concerning the treatment
of minority groups is that to allow
discrimination in our ranks would be morally wrong and would
ffect our efficiency and perma-
nence and, therefore, the weal-
and safety of the entire nation.

This policy is 'short, sweet and
the point.' It should provide ample
ance guidance as to any command-
order officer."

As has always been the case, some
ships are ineptly run. Too little at-
ention is paid by officers (starting
with the captain) to their crew's
weal and morale. Blacks are
orced to join assignments, promo-
tions, discipline. So a sort of cancer
set in.

Whether Zumwalt's surgery can
catch this before it goes too far is
anybody's guess.

Certain well-placed officials be-
lieve Zumwalt, who originated the
famed "Z-grams" which repeated
many a naval "black law," started a
risy era of permissiveness in a
where absolute obedience is
n absolute wartime necessity. But
ot of non-war times, or even
seudo-wartime as in a Vietnam?
That's the rub. Yet that's when
Zumwalt stands on solid ground as
he seeks to make the Navy habitable
for today's informed young men.

Zumwalt's key Z-grams began
with one establishing a board to find
out what distresses the crew and the
men were quitting the Navy in droves
when their hitches ended. They also
have directed each naval unit to
name an assistant for minority af-
fairs, and have eliminated demean-
ing and abrasive regulations on

dress, hair styles and tobacco. (See
Page 4.)

"The overall rationale expressed,"
write Proceedings, "is that regula-
tions should reflect that the vast majority
of Navymen not be penalized
by policies designed to construe
those few who would not respond to the
true and existent inherent in the
less stringent rules."

According to Command at Sea:
"The state of discipline aboard ship
is ideal when there is a maximum of
iciency and contentment and a
minimum of punishment. No ship
can be brought to its maximum state
of efficiency by threats of court-martial.

Yet, the prejudices and practices
of two centuries cannot be swiftly
ruled out among a service of 600,
000 members, even by a determined
Zumwalt. The United States has not
succeeded in doing this above, where
200-odd million Americans cohabit
disharmony because of re-
cial animosities. Too often, as
absorbed the microscopical shipboard
world, we manage to save each
other in the process.

The Kitty Hawk and Constellation
affairs cannot be condoned. Offen-
dent action in all cases must be
root causes must be identified and
eliminated, first one of our basic
al efficacies is to lessen once again,
doubtful source of strength at some
moment of national emergency."
Following is a text of yesterday's remarks by Adm. E. R. Zumwalt, Jr., chief of naval operations, to Washington area flag officers:

**Gentlemen,**

I have asked you to meet with me today because I find it necessary to make clear not only my position on an important issue but my conviction that programs relevant to that issue must be implemented. And by implemented I mean exactly that—down to the very lowest levels of command.

When I took office 23 months ago I, together with then Secretary of the Navy John Chafee, brought to Washington men and women of our officer corps who were members of minority groups.

I went on record at that time saying how surprised I was to find so great a misunderstanding between our racial groups. I also made clear the potential explosiveness of such a misunderstanding within our Navy. And, how important I considered the resolution of our racial tensions. And let me stress here as I will later on, I mean resolution within the framework of disciplined, efficient, judicious and ethical military operations.

Approximately two weeks ago, I received the fourth in a series of retention study group reports evaluating how effectively the more than 200 minority programs we have devised are working.

**Unacceptable Progress**

It was immediately clear to me, from this report, that the Navy has made unacceptable progress in the equal opportunity area. And that the reason for this failure was not the programs but the fact they were not being used.

At about the same time as I received the report, some of the very things I feared 28 months ago might come to pass, did, in fact, take place.

There is no point here in recapitulating the incidents which took place aboard the carrier Kitty Hawk, the other Halsey, and most recently the carrier Constellation. For, while these incidents are of great importance, a detailed discussion would only obscure, with specifics, the more fundamental issues we must face.

Let me remark, however, that these incidents are not the cause of racial pressures; rather, they are the manifestations of pressures unrelieved.

Gentlemen, even before the details of those incidents began to come to me in the message traffic, it was clear to me the time had come for me to speak very plainly. To speak without the usual cushions of jargon and without the extraneous politeness we sometimes use to mask the impact of our thoughts.

What we are talking about here is not a call for permissiveness, or a direction to coddle. Let me say again that discipline necessary for good order will and must be maintained and that each officer and man will be held accountable for failure to meet the standards of work quality we need and must have.

I am speaking to you and, through you, to the Navy's entire command structure, to emphasize again that this issue of discrimination must be faced openly and fully.

**Self-Deceptions Cited**

Let me begin my plain statements by saying that, in my opinion, the most destructive influence on the resolution of racial problems is self-deception.

- It is self-deception to think you can legislate attitudes. You cannot.
- It is self-deception to feel a program is a reality. It is not.
- It is self-deception to think that the Navy is made up of some separate species of man—that Navy personnel come to us fresh from some other place than our world—that they come untainted by the prejudices of the society which produced them. They do not.
- It is self-deception to consider all issues involving blacks and whites solely as racial in motivation. They are not.

And, finally, it is self-deception to consider the Navy, or any military organization, as free-wheeling—"to each his own way"—civilian society. In fact, even a civilian society unbound by military law and tradition can only exist within the system of law and custom. For a military society to fill its purpose every man must know his own role—and live within it.

There must be no substitution of one prejudice for another. The prejudice against good order and discipline is as pernicious as the prejudice of race.

We have tried—sometimes successfully, sometimes not—to free ourselves of those self-deceptions. They lead to abstractive instead of practical. They lead to inefficiency and failure due to an over-emphasis on theory, without consideration or to the practicality of implementation.

For instance, I believe many incidents are characterized as, racial only because that is their most visible aspect. They have, in fact, many causes. Men at sea for months on end, working extended hours seven days a week, with aging equipment, and escalating demands, face pressures almost inconceivable to those who have not known them.

It was in recognition of the possibility that these duty pressures might burst forth in black-white confrontations that I sought, through my racial programs, to forestall such explosions.

But it was also clear that we could accomplish nothing by putting our already overworked commanding officers in the intolerable position of having every move dictated, and their every judgment questioned.
INTERVIEW OUTLINE

F. Kaufman
May 19, 1975

1. Overview of study objectives
2. Focus of interview
   A. Pressure groups and means of expression
   B. Historical perspective of policy formulation
      1. Year
      2. Pre Phase I, Phase I, Phase II
      3. Description of policy at different stages
      4. Issues surrounding policy formulation and implementation
3. Other Resources
   A. Documents for study
      1. Sample Z-grams
      2. Copies of command policies
      3. OPNAV instructions
   B. Persons to interview/contact