Enlarging Adlerian theory: the connections between Adler's individual psychology and Varela's principles of biological autonomy and the implications of those connections for an approach to family/systems therapy.

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ENLARGING ADLERIAN THEORY: THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN ADLER'S INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY AND VARELA'S PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGICAL AUTONOMY AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THOSE CONNECTIONS FOR AN APPROACH TO FAMILY/SYSTEMS THERAPY.
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Abstract


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Adler's Theory of Individual Psychology will be refined by referring to the Theory of Self-Organizing Systems articulated by Varela in Principles of Biological Autonomy. Two complementary ways to refer to system levels using Adlerian terms will be proposed; one, "style," meaning the system's interaction with what it is not, and two, "gemeinschaft," meaning the system as a self-regulating autonomous being. Of the many implications for Adlerian psychology of there being two complementary ways to refer to systems, one implication in particular is explored in depth: that there are also two, complementary ways to describe pathology; one, in terms of "goals," or the stylistic
intentions of a component of a system, and two, in terms of "stages" of the deterioration of cooperation in a gemeinschaft. This new, Stages and Goals model of pathology will be described along with some of the implications of that new model for clinical practice.
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CHAPTER I
PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES:
GAPS IN ADLERIAN CLINICAL THEORY.

Adlerian Theory and System Theory.
The Adlerian tradition, which at one time found support in systems theory, now needs to catch up to current thought. When I refer to systems theory I am not referring to a theory of psychology or psychotherapy, but rather to a more elemental theory which is applicable equally to psychological, biological, social, and even chemical phenomena (Jantsch, 1980). Adlerian theory has always been built upon systemic concepts. Adler himself likened his theory to the holism of Smuts. (Adler, 1956). Rudolph Dreikurs, who was an influential pioneer in Adlerian Family treatment, said in 1954: "The terms feedback, servomechanisms, circular systems and circular processes express the same basic mechanisms and substantiate in mathematical and scientific terms what Adler visualized half a century ago" (Dreikurs, 1967a, p. 79).

Comparisons and connections have been made in the past between Adlerian theory and systems theory. However, systems theory has recently developed concepts which not only substantiate, but also refine basic Adlerian constructs. Only recently has systems theory developed ways to formalize
the ideas of self-organization, self-regulation and coherency -- the most basic Adlerian ideas. These formalizations are in the work of Prigogine, Lazlo, (Jantsch, 1980) and particularly, in the life sciences, in the work of Maturana and Varela. These formalizations have been called, by Varela, "the principles of biological autonomy." This dissertation proposes to demonstrate how these principles may be incorporated into Adlerian psychology.

There is a tradition in Adlerian theory for "referring outward" to strengthen fundamental constructs. Adler's own use of Vaihinger's *Philosophy of 'As If,'* in the early formulations of his theory is a particular case in point. (Adler, 1956). Varela's book, *Principles of Biological Autonomy* (1979) in the mid 1980's may have as much to offer in terms of strengthening fundamental Adlerian theory as did the Philosophy of 'As If' in the mid 1920's. The exploration of how Adlerian theory may be so enriched is the topic of this dissertation.

There is a broader need that may also be served by this work. It will be served by the connections drawn between an established school of clinical psychology, the Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler, in this case, and systems
theory. Systems theory seems to have become a school of psychotherapy without becoming a school of psychology, which is, perhaps, a questionable turn of events. As an example of what I mean, let me quote the Family Systems Theory clinician Lynn Hoffman who wrote that "Family therapists are better at how to change it than they are at what to change." This quote was from the opening paragraphs of Chapter Ten in her book *Foundations of Family Therapy* (1981). The chapter was titled, "The Thing in the Bushes," an acknowledgment of a certain precariousness in the theory. The "thing in the bushes" reference was to the unknown thing rattling about that therapists are looking to eliminate when they work with families.

Should we try to change or eliminate something when we do not understand what we are dealing with in the first place? The ecologists would argue "no." The Adlerian teacher, Harold Mosak, has said almost the same thing, speaking of strategic tactics in psychotherapy. He said, "They work, but it helps if you know a little psychology first." (Personal communication, 1976).

My position is that we do learn the nature of what we are changing by watching how it responds to our change-efforts. We do get to know people only by having some dealings with
them. Nonetheless, our ability to describe what we are changing should match our ability to encourage changes. It is the mark of tact to be able to continually assess the effects of our actions upon others. Our assessment models should be as powerful as our change models. Our theories of psychology should be adequate to theories of psychotherapy. For these reasons, I think it is worth exploring the connections between systems theory -- which has produced theories of change -- and psychology, which produces theories and maps of the patterns of the life of the soul.

It is possible that Adlerian psychology, when more explicitly connected to systems theory, has something to offer family system therapists. There are important connections to be drawn between family interaction patterns, described by systems theories, and the world described by Adler's theories, the world of meanings, subjectivity and individual lives (not to limit these phenomena to individual lives.)

The connection between the individual and the larger system is the coming area of exploration in family therapy in general. Witness the exploration of the relationship between psychoanalytically-based object-relations theory and family therapy, following the lead of Whittaker and others (1982).
Adlerian theory may become an useful alternative vision of the world.

Though there may be broader uses for the work here, the immediate purpose is to find ways to expand basic Adlerian theory into a theory of families and larger systems. Despite years of working with families, Adlerians have been slow to develop models describing their work in recent years. Dreikurs, Adler's follower, was writing models of family interaction patterns in 1940. (Terner and Pew, 1978). He was referring to cybernetic phenomena in 1949 (Dreikurs, 1967a). But precious little new has been written by Adlerians since that time. Hoffman's book, *Foundations of Family Therapy*, published in 1980, surveying important systemic ideas in the field in the past thirty years, includes not a single reference to Adlerian thinking.

There have been articles written which propose to represent and describe Adlerian Family Therapy (Dinkmeyer and Dinkmeyer, 1981) (Dinkmeyer, Pew and Dinkmeyer, 1979). However, the model so described leaves much to be desired as a clinical model. For Adlerian Family Therapy, Dinkmeyer and his co-authors propose a psycho-educational model, a set of standardized interventions which includes training in communication skills, training in expressing feelings,
training in encouragement and training in conflict resolution.

Here is their own description of the model:

The overall goal of family therapy can be simply stated as the therapists working themselves out of their job by teaching the family to communicate accurately, honestly and openly with each member speaking for himself/herself about his/her own ideas and feelings. This overall goal is the outcome of the successful accomplishment of several specific goals. One of them is to teach the family members to resolve their own conflicts by relying on the principles of (1) manifesting mutual respect, (2) pinpointing the issue, (3) reaching a new agreement, and (4) participating responsibly in decision making. (Dinkmeyer, Pew and Dinkmeyer, 1979, page 225)

I do not believe the Dinkmeyer model qualifies as an acceptable realization of systems theory and I also believe acceptability in the light of systems theory is a legitimate criterion. I will discuss why I think the criterion is legitimate in a moment, but first I will justify my observation.

The authors do not distinguish (in their writings) between individual-based and family-based phenomena. For example, on the one hand they claim that "the family can be understood in terms of the unity and patterns of its behavior. The therapist works to understand the family as a whole." (Dinkmeyer and Dinkmeyer, 1981, page 48). On the other
hand, when the authors present their treatment concepts, they proceed from a strictly individual focus, offering tentative hypotheses as to the "faulty beliefs" and "mistaken perceptions" of the family members (page 49). There is nothing per se "unsystemic" about these interventions. Often family therapists will offer a re-interpretation or re-framing to an individual family member in the course of an interview. What is "unsystemic" is the inability to distinguish between individual-level and family-level "perceptions" and "beliefs."

In the Dinkmeyer's "Adlerian Family Therapy" article, in *The American Journal of Family Therapy*, the explanation of how the Adlerian works to "understand the family as a whole," is sketchy at best. For example:

Focus on the Real Issue: Help People Identify Their Goals:
In a conflict people frequently focus on the thing which on the surface appears to cause the conflict, such as clearing the table, hanging up clothes or being in on time. The argument centers on a particular task. We help the family most as they resolve the real issue, which is for both parent and child more often winning, power, getting even, or displaying inadequacy in order to be excused. The therapist helps the family members deal with the real issue by focusing on the purpose of the conflict. (Dinkmeyer, D. and Dinkmeyer, D., Jr., 1981, page 50)

The advantage of systems theory is its ability to help the therapist distinguish between phenomena produced by
individuals and that produced by larger entities. The ability to be sensitive to multiple levels is the criterion of systemic thinking. Descriptive propositions at the level of the individual may or may not be appropriate at the level of the couple, or family, or larger system. A systemic theory must make these distinctions and keep them well ordered. Are the "real issues" Dinkmeyer and Dinkmeyer refer to features of the family, of the individuals, of sub-groups, of the interaction between groups or individuals, or of the interaction between the therapist and family? I'm not sure whether the distinctions are required by Dinkmeyer's model. The critical point here is that they should be required. To require them and to be able to make them is a hallmark of the systemic perspective. The model which will be presented in this work will help the clinician make those distinctions.

The American Association of Marriage and Family Therapy considers a therapist's ability to think systemically so important that familiarity with a model based in systems theory could become a requirement for clinical membership in that organization. In the July-August 1985 issue of Family Therapy News, the AAMFT newsletter, Insoo Kim Berg, Chair of the Commission on Supervision said that "We desire applicants who view supervision from the systemic
perspective. " Eventually AAMFT hopes to set standards for licensure in each of the United States.

In conclusion, because of recent developments in systems theory there is much that can now be done with Adlerian theory to expand its ability to describe family patterns from the systemic perspectives. Furthermore, Adlerian theory needs those conceptual tools.

The Proposal: Adler's Theory of Individual Psychology will be refined by referring to the Theory of Self-Organizing Systems. Specifically, a method for defining system levels in Adlerian terms will be developed. In addition, a Practical application of that refinement in terms of a model will be delimited: the four stages of deterioration of cooperation.

How the Presentation Will Be Organized.

First, in Chapter Two, I will review the theory that will be used to evaluate and refine Adlerian theory. I will start with the basic perspective of Gregory Bateson and then proceed to Varela's theory of biological autonomy. Bateson was one of the first to connect system theory and psychology thereby enabling the invention of family therapy; Varela's
theory of self-organizing, or self-actualizing systems unfolds from Bateson's basic perspective. (Varela, 1979)

In Chapter Three, I will present Adler's theory along with a proposed refinement to allow for "systems level" conceptualizations.

In Chapter Four, I will draw out some of the implications of the proposed refinement, especially as it leads to an additional perspective on pathology in Adlerian theory. I will show how one of the currently popular Adlerian models of pathology may be modified. I will construct a variation on Dr. Dreikurs' model, "The Four Goals of Disturbing Behavior in Children." The new model will be called "The Four Stages of Deterioration of Cooperation," and it will be proposed, for rigorous, theoretical reasons, not as a replacement, but as a complement to the Dreikurs model.

In Chapter Five, I will explain the model, discuss it, and demonstrate its use, as far as I can understand it. I think the model has many possibilities to explore. I will discuss some of them.

In Chapter Six, I will summarize.
It is my hope that this exercise will be stimulating for other Adlerians and that it will also invite readers unfamiliar with Adler to consider his work. I am encouraged in this ambition by two comments by two of my favorite authors. The Adlerian, Harold Mosak, in a recent interview in *Individual Psychology* said that he felt that Adlerian Psychology was suffering from the lack of people working at building theory and working at addressing central issues. (Bitter, 1985) I hope he finds in this work some of the core theory he would wish for Adlerian Psychology. The other author in whom I find encouragement is the family systems theorist, Paul Watzlawick, who wrote of Alfred Adler that "his rediscovery is long overdue. (Watzlawick, 1983, p. 66)" Perhaps this work will aid that re-discovery.
CHAPTER II
SYSTEMS THEORY FOUNDATIONS FOR A THEORY OF CLINICAL
PSYCHOLOGY.

Introduction.
In the following chapter we will review the work of two authors who, I think, are primary sources for the system theory used to support psychotherapeutic theory. These authors are Bateson, and Varela. Bateson's thinking has been used to shape systems-based psychotherapy for at least 20 years (Hoffman, 1981). Varela's work is just beginning to be applied (Keeney, 1982; Dell, 1982). However Varela's work is an extension of Bateson's (Dell, 1985; Varela, 1979). A third author, equal in importance to Varela is Umberto Maturana. However, since Maturana's work closely resembles Varela's and since an exposition of the differences between the two is beyond the scope of this work, Varela alone will be used as a principal resource.

The review will be organized as follows: First, two fundamental ideas from Bateson's writing will be introduced: the idea of how we should think about ecological phenomena and, in the context of that, how we should think about particularly human phenomena. In terms of the latter, the applications of Bateson's work to psychology and ethics, we will summarize how Bateson himself declared his work
unfinished and in need of extension. Next, we will review certain central concepts from Varela's book, *The Principles of Biological Autonomy* (which I will occasionally refer to as the "PBA").

The Quick and the Dead: Bateson's distinction.

Credit for formulating the philosophical foundations of systemic family therapy has been given to Gregory Bateson (Hoffman, 1981). These foundations spring from one simple premise which pervaded all Bateson's work. However, in 1972, Bateson published *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*, a collection of his essays over thirty-five years, and in the Introduction to the book, written in 1971, (Bateson, 1972a) he described that premise: There is an important distinction, between the rules for thinking about things that are alive, and the rules for thinking about things that are dead and that distinction must be respected.

Things that are alive must be described and explained with appropriate terminology. For the "Quick," terms like feedback, patterns, order and information were appropriate. Life, the Quick, required an aesthetic vocabulary, a vocabulary of motion captured, of pattern, meaning, values, beauty and spirit. Only for the non-living should one use
terms like "energy" and "force" or ideas like "quantity," as in "strength of emotion," or ideas like "pressure" as in "pressure of needs and instincts." "Pressure" and "strength," Bateson argued, were misleading metaphors. In his famous example, he proposed that, if you kick a stone, you can explain what the stone does in terms of vector, force, pressure, strength, and inertia. However, if you kick a dog which is alive, you need a different vocabulary, an aesthetic vocabulary to explain what happens.

In *Mind and Nature* (1979), his last book, he summarized his thinking. The mind versus body distinction is erroneous. From the point of view of all life through all time, learning, or changes in mind, and evolution, or changes in body, are equivalent processes. Only the scale differs. Learning is change which occurs over the lifetime of a single creature; evolution is the equivalent change in the lifetime of a species. Living beings are not living "things" but rather, living processes and all living processes feed into one another: all life is connected.

And an essentially important idea comes forward with an appreciation of how all life is connected: what you, or I, or Science, might declare to be a "unit" of life, is always a matter of opinion. In Bateson's own words:
The division of the perceived universe into parts and wholes is convenient and may be necessary, but no necessity determines how it shall be done. (Bateson, 1979, page 38)

Hence from Bateson come the philosophical foundations of family therapy: One, the reality we deal with is a reality of patterns. Two, the patterns we take as objective, that is, how the divisions in the patterns occur, are instead something in the creation of which we constantly participate. Three, the whole pattern is divided up as much by the observer as by the observed. Proceeding from these core assumptions, psycho-therapists developed ways of describing, teaching and doing psychotherapy as if the psychic life of a family-as-a-whole were as valid an object, were as law-governed, and has much integrity and wisdom as the psychic life of an individual. The Batesonian premise supported the belief that families and other group systems, like individuals, are living, intelligent, self-defining entities.

Bateson proposed a theory of the connectedness; Mind, Nature, all Life is necessarily a unity. But if everything is connected to everything else, what is the nature of individuality within the larger inter-connected whole? Individuality would appear to be a paradox in Bateson's paradigm. Bateson presented this paradox himself in his
epilogue to *Mind and Nature*. The epilogue is written as a
dialogue between himself and his daughter. Having described
the pattern which connects all life, he argues to his
daughter that, from the point of view of "all life," the
death of any individual creature or species is
insignificant. And, if a death doesn't matter, neither does
a life matter, at least from the view of the whole.

This disquieting observation leads to the questions that
Bateson leaves as his legacy: If this Toaist vision of an
interconnected life flow is to be the foundation for
behavioral science, where and how does individuality fit?
Here is how Bateson poses his question. It is in the form of
a dialogue between himself and his daughter. He has her
press the question at him as he struggles to frame his
answer:

 Daughter: So what?
 Father: I keep telling you: There is no "what." A
 million points or none.
 Daughter: Then why write this book?
 Father: That's different. This book, or you and me
talking, and so on-- these are only little pieces of
the bigger universe. The total self-healing tautology
has no "points" that you can enumerate. But when you
break it up into little pieces, that's another story.
"Purpose" appears as the universe is dissected. What
Paley called "design" and Darwin called "adaptation."
 Daughter: Just an artifact of dissection? But what's
dissection for? This whole book is a dissection.
 What's it for?
 Father: Yes, it's partly dissection and partly
synthesis. And I suppose that under a big enough
macroscope (sic.) no idea can be wrong, no purpose
destructive, no dissection misleading.

Father: There are subcycles of living and dying within the bigger, more enduring ecology. But what shall we say of the death of the larger system? Our biosphere? Perhaps under the eye of heaven or Shiva, it doesn't matter. But it's the only one we know...and I suppose it is a mistake of sorts for a species to be a party to its own extinction.

Daughter: So what? Why write the book?
Father: And there is some pride in it, too, a feeling that if we are all going down to the sea like lemmings, there should be at least one lemming taking notes and saying, "I told you so." To believe that I could stop the race to the ocean would be even more arrogant that saying "I told you so." (Bateson, 1979, page 207-208)

Under a big enough "macroscope" individuality disappears. And, in a disturbing way, disappearing along with individuality are such human issues as concern for right and wrong, good and bad, purpose and meaning. So Bateson askes, through the voice of his daughter, why should a particular person write a book about the "meaning of it all," if there is meaning only in the particulars and by the particulars? It is as if to ask, "Isn't Science suppose to find Truth?"

The equivalent question is this: how can we have a big theory which supports behavioral sciences that doesn't provide for individual consciousness and individual concerns, the meanings of each life?

The same question Bateson left -- how to sort through the
troublesome and paradoxical relationship between the values of the whole systems and the values of the individuals in those systems -- is reviewed in an article by Taggart (1982) with much the same conclusion: to resolve the paradox requires more work and that work has not yet been done. Bateson left hints as to how he thought the question should be addressed: there is either no point or millions of points. I believe he was suggesting that the answer has something to do with the scattering and patterning of individualities, that he thought we needed to consider the fact of millions of points (of view).

Among the hints Bateson left about how to move from the unconcerned flow of the Tao to the pressing concerns and meanings that shaped individual lives were what he called, the "next great untouched questions." These were, in Bateson's vocabulary, "Consciousness" and "Aesthetics." In these issues were to clues to the relationship Bateson saw between the living unity and the living individualities which composed it. Both Aesthetics and Consciousness were points-of-view issues, both were descriptions of local phenomena, both were concepts that got at the relationship between individuality and larger systems. But way did Batesons mean by these terms?
Bateson was coy about defining "Consciousness." At one point he said that nobody knew anything about it but everyone assumed that everyone did know about it. Therefore, he would not define it, assuming everyone one knew as much as he did. (1972b, page 139). He did emphasize, however, that consciousness was only a part of a person's make-up (1972b) and that it had something to do with purpose, problem solving, and the intentional manipulation of the environment (1972c).

Bateson's idea of "aesthetics" has been the subject of a complicated debate in the systems oriented family therapy community, the summarizing of which would be beyond the scope of this project. In Bateson's own writings "Aesthetics" seems to have something to do with the integration and harmony of consciousness with the larger whole of which it is a part. In "Style, Grace, and Information in Primitive Art," he described it as the integration of thinking and feeling and the integration of skill and sensitivity. In other articles (1972c, 1972d, 1972e, 1972f) and in his book, Mind and Nature (1979) he described aesthetics as the integration between inner processes and outer environment as though it were a life form's harmony with its environment. An aesthetic response indicates ones ability to recognize in the "primrose by the
river's brim," for example, something that is also within the self and to act as though informed by that knowledge. At one place he said, "I faced them with what was an aesthetic question: How are you related to this creature?" (1979, page 9)

Consciousness and aesthetics are both terms that have to do with the relationship between an individual and the larger system of which that individual is a part, how we are each "apart" and "a part?" The work of Varela addresses these questions in a more formal sense and is thereby an extension of Bateson's work.

The Principles of Biological Autonomy.

Where Bateson's theory is about "all life," the Principles of Biological Autonomy (Varela, 1979), or PBA, is a theory about individualities in the context of all life. The theory describes the universally pervasive phenomena of particularity; everything seen is always seen from a particular point of view, by a particular local observer or observer community.

The Idea of Complementarity.
A central motif of the PBA vocabulary is that almost all major concepts are defined as "complementarities." The idea of complementarity describes the relationship between the inside and outside of an individuality. For example you could speak of a flowering plant in terms of how its interior parts are interrelated as a system and/or you could speak of the same plant in terms of how it fills and ecological niche and fits into its environment. The two descriptions are complementary. In a similar sense, intrapsychic phenomena are complementary to interactional phenomena. The PBA theory is about how individualities "create" or "define" themselves and how the internal and interactional aspects of self-definition are best understood as being complementary.

Varela defines complementarity as "the constructive interplay between two interdependent visions that raises ones level of understanding to a new level" (1979, page xvi). In another context, he defines it as the relationship between "distinct but interdependent cognitive perspectives of the observer community" (1979, page 104).

To describe how complementarity is used to structure the Principles of Biological Autonomy, Varela proposed a semi-mathematical way of representing it called a "star
statement." The basic star statement looks like this:

\[
* = \text{the it / the process leading to it.}\]  

(page 99)

Star statement complementarities can be used to describe how we tend to observe life forms as though they existed in levels. We see individuals which are inside of families which are inside of extended families which are inside of communities and so on. The interplay of parts at one level can be seen as the whole at a higher level. Systems of interacting cells (which are self-containing, self-defining networks of process) are also "organs;" interacting organs are also "bodies;" bodies in interaction are also "societies."

When we think this way, we move in logic across levels. The process of the parts equals the whole. This relationship across levels is implied by the slash, "/". Varela called the logical transformation "imbrication." In "imbrication," one term of the pair emerges (to an observer) from the other. The terms mutually specify each other. Imbrication is a different sort of process than synthesis because, in imbrication, nothing new emerges except to an observer. In synthesis, the original parts are lost in the formation of the new synthesis. (Varela, 1978, page 101). A
complementarity is a way of making explicit a trick of the mind.

Here are some of the complementarities that will be used and explained in this dissertation:

1. * = The autonomous system seen in relation to its context/ The internal processes by which autonomy is created.

(For example, the squirrel may be seen as not only the animal in the tree, the system seen in relation to its context, but also the system composed of interrelationships between the squirrel's nervous system, circulatory system, gastro-intestinal system, skeletal-muscular system and so on. The latter version emphasizes the process by which the squirrel's autonomy is created, the former version emphasizes the autonomous squirrel.)

2. * = Organization, or the underlying principles/ Plastic structure, or the pattern of flexibility.

(The squirrel was once a fetus, then a baby, and now a full grown squirrel. Also, the squirrel can be asleep, awake, tired, famished, of fully fed. Something changes and
something does not. "Organization" is the word for what does not change: the squirrel is always the squirrel. "Plastic structure," is the word for what does change. All the ways the squirrel does change is in the service of making sure that certain things don't change, namely, the life and identity of the squirrel.)

3. * = Life Style, the characteristic pattern of movement of an individual system in the social world/ The Gemeinschaft, or dynamic cooperation between the composing systems and complexes which create the individuality.

(The way the family as a whole relates to the community, the school, the local charities, the business community,— this is its Style, one way of seeing the family. The family is also a gemeinschaft, a community of members who deal with each other, regardless of the specific context, according to certain basic principles.)

4. * = Pathology, or strains in the fabric of cooperation/ The intentions of the cooperating participants

(A very specific example will help here: John intends to make Mary change and Mary intends to make John change. These are the individual intentions. These individual intentions
create a strain in their marriage. To look at the strain is to look at it from one level. To look at the individual intentions is to look at it from a different level.)

The concept of imbrication also says that the structure of levels that an observer responds to is not merely a fiction created by the observer to organize perception but is also a phenomena of self-organization. Levels are both perceived and self-created or inherent in the phenomena. Here is how Varela makes the point:

There is no whole system without interconnection of its parts and there is no whole system without an environment. Such pairs are mutually interdependent: each defines the other. (Varela, 1979. page 99)

He is saying that the levels exist and that one or the other level is implied in every observation. To distinguish something is to choose to examine one or the other side of a complementarity. It is important to notice how taking one or the other side does shape perception. Here is how Varela states it:

If the observer chooses to pay attention to the environment, he treats the system as a simple entity with given properties and seeks the regularities of its interaction with the environment. On the other hand, the observer may choose to focus on the internal structure of the system, viewing the environment as background. From this viewpoint the properties of the system emerge from the interaction of its components. (Varela, 1979, page 85)...At a given level of the heirarchy a particular system can be seen as outside to the system below it and as an inside [part of] the
These principles will be applied to the Adlerian concepts of Life Style and Community and will be used to organize a model of pathology.

The Basic Complementarity: Autonomy and Interaction.

The basic complementarity in Varela's model involves the relationship between two ways of understanding the life of a living system; one, in terms of internal relationships; two, in terms of how the system interacts with the world. The two processes are separate and distinct realms of observation, yet what happens in one realm can be related to what happens in the other. For example, think about the difference between brain chemistry and styles of observable behavior. Another example of a complementary relationship between internal processes and interactional processes is the one that exists between national politics and foreign policy.

Two domains; two frames of reference; autonomy and allonomy, internal processes and interaction. In the autonomy frame of reference, we become interested in internal regulation, the "self", value systems, evaluation schemes, and personal biases. The rules governing these processes obtain
regardless of the context of the individuality unless the system dis-integrates. In fact, it is because these processes are independent of context that they are able to maintain autonomy.

In the complementary frame of reference, allonomy, we become interested in behavior in context. The system is seen as a simple unity, a "black box." We are interested in the manipulation of the environment and the manipulation by the environment.

These two frames of reference are complementary. One is not to be opposed to the other. Even though we know the realms of discourse are different, we do expect a person's values to fit with their behavior.

Organization and Structure.

Organization and structure are also complementary processes, but they are both features of autonomy. Taken together they describe how living entities can have a separate existence and still also be part of a larger whole. Organization refers to how there are certain principles about any particular living being that never changes and structure refers to the way these principles might have to be realized.
one way in one context and a different way in a different context.

The relations that define a machine as a unity, and determine the dynamics of interactions and transformations it may undergo as such a unity, we call the organization of the machine. The actual relations that hold between the components that integrate a concrete machine in a give space constitute its structure." (Varela, 1979, page 9)

"Organization" is the coherent whole of underlying principles, "structure" is how those principles are realized in physical space at any give time. (The term, "machine" in the above quote simply means "biological system.")

An example of the complementarity, organization /structure, is the caterpillar that becomes a butterfly: two structures manifesting one organization.

Another example of the organization/structure relationship is the relationship Alfred Adler describes between an individual's "law of movement" and his, or her, behavioral repertoire. (Forgus and Shulman, 1979) Adler describes an enduring set of organizational principles is embodied by every manifestation of a life form:

We are able to infer the familiar composer from an unfamiliar melody, the architectural style from an ornament, always from the connection of the part with the whole. It is the same in the case of a person, except that rarely does anyone fashion his life in such an artfully perfect form. (Adler, 1956, page 196)
A more detailed exploration of this idea will be attempted in the following chapter.

The inherent principles of organization are maintained by each creature's own actions. The structure of a creature is said to be constantly compensating for perturbances by the environment and in so doing, the organism is reasserting its organization.

**Structural Plasticity and Cognition.**

If the relationship between structure, organization and the environment is examined in a certain way it can appear that the flexibility of structure is a medium between organization and environment: an organism interacts with the world by constantly readjusting itself so as to maintain its identity. This process is cognition. Cognition occurs through the flexibility of structure.

A particularly suggestive analogy is the way radios receive signals. A radio receiver creates a tiny radio field tuned to a specific frequency. That field is perturbed by the broadcast signal. By amplifying the perturbation the radio produces music. Similarly, "blank" recording tape is tape
which carries a stable signal called a "bias." By industrial convention, a playback machine reads this bias as "silence." The patterns of deviation from the bias are read as "music."

An organism knows its environment and itself by offering to the environment a version of itself, its bias, and letting the environment create perturbations and interpreting those perturbations.

An organism's ability to "know" what is going on beyond its own borders consists in the plasticity of its structure. The quality of its ability to know consists in the subtlety of its plasticity. The color-blind man cannot see the difference between green and yellow. The limits of plasticity define the limits of cognitive realms. Different patterns of plasticity define different cognitive realms and different ways to "tune in." Seeing is one kind of plasticity, hearing is another. The different cognitive realms in human personality are called, in the common parlance, "sensitivities," or "skills."

**Structural Coupling.**

Plasticity establishes a relationship with the environment. A particularly important style of plasticity is called "
Structural coupling is a stable pattern in the general flexibility that creates a stable relationship between the creature and that to which it is coupled. Structural coupling is a broad term that includes both what we call "habits" as well as what we call "relationships" in human affairs.

Varela quotes Maturana's definition of structural coupling. Let us review that defining paragraph one sentence at a time:

The continued interactions of a structurally plastic system in an environment with recurrent perturbations will produce a continual selection of the system's structure...

A continuing selection of the system's structure is, among other things, a continuing adjustment of the cognitive realm. So, for example, if the refrigerator noise is always in the background, the recurrent perturbations lead your hearing to adjust so you do not notice it. On the other hand, if you walk into bright sunlight, the brightness (recurrent perturbation) leads your eyes to adjust so you can see. You experience a selection of your own vision system's structure. Structural coupling is like acclimatization.

To continue with the same quote:
This [ semi-stable adjustment of the ] structure will determine, on the one hand, the state of the system and its domain of allowable perturbations, and on the other hand will allow the system to operate in an environment without disintegration. We refer to this process as structural coupling...

In other words, what you are doing "now" places a limit on what you are able to do "next." That is why you have to wait for your eyes to re-adjust to a radical change in light levels. It is why some people have to "calm down" after an argument with one person before having a friendly talk with another person. It is also why so much emphasis is given in the ancient wisdoms to the change that must take place between a bride and her family of origin in order for a marriage to be launched successfully. Human affairs acknowledges structural coupling in the way we prioritize relationships and in our concepts of loyalty. Again, Varela:

If we can consider the system's environment also as a structurally plastic system, then the system and the environment will have an interlocked history of structural transformations, selecting each other's trajectories. (Varela, 1979, page 33)

Please notice that there are two ways to talk about structural coupling. We can talk about structural coupling as a process of one particular system, and as the modification of one particular system. It is in this sense that we would say, for example, "John is a married man," and expect the phrase to convey implications concerning the
limits on his behaviors, the particular sensitivities he might bring to any situation and the structure of the loyalties that govern his life.

But there is also a kind of reciprocal structural coupling in which systems are coupled to each other, as in "marriage." Two people who are married may be said (to refer to the previous quotation) to have "an interlocked history of structural transformations which select each other's trajectories." It means that two lives join to become like one and to make one co-ordinated path through life. Systems so coupled are called "higher order autonomous systems." (Varela, 1979, page 50).

**Higher Order Autonomous Systems**

There are several important things to note about higher order autonomous systems. This concept, which contains all the concepts discussed above, will guide our discussion of the relationship between autonomous individualities which are components of a system and the whole system they form.

First in a higher order autonomous system, there is a higher order organization which defines the identity of that higher order system. "There is also a selective pressure such that
the individual autonomy of each component system is subordinated to the environment defined by the autonomy of the whole." (Varela, 1978, page 51) In simpler words, being part of a team means following certain rules.

With married couples, the individuals must cooperate to define and create the couple. Reciprocally, the couple thus created has a life of its own which shapes and develops the personalities of the individuals composing it. But there is a limit. Each component must preserve and nurture its separate self while also cooperating to preserve and nurture the whole. If a component loses its individuality, then the higher order unity also changes its nature.

There is also a higher order plastic structure and a higher order cognitive realm. Here is Varela on that subject:

There is a next higher level in the coherence of a unit (sic.) to which we have no direct access, but to which we contribute and in which we exist. To this next higher level belong the characteristics of mind we attribute to ourselves individually; in fact, what we experience as our mind cannot truly be separated from this network to which we connect and through which we interdepend." (Varela, 1979, page 270)

To use the example of the couple again, we would say that there are realms of reality available to him only together with her (and visa versa) by virtue of their coupleness, not available to either of them separately. This higher order
reality shapes their individuality. One example of this is the creation of new life, which can only be done in partnership. Another example is the way certain rituals and ceremonies can be "observed" only by groups and not by individuals.

Yet another example of a "higher order cognitive realm to which we contribute and in which we exist" is the sensitivity to reality created not only in specific academic communities conversations but also in groups and cliques. Specific languages, which create cognitive realms, are formed though higher order unities.

Possibly all that we hold sacred and profound is that which unites us in a larger body than our own. Adler's definition of mental health, to be discussed in the next chapter, will hold that the measure of a person's mental health is his or her emotional and mental breadth. Breadth is measured by the highest order unity to which one can feel that they are contributing without violating the integrity of their own or other intermediate unities.

Operational and Functional Explanations.

The issue of "methods of explanation" takes into
consideration how we can talk about what we observe without violating the Principles of Biological Autonomy. The issue acknowledges that all observations originate with an observer who is a participant in the system.

Varela suggests that we distinguish two kinds of explanation. First, however, let us define "explanation." An explanation is a way of "making sense" out of data. According to Bateson (1972a), it is the way the "facts" are connected by the theory. Theory, he says, is all connections, no facts; description, he says, is all facts, no connections. Explanation is the intermediate concept. Therefore, when Varela suggests that there be two kinds of explanation, he is saying that there are two ways that we can "make sense" of what we observe, two kinds of patterns of connections we can use.

Varela says that, since we see systems as either autonomous or interacting, we tend to create explanations that are either operational or functional. Operational explanations describe internal patterns of interaction, simply, how something operates: "This happens, then this, then this." To quote Varela:

In the operational description the fundamental assumption is that phenomena occur through a network of nomic (lawlike) relationships that follow one another.
In contrast, functional explanations describe a relationship to context: The function (purpose, meaning) of this is to do that.

Functional explanations always include the observer's guesses about purpose. For example, Varela describes an experiment in which a frog's eye is surgically rotated. When the frog "sees" a fly it sticks its tongue at the fly, but the frog's tongue misses the fly by the same angle as the surgical rotation of its eye. Is it the "purpose" of the tongue sticking out to catch the fly? This experiment demonstrates that, when we say that the "real purpose" was to catch the fly, we introduce some assumptions of our own into the explanation. Such is the nature of functional explanations. When it comes to describing functions or purposes, the observer has to rely on his or her own imagination and sensitivities to create the explanation. Something of the observer enters the observation. When we speak about purpose and meaning in the lives of others we necessarily use our own outlook, values, and structure as a standard and as a resource.

In comparison, operational explanations are the observer's collection of correlations, as in, "I notice that when this
changes, that also changes, therefore the two must operate together."

A good specific example of the interplay between the two kinds of explanation might be the well-known "Nag-Withdrawal" cycle described by Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson in Pragmatics of Human Communication (1967).

In Pragmatics the authors suggested the following:

"to an outside observer, a series of communications can be viewed as an uninterrupted sequence of interchanges. However, the participants in the interaction always introduce what ... [can be termed] ... punctuation of the sequence of events" (Watzlawick, et al., page 54).

The "punctuation," Watzlawick, et.al, referred to is underlined in these sentences: "She nags because he withdraws," or "He withdraws because she nags."

"Punctuation," creates "functional explanations." The operational explanations are punctuation free; the cycle: "/Nag/ Withdrawal/ Nag/ Withdrawal/ etc" is an operational explanation.

Watzlawick 's argument, at the time, was that the view of the uninterrupted sequence was preferable to the view of the punctuated sequence. "In the analysis of how people affect each other in their interaction, we will not consider the
specifics of genesis or product to be nearly so important as the ongoing organization of interaction" (page 130).

The Principles of Biological Autonomy suggests a more complex analysis, saying that the two kinds of explanation are complementary. The PBA agrees with the Pragmatics analysis that functional explanations, or punctuations, are dispensable when an operational explanation is available. Individual punctuations are dispensable relative to some purposes of an inquiring community. However, the inquiring community usually has additional purposes.

If the inquiring community is a team of clinicians, their inquiry usually involves the consideration of several levels, among them 1) the dynamics between the parts of the system 2) the system itself 3) the relationship between the system and its environment, 4) the next higher order system and so on. That particular community of clinicians might want 1) functional explanations for the individuals: the purpose of his withdrawing/her nagging 2) an operational explanation for the system: Their nag/withdrawal cycle; 3) a functional explanation for the couple as a couple: they "nag-withdraw" each other to give his mother-in-law something to do since her husband died; 4) an operational explanation of that system: She nags, he withdraws, her
mother gets involved, then she stops nagging, she stops withdrawing and her mother gets distant.

Summary of the Review of Systems Theory

The Principles of Biological Autonomy and the presuppositions of Bateson are already highly suggestive of a theory of clinical psychology. I have tried to encourage this line of thought by choosing examples from human affairs to illustrate the basic points rather than, as Maturana, Bateson, and Varela have, examples from botany, zoology, and molecular biology.

The central concepts reviewed were the following:

From Bateson:

1. Life must be described using a language of pattern, not one of matter and energy.

2. Fundamental to all Life Sciences must be an appreciation of ecology.

From the Principles of Biological Autonomy:
3. The basic complementarity: all life forms exist autonomously and all life forms interact.

4. Organization and structure: autonomy in interaction is created through the interplay between unchanging forming principles and flexible responses to the environment.

5. Cognition: A life form's interaction with its environment is its knowledge of its environment.

6. Structural Coupling: The flexibility of a life form is limited by the more enduring patterns of relationship it established with its environment.

7. Higher order autonomous unities: the enduring relationships between living forms tend to acquire life and form of their own encompassing, informing and ennobling the lives of the components.

8. Operational and functional explanations: the complementary patterns of observation described in the principles of biological autonomy should also be reflected in the ways we organize our thoughts, in terms of operational explanations to explain autonomy processes, and in terms of functional explanations to explain interactions.
In the next chapter I re-examine the fundamentals of Adlerian Psychology organizing that review using these eight concepts from the Principles of Biological Autonomy.
CHAPTER III
THE INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ALFRED ADLER
AND A SUGGESTED REFINEMENT.

Introduction.

The purpose here is to use the principles of biological autonomy to strengthen and clarify Adler's theory and to refine it. The specific purpose is to develop a method for defining system levels in Adlerian terms.

In the previous chapter we reviewed the PBA. In this chapter we will review Adler's Individual Psychology using the eight central concepts from the previous chapter which summarized Varela's model.

In part one of this chapter, Adler's and Bateson's basic assumptions will be shown to correspond. The two basic Adlerian ideas of Life Style and Social Interest will be shown to capture the basic sense of the PBA and also to illuminate PBA concepts. It will also be shown how Adler's ideas about subjectivity provide an important and acknowledged missing dimension of Varela's model.

In part two, it will be shown that there is a certain precision in the PBA vocabulary that is missing in Adlerian
vocabulary. The PBA clearly distinguishes between one level of system and another and the relationship between adjacent levels. A way for Adlerian vocabulary to do the same will be proposed.

Part One: A Correspondence of Two Theories.

#1: Life must be described using a language of pattern, not one of matter and energy

Adler, like Bateson, was against materialistic metaphor. Here are Adler's words:

"Every semblance of causality in the psychical life is due to the tendency of many psychologists to present their dogma disguised in mechanistic or physical similies...It is plain that from a standpoint like this few of the fundamental varieties of man's psychical life can be observed." (Adler, 1964, page 13)

Like Bateson, Adler insisted on an aesthetic vocabulary. The concept Adler used to describe personality was life style or style of living. In the concept of "Life Style" the operative noun is "style," which is an aesthetic term whose meaning implies "pattern of patterns." The basic unit is
pattern, not something which can be weighed, measured or quantified.

#2: **Fundamental to all Life Sciences must be an appreciation of ecology.**

Adler not only acknowledged the connectedness of life, but went so far as to suggest that the extent to which anyone acknowledged that connectedness was a measure of mental health. To act as though one understood one's participation in the ecology of the community and the earth is to act with "Social Interest" or, to use the original German term, with "Gemeinschaftsgefühl." Adler described social interest in the following way:

> Social Interest is at the basis of any relationship of the child toward people, animals, plants and objects, and signifies the cohesion (die Verwachsenheit) with our life, the affirmation, the conciliation with it. (Ansbacher, 1980)

A more detailed discussion of the term appears below.

#3: **The basic complementarity: all life forms exist autonomously and all life forms interact.**
The PBA stressed that any autonomous entity should be understood in two separate, but complementary ways; one, in terms of its "innards," -- the internal processes; the other, in terms of the "actions" -- the entity as a simple whole interacting with the environment. Adler's idea of Life Style does include both the "innards" and the "actions" sides of the complementarity but does not explicitly separate them. The advantage of the PBA theory which does explicitly differentiate between innards and actions is that the theory implicitly calls attention to the boundary between the two. This boundary, which has no name in the theory, but which we will call "the autonomy line" defines a systems level.

Bateson's analogy for autonomy can be used to make the same point about complementary processes. Bateson said individuality was like a smoke ring. A smoke ring is a torus of air, twirling in on itself, made visible by smoke. (Bateson, 1977) It is the activity of the ring which creates the boundary. With a smoke ring there are two separate forms of movement. There is the process of the "innards," the swirling movement that creates the autonomy and there is the "action," which is the way the ring drifts through the air. Of course, in living forms, the swirling
motion is self-generated.

Adler's idea of style has a similar dual aspect. A person, like an artist, evolves an identity. And, at the same time, a person moves through the world maintaining that identity as style in a variety of contexts. However, the dual aspect is not explicit. At the end of this chapter an Alderian way of referring to the two kinds of motion separately will be proposed.

#4: **Organization and structure: autonomy in interaction is created through the interplay between unchanging forming principles and flexible responses to the environment.**

To understand this idea it is important to set the smoke ring analogy aside and go back to Bateson's thought experiment of what happens when you kick a dog (Bateson, 1972a). The dog responds for reasons that have more to do with the dog than with the kick. The dog's actions are asserting a truth about the dog's innards. This is an example of the interplay of organization and structure. It is also an example of the processes of self-definition and action.

Griffith and Powers, in *The Adlerian Lexicon* (1984),
define "Life Style" in a similar way emphasizing both sides of this interplay but not separating them out as we are recommending they should be in Adlerian theory. Nonetheless, both sides are signaled. Here is how they do it:

Life Style. This term in Adler's Individual Psychology is congruent with, but must be contrasted to, the terms "personality" and "ego" in other psychological systems. Adler first used the too-easily reified and misunderstood term "Life Plan" but abandoned it in favor of "Life-Style" in order to convey a sense of the creative, artistic side of the development of the unique individual. The Style of Living refers to (1) the person's characteristic way of operating in the social field, and (2) the basic convictions concerning self, others, and the world which form the person's schema of biased apperception. (Griffith and Powers, 1984, page 13)

This Adlerian definition of Life Style is similar to the PBA characterization of individuality as the interplay of organization and structure. Plastic structure is a person's "characteristic way of operating" in his or her context. Organization is the matrix of basic principles, or "convictions," around which all behavior is organized.
The Adlerian definition of Life Style clearly includes the idea of organization as a matrix of basic principles:

The Life Style is the "rule of rules" for the individual....not merely a collection of rules, it is the organization of all rules into a pattern which dominates not only the rules but all coping activity. (Shulman, 1973a, page 21)

The Adlerian understanding of Life Style also clearly includes a sense that self-consistency is not just a given, but is something achieved through action in the world. Here are Adler's words:

Every individual represents both a unity of personality and the individual fashioning of that unity. The individual is thus both the picture and the artist. (Adler, 1956, p. 177)

But individuality is established, once the picture is fashioned, so to speak, it is organization which pervades and shapes all expressions of self in the world. Turning again to the Adlerian Lexicon:
[The child's] opinion of life, which is at the bottom of his attitude to life and is neither shaped into words nor expressed in thought, is his own masterpiece. Thus, the child arrives at his law of movement which aids him after a certain amount of training to obtain a style of life, in accordance with which we see the individual thinking, feeling and acting throughout his whole life. (Adler, in Griffith and Powers, 1984, p. 145)

Every action is therefore understood in a double, complementary, sense. First, there is a private logic to every action, an expression of internal consistency. In addition, there is also a common sense, how the action plays out in the consensual world. (Griffith and Powers, 1984) Rudolph Dreikurs used to demonstrate this private meaning, which differed from the common sense, by asking in a therapy group why someone did what he did. He would have others in the group guess and many common sensical reasons would come forward. "Is that the reason?" "No." "Is that the reason?" "No." Then Dreikurs would ask, "May I guess?" If the person said yes, Dreikurs would say, "Could it be that you...etc"...and propose a private reason. If the person showed a spontaneous startle response, along with a smile, what Dreikurs called "a recognition reflex," then Dreikurs
would know he had guessed what he called, "the hidden reason." He had discovered how the particular behavior was consistent with the rest of the personality. (Robert L. Powers, personal communication, 1977)

#5. Cognition: A life form's interaction with its environment is its knowledge of its environment.

The rule of rules is achieved and maintained in terms of what people do. It is also manifested in terms of what people think they know.

In the PBA cognition is a creature's own experience of the plasticity of its own structure. A creature's way of being in the world is "perturbed" from an optimum condition and the creature's efforts to "compensate," or restore the optimum is cognition.

This is a broad definition of cognition. Whether someone is having their eardrum vibrated and is interpreting their body's efforts to stabilize the eardrum as "sound," or whether someone is having their self-definition vibrated by a court summons from the tax bureau and are interpreting their attempts to re-balance their metabolism as the "meaning" of that experience, in either case, in this model,
it is still cognition, the experience of perturbation and compensation.

It is the same in Adler's scheme:

Perception can never be compared with a photographic apparatus; it always contains something of the individual's uniqueness... The child perceives in his environment only that which for some reason fits his previously formed uniqueness... what a person perceives, and how he does so constitutes his particular uniqueness. Perception is more than a mere physical process, it is a psychological function, and from the way in which a man perceives, one can draw profound conclusions regarding his inner self. (Adler, 1956, page 210)

**Subjectivity**

A particularly important form of cognition, for psychotherapy, is subjectivity, that private and most unique inner experience. The PBA does not directly explore the concept of subjectivity -- the autonomous systems experience of its own autonomy --, even though Varela identifies it as a central theme. (Varela, 1978, note on page xiii) It is as
though too much groundwork needed yet to be laid before the PBA could take up the issue.

However, Adler's theory is a theory of the mechanisms of subjectivity. (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, in Adler, 1956). What might make Adler's theory interesting to family therapists working with Varela's model is that Adler describes individual subjectivity as though it operated according to the principles of biological autonomy. Subjectivity, in the Adlerian theory, is what happens when structure operates purposefully to insure that a unique organization is realized in the world.

Consider the role Adler assigns to feelings and emotions:

The feelings of an individual bear the impress of the meaning he gives to life and of the goal he has set for his strivings....The emotions are ...psychological movement forms, limited in time. They appear always where they serve a purpose corresponding to the life method or guiding line of the individual. Their purpose is to bring about a change of the situation in favor of the individual (Adler, 1956, page 227).

Similarly, consciousness is also understood in Adler's
theory in terms of its function as a "special device of the psyche."

The biological significance of consciousness as well as unconsciousness rests in the fact that these states enable action according to a self-consistently oriented life plan...Even consciousness is merely a device of the psyche... Thus every conscious manifestation of the psyche points to the unconscious, fictional, final goal, just as does the unconscious striving, in so far as one comprehends it rightly. The frequent antithesis of conscious and unconscious impulses is an antithesis of means only, but irrelevant for the final purpose of enhancing the self. (Adler in Ansbacher and Ansbacher, 1956, page 233)

Adler explains subjectivity as that which is least consensual and most unique. He pictures it as a person's experience of the meaning of his or her own life. In the following extended quote Adler develops his theory of subjectivity:

A goal of overcoming as an abstract formulation is unacceptable to the human mind. We need a much more concrete formulation. Thus each individual arrives at
a concrete goal of overcoming through his creative power, which is identical with the self. As soon as we speak of goal striving, when we comprehend the concrete goal-concept better, an immense difficulty appears, namely that we are dealing with thousands of variations, always with a unique case, with a unique concrete setting of the goal.

The dynamic value of mental, emotional, and attitudinal movements consists of their direction toward, or determination by, a goal which has for the individual the meaning of securing for him what he regards as his position in life. Only in this way can we understand these goal-directed movements: as the individual's efforts to secure for himself what he interprets, or misinterprets as success, or as his way of overcoming a minus-situation in order to attain a plus-position.

The goal of superiority with each individual is personal and unique. It depends on the meaning he gives to life. The meaning is not a matter of words. It is built up in his style of life and runs through it like a strange melody of his own creation. (Adler, 1956, p. 180-181)
Finally, subjectivity as a whole is purposeful. Every interaction with the world supports or challenges the private logic. But every subjective processes, every thought and feeling, tends to support and maintain the private logic. The Adlerian way of characterizing this homeostatic tendency is to refer to imaginary end point of this striving, a "Fictional Final Goal."

The Adlerian, Bernard Shulman defines Fictional Final Goal this way:

The Life Style, which we have also called the "Unique Law of Movement" is always movement toward the goal; yet, the goal itself is the nexus of the Life Style. The pattern swirls around it and tends toward it. The Life Style is organized around the goal and this concept leads to the Adlerian concept of "Unity of Personality." The goal itself is the unifier, the pattern is the organization of the uniting process. (Shulman, 1973a, page 24)

And Shulman, in presenting this definition, offers this from Adler:
The goal of the mental life becomes its governing principle, its causa finalis. Here we have the root of the unity of the personality, of the indiviudality. It does not matter what the source of its energies may have been. Not their origin but their end, their ultimate goal, constitutes their individual character." (Adler, in Shulman, 1973a, page 24)

Varela did discuss an idea like fictional final goal, a subjective orientation that is closed to the world but also determines action in the world. He used an analogy developed by Maturana of an airplane landing on instruments. Onlookers would say, "What a fine landing." But the pilot would say, "I know nothing of the landing. I only moved certain controls so as to coordinate certain readings on my instruments (quoted in Varela, 1978, page 250). The airplane proceeds as if it were pointed in a certain direction, its fictional final goal, which in the case of a successful landing, happens to correspond to the world outside of the airplane.

The presupposition that all subjectivity, all behavior, thoughts, feelings and sensitivities sustain the life style orientation and reflect the basic coherence has produced some powerful assessment tools for Adlerians. Adler noted
that a person's earliest recollections, because they represent a person's selection from millions of possible moments to save and savor can be interpreted for themes of that coherence. (Mosak, 1977)

Dreikurs used the assumption of coherence to develop an assessment technique called "two points on a line." (Terner and Pew, 1978). If a clinician took two apparently contradictory bits of behavior and sifted them for a unifying theme, the theme revealed would be a basic one. Take for an example, the behaviors of a young girl in school who, in one class is her teacher's favorite, in another class is leader in a project and, in yet another class, is a terrible distracter from the lesson plan. In all instances she has achieved a certain amount of special attention. "To always get special attention," then, is the formulation Adlerians would use to tentatively characterize her fictional final goal. Further, if there were circumstances in which she did not achieve her goal, we would expect her to create compensatory excuses for herself. We would expect her to spontaneously justify her subjective sense of failure by saying something like," If I had more expensive clothes..."

In Adlerian terms, all life processes, including
subjectivity, are organized in terms of an individual's striving toward his or her fictional final goal. In the PBA, all cognition and all subjective processes occur as compensation for perturbance in the direction of maintaining principles. These are equivalent concepts.

Part two: A Refinement in Adlerian Theory.

At this point in our survey of the Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler we will find that the principles of biological autonomy suggest a specific refinement.

#6. Structural Coupling: The flexibility of a life form is limited by the more enduring patterns of relationship it establishes with its environment.

# 7: Higher order autonomous unities: the enduring relationships between living forms tend to acquire live and form of their own encompassing, informing and ennobling the lives of the components.

We will compare the concept of structural coupling to Adler's concept of gemeinschaftsgefühl or social interest. There is no well developed Adlerian equivalent to "higher
order autonomous unities." The idea of "family life style" had been proposed by Danica Deutsch but not developed. It will be referred to in the discussion below.

Structural coupling is the process by which higher order autonomous unities are created. It is the stuff of ecologies. The rabbit and fox population, for example, are structurally coupled. A marriage is a kind of structural coupling. Structural coupling is a strict way of saying "co-operation." It occurs whenever two autonomous systems modify their style of operation so that, instead of merely operating, they are co-operating. They form a higher order autonomous unity while each simultaneously preserves individual autonomy.

The nearest Adlerian equivalent to structural coupling is the concept of "Social Interest" or "Gemeinschaftsgefühl." "Social Interest" is the preferred English translation of "Gemeinschaftsgefühl." Other translations used are "Social Feeling" and "Community Feeling," (Adler, 1956).

Social interest is a complex idea in its own right and needs to be defined first in its own terms. We will start with the original German term, "Gemeinschaftsgefühl." The cognate words of "gemeinschaftsgefühl" directly suggest the
refinement we will propose in Adlerian theory. "Gefuhl" translates as "a feeling for," or "a responsiveness to." "Gemeinschaft" translates as "community," in the sense of "tribe." Therefore, a feeling for, or a rapport, with the community of which one is a contributing part is Gemeinschaftsgefuhl. The "Gemeinschaft," meaning the community or the system or that which is the object of those feelings of rapport, is not yet a separate concept in Adlerian theory. We propose that it become one.

The difference between Gemeinschaftsgefuhl and structural coupling is a difference in precision. Structural coupling can refer to the specific co-operators which co-participate to form a specific higher order autonomous unity. In contrast, "Gemeinschaftsgefuhl," tends to be a measure of the extent to which an individual is coupled with the entire human gemeinschaft under the aspect of all time (Adler, 1956). It seems to be limited only to that very broad usage.

One could criticize the concept of Gemeinschaftsgefuhl by simply paraphrasing Adler's comment about the abstract nature of the "goal of overcoming," quoted above in the section on subjectivity:

The idea of feeling for the whole of human kind for all
time is unacceptable to the human mind. We need a much more concrete formulation.... how each individual acquires a feeling for the requirements of the specific situation of which he is a part....As soon as we speak of feeling for the human community, an immense difficulty appears, namely that we are dealing with thousands of variations, always with a unique case, with a unique concrete setting.

By Adler's own standard, Gemeinschaftsgefühl is unwieldy and something is needed to capture the "unique concrete setting" of each case.

We would propose that the problem is remedied by making "Gemeinschaft" a term in itself, such that in each situation there is a concrete Gemeinschaft to which Gemeinschaftsgefühl refers. "Gemeinschaft" would be the Adlerian equivalent of what Varela calls a "higher order autonomous system," a system formed by the coupling of component autonomous systems, with an organization, structure and cognitive realm. Under this modification of Adlerian theory, the assessment of gemeinschaftsgefühl in any lifestyle would be an assessment of the relationship between an individual's striving for self-fulfillment and the needs of the various specific communities to which that individual is
a contributing part.

Adler himself used "Gemeinschaft" to describe biological systems. Adler wrote that "the individual becomes a self-consistent Gemeinschaft in which all parts cooperate for a similar purpose." He also referred to the "Gemeinschaft of the cells" in the body (Ansbacher, 1980).

"Gemeinschaft," would be a concept which meets Bateson's preliminary list of criteria for a "Mind", among which were the requirement that it be an aggregate of interacting parts, triggered by aesthetic criteria, getting "energy" from collateral sources, circular patterns of determination. (Bateson, 1979, p. 102).

#8: Operational and functional explanations: the complementary patterns of observation described in the principles of biological autonomy should also be reflected in the ways we organize our thoughts, in terms of operational explanations to explain autonomy processes and in terms of functional explanations to explain interactions.

With the separate term, Gemeinschaft, it is now possible for Adlerian formulations to reflect the dual perspective inherent in the way we observe autonomous systems.
By proposing this elaboration of "life style" into the dual perspective view of * = life style/ Gemeinschaft, we would be giving Adlerian theory a way of specifying levels of system. Each system shows a "style" when considered in its relationship to the encompassing Gemeinschaft. Each system is a Gemeinschaft composed of components, each of which operates with a characteristic and purposeful style.

"Style" and "Gemeinschaft" will refer to separate domains of observation. For an analogy, think of the difference between the United States as a homeland (Gemeinschaft) and the United States as a member of the international community of nations (Style). The same autonomous entity but two very different ways of understanding and characterizing it.

There is already within Adlerian literature a sense of complementary ways to look at interaction and cooperation. Consider Adler's definition of a marriage:

It can easily be shown that love and marriage are one side of cooperation -- not a cooperation for the welfare of two persons only, but a cooperation also for the welfare of mankind." (Adler, 1958, page 263)
Here Adler is insisting that a higher order unity exists, the marriage itself. Furthermore, he suggests that there is a relationship between marriage as a whole and the even larger community and that relationship is also characterized by the style-related consideration of more or less social interest.

The idea that a marriage may have a style was advanced by the New York Adlerian Danica Deutsch in 1961. She proposed a family life style. Here is how Deutsch describes "Family Life Style":

It was in the course of my work with family groups that I initially became aware of a family life style, comparable to Adler's concept of the individual life style. By meeting with the family as a unit we are able to perceive the family gestalt in vivo, while the individual life styles of the family members are sometimes visible in statui nascendi. (Deutsch, 1962)

The strongest example, however, of the Adlerian analysis of Gemeinschaft as a Gemeinschaft is in the Adlerian practice of the assessment of the family constellation. (Shulman, 1973b) In this practice, a written description of the style of an individual is developed, for clinical purposes, by
inquiring into a person's memories of himself in his family in his formative years. The information gathered is summarized by the clinician who tries to include both the subjective view of the client as well as the clinician's interpretation of what actually happened based on the overall pattern. The clinician's guess about the overall pattern is a guess about the nature of a Gemeinschaft, in this case, the family, to which an individual contributes and in relationship to which an individual defines his "self." The elements of the family Gemeinschaft to which Adlerians are sensitive include the pervasive values in the family, the emotional atmosphere of the family, the sibling interrelationships, ordinal positions of siblings, guiding lines for masculinity and femininity, parental favoritism, parental models, and models of cooperation. (Mosak and Shulman, 1977) Shulman has pointed out that, using these sensitivities, Adlerians have done family therapy for years but never written about it (Shulman, personal communication, 1980).

What I have hoped to suggest here is a small shift in the definition system of Adler's Individual Psychology: the addition of the concept of gemeinschaft and the linking of that concept into a complementarity with the concept of lifestyle. This shift introduces the idea of levels into the
Adlerian framework, and with that allows for a more precise definition of pathology.

The implications of this change will be the topic of the next chapter.
CHAPTER IV

IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIFE-STYLE/GEMEINSCHAFT COMPLEMENTARITY.

Introduction.

In this chapter we will explore some of the implications the Life Style/ Gemeinschaft complementarity as they relate to the Adlerian theory of Pathology. We will suggest a way to define pathology using complementary perspectives and we will develop such a model. For one half of the complementarity we will use the Dreikurs "Four Goals of Misbehavior" model. For the other half we will use a new model called "Four Stages of Deterioration of Cooperation."

Pathology

Neurotic behavior, as currently defined in the Adlerian model, is behavior that fails to win cooperation. People who behave neurotically are said to be deficient in social interest. Neurotic behavior is said to be the selfish and desperate behavior of disheartened individuals who are trying to establish their identity in a world which is against them. Their behaviors show a lack of sensitivity, even a hostility, for the system of which they are a part.
In Adler's own words:

All mistaken answers to the tasks of life are...the attempts of more or less discouraged people to solve their life-problems without the use of cooperation or social interest. (Adler, in Ansbacher and Ansbacher, 1956, page 299)

This is clear as far as it goes, but in the elaboration and application of the concept, it is necessary to identify the system of which the people behaving neurotically are a part. It is a particular system which declares the behavior of its member to be pathological. It is the opinion of the particular system that the intentions of the "pathological" member are toxic.

Whether or not any behavior has sufficient social interest is not necessarily a judgement made by a clinician, but it certainly is a judgement made by the living context for that behavior. The phenomenon of pathology, the occurrence of behavior said to be informed by insufficient social interest involves more than just individual behavior, it also involves the opinion and the response consequent on that opinion on the part of a Gemeinschaft.

There are evident connections between the new ideas advanced here and the PBA. Social interest, the lack of which is said
to be the measure of pathological intention, is a kind of structural coupling. Structural coupling is a relationship between systems that form higher order systems. Pathological behavior, behavior informed by insufficient social interest, is a process that tends to be --to coin a new term for PBA -- structurally uncoupling, tending toward the dis-integration of the higher order composite unity.

Structural coupling is a manner of relationship. Therefore, it is not enough to speak only of the pathological intent of the identified patient(s) in a system. In a pathological situation other parts of the composite system (acting as normal to preserve themselves and the whole) work against the compensations of the "pathological components" to produce a counter-pathological movement -- which is also part of the pathology. When this happens, the compensation for perturbation of all parts-- a process necessary for survival of the system and its components -- makes the perturbation worse. This is a similar idea to one proposed by the MRI Brief Therapy School (Watzlawick, Weakland, Fisch, 1974): the problem is a mistaken solution strategy.

Here is how this definition of pathology appears in strict Adlerian vocabulary. Notice how it addresses only the intentions of the "pathological" component, but also how it
describes a pattern of compensation for perturbation.

[Adler] posited that the goal of success pulls the individual forward toward mastery and the overcoming of obstacles. He observed that, for socially-interested individuals, the goal of superiority is on the useful side of life and contributes to the developing human community. He further described his observation of the discouraged person who, operating on the useless side of life under the burden of increased feelings of inferiority, makes the error of supposing that (since he feels inferior to others) his task is to attain a position of superiority over them. Since this movement only invites the antagonism of others, it contributes to his further defeat and creates a disturbance in the life of the community. The discouraged person may express his superiority striving in self-elevation, depreciation of others, and self-aggrandizement, countering his immense feelings of inferiority with a pattern of compensatory pretenses to superiority which may be termed a "superiority complex." (Griffith and Powers, 1984, p.22)

The description fits the situation of someone caught in a pathological system. The judgement as to whether behavior is socially interested or not originates in the encompassing context for the behavior. Even though counter-pressure comes from the environment, the source of responsibility for the behavior is the individual. If behavior undesirable to the community is still forced on the community inviting antagonism, then the individual initiating the behavior is said to be wrong to persist. (Dreikurs, 1953, p. 8)

The new model to be proposed is an expanded Adlerian view of pathology which encompasses the traditional Adlerian view. The original view considered only the style of the
participants, although it implied the values of then encompassing Gemeinschaft. This new view specifies both the role of internal actions of the higher order composite unity, or Gemeinschaft, in defining pathology, as well as the interactional styles of the component unities.

This new way of looking at pathology involves a new kind of complementarity. The kind of complementarity we have spoken of here-to-fore identified the relationship between inside and outside of one autonomous unity, as for example, the relationship between the domestic affairs of the United States and the international style, or, to use a more intimate example, the relationship between the internal relationships of a family and the style of the family in its community (or in its extended family.) This additional kind complementarity is an inside-out version, or the previous one, so to speak. It describes the relationship between stylistic, i.e., purposeful, movement of autonomous components and the whole which they from when as they come together. It is "the Governor's Conference" perspective, the relationship between all of the States, as autonomous unities and the Country as a whole.

Here is the proposed new Adlerian, complementary definition of pathology:
From the perspective of the interests of the whole, pathology is a threatened breakdown or strain in the cooperation of the components. From the perspective of the interests of the parts, pathology is the weaken ability of any part to maintain itself while also contributing to the whole.

Here are some of the corollaries:

1) The actions of every autonomous creature (individual, couple, family, etc.) are always in the direction of self-maintenance and actualization.

2) These actions may or may not contribute to the maintenance and actualization of the higher order autonomous creature of which it is a part.

3) The requirements of the Gemeinschaft will put pressure on the components to modify their behavior so that the Gemeinschaft may continue to realize its higher order self.

4) One particular kind of pressure used in human affairs is moral pressure. The declaration from one part of the gemeinschaft that pathology is lodged in another is also a
sign of pathology in the whole gemeinschaft.

In the next part of the chapter we will construct a model using these complementary senses of pathology.

The "Four Goals" Model: The Functional Explanations.

Dreikurs' invented a model of psychological assessment called "The Four Goals of Misbehavior" (Dreikurs, 1967b) in order to teach people to see purposiveness, intelligence and intentionality in children's misbehavior. He claimed that the four goals could be found in Adler's writing and that he simply organized them into a model. (Terner and Pew, page 157) The model has become widely popular, a testimony to its usefulness.

In the Four Goals model, all emphasis is on individual goals. Yet even as Dreikurs elaborates his model we can see him evoking the complementary perspective, an operational explanation combining the actions of the participants into a pattern that describes a whole.

Let us review Dreikurs' presentation of his own model of functional explanations (attributions of purpose) with a sensitivity for the implied operational explanations.
Dreikurs introduces his model in the first paragraph. In the second paragraph he discusses the model as though the locus of control were the child, not the parent. However, by the end of the third paragraph he has come to distributing responsibility equally between parent and child. As you read these paragraphs you can, perhaps, see, as in a shadow, the complementary model I will propose later. Finally, and parenthetically, those readers familiar with systems theory will note that this surprisingly contemporary analysis of interactions was written in 1959 from a model first published in 1940! (Terner and Pew, page 156, note #23)

Here is Dreikurs own description of the "four goals" model of disturbing behavior in children:

The accuracy of the communication which exists between a misbehaving child and the adult is startling. We can distinguish four goals of a disturbing or deficient normal child. Every child tries to belong; but if he becomes discouraged, as all our children do, he develops wrong ideas about his possibilities to find his place. Then he (1) either tries to get attention and service, finding his place through what he can get; or, (2) he tries to demonstrate his own power if the parents attempt to stop forcefully his demand for attention. If he feels completely beaten down and disliked, then he may try (3) to get even, to hurt as he feels hurt, as his only means to make himself count. If he is utterly discouraged and expects nothing but failure, then he (4) may flaunt real or assumed deficiencies in order to be left alone, thereby avoiding more painful evidence of his worthlessness.

The children are not aware of the purpose in their
misbehavior; nevertheless they are very systematic in achieving their end. The adults are also completely unaware, in most cases, of the child's purpose in misbehaving, and consequently succumb to the child's provocation. The child does not appeal to their logic, but to their emotions; and this appeal is usually done skillfully and effectively. It is the evoked emotion in the adult which corresponds to the child's goal and makes the adult such an easy victim. When the parent feels annoyed, he is inclined to communicate this annoyance either by scolding, advising, admonishing, or coaxing. Little does he realize that in doing so, he is merely following the child's direction and demands, namely to give special attention. On the other hand, when the parent is provoked, feeling that he cannot let the child "do that to him," then he not only invites the child to show him that he can, but also becomes inveigled in a power contest in which the child is usually not the loser.

When the parent feels deeply hurt and cannot understand how anyone could be so mean, then he only responds to the child's intentions, namely to be hurt. And, as a rule, he retaliates and thereby provokes the child to hurt even further. And when the adult, parent or teacher, feels like throwing up his arms in despair because he does not know what to do with the child, then he merely responds to the child's desire to be left alone. Many children convince the adults that they are incapable, and induce them to treat them in such a way that both become more convinced of their inability.

Each relationship is a closed system, in which the responses to one stimulus are the stimuli to the next response of the same kind. There is no corrective feedback possible since both parties have agreed on the premises of their interaction, on the purpose of each individual act, fitting into the pattern of their definite, although unconscious, agreement. (Dreikurs, 1967, page 274-275)

There are four categories of intentions: attention, power, revenge and what Dreikurs called "assumed disability." The diagnostic indicators are the feelings of the adults and the response of the children when the adult responds initially.
Dreikurs says that each relationship is a closed system. In the next section we will examine the same four categories of intentions and behaviors as though each pattern created a system.

Four stages in the deterioration of cooperation:

The operational explanations.

In the following paragraphs we will describe the complementary model implied by the original model. We will work with the following theoretical complementarities:

1. To consider individual's style only is to conclude that pathology is a failing in social interest or gemeinschaftsgefühl; to consider the organization of the whole is to conclude that pathology is a strain in the cooperative fabric of the gemeinschaft.

2. For the individual, the greater the discouragement the more desperate the compensatory striving for belongingness; for the whole, the greater the strain in the gemeinschaft the more constrained and limited participants must become in respect to other ways of contributing and the more narrowly and rigidly their striving must be directed toward
remediating the strain and maintaining the whole.

3. For the individual, the more desparate the compensatory striving the more rigidly the focus on difficult, inappropriate, and unrealizable concrete goals. For the whole, the more desparate the strain the more the participants become pre-occupied with each other and the less capable they are of cooperating to accomplish the tasks set by life for the whole. The system as a whole tightens down, becomes pathological and is less able to contribute to the larger gemeinschaft of which it is a part. An example of this is Adler's favorite metaphor for marriages.

Adler tells the story of an old village ritual in which a to-be-married couple are asked to cut a log in half using a two-handed saw. Only if they cooperate equally can they succeed. If one tries to dominate, the saw will bind. If one tries to give less than equal work, the log won't be cut. One point of the analogy is that when cooperation breaks down in a family, the family itself can become a drain on the community.

4. As progressively more patterns of interaction are caught up in the various kinds of dis-cooperation less of the system is able to be involved in positive cooperation.
Therefore, one could also conceptualize the deterioration of cooperation as growing area of dis-cooperation, growing like a malignancy, within a system.

The complex implications of these idea will be explored in the next chapter, but first let us describe the complementary model.

The four stages of deterioration of cooperation in a Gemeinschaft.

**Stage zero: Gemeinschaftgefühl.**

This stage, numbered "zero," doesn't count. There is nothing remarkable about it as far as pathology is concerned. All participants are cooperating. Attention is focused on the needs of the whole. The needs of the various individual selves and the coherency of the whole is being maintained "automatically" through non-conscious action.

**Stage One: "Attention" or "Distraction."**

This is the first shift in the deterioration of cohesion and community-mindedness. It is the beginning of the shift in the component's style toward self-centeredness and the
first challenge to system level cooperation. It is the emergence of dichotomous thinking: "me or them." In the "Four Goals" model this shift occurs when a child wants to distract a parent's attention away from the task at hand and towards his or her more personal needs. In the "Gemeinschaft" Model it occurs when there is a disagreement about next steps.

People momentarily remove their attention from a common task and attend to each other. The diagnostic sign of attention getting behavior in children is a feeling on the part of the adult of annoyance. If one looks at this transaction considering the interests of the Gemeinschaft as a whole, it appears that the members are vaguely disagreeing about what they, as a team, are going to allow to happen next.

In the Four Goals model, attention changing negotiations are initiated by children against parents. When the Four Goals model is put into complementarity with the Four Stages model, these attention changing negotiations can be launched by any part at any time. For example, a parent asks a child a question and the child changes the subject. This behavior is an attention changing transaction, also part of stage one phenomena.
A simple example can be found in most conversations. Most conversations are constantly tended in quite, unobtrusive ways. People make decisions about when to talk and when to listen and so on. However, if someone is unhappy about the flow of conversation they can interrupt by saying something like, "That's not what I meant," or "Would you repeat that?" These comments signal a shift from an inobtrusive tending of the relationship to an insistence on conscious, intentional tending, or "attending." This shift to "attending" is an example of the most early stage of deterioration of cooperation.

It is important to not that a stage one shift is not in itself inherently pathological. Such corrective adjustments are made constantly in everyday life. What may be pathological is the inability of the system to make the correction successfully, as when, say, an automatic transmission gets stuck in a lower gear. The process itself may sound like a small thing but people caught in neurotic transactions work in it constantly and, for participants, the constant tending to each other is tiresome.

**Stage Two: "Power" or "Confrontation."**

When the simple request for attention and special
consideration does not produce results, the request is escalated a demand. Stage Two is a disagreement over who has the power to settle the disagreements of Stage one. The question of "how can we resolve this?" fades and the antithetical mode of apperception Adler spoke of -- "You or me" as opposed to "we" -- comes to the fore. The problem-solving resources of the participants become pre-occupied with questions of win or lose, your way or mine, superiority versus inferiority and, quite often, masculinity versus feminity.

The division that forms at this stage is the division between the needs of the individuals separately, on the one-hand and the needs of the group as a whole, on the other. The participants fight because they believe the only alternative is to give in. They can not quit because the needs of the whole will not let them quit. As they fight they ransom the needs the the whole to press their own demands which they believe to be paramount.

The difference between a pathological confrontation and a healthy one, according to basic Adlerian theory, is the presence or absence of discouragement. When participants are discouraged, the confrontation loses the quality of being a fight between opponents loyal to a common cause. In so far
as the fight is understood as one between loyal opponents there is no discouragement and no pathology. The pathological power struggle is marked by distrust, again there is that stuck in a lower gear quality.

Stage Three: "Abuse" or "Retribution."

When the assumption of good faith and the belief in the worthiness of the opponents is dropped, when appeal to mutual interest is weakened, the fight becomes personalized. When the opponents suspect disloyalty in each other to the common cause they demand retribution in the name of that common cause. They abuse each other in the name of justice.

The individuals in an abusive transaction are discouraged and retaliating actively (or retaliating passively by giving misleading pretenses to cooperation.) The individual shows what Adler called "a hesitation because of fear of defeat" (Griffith and Powers, 1984).

Questions of integrity are even more heightened in Stage Three. Inevitably, if I (or anyone) lose a power struggle and I feel forced to contribute to a project that violates my integrity I feel pain, injury, and insult. If I cannot leave the field and I am being abused, I will find some way
to retaliate.

The test of transactions at this level is pain and attack, although these signs are sometimes carefully hidden. To understand the attacks at this level, it is important to consider the overriding value system of the Gemeinschaft, which is still operative, and which, as a context, determines and defines the weapons. One example comes to mind of a family which had invested itself heavily in religion. When the son hurt the father by saying things about him at school, the father retaliated by praying for the son in Church. While the father couldn't actually damn his son, he could declare his son damned and in need of help.

Stage Four: Reciprocal Rejection.

Reciprocal Rejection is close to death for the Gemeinschaft. It is essentially a pretense of relationship. It is the very least interaction that can be comfortably born between interactants; consequently it is very intense and exhausting at points of contact. It is like Cold War. For each party, to open up for more interaction is to open up for personal attacks. Rejection is a mode of coping that seems to be a better alternative than damaging and exhausting retaliation.
Indicators are negative spaces, the feelings, thoughts and attitudes that are not there but should be there, and the numbness and exhaustion that comes from keeping strong feelings at bay. There are also intermittent flashes of great intensity and pain.

Examples of this sort of transaction abound. Divorce is a good example. So also is the "divorce" that happens between parents and minor children, the turning over of custody to State agencies. The relationship between a scapegoat and the originating community is probably also an example. Finally, probably many of the forms of what is called "cut-off" in the Bowen model of family therapy (Bowen, 1978) are examples of Stage Four.

The term, "Rejection," does not appear in Dreikur's individual model of the four goals. In his model Dreikurs defined Stage Four as "assumed disability," or "assumed inadequacy." His theory was that the child assumed a pretense of being inadequate so he or she would be left alone. The child was said to be so discouraged that she didn't want to be included or asked to try something that would only end in failure.
The term, "rejection," would seem to me to capture that intention more clearly, although it would not imply a specific mechanism, as does Dreikurs' term. Possibly assumed inadequacy is the only way a child, helpless to live on her own, can reject a parent — by forcing the parent to reject her. Adults and teens have many other ways to achieve rejection, not the least of which is to appear undesirable.

Conclusion

The Stages and Goals model provides a map of progressive stages of pathology. It does so in a way that assumes that "pathological," or non-cooperative behavior is a contribution to a general interactional and pathological logic. How this model may be used is the topic of the next chapter.
CHAPTER V
HOW THE STAGES AND GOALS MODEL MAY BE USED.

Introduction

In this chapter we will review ways to use the Stages and Goals model to explain systemic interaction. We will describe how, according to the model, systems define their own boundaries and how the clinician can define a system to be worked with in a way that respects that self-definition. We will describe how the clinician positions himself in relationship to the system being worked with. We will also describe how the clinician can use this model to create maps of interactive patterns within the systems being considered. Finally, we will examine how the model can be used to help devise an intervention. We will start with how systems define their own boundaries.

The Pathological System: The Protesting System.

The PBA describes how areas of autonomy emerge by their own designing as part of a general ecological process. It is a theory of self-separating realms in an otherwise interconnected ecology. Pathological systems also declare and define themselves. Furthermore, pathological systems structure themselves in ways that reflect the nature of
pathology.

The idea of pathology as "self-declared" is a dimension of Adlerian theory. In Adlerian theory, symptoms are understood as "strengthened devices to fulfill an inner demand." "Strengthened devices" means that the normal devices humans use to transact with Life are exaggerated. A symptom is a sign that someone is working harder than normal to accomplish something. Along these same lines, Adlerian theory describes the "Neuroses" (meaning, in a particular unified usage, all forms of mental disturbance and criminal behavior) as a form of protest. (Adler, 1956). To protest something is to take a position with such emphasis that others are forced into interaction along the terms of that position.

In the complementarity of the Stages and Goals Model, situations of "pathology" emerge as a form of protest and counter-protest, and as a strain in the cooperative community. When a component of a system begins to emphasize its own identity over and against the requirements of other components, or of the whole -- at least, when that is so in the opinion held by parts of the system -- then the system begins to work against itself. There is no telling which action is protest and which is counter-protest in this
model. All that is said is that, when protest and counter-protest occur, there is a strain in cooperation and diminution of productivity.

Since there is no telling how something gets started, situations of pathology are said to "emerge." In this Stages and Goals Model, pathology emerges in stages as levels of protest build on each other and call more attention to themselves. Pathology is more "emerged" as more "intentional consciousness," that particular "strengthened device" of the psyche meant to solve problems, becomes more and more pre-occupied with the methods of protest and less occupied with the issues of protest. Pathology is what happens when a problem begins to compound rather than resolve.

Psychopathology is the complex of extraneous problems which interfere with the solution of the basic problems of human social living. This complex of extra problems, in the manner of a clamor about a protest about a protest, announces itself in the general consciousness and thereby defines and declares a particular kind a system, one in which cooperation toward communal tasks has broken down. Rather than call it a "Pathological system," we would suggest the less evaluative and more descriptive term, the "Protesting system." A protesting system is one that has the effect of
calling attention to itself on the grounds that it isn't working to its own satisfaction. It is a system whose method of compensation for perturbance presses demands on its context that are interpreted as being excessive. The protesting system includes everyone who assumes an attitude toward or against the core issues or the methods of protest and does so in such a way that their own attitude feeds back into the protesting system.

The "Relevant" System: The Clinical System.

It is generally agreed that systems based therapy is not defined by who is in the consulting room but rather by how the therapist conceptualizes who is actively involved in the problem. (Haley, 1971). As an extension of this premise, system therapists find that the relevant system for therapy may often go beyond the boundaries of the nuclear family. Some therapists prefer a three-generation conceptualization. (Whittaker, 1982). Some systems theory writers have emphasized the role of the family in the homeostasis of larger systems (Coppersmith, 1983) and the role of the referring person in the homeostasis of the family. (Selvini-Palazzoli, Boscolo, Cecchin, & Prata, 1980a). Many insist that the therapist be included in the relevant system. (DeShazer, 1982)
In an idea similar, to the one to be introduced here, Hoffman suggested that a therapist might even want to think of a series of nested contexts and/or systems, each of which has its own characteristic set of dynamics which the therapist must work through, like layers of an onion, in order to reach the core dynamics of the family. (Hoffman, 1883)

The proposal here is that the "protesting system," may or may not include all the members of a nuclear family and it may also include the nuclear family and many more besides. The protesting system includes everyone one who has "feelings" about how things should turn out. Or, to use Bateson's suggestion to the effect that feelings are a kind of principle, (Bateson, 1972b) we would say that a protesting system should include everyone whose involvement is a matter of personal or professional principle.

Having a stake in the outcome of a problem in not necessarily a justification to be included in the therapy. The decision of whom to include is a clinical decision to be made on a case-by-case basis. We would distinguish the protesting system, meaning those engaged with problem and the related protests, from the clinical system, meaning
those with whom the therapist wants involvement.

In forming a clinical system, the therapist is creating an autonomous system within a protesting system. The creation of a clinical system is a way of entering a protesting system that is simultaneously part of the protest and not part of the protest. When people are excluded who want to counter-protest, then the act of excluding them is not neutral. On the other hand, the act of including people and engaging them equally is a way of accepting contradictory protests simultaneously. It is, obviously, in itself, a unifying act.

Considerations in Defining the Clinical System:
Pressure Areas in the Map of Emotional Atmosphere.

Structural models have been suggested to help a therapist organize his understanding of those family-and-larger system models. Coppersmith (1983) has suggested using the three triangle categories developed by Minuchin (1974). Hoffman (1983) suggested there are inner and outer rings to the presenting system and defined those rings in terms of roles. In the inner ring was the family alone; in the middle ring, the family and therapists; in the outer ring, the referring context.
One implication of the Stages and Goals Model is that there are lines of distinction that occur spontaneously within the protesting system that can be used as structural guidelines. Rings may be defined according to the quality and intensity of the protest. At low levels, the intention of protest is to control how conscious attention will be directed. When disagreement becomes a power struggle, the principle issue is compounded by the question of who will have power to decide. If people begin to fight unfairly they can start to justify mutual abuse, which is yet another argument. Finally, in the most intense area of protest, participants refuse to engage and refuse to drop the issue and they mutually imprison each other in their terrible relationship.

As protest spreads, it spreads first in its less intense forms. In the outer rings of the protesting system there are people who "disturbed." In the next inward ring, there are those who are forced to take a stand. Next comes those who are insulted and abused. At the core, are those in prison by hopelessness.

It is easy to see how a typical difficult family psychological problem can be mapped. The map of members of a system in various levels of protest is like a weather map of
the system's emotional atmosphere with high and low pressure areas deliniated. Consider the following case:

The presenting problem was Mom's drinking. The first person to show up for therapy was the daughter. In the following session the daughter brought the father in and he showed the therapist a date book in which he kept track of his wife's drinking.

After ten or so hours work with various family members, including Mom, the following picture of the family system emerged:

Mother and Father were at the core of a family system in mutual rejection. Father spent his time in the basement workshop "puttering," but really rejecting his wife's company. She sat at the kitchen table and drank. He kept track of her drinking. When they did talk they verbally abused each other.

The next circle of protest, abuse, included the teenage daughter as well as the two parents. The daughter tried to rescue her father from her mother's drinking by emotionally abusing her mother, calling her names,
saying "I hate you." When this happened, the father withdrew from both of them and started chain smoking which threatened his own precarious health and frightened the mother and daughter.

The next circle, power struggles, included the teenage son. The son was very angry with the daughter for being so hurtful, as he saw it, to the mother. The son would argue with the daughter but not around the parents, because he didn't want to upset them even more.

Finally, in the outer ring of protest, attention, were the two M.D.'s treating the mother and father for depression and back pain. They were both terribly worried about the emotional problems in the family. One was prescribing Valium for the mother, the other was recommending that the father get the mother to a therapist and go to one for himself as well.

Although the presenting problem was mother's drinking, the therapist took the time to examine the family system before setting up a treatment plan. An important question was whether the system was being organized by an alcoholic addiction or whether the alcohol was in the service of a goal. A ten session limit was to
determine whether family interventions could stop the drinking.

Treatment involved getting parents to come in separately at first, de-toxifying their mutual rejection. Then, the parents were seen together. The turning point in the treatment involved seeing mother and daughter alone and separating the daughter's issues with mom from dad's issues with mom. When daughter apologized to Mom and the two of them began spending time together Dad came out of hiding. Dad could stay in the basement only if he had Mom imprisoned by his rejection at the kitchen table.

Therapist Positioning: Defining the Clinical System.

Protest has the purpose of eliminating neutral turf and involving those who don't wish to be involved. It is the intended nature of protest that it is difficult for one to ignore, submit to, be unhurt or un-insulted by, or to withdraw from without becoming trapped.

It is the therapist's job to establish a realm within the protesting system in which, for a time, there can be neutral turf. The protest is entrusted to the therapist and the
therapist manages the protest by seeing that people in the session are not ignored, overpowered, hurt, or imprisoned. The therapist's ability to do this is, through the constant monitoring, control, and manipulation of his or her relationship to 1) the participants, 2) the system as a whole and 3) the excluded protesters.

Where to place this boundary between protesting system and clinical system is, I suspect, a matter of taste among therapists. Some negotiate it with their clients. Others simply declare it. The Stages and Goals Model suggests that, by reading the level of protest, the therapist may be able to assess how hard he or she will have to work in order to draw a boundary at any particular point.

For example, if the people excluded from the clinical system are counter-protesting at the level of rejection, to exclude them permanently from the therapy is to cut the heart out of the clinical system. If protesters at the level of abuse are excluded, one can expect them to try sabotaging the therapy. On the other hand, if those excluded are protesting on the level of a power struggle, then the immediate subject matter of the therapy will be the fight between system and "outsiders". If the people excluded are at the level of "distraction and attention," then the
coaching might be in the direction of politely ignoring. For example, an initial issue of therapy might be how much to allow a mother-in-law to know about about the marital difficulties.

Two additional comments can be made. It is also possible for the therapist to define himself as being outside of the clinical system by saying that the referring, i.e., counter-protesting, sources are wrong and that the clients are capable of solving their own problems for the time being. (Jones, 1985) Second, the most common way for a therapist to define a clinical system is through the mechanism of confidentiality. By establishing a confidential relationship with the client system as far as the larger, protesting system is concerned, the therapist avoids having to respond to the counter-protest against the clinical system.

The therapist stands on the boundary, and by his or her actions and attitudes, creates that boundary. By taking an exclusionary attitude towards the larger protesting system, the therapist supports the identity of the system he or she joins. By lending strength at a point of protest, the therapist might be able to make a protest unnecessary. It would be interesting to know, for example, who members of a
family stop talking to, fighting with, being bothered by, when they simply enter into therapy.

**Mapping Within the Clinical System.**

In order to facilitate less protest and more cooperation within the system, it is important for the therapist to avoid unintentionally siding with one or the other faction. This idea is basic to all systemic models of psychotherapy. Sluzki in a review of systemic models summarized it this way:

A stance that characterizes therapists who focus on any of the systemic models is one of equidistance or neutrality. The therapist may attain this neutral position either by carefully refusing to engage in any kind of side-taking (Selvini-Palazzoli et al., 1980b) or by systematically siding with all the participants, even those who do not wish to be sided with (Sluzki, 1975). The end result is the same: a nonalignment that increases the therapist's leverage as well as his or her ability to perceive seemingly conflicting views presented by family members (and even nonconflicting views) as interlocking choreographies of interactional patterns. (Sluzki, 1983, page 475)

To achieve this non-alignment and lay the groundwork for increased cooperation, a therapist must be able to recognize patterns of protest and somehow avoid being entangled in them. There are two kinds of sensitivities needed; first, the ability to recognize protest from the outside; second, the ability to recognize the signs within oneself of having lost neutrality. The Stages and Goals model addresses both
The Use of the Model to Help a Therapist Keep Track of His or Her Position in a Family Interview: Moment to Moment Hypothesizing.

The Stages and Goals model identifies the pressure areas of protest as a self-created distinctions within a system. These distinctions define disagreeing factions in an otherwise cooperative community. The therapist uses categories of feelings as clues to detect these distinctions. The feelings may be his or her own, as well as, those observed in others. In the following re-creation of a session feelings are used to identify pressure areas, areas of protest and counter-protest as they emerge in a session:

A teenager comes to an initial family therapy session with his mother, father and younger brother. During the initial conversation, between the therapist and the mother, the boy makes several comments which soon distract the mother.

(Stage one: Distraction. The mother and boy collude in avoiding the
therapist. The task, which involves explaining the situation to the therapist, breaks down."

The mother turns to the boy and tells him to mind his manners and the boy responds with taunting sarcasm.

(Stage Two: Confrontation. Mother and boy move even further from the task)

The argument escalates into name calling. Therapist has feelings of dread and concern about keeping control of the session.

(Stage Three: Abuse, involving boy and mother. Meanwhile, dividing therapist from the boy-mother team is the therapist's own passive resistance, a form of power struggle (Stage Two), as if they want him to stop the fight and he doesn't want to. The map now has two rings, an inner ring with the boy and the mother in stage three
and an outer ring in stage two, which includes the therapist as well.)

Suddenly the mother turns back to the therapist and suggests foster placement. The boys says "fine with me."

(Stage Three (Abuse) with threats of Stage Four (Mutual Rejection) between the boy and his mother. Therapist still in a Stage Two (Power) struggle with the two and resisting taking sides. Mother's new move invites the therapist into stage three. The therapist resists, wishing to have the two cooperate, at least in therapy. This wish places the therapist and the Mother-son team in confrontation.)

The therapist, feels helpless and overpowered by the exchange between the two. He asks the mother a non-related question, does she have brothers and sisters that live in the area? The boy gets quiet.
(The therapist changes the subject. Goal One (Distraction) behavior on his part, but accepted cooperatively. Cooperative Framework restored. Talking about the "problem" sets up a breakdown between boy and mother and ignoring the problem makes the strain go away. Does this mean that the escalating problem between mother and boy is a counter-protest to a third party who has complaints about their relationship? Who else is hurt by this fighting?

Other family members were quiet in this exchange.)

The therapist brings up the question of foster care as something they both are thinking about.

(An attempt to address the same issue in a cooperative framework.)
The mother begins speaking to the therapist of her profound concern for her son and her hopes that foster care will provide for him the care she, regretfully, can not provide at home. The therapist is impressed by the power, warmth and fullness of the mother's voice. As the mother shows more "love," the boy gets unusually quiet. He stops his distractions and becomes more self-absorbed. Suddenly he makes an incoherent angry speech to his mother and the therapist and storms out of the consulting room.

(How was the mother using her emotions? Similarly, what are the boy's intentions by his outburst? The theory would say that the boy has acted in response to his mother. The boy's behavior at the end seemed to indicate a rapid movement down through all the stages of deterioration of cooperation, including four, slamming the door. He is quiet, then angry, then abusive, and finally rejecting. The theory insists that those states have
their reciprocals. We have to then re-examine the possible intentions guiding the mother's behavior. Are they directed toward both son and therapist and perhaps the other family members as well? All this would produce the following hypothesis:

The mother's show of warmth and concern to the therapist is being used by her to punish her son. With warm feelings she is trying to win the therapist to her side thereby enabling her to have the son placed in foster care on her terms. The warm feelings the therapist read as "gratitude for the help" may, in fact, have been the glow of triumph. If so, the son's unaccustomed quiet could then understood as careful taking stock of the situation followed by a desparate counter attack. The boy's leaving and slamming the door was
directed at the new alliance the boy saw developing between therapist and mother. The therapist's own painful feelings of having failed the mother revealed to the therapist his alliance was with the mother and lead the therapist to newer and deeper respect for the sensitivities of this "out of control" boy.

One of the many questions remaining is the relationship between the mother and boy as a team, and others in the family. Feelings ran high inside the circle of the boy and his mom. The reactions of the other family members were low keyed and, after the boy bolted from the room the therapist felt defeated in that he did not control the session. This suggests that a passive power struggle exists between the mother -and-son team and someone in the rest of the
family. The therapist has assumed someone's defeat.)

Therapist turns to one of the siblings and tries to understand how he has fit into the system. He asks, "If an argument like this started at home and I weren't around to help, who would help?" The sib answers, "Grandma."

"Not Father?," says the therapist, having lost his hypothesis.

"No. Dad drives a truck and so he's not home much." Mother volunteers. "My mother helps."

(The picture now suggests that the mother-and-son team are demanding that someone control their relationship -- the circle of protest around the mother-son subsystem is at the level of power, perhaps at the level of abuse and even rejection. The abuse-to-rejection hypothesis is reasoned this way: if the father
doesn't attend to the family more then, as punishment, the boy will be banished to a group home and it will be the father's "fault." This hypothesis could be tested by asking the boy and others: "If you end up in a foster home, who will feel most responsible for that having happened?" We don't yet know why father drives truck, whether or not he's being extruded from the family.

Therapist asks Father whether his Mother-in-Law does a better job than he does of controlling the fights. The Father says that he does.

Therapist asks Mother if she agrees. She says she does but he's always on the road. Father responds that it's only on the road that he can make enough money. Therapist asks family who is best to bring the boy back into the room.

(Possibly a basic issue coming out.
This is suspected because it is a
spontaneous argument in the context of the argument about who is going to help Mother with Son. This would be a protest at the level of distraction: When Mother argues that she wants Father around more, Father cross-argues that he has to earn more money. It is an argument that goes in a circle and never resolves. Possibly it escalates into Mother's demand that Father be home more and from the to mother's abusive way with "his" son. More questions are suggested.)

In this transcript, it can be seen how, by being sensitive to protests and counter-protests, by keeping track of areas of more and less heightened protest, a therapist can evolve a map of the system in protest.

The Therapist's Use of the Stages and Goals Model to Monitor his own Position in the Field.

As the transcript noted, the therapist must check his or her own feelings and also read the feelings and strivings of the
participants in the clinical system. If the therapist develops strong feelings of protest toward factions of the clinical system, there is a good chance that the therapist is being co-opted into siding with someone against someone. The therapist needs relative freedom of movement despite the protesting currents in a clinical system. This freedom comes from knowing how to recognize a current when one is caught in it.

Therapist's feelings of annoyance, irritation, impatience indicate a protest in the "Distraction" stage. At this level, the currents in a clinical system will attempt to control the therapist's attention, to make sure he (or she) pays attention to this and not that. For example, it may be very difficult to pursue a line of questioning with a father without a mother interrupting. A therapist may learn that conversations with one person in a system are constantly the occasion for a second conversation to develop elsewhere, as if whatever is being said should be ignored. A therapist may observe that people forget what he wants them to remember. All of these behaviors, when accompanied by feelings of minor annoyance are signs that the therapist is not attending to things the way some in the system want.
At the next level, feelings of anger, frustration, challenge and defeat are a sign that the protest has become a power struggle. The strain in cooperation is in the second, or confrontation stage. I experience this stage in two ways, passively and actively. In either case, it is a sign that I am becoming too involved in counter-protest of some sort. My questions to myself when I have these feelings is, "With whom do I stand and whom do I oppose?"

The indicators to the therapist that he or she is operating under the goal of abuse and participating in stage three, retribution, transactions, are feelings that have to do with hatred, insult, and revenge. Few operate nakedly under Goal Three intentions. There is ample cover in a popular ideology that suggests that it is acceptable to cause someone pain if it is for a person's punishment. However, the good intentions that lead to punishment are usually a cover for bitterness. I, myself, am tempted into the revenge position by the pain I see people inflicting on each other. For me, the moralism of the rescuer/punisher role is almost irresistible.

Participants in stage three transactions often develop subtle methods of abuse. I find that my willingness to be impressed by subtlety helps me keep some distance from these
transactions. I do acknowledge my own cleverness in disguising my own bitter intentions from myself. I am vulnerable through my pride in my role as therapist. I have explained my failures to myself as though the failure were the fault of the client, that the client was too sick -- not "too sick for me to handle their bitterness" but simply "too sick" period. I leave my own limitations out of the assessment. I believe that clients can feel the negative assessment and that they find the negative assessment combined with the therapist's supposed authority on such matters to be horribly painful.

A related way in which I have seen clients punished is the clinical "curse." The clinical curse is a prognosis disguised as a diagnosis. It is a description of pathology such that there is no hope for a cure. Often, in forensic evaluations, a clinical curse is requested by one part of a system to be used against another part of the system.

This is not to say that there are not times in which severe and pessimistic evaluations are not appropriate and necessary. What is important in this discussion is the personal intention of the evaluator and the integrity of the therapist as manifested in his or her ability to acknowledge his or her own intentions and limitations.
Feelings that indicate the most intense level of protest, rejection, are even more difficult to catch in oneself in naked form than abusive feelings. Abusive intentions are hard to catch because they are so elaborately justified. The whole point of rejecting feelings is to deny the person and the pain from consciousness.

The first form of rejection, the pushing away of whole systems probably happens below conscious levels. It is possible to have such a thoroughly unproductive and miserable encounter with a client that neither one of you wants to see the other again. I suspect that these agreements are reached quickly.

The second form of rejection happens when a therapist is co-opted and ends up placing an essential player in a system out of reach.

The third form of rejection happens when a therapist is afraid to ask certain questions. (This is to be distinguished from when the therapist planfully refrains from asking certain questions.) To dispel rejection is to reveal abuse. There are matters in the family that everyone knows about and no one wants to talk about. The reason for
rejecting an issue is the expectation that the discussion will make things worse.

There is some subliminal negotiation between family and therapist as to what will be revealed in which order. With particularly loaded issues there is a certain amount of measuring by therapist and family. Families flash issues. Therapists color each question with tone of voice. Implicit contracts are made, much as with marriages.

The Use of the Model to Devise a Strategic Intervention.

In this section of the chapter, we will demonstrate yet another way to use the Stages and Goals model. The analysis of currents of protest can also suggest how to avoid fighting those currents and how, instead, to redirect the legitimate impulses forming those protests into a better pattern of solutions.

Problem
Portia had been diagnosed mentally retarded when she was a child and had grown up in a state institution. She was thirty three years old and had become a sweet, but pathetic woman. She was shy, hesitant, absent minded, and unkempt in a way that suggested to those who worked with her that she
was trying very hard to be acceptable but just didn't have what it took.

Like so many others who have been socialized by institutions she had a powerful personal effect on all who came in contact with her. The effect seemed to be to divide the human world into two camps. Those who pitied her and who felt moved to care for her were in one camp. Those who abused her with nagging criticism and scorn were in the other.

She lived in a supervised home with four other residents and four paraprofessional workers. The staff was often exasperated by her, and at times, even angry because she seemed almost perversely dense. They would explain to her what was needed and she seemed to understand at the time, then, later, it was as if she had forgotten the whole conversation. At other times, however she seemed to have a good memory. For example, she could keep track of days and knew when someone had promised her a trip to a store.

The other residents (who also carried a MR diagnosis) treated her in a manner that seemed an unattractive caricature of the attitude of the staff. They blamed her for not doing her chores, they picked on her, they took things
from her as "punishment." Her response to the other residents' efforts was to become even more helpless. The other residents responded by picking at her with greater vehemence. The cycle between Portia and the residents would escalate until the staff felt compelled to interrupt it.

The staff responded to the relationship between Portia and the other residents by defending "poor" Portia and by criticizing and censuring the other residents. Staff members were deeply concerned about the effects of the "helping" on Portia's self-esteem. They also found themselves criticizing Portia for allowing herself to be bullied. In effect, the staff, by being critical of the other residents, was modeling the very behavior they wished to eliminate from the household.

Analysis

Portia's style is to demand attention, whether positively or negatively. She forgets what she is told, but she remembers when people promise to spend time with her. People find their feelings reaching out to her. Her shy, hesitant manner bring forth parental feelings in others. All this suggests that most of the time she pushes a demand for special attention against the world in which she finds herself. It
also suggests that she experiences some form of counter-protests. The counter-protest she experiences is that people try to make her change so that she will become someone that don't have to pay so much attention to.

This demand for special attention is different than her status as a person in need of special attention. Other residents in this group home have the same status, but respond to their status in their own ways.

The second realm of protest, and equally important is the anger and abuse that binds the staff and the other clients. We don't know that the clients are angry at the staff. We are told how the staff is angry at the clients and we assume the feelings are mutual. Anger indicates a power struggle. There seems to be a fight going on over who, or how, to help Portia. Occassionally the fight escalates to abuse when the staff punishes the clients for hurting Portia and the clients get even through Portia.

**Solution**

The question is how to avoid working against these currents and, at the same time, redirect them.
The alternate solution was to ask Portia to give an award each week to the household member, staff or client, who helped her the most. Portia was not expected to stop asking for help, but was now expected to evaluate the help she received. This increased her importance to others, required that she assert herself and, at the same time, supported her wish to be "special." The staff and clients were not expected to stop fighting over who or how to help Portia. All that was changed in this situation was that a judge was formally named, and who the judge was, was acceptable to all.

Follow-up showed that this solution was immediately effective in terms of making that particular problem disappear. Portia still sought attention and also power, but she sought them in ways that contributed to the life of the home.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY.

The Proposal again.

The Stages and Goals model is one attempt to find the sense and order in suffering. Perhaps if we can describe the laws of misery, then we can do something to work around them. The model is also the product of an attempt to build conceptual bridges between Adlerian theory and Systems theory. It is proposed as a refinement in Adlerian theory.

We started this inquiry at a great distance from the everyday specifics of psychological pain. We examined the laws developed to describe any kind of life process, painful or not. The PBA and Bateson's cybernetics were attempts to state the most fundamental of biological principles. (Once Bateson said that if he could discover the laws of interactaction that were held in common by humans, sea otters and octopii then he wold have discovered something very fundamental indeed. (Lipset, 1982)) The Varela principles of biological autonomy are so basic that they propose the defining characteristic of Life. Varela has said that, in order to declare something to be "alive," we have
to see how it maintains its own autonomy. (Varela, 1979)

Of these basic theories we took eight principles and proposed that any theory of clinical psychology should contain realizations of, at least, those eight principles. Against those eight principles we compared the particular theory of clinical psychology by Alfred Adler.

On the whole, Adler's theory nested into the basic constructs of the PBA well: for Adler, the principle definition of the human psyche was as a social phenomenon and, at the same time, the principle by which each personality was a unified whole was held to be the highest governing principle of the soul. The fundamental sensitivity to both wholeness and context in both theories made for a good fit.

However, it was necessary to propose a refinement in Adler's theory. Adler's theory was originally constructed to capture ways of describing single individuals. The organizing principle of individual wholeness in Adler's theory was meant to apply only to single humans. The organizing principle of wholeness in PBA was the idea of a boundary between inside and outside that was the spontaneous result of a pattern of internal processes. In the PBA scheme, such
boundaries occurred simultaneously at many levels. What was needed was a way for the Adlerian clinician to also note multiple levels of autonomy. To give the Adlerian clinician that additional sensitivity we proposed a new term, which would be something like "Community," or, "Gemeinschaft," or even "Self," be used to refer to the organized internal processes that maintain and create the Life Style. The original Adlerian term, Life Style, would be limited in use and would refer only to the way the whole functioned in the larger world.

This new term, "Gemeinschaft," allowed us to refer to more than one level of autonomy. It also allowed us to refer to an autonomous system as experienced from the inside. The complementary terms of "Life Style" and "Gemeinschaft" allowed us ways of talking about the relationship between levels of autonomous systems. We were able to speak of how the confluence of Life Styles "imbricated" a Gemeinschaft at the next higher level and how the requirements of the Gemeinschaft shaped the Life Styles at the next lower level.

After having constructed this theoretical model, we used it, in turn, to construct a more immediate and practical counseling model which we could use to describe the processes of human suffering.
In this practical model, we said that, from time to time, the normal fabric of cooperation that holds the human community together gets strained. The needs of the various factions that form our communities simply do not always balance out perfectly with one another. The inevitable and utterly necessary give and take of life ends up placing exceptional demands on each of us and on our relationships with each other. There is a limit to how much we can accommodate each other, and that limit seems to be determined locally. As the limit is approached, component parts attack rather than support each other. Local civil wars break out. For example, a husband and a wife will fight with each other so hard about their kids behavior that their kids will attack them for being incompetent as parents.

We tried to address the question: What causes the breakdown in cooperation? How can it be that each participating individual seems fully convinced of the correctness of what he or she is doing, and, if not the correctness, at least, the desperate necessity? We believed it was fair to ask for an answer because, we believed that, if people persist in creating misery, certainly they must have desperate and compelling reasons.
Our theory suggested that the source of the desperate and compelling reasons that lead people and systems into painful interaction is, at base, integrity. In the name of self-identity, in order to preserve the meaning of one's own life, in the name of something terribly precious, however it is subjectively defined, people will resort to desperate means and submit to painful choices.

We were not able to explore fully how the requirement of desperate measures makes cooperation breaks down in some instances and not in others. Our analysis suggested that cooperation breaks down when the demands of the larger system for its integrity have the effect of being contradictory to the demands of the component parts for their self's integrity.

We did note that, when questions arise on the order of, "Which is more important, the whole of which I am a part, or me?", then some sort of moral struggle is being approached. To be true to myself or true to my friends; true to myself or true to my wife; true to myself or true to my children. These disjunctive questions are the sources of human misery. Or at least, these seemed to be the noblest and most universal ways we could find of describing them.
We proposed an Adlerian position which agrees with Watzlawick's position (Watzlawick, et.al. 1976); psychopathology is a problem that has become compounded though misguided solutions. We described four stages of compounding.

We believe that it helps if one knows some of the mechanisms by which mistakes are made. We spent some time describing possible mistakes. We also spend some time describing how a clinician might use the model to find hope and order in what looks like a hopeless messes.

Bateson's riddle again.

Much of this book was also an attempt to probe Bateson's "so what" riddle. Bateson ended his book, *Mind and Nature* with the question, "why write the book?" He had said that life has its own way of healing itself, which may or may not include the extinction of a species in the process. Why then should any one person, a very small and transitory part of the big whole, be so concerned about what is going to happen? So what?

An equivalent riddle could be put to the clinical
psychologist. Why does it really matter whether or not this family's daughter starves herself, or whether or not a marriage breaks up, or whether or not children are abused? It does seem to matter. Because, as this whole project has argued from many different angles, it is because we are individuals only partially. We are also participants in larger life forms, larger individualities that extend beyond our own lives and encompass it. It seems that these larger forms also have "feelings." We accept the suffering of our fellows as part of our membership in a life larger than our own.

The Mexico City earthquake of 1985 left thousands dead. There was a hospital in the center of the city that collapsed in on itself. Expensive teams of rescue workers built delicate tunnels through the debris to find survivors. Estimates were that survivors could last no more than four days under the mountain of rubble. Yet the teams worked for eight days and no one questioned the extra expense.

In January 1986, ten years after the United States Supreme Court decided to allow abortion of pregnancies in the first trimester, there was strong enough protest to challenge the wisdom of that decision that the question remains a respectable topic of national debate. The point the
protesters made was that the fetus, once conceived, was as alive as any human on earth, and therefore entitled to legal protection from murder.

When the muscles of the face engaged in smiling are activated, a general system is activated in the whole body which increases the health of the body. Smiles engage more than facial muscles. Yet in addition to this, smiles are infectious and people who smile tend to make others smile. We are never only participating in our own lives.

It seems that, by recognizing as fully as we can, the preciousness of any life, we also recognize the preciousness of our own life. There is something sacramental in acknowledging the connections between our own life and the life beyond it.

This, I believe, is the answer to Bateson's riddle and also the connection between Bateson's riddle and the theory of protesting systems. Much of what we do is an expression of, and service, to individualities of which we are a part, which encompass and form us. In the context of this, we would have to conclude that psychotherapy is, most basically, a form of reconciliation.
Finally, it is important to touch on some of the implications of the FS/FG model for the Adlerian theory of Individual Psychology, should some Adlerian colleague wish to pick up this line of inquiry. The expansion of Adlerian thinking into a systemic base has repercussions for the original, non-system Adlerian model. Here are some of the repercussions I could note:

1. The Stages and Goals Model, which is a mapping of patterns of strain in a gemeinschaft, or whole, could also be applied to the internal dynamics of the life style of an individual person. This would modify Adlerian theory as concerns individual pathology, which up to now has eschewed ideas of internal conflict, insisting that the whole cannot be divided against itself.

The new model would accept the old Adlerian premise that the individuality cannot be divided without dying, losing its integrity, dis-integrating. At the same time this new idea of "strains" could describe how the individuality, in its own experience of itself can feel "strained," as if it were about to be divided, as if it were threatened with a kind of death, a defeat.
Internal dynamics can be described in terms of the four stages of strain. Currently Adlerian psychodynamics describe pathology as manifested in interaction by "hesitating movement" and "back and forth movement" (Adler, 1956) and manifested in personal epistemology as an "errors" (Adler, 1956), "basic mistakes" (Dreikurs, 1953), and "interfering ideas" (Powers and Griffin, page 15).

We could further suggest that internal strains could be described as proceeding along the same four stage progression. At first one is distracted from the task at hand by the awareness of a loyalty conflict. Then one is torn between attending to the need for A or the need for B. When it gets worse, one punishes oneself for failing one or the other obligations, or for compromising oneself. The last stage in the progression is dissociation.

2. An additional important way in which this new model would modify Adlerian individual theory is in terms of the object of protest. Currently, pathology is a form of hesitation in response to what are called "the task of life." The modification proposed thus far would characterize pathology as a form of hesitation in response to the tasks of the next larger unity to which the individual is a part, rather than in terms of a generalized response to Life. In other words,
rather than saying an individual is sabotaging her marriage because she has something against the Institution of Marriage, we would say that an individual is sabotaging her marriage because she has something against the particular marriage she is in. We would not generalize unnecessarily beyond the data. I believe this modification would free Adlerian Psychology of some of its own moralism.

3. The model holds some implications for the process of individual therapy and individual assessment. The therapist knows the client through his paid relationship with the client and through his place in the protesting system which created the client role. Therefore, the therapist never attains the true subjective perspective of the client independent of context. There is a profound difference between assuming an underlying coherence which is independent of context and assuming that one can know what it is. This model suggests that clinical assessment is a comment on the marriage formed by the clinical system, which includes the therapist in the context of counter-protesting in-laws.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


