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
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SELECTING A PERMANENT SITE AND PLANNING AN URBAN
CAMPUS FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS - BOSTON
1964 - 1973: A CASE STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF STATE
AND LOCAL POLITICS ON POLICY FORMULATION AND
PLANNING FOR AN URBAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY

A Dissertation Presented

by

JOHN WHITTAKER

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

May 1989

School of Education

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
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
Ernest Lynton, Member



George Sulzner, Member



Robert Wellman, Member



Marilyn Haring-Hidore, Dean
School of Education

ABSTRACT

SELECTING A PERMANENT SITE AND PLANNING AN URBAN
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AND LOCAL POLITICS ON POLICY FORMULATION AND
PLANNING FOR AN URBAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY

MAY, 1989

JOHN WHITTAKER, B.S. Ed., NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY

M.B.A., BABSON COLLEGE

Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by: Professor Patricia Crosson

Major decisions for public universities are often shaped by the political dynamics which function continuously inside the institution and within the larger external community. A persistent problem in the study of higher education is the need to better understand this complex external environment and to build adequate consideration of it into the planning and decision making process.

This study examined a particular instance of planning and decision making for an urban public university; the site selection process for the Boston campus of The University of Massachusetts. It identified the major components and dynamics of this prolonged search and developed recommendations which can be generalized to similar institutions.

Study methods included review of University archives and contemporary news media, interviews, and review of public records.

The researcher first sought to describe the broader context in which Massachusetts public higher education developed during the decades prior to the sudden decision to create a Boston campus for the University of Massachusetts in 1964. Then a chronology was constructed describing major events and decisions reached during the site selection process. A particular effort was made to determine the nature and methodology of the University's planning process. The study then examined the internal organizational structure and political environment within the university and the broader political and economic environment in the external community in order to assess their impact on the final outcome.

A key finding was that the immediate local political and economic context surrounding an urban public university will have a profound impact upon policy decision making for the university. Since the near neighbors of such an institution will tend to view its presence in terms of its immediate impact on their daily lives and not in terms of its broader long term benefit to society, this local context must be known and understood by the university's decision makers.

Lack of adequate state-wide coordination of the development of public higher education in Massachusetts during the 1960's and the lack of an adequate public relations effort on the part of the University were major contributing factors which hampered the site selection process.

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GLOSSARY OF PEOPLE AND PLACES

PEOPLE

Weston Adams: Chairman of the Boston Garden sports arena in the North Station area of Boston during the site selection process.

H. Brown Baldwin: Vice President of the Boston Gas Company during the site selection process.

Frank L. Boyden: Noted educator, member of the University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees from 1953 to 1972 and Chairman from 1960 to 1969.

Francis W. Broderick: Second Chancellor of the Boston Campus of The University of Massachusetts appointed in 1968.

Donald Cadigan: Director of Planning for the University of Massachusetts during the site selection process.

Irwin Cahn: Chief editor of the Christian Science Monitor and host of the Boston television news commentary show, "Starring the Editors", during the 1960's.

Harold Case: President of Boston University in 1964. Opposed creation of the Boston Campus of the University of Massachusetts.

Hale Champion: Director of the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) during the administration of Mayor White.

John F. Collins: Mayor of Boston from 1960 - 1967.

Dennis M. Crowley: Boston attorney and member of the University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees from 1952 to 1973.

Maurice Donahue: President of the Massachusetts Senate from 1964 to 1970.

Paul Gagnon: Faculty member at the Amherst campus of the University of Massachusetts in 1964. Prominent member of the Committee on New Concepts and New Departures for the Boston Campus. First academic dean at the Boston Campus.

John Gillespie: Director of the Massachusetts State College System in 1964. Opposed creation of the Boston Campus of the University of Massachusetts.

Robert D. Gordon: Attorney and member of the University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees from 1964 to 1978.

Norman Greenwald: Director of the Golding Center at Brandeis University. Conducted a review of public higher education in the Boston area in 1963-1964.

Frank Haigus: Chairman of The University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees Buildings and Grounds Committee during the site selection process.

Kevin Harrington: Prominent state senator from Salem Massachusetts during the site selection process. Co-chair of the special commission established to study education in Massachusetts, the "Willis-Harrington Commission", which was established by Chapter 108 of the Resolves of 1962.

Joseph Healey: Vice Chairman of the University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees during the site selection process. President and Director of the Middlesex Bank, N.A. and prominent member of the Boston Business community.

Louise Day Hicks: Controversial chairperson of the Boston School Committee in the 1960's, unsuccessful candidate for mayor of Boston in 1967.

Peter F. Hines: Member of the Boston City Council from 1958 to 1967. Candidate for mayor in 1967.

Christopher A. Iannella: Member of the Boston City Council from 1958 to 1967. Candidate for mayor in 1967.

James Kelso: Executive Vice president of the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce during the site selection process.

Owen Kiernan: Massachusetts State Education Commissioner and member of the State College Board of Trustees in 1964.

Asa Knowles: President of Northeastern University in 1964. Opposed creation of the Boston Campus of the University of Massachusetts.

L. Edward Lashman: Vice President for Development at The University of Massachusetts during the Wood administration.

John Lederle: President of the University of Massachusetts from 1960 to 1970.

Edward Logue: Director of the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) during the administration of Mayor Collins.

William F. Looney: President of Boston State College in 1964.

John A. Lowry: President of the Back Bay Association in Boston during the site selection process.

John J. Moakley: Member of the Boston City Council in the early 1970's elected to the United States Congress in 1972. Conducted hearings on the Columbia Point site in the fall of 1972.

Daniel Patrick Moynihan: Later a prominent United States Senator from New York, Dr. Moynihan was active at Harvard during the site selection process in the Joint Center For Urban Studies. He acted as an informal consultant to the Boston campus administration during this period.

Kermit Morrissey: Dean of Students at Brandeis University and Chairman of the Massachusetts State College Board of Trustees in 1964.

Francis O'Brien: Director of Development at The University of Massachusetts during the site selection process.

Daniel O'Leary: President of Lowell State College in 1964.

Endicott Peabody: Governor of Massachusetts from 1963 to 1965.

John E. Powers: State Senator from Boston. Resigned from the presidency of the state senate in early 1964 resulting in the selection of Maurice Donahue as the new senate president.

Robert Quinn: Prominent member of the Massachusetts House of Representatives from the Dorchester District of Boston during the site selection process. Speaker of the House of Representatives from 1977 to 1979.

Leo Redfern: Director of Institutional Studies at the University of Massachusetts during the Lederle administration.

David Riesman: Dr. Riesman was a member of the faculty in the Department of Social Relations at Harvard University during the site selection process. He acted as an informal consultant to the Boston campus administration during this period.

George Rosen: Author of Decision Making Chicago Style: The Genesis of a University of Illinois Campus, A study of the site selection proces for the Chicago campus of the University of Illinois.

John W. Ryan: Chancellor of the Boston Campus of The University of Massachusetts from 1965 - 1968.

Hugh Thompson: University of Massachusetts trustee from 1962 to 1968 and New England Director of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. during the site selection process.

Oswald Tipppo: Provost at the Amherst campus of The University of Massachusetts during the site selection process.

William Tunis: Dean of Admissions at the University of Massachusetts during the Lederle administration.

John Volpe: Governor of Massachusetts from 1961 to 1963 and from 1965 to 1969.

David I. Walsh: Governor of Massachusetts from 1914-1916.

Robert Wood: President of the University of Massachusetts from 1970 to 1978.

Kevin H. White: Mayor of Boston from 1968 - 1983.

Frank J. Zeo: Executive Director of the Massachusetts Federation of Taxpayers Associations in 1964. Opposed creation of the Boston Campus of the University of Massachusetts.

GROUPS

The Dorchester Columbia Point Task Force: A coalition of 26 community action groups in the Dorchester section of Boston formed in November, 1971.

Justin Gray Associates: Consultant employed by the Dorchester Columbia Point Task Force.

Robert Heller Associates: A consulting group, based in Cleveland, Ohio, employed by the University in 1964 to identify potential temporary locations for the new Boston campus.

New Departures and New Concepts Committee: A task force of faculty established by President Lederle in 1964 to develop inovative academic programs for the new Boston Campus.

Sasaki, Dawson, Demay Associates: An Architectural Consulting Firm who were the primary consultants to the University of Massachusetts during the site selection process.

PLACES

Columbia Point: A peninsula of land jutting out into Boston Harbor directly southwest of South Boston and located just east of the Savin Hill area of Dorchester. Columbia Point is approximately one mile from the main rapid transit lines connecting Dorchester and the City of Quincy with downtown Bostond and approximately one and one half miles from access ramps to Boston's Southeast Expressway.

Copley Square: A small urban park on the western edge of the commerical district of Boston which is bordered by a number of buildings of historic and architectural importance such as The Boston Public Library and a dramatic highrise building housing the world headquarters of the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company.

Copley Square-Turnpike Site: A site lying directly southwest of Copley Square in downtown Boston and then extending easterly along "air-rights" over the Massachusetts Turnpike into the South End neighborhood of Boston.

Dorchester: A section of the City of Boston located in the extreme southeastern part of the city bordering on the suburban communities of Quincy and Milton. Dorchester was one of the first towns settled in the Massachusetts Bay Colony and retained independent status as a separately incorporated town until the mid-19th Ceentury when residents voted to join Boston.

The "Governor Shirley" Site: An area of sixty acres of fully developed industrial amd residential land located at the northern edge of the Dorchester section of Boston bounded by Massachusetts Avenue, Hampden Street, Norfolk Avenue and the new haven Railroad.

Highland Park Site: A site of approximately 164 acres on a prominent hill located centrally within the Roxbury district of Boston. The University considered and then rejected this site during the period May, 1966 to February, 1967

Madison Park: A neighborhood site in Roxbury adjacent to Highland Park.

Murphy Army Hospital: A former veterans hospital complex located in the suburban town of Waltham.

North Station: A major rail terminal located at the northeastern edge of the downtown commercial district of Boston. The North Station terminal complex includes Boston Garden, a large sports arena which hosts the home games of two major league teams, the Boston Celtics and the Boston Bruins as well as numerous other local sports events and seasonal performances by the Ice Capades, Barnum and Bailey Circus etc.

Quincy: A small suburban city located directly south of the Dorchester section of Boston.

Riverside Golf Course: A large private golf course located on the western edge of the suburban city of Newton a short distance from Route 128.

Route 128: The major inner belt connector of the interstate highway system surrounding Boston. Route 128 stretches from the City of Quincy on the south to the town of Marblehead north of Boston.

Roxbury: A section of the City of Boston located directly west of the commercial core of the city and bordering on the suburban town of Brookline. During the site selection process Roxbury was inhabited by primarily low income minority residents. Roxbury was one of the first towns settled in the Massachusetts Bay Colony and retained independent status as a separately incorporated town until the mid-19th Century when residents voted to join Boston.

Savin Hill: A densely developed residential area in the Northeast corner of Dorchester. This neighborhood is directly west of the campus and within sight and convenient walking distance of Columbia Point.

South Boston: A large peninsula of land lying directly south of the downtown commercial district of Boston. It is bordered on the southeast by Boston Harbor and on the southwest by Dorchester. South Boston was originally a portion of the old town of Dorchester. An area of very densely developed residential neighborhoods, during the period of this case study South Boston was inhabited

primarily by close knit white middle income residents intensely proud of their Irish and Polish heritage.

Watertown Arsenal: An historic U.S. government munitions production and storage facility which was closed in the 1960's. This large complex of buildings was located in the suburb of Watertown which abuts the northwest border of Boston.

West Roxbury: A section of the City of Boston located in the extreme western part of the city bordering on the suburban towns of Dedham, Newton and Brookline. West Roxbury was originally the western parish of the old town of Roxbury. It later became a separately incorporated town until the mid-19th century when residents voted to join Boston. The western edge of West Roxbury is bordered by the Charles River and extensive wetlands and marshes which are only a short distance from Route 128, the major inner belt connector of the interstate highway system surrounding Boston.

Wollaston Golf Course: A golf course located in the Wollaston section in the northeast section of the City of Quincy. This site was adjacent to the "Southeast Express Way" a direct connector between the interstate highway system surrounding Boston and the heart of Boston's commercial district. Wollaston Golf Course was located approximately five miles south of Columbia Point.

Woodland Country Club: An area of 130 acres located in the predominantly residential northwestern part of the Boston suburb of Newton. The site is adjacent to Route 128 and the Riverside line of the MBTA rapid transit system.

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT

Statement of the Problem

Contemporary public universities do not exist in a vacuum. What they are at any given moment and what they will become is often shaped by the political dynamics which function continuously both inside these institutions and within the larger community which surrounds them. They are also the product of a process of intricate planning and decision making which must find ways to balance the needs and desires of internal and external constituencies. This is especially true for the urban public university because of the unusually complex nature of these internal and external forces. A persistent problem in the study of higher education is the need to recognize and better understand this complex external environment and to build adequate consideration of these factors into the planning and decision making process.

Universities need to integrate into their formal planning and decision making an adequate recognition of the economic and political dynamics of the broader community in which they are seen as a "neighbor". It is of critical importance for a public university to seek and maintain strong support from within the external political environment during efforts to acquire resources and during consideration of public policy issues related to the operation of the university. The urban environment, with

its unique characteristics and challenges, adds a degree of complexity to this task. When a planning and decision making process specifically encourages effective communication between university and community leaders there is a better opportunity for them to interact effectively on resource and policy issues and attempt to insure congruence within their planning efforts. This will tend to reduce the negative impact of any serious differences between the interests and goals of the two groups.

The site selection process for the Boston Campus of the University of Massachusetts provides an excellent opportunity to examine these issues in the context of a specific planning and decision making process. My research has revealed that during the campus' formative years the administration, faculty, and student leadership developed a concept of the optimum physical configuration and location of their new urban campus which differed considerably from the expectations and public opinions of many of Boston's political and community leaders.

A significant level of conflict developed. Traumatic open confrontation took place between these two political systems as they began to disagree on the optimum site for the new campus. In the end the trustees of the broader parent institution, The University of Massachusetts, adopted the position of the external political leadership over the strong and forceful objections of the internal

leadership at their Boston campus. Here is an instance of community/university conflict, and failure to adequately address external community issues during the early stages of a university's planning process, similar to those identified in the literature as important sources of difficulty for the urban public university.

This study will seek to clarify why this happened in the case of the Boston Campus of the University of Massachusetts. During the prolonged site selection process, which stretched from 1964 to 1968, the campus leadership of The University of Massachusetts at Boston lived through some difficult and painful moments in open confrontation with the leadership of the client community which they were ostensibly serving. The question of to what extent the university learned and profited from this experience, and in particular modified its planning process so that it better considered community issues, can be best examined through a review of both the period of initial planning and site selection and the five years which followed. During this later period the university was engaged in efforts to gain acceptance on the part of their immediate neighbors as final planning and construction of the new permanent site progressed. Description and analysis of the process during these two separate stages in the university's early development provides a case study useful for those concerned with development of effective university/community relations and for those concerned with gaining a

better understanding of the difficult formative years of this particular Boston institution. The critical need to form a better understanding of the interaction between an urban public university and its constituency, as further developed in the review of literature which follows, provided the justification for this study. Similar studies have been conducted by Rosen and others. This form of inquiry is not unique or untested. It has provided useful results in the study of similar issues at comparable institutions. The conclusions may also be generalized to other site selection and community issues within the broader framework of urban government.

Purpose and Significance of This Study

The purpose of this case study is to examine in depth a particular case of planning and decision making for an urban public university. Particular emphasis is placed on identifying the impact on the planning and decision making process of political dynamics both within and outside of the campus. This study will add to previous research which has sought answers to these questions. Analysis of this period in the development of an emergent urban public university will contribute towards further understanding of some basic issues of particular importance concerning the appropriate structure of the planning process for such an institution. The implications of the Boston experience were examined for their relevance and significance for other contemporary urban public universities. The

significance of this study lies in the fact that it will provide a framework and point of reference, based in an in-depth review of an actual experience, with which to address these questions. This can be used by contemporary urban public universities while designing or reviewing their planning process to insure adequate consideration of the external political process. A secondary purpose is to provide an historical chronicle of this important formative stage in the development of one of the nation's most prominent emergent public urban universities.

This case study seeks to add to the work of Rosen, which deals with the site selection process for the Chicago Campus of the University of Illinois, and other writers by examining to what extent their approaches to analysis of public decision making can be applied toward a better understanding of the Boston situation. A second major question is whether the Boston situation essentially duplicated the Chicago experience. My hypothesis is that while Rosen's classification of approaches to public decision making and the analysis of such decisions can be applied towards a better general understanding of the Boston situation, the Boston experience was in many ways unique. It reflected the particular economic and political environment within greater Boston and Massachusetts. The particular political and economic context within a given time and place, as well as the particular political environment within the

university, are, therefor, very critical considerations within the university's planning process.

There has been no formal published research on the site selection process for the Boston Campus of the University of Massachusetts such as the work by George Rosen. The few contemporary media articles provide only a partial answer. This study attempts to partially fill that gap. It is important to note that the site selection process for UMB was taking place in the midst of the intense debate on the proper role of institutions of higher education within the broader community. This was also a time of unusually intense debate on a number of major issues within American society. The site selection controversy reached its peak in 1968, the year of the King and Kennedy assassinations, the Tet Offensive, and the insurgent candidacy of Eugene McCarthy. Distrust and disillusionment with established systems was at a peak amid intense questioning of traditional values within the broader American society. This accident of timing caused the UMB site selection process to bring "town/gown" issues into even sharper focus. The common thread that is apparent in the writing of commentators within higher education during this period is the thinly disguised notion that those laboring within institutions of higher education know what is in the public's best interest and that it is time that they got on with their duty of bestowing the benefit of their unique insight on a waiting world. Absent is any idea

of a need for consultation and dialogue with the public or community leaders before setting goals and directions for their institutions. Just how dramatic the difference can be, on occasion, between the way in which the university views its role in the community and the way in which the community perceives the university's presence is suggested by the following quotes. The nature of the conflict they reveal lies at the heart of the purpose of this case study. The first selection is from a formal statement of institutional purpose expressed at the installation of Chancellor John W. Ryan during the founding convocation of UMass-Boston on December 10, 1966:

Only by plunging into the heart of mass technological, urban society can the university hope to prepare its students and faculty for the future, and to take a leading role in shaping that future. As urban problems mount, many of the city's most able people flee to the suburbs and leave the oppressed, the weary, the overburdened to struggle alone. The urban university must stand with the city, must serve and lead where the battle is. 1.

An ironic and dramatic contrast to this optimistic goal is provided by the following extract from an editorial entitled, "The Strangling of a City", which was broadcast by Boston radio station WEEI during the heart of the site selection controversy in May, 1967. Commenting on the University of Massachusetts' plan to locate its new campus in the commercial heart of Boston it stated:

Such a plan is callous, selfish and dangerous. It disregards everything we have learned about the urban crisis since that crisis began... This university plan will stifle the New Boston in its tracks. It

will drive retailers farther into the suburbs. It will start a rush of real estate sales that might suggest that the Back Bay is sinking. We cannot permit this to happen. Whether you live IN the city or outside of it, you will be hurt, for the entire community will suffer. All of us must act forcefully, and we must act together. WEEI urges listeners wherever you are--study the plan, join groups that oppose it. 2.

A more restrained, but still worried, view of the new institution comes from a formal statement presented to the Boston City Council by a spokesperson for the Dorchester -Columbia Point Task Force in 1972:

Here is a great public university coming into our front yard, offering an education to those of our children who have already succeeded in getting a college preparatory education and the right examination scores. There has been little preparation made for our children to go to this University; there has been no preparation made to house or to transport the children of people who do not live close to Columbia Point...Students, even from Boston, unable to commute in a reasonable time to campus, will move into Dorchester, rents will go up, and long term residents will be forced out. Cars will be parked all over our neighborhood. And our community will bear the main cost of the education of the state's children. 3.

Boston's mayor, Kevin White put it quite bluntly in 1973:

Boston is desperately in need of a university that will serve its interests, meet its needs, and help solve its problems. Boston is emphatically not in need of another higher education institution occupying land which might otherwise be tax producing, receiving city services at little or no cost, and serving the sons and daughters of suburban and out of state families. 4.

Kevin White was simply continuing the viewpoint of his predecessor, Mayor John Collins, who, in commenting on Boston's colleges and universities in 1966, stated,

...they have made a fantastically great contribution to scientific advancement and to the growth of our industrial know-how. However they have made precious little contribution to the improvement of our urban environment, and its perhaps because they have not been invited into the middle of the battle. 5.

The final quote is from the Justin Gray Associates report which formed the basis for a new approach in community relations by the university,

It is clear that the University saw itself as a public good and never adequately prepared the political case for its site choices. It is equally clear, however, that the state and the city were exceedingly ambivalent about the school's growth and future. 6.

There is a need for further research which examines the impact of political and economic environments on the planning process for urban public universities. We need to better understand the basic causes of a conflict such as this so that it can be avoided or at least its impact lessened when it becomes inevitable. Each of the parties represented in the preceding statements was influenced by a political agenda and personal interests which reflected their place within the Boston community. This does not mean that the experience of the University of Massachusetts in Boston was a totally unique series of events. Conclusions drawn from the experience can be generalized to assist in designing the planning process for future stages of its own development and for that of other urban public institutions.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

During the past decade much of the literature examining planning for public higher education has been concerned with power and authority issues and relationships between institutions and state boards of higher education. Earlier literature provides a greater concentration on the the public university and political environment. Since the more recent literature moves away from the focus of this study, much of the literature which is reviewed below is from an earlier period.

Public Universities and Their Political Environments

A review of the literature even from the earlier period indicates that scholarly research on the relationship between institutions of public higher education and their political environments has been rather sparse. Writing in 1969 Michael Kirst and Edith Mosher described this subject as a new and largely uncharted area of research.¹ In 1972 Eulau noted that a systematic empirical body of knowledge on the politics of higher education did not exist.²

In 1976 Borgestad found that despite interest in legislative decision making, higher educational financing, and communication in general, there had been a paucity of research on the process by which a university system communicates its needs to a state legislature.³ Eliot noted this in a study in 1959 and suggested that it was

due to the wide variation in the makeup of the various state legislatures and related interest groups which hinders any generalized explanations and conclusions. 4.

Writing on the state of research on higher education administration and policy in 1975, Gove and Floyd stated that,

Research on the state governmental and political environment in which the public university operates is less well-developed than is research on the university as a formal organization". 5.

The need for such research, for the development of a clearer understanding of how an institution fits into its political context, and of the potential harm which can result from the lack of such an understanding, was clearly identified by Goodall, Holderman and Nolan. In commenting on the current nature of university-legislative relations they stated:

Unfortunately, the partnership has become seriously strained in recent years, each partner viewing the other with disdain and skepticism. There are certain perceptions that members of each community have of each other which, if not altered, may exacerbate the existing strained relationship with potentially severe consequences for all concerned. 6.

Borgestad's research revealed a significant communication gap between Minnesota's public university and legislature during the mid-1970's. As a typical example of this problem a prominent state senator is quoted as questioning, "whether the University weighed seriously the public interest versus the personal interests to build an empire". 7. Erika Pilver, writing one year later, noted

virtually the same problem in the State of Connecticut.

Pilver reported that,

The constituent units in higher education, because of their own priorities, sometimes find themselves opposing community and citizen groups which might in other circumstances be expected to support them. 8.

Rowland provides a more positive image of universities recognizing the importance of cultivating good community relations. He points to the partnership of Yale and the City of New Haven in seeking funding for downtown development as an example of such positive relations. Rowland warned that the consequences of neglecting community relations are unusually severe and long lasting. Aikman identified the sudden purchase of extensive real estate, intrusions into well established community patterns, and the perception on the part of the public that upper level college employees enjoy substantially higher levels of salary and fringe benefits than those ordinarily available to the average citizen, lengthy vacations and sabbatical leaves as sources for resentment of the presence of the university by other members of the community and as potential sources of trouble. Rowland adds the exemption from local real estate taxes and thus the perception that universities are not paying their fair share towards public services. 9. Rowland quotes from the Reports of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education to underscore the importance of community relationships, particularly for urban institutions,

The university located in an urban setting is not only an educational institution that happens to be in a city, it's a physical entity and a corporate force that has diverse and major impacts on the life and environment of the city....It is within the context of the growing urban crisis, however, that these impacts have taken on new significance requiring more conscious efforts on the part of the institution to maximize positive aspects and control potentially negative effects. 10.

The report lists some reasons why institutions generate ill will in their urban environments,

Uncertain expansion plans of a university can adversely affect maintenance standards of neighboring areas as well as real estate values, requirement for parking facilities and increased traffic in the vicinities of the campus may place an excessive burden on the city; and student housing patterns, from the viewpoint of some inhabitants of the neighborhood, may have undesirable effects on otherwise attractive residential areas. 11.

The literature suggests that many urban universities have been oblivious to the reactions of local inhabitants and community interest groups to their expansion plans.

In a book entitled, The Urban University and-the Future of Our Cities, J. Martin Klotsche, former chancellor of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, states that,

Blight, obsolescence, deterioration, overcrowding, and traffic congestion are common in the areas surrounding many urban institutions. These have a stultifying effect on institutional growth and are a deterrent to those wanting to live in the immediate vicinity of the institution. Often the university, itself, has contributed to these conditions...Zoning violations and substandard living conditions have occurred...High-density land coverage and indiscriminate intermingling of residential and commercial use of properties have resulted in incompatible land uses. 12.

Klotsche warns that while a primary concern should be to understand and serve the city, the university must not become so committed to the affairs of the city that the primary purposes for which it exists become compromised. He states,

It would be fatal to its historic mission were problem solving and local politics to become its primary goals. 13.

Seyffert warns that it is commonplace for local residents, particularly low income residents, to express fear and suspicion of university expansion projects,

Physical changes often beget social changes which long time residents deem undesirable... many neighborhoods view universities as elements of the community power structure. 14.

Clark Kerr warned in 1968 that,

The support of the inner city inhabitants--the new neighbors of the institution--will also be very important to the success of the enterprise. That support should not be taken for granted. If the people of the community are not fully consulted and informed of institutional plans, if they do not believe they will stand to gain visible and important benefits in exchange for some upheaval in their neighborhoods, the results can be catastrophic... 15.

Opposition to the location of a new university facility can be a function of a natural emotional reaction to change or "Negative Geography", which was identified and defined by Robert H. Stoddard. This author identifies Negative Geography as the automatic assertion by those in the neighborhood of a proposed "undesirable" public facility that any other site is preferable and who view with increasing favor any other proposals for alternative sites as these sites are identified at points which move

outward in concentric circles farther and farther away from their neighborhood. According to Stoddard, when Negative Geography is in play, the more rational approach of the professional geographer, consideration of variables such as proximity to transportation, amount of land available, and population density, are abandoned to an irrational emotional approach. This form of opposition will be present to some extent whenever a new public facility is proposed. This type of reaction needs to be separated from opposition resulting from the purely economic and political context. Negative Geography stems more from a basic emotional response to change in one's environment, plus a failure of adequate communication and understanding between the university and its community. 16.

Stoddard's work supports Rosen's conclusion that, within the early stages of the planning process, consideration of the political dynamics of the community can outweigh in importance careful scientific/technical and economic analysis. This literature suggests a public image of the university in some settings and circumstances not as a force for positive good in the community, bestowing the benefits of higher education and research to a grateful populace, but rather as a costly and confusing, "bull in the community china shop", encountering enmity and opposition at every turn as it pursues a particular course of action. It also suggests that the university may be at

times isolated from the realities of the world which surrounds it. One can find this public perception reflected in early accounts of "town/gown" conflicts during the formative years of Medieval Oxford and, at a much more recent date, in commentary of the late 1960's and early 1970's when this timeless issue of the relationship of the university to its larger community was being debated with particular intensity. 17.

Writing for The Saturday Review in 1969, Howard Zinn criticized colleges and universities for becoming too isolated from the realities of the world they allegedly served. His criticism is typical of a wide body of commentary from the late 1960's calling on the university to be more "relevant and involved". Leonard E. Goodall's book of readings on state politics and higher education contains the following quote from an article by Zinn which was originally published in the October 18, 1969 edition of the Saturday Review,

Like politicians we have thrived on public innocence, with this difference: the politicians are paid for caring, when they really don't; we are paid for not caring, when we really do...We were the first to learn that awe and honor greet those who have flown off into space while people suffer on earth...A catch phrase can become a stimulous for endless academic discussion, and for the proliferation of debates that go nowhere into the real world, only round and round in ever smaller circles of scholarly discourse. Schemes and models and systems are invented that have the air of profundity and that advance careers, but hardly anything else. 18.

Providing for Adequate Consideration of the External
Political Environment Within the Planning and Decision
Making Process for an Urban Public University

Although no major research has been done to date on the site selection process for the Boston Campus, formal studies have been done of similar processes at other urban public universities during approximately the same time period. The work most closely related to this study of the Boston experience is George Rosen's book, Decision-Making Chicago-Style: The Genesis of a University of Illinois Campus. Rosen presents a case study of the location of a permanent campus of the University of Illinois within the City of Chicago during the period 1955 to 1965. There were similarities between the process in Chicago and in Boston. Rosen examined the decision making process from economic, social and political perspectives as well as the roles played by the city government, the university, the general public, the state legislature and the courts. Rosen, an economist, sought to explain the Chicago site selection process as the product of classic economic principles and ended up concluding that it could not be examined in this manner since it was the result of external political forces not economics. The author describes how the university's goals and long range plans interacted with those of the city government and how the city and university together worked to overcome local neighborhood opposition to the site selected for the new urban campus. Rosen is particularly helpful because he provides a framework in which we can see how the external

political environment impacts on the planning process. A secondary purpose of his work was to provide an historical chronicle of the site selection process. Rosen identified four approaches which he thought might be used in making public policy decisions or in analyzing how such decisions were made for an urban public university. Rosen attempted to show to what extent each of these four theoretical approaches to planning and public policy decision making applied to the Chicago experience. The four theoretical approaches which Rosen proposed for this type of public decision making are:

1. The Economic Approach

This approach is embodied in such techniques as "cost benefit" or "systems analysis". Several alternative decisions are viewed simultaneously as potential investments of public resources and then traced through to their conclusion. A value is set on their likely outcomes in relation to their costs so that the course of action with the highest present value can be identified. This is a static technique which compares end results of several alternative decisions with an earlier state and with each other. It assumes that one single decision maker or a decision making group can at a given point in time examine a complete set of possible choices, identify the likely costs and benefits to the members of society from each of these alternatives and then pick the one best solution. The

problem with this approach to analysis of either future or past decision making is that in reality the decision maker seldom has the complete set of data which the process assumes will be available. In reality the rejection of one alternative choice changes the nature of all the remaining choices the full dimensions of which may not be immediately obvious to the decision maker at the time the decision is made to reject the first alternative. Rosen points out that the process may become more of a political struggle over who has the power to make the choice among the alternatives rather than an exercise in prudent choice among carefully articulated alternatives. Rosen points to the difficulty of identifying the economic value of the benefit of providing city officials and business firms with access to the intellectual resources of a university or of identifying the economic loss stemming from the destruction of a portion of a city neighborhood. It is sometimes difficult to identify at what point politics enter into and "contaminate" what is presented as a purely rational dispassionate "economic approach". Rosen found that while economic factors were underlying forces behind the need for a campus in Chicago, they played a secondary role in the actual choice of a site. Because of the availability of federal urban-renewal funding the city and the university were relieved of a major economic constraint on locating the new campus in downtown Chicago. The effect of this was to set aside market factors that would otherwise have

influenced the site selection process. In the case of the Chicago campus Rosen found that there were also very serious problems in measuring the economic benefit of placing the university in one location as compared with another. Rosen stated,

The deliberate replacement of the market as a device to allocate land by nonmarket factors would make any measure of optimality difficult. The nonmeasurability of the major external benefits and costs of the decision, whether economic or political, and the inevitable disagreement over weights to be given to the various benefits or costs make it impossible to determine in any remotely precise fashion the optimality of the decision reached or, even more important, which among the sites considered was optimal. 19.

He further points out that while the process was going on the benefits and costs of the various possible choices were constantly changing, simply because time was passing. In reality a site which would have been ruled out as both undesirable and unavailable at the start of the process turned out for political reasons to be the only feasible alternative at the close of the process. This finding was of particular significance to Rosen because as an economist he had hoped to measure the impact of economic factors on such a decision.

2. Analysis of Organizational Structure

This second approach stresses the organizational complexity of public decision making and the effect of organizational structure on the policy decision with emphasis on the interplay of the various elements within a

decision making organization, or group of organizations, their relationships to each other and their respective interests, strengths and weaknesses. This approach does not assume a single decision maker or universal agreement on objectives or value rankings among the group of decision makers. Rosen saw this as a more flexible framework for studying the interests and influence of external groups interested in the outcome of the decision. A disadvantage to this approach, identified by Rosen, is that the organizational structure and mix of competing organizational units described may be unique to a particular time and place and not be capable of being applied to describe another decision making process in a different institution. Rosen felt that the organizational approach provided the best explanation of the decision making process in Chicago. The University of Illinois wished to safeguard its strong position in the states' educational system. Semi-independent metropolitan area governmental agencies intervened to prevent the location of the campus in certain areas. The railroads were able to use certain state laws to prevent the use of their terminals and yards as possible sites. On the positive side, support from some state legislators and particularly from the city's urban renewal administration lent support to the university's final decision to select the Harrison-Halstead site which was their ultimate choice. Mayor Daley used his considerable political power to

support a site which was based on his own personal preferences and goals for the city and which would yield political benefits for his administration. Rosen states,

Economic determinants of choice were subordinated to political determinants, both from the very nature of the goals of the major parties involved, and from the institutional setting. 20.

3. The Science and Technology Approach

This approach to decision making argues that the application of science to a problem will result in a technically best solution superior to one based on economic analysis or one based upon political considerations. Rosen states that this approach has a natural appeal to scientists and academicians and is popular with the general public because of the prestige of both of these groups who appear to be above mere consideration of the dictates of market forces or partisan politics. Concerning this approach Rosen quotes Nelson commenting with scorn, "So now we return to square one and Plato's philosopher king. 21. " Rosen adds that now the philosopher king is a scientist rather than the economist required by the first approach and points out that now there is no more reason to expect consensus among the decision makers on the scientists' goals than there was on the economists' goals. In considering the economic and scientific approach to decision making Rosen briefly introduced "The Principle of the Hiding Hand" as developed by Albert O. Hirschman in his book, Development Projects

Observed. In this book Hirschman defines the "Hiding Hand" principle as the expectation of some systematic association of providentially offsetting errors which result in a highly favorable if not certifiably "best" solution emerging from a prolonged planning and decision making process in which none of the decision makers are ever fully aware, at the time, of the network of offsetting errors which are occurring. He states,

Since we necessarily underestimate our creativity, it is desirable that we underestimate to a roughly similar extent the difficulties of the tasks we face so as to be tricked by these two offsetting underestimates into undertaking tasks that we can, but otherwise would not dare, tackle...What we are trying to say can be well conveyed by taking up Marx's famous sentence, "Mankind always takes up only such problems as it can solve," and by modifying its wording slightly, but its meaning fundamentally, to read: "Mankind always takes up only such problems as it thinks it can solve." Indeed, people who have stumbled through the experience just described will tend to retell it as though they had known the difficulties all along and had bravely gone on to meet them...we find it intolerable to imagine that our more lofty achievements, such as economic, social, or political progress, could have come about by stumbling rather than through careful planning, rational behavior, and the courageous taking up of a clearly perceived challenge. 22.

In conducting his investigation Rosen also sought to determine whether the "Hiding Hand" was present in the Chicago experience. He found that selection of the site was the result of a sudden and unpremeditated choice, and there was no reason, from the decision process used in and of itself, for there to have necessarily been a favorable outcome. Yet there was a favorable outcome which pleased

many of those who had long wanted to see an urban Chicago campus of the University. Rosen states,

This experience may also support Hirschman's theory of a "hiding hand" in project planning, although, if so, it was more by chance than by any systematic tendency that I can determine. 23.

Rosen found that the University of Illinois did use the scientific and technical approach in an effort to gain support from the city's private universities, the legislature, and to influence public opinion. It was important for the University to develop a strong technical case based on its own research and that of a consultant, The Real Estate Research Corporation. Rosen states,

The University laid a good deal of stress upon the quality of its technical analysis and its prestige as the best public institution of higher education in the state. The various internal committees that were set up carried out technical analysis that developed a need for the campus, estimated the space required for that type of campus, and explored the relation between program needs and the use of space as well as other issues. Among the most important of these in their consequences for the choice of a site were the space studies. Both the analysis of costs of construction and maintenance and the examination of other urban campuses led to a conclusion that a low-rise campus of discrete buildings was the preferred type. The quality of the technical analysis, supported by the University's prestige as an institution, made it possible for the University to insist on and get what it considered to be adequate space, even in the inner city. Furthermore, its prestige and technical competence were undoubtedly significant factors in eventually persuading the private universities in the city to accept as inevitable (although with varying degrees of reluctance) the construction of a city campus. 24.

4. The Community Power Framework

This fourth approach cited by Rosen argues that the dominant economic interest groups within a political community, here a city, determine the decisions of the city leaders. When conflict emerges between the interest groups then the dominant group will prevail. Rosen found that,

This experience does not support those theories of decision-making that postulate a united business community dominating a city government. The business community was not united and the mayor was not weak. But it does support a picture of an important role for community influence groups; of conflict over the use of land; and of a willingness to sacrifice a weaker community group, in this case the Italian, Greek, and Spanish-speaking peoples of the near West Side, for the interests of stronger groups, in this case the University and the Loop business community. This sacrifice had in its support the prestige of the University, the technical expertise of the city planner, and the long standing desire for a University of Illinois campus in Chicago. 25.

Rosen concluded that, although each of the approaches formed part of the planning process and impacted on the final decision, the process was dominated by political factors particularly the influence and political strength and forceful action of Mayor Daley. He suggested that it would be interesting to explore, by means of further research, how such decisions had been made in cities other than Chicago to determine whether any general conclusions could be reached about the nature of such a planning process.

Rosen's discussion of approaches to the analysis of internal decision making and planning does not, of course, stand alone in the literature. His thoughts are reflective of some commonly discussed conceptual models of organizational

decision making and to some extent of governance within the university including those of Chaffe, Pettersen, Corson, Lallette, Baldrige and Cohen and March. Chaffe chose to label these concepts as "The Rational Model: Decision by Reasoned Problem Solving, The Collegial Model: Deciding by consensus, The Political Model: Deciding Through Conflict Resolution, and The Bureaucratic Model: Deciding by Structured Interaction Patterns". An additional model labelled by Chaffe as "Organized Anarchy: Deciding by Accident", suggests Hirschman's "Hiding Hand". These writers all attempt to conceptualize approaches to the analysis of decision making by groups and individuals within an organization. To some extent this limits their relevance since this study is concerned primarily with an examination of the impact of external factors within the broader environment on organizational decision making. Michela Reichman's work is particularly helpful when we bring the scope of the inquiry into this particular focus.

Reichman documented the planning process used by some universities to select new sites for operations within urban core areas. This study provides a review of the critical and initially unfavorable impact of the external political community on expansion planned by the Harvard Medical School in the Mission Hill area of the Roxbury District of Boston in the 1970's as well as similar experiences by the University of Pittsburgh and the University of California, San Francisco

at approximately the same period. In concluding a lengthy description of the difficulties each of these institutions experienced Reichman stated,

While the experiences of these three institutions were different in many respects, they show some striking similarities. The first is the extent to which large institutions are oblivious to their effect on the people living in their environs until it is called forcefully to their attention by legal, political, and community action. The second is the need for institutions to take neighborhood concerns into consideration when planning expansion of their physical facilities, no matter how beneficial those facilities may be to the institution and to the larger community. The third is the increasing sophistication shown by neighborhood residents in using the news media and public relations as well as legal and political processes to make their views felt by large institutions. The fourth is that when these messages get through, and institutions begin to pay attention, the compromises that are painfully worked out are not so destructive after all. 26.

This study seeks to add to this particular area of inquiry by documenting the occurrence of virtually the same phenomenon during the site selection process for the University of Massachusetts - Boston.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Study Design

The research design involved the development of a case study which analyzes the planning process for a contemporary urban public university. Specifically it examined the process of permanent site selection for the University of Massachusetts-Boston and the planning process which led up to the selection of a permanent site for the new campus during the period of 1964 to 1968.

The case study identifies the major components and dynamics of this prolonged planning process and develops recommendations for the planning process and for university relations which can be generalized to other urban public universities. It also identifies which of the factors identified by Rosen were present in the Boston site selection process.

Methods

The study methods include a review of materials within the University of Massachusetts Archives, a review of contemporary news media, interviews with faculty representatives and campus and university administrators, and with community political leaders of the period involved as well as a review of relevant extant public records of the City of Boston and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

On the basis of all of the above methods, the researcher first sought to describe the broader context of the development of public higher education in Massachusetts in this century in which the decision to locate a new campus of the University of Massachusetts within the Boston metropolitan area took place and then to construct a comprehensive chronological "Timeline" summary of the major events, decisions reached and turning points in the site selection and new site planning process. The researcher then used the same sources, to develop a more complete picture of exactly what occurred during key points in the process. He also attempted to determine the nature of the design of the planning process and its methodology. After developing a description, in depth, of the methodology of the internal planning process, and changes which took place in this planning methodology as events progressed, the study then attempted to place this process in its broader context by examining the internal political environment within the university. The next step was to place the university and its planning process within the context of the broader community. This presented the greatest challenge of this entire project.

The nature of research using the kind of sources required by this type of study militates against a precise definition of a course of action during the research and information gathering phase. Information and understanding which are derived from interviews and review of archival

materials tend to build upon themselves often suggesting new directions and sources. Out of necessity the methodology used in this case study was evolutionary in nature, developed in part as the research progressed on the basis of what the research had yielded to date.

Interviews

This study also included nine interviews with key participants in the site selection process during which they presented their insight into this episode from the perspective of 1988. A list of persons interviewed is provided in Appendix III. George Rosen provided a caution on the value of interviews in his study which is also quite appropriately added to this study,

The value of the interviews is less for details. -memories of events that occurred almost twenty years ago have faded- than for interpretation. Obviously people differ in their interpretation of events, but it is possible to cross-check interpretation and then reach an independent judgement as to the reasonable one. 1.

I have found this observation to be correct after conducting a series of interviews related to the Boston experience. The recollection of the details of specific events by major participants in the selection of the site for the Boston campus has also faded after twenty years and yet they have no problem recalling the major thrust and outline of what happened and how they felt about what occurred.

Limitations and Exclusions

It is important to note that this study was not a discussion of the teaching and research mission of higher education as a catalyst for change and progress in society. Much has been written about this aspect of the university/community relationship. Lynton and Elman, for example, in their book, New Priorities for the University urge that faculty become much more involved with their external environment and that institutions as a whole, "need to become considerably more flexible and nimble in their response to external demands". They state,

The knowledge needs of modern society require that university faculty become more involved in broader areas of scholarship, in the aggregation, synthesis, interpretation, and application of knowledge, and in outreach and extension. In short, faculty must come to be in active contact with the world outside academia. 2.

This study was concerned with the university more as a neighbor than as a teacher. It examined the direct impact of the physical presence of a new university upon a community and the direct impact of the local political process within that community on the development of the university.

Another factor which must be considered is that the events reviewed in this case study occurred during the late 1960's and early 1970's, an era which in some ways was quite distinct and different from the late 1980's. To a certain extent this is a limitation since not all of the events and conclusions within the study will be directly

applicable to contemporary urban public institutions. This time gap of some twenty years, however, is also a factor which strengthens the study since we can at this somewhat distant vantage point better understand the events described in terms of their broader context and long term outcomes.

Ultimately a study can never completely reveal the motivation of participants in an event no matter how complete the record. It cannot completely recreate, for purposes of analysis, the total context within which a series of events took place some twenty years in the past. It can never fully document the genesis of a new idea or change of attitude among a group of decision makers. This study was limited by the necessity to work largely with the written and printed record and limited as well by the all too human tendency of participants to forget, to embellish or to misconstrue events in which they played a significant role.

Sources

Sources for this study included formal documents, reports, correspondence and related materials with particular emphasis on planning documents. More precisely the following sources were used:

Contemporary News Media

All relevant news coverage of the decision to create a Boston campus as well as coverage of the site selection

process, 1964 to 1968, was reviewed in the two major Boston newspapers, The Boston Globe and The Boston Herald Traveler as well as the Boston campus' student newspaper, The Mass Media, for the period 1966 - 1968. The extensive newsmedia scrapbooks of the University Archives at Amherst, historical files maintained at The Boston Globe's central offices, and microfilm of the Mass Media maintained at the Boston Campus library proved to be invaluable sources during this effort. The study also reviewed contemporary editions of local "neighborhood" newspapers for Dorchester and South Boston as well as The Boston Pilot, the official weekly newspaper of the Archdiocese of Boston which are maintained on microfilm at the main branch of The Boston Public Library in Copley Square. A great deal of material was obtained through this process and the task became one of presenting the most relevant items for purposes of illustration.

University Archives

The holdings of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst as well as those of the Boston Campus were surveyed and reviewed through consultation with staff archivists at both locations. They were found to contain a rich source of information on the period. Numerous reference is made to this material throughout the case study.

Other Archival Sources

The formal records of the Commonwealth's governors and of annual legislative sessions which are maintained in part at the state archives at Columbia Point in Dorchester, Massachusetts and in part at the state legislative library at the statehouse on Beacon Hill in downtown Boston also provided a rich source of information. The state legislative library is also a rich source of data generated in reports prepared by the state agencies of the Commonwealth.

Research Questions

A series of research questions was developed to provide initial focus and to guide the research.

Questions Concerning Planning:

What does this case study tell us about the nature of the planning and decision making process in urban public universities?

How did the site selection process for the Boston Campus of the University of Massachusetts differ from that for the Chicago Campus of the University of Illinois? What were the similarities?

To what extent can the Boston experience be better understood using the approaches to decision making and analysis of decisions identified by Rosen in the Chicago site selection process?

Did the university use the prestige of its own reputation and that of its consultants to win support for the findings and recommendations of these studies?

Was there a new and different approach or dynamic which was not identified by Rosen in Chicago?

If political considerations did play a leading role, then exactly what were these considerations and how well were they recognized and integrated into the planning and decision making process?

Was there also an assessment made from the standpoint of the communities involved?

Questions Concerning University Participants

What was the nature of the political environment within the University during this period and how did it shape the University's approach to the planning process?

Who were the major participants within the University during the site selection process and what was their role?

To what extent do the views of the leadership of the University and the Boston Campus, as expressed in the period 1964 to 1974, appear to agree with or to digress from those of the local and state political leadership?

How did the background and nature of the faculty and academic leadership influence their perception of the city and its needs? Were they in fact isolated from the reality of the City of Boston?

What was the background and nature of the student body and their leadership?

Questions Concerning The External Community

What were the concerns of the city administration regarding the new university?

What concerns were expressed by local residents and community power groups?

How effectively were these concerns recognized and addressed during the planning process?

What was the impact of the contemporary external political environment of the period?

Were there other political events of the late 1960's which had an impact on the selection process?

What expectations did the external community have during this period regarding the potential benefits of an urban public university for the City of Boston?

How were the extensive urban renewal and economic development programs of the City of Boston related to the decisions regarding the location of the Boston Campus?

What was the influence of community power groups?

To address these questions I have prepared a narrative providing the background and context within which the decision was made to create the Boston campus and a description of the long and difficult site selection process from the decision to create the new campus in June of 1964 to the point at which classes began at the new campus at Columbia Point in January of 1974. The answers to some of these questions will flow directly from this narrative while the answers to others will be developed in

a final analytical chapter which will present findings and conclusions..

Chapter IV begins with a review of the early part of this century and moves forward through the decades to trace public attitudes in Massachusetts concerning support for public higher education and particularly for a public university in the Metropolitan Boston area. This chapter includes a description of public expectations and political support for such an institution immediately prior to and during the site selection process. Chapter V describes the initial planning effort for the new campus with particular emphasis upon the development of the initial mission statement for the campus. Chapter VI chronicles the long site selection process from 1964 to 1968 describing each major site considered by the University and the factors which led to their rejection. This chapter also describes the political situation in Boston and Massachusetts during the period 1964 to 1968 with particular attention paid to the pivotal mayoral race of 1967. The final section of this chapter describes the events leading up to the selection of Columbia Point in the fall of 1968. Chapter VII examines the process through which the University attempted to deal with concerns and opposition on the part of residents of the neighborhoods immediately adjacent to the new campus. It also demonstrates how this process shaped major decisions on policy for the new campus. Chapter VIII compares Rosen's findings regarding site selection for the

Chicago campus to the case study's findings regarding the site selection process for the Boston campus with particular emphasis upon the role of key decision makers, the impact of the University's internal organizational structure, and the role of technical consultants. Chapter IX presents conclusions and implications developed from the case study. This final chapter is an assessment of how well the university integrated an adequate understanding and allowance for the external political environment into the planning process. It also attempts to describe the relevance of the case study for other urban public universities.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUPPORT FOR AN URBAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY FOR BOSTON

The University of Massachusetts - Boston was born rather suddenly and at short notice in 1964. It was a "quick fix" solution to the political crisis created when its parent institution at Amherst could no longer absorb the flood of college bound students within the maturing post-war "baby boom" generation. The occasion called for a quick answer and the answer was legislation creating a second campus in the Boston area mandated to open its doors to students within 15 months. This event occurred as part of a sudden reversal of decades of reluctance by the state to develop an extensive system of public higher education.

A distinctly "Massachusetts" viewpoint had developed over decades regarding the need for public higher education in the midst of so many outstanding private colleges and universities. David Riesman commented on this viewpoint while speaking at the Boston Campus of the University of Massachusetts in 1966,

Where the land-grant tradition is strong and where public higher education has hegemony, it seems clear that these institutions can rise rapidly in status and pride, perhaps surpassing before long their downstate older siblings. But the University of Massachusetts in Boston begins in this respect under the disadvantage or handicap of the traditional Eastern (especially in Massachusetts) prejudice in favor of private education. 1.

The development of this "Massachusetts" viewpoint is traced in this chapter from the opening years of the

twentieth century to the point at which planning began for the Boston Campus in 1964.

In Chapter V this viewpoint is contrasted with that of the small group of faculty charged with formulating a statement of purpose to guide the development of the new university. This initial leadership group based their work on an emerging idea. The traditional "land-grant" mission of the great public universities of service to the agricultural heartland of America must now be extended. The expertise of the university should be brought to bear on the specific needs of the nation's cities in crisis.

The Debate on a Public University for Boston, 1900-1945

Evidence of interest and support for an urban public university for Boston can be found as far back as the first decade of this century. There was at that point a growing awareness on the part of some that higher education was still beyond the grasp of many young people from working class families. The basic problem was both a lack of money for tuition and the fact that working class students were often poorly prepared for college. Those few from this group who managed to acquire the necessary academic skills and a small cash reserve for tuition and books often found that they could not attend because their families could not spare the wages which would be lost if they attended college classes in the daytime. The dimensions of this dilemma are suggested by data from the

Statistical Abstract of the United States for 1910. It reports that in 1910 only 7,592 Massachusetts residents were attending college out of a total population of 653,189 young people ages 15 to 24.

As early as 1909, Edmund Dana Barbour, a wealthy retired Boston businessman and philanthropist, presented a petition to the state legislature requesting the establishment of an institution of learning to be known as "Massachusetts College". This new institution would be located in the City of Boston with branches in other cities and towns across the state. Under this plan students would enroll in evening course work to be conducted by faculty from the various private institutions in Massachusetts. Tuition would be only \$42.25 per year. An important limitation was that Massachusetts College could not open until \$600,000 had been subscribed by "bona fide and responsible donors to the satisfaction of the Governor and Council." Another was that the college's programs were to be supplemental to those already being offered by the state's private institutions. ² The legislature established Massachusetts College through enactment of Chapter 113 of the Acts of 1910. Despite widespread support among the public and the endorsement of sixteen of the state's private college presidents, classes were never held because of a failure to obtain the required minimum endowment of \$600,000 from private donors. ³

The annual address of Governor Eugene Foss to the legislature in 1912 provides an example of the attitude of the period toward providing increased access to higher education,

The Commonwealth cannot ignore the claims of higher education....I therefor recommend the thoroughly democratic measure of free scholarships, awarded for superior merit and carrying free tuition in any college of the state, approved by the State Board of Education, which the applicant may desire to enter. An appropriation of fifty thousand dollars would provide four hundred scholarships of one hundred and twentyfive dollars each without unduly burdening the finances of the State. We should thus secure the practical results of a State university without needlessly duplicating the splendid educational facilities already at hand. 4.

A Board of Education report to the legislature in 1912 discussed whether there was a need to provide additional higher education and extension programs which would supplement what was already being offered in the Commonwealth. The report suggested that there were already enough colleges and universities to meet the needs of the young people in the Commonwealth and thus there was no need to create a state university. It suggested instead that the state consider providing state funded scholarships for students in need and create an agency to promote extension evening courses and other forms of cooperative programs between the private colleges and state government. 5.

Speaking during this period before a legislative hearing on a proposal for a Massachusetts state university, Harvard's President A. Lawrence Lowell warned that a state university would be a wasteful duplication of the many

existing facilities and instructional staffs at the state's private institutions. Lowell warned that a state university would carry the stigma of a "poor boy's" college and advised the law makers that,

It is much better that rich and poor should go to the same institution, for this enables them to know and appreciate one another's point of view. 6.

A.E. Winship, editor of The Journal of Education, expressed similar advice in an editorial of the period. Winship stated,

A poor boy can go to Harvard, can work his way through, can live on onions and cabbage if he chooses; but when he is through, his diploma is as aristocratic as that of any student. But if he went to a State University in Massachusetts his diploma would have blazoned across its page, 'from a poor boy's college'. All education in Massachusetts is aristocratic...A State University in Massachusetts would always be the poor boy's college and poor boys would not go there. They would sooner do janitor work, live on stale food, for the sake of having an aristocratic diploma when they are through. That is the Massachusetts of it. Our western friends cannot understand it. They are democratic. They like the democracy of a State University. To them there is a heartiness in it that we cannot understand any more than they can understand the headiness of our Massachusetts ideal.7.

Writing about the University of Massachusetts in the early 1960's, David Riesman and Christopher Jencks noted the survival of these attitudes toward public higher education. They observed,

Few in New England seem ready to argue the 'socialist' doctrine that public sponsorship is inherently more egalitarian, more efficient, and more in keeping with the public impact of the educational system. The University of Massachusetts is a kind of educational New Deal, assuming only those residual functions that the private system cannot, or will not, fulfill. It is hard to find a

single area in which the University has entered into a serious competition with the private system when that system was doing a job adequately, or to find a single proposal that has been approved by the Legislature solely to make the University of Massachusetts an academically outstanding institution of which the State might be proud. The contrast with California or Michigan is obvious. 8.

Despite this prevailing attitude there continued to be support among organized labor and other progressive political and community leaders for the establishment of a state supported university in Massachusetts. Their efforts resulted in passage of Chapter 105 of the Legislative Resolves of 1914 which required the Board of Education to, again, conduct an intensive review of the need for a state university. The Board's report culminated in a bill filed in the 1915 session proposing the establishment of a state university located within the Metropolitan District of Boston on a campus of not less than three hundred acres located at a distance of not more than thirty miles from the state house of the Commonwealth. Tuition would be free for all students who had been resident in Massachusetts for at least one year prior to enrolling. Funding for the state university would be augmented by an annual state surcharge levied on all local real estate taxes collected in the Commonwealth. 9.

This proposal failed to pass primarily because it was eclipsed by parallel legislation establishing a state department of university extension which enjoyed the full support of the new progressive Democratic Governor, David

I. Walsh, and much of the leadership of the state's private institutions. Impressed by what he had seen on a visit to The University of Wisconsin, Walsh included a special section on education within his annual address delivered to the legislature on January 7, 1915. In this section, Walsh proposed a total reform which would provide much greater access for the poor to all levels of education from grade school through the university,

Massachusetts, also liberal to the point of extravagance in meeting the educational needs of the fortunate minority whose parents are in easy circumstances, owes no less to every child of the tenements, the factory and the farm, and to every adult whose early environment has been adverse, or who by economic conditions has been obliged to give to manual labor the years of childhood which should have been sacred to mental and physical preparation for civic usefulness and vocational success. 10.

While not completely fulfilling this ambitious goal, the new system of university extension, essentially state funded night courses at the private institutions, did provide, to a certain degree, access to higher education for working class youth and took much of the steam out of the movement for a state university. Decades later, as a United States senator from Massachusetts, Walsh stated that his most important accomplishment as governor was "bringing college to the people" through what was essentially a state sponsored continuing education program drawing on the resources and facilities of the private institutions. Using the University of Wisconsin as a rough prototype, Massachusetts had discovered a means of bringing college to

working class youth through extension of the private institutions which was politically satisfying to the majority for the moment.

The state had been providing large annual subsidies to MIT and Worcester Poly Tech for several years with the provision that these institutions provide a certain number of free scholarships to be distributed to needy students through the state's board of education. It is quite possible that the new extension program, in concert with the further expansion of these state funded scholarships specifically for working class students at institutions such as Northeastern University, Boston University, Boston College, and Wentworth Institute, might have permanently met the need.

But this was not to be. An amendment to the Constitution of Massachusetts, adopted by popular referendum vote in 1917, popularly titled the "anti-aid" or "non-sectarian" amendment, prohibited the use of state funds for any institutions or programs which were not directly under the authority of a department of the state government. This historic compromise, developed during debates at the Constitutional Convention of 1917, resolved a very old political conflict growing out of deep religious and cultural differences within the state. Generally, Roman Catholic leaders had favored the use of state funds in support of the various Catholic educational and charitable institutions in the Commonwealth but were

opposed to the use of state funds for scholarships at private colleges and universities which they viewed as essentially "Protestant" and middle class Republican in orientation. It was felt that a working-class, Roman Catholic youth stood a poor chance of receiving a state scholarship. Non-Catholic leaders were generally opposed to the use of state funds in support of Roman Catholic institutions but had no objection to the extension of state funded scholarships at such institutions as MIT and Worcester Poly Tech which they considered to be non-sectarian in their orientation.

The Roman Catholic leaders sense of alienation from the benefits of the state scholarship program may seem odd to us today in this post-ecumenical era. The concern that state funds might be used for religious institutions seems equally strange now that the provisions of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution have been extended by the courts to local and state governments. These were still very real and potentially divisive issues in 1917, keenly debated by the public and their political leadership. In speaking before the 1917 Constitutional Convention in opposition to the annual grants to M.I.T. and Worcester Poly Tech, Boston's famous Irish Democratic political boss, Martin Lomasney raised the issue of equal access for the working class and the possibility of political tampering during the distribution of the

scholarships,

It is a wrong thing, to have a private school of that kind in any county or in the state, where you may take the poor boy or the rich boy and give him an opportunity for advancement at the public expense, to which every young man in the state does not have access. To-day they have the power to dictate who shall go there to be educated, and the public contribute in part money that support the institution. That is all wrong....Why should the son of a poor mechanic toiling in the mills of Lowell be taxed so that the son of his uncle or brother could be educated as an engineer and always be capable of earning five or ten thousand dollars yearly, while the son of the mechanic never would get over one thousand? It is class legislation, it is improper legislation. 11.

Later in the Constitutional Convention debates

Lomasney raised the religious issue,

...how can they sit there with their views and allow all of us in the state who are Catholics to be taxed to maintain institutions of learning that are just as Protestant in their educational purposes and in their control as our institutions are Catholic? It is taxation without representation, because it is impossible for a Catholic to live in some of these institutions that have been getting money from the State under private control and be treated as he should be. 12.

These concerns, and a related orientation toward a network of private colleges and universities, free to be affiliated with a particular religious denomination or non-sectarian as their trustees desired, seems to have persisted for several decades. In the early 1960's, Riesman and Jencks observed,

... the difficulty is that in Massachusetts much of the resentment of Yankee dominance comes from Irish sources...The Church is naturally reluctant to see the faithful taxed to support public education since that leaves less money for the tuition and endowment of Catholic colleges. Hence, although 45% of the students at the University of Massachusetts are

Catholic, their co-religionists in the State Legislature have not been very enthusiastic about supporting the University...both Catholics and Protestants are deeply committed to separate development, and are uninterested in efforts to provide a common meeting ground in a public institution. 13.

The "non-sectarian" amendment put an end to the practice of state subsidies and state scholarships in 1917 and no new state program emerged to take their place in promoting access to college for the working class. The measure was intended as a compromise to put an end to years of sectarian bickering as America closed ranks to prepare for its active entry into World War I. The concept implicit in this compromise was that the state should now do absolutely nothing to expand programs or access in the private institutions. This amendment which has long been seen as a watershed event in the development of Massachusetts local public school systems was also a key turning point in the development of its institutions of higher education both public and private. Colleges and universities in the Commonwealth would now be either totally public or totally private.

Another study of the need for a state university, commissioned by the legislature in 1922, concluded that the state did not need a public university at the present time and could not afford the high cost. It called instead for the establishment of state supported junior colleges as the first step toward a possible state university in the indefinite future. 14.

Repeatedly during the Depression years, the Socialist Party introduced a bill requiring the Commonwealth to consolidate all public institutions of higher education into a new entity to be known as "The University of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts". This would be headquartered in Boston. Each year this measure failed to gather significant support and was withdrawn. ¹⁵.

In the 1938 session a bill proposed establishment of a commission to investigate the advisability of a University of Massachusetts located in Boston. It, too, was withdrawn because of lack of support. ¹⁶. Representative Charles Kaplan of Boston introduced a bill in 1948 calling for the legislature to establish a University of Massachusetts in the City of Boston. ¹⁷. In the 1950 session, House Bill 481 contained the petition of Wilfred Mirskey, William Sullivan and Meyer Pressman for, "the establishment of a branch of the University of Massachusetts within a radius of 15 miles of Boston" and another bill calling for, "The establishment of a free city college in Boston or elsewhere in Suffolk County". ¹⁸. Kaplan's bill was back again in the 1953 session. ¹⁹. Each proposal failed to be enacted due to a lack of adequate support.

The Impact of World War II on the Development of the University of Massachusetts

At the close of World War II, Massachusetts higher education faced a severe enrollment crisis due to the wave

of recently released servicemen eager to take advantage of the educational benefits provided by the GI Bill. The magnitude of this sudden growth is reflected in a comparison of data provided by the Statistical Abstract of the United States for 1947 and 1948. In 1944, Massachusetts colleges and universities had a total enrollment of 34,484 students. By 1947 this enrollment had grown to 93,087 students of whom almost half, 46,250, were veterans.²⁰ The Commonwealth's colleges, both public and private combined, were not equipped to handle this huge influx of students.

To meet this crisis, the legislature authorized the Massachusetts State College at Amherst to establish a branch annex for returning veterans through use of partially vacant training facilities and buildings at Fort Devens in central Massachusetts. As the largest public institution in Massachusetts, the State College Amherst was the logical choice to spearhead this project despite its relatively remote location in the western part of the state. The state normal schools were too small and highly specialized to handle this task.²¹

Not satisfied with this temporary solution, a coalition of student veterans and alumni at Massachusetts State College at Amherst, began a campaign to convince the legislature to raise Amherst to university status. Concern with the educational needs of veterans, the return of

relative prosperity in the post-war years, increased public interest in the new technologies which had been developed during the war, and a growing recognition of the need for college preparation for professional careers all combined into greatly increased support by the public for a decision to expand the state college into a university.

The temporary annex at Fort Devens had an interesting parallel in Illinois. The University of Illinois decided to respond to the same pressure brought about by the G.I. Bill by setting up, in the fall of 1946, a temporary campus for returning veterans at Navy Pier in downtown Chicago. This annex offered a two year program following which the veterans could go on to other institutions to complete their degree requirements. The original plan was for the Navy Pier operation to last for only four years. Instead the program continued for almost twenty years and did not close until after the new permanent Chicago campus of the University opened its doors in the early 1960's. Rosen states that,

The establishment of a permanent campus in Chicago was considered by the University administration of the period, as well as by very influential groups within the state and the University faculty, as possibly competitive in the legislature with the Urbana campus - a step that would divert necessary funds from the improvement and expansion of the main campus in the short run. 22.

To a certain extent this is what happened in Illinois. Rosen states,

The existence of this temporary campus established a base that heightened the demand for a permanent

campus. In addition, with such a campus even on a temporary basis, it would have been psychologically and politically difficult for the University to pull out of Chicago. This foothold also gave the University first choice of refusal in deciding whether or not to place a campus in Chicago—a political advantage for the future. 23.

In Massachusetts the same scenario took place with some local variations. The administration at Amherst moved quickly at the close of the war to ensure that a rival public institution did not emerge in the state's capital city. This was accomplished through the formal recognition of The State College at Amherst as the state's public university and by setting up Massachusetts' temporary response to the G.I. Bill "overflow" at an obscure rural site with a built in guarantee of a limited and temporary status since Fort Devens remained an active Army installation.

Legislation which transformed Massachusetts State College into the University of Massachusetts was signed into law by Governor Robert Bradford on May 6, 1947. 24. Very little was accomplished by this simple name change. It would take many more years of development before the new University of Massachusetts could begin to rival the long established public universities of such states as Michigan and Wisconsin. But an important precedent had been established. The state university would be located at Amherst not Boston. It would take another enrollment crisis, this time created by college bound children of World War II veterans, before the state would begin another

rapid expansion of its public higher education facilities.

The Impact of the Post-War "Baby Boom" on
Massachusetts Public Higher Education

The beginning of the 1960's saw renewed interest in the establishment of a Boston branch of the University of Massachusetts. A bill introduced by Representative Gerard Doherty in the 1960 and 1961 sessions called for the creation of a branch of the University in the City of Boston.²⁵ In the 1963 session Representative John J. McGlynn introduced a bill calling for a branch within ten miles of the City of Boston but once again the bill failed for lack of adequate legislative and popular support.²⁶ These bills failed as others had for decades before them for one basic reason, the lack of a generally perceived need to supplement the programs already provided by the private institutions.

Suddenly, in 1964, this would all change. By the fall of 1963 Massachusetts' colleges and universities were being swamped again by a tidal wave of enrollment. The impact of the post-war "Baby Boom" was being felt in full force. In response to this development the Legislative Research Bureau commissioned a study by Dr. Norman Greenwald of the Golding Center at Brandeis University on the need for and feasibility of providing additional higher public educational opportunities in the metropolitan Boston area. Greenwald wrote to University

of Massachusetts President John Lederle and to the University's Director of Institutional Studies, Leo Redfern, asking for their input. In this letter Greenwald outlined three possibilities, the expansion of Boston State College into a university, the establishment of a totally new metropolitan state university, or the establishment of a branch of the University of Massachusetts in the Boston metropolitan area.

Lederle had been president of the University since 1960 and had been looking for ways in which to expand its operations into the Boston area. In an interview in 1975 Lederle stated,

Very shortly after I arrived, I came to the conclusion that we had to get into Boston. This is obvious; it is the Hub...This was one of the major cities in America that did not have a quality public university. Inevitably there would be one there; and the University of Massachusetts ought to be programming its development. As we thought about that, we asked ourselves how do we get into Boston? One alternative would be to recognize that Boston State College is already there, and by the way, there'd been bills introduced from time-to-time to change Boston State College to Boston State University. These had never moved. Inevitably, pressures would have developed to make it a university. So, do you take them over--which would have required some doing--or do you go in there independently? I kept broaching this to the leadership of the Legislature. I think particularly of Bob Quinn and Maurice Donahue....I decided that it would be better to go in there independently rather than to invade the state college system by snipping off Boston State College. I did this for two reasons...we would inherit a faculty fundamentally teacher college oriented and very difficult to re-direct along university lines....I had visited the Boston State College campus and never in my life had I seen a physical location more impossible. It was located on one city block. The only way to go was up. 27.

A meeting of Greenwald, Lederle and Redfern took place at Amherst on January 10, 1964. Lederle and Redfern were presented with a semi-final draft of Greenwald's report on February 4. In a letter to Lederle dated March 4, Greenwald thanked the president for his extensive comments on the draft and noted that,

Our major problems relevant to establishing a University of Massachusetts branch in Boston will be Northeastern University and Boston College. 28.

As part of the growing concern with expanding higher education opportunities, the Legislature had passed Chapter 429 of the Acts of 1962 which provided for the establishment of an advisory board on higher education policy within the Massachusetts Department of Education. The new board consisted of the state's Commissioner of Education, the President of the University of Massachusetts, the President of the Lowell Technological Institute, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Southeastern Massachusetts Technological Institute, the Director of the Division of State Colleges, the Chairman of the Board of Regional Community Colleges, and five other persons appointed by the governor.

The role of the board was to review the total higher education program supported by appropriations of state funds and to submit a report to the governor and legislature by December first each year. The annual report was to include a recommendation on the allocation of state

funding among the various state supported institutions for the coming fiscal year. In their Second Annual Report, issued in January of 1964, the Advisory Board of Higher Education Policy noted that while there had been 54,745 Massachusetts High School graduates in 1960, this number was projected to increase to 86,575 by 1973. The state's institutions of higher education were not prepared to absorb this increase. The Board suggested that the state's public institutions adopt a year-round calendar of operation similar to that being used successfully by Northeastern University. 29.

In his annual message to the state legislature on January 2, 1964, Governor Peabody echoed this recommendation in calling for a special study of the feasibility of year round operation of the state's public institutions. He stated, "Rather than build costly new facilities, we first should make full utilization of our existing higher education facilities." 30. The governor made no mention of the possibility of a new branch of the University in Boston.

In a Boston Globe interview in late January, President Lederle predicted that by 1970 Massachusetts would be short 47,000 places in public and private institutions of higher learning and predicted that this challenge would be met primarily by the state's public institutions including a new "University of Massachusetts in Boston" which would eventually enroll 15,000 students. He noted that Boston

was the only city of its size in the nation without such an institution and stressed the great need because of the large number of Boston commuter students who worked part-time. Lederle stated that, because of a serious lack of space at the Boston State College campus, his preference would be to build on a totally new site rather than merge the existing state college with the new Boston campus. ³¹.

On April 6, during an appearance before the annual Senate Ways and Means Committee budget hearing, Lederle stated that the University had received more than 12,000 freshman applications for the upcoming fall semester and that about 8,000 of these applicants would have to be turned away due to a lack of space. In response to this, on April 7, Representative Robert Cawley of the West Roxbury District of Boston introduced a bill which would have created a special legislative commission to study the feasibility of a branch of the University in the Boston area. Cawley cited the relatively high cost of the area's private colleges, the fact that Boston was the only major urban center in the nation without a state supported university and that about half of the student population at the Amherst campus came from the Boston area.

Reacting very quickly the following day, Lederle announced through the news media that, "If the Legislature was to decide that it wanted to expand the University by creating a branch in Boston, we are prepared to come into

Boston and organize a branch there." 32. On April 9, The Boston Globe published an editorial in which they repeated Cawley's arguments, and noted that, "The task is rapidly slipping beyond the capacity of the private colleges..." and endorsed the study.33. On April 13, The Massachusetts Legislative Research Council release Dr. Greenwald's report on public higher education in the Boston area stating that Greater Boston must have a state university if the growing number of qualified students in eastern Massachusetts were to receive higher education.

In reviewing the quality of programs at the Commonwealth's state teachers colleges the report stated that,

...none of them, however...have yet achieved standards or quality in their arts and science offerings comparable to most private Massachusetts liberal arts colleges or the University of Massachusetts...Boston State College officials appear receptive to proposals to expand their mandate to that of a university; realistically, however, they apparently accept the lapse of a considerable period of time, perhaps a decade or more, before the institution can become a university in fact as well as in name...The academic standing of the University of Massachusetts is demonstrated by a variety of criteria....University officials appear receptive to the idea of establishing a second campus in Boston to service eastern Massachusetts. In formulating their expansion projections, they have considered the creation of such campuses in a number of metropolitan centers of the Commonwealth. 34.

The report acknowledged the existence of the peculiar Massachusetts higher education environment,

The concentration of private colleges and universities in Massachusetts creates special problems for those concerned with studying the need for additional public higher education opportunities.

In most states, higher education, especially at the university level, is primarily a public responsibility and the appropriate authorities have considerable freedom in providing for overall direction and coordination. In this Commonwealth, the public sector must augment rather than duplicate services provided by well established and nationally recognized private institutions....More specifically, a public university in Boston would not likely attain the necessary public support, faculty or standing in the academic world unless its offerings were approximately on a par with those of Boston College, Boston University or Tufts. Moreover its better graduates would have to qualify for acceptance into the graduate programs of nationally eminent institutions such as Harvard and M.I.T. 35.

Since it was not charged with making specific recommendations, the report concluded by identifying four possible alternatives for the Boston area,

- (1) Establish a 'Commuting' Campus of The University of Massachusetts In Greater Boston.
- (2) Establish a 'Commuting' Campus of the University of Massachusetts In Greater Boston, and Incorporate into it, as Components of the University, The Massachusetts Bay Community College, The Boston State College, And The Massachusetts College of Art.
- (3) Provide Express Bus Service to and from The University of Massachusetts Campus at Amherst for Qualified Greater Boston Students.
- (4) Expand Professional, Technical and Vocational Programs Of Existing State Institutions In Greater Boston. 36.

In March, Senate President John E. Powers resigned to accept a position in the state judicial system. His successor, Senator Maurice Donahue, spoke at the annual Newman Club communion breakfast at the Amherst campus on May 3. A number of reporters attended since it would be Donahue's first public address since becoming senate

president. In the midst of a talk on religious themes Donahue called for the creation of a new branch of the university in the Boston area to meet the need of the great number of students being turned away from the university. Donahue did not call for an urban location for the new campus. He suggested, instead, that it be located in the Blue Hills area of the Boston suburb of Milton since,

Any Greater Boston location for a second state university must include a minimum of 100 acres for at least 20 high rise structures housing a wide variety of specialized schools of liberal arts, fine arts, engineering, business administration, science, law and medicine." 37.

Donahue stated that the matter would be coming up soon for debate in the legislature.

In response to previous suggestions that Boston State College might be expanded into a state university for Boston, Donahue suggested that this would only be a temporary and unsatisfactory solution since their plant was already,

Hemmed in and overshadowed by Northeastern University, Simmons, Harvard University and Emmanuel College. It would be unable to expand and would pose an insolvable automobile parking problem. It would not provide one single additional desk for a student since it is already overcrowded and turning away proportionately as many students as the University at Amherst. And it cannot seize land for expansion without serious additional loss of valuable tax paying property to a city already being nibbled to financial despair by tax exempt foundations.

Donahue listed four essential conditions for the site of a new Boston area public university; a minimum of 100 acres, proximity to public transportation, extensive

off-street parking, and a site which was already state owned and exempt from local property taxes. ³⁸. During an interview conducted as part of this case study, Senator Donahue provided a copy of the full text of this speech and stated that the portion suggesting the possibility of a new Boston campus had been drafted by his friend, Daniel O'Leary, president of Lowell State College and a native of Boston. Donahue said that he was very surprised by the strong favorable interest and support and so the following day he asked two colleagues in the legislature to begin drafting appropriate legislation.

The Debate on the Need for a Boston Campus
of The University of Massachusetts

On May 4 President Lederle issued a statement stating that the university was ready to move to establish a high quality program in the Boston area if support was forthcoming from the governor and legislature. On May 13 a bill, Senate 849, was filed in the legislature by Senate President Donahue, Senator George Kenneally of Boston, and Representative Robert Quinn of Boston calling for the establishment of a branch of the University in Boston.

A late May marathon six hour public hearing on this bill by the Joint Senate House Education Sub-Committee brought forth both strong support and strong opposition. More than 300 persons attended resulting in the moving of the hearings to Gardner Auditorium. Senate President Donahue and Senator Kevin Harrington, chairman of the

Massachusetts Education Commission, led the support citing the great increase in unsuccessful applicants for fall, 1964 admission to the University. The University's dean of admissions, William Tunis, underscored this problem by pointing out that even highly qualified students from "prestige" high schools in Greater Boston such as Newton, Lexington and Brookline had been turned away in large numbers. Less than half of the applicants from the elite Boston Latin School had made it.

Also appearing for the University were President Lederle and University trustee Hugh Thompson who was also New England Director of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. Thompson attributed the dramatic increase in applications to an economic squeeze on the middle and lower income families. President Lederle stated that the new campus could be opened by September of 1965 for 1,000 freshman and would require from \$750,000 to \$1,000,000 for its first year of operation.

Among sites mentioned for the new campus were the tract of land adjacent to the Blue Hills area of Milton, which had been mentioned earlier by Senator Donahue, and an abandoned army hospital facility in the suburb of Waltham.

Reaction was mixed from representatives of the Commonwealth's other colleges. Education Commissioner Owen Kiernan, representing the State Board of Education as well

as the State College Board of Trustees, spoke in favor of the bill. Kermit Morrissey, Brandeis Dean of Students and Chairman of the State Regional Community College Board, also expressed support for the bill. However, nine of the ten state college presidents voiced opposition. The one exception was President Daniel O'Leary of Lowell State College who spoke in favor of the bill. O'Leary, it will be recalled, had earlier provided Senator Donahue with assistance in drafting the original proposal for the new campus. When asked about the reasons for this support by O'Leary, Senator Donahue attributed it to the fact that O'Leary was originally from Boston and thus fully understood the critical need in the Boston area.

State College Director, John Gillespie criticised the bill as "woefully inadequate, hastily conceived, and providing unplanned duplication".³⁹ He argued that the state colleges could provide space at half the cost and that a majority of the Boston area students, rejected for admission to Amherst, obviously wanted to live away from home and would not apply to a commuter institution. President Looney of Boston State College, suggested that the most economical way to solve the applicant growth problem was to expand the state colleges until they eventually became state universities. President Harold Case of Boston University called the bill premature and suggested that it be considered on the basis of "hard logic and un-feeling fact, not emotion and

sentimentalism".⁴⁰ He cited a study which showed that 92% of the 9,000 freshman applicants rejected by BU in a recent year had eventually gained admission at other accredited colleges.⁴¹

Case's suggestion that the local private institutions could provide solutions to the growth in college applicants had a parallel in the Chicago experience five years earlier. Rosen states that,

As late as March, 1959 the president of Loyola University had written to the mayor and President Henry opposing a city campus, especially a central-area campus, favoring instead a state scholarship program for the private schools.⁴²

The Massachusetts League of Women Voters voiced strong support for the bill at the hearing. Those speaking against the the bill also included Frank J. Zeo, Executive Director of the Massachusetts Federation of Taxpayers Associations. Zeo stated that while the associations recognized that there might be a need for such an institution, their current position of opposition was based upon the following points,

Massachusetts has suffered from the lack of perspective in its planning for public and private higher education. Historically our public system has developed into its present form largely through an irrational system of political preferment...To bring sense out of this chaos, an Advisory Board of Higher Education Policy was created in 1961 to study, recommend, and mediate between institutional interests. But now, on a crash basis, a Boston extension is proposed without reference to this Board and a quick political decision is being sought directly from the Legislature...We assume that these matters fall well within the objectives of the

Massachusetts Education Study, and that the recommendations of this body should be known before the University launches a branch operation... It seems obvious that to provide the Boston resident with an educational opportunity equivalent to that on the Amherst campus does not necessitate establishment of a University branch in Boston....In other words, the private commuting college in Boston may be the economic and educational equivalent of the low-tuition university at Amherst. Available to the Boston resident at even lower cost are the local state colleges and the work-study programs of at least one local private university...Considering the years of study and planning that go into the plant, program and staffing of new university campuses in such states as California, it seems to us that the new Boston campus is being launched with absurd speed and casualness--a sort of blind launching, with hardly sixteen months from the first public proposal to opening day and perhaps half that to the receipt of the first applications. Perhaps plans and cost projections do exist. If so, where are they? 43.

In his presentation at the hearing President Looney voiced the opinion of the majority of the state college presidents,

The University of Massachusetts in the Boston area will compete not only with Boston State College, but also with the state colleges at Framingham, Bridgewater, Salem, and even Worcester. Money spent on these colleges to give them just a few more buildings and educational equipment will enable them to do in the Boston area what the University wishes to do...They can do equally well on an undergraduate level anything that the University of Massachusetts can do. To expand them to meet our educational crisis is the most practical and economical procedure. It can be done at less cost to the Commonwealth... Another proposal is to do here what has been done in New York State. Organize the state colleges as a second state university independent of the University at Amherst. Each state college campus will be a campus of this new university and will have opportunity to develop at its own rate---some rapidly, some more slowly---all finally into the status of a university campus. These state colleges can thus easily fulfill the needs for more opportunity in public supported higher education in the Commonwealth. 44.

Looking back during an interview a decade later, President Lederle described the day of the hearing as an experience which was "really out of this world",

To begin with, there was a whole series of state college presidents who got up and opposed it. And, I don't want to say this with too much derogation, but I can't help saying it because I had been with these people for a long time and I've never said it publicly. Pam asked me, 'Are those really college presidents?' Harold Case, the then-president of Boston University, got up to speak, and he was just cut to pieces. He was arguing that there was no need for the University of Massachusetts, that Boston University could do all that was necessary, etc. Well, the members of the committee had been properly provided with backstopping questions on this one and they proceeded to ask what was the Massachusetts student enrollment of Boston University five years ago and what was it now. etc. this showed it had dropped down below 50%....I really felt sorry for Harold Case...People were running in and out all day. But, basically the legislators, obviously, were on our side, and they were cutting up the opposition. They listened with respect to what I had to say, and I'm always proud of the fact that we had the kind of rapport with the legislature at that time which led to this bill going through in about a month. 45.

Shortly after the end of the hearing the joint committee filed a favorable report.

Debate on the New Campus by the Willis-Harrington Commission

Two years before the proposal for the new Boston campus the state legislature had established a special commission to study education in Massachusetts through enactment of Chapter 108 of the Resolves of 1962. The Commission consisted of three members of the State Senate, seven members of the House of Representatives, and eleven

persons to be appointed by the Governor of whom two were to be elementary school teachers or administrators, two with similar experience at the high school level, and two college faculty or administrators. They were specifically charged with,

...making an investigation and study of the laws of the Commonwealth pertaining to education, of the educational institutions of the Commonwealth and their organization, of the various school systems therein, and of the educational laws, programs, and school systems of other states with a view to elevating educational standards in the Commonwealth, reorganizing the scope of the various educational boards and administrators of the Commonwealth, revising and modernizing the organizational and financial structure of the schools and school systems, extending the facilities, curricula and educational goals of the schools and colleges of the Commonwealth, and providing increased financial aid for education. Such commission shall consider the entire educational system from primary grades through college. 46.

On May 24, 1964, the Boston Globe reported that at a meeting of this special "Willis-Harrington" Education Commission two prominent members had entered into a sharp debate over the merits of the proposed Boston campus. Strong opposition was expressed by Northeastern University's president, Asa Knowles. Knowles stated that a branch of the University of Massachusetts which was within commuting distance of Boston, with its low tuition of only \$200 per year, would be likely to draw off students from the area's private institutions and end up being a greater expense to the state's taxpayers than if the state paid to send the same students to private colleges.⁴⁷ In rebuttal the Commission's chairman, Senator Kevin

Harrington, stated that,

... it would be less of a burden to both taxpayers and parents to put the new campus outside of the expensive real estate and traffic clogged area of downtown Boston. 48.

Harrington expressed the belief that there should be no further expansion of higher education institutions, public or private, in Boston proper since this would be very costly and would remove even more land from the city's tax roles. In reporting on this debate between Knowles and Harrington, the Globe observed that,

A new trend in legislative leadership thinking is to put a second University of Massachusetts out somewhere near the junction of Rte. 128 and the Massachusetts Turnpike where commuters could come easily from downtown Boston and from south, north and west of Boston...The specter of 5,000 or more University of Massachusetts students arriving in downtown Boston by automobile in the already nightmarish morning rush hour will provoke a lot of thinking about this idea of a west-of- Boston suburban university, beginning in rented quarters. 49.

Media Reaction in the Western Part of Massachusetts

Concern was expressed by the media in the Pioneer Valley area surrounding Amherst at the prospect of the creation of a new potential rival in Boston. An editorial in the Greenfield recorder Gazette suggested that Franklin County legislators should oppose the new branch for the reasons put forth by the Massachusetts Federation of Taxpayers and because it would be the likely cause of the withholding of needed resources from the Amherst campus and the watering down of its programs. The editorial concluded

by stating,

If this plan was the recommendation of qualified study groups it would be authoritative and deserving of respect. But it appears to be a political sop to legislators from the metropolitan region. Massachusetts cannot afford to make college education a political plum. 50.

An editorial released by Television Station WWLP, Channel 22, in Springfield, Massachusetts suggested that the proposal for a Boston campus was being rushed through the legislature for political reasons during an election year and proposed that Massachusetts higher education adopt the trimester system as the answer to meeting increases in enrollment. 51.

Final Debate and Passage of the Bill

As debate neared an end the University Trustees, who had been largely silent until now, decided to take a public stand. In a letter to members of the legislature on June 3, Trustee Chairman Frank Boyden re-emphasized the fact that the University had been forced to turn down nearly two thousand qualified applicants from the Boston area and rebutted those who were stating that the problem needed further study by making a personal recollection that, as far back as 1941, a report to the General Court had pointed out the need for the Commonwealth to start planning for expanded educational facilities to serve the Boston area. 52.

By the time the bill reached final debate in the Senate, Kevin Harrington had departed from his previous position of support and begun to argue that the measure should not be given further consideration until after his commission filed its report later in the year. Senate President Donahue continued in strong support of establishing the new campus and charged through the media that there was an "undercurrent" of persons out to kill the bill led by officials at Boston State College and some of Boston's private institutions. Harrington led support for an amendment requiring that the campus be situated in a suburban location arguing that the branch should not be established in the City of Boston since the city could not afford another tax exempt institution. Donahue replied that he had been told by an aide to Mayor Collins that the mayor had no objections to the new campus being in Boston. 53.

An unsuccessful amendment was offered during final debate in the House which would have sent the measure to the Willis/Harrington Commission for further study. Another would have placed the branch under the administrative control of Boston State College rather than the University of Massachusetts and a third would have eliminated Boston State College and merged it with the university. Although Robert Quinn, the majority whip from the Dorchester section of Boston, led the support for the bill during the debate in the House, support was far from unanimous among the Boston delegation. James Kelly from the Boston neighborhood of Jamaica Plain, and a member of

the House Ways and Means Committee, charged that the proposal, "wasn't given any deliberation and must have been drafted on a restaurant table somewhere." He stated that the Ways and Means Committee had reported unfavorably on the bill because its members felt that final action should await the final report of the Willis-Harrington Commission due out later in the year.

The general membership ignored this advice and rushed to take action. On June 15 the bill passed the House by a majority voice vote and the Senate by a roll call vote of 33-62. An initial appropriation of \$200,000 in start up funds was passed along with this bill.

On June 18 Governor Peabody signed the bill creating the University of Massachusetts - Boston. In a press release Lederle stated that the campus would be opened by September, 1965 with an initial enrollment of 1,000. ⁵⁴.

Reflections on the Debate by Two Key University Leaders

Looking back on the 1964 campaign for a Boston campus from the perspective of 1970, Leo Redfern emphasised that the sudden support of Senate President Donahue for a Boston campus caught many people by surprise and was one of the reasons for strong opposition from some of the private institutions,

I think their (the private institutions) concern with a public university in Boston would have been much less if it had been a case of the change of Boston State College into a university, or something of this order. But to have UMass, which had now

proven beyond doubt it could build a quality, rapidly expanding kind of operation in Amherst, build a Boston branch, gave them some cause for real concern, I think. Somehow we failed to effectively communicate to them the kind of viable relationship we sort of believed could exist, with the development of a Boston campus and the continued existence of the private institutions.

In discussing the effort to convince other key groups and the Legislature to support the campus Redfern stated,

I think that the struggle for the Boston campus was as much trying to convince alumni and some Trustees and others that it could develop without real injury to Amherst than convincing anybody it was needed of and by its own intrinsic merit. Everyone seemed to agree on the need; the difference came on how to do it. What it did, of course, was to throw a great many of the largest delegations, such as the Boston area delegation, in the legislature behind it, with the only exceptions being those who felt a parental pride in a particular public institution, like Boston State, which resisted, as did Salem State. Senator Harrington, the self-proclaimed father of education in the legislature, of course went off the ranch again on this one, as he did on many when the interest of public higher education happened to not particularly promote Salem State College at a given moment...." 55.

In an interview ten years later, Trustee Dennis Crowley, an influential Boston attorney, recalled that the impetus for the Boston campus seemed to have come from the legislative leadership, not the Trustees,

"Isn't it strange that, as we talk here today and as I try to recall the various reactions of people to the creation of UMass/Boston, that I believe our Board as a board did not operate to try to create such a thing as the branch in Boston? I have the feeling that it was legislatively-inspired and that we can't give much of the credit to either the Board or the administration." 56.

CHAPTER V.

THE FORMATION OF A MISSION STATEMENT FOR THE NEW URBAN CAMPUS

The Work of the New Departures and New Concepts Committee

In late August of 1964 the Hampshire Gazette quoted the University's Dean of Administration, Leo Redfern as saying that the new campus would be only a supplemental operation to the Amherst Campus although in years to come it might develop programs specifically tailored to the Boston urban environment. ¹ In a 1970 interview Redfern stated,

I was personally of the belief that my approach would be to involve the Amherst faculty in a close relationship to bind the two faculties into a close-knit family approach; but John Lederle on the basis of certain Michigan experiences as well as observations of other similar kinds of coordinated systems in the country was very certain that the best approach would be that of maximum autonomy within the University system and utilizing the Amherst campus only in supportive kinds of roles which the young institution in Boston could not very well provide for itself during an interim stage of development...So this was the basic kind of policy which evolved in respect to the Boston campus. I think this found a warm reception among some members of the Trustees, and because the President endorsed this approach, the entire Board concurred with it. ²

The academic leaders who were charged with the task of building this new institution from the ground up had much broader notions than Redfern of what it was that they were about to undertake. To them the new institution was an unusual opportunity to develop a totally new university specifically designed to serve the peculiar needs of an urban area and its people. It would be a model for other

urban universities which might be created in the years to come. Reisman and Jencks provide a contemporary description of this group of University of Massachusetts faculty and the environment in which they were about to attempt to build the new campus,

Many in the faculty at the University who have come in since the Second World War feel themselves missionaries for the cause of public education in the state, and, despite frustrations, remain in the hope that better things will come. The most visible frustration is the hostility of many in the legislature to scholars and intellectuals, and more specifically to public education. Not only does Massachusetts make higher education accessible to a tiny minority but also it insists on treating educators like middle-echelon civil servants and on running the University as if it were a prison or department of public works (not that these departments should be run that way either!), accountable for every action and penny....Yet despite such problems there is complete academic freedom... 3.

Their concept of what a new urban public university for Boston might be was close to the description of the ideal of an "urban-grant university" described by Clark Kerr in 1968,

Ours is a meritocracy--a society based on merit rather than on inherited status or economic class or political ideology. In such a society the university must assume the prime responsibility for finding and training the talented individuals...Now, for the continued well-being of our society, the university must intensify and broaden the initial search for talent, especially among the presently untapped source of the inner city and the minorities. The urban-grant university can locate in the inner city, at once removing the barrier of geographic distance and helping to bring about a familiarity with its existence, its purposes and its activities. It might be able to use a run-down area already slated for urban renewal. It might locate adjacent to or in air space over a central rapid transit station, to enhance its accessibility to a larger city area. Whatever its precise location, careful planning and design can

greatly add to the sense of accessibility and community-oriented concern. 4.

A discussion of the new campus took place at a meeting of the University's academic deans and provost in mid-August of 1968. Excerpts from the minutes reflect expectations of a totally new departure which would ultimately result in a truly great public university for Boston.

The provost next presented a series of tentative ideas for the University of Massachusetts/Boston for the purpose of discussion. Our ultimate plan is to create a great urban university, something like New York University, the University of London, or the University of California at Los Angeles. It will be of the highest quality in every aspect...This will be a commuter institution, initially with no frills, dormitories, fraternities, sororities or intercollegiate athletics...The important point is that this is a new institution and hence presents a rare opportunity for innovations and bold experimentation in curriculum, course content and methods...Special attention must be given at Boston to faculty-student contacts to avoid the subway concept with briefcase professors. We must develop special mechanisms and devices to bring students and faculty together to increase contacts. 5.

In September President Lederle appointed an additional subcommittee of the task force charged with planning for the new Boston campus to be known as the "New Concepts and New Departures Committee" for the further planning of the new Boston Campus. It consisted of a chair, Leo Redfern, the director of the Office of Institutional Studies, and ten members of the Amherst faculty representing the disciplines of English, History (two members), Physics, Education, Forestry, Engineering, Home Economics, Sociology, and Physical Education. Among the faculty was Paul Gagnon, who would later become the first Academic Dean of the new

Boston campus. The committee was charged by Lederle with,

...the responsibility of proposing, evaluating, and recommending new and imaginative ideas that may be considered in the development of the Boston campus. The scope of its charge should be broadly interpreted to encompass philosophy, principles and practices that may provide new dimensions to public higher education, particularly in an urban-oriented institution. 6.

At the first meeting of the Committee on New Concepts and New Departures it was decided that, "since the Boston operation would be a fresh experience without traditions, past history, or procedural guidelines, no relevant idea would be passed over and all suggestions would be given careful deliberation." 7. Any member could prepare a position paper which would be debated, voted on, and then sent to the appropriate University officials and other planning committees for the new campus. Any member could include a dissenting minority report. The committee met bi-monthly at the faculty club at Amherst and during its first several meetings dealt with the role of faculty, a variety of curriculum issues, and the possible development of a center for urban studies and urban affairs. The committee called in as consultants David Boroff of New York University, Champion Ward of the Ford Foundation, and Chancellor Lorentz Adolfsen of the University Center System, University of Wisconsin.

By the spring of 1965 the committee had prepared a formal Statement of Purpose for the new campus. This was formally presented to President Lederle on July 21, 1965.

Much of it reflects input from the consultants and makes reference to Boroff's recent book, Campus U.S.A., and the book, The American College, edited by Nevitt Sanford. The Statement of Purpose put forward major goals for the new campus which reflect the thinking of most of the founding faculty and academic administrators. These concepts would guide them in the early years of campus development and shape their thinking on a permanent site location. A rather thorough examination of these guiding principles is helpful because they indicate so well why this group was at a later point so strong in their insistence on an urban core location for the new campus.

The new university must adhere to traditional academic standards,

The first aim of the University of Massachusetts at Boston must be to build a university in the ancient tradition of Western civilization, to gather an academy of scholars devoted to intellectual freedom and integrity, to preserving and extending knowledge and wisdom while teaching both as well as they can. 8.

The new university must realize that most of its students would be economically deprived and thus poorly prepared for college level work.

A public university must offer education to students who cannot for economic or social reasons ordinarily go beyond high school. This is a special burden. A public university hoping to graduate people able to compete in work and thought with the graduates of private universities must be more effective than the latter. Its freshmen so often arrive with indifferent home preparation, with inferior prior schooling, and with rather lowly visions of themselves and their destinies. They require of us not less but more concentration on the art of teaching, and a faculty,

a curriculum, and a working intellectual atmosphere at least equal to those of the best private colleges. Unless a public university offers these, it will perpetuate a class system of education according to income and social advantage. 9.

The new university must make a special effort to reach minorities and the underprivileged.

Now we must seek out, and support, those young people whose race, or recent immigration, or depressed economic status, denies them higher education and even the expectation of it. 10.

The new university should become involved in a partnership with the local urban public school systems.

The academician must know what is going on in the lower schools and what his teacher colleague faces. Only then can they help each other to educate new teachers, to develop curricula and to set standards from first grade to graduate school. Nowhere is this more urgent than in the urban schools, whose problems and opportunities are enormous. 11.

The new university will have unique problem solving abilities and so must become involved with and lead in the struggle to overcome all of the many problems of urban society.

No cluster of problems is so critical to our future as a civilization than those of the city. Only by plunging into the heart of mass technological, urban society can the university hope to prepare its students and faculty for the future, and to take a role in shaping that future. As urban problems mount, many of the city's most able people flee to the suburbs, leaving the oppressed, the weary, the overburdened to struggle along. The urban university must stand with the city, must serve and lead where the battle is. This is what the University of Massachusetts must do, wherever its campus is ultimately built. 12.

The faculty and students of the new university must be immersed in the urban environment.

Both faculty and students must know the city as well as it can be known. Our program of urban studies ought not to be a sideshow, but a central and constant concern of the entire faculty and curriculum. The historian, the biologist, and the artist have as much to learn and to give as the economist, the sociologist, the psychologist or the political scientist...The public, urban university has the duty to transform and apply the great idea of agricultural extension and research to urban problems....Who among us will have nothing to do about poverty, crime, apathy, ignorance, ugliness and decay? About human degradation, humiliation and isolation? This is the hard, demanding side of the University of Massachusetts at Boston...Truth, beauty, joy and man's capacity for grace under pressure will survive in urban society, or they will not survive at all. 13.

This statement of purpose reflects the increased concern of the mid-1960's with urban problems. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. expressed the same sentiments, typical of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, within an address delivered at the installation of Boston Campus Chancellor John Ryan in December, 1966,

As more and more Americans live in cities, the city will increasingly become the battleground where the great issues of American society will be fought and resolved....The urban university promises to be a central agency in the national response to the urban challenge. The battle to rationalize and humanize our cities has only begun. It is a battle between our accumulated national sloth and fatalism, on the one hand, and our awakened national mind and purpose on the other. And it is more than a battle for the future of the American city: it is a battle for the possibility of civilized life in an industrial society. 14.

The statement of purpose also reflects the writings of David Boroff, one of the consultants employed by the committee. Boroff closed his book, Campus U.S.A., with the same call for universities to lead the way in a new

renaissance of the American character,

Higher education is a creature of our society, but it cannot escape its obligation to transcend it. We live in a dangerously easeful time. There is a lack of roughage in our national diet. Should not our colleges and universities provide a countervailing tendency to the fat, sleek materialism of American life? Shouldn't they provide something hard and lean and spiritually purposeful? The press of students at our college gates may give us just the opportunity we need. In the past our fear of the idea of the superior few pushed us into shoddiness and hypocrisy. We are now in position to try the leap for excellence. 15.

Another book cited in the committee's records is the anthology, The American College, edited by Nevitt Sanford. In one of the essays within this book Frank Pinner discusses "The Crisis of the State Universities: Analysis and Remedies" and ends with the same sort of militant spirit towards society and its problems,

Let us close our gates. For the academic community needs to be protected from the dictates of the multitude. Let us first of all be masters within our walls. Only then can we shift from a posture of defense to one of offense, which is our proper posture. For our mission is, after all, to see that the best of human achievements in the realm of truth and beauty come to conquer the world: not only to dominate the lives of our students inside our walls but ultimately those of the multitude outside as well. 16.

The formal statement of purpose did not directly address the question of campus site location other than to state that the new campus must make a major commitment to the city regardless of its ultimate location. The committee had, however, been discussing this question at some length for several months. An indication of their thinking can be found in a lengthy position paper submitted to the committee by Paul Gagnon in November, 1964 entitled, "Why Build UM/B

In The Middle of Downtown Boston?". Gagnon argued this position by stating,

Because UM/B can come quickly to maturity, excellence and a sense of its own high adventure only insofar as it is plunged into the life of a great and reviving city. It can do more for Boston and her people if it rises in their midst, and--even more obviously--Boston can do much, much more for the University. 17.

Gagnon proposed that the question of site selection, as well as other key planning issues, be approached from a very broad, very long term perspective with full awareness that the university's decisions in 1964 would be critically examined and judged by the many ages to come,

Why not act as though we cared what men would think eight centuries from now, as they read: 'The University of Massachusetts at Boston was founded after the great pre-atomic wars, in the mid-1960's, by a tough band of men with great hopes for a new kind of university and what it could do for human life in the middle of the mass technological, urban growth that was then churning up American society. Boston at that time was experiencing its great revival...' As we build must we let our work be determined by allegedly practical considerations without first examining them to see if they are in fact practical in any but temporary ways? Without balancing the costs of ignoring them against the greater good? Must we, for example, let the site and style of a university be determined by slide-rule calculations of temporary transportation problems, of temporary population distribution, even of present financial and tax difficulties? Or can we build according to a vision of what Boston and its public university can do for each other in the decades and centuries to come? 18.

Gagnon offered a variety of reasons why a downtown site would be essential for the new campus and beneficial to the City of Boston. It would be much easier to develop cooperative programs with the many existing private colleges and universities in the area and travel back and forth to

them on the subway network in Boston and Cambridge. The UMB faculty would feel keenly and respond to the "challenge of building something new under the eyes of the greatest academic and research center in America." Students could use the city as their classroom and,

...need only cross the street to see theater, architecture, ballet, sculpture, music, painting, journalism, politics, publishing, trade and industry, law, medicine, science and engineering at work in their natural, professional settings, not 'on tour' or in slide lectures. With all the best intent, the 'trip into town' is simply not made very often by students or faculty members on a self-contained suburban campus.

The faculty, argued Gagnon, would be provided with,

...a closer look at the settings in which their students live, and at the world they will work in after graduation, so that, in David Riesman's words, they will not be "donnish professors who cannot communicate with students who are not going to be like them. 19.

During the formative years of the new Boston campus, David Riesman was a member of the faculty in the Department of Social Relations at Harvard University and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, later United States Senator from the State of New York, was active at Harvard in the Joint Center For Urban Studies. On occasion both acted as mentors to the academic dean of the UMass.-Boston campus offering advice, encouragement and suggestions on various matters. In the section quoted above Gagnon was making reference to an essay by Riesman and Christopher Jencks entitled "The Viability of the American College" which was included within Sanford's anthology, The American College. Much of Gagnon's position

paper reflects this book in a general way or borrows direct quotes. Gagnon borrowed heavily from this work in arguing against the supposed opportunity for maturation and development of independence provided by residential colleges in non-urban settings and the proliferation of non-academic student activities. Gagnon stated,

Universities have themselves proliferated their directors of student activities, their deans and sub-deans of student life, their counsellors and organizers of fun and games. They have sponsored, subsidized and exalted a cult of extra-curricular activity of 'dreadful sameness from coast to coast' which betrays students, especially those from non-college families, into supposing that the university looks upon these things as indispensable to the intelligent life.....A rural or suburban university is bound to seek its identity in this way. The pressures to reproduce everything that State U. has, from fraternities to 'weeks' and queens and carnivals, from varsity athletics to Student Union bowling leagues is overwhelming. 20.

Gagnon cited a 1964 survey by ETS which found that 51% of entering freshmen in 1964 indicated that social life, extracurricular activities and athletics was their major interest in college. He suggested that,

A state university, paid for by the citizens, could best begin by encouraging that 51% to go elsewhere, but only in a downtown institution, explicitly concentrated on academic and professional aims could this plausibly be done. 21.

Here Gagnon seems to have been drawing on his own experience and that of his colleagues at the Amherst campus and also by the words of Riesman and Jencks concerning the University of Massachusetts in their essay on the viability of the American college,

For many years, the University has been known in some circles as a party school, whose fraternities were reputed among the hardest drinking in New England. 22.

The reference to a "dreadful sameness" originated in Boroff's, Campus U.S.A. In this book, Boroff stated,

Under the influence of a distorted progressivism colleges have pushed into areas in which they don't belong. The brash imperialism of personnel services and student activities strives to dominate the students' private and social life. In contrast with today's organized fun, there was something innocent about the horseplay of the twenties. At least the hell-raisers were autonomous. Their infantilism wasn't sponsored by the administration, which these days lays down the ground rules and acts as the umpire for the nursery games. There is a dreadful sameness about campus activities from coast to coast, for the personnel technicians are quick to import wholesome nonsense from other campuses. 23.

According to Gagnon, Boston had no existing public university and it needed one. An urban campus could work more closely with the Boston Public School System and help it to revive "a glorious past". The university would be in a better position to, "scout the entire Boston school system for promising students from underprivileged races, nationalities and economic classes", and then encourage and guide them along the way towards college with special programs. The university would be in a better position to engage in urban neighborhood projects similar to Hull House in Chicago and to develop cooperative efforts with the city's museums, parks, libraries, social services, educational radio and television, and offices of city and state government. The campus could more easily develop institutes related to various unique aspects of the city

such as port development, public transportation and labor-management relations. An urban setting would provide the best location for evening extension programs and could add a new dimension to the city's cultural life in the evenings by providing its own lecture, concert, drama and art programs in the heart of the city. The campus would bring added patronage to downtown business establishments and might enhance real estate values. Gagnon suggested that the university not pretend that this added business would make up for the loss of taxable property to the city,

Especially if we draw to UM/B the kind of students we should draw, many downright poor, who will bring their lunches in brown paper bags, drink from public fountains, read the library's magazines and newspapers, buy their books third or fourth hand...24.

He suggested minimizing this negative impact on the tax base through the indefinite use of rented taxable property in the heart of Boston, by the use of high rise buildings on minimum sized lots whenever it became necessary to build rather than rent, and by eliminating consideration of "playing fields, gymnasias, swimming pools, student unions, R.O.T.C. drill halls, dormitories, fraternities, sororities and the whole cluster of extras that are thought to be necessary to higher education in this country." The tax expense saved by the state in cutting out these extras, suggested Gagnon, "...might well be turned into a formula of payments to the City of Boston in lieu of taxes". Gagnon took a strong stand against the creation of the typical

"student activities" found in most colleges,

A university in a city of Boston's richness needs no artificial diversions. Life and art and talk are all around to be seized....A campus school (in the suburbs) would feel itself deprived if not allowed to copy all others. A downtown university could more easily dare to be different, to seek excellence through concentrating its energies on the academic task alone. 25.

A Warning Against Planning in Isolation from the Community

In a speech delivered during the installation of Chancellor Ryan, Daniel Patrick Moynihan identified an apparent dichotomy between public planners who were deeply involved with what they identified as a "Crisis in the Cities" and the perceptions of the general public.

While an articulate, vocal and visible group of persons in the country is very conscious of the 'Crisis in the Cities' and has raised this issue and given it its term, crisis, it is also fairly clear that the great majority of the American people think nothing of the sort. If they think about the subject at all, they think about it in quite different terms than the so called, 'Crisis in the Cities.'...The foundations of disbelief are varied but convergent. The principle one is that for a solid quarter century the great mass of Americans has experienced a steadily rising level of living, in a measure without parallel in history. This rising level of well-being has been accompanied by, and in large measure has consisted of, improvements in housing, transportation, education, health, recreation and other 'urban' amenities which are now said to be in a state of crisis, but which most persons know to be in a vastly better condition now than in times past. 26.

Moynihan also warned about the danger of university planners walling themselves off from the larger community they were supposedly serving,

The usual whispered argument, of course, is that to be candid about public policies that don't produce much progress is to give a weapon to the enemies of

progress. This is an unworthy argument; there are never grounds for concealing truth about public matters. When we in universities, now so deeply involved in the problems of cities, adopt this attitude that we can, or must, disregard facts without reasoned self-criticism, we are building up in this nation a level of disbelief about our competence and our sincerity and the genuine possibility of sustained social change which may lead us to a greater crisis than anything we now have; and in the cities it will become, in effect, a certain crisis of intellect, a certain crisis of confidence across American social and intellectual lines which has not until now existed but which has always been there as a potential source of discord and deep concern. 27.

By this point in late 1966, Moynihan's warning against planners isolating themselves from their community could quite appropriately be applied to the specific instance of the initial planning and site selection processes for the Boston campus. His warning stands in stark contrast to the rhetoric of the other papers delivered at Chancellor Ryan's installation and to that of the campus leadership. A state which had long been skeptical about the need for extensive state supported programs of public higher education had rather suddenly, in response to an enrollment crisis, authorised the creation of an extension or annex to its state university programs to better serve young people in the Boston metropolitan area. Nothing in the enabling legislation, or in the rhetoric of the legislative or University leadership who created and guided this legislation through to enactment, speaks to an "urban crisis" or of the need for the university to specifically address the many faceted needs of the inner city. The legislation and rhetoric speak instead merely of the need

to essentially duplicate the educational programs of the Amherst campus somewhere in the Boston area as quickly as possible so that more students could be accommodated.

Thus, there was a considerable difference between the perceptions of the two groups who would be responsible for creating the new campus. The members of the Committee on New Concepts and New Departures, some of whom would form the initial leadership group for the new campus, assumed that the Boston campus should be designed primarily to meet the unique demands of the "urban crisis" and to be a bold new experimental institution fully integrated into the life and environment of the inner city. Legislative leaders and many of the local community officials within the metropolitan Boston area assumed that the university would now move quickly to create within the inner suburb of Boston a second campus which would essentially duplicate programs at Amherst to serve the "overflow" in enrollment demand coming from the heavily populated eastern portions of Massachusetts. This difference in perceptions set the stage for the conflicts, frustrations, and long delays which developed during the site selection process. This problem was seriously compounded by the fact that very little analysis regarding actual possible site locations and of public preferences for a site location had taken place prior to the adoption of the enabling legislation.

While Gagnon was drafting his eloquent case for an urban university located in downtown Boston, Dean Tunis, Dean of Admissions and Records for the University met with the Task Force to report on the results of his initial visits with high school teachers, students and guidance personnel in the greater Boston area cities and towns. Dean Tunis reported that,

Those communities of high economic level have less interest in the Boston operation than cities and towns with less economic advantages and lower average family income... where interest in the UMass-Boston exists it is strongly, even preponderantly, in favor of a suburban campus type of institution rather than a centrally located urban, high rise, type of institution. 28.

Initial Admissions Policies and Process

In September of 1965 classes began in temporary rented buildings in the Park Square section of downtown Boston. University records indicate that during Academic Year 1964/65 the University decided to admit 3,300 freshman students at the Amherst campus and 1,000 freshman at the Boston Campus for the fall semester of 1965. In this initial year the admissions process for both Amherst and Boston was directed and controlled by Dr. William Tunis, Dean of Admissions at the Amherst Campus. The Boston campus admissions office did not achieve complete autonomy from Amherst until 1971. During the start up academic year, AY 1964/65, Dr. Tunis' staff made a special effort to visit all of the Boston suburban high schools to acquaint them with the new U.Mass. option which would be available closer to home in the coming September. A special effort was made

to redirect qualified applicants from the Boston area who were unsuccessful in gaining acceptance to the limited number of spaces at the Amherst Campus back to the new Boston Campus. Approximately 500 Boston area students who had been denied admission at Amherst, because of lack of space not because of academic deficiencies, were contacted and offered acceptance at the Boston campus for the fall semester of 1965. Approximately 300 students from this group enrolled for the first semester of the new campus. 29.

During the initial years a deliberate policy decision was made to apply the same admissions standards to both campuses and thus restrict admission to only well qualified students. In February, 1966 the Admission Committee for Boston adopted a policy that restricted admission to students who had either been in the top 1/3 of their graduating class or who had achieved a combined score of 1000 in their SAT's including a score of at least 500 on the verbal aptitude test.

Admissions policy at the new campus gradually began to reflect the special role envisioned for the campus in its initial mission statement. A small experimental special admissions program for less qualified disadvantaged students began with the admission of 25 students at the Boston campus for the initial fall, 1965 semester. This number was increased to over 100 students in AY 1969/70. In January of 1966 the Admissions Committee for the Boston

campus adopted the following policy further defining this target group of disadvantaged students:

We have a major commitment to the City of Boston and its schools and that in reviewing folders, we should give preference--other things being more or less equal --to the disadvantaged students from Boston rather than to the student from the suburbs, whose difficulties we may presume are personal rather than social in origin. 30.

The results of initial admissions efforts are indicated by Table I which provides data on the distribution of students by home of record during this period. It provides an indication of the origins of the clientele being served by the new campus during the first six years and the degree of success which it achieved in reaching disadvantaged inner city students. 31.

It appears, upon review of this data, that the new campus was more nearly meeting the original purpose for which it was created in 1964, providing room in eastern Massachusetts for the enormous spill-over of qualified applicants who could not be accommodated at Amherst because of a lack of space, rather than the role suggested by the evolving self perception of a special mission for the campus to students among the disadvantaged residents of the inner city. From the very first semester, enrollment was largely suburban in origin consisting of a wide distribution of students throughout metropolitan Boston. This pattern of dispersed enrollment demand and a large percentage of commuting students might have been expected to have provided the campus with a strong incentive to pursue a site location at a convenient

TABLE 1.

FALL SEMESTER ENROLLMENT DISTRIBUTION BY HOME OF RECORD
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS - BOSTON 1965-1970

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
<u>I. CITY OF BOSTON</u>	377	689	768	945	1203	1482
	33%	32%	30%	27%	34%	35%
<u>II. COMMUNITIES</u> <u>SHARING A COMMON</u> <u>BORDER WITH THE</u> <u>CITY OF BOSTON</u>	289	503	508	769	877	962
	25%	23%	23%	22%	25%	22%
<u>III. OTHER COMMUNITIES</u> <u>WITHIN 10 MILES OF</u> <u>THE CITY OF BOSTON</u>	284	611	721	882	1008	1120
	25%	28%	28%	25%	28%	26%
<u>IV. OTHER MASS.</u> <u>COMMUNITIES</u>	189	333	476	829	447	736
	17%	15%	18%	24%	13%	17%
<u>V. OUTSIDE</u> <u>MASSACHUSETTS</u>	0	14	21	25	15	0
	0%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%
<u>TOTAL</u>	1139	2150	2575	3450	3550	4300
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

suburban location popular with a ready made network of suburban based students and community leaders eager to lend their support in lobbying for resources. Because of their perception of the new campus as a new, experimental, uniquely urban institution, the campus leadership were, instead, firmly committed from the first to a core city location.

CHAPTER VI

THE SITE SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS - BOSTON: 1964 - 1967

This chapter begins presentation of the complex story of the site selection process for the University of Massachusetts - Boston. This was a long process spanning 1964 to 1968 and involved several players, both persons internal to the University and representatives of Boston's political, business and residential communities as a number of potential sites were examined in depth and then rejected by the University. The process was affected by a complicated dynamic stemming from traditional attitudes toward public higher education in Massachusetts, intense competition for the very limited space in the core city, and positions taken by the city's political leaders in reaction to tensions created by the urban renewal process and concern with the loss of property tax base to tax exempt institutions. This story is presented chronologically beginning in 1964. Subheadings will be used to note the major contextual themes as the story unfolds.

The Problem Presented by an Initial Lack of Resolution of the Issue of an Urban vs. Suburban Location

During the rush to gain legislative support for the new campus during the spring of 1964 there had been far too little attention given to the question of just where

the campus would be located. Related questions of the total size of the new campus, type of architecture to be employed, proximity of highway systems and public transportation, and relationships with local municipal governments and immediate residential, institutional and commercial neighbors were also paid scant attention. The main focus by the University and its legislative supporters during this struggle was that of securing for the University of Massachusetts the sole right to create and control the new public university for the Boston metropolitan area for which political support had now suddenly emerged in responses to the college enrollment surge. This exclusive right had to be secured quickly in order to prevent public competitors such as Boston State College or private institutions such as Boston University or Northeastern University from shutting the University of Massachusetts out of the important greater Boston student market and the key strategic position of proximity to day to day political decision making at the state capital.

What seems almost incredible in hindsight is the apparent fact that nobody from the University appears to have engaged in serious prior discussion of the possibility of a Boston site for the new campus with the mayor of Boston. Much of the legislative debate on the proposal for the new campus and much of the media coverage during and immediately after this debate either ignored the issue of a specific site or suggested that the campus would probably

be located in the suburbs. Boston's mayor and other business and community leaders within the city demonstrated a marked lack of interest and involvement in the debates and a general lack of enthusiasm towards the new campus, especially once proposals surfaced to locate it within Boston's commercial core.

The University's leadership seems to have assumed that their new campus would be welcomed with the same enthusiastic support shown by the mayor of Chicago and the political leadership of other major American cities towards the development of their new urban universities. The University was due for an unpleasant surprise. This major oversight is reflected in President Lederle's memoirs which he dictated in 1975. Lederle recalled,

We got the authorization, and then the question was where are we going to be located?...We expected the Boston campus to be a different kind of institution, with a heavy urban emphasis which appealed to the Legislators. Maybe we'd get the University to worry about the city now, I thought, and not be the farm college way out west...One of the things I learned was that Boston couldn't care less whether it had a public university. It felt that private higher education is superior anyway, which, of course, coming from a 'Big Ten' school, I thought was an anathema. 1.

An earlier Globe article by Ian Forman in June, 1964 reflects the confusion brought on by inadequate consideration of the site location issue prior to passage of the enabling legislation. Forman reported,

Two factions are now battling both within the UMass Board of Trustees and outside it, as to what kind of state university Boston will get. It will be chiefly

a commuter university, everyone agrees on that. Terrific 1964 and 1965 enrollment pressures and tightening family budgets demand quick expansion of less costly non-dormitory education. But one group wants a cut-rate institution with only the barest facilities--no athletic fields, no student union or extracurricular activities. They foresee this either in a rented downtown Boston office building or on a limited urban renewal site in Roxbury or the South End. The other group attacks this concept which might have been suitable 30 or 40 years ago but is now out of touch with the 1960's. They want an institution modeled on the concept of the Amherst campus in every way, except dormitories, though a few of these will be needed eventually as the graduate schools grow as expected. Top UMass administration officials privately concede they could never build a campus comparable to the Amherst university in downtown Boston office buildings or on either of the two separate 40-acre urban renewal sites which Boston has available. This second group advocates a large, attractive suburban site such as the 93-acre former Murphy General Hospital in Waltham. Both Sen. Edward Kennedy and Cong. Bradford Morse (R-Lowell) are working to have it made available on the Federal surplus list for a possible UMass site. 2.

The Work of the Planning Task Force

In July President Lederle appointed a task force to develop plans for the new campus consisting of Leo Redfern (chair), Dr. William Venman, Assistant to the Provost, Robert Brand, Associate Treasurer, and Donald Cadigan, Director of Planning at Amherst. The Boston Globe suggested that this group's greatest task would be finding a site large enough and otherwise adequate for the new campus and noted that although Amherst officials were calling the new institution the "University of Massachusetts-Boston" its location might ultimately be anywhere within the Greater Boston area. 3.

Initial Site Review

Site selection was identified as a top priority at the first meeting of Redfern's task force. They decided that a temporary site should be selected first and then a permanent site capable of housing 20,000 students.⁴ By their fourth meeting they were ready to discuss possible approaches for location and site studies. It was agreed that members of the task force would provide the director of planning with suggested criteria for decisions on site locations. The director would then prepare "unscreened" lists of consultants and sites that had come to the attention of the Task Force thus far. He would also start accumulating aerial maps, transit maps, study reports and other data relevant to the Boston area.⁵

At their ninth meeting, held at the end of July, it was noted that an initial contact had been established with the Boston office of NASA in an attempt to obtain access to the information they had accumulated in their search for a site and that the Metropolitan Area Planning Council had furnished maps, transportation and population data including information about possible sites.⁶

At a meeting on August 21 Cadigan reported on visits to look at limited office space and check the prevailing prices of rental space in the Boston area, a visit to the local office of the Federal General Services Administration to identify surplus federal property and contacts with the realtor agent for Boston's Hotel Madison and a nearby factory building.

In recognition of the critical nature of the time schedule for obtaining and renovating a building in time for the opening of classes, the Task Force prepared a preliminary list of steps to be accomplished and set dates by which these steps must be accomplished:

1. September 1, 1964 - Trustee consideration of site and obtaining an architect.
2. October 1, 1964 - Approval of the building by University officers.
3. November 1, 1964 - Completion of preliminary drawings.
4. January 1, 1965 - Completion of working drawings and specifications. 7.

On September 1 Mr. Hugill and Mr. Cadigan reported on their examination of 12 sites within Boston and its immediate suburbs. These sites included the former Murphy General Hospital in Waltham, the Watertown Arsenal, the Raytheon Corporation Plant in Waltham, various old buildings on Commonwealth Avenue in downtown Boston, the Hotel Madison and a warehouse in the North Station area of Boston, and the former Walter Baker Chocolate plant in the Dorchester Lower Mills section of Boston.

The Murphy General Hospital Site

A lengthy discussion took place on the desirability of the Murphy General Hospital site in Waltham. It was determined to be the only completely satisfactory site out

of the group of twelve sites initially identified as possibilities. The Murphy Hospital site was located adjacent to the Fernald State School on 150 acres in the suburb of Waltham. It offered an attractive open area along with the added advantage of several abandoned hospital buildings which could be readily converted to temporary use by the University while the permanent campus was under construction.

Development of the site would require no dislocation of residents or businesses and the loss of no taxable land. One major disadvantage was that it was far from any available or planned rapid transit lines. During the meeting a call was placed to officials controlling the site and the committee was told that it would probably not be available in the near future. It was dropped from active consideration. 8.

Criteria for the Temporary Site Location

At their meeting on September 11, the Task Force adopted some broad criteria to guide them in selecting a temporary site location:

- A. Taxability - Property not to be removed from the city tax rolls.
- B. Leasability - Renovation to be conducted by the lessor in order to expedite completion.

C. Accessibility - Site to be accessible to students and faculty by rapid transit, bus, automobile, and should be near parking facilities.

D. Presentability - Site to be commensurate in appearance and location with the fine quality of education the University proposes to bring to Boston.

E. Adequacy - Site or facility to provide adequate space for the normal development of a curriculum and to allow for the development of an enrollment within this curriculum for a minimum of 5 to 7 years.

F. Availability - Site to be available from the point of view of leaseholds recognizing the time required for renovation, so as to provide for the development of the institution for a period of five or more years and yet permit the accomodation of 1000 students by September 1965. ⁹.

Selection of a Temporary Location

In September 1964, Robert Heller Associates, Consultants, based in Cleveland, Ohio, began a study of possible temporary site locations for the new campus. Their report back to the trustees in November stated that the need to serve qualified students in the Boston area was real and immediate. It was judged unwise to wait for completion of long-range plans before opening the Boston branch. They recommended, that no commitment should be made to a particular site at the present time but that the

University consider acquiring a location in downtown Boston through a lease which would be suitable for the first five to seven years of operation.

Here, another comparison can be made with the University of Illinois-Chicago. Since in Chicago a branch of the University of Illinois had existed in the core city for almost two decades at Navy Pier, there was no real impetus to establish a "temporary" site for the new four year campus while a search for a permanent site progressed. The securing of a temporary site for the Boston campus in the core city tended to push future thinking about the permanent site toward a location within the core city. The consultants stated that a suburban location would be best because it would provide easy access and plenty of parking, the opportunity to create a traditional campus environment and uncongested surroundings. After reviewing several possible temporary locations in the suburbs, however, they determined that nothing was available on a short term basis which would meet the University's needs and recommended that the University consider, instead, acquiring a temporary site in downtown Boston.

Alternatives suggested were the Houghton-Dutton Building at One Beacon Street, the former Boston Gas Company building near Park Square or the Boston Edison building complex at the intersection of Tremont and Boylston streets near the edge of the downtown commercial district.

The consultants suggested that the former Boston Gas Company building, which was owned by the John Hancock Insurance Company and currently under lease to Boston Gas, would, because of its excellent condition, be the best choice from the standpoint of creating a quality image for the new campus. 10.

On December 6, 1964 the trustees authorized negotiations for lease with an option to buy a downtown Boston site and engaged the services of the architectural firm of Drummey-Rosane-Anderson to conduct a cost feasibility study of the suitability of each of the three sites recommended by Heller Associates. On February 16 the University announced that they had reached agreement on a lease of the former Boston Consolidated Gas Company Building at 100 Arlington Street in the Park Square area of Boston as the temporary site of the new campus. The facility would be leased with an option to buy. 11.

Reached that evening by the press, Boston Mayor John Collins stated that he welcomed the new campus on a temporary basis but that a permanent intown location would be "devastating" to traffic and thus most unwelcome. 12. During the weeks which followed debate developed in the Legislature over the proposal to allocate \$1,600,000 for an initial period of lease of the building from its owners, The John Hancock Company. Some legislators argued that it would be better to purchase rather than lease and this

ended in a provision that the University purchase the building by January 1, 1966. During this debate, Senator Kevin Harrington offered an ammendment to the appropriation which would have transferred control of the building site for the new campus from the University's trustees to the State Department of Education who would then lease it back to the University for \$1.00. The amendment was defeated by a roll call vote of 18 to 6. ¹³.

The Appointment of John W. Ryan as Chancellor

On February 12, 1965 Dr. John W. Ryan, Academic Dean at Arizona State University, was named chancellor of U. Mass.- Boston. Ryan had served as Assistant to the President and Secretary of the University of Massachusetts before leaving for Arizona in 1962. ¹⁴. One of the most important tasks facing Ryan was the securing of a permanent location for the new campus. His frustration in not being able to accomplish this task would be a major contributing factor in his later decision to resign. The campus would now begin a search which, after more than three years of continuous effort, would leave its leadership exhausted, discouraged and still without a site in the spring of 1968.

The basis of this problem can be seen in the fact that at this point in 1965 there was still considerable confusion over whether the campus would be located in the core city or in one of its suburbs. The campus had not yet

clearly defined its mission to its constituents and to the legislature as that of a unique, urban oriented, experiment in public higher education. Much of the public, including the mayor of Boston, still seem to have been anticipating the creation of a something quite similar to the University's campus in Amherst at a location in the suburbs.

Reflections of Public Confusion Over the Mission of the New Campus

In accordance with the mission statement which was now being finalized by the faculty membership of the New Directions task force, the new campus leadership began immediately to consider a permanent location in the core city. One of the first in-town sites which they chose to consider was Madison Park. The Madison Park neighborhood was located in the southern part of the Roxbury District of Boston bounded approximately by Tremont Street, Shawmut Avenue and Ruggles Street.

The area had begun as a new fashionable upper-middle class housing venture in 1875 but by the Depression of the 1930's had declined into an urban slum of abandoned and decaying houses. In 1961 the city took the land parcel for back taxes from realtor Maurice Gordon and put it up for sale at public auction. No buyers were interested. A study by the Boston Redevelopment Authority in 1964 envisioned

the area as a potential site for planned development on a very large scale which would be enhanced by the fact that a new inner city artery and a rerouted MBTA rapid transit line, now in the final planning stages, would pass nearby.

In an article published on April 4, reviewing the history and present sorry state of Madison Park, the Boston Globe stated that the site was being considered by the BRA as a possible location for the new University of Massachusetts Campus.¹⁵ A Madison Park location was quite consistent with the concepts being developed by Paul Gagnon and his faculty colleagues.

Meanwhile, however, in an article appearing in the Boston Globe on May 9, 1965, Ian Forman was still referring to the new UMass campus as, "the Greater Boston institution" and predicting that, "Five to 10 years from now it probably will be sitting on a big permanent suburban campus near commutable Rte. 128 with 25,000 students and a diadem of graduate schools."¹⁶ The article carried a picture of the former Murphy Army Hospital in Waltham describing it as a "hot prospect" for UMass Boston's permanent campus". Forman also noted that several scientists joining the UMass-Boston faculty were being loaned laboratory space and facilities at Harvard and MIT to continue their advanced research because the facilities at the converted Boston Gas building were inadequate.¹⁷

Expression of Concern by the Collins Administration

Chancellor Ryan stated in an August 11, 1965 memo to President Lederle that he had met with BRA officials during the past few weeks and found that they were upset that they had not been extended the courtesy of discussion and information regarding the University's plans for a temporary site. Acting on its own the BRA had given some consideration to the question of a permanent site and had not yet arrived at a definite position but seemed to be leaning toward Madison Park. Ryan closed with the news that,

Mayor Collins, today, informed me that he hoped we did not consider an "in town" campus, but did consider desirable an "in town" building. His preference for the latter is a West Roxbury site currently being considered for a campus-high school. 18.

On September 10, 1965 classes began in the Boston Gas Building with 1,227 freshman students.

Faculty Sentiment Favoring a Core City Site

In a letter sent to John Ryan in early December, a group of faculty provided the chancellor with their thoughts on the desirability of an urban versus suburban location. They stated that a suburban site would be a serious obstacle to achieving the goals for which the new campus had been established. An urban location, they argued, would provide better accessibility for commuting students, a more attractive site with which to entice excellent faculty, a more intellectually stimulating

environment for a university and a better location from which to address the special problems of the city. They expressed a strong fear that in the suburbs,

...it almost certainly would become an institution like the University at Amherst - one overwhelmed with fraternities and sororities, athletic teams, and other extracurricular groups and activities which threaten the integrity of an intellectual center. 19.

In December the State Auditor publicly questioned the wisdom and propriety of leasing rather than purchasing the building at 270 Stuart Street since the University seemed to be paying about \$55,000 more per year in rent than Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates was in turn paying for their lease of the building from its owner the John Hancock Insurance Company. 20.

On March 15, 1966 a public debate was held in front of a group of about 150 students and faculty at the Boston campus on the topic of an urban vs suburban site location between two teams, one consisting of Professor Glen Tinder of the Political Science Department and a student speaking in favor of an urban campus and the other team consisting of a faculty member and a student arguing in favor of a suburban location. No definite conclusion was reached as to the desirability of one location over the other each side seems to have left the debate convinced that they had carried the day. I make reference to this debate to illustrate the fact that at this late date there was still a lack of definite resolution on this issue. 21.

Review of the First Major Site Proposal:
Highland Park in Roxbury

In May of 1966 the University announced that it was considering the Highland Park area of Roxbury, adjacent to the Madison Park site which had recently been chosen for the new location of Boston English High School, as a possible site for the new campus. 22.

Highland Park was located on a prominent hill within the ring of hills surrounding the downtown Boston area. The hill, consisting of 164 acres of land, rose by a grade differential of 135 feet from its base on Columbus Avenue to its crest. The western and southern edges of the site consisted of precipitous and rocky cliffs. It was located at the juncture of a proposed new Southwest Expressway and Inner Belt and close to two major rapid transit stations. The hill commanded magnificent views of Boston harbor and the Boston area. Any structures located on this site would make a strong impact on those who entered the City via the new highways.

An Early Warning About the Impact of the Local Boston Political Context

Sasaki and Associates presented the University with a confidential report on May 9 which warned of the difficult social and financial problems which the development of the Highland Park site might present to the City of Boston.

These centered on the increasingly serious issue of the reduction in property tax base caused by the growth of tax-free institutions and on the fact that over 7,000 people were living in the Highland Park area and might face dislocation if the University went ahead with its plans. The consultants warned that,

Over 40% of the real property in the City of Boston does not pay real estate taxes by virtue of its tax exempt status. The educational institutions constitute the largest bulk of this property. To a city such as Boston which relies heavily on the real estate tax for income to finance its municipal operations, the prospect of another 150-200 acres of land and buildings removed from the tax rolls would indeed be disquieting. A location of a large university in Highland park would generate a need for additional city services, including police and fire protection as well as continued maintenance of streets and public open spaces. Yet, the presence of the University would reduce significantly the City's ability to finance these services by removing 168 acres from the tax rolls. ²³.

They warned that an even more troublesome problem was presented by the political situation in Boston,

The University's appreciation of and answers to the financial and social problems that its presence in the Highland Park Area will create for the City of Boston will probably be the principal determinant in the City's approval or disapproval of the site. Both the financial and social problems are politically sensitive issue within the City. It should be noted that the mayor of Boston under whose aegis urban renewal has had its greatest impact and strong support is running for United States senator; and that the City Development Administrator, Edward Logue, has a part-time consulting job to the mayor of New York City after turning down Mayor Lindsay's offer of a permanent position. The entire urban renewal program has been under heavy fire--fire from several quarters. At least two of the present Boston City Councilors were elected on an anti-urban renewal program. Serious doubt can be raised about the status of urban renewal under succeeding administrations. Many institutions have found it extremely useful to

hire public relations consultants when extremely sensitive public issues are involved. The University should consider the feasibility of utilizing a competent firm which knows the City of Boston. 24.

The consultants recommended that the University should not expect Boston to accept the total clearance of all buildings on the site. It should either plan on a total integration of its new campus within the existing local Highland Park community or it should select a site at a different location,

A planning approach with its emphasis on total clearance similar to that used for the University of Illinois Chicago Campus would not be appropriate for the University of Massachusetts on the Highland Park site. If for some reason the University does not wish to take this approach of selective clearance and rehabilitation, working with the residents of the Hill and finding solutions to the financial problems that its presence creates, a larger suburban site should be selected. 25.

Sasaki, Dawson, Demay Associates presented the University with a formal report on their site evaluation of Highland Park in June. They stated that while some limitations existed, the site could satisfy the University's requirements for a centrally located in-town campus and that they were therefor recommending its use.

The consultants anticipated that difficult and unique architectural problems would be presented by the unusual topography of the site but that these difficulties could be solved. Much of the site was intensively developed with decrepit multiple unit low-income housing although some open space existed where buildings had recently been cleared, the land was excessively steep and rocky or land

had been held open as part of the neighborhood park. About 1,100 families consisting of about 5,000 people lived within the 800 assorted buildings on the site. 26.

Use of the site would immediately remove property paying approximately \$500,000 per year to the City in property taxes and would put an end to BRA plans to develop the site to the point where it would be paying about \$1,000,000 in property taxes. The consultants recommended that the University plan on an annual payment in lieu of taxes to Boston of approximately \$1,000,000 in either a direct cash allocation or its equivalent in other indirect forms. The consultants warned that,

In Amherst, the community and the University have been able to co-exist and grow separately with relative ease. In Boston, the surrounding environment of the Highland Park site typifies the older sections of urban America. The urban renewal process in which the University will be involved gives rise to a whole set of new concerns and challenges and the City of Boston will have a continuing and substantial review capacity over the University's plans. While utilization of the Highland Park site will require new programs, techniques and attitudes, a more appropriate site to meet the goals of the Boston campus will not be easily found. 27.

Highland Park Compared With Other Alternatives

On June 10 Chancellor Ryan provided President Lederle with a formal recommendation that the University give first preference to Highland Park. Ryan said that he preferred an inner city site over a suburban site because the inner city site would be more accessible for students and faculty, permitted greater advantages to be drawn from the cultural

facilities of Boston, identified the University as a participant in the study of urban life and problems, and, finally, because there did seem to be adequate space available in the core-city. Ryan stated that the objectives of the new campus could be achieved even if an inner city site ultimately was not made available.²⁸

On August 1, 1966 the Sasaki and Associates, presented the University with a report on alternatives to the Highland Park site in response to a request which had been made by the Boston Redevelopment Authority. The BRA had suggested that substantial portions of the existing housing and other structures at Highland Park could be retained and rehabilitated to solidify the community spirit which was beginning to become evident in the area. The University's land requirements for a new campus were so large as to require nearly a total clearance of all buildings in the area. This would destroy the emerging community spirit.

The study compared the relative advantages of Columbia Point in South Boston, Highland Park, Wollaston Golf Course in Milton and an unspecified "typical location" along or near the metropolitan area's outer beltway, Route 128. It described these sites as providing three alternatives; an urban core site represented by Highland Park, semi-urban sites represented by Columbia Point and Wollaston Golf Course, and suburban sites represented by a

Route 128 site. The location of these sites and others given serious consideration during the site selection process can be identified on the map entitled, "Greater Boston Proposed UMB Sites: 1964-1968 which is included among the appendices.

The consultants viewed the two semi-urban sites as least desirable since they did not offer the urban environment which the University was seeking or the convenient parking, easy access and space of suburban locations. The report stated emphatically that, "Highland Park presents the University with their only choice if an in-town, urban campus is deemed desirable." They pointed out that Highland Park was adjacent to existing public transportation and the planned location for a new inner city beltway which would connect it easily with the region's highway network. Such institutions as the Boston Fine Arts Museum, Harvard Medical School, Northeastern University and Simmons College were within a mile and the Boston Public Library could be reached by students via a five minute ride on the nearby rapid transit system. 29.

The consultants warned about the one important negative factor,

The liability of the site is also its chief asset-- the urban character. The asset can be destroyed unless respected, but this implies a difficult and, at times, frustrating development since the program must consider the existing social organization and economic status as well as physical characteristics. Attempts to coordinate with community groups are likely to be trying, yet accomplished could be richly

rewarding....The question remains are the University land requirements incompatible with the desire to retain Highland Park as a community or will the presence of the University provide the solidifying element and become a part of the neighborhood. 30.

They viewed Columbia Point as a poor choice because of potential development costs, and the lack of easy access to the region's highway and public transit systems. They suggested that on the other hand it would be the best site in terms of political feasibility since the city would gain a major institution without having land removed from the tax rolls. They pointed out that a campus at Columbia Point would be visually striking and provide a pleasing campus environment.

The principle advantage of the Wollaston Golf Course site would be its proximity to an interchange directly on the major north-south commuting route into Boston, the Southeast Expressway. The major disadvantages would be the site's limited size, lack of convenient access to public transportation and the fact that it was more suburban than urban.

A Route 128 site would be a disadvantage if day-to-day contact with the city was viewed as essential but it could offer excellent highway and rapid transit access which would allow students to make a far quicker trip into the heart of Boston than would be possible at either Columbia Point or Wollaston Golf Course. 31.

Formal Objections Raised by the Collins Administration

Shortly after this report was released, Boston Redevelopment Authority Administrator, Edward Logue sent a letter to Chancellor Ryan stating that Mayor Collins was strongly opposed to locating the campus at the Highland Park site or in any other residential area of the city. Logue stated that he was currently checking on the availability of land at Columbia Point as a potential location. 26.

The 1966 Democratic Primary Race for U.S. Senator

On Tuesday, September 13, 1966 the second academic year began with 1,175 new freshman and a total enrollment of 2,151 students. This same day, primary election day in Massachusetts, saw the climax to a bitter contest between former governor Peabody and Mayor Collins for the Democratic Party nomination for the United States Senate. Collins, posing as a conservative law and order candidate, had attacked Peabody throughout the campaign for his opposition to the death penalty and strong support of acts of civil disobedience by civil rights activists, Peabody had capitalized on Collins' growing unpopularity within Boston because of disenchantment with urban renewal and a growing sense that his administration was no longer primarily focused on the needs of Boston's residential neighborhoods. Both candidates had appeared on a local

televised debate the Sunday evening before the election.

In closing Peabody lashed out at Collins stating,

During his term the mayor has been concerned with building development, which has literally and figuratively bulldozed many of the citizens of Boston out of their homes. I think it's nice to have insurance centers, bank buildings and luxury apartments but what of the people? 27.

Peabody easily secured the nomination. In Boston, he obtained 71,052 votes to Collins' 48,523. ³⁴. This devastating defeat was widely regarded as a repudiation of Collin's urban renewal programs and a reflection of a desire on the part of the voters of Boston for a more people oriented city administration.

Rejection of the Highland Park Site

On October 7, 1966, with the approval of the legislature the University purchased the Boston Consolidated Gas Company Building for \$1.5 million.

In November of 1966 Dr. Paul Gagnon was appointed as Dean of Faculty. At the same point the Faculty Committee on Planning and Development completed working papers stating that a core city site would be both feasible and highly desirable and suggesting that the Highland Park area, "would provide a location that would enable the University to fulfill admirably its mandate to afford greater Boston residents with an excellent education at low cost to the individual." ³⁵.

On November 10, 1966 the Faculty Senate at the Boston Campus passed a resolution calling for Chancellor Ryan to

appoint a committee to meet with community representatives in each of the sites under consideration to explore with them the implications of the location of the new campus in their community. In a memorandum to President Lederle dated November 30, Chancellor Ryan endorsed the idea and told Lederle that unless he had objection, such a committee of the faculty would be appointed. In a response eight weeks later, on January 16, 1967, Lederle replied to Ryan stating that the Trustees Committee on Buildings and Grounds disapproved of the idea. According to Lederle,

They felt that at this stage it would be inappropriate to have any group roving around making contacts on behalf of the University.... It is simply that the Trustee committee feels that now is not the time to be stirring things up, for we seem to be too far away from a clear idea as to the likely site. 36.

Lederle's letter arrived too late. Ryan had already accepted an invitation to a mass meeting with the community to discuss the University's plans at Highland Park.

On December 13, Mayor Collins had asked the Highland Park Council for their reactions to the possibility of a fifty acre campus site for the University at Highland Park. The Council responded stating that, "Our immediate reaction is in the negative." They raised concerns that the University would expand until the campus eventually included the full 165 acres specified by Sasaki and Associates. This would put an end to plans to revitalize the residential character of their neighborhood. They asked Collins to

take action to stop the University. A copy of their response was sent to Chancellor Ryan inviting him to attend an upcoming public forum. The strength of community opposition at this meeting and at other open forums caused the university to reject the Highland Park site. 37.

Opposition by Mayor Collins played an important part in the rejection of Highland Park by the Trustees as a site for the new campus. In 1974, Trustee Dennis Crowley, a member of the Trustee Building and Grounds Committee during the site selection process, recalled the Highland Park episode,

I had another great disappointment there on the site. We had thought it out, and I had succeeded in convincing a few Trustees on the value of an area known as Highland Park, in Roxbury, which is just outside of the Fenway area, a run-down area, but a very desirable one for a college location. The Boston representatives on the Board went to Mayor Collins and asked for that location. Our administration asked for an acreage that Mr. Collins could not guarantee, and even smaller acreage he was uncertain about. As he was a holdover as mayor, had run and been defeated by Endicott Peabody for the nomination for the United States Senate, he said facetiously, 'I don't know enough about politics to know how I could get this City Council behind me on that location.' So, he refused to recommend Highland Park as the location for the University of Massachusetts. 38.

Review of the Second Major Site Proposal:
The Copley Square-Turnpike Site

At this point the new leadership of the Boston Campus had spent the better part of a year in an unsuccessful effort to secure a core city site at Highland Park. The University

was still presenting a public posture of ambivalence regarding an urban vs. a suburban site and does not seem to have fully grasped the warnings which their consultant, Sasaki, had raised concerning the difficulties presented by the political climate within Boston.

Speaking before the Greater Boston Council of the AFL-CIO on February 8, 1967, Chancellor Ryan stated that if no acceptable site was found within eight weeks, the trustees might have to look outside of the city. He suggested that the most favored urban site was Columbia Point because of strong community opposition to Highland Park and that in any event a new site would have to be found within 60 days since the present temporary Park Square site was too small to admit a new freshman class in September. 39.

A New Proposal to Merge Boston Public Higher Education

A hearing took place on March 8, 1967 before the Joint Education Committee of the legislature on House Bill 516 which provided for the merger of the University of Massachusetts, Boston State College, and The Massachusetts College of Art at a site, just outside of Boston, in the Chestnut Hill area of the City of Newton. The bill was opposed by all three institutions. A hearing took place on the same day before the Joint Education Committee on House Bill 1978 providing for the creation of a special commission to study the issue of a location for UMB.

Chancellor Ryan and Leo Redfern appeared for the University and stated that their current timetable called for a definite decision by the trustees in June or early July. Leo Redfern came away from this hearing with the impression that he had bought time for the University and later told Lederle that the Joint Education Committee seemed reluctant to act if the trustees actually were close to making a final site selection. Neither bill was enacted. ⁴⁰.

The Consultant's Proposal

On April 18, 1967, consultants Sasaki, Dawson, DeMay Associates, Inc. presented a report to the University Planning Office on their preliminary evaluation of the Copley Square-Turnpike Site. The site they proposed would have encompassed approximately thirty five to forty acres on both sides of the Massachusetts Turnpike and the Boston and Albany Railroad right-of-way situated between Huntington Avenue and Berkeley Street in the general vicinity of the Copley Square section of downtown Boston.

About 40% of the proposed site would be on "air rights" over the turnpike and railroad tracks. The area north of the "air rights" within the proposed site was presently being used by a variety of commercial enterprises while the area to the south consisted of row-house residences and small retail and light manufacturing operations. Prominant neighbors on land immediately adjacent or close to the proposed site included the Boston

Public Library, The Prudential Insurance Company's new center, the New City Auditorium, the Christian Science Mother Church and the site of a proposed Christian Science Church development, the John Hancock Company headquarters and the site of Hancock's proposal for a new 60 story office building.

In recommending the site Sasaki pointed out that it would be near access to four of the major subway lines as well as a commuter rail station. It would also be near the major arteries used by automobile commuters. The site was closely related to the City's cultural, educational and commercial resources such as the Boston Public Library, Symphony Hall, the Museum of Fine Arts and the Massachusetts State House and many others. A major university complex on this site would bridge the existing barrier between the Back Bay and South End areas which was presently created by the railroad-turnpike depression. The university complex could be physically integrated into the areas surrounding it rather than focusing inward on itself. Faculty and staff would find housing prospects available in the nearby Back Bay, Prudential Center, Christian Science Center and South End townhouses. This would further integrate the University into the community.

The consultants estimated total project costs at \$389,540,000. They projected that 192 buildings would have to be demolished in the area and 1,272 residents relocated to new housing. They glossed over this significant concern

by noting that the present renewal plan called for clearance in the area regardless of the University's actions and that substantial increases in vacancy of both land and buildings had occurred in the eight years since the 1960 Census on which their population estimates were based. They also noted that their estimates of acquisition costs assumed that the entire area would be obtained immediately in order to negate the possibility that land values would rise as the result of speculation once the university's acquisition plans became public.⁴¹

The Boston Business Community's Concern About A Shrinking Tax Base

The University, a tax exempt institution serving primarily non-residents of Boston, announced the choice of a site in the heart of the city's commercial and cultural district at a particularly difficult time. Boston Magazine had been running a series for the past year on "The Plight of the Institutional City". This was a frank discussion of the negative impact of too many tax-exempt institutions on the shrinking property tax base of Boston. Boston Magazine was a popular monthly published by the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce which featured articles aimed primarily at Boston's young professionals.

The series began with an article in June, 1966 which described the ambitious expansion plans of the Christian Science Mother Church adjacent to Copley Square. The

writer praised the Church because,

In blessed contrast to its sister religious groups, it voluntarily picks up its share of Boston's staggering tax burden, and last year paid out \$1.1 million on assessed property valuations of \$13 million.⁴²

The next article in the series which appeared in the September issue charged that the city's universities,

...regard themselves as simple business establishments taking advantage of laws set up to allow a maximum return on investments. Institutional money, like any other money, lacks social consciousness.⁴³

The article claimed that schools, because of their special tax exempt status, were in a much more competitive position than business firms to bid for real estate while each of their acquisitions caused the city's property tax base to shrivel a little more. The article warned that Boston's residents were beginning to become concerned,

With the Back Bay's schools threatening to make one vast campus out of the once proud area, with Boston University acquiring, as it were, the entire left bank of the Charles River as its very own precinct.⁴⁴

The article pointed to the contrast between Boston University's claim that its new Metrocenter study group was dedicated to bringing the university and metropolitan area together in solving urban problems and the fact that BU's tax exempt property holdings in the city had increased by \$6 million over the past eighteen months to a total holding of over \$31 million.⁴⁵

As the University unveiled its plans for Copley Square in April of 1967, the magazine was turning up the

heat. An editorial in the May, 1967 edition reminded readers that during the past year it had,

...opened its pages to a discourse on tax exempt institutions, stressing the fiscal hardship their exemption causes a city which supplies public services to over 40 per cent of its property without recompense, and the social and structural unrest that institutions are leaving in the wake of persistent expansion. 46

The magazine cited statistics indicating that Boston suffered more severely than any other urban area in the nation from this problem since it hosted within its city boundaries 25 colleges and universities, 26 junior colleges, and 150 business, trade and other private schools which together enrolled more than 110,000 students including 50,000 who lived within the city in dorms or apartments. The BRA, it warned, was projecting an increase of another 70,000 more students by 1970. The city would be expected to provide municipal services for this influx even though it was confronted with the "shocking fact" that its property tax base in 1967 was \$77 million less than it had been in 1915. Dr. Case of B.U. was quoted as suggesting that the time had come to establish positive, realistic school-city programs to meet these problems, perhaps through a joint development corporation. 47.

The final item in the series, an editorial, appeared in the June edition. It stated,

With the site of a Boston branch for the University of Massachusetts still a subject of controversy as this issue goes to press, we are rather forcefully reminded of the need for the establishment of a

meaningful dialogue between the city's educational institutions and the agencies responsible for planning Boston's orderly development. With enormous commitments for construction and renewal, it would seem even more pressing than ever that voluntary guidelines be established for the mutual benefit of the community and its institutional components. 48.

Among the ill effects of the influx of college students cited by the editorial was a study showing that during the months of April and December, 1966 more than 86% of the services of the Boston Public Library went towards assisting college students. The editorial also reported comments by Boston Police Commissioner McNamara on the apparent indifference of the colleges and universities toward the devastating impact of the growth in student commuter vehicles on Boston's traffic problems. 49.

The editorial called for the creation of a master plan for Boston and the surrounding metropolitan area through which both private and public higher education might expand without jeopardy to the City and its finances. A principle purpose of such a planning mechanism would be,

...to select desirable areas for future growth, in both the core city and the suburbs, and channel educational development into such areas. A dual result of this pre-selection would be to aid the general growth of all institutions and simultaneously protect existing neighborhoods from excessive school development which to date has shown little sensitivity to the problems of business or residential zoning. 50.

Regarding the planned development of a public community college and the Boston branch of the University of Massachusetts the article suggested,

The availability of a master plan to guide the placement of these institutions within the city would, of course, be of great value. 51.

During the first week of May, City Councilman Christopher Iannella capitalized on the developing controversy over the Copley site proposal during an announcement of his entry into the 1967 mayoral race by reminding voters of his long standing opposition to an in-town campus for the University of Massachusetts. 52. Collins' poor performance in the September primary had now inspired a number of local politicians to consider entering what had previously been viewed as an impossible contest against a popular incumbent.

The following Monday, City Councilman William Foley introduced a resolution stating that the Council, "deplored the intention of the trustees of the University of Massachusetts to pre-empt 30 acres of land in the Back Bay." Foley's resolution passed unanimously. Iannella then seized the occasion to attack the plan and indirectly the mayor. "If the Copley Square acquisition were to become a fact", Iannella stated, "...it would do more to destroy the character of this city than any other single activity in the last ten years." Iannella introduced a resolution calling on Collins to meet directly with the University trustees to find a more suitable site within the Greater Boston area. This too passed unanimously. 53.

Councilman Peter Hines, who would soon announce his candidacy for mayor, was not about to be outdone by

Iannella. While Hines strongly criticized Mayor Collins and Logue and voted for both resolutions, he never the less endeavored to support education, stating, "The people are not so damn anti-education as you make them out to be." Hines reminded the Council that the low-income working families of Boston still wanted an opportunity to send their children to college and that he was not at all convinced that they would not be willing to give up some tax producing land to provide low cost educational opportunities. 54.

Internal Opposition To A Core City Location

On May 1, 1967 Dr. J.P. Anselme, Assistant Professor of Chemistry at the Boston Campus wrote to President Lederle in an attempt to present the perspective of the science faculty on the question of site selection. Anselme stated that,

...the sciences are in the ridiculous position of having to provide tangible and convincing arguments for a large site while the opposition only has a nebulous 'feeling' that the choice of an 'intown' site is the right thing to do. Although I am speaking for myself, I am certain that many of my colleagues, particularly in the sciences area, share my views. It is my decided opinion that such a decision ought not to be taken without a complete understanding of the general problem and those particular to the physical sciences. I can frankly say that it seems rather incongruous to me that, in order to educate students, one needs 'an urban environment', especially since any reasonable non-urban' site could not be very far removed from the center of town. 55.

Lederle thanked Anselme for this advice noting that, Right or wrong, the Board of Trustees has been proceeding on this idea of an in-town site, encouraged by the thought that this is consistent with the original mandate of the General Court and has generalized approval of the majority of the faculty. 56.

This was not the first time that Lederle had heard these negative sentiments expressed by a member of the Boston faculty. A year before the president had reported in a note to Provost Tippo that at a Boston campus faculty dance in Cambridge he had been approached by a number of faculty who expressed dissatisfaction with a Boston location. Along with this note Lederle included a memo sent to him by Professor Walter Lehmann of the Chemistry Department presenting arguments in favor of a suburban site. 57.

Lehman argued that even under the most optimistic assumptions regarding the admission of high school graduates from Boston, 75% or more of the students of the new campus would come from outside Boston and that this fact, "points up the fallacy of focusing all our attention on the city of Boston". He also noted that, "considerable pockets of underprivileged areas will be found outside of Boston." Lehman stated that it was "ridiculous, in this modern day and age" to plan a campus without adequate parking facilities when it was known that 80% of its student body would be commuting in from outside the City. 58.

Lehman then concentrated on a major concern of the science faculty,

The sciences will have some difficulty with delicate apparatus, which traditionally are located in spacious basements and first floors for stability. The upper floors simply vibrate and sway too much. In a central city, however, even in the basements, there may be problems with the rumblings of subways and thru-ways. 59.

Lederle commented in his note to Tipppo that, "Some of his points are well taken...I suggest that we keep this point of view in the backs of our minds." 60.

Opposition To the Copley Site By The Collins Administration And Local Business Interests

An article appearing in The Boston Herald American on May 4, 1967 reported that the University had selected a site near Copley Square and listed the arguments being presented by local business interests against selection of this site for the new campus. 61. That evening the Boston Redevelopment Authority took a formal vote to oppose the Copley Square site proposal. Boston's redevelopment administrator, Edward J. Logue, termed the proposal "impossible" since it would take up far too much land in an area which was planned for extensive tax generating commercial development. Property taxes had become an important issue in the 1967 Boston mayoral race and Logue was about to become a candidate for mayor. The site selection issue, particularly the Copley Square proposal gave him a badly needed opportunity to attract media coverage. 62.

The John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company threatened publicly, through the news media, to rule out further consideration of its plan for a multi-million dollar high rise office building in the Copley area if the University continued to pursue acquisition of the Copley site. ^{12.} 63.

The following day, May 5, 1967, the University issued a statement denying that any final decision had been made on a site for the Boston campus and pointing out that no vote had been taken by the trustees.

Mayor Collins and BRA Director Logue were strongly criticized through the media by university trustee, Hugh Thompson. Thompson, who was also the New England Regional Director of the AFL-CIO, complained that, "Every time we try to get a site in Boston, as the General Court decided we should, we find opposition not only from the mayor but Mr. Logue." Thompson described Logue's suggestion of a Columbia Point site as "pure nonsense" because engineering studies had already shown it could not be used for such a large project. 64.

Reaction by State Political Leaders

On May 9, Senator Kevin Harrington told a reporter from The Boston Record American that he still felt the new campus should be a suburban commuter college adjacent to a highway network. Harrington stated that when the bill to establish the Boston branch was before the Senate in 1964, he had offered an amendment to keep it out of Boston but

he had offered an amendment to keep it out of Boston but that several senators from Boston had opposed the amendment. At the same point in 1964 university officials, including President Lederle and Dean Redfern, had told him that they didn't want to be in Boston. ⁶⁵.

Intervention by the Governor

A special meeting of legislative leaders from both parties and nine University of Massachusetts trustees was held on May 11 in Governor John Volpe's office. The private meeting was closed to the press and centered on a presentation by the University of a scale model of the Copley site. Volpe emerged from the meeting stating that he was not in favor of the Copley site. A press sampling of the opinions of Senate President Donahue and such prominent senators as Kevin Harrington, John Parker, James Burke and Mary Fonseca, indicated that they also opposed the site.

Lederle told the press after the meeting that he still considered the site ideal although he recognized the necessity for support from the governor and legislature since they had to provide the funds.

In covering this meeting The Boston Record American reported that the John Hancock Insurance Company had stated that they would halt plans for a \$100 million office building near Copley Square if the new campus was located there and that Christian Science Church leaders had

indicated that they would be forced to reduce the scale of their \$70 million expansion program. 66.

Opposition by the Back Bay Community

A telegram sent to Lederle on May 13 by John A. Lowry, President of the Back Bay Association, expressed regret that the issue of site selection had become a matter of so much public controversy. Lowry urged Lederle to meet with the various community groups in the Back Bay as soon as possible. He expressed doubt that the Copley Square proposal was possible of attainment since the area was already at the mid-point of an economic development surge which had generated an estimated \$500 million in private investment. The proposal would jeopardize this project and impose additional burdens on Boston taxpayers by preempting taxable property.

Lowry argued that the University was mistaken in assuming the support of the BRA, the City Council and the mayor since all three had already "decisively and publicly opposed building the university here". He listed the following community representatives and groups as opposed to the proposal: The Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, The Back Bay Council, St. Botolph Citizens Committee, South End Federation of Citizens Organizations, Greater Boston Real Estate Board, various neighborhood associations of the Back Bay, Fenway Civic Association, Ellis Memorial Settlement House, The Greater Boston Retail Board of Trade,

The John Hancock Company, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Prudential Insurance Company, New England Mutual Life Insurance Company, and the Seraton Corporation as well as virtually the entire legislative delegation from the Back Bay area. 67.

Rejection of the Copley Square Site by the Trustees

At a meeting of the trustees on May 15, Frank Haigus, Buildings and Grounds Committee chairman, issued a statement explaining that his committee had been prepared to recommend the Copley Square site but decided to make no recommendation after Governor Volpe opposed the site at a meeting the previous week. He said that in accordance with the governor's wish they would set aside Copley and examine a dozen or more sites which had been suggested as alternatives and would have a report ready for the full board of trustees by mid-summer. Haigus emphasized that the trustees had not yet made a final site selection and would not do so until after his committee had a chance to confer further with the governor, legislature and community officials. Trustee Barney Troy criticized those who had brought the Copley Square issue into the public arena before a final decision had been made and emphasized the need for more cooperation from public officials. 68.

On May 17, 1967 the Boston Redevelopment Authority formally presented Chancellor Ryan with a copy of its Campus-By-The-Sea proposal to locate the Boston campus at

Columbia Point. At a news conference Logue said that he hoped for a future opportunity to meet with the trustees to try to convince them to reverse their previous rejection of Columbia Point.

Logue argued that the Columbia Point site offered almost unlimited space for expansion. He estimated construction costs of only \$266 million as opposed to an estimate of \$417 million for the Copley plan. He also said that, if necessary, the BRA had the legal right to veto the Copley site since it would project into four different federally funded urban renewal projects which had federal immunity from seizure by a state agency.

Another plus for Columbia, according to Logue, was that Boston would lose only \$30,000 from its property tax base, not the estimated \$11 million which would be lost through selection of the Copley site for the new campus.

A final argument was that the new campus at Columbia Point would be the focal point for a revival of a badly depressed and neglected part of the City and might also serve as a stepping stone toward development of the harbor islands as part of the proposed 1976 World's Fair. ⁶⁹.

During this period a number of newspapers across the state published editorials which were critical of the university's consideration of the Copley site and which praised Logue. ⁷⁰. Particularly blunt criticism of the University came from Victor O. Jones who provided strong

backing for Logue in his regular commentary appearing in the Boston Globe for May 18. Jones stated,

The average dope who would like to be for education, and for progress, and who doesn't think all the city's largest taxpayers necessarily wear horns, will side with Logue on this matter. It's perfectly possible for a citizen to be in favor of high class public education without also being in favor of giving a state university real estate whose loss from the tax rolls would make it more difficult to support the state university. To be sure, this principle comes under the head of noblesse oblige - not fashionable these days - but perhaps not entirely invalid. And it's a principle which is particularly appropriate to the academic community. After all, if you enjoy, as does the academic community, certain privileges, you also have certain responsibilities. These would seem to include not biting the hand that feeds you, or perhaps more accurately, not killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. 71.

The Waltham News Tribune expressed the sentiment which still existed in some quarters for a suburban site,

That the trustees put themselves in a position to be clobbered is indicative of a lack of reliance on regional planning. This is precisely the kind of need that a metropolitan planning program was supposed to serve. A UMass campus of the scope outlined should be a part of urban renewal, in the interior suburbs, if not in Boston proper. Commuting students would benefit most from single-fare access, so the search would logically have to be within the suburban area contiguous to the core city. 72.

Dr. Harold Case, president of Boston University, used the occasion and his impending retirement to once again publicly voice an opinion, during a Boston radio news program, that there was no need to build a new University of Massachusetts campus in Boston. As an alternative to this "inefficient and wasteful" move, Case suggested that the state begin to pay subsidies to existing colleges and universities.

The Boston Mayoral Race of 1967

John Collins' defeat in the fall primary of 1966 was followed by his decision in the late spring of 1967 not to seek another term as mayor. A review of the succession struggle which followed reflects clearly the current political climate in Boston and suggests why the University was having little success in gaining approval for a core city campus. During the week following President Case's attack on the need for a Boston campus Boston newspapers published speculation that Ed Logue would enter the 1967 mayoral race. In adding to this speculation, Richard Daly of the Boston Traveller stated,

Logue, meanwhile, is moving into position as the man with all the answers about the New Boston. He will not run against his boss, it is assured, but he has made clear that he would like to go if Collins does not. He is not a Bostonian - he is dubbed, 'the intruder', by Mrs. Louise Day Hicks, a native candidate.... Yet who came forward with a fine idea on where to put the University of Massachusetts Boston branch? Everybody howled about erosion of the tax base when the UMass trustees eyed Copley Square. Logue came up with Columbia Point, offering visions of an in-town 'campus by the sea' on land now vacant. Other candidates talk about potholes in the streets, but Logue - with Collins and the Chamber of Commerce - comes up with a \$400 million plan for a new downtown of skyscrapers and malls that, if ever realized, would be the best thing for Boston since the British left town. The BRA and cooperating agencies have been playing with plans for years, but it is now-as the mayoralty race takes shape-that Logue produces a dream site for a local UMass and a dream plan for a new downtown. 74.

In announcing her candidacy for mayor, Louise Day Hicks placed great emphasis on her campaign theme of "Boston for Bostonians" and made oblique reference to the UMass controversy stating, "It is high time we stopped giving away city land and city services to private schools and universities. 75.

By 1967, there was no longer strong popular support for urban renewal in Boston. The reign of the "little people" in local politics had begun.

During the Chicago site selection process there was one politically strong mayor, Richard Daley, in office throughout the site selection process. In Boston there was a change of leadership mid-way through the site selection process which signified the end of an era of emphasis upon rapid economic growth and dynamic urban renewal in the core city and the beginning of an era of empowerment of community action groups.

Boston's Mayor Collins, who had been soundly defeated in his home city and across the state in the race for U.S. Senator in 1966, decided to retire from politics. This happened in the spring of 1967 just as the debate on a core city site was becoming most intense.

Collin's political retirement gave rise to a struggle for succession. Among the field of ten candidates was Boston's redevelopment director who made the site location for the new campus a campaign issue. Logue had taken strong public positions in opposition to certain site choices

proposed by the University and used these occasions, and his own proposal to locate the new campus at Columbia Point, as an opportunity to showcase his own administrative skills and vision for the future development of the city. Logue enjoyed considerable early support from the Boston business community.

The 1967 race included other candidates who were at least partially expressive of an attitude of hostility to the location of the University in Boston and particularly towards its plans for a permanent site in the core city. Most notable for this attitude among the other candidates were Louise Day Hicks and Albert "Dapper" O'Neil.

Both publicly expressed suspicion and criticism of the area's college students and professors along with a general anti-liberal, anti-intellectual attitude. Their positions centered on the issue of busing to achieve racial balance in the City's schools, fear of possible racially motivated violence in the city, and a generalized fear by the City's white working class that their city was being rapidly snatched from their grasp by meddling "outsiders". A large segment of the Boston electorate was encouraged by these candidates to fear interference and a "takeover" by "outsiders" who would disregard and ignore what "Dapper" O'Neil described as "Boston's little people".

Hicks struck a responsive cord with her slogan of "Boston for Bostonians", which enabled her to finish first

in the September mayoral primary race while Logue finished a distant third. Hicks' campaign platform demanded an end to involuntary busing, an end to property tax exemptions for private institutions, including colleges and universities, and a payroll tax for non-Boston residents who earned their paycheck in Boston. 76.

Kevin White, a moderate who had finished second in the primary, emerged as the new mayor after narrowly defeating Hicks in a two person final run-off contest in November. Building on his political base as Secretary of the Commonwealth, White tapped into the same voter sentiments as Hicks but with a more positive program. During the 1967 race White stated,

Obviously, the people of the city judge Boston not only by its skyline but also by its services. They are not different from people anywhere, they want what they are entitled to - a decent environment. They rightly believe that a city capable of attracting hundreds of millions of dollars to revitalize downtown Boston where people work is equally capable of attracting private and public funds to influence new life into the neighborhoods where people live. Boston needs people programs to match building programs. 77.

White won with the help of a considerable portion of the Boston business community, who feared the results of a Hicks victory, and through skillful application of this more positive statement of the same basic theme being used by his opponent.

White would go on to dominate city politics as mayor for almost two decades and became, like Daley of Chicago, one of his era's most prominent urban mayors. His

considerable political talent, charisma and style enabled him to win the Democratic Party nomination for governor in 1970.

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He began office in 1967, however, as a mayor in a position to lead the city only if he paid considerable public allegiance to the strong feeling that a City of Boston administration should seek first to serve and fight tenaciously for the particular interests and desires of Boston's residential neighborhoods and calm the fears which were reflected in Hick's rhetoric.

During an interview conducted as part of this case study, Mayor White reflected on the mayoral race of 1967. He said that the number one issue in the race was not taxes, or concern with a reduction in the city's tax base, but concern with racial tensions in the city stemming from a series of violent incidents. A second important and related concern was how to bring the city government closer to the residents of Boston. Mrs. Hicks skillfully exploited both of these issues and as a result dominated the primary race. The task for the White campaign was, therefor, to defeat Mrs. Hicks by promoting a better approach to the same issues. Mayor White was clearly committed to community and neighborhood concerns and objectives and was prepared to act forcefully to address these issues to protect his political base.

The University's Growing Concern With Its Negative Public Image

In a memorandum to Messrs. McCartney, Redfern, Ryan, Johnson and Tipppo on July 24, 1967 Lederle expressed concern about negative public reaction in Boston and reported the following incident,

As I passed the 25-cent Allston toll gate on my way back to Amherst on July 21 at 2 P.M., the toll collector asked: 'Where have you decided to locate the college?' I responded: 'It is really quite a problem.' He then responded: 'It can't be in Boston. Taxes are too high. We pay \$130 a thousand now and we can't stand any more universities.' We had a similar conversation with another ticket taker a month or so back. Query whether our sample is representative of general Boston citizen attitude? If so, we have real difficulty ahead. 78.

McCartney, Secretary of the University, replied three days later stating that there did indeed seem to be a problem developing which required watching given the recent announcement of the \$130 tax rate for Boston. As a possible solution he suggested,

An interpretive news story would be very much in order, and quite easy to arrange if we had a definite idea at this time of what direction our tax relief measures might take in terms of establishing the new UMass in Boston campus. In-lieu payments, use of air rights and 'piggy backing' a campus on top of commercial property which would return tax payments are all in the wind but nothing has become sufficiently definite to make a firm commitment at this time. 79.

Later comments by President Lederle concerning his frustration in confronting this attitude of the Collins and

White administrations suggest that Lederle and his staff did not fully understand the dynamics of Boston politics in the summer of 1967. In his oral memoirs Lederle stated,

I take great exception to the way mayors and others in positions of responsibility in Boston, such as the MBTA have operated. They are 'losers'. If we had run the University of Massachusetts like that we'd still be about 6,000 out here in Amherst. They don't live up to the responsibilities of their job, in my opinion. Well, at any rate, looking for a site, Logue sicced us on North Station, Highland Park, any number of sites...I had some idea that we might be able to work with urban renewal. I explored all these things with Logue, but found that we came along just a wee bit too late. It was no longer possible. No city council, no mayor, would move a single black. Logue himself didn't quite get the score on this, despite the fact that he's thought to be one of the great housing experts. He led us down the primrose path and then found from his mayor and city council, that they weren't going to move a black, they weren't going to move anybody. 80.

The fact that he chose to characterize the two mayors of Boston as weak "losers", incapable of making decisions and taking strong action, suggests that President Lederle appears to have failed to fully understand the local Boston political context of the period 1966-1968 in which Collins and White were operating. What emerges, instead, is the strong suggestion that the University and Boston Campus leadership had failed to convince these key leaders of the necessity for locating the new campus in the core city. They had also failed to communicate their vision of how the university could provide unique and tangible assistance in dealing with the very urban issues which were at the forefront of the 1967 mayoral campaign.

A 1967 Consultant's Report On The Public Image Of The
Boston Campus

A growing concern with public image led the University to employ the services of Science and University Affairs, a consulting group headquartered in New York City. The consultants conducted a study of the institution's university relations and public affairs responsibilities during the fall of 1967. In their report, released on December 2, 1967, they stated that,

The first dominant truth is that the long-range viability of a public university in the City of Boston is in fact far from established, either in terms of the political leadership of the state, or, indeed, to a much lesser degree in the (University of Massachusetts) administration itself. Secondly, in terms of circumstances of geography, tradition, and socio-political trends, UM/B's long-range establishment is subject to a rather particular set of potential hazards. An important facet of this deeper difficulty relates to the fact that the Commonwealth, more so than most other Eastern states, has only of late recognized the value of a viable public system of higher education. Its low per capita investment in this area of social enterprise clearly bears out this incontrovertible fact....The cold evidence remains, we believe, that neither the Governor, the General Court, nor the University of Massachusetts has come to a final conviction that the successful establishment of a Boston campus is a top-priority objective. Until such time as all three of the decision-makers arrive at this final conclusion--hopefully at the same time--the Boston institution will continue to operate at risk. 81.

A key point among the consultants' findings was the observation that there was very little public awareness of the University of Massachusetts at Boston. They interviewed several local newspaper reporters and editors and concluded that, "It is still very much isolated, still very much unknown. 82.

Regarding the stagnated search for a site the consultants stated,

The prolonged uncertainty of a site poses a continuing dilemma in terms of the public impression ...For political, psychological and purely survival reasons, it has become vital to announce a site decision, even if this threatens to burst out into large public controversy. But the University and its trustees must act in a forthright and well thought-out manner, so that the whole enterprise can impress the larger public with a strong sense of direction--and future. The first public unveiling of a proposed urban campus, whether in its final conceptual state or preliminary stage, will do wonders for morale and will produce public awareness of the institution's intentioned performance. From here on out, one needs to be particularly sensitive to the public implications of planning procedures and actions, and to be prepared to deal with them ahead of such actions, and not after. 83.

The recommendations of the consultants centered on the establishment and development of a public relations office at the Boston campus and consideration over the next several years of moving the University's Amherst based public realtions staff to a separate Boston location along with the University president's office itself. The report concluded,

Under the particular circumstances of UM/B, the development of a broad and operational university relations function in Boston represents not a peripheral and desirable activity, but an absolutely essential and perhaps pivotal function. It may well turn out that the flowering or demise of this campus rests on the degree of success with which it grapples with these public questions. Institutional investments in such activities, therefore, represent no idle self-titulation for the institution, but, instead, a cold necessity of survival. 84.

Resumption Of The Search And Analysis of Remaining Options

At a meeting of the trustee Buildings and Grounds Committee on November 1, 1967, Sasaki, Dawson, DeMay Associates was asked to provide a detailed analysis of the 15 possible sites currently under review. They provided this report on November 20. Out of the 15 sites, seven were recommended for further consideration.

In making this recommendation the consultants reviewed the criteria which had been previously agreed upon by the trustee committee.

They identified four location zones and developed different assumptions concerning building density for each of these four zones with building density becoming less as the sites moved further away from the core city area.

The planning assumptions built into the site selection review included the following:

A total campus population of 15,000 students and 3,000 faculty and staff.

A requirement for 3,500,000 gross square feet.

Minimum acreage required would range from 30 acres in the core city to 145 acres at a site on the Route 128 Corridor.

Building height would range from an average of 7 levels in the core city area to an average of 5 at Route 128.

The maximum total land coverage by buildings would range from 50% in the core to only 30% at Route 128.

There would be no requirement for dormitories since all students would commute to the campus by automobile or public transportation. Parking requirements, therefor, would vary by site location and availability of public transportation from a minimum of 2,250 spaces in the core city to a minimum of 9,000 at a site on the Route 128 Corridor.

Availability of adequate public transportation would be a critical consideration since it would be an all-commuter student campus.

The sites under consideration are identified on the map within the appendices of this case study. The seven sites recommended for further consideration were:

In the Core Area: The Copley Square Site and a site adjacent to North Station.,

In the Core Fringe: Highland Park,

In the Intermediate Zone between Core City and Suburbs: Columbia Point and an additional location labeled, "The Governor Shirley Site".

In the Inner Suburbs Near Route 128: West Roxbury Marshes and Woodland Country Club. 85.

The Copley Square, North Station, Highland Park and Columbia Point sites are described and discussed at length elsewhere in this paper. The remaining three sites, "Governor Shirley", West Roxbury Marshes, and Woodland Country Club, were briefly reviewed in late 1967 and early

1968 and rejected. The following is a brief discussion of these sites.

The Governor Shirley Site

The Governor Shirley Site was located at the northern edge of the Dorchester section of Boston on sixty acres of fully developed land bounded by Massachusetts Avenue, Hampden Street, Norfolk Avenue and the New Haven Railroad. It had been originally proposed to the University by local community groups eager to bring about a revitalization of the area. The site's label was drawn from the fact that it included the former home of one of Massachusetts' colonial governors. The community groups suggested that the Shirley Mansion could be restored as an historic shrine and used as the official residence of the current governor. 86.

The consultants noted that the site encompassed 143 buildings and 371 local residents. It was a generally depressed area with an unattractive appearance in a period of transition from residential use to commercial and industrial uses.

There were some important limitations. Any future expansion of the new campus would cut heavily into the existing residential areas or already intensively developed industrial area. The University would, therefore, have to make an early and final decision on the amount of acreage required and then live with this final decision in the years to come. The site had been specifically identified

by the BRA as part of their "Model Cities" urban renewal proposal and thus would probably not be available for several years due to the complex development process which they had established. Construction of the campus would result in the elimination of an estimated 2,000 jobs and 110 residential units and a significant loss of tax base to the city. The nearest access to the public transit system was nearly a mile from the site. These factors caused the University to discontinue consideration of the site in early 1968. 87.

The West Roxbury Site

The West Roxbury Site consisted of about 250 acres of marshland lying along the banks of the Charles River at the extreme southwest corner of the City of Boston. It was completely undeveloped and its development would result in the dislocation of no homes or businesses but would result in a very insignificant reduction in the City's property tax base.

The site would require the construction of one or more very expensive new connecting roads to Route 128, which was about one mile south of the site. The site would straddle a proposed extension of the Forest Hills MBTA rapid transit line. The campus could potentially expand along the banks of the Charles River into suburban Newton and be linked with future recreational development of river frontage by the Metropolitan District Commission. The

nearby attractive suburban towns of Needham and Newton would be likely to attract faculty and staff.

Problems might result, however, from the fact that the site would be located in from two to as many as four different municipalities depending on the size of the site taken. Because the site was primarily marsh land and a former land fill, site preparation costs would be higher than normal. Although the site was the nearest Route 128 site to downtown Boston, it would still have been a 20 to 25 minute ride to the core city by the proposed rapid transit line. Although technically within the legal limits of Boston it was actually an isolated location far out from the core city and totally at odds with the concept of an urban university developed in the campus' mission statement. This factor caused it to be abandoned by the University in early 1968.⁸⁸

The Woodland Country Club Site in Newton

The Woodland Country Club was a 130 acre site located in a predominantly residential section of the northwestern part of the suburb of Newton directly adjacent to Route 128. The Riverside line of the MBTA rapid transit system passed through the center of the site terminating in a massive public parking lot at its western terminus directly northwest of the site. Further expansion would be possible onto either the adjacent Brae Burn Golf Course or the nearby warehouse area of the Jordan Marsh Company. The site

offered immediate access to the rapid transit system and to Route 128 and would have required virtually no dislocation of residents or businesses. There would be a minimum of site preparation costs. The choice suburban location would be likely to prove attractive to faculty and staff. The site would, however, be some 25 to 30 minutes from the core city by public transportation and a 20 to 25 minute ride by automobile. Although somewhat more accessible by rapid transit, it suffered from the same sense of isolation from the city and city life as did the West Roxbury site. 89.

Both the West Roxbury and Woodland sites offered an attractive prospect to faculty and students willing and able to commute some distance by automobile. The mission statement of the campus, however, called for an institution which would specifically provide access to the financially disadvantaged youth of the inner city who could only afford to commute by public transportation. It called, too for immediate access to the cultural riches of the inner city. These objectives and similar concerns could not be achieved at West Roxbury or Woodland. They would only be selected as an alternative if a core city site turned out to be an impossibility.

CHAPTER VII

THE SITE SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS - BOSTON: 1968

The Negative Impact of Continuing Delay In Site Selection

By January of 1968 the new campus began to experience serious negative consequences stemming from the three and one half years delay in locating a permanent site. These consequences would include growing disillusionment on the part of the legislature, continued delay in the expansion of Boston Campus enrollment and in academic programs, the resignation of a very talented but deeply discouraged chancellor, increased community resistance to a core city location and the revival of a proposal to scrap the Boston campus in favor of a totally different plan. Decisive action was now long overdue. By year end a final decision would be made but as the year opened it was not at all clear that the long search was now nearing a final resolution.

Growing Concern by the Legislature

As yet another year began with no decision on a site for the Boston campus, the legislature was becoming uneasy about the long delay and concerned as well about the increase in anti-war protest activity by the University's students and faculty in downtown Boston. Early in February the Massachusetts Legislative Joint Committee on Education

passed a resolution calling for an investigation of Boston faculty who had allegedly been overtly contributing, aiding, and encouraging acts of civil disobedience committed by some students at the University. On February 12, 1968 a hearing was conducted by the Joint Committee on House Bill No. 1798 presented by the Boston Teacher's Union, Local 66, AFL-CIO, requiring the location of a permanent campus for The University of Massachusetts within Boston's city limits. The bill was adopted by the House and sent on to the Senate. Both measures eventually died during the session without any action being taken but they clearly reflect the growing impatience and concern with the Boston Campus on the part of the legislature.

Resignation of Chancellor Ryan

Boston Campus Chancellor Ryan had become totally frustrated by the failure to locate a site coupled with a lack of adequate financial resources. Ryan submitted a formal letter of resignation to President Lederle on February 25 stating that his resignation would be effective on or before August 15, 1968. Ryan suggested that his decision be kept confidential until at least April or May so that he could continue to fully address the many problems of the Boston Campus. Ryan listed personal family considerations as his primary reason for leaving, but also stated that,

The professional reasons are very nearly as grave...
There is every indication that all of my effort has

been insufficient to produce the public support needed to translate our objectives for this University from the pious words of platform speeches into the splendid reality of academic resources and physical plant. We are at best marking time. Not one single measure of improvement has been made in the budgetary support of the Boston campus since my first day on the job. Instead of calling for high quality educational opportunity, the Governor has forced us to take more and more students into an understaffed, ill-housed, inadequately financed Boston campus, with sub-minimal library and equipment resources. 1.

A Second Attempt by the University
to Win Approval of a Copley Site

Intervention by Student Leaders

During the second week of December a mass rally of more than 1500 students was held in the lobby of the temporary facilities in Park Square. A student leadership group including Paul Pierce, president of the 27,000 member Massachusetts Student Association, a representative of the University's Amherst campus and several Boston campus student leaders, announced a campaign of support for the proposal for the 30 acre Copley Square/South End campus. Dennis McKinley, public relations director for the new Boston Campus student coordinating committee said that a 15 member student visiting committee would begin paying visits to legislators, civic and political groups in hopes of gaining wide spread support. The students listed convenient commuting as the number one reason for a core city site and also cited the importance of being located "where the action is" and the better possibility of meaningful

cross-cultural exchanges between the student and the core city. State Representative David Vigneault of Springfield, a full time student at the University's Amherst campus, spoke to the crowd stating that it would be a violation of legislative intent to locate the new campus anywhere but in the core city and promised to argue this point on the floor of the legislature. ². The Student Council at UMB sent a letter to Chancellor Ryan in early January announcing their resolution calling on the Governor, State Legislature and University Trustees to immediately take steps to acquire the Copley Square site for the permanent site of the Boston Campus. ³.

In early 1968 the Boston Campus faculty leadership began a renewed effort to win approval of a smaller Copley Square/South End area site. In a letter to Lederle dated February 19, 1968, Hale Champion, who had replaced Ed Logue as Development Administrator of the Boston Redevelopment Authority within the new White administration, summarised the discussion which had taken place at a meeting between the BRA and representatives of the University on February 16. The BRA recommended Columbia Point as their first choice and noted that it was the only site approved officially by the Authority. Both groups agreed to explore the possibility of a smaller site on a 14 acre area in the South End section of downtown Boston bounded by Huntington Avenue, Stuart Street, Dartmouth Street, the

New Haven Railroad and Follen Street but there was no commitment by either party. The staffs of both groups were instructed to arrive at a decision within 30 days as to whether the site was feasible. ⁴.

On March 8, 1968, an informal association of Boston Campus students identifying themselves as the "Student Copley Site Committee" sent a memorandum to the trustees reporting that through their efforts massive community support had been gathered in support of the Copley site including 10 state senators and 42 state representatives, who were listed by name, and a number of Boston area community groups and labor unions such as the civic associations of the Brighton-Allston, Jamaica Plain, and South End sections of Boston and the Boston Teachers Union, an affiliate of the AFL-CIO. The students also included copies of a petition signed by 98 members of the faculty at the Boston campus endorsing the choice of the Copley site. Conspicuously absent from this petition were the signatures of any faculty from the hard sciences. ⁵.

In a letter to Dean Gagnon, dated March 28, 1968, Daniel P. Moynihan, then the Director of The Joint Center For Urban Studies of MIT and Harvard University, expressed his satisfaction at learning that Gagnon and the faculty leadership were still determined to fight for a core site for the new campus. He reported to Gagnon on a recent conversation with BRA chief, Hale Champion,

...who is particularly concerned to see that everyone understand the basics for the BRA rejection of the Turnpike site. It was not a rejection on the basis of land use. To the contrary, Hale Champion and the Mayor are entirely willing to see that area used for educational purposes. The problem, as you suggest in your letter, was exclusively one of design. The staff of the BRA simply felt that the Sasaki design would be altogether inappropriate to the pattern they are developing in that area and further concluded that no satisfactory design could be developed so long as the present student density, as it were, is maintained. Hale put it to me that if you could cut down the number of students from 15,000 to 10,000, with a comparable reduction in the number of cars, etc., that the site could be managed and would be made available. He wonders whether or not in phasing into a second institution needed in Boston something couldn't be worked out. In any event, be clear on the point that the BRA and the mayor want you in Boston and want to see if they can't make it possible to get you....A second point which Hale made is Mayor White is prepared to take the political heat that will arise from using this property for an educational purpose. I think it is extremely important to understand that what defeated us was the problem of design, not the question of use. 6.

Meanwhile the BRA and White administration continued to pursue the possibility of Columbia Point. On April 3 the BRA met with the Columbia Point Community Development Council to present local residents with an overview of its plans for locating the Boston campus at Columbia Point. Most of the approximately 150 residents in attendance indicted approval by a show of hands. Representatives from the mayor's office promised that no existing apartments would be taken from the Columbia Point public housing complex. Francis O'Brien, the University's director of development, indicated that selection of Columbia Point was still only a remote possibility but that the University would be a good neighbor wherever it went. House Speaker

Robert Quinn, who represented the area in the legislature, was in attendance and stated that selection of Columbia Point seemed to be only a remote possibility and that he had faith in the University Trustees to do what was right in the matter. 7.

In a letter sent to the University on April 22, H. Brown Baldwin, Vice President of Boston Gas told Dean Gagnon,

I've been in touch with Jim Kelso (Executive Vice President of the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce) who had a lengthy discussion with John Ryan and others and has been keeping me informed of events. It seems that there is still some confusion within the University...As I understand it, it was left that Ryan would develop with the Board, a clear statement of just what it is the University wants and where they want it and I have suggested to Eli Goldston (Chairman of the Board of Boston Gas and a Director of the First National Bank of Boston) that, until that rather basic matter is cleared up, we can't really proceed in a supporting role. 8.

It is clear that the faculty leadership was working closely with local business leaders and the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce on the revised proposal for a smaller Copley site. In a May 3 letter to James Kelso, Executive Director of the Chamber, H. Brown Baldwin stated that he had been in touch with Dean Gagnon relative to the new proposal and that the campus administration and a majority of the trustees were definitely ready and willing to move forward on the proposal. Gagnon had told him that he hoped to set up a meeting with Hale Champion to discuss the plan and had left a copy of the plan with Kelso to be shared with various leaders in the business community. 9.

Opposition by Back Bay Business and Community Leaders

Erwin Canham, President of the Back Bay Federation for Community Development, senior editor of the Christian Science Monitor newspaper, and moderator of a televised weekly panel discussion by local newspaper editors on current events entitled "Starring The Editors" had become deeply concerned over the site selection issue. Canham sent a letter on May 6, 1968 to Joseph Healey in which he stated that the community objections made so strongly against the Copley Square site also applied to the Park Square - South Cove site as well. Canham asked for an opportunity for community input stating,

Since last Summer, the Back Bay leadership and civic organizations have remained silent and patient on this matter, even while administrators, faculty, and students of the University were conducting public relations, mailing and lobbying campaigns for the Copley Square site. We waited until the time when the University would consult us and divulge their plans. However this did not happen. We would hope in the present situation that you would be willing to meet with leaders of the Back Bay at the earliest possible date to discuss all aspects of this subject. 10.

In a response to Canham, Healey stated that a majority, but not all of the trustees had concurred in a decision to attempt to locate the new campus as close as feasible to the core city area and that,

They have accepted as a viable educational philosophy the concept that the modern urban university should be related in fact to the economic, cultural and social life of the inner city. This view is shared by the overwhelming majority of the faculty and students at UMass-Boston who have strongly favored a core city permanent site. 11.

Healey stated that the trustees had attempted to cooperate with Mayor Collins and Mayor White and the BRA. He added that the trustees had now begun to discuss a much smaller 14 acre site over the turnpike interchange which would accomodate not more than 15,000 students. The site's feasibility had been approved by Sasaki and Associates and had been reviewed by D. Patrick Moynihan and David Riesman of the Harvard-MIT Joint Center of Urban Studies who had expressed the view that this new proposal would be their preferred site for an urban state university in Boston. The plan was then submitted to Hale Champion of the BRA and his staff for review and they asked for further study of such things as architectural concepts, traffic patterns and transportation facilities. ¹². Healey stated that,

During this period I and other members of the Board talked with a number of the leaders of the Boston business community about the modified air rights proposal. Much of the reaction was unfavorable. The strong opposition to the plan of the various associations in the Back Bay was well known and recognized. On March 21, 1968 the trustees were notified that the air rights location was not acceptable to the city administration. At the meeting on March 22, 1968 the trustees dropped this site from active consideration. ¹³.

Healey said that the University was now limiting its consideration to Columbia Point, the North Station area, Fenway Park, which had been suggested by Speaker Quinn, the Watertown Arsenal, and the South Cove redevelopment area adjacent to Park Square. He said that conversations were still going on with the BRA and the Chamber of Commerce

about the South Cove area and that the trustees would welcome comment from Canham and others in the Back Bay Associations although they did not realize in beginning these discussions that there would be strong interest from these groups in the South Cove area. ¹⁴.

A Final Proposal to Scrap the Boston Campus in Favor of Boston State College

As he announced his retirement in late May, Dr. Looney, president of Boston State College suggested that a "solution to the chaotic condition of higher education in the Boston area" could be reached through the merger of Boston State College, The Massachusetts College of Art and the Boston Campus of the University of Massachusetts into a new state university, autonomous and separate from the University of Massachusetts, designed to serve 20,000 commuting students in the Boston area. He pointed out that money was being wasted through the provision of three separate libraries and other facilities and suggested that the new university be built on the present site of Boston State College augmented through the purchase of 10 to 15 more adjacent acres along Huntington Avenue. Responding to Looney's suggestion in an editorial the Boston Globe noted that the standards and purposes of the three institutions were different but suggested that it might possibly be a good idea for them to share facilities even if they didn't merge. ¹⁵.

Reconsideration of a North Station Area Site

On June 28 the trustee Building and Grounds Committee met with Charles Hilgenhurst of the BRA and it was agreed to request the BRA in co-operation with Sasaki and Associates to again review the feasibility of the North Station area. Hilgenhurst and representatives of the Chamber of Commerce stated that they would support the University on this site provided that it stayed north of the commercial stores in this area. 16.

In a final letter to Lederle on July 30, 1968 John Ryan summed up his frustration as chancellor with the site selection problem. Ryan noted that in December, 1965 he had presented a paper at an informal meeting of the trustees listing the question of a permanent site as his first priority and a decision which could be made by April of 1966. He stated that he was now convinced that the Copley Square site was not available and that the site in Boston most nearly meeting criteria was Columbia Point. Ryan stated,

This is not a recent conclusion, and should not come as a surprise to anyone...Nothing has happened to change any of the facts which applied in October, 1967. Copley Square vicinity is not available; Park Square vicinity is not available; Highland Park is out of the question. 17.

He concluded that although the North Station site was adequate in terms of size it was also congested, noisy and

unsightly and did not offer the potential for an ultimately beautiful setting which was present at Columbia Point and ended by suggesting to Lederle that it was of critical importance that an immediate decision be reached on one of these two sites. 18.

In a similar letter to Joseph Healey dated August 8, 1968, Ryan made the same points, stated his preference for Columbia Point, and recommended that a choice of either North Station or Columbia Point be made as soon as possible. 19.

Appointment of a New Chancellor for the Boston Campus

The appointment of Dr. Francis L. Broderick, former dean of Lawrence and Downer Colleges at Lawrence University in Appleton, Wisconsin, was announced in the Boston Globe on August 18. The Globe noted that,

Broderick appears to be the superman needed to save the struggling urban experiment from a city that has no space, a state that has no money, and a jealous academic community already suffering from too much competition and too little support. 20.

In an August 20 letter to the trustee Buildings and Grounds Committee the Chairman of the Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges stated that he had noticed reports in the press of the University's possible interest in the North Station site and since the Community Colleges were planning a new community college nearby at the site of the old state prison in Charlestown, he could foresee,

"infinite possibilities for collaboration between our two institutions" and hoped that these possibilities would be a favorable factor in the University's consideration of the site. 21.

Description of the North Station Site

The North Station site had been passed over by the consultants and the Buildings and Grounds Committee in prior reviews. It was a flat site consisting of old railroad yards directly adjacent to the northeastern edge of the downtown commercial district. It consisted of 15 acres directly behind North Station and the Boston Garden sports arena and another 60 acre tract beyond this area and across the Charles River which was presently in use as a railroad yard. No information had been developed on availability, exact ownership, the required timing for acquisition, or acquisition costs. The area offered an in-town location with convenient access to highway and public transportation which could be developed with virtually no requirement for dislocation of residents and businesses. The site had been previously passed over because of uncertainty about when it would cease operating as an active railroad yard, the fact that much of the land was on filled tidal flats which might necessitate higher construction costs, and the "visually overpowering" existing and proposed elevated highway structures which would both surround and physically divide the site. Further

complications would be caused by the fact that the site was located in three different cities and might be subject to complicated regulations concerning tidelands leasing. 22.

Opposition to the North Station Site

Up to this point no one appears to have seriously considered the possible negative impact of a campus located in the North Station area on the operation of the adjacent Boston Garden sports arena. By early September, officials at Boston Garden were expressing grave concern over the impact of over 15,000 day and night students on the already congested public transportation system which was the life blood of their business.

In the September 6, 1968 edition of The Herald Traveller, sports writer, Al Hirshberg predicted that anything as big as the new campus of the University of Massachusetts would strangle the Boston Garden with "the greatgrandfather of all traffic jams, with students, faculty and commuters getting into the way of sports followers. Hirshberg quoted Boston Garden Chairman Weston Adams as telling him in an interview,

I'm Boston, My father was Boston. My roots and my family life are Boston. There's nothing in the world would make us move the Bruins away from Boston if we didn't have to. But if this thing goes through we'd have to. With a university here we'd die. I don't know what brilliant mind conceived this area as a university site, but I can't think of a worse one. 23.

The Boston Globe for Friday, September 6 reported that the mayor was prepared to, "do everything possible to prevent a UMass-Boston campus from swallowing the Boston Garden." White was quoted as stating,

The city can fight a location decision but actually it is up to the state. Back in my first days as mayor I spent 4 1/2 hours with UMass. President John Lederle discussing the problem. The city would like to be able to provide a location for an urban institution but we have a real land use problem. This has hampered us both with the stadium project and the UMass intown campus. One of the last things I want to happen is to have one desirable addition to the city cancel out an existing healthy situation. 24.

The University Responds to Opposition

The Globe quoted a spokesperson for President Lederle as stating that no decision had been made on the North Station site and that the University was giving it reconsideration only because Mayor White, the BRA, and the Boston Chamber of Commerce has asked them to reconsider it. The same University spokesperson is quoted as saying that the North Station reaction was becoming a repetition of the Coply Square controversy and stating, "We look at an area and the people in the area immediately get up in arms."

The same edition published a letter by Dean Paul Gagnon answering critics of the North Station plan. Gagnon stated that the University had no intention of taking Boston Garden and instead would be improving the situation in the area by working to improve public transportation and expanded public parking garages. Gagnon went on to castigate Adams for his public reactions,

I am sorry to see him (Weston Adams) and others join those Boston business and political spokesmen who do not seem to know what a public municipal university means to a city in the 20th century. They can think only of segregating the university and its students at Columbia Point, out of sight and out of mind. We do not believe in an isolated segregated campus, but in university buildings in a city, for city people of all ages and incomes easily reached on foot or public transit at all hours of the day. They should meet and learn together on common ground in the middle of the city they are going to live in, work in, and take pride in after they graduate. 25.

Reaction By The Legislature Leadership

The publicity over opposition to the North Station site and the prospect of additional serious delay and uncertainty regarding a site, prompted strong reaction from some of the legislative leadership. House Speaker Robert Quinn, representing the districts of South Boston and Dorchester, sent President Lederle a telegram on September 9 expressing his personal opposition to the North Station site and recommending Columbia Point as the appropriate site since it offered "a tremendous future for our young people and their education". He warned that, "continued inaction will prompt legislation naming Columbia Point as the site." 26.

Speaker Quinn emerged from a private meeting with Governor Volpe on September 10 and told reporters of an ultimatum he had given the University trustees through the governor, "The trustees have had enough time to select a site. Personally, I believe they should settle on the Columbia Point proposal." He said that the governor had

told him that the trustees had the most information on the subject and that he was going to rely on their judgement on the matter. 27.

Quinn followed this news report up with a letter to Lederle on September 11 stating that because of the publicity concerning his telegram he felt compelled to write again to clarify his position. He reminded the president that he had always taken the position that the site selection was a matter to be decided by the trustees but that now when , "choices are narrowing and the time for action is fast slipping by", he felt that the advantages of Columbia Point far outweighed the disadvantages which could be eliminated with imaginative planning. Quinn closed with the statement,

As one who has many times expressed his willingness to you to wage your fights in the political arena, I urge you to end the inaction and indecision and settle upon the Columbia Point site. 28.

Professor James Ryan sent the trustees a letter on September 11 on behalf of the Executive Committee of the Faculty Senate asking that the trustees postpone a decision on a site until the new chancellor had time to complete a review of alternative sites with the faculty. Responding to the publicity surrounding Quinn's telegram, they stated,

We also want to express our full support for the trustees in their efforts to choose a site because of its positive advantages for the educational and urban goals of the University of Massachusetts at Boston. We hope that recent partisan, well-publicized attempts to influence the trustees will not be allowed to affect this irrevocable decision. 29.

The unfavorable reaction continued to Quinn's move. In an editorial entitled, "The Dictates of the Speaker", broadcast on September 13, the management of Boston Radio Station WEEI warned that Quinn's,

inordinate pressure on the trustees is the opening wedge to what we consider to be blatant and uncalled-for legislative interference in the affairs of the state university. The last thing we need is for the University of Massachusetts to become a political football in the legislature. Beyond that, there's the incredible amount of presumption in Speaker Quinn's demands. Is our legislature so docile that on the demands of its Speaker it will automatically mandate the University Trustees to locate the campus just where he wants it? 30.

In mid-September the Salem Evening News published an interview with Senate Majority Leader, Kevin Harrington in which he advanced a new explanation for the long delay in the site selection for the Boston campus. According to Harrington,

The University doesn't want a Boston branch. It's never wanted one. It wants everything centered in Amherst. History has shown that whenever you have a geographical split, eventually you're going to have a power split. The university doesn't want that. They're afraid of that. 31.

Harrington stated that Chancellor Ryan had resigned once he began to recognize this attitude on the part of the Lederle administration and saw the Boston campus operating budget requests being cut back by Lederle year after year. Harrington said that the University of Massachusetts had been compelled by circumstances to establish a Boston branch when the Willis-Harrington Commission began drafting a blueprint for the state's expansion in higher education.

The clause which concerned the University was that which would have prevented any state institution from undertaking an expansion program without prior approval of the new Board of Higher Education and its chancellor. Since the University of Massachusetts had no way of knowing whether the balance of power on this new board would tilt toward UMass or the state college system, it decided to act on a Boston campus before the Willis-Harrington Commission completed its work. Now, by Harrington's estimation, the University had effective control through the strong support of a majority of the members of on the new Board of Higher education and could block expansion by the state colleges. As a result they were intentionally proposing sites which were, "calculated to fail under the weight of opposition." The Copley Square and North Station proposals were suggested in full knowledge that they would be opposed and were about to suggest Columbia Point after learning from test borings that the site was virtually unbuildable. Harrington also expressed concern about the changing power dynamics between the University of Massachusetts and the state college system. He claimed that since the University was now in a position to push an expansion of its own budget and cut the state college system to the bone, the legislature would have to intervene on the part of the state college system. He would fight for Salem State College, House Speaker Quinn for Boston State, House Ways and Means Chairman, Anthony Scibelli of Springfield for

Westfield State College, and Senate Ways and Means Chairman James Burke of Brockton for Bridgewater State College. The legislative leadership would provide this support through increasing the state college budgets but not by cutting the University's budget. 32.

This interview was so disturbing to President Lederle that he wrote to John Ryan, now a vice president at Indiana University, stating,

Wendell Woodman is bad enough, but couple him with Kevin Harrington and it becomes really vicious. I would appreciate it if you could see your way clear to write Kevin saying you have seen the article and that there is no truth to the claim that you quit because I did not support you and the Boston campus. Indeed, it would be useful if you could go further and state that I was always a strong and dedicated supporter of rapid and vigorous development of the Boston Campus. 33.

Ryan wrote to Harrington on October 15 stating

For the record, I did not resign because I learned of sabotage by 'Amherst' of the Boston campus requests. I do not believe any such sabotage ever occurred in my years of service. You are quite right to blow the whistle on the unconscionable budgetary neglect of the Boston students, but I am sure you want to put the blame where it belongs. Year in and year out, since 1965, I prepared the most prudent and frugal budget possible for a nascent University, and year in year out my experience would be the same: the President would approve it, the trustees would adopt it, the Board of Education would endorse it, and the Governor, on the advice, presumably, of his budget 'experts', would slash it 40%, 30%, 25%. Every year, Boston students were saved from academic disaster by the General Court through supplemental appropriations and once by actually increasing the executive request. 34.

The Final Effort By Faculty And Student Leaders to Secure
A Core City Location

On October 3 a special meeting of the Committee on Buildings and Grounds was called at the Sheraton Plaza Hotel for October 14 to brief state and city leadership on the final stages of the site selection process. In a letter inviting Governor Volpe to this meeting, Trustee Chairman Boyden described it as, "...a private briefing session prior to expected Board action later that day on selection of a permanent site...". 35.

The Faculty Request Delay on a Decision

On the same day, October 3, the faculty of the Boston campus met with President Lederle, Trustees Healey, Hagis and Crowley and representatives of Sasaki in a three hour session to review the site selection process to date. On October 8 the faculty met again and passed a resolution stating their continuing commitment to a core site and asking the trustees to delay a final decision for one month so that they could offer other proposals. They also voted to create two ad-hoc committees one on "The Goals of An Urban University Education" which would, "prepare position papers on the cultural, social and intellectual goals and advantages of an urban university education" and "begin a meaningful dialogue with the trustees on the nature of these goals and advantages" and a committee on "Multiple Use

structures" which would "report on the legal, architectural, and economic feasibility and advantages of multiple-use structures for UMB in the core area" and "develop a sketch, plan or model of at least one university structure designed for multiple uses." A notice of these votes was mailed to President Lederle and the members of the Board of Trustees on October 9. ³⁶.

Meanwhile Trustee Vice Chairman Healey, acting for Chairman Boyden, contacted several of the other trustees during the first week of October and together they decided that no postponement on a decision was warranted. He met informally with Mayor White and Chancellor Broderick on October 9 to discuss the site and to inform them of the trustees' decision to go ahead with Columbia Point. ³⁷.

An article in the Boston Globe for October 10 indicated that the Trustee Building and Grounds Committees had reached a decision on Columbia Point during a meeting in Mayor White's office the day before and that no further delay would be granted. According to this report it was expected that the site would be approved at a trustee meeting later in October. ³⁸.

In an editorial on October 11 the Globe gave warm approval to the Columbia Point decision stating that it was simply not practical to build in Copley Square or at North Station because of the loss of tax revenues involved.

The Boston faculty met again on October 11 and voted to send the trustees a telegram expressing their shock at

the apparent failure of the trustees to honor their request for a delay and repeating their request for such a delay. 40.

Student And Faculty Demonstration At The Statehouse

As the faculty were meeting, a group of students estimated at 2500 staged a mass rally in front of the campus building at 100 Arlington Street near Park Square to voice strong support for an intown, core city site and to condemn the decision to select Columbia Point. The students then marched across the downtown section to the capital building on Beacon Hill where they resumed their rally while one student attempted to fasten a copy of their demands to the door of the State House. Faculty leaders, including Dean Gagnon, marched with the students and addressed the group calling on the trustees to grant a delay so that further study could take place. 41.

In a stirring speech on the steps of the statehouse, Dean Gagnon repeated once again the arguments for an in-town site and then concluded by stating,

I don't have time to repeat all of our arguments for an intown site but it has always been cheaper, and better, to build an efficient, no-frills city university in a few high-rise buildings. And we have always been ready to make payments in lieu of taxes to the City. All we need are 10-12 acres: Hunter does it. University of London does it. Brooklyn does it--and we are already doing it with 3,500 students in less than two acres of space! We do not need more. We do not want more. We are not a Boston University, or a Northeastern University! we would and are ready to sign a solemn covenant with our surrounding community, and share equal power with them on a governing board. But we need time. I myself

cannot yet believe that the political business and religious leaders of Boston will not try again to do for their university, what the leaders of New York City, Chicago, St. Louis, San Francisco, New Orleans, Philadelphia, and even Washington D.C. have done for theirs--find 10 or 12 acres for a core city site.... In closing, then, I would say that this is not a day for denunciation, or even a day for presenting all the arguments to convince people, but rather a day in which we ask for a decent amount of time to do what we feel still remains to be done. I do not see but that fair-minded men will support us in this effort. ⁴².

The Trustees Meet to Consider Columbia Point

October 14 would be a full and busy day for the board of trustees. In the morning the Trustee Buildings and Grounds Committee met privately with a group of student and faculty leaders. This was followed by a full open meeting of the Trustee Building and Grounds Committee followed in the afternoon by a full meeting of the board of trustees.

By the time of their meeting the trustees had reason for concern. Over the weekend student groups had sent telegrams to each of the trustees demanding a decision in favor of an in-town site and told reporters that they planned to attend the meeting in force on Monday to try to delay the selection of Columbia Point. About 2000 students attended the meeting. As they entered the meeting, however, they were admonished not to demonstrate. Globe reporter, Nina McCain described student leader Steven Berkowitz as standing at the door urging students, "No matter what decision is made please don't react violently." The

Trustee Building and Grounds Committee met privately with student and faculty leaders earlier in the day to listen to their opinions. Despite some occasional loud applause at the open meeting, the student attendees did nothing to disrupt the meeting. 43.

Governor Volpe attended the trustee meeting on October 14 along with House Speaker Quinn and personal representatives of Mayor White and the Senate President. During this period of time it was a common practice for Trustee Chairman Boyden to ask Vice Chairman Healy to preside at meetings and perform other duties of the chair. Vice Chairman Healey addressed the meeting stating that the meeting had been called on the assumption that the trustees were now prepared to vote in favor of Columbia Point and so the governor, mayor and other legislative leaders had been called to provide them with a full briefing on the site.

Mr. Sasaki of Sasaki, Dawson, DeMay Associates presented an in depth review of the long search process and the reasons why the Columbia Point site had been selected. 44,

Description and Relative Advantages of Columbia Point

The Columbia Point site was located in the extreme northeastern portion of the Dorchester section of Boston on a peninsula extending out into Boston Harbor. The western end of the peninsula was occupied by a public housing

project while the eastern end contained a former city dump which was now closed. The area provided panoramic views of the harbor and harbor islands. The actual site proposed for location of the campus consisted of approximately 100 acres of open undeveloped land resting on top of fill resulting from 70 to 80 years of trash, coal cinder and rubble disposal. There was significant potential for the development of the area's shorelines for scenic and recreational use by the general public which would provide an important opportunity for positive contact with the local community. The site was located along the direct air access routes into Boston's Logan Airport. Building profiles would have to remain relatively low and allowance made for some insulation from aircraft noise. This noise factor, however, was not viewed as being any worse than the traffic noise present at any of the downtown sites.

There were no people, businesses or ongoing public uses which would be displaced. Construction could begin almost immediately. Most of the land was owned by the city of Boston. There would be a loss of only \$300,000 in assessed valuation from the city's tax base from the one section which was in private hands.

Columbia Point offered the best automobile access of any of the core sites which had been considered. Most people would be coming to the site from the north, away from the city, and thus would not be caught in the daily

morning rush hour traffic congestion. Local stations on the MTA rapid transit system were only a eight minute ride from the downtown commercial district. Although these stations were over three quarters of a mile from the site a shuttle bus system from the campus to the rapid transit line could greatly reduce the negative impact of this limitation.

The site possessed certain of the environmental qualities of the suburban sites. At the same time it was closer to the urban core than any other site then available. The large amount of land area available and relative ease of access to the urban core were compelling assests in land scarce Boston. It was the one remaining potential site presenting the best combination of favorable factors when measured against the original site selection criteria. 45.

In the discussion which followed, Speaker Quinn indicated that the decision on a site was up to the trustees and that he would support any choice they made. He said that he had originally favored a core city location but thought that this was now impossible and that Columbia Point would be the next best thing. Quinn noted that the Columbia Point site would not displace any housing or industry and would not eliminate any of the city's present tax base and represented a far more attractive site than the North Station area. He expressed his full support of

the choice of Columbia Point and urged them to ignore the requests being made by the faculty and students for a thirty day delay and to take quick decisive action instead since the search had now dragged on for four years. Other legislators present expressed support for Quinn's position.

After brief discussion the trustee subcommittee voted to recommend the rejection of the North Station site. In a second vote they gave tacit approval to the request for a 30 day delay by voting to recommend to the full board that Columbia Point be the only site under active consideration and that a final decision be made on this location at the next trustee meeting on November 22.

At the meeting of the full board of trustees which followed, Sasaki made the same presentation on the case for selection of Columbia Point. The trustees then voted to formally reject North Station and then voted to accept Columbia Point as the only site under active consideration with a final decision to be made at their next meeting. In closing the meeting Vice Chairman Healy advised the faculty and students in attendance that, "This Board does not see any other viable alternative than Columbia Point, but, we are willing to listen." The faculty and students had won a one month delay. 46.

On October 21 Quinn spoke at UMB and stated that any decision on a final site location made by the trustees would receive the full support of the Democrats in the House and Senate. The speaker voiced support for the

Columbia Point site since an "ideal" in town site has not been located. 47.

On November 12, 1968 in an interview with the Mass Media, Professor H.P. Mahon of the Physics department, and a member of the in Town Site Committee, warned that because of an emotional commitment to an in town site, some people on campus had blinded themselves to the problems which a scattered in-town site might entail. 48.

The Scattered Site Proposal

On November 15, Chancellor Broderick presented a proposal to the Trustee Buildings and Grounds subcommittee for a scattered site, in town space proposal. He proposed that the new campus be located in three "close but separate" sites within the core city,

Park Square: The Campus would retain its present location at 200 Arlington Street and search for other rented space in adjacent buildings which would be shared with other users such as restaurants, offices for businesses and retail stores.

South End: The University would develop 1,500,000 square feet of usable space within an urban renewal district located approximately $\frac{1}{4}$ mile from the Park Square site. Most space would be in buildings shared with business firms and light industry, although the campus would also occupy five or six acres devoted exclusively to the use of the university. None of the current residents of the area would be displaced.

Air Space: The University would share space in a variety of multiple use buildings to be built on approximately 10 acres of "air rights" over the depressed portion of the Massachusetts Turnpike located approximately three blocks south of the Park Square location.

As enrollments continued to grow in future decades the university might decide to branch out further along the public transportation lines into such core city locations as South Station, the "hinge block" at the intersection of Tremont and Boylston Streets, the Quincy Market area behind the government center, the banking district, and the air rights over rail yards behind North Station.

Broderick's report presented three central concepts which guided the proposal,

UMass/Boston created as an urban university alert to the needs of the late 20th century, needs to plunge itself into the midst of the city, into the variety, the vigor, the restless movement that make our society primarily urban.,...The University is not a haven for withdrawal, but a center for learning, a meeting place, a forum, that operates in the middle of things, encouraging integration, association, and mutual education among students, faculty, and all people of the city.

The desire to add to, not subtract from, the city ...add to the cultural and educational resources of the city without causing any loss to the city - no loss of tax revenues, no loss of commercial development, no loss of actual or potential housing ...We are not asking the city to deprive itself of a site that now produces revenue, or of a large acreage that might produce revenue in the future...We want to avoid moving residents who want to remain, for we want the university to be threaded through and around the life of the city.

The need to create a physical setting that will allow the university to adapt to Innovation in education. The university will change as it grows - perhaps even as much as Boston has changed in the last dozen years - because society will change... Space that blends with the city, that is something other than an urban architectural monument to current notions of education, will be adaptable... academic units of 2,200 students allow change to occur as needs are perceived. A smaller administrative unit can experiment with new programs, even at risk of failure, without endangering the whole university. Smaller units, with their greater intimacy, serve another purpose as well - they remind the whole academic community that no matter how large the university may grow, it may not lose sight of its central responsibility to the individual students... 49.

Following the meeting, Trustee Healey told reporters that he saw a basic conflict in educational philosophy between those who felt that an urban university ought to be woven into the life of a city and those who felt it should be a separate integrated whole located in one place. He added, however, that that it was still possible that the trustees might decide to further pursue the scattered site concept. 50.

Community Support for the Scattered Site Proposal

At this point various other groups within the community, responding to lobbying efforts from the student groups at the Boston Campus, contacted the trustees on behalf of the scattered site proposal. The board of directors of the 25,000 member University of Massachusetts Alumni association sent a letter to the trustees stating that they would view the choice of Columbia Point with

"total disapprobation" and charging that the "political and mercantile arguments favoring the location are specious". They asked the trustees to give serious consideration to the scattered site proposal. 51.

Boston's Roman Catholic Archbishop, Richard Cardinal Cushing decided to take a eleventh hour stand on the issue. In a letter to President Lederle dated October 16, the cardinal offered the university use of the diocese's cathedral located in the South End area of Boston along with other land and buildings nearby. Cushing stated that he wished to add his voice,

to those who feel the university should be close to the heart of the city. It should not be off in the suburbs or on the dreary acres of Columbia Point, but in the heart of things where the life of the city and the life of the university can serve each other. I cannot imagine a less desirable site for a large university than the unused acres at Columbia Point. 52.

Dolores Mitchell, chairperson of the Massachusetts Chapter of the Americans for Democratic Action contacted the trustees on behalf of the ADA urging them to postpone action. 53.

Opposition By President Lederle

President Lederle was unimpressed with the scattered site approach. In recalling the final stages of the site selection controversy he stated,

Well, before he started, the very day that he took over, I said, 'Frank, this is one to stay out of. You cannot win on this. You haven't been around long

enough. Whichever way you jump you're going to alienate the other half.'...But Broderick didn't get the message, and at the final meeting for the decision of the site he came up with what I call the 'scatteration theory' of a university....The Board bought my concept--and I hated to do this at the very first public meeting where Broderick was taking the position--namely, that a university requires a certain critical mass. The very nature of a university is the bringing together of people from various professions, from the various disciplines; they rub off on each other. If you scatter them around, you don't have enough in one place, you've got all the problems of the wear and tear of going back and forth. You're missing the point of what a university is I said, 'It's all right to build community colleges this way. It's all right to scatter state colleges with a limited mandate that way, but a university by its very nature is a conglomerate and requires a certain critical mass.' 54.

The Final Decision For Columbia Point

The major item on the agenda at the trustee meeting on November 22 was a final decision on the location of the permanent site. First to speak was Trustee Haigis, Chairman of the Committee on Buildings and Grounds. Haigis announced that after three years of discussion, the review of over fifty different possible sites, and careful review in recent weeks of the latest proposal for multi-use structures on scattered sites the Committee was now recommending Columbia Point. Trustee Gordon, a prominent Boston attorney, spoke for the minority on the Committee opposed to Columbia Point. He noted possible legal problems with the scattered site proposal as it was presently formulated but suggested that they were not insurmountable given enough time and argued,.

This new, extended perimeter concept means breaking out of the 'fortress concept' rejecting the

physical boundaries that represent the University as a closed system...One of my reasons for dissenting is that while we can establish what could be a good to possibly a great university at Columbia Point, we are probably talking about something that may already be obsolete. I would be remiss if five to ten years from now, with a commitment of taxpayers dollars there, we find the Cleveland States and others of this country doing that which Boston and Massachusetts did not dare to do....Again, I as a dissenter to this report do not negate the possibility that Columbia Point can become a good, if not a great urban university, but it will take a great deal more imagination and money and interest on the part of people who show no interest in this university to make this a good to great urban university. It seemingly is easier to locate an incinerator in the city of Boston than it is to locate an educational institution. 55.

Chancellor Broderick then presented essentially the same proposal which he offered at the previous meeting of the Buildings and Grounds Committee. He was assisted in this presentation by two representatives of the Ford Foundation, Flansburgh and Clinchy, who had helped Broderick, Gagnon and the members of the faculty in preparing the proposal. In closing Broderick called attention to the fact that the faculty had voted the previous evening indicating that Columbia Point was unacceptable for the type of university being described in this "new, radical, dynamic, 'alternative'" and noted that students and alumni had also expressed their opposition to Columbia Point. The chancellor asked for a further delay until January 30, 1969 so that the new concept could be further explored. 56.

Professor James Ryan expressed the strong opposition of "95-98%" of the faculty to Columbia Point. Student

leader, Stephen Berkowitz then expressed the dissatisfaction of the student body with what he described as a lack of consideration by politicians and the Board of Trustees. He said that in the event of a Columbia Point decision the students would carry the fight to the Legislature and an effort would also be made to obtain a separate board of trustees for the Boston campus made up of persons from many diverse areas in greater Boston and exclude residents of Western Massachusetts. Daniel Angert, a representative of the Students for a Democratic Society then read a long and angry statement condemning the trustees for their choice of Columbia Point. 57.

President Lederle spoke against Broderick's proposal stating that if major facilities were separated physically it would result in the destruction of the very concept of a university which needs an internal cohesion and an identity and integrity as a university and a community of scholars. Such a community could not be built under the "splintering concept." He also pointed out that, instead of solving relations with the city, the concept of continuous and repeated movement to multiple sites would aggravate relations because,

On the multiple campus basis, you go through continual travail, moving from one parcel to another. In lieu of tax problems multiply for a city with existing serious tax problems. Inevitable attempts to enlarge sites would lead to continual troubles with neighbors every time the University needed to move. 58.

Vice Chairman Healy then concluded the debate stating that, along with President Lederle, he found the scattered site concept unacceptable. He spoke of the need to secure Columbia Point, the only large piece of land adjacent to the city which was still available, as soon as possible and of his personal conviction that a truly great university could be build at the site. In the roll call vote which followed fourteen trustees voted in favor of the immediate selection of Columbia Point and four voted against. 59.

Reaction By Faculty and Students

On November 26, 1968 the angry Intown Site Coalition issued a statement saying that their priorities now will be to send delegations of students and faculty to discuss the negative features of the Columbia Point site with the legislature, to work to change the charter of the University of Massachusetts to allow for more trustees from Greater Boston, and to organize a new "Friends of U.Mass.-Boston" support group. 60. At a special meeting on campus on December 2, 1968 Chancellor Broderick told faculty and students that he now accepted the choice by the trustees of Columbia Point and that he would work to make the new site a success. 61.

Lederle later summed up the search as follows,

Eventually, it became clear that no feasible site in downtown Boston and in the highly built up area was going to be available. We also were under the gun to make a final decision. After all, years had elapsed,

and we were still fiddling around on site. I attribute this primarily to the tenacious, continued, push by Gagnon and a few faculty members. I never was certain that it was as many as 50%, by the way, but a few faculty members and Gagnon kept insisting it must be downtown. It became apparent to me and many others that we weren't going to get a downtown site. I must say also that faculty are very naive. 62.

The long search process and debate was over. It was now time for the University to turn its attention to the specific plans for construction of the new campus facility and to begin to address the substantial concerns which were beginning to be expressed by representatives of the communities immediately adjacent to the Columbia Point site.

CHAPTER VIII.

DORCHESTER/SOUTH BOSTON COMMUNITY RELATIONS FOLLOWING THE SELECTION OF COLUMBIA POINT

Now that the University trustees and administration had made a final decision on a permanent site for the new campus, they entered a new phase of community relations. Interaction with the neighborhoods adjacent to the Columbia Point site would become of critical importance. The residents surrounding Columbia Point had become deeply concerned regarding the possible negative impact of the new campus. To some extent their concerns are common to any urban residential neighborhood faced suddenly with the incursion of a college campus or research center of major proportions. Their concerns are very well stated in the January 1973 Report of the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force, a group established to act as liason between the community and the University. Their words are included here in order to provide a context to the chapter which follows.

The University buildings are huge, dwarfing the housing development, and they loom larger day by day as construction progresses. The communities began to sense the size of the University community that would suddenly move in among them. How many people would fill the buildings? Where would they come from and how would they get there?...The newspapers have been full of the sad statistics of low income families displaced from their homes by landlords who could charge groups of students twice and three times the previous rent. The housing shortage in the Boston area has been well documented over the years, and the greater purchasing power of students and faculty have created increasingly critical shortages of decent housing for low and moderate income residents

wherever the students and the faculty have chosen to live. The people of Dorchester are afraid that they are next in this sequence. So are the people of the Columbia Point Housing Project development. Both fear that they will be displaced to make way for students. 1.

This chapter continues the case study by providing a narrative of the key events which occurred during the period 1969-1974, relative to Boston Campus/community relations, as final detailed planning and construction of the new campus took place at Columbia Point. This review reveals the important role which local community relations played in shaping major long range policy decisions regarding the new campus. It also reveals significant differences in the approach to local community relations adopted by the new administration of President Robert Wood.

Reaction of Community Leaders Following the Selection of Columbia Point

Local community groups began to express concerns almost immediately following the selection of Columbia Point. In mid-May of 1969, mimeographed flyers were distributed among the residents of the Columbia Point Housing project warning that the University would soon move to acquire all of the public housing on the peninsula for student dormitories. At a meeting of the Boston Housing Authority, the planning director of the Boston Campus, Frank O'Brien, attempted to calm these fears by stating that the University had absolutely no interest in acquiring any of the housing. 2.

On March 11, 1970 a news conference was held at the statehouse to unveil plans for the construction of the campus at Columbia Point. An address was made by both Chancellor Broderick and Governor Sargent. A group of Columbia Point residents suddenly interrupted the conference to protest the fact that, to date, they had not been adequately consulted by the University. 3.

The University Establishes a Community Liaison Office

By April the situation had improved considerably as the result of a decision by the University to hire a community liaison person to work with the residents of Columbia Point. Representatives of Governor Sargent's office, the University, local labor unions and contractors had been meeting to draft contract clauses that would offer Columbia Point residents first preference on construction jobs and would include minority hiring and training programs. Mrs. Ann Stokes, who had lived in the project with her ten children for several years and who was now the executive director of the Columbia Point Health Association told a Boston Globe reporter,

I believe the UMass people are sincere. They have already promised us the first 100 construction jobs and we're talking about jobs for our people when the University starts functioning. 4.

Community Demonstrations at the New Campus

By late July, 1970, actions taken by the construction contractors at the site caused residents of the housing project to decide to confront the University once again. Approximately 40 residents formed a human chain to halt trucks which had been filling the lagoon in front of the site with refuse and fill from the construction project. The University quickly agreed to suspend the dumping and set up a mechanism whereby the residents could provide input on design of further development of the lagoon. 5.

Dissatisfied with the lack of progress on this agreement, the residents returned again on August 17 and blocked the access road to the site for four hours while representatives hammered out an agreement with University spokespersons which allowed the continued filling of the lagoon on the eastern end of the site in exchange for a promise that a new lagoon would be constructed on the northeast portion of the site which would include boat marinas, stores, a restaurant and recreational areas. Vice Chancellor Roy Hamilton warned the residents, however, that a final decision on the agreement was the prerogative of the trustees. 6.

The New Wood Administration Responds to the Community

At a meeting on September 14, President Wood warned the trustees that there was an inevitable conflict between a concern with building a campus to provide "desperately needed education" for young people in the state as a whole and a concern with "being a good neighbor" to the Columbia Point residents. He recommended that a task force be established to study how cooperative planning, community consultation, and employment program for local residents could be better integrated into the University's planning process. The trustees unanimously adopted his proposal ⁷.

Robert Wood announced the appointment of a special Committee on the Future University of Massachusetts at his formal inauguration as President of the University on December 9. The committee, a broadly based group of business leaders, students, alumni, and faculty from the University and some prominent education professionals from outside the University, would advise the president and trustees on the nature and direction of the future University of Massachusetts. ⁸.

The University's new vice president for development, L. Edward Lashman, addressed the issue of Dorchester and Columbia Point community relations in a July 26, 1971 memorandum to President Wood. Lashman identified issues which the new campus would have to address in developing

effective relations with the neighboring communities. The quality of life at the Columbia Point Housing Project needed upgrading. The University needed to develop positive ways in which to provide access to jobs and special University services for the residents of Columbia Point's public housing. Lashman warned that all relations with the community should be judged by the standard of how well they contributed to the central purpose of the campus which was to provide university level education to residents of the Boston metropolitan area. He pointed out that,

In order to deal effectively with these issues, the University will have to play varying roles in a number of enterprises, both private and public in character, which are not strictly educational and which are not, in themselves, central to its mission. In many instances the University faculty and staff are not trained nor equipped to carry out such functions. 9.

Lashman recommended that the University attempt to act as a catalyst within the Boston Community to develop support for conversion of the public housing on Columbia Point into a tenant owned and managed cooperative with funding coming from H.U.D. and the major initiative from the Boston Housing Authority. To develop opportunities for common activity between the surrounding communities which he said, "have relatively little in common", and to better respond to their needs and demands, Lashman suggested the creation of a Chapter 180 non-profit corporation governed by a board comprised of campus faculty, students and

administrators, local residents and Greater Boston community and business leaders. The corporation would then seek federal funding to develop and plan use of the campus recreational facilities, expansion of existing community health services, business enterprises employing community residents and serving the needs of the new campus, day care centers and other service centers, limited partnerships with private investors to develop new housing, and other appropriate activities and enterprises. In these efforts Lashman saw the University as an innovator and catalyst for improvement and change but not as the prime actor. The University should bring appropriate groups together and then back away from continuing involvement. 10.

In a report, presented in December, 1971, the Committee on the Future University of Massachusetts spoke of the special obligation of the University to its neighbors in Boston,

It is the Committee's impression, based on meetings with residents of Columbia Point and Dorchester, that the University has not up to now sufficiently involved the residents of these areas in its planning processes. There is much suspicion and mistrust, and people feel they are not being consulted. These feelings must be overcome before the University can succeed in establishing a productive relationship... Adequate high-level staff must be developed to enable policy planning in conjunction with the people of Columbia Point and Dorchester on the full range of issues of mutual concern. The neighborhoods need to know they are dealing with people who can come up with answers to questions. They will not be convinced until the relationship is clear and direct. 11.

The Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force

During the next few years the spirit of Lashman's recommendations, although not all of his specific proposals, would guide the new campus in developing relations with its neighbors. In November of 1971, a coalition of twenty six community action groups in Dorchester joined together as the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force and approached the University to speak jointly about their fears of the impact of the new campus on their neighborhoods. The University agreed to provide \$30,000 for an independent consultant, Justin Gray Associates, to assist the community groups in organising and conducting a study of the impact of the new campus on the demand for housing in the surrounding community.

A three-way agreement was developed and ratified on May 3, 1972 under which the community groups would work with the consultant. While the University would provide the funding to pay the consultant's fees, the community groups would have authority to approve or disapprove payment of specific bills presented by the consultant. This gave the community a considerable amount of control over the scope and direction of the consultant's study. No public funding was involved. The University administration raised the required amount through donations from a group of major Boston business firms such as The Boston Gas Company, The Boston Five Cent Savings Bank, and New England Telephone.

It was agreed that the study would develop a profile of the future student body at the new campus, attempt to identify the impact of these students on the demand for local housing, and develop alternative strategies to provide additional housing for the students if that was deemed necessary to protect existing low and moderate income tenants in the area from losing their rented homes and apartments to more affluent students. The community task force was given the exclusive right to terminate the work of the consultant if they became dissatisfied for any reason. 12.

Contemporary Media Reports Reflect Heightened Local Concern

In the summer of 1972, local concern about the University's impact on housing prompted a major review by Peter Cowan of the Boston Globe. According to Cowan, families renting apartments comprised more than two thirds of the 177,000 residents in the neighborhoods adjacent to Columbia Point. Rumors had been circulating for months among these residents of coming mass-evictions and rent hikes as students and faculty began to arrive and compete for housing. The article reported that even many of the small landlords who might benefit from a boom in demand for apartments were deeply saddened by the thought that the old neighborhoods would be broken up and long time friends forced to move out to the suburbs or other areas of the city.

Rumors of mass evictions to make way for students also circulated at the Columbia Point Housing project. Mary Thompson, assistant manager at the project, stated that most of the residents were skeptical about the intentions of the University. Elderly residents were especially fearful about a takeover by students. Throughout the area there was widespread concern and pessimism about the devastating impact of a massive increase in traffic. 13.

A follow up article by Cowan in August reported that the University was insisting that their impact on local housing would be minimal but repeated a warning from Sam Mullins, president of the Columbia-Savin Hill Civic Association,

Mullins known for his flamboyant assertions, predicts a 50 percent increase over the next three years in the value of homes near the campus. He also foresees acts of vigilante violence directed against students who move into Dorchester and threaten to disrupt the stability of old neighborhoods. 'We'll burn them first,' he says, 'Damn right we will. You know, we'll fight honestly as long as we can and as long as we have to, but if we have to resort to civil disobedience its not beyond our realm.' 14.

Hearings By The Boston City Council

In early October of 1972 the Boston City Council conducted hearings on the impact of the new campus on nearby neighborhoods. Councilman John J. Moakley of South Boston presided at these meetings since he was chair of the special subcommittee established to study the problem. The hearings quickly dissolved into an unpleasant political

debate between Moakley, who was running for the Ninth District's Congressional Seat, and Councilman Patrick F. McDonough, a strong supporter of the incumbent, Congresswoman Louise Day Hicks. McDonough stormed out of the meeting after shouting that Moakley's questions were, "irrelevant and a lot of bull". Fred Pillsbury who was covering the meeting for the Boston Globe agreed in his column that it was obvious that Moakley was using the hearings to promote his candidacy but then asked if this wasn't a legitimate tactic given the enormous impact the new campus was likely to have on the Ninth District. 15.

Margaret Mitchell, appearing at this meeting as spokesperson for the Dorchester- Columbia Point Task Force presented the coalition's purpose and their fears,

We, the residents of Dorchester and of the Columbia Point housing development, are seriously concerned with the impact the opening of the University of Massachusetts' Columbia Point campus will have on the housing resources in our community. We have joined together, homeowners and tenants, poor and not-so-poor, black and white in the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force to try and deal with this impact....There has been little preparation made for our children to go to this university; there has been no preparation made to house or to transport the children of people who do not live close to Columbia Point. Neither in the seven years since the decision was made to move to Columbia Point to see that the transportation and housing needs of students, faculty and staff would be met. We know how they will be met. Students even from Boston, unable to commute in a reasonable time to campus, will move into Dorchester, rents will go up, and long term residents will be forced out. Cars will be parked all over our neighborhood. And our community will bear the main cost of the education of the state's children. 16.

To address these fears the task force demanded that the University make sharp cuts in the projected enrollment for the new campus, expand its recruitment effort in the Boston public school system, develop specialized remedial and advising programs within Boston's high schools to enable more students to qualify for admission, develop a thirteenth year program on campus to assist those who were not fully prepared for college, and consider building student housing on campus through use of the space which would be saved by limiting enrollment. 17.

Fred Pillsbury followed up on the hearings in late October with the comment that the "disruptions" by McDonough and others had led Moakley to postpone further hearings until after the national election in November. Pillsbury closed with the comment,

A major planning effort should have been launched five years ago. Perhaps if the Legislature had been a bit more imaginative that might have occurred. It is too late for that now: the project has gone too far and it is too near completion. All that can be provided is rushed, makeshift planning and belated coordination. But is even that going to come about? 18.

Moakley won the congressional seat in November putting an end to the political career of Louise Day Hicks.

Report Of The Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force

In January of 1973 The Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force presented a formal report to the University. The findings of the surveys conducted by the consultant

revealed the possibility that the worst fears of the community might be realized. It was determined that 40% of UMB students were living away from their parents including 15% who were married. The surveys also suggested that 30% to 35% of the student body planned to seek new housing accommodations closer or more accessible to the new campus once it opened and that the majority of the students in this group would use on campus housing if it became available. It was determined that few if any of the support staff or faculty would change residence. It was determined that, to date, no effective plan had been developed to deal with increased traffic or to provide expanded public transportation. The task force presented several pages of specific detailed proposals and recommendations. They can be summarized as follows:

The constructive relationship between University and community evidenced by the work of the Task force must be continued and strengthened through the establishment of permanent University neighborhood field offices in Dorchester and Columbia Point.

An adequate amount of housing for students must be constructed on campus in order to protect the surrounding neighborhoods from excessive housing demand.

The City of Boston must move immediately and forcefully to enforce existing buildings codes and rent control to protect the area against excessive real estate speculation.

The City must also develop an effective traffic and parking control program in the surrounding neighborhoods.

Both the City and the State must work together to develop and put in place an enhanced public transportation system for the area before the opening date for the new campus. Student use of private automobiles should be strongly discouraged as a matter of administrative policy aimed at the drastic reduction of on-campus parking spaces and the active encouragement of use of car pools and public transportation.

To reduce the number of students coming into the community for classes and perhaps competing for housing, the University should reduce its enrollment targets to 10,000 students and do its utmost, through the design of collaborative efforts with community high schools, through an open enrollment program and through a "thirteenth" year program of developmental studies, between high school and college, for Boston students, to ensure that 50% of UMB students in future classes would be drawn from Boston neighborhoods and the Boston school system.

Specific numerical goals should be established for the hiring of Dorchester and Columbia Point residents in the various new support positions which would become available at the campus.

To expedite the achievement of these quotas, a branch personnel office should be established in the Dorchester and Columbia Point field offices as well as

basic skills training programs to help local residents qualify for the new jobs.

Finally the University should, through use of its unique role and public image within the state and nation, itself become an innovative partner and public advocate in addressing the many peculiar needs of the urban neighborhoods surrounding the site of the new campus. The University would thus become the catalyst for growth and development in the urban community. ^{19.}

As an outgrowth of this report the Columbia Point-Dorchester Task Force provided the impetus and strong support for a series of bills which were introduced into the 1973 session of the legislature calling for a 50% cut in projected enrollment at the Boston Campus, a \$20 million appropriation for student housing, and relocation allowances for Dorchester residents forced out of their homes by UMass students. Despite prolonged debate and considerable lobbying by Dorchester residents and their supporters these measures failed to pass. ^{20.}

Formal Demands by the City of Boston

In March 1973, Mayor White presented the trustees with a formal statement of the City administration's position on The new campus at Columbia Point. The report stated that the single most important contribution that the University could make would be to provide access to quality higher education for thousands of city residents who had

previously been excluded from college because of economic constraints. The City would recognize this service as a significant contribution in lieu of taxes. In order to ensure that the new campus would indeed be a real asset to the urban community the City made the following demands:

The campus must restrict its service area to communities within easy commuting distance and should do everything in its power to ensure that at least half of its students are graduates of Boston high schools.

The University must make every effort to ensure that a majority of its students come from families with low or moderate incomes.

The Columbia Point campus should become the nucleus of an urban university system dispersed throughout Boston in order to promote "physical accessibility of learning and the possibility of community service."

To reduce transportation and parking problems the University should attempt to schedule no classes or functions prior to 10 a.m.

In its role as a state sponsored agency the University should work directly with the MTA in developing expansion of the public subway system and direct shuttle bus links.

The mayor also proposed that the Boston Housing Authority and the University work together to rehabilitate 300 vacant housing units at the Columbia Point project for the use of students. A final recommendation was that the

Board of Trustees be expanded to include representatives of the communities in the area impacted by the new campus. 21.

The University's Policy Statement On Columbia Point

On June 6, 1973 the University trustees adopted a formal set of policies relative to the Dorchester and Columbia Point community concerns which contained the following major points,

(1) The primary mission of the University of Massachusetts at Boston is to provide high quality educational opportunities to the residents of Boston and surrounding communities, particularly those whose opportunities have been limited by income or race. We recognize a special responsibility to provide maximum educational opportunity to residents of Dorchester, Columbia Point and South Boston. 22.

To reach this objective the University pledged to develop an explicit admission policy which emphasized outreach in area schools and flexible techniques for identifying qualified applicants, continuation of existing pre-college programs and cooperative efforts with the Boston schools, increased financial aid and responsive academic counseling and support services.

(2) The University of Massachusetts at Boston will remain a commuter institution, with a strong commitment to encouraging the use of mass transit rather than automobiles. 23.

To reach this objective the University pledged to develop a system through which parking fee revenue was used to fund an expanded public shuttle bus service to the campus, adjust class schedules as necessary to minimize traffic congestion, cooperate with local neighborhoods in

the enforcement of parking regulations, lobby for a new Dorchester station on the Quincy to Boston rapid transit line which presently passed, non-stop, through the community on its daily commuter runs, and lobby for the long-range development of a direct rail or monorail link between the campus and the rapid transit system.

(3) The University is committed to minimizing student housing impact on adjacent communities. 24.

To reach this objective the University pledged to actively assist students who had formed their own households to find housing outside of the high impact neighborhood areas, exclude housing allowances from financial aid calculations unless a student could demonstrate the necessity for establishing his residence in the high impact area, work with the community and city to actively discourage conversion of local family dwellings to student apartments and to support the creation of additional low income non-student housing.

(4) The University is deeply concerned with the social and economic well-being of neighboring communities and the city as a whole, and is committed to furthering this well-being in all ways consistent with its skills, missions, and resources. 25.

The University promised to support maximum opportunities for locally owned businesses to bid on supplies and services for the new campus, provide maximum job opportunities for local residents, share recreational facilities with neighborhood groups, and establish a

cooperative and consultative process between the campus and local residents. In conclusion the trustees stated,

Common work with the neighborhoods as partners, not as adversaries, is essential. We foresee substantial opportunities for student, faculty, and staff involvement in community based activities and projects. We hope that the campus will energetically respond to these opportunities with all the talents at its command. As Trustees, we are ready to do our full share. 26.

A Final Community Protest

A final attempt was made by a tenants group, The Dorchester Tenants Action Council in late July. Following a demonstration and brief confrontation with building security in an attempt to storm President Wood's downtown offices, they conducted a brief news interview on the sidewalk and announced that they would bring suit under a 1971 state environmental protection law designed to curtail air, water and noise pollution in an attempt to block the University from opening until transportation and housing problems were resolved to their satisfaction. Their legal efforts were not successful. 27.

By 1974 much of the initial resistance of local residents to the presence of the new campus had abated because of the strong pro-active stance of the University towards community relations in Boston which had been adopted by the new administration of President Wood.

CHAPTER IX.

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE BOSTON EXPERIENCE WITH ROSEN'S FINDINGS IN CHICAGO

How does the Boston experience compare with other site selection processes or university/community conflicts? In regard to other universities and states, the most direct comparison can be made with the experience of the University of Illinois and the site selection process for the Chicago campus. Both cases involved major state universities and major urban centers.

As reported in the review of the literature, Rosen studied the site selection process for the University of Illinois Chicago campus. He identified four approaches to decision making and to understanding the dynamics of decision making: the economic approach or cost/benefit analysis; the organizational structure approach or analysis of the nature of the organization in which the decision is made; the science and technology approach which applies scientific method to the decision making problem; and the community power approach which assumes that decisions are ultimately made as the result of pressure brought to bear by dominant groups within the community. Rosen asked five important questions concerning the site selection process for Chicago which can also be asked of the Boston experience. Paraphrasing Rosen, these questions were:

Was there a single dominating decision maker who made the choice among alternatives or were there many

decision makers whose conflicting views with respect to objectives and values were resolved so that all agreed on a compromise in the end?

Were the various constituent groups affected by the site selection process able to exert political power to influence and modify the outcome?

Did the organizational structure of the University or other decision making groups influence the final outcome?

Was the decision influenced in any important way by purely technical considerations which were determined by applying scientific techniques of analysis to the problem of site selection? Were these used to develop solutions which were free of political or bureaucratic bias?

Can any aspects of the experience at Chicago or Boston be generalized to apply to similar policy decision making at other urban public universities?

This chapter will first seek to answer Rosen's questions for Massachusetts and thus compare the site selection processes in Massachusetts with those in Illinois. It will then use Rosen's approaches to decision making as a lens through which to analyze the site selection process in Boston.

The Role of Key Decision Makers

The City's Mayor

The positions taken by the core city's mayor were important factors in both the Boston and Chicago site selection processes. Boston's Mayor Collins raised objections to proposals for a site in the core city and argued that the new campus should be located in the suburbs. His successor, Mayor White, appeared unconvinced of a critical need for a public university within the City of Boston and concerned about possible negative impacts. Along with Collins, White strongly opposed any site which would disrupt established neighborhoods, businesses or institutions or which would result in a reduction in the city's property tax base. In an interview, conducted as part of this case study, White said that, as mayor, he viewed the proposal to place the new campus in the Copley Square area as "impossible and ridiculous" given the value of the commercial property which would be lost and the crowding and "traffic nightmare" which would result. He and his director of urban renewal, Hale Champion, were not convinced that the University would be content to stay on a small crowded downtown site indefinitely. They would eventually expand outward acquiring more and more property in the same pattern that had been followed by Harvard and Boston University. White supported the location of the

campus at Columbia Point, but only after some major concessions by the university which addressed neighborhood and city concerns.

In Chicago the situation was reversed. Mayor Daley had been a long time advocate of an urban university campus for Chicago and fought hard at the beginning of the urban renewal process to locate the new campus in the core city. Concerning Mayor Daley's attitude Rosen states,

While the mayor always had to be conscious of the political reasons for and cost of his actions, his interest in establishing a public university in Chicago preceded his mayoralty and transcended politics. He considered education one of the most important means of economic and social improvement. His father had been a business agent in the Sheet Metal Workers' Union, and his mother had strongly encouraged his own efforts to reach an important position by completing studies in a private college and law school, which he had done while working. He felt others should have the same opportunity but at a public institution." 1.

Daley demonstrated this strong support at the point at which the University was considering locating the new campus in a suburban location, Riverside Golf Club. In order to attract the University towards a core city site, Daley pledged that Chicago would make up the difference between the cost of the suburban site and the higher cost of purchasing land for a core city site. 2. The attitude of the mayor caused the site selection process in Chicago to differ quite markedly from the experience in Boston. Rosen states,

Mayor Daley's statement to the University in February, 1959, in which he offered to pay the

extraordinary costs of land acquisition within the city beyond the costs of a suburban site, changed the conditions of negotiation between Chicago and the University. Until that offer was made, the University was taking the initiative on the site selection, and its preference had been for a "green" site, one with abundant land and expansion possibilities...But the initiative had changed. It was now up to the city to make available the land upon which the university could build a campus of adequate size...The key figure for the city in making the site decision would be Mayor Daley. Combining within himself the chief political position in the city as chairman of the Cook County Democratic Central Committee and the city's chief administrative position as mayor, he was the most important political figure in the city. 3.

The mayor was the one key decision maker in both Boston and Chicago. What differed was the local context. Mayor Daley wanted a public university within the core city and saw this as an integral part of the urban renewal effort. He sought out and fought for a downtown location. Collins and White saw no real need for a public university in Boston and sought to keep it out of the core city so that its physical presence would not impair their efforts at economic revival. Columbia Point was the first preference of both the White and Collins administrations and became the ultimate choice. The mayors were no less strong leaders or key decision makers because of their ambivalence towards the need for the new campus. Although the mayor in each of the two cities had quite different agendas, they both achieved their objectives.

The Importance of Local Political Context

If the core city's mayor is a key decision maker then an important consideration is the political strength

of the mayor and the source of the mayor's political influence because this, as much as the mayor's personal opinions, will contribute to formation of the city administration's position on site selection. In Chicago there was only one, politically strong, mayor, Richard Daley, throughout the site selection process. During this period Daley grew in terms of his political influence over Chicago, the surrounding Cook County, and within state and national political affairs. In Boston there was a change of leadership mid-way through the site selection process which resulted from a decline in mayor Collin's political popularity and which signified the end of an era of emphasis upon rapid economic growth and dynamic urban renewal in the core city and the beginning of an era of the empowerment of community groups acting on behalf of the "little people". Mayor Daley of Chicago, operating at an earlier point in a considerably different political climate, was in a position to provide strong positive support for the location of the new campus.

Rosen did not comment extensively on the local political context and its impact on the relative strength and influence of the mayor because Mayor Daley remained in a solid dominant role throughout the site selection process. The issue becomes more important in Boston because of the decline in popularity of Mayor Collins, the change of mayors and the growing influence of community

action groups on policy development by the city administrations.

One similarity between Boston and Chicago is the fact that in both cases the final site selected was a compromise among all of the key players, was identified publicly as the preferred choice of the mayor, and quite possibly was the only viable choice which could be made at that point given timing constraints and the need to move on to a final decision following a very long site selection process.

The difference is found in the local context. Boston was different because of the ambivalent attitude of the mayors and much of the general public about the need for more public higher education in the midst of the "Athens of America". A secondary issue in the Chicago vs. Boston context is space. There was far less in Boston and it was very expensive both in terms of tax revenues which would be lost to the city and in terms of development opportunities which would be lost to the business interests. A third issue is timing. The University of Illinois campus site selection process occurred much earlier in the urban renewal cycle for Chicago than did the University of Massachusetts site selection process in Boston. In Chicago it also occurred somewhat before the blossoming of the community power movement in the late 1960's which was at a peak during the Boston process. In each situation, however, the

mayor was a powerful decision maker but in a different local political context. An important finding of this paper, fully supported by the data presented in the case study, is that the immediate local political context surrounding an urban public university will have a profound impact upon policy decision making for the university. This impact is much greater on the public university than on the private because of the nature of the source of funding and the appointment process for the trustees for the public university. The power and influence of the mayor, the trustees, community influence groups, and a business community will vary according to the local context but their influence will always be present to some degree in major policy decisions.

The Importance of Community Interest Groups

The material presented in the case study suggests that Collins and White tended to react to pressures from community interest groups, more than did Daley, during both the site selection process and the negotiations with the university regarding specific policies for the development of the urban campus. In Boston, the need for a city administration to be more responsive to neighborhood concerns became the key issue in the 1967 mayoral campaign and a primary theme during the subsequent White administration. In Boston the mayor's position tended to support the positions taken by community action groups

while in Chicago expressions of opposition by the local community groups were largely ignored because they were at variance with the mayor's position of strong support for a campus location in the core city. In Chicago the local business interests supported a core city campus location while in Boston they opposed such a location.

The Boston experience seems to differ from Rosen's conclusions about the importance of community interest groups. Rosen saw them as relatively unimportant. In Boston they loom large in the decision making process. The Harrison-Halstead community groups had almost no impact on the decision in Chicago. In Boston the Highland Park residents, the Back Bay interests, and the Dorchester-Columbia Point community groups had a strong impact on the mayor's position and university policy.

The Role of the Board of Trustees

In both cases, the board of trustees had ultimate formal responsibility for the decision on a site. One difference between the University of Massachusetts and the University of Illinois during this period was the manner in which trustees were selected. In Illinois the trustees were elected by popular vote from Republican and Democratic Party slates of candidates nominated during biennial state elections. Because the board consisted largely of University of Illinois alumni who followed their own personal views, Rosen did not view party affiliation of

individual trustees as an important factor influencing consideration of the location of the Chicago campus. Instead this group of alumni with a strong affiliation with the Urbana campus,

...saw a permanent campus in the Chicago area as a secondary need and as a possible threat to the main campus but by 1955 accepted the desirability of such a campus, initially for a two year program but expandable to four years in response to mounting pressure from student enrollment. Among most members of the board, the desirable campus was as much like that at Urbana as possible-i.e., a green campus with lots of land. 4.

In Massachusetts, the University's board of trustees were appointed by the governor for renewable terms of five years and tended to be persons who had distinguished themselves in some manner in the broader community. The governor had the theoretical right to make a change at the end of each trustees term but during the period in question the trustees tended to serve for several years. The result was the relatively stable, non-partisan board during the site selection process. Twelve of the seventeen trustees remained on the board during the entire period.

As in Illinois, there is no evidence of an influence of partisan politics in the site selection process. Unlike Illinois, however, most trustees accepted the desirability of an urban campus and some argued passionately for its location in the heart of the core city up through the final debate preceding the decision. Because of the strong opposition of both mayors and other groups, the University

of Massachusetts trustees had a far stronger incentive to opt for a suburban location than did their counterparts in Illinois and yet they remained committed to an urban location.

The reason for this commitment by the University of Massachusetts trustees appears to have stemmed in part from a genuine concern for the future welfare of the low and moderate income people of Boston and from a concern, shared by many of the trustees with President Lederle, that Boston had to be secured for the University in order to stop potential expansion of the State College at Boston into a rival state university much closer to the decision makers in the capital city. The trustees displayed acute sensitivity to the concerns and opinions of the mayor, the governor, and the leadership of the Boston business community. At the same time, despite their rejection of the final scattered site proposal, they appear to have been strongly influenced in their basic decision to pursue an urban rather than a suburban campus site by input from the leadership of the Boston campus faculty and students.

The Influence of the Business Community on Trustees and Key Decision Makers

The site selection process for Boston revealed many complex networks of individuals and connections between members of the business community, university trustees and

political leaders in the city. Rather than trace all the relationships between business leaders and community leaders, this chapter will attempt to show some sense of this inter-relationship of the leadership groups through a closer look at the career and network of professional associations of the University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees vice chairman during the site selection process.

Joseph P. Healey, Vice Chairman and presiding officer at most trustee meetings throughout the site selection process, was an important and highly respected figure within the Boston business community during the late 1960's. He received strong support among the legislative leadership.

Maurice Donahue, the State Senate President from 1964 to 1970, expressed his high regard for Healey in an interview conducted as a part of this case study in September, 1988. Donahue stressed that Healey held the respect of the legislative leadership because of his professional background and because he appeared to be an experienced, highly capable, "top drawer individual" who was involved in public service out of a strong desire to serve the public interest and not from a motivation of personal gain. The legislative leadership decided to allow the University trustees to exercise a wide latitude in picking a site because of their confidence in Healey and other members of The Board of Trustees. They did not want the process to become a devious political process in

which various senators and representatives vied with each other to locate the campus in their home district. Governor Volpe, who was governor during almost the entire site selection process, appears to have had the same confidence as Donahue toward the Board of Trustees and their ability to make an appropriate site selection.

A community leader such as Healey, performing in a public service role as university trustee, does not operate in a vacuum isolated and uninfluenced by the external community and does not act on the basis of personal whim or bias. By 1968, Healey had made his mark in Academe, Law, Politics and Business. Through his involvement in these activities Healey came into frequent contact with major decision makers in the greater Boston community and was in a position to act as a two way conduit of information and ideas between this community leadership group and the University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees. A review in some depth of the nature of this group of contacts will illustrate how such a network can operate.

Healey was President and Director of the Middlesex Bank, N.A. at the time of the final decision on the Columbia Point site in 1968. This position brought him into frequent contact with the membership of the "Boston Vault". This group of key Boston financial and business leaders earned the nickname the "Vault" from their practice of

meeting in monthly closed sessions in the board room of the Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Company. Preferring the name, "The Boston Coordinating Committee", the group kept no minutes of its meetings and allowed no substitutes to attend for an absent members. No outsiders were allowed to attend. In 1967 their membership included the chairman of the board, president or senior vice president of most of Boston's leading businesses and financial institutions. Of the fourteen members in 1967, twelve were graduates of Harvard, Dartmouth or Yale. Through its economic power, prestige in the community, and especially through interlocking business relationships, the Vault wielded enormous influence in Boston.

Initially formed in 1959 in an attempt to keep the City from fiscal insolvency, they supported John Collins's opponent, John Powers during Collins' initial race for mayor. Following his upset victory they soon became staunch supporters of Mayor Collin's administration and of BRA chief, Ed Logue's urban renewal efforts. Officially neutral in the 1967 mayoral primary race, they provided strong support to Kevin White in the final two person runoff against Louise Day Hicks, a candidate whose political views were anathama to the Vault.

The Vault was strongly disposed to support the suggestion of Logue that the new campus of the University of Massachusetts be located at Columbia Point. Since they were among the city's largest property tax payers and thus

their balance sheets were likely to be directly affected by higher tax rates stemming from the city's shrinking tax base, it is logical that they would have viewed proposals to place the new campus in the urban core as a totally unnecessary eradication of scarce, valuable, taxable commercial property. The loss of this scarce downtown property would also tend to foreclose possibilities for their own expansion at later dates. As the downtown area's principle "landlords", they would have been concerned as well by the prospect of ever larger hordes of students, student protest marches and student automobiles clogging the streets. 5.

The network through which the Vault and similar formal and informal associations shared influence and opinions can be seen through a closer examination of Trustee Healey's group of business associates in the late 1960's. During this period, for example, Mr Healey's many activities and interests included a position as a member of the board of directors of the Boston Edison Company. Other directors of Boston Edison included:

Charles F. Avila, who was also a director of the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company; a trustee of Northeastern University, a member of the Citizens Advisory Committee on Urban Redevelopment, and a member of the Committee for the Central Business District;

O. Kelley Anderson, Chairman of the Board of New England Mutual Life Insurance Company and also a trustee of Boston University, and a director of the Ritz-Carleton Hotel Company;

Roger C. Damon, Chief Executive Officer and Director of the First National Bank of Boston, also a trustee of Boston College, a member of the Northeastern University Corporation, a member of the executive committee of the New England Colleges Fund, and a director of the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company;

Byron K. Elliott, also Chairman of the Corporation and Trustee of Northeastern University;

Frank L. Farwell, President and Director of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, who was also a member of the investment committee of Northeastern University;

Edward B. Hanify, also a director of John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, and a trustee of Tufts University.

Corporate headquarters buildings for The John Hancock, Liberty Mutual and New England Mutual Life Insurance Companies were all located in the vicinity of Park Square and Copley Square.

During this period Healy was also a director of the Boston Mutual Life Insurance Company. Other directors of this company included:

Thomas M. Joyce, also a member of the board of directors at Boston College;

John I. Ahern, also director of the General Alumni Association at Boston University, and a trustee of Regis College.

This list indicates, clearly, that Healey came into frequent contact and conversation with many individuals who had major business interests in the Back Bay area and other commercial areas in downtown Boston as well as a number of individuals with direct ties to the area's private colleges and universities. Altogether, Healey served on at least one board of directors with three different members of the Boston Vault. Other members of the Vault sat at the hub of similar networks of key business and community leaders. The Vault was not a malevolent oligarchy, despite its rather fearsome nickname, but rather the Boston version of a quite common form of association among business leaders which can be found functioning in almost any city in America: 6.

Direct evidence of the way in which this network of associations could and did work to influence decisions by the University was provided by President Lederle in recalling the controversy over the Copley Square site,

We had a big session (concerning the Copley Square site proposal) in the Governor's Office with Kevin Harrington, who was Majority Floor leader later; he wasn't at that time. We were just raked over the coals for coming in with this proposal. What really was happening was that on that particular proposal we "hit" the "Establishment" in Boston...Then I got a call one day from Erwin Canham. A year or two earlier we had given Erwin an honorary degree....He called me up and asked me what we were doing and why we were doing this. And I explained and he gave me the impression that he

thought we were out of our minds. And I made some reference to the opposition of the Hancock, only to find that he was on the Hancock Board. Then I found that they were concerned about the student load in the area, and it turned out that he was the Vice President, I think, of the Back Bay Association. Then, knowing that the universities in Massachusetts live poor in terms of library resources, he expressed concern about abuse of the Boston Public Library adjacent to the site and suddenly I discovered that he was a member of the Library Board, and then, I learned what was really eating him, mainly, as a pillar of the Christian Science Church, he and the Church had certain thoughts about a big construction program, office buildings and other things in the same area which would be harmed by our project. Needless to say, we got nowhere with that proposal. 7.

Trustee Healey was very much a member of the Boston business "establishment". It would appear likely that their opinions and concerns regarding the site selection for UMB would have some influence on Healey.

Virtually all of the other members of the Board of Trustees had similar networks of connections to business and political leadership groups both in Boston and within other areas of the state. Trustee Healey is used here as an example, not as a unique case, of how these networks can affect the decision making of a board of trustees. The evidence suggests that through Healey, as well as other trustees with close ties to Mayor Collins and Mayor White and the Boston business community, those who perceived a negative impact to their interests if UMB were located downtown had an influence on the site selection process which essentially blocked a downtown site.

community was relatively unimportant in the site selection process.⁸ One key difference, however, was that the Chicago business community was generally delighted at the prospect of the inclusion of plans for an urban university campus in the urban renewal process for their core city. They were not competing with the University for land and key locations. It is possible to speculate that their role would have been far different had they perceived a strong adverse impact from the location of their new campus. Unlike Chicago, the Boston business community appears to have played a strong role in keeping the campus out of the core city. They may well have been the deciding influence.

Again, the local context was different. This fact seems to have been unrecognized for a time by some of the Boston Campus leaders as they asked publicly why Boston did not react with the same enthusiastic welcome as Chicago.

The Role of Governor John Volpe

John Volpe, a republican in a state dominated by the Democratic party, was first elected governor in 1960. In 1962 he was defeated in a very close race by Endicott Peabody. Peabody was defeated in the Democratic Party's fall 1964 primary election by his own lieutenant governor and Volpe was able to take advantage of the resultant split in the opposition party to regain the governor's office. He remained governor until early 1969. Volpe was, therefor,

governor of Massachusetts throughout almost the entire site selection process.

Governor Volpe appears to have left selection of a specific site for the campus to the discretion of the trustees except for a brief personal intervention at two periods, the spring of 1967, when the business interests of the core city were threatened, and again when the scattered site proposal emerged as a serious consideration in the fall of 1968. In these cases, public interest and concern was at a peak and indicated the political need for some public show of action. There appears to have been little or no direct discussion or negotiation on the issue between the governor and the mayor and very little between the governor and the trustees.

A factor which may have influenced Volpe's decision to intervene and attempt to influence the trustees to reject the scattered facilities approach for the Boston Campus and to move forward decisively to a final decision on a permanent site, was the patronage value inherent in a public construction project which would require a very large capital outlay. The potential patronage value inherent in such a huge public construction project is suggested by evidence provided within the final report of the Special Commission Concerning State and County Buildings, popularly referred to as the Ward Commission.

The Ward Commission was created through action of the Legislature in 1978 with the specific charge of

investigating allegations of corruption in the awarding of state building contracts including the new Boston campus at Columbia Point. The Chairman of the Commission, Dr. John William Ward, was an historian and a former president of Amherst College. In describing their findings regarding the period 1960 - 1970 the Commission's report states,

In the award of contracts for the construction of state and county buildings, corruption has been a way of life. For a decade at least, across Republican and Democratic administrations alike, the way to get architectural contracts was to buy them....The name of the game is cash. 8.

The Commission provided an overview of a system under which political contributions were solicited in return for favors,

A list is made of those who do business with the state: architects for design services, contractors for construction, engineers for consulting services, lawyers who may wish to be considered for judicial appointment. One can take a walk through the Yellow Pages to make up the list. An individual receives a call that the Governor would like to meet him. The innocent feels a flush of pride; the practiced feel for their pocket-book. The appointment is at a suite of three rooms in a Boston hotel. The outer room is a large waiting-room where one discovers one's peers and fellow-practitioners in uncomfortable numbers; in the second room sits the Governor, usually making up time over soup and a sandwich; the audience lasts no more than two or three minutes. In the third room is the fund raiser who with records at hand, reminds the individual of work done in the past, of profits received on state work, and suggests the time has come to help the Governor and the party by a major contribution...What is not said is what is important. No one is so bold as to suggest if you do not contribute you will not do business in the future: that would constitute extortion....Instead there is the tacit understanding between public servants and private professionals that this is how business is done in Massachusetts. 9.

The Ward Commission report was particularly concerned with documenting the relationship between the Peabody and Volpe campaign organizations and the firm of McKee-Berger-Mansueto, (MBM) architectural consultants, who served as project managers for the construction of the Boston Campus at Columbia Point. Excerpts from the testimony gathered provide a description of a political fund raising and patronage system at work in the period 1963-1968.

The report states that MBM began to actively solicit state contracts in Massachusetts in 1963 and continued this activity through the point in December, 1969 at which it was selected as project manager for the Boston Campus. MBM eventually was paid a total of \$5,488,913.55 for this project. 10.

The report described early efforts by Anthony Mansueto in 1964 to gain access to the Massachusetts market through the Worcester based architectural firm of Frank R. Masiello, Jr. Inc.,

Mansueto and Frank Masiello quickly developed a close personal friendship. Masiello was a donor and fundraiser for then-Governor Endicott Peabody, and one of the first introductions that Masiello provided was to Sherwood J. (Woody) Tarlow, Peabody's chief fundraiser. It was the policy of the Peabody administration to give preference to firms whose principals contributed to the Peabody campaign, and Mansueto was quickly apprised of this. Mansueto's calendar reveals that he was introduced to Tarlow by Masiello on February 25, 1964. Less than a week later, Mansueto's diaries contain the entries: "Money to Masiello, \$1,000" and "Check to Masiello." "On March 15, 1964, Mansueto and his wife, along with Frank Masiello and his wife, attended a birthday

party for Governor Peabody on the 11th floor of the Statler Hilton Hotel (now the Park Plaza) in Boston. According to Peabody campaign records, Mansueto paid \$1,000 for tickets." 11.

The report states that with the return of John Volpe to the governor's office in 1965, Masiello switched to becoming a doner and fundraiser for the Republicans. Initial contacts began during Peabody's unsuccessful re-election bid in the fall of 1964. He soon was in a position to introduce Mansueto of MBM to Albert P. ("Toots") Manzi, a very influential and powerful political figure within the Volpe campaign organization. The Commission's report states that a number of contacts and meetings took place between Manzi and Mansueto in 1967 and throughout 1968. ¹². The nature of Manzi's relationship with contractors and architects such as Mansueto and Masiello might be suggested by the following extract from Masiello's testimony before the Commission,

Q. What was your discussion with Mr. Manzi in his market on that occasion?

A. The substance of the conversation was essentially I agreed to financial support or assisting Governor Volpe, and the deficit that they were attempting to overcome. I would purchase tickets to the fundraising activity, but it would be on the premise or on the assurance that if I did undertake these activities that I wanted a firm promise that we would be allowed to continue on our existing contracts we had in effect at that time, new contracts we had received, and hopefully be assured that when another capital outlay program came out in the future that we would be favorably considered for possibly another project. 13.

The conversation quoted below is alleged to have taken place between Masiello and Manzi,

Masiello further testified that, "within a day or two prior" to the interview, he, Smith and Manzi met. At this meeting, DMJM agreed to pay Manzi \$22,000 in cash over a period of time for the Holyoke Community College contract, and Manzi agreed to make certain that DMJM was selected as the designer. 14.

The Ward Commission Report presented evidence that suggests that influence peddling and corruption in the awarding of contracts may have been present to a very serious degree in Massachusetts state government during the period under discussion. If this was the case, then all major capital projects were likely to have been seen not just as initiatives aimed at meeting public needs, but, also as important potential sources of essential campaign funding. In such an environment it would be difficult for an incumbent governor not to conclude that if he failed to exploit these opportunities, his political opposition would, and quite likely drive him from office with the campaign funds provided.

While this study found no evidence of any attempt by the officers of an architectural consulting firm or construction company to improperly influence the decision on a site location for UMB, or any evidence of any attempt by Governor Volpe or anyone else to improperly influence or force a decision by the trustees to accept a particular site proposal, there is much suggestion within the Ward Commission's report of continuing contacts between such firms and the Volpe administration throughout the period 1965 - 1969 involving the discussion of state construction

projects and the solicitation of political contributions.

It appears unlikely that the Volpe administration would have allowed the important decision on the location and physical size of such a major project as the new Boston Campus to drag on any longer than necessary. It would appear likely that Governor Volpe would never have taken seriously the suggestion that such a major capital budget project be scrapped in favor of a proposal to rent a scattered group of buildings in downtown Boston. Such a decision would have involved the setting aside of a major potential patronage opportunity as well as an opportunity to boost the number of construction jobs available in the Boston area just as the critical election year of 1968 was reaching a climax.

The Impact of the Internal Organizational Structure of the University

Three factors concerning the organizational structure of the University caused problems during the site selection process: the lack of an adequate public relations effort, the remoteness of the city of Boston and the new campus from the University president in Amherst, and the lack of resolution on the degree of autonomy to be exercised by the Boston campus administration.

Other factors strengthened the University during this difficult period. These included: the diversity of

background and the prestige of the University Trustees, the establishment of effective legislative relations by the president and the prestige of the University, itself, as the "flagship" institution within the state system of higher education.

The issue of the independent authority of the Boston Campus leadership was a clear problem area which had a negative effect on the site selection process. President Lederle's publicly stated decision early in the process to give as much autonomy as possible to the new campus worked well in getting many of the internal administrative and decision making processes off to a good start at the Boston campus. However, it had a negative impact on the site selection process. Given the political context, Columbia Point was ultimately selected, out of necessity, by the University's president and trustees despite strong public objections of the Boston campus leadership.

During a review of the site selection process a question frequently occurs concerning which official of the University was, actually, leading the effort. It becomes unclear from time to time, who, at a given point in time was charged with the role of spokesperson for the University regarding the search.

Various persons seemed to fill this role from point to point. The initial proposal for a site, for example, was made by State Senate President Maurice Donahue. He

suggested in the Amherst Newman Club speech that it should be located in the suburbs. Much of the subsequent media coverage concerning the new campus kept reflecting this assumption for at least the next year. The actual legislation which followed was ambiguous on the question.

The trustee buildings and grounds committee, who were charged by action of the University trustees with responsibility for reviewing all possibilities and recommending a final site, began with an assumption of the desirability of a suburban location. They later accepted the assumptions contained in the campus' initial mission statement reflecting the views of the New Departures and New Concepts Committee who had assumed from the first the absolute necessity of a core city location.

The Boston campus' first chancellor, John Ryan seemed at times to present a posture of ambivalence, suggesting at first in his public statements that the site would be in the urban core and then drifting toward the possibility of a suburban site when nothing else seemed possible.

This problem of a lack of clear definition of authority issues is reflected, too, by Ryan's decision to move ahead with direct open meetings with the residents of Highland Park in the absence of clear direction from Lederle followed too late by clear written instructions from Lederle discouraging such direct meetings between the Boston campus leadership and community representatives.

Toward the close of his incumbency, Ryan indicated acquiescence with the inevitability of Columbia Point, a choice of site proposed by the city. Ryan's sudden resignation reflected frustration with this lack of clear definition of authority and with a lack of strong support by the governor. Despite his written statements to the contrary, it is not completely clear that Ryan felt a sense of total support from the university president. Senator Harrington's frank statements to the press identifying such a rift leave one wondering where this legislative leader got such an impression and why he would choose to totally fabricate such a report. Kevin Harrington failed to respond to requests to be interviewed for this study and thus direct follow up was not possible.

An interpretation which can be drawn from the data presented in the case study, despite the later written denial by Ryan, is that Ryan's sudden resignation in 1968 left many persons, including a key legislative leader, Senator Harrington, with the distinct impression that serious tensions had developed between the president and the Boston chancellor over authority issues.

Ryan's resignation at a critical time for the campus left a power vacuum which was then filled in part by the academic dean and other senior faculty leaders. The academic dean, serving as acting chancellor, frequently appeared as a spokesperson for the campus in the months which followed and continued to do so even after the

appointment of a new chancellor. This culminated in the academic dean's dramatic speech on the steps of the statehouse in the fall of 1968. Throughout the process, and especially during this power vacuum, it was the academic dean, not the university president, who acted, with strong support from the majority of the faculty and student leaders, as the primary public spokesperson for the campus. He was the leader who persisted in an insistence on not just an urban location but a core city location in the face of opposition by almost every leader within the external community.

The campus' second chancellor, arriving in the fall of 1968, immediately adopted the highly innovative proposal by the academic dean and faculty leadership for a scattered site proposal despite clear signals from the president, the trustees, the mayor, the governor, and key legislative leaders that such a proposal was unacceptable and that the decision had by the time of his appointment been essentially already made. This position by the new chancellor suggests the existence of considerable ambiguity regarding authority over decision making for the Boston campus. The result of this general confusion in the period 1965 - 1968 was more delay and embarrassment for the University.

The physical distance between the University president and the local Boston chancellor and academic dean

appear to have exacerbated the difficult site selection process. The lack of clear internal lines of authority for negotiation with the external community concerning various site proposals throughout the site selection process appear to have added to the problem .

It is clear, from his public statements, that Lederle considered the Boston campus faculty and administration to be naive and inexperienced and that he was determined to make the decision himself in consultation with the trustees. It may have been a mistake, therefor, for the president and trustees to authorize a delay and more study of the scattered site proposal in the fall of 1968 in order to present the appearance of Boston campus participation in the final decision. The board of trustees would seem to have been organized in such a way that they had adequate communication with key people within the Boston community and within the state's political framework. It appears, however, that they lacked effective channels of communication with the Boston campus administration and faculty. Throughout the process there remained the impression that the primary focus of the trustees, the president and the central university staff was towards the parent campus in Amherst. There is the clear indication by Lederle in his narrative that one primary purpose of a Boston campus for the University was to protect the mother campus in Amherst from loosing resources to expansion moves by the State College at Boston. This approach had to result

in a confusion of loyalties and priorities which was not healthy for the new urban university. Throughout the period covered by this case study the University was unable to clearly resolve the question of whether the Boston campus was itself a fledgling urban university or simply a local extension program of a university headquartered in Amherst. President Wood addressed this issue in part by moving his office to Boston in the early 1970's. This move clearly identified the president as head of a multi-campus university system whose headquarters was no longer at Amherst. However, in doing this President Wood also opened further questions surrounding the authority relationship between the university president and the Boston campus chancellor. Now there were two University of Massachusetts spokespersons on the Boston scene.

The Role of Faculty Participation in the Site Selection Process

Given the problems identified above it is important to note that the faculty did play a major role in the decision reached concerning the location of the Boston campus. This happened because the faculty, with the exception of many of those in the "hard sciences", were strongly supportive from the beginning of a core city site for the university. The choice of residence of a number of the founding faculty appears to reflect this commitment

and may have added a personal and practical incentive to their determination to secure a core city site. Table II indicates the choice of residence of members of the faculty during these formative years. Data was obtained from campus telephone books for the years indicated. In comparing this data to that on student residence presented earlier in Table I it is interesting to note that in the early years the faculty of the Boston campus were slightly more "urban" in terms of their choice of residence than the student body.

By taking an early, strong and well articulated stand on the necessity for an urban location the faculty leadership group effectively prevented the choice of a suburban location. This point was won and won early. Time and again throughout the process suburban sites which met many of the other technical requirements were set aside because they were too far from the core city. Seen at first as a public university which would be located in the suburbs, the new campus developed a unique urban character in its first quarter century because, in the first few years of planning, the faculty insisted that it must be urban in character. What they failed to develop effectively was impeccable arguments as to why, at great public expense and the sacrifice of very scarce space, the campus must sit at the very core of the urban area rather than nearby on its inner fringe.

TABLE 2.

HOME ADDRESS OF FACULTY IN SELECTED ACADEMIC YEARS

	Academic Year 1966 - 1967		Academic Year 1968 - 1969	
	-----		-----	
Core Area of Boston	26	17%	57	21%
<u>Other Boston Address</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>6%</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>4%</u>
Sub-Total	36	23%	68	25%
City of Cambridge	36	23%	54	20%
Town of Brookline	18	12%	18	7%
Other Communities				
<u>Bordering on Boston</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>6%</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>7%</u>
Sub-Total	63	41%	92	34%
Other Address Within 10 Miles of Boston	48	31%	77	28%
Other Mass. Address	6	4%	31	11%
<u>Outside Massachusetts</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>.6%</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1%</u>
Total	154	100%	271	100%

(Source: University of Massachusetts at Boston Campus
Telephone Directories for Academic Year 1966-1967 and
Academic Year 1968-1969.)

The Role of Technical Consultants

During the public debate in 1964 concerning whether there should be a Boston campus and during the very early stages of the site selection process, the University appears to have suffered from a lack of competent assistance by technical consultants. During these early stages various site proposals were being advanced by political leaders and university administrators with virtually no experience in the identification and analysis of the many relevant technical considerations which must form a part of such a decision.

It seems, today, almost incredible that the Commonwealth's political leadership and the University would embark on such a complex and expensive venture without technical assistance. The decision on creation of a Boston campus was reached quickly in June, 1964 despite the fact that Senator Kevin Harrington, the co-chairman of The Willis Harrington Commission, the professional/technical group charged with studying higher education in Massachusetts, objected that his group was still hard at work and would not complete its report for several months. The lack of professional technical consultants contributed to the false starts and long delays during the first year of the site selection process.

The consultants finally employed by the University, Sasaki and Associates, had a strong influence on decisions by the University regarding specific sites. Their reports present a thorough treatment of such technical factors as topography, minimum site size, nature of the surrounding community, the composition of subsoils and bedrock, traffic patterns etc. Their planning documents display a general technical competence and many bold and innovative concepts which unfortunately were not used effectively by the University in presenting the various site proposals to the external community. There is no evidence that this technical excellence, or any aura of prestige they may have accrued as experts in the field of architectural design, was of any assistance to the University in selling their proposal to the external community. This was due in part to a tendency for the consultants and the University's planners to work on their own in a vacuum rather than in close contact and effective cooperation with the city's technical experts, Edward Logue, Hale Champion and the staff of the BRA. In each of the conflicts between the University and the city over specific sites, these two groups of experts were also in conflict. Obviously the University would have been in far deeper trouble without the competent assistance of Sasaki and yet the prestige of Sasaki's reputation for excellence counted for very little in the effort to gain support in the external community.

Rosen, it should be recalled, concluded that the analysis of organizational structure provided the best approach to understanding the Chicago experience but expressed concern that a particular organization's internal structure and the interplay between a particular mix of competing organizations might be unique to a particular time and place. He also found that the University of Illinois used its prestige as a research university, and the aura of reports generated through a scientific and technical approach to site selection for its Chicago campus, to gain support for the university's position. Sasaki's work was excellent from the standpoint of thoroughness and the technical accuracy of research and analysis. The University was unable to use Sasaki's work effectively to support their position on site choices such as Copley or Highland Park because of the extensive local political opposition to these locations. This suggests that the technical approach is useful only in a subordinate way to support policy decisions which are either politically popular with major groups of constituents or at least neutral in their impact.

It is significant that Rosen did not identify faculty leaders as playing a significant role in the choice of the site for the Chicago campus. In Boston they played a major role in developing the unique mission statement for the campus which, in turn, dictated a strong orientation toward a core city location. The Boston context was different.

CHAPTER X.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS DEVELOPED FROM THE CASE STUDY

Although the passing years would gradually provide a vastly improved prospect, from the perspective of 1968, the site selection process for the University of Massachusetts - Boston had taken much too long and resulted in a conclusion which was a disappointment to the campus leadership. The frustrating early years had brought a premature end to the promising leadership of the campus' first chancellor. A serious delay had occurred in the campus' ability to achieve its full mission of service to metropolitan Boston. A public educational institution which had been founded in 1964 with great public anticipation and acclaim had now been pushed into a position of relative obscurity at a site which much of the public at the time would identify as highly undesirable and potentially dangerous given the notorious reputation of the adjacent housing project and the relative difficulty in reaching the site via public transportation.

It is appropriate to ask how these disappointing outcomes might have been avoided and what implications the site selection process for the Boston campus of the University of Massachusetts might have for institutions facing similar major policy decisions.

The end result of this case study is a series of conclusions that emerge from a review of this particular

site selection and decision making process. A suggestion for further research is that others who conduct similar studies use these conclusions, and perhaps Rosen's, as a point of focus to see whether these conclusions about the important factors affecting such processes will hold across other site selection processes and major policy decision making concerning other urban public universities.

It is suggested that this be done following similar methods of historical treatment and in-depth review of the actors and processes as used in this case study and in the study by Rosen. Only by telling the full story of what occurred that can one capture and understand the underlying dynamics and decision making processes. The findings of this case study can be summarized into several broadly stated conclusions which are presented in the remainder of this chapter.

The Importance of Adequate Institutional Research and Planning

The decision to establish a public institution at the university level in the Boston area was a sudden political decision reached in the spring of 1964 with a minimum of public debate and virtually no prior planning and analysis. This left the University with virtually no road map as it began to quickly throw together an operating plan in the summer of 1964 which would enable it to find a temporary site and open a new campus by the fall of 1965. The case study reflects the disappointing results.

One gets the impression that the University of Massachusetts at Boston was created in 1964 almost entirely as the result of the sudden accidental discovery of sufficient political support for a public university in the Boston area. A major factor behind the decision that the University of Massachusetts at Amherst should take the leadership in providing a new public university in Boston appears to have been the personal opinion held by the new president of the state senate that Boston State College had inadequate space and insufficiently experienced faculty leadership to develop into a state university.

The decision was definitely not the logical, carefully phased result of sound long range planning for growth within a carefully balanced state system of higher education. It was a victory won by the University of Massachusetts in the political arena with detailed planning and actual public needs assessment issues left to be addressed later on. The lack of statewide coordination and the absence of adequate assessment of needs and of comprehensive planning prior to the enactment of enabling legislation left the University with no clear case to make for a core city vs. suburban location. It also left them no basis on which to make an informed objective choice of site which would be acceptable to the host community.

State-wide coordination of the development of higher education in Massachusetts in the 1960's and thorough prior planning for a public university for Metropolitan

Boston would have eliminated much of the difficulty reflected in this case study. The prolonged debate and decision making process on a site would have taken place during the years before passage of enabling legislation, not for years after the campus opened its doors in temporary quarters. The strong arguments of the city administration and business community against a core city location, and other difficulties involved with the selection of any site in metropolitan Boston, would have surfaced very early, have been resolved, and would have been key determinants in a decision on possible sites before the legislation was passed. The enabling legislation would have almost surely been site specific.

The Importance of a Central Statewide Coordinating
Agency for Public Higher Education

In the spring of 1964, there was no state-wide coordinating agency, such as today's Massachusetts Board of Regents, charged with planning and coordinating the development of the state's system of public higher education. The result was a condition of intense and unbridled political competition for legislative support among the various segments of public higher education. In this wide open environment, it appears that the university saw itself as threatened by the possible creation of a rival state university located closer to the center of political power.

President Lederle was able to use the greater prestige of the University of Massachusetts, to advantage. He was also able to capitalize on the sudden opportunity for strong political support in the legislature occasioned by the resignation of Boston's Senator John Powers, a strong ally of President Looney of Boston State College, from the presidency of the State Senate and his replacement by Maurice Donahue, a strong supporter of The University of Massachusetts from the western part of Massachusetts.

President Looney and his senior staff might have been able to create the equivalent of the Boston campus of the University of Massachusetts, or an even a stronger institution, within the same time frame, given the same resources and political support or a merger might have been possible which included Boston State College as a college of education within the new urban university. The merger of the two institutions, the Boston campus of the University of Massachusetts and Boston State College, did finally take place as the result of a legislative mandate in 1982. This could have been accomplished in 1964 and it is possible that the result would have been a stronger public university for Boston. It seems certain that this approach would have eliminated some needless duplication of resources and programs. This did not happened in 1964 because the conflicting positions of the University of Massachusetts and Boston State College concerning the future direction of public higher education in Boston

were not offset by a counterbalance provided by a strong state coordinating agency directing the development of public higher education.

In this vacuum each institution sought to win a political victory in the legislature. The University emerged from this conflict with a mandate to build and control the new urban public university, but, Boston State emerged still intact and able to maintain its separate status for several more years.

The Importance of Strong Community Relations
Based on an Understanding by the University
of the Local Political and Economic Context

The University leadership, most notably President Lederle, displayed a surprising lack of understanding of the local political and economic context within the Boston community. Most surprising of all is the fact that they appear to have had few, if any, discussions with the Collins administration prior to passage of enabling legislation in 1964. Several more months elapsed before a meaningful dialogue was established at which point the mayor discovered that the University intended to locate in the core city and the University discovered that the mayor had assumed, and strongly preferred, the choice of a suburban location for the new campus.

In the initial stages of the site selection process the University was unable to convince Collins and White of the desirability of locating the new campus within the core

city or of any important benefits to be derived by the city. The University also appears to have not fully understood the political and economic milieu into which they were attempting to introduce a new campus. They seem to have underestimated the importance of the fierce competition for the very limited available space in the core city. In the early years they virtually ignored, in their public statements and actions, the growing concern in the Boston community about the loss of property tax base to tax exempt institutions.

They seem to have assumed that a strong base of support for the location of a public university campus in the core city would develop as a matter of course in the Boston community as it had in Chicago and other major urban areas. This strong base of support simply wasn't there and as late as the fall of 1968 Dean Gagnon was expressing publicly his dismay and amazement that Boston would not do what other major urban areas had done for their public university.

The later part of the case study suggests that the administration of President Robert Wood had a far better understanding of the importance of positive dialogue between the university and the community during the development of a new campus. He used this understanding in positive ways to successfully resolve potential university/community conflicts during the crucial final stages of planning for the new campus.

This case study has important implications for planning for university-community relationships. The community will not automatically accept the presence of a university and its programs as an unqualified benefit. The university must make the case for its benefit to the community and before it can do that it must be certain that it has fully articulated and fully understands, itself, the case to be presented. This requires a thorough examination of the nature and needs of the host community. It also requires productive communication.

This case suggests that in the early years of the site selection process, the University was not at all adept at community relations. Their plans might have caused serious harm to the Highland Park Community, to the efforts of the city to revitalize its core business district, and to the tenant residents of Dorchester and Columbia Point. It was not until various constituent groups within the host community expressed strong resistance that the University began to listen and yield to the concerns of the community. The review of the literature suggests that the University of Massachusetts was not alone in this error.

This case study also suggests that community relations did improve. The University of Massachusetts' subsequent work with the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force and its formal statement of policy regarding community relations, stands as a model of what "town/gown" relationships can be.

The University of Massachusetts at Boston exists today as a model of university community relations largely because of this recognition which took place under the Wood administration in the early 1970's.

These observations about the Boston site selection process suggest the negative consequences of the lack of an adequate community relations effort with the capacity to analyze, understand and make recommendations on how to deal with the complex political and economic environment in Boston adequate to support the very difficult task of locating a totally new satellite campus one hundred miles distant in the heart of the state's capital city. Had this capability been in place in 1963, it is possible that much of the controversy and delay surrounding the debate on a core city site would have been avoided.

The Accidental Impact of Timing

Timing, within a given local political context, is an extremely important consideration during the introduction of a major new publicly supported higher education institution. It worked both for and against the University.

Support for a public university in Boston could not be mustered until a wave of new college bound students engulfed the public and private institutions. President Lederle, who had been thinking about a Boston campus for some time, skillfully chose the moment when public concern

was growing about the lack of space at Amherst and he had the support of a new State Senate president to launch his campaign for expansion of the University.

The new campus of the University of Illinois arrived in Chicago early in its urban renewal program as the result of a wave of enthusiasm for an urban public university spearheaded by a very popular and powerful mayor, Richard Daley. The University of Massachusetts' new campus arrived in Boston towards the close of the urban renewal process and at the crest of a wave of xenophobia spearheaded by a woman who almost became mayor, Louise Day Hicks and a more restrained but heightened concern by the local business community with the amount of property tax base which had already been lost to colleges and other non-profit institutions.

The Lack of a Single Voice for the University

The lack of a single University voice, described at length in the previous chapter, clearly hampered the site selection process in Boston. The fact that President Lederle, Chancellor Ryan, Dean Gagnon, and to some extent the members of the Trustee Buildings and Grounds Committee, and Vice Chairman Healey, all at one point or another represented themselves as the voice of the University, and all in fact had differing points of view, left outsiders never sure what was the position of the University at any given point in time on the suburban vs. core city site question, or on any particular site.

The City and the Urban University as Neighbors

A key finding of this research is that the immediate local political context surrounding an urban public university will have a profound impact upon policy decision making for the university. The local political context must be known and understood by decision makers within the urban public university. It cannot be ignored. This finding dramatically underscores the need for effective public relations by the urban public university. It suggests that the near neighbors of such an institution will view its presence in terms of the immediate impact on their daily lives and not in terms of its broader long term benefit to society. The prestige of the university, and support for its presence within the the broader society, count for very little in such relationships. The urban public university must interact in a positive two way working relationship which yields direct tangible benefit to its local neighbors. Planning and decision making are more effective when representatives of the community are involved. At the beginning of the site selection process the University of Massachusetts had not built into its structure a mechanism through which it could foster positive two-way dialogue with the Boston community. During the Wood administration the University introduced a carefully planned program designed to adress this important need.

The Importance of a Clear Mission Statement
for Urban Public Universities

A clear understanding of the dynamics of what occurred during the long site selection process for this particular urban public university speaks directly to the nature of the essential mission of all urban public universities. In the case of the University of Massachusetts-Boston this definition of mission took place within the crucible of the site selection experience not before it. It can be argued, perhaps, that because it was formed in this manner the definition is clearer and more valid and yet it would certainly seem that much of the difficulty and delay related by this case study could have been avoided by the clear definition of a valid mission statement in the fall of 1963, not ten years later. The narrative of this difficult and costly experience should serve as a caution to those who may be charged at a future point with the enormous task of beginning an urban public college or university from nothing.

As a result of this experience, the University of Massachusetts at Boston can be said to have entered into a compact with the city in which it chose to locate as an alternative to other locations. The city did not invite the university, it came of its own choosing. One might even say, at its own insistence. In order to gain acceptance by the city, it agreed to bend its own agenda, finally, to better fit that of the city. Its programs would be

developed and operate with this premise clearly in mind. The city administration and the campus' immediate neighbors would be fully participating partners in defining the nature of the urban mission of the university. This agreement upon a symbiotic relationship between city and university cannot be abrogated at some future point by the university. The relationship must of its nature remain symbiotic so that the university may function as a logical part of the whole fabric of urban life and continue to return to the city services of tangible value to replace those resources which it has taken away. This necessary facet of the university's relationship to the city will remain as both a unique opportunity and a constraint in the years to come.

The "Hiding Hand" and Institutional History

During a review of the site selection process for Boston, and a comparison of this process with the similar experience for Chicago, it is possible to develop a feeling of "inevitability", a sense that a final solution to the issue is just waiting all along to be discovered as the only feasible political compromise at least minimally acceptable to all parties and meeting, at least in a minimal sense, basic technical and cost requirements for such projects. Hirshman's "Hiding Hand" comes strongly to mind as perhaps the best way to describe such popular impressions of the processes of planning and decision

making. Many random direct and indirect environmental factors and events came together finally to form a decision which few, if any, foresaw at the beginning and with which none were totally satisfied or dissatisfied at the end.

Years later when the decision is long made and subsequent events and adjustments have gradually shaped the decision into a functioning reality with which most are satisfied and many totally delighted, some will look back and wonder how anyone could have foreseen any other possible course.

Recently, over lunch, a six year veteran of the UMB faculty commented, "But, there were never any other sites for the campus ever seriously considered besides Columbia Point were there? Where else could we have been in this city than here?" One can see this tendency taking place in the closing lines of President Lederle's recollections of the Boston campus search process which were recorded in 1975, seven years after the decision was made for Columbia Point,

There was no question but that certain members of the Boston faculty were critical of me and critical of the Board because we didn't stand up to Hancock and some others. I might have stood up to them if it was the ideal site. I didn't happen to think being on a cloverleaf with fifteen acres and building a ribbon-strip university was really in the long run a good thing. But if I had thought so I might have assessed very carefully our strengths and gone ahead to fight it....Now, I understand that most of them are terribly enthusiastic about Columbia Point. they like it out there. They've got a little space. it's a beautiful view out onto the harbor. 1.

The interviewer, Robert McCartney, agreed with Lederle. He responded, "In fact, they've renamed it the Harbor campus and are going to put in a little marina in there, and everyone seems happy. They are delighted with it." 2.

From the perspective of 1989 it is even easier to gain the impression that the choice of Columbia Point was the purposeful and deliberate outcome of a carefully designed and executed planning process. It is not difficult to develop the assumption that it was the best of all possible alternatives. The data presented in the case study suggests quite different conclusions.

In addition to being an analysis of a major decision making process by an urban university, this study is also a partial history of the first ten years of a specific urban university, The University of Massachusetts - Boston. In consideration of this dual purpose a special effort has been made to present the data in as stark and objective a manner as possible.

As the case unfolds the actions and opinions expressed by key participants both within and outside the university appear at times as confusing, indecisive and ambiguous. External factors intervene which could never have been foreseen at the beginning of the episode causing further delay and indecision. As time passes key decision points are reached and decisions are made even though they may be simply a decision to postpone a decision. Multiple choices are possible but, ultimately, only one is selected.

There is never a guarantee that the direction taken was a "best choice". It was simply a choice. There is no providence, no "hiding hand" directing the evolution of colleges and universities only an ongoing complex series of decisions which must be faced in a continuum of one academic year following the next.

Decisions made in the past and the forces which impelled them remain as the foundations for the very problems and issues which confront the institution at the present moment. An institution which has no clear understanding of the reality of its foundations and its past is at a greater risk of blundering forward into the future. This risk is heightened when there is a false sense of an institution's past and its historic mission and role within the community.

With this in mind, it is of critical importance that those who endeavor to write histories of colleges and universities endeavor to be as complete and objective as possible in presenting the evidence of what has occurred in the past even though that evidence may at times present a picture which is stark, bleak, ambiguous and not altogether pleasant and flattering. To do otherwise is to ultimately do a serious disservice to the institution which is the subject of the study.

Epilogue

Technical problems in the construction of the new campus caused a postponement of the original plan to open for the fall semester. The new facility was finally opened for classes on January 28, 1974. The worst fears of the community were never realized. The University lived up to its commitments. No massive traffic jams resulted. No significant dislocation of Dorchester residents occurred as the result of an influx of student tenants. In the early 1980's local community groups and individual residents began the shared use of recreational facilities in the newly opened, Catherine Forbes Clark Athletic Center. The Clark Center was named to honor the memory of a former trustee and Dorchester community activist who had been specifically selected by Governor Sargent to fill a new trustee position created to enhance communication with the neighboring communities.

Visitors to the campus, today in 1989, are often impressed by the spectacular scenic ocean views, the innovative architecture of the building complex, the proximity of new Columbia Point neighbors such as the Kennedy Presidential Library, the Massachusetts State Archives and "Harbor Point", the beautifully refurbished luxury apartment complex which has recently opened on the reconstructed site of the former public housing complex which was almost totally abandoned by the Boston Housing Authority by the mid-1980's.

A recent mass mailing from this apartment complex invited University of Massachusetts students to consider becoming one of the new residents. Future plans include a waterfront park with picnic areas, biking and jogging trails, tennis courts, swimming pools, clubhouse with fitness center, a day care center, health care center and 18 hour per day shuttle bus service. All of this can be had for rents ranging from \$700 to \$1,400 per month. "Harbor Point", the mailing assured the students, "is truly Boston's best value and lifestyle for apartment living and a great alternative to the pricey, congested inner city."

Finishing touches are being made on a refurbished multi-million dollar public transit terminal adjacent to the campus which provides a more effective link to the two rapid transit lines which pass near the campus.

Many visitors are struck as well by the remarkable cultural, racial and economic diversity of the campus' the 13,000+ students, all of whom commute to classes each day from their homes throughout the Greater Boston area and beyond.

Paul Gagnon and Francis Broderick, along with a number of the founding faculty of the late 1960's, remain as highly valued and respected senior faculty. The campus administration building was recently named in honor of a former speaker of the house and state attorney general, Robert Quinn, who recently completed service as the chairman of the University's board of trustees. The campus

library was recently named in honor of another former chairman of the board of trustees, the late Joseph Healey.

In virtually every respect, the campus presents the image of a public university carefully planned and wisely sited to best meet the specific needs of its host population without harmful intrusion into the local neighborhood.

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF MAJOR EVENTS 1963 - 1974

1963 - 1964

Fall, 1963

Dr. Norman Greenwald, Golding Center, Brandeis University is commissioned by The Legislative Research Bureau to conduct a study of public higher education in Boston in response to the current enrollment crisis

January, 1964

Greenwald consults with President Lederle.

The second annual report of the Advisory Board of Higher Education Policy projects large increases in high school graduates by the mid-1970's. They recommend a year round calendar for the state's system of public higher education.

President Lederle proposes a "University of Massachusetts in Boston" in an interview with The Boston Globe.

March, 1964

Senate President John Powers, from Boston, resigns and is replaced by Senator Maurice Donahue from western Massachusetts.

April, 1964

While testifying before the Senate Ways and Means Committee, President Lederle states that 8,000 qualified freshman applicants will have to turned away from the University due to lack of space.

Legislation is filed calling for the creation of a special legislative commission to study the feasibility of a branch of The University of Massachusetts in Boston.

Dr. Greenwald's report is released. It recommends, as one alternative, the creation of a public university for Boston.

May, 1964

Senate President Donahue calls for the creation of a new campus for the University in the suburbs of Boston while speaking at the University of Massachusetts in Amherst.

Legislation is filed authorizing a Boston campus for the University.

May-June, 1964

During hearings and debate on the legislation creating a Boston campus strong opposition is voiced by representatives of Boston area private institutions and the college system.

June, 1964

Passage of legislation creating UMass.-Boston.

July, 1964

President Lederle appoints a task force to develop plans for the new campus and they begin consideration of campus site alternatives within greater Boston as well as within the core city.

September, 1964

President Lederle appoints The New Departures and Concepts Sub-Committee to the planning task force.

Robert Heller Associates is employed to find a temporary site for the Boston campus.

November, 1964

Robert Heller Associates recommends selection of a temporary site within the downtown commercial district and suggests various buildings as possible choices.

1965

February, 1965

The University secures the former Boston Gas Building in Park Square in downtown Boston as the temporary campus.

Dr. John Ryan is appointed chancellor for the Boston Campus.

October, 1966

The University purchases the Boston Gas Building in Park Square.

December, 1966

Residents of the Highland Park area speak out in opposition to the University. Protest meetings and activities continue through the end of January, 1966.

1967

February, 1967

The University abandons further consideration of Highland Park.

April, 1967

Sasaki associates propose selection of a "Copley-Turnpike" site.

April-May, 1967

Widespread opposition to the "Copley-Turnpike" site by the Boston business community and other community leaders.

May, 1967

The Collins' Administration and the BRA express strong opposition to the "Copley-Turnpike" site.

Governor Volpe and the legislative leadership express opposition to the "Copley-Turnpike" site.

The University abandons further consideration of the "Copley-Turnpike" site.

The BRA formally presents the University with its "Campus by the Sea" concept for a site at Columbia Point.

May-Nov., 1967

Mayor Collins decides not to seek another term and Kevin White is elected following a long campaign in which strengthening of neighborhoods and empowerment of community action groups emerges as a key issue.

June, 1965

The sub-committee on New Departures and Concepts issues a final report citing the critical importance of a core city location.

July, 1965

Chancellor Ryan conducts discussions with officials of the Boston Redevelopment Authority. These are the first formal contacts between the University and the BRA.

August, 1965

Boston Mayor Collins asks Chancellor Ryan not to consider any "in-town" site for the new campus.

September, 1965

First classes begin at the Park Square campus.

December, 1965

Formal installation of Chancellor Ryan.

1966

May, 1966

The University receives a formal proposal from Sasaki associates for a site at Highland park in Roxbury.

June, 1966

Chancellor Ryan recommends selection of Highland Park to the trustees.

August, 1966

Mayor Collins and the BRA state formal objections to the use of Highland Park for the Boston campus.

September, 1966

Mayor Collins is defeated in bid for the Democratic Party nomination for United States Senator.

November, 1967

Sasaki Associates present a report to the trustees on 15 possible site locations within suburban Boston and the core city. They receive approval to begin more intensive review of seven of these sites which appear to be the most suitable.

December, 1967

A consultant report by Research Associates points out the University's weak public image in greater Boston and recommends a program to strengthen community relations.

At a mass rally of 1500 persons at the Park Square campus student leaders demand a core city location for the Boston campus, preferably near Copley Square and the South End.

1968

February, 1968

Chancellor Ryan submits his resignation effective in August, 1968.

March-May, 1968

Boston Campus administrators and faculty leaders attempt to win approval by the BRA and the Boston business community for a smaller Copley area site. The effort is unsuccessful.

June, 1968

Sasaki Associates and the BRA begin consideration of a site near Boston's North Station.

August, 1968

Dr. Francis L. Broderick is appointed chancellor for the Boston campus.

September, 1968

Owners of the Boston Public Garden raise strong objections to consideration of the North Station area as a site for the new campus.

Mayor White expresses opposition to the North Station site.

September, 1968

House Speaker Robert Quinn urges the trustees to select Columbia Point. Harsh criticism is expressed through the news media of the University leadership's "deliberate inaction and sabotage" by Senate Majority Leader Kevin Harrington.

October, 1968

Faculty and student leaders request a delay on final site selection until they can prepare a report to the trustees on a new scattered site concept for the campus.

A mass rally of 2500 students and faculty is held at the statehouse to demand an in-town site for the campus.

At a meeting initially called to approve the selection of Columbia Point the trustees agree to delay their decision so that further consideration can be given to the scattered site proposal.

November, 1968

Chancellor Broderick presents a report on the scattered site concept to the trustees and asks for further delay in a decision on a site. His request and the scattered site concept are rejected by President Lederle and the trustees. A majority of the trustees vote to select Columbia Point as the final site.

1969-1970

May, 1969

Local residents surrounding the Columbia Point site begin to express heightened concern now that a definite site selection has been made.

March, 1970

Architectural plans for the new campus are unveiled at the statehouse by Governor Sargent and Chancellor Broderick.

April, 1970

The University establishes a liaison office to work with the residents of the Columbia Point housing project.

July, 1970

Local residents form a human chain to protest construction at Columbia Point.

September, 1970 The University's new president, Robert Wood appoints a task force to study cooperative planning, community consultation, and employment programs for local residents adjacent to the Columbia Point site.

December, 1970 Preseident Wood is formally inaugurated. He announces appointment of a select Committee on the Future University of Massachusetts.

1971-1974

July, 1971 Report by Vice President for Development, L. Edward Lashman calls for greter cooperation in mutual development between the University and community at Columbia Point.

November, 1971 Appointment of the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force.

Summer, 1972 The news media reports on heightened concern by local residents at Columbia Point and Savin Hill concerning possible negative impacts of the new campus.

October, 1972 The Boston City Council holds hearings on Columbia Point

January, 1973 The formal report of the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force expresses local concerns and demands regarding operation of the new campus.

March, 1973 Mayor White presents the trustees with a formal statement of Boston's concrns regarding the operation of the new campus.

June, 1973

The University trustees adopt a formal policy statement on the new campus at Columbia Point which addresses the concerns of Mayor White and local neighborhood groups.

January, 1974 Classes begin at the new Columbia Point campus.

APPENDIX B

LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED FOR THE CASE STUDY

<u>Person</u>	<u>Role</u>	<u>Date and Place of Interview</u>
Dr. Francis L. Broderick	Chancellor of UMB from October 1, 1968.	May 17, 1988. Dr. Broderick's office at UMB.
Donald Costello	First Director of Admissions at UMB. Started in March 1965.	May 25, 1988 John Whittaker's Office at UMB.
Maurice A. Donahue	President of the Massachusetts State Senate from 1964 to 1970.	September 26, 1988. Mr. Donahue's Office at The Institute for Governmental Services at UMB.
Dr. Paul Gagnon	Member of New Departures and New Concepts Committee and First Academic Dean at UMB.	May 27, 1988 By telephone.

Dolores Miller

Resident and community leader of Savin Hill Dorchester during the site selection process and building of the new campus. Active with the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force and related committees. Ms. Miller also provided extensive files of the meetings and activities of these groups during the early 1970's.

Various dates from September 1987 to October 1988.
Ms. Miller's office at UMB.

Dr. Duncan Nelson

UMB Professor active in Faculty Governance groups in fall of 1968.

June 1, 1988.
Dr. Nelson's Office at UMB.

Dr. Walter Weibrecht

Chemistry Professor at UMB UMB from 1966 to 1988.

June 20, 1988.
Dr. Weibrecht's Office at UMB.

Kevin H. White

Mayor of Boston from 1968 to 1973.

October 7, 1988.
Mr. White's Office at Boston University

Edward A. Zaleskas

Faculty Member and Administrator at Boston State College from 1964 to its merger with UMB in 1982.

May 19, 1988.
John Whittaker's office at UMB.

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38. "Donahue Urges UMass Annex At Blue Hills", The Boston Globe, May 4, 1964, pg. 3.
39. Ian Forman, "Mixed Views Greet Hub UMass Plan", The Boston Globe, May 28, 1964, pg. 5. See also "Help For Those Qualified", an editorial appearing on pg. 24 of the same edition of The Boston Globe.
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43. Statement of Frank J. Zeo, Executive Director of the Massachusetts Federation of Taxpayers Associations, Inc. regarding Senate 849, A Bill to establish a Branch of the University of Massachusetts in the Boston area, May 27, 1964. A copy of this statement is contained within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 39 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at the Amherst campus.

44. Statement of Dr. William F. Looney regarding Senate Bill 849, May 27, 1964. A copy of this statement is contained within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 39, Folder 491 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at the Amherst campus.

45. The University of Massachusetts Oral History Project, Conducted by Robert J. McCartney for the University of Massachusetts, Edited by Maura Donahue, Interview With former President John Lederle at the Amherst Campus on January 27 through February 12, 1975, pg. 81-82. A copy of this document is filed within Group 1,207, Series No. II, Box No. 2 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at the Amherst Campus.

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56. The University of Massachusetts Oral History Project, Conducted by Robert J. McCartney for the University of Massachusetts, Edited by Maura Donahue, Interview With Dennis M. Crowley, Trustee of the University, 1952-1974, on November 7, 1974, Page 30. A copy of this document is filed within Group 1,207, Series No. II, Box No. 2 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at the Amherst Campus.

CHAPTER V

1. "UMass Boston Branch Is Only A Supplement", The Hampshire Gazette, August 28, 1968, pg. 4.
2. The University of Massachusetts Oral History Project, Conducted by Robert J. McCartney for the University of Massachusetts, Edited by Maura Donahue, Interview With Leo Redfern at the Amherst Campus on February 24, 1970, pg. 19. A copy of this document is filed within Group 1/207, Series No. II, Box No. 2 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at the Amherst Campus.
3. Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, The Academic Revolution, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1968, pg. 143.
4. Clark Kerr, "Higher Education In a Troubled City", a paper presented by Dr. Kerr as a part of a Lowell Lecture Series sponsored by The Lowell Institute in cooperation with The Tufts-New England Medical Center and WGBH-TV on Tuesday, April 2, 1968, pg. 6.
5. Minutes of the Dean's Council, Amherst Campus, August 18, 1964. A copy of these minutes is filed in Box 6, "Plans & Site Selection", of the Provost's Office records within the holdings of the University of Massachusetts-Boston Records Center.
6. Final Report Of The Committee on New Concepts and New Departures, University of Massachusetts-Boston, July 21, 1965, pg. 1. A copy of this report is contained within Folio 12, Box 4 of the papers of Professor Max Bluestone at the Archives of the University of Massachusetts-Boston.
7. Summary Report, October 1964 - February 1965, Of The Committee On New Concepts and New Departures, University of Massachusetts-Boston, February 28, 1965, page 2.
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18. Paul Gagnon, "Why Build UM/B In The Middle Of Downtown Boston?", A paper presented by Dr. Gagnon to the Committee on New Concepts and New Departures in November, 1964, pg. 1. A copy of this paper is filed within Box 2 of the collections of the Archives of The University of Massachusetts - Boston.
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27. Daniel P. Moynihan, "Crisis In The City", The Massachusetts Review, Summer 1967, Volume VIII, No. 3, pg. 498.
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29. F. Donald Costello, "The University of Massachusetts At Boston Admissions Report; 1965-70; The First Six Years", A Report Submitted to the Trustee Committee on Faculty and Educational Policy of the Board of Trustees of The University of Massachusetts by F. Donald Costello, Director of Admissions, University of Massachusetts at Boston, April 21, 1971, pg. 1-6. A copy of this report was furnished to me by Mr. Costello from his personal files.
30. F. Donald Costello, "The University of Massachusetts At Boston Admissions Report; 1965-70; The First Six Years", A Report Submitted to the Trustee Committee on Faculty and Educational Policy of the Board of Trustees of The University of Massachusetts by F. Donald Costello, Director of Admissions, University of Massachusetts at Boston, April 21, 1971, pg. 12. A copy of this report was furnished to me by Mr. Costello from his personal files.
31. F. Donald Costello, "The University of Massachusetts At Boston Admissions Report; 1965-70; The First Six Years", A Report Submitted to the Trustee Committee on Faculty and Educational Policy of the Board of Trustees of The University of Massachusetts by F. Donald Costello, Director of Admissions, University of Massachusetts at Boston, April 21, 1971, pg. 24-26. A copy of this report was furnished to me by Mr. Costello from his personal files.

CHAPTER VI

1. The University of Massachusetts Oral History Project, Conducted by Robert J. McCartney for the University of Massachusetts, Edited by Maura Donahue, Interview with former President John Lederle at the Amherst Campus on January 27 through February 12, 1975, pg. 83. A copy of this document is filed within Group 1/207, Series No. II, Box No. 2 of the collections of The University of Massachusetts Archives at the Amherst Campus.
2. Ian Forman, "The University of Massachusetts: A Model Campus in Amherst-What Can Hub Area Expect?", The Boston Globe, June 18, 1964, pg. 20.
3. Ian Forman, "4 Will Plan Creation Of Hub UMass", The Boston Globe, July 9, 1964, pg. 6.
4. Task Force Minutes - Meeting #1, June 26, 1964. A copy of the minutes of the task force is filed within Box. No. 3 of the collections of the Archives of the University of Massachusetts-Boston.
5. Task Force Minutes - Meeting #4, July 10, 1964.
6. Task Force Minutes - Meeting #9, July 31, 1964.
7. Task Force Minutes - Meeting #11, August 21, 1964.
8. Task Force Minutes - Meeting #12, September 1, 1964. See also a memorandum from H.S. Hugill, Director of Physical Plant at Amherst to Donald Gadigan dated September 2, 1964 in which Hugill provides a detailed report on each of the 12 sites visited, filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 496 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
9. Task Force Minutes - Meeting #13, September 11, 1964.
10. Robert Heller Associates Inc. Report to the Trustees, November 24, 1964.
11. Robert L. Levy, "UMass Boston Goal Is 25,000 Students" The Boston Globe, February 17., 1965, pg. 3. See also Joseph Sullivan, "Clash Looms On UMass City Site", The Boston Herald, February 17, 1965, pg. 1. and the University of Massachusetts Official News Release for Tuesday, February 16, 1965. A copy of this release is filed within the collections of the Archives of the University of Massachusetts-Boston Box 3.

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13. "UMass Board Wins Boston Site Control", The Boston Globe, April 27, 1965, pg. 2.
14. University of Massachusetts Official News Release for Friday, February 12, 1965. A copy of this release is within the collections of the Archives of the University of Massachusetts-Boston Box 3.
15. Gail Perrin, "Madison Park: From Fashionable Birth to Decay", The Boston Sunday Globe, April 4, 1965, pg. A7.
16. Ian Forman, "Infant UMass-Boston Already Quite a Lad," The Boston Sunday Globe, May 9, 1965, pg. A7.
17. Ian Forman, "Infant UMass-Boston Already Quite a Lad," The Boston Sunday Globe, May 9, 1965, pg. A7.
18. A copy of this letter from Ryan to Lederle dated August 11, 1965 is contained within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 498 of the Collections of the University Of Massachusetts Archives at the Amherst Campus.
19. Letter from Chancellor Ryan from Professors Brown, Goodwin, Powers, Tinder and Walter dated December 6, 1965. A copy is located in Box 8, Folio 12 of the Max Bluestone Papers at the Archives of the University of Massachusetts-Boston.
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21. The UMB News, April 25, 1966, pg. 3.
22. "Highland Park being Weighed As Site For UMass Hub Branch", The Boston Globe, May 2, 1966, pg. 1.
23. Confidential Memorandum On the Highland Park Site For University Of Massachusetts/Boston, Prepared by Sasaki, Dawson, Demay Associates, Inc., May 9, 1966, pg. 1. A copy of this report is contained within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 498 of the Collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at the Amherst Campus.
24. Confidential Memorandum On the Highland Park Site For University Of Massachusetts/Boston, Prepared by Sasaki, Dawson, Demay Associates, Inc., May 9, 1966, pg. 6. A copy of this report is contained within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 498 of the Collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at the Amherst Campus.

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26. Site Evaluation of Highland Park, University of Massachusetts - Boston, a report presented to Chancellor John W. Ryan by Richard F. Galehouse of Sasaki, Dawson, Demay Associates, Inc., June, 1966. A copy of this report is contained within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 498 of the Collections of the University Of Massachusetts Archives at the Amherst Campus.
27. Site Evaluation of Highland Park, University of Massachusetts - Boston, a report presented to Chancellor John W. Ryan by Richard F. Galehouse of Sasaki, Dawson, Demay Associates, Inc., June, 1966, pg. 5. A copy of this report is contained within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 498 of the Collections of the University Of Massachusetts Archives at the Amherst Campus.
28. Letter from Chancellor Ryan to President Lederle dated June 10, 1966, A copy of this report is contained in Box 8 Folio 5 of the Max Bluestone Papers at the Archives of the University of Massachusetts-Boston.
29. See: Site Comparison - Boston Campus, a report submitted by Sasaki, Dawson, Demay Associates, Inc. to the Trustees of the University of Massachusetts. August 1, 1966. A copy of this report is contained in Box 8, Folio 5 of the Max Bluestone Papers at the Archives of the University of Massachusetts-Boston.
30. See: Site Comparison - Boston Campus, a report submitted by Sasaki, Dawson, Demay Associates, Inc. to the Trustees of the University of Massachusetts. August 1, 1966, pg. 6. A copy of this report is contained in Box 8, Folio 5 of the Max Bluestone Papers at the Archives of the University of Massachusetts-Boston.
31. See: Site Comparison - Boston Campus, a report submitted by Sasaki, Dawson, Demay Associates, Inc. to the Trustees of the University of Massachusetts. August 1, 1966. A copy of this report is contained in Box 8, Folio 5 of the Max Bluestone Papers at the Archives of the University of Massachusetts-Boston.

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33. James S. Doyle, "Collins, Peabody Square Off on TV", The Boston Globe, September 12, 1966, pg. 1.
34. Election Statistics for 1966, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Office of Kevin H. White, Secretary of the Commonwealth, March 10, 1967.
35. The Mass Media, November 16, 1966, pg. 1.
36. Letter from Lederle to Ryan dated January 16, 1967, with attachments, filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 499 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
37. Letter from David Freedman, Chairman, Highland Park Council to Chancellor John Ryan dated December 29, 1966 which includes a copy of a letter from Freedman to Mayor Collins also dated December 29, 1966. See also Ryan's letter responding to Freedman's invitation dated January 16, 1967. These letters are filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 499 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
38. The University of Massachusetts Oral History Project, Conducted by Robert J. McCartney for the University of Massachusetts, Edited by Maura Donahue, Interview with Dennis M. Crowley, Trustee of the University, 1952-1974, at the Amherst Campus on November 7, 1974, pg. 36. A copy of this document is filed within Group 1/207, Series No. II, Box No. 2 of the collections of The University of Massachusetts Archives at the Amherst Campus.
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42. F. Peter Model, "The Healer and The Wrecker", Boston Magazine, June, 1966, pg. 23.
43. F. Peter Model, "Wanted-A Community Conscience", Boston Magazine, September, 1966.
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50. Unsigned editorial, "Students In The City: A Call For Candor", Boston Magazine, June, 1967, pg. 36.
51. Unsigned editorial, "Students In The City: A Call For Candor", Boston Magazine, June, 1967, pg. 37.
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54. Arthur Stratton, "Council, Chamber Take Aim At Copley Square UMass Campus", The Boston Herald, May 9, 1967, pg. 1.
55. Letter from Anselme to Lederle dated May 1, 1967 and related letter of response from Lederle to Anselme dated May 5, 1967, filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 499 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
56. Letter from Anselme to Lederle dated May 1, 1967 and related letter of response from Lederle to Anselme dated May 5, 1967, filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 499 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.

57. Memorandum and position paper submitted by W.J. Lehmann to President Lederle on April 25, 1966 and covering note from Lederle to Tipppo dated July 7, 1966. filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 499 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
58. Memorandum and position paper submitted by W.J. Lehmann to President Lederle on April 25, 1966 and covering note from Lederle to Tipppo dated July 7, 1966. filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 499 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
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64. Richard J. Connolly, "Trustee attacks Opposition To UMass Site In Boston", The Boston Sunday Globe, May 7, 1967.
65. Frank Reilly, "Salem Senator Raps Trustees Over Copley Square", The Boston Herald-American, May 10, 1967.
66. Frank Reilly, Gloria Boykin and Frank Sullivan, "UMass Still Prefers Copley Sq.", The Boston Record-American, May 12, 1967, pg. 3.
67. See: Telegram sent to Lederle by John A. Lowry, President of the Back Bay Association May 13, 1967, filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 499 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.

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69. Letter from Philip Zeigler, Director of Comprehensive Planning, Boston Redevelopment Authority to Chancellor Ryan, dated May 18, 1967
70. See, for example, "No Place For It", an editorial appearing in the evening edition of The Lawrence Eagle-Tribune on May 17, 1967, "Campus by the Sea", an editorial in the Boston Globe on May 19, 1967, "UMass-Boston", an editorial appearing in The Beverly Times on May 15, 1967 and "One-Sided Thinking" in the Athol News on May 15, 1967.
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72. "Hope Dims For UMass In Copley", The Waltham News-Tribune, May 12, 1967, pg. 6.
73. "Boston Branch of UMass Not Needed, Dr. Case Says", Evening Eagle-Tribune, Lawrence, Mass., May 22, 1967, pg. 3. See also "UMass Campus in Boston Not Needed Says BU's Case", The Berkshire Eagle, May 22, 1967, pg. 5, and "Dr. Case On Thin Ice", The Boston Globe, May 23, 1967.
74. Richard W. Daly, "Logue Moves Up Fast In Mayoral Race", The Boston Traveler, May 23, 1967, pg. 1.
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76. George W. Higgins, Style Versus Substance: Boston, Kevin White, And The Politics of Illusion, New York, MacMillian Publishing Co., 1984, pg. 70-73. See also coverage of the formal announcement of candidacy for mayor by Hicks in The Boston Globe for May 2 and May 3, 1967.
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78. Memorandum of Lederle to McCarthy, Redfern, Ryan, Johnson and Tipppo dated July 24, 1967. A copy of this memorandum is filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 499 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.

79. Memorandum of McCarthy to Lederle dated July 27, 1967. A copy of this memorandum is filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 499 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
80. The University of Massachusetts Oral History Project, conducted by Robert J. McCartney for the University of Massachusetts, Edited by Maura Donahue, Interview with former President John Lederle at the Amherst Campus on January 27 through February 12, 1975, page 83-84. A copy of this document is filed within Group 1/207, Series No. II, Box No. 2 of the collections of The University of Massachusetts Archives at the Amherst Campus.
81. The Public Case for The University of Massachusetts at Boston, a report by Science and University Affairs, 59 East 54th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022, December 2, 1967, pg. 1-2.
82. The Public Case for The University of Massachusetts at Boston, a report by Science and University Affairs, 59 East 54th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022, December 2, 1967, pg. 7-8.
83. The Public Case for The University of Massachusetts at Boston, a report by Science and University Affairs, 59 East 54th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022, December 2, 1967, pg. 9.
84. The Public Case for The University of Massachusetts at Boston, a report by Science and University Affairs, 59 East 54th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022, December 2, 1967, pg. 17.
85. Report of Sasaki, Dawson, Demay Associates, Inc. to the Buildings and Grounds Committee of the Board of Trustees, November 20, 1967, A copy of this report is filed within the collections of the Archives of The University of Massachusetts-Boston.
86. See: "Governor Shirley Proposal, University of Massachusetts at Boston: A Prospectus." This is a three page flyer prepared by informal neighborhood groups living in the "Governor Shirley" area in 1967 which argues the case for the site. A copy of this flyer is contained within the collections of the Archives of The University of Massachusetts-Boston.

87. Report of Sasaki, Dawson, Demay Associates, Inc. to the Buildings and Grounds Committee of the Board of Trustees, November 20, 1967, A copy of this report is filed within the collections of the Archives of The University of Massachusetts-Boston, pg. 10-11.
88. Report of Sasaki, Dawson, Demay Associates, Inc. to the Buildings and Grounds Committee of the Board of Trustees, November 20, 1967, A copy of this report is filed within the collections of the Archives of The University of Massachusetts-Boston, pg. 37-39.
89. Report of Sasaki, Dawson, Demay Associates, Inc. to the Buildings and Grounds Committee of the Board of Trustees, November 20, 1967, A copy of this report is filed within the collections of the Archives of The University of Massachusetts-Boston, pg. 40-42.

CHAPTER VII

1. A copy of Chancellor Ryan's resignation is included with the papers of President Lederle in the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
2. Arline Grimes, "Students Back Copley Campus", The Boston Herald, December 13, 1967.
3. See letter from James E. Smith to John Ryan dated January 4, 1968 filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 501 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
4. See letter to Lederle from Hale Champion dated February 19, 1968 filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 501 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
5. A copy of this memorandum is filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 501 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
6. Letter from Daniel P. Moynihan to Dean Gagnon, dated March 28, 1968, a copy of this letter is filed within Box 6 of The Provost Office Records, "Plans & Site Selection, 1964-1971", UMass.-Boston Records Center.
7. Betram G. Waters, "Columbia Pt. Site Aired For UMass.", The Boston Globe, April 4, 1968.
8. Letter from H.B. Baldwin to P. Gagnon, dated April 22, 1968. A copy of this letter is filed within Box 6 of The Provost Office Records, "Plans & Site Selection 1964-1971", UMass.-Boston Records Center.
9. Letter from H.B. Baldwin to James Kelso, dated May 3, 1968. A copy of this letter is filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 502 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
10. A copy of Canham's letter and Healey's response are filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 502 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
11. A copy of Canham's letter and Healey's response are filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 502 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.

12. A copy of Canham's letter and Healey's response are filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 502 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
13. A copy of Canham's letter and Healey's response are filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 502 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
14. A copy of Canham's letter and Healey's response are filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 502 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
15. Nina McCain, "One Hub Site Urged For 3 State Colleges", The Boston Globe, May 22, 1968. See also an unsigned editorial entitled, "Three-way Merger?", in The Boston Globe, May 23, 1968.
16. Letter from Francis O'Brien to K. Alexander of Sasaki, Dawson and Demay dated July 10, 1968. A copy of this letter is filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 502 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
17. Letter from Ryan to Lederle dated July 30, 1968. A Copy of this letter is filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 502 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
18. Letter from Ryan to Lederle dated July 30, 1968. A Copy of this letter is filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 502 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
19. Letter from Ryan to Healy dated August 8, 1968. A Copy of this letter is filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 502 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
20. Bertram G. Waters, "Couldn't Resist Challenge," Says New Boston UMass Head", The Boston Globe for August 18, 1968.

21. Letter from Thodore Chase to Fred C. Emerson, August 20, 1968. A copy of this letter is filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 502 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
22. A detailed profile of the North Station site is contained within the November 20, 1967 report of Sasaki, Dawson, DeMay Associates to the trustee Building and Grounds Committee.
23. Al Hirshberg, "Garden Too Vital To Be Strangled", The Herald Traveler, September 6, 1968.
24. The Boston Globe, September 6, 1968, page 1. A copy of this article is contained within the newsmedia clipping book within the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst for the Boston Campus - 1968.
25. The Boston Globe, September 6, 1968, editorial page. A copy of this article is contained within the newsmedia clipping book within the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst for the Boston Campus - 1968.
26. Telegram of Quinn to Lederle dated September 9, 1968. A copy of this telegram is filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 502 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
27. Robert B. Hanron, "Quinn Says UMass Must Choose Soon", The Boston Globe, September 11, 1968.
28. Letter of Quinn to Lederle dated September 11, 1968. A copy of this letter is filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 502 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
29. Letter from James Ryan to the Board of Trustees, September 11, 1968. A copy is filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 502 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.

30. Letter from Donald J. Trageser, Vice President and General Manager of WEEI, including the text of this WEEI editorial, to President Lederle, September 18, 1968. A copy of this letter is filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 502 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
31. Wendell H. Woodman, "Sen. Harrington Blasts UMass Power Grab", The Salem Evening News, September 19, 1968.
32. Wendell H. Woodman, "Sen. Harrington Blasts UMass Power Grab", The Salem Evening News, September 19, 1968.
33. Letter of Lederle to Ryan, September 20, 1968. A copy of this letter is filed within President Lederle's papers in the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
34. Letter of Ryan to Harrington, October 15, 1968. A copy of this letter is filed within President Lederle's papers in the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
35. Convening letter for this meeting to members from Secretary Robert McCartney dated October 3, 1968 and letter from Frank Boyden to Governor Volpe inviting the governor to this meeting, dated October 4, 1968. Copies of these letters are filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 503 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
36. Memorandum from Lynn Dhority, Secretary of the Faculty to President Lederle, October 9, 1968. A copy of this letter is filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 503 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
37. Memo from L. Redfern to President Lederle, Subject: "Discussion with Mr. Healey", October 9, 1968. A copy is filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 503 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
38. The Boston Globe, October 10, 1968. A copy of this article is contained within the newsmedia clipping book within the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst for the Boston Campus - 1968.

39. The Boston Globe, October 11, 1968, editorial page. A copy of this editorial is contained within the newsmedia clipping book within the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst for the Boston Campus - 1968.
40. A copy of this telegram is filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 503 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
41. Nina McCain, "2500 Students Boo UMass Site Plan", The Boston Globe, October 12, 1968. See also the Mass Media coverage in the edition for October 15, 1968.
42. See: Rally Address by Dean Paul Gagnon, November 11, 1968. A copy of this address is contained within the collections of the Archives of the University of Massachusetts-Boston.
43. The Boston Globe for October 14 and 15, 1968. A copy of this article is contained within the newsmedia clipping book within the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst for the Boston Campus - 1968.
44. Minutes of The Meeting of the Trustee Committee on Buildings & Grounds, October 14, 1968, held at 1:30 p.m. and of the Special Meeting of the University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees, October 14, 1968, held at 3:10 p.m., both at the Seraton Plaza Hotel, Boston, Mass. are filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 503 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
45. Report on the Columbia Point Site prepared for the meeting of the University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees held on October 14, 1968 by Sasaki, Dawson, Demay Associates. A copy of this report is filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 503 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
46. Minutes of The Meeting of the Trustee Committee on Buildings & Grounds, October 14, 1968, held at 1:30 p.m. and of the Special Meeting of the University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees, October 14, 1968, held at 3:10 p.m., both at the Seraton Plaza Hotel, Boston, Mass. are filed within Group No. 3/1, Series No. 3/2, Box No. 40, Folder No. 503 of the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.

47. The Mass Media October 30, 1968.
48. The Mass. Media November 12, 1968.
49. An Urban University For The Future: A Proposal for a Core City Location for The University of Massachusetts in Boston, presented by Chancellor Broderick at the November 15, 1968 meeting of the trustee Buildings and Grounds committee and as Trustee Document T69-025 at the meeting of the full board of trustees on November 22, 1968.
50. The Boston Globe November 21, 1968, A copy of this article is contained within the newsmedia clipping book within the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst for the Boston Campus - 1968.
51. Nina McCain, "Scattered Sites Proposed For In-Town UMass.", The Boston Globe, November 21, 1968
52. Letter from Cardinal Cushing to President Lederle, October 16, 1968. A copy is located in Box 3, of the collections of the Archives of the University of Massachusetts-Boston.
53. The Boston Globe, November 22, 1968.
54. The University of Massachusetts Oral History Project, conducted by Robert J. McCartney for the University of Massachusetts, Edited by Maura Donahue, Interview with former President John Lederle at the Amherst Campus on January 27 through February 12, 1975, pg. 86-87. A copy of this document is filed within Group 1/207, Series No. II, Box No. 2 of the collections of The University of Massachusetts Archives at the Amherst Campus.
55. Minutes of the meeting of the board of trustees, November 22, 1968.
56. Minutes of the meeting of the board of trustees, November 22, 1968.
57. Minutes of the meeting of the board of trustees, November 22, 1968.
58. Minutes of the meeting of the board of trustees, November 22, 1968.
59. Minutes of the meeting of the board of trustees, November 22, 1968.

60. The Mass Media, November 26, 1968, pg. 2.
61. The Mass Media, December 10, 1968, pg. 1.
62. The University of Massachusetts Oral History Project, conducted by Robert J. McCartney for the University of Massachusetts, Edited by Maura Donahue, Interview with former President John Lederle at the Amherst Campus on January 27 through February 12, 1975, pg. 90. A copy of this document is filed within Group 1/207, Series No. II, Box No. 2 of the collections of The University of Massachusetts Archives at the Amherst Campus.

CHAPTER VIII

1. The Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force Report On The Impact of UMass In Dorchester, Justin Gray Associates, January, 1973, pg. 1:3 - 1:4.
2. Janet Riddle, "UMass Denies It Wants Columbia Point Housing", The Boston Globe, May 15, 1969, pg. 17.
3. Larry Van Dyne, "Sargent Seeks \$100M For UMass Boston", The Boston Globe, March 12, 1970, pg. 1.
4. Nina McCain, "U-Mass A Rare Opportunity At Columbia Point", The Boston Sunday Globe, April 26, 1970, pg. A24.
5. Janet Riddell, "UMass Halts Lagoon Dumping", The Boston Globe, July 25, 1970, pg. 5.
6. "UMass, Columbia Pt. Residents Agree", The Boston Globe, August 18, 1970, pg. 3.
7. The Boston Globe, September 15, 1970, A copy of this article is contained within the newsmedia clipping book within the collections of the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst for the Boston Campus - 1970.
8. Report of the President's Committee on the Future University of Massachusetts, Boston, Mass., December, 1971 pages i-v, 9.
9. Memorandum from L. Edward Lashman to Robert Wood, July 26, 1971. The copy which I consulted is in the files of Dolores Miller, a former member of the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force.
10. Memorandum from L. Edward Lashman to Robert Wood, July 26, 1971. The copy which I consulted is in the files of Dolores Miller, a former member of the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force.
11. Report of the President's Committee on the Future University of Massachusetts, Boston, Mass., December, 1971 page 98.
12. The Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force Report On The Impact of UMass In Dorchester, Justin Gray Associates, January, 1973, pg. 1:4-1:6 and Appendix A, "Contract and Memorandum of Understanding".
13. Peter Cowen, "Dorchester Sees More Threat Than Hope In Anticipated Demand For Student Housing", The Boston Globe, July 30, 1972.

14. Peter Cowan, "UMass-Boston: Will It Create A New Housing Crisis?", The Boston Globe, August 20, 1972.
15. Fred Pillsbury, "Around City Hall", The Boston Globe, October 3, 1972.
16. The Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force Report On The Impact of UMass In Dorchester, Justin Gray Associates, January, 1973, Appendix G, pg. A.50-A.52.
17. The Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force Report On The Impact of UMass In Dorchester, Justin Gray Associates, January, 1973, Appendix G, pg. A.50-A.52.
18. Fred Pillsbury, "Around City Hall", The Boston Globe, October 24, 1972.
19. The Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force Report On The Impact of UMass In Dorchester, Justin Gray Associates, January, 1973, pg. 11:1 to 11:5 and S:1-S15.
20. For details on this legislation see The Journals of the Massachusetts House and Senate for the 1973 session, Appendix M and O of the January, 1973 Justin Gray Report, and "Timilty Urges Delay of UMass Opening" a news article by Michael Kenny in The Boston Globe for March 15, 1973.
21. City of Boston Policy Statement Concerning the Impact of the University of Massachusetts at Columbia Point, Kevin H. White, Mayor, March, 1973.
22. See: "Board of Trustee Statement on Columbia Point", Trustee Document No T73-205, dated June 6, 1973, pg. 1. A copy of this document is filed with the minutes of trustee meetings in the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
23. See: "Board of Trustee Statement on Columbia Point", Trustee Document No T73-205, dated June 6, 1973, pg. 2. A copy of this document is filed with the minutes of trustee meetings in the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
24. See: "Board of Trustee Statement on Columbia Point", Trustee Document No T73-205, dated June 6, 1973, pg. 3. A copy of this document is filed with the minutes of trustee meetings in the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.

25. See: "Board of Trustee Statement on Columbia Point", Trustee Document No T73-205, dated June 6, 1973. pg. 3. A copy of this document is filed with the minutes of trustee meetings in the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
26. See: "Board of Trustee Statement on Columbia Point", Trustee Document No T73-205, dated June 6, 1973. pg. 4. A copy of this document is filed with the minutes of trustee meetings in the University of Massachusetts Archives at Amherst.
27. John B. Wood, "Neighbors Set To Sue UMass", The Boston Globe, July 19, 1973.

CHAPTER IX

1. George Rosen, Decision-Making Chicago-Style: The Genesis of a University of Illinois Campus, Champaign, Ill., The University of Illinois Press, 1980, pg. 63.
2. George Rosen, Decision-Making Chicago-Style: The Genesis of a University of Illinois Campus, Champaign, Ill., The University of Illinois Press, 1980, pg. 58-59.
3. George Rosen, Decision-Making Chicago-Style: The Genesis of a University of Illinois Campus, Champaign, Ill., The University of Illinois Press, 1980, pg. 61.
4. George Rosen, Decision-Making Chicago-Style: The Genesis of a University of Illinois Campus, Champaign, Ill., The University of Illinois Press, 1980, pg. 25-26.
5. Carol Liston, "The Vault: Boston's Elite "Committee of 14 Keeps A Canny Eye On The City", The Boston Sunday Globe, September 3, 1967, See also George V. Higgins, Style Versus Substance: Boston, Kevin White and The Politics of Illusion, New York, MacMillian Publishing, 1984, pg. 65-68.
6. Data on Mr. Healey's business affiliations and that of other Boston area business men was obtained from the Sixty-third Edition of Directory of Directors In the City of Boston & Vicinity, The Bankers Service Company, Boston, 1969.
7. The University of Massachusetts Oral History Project, Conducted by Robert J. McCartney for the University of Massachusetts, Edited by Maura Donahue, Interview with former President John Lederle at the Amherst Campus on January 27 through February 12, 1975, pg. 84-85. A copy of this document is filed within Group 1/207, Series No. II, Box No. 2 of the collections of The University of Massachusetts Archives at the Amherst Campus.
8. George Rosen, Decision-Making Chicago-Style: The Genesis of a University of Illinois Campus, Champaign, Ill., The University of Illinois Press, 1980, pg. 171
9. Francis X. Bellotti et al. Final Report to the General Court of the Special Commission Concerning State and County Buildings, Boston, The Commission, 1980, pg. 21-22.

10. Francis X. Bellotti et al., Final Report to the General Court of the Special Commission Concerning State and County Buildings, Boston, The Commission, 1980, pg. 25-26.
11. Francis X. Bellotti et al., Final Report to the General Court of the Special Commission Concerning State and County Buildings, Boston, The Commission, 1980, pg. 26.
12. Francis X. Bellotti et al., Final Report to the General Court of the Special Commission Concerning State and County Buildings, Boston, The Commission, 1980, pg. 18-19.
13. Francis X. Bellotti et al., Final Report to the General Court of the Special Commission Concerning State and County Buildings, Boston, The Commission, 1980, pg. 22-23.
14. Francis X. Bellotti et al., Final Report to the General Court of the Special Commission Concerning State and County Buildings, Boston, The Commission, 1980, pg. 21.
15. Francis X. Bellotti et al., Final Report to the General Court of the Special Commission Concerning State and County Buildings, Boston, The Commission, 1980, pg. 39.

CHAPTER X

1. The University of Massachusetts Oral History Project, Conducted by Robert J. McCartney for the University of Massachusetts, Edited by Maura Donahue, Interview with former President John Lederle at the Amherst Campus on January 27 through February 12, 1975, pg. 90. A copy of this document is filed within Group 1/207, Series No. II, Box No. 2 of the collections of The University of Massachusetts Archives at the Amherst Campus.
2. The University of Massachusetts Oral History Project, Conducted by Robert J. McCartney for the University of Massachusetts, Edited by Maura Donahue, Interview with former President John Lederle at the Amherst Campus on January 27 through February 12, 1975, pg. 90. A copy of this document is filed within Group 1/207, Series No. II, Box No. 2 of the collections of The University of Massachusetts Archives at the Amherst Campus.

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
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GREATER BOSTON

Proposed UMB Sites: 1964-1968



1. Columbia Point
2. North Station
3. Copley Square
4. Highland Park
5. "Gov. Shirley" Site
6. Neponset GC
7. "Typical" Rt 128 Site
8. Woodland GC
9. Watertown Arsenal
10. Murphy Hospital Site
11. Blue Hills Site
12. West Roxbury Marshes

Boston--Core City, 1968

