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TOWARD A THEORY OF CHANGE:
THREE CASE STUDIES IN
ONE UNIVERSITY

A Dissertation Presented

by

PATRICIA H. CROSSON

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF EDUCATION


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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

This study focuses on three missions--access, individualization, and social problem-solving--that have been recommended as priority agendas for higher education. The study also describes the planning and development of three special programs--the University Without Walls, the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration, and the Institute for Man and His Environment--which serve as vehicles for the assumption of these missions in one university--the University of Massachusetts. The aim of the study is to provide information on the viability of the missions of access, individualization and social problem-solving within existing public universities and to contribute to the study of institutional change.

In a review of related research and theory, special emphasis is placed on the articulation of new missions and objectives for higher education by educational theorists including Clark Kerr and David Riesman, and several specially created study commissions and task forces including the Truman Commission on Higher Education, the Newman Task Force, and the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.

Also emphasized are the characteristics of universities as organizations and theories of change as articulated by Ronald Havelock, Lon Hefferlin, Jack Lindquist, Warren Bennis, Victor Baldridge and others.

Data for the study has been gathered from participant observation, from University documents and from approximately forty interviews. Case studies provide descriptions of the University of Massachusetts and of the planning and implementation of the three programs--the University Without Walls, the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration, and the Institute for Man and His Environment. Each case focuses particularly on those elements which could be considered important factors to implementation and institutional change.

Each case is analyzed in order to assess the feasibility of the missions of access, individualization and social problem-solving for the University of Massachusetts and other public universities and to determine and compare the factors important to the change process in the University.

The study shows that all three missions have been considered priority agendas for the University of Massachusetts and that special units were developed and approved by the formal governance bodies in order to commit the University to the fulfillment of these missions.

The separate program cases, however, revealed variations in the extent to which these missions could be considered viable for special units and/or for University-wide implementation. The Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration program shows that the mission of individualization was accepted and adopted. The University Without Walls program shows that although the provisions of educational opportunity for non-traditional students and the fulfillment of the mission of access would require comprehensive changes, many at the University of Massachusetts were willing to make these changes. The case of the Institute for Man and His Environment reveals the difficult organizational, attitudinal, and behavioral changes that are required to adopt the mission of social problem-solving.

The study corroborates the importance of those change factors which had been cited by Lon Hefferlin--resources, leadership, support, and environmental factors of reward and approval--and shows very clearly the importance of the political dynamic suggested by Lindquist and Baldrige. The study does not unearth new change factors, but suggests that timing might be a change factor deserving more attention and study. It shows the advantage of creating special focus programs as a vehicle through

which the University can accomplish change. It also makes clear that the process of change involves a whole network of factors and dynamics that cannot be easily isolated. It shows that it is difficult for universities as organizations to adopt new missions.

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INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem. Higher education has increasingly moved toward center stage in American society-- a higher percentage of the population attends college; a steadily increasing percentage of public funds support our colleges and universities; and more and more agencies and individuals look to university professors for solutions to complex problems. As a result, the number and stridency of the voices seeking to determine the priorities and direction of higher education have increased. Many people feel that colleges and universities are not providing sufficiently individualized education for students, and they are not applying their energies and resources to the solution of society's most complex problems.

Educational theorists and policy makers over the last two decades have defined access, individualization and social problem-solving as "new" missions for higher education.¹

Colleges and universities have been slow to respond to these renewed priorities. This failure results less from deliberate refusal or inattention and more from the

¹See Chapter I for review of theorists and policy makers defining missions for higher education.

organizational patterns and structures necessitated by rapid growth. In order to educate the millions of applicants, most universities have become large, complex, and bureaucratic organizations. Whatever their original purposes, established bureaucracies often begin to assume a single objective--maintenance of the status quo. It is difficult for such organizations to change.

However, the centrality of higher education to our society makes it imperative for our institutions of higher education to be able to change their objectives, priorities, and practices in order to assume new missions. The manner in which this change is accomplished is the focus of this study.

It is important to consider together missions and organizational adaptability because each informs the other--the type of mission affects how it can be introduced into an organization and organizational characteristics often determine the viability of the mission. This study will focus on the missions of access, individualization and social problem-solving and the implementation or change process within an organization.

The study will consider how one university, the University of Massachusetts, has adopted the missions of access, individualization, and social problem-solving. The most important and visible method of adoption is the

establishment of three programs--the University Without Walls, the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration, and the Institute for Man and His Environment. The primary objectives of each of these programs correspond respectively to the missions of access, individualization and social problem-solving. Descriptive case studies of the establishment of these programs as well as of the University of Massachusetts form the core of this study.

Each case study will describe the planning and implementation of the program as a way of describing the change process. In each, particular attention will be paid to those factors which organizational change theorists have cited as critical to the process of change: extra-institutional influence, resources, leadership, and organizational environment, but other factors important to the program's development will be treated as well. The purpose is to validate the work of change theorists and to contribute new information to the study of change.

Significance of the Study. The aim of the study is twofold: to provide information on the viability of the missions of access, individualization and social problem-solving within existing public universities and to contribute to the study of institutional change. It is informative to consider these two aspects together and within the context of a particular institution.

Limitations of the Study. The author of the study

has been associated with the University of Massachusetts for five years. This can be seen as a limitation to the study as it raises the possibility of bias. It can also be viewed as an advantage in that the author has for three years been actively involved with the programs in a role analagous to that of "participant observer."

While the University of Massachusetts serves in a sense as the case for the study, no attempt is made to investigate all the ways in which the University of Massachusetts has attempted to assume the missions of access, individualization and social problem-solving. Nor does this study investigate the totality of the change process at the University. The study does, however, focus on three programs which were used at the University of Massachusetts as vehicles for change. This limits the study in terms of "generalizability" but provides a more in-depth look at complex processes.

The case studies focus on the views of the faculty members and administrators who were instrumental in the planning and development of the programs rather than on the perspectives of the students or others being served by them. No attempt is made to evaluate the programs, and the case studies are limited to the specific focus of change within an organization.

Methodology of the Study. A descriptive case study was deemed appropriate for analyzing the processes

of assuming new missions and affecting change within an institution and was chosen as the methodology for the study.

The University of Massachusetts is the locus of the three programs which are taken as case studies and in a sense serves also as a case. The study considers the history, organizational structures, academic program, leadership and governance of the University of Massachusetts over the period 1950-1970. It describes the University in order to provide background material for the specific cases and review the general factors which were important for the creation of programs reflecting new missions and supportive of internal institutional change.

The programs selected as case studies were chosen because each takes as its primary objective one of the missions advocated by educational policy-makers. The Institute for Man and His Environment attempts to solve complex environmental problems; the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration provides for individualized education; and the University Without Walls operates chiefly as an access route for those who have not previously enjoyed equal opportunity for higher education. They have been chosen, in addition, because the history of their development within the University of Massachusetts provides three similar but distinct lenses through which to view the process of change within an institution. No attempt has previously been made to study these programs with a focus on institutional change.

Data for the study was collected from documents in University files. Those documents describing the planning and implementation of the three programs taken as case studies and documents more generally related to the University and recent change efforts were a primary source of information.

Because these programs are of relatively recent origin and because they have not previously been studied in relation to the change process or as vehicles for accomplishing university missions, the study of documents was supplemented by approximately forty interviews.

For each case study, interviews were conducted with individuals who were in a position to provide information on the particular program. Those interviewed had been involved with the initial preparatory stages of the program, with the process of implementation, or with some aspect of the programs' relationship to the University. Many of these individuals were already known to the author, others were named in the documents on the programs and others were suggested by program directors or others currently associated with the programs. Appendix I contains a list of those interviewed.

Interviews were non-scheduled to encourage different information and perspectives but they were in some respects standardized so that each of those interviewed would consider certain issues. All of those interviewed were asked open-ended questions about program goals and objectives, the process of planning and

implementation, and the characteristics of the University of Massachusetts in terms of possibilities for change as compared to other universities. Interviewees were asked to consider the importance of specific factors in the change process: extra-institutional influence; resources; leadership; and organizational environment including reward systems, approval process, and communications. Appendix II contains a list of the questions used as a basis for discussion during the interviews.

These questions were field tested on two individuals who are directors of programs at the University of Massachusetts which are similar to those under study in orientation, size, and relationship to the University, yet distinct in terms of objectives, personnel, and process. The field tests led to some revisions of wording and considerable reduction in the number of questions.

In addition to data gathered from University documents and interviews, the study contains a review of the literature. It reviews generally the work of the major study commissions and groups who have been concerned with overall missions and objectives for higher education in the past two decades, and the work of organizational theorists and researchers on the change process. It reviews specifically the work of commissions and influential individual authors that related to the missions of access, individualization and social problem-solving,

and the work of those focusing on universities as organizations and the process of change and academic reform in colleges and universities. Concepts and change factors emerging from this review of the literature informed the perspective of the description of the University of Massachusetts as an organization and each of the case studies. An analytical section makes these connections more precisely and attempts to draw conclusions from the data.

Organization of the Study. The study contains an introduction and seven chapters. Chapter I discusses the missions of access, individualization, and social problem solving as advocated by those commissions and groups that have most informed policy concerning higher education. It also reviews the literature on organizations and change theory.

Chapter II considers the University of Massachusetts. It provides a general description of its evolution as a university over the past two decades; an overview of the policies and activities of the university with respect to access, individualization and social problem-solving; an assessment of those characteristics that make the University capable of change; and a description of its special unit change strategy.

Chapter III contains the case study of the University Without Walls program. It describes its re-

lationship to the Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities and the National University Without Walls program; its planning period, and its year as a pilot experimental program with a small number of students. It focuses on those factors that were crucial to the implementation of the program.

Chapter IV contains the case study of the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration program. It discusses general issues and trends in curricular structure and reform over the last two decades and relates the BDIC program to them. It describes the planning and implementation process of the program and focuses on those factors that have been critical to that process.

Chapter V is the case study on the Institute for Man and His Environment. It traces the complex evolution of the Institute, highlighting in the process the crucial change factors.

Chapter VI is an analytical chapter which draws the general issues and processes described in the review of the literature together with the data provided by the case studies. It analyzes the feasibility of the missions of access, individualization and social problem-solving for the University of Massachusetts and other public universities. It considers the process of change at the University of Massachusetts by focusing on those factors which were important to the development and implementation

of the three programs under study. It corroborates those factors suggested in the literature on change theory as important to the process of change and suggests additional change factors.

Chapter VII concludes the study with a summary statement, some speculations which were generated by the investigation about the process of change, and several recommendations for further study.

C H A P T E R I

MISSIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND CHANGE

For as long as colleges and universities have been in existence, there have been arguments about what functions they ought to perform and about their appropriate role in society. Like other social institutions, colleges and universities have changed over time; they have discarded outmoded functions and taken on new missions and objectives. Many people have sought to have a voice in the determination of missions and objectives for higher education. Social scientists, recognizing the close relationship between organizational form and the ability to carry out functions and respond to new objectives, began to study colleges and especially universities as complex organizations. A few have focused on the change process within organizations. This chapter reviews the works of those individuals and groups who have had the greatest impact in the last twenty years on the articulation of missions and objectives for higher education, reviews the work of major organizational theorists who have spoken to the issue of how universities as organizations adopt and carry out missions and objectives, and reviews recent research and theory on the process of change.

Missions for Higher Education

The literature on higher education over the last twenty years has contained an enormous number of recommended missions and objectives for higher education. Although the range has been substantial, the predominant themes for the period from the end of World War II to the early 1970's have been access--the provision of equal educational opportunity; individualization--more attention to individual student needs; and social problem-solving--the application of the resources of the university toward the solution of complex social problems. Each of these missions has been urged by educational policy-makers and each has itself evolved in meaning, emphasis, and practice over the period. It is important to be aware of these missions and of their evolution, for they encompass the demands of the society on institutions of higher education.¹

The sheer volume of the demands for access, individualization, and social problem-solving has caused an impact on higher education and society as a whole. Yet it is extremely difficult to trace a path or diffusion process from individuals to policy decisions at the national level, to policy decisions at the institutional level, and to institutional functioning. There-

¹Since 1970, the emphasis has shifted. The pre-dominant themes have become finances and power. These new themes, however, have served to add new urgency to those of access, individualization and social problem-solving.

fore, it is almost impossible to assert direct causal relationships between ideas and events in so broad an area as higher education.

One can, however, say that those individuals and groups who would have been most likely to have an impact on events in higher education would include commissions established specifically to study higher education as a whole, and those individual authors on higher education whose books have been widely read. For the period 1947 to 1973 these include: The Truman Commission, The White House Conference on Education, The Newman Task Force, The American Council on Education's Special Committee on Campus Tensions, The Assembly on University Goals and Governance, The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, and Christopher Jencks, David Riesman, and Clark Kerr.

Even among these groups and individuals, some have been more influential than others because they caught the mood of the times and voiced the majority view, because they engaged in a political advocacy process or because their reports were widely disseminated. The most influential have been the Truman Commission, the Newman Task Force and the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.

Appendix III gives an overview of these commissions and the main thrust of their recommendations while this section treats their observations on access, individualization, and social problem-solving.

Access. The priority of increasing educational opportunity for individuals who have not previously enjoyed the benefits of higher education is hardly a new fad. In its most general sense, the history of American higher education is the history of the evolution from small private colleges for the classical training of the elite to the agreement in principle (though not yet in practice) that there should be universal higher education.

The proportion of the population entering college grew slowly yet steadily throughout the last two centuries. After World War II it seemed to leap dramatically. In part this was due to the economic benefits that were part of the GI Bill but more important were the realization of the importance of knowledge to the economy and the positive correlation between educational attainment and income. The Truman Commission in 1947 articulated the arguments for universal higher education:

The swift movement of events and the growing complexity of our national life and of world affairs make it imperative, at the earliest possible time, to translate our democratic ideal into a living reality; to eliminate the barriers to equality of educational opportunity; and to expand our colleges and universities to assure that the only factors which limit enrollment are the ability and interest of the prospective students.²

²Higher Education for American Democracy, The President's Commission on Higher Education, Frederick Zook, Chairman, 6 Vols. (New York: Harper, 1947) 2:1.

The Commission felt that at least fifty per cent of high school graduates should receive higher education.

The period of the fifties and sixties was a period of tremendous expansion for higher education. By the late sixties the Truman Commission's fifty per cent goal had been realized and replaced by a goal of universal access.

In Priorities for Action,³ the Carnegie Commission provided a list of tables which charted the attitudes on certain issues of twelve different commissions and task forces (starting with the Truman Commission). To the statement--"The United States should have a system of universal access to higher education"--four gave strong positive endorsement and six gave moderate endorsement.⁴

The Truman Commission recommended that government and the private sector remove the barriers of race, religion, economic status, and residence that were inhibiting access.

In many of its reports the Carnegie Commission gave strong emphasis to the notion of equal educational oppor-

³Priorities for Action: Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Clark Kerr, Chairman (New York: McGraw Hill, 1973).

⁴The four giving strong endorsement included: The Truman Commission, The Committee on Education Beyond the High School, 1956, The White House Conference 1971, and the Carnegie Commission.

tunity. In one of its first, A Chance to Learn, it sets short and long range goals:

By the year 2000, ethnic origin, geographic location, age, and quality of prior schooling should no longer stand in the way of access to higher education and success within it.⁵

The commission reemphasized the theme in their final report, Priorities for Action, and they recommended a variety of steps through which this goal could be achieved including the provision of additional places in existing institutions, new institutions, the financing of student costs, and adjustments of existing institutions to students from a wider variety of backgrounds.

The theme of access, however, is a complicated one for it speaks to the larger issue of the role of higher education in society and to questions of equality of opportunity and equality of outcome.

Christopher Jencks and David Riesman spoke to the role of higher education in an economically stratified yet democratic society:

One of the central functions of higher education --along with providing jobs for scholars--is to control access to the upper-middle social strata. Since demand for upper-middle class jobs and living standards far exceeds the supply, colleges must (in Erving Goffman's terminology) cool out large numbers of youngsters whose ambitions exceed their ability. Not only that--these individuals

⁵A Chance to Learn: An Action Agenda for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education, Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Clark Kerr, Chairman (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970), p. 4.

must be eliminated in such a way as to preserve at least the appearance of fairness to all social strata . . . the distribution system must be in keeping with traditional American mythology, which portrays America as a land of opportunity with unlimited room at the top⁶

Jencks and Riesman do not feel that universal higher education will result in an egalitarian classless society, and they feel that what is important for America is not more mobility, but more equality.

The Carnegie Commission did not advocate an egalitarian classless society and pointed only to the positive correspondence between education and income for those who had achieved higher education. The Carnegie Commission called for universal access, but it made it quite clear that it was not recommending universal attendance. In Quality and Equality⁷ and Priorities for Action the Commission saw the mission of higher education to provide equality of opportunity, not equality of results.

⁶Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, The Academic Revolution (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, 1968), pp. 99-100.

⁷Quality and Equality: New Levels of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education, Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Clark Kerr, Chairman (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968).

The Carnegie Commission has been criticized for its failure to examine thoroughly the role of higher education in society, especially in areas of access, equality, and the economic order. Norman Birnbaum felt that with its five year study and five million dollars, the Carnegie Commission should not have avoided the difficult issue of meritocracy vs. egalitarianism in the American social order. He felt that:

If the Commission were serious about the idea of an educational revolution, its work would have been remarkably different. Beginning with a rational critique of our institutions, particularly our economic ones, it would have sought to devise new ones consonant both with our productive powers and our egalitarian and democratic ideas.⁸

Finally, it is a very complex argument. There have been obvious economic gains for individuals and groups because of the provision of greater educational opportunity yet there are obvious limits to what an equalized educational system can achieve in an unequal and stratified social order.

There is no doubt, however, that during the sixties, attention was drawn especially to the subject of access for minority group members who remained significantly

⁸ Norman Birnbaum, "The Politics of the Future: The Carnegie Commission," Change. 5 (November 1973): p. 29.

under-represented in colleges and universities. More equalized educational attainment, it was assumed during the Kennedy and Johnson years, would lead to a more democratic and tolerant society. Many blacks who received degrees during that period in fact moved to high level positions in government, business, and industry and there was no question that the society as a whole became more democratic. By the late sixties, however, it became clear that many wanted equality of opportunity for the few but not for the many.

Other groups who were being discriminated against were receiving attention as well. Many suggested equal education access for women as a means of achieving greater equality between the sexes. Others recommended the provision of education for those persons beyond the traditional college age as a means of providing a second chance to those who had not taken advantage of higher education in earlier years and/or for whom retraining or further education was desired.

While access had been the goal, it had not been fully realized. In 1971 the Newman Task Force found that:

Minorities are still underrepresented. Women are openly discriminated against. Arbitrary restrictions and a lack of imaginative programs limit the opportunities for those of

beyond the normal college age or those for whom attendance at a conventional campus is impractical.⁹

Access will continue to be an important mission for higher education throughout the seventies, and increasing emphasis should continue to be put on the provision of educational opportunity for particular groups. In fact the dynamic has changed considerably in the last few years. Instead of the Jenck's notion of "cooling out" the masses we have the Sunday Times "hard-sell." Where once the provision of educational opportunity was a moral issue it has now become an economic one. Colleges and universities are actively recruiting students to fill up empty places, and this economic factor should insure that the mission of access will remain a predominant theme for higher education.

Individualization. Those who have called for greater access have been aware that the obligation "is to provide more than just the chance to walk through the college gate--that there must also be access to a useful and personally significant educational experience."¹⁰ This thrust toward greater individualization of education constitutes a major theme of the period.

⁹Report on Higher Education, Report of Task Force on Higher Education, by Frank Newman, Chairman (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971).

¹⁰Ibid., p. 3.

Individualization has meant many things to many people and is a "new" mission only in the context of the times and circumstances. Students have been central to colleges for centuries. American higher education during the twentieth century, however, increasingly replaced student interests with those of faculty. The "new" mission, therefore, signifies an emphasis on the students and a concern for their educational and developmental needs as individuals. It also means providing students with the freedom and responsibility of making their own educational choices. It has led to a call over the last twenty years for academic reform and has had two major foci--one concerned with the inadequacy of the curriculum for current and more traditional students, and the other concerned with the educational development of non-traditional students.

Oddly enough, individualization has become a predominant theme because of the successful provision of access. Colleges and universities have expanded so rapidly in response to demand that many of the large ones resemble factories and treat students as units to be processed.¹¹

The current situation on college and university campuses was eloquently described by Jencks and Riesman.

¹¹Machine and computer analogies are made repeatedly in the literature on higher education from the 1960's,

They hold that a central feature of college life is the confrontation between the old and the young. This confrontation has been exacerbated as faculty become more and more academic and retreat from any concern with students--especially undergraduates--even to the extent of handing the teaching function over to graduate students. On the other hand, the specialization of knowledge, the narrow vision of disciplines and departments, and the aloofness of the faculty, have made the students feel that they have nothing to contribute in an academic sense so they retreat into a host of subcultures which in fact define their entire collegiate experience.

As colleges and universities differ considerably in orientation and style, students also are quite diverse from institution to institution and on a particular campus. They tend to define and group themselves as collegiate (fraternity-sorority-athletic), academic (serious), vocational (clear career focus), or non-conformists (political and more recently deviant life-style activists). These affiliations dominate the collegiate experience for students and define the educational component much more pervasively than do curricular or departmental units created by the university for that purpose.

Clark Kerr is somewhat more optimistic than Jencks and Riesman about the possibilities for students

within large universities. He defines the multiversity as a city which provides a plethora of options.

The multiversity is a confusing place for the student. He has problems of establishing his identity and sense of security within it. But it offers him a vast range of choices, enough literally to stagger the mind. In this range of choices he encounters the opportunities and the dilemmas of freedom. The casualty rate is high. The walking wounded are many. 'Lern-freiheit'--the freedom of the student to pick and choose, to stay or to move on--is triumphant.¹²

Many students and faculty do not agree with Kerr's concept of free choice for the student. They feel that in a society which continues to use educational credentials as a sorting device students do not in fact have the option of non-attendance. Furthermore, they claim that while universities have appropriated the role of credentialer in society, the university curriculum is appropriate only to specialized disciplinary study and research and is therefore not helpful in preparation for most careers. Furthermore, they feel that universities have not provided a curriculum that is concerned with the complex and important issues of the day because it is so fragmented by specialization. Finally, many students--who in terms of age and maturity are more adult than previously--feel that universities have failed to recognize them as

¹²Clark Kerr, The Uses of the University (New York: Harper, 1963), p. 42.

adult individuals and have failed to provide them the opportunity to make decisions about their own lives and educations.

For all of these reasons, students and many faculty became involved during the sixties with academic reform movements. Many students had tested their power and organizational skills in political activism but had been frustrated by attempts to effect political changes. They turned their energies inward and demanded a more "relevant" curriculum and more power to the individual student in determining his or her academic program.

Concurrent with and in part resulting from the student movement, many educators were becoming concerned with the issue of reform on campus. Several were becoming alarmed at the pervasive institutional trend termed by Jencks and Riesman "the academic revolution," and they tried to think of ways to reintroduce a community of scholars. The prevailing patterns that academic reforms have taken over the past decade include:

- A. Attempts to reintroduce the "community of scholars" through cluster or residential colleges.
- B. Greater course options for students within core and major requirements.
- C. New courses, majors and departments that are more closely aligned with student interests and/or career goals.

D. More opportunities for experiential learning and field experiences.

E. Greater variety in means for crediting learning experiences including credit for prior learning.

F. Movements toward external degree programs and open universities often initiated on the state level.

Recommendations for these and other reforms have pervaded the commission reports over the last twenty years. It was the Truman Commission that first voiced concern over the increased specialization and emphasized that education should contribute to the general quality of life. The Commission recommended a unified concept of general education. The American Council on Education's Special Committee on Campus Tensions,¹³ and the President's Commission on Campus Unrest,¹⁴ while focusing primarily on governance issues and ways to include students in decision-making, also recommended curricular reforms to give students more power over their own education. The Assembly on University Goals and Governance called for experimentation

¹³Campus Tensions: Analysis and Recommendations, Special Committee on Campus Tensions, The American Council on Education, Sol Linowitz, Chairman (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1970).

¹⁴Campus Unrest, Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest, William W. Scranton, Chairman (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970).

and flexibility.¹⁵ Much of the report of the White House Conference on Youth was concerned with education and it stated that higher education should become more humane and more oriented to the self-development of the individual student.¹⁶ Martin Meyerson felt in 1970:

Perhaps the most important task is to deal with the students' demands for relevance in their education. One of the great tasks for the 1970's is to try to integrate the liberal learning and the professional learning so that the scholar, the student, and society each benefit These are the tasks: transforming professional education for undergraduates and graduates alike by making it more humane and intellectual; adding to the intrinsically valuable academic studies that devotion to social purpose which is so typically a part of the spirit of service of the professions¹⁷

The Newman Task Force was perhaps the most outspoken in its criticism of existing institutional practices. The

¹⁵First Report, The Assembly on University Goals and Governance, Martin Meyerson, Chairman (Cambridge, Mass.: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1971).

¹⁶Report of the White House Conference on Youth, Task Force on Education, Robben W. Fleming, Chairman (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971).

¹⁷Martin Meyerson, "New Paths to New Destinies," Saturday Review, 53 (January 10, 1970), p. 54.

Newman Task Force felt that institutions of higher education were not responsive to society, to different kinds of students, or to the needs of individual students. Their opinion of the current reform efforts was also devastating:

In the last several years, largely due to the escalation of student protests, a great deal of thought and energy has been given to the problem of making colleges and universities more responsive to the educational needs and interests of students

On campuses where reforms have been implemented, students have greater responsibility for their educational programs, and see more of their teachers than they did before But, by and large, this movement toward reform was begun at selective institutions, and has been shaped by elitist premises. Characteristically many of the reforms are designed to make undergraduate¹⁸ education more like graduate education

The basic position of the Newman Task Force was that reform was not really possible within existing institutions and could only be achieved through the creation of new institutions which would be more responsive and flexible. Their critiques of existing practices and reform efforts were impressive and very influential, but one would have liked more substance in their recommendations for alternatives.

Although many have criticized the Carnegie Commission for its failure to deal with substantive issues, several of its reports deal with issues of academic content and reform in order to provide greater individualization. In Reform on Campus: Changing Students, Changing Academic

¹⁸Newman, Report on Higher Education, pp. 21-22.

Programs the Commission surveyed attitudes of thousands of students and faculty toward the curriculum and found considerable satisfaction with current educational programs. However, the Commission felt that there was enough evidence of malfunctioning to warrant reform and called for efforts in two directions. First they called for diversity among institutions and diversity of program within institutions. Second, they called for provision of a number of coherent and internally consistent options within the curriculum. Each option would provide a broad learning experience. "Relevance is achieved when courses and programs relate directly to the individual interests of students and to current social problems."¹⁹

The Carnegie Commission's Less Time--More Options: Education Beyond the High School, holds that most college programs are inappropriate for many kinds of students and it calls for a diversity of program options for diverse students.²⁰ It focuses perhaps too much on the structural aspects of the curriculum such as three year degree programs, more points of entry and exit, and greater flexibility in time and space, and too little on the content

¹⁹Reform on Campus: Changing Students, Changing Academic Programs, Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Clark Kerr, Chairman (New York: McGraw Hill, 1972).

²⁰Less Time, More Options: Education Beyond The High School, Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Clark Kerr, Chairman (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970).

of the curriculum. Yet it has been disseminated widely, and clearly had an impact on educational thinking. It provided the framework for much of the activity on college and university campuses over the past two years. In New Students and New Places Policies for the Future Growth and Development of American Higher Education, the Commission recommends state-wide expansion of external degree programs and open universities.²¹

Priorities for Action makes clear the Commission's attitudes toward students. It also summarizes the Commission's recommendations for reform into three directions: "toward more options for students in their attendance patterns; toward more diversity of programs both among and within individual institutions, thus expanding the range of choice for students; and toward enrichment of programs."²²

Students vary greatly in their capacities and in the intensity of their interests. They are generally capable--or at least as capable as anyone else--in many situations of making decisions among alternatives that directly affect themselves. They will be more satisfied with their situations if they are able, within reasonable limits, to structure--student by student--

²¹New Students and New Places: Policies for the Future Growth and Development of American Higher Education, Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Clark Kerr, Chairman (New York: McGraw Hill, 1971).

²²Priorities of Action, Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Ibid., p. 46.

a combination of alternatives that each student believes will best fit his or her individual wishes.²³

By 1971, the notion of non-traditional study had gained broad enough acceptance that a commission to study and make recommendations concerning it was established by the Educational Testing Service and the College Entrance Examination Board. The Commission defined "non-traditional study" as an attitude, rather than a system; that places emphasis on the student; that encourages diversity of individual effort, competence, and performance; and that de-emphasizes time and space. The Commission recommended a wider range of educational options, increased emphasis on learning and less on degree structures, and a national assessment capability to advise students of alternative ways to complete a degree program.²⁴

It seems clear that as student bodies continue to grow and become more diverse, the mission of individualization through academic reform will continue to be an important issue in higher education.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Diversity by Design, Report of the Commission on Non-Traditional Study, Samuel B. Gould, Chairman (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1973).

Social Problem-Solving. A third mission for higher education is the application of knowledge and other resources toward the solution of complex social problems. It is a theme that has taken a number of complex twists over the years but generally stated it is believed that as problems --ranging from overpopulation, resource depletion, urban decay, environmental pollution, health care delivery and the like--become more visible, complex and urgent, colleges and universities must take on the responsibility of looking for solutions. The traditional missions for American higher education have included public service as well as teaching and research. Social problem-solving is related to public service, but it is more specific in that it establishes definite areas for service and implies attention to complex and difficult problems. Problem-solving is seen as a responsibility of higher education for several reasons:

1. Public colleges and universities are supported by the public through taxation. That support has increased dramatically over the last twenty years in line with the tremendous increase in the number and size of higher education institutions. More support has led to a demand for increased accountability.

2. Universities produce knowledge and knowledge is essential to problem-solving. As Ikenberry put it:

Knowledge is the fuel central to a scientific, technological, and socially complex society; it is the nourishment society must have to function and prosper. The rapid escalation of the power of the university results from its role in the knowledge industry as a principal producer and distributor. From this point of view, one could argue persuasively that the *raison d'etre* of the contemporary university is not knowledge for its own sake but knowledge for society's sake.²⁵

Universities--especially after World War II--continued to place high priority on the production of knowledge, primarily through the expansion of the frontiers of the disciplines. They did not, however, hold in high priority the transmission or application of that knowledge through applied research or service activities, so social problem-solving has become a mission.

3. Universities are the only institutions that maintain the freedom and distance from the rest of society and its institutions which may be necessary to effectively solve problems created by those social institutions. Those who hold a classical view of the purposes of the university say that the mission of the university is to house scholars and students--it is not the mission of the university to involve these scholars in the solution of contemporary problems.

²⁵Stanley Ikenberry and Renee Friedman, Beyond Academic Departments, (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1972), p. 98.

The classical view is that the university has no purposes, at least none as defined in utilitarian terms. The pursuit of truth is synonymous with purpose and the means are ends in themselves. The primary function of the corporate body, therefore, is to provide a setting for scholarly activity.²⁶

This view of the university predominated in Europe more than in the United States where the establishment of land-grant universities from the 1960's in every state established a stronger precedent for service to society.

The role of the university as the producer of knowledge and the ultimate good of higher education for society were assumed concepts by many of the commissions created to study higher education from the late forties to the mid-sixties.

The Truman Commission--following shortly upon World War II--wanted American higher education to concern itself with solutions to the global problems created by the war. A White House Conference on Education convened by Johnson in his first years as President claimed that education had emerged as the primary instrument for the solution of domestic social problems--racism, poverty, urban problems, environmental problems and the like.²⁷

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷These problem-solving efforts of the Johnson era might have borne more fruit had they not been quickly overshadowed by the imperatives of the Viet Nam War.

Clark Kerr's The Uses of the University faced head on the question of the role of the university in society and sent both positive and negative shock waves throughout higher education. Kerr argued that the major impacts upon current universities were the land grant movement and federal support of scientific research during World War II; that the universities had lost their community aspects and become cities or multiversities that were characterized by a variety of communities and a variety of purposes held together by a corporate structure. Many of their purposes were determined by the federal government's funding policies. Universities had become predominantly service institutions for the society.²⁸

The Newman Task Force claimed, in 1971, that the system of higher education had not been at all responsive to society and that it therefore needed to be dramatically overhauled. The Task Force called for more public debate on higher education, for greater clarification of institutional priorities, for greater "real" diversity, for the creation of explicit research universities, and for professional training programs. These last would have the specific mandates to advance knowledge and provide

²⁸Corson provided the most apt terminology in a Saturday Review article by claiming that higher education is rapidly taking on the status of a "public utility" See John Corson, "Social Change and the University," Saturday Review 53 (January 10, 1970), p. 76.

skilled manpower to attack social problems.

The Carnegie Commission saw attention to critical social problems as a mission for higher education but focused more on the related role of criticizing and evaluating other social institutions. It listed as fifth among the major purposes for higher education: "evaluating society, for the benefit of its self-renewal, through individual scholarship and persuasion."²⁹

Universities, because of the safeguarded tenets of academic freedom and tenure have the opportunity to criticize other social institutions. This ability to criticize is as important as the active involvement in applied research and service activities to the solution of problems involving large social systems. The Carnegie Commission, while including problem-solving as a purpose did not, however, set it as a priority.

Public service as a traditional mission for higher education has received far less attention in the literature than have teaching and research. Similarly, social problem-solving, although generally accepted as a responsibility for higher education by taxpayers, the federal and state governments, and many educators, has not received primary attention by any but the Newman Task Force. There is no

²⁹Priorities for Action, Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Ibid., p. 26.

question however that accountability to the public has become a predominant theme and mission for higher education.

Universities as Organizations and Organizational Change

The missions for higher education, and calls for change will remain rhetorical, however, unless they are adopted by institutions of higher education. This section reviews some of the theory and literature on universities as organizations and on organizational change,³⁰ considers some of the organization difficulties that prevent institutions from assuming the missions of access, individualization, and social problem-solving, and describes the strategy of the creation of new organizational units as a way of dealing with this problem.

The formal organizational structure of universities has consisted of discipline-based departments organized into schools and colleges and administrative support units. The traditional functions for public, land-grant universities have included teaching, research, and public service. Governance structures have reserved for the faculty decisions concerning the curriculum, personnel, and overall

³⁰Only those works on organizational theory and change theory that are directly related to this study are reviewed in this chapter. Appendices IV and V contain additional reviews of works on organizational and change theory that are pertinent as background information to this study. Appendix IV is a supplementary review of the literature on organizational theory.

policies; and administrative units are organized hierarchically with decisions made at top levels. Independent governing boards have final legal responsibility for the university and therefore authority for all decisions.

A recent work, the University as an Organization, contends that:

Organizationally the university is, in fact, one of the most complex structures in modern society; it is also increasingly archaic. It is complex because its formal structure does not describe either actual power or responsibilities; it is archaic because the functions it must perform are not and cannot be discharged through the formal structure provided in its charter. The predicament of university organization has arisen in part because of its conflicting missions.³¹

Parkins would contend that actual power over universities--especially public ones--is increasingly held outside the institution at the state level and that the department and school structure is appropriate only to the teaching function of the university.

Neal Gross argued that universities were experiencing "organizational lag"--changes in organizational goals and functions had outrun the capacity of the organizational structures.³²

³¹James Perkins, ed. The University as an Organization. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1973), p. 3.

³²Neal Gross, "Organizational Lag in American Universities," Harvard Educational Review. 33 (Winter 1963).

E.D. Duryea noted "three pervasive organizational inadequacies" that further clarify the notions of organizational lag and archaic structures. These inadequacies he attributed to size and complexity, specialization and departmentalization, and shifting patterns of institutional government.³³ They point as well to reasons why systems-wide change in universities will be difficult to achieve.

The size and complexity of many universities has resulted from huge educational bureaucracies. Duryea found two bureaucracies--"the academic bureaucracy with departments, senates, and councils and the administrative, management bureaucracies."³⁴ Organizational theorists have long agreed that one of the characteristics of a bureaucratic organization is an inability to change rapidly no matter how imperative or desirable the change.

The second organizational inadequacy Duryea found in universities is specialization and departmentalization. He claims that departments continue to exert the principal force in the operational definition of goals and purposes because of their power over the curriculum and personnel decisions. Current practices and policies reflect their decisions, and change efforts are inhibited because departments have the largest vested interest in the

³³E.D. Duryea, "Evolution of University Organization," in The University as an Organization, Ibid.

³⁴Ibid., p. 36.

maintenance of the status-quo.

The third organizational inadequacy consists of outmoded governance structures. One of the most dynamic forces operating in universities today is the struggle to gain power and control over decision-making in the universities: a) Much real power--i.e., budgetary power--is moving outside of the institution into the hands of state governing boards and legislative committees, b) Presidents continue to assert the power and authority delegated to them by Boards of Trustees and frequently exert control over all areas of the university by careful manipulation of the internal allocation of resources, c) The collective faculty insists upon more involvement in all areas of university governance because of their hegemony over curriculum and personnel, and d) Subgroups within the university--professional staff, classified staff, faculty, graduate teaching assistants, and students increasingly demand power over decisions affecting them. As a result of these governance shifts it is difficult to pinpoint the final authority for any decision, and systems-wide change efforts are often blocked or confused by issues of power and influence.

The relationship between organizational form and governance is a complex one which remains ill-defined in the literature. Another recent work The Multicampus University looks closely at a new organizational

phenomenon in higher education and asks the question about which organizational form is likely to solve the problems of higher education in the 1970's.³⁵ Multicampus universities have developed in many states, including Massachusetts, ³⁶ as a response to needs for more state-wide attention and coordination of higher education, as well as needs to limit at some point the size of single institutional units. The study finally does not answer the question of organizational form but it raises important issues:

Indeed, our inability to understand the political and social context of organizational form has beclouded our understanding of the dynamics of university governance. None of the alternative patterns of organization is better or worse in the abstract. They take shape and can be evaluated only in terms of the environment within which they are set

The organization of higher education, therefore, is critical "in combination" with its environment. Organizational form affects the access and power of the different participants in academic governance with respect to specific decisions. It influences the agenda of all institutions of higher education, the manner in which that agenda will be handled, and the very substance of educational plans and programs. Organizational form affects the goals and values that control the life of the universities and colleges--singly and collectively--

³⁵Eugene Lee and Frank Bowen, The Multicampus University: A Study of Academic Governance (New York: McGraw Hill, 1971).

³⁶The University of Massachusetts was not considered in the Lee and Bowen study, however, because of the University's recent evolution to multi-campus status.

however, have pointed to the inability to change and those who have studied universities as organizations have pointed to additional reasons why it is hard for universities to change rapidly. All of these provide some insight into why it would be difficult for universities as whole systems to assume the new missions of access, individualization, and social problem-solving.

Those who recommend universal access for higher education find that the structures and forms of higher education were created to deal with full-time residential students who enter at more or less the same knowledge and experience level. Changing those structures and forms--administrative as well as academic--will be a very difficult undertaking.

Those who argue for greater individualization and responsiveness to student needs and interests find the discipline-based curriculum emanating from the organizational structures of departments more a reflection of faculty interests than student interests. Although departments were originally created to perform the teaching function, the increase in knowledge and consequent specialization have rendered them appropriate, in many cases, for teaching only at the graduate level. Full provision for individualization would require a revamping of the academic program and would probably be beyond the financial capabilities

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of universities.

Those who recommend social problem-solving as a mission find that while departments and schools allow for research that pushes back the frontiers of knowledge in the various disciplines, they rarely allow for attention to problems that cut across disciplinary lines. Adequate attention to even a handful of the most pressing social problems would require a change in the entire departmental system.

Because of the difficulties of accomplishing systems-wide organizational change efforts in a university, many have advocated the creation of special units as parallel structures or temporary systems. They have recommended them for two major reasons:

1. It would be more possible to implement them in a university environment; and

2. Once implemented such units bring pressure for change on existing organizational structures. In this way they become part of a larger organizational change strategy.

The point is made by a number of organizational theorists. Everett Rogers talks about models for emulation³⁹

³⁹Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (New York: The Free Press, 1962).

and Mathew Miles about temporary systems.⁴⁰ Ikenberry makes the point most directly in connection with his study on research institutes and their relationships with the university. A large number of university administrators that he interviewed felt that:

1. Institutes enable the university to establish new goals and respond to new constituencies more readily than do departments.

2. Institutes make visible the university's commitment to a particular area of specialization in a manner not possible in the department.

3. Institutes are useful in assembling interdisciplinary teams.

4. Institutes generate financial support.

5. Institutes more than departments allow for a rapid shift of resources to meet new institutional responsibilities.⁴¹

Ikenberry concluded that independent research institutes provided the best organizational form for interdisciplinary research and service activities.

⁴⁰ Mathew Miles, ed., Innovations in Education (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1964).

⁴¹ Ikenberry, Beyond Academic Departments, Ibid., pp. 104-105.

Distinct, parallel units would make the organizational forms and functions even more complex but, according to many theorists, represent the most viable means for the assumption of new missions.⁴²

Change Theory

While study commissions and others have articulated missions for institutions of higher education; organizational theorists have begun to study the characteristics of colleges and universities as complex organizations, and many theorists have suggested new organizational units as a means of accomplishing change within complex institutions; others have been devoting their energies to studying the process of change. This work on change theory serves as important

⁴²The author here disagrees with the conclusions of Perkins in the University as an Organization. Perkins predicts that there will be changes in mission and function, as well as in organizational form in universities over the next twenty years. He argues that large scale research and many--though not all--public service activities will shift to non-university institutions and that consequently organizational forms will be simplified and governance clarified. The author feels that pressure for more public service--particularly in the area of social problem-solving; for more research; and for greater access will increase and that new missions will emerge in the years ahead. As a direct consequence organizational structures will become even more complex and as a consequence of that, governance will continue to be fuzzy.

background for this study for several reasons.

1. It helps clarify the question of how universities--as total systems--can adopt new missions.

2. The preceding section described the near impossibility of achieving system-wide change, but pointed to the creation of separate units as one possible change strategy. Change theory provides further elaboration on this strategy.

3. Assuming that the university has adopted the strategy of creating new units, it remains important to ask what factors have been important to the creation of those units. Close scrutiny of the change factors in a single unit might lead to a clear understanding of those factors in larger units.

Social scientists have been scrutinizing the change process in a variety of different social systems and they have been using a variety of different research methodologies related to different disciplines--predominantly sociology, anthropology, and psychology--in their studies. They are working toward a generalized theory of change that would be applicable to all situations. Much of their work remained separate and distinct within the disciplines, however, until Everett Rogers in 1964⁴³ and Ronald Havelock

⁴³Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, Ibid.

in 1968 began to synthesize it. Ronald Havelock claims in 1968 that there is an emerging discipline in the social sciences focusing on processes of change, innovation, and knowledge utilization:

the quantity and even the quality of available literature indicates that the basic conceptual and empirical ingredients of this new discipline are now present.⁴⁴

Havelock surveyed over 4,000 literature titles.

The rudimentary state of the "discipline," however, precludes simple analysis and easy generalizations. It remains necessary to trace change theory through many research strands each of which contributes insights to the process. Appendix V reviews some general attitudes toward change, and some recent change theory, while this section treats more specifically those works which have dealt with the change process in colleges and universities and which were directly relevant to this study.

The most important researchers on change in colleges and universities are J.B. Lon Hefferlin and Jack Lindquist. Four additional authors--Joseph Fashing, Steven Deutsch,

⁴⁴ Ronald J. Havelock, Planning for Innovation Through Dissemination and Utilization of Knowledge (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Center for Research and Utilization of Scientific Knowledge, University of Michigan, 1968), p. 16.

Victor Baldridge, and Warren Bennis wrote case histories of change or reform efforts in colleges and universities which contributed to the theory of change and to this study.

Lon Hefferlin. One of the most important works for this study was Dynamics of Academic Reform by J. B. Lon Hefferlin. Hefferlin's book, published in 1969, reports on a four year major study--the study of Institutional Vitality--conducted by the Institute of Higher Education, Teachers College, Columbia University.

In simple terms the purpose has been to uncover the forces within institutions which tend to preserve and nourish a readiness to change as they face new social conditions, new types of students, and new developments in teaching methods and materials.⁴⁵

To carry out the study Lon Hefferlin and others surveyed existing information on organization change in general and academic change in particular, made a series of sixteen case studies of the evolution of particular practices at a number of institutions, developed a questionnaire called the Institutional Functioning Inventory, and tested their ideas about academic reform on a randomly selected stratified sample of 110 American colleges and universities.

⁴⁵J.B. Lon Hefferlin, Dynamics of Academic Reform (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969), p. x-xi.

Lon Hefferlin, like most authors considering change in higher education, felt that most changes in higher education are attributable to forces external to the university. Changes are made within the institution in order to respond to the existing or perceived priorities of those outside of the institution who control the flow of resources to the institution. These groups include state legislators, the federal government, foundations and the general public. The redirection or reorientation of any institution must come from without. Data in the Hefferlin studies supported this conclusion.

Lon Hefferlin concludes, in addition, from his study that three dominant sources of change in higher education have been resources, advocacy, and openness.

As resources constitute the key external factor, they also are the key internal factor.

In short, the first key to academic reform is that of resources: an existing program will continue to exist as long as it can find support. A new program will be tolerated if it costs no money or it brings its own support. It will be resisted if the new funds it requires could be used for the expansion of existing programs. And it will be actively opposed and accepted only under duress if existing resources must be divided to include it.⁴⁶

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 39.

The second factor is advocacy:

Call it inspiration, leadership, persuasion, or politicking; without it change is unlikely.

All the evidence from history as well as from the observations of men and women engaged in academic life about the importance of individual initiative in stimulating change is borne out by the statistical evidence of this study: academic change tends to be highest at colleges and universities where the most influential members of the institution are seen as forces for change rather than for stability.⁴⁷

Leadership or advocacy needs to be exercised at three different levels. Some individual (often from outside the institution) must act as initial advocate or change agent, another individual who has influence over the faculty must exercise opinion leadership and a third individual occupying a position of power and control over resources must be willing to financially support an innovation.

In addition to the individual leadership and action, however, there must exist a critical mass of support from the faculty for a reform to be adopted. The absolute number of the critical mass is impossible to determine as that varies with other factors--amount of financial resources, need for innovation, position power of person(s) exercising leadership, etc., but it is clear that a number

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 141.

of individuals must be supportive. The critical mass of support is necessary from among the faculty and administrators, and while students can contribute to the critical mass, although critical numbers here are far higher than for faculty, student support alone does not seem sufficient to bring about change.

The third factor important to reform, according to Lon Hefferlin, involves the openness of the system or a conducive institutional environment. This includes a shifting combination of organization structure, governance, ethos, communications, growth, and other institutional characteristics. Lon Hefferlin concluded from the literature on organizational change that organizations generally are inherently passive, and tend toward ritualism and self-maintenance of their members. He concluded from his study on academic organizations that they were even more resistant to change than other organizations because their purposes and support are conservative, they are vertically fragmented and structured to resist change, and the norm of professionalism breeds independence among institutional members.

Lon Hefferlin found, however, some characteristics that lead to change and reform.⁴⁸ These include:

⁴⁸These characteristics are discussed in Chapter VI-- "Sources of Reform," Lon Hefferlin, pp. 136-190.

1. A market is essential:
-Market means both a demand for change and a corresponding reward for change.
2. New models are needed for emulation.
-These may be extra institutional models or internal models housed in distinct or separate units.
3. Ideas need circulation.
-Communication between institutions should not be dependent only upon faculty growth but should be encouraged by workshops, seminars, and inter-institutional meetings.
4. A number of "marginal" members are helpful.
-Marginal members of institutions are those who are committed to it but not dependent upon it for livelihood.
5. For major reorganization, new members seem necessary.
- "The most dynamic institutions tend to be those where the faculty is both expanding and changing the most, where the junior faculty appear to have more influence in affecting educational policy than at other institutions, and where the proportion of tenured faculty is lowest."⁴⁹
6. The right people must be retained.
-The atmosphere and environment must be conducive to change and supportive so that the vital people and advocates of new ideas stay on at the institution.
7. Initiative is decentralized.
- "We suspect that the major restriction to continuous reform on many campuses is the debilitating effects of a sense of powerlessness" ⁵⁰
8. Patriarchy is avoided.
- "In a patriarchal institution, power is not merely concentrated in one person or group, but it is assigned on the basis of seniority

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 163.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 166.

and is thus held interminably or indefinitely by senior members."⁵¹ Patriarchy is an inadequate form of government in a rapidly changing society.

9. Collegial consensus is also avoided.

-"Collegiality is well-suited to those colleges and universities that operate as holding companies for their faculty members--those institutions that exist for the purpose of providing professors with space, equipment, and apprentices, and where the combined interests of the faculty constitute the purposes of the whole."⁵²

Lon Hefferlin and others would maintain that colleges and universities are not meant to be such holding companies and that such governance control by the collegium has resulted in conservative institutions which are not easily adaptable to social change. It is very difficult to accomplish anything if everyone must agree.

10. The institution is avuncular.

-The term avuncular is derived from the Latin term avunculus referring to an uncle. The characteristics that identify the avuncular institution are: a) initiative is neither permanently centralized nor dispersed and all connected with the institution participate at one time or another in determining policy; b) high status is assigned on the basis of expertise and c) positions of status shift according to different tasks rather than in strict rotation. "Expertise tempers the authority of patriarchy and the equality of the collegium."⁵³

⁵¹Ibid., p. 169.

⁵²Ibid., p. 175.

⁵³Ibid., p. 180.

Lon Hefferlin's study was very impressive. It started from a broad theoretical base concerning both higher education and the general process of change, used imaginative research methodologies⁵⁴ and analyzed perceptively the factors for change in universities.

Jack Lindquist. Next to Lon Hefferlin's, the most immediately helpful and the most recent work on the process of change in colleges and universities is that being undertaken by Arthur Chickering and Jack Lindquist in the "Strategies for Change and Knowledge Utilization" Project that is being conducted under the auspices of the Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities and supported by the National Institute for Mental Health. The project has both research and action objectives.

The research seeks to identify structures, values, and processes which correlate highly with utilization of knowledge in ongoing, educational problem-solving. The action seeks to institutionalize within Project colleges and universities (currently eight) such self-renewing structures, values, and processes as well as specific academic innovations.⁵⁵

⁵⁴A combination of evolutionary case studies, "Institutional Functioning Inventory," interviews, Index of Institutional Vitalization, etc.

⁵⁵Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities. "Strategies for Change and Knowledge Utilization Brochure on Project," supported by the National Institute of Mental Health. Arthur Chickering, Director, p. 1.

The project was a three year project begun in 1969/70 and although the project is completed, the final report is not. A valuable article by Jack Lindquist, however, contains a review of the background research for the project, a description of the project methodologies, and some preliminary conclusions.⁵⁶

The first step in the research component of the project was to analyze literature regarding the adoption of innovations, and decision-making in complex organizations, including the study of academic reform and governance in higher education. Lindquist's analysis of the literature suggested seven characteristics of change and of higher educational institutions which formed obstacles to academic innovation. These include: 1. most changes threaten secured positions, 2. institutions of higher education are extremely differentiated organizations, 3. academic power is pluralistic rather than monolithic, 4. universities display "value resistance" to innovations which challenge meritocracy and graduate research specialization, 5. educational outcomes and future demands on the

⁵⁶Jack Lindquist, "Political Linkage in the Academic Innovation Process." Journal of Higher Education. XLV No. 5 (May 1974).

institution are inadequately measured, 6. most college and university members are isolated from new teaching-learning information, and 7. universities are invested with organizational inertia.⁵⁷

Lindquist moves from a review of the barriers to academic reform to a discussion of various conceptual models of change process. He reviews those which had been abstracted by Havelock from diffusion studies in a wide variety of disciplines, including sociology, anthropology, psychology, and education and which were meant as general theoretical models.⁵⁸ Lindquist then proposes one that will, by taking into account the barriers to change in academic institutions, be appropriate for colleges and universities.

Havelock's first major perspective or conceptual model is "Research Development, and Diffusion." It serves as a relevant paradigm for technical and social change including the following features: a. rational sequence from

⁵⁷Ibid., pp. 324-327.

⁵⁸Lindquist's review of Havelock is taken from: Ronald Havelock, Planning for Innovation Through Dissemination and Utilization of Knowledge, Ibid.

research, to testing, to production, to distribution to consumers, b. planning, c. division of labor, d. defined audience, e. high investment for maximum pay-off. Havelock finds it a useful model for consideration of issues at macrosystemic and policy levels, and Lindquist finds it only minimally applicable to colleges and universities because it assumes aspects of packaging and marketing that university faculty are likely to mistrust. An example that strengthens Lindquist's point can be found in Richard Evans' Resistance to Innovation in Higher Education where he reported on the negative response to Instructional Television in Selected Universities.⁵⁹ ITV could be considered a research development and diffusion-type innovation, and it clearly failed at the university level.

The second conceptual model suggested by Havelock and reported by Lindquist is the "Social Interaction" perspective. This perspective has its roots in anthropology and social psychology and its major theorists include Newcomb, Lewin, E. Rogers, Carlson, Mantard and Ross. It assumes a constant empirical innovation and measures its flow through the social system by concentration on the communications network, and on the process of

⁵⁹Richard Evans, Resistance to Innovation in Higher Education (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968).

adoption. Major points derived from theories in this tradition include: a. the importance of the social relations network, b. the importance of opinion leadership, c. the importance of informal personal contact, and d. the significance of the individual's group identity. Havelock and Lindquist felt that the shortcoming of this perspective was that it concentrated more on the individual than on the group or social system.

The third model is the "Problem-Solving" perspective. It is closely associated with the human relations tradition of planned change and represents basically a psychological and user-oriented approach. Its major proponents include Benne, Libbitt, Miles and Watson. Major points stressed by theorists with this perspective are that knowledge utilization must include a diagnostic phase where user need is the primary consideration; that the role of the outsider is primarily to serve as a catalyst, collaborator or consultant on how to plan change; and that self-initiation by the user or client system creates the best motivational climate for lasting change. Bennis' study on the failure at Buffalo of major institutional reform corroborates this point.⁶⁰ The motivation for change

⁶⁰ Warren Bennis, The Learning Ivory Tower (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973).

at Buffalo did not come from the faculty or the students, but from a small group of individuals and the overall reform effort could not be sustained. Lindquist points, however, to the inadequacy of this model for higher education by claiming that most educational changes in fact are made in response to external, rather than internal influences.

Havelock added to these conceptual frameworks of change his own model--the "Linkage Model." The key concept is the aspect of linkage between user and external knowledge resources. The task of intervenors, or linking agents, is to bring the knowledge-disseminating, and the knowledge-consuming subsystems into effective and continuing interaction.


Figure 1 depicts the four diffusion perspectives synthesized by Havelock.

Lindquist adapted Havelock's "Linkage Model" to a college and university environment by creating a new model, the "Political Linkage Model." Figure 2 depicts this model.


Lindquist's model adds to Havelock's the formal governance or decision-making process in a university. The model looks at ways teaching-learning innovations enter an institution. Most often students and faculty within the institution become aware of research and practices

(Continued on Page 62)


The Research, Development and Diffusion Perspective




The Social Interaction Perspective



The Problem-Solver Perspective




The Linkage Process



SOURCE: Havelock, Planning for Innovation Through Dissemination and Utilization of Knowledge, Ibid., Chapter II.

Figure 2

SOURCES OF NEW ACADEMIC INFORMATION



SOURCE: Jack Lindquist, "The Academic-Innovation Process," Journal of Higher Education. XLV No. 5 (May 1974), p. 330.

at other institutions. It looks at ways these ideas connect with needs, wants, or demands that have been articulated on the campus, and it studies the stages in the political governance system through which a proposal for any change in program policy or procedure must pass. Important to this political governance system are the gatekeepers who decide which proposals enter and the formal authorities who make the final decision. The next step in the process is a diffusion step within the university so that the program or policy will be implemented.

Lindquist's model was meant as a deductive framework rather than a rigidly testable model, but it does capture some essential steps in the process of change. The model has been further elaborated by Lindquist and is currently being tested in the "Strategies for Change" project. Research results from that project are not yet available.

On the whole, Lindquist does not think colleges and universities are organizations susceptible to innovations. He restates the Mohr hypothesis:

Innovation is directly related to the motivation to innovate, inversely related to the strength of obstacles to innovation, and directly related to

the availability of resources for overcoming such obstacles.⁶¹

Lindquist said that such resources as internal research on teaching and learning, regular in-service workshops and training, funds for academic experimentation, an abundance of cosmopolitan locals, structures for academic planning, professional rewards for innovators, and open collaborative governance are not found in many higher educational institutions.

He concluded:

The probability of academic innovation is not high under current conditions. Dabbling in educational R & D, linkage to diffusion channels, self-study, and collaborative problem-solving may not help much, for the problem is beyond mere tinkering.⁶²

Lindquist did suggest systematic attention to research and development of academic innovations, attention to diffusion channels, collaborative problem-solving, professional development, and intervention into ongoing institutional functions. He also suggested a number of strategies for change:

⁶¹Lawrence Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation in Organizations," American Political Science Review, 63 (March 1969), pp. 111-126.

⁶²Lindquist, "Political Linkage," p. 343.

1. hold workshops and retreats
2. conduct faculty seminars on teaching and learning
3. sponsor new faculty orientation or in-service training
4. provide student orientation to learning options and problem-solving
5. hire new personnel and recruit new kinds of students
6. introduce an alternative learning experience
7. restructure governance
8. build into the institution an Educational Development Office and/or Research and Planning Committee
9. conduct a major self-study
10. bring in experts
11. visit other campuses
12. utilize social gatherings
13. utilize administrative perogatives
14. develop a change agent team
15. join a consortium⁶³

Case Histories of Innovation at the College and University Level. The case history most closely related in focus to this study was a study completed by Fashing and

⁶³Jack Lindquist, "Strategies for Changing Campus Programs," supplement to remarks made at Commissioner's First Annual Conference on Non-traditional Study, Glens Falls, New York, November 2, 1973.

Deutsch Academics in Retreat. It is a study of the process of educational innovation in six colleges and universities with reference to specific developments such as student-initiated experimental colleges, other experimental units, and ethnic studies programs. According to the authors: "Our central focus is on the sources of educational innovations, and particularly, their impact on the governance of the institutions in which they are undertaken."⁶⁴ The timing of the study, the thinly veiled political perspective of the authors, and their concern with student activism and power reveal something of a bias to their study of the process of change in an institution, but the authors made two points well worth considering.

They felt that the inhibitors to university reform were the lack of consensus about what changes are desirable or required, the nature of the university organization with its hierarchies and divisions along narrow disciplinary lines, university governance structures with decisions reserved for the top administration and governing boards, and its multiplicity of official interest groups within the university.

Reviewing materials on innovation processes and innovative programs in a number of colleges and universities,

⁶⁴ Joseph Fashing, and Steven Deutsch, Academics in Retreat: The Politics of Educational Innovation (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1971), p. 5.

Fashing and Deutsch found "that such programs are not only limited in their scope, but that they are usually set apart as a distinct unit from the 'normal' university."⁶⁵ Such units were in addition usually given little financial backing and were low on the institutional priority list, which meant that in periods of budget crises they were likely to be eliminated or severely curtailed. They concluded, therefore, that innovative program units, like ethnic studies programs or experimental colleges within institutions, were accepted by administrations and faculty as "cooling out" mechanisms.

Such attempts move to restore equilibrium without altering established procedures or units in any significant way. . . . Such moves can be interpreted as means to temporarily avoid the central issue--reform of already existing ones (departments). In addition, experimental programs often have limited life-span and have in no sense been considered permanent additions to the institutions.⁶⁶

I find Fashing and Deutsch's analysis compelling for the period of generalized unrest and institutional response to that unrest of the late sixties but somewhat weaker as we move into the seventies and a period of reduced student activism. The creation of special program units can also represent less of an intentional device

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 22.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 24.

for avoiding institutional change than a vehicle for obtaining it.

Bennis' case study also provided insights to this study. In The Learning Ivory Tower, Bennis describes in detail three events that were meaningful and important to him and which are related to three universal organizational phenomena--leadership succession, resigning, and a new administration's attempt at massive organizational reform. His intention is to provide a more thorough and realistic understanding of the university through describing it in its complexity and changes, and he counts upon the reader to generalize to other similarly complex situations. He attempts, in short, a new kind of social science, one that combines action and analysis. I found his method fascinating, and his last two chapters--where he reflects upon the failure of attempts to bring about radical reform at the State University of New York at Buffalo and offers guidelines on how to bring about changes in a university setting--particularly helpful.

Based on his negative experience at Buffalo, Warren Bennis offers eleven guidelines on how to bring about change in a university setting:

1. Recruit with scrupulous honesty.
-avoid the disparity between vision and reality
2. Guard against the Crazies.

3. Build support among like-minded people, whether or not you recruited them.
"Given economic sufficiency, persons stay in organizations and feel satisfied in them because they are respected and feel competent. They are much freer to identify with the adaptive process and much better equipped to tolerate the high level of ambiguity that accompanies change when these needs are heeded."⁶⁷
4. Plan for how to change as well as what to change. If change is to be permanent it must be gradual. The incremental-reform model depends on a rotating nucleus of persons who continuously read the data provided by the organization and the society around it for clues that it is time to adapt.
5. Don't settle for rhetorical change.
6. Don't allow those who are opposed to change to appropriate such basic issues as academic standards.
7. Know the territory.
8. Appreciate environmental factors.
9. Avoid future shock.
10. Allow time to consolidate gains.
11. Remember that change is most successful when those who are affected are involved in the planning.⁶⁸

Another case study which provided insights on the dynamics of change in universities is Power and Conflict in the University, by Victor Baldrige. It is particularly important because it suggests a way for looking at the

⁶⁷Bennis, The Leaning Ivory Tower, Ibid., pp. 138-139.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 140.

dynamics and interacting forces among the factors of change.

Baldrige conducted an extensive research study of New York University. The three major thrusts of his research were: a. the study of policy formulation--"the dynamics involved in setting long-range goals and arranging basic decision structures;"⁶⁹ b. the study of conflict processes in the University--"the type of conflict that develops when interest groups try to influence policy decisions;"⁷⁰ and c. the study of change dynamics in the university.

Baldrige incorporates all three thrusts into the notion of governance but found existing theories of decision-making and governance--the bureaucratic and collegial theories--inadequate to deal with the process of change in the university. According to Baldrige:

When we look at the complex and dynamic processes that explode on the modern campus today, we see neither the rigid, formal aspects of bureaucracy nor the calm, consensus-directed elements of an academic collegium. On the contrary, if student riots cripple the campus, if professors form unions and strike, if administrators defend their traditional positions, and if

⁶⁹Victor Baldrige, Power and Conflict in the University (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971), p. 3.

⁷⁰Ibid.

external interest groups and irate governors invade the academic halls, all these acts must be seen as political. They emerge from the complex, fragmented social structure of the university and its 'publics,' drawing on the divergent concerns and life styles of hundreds of miniature subcultures. These groups articulate their interests in many different ways, bringing pressure on the decision-making process from any number of angles and using power and force whenever it is available and necessary. Power and influence, once articulated, go through a complex process until policies are shaped, reshaped, and forged out of the competing claims of multiple groups. All this is a dynamic process, a process clearly indicating that the university is best understood as a 'politicized' institution--above all else the Political University.⁷¹

Baldrige selected policy decisions as being the most important decisions and the key to studying organizational conflict and change, and developed a new theory of decision-making which he called a political model. His model suggests that the organizational analyst should focus on the nature of the organization's social structure, on interest articulation dynamics, the legislative process, and on the execution of policy.

Summary. The research studies of Lon Hefferlin and Jack Lindquist and the case studies of Fashing and Deutsch, Bennis, and Baldrige all are concerned with the process of change in colleges and universities, and they all show the complexity of that process. All would have

⁷¹Ibid., p. 19-20.

agreed with Lon Hefferlin's observation concerning the change process:

We have unearthed no academic philosopher's stone; no one device, no one mechanism, no one technique that seems alone adequate to bring about academic change. Instead a whole network of factors (attitudes, procedures, mechanisms, pressures) appear to be involved. Colleges and universities, like other organizations, are systemic by nature. To alter their operations significantly requires effort on several fronts at several levels and by several means.⁷²

The following chapters will consider this network of factors for one institution, the University of Massachusetts, by describing its attempts to take on the important missions of access, individualization, and social problem-solving.

⁷²Lon Hefferlin, *Ibid.*, p. 140.

C H A P T E R I I

THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

The University of Massachusetts is a large, public, land grant institution. This chapter contains: a) a brief overview of its history; b) a more complete description of its development since it achieved university status in 1947; c) an overview of the policies and activities of the University with respect to the missions of access, individualization, and social problem-solving; d) an assessment of those characteristics that make the University of Massachusetts amenable to change; and e) a description of its special unit change strategy.

Brief History of the University

Massachusetts Agricultural College. The University of Massachusetts is fundamentally a land grant institution, but it could have been other things. According to its historian Harold Whiting Cary:

. . . it was clear that this was not to be the University which Massachusetts' Governor John A. Andrew had dreamed of in 1863, a state university of schools partly private and partly public gathered around Harvard College as their nucleus. And it was not the University in Boston which the leaders of the labor organizations had strongly urged in the 1930's. This University was to develop where Levi Stockbridge and William S. Clark had cleared land of swamps

and brambles to create in 1867 the Massachusetts Agricultural College.¹

The Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862 which promised federal financial assistance in agricultural education spurred on many years of effort within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to develop a school for the education of farmers. Finally, Massachusetts legislators determined not to attach the state's land grant monies to an existing private institution, but to create an entirely new public institution.² The institution was incorporated as Massachusetts Agricultural College in April 1863 and it opened its doors to a handful of students in 1867.

The first announcements from "Mass Aggie" emphasized that the new college was designed primarily for those who could not afford to attend the private colleges,³ and its main purpose was to provide "an education for farming."⁴

¹H.W. Cary, The University of Massachusetts: A History of One Hundred Years (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1962), p. 2.

²This meant, in fact, dividing up federal land grant monies so that a portion would go to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for education in technology.

³To this day, U. Mass. continues to be a place for those who cannot afford to attend the private colleges of the Commonwealth. In studies of entering freshmen conducted by the American College Testing Service each year, a significantly large percentage (47% for 1968) cite low tuition as a major reason for attending the University.

⁴Cary, p. 38.

Between 1867 and 1931, the college grew slowly to an enrollment of 1200, but its basic curriculum was centered in agriculture. Not all of those who wanted low cost public education, however, wanted agricultural education, so students, faculty and alumni pressed for designation as a State College rather than an agricultural college. A State College would enable a broader curriculum and a liberal degree, and would be a step in the direction toward a university.

Massachusetts State College. Designation as a State College came in 1931. Changes were slow during this period but the State College gradually formed a division of agriculture and horticulture, a division of biological sciences, a division of physical sciences and mathematics, a division of humanities, and a division of social sciences. Within divisions, departments were slowly being established.

University of Massachusetts. Enrollment grew slowly from 1931 to 1945, but World War II was to have a significant impact on the college.

Not only was there a backlog of young people whose opportunity for education had been postponed, but a new pressure of numbers was about to develop as a result of the increase in population and the desire of a larger percentage of the people for college training. A new emphasis upon education for professional needs, resulting in part from the rapid advances in technology, led to the demand for programs in engineering, business administration, and teacher training.⁵

⁵Ibid., p. 173.

Many in the Commonwealth argued for the creation of a State University in Boston that would be distinct from the Massachusetts State College in Amherst, but influential alumni as well as faculty and students were pushing instead for a change of status for the institution in Amherst. They were able to engage enough political support so that on May 8, 1947, the Massachusetts State College became the University of Massachusetts

The University of Massachusetts
From 1950 to 1970

Organization. The broadening of scope to become a university required new organization, new buildings, expansion of curriculum, and increase of staff. These changes took place during the decade of the fifties. All activities related to agriculture--education provided by the Stockbridge School, research, and extension activity--were unified in a School of Agriculture.

In 1953 the college was responsible for the agricultural education of some 700 students and stood sixteenth among fifty land-grant colleges in the total enrollment in agriculture.⁶

The college of Arts and Sciences--merging several divisions--was created in 1955. A large number of specialized departments were established within this college during the period. The department of Home Economics was trans-

⁶Ibid., p. 179.

formed into School status in 1947. More important were the achievement of School status by the divisions of Engineering (1947), Business Administration (1950), Nursing (1954), Education (1956), and Physical Education (1959).

In comparison with other state universities, the University of Massachusetts was slow in its development of professional schools. Its Schools of Engineering and Business Administration were created quite late; a very small Medical School in Worcester did not appear until the sixties, and only discussions about the possibilities of a Law School were in evidence by 1970.

In 1960, then, the University of Massachusetts was not a large institution, but the basic organization at Amherst was established.

Its College of Arts and Sciences was surrounded by six other colleges and schools offering vocational curricula (Agriculture, Engineering, Business Administration, Education, Nursing, Physical Education). A student body of 6500, and a resident faculty of 580 members seemed large by standards which Amherst people had had in the past.⁷

The decade of the sixties was going to be an era of more dramatic changes for the University of Massachusetts. Its enrollment nearly quadrupled. By the Fall of 1971, University enrollment exceeded 25,000 students and faculty numbered more than 1600.

⁷Ibid., p. 198.

Organizational changes were radical as well. The University became a multi-campus system with an urban campus in Boston, a Medical School in Worcester, and a systems office for its president in downtown Boston. It became part of a more formalized structure for public higher education in the Commonwealth with the passage of the Willis-Harrington Act in 1965.⁸

Its budget and facilities grew spectacularly. With growth at Amherst and new campuses more than seventy new buildings were built. The budget quadrupled so that the fiscal operating budget of 1971 exceeded 110 million. Library holdings quadrupled.

An important achievement was legislation granting fiscal autonomy to the University in 1962. This allowed the University to set its own salary schedules and thus compete successfully for faculty. Marked improvements in the quality of the faculty were a result.

Its academic program expanded and improved in quality upon the foundation built in the 1950's. Table 1 lists university departments by college or school and the degree programs offered as of June 1972.

⁸The Willis-Harrington Plan set up and defined a state-wide university system, a State College system, and a community college system, a coordinating Board of Higher Education, and an Advisory Council on Education.

TABLE 1

DEPARTMENTS AND DEGREE PROGRAMS

A - Associate (Stockbridge) B - Bachelor D - Doctorate
 M - Master S - Master, more than 42 required credits

D S M B A	<u>College of Agriculture</u>
D M B A	Agricultural and Food Economics
D M B	Entomology
	Environmental Science
D M B	Food and Agricultural Engineering
D M B A	Food Science and Technology
D M B A	Forestry and Wildlife Management
	Hotel, Restaurant, and Travel Administration
S B A	Landscape Architecture
D M B	Plant Pathology
D M B A	Plant and Soil Science
D S M B	<u>College of Arts and Sciences</u>
D S M B	Faculty of Humanities and Fine Arts
	Afro-American Studies
S M B	Art
	Classics
D M B	Comparative Literature
D S M B	English
D* M B	French and Italian
D* M B	Germanic Languages and Literature
D* M B	Hispanic Languages and Literature
D M B	History
D M	Linguistics
	Music
D* M B	Philosophy
	Slavic Languages and Literature
D S M B	Faculty of Social and Behavior Sciences
D M B	Anthropology
	Asian Studies
D M B	Economics
D M B	Political Sciences
D M B	Psychology
D M B	Sociology
D S M B	Speech
D M B	Faculty of Natural Science and Mathematics
D M B	Biochemistry
D* M B	Botany
D* M B	Chemistry
D* M B	Geology and Geography

TABLE 1 (Continued)

A - Associate (Stockbridge) B - Bachelor D - Doctorate
 M - Master S - Master, more than 42 required credits

D	M B	Mathematics and Statistics
D*	M B	Microbiology
D*	M B	Physics and Astronomy
D*	M B	Zoology
D	M B	<u>School of Business Administration</u>
	M B	Accounting
	B	General Business and Finance
	B	Management
	B	Marketing
D	M B	<u>School of Education</u>
D	M B	<u>School of Engineering</u>
D	M B	Chemical Engineering
D	M B	Civil Engineering
D	M B	Electrical Engineering
D	M B	Industrial Engineering and Operations Research
D	M B	Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering
D	M B	<u>School of Home Economics</u>
	B	Home Economics Education
	B	Human Development
		Management and Family Economics
D	M B	Nutrition and Food
	B	Textiles, Clothing, and Environmental Arts
	M B	<u>School of Nursing</u>
D	M B	<u>School of Physical Education</u>
D		Exercise Science
	B	Physical Education for Men
	B	Physical Education for Women
	B	Recreation
D	M	<u>Graduate School</u>
	M	Computer Science
	M	Marine Science
D	M	Polymer Science
		Water Resources

TABLE 1 (Continued)

A - Associate (Stockbridge) B - Bachelor D - Doctorate
 M - Master S - Master, more than 42 required credits

<u>Provost</u>	
	Air Science
	Military Science
B	Bachelors Degree with Individual Concentration
B	Continuing Education
B	Honors Program
	Institute for Man and His Environment
S	Labor Relations and Research
M B	Public Health
	Residential Colleges

*Five College cooperative PHD offered.

SOURCE: Patricia Bourke, Richard Story, and Richard Wagner, "1971-1972 UM/A Data Sheets" (Amherst: Office of Institutional Studies, 1972).

The number of graduate programs had doubled since 1960; new research programs had been established in computer science, polymer science, and marine science; and new service centers were created in labor relations, water resources, and governmental services. A graduate Dean had been established and a new facility for graduate research begun. A Division of Continuing Education had been established in 1970 to provide credit and non-credit educational programs throughout the state.

One of the most important changes at the University of Massachusetts involved the School of Education. In

1968 a new Dean was hired and given the mandate to revamp the education program. He did this almost with a vengeance. Within the space of two years the School of Education had a new and quadrupled faculty, a thousand graduate students, innumerable activities and outreach programs throughout the state and nation, and an entirely new curriculum that was strikingly different from the rest of the University. The objective of the School of Education was to act as an agent of change for elementary, secondary, and higher education. It clearly affected the rest of the University.

Leadership. The leadership of the University of Massachusetts during the period from 1950 to 1970 was quite strong, but underwent significant changes which in turn affected the basic orientation of the University.

Ralph Van Meter, President of the University from 1947 to 1954, had begun the transformation from a college to a university. Jean Mather, President from 1954 to 1960 had devoted most of his attention to building the physical plant to accommodate the influx of students and faculty. He was committed to growth.

The obvious need for developing greater opportunities in public higher education for the tidal wave of youngsters now coming up through the elementary and secondary schools of Massachusetts is a real challenge. The very preponderance of private colleges and universities in the state, all committed to a program

of limited enrollment, makes the challenge here the greatest, I believe, in the country.⁹

Mather also worked for the achievement of fiscal autonomy for the campus although this was not fully achieved until 1962, during the presidency of John Lederle (1960-1970).

Lederle, too, was concerned with providing educational opportunity to citizens of the Commonwealth.

We are pledged to the democratic principle of the right of every individual, regardless of race, religion, or economic background, to that amount and kind of education of which he is capable and for which he has the desire and will.¹⁰

He was concerned, perhaps, with building a great, public, research-oriented university on the model of Michigan and Berkeley. Under Lederle and his Provost, Oswald Tippo, hundreds of new faculty members were brought to the University. They recruited primarily young men trained at Harvard, Yale, Michigan, or Berkeley and committed to graduate education and research. During this period, the University of Massachusetts took a leading place among state universities.

⁹Jean Mather, "Inaugural Address," quoted in Cary, *Ibid.*, p. 189.

¹⁰John Lederle, Report of the President for 1960, quoted in Cary, *Ibid.*, p. 197.

Spectacular growth on the Amherst campus was augmented by the establishment of a branch campus in Boston and plans for a Medical School in Worcester. In 1969, plans for system-wide reorganization were announced, and Robert Wood in succeeding Lederle in 1970 became the President of the University of Massachusetts system. His office was moved to Boston.

Robert Wood de-emphasized graduate education and research and concerned himself more with the role of the University within the Commonwealth.

But I am inclined toward research that will actually solve problems and toward education that really helps the student concerned But the real challenge comes in bringing the University and the real world together in new ways The knowledge and skills that exist in this University are among the state's great natural resources. The Commonwealth has a right to that knowledge and those skills. They represent opportunities to bring about not only incremental improvements but institutional change I am persuaded that the real hope for change lies in an 'institutional' approach. The University as an institution that represents both knowledge and change can work with other institutions that need knowledge and are receptive to change. This process--properly undertaken--can feed back to and strengthen the University's own educational and research capacities.¹¹

This re-orientation toward social problem-solving and public service would prove difficult for the faculty hired by Tippo and Lederle in the 1960's, but unquestionably

¹¹Robert Wood, "Inaugural Address," The Alumnus 2 (February/March 1971): 3-8.

the interests of the leadership of the University of Massachusetts from 1950 to 1970 combined to make the University of Massachusetts responsive to the pressures for providing access, individualization, and social problem-solving.

Administration. As a result of growth and the move to a multi-campus system, the administrative organization of the University was in flux during the period from 1950 to 1970. The president had a small systems office staff in Boston. Each of the three campuses was headed by a chancellor. At the Amherst campus (by far the largest campus in the system), the chancellor had reporting to him a Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs and Provost and Vice-Chancellors for Student Affairs and Administrative Services. Deans of the Schools and Colleges reported to the Provost. During this period, the number of top level administrative positions and the turnover in these positions was considerable.

Robert Wood's arrival, his move of the president's office from the Amherst campus, and his stated intentions of re-orienting the University toward public service and away from graduate education, and the "Michigan/Berkeley Model" led to an inevitable power struggle with the then-chancellor, Oswald Tippo. Tippo would resign in 1971, but the dynamics of power and conflict was significant during 1970 and 1971.

Governance. The basic governance structures at the University of Massachusetts were similar to those at other universities. The Board of Trustees made all final decisions on the recommendation of the president. The president in turn sought the advice in academic areas of a representative faculty senate, and in student life areas, of a representative student senate. An academic Matters Council considered proposals for new course, major programs, and other academic programs, and forwarded these to the faculty senate.

During the late sixties, student dissatisfaction and considerable faculty sentiment that the administration was making too many policy decisions without consulting the faculty led to a reexamination of governance by several committees. A variety of proposals for reorganization were made and widely debated on the campus. Students suggested an all-university senate and rumblings about faculty unionization and collective bargaining were heard. What emerged by the early seventies was a system of multiple governance units--faculty senate, student senate and administration--with final decisions allowed to that unit which had been granted responsibility in the particular area.

The Evolution of Mission and Objective from 1950 to 1970. It is difficult to define the missions and objectives of the University of Massachusetts from 1950 to 1970 for it

was clearly a "multiversity" in both the positive and negative definitions of the term coined by Clark Kerr. There were many goals, a large number of sub-groups among students, faculty, and administrators, whose interests sometimes corresponded and sometimes clashed, and an array of activities ranging from undergraduate education to large scale research and service efforts. The dynamic forces and the pace of change at the University of Massachusetts were considerable and the University's sense of its mission evolved in response to these forces.

One way of describing the missions of the University of Massachusetts and their evolution is to look at statements from major planning documents during the period. In 1962, the Long Range Academic Planning Committee of the Faculty Senate issued its report and supported a multiple role for the University of Massachusetts as a land grant institution of higher learning supported by the Commonwealth.

As such, the University carries a strong mandate for rendering appropriate educational services on behalf of the people, the Commonwealth and the common good. But as our institution of higher learning, it also carries a primary obligation to other universities to uphold intellectual standards and ideals.¹²

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1962 Report of the Long Range Academic Planning Committee, by Maxwell Goldberg, Chairman (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1962), p. 6.

Under multiple roles the committee called for teaching, research, extension, equality of opportunity, and excellence, but it clearly stressed excellence as defined by a student body drawn from the top twenty per cent of their high school graduating class, a faculty holding doctorates from elite institutions, and a large number of graduate programs.

A September 1970 report of a different Faculty Senate Long Range Planning Committee reverses this posture to some extent and stresses the notion of equality of opportunity.

. . . a public university in a democratic society cannot pursue an educational philosophy which, in effect, outlines a policy of exclusivity. A democracy implies diversity. A public university must, to whatever extent practicable, reflect that diversity.¹³

The many recommendations in the report reflected the changes the Committee felt were needed for the University of Massachusetts to accomplish its mission of diversity as a public university. It called for more and more diverse students, a commitment to academic experimentation and innovation in response to student dissatisfactions, a commitment to public service, and a better articulation of the role of the University in the

¹³Directions for the Seventies: A Report of the Faculty Senate Long Range Planning Committee, by Joseph Marcus, Chairman (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, September 1970), p. 41.

Commonwealth. Overall, however, the report emphasized the improvement of undergraduate education.

This report had been completed and distributed in September 1970. In December 1970, Robert Wood was inaugurated as president and he used the occasion to name a new committee--The Committee on the Future University of Massachusetts. In contrast to long range planning committees, this was not solely a faculty committee, but a committee including students, faculty, alumni, and leading members of the professional and business community. It was headed by Vernon Alden, Chairman of the Board of the Boston Company and former president of Ohio University. After a year, the committee issued its report, commonly called "The Future Report," with the following intentions:

. . . to outline a set of goals and directions for the University for the coming years that will help generate a renewed sense of public trust that the University belongs to the people of the Commonwealth and is serving them, inspire a renewed sense of purpose and mission within the University, and instill in the elected leadership of the State a renewed confidence and shared vision that the University deserves full and unstinting support in the years ahead.¹⁴

The Future Committee too called for teaching, research, service, and academic excellence. It stressed under-

¹⁴Report of the President's Committee on the Future University of Massachusetts, by Vernon Alden, Chairman (Boston: University of Massachusetts, 1971), p. 34.

graduate education, and, most importantly, called for a new involvement of the University in society. "We believe universities should be responsive rather than disengaged, appliers as well as creators of knowledge, questioners as well as conservers of values."¹⁵ The Committee called for a series of changes on all campuses of the University in such areas as admissions, educational programs, academic organization, and administrative priorities. They ordered these recommendations around five major themes: accessibility, diversity, undergraduate teaching, service, and productivity. The Committee wanted the University of Massachusetts to be a "new model for the public university in America--one defined by its stronger emphasis upon the quality of the undergraduate learning experience and service to society."¹⁶

Therefore, while the mission of the University of Massachusetts from 1950 to 1970 continued to include the traditional functions of teaching, research and public service, and a commitment to academic excellence, the emphasis changed considerably over the period from a stress on graduate education and research to higher priority for undergraduate education and public service.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 52

¹⁶Ibid.

The University of Massachusetts and
Access, Individualization, and
Social Problem-Solving

Access. It has been pointed out that the pre-dominant preoccupation of the University of Massachusetts for the period 1950 to 1970 was institutional growth and expansion. The University's rationale for its exceedingly rapid growth rate was the provision of educational opportunity to the citizens of the Commonwealth.

Between 1950 and 1959, the overall enrollment (graduate, undergraduate, and Stockbridge School) grew seventy-five per cent from 3,524 students to 6, 131. Between 1960 and 1969, enrollment on the Amherst campus grew 191 per cent, from 6,495 to 18,865.¹⁷ If the enrollments of the Division of Continuing Education and the Boston and Worcester campuses are added, the figure reaches 24,989.¹⁸

¹⁷Direction for the Seventies, Ibid., Table 2, p.8.

¹⁸Opening Fall Enrollment in Higher Education, 1970, Report on Preliminary Survey (U.S. Dept. of H.E.W., 1970), cited in Future Report, Ibid., p. 1-4. It is worth noting as well the comparative enrollment increase among institutions of higher education in the Commonwealth.

Reflecting the changes in the relative roles of the public and private sectors in Massachusetts, there has been a spectacular increase in the size of the public sector. In ten years the State system has grown from 17,190 students in sixteen institutions to 74,002 in twenty-nine institutions: from 6,371 at the University to 22,851; from 8,373 at the eleven State Colleges to 26,652; from 151 at one community college to 17,850 at thirteen of them; and from 2,295 at the technological institutes to 6,650. Fourth Annual Report of the Chancellor, Board of Higher Education (January 1971), cited in Future Report, Ibid., p. 15.

Not everyone on the Amherst campus approved of such rapid expansion, however, and a review of major recommendations for admissions policies shows a shift in emphasis over the period similar to the shift in priorities among University missions.

The 1962 Long Range Planning Committee had been very conservative and had recommended the University slow its growth rate to approximately ten per cent a year and concentrate on increasing the proportion of graduate students in the overall student body. The admissions policies throughout the sixties have been characterized by the Director of Admissions at the University, Robert Doolan:

The admissions function is but a reflection of the University's philosophy and objectives. Like the institution it too has been quantitative, means-oriented and concerned with logistics over the past quarter of a century It was an era perhaps best described . . . by the phrase 'pursuit of excellence' The demands for the higher-qualified student from an increasingly larger base of selection became the basic admission philosophy for the time.¹⁹

The proportion of graduate students in the overall student body did rise dramatically during the sixties. And

¹⁹Robert Doolan, Report on the Present and Future Status of Undergraduate Admissions at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, January 1974), p. 1, 7.

the Admissions Office was able to recruit the higher-qualified students because it used predictive formulas, and because the applicant pool was quite large. But the University far exceeded the Long Range Planning Committees recommendations concerning enrollment growth.

By the late sixties, the concept of access was taking on new meaning. It began to connote the provision of educational opportunity for those groups that had previously not been part of higher education--youth from poor families, minority groups, persons beyond the normal college age. The Long Range Planning Committee of 1970 took the view "that it is not necessary to have highly selective standards of admissions to have a quality public university."²⁰ The Committee recommended a more flexible admissions policy to provide access to those who had been turned away by the rigid prediction formulas.

²⁰Directions for the Seventies, Ibid., p. 48. The committee view was informed by the work of Alexander Astin, who after study of the relationship between undergraduate achievement and institutional excellence concluded that there was no direct correlation between the two and therefore that admissions standards could be lowered without negative effect on bright students, less able students, or the quality of the institution.

The Committee on the Future University laid even greater stress on access:

The opportunity for higher education has not yet been extended to all who should have it. Ability knows no lines of income or race. A public university, especially, has an obligation to all the citizens who support it, to say nothing of its obligation to facilitate mobility as part of the American commitment to equal opportunity.²¹

They looked at the trends in the economic background of the student body and were concerned to find the percentage of students from lower-income families decreasing. They recommended changes in admissions policies, more recruitment and, as a critical factor, more financial aid.²²

The Future Committee also recommended attention to a more diverse student body in terms of age. Having already recommended admission of more low income persons, and recognizing a potential conflict in the fact that the traditional older student clientele tends to be more affluent, the Committee in turn recommended that the University "design or adopt programs which would tend to have more appeal to lower-income older people, and then recruit students specifically for those

²¹Future Report, Ibid., p. 53.

²²The Future Report did not recommend an open admissions policy for the University because it felt that that would not be physically possible or educationally desirable, but it did suggest that as a whole, public higher education in Massachusetts move to open admissions.

programs."²³

Thus the Future Committee recommended a specific, and immediate program response as a vehicle through which the University could provide greater access.

Individualization. During the fifties and early sixties, the University had put all of its energies into development as a major graduate university and into growth to accommodate a very large influx of students. Even in curricular planning and academic programming, the emphasis was on numbers not on individualization or responsiveness to the developmental needs of individual students. The 1962 Long Range Planning Committee devoted only a few pages to discussion of the curriculum. They called for a number of new departments and schools and further study of the academic program, but they did not relate their recommendations to student needs.

By the late sixties, however, the emphasis had shifted at the University of Massachusetts toward a concern for the undergraduate student. U.Mass students had joined the nation-wide student protest movement over the war in Vietnam, and although there had been only a small number of disruptions on campus, faculty and administrators were

²³Future Report, Ibid., p. 26.

showing a new concern. Political activism was combined with activism focusing on academic reform. Students initiated a week-end conference to bring together students, faculty, and administrators to discuss important issues in the University. These week-end conferences, called SWAP conferences, became an annual event. In April of 1970, students organized a moratorium on classes in order to spend time on educational reform issues. The faculty, too, had become active and had sponsored a series of conferences to discuss ways to improve undergraduate teaching, grading reforms, and other issues. The Academic Matters Council spent much of its time deliberating over the undergraduate program.

The Faculty Senate Long Range Planning Committee, which issued its Report in 1970, therefore paid much closer attention to curricular and other aspects affecting student life. It considered that a series of academic reforms and other changes were needed on the Amherst campus to make it a better educational environment for students. They investigated reform efforts at other universities and quoted the "Muscatine Report" recommendations as their own:

. . . . Consequently, many of our concrete recommendations are for substantial experiments, not for untested wholesale changes. In this spirit, we have avoided wherever possible the temptation to frame legislation for 'all'

students and 'every' department . . . changes are most likely to succeed if they remain optional, offered along with the means for their implementation on experimental trial, then, left to the judgment of those for whose benefit they are intended.²⁴

The Committee recommended supplementing the normal pattern of divisional and major requirements by a number of optional programs for undergraduate students.

By 1970, optional programs outside departments included the following: Orchard Hill Residential College, Southwest Residential College, Project 10, Program for the Collegiate Education of Black Students (CCEBS), an Honors Program, and International Programs in Bologna, Freiburg, Oxford, Madrid, Pau, and Colrairie. Within Schools and Colleges, increased options were being made available as well. In the Spring of 1968, the College of Arts and Sciences conducted an extensive review of its educational program. It conducted a study of student attitudes toward undergraduate course requirements and found that students endorsed course work in the major and electives as important sources of education, but did not like required distributional or

²⁴ Education at Berkeley: the Muscatine Report, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 4. as quoted in Direction for the Seventies, Ibid., p. 66.

"core" courses. "A large majority of students evidenced a desire to change the existing curriculum with regard to seven out of eight of the core requirements."²⁵ Several changes were made during the late sixties which eased these requirements by allowing more options for students within the designated core areas of humanities and fine arts, social and behavioral sciences, mathematics and natural sciences, and rhetoric.

The Report of the Committee on the Future University also emphasized the notion of optional programs to provide choices for students.

The University should seek to intensify its undergraduate focus, offering a diversity of programs, places and times to learn suitable to a diverse student body and a complex society

A greater diversity of carefully designed options . . . including more options for independent study, broadened majors, (and) new problem oriented approaches to learning²⁶

They felt that:

. . . the undergraduate curriculum should avoid impersonality, meet real career needs and pressing societal needs, make the most effective use of educational resources and students' time, relate classroom work more directly to the world beyond the campus, educate better citizens, and promote physical accessibility.²⁷

²⁵Ted Jakubowski; and H. Roy Kaplan, Seniors View the Core Curriculum: A Survey Report (Amherst: Office of Institutional Studies, University of Massachusetts, October 1968), p. 1.

²⁶Future Report, Ibid., p. 42.

²⁷Ibid., p. 56.

Greater individualization and responsiveness to student needs was encouraged in the academic area through the provision of more programmatic options and through granting students the ability to choose among those options.

Social Problem-Solving. It has been pointed out that when Robert Wood assumed the presidency of the University of Massachusetts in 1970, he emphasized the need for more public service which would be geared to the solution of social problems. James Pease who studied the public service role and activities of the University felt that this was a significant departure.²⁸ He claims that there had not been a coherent, positive policy statement on public service from the administration or Board of Trustees until President Wood's inaugural address and that "public service responsibilities have been recognized and carried out largely by the efforts of individuals within the University."²⁹

The Long Range Planning Committee which reported in 1970 had devoted only five pages to the question of public service and in those had emphasized Continuing

²⁸James Pease, Public Service and the Public University: Environmental Problem-Solving and Research (Amherst, University of Massachusetts, January 1971).

²⁹Ibid., p. 58.

Education rather than the application of the University's resources to the solution of specific problems. It had recommended a review of campus outreach activities "to insure that public service activities are sufficient to and compatible with the University's mission as a public university"³⁰ but had suggested that the University should not be turned into a service station.

While Pease had found ambivalence and confusion within the University over the appropriate University role in public service, he found the same confusion outside.

He administered questionnaires and interviewed many throughout the state and in the University and concluded that while action agencies and planning commissions in Massachusetts thought the University should be involved in problem-solving research, the Office of Administration and Finance was skeptical about the University's ability to deliver and therefore reluctant to support such activities through state appropriations. The Future Report, issued a year after the Long Range Planning Committee Report and after the arrival of Robert Wood, placed much more emphasis on social problem-solving. The report can be seen as an attempt to convince the legislature and through them,

³⁰Directions for the Seventies, Ibid., p. 144.

the Office of Administration and Finance of the importance of legislative appropriations to the University for such activities.

The Future Report defined public service as including three major areas: advice and technical assistance in problem-solving, research toward solution of public policy problems, non-degree training programs for government social service personnel. It called for an expanded public role for the University in the Commonwealth with emphasis on service to immediate neighbors, service to government agencies, and service to the poor. It felt that the University should help the Commonwealth provide better education and economic growth.

The list of organized public service programs at the University of Massachusetts in the late sixties mentioned by the Faculty Senate Long Range Planning Committee Report, the Pease Study, and the Future Report included:

1. The Cooperative Extension Service - involving University of Massachusetts from 1908 in agriculture, land use, planning, and rural community development.
2. The Water Resources Research Center.
3. The Institute of Agricultural and Industrial Microbiology which was transformed into the Environmental Sciences Department of College of Food and Natural Resources.

4. The Labor Relations and Research Center

5. The Center for Business and Economic Research
of the School of Business Administration

6. The Commonwealth Technical Services Division of
the School of Engineering

7. The Center for Urban Education in the School of
Education

8. The Division of Continuing Education

This list does not include service activities of individual faculty members, and even the level of activity among these groups varied considerably. The Extension Service was quite large, involving hundreds of people throughout the Commonwealth for substantial amounts of time, while the Center for Business and Economic Research involved only a few individuals at sporadic intervals. Both the Long Range Planning Committee and Future Committee recommended greater coordination among service activities.

This list is not impressive, moreover, when compared to other universities, for others were developing research institutes in addition to centers throughout the fifties and sixties. Stanley Ikenberry studied this development. He defined institutes and centers as

a new organizational form in universities, (that) were formally identified by specific names or titles and (that) were established on a 'permanent

basis' as separate entities for carrying on continuing research programs.³¹

Ikenberry studied the characteristics of institutes and centers in fifty-one land grant universities and found that "in some institutions, institutes and centers are almost as numerous as departments, with an average of some eighteen institutes and centers each in this particular group of universities."³² Ikenberry attributed their appearance to the inability of discipline-based departments to focus on tasks and problem-solving and considered them a significant organizational alternative.

At the University of Massachusetts, however, Oswald Tippo and others had been opposed to institutes during the sixties and had only allowed the creation of centers which remained closely affiliated with existing Schools and Departments. Thus the University's commitment to social problem-solving as seen in policy statements and organized activities was less impressive than its commitments to access and individualization. Much of what it did accomplish however, it did through the vehicle of special units or centers.

³¹Stanley Ikenberry, A Profile of Proliferating Institutes (University Park, Pa.: Center for the Study of Higher Education, the Pennsylvania State University Report No. 6, November 1970), p. 3.

³²Ibid., p. 16.

Characteristics That Make the
University of Massachusetts
Amenable to Change

Organizational Characteristics. It can be concluded from the shifting priorities for missions and objectives over the period from 1950 to 1970, and from the response to the missions of access, individualization, and social problem-solving, that the University of Massachusetts had a positive orientation toward change. Organizational characteristics that seemed most important to this change orientation include:

A. Spectacular growth in enrollment, facilities, and faculty.

B. Adequate resources provided by the State to support this growth.

C. Fiscal autonomy so that the University could internally allocate resources for redirection in response to its own priorities and missions.

D. A major organizational shift from a single campus to a multi-campus system. The resulting unstable organizational environment proved conducive to change.

E. A shifting governance structure.

F. A critical mass of faculty who were interested in academic reform and public service.

G. Many students who applied pressure for change and who were willing to work with faculty and administrators.

H. Strong yet changing leadership throughout the decade.

I. A number of institutional self studies, committees on long range planning, and frequent open discussions on missions and the role of the university in society.

J. An overall climate for change. Students, faculty, and administrators felt that it was worth working for change because change was possible.³³

It would, however, be a mistake to oversimplify. Although campus leaders were prepared to place emphasis and "prioritize," they were not ready to become one-dimensional, so the University of Massachusetts remained a complex institution with many missions and objectives. Also, the shifts in orientation from graduate to undergraduate education; and from pure research to applied research, public service, and social problem-solving were shifts more obvious in the rhetoric than in the organizational structure, the allocation of resources, or the activity levels.

Special Units as Vehicles for Change. The vehicle for change most often advocated and used at the University of Massachusetts was the creation of new programs or centers. Special programs were advocated and created as a means to be responsive to a new student clientele.

³³See Chapter VI for assessments of these conditions in relation to the literature on change.

Departmental and extra-departmental educational program options were created in an attempt to be more responsive to student needs, and special extension research and service centers were begun to more directly relate the University's resources to social problems.

The University Without Walls Program allowed the University of Massachusetts to pay special attention to the mission of access. This program not only made the University efforts more visible, it created pressures for change throughout the system--in admissions, student support services, curricular requirements, and other areas. Thus in ways far beyond what its actual student enrollment would imply, U.W.W. helped the University of Massachusetts be more responsive to the mission of achieving access.

The Bachelor's Degree With Individual Concentration Program served as a vehicle through which the University of Massachusetts assumed the mission of individualization. The BDIC program not only made the University's efforts at providing for individualization more visible, in itself became an important vehicle in the University for gauging student interests. Spinoffs from BDIC became new major programs of study, and for the first time these programs were determined by students rather than faculty. In addition, since students could design their own majors as alternatives to departmental majors, departments began to revitalize their own offerings to keep students

interested, thus making the University as a whole more responsive to the mission of individualization.

Although there was less enthusiasm for the mission of social problem-solving at the University of Massachusetts, and throughout the sixties the University had avoided the creation of separate research institutes, it did approve the Institute for Man and His Environment as a vehicle for focusing the resources of the University on environmental related problems. The Institute did make the University's efforts (and lack of them) visible in this area and pointed clearly to the difficulties of responding to the mission of social problem-solving.

Summary. The quarter century following World War II was an extraordinary period of growth and development for the newly designated University of Massachusetts. The University was aware of the missions of access, individualization and social problem-solving and intended to be institutionally responsive to them. The primary vehicle for this change effort was the creation of special program units, the University Without Walls, The Bachelor's Degree With Individual Concentration, and the Institute for Man and His Environment. These programs in turn enabled more institution-wide responsiveness to the missions.

C H A P T E R I I I

THE UNIVERSITY WITHOUT WALLS

The University Without Walls is a programmatic vehicle for fulfilling the mission of the provision of access and equal educational opportunity. It was planned and implemented at the University of Massachusetts between 1970 and 1972. This chapter starts with information on the Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities, the National University Without Walls program and the School of Education, as necessary background for the campus University Without Walls unit; describes the planning process from its beginning in the School of Education, through the pilot year of the program; describes the evolution of the major objectives and concepts of the program; and concludes with an overview of the major change factors in the program. Chapter VI analyzes these factors in greater detail and compares them to those operating in other programs.

The goals of the University Without Walls program are:

- A. to provide access to the University of Massachusetts for people who would not otherwise have access, and have few other options for formal education;
- B. to offer a competency-based B.A. degree from the University, one that would certify a competent

scholar-to-be or practitioner;

C. to help these students learn how to make the University work for them (i.e., to make it a more humane, student-centered place);

D. to help these students develop into life-long learners.¹

The University Without Walls Program was committed to providing access to a different student clientele, and it was committed to the creation of different academic programs that would be appropriate for its students. The process of defining these commitments and their realization in the organizational format of a program provides a lense through which to view the process of change in a university.

Background to University Without Walls

The Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities.

The University Without Walls program considered in this study was a program developed on the Amherst campus of the University of Massachusetts. It was also one of thirty units in the country which were sponsored by the Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities. The history of the Union and the development of the National UWW concept is important to the development of the University of Massachusetts' unit because it established the context

¹"University Without Walls," University of Massachusetts Proposal, Draft (March 7, 1972).

and parameters for that unit. It is important as well to the consideration of the broader issue of organizational response to new missions for higher education because the Union and UWW saw themselves as vehicles to help existing colleges and universities change.

The Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities is an association of colleges and universities whose twenty institutional members include small liberal arts colleges, large public universities, community colleges, predominantly black colleges, and special interest colleges such as the Collegio Jacinto Trevino. The presidents of these institutions formed the association to encourage research, experimentation, and innovation in higher education.² They recognized the difficulty of changing organizational structures (their own institutions included) and sought to encourage change through collaborative efforts. Together they planned a new entity--the University Without Walls.

The University Without Walls. The University Without Walls was to be an alternative structural form

²The presidents of the affiliated institutions were the institutional representatives to the Union and attended all Union meetings with one exception--the University of Massachusetts. At U.Mass., the School of Education was the affiliate member and the Representative was a then Associate Dean--Robert Woodbury. Both of these anomalies will be important to the development of the University Without Walls unit at U.Mass.

with a distinct philosophy and organization, but it was to be organizationally affiliated with many diverse institutions.³

Robert Woodbury, currently the Associate Provost for Special Programs at the University of Massachusetts, was involved from the beginning with the planning for the National University Without Walls. He described its objectives as follows:

The University Without Walls wanted to provide access to a college education, but they wanted to see if that college experience could be built without depending upon the capital expenditures of a campus setting or upon campus residency. They wanted to see if it was possible for a people to go through the college experience no matter where they lived. The second theme was

³Other educators, also recognizing the difficulties of achieving swift organizational change, were recommending and establishing other types of alternative university structures during these years. External degree programs, open universities and other units were being talked about in nearly every state and a few were actually established. The unique asset of the University Without Walls program in comparison to these units is the fact of continued affiliation with more traditional institutions. This makes possible a reallocation of manpower and facilities to new purposes and theoretically does not require major new expenditures. Other alternative structures were starting from zero as new institutions. Many of these have faltered while UWW has flourished.

that UWW would be a program that provided a freer structure for students to build their own education. This freer structure might be of interest to current students as well as non-traditional students.⁴

While the planning for the University Without Walls involved presidents, faculty and students from member institutions of the Union, and many community representatives, it was spearheaded and orchestrated by one man, Sam Baskin. Baskin was a faculty member of Antioch College and the president of the Union. Without his vision, persistence to the point of single-mindedness, and strong leadership, the difficulties of coordinating the many and diverse groups and institutions and of obtaining sufficient financial support could never have been overcome.

Baskin was able to obtain the financial backing of the Office of Education and the Ford Foundation. O.E. and Ford together gave \$800,000 as seed money for the implementation of the idea, and smaller grants were received for the development of a plan for assessment and research, for overseas expansion of the idea, and for other special purposes.

⁴Interview with Robert Woodbury, Associate Provost, March 30, 1974.

This level of support was important as it enabled the Union to cover the costs of coordination and also provide grants of approximately forty thousand to those colleges and universities which agreed to plan a UWW unit which would remain affiliated with their institution. In a sense it gave the Union the wherewithall to buy themselves in.⁵ The University of Massachusetts was one of the twenty colleges and universities which received a planning grant.⁶

It was expected that each participating institution would plan a University Without Walls program that took advantage of the resources and responded to institutional needs and priorities, yet would remain distinct in structure,

⁵It was also well known that the planning grants from the Union would not cover the full cost of planning efforts at participating institutions, contributions of time from a large number of faculty and administrators were an expected institutional commitment to the University Without Walls.

⁶The other institutions participating in the University Without Walls as of 1970-71 were the University of Minnesota, Antioch College, New College at Sarasota, Shaw University, the University of South Carolina, Roger Williams College, Bard College, Chicago State University, Goddard College, Howard University, Friends World College, Northeastern Illinois University, Stephens College, Loretto Heights College, Skidmore College, Morgan State College, New York University, Staten Island Community College, and Westminster College. These institutions have very different philosophies, goals and student bodies, but they shared a commitment to the UWW idea.

organization, and curriculum from the institution. The Union did not want to impose a single structure or educational mode and encouraged diversity among the units. It did however want all units to be in accord with the basic UWW philosophy and organizational concepts. These were articulated in eight characteristics and disseminated widely on the campuses receiving planning grants. They are

1. A UWW student body which includes students from the widest possible age group and reflects the ethnic, racial, and economic diversity of the United States. Older students and those from minority or highly disadvantaged population groups--while excluded from many more traditional structures of higher education--are encouraged to participate in the University Without Walls.

2. Involvement of students, faculty members, and administrators in the design, implementation and governance of each UWW unit on the assumption that not only will the process be educational but the product will be a more viable alternative for those it is meant to serve.

3. Development of special seminars and other procedures to prepare students to learn on their own and overcome the dependence and apathy that is often the result of traditional American schooling at all levels. Provision,

through seminars and other activities for continued contact among students and faculty members in order to allow for the kind of purposeful interaction which is important to the learning process. The development of special training programs to prepare faculty members for the new instructional procedures.

4. The elimination of a fixed curriculum or uniform time schedule for completion of a degree to allow for greater individualization in the University Without Walls. Flexibility not only in the amount of time required for each student to complete his own program, but among study programs to allow for individual differences, learning styles, interests, and outside responsibilities and activities.

5. Use of a broad array of resources for teaching and learning inside and outside the regular university: internships, apprenticeships, and field experiences; independent study and individual group projects; field seminars and use of adjunct faculty; travel in this country and abroad; and programmed material, cassette and other technologically aided materials. The development of a National Inventory of Learning Resources and inventories at each UWW unit to indicate possible resources for learning, and as a guide to program planning.

6. Use of an adjunct faculty of government officials, business executives, persons from community agencies, scientists, artists, and others as a regular part of the UWW's instructional staff in teaching, supervising and advising roles in order to broaden the undergraduate experience and expand the definition of "educator" to include those with knowledge and experience in a wide variety of fields. Special seminars in the field conducted by adjunct faculty are an additional feature of the University Without Walls.

7. Opportunities for students to use the resources of other UWW units thus significantly increasing the available resources per student and initiating a process of institutional cooperation.

8. Concern for both cognitive and affective learning and the development of new assessment procedures more appropriate to different students with different learning styles and goals that do more than record time spent in class, number of courses and grades.⁷

These eight characteristics formed the basic philosophy and objectives of the University Without Walls

⁷"University Without Walls," Summary Statement of a proposal for an experimental degree program in undergraduate education issued by the Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities (distributed to units in draft mimeo form in January 1971, in final form in June 1971).

experiment and established guidelines concerning organizational structure, function, and clientele for each unit. The University of Massachusetts UWW unit was planned within these guidelines.

The School of Education. The University of Massachusetts' UWW unit was also affiliated during its early planning phase with the School of Education.

The School of Education through its Associate Dean for Special Projects was a member of the Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities and had participated in the planning of the University Without Walls experiment. Woodbury had helped prepare the massive and complicated grant proposals for the Office of Education and the Ford Foundation, and had argued successfully that the University of Massachusetts--as one of the few large public universities in the Union--should receive the seed grant and plan a UWW unit.

Most of those actively engaged in the planning of the University Without Walls unit were faculty and graduate students in the School of Education. While the Union and central UWW office established parameters and guidelines and encouraged collaboration among UWW planning units, the style and tone of the University of Massachusetts effort was more a reflection of the School of Education. The Dean of the School of Education was committed to innovation

at all levels of education. Students and faculty had been attracted to the School of Education because of this commitment, and most saw themselves as change agents committed to having the program serve as vehicle for reform within the University, and more generally, in higher education. Because of their interests in higher education they were perhaps more conscious as well of the factors that would influence the development and implementation of such a program within the University.⁸

The School of Education had been engaged for two years in attempts to restructure governance. At a time when students were still excluded from most decision-making bodies in higher education, the School of Education had not only used students extensively in its own planning effort, but its new constitution included them in all committees and councils of the School including personnel committees.⁹ This emphasis on collaboration and partici-

⁸I would not want to overstress this point. It may simply be that because of the author's own interest in higher education, there was during interviews a compatibility of language and concepts that made it appear that the faculty and students associated with UWW were more aware of change factors than were those faculty associated with other programs.

⁹Many would argue that despite the trappings of participation and collaborative decision-making all authority and power in the School of Education remained in the hands of the Dean. That may or may not be true, but what is of importance to the development of the University Without Walls program is the fact that the rhetoric and structures of participation were present at the School of Education.

pation was to influence the UWW planning effort.

The graduate students in the School of Education were for the most part older students who represented ethnic, racial and economic diversity. This was the kind of student body that was to be sought by the University Without Walls at the undergraduate level. The School of Education thus not only created an atmosphere which would support the concept of diversity for UWW, it also provided a different group of planners for the program.¹⁰

The School of Education was engaged in a variety of attempts to provide greater flexibility in the structure and content of curriculum in order to enhance the learning opportunities for students. Systems of flexible scheduling, achievement monitoring, off-campus experiences, a modularized

¹⁰The differences in UWW units that resulted from the twenty distinct planning efforts resulted no doubt from a whole complex of factors. One of the most important however, was the difference in planning groups. There is no doubt that the involvement of a large number of graduate students--which was not possible in most other colleges engaged in planning--was a distinct advantage for the University of Massachusetts unit.

curriculum and career opportunities programs¹¹ were being designed and implemented for other school systems or for undergraduate education majors in the School of Education. The influence of such programs and educational ideas is difficult to measure but it is clear that the University Without Walls program was being planned and developed in an environment that was fertile with educational reform ideas.

One School of Education program that did have a direct influence was the Contemporary University Program, because many of the faculty and students associated with CU, later were affiliated with UWW. Contemporary University was a program funded by the Ford Foundation and directed

¹¹The lack of a direct influence on UWW of the School of Education Career Opportunities Program is surprising considering the similarity of goals and clienteles. The Career Opportunities Program provided an educational career ladder to 200 para-professional leaders in New York City, and it was in its first year of operation under the sponsorship of the School of Education and its Urban Education Center, while UWW was being planned. While it was specifically designed for education majors who wanted teacher certification, nevertheless it did precede UWW as a program committed to older, predominantly minority students who required a different educational format and content. The failure of the UWW planners to learn and build from experiences of COP and their reference instead to the Contemporary University Program, seems to this author to be unfortunate. It was probably the result of divisions within the School of Education into political interest groups--higher education vs. urban education.

by Tom Clark which gave approximately a hundred undergraduate education majors total freedom to design their own educational program. It also gave students direct grants with which they could buy whatever they thought they needed. CU students were unaccustomed to such unstructured education and most did not use their time or money well. Many of them bought a bus and spent six months travelling around the country. The Contemporary University program was not re-funded by Ford, but the reactions to it had been diverse and in a sense formed the preconceptions about the University Without Walls. Woodbury and other Deans in the School of Education felt that CU had been a fiasco and were determined that UWW not turn out similarly. Many students were convinced that it had not gone far enough in its attempts at reforming higher education and giving students freedom, and wanted UWW to start from where CU left off. These differences would be important to the UWW planning effort.

The School of Education would also become a negative factor when UWW sought approval as a University-wide program, because many faculty members in other departments and Schools of the University were suspicious of the "radical" ideas of the School of Education and were prone to disapprove any program that was in any way associated with it.

As one Academic Matters Council member and Whitmore Administrator put it, "UWW was disconcertingly close to the School of Education in terms of where it was and who was involved in it."¹² Later in its development UWW would have to work hard to disaffiliate itself from the School of Education.

For the most part, however, the School of Education provided a conducive environment in which to plan an innovative educational program like UWW, and it influenced in a positive way the UWW planning group.

The Planning Process for the University Without Walls

The Planning Grant. The University of Massachusetts' School of Education received a \$40,000 planning grant from the Union for Experimental Colleges and Universities in the late Fall of 1970. The grant itself was an important factor in the planning process. Although the contractual agreements between the Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities and the University of Massachusetts placed the University only under obligation to engage in a planning process for a UWW unit, and did not require it to establish one, nevertheless the fact of having received funds for UWW exerted a powerful pressure in favor of such

¹²Interview with David Bischoff, Associate Provost, March 20, 1974.

a unit. As Tom Clark put it, "the grant implied a vague commitment to carry through which produced a strange accountability which turned into a lever."¹³ This affected those who were involved in the planning of UWW as well as those in a position to approve it. It gave the planners a deadline against which to work and a sense that they were creating something that would be implemented, both of which were positive influences. It also led to a willingness to compromise. According to Ed Harris "There were some people that would have preferred to design the perfect program and if U.Mass. didn't accept it then that was it, but most were willing to compromise."¹⁴ in order to get something going.

Tom Clark Named Director for UWW. The Dean of the School of Education asked Tom Clark to head up the planning effort. Clark was the Director of the Higher Education Program in the School of Education, and his field of special interest was non-traditional higher education. He had been very much involved in the planning and formation of the "New" School of Education. He had been involved, too, in a series of innovative and experimental

¹³Interview with Tom Clark, Director, March 31, 1974.

¹⁴Interview with Ed Harris, April 12, 1974.

programs in the University including Residential Colleges, the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration Program, and the Contemporary University Program. He was a good teacher and had a large following of graduate and undergraduate students who were interested in educational reform.

Tom Clark said when interviewed, that there was a natural link between the interests of students and faculty in the higher educational program, and the University Without Walls experiment, and he saw the planning grant as a way to support graduate students. Clark started by spending time reading the Union grant proposals in the studying Office of Education and Ford, the UWW summary statement, and talking with Bob Woodbury. He went with Woodbury to meet Sam Baskin and others connected with the Union. He decided to build the initial planning efforts around a course he was teaching on non-traditional higher education.

The Collaborative Planning Process and A Strategy for Planning. The UWW summary statement had called for involvement of students, faculty and administrators in the planning of units, and the School of Education had developed a "tradition" of student participation in decision-making; so Clark had strong precedents for a collaborative planning model. The philosophy of the process that Clark initiated was described as follows:

The need was to provide for a group of planners who could share both responsibility and authority, and to provide a climate for various interested people to participate in trying to achieve our intended goals--in content, philosophy, and process for a University Without Walls. Students, Faculty, community and resource people were involved in this process as an attempt to design an environment conducive to creativity, change, efficiency, and diversity¹⁵

Clark's class was the first step of the collaborative planning effort and it ensured the participation of a large number of students. The second step involved open discussion meetings on the University Without Walls that were held at the School of Education Marathon in February 1971. Marathons were semi-annual events in which the School of Education attempted to open itself up to the community through five days of workshops, seminars, fairs, films and other "happenings." The marathon sessions on UWW were attended by a large number of community people who were not students but who were interested in education and concerned about the fact that universities were not providing adequate access. Many of those who attended the marathon sessions were interested enough in the potential of a University Without Walls program to join Tom Clark's class and participate in the Wednesday night Town Meetings.

¹⁵"University of Massachusetts, University Without Walls Discussion Paper No. 2," (May 26, 1971).

The Town Meetings were the third piece of the initial planning effort. They provided a continuing open-forum for discussion on the University Without Walls. The first meeting was held in February and they continued weekly throughout the Spring. Initially they were well attended and lively, but they grew smaller as the end of the school year approached.

The involvement of faculty members was also sought for the planning effort, and several bag lunches were arranged during which faculty from throughout the University were invited to discuss the program. Although these lunches were not initiated until somewhat later in the Spring, they could be considered an important fourth step in the collaborative planning process.

All of these pieces were one part of an overall strategy for planning that Tom Clark said "had been clearly thought out in advance, carried out as planned, and proved effective in getting the program off the ground."¹⁶ They were calculated efforts to involve in the planning process "all groups who would be potentially interested in the outcome or who would affect the outcome."¹⁷

¹⁶Interview with Tom Clark, March 31, 1974.

¹⁷Ibid.

The Steering Committee, Task Groups, and Staff.

After the first month of rather free-wheeling marathon sessions, town meetings, and classes, it was agreed that more structure was needed for the planning effort in order to get down to the "nuts and bolts" issues of program development. Two people--Ed Harris and Gail Kauffman--were brought on as staff members, and a Steering Committee and Task Groups were created. The Steering Committee was described as

a non-anxiety/paranoia-generating group that could function expeditiously yet, insofar as possible, involve the entire UWW community in immediate decision-making.¹⁸

Task Groups were formed to pursue particular areas such as admissions, independent learning skills, evaluation, faculty involvement, program funding, management and learning resources.

The functions of the Steering Committee were to assure that the task groups did not duplicate efforts, issue a weekly bulletin, "Supersheet," "make recommendations to community," and coordinate preparation of the UWW proposal to be made to the University.¹⁹ While the task

¹⁸"UWW Supersheet," Newsletter issued approximately weekly from March, 1971 to May, 1971, No. 1.

¹⁹From Proposal to Town Meeting, made by Management Task Group.

groups were quite active in the beginning, they lost momentum as the spring wore on, and most of their functions were taken over by the Steering Committee. Quickly the Steering Committee began to focus on those things that most needed attention for a program to be implemented by the Fall including advising, evaluation, faculty recruitment, admission, and management.

Tom Clark, Ed Harris and Gail Kauffman were active throughout the Spring. They put together the discussion papers; met with faculty members, administrators, and potential students; and put together a brochure on the program. They served on the Steering Committee, spread themselves out among the task groups, and attended Town Meetings. They also kept in touch with the Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities and other UWW planning units by attending a number of meetings organized by the Union. Some felt that there was surprisingly little cross-fertilization of ideas among UWW planning units although others felt that other units and the Union had strongly influenced the development of the University of Massachusetts unit.²⁰ The Steering Committee and full-

²⁰The story of the first meeting for planning UWW units in the Northeast illustrates the distinctiveness of the University of Massachusetts unit. The meeting was held at Roger Williams College. In attendance were one representative from each planning institution--invariably a faculty member/administrator, all white males and all suited and tied. In attendance was a busload of bearded, scruffy students from the University of Massachusetts. The U.Mass students

time staff members carried out the second part of the implementation strategy. Tom Clark recruited a small number of faculty members to serve as the first group of faculty sponsors. These included respected faculty from diverse areas including Psychology, English, Botany, Anthropology, and Education. Tom and staff members also met with key administrators to get help and approval for different aspects of the program. Charlotte Rahaim, Assistant Dean of Admissions and Head of Transfer Affairs, agreed to handle all admissions procedures and in effect gave a number of admissions positions to the program. All of those interviewed felt that Charlotte Rahaim's help was absolutely crucial to the program. David Bischoff, Associate Provost, was also critical as the Academic Administrator who was the gatekeeper to the approval process. Bischoff was not overly enthusiastic about the efficiencies of the planning group.

repeatedly challenged the assumptions of the "educators" around the table. As Bob Woodbury, who attended the meeting put it: "There was a real cultural gulf between institutional types . . . and students who wanted a very different program." U.Mass remained out of favor for at least a year after that, but by the end of the 1971-72 academic year, it was considered one of the most successful units by the Union.

The planning group had the cart ahead of the horse. They had gone way down the road in terms of planning --talking about students, etc.--when they came to see me but they really had no idea of what they were doing.²¹

According to all of those interviewed, however, Bischoff was crucially helpful in getting the program started.

The Pilot Program. Because it was so late into the spring when Clark and others began meeting with him, and because it was clear that everyone wanted to have a program up and running by the fall of 1971, Bischoff took the step that may have been the most decisive one for the program. He gave administrative approval to a small pilot program for the 1971-72 academic year by convincing the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration Program and the School of Education, to serve as academic covers for thirty students. He insisted that UWW go before the Academic Matters Council and the Faculty Senate during that year, but he gave them the chance to begin the program.²²

²¹Interview with David Bischoff, March 20, 1974.

²²The organizational flexibility to allow trial experimental programs was an important feature that separated the University of Massachusetts from most other universities of its type. It was also a feature recommended by the Carnegie Commission, the Newman Commission, and others as essential to the ability of colleges and universities to change, to respond to different purposes and priorities. It is important to note that the Associate Provost had not appropriated the academic prerogatives of the faculty, because he had arranged covers with faculty--approved academic majors for students participating in UWW. His approval was in the name of the Provost and Chancellor, although neither Gluckstern nor Tippo were involved at this time. His approval did not promise University support at the end of the grant period, either. Bischoff was aware at the time that Woodbury would be coming as Associate Provost in the fall and expected him to deal with these details.

Clark and others have called the pilot program part of the planning strategy and design, others attributed it to the supportive decisions of administrators, but all agree that it was a critical, positive factor for the program. UWW was given the opportunity to bring in real students and work with them to learn what educational vehicles were appropriate, they were given time to recruit faculty members as sponsors and to build a support base among faculty, they were able to work out appropriate process and procedures with offices representing student support services of financial aid, counselling, records, admissions, registration and others. In a program that required as many changes as did UWW, having real data to learn from and time was very helpful. As Gail Kauffman put it:

The fact of the pilot year was crucial to the program. It gave us a chance to really get it started and to prove that it could work to ourselves and to the faculty.²³

Assessments of the Planning Process and Leadership.

There were very mixed views about the effectiveness of the collaborative planning process. Bob Woodbury felt that "as an educational experience it was probably extraordinary, as a planning process it was questionable." Dave Bischoff felt that it had been enormously inefficient and counter-productive. Tom Clark said that there was "no question

²³Interview with Gail Kauffman, March 28, 1974.

that the process was not efficient" but felt that it had been important nonetheless. Ed Harris felt the same way. "A large number of people does provide more feedback and criticism and a healthier process. It can lead to better decisions which create a more responsive program."

Ironically, several people associated with the planning felt that it had not been as collaborative as was claimed.

Mark Cleron felt that "UWW went through the motions of involving lots of people in planning, but the structure that emerged was pretty conventional and not effective."

Jean Carritt did not think there had been a planning strategy but that "what was done was entirely random with decisions made by a few individuals--there was sort of a power elite within UWW planners. While information seemed to flow up the communications network from task groups to Steering Committee, and Town Meeting to Whitmore Administration Building, it did not seem to flow back down again."²⁴

A review of the documents tends to support the view that there was not a great deal accomplished in terms of program planning through collaborative efforts. All critical decisions in terms of clientele, organization

²⁴Quotations and opinions respectively from interviews with Bob Woodbury, David Bischoff, Tom Clark, Ed Harris, Mark Cleron and Jean Carritt.

and structures seem to have been made by five people: David Bischoff, Bob Woodbury, Tom Clark, Ed Harris, and Gail Kauffman (two of these were not actively involved in the planning). Despite the lack of accomplishment, however, it was probably important to have a process that was open to those who cared to participate and who would be effected by decisions. This view is held by most change theorists and was expressed, perhaps most directly for this study, by Warren Bennis when he showed that the radical reform programs failed at Buffalo because they represented the ideas of a handful of newcomers and could not be forced onto unwilling faculty and students.²⁵

The person in the leadership position throughout this process was Tom Clark. It was his job to try to orchestrate a collaborative planning mode and at the same time get a dramatic educational departure off the ground in six months. There is no question that that was an enormously difficult job. Tom Clark saw himself as "mediator within the (planning) group but spokesman for the group to others."²⁶ All of those interviewed felt that

²⁵See Chapter I for review of Bennis' The Learning Ivory Tower.

²⁶Interview with Tom Clark, March 31, 1974.

leadership had been a critical factor in the development of UWW but there was some disagreement about the effectiveness of Clark's leadership. Planning group members, faculty, and administrators generally agreed that he had good ideas, but did not follow through so that others--staff members, Woodbury, Bischoff--had to pick up after him. Students and staff members generally saw him as successful in recruiting faculty, and working with administrators saw him as generally ineffective at that, but felt that he was managing well the planning process that he had begun. It is difficult to assess Clark's leadership separately from the process itself. As in the case of the planning effort, where there were inefficiencies which were outweighed by other considerations, Clark's leadership may have often appeared haphazard or non-existent, but the program was planned and implemented in a surprisingly short period of time.

Summary of Process. During the Spring of 1971 through an elaborate collaborative effort including open meetings, a course in non-traditional higher education, steering committee, task groups, faculty lunches, and countless meetings involving a large number of people, the UWW unit for the University of Massachusetts had been planned. The Steering Committee had prepared discussion papers to define the program; an admission task

group had defined the clientele, obtained permission to admit thirty students, and recruited those students; enough faculty had been successfully recruited by Tom Clark to serve as sponsors; the needed resources for staffing costs had been saved from the initial planning grant from the Union; and the Associate Provost had authorized a small pilot planning program under the rubric of BDIC for the year 1971-72. Clearly, a great deal had been accomplished.

Major Objectives and Issues

Throughout the planning semester and the pilot year, the major objectives of the UWW program were in the process of definition, evolution and modification. The most important had to do with clientele and academic program.

Clientele and Access. The UWW summary statement had called for a student body characterized by ethnic, racial, economic and age diversity, but this had been one of eight potential emphases and the central UWW office had left it to individual planning units to determine priorities.

From the beginning, it was assumed that UWW would be a special focus program which could decide on a target student clientele. Bob Woodbury in a memo to the planning group on January 22, 1971, made it clear where his preferences lay for that clientele.

Participation in the University Without Walls gives us the opportunity to respond to some very real needs in Massachusetts and to experiment with some new ideas which could have far-reaching consequences in higher education.

I would suggest that the UWW component on this campus focus on those people in the state of Massachusetts who for reasons of economics, physical handicap, prison terms, home responsibilities, discrimination or past or present circumstances are unable to contemplate full-time residency at a college or university such as U.Mass. Generally speaking these students would be older than average college age.²⁷

The admissions task group, however, recommended something different. The task group met several times during February, and on March 3rd recommended to the Steering Committee and the Town Meeting that the first admissions group to the program be all current University of Massachusetts undergraduates. The decision resulted from the fact that task force members were for the most part university students who wanted a more flexible degree program and therefore wanted UWW to be something they could enroll in. As Ed Harris put it, "UWW became a focal

²⁷Bob Woodbury, "Memorandum on University Without Walls," January 22, 1971. The Woodbury reference here to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is the only explicit reference to service to the Commonwealth during the first year, although service will become an important UWW theme later on.

point for a lot of bright, alienated, disaffected, younger, educational reform oriented students."²⁸

Core UWW staff and faculty had differing opinions concerning the clientele for the program. Ed Harris, and Gail Kauffman agreed with the Woodbury position. As Gail Kauffman said, "Ed and I didn't feel necessarily compelled to provide an educational alternative to U.Mass. kids, but Tom (Clark) in many respects did, because he had been talking about the University's failure to provide alternatives."²⁹ Bob Woodbury felt that "Tom Clark agreed with the objective of non-traditional students, but had allowed himself to get caught in the process which inevitably skewed the results in favor of the predominantly on-campus planning group."³⁰ Tom Clark did not mention this difficulty. He said that "the title addresses itself to the access question--that is creating for people who could not engage in a residential learning experience the option to, in fact, pursue an experience in post-secondary education at U.Mass."³¹

There is no question, however, that the question of

²⁸Interview with Ed Harris, April 12, 1974.

²⁹Interview with Gail Kauffman, March 28, 1974.

³⁰Interview with Robert Woodbury.

³¹Interview with Tom Clark, March 31, 1974.

who the program would serve dominated discussion throughout the Spring and was as Shapiro put it "a source of potential confrontation."³² Shapiro also agreed with the Woodbury, Harris, Kauffman position that the program should be for students who were non-access because of age, or job responsibilities.

A compromise was finally reached. Of the thirty admission slots³³ for the pilot year, fifteen were to go to on-campus students and fifteen to "non-access" students. Even with the compromise, the precise definition of non-access was difficult to achieve. During the planning period, the distinction was simplistically drawn between insiders--usually young, resident, U.Mass. students who wanted a more flexible and self-initiated academic program--and outsiders--those who did not live in Amherst and/or had jobs and could not attend during the day. During the

³²Interview with Seymour Shapiro, April 30, 1974.

³³No one knows exactly where the number thirty came from. Apparently Bischoff, Woodbury and Rahaim determined that a certain number of admission slots be set aside and that UWW would be allowed to determine the criteria and handle the process. This was a prerogative not enjoyed by other University special programs.

pilot year in discussing admissions for the following year, the distinction was drawn between physical non-access--those who had jobs, lived far away, etc.--and psychological non-access--those who could not accomodate themselves to traditional academic modes even though they might have the flexibility to live in Amherst and attend as a full-time regular undergraduate.

The experience of the pilot year, added interesting data to the discussions on clientele. Many of the educational reform activists who had been so much in evidence during the planning semester and who had secured fifteen admissions positions, lost interest in the program and either failed to enroll or complete any work. The "non-traditional," non-access students were more highly motivated and used the program to greater advantage. By the end of the pilot year, it was agreed that only non-access students (as variously defined) would be eligible for the UWW program.

Academic Program. The second major issue during the planning and pilot semesters had to do with program--what kind of educational alternative would the University Without Walls offer?

The UWW summary statement had mentioned the elimination of a fixed curriculum, greater flexibility of time and place for learning, greater individualization,

use of a broad array of resources and a broad definition of faculty to include people with experience in a variety of fields. Most of the U.Mass. planning groups were students interested in educational reform, and Tom Clark encouraged them to think creatively in designing the program. Several alternatives were suggested and discussed during the planning semester.

Several planners recommended that UWW should become an experimental learning community with the emphasis on community. They wanted UWW to sever itself from the University so it could allow greater freedom and would not have to compromise its values. It would offer its own degree with the backing of the Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities,³⁴ and have its own financial base as a result of income and cost sharing.

Others, however, felt that the major reform task had to be within the University, and that one of the major goals of the program had to be to change the system. They felt, moreover, that the credential from the University of Massachusetts meant something to non-traditional students

³⁴ Some other UWW units around the country went this route and offered a Union Degree rather than the degree of the sponsoring institutions.

whereas that from UWW alone might not. This group recommended an experimental educational program in which the program elements would be individualized to the educational needs and life style of the students, and the degree would be based on competency. They were less concerned with community and more concerned with such issues as finding faculty members who could engage in more sophisticated advising as part of the instructional process and defining assessment and evaluation procedures. Tom Clark, Ed Harris, Gail Kauffman and Bob Woodbury all supported this position.

Other groups felt that the program should remain affiliated with the University, but that it should have a single academic focus and draw into it only those who were interested in that focus. The theme orientation recommended was "Ecology and Social Action." The purpose would have been to respond to the need for relevance, and allow an "educational institution to begin serving society in a real way."³⁵

All of these possible educational emphases were discussed at length during the planning period, and by April, they had still not been resolved. Town Meetings and Steering Committee meetings were cancelled through much

³⁵James Higgenbottom, "Memorandum to the Steering Committee," Undated (Spring 1971).

of April, however, because of the student strike, moratoria, spring marathons, and other activities. By the time things got back together again, the core staff had already decided to remain affiliated with the University and opt for individualized programs. What was left of the planning group (several students and others had more or less dropped out by this time, which made the choice of program emphasis somewhat easier), began to work on the nuts and bolts issues of admissions, brochures, etc.

Although the permission for the pilot year and the admissions slots gave UWW the opportunity to recruit some non-traditional students, they had very little programmatic flexibility. They had to follow the procedures of the BDIC program,³⁶ and students for the most part had to enroll in regular courses. The UWW staff worked at finding good faculty sponsors so that students would have something more than an accumulation of courses, and Shapiro felt that this was one of the critical positive aspects of the program.

The pilot year did, however, provide the staff the opportunity to learn from students what programmatic aspects were important. In their proposal to the Faculty Senate in the spring of 1972, UWW sought:

³⁶See Chapter IV concerning BDIC.

- A. Transferability of a significant amount of academic credit from other institutions with no time restrictions;
- B. latitude in the use of UWW course numbers to cover experiences not usually recognized in departments;
- C. the ability to satisfy the "spirit" of a requirement through an examination or equivalent experience instead of specific courses fulfilling core requirements;
- D. permission to waive core requirements for students if the program felt the courses were superfluous to a student program;
- E. ability to accredit prior learning resulting from experience as well as that received through course work;
- F. use of adjunct faculty and others as "instructional personnel."

With the exception of core requirements, most of these academic provisions were approved by the Faculty Senate, and the program was able to offer flexible and individualized academic programs to non-traditional students. In this respect, too, it was a unique program at the University and among UWW units across the country.

The individualized academic programs did make the program expensive to operate however, so it is hard to imagine UWW as other than an alternative for a relatively small number of students.³⁷

³⁷The same will be true for BDIC. See Chapter IV.

Major Change Factors

The University Without Walls sought and received Faculty Senate approval (with a two year mandate) for its experimental program in the Spring of 1972. Both the Spring semester of 1971 in which planning was undertaken within the School of Education and the academic year 1971/72, in which a small University-wide pilot program was operated, could therefore be considered the planning and developmental period for the program.

The planning effort was influenced by the Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities and the central UWW Office which provided the initial philosophy, organizational concepts, guidelines and funding for the UWW unit at the University of Massachusetts. It was also influenced in terms of participants, ideas, tone and style by the School of Education which was involved in a vast array of educational reform attempts during that period.

The initial planning semester for the program under the leadership of Tom Clark, was guided by the philosophy of collaborative decision-making and a strategy for program implementation that involved a selected approach to those University offices and personnel who would become involved with or in some way approve the program. Those factors which most influenced getting the program off the ground that semester were the planning

grant, a large group of committed and enthusiastic workers, a sense of timing, and a commitment to have a program implemented by the fall. The major accomplishment was the definition of a distinct student clientele.

The pilot year itself became a crucial element in the strategy to obtain full-fledged University approval and support. During that year, the major aspects of a unique educational program were defined for a now wholly non-traditional student body. Those who helped to define the program included non-traditional students, staff, and faculty from throughout the campus. Only after this process was UWW ready to articulate to the Academic Matters Council and the Faculty Senate what the program should be. The major factors in getting the program approved and implemented on a wider scale this year were resources, the negative impact of the program's close affiliation with the School of Education, and support from a number of key individuals among faculty and administrators. The major accomplishment was the definition of a distinct educational program.

C H A P T E R I V

THE BACHELOR'S DEGREE WITH INDIVIDUAL
CONCENTRATION PROGRAM

The Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration Program is the response of the University of Massachusetts to the mission of individualization as defined in Chapter I, because it allows students to pursue their own academic, intellectual, and professional interests by designing their own major programs of study. This chapter describes the history of BDIC from 1968 to 1971. It traces the slow evolution of the idea from its source at a student-organized conference through myriad committees, conflicts, and compromises, to its realization as an experimental pilot program. It relates this development on the University of Massachusetts campus to national student trends and the academic reform movement. The chapter also looks at the implemented form of the idea--the BDIC program, from two perspectives, that of the faculty supervisory committee of the program, and that of a student participant. Finally, it describes the process through which the program gained permanent approval and the factors important to that process. Chapter IV will analyze and compare these change factors.

The Evolution of An Idea

Emergence on the Amherst Campus. The BDIC program was not a transplanted program from another college or university. It was a program which emerged as a response to the interests and needs of students on the Amherst campus.

The original idea for the program had come from the 1968 SWAP conference. The SWAP conference was a new "tradition" at the University--a weekend organized by students, when students, faculty members, and administrators came together to talk about issues of education and the educational environment. The discussions at the 1968 conference had focused on the students' feelings that the undergraduate curriculum was too rigid and irrelevant. Someone (no one remembers who) suggested the idea of an individualized major program of study in which the student would be allowed to make the critical decisions. A group of students and faculty got excited about the idea and agreed to keep working together on it after the conference.

This group became the first planning committee for what was to become the BDIC program. It consisted of three faculty and five student members¹ with Bernard

¹The first planning committee members were: Bernard Fleischman, Arthur Kinney, Joyce Berkman, Howard Altman, Hedy Kaplan, Celia Mandel, Susan Tracey, and Robert Ross.

Fleischman, a faculty member, taking the leadership position. The committee met several times that spring and issued a one-page "report." The "report" was in fact a statement of need rather than a recommended program or policy change, so no action was taken at that time. The report focused on the shared student and faculty feeling that the needs of many students were not being satisfied by current departmental offerings.

National Trends Among Students. Although the idea of a student-designed major was not transplanted from outside the University of Massachusetts, there is no doubt that both students and faculty were being affected by a national mood which influenced in many ways the discussions at the SWAP conference and the first BDIC planning group. Many college students and faculty members were exerting pressure for change. The student pressure was less clearly articulated but more powerful. The years 1967 and 1968 had been busy on college and university campuses throughout the country with many students engaging in political activism centered around the war in Viet Nam, and the Presidential election of 1968. While it is true that the highly publicized activity at Berkeley was not typical of other universities, students generally began to recognize the enormous power they had vis a vis social institutions when they chose to exercise it. Concurrent

with their political activism, many students became involved with academic reform movements. Students began to criticize colleges and universities for antiquated rules and regulations, dehumanizing procedures, and irrelevant curricula. They felt that the organization of the curriculum with prescribed distribution and major requirements and courses offered only in disciplinary areas, was not responsive to their own needs. They were interested in more broadly-defined issues and social problems and in examining their own role in relation to these issues. Such interests were not represented in the course offerings. As one student interviewed put it:

Many people define education as courses, people don't define education (in terms of) individual students and they don't assume the responsibility for helping students define their own program as a coherent whole.²

A few students formed free universities which operated outside the structure of the University, but offered courses of broad interdisciplinary nature. Most, however, began to work within the system for curricular change.

University of Massachusetts Students. While students at the University of Massachusetts were more apathetic than those at Berkeley or Wisconsin in a political sense, they

²Interview with Janet Sheppard.

were active and vocal concerning campus educational matters. The Student Senate Academic Affairs Committee became involved in a number of academic policy decisions and began to work closely with the Faculty Senate Academic Matters Committee. The Student Academic Affairs Committee issued a report in 1969 which was to influence the planning group of the BDIC program.

The overriding theme of the report was individualization. "Our central principle has been that of facilitating, as best we could, the process of individualized education."³ The authors of the report wanted "to color every academic endeavor with a new regard for the personality and sovereignty of the individual student."⁴

One of their major recommendations was for the creation at the University of Massachusetts of the equivalent of Berkeley's Board of Educational Development. The Board would consist of a committee of faculty and students and be responsible for the encouragement of experimental courses and programs. Although the report did not call explicitly for a program such as BDIC it did call for interdisciplinary,

³Education for Living: A Program for the '70's, Report of the Academic Affairs Committee of the Student Senate, Richard Story, Chairman (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1968), p. 6.

⁴Ibid.

multidepartmental programs and greater choices for individual students.⁵

Students had strongly supported the creation of Orchard Hill and Southwest as Residential Colleges, and many had been instrumental in the creation of Project 10, an experimental living-learning community in Pierpont Dormitory.

National Trends in Curricular Reform. While students on the Amherst campus were responding to national trends by becoming involved in efforts at curricular change and focusing on individual student needs, many University of Massachusetts faculty members were similarly joining a national academic reform movement. This was not exactly a "new" movement; there had always been debate over the curriculum among teachers, and the history of American higher education reveals a pattern of gradual--very gradual--curricular change in response to the needs of society. The "Academic Revolution," however, with its acceleration of the production of knowledge, its ever greater disciplinary specialization, and the increasing student outcry against those specializing trends seems to have quickened the pace

⁵The report was to be quoted in the BDIC formal proposal to the Academic Matters Committee.

and altered the tone of the curricular debates of the late sixties. Paul Goodman's diatribes were in vogue among students and faculty during this period.⁶

The demands for change were strident but without a great deal of substance and the actual changes were few in colleges and universities during the 1960's. Paul Dressel investigated curricular practices in higher education over a ten year period, 1957-1967, in order to give a then current curricular profile and to show curricular trends.⁷ His profile provides an interesting benchmark against which to view the idea for the BDIC program. Dressel's sample included over 300 institutions of various sizes, affiliations and clienteles, and he found remarkable similarity in curricular mode among institutions of size or type. All of them had three elements--a series of general or divisional requirements designed to provide the "breadth" experience and composing an average of forty per cent of the total undergraduate education; a major field of study occupying

⁶Paul Goodman, Compulsory Mis-education and The Community of Scholars.

⁷Paul Dressel and Frances DeLisle. Undergraduate Curriculum Trends (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1969).

approximately thirty per cent of the curriculum and associated almost invariably with departments; and electives or courses chosen by the students and comprising approximately thirty per cent of the curriculum.

Dressel's study also contained a chapter, "Provisions for Individualization," which focused on curricular features "which provide for individualizing and a personal integration of learning."⁸ By individualizing, Dressel meant "permitting students to select (curriculum) on the basis of personal interests or goals, rather than because of faculty determined principles."⁹ Table 2 lists those curricular features or instructional methods which promoted individualization and shows their occurrence in 322 institutions in 1957 and 1967.

It is interesting to note that in 1967 there was no provision in any of the sample institutions for a student-designed major program of study such as the BDIC program.

Dressel finds that "despite all the talk about innovation, undergraduate curricular requirements as a whole have changed remarkably little in ten years."¹⁰

⁸Ibid., p. 34.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 75.

TABLE 2

TYPES OF DEVELOPMENTS FOR INDIVIDUALIZING
AND INTEGRATING LEARNING EXPERIENCES

INSTRUCTIONAL METHODS	(1967) CURRENT PRACTICES		(1957) TEN YEARS AGO	
	N	%	N	%
Advanced placement	274	85.1	117	36.3
Honors programs	212	65.8	103	32.0
Independent study	188	58.4	90	28.0
Seminars	165	51.2	80	24.8
Study abroad	151	46.9	36	11.2
Comprehensive examinations	129	40.1	107	33.2
Tutorials	72	22.4	25	7.8
Senior thesis or project	48	14.9	26	8.1
Field Work experience	42	13.0	21	6.5
Residence hall programs	34	10.6	5	1.5
Interim terms ¹	20	6.2	2	.6
Work study or coopera- tive programs	18	5.6	11	3.4
Community service	13	4.0	7	2.2
Off-campus or non- resident terms	7	2.2	2	.6

¹Periods of shorter duration variously related to longer terms, and usually used for special programs.

SOURCE: Paul Dressel, Undergraduate Curriculum Trends, Ibid., p. 39.

He postulates some change theory to account for this.

. . . faculty interests, publicity, institutional prestige, opportunism, and expediency in responding to pressures or to availability of financial resources are more potent determiners of specific change than is deliberation based on educational goals, social needs, and the abilities and aspirations of students.¹¹

Dressel thinks that faculty and professional associations have exerted a pressure for stasis in the curriculum that exceeded the pressure for change coming from students and/or outsiders. He concludes, however,

. . . that there are signs, both in the trends and in the comprehensive patterns, that the student may become--as indeed he should--the focal consideration in curricular planning.¹²

The University of Massachusetts and Academic Reform--Continued Evolution of an Idea. Nearly all the instructional methods listed by Dressel as contributing to the individualization of curriculum were in evidence at the University of Massachusetts by the spring of 1968.¹³ Yet the students and many faculty felt that these curricular features were not enough. They usually served only a small number

¹¹Ibid., p. 2.

¹²Ibid., p. 77.

¹³The exceptions were interim terms, work study or cooperative programs and off-campus or non-resident terms.

of students and they did not provide an alternative to the basic departmental requirements.

The goal of the BDIC program, according to one of its planners was "to provide a mechanism for students who were being turned off by college and for whom departmental requirements didn't meet their needs."¹⁴

Designing appropriate mechanism, however, especially given the lack of models in other colleges and universities, was a difficult task. The group that had been excited by the SWAP conference and had met throughout the 1968 spring semester, lost momentum over the summer. Many of the students graduated or became interested in other things, and the faculty had other commitments as well. The group that reconvened in the fall was smaller and met less often. One reason for the slow pace may have been that there was no sense of a deadline and no urgency to have a specific program in operation by a certain time.¹⁵

One of the students who had been active, left the planning group out of frustration with its slowness.

¹⁴Interview with Anthony Borton.

¹⁵This is in sharp contrast to the University Without Walls program in which the sense of timing and deadlines provided a constant and positive dynamic.

Mark Cheren, a graduate student in the School of Education had also had some conceptual disagreements with the planning group. The faculty members all agreed that the fundamental core of a program that was an alternative to an academic major had to be a close student-faculty relationship. Cheren had argued more for a group orientation in which students would help each other learn to use the freedom to make educational decisions. In Cheren's view, the faculty occupied a less central place.

Cheren began to work for a student-designed program within the School of Education. At that time, the School of Education was engaged in a massive effort to redesign its entire academic program for undergraduate and graduate students. Many of the radical ideas for educational change were beginning to seep out of the School of Education and infiltrate the campus.

The BDIC planning group was kept somewhat informed of ideas at the School of Education by Tom Clark, a faculty member in the School who occasionally participated in BDIC planning meetings. The pace of the planning group, however, continued to be slow and no documents or reports were produced for many months.

In the spring of 1969, the BDIC planning group was in a sense beaten to the punch. The School of Education brought its entire "package" before the Academic Matters

Council for discussion and submission to the Faculty Senate. The package contained an entirely new academic program for the School of Education. One of the items in the package was a proposal for a student-centered Bachelor of Education degree. It had been prepared by Mark Cheren and a small number of other graduate students, but it had the support of Dean Dwight Allen.

The Academic Matters Council had not been confronted before by such a curricular package, and did not quite know how to proceed. The Council did, however, single out the student-centered Bachelor of Education proposal for discussion and invited Dean Dwight Allen and Associate Dean Carl Seidman to appear before Academic Matters on its behalf. The Academic Matters Council members were quick to agree that the idea had merit, but they suggested that the degree should be university-wide, and not limited to the School of Education. The Deans of the School of Education recognized the need for a university-wide option, but felt that their proposal ought to be approved as well. The Academic Matters Council did not approve it. Instead they created an ad hoc subcommittee to draw up a proposal for an all-university, student-centered degree.

The motivation of the Academic Matters Council in this unprecedented action is subject to various interpretations. Academic Matters Council members describe

it as an example of that group's initiative in achieving academic reform.¹⁶ Others described it as a backlash against the School of Education--taking its best ideas but not allowing the School of Education to implement them.¹⁷ The issue was further complicated by the fact that the chairman of the Academic Matters Council--Richard Ulin--is a professor in the School of Education. The author did not have the opportunity of interviewing Dr. Ulin, but others have suggested that his move to appoint a subcommittee was in fact an effort to save a good idea--a student-centered degree program--from almost certain defeat in the Faculty Senate.¹⁸

¹⁶A point made in interviews by Leigh Short, Anthony Borton, and David Bischoff; all Council members.

¹⁷A point made in interviews with Tom Clark and Bob Woodbury.

¹⁸This point was made by David Bischoff, Arthur Kinney, Leigh Short and Anthony Borton. In fact, however, the rest of the School of Education package was eventually approved by the Faculty Senate so it's likely that this particular segment would have been approved as well.

Further Conflicts and Compromises as the Idea Moves Toward Institutional Reform. In any event, Dr. Ulin created an ad hoc subcommittee. Ulin had been aware of the faculty-student group which had been meeting since the SWAP conference to discuss alternatives to departmental requirements, so he intentionally chose Arthur Kinney, a faculty member from this group, to chair the subcommittee. Under Arthur Kinney's chairmanship, the two groups became one.¹⁹

The new committee met several times during the spring of 1969 and continued into the fall without losing a great deal of momentum. In December 1969, the group submitted a five-page proposal to the Academic Matters Council. The proposal reiterated the goal of having students design their own major programs and spelled out in some detail the mechanisms for them to do this. It called for a bachelor's degree to be awarded to seniors

¹⁹The members of the Academic Matters ad hoc subcommittee were: Arthur Kinney, English, Chairman; Anthony Borton, Animal and Veterinary Sciences; W.B. Fleischman, Comparative Literature; Charles Moran, English; Mark Smith, Student Senate; Richard Storey, Provost's Office and Student Senate Academic Affairs Committee. The above names appear on the submitted proposal of the ad hoc committee, but the preliminary report of the BDIC supervisory committee issued in April 1971, listed two additional members: Tom Clark and Mark Chenen (sic) of the School of Education.

who have completed no fewer than four academic terms at the University which demonstrate, in no fewer than three courses each term, an academic program of 'designed coherence.'²⁰

It was assumed (but not required) that programs of coherence would cut across departmental lines, but the ad hoc committee felt that the student working with the faculty advisor was the responsible party for defining that coherence. They felt that the

validity of the 'designed coherence' of each individual program will be determined by the student's own faculty advisor in consultation with the student and finally by the director of the program.²¹

According to the proposal, any undergraduate in the freshman or sophomore year who had a 2.0 average and was willing to define a program, work with a faculty sponsor, and prepare reports and evaluations at the end of each term, could be admitted to the program.

Thus, the mechanism proposed by the ad hoc committee was a new program. As one faculty member said in praise of the planning committee's efforts,

²⁰"Proposal for a New Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration," proposal submitted to the Academic Matters Council by the Ad Hoc Committee, Arthur Kinney, Chairman (Undated), p. 1.

²¹Ibid.

. . . there had been the idea of providing some flexibility for students, but before that (BDIC) it had had a negative caste to it--you released an individual student from requirements . . . BDIC turned the psychology around--from being something you wanted to get out of into something to get into. The program was a positive thing for students.²²

The ad hoc committee proposal was less clear about the organization of the program and its relationship to the University. It called for the College of Arts and Sciences to offer the option of BDIC to students. It called as well for a Director of the program, but the reporting lines were unclear. It was to be the Director's responsibility to recruit faculty advisors, to recruit students and oversee programs, to establish interdepartmental and interdisciplinary courses. In its closing paragraph the committee asserted that "(BDIC is not conceived as an honors degree and there should be no overlapping of responsibility here)."²³

When the report was submitted to the Academic Matters Council in December, however, it was the potential overlap--or threat--to the Honors Program that was the item of most intense debate and conflict. The Director of the

²²Interview with Dave Bischoff.

²³Proposal for a "New Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration," Ibid., pp. 4, 5.

Honors Program--Everett Emerson--was a member of Academic Matters and he was opposed to the program as a separate entity. He felt that a student-centered degree program should be one of the available options within the Honors Program. Arthur Kinney, on the other hand, was strenuously opposed to this. He felt that the students for whom BDIC had been designed were not those who would identify themselves as Honors students. The students he had in mind--stemming from his experience as a faculty resident in Southwest Residential College--were those who were bright and capable, but who had been turned-off by the university experience, and therefore had mediocre to poor academic records. He was seeking a vehicle to reinvigorate and "turn-on" these students to education.

In addition to the substantive differences over program orientation that existed between Everett Emerson and Arthur Kinney, there emerged as well questions of leadership and power. Emerson as Director of Honors--then the only free-standing nondepartmental degree program--did not want another, and Arthur Kinney who had for a year and a half been developing the idea for BDIC and had conceived of a separate organizational unit headed by a director, was not interested in merely a sub-unit of another program. These differences, however, are hard to document.

The Academic Matters Council had other questions about the proposal as well. It asked for a university-wide program, because it felt that this proposal was too affiliated with the College of Arts and Sciences. In response to this objection, the ad hoc committee revised its proposal to call for a free-standing program called the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration. It would have a director responsible to the Provost's Office. The revised proposal encouraged the participation of other Schools in addition to the College of Arts and Sciences.

The revised proposal was discussed again at a February meeting of the Academic Matters Council. Council members--principally Everett Emerson--were still not satisfied with the program. The issue of the cost of such a program was raised.

In an action quite separate from the BDIC proposal, the Academic Matters Council had decided that it should investigate the cost implications to the University of any new policy or program before it recommended action to the Faculty Senate. Accordingly, it established occasional ad hoc committees for this purpose. Several members of the Council objected strongly to the budget review committees, because they felt that the Council should concern itself with academic and not budgetary issues. Because of this difference of opinion, the ad hoc budget review mechanism

was only occasionally used. When it was called up in the BDIC case, therefore, it could have been for either of two reasons: a) to seriously consider the cost implications because the proposal called for a director on released time, and secretarial support, or b) to side-step the Kinney-Emerson split by creating in effect another committee to revise the Kinney proposal.

Although the documentary evidence is unclear, the second notion seems the most plausible because the new subcommittee chaired by Professor Leigh Short not only considered budgetary implications, but proposed a number of important revisions to the program.²⁴

The review committee accepted the basic idea and objectives of the program, but changed many of the specifics. Most importantly, they saw the program as an experimental or pilot program and therefore recommended a limited number of students and a pilot period of two years. They saw the pilot notion as a strategy for gaining Faculty Senate approval, but also as an opportunity for testing the validity of the core idea and for experimentation with

²⁴The members of this committee included: Leigh Short, Chairman, Tony Borton, Everett Emerson, Hugh Miser, John Zahradnik, and John Kendall. It is interesting to note the elimination of student participation. Of this group, none was a student.

the mechanics of the program.²⁵

In order to strengthen the notion of a university-wide program, the subcommittee replaced the director with a four-person supervisor's committee. The committee would include a student and the chairmanship would rotate among the members. It was understood but not stipulated that the committee membership would represent various professional Schools as well as the College of Arts and Sciences.²⁶ This supervisory committee structure rather

²⁵This in fact extended the planning period of the program two years, but gave more clear focus to the efforts because the pilot program would have active students.

²⁶Perhaps the reason it was not stipulated was that it was clear by then who the first supervisory committee would be (assuming Academic Matters Council and Faculty Senate approval.) The supervisory committee would include Leigh Short, the chairman of the budget review subcommittee and professor of Engineering; Tony Borton, professor in the then college of Agriculture and member of both the ad hoc committee and the budget review committee created by the Academic Matters Council; and Arthur Kinney, professor of English, Chairman of the ad hoc committee and one who had been involved with the program from the initial SWAP conference. It is also interesting to note that the notion of a student committee member although part of the proposal was never acted upon.

creatively solved the leadership conflict between Everett Emerson and Arthur Kinney while appealing to the university-wide nature of the program.

The committee changed too, the notion of the student clientele. While supporting the idea that BDIC would not be an Honors College it made it clear that the program was for students ready to undertake the major rather than for entering freshmen. It minimized the departure from existing university requirements stressing that students entering the program would have completed distribution requirements and that BDIC in fact offered only an alternative way of meeting core requirement F--intensive or specialized work constituting a major. The committee also put the responsibility of finding a Faculty Sponsor onto the student rather than the Director of Faculty Committee and articulated a very stringent set of procedures for students to follow during the pilot phase:

1. With guidance from the chairman, a student who wishes to be a candidate for a degree in the program first seeks to locate a member of the faculty who is willing to serve as his sponsor. If the student is successful, he prepares with his sponsor's help a unified program of studies for at least two semesters and a rationale for the four semesters of his program.
2. The student then presents his proposal to the Committee and stands prepared to defend his proposal.
3. With the aid of appropriate consultants who may serve as ad hoc members, the Committee reviews the proposal and decides whether the student may be authorized to undertake the program. When it

is approved, the student becomes responsible for preparing periodic written self-evaluations with his sponsor and for planning with him the remainder of his academic program, subject to the approval of the Committee chairman.

4. The student who successfully completes the major will be awarded his degree by the University of Massachusetts upon the initial recommendation of the Committee.²⁷

One of the more important strategies of this Committee's proposal to Academic Matters was to include sample programs of study. Table 3 lists these sample programs. These, more than anything else perhaps suggested what the program would be like. It is interesting to note that the core idea of the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration program is a combination of courses. This core idea will continue to evolve during the pilot phase of the program. The subcommittee's proposal was accepted by the Academic Matters Council on March 5, 1970. It had previously been presented to and approved by the Student Senate Academic Affairs Committee.²⁸

²⁷A Proposal to Establish a Program for A Bachelor's Degree With Individual Concentration," proposal submitted to the Academic Matters Council, March 5, 1970, Leigh Short, Chairman, p. 1.

²⁸Arthur Kinney had felt that it had been important to get formal student backing and support for the program so had gone to the Student Senate first for approval and returned to Academic Matters with their backing and support. Others including students felt that that had been something of a phony process--a last minute appearance before the students rather than actual student participation. In either case it was symbolically quite important.

TABLE 3
SAMPLE INTERDISCIPLINARY PROGRAMS FOR THE
BACHELOR'S DEGREE WITH INDIVIDUAL
CONCENTRATION PROGRAM

Urban Studies

Before Junior Year		
Sociology 251		Urban Sociology
Sociology 261		Population Problems
Economics 282		Urban Economics
Junior Year		
Landscape Architecture 273		City Planning
Anthropology		Urban Anthropology
Landscape Architecture 274		City Planning
Geography*		Urban Geography
Senior Year		
Landscape Architecture 377		Urban Problems (2 credits)
Government 220		Municipal Government
Sociology 256		Race Relations
Landscape Architecture 378		Urban Problems (2 credits)
Government 324		Metropolitan Politics
History 337		City in the Modern U.S.

Courses marked * are in the proposal stage. If they are not approved, others may be substituted, such as Sociology 275, Social Problems; Sociology 278, Criminology; General Business 240, Transportation Administration.

TABLE 3 (Continued)

Aquacultural Engineering

Junior Year

Fisheries Biology 261
 Zoology 281
 Mech. & A.E. 385
 C.E. 259

Techniques of Fisheries Biology
 Biology of Lower Invertebrates
 Special Topics (Aquacultural Eng.)
 Oceanography

Fisheries Biology 270
 Fisheries Biology 272
 C.E. 259
 Stat. 315

Ecology of Fishes
 Introduction to Marine Fisheries
 Engineering Oceanography
 Introduction to the Theory of Statistics

Senior Year

M & A.E. 255
 Marine Science 201
 Marine Science 200
 M & A.E. 385
 Food & Agr. Ec. 387
 Geology 355
 M & A.E. 385

Aquacultural Engineering Systems
 Biological Oceanography
 Microbial Ecology of the Marine Environment
 Special Topics (Aquaculture Eng.)
 Special Problem in Marine Resource Economics
 Physical Oceanography
 Special Topics (Aquaculture Eng.)

SOURCE: "A Proposal to Establish a Program for a Bachelor's Degree With Individual Concentration." Ibid., p. 2.

It was forwarded to the Faculty Senate and approved at their April 2nd meeting. It was approved at a May meeting of the Board of Trustees.

Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration
During its Pilot Phase: Perspectives from
a Student Participant and from
the Supervisory Committee

By the Fall of 1970, then, the BDIC supervisory committee had been formed,²⁹ the program had been given a two year experimental mandate, and it was finally ready to admit its first students. The objective of the program was to provide for individualization by allowing students to develop their own major program of study. The first part of this section depicts what that meant for an individual student. BDIC was also a programmatic or organizational vehicle for meeting this objective and the two year mandate afforded the supervisory committee the opportunity to experiment with that vehicle. The supervisory committee during this period was concerned not only with individual student programs, but with a variety of programmatic issues relating to the implementation of

²⁹The supervisory committee members were, as had been predicted, Anthony Borton, Leigh Short, and Arthur Kinney.

the program. The second part of this section deals with those issues from the perspective of the supervisory committee.

Janet Sheppard--A BDIC Student. Janet Sheppard was one of the first ten students in the BDIC program. She applied and was accepted during the fall of 1970 and her program began with the spring semester of 1971.

Janet had come to the University of Massachusetts as a freshman with a clear idea of what she wanted for herself. She wanted to be a lawyer and she wanted the University of Massachusetts to help her learn what she needed to get into law school, what she needed to practice effectively, and how to keep the study of and practice of law in a broader perspective. She quickly learned that there was no particular Department, School or program at the University of Massachusetts to directly help her with her objective. According to Janet, "the majors would not have prepared (me) for anything but that academic discipline--would not have helped me in terms of skills for law school."³⁰ Janet's motivation was strong, however, and she began to pursue her objectives on her own.

³⁰Interview with Janet Sheppard. While this statement is clearly inaccurate, what is important to the point are Janet's perceptions about the University and her motivations for joining BDIC.

One feels that "you have to really fight for an education at U.Mass. (but) you can get what you want."³¹ She joined the Honors Program because she had become convinced that good teaching was more important than content of courses, and the Honors courses were offered by many of the best professors in the University. Honors also allowed her to get out of University core requirements, which she considered useless. She joined Project 10 "because it seemed different from all other places in the University,"³² and because it too had good faculty associated with it.

By the beginning of her sophomore year, she still had to choose a major and she heard in Project 10 about a new program which allowed students to structure their own majors.

According to Janet, "it was strange to think about. I was going to design my own education. I wasn't sure I wanted to do that."³³ She decided, however, to investigate the program and went to see someone in the office to explain about wanting to go to law school and the skills she felt she needed to learn at U.Mass in order to get there. Tony Barton talked with her and said that what she wanted

³¹Interview with Janet Sheppard.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

to do was important and that she should find a faculty sponsor and apply to the program. Janet felt that his encouragement during that meeting was crucial. She went to a faculty member--Richard Harzler, a lawyer affiliated with the School of Business Administration--informed him of the new program and invited him to be her sponsor. After checking out the program, he agreed.

They worked together to prepare the program of Study and Rationale required of applicants to the program. Janet's program statement had emphasized her professional goals:

My professional goal is to be a lawyer. In order to have a useful background, I want to study law specifically, but I would also like to study the things that influence the law. I think politics, culture, history and social grouping influence the law, and in turn are affected by the law.³⁴

The courses listed for her first year of the program included American government, Political Novel, Criminology, the Individual and Society, the Law and Judicial Behavior.

Janet and Professor Harzler went together to be interviewed. Janet found the process strange. The interview seemed to focus more on the specific combination of courses than on her rationale and objectives, and most

³⁴ Janet Sheppard, "The Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration," Program statement, undated but contained in her academic folder.

questions were directed to Professor Harzler rather than to her. She was nervous about locking herself into the program for two years and wanted to be assured that her program could remain flexible.

The supervisory committee said she could change her program if she felt she needed to and accepted her into the program.

BDIC did allow Janet to change her program. Her report at the end of her first term stated that "I have added the goal of acquainting myself with the aspect of the law which deals specifically with women."³⁵ More fundamentally, it allowed her to do something more than just combine University courses. In the Summer of 1971, a new program had been started at U.Mass called the University Year for Action in which students spent a full year in community anti-poverty work. Janet convinced Professor Hartzler that a year spent working with the Community and Regional Legal Assistant Program in Holyoke would give her practical legal experience and insights into the sociology of law. Together Janet and Professor Hartzler convinced

³⁵Sheppard, "Program of the Bachelor's Degree With Individual Concentration, End of Term Report," May 28, 1971.

The BDIC program to allow Janet to participate in the Action program as part of her BDIC major. They put together a reading list designed to help Janet understand and clarify her day-to-day experiences.

At the end of one semester in the program, Janet felt that it had "sharpened my insights into the social problems related to the law and given me a better perspective from which to plan my career."³⁶ She also felt that she had gotten a much clearer perspective on a law office, on lawyers as professionals, and on ways in which their attitudes shaped the profession. Because she was concerned with ways of articulating what she had learned and in some way bringing it back to the university, Janet taught a University course during her second semester in the Action program and her third in BDIC. She appreciated Professor Hartzler's and BDIC's willingness to let her teach what she had learned in order to learn from that process. During her second semester with Action, Janet also co-authored a pamphlet on Landlord-Tenant Rights and Duties, which he felt was a valuable learning experience.

Hartzler in his memo to BDIC evaluating Janet's experience in the Action program says:

³⁶Sheppard, "End of Term Report, Fall 1971," p. 3.

In summary, her educational experiences in the Action program brought her to the point where she is now--a respected teacher. This respect comes from the lawyers with whom she worked, their clients, the personnel of the courts, her student peers and even a few professors; and law school is still to come

I am becoming more convinced than ever that at least some students don't need as much traditional formal education as we presently have structured into our system. I think BDIC and Action are good things³⁷

Janet felt that the most important things about her BDIC program had been her experiences in Action, her teaching, her reading, and her close relationship with Professor Hartzler. She felt that she had learned a great deal from keeping in close contact with him over two years and she felt that the most important thing that BDIC had done was facilitate that relationship.

Janet finished her final semester in the BDIC program by taking and teaching additional University courses and she was accepted into law school.

Arthur Kinney, when asked what had made BDIC a successful program, had said:

I want to say that the most important thing-- in a kind of naive and adolescent way, was the

³⁷Richard Hartzler, memo to the Committee on Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration concerning Janet Sheppard, found in Sheppard's academic folder, p. 2.

wisdom of the student programs, that is, the purposes they came up with, the combinations, etc. (Students) were what made the program successfully.³⁸

I think that Janet Sheppard's experience proves Arthur Kinney's point. Janet's program attests as well to the fact that BDIC fulfilled its main objective--that of providing individualized education.

The Supervisory Committee and the BDIC Program.

When the BDIC program was approved by the Board of Trustees in May of 1970, the supervisory committee began spending time together immediately. They were an impressive group and nearly all of those interviewed concerning BDIC felt that the most important factor to the quick acceptance university-wide of the BDIC program was the "academic respectability" of the first supervisory committee. Arthur Kinney was seen as the program's leader from the beginning of the planning period and all of those interviewed felt he had been very effective. His success was attributed to his energy and dedication, and the fact that he was well known and respected throughout the campus. Arthur Kinney typified what Lindquist and others referred to as a "cosmopolitan local" because he had been involved in a large number of activities on the campus that made him well known beyond the confines of the English Department.

³⁸Interview with Arthur Kinney.

He was respected by both the faculty and the students at the University. He had been a faculty resident in Southwest, had participated in the SWAP conference, and had organized a student-faculty teach-in in May 1970 about the invasion of Cambodia in addition to well-known scholarly activities. His experience prior to coming to the University of Massachusetts had been at Yale where he had been involved with the collegiate system.

The other faculty members on the first Supervisory Committee were widely respected as well. The Academic Matters Council was an established academic campus group and Leigh Short had been a member for some years.³⁹ He was well known within and without the School of Engineering. Tony Borton, also a member of the Academic Matters Council, had been at the University for many years, knew a large number of faculty members and had been actively involved in undergraduate curriculum development in the College of Agriculture.

The supervisory committee accepted six students into the program for the fall of 1970 and another thirty for the spring semester. They worked hard to achieve diversity among the students and their programs, to foster creativity,

³⁹In fact, when BDIC was to come up at the end of its trial period for permanent approval, Leigh Short was serving as chairman of the Academic Matters Council.

and to interest students who were capable but had previously been academic underachievers.⁴⁰

The preliminary report described the range and diversity of programs:

The most popular areas in the first year of the program are: pre-law (5), natural science (4), environmental science (4), urban studies (4), and mythology and folklore (3). Other students have combined speech therapy and physical education work for a career helping the profoundly retarded; work in philosophy, creative writing, theatre, and dance for a study of aesthetics; work in engineering, film, and music theory and composition for composing and scoring for mass media; work in government, history, sociology, English, and economics, combined with employment by the state legislature and the Democratic Party for a study in professional politics⁴¹

The supervisory committee at first required that students combine existing University courses, but as the program progressed, they found that University courses did not always fulfill the educational needs of students in the program. The supervisory committee petitioned the Academic Matters Council for special course numbers which

⁴⁰This nonmeritocratic emphasis was one of the unique things about the BDIC program as compared to programmatic attempts in other colleges and universities.

⁴¹"Program of Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration: A Preliminary Report--April 1971," submitted by Anthony Borton, Arthur Kinney, and Leigh Short, supervisory committee, p. 3.

would serve as academic umbrellas under which BDIC students and their sponsors could design directly relevant educational experiences. These courses became widely used. They also began to allow more field work and off-campus experiences as students and their sponsors sought to build these into their programs.

The supervisory committee asked students to articulate both a personal and professional goal for their studies, and they found that the program tended to attract ambitious, aggressive and industrious students. Students often used the BDIC program as a way to undertake much more specifically career-related studies than usually available within Departments. Some excerpts from student proposals are illustrative:

The purpose of my individual concentration will be to prepare myself in the field of East Asia Journalism, centering around Japan.

I have proposed a program to acquire many of the skills essential to the positions of the Software Design Specialist and Management in that field (Computer Science). My proposed study consists of at least seventeen interrelated courses covering Mathematics, Software Systems, Hardware and Cybernetics.

This program is designed to provide a foundation for graduate study and research in both mythology per se and the manifestations of myth in literature.⁴²

⁴²Ibid., Appendix IV: Selected Case Studies

Just as the first students were important to the implementation of BDIC, as a program, so too were the faculty sponsors. The Supervisory Committee paid close attention to its initial group of faculty sponsors. They made it very clear that they were accepting or rejecting students to the program according to their judgments about the faculty sponsors and the quality of the faculty-student relationship as well as on the coherence and viability of the student program. In their proposal for permanent status they defined their criteria for student acceptance as follows:

Approval and acceptance is dependent on the Committee's evaluation of: (1) the need for an individualized major in consultation with the sponsor and on occasion other faculty, (2) the faculty-sponsor's ability to advise the student effectively, (3) the student-sponsor relationship, (4) the academic merit of the proposal, and (5) the interrelationship and coherence of the proposed course of study.⁴³

During their first year they attracted faculty sponsors from twenty-six departments and colleges. The sponsors were well respected as a group, by other faculty and administrators in the University. The BDIC supervisory committee did not interfere with faculty judgments and

⁴³"Proposal to Award Permanent Status to the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration Program," submitted to the Academic Matters Council by the supervisory committee, p. 4.

expected the faculty member to take responsibility with the student for the student's program. They felt that:

The ultimate success of the BDIC program is dependent on the individual faculty-sponsor who is the key to a successful independent major. The sponsor counsels and advises the student, makes academic decisions concerning the major (pass-fail courses, pre-requisites, etc.), certifies the student as a candidate for graduation and in the final analysis, provides the academic credibility to the BDIC major.⁴⁴

The Supervisory Committee also worked hard at establishing harmonious relationships with University Departments. They made it clear that they did not intend to challenge or undermine existing Departments or majors and that the program was only for those few students who wanted an academic program that was not otherwise available through existing departmental major offerings.

As BDIC moved into its second year of the pilot program, another major objective began to be articulated for the program--that of academic experimentation.⁴⁵

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Arthur Kinney, when interviewed stated that this objective had been present from the beginning of the planning period, but there is no documentary support for this position. The documents and most of those interviewed testify that the sole purpose of the program in the beginning was to respond to the pressure for individualization of the curriculum by allowing students to design their own major program of study. I would agree with Kinney that individualized majors do, in fact, constitute an academic reform, but would agree with the others that the program was not initially viewed as a vehicle for continual curricular experimentation. That the program in fact turned out to be such a vehicle could only be attributed to serendipity.

The BDIC supervisory committee began to allow groups that were planning new academic programs to use the rubric of BDIC as a vehicle for their program development and experimentation. For example, the fact that BDIC allowed UWW students to enroll under its major was crucial to the development of the University Without Walls program for it gave UWW a year of working with real students, and faculty members while it designed its program. In addition, BDIC became a vehicle for gauging student academic interests and this information was useful to the university for curricular planning. Students joined the BDIC program in order to design a major program of study that was not available to them in any other way at the University. As the BDIC enrollment grew, student programs began to cluster in certain areas such as urban studies, environmental studies, or legal studies. As one faculty member put it: "Students, in a sense, voted with their feet."⁴⁶ The supervisory committee watched student program patterns closely and suggested new majors for the University.

The concept was best stated by Arthur Kinney:

In the best sense of the word, BDIC is really a service program for the University in general but most especially for the Academic Matters

⁴⁶Interview with Robert Woodbury.

Committee itself: a program which tests certain possibilities which are raised as academic matters on our campus.⁴⁷

In addition to encouraging experimentation and new major programs, BDIC began to have an impact on Departmental curricula. Departments began to revamp their course offerings and to allow greater flexibility to students in fulfilling major requirements. The Biology, Zoology, and the College of Agriculture were three examples cited often during interviews.

The Success of an Idea--BDIC Moves For Permanent Approval

From its inception as a pilot program in 1970, the BDIC program had grown rapidly, so that by the spring of 1972, it had 134 students. As its two-year experimental mandate was to expire in May, the BDIC supervisory committee decided that the program had proved successful in providing individualized majors and that permanent status for the program should be sought from the Board of Trustees.

While the process for planning and gaining approval as a pilot program had taken two years the process for gaining permanent approval seemed quite simple. The supervisory presented a tried proposal to the Academic

⁴⁷Arthur Kinney, letter to Ernest Buck, Chairman of the Academic Matters Committee, March 1973.

Matters Council. The Council voted unanimous approval and supported the proposal in the Faculty Senate. The Senate also voted its approval and supported the program before the Board of Trustees. The Board of Trustees voted its approval and BDIC became a permanent academic option for students.

The critical supporting factors in the first planning stages of BDIC had been leadership in the involvement and support of a few well-respected faculty members and a genuine concern on the part of students and faculty for finding an academic mechanism for meeting students needs. The important factors in the process of gaining permanent approval were somewhat different. Due to the successful experience with an experimental pilot program, BDIC had achieved a critical mass of support from students, and faculty. The students had for the most part come up with serious and exciting alternative programs and the faculty responded to the students. The large number of faculty members who supported the program before the Faculty Senate were according to one supervisory committee member "strange bedfellows." BDIC appealed to both extremes--liberals for its reform potential and conservative academics because of the flexibility it gave students to follow their own particular line."⁴⁸ The effective leader-

⁴⁸Interview with Tony Borton.

ship of the well-respected supervisory committee was still a critical factor, but the University environment was more conducive to academic reform in 1972 than it had been in 1969 and 1970.

An important element in the planning and implementation of BDIC from 1968 to 1972 was the fact that it did not appear to be a program of radical change. Allowing students to make all the decisions concerning a major program of study was a fundamental departure from prevailing attitudes about the relative roles, responsibilities, and competencies of faculty and students, but within the context of BDIC this departure was not immediately apparent. A BDIC program for a few students did not appear to alter in any way the basic missions or functions of the University; this was the most important reason for its swift and widespread acceptance, but as an approved program, it did allow for the assumption of the mission of individualization.

C H A P T E R V

INSTITUTE FOR MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT

The Institute for Man and His Environment was formally approved by the Board of Trustees of the University of Massachusetts on April 26, 1971. Its establishment as a distinct research unit attests to the intention of the University of Massachusetts to assume the mission of social problem-solving. The story of its development over a two year period, however, shows how difficult it is to alter the basic missions of the University, and on another level, how difficult it is even to create a new unit within the University where an altered mission could be apparent. Its history also reveals some of the complex aspects of the change process and suggests a number of factors that were important to its creation as well as many that prevented its realization in the grandiose terms envisioned. This chapter traces the development of the Institute from the fall of 1960 to the spring of 1970.

Objectives of the Institute

The concept of the Institute grew out of a widespread feeling among many members of the faculty that a great state university had a responsibility to employ its resources to help cope with the worsening problems of the environment.¹

¹Bernard Berger, "A Chronological Account of the Development to Date of the University of Massachusetts Institute for Man and His Environment," Amherst, 16 March 1971.

In the late sixties and early seventies environmental problems such as pollution, overpopulation, and resource depletion were the center of a great deal of attention and public concern. It was felt that the University ought to take an institutional role about the issues of knowledge and its application to environmental problems.

There was a growing feeling on the part of the activists among the students and faculty that the University should get involved in social problems, that they should get themselves intruded into the social process and become an agent of social change in a much more active way.²

The concept of an institute was shared by many at the University; the entity of an institute, its structural and operational form, evolved over the two year period and was much harder to achieve. A recent brochure describes the goals of the Institute:

The Institute for Man and His Environment has been established . . . to meet the challenge of the many complex problems arising from the interaction of people with the social and physical environment. Its main task, which no other single segment of the University is equipped to perform, is to bring together the diverse talents of the faculty and students to bear on problems of common interest. The Institute is designed to act, therefore, as a focal point for the

²Interview with Carl Swanson, Associate Director, Institute for Man and His Environment, 24 January 1974.

recognition and delineation of areas of environmental concern which call for a multidisciplinary approach, and as a stimulus to the development of appropriate strategies for dealing with these concerns.³

The documents pertaining to the Institute were quite eloquent about its goals. Those who were interviewed were less eloquent, but they revealed the fact that there were many perceived goals and objectives for the institute; these were not prioritized, and some of them were in fact contradictory.

Of the thirteen people interviewed, all agreed with the generalized goal of meeting the challenge of complex environmental problems. They agreed that these problems stemmed from the interaction of man with the environment, and that the solutions had to involve both man and technology--the social sciences, the hard sciences and even the humanities.

Most agreed, as well, that the problems faced were of a kind that required some sort of multidisciplinary activity, and that no existing unit could mount such an effort. Therefore, they agreed that an institute should be created as connecting tissue between departments and schools and between teaching, research, and service in the environmental area.

³Institute for Man and His Environment, Informational Brochure, 1972.

The objective of many to have an educational program that was closely tied in and that was available to undergraduate as well as graduate students at all levels of sophistication was a shared objective but one that was unique to this institute. One more cynical faculty member felt that the reason for the educational program was somewhat different: "We were Johnny-come-lately's so we had to do something different."⁴

Another goal for the institute was that the institute should serve as a resource for state government. Agencies of the state government concerned with environmental problems ought to be able to call upon the institute for help. This goal was articulated by most of those interviewed, although some claimed that the focus originated at a national level and only slowly shifted toward the state level. As one faculty member put it:

We are a large state university. We have a unique responsibility--an obligation to respond. My feeling is that the state agencies were originally skeptical that the University could look on such problems in a realistic fashion, and some state agencies still are skeptical.⁵

Many felt that the "real" motivation for the Institute had less to do with the environment and more to

⁴Interview with Otto Stein, Head, Department of Botany, 1 February 1974.

⁵Interview with Bernard Berger, Director, Water Resources Research Center, 31 January 1974.

do with money. As the Associate Director put it:

. . . it was both in response to a very obvious social need . . . and it was also in response to the fact that there was money available through RAND and NSF . . . there was in the air, the feeling that we had better get on the ball.⁶

A number of Federal agencies and large foundations were at that time making large grants to universities for work in the environmental area, and the University of Massachusetts wanted to be on the receiving end. The structural forms, the timing, and much of the energy and motivation seem to have been related to "grantsmanship."⁷

Those who saw monetary objectives as a goal for the Institute also saw political and personal ones. As one administrator said, "the zeitgeist was in the environmental area so the University needed a labelled entity in the environmental business."⁸ New presidents, new top administrators, and new deans all wanted to improve

⁶Interview with Carl Swanson, 24 January 1974.

⁷The fact that over the years its major proposals have not been funded and few resources have come to it has been a severe blow to the inflated aspirations of those who saw it solving hosts of problems.

⁸Interview with Richard Louttit, Head, Department of Psychology, 1 February 1974.

their power base through control over a visible and successful entity.

These last conflicting motivations--not the generally accepted notion that the University ought to be working towards the solution of difficult environmental problems--led to the two year squabble over the forms and functions of the Institute.

Planning Process for Institute

Initial Stages--Faculty Meeting and External Influences. Concern over what the University was doing in the environmental area first was expressed in an organized fashion in the Fall of 1969. A group of faculty--mostly from engineering and business--had been meeting on Monday evenings to talk about what the University could do about major social problems. At the same time the Dean of the Graduate School, his research associate dean and others were trying to think of ways to involve the University in areas that would respond to needs but would also produce funds. The catalytic agent between these groups was Bernard Berger who had spent the 1968/1969 academic year as the water specialist on the Presidential Science Advisory staff in Washington, and who returned to campus convinced that the University should be doing something in the environmental area and

that there were funds available for such activity. Berger had been in a position in Washington to know what legislation and appropriations were likely in the environmental areas so he was granted substantial credibility on campus. Berger met several times with the Graduate Dean, and they planned a series of large group meetings where interested faculty and students could discuss the issue.⁹

The first meeting which was held on September 23, 1969, was well attended. Close to one hundred people were there, including a smattering of "vocal" students and faculty from a wide variety of University departments. The agenda for the meeting was to discuss problems and what the University ought to do about them. There was a general consensus that something ought to be done about the environment by the University as an institution but considerable disagreement about what and how. As one participant put it "the humanists were talking about ethics and culture, and the engineers about waste treatment."¹⁰

⁹All of those interviewed attested to the initial leadership roles of M. Appley and B. Berger although there were differences of opinion as to who was really the prime mover. Clearly B. Berger as the Chairman of meetings and the Steering Committee was the most visible, but that was perceived by most as a justifiable strategy on the part of the Graduate Dean to put a faculty member in the visible position.

¹⁰Interview with Robert Gluckstern, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs and Provost, 22 March 1974.

A second meeting was held on October 16, 1969 and an outside guest was invited. John Steinhart had been a colleague of Bernard Berger's in Washington, was associated with the Office of Science and Technology, and had recently completed a report to the President's Environmental Quality Council.¹¹ Steinhart's visit was remembered by almost all of those interviewed, his report was distributed on the campus and widely read, and he was quoted in all the major Institute documents. He was, therefore, the most important outside influence on the development of the Institute, and his input came at a crucial, early stage in the Institute's development. It is important, therefore, to review the major elements of Steinhart's Report.

The Steinhart study set out to determine the appropriate institutional arrangements for environmental problem-solving. It started from some assumptions about the role of the university in society and claimed that "the ongoing discussion of problems" was the third major function of the university (along with education and research). Thus Steinhart made the transition from public

¹¹John S. Steinhart and Stacie Cherniack, The Universities and Environmental Quality: Commitment to Problem-Focused Education, A Report to the President's Environmental Quality Council, Office of Science and Technology, September 1969.

service to social problem-solving as a mission for the university. According to Steinhart:

. . . society has a right to expect, as a part of the educational process, discussion of the prominent issues, problems and opportunities of the day, and training of professionals who can deal with these problems on a professional level. (Universities should also play) a prominent role in the long range public discussion of alternative futures.¹²

Steinhart studied a variety of institutional arrangements developed in universities to focus on environmental problem-solving, but concluded that most had failed because they had been unsuccessful at providing a viable alternative to the departmental structure. Although federal money had encouraged the proliferation of institutes and centers, many of these according to Steinhart had become paper institutes to channel research out to departments.¹³

Of these few institutes that Steinhart found to

¹²Ibid., p. 8.

¹³The basis of the Steinhart study was a survey "Environmental Science Centers at Institutions of Higher Education" which had been prepared for the subcommittee on Science Research and Development, U.S. House of Representatives, 91st Congress by The Environmental Policy Division of the Legislative Reference Service. The survey found a great number of institutes and centers and tried but failed to determine the most successful organizational forms to deal with environmental problems: "No obvious answer exists to the mis-match of historical institutional organization and emerging social problems." The Policy Division survey recommended the involvement of more social scientists and more operational relationships with government agencies. Steinhart had selected twenty institutes from this survey for further study.

be successful, Steinhart delineated two factors that he deemed crucial to their success:

1. They had substantial or complete control of the faculty reward structure and

2. They had the freedom to be innovative in introducing course material, educational programs, work study programs, and curriculum requirements for degrees. (Emphasis in original)¹⁴

Steinhart felt that control over the reward system--including hiring and subsequent promotion and rewards--was important as the only way to establish a viable alternative to the departmental structure and enable faculty to focus on problems rather than disciplines. Steinhart felt, as well, that one of the most valuable results of a program concerned with environmental quality was the education and training of students with a problem orientation. The appropriate educational program in this area, however, required new multidisciplinary and problem-focused courses, so Steinhart felt that the environmental unit/institute needed the power to create them. He also felt that they needed the ability to sponsor experience-based programs and confer degrees so that students could be freed up to pursue work in the environmental area. In addition to the crucial factors of control over faculty rewards and the educational program, Steinhart also found that the most successful institutes enjoyed the direct interest

¹⁴Steinhart, p.10.

and support of one or more senior administrators.

The Steinhart study concluded that the current federal funding policies were inappropriate and recommended that the federal government provide broad programmatic support (including developmental support) for environmental quality centers.¹⁵

The findings and recommendations of this report were the substance of Steinhart's speech to the faculty meeting on October 16, 1969. The reactions to the speech were intense and conflicting. Mort Appley and others who wanted an environmental problem-focused unit that was large, visible and liberally supported from Washington heard in the Steinhart speech the future federal policies and patterns, and wanted to move at once for the creation of an institute along the Steinhart model. Those who had been primarily concerned with how existing faculty members from various departments and schools might come together

¹⁵In an appendix to the Steinhart report, D.E. Cunningham discussed the advantages and deficiencies of several federal funding patterns. Cunningham notes that a university response to the complex problems of society must be unavoidably expressed through financial interactions between government and universities. "The details of form, conditions, and patterns which these financial relationships assume is of abiding significance in the future structure and functions of the university." Cunningham discussed the several different funding strategies and finally recommended program funding to the university to replace individual research grants to faculty members. His recommendation was reiterated by Steinhart.

to focus on environmental problems were very concerned with the notion of a separate unit with its own faculty, research projects, and educational programs.

Formation of Steering Committee. The meeting with Steinhart and the reactions convinced the Graduate Dean that large group forums were not the most productive for pursuing complex questions, so with the agreement of a large number of faculty he appointed a Steering Committee and named Bernard Berger as its Chairman. The charge to the Steering Committee was to recommend shape and substance and to suggest a strategy for launching a program.

The Steering Committee wanted to focus on the three major elements of education, research, and service or outreach, and established sub-committees in each of these areas. The Steering Committee itself continued to focus on issues of goals and structure. These four groups met often during the period November 1969 to April 1970, discussed a large number of questions, and put together a report recommending structure and function for an Institute. The Steering Committee drew its membership from different departments and schools in the

University.¹⁶ The motivations of those on the Steering Committee and subcommittees were quite diverse. Most of those interviewed felt that the primary motivation was one of "watch-dog-ism." Individuals joined the committees not out of desire to work for an Institute, but to be sure that their department or school did not miss anything. They represented units on the campus who had a stake in the outcome of the deliberations either because they wanted control of the Institute themselves (Engineering, Graduate School) or because they would stand to lose power if an Institute were created (Agriculture). Therefore, their positions on an issue regarding structure or function reflects their feelings about impact on their own unit

¹⁶The members of the Steering Committee were: Bernard Berger, Chairman, Director of Water Resources Research Center; Samuel Seeley, Secretary, Associate Dean, Graduate School; Kenneth Picha, Dean, School of Engineering; Lester Van Atta, Associate Dean, School of Engineering; John A. Naegle, Department of Environmental Sciences; Otto Stein, Head, Department of Botany; Irving Howards, Government Department; Robert McGarrah, Center for Business and Economic Research, School of Business Administration; Ervin Zube, Department of Landscape Architecture; John Roberts, Department of Zoology; William Darrity, Dean, Department of Public Health; Ellis Olim, Department of Human Development.

rather than on the Institute itself.¹⁷ As one person interviewed put it: "some strong people got involved who wanted to run with the ball and everybody was juggling and pushing here and there."¹⁸ This political maneuvering was to be one of the major factors in the development of the Institute. Other motivations for involvement with Institute planning committees were more personal. Many second-rate faculty members tended to

¹⁷The College of Agriculture especially viewed the Institute with some consternation, because they felt that they had been doing for some years in their Department of Environmental Sciences and in their Experiment Stations, the very things that the Institute was calling for. There was some legitimacy to this view, for the service mission of the University had evolved primarily from the Land Grant movement in the 1860's, and the establishment of Agricultural Experiment Stations in the late 1890's and early 1900's.

With the exception of the Dean of the School of Engineering, all those interviewed pointed to the fact that Engineering wanted to gain control of the Institute. Most people tended at first to define environmental problems as engineering technology problems, the School of Engineering had a division of Environmental Engineering and they were deeply involved in grantsmanship.

¹⁸Interview with Otto Stein, 1 February 1974.

attach themselves to the new enterprise as a vehicle to gain recognition they had failed to achieve in their home department. The majority of those seeking routes to legitimacy included faculty from Agriculture and Business.

The Steering Committee had a great deal of difficulty focusing goals for the new Institute as well as deciding on its function. Generally its objectives for the Institute were similar to those mentioned during interviews: the Institute should serve as a vehicle through which the University responds to society, it should obtain financial support for projects, serve as resource to state agencies, and engage in multidisciplinary research, education and service projects that focused on environmental problems.

There were differences of opinion as to the importance of such goals as compared with the other missions of the University, and therefore differing opinions as to the appropriate size and activity level. Many argued that the traditionally emphasized missions of teaching and disciplined-based research ought to continue to be of highest priority in the University because the university is the only and/or best societal institution for carrying out those missions. While a multidisciplinary, problem-focused unit might be desirable--especially if it had

educational and training aspects--social problem-solving was performed by other agencies in the society and should remain a low-level University priority. Others argued that the educational and research missions were anachronistic in contemporary societies and could be revitalized only through an emphasis on social problem-solving. They argued for a central place for an Institute for Man and His Environment.

Lack of a coherent University policy on public service hampered the deliberations of the Steering Committee.

The education subcommittee reviewed current environmentally-focused curricular offerings and recommended a number of new courses and seminars. The research subcommittee grappled with the problem of theoretical vs. applied research, disciplinary vs. multidisciplinary activity, and how to decide which research activities would fall under the purview of the Institute and which would not. They recommended research efforts which were multidisciplinary, problem-focused, and which brought together willing faculty members. The service-outreach committee focused on questions of what activity for whom, and articulated the notion of service to the state. They recognized the fundamental importance of outside funding to support the activities of the Institute.

The Steering Committee had a number of alternative

organizational formats to choose from during this stage of the planning process. They could opt for the Steinhart model--a separate research unit with its own faculty, staff and educational program, they could argue for a new department or school or they could dispense with a new structural entity and recommend a series of committees or task forces.

The deliberations of the Steering Committee were somewhat aided by a second visitor to the campus. Dr. John Buckley, ecologist on the staff of Dr. Lee DuBridge then the President's Science Advisor, spoke to a third large group meeting on December 2, 1969 and described the efforts of Executive agencies in developing programs in the environmental area.

The Steering Committee pulled together reports from the subcommittees and incorporated them into one draft report proposing an Institute for Man and His Environment. It recommended an independent Institute but one with only a small staff for coordination purposes. All projects and activities would be carried out by faculty and graduate students working with or for diverse state agencies. The Institute would report through the Graduate Dean.¹⁹

¹⁹At the time of the Steering Committee deliberations there were a number of people who voiced opposition to the reporting line through the Graduate Dean, but it was not a critical issue at that time. It later became one.

Although the Steering Committee recognized that its recommendations left unresolved some of the reward system problems for those faculty who might want to participate in Institute projects, it was felt that the Institute would have to deal with these problems as they arose on a one-to-one basis.

The Steering Committee's report was meant as an on-campus discussion paper and as a proposal for funding to the National Science Foundation. It was distributed to University faculty on March 27, 1970, and discussed at a fourth large faculty meeting on April 9th. Following that meeting, and with the general concurrence of the faculty attending the meeting, it was submitted to the National Science Foundation. It sought a development grant from the National Science Foundation for the creation of an Institute.²⁰

²⁰The struggle for control over the Institute was revealed once again in deliberations over who was to be principle investigator of the proposal. Both Bernard Berger and Lester Van Atta, Research Associate Dean of Engineering were likely candidates but the Associate Provost and the Graduate Dean were both concerned that that would result in the School of Engineering taking control of the Institute. In the end, the Graduate Dean himself signed on as principle investigator.

Recruitment of Director. With the Steering Committee's draft report in hand, the Graduate Dean requested three faculty positions for the Fall of 1970. He wanted a Director and two Associate Directors for the Institute. The Provost and Associate Provost found such a request impossible, given the fact that the Institute did not then exist as a formal unit,²¹ but authorized one appointment. The Steering Committee was transformed into an informal search group, and M. Appley took the initiative in late spring to recruit a Director for the Institute.

There was immediate controversy over where to recruit. Some, including Appley and the Provost, felt that selection of an on-campus person would run the risk of a department or school assuming control over the Institute; others argued that if the primary task were to bring together and coordinate the faculty on various environmentally-related problems, a person who was known and respected on the campus would be best. Nevertheless,

²¹The Steering Committee Report had not gone to the Faculty Senate and Board of Trustees for approval. Although many felt that approval was important, they wanted the Report to go immediately to N.S.F. as a grant proposal and did not want to wait for formal approval.

an off-campus search began but was incomplete that spring and continued into the fall. The recruitment process had not been overly successful. The favorite candidate, Carl Swanson, refused the Directorship while agreeing to the Associate Directorship. Two other names had been put forward, and the Provost chose Dayton Carritt, he was a scientist with an established reputation. Everyone later agreed that it had been an unfortunate choice. Nevertheless, Dr. Carritt was offered a position and he came in January as Director of the Institute.

Continued Planning of the Institute Under Carritt Directorship. Dayton Carritt's mandate was clear. He was to implement the proposal that had been completed the previous April by the Steering Committee by moving a) for Faculty Senate approval for the Institute, b) to bring faculty together and get them started on activities, and c) to push forward in the pursuit of grant funds.

Dr. Carritt agreed that his mandate to implement the proposal had been clear but felt that the proposal was so vague and general that it could not be done. According to Carritt, the Steering Committee had avoided the really difficult implementation problems concerning resources, reward systems, and priorities for activities. In addition, Carritt felt that he had been misled concerning the actual status of the Institute. He thought the Institute had been clearly established and had

campus-wide support, even though he was told that as a trivial matter it had to go through an approval process. Again, according to Carritt, he found himself, upon arrival as Director, in a position of trying to create an Institute from nothing and against the opposition of the Deans of the two most powerful professional Schools, the top campus administration, and the constituted academic bodies on the campus.

Whether the opposition was there when he arrived, whether it was generated by his actions during his first months, or whether it was generated by other forces such as opposition and antipathy for the Graduate Dean is a fascinating question to which, unfortunately, there are no clear answers.

Carritt, upon his arrival, began a series of meetings with department heads, Deans, the Provost and Associate Provost, and the President.²² He began to lay out his notion of an Institute for Man and His Environment. The Institute was to be, according to Carritt, a large, liberally supported unit. Following the Steinhart model,

²²There is unfortunately, no documentary evidence of these meetings, but many of those interviewed--Stein, Louttit, Picha, Gluckstern--were able to speak to the substance of those meetings from personal recollection.

it would have control over all grant funds and research projects concerned with environment-related problems, and it would have its own educational program.

Carritt's conception was clearly different from that envisioned the year before by the Steering Committee and its subcommittees on education, research, and outreach. The difference could be explained in several ways:

1. It could reflect Carritt's sincere attempt to put specifics on the generalities of the Steering Committee's report by facing directly issues of reward system and control.

2. It could reflect Carritt's own personal aspirations as Director of the unit.

3. It could reflect M. Appley's original, but skillfully hidden agendas. When interviewed, Appley stated almost in passing:

One of the sub-interests I had--once we got the thing going--was to incorporate those environment-related activities on the campus--Environmental Technology, Marine Science, Water Resources, etc.--and to set up a university-wide structure This structure would have liaison with the Bureau of Government Research.²³

Most of those interviewed felt that Appley's aspirations were finally beginning to emerge through Carritt. As one person put it, "The Institute for Man and His Environ-

²³Interview with Mortimer Appley, Dean, Graduate School, 27 January 1974.

ment was a real political issue from the start. The initial impetus was an attempt by Mort Appley to develop a power base."²⁴ As another put it, "Carritt didn't do anything that wasn't totally tied with Mort."²⁵

If the theme underlying Carritt's descriptions of the form and function of the Institute to department heads and deans was a political theme, that same theme was also important in their response. Most went immediately to Bob Gluckstern--who was Associate Provost at this time under Tipppo--to voice their opposition to Carritt and his ideas. Most took the opportunity as well to voice their opposition to Mort Appley. It was clear that a unit with control over research proposals and grant funds in an area as broad and as yet ill-defined as "Man and the Environment" was an enormous threat to many of the research activities and aspirations in schools and departments all over campus,²⁶ and this was probably the most important

²⁴Interview with Stanley Moss, Psychology Department, 6 March 1974.

²⁵Interview with Robert Gluckstern, 22 March 1974.

²⁶This would include Engineering, Agriculture, Botany, Zoology, Geology, Geography, Psychology and a large number of other departments.

reason for their opposition.

Another clearly had to do with personalities and leadership style. Dayton Carritt was clearly insensitive to the concerns of those with whom he was meeting, and many found him both arrogant and incompetent. Most of those interviewed agreed that he was an ineffective leader at precisely the time when leadership was most crucial to the development of the Institute. A few however, claimed that Carritt's ineffectiveness was due to circumstances beyond his control and laid most of the blame for inadequate leadership onto Mort Appley. Everyone agreed that Appley was impossible. There was strong opposition to the fact that the Institute reported to Appley as Graduate Dean, and much of this opposition stemmed from the fact that other Deans and department heads found him difficult to work with. While a few excused Appley's behavior on the grounds of the difficult role of Graduate Dean, most felt that the person, not the position was the problem.²⁷

²⁷ Graduate Deans do not have the line of responsibility and authority of other Deans in the formal university organization. They are dependent on Provosts for their power and are able to operate only through influence with other Deans. Their power, especially during the sixties, however, was generally increased by the number of research grants they could bring to the University.

Bob Gluckstern did nothing at this time except try to maintain open communications so that differences over the form and function of the Institute could be settled.²⁸

Carritt Moves For Faculty Senate Approval for the Institute. As a result of what he felt were disappointing meetings throughout the campus, Dave Carritt decided to move very quickly on the second piece of his mandate and obtain formal Faculty Senate and Trustee approval for the Institute.²⁹

The approval process itself constitutes, according to Hefferlin, a crucial environmental factor in the change process. In the case of the Institute, it also allows one to view more clearly the political maneuvering, the interplay of personalities, and the attempts to grapple with the difficult problems of reward, resources, form and function for the Institute.

²⁸A recent administrative reorganization had already given Gluckstern control over several areas previously handled by Appley, so Gluckstern was reluctant to move against Appley at this time.

²⁹At the University of Massachusetts any new program which wanted to offer courses, degrees or proposed to hire faculty or staff, required Faculty Senate and Trustee approval. The Academic Matters Council, a standing committee of the Faculty Senate, was the first step in the approval process. It reviewed all academic programs and forwarded those it approved on to the Senate, which forwarded those it approved on to the administration and the Board of Trustees. The time required for the entire process varied from a month to several years depending upon the urgency of the issue, the level of consensus, and the nature of the program.

Dave Carritt in fact moved too quickly. He forced the issue onto the Academic Matters Council agenda in February and demanded an expedited process on the grounds the N.S.F. funding depended upon an approved Institute.³⁰ He prepared a brief draft proposal for Academic Matters which he did not circulate on the campus.³¹

Carritt's draft proposal contained little rationale but moved for the establishment of an Institute for Man and His Environment:

II. that will be a multidisciplinary, problem-solving component of the University having the capability to compliment and augment existing discipline-oriented departmental programs in instruction, research, and public service which are concerned with the environment.

III. the Institute's functions include (1) the coordination and (2) reporting of existing environmentally-oriented programs in the University, and (3) the initiation and submission to the Academic Senate, the Graduate Council, and the Board of Trustees plans for such new programs of instruction and research as may be deemed necessary.³²

³⁰There is no documentary evidence that N.S.F. was ready to fund the Institute at this time. It had had the U.Mass. proposal for more than ten months. Carritt, however sincerely believed that something might develop at that time.

³¹Although Carritt and Appley worked quite closely together, Appley does not remember having seen a copy of the draft prior to Academic Matters.

³²Dayton Carritt, "Draft Proposal for the Creation of an Institute for Man and His Environment." Submitted to the Academic Matters Council, 5 February 1971.

The proposal further anticipated an integrated educational program in environmental studies at both the undergraduate and graduate level, called for a staffing pattern that included University faculty, permanent Institute staff, and more temporary yet qualified workers from outside the University who would be associated with specific projects. The Institute was to group research activities into problem-centers and although it was not explicit, the presumption was that all environmentally-related research projects would go through the centers and report to the Institute.

The draft proposal pleased nobody. Five days later Dayton Carritt provided a five page "rationale."³³ It defended the proposed organizational format of the Institute and by pointing to the inability of vertical, discipline-based Department and School structures to deal with multidisciplinary or horizontal problems, and pointing out the differences between the kind of research and theoretical work required for solving complex environmental problems and that associated with pushing back the frontiers of knowledge in a discipline. It quoted Steinhart at length and called for additional permanent staff members

³³Dayton Carritt, "Institute Organization," elaboration on the draft proposal for the creation of an Institute for Man and His Environment. Submitted to the Academic Matters Council, 10 February 1971.

and a separate reward structure.

The rationale did not help convince the Academic Matters Council. They did not appreciate the fact that a Director for the Institute had been hired before the Institute had been formally approved. Niehter did it like being by-passed by the administration. Furthermore, the Council saw this as the work of one individual rather than a large group of interested faculty and it had serious misgivings about the organizational format proposed. The strongest opposition was voiced to the proposed umbrella function for research projects and the independent faculty.

The Academic Matters Council would not approve the proposal. Instead, the Council sent it out to the faculty and asked for responses, and then set up a review committee to study the matter further and report back.³⁴

Leigh Short, a member of the Council was made Chairman of the Review Committee and he insisted that Bernard Berger also be on it. The subcommittee had many

³⁴ Again in this case, the role of the Academic Matters Council in the University is an interesting one. It proves itself to be an open and flexible agent of change. Other groups would simply have rejected the proposal, but the Council always attempted to give the proposer--or the new idea--the benefit of the doubt. It was flexible enough to create an ad hoc review group, solicit faculty opinion, and employ other means to aid it in its deliberations. Professor Leigh Short--at this time chairman of the Review Committee and later chairman of the Academic Matters Council in an interview claimed that the Academic Matters Council constituted the major change force in the University in the last five years.

heated meetings with concerned faculty and Deans, and reviewed the responses from faculty throughout the campus.³⁵

The focus of the opposition was becoming clearer.³⁶

A. Faculty did not want an umbrella unit through which all grants must pass. They wanted the faculty to be able to choose to participate or not in the Institute without any jeopardy to individual grantsmanship.³⁷

³⁵The members of the subcommittee to review the proposal were: Leigh Short, Chairman; Bernard Berger, Ernest Buck, Sheldon Goldman, Richard Louttit, James Ludtke, Claude Penchina, Skip Schuckman.

³⁶Among those who voiced their opposition were: Ken Picha, the Dean of the School of Engineering; Warren Litsky, the head of the Department of Environmental Sciences in the College of Agriculture; Ervin Zube--that year on sabbatical but the year before chairman of the education subcommittee and the next Director of the Institute.

³⁷During these months (January, February, March 1971), the School of Engineering was putting together a large grant proposal that would involve a multidisciplinary study of energy usage. Their involvement of faculty from all over the campus and their refusal to work with or through the Institute for Man and His Environment shows how strong the opposition to the umbrella function of the Institute really was. Engineering's refusal in this case also infuriated Dave Carritt and hardened his position that it was necessary to mandate co-operation during the approval process.

B. Even in the environmental area faculty did not want the unit to be able to hire its own faculty and senior research staff independent of the departmental hiring process. Essentially departments wanted to maintain control over the reward system.

C. Faculty did not like Dave Carritt and they did not like Mortimer Appley and they did not think the reporting line for the Institute should be through the Graduate School.

D. They did not want the Institute to be able to create an educational program that they did not approve or that threatened their enrollments.

Despite all of this opposition, however, there were still a large number of people who were supportive of the idea of an Institute. The faculty who had worked hard the year before still wanted an Institute created. The subcommittee of the Academic Matters Council began to revise Carritt's proposal into something more generally acceptable.

In the midst of their work, the Provost decided to intervene and this intervention provided the most dramatic moment in the history of the Institute. On Friday, April 9th, Oswald Tippe cancelled a meeting of the subcommittee, called Mort Appley to his office, announced that he would not support the Institute, and asked Appley to withdraw his proposal from consideration before the Academic Matters and the Faculty Senate. Mort Appley refused to withdraw it and left. It happened that Carl Swanson, then a professor with a possible

position in the Botany Department, (Swanson had been approached a year before as a potential Director and refused, the Provost happened to be a Botanist), had dropped by that Friday afternoon to see the Provost. He was asked his opinions about the Institute. Swanson was very supportive of the concept of an Institute for Man and His Environment and implied that the existence of such a unit would make the University of Massachusetts a much more interesting place for him to consider.³⁸

The Provost apparently changed his mind again and did not further block the Institute.

Most of those interviewed felt that it was Carl Swanson who had turned the Provost around, others, including the Associate Provost, underplayed the importance of Swanson, but in any event, the Associate Provost arrived at the home of the chairman of the subcommittee the following evening and they spent Saturday evening revising the draft proposal. The revised proposal made participation in the Institute strictly voluntary on the part of the faculty; made any academic course or program

³⁸The Associate Provost and others remember Swanson as having been recruited as Associate Director at that time, Swanson remembers only vague mention of it and stated that in fact he was quite surprised--and somewhat perturbed--to find that he had been named Associate Director upon his arrival the following fall. He felt that he had not been recruited in connection with the Institute, but as a Professor of Botany.

subject to further faculty senate approval; and changed the reporting lines from the Graduate Dean to the Provost. They added two additional twists. The Institute would have an Advisory Board, and it would have only a two-year mandate. At that time it would be up for review.

Another subcommittee meeting was held on Monday and although members of the committee were angered at the intervention of the Provost, and at the fact that he almost summarily blocked the institute, they nevertheless liked the proposal as revised by Short and Gluckstern and recommended its approval by Academic Matters.

The proposal as forwarded by the Academic Matters Council to the Faculty Senate was brief and to the point. It mandated for two years an Institute, with a Director and an Advisory Board which would:

A. concentrate on the planning, development, and implementation of interdisciplinary education at both the undergraduate and graduate levels, and

B. develop a programmatic approach to interdisciplinary research and public service.³⁹

The Institute would not have a separate and distinct staff but would depend on University faculty.

³⁹"Special Report of the Academic Matters Committee," A. William Plumstead, Chairman, presented to the 174th Meeting of the Faculty Senate, April 15, 1971. (Senate Document 71-037).

Individual faculty members could choose to participate or not and their ability to pursue independent research grants was preserved. Courses and academic programs would require further approval, and the implication was that they would be few and far between. The reporting line was to the Provost rather than to the Graduate Dean. And there would be an opportunity to quash the Institute after two years if the faculty didn't like its activities. For all these reasons the Institute did not seem very threatening. It was approved by the Faculty Senate on April 15, 1971.

Dave Carritt and others felt that if anything this approved entity was even more vague than that recommended in April 1970. While he had wanted a formally constituted unit as a vehicle to insure faculty participation and enhance funding potential, this approved unit did neither. It had no control over the reward system--it could not hire, promote, or tenure faculty members and thus could not counteract the fundamental orientation toward research and education that was required by discipline-based departments. While almost all of those interviewed felt that the approval process and reward system were critical factors to the development of a new academic and organizational unit in a university, some felt that in the case of the Institute for Man and His Environment, these factors

had been inhibiting. Others who had originally had more limited aspirations for the Institute, and who had never seen it as a large, visible, independent organization, but rather as a facilitating vehicle for some multidisciplinary environmentally-related problem-solving activity, felt that while the reward system was inevitably negative, the approval process had been a positive factor.

Summary. With formal approval, the Institute for Man and His Environment could begin to engage in those activities for which it had been created--multidisciplinary research, education and action toward the solution of complex environmental problems. Thus it would serve as one vehicle through which the University of Massachusetts could assume the mission of social problem-solving.

The long struggle over the creation, however, and the resulting weakness as an organizational entity would make it extremely difficult for the Institute to actively involve a large number of faculty and achieve any measure of fulfillment of the mission of social problem-solving.

While a number of factors, including resources, leadership, external influence, reward system and approval process, had been important to the process of creating the Institute, the most important dynamic was a political one and lay in the moves for enhanced position power.

The Graduate Dean, the Deans of Engineering and Agriculture, and many departments and faculty interested in outside grants were all involved in the development of the Institute not only because the zeitgeist was there-- environmental problem-solving was an important, new activity for a university--but because becoming the leading force in such a department could enhance personal, departmental, or school reputations.

The opposing forces and competition, however, led to the creation of an entity that had very little independent power and support and that therefore had difficulty fulfilling its objectives.

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Universities are complex institutions which are continually evolving in tune with a changing society. It was pointed out in Chapter I that it is difficult to know definitively who or what determines missions for higher education. A few individuals and study commissions, however, have been the most influential over the past quarter century. Clark Kerr, David Riesman, The Truman Commission on Higher Education, The Newman Task Force, and the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education have all reaffirmed the traditional functions of higher education--teaching, research, and public service--but they have called for new missions as well. They have said that colleges and universities should concentrate on providing access, individualization, and social problem-solving. Although each of these themes has also evolved in meaning and emphasis over the years, by the late sixties access meant the provision of educational opportunity to those who had previously been excluded from higher education: the poor, minority group members, women, and older students. The mission of individualization meant a concern for the needs of individual students by allowing them to choose their own educational programs. Social problem-solving was a

refinement of the public service mission which placed special emphasis on the application of university resources to the solution of complex social problems.

Chapter II provided an overview of the history of the University of Massachusetts and focused specifically on the University's position with regard to the missions of access, individualization and social problem-solving. The University committed itself to each of these missions although there was considerable difference of opinion over the mission of social problem-solving. The means through which the University of Massachusetts proposed to assume these missions was the creation of specific units or programs which would take on the missions as specific objectives.

Chapters III, IV and V were descriptive case studies of three programs, the University Without Walls, the Bachelor's Degree With Individual Concentration, and the Institute For Man and His Environment, whose objects were respectively, access, individualization, and social problem-solving.

Chapter I discussed as well the influence of the organizational characteristics of universities on their ability to change and assume new missions. The review of the literature included a review of those factors--resources, leadership, external influence, and conducive

institutional environment including reward system, critical mass of support, approval process, and communications which change theorists have determined to be the most crucial to the process of change in universities. The case studies on the University and the three programs--UWW, BDIC, and the Institute for Man and His Environment--considered these factors within the more general description of program development.

This chapter will put the data from the review of the literature on organizational and change theory together with the data from the case studies at the University of Massachusetts. It will assess the characteristics and change strategies at the University of Massachusetts and analyze, using specific situations, the viability of the missions of access, individualization and social problem-solving. It will also analyze the change process by focusing on the factors of resources, leadership, external influence, reward system, critical mass of support, approval process, and communications in each of the program case studies. Additional change factors that emerged from the study of the development and implementation of the three programs will also be analyzed in their situational context. A comparison of change factors across programs will then be made in order to draw more general conclusions about the process of change at the University of Massachusetts.

Institutional Assumption of Missions
of Access, Individualization,
and Social Problem-Solving

Characteristics of Vital Institutions and the University of Massachusetts. Institutional characteristics help to determine the possibilities for change in order to assume new missions.

The University of Massachusetts was through the period of the sixties and early seventies what Lon Hefferlin would have termed a "vital" institution--able to face new social conditions, new types of students and new developments. Lon Hefferlin had spelled out ten characteristics of a vital institution. Table 4 lists these characteristics and the corresponding attributes of the University of Massachusetts.

The most important characteristics were new models, new personnel, major reorganization, and an avuncular environment. The University of Massachusetts, then, displayed most of Lon Hefferlin's characteristics of a vital institution. For the University of Massachusetts as a whole, the most important change factors were resources, new personnel, advocacy, and an overall environment conducive to changes. Thus it also corroborates those factors cited by Lon Hefferlin as important to the change

TABLE 4

CHARACTERISTICS OF "VITAL" INSTITUTIONS
AND THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Lon Hefferlin Characteristics	Attributes of the University of Massachusetts
1. A market is essential-- meaning both demand and reward for change.	1. Committee Reports called for a series of changes through- out the period and resources were available for these changes. ¹
2. New Models are needed for emulation.	2. The programs--U.W.W.-- B.D.I.C.--and IME--served as important models for emu- lation and did inspire systems- wide changes. ² Other programs were created as well at U.Mass.: CCEBS, Residential Colleges, Project 10, Institute for Governmental Services, etc.
3. Ideas need circulation-- communication should be en- couraged by workshops, seminars, meetings, etc.	3. Repeated meetings were held to discuss issues of missions and objectives for the University and to bring to- gether faculty, students and administrators from throughout the campus. Long Range Plan- ning Committees, student- initiated SWAP conferences, committees for improvement of teaching, etc. met often throughout the period.
4. A number of "marginal" members are helpful.	4. Marginal members in large numbers were not found at the University of Massa- chusetts.

TABLE 4 (Continued)

Lon Hefferlin Characteristics	Attributes of the University of Massachusetts
5. For major reorganization, new members seem necessary.	5. Spectacular growth during the period allowed for many new faculty and administrators to be brought to the campus. ³
6. The right people must be retained.	6. Large numbers of new and young faculty members allowed for high rates of retention.
7. Initiative is decentralized--individuals throughout the institution have a sense of power.	7. At U.Mass., administrators, faculty, and students all felt that they had some power, and that they could make things happen. This was most obvious in the allocation of resources, in the Academic Matters Council and in the student-run SWAP conferences.
8. Patriarchy is avoided. Patriarchy is power concentrated in the hands of one individual, usually determined by seniority.	8. Although leadership was strong at U.Mass. it was discontinuous throughout the period. Power was distributed among large numbers of groups and individuals. ⁴
9. Enforced collegial consensus is avoided.	9. It was possible at U. Mass. to initiate programs on a pilot and experimental basis without total consensus among the faculty. This allowed for more rapid and diverse responses.

TABLE 4 (Continued)

Lon Hefferlin Characteristics	Attributes of the University of Massachusetts
-------------------------------	--

10. The institution is avuncular. A large number of people help determine policy--status is assigned according to expertise.

10. At U.Mass. rapid organizational and governance changes and new positions allowed for an avuncular institution.

¹See Chapter I for recommendations of major planning committees with respect to access, individualization and social problem-solving.

²U.W.W. caused changes in policy and procedures in admissions, records, and transcripts, financial aid, housing and fee structures. It also caused a series of academic changes in core and major requirements, examinations and grading, and in credit policies. Most significantly it established the principle and practice of awarding credit for prior learning. B.D.I.C. caused academic reforms in a large number of departments and spun-off (by 1974) five separate degree programs. The Institute for Man and His Environment established models of contractual agreements with state agencies that were emulated throughout the University.

³See Chapter I for growth statistics in enrollment, faculty and state appropriations.

⁴See Chapter I for leadership.

process--extrainstitutional influence, resources, leadership or advocacy, and conducive institutional environment.

Change Strategies and the University of Massachusetts.

Jack Lindquist had considered the conducive institutional characteristics and change factors established by Lon Hefferlin and others and compiled a list of strategies that would be appropriate for universities interested in supporting change efforts. Table 5 compares his change strategies to those utilized at the University of Massachusetts. There is obviously considerable overlap between the Lindquist strategies and the Lon Hefferlin characteristics. While the University of Massachusetts utilized most of the strategies suggested by Lindquist, those that were the most directly effective in the assumption of the missions of access, individualization and social problem-solving were new personnel, alternative learning experiences, an educational development office (at the University the office of the Associate Provost for Special Programs), major self-studies, and joining consortia, particularly the Union of Experimenting Colleges and Universities.

The Special Unit Change Strategy of the University of Massachusetts. Although the University of Massachusetts displayed most of the characteristics of a "vital" in-

TABLE 5

CHANGE STRATEGIES AND THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Lindquist Strategies
for Change

University of Massachusetts

1. Workshops and
retreats

1. A variety of workshops and conferences were held at the University throughout these years. Many were sponsored by Long-Range Planning Committees and most included students.

2. Faculty Seminars
on teaching and
learning

2. A group of faculty at the University established the Committee on Undergraduate Education which met often during this period.

3. New faculty
orientation or in-
service training

3. While U.Mass. did not have extensive orientation for new faculty, it did foster communication among them and across disciplines.

4. Student Orienta-
tion to Learning
Options and Problem-
Solving

4. Freshman Orientation programs were begun during these years, as well as comprehensive advising systems. Students were informed of program options.

5. Hire new per-
sonnel and recruit
new kinds of
students

5. Faculty and staff grew rapidly and the explicit choice of the Chancellor was to go after young faculty members. A diverse student body was beginning to be recruited.

6. Introduce an
alternative learning
experience.

6. The University explicitly chose to create a number of alternative program options.

7. Restructure
governance

7. Several governance models were proposed over the years and practices were considerably altered.

TABLE 5 (Continued)

Lindquist Strategies
for Change

University of Massachusetts

- | | |
|---|---|
| 8. Build into the institution an Educational Development Office and/or Research and Planning Committee. | 8. The University established a new top-level administrative position with a respectable budget for new program development. |
| 9. Conduct a major self-study | 9. U.Mass conducted two major self-studies in a three year period. |
| 10. Bring in experts | 10. Long Range Planning Committees and other planning groups brought in consultants and knowledgeable people from other universities. |
| 11. Visit other campuses | 11. Fiscal autonomy allowed some travel support for faculty and staff. |
| 12. Utilize social gatherings | 12. The author did not find data on social gatherings but they were doubtless used. |
| 13. Utilize administrative perogatives | 13. U.Mass enjoyed a high level of administrative autonomy. Several new programs were started by administrative fiat. |
| 14. Develop a change agent team | 14. Although U.Mass did not develop an explicit change agent team until 1973, a variety of ad hoc groups acted as such during the late sixties and early seventies. |
| 15. Join a consortium | 15. U.Mass. belonged to several associations--Association of Land Grant Universities, Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities, and Five College Incorporated, to name only a few. |

stitution as suggested by Lon Hefferlin, and employed change strategies suggested by Lindquist. Although reports and other documents over the period at the University of Massachusetts recommended a major reorientation of the University which would give more attention to a more diverse undergraduate student body and encourage greater public service and problem-solving activities, it is also true that a) the student body of the University continued to be largely white, middle class and between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two; b) the curriculum was largely prescribed; and c) the level of public service and social problem-solving activities was low. The University of Massachusetts found it extremely difficult to effect change throughout the organization.

In this respect, the University corroborates the findings of those organization and change theorists who describe organizational inabilities to change. Havelock had synthesized the literature on organizations and defined an organization as a group of individuals with a common task whose strongest impulses are toward routinization of activity, maintenance of status quo, and preservation of existing institutional members. He found that most structures and roles in an organization act as inhibitors of change.

The inability to effect system-wide change was

counterbalanced in the University of Massachusetts through the creation of specific program units which allowed the University to be responsive to missions of access, individualization and social problem-solving. In effect, the creation of UWW, BDIC and the Institute for Man and His Environment operated as a strategy to effect change in the total system, for these programs, once created, began to pressure for a number of more system-wide changes.

Matthew Miles, Everett Rogers, Lon Hefferlin and Jack Lindquist had all recommended the separate unit strategy for change. They felt that it would be more possible to establish such units than effect system-wide change because such units would not be as threatening to institutional members. They felt that such units serve as models for emulation within the system and help encourage innovativeness and a conducive environment for change. Such units, too, they recognized might bring pressure for further changes. The University of Massachusetts case supports their theory concerning separate units as change strategies.

Generally, the method used to establish these units is similar to that described by Jack Lindquist in the "Political Linkage Model." A generalized sense that the University of Massachusetts ought to assume the missions of access, individualization and social problem-solving

developed over time into planning committees and groups each of which recommended the establishment of a special program. Plans were debated and proposals prepared and submitted to the formal authorities for approval. In all cases the process could be termed a political one for it involved a dynamic interaction between individuals and interest groups and between forms and function.

Special Programs for Access, Individualization, and Social Problem-Solving--An Assessment of the Viability of These Missions at the University of Massachusetts. The mission of access was assumed by the University of Massachusetts chiefly through the creation of the University Without Walls Program.

It was relatively simple to initiate the University Without Walls Program for several reasons:

A. It allowed the University to start with a small number of students and learn from them what adaptations would be necessary in the larger system. Not having to go for total systems change made the provision of access much more possible.

B. As an option it required only a small number of faculty, staff and students to support it. It did not require agreement and approval of the total faculty and student body. Such agreement is generally impossible to achieve in a large institution.

C. While the provision of real access in terms of education, attitudes, and procedures required of the institution and its faculty and staff a different conception of clientele and content, it still did not alter the basic teaching and research functions of the University. This consonance of function made it easy to accept and implement the mission of access.

The University Without Walls program was successfully implemented at the University of Massachusetts, and it began immediately to exert positive pressures toward more pervasive changes in the University. The Admissions Office began slowly to recruit more diverse students, policies and procedures were devised to deal with them, and faculty began to become accustomed to working in a different instructional mode. In part due to the changes brought about by the University Without Walls Program, the mission of access became feasible for the University as a whole. It would not be feasible for all students however, because the costs would be prohibitive.

The University of Massachusetts is similar to other public, land-grant universities in size, organization, and basic philosophy. It would, therefore, be possible to assume that the mission of providing educational access would be appropriate for other land-grant institutions as well.

The creation of a special program such as the

University Without Walls as a mechanism for providing access could be a useful strategy for other institutions as well, although this study did not generate enough comparative data to assert this as a fact.

The mission of individualization was assumed by the University of Massachusetts in part through the creation of the BDIC program.

Although it was a lengthy process, BDIC was not a difficult program to implement. This was true for a number of reasons.

A. Even more strikingly than in the case of the University Without Walls Program, BDIC and the philosophy of individualization were not a departure from the basic functions of the University. Teaching was central to the University mission and, therefore, the fundamentals of the educational programs suggested by BDIC was something that would have been difficult not to accept. Individualization was a new mission in terms of actual practice because of the "academic revolution," but it was not a new role for faculty members.

B. BDIC was a curricular reform but it did not alter the basic curricular structure of the University. Because it did not alter the offerings of departments and was seen as an option only for a relatively small number of students, it was much more acceptable. BDIC allowed the University to be responsive to some undergraduate

students' educational needs without overhauling the entire educational program.

C. BDIC, like UWW, did not require total acceptance by all faculty members and students. If fulfillment of the mission of individualization had required curricular revision with the total agreement by all faculty in the University, it would never have been approved. BDIC asked that only those faculty who were willing participate. This made it acceptable to a much larger number than those who actually did participate.

BDIC began immediately to exert pressures for greater attention to student interests throughout the University. Departments began to offer more student-centered majors, new major programs were approved, and faculty members seemed more willing to work with students on a one-to-one basis. In a sense, therefore, it could be argued that the BDIC program proved the viability of the "new" mission of individualization for the University of Massachusetts.

In another sense however, it did not. While individualization is possible within the context of an optimal and small program like BDIC, it could be argued that it would not be feasible for the totality of the student body. The cost would simply be too high for individual students or the public taxpayer to bear. In a

very real sense, individually designed programs and one-to-one faculty/student relationships are only possible because of the mass production aspects of much of the rest of undergraduate education. At the University of Massachusetts only a small number of students in the total undergraduate enrollment could be handled this way.

The BDIC program was a first of its kind and was not patterned after a program at another college or university. Nevertheless, a number of educational reform programs were being initiated throughout the country and student-centered academic programs were to be established at a large number of institutions within a very few years after 1968-69. It is possible to assume from these reform activities that the mission of more individualized undergraduate education was a viable one for other universities as well as the University of Massachusetts. Other public, land grant universities which depend on state funds, however, would no doubt experience the same difficulty as the University of Massachusetts in making individualized programs available to the entire student body.

The University of Massachusetts paid lip service to the notion of social problem-solving over the two decades, but it is not possible to say that it clearly or unambiguously assumed this mission.

While the number and range of service activities

increased faster than the growth rate would imply during the sixties and early seventies, it was also true that by the end of that period, the University was still struggling to define "appropriate public service." The lack of a clear definition hampered its effectiveness.

The University attempted to respond to the mission through the creation of an Institute for Man and His Environment. The difficulties encountered by the Institute during its development period highlight the difficulties of implementation of the public service mission.

A. The creation of a new unit which would have potentially its own staff and academic program threatened existing units in a way that UWW and BDIC had not done. Strong opposition was voiced--not against the concept, but against the organizational plans--by most of the schools and colleges in the University. The Institute required a larger scale change effort than had BDIC or UWW.

B. The Institute for Man and His Environment brought sharply into focus issues of power and control. Who decides academic programs? Who hires faculty and professional personnel and to whom are they accountable? Who has the power and the exclusive authority to go after research grants? All of these questions were necessarily raised during the planning for the Institute, and since there was no agreement and no mechanism for reaching

agreement, it was very difficult for the Institute to begin its work.

C. The Institute for Man and His Environment required developmental as well as program money and by the late sixties neither the federal nor the state governments were eager to grant large sums for the creation of a vehicle or organization to focus on environmental problems. They wanted more immediate and visible impact for their dollars. Reallocation of resources within the University to cover the start up costs of the Institute was severely opposed by existing units.

D. Social problem-solving in the environmental area often required different behavior of faculty members-- it required attention to detail, task orientation and a willingness to be one piece of a large effort and take directions. Faculty accustomed to abstraction and the right of pursuing their own interests found public service projects antithetical to their own scholarly interests as well as tedious and boring.

E. The Institute planners were unable to agree on a precise focus for institute activities. This was due at least in part to the fact that clear service priorities had not been established for the University as a whole. The resources were clearly not adequate for all problems, but an inability to choose among several possible activities led to a diffusion of energies and lessened impact.

The same difficulties experienced with the creation of the Institute for Man and His Environment and the assumption of the mission of social problem-solving would probably be experienced in other public universities. Research on the large number of problem-focused research institutes that were created in colleges and universities prior and subsequent to that at the University of Massachusetts shows for the most part a history of failure.¹

It would seem, therefore, that the mission of public service and the University's responsibility in applying its knowledge production and educational resources toward the solution of social problems is the least viable mission at the present time. There is still considerable disagreement--within and without the academy--about the

¹The most negative assessment of research institutes is found in Harold Orlans, The Nonprofit Research Institute. Its Origin, Operation, Problems, and Prospects. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1972). Orlans concluded that they had been overevaluated as organizational vehicles for focusing on complex problems. Paul Dressel, Craig Johnson, and Philip Marcus, in "The Proliferating Institutes," Change. Vol. 1, No. 4 (July-August 1969), also gave a negative assessment of research institutes as organizational structures. Ikenberry, however, felt that they held out considerable promise as new organizational structures which could help the university apply its resources to current social problems. (See Chapter 1.)

responsibility of the University to society. Taxpayers, federal, state and local governments: students and some faculty, all demand that the University join the "real world" and help work on its problems. Other faculty claim that the University is the only institution in society engaged in basic research that produces knowledge for its own sake and for the long run benefit of society, and that to divert to the short run would be a critical mistake.

These positions, however, could be better represented as poles along a continuum, and there is no question that for many people public service is assumed to be the responsibility of the public university.

Even when the concepts of public service and the mission of social problem-solving are generally accepted in public universities, however, the mechanics of follow-through are difficult for universities because of the major changes in organization, attitude and behavior that are required. Social problem-solving, therefore, will be a difficult mission for public universities to assume at this time.

Conclusions Concerning Viability of Missions. From the experience with BDIC, UWW, and IME at the University of Massachusetts, it would seem that those missions are most viable which are closest to those functions already accepted by the faculty and embedded within the organizational structure--teaching and research. While public universities

in the 1970's have accepted the missions of providing equal educational access and public service, current organizational patterns, attitudes and orientations make these objectives difficult to achieve. Continuing change efforts will be required.

From the case study on BDIC it was clear that the mission of responsiveness to individual students is a mission that is easy to accept and put into practice, provided it is for a small number of students. The University Without Walls case showed that a student body of widely diverse backgrounds, ages, and interests requires the faculty and service units of the University to rethink some of their attitudes and behaviors. A different student clientele in response to the mission of access does not imply a drastic departure, however, from the traditional university function of teaching. The mission of access, therefore, is feasible for universities at this time. The case of the Institute for Man and His Environment showed that public service--especially in the area of utilizing university resources to solve complex and difficult social problems--requires a much greater departure from the normal behaviors and organizational patterns of the university. It is at this time a mission difficult to achieve.

The Process of Change at the
University of Massachusetts

Factors in the Process of Change. Lon Hefferlin and Jack Lindquist synthesized the research and theory on the change process in organizations and conducted research on change in universities. Lon Hefferlin found that the most important factors for change in educational institutions were: resources, leadership, outside influences, support from campus groups, and institution-specific characteristics including reward systems, approval process, and communications. These factors, according to Lon Hefferlin, were found in various combinations depending upon specific institutional situations.

This study analyzes the Lon Hefferlin factors for each of three programs at the University of Massachusetts: The University Without Walls, The Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration, and the Institute for Man and His Environment. It analyzes, as well, additional factors that were important to the creation of each of the programs taken as case studies.

Each person interviewed in the study was asked in an initial open-ended question to name those factors which were important to the planning and implementation process of the program with which they had been associated. They were also asked to assess the importance to the program

of each Lon Hefferlin change factor.

It is important to note that factors are in a sense generalized concepts and that their meaning for a specific situation--e.g., the creation of the Institute for Man and His Environment--can vary considerably over time and from individual to individual. It is also important to remember that each change factor may be seen as either supporting or hindering (positive or negative) as well as more important and less important for specific situation.. For example, one respondent considered leadership a critical factor to the implementation of the Institute for Man and His Environment, but considered the actual leadership to have been a hindrance to its development; another respondent, also convinced that leadership had been crucial, felt that the Institute's leadership had been quite effective.

For each program, the combined responses of those interviewed provide sufficient data for an analysis of the change factors in that specific situation. Although the method of collecting data made it difficult to prioritize among factors, the author did so from the general sense of the interviews.

Following the analysis of the factors for each program, a comparison across programs is made. Such a comparison provides for a more generalized view of the change process at the University of Massachusetts and

allows for a validation of the Hefferlin change factors.

The University Without Walls. Those interviewed concerning the University Without Walls program showed remarkable agreement about those factors which had been important to the program, and considerable agreement about whether those factors had been supporting or hindering to the program. They also tended to define their terms similarly which may have been caused by the fact that many of them were either students or faculty studying issues of higher education. Table 6 summarizes their responses.

The following emphases were placed during the interviews on those factors listed in Table 6.

I. Resources.

Twelve of the thirteen respondents considered resources as a crucial factor to the program. They all mentioned that the small grant received from the Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities had allowed them to support the planning period and the pilot program, and most were convinced that a) the University would never have come up with that much money and b) that that much was crucial to the program. The grant was symbolically important as well for it signalled a commitment to a product or end-result of planning efforts and this helped to keep morale and energy levels high. It allowed them a year and a half in which to build a case for university resources.

TABLE 6
CHANGE FACTORS IN THE UNIVERSITY WITHOUT WALLS PROGRAM

Lon Hefferlin Factors	# who cited factor critically impor- tant to program	# who cited factor important but not critical to program	# who cited factor as not important to program or who did not mention factor
TOTAL NUMBER INTERVIEWED - 13	12		1
I Resources			
II Leadership	13		
III Outside Influence	8		5
IV Environmental Factors: Reward System	6	5	2
Approval Process	10	1	2
Communications	6	1	6
V Small Yet Critical # of Active Supporters	11	1	1
VI Larger Support Base Critical Mass	10	1	1
Other Factors Mentioned:			
1. Influence of School of Education	10		3
2. Pilot Program Strategy	8		5
3. Political Factor	7		6
4. Timing--Strategy for the Process	7		6

II. Leadership

All thirteen respondents agreed that leadership was a critical factor, and all agreed that Tom Clark had occupied the leadership position. There was some disagreement, however, over the effectiveness of Tom Clark's leadership and over the appropriate style of leadership for a program that was attempting a collaborative non-hierarchical model. Tom Clark saw his role as two-fold: serving as the spokesman for the program to faculty, administration and other outside groups in a role analogous to a program director or dean, and acting as a facilitator for the collaborative planning. Some felt that Clark had been effective as program spokesman, others that he had not been, because he failed to attract faculty and caused problems throughout the campus. Most agreed that the collaborative planning effort had been educational for those involved, but that it had been confusing and cumbersome, and that Tom Clark's administrative deficiencies and inability to make decisions only made it more so. This perception was held by some who had been part of the planning effort and some who had not. Others felt that Clark had been very effective considering the difficulties of implementing a program that required as many changes as did the University Without Walls.

III. Outside Influence

Eight respondents felt that UWW had been influenced in many ways from outside the University of Massachusetts. The chief source was the Union for Experimenting Colleges

and Universities and the National University Without Walls Program. Most felt that this had been a positive influence--it had set the broad parameters for the program but allowed UWW in Amherst to plan from the needs of the total situation; it provided resources, and it helped keep the momentum of the program high. A more general yet critical outside influence was the general controversy over higher education--the role of universities in society and the functioning of colleges and universities. Most UWW planners were part of the educational reform movements, and its perspectives influenced UWW planning.

IV. Environmental Factors:

Reward System. There was some disagreement over the importance of the reward system to UWW. Six felt that it was an important hindering factor and five felt that it had not been very important. The size of the program was an important variable here--for a small program as UWW was at first, the reward system was not necessarily vital but most would agree that it became more of an issue as the program expanded. Many argued as well that the most difficult thing was locating faculty members with the ability to work in new instructional modes with non-traditional students, and that the University of Massachusetts had shown a willingness to reward those who had become involved.

Approval Process. Ten of those interviewed felt that the approval process had been critical to UWW. They saw essentially two stages to that process: the first

stage was getting administrative approval to run a pilot year, and the second stage was obtaining formal Faculty Senate approval for the program. The first stage was seen as positive in that the administration allowed them to admit the non-traditional student group, and the second stage for most was positive in that the Faculty Senate approved a flexible educational program. UWW planners had been aware of the importance of the approval process and had worked out a comprehensive strategy to get that approval.

Communications. Six persons felt that communications had been important to UWW while six failed to mention it. Those who saw communications vehicles as important stressed the fact that UWW had had to create its own communication links to prospective students because of the inappropriateness of traditional admission office liaisons.² UWW planners also stressed that they had had to help build new communication routes to faculty, and from students to faculty.

V. Small Yet Critical Number of Active Supporters

The word most often used during interviews was "commitment," and eleven respondents felt that by far the most

²Little was actually done to advertise the program, yet the applicant pool was consistently large. This testifies to the failures of universities to provide adequate educational opportunity and the need for the mission of access.

important factor to the process of UWW effort had been a group of energetic and committed people--many of them volunteers--who believed in the program and wanted to see it work.

VI. Larger Support Base

Ten of those interviewed felt that a support base that included many faculty members and administrators had been very important to the UWW. Faculty support was seen as crucial to the approval process but also as fundamental to the program, for the willingness of the faculty to serve as sponsors and the interactions between sponsors and students were fundamental to the program. Administrative support was seen as crucial in terms of resources.

Other Factors

1. Influence of School of Education.

Ten of those interviewed felt that the School of Education had been critical to the development of the UWW program, eight felt that it had been a positive factor, and two that it had been a negative one.³ Those who talked of it in a positive sense felt that the ideas, energy, innovativeness, and values of the faculty and students in the School of Education had provided an essential background

³It is interesting to note that the two people who felt that it had been critical in a negative sense were both from outside the School of Education and both members of the Academic Matters Council.

for the planners of UWW. The commitment to institutional change and educational experimentation had been fostered in the School of Education.

2. Strategy of the Pilot Program.

Many of those interviewed felt UWW had gotten Faculty Senate approval and University resources in the spring of 1971 as the result of a critical strategic move--the small pilot project during the 1970-71 year that had been supported out of planning grant funds. On a smaller scale this is the same strategy as that employed by the University of Massachusetts in the assumption of new missions. It tests out an idea in a real situation, allows planners to learn from it, and begins to put pressure for change on these units. UWW was able to learn from the students in the pilot year what kind of educational program and support services were needed. It also gave people a very important dose of reality--they knew they were not engaged in a theoretical or abstract process.

3. Political Factor

Seven of those interviewed felt one of the most important supporting factors of the University Without Walls program was the general political climate within the University and the state. It would have been difficult, this group argued, for the University to have disapproved of a program designed to serve students who had previously not had access to higher education. It would have been

particularly hard for the public University in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to do this.

4. Timing

Seven of those interviewed spoke to the crucial factor of timing. The planning process was consistently informed by the fact that everyone was trying to get a pilot program implemented by the first fall, and a larger and formally approved one off the ground by the second. The planners had a strategy and time-line for achieving this goal mapped out, and were very sensitive to suggesting the right idea, in the right place, and at the right time.

Prioritization of Factors. From the sense of the interviews, it is possible to list the factors important to the implementation of UWW in the following priority order:

1. Small yet critical mass of committed supporters
2. Resources
3. Pilot Program Strategy
4. Leadership
5. Influence of School of Education
6. Outside Influence
7. Approval Process
8. Larger Support Base of Faculty and Administrators
9. Political Climate in State
10. Reward System
11. Timing

Bachelor's Degree With Individual Concentration.

The Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration was planned over a two year period, but a surprisingly small number of people were involved in that planning. The author was able to interview only nine people connected with the program, and some of these interviews were brief. There was not generally a high level of consensus concerning the importance of various change factors. Table 7 lists those factors.

I. Resources

There was substantial disagreement about the importance of resources to the development of the program. Four responded that they were critically important, three that they were important but not critical, one that they were not at all important, and one failed to mention them. The disagreement may have come in part from confusion over terms--most people took resources to mean money or released faculty time for coordination, and felt that since the program had very little of either, resources could not have been a major factor. Others defined resources to include faculty sponsor volunteer time, and saw that time as critical to the program. They agree, however, that since the faculty commitment was voluntary, resources could not be seen as a hindering factor. Overall, then, resources were seen as a supportive factor.

TABLE 7
CHANGE FACTORS IN THE BACHELOR'S DEGREE WITH INDIVIDUAL CONCENTRATION PROGRAM

Lon Hefferlin Factors	# who cited factor critically impor- tant to program	# who cited factor important but not critical to program	# who cited fac- tor as not im- portant or who did not mention factor
TOTAL NUMBER INTERVIEWED - 9	4	3	2
I Resources			2
II Leadership	7		
III Outside Influence			9
IV Environmental Factors: Reward System	3	1	5
Approval Process	7		2
Communications		3	6
V Small Yet Critical # of Active Supporters Triumvirate	6		3
VI Larger Support Base	8		1
Other Factors Mentioned:			1
1. Academic Integrity	8		1
2. Political Climate	8		2
3. Pilot Strategy	7		3
4. School of Education	6		
5. Clear Objective--Minimal Departure from Existing Routine	6		3

II. Leadership

Seven of those interviewed felt that leadership had been a critically important factor, and all agreed that Arthur Kinney's leadership style had been quite effective. Most mentioned the fact that he was respected by both faculty and students as having been especially important in attracting students and faculty sponsors to the program.

III. Outside Influence

All nine of those interviewed were aware that BDIC was the first of its kind in the country, and said that it had developed directly in response to perceived needs of students on the Amherst campus. The planning group had done its homework concerning academic reform efforts in other colleges and universities, and many felt that the program was clearly responding to something of a national movement calling for relevance in the curriculum and individualization, but the most important influence had come from the campus. Arthur Kinney disagreed:

Relevance doesn't mean anything unless it is defined in an individual situation
BDIC was really an attempt to provide what was individually relevant to students not in response to a general mood that called for relevance.⁴

⁴ Interview, Arthur Kinney concerning Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration Program.

Nevertheless, the BDIC case did not follow the conclusions of change theorists that the most important influences on the change process come from outside the institutions of higher education.⁵

IV. Environmental Factors:

Reward System. There was disagreement about how important the reward system was to the development of BDIC. Five felt that it had not been particularly important because: a) the program was small, b) faculty members could choose not to be part of it, c) those faculty who did get involved were people who did not jeopardize their own career by working in BDIC, and d) faculty tended to become involved in the program because they were interested in the students proposed program not because they expected rewards. Three of those interviewed did, however, feel that it was a very important and hindering factor. As one respondent put it, "more faculty would have become involved,

⁵This issue is not that clear, however. Change theorists are referring to more broadly-based change efforts in institutions of higher education, and I would agree with them that at that level the most important influences have been external to institutions, and have been government funding policies, state legislatures, etc. This may be an instance where it is not appropriate to draw connections between change theory for institutions and change factors for particular programs.

but the departments and their own mind-sets made faculty think of research and publishing first." (Moss, Interview.)

Approval Process. Seven of those interviewed felt that the approval process had been an important and positive factor in the development of BDIC. They spoke of the importance of the close relationship between the program proposers and the Academic Matters Council as having been very important. As in the case of UWW there were really two steps to the process, one involving approval for a pilot year, and another more formal process involving the Faculty Senate and Board of Trustees for permanent approval of the program.

Communications. Only three people felt that communications were important to the program, and six either did not mention them or did not think they were important. The campus communications vehicles to faculty and students were obviously considered adequate.

V. Small Group of Active Supporters

Six of those interviewed felt that the work and dedication of a very small group of people over the two year planning period and the pilot program had been very important and positive factors. The academic respectability of this group was so often mentioned that it has been listed as a separate factor.

VI. Large Support Base

Those who planned the BDIC program felt that widespread faculty and student support would be crucial to its success because so much of the program depended on faculty willingness to spend time. They, therefore, started from a small group and gradually expanded in size to get that broad support. This strategy obviously worked, and eight of those interviewed felt that a large group of faculty supporters who were respected by other faculty members had been critical to the success of the program.

Other Factors

1. Academic Integrity

Eight of those interviewed felt that the single most important factor to the BDIC program had been the academic integrity and respectability of those faculty members who had planned the program, those who served on the first supervisory committee, and the first group of approximately fifty faculty sponsors. Because of this trust and respect, the Academic Matters Council and Faculty Senate were much more willing to approve the program and allow the supervisory committee to encourage experimental student programs. According to one person interviewed:

What was unique about BDIC was that it allowed faculty to feel that they were responsive to

student needs with a program that also had high academic quality--a nice combination.⁶ (Woodbury - Interview).

This factor corroborates Warren Bennis' admonitions concerning change in a university setting.

. . . guard against the Crazies; build support among like-minded people and don't allow those who are opposed to change to appropriate such basic issues as academic standards.⁷

2. Political Climate

Eight of those interviewed felt that the sensitivities to the political climate of the planners of BDIC had allowed the program to be approved and implemented. BDIC planners had been very careful to start small and not threaten enrollments of any department or school. They had also been careful in reviewing student academic programs not to undermine or run around departmental curricular offerings or requirements. This sensitivity perhaps made BDIC more viable as a program than other more radical or visible student-centered programs.

3. Pilot Strategy

The planners of the BDIC program felt that the best way to get widespread support was to get a small pilot up and running. This proved to be an effective strategy

⁶Interview with Robert Woodbury concerning Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration.

⁷Bennis, The Learning Ivory Tower, Ibid., p.

for it signalled to students that something was possible and attracted respected faculty members. During the pilot phase, the academic components of the program evolved to become something more than a mere rearrangement of courses. Seven of those interviewed spoke to the effectiveness of the pilot strategy. As one of those interviewed put it,

Anything going has a bias for reapproval because it has begun normally to build its own constituency . . . on the other hand, a good strategy to get initial approval is to sell it as a pilot.⁸

This pilot strategy was referred to often in the literature on change theory especially by Miles, Lon Hefferlin, and Everett Rogers.

4. School of Education

Six of those interviewed paid particular attention to the positive effect the School of Education was having on the University at this time through its series of reforms and debates on educational issues. Most were aware that the concept of student-centered learning and student designed programs of study had been part of the School of Education package and drew a direct connection between this and the BDIC program.

⁸Interview with Robert Woodbury

5. Clear Objective--Minimal Departure

Six of those interviewed felt that one of the most crucial factors had been the fact that the goals and objectives of BDIC had been clear, simple, and shared by all of those involved with it. They also spoke to the fact that BDIC in fact involved only a minimal departure from existing attitudes and behaviors. This made its adoption very simple. Social scientists have generally agreed that what is difficult about changing organizations is changing the behaviors and attitudes of organizational members, and therefore that changes involving only minimal departures are the easiest to achieve.

Prioritization of Factors. While it is extremely difficult to prioritize the factors important to the development and implementation of BDIC, the following represents the author's attempt to do so:

1. Academic Integrity
2. Large Support Base
3. Political Climate
4. Leadership
5. Pilot Strategy
6. Small Group of Active Supporters
7. Clear Objective - Minimal Departure
8. Approval Process
9. School of Education

10. Resources
11. Reward System
12. Communications
13. Outside Influence

Institute for Man and His Environment. The responses on the Institute for Man and His Environment must be assessed quite carefully. In the cases of the University Without Walls and The Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration, there was general agreement that the programs had been successful, and the factors--whether supporting or hindering--were discussed with that assumption in mind. In the case of the Institute for Man and His Environment, there was no such agreement. Many of those interviewed felt that the Institute had been successfully implemented, and many others felt that it had been a failure. They tended, therefore, to assess change factors more as positive and negative causal factors than as supportive or hindering factors in program development. Table 8 lists those factors.

I. Resources

All of those interviewed felt that resources had been critical, and all felt that resources had been critical as a motivational factor--an Institute to focus on environmental problems was planned because many people were convinced that there were funding possibilities in the

TABLE 8
CHANGE FACTORS IN THE INSTITUTE FOR MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT

Lon Hefferlin Factors	TOTAL NUMBER INTERVIEWED - 13		# who cited factor as not important or who did not mention factor	
	# who cited factor as critically important to program	# who cited factor as important but not critical to program	# who cited factor as not important or who did not mention factor	
I Resources	13			
II Leadership	12		1	
III Outside Influence	11	1	1	
IV Environmental Factors: Reward System	12	1		
Approval Process	10	2	1	
Communications		7	6	
V Small Yet Critical # of Active Supporters	8	2	3	
VI Larger Support Bases Critical Mass	7	5	1	
Other Factors:				
1. Lack of Clearly-Defined Priorities at U.Mass.	12		1	
Lack of clear focus for Institute				
2. Political Factor Attempts to Improve Power Base Interplay of Personalities Institutional Competitiveness Reporting Lines	11		2	
3. Administrative Support	10	3		
4. Timing	6	5	2	

environmental area that year. The Institute was considered a failure by many because of its failure to attract grants.

II. Leadership

Nearly all of those interviewed agreed that leadership had been important. Over the two year period three people were cited in leadership roles--Berger, Appley and Carritt, and most felt that Berger had been effective while Appley and Carritt had not. Many had been opposed to Appley's leadership because they saw his moves as power plays; others felt that Carritt should have been more collaborative on campus and a more successful fund raiser.

III. Outside Influence

There were two major influences on the University at that time to create something in the environmental area. One was the national concern for the environment which was picked up with a vehemence by student groups; the other was a trend toward the creation of independent research institutes, especially among land-grant universities. It would have been difficult for the University of Massachusetts to have justified not becoming involved, although it was obviously difficult to spell out the specifics of that involvement. Eleven of those interviewed felt that these two outside influences were critical, and many felt that they were solely responsible because there had been little or no organic development of interdisciplinary activity on the campus.

IV. Environmental Factors:

Reward System. Twelve of those interviewed felt the reward system was the primary impediment to a strong and viable institute. Interdisciplinary activity and task orientation toward problems was not rewarded by departments, and they had control over such things as tenure or promotion. Discussions on the reward system had been lengthy during the planning, and a few felt that the Institute had failed because of its inability to counter the existing system with its own independently supported positions.

Approval Process. Among the ten respondents who felt that the approval process had been very important to the Institute, half felt that it had been positive and half felt that it had been negative. The positive group talked about the enabling effects of a faculty senate mandate and the fact that the process had encouraged the proposers to clarify the crucial issues. The negative group felt that the Institute had emerged from that process in such a watered down form as to be nonviable, and therefore felt that the process had given power and control to all the Institute's opponents.

Communications. Communications was not considered particularly important by those interviewed. They felt that enough information had spread about the Institute and its plans so that anyone who wanted to become involved had that option.

V. Small Yet Critical Group of Supporters

Eight of those interviewed felt that the Institute had been implemented as a result of the volunteer efforts of a small but consistent group of people--primarily the Steering Committee members. Others argued that more crucial had been one or two individuals in power positions especially Mort Appley. In the case of the Institute, both had probably been equally important, and the variousness of the responses probably depended on whether or not the person interviewed had been part of the Steering Committee.

VI. Larger Support Base

On this question there was considerable difference of opinion on whether there had been a critical mass of support and how many people determined critical mass. Most of those interviewed agreed that there had been few students who stayed involved throughout the process and that student support had not been critical. In terms of faculty, five felt that a large number of faculty wanted an Institute and this had been an important though not critical factor while two felt that it had been critical. Five others, however, felt that there had not been a large faculty support base and that this had been an important negative factor. These claimed that while faculty may have supported the idea of environmental problem-solving in the abstract, they did not support an Institute that threatened to take resources away from their own departments or potentially

limit their independent research activity and grantsmanship. All agreed, however, that at the University of Massachusetts, it did not take faculty consensus to create an Institute--it took only a few faculty. Enough attention was given by respondents to administration support, that I have listed that as a separate and distinct factor.

Other Factors

1. Lack of Clearly Defined Priorities at U.Mass--
Lack of Focus for Institute

Mentioned by twelve of the thirteen respondents as a critical factor that inhibited the development of the Institute was the failure of the University of Massachusetts to focus on and unambiguously state a position on what the University should be doing in terms of public service and social problem-solving. The lack of consensus in the University over priorities led to a lack of focus for the Institute. The planners wanted to consider all man/environment problems in their interrelationships; they wanted all urban and rural problems and just about everything else that could fall under the label--environment.

This inability to focus--or diversity of functions to state it more positively--had been considered an essential definitional factor of a "multiversity" by Clark Kerr. Jack Lindquist, too, had talked about the extreme differentiation of universities as an obstacle to change, but I was surprised at the consistency of opinion

among respondents. It is true that there had been many public service activities and no clear policy statements at the University.

2. Political Factor

The second "new" factor that emerged with a great deal of consistency during the interviews reaffirmed Victor Baldrige's and Jack Lindquist's notion of the importance of power and conflict in determining policies and activities in a university. A surprising number of people felt that the Institute for Man and His Environment was essentially a tool through which a number of people sought to improve their positions in the University--second rate faculty members sought routes to recognition and reward, entrepreneurs sought grant monies, and graduate deans sought more personal power vis a vis other administrators. It was this jockeying for position that lent the dynamic to the process.

There were several factors mentioned during the interviews that fall within the larger notion of a political or power factor. Ten of those interviewed mentioned the importance of the controversy over the formal reporting line of the Institute. The Graduate Dean wanted it to report through him to improve his power position, others felt that it should report directly to the Provost or Chancellor because the Graduate Dean had no clout within the University. Several people mentioned the importance

of the interplay of personalities to the outcome. There were strong animosities between and among the major characters--Mort Appley, Ken Picha, Dayton Carritt to name only a few--that made agreements much more difficult to reach. At an institutional level, many people saw a competitiveness and a vying for institutional reputation and prestige. Two hundred other colleges and universities were creating institutes that year--how could the University of Massachusetts allow itself to fall behind the others?

3. Administration Support

There was surprising agreement that support from the top level administrators at the University of Massachusetts was a crucial factor in determining the viability of the Institute for Man and His Environment. Lon Hefferlin and Jack Lindquist both had pointed to the fact that it was helpful to have administration support for reform, but they had not emphasized it particularly. The Steinhart study on Environmental Science Centers had found that the most successful ones enjoyed administration support. Those interviewed took great pains to discuss Oswald Tippo's and Bob Gluckstern's (and for two Moyer Hunsberger's and Robert Woods') attitudes toward research institutes, but they all recalled the famous Friday when Tippo withdrew his support. Those who saw the Institute as a failure blamed the administration. A few mentioned the fact that the University was experiencing many administrative changes

as having been important.

4. Timing

More than half of those interviewed mentioned timing as a crucial factor in the development of the Institute. They emphasized the timeliness of the idea of environmental problem-solving as a positive factor, and Dave Carritt's lack of a sense of timing as a critical negative factor--he approached Academic Matters too abruptly and lost support, and made many wrong moves at the wrong time. Mort Appley took a more general view: "institutes as new structures can be good if brought into the University at the appropriate time in the life-cycle of the University. Institutes have been failures when introduced at the wrong time."⁹

Prioritization of Factors. There was considerable difference of opinion among those interviewed on the question of whether the Institute for Man and His Environment had been a success or a failure, and therefore considerable disagreement over whether certain factors had been hindering or supporting factors in its development. Despite these disagreements, it is possible from the sense of the interviews to prioritize the important factors to the planning and implementation of the Institute for Man and His Environment in the following manner:

⁹Interview with Mort Appley.

1. Resources
2. Politics
3. Lack of Institutional Priorities
4. Leadership
5. Reward System
6. Administration Support
7. External Influence
8. Approval Process
9. Timing
10. Small Yet Critical Number of Active Supporters
11. Large Support Base
12. Communications

Comparative Assessment of Change Factors. A comparison of the factors among the three case studies enables a validation of the importance of most of Lon Hefferlin's change factors and provides information on the process of change at the University of Massachusetts. Table 9 lists those factors for each case in priority order so that they may be compared and analyzed.

From Table 9, a number of observations concerning change factors at the University of Massachusetts can be made that related the University of Massachusetts' situation to more general change theory.

1. No factor emerged as having been the single most critical factor to all three programs at the University of Massachusetts. This corroborates Lon Hefferlin's observation that the change process in a university involves a complex interweaving of a larger number of factors.

2. The factor that emerged as unequivocally

TABLE 9

CHANGE FACTORS FOR THREE PROGRAMS AT
THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Factors Critical To University With- out Walls Program	Factors Critical to the Bachelor's Degree with Con- centration Program	Factors Critical to the Institute For Man and His Environment
1. Small yet critical mass of active supporters	1. Academic In- tegrity	1. Resources
2. Resources	2. Large Supprt Base	2. Politics
3. Pilot Program Strategy	3. Political Climate	3. Lack of In- stitutional Priorities
4. Leadership	4. Leadership	4. Leadership
5. Influence of School of Education	5. Pilot Strategy	5. Reward System
6. Outside Influence	6. Small Group of Active Suppor- ters	6. Administra- tive support
7. Approval Process	7. Clear Objectives --Minimal De- parture	7. External Influence
8. Large Support Base of Faculty and Ad- ministrators	8. Approval Process	8. Approval Process
9. Political Climate in State	9. School of Education	9. Timing
10. Reward System	10. Resources	10. Small yet critical # of active supporters
11. Timing	11. Reward System	11. Large support Base
12. Communications	12. Communications	12. Communications
	13. Outside In- fluence	

important in all cases was leadership, yet in two of the three case studies there had been considerable agreement that the leadership in that program had been ineffective.

3. The importance of the political climate within the University of Massachusetts is seen clearly in two of the cases. In the third case--UWW--the pilot program strategy which was viewed as a critical factor could be termed a strategy to deal with the campus political situation, so politics like leadership, could be read as a factor important in all cases. This essentially affirms the image of the "multiversity" as portrayed by Clark Kerr and Victor Baldridge, and corroborates Baldridge's theory of power and conflict and Lindquist's Political Linkage Model.

4. Resources emerge as high on the list of critical factors for two of the programs but quite low for the third--BDIC. This low ranking, however, probably resulted more from the small size of the program at its initiation and hence a small actual dollar investment; and the confusion over terms in that faculty time was not considered by many as a resource for the program although it should have been. Therefore, despite the low BDIC ranking, the study can be said to corroborate the findings of those change theorists who claim that resources are the critical factor: Mohr, Lindquist, and Lon Hefferlin.

5. External influence does not emerge as important

a factor to the University of Massachusetts situation as the literature on change would have suggested. This may be true because the literature was referring chiefly to the influence on overall direction and policy for higher education by groups other than higher education institutions; this study focused on external influences over specific programs.

6. Communications as an environmental factor does not emerge as at all important in the University of Massachusetts situation even though it had been mentioned as critical by Lon Hefferlin. The Lindquist study, too paid particular attention to the diffusion process.

7. Timing emerges as having been particularly important in two cases, yet this was something that had not been mentioned in the literature on change theory.

Validation of Hefferlin and Lindquist. It can be concluded that in most respects, the University of Massachusetts cases validate the conclusions of Lon Hefferlin and Jack Lindquist. Lon Hefferlin's factors varied in importance with each case, but leadership, resources, approval process, and reward systems were central to the development and implementation of the University Without Walls, the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration, and the Institute for Man and His Environment. While external influence and communications did not emerge as particularly significant, that is probably due to the focus of the study on three specific programs rather than on the University as a whole.

Lindquist and Baldrige were also validated in this study because the importance of the political climate of the University and the dynamic of competing interest groups were marked causative factors in each case.

While the data is not unequivocal, the study suggests that change theorists ought to pay closer attention to the factor and strategy of timing in institutional change.

Conclusions on Change Process at the University of Massachusetts. In this study, change factors were researched and analyzed in relation to three specific program situations. Because all programs were developed at roughly the same time in one university, however, it is possible to "generalize" these factors to the process of change at the University of Massachusetts. The University of Massachusetts was a "vital" and change-oriented institution throughout the period of the fifties and especially the sixties, and those factors which were important to the dramatic changes included resources, leadership, external influence, and a conducive environment in which reward systems, approval processes, governance, and communications were used to encourage change.

The most significant finding concerning the process of change at the University of Massachusetts that emerged from the study was the finding that the creation of special focus units is an effective change strategy. This strategy had been suggested by Lon Hefferlin and Lindquist, and was

used at the University of Massachusetts in order to assume three missions--access, individualization, and social problem-solving. The successful creation of the University Without Walls, the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration, and the Institute for Man and His Environment as programs provided an institutional and organizational--rather than rhetorical--method or vehicle for accomplishing organizational change. While specific change factors may vary from institution to institution, the strategy of special program units should be appropriate for other large, public universities.

C H A P T E R V I I

SUMMARY, SOME SPECULATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

This chapter contains a summary of the purposes, methodology, and findings of this study, and some speculations that it generated about missions, organizations, and change. It also contains several recommendations for further study.

Summary

This study focuses on three missions--access, individualization, and social problem-solving--that have been recommended as priority agendas for higher education. It also focuses on the process of planning and development for three special programs--the University Without Walls, the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration, and the Institute for Man and His Environment--which served as vehicles for the assumption of these missions in one university--the University of Massachusetts. The aim of the study is to provide information on the viability of the missions of access, individualization and social problem-solving within existing public universities, and to contribute to the study of institutional change.

In a review of related research and theory, special emphasis is placed on the articulation of new missions and objectives for higher education by educational theorists, including Clark Kerr and David Riesman, and several specially created study commissions and task forces, including the Truman Commission on Higher Education, the Newman Task Force, and the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. Emphasized, as well, are the characteristics of universities as organizations and change theories as articulated by Ronald Havelock, Lon Hefferlin, Jack Lindquist, Warren Bennis, Victor Baldrige, and others.

Data for the study has been gathered from participant observation, from University documents and from approximately forty interviews. Case studies provide descriptions of the University of Massachusetts and of the planning and implementation of three programs--the University Without Walls, the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration, and the Institute for Man and His Environment. Each case focuses particularly on those elements which could be considered important factors in the process of implementation and institutional change.

Each case is analyzed in order to assess the feasibility of the missions of access, individualization, and social problem-solving for the University of

Massachusetts and other public universities and to determine and compare the factors important to the change process in the University.

The study showed that all three missions have been considered priority agendas for the University of Massachusetts, and that special units have been developed and approved by the formal governance bodies in order to commit the University to the fulfillment of these missions.

The separate program cases, however, reveal variations in the extent of the commitment. The Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration program shows that the mission of individualization was accepted and adopted. The University Without Walls program shows that although the provision of educational opportunity for non-traditional students and the fulfillment of the mission of access would require comprehensive changes, many at the University of Massachusetts were willing to make these changes. The case of the Institute for Man and His Environment reveals the difficult organizational, attitudinal, and behavioral changes that are required to adopt the mission of social problem-solving.

The study corroborates the importance of those change factors which had been cited by Lon Hefferlin--resources, leadership, support, and environmental factors

of reward and approval and showed very clearly the importance of the political dynamic suggested by Lindquist and Baldrige. The study does not unearth new change factors, but suggests that timing might be a change factor deserving of more attention and study. It shows the advantage of creating special focus programs as a vehicle through which the University can accomplish change. It also makes clear that the process of change involves a whole network of factors and dynamics that cannot be easily isolated. It shows that it is difficult for universities as organizations to adopt new missions.

Some Speculations

On Missions. The author experienced considerable difficulty in attempting to identify the major missions and objectives for higher education over the past quarter century. It is surprising that despite huge expenditures of tax dollars at the federal and state levels for higher education, there is no one individual or group who has been delegated the power and the authority to determine priorities, missions, and objectives for higher education. Instead, study commissions, task forces, institutions, political leaders, lobbyists, and thousands of individuals vie for attention to state their preferences about higher education. At one level this can be considered unfortunate

for it leads to confusion and delay. Colleges and universities--not knowing who to listen to--do nothing. On the other hand, it can be considered positive, because it leads to greater participation and involvement which might insure that those missions which do emerge, represent a more widespread consensus. It is also possible that any group mandated to make decisions might itself become rigid and tend toward the status quo. The constant debate over the directions for higher education seems a healthy process.

On Organizations. This study attempts to consider at the same time missions for higher education, and the implementation of those missions within universities. It is very difficult to keep the focus on both of these issues together, because the connections between them keep disappearing. This experience with the study, leads to some speculations on organizations. The data from the case studies revealed that once a planning and development process was set in motion, the original objectives for those programs began to be overridden by other, more organizational considerations. Individuals seemed to be more concerned with issues of power, status, and control, and the programs seemed to be interested more in growth for its own sake, rather than for the realization of any objective. In a sense, programs began to assume the same

characteristics as the organization as a whole. This experience suggests that no single format or structure will remain adaptive and that those interested in having institutions continually respond to the needs of society, should encourage organizational instability and conflict between old and new structures so that the whole gradually changes in the desired direction. Put another way, perhaps conflict ought to be one of the characteristics of a "vital" institution.

On Theories of Change. The aim of this study was to contribute toward a theory of change that would be useful for universities as they attempted to be both responsive to social needs, and positive agents of change in society. In the final analysis a theory of change remains elusive.

Universities have begun changing for centuries, and the pace of change seems to be accelerating, but in the opinion of this author, a theory has not been developed to adequately explain or guide that change. Lon Hefferlin was best when he observed that "a whole network of factors (attitudes, procedures, mechanisms, pressures), appear to be involved." The theoretical models offered by Havelock, Lindquist, and Baldrige are quite general and would not at this point really help to understand the change process in a new situation. Jack Lindquist's "strategies" represent

a conglomeration of ideas that may or may not be helpful in diverse situations.

This study also provides little "generalizable" data. It was very difficult to separate change factors from the history of each of the programs for the more they became generalized, the more they became meaningless. The study does, however, suggest that a number of things operating together can be important to getting a change program started within a university.

A. A small group of committed individuals is essential.

B. The core group must like to work together, contain a congenial mix of personalities, and it must also be acceptable to the larger group which controls the approval process.

C. The idea or program must carry enough moral weight to inspire people to work on it.

D. The idea must also be provocative to a large number of people--it must be in tune with the times.

E. The core group proposing the program, must have a sense of timing that is in tune with the campus and deploy a strategy for implementation.

F. Resources are important, but are not alone sufficient. It can be more effective to start with a small program and allow it to grow organically, than to make

inordinate demands for resources given the present financial conditions.

G. Granting the difficulty of changing basic behaviors and attitudes, it can be effective to underplay the extent of the change.

It is hoped that this study will furnish case material for continued theoretical development. Like the case studies of Bennis and Baldrige, it attempts to consider important university issues in the full range of their complexity.

Recommendations for Further Study

In order to deal with what the author considered important present and future issues in higher education, this study focuses on broad issues and general theories. As a consequence, it suggests multiple areas and levels for further elaboration and clarification. The following represent only those which the author considers to be the most crucial for higher education as a whole, or the most compelling in terms of the data from this study

1. Study Relating Higher Education to Other Social Institutions. This study focuses on the missions of access, individualization, and social problem-solving in connection with institutions of higher education, but it does not consider these missions in their broader social context. A broader focus would be helpful. This study suggests that

social problem-solving is a very difficult mission to accomplish in a university. It should, however, not follow from this study that recommended missions for universities should be revised to exclude social problem-solving. Rather, it follows that other social institutions should be examined to determine the possibilities of their taking on this agenda. If the university emerges as the most likely institution to direct its attention to complex social problems, then that should remain a mission regardless of the difficulties. Similarly, the mission of access should be examined from a broader perspective. It seems far too simplistic for universities to congratulate themselves on their ability to make the procedural and academic changes required to serve a different study body who had previously been excluded from higher education, and yet neglect to consider the impact of their admissions policies on students and non-students. Recommending access, but encouraging non-attendance as the Carnegie Commission has done, does not seem an adequate solution to the problem. Further attention should be paid to the relationship between education, economics, and the social order.

2. Study on Timing and Time as Factors of Change.

One of the findings of this study was that a sense of timing on the part of program sponsors was essential to imple-

mentation. This factor needs more careful scrutiny than it has received in the research on higher education. Closely related to this factor is the more general sense of the times that influenced priorities and missions for higher education. Time in this sense also emerged as an important factor in the study. To illustrate the difference--an important impetus for the BDIC program was the student movement of the late sixties and a major influence for the Institute for Man and His Environment was the general feeling that the world has reached an environmental crisis-point. Both of these would be considered factors of time which were important. The supporters of BDIC displayed a sense of timing in their approach to faculty, to administrators, and to those groups which were part of the approval process. This sense of timing was also an important change factor. The Institute's supporters did not have this sensitivity to timing, and the Institute did not really get off the ground, despite the environmental crisis. Both factors--time and timing--deserve further study and clarification.

A third time-related question is important, although it did not receive particular attention in this study. This is the question of whether changes are implemented swiftly enough to respond to the need. The study showed that the University of Massachusetts did respond to the demands for access, individualization, and social problem-solving

through the creation of special program units. The study did not, however, raise the important questions of whether the vehicles to meet the demands were adequate or whether they were implemented swiftly enough. UWW, BDIC, and the Institute for Man and His Environment were all finally in operation by the spring of 1972, but were they responding to the needs of 1972 or of 1962?

3. Further Study on Special Programs at the University of Massachusetts. A number of important follow-up studies could be conducted at the University of Massachusetts. It would be worthwhile to examine the three programs--UWW, BDIC, and the Institute for Man and His Environment to see if their missions and objectives have changed with time. This study concludes that special program units serve as vehicles for change throughout the institution, so it would be important to examine more closely the impact of these programs on the university. All three programs were developed during a period of substantial growth and change at the University of Massachusetts. Since 1972, the Amherst campus of the University has entered a no-growth period, and it would be interesting to study the development of special focus programs under these altered circumstances. The strategies for change in a game of zero-sum may be very different.

4. Further Research Related to Change Theory.

Many researchers on organizations and change have pointed out that because of organizational impediments, more change was likely to result from external rather than internal pressure. The specific focus of this study on three cases did not allow for careful consideration of the external influence factor, but it could be argued from the data as a whole, that despite good intentions on the part of the University of Massachusetts to take on new agendas, the realization of these agendas was meager by comparison to the need. Thus further consideration of the ways institutions could be influenced to change could be more important and useful to institutions in the long run.

APPENDIX I

FACULTY, STUDENTS, AND ADMINISTRATORS
INTERVIEWED FOR THE STUDY

I. Those interviewed regarding the University
Without Walls Program.

	<u>Date</u>	<u>University position and Relationship to UWW</u>
1. Leigh Short	12/28/73	Chairman of the Academic Matters Council when UWW came up for approval.
2. Otto Stein	2/1/74	Head of Botany Dept. Attended faculty lunches that were part of UWW planning effort.
3. David Bischoff	3/20/74	Associate Provost-- Member of Academic Matters Council.
4. Robert Gluckstern (briefly)	3/23/74	Provost
5. Charlotte Rahaim	3/27/74	Assistant Dean of Admissions, member of Admissions task force and UWW policy board
6. Gail Kauffman	3/28/74	Staff member UWW from beginning of planning period. Communications coordinator.
7. Robert Woodbury	3/30/74	Associate Dean, School of Education during planning semester, Associate Provost for Special Programs to whom Program reported during pilot.

	<u>Date</u>	<u>University position and Relationship to UWW</u>
8. Tom Clark	3/31/74	Director of UWW
9. Mark Cheren	4/3/74	Graduate student, participant in initial planning effort, member of learning skills task group.
10. Jean Carritt	4/8/74	Volunteer partici- pant in UWW planning effort, member of re- sources task group.
11. Dee Appley	4/11/74	Faculty member, Psy- chology Department, one of first faculty sponsors and member of policy board.
12. Edward Harris	4/12/74	Graduate student and staff member, UWW (would become Director in 1972).
13. Seymour Shapiro	4/30/74	Faculty member, Botany Department--one of first faculty sponsors and member of policy board.

II. Those interviewed regarding BDIC

1. Leigh Short	12/28/73	Member of Academic Matters Council and review committee for BDIC, member of first BDIC supervisory committee, Chairman of Academic Matters when program came up for permanent appro- val.
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	<u>Date</u>	<u>University position and Relationship to BDIC</u>
2. Arthur Kinney	2/22/74	Participant in BDIC planning effort from the beginning, member of all committees except Academic Matters ad hoc budget review committee, and Chairman of first supervisory committee.
3. Janet Sheppard	3/2/74	Student in BDIC program.
4. Stanley Moss	3/6/74	One of first BDIC faculty sponsors, member of supervisory committee, 1971-1972, and currently Chairman of the supervisory committee.
5. David Bischoff	3/20/74	Associate Provost--member of Academic Matters Council
6. Robert Woodbury	3/30/74	Associate Provost for Special Programs.
7. Tom Clark	4/1/74	Faculty member, School of Education, member of BDIC planning committee.
8. Mark Cheren	4/3/74	Graduate Student, School of Education, participant in SWAP conference and first planning group to emerge from SWAP.

	<u>Date</u>	<u>University position and Relationship to BDIC</u>
9. Tony Borton	4/9/74	Faculty member, College of Agriculture, member Academic Matters Council and ad hoc committee to plan BDIC, member of first supervisory committee.
III. Those interviewed regarding the Institute for Man and His Environment.		
1. Leigh Short	12/28/73	Member of Academic Matters Council and committee to review and revise proposal for Institute for Man and His Environment.
2. Carl Swanson	1/24/74	Associate Director, Institute for Man and His Environment, from September 1971, faculty member, Botany Dept.
3. Mortimer Appley	12/30/73	Dean of Graduate School --responsible for initial planning effort for the Institute.
4. Bernard Berger	1/31/74	Director, Water Resources Research Center. Chairman, Steering Committee for the Institute.
5. Otto Stein	2/1/74	Head, Dept. of Botany, member of the sub-committee on education and the Advisory Board.

	<u>Date</u>	<u>University position and Relationship to the Institute</u>
6. Richard Louttit	2/1/74	Head, Dept. of Psychology, member of Academic Matters Review Committee and Advisory Board.
7. Kenneth Picha	2/4/74	Dean, School of Engineering, member of Steering Committee for Institute and Advisory Board.
8. Dayton Carritt	2/5/74	Director, Institute for Man and His Environment Jan. 1971 to January 1972.
9. Erving Zube	3/5/74	Chairman, subcommittee on education and currently Director of Institute.
10. Stanley Moss	3/6/74	Chairman, subcommittee on research.
11. Robert McGarrah	3/16/74	Director, Center for Business and Economic Research, SBA, Member of Steering Committee and Advisory Board and Chairman subcommittee on outreach.
12. Robert Gluckstern	3/22/74	Provost
13. Seymour Shapiro	4/30/74	Acting Director, Institute for Man and His Environment-- January 1972 to June 1972.

APPENDIX II

QUESTIONS USED AS BASIS FOR INTERVIEWS

1. What were the original objectives of the (UWW, BDIC, IMHE) program?
2. Will you describe the process through which the program was developed and implemented?
3. What things or factors would you say were most important to the development of the program?
4. What was happening at UMass at that time that made the program important?
5. Were you aware that educators elsewhere were saying that
 - access
 - individualization
 - application of knowledge to social problemswere important agendas for higher education?
6. Could the program have been developed as a result of what outsiders were saying?
7. Who was the person in the leadership position in the program?
8. How important was his/her status to the implementation of the program?
9. Can you name the five most important people to the program? Why were they important?

10. In addition to the core group, how many people were supportive of the program in its early stages?
11. Was their support necessary for program approval and implementation?
12. Which was more important: faculty support, student support, or administrator support--or did it matter?
13. How many people were significantly involved with the program during the planning and initial stages of the program?
14. How many other resources such as money were available to the program during its initial phases?
15. Just how important were these human and material resources to the program? Could it have been implemented with less?
16. Was the reward system at UMass relevant to the program in its initial stages? Did it have a positive or negative influence?
17. Was the approval process at UMass a hindering or supporting factor to the program?
18. How about the established communications vehicles --faculty to departments to students, etc. Were they helpful and important to the program?
19. What other environmental factors might have influenced the program in its development and implementation?

20. How would you characterize UMass in relation to other universities in terms of missions and objectives and possibilities for effecting change?
21. Why do you think UMass approved and supported the program?
(Probe: Do you think the motivation was institutional image, response to external or internal pressure or what?)
22. What in addition to those things we have talked about --external influence, resources, support, leadership and campus environment--would you say was important to the program in order for it to be established and implemented?

APPENDIX III

OVERVIEW OF MAJOR STUDY COMMISSIONS WHICH
INFLUENCED POLICY IN HIGHER EDUCATION
AND MAJOR THRUST OF THEIR
RECOMMENDATIONS

Truman Commission

The President's Commission on Higher Education convened by President Harry S. Truman in 1946 stressed egalitarianism of access to higher education and set the stage for the spectacular expansion of higher education during the fifties and sixties. It also attempted to articulate the purpose of collegiate education, and establish a framework for curricular responses through the general education movement. According to Lewis Mayhew, "in many respects the Truman Commission may have been relatively more influential for its time than the Morrill Act of 1862."¹

White House Conference on Youth

The White House Conference on Youth was planned in 1971 as a forum whereby the youth of America could address the most pressing issues of the day. This group

¹Lewis Mayhew, The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, p. 6.

suggested that education had emerged as the primary instrument for the solution of domestic social problems such as racism, poverty, the city and the environment. Mayhew claims, however, that despite its "ringing ideals (it) has had little effect on the conduct of higher education."²

Newman Task Force

The Task Force on Higher Education established by the Office of Education and headed by Frank Newman was considerably smaller in size and budget than other study commissions on higher education. It also had a more liberal membership.

The Newman Task Group looked at higher education as a broad total system and asked questions about its effectiveness in terms of society's needs. Its overall thrust was that much of what is going on in higher education today is not responsive to the needs of society; that institutions themselves are not likely to effect the

²Ibid., p. 9.

needed changes; and that massive federal intervention and the creation of new educational enterprises are required in order to get a higher education system more in line with present national priorities. The Task Force placed emphasis on public debate as a force for change in higher education, and suggested that the federal government take the initiative through specific funding efforts. In 1973, one might well question the viability of the notion of new alternative systems, but there is little doubt that the Newman Report with its able critique of higher education had a major impact on the educational debate both inside and outside of institutions.

Assembly on University Goals and Governance

The Assembly on University Goals and Governance established by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1969 spoke to a large number of educational issues, and issued a series of recommendations, but its Report has been poorly disseminated. While it should have some impact within higher education circles--because of the prestigiousness of the group--it is not likely to have a major impact at broader national levels.

Special Committee on Campus Tensions

The Special Committee on Campus Tensions established in 1969 by the American Council on Education,

suggested remedies for many of the problems that were causing widespread disruption on campuses. They called for improved governance procedures, greater diversity among faculty, staff and students, and more flexible curricula.

President's Commission on Campus Unrest

Established in June 1970 in the wake of Kent State and Jackson State, the President's Commission on Campus Unrest suggested ways of dealing with campus disruption and a variety of reforms for higher education.

Carnegie Commission on Higher Education

The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education was established in 1967 by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching with support from the Carnegie Corporation. It was financed with five and two-thirds million dollars over a six year period. Chaired by Clark Kerr, the Commission's members included presidents, trustees, and professors associated with colleges and universities. Starting with the objective of studying the financing of higher education, the Commission eventually took under review almost every aspect of higher education--function, structure, governance, expenditure, technology, effective use of resources, and reform. The Commission

issued special reports, and sponsored a series of special studies appearing in over eighty publications.

The work of the Commission is difficult to summarize, but the overall directions they suggest for higher education are, according to Clark Kerr,

Toward social justice--provision of universal equal access to higher education (but not the encouragement of universal attendance)

Toward more options, flexibility, diversity--a revolution of free choice for students of all ages.

Toward more resources and their more effective use

Toward reconsideration of purposes--though the functions of higher education may have multiplied, the purposes of higher education have not been deeply analyzed and redefined for nearly a century

Toward improved governance

We give high priority as well to constructive change³

It is also difficult to evaluate the work of the Commission. Norman Birnbaum and others have been severely critical, maintaining that the Commission did not deal with matters of substance, and that it accepted too many educational assumptions as inherently good. Lewis Mayhew on the other hand is supportive:

³Clark Kerr, "Viewpoint," Change. (November 1973), p.5.

In total, the work of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education must be judged highly successful --virtually all of the policy recommendations and studies are sophisticated and tuned to prevailing knowledge about higher education . . . it is possible that a substantial number of commission recommendations will become operative elements of public policy.⁴

Books

In addition to Commissions, two books written in the last decade seem to have had a major impact on the debate about higher education. The Academic Revolution by Christopher Jencks and David Riesman is a comprehensive study of American higher education which pays particular attention to the relationship between education and society. Clark Kerr's The Uses of the University treats the role of the university in society and claims that the university's chief product--knowledge--is the most important factor in economic and social growth as well as "the most powerful single element in our culture."⁵ He sees the role of the university as that of "service station."

⁴Mayhew, Ibid., p. 4.

⁵Kerr, The Uses of the University, Ibid., p. vii.

APPENDIX IV

SUPPLEMENTARY REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY

This section contains an overview of the work of Ronald Havelock, who is the major synthesizer of research on knowledge diffusion and utilization, a general review of research on decision and change process in business, industry and other organizational settings, and a review of the work on planned change in systems, particularly elementary and secondary education. All of this work contributed in important ways to the perspectives of those focusing on change in institutions of higher education.

Ronald Havelock--Research on Knowledge Diffusion and Utilization. Ronald Havelock's work in the area of knowledge diffusion and utilization is concerned with how ideas spread among and within social systems. For this study, it is important because it speaks to the question of how concepts about missions and objectives diffuse from the level of higher education theorists and policy influencers into the university, how they diffuse among university members, and how they are utilized for program planning. The focus of Havelock's major work, Planning for Innovation through Dissemination and Utilization of Knowledge, was "to assess the current state of knowledge with respect to processes of dissemination

and utilization."¹ He conducted a literature search of over four thousand titles and categorized the literature into three conceptual models: research and development, social interaction; and problem-solving. He felt that each of these models provided insights, but each was inadequate to explain the totality of the diffusion process. He, therefore, created his own conceptual model--the linkage model--to integrate the other three. These models were discussed in Chapter I because they were significant in the work of Jack Lindquist, and further elaborated upon in connection with their applicability to the study of change in colleges and universities.

In summarizing his work, Havelock was able to identify seven "general factors" in knowledge dissemination and utilization:

1. LINKAGE - Linkage means the degree of interpersonal or intergroup connection. "The more linkages there are and the stronger these linkages are, the more effective will be the day to day contact and exchange of information, hence the greater will be the mutual utilization of knowledge. Most importantly, the greater the number of overlapping linkages throughout the macrosystem of knowledge production and dissemination, the more frequent and the more effective will be the knowledge utilization by all."²

¹Ronald Havelock, Planning for Innovation Through Dissemination and Utilization of Knowledge, Ibid., p. 18.

²Ibid., pp. 11-21.

2. STRUCTURE - "The degree of systematic organization and coordination of elements strongly affects the utilization process. The extent to which structuring takes place in the sender and receiver and in the message seem to be important correlates of successful dissemination and utilization."³
3. OPENNESS - "Openness is the readiness to give and receive new information and is fundamental to effective utilization. It is a prerequisite to 'linkage' and a necessary complement to 'structure.'"⁴
4. CAPACITY - "This summary concept ties together the highly intercorrelated variables of 'wealth,' 'power,' 'status,' 'education,' 'intelligence' and 'sophistication' which are invariably good predictors of successful innovation and utilization. Those who already possess the most in the way of resources and capabilities are the most likely to be able to get even more."⁵
5. REWARD - "It is a fundamental psychological fact that rewarded behavior tends to be repeated."⁶
6. PROXIMITY - Closeness to resources, people and knowledge makes their use more possible. Proximity is a factor closely related to linkage.
7. SYNERGY - Havelock uses the English and English definition of synergy: "exerting force together or in combination, or upon the same point."⁷

³Ibid., pp. 11-23.

⁴Ibid., pp. 11-24.

⁵Ibid., pp. 11-25.

⁶Ibid., pp. 11-26.

⁷Ibid., pp. 11-27.

For knowledge diffusion and utilization the concept of synergy suggests the need for "purposeful redundancy" and the need for leadership.

Although Havelock found several other important variables in his study, he thinks that these seven factors seem to account for the bulk of diffusion and utilization as a phenomenon.

Research and Theory on Decision and Change Processes in Business and Industry and other Organizational Settings.

A great deal of research has been done on the process of change in the organizational settings of business and industry. Benne, Bennis, and Chin review the social, psychological, and sociological literature pertaining to innovation and change in organizational settings in The Planning of Change.⁸ Warren Bennis in Changing Organizations⁹ summarized and categorized techniques used in organizational change efforts and advocated a theory of "planned change." Paul Hersey and Ken Blanchard in Management of Organizational Behavior¹⁰ have attempted to synthesize a number of theories of change, motivation, and leadership behavior. They summarize Maslow's Need's

⁸Warren Bennis, Kenneth Benne, and Robert Chin, eds., The Planning of Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969).

⁹Warren Bennis, Changing Organizations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).

¹⁰Paul Hersey and Ken Blanchard, Management of Organizational Behavior. 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972).

Hierarchy, Herzbug's Motivation-Hygiene Theory, Argyris's Immaturity-Maturity Continuum, McGregor's Leadership Theory, Likert's Theory of Management Systems, Schein's Motivation Paradigm, and Lewin's Change Cycle, and attempt to integrate these into their own Life Cycle Theory. Life Cycle Theory describes four phases of growth in an organization and suggests appropriate behavior for each growth phase on the part of the leader. It is meant to be useful to practitioners of change.

Havelock devoted a chapter of his study to the organizational context of dissemination and utilization. He views the organization as a

dynamic problem-solving system which maintains functionality and stability over time, by developing and maintaining an internal structure and a protective skin to regulate and inhibit the flow of messages from the environment.¹¹

He sees, however, two competing demands

the drive to maintain order and certainty which tend to create structures, hierarchies, requirements and screening procedures which act as barriers to knowledge flow; while the drive to innovate and improve tends to remove such barriers.¹²

He found that some organizational factors such as training,

¹¹Havelock, Ibid., pp. 6-1.

¹²Ibid.

leadership styles, structure, and roles to have been crucial to the dynamic in organizations, yet Havelock concluded that most structures and most roles in an organization act as inhibitors of change.

Research and Theory on Planned Change in School Systems. In 1962 Everett Rogers completed an important study, Diffusion of Innovation, which included a comprehensive review of the literature--chiefly from anthropology, rural sociology, medicine and education--and attempted an inter-disciplinary comparative approach to the study of diffusion. Roger's work led not only into Havelock's diffusion studies but also quite directly into the tradition of research on innovations in school systems. Rogers also attempted to define the characteristics of innovations that would make them more or less difficult to implement. These characteristics include.

1. Relative advantage over existing practice
2. Compatibility with basic values
3. Complexity
4. Divisibility
5. Communicability¹³

¹³Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations,
Ibid.

Richard Carlson in 1965 tried to relate Rogers characteristics to rates of adoption of an innovation. He showed that "innovations that were considered the best possibilities for more rapid diffusion . . . were those rated high in relative advantage, compatibility and communicability and low in complexity."¹⁴ Although he felt that there was no conclusive data on the relationship between diffusion rate and characteristics, the characteristic that seemed to be most important was compatibility. Innovations must be compatible with cultural norms, existing values and past experiences of individuals and social systems.

Matthew Miles' Innovation in Education (1968) provides an overview of research in the area of educational innovation and diffusion of innovations through school systems.¹⁵ He includes a series of case studies on specific innovations and provides a summary chapter that contributes significantly to the theory. Although its major thrust is on innovation at lower school levels, it does consider the process of change in higher education, and has become a base line for those interested in academic reform in colleges and universities. In summarizing

¹⁴Richard Carlson, Adoption of Educational Innovations (Eugene, Oregon: Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration, University of Oregon, 1965).

¹⁵Matthew Miles, ed. Innovations in Education, Ibid.

the studies in his volume, Miles states that educational innovations are almost never started or installed on their merits. He feels that the characteristics of the local system, of the persons or groups involved, and of other relevant groups are the crucial factors. He also advocated the use of temporary systems and linkages.

Temporary systems are those that operate within an organization or institution, but have not been completely accepted as a permanent part of the organization. Special programs are examples of temporary systems within the organization. If the innovation is to spread from the temporary to the larger system, Miles felt that there had to be linkages--usually people--between those systems.

Goodwin Matson and others built from Miles' work and attempted a fusion of theory and action in one project. The Cooperation Project for Educational Development (COPED) was a three year project funded by the Office of Education which brought together scholars from several universities in an inter-university facility to develop models for planned change for twenty-five school systems in metropolitan areas.¹⁶ The papers from the project

¹⁶The project model was an interesting one which was later to be used by Lindquist and others working on planned change for college and universities.

Concepts for Social Change¹⁷ and Change in School Systems,¹⁸ although aimed at secondary systems, provided many insights for higher levels. Concepts for Social Change started from a broad theoretical view of the problem of knowledge dissemination and utilization, drew from a variety of disciplines, and developed the core ideas about planned change in education. Change in School Systems focused attention on the special properties and processes of the schools in the project and on strategies for change designed to test and develop the core ideas.

The major barrier to change at secondary and elementary school levels was considered by most authors-- in Miles' work and COPED--to be bureaucratic organizational pattern. In elementary and secondary schools, missions are somewhat clear, power is clearly located, and while conflict is apparent, it is responsive to interventions. Given this, the major change strategies suggested at these levels in-

¹⁷Goodwin Watson, Concepts for Social Change (published for Cooperative Project for Educational Development by National Training Laboratories, 1967).

¹⁸Goodwin Watson, Change in School Systems (published for Cooperative Project for Educational Development by National Training Laboratories, 1967).

volve personnel administration to provide effective leadership from the top and the use of outside consultants--as diagnosticians, and/or trainers of internal change teams.

In colleges and universities, however, where missions are unclear, power is diffuse, and the organizational structure archaic, the change strategies that seem to be effective at secondary elementary levels may prove insufficient.

APPENDIX V

This section contains an overview of work on the change process that was not considered in Chapter I. It reviews general attitudes toward change and the change process including those of the Newman Task Force and the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. As was seen in Chapter I, these two groups were the most influential in determining the missions of access, individualization, and social problem-solving. They were concerned as well with how higher education might respond to these missions, and although their observations did not have a research base or contribute a great deal to the theory on change, the Newman and Carnegie groups have influenced the general attitudes and feelings about the process of change and the possibilities for change in colleges and universities.

This section also contains a review of additional work on the process of change in colleges and universities that was published subsequent to Lon Hefferlin's synthesis of the change literature and was not considered by Jack Lindquist.

General Attitudes Toward Change. In American society, change has traditionally been considered synonymous to progress and therefore good. Educational institutions, especially universities, however, were considered to have the major function of preserving the best of the culture. Therefore a great traditionalism

and ritualistic conservatism has been built up around them that makes changes seem almost impossible to achieve. In contrast to European universities, however, American universities have always been more pragmatic and utilitarian. The history of American higher education is the history of the slow evolution of form and function in response to the dictates of American society.

In the quarter century since World War II there have been two major trends. From 1945 through the mid-sixties, higher education was almost universally considered a good in American society, therefore, the emphasis was not on changing its forms or functions but on providing more of it to more people. By the late sixties and early seventies, however, more people were criticizing higher education for its failures to respond adequately to society's or its own students' needs and were urging it to take on new missions. Many were despairing that it could ever regain its place as a vital institution in American society.

For those who remain positive about our educational institutions, "evolutionary" change has greater appeal, for those more negative, nothing short of radical change will do.

John Gardner summed up well the general attitude toward change:

We do not need more change as such. We need more 'intentional change'--specifically, the kinds of change in our institutions that will enable them to adapt to the radically altered circumstances in which they are now forced to function.¹

The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. The Carnegie Commission was generally in favor of change, but not radical change. In its final report, Priorities for Action, the Commission lists "the enhancement of constructive change" as one of its seven "priorities for action."

The Commission cited three reasons why change has been slow: a) higher education by nature has been oriented toward preservation of history and perpetuation of traditions, b) faculty members have control over governance and as a professional group move very slowly and attempt where possible to achieve consensus before changing and c) continuity of academic mores including "a sense of stability in structure" has in the past been deemed important for individual scholarly activity. The Commission felt, however, that "the period 1970 to 2000 may prove to be the second most active period of change in the

¹John Gardner, "Universities as Designers of the Future," Educational Record (Fall 1967), pp. 315-319.

history of American higher education."² The reasons for this prediction about change include new types of students, new interests among students, new knowledge, new job market, new social problems, and new technology. Also "the most universally intense pressure for change may well turn out to be the shortage of students, as compared with places available for them, particularly in the 1980's."³

The Commission has favored reform in three directions:

toward more options for students in their attendance patterns; toward more diversity of programs both as among and within individual institutions, thus expanding the range of choice⁴ for students; and toward enrichment of programs.

They have recommended ways to encourage change at the system-wide and institutional levels mentioning specifically:

- A. The Fund for Improvement of Post Secondary Education to be created at the national level.

²Priorities for Action, Ibid., p. 44.

³Ibid., p. 46.

⁴Ibid.

- B. The creation of such funds at the state level.
- C. At the institutional level, setting aside one to three per cent of the budget to be directed toward new endeavors plus the creation of an office for improvement of undergraduate education.
- D. Assuring that new ideas be allowed trial on experimental basis before review by faculty members.
- E. Greater involvement of students in decision-making.
- F. The selection of activist presidents who will give forward-looking leadership.

The Commission feels that higher education should take internal initiative as the basic pattern for change rather than simply respond to outside pressures, but it does not feel particularly confident about this likelihood.

When all is said and done, however, more change is likely to take place on the periphery of higher education--in non-traditional programs and in further education--than in colleges or universities themselves.⁵

While the Commissions' analysis of the change process is fairly unsophisticated, and their recommendations concerning change programs and strategies are fairly general, it is one of the few attempts to view higher education from a total system view and it does at least

⁵Ibid., p. 51.

encourage (or allow for) thinking about change process at the general policy level.

Newman Task Force. The Newman Task Force whose first report was issued two years prior to the Carnegie Commission's Priorities, can nonetheless be taken as a rebuttal to the fundamentally positivistic and ameliorist stance of the Carnegie commission: The Newman Task Force points out that:

The beginning of the decade of the 1970's seems a time of unprecedented crisis for higher education Something has gone wrong There is growing recognition that higher education needs reform.

The major impediment to change is the set of assumptions on which educational policy is based Thus it is argued that the task is:

- a. To expand our present system to provide each young American with a chance at entrance
- b. To maintain diversity by insuring that we continue to have both public and private institutions
- c. To meet the demand for relevance in education by developing new curriculums
- d. To continue to improve the level of professionalism, etc.

To each of these recommendations (strikingly similar to those articulated two years later by the Carnegie Commission!), the Newman Commission provides a rebuttal. For Newman, simply expanding our system will not meet the educational needs of the new students that will be entering; diversity cannot be maintained simply through the maintenance of public and private institutions, because

higher educational institutions of all current types are inexorably moving towards homogeneity. What is required are radically new institutions both public and private. Also, relevant new curricula can only be developed by those outside the present system, not by those inside.

The Newman group feels that

Today, the most pressing issues are not internal, within higher education, but involve broad social decisions regarding its role in contemporary America, decisions in which the public must have a voice.⁶

The Task Force found a compelling need for major structural changes and felt that there was a fleeting opportunity for effecting them provided that a) higher education was made an issue of serious and comprehensive public debate, and b) the federal government used its financial clout to encourage the major changes by creating new and competitive institutions.

The Commission recommended a variety of changes ranging from the creation of new enterprises to reviving institutional missions, but other than federal funding and a reliance on making a problem a public issue. The Task Force did not suggest other strategies for effecting changes.

⁶Report on Higher Education, p. 62.

Harold Hodgkinson has some serious questions about the Newman change strategies. In a review of the Newman Task Force report in Change, he predicts that the Newman Task Force,

. . . will have great difficulty in creating change and diversity at the campus level . . . few debates have taken place within institutions . . . yet it is at the institutional level that educational debate is most needed How does one engage the thousands on thousands of college and university faculty .⁷ . in the decisions of educational policy?

The Newman Task Force displayed a pessimistic view about the possibilities for change within institutions of higher education. Ironically, hosts of college and university faculty and administrators were profoundly affected by its report, and a series of changes and reforms were initiated within institutions as a direct response.

Additional Research and Theory on Change in Colleges and Universities.

B. Richard Evans.

In 1970, Richard Evans published a book entitled Resistance to Innovation in Higher Education,⁸ in which he reported on a study which pursued the problem of faculty resistance to innovation

⁷Harold Hodgkinson, "Reflections on the Newman Commission" Change. (May 1972), p. 37.

⁸Richard I. Evans, Resistance to Innovation in Higher Education (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1970).

through a research case study. The study examines an academic community's response to a particular innovation--I.T.V. His few conclusions basically corroborated those of Lon Hefferlin but were far more limited in scope

C. Dwight Ladd

Another work published in 1970 that deals with institutional change is Dwight Ladd's Change in Educational Policy.⁹ Ladd looks at self studies made by a diverse sample of colleges and universities, tries to assess the changes that have resulted from the self-studies, and attempts to generalize some theories of change from these cases. Ladd concluded,

The situations reviewed here suggest that these studies have rarely succeeded in bringing about any fundamental change in educational policies on the campuses involved except where a significant portion of the faculty had accepted the desirability of some change before the study began and where pressures for change from outside the faculties were much in evidence.¹⁰

Ladd ascribed the resistance to change primarily to governance patterns which afford collegiality.

. . . real change in educational policy will require significant reallocation of resources, and at present, resource allocation is controlled for

⁹Dwight R. Ladd, Change in Education Policy: Self-Studies in Selected Colleges and Universities, The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970).

¹⁰Ibid., p. 200.

the most part by those who most benefit from the status quo.¹¹

Ladd did not see the institutional studies and reports as an effective strategy for change.

E. Harold Taylor

Harold Taylor wrote How to Change Colleges: Notes on Radical Reform¹² in 1971. It was "intended as a practical book or operating manual on how to put educational changes into effect."¹³ While it might prove helpful for a president of a small college, I did not find its suggestions adequate to deal with the complexities of large institutions such as universities.

¹¹Ibid., p. 211.

¹²Harold Taylor, How to Change Colleges: Notes on Radical Reform (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971).

¹³Ibid., author's note.

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The Academic Matters Council had other questions about the proposal as well. ^{because it} ~~It~~ asked for a university-wide program ~~and~~ felt that this proposal was too affiliated with the College of Arts and Sciences. In response to this objection, the ad hoc committee~~d~~ revised its proposal to call for a free-standing program called the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration. It would have a ~~Director~~ responsible to the Provost's Office. The revised proposal encouraged the participation of other Schools in addition to the College of Arts and Sciences.

The revised proposal was discussed again at a February meeting of the Academic Matters Council. Council members--principally Everett Emerson--were still not satisfied with the program. The issue of the cost of such a program was raised.

In an action quite separate from the BDIC proposal, the Academic Matters Council had decided that it should investigate the cost implications to the University of any new policy or program before it recommended action to the Faculty Senate. Accordingly, it established occasional ad hoc committees for this purpose. Several members of the Council objected strongly to the budget review committees because they felt that the Council should concern itself with academic and not budgetary issues. Because of this difference of opinion the ad hoc budget review mechanism

H. Strong yet changing leadership throughout the decade.

I. A number of institutional self studies; committees on long range planning, and frequent open discussions on missions and the role of the university in society.

J. An overall climate for change. Students, faculty, and administrators felt that it was worth working for change because change was possible.³³

It would, however, be a mistake to oversimplify. Although campus leaders were prepared to place emphasis and "prioritize," they were not ready to become one-dimensional, so the University of Massachusetts remained a complex institution with many missions and objectives. Also, the shifts in orientation from graduate to undergraduate education; and from pure research to applied research, public service, and social problem-solving, were shifts more obvious in the rhetoric than in the organizational structure, the allocation of resources, or the activity levels.

Special Units as Vehicles for Change. The vehicle for change most often advocated and used at the University of Massachusetts was the creation of new programs or centers. Special programs were advocated and created as a means to be responsive to a new student clientele.

