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The necessity for producing educational television programs nationally in order to preserve the national culture in the Arab states: case study of the State of Kuwait.

Rashid Abdul Rahman Walayti

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THE NECESSITY FOR PRODUCING EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION PROGRAMS NATIONALLY IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE NATIONAL CULTURE IN THE ARAB STATES: CASE STUDY OF THE STATE OF KUWAIT

A Dissertation Presented
by
RASHID ABDUL RAHMAN AL-WALAYTI

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

February 1991

Education
THE NECESSITY FOR PRODUCING EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION PROGRAMS NATIONALLY IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE NATIONAL CULTURE IN THE ARAB STATES: CASE STUDY OF THE STATE OF KUWAIT

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Approved as to style and content by:

Robert J. Miltz, Chairperson
Juan P. Caban, member
Maurice E. Shelby Jr., member

Marilyn Haring-Hidore, Dean
School of Education
TO MY PARENTS

I DEDICATE THIS PIECE OF KNOWLEDGE
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Throughout the many different stages of writing this thesis, many people have contributed either directly or indirectly in achieving and conducting this work, without whose help this work probably could not have been possible. In this regard, I would like to express my deep appreciation to many people, but can mention only a few. A great deal of this gratitude goes to my committee members. I feel quite fortunate and honored for the privilege of working with them. I mention, in particular, the chairperson of my committee, Professor Robert J. Miltz, for his continuing encouragement, valuable advice, criticism, analysis, and comments regarding ways to approach my topic from different angles for this thesis. A great deal of appreciation is also extended to the other members of the committee, Professors Juan P. Caban and Maurice E. Shelby Jr., for their critiques, comments, and indispensable support and constant enthusiasm. Special thanks go to my former advisor, Professor Patrick J. Sullivan, and to Professor Raymond Wyman, for their continued support and for being sources of creativity and new ideas throughout my program.

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THE NECESSITY OF PRODUCING EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION PROGRAMS NATIONALLY IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE NATIONAL CULTURE IN THE ARAB STATES: CASE STUDY OF THE STATE OF KUWAIT

FEBRUARY 1991

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This study deals with the phenomenon of dependency on imported western television programs in the Arab states. The primary concern of this study is that the Arab culture is under siege by western culture through the massive importation of western television programs. This influx has jeopardize the continuity of the indigenous national Arab culture since the content of most of the imported materials has no connection with the authentic culture, which needs help in its promotion and enhancement.

The aim of this study is to search for the reasons that cause the Arab governments to depend heavily on imported western programs rather than the nationally produced programs. This study concludes with some suggestions to promote the production and airing of Arab
nationally produced programs which could provide a solution or alternatives to the issue, or at least reduce its impact in order to preserve and promote the national Arab culture.

The study examines and analyzes the experiment of the Arabian Gulf States Joint Production Programs Institute (AGJPPI) as the first professional and successful Arab educational television production and seeks the secret behind its success. The state of Kuwait is selected as a case study for the research, and presents Kuwait television as a model of Arab television systems.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This study is a descriptive and critical analysis of the phenomenon of the broadcast of Western television programs by state controlled television systems within the Arab states. A case study of Kuwait television is presented and compared related state television in other Arab states. A review of literature indicates that state television in the Arab states is not reflecting the indigenous life and national culture. Therefore, state television became a tool of destruction, undermining the national culture by depending on Western programs broadcast on a daily basis. The review of the literature also indicates that studies of this phenomenon are lacking. Such a study should contribute to knowledge about the potential impact of alternative national programs and national production, which would serve to preserve and promote the culture and heritage of the Arab peoples.

The goal of this research is to develop hypotheses and suggested alternatives for appropriate and effective methods by which nationally produced educational programs within state television may be developed and implemented. Such programs would serve the national culture as a viable and preferable alternative to importing Western programs.
Statement of Problem

The state of Kuwait, as well as the rest of the Arab world, depends very heavily on massive imports of western television programs to fill its broadcast time. This practice has had a pervasive negative effect on the Islamic Arab national culture. A central factor in relation to this matter is that all television systems in the Arab states—with few exceptions—are governmental televisions and run very tightly either directly or indirectly by the state governments.

Current figures show that Arab states import from 40% to 60% of their broadcast programs, an average of 50%, and in some Arab states the percentage goes higher, to 80%. The alarm increases when we review the types of programs that are imported. Statistics show that entertainment programs were the predominant types of programs imported—whereas educational programs were broadcast for the least number of hours. The danger the entertainment programs poses arises from the misconception that they may be enjoyed as an innocent pastime, are good for diversion in leisure time, and that there are no particular intellectual or cultural ideas or biases connected with them. In fact, Herbert Schiller calls this misconception "the biggest deception in history."¹ Erik Barnouw, chronicler of American broadcasting, puts it this way: "To me, entertainment is a..."
poisonous concept. The idea of entertainment is that it has nothing to do with the seriousness of the world, but that it fills up an idle hour. Actually, there is an ideology implicit in every kind of fictional story. Fiction may be far more important than non-fiction in forming people's opinions."

The considerable import of western programs originally designed for peoples of western cultures is threatening to break down, if not destroy, Arab people's indigenous culture and to disrupt the cultural continuity of Arabs' heritage. Regardless of the programs' content or original cultural focus, these programs present ludicrously distorted models of western cultural values as distinct alternatives to those of the national culture.

There have been many exhortations in recent years among concerned thinkers within the Arab world pleading for "cultural security" to counter the massive waves of westernization through the importation of western television programs and to prevent further cultural invasion. Arabic researchers are arguing that importing western television programs is an opening of the back door for the importation of western values; they call it "imported civilization" inasmuch as people in the Arab world are beginning to feel alien in their own culture. This situation is causing a dual cultural society, since the values of an alien culture (depicted, moreover, in an unreal, distorted, and
exaggerated way for "entertainment" and commercial purposes) are being mindlessly superimposed on the original one without realistic examination or intelligent criticism. The danger is that people can start to devalue and forget their own national language, art, and cultural mores under the ubiquitous influence of an alien culture as presented to the masses via the television medium. Samir Amin, one of the Arab scholars, noted that "Currently, cultures are vanishing, not because they are isolated but as a result of the double standard in culture. In developing countries, we are observing cultural destruction, and the aim is to impose a western style model by ridiculous and ironic means."³

If we assume that an elementary function of the television medium is to reflect and represent a society's culture, it is obvious that television in the Arab counties does not perform that function, certainly not under the prevailing heavy load of western programming. Douglas Boyd, one of the western scholars who studied television in the Arab countries, noted: "There is very little that is uniquely Arab in Arab world television."⁴ It is obvious, therefore, that television in the Arab states neither reflects the indigenous culture nor plays a major role in the process of development, but has simply been functioning for the most part as an entertainment medium, political tool, and consumptive means for western goods.

In a meeting between UNESCO and the Arab states
Broadcasting Union (ASBU), it was warned that even though it might be an advantage to import ready-made educational materials due to the availability of well-produced materials and saving time and money, should be based on local conditions and programs must be relevant to the society's problems, concerns, and developmental needs. The meeting emphasized the importance of making use of local production elements. In 1978, the Arab Educational Technology Center requested its member states to submit reports on the extent to which they were using educational media materials prior to a seminar held in Kuwait about educational technology in the Arab countries. All the reports raised the issue of educational film production and all countries expressed the fact that they lack capabilities in this field, ranging from equipment, staff and funds, to creative specialists. The reports reflected widespread agreement that imported educational films had not been found suitable for educational programs. At the end of the conference, the member states recommended establishing an Arab institution for the production of educational films.

Teaching and preserving the national culture is a very important element in the process of a country's development. In its 1973 report, the International Commission for Educational Development recommended that people should learn how to enact constitutional legislation which can provide security against spontaneous imitation in the educational
field and against westernization which might be exercised under the cover of technical aids. The McBride Commission states that media and advertisement should be very attached to culture, traditions, and development goals, not attached commercial interests.\(^5\)

The function of television in the Arab states should not be confined to preservation of the national culture but should also be to defend it from any kind of distortion. The present situation is working to foster interest in western civilization at a time when its influence should be mitigated. To open the doors widely for western programming means to put the national culture and its people at the mercy of the giant foreign corporations that produce and distribute the material which is aired, programming which manipulates people's tastes and thoughts rather than fulfills the national government's responsibility toward its people. As Herbert Schiller pointed out, "What people see and read and hear, what they wear, what they eat, where they go, and what they believe they are doing have become functions of an informational system that sets tastes and values according to its own self-reinforcing market criteria."\(^6\)

Studies show that there is a contradiction between educational strategy and television broadcasting strategy, if we assume there is a strategy. Arab educators are accusing television of destroying what education builds due
to the absence of clear and purposeful broadcasting strategy. They are calling for cooperation from the television industry, in an effort to halt the present tendency to undermine the goals of Arabic education. It is undeniable that Arab governments do not have a clear national strategy for television broadcasting. Because imported programs meet neither the goals of national development nor with indigenous people's need, minorities in the Arab states, especially children and women, are being harassed and unsettled by these television programs. Samia Sadik, the Director of the Egyptian television system, one of the leading Arab television systems, admitted that Egyptian television has no clear strategy for selecting some of its programs which are being broadcast.

Programs must be created that give authentic expression of the Arab culture and therefore, the television system of the Arab states need to play a better role in preserving the national culture and contribute to the Arab's cultural continuity.

**Statement of Purpose**

The purpose of this study is to explore the issue of dependence on imported western programming on the part of the Arab states' television industry.

The main question which arises is why television in
the Arab states depends so heavily on ready-made western imports, despite the fact that these programs have negative effects on the national culture and their irrelevance to the process of national development. Why not depend on nationally produced programs reflecting one's own culture and values, as do programs produced in most other parts of the world?

The study intends to examine the obstacles that hinder the improvement of the Arab states' national television production, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The working assumption is that Arab states depend on western programming because of deficiencies and insufficiencies in Arab television production, problems that exist because of the nature of prevailing public policy.

Through the process of answering the main question, the study should answer several other related questions arising from the major question, including:

1. What negative effects do these imported western programs have on the Islamic Arab culture?
2. What have Arab governments done to reduce the import of western programming?
3. What have Arab governments done to improve national television production?
4. For how long in the future will the Arab states depend on imported western programs?
5. What have Arab states done to protect the
national culture?

(6) What is the role of private enterprise in Arabic television production, what is its relationship with government, and what types of problems are they facing which hinder improvement in their production?

**Significance of the Study**

The significance of this study is four-fold. It will examine:

(1) How television can play a much better role in preserving the national Islamic culture in the Arab states.

(2) How television can protect the national Islamic culture by rejecting alien values reflected in imported western programs.

(3) How Arab television production can be improved and be a good alternative for imported programs.

(4) How the nationally produced programs can in many ways accelerate the process of development.

Finally, after identifying the obstacles which presently hinder programs toward self-sufficiency and self-interest on the part of Kuwait's national television industry, this research study will offer suggestions and recommendations for moving toward this goal. The premise of the study is that Arab educators should be in the forefront in advocating and developing changes in public policy and
planning by which the medium of television in the Arab states will help to honor and preserve rather than sabotage the Islamic culture.

Methodology

In order to answer the main question of this research, it is very important to know and understand other issues that are related to the subject, so the main issue can be put in the appropriate context.

This is a descriptive study and critical analysis. To understand the situation in the Arab states, we must understand the situation in the world. Taking a panoramic and comprehensive look at the global media and culture situation and how it functions is essential to understand how other countries are affected with respect to this media system. Understanding the relationship between North and South, developed and developing countries, East and West, is significant as a key to understanding and analyzing the issue under study. There is a very close relationship between the past and present, impossible to separate. To go back to the historical roots of the problem is absolutely essential in order to understand the present situation.

Study of the history and development of television broadcasting in the Arab states and the circumstances under which Arab television has emerged, which to a large extent
shaped the present situation, is also essential. Such a study will lead us to understand the present circumstances surrounding contemporary television broadcasting and how that is affecting the function of television in the Arab states.

Since the main purpose of this study is to explore how to preserve the Arab states' culture, it is fundamental to give an overall description of the Arab Islamic culture and how it is being affected by western television. The case study focusing on the state of Kuwait will be discussed in detail as example of the Arab states in general. A case study was used as the methodology for this research. In this type of research the case study method is very helpful as a general approach to the problem in the whole Arab world. The Arab world is vast, comprising more than twenty states, and it would be beyond the scope of one dissertation to study each one of them in detail. The case study method can provide appropriate and ample guidance for comprehensive understanding and general review of the situation in the Arab world.

Rationale for Use of the Case Study as a Method

The primary concern of this study is to examine the phenomenon of dependency on imported western programs in the Arab states' television. The research method includes
discussion along with descriptive analysis.

A qualitative case study is suggested as a method for this research. A case study method is well suited, particularly in this kind of research, to study a bounded phenomenon. Sharan B. Merriam (1988) noted that case study research should be used when certain questions are raised about a phenomenon and when a certain end product is desired. This method is designed to illuminate a general problem and to make generalizations—to some degree—to look at a situation as a whole. A case study model can be developed to represent the phenomenon and also can simplify the complexity of the research.

Case study research and, in particular, qualitative case study, is an ideal design for understanding and interpreting observations of educational phenomena. McMillan and Schumacher (1984) noted that

The purpose of most descriptive research is limited to characterizing something as it is, though some descriptive research suggests tentative causal relationship. There is no manipulation of treatment or subjects; the research takes things as they are.

Historical research does not deal only with the dead past, but also can deal with contemporary events. In this research, both past and contemporary events will be overlapped. Yin (1984) describes the historical case study approach:

The case study is preferred in examining contemporary events, but when the relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated. Thus, the case study relies on many of the same techniques as a history, but it adds two
sources of evidence not usually included in the historian's repertoire: direct observation and systematic interviewing. Although case studies and histories can overlap, the case study's unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence—documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations.\textsuperscript{11}

Case studies have the advantage of permitting researchers to observe the growth effect, and change in depth. Close analysis of a single Arab state may lead to a clearer understanding of the situation in the whole Arab world and the relationship of variables that affect television's function in the Arabs' culture. Yin (1984) noted that a case study is a design particularly suited to situations where it is impossible to separate the phenomenon's variable from their context.

The goal of this study is to develop hypotheses about appropriate and effective methods to reach a level of self-sufficiency for national television programs in the Arab states. It is hoped that the results of the analysis in this case study could be used as suggested guidelines for future activities in the service of national culture. It is also hoped that an analysis of the case study data will contribute to an increased understanding of conditions that block the improvement of Arabs' television so it would participate in and contribute to the preservation of the national culture.
Selecting the Case

Selection of the specific subject of a case study needs to be done carefully in order to assure that the subject is typical of those we wish to generalize. Therefore, Kuwait television was selected as an analysis unit for this study. Kuwait television is a good example of an Arab television institution for many reasons.

Kuwait television has a fairly long history of broadcasting compared to that of other Arab states. It is the oldest television station in the Gulf region. Since Kuwait is the first state in the Arabian peninsula to have its own television system, Kuwait television played an important role in the development of television broadcasting in the area, and obviously paved the way for other Gulf states to follow suit. The wealth of the government, because of the oil revenue, afforded the government the opportunity to expand the television system technically to the ultimate, developing a modern broadcasting system. Thus, Kuwait has the highest average number of television receivers in the Arab states per capita and the second in the world after the U.S. : 400 sets for each 1,000 people. One of the unique aspects of Kuwait is that the number of television sets are more than the number of radio sets in the state unlike any other country in the world. From a technical point of view, Kuwait television is well known for
its powerful transmission signals, which cover a vast area both in the Arabian peninsula and the Gulf area to Iraq and Iran.

Moreover, Kuwait television is considered a leading production center especially for the Gulf region. Its production is distributed and viewed in many Arab states and all Gulf states in particular. Kuwait is the headquarters of the Arabian Gulf States Joint Programs Production Institution (AGJPPI), which originated the first successful educational series of the Arabic version of the American program "Sesame Street" and other successful educational and documentary productions.

With respect to the issue of cultural invasion perspectives, there is no doubt that Kuwait is falling prey to cultural domination and is a target in this matter. Kuwait is one of the Arab states which has a special channel to serve the non-Arab community broadcast in English called the foreign channel, filled heavily with imported foreign programs, shows, serials, and films which are usually from the U.S. A whole separate channel to serve the "non-Arab community" is a good justification for allowing more imported foreign programs to be broadcast by the state.

As a matter of fact, Kuwait and other petro-dollar Gulf states are more vulnerable to this type of invasion than other less wealthy Arab states, due to the availability of television and VCRs among the people and the financial
capability of the wealthy governments to purchase foreign programs. Kuwait television also overlaps with other Arab television systems through formal regional and national Arab treaties.

The case study chapter will cover a general view of Kuwait as a state, television broadcasting history and its development to the present, the structure of the broadcast system, policies and strategies of broadcasting, and types of programs that are being broadcast. It is in this chapter that the main purpose of this study, the issue of dependence on western programs and the obstacles that hinder and deter national production, will be discussed. From the overall analysis, this study should provide some solutions, suggestions, and recommendations that would help to overcome these obstacles and improve the national production, thus contributing toward the goal of preserving the national culture.

In the case study chapter the experience of producing an Arabic version of "Sesame Street" will also be discussed as a good example of the first professional successful educational programs experience in the Arab states. It can be used as a foundation on which to establish and build national educational television production in the Arab states.
Data Gathering

The purpose of this research is to present an intensive case study of an Arab television model. The methods of gathering data in this research are to study the phenomenon of domination of western programs on Arab television and to answer the questions posed by this research, which will consist of the following:

(A) **Documentary Data**

These documentary data are usually governmental data. They are either published or unpublished documents, some of them formal, some informal. Basically, these documents include the following sources:

1. Documents and reports of the Arab League meetings.
2. Documents and reports of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
3. Documents and reports of Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU).
4. Documents and reports of government of the state of Kuwait.
5. Documents and reports of Kuwait television.
6. Documents and reports of other Arab and regional educational and media organizations.

(B) **Field Data**

These data were gathered by the researcher and cover
the main issues investigated by this research which in turn serve as guidance in data gathering for the research. The field data was gathered because much of the information needed for the research is not available from other sources. These field data include observations and personal interviews.

Observation:

Observation is a primary source of data and a useful data gathering research technique in a case study. In this research, observation will play a main role both in collecting and analyzing data. The observation will cover historical events of the past as well as those carried in the present. The observations will provide descriptions, explorations, and detailed examinations of the whole environment of broadcasting in the state of Kuwait, regarded as a model since Kuwait is part of the Arab world's larger environment.

The observation will trace the historical development of the problem and try to explore the connection between the past and the present. There are many events in the past which can be help us to understand and examine the present situation.

The observation will emphasize the strong attachment between television and western programs by observing the type of western programs broadcast and their negative
influence on the national culture. Also, the observation will include the discovery of the relationship between television and other variables which effect the function of state television in the Arab states. These variables are government, politics, broadcasting policies and strategies, democracy in broadcasting, entertainment, and the structure of broadcasting and how it operates and functions.

As a result of these observations, we will understand why television is not serving to support the national culture. We will, as well, observe and examine positive attempts and experiments of some of the successful nationally produced education programs and organizations, such as the Arabic version of "Sesame Street" series.

Interviews

Another source of data for this study is personal interviewing. Personal interviews are a common means of collecting qualitative data. The importance of interviewing as a means of collecting data is explained by Patton (1980):

We interview people to find out from them those things we cannot observe...we cannot observe feelings, thoughts and intentions. We cannot observe behaviors that took place at some previous point in time. We cannot observe situations that preclude the presence of an observer. We cannot observe how the people have organized the world and the meanings they attach to what goes on in the world. We have to ask the people questions about those things. The purpose of interviewing then, is to allow us to enter into the other person's perspective.12

In this study, personal interviewing was an important method
of collecting data that could not be collected through observations (such as past events that are impossible to replicate). All interviews in this research were direct and person to person. The aim was to collect certain information and the questions were predetermined ahead of time.

Interviews included conversations with top officials from both the governmental sector and private sector of Kuwait. The governmental sector was represented by the Ministry of Information, which is the institution responsible for television broadcasting in Kuwait. Some of these interviews were formal, other were informal. The interviews also covered executive managers of institutions and enterprises which deal with Kuwait television in the fields of production and supplies, importers of western programs, western television companies' franchise holders, educational production enterprises, and people who are involved in educational program production and have expressed a concern about the relationship between television and culture in the Arab world.

The aim was to study the phenomenon in more depth from the various perspectives of people who work and are involved directly on the site of the study and who could observe things that we could not. The main questions of the interviews included the following:

(1) Why does Kuwait television import western
television programs? And is there any need for them?

(2) What do you think about the positive or negative impact of the content of these programs on the culture and the people?

(3) Why does Kuwait television not depend entirely on nationally produced programs for its daily broadcasting?

(4) Is it possible to ban all western programs and nationalize the entire spectrum of programs broadcast in Kuwait?

(5) What obstacles face implementation of national production? How can we reach a level of self-sufficiency?

(6) What has the government done to improve national television production?

(7) What has Kuwait television or government done to protect the national culture through television broadcasting?

(8) Why is there such a concentration on entertainment programs over educational and cultural programs?

(9) What do you think are the solutions and alternatives to importing western programs?

(C) Other Sources of Information

Other sources of information and data were gathered by the researcher through sources which include literature, annual reports and statistics, public and government
documents, minutes of meetings, official and academic research and studies, final reports and recommendations of seminars and conferences, officials' logs, periodicals, journals, and publications of national and international institutions and organizations. Basically these sources are those listed in the bibliography.

Definitions

The term "Arab Culture" is misleading and inaccurate. It has been used very commonly by many authors and writers as a synonym for "Islamic Culture," which is the correct and accurate term, since Arab people derived their whole culture from Islam's teachings and law—the Holy Koran and the prophet Muhammad's life, as the only source generating their way of life.

People, especially in the west, used the word "Arabs" to indicate Muslims, probably because Arabs are the ones who carried the message of Islam to the world in its earliest stages. Arabic, too, is the language of the Koran—the last words of God revealed to the humankind—and the language of Muhammad.

The word "Arab," as well, is inaccurate. At the present time it is very hard to define who the Arabs are and who are not. Historically, the Arabs are those tribes who inhabited the Arabian peninsula after the Marib Dam in Yemen.
burst. They were two major Arab tribes who inhabited the north and the south of the peninsula. Those tribes who inhabited the north were called "Adnani" and those of the south were called "Qahtani", thought to be more purely Arab than the "Adnani," the Arabs of the north.

After Islam was revealed to prophet Muhammad, the Arabs carried the message of Islam to other non-Arab neighboring countries. The Arabs began to mix with people of other races, thus spreading Islam across vast areas of Asia and Africa. People in those countries adopted Islam and started speaking Arabic. The people of Egypt, for instance, considered at the present time a major Arab state, historically were known as a race of Coptic people; the people of north Africa, such as Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, considered at the present time to be an Arab states, are historically known as the Moorish people.

The term "Arabs" is used very commonly by the researcher, not to be racist, but with the intention of defining a certain geographic and political region on the world map which forms the members of the Arab league. In addition to the formal treaties that connect the member governments of the Arab league in connection with their policies and strategies, they also share a common legacy of religion, culture, history, and language. In this respect, the researcher would like to express and affirm his advocacy of Islamic unity.
The term "foreign programs" or "western programs" is used to refer to those programs which are produced in non-Islamic countries in general and whose content does not necessarily harmonize with the rules and customs of Islamic culture. Obviously, I am referring to those programs of western Europe and the United States, who are major producers and worldwide distributors of television programs.

The term "educational television programs" is used not in the formal sense of education but rather in the sense of non-formal education, on the assumption that every television program's content should be constructive as possible, with positive objectives which lead toward accumulating knowledge on the part of the viewers over the long term. The type of these educational programs is not important as long as they represent the national culture and do not contradict the rules of Islam.

**Organization of the Study**

This study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I outlines the framework for the study. Chapter II is a review of the literature. It reviews the prominent literature written on the subject which is the concern of this study, and is divided into two parts. The first part review the English language sources written mostly by western authors and writers, while the second part reviews
the Arabic literature on the subject written by Arab writers and authors.

Chapter III introduces the reader to television in the Arab states and gives general views of media and television in the Arab world. This chapter covers several crucial topics that concern television as a medium in the Arab states such as western influence on Arab television, the government strong control on television, the political function of Arab television, and the characteristic of being a one-way medium.

Chapter IV discusses the main concern of this study of the aspect of television and culture in the Arab states. This chapter illustrates the role of U.S government in homogenizing the world cultures through "made in America" materials. The chapter also illustrates how the imported western television programs affected the Arab culture negatively and how the Arab life style and patterns were changing to western life styles as a consequences of the extensive exposure to western television programs, especially those of the entertainment genre.

Chapter V is the heart and the core of this study. It narrows down the situation and the issue from the Arab world in general to the state of Kuwait specifically as the case study of this research. In this chapter, the situation in the state of Kuwait is discussed in depth through critical analysis in order to provide a thorough basis for the
conclusions of this study. In this chapter many topics are covered, beginning with a brief history of the evolvement of the state of Kuwait to the present and the status of Kuwait before and after the oil era which caused an upheaval in all aspects of life and changed all expectations.

Besides covering the present structure of the state of Kuwait, the chapter makes a critical analysis of the development of broadcasting in Kuwait and its evolvement until present time with special emphasis on the television medium.

The diagnosis of Kuwait television requires tackling of some critical issues such as policies and strategies of broadcasting, censorship, types and characteristics of broadcast programs, and the foreign channel. Most important in this chapter is the relation between television and culture in Kuwait and how western programs played a chief role in disturbing the continuity of its people's culture, and negatively affecting the pattern and customs of the lifestyle of the indigenous culture in Kuwait.

Chapter VI describes and analyzes the successful experiment of the Arabian Gulf States Joint Programs Production Institution (AGJIPPI). The chapter reviews the secrets of success of this experiment which made it the first successful and professional Arab television production, one which could be used as an excellent small-scale model and serve as a firm foundation for a Pan-Arab
television production industry.

Chapter VII presents results, analyses, proposed solutions, and conclusions of the study. In this chapter reasons for dependence on imported western programs are identified. Also in this chapter some of the problems and obstacles that have been hindering national television production are listed. As a result of these analysis, this chapter offers some suggestions and solutions as an alternative to importing, or at least reducing the dependence on western programs while serving to enhance national production. The chapter, is climaxed by the final conclusion of the study, encompassing the recommendations and the out-look for future studies in this field of television and culture which may promote the preservation of the Arab national culture.

Limitation

This study deals with television in the Arab states in terms of cultural dimension only, primarily as a consequence of imported foreign western programs. However, there are other important dimensions in Arab television which must also be studied and researched. The researcher encourages other scholars and researchers to analyze other aspects of Arab television from different dimensions and perspectives.

During the research process, the researcher faced some
difficulties in finding sufficient information and available sources. The researcher had found that Arabic libraries holdings on the subject of Arab media in general and television in the Arab world in particular are scarce and poor. This research concentrates on the state of Kuwait, only as a model. Television in other Arab states should be studied, researched, and analyzed in detail as well.

Conclusion

The television situation in the Arab states is not functioning along the right path. It neither promotes nor protects the authentic Arab people's culture.

The heavy dependence on broadcasting alien western ready-made programs constitutes a very dangerous phenomenon in the Arab television and a negative aspect in its function. This negative phenomenon, which started simultaneously with the emergence of television in the Arab world, has helped to create a dual culture society and which started to threaten the people's ingenious culture.

The peril in these imported programs lies in the promotion of western culture and the implication of the supremacy of western values, which aims in the long run to superimpose western culture over Arab culture. There is an urgent need for drastic reform in the function of Arab television and reconsideration of the type of programs to be
broadcast. Arab governments are requested to make maximum use of television and to make it work in the service of the people's culture and need, not only protecting it but also fending and enhancing it.

The western media invasion through television programs and software must be stopped in order to protect Arab identity. Dependence on western programs must be eliminated. The quality and quantity of national and local production must be enhanced so as to reach a level of self-sufficiency.
Footnotes of the Chapter

1 Herbert Schiller, The Mind Managers, Beacon press, Boston, p.80.

2 Ibid, p.80.


6 Herbert Schiller. p.150.

7 What Educators Want from Broadcasters, seminar, Arab Education Bureau for the Gulf States, Riyadh, 1982.


Chapter II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Introduction

The phenomenon of dependency on western programs is not exclusive to a specific geographical area in the world, rather it is a worldwide phenomenon. Therefore, it is not only an issue threatening the culture in the Arab states but an issue threatening the global cultures in other parts of the world, especially in developing countries where the more they depend on western programs the more the risk exists that their culture may perish.

The body of this review of literature is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the one-way flow of information of western television programs as global issue. All of this literature is English sources and was written by western writers. The second part focuses on the same phenomenon in the Arab states, although some literature pertaining to the first part has touched very slightly on the issue in the Arab states.
Among those first scholars who started to trace and analyze the phenomenon and became extremely discontent and sensitive to the issue is Herbert I. Schiller. In his early work in 1969, *Mass Communication and American Empire*, Schiller illustrated the relationship among different variables of the equation in this matter. Schiller's emphasis was on the strong connection between the American media technology industry and the American military-industrial complex. He sees that American television exports are part of the American military activities which are part of the American government foreign policy to subjugate the world in order to achieve economic goals. Schiller also sees that all these operations are done through a complicated and organized operation network of military, economic, and media systems.

Later in 1976 and in a more specified work about media and culture, Schiller developed his theory of cultural imperialism in his study *Communication and Cultural Domination*. In this work, he explained in more details the role of the multi-national corporations and advanced technology, especially in the field of media, tourism, training programs, and western media curriculum and theory in spreading American culture to the rest of the world since World War Two under the cover of Free Flow of Information.
doctrine. Schiller accused the U.S government of reviving colonialism over the new independent countries through attempting to homogenize the world's cultures and turning it into a global village with the help of its advanced technology so as to exploit it economically by controlling it culturally. Schiller argues that the present global structure of the world information system is unbalanced and unfair and it has been set up to meet the U.S interest only and to match the U.S foreign policy.

In their joint work, National Sovereignty and International Communication, Schiller and Nordenstreng argue that developing countries' national boundaries, national autonomy, and the independence they have gained in the last few decades have been violated and have become meaningless. The new advanced media technology in the age of the direct satellite can penetrate all these boundaries so that the future of these countries can be determined by those who own and control these satellites. The unregulated flow of western programs can impair not only the cultural identity but also the national media policy in the receiving countries. As a result, these developing countries have lost their sovereignty over their national land and have become not only economically but culturally dependent on western products, a situation which threatens the cultural continuity of these countries as long as they are within the sociocultural orbit of developed countries.
There are other sources which relate to Schiller's topic and support his theory of cultural colonialism. A related work is *Picture-Tube Imperialism: The Impact of U.S Television on Latin America*, by Alan Wells, in which he follows and supports Schiller's theory. Wells presented two case studies of Latin America, the focus of his study. Wells concludes that the purpose of Americanization of Latin America television and life style has an economic end according to consumerism theory.

Jeremy Tunstall in his work *The Media are American: Anglo-American Media in the World*, gave a good panoramic and comprehensive look at the media situation, its structure, strategy, and impact on the world, along with a review of its historical development. Tunstall discussed many media issues in different parts of the world. Tunstall argues that the problem of cultural identity is part of a large problem of national identity. Tunstall sees that a country with a high national identity tend to have a strong cultural identity and vice versa. Therefore, he listed as having Africa the least strong national unity in all countries. Tunstall emphasized the relationship between national identity and the role of media.

Another study, by Anthony Smith *The Geopolitics of Information: How Western Culture Dominates the World*, demonstrates the power of American media in all its aspects either in producing, distributing, or disseminating
information all over the world. Smith supports his thesis with number and statistics on the massive amounts of budget expenditures and exports spent overseas to transmit American ideologies. Smith reviewed in a critical manner the old world information order and the struggle for new information order, which was a struggle between governments of the powerful and powerless to maintain cultural domination over developing countries.

Smith believes that the Free Flow of Information doctrine is blocking cultural development and that technology is a primary factor in multiplying the danger of cultural domination. Smith also sees that the western approach of modernization is in conflict with culture and social heritage when applied in developing countries.

Another study by Armand Mattelart, Multinational Corporations and the Control of Culture, emphasizes in more detail the role of multinational corporations in the field of cultural imperialism. Matterlart argues that the function of these corporations is the same function of the colonial governments of the past in dominating and exploiting the wealth developing countries. Mattelart also emphasizes on the relationship between these corporations and the ruling elite in the developing countries.

UNESCO is an active organization in this field. It conducted and published many studies in this issue since it is the organization which sponsored the Free Flow of
Information doctrine. Perhaps the most reasonable and most concentrated study which focuses and exposes in depth the international one-way flow of western television programs was done by Kaarle Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis in their work *Television Traffic- A one Way Street?*. They surveyed most countries and presented a worldwide map of television programs' flow. Unlike other studies in the field, this study went further in analyzing the issue in depth by collaborating with other world scholars to reach a solution. At the end of the study, the authors suggested a general framework as an alternative solution.

A decade later in 1983, a similar updating study was done by the UNESCO as a follow up, entitled *International Flow of Television Programs*. A few more things were added to the study, such classification of programs categories, duration of imported programs, and sources of imported programs—all that in comparison with domestically produced programs. The result of the study indicated no clear changes in the global situation in comparison with the 1974 figures. The imported programs still constituted more than one third of the total time of broadcasting.

Another study published by the UNESCO is *Transnational Communication and Cultural Industries*, by Thomas Guback and Tapio Varis and others. The study's focal point is that TNCs have largely contributed to the cultural flow of programs and to the circulation of materials, in
particular between developing and developed countries. The study concluded that TNCs role have an economic and cultural impact, that they are very active in the media field, and that their role can not be disregarded.

In 1980, the UNESCO published its first comprehensive study of world communication problems in what has been known as "Sean MacBride Commission Report," an effort of two years of research published under the title Communication and Society Yesterday and Tomorrow: Many Voices, One World. The report raised the issue of disparity and the huge gap in all media aspects between developed and developing countries and the issue of one way flow of information which caused a severe damage to developing countries cultures. The conclusion of the study recommended a fairer and more balanced flow of information between north and south, and called developing countries to strengthen their independence and self-reliance through strengthening their cultural identity:

Establishment of national cultural policies, which should foster cultural identity and creativity, and involve the media in these tasks. Such policies should also contain guidelines for safeguarding national cultural development while promoting knowledge of other countries. It is in relation to others that each culture enhance its own identity.

There are two other studies more specialized than the one mentioned above. The first one is Broadcasting in Africa, by Sydney W. Head, in which he surveyed all African countries, including Arab African countries. Head observed
that Africa is facing many problems and media has not been used to its capacity in the process of development despite the huge potential the media can play. Head also criticized the western approach being applied to broadcasting systems in Africa and warned that alien techniques, methods, institutions cannot be exported to Africa without appropriate modification. Head believes that there is an opportunity for creative adaptation based on Africa's lack of information infrastructure, Africa's need to use the media in coping with problems of economic and social development, and Africa's special political demands upon the media.

The other study is Elihu Katz and George Wedell and others, Broadcasting in the Third World: Promise and Performance, which used eleven developing countries as case studies. The study conclusion is that broadcast media and particularly television in developing countries are in general purveying a homogenized brand of popular culture, either copied or borrowed from broadcasting in the west. The study warns that maintaining this situation is certainly destructive of indigenous political and cultural self expression. The study criticizes the structure of broadcasting in developing countries and the control of government. Therefore, they (the governments) did not leave much room for dissent, however constructive, and did not leave much room for the inherited culture values of the
society either.

Katz and Wedell call for more authentic self-expression in broadcasting and assert that broadcasting serves not only the goals of national integration and economic development, but also the goals of culture rediscovery and creativity. Katz and Wedell argues that developing countries' mistake has been in imitating western styles and the solution to that is to establish their own style of broadcasting system based on their own theory, demands, needs, and circumstances.

Boyd A. Douglas is one of the few western scholars who showed interest and studied Arab broadcasting in depth. In his study, *Broadcasting in the Arab World*, he surveyed and analyzed form critical point of view all radio and television systems in the Arab states. At the end of his study, Boyd discussed some of the critical Arab broadcasting problems as an outside viewer. Boyd observed several things that characterized the programs content in Arabic television: massive import of western programs, concentration on entertainment materials, strong control of government, political propaganda, and it is a one-way medium. Boyd concluded that there is very little uniquely Arab in Arab television. Boyd also pointed out that the obsession of predominantly western style images in all television aspects, from equipment, training, production, creativity, theory, and content has caused negative
consequences on the style of Arab television.

Arabic Literature

The second part of the literature I have reviewed was written since 1980. It was very difficult to find a major study prior to that date, in which there are several reasons. Television is still considered a new field in the Arab states either for governments or people. As a matter of fact not too many Arab states have institutions to teach media studies, nor do they seem to wish to have them. Only a few Arab states have academic institutions of higher education, and these are criticized for their inadequacy. There is still a big demand and urgent need to discover television in all its dimensions in the Arab states.

Most of Arabic research are superficial and lack critics and objective analysis. Many of them are purely descriptive survey studies. I am going to review several of the better major studies.

One of these studies is by Awatif Abdulrahman Issues of Media and Culture Subservience in the Third World. In her study, she followed and supported western theories of cultural imperialism of Schiller, Mattleart, and Nordenstreng. Even though she concentrates on the press, she analyzes the issue from a broad perspective rather than a narrow one and tackles the issue in the Arab states as part of a global issue rather than a regional one.
Therefore, she attempts to examine the external factors of the issue rather than the internal factors. Abdul-Rahman focuses on the international efforts to solve the problem between north and south within the global framework but she could not come up with any solutions or alternatives for the Arab states.

In another study more narrow than the first, Abdul-Rahman focuses on the issue in the Arab states. In her work, *The Dilemma of Developmental Media in the Arab world*, she tackled the issue of cultural invasion from the press. Abdul-Rahman concludes that the main dilemma that hinder the media from playing a developmental role in the Arab world is the absence of specific media theory for the Arab world which would fits with its needs and demands. Therefore, Abdul-Rahman presents at the end of her study a general headlines theory for the Arab world as an alternative for western theories. Part of her theory called for preserving national cultural identity through media in a very general statement.

Another study is by Mustafa Masmudi, one of the pioneer Arab scholars in this field. In his distinguished comprehensive work, *The New Information Order*, Masmudi in one segment of his study focuses on the danger of the cultural invasion and the importance of preserving cultural identity. Masmudi also presents a general frame work on how to implement media in the service of preserving the culture.
Masmudi also devotes part of his thesis to the situation in the Arab world. He presents a general evaluation of the media situation in the Arab world and reviews some of the constraints that face media development between the Arab states and within Arab states. He also criticizes Arab media policies and strategies.

Accordingly and as a conclusion to his study, Masmudi has presented for the first time a new strategy of new Arab information order to be applied in the Arab states. The purpose of this strategy is to enhance the performance of the Arab media. Part of the strategy was to counter the cultural penetration through achieving media immunity to achieve what he called it cultural security. Masmudi's strategy however, was still very general and idealistic and could not deal with the existing problems at the existing level. The strategy ignored the existing problems and was set as if the circumstances were ready for such a strategy. Masmudi, however, did not explain how the strategy could be applied successfully under the actual circumstances.

A similar study to that of Masmudi was published by the Arab League Education, Culture, and Science Organization (ALESCO). The study was a report by the Arab Commission to study issues of media and communication in the Arab world which is also headed by Masmudi. The study is called Arab Media Present and Future: Toward New Arab Order for Media and communication. Like other studies, this study was not
tackling television issues in particular, rather was tackling media issues in general. Part of the study brought attention to the threat of massive flow of western cultural materials and their negative effects on Arab culture. The study also called for protecting the national culture and enhancing national media policies and national television production. The study criticized the gap between media institutions and other educational and cultural institutions and called for more collaboration among them. In conclusion, the study presented a general philosophical strategy as a framework foundation for Arab states' national media policy.

A joint work by Yahya Abu Bakr, Sa'ad Labib, and Hamdy Kandil, some of the prominent scholars in the field of Arab media, is titled Developmental Media in the Arab States: Needs and Priorities, and published by UNESCO. The authors criticized the present Arab media policies and planning strategies in general and proposed priorities and planning as a first step for reform. However, some of these priorities were more technical. The study also called for more collaboration among media, cultural, and educational institutions. The study criticized the importation of educational programs and called it a major obstacle to a successful implementation of national development plans.

The report stated that a joint meeting between UNESCO and Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) held in Baghdad
warned that while it might be advantageous in some ways to import ready-made television programs, popular science materials as these were backed by greater production resources and hence might represent cost savings. The scientific materials disseminated should be based on local conditions, make use of local production elements, and deal with issues and subjects that were relevant to the society concerns and its problems, its development needs and plans.

In the field of television, the study suggested a few shallow tips to improve Arab television policies. Once again, the suggestions focused more on technical aspects of television rather than on the content of programs.

In a seminar held in Tunisia conducted by the Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) about Television Production Issues in the Arab States, delegations from all Arab states gathered to discuss the issue of television production. Interestingly, the participants in this seminar discussed the issue of production as an independent issue which has nothing to do with cultural invasion issue or the issue of imported western programs. Therefore, the solutions and suggestions the seminar came up with were empty of any reference to programs' relationship to education and culture or the type of programs to be produced, and concentrated mostly on technical points. The seminar in general concentrated on the solutions more than on the problem, in other words without knowing and understanding the problem.
Thus the solutions they came up with were not in accord with the essence of the problem. Even though the participants have tackled some sensitive issues and solutions, they fall short of examining the basic problems.

One of the most important conferences in this field is the one which was held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The conference was conducted by the Arab Education Bureau for the Gulf States under the title of *What Educators Want From Broadcasters*. In this conference, education leaders up to the level of Ministers of Educations, media leaders up to the level of Ministers of Information, and scholars in the field of Islamic Arab culture from different Arab states discussed the issue of media and education within the context of the Islamic Arab culture. The long debate and argument discussions among the participants have revealed huge gaps and obvious disagreement, discord, and lack of cooperation between media and education institutions in the Arab states. The final report of the conference called for more coordination and cooperation between media and education institutions in the following fields:

1- Unifying goals, objectives, plans of both institutions.
2- Instill Islamic Arab values in programs and curriculum of both institutions, especially in children's programs.
3- Encounter the flood of cultural and intellectual
invasion by two methods:
a- Immunization: by selecting carefully television programs which do not contradict with Islamic teachings.
b- Cure: by encountering destructive values by the use of persuasion in both education curriculum and on television programs.

4- The participants also requested that all broadcasted programs must be in accordance with Islamic teachings, with more concern should be given to Islamic programs.

5- The conference emphasized the importance of reinforcing the Arabic language in both media and education institutions as a supreme Arabic value.

May be the most realistic study and the best of what has been written about Arab television is by Sa'ad Labeeb. In his work Studies in Arab Television, Labeeb criticizes the present function of Arab television, structure, objectives, planning and policies. Labeeb emphasizes on the importance of planning in Arab television policies. Labeeb also presents from his point of view the objectives of planning in Arab television policies.

About the issue of cultural invasion, Labeeb stresses the role of television and other media aspects to repel the current invasion. Unlike other literature, Labeeb is one of the few writers who demands a merger between religion and television in Arab states since religion has been vital element in Arab culture throughout the history, and still
is. Labeeb went even further by saying that religion teachings should determine the general frame work of any television and culture policies. Labeeb also focused on the Arabic language as an important vital element in the Islamic Arab culture as well. Labeeb called for supporting local production and suggested very briefly a few general tips on how that could be done.

Husain Abu Shanab in his study, Communication Policies in the State of Kuwait, noticed that drama programs and entertainment programs always constitute the larger proportion of the daily broadcast programs in Kuwait television. He also noticed that imported news usually range around 60% of the total broadcast news, which was the major concern of his study. Abu Shanab very briefly called for encouraging local production either on state level or on Pan-Arab level to address Arab people's national issues within well prepared and studied media policy.

Conclusion

As we have noticed from the review of literature above, they all share and agree to preserve and protect the national culture through television medium and programs' content. They all called for halting and reducing foreign programs and increasing national programs. However, none of them elaborated and explained how that can be done. This study will address this question of how we can implement
television programs in the service of national culture by depending on national production through discovering of the obstacles that hinder this kind of national production. This study will also suggest at the end of the thesis some solutions as an alternative to the present situation.
This chapter serves as an introductory chapter to the study. It gives a general overview of television in the Arab states and other critical issues related to it. It describes in critical analysis the function of Arab television since its emergence as a medium in the Arab world and the governments' approach and perception of this medium. This chapter gives a historical background of Arab television and the western influence on this medium in particular, and broadcasting in general, since the early days. The chapter also illustrates the relationship between television and Arab governments which to great extent affected its constructive function.

As a consequence of the relationship between governments and the states' television industry, this chapter covers many connected issues, particularly the aspect of the political function of Arab television and the fact of its being a political oriented medium. An important part of Arab political broadcasting and its political orientation is its development in this direction during Nassir's reign, a part which cannot be ignored in the
history of Arab Broadcasting. Last but not least, the chapter covers one of the common features that characterize Arab television, that of being a one-way medium.

The Arab States

The land of the Arab nation is a unique land. People look at it differently according to their individual perspectives. To economists, it is a land of sponge filled with oil. Sociologists look at it as an arena in which modern technology is engaged in struggle with the most deeply-rooted traditions of the past. To anthropologists, it is the land of mankind's ancient civilization. Novelists and film makers imagine it to be a region of desert sand, oasis, and palm trees replete with scenes from the Arabian nights. Politicians look at it as the sixth power in the world. And of course, on top of all that, billions of people look at it as the land of origin of the three major religions of the world.

From a cultural point of view, the Arab ministers of Education in their third conference, which was held in Kuwait in Feb, 1968, described the Arab nation in its final report as follows:

The Arab nation is a single nation with deep historical roots, the Arab people are united in respect of their common land, culture, language, history, interests and will; Arab nationalism is the human, civilizational, cultural, social, and historical reality of the nation and concepts, principles and goals which spring from
and express that reality. The Arab nation has a human and civilizing mission which has been manifested throughout the ages and which has contributed to progress and development and to the building of the World civilization.

From the geographical point of view, the Arab World occupies a vast area which is estimated at approximately 13,738,000 square kilometers, or 10.8% of the earth's surface. It extends over an expanse of 7,000 kilometer, from the Atlantic Ocean in the West to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean in the East, a distance equal to one sixth of the circumference of the earth.

From the demographic point of view, the population of the Arab land, according to 1980 census, was estimated at 172,558,000, for making an average density of 12.5 persons per square kilometer. There is, however, a considerable disparity in this respect between different parts of the Arab World, ranging from a minimum of 1.3 persons per square kilometer in Mauritania to a maximum of 575.1 in Bahrain.

The low population density of the Arab World is attributed to its large desert area, which is estimated to constitute some 68 per cent of its total area. When desert areas are excluded from the calculation, the Arab World's mean population density becomes 40 inhabitants per square kilometer. If the total population is evenly distributed over arable and potentially arable land, the average density would increase to 288 inhabitants per square kilo-meter, a figure greater than the corresponding figure for the United
Kingdom, one which would be regarded as ranking high on a world wide scale. The total population of the Arab World is expected to increase to approximately 295,000,000 by the end of this century.³

While the Arab World constitutes nearly 10.8% of the world's surface, its people count for only 3.4% of the world's population and their share of the world's income is only 1.1%. Per capita consumption of electricity in the Arab World is only 2% of the corresponding figure in the developed countries. The Arab World's energy consumption in general amounts to only 3% despite the fact that the Arab World is the world's largest source of energy.⁴

Regardless of what has been said about the wealth of the Arab World, its total share of the world's income is not commensurate either with its geographic area or its population. It must be realized that the Arab countries are still poor countries, and their resources are in need of development.

Despite the common factors shared by the Arab states, there is also a huge disparity among Arab states, in many aspects. The annual per capita income in North Yemen is $300, while it is $22,000 in the U.A.E, according to 1978 statistics. In educational services, we observe that formal schooling started in some Arab states as late as the Sixties or the Seventies while other states have had schools and educational institutions for centuries.
We find different types of governmental structure in the Arab states (monarchy, republic, and revolutionary), single party system and multi-party system, and we find different types of economic systems (socialist-oriented and free enterprise). States' constitutions vary from one state to another. Whereas some states have temporary constitutions, others have no constitution, and while in some states the constitution calls Islam the state's official religion, others call the state a secular state. In terms of media, this disparity is obvious in the press, radio, and television. Using the UNESCO scale of 20 television set for each 1000 inhabitants, one finds that most Arab states are above that scale with the exception of Sudan, Somalia, Oman, South Yemen, and North Yemen. According to UNESCO figures, Kuwait is on top of the list of Arab states for the highest average availability of TV sets: 400 TV sets per 1000. At the bottom of the list comes South Yemen, with 18 sets for each 1000 inhabitants, and North Yemen with 6 sets 1000 inhabitants, constituting 0.2% only. In terms of the press, Lebanon is the only Arab state that passed the UNESCO scale of 100 copies for each 1000 inhabitants.

Despite of all that has been said, however, about the unity of the Arab states, one should not be too optimistic about this illusion of Arab unity. As a matter of fact, Arab unity around the slogan of what has been called "Pan-
"Arabism" is probably the biggest lie in the Arab history. After decades of calling for this ideology, it turned out to be nothing but a myth. To know more about this, we should look at the practical side.

In reviewing the history of the Arabs, I found no shred of evidence that the Arab people have ever unified at any time under the name of "Arabism". In fact, the first and the only times that the Arab people have succeeded in unifying themselves were under the Islamic dogma. Probably that is why no Arab unity existed before the emergence of Islam.

At the present time, the Arab states are not in accord. They never have been so since the turn of this century with fall of the Islamic Ottoman Caliphate and the emergence of Western colonialism over Arab land— and even after their independence from Western countries. In fact, we observe Arab people's unity before independence during the struggle against the colonialists was much stronger than after independence. There are many disagreements among Arab states' governments; they are usually in constant dispute among themselves and they had never been in accord at any time— and if they did it never lasted long.

While many people believe that the major dispute among Arab states is political, the fact is that the main dispute among Arab states is an ideological one which is more profound than the political; actually politics is part of
the ideology and the disparity among Arab politics reflects the disparity in their ideologies. We find Arab states have different ideologies in which the structure and other infrastructures are derived from this ideology. This differentiation in ideologies was reflected in the media policies and it justifies the constant dispute among Arab states.

There is no doubt that the Arab World is living in an ideology dilemma. The search for an alien ideology as an alternative for its indigenous ideology has led the Arab World astray. All the ideologies the Arab states experience right now are unsuitable for the indigenous Arab atmosphere, they all were exported to the Arab land by the west during the colonial period.

Since the emergence of Islam in the seventh century until the fall of the Turkish Ottoman Empire in the twentieth century, we find that the Arab people have had only one dominant and firm ideology, the Islamic dogma, which has maintained their stability, prosperity, and unity.

Media and the Arab World

Communication in its basic doctrine and principle is not a new form of knowledge. It was known and practiced by the people in the past throughout the ages. But it is entirely new in this age of electronic communication in its
style, methods, content, theories, pattern, and techniques. Media in its modern form as a new technology is a new medium to the Arab World in all its notions and practices. And since the Arab World is still new to this type of technology it is still vague to many people and has been utilized by many randomly in circumstances where other notions and misconceptions interfere with it.

It took the Arab World quite a long time to realize the appreciation of media in its modern form. It has been underestimated by Arab states for a long period of time. The political situation in the Arab World and the Arab-Israeli conflict is probably the main key to realizing the power of media.

The Arab League covenant which was declared on March 22, 1945 did not give media the attention it deserves; in fact, no attention was directed to media affairs. Perhaps this default can be attributed to the lack of Arabic institutions specializing in the field of media; the neglect of Arab public opinion, furthermore the notion of the power of media and technology at the time, was immature. Article # 2, which was about cultural affairs and transportation, has ignored the subject. Gassan Atiyya believes that was intentional, on the grounds that media is considered a state responsibility, and the covenant was trying to avoid any kind of violation to state sovereignty. It was cautious in interfering in any state internal affairs. Ironically, at
that time not too many Arab states had their broadcasting system as yet, and many of them had not gained their independence yet.

It seems that the Arab-Israeli conflict and the aggravation of the political events in the Middle East, and the Arab image in the rest of the World have forced the Arab states to start changing their media policy from state level to Arab league level so as to give more attention to Arab media matters—especially to improve the Arab image politically abroad. However, the Arab League has not given the issue the attention and the boast it deserves. The launch was weak, disorganized, narrow minded, unplanned, had no firm grassroots, and lacked vital factors.

It started in 1954 with a narrow approach by establishing media and information offices in some major cities in the world for the primary purpose of Arab propaganda on the Palestinian question. These offices were called Arab media and information offices. These offices were under joint auspices of the Arab League and Arab ambassadors in these countries. In 1953, a Department of Information and publication was established and, in 1959, the organization of this department was expanded somewhat to include other committees and offices; however, in general, the role of these organizations was limited and primitive and it had no effective activities worth mentioning. Abdul Rahman Al-zamil who studied, analyzed, and evaluated the
role and activities of these offices and organization has pointedly criticized them. Their establishment and operation was not based on a serious clear study and lacked many vital elements in the planning process. Al-zamil concluded that these offices had failed to set a strategy of clear objectives to achieve positive results. He recommended to abolish these offices; however, he attributed the responsibility to the Arab League-- the organization which maintains surveillance of these offices' operations. He charged that it was responsible for an ineffective decision making process, weak policy, and vague goals.8

It was not until January 1964 when the Arab summit tackled for the first time the issue of media in their agenda. Once again the reason was a purely political one. It was because of the aggravation in the Arab-Israeli conflict during the Israel operation intending to detour the direction of Jordan river. In this summit, upon reviewing the file regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, Arab leaders have agreed that media is one of the primary weapons that must be considered in countering Israeli aggression, second only to political and economic weapons. The summit, however, had failed to set a clear strategy for an Arab media framework. But the recommendation of the final report of that summit concerning the subject of media, fall far below the need, and hardly touched on the issue except for one simple and general statement, as follows: " Arab states
must establish the necessary strategy to tackle political, economic, and media issues".  

In March 1964, the first meeting of Arab ministers of information was held in Cairo two months after the summit and according to the summit's recommendation. In this meeting, the Arab ministers set basic alternatives and general headlines for an Arab media framework. Simply, they demanded reorganization of the media department, and more coordination between Arab Embassies and media centers abroad. The goal of all these moves was the Palestinian question.  

Despite the fact that the media issue has been on the agenda of every summit since 1964, no attempts had been made to set a clear and specific strategy and all the recommendations came in general headlines. The second summit, which was in September 1964, recommended the following in article # 10: "Give the necessary commands to ministers of information to set an Arab social strategy for media that assure presentation of Arab issues.". Despite the general brevity, vagueness, and lack of many details, the recommendation is considered to be the first indication from Arab leaders for a certain media strategy, even though this time the summit recommended social media strategy instead of political strategy which was rather unusual and unexpected. Muhammad Masalha believes that the consensus on the function of political media at the time was a premature
among Arab states.\textsuperscript{11}

The third summit in 1965 in Morocco gave the green light to states' governments for more monopolization of all kinds of media forms. The summit urged the governments of member states to tighten their grip and control over the media in their states and to halt the severe air waves hostility among the members in order to improve relations among Arab states. The third article of the final report of the summit recommended the following:

1- Utilization of press and broadcasting and all forms of media should be in the service of the Arab question.

2- Adherence to limiting objective discussion and constructive criticism in tackling Arab issues and halting press and air waves campaigns and all forms of media.

3- Review and revising of the press laws in each state and enactment of legislation that would prohibit any media act which might cause any offence to any Arab state or might directly or indirectly offend the head of states.\textsuperscript{12}

However, all these recommendations did not have the chance to be enacted, and the members could not keep their agreement. Once the summit was over, the Arab states got involved in more disputes and disagreements among themselves through the media, and generated even more severe hostility than before until they all awoke to the tragedy of the Six Days War defeat. The defeat was considered by many a defeat in the media field more than a defeat on the battle field.
Indeed, the Six Days War defeat is considered a major shock which draw a clear cut line in Arab media history. Al-zamil observed an obvious disparity between Arab media activities and policies before and after 1967 defeat.

with the exception of the educated class and political commentators, neither Arab leaders nor Arab people have given a thought prior to the defeat to media affairs beyond the limits of Arab states' borders.\textsuperscript{13}

Al-zamil observes that Arab governments began to think of media more seriously and logically than ever right after the defeat. The Arab Ministers of Information, in their September 1967 meeting which was called exclusively to discuss the defeat—admitted the failure of their policy in the field of media and that these mistakes and shortcomings contributed to the defeat. The participants demanded a reevaluation of the whole situation and reconsideration of the issue. The meeting came up with only one final recommendation by the end of their meeting, reflecting their attitude: "Create a media policy to persuade world opinion with respect to the justice of Arab issues".\textsuperscript{14}

On the contrary, in their previous February 1967 meeting, held a few months before the war occurred, the participants were not enthusiastic about the issue and the final report of that meeting did not mention it.
The start of the first Arab television broadcasting system is not really known. Whereas some writers believe that the first formal Arab television station was built in Iraq in 1956, others believe that there were other private television stations before the Iraqi station. It seems that the first television station in the Arab states began in the early 1950's as non-official beginning when the French and the Americans established the first television stations in the Arab states. Even though it is not quite sure who started first, it is believed that the French built the first television station in Morocco in 1954. Around that time the American Army built another station at Wheelus Air Base in Libya and two more stations in Saudi Arabia. Then, in 1956, the Iraqi launched their television as the first official Arab television.

Television did not start in all Arab states as a governmental television, especially those states which started earlier than others. As we have seen, some of them started in the form of foreign military activity as in the cases of Libya and Saudi Arabia. In some Arab states television started in the form of commercial services, as for example in Morocco (1954) where television began by the French on a commercial basis in Rabat and Casablanca, in Lebanon where the Lebanese Television Company was founded in
1956, and the Lebanon and the Orient Television Company founded in 1962. In Kuwait, television broadcasting was launched by a private station owned by a businessman who happened to be an RCA dealer. In Bahrain (1973), a commercial station whose revenues were derived exclusively from advertising and which was established by the American-owned International Radio and Television Corporation, the government owned 20% of the station's capital.

Television did not start in all Arab states at the same time or even within a short period of time. As a matter of fact we find disparity and a huge gap in time among Arab states in establishing their television services. We see that some Arab states started their television service relatively late compared to other Arab states. Some such as Morocco, Libya, Iraq, and Lebanon started their television as early as in the 1950's. We find that other Arab such as Qatar, United Arab Emerits, Oman, and North Yemen, did not have their television service till mid and late seventies or even in the eighties as the case in Somalia. Sometimes we see a time span as long as twenty five years.

Although television in the Arab states did not start with government sponsorship, all television systems in the Arab states at the present time are under extraordinarily tight governmental control either directly or indirectly, reach the level of exaggeration in all its aspects—
including supervising, directing, funding, control, and operations. In Dubai (U.A.E) we find the only commercial television station in the Arab World; however, even this station is highly supervised by the government. Another special case is Lebanon; television in Lebanon began on a commercial basis with two television companies, both with substantial outside financing. This situation continued until 1978, when the two companies were merged into a single service owned jointly by the government and the private sector. In the special case of the civil war in Lebanon, there exist different televisions stations representing different fighting sects.

Through the years of government control, policies of television has changed slightly. In the early days advertising used to be prohibited; now, most Arab states allow advertising in their television broadcasting even in very strict states such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Even though advertising is permitted, it has to be within a certain limit. Most Arab states do not have a television fee. In some Arab states a fee takes the form of charge added to the electricity bill.

The technical development of television in the Arab states has grown very rapidly in all its related aspects particularly in the last two decades, especially in the rich oil Arab states either in receiver ownership, facilities, training, land coverage, transmission power, broadcast
hours, station numbers, and channels availability.

At the present time, there are more than 116 television stations in the Arab states, some of them linked together in a microwave network such as "maghrebvision". Similarly, stations within a single state may be linked by satellite, as is the case in Sudan and Algeria. The Saudi television network which links a number of cities in Saudi Arabia is perhaps the largest and newest television network in the Third World.

**Western Influence on Arab Television**

Western influence has a great presence in Arab media in general and Arab television in particular. This influence is not recent. When we trace the background of this influence, we find it was going on since the early stages of establishment of television.

Western countries have had a great influence on and played a vital role in introducing and establishing broadcasting in general in the Arab states. It influenced not only television but it also radio, before that. This western influence has continued and still exists, even after the westerners had left the Arab land. In any case, radio and television are considered a western invention in the first place.

This influence began during the colonial era when the
Westerners established the foundation for Arab broadcasting for their own purposes, to be more specific, during World War II when the Allies and the Nazis built broadcasting stations in some parts of the Arab world to spread propaganda for their policy during the war and to serve their own interests as colonists. Obviously, the Westerners did not establish these stations for the benefit of the indigenous people so it would seem that if World War II had not broken out Westerners would not have bothered to establish these stations.

Probably the first words the Arab people heard through the air waves was ...THIS IS BERLIN...and THIS IS LONDON! The British, French, Italians, and the Germans are actually the first ones who introduced broadcasting to the Arab World, each one according to his location in the Arab World. That's why we see the Arab states which were not under western colonialism begin their broadcasting services relatively late comparing to other Arab states which were under western colonialism. Douglas Boyd attributes the late radio service in Saudi Arabia to the absence of foreign influence on government decisions at the time:

There had been no such early need for a radio broadcasting service in Saudi Arabia, as in Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq. No foreign power was at the time influencing government decisions.
Radio

In reviewing history of colonial periods, we observe that the French introduced radio broadcasting to their colonies in the Arab states in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Lebanon. The British introduced it in their colonies in Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Palestine, Kuwait, U.A.E, and South Yemen.

In Egypt, Egyptian radio had an Anglo-American and Anglo-French birth. In 1931, Egypt had two radio stations, each one owned by an Englishman and a Frenchman; both stations were advertising European and American products. Broadcasting occurred in Arabic, English, and French, but English concerts and dance records were in daily use. Thus there was a background of some 25 years of strongly Anglo-American, and French- influenced radio when the Voice of the Arabs began in July 1953.17

Later, the British company, Marconi, set the first pattern of radio broadcasting in major cities before it expanded it services in the following years with agreements with the government. In Libya, broadcasting began in 1939 by the Italians when they established a radio station in Tripoli. The station was called "RADIO MARRELLI" but it was destroyed during World War Two. Libya also experienced a military broadcast service which was operated from both the British and the Americans Armed bases till the 1969 coup. In Sudan, the British began radio transmission in April 1940
from a small room in the post office of the city of Umm Derman, funded by the budget designated for Allied propaganda. The function of the station was to give updated news of the war. The British authorities distributed receivers in the public square to encourage people to listen to the station. The station was expanded in 1942 and two programs were added, one broadcast in English only; the other was for the fighting troops. Once the war was over, the Allies terminated the station's propaganda budget and it almost ceased operating, but British authorities interceded and continued to subsidize the station. 

In Somalia, broadcasting was introduced by both the British in 1943 and the Italian in May 1951 to serve their colonial purposes, since the British dominated the north and the Italian dominated the south. Both stations were broadcasting in English and Italian besides the Arabic language. In Palestine and Jordan, the British built a radio station in 1936 during the mandate authority, one of the early and prominent radio stations in the Arab World. The special concern of the British in this station is due to the Palestine strategic location and because it is the focal point of Arabs, British, and Jews. The station was broadcasting in three languages, Arabic, English, and Hebrew. In Iraq, the Germans had the best stronghold in the Arab world, where they built a powerful station with their gifted, skilled, and talented announcer, Yunis Bahri, to
propagandize for them.

In Kuwait, the British also built a small radio station for the Allies to counter the powerful Nazi station in Iraq for which all program materials were provided by the Germans. In South Yemen, radio started in May 1954 with the local relying station of the BBC Arabic service from London and the Cyprus-based, British-operated station. Programming was broadcast via a transmitter rented by the colonial government from the British telecommunication company cable and wireless.\(^{19}\) In North Yemen, broadcasting began in 1947 when an American delegation gave the ruler at the time, Imam Yahya, a gift of a CB device which could operate as a transmitter; he used this device to start broadcasting despite the rarity of receivers among his people.\(^{20}\) In U.A.E, the British forces brought a radio station for their own use and built it in the sheikdom of Sharja.

In Saudi Arabia, despite the late public use of radio in the Kingdom, the King, acquired from his friend, British Marconi agent H.st John Philby, a portable transmitter that would accompany him when he traveled, to keep him in touch personally with the vast Kingdom and the outside World where he purchased and installed a network of transmitters in various cities in the Kingdom.\(^{21}\) In May 1949, the King had a contract with International Electric Company (IEC) a branch of ITT to build a medium wave transmitter in the Western provence of the country. Later the same company had
another contract to build another station in Jiddah.\textsuperscript{22}

The French were very active in their colonies as well. In Lebanon, in 1937, they constructed two radio transmitters. One medium wave station to operate in September, 3 1938 and a short wave to operate in 1940. Both stations were operated by the French. The purpose was to counter Italian and Nazi German propaganda beamed at Syria and Lebanon from the Arabic division at radio of Berlin.\textsuperscript{23}

In Morocco, the French built a radio station in 1928 during their occupation. In Algeria, radio broadcasting began in 1925 when the French government built a radio transmitter to serve one million French colonists. The expansion was continued, and by the end of the war, the transmission was covering most of the country. It was not until January 1963 when the national government took over the stations. In Morocco, the situation was even worse and it took on a humiliating formal aspect when the French had an agreement with the Moroccan government for a monopoly over Post, Telephone, and Telegraph (PTT). In November 1924 the monopoly was expanded to include all electronic communication. In Feb 1928, the French started radio broadcasting. Under the French protectorate, the mission of radio was to serve French interests, those of the settlers and those of the empire. News and other programs were tightly supervised by the Resident General. He appointed the Director of Radio Morocco. Perhaps that's why radio in
Figure 1. Number of radio sets per 1000 people.

Morocco did not play any part in the struggle for independence. In Tunisia, the French also had a very strong influence. The colonial government broadcast a radio service in 1930 to serve primarily the French colonists. The broadcast materials consisted largely of materials imported from France. Even after independence in 1956 French staff helped operate the Tunisian station and the French channel maintained its broadcasting.

**Television**

In the field of television, the history of its development was not much different than it was in radio. By and large television was also introduced to the Arab World by westerners. Whereas the British and the French were the most active in introducing radio, the Americans had joint the British and the French as a up coming force in introducing television, competing with them, and years later becoming the only predominant force in the field of television in the Arab World.

Jeremy Tunstall attributes the American presence to military and economic objectives "Television, especially, had a very American-influenced birth in the Middle-East. One factor was the early presence of television stations on the Persian Gulf used by the USAF and American oil companies. There was also much activity by RCA, with whom
the United States government was directly involved in establishing television in both Syria and Egypt (as a balance to Soviet financing of the Aswan dam)...American influence has been especially strong in the birth of television in the oil states of the Persian Gulf."

In fact, it is believed that the first television stations in the Arab World were built by the U.S Army, when American armed forces established low-power English language stations utilizing the technical Americans standard for both military base personnel at Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya, and the U.S Military Training Mission at Dhahran International Airport in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) built a similar low power station for its 9000 employees in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia. This station still operates.

The first formal Arab television station, established in Iraq in 1956, was imported originally as part of a British trade fair. In 1966, the British company, Marconi, won a contract with the Jordanian government to build a Jordanian television system. In South Yemen, television was introduced by the British during their occupation of South Yemen. The purpose was to find a means of distracting people's thoughts from the outcomes of the revolution in neighboring North Yemen and from listening to the popular Egyptian radio programs which were attacking very severely the British presence in South Yemen and demanding that
people revolt against the British occupation. The station was destroyed during the struggle against the British and it took the new regime two years to resume broadcasting. In U.A.E (United Arab Emirates), the British started a television company on August 6, 1969 owned by the British company, Thomson, but in same year the regional government took over the station. In Oman, television broadcasting began in November of 1974 by a German company which operated and maintained it according to an agreement with the government. Another Oman station was established in 1975, operated by a British company under contract with the government. It was not until 1979 that the government took over the two stations.

In the North Africa Arab states, it is believed that the French built the first television station in the Arab World and in Africa as well. In 1950, two French firms obtained from (PTT) Post Telephone Telegraph a 50-year monopoly on Moroccan Television to broadcast in both Arabic and French. In Algeria, the French built the first television station during the occupation but the station was destroyed during the liberation war. After rebuilding the station, some radical French destroyed the transmitter in order to prevent the Algerian people from listening to president Degoal statement that declared the independence of Algeria. The French rebuilt the station again in 1963.

In Libya, the U.S Army Forces built one of the first
television stations in the Arab World in Wheelus Air Base to entertain American personnel. In Egypt, the government signed in 1959 a contract with RCA to provide a comprehensive television service for Egypt and Syria. Both were united under the name of United Arab Republic. In Lebanon, the first television station was established with the help of the French and the second television station was established with the help from ABC.28

In Saudi Arabia, there was a very strong American involvement in the Saudi television system, both in planning and operation. Saudi Arabia started its own television service relatively late compared to other Arab states. Until mid 1965, Saudi Arabia was the only big Arab state which did not have its own television system despite the fact that the second television station in the Arab World was founded in Saudi Arabia by the U.S.A.F to entertain Base personnel. Also another station was founded earlier by the Arab-American Oil Company (ARAMCO).

The American connection started when the Crown Prince (Faisel), who later became King made a visit to American Ambassador Parker T. Hart and asked him for help in building a television system. Ambassador Hart passed the request to the State Department, which, in turn, passed it to the FCC. Edward W. Allen, chief engineer came to Saudi Arabia and wrote a report that served as a blueprint for an agreement between the two countries. The Allen report called for the
responsibility of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE), who had already constructed many governmental projects throughout Saudi Arabia. The responsibility was formally defined in an agreement signed in January 1964 by Ambassador Hart and Saudi government. The (COE) chose the American firm of RCA to supply the equipment, and another American firm, NBCI, for the operation and maintenance. COE, RCA, and NBCI continued to carry out the development and expansion of the Saudi television.  

In Bahrain, also, an American company, RTV International, signed a contract in 1974 with the government to operate a color commercial television service, making Bahrain the first Arab state to have color television and the only commercial station in the region. In fact the, station's slogan was "The first color television in the Arab world". The government owned only 20% of the enterprise and had one representative on its Board of Directors. In general, the station was too Americanized. There was no signs that it was an Arab station or operated in an Arab state except for its broadcast of Arabic news. The government assumed operation of the station in 1976 because of its poor facilities and to overcome rumors of a CIA connection with the station.  

In North Yemen, a group of international businessmen headed by an American attempted in the 1970s to gain a government concession to operate a commercial television
service in the capital city San'a, with a percentage of the income paid to the government. Due to the political unrest and military coups which changed governments, such an agreement could not be reached.

Television and Governments in the Arab States

One of the obvious features that characterized Arab television is its strong relation to governments. All television stations in the Arab states are state systems. They are owned, controlled, supervised, operated, and financed by the governments. There is no doubt that Arab governments have realized the power of television as an effective influence by whoever is using it over public opinion. It seems that Arab governments have no intention of giving up this psychological weapon, even partially, at least in the near future.

On the contrary, we observe more and more control and domination because television broadcasting has become part of the national policy. That justifies the tight control of government over television and the absence of even a minimum of public participation. Democracy and television in the Arab states have always clashed with government structure. Herbert Schiller notes that whichever way decision-makers move in any particular situation, the central and unprecedented fact is that information control
Figure 2. Number of television sets per 1000 people.

Figure 3. Distributions of television transmitters on global basis.

has become part of national policy. The techniques of ideational packaging have become instruments for manipulating popular support for (or, at least, indifference to) governmental actions.\textsuperscript{32}

If Arab governments are acknowledging television power at the present time, that was not the case when television first started in the Arab World. It seems that Arab governments have discovered the power of television years after it started in their lands. As a new technological invention, not too many Arab leaders realized its power, which probably explains the existence of private stations in the early years and their disappearance in later years. The Arab states built their television systems relatively late on the scene, which is why we did not see as much attachment between government and television in the past as we do now. The attachment has increased over the years. Governments increasingly paid more attention and manifested more concern about television as the years went by. In fact, television received more governmental attention than any other aspect of media— the press, for example.

It seems that Arab governments were trying to encourage their people to be attracted to television by watching television as the ultimate voice of government authority, since the press is not necessarily the formal voice of the government in some Arab states. We observe that Arab television has developed quite drastically in the
past twenty years, much faster than was expected despite the fact that Arab television started in the mid-fifties and early sixties. Jeremy Tunstall observed that,

An unusual aspect of the Arab-Muslim World is that the weak press tradition, combined with government enthusiasm for television, leads to several countries having television set ownership more widely diffused than daily newspaper sales.  

In fact, one of the main problems Arab television is suffering from is the extraordinary censorship and the unusual government control. At a time when one of the functions of television is to pose government activity, we find virtually the opposite in the Arab world where government exercises censorship of television. In addition to its weakness as an institution, poor human resources, lack of technical training facilities, it also lacks freedom of creativity.

Arab television has often been used as a tool to legitimize undemocratic government systems and in many cases to legitimize illegal government actions, since there are no democratic governments in the Arab states. There are only two types of governments in the Arab states; either monarchy governments or military governments, and they both are undemocratic. Since the state structure is not democratic it was very natural that this would also be characteristic of the states' institutions. Democracy does not exist in television, and criticism of governments, heads of state, and senior officials is prohibited. In fact, criticizing a
Mahmood El-sherif, an Arab media activist holds Arab governments responsible for the abuse of television.

Unfortunately, and because the means of communication in the Arab countries were and still are owned and controlled, overtly or covertly, by Arab governments, these means have been used in certain instances for negative purposes, and in the absence of a free competition for quality, certain branches of the media, like television, not only failed in discharging their social responsibility, but were turned into proponents of harmful pattern of behavior, and even moral decadence.\textsuperscript{34}

The Arab committee studying media issues in the Arab World, in its report, "Toward New Arab Information Order," expressed its deep disappointment in the weak performance function of Arab broadcasting and blamed Arab governments for the deterioration and admitted the low level that Arab broadcasting has reached,

Concerning the core, Arab media has not reached the level that adequately copes with its message in terms of increasing the awareness of Arab citizens, reinforcing his cultural identity, getting him involved in his society's main problems, and contributing to the social development. On top of that, Arab media probably was in many cases the cause of Arab citizen living in confusion and contradiction. Arab media has been utilized in many cases in the service of questionable goals such as sustaining dispute and disagreement instead of reinforcing brotherhood ties of the Arabs, defending the justice of Arab issues, and contributing to development programs of Arab societies.\textsuperscript{35}

\textbf{The Political Function of Arab Television}

Media activists in the Arab World believe that there is a big difference in the content of broadcast messages
some twenty five years ago and those of today. The political content of programs has out-numbered any other locally produced programs. The political programs constitute from 15% to 25% of the total programs broadcast either on radio or television, and the government monopoly of the broadcast media has a lot to do with this political function. The ruling elite in the Arab states has utilized the media for political socialization of their states to instill certain political values promoted by these ruling elites. Usually to increase the public loyalty to the head of state, the political system, and the state structure.

At the present time, if we look at television in the Arab states from any angle, we find that it always relates to politics. That give us the rationalization that we can not separate television from two things, one a consequence of the other. First, we cannot separate it from government and, second, we can not separate it from politics. Jeremy Tunstall, who studied media in Arab states, noted that everywhere else in the Middle East, the media have always had strong political overtones.

The evidence of what we are saying is that wherever we go in the Arab states, we see that television and radio stations are always protected by the army, unlike other states's institutions. And whenever there is a coup, the first thing done is to attack and take over television and radio stations, since broadcasting services became part of
the political system. It becomes the voice of the government, the voice of authority. As a consequence, broadcasting stations become a main political target for every new regime and every anti-governments regime.

After a military coup took place in Iraq in 1958, Qassim became to power. He was well known for his fondness for television and political broadcasting. He was devoted very extensively and exclusively to broadcasting to promote his own personal political philosophy in a way that was much worse than President Nassir of Egypt. His daily television appearance and speeches proved his attachment to television.

In 1963, Qassim was overthrown in a coup and he was killed near the television studio. Ironically, his body was displayed on live television.\(^{38}\)

In 1971 during the unsuccessful bloody military coup in Morocco, a rebel army group seized the radio station and claimed the King is dead, declaring a revolutionary republic government. Forces loyal to the king put down the rebellion after seven hours of battle to recapture the radio station.\(^{39}\) Also the same thing happened during the bloody coup in South Yemen in January 1986. The two struggling groups of rebel forces and government forces lived through days of battles, attacking each other through the air waves.

The battle to capture the television station make the station go off the air for days before the public knew who won the battle. In Lebanon, since the start of the civil
war, each fighting group has its own radio and television station.

Television in all Arab states with no exception has been used as a tool of governments. And it has been always treated and looked at as the private property of the ruling elite and, to be more specific, as a personal tool of the head of the state. Governments have always looked at television as a monopoly tool and they are the only class who have the privilege of expressing their attitudes. The main function is to propagandize for the ruling class and to defend their internal and external policy.

Arab television has been overused in politics and its programs are overloaded with purely political content reflecting the attitudes of certain people. And if Arab governments have assigned high priority to radio and television broadcasting, they have also assigned an even higher importance to the political content of programs. In fact, politics was the main concern of broadcasting development in the early years. As a consequence Arab governments were more concerned in utilizing television in politics much more than to utilize it in social development. And in investing resources in television than in investing resources for any other human and developmental services.

There are some Arab states in which their people are in desperate need for basic human services: however, their governments insisted on giving the top priority to building
luxury television stations. Even though some analysts see that the political phenomenon in Arab television can be ascribed to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the political seething in the Middle East in general, the truth is most of these programs do not deal with Arab issues as much as they serve as propaganda for each state government. State government news always precedes and has priority over national news no matter how important the latter may be. News bulletins always start with the news of the head of state and government officials no matter what the situation is, even in cases of national disaster.

Statistics and figures showed that political programs and news in Arab television occupy the largest portion of broadcast programs after entertainment programs, for an average of 20%. In some Arab states the percentage reaches 25%. UNESCO conducted research in behalf of the Gulf Television Agency to find the reasons why International and Western media do not use their news to the level the Agency would desire; the findings of the study indicate that most of the Agency news does not take into account the common sense of news ethics and norms of the west. It insists on the state protocol news, news which makes no sense to the public, in addition to having a lack of professional principles of news reporting in media broadcasting.

Muhammad Al-Sanousi, former Under-Secretary Assistant for Television Affairs in Kuwait, told the writer in a personal
interview that there are many exciting and powerful events and news taking place in the Arab world, but they are rejected by the international news agencies primarily because of poor and improper coverage.

In analyzing the content of these political programs, we conclude that these programs usually aim to do the following:
1- gain people's loyalty to the head of state.
2- Praise the political structure and the ideology of the state.
3- Praise the performance of the government.
4- Defend the internal and external policy of the state as the level of perfection.

**Political Broadcasting Under Nassir**

In studying media within Arab states, one can not ignore the role that Egypt under Nassir had played in the development and shaping of Arab media, especially in the field of political broadcasting, regardless of the negative aspects of this role. It is beyond the scope of this paper to cover this role in detail, however, it is unfair to ignore it totally. Inevitably, one must touch on the political aspect of this role.

Perhaps one of the sharp turning points of Arab government involvement in broadcasting was in the 1950s when
Nassir of Egypt came to power. When for the first time in the Arab World the political broadcasting phenomenon was launched as the main function and the clear, strong, and formal relation between government and broadcasting was established.

Nassir was the first Arab ruler to monopolize not only radio and television but the press as well, through what has been called "nationalization of the press". With that, he announced the official attachment between government and broadcasting. Since Nassir came to power, he caused an upheaval within the Egyptian broadcasting system which afterward became a pattern for other Arab states:

1- For the first time in the Arab World Nassir put broadcasting under direct government control through a ministry of national guidance which later became in the Arab states the ministry of Information.

2- He showed his appreciation of broadcasting by giving special attention to developing broadcasting performance, and increasing the number of employees and technicians.

3- Increased transmission hours and variety of programs.

4- Increased transmission power to cover not only Egypt but also the Arab World to achieve political purposes. In less than ten years transmission power increased 28 folds.

5- Increased and expanded external services.

Nassir set the first and the best example of how to devote broadcasting to personal propaganda and politics and
how to use it both as a personal and as a government tool in the Arab World; which was followed later by all other Arab governments. Nassir played a major role in spreading the political broadcasting phenomenon throughout the Arab states, which was heretofore unknown; at the very least, he helped to accelerate this type of expansion.

The role of broadcasting as an important and a vital political force for transmitting ideas, mobilizing masses, shaping public opinion, and reaching out to people was invisible for Arab rulers until they awoke to hear Nassir's voice endeavoring to topple their monarchies, especially those of Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, during what has been called of the Air Waves War. Nassir also called for Arab liberation from Western colonialism in some Arab states such as Algeria, Oman, and South Yemen. Nassir triggered the first spark through his popular and powerful station, "Voice of The Arabs" which was actually "Voice of Nassir" and through the voice of the legendary and most skilled announcer of all Arab times and Nassir's spokesman "Ahmed Sae'id", the Walter Cronkite of the Arabs.

The fast success and the amazing growing of the popularity of the "Voice of the Arabs" program among the people caused its broadcast hours to jump from half an hour a day, when it first began in July 1953 to seven hours in July 1954. In 1962 the average broadcast hours reached 22 hours and 15 minutes, and grew to 24 hours in 1970.42
For so many years, Egypt had been the knowledge center for the Muslims and Arab World. At the turn of the century, Egypt became a major source of printed media and films for the Arab states, and with the launching of the "Voice of the Arabs" station, Egypt completed its role as a center of electronic media for the Arab states.

Nassir for the Arab World had played the same role that Hitler did for Europe. If Hitler realized the power of radio to manipulate people's thought before other Western leaders did, Nassir also realized the power of radio and television before other Arab leaders did. Nassir suddenly became a voice that attracted the attention of the Arab people through air waves. He was the first Arab figure to master broadcasting as a political medium taking advantage of the Arabic culture as an oral culture. Nassir's smart utilization of broadcasting was not only directed against Arab rulers in other Arab states but also against his own people who opposed his regime and his personal enemies outside Egypt, a practice which was followed as an example by other Arab leaders. Egypt is considered a pattern with a special effects in terms of political programs. In the fifties, the Egyptian regime concentrated primarily on radio; in the sixties increased attention was concentrated on television as an additional tool to reach out to audiences; Nassir used both radio and television to evoke enthusiasm and was promoting people's advocacy of his
political and economic changes. He also used it to develop contempt for the regime's enemies he was fighting, domestic as well as foreign enemies.44

Nassir's voice succeeded very quickly and powerfully in attracting audiences all over the Arab states in an attempt to export the Egyptian revolution model to other Arab states and to gather Arab people around his ideology. He makes himself an Arab national hero through broadcasting, especially after he raised his slogan for Arab Unity through his famous racist movement, "Pan Arabisim".

For so long, Nassir's station was calling Arab people to topple their monarchy government regime and to set up a revolutionary governments especially in states such as Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, accusing them of loyalty to the west. The quick and positive responses to Nassir's calls in Iraq and North Yemen amazed Arab governments and made them realize, probably for the first time, of the power of broadcasting in mobilizing people politically. Arab governments found themselves unable to counter Nassir's station due to their lack of powerful transmission and skilled personnel. During the vicious campaign from Nassir's station attacking the Iraq government; the Iraqi government petitioned the American Ambassador to Iraq with an urgent request that the U.S supply high-power short and medium-wave transmitters in a matter of days or few weeks at the latest because Iraq's
transmitter's were too inadequate to match Nassir's signals. In 1958, as a result of Nassir's calls, a bloody coup took place in Iraq. The full credit may go to Nassir's station and its mouthpiece, Ahmed Sae'id.

The fast success and powerful advancing of Nassir's station took other Arab leaders by surprise. Its threat extended to other Arab governments which were in dispute with him ideologically. After the early and fast result in Iraq, the Nassir station made the same demand to the people in other Arab states there were where also positive results in Algeria, Libya, and South Yemen. That was a sufficient signal to other Arab governments of the threat of broadcasting to their regimes. All of a sudden, the Arab governments found themselves at a critical disadvantage.

In an attempt to repel Naasir's station and to deter their people from listening to his provocative commentators, Arab governments that opposed his ideology started to accelerate establishing their own broadcasting systems to emulate him politically in order to distract their people from listening to him. In fact, one of the reasons that the British-introduced television in South Yemen is to distract people from listening to Nassir's station. Also, Arab governments which were proponents of Nassir's ideology and witnessed the success of his station and admired the popularity of his broadcasting strategy were eager to develop their own systems following his pattern.
Meanwhile, after witnessing the popularity and the over-whelming success of his station, Nassir was eager to develop the power of his broadcasting system to make sure that all Arab people, either in Asia or Africa, could hear his voice. During the Yemen War, Nassir distributed 100,000 transistor radios sets to ensure that the "Voice of the Arabs" would reach Yemeni tribesmen. Nassir wanted his voice to reach the people not only in the Arab World, but also the people in the Third World as well. Between 1952 and 1971 Egypt expanded its radio transmission power seventy-fold, ahead of both France and Japan in hours broadcast. Since 1953, Egypt started broadcasting to Indonesia, India, and Pakistan. And in 1954 it started broadcasting to Turkey, Iran, and East Africa. Broadcast hours jumped from 86 hours a week in 1953 to 339 hours a week in 1960. Broadcasting under Nassir has expanded tremendously. In 1962, a United Nations report classified Egypt radio as the World's largest and powerful external service in daily transmission hours after the Soviet Union (RM).

In addition to Nassir's success in utilizing broadcasting for political reasons to mobilize people in order to achieve his goals, other circumstances helped him to reach them:
1- Nassir was the first Arab ruler to appreciate the power of media and he took advantage of broadcasting both as a new
technology and as a double-edged weapon. He could reach his far away Arab audience in Asia and Africa by radio waves, which the printed media could not do. Nassir did not want to attract only the literate elite Arabs, but also the illiterate masses at the bottom of the pyramid. The enormous number of illiterate Arabs did not have to know how to read to listen to his programs.

2- He used broadcasting as a means of crossing national borders, whereas printed media could be easily banned by those who opposed his ideology; jamming techniques were not available at the time.

3- Nassir seized upon the opportunity that none of the Arab rulers appreciated media as he did and not all Arab states had their own broadcasting system; their people had not yet begun to pay much attention to broadcasting, and even when their governments did have stations, they were not as powerful and popular as Nassir's.

4- As mentioned earlier, Nassir took advantage of the Arabic language as an oral language, by which he could communicate with his audience very strongly and with emotionally overtones to provoke and stimulate them.

5- The peak of political unrest in most Arab states during the 1950s and 1960s helped Nassir to succeed to a great degree, since most Arab states at that time were still under Western colonialism and had not yet gained their political independence. Their states had not been really defined yet,
the struggle of power was continuing among different factions, none of the regimes were firmly established, and there was an absence of prominent charismatic leaders who could rival Nassir. The Egyptian revolution, as the first major revolution in the Arab World against the British, was the first spark of rebellion against colonialism in the Arab states. Nassir was trying to transmit this spark through the broadcasting programs beamed to other Arab states, promoting the Egyptian revolution as an ideal for similar expected revolutions to model themselves after.

Thus, Nassir was the first to capture and attract the first generation of a government political broadcasting audience long before any other Arab leaders did; competition was then created among other Arab governments to capture as many audiences as they could to attract them to their side. As a result, politics and government propaganda became a major factor in establishing broadcasting systems in other Arab states either to support Nassir's ideas or to counter propaganda from him. Basically, it is fair to say that the emergence of broadcasting in the Arab states was due to a cause not a need. Even after the introduction of television, this political function of broadcasting has automatically shifted as a natural consequences from radio to the newly introduced medium, in which this notion became even more developed than it was in radio.

As a result of other Arab states' reaction to Nassir's
station which had set the first and best example for devoting broadcasting to propaganda for his regime; other Arab governments followed exactly the same pattern setting up the first priority and the ultimate objective of their broadcasting system to be propaganda for their regimes. Perhaps that is why we see all Arab televisions broadcast are filled with political programs and news which propagandize for the government and the regime, making television the voice of government only. Also, Nassir's tight grip and centralization of control of the broadcasting system, his direct daily control and supervision, together with his strategy and technique in attacking his enemies, was followed by other Arab governments.

It was years before the Arab people discovered that Nassir's political broadcasting was based on fraud and illusion and that they were being used for his personal objectives. The relation between Nassir and his political broadcasting finally collapsed and came to an end when he lost his credibility; the Arab people who had been listening to his stations and his emotional voice for years lost their belief in him. For years he had been promising the Arab people to bring them triumphant victory over Israel, and for years had been promising to unite them very soon around his ideology. They finally discovered his lies and that they had been fooled by the overtone of his speeches all these years. Probably one of his biggest lies that neither history nor
The facts could hide was perpetrated when he told the Arab people during the Six Days War that he had crushed the Israeli army and that he had won the war he promised the Arabs; his own people discovered a few days later from the enemies' stations that they had lost the war in one of the most humiliating and shameful wars in Arab history.

**One-Way Medium**

The basic concept of any communication medium is that it is a two-way medium between the sender and the receiver, or at least it should be. If either side did not communicate or did not communicate properly, then the communication will be ineffective or less effective. The fact is that the effectiveness of communication depends upon the interplay and the interaction among the participants. The variable degrees of communication usually cause miscommunication and then misunderstanding which harm generally the degree of effectiveness in getting the content of the message across. Television as a medium can not only send messages, but can also facilitate two-way communication involving people's participation.

Studies have shown that one-way communication methods are ineffective. Everett Rogers explains why:

Self-development implies a different role for communication than the usual top-down development approach of the past. Technical information about development problems and possibilities and about
appropriate innovation is sought by local systems from the central government. The role of government development agencies, then, is mainly to communicate in answer to these locally initiated requests, rather than to design and conduct top-down communication campaigns. Key elements in self-development approaches are participation, mass mobilization, and group efficacy, with the main responsibility for development, planning and execution being at the local level.50

If we try to apply this notion to television in the Arab states, we find that governments' approach to television is simply a "one-way medium,". Meaning it functions only as a sender; as a consequence it became useless and mal-functioning and lacks interaction. Sydney Head comments on this point:

Part of the reason for the lack is that officials of some governments still tend to regard broadcasting as a one-way medium. They see it as a means of issuing directives, orders, fiats, or edicts, rather than a means of establishing a dialogue. They see it as a way of imposing conformity, rather than as a means of developing consensus; as a weapon of propaganda, rather as an avenue of enlightenment. Such officials use the national broadcasting service as a personal megaphone, rather than as a device for responding to the wants and needs of those at the receiving end. This one-way approach on the part of high officials demands broadcasters as professionals..though their generally low status is also a function of the recruitment and training process.51

The above statement applies exactly to the situation in the Arab states. Arab television does not establish a dialogue, nor does it develop consensus. Rather than enlightenment, it is an avenue of black-out in the Arab states, and a one-way device which does not responds to the needs of the people at the receiving end. Everett Rogers sees that the lack of authentic contact and understanding
between the source of communication and the receiver is likely to nullify the effects of whatever is transmitted through media. Lack of feedback, Rogers says, results in "remedying where there is no pain" He notes that:

the inadequate communication between elite and masses may...lead to conflict in which the frustrated masses seek to communicate their needs by more violent expression. Perhaps the high rate of political instability in less developed countries in the 1960's...is a manifestation of the communication gap between elite and masses. One reason for the frequent failure of elite- directed programs of change is that we know so little about the traditional audience.52

Yahya Abu Bakr and others believe that many Arab scholars attribute the phenomenon of fundamentalist movements in some Arab states to the weak content of the religious message communicated by the media. Therefore, several Arab states are currently conducting a comprehensive reexamination of the complementary roles of mosque and the media.

Television does not create an immediate response and feedback, but that can be done through audience research measures to test programs' effectiveness among viewers and to evaluate the communication level with the receiving end, so as to be aware of the needs of the society and to evaluate the performance of the television system as a whole. The benefit of this kind of research will be for both sides, the sender as well as for the receiver. Perhaps this is one of the negative sides of Arab television. Since the emergence of television in the Arab states, almost
no serious study or research has been done to test viewers' feedback in any of the Arab states. As a matter of fact, no such study has been made before establishing television in any of the Arab states to find out people's and society's needs which could be addressed by television service. A neutral and objective study of the results of government control of the Arab media ..on balance..was used more for limited political ends than for social or economic development.\(^{53}\) Apparently governments are not concerned about the needs and the problems of the receiving end, which also means that governments are less concerned about the development process. Thus, there is no way that content of programs can be changed and adapted to meet people's and society's needs.

Many media managers believe that by themselves they have the ability and knowledge to provide a well-rounded broadcast schedule that include news, entertainment, and educational programming. For them, the statement by former French broadcast official Arthur Conte, "I am the public" applies".\(^{54}\)

Wilbur Shramm has emphasized that the media should not be used merely to transmit orders from a ruling elite to its charges, but as a channel of communication through which the people can participate in national government and in development planning.\(^{55}\)

Ignoring the other side's opinions has led, accordingly, to many other secondary phenomena within the public themselves. Since television does not reflect
society's needs but reflects the needs of the ruling elite, it became very logical for viewers to look at television as a medium of monotonous programs. Studies indicate that the Arab states are the World's largest market for VCRs. This supports the argument that Arab viewers are not satisfied with the types of programs offered by their government's televisions. Turning to a VCR is a reflection of dissatisfaction. Therefore, viewers' stimulation is essential to get the sender's message across. As long as there is no stimulation for viewers, then there is a gap between the sender and the receiver with no message getting across. Consequently, the medium becomes worthless.

Arab viewers have also turned to foreign stations, home satellite dishes, and external service programs as their sanctuary for seeking satisfaction and truth. External services are very popular in the Arab states. There are more than forty foreign stations broadcasting in Arabic. This issue is a national tragedy in itself, considering the fact that their own government had lost its credibility with the people who trusted foreign sources more than their national government sources, and despite the fact that these foreign sources are not as authentic and reliable as most Arab people believe— especially when these foreign sources have for a long time been considered by the Arab people as implacable enemies and as their former colonists. Very often these foreign sources present untrue reports and
news and programs aimed at distorting images of the Arab states, taking advantage of their credibility to the Arab people.

However, it seems that the Arab viewers can not accept the official stories any longer where truth is hidden and criticism of government and officials is not only unacceptable but also prohibited. People in the Arab World have started to realize that praising government officials as the level of perfection does not alleviate their suffering as a result of their being starved for learning.

All these factors have combined to create a mistrust between people and governmental television. Perhaps the beginning of this mistrust was in 1967, right after the Six Days War when they were told that they were winning the war against Israel and the Arab people awoke to the fact, broadcast a few days later the foreign external services programs, that they had lost the war. After the bitter truth had manifested itself from foreign sources, people realized that government officials' stories are not dependable. This type of situations has created animosity between Arab governments and foreign external services, especially during crucial political events. Usually Arab governments overcome this problem by jamming these stations.

John Merrill sees that this peculiar relationship between broadcasting, government, and people in developing countries happens only during the early stages of
development where national leadership does not really want a mass media system except for the elite communication:

In fact, the leadership elite feels that mass communication is a danger...not an asset...little attention is given to the masses...to their participation in government, in their literacy, in their "rights to know" and all such things. All this comes at a late stage, when the nation is fairly established, stable, and has what is considered by the elite a viable political and economic base.\textsuperscript{56}

Merrill's point is somewhat theoretical if the problem is a matter of time. Experiences have shown that developing countries have been in the same situation for decades and decades, and the time Merrill speaks of has not yet come. On the contrary, one observes no improvement as time goes on but becomes more and more deteriorated. Perhaps, Merrill is speaking of the natural process of development under natural circumstances. Wilbur Shramm, however, observes that governments approach as a one-way medium is intentional and they sustain it on purpose. He notes:

The governments of the Third World countries are not unaware of the power and value of the mass media, but at the same time they realize that the media can be very important in maintaining popular support and in encouraging people to obey the government. They also seem to concentrate their use of this power in the area of transmitting orders from the ruling elite to the general population, instead of using it to permit the masses of the people to participate in the national government and in development planning.\textsuperscript{57}

Lack of democracy in Arab television is a reflection of lack of democracy in the political system of the states in the first place. Since no democracy exists in the government political structure, it is very natural that
there be no democracy in the government infrastructure. Also centralization of television is part of the centralization of the government structure.

Generally, the phenomenon of one-way flow of television programs is not only a state phenomenon but it a global one as well. Television programs flow internationally in one direction and from top to bottom, from developed countries to developing countries. These programs also flow on the state level in one direction, from those who have access to the medium to the masses of people.

**Conclusion**

Television in the Arab states is ineffective, not functioning well, not playing an important role in the development process, and has a marginal role. Many reasons can be counted for this situation. The western influence in Arab television since the days of establishment is very evident in determining its function. The role of Arab governments, however, in this matter has a lot to do with this state of affairs and holds a great deal for responsibility of reaching this level of deterioration.

The chapter has supported the view that the Arab governments' approach and comprehension of the medium is the main question. The chapter has covered several critical issues associated with this misconception which has led to
other minor issues. Some of the outcomes of the governments' misconception that the chapter has covered were governments' strong control of the medium, the political function of Arab television, and the fact of being a one-way medium, and the lack of freedom and democracy in television programs' content.

While Chapter III covered these aspects of television and governments, it definitely didn't cover all issues. Chapter IV, however, will be concentrated on the relation between television and culture in Arab states and other issues not covered by Chapter III. The next chapter will discuss in more detail the other aspects of Arab television and its role in respect to Arab culture.
Footnotes of the Chapter


2 Ibid.

3 Ibid. Quoting from Khamis Ta'mullah The Arab Population Situation and its Demographic and Social Effects, a paper presented at the second meeting of planners and those responsible for communication to study the preparation of an Arab strategy for communication for development. Damascus, October 1981, Arab Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization.

4 Ibid.

5 AL-masmudi, Mustafa, New Information Order, National council of culture, Arts, and Literature, Kuwait, 1985, PP.237-238.


7 Ibid, PP.242-243.


9 Masalha, Muhammad , Studies In Arab Media, Gulf States Information Documentation Center, series #3 Baghdad, 1984, P.14.

10 AL-masmudi, Ibid, P.243

11 Masalha, Ibid, P.16

12 Ibid, P.18.

13 AL-Zamil, Ibid, P.8


19 Boyd, Ibid, P.100.

20 AL-hilwani, Ibid, P.158.

21 Boyd, Ibid, P.120.


25 AL-hilwani, Ibid, p.79.


27 AL-Eweini, Muhammad A. *Arab International Media*, Anglo-Egyptian Book shop, 1st addition, Cairo, 1984, p.38.

28 AL-hilwani, Ibid, p.60.


30 AL-hilwani, Ibid, p.95.


38 Boyd, Ibid, p.112.


42 AL-hilwani, and AL-abd, Ibid, p.402.


49 Imam, Ibrahim, Radio and Television Media, Dar AL-Fikr AL-Arabi, 2nd addition, Cairo, 1985, p.280.


52 AL-Harithi, Ibid, p.78, quoting from Everett Rogers and Floyd Shoemaker, Communication of Innovation, the Free Press, N.Y, 1971, p.84.

53 AL-Harithi, Ibid, p.78


56 Head, Ibid, pp.334-335.

57 Shramm, Ibid.
Chapter IV

TELEVISION AND CULTURE IN THE ARAB STATES

Introduction

This chapter touches on the main concern of this study, discussing the heart of the problems as they relate to the connection between television and culture in the Arab states. Whereas Chapter III dealt largely with the relation between television, governments, and politics, this chapter, concentrates primarily on the type and content of broadcasted programs of Arab television. First of all, the chapter illuminates the role of U.S government policy in homogenizing the world cultures through "made-in-America" media materials and massive export of U.S television programs, and through the Free Flow of Information doctrine.

The chapter then illustrates the impact of television in the Arab people's culture and the impact of the content of the imported western programs in affecting negatively the original Arab culture. These negatives effects were reflected in people's mentality and shifts from an Arab life style to western life styles and the daily life practice, as a consequence of the large exposure of western programs. This chapter emphasizes on the role of the imported entertainment programs and the foreign channels as a chief
carrier of alien western ideas. All these combined aspects seriously threaten the continuity of the indigenous Arab culture.

**General Perspective**

Any study of television in the Arab States, should not confine itself to superficial measures such as the availability of numbers of television receiver sets per capita, the type of transmission service (whether it is black and white or color), number of transmission stations, number of transmission hours, number of availability of channels, and other hardware measures. It should go beyond these limitations to include essential factors such as type of programs broadcast and their relation to the society's needs, the level of interaction between broadcast programs and receiving audience, the percentage of locally and nationally produced programs, the percentage of foreign imported programs, the type of these imported programs and their relevance to the needs and demands of the Arab societies, the function of television in general and how its performance is contributing to the national culture and how well its programs serve the needs of the society.

The concern of this study, the relation between television and culture, is the main focal point to be addressed. It will review and evaluate the extent to which
television has served the national culture and whether its programs have contributed to the indigenous national culture. In this regard, the content of programs is actually what counts; it is the most important element in the communication process. "The content of the programming is all that really matters, for what is broadcast may determine, in large measure, the cultural outlook and the social direction of the new nations of generations."\(^1\) It also reflects the state's television policy since state television is the voice of the government. Therefore, programs' content will be the focus of our discussion.

The U.S Cultural Impact

After the Second World War, the United States emerged as a new super power of what has been called the" American Century". But unlike other super power countries, the United States was distinguished from other super powers. It was not only in terms of military force, political, and economic but it also added one more super feature that set it a part from other super powers, and that was its advanced and sophisticated electronic communication power reflected in all aspects of electronic media, especially in the field of commercial television programs. The United States through its media center -Hollywood- became the globe's largest source for producing and distributing media software
programs in a massive quantity for the rest of the World.

It took governments and scholars years before they began to realize the peril of this phenomenon after it manifested itself as a new imperialistic power, after it became clear to the international community that this phenomenon is a threat to the globe's indigenous cultures. It was not until decades later when the issue of the threat of American media as a global phenomenon became an international one. New terms, terminology, phrases, and expression began to arise concerning this issue of "cultural imperialism", such as "Cultural invasion", "electronic global village", "cultural alienation", and "imported civilization". Many studies and much research have been conducted on the issue, especially in the last decade. Many seminars and conferences under international organizations have discussed the issue, demanding a safeguard of their cultures and new world information order which would be balanced and just.

One of the early scholars who warned of the threat of the American media is Herbert I. Schiller. In his early work, MASS COMMUNICATION AND AMERICAN EMPIRE, (1969) Schiller argues that the powerful American media is part of the American military industrial complex which would dominate the world to achieve economic purposes. The American military build up was simultaneous with and extremely relevant to the electronic communication
technology industry built up through the giant multi-
national corporations, especially in the field of space
satellites. Schiller reaches the conclusion that the
invasion of "made-in-America" products is not a matter of
casual coincidence but rather an international well-
organized conspiracy planned for years as a long term
strategy of the U.S government foreign policy to dominate
the world.

The U.S had to put an incredible effort in this matter
to monopolize world's media. To do so they had to invent
what has been called the "Free Flow of Information" doctrine
and "worldwide access to news". The U.S launched a
comprehensive campaign and spared no effort to get it
recognized and backed up by international organizations.
However, the U.S first had to break the European monopoly on
the world's information, which took them two decades, their
power eclipsed that of Europe after they began utilizing the
space satellite as a new communication medium.

Schiller observes that the "free flow of information"
doctrine began with the emergence of the U.S as an colonial
power, not after the Second World War. The principle served
as an excuse for breaking the British and French Empires'
monopoly targeted by American media which accused them of a
world information monopoly and of distorting the American
image by confining their coverage of America to Hollywood
scandals, violence, rubbery and crimes in Chicago.
In 1914, Kent Cooper, former executive manager of the Associate Press published a book, *Barriers Down*, criticizing the international grip of the European news cartels, the first public official statement summing up the U.S policy came immediately after the war. William Benton, the Assistant Secretary of State (who was to become a U.S Senator), outlined, in a State Department broadcast in January 1946, the government position on the meaning of freedom of information:

> The State Department plans to do everything within its power along political or diplomatic lines to help break down the artificial barriers to the expansion of private American news agencies, magazines, motion pictures, and other media of communication throughout the world.... freedom of the press and freedom of exchange of information generally- is an integral part of our foreign policy.\(^2\)

John Foster Dulles, the former Secretary of State declared that "If I were to be granted one point of foreign policy and no other, I would make it the free flow of information."\(^3\)

In June of 1944 the directors of the American Society of Newspaper Editors adopted a resolution urging both major political parties to support "world freedom of information and unrestricted communication for news throughout the world." In September of 1944, both houses of Congress adopted a concurrent resolution following closely the recommendation of the editors and publishers. In November of 1944, the directors of the American Society of newspaper Editors, declared that "most Americans and their newspapers
will support the government's policies ...and action toward removal of all political, legal and economic barriers to the media of information, and ...our government should make this abundantly clear to other nations."

In spring of 1945, a delegation of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in conjunction with the AP and UPI toured the world on Army transport planes— including 22 major cities and 11 allied and neutral countries— to promote this doctrine. On December 14, 1946, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 59, which declared that "freedom of information is a fundamental human right, and is a touchstone of the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated," and the freedom "implies the right to gather, transmit, and publish news anywhere and every-where without fetter."5

Within a few years, the American media industry dramatically developed a massive production that invaded the rest of the world. The immense influx of American media products was tremendous and impressive especially in the last three decades. Depending on American programs became inevitable and avoiding them was impossible and threatened developing countries as well as developed countries such as Europe and even neighboring Canada.

The American commercial television products has become an important and flourishing national export since early
'60s. In 1964, Wilson P. Dizard, a former U.S.I.A. official, mentioned that

American TV products, for better and worse, are setting the tone for television programming throughout the world in much the same way Hollywood did for the motion picture 40 years ago. The United States now leads all other countries combined twice over as a program exporter...Foreign sales were until a few years ago, a source of random profits peripheral to revenues from syndication at home...Today, overseas sales accounts for 60 per cent of all U.S. television syndication activities and represent the difference between profit and loss for the entire industry.6

In 1967, Dizard told a congressional committee that

"The amount of [TV commercial] export now approaching $100 million a year, is such that the television screen is becoming the main source of the "America Image" for increasing millions of people abroad."7

Jack Valenti, president of Motion Picture Export Association of America, reported before the Subcommittee on Government Operations of the, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

American motion picture occupy perhaps half of the screen time of theaters of the world...Nearly half of the theatrical revenues of MPEAA members is derived from foreign showings...In 1976, the gross foreign billings of our members from theatrical films and television programming came to approximately $700,000,000, with theatrical movies accounting for a little more than two thirds. The foreign theatrical market represented 49.5 percent of total film rental grosses. For television, the foreign market accounted for 23.4 percent of grosses.8

Commissioner of FCC Fowler stated that media activities in the U.S. which was no more than 2% of the total American G.N.P in 1880, had reached 66% in 1980.9
William Davidson, in his book *The Amazing Race* (1983), estimated the American media industry to be approximately $150 billion and that it will increase by 20% annually and constitute 40% of the total economic activities in the U.S. market.\(^1\)

In 1974, UNESCO conducted a study indicating that most developing countries with television systems import more than half of its broadcast programs, and that 75% of the total import of television programs comes from the United States. Despite this enormous export, the U.S. imports no films or serials except of 2% of educational programs.\(^1\) In 1982, UNESCO statistics indicated that 74% of the world's radio sets and 80% of the world's TV sets are in the industrialized countries.\(^1\) The developing countries imported 80% of its news from the industrialized countries (mainly from U.S, Britain, and France)\(^1\) despite the inconsistency that these news programs were irrelevant to the conditions in the developing countries.

Needless to say, the free flow of information doctrine did not do the good to human culture that was claimed for it in its early days. On the contrary, it put other cultures in jeopardy threatening to homogenize the charm of the world's separate cultures and to deteriorate the situation in the world. It caused and propounded international problems between what has been called North and South, exacerbating the huge gap and disparity between developed
and developing countries, particularly in terms of media and cultural affairs.

During the early '70s, developing countries realized the injustice of the present world information order and the hazard that it presented. In breeding primarily on cultural structure shock, it caused semi-termination of cultural continuity, which maintained a cultural imperialism reminiscent of the political and economic imperialism of colonial times.

A variety of calls arose from different parts of the world, especially from the Third World countries, demanding a new and just world information order. To achieve this intent, however, it was not an easy task. The developing countries had to struggle hard for years for this crucial demand. Within many conferences, meetings, seminars, and debates sponsored by regional, national and international institutions such as the non-allied movement, UNESCO, and the U.N, many proposals have called for more socially responsible reporting, a free and balanced flow of information, and a large share of the international spectrum so that all countries can derive some of the benefits and profits of satellite distribution. The United States, supported in many cases by Western Europe, rejected these proposals as unacceptable restrictions on the free flow of information and the free market.¹⁴

UNESCO, the strongest advocate of the free flow of
information doctrine at one time, has veered noticeably away from its formerly unquestioning support and adopted in October 1972 the Declaration of Guiding Principles on the use of Satellite Broadcasting for the free flow of information. In November 1972, the U.N General Assembly supported this view by a Vote of 102 to 1, the United States casting the single dissenting vote.15

The General Conference, in its nineteenth session held in Nairobi in 1976, instructed the Director General of UNESCO to undertake a review of all problems of media in contemporary society. He accordingly established the International Commission for the study of communication problems in the world, with a membership of fifteen media experts from all over the world-- or which come to be known as the Sean MacBride commission. Within two years the commission submitted its comprehensive study in a report called Many Voices, One World. In its twentieth session in 1978, the General Conference adopted unanimously the principles set forth in the Declaration of Media. The General Assembly of the United Nations, in its 33rd session, adopted a resolution assuring the importance of the establishment of a new international information order, supporting the efforts in this field and the U.N role in achieving this goal.16

Generally speaking, however, despite all these efforts and endeavors by the developing countries to hold the threat
of the American media at bay, there was no indication of a change in the situation and the Americans' programs remained as the globally predominant programs. It appears that more countries are in relying on them, especially those with newly established television systems such as those in Africa and Asia. It seems that the achievements of developing countries were theoretical more than pragmatic and they still could not put them into action. Obviously, it was not expected the situation could be changed within a short period of time. It is quite evident that it will take the developing countries years to recover from the old order before they will be able exercise the new information order.

Television and Arab Culture

It is already been noted that Western countries have had a great influence in establishing the foundation of Arab television during the colonial era. Television in many Arab states was not established by the national governments but by the colonial Western governments. Despite the fact that Westerners have left Arab land a long time ago, and although the Arab States have gained their political independence years ago, the Western influence still exists and continues to have a major presence on Arab television, probably even greater than before.

This Western influence was never discontinued and
became greater and greater as the years went by. Actually, this influence was simultaneous with and relevant to the development of Arab television systems. The more Arab television developed, the more Western influence existed. This applies not only to the Arab states whom whose systems were founded by colonial governments but also to other Arab states whose television was established under the national governments. It seems that Western influence does not depend on who established television; the problem goes beyond this issue as we going to see.

Most people assumed, that the more Arab television was developed, the less Western influence would be. In fact, experience has proved totally the opposite. If Western influence during the colonial era was through hardware equipment and only a few programs for several years, it burgeoned to an uninterrupted influx of software programs after they left up until the present time. As a matter of fact, establishing Arab television during the colonial era was only considered the first primitive step for a giant coming in the future with many additional giant steps.

After independence, the newly independent Arab states thought they could handle the business of television. Surprisingly, that was not the case. Television a serious business, was to a large extent beyond their limits and capabilities to handle. Despite the assumption that Western influence will vanish with the declaration of independence,
the truth is that television has nothing to do with independence. The relation between television and the Western connection has continued through the supply of ready-made programs.

Through the years, television has proved that it is not merely a matter of hardware equipment. More importantly, in the long run, there is also a software side. The software content, however, is a double-edged weapon. That, probably, was the point that most Arab governments did not perceive. That was definitely that was the gap through which Western influence could penetrate. They could fill the span of air time not only with ready-made imported Western software but also with ready-made Western ideas and taste.

Probably one of the features that clearly characterized Arab television in connection with Western countries is the massive import of software tapes. Ironically, at the time when Arab States were putting their concentration on television as hardware equipment, the Western countries were putting their emphasis on software tapes. However, the problem still is not simply a matter of software programs: does it cease at this limit? Elihu Katz explains why:

In examining the situation of broadcasting in developing countries, one must look beyond the importation of tapes and films to the importation of program ideas and formats. What is not directly imported may be—at second glance—imported as a model or "stimulus" for local translation salesmen, for the
international marketeers who come equipped not only with packages of videotape, but with catalogs of ideas which are also for sale.\footnote{17}

Television in the Arab States has played an indisputable role in changing social life and social values in general which, as a consequence, changed the patterns of people's social behaviors. Since the appearance of television in the Arab States, there were early signals indicating an expectation of attachment between people and this new medium, which applied to radio before television. In general, the Arab people are attracted to and fascinated by all types of electronic media technology such as radio, television, and video. Many field studies suggest that the concentration of radio and television in the cities of Arab states have accelerated the immigration from the peasant areas to the city, since enjoying these mediums is considered by the peasant an advantage of living in the city.

When radio was still a young medium, it was popular and abundant. Despite its relative expense before the introduction the transistor, there was a strong desire among the Arab population, even by low-income people to acquire a set. People who had a set got unusual respect from the people in the neighborhood, and ownership somewhat changed the social status of the person. Boyd noted that "In many Arab countries a radio is a status symbol: the larger and more intricate the set, the higher the status."\footnote{18}
Wlibur Shramm delineates the situation in an Arab village:

Once in an isolated village in the Middle East I watched a radio receiver, the first any of the villagers had seen, put into operation in the head man's house. The receivers promptly demonstrated that knowledge is power. It became a source of status to its owner; he was the first to the news, and controlled the access of others to it. For him and all others who heard, the noisy little receiver became a magic carpet to carry them beyond the horizons they had known. But the most impressive demonstration of the impact of that radio was the scene when a group of villagers—who had previously known higher government chiefly through the tax collector or a soldier—heard for the first time a spokesman of their leaders invite them to take part in governing their country. The surprise, the incredulity, the rather puzzled hope in their faces made an unforgettable picture. 19

The rapid spread of radio in the Arab States went above Shramm's scale which was adopted by the UNESCO: 100 sets for every 1000 population. With the exception of few Arab states the average of radio sets for every 1000 capita ranged from 150 sets to 204 sets, and in the rich oil countries the figure reached 465 for every 1000 capita. 20 From 1971 to 1975 the number of radio sets jumped from 10,000,000 to 18,300,000, an increase of 83%. With respect to television, the case is not much different. The UNESCO estimated the minimum of TV sets to be distributed as 20 sets per 1000 capita, but the Arab states went above this limit, reaching an average of between 40 and 56 sets. In rich oil Arab states the figure probably is the highest in the world: 484 sets per 1000 capita, according to 1981 UNESCO statistics. 21 Between 1971 and 1975, the number of television sets in the Arab states have increased from
The special chemistry between television and the Arab people can be attributed perhaps to the social and cultural environment. Television is considered a recreation medium privately as well as publicly. One of the unique viewing pattern in the Arab culture is to watch television in groups, either in coffee houses, local restaurants, or even in the front yard of private residences, an implied invitation for passersby to join them, part of the Arab cultural concept of hospitality and brotherhood. Television is also considered a major pastime for a family centered Arab culture. Acquiring a TV set is considered a big advantage and is an essential house appliance for any family household, especially in family- oriented Arab societies. It is not unusual that purchasing a TV set may be a priority over any other household appliance even in rural areas, since it serve as a recreational device around which the family members can gather. Douglas Boyd who studied television in the Arab States observed that television service is a reality in all Arab countries, rich and poor alike, and it has no competition:

there is very strong motivation among the poor to acquire a television receiver: In Egypt it is not unusual for a television set to be purchased by village leaders before electricity reaches their area. In poor section of Cairo, an extended family may pool resources to purchase a used black and white set from a neighborhood dealer. 

Muhammad A. Subhi depicts the impact of television
transmission on people's behavior when it first began in some cities in Saudi Arabia--Riyadh and Jiddah. He noted that people were so interested in television that during evening broadcasting hours the radio audience rate had dropped in the areas of television coverage. Also, traffic in the streets of the capital city of Riyadh and Jiddah had declined during the television broadcast hours. Outdoor recreation was dramatically reduced as people began to prefer to stay in their houses to watch television programs.24

Through the years, Arab people became well known for their fondness for watching television, actually their addiction for watching television. In 1982, the Arab center for audience and viewers research conducted research on five Arab states (Iraq, Sudan, Morocco, Jordan, and Kuwait) to determine their television viewing patterns. The conclusion of the study suggested that the average time the Arab viewers spent on watching television ranged between 3 and 4 hours a day despite the relatively short broadcasting day. However, this percentage increased on the weekends and during the holidays and special occasions when the transmission becomes longer.25

The power of television shocked both the structure of the society and the structure of the family. The impact, unfortunately, was negative. Since the function of television was not utilized constructively, the outcome was
not positive or even neutral.

Generally speaking, television in the Arab States did not play any positive role in contributing to the promotion of the national culture or even in preserving it. To the contrary to a large extent television was the cause of undermining the national culture. In many cases, intentionally or unintentionally television caused a distortion of the image of the indigenous culture.

Although all Arab states have stated explicitly that their main goal of television broadcasting is to protect and enhance the values of the culture, actually that was merely theoretical more than actual and has nothing to do with reality. None of the Arab states could translate this statement into action. On the contrary, we find that most Arab states' broadcasts do not meet with their officially stated goals. In Egypt, for instance, broadcast law was enacted as follows:

To enhance the standard of all kinds of arts, to encourage favorable habits and customs, and to discourage improper ones. To deal with social problems and to exhort adherence to moral and ethical values, to revive the literacy, scientific and artistic Arab heritage. To acquaint the people with the best products of human civilization.26

In reality, in reviewing Egyptian television programs, totally the opposite is true. More than 40% of the programs are imported; and while entertainment occupies the largest portion of air time, Islamic programs occupies only 1% of the total air time. In radio time, 46% is devoted to
entertainment, 20% to news, 9% to culture, and 1% to education: "As this breakdown suggests, it is not a highbrow service.". 27 During Nassir's reign, Egyptian television was offering American and British series, and, because of his close relation with the Russians, he was also showing programs from socialist countries.

Despite its tough and distinctive position, and despite its adherence to Islam's teachings in its broadcast programs compared to other Arab television, Saudi television is no exception in this case. Article 22 of the new communication policy stated that the "Saudi media have a holy duty to communicate the message of Allah to both Muslims and non-Muslims kindly and wisely." 28 However, in 1974, Saudi television purchased 1800 hours of Western programs, a package which included 165 feature films, 348 serials, 452 cartoons, and 835 soap operas and documentaries, mostly from the United States. 29 The Western programs on the first channel in Saudi television constitute 15% while they constitute 86% of the second channel air time. 30

In the field of television it is unlikely that the values of culture could be enhanced or even protected under the free flow of television programs. Under a massive import of Western programs, we reluctantly say it is "mission impossible". It is difficult to escape the global spread of U.S cultural styles through television programs.
Figure 4. Imported programs as a percentage of estimated total Arabic region television broadcast time.

Table 1. Percentage of imported television programs in 1973 and 1983.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and Broadcasting Institution</th>
<th>Percentage of Imported Programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia/Aramco TV</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Republic of Yemen</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Prices for United States television films in some Arab states (in U.S. dollars).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Half-Hour Episode</th>
<th>Feature Film</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>400 - 600</td>
<td>1,750 - 2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>350 - 500</td>
<td>1,200 - 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>450 - 500</td>
<td>1,750 - 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>175 - 200</td>
<td>800 - 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>650 - 800</td>
<td>3,000 - 3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>70 - 275</td>
<td>150 - 1,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>90 - 100</td>
<td>no sales</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Imported % 1973</th>
<th>Imported % 1983</th>
<th>Imported % 1983 Prime Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia/Riyadh TV</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia/Aramco TV</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Rep. of Yemen</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and it is extremely difficult for a society other than the U.S society to practice a free flow of media and enjoy a national culture at the same time.

Arab television can be characterized as a ersatz and non-authentic television. Its programs do not reflect the indigenous national culture and most of its broadcast programs are irrelevant to the society's issues despite the fact that Arab societies are full of political, economic, and social problems. Actually television programs affairs in the Arab States in one path and society and cultural affairs are in another path. Cairo University conducted research on the link between television programs and society's issues in Egypt from the period of 1981 to 1983. The finding of the study was that 87% of the broadcast programs have nothing to do with the society's issues and the rest (13%) have touched on some of the issues. In Tunisia, study found that programs directed to the women in the peasant area are programs of Western musicians such as Bach and Beethoven and about Western intellectuals such as Sartre and Hagel.

Since most of the broadcast programs are Western-imported, Arab television has played a primary role in reflecting and promoting Western culture much more than it did in promoting the indigenous national culture. Muhammad A. M, ascribed the source of social change in the Arab world to the new technology such as telephone, radio, television,
and video; meanwhile he refutes the allegation that the direction of this social change is the progressive appropriate direction due to lack of proof. Besides, the control of this direction is external and attached to those who own this technology. Thus, it cannot be taken for granted that the social change that television might cause will be positive change. In 1964, Shramm noted that "There is little doubt that modern communication can be influential in a developing culture." From experience, as the years went by, Shramm's statement is very true.

Actually, with regard to the issue of television and its Western impact on the indigenous Arab culture, many indictments can be made of television, or to be more precise, of governments, who are responsible for running this medium. It is no longer a secret that Arab television is a mini-copy of Western television and that there is very little uniquely Arab in Arab television. There is still no independent theory or philosophy of Arab television. Arab governments failed to create and present a unique new model which would incorporate into television the authentic Arab culture and reflect Arab life style. Al-Usmani noted that in the Arab Gulf states, it is difficult to identify a coherent television philosophy that strongly reflects the ideological and national identity. Television, in particular, is a new phenomenon that originated in the West and became available as a technology before its
practitioners fully realized the technological potential.³⁵

"Mohammad Sanousi, [former] Assistant under secretary for Television Affairs in Kuwait, has expressed his doubts that any Gulf state has a recognizable philosophy about how television can be used...'I don't really believe that we know what television is...or how it can be used effectively. So far we only have certain ideas.'"³⁶

If one excludes from the daily television schedule the opening recitation of the holy Quran, Arabic news, and a few talk shows, it is very hard to believe it is television of an Arab state. Abdul-Samad M. comments on the concentration of American movies on the Egyptian television as reflecting a picture where some one might think that Egypt is one of the U.S states.³⁷ Little attention has been given to television by governments who failed or ignored the utilization of television in a matters of culture, indigenous arts, authentic customs and traditions, local and national thought and intellectual, religious rituals, national history and civilization, and national development. This state of affairs might be attributed to the misconception and approach with which most Arab governments most often viewed the television medium.

In reviewing the development of Arab cultural history, one observes that people were committed and attached to their culture before the emergence of television much more before the emergence of television. People started to
change their life style after the Western wave that swept the Arab world after the Second World War ('50s and '60s). Television-and other media-were the main factors relied upon by Westerners in transmitting their life style pattern to the Arab states. The emergence of television drew a clear cut line in terms of cultural continuity. Meanwhile, one observes that the rural areas and the remote areas from the cities which have not been influenced yet by the medium of television are more authentic in their culture and life style, since television centralized mostly around the cities and the suburbs. However, the attraction of television within the cities and suburbs created demographic problem that encouraged rural peasant to migrate to the cities.

For the first time in history Arab culture was penetrated by Western culture. Throughout history, Arab culture was impenetratable despite numerous Westerners' endeavors. With the invention of the power of television, it seems that Western culture could for the first time easily penetrate the Arab culture.

A common observation regarding the modification of Arab culture is the deteriorization of the Arabic language. Throughout history, the Arabic language maintained its strength as one of the ancient Semitic languages. Historically, Arabs always have taken pride in their language as one of the world's richest languages. The most
significant turning point for Arabic language was the emergence of Islam in the Arab land and the revelation in Arabic of the holy Quran to the Arabian prophet "Muhammad". That event was considered a great honor to the Arabic language in which Arab people have always taken pride. As a matter of fact, the two main factors that enriched, strengthened, and maintained the Arabic language through history is the Quran and the Hadith, "the sayings of the prophet". Arabic became essential not only for Arabs but for non-Arab Muslims as well, since it was the language of the Quran and the language of the prophet.

Through the years, during the spread of Islam and despite the interaction with other remote cultures, Arabic maintained its strength. Because of its power, the Arabic language was not influenced by other languages but other languages such as Persian, Turkish, Indian, and those in other parts of the world such as Africa, Asia, and even Europe, were influenced by Arabic. It was not until the Seventeenth Century that the Arabic language began to witness some recession when the Westerners, especially Portuguese, Dutch, and British, began to dominate some parts of the Arab world. With the fall of the Turkish Ottoman Empire followed by the fall of the Arab world to Western colonialism, the situation deteriorated even further.

With the recession of Arabic language in different parts of the Islamic world such as East and West Africa,
South East and central Asia, and Turkey, oral interpersonal Arabic even in the original Arab land began to be affected by other languages, especially by English and French. In fact, during the colonial era, one of the aims of the colonials was to weaken the formal classic Arabic through encouraging local dialects. Nevertheless, and despite the relatively successful attempts of the colonialists, Arabic still maintained its strength.

Nevertheless, damage to the Arabic language continues with the emergence of the modern mass media technology and its fast spread through the Arab states with, the help of the uninterrupted flow of imported Western software. Western television programs in all its variety and Western pop music have played a major role in advancing the notion of the supremacy of the English language. In fact, the global Western media has succeeded in promoting the English language to the point where it is now recognized as the international language despite the fact that those whose mother tongue is English constitute no more than 10% of the world's population.

For centuries, the Arabs used to take pride in their mother tongue. It is no longer so. With the Westernization wave that swept the Arab world since the fifties, there was a tendency among governments and some categories of people (especially the Westernizers and those who were educated in Western countries or by Western educators) to undervalue
Arabic and look at it as if it is a thing of the past and no longer a valid language to be associated with modern civilization science and modernization. Meanwhile, English was viewed as the language of science and modern civilization. At the present time, science in higher education institutions in the Arab states has to be taught in English, or in French in some Arab states.

Unfortunately, Arabic was not given the attention it deserved by Arab media in general and television in particular. While it used and promoted the English language, Arab television did not promote formal classic Arabic; instead, it promoted and encouraged what is so-called the "simple media language Arabic" based on local dialects. In 1971, Algeria changed programming language from French to Arabic. However, they as well as Tunisia and Morocco still depend heavily on French programs. Other Arab states depend largely on American programs.

The members of Arab Commission to Study Media Issues in the Arab World have expressed their regret for the fact that some Arab media policies neglected the Arabic language and for the lack of cohesive national strategy to serve the Arabic language through the media. They especially regretted that common dialects with their lower levels constitute a large portion of theater, radio, and television programs. A study conducted by (ALECSO) Arab League for Education, Culture, and Science Organization, concluded that
among the Arab states language unity is demonstrated by the use of only 7% of the total language expression, and among 93% dialects and slang dominate media language. In the final report of their meeting in Riyadh, Ministers of Education and Information in the Gulf states affirmed the necessity of reinforcing the Arabic language in education and the media since it is the language of the Quran, and since the Arabic language is of ultimate value.

Another aspect of changing the social life style was through the social movement, Arab women, for example. For the first time in the Arab woman's history she followed Western woman. Shramm has often noted that change will not take place smoothly unless people want to change, and that requires both information and persuasion. That's exactly what happened in the Arab world and to woman in particular. Unfortunately, Arab people in general and Arab women in particular were ready for change when the Westernization wave swept the Arab world after World War II which had been preceded by years of Western colonialism. People were persuaded to change after they were brain-washed for years with the notion of following the Westernization path to modernization.

Arab Women were vulnerable to the current of Western women's liberation movements in Europe and U.S. Hence, a group of women began to express publicly their rebellion against Arab and Islamic values and began to call for the
same changes that Western women were requesting, making Western woman their ideal. Noticeably, women began to imitate Western women with respect to the notion of "modern women". Arab women began to dress in clothing of western styles, imitating Western women's appearance.

In this regard, television through the imported programs, played a outstanding role in promoting the glamorous image of Western women and in reinforcing the notion of the supremacy of modern Western women's lifestyle. Meanwhile, the image and historical role of the Arab woman was undermined and ignored. Studies in this field, especially those which were conducted under the auspices of Arab League for Education, Culture, and Science Organization (ALECSO), concluded that Arab media has distorted the image of Arab women. She was always presented and visualized in a negative manner.

In the field of advertisement, Arab women have been misused by the advertisement agencies, especially in promoting products such as perfumes, cosmetics, fashions, automobiles, and furniture. It was influenced to a great extent by the Western style of production which uses women to present images of the contemporary woman. This paradigm of Arab woman does not exist in Arab reality. Also, studies proved that Arab media in general is not giving attention to major women's issues in the Arab world or in the world in general.
The current of the international flow of television programs was so strong that it swept all barriers in its way, and all kinds of victims started to fall prey to this current. Schiller predicted a long time ago that "It is difficult, in fact, to escape the global spread of U.S cultural styles featured in the mass media of films, TV programs, pop records, and slick magazines. Their influence prompts sentiments such as that expressed by the prime minister of Guyana, 'A nation whose mass media are dominated from the outside is not a nation.' Anthony Smith ruled out the enjoyment of national culture under the roof of free flow of media: "It is extremely difficult for a society to practice a free flow of media and enjoy a national culture at the same time -- unless it happens to be the United States of America."

Repelling this influx of Western programs seems impossible and relying on them seems indispensable. None of the Arab States succeeded in doing so; neither Egypt, the major producer and distribution center for the Arab world, which is considered the Hollywood of the Middle East, nor Saudi Arabia which is considered the most traditional and strict state in the Arab world. Despite Egypt's production, it imports more than 41% of its programs, according to UNESCO statistics. Between 1970 and 1978, Egypt imported 5732.17 hours of foreign programs, 1126.78 of which were rejected (therefore not broadcast). Late statistics
showed that Egypt import annually 1800 hours from the U.S., 300 hours from France, and 400 hours from different European countries. Despite these impressive figures, religious programs do not exceed 1% of the total broadcast time. After Sadat's open policy to the West in 1977, even more Western material was poured into Egypt.

In fact, even during the reign of President Nasir, who was known for his policy of animosity toward the West, Egypt could not escape this peril. On the contrary, he encouraged the importation of Western programs.

President Nassir, in the common pattern of the "father of the new nation" set his personal stamp on radio and television in Egypt. This was a political, Arab nationalist stamp but Nassir also encouraged imports of some Anglo-American material at Nassir's personal directive. During much of the 1960s an entire television channel was aimed at expatriates resident in Egypt and was filled with mainly Anglo-American programming.

The flood of Western programs, along with their inconsistent alien ideas and values, into the Arab states has aroused and provoked many categories of people within the Arab world; the conservatives, religious leaders and organizations, scholars, academic professionals, governmental and professional organizations, all calling to counter this current for the sake of the Arab and Islamic nation. Accordingly, many conferences and seminars were held to tackle this issue. In conferences such as "The Intellectual Invasion and Anti-Islamic Attitudes", "Civilizational Challenges and Cultural Invasion", "Islamic
Media and Human Relations", and "What Educators Want from Broadcasters, the participants are in consensus that the current situation is a deliberate conspiracy and attack against the Arab and Islamic nation, aiming to transmit anti-Islamic values and destroy the morals of the Islamic civilization. It was considered a new invasion attempt by the West with new technique after all their past attempts had failed, a new aspect of the old conflict between Islamic and West civilizations. The conferences have warned of the wicked consequences of the present situation if it continues and demanded that governments take prompt and serious actions to counter this destructive current.

In their final report of their seminar, What Educators Want From Broadcasters, the Ministers of Education and Information set a strategy for countering intellectual and cultural invasion based on two major fronts: Prevention and remedy. Prevention, would be effected through the cautious selection of the broadcast programs and rejecting all that opposes Islam's principles. Remedy would be achieved by countering the anti-Islamic attitude through educational curricula and media programs by means of criticism, which would attempt to prove their invalidity and threat through logic, dialogue, and persuasion.

The fourth conference of Arab Ministers of culture which was held in Algeria in May 1983 under the auspices of (ALECSO) Arab League of Education, culture, and Science
Organization discussed one issue "Arab cultural security and cultural industries". In the end of the conference, the following recommendation was issued: The conference asserts that cultural security is attached to the Arab states' capability to manufacture all they need of cultural, educational, and entertainment products. The rising Arab generations have increasing acceptance on imported cultural products. The spread of cultural consumption need entail the Arab states to be concern of the availability of needed facilities to establish cultural industries.⁴⁷

The status of Arab television staggering between Western and Eastern cultures gave it the character of a double standard and a schizophrenic identity, constantly giving a contradictory messages to viewers. Very often, for instance, a religious program would be followed by a Western fashion show or a religious program on the first channel, while at the same time "Dallas" would be on the second channel. Usually, the daily television schedule begins with a recitation from the Holy Quran and ends late at night with a Western cowboy movie. Very often viewers can not relate the television messages to their real life surroundings and feel they are alien in their own society, which might cause inner disruption, anxiety, and confusion for some, especially children and teenagers. Frequently many of these messages clash with Arab society, family, and school messages. An Egyptian psychiatrist, in his commentary on
youth's feelings of alienation, depression, and anxiety, says youth feels helpless and hopeless because they cannot be rescued from their feelings of loneliness. The society has eliminated any hope for them, through its radio, television, and movies; I have believed eventually, as a psychiatrist, that schizophrenia does not affect individuals only but it can affect societies as well. In the Arab States people read in the newspapers, hear from radio, and see in television all that our enemies want us to read, hear and see.

The flood of imported programs along with its alien values have created a bicultural society which caused an ongoing conflict between the traditionalists and the modernizers. For so many years governments, officials as well as many people, were confused between the two different irrelevant concepts, modernization and Westernization. It appeared to them that the two notions overlapped. Therefore, they always tend to associate modernization with Westernization believing that Westernization is the only path for modernization.

Despite the failure and invalidity of this theory, however, some television officials still insist on Westernization of television programs. In fact, at one time this misconception used to be the trend of economists and sociologists:

Economists and researchers thought in the 1950s and 1960s that imported radio, television, cinema, and
foreign-owned press were all part of the process of modernization which consisted in the transference of capital goods and other industries. Today it is more widely held that machinery of information, if it is controlled from outside, merely confirms the receiving country in the state of perhaps more hopeless dependence than before.\(^5\)

Even Sociologist Daniel Lerner, Who studied the effect of Western mass media on some of the Middle East societies in the early '50s and afterward, wrote a book on The Passing of The Traditional Society: Modernizing The Middle East. Even though in one segment of his book he discriminated between Europeanization and modernization, he could not discriminate between modernization and Westernization or between Europeanization and Westernization. It seems that in early years in the '50s the influence of Western mass media on Arab people's life style was not yet clear.

Europeanization some years ago penetrated the upper levels of Middle East society, and affected mainly leisure-class fashions. Modernization today reaches a far wider population and touches public as well as private aspiration. Central to this change, says Lerner, 'is the shift in modes of communication ideas and attitudes- for spreading among a large public vivid images of its own New Ways is what modernization distinctly does.' Europeanization used the class media; modernization, the mass media. The mass media, he says, are what chiefly make the difference between the effect of these two social movements.\(^5\)

Now at the present time after decades of Lerner's perspective of "modernization", it becomes clear that it served the same end as Europeanization and there is a difference between Europeanization and Westernization. In fact, "Modernization" became much worse than "Europeanization". If Europeanization had Westernized only
the upper class of the society at the time, "Modernization" has Westernized the whole society and shifted the Arab culture from oral culture to modes of communicating Western ideas and attitudes.

Schiller ridicules the allegation that refusing Western media means refusing modernity. "Some claim that an expression of support for cultural integrity is equally a defense of traditionalism and reinforces the most conservative and repressive elements in (mostly) poor societies. According to the most influential group of American communication scholars, the Western mass media are the instrument of modernity and social change; and resisting them signifies an opposition to modernization and an endorsement of orthodoxy, illiteracy, and backwardness. Actually, the situation is reversed. The objective of cultural policy is not merely to exclude material: it is to assist the process of shaping consciousness. In its very essence it is opposed to established, traditional authority."

The problem in the Arab states, as in the developing countries in general, is that of understanding technology and how to combine both the modern imported Western technology and maintenance of the heritage at the same time. Actually, that was not as easy task as it might appear to determine what and how much to take from the West and what to reject, how to draw the line between what should be
changed and what should be preserved. These were very confusing but crucial decisions for the Arab states to make. It seems that because of the desire for quick modernization and the starvation for technology, the Arab states were not able to draw that clear-cut line, which led them to import from the West both the good and the bad. Katz and Wedell have pointed out that "The quest for speedy modernization does not allow new nations to create their own symbols of the media— it is far easier to buy the symbols of modernization wholesale." Hamdy Kandil, an Arab media expert and director of the Free Flow of Information at UNESCO, comments on the problem of technology in developing countries "Technology is ahead of us. It controls us and to this day we do not benefit from it the way we should." Ibrahim Alusef, the Director of AGJPPI (Arabian Gulf States Joint Programs Production Institute) comments on the phenomenon of television as a technology in the Gulf region:

> I think we are running behind television instead of the opposite process occurring. Technology is changing too fast and every day our responsibility to utilize it become more demanding. This is in contrast to our content, which still lags behind and does not reflect the many fields that developed rapidly in the last twenty years."

Analyses attribute the causes of the Iranian revolution to the wave of Westernization that the late Shah of Iran was trying to impose over the indigenous Islamic culture during his unsuccessful attempts to modernize Iran against the will of his people, causing a contradictory
dual-cultural society rejected by the masses of people. The
discrepancy between the indigenous and the alien Western
values was actually the spark that erupted the revolution.
Noticeably, after the revolution, all aspects of
Westernization that were imposed by the old regime had
disappeared from the country.

It is obvious that Arab television operate separately
and apart from other institutions in the society. In fact,
television frequently clashes with other institutions'
goals. Due to the absence of planning and cooperation
between television and other institutions of society,
television was constantly accused of destroying what school
and family constructed, and instead of reinforcing family
and school roles, television functioned to weaken these
efforts. What is being taught by school and family can be
easily erased by television programs. Thus, one can observe
easily the irresponsible role of television and the
disparity between television and other educational
institutions in the Arab society.

While there are exceptions in the Arab Middle East,
broadcast officials do not seem to have a policy or
goals for radio and television that are tied to the
goals of the country and the appropriate central
planning organization. This is particularly true with
respect to programming policy for both news and
entertainment. There is a surprising lack of
communication and cooperation between ministries of
information and education.56

The Ministers of Education and Information in the Gulf
states along with other Arab media experts and specialists
met in Riyadh in 1984 in a conference called "What Educators Want From Broadcasters". The participants agreed on the huge gap between the two sides and they confirmed their belief in the destructive role of media, in the areas of education and social fields. In the final report and the recommendations of the conference, the participants called for more coordination, cooperation, and homogenization between educational and media institutions.

Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) organized a conference in Kuwait in 1975, "Arab Regional Conference for Educational Broadcasting," to study the problems facing utilization of television in education; on top of these problems comes the unclear relation between educational and media institutions. Despite its young age in the Arab States, television had joined and has somewhat replaced the role of family and school. It has started to compete with them in inculcating new values and tendencies in children.

The phenomenon of television's impact on changing values in people's social life is actually not confined to Arab societies. Rather it is global phenomenon, even in the original Western countries, which experienced this problem long before Arab societies did, although it was much more severe and shocking to Arab societies. Soviet sociologist, Yurikouf, noted that in the twentieth century, because of television, a unique spiritual relation has appeared. Before the emergence of television this spiritual relation
was between man and another man; but now this relation exists between the humankind and the machine. But despite of some benefit of this on one hand, there is also unusual peril on the other. A new member has appeared as the new master of the family. Yurikouf comments on the phenomenon of gathering around television and he observes that a new phenomenon has appeared: receiving guests and continuing to watch television at the same time, as if people do not come to visit their friends but to visit their television. They are connected spiritually to the television screen and to the dining table through their abdomen, but actually there is nothing to connect them together. Thus, television unites people superficially as viewers only, but from psychological point of view it separates people, disconnecting their relationships. Mostly the television is the speaker and people are the listeners, and they do not socialize with people but with television.  

Canadian K. Taggart observed that those hours the family used to spend together in sharing ideas and opinions had dispelled because it became the peak hours for watching television. For people to gather only in the same place is not enough to bring them close socially without interacting. More important than that is that the traditional values that the family instills in the children started to disappear and were replaced by television values derived from cowboy movies and violence and crime serials made by television on
Psychologist White believes that the viewing process of television increases the negative tendency in the individual, since the viewer stay still, accepting all that is presented to him without taking any positive action.

Needless to say, probably the innocent victims of television are the children. German Martin Keihacker affirms that today's children are not only spectators but also partners in the events and in the acting. They live the event and participate in it and are influenced by the experiment, an actual living influence. Studies have shown that pre-school children spent hundreds of hours watching television before they reach school age. They learn television's values long before they learn school's values and before they learn how to read and write. Unmistakably, violence and crime programs are more psychologically effective on children's and teenagers' personality. Some Arab states had to ban the show, "The Six Million Dollar Man", after several accidents involving children were reported. Some children attempted to imitate the fictional power of the show's main character.

Nevertheless, while it is not the purpose of this study to focus on individual and social problems caused by television, many studies have shown that numerous individual, educational, social, and psychological problems are linked to television programs and viewing patterns.
Within the last several years, as a result of the unchanged policy of television programming and after people—especially parents—have experienced negative results from their children's behavior, many calls came from Arab television experts, educators, scholars, religious groups, columnist, and parents charging that television is a corrupting influence and demanding true nationalization of television and Islamization of its programs.

Noticeably, in the last several years, people accordingly tended to form negative impressions of television and began to deal with television more seriously than before. Some people changed their viewing pattern, and others their general outlook on television. Therefore, according to their new comprehension of the situation they started to react to these changes, especially within the educated class and the conservative class. Many people started to restrict viewing hours—after it had been unrestricted on the fraudulent ground that television is an innocent entertainment medium,—especially for children. Now—their viewing is also often attended by one or both of the parents. Others, moreover, ban television from the household on the ground that television is nothing but a corrupting device and that their family and children are better off without it.

This recalls the history of television in Saudi Arabia, when some religious groups opposed the establishment
of radio and television in the country because it was considered a corruptive device coming from the West to corrupt the people. At that time their allegation were lampooned and ridiculed and they were called ignorant and backward by the majority of the people at the time who claimed themselves modernizers. Interestingly, and after about thirty years, their expectations turned out to be true, as indicated by research and studies of Arab media experts and by the educated class. To clear up any misunderstanding, the accusation that television is a corrupting medium, actually is not directed to television as a technological device but rather to the type of programs broadcast and the way it has been used.

Entertainment

One of the clear features of Arab television is that it depends extensively on imported Western programs for its daily broadcast schedule, and this by itself is not unusual. If we think about it, Arab states do not only import television programs but they import from the Western countries almost every-thing for daily life needs. But the prominent feature characterizing these imported programs is that Arab television is entertainment- oriented.

The Arab States import a massive volume of foreign Western programs especially in the field of entertainment.
Ready-made Western entertainment programs occupy the largest portion of air time, filling from 40% to 60% (an average of 50%) of air time. In some Arab states, the percentage reaches as high as 80% of air time. Ironically, meanwhile the Arab states import 50% of their programs from Western countries, the average of programs importation among the Arab states is approximately 13% of the total air time. Indeed, this is a dilemma in the Arab States, and in this issue lies the ugly face of Arab television broadcasts, imports of poisonous programs that are really far from its needs or actually not needed at all.

In the Arab states, television has always been looked at either as a political tool or a pastime medium, rarely looked at and often ignored as an educational or a developmental tool. In fact, it was imprinted on people's mind that television is primarily for entertainment purposes. Douglas Boyd comments on this point:

To a great extent programming is basically entertainment oriented on Arab television station and it is not unfair to say that both radio and television in the Arab World are believed by consumers to be primarily for entertainment. The director of Egyptian television observed... that a television set is usually bought with the intention of entertainment. Nobody thinks of television as a mean of education when they go to buy a television set.62

Nevertheless, the problem does not stop at this limit. The danger of this type of programs goes beyond the fact that these programs are merely imported as entertainment to the fact as disclosed by facts and figures that the content
of this type of ready-made programs is entirely irrelevant both to the national culture needs and to the national development process. That in itself is a national cultural tragedy and is considered as committing vicious crime to the dignity of the national culture. Wilbur Shramm comments on the problem of the use of television and entertainment programs in the Third World countries:

Every new country is under some pressure to install television. It is a badge of prestige. It is an invitation to entertainment... but the essential question, as for radio and film, is where television belongs in national development. What the people are usually asking for, when they clamor for television, is the succession of entertainment programs which have made the medium so popular in many countries that are further advanced economically. These are the "Westerns," the crime mysteries, the advanced programs, the comedies, variety shows, and sporting events. It is hard to argue that these have much to do with economic development.63

It is quite evident that television management and officials in the Arab states realize the irrelevant content of these entertainment programs, and yet they insist on importing them deliberately. It seems that Arab states' television acts like private commercial television in this matter as if they are in competition with the commercial market. That is the simple and easy method to attract viewers by offering pure commercial entertainment programs. The director of programming in the state of Qatar television admitted that

We know that many of our imported programs which are supposed to be entertainment deal with various problems, most of which lack relevance to our own
situation. But people like them, and if we cannot provide such material for them, they will find alternatives somewhere.  

The threat of this type of imported entertainment programs is not only that they convey different ideas and values but also because the content of these type of programs is in contradiction to the society's indigenous cultural values.

While some warn of the threat of these alien values on the cultural continuity of the society, others see nothing wrong with having these alien values of other cultures, proclaiming that this is the nature of modernization and that is how societies and culture change. Interacting with and becoming influenced by each other ... is a natural process for modernization, by changing values, norms, ideas, and attitudes, and radio and television are nothing but media for this interaction.

Modernization is inseparable from traditionalism and it is nothing but transformation of tradition. Indigenous culture is changed or changed by its contact and interaction with other cultures. The new society is born on the old, and not superimposed on it. Recognizing the great impact of media, the point is that not all effects of alien ideas are generally negative, and what is considered negative for some might be considered positive for others.  

However, the above argument is not the point here. They are totally two separate issues. The point in this topic is not meant to be a diatribe against foreign cultures or against different customs and values. To do so, would be against the nature of humankind. In fact, efforts should be
encouraged to interact with other world cultures in order to accelerate the process of modernization, learning, and human and cultural understanding among humankind and to share intellectual ideas. That is a very natural process, the question which remains is has this type of program made any contribution in this regard, and was it for the sake of the world's cultural process?

It is already been noted that the so-called the positive cultural intention is far from the original purpose of these programs. The homogenization of the world cultures is considered a serious threat which would abolish and eliminate the fascination of life on earth by imposing a worldwide uni culture on the original one to achieve certain goals. The truth is that life is fascinating because of its diversity of customs, traditions, languages, food, and clothes. "Made in America" messages, imagery, life-styles, and information techniques are being internationally circulated and, equally important, globally imitated.66

The massive importation influx of these Western commercial entertainment television programs actually were the chief carriers of Western values and life-style which, as a consequence, caused the people of the Arab states to a great degree, consciously or unconsciously to change their life-style. Varis and Nordenstreng study reported that during the early 1970s the U.S exported approximately 150,000 hours of programming each year. This was more than
three times the total programing exports of the next three leading exporting nations combined (U.K, France, and W. Germany).\textsuperscript{67} In 1974, U.S exported 100,000 to 200,000 hours of television programs. One-third of which was exported to Far and Near East.\textsuperscript{68} The editor of the \textit{Boston Globe} attributed the forsaking of Islam's ethics by Muslims nowadays to the influence of the Western life-style.

Needless to say, there have always been Moslems who have ignored these details of behavior, just as there are today. But they nevertheless constitute a reference point that Moslems can and do turn to, particularly in a period when the behavior patterns of many people are rapidly changing under the influence of Western lifestyle.\textsuperscript{69}

Unfortunately, the prevailing misconception among people and officials in the Arab States is that these imported programs may be enjoyed as innocent entertainment for pastime, and there are no specific intellectual or cultural ideas behind it. Schiller believes that "The notion that entertainment is not instructive must be classed as one of the biggest deception in history."\textsuperscript{70} Erik Barnouw, chronicler of American broadcasting, puts it this way:

\textit{To me, entertainment is a poisonous concept. The idea of entertainment is that it has nothing to do with the seriousness of the world, but that it fills up an idle hour. Actually, there is an ideology implicit in every kind of fictional story. Fiction may be far more important than non-fiction in forming people's opinions.}\textsuperscript{71}

Perhaps not too many people realize that alien values come more strongly and effectively through entertainment programs. What people do not take seriously is actually
what effective them more. The magic impact of entertainment programs lies within its unconscious and intangible penetration that not too many people realize. and since not too many people take entertainment seriously, the fact is what people do not take seriously is what effect them more.

Role-playing is an effective method in learning. In fact the notion of entertainment depend extensively upon the factor of role-playing as an essential indirect way to influence viewers psychologically, thus ruling out the allegation that entertainment is neutral,

Recognition of the promise of the media in connection with the problem of cultural identity leads to the realization that entertainment is not neutral, but an active force in the communication of values. Actually, entertainment is a useful medium in transmitting Western ideologies even in the pattern of music, Dr. Joseph Klapper of the Columbia Broadcasting System explained to the congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs:

The broadcasting of popular music is not likely to have any immediate effect on the audience's political attitude, but this kind of communication nevertheless provides a sort of entryway of Western ideas and Western concepts, even though these concepts may not be explicitly and completely stated at any one particular moment in the communication.

Governments and television officials believe that they are on the safe side and these Western entertainment are fine as long as they edited out the violence and excessive sex scenes. But actually the influence of these programs goes far beyond the limit of violence and excessive sex
scenes. These Western entertainment programs, truly, were the vital carrier in transmitting and imposing the concept of "supremacy" of Western people and of Western culture over any other cultures including the Arab culture. Western people were always viewed through these images as the best and smartest people. Unlike other people, their mentality appeared to excel that of other people and the Western culture was always viewed as the best culture on earth in contrasts to other cultures.

In fact, masses of Arab viewers are so attached to these programs that it sometimes reaches the level of addiction and brain washing. The Arab Center of Audience and Viewers Research—a branch of ASBU—conducted a research study in five Arab states to test the viewing pattern of the dramatic entertainment shows. The finding of the study suggested that the average number of Arab viewers who watch these serials is 80.78%, as follows: Iraq 88%, Sudan 78.92%, Morocco 72.05%, Jordan 89.33%, and Kuwait 96.44%. 

The addiction to watching these shows affects very impressively the mentality of Arab viewers, since they consider what they see in these programs to be their ultimate goal. Through these programs, they visualize the Western lifestyle in all its aspects as their supreme lifetime aspiration and the only desirable path for civilization and modernization; at the same time it makes them resent and want to undermine their own culture.
Also these programs were an excellent method to promote Western goods and were probably more effective than standard direct advertising methods. In persuading people that it would be better to live like Western, to have a Western style house, Western furniture, to use Western home appliances, to drive Western cars, to consume Western products, to have the Western look, to wear Western clothes, even Western style hair cut, and even to have the same mentality of Western people. According to the French Paris Match magazine, the marketing strategy of the Americanization television programs, resembles the world marketing of Coke. When the producer company of "DALLAS" for instance, negotiated and signed contract with international television to sell the show, the method and procedures were the same OPEC undertaking its marketing negotiation.75

Hollywood television actors and actresses are very popular among the masses in all their categories (children, teenagers, and women). People, unfortunately, tend very often to regard them as their best role model, probably as pervasively as do the people in the West. Ironically, one might find people who know more about these actors and actresses than he or she knows about their own national heroes.

Despite the American and worldwide popularity of the American show, "DALLAS", Hassan Al-Tilili, an Arab media
specialist in his work Our Ailing Media describes the impact this serial had on people's thought in different parts of the Arab world and the Middle East: In Lebanon, despite the tragedies of the atrocious civil war, the people in Beirut watched it twice a week since 1978. In Morocco, the show was also broadcast twice a week, despite the constant criticism from the opposition pressing to boycott the show due to its explicit undermining of virtue, values and conduct. However, the television continued to broadcast the show because of its popularity among the people; it was their favorite topic of discussion.

In Algeria, and despite its state's socialist system, the national newspaper waged a campaign against the show, considering that it praises for American capitalism. After a short suspension of the show, the Algerian television had to continue broadcasting it because of viewer pressure. The show had left its fingerprints on the Algerian society, and in many cases people began deal with each other according to the show's values and notions which people started to take as a point of reference.

In Tunisia, the Electric and Gas company conducted a research study which showed that the consumption of water, electricity, and gas dropped by 20% during the show's air time. In Egypt, the people were frustrated and depressed because television ceased to broadcast the show during the national period of mourning after Sadat's assassination. In
the Arab Gulf states, viewers started to buy the video tapes of the show in order not to waste time.\textsuperscript{76}

Because of the liberal approach in editing employed by Bahrain television, in contrast with other Arab television, especially in the Gulf region, some viewers tune in to it to watch "Dallas". "The tolerance characteristic of Bahrain television has attracted many viewers, especially youths who would prefer to watch \textit{Dallas} unedited than to see an episode that has been severely cut. Officials at Bahrain television feels that because of tough competition from the video market."\textsuperscript{77}

A Turkish professor, Awzkok, portrayed the situation in Turkey after J.R was shot. "Who shot J.R" was similar to the public build-up and high alert during war time. It was the main event for people all over Turkey in schools, courts, hospitals, and cafes. The mayor of one of the Turkish towns, after he found out who shot J.R, had to announce the answer in public to the townspeople through the loud speaker. Despite the strict censorship on television programs since the army came to power, however, they could not edit the show. Moreover, the Generals gave orders to broadcast the show as it is.\textsuperscript{78}

Altilili, however, attributes the success of "Dallas" among Arab viewers primarily to the cultural vacuum that Arab viewers are living in, since television is considered almost the only way that Arab viewers can release their
tensions. Those in authority in the Arab world still look at culture in a negative way and they still consider that culture is not an affective element in economic activities or in the developmental operations. Therefore, Arab television viewers find themselves in a position where they have to be consumers of foreign production without bothering to distinguish between the good and the bad, as long as local production is missing. Even when local production is available, it is usually less than expected. No wonder, given this situation, that Dallas has a prestige over other programs.79

However, entertainment programs might be a smart move on the part of governments to distract people's attention from problems and crises their country is facing. Gehan Rachty believes that the concentration of entertainment by government is intentional:

There is an increasing emphasis in the Arab states' television system on entertainment, especially serials, long feature films, and variety shows. These program categories account for 53.8% of television time in Abu Dahbi, 44% in Saudi Arabia, 56% in Qatar, 60.5% in Kuwait and 60% in Egypt, and an average of 55% of television time in all Arab states. The purpose is to attract the audience and give them what they want, since television is considered mainly a medium for entertainment, especially in states where there is no other public entertainment. Television entertainment is consciously used in many cases to divert people's attention from social, economic or political problems.80

Also during the British occupation of South Yemen, the British introduced television to the people in 1964 to divert their attention from the revolutionary liberation
movement's activities and from North Yemen's spreading the spirit of struggle against the British occupation.

The criticism of the epidemic of entertainment programs is not confined only to imported programs; the same criticism applies also to the locally-produced entertainment and drama. The frequent criticism directed to this type of program is that they do not deal with important issues but often create an alien world that has nothing to do with real life. However, even these local entertainments have a Western style of production and content. The mentality of Arab television was influenced pretty much by the mentality of Western television. As viewers are looking at Western actors and actresses as their best role model, television officials are also looking at Western television as their best model. The result was an imitation of Western style programs and techniques. Being a mini-copy of Western television, cause it to lose essential factors of creativity and authenticity. Arab television was not only brain-washed in terms of production techniques but even in theories of content;

Television in the Arab Middle East has a predominantly Western style...creativity in the television medium is moreover tied to electronic requirements and technological innovations...virtually all television station in the Arab world were purchased from and installed by West European and American equipment manufactured. Furthermore, various programs sponsored by both western and Middle Eastern governments as well as private foundations, have taken experts to the Arab countries to advise, or sent Middle-East nationals to the United States, Great Britain, France, or West Germany to train in television production. The natural
result of all this is a western-type television program in Arabic.\footnote{82}

To the extent that Arab television give its attention to entertainment programs, they gave much less to educational and religious programs although statistics showed that illiteracy in the Arab world reaches more than 50% of the total population. This percentage reaches 80% in the rural areas which constitute 60.7% of the total inhabited area. Despite the lengthy daily schedule of broadcasting hours of Egyptian television, for instance, the percentage of religious programs of the total broadcast time does not exceed 1%.\footnote{83}

In 1982 Arab television produced a total of 30,000 television hours; the Egyptian television produced 25% and the remaining was produced by eight other Arab countries. More important is the type of these programs produced, as follows:\footnote{84}

1- Entertainment programs: 16395 hours.
2- News programs: 5078 hours.
3- Educational programs: 3499 hours.
4- Religious programs: 2136 hours.

The Arab Commission to study media issues in the Arab world, in its report, "Arab Media: Present and Future, Toward New Arab Information Order," focused on the content of broadcast programs in Arab television, arguing that the content of programs in Arab television is still questionable and that the notions of entertaining, educating, and
informing are meaningless as long as they are isolated from the political and social climate. Entertainment has become warning, educating has become propaganda, and information has become a hiding of truth. It has been shown that television has been used in an improper manner, which does not consider the viewer's interests nor ambitions. The argument comes to the surface when considering the seriousness of these functions of television (to entertain, educate, and inform) in a situation where Arab televisions import 40%-60% of its programs, some of them accepted to allow the advertisement and promotion of goods and commodities inconsistent with the existing circumstances. Late statistics indicate that six Arab states broadcast annually a total of 850 hours of commercial advertisement, but there is no indication that assures the compatibility of these goods and products with the economical planning of these states.

The Foreign Channel

In almost every Arab state there are two television channels, the first channel or what might be called the main program, and the second channel or what might be called the foreign program. The main channel used to be the only channel on Arab television for quite long time. During the seventies and early eighties, as a result of the development
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>News and current</th>
<th>Documentaries and educational</th>
<th>Fiction, entertainment and children</th>
<th>Sports</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia/Arabco TV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Rep. Yemen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5. Distribution of type of TV program materials in some Arab states.

Table 4. Program structure of some Arab countries according to categories.

(The share of imported programs within each category is shown in parenthesis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Categories</th>
<th>Algeria %</th>
<th>Egypt %</th>
<th>Syria %</th>
<th>Tunis %</th>
<th>Democratic Yemen %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Informational</td>
<td>22 (31)</td>
<td>16 (-)</td>
<td>20 (9)</td>
<td>28 (17)</td>
<td>37 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
<td>5 (25)</td>
<td>7 (-)</td>
<td>15 (-)</td>
<td>3 (37)</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
<td>10 (17)</td>
<td>5 (-)</td>
<td>5 (40)</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children's</td>
<td>9 (96)</td>
<td>7 (-)</td>
<td>2 (-)</td>
<td>5 (47)</td>
<td>1 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>9 (96)</td>
<td>5 (50)</td>
<td>14 (75)</td>
<td>9 (77)</td>
<td>11 (66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainment</td>
<td>48 (80)</td>
<td>48 (60)</td>
<td>38 (55)</td>
<td>51 (74)</td>
<td>48 (73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td>5 (-)</td>
<td>5 (39)</td>
<td>2 (-)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertisements</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 (-)</td>
<td>4 (-)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total minutes</td>
<td>7,669</td>
<td>20,292</td>
<td>7,443</td>
<td>6,322</td>
<td>6,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import %</td>
<td>(55)</td>
<td>(35)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(55)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and increase of broadcast hours, some Arab television systems started to broadcast another channel, which became known among the people as the foreign channel or the English channel. Ironically, some Arab governments insist on calling it the educational channel. Soon the epidemic of adding the foreign channel affected many other Arab television systems. Establishing another channel, however, should not be judged as a big step in television development. What counts is not the number of channels nor the number of broadcast hours, but what the content of the broadcast programs on this channel.

Before establishing the foreign channel, the main channel used to be a mix of Arabic and foreign programs, since the number of Arabic programs were not sufficient to fill out the transmission time. It was expected that foreign programs would fill the foreign channel since Arabic programs can barely fill the main channel. Thus, most of the broadcast time was filled with imported foreign programs. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the percentage of foreign programs on this channel reaches 86%; in Kuwait, 87.4%, and in Qatar, 78%.87

Establishing the foreign channel to serve foreign communities was the purported justification for allowing more foreign programs to penetrate Arab culture. Actually the foreign channel worsened the question of importing Western programs, which did not do any good for the native
cultural development. While the problem already existed before the establishment of the foreign channel, the complexity of the issue has increased with its emergence.

Although Arab television management justified these channels as needed to serve non-Arab communities in the Arab states, undoubtedly, this kind of justification is illogical and cannot be taken at face value. Unmistakably, the establishment of this channel can not be explained in any way as arising from the governments' concern for foreign communities. While this channel may be serving the foreign community, it is at the same time causing severe damage to the indigenous society which still does not have its own genuine channel and was already suffering from the foreign programs on the main channel. Besides that, the Arab native majority should be given priority service by the establishment of a full, authentic Arabic culture channel.

Moreover, it is not true that the foreign channel attracts non-Arab viewers only. It also attracts Arab viewers of the first channel who have a desire to watch foreign programs. As a matter of fact, the foreign channel seems to attract more Arab viewers than the first channel does. It is a preferred by many people, and Arab community watches this channel more than does the non-Arab community.

Probably no governments in the world other than the Arab governments offer a whole independent channel by itself to serve foreign minority communities at the state's
expense. In addition to that, serving foreign communities is not accomplishment through importing western programs. Most of the programs broadcast on this channel are globally Western, pure entertainment shows which have nothing to do with "serving" the foreign communities.

The truth is that establishing foreign channels is a deliberate move by Arab governments to allow more foreign entertainment programs into the Arab states to entertain people and offer them what they want which serve as a distraction tool to people. Arab television systems are engaged in competition with each other. They are in a race among themselves with respect to availability of channels and transmission hours. Establishing the foreign channel was a deliberate move by governments, not to serve the non-Arab community but to show off what might be considered as a technological development which could be accomplished only with foreign programs. They tend to take pride in their channels' availability they offer and the length of their daily broadcast hours length to dominate the television facilities they offer regardless of the broadcast content. Thus, those Arab states with one television channel tend to feel that they are at a lesser advantage and less fortunate than those who have more than one channel. Actually, there is no need for this kind of channel; the trouble already existed on the first channel. Two problems have replaced one problem.
Arab television not only imports entertainment programs from Western countries, they also depend on them for news importation as well. As regular television programs are filled with imported Western programs, news editions are filled with Western news. As viewers become attached culturally to the West through entertainment programs, they become attached politically to the West through the news.

Facts and figures indicate that the world’s information and news are controlled and dominated by a few Western countries. They come from four sources (Reuter, Agence France Press, AP, and UPI) and from three cities in the world (London, Paris, and New York). Figures also indicate that developing countries import approximately 80% of their news from Western countries, although 20% to 30% of which is news related to the developing countries. However, an argument can still be made about the type of negative and distorted implied even in this 20 to 30%.

Arab media in general and Arab television in particular are no exceptions in this regard. Imported Western newscast out-number any local or national Arab news. In 1981, the average Western news constituted a total of 40% in the newscast in the Arab states while Arab national news constituted 30% and the local news 10%. However, these
figures vary from one Arab state to another.

Ironically, Arab states do not import news of Western countries but do import news of other Arab states from Western sources. Despite the close geographical distance among Arab states, news has to go to Europe first and then distributed to the Arab states. During the civil war in Lebanon and the Israeli invasion, most Arab television obtained their news from Western agencies. In 1988 and during the riots in Algeria, Arab television got the news from France Press news agency, among others.

If we review the content of these imported news programs, we will end up with the same result as effected by imported Western programs, the meaninglessness of these programs and irrelevancy to people's and society's needs. Western news is covered in greater detail than events and major news are covered in other Arab states. Probably Arab viewers know more about what is happening in Western countries than what is happening in their own home land.

All studies conducted in the field of the flow of news among Arab states, either on international level or Arab world level, indicate the paucity of this flow. Despite all that been said about the unity of the Arab states and the common elements they share, and the existing organizations they have established, the news flow activity among them range between 10% and 30% of the total flow.89

Arab television present Western news in considerable
detail. The President of the United states, officials of the White house staff, State Department, and Pentagon appear almost daily on Arab television with their daily statements and press conferences. Even in such events as sports and news of the weather is covered. Anthony Smith observed that Third World media pays as much attention to the private lives of American celebrities, to the dangers of another San Francisco earthquake, to the problems of drug-taking among American students, to the health of the American president, as they do to the comparable personalities and issues of their own societies.90

The British royal wedding in 1981 received a tremendous coverage, giving it as much attention as it was paid in the West. The health of the President of the United States, the first lady activities, Baby Jessica who was trapped in a well pipe in Texas, the Geraldo Rivera incident of fighting during his show, the two whales who got trapped in an icy area and the effort to rescue them for days, all are examples of incidents receiving the attention of Arab television newscast.

Conclusion

The disfunctioning of Arab television has continued and spread to the Arab culture. The impact of imported western television programs on aspects of Arab heritage and Arab
people is very obvious. The chapter has demonstrated that television in the Arab states is far from playing a constructive role in terms of Arab cultural continuity. Arab television is playing neither a neutral role nor even a marginal role toward preserving Arab heritage.

Unfortunately, Arab television has become a negative and destructive weapon against Arab culture through its irresponsible broadcasting of alien content of programs which contradict and are incompatible with the basic Arabic values. Therefore, Arab television is accountable for its harmful role and holds a great share of responsibility for the damage that pervaded the Arab culture.

Chapter V narrows down the situation, turning the study's attention from the Arab world in general to the state of Kuwait as a case study for the research, studying the issue in more depth. More of the effect of imported western television programs on the Arab culture will be demonstrated in the following chapter. The chapter will take a close-up look at the model of Kuwait television.

2 Schiller, Herbert *COMMUNICATION AND CULTURAL DOMINATION*, international Arts and Science Press, N.Y, 1976, PP.26-29


5 Ibid, PP.32-36.


10 Ibid, P.140.


13 Abdul-Rahman, Ibid P.84.

15 Schiller, Communication and Cultural Domination, Ibid, PP.40-41

16 AL-Masmudi. Ibid, P.

17 Nordenstang and Schiller, Ibid, P.70.


21 Ibid, P.39.


29 Ibid, P.86.

30 Ibid, P.201.


32 AL-Tilili, Hassan, Our Ailing Media,


36 Ibid, P.85.


40 Ibid, P.221.


50 Smith, Ibid, P.27.

51 Shramm, Ibid, P.45.
52 Schiller, Communication and Cultural Domination, Ibid, P.85.


54 Al-Usmani, Ibid.

55 Ibid, .


59 Imam, Ibraheem Radio and Television Media, Dar Al-Fikr Al-Arabi, Cairo, P.237.

60 Al-Yahya, Ibid, P.17.

61 Imam, Ibid.


64 Al-Usmani, Ibid, P.87.


68 Noerdensting and Schiller, Ibid, P.127.


71 Ibid, P.80.

72 Nordenstang and Schiller, Ibid, P.71.


76 Ibid, PP. 125-126.

77 AL-Usmani, Ibid, P.211.

78 AL-Tilili, Ibid. PP.123-124.

79 Ibid. P.131.


83 Abdul-Samad, Ibid, P.

84 AL-Masmudi, Ibid, PP. 238-239.


86 AL-Masmudi, Ibid, P.239.


88 Al-Buhoorth magazine, Arab Research Center, (ASBU), Baghdad, 1981.


90 Smith, Ibid, P.72.
Chapter V

THE CASE STUDY: THE STATE OF KUWAIT

Introduction

This chapter is the heart and the core of this study. It narrows down the issue from the Arab states in general to the state of Kuwait specifically as the case study of this research. In this chapter, Kuwait television will be studied as a model of Arab television in terms of the relationship between television and Arab culture. In this chapter, the case study will be discussed in depth through critical analysis in order to arrive at the final results and conclusion of the research.

Many topics and issues are covered in this chapter. In addition to providing a brief history of Kuwait and the structure of the state, this chapter reviews in critical analysis the development of broadcasting in Kuwait with special emphasis on the television medium. The review of Kuwait television tackles some issues such as policies and strategies of broadcasting, censorship, types and characteristics of broadcast programs. In terms of program content, the chapter will examine the content of the imported western programs, especially entertainment programs and the role of the foreign channel. Most important, this
chapter will touch on the issue of cultural domination and illustrates how the Arab culture in Kuwait was damaged through broadcasting alien imported western programs.

Location and Topography

Kuwait is located between latitudes 28.45 and 30.05 to the north of the Equator and between longitudes 46.30 and 48.30 to the east of Greenwich. The state of Kuwait occupies the north-east corner of the Arabian Peninsula and the north-western corner of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. It is bounded in the east by the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, in the south and west by Saudi Arabia, and in the north and west by Iraq. Due to this location, Kuwait is the veritable gateway to the north eastern section of the Arab Peninsula.

The total area of the state of Kuwait is 17,818 square kilometers, mostly flat desert, or approximately 7,780 square miles (nearly the same size of the state of Massachusetts). Kuwait also owns six Islands which add some 300 sq miles to the area; however, most of these Islands are uninhabited. The Neutral Zone (5,700 sq km) was partitioned between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 1966; revenue from oil production in the zone is shared between both states. There is also another Neutral Zone between Kuwait and Iraq. This zone has been under a long political and border dispute for years and still has not been solved. Kuwait has one of the
few finest natural harbors (Kuwait Bay) in the north portion of the Gulf. The weather of the state is typical of the desert climate geographical region. The temperature is very hot in the summer, the average summer day temperature ranging between 110° and 120°F, in the shade. In winter, it ranges from 46° to 66°F, with occasional winter rains that bring some grass and small flowers to the desert in early spring. Dust and sandstorms are frequent in the summer and humidity aggravates the severe summer heat making air conditioning indispensable.

**Background History**

Although the history of modern Kuwait as an inhabited city started in the early eighteenth century when some tribes from central Arabia (Najd) immigrated to what became known later as "Kuwait", its history as uninhabited land goes back much further than that. It is known that people, particularly seamen from other nations, had reached its shores many years ago.

Archaeological findings at Failaka island, south of Kuwait Bay, indicated that pre-historic settlements of the early Bronze Age existed there some 4,000 or 5,000 years ago. The island became in later times a Greek settlement (Ikaros), as is evidenced by the ancient remains of a stone temple built about 334 B.C. at the time of Alexander the
Great by his army, a bust of whom was found and the discovery of a hoard of coins from Hellenistic times. For centuries, Kuwait land has been an important trading rout due to its strategic location on the northern Gulf. Through this strategic route of water, goods have passed from China and India to Kuwait and Shatt Al-Arab, continuing overland to Arabia, Syria, Iraq, the Mediterranean and then to Europe. However, no such evidence indicated any kind of habitation on the mainland of Kuwait in the very early times. In 632 A.D, the Muslims under the command of the famous leader, Khalid ibn al Walid defeated the Persians under the famous Persian leader, Hormus, in the battle of "That Alsalasil" or the "Battle of the Chains", which took place on Kuwait land in "Kadhma".

In the sixteenth century, the European influence started to penetrate the Gulf area when, following the exploration of Bartholomenw Diaz and Vasco de Gama, Portuguese ships reached these waters. Their presence lasted unchallenged for entire century. Because of their powerful naval fleet, the Portuguese influence was strong and obvious and they established a chain of forts along the coast from Oman in the South of the Gulf to the north of the Gulf in Kuwaiti island, then known to the Europeans as "Grane" (the little horn), meaning high hill. It was located opposite Kuwait Bay and served as the center for their naval fleets which dominated and secured the region
mainly for maritime route trade purpose. The Gulf maritime route and Grane Island were familiar to the Dutch, French, and British marines as well who sailed these seas in the seventeenth century to challenge the Portuguese during the struggle for dominating maritime trade routes. Eventually, the British emerged as the prevailed power.

It believed that the present town of Kuwait was founded in the beginning of the eighteenth century when in 1710 a terrible and continuous drought hit the interior of Arabia, driving some families of the Anazah tribe to immigrate from central Arabia (Najd) in search of a less difficult place. After searching in several places, they found the conditions to be even worse than where they came from, till they reached to the shore of the Gulf where they settled eventually near the harbor or bay where a fort or "Kut" stood. The name Kuwait is derived from the Arabic diminutive word of "kut" meaning small fort.

It seems that from the early settlers' time, the people of Kuwait decided to appoint a "shaik", or chief, to rule them. In 1716, the chiefs of the most important three tribes entered into alliance. The conditions of the alliance provided that Sabah bin Jabar bin Salman bin Ahmed will have the leadership in the affairs of government, in consultation with the other chiefs; Khalifah bin Mohammed, would have the leadership of the financial affairs in commerce; and Jabar bin Rahmat, chief of the Jalahmah, would
control the affairs of work on the sea. All profits were to be equally divided among them. In 1766, the whole of Khalifah followed by the majority of al-Jalahmah left Kuwait to settle in Bahrain. With the migration of al-Khalifah and al-Jalahma, there was no serious challenge left in Kuwait to Sabah authority. A member of Al-Sabah family ruled Kuwait ever since through selection among the family and the Al-Sabah family has been the ruling dynasty of Kuwait since that time. Unfortunately, many people and writers tend to associate and recognize Kuwait with the oil era. The post-oil era has been much covered; many have written on that subject, which was given too much attention. However, less attention has been given to the history of pre-oil era.

Kuwait had a long glorious heritage of maritime history. Those Kuwaiti men and women who lived in the pre-oil era and bore much hardships associated with surviving mother nature sacrificed much and committed their lives to their land, indeed should be given full credit for their great achievements in establishing and maintaining the modern Kuwait. They all proved they were sea and state craftsmen.

Despite the nomadic origin of the Kuwaiti people, they quickly adapted to the sea life environment. Prior to the oil era, the Kuwaitis always looked to the sea as a source of livelihood. Soon, they took from the sea occupations such as pearl diving, fishing, and maritime commerce and
turned the small town into the maritime trading center of the northern Gulf. British traveler-author, William G. Palgrave, who made a trip to Kuwait and the region in 1862, delineated the skills of Kuwait's seamen as follows:

Among all the seamen who ply the Persian Gulf, the marines of Kuwait hold the first rank in daring, in skill, and in solid trustworthiness of character. Fifty years since their harbour with its little town was a mere nothing; now it is one of the most active and the most important port of the northerly Gulf.4

The pearl diving industry played a major role in the state economy and some of the finest pearls in the world came from the Arabian Gulf. At one time, the estimated number of pearl harvesting boats in the Gulf were 5000, of which 700 came from Kuwait.5 By 1912, a fleet of 812 ships employing 30,000 sailors and divers was engaged in these maritime activities. During the summer months, nearly one-third of the entire population would be at sea for the pearl diving season.6

The long and hard sea life had shaped the Kuwaiti people to be one of the best talented and skilled vessels craftsmen in the world. They succeeded in building vessels that sail in the oceans and cross seas with no navigational aids except the qualifications and skills of the men.

In 1944, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold R. P. Dickson, the former British political agent in Kuwait made this note:

Kuwait to-day is still a most interesting and old-world spot for any one who wishes to study the various types of sailing-craft in the Persian Gulf...Many a sailor of the Royal Navy or other visitor has taken away with him as a souvenir a perfect model of [sailing-boats], or
one of the types of pearling boat. About nine years ago, an admiral took home one of these perfect models and presented it to the Science Museum, South Kensington.\footnote{7}

Not too many years ago, a Kuwaiti ship craftsman built a classical Kuwaiti style yacht (boom) for the ruler of Qatar; John Daniels portrays the amazement of British naval architect when he saw this art masterpiece of Kuwait craftsmen:

A senior British naval architect, greatly impressed by this particular craft, asked if he could see the plan. His embarrassment must have been greater when he learned that the craft had been made entirely from the creative genius of Kuwaiti craftsmen with their specialised skills and that no plans are ever used! the builders merely got down on the keel and proceeded with the job with no more ado.\footnote{8}

In 1776, Kuwait served as a starting point of a desert trade and mail route to Aleppo and the Mediterranean to replace Basra which was captured by the Persian during the war between Turkey and Persia. Before the turning of the nineteenth century, the British East India company moved its trade headquarter for the northern Gulf from Basra to Kuwait to avoid the threat to its trade route. Years later, Kuwait was the intended termination point of Berlin-Baghdad railway. William Palgrave depicts the condition of Kuwait during his visit in 1862:

The import duties are low, the climate is healthy, the inhabitants friendly, and these circumstances, joined to a tolerable roadstead and a better anchorage than most in the neighborhood, draw to Kuwait hundreds of small craft which else would enter the ports of Aboo-Shahr or Basra....In its mercantile and political aspect this town forms a sea outlet, the only one for Jabal Shammar, and in this respect like Trieste for
It is worthy to note that Kuwait history as a land has always been part of Arabian history. When Islam emerged in the Arabian Peninsula in the 7th C., the whole Arabian Peninsula converted to the new religion and Kuwait as uninhabited land at the time became part of the Islamic caliphate ever since. When Kuwait was established in the 18th C., it was already under the Islamic Ottoman caliphate and flew the Islamic Ottoman flag.

International powers dominated the Gulf region since the 16th C., the British eventually emerging as the uncontested power over that of the Dutch or the Portuguese who used to be the only power operating in the Gulf prior to the arrival of the British. With the emergence of Kuwait as a new trading center in the northern Gulf, the British started to maneuver around this new strategic center. The British relationship with Kuwait started when they transferred the British East India company of the southern terminal of its overland mail route through Aleppo from Basra to Kuwait. Meanwhile, the British interest in Kuwait did not stop there.

Kuwait Under Britain

In the struggle for power in the region between the Ottomans and the British, with a significant British
connection a bloody coup took place in Kuwait and Shaik Mubarak came to power in 1869. The legitimacy of Mubarak's reign, who ruled Kuwait until 1915, is still questionable. The rules that were made by Kuwaiti people since the establishment of Kuwait town in early 18th C. concluded that the seat of power should shift through selection. This was agreed upon as a common sense rule. This procedure was carried out peacefully and smoothly through the years until Mubarak's reign, when he broke these rules.

Mubarak was known to be so fond of the throne that he would do whatever it took even if he had to kill his two brothers. The British took advantage of Mubarak's fondness for the throne and backed him in the coup with many promises. According to an official memorandum by the legal adviser to the British Embassy in Istanbul, prior to the coup Mubarak spent one month in Bushire with the British Resident in the Gulf, F.A. Wilson, a point not denied by Wilson.10

In May 17, 1896, Mubarak carried out his coup and seized power from the ruler, his elder brother, Shaik Muhammad, by murdering him along with another brother, Shaik Jarrah, in a vicious and atrocious slaying while they were sleeping. Unlike other rulers of Sabah family who came to power through selection, Mubarak proclaimed himself ruler of Kuwait, breaking the rules of succession by selection, which made the people of Kuwait regard him as an illegitimate
ruler. The Ottomans, however, to avoid bloodshed, did not interfere in the event, regarding it as an internal matter of Kuwait.

Although Kuwait had always been proud of being part of the Islamic Ottoman Caliph territory and raising the Islamic Ottoman flag, Kuwait enjoyed full autonomy and the Ottomans actually never interfered in Kuwait's internal affairs. However, that was not the case after Mubarak came to power. During Mubarak's reign, Kuwait became an official British colony. It was clearly evident that the British, in conjunction with Shaik Mubarak, had planned and determined the future of Kuwait long before Mubarak's coup.

Through the years, Mubarak gained a reputation for selfishness, ruthlessness, tyranny, and sought to have many exclusive privileges. These attitudes put him on many occasions in confrontation with the people of Kuwait. It is not true that Mubarak was a "great man," despite the description in British-written history books and other foreign sources. A prominent and authentic Kuwaiti historian, Abdul-Aziz Al-Rushaid, described Mubarak's character and assessing Mubarak's reign:

Mubarak was a tyrant, stubborn and unjust. He was an absolute ruler who loved the accumulation of wealth and was always seeking ways to increase his wealth. He assessed high fines against law-breakers; continuously invented taxes...and made himself partner in all building and property. He received one-third of what was sold or rented, even if this was repeated a number of times a day."

Meanwhile another Kuwaiti historian, Al-Shamlan, delineated
Kuwait as a just and peaceful society, and the characteristics of rulers before Mubarak:

[They] were not privileged from most of the Kuwaiti population in any way. They were similar to the shaik of the tribe. There was no distinction between the shaik and members of his tribe. The power of the ruler was limited, and there were some Kuwaiti leaders who had more authority than the ruler himself.\textsuperscript{12}

Beside his fondness for ruling, Mubarak was also well-known for his anti-Islamic rule attitudes and pro-British. All Kuwait rulers before Mubarak held the title of Qaimqam "District Governor" from the Islamic Caliphate. When he was offered this title in January 1897, he refused to accept it and sought British assistance instead. Mubarak was known for his lavish and extravagant life and during his reign some immoral conduct that opposed Islam's teachings appeared in Kuwait. Years later it provoked the followers of the famous Islamic movement (Wahabbis) to attack Kuwait to suppress these evil acts. Right after he came to power, Mubarak sought British assistance against the Islamic caliphate; they were more than happy to accept Mubarak's offer.

On January 23, 1899, Mubarak signed a secret agreement with the British incorporating humiliating stipulations. Mubarak agreed not to cede territory to, or to direct relations with another power, without Britain's consent. Under this treaty, Mubarak agreed that Kuwait's foreign relations were to be handled through the British Foreign Office. Mubarak bound himself, his heirs and his successors
not to receive the Agent or Representative of any power or government at Koweit [sic], or at any other place within the limits of his territory, without the previous sanction of the British Government; and further binds himself, his heirs and successors not to cede, sell, mortgage, or give for occupation or for any other purpose any portion of his territory to the government or subjects of any other power without the previous consent of Her Majesty's Government for these purposes. This engagement also to extend to any portion of the territory of the said Shaik Mubarak, which may now be in the possession of the subjects of any other Government.\(^\text{13}\)

The agreement affixed no obligation upon Britain despite Mubarak's insistence upon British protection. Later, the British Political Resident in the Gulf, Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm John Meade, I.S.C., paid a visit to Kuwait and assured Mubarak in a letter of the good offices of the British Government to him, his heirs, and successors as long as Mubarak scrupulously and faithfully observed the conditions of the said bond. The letter also agreed to pay Mubarak Rs. 15,000 (1,000 £) and added "A most important condition of the execution of this agreement is that it is to be kept absolutely secret, and not divulged or made public in any way without the previous consent of the British Government."\(^\text{14}\) Mubarak's two brothers, who witnessed the agreement, refused to sign the agreement unless Britain assured protection of the family palm tree groves in Fao from the Ottomans. As a guarantee of their silence on the secret agreement, the British agreed to do so.\(^\text{15}\) This treaty was humiliating to the dignity of Kuwait and all Kuwaiti people, making many Kuwaiti people believe
that Kuwait was sold to the British. Ironically, despite all these negatives, the British called Mubarak "Mubarak the Great".

In 1899, the Ottoman Caliph supported a proposal that the Islamic Ottoman caliphate should give the Germans consent to build the famed Berlin–Baghdad railway and to extend and terminate it in Kuwait; the British intervened to block the extension of the project, depriving Kuwait of a vital means of contact with the external world. This was an early indication of Britain's tight grip on Kuwait and domination of Kuwait decision-making.

In 1904, the British Political Agency was established in Kuwait. Since then, the British Political Agent became the de facto ruler of Kuwait. Among its other functions, the Agency was given the right to establish and conduct its own jurisdiction law court for non-Muslims in the state. The Agency was the only foreign government post in Kuwait until an American Consulate was opened shortly after World War II. During the First World War, which caused the fall of the Islamic Ottoman caliphate, the British promised Mubarak that his palm tree groves in Fao would be permanently exempted from taxation and they would guarantee his protection if they occupied Basra, taking it from the Islamic rule of the Ottoman in exchange for his assistance to the British forces region. When the Ottoman Caliph called all Muslims for Jihad against the British, it was
expected that Mubarak would not respond to the Caliph's call. However, many of the tribes in neighboring Iraq responded to the Caliph's call and rebelled against Mubarak's ally, Shaik Khazal of al-Muhammarah, because of his support of the British. Shaik Mubarak attempted to rescue his ally by mobilizing Kuwaiti forces and forcing Kuwait people to quell the tribes who responded for the Jihad. The Kuwaitis surprisingly stood against Mubarak and refused to fight their own Muslim brothers for the sake of the British. As a result, Mubarak was forced to change his mind. Al-Rushaid comments that Mubarak "was disturbed by the degree of enthusiasm for the rebellion common among Kuwaitis, something he had not seen the equivalent of all his life". In 1914, after the fall of the Islamic Ottoman Caliphate, Mubarak and the British formally agreed that Kuwait would come under the British colonial system. Since that time, Britain had full control of Kuwait. Mubarak died suddenly in January, 1915.

In 1922, following a short conflict with Saudi Arabia, Britain once again betrayed Kuwait at the Uqair conference. Sir Percy Cox, then the British High Commissioner in Iraq, and Major J.C. More, the British Political Agent in Kuwait at the time, drew boundaries giving two-thirds of Kuwait territories to Ibn Saud. When he heard the news, Kuwait's Shaik Ahmed Al-Jabir resented the unjust agreement and felt that he was deceived. Even though he signed the agreement,
Shaik Ahmed was constantly considering how to regain Kuwait's lost territory. "To the day of his death he believed that he had been unjustly treated."\textsuperscript{17}

In January 1961, the government announced that Kuwait was now responsible for its foreign relations. It was not till June 19, 1961, when letters were exchanged between the ruler of Kuwait, Shaik Abdullah Al-Salim, and Sir William Luce, then the British Political Resident in the Gulf, that the British Government recognized Kuwait's independence and sovereignty.\textsuperscript{18} The 1899 protectorate treaty was replaced by a treaty of friendship and consultation. Britain and the Untied States have established embassies, replacing the Political Agency and the former American Consulate.

\textbf{Post-Oil Era}

The pearling industry at one time played a major role in the state's economy and Kuwait was one of the chief pearl centers in the Gulf and the region. But the economic depression in the 1930s and the advent and growth of cultured pearl industry led by Japan, brought depression to the industry as well to the state and threatened people's life source. But God never closes a door without opening another. An unexpected miracle was on the horizon. At that time, the mid-30s, early signs indicated great potential of oil in the area; then the discoveries were confirmed. Oil
was first discovered in 1938, stopped for several years due to the onset of the Second World War, and resumed in 1946.

As a consequences of the new discoveries, the pearling and fishing industries suffered a drastic declined and people of Kuwait could no longer look at the sea as a source of life. Instead, this time they turned to the forsaken, abandoned desert land as a new source of life. Unfortunately, the discoveries of the "black gold" lured the people and made them forget somewhat their pride in their past. The shipbuilding industry likewise fall sharply. Compared to 812 ships operating in 1912, there were only five boats operating in 1956. The last Kuwaiti deep sea dhow was purchased by the Office of Education in 1954 for preservation as an historical memorial. Such tragedy to the glorious industry of maritime heritage!

In some ways "black gold" has usurped much of the romanticism, the quaintness and the attractiveness of the old Kuwait. Nevertheless, even in recent years, we have been reminded of the remarkable achievements of the former era....one could not escape from a vivid sense of character, an inseparable link of the romanticism of the past as one toured the Kuwait waterfront of yesterday and saw the various craft silhouetted against the setting sun.¹⁹

Needless to say, the discovery of oil did not only shock the economic system but caused an upheaval to the whole structure of the entire society, changed all expectations, and created new stages of life. In fact, the oil boom in the region drew a very thick clear-cut line not only in Kuwait's history but in the history of the Arabian
Peninsula. As a matter of fact, oil was considered the major variable that shifted the primitive town to a modern state. When the oil tap was turned on, Shaik Ahmed Jabir Al-Sabah, in his address to his people referred to Kuwait for the first time as a state, not as a shaikhdom.20

Harold R.P. Dickson, former British Political Agent, who lived in Kuwait both before and after the oil era and then wrote many history books of Kuwait, expressed his admiration toward the will of the people of Kuwait and the challenge they met in living in the harsh environment.

Sun and sand are formidable enemies in an almost waterless country where the rainfall is less than five inches a year, and where day shade temperature rise to 110, 120, and even 128 F. These difficult conditions under which men had to work and live, particularly during the early eages, make the success which has been achieved all the more remarkable.21

One of the state's first planning advisors, Dr George Saba Shiber described the sudden disparity between the pre and post oil eras: "Yesterday there was old Kuwait; today, new Kuwait. Yesterday and today are literally a stone's throw away in space and fifteen years apart in time. The story of pre-oil and post-oil Kuwait is extraordinary and unique.".22 British author John Daniels, who lived and studied Kuwait's society in its first stages of the post oil era, describes the thriving rapid progress in the state as unparalleled in the Middle East, if not in the world.23
In general, Kuwait lacks natural resources particularly sources of drinking water, and depends thoroughly upon desalination techniques to provide water and drinking water. Kuwait has the largest water distillation plant in the world. Water has been always Kuwait's main problem in the either pre or post oil era. In fact, drinking water was a big business before oil was discovered; usually imported from the Shatt Al-Arab river in neighboring Iraq or obtained from springs under the sea by divers who would trap it in jugs and bring it to the surface. Some ground water has been found but most of it is brackish water. Interestingly, the highest budget item in the state is not the defense or the educational budget as one might expect, but it is the budget of water and electricity. Despite the heavy cost to the government of this burden on the budget, both water and electricity are subsidized by the government and people are charged below cost prices. In Kuwait, producing a barrel of distilled water costs more than producing a barrel of crude oil.

The lack of water combined with the poor quality of soil and the harsh weather makes agriculture almost impossible. Arable land represents only 1% of the total area. In recent years, the government has been concerned with issues of natural resources such as agriculture,
fishing, and animal husbandry. The government set strategies to increase production of fishing, animal products, plantation, green land, arable and potential arable land in the state, and green houses. However, it was clear that these ambitions would not succeed or survive without government support. Therefore, the government began to allocate lands, loans, and providing facilities to those who are interested in investing in the land. Nevertheless, this industry has not be able to attract many Kuwaities due to the more lucrative opportunities in the oil and commercial sectors. Moreover, this is a long-range government strategy. The result in the best cases, is not expected to reach commercial level and still far away of reaching local self-sufficiency level.

Kuwait's oil resources, owned and controlled by three government oil companies, is the vital natural source for the state. More than 90% of the state's revenue is from oil and oil products. Kuwait's oil reserves, approximately 68.53 billion barrels, is estimated to last for another 188 years if the oil production remains with the average of one million barrel a day, as it presently is. Kuwait has one of the largest oil fields in the world, "Burgan" oil field. The International Bank Mission which visited Kuwait in 1961 indicated in their report that the oil resources of Kuwait, about one-fifth of the world's total, give the shaikhdom a much larger role in the economic affairs of
Figure 6. National income and expenditure for Kuwait (1986).

Figure 7. Revenue of the state income in percentage terms.

the Middle East than its modest geographical dimensions and population might indicate. Due to the wealth of the government, Kuwait provides its citizens with one of the most comprehensive welfare systems in the world. The per capita GNP in Kuwait is among the highest in the world for an average of $13,500. While a barrel of Kuwait oil sells for about $29, a U.S Department of Energy official has estimated its cost of production to be 25 cents. This compares to 6 to 8 cents in 1961.

Population

The story of population in Kuwait after oil was discovered is a unique one. Due to the oil boom that got under way in the early 50s, and due to the government needs for labor and skills not available in Kuwait at the time to carry out the government jobs and services, Kuwait became the mecca for immigrants. Due to the huge state's budget and the government announcement of the first development plan and the massive governmental projects and the rapid expansion of civil services, Kuwait was swelled by the influx of immigrants from both Arab and non-Arab expatriate; skilled and unskilled. Ragael El Mallak noted that "With the possible exception of America at the turn of this century, no other country has witnessed such a mass movement of people, proportionately, as has Kuwait.". Fakhri Shehab
described the immigration in Kuwait in early 1950's: "A uniquely attractive market for labor was created and a flood of skilled and unskilled workers flocked from the four corners of the globe, but mostly from neighboring countries."  

Although the government for the time being has set very tough restrictions on entrance visas to the country, the immigration to the country was unrestricted and unsupervised until 1954. It was not until 1955 when the Office of the Social Affairs drew the government attention's to the fact that only 13% of the labor force was made of Kuwaiti nationals. In spite of government restrictions on entry visa to the country and work permits, it is still having some difficulties in controlling immigrants and reducing their number. It seems that the need for the immigrants, especially the skilled, is indispensable to carry out the massive expansion in government civil jobs and services.

In 1900, Kuwait population was estimated at 10,000 and in 1937 it was 75,000. In 1950, after oil was discovered, it reached 150,000, then 160,000 by 1952. In 1957, the first Kuwaiti census indicated that Kuwait population was 206,473, of whom 45% were Kuwaitis. The censuses following in the years 1961, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1985 have consistently indicated that the non-Kuwaitits out-number the Kuwaitis. In 1975, Kuwait's population was 994,837; the
Kuwaitis constituted 47.5% of the total population. In 1980, Kuwait population was 1,355,827, of which 58.6% were non-Kuwaiti. The estimated population of Kuwait according to the 1985 census was 1,697,301, of whom approximately 40.1% were Kuwaiti citizens. The population at mid-1988 was estimated at 1,958,000.²⁹

Kuwait's population have increased very rapidly over the years after the discovery of oil. Within the eight year period from 1957 to 1965, the population increased 128%. Between 1957 and 1975, Kuwait population increased 557%, an annual average increase of 24%. Between 1957 and 1980, the population increased by 656%. The annual population growth between 1957 and 1961 was 12%, probably the highest in the world. Both Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti populations have grown rapidly. Kuwait population has one of the highest growth rates in the World (about 4.5% from 1975 to 1980). Over the years, the growth rate among Kuwaitis increased dramatically despite their decline in number against the non-Kuwaitis. In 1980, for instance, there were about five times as many as in 1957, an increase of 494% over a twenty-three year period. Meanwhile, the growth among the non-Kuwaitis for the same period was even greater, 854%.³⁰ The average rate of growth of the non-Kuwaiti population has been decreasing very noticeably, from 10.3% in 1975-1980 to 5.6% in 1980-1985. It is estimated to have been 1.9% in recent years, with Kuwaiti population growing by 3.9%.
Of these figures, about 80% of the immigrants are males. The non-Kuwaiti population, because of its immigrant nature, has an unusually high proportion of young and middle-aged adult males (61.8% in 1985), many in construction and service jobs. The foreign population consists primarily of workers, sometimes accompanied by their families, who are in Kuwait to take advantage of the relatively high wages and the shortage of labor in all areas of employment. Jobs held by immigrants range from manual labor to important government and managerial positions. Palestinians and Jordanians constitute about 22% of the total population; Egyptian, 4%; other Arabs about 15%; Iranians, Pakistanians, and Indians about 10%; and the remaining 2% come from Europe, the U.S and the Far East. The population is relatively young: 58.3% are under 25 years old, and highly urbanized, with 91% of the population living in the urban areas. The population density is 80.2 per sq km.31

The definition of citizenship in Kuwait is a very strict one, and probably is among the most strict in the world. Article 1 of the citizenship law of 1959 (Amiri Decree #15, issued December 5, 1959) amended 1960, 1965, and 1969, officially defined the Kuwaiti nationals as those people and their descendents who were present in Kuwait prior to 1920 and maintained residence there to 1959. Kuwaiti law allows granting of citizenship to non-Kuwaitis
if they meet certain requirements. It requires, for instance, residency in Kuwait for a minimum of 15 years, a knowledge of the Arabic language, possession of a skill needed by the country, and a legal source of income in Kuwait. By 1975, 29.9% of the non-Kuwaiti population were born in Kuwait, 16.4% had been in Kuwait for 10 to 14 years, and 12.7% had been in Kuwait for 15 or more years. However, they were still considered non-Kuwaiti. Until 1980, the number of those who could be naturalized was limited to fifty persons annually. Those who are granted Kuwaiti citizenship have the same rights and obligations as other citizens except for some political rights.

Despite this citizenship law, the government granted naturalization for a large number of Bedouins with full political rights for the purpose of political and demographic reasons. Till 1979 there were 132,490 persons naturalized. Most of these bedouins were from Saudi desert (66.9%), Iraqi desert (21.6%), and Syrian desert (2.9%).

However, there is still a large population who permanently reside in Kuwait but still do not hold a Kuwaiti nationality. Most of these people are tribesmen who used to travel constantly in northern and inner Arabia searching for better life or better jobs. As a desert tradition, those tribesmen had not recognized the concept of boundaries and many of them would spread over today's states. Therefore, it was rather difficult for some of these tribesmen to
Immigrant population has always been a problem for the government. Since most of the services in the state are free or subsidized, and since there are more immigrants than citizens, the immigrants are benefiting more from these services than the citizens. Also this means that the government spends more on these services on immigrants more than it spends on citizens. It was also difficult for the government to control the political movements within groups of these immigrants which for years have influenced the political movement in Kuwait. From the security point of view, most of the crimes, robberies, and smuggling illegal materials to the state are carried out by immigrants. The government never considered the immigrants as permanent residents. Usually these immigrants are viewed as temporary employees for the purpose of doing temporary jobs. Very often the government urges these migrants to leave the country when their contracts expire.

Despite the rapid birth growth among the citizen population after the oil boom, there was also a rapid growth rate among the immigrants which always outnumbered the Kuwaiti people. For years the government encouraged population increase among the Kuwaitis; nevertheless, it never reached the government's aspiration and the problem has not been solved. In recent years, the government gave much attention to the issue of the massive expatriation in
the state since foreigners out-numbered the native citizens, considered by the state to be a threat to the internal security. The government called for a balance in the population structure between native and migrant people. Right before the onset of Iran-Iraq war and during the increasing Iraqi-Iranian hostility, the government waged a massive deportation campaign and termination of contracts for security reasons. In the last three months of 1980, and after a series of bombing and explosions in the state a total of 18,000 repatriates were deported.35

**Political Background**

Kuwait became independent of Britain in 1961, and was threatened immediately, within hours, by neighboring Iraq claims to sovereignty of its territory. British and Arab League forces were sent to maintain Kuwait independence. In 1963, after the military coup in Iraq that overthrew the Qassim regime, and after international pressure and a substantial financial inducement payment from Kuwait of 30 million KD ($84 million), Iraq dropped its claim.36 Official Iraqi policy recognizes the state of Kuwait without accepting the legitimacy of its border. A border dispute over what appeared to be the oil rich-border zone still unresolved, flared in 1967, 1973, and 1990. Since the leftist regime came to power in Iraq in 1958, Iraq has been
the major threat of destabilizing the security of Kuwait and the Arab world because of its territorial and oil ambitions. The last threat was the barbaric Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

The Iraqi Invasion

During the course of the final stage of writing this thesis Iraq invaded Kuwait because of territorial and oil field ambitions. The invasion which shocked the world occurred after the secular leftist government of Iraq promised Kuwait's government, and many other Arab states and western countries that it would not invade Kuwait; it alleged that it would peacefully settle the border and disputes about oil fields with Kuwait.

On August 2, 1990, in a deceptive and unprovoked attack, the dictator of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, ordered his army to occupy Kuwait. The Iraqi army took Kuwait by surprise and swiftly invaded and occupied the whole country. The Emir of Kuwait and his government officials, who were the prime target of the invasion, successfully fled the country and sought refuge in Saudi Arabia to lead the resistance. Within a very short period of time, they asked the U.S to intercede militarily in their behalf.

Despite a worldwide condemnation of the invasion and extensive international diplomatic pressure on Iraq to
withdraw from Kuwait, Iraq refused. The U.N Security Council unanimously issued a resolution condemning Iraq's aggression, imposing economic sanctions against Iraq. Despite Iraqi denial of any territorial ambition in Kuwait, and an Iraqi promise to withdraw, two days later Iraq announced its "annexation" of Kuwait. The U.N again unanimously voted that the annexation was null and void.

Furthermore, Iraqi troops moved southward and threatened to invade neighboring Saudi Arabia and amassed troops along its border. The U.S, together with some 25 other countries, including many Arab countries, responded to a request from the Saudi government to send troops to defend Saudi Arabia as well as put pressure on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The Arab emergency summit in Cairo, also condemned the Iraqi invasion and demanded immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops. The summit announced that many Arab states would send troops to the Kuwaiti-Saudi border and join a massive international military buildup of forces to repel any Iraqi aggression. It has become very obvious that Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait was not merely a dispute over part of Kuwait's territory but a conspiracy which had been planned for years. The plan to occupy Kuwait and Saudi Arabia was developed in conjunction with King Hussein of Jordan.

Within a few days the whole world stood against Saddam Hussein, and Iraq became isolated from the rest of the
world. Saddam Hussein responded to his isolation by taking thousands of foreigners in Iraq and Kuwait as hostages including women and children to use them as a human shield against any international attack on Iraq. This move was denounced by the international community. Within two months of the invasion, the U.N Security Council issued nine major resolutions against Iraq.

Meanwhile, Sheik Jabir Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, the Emir of Kuwait, and the Kuwaiti governmental authorities who sought refuge in Saudi Arabia vowed to fight for the liberation of Kuwait until all the Iraqi invaders were withdrawn. The Kuwaiti people have shown extraordinary solidarity and unity behind their leadership in resisting the Iraqi Army. Right after the invasion, eye witnesses and international organizations reported massive destruction and wholesale looting of the country of both public and private possessions. The Iraqi military personnel began torturing and executing thousands of Kuwaiti civilians, including women and children. As these lines are written, the situation is still tense and unclear and the fighting is still going on between Kuwaiti resistance and Iraqi troops.

The Political System

Kuwait is a traditional hereditary constitutional monarchy with a ruler (Emir). Succession of the Emir is
restricted to the heirs of the seventh ruler of Kuwait, Mubarak Al-Sabah, chosen alternately as a tradition from one of the two branches of Al-Sabah family, Jabir and Salim named for the two sons of Mubarak AL—Sabah. According to Kuwait's constitution, the Emir chooses his successor and must obtain the approval of the Kuwaiti National Assembly.

The constitution provides for a tripartite governmental structure. The Emir is the head of the state and is the highest authority. He is assisted by an 18 member cabinet which he appoints, headed by the premier. The National Assembly (parliament), formed by 50 members elected to four-year terms, has legislative functions. A judiciary authority constitutes the third branch of government in which the Emir acts the High court of Appeal.

Although the political authority revolves around the royal family of Al-Sabah, there are other prominent groups in the society, such as merchants and principal tribal groups which share the power with the royal family. Political parties are not allowed in Kuwait; however, there are several informal groups and organizations operating unofficially.

Unlike other Arab states, Kuwait enjoys a relatively Western-style democracy. Two years after independence, in 1963, election for a 50- member National Assembly took place for the first time on a very limited franchise. Candidates for the National Assembly are elected by a very narrow
electoral base. In 1985, the electorate only 57,000. Suffrage has been restricted to first class citizen male adults who prove that their families were resident in Kuwait in 1920 or before.

The National Assembly has always been a vocal forum for criticism of government domestic, regional and international issues and policies. Since it was established, the National Assembly had been influenced by different ideologies, from Nasserists and leftist groups in the sixties until mid-seventies, to the rightist and Muslim groups in the eighties. Despite the limited seats they won in the Assembly (four seats), the Islamic groups were viewed as the only active and prominent opposition group.

Nonetheless, on two occasions, the Emir had to interfere and dissolve the National Assembly by Emiri decree. The first occasion was in 1976, after overt criticism of neighboring countries caused the Emir to view the Assembly as a disruptive influence. In August 29, 1976, he dissolved it and suspended some articles of the constitution including the free press article, a decree which lasted for five years. In February 1980, the government appointed a committee to review the constitution and report in six months. After its reconstitution in February 1981, Arab leftist and Nasserist groups were defeated and victory went to right, independent, and Islamic groups. The Assembly became increasingly effective and had
almost constant clashes with government, especially over economic issues. After the 1985 election and despite a significant number of prominent candidates; independent members of the de facto opposition described as nationalists and Islamic groups were elected.

Even though the opposition stopped far short of making any revolutionary demands, it consistently embarrassed the government over its economic policy. A member of the ruling family was forced to resign his position as a Minister of Justice in May 1985 after a hearing before an Assembly commission proved his lack of integrity. Another member of the ruling family--the Oil Minister--and three other Ministers--persistently came under fire, the two Ministers actually tendering their resignations without having them accepted, a unique state of affairs by the autocratic standards of the region. Eventually, and apparently due to external pressures, the Emir stepped in to dissolve the Assembly for a second time in June 1986, citing internal and external threats to the state's security. The Emir once again suspended some articles of the constitution, including the free press article, and imposed a pre-censorship law over the press. But since the cease-fire in the Gulf War took effect, there has been increasing domestic pressure for new elections and reconstitution of the National Assembly. However, the government seems to be unwilling and unenthusiastic about restoring democracy in its original
style unless major changes occurred. Nevertheless, in May 1990, after public pressure, the Emir announced he would accept the restoration of democracy through the "National Council", composed of 75 members in which he has the right to appoint 25 members; the other 50 members are elected secretly.

Historical Background of Broadcasting in Kuwait

Introduction

There are two major factors which played a vital role in establishment and emergence of broadcasting in Kuwait: 1- external factors and 2- internal factors.

1- External factors: influence of the Europeans, especially the British, during their domination of the country and the region in general, the impact of broadcasting systems from other Arab states especially Egypt and Iraq.

2- Internal factors: the discovery of oil which led to the wealth of the state as an economic power and the achievement of independence and formation of a formal state with a modern political system.
Radio

It was during the Second World War that the British installed a small low-power radio station in a small room in the security force building to broadcast two hours daily in Arabic for purely political purposes; to counter the powerful Nazi station in Basra in neighboring Iraq, and to propagandize for the Allies' policies during the war. At that time was part of British strategy to establish many radio stations in different parts of the Arab world to counter Nazi stations.

Officially, Kuwait's radio, founded in 1951 with one and 1/2 kilowatt transmitter operated by two employees for two hours daily, covered Kuwait's city only. In 1953, the number of employees increased to five and the transmission hours increased to three hours and half, which lasted for five years. In 1959, four rooms in an old army built on the land of the army workshop were turned into a temporary studio and eight rooms became offices. Until 1959, a one-kilowatt short wave transmitter handled the broadcasts. The next year a five-kilowatt medium-wave transmitter started operating; within months a five-kilowatt short wave transmitter was added to the strength, while before the end of 1960 both the new transmitter had been increased to ten-kilowatt each. Summer, 1960, saw the six evening hours of daily air time increased to ten and half hours; three and
half in the morning and seven in the evening and news bulletins were broadcast for the first time.37

Unlike some other Arab states, radio in Kuwait was from the beginning a governmental station long before independence. After independence in 1961, because of the wealth of government and the image of the modern state, Kuwait's radio expanded considerably and powerfully especially after the emergence of radio as a political weapon.

In the 1950s and 1960s, during the cold war among some Arab states or what had been known as the Air Waves War among Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait was attacked through the air waves by some leftist and revolutionary regimes such as Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, especially during the 1956 tri-attack on Egypt. These developments alarmed the Arab states against Britain, putting Kuwait official policy in a crucial position, since Kuwait is a good ally to the British. The government found that many people were listening to and influenced by these stations causing the government to accelerate the expansion of its radio service to attract the people to listen instead to their national government voice.

The emergence of radio in Kuwait can not be separated in any way from politics. The relationship between radio and politics in Kuwait is very obvious both prior and after independence. Abdul Aziz Jafar, Assistant Under- Secretary
of Ministry of Information in Kuwait, who lived through the long years of experience with Kuwait radio since the early 1960s, stated that politics was the loudest and most effective voice in the world and has been the Arab world from the time that one opens one's eyes on life. When the world was engaged in the World War, the Arab world was engaged in two parallel wars; the war of liberation from colonialism and the war of reformation of the state structure and political system. Kuwait, despite its small size, was not in isolation; actually Kuwait's maritime history and constant travelling among different coasts of Persia, India, and Africa in addition to its location on the Eastern Arabian Peninsula and its location in the vicinity of Iraq, made politics an integral part of the Kuwaiti existence. In early 1960s, when radio was still annexed to the police force, the political department of the radio was annexed directly to the office of the ruler.

In 1956, when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, Britain initiated the Suez conference in London in condemnation of Egypt's action which eventually led to the Anglo-French air attack on Egypt on October 31 1956. The Suez Canal crisis set the Cairo radio to spreading anti-Western views, especially against the British and provoked Arab Nationalism feeling which sparked an increasing anti-British sentiment in the Arab world in support of Egypt. Kuwait was under air wave attack by Cairo radio "Voice of
the Arabs," which put the Kuwait government in a crucial situation since Kuwait was still under British Protectorate and the British Political Agency still existed in Kuwait as a representative of the British government. As a result and as positive response to Cairo's radio, Kuwait's government was under popular pressure to end British domination of the country. In 1958, the Voice of the Arabs recorded:

AL Sha'ab [name of newspaper, means, the people] of Kuwait has demanded the abolition of the Political Agent's court in Kuwait, as the British are acting as Rulers and this is a transgression against the dignity of Kuwaitis.  

Before all these powerful and severe air waves attacks, Kuwait's radio was unable sufficiently to counter or even match Cairo's radio attacks. In 1960, an Arab ship, Cleopatra, picketed in New York as a result of Zionist activity. The Arab ship picket incident brought forth a spontaneous reaction from Kuwaiti dockors indicating that they would blacklist all American ships, and that no further United States tankers would be loaded at the two Kuwait's oil ports of Mina al-Ahmadi and Mina Abdulla. This message evidently pleased the Egyptian radio station "Voice of the Arabs". The station's announcer gave this dramatic commentary:

Today and for ever we have a date with glory. 
Today, our workers, from Casablanca to Ahmadi and Basra will wage their triumphant battles. 
We shall assert our Arabism to the World. 
We shall prove to the World that we are united -from Morocco to Kuwait and Iraq. 
We shall redeem Palestine.
Despite these air waves tensions, the Egyptian's hostility actually was not considered a serious direct threat to Kuwait's security or intended to overthrow the ruling government. Nonetheless, in 1958, a military bloody coup took place in neighboring Iraq and the pro-British government was overthrown to be replaced by hard-line military communist government. The new government began gradually to antagonize relations with Kuwait, criticizing the British presence. In 1961, however, a serious and direct threat came from Iraq. Right after Kuwait's declaration of independence from Britain and signing of a new agreement with her, the dictator of Iraq, Abdul Karim Kassem, claimed the territory of Kuwait, a claim arising from years of build up of borders disputes and antagonism. Iraq's radio launched a propaganda attack against Kuwait:

Everybody knows that Kuwait is a district belonging to Basra Liwa (Province). Iraq has helped the inhabitants of Kuwait to expel the ghost of British imperialism. Kuwait is an inseparable part of Iraq. "Kuwait's inhabitants are being ruled by a gang robbing them of their money and toying with the country's interests; they have been preventing Iraq's water from reaching Kuwait. Our country depends on oil resources and this gang toys with these resources ... We shall appoint Shaik Abdulla [Kuwait's ruler] as District Commissioner in Kuwait."

Kassem, on different occasions, demanded every inch of Kuwait's territory. "Tomorrow Iraq would inform all nations of her position with regard to the territory." He rejected the new Anglo-Kuwaiti agreement and called it an "especially dangerous blow" against the integrity and independence of
Iraq and the people of Kuwait. "From the date of the abrogation of the 'illegal 1899 agreement', Iraq had decided that nobody inside or outside Kuwait, of whatever status, should rule Kuwait. 'We would stand up to imperialism if it intervened in her (Kuwait) peaceful movement.' 

On June 26 1961, Kuwait's radio broadcast a strong and clear statements explaining its position of the issue which were not empty ones:

The Government of Kuwait declares that Kuwait is an Arab independent state with complete sovereignty internationally recognized and that the Government of Kuwait, backed by all the people of Kuwait, is determined to defend Kuwait's independence and protect Kuwait. The Government of Kuwait, while announcing this, is fully confident that all friendly and peace loving states, and especially the Arab states, will support her in safeguarding her independence.

A few days later, at the Kuwaiti government's request, some 6000 British troops, landed in Kuwait, enough to provoke Cairo Radio's "Voice of the Arabs" against the presence of British troops on Kuwait's land and accusing Britain of plotting to occupy Kuwait, demanding an immediate withdraw of British troops.

It is worthy to note that General Qasim was not the first Iraqi leader who attempted to annex Kuwait. King Ghazi (who ruled Iraq from 1933 to 1939) also attempted to absorb Kuwait into Iraq territory. King Ghazi tried to arouse the Kuwaitis against their ruler through a private broadcasting station in his palace. In 1938, the King summoned the Chief of the staff and ordered to arrange for
the army immediately to occupy Kuwait, but the acting Prime Minister persuaded the King to abandon his scheme.\textsuperscript{45}

Within the trauma of these sizzling political events jeopardizing its security, Kuwait had two major aims for developing its broadcasting system now the power of radio in reaching and shaping people's opinion had become clear: to extend its voice to other countries as far as possible, to prove its existence, and to attract its people to listen to their national radio by offering them alternatives in radio programming instead of listening to other countries' stations. Therefore, In 1958, Kuwait government had a contract with two experts in radio and television to set up two strategies— an urgent short-term one, and another long-term one to develop and expand radio services.

It seems that Kuwait has succeeded in achieving these two goals. Compared to two hours of daily broadcasting in 1951, Kuwait's radio now broadcasts more than 62 hours a day on eight channels, four of them in non-Arabic languages. The 1960s were crucial years for Kuwait's radio. It is evident that the Arab air waves "Cold War" was a big lesson for Kuwait to learn from. In 1960, the transmitter had a power of 10 kilowatts and broadcasted for about 17 hours a day. Right after independence, the government gave considerable attention to expanding and developing its radio services, taking advantage of the oil wealth. In 1961, the number of the employees increased to 267 and transmission
was through two powerful transmitters. One with 100 kilowatts operates on medium wave and another with 50 kilowatt operates on short wave. The archives of audio tapes increased to a total of 2013 hours, compared to not more than 15 hours in 1958.46

In early 1960's, the government published a report stating that the government is boosting its medium-wave transmitter to 400 kilowatts and its short-wave transmitter to 250 kilowatts, the report continued:

All these equipment is either ordered or already in the country and it is designed to give a very comprehensive coverage to the Middle East through an aerial array of 29 beamed aerials covering an aerial "farm" area of two-and-a-half miles square. When this project is finished in 1966 the Voice of Kuwait may be heared as far as the United States of America. The final expansion planned at the moment is for a very high power medium-wave station to be built within the next two or three years. It could make Kuwait the loudest Arab voice over an area covering Alexandria, Beirut, Northern Iraq, Afghanistan, Karachi, the Gulf towns and round to Aden, Riyadh and Mecca.47

In its early stages, Kuwait's radio depended on Egyptian programs. Many were written and recorded in Egypt and Lebanon especially for the Kuwait radio service, but in the 60s Kuwait had its own recording studios. Radio receivers spread very rapidly among the people and became very popular. In early 1960's, the estimated number of radio receivers in Kuwait was 80,000 set.48 Many factors accelerated the popularity and the availability of radio in Kuwait; the opening of Kuwait's market on international markets after the oil boom, the wealth of the people who can
very easily afford to purchase even expensive radio sets, and needless to say the wide spread interest in politics. In 1968, there were an estimated 400,000 radio sets in the state for an estimated population of 650,000, probably the highest rate in the world.\textsuperscript{49}

During the 1970s, Kuwait's radio continued expanding and its signals covered most of the Arab world and in the 1980s, Kuwait's radio programs reached as far as Australia, New Zealand, North and South America, Far East, and East and South East Asia. Abdul Aziz Al-Mansour, the director of Kuwait radio, described the status of Kuwait's radio in the 1980s as passing from amateur level to professional level.\textsuperscript{50} At the present time, Kuwait's radio broadcasts through eight programs four of which are non-Arabic. These programs are: General program, Second program, Holy Quran, European, Urdu, Persian, Directed, and F.M program. The total of broadcast programs is about 23,315 hours a year.

Entertainment programs receive most of the air time in most radio channels and constitute more than 60% of the total broadcast time, while cultural programs are allocated the least number of hours. Like most other Arab states, Kuwait's radio offers FM service which is filled with Western pop songs and music such as American, British, French, and Spanish. Most of the audience for this station are teenagers and Europeans, however, It is not clear yet what is the real purpose of this station.
Despite the incredible development in Kuwait radio in the last thirty years and despite the success of the government to attract the people to listen to the national radio, external programs, still have some popularity among the people and are considered credible sources of information. Audiences usually tune in to these stations during political crises and crucial political events as a way of seeking truth in contrast to evasive official stories of government. Some of these external stations include (RMC) Radio Mont Carlo, BBC, VOA, and RM.

**Television**

Just as in radio, Kuwait's television was developed and expanded very rapidly beyond all expectations in a relatively in very short period of time. Due to the Arab air waves "cold war" in mid-1950's and 1960's and the Kuwait-Iraq crises in 1961, Kuwait's government had a substantial desire to develop radio and television services as well. Nonetheless, due to the relative complexity of the nature of television compared to radio, television development in Kuwait was less rapid than radio. In spite of this, television development in Kuwait is impressive and extraordinary. If television service is a reality in the Arab states, it is no doubt a reality in Kuwait. It seems that the early political events made the Kuwaiti officials
realize the significance of this medium and its development, since early stages, as a means of expressing Kuwait's policy, getting its message cross, and defending its opinion.

Indeed, the government succeeded in making television a distinctive phenomenon and in attracting people and families around the television set and building credibility of the national television. Moreover, The nature of economic, political, and social environment of Kuwait have played key roles in spreading the phenomenon of television. The high income of the government and the people as a result of the massive oil revenue, the political events that surround Arab states in general and Kuwait in specific as a post-independence era, and the image of forming new modern social life as a post-oil era equipped with television set which served as a technological aspect and entertainment medium at the same time were all factors behind the rapid spread of television in Kuwait.

Early statistics in 1968 indicate that there were about 80,000 television sets in use in the state for an estimated population of 650,000. The United Nations late statistics of 1980 give impressive figures, indicating that Kuwait has the highest ratio of television set per capita in the Arab states, 490.91 sets for each 1000 capita, and the second in the world after the U.S., 631.99 set for every 1000 capita. A study conducted by Kuwait Ministry of
Information in 1985 suggested that more than 80% of the families living in Kuwait acquire a television set and many of them acquire more than one set; more than 99.5% of the population watch Kuwait's television and 58.8% watch other neighboring states' television stations. However, according to 1982 statistics, the estimated viewers within the population of the state was 1,300,000, which constitute 96% of the total population. It has been estimated, however, that the viewers of Kuwait television in the region of the Gulf area number 10,000,000. The number of television receiver sets in the state were estimated in 1982 for 400,000 sets and in 1985 for 423,000 sets. Kuwait television gained good reputation among other Arab televisions particularly in the Gulf region. In all past Gulf Televisions Festivals, Kuwait television always occupies the first position in major categories such as programs and development.

Since Kuwait Television (KTV) is the first system in the Arabian Peninsula region, it helped other states and played a primary role in the development of television services in the region. Kuwait's concern for developing its television service was not limited to its geographical border but it was extended to other neighboring states in the Gulf region. In each stage of development to increase its transmission power, Kuwait always take into consideration the desirability of its signals reaching to
neighbouring states so they can make use of the television service for one reason or another.

In early 1960's, right after Kuwait television went officially on air, Kuwait government announced that it is building a powerful VHF signal transmitter to cover Basra, Abadan and southern parts of Iraq. "As well as this the ministry [of Guidance and Information] may build a transmitter in Bahrain, and send down complete video-taped programs for broadcasting; at the moment reception in Bahrain is feeble and unreliable." In 1974, Kuwait financed the construction and furnishing the television building in Bahrain.

In 1969, Kuwait built a television station in Dubai. This station was operated under the name of Kuwait Television Service in Dubai. This station was under the control of the General Board for the South and the Arabian Gulf until December 1972 when it was handled to the government of Dubai after the formation of the federation of U.A.E.

Background of Kuwait Television

Whereas Kuwait's radio was established as a government property from the beginning, Kuwait's television, to the contrary, was established as a private commercial station. The beginning of Kuwait television started when a Kuwaiti
businessman who happened to be a local RCA television receivers dealer purchased a low-power American standard television transmitter (525 lines) from the American company, RCA, in 1957. He started simple daily broadcasting of cartoons and motion pictures to promote television set sales. At that time, many Kuwaitis already had TV receivers to receive program signals broadcast from Abbadan in neighboring Iran from the opposite bank of the Gulf on American standard signals.

Within a few years of broadcasting, on November 15, 1961, and right after independence, Kuwait government bought the small station; a 100 watt transmitter was used to broadcast experimental programs for a year. On January, 17 1962, Kuwait television was annexed officially under the supervision of the Ministry of Information, formerly Ministry of Information and Guidance, according to Article #1 of the Amiri decree #2 of 1962 issued in January 17, 1962. 59 In 1962, the government changed the system from the American standard to the European standard when a European two-kilowatt transmitter was purchased, and it began to broadcast on channel 8. Therefore, all American receivers in Kuwait were adapted to receive the new European channel of 625 lines. Kuwait television started with four hours of daily broadcasting.

A round 1962, the government announced that a stronger ten-kilowatts transmitter working on the European channel 10
was ordered to start working in 1963. The government also announced that this transmitter will for a while broadcast the same programs, and later it will be used to provide a second channel.\textsuperscript{60}

In 1963, Kuwait television started broadcasting officially. The residents of the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia, who used to receive American standard signals from Kuwait and ARAMCO (Arabian-American Oil Company) in Saudi Arabia, had to purchase dual systems receivers to pick up the new European system in Kuwait. Kuwait was the first state in the Arabian Peninsula to have its own television broadcasting system. (Actually the first television station in the Arabian Peninsula is the American oil station ARAMCO and which is believed to be the second in the Arab world after the American air base station in Libya). Kuwait television played an important part in television development in the area, which obviously paved the way for other Arab states in the region to have their own national system, too (Saudi Arabia in 1965, U.A.E in 1969, Qatar in 1970, Bahrain in 1973, Oman in 1974, and Yemen in 1975).

In 1964, after the government felt that the Iraqi television from Basra and Iranian television from Abadan were beginning to gain audiences in Kuwait, the government made a decision to increase the transmission power to cover the whole state through a transmission station in Al-Rudtайн with 2 kilowatts (video) and 0.4 kilowatts (audio).
1966, Kuwait government signed a contract with the Japanese company Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Limited to improve and develop the state's communication system and to build the first earth satellite station in the Arab world, "Umm Al-aish", which operates via the Indian Ocean's satellite. The station was inaugurated in 1969 and broadcasted live the trip of Apollo 11 which carried the first man to walk on the moon on July 16, 1969.

In 1971 a substantial change in transmission occurred with the establishment of a powerful transmission station in the island of Failaka, with two transmitters for a total power of 20 kilowatts (video) and 4 kilowatts (audio). The purpose of this new station is to cover the eastern province of the Arabian Peninsula and parts of other Gulf states such as Abbadan in Iran and southern Iraq. One of the transmitters is broadcast specifically to Basra in southern Iraq in order to provide a television presence in a country that threatened to invade Kuwait in the 1960s and 1970s.

On March 15, 1974, Kuwait television began transmitting in color on the German system PAL (Phase Alternation Line) with 625 lines on the channels 5-8-10-6. The last channel "6" was directed especially to Basra. The reason for adopting the German system was partly as an expression of desire for political unity with some other Arab Gulf states such as Qatar, Bahrain, U.A.E, and Oman which adopted the same system. Meanwhile, other Arab Gulf
states like Saudi Arabia and Iraq adopted the French system, SECAM, as an appreciation for France's moderate policy in the Middle East associated with the transaction of French "mirage" military airplanes and other arms supplies sold to some Middle East countries. 61

In March 27, 1977, the German company (Semins) inaugurated another earth satellite station beamed at the Atlantic Ocean satellite. In 1979, the television moved to its new and modern French built TV and radio complex. On December 2, 1979, Kuwait television began broadcasting another channel designated for foreign programs only and for four hours a day. In 1981, the Japanese company Nippon built another satellite earth station beamed also at the Atlantic Ocean satellite. In September 28, 1985, another earth station was inaugurated which operate through the ARABSAT satellite system.

Broadcasting hours have also increased since 1961. From 24 hours weekly in 1961, it reached 42 hours in 1964, 52 hours in 1969, and 58 hours weekly in 1975. The second channel which began broadcasting for 21 hours a week has been raised to 45 hours a week in 1986 for a total of 131 hours a week on both channels. In 1981, the total broadcast hours were increased 350% in contrast to 1961. 62 In 1986, the annual broadcast hours on the first channel was 4,488 hours and on the second channel was 2,307 for a total of 6,795 hours a year, an average of 130.5 hours per week.
At the present time, Kuwait television uses five ground stations linked to the satellites over the Atlantic Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and Arabsat.

The Structure of Television System in Kuwait

Television in Kuwait is a government institution owned, controlled, financed, and operated by the government. Kuwait television is part of the Ministry of Information which is the one in charge of operating and supervising the broadcasting system in the state. The head of this Ministry is the Minister of Information, who is appointed by the Emir—the head of the state-. This position has been very sensitive and important to the government since television came under governmental authority. The position is always occupied by a member of the ruling family. The director of television (formerly Assistant Deputy under Secretary for Television Affairs) is the one who is directly in charge of the television organization and reports to the Minister, followed by the Programming Department Executive who is responsible for the whole planning process and everything broadcast on television. The television organization is composed of six departments as follows:

A- **Programming Department:** This is the main and largest department in the television which is in charge of programming service either planning or production. Also
this department is responsible for evaluating and approving the programs. There are nine other sub-departments which come under the administration of this department related to the work of programming: 1-drama programs division, 2-sports programs division, 3-news division, 4-variety division, 5-production services division, 6-second channel division, 7-coordination division, 8-cultural programs division, and 9-production division.

B-Financial Affairs Bureau: Responsible for all financial work and transactions that are related to television, it has a connection with the main financial Department of the Ministry. This Bureau controls four divisions: 1-marketing and bidding, 2-advertisement and commercials, 3-archives, 4-treasurer.

C-Managerial Affairs Bureau: Responsible for all administrative and organizational work, this department is formed of four divisions: 1-staff affairs division, 2-public services division, 3-secretarial and registration division, 4-and typing division.

D-Films and Cinema Bureau: This Bureau is in charge of preparing and producing films and footage of films that are needed by television for its programs, either documentary or informative.

E-Censorship Bureau: This bureau is in charge of censoring all materials reviewing them for suitable content and artistic quality. This bureau determines the compatibility
of the programs with the overall policy of Kuwaiti television. This bureau has two sections, one for censoring Arabic materials and the other for censoring foreign materials.

F-Technical Office: This office deals with technical affairs such as making arrangements for receiving and sending materials through satellite, receiving and recording the daily news editions through the Euro-vision and distributing it, in turn, to other Gulf states' television systems. Since Kuwait is the Center of News Exchange and Coordination for the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region, this office is in charge of this mission.

As in most other Arab states, there are no television fees; obviously this is the case because the government is wealthy enough and capable of funding the whole system and because it wishes to make sure that every thing is under government control and because it is in the government's interest that no one else should claim any sharing of this power. Centralization is very obvious in television organization and management. This can attributed to two main reasons; since television is a government property, then it is very natural to become the voice of government. Perhaps the other main reason of television centralization is the nature of centralization of the political structure of the state, which leads automatically to centralization of other sub-system institutions in the state.
Figure 8. Structure of Kuwait television.

SOURCE: Kuwait Television Over Twenty Years, Ministry of Information, Kuwait.
Policies and Strategies of Television System

In reviewing the historical background broadcasting of the Arab world in general and in the Gulf area and Kuwait in particular, we find that the circumstances which surrounded the emergence of broadcasting have pretty much shaped the policies and strategies of broadcasting in Kuwait and other Arab states. Not only that, but they have also shaped the function and structure of television broadcasting. Since television in Kuwait is a governmental property, it is very natural that television operate and function within the framework of the state policy.

The planning process for programming in Kuwait television goes through two main steps: first, it sets up the general annual programming and proposes the budget for it, and second, divides the annual programming to four seasons (each season is 3 months). To carry out these steps, the management requests all programming departments and sections to submit their plan for programming over the next four seasons along with estimated budget and technical needs. The programming department through its committees study, review, and evaluate all bidings of Arabic and foreign materials from local, regional, and international companies and prepare a report of these materials. After preparing a whole cohesive plan based on information from the different departments, it submits to the Director of
television for approval. The Director of television in turn submits the plan to the supreme commission of radio and television programs which is headed by the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Information and membership of Assistants Under Secretary, Directors of radio, television, technical, and engineering departments. The commission then submits the whole plan to the Minister for final approval.

Kuwait television usually begins its daily programs in the evening at five clock in the winter and six clock in the summer during the weekdays. There is no day television broadcasting in Kuwait. However, there are exceptional cases on the weekends, holidays, national days, and special occasions when television broadcasts morning programs. Since early 1974, Kuwait television began broadcasting daily morning programs for only four hours during the three month school summer vacation period. There have been suggestions to have regular daily morning broadcasting all year long, even when schools are in session.

Kuwait television broadcasts on two channels, the first channel and the second channel:

The First Channel (KTV1): This is the main channel and the predominant one. Kuwait's oldest channel, operational since November 15, 1961. It started broadcasting four hours a day, increased to 6 hours a day in November, 1964, to 7.5 hours in November, 1969, and to 9.2 hours in November 1975. This station used to broadcast both Arabic and English programs
(with Arabic captioning) until the establishment of the second channel in December, 1979. Most of the foreign programs were then shifted to that channel. Currently, most of the programs in the first channel are in Arabic and foreign programs constitute about 15% of its air time. It broadcasts longer than the second channel, especially on special occasions such as weekends, holidays, and special events.

The Second Channel (KTV2): This channel was established in December, 1979, with 4 hours of broadcast a day, increasing in the following years to nearly 6 hours a day. The main purpose of this channel, officially, is to serve the non-Arab community in the state. All the programs in this channel are in the English language. More than 80% of the programs broadcast over this channel are imported; about 55% are drama and entertainment programs. This channel also broadcast many of educational and cultural materials, accounting for 35% of the channel's air time.

Censorship

Censorship on broadcast programs in general can be described as moderate, but conservative especially of excessive sex scenes, violence, and anti-governments materials particularly any which criticize heads of states. Since the emergence of television in Kuwait, censorship has
changed its trend; during the 1960's until mid-1970's censorship was liberal. Noticeably, in late 1970's, censorship took a conservative trend. Since 1979, censorship toward moral issues became very strict, concentrating and focusing more than before on religious programs. This trend can be ascribed to the timing of many political events of the time in the Islamic World, such as the Iranian revolution, the takeover of the Holy Grand Mosque in Mecca by a religious group, the communist Soviet invasion of Muslim Afghanistan, and the signing of Camp David treaty between Egypt and Israel.

In searching for written rules that KTV might apply in its censorship procedures, the writer could not find any such rules. However, he was told by television officials that any such written restrictions or guidelines do not exist and most of these rules are unwritten ones. In many cases, it depends pretty much on the common sense of the censor person or the committee.

Al-Usmani, who studied Kuwait television, noted that there are three main requirements for program acceptance in Kuwait TV: a program must not violate the religious beliefs of the state, it must not violate the state's traditions or social values, and it must be compatible with the government's overall broadcasting policy; "These conditions are obviously vague to the point where one has difficulty understanding if they are really applied."
Nonetheless, Kuwait television, for instance, would tolerate such scenes as love scenes or dancing. Kuwait TV would not mind showing drinking alcohol or showing drunk persons on the ground that these problems are common problems even in the Gulf region and cannot be ignored; "We cannot put our head in the sand and pretend everything is okey" argues Salim Al-Fahad, the former director of Kuwait television and programming department. The censorship department has two committees, one to censor Arabic programs and the other to censor foreign programs.

Advertising

Even though Kuwait television is state television and not commercial television, the government had allowed commercial advertisement in this medium for a limited period of time during the day. Government policy toward commercial advertisement had been also changed through the development of Kuwait television. Generally speaking, there has been a great deal of reluctance to allow commercial advertising on Arab television. This reluctance reflects the governments' desire to remain the sole supporter of the service so it can maintain full control over it. Also, part of this reluctance arises from the belief that introducing commercial advertising to state television is incompatible with the dignity of a medium which is ultimately the voice
of the government.

Although Kuwait television began in 1961, advertisement was not allowed till October 1969, about eight years after starting transmission. In fact, Kuwait had preceded many other Arab states who had restrictions and were forbidding commercial advertisements in government television in their first stages.

In 1969, the administration of Kuwait television formed a committee the study the possibility of allowing commercial advertising in television without destabilizing the objectives or the principles of television as a governmental medium and at the same time to serves as additional income source to the government. The committee after studying many commercial advertising laws in some Arab and foreign countries, and after studying the international treaties that deals with commercial advertising specially in television, elicited the law of commercial advertising in Kuwait television.  

From the beginning, advertisement became very popular due to the nature of the free economic system of Kuwait, the nature of Kuwait's consumer society, the high income of the people, and low state customs tax on imported merchandise. In the fiscal years 1970-1971 and 1971-1972, the commercials income were 59.5% and 78.2% consecutively from the total television programs budget. In 1972-1973, the commercials income covered the whole programs budget with slight surplus
and with later years there were great surplus. In 1975-1976, the income increased 217.9% than the previous years. This increase can be attributed to the timing of the beginning of the color transmission. In 1978-1979, there were 199.5% increase in contrast with the previous years 1977-1978. In the fiscal year 1980-1981, the commercial income was more than ten times as it was in the fiscal year of 1970-1971.66

The time designated for commercial advertisement in Kuwait's television is very limited since television is not a private commercial institution and since advertisement is not considered the major source of television income. Commercials are usually broadcasted at specific time between programs and not within programs; programs cannot be interrupted for commercials as the case in some western countries.

In 1980, Kuwait television determined the air time for advertisement with a maximum of 20-25 minutes a day, an equal of 4.1% of the broadcast time on the first channel and 3.1% of the air time on both channels. However, advertisement in the years 1972, 1973, and 1974 was 4.6%, 5.7%, and 3.9% consecutively.67 According to 1987 statistics, advertisement constitute 5% of air time on both channels; 3% (132 hours) on the first channel and 2% (50 hours) on the second channel.68

Perhaps the noticeable criticism of most of these
broadcast commercials is that they promote Western products most of which were designed and produced especially for Western environment. Most of these commercials contain materials which are not compatible with the norms and values of the indigenous culture of the state. Since television is a government property, the revenue of advertisement does not go to the television treasury but to the state's treasury.

Types and Characteristics of Broadcast Programs

It was mentioned earlier that broadcasting in Kuwait emerged during World War II to propagandize for the Allies and counter the Nazi stations in the region. Then, broadcasting in Kuwait emerged within a political atmosphere surrounding it and it was introduced by the British as a propaganda tool. Although the original cause disappeared other analogous variables emerged maintained this original function. Hence, it was natural that it continued, especially after the emergence of a series of complicated developments in political events in the Arab world in general and the Gulf region in particular.

Government Politics

Since the end of the World War, the political situation in the Arab world was at its peak of political
seething, ideological struggle, and the struggle for political independence. As a result, the function of broadcasting in the Arab states was devoted to purely political purposes. Therefore, we can conclude that political broadcasting is actually considered the foundation of Arab media.

In late 1950's and during the 1960's, Kuwait in turn was vulnerable to air waves attack from radical Arab states especially Egypt, Iraq and Syria. Since the bloody coup in Iraq in 1958 when the military came to power, the Kuwait-Iraq relation crisis was aggravated; the Iraqi broadcast system began attacking Kuwait and since then Iraq threatened to invade Kuwait several times. Kuwait reluctantly found itself pushed into a war of the air waves. The government became more concerned when it found out that people in Kuwait began buying television sets to receive signals from neighboring countries. These external threats began to jeopardize the national unity of the state and the government decided to make more contact with its people through a national television medium and sought to use the television medium as a means to unify the people of the state under their national government policy.

In early 1970's, with the expansion of Kuwait television transmission, Kuwait set a separate transmitter (channel 6) beamed at southern Iraq (Basra) to provide a presence of statehood and independence. Due to Kuwait's
crucial geographical size and location, which makes her more vulnerable during critical political times, Kuwait also had to beam its television signals to other two countries as well—Saudi Arabia and Iran. Douglas Boyd attributes Kuwait's powerful transmission as overcoming the psychological disadvantage of a smallness by having a powerful radio and television service.  

Since early 1970's, the Gulf region and Kuwait in particular witnessed a few political movements as a result of immigration of a large group of Nasserites, mainly Palestinians, who held positions in Kuwait Ministry of Information and other Kuwaiti press. Previously, Iran claimed the territory of Bahrain and occupied some Arabian islands in the Gulf that belong to U.A.E. Kuwait, in turn, became cautious about foreign intervention. Meanwhile, the nationalism movement was sweeping the region all along the Gulf shore. Salim Al-Fahad, former director of Kuwait television, said since the 1970's "Nationalism has been an essential element in the policy of the Kuwait television."  

Nationalism as a policy for Kuwait television has become a more and more essential element as the years go by. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, Kuwait witnessed profound and complex political developments. Throughout Kuwait's history, nothing has been more threatening to its national security than the Iran-Iraq war. Since 1980, Kuwait witnessed a series of explosions, assassinations and
assassination attempts as a result of increasing Iran-Iraq hostility. After the breakout of the Iran-Iraq war, Kuwait came under constant severe attack from Iranian media. These air wave attacks reached their peak with the assassination attempt of the Emir in May 1985 and several missile attacks on Kuwait's territory in the following years. Kuwait television in turn, through all these years of events, emphasises nationalism more than usual on many different occasions.

Television in Kuwait is the official voice of the government and always been used as an integral part of the government, working within the framework of the state policy presenting and supporting the official state's policy and the political system. It presents only one point of view of official reports and reflects very much official political content in its programs, which serve in general as propaganda for the head and seniors of the state, state's policy, and other Arab states' heads and officials. News programs' content are loaded with government reports and there is special focus on government seniors' daily activities schedule. Often these activities are presented in a meaningless and dull manner such as official meetings, airport receptions, royal motorcades, and state's banquet dinners.

Kuwait television also present a large portion of foreign imported news. In fact, the imported foreign news
are the prevailed and they overshadow both local and national Arab news. According to a study conducted by Arab Center of Audience and Viewers Research in 1982 concluded that international news in Kuwait television form 32.7% while Arab news forms 25% and local news 9.1%. In another study of news in Kuwait television concluded that in 1982 news was 15.7% of the total air time in which 60.7% were imported from Arab and non-Arab countries, in 1983, news formed 9.9% of the air time in which the imported formed 33.3%, and in 1984, the news air time was 10.65% of the total air time, imported news constituted 56.1%. The President of the U.S, members of his cabinet and administration, officials and staff from the White House and State Department, members of the Senate and the House appears almost daily on Kuwait television news. Another study also showed that the News viewing pattern among Kuwaitis toward Kuwait television news is very high and it reached as high as 85.7% in contrast to 71.5% in Egypt, 93.3% in Jordan, 75% in Sudan, 85.7% in Qatar, and 61.2% in North Yemen.

Kuwait television receives its daily imported news bulletins through Eurovision and Visinews. Because of the communication facilities in Kuwait, and its long experience in dealing with international and European news agencies, Kuwait became the Center of News Exchange for the Gulf and Peninsula region.
Compared to other Arab states, Kuwait enjoys a relative freedom and democracy. Freedom of individual opinion and freedom of the press are guaranteed by the constitution according to the articles #36 and #37, subject to the will of the Emir:

Freedom of opinion is guaranteed to everyone, and each has the right to express himself through speech, writing or other means within the limits of the law. The press is free within the limits of the law, and it should not be suppressed except in accordance with the dictates of law.

Freedom of expression in Kuwait is a right but not through the broadcasting system. Government and government officials and institutions are usually the ones who have the privilege of access to television. Public criticism of government and its policy through television is highly unlikely if not forbidden. However, criticism of television programming might be acceptable. Muhammad Al-Sanousi, the former Assistant Under Secretary for television affairs in Kuwait, has pointed out that "Criticism of the press is usually taken into consideration when it is objective and comes from a knowledgeable person who knows what he is talking about."74

Unfortunately, Kuwait's democratic life was not reflected on Kuwait's television, which did not present any news of its political governance. Despite the relatively democratic political system in Kuwait, the unique Kuwait democratic experience in the region and the Arab world, the active National Assembly sessions, and vital discussions and
debates among its members over significant national issues, Kuwait television ignored totally this aspect of Kuwait's life. It never covered any of these events. The chairman of the National Assembly, "ranked the second most important official in the state" and other members of the Assembly, were never shown on television and had no opportunity to make any statements to the viewers.

Therefore, the television system in Kuwait can be characterized as a one-way medium and a one-way flow of information. Being a one-voice medium is against the nature of television as a medium of communication. With the absence of participation in planning and programs' content, many messages have been ignored and bounced by both ends, which has led to miscommunication between the sender and the receiver. Ithiel de Sola Polo describes a broadcasting system supported by the government as follows:

Run the risk of becoming boring and reflective of the tastes and views of civil services. There are no incentives to attract audience, since the revenue does not decline if the audience fall off, and the only people who must be satisfied are those who hold the purse-strings.\textsuperscript{75}

The absence of democracy in the structure of television has led to the absence of cooperation and coordination with other developmental organizations, especially those in the non-governmental sector. Consequently, the message does not stimulate much interest at the receiving end due to the lack of dynamism in the transmitted message. Usually in a situation like this, a thin connection at least is required
to work as a channel for getting the message across.

Entertainment

Like any other television in the Arab states and developing countries, needless to say, entertainment programs dominates air time in Kuwait television. In 1975, a study conducted by the UNESCO suggested that light entertainment constitutes the major programs in both Kuwait's broadcasting systems, radio and television. The study reported that Kuwait radio broadcast over 129 hours a week, of which 97 hours are light entertainment, 14 hours for a special audience, 13 hours for news, 4 hours for cultural programs, and 1.5 hours for education. In terms of television, the same study concluded that Kuwait television broadcast programs for a total of 38 hours a week. Light entertainment occupies 25 hours, news 8.5 hours, programs for special audience 4 hours, cultural and educational programs 1 hour.76

Light entertainment still forms the majority of Kuwait's television programs, outnumbering any other programs. In spite of the development of Kuwait television since 1975, there was no development in this particular aspect. As a matter of fact, entertainment program time increases every time the state increases the transmission hours. In reviewing the development of transmission hours
in Kuwait television, we observe that with each expansion in transmission hours, there is expansion in entertainment hours as well. With establishment of the Second Channel, the Foreign Channel, air time of entertainment programs became even more prominent since the purpose of this channel, purely devoted to Western programs, is to serve the non-Arab community in the state and the availability of these programs in English language.

Kuwait television broadcast approximately a total of 6,795 hours a year on both channels, according to 1986 statistics. The first channel broadcast 4,488 hours and the second channel broadcast 2,307 hours. It was already mentioned that the predominant broadcast programs are entertainment. One must examine and diagnose the type of the broadcast programs on this two channels in order to be able to assess the role and the function of television since the content of programs is what really counts.

Between 1976 and 1980, Kuwait television purchased 7154.4 hours of foreign programs for an average of 1430.9 a year. However, drama programs constituted 69% of these hours. Meanwhile, the Arabic programs Kuwait television had purchased for the same period (1976-1980) were 2550 hours for an average of 510 hours a year. Arabic soap operas programs -serials- constituted 61% of these hours, followed by feature films, drama, varieties, plays, children programs and cartoons. Table # 5 and Table # 6 elaborate the total
broadcast hours according to classification of the types of foreign programs for the years 1985 and 1986.

In analyzing the two Tables, we can make very clear observations of features that characterize the types of programs on Kuwait television:

1- Drama programs (includes shows, serials, plays, and films) are the dominant programs on both channels. They consume 27% of the total broadcast time on the first channel and 36% on the second channel.

2- Entertainment or recreational programs (includes light music and songs, music shows and songs programs, and sports) are second on the list, constituting 20.5% of the total broadcast time on the first channel and 27% on the second channel.

3- Special Group programs (includes women's, youth, children, family, education, army and police) come in the third place and they constitute 14.4% of the total broadcast time on the first channel and 12% on the second channel.

4- News and information (includes news, political programs, and commentaries) occupies the fourth place with 14% on the first channel and the fifth on the second channel with 8%.

5- Cultural programs (include poems, talk shows, seminars, contests, global music, and physical education programs) form about 10% of air time on both channels.

6- Religious programs (includes recitation of the holy Quran, Athan "call for daily prayer", live broadcast of
weekly Friday prayer, and religious talk shows) form the least number of programs within the total broadcast time, coming at the end of the list.

Noticeably, drama programs do not count as entertainment programs according to Kuwait television officials' definition which include shows, serials, and films. If we combine both drama and recreational as entertainment, they would form a total of 47.5% on the first channel and a total of 63% on the second channel. Nonetheless, the argument in this matter does not terminate at the fact that these programs are merely entertainment programs, but it gets more serious when it goes beyond that to the fact that most of these entertainment programs are imported from Western countries.

In reviewing and analyzing the content of these programs, the problem consequently, becomes more profound. There is a danger of finding that the content of these imported entertainment is irrelevant to the values of the culture of the state. In most cases the content of these programs is not only does not help in the process of development in the state, but also cause severe damage to aspects of culture and play a negative role in the development of the culture.
Table 5. TV transmission hours by type of program, 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Hours of Second Channel</th>
<th>Hours of First Channel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informative</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreational</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drama</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group programs*</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercials</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2,033</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes children, household, and safety programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Hours of Second Channel</th>
<th>Hours of First Channel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informative</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreational</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drama</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group programs*</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercials</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,307</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes children, household, and safety programs

Table 7. Classification of program categories and percentage of broadcast time as a fixed standard (the main channel).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Programs</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) Cultural and Special Programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Cultural, Scientific, Art, Literature</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Religious</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Children</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) Information Programs:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. News and Political</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Information about State Activities</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) Entertainment</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D) Sports</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(E) Drama</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Kuwait Television in Twenty Years, Ministry of Information, Kuwait, 1982.
Table 8. **Classification of program Categories and percentage of broadcast time (the second channel).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Programs</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drama</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainment</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Kuwait Television in Twenty Years, Ministry of Information, Kuwait, 1982.
Historically, Western programs in Kuwait television are not a new phenomenon. They can be traced back to the period when television was first established in Kuwait. In its early stages, Kuwait television was more heavily dependent on Western programs. Ironically enough, this dependency still prevails, despite the increase in local production and may be even more extensive than before. Furthermore, the new development of increasing transmission hours and establishing the second channel mainly for foreign viewers has created an even greater demand for Western programs. With the establishment of the second channel, the problem of imported foreign programs has become more aggravated.

**The Second Channel:** The idea of establishing this channel goes back to early sixties before it actually went on the air in December 2, 1978. This time of delay was intentional, according to a government report, designed to give the project enough time to be more mature and developed through studies aimed at determining its objectives, content, and type of viewers. However, it was clearly determined from the beginning that the purpose of this new channel is to serve the non-Arab community in the state.

Prior to making the final decision, the television officials conducted a pilot study to seek different opinions
and views of knowledgeable people and those who have experience in the field, consulting with them to elicit suggestions which might be helpful in the planning process—especially the type of programs to be broadcast. Eventually, the prevailing thought among the officials regarding the type of programs was that they should concentrated on dramatic and cultural types of programs. 78

In its first stage, the channel used to broadcast mixed programs of Arabic and English. After a short time, a decision was made to devote the channel to English programs and shift most of the foreign material from the first channel to this channel. Currently, all the programs in this channel are in English or other foreign languages with Arabic subtitles. They accounted an average of about 80% of the channel's air time: the other 20% are still in English but are locally produced, or produced in other Arab countries. These programs are confined to programs not available through ready-made importation, such as local news and reports, religious programs, and special occasions reports. Although this channel is aimed at the non-Arab community in the state, nonetheless it has very wide popularity among Arab viewers.

The U.S is the major supplier for this channel but other sources include Britain, Australia, France, Japan, China, New Zealand, Italy, Germany, and Russia. Programs are purchased for this channel either through local or
international agents or through a direct contact with the companies.

A heavy schedule of foreign shows, serials, drama, comedy, and feature films are shown on this channel. They form 50% of the channel time. Officials commenting on this phenomenon in Kuwait television to the desire to satisfy a large portion of viewers' taste in addition of the wide range of availability of this kind programs which is mostly produced internationally. However, officials said, television receive and review hundreds of films every year for evaluation and selection, many of them cannot be broadcast for one reason or another; either for technical, content, rights reserved, high prices, or boy cut rules.

Other light foreign entertainment programs such as music, songs, and dancing shows and concerts and other variety of programs are also shown in this channel. Officials say that despite the popularity of this kind of programs and the great demand of viewers to increase this type of shows, but the television cannot obey this kind of demands since most of these shows contain scenes and actions do not fit with the norms and values of Kuwait's society. These programs form 3% of the channel air time.

Foreign sports are also shown in this channel such as British and Italian soccer games, U.S NBA, international Tennis tournament and matches, and other world sports programs such as the Olympics games. These programs form 3%
of the air time. Many cultural programs are offered in this channel, apparently because of the availability of this kind of programs in English.

The availability of educational and cultural programs that this channel offer is probably the only advantage of this channel over the first channel. A large group of viewers described as the educated class recognize this channel through this type of programs. A large variety of educational programs such as Geography, animals' life, world's cultures, documentary, travelling, science and invention discoveries are shown in this channel as well. They quite occupy a large air time of 35%. Even though all these programs are with Arabic captioning or commentaries, noticeably, local programming almost does not exist.

News bulletins in English was the first thing was in mind when this channel was first established. This channel offer two daily English evening and late night news bulletins, political programs, especial reports, commentaries, and other informative reports. The news and informative programs constitutes in this channel 10% of air time.

In Kuwait, the average ratio of imported programs of the total broadcast time is 50%; on the Second Program Channel -which is the foreign channel- the percentage of the foreign imported programs has reached 81.8%, 79%, and 79% for the years 1979, 1980, and 1981 respectively. Between
1976-1980 Kuwait television purchased a total of 7154.4 hours of foreign programs; of this 69% were considered entertainment programs.

In 1987, Kuwait television imported more than 3011 hours foreign programs and, in 1988, imported more than 3120 hours. Douglas Boyd observed that officials at Kuwait television are not concerned about the cultural affect of imported programs because they believe that it is up to the viewer to make a choice between what is offered on the two services. They indicate that even if western entertainment programs were not offered on Kuwait television, they are available in local cinemas or on videotape for home video systems.

In this matter, however, it is important to examine the type of these imported programs where we find that entertainment programs constituted more than 60% of the total imported programs.
Table 9. Imported television hours and their classification according to types of programs in Kuwait in 1987.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Programs</th>
<th>Number of Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drama - shows - serials</td>
<td>1,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural and scientific</td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light entertainment</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,410</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. Number of featured films broadcast in Kuwait in 1987 (average of 2 hours each).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Films</th>
<th>Number of Films</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American and British</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>301</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 11. Imported television broadcast in Kuwait in 1988.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Program</th>
<th>Number of Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drama - shows - serials</td>
<td>1,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural and scientific</td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light entertainment</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total imported hours:</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,570</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12. Number of featured films broadcast in Kuwait in 1988 (average of 2 hours each).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Films</th>
<th>Number of Films</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American and British</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>275</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Television service is a reality in Kuwait and it is considered one of the tools that has a broad effect on Kuwait's society, as it does everywhere. Television viewing patterns are very common and popular among Kuwaiti people. People in Kuwait are well known for their fondness of acquiring and watching television. As Zahra Freeth noted, the Kuwaitis are confirmed TV addicts.

British author, Violet Dickson, wife of the former British Political Agent, who witnessed the development of Kuwait in the 1960's and the emergence of television in its early days, describes the situation in Kuwait in the early days of television and the great desire of Kuwaiti people to have a television set even among women in the desert. She recalls a story when two bedouin women, black draped figures wearing veils wearing over their face-masks who made a surprise visit to her asking her help to acquire television set.

After sitting and chatting for some time, I ask Sarah, the young girl, what is on her mind:
She replies, 'you are my mother and I am Sarah, your daughter;
I have come to ask you to give me a television set. Everybody has one except me, and a small one is quite cheap-only sixty dinars (60 £)
'My dear little girl, I cannot give you this. Even my own daughter has not got one, neither have I. Perhaps one of the ladies at the palace will give you one.
'No; as you are my mother, surely you can do this for your daughter?
'I will bring you a nice piece of silk to make into
adress for the Id.' [holiday]

'No, I don't want that- only a television.'

She is very disappointed at my firm refusal, and they get up and glide out, for all the world like two clippers under full sail.

Some days later however, as I was passing their house, I saw that there was a television aerial on it; so perhaps she got one after all. 80

In 1982, a study was conducted on a random sample of families in Kuwait which represent and cover all areas in the whole state. The study indicated that 96.8% of all families in the state are television viewers. The same study also indicated that the average family in Kuwait -- both Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti-- acquire 1.6 color television sets. The average Kuwaiti family has 2.23 sets as opposed to 1.17 sets for each non-Kuwaiti family in the state. The study also indicated that the spread of videos' popularity confirms the television viewing pattern. The study showed that 58.11% of the total families in Kuwait acquire a VCR set, the average share of each family of VCR is .70, the Kuwaiti family is .97 and .52 for non-Kuwaiti family. 81

Nonetheless, the nature and features that characterized the Kuwaiti society traditions were the chief factor that helped in many ways the acceleration of the spread of television in Kuwait. Beside the easy approach of television as a major entertainment medium, the nature of the Arab Kuwaiti culture as a family oriented culture encouraged a family gathering around the television when they gathered daily. Also the traditions and customs of
Kuwaiti society of evening group gathering outdoors or in public places have created a group viewing pattern. One of the interesting and unique group viewing pattern in Kuwait is to place television in public places such as coffee shops or restaurants in local quarters, which imply an invitation for others or passers by to come and join the group. A British visitor found that what most particularly interested her in Kuwait was to see that at a refreshment kiosk on the sea-front, the television set was placed on the ground, and men bought their drinks and sat on the ground to watch it; this scene in particular reflects the tradition of the ultimate enjoyment of Arab culture, sitting. Needless to say, the high average income of the people and the unusual hunger for acquiring technology mediums, make the desire to obtain a television sets striking to the observer.

In reviewing the history of Kuwait, it is evident that Kuwait society had been enjoying cultural continuity and a self-sufficient cultural environment. The society and the people of Kuwait were secure in terms of culture until oil was discovered in the late 1930's combined with British presence over years of domination. The British have a great influence on Kuwait's social life and the legal system as well.

It was already mentioned earlier that the discovery of oil in the region and in Kuwait has changed all expectations and drawn a thick and clear-cut line in the history of Kuwait. Not only that, it caused a severe shock to the
customs and traditions of the society and people. Jaqueline S. Ismael ascribes the social change in Kuwait to the physical modernization of Kuwait, the dependence of utilities, transportation, and communications infrastructures upon technologies produced in the central capitalist nations, and the increase in the standard of living. Although this trend was to be expected to be as a result of the advent and wealth of oil revenue, but it seems that there was no way to evade these social changes even though there was some control aimed at minimizing the degree of this damage.

Harold R.P. Dickson, former British Political Agent in Kuwait and one of the prominent figures of the story of oil in Kuwait in the early days, had warned the Shaik Ahmed Al-Jabir, Shaik of Kuwait at the time, of the probable social outcome of the oil discovery on Kuwait society, but the Shaik had no other choice except to sign the oil concession agreement.

Not long before oil concession was signed, Shaik Ahmed confided to Colonel Dickson his feeling about the advent of wealth. 'You must realise,' the Political Agent told him, 'that this probably means that Kuwait will become very wealthy; a large number of outsiders will have to come to your country to work the oil; it will bring both good and bad...it will mean the building of a power station for lighting and air conditioning, modern building materials for houses. Think very carefully about these things.' Shaik Ahmed did not reply at once. But a few days later he told Dickson: 'I must do this for my people, even if it will bring undesirable things to my country. We are poor, pearling is not what it used to be, so I must sign.'

...he accepted the need to develop the country's oil
resources, and he accepted that change would inevitably follow. He regretted that some of the old customs of brotherhood and tribal leadership which grew out of the very austerity of a desert existence would be lost in a surge of technology and social sophistication.

In early 1950's, Harold Dickson's earlier expectations began to become true. He observed some of the early signs of the social changes in Kuwait society as a result of oil wealth. The changes were due to the impact of the West. Dickson sums up the early Western impact in Kuwait in two major factors: motor-car and radio. Dickson explains how these two major factors made some changes in people's behaviors in the early days:

Probably no single factor has done so much to alter the thinking of the desert Arab as the motor car...more insidious is the effect of the motor-car on the ladies of the town...women hear more and see more, and it is likely that the motor-car will be an important factor in the eventual removal of the veil, through this is very, very far distant where tribal Arabia is concerned...the radio brings them into a world of music, people, places and happenings of which their mothers did not even guess the existence...these same women have growing interest in cosmetics, perfumes, powders and soaps.

Dickson also noted that radio was so popular in Kuwait and that people like to be informed regarding world affairs, that they would tune to Arabic-speaking programs from London, Ankara, and Moscow as well as to other Arab states' radios such as those of Beirut, Jordan, and Baghdad. Radio became so popular among the Kuwaitis that since early years it was in every home, even of the humblest villagers, as part of the government's strategy of entrance into the modern world. Dickson estimated the number of radio sets
available in Kuwait alone at that time as some eight thousand receiving sets\textsuperscript{87}, a very high figure in contrast to the small population at the time.

After the emergence of television, it was very evident that the people of Kuwait also had great desire to acquire television sets. Very soon the popularity of television spread very rapidly among the people, high classes and lower classes alike.

During the reign of Shaik Abdulla Al-Salim (1950-1965), Kuwait was in the first stage of opening to the West. Nevertheless, Shaik Abdulla was very keen to introduce Western media to Kuwait society. At the beginning of his rule, he resisted the introduction of films to the Kuwait public as a whole to avoid any political or social instability which might result. However, after waiting for few years and giving the intensive educational drive a chance to develop more and more, and after introducing radio medium in 1951, he reconsidered his attitude towards films. With the spread of education and radio communication, Shaik Abdulla acceded to public opinion and allowed the establishment of Kuwait National Cinema Company, founded in 1953.\textsuperscript{88}

British author John Daniels, who lived in Kuwait during that period and witnessed the introduction of Western mediums of radio, cinema, and television in Kuwait, attributes the Shaik of Kuwait's cautious resistance to the
introduction of films to his understandable reluctance to permit his people to run before they were able to walk. The Shaik of Kuwait knew that films would inevitably sink Western ideas deep into the Kuwaiti mind. If the best of the Western world were to be absorbed and the worst rejected, the Amir was acutely aware of the need for an extensive education and development program in order that a progressive new world could be introduced to the people.  

It was clear that during 1950's and as a result of many factors such as the long period of time of Western colonialism which resulted dependence after independence and the Westernization wave that swept the Arab world after the second World War, people in Kuwait, like those in other parts in the Arab world, were fascinated by western civilization. It was viewed as the only path for modernization. Therefore, and for a certain period of time and according to this approach, people began to shift to everything western in order to be called modern, underestimating their indigenous values and customs which were viewed as things of the backward past.

Kuwaitis attitude toward foreigners in the early 1950's was reflected in their dress; Kuwaitis felt that to compete in the modern world they must abandon their national gowns as impractical and get into shirts and trousers. Even Kuwaitis of the merchant class were experimenting with suits of European style. In early 1960's, the Ministery of
Guidence and Information published a report in which proudly described the influence of western culture over Kuwait's radio listeners as follow:

Kuwaitis enjoy 'listeners choice' programs as much as the experienced Western radio fans. The radio station gets as many as five hundred letters a week with requests for tunes, including Western 'pops' and 'hits'.

Another weekly music programme tells about the lives of the classical European composers and presents their works on records.²⁷

However, in the 1960's, Daniels noted, many new patterns have emerged in Kuwait society mainly as a result of contact with the outside Western world in the U.S and Europe. When he asked a low income local Bedouin taxi driver if he ever took his wife to the cinema, he answered immediately "No need to do that. She can watch television at home.".²² John Daniels describes some changes that occurred in the situation of Kuwaiti women in the late 1960's, in contrast with her former status few years earlier:

In any event, Kuwaiti women of today have made their presence felt and nowadays a European visitor meeting a sophisticated businessman may be introduced at a social gathering to the wife of his contact. Formerly this would never happened.

...where the former Kuwait wife at home wore a plain, simple dress with long sleeves, the young wives of today dress in the latest Western fashion. Furthermore the veil, which was traditionally worn whenever the women left the house, has been discarded by the younger generation. True, some of the older women still wear it, but it seems clear that the veil will probably become almost extinct in a few years from now.²³

Although Kuwaiti women's dress was always receptive to external influence in fabric or detail of cut, the wearing of European styles did not become widespread until the late
1950's and early 1960's right after the emergence of cinema, films, television, and the flood of Western magazines and printed media which were the chief carrier introducing Western culture and lifestyle to the people. The newly introduced lifestyle attracted the younger generation and it spread more rapidly among young women lured by the notion of joining the "liberated generation."

"At first, girls would compromise with family concern for reputation and modesty and would cover their new clothes with the, Abbaya, when out of doors. Family photographs of the 1960's, however, show groups of girls cheerfully posing in the then current European fashions of short skirts, stiletto-heeled shoes and bouffant hairstyles."

One of the outrageous incidents that took place in Kuwait, which proves the western influence on Kuwaiti people's mentality in general and Kuwaiti women in particular, happened in the early 1960s when a group of young Kuwaiti women under the influence of women liberation movements in Europe and U.S, publicly expressed their rebellion against the traditional Islamic of purdah "abayah" and demanded western style women's freedom, regarding western women as their best role model. Furthermore, these group of young women on several occasions burnt the Islamic purdah in public.

When formal education began in Kuwait, Kuwaiti girls and women wore the Islamic purdah "abayah" to school according to Islam's teachings. However, this group of westernized Kuwaiti women burnt the Islamic purdah in
school yard and demanded permission to come to school with western clothes. The social movement in Kuwait was very active, especially in the 1960s. "As television arrived, they were eager to discover how much they could be part of this new medium." Their active role was very evident through their early appearance and participation in television which caused them to be viewed by women in the region as liberal women.

Women's group are still very active in Kuwait and play an important role in influencing programming input. Their representatives hold semi-annual meetings with the television Director to discuss the portrayal of women in television and other related issues. In 1975, for instance, they opposed a Kuwaiti series portraying a Kuwaiti female teacher as careless and more concerned with her appearance than her teaching.

British author, Zahra Freeth, who lived in Kuwait before the oil era and who made a visit to Kuwait in the early 1970's after about twenty years of absence, expressed her ultimate astonishment of the cultural shock that occurred to her old town. Freeth noted that no country could have moved further or changed faster than Kuwait and that changes which in Europe took place gradually over centuries, in Kuwait have taken only twenty-five years. She observed how the Kuwaitis became Westernized and no longer care for their old customs and "with their new affluence,
the Kuwaitis have not only destroyed their old town, they have discarded a whole culture."^®

In contrast to the Kuwaitis extreme adherence and commitment to their religion before the oil era, she was surprised by the lack of enthusiasm among the new generation of Kuwaitis toward Islam's basic principles and teachings. Freeth explain more:

While we were out on the mole the sun dipped below the western horizon, and at once the muezzins began their call from the mosques of our quarter. My son stood to listen to the call for prayer, and I could see that he was watching the busy stream of cars on the highway, and the pedestrians who walked on the sea-front. It seemed they paid no heed to the cry from the minarets. 'Isn't everybody supposed to stop whatever they are doing and make the sunset prayer when the muezzin calls?' he asked. We explained that in a perfect world that is would happen; this was what used to happen in the unsophisticated town of my youth.^®

Moreover, Freeth expressed wonder at how the traditions of old Kuwait were wiped out so thoroughly and replaced by everything Western, including Food, clothes, morality, values, and people's attitudes.

It is only twenty years since the first really modern shops began to appear in Kuwait, and now the main streets are lined with stores which in equipment and stock are totally European. To me, the interest of such shops lay in the way they reflected the changing consumer tastes in Kuwait. Fifteen years before I had not seen European-type restaurants, dry cleaners and laundries, hairdressing salons, shops full of prams and modern infants' clothes, and women's dress shops. Now they are all here. The dress shops even have model female figures in the window to display their goods - some thing so contrary to the traditional Muslim ban on representation of the human form that I found it hard to believe that such things were now accepted without a second glance. ¹⁰⁰

Freeth recalls women's status when she left Kuwait in
the 1950's. She noted that at one time it was hard to imagine that one day the Kuwaiti woman would break out of her purdah. Women, she added, who wandered unveiled about the streets and spoke boldly to strange men, were prostitutes, and there was no middle ground; nor could a woman appear unveiled among her husband's friends. For a woman to be eyed openly by others in the street was in itself a defilement, and no man then would have wanted a bride who had been thus sullied. Twenty years later and under western influence, she noted, Kuwaiti girls move about the streets freely in European dress with mini-skirts and the men allow their young wives to meet their own male acquaintances. Freeth portrays some of the practices of western life style in one of Kuwait high class houses to show how far some Kuwaitis gone in westernization:

These modern families live in luxuriously furnished houses in the best suburban areas, and entertain in the European way. In most of these houses the cocktail bar is the most prominent feature of the sitting room and there is a lavish supply of drink. The wife welcomes the guests at the door and moves freely among them...often at parties there will be dancing to the record-player, and some of the Kuwaiti girls, with their husband's consent, will go so far as to partner other male guests.¹⁰¹

The costumes worn in Kuwait nowadays are clear examples of social change in the society as a result of the impact of the Western culture. The change of costumes was not confined to women but to men as well. In contrast to the past, where every one wore the traditional local Arab dress which had steadily evolved to suit climatic and
cultural conditions, present practices are more varied. Western-style suits and clothing are worn not only by Westerners working in Kuwait, but also by Kuwaitis and Arabs in professional and service jobs. Working clothes of jeans and T-shirts are favored by the various nationalities involved in technical and construction work.\textsuperscript{102}

Furthermore, the Kuwaitis not only changed their customary clothing to a European style but they also changed their homes. After demolishing the old traditional houses in the old part of the city, the Kuwaitis, unfortunately, did not live in a newly developed version of the traditional home but rather moved out into the suburbs in European style houses that do not harmonize with the natural climate of the Kuwaiti environment. Dr. George Saba Shiber, one of the old and first planning consultants to the Kuwait Municipality in early 1960's, wrote a book on Kuwait urbanization in which he expressed his regret for the missed opportunities. Dr. Shiber expressed his admiration and amazement at the old Arab Kuwaiti forms of architecture and how they had evolved to suit the climate of the east. In contrast, he found that the new buildings lack any feeling of continuity with older traditions, and were often designed without the slightest thought for the climate conditions of Kuwait.\textsuperscript{103}

About old Kuwait, Dr Shiber writes:

\begin{quote}
Its buildings were a closely-net labyrinth that repelled heat and sandstorm to the maximum, having thick walls, narrow apertures, and properly located slits for ventilation. [about the new buildings]
\end{quote}
Despite all the millions of Dinars spent since the discovery of oil one can safely say...that few are the new buildings which obey any of the laws of functionalism and organic design.\textsuperscript{104}

In 1954, Harold R.P. Dickson commented on the early effect of western modern technology on Kuwait's Islamic culture. Dickson wrote "Materialism, popularized by modern science, has weakened Islam...material prosperity, which of itself is neither good or bad, but, like fire, depends on how it is used, has tended to weaken rather than strengthen Islam.\textsuperscript{105} In 1972, his daughter, Zahra commented on the new western look of Kuwait. She wrote, "The new Kuwait has the best and the worst of the western civilization that it so assiduously set out to emulate. What of its Arab identity? What has remained to act as a visual and spiritual link with the past? Not much."\textsuperscript{106}

Conclusion

This chapter took a close-up look at the issue in the state of Kuwait, as a model of Arab states. It is very evident that the imported television programs has left its deep negative cultural effect on the indigenous culture of Kuwait.

Many factors combined can be counted as responsible for this phenomenon, including the financial capability of the government to purchase packages of western programs even
for high prices because of the wealth of the government's revenue, and the availability and the widespread use of television sets among Kuwaiti people because of their high average income. Largely this negative effect is caused by viewers' wide exposure to western programs, the designated special channel for foreign programs, and the fact that it is an entertainment-oriented medium.

Yet, there is still insistence on the part of the government on importing these programs. The chapter has also demonstrated that Kuwait television like in any other Arab television systems is not playing a primary role in preserving and protecting the Arab national culture.

Chapter VI will describes and analyzes the successful experiment of the Arabian Gulf States Joint Programs Production Institution (AGJPPPI). The chapter will look for the secrets of success of this pioneer experiment which considered the first successful and professional Arab educational television production. The AGJPPPI can be used as an excellent small-scale model for a national Pan-Arab or regional television production industry.
Footnotes of the Chapter


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Abu-Shanab, Ibid, P.104.
82 Zahra Freeth, Ibid, P.90.
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89 Ibid.
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92 Daniels, Ibid, P. 158.
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94 The Evolving Culture of Kuwait, Royal Scottish Museum, Edinbrough, 1985, P.130.
95 Freeth, Ibid, P.35.
96 Al-Usmani, Ibid, P.71.
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102 The Evolving Culture of Kuwait, Ibid, P.118.
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Chapter VI

THE EXPERIMENT OF THE ARABIAN GULF STATES JOINT PROGRAMS PRODUCTION INSTITUTE (AGJPPI)

Introduction

After the successful launch of the popular Arabic children's program, Iftah Ya Simsim, the Arabic version of the American program, Sesame Street, as the first professional Arab educational television production, Hamdy Kandil wrote:

This may be the first time in the Arab world that such sums have been allocated to an educational and cultural programs; for the usual practice has been to lavish funds on entertainment and drama programs and their producers while educational and cultural programs, and perhaps serious programs in general, have occupied second place in the concerns of administrators and financiers.¹

Indeed, the experiment of the AGJPPI, with its high standard of productions is a pioneer work and considered a breakthrough in Arab television production, and set the paradigm for any Arab television work. This unique experiment is actually the beginning of authentic Arab television history and offers a new generation of Arab programs and set the foundation for the Arab television industry. It is the kind of production house, as Hamza Bait Al-mal put it, that every state in the region, if not in the Arab world, wishes to have.²

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Although the AGJPPI is a regional institute and not a Pan-Arab institute, it is probably the only Arab institute in the whole Arab world that produces television programs on behalf of all Arab states. The AGJPPI is a good example of regional cooperation among Arab Gulf states which might be applied in other different parts of the Arab world. Therefore, it is worthwhile to take a look in more detail at this pioneer experiment.

Background of the AGJPPI

In 1976, the Ministers of Information in seven Arabian Gulf states (Bahrain, Iraq, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and U.A.E.) held their first conference in Riyadh to discuss some media problems facing their states, including the television production problem. At the end of that conference, the Ministers agreed on the establishment of an institution which would be in charge primarily of producing television materials for the members' stations. The institution was called the Arabian Gulf States Joint Production Programs Institute.

The headquarters of the institute is in Kuwait and enjoys complete independence from governmental authority. The Board of Directors is composed of the Under Secretaries of the Ministries of Information of the members states, or who represent them, and is headed by the Minister of
Information of the headquarter state. The General Director of the institute is appointed by the Board of Directors and reports to the Board. The structure of the AGJPPI is composed of four major departments: 1- Planning and Programming, 2- Production, 3- Public Relations, and 4- Administrative and Financial Affairs.

The Institute is not a commercial establishment and does not seek commercial profits as much as it seeks social development through television production. The Institute sells its production to the member states for at cost and to other non-member Arab states for low prices. The Institute gets all kind of governmental support including the financial support. Financing the Institute is achieved through a contribution quota distributed among the member states. The reasons for establishing the AGJPPI, as Ibrahim Al-yuosif, the Director General of the AGJPPI, indicated are:

1- The need for high standard, good quality television programs that have a common subject and appeal to the people in the region.

2- The need for cooperation among the Arabian Gulf states based on what they have in common.

3- The need to unify efforts and avoid duplication in the production of these kind of programs to save time and money.

4- The need to help develop a feeling of closeness among people of the region.
Objectives of the AGJPPI

According to Article IV of its charter, the AGJPPI's purpose is to produce radio and television programs for its members as well as other Arab and friendly countries. The subjects of these programs should achieve the following objectives:

1- Revive Arabic and Islamic history, showing the high morality of the heavenly religion of Islam, and portray the honorable conduct of Islamic heroes and leaders.

2- Revive the Gulf traditions, specifically those related to indigenous arts, and work on recording them in a documentary fashion so that they become a historical reference and a source for upgrading the artistic and literary level of the Gulf in various fields.

3- Providing information concerning the Gulf region from all aspects of geography, population, and tourism.

4- Upgrade technical production of radio and television programs, and highlight all artistic, literary, and scientific work done by the Gulf's people.

5- Discover young talents in the field of art, literature, and science; work on training them; show their talents; and provide them with all mass media facilities.

6- Give the personnel working in radio and television stations of member states a chance to upgrade their artistic and vocational skills, and help them earn new experience as
result of their continuous interaction with people working in this production.

The Experiment of "Iftah Ya Simsim"

The AGJPPI has produced many successful and professional educational, cultural, and documentary programs and series such as *Islamic and Arab Civilization* (156 episodes), *Your Safety* (104 episodes), *Stop* (100 episodes), *The Discovery* (65 episodes), *It's Time* (65 episodes), *The Mirror* (30 episodes), *Our Life, Oil and Water, Arab Medicine, Treasures of the Red Sea, Treasures of the Gulf,* and many other children's works. However, the most distinguished and prominent program for which the AGJPPI is known throughout the Arab world is their first production of the children's program of *Iftah Ya Simsim*, meaning "Open Sesame", an Arabic version of the *Sesame Street* series, composed of 260 half-hour episodes. The popularity of the program attracted both children and adults, becoming one of their favorite programs. The result has encouraged the AGJPPI officials to produce more and more similar works and made the AGJPPI to give considerable attention to children's programs.

Although the original purpose of the AGJPPI is to produce programs for the Gulf States stations, its noticeable success encouraged it to respond to the various
demands to distribute its production all over the Arab world. Although the AGJPPI is neither an educational nor cultural institute, it became specialized in and known for its educational, cultural, objective drama, and documentary programs. It presented a great mix between television and education, for the first time in the Arab world. The Director of Production of the AGJPPI, however, call this mixed "Pure coincidence, but a happy one like the ones that happen during the historical discoveries." 

The beginning was an initiative in 1976 from the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), headquartered in Kuwait, to produce an educational program for the Arab children. Officials at AFESD eventually chose the American program, Sesame Street, which is produced by the Children Television Workshop (CTW) to be the ideal program.

Since that time, the AFESD invited Arab experts to study the possibility of adapting this program to the Arabic language. The experts involved were educators, psychologists, socialologists, and linguistics. The result of the studies supported the project. It is very evident that they succeeded. The Arabic adaptation won the first prize in Amsterdam for the best adapted version using the American "Sesame Street" format. Among the participants in this contest were Germany, France, Sweden, Britain, Mexico, Puerto Rico, Japan, Holland, and Canada. The AFESD
initiative was based on five points: 9

1- The AFESD believe that financing social development projects is not less important than financing economic development projects.

2- The absence of a unified Arabic program addressing preschool children in the Arab television.

3- The positive impact of the American program on American children.

4- The possibility of adapting the American program to other languages especially after the successful adoption by some European and Latin American languages. These attempts gave the program an international characteristic.

5- The availability of the AGJPPI as a new, up coming production institute which might adopt this project since it has the potentials to execute such a giant project.

After many preliminary meetings of experts and specialists, the three main institutions involved in the project met together in order to start planning and carry-out the project. These three main institutions were:

1- The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD).

2- The Arabian Gulf States Joint Programs Production Institute (AGJPPI).

3- The Children Television Workshop in New York (CTW).

In May 1977, the AGJPPI signed an agreement with the
CTW for $2.5 million. The AGJPPI paid $1,000,000 for the rights of, Sesame Street,\textsuperscript{10} valid for 9 years. The agreement included:

...the Arab world's rights to the "Sesame Street" concept for a nine-year period, as well as CTW's technical assistance, research and production advice and the services of a resident consulting producer during the production period in Kuwait. Under the agreement, CTW was also to provide 15 hours of cross-cultural material, such as animal or nature films, from the US programme, which would be selected by the institution as appropriate for Arab children and dubbed into Arabic.\textsuperscript{11}

The project was to produce 130 half-hour episodes of the program aimed for the pre-school children from 3-6 years old. The AFESD financed the first stage of the project which included conducting research, studies, and tests on Arab children. For this stage, the AFESD paid KD 80,000 ($300,000).\textsuperscript{12} The AGJPPI supplied the project with human resources and staff, equipment, training and studios, and the CTW provided its technical advice, consultation, experience, and some materials and clips which can be adapted to Arabic.

The first step of the production process was training five leadership personnel in New York for three weeks. The personnel were chosen among Arab educators and media specialists selected from different Arab states. During the training a total of 15 hours of clips, footage, and materials were selected from the original American program which were thought to be useful and fitted for adaptation to the Arab environment. After full and extensive training,
research, discussion, and consulting, the personnel returned to Kuwait to undertake the project as a well trained team.  

The team work was formed of experts who specialized in Arabic language, education, psychology, researchers, writers, producers, and other production staff. The whole team worked under the supervision of a resident consultant producer and education researchers from the CTW. That was in mid-1977, and by September 29, 1979, the Arabic program was on the air of the Arabian Gulf States televisions.

The production of the 130 episodes took 30 months and the final cost reached $7,500,000; it was distributed to 14 Arabic stations. The total amount of cost brings down the cost for each 30-minute episode of about $7,500. It is rather expensive when compared to the average price of $1000 per hour of foreign imported programs, but for this kind of good-quality of Arabic program make such costs reasonable. The work experience of people involved in producing this show cannot be measured in terms of money. Although the AGJPPI programs sells to non-members Arab states for low prices, there was some complaints from states of the high prices in contrast to foreign imported programs. Prices to non-member Arab states is determined by the financial capability of the state. An hour of AGJPPI programs, for instance, costs Libya $4000, Algeria and Syria $2000, Jordan $1500, Tunisia, Yemen, and Sudan $1000.

The remarkable success and the positive results of the
project, ascertained through studies and feedback undertaken during and after the program, has encouraged the AGJPPI to make a decision to produce another 130 half-hour episodes directed to the children of age 3-9 years old with several developments and improvements learned from production of the first part.

The Secret of the AGJPPI Success

Yasir Al-Malih, the Production Director of the AGJPPI who is one of the prominent figures of the Institute since its establishment, attributes the success of the AGJPPI experiment to several major reasons seldom to be found in other Arabic television work:

1- The support of the regional governments: The AGJPPI is a governmental institute shared by the Arab Gulf states; and the Board of Directors is formed by the Under Secretary of the Ministries of Information of these member states. The AGJPPI gets all kinds of support from the member states, either financially or materially. The member states offer and provide their television facilities to the AGJPPI. The AGJPPI is supported financially through a contribution quota distributed over the member states' governments. For the time being, the AGJPPI does not have financial deficiencies; however, in its first stages and despite the governmental support, the AGJPPI ran into some financial difficulties and
almost went bankrupt four years after its establishment. Mohammad Al-Sanousi, the first Director of the AGJPPI noted that some member states did not pay their quota and did not take the matter seriously. Fortunately, it was rescued by other institutions and departments such as Education, Health, and Interior Departments which sponsored some of the projects and charged it to execute some projects on their behalf. Otherwise, it couldn't continue, when depending on Information Ministries' quota only.

2- **Freedom and Independence:** Although the AGJPPI is a governmental institution, one of its advantages is that it enjoys a complete independence in authority and decision-making and none of the member governments has direct influence on it. This privilege also gave the Institute the freedom to maneuver in selecting and hiring the best and most qualified staff, more than any other formal television enjoys.

3- **Careful planning:** Planning is probably the essential element that distinguishes the work of AGJPPI from any other Arab television works and is the basic, vital secret of success. The Institute has two departments which carry out all the required planning. Among other jobs, Planning and Programming department studies and reviews all local, Arabic, and foreign television, radio or film program-script
proposal efforts; and finally, plans a program-script contest for the best script. The Public Relations department is responsible for all field studies and audience surveys on all the AGJPPI programs as well as other public and foreign relations.21

From the beginning, every step was preceded by careful planning. Planning was not confined to the AGJPPI organizational structure but was also carried out in coordination with other Arab televisions and specialized institutions. Planning was based on studies and research conducted by AGJPPI in conjunction with educational and academic institutions.

Experts and specialists were invited to assess projects before any action was taken and to make final judgments on the outcome of the project. Before starting the "Iftah Ya Simsim", about $300,000 were spent on studies of Arab children. Seminars and conferences were held to analyze and evaluate the results of these studies. Evaluation technique was undertaken for every AGJPPI project before and after telecasting any project to overcome as many as possible disadvantages and mistakes so future works can be enhanced.

Field tests and feedback were taken among the public and viewers during and after the programs were broadcast. Public and viewers' feedback was not the only feedback that AGJPPI has sought; formal feedback from the Ministries of
Education and Information in some Arab states were also sought. Also there is a consultants' council apart from the AGJPPI structure composed of educators and media specialists which holds periodical meetings to discuss issues and suggest solutions.

One of the unique techniques that AGJPPI has utilized in its strategy is the "pilot project" tactic. In all its projects that have been produced, the AGJPPI produced two episodes of each project and then invited Arab scholars and consultants in education, Arabic language, television, and psychology to give their feedback, suggestions, critiques, and reaction so the AGJPPI can do the modifications before producing all the episodes. This technique has proved to be a very effective method in improving the programs content.

Before producing the first 130 episodes of "Iftah Ya Simsim", the AGJPPI produced two pilot episodes and invited education and media experts and specialists from all over the Arab states for a seminar to be held in Kuwait on 4-9 March 1978 to discuss the two pilot episodes and the studies in this matter. The purpose of the sponsors was to get as many of consultations, suggestions, and recommendations as possible for better production. According to AGJPPI officials, much has been learned from this technique and very often many modifications, changes, and improvement have been made to the balance of the episodes in every project.
On top of all that has been mentioned above, the advertising campaigns were very well organized and preceded the launching of every AGJPPI project. The advertising was on the public level as well as on a formal level such as coordinating with other Arab televisions and governmental institutions.

4- **Enthusiasm and Faith:** The enthusiastic and the sincere faith of all staff involved in the project, whether planners, producers, or administrators, caused them to give the best of their effort in the project and to be accomplished in the best professional manner.

5- **Cooperation and Coordination:** The full cooperation and understanding of the team work in general and the exceptional coordination between the educators and the production team in particular is a distinctive feature of the AGJPPI and cannot be found in any other work at a similar level. Although the team work is composed of members from different Arab states, their true belief in the project as a pioneer Arab project has created an environment of full understanding and set a model for other similar future works.

6- **Democratic Management:** Democracy was implemented in every level of the managerial organization of the AGJPPI as
an institution. All the decisions taken within the institution were taken as a consensus decision and according to democratic rules after discussing them in group format. Moreover, the democratic atmosphere exists also within the various separate project units at a sub-institutional levels.

Despite the outstanding works that AGJPPI has presented over the years, however, the AGJPPI works within limited resources and is not operating with as much ability and potential as one might think. The Institute's headquarters are located in a small, humble rented building which has no studios. The full time staff are 25 personnel, of which are seven are top personnel and the rest are administrative and secretarial staff. Despite these limited resources, Faisal Al-Yasri, pointed out that with good management, organization, and planning these limited resources could be used to capacity in order to present a high standard of work.23

Nonetheless, and despite the superior success of the AGJPPI experiment and the professional work of "Iftah Ya Simsim" series, Al-Malih does not, rule out the disadvantages and difficulties that AGJPPI are facing. First among these difficulties are the talented and skilled native human resources. Arab human resources and Arab creativity are still in shortage and desperately needed. In the case of "Iftah Ya Simsim" for instance, Yasir Al-
Malih noted that there are no Arab staff specializing in children's programs. "First of all, we should confess that "Iftah Ya Simsim" is not a pure Arabic invention but rather an Arabic adapted copy of the American program, 'Sesame Street'." In addition to that, more than 25 hours of the original American footage were used in producing the episodes besides many other materials.

Another difficulty is the television scriptwriters who specialize in the children's field. If the Arab world has a shortage of television scriptwriters, and if television writers are few, then even fewer specialized in children's writing. "We tried to attract the children's programs scriptwriters from all over the Arab world; they were 23 writers; most found that writing for children in television is a difficult task; so we ended up with three of them who continued working for us." There have been many attempts by the AGJPPI to reduce the production costs of its programs. "If there is one problem that could reduce the production of such programs, it is the lack of good scriptwriters; well qualified scriptwriters do not exist in the region."

In addition to all these problems, the AGJPPI officials argue that there is lack of experience in planning for children's programs, qualified children's programs producers, and directors who specialize in directing children's programs.
In spite of all these disadvantages and difficulties, the AGJPPI experiment is truly considered a pioneer experiment in the authentic Arab television industry. More than that, it set the basic foundation and the framework for any Arab television industry. The AGJPPI not only represents a regional cooperation, but its success proved to be Pan-Arab success. In the final report of the seminar "Cultural Identity and its Interaction with Foreign Cultures in the Arabian Gulf States", which was held in U.A.E. on February 1988, the participants strongly recommended the continues support of the joint media institutions in the region especially the AGJPPI because of its contribution in producing programs homogeneous with the values and traditions of the Arab culture.

The AGJPPI experiment has demonstrated that joint Arab production is the only practical method of producing high standard national programs. This unique experiment has encouraged many other similar regional cooperations and the idea of Pan-Arab joint television production as the best way of establishing grass roots Arab television production.
Footnotes of the Chapter


12. Yasir Al-Malih, The Impact of Media on the Arab Child and Means of Development, paper presented to the seminar of Child's Culture in the Contemporary Arab Society, The
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14 Al-Yasri, Ibid.

15 Al-malih, Ibid, p.16.

16 Bait Al-mal, ibid, p.191.

17 Bait Al-mal, ibid, p.183.

18 Mohammad Al-Sanousi, interview, Kuwait, December 18, 1988.

19 Mohammad Al-Sanousi, Ibid.

20 Mohammad Al-Sanousi, Ibid.

21 Bait Al-mal, ibid, p.180.


23 Al-Yasri, Ibid.


25 Yasir Al-Malih, interview, Kuwait,

26 Bait Al-mal, ibid, pp.191-192.

Chapter VII

REASONS FOR DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTED WESTERN PROGRAMS

Introduction

This chapter is the last chapter of the study and is composed mainly of the analysis and results of the research. In this chapter the primary concern of the study, of that is, analyzing the reasons for dependence on imported western television programs, will be identified. At the same time, some of the problems and obstacles that hinder national television program production are identified.

Based on all these analyses, the chapter presents some suggestions and recommendations which might work and serve as solutions or alternatives for importing and depending on western television programs, or at least reduce the level of this dependency. The chapter also suggests many ideas to enhance local and national Arab television production industry as a framework for grass roots.

The chapter also reviews and analyzes the successful experiment of the Arab Gulf States Joint Programs Production Institution (AGJPPI) as the first professional and successful national Arab educational television production. It explores the secrets of success of this unique experiment, which could be used as an excellent small scale
model for a firm and grass-roots foundation for a pan-Arab television industry.

Reasons for Dependence on Western Programs

The issue of the flow of western television programs is neither an easy nor a new issue. It is an issue of concern to the whole world rather than one concerning only Kuwait or the Arab states. Although this issue has been under debate since the 1960's on a global level, the debate is still going on because the issue still exists.

The reasons for Kuwait television's dependence on western programs are many, and intricate where they overlap with each other; however, the essential reasons can be identified:

1- On top of these reasons comes the price of these programs. The prices of western programs are very seductive to the pocketbook. The lower cost of purchasing western programs in contrast to the higher production costs of a similar show from the Arab states makes the deal very attractive. Moreover, the quality of Arabian-produced films are unlikely to be equal to or even close to that of western production. Purchasing ready-made western programs makes things easy, and saves money, time, and effort. One hour of an American series costs between $250 and $1000, depending
on the financial capability of the state, while an hour of an Egyptian or other Arab series cost an average of $1500 to $2000.¹

This tactic of manipulating the international market through making available high quality western programs for cheap prices attracts many states to purchase them, especially those with limited financial resources. The state of Bahrain's television, for instance, can purchase an hour of "Magnum P.I" for only $300, while it sells elsewhere for $1000, which could explain why western programs in Bahrain television comprise more than 90% of its air time, the highest in the Arab world.² Kuwait television because of its financial ability pays a higher price per program than Bahrain. An hour of "The A Team" costs Kuwait television $1142, and $1390 for each hour of "St. Elsewhere".³

Despite the increase in prices for imported western television programs over the years, they are still considered very low compared to the cost of production. In late 1960's, however, prices for Kuwait television for half hour episodes were ranging between $60 and $90 and prices for feature films ranged between $250 and $350.⁴

In the case of Kuwait television, the price of a program hour according to television official, is determined by the duration, quality, topic or story, featured actors, (new or old...etc.). But, in general, the price of one
television hour (for serials and shows) ranges between $1000 and $1200; the hour price for best sellers drama, soap operas, light entertainment and variety shows is $1200; for long television feature films, the price ranges between $1500 and $2400. These prices are still considered very cheap compared to what they sell for in other countries, especially European countries. The reason for the disparity is because Kuwait television, like other Arab television systems is non-commercial government television and the countries are considerably less populated than European countries.

Kuwait television has been authorized by other Gulf states to purchase western programs on their behalf, a step that can save money for the Gulf states if purchases are made collectively. This step, however, does not please Bahrain, which can obtain western programs for even less than the discounted price given to the Gulf states collectively.

2- Television in Kuwait is committed to broadcast at certain times every day. Unfortunately, due to poor national production and insufficient of national production to fill in this span of time, the only available alternative for filling this daily air time is the foreign alternative. It seems that filling the daily television air time is the obsession of Arab television officials. Salim Al-Fahad, the
former Director of Kuwait television pointed out that "We consume hours of television programs everyday, and faced with this necessity one's needs massive supplies and reserves of television programs for one's daily consumption".  

3- The influx of western television programs exists, on one hand because of the abundance and variety of the foreign mass production. The other side of the coin is the incapability of Arab production to replace this influx. No alternative to foreign production is available. The choice does not exist in this business. "It is so easy to demonstrate the issue of foreign cultural invasion but to our deep sorrow we do not have alternatives or even the ability to choose. The choice is limited to what in the international market." 

4- The Arab world suffers from a vast vacuum and extreme shortage of art, culture, intellect, and literature in the field of television. As a result, this influx of western programs fills the existing vacuum. Muhammad Al-Sanousi, former Under-Secretary Assistant for Television Affairs in Kuwait, describes the situation in the Arab world in this manner:

Television work is team work and never a solo work. All elements of the circle have to be available so it can be inter-connected. In most cases all elements of the circle cannot be found in any single Arab state.
Sometimes there is good work but the packaging is bad and sometimes the cover is elegant but the content is bad; there is something wrong in the Arab mentality toward television. We must confess and say we are not capable of competing with others. We can't compete.  

5- Television in the Arab states is a new technology, a relatively new introduction to the Arab environment. It is still considered by some to be a new science which has not been discovered to its full capacity. Many still have not comprehended its real functions and purposes. Due to this lack of this perception, the business of Arab television production was neglected for years, and it was not until the last several years that it began to give some concern.

Television in the Arab gulf states emerged like a mushroom, and the only best available option has been foreign production. Unfortunately, the Ministries of Information in the Arab Gulf states are the most backward countries with respect to follow better production".  

6- Probably the most significant reason for depending on imported western programs is the lack of human resources. Human resources are the basic and most essential element in any television production. Lack of specialists and talented writers, casts, directors, scenarist, technicians and other elements of human resources of television industry make any attempt of television production impossible.

Television is a serious business and we have to admit that we are much behind the west in the television field. We cannot fool ourselves and claim we have the capabilities of a television production industry. Let's be realistic and deal with realities and do not
over estimate our abilities. How can we build an industry when even its basic elements are not available?\textsuperscript{11}

Yasir Al-Malih, Production Manager of The Arabian Gulf States Joint Programs Production Institution, observed that in the Arab world everything may be purchased except for the human resources element which is the most important element in the production process.\textsuperscript{12}

7- Although the factor of human resources is essential, however, it becomes meaningless if it lacks the element of creativity. Unfortunately, the element of creativity almost does not exist in Arab human resources. Despite the modest number of human resources in the Arab states, very few of them have the talent of creativity in presenting new ideas and tackling new issues.

Yasir Al-Malih explained that if we take television writers in the Arab world, for instance, they are many and they are few. They are many because we see so many of them every day and they are few because few have the talent of creativity and originality. In the Arab world such are very rare.\textsuperscript{13}

8- The high professional western standard of quality cannot compared with those programs produced in the Arab states. There are so many type of series and selections of western programs that cannot be produced in any Arab states.
Resources for professional quality production are not to be found together within any Arab states. Abdullah Al-Rushaid, the Director of the Foreign Channel at Kuwait television noted that "The foreign programs exist because there is a necessity for them and they have very high production features that Arab programs still cannot reach.".  

9- The people have become used to viewing a high quality level or standard of production through western produced programs; they always looking for better, and cannot accept the lower standard of locally produced programs. The people have become attached to foreign programs and they are connected mentally with American characters. Therefore, they are indispensable and they will continue. With the age of direct satellite broadcasting, the problem will continue and become even more complicated even if we have sufficient national production. National production is not the solution. We feel we cannot do anything about it.  

Hamza Bait Al-Mal noted that viewers' level of appreciation for technically advanced television programs has risen as a result of exposure to professional foreign productions. Both views are supported by Sydney Head's view regarding this matter of viewers' acceptance in terms of the comparative quality of foreign and local production. "People throughout the world have became knowledgeable about production quality, and most will not tolerate poor quality just because it comes from domestic sources. Programs must be attractive enough to motivate audience members to invest in receivers.".
10- The competition among television systems in the Arab states to gain and attract as many viewers as possible contributes to dependence on foreign production. This approach has led them to increase transmission hours, establish other channels, and offer western top shows and considerable diversity in western programs in order to compete with other neighboring states, knowing that people in these neighboring states would tune in to their station.

Noticeably, the Arab states always get arrogant in their reports regarding the development of their television service in terms of the programs they offer, the long air time they broadcast, and the availability of channels they offer regardless of the content of programs. Some Arab states do not have the capability of offering all these services, nevertheless, they strain to do so in order not to be in less advantage position than other states.

11- Other tough competition is coming from the videotape market which has led television to gamble on the same horse by providing similar programs to those available in the video market in order to attract viewers. Officials of Kuwait television indicate that even if western entertainment programs were not offered on Kuwait television, they are available in local theaters or in local home video store for home video system.
Obstacles Facing National Production

1- The field of television production is considered a new field in the Arab states. It is still does not have a full grasp of its function and purpose. Although national television in the Arab states appeared decades ago, the national production industry did not start simultaneously. In fact, It was ignored for years and it was not given attention until in the last several years.

Unlike theater, cinema, and press industries, television production in the Arab world began and grew within a government system. For years it was manipulated by governments, long before private production become part of the process. Private production started in mid-1970s, especially in those states who built their systems in early 1960s. Nonetheless, the entrance to this industry was not fully equipped with enough preparation to deal with this kind of business. Thus, the start was very primitive and the result was very weak.

Therefore, the ground in industry for national television production is still not firm or reliable. The industry's role in the daily national broadcasting is still ineffective and its participation in the national programming is still poor, weak, limited, and marginal.

2- The Arab television market is very limited market for
commercial purposes and does not encourage any television production marketing. Furthermore, the complicated geographical, political barriers, and the intricate states marketing laws among the Arab states hinder any attempt to market on a large scale. Therefore, many Arab enterprises and companies who lost profits moved their businesses from Arab states to Europe and United States, aiming for better market and uncomplicated marketing barriers.

Many of these enterprises have achieved success in western countries while they failed in their Arab states. Those enterprises who preferred to keep their businesses in the Arab states found themselves in a position where they had to reduce their production budget to a minimum, and many of them refused to produce a major work with big budget on the ground that the marketing of the production within the Arabic television market cannot cover the cost of the production. Therefore, many of them do not even bother to produce professional or high quality programs.

Investing in television production in the Arab states is considered unprofitable business with a high risk and involving in it is a losing battle. Many enterprises prefer to invest their capital in fields other than the television field.

3- The high cost of production is one of the main obstacles that hinders either high standard productions or very large
productions. Under financial pressures, many enterprises squeeze production costs to the minimum by hiring a low-paid unskilled writer, untalented cast, and uncreative director. The natural result of all this is a low quality program.

Even in the case of highly professional standard nationally produced programs of considerable budgets, Arab televisions usually refuse to purchase the program for a high price, and treat it as if they were purchasing any low priced imported program. The newly established Arab production enterprises with limited financial and human resources cannot be compared in any way with the giant western multi-national corporations.

4- Even though it is hard to find all elements of production available in a single Arab state to make the circle of work complete, on many lucky occasions when the circle of the team work of production was completed and available, and the work was done, the censorship department interfered and rejected the production on the ground that the topic or the theme of the program's content was not compatible with the media policy of the state or other reasons.

Many executive managers in the private sector have expressed their resentment of the censorship department policy and how it discourages them and restricts their work. They explain that they have produced many good works with
great ideas and they're capable of producing more if they
given the chance, but censorship departments frequently
reject their production for one reason or another. "One of
the obstacles is lack of creativity, but when creativity is
found, censorship becomes the obstacle." For them the
production is becoming too risky and the censorship judgment
is unpredictable.

After spending all this money we were surprised to find
out that no one would buy it from us and the loss was
doubled. Sometimes we wish they would say what they
would accept and what they would reject before we start
working on any project; in many cases we worry about
the censorship more than our work itself."

Moreover, there are no standard policies for accepting
programs. The stipulations of the censorship departments to
accept programs vary from one Arab state to another. Given
this complexed situation, the production companies become
uncertain of whom they should please.

Consequently, to satisfy the censorship, most of the
programs, especially the drama programs, try to escape
tackling critical current issues and problems if the
programs are not trying to sustain them. This has resulted
in deterioration in the production content, with long and
repeated monotonous dialogues with no significant end.
Therefore, the fear of rejection from television stations
became the major obsession of producers and the anxiety of
getting approval from the censor became the aim of every
production work. The result of all this is a dull content
and low standard of production which can be suitable for any
time and place as long as it gets the consent of the censors, since it touches no sensitive issue.

5- Lack of freedom of expression: Because of the nature political system in the Arab states and due to the nature of the broadcasting system in the Arab states as a governmental system operated, controlled, and financed by the government, freedom of expression does not exist within their television systems. Many producers feel that they lack the freedom to present a bold theme, fearing that their act might arouse the anger of the governments against them. As a result, the producers feel insecure, which hinders the creativity of their work.

There are so many vital and sensitive national issues concerning the society that we do not dare to present or discuss on television and the reason is because of the censorship. The censorship department does not want any topic which provokes or stimulates the public.

6- Lack of human and material resources: Needless to say, many essential elements for television production are not available in the most Arab states. Foremost among these elements is the human resources element. There is a severe lack of creative writers, scenarists, casting personnel, directors, and technical staff. "We're wrong if we exaggerated and say we have creative capability of human resources. Actually we don't." Although governments might bear the major share of causing this situation:
Perhaps people's perspective toward television might also be blamed for this situation. A producer in the private sector noted that "People's approach toward television still passive and something must be done to provoke their imagination and creativity toward television work."  

Suggestions and Alternatives for Importing Western Programs

Since the reasons of importing western programs are somewhat complicated, the alternatives and suggested solutions are also somewhat inter-connected and overlapped.

Before getting into any further details, general agreement on and the broad direction of any solution must come through national endeavors. Protection of indigenous culture depends in the first place on indigenous efforts. H. Schiller supported the point that developing countries must depend on no one but themselves in developing their own authentic broadcast materials and reviving their culture. He noted:

If there is a prospect that cultural diversity will surface anywhere on this planet, it depends largely on the willingness and ability of scores of weak countries to forgo the cellophane-wrapped articles of the west's entertainment industries and persistently to develop, however much time it takes, their own broadcast material.  

Foregoing western materials is not as inconceivable as it seems to those of limited vision, and developing national programs and materials is not "mission impossible."
1- The first solution must come from national governments because of many reasons; the mistaken government policies toward the function of television are actually the main factor which has led to the deterioration of this issue; second, since the television system has been always a government property under full government control, the government holds full responsibility for all outcomes and consequences in connection with this medium; third, the government is the only authority which has the power of decision-making to decide any such policy toward television.

Therefore, Arab governments must change their attitudes and reconsider their approach and mentality toward the function of television, and start immediate and serious action through their effective and vital contribution. "The whole issue revolves around one point. Why we broadcast, what should we broadcast, and how we broadcast if we think as planners." So far there is no clear and definite answer for this main question. Most of the literature in the subject observed that one of the negative aspects of Arab television is the lack of planning and clear national policies and strategies toward television.

Planning in Arab production almost does not exist, the minimum of production criterias is almost not available, performance is carried out extemporaneously, and no one presently cares to evaluate the production after it's been broadcast to measure its feedback and effects on viewers.

Regarding this point, Arab television experts in
their seminar, *Issues of Arab Television Production*, recommended in one of their suggestions on improving production in government sector that Arab national television institutions should set long range production strategy, taking into consideration the future outlook of television in terms of the audience it addresses. Within this process there should be a balance between available resources and viewers growing needs to avoid any kind of spontaneous and quick production.

This queer mix between Arab and foreign programs is not based on clear and decisive strategy. Some Arab states provide some programs while other states do not; and sometimes this situation occurs within a single state where sometimes they allow certain programs and other times they do not. Very often the selection of this mix depends upon the personal mood and the temper of programs selection and censorship committees, mainly to fill in the space of air time. Therefore, many of these programs come inharmonious with the culture values. All this outcome is a result of the lack of national programming planning. The structure of Arab television systems lack serious studies and research into their programming planning. Unfortunately, few Arab televisions give this subject serious attention and few Arab televisions have research and studies departments within their structures.

In support of the previous point, a study conducted by
the ASBU through the Center of Audience and Viewers Research on Arab televisions regarding this matter concluded that 25% of Arab television institutions have no intention to establish studies and research in their systems because they believe there is no need or necessity for this kind of departments; the other 75%, however, believe that it is a necessity but they do not have the available financial and human resources. 

The Arab television experts also suggested that Arab governments should undertake evaluation research about a production after it has been broadcast to measure its effect on the audience and to know its cultural and social impact; planners and producers, in turn, should make use of the results of these studies and take them into consideration when setting up later production plans and strategies.

Moreover, the selection of broadcast programs should not be left to the whims of selection or censorship committees who may be incompetent because their judgment should not be the only criterion. The programs selection should be judged by specialized committees composed of religious scholars, educators, psychologists, sociologists, as well as media specialists who operate within definite and clear criteria. For the time being, these television committees do not have these specific qualifications.

2. The business of television production is a big and vital
economic industry and part of the fundamental structure of a modern state. As they are establishing political, economic, industrial, social and other infrastructures of the state, national governments must give similar concern to establishing a complete and firm national grassroots television industry structure. It has become clear, especially in the last decades, that it is not less important than other structures. While recognizing the substantial cost and the great effort especially in the first stages, in the long run it would be a profitable industry and great national investment. The lack of economic resources for television production has resulted, to great extent, in the lack of a firm industrial basis for the television production industry.

However, the critical question which remains is whether Arab producers can ever satisfy Arab viewers' demand after seeing so many western programs or whether the homegrown production may or may not improve the overall quality of Arab television. The answer to this significant question is that sacrifice is actually needed from both sides, the government as a sender and the Arab public as a receiver, to cope with the various expected difficulties in the first stages so that there will be enough time for the standard of production materials to develop and grow. Otherwise, as Jacques Delors said, "all televisions will be made in Japan and all programs will be American.".
3- National television production as a government concern should not be confined to or rely mostly on governmental production, as is presently the situation. Governmental work is always given priority and privileges over other private works. Private producers should also have the same privileges as government productions do. Relying mostly on government production is not a solution, and the government's capabilities by itself cannot meet all the demands of national production.

Fuad Ballat, the Director of Syrian television, in his analysis of the problems of television production in the public sector emphasized the importance of separation between television as a whole (as a broadcasting system) and the production departments within the government television system, as a first step. The second step is to establish production centers financially and administratively independent from the television stations which would serve as economic centers with economic ends to avoid complicated bureaucratic procedures which often hinder the work.\(^3\)

In fact, there was a similar suggestion by Muhammad Al-Sanousi, the former Under-Secretary Assistant for Television Affairs to convert Kuwait television to an independent government institution with economic goals, one which would serve as a profitable, as in source to the government like the case of governmental airlines enterprises. Al-Sanousi cited that television attachment to
direct government administration and codes is restricting its development; television must be independent and operating far from government routines and bureaucratic system.33

4- The private producers as a newly established institution in the industry, with limited human and financial resources, need the support and encouragement of the national government. Financial subsidies because of the high cost of professional production are the primary requirement. Many producers hesitate to produce high standard programs because of the high cost and less expected profit. Other kind of supports could be also offered through technical aids such as building or providing facilities, and giving priorities and privileges of using governmental utilities.

There is a consensus among Arab television experts that Arab television production should not be a monopoly by government institutions only but rather multinational sources between which both sectors should cooperate. Such cooperation between the government stations and the private producers to set a strategy of national programming is a very useful method to enhance nationally broadcast materials. The governments can charge private producers to carry out their projects according to their plan and according to government stipulations. This technique also
prevents the private producers from producing purely commercial, cheap programs.

The government should also encourage the national production of these producers by giving them priority on air time and through purchasing their production in distinguished and special prices. The present status does not deal with this kind of preference. Foreign and national programs are purchased for the same price according to the length of the programs. In the seminar, "Television Production Issues In the Arab States", the participants pointed out that the current programs' price list of Arab televisions does not encourage Arab producers, and that they are an obstacle in achieving the required high quality; therefore, it is illogical to compare Arab production with the foreign international production.

Private producers argue that they are unwilling to produce high quality programs because the purchased price would be the same as average programs as long as they run for the same period of time. They also indicated that they are highly unlikely to produce any kind of educational or cultural programs because the purchased price for this kind of program is less than the price of drama or entertainment programs. Therefore, since educational or cultural production is not profitable for them, the best way to make a profit is through producing entertainment or drama series.

Therefore, national governments should reconsider
their programs' price scale. As a way of support, the nationally produced programs should be valued at a higher price than the internationally produced programs. In addition, prices of national programs should be based according to quality rather than program span, the situation in the international market at the present time. This tactic can create competition among producers for better quality production and at the same time discourage them from producing low standard materials.

Moreover, educational or cultural programs also should be encouraged and supported, and should not be treated as marginal programs at lower prices. This point supports the previous idea that a program's price should be based on quality. Otherwise, the market would be encouraged to be entertainment-dominated rather than concentrating on educational and cultural programs.

In a meeting between UNESCO and the Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU), it was warned that even though it might be an advantage to import ready-made educational materials because they may be of good production quality and save time and money, selections should be based on local conditions and subjects matter must be relevant to the society's problems, concerns, and developmental needs. The meeting, however, emphasized making use of local production elements.

In 1978, the Arab Educational Technology Center
requested its member states to submit reports on the extent to which they were using educational media materials to a seminar about educational technology in the Arab states which was held in Kuwait. All the reports raised the issue of educational film and video production and all states expressed the fact that they lack capabilities in this field, ranging from equipment, staff, funds, and specialists. Reports have shown that imported educational films had not been found suitable for local educational programs. At the end of the conference, the member states recommended establishing an Arab institution for the production of educational films. Nevertheless, so far no action has been taken with regard to this vital recommendation.\(^{35}\)

5- Muhammad Al-Sanousi, however, argues that the core of the crisis with respect to national Arab television production is not merely lack of financial or building facilities. It goes much deeper, to the issue of creativity and talented human resources capable of creativity and competition, without which television work becomes worthless. "So far, the competition is far and away extreme between Arab and western industries, and the main reason is creativity."\(^{36}\) It is true that the Arab world is experiencing a creativity crises.

The paucity of intellectual grassroots in the Arab
world can be attributed to the collapse and deterioration
the Arab cultural and intellectual institutions. This
sterile situation was reflected deeply and directly by all
aspects of arts, including the art of Arab television
production. The lack of self-expression and creativity in
the Arab world is the outcome of the absence of clear media
and cultural policies. Arab governments bear the biggest
part of responsibility in creating this crisis. Nearly
since the First world War and the Arab world is living in
continues and complicated political and ideological crises.
The disappearance of political and ideological stability has
led to lack of freedom of expression and atmosphere within
which creativity can flourish.

Arab television experts, meeting in Tunisia to discuss
the crisis of Arab television production, emphasized the
subject of creativity and suggested several points in order
to activate and cultivate creativity, as follows: 37
A- Arab governments should provide as much freedom as
possible to creative people on the ground that any kind of
artistic expression can flourish only in the climate of
intellectual freedom. Fuad Ballat pointed out "The real
reasons that prevent the development of art to be a
fundamental factor in any given people's civilization
incarnate when hypocrisy and fearing become the ground of
any decision in artistic production." 38
B- The governments should endeavor to enact legislation and
laws which guarantee all literature and financial rights of creative people and enhance their rank in the society.

C- The Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) should strive to support the trend of its members to set the rules which organize the artistic and intellectual ownership and reserve all rights of creative personnel who work in the field of television production.

D- All government and private production institutions should work on providing the proper circumstances which help the development of the specialized television writer through arranging workshops and training sessions, or through incorporating writers with production teams to stimulate in them, as writers, the creativity and perception of television work seen in its different stages.

E- The Arab television institutions should establish research units within its systems. The mission of these units is to produce pilot programs aimed at checking ways of possibilities to produce creative or programs derived from the civilization of the Islamic and Arabic heritage.

Noticeably, television in the Arab states has been brainwashed by a western style taste. Some see no Arab television style, merely a spinoff of western style. This was reflected in western model types of production. Most of the content of Arab programs is an imitation of western materials and rarely the content is originated from indigenous Arab culture. D. Boyd observed that television
in the Arab states has a predominantly western style. The brainwashing process usually occurs during training in western countries as agreements call for, reinforced automatically with the fascination of western techniques, and the constant viewing pattern of western programs. Boyd concluded that "The natural result of all this is western-type television programs in Arabic."\textsuperscript{39}

F- Academic people, on their part, should design curricula and research tools which can be used as criteria by television critics to evaluate television programs.

6- There is a great necessity to allow the establishment of private stations. Television in all Arab states has been always a government property and the voice of government with one or two exceptions. Many producers have expressed their frustration that many national, regional, and local productions are rejected by these government stations for one reason or another such as low standard of production or incompatibility with government policy. Therefore, these producers found no other alternatives to market their productions. Moreover, these private stations expand and enlarge the ground of Arab television market in addition to their great potential of participating in democracy of broadcasting. Also, these private stations might serve as a vital and sincere supporter of the government system in achieving its national goals of informing, educating, and
entertaining.

Nevertheless, there is a general concern that these private stations should be under government auspices and supervision, similar to the case of the private press in some Arab states. The reason for the government supervision is to avoid the negatives aspects and the misuses of being a commercial stations, like what happened to the European commercial stations when they came more dependent on imported programs and entertainment-oriented stations and the situation became more critical.

7- Arab television must decrease their daily broadcasting hours in order to depend less on imported western programs. Through the years Arab television expanded air time very dramatically, and always looked at this as a big leap in television development at the same time that national production was far less developed in the same proportion. In fact, the more air time increased, the more they became dependent on western programs. Arab states are in constant competition regarding the span of air time. Many Arab states feel that they are less advantaged than other states if they have short air time. Their solution is to expand the air time and fill it with western programs. With the establishment of second channels, the situation deteriorated and the issue became even worse.

After all, from a logical point of view, there is
virtually no need for the bulk of western programs. Actually, there is no need for television at all, in the worse cases, if it has to be filled with western programs. People and the native culture are much better off without it. Most of the literatures confirms that the Arab people were more attached to their culture and were more enriched by their culture before the emergence of television.

In this regard, we aver that there is no need for such a long span of air time, nor is it shamful to have a short span of air time. To have a few hours a day of national programs on a single channel is much better than to have two channels broadcast for many hours a week of imported programs. Many countries either developed or developing are enacting legislation to restrict importation of foreign programs to allow more air time for national programs. The United Kingdom, for instance, stipulates that a minimum of 86% of air time must be of commonwealth origin, Canadian air time must be 55% locally produced and Australia 50%, and similar trends in Japan, Argentina, Italy, Mexico, Brazil and many other countries. In 1984, the EEC (European Economic Community) suggested a local-content quota of 60% of television air time.

In the case of the Arab states, actually there is no need at all for the foreign channel. The real purpose for the existence of these kind of channels is still not yet clear despite the governments' excuses. The governments'
justifications of these channels cannot be taken for granted and accepted as definite answers. Many Arab specialists believe that these channels are a premature development.

8- One of the easiest methods to reduce reliance on western programs and to fill air time is to increase the exchange of programs among Arab states. At the present time, the exchange of national television programs among Arab states is very low. The Arab states import programs from western countries more than they import from each other.

At the time when Arab states import from western countries more than 50% of their air time (mostly films, serials, drama, shows, entertainment, and children programs), the average exchange of television programs within the Arab states constitutes for only 13% of the total air time (mostly news and news programs and reports). "If each television station in the Arab world presented its production to other Arab stations, we could have reduce the foreign importation to the half in each station."

Indeed, there is a great demand for expansion of the level of programs exchange within the Arab world to make Arab people familiar with different life, customs, and traditions of other parts of the Arab world. Unfortunately, because Arab viewers watch western programs more than programs from neighboring Arab states, they know more about life in western countries than they know about the other Arab states. Sa'id Al-Harithi noted that "television offers
Arab viewers a wealth of information about western culture--far more than it brings them information about their own culture.".

9- Needless to say, cooperation and coordination among Arab states regarding this matter is extremely essential to carry out successfully any such alternatives and suggestions. Experiences have shown that cooperation and coordination among Arab states is weak, if non-existent. Very often political and ideological disagreements among Arab governments' policies are the main obstacle hindering any such cooperation.

Meanwhile, experience has also demonstrated that an action by a single state is courting failure. One state cannot solve the whole problem because all elements to establish a firm national grassroots production industry cannot be found in a single Arab state. As mentioned previously, all elements of the circle of television work have to be available so the circle can be connected otherwise, there won't be a solid foundation for an Arab industry. The issue needs full and serious cooperation among Arab states.

The Arab governments realize this point very well. The Arab delegates focused on this point in the Government International Conference for Cooperation in Communication development which was held in Paris on April 1980 under the
auspices of UNESCO. The delegates expressed the need for cooperation among themselves and the necessity of cooperation in this field with industrially developed countries.⁴⁵

There have been many attempts and suggestions for Pan-Arab joint production, but political disagreement among Arab states always hinders such agreement. The ASBU, at one point, encouraged sub-regional grouping among Arab states as a primary step after the failure of creating a unified Arab media policy and joint production. All Arab conferences and studies of this subject emphasized the importance of at least regional cooperation and coordination among Arab states in the field of production. Experience has shown that this technique of joint production is very effective in all aspects. The best successful example of this kind of regional cooperation is the Arabian Gulf States Joint Programs Production Institution.
Footnotes of the Chapter


2 Al-Usmani, ibid, p.200.

3 Al-Usmani, ibid, p.201.


5 Salman Al-Begshi, supervisor of marketing and Biding Department at Kuwait television, personal interview, Kuwait, December 1988.

6 Al-Usmani, ibid, p.201

7 Salim Al-Fahad, Director of Kuwait television, personal interview, Kuwiat, December 1988.

8 Muhammad Al-Sanousi, Former Under-Secretary Assistant for Television Affairs in Kuwait, personal interview, Kuwait, December 18, 1988.

9 Al-Sanousi, personal interview, ibid.

10 Al-Sanousi, personal interview, ibid.

11 Salim Al-Fahad, personal interview, ibid.


13 Al-Malih, personal interview, ibid.

14 Abdullah Al-Rushaid, the Director of the Foreign channel (the Second Channel) at Kuwait television, personal interview, Kuwait, December 21, 1988.

15 Al-Sanousi, personal interview, ibid.


18 Al-Usmani, ibid, p.201.


20 Al-Sanousi, personal interview, ibid.


22 Al-Sanousi, personal interview, ibid.

23 Al-Sanousi, personal interview, ibid.


25 Schiller, Mass Communication and American Empire, ibid, pp.121-122.

26 Al-Sanousi, personal interview, ibid.

27 Issues of Television Production in the Arab States, Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU), Tunisia, 1985, p.15.

28 Issues of Television Production in the Arab States, ibid, p.17.

29 Al-Buhooth journal, No 8, April 1983, ASBU, Audience and Viewers Research Center, Baghdad, 1983.

30 Issues of Television Production in the Arab States, ibid, p.19.


32 Fuad Ballat, Arab Television Production Between Private and Public Sector, lecture given at the seminar of Issues of Television Production in the Arab States, ibid, p.9.

33 Aalam Al-Fen journal, Kuwait, February 18, 1979, p.5.

34 Issues of Television Production in the Arab States, ibid, pp.14-15.

Al-Sanousi, personal interview, ibid.

*Issues of Television Production*, ibid, pp.16-17.

Fuad Ballat, ibid, p.29.


Sunday Republican, ibid.

*Issues of Television Production*, ibid, p.13.

Amal Abdullah, Executive Manager of Al-Amal enterprise for television production, personal interview, Kuwait, December 10, 1988.


Final Conclusion, Closing Remarks, and Recommendations for Future Studies

The issue of cultural invasion of the Arab national culture through importing western television programs is a serious and dangerous issue needing serious and prompt action in order to confront it. All literature as well as the analysis of this study have shown that the Arab national culture is in deep jeopardy and the rift in the Arab culture is great. Many aspects of the indigenous Arab culture are fading out, primarily as a result of western culture domination in particular through a large exposure to imported western television programs. The text also indicated that imported western television programs have had profound long-term effects on Arab culture. Imported western programs, especially entertainment programs, are the chief carrier in transmitting alien western values.

Unfortunately, the issue of importing western television software was ignored for quite a long period of time by Arab governments, and was not given much attention until the last several years. This situation caused the issue to worsen. Despite the governments' concern and attention to the issue, the problem still exists and is becoming more aggravated.

The issue of cultural invasion and importing western television programs in the Arab states is part of the big
problem that the Arab world is experiencing. Along with many negative factors in the Arab world, such as the complexity of the ideological and political situation in the Arab world, disunity, lack of consensus, and the myth of Arab unity, the Arab states cannot take a unified stance in countering this dangerous issue. Beside the fact that Arab television is not functioning positively in terms of enhancing and promoting the national Arab culture, the study shows that Arab television systems are not taking serious precautionary measures to protect and preserve the Arab culture from the alien values which penetrate through the content of the western imported programs.

Despite the dominant global aspect of the issue and despite the strong current of the flow of western television programs, the study rebuts the allegation that dependence on western programs is unavoidable and any solution for the problem is impossible. The study presents and suggests many options and solutions which might work as alternative solutions for these problems if they were acted upon.

Throughout the research, it became very evident that Arab governments bear a great deal of responsibility in dealing with and solving this crucial question. The current situations require that the Arab governments act promptly by taking serious measures to protect the Arab indigenous culture. The purpose and uses of television are not specified in most Arab states; when they are specified, no
provisions are made for their implementation. Arab television is mainly entertainment-oriented and is not effectively used for educational and cultural purposes; when it is, such efforts are fragmentary and not well planned.

It is worth noting that the diagnosis and the results of the issue reported in this text are neither final nor absolute. Other studies might tackle the issue from different approaches and perspectives, and probably under different circumstances. Once again, to remind the reader, this study deals with the situation in the state of Kuwait as a case study for this research and Kuwait television as a model of Arab television. However, the situation and conditions might vary in other Arab states and not necessarily be the same.

Other studies and research are strongly encouraged and recommended as a follow-up to this study. As mentioned in the beginning of this study, Arabic libraries lack sources in this field, and Arab studies and research into this issue are in extremely short supply.

It is not claimed that the options and suggestions presented in this study are the only and best solutions to the problem. Certainly other suggestions which may not have been touched on within this study might be presented as additional solutions. This study's main concern is the relationship between television and culture. Different options from various perspectives might also apply. In
general, there is an urgent need for Arab studies and research to explore the many different ways that Arab television can contribute effectively, not only toward the preservation and protection of the Arab indigenous culture, but also toward its enhancement.

The function of Arab television has to be re-invented. The Arab culture, through the television medium, must be re-discovered by the indigenous people who have their own style, technique and approach for survival. A cultural gap still exist between the people and broadcasting; there is a need to create programs that give authentic expression, to help in the process of confronting with westernization in order to preserve the national heritage. Such indigenous culture broadcasting must be connected to traditions, customs, values, and all aspects of art.

However, it's worth emphasizing that preserving the Arab culture is not a responsibility of broadcasters and governments only. Rather it is a responsibility shared collectively, especially by scholars, clerics, historians, researchers, artists, and all educated people.
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