Executive leadership and political decision-making: a case study of the development and evolution of the community college system in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1957-1962.

James H. Mullen
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/5143

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
A Dissertation Presented

by

JAMES H. MULLEN, JR.

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

September 1994

School of Education

A Dissertation Presented
by
JAMES H. MULLEN, JR.

Approved as to style and content by:

William C. Wolf, Jr. Chair
Johnstone Campbell, Member
Patricia Crosson, Member
Nelson Pion, Member

Bailey W. Jackson, Dean
School of Education
DEDICATION

To my Mother, always my best friend, who sees this long journey from a better place, and to Mari, whose smile has made the path run even.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many thanks to my Committee members for their faith and encouragement; to Dr. Evan S. Dobelle, Dr. Carole, A. Cowan, and Dr. James L. Wattenbarger for their steadfast support; to Jeanne Barrow for her encouragement and effort, and to Peg Louraine for pulling it all together. I am also deeply grateful to the individuals who shared their insights and memories with me; this study recounts the history they made, and I hope does so accurately.
Politics plays an inevitable and integral role in the development of policy concerning higher education at the state level. Governors are fundamental to the political process of statewide higher education policymaking. This study examines the role which two governors played in the early development of community colleges in Massachusetts between 1957 and 1962.

The purpose of this study is essentially two-fold. First, it seeks to tell a political story about two governors of different personalities, parties, and policy priorities. Focusing on the common historical theme of community college development, this story presents how the contexts of their times influenced the strategies and decisions of Foster Furcolo (1957-1960) and John Volpe (1961-1962) and how, in turn, these two men shaped the period in which they lived.

The second purpose of this study is to analyze specifically how Furcolo and Volpe influenced the critical
early years of community college development in Massachusetts. Furcolo held a passionate policy commitment to community colleges and his passion is largely responsible for their gestation and birth. Volpe was less personally committed, yet his administration witnessed a marked increase in funding and pace of campus planning. Analysis of this irony holds a number of significant lessons concerning gubernatorial responsibilities for policy formulation, legislative leadership, and public opinion leadership.

This dissertation utilizes a case study research modus operandi. It includes a literature review which focuses on works related to politics and policy-making in higher education, as well as the American governorship and the range of gubernatorial power.

The results of this study offer insights into how governors use the powers of their office to shape the policies of their eras and beyond. It also provides a view of how two different governors engaged the specific policy issue of community college development within the context of other demands and policy concerns of their administrations. Finally, it offers tightly defined lessons for the relationship between governors and higher education in contemporary times.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. GOALS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement of the Problem</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of the Study</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meaning of the Terms</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of the Study</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delimitations of the Study</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy and Politics in Higher Education:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of the Field</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Government and Public Higher Education</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The American Governorship - Formal and Informal Powers</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. DESIGN AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Framework</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Design</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Questions</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources of Information</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations and Exclusions</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretation of Information</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY COLLEGE MOVEMENT: 1900-1957</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community and Junior Colleges in America,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-1957</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts Before 1957</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Junior College Movement in Massachusetts:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-1957</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

viii
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Massachusetts State Budget Chronology - Community Colleges Fiscal Years 1959-1962</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

GOALS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Statement of the Problem

Politics and political institutions play an inevitable role in shaping the community college mission in Massachusetts as well as in other states. Governors, legislators, regulatory boards and county and local officials provide the enabling legislation for such institutions, establish the ground rules under which community colleges operate and set the budget authorizations that fund college programs. Moreover, the community college commitment to comprehensiveness, affordability and open access make such institutions a logical vehicle for public officials who seek a quick and visible response to issues ranging from labor force training to developmental education. Finally, by definition community colleges are intimately tied to local needs. Such intimacy weds community colleges to state, county and local political processes.

While much has been written concerning the history of community colleges (Bogue, 1950; Monroe, 1972; Witt, 1988; Cohen, 1989; Witt, Wattenbarger, Gollattscheck, & Suppiger, 1994) and an important body of work is developing related to issues of class and economic development at two-year colleges (Clark, 1960; Blocker, Plummer, & Richardson, 1965; Zwerling, 1976; Brint & Karabel, 1989), comparatively...
little research exists concerning the role of politics and political institutions in shaping the community college mission. Most such research is reported in chapters of general texts (Tillery, et al., 1985; Cohen & Brawer, 1989; Brint & Karabel, 1989), in portions of dissertations (Asquino, 1976; Bartley, 1985; Whitaker, 1989) and in unpublished papers (Lustberg, 1979) or in occasional articles (Katsimas, 1993).

The work of scholars such as Fabian and Lustberg emphasizes the legislative perspective, focusing on how the Legislature has historically influenced the mission of community colleges in Massachusetts. Conversely, the role of the governor in defining that mission has received minimal scholarly attention.

A small but growing body of literature examines the policy relationship of governors and higher education. However, while the writings of such authors as Goodall, Lederle, Eulau and Quinley each provide useful insights into executive branch policymaking vis-a-vis public higher education, their analyses emphasize the actions of specific governors toward statewide higher education systems or toward large and unwieldy research universities. Almost no specific attention is paid to the policymaking goals and influence of governors concerning community colleges. Moreover, while this growing body of literature offers useful analyses of systems in states such as Wisconsin and California, it does not relate specifically to the
situation in Massachusetts, a case study which is in many ways unique.

The absence of scholarship pertaining to the central policymaking role of the executive branch in Massachusetts is unfortunate. Bartley has called the governor "the chief legislator" (interview, 11/26/90), for it is the executive branch which sets the policy agenda for government in Massachusetts. The governor's annual budget requests to the Legislature establish the basic parameters for policy debate, while constitutional powers such as the veto provide gubernatorial leverage over legislative action. Executive branch appointments to cabinet and sub-cabinet posts provide the leadership for key departments and program initiatives. Moreover, the governor personally commands extensive media attention and can utilize this visibility to focus the policy debate on issues of importance to him or her.

Since the 1960s, public higher education in Massachusetts has expanded greatly in size and has earned a more prominent position in the policy debate on Beacon Hill. From fifteen institutions (UMass, ten state colleges, the Massachusetts Maritime Academy, three technical institutes) in 1957, public higher education had grown to twenty-nine institutions by 1990 with a total budget of some $700 million.

The public community college system in the Commonwealth had grown since 1960 into fifteen institutions
by 1990 with a total annual budget of over $120 million. More than 100,000 community college students attended classes during the day and evening in the Fall of 1990.

This growth has occurred within a context that is unique in three important ways. First, public higher education co-exists with Massachusetts' unmatched array of private colleges and universities. This reality has historically affected the priority given public higher education by political decision-makers in the Commonwealth. Moreover, the funding mechanism for community colleges in Massachusetts is unlike that in most of the rest of the nation. State dollars fund higher education, with no contribution from either local or county government. Finally, evening educational programs receive no state support and must be self-supporting.

As is the case across the country, the Commonwealth's community colleges are committed to comprehensiveness and to open access as they struggle to balance diverse mandates which include career programs, transfer curricula, developmental coursework and contract training. With attrition rates at some institutions exceeding fifty percent and vocational programs dominating an increasing portion of community college curricula, however, a number of scholars such as Zwerling and Karabel have asked whether the community college commitment to open access offers little more than false promises to the lower socioeconomic classes of American society.
It is important to build on the current scholarship concerning the factors which influence the mission of the Commonwealth’s public two-year colleges. A full examination of the community college mission in Massachusetts should entail consideration of the role played by political institutions and personalities, including the Commonwealth’s chief executive. The present study has sought to contribute to this effort by examining how two gubernatorial administrations influenced development of the Massachusetts community college system between 1957 and 1962.

The period 1957-1962 provides a useful case history of gubernatorial influence upon the Commonwealth’s community colleges. First, it encompasses their birth and early development. Second, it provides a window on two governors, Foster Furcolo and John Volpe, who belonged to different parties, possessed very different personalities, held different priorities, faced different political dynamics, encountered different crises and left different legacies. Both, however, affected the early formation of Massachusetts community colleges in a positive manner.

Finally, in examining the period 1957-1962, this study concentrates on a manageable case history. A great danger in historical research is to grasp too grand a topic, only to lose focus and become mired in volumes of disconnected data. This study analyzes a tightly defined period of
gubernatorial activity, thus forming a solid foundation for future research of subsequent administrations.

The clearest and most direct impact of the executive branch on community colleges came at the time of their authorization by the Legislature in 1958. Perhaps more than any other individual, Governor Foster Furcolo is responsible for the birth of the community college in Massachusetts. Proposals for two-year colleges had been presented to the Legislature periodically since a 1922 study by George Zook recommended inclusion of junior colleges in a general expansion of the Commonwealth's public higher education system. It was Furcolo, however, influenced by community college programs in other states (particularly Florida) and seeking to provide comprehensive institutions that would "allow students to pursue whatever type of educational program they needed" (Furcolo, interview 1988), who was the first Massachusetts governor to make community colleges a cornerstone of his legislative program. His personal commitment and stewardship, combined with that of key supporters in the Commonwealth's House and Senate, was the most critical factor in the 1958 passage of legislation (Chapter 605 of the General Laws of 1958) authorizing the development of community colleges in Massachusetts.

The nearly two-year period between Furcolo's first formal call for a community college system in his 1957 inaugural address and the passage of Chapter 605 offers a
number of important insights into both early evolution of the community college mission in Massachusetts and the policymaking and legislative processes in the Commonwealth. It also provides a clear example of how the steady support of a chief executive can combine with the goals and ambitions of individual legislators to drive major policy development. It is no coincidence that the first two community colleges in Massachusetts were established in Pittsfield and Hyannis, home respectively to Representative Thomas Wojtkowski and Senator George Stone, two key supporters of Furcolo’s initiative.

Although scholars such as Lustberg have described Furcolo’s leadership in developing support for community colleges in Massachusetts, the case offers fertile ground for analysis as both a study in policy development and as the critical first phase of executive branch influence over the evolving community college mission in Massachusetts.

The role of subsequent administrations has received even less historical analysis, despite important developments related to the mission of public higher education in general and community colleges in particular.

For example, Governor Volpe’s role in the historical development of community colleges has been essentially unexplored. His first administration (1960-62) provides a particularly informative contrast to the Furcolo era. Whereas his predecessor held community colleges as a personal priority, Volpe’s fundamental policy focus lay
elsewhere, particularly in capital projects and political reform. Despite Volpe’s relative lack of attention, however, the Massachusetts community college system continued to expand, thanks largely to support from key legislators and a strong governing board and the governor’s willingness to endorse continuation of his predecessor’s two-year college program.

This study sets the two administrations in the historical and political context of their times. It examines the personalities of Furcolo and Volpe as well as the priorities and predispositions each brought to office. Finally, and most significantly, it analyzes their relative influence over the development of community colleges and their mission in Massachusetts during the critical era of 1957-62.

While scholars have examined the history of community colleges in Massachusetts and explored the roles of legislators, statewide education officials, private businesses and individual college presidents in shaping institutional mission, almost no research has incorporated a detailed analysis of the role played by the Commonwealth’s governors. Although the personal interest of individual governors has varied from the very direct role played by Furcolo to Volpe’s less focused attention, every governor has played some part in influencing the mission of community colleges in Massachusetts. At the very least, they have approved the opening of such
institutions, set budget authorizations for them and appointed college trustees as well as other key officials who have directly influenced the community college mission.

Purpose of the Study

The present study addresses the role of the Massachusetts governor in shaping the early development and mission of community colleges in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Specifically, it examines how the actions and inactions of the governor and key executive agencies influenced the evolving mission of the commonwealth’s community colleges between 1957 and 1962.

The primary research questions which guided this study are:

1. What role, if any, did the executive branch play in shaping the mission of community colleges in Massachusetts during the period in question?

2. How was that role shaped by the individual priorities of the governor in question and the historical context in which that governor served the commonwealth?

3. Who were the other key political actors who influenced development of community colleges and their mission in Massachusetts?

4. What is an appropriate policy role for the governor in shaping the mission of community colleges in the commonwealth?
Meaning of the Terms

For the purpose of this study, the terms community college, primary sources, secondary sources, executive branch, fiscal year, legislature, and political institution have been defined.

Community College - While several definitions exist in the literature, the two most appropriate for use in the study are found in Cohen and Brawer’s The American Community College and in Deyo’s 1967 examination of the Massachusetts Community college system, Access to Quality Community College Opportunity - The former defines a community college as "any institution accredited to award the Associate in Arts or the Associate in Science as its highest degree (p. 4). Deyo recognizes the comprehensive aspect of these institutions when he writes, "the community college, by definition, is a growing, changing institution responding in its program and services to the changing needs of the region and of society" (p. 3).

Executive Branch - For purposes of this study, the executive branch will be considered to include the governor, his or her immediate staff as well as all staff and agencies which report to the governor or to a member of his or her staff.

Fiscal Year - The fiscal year in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts runs from July 1 of a year through June 30 of the following year. For example, Fiscal Year 1960 would encompass the period July 1, 1959 through June 30, 1960.
Legislature - The Massachusetts Legislature is bicameral with a House of Representatives and a Senate.

Political Institution - This study considered any institution whose chief executive officer or board is elected or appointed by elected officials to be a political institution.

Primary Source - Travers defines a primary source as "one which has had some direct physical relationship to the events that are being reconstructed" (1969, p. 383). This study considered as primary sources those individuals directly involved in development of the Massachusetts community college mission, documents written by these individuals and newspaper articles written by direct observers of the evolving community colleges.

Secondary Sources - Travers (1969, p. 383) defines secondary sources as "those that do not bear a direct physical relationship to the event that is the subject of study." This study considered as secondary sources individuals who have examined the Massachusetts political scene and/or the evolution of community colleges in the Commonwealth but who were not directly related to that scene or that evolution, as well as writings by scholars who have studied the American community college movement. The same consideration was given to other sources not directly related to the evolution of Massachusetts community colleges or to the political institutions that have influenced that evolution since 1956.
Significance of the Study

Significant research exists pertaining to the historical evolution of community colleges at the national level, as does literature which analyzes the economic and social effects of such institutions. Included among these studies are important examinations of the role of community colleges within the Massachusetts higher education system.

As noted earlier, however, the role of key state and local political institutions in shaping the mission of Massachusetts community colleges has received relatively limited scholarly attention, while the influence of individual governors has been the subject of almost no focused research. The theoretical significance of this study lies in its emphasis upon the relative role played by the executive branch in the early development and mission of community colleges in the Commonwealth.

Furthermore, the present study provides a case study of policy development within the Massachusetts state political structure. From this study, useful lessons have emerged as to how policy priorities evolve (or fail to evolve) within Massachusetts state government and how the executive branch interacts with other key institutions of government such as the Legislature.

This study is also significant in that its results may provide a foundation for recommendations as to what role is appropriate for the executive branch in influencing the mission of community colleges in Massachusetts. Such
recommendations should provide salient data to those who will advise the current administration as well as future governors concerning the process of educational policy development in Massachusetts.

Delimitations of the Study

There are five specific limitations to this study. First, its scope is restricted to Massachusetts. While community colleges in Massachusetts share many characteristics (e.g., commitment to open access) with similar institutions in other states, there are important differences in history, size, governance and financing between Massachusetts community colleges and those in other parts of the country. In particular, community colleges in Massachusetts operate within a state characterized by exceptional private institutions, a fact which has historically influenced resource allocation to public higher education. Moreover, governance and funding at community colleges in the commonwealth have been dominated by the state and (until 1980), by an appointed statewide governing body, the Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges. Conversely, in many other states county and local governments play a central role in governance and funding while local boards of trustees are elected. Appropriations to community colleges in Massachusetts flow solely from the state (again, no role for county and local governments) and state dollars support only day programs.
The second major limitation of this study is its focus on community colleges. While examining the executive branch’s role in shaping the community college mission will provide useful insights into governance at the state level, it is important not to assume that all observations are fully generalizable to other inter-governmental relationships or to other parts of the higher education system.

The third significant limitation of this study is its focus on a circumscribed period of six years. While failure to so constrain this research effort would lead to diffusion and unwieldiness, it is important to remember that the late 1950s and the early 1960s were in many ways a unique era in the histories of Massachusetts and the United States. Thus, any extrapolation or generalization of this study’s results must be carefully circumscribed.

The fourth limitation of the study is its reliance on primary resources and, most specifically, on interviews with key figures in the development of public higher education policy in Massachusetts during the past three decades. The limitation of source materials creates a research constraint best summarized by John Whitaker (1989) who faced a similar dilemma in completing his doctoral research:

Ultimately a study can never completely reveal the motivation of participants in an event no matter how complete the record. It cannot completely recreate, for purpose of analysis, the total context within which a series of events took place some twenty years in the past. It can
never fully document the genesis of a new idea or change of attitude among a group of decision makers. This study was limited by the necessity to work largely with the written and printed record and limited as well by the all too human tendency of participants to forget, to embellish or to misconstrue events in which they played a significant role. (p. 32)

The final limitation grows from the personal involvement of the author in the Commonwealth’s community college system. Although an earnest effort at impartiality has been made, it is impossible for the author to approach this study without a set of predispositions concerning the role of the community colleges in Massachusetts higher education.

This study looked to the evolution of community colleges in Massachusetts as an historical case which could contribute to the literature concerning educational policymaking at the executive level of state government. Before making broad extrapolations, however, the reader should keep in mind that the study focuses on a single state that has a rather unique higher education pedigree and on a community college system whose development has been influenced by that pedigree.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Policy and Politics in Higher Education: Overview of the Field

Since 1958 and the publication of Moos and Rourke's comprehensive study, The Campus and the State, a growing literature has developed concerning policy and politics in higher education. Much of this scholarship has been completed since 1970 and, as Hartmark and Hines have demonstrated, it has often been descriptive in nature, has generally focused on the state level and has consisted primarily of case studies (Hines & Hartmark, 1980, p. 5).

The field of policy and politics in higher education at the state level incorporates a range of topics and subtopics related to the content (policy) and the process (politics) of decision making (Hines & Hartmark, 1980, p. 7). In their work, Politics of Higher Education (1980), Hines and Hartmark write that "state governments influence higher education largely through three mechanisms: planning and coordination, budgetary appropriations and the allocation of resources among institutions and sectors, and administrative regulation and control" (p. 21). Given this scope of influence, scholars have examined questions related to statewide coordination, institutional governance and mission, budget and finance and academic freedom.
In a separate article, Hines and Hartmark argue that a taxonomy of higher education exists in which five levels (purposes, values and norms, programs, management, and resources) comprise the policy domain and in which political interactions occur in three loci (institutional, extramural, and governmental) (Hines & Hartmark, 1980, p. 9). The present study operates primarily at the intersection of purposes (policy) and government (politics) as it traces the gubernatorial role in shaping the community college identity in Massachusetts.

While research specifically related to the gubernatorial role in the development of individual community college systems is rare, this study draws from and contributes to a diverse literature whose common thread is the gubernatorial role in policymaking.

First, the present study depends on a body of literature which describes the relationship between state governments and public higher education. The foundation of much of this literature is *The Campus and the State* in which Moos and Rourke (1959) present an extensive analysis of the relationship between university systems and state governments. Subsequent authors, including Hartmark, Hines, Goodall, Eulau, Greer and Glenny have made significant contributions to the scholarship concerning state governments and public higher education. In doing so, each has also offered useful, if somewhat generic insights into the role governors play in the relationship
between the state and its public institutions of higher learning.

The present study also relies on a second related body of literature which focuses on the American governorship as a political institution. This literature examines the governor's office through the lens of political science and is primarily concerned with the mechanics of how gubernatorial power is exercised in relation to that of the other key political actors. Leslie Lipson's 1949 study, *The American Governor: From Figurehead to Leader*, is among the first such examinations of the governorship and has been followed by the works of Ransone, Sabato, Beyle and Osborne, among others.

The existing literature concerning the evolution of community colleges in the United States offers surprisingly little substantive discussion of the role played by governors in shaping the identity of such institutions in individual states. Even Brint and Karabel's *The Diverted Dream*, a case history of community college growth in Massachusetts, is relatively silent on the gubernatorial impact on the Commonwealth's fifteen-college system, emphasizing instead the role of campus presidents and the statewide governing board in creating institutional missions. While others such as Lederle (in Beyle & Williams, 1972) have at least acknowledged the role of governors in shaping the two-year college mission in their states, it is interesting that in most important recent
works concerning the American community college, the gubernatorial role is almost ignored. Perhaps the most useful history of the community college movement is provided by Witt, Wattenbarger et al. in their 1994 work, *America’s Community Colleges: The First Century*. Although the text does not focus on the gubernatorial role, it offers a most helpful sense for the context in which community colleges developed nationwide.

A limited body of literature exists which relates specifically to either the Massachusetts governorship or to the overall relationship between the state and public higher education in the Commonwealth. In the former group, Mallan and Blackwood’s study of Foster Furcolo’s legislative battle over issues such as the sales tax (in Westin, 1962) and Osborne’s analysis of Michael Dukakis’ two incarnations as governor (1985) are particularly helpful. In addition, the governor’s role as legislative leader includes useful insights into both the Furcolo administration and the Massachusetts Legislature of the late 1950s. Brint and Karabel contribute to the understanding of state government’s relationship to community colleges as do Bartley (1988) and Asquino (1976) in their respective studies of campus strategic planning and systemwide budgeting. Examinations by Stafford (1980) and Murphy (1974) of higher education reorganization efforts in Massachusetts during the 1960s and 1970s provide data concerning the more general relationship of state
government to public higher education during a watershed era for the system. Katsinas (1993) has provided a most useful analysis of George Wallace’s role in the founding of Alabama’s two-year college system.

Thus, the goal of the present study is to bridge several bodies of literature. Building from foundations in both the political science study of the governorship and in higher education and the field of policy and politics, it seeks to provide an historical case study that will fill a void in the contemporary literature concerning both community colleges and the modern office of governor.

State Government and Public Higher Education

Gubernatorial influence over public higher education is rooted both in the formal and informal powers of the office and in the individual governor’s hierarchy of interests and needs. Executive influence is also a function of the primary responsibility which state governments (particularly Massachusetts) have assumed vis-a-vis public higher education.

Adler and Lane (Politics, Budgeting and Policy, 1985) have argued persuasively that higher education has evolved into a unique policy area in most states:

To begin with, we see education as a policy area of increasing state activity. In the American federal system, we know that most governmental activities are carried out jointly by the various levels of government. At the same time, some policy fields are dominated by state government. Higher education is a good example of an area which is primarily a state responsibility and in which state government is becoming increasingly active.
Not only is there a trend toward greater state policymaking activity in higher education, but we also feel that higher education's emergence as a unique policy area is an important related phenomenon. Higher education, as distinct from all of education or education and welfare, or education and labor, is increasingly developing its own identifiable policymaking system in the American states. (p. 68)

Kerr (State Government, 1985) makes a similar argument, pointing to a "New States Period" in higher education:

... we are once again entering a state period in higher education. This has been the standard situation for higher education since the founding of our republic, except for the land-grant period from 1860 to 1890 and the recent period from 1955 to 1985. The states, by and large, have taken good care of higher education; otherwise we would not have the best system of higher education in the world.

Perhaps I should say that we are entering a state-private period of higher education when, once again, the major initiatives will come from state and private sources. (p. 47)

As state responsibility for higher education has increased, so too have public demands for accountability in public college and university systems. Issues of accountability manifest themselves most clearly in the ongoing debate concerning the appropriate level of statewide coordination over public higher education. A significant body of literature exists which demonstrates the increasing level of control exercised by state government over public colleges and universities. While a comprehensive analysis of statewide coordination lies beyond the scope of this study, coordination and accountability are of importance to individual governors at
specific moments in their terms. As this study demonstrates, establishing the mechanism of statewide coordination as well as appointing those who will guide that mechanism is a fundamental source of gubernatorial influence over the Commonwealth's community colleges. Thus, it is important to have some understanding of the literature concerning statewide coordination of public higher education.

Hartmark and Hines (1980) provide a useful bibliographic overview of major works related to statewide coordination, beginning with Glenny's pathbreaking 1959 study, *Autonomy of Public Colleges*. In doing so, Hartmark and Hines emphasize two recurrent themes in the literature: first, that coordinating boards operate in a critical and tenuous position between state government and individual institutions and that new forms of accountability are necessary to address "the increased complexity, interdependence, and scale of higher education" (p. 18). Concerning the latter point, Hartmark and Hines join Balderston in arguing that:

> Numerous demands for more specific and detailed information have affected accountability. These demands have been a function of a number of factors: the increasing size and complexity of higher education; increased competition for public funds; problems with inflation; productivity and enrollment, which have reduced institutional flexibility; a perceived decline in the value of the college degree; and the recurrent problems in supply of trained manpower. (p. 19)
In his comprehensive work, *Statewide Coordination of Higher Education* (1971), Berdahl makes several important points which remain constant in the discussion of coordination. Two are particularly salient to the present study. First, that true coordination does not exist in an ideal form. Instead, government entities such as the governor’s office, budget office or legislature generally intervene to make decisions in something of an ad hoc manner.

Second, Berdahl makes an important distinction between procedural autonomy (how institutions pursue their goals) and substantive autonomy (what goals the institutions are pursuing and how those goals relate to overall systemic needs and resources). Berdahl emphasizes the latter, arguing that it is in the area of substantive autonomy that the state has the most significant and delicate role to play.

In addition to those scholars noted above, a range of authors have written extensively on issues related to statewide coordination of higher education. Moos and Rourke (1959), Millet (1975), Greer (1976), and Newman (1973) have each made significant contributions. Beyond individual prescriptions and matrices concerning the appropriate structures for coordination, one common theme throughout the literature is the steadily increased level of control by individual states over their public colleges.
and universities. As the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education has written:

External authorities are exercising more and more authority over higher education, and institutional independence has been declining. The greatest shift of power in recent years has taken place not inside the campus but in the transfer of authority from the campus to outside agencies. (1973, quoted in Hartmark & Hines, 1980, p. 18)

While acknowledging the increasing scope of state influence over public higher education, it is important to also remember that state systems of colleges and universities remain important bases of autonomous political power in Massachusetts and elsewhere. Zusman (Hines, 1988) has argued persuasively that public higher education is not wholly subordinate to state government but rather that government and higher education exist as ‘semihierarchies’ -- each partially dependent on the other. Zusman’s primary measure of the relative level of interdependence is the autonomy of a state’s university system in the areas of academic decisionmaking and institutional governance. In other words, while the interrelationship between state government and public higher education is fundamental and multifaceted, the "balance of power" in the relationship -- while generally shifting toward the state on issues such as coordination -- ultimately depends on the political dynamic, on economic realities and on historical trends in an individual state at a given moment in time.
The American Governorship - Formal and Informal Powers

It is fair to say that as states have established their primary relationship to public higher education, the American governorship has expanded its formal and informal bases of power. The manner in which Foster Furcolo and John Volpe utilized (or failed to utilize) these formal and informal powers is fundamental to the purposes of this study.

Larry Sabato (1983) described the evolution of America's governors from comparably low visibility and limited accomplishment while Beyle and Muchmore (1983) have expanded on the same point, arguing that a shift in the focus of policymaking has shifted from the federal to the state level.

Neustadt (1960) reminds us that government consists of separate institutions sharing power. In the policymaking process concerning public higher education, it is now increasingly the governor who wields the greatest potential power, both in terms of formal constitutional authority and in terms of informal powers of political persuasion.

A number of authors have pointed to the fundamental role which American governors can play regarding public higher education. Moos and Rourke (1959) describe the central importance of the governor in relations between the campus and state government. In its 1971 report, The Capitol and the Campus, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education argues that the governor's potential influence
over public higher education exceeds all other factors affecting a state’s colleges and universities. Herzik (1985) writes that "while the bulk of state funding and policy initiatives in education are directed toward the primary and secondary levels, gubernatorial influence is probably greatest in the area of higher education" (p. 65). And Clark Kerr, the eminence grise of public higher education, emphasizes that "within most states, the governor has now become the most important single person in higher education" (1985, p. 47). Kerr goes so far as to refer to the governor as chief academic officer (p. 49).

Adler and Lane (1970) point to three main gubernatorial roles in the governance of higher education -- as chief executive, as chief budget officer and as chief opinion leader (p. 70).

The first two of these roles relate primarily to the formal powers of governorship; those powers which come directly from the state constitution or from legislative statute. For example, as chief executive, the governor often appoints members of both statewide coordinating boards and local governing authorities. In addition, he or she files, supports, opposes or vetoes legislation which directly or indirectly affects the state’s public higher education system. And finally, the governor is often at minimum an arbiter and at maximum the determinative force in establishing statewide master plans for higher education. In some situations, the governor may even
become a direct influence over the master plans of individual institutions.

The governor, as chief budget officer in his or her state, generally recommends and ultimately approves the budgetary package for public higher education as well as for all other major statewide appropriations. In actuality, moreover, the governor's power within the budgetary process extends beyond simple dollars and cents. For the accomplished political leader, working in close collaboration with a strong budgetary/fiscal adviser, the governor's budgetary authority brings with it the power to set the tone and agenda for the policy debate. Lederle has written (1976), "It is not through the organizational hierarchy by itself, but rather through the executive budget process, that the governor makes his impact and gives significant leadership on major issues of higher education policy" (p. 46).

Sabato (1983) argues that the executive and budgetary authority of most American governors has significantly expanded since mid-century and that 'the governor now works in a political and structural environment less inhibiting than ever before" (p. 88). Specifically, Sabato argues:

In the executive sphere, governors have done quite well, not only in successfully orchestrating constitutional revisions and reorganizations but also in consolidating and fortifying their control of administration. The executive budget is a formidable and almost universal gubernatorial lever. Lesser planning and management tools also have been strengthened and are at the governor's disposal.
The governorship as an office draws a better salary and is more adequately staffed now than in the past. (p. 88)

Kerr (1985) shares the belief that governors have expanded their formal executive authority since mid-century, particularly in their relationship to public higher education:

Governors have mechanisms they did not have in 1955. They have bigger staffs and they have better staffs. There has also been the development of state coordinating mechanisms that permit governors to become involved, not campus by campus, which would frequently be impossible, but through coordination where it is possible to have an impact. (p. 48)

Hines (1988) expands the discussion of formal gubernatorial powers, offering a matrix by which to compare the strength of America’s governors vis-a-vis higher education. This matrix assigns values to the relative powers held by the nation’s governors in five critical areas (tenure potential, appointive powers, budgetary powers, organizational powers, veto powers). The total value across these five areas provides an index as to the strength of each governor’s formal authority (p. 24). As Hines summarizes:

One measure of gubernatorial influence is the extent of formal powers over a number of specific areas. Budgetary power is the best known of the formal powers, dealing with whether or not the governor shares budgetary powers with a civil servant or a person appointed by someone other than the governor, with the legislature, with someone popularly elected, or with others. Another area involves how long the governor may serve and whether the governor can serve for more than a single term. A third area is the power of appointment, involving the state bureaucracy and agency personnel, including the higher education
agency and those who serve on governing boards, coordinating boards, and councils. Governors have organizational powers regarding creating and abolishing offices, conferring organization status, and providing access to key personnel. Veto power pertains to override by a majority of legislators present, by a majority of the entire legislative membership, or by a simple majority. (p. 23).

Despite the expanded array of gubernatorial powers, a number of scholars have pointed to significant restraints which continue to limit most governors' capacities to shape policy in their states. For example, Goodall has claimed that "in most states, the institutions of higher education are prime examples of institutions which spend large amounts of state funds but operate fairly independently of the governor" (1987, p. 41).

Lederle (1976) claims that beyond the power of the purse strings, governors have surprisingly few direct means by which to fundamentally alter policy at colleges or universities. For example he points out that governors generally have little influence over faculty and staff hiring and goes so far as to argue that "it has been the rare governor who has used his power to make board appointments with the objective of profoundly changing educational policy" (p. 45).

In his study of educational reform in South Carolina, Kearney (Journal of State Government, 1987) points out that despite the growth in formal gubernatorial power across the United States since the 1950s, most governors continue to
face significant limitations on their constitutional strength:

In spite of a recent wave of executive branch reforms, America’s governors suffer serious institutional weaknesses compared to the president of the United States and to chief executives in the private sector. Governors are not, as a political observer put it, "masters of their own houses."

Such a constrained institutional environment can make it difficult to promote significant policy changes. (p. 150)

Thus even the most constitutionally powerful governor must look beyond formal authority to the potentially substantial range of informal power at her or his disposal. The potency of such power depends on the relative political skills of individual chief executives, on the social, economic and political environment surrounding a specific issue at a particular moment in history and on the importance that a governor attaches to a given topic. As Moos and Rourke (1959) summarize, "beyond and above the law, the high political position of the governor enables him to wedge himself deeply into the affairs of higher education" (p. 255). Lipson (1939) writes even more eloquently, "true leadership which inspires the willing confidence of men cannot be crystallized into constitutional grants of power. Each governor must earn it anew" (p. 268).

Perhaps the greatest of a governor’s informal powers is her or his capacity to influence public opinion — the governor as chief opinion leader. Adler and Lane (1985) emphasize that, particularly during times of fiscal
constraint, the informal power to move public opinion is vital to the governor:

Since the governor holds office through election by the entire state, the governor is the voice of the people of a state. It is he who provides public opinion leadership in matters relating to higher education. This role of chief opinion leader is particularly important in relations with higher education boards and with a variety of citizen and educational groups and organizations. (p. 70)

A number of scholars have examined the importance of public opinion leadership to the success of a gubernatorial administration. This research has indicated that in setting the tone and agenda of debate, style often matters as much as substance, symbols play a critical role in communicating to key constituencies, and a significant amount of executive attention and staff time is often allocated to public opinion leadership.

Beyle and Muchmore (1983) utilize survey data collected from governors and other public officials to demonstrate the different approaches that individual governors take toward public opinion leadership:

Governors approach their public role with differing perspectives. Some fulfill the role as one of many and carry it out to the best of their ability. They do not seek to expand on the role or encourage contacts but are responsive to constituents and to the media. This is often a most necessary view of the role due to the sheer volume of public activity facing the governor. Other governors undertake a more aggressive and activist role, seeking out and stimulating public contacts. (p. 54).

Kearney's study of educational reform in South Carolina (1987) demonstrates the enormous range of informal
power available to an astute governor, even in a state whose constitution mandates weak executive authority. Kearney’s research describes how Richard Riley utilized the informal powers available to a constitutionally weak executive branch in achieving a massive restructuring of South Carolina’s educational infrastructure. As Kearney points out, much of Riley’s informal power emanated from personal characteristics — his capacity as a politician, the depth of his commitment to educational reform as a policy issue and the strength of his interpersonal skills:

Clearly, Riley’s remarkable achievement during his eight years in office (1978-1986) were not the result of the formal powers alone. . . . He also skillfully used the informal powers of the office, which are widely recognized but less written about by political scientists. These informal powers include such factors as access to the mass media, political party influence, patronage, pork barrel, prestige of the office and the popularity of the governor. Additional informal powers encompass personal characteristics such as interpersonal skills, bargaining ability, education, experience, energy, and ambition. The informal powers are just as important as the formal ones and, unlike the formal powers, all except patronage and pork barrel depend on the person — not the office. An outstanding individual can exercise strong leadership in a weak governor state as Riley’s success with the South Carolina’s Education Improvement Act (EIA) illustrates. (p. 75)

In the exercise of both formal and informal gubernatorial power, a number of authors have correctly emphasized the central role played by the legislative branch. Arguing that the legislative role is "the role around which others revolve," Beyle and Dalton write (1983, in Beyle & Muchmore) that
a governor who fails to develop a positive relationship with the legislature may find his executive budget, his programs and policies, and his key appointments tied up in legislative committees or mired in petty controversies. Ultimately, the public most often measures the success or the failure of an administration by its real or perceived record of legislative achievement. (p. xx)

As Jewell (Beyle & Williams, 1972) has argued:

A governor is judged today largely on the success of his legislative programs. Unless his administration has been plagued by unusually serious scandals, the administrative success or failures of a governor are neither visible nor interesting to a voter. The gubernatorial candidate’s platform is composed largely of legislative promises — whether he offers more money for education, the enactment of a merit system, or the lowering of taxes. To the extent that issues determine elections, a governor is judged by the legislative promises he has kept or broken, and this often means that he is judged by his success or failure as a legislative leader. (p. 124)

A governor’s formal relationship to the legislature depends on the relative constitutional powers assigned to the executive and the legislative branches. No less significant, however, are the informal aspects of the institutional relationship — e.g., the governor’s personal history and interactions with legislative leaders, the distribution of party membership in each house of the legislature and the public’s comparative opinion of the two branches.

Sabato’s (1983) analysis of the executive-legislative relationship indicates that as gubernatorial power has increased since the 1950s, so too has the legislature increased its scope of informal and formal power. This
expansion of legislative influence is due in good measure
to a series of reapportionment decisions (particularly
Baker vs. Carr in 1962 which affirmed "one-person one-vote"
and required that each legislator in a state represent
approximately the same number of people) as well as
expanded professional legislative staffs and improved
compensation packages which often attracted a more
substantive, policy-oriented brand of legislator (p. 78).

As legislative sophistication and power has increased,
the pressure has grown on governors to spend extensive time
and energy nurturing relationships with key legislators.
Much of a governor’s success in developing these
relationships depends on both the partisan distribution in
the legislature and on the personalities and goals of those
who hold legislative positions of leadership. Jewell
(Beyle & Williams, 1972) summarizes:

No factor is more important in determining a
governor’s legislative success than his
relationship with the legislative leaders of his
party. When that party is in the majority, those
leaders -- and particularly the House Speakers --
have broad powers to appoint committees, assign
bills to committees, and guide deliberations on
the floor. Moreover, these are the governor’s
spokesmen and representatives in the legislature.
If they are ineffective or uncooperative, the
governor is seriously handicapped. (p. 133)

A number of case studies exist which artfully
demonstrate how specific governors have utilized various
forms of influence to achieve specific policy goals.
Rosenbaum’s analysis of university reorganization in
Wisconsin during the governorship of Patrick Lucey and
Wood's study of the University of California during the gubernatorial administration of Ronald Reagan are particularly informative (Beyle & Williams, 1972). Each provides important insights into policy confrontations between critical hierarchies -- two strong-willed and popular governors clashing with two of the nation's most influential university systems. Each study demonstrates the potential and limits of gubernatorial powers and Rosenbaum, in particular, traces the institutional importance of the legislative branch in any such confrontation.

The present study contributes to existing literature concerning the American governorship by offering insights as to how two Massachusetts governors from different political parties and with different policy priorities utilized the various powers of their office during the period 1957-62 and, in doing so, how they influenced development of the Commonwealth's community college system. For example, Foster Furcolo (1957-60) was willing to use the full range of his formal and informal powers to create a community college system but was ultimately constrained by his tendency to be, in Jewell's words, "aloof from the party organization, ill at ease with politicians, and unskilled and uncertain in bargaining sessions with legislators" (Beyle & Williams, 1972, p. 133). John Volpe, Republican businessman who succeeded Furcolo, witnessed expansion of the community college system, due less to his
overarching vision concerning two-year colleges than to his instinctive faith in such institutions; to his willingness to endorse legislative initiative; to the entrepreneurial spirit of the Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges; and to the momentum which carried over from Furcolo's administration.

This study analyzes early community college development in Massachusetts through the prism of gubernatorial use of power and, in doing so, provides a contribution to the literature concerning the American governorship and to that concerning the mission of community colleges in Massachusetts.
Chapter III

Design and Theoretical Framework of the Study

Overview

An historical case study research modus operandi is utilized to address the policy role of two Massachusetts governors in shaping the community college mission during the period 1957-1962. Specifically, the study examines the goals and objectives of each governor vis-a-vis the developing community college system and how these goals and objectives fit into his overall policy priorities and practical political needs. It briefly reviews the political history of the period in question and fits the gubernatorial role in shaping community college development into the context of that history.

The case study identifies the role of each governor during the critical early years of community college development in Massachusetts. Moreover, it provides general insights into how each governor perceived the mission of two-year colleges and examines the relative policy and political importance that each placed on community college development. Further, it summarizes the relative impact that each governor had on the evolution of the community college mission. Finally, based on its findings, the study draws several conclusions concerning the appropriate role of a governor in shaping the community college identity. In doing so, this study hopes to
contribute to the growing body of literature which explores the relationship between state government and public higher education.

Theoretical Framework

This study seeks to weave and analyze together two intimately connected stories.

The first story presents the development of Massachusetts community colleges as one element of a larger political whole. It focuses on where community colleges fit amid gubernatorial and legislative priorities, how individual governors of different temperaments and political persuasions sought to implement their agendas, and how other issues and players influenced the outcome of gubernatorial efforts.

Governors are individuals who bring their own priorities, interests, and life experiences to their office. In attempting to make history, they, in turn, are shaped by it. While their legacy is partly their own creation, it also belongs to people and forces beyond direct gubernatorial control.

The second story focuses on the evolving mission of community colleges in Massachusetts during the period in question. While one cannot discuss mission without considering politics, one must equally recognize that other factors beyond politics shaped the community college identity. To understand adequately the role played by governors in shaping two-year colleges in the Commonwealth,
it is important to understand the substance of what community colleges were expected to do during the period between 1957 and 1962, and then to describe the factors beyond statewide politics that shaped these expectations. Only then can the gubernatorial role be considered in something approximating full context.

The political story is in many ways the most interesting and enjoyable to tell, in that it focuses on the human side of policy development and implementation. It is also a story which compels us to draw on the theoretical constructs of both political science and sociology.

One fundamental piece of this political story involves issues of executive power. As chief executive of the Commonwealth, the governor holds an array of direct and indirect powers. It is his or her understanding of these powers, willingness to use them and sophistication in doing so that combines with no small amount of luck to help determine the success or failure of a gubernatorial initiative.

The master political historian Richard E. Neustadt has contributed greatly to the study of political power at the executive level and his brilliant use of historical case studies has profoundly influenced the approach taken in this study. Neustadt, particularly in Presidential Power and Alliance Politics, eloquently analyzes the potential and the limits of executive power at the federal and
international levels. As noted earlier, Sabato and Osborne have utilized similar case studies at the state level.

Governors do not act in isolation, however. They are but one actor, albeit a central one, on the political stage. While the significant policy issues of any given time are often a product of gubernatorial emphasis or initiative, other forces also influence the evolution of public policy.

Thus, while an historical reconstruction of the political saga surrounding community colleges between 1957 and 1962 is interesting and necessary, it is not sufficient to meet the goals of this study. Nor is it enough to simply elaborate on the formal and informal powers available to the governor of Massachusetts, although this, too, is a necessary part of the total story. To satisfactorily describe the role that individual governors played in shaping community colleges and their mission, we must also look through a sociological lens. Only then can we analyze satisfactorily how and why governors used (or failed to use) their available powers to influence the community college identity and how their influence fits in with that of other players in the evolution of two-year colleges and their mission.

Brint and Karabel, in their 1989 work, The Diverted Dream, utilize an institutional model based on the sociological study of organizations to argue that Massachusetts community college administrators moved toward
a vocational emphasis in the 1960s out of perceived organizational self-interest. Their work builds from the earlier work of Lustberg, who examined the evolution of the Massachusetts community college system utilizing a sociological perspective.

As sociologists, the above authors have sought to understand the social and political forces that drove community college expansion in Massachusetts. In doing so, they have grappled with the reality that policymaking involves competing interests battling on a playing field whose contours change over time.

The theoretical framework of this study is heavily influenced both by Lustberg and by Brint and Karabel. It has sought to view the policymaking field from the perspective of the governor’s office. It has examined gubernatorial influence upon the community college identity in Massachusetts by seeking to place the governor’s role within a broader context that includes other key actors (educators, legislators, business and labor, etc.).

It is also impossible to analyze community college development in isolation from other significant policy issues of the period in question. As in a chemical reaction, the various compounds that comprise the mix combine and interact to influence the outcome. So, too, do other issues of the day influence the attention or strength that a governor can bring to matters such as community college growth or mission. Thus, this study must
continually refer back to the context of the period it describes.

Only by incorporating the broad array of actors and issues that compete on the policy stage can one draw conclusions as to the actual role played by Governors Furcolo and Volpe in shaping the early evolution of community colleges and their mission in Massachusetts.

**Study Design**

This study is a case history rooted in theoretical constructs of qualitative inquiry. Like much historical research, it seeks to reconstruct past events and to draw inferences from them. In order to represent faithfully the past and avoid careless inferences, this study includes a research design which ensures appropriate validation both of source materials and of the conclusions drawn from those materials.

Specific study methods which frame this research include review of Massachusetts public records, analysis of relevant news media, an examination of appropriate archival materials, as well as interviews with elected officials, college administrators and appointed leaders within the government of the Commonwealth.

In order to provide an analytical framework around which to construct this case study, the researcher utilized a modified "Timeline" summary similar to that employed by Whittaker in his 1987 analysis of the process leading to
establishment of the Boston campus of the University of Massachusetts.

By building an incrementally more comprehensive timeline that includes general political, economic and social data from the period, the researcher was able to develop a clear perspective as to how the mission of community colleges fit into the overall policy situation faced by each governor. In Whittaker's words, the researcher developed "a more complete picture of exactly what occurred during key points in the process" (p. 29).

As Whittaker emphasizes, (p. 29) this methodological approach is inherently "evolutionary in nature" and "militates against a precise definition of a course of action during the research and information gathering phase." As Timeline data expands and is augmented by information and insights gleaned from interviews and various other primary sources, "materials tend to build on themselves often suggesting new directions and sources" (Whittaker, p. 30). Thus, as this study progressed, new data at times required that the researcher's methodology be flexible enough to respond to avenues not previously apparent.

For purposes of analysis, the Timeline for this study was divided into six segments, each corresponding to a specific year in the life of a gubernatorial administration. In order to build a useful historical framework, the researcher then added to each segment
general political, economic and social data from the period, (e.g., economic conditions, fiscal situation, legislative composition, size and nature of public higher education, demographics of the Commonwealth). For example, during the first year of Foster Furcolo's administration (1957), critical economic data would relate to the fiscal difficulties of the state, while the governor's initial battle to enact a sales tax would constitute a critical political consideration.

The researcher then added more specific information concerning major events or decisions relevant to public higher education and community colleges, including action or inaction by individual governors. For example, during the administration of Foster Furcolo key events vis-a-vis higher education would include the Audit of State Needs, passage of the legislation establishing community colleges and the decision to open the first such institutions in Pittsfield and Hyannis.

By building an incrementally more comprehensive timeline that includes general political, economic and social data from that period, the researcher was able to develop a clear perspective as to how the evolving mission of community colleges fit into the overall policy situation faced by each governor. In Whittaker's words, the researcher develops "a more complete picture of exactly what occurred during key points in the process" (p. 29).
With this framework in place, the researcher was able to revisit major source documents to create a more definitive analysis of the role of individual governors at key moments in the development of community colleges in Massachusetts. It was only at this point that the researcher wrote an initial draft of the proposed case history.

**Research Questions**

A number of research questions provided the early emphasis and direction for the research. General questions concerning the time period included:

- What was the general economic and fiscal condition of the commonwealth at the time of each governor's election to office?
- How did this economic/fiscal situation evolve during each governor's term in office?
- What was the general status of public higher education in Massachusetts at the time of each governor's election to office?
- How did the general state of public higher education change during each governor's term of office?
- What was the overall political climate of Massachusetts at the time of each governor's election and during his term in office?
Who were the key political figures who influenced the formation of higher education policy during the period?

How was the political climate reflected in composition of the legislature and in key gubernatorial appointments?

How did the political climate influence the debate concerning public higher education in the Commonwealth?

Questions Concerning Gubernatorial Priorities:

What is the relevant personal history which helped to shape the political philosophy and priorities of each governor?

What were the major policy priorities which each governor brought to executive office?

How did the policy priorities of each governor shift during his term? If they did shift, Why?

Where did public higher education fit as a policy priority of each governor? What were his chief concerns (governance, mission, finance, programs)?

Did the governor in question have specific policy goals related to community colleges in Massachusetts?

How did the governor perceive the community college mission/identity?
Where did these goals "fit" in the hierarchy of the governor's priorities?

Did the governor's goals or perceptions concerning community colleges change during his term?

What were the major constraints and which limited or aided the governor in achieving his goals vis-a-vis the community college system?

Who were his chief allies/foes in pursuing these goals?

How successful was the governor in achieving his policy goals concerning the mission/identity of Massachusetts community colleges?

Questions Concerning Applications of the Study:

What conclusions does the analysis permit concerning the policymaking style of each governor?

What conclusions can be drawn concerning the policymaking role of each governor vis-a-vis the development of community college mission/identity?

How does that role correspond to the relationship in general literature (Eulau, Heinz, etc.) between governors and public higher education?

What recommendations can be made concerning an appropriate role for the governor in shaping the community college mission in Massachusetts?
Sources of Information

Sources for this study include formal documents of Massachusetts state government, correspondence, memoranda, and reports as well as planning documents, legislation and other relevant archival material.

Formal archival documents of the Massachusetts state government proved particularly useful to this study. Specifically, annual budget messages, requests and authorizations informed the research in question as did the records of annual legislative sessions and policy planning reports of the period. This material is maintained at the state legislative library in the statehouse, at the state archives at Columbia Point and in the records of the Massachusetts Higher Education Coordinating Council (formally the Board of Regents of Higher Education).

The study also relied heavily on a thorough review of relevant media coverage of the timeframe in question. Particular attention was given to a comprehensive analysis of the major Boston newspapers, the Boston Globe and the Boston Herald Traveler during the period 1958-1969. These two newspapers provided the chronological foundation upon which the study’s "Timeline" analysis was constructed.

Concomitant with preparation of a first draft of the present study, a series of interviews were conducted with key individuals who participated in Massachusetts state government during the period in question and who, in almost every case, played a significant role in shaping the
mission of community colleges in the Commonwealth. While the schedules or health of some individuals required that several interviews occur earlier in the process, wherever possible, they were scheduled after the preliminary work on the Timeline and drafts were complete. These interviews constituted the final layer of this historical analysis and provided the personal recollection of those who helped make the history which this study interprets. The opportunity to speak directly with policymakers or observers who were closely linked to the significant historical event or to a train of such events provides the chance to develop insights not offered by the secondary accounts of more distant analysis.

Documents (e.g., memoranda, policy analysis, legislation, reports, budget proposals and authorizations) originating in the executive branch, in the legislature, in state and local governing boards and, where obtainable, in the offices of college officials provided another important source of primary data. Such documents proved most useful in considering the role played by the executive branch in shaping the community college mission during the period in question and in developing possible extrapolations concerning the policymaking relationships between the executive branch and other institutions of Massachusetts politics.

Newspaper and magazine articles of the period were also reviewed to gain a sensitivity to key issues at
important moments in the history of Massachusetts community colleges. These accounts provided a lens through which community college development could be seen within the context of other events and issues of the times. In addition, such accounts allowed data accumulated from interviews and primary documents to be considered in light of news accounts from the period.

Other secondary source materials were also utilized in this study. Although little secondary material exists concerning the executive branch’s historical influence over the evolving community colleges mission in Massachusetts, a significant body of literature has developed concerning the growth of community colleges nationwide. A comprehensive review of this literature provided data as to how the evolution of community colleges in Massachusetts compares with that of similar institutions across the United States.

Literature from the evolving field of politics and policy in higher education provided another important cornerstone for this study. Of particular utility was a body of work focusing on the relationship between state government and public higher education.

Several works which focus on the development of educational policy in Massachusetts were reviewed as part of this study. These secondary accounts consist primarily of articles in various journals, portions of dissertations or theses or unpublished works found in the archives of graduate and undergraduate programs.
Finally, literature which examines the American governorship offered an important body of secondary source material. Such studies proved relevant to analysis of the relationships between the executive branch and other political institutions, to an examination of how the executive branch interacts with and influences public higher education and to a discussion of the most appropriate role for the executive branch in shaping the future mission of community colleges in Massachusetts.

Interviews

This study incorporates interviews with fourteen individuals who either directly influenced the development of community colleges in Massachusetts or were close observers of public higher education and gubernatorial policymaking during the period 1957-1962. Appendix A provides a complete list of those individuals who were interviewed as part of this project.

Wherever possible interviews were conducted face-to-face, avoiding the use of questionnaires. The majority of interviews were structured in format, although in some limited circumstances, an unstructured format was employed. While specific questions varied according to the role of the interviewee, each interview was organized around the primary research questions that guide this study. Finally, interviews were conducted and their results utilized with full recognition of the limitations of interviewing as a research tool.
The opportunity to speak directly with policymakers or observers who were closely linked to a significant historical event or to a train of such events provides the chance to develop insights not offered by the secondary accounts of more distant analysts. Moreover, as Travers points out (p. 133), personal interviews offer at least three advantages over questionnaires: a higher percentage of respondents; the capacity to answer questions related to the purpose of the interview and to build confidence in the researcher on the part of the interviewee; and the opportunity to conduct an interview at an appropriate speed to garner dependable data.

There are, however, several important limitations to the interview as a research technique. Travers describes several such limitations that are extremely important to the project at hand (p. 131). The first is connected to the inherent complexity of the interviewer/interviewee relationship; one in which the behavior of the interviewer can profoundly influence the responses of the individual being interviewed, as can differences in the environment or setting from one interview to the next. In addition, there may be differences between those interviewed as to their willingness to reveal information.

A final limitation of the interview was particularly relevant to this study. It was best summarized by Rosen (as quoted by Whittaker who faced similar hurdles in his study of the University of Massachusetts at Boston):
The value of the interviews is less for details—memories of events that occurred almost twenty years have faded—than for interpretation. Obviously, people differ in their interpretation of events, but it is impossible to cross-check interpretation and then reach an independent judgment as to the reasonable one. (p. 30)

Given the warning, the present study relies on interviews less for the details surrounding specific decisions or policies than for composite sketches of overall policy emphasis and insights into the general forces and personalities that helped to shape the history of a particular moment.

Limitations and Exclusions

It is important to emphasize that this study functioned within carefully defined parameters. It focused on the policy impact of two administrations between 1957-1962 on the development of community colleges in Massachusetts. It did not seek to provide a comprehensive history of each governor’s term in office nor did it analyze in comprehensive detail every policy issue related to public higher education in the Commonwealth during the years in question.

This study looked to the evolution of community colleges in Massachusetts as an historical case which could contribute to the literature concerning educational policymaking at the executive level of state government. Before making any extrapolations, however, the reader should keep very much in mind that the study focuses on a single state with a rather unique higher education
pedigree, on a community college system whose evolution was influenced by that pedigree and on a specific time period which cannot in every instance be applied directly to contemporary affairs.

**Interpretation of Information**

The present study includes an historical narrative which chronicles the influence the two Massachusetts governors on the development of community colleges and their mission in the Commonwealth between the inauguration of Foster Furcolo in January, 1957 and the defeat of John Volpe in the election of 1962. This narrative, in concert with a final chapter presenting the study’s findings and conclusions, addresses the research questions outlined earlier in this chapter.

Chapter IV provides a comprehensive presentation of the major historical data relevant to this study. The chapter opens with a brief summary of pre-1958 efforts (e.g., the Zook Report of 1922) to establish state-supported junior or community colleges in the commonwealth. This summary provides a context for analysis of the period 1958-1969.

Following this overview, Chapter V focuses on Furcolo’s two terms as governor between 1957 and 1960. Chapter VI describes events of the Volpe administration between 1960-62. Chapter VII briefly summarizes development of the Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges during the period 1957-62, with special
attention paid to its early decisions concerning campus locations and mission focus.

These chapters do not seek to provide a thorough history of each governorship or even to present every detail of educational policymaking during the six-year span in question. The careful construction of this study's timeline analysis permitted the researcher to focus both on events which were critical to the evolving identity of community colleges and on the governors' role in shaping those events.

It is also important to emphasize that Chapters V through VII rely heavily on primary records, newspaper accounts and on interviews with those who observed or influenced events during the time period in question. Thus, in interpreting the data from these chapters, one must always remember that no history is perfect, no appraisal of past events can claim to be complete and no human memory should be considered either a perfect source of historical data or beyond the natural tendency to remember events as they should have happened rather than as they actually occurred.

Chapter VIII includes the conclusions and implications of this historical study. It analyzes the relative influence of each governor in shaping the community college identity in Massachusetts, analyzes the political context and the strategic foundations from which this influence emanated and offers recommendations as to an appropriate
policymaking role for Massachusetts governors in the years to come.
CHAPTER IV

THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY COLLEGE MOVEMENT: 1900–1957

Witt, Wattenbarger, et al. (1994, p.1) have described the American community college movement as "the most important higher education innovation of the twentieth century." From its origins at the turn of the century as a means of providing access to rapidly increasing numbers of high school graduates while preserving university elitism, the community college movement in the United States had grown by 1990 to include some 1200 institutions which enrolled approximately 45% of the nation’s college students (Witt, Wattenbarger, et al., p. 262).

This chapter presents a brief overview of two-year college growth in the United States during the first half of the century. It seeks to provide a background against which to examine the early development of community colleges in Massachusetts.

This chapter also describes the condition of Massachusetts public higher education on the eve of Foster Furcolo’s inauguration as Governor of the Commonwealth in 1957. It offers a foundation upon which to tell the political stories of the governorships of Foster Furcolo and John Volpe and to analyze the evolution of a community college system in Massachusetts. Long blessed with the nation’s most respected concentration of private colleges
and universities, Massachusetts has historically struggled to develop a strong system of public institutions. To understand the gestation, birth and early development of community colleges in the Commonwealth, one must understand the context of Massachusetts public higher education in the late 1950s.

Community and Junior Colleges in America, 1900-1957

Community colleges were an accepted feature of educational systems across much of the United States by 1957. Born as junior colleges at the turn of the century, community colleges satisfied the seemingly conflictive goals of expanding higher educational opportunities to the growing number of graduates from public high schools and the desire of elite universities to focus their missions on advanced scholarship. As Blocker and his colleagues have summarized (1965):

The two-year college might be considered an historical accident growing out of the struggle between conservative thought and liberal thought . . . [Conservative thinkers envisioned] the highly specialized education of an intellectual elite . . .

Liberal thinking insisted that public education be expanded to provide equal opportunities for all. (p. 32)

A primary thrust behind the development of America’s first community colleges was the nation’s late eighteenth century expansion of public primary and secondary education. The 1874 Kalamazoo court decision, which authorized local governments to fund secondary education, led to a rapid increase in the numbers of students
attending public high schools. Between 1874 and 1904, high school enrollments nationwide increased by some 600 percent (Witt et al., 1994, p. 2). This burgeoning public high school expansion led to a concomitant increase in the numbers of students seeking admission to higher education. And with this increased demand for access to postsecondary learning came a dilemma for existing American universities who sought to maintain themselves as bastions for study by the most gifted and elite students.

The notion of junior colleges, based on the much admired German gymnasiums, provided a unique common ground for those committed to university elitism and those who were equally dedicated to the populist ideal that access to higher education was a right deserved by all. The junior college would serve as a semi-permeable membrane through which the most talented would pass on to university training, while the less gifted would complete two years of college work leading to a dignified and productive place in the increasingly industrial economy of the United States.

While private two-year colleges had existed in states such as Illinois, Massachusetts and Georgia since the mid-nineteenth century, the roots of the national junior college movement lie in Illinois, where William Rainey Harper implemented the first true junior college program. The founding president of the University of Chicago, Harper was influenced by the arguments of other university presidents such as Michigan’s Henry Tappan and Minnesota’s
William Watts Folwell, who pressed for a mechanism to "guard the entrance of universities" (quoted in Witt et al., 1994, p. 8) from the mass of high school graduates.

Harper sought to create Chicago as a laboratory of reform in higher education, believing that such reforms would "revolutionize university study in our country" (Quoted in Witt et al., 1994, p. 13). Specifically, in 1892, Harper divided the four-year undergraduate curriculum into two distinct colleges, the Academic and University Colleges. By 1894, he had renamed the Academic segment as the Junior College.

Harper saw his efforts as the first step toward establishment of a national network of junior institutions which would be linked to university programs. In 1902, thanks largely to momentum created by Harper, the first such junior college opened in Joliet, Illinois (Witt, p. 18). By the early 1900s, ironically after the premature death of Harper at forty-nine, junior college movements were evolving in other parts of the country.

Most prominent among these early systems was California, where the state legislature approved a state-supported junior college system in 1921. Under the legislature’s mandate the system was to "provide courses of instruction designed to prepare for higher institutions of learning; courses of instruction designed to prepare persons for agricultural, industrial, commercial, homemaking, and other vocations; and such courses of
instruction as may be deemed necessary to provide for the
civic and liberal education of the citizens of the
community" (House 1700, 1923, pp. 259).

By 1929, eighteen states had at least nine public or
private junior colleges within their individual borders,
with the heaviest concentration of publicly-supported
institutions found in California, Illinois, Michigan and
Missouri (Brint & Karabel, p. 31). Two-thirds of the
community colleges in the United States on the eve of the
Depression were secular and the vast majority were liberal
arts institutions that emphasized transfer curricula (Brint
& Karabel, p. 31).

In the 1920s, however, arguments had increased for a
new vocational focus in junior college education. Respected
authors such as Koos, Eells, and Campbell argued that
beyond the transfer function lie the need for expanded
terminal programs in the "semiprofessions" (Brint &
Karabel, p. 38). This argument would gain increasing
support during the Depression and the years following World
War II.

Today, while most community colleges offer both the
transfer and vocational tracks, the appropriate balance
between the two remains a fundamental issue of debate on
campuses across the country. This debate will arise
periodically during this study's analysis of community
college growth in Massachusetts.
During the Depression and again in the 1950s, community colleges experienced massive enrollment growth. Between 1929 and 1939, junior colleges offered affordable access for the increasing numbers of high school graduates who confronted a devastated job market. Enrollment at two-year institutions rose during this period from less than 56,000 nationwide to approximately 150,000 (Brint & Karabel, p. 53).

The postwar years of the 1950s witnessed even more extraordinary growth, fueled by the G.I. bill and an expanding American economy. Between 1950 and 1960, two-year college enrollments grew from 562,475 to 660,216 (American Association of Community Colleges).

A major factor encouraging the rapid expansion of two-year institutions during the years after World War II was the work of the so-called Truman Commission which sought to articulate a national education strategy for Cold War America. The Commission's final report, *Higher Education for American Democracy*, proposed development of comprehensive, tuition-free "community colleges" and argued that "the democratic community cannot tolerate a society based upon education for the well-to-do alone. If college opportunities are restricted to those in higher income brackets, the way is open to the creation and perpetuation of a class society which has no place in the American way of life" (Monroe, p. 14).
In 1957, on the eve of Sputnik, President Eisenhower’s Committee on Education Beyond High School would rearticulate the basic recommendation of the Truman Commission:

Communities or groups of neighboring communities faced with an impending shortage of higher education capacity will do well to consider new two-year community colleges as part of the solution. Experience in a number of areas has demonstrated that with carefully planned facilities and programs, community colleges can be highly effective in affording readily available opportunities for education beyond high school. (Monroe, p. 15)

The growth in community college enrollments witnessed during the 1950s was but prelude to the explosion which would occur during the 1960s. As Eaton has written, this growth resulted largely from the historical intersection of public policy and demographic reality:

Several factors combined to produce a national public-policy commitment to higher education between 1960 and 1970. These included the baby-boomers beginning to go to college, a growing economy, the liberal-populist political tradition of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, and the civil rights movement. Growth, opportunity and the perception of a "right to education" dominated the literature and the thinking of these years. (Eaton, Colleges of Choice, p. 12)

In absolute numbers, community college growth during the 1960s was by any standard remarkable. Seven hundred and four such institutions existed in 1963, 1141 in 1973; 914,494 students attended community colleges in 1963 while 3,100,951 did so ten years later (Eaton, p. 12).

Although the 1970s and 1980s would not match the unparalleled growth of the 1960s, community college
expansion continued inexorably toward record heights. By 1990, community college enrollment totaled 5,851,953, with over fifty percent of all college freshmen attending one of the some 1,300 community, technical or junior colleges in the United States.

**Massachusetts Before 1957**

On the eve of Foster Furcolo's first inauguration as governor, Massachusetts public higher education consisted of fifteen institutions which suffered in comparison to the commonwealth's elite private institutions and which the 1958 Audit on the Commission of State Needs would describe as "neglected" (p. 34).

The flagship of the public system in 1957 was the University of Massachusetts. A land grant institution located in Amherst, the University was, in the words of Senator Kevin Harrington (D-Salem), a leading voice on educational issues in the legislature, a "sleepy institution which had yet to earn any real reputation" (interview, August 18, 1993). The University, which retained a focus on agricultural programming, had seen its enrollment grow from 1,002 in 1945 to 4,740 in 1957 (Audit Report, p. 34). University governance rested in a board of trustees, dependant on the General Court for budgetary allocations.

Ten state teachers colleges were spread across the commonwealth, legacies to the normal schools of the 19th century. Described by Harrington as a "polyglot," with a
generally "confused" purpose, the state colleges had also faced rapidly increased enrollments during the post-war era. In 1945, the ten institutions enjoyed a total enrollment of 2,131; by 1957, that figure had essentially tripled to 6,700 (Audit Report, p. 38). The Commonwealth’s Board of Education, under the leadership of Education Commissioner Owen Kiernan, held governance responsibility for the state colleges.

The Lowell Technological Institute, founded as an institution in 1895 to prepare technicians for the textile and related industries, stood as arguably the most respected of Massachusetts’ public institutions in 1957. Harrington remembers the Institute as "first rate" and as "having in its narrow field a reputation probably better than the University of Massachusetts" (Interview, August 18, 1993). Between 1945 and 1957, day enrollment at the Institute had grown from 290 to 1,087; while evening numbers had increased from 581 to 2,600 during the same period (Audit Report, p. 39). The Institute was governed by a separate board of trustees.

Bradford-Durfee Technical Institute (located in Fall River) and New Bedford Institute of Technology (in New Bedford) were, like Lowell Technological Institute, each originally founded as two-year colleges devoted to the textile industry. In the years after Furcolo’s election these institutes would become enmeshed in a protracted debates concerning their merger as well as the educational
and economic needs of Southeastern Massachusetts. In 1957, these debates were percolating, as the institutes stood as the most troubled public higher education institutions in the Commonwealth; this despite enrollments having grown from 120 to 274 students at Bradford–Durfee since 1945 and from 62 to 406 at New Bedford. The Board of Education held responsibility for governance of the institutes.

The Massachusetts Maritime Academy at Buzzard’s Bay on Cape Cod was founded in 1891 as a training academy for cadets in the American Merchant Marine. Its specialized curriculum, which qualified students to apply for commissions to the Naval Reserve, had sustained a relatively steady enrollment of nearly 200 students during the post-war period (Audit Commission, p. 38). The Academy was governed by a separate board of trustees.

Although not part of the state system, city junior colleges had existed in Holyoke and Newton since 1946. Supported by state funds (up to $100 per student under the provisions of Chapter 756 of the Acts of 1957), the junior colleges offered both terminal and transfer programs and were governed by the local school committees in each city.

The Massachusetts Board of Education which retained governance responsibility for the state colleges as well as Bradford–Durfee and New Bedford Technical Institute, focused primarily on elementary and secondary education and left its higher education institutions with a good deal of autonomy. Governed by a nine-member board, the Department
of Education was led by Commissioner Owen Kiernan. A veteran of bureaucratic battles who jealously guarded his domain and power base, Kiernan would oppose development of community colleges outside the Board of Education’s control and, in doing so, earn the enmity of Furcolo and his staff.

Massachusetts higher education in 1957, then, consisted of fifteen institutions whose missions and governance mechanisms were varied and in some cases murky. Generally discounted in terms of reputation, they faced increasing enrollment projections without facilities, funding or firm support equal to the task. Murphy has described this situation, which she labels "the Massachusetts Lag":

Before 1950 public higher education in Massachusetts had received little or no attention. Threats of closing one or more state colleges were common occurrences. The reasons why were many. Campus buildings had reached a state of total disrepair, public education institutions were looked upon as a last resort for young people seeking higher education, enrollments were dropping, and the programs were extremely limited. (p. 6)

In 1950, Massachusetts public higher education served less than ten thousand students, approximately ten percent of the Commonwealth’s total postsecondary enrollments. In 1959, public enrollment was only 14 percent of the total, even though 58 percent of college students nationally attended public institutions (Progress Report, p. 19). Not until the 1980s would the Commonwealth’s public institutions achieve enrollment parity with the private sector (Brint & Karabel, The Diverted Dream, p. 143).
A fundamental reason for the historical struggle of Massachusetts public higher education to develop credibility lies in the unmatched array of private institutions in the Commonwealth. Whereas in California educational opportunity is often defined as access to Berkeley or in Michigan to the University of Michigan or Michigan State, opportunity in Massachusetts has historically been seen as access to Harvard, Boston College or any of the other prestigious private institutions in the Commonwealth. Lustberg and other sociologists have pointed out how this perception lessens the public's inclination to support public colleges and universities.

Of profound importance politically is the fact that most members of the General Court have historically graduated from private colleges. Unlike states with strong public higher education traditions, Massachusetts has a legislature whose members historically lack a personal attachment to the public colleges and universities. For the majority of Massachusetts legislators, their educational roots and personal ties to postsecondary learning lie in the private sector, leaving little urgency driving investment in a large public system.

The Junior College Movement in Massachusetts: 1900-1957

During the first half of the twentieth century, the General Court witnessed at least a half dozen serious attempts to inaugurate a two-year college system. In each case, the arguments in favor of such an initiative were
similar to those heard around the nation: access for increasing numbers of secondary school graduates and opportunities for vocational training beyond high school. Each of these efforts, however, failed and in their failures can be seen the roots of Foster Furcolo's battle in 1957-1960.

The most well-known and analytically comprehensive of the failed efforts on behalf of two-year colleges occurred in 1923-1924. Charged by the legislature in 1922 to review technical and higher education in the Commonwealth, "The Commission For An Investigation Relative to Opportunities and Methods for Technical and Higher Education in the Commonwealth" provided a detailed history of the junior colleges movement nationally as well as a powerful argument for public junior colleges in Massachusetts.

The author of the Commission report was George Zook, then higher education specialist in the U.S. Department of Education, and in the years to come, President of the University of Akron and President of the American Council on Education. Zook strongly supported the junior college movement, believing particularly in the vocational role of such institutions. Brint and Karabel have summarized his views:

Zook had a clear vision of the proper role of the junior college. It was to "draw off" substantial numbers of students who might be headed for existing colleges, to serve as a sieve for the minority that was capable of transferring to a four-year institution, and to provide terminal vocational training for the remainder. (p. 69)
Using extensive survey and comparative data, "the Zook Commission" report recommended creation of up to twelve community colleges (in cities and towns with assessed valuation of $10 million and an average of 500 students in four-year courses at local high schools) under the management control of local school committees. The report endorsed local responsibility for provision and maintenance of college buildings, with the Commonwealth reimbursing ninety percent of local expenditures for teachers and administrators (excluding school superintendents). Junior colleges would be tuition-free, with students paying only the necessary costs of learning and laboratory materials (House 1700, p. 261).

Like other pre-1957 attempts at creating a junior college system, the Zook Commission recommendations fell prey to private college influence and conservative opposition to increased government spending. Each of these obstacles would confront Furcolo and his successors to varying degrees and each is evident in the minority report offered by Zook Commission member (and Boston College president) Reverend William Devlin:

If sufficient appropriation be made, the State university extension, in conjunction with other existing institutions could amply provide in a very practical way for all students seeking merely further training along particular lines after the completion of high school. As regards a college or university course in a strict sense, the report makes it clear that neither tuition rates nor the present number of applicants in freshman classes in the large number of colleges already established are an obstacle to the obtainment of a college education for students.
properly qualified. It has also been shown in the report of the Commission that present entrance requirements in Massachusetts colleges are not so severe as to debar applicants who have been well-fitted for college work. Finally, the great increase of tax appropriations required for this department of higher education at a time when very large appropriations are demanded, not only for the betterment of present conditions in our secondary schools, but also for their necessary expansion in the immediate future, seems to render inopportune the recommendation of a state system of junior colleges. (p. 926)

In the more than thirty years between the Zook Commission report and the first inauguration of Foster Furcolo, at least four major two-year college bills were introduced to the Massachusetts House of Representatives. For example, in 1943, as the Commonwealth looked toward the post-war era, the Special Commission Relative to the Establishment and Operation of Junior Colleges (H 1335 of 1943) called for a system of two-year colleges "offering instruction on a level and to a degree of thoroughness distinctly above that of the secondary school and on a level below that of advanced senior college specialization" (p. 6).

In 1948, the Special Commission Established to Investigate and Study Certain Problems of Education in the Commonwealth (H2050 of 1948) urged "that the establishment and development of community colleges be encouraged" (p. 7) and argued that "the impact of new economic and social forces, together with the modern attitude toward government as a powerful instrument for social betterment, has widened the area of state action in public education" (p. 10).
This report resulted in successful passage of legislation authorizing the Massachusetts Department of Education, upon request of local school committees, to maintain junior colleges. Interestingly, by 1957 only Holyoke, Newton, and Quincy had applied for and received any state assistance for institutions in their respective communities (Progress Report, p. 21).

The next major attempt at creating a community college system came in 1956-57 with the work of the Special Commission Relative to the Operation of Junior Colleges in the Commonwealth (H2850 of 1957). Completing its work during the final days of the 1956 gubernatorial campaign, the Commission was guided by two key community college advocates who would subsequently play a major role in the successful 1958 effort to finally pass community college legislation: Senator Edward Stone (Chair of the Commission and powerful Republican from Hyannis) and Representative Thomas Wojtowski (Vice Chair of the Commission, Democrat from Pittsfield and former teacher).

Although House 2850, which proposed the study of a community college system under the aegis of the University of Massachusetts, failed to generate tangible progress, it did serve as an opportunity for Stone and Wojtowski to develop a comfortable working relationship and to begin building a core of legislative support for community colleges. The missing ingredient was a governor who had

72
the conviction and the mandate to serve as catalyst. That governor arrived in 1957.
CHAPTER V

FOSTER FURCOLO: 1957-1960

Between 1957 and 1962, two governors of different parties, backgrounds, personalities and agendas provided executive leadership to the nation’s most historic governing body, The General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The chronicle of their stewardship embraces an extraordinary period in the history of the United States and the world.

It was a period that bequeathed Ike and JFK, the Missile Gap and the Cuban Missile Crisis, the New Frontier and a growing conflict in a place called Vietnam.

In Massachusetts, the six years between Foster Furcolo’s first inaugural address and John Volpe’s loss to Endicott Peabody provide a time capsule of historic change. From the fiscal mess of 1957, to election of its favorite son to the Presidency in 1960, to accusations of corruption in state government in 1961, Massachusetts witnessed the pain and promise of change in a major industrial state.

This chapter focuses on the period 1957-1960 and the governorship of Foster Furcolo. It views Furcolo and his time through the prism of the struggle for legislation to establish community colleges in Massachusetts. Through this prism one sees not only debate concerning an issue of fundamental importance to higher education in the Commonwealth but also the rich tapestry of personal
idiosyncracies and policy interactions that comprise politics in Massachusetts. Most of all, one witnesses the opportunities and pitfalls awaiting a complex individual committed to use the full range of gubernatorial powers to alter the higher education landscape in the Bay State.

**The Governor-Elect**

The roots of Furcolo's commitment to educational reform extended to well before his election to the Massachusetts Governorship in November 1956. Although only 45-years-old at the time of his election, the Democrat had already built a successful political career and a solid progressive record on issues such as education.

Defeated in 1943 for the post of Springfield District Attorney and narrowly beaten in a 1946 congressional race by a six-term incumbent, Furcolo broke through in 1948 with a 10,000 vote victory over that same Republican. As a young Congressman, Furcolo quickly earned both a post on the powerful Appropriations Committee and a reputation as one of the rising stars of the Massachusetts Democratic Party (a position which encouraged no small amount of tension between Furcolo and another rising star, Congressman John F. Kennedy).

In 1949, Furcolo introduced legislation to create a higher education loan program; legislation which reflected his deep commitment to college access. In the 1970s, during an interview with Lustberg, he gave voice to this commitment (1977, p. 113):
It has always bothered me that some students couldn't go to college just because they couldn't afford it. . . . I saw friends of mine who were even more qualified than me that couldn't go.

In 1952, Furcolo attained statewide constitutional office when outgoing Governor Paul Dever, appointed him to the vacant post of state Treasurer. With this appointment, Furcolo set his sights on a long-shot Senate race against Republican stalwart, Leverett Saltonstall.

Furcolo entered the 1954 race burdened by his widening rift with Kennedy (who had won a Senate seat in 1952) and facing a wealthy incumbent blessed with personal wealth and a reservoir of good will from the Massachusetts electorate. Despite the fact that Kennedy never endorsed him (Globe, 8/10/58, Gould Lincoln, "Democrats Making Bid for Full State Control, p. 23), Furcolo ran an impressive race, losing by a surprisingly narrow margin and reinforcing his image as an attractive candidate who now possessed a strong base for another statewide campaign.

In his 1956 gubernatorial run against Republican Lieutenant Governor Sumner Whittaker, Furcolo took advantage of a stabilized relationship with Kennedy and a progressive platform to win the race "hands down" (Boston Globe, 8/10/58, p. 23). His victory margin of 140,000 votes was particularly impressive given that it came in the face of an Eisenhower landslide both nationally and in the Bay State.

As Furcolo's victory margin grew, other statewide races also fell into the Democratic column. The posts of
Lieutenant Governor, Auditor, and Treasurer would all belong to Democrats by night’s end, with only the office of Attorney General in the Republican column.

In the Legislature, the results were less decisive, as the House of Representatives remained heavily Democratic (132-108) and the traditional Republican majority in the Senate held by the slim margin of 22-18.

Thus, as Furcolo arrived at the statehouse on January 3, 1957 for his inauguration as Massachusetts’ 60th governor he stood as a power in Massachusetts politics and a budding voice on the national scene. As the first American of Italian descent elected to the Commonwealth’s governorship and the first Western Massachusetts resident to achieve that office in twenty-six years, Furcolo could reasonably expect success for his progressive agenda. As one Boston Herald columnist observed (1/1/57, W. E. Mullins, "This is How I See It: Attractive Hopefuls Lurk in Democratic Party Wings," p. 92):

The dawn of the new year is one of exultation for the Democrats of Massachusetts. For their brethren in the Republican Party it is one of despair. The Democrats have been restored to power. Not only have the Republicans encountered disaster at the polls, but they also have scant prospects for salvage purposes.

On that January day, however, as Furcolo took the oath of office in the House chamber, the seeds of future difficulty were already in place.

First, it is important to emphasize that the Massachusetts governorship was a far weaker office in 1956
that it is at present. Burdened by limited constitutional authority and the necessity to face a re-election campaign in only two years, Furcolo's capacity for major policy reform was significantly constrained. As Furcolo's closest advisor and future Commissioner of Administration and Finance Charles Mahoney recalls (Interview, July 27, 1993):

The governorship of Massachusetts was very different than today. The executive branch was probably at its weakest point in history. . . . The Legislature was dominant. And when we came to power, Governor Furcolo could only appoint one or two senior members of the executive branch—for example, Commissioner of Administration and Finance. All the major agency heads served three to seven years. The governor's entire appointed staff consisted of only fourteen people.

Second, in terms of substantive policy, Furcolo's progressive agenda confronted an increasing bipartisan awareness that the Commonwealth faced severe fiscal imbalance. Although estimates varied as to the extent of the state's debt, there was general agreement that it was significant and that it was growing. Furcolo, himself, had referred to the Commonwealth's fiscal difficulties throughout the campaign and, on the night of his election had said, "It is generally agreed that whoever won a tremendous headache" (Feinberg, 1956).

Mahoney recalls unraveling the full extent of that headache during the period immediately after Furcolo's election (Interview, July 27, 1993):

When he got elected that fall, he was very popular. Very soon thereafter, I'd gone through the books and found that we were about $1 billion
in debt. There were all these items which by legerdemain has not been dealt with.

To meet the Commonwealth’s statutory requirement for a balanced budget while simultaneously expanding public investment would inevitably require new revenues. Any tax proposal would face an uphill climb, particularly in the Republican Senate. A Boston Herald column the day after Furcolo’s inauguration offered a preview of the challenge Furcolo confronted:

Massachusetts does rank high in per capita income. But it also is near the top, if not the topmost, state in social welfare expenditures. In Old Age Assistance, Aid to Dependent Children, pensions, subsidized housing units, care for the mentally ill, work hours of municipal employees, and, though the tax levy is different, in employment compensation and workman’s compensation, Massachusetts is about the most liberal in the country. If we have a big debt and high taxes, that’s a major reason. Yet, so far as Mr. Furcolo has indicated a program, he has indicated more of the same -- more mental health employees, more subsidized higher education, more public welfare. A sort of hair-of-the-dog-that-bit-us program. (Boston Herald Editorial, "Furcolo--Mixed Reaction" 1/4/57, p. 32)

The Political Cast

Compounding Furcolo’s challenge was the cast of political players with which the governor would share center stage during the upcoming term. In its passion and historical emphasis on personality and ethnic rivalries, Massachusetts politics often resembles sport as much as the process of policymaking.

One of the most influential and potentially problematical of the political players in the Legislature
was John Powers (D-South Boston), the Senate minority leader. A veteran of Boston City Government, the House and the Senate, Powers had demonstrated extraordinary tenacity in ascending to a leadership role.

As Furcolo's term began, Powers had every apparent reason to wish the new governor success. A successful Furcolo would likely earn re-election in 1958 and quite possibly carry a Democratic majority to power in the Senate. Such a majority would make Powers the prohibitive favorite to become Senate President. A positive relationship between the Irish politician from South Boston and the Yale-educated governor, however, would only survive as long as one needed the other and perceived that the other remained supportive on major issues in the General Court.

Powers was in many ways among the last of a dying breed of politicians in the lineage of legendary Boston Mayor James Michael Curley. The minority leader had no core ideology and his politics relied on the pure manipulation of power. Mahoney recalls him as a man who was "devoid of substantive interest" and one who was "very parochial" in view (Interview, July 27, 1993).

For Powers, Furcolo was an aberration—"an outlander who wouldn't last" (Mahoney Interview, July 27, 1993). Powers had no context within which to understand a Western Massachusetts progressive whose view of the world was broad and cultured. Where Powers saw the raw power of Beacon
Hill and South Boston, Furcolo saw Massachusetts in the context of a changing world. As Mahoney has said, theirs were "polar personalities" (Interview, July 27, 1993) and it was but a matter of time before their relationship would be untenable.

The Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, Michael Skerry (D-Malden), also held a crucial voice in the future of Furcolo's program. From early in the governor's term, however, it would become clear that Furcolo and Skerry were "like oil and water" (Costello, interview, 6/1/92). The governor and the Speaker shared little in common beyond party affinity and their relationship would deteriorate quickly.

More amenable to the Furcolo agenda was "Iron" John Thompson of Ludlow, the Democratic Floor Leader. Committed from the early days of 1957 to the Governor, and friend to both Furcolo and his key education advisor Kermit Morrissey of Brandeis (Lustberg, p. 120), Thompson had earned his reputation as an iron-fisted leader in the Democratically controlled House.

The relationship between Skerry and Thompson was at best tenuous from the beginning. As columnist W. E. Mullins of the Boston Herald would write in late 1957,

Although Representative Thompson was appointed by Speaker Skerry to serve as Democratic floor leader, they subsequently came to a parting of the ways on important issues. . . . At the close of the session, they were barely on speaking terms. (Boston Herald Traveler, October 3, 1957, "This is How I See It: Artesani Support Aids Thompson for Speaker", W. E. Mullins, p. 26)
Although neither held the formal powers vested in the Senate President or the Speaker of the House, two legislators of opposing parties and very different backgrounds would also play central roles in shaping the governor’s educational program. Senator Edward Stone (R-Hyannis), wealthy Cape Cod businessman and personification of the Massachusetts Republican Brahmin, and Representative Thomas Wojtkowski (D-Pittsfield), former teacher and first in his large family to attend college, would form an unlikely alliance in support of expanding Massachusetts higher education.

The Governor as a Politician

Those who knew Furcolo well knew him to be bright, extremely witty, personally honest, and often a visionary public servant. The Governor was not, however, a naturally gifted administrator. His talents were more suited to the United States Senate—his lifelong goal—a center of debate on big ideas and big policy initiatives. One sympathetic observer recalls him as "a great idea man who could quickly see the solution of a problem but not an effective day-to-day administrator of government" (Costello, interview, 6/1/92).

Compounding the governor’s handicaps was the fact that he came to the office without deep relationships in the Legislature. He had never served in either the Massachusetts House or Senate; had never come through the ranks. As such, there was no accrued loyalty to him in an
institution which revolves around political ties. This was a potentially debilitating situation for a governor who sought to implement a progressive agenda in fiscally constrained times. As John Mallan and George Blackwood have written:

His background separated him from many of the Democratic legislators; he was urbane and well-educated, with a broad interest in national and international issues, while many of them were self-made men—small businessmen, lawyers or insurance salesmen—whose education had ended with high school or perhaps night law school. But more essential was the interest Furcolo had in broad and sweeping programs, combined with a determined if not stubborn willingness to push for an idea he believed in against the political judgment of his own advisors. (p. 287)

It is one of the ironies of Furcolo's governorship that the Governor's "stubborn" commitment to swim against the tide was both the sine qua non of success in pursuit of his community college program and the great contributing influence to his continued defeat on the painful sales tax issue. The political giants of our history have all possessed the instinct to divine when to pursue issues of principal against all cost and when to fold one's hand or compromise to face another day. Perhaps to the credit of his fundamental integrity, such instinct for strategic retreat was not common in Furcolo's administration.

To strengthen his personal relationships in the Legislature would have required a concerted effort by the governor during the early days of his administration. Unfortunately, such an effort did not come naturally to him, particularly as he dove into the policy demands of
addressing the Commonwealth’s budget difficulties while simultaneously preparing his administration’s legislative package.

Moreover, in the early days of his administration, he lacked any senior staff member who combined personal loyalty to the governor with strong and historical ties to the legislature. In short, he lacked a buffer during a period of difficult political choices.

The Furcolo Agenda and the Audit of State Needs

Any expectations that the governor or his staff would use the beginning of his administration as a honeymoon period to develop alliances in the General Court were quickly dismissed by Furcolo’s inaugural address:

I am shocked! The outgoing administration has left bills for some one to pay. That some one is the public. The inheritance left to the public by the outgoing administration is the worst financial mess in our history, and we need to raise millions and millions in additional revenue to clean it up. It is a legacy of inherited taxes and still more inherited taxes. (Senate No 1, 1957)

Pointing to an accumulated state debt of some $721 million, Furcolo divided the state budgetary options into three general categories. To simply carry on at the same level of services provided during the previous year ("No Progress Budget") he offered a total dollar figure of $387 million, an increase of some $24 million dollars over the previous year to account for inflation, interest on the state debt, expanded compensation to state employees and a $10 million reimbursement to cities and towns. A "Slight
Progress Budget" entailed $418 million, while Furcolo argued that a "Fair Progress Budget" would require $450 million in spending (Boston Globe, 1/4/57, "Must Hike Taxes - Furcolo. GOP Angered by His Charge of 'Financial Mess:' New Governor Calls Deficit Staggering", William J. Lewis, p. 8). The Governor promised to attach details to those numbers in a special message to the General Court slated for the following week.

While the new governor’s inaugural focused on the fiscal inheritance bequeathed by the Herter administration, it also provided useful insights into Furcolo’s major policy interests. In the area of education, the governor emphasized that 25% of Massachusetts schools were "overcrowded, inadequate or unsafe" (Boston Globe, 1/4/57, "Furcolo Says State Purse Flat: Full Text of Inaugural Speech by Bay State’s New Leader" p. 5). In higher education he warned that "the number of young people of college age is increasing" and emphasized that "even in 1955, only one out of ten applicants was accepted to begin his freshman year at U/Mass" (Boston Globe, "Furcolo Says State Purge Flat: Full text of Inaugural Speech by Bay State’s New Leader," 1/4/57, p. 5).

Furcolo’s commitment to education was long-held and deeply rooted. This commitment grew both from his own liberal progressive instincts and from the "brain trust" which formed his inner circle of advisors. Mahoney describes Furcolo as a veteran who shared the post war
belief that "the Western world would be developed and rebuilt through education at all levels" (Interview, July 27, 1993). And as Lustberg (1979) wrote shortly after interviewing Furcolo as well as several of his closest advisors:

Furcolo, being a "liberal from Yale", was especially comfortable with education issues, especially those pertaining to higher education. He was more puzzled, Mallan told me, by technical issues in areas such as health or economics. Furcolo surrounded himself with a "brain trust" which was largely composed of educators, men like Mallan (a professor of Political Science at Smith College) and Kermit Morrissey who was a Professor of Political Science at Amherst College "when he was drafted to organize a research team for Governor Furcolo." Even those who were not professional academicians were, in Furcolo’s words, "all in favor of the idea of education." (p. 113)

On January 14, Furcolo returned to the House Chamber to offer a more detailed "special message" outlining the specific legislative goals of his administration. Serving as a bridge between the previous week’s inaugural and his upcoming budget proposal, the special message clearly reaffirmed the governor’s progressive instincts, as well as his recognition of the Commonwealth’s severe budgetary constraints.

In our complex society, we must recognize that the functions of the State have been greatly expanded, and that there is, therefore, an urgent requirement to establish priorities among the programs and proposals which compete for our attention (Senate No 1, 1957).
The centerpiece of Furcolo's special message was his call for "the creation of a commission to be appointed by the Governor and the General Court to make an overall Audit of State Needs" (Senate No. 1, 1957, p. 26). Arguing that "we should not simply guess at our needs and neither should we use all of our revenues on one or several programs at the expense of neglecting others" (Senate No. 1, 1957), Furcolo recommended that the Commission consist of ten members — two appointed by the Senate President, three by the Speaker of the House, the Commissioner of Administration and Finance (Chair), and four gubernatorial appointees. He further recommended that the Commission focus its efforts on seven major areas (Senate No 1, 1957, p. 27):

1. Educational Needs
2. Health
3. Problems of the Aging
4. Mass Transportation
5. A revision of the tax structure
6. The organization and operation of state government
7. Programs, laws and proposals related to the economic growth of the Commonwealth, with due regard to the problems of labor and industry.

In establishing education as the first priority of the proposed Audit of State Needs, Furcolo emphasized his commitment to the issue, stating in the special message (p.
29), "one of the areas of critical need is that of providing adequate educational opportunities not only for our children but for our citizens of all ages."

Concerning public higher education, Furcolo's special message highlighted his concern that the Commonwealth lacked adequate facilities to cope with increasing enrollment pressures:

There is an urgent need for an increase in our higher educational facilities. We must take steps toward providing them. Whether we may best meet this demand by expanding the University of Massachusetts, and/or our state teachers colleges and technical institutes, and/or by aiding in the establishment of regional colleges in various sections of the Commonwealth, or by other means, is a problem of first priority for the Audit of State Needs on Education. Following its report, I shall submit a report on this subject. (p. 30)

Although a detailed review of Furcolo's entire higher education program lies beyond the scope of this study, it is important to note that the governor was deeply committed to reform across the public university and college system. He believed in a strong state university as the anchor of that system. And against the opposition of an entrenched University Board of Trustees, he would push hard during the next four years to enhance what was still essentially an agricultural institution in Amherst. Moreover, the governor and his staff hoped to bring the Commonwealth's state colleges beyond their traditional role as "teachers colleges," transforming them into solid liberal arts institutions. He further sought to identify a new mission for the technical institutes in Lowell and Dartmouth, whose
programs had suffered with the decline of Massachusetts' textile industry. And, finally, there was the still conceptual notion of community colleges to flesh out. His vehicle for all of this would be the special commission.

Furcolo set April 15 as the goal for a preliminary report by the Audit Commission, with a final report to follow in time for legislative action in 1957 (Boston Herald-Traveler, "State Audit Plan Stirs Row: GOP Charges Move to Shift Responsibility," Edward Devin, 1/15/57, p. 12).

The governor's proposal for a special commission received generally positive, if in some cases bemused responses from the political establishment. The Boston Herald-Traveler, conservative in its editorial viewpoint, labeled the Commission a "Super Hoover Commission" (1/15/57, "The Furcolo Audit," p. 12) and called it "one recommendation of outstanding importance" (1/15/57, p. 12). Norman McDonald, Executive Director of the Massachusetts Federation of Taxpayers Association, suggested that Furcolo has revealed an entirely new approach to executive responsibility by proposing that a great many decisions hitherto regarded as purely legislative in character be shared by members of the legislature, a suggestion that there be created a Commission on the Audit of State Needs, one half the members of which would come form the House and Senate. (Boston Herald-Traveler, 1/15/57, p. 1)

Furcolo agreed with the Senate President and Speaker on a distinguished group to comprise the Commission. In doing, so, he both established education as the
Commission's primary issue of concern and ensured that it would ultimately issue recommendations which were consistent with his progressive agenda.

Although Francis X. Lang (Commission of Administration and Finance) would serve as the commission's official chair, Mallan would act as "Executive Secretary" and Mahoney would provide policy guidance to the group. It is not a coincidence that Furcolo's final proposal for regional community colleges—a proposal developed by the Commission—would resemble a recommendation first put forward by Mallan to candidate Furcolo during his unsuccessful Senate campaign against Saltonstall (Lustberg, 1979, p. 114).

Another gubernatorial appointment of great significance was Seymour E. Harris, Professor of Economics at Harvard. Deeply respected by the Governor, Harris would in 1958 become one of the most articulate voices arguing for the importance of community colleges to Massachusetts' economic development. Harris would also later serve as a founding member of the Commonwealth's Board of Regional Community Colleges.

Third among the critical appointments to the Special Commission was that of Senator Edward C. Stone, Republican of Hyannis. Powerful member of the Senate Ways and Means Committee, wealthy insurance executive and member of the Boston University Board of Trustees, Stone had long hoped for a community college in Hyannis to replace a state
teachers college lost during the previous decade. In the months ahead, Stone’s absolute commitment to community colleges, his extraordinary power in the Republican Senate and his position of influence within the private higher education establishment would all contribute immeasurably to the establishment of the two-year colleges in Massachusetts. "Without Stone," former Representative Thomas Wojtkowski of Pittsfield has said, "there would very simply have been no final community college bill" (Interview, June 1993).

The fourth particularly significant appointment to the Special Commission was that of J. William Belanger, President of the Massachusetts AFL-CIO. Although one would expect Belanger and his union colleagues to instinctively support Furcolo and his progressive agenda, a rift was growing between labor and the Democratic Governor over the issue of introducing a sales tax to the Commonwealth. By appointing Belanger to the Special Commission, Furcolo had drawn the powerful union leader toward him on higher education issues—a move that would ultimately help to ameliorate potential labor opposition to the governor’s community college proposal.

The Governor’s First Budget Proposal and The Sales Tax

The need to combine revenue enhancement with any progressive budgetary package became increasingly clear as Furcolo completed his special message concerning the Audit of State needs and refined his budget proposal for
presentation by the end of January. Furcolo’s budget message included a bold proposal which he hoped would address this reality. It would, in fact, ensnare him in controversy for the remainder of his administration.

The sales tax story is fundamental to any discussion of Foster Furcolo’s governorship. Three times (1957, 1958, 1959) he would propose the measure only to see it lose in the legislature by overwhelming margins and amid often angry defections by members of his own party. Over time, the sales tax would become a political stone around the Governor’s neck as well as a compelling symbol for those who opposed the administration or doubted its capacity.

In 1957, Massachusetts remained one of sixteen states which did not rely on a sales tax to support its public spending (Globe, "Sales Tax? Globe Finds Out What Other States Are Doing About It", William E. Jones, 1/27/57, p. 1). While some economists and an occasional legislator had argued on behalf of such a levy as a counterbalance to the property tax, no governor had publicly supported the potentially volatile measure.

The sales tax was anathema to the Democratic Party and its core labor constituency, both of which believed it intrinsically regressive. Opposition to a sales tax had traditionally been a fixture of the party’s platform and for several members of the Democratic leadership (e.g., Senator Powers) such a position constituted a litmus test of party loyalty. As Mahoney recalls, "Democrats were
absolutists about the sales tax—they saw it as heresy" (Interview, July 27, 1993.)

While most Republicans in the legislature shared a general disdain for taxes, the idea of a judiciously applied sales tax as a lever to reduce property taxes inspired at least some measure of interest. And in the face of fiscal crisis, many felt that a sales tax deserved consideration before increased income levies.

It is unclear at what point Furcolo decided to cast his lot behind a sales tax proposal. What is clear is that by January he had determined that such a proposal was the only hope for any progress toward his progressive agenda. Mahoney recalls that as the final reality became clear, Furcolo became increasingly firm in his belief that a sales tax was the only way to preserve his agenda:

We spent a lot of time in November and December looking at options. He really believed that a limited sales tax was in the economy’s best interests, particularly because it could be used to ameliorate the very regressive property tax. (Interview, July 27, 1993)

In his budget proposal to the legislature, Furcolo called for a 3% limited sales tax to finance a record state budget of over $423 million (Boston Herald-Traveler, "Sales Tax Chances Look Good: Furcolo’s Proposal Wins Wide Support", William J. Lewis, 1/24/57, p. 1). Under terms of the tax, exemptions would be provided for food, prescription medication, rent, children’s clothing, light, heat, gas, telephone, utilities and items already affected by the excise tax. Of $112.5 million in revenue expected
from the tax, Furcolo proposed that two thirds, or $75 million be returned to cities and towns to underwrite property tax relief. Other fees and revenue sources would provide the remainder of the budget’s $60 million in additional spending (Boston Globe, 1/24/57, p. 1).

The governor’s sales tax proposal came with almost no warning to Democrats in the legislature. As the Herald-Traveler would summarize on January 24 (p. 1), Furcolo’s plan "came as a stunning blow yesterday to legislative leaders of his own Democratic Party." One year later, the same newspaper would write:

When Furcolo took office in January 1957 he was inclined to play things close to the vest. His inaugural address came as a surprise to party leaders and his budget message in which he proposed a limited 3% sales tax flabbergasted Democrats. (1/14/58, "Edward Devin Scene and Heard at the State House" Governor Seeks Improved Liaison with Legislature," p. 24)

The Democratic leadership was clearly caught off balance by the sales tax measure and their remarks at the time indicate no small measure of cautiously expressed pique at both the governor’s message and the process leading to it. Senator Powers set the tone by saying, "The Democratic Party has consistently and historically opposed this type of tax imposition" (Boston Globe, "Civic Leaders Opinions of Sales Tax Proposal", 1/24/57, p. 9).

Initially, Skerry and others in the party leadership remained relatively silent on the subject. The Herald-Traveler pointed out that "Skerry refuses to say
that he is for or against [the sales tax] -- one can read much into this" (4/17/57, p. 1).

By January 24, Powers had become less cautious in expressing his opposition to the sales tax. Speaking to the Massachusetts Federation of Labor Tax Forum (a union group opposed to the sales tax), he made his view clear:

Don't let them sell you a sales tax. Don't let them sell you a philosophy that makes the poor poorer and the rich richer. We shouldn't try to tax people on what they spend. The theory of taxation is based on what you earn. (Globe, 1/25/57, "State Sales Tax Hit and Updated at Labor Forum", p. 1)

Within hours of this speech, the Minority leader placed the sales tax directly on Furcolo's lap distancing himself and the party leadership from both the Governor and the proposal. He emphasized to the press that the Democratic leadership had "urged, pleaded, importuned, entreated, tried to persuade, argued and respectfully but firmly requested" Furcolo to move away from the sales tax. "But," the Minority Leader summarized, "Foster Furcolo is the Governor and nobody else. He made the decision and it's his baby" (Globe, 1/26/57, "Retailers to Support Sales Tax, If ... Want Relief Assured to Cities and Towns", p. 2).

As Powers continued to raise the level of rhetoric against the Governor of his own party, early press reaction to Furcolo's sales tax proposal was positive. The Globe in an editorial piece of January 24 ("Governor Furcolo's Surprise," p. 18) wrote "In the past, no governor of
Massachusetts has committed himself as forthrightly on the subject as did the chief executive yesterday." The Herald-Traveler, no friend to Furcolo, went even further stating that:

For a decade Massachusetts has been building up to a financial crisis. For a decade successive governors have either sidestepped the issue or met it with half-hearted recommendations. Today, Governor Furcolo has grasped the nettle and boldly advanced the only solution—a sales tax. (1/24/57, "Furcolo Meets a Crisis," p. 28)

The initial reaction to the sales tax was also comparatively warm in the Republican ranks. As one observer summarized at the time, "oddly enough, some of the more favorable comments on [Furcolo's] recommendations came from Republicans, including Governor Herter" (Herald-Traveler, 1/24/57, "Bitter Sales Tax Fight Due: GOP, Civic Units Hail Reality Aid," Edward Devin, p. 1).

It is important for purposes of this study to consider how the sales tax influenced progress of the governor's two-year college program. First, the Governor's commitment to the sales tax both antagonized key parts of his core constituency and influenced how several key actors viewed other parts of the Furcolo agenda. As Lustberg (1979) has argued:

Furcolo alienated liberals, party Democrats, labor and the press without ever capturing the Republican Party to implement a sales tax... in the fact of its political presence during the time of the proposal for regional community colleges [the sales tax issue] structured that debate and those who lined up on either side of the issue. (p. 119)
The antagonism aroused during the sales tax fight would surface again during the debate over community colleges, affecting the positions taken by key players. Powers, for example, would remain neutral and not helpful on the community college package. Having taken so strong a position in opposition to the sales tax, the Senate President felt constrained from supporting any major new expenditure of funds (Lustberg, 1979, p. 120). But, fundamentally, it was Powers' deep-seated animosity toward Furcolo that influenced his lack of active support for a bill that a Democratic leader would normally have worked diligently to pass. Given this vacuum in the Senate, Furcolo sought allies wherever he could. Thus did Stone's role become paramount. As Mahoney has stated:

We didn't have a Senate President with us. So we had to make due. Where we grew up [Springfield], it was important to work in a pluralistic universe. We were entirely open to this [dealing with Stone and the Republicans]. (Interview, July 27, 1993)

Labor would also remain vehement in its opposition to the sales tax. While there is no record of strong, active labor support for the community college bill, legislation that unions would seem likely to endorse with vigor, Belanger's presence on the Special Commission combined with a general union weariness of opposing Furcolo to earn "a passive endorsement" from the chief executive of the AFL-CIO (Lustberg, 1979, p. 120).

Thus, the sales tax influenced, albeit subtly, the attitudes of key actors in the community college debate.
While one should not overly generalize, it seems fair to observe that Furcolo’s path on the community college bill was made more uncertain by the alienation of natural allies in the sales tax debate.

It is difficult to measure how the chain of events around one issue affects the outcome of another. But certainly, the sales tax fight did not help Furcolo in the ensuing battle for community colleges. As noted, he had antagonized in many his own party without guaranteeing widespread support from opposing camps. Moreover, the Governor spent much precious political capital in a failed effort. Third, the sales tax debate would contribute to a growing public perception that the governor’s administration had difficulty figuring out how to push its agenda. And finally, Furcolo was forced to consistently argue why he was pushing so hard for new and expensive program if the state confronted such fiscal turmoil as to require a new tax.

The Politics of Educational Reform: 1957-58

As the first signs of spring moved over Boston Common and the legislature’s focus turned increasingly to the budget for the next fiscal year (Fiscal Year 1958, to begin on July 1, 1957) as well as to closing the deficit in the current year’s accounts, debate over the proposed sales tax dominated the political landscape. Furcolo looked to the newly appointed Audit Commission as the foundation for his progressive program. The Special Commission, however, was
quickly becoming a convenient avenue by which the increasingly disenchanted Powers and Skerry could avoid action on issues of major concern to the governor. In a Herald-Traveler column, political writer Edward Devin summarized:

Some controversial legislation will be disposed of by sending it to a study by the newly created Commission on the Audit of State Needs. Bills based on requests of the Governor for legislation in various fields will be sent to the commission. These will include bills for state aid to education and the establishment of state-operated medical and dental schools and scholarships. (Boston Herald-Traveler, "Skerry Turns on Heat, House Docket Shrinks," 4/28/57, Section V, p. 6)

Furcolo's relationship with Powers, Skerry and others in the Democratic leadership had deteriorated by early May of his first term to the point of jeopardizing his legislative program if not his prospects for re-election in 1958. Powers, in particular, consistently challenged the governor on the sales tax issue. In May, the Senate president went so far as to spend two and one half hours before the Joint Committee on Taxation, making clear that he was "unalterably opposed to the thing the governor has advocated here" (Herald-Traveler, 5/3/57, "Opponents Blast Sales Tax Plan", p. 21).

The administration in late spring of 1957, appeared to be adrift. There had been no major legislative victory, available political appointments remained vacant, and a general restiveness was growing within the governor's
party. Increasingly, the press pointed to ominous tidings in the governor’s future.

Currently, there is an element in the party which looks ahead to 1958 with apprehension. Governor Furcolo’s administration is hardly sensational. Devoid of important accomplishments, it even has antagonized vital groups which helped in its election. The result is likely to be a big demand for the Republican nomination . . .

(Herald-Traveler, 5/7/57, "This Is How I See It: Furcolo Rule So Far Devoid of Anything Hurtful to GOP," W. E. Mullins, p. 44)

Entering Fall of 1957, Furcolo looked to be a wounded governor. His sales tax proposal had been soundly defeated by summer’s end, the 1957 budget had been balanced only through a series of one-time savings, and there still was no significant initiative from the Commission on the Audit of State Needs. Moreover, in addition to the governor’s program for education, he was committed to four other major legislative items—construction of a new state office building, establishment of the Massachusetts Port Authority, completion of the Massachusetts Turnpike and construction of a major parking garage in Boston—all projects steeped in cost as well as political contentiousness.

Looking ahead to the election year of 1958 as determinative for his governorship, Furcolo moved to set his administration on firmer political footing. His first step was to take advantage of a vacancy in the Malden District Court to move Skerry out of the speakership. Furcolo realized that Skerry would remain an impediment to progressive legislation as long as he controlled the House.
The Democratic floor leader, John Thompson, who would likely succeed Skerry, was a Furcolo loyalist whom the Herald-Traveler had described as "Governor Furcolo’s right-hand man during the 1957 session" (10/3/57, "This Is How I See It: Artesani Support Aids Thompson for Speaker", W. E. Mullins, p. 26).

A strong-willed veteran of the General Court, Thompson had proved his loyalty to Furcolo by supporting the ill-fated sales tax proposal. As Mullins of the Herald-Traveler summarized:

Although Rep. Thompson was appointed by Speaker Skerry to serve as Democratic floor leader, they subsequently came to a parting of the ways on important issues. During the 1957 session, Thompson ardently supported the administration in the House while Skerry was a factor in the defeat of several administration projects, particularly the sales tax . . . (10/3/57, "This is How I See It: Artesani Support Aids Thompson for Speaker", p. 26)

On October 8, Furcolo submitted Skerry’s name to the Commonwealth’s Executive Council (an elected body which must approve many gubernatorial appointments) for approval as clerk of the Malden District Court. The nomination to this choice political slot was part of a larger deal in which Skerry had agreed to deliver to Thompson key House votes (particularly Boston members who were inclined to support Representative John J. Toomey of nearby Cambridge) for the Speakership, while Furcolo had committed the jobs of state purchasing agent and registrar of motor vehicles to two Skerry loyalists (Mullins, "This is How I See It: Artesani Support Aids Thompson for Speaker," 10/3/57, p. 26).
On October 10, House Democrats met in caucus to unanimously endorse Thompson, virtually assuring his selection as Speaker when the full House reconvened in January. Later the same day, the Executive Council approved Furcolo's nomination of Skerry to the Malden clerkship. In November, Furcolo moved to shore up his own administrative team. Most significantly, he replaced Francis X. Lang as Commissioner of Administration (the most powerful cabinet post) with the governor’s young special assistant and Western Massachusetts protege, Charles Mahoney. Seasoned beyond his twenty-eight years, Mahoney had held key posts in each of Furcolo’s campaigns, had practiced law with the Governor between 1954 and 1956 and was acknowledged as brilliant, savvy, and personable. Most of all, he held the governor’s trust and provided a sure, loyal hand at Furcolo’s side.

With Mahoney in place, Furcolo also took steps to strengthen his ties with rank and file Democrats in the Legislature. In late December and early January, he began to schedule more frequent briefings for members of the Democratic leadership and on January 13, 1958 announced regularly established opportunities for individual legislators to visit him on issues of importance to them. As the Boston Herald-Traveler, a frequent critic editorialized:

Governor Furcolo yesterday announced a new "open door" policy to improve his liaison with the Legislature. Starting tomorrow, legislators are invited to his office from 2 to 5 pm to discuss
any problems or to speak their minds. Legislators will be received every Wednesday afternoon right through to the end of the session. This will mark an improvement in the governor’s relationship with the legislature and will help eliminate much of the friction that existed during the 1957 session. It is only one of a number of steps that the governor is taking to assure as harmonious a year as possible. (Herald-Traveler, "Scene and Heard at the State House: Governor Seeks Improved Liaison with Legislature," 1/14/58, p. 24)

Having taken steps to smooth the way for 1958, Furcolo also realized that he needed a major breakthrough on the legislative front to generate momentum for the election. Knowing that he had pinned great expectations on the Commission on the Audit of State Needs, Furcolo had to shake substantive policy recommendations out of the body.

After its much ballyhooed introduction in Furcolo’s 1957 annual message, the Commission had faded into the background. Not only had it failed to meet its ambitious April deadline for a preliminary report, the Audit group had drifted away from its original focus on a prescribed set of broad policy issues, becoming instead a legislatively-driven research vehicle. Mullins of the Herald-Traveler assessed the Commission’s work in a Christmas 1957 appraisal of Furcolo’s first year in office:

His Commission on the Audit of State Needs currently is overburdened with a multitude of demands for research in many areas. Instead of being used by the executive department, it has become an agency employed to inform the Legislature. There is the suspicion that the lawmakers have passed many of its own problems on to the Commission. (12/25/57, "This is How I See It: Governor Furcolo Survey Cites his Three Key Achievements," p. 48)
In 1958, Furcolo would turn to Mahoney and Mallan to push the Commission back to its original policy focus and to move the group toward recommendations by springtime in order to allow the possibility of substantive legislation during the election-year legislative session. Mahoney recalls:

By 1958 it had become clear to me that we were living in a hat box in the State House so I persuaded the Governor to let me exert control over the Executive Branch. That is why I went to Administration and brought the Audit of State needs physically under my office. I used it as a bully pulpit and a research tank. (Interview, July 27, 1993)

Despite his best effort, Furcolo still faced significant hurdles in achieving his program. Perhaps most prominent among these was the Commonwealth’s continuing fiscal difficulties. With estimates of a potential deficit in the current fiscal year (ending June 30, 1958) of $47 million (Herald-Traveler, "Record State Deficit Forecast," 12/26/57, p. 1) as well as a projection that state costs could increase by $20 million in the next fiscal year without any expansion in services (Herald-Traveler, 11/13/57, Editorial: "Paying for the HCG," p. 44), Furcolo faced a profoundly unpleasant decision as to reintroduction of his sales tax proposal.

By the end of November 1957, the State Finance Board was calling the Commonwealth’s financial situation "serious if not critical," pointing to a total state debt which had grown from $3.5 million in 1945 to $662 million in 1957
Such data left one pundit musing:

Up on Beacon Hill, Governor Furcolo is wrestling with next year's budget and trying to decide whether to ask for a sales tax again. Virtually all his advisors say it will be poison to push this unpopular tax in an election year. And there is little evidence that the measure has changed since the Legislature said 'no' this summer. Yet the need for additional funds becomes daily more obvious. (Herald-Traveler, Editorial, 11/13/57, p. 44)

Any effort to reintroduce the sales tax would only inflame the second problem which continued to face the governor. Although Skerry had been removed as a thorn in the House, Powers remained as minority leader in the Senate. Looking for a Democratic majority in the upcoming election to ensure him the Senate presidency, Powers retained little regard for Furcolo, as he made clear in a December interview with the Herald-Traveler:

As for myself, my contacts with the governor have not always been happy. Since he took office, I have sat down with him only four times. I had a feeling that I was not welcome. I took what I thought was a sound position in opposition to his sales tax and I continue to reserve my right to disagree ... (12/30/57, William E. Mullins, "Sales Tax 'Folly' For Gov. Furcolo: Powers Gives Views on Session," p. 1)

In his annual message to the Legislature on January 1, 1958, Furcolo sought to balance a clear acknowledgment of the Commonwealth's fiscal reality with a commitment to progress on a number of fundamental legislative issues:

The matter of our fiscal rehabilitation continues to be one of our most pressing problems. Despite increasing economies in every phase of governmental operation, our fiscal condition remains critical. I shall in my budget message
for FY 1959, define those policies which have been adopted in order that the substantial additional revenue requirements might be reduced to a bare minimum. Economy has been and must continue to be our watchword, but at the same time we must not permit the elimination of valued and necessary humanitarian programs which we have long labored to establish and maintain. Despite the enforcement of the most rigid economy possible, despite the stringent curtailment of all departmental requests for FY 1959, and despite the acceptance of certain measures, substantial sums of additional revenue will be required for fiscal 1959 without the enactment of any additional programs or the provision of further services. This is our inheritance.

While I do not deem it possible for us to undertake many desirable and needed additional activities and programs during the coming year, we shall not turn our backs upon tomorrow. We must face the future with confidence and with the recognition that the people of this Commonwealth expect of their government realistic and forward looking policies. (Senate 1, 1/1/58)

In the area of higher education, Furcolo continued to press for a progressive agenda while looking to the Audit Commission to give his program both substance and credibility. In his annual message, he urged the Commission to focus its efforts on issues of access for future high school graduates.

The first quarterly report of the Commission demonstrated the demand for post high school educational opportunities which we must soon face in this Commonwealth. Within the next ten years between thirty and fifty thousand qualified young men and women will be denied the opportunity of self-improvement through training beyond the high school unless new and additional public facilities are provided for them. The Commission on the Audit of State Needs has continued its investigation into the difficult questions involved in providing adequately for our existing institutions, and at the same time, it is seeking answers to the questions surrounding the establishment of additional facilities. Our objective must be to provide quality education, adapted to the needs of a complex and growing
society, provided for in the most economical manner and on a sound fiscal basis. (Senate No. 1, 1/1/58)

As Furcolo completed his annual address, Speaker-elect Thompson was moving to consolidate his power and, in doing so, set the foundation for the governor’s legislative program. The Herald-Traveler’s Edward Devin summarized Thompson’s moves:

It will not be a happy New Year, however, for a number of House Democrats because shortly after Representative John Thompson (D-Ludlow) takes over as Speaker there will be shifts made in key positions, changes that are bound to cause repercussions. In the major change, Representative John T. Tynan, an outspoken Democratic legislator from South Boston will be dropped as assistant floor leader, or "whip" and he will also be dropped as a member of the powerful House Rules Committee. Tynan will be replaced as party whip by Representative Cornelious J. Kiernan of Lowell it was reported. This will be an important step for it means that Kiernan will be in line shortly for the position of Democratic floor leader. Representative Charles Artesani of Allston is scheduled to be appointed floor leader by Thompson as soon as the House is organized today. Artesani is also reported to be in line for appointment by Governor Furcolo as presiding justice of the Brighton District Court to replace the late Judge Thomas H. Connelly.

As soon as Artesani is appointed to the bench -- it won’t be for awhile yet -- Kiernan will move up to the position of Democratic floor leader. In another move, former Representative Joseph D. Ward of Fitchburg will be dropped as Counsel to the House Committees. He will be replaced by former Senator Albert S. Previte Jr. of Lawrence. (Herald-Traveler, 1/1/58, p. 1)

This purge, which included the removal of two Republicans who had opposed Furcolo’s financial program from the Ways and Means Committee, permitted Thompson to at once demonstrate his intention to rule with an iron fist,
remove key members who had separated themselves from Furcolo and establish a team loyal to the Ludlow Democrat rather than to Skerry. Mullins summarized the moves by writing, "Speaker Thompson apparently has moved to eliminate as far as may be all opposition to the Furcolo administration" (Herald-Traveler, 1/3/58, "This is How I See It: Boston Democrats Facing Liquidation as House Chiefs," W. E. Mullins, p. 12).

With the new year underway, therefore, major reform in Massachusetts public higher education was undeniably linked to the success of Thompson’s speakership, to an improvement in Furcolo’s legislative relations, to the outcome of other major legislative initiatives (including the governor’s decision concerning another try at a sales tax), to the unfolding election campaign, and to the status of the commonwealth’s economy. Furcolo’s staff had strongly advised the governor against resubmission of the sales tax proposal (Herald-Traveler, 11/13/57, Editorial p. 44). Even with Thompson in the Speakership, the prospect of another bitter tax battle threatened to deflect attention away from other key initiatives. And, ultimately, another overwhelming defeat could cost Furcolo a second term.

In his budget proposal to the legislature for Fiscal Year 1959, presented as House I on January 21, 1958, Furcolo held back from reintroduction of the limited sales tax proposal. The governor, however, did call for "a long range solution providing for fiscal rehabilitation of the
Commonwealth" (House No. 1, 1958). Moreover, he argued once again that "the overall tax structure of this Commonwealth is antiquated and outmoded for our present and future purposes" (House No. 1, 1958).

Examining the details of Furcolo’s budget plan for FY59 brings his dilemma into clear focus. An unabashed progressive, he sought major expansions in state spending for programs in areas such as mental health and education. Once again, however, the governor was constrained by a worsening fiscal situation as well as a recalcitrant legislature unwilling to vote for new taxes.

The Governor’s budget proposal called for $418,025,577 in total state spending, an increase of some $65 million over the total appropriation of the previous year (House 1, 1958).

Furcolo’s recommended spending for the Department of Education totalled $37,126,720, an increase of over $3.4 million. Of the total amount recommended for Education, over $16 million was dedicated to the University of Massachusetts, Lowell Technical Institute, the Massachusetts Maritime Academy and the ten state teachers’ colleges (House No. 1, 1958).

House I was mute on the subject of community colleges, awaiting recommendations from the Commission on the Audit of State Needs. What seems clear, however, from rhetoric of both the governor’s annual address and his budget message, is that Furcolo believed that ultimately the
Commonwealth could not sustain his progressive agenda without the foundation provided by additional revenues.

While only referring to the limited sales tax measure as his solution of the previous year "to meet the dual problem of providing adequately for essential State revenue, and of providing relief for the homeowners and rent payers of the cities and towns of the Commonwealth" (House No. 1, 1958). Furcolo did reintroduce a withholding tax measure. The withholding tax appealed to Furcolo as both a means of "assuring collection of taxes when they are due" (House No. 1, 1958) and as a means to secure a revenue windfall he would later estimate at up to $17 million (Herald-Traveler, "Forgive Clause may Save Tax," 8/4/58, p. 1).

The 1958 Legislative Program

Furcolo's team pulled together the pieces of its 1958 legislative program as it also prepared for an intense spring debate over his budget, for the report of the Audit of State Needs concerning education and for the heat of the year's election battle.

Again, the sales tax would sit at the core of Furcolo's agenda. Despite the best arguments of his staff and his own admission that "I have been advised by Legislative members of both parties that there is no possibility of the membership adopting such a program" (House No. 1, 1958), Furcolo would decide to reintroduce a bill calling for the highly contentious tax, believing to
it to be the best option by which a progressive Massachusetts government could meet its obligations.

During the spring, as debate over the sales tax began anew on Beacon Hill, Furcolo’s administration finalized a major legislative program for the heat of the election year. The governor achieved two moderately significant victories in the spring with imposition of an additional penny per package tax on cigarettes and an increase in the number of Supreme Court justices from 32 to 38. By mid-summer, however, the Globe’s S. J. Micicicche could still rightly claim that much remained to be done:

With the election just three months away, administration forces will launch a "crash effort" to improve Governor Furcolo’s legislative record in these intervening weeks. To a governor seeking re-election the tally of his legislative successes and failures carries the equivalent importance of a baseball player’s batting average when it comes time to renew contracts. While Furcolo has managed to better his mark of last year, several major recommendations still await action. His legislative record for November rests largely on the fate of these pending matters. (8/4/58, Evening Edition, S. J. Micciche, "The Political Circuit: Furcolo Starts Sprint for Legislative Record," p. 17)

In addition to the sales tax, seven other major bills formed the core of Furcolo’s legislative program. First, the withholding tax, which would be twice approved by the House in April and July of 1958 only to die in the Republican Senate.

The third major legislative initiative for 1958 was a long-awaited measure to activate the Massachusetts Port Authority. Created in 1956, the Port Authority had
remained dormant pending final legislative and gubernatorial approval of a provision in its enabling legislation which set a 4% ceiling on the rate at which it could market its bonds. Furcolo’s special message permitted the authority to raise its rate ceiling contingent upon a set of state controls, including the right of the state auditor to examine Authority records, appointment of a financial advisor, and legislative approval of the final rate (Herald-Traveler, 8/1/58, Edward Devin, "Furcolo Insights On Port Rein: Leaves Issue of the Board’s Role to Legislature," pp. 1 & 9).

The fourth major legislative proposal for 1958 was construction of a state office building in downtown Boston. Key to the Furcolo proposal for a $30 million building was creation of a private non-profit corporation to manage the development. The governor’s proposed corporation consisted of State Public Works Commissioner Anthony DiNatale, Chairman of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority William F. Callahan, and State Public Safety Commissioner Otis M. Whitney.

The fifth measure of major importance called for construction by the Turnpike Authority of a second tunnel across Boston Harbor to enhance transportation between the downtown and Logan International Airport.

Sixth on the Governor’s legislative slate was construction of a public parking garage under Boston Common. Viewed by the administration as critical to
downtown vitality, estimates indicated that the garage would cost approximately $30 million.

Seventh on the list of gubernatorial priorities was a $43 million bond issue to support unemployment relief. Reduced from an original proposal of $50 million prepared during the 1957 session, the bill was "the nub of the governor’s unemployment program," which also included extension of unemployment relief benefits, a new vocational retraining program, and accelerated construction of Division of Employment Security offices (Globe, 8/4/58, p. 17). The bond issue, which would support new state jobs, was by August 1958 locked in the Senate Ways and Means Committee amid debate over thirteen proposed amendments (Globe, 8/4/58, p. 17) and questions over the implications of the measure for the high state debt amid signs that Massachusetts was emerging from the national recession.

Eighth, and perhaps closest to Furcolo’s heart, was the long-awaited Audit Commission proposal for a $111 million higher education expansion, including $24 million for creation of a community college system in the Commonwealth.

**The Audit of State Needs and the Governor’s Community College Program**

In late March, the Commission on the Audit of State Needs had finally issued a preliminary report on higher education. Mallan had heavily influenced the report which included proposed legislation for major expansion of public higher education in the commonwealth. Building on
Furcolo’s rhetoric of the past two years, the Commission Report described a "crisis in higher education" hitting squarely on the issue of access:

There is growing agreement among educators and authorities about the growing shortage of higher educational facilities. National and regional studies, those made in other states and the work of the Special Commission on the Audit of State Needs all show that public and private institutions together do not at present have the facilities, faculty or finances to meet the rapidly rising tide of college enrollments. (House 3035 of 1958)

The Commission pointed to a set of imposing demographic projections as it called for both an expansion of the existing fifteen public institutions of higher learning and the creation of a network of regional community colleges:

The simplest way to express the growing shortage in MA higher education is to say that by 1967 the number of qualified Massachusetts residents seeking admission to colleges within the State may range from 107,000 to 118,000 to a possible higher figure of 133,000.

But even if all public and private colleges expand to the maximum they now plan, they will have room for only about 68,000 full-time undergraduates from this State. This would mean a shortage of college places running from 39,000 to 50,000 to a possible 65,000. (House 3035)

In addition to recommending "a unified over-all plan for public higher education in Massachusetts" (p. 10) which would address "the over-all expansion and coordination of our educational system including curricula and programs of study at all institutions" (p. 10), the Commission report offered a comprehensive case for "the immediate development of a statewide system of regional community colleges, under
The direction of a new Board of Regional Community Colleges" (p. 14).

The Commission pointed to wide-ranging benefits which could accrue from development of such a community college system. The benefits of this system would be great to the student and his parents, who would save from an average of $2,000 in the cost of the first two years of college; to the secondary school which could find that many more students would be motivated to continue their education, to business and industry, which would find available a new set of trained and skilled employees; to the tax payer who would be saved the much greater costs of further expanding four-year residential colleges; and to the entire Commonwealth and the nation which would gain in the knowledge and skills of its young men and women (p. 14).

While drawing heavily on national data to support its recommendations for a system of regional community colleges, the Commission also looked closely at the individual character of Massachusetts to define the financing and governance models for the system.

In terms of financing, the Commission recommended that, unlike other states, which relied on county and/or local support of community colleges, Massachusetts would have to rely on state coffers. The large geographic size and diminutive political power of Massachusetts counties combined with the diversity of local government models in the Commonwealth to lead the Commission to full financing
by the State, with local contributions coming in the form of dedicated space (p. 58). In addition, the Commission was influenced by the fact that Massachusetts property taxes were already second highest per capita in the nation and that any added burden could jeopardize college development (Lustberg, p. 116).

Governance was also to be centralized at the state level and separated from the Board of Education and its recalcitrant Commissioner, Owen Kiernan. The Commission viewed the proposed Board of Regional Community Colleges as a dispassionate authority able to rise above the political fray on issues such as community college locations and budgets. Moreover, as Coles (1977, p. 4) has written

The Audit Commission urged the development of a state-wide system of regional community colleges under the direction of its own board because members of the Commission did not want the colleges to be merely adjuncts to secondary education or other institutions of higher education. (p. 4)

The Board would serve as an advocate for the institutions in a Commonwealth whose "long emphasis on private education and other factors have combined to create a situation where many citizens are unaware either of general needs in higher education or the possibilities of such institutions as community colleges" (p. 59). Morrissey would write in later years that statewide coordination was the only option seriously considered (Quoted in Lustberg):

Here [Massachusetts] the organization of two-year public colleges has been undertaken by a single state board without local control or direct local responsibility for operations. In the
Massachusetts setting, there is reason to believe not only that it was the best solution but that it may have been the only solution. (p. 117)

The Commission recommended that the Board’s membership include the state’s Commissioner of Education, the President of the University of Massachusetts, the President of Lowell Technical Institute, and a president of a state teachers college elected annually. The total membership of the Board would be nine with the other five members appointed to overlapping five-year terms (p. 65). A board-appointed Executive Director would hold responsibility for "preparation of an over-all plan to meet the need for community college education in the entire State" (p. 66).

While leaving the exact locations of individual colleges and precise definition of regions to the Board, the Commission pointed (p. 15) to nine general regions deserving attention:

1. Metropolitan Boston
2. Lowell-Lawrence-Haverhill-Essex County
3. New Bedford-Fall River-Taunton-Attleboro-Bristol County
4. Greater Worcester
5. Greater Fitchburg
6. Franklin-Hampshire Counties
7. Springfield-Hampden County
8. Pittsfield-North Adams-Berkshire County
9. Cape Cod-Plymouth
The Commission envisioned that the immediate physical needs of the nascent community colleges would be met through the use of high schools or other temporary facilities (p. 66). Over the longer term, the Commission looked to the Board to develop a state-wide plan to "make possible large savings to the taxpayer through uniform architectural planning and the large-scale purchase of supplies, equipment and library books" (p. 66). Finally, the Commission called for passage of a bond issue by the Commonwealth to pay for capital charges associated with construction and major equipment purchases (p. 66).

The Commission report was comprehensive and, given the strong influence of Mahoney and Mallan, presented a community college program that was wholly consistent with Furcolo’s goals. Still, however, debate existed within the administration as to the wisdom of presenting a strong regional college bill to the Legislature in 1958.

The report had generated no groundswell of support either in communities across the Commonwealth or in the General Court. Moreover, there remained the issue of Massachusetts’ fiscal problems. Any new and expansive program would be a hard sell particularly at a time when Furcolo was mulling another attempt to secure passage of a sales tax.

So daunting were the hurdles that Furcolo recalls meeting with some twenty-five of his advisors from inside and outside the government. Twenty-four argued against
pursuing a community college bill at that time; one argued in favor. "I had one vote," Furcolo remembers, "so we went ahead" (Interview, 1988).

The period of March through November of 1958 is arguably the high water mark of the Furcolo administration. During this time, as he pursued the community college bill as well as several other key pieces of legislation, one sees the governor at his best.

Particularly in the community college bill, Furcolo demonstrated a focus and a political effectiveness that this author believes he never equalled. Mahoney recalls that during this period, the governor worked three to four hours a day on educational issues (Interview, July 27, 1993). In doing so, Furcolo drew on the formal and informal powers of his office. Lustberg has written (1979, p. 118):

> Despite the work of Mallan and all the educators, legislators and other members of the Special Commission on the Audit of State Needs, this work would have been 117 pages of well-documented but useless material had it not been for Governor Furcolo. (p. 118)

With Furcolo clearly engaged and in control, the administration pursued an aggressive three-part strategy.

First, the governor and his aides met regularly with legislators individually and in small groups. Furcolo remembers these meetings as attempts to "educate" those who questioned the need for regional community colleges and to "convince the legislators who already felt there was a need but who didn't want to spend the money because they didn't
believe the state could afford to spend the money"
(Videotape: "The Massachusetts Community College Story: The Early Years").

Second, the administration sought to create grassroots support among key constituencies in those areas tentatively slated for establishment of community colleges. Such support would not only help the cause of regional colleges locally but also, it was hoped, would have an impact in the General Court. As Furcolo recalls (videotape):

We had to try to go in the back door. By that I mean, we had to set up committees in the districts of the various legislators to try to educate the people in those districts in the hope that they then would put some pressure on members of the Legislature.

We had what was perhaps the most ambitious citizen participation program in the nation, where we had citizens participate in every phase of government.

And so we set up what we called advisory groups of prominent citizens and influential people in every region of the state and we proceeded to educate them and see if we could get some support.

Third, and perhaps most important, Furcolo took one of the most decisive actions of his governorship. Culling the Audit Commission report to its essential themes, the governor and his staff developed a special message for presentation to a joint session of the legislature on July 1, 1958.

In his special message, (The State's Responsibility for Higher Education, Senate 760 of 1958), Furcolo energetically engaged legislative and public opinion
leadership. Drawing on his capacity to create an audience by calling a special session, he set forth the case in support of his higher education program. The speech deserves attention for at least three reasons.

First, it stands as eloquent testimony to the passion with which Furcolo viewed educational issues. Calling the challenges which faced public higher education in the Commonwealth a "problem of almost overriding importance in our public life" (Senate 760), the governor left no doubt as to the priority which he personally placed upon the issue.

Second, Furcolo framed the debate in terms understandable to average families. He addressed in stark terms the impact of inadequate facilities upon access for high school graduates across Massachusetts.

The recent report of the Special Commission on the Audit of State Needs has demonstrated conclusively the magnitude of the problem which faces us in post high school education. The Audit Commission study shows that the minimum number of qualified Massachusetts residents seeking admission to college will rise from approximately 78,000 in 1957 to 88,000 in 1960 to 99,000 in 1962 and to 123,000 in 1967. If every public, private and parochial college in Massachusetts increases its capacity to the limits which it now anticipates, there will be a minimum shortage within the next 10 years of at least 39,000 places for qualified young men and women seeking post high school education. I wish to emphasize that the actual shortage may rise above 29,000 to 50,000 or more. This is roughly three times the present enrollment at all 15 state colleges in Massachusetts. It is roughly six times the present total enrollment at all the state teachers colleges. (Senate 760, p. 16)
Furcolo built from his fundamental argument of access to make the case for a statewide system of regional community colleges. His arguments echo those of the Special Commission and give additional insight into the governor's broad vision for two year institutions. He summarized that a community college system "has many advantages for students, for parents and for taxpayers". (Senate 760, p. 17) He outlined six such benefits:

1. For Families of Limited Income - "Colleges within commuting distance, enabling students to live at home, can mean a savings to the student and the family of from $1,400 to $4,400 for the first two years. Such savings will, in many cases, mean the difference between going to college or not going to college."

2. For Personal and Family Convenience - "... the presence of a regional community college within an area makes it both possible and desirable for students to attend college who otherwise have neither the hope nor the possibility of furthering their education."

3. For an Adequate Supply of Technical Personnel - "Modern business and industry require not only newly trained employees but the constant upgrading and retraining of those already at work. A system of regional community colleges will permit those industrial and vocational needs to be met in every region of Massachusetts."

4. For High-Quality Standards and Accreditation - "With high quality standards in a state system of regional community colleges, qualified students will be permitted to transfer in the junior year to the state university, the teachers colleges, the technical institutes and to other public and private colleges ... Fully equipped and properly staffed regional community colleges will be a source of regional pride and will benefit from maximum regional participation."

5. For Adult Education and Community Purposes - "A community college system will provide evening and adult programs for people 'from 18 to 80' who wish either vocational or non-vocational
schooling. In addition, a regional community college can serve as a cultural center and a source of expert consultants and advisors to many kinds of businesses, professional and governmental activities."

6. For the Benefit of Taxpayers - "I wish to emphasize that substantial savings can be achieved by the development of a state-wide plan for regional community colleges, utilizing a single, basic architectural plan benefitting from large scale purchase of supplies." (pp. 17-19)

To his special message, Furcolo attached a proposed capital outlay bill that incorporated all of public higher education. Included in the total capital outlay of more than $111 million was $24 million for "plans, site acquisition [and] construction of nine regional community colleges" (Senate 760. p. 39).

Furcolo formally requested a capital outlay bond issue of some $43 million for fiscal year 1959 to initiate the $111 million educational development program proposed by the Commission on the Audit of State Needs. Twenty-four million dollars of that amount remained earmarked for establishment of the community colleges. This recommendation quickly became locked in the House Ways and Means Committee amid concerns for the state's level of bonded indebtedness, anxiety about the growing operating deficit in 1959 and Republican demands for more coherent plans concerning community college development (Globe, 10/7/58, p. 11).

To break the logjam, Furcolo and Thompson agreed to push for immediate passage of only the community college piece of the legislation. In addition, the Governor and
Speaker agreed to press only for the authorization to appoint the Regional Board and to establish its powers consistent with the recommendations of the Commission on the Audit of State Needs. Funding would be left to a separate capital outlay bill to follow (Herald-Traveler, 8/12/58, Edward Devin, "House Passes Four Furcolo Bills: Witholding Port Authority Plans Passed," p. 4). With the election closing in and Furcolo facing the prospect of a tough fight with Republican gubernatorial nominee (and incumbent state Attorney General), George Fingold, August was set as the month of decision for major pieces of the Governor's legislative agenda. In strategy sessions with key aides and his allies in the Legislature, Furcolo agreed to a plan which would send four essential parts of his program (withholding tax, state office building, community college authorization, and Port Authority activation) to the House in a manner which tied the success of each one to that of the others.

Thompson intended to present the bills in a tightly defined sequence which would begin with the withholding tax, follow with the $30 million state office building proposal, the education plan and finally with the activation of the Port Authority. Only after passage of the first three measures would Thompson allow a vote on the Port Authority bill (Globe, 8/11/58, Evening Edition, "House Passes Withholding Tax Again," p. 1) which was very much supported by key members of the House.
At 1:00 PM on August 11, Thompson gaverted the House into what would be a marathon session that would run until after 3:00 AM the following morning. As expected, the withholding tax measure was approved by voice vote after a motion for its rejection was defeated by a roll call vote of 140-86 (Herald-Traveler, 8/12/58, p. 4). The $30 million office building proposal was approved next, allowing Thompson to move to the community college proposal.

During two hours of debate on the education bill, Wojtkowski and others argued on behalf of the measure against Republicans who called the plan "a political move" in an election year (Herald-Traveler, 8/12/58, p. 4).

Frank Giles (R-Methuen), the Republican floor leader, railed against the community college bill, arguing that it was "thrown to the people in an election year as a political morsel to try and make voters think the Democratic Party is deeply interested in the education of our youth" (Globe, 8/12/58, William J. Lewis, "4 Furcolo Bills Passed: Withholding Tax Voted; 9 Colleges Approved. $30 million State Office Building Ok'd," p. 13). Pointing to the Commonwealth’s continued financial challenges, Irene K. Thresher (R-Newton) claimed, "We shouldn’t kid the people into thinking they can have things we cannot afford to give them" (Globe, 8/12/58, "4 Furcolo Bills Passed: Withholding Tax Voted; 9 Colleges Approved. $30 million State Office Building Ok’d," p. 13).
The depth of conservative Republican opposition to the community college program and the level of passion of both sides of the issue was evident in an incident involving a member of the Grand Old Party which the Globe summarized:

One of the first to speak against the governor's multi-million community college and education program, Rep. Theodore J. Vaistses (R-Melrose) stated that he had been threatened in the House lobby for his refusal to go along with the governor's program. Just a few hours ago out there," asserted Vaistses, as he pointed toward the lobby, "I was threatened by one of his [the governor's] cohorts who told me something would happen to me for not being cooperative."

Vaistses then added, "There's no reason for somebody like William Callahan to send fear down on us." (Globe, 8/12/58, "4 Furcolo Bills Passed: Withholding Tax Voted; 9 Colleges Approved. $30 million State Office Building Ok'd," p. 1)

In the end, however, Thompson and his allies such as Representative Wojtkowski held the cards on the bill. Only two amendments were added to the measure, both by Wojtkowski and both with the purpose of strengthening the proposed Board's independent power. The first amendment authorized the Board to exercise the power of eminent domain in securing sites for the nine proposed community colleges while the second (which did not survive in the Senate) gave the Board power to set teachers salaries without prior approval by the Legislature or the State Department of Personnel and Standardization (Globe, 8/12/58, p. 13). The bill passed by voice vote with these amendments in place.

With passage of the first three bills in hand, Thompson brought the Port Authority bill to the floor.
After a significant debate in which several Furcolo demands (e.g., his call for a state audit of PA finances) were deleted, a bill approving an interest rate ceiling of 5% for Authority bonds was approved (*Globe*, 8/12/58. p. 13).

The four measures moved on to the Senate where one experienced observer (*Globe*, 8/12/58, p. 1) correctly predicted a rockier path:

But the real battlefield for all four of these measures is expected to be in the Senate where the GOP holds a slim but stubborn two-seat margin. The Senate has been the graveyard for most of the Furcolo administration program this year and last. (p. 13)

The community college bill faced a number of powerful adversaries in the Senate chamber. Most notably, Ralph C. Mahar (R-Orange), a staunch fiscal conservative and chair of the Ways and Means Committee, increasingly questioned both the notion of delegating expansive powers to an untested Board and the financial implications of increasing state debt to fund the proposed institutions.

Republican fears concerning the debt had intensified during the summer months of 1958 as Furcolo proposed a series of measures requiring debt financing. In addition to the $43,350,000 which would be required for educational expansion and $43,375,000 for unemployment relief, the Governor had by late August also proposed a $12,884,000 overhaul of the Commonwealth’s prison facilities (*Herald-Traveler*, 8/19/58, Killiam, p. 1). This nearly $100 million of new bonded indebtedness was layered on top of a projected deficit in the current fiscal year of some
$50 million (Boston Herald-Traveler, Editorial, "All on the Cuff," 8/19/58, p. 22). The growing debt situation had recently resulted in a Wall Street reduction of the Commonwealth's rating from AAA to AA (Globe, 10/11/58, p. 1). In the face of such indebtedness, Mahar recommended that the community college bill be shelved for study (Herald-Traveler, 8/13/58, p. 1), a position supported by the Herald-Traveler in an August 16 editorial:

Governor Furcolo is reportedly incensed because the Senate is taking time to deliberate a little on his regional college bill. The fact that the upper chamber has not rubber-stamped the measure as quickly as the House did makes him suspect a plot to defeat the project.

This urgency is unseemly and unnecessary. There is even less reason why the legislature should "vote first and talk afterwards" on this measure than on the emergency job bill which the Governor tried to rush through in the same manner earlier in the session. Providing educational opportunities for our young people, though important, is necessarily a long-range undertaking. There must be months of detailed planning before any buildings can rise or any students be enrolled.

The governor has a good idea but the legislation in which he has embodied it shows his own too hasty follow-through. It is hasty and incomplete. He wants the General Court to provide $24 million for the construction of nine regional community colleges and entrust all the details of development and administration to a still-to-be-named board. But he offers no proof that his precise number of colleges is needed. He merely suggests the probable locations of the institutions. He says nothing about the recruitment of faculty. And he makes no mention of maintenance and other continuing costs (estimated by the MA Federation of Taxpayers as upward of $20 million annually). Most important of all, he fails to show how Massachusetts, which cannot meet its regular departmental expenditures, is going to finance this enormous addition to its overhead. (Herald-Traveler, Editorial, "Time To Deliberate," 8/16/58, p. 4)
Recognizing that to permit the General Court to study his community college proposal and assume overt control over decisions such as campus locations would tie the measure up indefinitely while also politicizing the system’s future, Furcolo and his aides developed a strategy to force the Senate into action.

First, the Governor turned to Seymour Harris, distinguished Harvard economist, member of the Audit Commission and proponent of public higher education, to make the economic case for the community college plan. In the remaining years of his governorship, Furcolo would find no more loyal and respected public spokesman on behalf of two year colleges. In a letter to the editor of the Boston Herald-Traveler, Harris challenged the August 16 editorial in the same newspaper and developed the arguments which he would utilize in the months ahead:

The $20 million annual estimated cost quoted by you of the Massachusetts Tax Federation is absurdly high. General educational costs for junior colleges are $50-600. Hence, the correct figure is about $5 million per year. Massachusetts is just about last in public provision of higher education. The legislature has a heavy obligation in this field. Can it afford to delay? (8/28/58, "Junior College Plan within State Means," p. 18)

The governor played as well a critical trump card within the Republican Senate majority. Edward C. Stone, the aging Brahmin from Hyannis who had long sought a junior college for his district, became the point person in the Senate for the community college bill. As a conservative and wealthy businessman, Stone’s Republican credentials
were impeccable. And as a senior member of the Ways and Means Committee, he had the institutional strength to force a deal on the issue by Mahar and the Republican leadership. Of Stone’s role, his good friend Wojtkowski has said (Interview, June 1993):

Stone made that bill fly in the Senate. He was a man who was committed to education, to a regional college for the Cape in the vacant Maritime buildings, and to public works programs. Most of all, he was a respected Republican power. Without him, there would have been no community colleges.

Furcolo played the Stone card by allowing the Senator to lead on and gain credit for Senate adoption of the Port Authority bill. This legislation was of tremendous importance to Stone and his fellow Republicans. As such, by turning to the veteran member of Ways and Means as his point person on the Port Authority measure, Furcolo also solidified his relationship with a critical supporter of the community college initiative. As Mahoney recalls, "We horsetraded, giving them the Port Authority in exchange for the community colleges" (Interview July 27, 1993).

Furcolo accepted, in turning to Stone, a further blow to his already poor relationship with Powers. The Senate minority leader had remained largely silent during the summer concerning Furcolo’s legislative program. The governor’s willingness to turn to Stone on the Port Authority bill, however, combined with past tension over the sales tax, left Powers once again angry at the governor and unwilling to actively promote the community college

The attitude of Powers toward pending legislation desired by the administration will be observed in efforts to assess the political consequences of this apparent breach between him and his party’s standard bearer.

It was indicated that if the administration had taken him into its confidence 10 days ago the entire dispute might have been compromised before it burst onto the Senate floor. The episode revealed that the administration does not rely on him as an official spokesman and it was particularly disappointing to him because the spokesman was Stone, an undeviating Republican. One of the administration’s pet measures awaiting disposition calls for a vast expansion in public education facilities. Stone has ardently supported a crucial part of this program. Powers has not given any public indication of his position on this legislation.

The third key part of Furcolo’s strategy was an intensive public effort to counteract arguments against his program. Furcolo’s battle plan as the election approached increasingly focused on a campaign against the Republican-controlled Senate, which the governor blamed for his lack of legislative success during the past months (Globe, 8/13/58, William J. Lewis, "Pressure G.O.P. Furcolo Urges Voters on T.V.,” p. 1).

Furcolo opened this public campaign during two televised appearances paid for by his campaign committee on August 12 and 13. Arguing vigorously for his education proposal, Furcolo painted to his Republican opponent, Attorney General George Fingold and state GOP chairman Daniel ("Chuck") McClean as "trying to kill my education
program by attempting to put pressure on members of the Republican-dominated Senate." He further implored voters to "tell your Republican senators you want this bipartisan education program" (Globe, Lewis, 8/13/58, p. 1).

The fourth part of the governor's game plan was to continue to separate authorization of the regional board from the capital outlay proposal for campus planning and construction.

By fall, the Furcolo strategy had crystallized and his political position solidified. His opponent, Fingold, had died suddenly on August 31, leaving the Republicans in disarray. The late attorney general's replacement as a candidate faced the prospect of igniting a campaign from ground zero and held little prospect of defeating the incumbent governor.

Thus, with his position strengthened, Furcolo moved to capitalize. General agreements had been reached with both the House and Senate leadership that in exchange for final administration acceptance of the Port Authority bill, Republicans would acquiesce to passage of three key gubernatorial initiatives—a second Boston Harbor crossing to be constructed by Callahan's Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, the Boston Common garage and the independent Callahan-led corporation to build the $30 million state office building.

With Stone's leadership decisive, Furcolo had also secured sufficient votes to pass the legislation.
authorizing establishment of the regional community college board. Stone’s leadership in navigating the bill through the choppy Senate waters during the throws of an election campaign was masterful.

The final Senate vote in support of the regional board stands as testimony largely to Stone’s power and his determination. It stands also as Furcolo’s reward for turning to the Republican brahmin to secure a critical victory. Finally, it is testimony to the governor’s wisdom in packaging the legislature with other bills that were important to Stone and other key political actors. On October 3, Furcolo signed Chapter 605 of the Acts of 1958, authorizing establishment of a regional community college board to plan and develop a system of two-year colleges in the Commonwealth. Still uncertain, however, were the futures of Furcolo’s two major bond proposals for unemployment relief and education expansion. As bond issues, each required a 2/3 majority in both the House and Senate, a difficult prospect at best.

The unemployment relief measure faced a particularly difficult course. When the measure was first introduced in March, 1958, Massachusetts and the rest of the nation had been mired in a recession. By October, the economy looked to be improving, with the governor himself pointing to 30,000 new jobs in private industry and $600,000 having been spent on new industrial construction during his term (Herald-Traveller, 10/3/58, Edward Devin, "Senate Revives
Jobless Aid Bill: Parties Clash on Need of Fund," p. 5). Despite several resuscitations in both the House and Senate during early October, the unemployment bond issue would ultimately die on the House floor on October 7 after what the Herald-Traveler labelled "Acid" (Herald-Traveler, 10/8/58, Edward Devin, "House Kills $43,475,000 Job Projects: Furcolo Bill Lacks Two-Thirds Vote After Acid Debate," p. 1).

The capital outlay was thus left as the last major Furcolo legislative initiative of 1958.

As the employment relief bill was moving toward its political grave, the House Ways and Means Committee was moving to pare down the capital outlay bill. As the full House began debate on the outlay at 3:00 pm on October 7, the original amount of the bond issue for regional colleges had been cut by the Committee from $24 million to $8 million (Globe, 10/7/58, Evening Edition, "Capital Outlay Bill Sent to House," p. 29).

Early in the House debate, Republican Floor Leader Giles moved to eliminate the community college piece of the outlay entirely, a motion which was defeated on a roll call of 104-93 (Globe, 10/8/58, William J. Lewis, "House Kills Jobs Bond Issue: 118-89 Vote Less Than Two-Thirds," p. 23).

Giles received the support of Representative Tynan for his effort. Tynan, a victim of Thompson’s purge, said, "It is utterly ridiculous to vote this outlay when the Ways and Means Committee cannot even now tell us where these
colleges are to be located or even how many students they are to accommodate" (Globe, Lewis, 10/8/58, p. 23).

Following Giles' initial thrust, a number of motions were filed which reduced the community college outlay to sums ranging from $320,000 to $1 million (Globe, Lewis, 10/8/58, p. 23). Each was defeated on roll call votes.

The most significant challenge, however, came in a parliamentary maneuver by Giles. Not long after debate begun, he filed a motion to postpone action on the outlay until the next day to allow further study. Despite Thompson's opposition, the measure passed on a roll call of 122-82. Recognizing that such delay could mean the death of the bill, Thompson quickly recessed the House until 7:00 pm that evening.

Although little is known of exactly how Thompson used the hours available, it is known that when the House reconvened it voted 106-94 to reconsider the postponement measure and that by 1:30 a.m. of the next morning, the House had approved a capital outlay for college development which included $8 million to plan and develop community colleges.

Debate in the Senate over the capital outlay was even more contentious than in the House, and given the Republican majority, its outcome was far more questionable. Senate ways and Means Chair Mahar was pointing toward major cuts beyond those in the House--citing as his rationale the Commonwealth's growing debt and precarious
The bill which emerged from the Senate was indeed a significantly reduced version of that passed by the House. In cutting the total capital outlay proposal bill by $20 million, the Senate slashed the portion devoted to education projects by one-half. The $28 million bill passed with almost no debate in the upper chamber and cut the community college outlay from $8 million down to $1 million, a figure recommended by the Senate Ways and Means, despite an attempt by Sen. William Fleming (D-Worcester) to restore the $8 million figure on the Senate floor. Fleming’s effort failed on a roll call vote of 15-15 (A two-thirds majority necessary to approve bond issues) (Globe, Lewis, 10/11/58, p. 1).

Mahar’s arguments were seconded by other members of the Republican majority, such as Harrison Chadwick who argued:

The capital outlay program [passed by the House] contains a blank check for $8 million to be spent by the governor’s proposed community college commission which has not yet been appointed. It contains no emergency items—nothing that cannot wait until the next session. (Herald, 10/12/58, Edward Devin, "Scene and Heard: Words of Wisdom by Johnson Chadwick Ignored as House Votes $48 Million for Capital Outlay," p. 18)

Ironically, as the Senate was slashing the community college outlay, Furcolo moved to appoint the Board of Regional Community Colleges (Globe, 10/11/58, "Furcolo
Names 12 Members to College Board," p. 3) (A full list of original Board is provided in Appendix C). The Board was largely comprised of leading educators and supporters of the Governor’s community college initiative. Chapter VII provides a detailed discussion of the MBRCC and its activity during the period 1958-62.

Furcolo and his allies were faced with a moment of stark political reality. As a House-Senate Conference Committee began its efforts to mesh the two versions of the capital outlay bill, the Governor and community college advocates in the House faced three options.

First, they could attempt to force Senate conferees into accepting a higher dollar value for the outlay and for community colleges.

Second, they could focus solely on the community college section of the bill, seeking to increase its appropriation, irrespective of the amounts set aside for other parts of the bill.

Third, they could accept a small but partial victory by accepting the Senate cuts, choosing to press on and fight another day.

Recognizing that the first two options each risked losing everything in a renewed fight as the Legislature concluded its session, Furcolo and his allies opted for the third route. As House Ways and Means member Anthony Schibelli explained at the time, "Let us accept what the Senate will give us rather than nothing at all" (Herald,
Having adopted this strategy, the House and Senate moved quickly toward agreement, sending a final capital outlay bill of $28 million to the Governor's desk before prorogation October 16. On the same day, the Governor signed the legislation which included $1 million to begin development of community colleges in Massachusetts (Herald, 10/17/58, Edward Devin, "$408,180,000 Session Ends, State Debt Reaches Billion Mark: Furcolo Blasts Senators," p. 17).

With passage of the reduced capital outlay bill, Furcolo's attention turned first to re-election, then to the Commonwealth's continued fiscal dilemma and to implementation of key parts of his agenda including the community college program.

Furcolo's strategy revolved around emphasis on his efforts both to provide fiscal stability and to lead an activist government in pursuit of progressive goals. Moreover, he continued to focus strong attacks on the Republican-controlled Senate, labeling it "one of shame, fraud, deceit and political fakery" (Boston Herald, 10/17/58, Devin, p. 17). In doing so, he hoped to achieve not only his re-election but the long-awaited Democratic control of the legislature.

The Governor accomplished his goals with a solid across-the-board victory in November. Winning nearly
1,100,000 votes to approximately 815,000 for his new opponent, Gibbons, Furcolo carried Democratic majorities with him in both the House (147-93) and the Senate (24-16). Furcolo and soon-to-be Senate President Powers would have the chance to reconcile their tempestuous political relationship.

As the Governor prepared for his second inaugural, however, all was not bright on his horizon. Most significantly, the governor continued to see little alternative to the sales tax as the foundation for his progressive agenda, despite signs that the economy was beginning to lift itself out of recession. Ironically, the economy's improvement in some ways made Furcolo's challenges more complex; for, as the recovery settled in, both the Legislature and the general public felt less urgency to attack the deficit through the Governor's tax program. Thus, as prospects for the sales tax and withholding proposal continued to diminish, Furcolo's maneuverability also declined as he sought to implement his ambitious program in the face of a still limited capacity for new spending.

Clearly, Furcolo needed to identify some mechanism to pay for his program or else lose much of it during the upcoming budget debate of spring 1959. Although he stopped short of formally reintroducing either the sales tax or the withholding program, the rhetoric of both the Governor's inaugural and his subsequent budget proposal indicate his
continued belief that they offered the only responsible means by which government could continue to meet its obligations.

Arguing in his inaugural address that Massachusetts would need $25 million in new revenue "just to carry on the regular services to the public for the next six months and for the twelve months starting July 1, the State will have to raise $65 million to continue present services (Globe, 1/5/59, Evening Edition, "Must Raise $90 Million, Says Furcolo," p. 12). Furcolo labeled the Commonwealth’s fiscal dilemma "the greatest challenge ever to face state government" (Globe, 1/5/59, "Must Raise $90 Million, Says Furcolo," p. 1).

Still, however, the Governor remained passionately committed to the core elements of his progressive agenda. In describing this agenda, he moved quickly to the area nearest to his heart (Globe, 1/9/59, "Abolishment of Milk Control Commission Urged. Also Asks New Approach to Tax Policies Structure," p. 13).

Last year, in a special message to the General Court, I recommended a blueprint for action designed to enable the Commonwealth to assume its full share of responsibility in meeting the state and national crisis in higher education. That program included the planned expansion of facilities at the University of Massachusetts, the state teachers colleges, the Massachusetts School of Art and the Lowell Technical Institute. The Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges was established last year in order to provide a statewide system of high quality, low-cost education in every section of the Commonwealth. We must now implement the authorized program of the Board of Regional Community Colleges and I shall later make
necessary recommendations for this purpose.
(House No. 1, 1959)

In his budget submission (House I) for FY60, delivered in January 1959, Furcolo made no separate request for additional funds to support the community college program or the regional college board. Instead, he left any such proposal to later in the spring and concentrated additional budget dollars for education on the personnel needs of Massachusetts' existing institutions. In requesting 217 new positions for the Department of Education, he stated:

In my Special Message to the Legislature of last year on "The Responsibility of the Commonwealth in Higher Education," I pointed out that accompanying the recommendations for the physical expansion of badly needed educational facilities must be adequate support to recruit and retain competent teaching and administrative personnel. I, therefore, requested that the Informal Coordinating Committee of the Presidents of the public institutions of higher learning make a comprehensive study of the minimum salary and staffing administrative personnel. I believe that they have successfully and responsibly demonstrated the need for additional support.

Although the Board carried primary statutory responsibility for implementing a community college program, Furcolo continued to serve as advocate, both behind the scenes with legislators and in public appearances around the state. As detailed in Chapter VII, he lobbied hard on behalf of Wojtkowski's bid for a Pittsfield college as well as for seed money to support the first campus and operations of the Board of Regional Community Colleges.
By summer 1959, however, the Governor's attention was again diverted by the sales tax issue. Having finally achieved victory in January on the withholding program, Furcolo had resubmitted the 3% limited sales tax to the General Court. Despite his passionate entreaties and promises of property tax relief, the Democratic House defeated the measure by an overwhelming 197-24 margin on August 6, 1959, ending any chance of passage that year.

In documenting the Furcolo administration, the failure of the sales tax stands as a chronic political bete-noire for the Governor. Like Prometheus struggling vainly to push his heavy stone up an unforgiving mountain, Furcolo three times returned to the ill-fated tax as a means to provide stable revenue for his ambitious program. Honorable in his intent and only a matter of years ahead of history on the issue, the Governor paid a high price for his quest. Alienated from members of his own party, perceived as pushing for more taxes in the face of an improving economy and buffeted by the ripples of three major political losses on the issue, it is impossible to quantitatively measure the impact of the sales tax on other parts of his program. But it is undeniable that it had an impact and that the impact on the Furcolo governorship was significant.

Fall 1959 also found the Governor consumed by other difficult legislative issues beyond the sales tax and
community college development. Two stand as particularly informative.

First, during the summer, the Governor had supported legislation raising the salaries of faculty at the University of Massachusetts and the ten state teachers colleges. Arguing that the state's fiscal situation precluded more, Furcolo failed to push for concomitant increases for the other 35,000 state workers, including non-faculty at the Commonwealth's institutions of higher education. This position was endorsed by outgoing University President Mather as well as other college presidents, but earned the ire of pro-labor Democrats such as then Boston mayoral candidate Powers as well as state employees and union leaders. The Legislature would ultimately pass a general pay increase.

At the same time, debate was proceeding on a capital outlay bill totaling some $22 million which the Governor had submitted late in the legislative session. Inspired by an improving economy and probably in no small measure by the upcoming advent of an election year, House members had added some $80 million to the bill before sending it on to the Senate. Ironically, none of the proposed spending was dedicated to community college planning or development. The Upper House, in a similar spirit of largess increased the outlay to $34.6 million before passage.

In mid-September, with both general pay increases and the nearly $35 million outlay on his desk awaiting
signature, the Governor shocked his legislative colleagues by vetoing nine major pieces of the latter bill (Globe, 9/16/59, William J. Lewis, "Legislature Fails in Windup Drive," p. 1). An angry and tired Legislature was forced to remain in session to respond. It did so, resoundingly defeating the vetoes on roll call votes on September 16 and 17 (Globe, 9/16/59, William J. Lewis, "Lawmakers Quit After 8 Months," p. 1).

Thus, the Governor ended the 161st session of the General Court facing a still testy relationship with the Democratic majority in both houses.

Completion of this somewhat rocky legislative session allowed Furcolo to focus on the next chapter of his political life, speculation about which had mounted as to whether he would make another run against Senator Saltonstall in 1960.

The Governor's annual special message to the General Court (Senate No. 1, 1960) could be seen as setting the stage for the campaign to come. Reaching beyond education which had been the bell-weather issue of his administration, Furcolo identified seven issues as his "positive state program" to spur economic development in the year ahead.

1. Natural resources and the promotion of related technologies
2. Programs of economic assistance and industrial promotion
3. Improved transportation facilities
4. Protection of consumer interests
5. Progress in labor management
6. Greater odiousness and economy in operation of state government
7. Constitutional revision and reform

In his budget submission for FY61 (House No. 1, 1960), the Governor proposed a total of $34,382,057 in state spending, including $900,000 of new expenditures for essential state services and a total increase of some $3 million in General Fund requirements. Of the $900,00 in new expenditures recommended $85,000 was slated for the MBRCC to help in the opening of Berkshire. This community college proposal was markedly less that the $200,000 requested by the Board, a fact which is at least as reflective of the still tenuous state of legislative support as it is of the Governor's continued sense of fiscal fragility.

The Governor's budget also called for more than $58,000,000 in capital construction projects for the upcoming fiscal year, including over $30,000,000 to complete the three-year educational plan submitted in 1958. Although there was little chance of this aggressive outlay passing, it offered more than election-year posturing. It again demonstrated the Governor's deep-seated belief in educational access. As he noted in his budget address (House No. 1, 1960):
In this budget more than 1200 new students have been provided for in September of this year at our institutions of public higher education, and this increase in student capacity reflects construction approved over the past three years. The need for additional higher education facilities is increasing, however, and the years immediately ahead promise to produce an unprecedented demand for added classrooms, laboratories, etc. for the qualified young people of Massachusetts. The program that I am recommending will assist thousands of Massachusetts students to take full advantage of higher educational opportunities, and will enable Massachusetts more effectively to meet the educational challenge of the present and the future.

The Governor’s announcement of a Senate run had combined with the Presidential bid of favorite son, John F. Kennedy, to energize the Massachusetts political scene. While some six Democrats battled for the nomination to succeed the governor, the first-term Mayor of Springfield, Thomas O’Connor, opened a long-shot bid to defeat Furcolo in the Democratic contest to select Saltonstall’s opponent.

A full review of the 1960 election in Massachusetts lies beyond the scope of this study. It is ironic, however, that as John Kennedy’s political star achieved its zenith, that of his rival Foster Furcolo fell suddenly from the sky.

Having won the party’s nod at its June convention, Furcolo moved to the September 12 primary as the odds-on favorite for formal nomination. O’Connor, however, refused to quit the race, arguing both that the Governor had coerced support from convention delegates and that Furcolo ultimately would do no better against Saltonstall than he
had in 1954. While Furcolo campaigned on his achievements in areas such as higher education, O'Connor relentlessly portrayed himself as an outsider who had cut taxes each year of his term as Springfield's Mayor (Globe, 9/12/60, Advertisement, p. 3).

O'Connor's vigorous campaign caught hold in the late summer weeks. A series of alleged scandals in the purchasing and public works areas of state government hurt the Governor as investigations loomed. Moreover, Furcolo was probably damaged by the nearly inevitable outcomes of two terms in executive office—an intangible public desire for change to a new younger generation of political leadership (not unlike the mood that helped carry Kennedy to the presidency) as well as the cumulative scars of legislative battles. As political columnist John Harris summarized on the eve of the primary (Globe, 9/12/60, "Rebel Democrats Enliven Election," p. 26), "The dissenting vote has often proved significant in past primaries when Governors seek re-election or other office when their terms draw to a close."

O'Connor's victory in the Democratic primary was shocking, as he claimed over 268,000 votes against the Governor's more than 218,000 (with some 70,000 votes to Middlesex County Registrar of Deeds, Edmond C. Buckley). O'Connor had accomplished a smashing victory in what would prove to be Furcolo's last campaign. It is poignant and ironic that one of the final stops of that last campaign,
opening ceremonies at the new Berkshire Community College on September 10, had to be postponed due to the threat of Hurricane Donna. An emotional Furcolo, unable to complete his remarks, would attend that ceremony as outgoing governor in December, 1960.
CHAPTER VI

VOLPE: THE COMMUNITY COLLEGE PROGRAM BEGINS TO GROW

Every governor or elected official assumes office with a distinct set of priorities that are driven partially by the temperament and background of the individual and partially by the moment in which he or she governs. Just as Woodrow Wilson came to power with a priority commitment to economic reform only to be cast as world leader during the Great War, so too did Foster Furcolo come to his governorship with a progressive agenda centered on his personal commitment to education only to have fiscal reality and legislative difficulties draw him into new battles over tax policy.

John Volpe assumed the Massachusetts governorship with his own set of priorities and his own value structure. A successful self-made Republican contractor, he believed in government's responsibility to support major social programs in areas such as education and mental health. He was, moreover, committed to cleanse state government of corruption and cronyism, while promoting constitutional reforms that would make the infrastructure of government more modern and efficient. Most of all, Volpe was at heart a builder who sought to expand the Commonwealth's construction activity while maintaining fiscal restraint and providing property tax relief.
Unlike Furcolo, Volpe did not hold education, much less community colleges, as his primary area of interest; although he endorsed expansion of the two-year community college system. It is important to emphasize, however, that while his support of education was sincerely felt and helped to spur the expansion of community colleges, it was not fundamental to Volpe's governorships.

It is this dichotomy—the willingness of Volpe to back community colleges as good things which offered attendant political benefits, combined with his apparent lack of focus as to either the framework of the community college system or its mission that opened a vacuum of policy opportunity for others to fill. The story of Volpe's governorship as it relates to community colleges and to educational issues in general is largely a story of how momentum created by his predecessor combined with events as well as with the efforts of leaders in both the Legislature and the community college movement to draw a willing governor toward a significant expansion in campus development.

The 1960 Election

The election of 1960 electrified Massachusetts as its junior Senator became the youngest man and first person of Irish Catholic descent to achieve the presidency of the United States. But as John F. Kennedy swept the Commonwealth by a margin of 500,000 votes (Globe, 11/9/60, John Harris, "Bay State Splits for Jack, Salty, Volpe,
McCormack," p. 1) over Vice President Richard M. Nixon, two other major Democrats were facing surprisingly one-sided defeats in races for statewide offices.

Having defeated Furcollo in the Democratic primary, Mayor O'Connor carried on his aggressive campaign against the stalwart Senator Saltonstall. Despite his attempts to set himself as a vigorous alternative to "Salty", Massachusetts voters opted for the established Republican Brahmin by some 299,000 votes (Globe, 11/9/60, Late Edition, C. R. Owens, "Volpe Wins by 132,000, Saltonstall Margin 299,000," p. 1).

In the race for Governor, Secretary of State Joseph Ward survived a primary challenge from six other Democrats to earn the right to face Republican businessman John A. Volpe. Despite Kennedy's big win, Ward carried the burden of a bitter and divisive primary contest as well as the continuing investigation of alleged corruption within the MDC and DPW. These disadvantages combined with a smaller than expected pro-Ward vote in Boston to ensure a Republican win. Volpe, who had never before sought elective office, captured the governorship with a plurality of 132,000 votes (Globe, 11/9/60, Late Edition, Owens, p. 1).

Amidst the euphoria of his victory, Governor-elect Volpe faced the reality of increased Democratic control in the Legislature. Twenty-four Democrats would sit in the upcoming 162nd session of the Senate, as opposed to 14
Republicans (the margin in the previous session had been 21-17). The Democrats had also increased their margin in the House, to 143-92 (Globe, 11/10/60, William J. Lewis, "Slim Pickin's for Bay State GOP," p. 12).

Volpe was surrounded as well by a full slate of Democratic state constitutional officers. Edward McGlaughlin of Boston was elected to serve as Lt. Governor. Attorney General Edward McCormick was re-elected to the post of Attorney General. Representative John Driscoll of Boston won the contest for Treasurer, with Kevin White elected to succeed Ward as Secretary of State. Finally, Thomas Buckley, a Democrat who was carrying out the investigations into the M.D.C. and D.P.W., earned re-election as Auditor.

Thus, despite Saltonstall's victory, Volpe's election was an aberration in the campaign of 1960. As Globe political reporter John Harris wrote in a retrospective two days after the election (Globe, 11/10/60, John Harris, "Volpe, Salty Didn't Squeak in . . ., They Raced," p. 1):

... There is no question that he won widespread acceptance as a successful businessman deeply interested in civic affairs.

But his election won a heavy assist from what the Democrats did to themselves in the primary and an even greater assist from voters who wanted to show their disapproval of the scandalous situation that was revealed in the M.D.C.'s operations.

The Governor-Elect

Volpe, himself, was something of a new breed of Massachusetts Republican. In a state whose GOP leadership
had been comprised largely of Brahmin stock, the 52-year-old Governor-elect was a self-made man who had built a major construction business from ground zero.

A former journeyman union plasterer, Volpe had taken evening classes at Boston's Wentworth Institute before quitting his job to become a full-time day student. To support his day studies, he took a job selling shirts in the evening.

Upon completion of his studies, the future governor opened Volpe Construction with $500 borrowed from a friend. In World War II, he gave up operation of his business to become a civil engineer in the Navy. Following the war, Volpe returned to his construction business and led it to prominence throughout New England.

In 1953, Republican governor Christian Herter appointed Volpe (who had become Deputy Chairman of the Republican State Party in 1950) to the post of Commissioner of Public Works. Appointed by President Eisenhower as Federal Highway Administrator shortly thereafter, Volpe helped the administration develop the massive national highway program of the 1950s. Upon his return to Massachusetts, Volpe again moved to a position of prominence in the business community, becoming President of the Boston Chamber of Commerce.

The Volpe Agenda: 1961

Three key factors shaped the first year of the Volpe administration. First, was the new governor's attempt to
capitalize on public dissatisfaction with the alleged corruption and mismanagement in the MDC and DPW by making political and constitutional reform synonymous with his administration. Second, was Volpe’s personal history as a builder and his innate interest in issues related to construction: to creating roads, bridges and buildings as fundamental cornerstones of his legacy. Third, Volpe faced the dilemma of achieving his program in the face of Democratic majorities in the Legislature who were already looking to a return to executive power in 1962.

Volpe’s inaugural address, which the Boston Globe described as "moderate" (Globe, 1/5/61, Late Edition, C. R. Owens, "Volpe Calls a Halt: Plans Changes in DPW, MDC, MTA. Bars New Spending with $1 Billion Debt," p. 1) sought to establish the new governor as an agent of reform who would maintain progress on key fronts while ensuring fiscal prudence. He offered few specific proposals and made no direct references to higher education or community colleges.

Reform was the major topic as the Governor’s address called for reorganization of both the MDC and the DPW—recommending that each agency be run by an executive director instead of the existing multi-commissioner format. He also called for a standard code of ethical conduct for all Massachusetts public officials, saying that it was time to "rebuild public respect for our government" (Senate I, January, 1961). Finally, Volpe set the stage for future
proposals on constitutional reform by arguing that "there is an overwhelming need for action" (Senate I, 1961) to modernize the infrastructure of state government.

The Governor's ensuing budget message (House No. 1, 1961) for Fiscal Year 1962 is interesting on several fronts. First, its rhetoric concerning fiscal affairs is remarkably similar to that of Furcolo in 1956 and not unlike that which one would expect of any governor assuming power from a member of the opposing party:

I found when I started work on this budget that there was $25 million less to work with than I had looked forward to a month earlier to pay for state purposes and local aid. (House No. 1, 1961)

Arguing that there were 5,000 more state employees than five years earlier (707 in education), Volpe pointed to his overall $57 million reduction of departmental requests for the upcoming fiscal year. This said, he called for an $11,000,000 increase in total general fund appropriations, labeling it "the minimum required to meet obligations for which we are committed" (House No. 1, 1961).

Of 245 recommended new positions in state government, Volpe slated 62 for the new regional colleges, the second highest figure (after the Belchertown Nursery) awarded any department or agency. The Governor also recommended an additional 59 new positions for the University of Massachusetts and 13 for the Commonwealth's state colleges.
Overall funding for the community colleges was also markedly increased. As summarized in Table 1, the proposed total budget for community colleges was nearly $551,000, an increase of almost $400,000 over the FY61 appropriation. Some $37,000 of this amount was earmarked for the Board’s operating costs, while the remainder was divided among the four nascent colleges (Berkshire, Cape Cod, Metropolitan Boston and Northern Essex).

In describing the rationale for these proposed increases, Volpe’s words again echoed these of Furcolo in their professed commitment to access (House No. 1, 1961):

The 13 positions for the state colleges will allow them to enroll 450 more students as planned. The expansion program of the University is based on taking 600 more students in 1962 and provides 50 clerical, technical and maintenance positions for new buildings and for administration.

For the Regional Community Colleges, 53 positions are for a planned first year enrollment of about 800 at Boston, Haverhill, and Hyannis, and nine more positions for the second year at Pittsfield for 150 students.

This the total of 134 college positions will make it possible to enroll 2,131 additional students making a grand total of 19,385 as compared with 17,254 now in state operated colleges.

Clearly, Volpe was presenting a vision for community college development which was consistent with Furcolo’s agenda. By May, when the Legislature concluded the shortest session in its history, almost all of Volpe’s recommendations for community college expansion would be enacted.
It appears logical, then, to assume that education remained a high priority and high visibility issue for the new governor. Interestingly, however, a review of major press during the first year of the Volpe administration generates nary a major speech or gubernatorial message focused on community colleges. Nor do those who observed the governor at the time remember him as a passionate advocate for community colleges. Wojtkowski recalls, "It's fair to say Volpe wasn't a big education person in terms of his basic priorities. He was a builder" (Interview, July 21, 1993).

By March, Volpe had initiated a significant effort to push lawmakers into supporting his recommended reorganization of the MDC and DPW as well as his proposed code of ethics and a reform of the Massachusetts constitution. Specifically, the governor sought to modernize the 180-year-old document by moving to four-year gubernatorial terms and by establishing coterminous service by key executive branch officials (e.g., commissioner of administration, purchasing agent, comptroller, budget director, personnel director) and the governor. In the general concern for good and efficient government, Volpe had found an issue than could separate him from the Democratic establishment in the Legislature and possibly earn him popular legislative victories that could in turn provide momentum for the rest of his program.
The push for reform dominated much of the Boston media discussion during the spring 1961 session of the Legislature. As prominent legal scholars and public officials joined the media to support a constitutional convention to modernize the Constitution, legislators began to board the bandwagon. Speaker Thompson went so far as to float the idea of a joint session to debate both four-year gubernatorial terms and the idea of a graduated income tax which Democrats had traditionally found appealing as a basis for substantive tax reform.

Beyond political and constitutional reform, Volpe’s attention focused on a delicate issue concerning the New Haven Railroad. On the verge of bankruptcy, the carrier had turned to the governors of New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island and Massachusetts for relief. Statutorily, if Volpe moved to aid the New Haven Railroad, he was also required to assist the Boston and Maine. In committing himself to tax relief for the railroads as well as to state assumption of various maintenance functions such as bridge repair and to the state purchase of a railroad right-of-way between Boston and the southeastern city of Braintree to be used for rapid transit development, the governor presented what one observer called "the biggest legislative package which must be resolved this year" (Globe, 3/7/61, S. J. Micciche, "$1.2 Million 'Safe Haven' Bill Given Legislature by Volpe Today," p. 1, and 4/21/61, S. J. Micciche, "Thompson Hits Volpe Rule As 'Era of Good Feeling,'" p. 8).
The railroad measure would generate partisan controversy throughout the spring as Thompson and other Democrats criticized such extensive tax relief for the two carriers (Globe, 4/21/61, S. J. Micciche, "Thompson Hits Volpe Rule As 'Era of Good Feeling,'" p. 8).

On the construction front, Volpe’s early attention focused on agreements for a $170 million extension of the Massachusetts Turnpike into Boston and on a new $127 million "inner belt" roadway through the state capital.

The Turnpike extension was the more contentious. It had stalled over the issue of whether it should be a toll road or a freeway. Turnpike Authority Director (and Democratic powerhouse) William Callahan strongly supported a toll road under his agency’s direction while the new governor endorsed a free route. Agreement on the issue would elude the two throughout Volpe’s term, as would a final go-ahead on the inner beltway.

Other major public construction projects were about to start in Metropolitan Boston. With 90 per cent federal funding, Route 95 North and South of Boston as well as Route 93 through the city were underway. Final design competition was in progress for a new government center and city hall complex in downtown Boston, preparatory work continued on the Boston Common garage. The new state office building and the second harbor tunnel—all passed during Furcolo’s 1958 legislative push. On the private
side, the long-awaited Prudential Tower finally seemed ready for a go-ahead.

Still, by the end of April, Volpe could point to few major legislative accomplishments. Democrats in the legislature were already talking of bringing the session to a close. Boston Globe political analyst, William Lewis, viewed the governor's prospects as bleak (4/21/61, "Little Done . . . but Done Fast," p. 17):

> The 1961 legislative session to date has been mostly sound and fury. Much legislation has been killed outright or sidetracked. Little legislation of major import has cleared the branches. It has been a stalemate in the Legislature clearly dominated by the Democrats. Virtually all of Republican Governor Volpe's legislative program is in limbo and apparently destined for defeat.

As is often the case, the waning moments of the session saw a last minute flurry in the Legislature with Volpe achieving at least a portion of his legislative priorities. Most significantly, the governor secured passage of both three-year 60% tax relief for the railroads and the power to purchase the Boston-Braintree right-of-way. In addition, the Legislature approved a modified reorganization of the MDC which maintained the four-person governing commission but gave the agency's director expanded powers (Globe, 6/1/61, James H. Hammond, "MDC Reorganized; Murphy Now Czar," p. 4). The Legislature failed to act, however, on the Governor's proposals concerning constitutional reform, an ethics code, the inner belt roadway, or reorganization of the MTA and DPW.
Of particular interest for this study, however, is the rather odd fact that as the Legislature was putting the brakes on many of Volpe's major initiatives, it joined him to support significant increases in day-to-day operating appropriations for a variety of state agencies.

By the time the Legislature ended the shortest session in its history on May 25, 1961, it had passed and the governor had signed a budget of over $483 million for the upcoming (1963) fiscal year as well as a supplemental appropriation of some $4.5 million to close the books on Fiscal Year 1961 (which would end June 30). This increased spending reflects a growing sense in the General Court that the Commonwealth's worst fiscal woes were over and that the economy was in a period of growth. For the Legislature the net result was an explosion of pent-up demand for spending on a range of projects. As Wojtkowski remembers "there was money to spend."

In accepting the largest budget in the Commonwealth's history, the Legislature and Volpe also tacitly accepted an inevitable budget deficit for Fiscal Year 1962. Estimates by state fiscal officers indicated that the $483 million budget would result in a deficit of between $5-10 million and that an additional $18 million would be necessary to match the normal increases in state costs during the 1962-63 fiscal period (Globe, 5/24/61, C. R. Owens, "Deficit Bound Volpe Serene," p. 17). This last minute
largesse allowed both Volpe and the Legislature to claim victory on several important fronts.

The budget provided the governor at least some sense of achievement and movement in areas across state government. Moreover, as shall be discussed subsequently, in areas such as higher education, the budget allowed Volpe to give key legislators victories in their home districts. Finally, as C. R. Owens of the Globe noted in a retrospective on the 1961 session, the inevitable deficit of FY92 offered Volpe the opportunity to again engage the sales tax issue. Writing that "there hasn’t been a governor in recent memory who has faced the prospect of deficit spending with more equanimity than does John A. Volpe," Owens went on to speculate (Globe, 5/24/61, Owens, p. 17):

It is more likely that the governor will wait until next year before asking the Legislature to enact the tax measure to provide the needed money. The 1962 Legislative session will have five or more months before the Commonwealth actually runs out of funds. With an empty treasury facing them, the Legislators may be more amenable to approving a tax increase--such as a sales tax levy which Governor Volpe supported during the administration of Governor Furcolo.

For Democrats in the Legislature, the budget also fulfilled a set of needs. First, it maintained fundamental elements of the progressive agenda established during the past four years, while blocking approval of several Volpe initiatives. Moreover, if a tax increase became necessary during the next year, Democrats could put the governor in the unenviable position of pushing for new revenues during
an election year. Finally, as noted above, the budget provided many Democrats with benefits to bring back to their home constituencies.

This interesting balance of needs between Volpe and the Democratic Legislature is important to the core issue of this study. As Table 1 demonstrates, the Legislature adopted and the governor approved, major increases in appropriations for the community college program. The final Fiscal Year 1962 operating budget of $538,085 (including $20,484 in a supplemental budget to the general appropriations bill), though some $12,000 less than that requested in Volpe's House 1, represents approximately a $400,000 increase over the appropriation for Fiscal Year 1961. All this despite minimal public discussion of either community colleges or public higher education by either the governor or the legislative leadership.

"The Mess in Massachusetts Education" -- The Media Focuses the Agenda

The world of politics and policymaking is often as much reactive as proactive. Events in far-off lands (e.g., Sputnik) or in the nation's capitol (e.g., Civil Rights legislation, funding for new initiatives) can shape popular opinion and thus directly or indirectly affect policymaking at the state level. The press, particularly in the pages of the state capitol's major dailies or on the airwaves of network affiliates, holds the power to shape the politics of the moment and to focus the policy debate through the power and reach of their influence.
Table 1

Massachusetts State Budget Chronology - Community Colleges
Fiscal Years 1959-1962

The Furcolo Administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 3, 1958</td>
<td>Governor Furcolo signs Chapter 605 of the Acts of 1958 which established a Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges and provides for the establishment of regional community colleges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 16, 1958</td>
<td>Governor Furcolo signs Chapter 650 of the Acts of 1958, a Capital Outlay which includes $1 million for community college planning and development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 12, 1959</td>
<td>Governor Furcolo presents his proposed budget for FY 1960 (House I) which includes no request for additional community college funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 6, 1959</td>
<td>Passage of Chapter 171 of the Acts of 1959, a supplemental budget which includes $25,000 for administration of the community college program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 31, 1959</td>
<td>Passage of Chapter 433 of the Acts of 1959 (Budget for FY 1960) which includes no additional funding for community colleges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 17, 1959</td>
<td>Passage of Chapter 604 of the Acts of 1959 (Special Capital Outlay) which includes no additional funding for community college development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 25, 1960</td>
<td>Governor Furcolo presents his proposed budget for Fiscal Year 1960 (House I) which recommends $85,521 for community college operations. This recommendation is less than the figure of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued, next page.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 13, 1960</td>
<td>Passage of Chapter 318 of the Acts of 1960, a Supplemental Budget and for Fiscal Year 1960 which includes $82,950 for the regional community college at Pittsfield.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 13, 1960</td>
<td>Passage of Chapter 318 of the Acts of 1960, a Supplemental Budget and for Fiscal Year 1960 which includes $82,950 for the regional community college at Pittsfield.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 23, 1960</td>
<td>Passage of Chapter 774 of the Acts of 1960. A Special Capital Outlay which includes funds ($300,000 to be added to funds in Chapter 650 of the Acts of 1958) to develop a system of regional community colleges in Massachusetts (including plans, agreements with local communities, supplies, furnishings and equipment).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 23, 1963</td>
<td>Passage of Chapter 784 of the Acts of 1960, a Supplemental Budget for Fiscal Year 1961 which includes funding for: Administration of the community college program $21,000 Regional community college in metropolitan Boston $7,596 Regional community college in Northeastern MA $7,271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued, next page.
Table 1—Continued:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional community college</th>
<th>$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in Southeastern MA</td>
<td>7,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Central MA</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in CT. valley</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$83,586

The Volpe Administration

January 25, 1961

Governor Volpe presents his budget proposal for FY62 (House I). It includes $550,942 in proposed spending on community colleges, a reduction of $102,834 in the amount requested by the MBRCC. Specifically, Volpe’s budget recommends:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community College, metropolitan Boston</td>
<td>37,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community College, Northeast MA</td>
<td>191,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community College, Southeastern MA</td>
<td>88,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community College, Pittsfield</td>
<td>89,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community College, Central MA</td>
<td>144,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community College, CT Valley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$550,942

May 5, 1961

Passage of Chapter 430 of the Acts of 1961 (Supplemental Budget for Fiscal Year 1961), which includes language limiting the college in Metropolitan Boston to "not more than 26 permanent positions;" the regional community college in northeastern MA to "not more than 8 positions"; the regional community college in southeastern

Continued, next page.
Table 1--Continued:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metropolitan Boston (not to exceed 31 permanent positions) $179,965</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northern Essex (not to exceed 11 permanent positions) $74,194</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cape Cod (not to exceed 11 permanent positions) $74,888</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Berkshire (not to exceed 20 permanent positions) $146,760</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$517,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 27, 1961</td>
<td>Passage of Chapter 543 of the Acts of 1961, a Supplemental Budget to the General Appropriations Act, which includes:</td>
<td>Metropolitan Boston (not to exceed 31 permanent positions) $12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Northern Essex (not to exceed 11 permanent positions) $3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cape Cod (not to exceed 11 permanent positions) $3,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$19,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 27, 1961</td>
<td>Passage of Chapter 544 of the Acts of 1961, A Special Outlay Program for the Commonwealth which includes $750,000 to supplement that in Chapter 650 of the Acts of 1958 including colleges in the Worcester and Springfield areas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Governor Volpe presents his proposed budget for Fiscal Year 1963, which includes $928,708 in new proposed spending on community colleges as compared to $1,231,531 requested by the MBRCC. Specifically, the budget proposal recommends:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>$44,891</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts Bay</td>
<td>$345,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Maintenance)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Essex</td>
<td>$144,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Cod</td>
<td>$149,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkshire</td>
<td>$168,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional College of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central MA</td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional College,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT Valley</td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community College,</td>
<td>$75,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper CT Valley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$928,708

April 26, 1962

Passage of Chapter 373 of the Acts of 1962, a Supplemental Budget for Fiscal Year 1962. Specific community college portions of the bill include increasing the position caps mandated in Chapter 543 of the Acts of 1961 to 51 for Mass. Bay, 21 for Berkshire and 20 for both Northern Essex and Cape Cod. The bill also expands the language of Chapter 544 of the Acts of 1962 to include community colleges in Boston and Greenfield areas as well as Springfield and Worcester areas. The Supplemental also includes:

| Northern Essex       | $3,600  |
| Cape Cod             | $5,380  |
| Berkshire            | $3,880  |

Continued, next page.
Table 1—Continued:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 11, 1962</td>
<td>Passage of Chapter 649 of the Acts of 1962, a Special Capital Outlay. Specific community college items approved are $255,000 to support planning and development of community colleges in Boston, Greenfield, Springfield and Worcester areas (amount added to appropriations in Chapter 544 of 1961) and $15,000 for furnishings and equipment at Cape Cod Community College.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 21, 1962</td>
<td>Passage of Chapter 705 of the Acts of 1962, a Capital Outlay Program, which includes $150,000 in additional monies to support the planning and development effort detailed in Chapter 649 of 1962.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Boston Globe has traditionally held a special policymaking influence in Massachusetts. As New England’s largest newspaper and the paper of record in the Commonwealth’s major city and capitol, the Globe has historically spoken with a potent and liberal voice. An interesting example of the Globe’s influence occurred in September 1961, with publication of a seven-part series entitled "The Mess in Massachusetts
Education. This series, written by the paper's general education reporter, Ian Forman, and its scientific education reporter, Ian Menzies, returned education to the front rank of policy issues and set the stage for a major review of all levels of education in the Commonwealth.

The series presented a scathing indictment of Massachusetts public education from kindergarten through graduate school. Describing the situation in near scandalous terms, Forman and Menzies labelled public education in the Commonwealth "an archaic mess" in which "the sons and daughters of Massachusetts citizens are being cheated" (Globe, 9/17/62, Ian Menzies & Ian Forman, "Who Cares About Schools in Massachusetts?", p. 6-A). Pointing to "a lack of direction and drive for progressively higher standards," the series assailed the Legislature as "slow with funds"; educators and education boards as "lackluster"; and the efforts of the Massachusetts Department of Education as "inadequate" (Globe, 9/17/62, Menzies & Forman, p. 6-A). Moreover, it described the funding mechanism for local school systems, which relied on property taxes for sustenance, as leading to "two kinds of public education available to children in Massachusetts today--first class and second class" (Globe, 9/17/62, Menzies & Forman, p. 6-A).

Forman and Menzies reserved special criticism for the Commonwealth's higher education institutions, writing that "public education in the state is at its worst at the
college level" and that few people in Massachusetts could even name 75 percent of our 19 institutions of higher education. That’s the kind of impact they’ve had" (Globe, 9/17/62, Menzies & Forman, p. 6-A).

In criticizing public higher education, the authors pointed to a "war" within the system which had its roots in "a historical background of political, private school and religious strife" and emphasized that "Catholic Boston considered the University of Massachusetts a stronghold of Western Massachusetts Protestantism, alleging discrimination against Catholic faculty and students "and that legislators, only three or four of whom at any one time were graduates of the University, opposed money for the University on these often unstated grounds" (Globe, 9/17/62, Menzies & Forman, p. 6-A).

Arguing that the "10 state teachers colleges were looked on more favorably by the predominately Boston area legislators who felt these schools could provide a low-cost education for the sons and daughters of their constituents," Forman and Menzies labelled as "unsatisfactory" these institutions’ progress in becoming "full-fledged four-year degree granting colleges" (Globe, 9/17/62, Menzies & Forman, p. 6-A).

For the new community colleges, Forman and Menzies offered relatively positive words:

The two year community college idea was pushed through in the Furcolo administration by educators somewhat disenchanted with our state colleges. They kept it out of the hands of state
educators by assigning them an independent governing board. These quite dynamic and needed schools, which have attracted good teachers, have however, further clouded the higher education picture from the overall administrative, integrated angle. (Globe, 9/17/62, Menzies & Forman, p. 6-A)

In response to this "clouded picture" and in an effort to correct the "mess in Massachusetts education", Forman and Menzies argued strongly for a thorough review of public education in the Commonwealth:

One thing must be done. It has been done in California, New York, Indiana and other states. A master plan for higher education must be produced. At the same time, there must be a similar plan drawn up for elementary and secondary education. The present confusion, lack of money, lack of direction and internal strife must end. (Globe, 9/17/62, Menzies & Forman, p. 6-A)

The Globe series had a profound effect on both the governor and the Legislature. Its tone fit with the general reform sentiment in the Massachusetts political air. Moreover, its temper and timing dovetailed with the continuing high number of high school graduates who were demanding entry to higher education as well as with the increasing perception that the nature of the economy was shifting toward a more scientific and technical base. And, finally, in its criticism of local elementary and secondary systems, the series confirmed the sentiments of homeowners whose property taxes supported schools that often seemed unaccountable and out of step with educational advances.

For all of these reasons, the Forman-Menzies series reestablished education as a core political issue on the
eve of the 1962 election year. As one long-time observer of Massachusetts education pointed out, "Forman and Menzies drove the issue of educational reform, as did the Globe" (Kevin Harrington, interview, 8/16/93).

The series generated an irresistible momentum for political action. As prominent educational and business voices endorsed the validity of the series, Forman and the Globe gave their words a wide hearing. For example, in October when the University of Massachusetts President spoke on behalf of "a major survey and re-evaluation of Massachusetts educational resources," Forman gave the speech extensive coverage, writing that President Lederle "... added his voice to the growing number of state officials, legislators, educators and laymen calling for a review of Baystate education" (Globe, 10/17/61, Ian Forman, "UMass President Asks review of Education Resources in Bay State," p. 8).

In early October, only one week after the conclusion of the Globe series, Senate Majority Leader Maurice Donahue (D-Holyoke) filed legislation to authorize a master planning effort akin to that recommended by Forman and Menzies. That, as then Senator Kevin Harrington (D-Salem) recalls, set the wheels turning in the executive branch. "Volpe’s people said to him, this is a red-hot thing that Donohue has filed," Harrington explained in an interview years later. "You’d better do the same."
In an October 17 Convocation speech at Northeastern University, the Governor attempted to catch the tide of educational reform created by the Globe series saying that he was preparing a program for the "first-class re-evaluation of the state's entire public education system." Volpe announced, "I shall ask the incoming Legislature for adequate funds with which to finance this vitally needed study" (Globe, 10/18/61, Ian Forman, "Volpe Maps School Survey," p. 1).

During the Northeastern speech, which the Governor entitled "Building for Education in the Commonwealth", Volpe reviewed the Massachusetts educational scene and echoed the arguments of Forman and Menzies, "the picture as it stands today is not encouraging" (Globe, 10/18/61, Forman, pp. 1, 2). Describing higher education, the Governor pointed to the Commonwealth's private universities as a tremendous asset" but emphasized that "it is not possible for them to meet the educational needs of all our people" (Globe, 10/18/61, Forman, p. 2).

The Governor concluded by recommending enhanced support for higher education, arguing that "there is some danger that Massachusetts will be left behind if it does not expand its public support for higher education and begin to match the pace that has been set by our private institutions" (Globe, 10/18/61, Forman, p. 2).
January 1962 on Beacon found both Democrats and Republicans looking ahead to the November election with a heightened sense of partisanship. Tension was particularly high as stories continued related to ongoing investigations of the DPW, MDC and alleged improprieties in 1959-60 planning of the Boston Common garage. Worse yet, recent allegations from within the Senate that some members were under the influence of bookies sent Legislators into a frenzy. Looking to the year ahead and to the opening of the second session of the 162nd Great and General Court, veteran political observer S. J. Micciche wrote:

Governor Volpe unveils his 1962 program at noon today to a Massachusetts Legislature fretting over its public image in an election year. lawmakers will convene an hour early to officially begin work on a record number of bills peppered freely with a large portion of controversial matters. House and Senate members predicted last night a long and hard year with politics tingeing every major proposal. They ruled out any repeat of the modern day record for speedy deliberations set last year. (Globe, 1/3/62, S. J. Micciche, "Legislature Fretting About Public Image," p. 1)

In his annual address, the first volley of election year rhetoric, Volpe once again focused on corruption which he said "cast a shadow over the general repute of thousands of civil servants and public officials" and challenged the Legislature to pass his controversial proposal for a Commission on Crime and Public Morality (to investigate organized crime and serve as watchdog over the conduct of public officials). He also demanded reorganization of
state agencies under a strengthened chief executive and presented proposals on a range of issues from a $2.3 million study of mass transit in the Commonwealth to expansion of mental health facilities.

Concerning education, the Governor grasped the issues raised in the Forman-Menzies series and spoke in language that built on both their sense of alarm and his October speech at Northeastern University:

Here in Massachusetts, where the first public school in America was established and where exists an awesome and world envied assembly of great schools and universities, we cannot afford to remain smug about our achievements or ignore our potentials . . .

There have been efforts over the years to examine the critical problems of our schools and colleges but for the most part, these studies were not comprehensive. I am submitting a request for creation of a twelve-person unpaid commission to examine our total picture on public education, including financing, which now rests solely on real estate and to provide a guide for a program in our Commonwealth. This commission would be appointed by the governor and the Legislature and provided with the sum of $100,000 for necessary expenses. I feel this is needed in view of the serious problems facing education nationally and in our state. (Senate No. 1, 1962)

Among those listening to the Governor’s address were four men who would play leading roles in establishing the study commission during the 1962 session and who would also help to drive it to a substantive and important report by 1965.

The first was Forman. The highly opinionated, yet thoughtful, education writer for the Globe was passionately committed to the idea of a master plan for Massachusetts
education. In his regular Sunday column, as well as in his coverage of Legislative action on education, Forman would become a cheerleader for the commission and its members. Respected and widely read, Forman was unabashed with both praise and criticism. Forman was thus a player to be reckoned with on Beacon Hill.

Also listening to the Governor's proposal was Senator Kevin Harrington (D-Salem). Chair of the Senate Education Committee and a forceful advocate for the state colleges (particularly Salem State College in his native city), Harrington was a rising star in the upper house of the Legislature. Imposing at over six-foot-five inches tall, the Senator possessed the accrued instincts of an established political family on the North Shore and combined the look and easy intelligence of a Brahmin with the charm and tenacity of a first rank Irish politician. A favorite of Forman, Harrington shared the reporter's commitment to educational reform and saw in the Governor's proposal an opportunity for substantive achievement on both the policy and political fronts.

Maurice Donahue of Holyoke, the Senate Majority Leader who would in two years succeed Powers as Senate President listened to the Governor's words on education reform with special interest. Harrington describes Donahue as "a great pusher for the University principally because of its geographic location near Holyoke" and as one "who understood and truly believed that public education was the
state's only salvation" (Interview, 8/16/93). The Majority Leader also possessed the requisite political savvy to understand that while Volpe's support of the educational master plan was important, Democrats had to remain out front on the issue or risk losing it to the Republican Governor.

Fourth among those who listened attentively to the Governor's annual address was the remarkably resilient Speaker of the House John Thompson. Unerringly loyal to Furcolo during the governor's two terms, Thompson had fought Volpe publicly on a series of issues in 1961. Most notable among these issues was the latter's crime commission proposal which the Speaker believed would stand as an inappropriate legislative watchdog.

Thompson had also earned the enmity of many within his own party. Ever the "Iron Duke," Thompson would spend the remaining two years of his Speakership beating back increasingly bitter challenges to his leadership and fighting allegations of impropriety that would eventually lead to his indictment. In 1962, he would also face a surprisingly difficult re-election campaign. As one who had shown his commitment to education and who was fighting for his political life against an unruly House and a public perception that linked him to Beacon Hill cronyism, leadership on educational reform offered an attractive opportunity. And as long as he was speaker, any serious reform would require his active support.
Generally, the response to the governor’s annual message was what one might expect at the outset of an election year. Republicans praised Volpe’s effort while the Democratic leadership said the governor had "displayed intellectual bankruptcy in his 1962 program" (Globe, 1/4/62, S. J. Micciche, "Democrats Hoist Storm Flag as Volpe Launches Program," p. 1). Overall, the press response was positive, with the Globe praising the Governor for presenting "a moderate program whose very reasonableness gives it strength" (Globe, 1/4/62, Editorial, "What the Governor Seeks," p. 20).

In his budget message on January 24, the Governor again addressed the need for an overhaul of public education and reaffirmed his call for "a commission to be provided with the sum of $100,000 to examine the present structure of public education and to make recommendations for improvement" (House No. 1, 1962).

For higher education, Volpe proposed a significant boost in funding noting that "one of the largest departmental increases in this budget is caused by increases in enrollment in state colleges" (House No. 1, 1962).

Specifically, the Governor recommended an increase of $2,660,000 for the Department of Education in Fiscal Year 1963, of which $2,097,833 was slated for operation of the University and public colleges. Once again, as Furcolo had done before him and Volpe had done in his budget message of
the previous year, the governor justified his call for additional dollars by emphasizing the issue of access. Arguing that his budget would "provide additional teachers and related expense for 2,273 additional students, Volpe went on to emphasize (House No. 1, 1962):

I know that we want to provide facilities that will enable every student in Massachusetts capable of achieving a higher education to enjoy that opportunity. In view of the rapid rise in numbers of students preparing for college and of the announced limitations in enrollments made by private colleges, there is no other course open than for the state to go ahead with plans for expansion of publicly supported institutions of higher education, not only for 1963, but for the years ahead.

As Table 1 indicates, some $928,708 of the proposed increase in educational funding was slated for the regional community colleges, so as to allow an additional enrollment of 990 at the four existing institutions. Although less than those requested by the MBRCC—and rarely does a department receive its full request—the proposed increases are noteworthy and represent growth of nearly $400,000 over the sum appropriated by the General Court in 1960, Furcolo's last year as governor.

Volpe concluded his discussion of higher education by announcing that he had "asked each of the governing boards of our institutions of higher learning to set down in public reports their ten-year anticipations of enrollment and to relate them to plans for necessary new construction." The Governor's intended wish was that these reports provide the Legislature with a "better under-
standing" and allow it to express "approval or disapproval" (House No. 1, 1962). Chapter VIII will discuss the report prepared by the MBRCC in some detail for it provides an interesting snapshot of community college mission evolution during the early 1960s.

With the introduction of Volpe's budget, the political season was in full sway. In this context, three issues would dominate the educational debate.

First and foremost, was the proposed Master Plan for Massachusetts education. Forman continued to press the issue in columns throughout the spring, calling the Master Plan Commission "the number 1 'must' bill on education before the Massachusetts Legislature right now" (Globe, 4/8/62, Ian Forman, "State Education Board Under Sharp Scrutiny," p. A-56).

Behind the scenes Donahue and other members of the leadership pushed for legislative action on the Commission. By mid-spring, Donahue's bill, (Senate 615) creating a commission has been approved. It still remained, however, for the Senator and his allies to secure funding for the planning effort. With Forman's support in the Globe, Donahue aimed to raise Volpe's recommended funding level from $100,000 to $250,000. As the final June battle over the budget loomed, Donahue's proposal was locked in the Ways and Means Committees of both houses.

The second major educational issue facing the General Court was the long-discussed proposal to develop a
four-year state medical school as part of the University of Massachusetts. First presented in 1948 by then Governor Paul Dever, the medical school proposal enjoyed the support of Western Massachusetts legislators Wojtkowski, Thompson and Donahue as well as the endorsement of other key players such as Harrington. Despite this support and the best efforts of Dever and Furcolo, the medical school had never been able to overcome opposition and private universities (who perceived a threat to their enrollments) and their Republican allies.

Volpe appears to have been at best indifferent to the medical school recommendation. Unwilling to take the lead on the issue in the face of opposition within his own party, the Governor remained on the sidelines as the issue percolated. By fall, however, as prospects for medical school legislation improved, he would be prepared to step in and attempt to score a quick political victory in the midst of the election campaign.

The third major educational issue of 1962 concerned another long-debated matter: fiscal autonomy for the University of Massachusetts. Another favorite of Western Massachusetts legislators, the proposed legislation provided the University with the freedom to manage its appropriation free of legislative control. Opposed by legislators of both parties who were unwilling to give up such leverage over the flagship of public higher education,
Donahue and Thompson faced a tough but winnable fight, again without active gubernatorial engagement.

Despite the significance of these matters, the primary issue of debate in 1962 remained corruption in state government. A review of the period's media provides a near soap opera level of daily articles concerning indictments in the Boston Common garage scandal, continuing investigation at the DPW and MDC, firings of longtime staff in major departments and a continued swirl of allegations of corruption in the Boston Police Department.

The corruption issue provided Volpe a card that he played adroitly. Holding an impeccable personal record, he moved to oust individuals (often Democratic appointees) who has been accused of wrongdoing; and he did so with great fanfare. Most notable were his efforts to fire both the State Waterways Director who had been accused of misconduct in office and the Boston Police Chief following allegations of racketeering in the department.

In the corruption issue, Volpe had found a weapon that concerned the Democratic leadership, particularly when a Massachusetts taxpayers Foundation Poll indicated that 80% of Bay State residents considered corruption to be one of the Commonwealth's major problems (Globe, July 15, 1962, p. A-4). Globe columnist C. R. Owens wrote of "a deep-seated fear that Republicans have scored with the issue of crime and corruption and that the political tides are running

It is interesting to reflect on how the education Master Plan fit into the overall issue of reform in Massachusetts politics. In the contentiousness of an election year, it provided one area of relative common ground which met the needs of both Democrats and Republicans. First, education reform was an issue that resonated with parents who paid significant property taxes to support the school systems that Forman and Menzies had pilloried and who sought admission for their sons and daughters to increasingly inaccessible and crowded state institutions of higher learning. Second, in the notion of a commission the political leadership on both sides of the aisle could find short-term safety in the benefits of a high-profile study knowing that no hard and potentially controversial recommendations would follow until after the 1962 election. Third, for Volpe, whose reform agenda remained bottled up in the Legislature, the commission offered the promise of tangible achievement on an issue that the Democrats held as one of their own. Fourth, for Democrats such as Donahue and Harrington, the Commission promised both eventual substantive and progressive achievement in an area they held dear and the opportunity to reclaim for their party the mantle of reform. With passage of authorizing legislation in March, the only issue that remained was its level of funding--$100,000 as
proposed by Volpe or more as Donahue and other legislators hoped.

It became increasingly clear by late spring, that on the vast array of issues floating across Beacon Hill, there would be little common ground and much jockeying for political advantage. June saw both parties preparing for their nominating conventional; the air was thick with politics Massachusetts-style and the General Court was far from completing its work. A host of major legislative initiatives awaited action including Volpe's proposed crime commission and code of public ethics, the general appropriations bill ($512 million), a highway borrowing bill ($190 million), a capital outlay ($31 million) and a supplemental budget of $6-10 million to close books on Fiscal Year 1963 (Globe, 6/17/62, C. R. Owens, "Would Keep Financial Records from Auditor," p. 4-A). The major education initiatives (Master planning commission, University of Massachusetts Medical School, and fiscal autonomy for the University) all also remained to be completed.

At their respective June conventions in Springfield and Worcester, the Democrats and Republicans nominated their slates for the November elections.

The Democratic affair was filled with a special electricity as the President's youngest brother Edward squared off against State Attorney General (and nephew of the venerable Speaker of the House John McCormick) Edward
McCormick in the fight to fill John F. Kennedy's vacant Senate seat. While Kennedy prevailed in the nomination fight, this battle between Massachusetts dynasties stands as one of the fiercest in the Commonwealth's recent history.

While the Kennedy-McCormick race dominated the Convention, delegates selected Endicott "Chub" Peabody as its nominee for Governor. Peabody was the son of a prominent Episcopalian bishop and held seemingly impeccable credentials for political office. He was described by the Boston Globe (6/17/62, Photo Caption, p. 19) as having "... the political reputation of a Yankee with a liberal streak and a Democrat who gets Republican votes." An All-American guard on Harvard's 1941 football team, Peabody had earned the Silver Star in World War II, graduated from Harvard Law School and served on the Commonwealth's Executive Council. Despite these credentials, he had yet to win statewide office having lost the nomination for attorney general in 1956 and 1958 and the nomination for governor in 1960.

Both Kennedy and Peabody left the convention on a high. But Massachusetts law leaves final party nominations to a September primary. Both McCormick and Peabody's rival, Joseph Ward, chose to take their cases to the primary ballot, leaving the possibility of upset to stir the summer air.
Volpe, on the other hand, received his anticipated unopposed coronation at the Republican convention. Despite the first faint rumblings among some delegates that the governor’s political operation had isolated itself from the party and although Republicans faced the prospects of somewhat contentious primary battles for other statewide offices, the GOP left Worcester confident that under Volpe’s leadership, the party would hold its own in November.

The post-convention problems of Speaker Thompson further inspired Republican confidence. On July 3, dissatisfaction among Democrats over "the Iron Duke’s" style and his increasingly evident battle with alcohol exploded as thirty-five members of the party called for his ouster and expressed a "feeling of disgust" with both Thompson and the House Democratic leadership (Globe, 7/4/62, "35 Democrats Seek Ouster of Thompson," p. 1).

As this unrest festered in the House, Volpe struck with two well-timed political jousts on key education issues.

First, the Governor suddenly doubled his proposed funding level for the education commission to $200,000. Offered as part of the year-end supplemental budget, Volpe’s new proposal earned plaudits from across the state. As Harrington recalls (interview, August 13, 1993), the Governor had "upped the ante" on the education master plan and in doing so had at least momentarily grasped the
limelight on the issue. The Globe would write of Volpe's proposed increase in funding for the commission (7/8/62, "Volpe Urges $200,000 for Education Survey," p. 10):

Perhaps the Governor responded to the pressures of many top educators and groups throughout the state; perhaps he saw it as a shrewd political move; perhaps he did it from truly altruistic motives. Whatever his reasons for boosting the amount, he made many persons happy.

By the time of Volpe's new proposal, the education commission had taken on a dynamic of its own. With Donahue, Harrington, and Thompson driving the bill and Powers supportive of Donahue's efforts, the commission's legislative path was secure. Volpe's strong public endorsement practically ensured that a mutually beneficial deal could be reached between the Republican governor and the Democratic leadership in the Legislature. And to prevent the measure from being lost at session's end, the Globe maintained persistent coverage of its progress. Harrington recalls (interview, August 13, 1993) that "the Globe continued to be a great pusher on this." The major issue seemed to be at what point the ante would stop growing.

On July 13, the House gave its final approval to the commission. Not to be upstaged by Volpe, Thompson added an additional $50,000 to the governor's supplemental request, bringing the total amount passed by the House for the master plan effort to $250,000. The only opposition to the measure came from a few disgruntled Democrats and long-time Republican opponents of education spending such as Theodore
Vaistses of Melrose who argued, "... They'll spend it on an educational junket" (Globe, 7/13/62, "House Votes $250,000 for Education Survey," p. 4).

Within days, the Senate had also approved the supplemental budget, as had a House-Senate conference committee. With nary a whimper concerning the additional $50,000 appropriated to the commission, Volpe signed the bill.

Volpe also made a tactical political move on another big ticket educational issue as the commission moved toward reality. With the recess commission recommendations in hand, the word among key Beacon Hill observers was that the governor would veto the state medical school legislation rather than antagonize the Commonwealth’s medical society and the private universities who operated prestigious medical schools. In that the bill had passed by only a 19-17 roll call vote in the Senate despite the efforts of Powers, Donahue and Harrington, it was doubtful a veto could be overridden.

Then in July the Governor did an apparent about-face and suddenly announced that he would sign the legislation if the 14-member university Board of Trustees was expanded by five to allow him to appoint physicians experienced in management of a medical school.

Almost immediately, Powers endorsed the Governor’s proposal. Having lost his dream of Boston’s mayoralty over his opposition to a university payraise in 1958, the Senate
President was not anxious to again be seen as standing in the way of such a high visibility issue affecting U/Mass. Powers said of the Governor’s plan, "I don’t care if the governor wants 50 trustees. It wouldn’t bother me a single iota" (Globe, 7/26/62, S. J. Micciche, ‘House Kills Volpe’s Rider; Medication School in Doubt," p. 1).

Thompson, on the other hand, issued a scathing attack on Volpe’s proposal. Calling it a "thinly disguised sellout" to medical school opponents (Globe, 7/25/62, "Powers, Thompson Clash on Medical School Bill," p. 1), the Speaker argued that the governor’s proposal was an attempt to simultaneously grasp control of the U/Mass board by appointing "the deans of private medical schools who would sabotage the Legislature’s intention for a first-class medical school" (Globe, 7/25/62, "Powers, Thompson Clash on Medical School Bill, p. 1).

With Powers and Thompson at odds over the bill, it was left to Donahue to step into the breach and find a workable compromise that would also earn the governor’s support. The Holyoke Senator recalls (Interview August 19, 1993):

John Thompson was one of my closest friends. And Johnny Powers was very supportive of me as I rose to majority leader. This was one of several occasions when I worked to get them to smoke the peace pipe.

By month’s end, with The Legislature in its final hours, Thompson, Powers and Volpe agreed to a compromise in which the Governor would add three trustees to the
University Board. To earn the Speaker's support, language was included in the final conference committee measure that prevented the governor from appointing representatives of private medical schools to the University board. With this agreement, the bill calling for a $10 million state medical school received final legislative approval and was signed by Volpe on July 27.

The third and final major education-related measure by 1962 concerned fiscal autonomy for the University. Long sought by Furcolo, Donahue and others to correct what Harrington described as a situation in which "every time a light bulb went out you had to go to the Department of Education to get authority to purchase another" (interview, August 13, 1993), the bill had never been able to overcome fears in the Legislature concerning both the loss of direct fiscal control through legislative line items and the prospect that the measure could set a precedent for similar initiatives concerning the state colleges and community colleges.

Recommended by Donahue's recess commission on the University, the bill held the backing of Thompson, Powers and Harrington. The governor remained supportive but relatively mute through July, awaiting disposition in the Legislature. That action came early in July when Thompson pushed the bill through the House and Powers and Donahue combined to force it through the more conservative Senate. Volpe signed the legislation quickly in the same month.
The measure would ultimately help lead to a similar, somewhat coincidental empowerment of the MBRCC in 1964.

In a summary article (Globe, 7/28/62), Forman offered "high praise" for the year’s legislative accomplishments in the educational arena:

Vast gains were accomplished in the area of public education as the lawmakers faced up to the fact that many more millions must be spent to meet the challenge of present-day educational demands. (Globe, 7/28/62, "Volpe Made Great Strides in Legislative Year: Season’s Achievements Listed, p. 5")

Despite almost no discussion of community colleges in the Legislature’s flurry of education-related initiatives, the MBRCC received a significant increase in funding as the session came to a close.

In addition to the education bills, a number of other hotly contested measures were approved before the Legislature finally perogued on July 27. For example, the General Court approved Volpe’s crime commission (a stunning victory for the governor); passed a $10.2 million Federal-state study of mass transportation in the Commonwealth; endorsed a bond issue to pay for Massachusetts $110 million highway program; sustained a gubernatorial veto of Callahan’s proposal to give the Turnpike Authority control of air rights around the turnpike extension into Boston. All in all, despite defeats on proposals such as his reorganization plan for the DPW, the year’s work seemed to provide momentum to the governor as the election neared.
The November Surprise: Governor-Elect Peabody

The focus of political pundits remained on the heated Kennedy-McCormick race as the September primaries approached. In the shadow of this dynastic battle, Peabody held to an advantage in the gubernatorial primary given his status as the convention's chosen candidate.

Meanwhile, on the Republican side, Volpe continued to run a low-key campaign taking opportunities to point at his record and avoiding where possible remaining above the overall election-year fray.

In the September primary, Peabody won an impressive victory over Ward. In earning the nomination, he also achieved a new measure of respect from political observers as having a shot at upsetting Volpe.

Peabody stood as an anomaly in Massachusetts politics; he was in Donahue's words, "a new-look Democrat" (interview, August 19, 1993). The question was whether this "new look" would candidate hold the traditional ethnic Democratic base while appealing to sufficient Republicans to upset the incumbent.

The final month of the 1962 gubernatorial campaign stands as an intriguing case study which deserves greater scrutiny than this work can provide. Two points deserve specific mention.

First, to the end, the governor held to a low-key campaign. Rarely referring to Peabody by name, Volpe refused to debate his opponent or to respond to the
Democrat's blistering attacks. Choosing to remain above the fray by simply pointing to his record and his standing as a known quantity, Volpe relied on polls which showed him holding a consistent lead. Not only did this strategy open the governor to criticism from other Republicans that he was not actively working for the GOP candidates, it also opened the door for Peabody who ran a tireless campaign under the careful guidance of Congressman Thomas P. O'Neill. Moreover, the Kennedy camp provided support to Peabody. The Kennedy assist gained extra weight when the President journeyed to Boston to vote and personally endorsed Peabody.

Further complicating the landscape was President Kennedy's October announcement that offensive nuclear missiles had been discovered in Cuba. For thirteen extraordinary days, the Cuban Missile Crisis dominated the news, casting the Massachusetts election into the background.

Observers at the time estimated that the political fallout of the crisis aided Volpe by moving Peabody out of the limelight just as his campaign was coming together. Thus, as the campaign entered its final days, most smart money seemed to remained on the Republican.

On election day, however, the voters of Massachusetts offered a different verdict. Buoyed by a strong performance in traditionally Democratic urban areas and by a surprisingly solid performance among suburban voters,
Peabody maintained a narrow lead that would hold up through a recount requested by Volpe. Peabody owed his upset to a number of factors, as summarized by Globe political editor Robert Healey (Globe, 11/11/62, Robert Healey, "State Democrats Are Back on the Reservation," p. 6-A):

What happened? Well, the governor just played it cool . . . The Cuban Crisis turned out to be a great break for Peabody in more ways than one. He was short of money. There was no point in spending on television or radio during the crisis. So Peabody was able to throw it all into the last week when the Cuban situation eased . . . And the real bust was the corruption issue. Gov. Volpe was not running against the entire Democratic slate. He was running against Peabody and there was no mileage in the corruption issue with Peabody. (p. 6-A)

Volpe's stinging defeat, confirmed in a recount that consumed much of November, remains one of the most significant upsets in recent Massachusetts political history. More salient to the present study is the legacy of his first term as governor (Volpe would win a re-match with Peabody in 1964), particularly as it relates to development of community colleges in the Commonwealth.

Conclusion

Most political observers would not list community college development (or education in general) as a major component of John Volpe's legacy between 1960-62. Volpe, himself, referred to two-year colleges on only rare occasions and almost never discussed their mission in any thoughtful, much less, visionary manner.

During his initial term, however, funding increased significantly for the planning and development community
colleges. This level of support, along with passage of the Master Planning Commission, University Fiscal Autonomy and the Medical School proposal, Volpe's record could be interpreted as highly successful in public higher education.

As noted earlier, this record owed more to strong legislative leadership than to the governor's vision. Perhaps Volpe's greatest contributions lie in his underlying acceptance that public education was a good thing worthy of financial support and in his political understanding at critical moments that education offered the chance to upstage the Democrats on an issue close to their policy core.

The community colleges also owed their growth under Volpe's governorship to the MBRCC. Under the strong leadership of Kermit Morrissey, the regional board used its voice and legislative connections to push an agenda of growth. Chapter VII briefly reviews the role played by the MBRCC between 1960-62.
CHAPTER VII

THE MASSACHUSETTS BOARD OF REGIONAL COMMUNITY COLLEGES: 1959-62

Chapters IV and V describe the political context within which the community college program in Massachusetts was born and nurtured between 1958 and 1962. This chapter looks within that context to identify a number of subtexts.

Specifically, it examines the early activity of the Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges, analyzing the process which the MBRCC brought to its first decisions regarding campus locations and institutional mission. It also presents a detailed summary of appropriations which the MBRCC secured from the General Court during the period in question, as well as something of the political dynamic which inspired those appropriations. Finally, this chapter examines the Legislature’s level of influence over the activities of the regional community college board, particularly as the Board designated sites for the first campuses. Through this examination of the MBRCC and legislative roles in community college development, the fundamental issue of gubernatorial role comes into clearer focus. This focus, in turn, illuminates a fundamental irony -- why the pace of campus planning and the level of state financial support both appear to have increased in 1961-62 despite John Volpe’s
lack of policy attention relative to that which Foster Furcolo brought to the issue.

Furcolo: Shaping the Board: 1958-62

On January 21, 1959, only days after submitting his annual budget proposal, Governor Furcolo met with the new Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges (MBRCC). After formally swearing in the members, the Governor re-emphasized his commitment to the community college program and "indicated that the facilities of the governor's office, the Commission on Administration, and the Special Commission on the Audit of State Needs would be available to expedite the program as rapidly as possible" (MBRCC Minutes, 1/27/59).

One cannot adequately present Furcolo's impact on Massachusetts community colleges without looking closely at the governing board. Through his influence over the structure and temper of the MBRCC, the governor arguably left his most enduring legacy.

Furcolo's vision of community colleges, as noted in Chapter V, was broad. He saw them as institutions of access which would "meet the needs of all students" (Interview, November 1988), allowing individuals of all socio-economic backgrounds to rise to the maximum of their abilities through career preparation or transfer to baccalaureate programs. The governor left it to Mallan, Morissey, and others to provide the details on issues of mission. His most profound contributions remain the
conviction with which he fought for his broad vision, the infrastructure that he provided for the long-term management of the system and his willingness to adopt a political strategy which would achieve early progress despite Massachusetts’ fiscal challenges and the persistent doubts of naysayers.

**Membership of the MBRCC**

The Commission on the Audit of State Needs had recommended that the regional community college board consist of five gubernatorial appointees and four other specifically defined members (state Commissioner of Education, president of the University of Massachusetts, president of Lowell Technical Institute and a president of a state college elected by his or her peers) who would serve overlapping five-year terms.

Chapter 605, which resulted from fine-tuning on the part of the administration and members of the legislative leadership expanded the board membership to fifteen and mandated inclusion of

the Commissioner of Education, the president of the University of Massachusetts, a president of a state teachers college elected annually by presidents of the state teachers colleges including the Massachusetts School of Art, a president of a Massachusetts technical institute elected by the presidents of such technical institutes and eleven members appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the [executive] council, at least one of whom shall be the president of a private college, university, or junior college in the Commonwealth. (Chapter 605, Acts of 1958)
The modifications in board composition allowed Furcolo seven additional opportunities to exercise his power of appointment. They also ensured that key constituencies in both private higher education and from public colleges and universities would be drawn into collaboration with the new community college program. Finally, it afforded at least the slim possibility of co-opting the obstreperous Education Commissioner Owen Kiernan, long a foe of a separate community college board beyond his direct control.

Chapter 605 also amended the Audit Commissioner's recommendation concerning board tenure. In the place of staggered five-year terms for gubernatorial appointees, it mandated a somewhat more complex formula:

The governor in his initial appointments shall designate three members to serve for six years, three members to serve for five years, two members for four years, one member for three years, one member for two years, and one member for one year. Upon the expiration of the term of office of the member of the board his successor shall be appointed for a term of six years. (Chapter 605, Acts of 1958)

The changes prescribed by the final community college enabling legislation offered Furcolo the opportunity to appoint individuals who would serve well after he had taken his final walk down the statehouse steps. The governor used this opportunity to good advantage as over time he appointed three of his most trusted allies to the MBRCC. The appointments of Harris (an original member of the board), Morissey (appointed 11/61) and Mallan (12/61) ensured that the governor's interests would be voiced by
individuals who possessed sound academic credentials, passion for the community college agenda, and solid political instincts. Most of all, they guaranteed that his vision of community college development would echo at least throughout the mid-1960s.

Furcolo gave intense personal attention to selection of the original board as well as to subsequent appointments during his last term. His seriousness of purpose was born of both a personal commitment to the nascent community college program and a recognition that appointment of a weak board would threaten the viability of that program. Years later, the governor elaborated on the basic criteria he brought to board selection (videotape).

It was important to have people on that Board who were of excellent character. . . . We wanted to get the best qualified people not only in terms of standing and reputation in the community but also from the point of view of being doers, people who were willing to tackle a challenge and something that would be new. Now the reason for this is that this was a brand new system. We wanted to try and build confidence in it and trust in it. We wanted the legislature and the public in general to know that the best qualified people possible were running these colleges. We also wanted to be certain that they were truly non-political and bipartisan so that there could be no question of the fact that they were doing what was best for education and without any political considerations of any kind. For that reason, we very carefully screened and selected people who would serve on the community college board. (videotape)

Furcolo seems to have achieved his goal of appointing a "non-partisan" group of "doers" who held an "interest in education" and were "willing to take on a challenge."

Individuals appointed during the governor's tenure included
Republican attorney Theodore Chase, noted educators such as Harris, Jaffe, and Mather, and respected business leaders such as Springfield’s Roger Putnam. Each brought credibility to the board, as well as sincere commitment to the task of establishing a community college system irrespective of the fact that initially they had almost no money or broadbased statewide support.

The governor’s assertion that he appointed a board that would act "without any political consideration of any kind" is less easy to substantiate and serves as a subject for discussion later in this chapter.

Furcolo appears to have accepted some political dynamic with his appointment of several MBRCC members who brought with them the support of constituencies which were important to the long-term health of the community college program. For example, he appointed the chief executives of Old Colony Trust, the Massachusetts AFL-CIO and the Massachusetts Congress of Parents and Teachers, all with an eye to the groups they represented (Brint & Karabel, p. 146). As noted earlier, the mandated inclusion of representatives from private and public universities and colleges as well as that of Kiernan similarly recognized the need to bring potentially troublesome or important constituencies under the tent.

The net result of Furcolo’s efforts was a board comprised of key educational advisors, major business leaders and representatives of important constituencies --
almost all of whom shared a commitment of rapid progress.

Brint and Karabel have written of this group:

> Businessmen and educators on the Board worked closely together. As Furcolo had hoped, members of the Board tended to view one another as people capable of "getting things done." Members of the Board shared, above all, a strong commitment to the signature elements of managerial culture: efficiency and productivity . . . High praise was reserved for those who were regarded as results-oriented, hard-headed and effective. (Brint & Karabel, 1989, p. 146)

The MBRCC quickly embarked on a five-part strategy which centered around a consensus concerning the need to get campuses established quickly. The Board sought to generate demand for colleges among residents, government officials and particularly business in key cities and towns; to work with the civic and business leadership in these communities to develop studies which would demonstrate the need for a college; to open temporary campuses in available public buildings provided by local communities; to seek donated land to serve as permanent campuses; and, finally, to work with the administration to secure at least some operating monies to support the program.

Costello (interview, May 1993) recalls that early board discussions concerning campus locations focused on two sites as "givens." The first was in Hyannis on Cape Cod, home to both Senator Stone and the recently closed Hyannis Teachers College. The second was the Greater Boston area. During an interview with Lustberg, Costello recalled that "Cape Cod demonstrated need . . . but it was
a Republican area, represented by a Republican strong-man and we thought that a community college there would give it bipartisan support" (1979, p. 141). Of the Boston situation, Costello said in a May 1993 interview with this author, "If we wanted long-term credibility we had to go to the largest metropolitan area and the one with the largest legislative delegation."

Pittsfield soon emerged as the third site for a campus and, in fact, became the preferred location of the inaugural project. Its incarnation as the first community college warrants a detailed examination.

Berkshire Community College: Choosing the First Campus

The earliest efforts of the new regional community college board focused on establishing the criteria for location of the Commonwealth’s first colleges. The board summarized these criteria in a retrospective report presented to Furcolo in December 1959:

In order to determine sites for regional community colleges in Massachusetts, it was necessary to devise some method of assigning priorities based upon, among other things, greatest need, population, interest of people, and services rendered by existing institutions of higher education in the various areas. The current and potential secondary school junior and/or senior student population of an area, for example should be large enough to insure a minimum enrollment necessary to offer enough different programs to meet the needs of the region and also to insure an economical operation. The interest of the people in the region is also an important factor in determining sites for community colleges. The presence or absence of other college facilities in an area considered for community colleges should be given close attention. The Board realized soon that the need would probably be more urgent in regions
without adequate college facilities. (Progress Report, p. 36)

The board needed an implementation plan which would set community colleges in place quickly and with the maximum local support. To do this in a manner which also demonstrated a viable educational need in the first locations, the MBRCC adopted a four-phase approach to implementation: Phase One -- Prioritization of potential community college sites statewide into three categories (A, B, C) according to "total population, enrollment potential, and the extent educational needs are currently being met by existing institutions of higher education" (Progress Report, p. 41).

Phase Two -- Surveys of areas designated A, B, or C in priority to determine "(1) the level of interest of the people in having a community college, (2) the need for such an institution in the area" (Progress Report, p. 41).

Phase Three -- Submission of findings in phase two to the MBRCC to permit final prioritization of 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 (1 being highest and 5 the lowest priority).

Phase Four -- Planning for community colleges in those locations designated as Priority 1. This planning included appointment of "a core of administrative people for each community college" and hiring of teachers "at least three months or earlier [before opening of the college] to prepare the curriculum" (Progress Report, p. 43).

The preparation of Phase One by the Board was influenced by the works of contemporary leaders in the
community college movement such as Wattenbarger and Martorana. Each had completed studies concerning the location of community colleges. Wattenbarger's work had been central to the establishment of Florida's two-year college system.

Influenced by Wattenbarger and Martorana, the MBRCC determined that "for area priority A there should be a minimum of 1,000 high school graduates within a commuting radius of 20-30 miles of the community college to insure an enrollment of at least 400 students in the two years (Progress Report, p. 39). This recommendation was basically consistent with that of the Commission on the Audit of State Needs.

Phase Two was particularly crucial to both the governor and to the MBRCC. Unless support could be generated quickly and evidenced through the local surveys, the two-year college program could lose its viability.

The governor had sought to ensure grass roots support through creation of local advisory groups as part of Chapter 605. These groups, which would advise individual colleges as to local needs, were consistent with both Furcolo's commitment to "citizen participation" and his belief that community colleges could only survive through development of core groups of supporters in cities and towns throughout the Commonwealth.

Pittsfield seems, at first blush, an unlikely contender to lead the way in meeting the criteria of the
Board's first three phases. A closer analysis, however, is illuminating.

First, Pittsfield was home to Representative Wojtkowski, whose steady support had been crucial to passage of the community college legislation and whose position on the powerful Ways and Means Committee made him important to community college funding. Brint and Karabel go so far as to write that "the location of the first college in the relatively isolated Berkshire mountain town of Pittsfield discharged the Board's debt to Pittsfield's representative, Thomas Wojtkowski" (1989. p. 146).

To their great credit, however, Wojtkowski and his allies in Pittsfield had worked diligently to enhance the city's status as a potential college site. For example, the representative had compiled data showing the need for a college to provide technical and transfer education in Pittsfield during his 1956 effort to pass community college legislation.

Moreover, Wojtkowski had campaigns tirelessly to build local enthusiasm for a community college in Pittsfield and had identified a former high school in the downtown as a temporary site. Costello recalls that "Tom had compiled a great deal of data which essentially served as a local study. And, of course, he had worked to identify a temporary site" (interview, June 1, 1993).

Sensing the prospects for a successful campus start-up, the MBRCC quickly sent Thomas O'Connell, a
consultant in its employ (and eventually the first president of Berkshire Community College), to meet with senior executives of General Electric and the Berkshire Eagle to push for rapid completion of the formal study (MBRCC Minutes). Members of the Board were also actively engaged in the effort to achieve success. Minutes reflect that Putnam and Dr. Stanley Salwak (a University of Massachusetts professor who served as a consultant to the MBRCC) encouraged local activity in the Berkshires as early as 1959 (MBRCC Minutes, April 22, 1959).

Dr. Salwak stated that both he and Mr. Putnam had been hard at work. Both had been in the Pittsfield area and suggested that a pilot program might be set up . . . In addition both he and Mr. Putnam met with professional and leading citizens of Pittsfield in order to determine first hand any interest in having such an institution in their town. They also met with other people in the Northern Berkshire area and nearly every other community and thoroughly discussed the need and possibility.

Costello, who visited other communities as a member of the staff, recalls that it was not uncommon to use significant energy building local demand for community colleges (Costello interview, May 1993)

Brint and Karabel also emphasize the role played by the Board in helping to create local demand for community colleges, particularly among businesses:

In the local communities, the Board’s promotional efforts were usually channeled through major economic interests and most often through local chambers of commerce. There were practical political reasons for this: the leading businessmen were often the most influential forces in local political affairs. If they could be convinced of a project’s usefulness, the project stood a good chance of acceptance. But the Board also saw the economic appeal the college might have for employers. The colleges
were promoted for their potential not only to bring new customers to local businesses but also to provide better and more cheaply trained workers. (1989, p. 147)

In reviewing the Berkshire study, the Board professed to being persuaded on at least four counts (Progress Report, p. 52):

1. Pittsfield’s lack of established colleges open to county residents and isolation from other areas where there are colleges.

2. The large number of high school graduates in the Pittsfield area with no place to go to college and the resultant low college-going percentage and high indication of reported interest by present high school seniors in attending a community college.

3. The availability of a rent-free building in Pittsfield (the Central High School) which could be used, with some renovation, by the college on a sharing basis with the Pittsfield School System during the 1960-61 school year, and in its entirety by the college starting in September 1961.

4. The availability in the Pittsfield area of qualified teachers for a wide range of standard and specific subjects. (p. 52)

Furcolo and the senior members of his administration also saw a compelling logic in Pittsfield’s candidacy to host the first community college. Most significant was the fact that the college could open quickly and enjoyed the support of both a significant member of the General Court and the backing of major local business and community leaders. Morissey summarized the administration’s position many years later (videotape):

Berkshire would not rank in the top priority of the state population-wise or need-wise. But they were spending a great deal of money in Berkshire County training technicians to serve the needs of
General Electric in that part of the state. So with a massive technical need in that part of the state and with substantial local support -- from the Miller family, the newspapers and just about everybody out there was in favor of it -- we went for an appropriation . . .

The MBRCC was prepared by mid-1959 to recommend that a community college open in Pittsfield in Fall 1960 and serve an initial student population of 125 students. Those students would pay a maximum tuition of $200 and take classes in Central High School (MBRCC Minutes, April 22, 1959).

Renovations to the school were slated to come from the 1958 capital outlay of $1 million. Still unanswered, however, was the question of where to find operating dollars for the new campus as well as how the MBRCC would obtain a general operating budget to sustain its operations and its efforts to open additional colleges.

The administration's decision to support the MBRCC in its 1959 bid to secure an initial appropriation of to seed its efforts in Pittsfield was a critical first test of community college viability. The proposal immediately fell prey to attacks from opponents who were not prepared to support new spending by the MBRCC absent a fully completed master plan. Ultimately, despite active lobbying by the governor and the support of Speaker Thompson, the appropriation failed in 1959 on a roll call vote in the House (Morissey, videotape).

The administration and the MBRCC each recognized that the entire community college program was in jeopardy. It
was critical to earn another vote on the appropriation and secure a victory.

The governor turned to Boston and Maine Railroad General Counsel and former state senator Joseph Mulhern to lead the MBRCC and nail down the appropriation. Mulhern was considered a power on Beacon Hill who controlled a strong lobbying network. Mahoney points out that Furcolo believed Mulhern’s strength in the legislature could neutralize opponents such as Senator William Fleming (R-Worcester) who continued to oppose the governor from his position on the Ways and Means Committee (Mahoney interview, July 25, 1993). Mahoney also recalls a certain level of amazement on the part of Mulhern as to the governor’s intensity in pursuing him to join the Board (Mahoney interview, July 25, 1993).

The governor and Mulhern agreed that the latter would assume the chairmanship of the MBRCC from Putnam until the initial appropriation could be secured. At that time, Mulhern would resign from the Board and re-focus on his other interests (Mahoney interview, July 25, 1993).

Morissey described Mulhern as "just a good tough guy" who brought "some muscle to the Board" and allowed it to "take the appropriations process seriously" (videotape). He also emphasized the critical role which Mulhern played during his short tenure as chair (videotape):

It was the governor’s theory that once the first appropriation was made it would be all done, and, of course, he was correct. The critical vote was the first vote. Joe Mulhern took the job as
The appropriation (Chapter 318 of the Acts of 1960, April 13, 1960) which Mulhern's power helped to secure as part of a general supplemental funding bill in April 1960 provided $82,950 for "the regional community college in Pittsfield." Most of all, it provided a critical foundation for subsequent appropriations to support the opening of other regional colleges. The first Berkshire appropriation appears to be a watershed in the early funding history of the community college program. Table 1 provides a chronological listing of all appropriations to the community college board and to individual colleges between 1958-62. It is interesting to contrast the funding pattern which preceded the April 1960 appropriation with the pattern which followed. Before April 1960, Furcolo and the Board had confronted a series of hurdles in setting the community college program on a sound fiscal base. Other than the $1 million capital outlay appropriation of 1958, the governor and the MBRCC could point to only a single $25,000 appropriation for administration of the program which had been included as part of an April 1959 supplemental budget (Chapter 171, Acts of 1959, April 6, 1959). So bleak had been the prognosis for community college funding amid Furcolo's continuing difficulties in the Legislature, his sales tax defeats and his continued public emphasis on the Commonwealth's fiscal difficulties,
that the governor had not even requested additional funding for the MBRCC in his formal budget proposal for Fiscal Year 1960 (House 1, January 12, 1959). Moreover, no additional capital dollars for community colleges were included in a major special outlay of September 1959, despite the fact that the bill ultimately included over $12 million in higher education projects (Chapter 604, Acts of 1959, September 17, 1959).

The outlook through much of early 1960 appeared little rosier. The administration slashed the MBRCC’s budget request of $200,699 to a figure of $85,521 in the governor’s budget proposal for Fiscal Year 1961 (January 25, 1960). Until Mulhern lifted the Berkshire appropriation out of the Legislature, the administration and the MBRCC were left to create a community college out of high intentions, singleness of purpose and a near-empty operating account.

By contrast, two major operating appropriations and a significant capital appropriations followed in 1960 on the heels of the Berkshire vote. A general supplemental which passed in June included over $71,000 to support administration of the MBRCC and to begin development of colleges in metropolitan Boston as well as Northeastern and Southeastern sections of the Commonwealth. A second infusion of $83,000 in operating dollars to support the same ends followed in a November supplemental (Chapter 784, Acts of 1960). Finally, a special capital outlay bill of
November 1960 included an appropriation of $300,000 to augment the $1 million outlay of 1958 (Chapter 774, Acts of 1960).

Furcolo had been right; the first appropriation was key to provide momentum behind community college development. With the appropriation of April 1960, Berkshire became a physical and political inevitability. This reality, in turn, catalyzed a reaction among other environmental factors which ultimately led to a series of larger appropriations in 1961 and 1962.

The ironic outcome of this reaction is that while Foster Furcolo's energy and policy focus made the community college program a reality, it was the far less engaged John Volpe whose first administration witnessed nearly $2 million in critical new funding for two-year college expansion and operations.

This irony, and the environmental factors which inspired it, deserve some focused discussion. Three factors are particularly important. First, already discussed, is the momentum created by the 1960 Berkshire appropriation. Second is the approach of Volpe whose surface disengagement belies a sophisticated strategic position. Third is the fiscal status of the Commonwealth which had begun to show signs of improvement by mid-1960, an improvement which inspired renewed interest on the part of legislators to spend. Fourth, arguably most important, is the active involvement of legislative leaders who, in
the face of a tangible post-Chapter 318 community college initiative in Pittsfield, were not to be left at the starting line in securing campuses for their districts. Fifth, there remains the role played by the MBRCC. This group of largely Furcolo "doers" maintained fidelity to its maxim that community colleges must be set in place quickly so as to ensure the program’s long-term viability.

Volpe 1961-62

The conclusion of Foster Furcolo’s governorship ended a unique period of executive branch focus on community college development. Never in the more than thirty years since has a governor dedicated such energy and emphasis to two-year college growth. And yet, thanks in good measure to his labors, community colleges have survived and grown in the commonwealth.

John Volpe, as noted in Chapter VI, came to power with a different set of policy priorities and political exigencies than did his predecessor. A builder and self-made Republican businessman, he pursued a legacy of government reform and completion of major construction projects. Surrounded by Democratic majorities in both houses and facing an increasingly Democratic sentiment among voters, Volpe held a tenuous mandate. To survive required acute political antennae and an ability to corner the Democrats on difficult issues such as corruption while stealing their thunder on matters such as education.
Partially because of his inherently fragile position, Volpe's term is rich in ironies concerning the community college program. MBRCC minutes indicate only two meetings during the period 1961-62 at which senior administration budget officials were in attendance (as opposed to the regular attendance of Morissey and Mahoney during Furcolo's governorship). Volpe's personal papers reflect almost no focus on issues of community college development or mission. Newspaper accounts from the period rarely link the governor to two-year colleges and Volpe's major speeches only refer to community colleges in the most general manner.

And yet, during his first administration, colleges opened in Boston, Hyannis, and Haverhill; MBRCC efforts to open colleges in Worcester and Greenfield intensified; and budget appropriations to the MBRCC and to individual schools increased markedly.

The community college program which Volpe found upon coming to power appealed to his self-made experience as well as to his political instincts. The program was established; it was slowly developing a core of business support in municipalities across the Commonwealth; key legislators were seeking colleges for their districts; the budget situation was improved to the point where some increased spending was perceived as acceptable; Forman and the Globe were beginning to rumble about unmet needs. For all these reasons, despite his limited policy interests in
community colleges, Volpe had much to gain from supporting reasonable growth in the program and little to gain by standing in its way.

Thus, it is not surprising that in their first meeting with the new governor on February 10, 1961, Morissey Chase, and Putnam found Volpe "understanding and sympathetic, ready to discuss the Board’s problems at any time" (MBRCC Minutes, February 20, 1961).

The Minutes of the MBRCC meetings during the first Volpe term reflect only two substantive policy interactions with the governor. First, on March 20, 1961, Assistant to the Budget Commissioner, William Bixby, met with the Board to relay the governor’s request for consideration of a tuition increase. Beyond a cursory discussion and simple reply concerning the Board’s rationale for a tuition consistent with other public higher education institutions, there is no evidence that this policy discussion continued beyond the next meeting.

The second policy interaction between the governor and the Board came with Volpe’s request for a ten-year plan from the MBRCC. This request came during Volpe’s second annual address, as the pressure for an education Master Plan was peaking. The report presented by the Board on February 23, 1962 received little public notice and there is so evidence that it drew any extraordinary attention from Volpe.
Perhaps the most intriguing of Volpe’s decisions concerning the Board was his willingness to leave Kermit Morissey as chair during his entire first term in office. Under Chapter 605, the governor held the right "to periodically appoint a chairman" (Chapter 605, Acts of 1958). Thus, Volpe could have removed his predecessor’s close ally from the chairmanship and offer the political plum to a loyal Republican.

When Mulhern resigned following achievement of the community college appropriation in 1960, Furcolo was a soon-to-be defeated candidate for the United States Senate. By this time, Morissey had left the administration to become assistant to Brandeis President Abraham Zachar. In a major step toward insuring his legacy on the Board, the outgoing governor reached an agreement with Zachar allowing Morissey to assume the chairmanship.

Immediately Morissey became the Board’s lifeblood. Irrepressibly candid, politically sophisticated, and passionately committed to community colleges, he led the Board through the power of his personality and the strength of his convictions. He was Board Chair in title and chief executive officer in fact.

To remove Morissey as chair would have created a significant vacuum in leadership of the MBRCC. With this loss of leadership would likely come a slowdown in community college expansion; a prognosis which ultimately failed to serve Volpe’s end. Moreover, Morissey held
respect in both the Legislature and in the academic world. Volpe could work with Morissey and the governor had no interest in creating problems at the MBRCC which would draw him from more pressing issues. Again, the short-term rewards of replacing Morissey with a Republican loyalist did not outweigh the longer-term risks.

It is interesting to note Volpe’s appointments to the Board. The governor’s appointments to the MBRCC during the period 1961-62, including Reverend Richard Sullivan, President of Stonehill College, and Northeastern President Asa Knowles, were serious, if also politically advantageous. Furcolo himself, much later, would acknowledge that his successors, including Volpe, maintained a standard of excellence in their appointments to the regional college board (Videotape).

Thus in his board appointments, his willingness to retain Morissey as chair, and his general willingness to support campus expansion, Volpe kept faith with the community college program. In doing so, he allowed what was essentially a Furcolo board to continue the former governor’s strategy of establishing campuses quickly to generate sustainable momentum as he remained above the fray concerning legislative influence over campus locations. The consummate irony, summarized in Table 1, is that it was the Volpe administration which provided the greatest early infusion of monetary support to develop the early campuses
in Haverhill, Cape Cod, Worcester and Greenfield while also providing additional support to Berkshire.

On the issue of community college expansion, as with others in education, Volpe seemed comfortable to ride the wave others had created. Community colleges had developed a certain momentum by 1961. Money was increasingly available and key legislators (several with a particular interest in higher education) were prepared to spend it on visible projects in their districts. Education was a hot issue thanks largely to Forman and Menzies and the upcoming Master Planning effort.

Volpe’s strategy appears to have revolved around securing a place in line when credit for educational expansion. Community colleges ("the people’s colleges") were on track and Volpe, who endorsed their purposes, was more than willing to share the limelight for their successes.

The Legislature and Early Decisions Concerning Campus Location

The Legislature’s role in shaping the early community college program during the period 1961-62 has received some scholarly attention. Most notably, Coles and Lustberg have discussed the influence of key legislators in pressuring the Board to open campuses in specific locations.

It is important, before discussing the legislative role in detail, to briefly note the environmental realities which help to define that role during the period in question.
First, by early in Furcolo’s second term, the Massachusetts fiscal picture had begun to show signs of improvement. The national recession of the mid-1950s had bottomed out and employment in Massachusetts had begun to tick upward. Republicans had used this changing economic picture to their advantage in battling Furcolo’s 1958 unemployment relief bill, citing increases in employment numbers as well as a general improvement in the Commonwealth’s economy. This enhanced fiscal picture was further confirmed by a surprising surplus at the end of Fiscal Year 1958 (Brint & Karabel, p. 145).

The Massachusetts economy was well-poised for growth by 1961. The nation had entered a period of sustained growth, which the Kennedy tax cuts would soon reinforce. Continued high levels of defense spending and dollars spent to jump-start the space program was particularly helpful to the Massachusetts economy with its heavy concentration of research universities.

This economic growth and renewal optimism fed the most traditional instincts of the now Democratic Legislature. Influenced by an activist President whom most knew personally, the Democratic leadership was positioned to exercise its pent-up demand to private government to work in pursuit of a liberal social policy agenda. For young Democrats who were entering leadership positions such as Donohue, Wojtkowski, and Harrington, education was central to this agenda.
Volpe, although a Republican, was a moderate political temperament. A self-made man, devoid of Brahmin roots, he believed government had a role to play. Moreover, if he were to survive politically, he had to catch the wave of positive energy established by the nation's young president. These were the days of Kennedy, not Coolidge, and if a Republican were to succeed in Massachusetts, he had best represent progress.

As the legislature and the Board pressed for community expansion and general reform, Volpe joined the parade. He pressed for hefty budget increases for the MBRCC and he supported each new campus which the Board voted to establish. His support was steady, if far more understated than Furcolo's. Mostly he stayed out of the way, allowing the Legislature and the Board to fill the void.

Funding of the community college program was the most obvious leverage which the legislature held in the process of opening the commonwealth's first community colleges. Debate has continued through the years as to the role played by legislators in determining the location of individual campuses and their sequence of opening.

The few studies available which discuss the establishment of Massachusetts community colleges focus on the Legislature's role in site selection. Cole (1977) argues both that in a number of instances there is a direct relationship between participants in . . . key legislative roles and the location of opening dates of the community
colleges" (p. 2). Lustberg writes that "as we do down the list of foundings we find one story of political interference after another" (1979, p. 141). Brint and Karabel assert simply that "legislative influence contributed to these first location decisions" (citation).

To illustrate his argument Lustberg (1979, p. 141) points to a chain of events related to the decision to establish Cape Cod Community College. The MBRCC minutes from its April, 1960 meeting reflect some internal debate as to Cape Cod's application. Between April and June, Lustberg points out that Senator Fleming called Roger Putnam threatening to delay $75,000 slated for the MBRCC unless the Board declared its support for community colleges in Cape Cod, Haverhill (represented by long-time Senate Ways and Means power, John Rurak) and Boston. Lustberg quotes Morissey as saying that Fleming further demanded that preparation begin for a campus in his home city of Worcester (thus setting in motion the process that led to establishment of Quinsigamond Community College in 1963), despite Costello's difficulty in generating either significant local support or a donated temporary facility. By June of 1960, the Board had given final support to the Cape Cod and Boston sites and had begun the push for a Worcester campus.

There is no denying that politics played a significant role in the locations of Massachusetts community colleges. Wojtkowski, in fact, once went so far as to say that "the
House of Representatives is the Board of Trustees of the community colleges" (Lustberg, 1979, p. 140).

If one acknowledges the fact that politics played a substantive role in the siting process, then one must ask to what end? While Chapter IX will elaborate further on this point, it is fair to make a number of observations at thus juncture.

The central thesis of Cole's 1977 paper, "The Dynamics of Non-Planning in the Massachusetts Community College System, 1958-1972" is that undue political influence was used to site the Commonwealth's system of colleges and that the influence of Senate House Ways and Means Committee members was particularly pervasive.

Cole argues that a number of adverse effects resulted from this legislative influence. First, that it usurped any serious planning effort by the MBRCC, such as that called for both by Furcolo and by the Special Commission on the Audit of State Needs. In concluding her paper, she writes:

As a result of the dominant role played by the state legislature in determining the location of the community college system and the order in which they opened, the Massachusetts community college system today is a collection of institutions located in areas which are not always convenient to the population centers of the state or to the communities where there is a high percentage of college-age youth not pursuing post secondary education. (p. 20)

Cole further argues that in establishing the Berkshire campus in temporary facilities provided by Pittsfield and by accepting land donated by Barnstable for the permanent
Cape Cod college, the MBRCC set a dangerous precedent which limited its options concerning the locations of future campuses and led to formalization of Board policies concerning the opening of colleges in temporary space and the requirement that communities provide land for permanent campuses. As Cole summarized:

Both these policies were based on the precedents set by the willingness of the City of Pittsfield to provide a temporary facility at no cost for what became the first community college in the system and the Town of Barnstable to give the land for a permanent campus for Cape Cod Community College, the second college opened. While the original legislation for the community college system had not specified these conditions, once communities set the precedents, the state legislature resisted appropriating funds for the rental of temporary facilities or the purchase of land for permanent campuses. Instead of confronting this resistance, the MBRCC followed the lead of the legislature and adopted these precedents as policies for the community college system. The Board's support of these policies extended to initiating legislation making it legal for communities to raise local taxes in order to purchase land for the Board. (p. 21)

While Cole's arguments are reasoned and persuasive, one must reach deeper to fully analyze the politics of establishing the Massachusetts community college system. First, it is important to remember that there was no great early groundswell of local support in any major city or region behind two-year colleges. As Mahoney correctly recalls:

You must remember that at first there was no outpouring of demand for these colleges. As such, we were prepared to work with anyone who was prepared to work with us. (Interview, July 27, 1993)
Wojtkowski and Stone were ready. They offered arrangements that would allow early tangible results for the MBRCC, potentially leverage additional appropriations for expansion to other communities (particularly given Wojtkowski's and Stone's positions on the Ways and Means Committees of their respective houses) and repay a political debt for their service in passage of Chapter 605 and the initial capital appropriation.

Costello argues that, particularly in these early difficult days when the MBRCC lacked either resources or strong community support statewide, the Board "used" legislative figures to set colleges in place and to secure appropriations (Lustberg, 1979, p. 144). Rather than a club at the Board's neck, legislative pressure may in fact have been one of the few points of leverage by which Furcolo and the MBRCC could achieve the goal of rapidly establishing campuses.

It also deserves note that not every legislator who desired a college was able to secure one. Lustberg points specifically to Stone's foiled attempt to establish a second college on the Cape (1979, p. 145) and the continued failure of Quincy to acquire a public community college in the city (1979, p. 144). Board minutes from late 1961 and early 1962 reflect strong and formal Board opposition to legislative mandates concerning college locations, most notably concerning bills filed by legislators from Quincy and Lynn calling for colleges in their cities (MBRCC
Minutes, December 18, 1961 and January 13, 1962). Costello holds that such cases are evidence that while "we certainly listened to what the Legislature had to say, its input was not always decisive."

A final point can be made, at least in terms of the Board's decisions concerning Pittsfield, Cape Cod, Boston and Worcester. Each of these sites was an original part of the Audit of State Needs Master Plan. While it is true that the planning process was probably far less formal than that originally envisioned by the Commission or by Furcolo, the fact remains that the first three campuses opened by fall, 1961 did so in regions consistent with those identified by the Audit Commission as having need.

**Early Discussions on Mission and Philosophy: 1959-1962**

The MBRCC's focus during the period 1959-62 was clearly on issues of campus location and funding. Comparatively little time was spent on matters related to mission or educational philosophy.

When issues of mission were raised, an interesting dichotomy appears in the Board's minutes. On the one hand, MBRCC members were clearly committed to developing a curriculum that was responsive to the labor force needs of local businesses. This commitment inclined the Board toward occupational and community service programming; an inclination which grew in no small part from the Board's quest to earn local business support.
On the other hand, the MBRCC was not prepared to cast its lot completely with an occupational program. Its members perceived the need for a strong liberal arts and transfer foundation in order to achieve academic credibility for the two-year colleges. Clark (1960) as well as Jencks and Riesman (1969) have argued that community colleges have traditionally lacked the capacity to shape their own identity in that much of their curricula and academic status depends on acceptance by baccalaureate institutions. As Brint and Karabel have summarized, this dependency played a role in Massachusetts:

Given the Board’s curricular preferences (for occupational programs), it may seem surprising that the colleges themselves initially concentrated on developing liberal arts rather than occupational programs. Little real contradiction existed, however. Key Board members and campus officials understood clearly that the legitimacy of the colleges depended on their acceptance as institutions of higher education, which meant their offering liberal arts courses closely resembling those offered in four-year colleges and universities. As Kermit Morissey recalled, "Liberal arts gave respectability—the stamp of legitimacy. The standards for higher education were standards of private colleges . . . a six-week training program for secretaries would not have been regarded as higher education. The transfer part had to be nailed down first." (1989, p. 148)

In order to understand this tug-of-war concerning mission, it is important to consider the historical context within which the MBRCC operated. Three points are particularly salient in this regard.

First, the nation in 1958-62 stood at the height of the Cold War, confronting a clear and seemingly monolithic
foe on the world stage. This conflict framed public policy on almost every major federal and state issue. Sputnik had placed education at the center of the Cold War in 1957, convincing many Americans that their country's scientific and technical skills lagged dangerously behind those found in the Soviet Union. And, as Brint and Karabel summarize, this perception of inferiority "encouraged national elites to take a greater interest in community college vocational programs" (1989, p. 83).

Second, the 1950s and 1960s witnessed an extraordinary growth in college enrollments due to the G.I. Bill and the post-war baby boom. This enrollment pressure, which profoundly influenced Furcolo and other political and educational leaders in the nation, created a demand for higher education that the elite universities and colleges neither could nor wanted to meet. The result was both a remarkable increase in community college enrollments and an intensification of the debate as to what the two-year college mission should be.

Third, the 1950s and early 1960s was a period of relative affluence and optimism in the United States, a time of unequalled military and economic stature in world affairs. Americans generally accepted the premise that through hard work and innate ability, individuals from any social or economic strata could improve their stations. And despite fiscal concerns such as those expressed by Furcolo or outrage over the occasional political scandal,
there remained an underlying pre-Vietnam and pre-Watergate faith that government and its institutions could and should contribute to the public welfare in a positive way.

The Cold War and the socio-economic forces at play in the United States combined to strengthen the appeal of community colleges. Much of this appeal was rooted in the notion of "meritocracy"—the principle that community colleges allowed access to higher education by students of all socio-economic classes who would, in turn, achieve at their maximum levels of ability. In this sorting-out process, community colleges would filter their most talented students through to baccalaureate institutions (who would thus be saved the pressure of potential freshmen banging on their doors). For the rest—the majority—community colleges would provide a meaningful outlet, allowing them to contribute to an increasingly technical economy that required more than basic manual skills.

One of the leading voices for such a system was Harvard's James Conant, who had first argued for a "differentiation in higher education" in his 1948 work Education in a Divided World. As Brint and Karabel have summarized, Conant called for a higher education system that "was at once meritocratic and technocratic."

Through Conant's discussion of junior colleges in Education in a Divided World was framed in the context of his very genuine desire to expand educational opportunities, his specific vision of community colleges emphasized that they "should be defined as terminal two-year colleges." While subscribing to the official AAJC (American Association of Junior Colleges) ideology that the
junior college should be a "comprehensive" institution offering college preparatory, general and vocational programs, his clear preference was for the terminal functions. (1948, p. 200)

Conant’s arguments and those of other like-minded voices combined with demographic and socio-economic realities in the post-war United States to influence the leadership of public higher education across the country. Brint and Karabel (1989) have summarized the debate concerning the two-year college mission which occurred in the AAJC beginning in the 1930s. By the 1950s, the "vocationists" (those favoring a terminal, occupational focus at community colleges) had gained a position of prominence in the junior college movement over the traditionalists who favored a preeminent emphasis on liberal arts and transfer.

The AAJC leadership, by 1959, had essentially adopted the position of Koos, Conant, and others that while academic credibility lie in the liberal arts, it would be occupational programs which would provide long-term viability to community colleges. It would be vocational programs which would allow two-year colleges to emerge as a clearly definable identity in American education, enjoying the support of key constituencies such as small business.

The influence of Conant and others can be seen in the so-called California Master Plan which was implemented under the leadership of that state’s university president, Clark Kerr. According to Brint and Karabel, the plan was "widely viewed as a model in providing for both broad
public access and the maintenance of academic excellence," while "diverting large numbers of matriculating students away from the state colleges and universities" (1989, p. 86).

In projecting a limitation of 41 percent by 1975 in the number of lower division students attending California's senior institutions, the Master Plan combined open admissions at community colleges with progressively restrictive criteria at the state college and universities. Thus was the number of lower division students in the top two segments limited (Brint and Karabel, 1989, p. 86). The goal, in the words of the plan, was to insure that "the best students get into the right institutions" (Quoted in Brint and Karabel, 1989, p. 87). Thus, by the first meeting of the MBRCC, the curricular emphasis of the national community college movement was clearly leaning toward occupational programs. As Brint and Karabel have noted, "... by 1959 the battles in the AAJC between the traditionalists and the vocationalizers were well on their way toward being resolved in favor of the vocational wing" (1989, p. 148).

Conant and others in the forefront of the debate over the two-year college mission were invited to address the MBRCC during early 1959. On March 10, Conant and SUNY President Elbert K. Fretwell, Jr. spoke to the Board concerning the mission of two-year colleges.
Minutes of the meeting reflect that Conant pointed to California as a model system referring positively to the concept of a "filtering process" and saying that "the whole key to a good program, as in California, would be to have the state university play the same role" (MBRCC minutes, March 10, 1959). Conant also focused his remarks on "the terminal student", arguing that such a student "must develop skills in specialized fields." He further argued that the needs of the terminal student made it particularly "important to have a community college set up so that a student may readily commute; discover the needs of the area; hire a good man to run it and let him handle the local situation."

Fretwell spoke of the New York experience, focusing on the importance of local involvement and support of two-year colleges. He argued that "programs are adopted not only to the needs of local high school graduates but also to the needs of the community" (MBRCC minutes, March 10, 1959).

In subsequent months, other noted leaders in the educational world met with MBRCC. For example, on March 25, S. V. Martarana (U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare) and Edmund J. Gleazer (Executive Director of the AAJC) participated in a panel discussion of the fifth meeting of the Board. Each discussed the policy role of the Board, various criteria to consider in locating campuses, the relation of two-year colleges to the university and the balance between transfer and terminal
programs. Gleazer argued that vocational and technical curricula were particularly important for Massachusetts "because of the need for a continued supply of trained technicians and skilled workers" (MBRCC Minutes, March 25, 1959).

The Board's desire to create both a credible liberal arts cornerstone and a strong vocational program which focused on the needs of local businesses is evident in its recommendations concerning curricula at Berkshire.

First, the MBRCC called for "a Liberal Arts offering to prepare students for transfer for four-year institutions for their last two years":

At first this program should be modeled carefully on the freshman-sophomore program offerings of the University of Massachusetts so that Pittsfield Community College students who do well can plan to transfer to the University. This is not to say that all transfer students of the Pittsfield Community College will or should plan to attend the University of Massachusetts for their last two years. The standards of the Pittsfield Community College should be high enough to provide students who do well with the possibility of transferring to any one of a number of four-year institutions. (Progress Report, p. 55)

The language of the MBRCC consistently places community college liberal arts programs in a subservient position to those at four-year institutions. Standards are to be set by baccalaureate colleges and universities with two-year colleges left to appreciate the fact that senior institutions would consider some number of transfer students. As the MBRCC wrote of the University of Massachusetts, "there is a clear advantage to using the
excellent University of Massachusetts programs as a basis for developing the Pittsfield Community College liberal arts or transfer program, particularly since the University has expressed its willingness to take as transfer students in the junior year a number of those Pittsfield Community college graduates who do well" (Progress Report, p. 56).

The Board envisioned a single vocational program for Berkshire's first year. The program would train electrical technicians and "would parallel the apprenticeship course conducted by the Pittsfield School System for tool makers and draftsmen for 13th and 14th year level students" (Progress Report, p. 56). Designed with the needs of General Electric clearly in mind, the electrical technicians program would be the first of an expanding number of vocational initiatives:

The Board's plan is to increase the number of offerings at Pittsfield to include one or two more occupational programs as the need becomes apparent. These might be in the areas of mechanical (as distinct from electrical) technology and business (including accounting and secretarial courses. (Progress Report, p. 57)

Governor Furcolo and his aides appear to have been satisfied to leave specific curricular discussions to the MBRCC. The administration's goals remained to see colleges start and succeed quickly, to push generally for a comprehensive program, to secure sufficient funding and local enthusiasm to set the colleges and the Board on a reasonably firm footing and to maintain a Board whose
character was one of integrity and whose predisposition was to action.

MBRCC minutes and interviews indicate that Governor Volpe expressed no more interest in the details of mission than did Furcolo. The only tangible expression of any such interest is found in his 1962 annual address request that the MBRCC develop a ten-year plan. This request, however, came amid the push for a statewide educational master plan and probably grew more from political strategy than personal policy priority.

The ten-year plan which the Board sent to Volpe in February 1962 provides a lens into the Board's long-term projections as to campus development, enrollment levels and program emphases. The report's brief discussion concerning programs warrants remark. This section focuses on three program areas in which it argues a "distinct probability that over the next decade the nation will experience a great upsurge of interest" (p. 5).

First, the Board points to "technical-vocational programs with the recommendations that in areas in which finely equipped technological facilities do not exist under public auspices, these facilities should be established in community colleges." Second, the Board calls for emphasis on "shorter re-training, refresher programs, and upgrading programs -- as required by increasing technological requirements and, especially, automation." Finally, the Board indicates the need for "general studies, as developed
out of the growing realization that alert men and women capable of voting intelligently need opportunities to keep abreast of the times under able and exciting teachers" (p. 5).

None of these three program areas relate directly to the traditional liberal arts transfer program. Clearly, as the MBRCC and the Massachusetts community college presidents looked to their future, they saw vocational and general studies courses which were rooted in local need as defining much of their niche.

By 1962, then, the picture which emerges of the MBRCC is one of a board working to quickly establish campuses in key locations across the state; a board seeking to create demand for such campuses among critical constituencies such as local businesses and legislators; a board dealing with the many details of campus start-up; a board seeking increased resources to support its efforts; and a board beginning to deal with basic issues related to mission and philosophy.

Perhaps most significantly, the MBRCC by 1962 represents a Board whose identity and viability are each emerging on solid ground. Thanks to Furcolo’s energy, commitment and focus on key matters such as appointments and to Volpe’s willingness to endorse the Board’s activities during the key 1961-62 period, the MBRCC had achieved relative stability by the time of Endicott Peabody’s election. Furcolo’s dream of a two year college
system, though buffeted by strong winds and somewhat patched together across the state, was a reality and would survive and grow.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The methodology and style of the present study owes much to master historians such as Neustadt, May and Burns, whose works set high standards of excellence in historical scholarship. They understand, as few others, that history is part story and part analysis. Story alone, while entertaining, lacks connections and meaning. Analysis alone ignores the whimsy and the varied colors which give historical study its context. History that enriches and teaches is that which molds story to analysis with words worthy to the task.

The "story" of this study has centered on the comparative roles which two very different governors played in the birth and early development of the Massachusetts community college system. Itself intriguing, this story provides a snapshot of politics, personalities and policymaking in the commonwealth. Lessons, however, lie within the story and demand careful analysis. Such analysis encourages the conclusions and recommendations which characterize serious scholarship.

Drawing these lessons has required much care and a heavy dose of humility. As Michelet has argued, "history is a reconstruction of life in its wholeness, not of the superficial aspects, but of the deeper, inner organic process" (Oates, 1984, p. 33). Successful scholarship
thrives in this spirit — sensitive to context; wary lest the values and assumptions of one era be ascribed to an earlier place and time; always searching for the organic process of an historical moment.

This study has examined the gubernatorial role in the birth and early development of community colleges in Massachusetts as one piece of a deeper organic process. Matters of little direct connection to two-year colleges — matters large and small, global and national, state and local — shaped the context of 1957-62. In doing so, they also influenced the values, needs and goals of those who steered the early development of the commonwealth’s community colleges.

Neither Foster Furcolo nor John Volpe encountered community college development in a policy vacuum, unaffected by other issues, events, and personalities. Nor for that matter, did any member of the Massachusetts General Court. Only by understanding the scope and interplay of these issues and their effect on the key actors in the drama, can one hope to achieve a rich understanding of early community college evolution in the commonwealth.

Such richness of understanding requires the capacity to step outside the confines of one’s preconceptions and to engage an earlier time on its own terms. While no student of history can completely set aside preconceptions and assumptions, the most successful scholars present a moment
within the context of its place and time, not within a framework dictated by the demands of the present.

Traditionally, study of the American governorship has fallen within the realm of political science. Distinguished scholars such as Lipson, Beyle, and Sabato have contributed significant studies which focused on the mechanics of gubernatorial power.

This study has attempted to bring the historian’s perspective to bear on the American governorship. Utilizing a case study, it has reached beyond mechanics to touch the deeper organic process which describes how and why two governors used or did not use the formal and informal powers of their office.

Thus, one must analyze the lessons of Furcolo, Volpe and the early days of Massachusetts community colleges with restraint and with a sincere attempt to walk in the footsteps of those who shaped politics and policies in the commonwealth during the period in question.

Hopefully, through its reliance on interviews, newspaper accounts and official documents of 1958-62, as well as through a consistent effort to recognize the appearance of personal preconceptions or historical bias, this study has engaged the period on its own terms and within its own context.

Early community college development in Massachusetts was the product of many ingredients. The executive branch, under both the forceful and focused leadership of Furcolo
and the more passive, less committed hand of Volpe, played a central role in this development. It is fair to say that without Furcolo there would have been no Massachusetts community college program and that without Volpe that program could well have lost its momentum and quite possibly its prospects for long-term viability.

History affords numerous examples of leaders who, during moments of supreme challenge to a cause they hold deep, rise to the full measure of their office. Among the most significant such examples in American history are Lincoln’s strength in preservation of the Union and Johnson’s boldness in pursuit of civil rights legislation.

Furcolo’s effort between 1958 and 1961 to create and sustain community colleges in Massachusetts is less glamorous but still a worthy case study. Had he wavered in the heat of an often lonely battle or diverted his attention to other less controversial matters, two-year institutions in the commonwealth would have been aborted or still-born.

It is perhaps easy in the distant passage of nearly four decades to ignore the extent to which Furcolo cast the lot of his governorship with the cause of community colleges. From the moment of his special message in July 1958, he accepted the burden of personal leadership on an issue that lacked, at least initially, any major vocal constituency.
This moment of personal leadership, a moment in which Furcolo drew on the full array of direct and indirect powers at his disposal, is the high point of his administration. Though constrained by fiscal challenges through much of his tenure and weakened in the Legislature by recurrent battles over the sales tax, as well as by his outsider status on Beacon Hill and his ongoing problems with Senate President Powers, Furcolo skillfully drew on the formal and informal powers of his office to make the community college program a reality. At critical moments, when a governor less committed to the idea of two-year colleges would have wavered, Furcolo was focused and took the political steps necessary to keep his idea alive.

It is also easy to minimize the substantive strategic foundation which supported Furcolo’s efforts during the period in question. Massachusetts community colleges are not, as some would have them, simply the political outcomes of legislative muscle-flexing and policy ad hocracy. Rather, their earliest development reflects conscious policy choices on the part of Foster Furcolo. These choices, made before and after passage of Chapter 605, were born of three essential realities -- the governor’s deep personal commitment to community colleges, the fragile state of his relations with the legislature and the lack of any large or coherent public constituency supporting two-year colleges across the commonwealth.
The reality of Furcolo's leadership position in 1958-1959 mitigated against any strategy which required significant time or general systemwide planning. Any such lengthy process would have exposed the governor's weak legislative position, affording his opponents multiple opportunities to undermine the foundation of his community college agenda. Moreover, were the governor to leave office in 1960, most likely to pursue his long-time goal of the United States Senate, he needed to have a sound governing board securely in place as well as colleges both operational and in the pipeline. Otherwise, an unknown successor would control the fate of his entire community college program.

To succeed, Furcolo required in late 1958 a strategy which created momentum and a sense of credibility for community colleges. He also needed a strategy that would quickly take advantage of positive factors such as the gradually improving economic and fiscal situation in the commonwealth. In attempting to persuade the public and the legislature, Furcolo could not depend (as Johnson had done in the civil rights battle and Wallace had done in establishing Alabama's community colleges) on force of personality or fear of retribution among recalcitrant legislators. He had to rely instead on a strategy which would overcome his hurdles in the Legislature and create a core of public support, building momentum through moderate successes and partial victories. The keys to this strategy
were initial approval of community college legislation (Chapter 605) and successful establishment of a college quickly to confirm the program’s viability.

The Furcolo strategy of "begging, borrowing, and stealing" to establish campuses and build momentum also reflected the governor’s temperament, as well as that of the community college board which he appointed. To have engaged a long, highly formalized campus planning process would have violated his inherent desire to do big things and do them quickly. The same spirit which moved so rapidly to engage the sales tax issue and held so little time for detail was congenitally ill-suited to further study the implementation of his community college program. The Commission on the Audit of State Needs provided his planning framework; with passage of Chapter 605 it was time to establish campuses.

Thus, Furcolo’s strategic approach reflects both the dynamic of his political situation and the reality of his personality. For him to have taken any other strategic course in 1958-1959 would have been politically tenuous and personally out of character.

Strategic choices have policy consequences, however. Once Furcolo accepted a strategy based on speed and momentum, he also accepted the implications of his decision --- a limited initial capital outlay, encouragement of campuses in temporary facilities, designation of Pittsfield as home to the first institution and a willingness to open
colleges where local support could be generated rather than according to a fixed developmental plan. Perhaps most significantly, the Furcolo strategy led almost inexorably to strong legislative influence over decisions related to campus location.

To achieve rapid successes, Furcolo had to demonstrate that colleges could open without permanent homes; that they could operate at limited cost; and that they could earn popular support. Berkshire’s opening demonstrated that colleges could open on a shoestring and that local enthusiasm could be generated. This success, combined with an improving fiscal picture created a dynamic which no powerful legislator could ignore — a governor and MBRCC dependent on accessing additional state funds (and without a local or county funding source to turn to), state revenues available to appropriate and a model in place which enjoyed increasing support among key constituencies. This situation was too enticing for even a traditional community college foe such as Senator Fleming to ignore.

The decision by Furcolo to emphasize rapid openings of colleges represents a classic political trade-off in democratic policymaking. To succeed in ensuring the short-term survival of his program and thus enhance its prospects for long-term survival, the Governor accepted the consequences of legislative influence. By 1960, the nose of the legislative camel was under the community college
tent; that tent, however, was firmly embedded in solid ground.

Furcolo made a second decision, quite possibly unconsciously, which affected the evolution of community college identity in Massachusetts. He opted to avoid detailed involvement in the nuances of community college mission, preferring instead to focus on the broad notion of access and on the imperative of establishing colleges quickly. Specifics concerning issues such as the relative place of transfer versus occupational programs were left to the MBRCC and, in the tone and emphasis of the governor, consigned to secondary importance behind getting the program in place.

It is not unusual for a governor to paint policy in broad strokes, leaving the details of implementation to governing boards or experts. Rare is the successful chief executive who is temperamentally or professionally suited to embrace the details of institutional mission. What makes the Furcolo case interesting is that, in his rush to establish campuses quickly, he appointed a group of "doers" to the MBRCC who shared his broad vision as well as his impatience. The focus of both Furcolo and the MBRCC was clearly on campuses first, with the details to follow.

This situation did not change under the governorship of John Volpe, who was even less concerned with the details of mission than was his predecessor. With Furcolo's board still essentially intact and focused on achieving viability
through campus development, issues related to mission received only limited concentrated attention.

While this lack of deep reflection concerning mission is understandable and was likely inevitable within the context of the time, it too was not without consequences. The Massachusetts community college system never built an identity of its own during its crucial early years. As Brint and Karabel describe, and MBRCC minutes reflect, the Board generally accepted the national direction of community college evolution toward vocational programming and continued to speak of mission largely in the general terms of access. There was limited debate as to how the national community college model could best be shaped to fit the Massachusetts reality. Arguably, this debate has never occurred to the present day.

When Furcolo turned over the gubernatorial reins to Volpe, the momentum behind community colleges was beginning to grow. Legislative influence over the process of campus location grew concomitantly and inexorably with this momentum. As with the Furcolo case, one should not underestimate the strategic underpinnings of Volpe’s response to the situation which he inherited.

The contrasts between Volpe and Furcolo are evident and have been previously documented in this study -- the former, a moderate Republican who had made a fortune in construction; the second, a Democrat whose liberal instincts reflected the Roosevelt tradition and whose
expansive world view set him apart from the majority of political figures in Massachusetts. The similarities between the two men are less obvious, but are of significant importance to an understanding of the strategic decisions each made concerning the politics of community college development.

The first similarity between Furcolo and Volpe is impossible to quantify, is subtle in its manifestations and relates directly to the point made above concerning mission development. Each, through both his life experiences and worldview had accepted two fundamental arguments concerning higher education in Massachusetts during the late 1950s and early 1960s -- that the existing system of public colleges and universities were insufficient to meet the burgeoning demand for postsecondary training and that community colleges, "democracy's colleges," were a basic part of correcting this situation. Furcolo and Volpe might have differed in their passion concerning the policy importance of higher education and community colleges, but nothing in the historical record disputes the assertion that they held common ground around the need to expand the public system. To the contrary, comments made by each concerning public higher education (e.g., in their respective annual messages) emphasized the issue of access as fundamental.

The second similarity between Volpe and Furcolo lies in the basic fragility of the relationship each held with
the Legislature. Although a Democrat with majorities in both houses from 1958 through the end of his tenure and with a friendly speaker in the House, Furcolo entered the governorship as an outsider and (thanks in good measure to the sales tax imbroglio) never developed a solid working relationship with many in his own party.

Volpe’s difficulties with the Legislature are more easily understood. A Republican with no roots in elective office and elected by only a narrow margin, Volpe had no strong foundation of camaraderie in either the House or Senate upon which to draw in his efforts to secure passage of his program. Nor did he possess an electoral mandate with which to bludgeon the unfriendly majorities in the Legislature. He was, in the minds of many Democrats, an aberration to be replaced in two years by one of their own. To afford him victories on his legislative program, particularly on his anti-corruption initiatives, could only help to validate his governorship at the expense of the Democratic Party. Thus, 1961 and 1962 were remarkably quick legislative sessions with passage of little noteworthy legislation.

Volpe appears to have employed essentially a three-pronged political strategy to overcome his weak legislative position. First, he continued to attack the Democrats at their Achilles heel, corruption and government reform. Painting Thompson and other members of the Democratic leadership as entrenched and self-interested,
the Governor succeeded in some measure of role reversal — he became the voice of the person in the street while the Democrats increasingly became caricatures of machine politicians who were out of touch with the values of their constituents.

Second, Volpe pursued an aggressive construction program. Although his proposals enjoyed scattered success in the Legislature, his efforts on behalf of projects such as the Prudential Tower, the Massachusetts Turnpike extension and the Boston inner beltway both reflected the builder in his soul and presented him as an aggressive governor seeking tangible progress for the Commonwealth.

Third, and most directly related to community colleges, Volpe selectively jumped on the wave to support proposals traditionally associated with Democrats. The most obvious manifestation of this strategy is his response to a series of education issues during his first term.

Education had traditionally been a Democratic issue in Massachusetts. Furcolo had championed expansion of public higher education, Wojtkowksi had led in the fight for community colleges, Harrington had become a powerful voice for the Commonwealth’s state colleges and Donahue an equally resonant voice for the University of Massachusetts. Almost alone among major Republican figures, Stone was considered a leader on educational issues. As noted in Chapter VI, Volpe had demonstrated little evidence during
the early days of his governorship that education would be an issue of gubernatorial focus.

The Forman and Menzies series in the Globe changed the parameters of the field, however. Suddenly, education had become a hot issue in the Commonwealth and, with Forman consistently turning up the heat in his columns, Volpe faced the prospect that Harrington, Donahue, Thompson and a Democratic foe in 1962 could use the issue against him if he failed to respond.

During 1962, as the education reform debate began to percolate on Beacon Hill, Volpe coyly played for time on potentially controversial issues such as the proposed state medical school, fiscal autonomy for the University of Massachusetts and the master planning effort for which Forman and Harrington were champions. On each of these issues, the Governor would ultimately offer his support, clearly enough to earn a measure of credit in the 1962 campaign and with enough caveats to hold the conservative voices in the Republican Party in check.

The issue of community college development was subtly different than others Volpe faced in the educational arena. By 1961, Furcolo's strategy had succeeded in creating a momentum behind college development. Ironically, community colleges provided a rare issue of mutual interest between Volpe and the Democratic leadership.

While none of these individuals (with the possible exception of Thompson) shared the deep visceral commitment
which had driven Furcolo, each shared at the very least an acceptance that community colleges were a reality and an acceptance of the positive potential for such institutions both to address the challenge of growing post-secondary enrollments and to provide opportunities to students of varied backgrounds and needs.

Thus, as the Commonwealth’s fiscal picture improved, it served the political interests of no major political figure to stall the momentum for community college development. To the contrary, it served the interests of Volpe to encourage the construction of such institutions as evidence of achievement in an otherwise meager legislative record. Similarly, as the Democratic leadership held much of Volpe’s agenda hostage, community colleges offered an opportunity to deliver a tangible resource to increasingly receptive communities. The mutual benefits which community colleges offered to Volpe and to the Legislature created a wide pathway for the MBRCC, a pathway which the aggressive board followed with vigor.

It is tempting, within the context outlined, above to undervalue Volpe’s role in the increased pace of community college funding and development during 1961-1962; to argue that the Legislature would have funded such development no matter who was governor and no matter what position that governor assumed on the issue. While such speculation is tempting, it unfairly undervalues the decisions which Volpe
did make as well as those he did not make that a lesser governor might have made.

Perhaps the most important decision which Volpe did make was to accept Morrissey as chair and spirit of the MBRCC. Generally, governors covet such positions as opportunities to reward a loyal supporter or to establish a policy direction. Rare is the chief executive who both accepts and encourages the policy intimate of his erstwhile rival. In avoiding confrontation with Morrissey Volpe at least tacitly endorsed a program which was fundamental to his predecessor’s legacy, as well as the policy direction which that program had taken. To have done differently, would have stripped the MBRCC of its life force and its most powerful visionary at a critically sensitive stage in the history of Massachusetts community colleges. Worse yet, to have made a purely political choice to attack Morrissey, surely a temptation to a new governor surrounded by appointees of a different party, could have killed the momentum generated by Furcolo, undermined the credibility of the Board and even further politicized the campus development process.

The second major decision which Volpe made was to allow the process of community college development to go forward with relatively little gubernatorial interference. It is interesting to speculate what might have happened had Volpe taken a more activist interest in the process; had he intervened to stop Democrats from securing colleges in
their districts, or challenged the policy of opening in temporary facilities, or called for a more comprehensive planning process. Any of these decisions would have affected the course of community college development.

Arguably, given the state of Volpe's legislative relations and the still tenuous status of community colleges, it is highly possible that such decisions would have led to stalemate and to loss of momentum. Given Volpe's lack of apparent policy emphasis on community colleges, Thompson's growing problems in the House and Wojtkowski's increasing difficulties with the leadership, two-year institutions would have faced this loss of momentum without a resonant voice in government. At the very least, Morrissey and the Board would have had to significant energy to re-establish their position.

One can argue what chain of events might have ensued had Volpe chosen to play a more activist role. The fact remains, however, that he chose not to step into the fray and that the Furcolo strategy of speed and momentum continued to drive policy during the first Volpe administration.

As the basic Furcolo strategy of community college development carried forward into the first Volpe term, so too did the policy consequences of that strategy. Colleges continued to open in temporary facilities and the Legislature continued to influence decisions concerning campus locations.
Chapter VII summarizes the arguments of scholars who criticize the influence which legislators brought to bear on campus development. While these arguments are in some measure persuasive, it is the opinion of this author that they hold the Massachusetts case to an unrealistic standard.

First, they fail to recognize the strategic imperatives which forced a weakened Governor Furcolo to pursue a strategy of speed and momentum. To have opted for any other strategy in the context of his time would have likely doomed tangible campus development before the election of 1960, thus leaving the future of two-year institutions to a very uncertain future.

Second, they fail to consider the position of Governor Volpe. Also the victim of a weak legislative position, Volpe effectively assumed Furcolo's strategy concerning campus development. Had he chosen any other course, momentum behind community colleges would likely have shifted, funding would have been threatened and the process even more politicized.

Third, critics of the Legislature's role in the development of Massachusetts fail to acknowledge that other states faced similar situations in the development of their systems. Wattenbarger (interview, April 1994), for example, recalls that the earliest community colleges in Florida developed in rural areas due to the influence of individual legislators and Katsinas (1993, p. 2) describes
the situation in Alabama as one in which "two thirds of the eventual 41 system institutions were placed in the southern third of the state, a reflection of the rural power base in the state’s political system . . ." (p. 2).

Fourth, critics fail to recognize the extent of planning that did occur concerning community college development in the Commonwealth. Dating back to the Zook Report, numerable studies had taken place which analyzed the need for two-year institutions in specific regions of Massachusetts. Most notably, the Commission on the Audit of State Needs provides a fairly well-documented articulation of regional needs for such institutions. Finally, while admittedly pushed by an anxious MBRCC, the local studies prepared in each prospective college community, did provide important insights as to level of need and support. It should further be noted that such local studies were also a cornerstone of planning in Florida, a state recognized for the excellence of its two-year college system.

Contemporary literature concerning the evolution of America’s community colleges tends to focus either on the sociological foundations of such institutions (e.g., Clark, Zwerling, Brint, & Karabel) or on the essentially chronological presentation of data, personalities and dates (e.g., Monroe, Cohen, & Brawer, Witt et al). The role of politics, the inherently messy and human face of
policymaking, has been comparatively ignored (Katsinas standing as a notable exception).

To ignore the political dimension is to invite an artificially antiseptic view of policy development, a sense that rational decision making based on clearly presentable models is not only possible but to be expected. For example, Brint and Karabel fail to incorporate the political dynamic into their presentation of an "institutional" model of mission evolution in Massachusetts community colleges. Coles recognizes a political dynamic in her study of campus planning, but only to criticize its inappropriateness; as though in a better world politics would remain discretely beyond the field of policy decisions.

This study proceeds from a very different perspective -- that politics and policymaking are inherently linked. Any attempt to divorce one from the other, to create a pristine policymaking environment, denies a fundamental reality of the democratic process and unfairly diminishes the human character of policy development.

It is impossible to remove politics from policymaking. Particularly in a situation of gubernatorial vulnerability, legislative bodies will assume greater policy influence. When this occurs, the process inevitably becomes more messy, as multiple legislators jockey for position.

In a democracy, it seems fair to judge the role of politics in policymaking against a long-term standard of
outcomes rather than against a standard of purity in apolitical planning. In 1994, fifteen community colleges serve over 75,000 students in Massachusetts. While political influence led to campuses in communities of arguably less need, the fact remains that over time each region identified in both the Zook Report and the report of the Commission on the Audit of State Needs received a campus. Despite a lack of intense or focused debate concerning mission, the system has evolved, with each institution finding its own identity in the community it serves. For all its admitted compromises, and limitations, the Furcolo strategy of speed and momentum -- a strategy essentially assumed by Volpe -- set the foundation for a viable community college system. In the final analysis, therefore, this author believes that both Furcolo and Volpe deserve history’s acknowledgment for the positive role each played in the early development of community colleges in Massachusetts.

General Lessons for Contemporary Governors

The Furcolo and Volpe case studies offer innumerable examples of how two individuals of different backgrounds, temperaments and parties drew on the powers of their office to secure passage of their programs. Chapters V-VIII describe these cases in detail.

The purpose of analyzing these studies has not been to provide a "how-to" primer for contemporary governors. Each governor must lead in a particular time and place,
confronting challenges in a specific context for which history offers no perfect template.

There are, however, certain overarching lessons that today’s governors can draw from the experiences of Furcolo and Volpe.

The Furcolo case reconfirms that an activist governor in Massachusetts, even when hampered by strained legislative relations, holds enormous formal and informal authority. When a governor applies the full measure of his or her office to a cause, he or she draws on a powerful armada. The capacity of a governor to set the tone of public debate, to play off the goals and needs of individual legislators and to build key alliances in the community is profound. Only in rare cases does a governor care so deeply as to employ the full force of his arsenal. The Furcolo effort in support of community colleges offers one such example.

Perhaps the most useful lesson of the Furcolo case for today’s governor is that provided by the care which he brought to appointment of the MBRCC. The power of appointment is one of the most important which falls to any chief executive. Furcolo exercised this power with restraint, vision and integrity. The personal attention which he applied to defining the Board in Chapter 605 as well as the energy he applied to appointment of a Board which shared his broad vision and his passion insured that his influence would live long beyond his administration.
This author believes that the definition which Furcolo provided to the Board and the seriousness which he brought to its appointment is his greatest legacy to the community college movement in Massachusetts. It offers a standard which any governor could emulate.

The activism of the MBRCC in the years following its creation also provides ample evidence of the potential power which a governing body can employ. The regional community college board became in many ways a "semi-hierarchy" of the sort described by Zusman, dependant on the governor and legislature for funding, but a driving force in the pace of college development.

The Volpe case offers a somewhat different lesson for today's governors. When a chief executive assumes power from a governor of another party, there is an extraordinary human temptation to cast aside fundamental elements of that predecessor's program as inherently flawed. Volpe chose, for the strategic reasons enumerated above and because he saw the worth in Furcolo's initiative, to support community college development. Such choices deserve notice, both for their strategic significance and for the policy openness they represent.

This case study also reminds contemporary governors that every strategic choice has policy implications which extend beyond the moment of decision and beyond the narrow issue at hand. No decision is made in a vacuum or without downside risk. For example, Furcolo's decision to pursue
campuses before mission and Volpe's decision to endorse the
efforts of Furcolo's board each had long-term implications
for the system. This study has concluded that the
long-term benefits of securing and sustaining a community
college system in the Commonwealth outweighed the downside
effects of limited substantive debate concerning mission.
For today's governor, the "lesson" may lie less in the
details of what Furcolo or Volpe did or did not do
coverning community colleges, but in the reality that the
choices they made have affected the identity of community
colleges in Massachusetts to the present day.

Opportunities for Future Research

The Furcolo and Volpe case studies also provide the
foundation for further important research. A number of
studies warrant particular attention.

First, the present study offers only a first look at
gubernatorial policymaking concerning community colleges in
Massachusetts. Eight administrations and six governors
have followed since 1962. Each governor brought his own
set of priorities and goals to the corner office on Beacon
Hill. Each also confronted opportunities, challenges, and
political realities unique to his time and place. Each of
these administrations deserves analysis within its own
context so that eventually a holistic picture of governors
and community colleges in Massachusetts will develop.

Second, this research should be extended to other
states where the mechanics of government and the community
college identity are different. Such research would provide an interesting opportunity to add significantly to both the literature concerning the American governorship and the politics of community college development.

Third, it is hoped that his research will inspire others to use the case study method to examine how governors have influenced policy development in a number of areas beyond community colleges and higher education. Chapter II notes that case studies have been used successfully by Neustadt and others to examine politics and policymaking. These efforts should be extended and contrasts between cases and contexts should be encouraged.
APPENDIX A

INTERVIEWS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Title/Affiliation</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Asquino</td>
<td>President, Mt. Wachusetts</td>
<td>10/20/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Bartley</td>
<td>President, Holyoke Community College; Former Speaker of Massachusetts House of Representatives</td>
<td>11/26/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steven Brint</td>
<td>Author, The Diverted Dream</td>
<td>11/15/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theodore Chase</td>
<td>Former Chair of Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges</td>
<td>07/20/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Costello</td>
<td>Former member of the Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges Staff</td>
<td>06/01/92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maurice Donahue</td>
<td>Former President of Massachusetts Senate</td>
<td>08/25/93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Dwyer</td>
<td>Former Executive Director of Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges</td>
<td>07/18/93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foster Furcolo</td>
<td>Former Governor, Commonwealth of Massachusetts</td>
<td>10/15/88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevin Harrington</td>
<td>Consultant; former President of Massachusetts Senate</td>
<td>08/18/93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Wattenbarger</td>
<td>Distinguished Professor Emeritus at University of Florida</td>
<td>04/05/94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Wojtkowski</td>
<td>Counsel, Massachusetts House of Representatives; former member of Massachusetts House</td>
<td>05/10/91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Advertisement. (9/12/60). Boston Globe, p. 3.

All on the cuff. (8/19/58). Boston Herald-Traveler, p. 22.


Furcolo says state purse flat: Full text of inaugural speech by Bay State’s new leader. *Boston Globe*, p. 5.


Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges. (1959). *A progress report to Governor Foster Furcolo*. Boston: MBRCC.


Massachusetts House of Representatives. (1956). *A petition that the Trustees of the University of Massachusetts be authorized to establish and maintain community colleges*. Boston: Source.


Mullins, W. E. (5/8/57). This is how I see it: Furcolo rule so far devoid of anything hurtful to GOP. *Boston Herald-Traveler*, p. 44.


Mullins, W. E. (12/25/57). This is how I see it: Governor Furcolo survey cites his 3 key achievements. *Boston Herald-Traveler*, p. 48.


Mullins, W. E. (1/3/58). This is how I see it: Boston Democrats facing liquidation as House chiefs. p. 12.


Paying for the HCG. (11/13/57). Boston Herald-Traveler, p. 44.


Retailers to support sales tax, if . . . want relief assured to cities and towns: State GOP wiling "to go along" if Democrats agree to back levy. Boston Globe, pp. 1 & 2.


