Absent Others: Perspectives on Marginality in Barcelona Schools

Oriol Pi-Sunyer

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By Oriol Pi-Sunyer
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Why are some of Spain's peoples denied Spanishness? What does this denial tell us about Spanishness itself? (Freeman 1979:244)

Uncomfortable truths travel with difficulty. (Levi 1988:159)

This essay is a component of a larger project designed to examine the construction of cultural memory, specifically the interpretation and transmission of historical knowledge in Spain and Catalonia. It is an outgrowth of earlier work on political process and political economy in Catalonia (Pi-Sunyer 1971; 1974; 1976; 1980; 1985a; 1985b; 1987) and also builds on a longstanding interest in how Spanish historiography approaches the societal past (Glick and Pi-Sunyer 1969; Pi-Sunyer 1970).

My point of departure is that in modern complex societies the genre commonly categorized as history represents a particular form of cultural construct devoted to the transmission, preservation, and alteration of the collective memory. History, in this sense, is crucial to social identity in that it functions as a fund of shared knowledge and as a system of cultural meanings (Geertz 1973:255; 312-313). In common with certain other bodies of shared knowledge, such as myth and religion, it helps to legitimate the social order and contextualize experience.

The subject of history may be the past, but it is a past that is given pertinence in terms of the present, the point from which we arrange and reassess the relevance of past events (Lass 1988). I would agree with Errington's (1979:239) observation that the historical style is essentially moral, designed less to note down events than to explain them: "the genre history is an argument." It follows that meanings and significances are not fixed or given, but are to be understood processually, generated as they are developed and expressed. Hobsbawm (1983:13), making a direct linkage between history, politics, and general perceptions, writes that historians are engaged in "the creation, dismantling and restructuring of images of the past which belong not only to the world of specialist investigation but to the public..."
sphere of man as a political being." By extension, the same can be said to hold true of teachers and the writers of textbooks. Indeed, all structured learning, and most directly that which attempts to engender a sense of the social order, forms part of this political-ideological sphere. While the validity of this general proposition is something for specialists to ponder, the issue of how collective pasts should be remembered and commemorated (including Czeslaw Milosz's assessment that "a refusal to remember" is symptomatic of our age) is obviously a matter of much more general concern.¹

If we grant that history, in this sense, has the potential of instilling or reinforcing shared values, we must ask whose ethos, whose history? There are many possible answers, and much depends on the specific circumstances. Clearly, though, history as cultural myth can work as a powerful force in forging strong links between different classes, links that may, under some circumstances, succeed in transcending deep cleavages and divisions. What I am suggesting is that the ideological functions of history can fruitfully be examined from a perspective informed by Gramsci's (Femia 1987; Forgacs 1988) model of cultural hegemony. He argues from the Italian case (one of particular relevance for Spain) that even societies with severe inequalities can remain surprisingly stable so long as the masses share with the elites a body of beliefs and traditions. Gramsci's analysis has been supplemented by more recent historical and cross-cultural studies of power, including the influential contributions of Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1984).²

I will also be drawing on the history-as-discourse perspective developed by Michel Foucault and his followers. The Foucaultian analysis of discourse focuses on the configuration of systems of knowledge, and in particular of knowledge that ideologically legitimates the status quo. A discourse, in this sense, is a particular privileged representation of social reality; knowledge, in short, is power (Foucault 1980). Dominant discourses, however, do not stand unchallenged but are "endlessly accessible to new discourses and open to the task of transforming them" (Foucault 1975: xix). This sense that systems of thought are seldom monologic, but are potentially open to various interpretations and contestations, has already had a notable influence on the ethnographic interpretation of societies on the European periphery (Herzfeld
1987; McDonogh 1991). What I am suggesting is that a concern for discourse and dialogic narration points us in much the same direction as does the study of hegemony: the social organization of ruling relations, the sense that power and authority are never self-secured, but must be won and maintained. Ethnography, for its part, can contribute an insistence on context and on the importance of active subjects, elements that are seldom foregrounded in textually-based discourse analysis (Kinsman 1991).

In this essay, I apply the Gramscian analysis of beliefs and institutions not so much to the direct issue of class relations, but to the processes that create and disseminate attitudes, beliefs, and practices respecting the nature and place of what I am calling marginal groups and populations. In part, this selection is conditioned by factors of space, but there is also the intrinsic interest of applying the paradigm to a different -- though obviously related -- order of group and power relations.

Also, I will not be limiting myself to how history, as a bounded field, is conceptualized. While Spanish curricular organization remains strongly oriented to history (the other powerful card in comparative studies being geography), since the early 1970s it has -- in theory at least -- been taught in the wider context of a social world or social science program. Consequently, to examine only what emerges from the way the past is examined would distort what actually takes place in the classroom. But more than this, with respect to the issues being considered in this study, the approach and treatment accorded to "others" seems much the same whether they are in the past or in the present.

The validity and utility of the general approach does not require that a system of education be fully consistent or free from conflict and contradiction. In fact, one of the virtues of the Gramscian paradigm is that it takes cognizance of both internal differentiation and over-reaching value systems. As numerous observers have noted (Mintz 1986:121; Moore 1978:49), an element of indeterminacy, of dissonance and arbitrariness, is very much a characteristic of modern, complex, sociocultural orders, and this is no less true of Catalonia or of Spain as a whole (Pi-Sunyer 1987:168; 1988). It would be remarkable not to encounter alternative, even contradictory, societal
renderings or interpretations in the schoolroom, especially when we keep in mind the scope of political change that Spain has experienced since the dismantling of the Franco regime in the mid 1970s. What is surprising, and calls for explanation, is why certain issues and questions, such as those revolving around the many meanings of nation and people, receive much greater attention outside the classroom than within it. As we shall see, this heavily contested domain is seldom ventured into by teachers and students. In contrast, there is little reluctance to tackle class as a political or economic category, particularly when the discussion is pitched at the level of abstract theory. Race and race relations, on the other hand, are matters that receive little critical consideration, and do not appear to constitute -- as do ethnicity and nationalism -- issues that, while evidently important, are best left outside the school.

What we have, therefore, is a degree of patterning that defines certain societal subjects and problems as proper for educational purposes, while others receive little consideration, either due to a reluctance to discuss the uncomfortable, or because the phenomenon itself is assumed to have little consequence. In part, this process of categorization reflects professional training; concretely, the fact that the social sciences play a limited role in the education of teachers while history is accorded the status of a privileged order of knowledge. If nothing else, this structuring is likely to limit awareness of certain ranges of social and cultural phenomena that do not normally form part of the historical canon. More important, in my judgment, is the issue of social priorities -- what is to be taught and why -- as these are understood and interpreted by different actors, including teachers, the educational establishment, parents and children.

It is to this phenomenon of distribution that the title refers; the "absent others" is a congeries of groups that share a quality of marginality or peripherality. They have little in common besides alterity: they are "others" chiefly, I believe, because they are not viewed as really forming part of the conceptual society. Alternatively, in some circumstances, the distinctiveness or identity of such groups is played down. Needless to say, the reluctance of teachers to enter the state-and-nation debate is influenced by other factors, the
critical one being a desire to maintain a tranquil classroom environment. But, as we shall see, this politically charged issue does share some common ground -- an element of disquiet and anxiety -- with the academic treatment of marginal social groups.

Undoubtedly, the archetypical example of social marginality is provided by the Gypsies. Gypsies have been a component of the Iberian mosaic since the early decades of the fifteenth century, and they continue to constitute a very visible presence in contemporary Spain. Nevertheless, only one (Centeno et al. 1977:200-201) of the half dozen history and social science texts that I consulted made any reference to them, historically or in terms of present-day social issues. In the instance in question, Gypsies are discussed together with a variety of other marginal social groups -- including vagabonds and beggars -- that faced general persecution and state coercion in eighteenth century Spain. Calvo Buezas (1989), who has undertaken a careful analysis of social, ethnic and racial content in Spanish school texts, found a total of 17 references to Gypsies in his comprehensive sample (179 texts in social science, history, language and ethics/religion). In his opinion, one can reasonably assert that "Gypsies do not exist in Spanish school texts... A few marginal references in so many thousands of pages and illustrations is the same as if they did not exist" (Calvo Buezas 1989:63). This is hardly an unreasonable assessment, since the 17 references make up a grand total of 59 lines in 41,803 pages of text. In my own case, the only substantive in-class treatment of contemporary Gypsies (in the wake of several episodes of violent anti-Gypsy activity reported in the press) was initiated by me during a general class discussion of racism, prejudice, and related matters.

Other groups/social categories that commonly receive inadequate, sanitized, or ambivalent attention include Jews in late medieval and early modern Spain, Moors and contemporary Arabs, various relatively recent refugees and immigrants, and marginal socioeconomic elements, such as shantytown dwellers. Some of these people, for example recent arrivals from Asia, have perhaps not been around long enough to enter public consciousness or the formal curriculum, but this can hardly be true of North Africans.

We are not, it should be stressed, discussing a society of censorship nor
faculties and teachers subject to intimidation or powerful external controls. On the contrary, classroom teachers (not to mention university professors) enjoy a broad autonomy with respect to means and methods of instruction. We should also be mindful of a liberal and politically activist tradition in the teaching profession and the universities. The challenge, therefore, is to explicate the particular social orientation and content of a consciously progressive educational system.

At the risk of disaggregating interrelated elements of the social process, I will develop my analysis by first addressing (as Spaniards probably would) the political dimension, moving next to a consideration of the educational system in general terms, and then focusing on the specific settings and situations in which I observed how teachers and students worked on, discussed, and gave meaning to subjects and issues. Finally, I will return to what are broadly political questions, in particular the relationship between the social world elaborated in the classroom and the rather different universe outside it. The matter is not simply one of goodness of fit, but of how the environment of learning elaborates a particular system of categories and a hierarchy of priorities. For what world, in short, is the next generation of citizens being prepared? It is my distinct impression that many of the issues and agendas that are bound to challenge Western Europe at the close of the century have barely surfaced in the curriculum.
CHAPTER II
THE TRANSITION

The transformation of the Spanish state in the course of the past dozen years from a dictatorship to a constitutional monarchy has received considerable, and merited, attention from scholars and political commentators. Most of this attention has centered on the process of democratization, specifically the reestablishment after almost forty years of dictatorial rule of an effective system of representative parliamentary government.

The very success of this transformation (especially when compared to the problems of post-communism in Eastern Europe) may have obscured for outside observers the difficulties that had to be overcome or negotiated, and the fact that democratization was part of a more general reordering of the political system. The most important internal parallel development involved the change from a unitary state with a long tradition of centralized control to what Spaniards term a "state of the autonomies," fundamentally a system of regional power sharing. With respect to external relations, it was the goal of post-Franco administrations to forge strong political, economic, and cultural ties with other European democracies. These matters -- the problems that the process encountered, the internal reorganization of the state, and the links to Europe -- all have relevance to the conduct of education.

Spain is now divided into 17 Autonomous Communities [Fig. 1]. Three of these -- the Basque Country or Euzkadi, Catalonia, and Galicia -- are recognized as "historic" in the sense that they had already achieved or voted for statutes of autonomy during the Second Republic (1931-1939). The other communities are a post-Franco development, although some of these areas are characterized by a certain tradition of particularism or had for some time manifested a desire for greater administrative decentralization.

Much remains to be worked out in the relationship between autonomous communities and the state, and this includes important educational concerns such as levels of central government funding. Some critical matters, however, have achieved a relatively satisfactory resolution,
specifically the language question and the issue of primary responsibility over education. Since 1980, education in Catalonia has been under the authority of a Catalan Department of Education, the Departament d'Ensenyament of the Generalitat (Autonomous Government) of Catalonia. Much instruction (from preschool to university) is conducted in Catalan, and while this reorganization of education does not assure that Catalan will be applied in all contexts or ranges outside the school, it has contributed to making Catalan "a language used for all communication purposes, at all levels of social and political organization" (Woolard 1991:51). The institutional support of Catalan, in the school and elsewhere, has done a good deal to alleviate the fears of many Catalans that their language and their culture are at risk. For our purposes, what this amounts to is that the discourse on education and culture in Catalonia has increasingly shifted to the domain of regular politics -- a very different setting from that of a generation ago when advocates of Catalan cultural and linguistic rights were in very real danger of imprisonment.5

To this point, I have been discussing the transition in very general terms, but the forces that shaped it and the direction it took, have to be contextualized. What were the majority of Spaniards trying to free themselves from? What constraints did they face?

The Franco regime was a conservative and repressive political order, lacking a coherent ideology, and quite incapable of "evolving" into anything that might pass muster as a democratic system. In retrospect, what ordinary people most often remember is the sheer grayness of everyday life, the anachronistic texture of the regime (forms, symbols, and institutions), and how isolated they felt themselves to be from the rest of Western Europe. Economic and class disparities were profound. In this respect, we might note that of every 100 students who began primary school in the early 1950s, 27 progressed to secondary education, ten passed the bachillerato marking the completion of secondary education, and only three graduated from the university (Walsh 1972:241-242). As recently as 1960, 26 percent of men, and 30 percent of women, 25 years of age and over, had completed less than four years of elementary education; the category encompasses illiterates and those without any formal education (United Nations 1968:351). The moral order of
the regime was characterized by enormous contradictions: an official religious orthodoxy in tandem with the most extreme and entrenched privileges for regime supporters; a cult of technocracy and developmentism coexisting with a public morality that came close to making Spain a caricature of itself. And all this ensconced in a political system that, while evidently irrational and arbitrary, was still powerful enough to keep democracy at bay.

To the degree that one can speak of a Francoist ideology, it was a strange emalgam of fascist mimesis and Catholic corporatism. More than anything else, though, it has to be understood as a system of rejection: a rejection of the Spanish intellectual renaissance which in the early decades of this century gave Spanish artists and thinkers an international reputation; a rejection of "alien" concepts and ideologies (everything from Marxism to psychoanalysis); and, of course, a rejection of political and cultural pluralism. Spain, regime ideologues insisted, should be guided by "historic" virtues and precepts such as fervent Catholicism, the military spirit, and the "natural order" of hierarchy. Carr (1988:28) is no doubt right to stress that the most important achievement of the opposition is "that it challenged the regime's claim to legitimacy" and exposed its "intellectual poverty."

But granted that long before the death of Franco (November 20, 1975) the ideological foundations of the system had ceased to have relevance, it was still far from clear what direction Spain would take. The ideology might be defunct, but this still left in place a system of government and powerful political interests. The problem was cogently rendered by a group of political analysts ("Democracia 2000" 1977:184) reviewing the first year of post-Franco administration: "Franco left no heirs, but he did leave collaborators. Francoism no longer exists, but neo-Francoism does."

The administration that came into power following the dictator's demise made so little progress towards democracy that the political and social climate turned increasingly tense and confrontational. Nor was this failure to initiate significant reform remarkable given that the government was headed by Carlos Arias Navarro, a former Minister of the Interior who had been Franco's last Prime Minister. The growing tempo of strikes and demonstrations was met by police actions (five workers were killed by the
police in March of 1976) that served to fuel discontent. At this juncture, the critical question was whether Spain could indeed find a way to establish a democratic order through some process of reform, or whether mounting pressures would require something much more drastic, a violent break -- a ruptura -- with the system inherited from the regime.

The details of how, mainly through negotiation and compromise, reform became the selected avenue of change falls outside the purview of this monograph, but the general process and its consequences are obviously pertinent to our enquiry. Fundamentally, it was an arranged, initially even an improvised, transition brokered by the major personages of the political opposition and the more reform-minded members of the Francoist system. The process required a substantial amount of political space (something greatly facilitated by the resignation of Arias in July of 1976), and also the willingness of the parties to search for a democratic formula that would nevertheless permit the retention of much of the institutional and administrative armature of the state.

The informal, and later formal, negotiations that took place between the death of Franco and the approval of the Constitution in 1978 established a framework that stressed consensus and pragmatism over ideology. This general position was explained by Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez in a speech before the Cortes (parliament) in April of 1978. "During a constituent process," he said,

    the government must restrict its options to those which would not produce dissensus, because that is the only way to avoid what would be the gravest danger to the body politic: the lack of a concord rooted in the country and [the lack of] respect for the basic elements of national coexistence (quoted in Gunther et al. 1988:119).

One has the distinct impression that the negotiators were very conscious of the fragility of the political situation, and it is certainly true that both the government and the opposition selected moderate and pragmatic representatives. In due course, amnesty was granted to political prisoners and a spectrum of political parties were legalized. The Movimiento (the official
"National Movement" inspired by fascism) and its syndicates were dismantled and free trade unions emerged from clandestinity. Finally, the electoral system was put in place and the outlines of the autonomy statutes negotiated.

For its part, the opposition, and in particular the established parties of the left, made a number of important concessions. Chief among these was recognition of the keystone constitutional role of the monarchy (Prince Juan Carlos, it must be remembered, had been designated successor head of state by Franco in 1969) and the privileged place of the military in state affairs. The transition also involved a clear understanding that political figures, regardless of prior affiliation, who wished to continue their careers would not be hampered from doing so. Indeed, Adolfo Suárez, the first Prime Minister to be democratically elected since 1936, may quite accurately be described as a former Movimiento functionary: he had served as Director-General of Radio and Television (the electronic media was a fief of this organization) between 1969 and 1974, and later, in its terminal phase, held the top position of Minister and Secretary-General of the Movimiento. We should note that the agreed upon avenue for change involved two stages: the long course of negotiations to establish a political framework, followed by referenda and elections to confer on this framework full democratic legitimacy. This whole process permitted a formal legal transmission of authority; as Prime Minister Felipe González (1985:5-6) expressed it some years ago,

This transition -- and this is the most significant feature in the case of Spain -- was carried out without any sudden violation of established legality, and without a single day's institutional gap.

The redemocratization of Spain thus represents something quite distinct in the way of political reordering. While the change has been real enough, it is, above all, a process designed to integrate, rather than to peripheralize, individuals and selected structures of the antecedent regime. Expressed differently, the last of the historic fascist regimes has been displaced in the absence of internal revolution or external overthrow, and with something approaching a political consensus (at least on the part of party elites) regarding the desirability of avoiding too critical a scrutiny of the
process itself, the Civil War, and the dictatorship imposed on Spain by the victory of General Franco.

This is an understandable approach in the light of the country's conflictive past and more recent fears regarding potentially explosive cleavages in Spanish society. Clearly, though, the pattern is unusual, and evidently, it is not an arrangement likely to foster deep concerns respecting the societal past, a sense that the actions taken one or two generations ago continue to have significant contemporary meaning. The journalist Gregorio Morán's (1992) recent book on the transition goes considerably further in arguing that a loss of collective memory is the "price" that Spaniards have paid for their particular route to democracy. It is important to note here that in Spain today neither the past nor specific elements of it are explicitly defined as out of bounds. However, there is some evidence that the political compact works, to some degree and in subtle ways, to help order the universe of enquiry.

There are other contextual factors that make recent Spanish experience significantly different from that of its neighbors. Spain, we should remember, did not directly participate in a series of key events and processes that marked the majority of Western societies. Most obviously, it avoided the trauma of World War II. Thus, unlike the French across the Pyrenees, Spaniards have never had to grapple -- however cautiously -- with such knotty issues as who sided with the Nazi occupiers, and why. Also, since Spain had lost virtually all of its imperial possessions in the Spanish-American War of 1898, decolonization seemed to pose few of the problems -- and hence raised few of the questions -- that it did for many other countries.

Post-World War II Spanish experience has also been distinct in several other respects: the regime was ostracized by the victorious Allies, borders were closed, ambassadors withdrawn. And, of course, there was no Marshall Plan for Spain. All this began to change as a result of the Cold War and the 1953 bases agreement with the United States, but American aid and a changed political climate did not, and could not, confer legitimacy on the regime. Spain remained a political anomaly, and many Spaniards continued to feel themselves disconnected from the European mainstream. If anything, the
rapid expansion of foreign tourism, and the growing number of Spaniards working in richer countries, only aggravated the sense of difference and isolation (Pi-Sunyer 1973, 1979).

These almost forty years of isolation and peripheralization go a long way in explaining why all who were engaged in resistance to the regime (and even many who had been associated with it), insisted that Spain had to reclaim its place as a European society. This need had, and continues to have, many dimensions, but above all, "Europe" meant the legitimacy, the status, that had always evaded Franco. In the words of José Antonio Martínez Soler, chief economics editor of El País, "The Common Market always slammed the door in Franco's face every time he called. To join the Nine was to have regimes similar to theirs. Political problems were the main obstacle to our membership" (New York Times, May 21, 1980).

Spain became a full member of the European Community (EC) in 1986 and the political and economic significance of this membership is readily apparent. For Spaniards the linkage also carries powerful connotations in terms of values, beliefs, and aspirations. At the risk of oversimplification, one can say that Western European countries are conceived of as modernized secular societies with intellectual and social environments rooted in established traditions of tolerance and reason. Even today, with Spain an active and established EC member, it is hard to find a country that displays its Europeanness so conspicuously. "To be European," says Finance Minister Carlos Solchaga, "is the same as to solve the internal problems of this country" (The Economist, April 25, 1992). Perhaps this is ministerial overstatement, but it is certainly true that the flag of the Community flies everywhere, from posh hotels to village squares.

In conclusion, the transition has been -- and still continues to be -- a complex process involving not only the reestablishment of democratic institutions but, less explicitly, the search for new definitions of self and society. The process labors under some constraints. The political system is new, yet it can hardly represent a total rejection of everything associated with the recent past. Democracy and pluralism have been gained, but at a considerable price (which is not to deny that other avenues might have been
much costlier). The stress on European identity and European links is perfectly understandable, but a "European" conceptual model may prove to be of only limited utility for purposes of social policy as Spain confronts the reality of a changing human and cultural environment -- one that includes a growing non-white population. This is an issue that I will discuss in the final chapter, but fundamentally, at the same time that Spain is increasingly converging with its Western European neighbors (not the least in economic terms), its citizens have barely begun to recognize that the Europe of the next century is bound to be a multiracial universe. Spain, in common with France and Italy, not only faces Africa across the Mediterranean, but is proximate to regions of extreme poverty and demographic pressure. How this conjuncture is addressed will mark not only the countries to the south, but also the nature and identity of Iberian societies. A different transition, to be sure, but an equally important one.
CHAPTER III
MODELS OF EDUCATION AND MODELS OF SOCIETY

In this section I will be looking at three related matters: what it means (and has meant) to be "educated"; the role of the state in education; and the problems that educational reform has encountered. I make the assumption that the successful implementation of national educational policies depends on a reasonable degree of political agreement respecting models and on an adequate level of funding. As we shall see, education in Spain has been beset by major difficulties, both economic and social-political.

One of the major reasons I undertook this research was that the time seemed particularly opportune. I knew from earlier work that issues of education were taken very seriously and that, historically, one of the major lines of social and political cleavage passed through education. I was also aware that both the Generalitat in Catalonia and the central government in Madrid had defined education as a top priority. At the same time, it was obvious that education, including its perceived mission, was in some crisis, in part as a consequence of growing youth unemployment.

What I was not prepared for (and it appears that in this I was not alone) were the massive, and often violent, student demonstrations and strikes that I found on my arrival in early February 1987, and which continued for weeks. Students fought running battles with riot police on the steps of the Spanish Parliament, confronted them in front of the Prime Minister's residence, and took to the streets in all the large cities, including Barcelona. As more than one observer noted, it all brought back memories of anti-regime activity during the last years of Franco, but obviously the context was different, and it is this difference that makes the phenomenon pertinent to this essay.

In earlier times, the students in the streets had in the main come from the universities, but these "mobilizations" were the work of adolescents, mostly high school students, but also some out-of-work youths. Initially, I found the level of violence and the degree of anger incomprehensible. The major grievances -- high school fees and university entrance requirements -- simply did not appear to warrant recourse to Molotov cocktails -- or the risks of a bad
beating at the hands of the police. Also, the target seemed inappropriate. The government, in fact, had been spending more on education and the Minister of Education had recently described its policy as based on "equality of opportunity" and the "goal of an egalitarian school system together with an occupational system where social mobility is not restricted by the rigidities of privilege" (Maravall 1987:72).

Evidently, the young demonstrators saw matters in a very different light and it is worth considering their major complaint, the tightening of selectividad, the university entrance requirements. What needs to be kept in mind is that, until a few years ago, educational triage had occurred almost exclusively at the level of secondary education: families that could afford to send their children to private secondary school also could maintain them through university since tuition was low and virtually all students lived at home. Secondary education, in short, was the key to careers and professions, and thus to economic security. Also, much more than is the case in some other countries, secondary school is supposed to provide the background and training that defines the educated person, while universities are basically in the business of turning out professionals.

The students in the streets (and later in the classrooms) were thus expressing not simply frustration, but a fear that the rules had been changed on them. As one editorial writer expressed it, "They are not demanding liberty (as during Francoism), which exists, but security, action and money, that is to say, guarantees for a very uncertain future" (Morodo 1987:13). Other commentators took note that this was essentially a middle class revolt sparked by fears that a cap was being placed on social mobility (Sotelo 1987:13; Umbral 1987:52).

All of these observation are apropos, but they do not directly address why the sense of entitlement should be so strong. Part of the reason would appear to be linked to the control which the state now, as in the past, exercises over different types of professional accreditation. This is particularly significant given the employment situation and the fact that the state, in its different guises, continues to be a major employer of skilled personnel.

Less easy to document as a determinant of these actions, since the
matter is structural and qualitative, is what may be termed fear of status loss. It is a common foreign misconception that Spain is, or until recently was, a rigidly stratified society. On the contrary, while it is certainly a class society, for the better part of two centuries the system has provided significant (and symbolically important) opportunities for individual mobility. The most important channel of access into the elite has been education, specifically the acquisition of that particular form of knowledge that Spaniards know as cultura, and which (with care) may be glossed as "culture."

Cultura can be understood as both the world-view of a learned elite and as an ideology of mobility through education. According to Amelang (1986:125), who has studied its influence in early modern Catalonia, "This ideology did much to dignify the status of upwardly mobile urban elites determined to redefine the boundaries of the ruling class." He proceeds to examine its major attributes: "First, contemporaries took pains to define "culture" as acquired knowledge... it was thus a markedly public form of knowledge... As a result, "culture" often -- though hardly exclusively -- found validation through institutional sanctions like university degrees. It also possessed close ties to literacy ... Finally, elite cultura was highly restrictive in character -- that is, the limits placed on access by outsiders defined it to a crucial extent" (Amelang 1986:180).

With respect to content and style, cultura reflected classical notions of breeding and an emphasis on abstract, speculative thought. The essential dichotomy was between this type of knowledge -- displayed in the language of erudition -- and empirical knowledge associated with manual labor and the lower classes. Cultura, in common with its cognates in other European languages, also carries powerful associations of territoriality, rootedness and sedentarism, "a sedentarism that is taken for granted to such an extent that it is nearly invisible" (Malkki 1992:31). This is a connection of some importance (and one that we shall return to) since so many of the groups that have suffered exclusion are commonly perceived as nomadic, displaced or otherwise lacking a firm territorial base. Needless to say, the division between rootedness and displacement carries deep metaphysical and moral implications.
How relevant is this analysis for contemporary Spain? Obviously, a great deal has changed. For one thing, the sheer quantitative factors are most important: at no time in Spanish history have so many students attended secondary school or has such a high proportion of the appropriate age cohort been enrolled in universities. Also, much of the content of knowledge has undergone a transformation. As a case in point, there is now a tremendous demand for degrees in business, information science, and technology -- keys to careers in the modern sector. Furthermore, the particular world-view represented by traditional notions of cultura does not easily fit a society which defines itself as modern, pluralistic, and democratic. Lastly, intellectuals, including teachers and professors, have been at the forefront of reform movements.

Having said this, elements of the old system of values endure. Among these is the belief that the hierarchy of labor tends to reflect the hierarchy of intelligence, even if the measure of intelligence is today much less closely linked to traditional learning. It is interesting in this respect that not a few students accused the police of being both brutal and "lacking culture," one of their chants suggesting that the children of the police should attend the university in order to avoid becoming like their fathers. One of my young informants described the behavior of the police as "very third world-like," meaning both brutal and uncultured.

Adolescents do not develop such ideas in isolation. The formal curriculum with its propensity to order events logically and sequentially, reinforces a sense of cultural continuity with the past, and -- not surprisingly -- the past that matters is the remembered past of Iberian society. This past not only supplies reaffirmation, but much of it is rendered as a time of national power and influence. Obviously, greatness so understood is likely to be represented as the work of elite personages -- cultured and educated individuals. The distinction between "cultured" and "uncultured" even enters some of the best pedagogical material. A superior social science syllabus, Living in a Diverse and Unequal World, offers an anthropologically-inspired definition of culture and establishes as major goals of the course that students should arrive at an understanding of "the relativity of their own culture" and
appreciate the need to "have respect for, and interest in, other cultures and styles of life" (Freixenet et al. 1986:5-6). But, a shift in meaning occurs a couple of pages later when, in discussing issues of inequality, one of the designated causes is stated to be "inequality in cultural levels" (Freixenet et al. 1986:9). At the very least, this juxtaposition is likely to cause semantic confusion, but more to the point, what we seem to have here is an echo of cultura as previously discussed.

The purpose here is not to criticize, on the basis of one phrase, what is in most respects an excellent experimental study plan, but simply to show that even in such a setting cultura continues to retain elements of its old meaning. I concur with Amelang (1986:215) that "the overall schema of cultural distinction has persisted to the present day," a position similar to that expressed by McDonogh (1986:10), another observer of class and society in Catalonia, who notes "the striking permanence in the ideas to which succeeding generations accede." Cultura, albeit substantially changed in content, continues to function as an explanation for the existence of social inequalities, and as such, is bound to influence the way that people, including schoolchildren, conceptualize the social universe. I believe that a very strong case can also be made that a key factor underlying student unrest was the sense that an established channel of access was being restricted by those who themselves had but recently achieved political and economic power.12

There is nothing particularly remarkable in the association of social and political elites with the instruments of learning. The Spanish case though, is sufficiently different from others that may come to mind, such as the Oxbridge system or the mandarinate of the grandes écoles, to justify some explanation. Historically, modernizing states have espoused policies designed to broaden the base of education and to provide the products of this education with suitable employment, whether in the private or public sectors. However, the capacity of the Spanish state to meet either goal has usually been quite restricted.

Undoubtedly, a major reason for these failures and shortcomings was the extreme poverty of the country during much of the past century and a half. Although there were important regional differences in living standards, the
overall situation was one of economic fragility and political insecurity, both making for a state chronically short of money. At the same time, since these conditions functioned to limit career opportunities for the educated, some of the slack -- as in many contemporary third world countries -- had by necessity to be taken up by the state. We thus find that significant numbers of the middle class made their living (badly) as state employees, the inflated size of the officer corps being but one of the best known examples of this phenomenon.13

These matters are directly pertinent to education. The Spanish state began to define a major role for itself in education during the nineteenth century when its resources to carry out effective educational policies were most limited. It also attempted to do so in general opposition to the church, which had an especially strong hold over secondary instruction. Control over the universities was a critical issue. In the rather distant past, Spanish universities had enjoyed an international reputation as centers of learning. But by the nineteenth century, these institutions were clearly in decline and had also ceased to be self-regulating entities. For Spanish leaders pondering the dismal state of their society and the need for what they termed "moral regeneration," the university seemed to offer the chance of training the elite necessary to modernize Spain. What type of university? Given the circumstances, the state would have to play a directing role. As Carr (1982: 237) has noted,

The lamentable state of the professorate... and the indifference of society made the autonomous university of Germany or England an intellectual and administrative impossibility. Without state supervision a private 'free' university system would have been dominated by the strongest force in society -- the Church.

It is from this period that much of the contemporary educational structure -- and a good deal of rhetoric -- derives. The organizational model for education was borrowed from France and it transformed all teachers in public institutions into civil servants. Positions in the educational system were to be filled by oposiciones, public competitive examinations which functioned as the final step in the selective process (there were typically more candidates with
formal qualifications than available openings). This system was first applied to university positions in 1845 and later extended to all teachers in the state system. It remains in place today, little altered, as a key component of the current Ley General de Educación, the General Education Law of 1970.

Oposiciones were initially established as part of a liberal reform measure designed to provide objective criteria for recruitment and promotion. What could hardly have been foreseen at the time was the degree to which such a system lent itself not only to abuses of formalism but, as was notably the case during the Franco dictatorship, to operating as a mechanism of ideological control. By their very nature, oposiciones tend to select for a particular type of knowledge. In the words of a recent report,

These examinations stress memory and verbal skills, they have a limited theoretical component, and are distant from reality; and... they in no way measure the professional capacity of the candidate. In the exercises, much weight is given to content, very little to professional background, and none at all to practical knowledge (López 1986:55).

Whatever may be said in favor of the process (such as security of tenure, professional identity, and protection from local pressure groups), the system is obviously one more likely to value received knowledge than to stimulate innovation -- problems that most of the teachers I know readily acknowledge and would dearly like to see eliminated.

In part, no doubt, because of these shortcomings and rigidities, new educational ideas generally flourished more successfully in independent institutions. This was certainly the case with the Institución Libre de Enseñanza, the Free Institute of Education, founded in Madrid in 1875. Until the Civil War brought its operations to an end, it represented the most serious and consistent attempt to offer non-dogmatic and non-official education. It stressed -- somewhat on the English public school model -- the formation of "character" rather than the assimilation of a fixed body of traditional knowledge, and encouraged students to learn by experience through field trips, technical training, courses in art and folklore, sports, and even manual labor. The Institución's teaching methods were not easily translatable into
mass education, but its total approach to education, and its philosophy of treating children with due consideration and respect for their moral and intellectual personalities, influenced the thinking of generations of progressive teachers. I would agree with Linz (1978: 175) that the Institución and other reformist educational associations and institutions helped to mold a liberal, rational, and humanistic political and educational ethos; it is certainly true that teachers and professors were among the strongest supporters of the Republic.14

In Catalonia, progressive educational programs were developed not only by several private institutions (Maria Montessori established a school in Barcelona after fleeing from fascist Italy), but by the Generalitat and municipal authorities, in particular the Barcelona city government. Official support for education reflected the willingness of Catalan authorities to allocate substantial resources to education, and a recognition on the part of these bodies that the maintenance of Catalan national identity was linked to the schools. I have been informed by numerous individuals, including past and present officials, that the quality of public primary schooling was probably higher in Catalonia than in any comparable jurisdiction elsewhere in Spain, an assessment that finds documentary support in the reports of Franco bureaucrats engaged in the "purification" (depuración) of education after the Civil War.15

What we have up to the late 1930s is an educational situation of some complexity, but whose main outlines are clear enough. In the context of a badly underfunded educational system, the state allocated the bulk of its resources to the two ends of the continuum: primary education and university, thus leaving secondary education essentially in private, mostly clerical, hands. Also, those who could afford it, enrolled their children in private primary schools. This division of education by class was much the same in Catalonia as elsewhere in Spain, granted the superiority of its primary, obligatory, educational system, some excellent private secular schools, and probably a higher degree of class mobility (a function of industrial development) than that found in most other parts of Spain.

At its best, Spanish education produced cultured, at time brilliant,
individuals who were intellectually at home in several worlds and were not constrained by disciplinary boundaries. But it was indubitably an education designed for the few. When, in the 1930s, the Republic did undertake to change and broaden the educational system, it was frustrated by economic constraints intensified by the global crisis, internal dissension and, finally, by the triumph of reaction and fascism in the Civil War.
CHAPTER IV
THE STRUCTURE OF EDUCATION

The present structure of education is an outgrowth of changes undertaken in the late 1960s and the early 1970s to modernize the system and provide a better technical fit between education and a developing market economy. What we should understand is that by this time the attempts of the early Franco regime to impose a distinctly "national-Catholic" educational model had failed. They had done so because the ideology and values which such a model encapsulated -- a stress on the "singularity" of Spain and its "universal mission"; the claims that the regime was the legitimate heir to a glorious past of saints and soldiers -- were clearly anachronistic. Also, such an orientation hardly fitted the image of the consumer society touted by the technocrats of the period.

It is pertinent to take note here of some of the recommendations made in 1963 by the mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. After observing that only about 15 percent of the children of secondary school age were attending school, it called for both an increase in numbers and a shift in the direction of improved technical training: "The training of highly skilled workmen and the middle range of technicians (such as assistant engineers, farm and works managers, accountants and the like) requires a good general secondary education... supplemented by specialized training" (The Economic Development of Spain 1963:393). By 1971, the Third Plan of Economic Development was projecting almost a tripling of secondary education in five years (III Plan de Desarrollo 1971:36). In the course of these shifts, much of the explicit ideological content of education was scrapped or very substantially toned down. Thus, by the time the General Law of Education was approved in 1970, formal indoctrination was reduced to such banalities as "understanding the values and potentialities of the political doctrine of the National Movement," a system defined as the "most appropriate to Spanish reality" (Ley General de Educación 1976:667). Fundamentally, what seems to have taken place is an abandonment by the regime of serious efforts to use the schools for purposes of political mobilization. In the process, no alternative
ideological model entered the picture (at least not officially), and education was treated essentially as if it were devoid of political content.\textsuperscript{19}

In some respects, therefore, the educational philosophy of the terminal years of the regime was something of a throwback to "traditional" models of class education with the added element of an orientation (more than specific technical instruction) designed to socialize the student to the totalizing forces of technocracy or, using the language of the times, learning to live in the context of "a universal civilization" of which "the West will probably form the base" (\textit{Ley General de Educación} 1976:661-662).

Pre-university education (leaving aside preschool) was -- and essentially continues to be -- organized on the basis of eight years of Basic General Education (\textit{Educación General Básica}, or EGB), which is obligatory and typically terminates at some point in the student's fourteenth year. After EGB, there are two streams of non-obligatory secondary education (\textit{enseñanzas medias}), one leading towards university, the other being somewhat akin to trade or vocational school. The first, and clearly the much more important and prestigious option, is made up of two phases: the \textit{bachillerato} (or, to give it its full title and acronym, \textit{Bachillerato Unificado Polivalente}, or BUP), lasting three years, followed by a year of university preparation, the \textit{Curso de Orientación Universitaria}, or COU. The other path, lasting anything from two to five years, is known as \textit{Formación Profesional}, or FP [Fig. 2]. To simplify matters, and given that this is a state-wide structure, I have opted for the Castilian [Spanish] terminology; equivalent Catalan terms ("batxillerat," "formació professional," etc.) are standard in most schools and are used in Catalan government publications and directives, as well as in pedagogy. I have kept the Catalan cognates when quoting Catalan sources.

Historically, the pivotal element in this system has been the \textit{bachillerato}, the series of courses providing a liberal arts exposure and an avenue to university careers. The \textit{bachillerato} has undergone changes over the years (and, as we shall see, more are in the making), but fundamentally it can be thought of as a vehicle for instilling what some now term "cultural literacy" (Hirsch 1987; Cheney 1987). The stress has been on humanistic education with an emphasis on language, literature, history, mathematics, geography, and
general science.

In some respects, the curriculum (and the teaching) clearly accomplish the intended educational mission. Courses in language and literature deal directly with a corpus of knowledge (major literary works, techniques of textual analysis, etc.) and the quality of foreign language training is generally of a high order. I was not a little surprised, for example, to find that many BUP students in Catalonia can function with some ease in four languages: they are fully bilingual in Catalan and Castilian (and control the relevant core literatures), and often understand and have some speaking knowledge of two other languages, typically English and French. All three years of the current BUP include a history/geography-cum social world component, the first year being devoted to a "history of civilizations" course, the second to a general course on human geography and global economy, and the third and final year to a course on the geography and history of Spain, sometimes including also other Hispanic countries. Each course runs for a year, and there are at least three other years of history-geography at the EGB level. The university preparatory COU year, which really should be thought of as a fourth year of BUP, addresses more specialized topics, for example demography or economic history. Altogether, this adds up to some six or seven years of history and related topics in the course of twelve years of school, a degree of coverage that compares very favorably with the three or four years of history which most American schoolchildren are exposed to during their primary and secondary education (The New York Times, August 31, 1987).

The system, though, is beset by a variety of problems and shortcomings. As much else in present day Spain, education is a product of political compromise. In the early post-Franco period, the demand of the parties of the left was for the creation of la escuela pública única -- a unified system of public education.20 For reasons both political and economic, these expectations had to be scaled back to a substantial degree of state involvement in the supervision of private education (Gunther 1987:49). The trade-off for these supervisory functions was state economic support for private education. Today, nearly all private schools, about half of them religious, receive public funding, and it is difficult to see how such a system can easily alter what the Minister of
Education has himself termed the "intergenerational transmission of privilege" (Maravall 1987:75).

Currently, some 69 percent of EGB schools in Spain (including Catalonia) are public, while the figure for Catalonia is 50.5 percent. With respect to secondary education (BUP and COU), the breakdown at the state level is 51.8 percent private and 48.2 percent public (Darder 1987:20; López 1986:74; Anuario El País 1988:162). Private secondary education plays an even more important role in Catalonia.

This is a very high proportion of private primary and secondary schools in the total system, which is not to deny the important changes that have taken place in education in the course of the last generation. Today, virtually every child in Spain receives a primary (EGB) education and the proportion of students enrolled in secondary school (BUP, COU and FP) has more than doubled in two decades to a figure well within the range of other industrial market economies. Levels of university enrollment are also comparable to those typical of Western European countries (World Development Report 1987:263). These positive developments may obscure a number of structural problems which include high dropout rates (28 percent of those who begin EGB do not finish it; 22 percent do not finish BUP), 12-15 percent of high school students failing year-end examinations, and perhaps half of the current EGB population not continuing into secondary education (El País Educación, February 17, 1987, July 28, 1987; Diari de Barcelona, April 1, 1987, April 9, 1987). Also, the split at fourteen-plus between those going on to the bachillerato and those who finish their education at this point or enter trade schools reinforces segmentation by class and the assumption, as one of my Teachers' College informants phrased it, that "bright kids do the batxillerat and dumb ones have no choice but formació professional."21

It is in recognition of some of these problems that the educational system is undergoing a substantial overhaul. The most important element of this change (designed in part to bring Spanish education more in line with that of other European Community countries) is the phased extension, in the course of the next decade, of obligatory education to sixteen-plus years. As currently envisaged, primary education will be followed by two "cycles" of
secondary education, the first from approximately age 12 to 14, the second from 14 to 16. It is also expected that by the year 2000 fully 80 percent of the school-age population will be continuing their studies until their eighteenth year (El País, June 17, 1987; Avui, February 10, 1987). This reform is intended to provide a common core of secondary education for all children and thus break the distinction between students following the bachillerato path (strongly linked to an inherited system of values) and those leaving after EGB or entering FP institutes. The political and social dimension of the reform was well expressed by one of the professors at the Sant Cugat Teachers' College:

One of our longstanding and most important demands (revindicacions) is what we term "el tronc comú" ["common trunk,"i.e. core curriculum], until sixteen or so, following which we can have diversification and specialization, but on the foundation of a common base of education. In short, we are trying to put together -- the specialists, the Generalitat, the teachers -- a structure of education, covering the years 12 to 16, that provides children with a common, shared, experience.22

This process is already underway. By 1987, some 200 schools (32 of them in Catalonia) were experimenting with the new structure and the new curriculum (Diari de Barcelona, April 9, 1987; El País Educación, May 31, 1987). The new curricular arrangement is considerably more flexible than the old one and allows, in Catalonia at least, for up to 40 percent of elective courses. Also, the goal is to offer not one bachillerato, but the choice of about half a dozen (general, human and social sciences, technical-industrial, etc). Perhaps even more important is the recognition on the part of educational planners that a primary function of schooling should be the provision not just of skills, or even the transmission of a corpus of knowledge, but the engendering of attitudes and values designed to facilitate an on-going process of "learning to learn" (Coll 1986:9-10, 20-21).23

I did not have the opportunity to visit any of these experimental schools, but I interviewed several educators and they are well aware that earlier programs of reform were short lived and that the present system has critical
defects. Their willingness to work for change cannot be doubted. I am only echoing some recognized shortcomings -- which mesh with my own assessments -- if I point out that both the "culture" of education and its disciplinary structure will require a major overhaul. It is difficult, for example, to propose serious programs (at any educational level) of cultural diversity when, to cite but one revealing instance, in the whole of Spain there is but a single professor (non-tenured) of Far Eastern art (El País Educación, May 3, 1987). What we have, therefore, is a teaching profession that, while generally disposed to broaden its horizons, has been little exposed to fields and approaches outside the traditional disciplines. Discussing this matter with a teacher, I received the following assessment:

The truth of the matter is that we have not been trained to teach the realities of an increasingly complex world. Our education is solid, but very textual and very much within the European tradition. We simply don't have the tools to handle with much authority such matters as African cultures or the civilizations of the Orient.
CHAPTER V
THE CONTEXT OF LEARNING

Shifting our attention from educational structures and plans of reform to the observed context of teaching/learning, I first want to consider -- in a very general way -- the attitudes, values, and cultural constructs that teachers and students bring to the classroom and how these help to define the nature and shape of discourse. Following these introductory paragraphs, I will say something about the four schools in which I worked.

One of the first issues often raised by American colleagues when discussing Spanish education is the matter of authority, the assumption often being that in the aftermath of the Franco regime, and following a long history of clerical influence, the learning environment must perforce be heavily authoritarian. The situation turns out to be considerably different, certainly more complex. In my experience, teachers -- most of them young, most of them female -- exercise a degree of moral and intellectual authority rare in the classrooms of America. The message, however, is much less one of control than of mentoring and intellectual initiation. There is certainly no presumption of a hypothetical equality between child and teacher/adult (I heard one teacher say, "This classroom will not be turned into a republic of children"), but this distinction, it is assumed, is grounded in a differential of knowledge and experience. One teacher, in the context of the aforementioned student strikes, put the matter of authority and intellect thus to her class:

It is very natural for youth to question authority. If you did not do so I would worry. But rebel, go to the streets, as intelligent human beings, not just out of anger and frustration. If you want to fight oppression, you will be much better served if you understand how oppressive systems work. There are no short cuts.

The teacher in question had been involved in all manner of anti-regime activities during the dictatorship and she felt that ignorance had been used as a powerful instrument of social control. Her outlook reflects this experience, but also something that I encountered many times over: an almost
Enlightenment faith in the power of reason. Phrased differently, teachers view themselves as guardians of minds, and in this domain they do not have to compete with other professionals, such as administrators, counselors, or school psychologists, categories which are virtually non-existent in the Spanish educational context. It appears to be a system that -- at its best -- balances authority with a recognition that such authority is a temporary mandate, and that an important element of this mandate is to stimulate intellectual (and less explicitly, human) growth. In the many weeks I spent attending classes, I witnessed numerous discussions -- some quite heated -- between advanced students (BUP and COU) and teachers, but never a single conflict, a single disciplinary problem. Obviously, the educational process socializes children to internalize a particular model of interaction discourse that is liberal in content but also respects intellectual authority.

If teachers are not exactly the martinets that some might expect them to be, students are hardly without voice. As we have seen, the demands of secondary school students can be powerful enough to be felt at the highest levels of government, a social and political datum of some importance. Students -- especially those in higher grades -- can, and do, organize for a variety of purposes -- social, recreational, and political. Furthermore, the educational model tends to grant legitimacy to what are perceived to be valid complaints, such as excessive homework assignments (I recorded several instances of negotiated homework).

Even more significant (although open to several interpretations) have been a series of shifts in youth behavior and attitudes during the past 15-20 years. These changes are most evident outside the school, particularly in leisure/discretionary activity, and are manifested in both group and individual behavior. Young people of both sexes tend to form part of small groups (colles in Catalan) defined by common interests and ideologies, frequenting particular locales (bars, discos, cafes), and often identifiable by dress or other visible markers. We might note here that school classes generally move as an age-grade through the academic sequence, a circumstance that tends to reinforce identity and solidarity. Clearly, organizations of this type can function as a defense against authority and help define a variety of alternative
styles of life (Feixa 1986:14-15). It is also relevant that these activities begin in the early teens and that teenagers in Spain do not have to concern themselves with such matters as drinking age regulations. Not least among these changes have been significant transformations in sexual attitudes and behavior, changes of sufficient magnitude to make an impact on the educational system.25

I would be loath to give the impression that there is something in Spain that can neatly be summed up as a "youth culture," but there is no doubt in my mind that the young people of today find it perfectly natural to examine and question what we tend to think of as established values. As a case in point, I participated -- as an informant on the mysteries of American society -- in a class discussion of the American political scandal of the moment, the Gary Hart affair. Sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds of both sexes found it puzzling and remarkable ("If I were Gary Hart, I would not have allowed them to interrogate me," "What a strange country, all this concern with the sexual life of politicians.") that private and personal acts should have such an impact on the political process.26 But, above all, they were shocked at the indignity of the proceedings and the brutal invasiveness of press and public. Responses of this type are in keeping with what we know from other sources respecting behavior and attitude. A recent city-funded survey of youth in Barcelona (both working and in school) indicates that what they value most are honesty, responsibility, liberty, and equality (Funes i Artiaga 1985:195). In a binary test of attitudes and practices, some 75 percent of young people regarded corruption and hard drugs as "more inexcusable," but 85 percent viewed abortion as "more tolerable" -- a rating of disapproval similar to that assigned to riding the train without a ticket (Funes i Artiaga 1985:197). Evidently, the youth of today bring to the classroom ideas and values that are hardly orthodox, although I would argue that they are derived primarily from a Western contestatatorial tradition, on which has been superimposed more contemporary -- mostly European -- forms and styles.27

A number of elements and features of the instructional environment, besides the ones already discussed, are so general and pervasive that they are bound to influence the very meaning of knowledge. Any visitor to Spain
(certainly anyone who uses public transportation at the appropriate hours) cannot fail to notice the collections of large and complex notebooks, files, and binders that all students -- from the higher elementary grades to university -- carry with them. These books contain dictations, abstracts, homework assignments, and lists of suggested study materials, but most of all, "notes" (apunts in Catalan). How important these are to students, and what use is made of them, may not be immediately apparent. I learned in due course that the loss of apunts, as happened to a student in a third year BUP class, is regarded as a calamity. To appreciate why this is so, requires that we understand the extent to which particular types of knowledge continues to be orally transmitted. At times, this transmission is explicit and closely monitored, with teachers indicating what pieces of information are vital and should be written down, and students being asked to read back the pertinent facts and concepts.

Obviously, the taking of notes is a common feature of all systems of formal education. With respect to Spain, though, it is no exaggeration to maintain that notes acquire a quasi-magical quality. They are knowledge of a particular type -- the logos of the teacher/professor interpreted by the student -- and their primary function is to facilitate the passing of examinations. "Good" notes are a valuable commodity and move through a distribution network that includes exchange, photocopying, textual comparison and, at the university level, cash sale.

The importance given to notes is related to several other aspects of the educational system. Perhaps most manifestly, apunts are linked to a pedagogy that continues to stress memorization. That such an approach functions to enshrine the magisterial words of the instructor is evident and was remarked on by several educators.28 Less obvious is the linkage to a paucity of other sources of information, in particular libraries. With the single exception of the elite school "Magna" (see below), all other institutions I worked in had very limited collections, and these were usually accessible for only a few hours a week. I asked several students what sources and materials they used in writing papers and assignments; in virtually all instances the answer came down to a combination of textbook and notes, although some mentioned
periodicals and encyclopedias. One of my teacher respondents commented,

It is really very difficult, Oriol, for my advanced students to
do anything that resembles historical research. The in-school
facilities are limited, the Municipal Historical Institute is not
open to schoolchildren, and the Biblioteca de Catalunya --
supposedly the premier public library in Catalonia -- is
understaffed, poorly organized, and has but one copier that
is often out of order.

This poverty of resources (my enquiries about the availability of
audiovisual aids were commonly attributed a humor that was not intended)
has much to do with funding and staffing: the number of schools has grown,
as have the number of teachers, but there is a shortage of specialists and
support personnel. Similarly, money for libraries, materials, and athletic
equipment is often very scarce. Of course, the situation is generally worse in
public schools. What we have, therefore, are conditions that tend to reinforce a
restricted vision of knowledge, even when the formal and explicit educational
goals stress openness and teachers support these aims. It is interesting to
observe here that one of the major complaints voiced by students is that
education is too abstract and theoretical, some claiming that its only real
utility is that it trains one for taking examinations.

In order to facilitate a degree of generalization respecting education, I
looked for a mix of schools that reflected at least some of the most obvious
socioeconomic variables found in Barcelona. As is usually the case with
anthropological research, the final selection was as much a result of
institutional access as of research design. I had no intention, for both ethical
and practical reasons, of conducting research in any school or classroom
whose teachers were not willing and happy to have me in their midst. I also
explained the project to students and told them that their cooperation was
strictly voluntary. The end result was a selection of schools which, while
hardly representative statistically, nevertheless offered a reasonable
distribution. As is common in such cases, I have assigned them
pseudonyms.29

The sample, I recognize, is limited, both in terms of number and
locality. Also, it is very likely that the schools in question are either especially open and innovative or very secure in their educational mission. We also have to keep in mind some specifically Catalan concerns (and the strong supporting role of Catalan political institutions in education) that give all education in Catalonia a distinct dimension. But granted these provisos -- and I might also add here that none of the schools are church-affiliated -- I believe that the overall situation described is similar to that found in other major urban locations.

Granted that the methodology had to be tailored to fit temporal, spatial, and political constraints -- two of the schools experienced severe closures and disruptions due to strikes and student unrest -- I nevertheless believe that the range of experience (which included interviews with university faculty, teachers from other institutions, students attending other schools, and friends with children in other schools) was broad enough for the purposes of the research.

Escuela Pública Valle Inclán. "Valle Inclán" is a public kindergarden and general education (EGB) establishment serving a working class neighborhood in one of the industrial towns of Barcelona's "red belt." The population is predominantly Castilian-speaking, much of it originally from Andalusia and Extremadura. Since the early eighties, migration from southern Spain has slowed down dramatically and today about 50 percent of the inhabitants were born in Catalonia. It is claimed by some authorities (mainly on the basis of surveys) that the majority of the population now understands Catalan; this may be the case, but even a short sojourn in this district is sufficient to make evident that the language of home and street is Castilian. Indeed, the neighborhood exhibits, particularly during the warm months, something of the air and style of small-town southern Spain. While children learn some Catalan in the school, and read Catalan texts without too much difficulty, Castilian is their language of choice in and out of school. The children who attend "Valle Inclán" form part of a numerous, important -- and relatively understudied -- segment of the population of Catalonia. One of the reasons I was interested in visiting this school was to see whether the dual factors of working class background and immigrant origin might in some
measure influence the perceptions of children respecting those positioned on the margins of society.

**Magna.** If "Valle Inclán" is a school whose pupils are virtually all drawn from the working class, "Magna" represents the other end of the socioeconomic spectrum. This is an expensive private school, of modern functional architecture, set in one of Barcelona's most exclusive residential neighborhoods. It teaches the whole curriculum from EGB to COU and enjoys the reputation of being highly selective in the pupils it accepts: only the very brightest and those who show great promise. More than anything else, it is a school on the continental model where quite young students quickly learn -- one notices it already in fourteen-year-olds -- that education is serious business and that individual success is very important in getting ahead. Children who do poorly are flagged for special attention; if performance continues below par, they are regretfully asked to leave. Students come from family backgrounds that range from the comfortably well-to-do to the very rich. Most are Catalan-speakers, but there are also quite a number of Castilian-speaking pupils as well as some children of resident foreigners. Virtually all the teaching is in Catalan. A teacher who knows the school well attributes its reputation to selectivity combined with a clearly defined educational philosophy: "Parents who send their children to "Magna" know exactly what they are getting -- a French-style education in an elite environment."

**Escola Santa Eulàlia.** "Sta. Eulàlia," as its name suggests, was formerly a religious school. About ten years ago, the parents' association negotiated with the religious order to cede the school to them. This was accomplished, but at the cost of a substantial burden of debt assumed by the school and the new trustees. The school is something of an organizational anomaly with grades from kindergarten through EGB being public, while BUP and COU are private. "Sta. Eulàlia" forms part of CEPEPC, an educational collective that is pressing for the integration of member schools into the system of Generalitat-supported public education. **30 CEPEPC** philosophy calls for quality public education high in both Catalan content and community involvement. In common with most other CEPEPC schools, "Sta. Eulàlia" students are drawn chiefly from a culturally-conscious middle class
that identifies itself as Catalan and politically progressive. It is manifestly an institution in the tradition of Catalan reformist education and reflects the educational and social agendas of a politically and demographically important component of the population of Catalonia. The school itself is housed on three crowded floors and an extensive basement of a relatively modern highrise in a solid, if hardly elegant, turn-of-the-century section of downtown Barcelona.

**Institut Ausiàs March.** My experience at "Ausiàs March" was limited in duration and of a somewhat specialized nature. I was invited to visit the institute, a modern public secondary school, by a faculty member at the Teachers' College (Autonomous University of Barcelona) who enjoys an arrangement permitting her to use it for the practical training of her education students. These internships take the form of mini-courses in which half a dozen university trainees first participate in a two-hour methods seminar and then spend about the same amount of time practice teaching BUP students. Obviously, this is not a standard class situation, but it was interesting and instructive to observe how the next generation of teachers are being trained. Also, the BUP students with whom they work represent a rather heterogeneous group, mostly, but not exclusively, middle class, and perhaps evenly split between those of Catalan cultural origin and those whose parents or grandparents originally hailed from other parts of Spain. This mix no doubt reflects the fact that the institute is a public school -- thus reasonably accessible -- in a town which lacks the range of educational options found in Barcelona. It is also a school with a certain reputation for excellence, which no doubt explains why it is used for teacher training. The language of instruction in the course I attended, and apparently most other courses, is Catalan.

My time was not distributed evenly among these four schools. Two schools, "Sta. Eulàlia" and "Valle Inclán," represented between them close to two-thirds of the hours I actually spent in classrooms. The reason for this apportionment was mainly logistical (distance and relative complexity in arranging visits), but also to some degree a matter of choice: the more I worked in the above two institutions, the better I got to know and understand students and teachers. In short, a dynamic of increasing returns came into play. As previously noted, student political actions made it necessary to work
in a very flexible manner.

In this section, I have tried to indicate that a number of significant cleavages, ambiguities, and contradictions are discernible in the general context of education. The major problem, I would argue, is a certain dissonance between educational ideals and what we may term the everyday culture of learning. Most evidently, students find themselves in an environment strongly influenced by liberal values, but must also come to terms with an instructional system that generally places great emphasis on the student's capacity to internalize a given body of knowledge and reproduce it on demand. Also, as was pointed out to me more than once, students tend to look for the answer, while many secondary school teachers handle classroom instruction in a manner more appropriate to university lecturing, a situation that makes for what one teacher referred to as "one-directional teaching." In short, students are not so much participants in a learning process, as recipients of knowledge.

Altogether, such a model of learning is likely to emphasize individual goals over collective ones and, at another level, corporate interests -- those of the student body -- over wider societal concerns. The system simply does not put much stress on the broad educational benefits of cooperation and teamwork, nor is it generally structured to reward activities of this type. Students are not barred from raising issues in class, but discussions generally take place between an individual student and the teacher; what the educational ethos lacks -- at least at the pre-university level -- is a reasonably well-established and integrative tradition of debate. Students, to be sure, generate their own collective forms of activity, but these are mostly extracurricular; in the specific context of education, a much more Hobbesian ethic is the norm.

Once more, these shortcomings do not go unrecognized by teachers and other educational personnel, and I witnessed some efforts (generally not terribly successful) to introduce new elements in the structure of learning. Such innovations, however, can do little to relieve the enormous pressure, especially at the BUP and COU levels, to gear instruction to university entrance requirements. These exams, we should remember, determine not
only access to the university, but also the career options that will be open to the entering student. It seems reasonable to assume that a secondary school education so driven by future career concerns is not the ideal vehicle for stimulating critical thinking about society and one's place in it. Needless to say, this is not a problem confined to the Spanish educational system.

A final stress factor -- one that generally goes unrecognized and that warrants more attention than we can give to it here -- entails competing demands for finite blocks of time. The matter is complex, but includes problems of general time-management and a cultural system with quite rigid and time-absorbing social obligations. Throughout my notes, I find mention of how both teachers and students complain rather constantly of lack of time and lack of sleep and of how difficult it is to keep up to schedule. The particular conditions of the year I conducted fieldwork, most obviously the sequence of strikes and demonstrations, no doubt added to the pressures. The issue, though, is much more general, and involves cultural priorities that are bound to limit the time and effort that can be allocated to study in the course of the school year.
CHAPTER VI
INTERPRETING THE PAST

More than in most modern literate societies, the past in Catalonia is potentially treacherous territory. Some of the reasons why this is so have already been mentioned and, as indicated, much of the problem stems from the absence of a clear closure to the events and experiences of the first three quarters of the present century. What we can say with some assurance is that nothing approaching a public myth has emerged to explain and give contemporary significance to this conflictive era. The general failure to confront the recent past has not gone unremarked by professional historians, a recent editorial in the leading journal of contemporary history noting that the fiftieth anniversary of the termination of the Civil War has slipped by almost without notice, a phenomenon attributed to "the still painful memories of lived experience" and to the circumstance that "those events of the Civil War implicate everyone in one form or another, and the protagonists have names well known within each family and each neighborhood" (Vèncer la Memòria 1989:5). Observations of the same order were offered by a sociologist who has carried out research among schoolchildren and young adults. In her opinion, "The vocabulary of common political parlance has virtually done away with Franco, barely known to most children, and Fascism, generally referred to as 'the antecedent regime' or 'before democracy.'" She felt that young people had a most limited understanding of the past and that schools made little effort to link the present to the historical events and conditions that had shaped it.32

This is a problem common to all of Spain, but it has a special significance for Catalonia given that the emergence of a modern, politicized, national identity is inextricably tied to the turbulent decades of the first half of the century. Thus, while for all Spaniards the period carries a similar burden of pain, only in Catalonia is it imbued with such a powerful charter significance. It is altogether remarkable, therefore, that so great a degree of historical amnesia continues to be the norm in Catalonia. The price paid is undoubtedly high. The treatment accorded to this period -- conflictive, but also formative -- provides valuable insights on how other problematic historical
episodes are managed.

History textbooks, especially those designed for the basic education (EGB) curriculum, are particularly anodyne. In two commonly used texts written for the last year of compulsory education (Grup Promotor 1984; Equipo Aula 3 1985), the Civil War, its causes, and its aftermath, is covered in approximately ten pages, with at least half of this space being devoted to illustrations, maps, charts, definitions, and timelines; needless to say, this leaves little room for exposition. In both books, the text seems to aim at a "balance," the underlying message being that those were indeed terrible times, but that they are now safely behind us. What one does not find is some, however rudimentary, attempt at commentary and explanation. Instead, there are descriptions of such matters as battles and their outcomes and of the political/sectoral composition of the opposing sides.

This putatively non-controversial approach is followed in a number of the books utilized in secondary education. Some older texts still in use present the Civil War as something of an unfortunate precondition for the establishment of an ordered political system that would, in due course, give rise to new and appropriate institutional forms (Centeno et al. 1977:339-355). Virtually all texts are in agreement that not only was the war bloody and destructive, but that its duration was quite unexpected: "a civil war, which, against all expectations, lasted three years" (Balanza et al. 1986:298); a military uprising that should have "rapidly brought down the Republican government" (Centeno et al. 1977:339).

Without much more in the way of interpretation, statements of this type implicitly reinforce the notion that the Civil War was, to a considerable degree, the result of poor judgment, even bad luck. What really calls for explanation is why a military coup -- the classic Spanish pronunciamiento -- failed so dismally. A fundamental reason, as one of the more recent texts makes clear, is that in the Spain of 1936, unlike that of the previous century, the military rebels faced a substantial population ready to resist the takeover -- "thousands of peasants and workers organized into powerful unions and parties, and an important sector of the middle class (some even from the army) who had also rallied to the democratic project" (Garcia 1986:336). The value of such an
interpretation lies in the fact that the student is directed to the analysis of social and political processes; in a word, is asked to think. A good teacher might also address the very definite political and institutional weaknesses of the Republic -- a gradual breakdown in democracy that had its parallels in other European societies -- and the particular vulnerability of the Spain of the times to foreign pressures and intervention.

The majority of texts, however, do not follow such an approach, and I suspect that the primary reason is that ultimately it calls for some judgment or evaluation, something that goes beyond the pronouncement that the war was an awful tragedy that should never be repeated. Furthermore, most books are hardly bias-free. In the absence of a deeper examination than is commonly encountered, the contrast between the war-torn past and the peaceful present echoes in muted tones the old claims of Franco that he alone brought peace to Spain. Finally, we might note that most texts are multi-authored (as many as half a dozen contributors), and that this too may help account for some of the blandness of style and problems of approach.

Almost any text, regardless of its shortcomings, can function as a point of departure for purposes of discussion. This, though, is too infrequently attempted. My notes from the end of March (almost two months into the project) give some sense of how I saw the classroom environment:

By now I notice a particular style of teaching/learning that places a good deal of stress on copying and memorizing. Facts tend to be givens: this happened on such-and-such a date; Hitler was an Austrian painter (in [another school] he was spoken of as de brocha gorda -- in short, a house painter -- which misses the frustrated artist in him); there were three (or four) main policy objectives to the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera [1923-30], and so on.... The problem here is that history and society do not appear to be paradoxical, contradictory...

Certainly, this is not the sole educational model, the only use made of textual materials. In another school -- the institut where teacher training practicums were taking place -- the students in the last year of BUP followed
up a set of quantitative problems in human geography with the opportunity to role-play a "development drama": the impact of highway construction on a remote rural area. Students broke up into working groups representing distinct interests -- big business, local hotel and store owners, government, ecologists, peasants, and so on. The main point of the exercise, according to the instructor, was to make them aware that virtually any policy, social or economic, impacts on different groups of people in different ways. In the end, the students were not only raising cost-benefit questions regarding development, but trying to decide what kind of government, of the left or of the right, would be most likely to undertake given development policies.

I am sure that one of the reasons why this particular class became so enthusiastic, so involved in its work, is that many of the issues covered had a definite immediacy. In contrast, the Civil War appears -- and is often made to appear -- so distant in time that connection is difficult. The crux of the problem, though, is not so much a generational matter as the difficulty that children encounter in putting a human face to those times and events. I came to this conclusion on several occasions, once following a discussion on the war with a group of seventeen-year-olds. I mentioned to them that, as a child, I had spent the first couple of years of the war in the Barcelona, a situation which had to be true of other people they knew. My experiences were not particularly remarkable and the memory of them was episodic and lacking much in the way of context. Still, this small window on the past was sufficient to help give the formal knowledge they had acquired a different dimension. I do not believe that it was simply the presence of someone who had lived through those times that made the difference, but rather that these young people were able to join to their school learning a realization that the past was not just something that had "gone," but a world inhabited by people who, in some respects at least, were quite like themselves.

When I raised this matter of connection with an educator who is working on the current restructuring of the social science curriculum, he agreed that the problems were real and deep-seated. He noted that the texts, which he characterized as often "arid," hardly helped the past to come alive, and he also observed that in most classes "there is little discourse."
remarked that under these circumstances it was not surprising that children who have grown up surrounded by visual images tended to focus on the illustrations, but that these, if anything, conspired to reinforce the notion that even the recent past was strange and different. Much more important, in his opinion, was the severing of the line of oral history transmission linking those who had experienced the war and the present school generation. "What causes this loss of memory," he went on, "is hard to say exactly; one sees the results clearer than the causes." As suggestions, he offered not only the "comfort" of avoiding too close a scrutiny of the past, but another possible factor: that in the wake of such a long period of deprivation -- political as well as material -- many people in Spain are still trying to catch up with the "good life."

According to recent reports, the Franco regime has become the stuff of fashionable nostalgia for some well-to-do youths, a matter, apparently, much more of style than of content or ideology (De la Fuente 1990).

Interestingly enough, some aspects of the more distant, as distinct from the more recent, past do not produce the same degree of hesitancy, ambivalence or distortion. This seems to be true of the treatment accorded to rural life in general, whether medieval or pertaining to the last century. I attended several classes that dealt with all manner of agrarian issues -- economics, demography, village organization, health, feudal privileges -- and found the coverage to be often thorough and discussion quite open. It is also worth noting that the Departament d'Ensenyament has funded the publication of a fine study guide (really a text in its own right) covering agriculture and rural life from the Neolithic to early modern times (Freixenet i Mas et al. 1986). This publication not only treats different social systems and organizational structures (ancient empires, classical antiquity, feudalism, peasant smallholding), but devotes a chapter to change and conflict. This particular section, however, is prefaced by the caveat that "during more than five thousand years the basic life of the majority of the population underwent very little change" (Freixenet i Mas et al. 1986:274).

I believe it is in part this view of rural life as fundamentally static, together with the notion that this world is now very distant, that makes for relatively uninhibited discussion. It permits a sixteen-year-old girl, as actually
happened in one class, to question the teacher at length about droit de seigneur ("Was the clergy involved?"; "How common was it?"). Perfectly legitimate points, but they remind one of the questions often raised in introductory anthropology courses respecting the "customs" of this or that society; interesting material, to be sure, but does it have much bearing on our life and times? Even more recent events, for instance peasant unrest early in the present century, are generally seen as belonging to a past that has long disappeared.

That the rural world is viewed in this way is curious since in 1950 as much as half of the economically active population of Spain made their living from the land, the vast majority as agricultural laborers (United Nations 1968:135; de Miguel 1977:191), and as recently as 1969, more than 30 percent of the labor force still followed agricultural pursuits (del Campo 1972). In reality, therefore, this agrarian life is not, after all, so temporally removed and must have been experienced by the parents and grandparents of quite a number of the students (in particular those attending "Valle Inclán") I went to class with.

One does not, however, receive the impression that much from this recent past has been transmitted to the present generation. To the extent that the country or references to the ancestral village come up in casual school conversation, it is generally in the form of nostalgic or romanticized images. As for coverage in class, the approach, in the three (two different schools) instances that I witnessed, stresses "social problems" without entering into too much detail. For example, in a discussion of the vitally important Casas Viejas episode, where in 1933 two dozen Anarchist villagers were massacred by the Guardia Civil, which in turn led to the downfall of Manuel Azaña's liberal government, it was not explained that the village formed part of the southern latifundia region characterized by chronic underemployment and endemic famine. Since, fortunately, very few children in Spain today actually go hungry, it would have been valuable to explain what such deprivation does to people, and how it has often been used as a powerful instrument of social and political control. I believe that one of the reasons why such an approach, which must obviously look at poverty in other than purely abstract terms, was
eschewed is the fear that detailed discussion of the subject might embarrass students of modest rural backgrounds. At a deeper level of interpretation, it could be argued that what is being communicated, by omission rather than by direct reference, is how much better it is to be an urban person than one from the country, with all that this change implies not only in terms of life chances but also in terms of cultura. In summary, rural life seems to be easier to tackle the further away it is from the present, and even relatively recent experiences and situations tend to be approached as if quite distant. In some respects at least, it is probably fair to say that the wish to forget is akin to that surrounding the Civil War.

The country, it may be argued, is bound to be an experience of some remoteness for present-day city children attending city schools. How do they respond to city life and how is the city and its history presented to them? As to the first question, there is little doubt that Barcelona schoolchildren are consummate cosmopolitans. They are knowledgeable of city geography and often travel long distances from home to school via the network of public transportation. The city, except for a very few locations, is not categorized as a dangerous environment. As noted previously, by the time they are in their middle teens, young people are likely to congregate in the informal clubs of cafes and bars; for those who cannot afford such establishments, the central streets of the city, in particular the broad and tree-shaded Ramblas, offer a readily available meetingplace.

Barcelona itself should provide countless opportunities for instruction in history. Within the city core and surrounding districts one can find two thousand years of often superb architecture, including Roman walls, major medieval religious and civic structures, and a series of neighborhoods reflecting the changes that the city has undergone from the high Middle Ages to the art nouveau ("modernisme" in Catalan) expansion of a century ago. Furthermore, Catalans by and large, and the citizens of Barcelona in particular, are not only proud of their capital, but often quite consciously aware of the symbolism that may accrue to cityscapes and urban architecture.

It was with these thoughts in mind, that I awaited to see the use to which the city might be put as historical text. To the extent that it was
employed as a point of reference, two themes dominated the exposition:
temporal continuity and Barcelona as a European city. Both themes are well
taken. The structure of Barcelona parallels that of many other old European
towns -- the roughly oval shape of the original core, the narrow streets of the
old quarters, vestiges of defensive walls, the dominance of Cathedral and
churches, and the later extramural expansion. Thus, to point out that
Barcelona shares many features with other ancient European administrative
and mercantile centers, is both valid and a good foundation for a more detailed
study.

Much the same is true respecting continuity. As was noted during a
"Magna" field trip to the historic "centers of power" -- the City Hall and the
Generalitat; the Cathedral, Episcopal Palace and associated buildings; and the
Royal Palace -- in many respects the loci of power in Barcelona have remained
the same for some 2,000 years. The teachers running this excursion did a
commendable job outlining the overlapping spheres of authority in the
medieval city. They also pointed out that, ideally at least, power in the Middle
Ages was organized in a complementary rather than an oppositional manner.
My notes from this successful outing close with the observation: "What one
misses -- and granted that the physical remains work against this -- is a
recognition that the vast majority of the inhabitants were not king, bishop,
senyors [lords], or honored citizens." Parenthetically, it also seemed to me that
there was a certain congruence between this emphasis on continuity and a
non-conflictive political order on the one hand, and the values of an audience
drawn largely from privileged backgrounds on the other. This episode would
appear to be a particularly good example of what Keene (1986:5) terms "the
dominant story," a representation whose message is that there is "an
unbroken line between the past and the present which supports the
timelessness, inevitability and undeniable legitimacy of certain contemporary
social relations." What initially struck me was the absence of even a passing
mention of artisans, tradesmen, and workers, all vital to the operation and
prosperity of the medieval city, and just those components of society most likely
to question aspects of the hierarchical order. After some further thought, I
realized that our tour had taken us right through the Call (from the Hebrew
Kahal, community), the old Jewish neighborhood between the Generalitat and the Cathedral. Those who at one time had lived there had gone unnoticed, nor was mention made of the manner of their passing.

Obviously, a single episode hardly constitutes a pattern; after all, not all questions, even important and interesting ones, can be dealt with in the course of a morning's excursion. Nevertheless, as the the school term progressed and I had the opportunity to attend more classes and read the pertinent texts, a certain pattern seemed to unfold. I never witnessed an in-depth discussion of Jews in Catalonia or in other parts of Iberia, nor was there any attempt to compare and contrast the condition of Jewish communities in Christian Spain with those in other lands. Nor, for that matter, was the persecution and eventual expulsion of Jews from the Spanish kingdoms used to explore the Holocaust and other episodes of recent European history. Fundamentally, the fate of Spanish Jewry in late medieval and early modern times was approached as a regrettable example of the prejudice and fanaticism peculiar to the age.

Textbook coverage of the Jews in Spain ranges from limited mention and the assumption that the "assimilation" of such populations was something of a necessity for the emergence of a more modern polity (this is the thrust of several EGB texts), to considerably more detailed and insightful presentations. In the previously mentioned Generalitat study guide, students are offered a vivid description of the Girona Call (the second most important in Catalonia) and its virtual destruction in 1391, and are invited to think of reasons why the Jews "were forced to live in their own neighborhoods" (Freixenet i Mas et al. 1986: 212, 254). Sepharad, certainly one of the more stimulating high school texts of those I reviewed, discusses the pogroms of 1391, linking them to systemic economic and political crises, and goes on to explain that "The edict of Jewish expulsion of 1492 and the forced conversion of Muslims to Christianity in 1502 are the logical culmination of the policies introduced by the Inquisition" (Garcia el al. 1986:145,151). In general, though, textual coverage is thin, which can in part be accounted for by an approach that emphasizes formal political structures and their material manifestations. Whatever influence Spanish Jews enjoyed derived from an always conditional
royal protection and, as a stigmatized group, they were never in a position to
develop much in the way of public art or a distinct architectural tradition.
Jewish culture of the period, essentially private and domestic, does not readily
lend itself to textbook illustrations.

The Jewish presence only marginally informs the "remembered
history" that the present-day inhabitants of Barcelona, and Catalans in
general, make ready reference to. Usually, when the issue comes up, Jews are
numbered with the scores of other groups -- Greeks and Romans, Visigoths
and Franks, Phoenicians and Saracens, French and Italians -- that conjointly
are said to give to Catalonia its special character as a terradepas -- a
historical crossroads of peoples and cultures. There is certainly no denial that
Jews had resided in Barcelona and other locations for centuries, but this is all
seen as remote and of scant present significance.38

There are, of course, good psychological reasons to adduce for the way
that the subject is treated. Most obviously, there is so little to be proud of in the
actions of the dominant society that reticence or the touching up of the
historical record is a not unexpected reaction.

In broad outline, what happened to the Jews in Spain is the dismally
familiar story of a marginal group subjected to physical and symbolic violence,
but it also constitutes a major human and communal tragedy from which
valuable civic and historical instruction can be derived. Note might be taken
that notwithstanding enormous pressures (present even during the most
tolerant times), the community produced renowned thinkers and scholars (the
closest thing to a university in medieval Barcelona was the Jewish Escola
Major), as well as merchants and businessmen.39 Thinking about the Call
and similar quarters can also further the analysis of some distinctly Catalan
issues. Part of the Catalan national myth is that evils and disasters are
essentially of external origin, a common enough reaction among subordinated
people, and one with more than sufficient truth in the Catalan case. But what
occurred to Catalan Jewry cannot be blamed on outside forces. The lesson that
should be drawn is that, historically, Catalans, in common with other peoples,
have at times been victims, at others victimizers. Examination of the latter role
-- and how it was supported by interests and institutions -- is bound to be
uncomfortable, but should be explored, especially given the current climate of ethnic and racial tensions in Spain, a matter I shall return to in the conclusions.

At a level of enquiry demanding greater sophistication, but scarcely beyond the intellectual capacities of pre-university students, the Jewish experience offers the chance to investigate models of society. In particular, the similarities and differences between what some have termed the "imagined community" of contemporary nationalism (Anderson 1983) and the religiously-defined collectivities of earlier times presents a fruitful approach to the study of identity. Much of the political debate in present-day Catalonia revolves around the attributes of nationality: what it means to be Catalan, how is membership in the nation defined and manifested -- in common parlance, "Who is a Catalan?" If the student is directed to a consideration of fourteenth century Barcelona, he will find that the most important lines of societal demarcation were not (granted all the difficulties of applying such terminology) defined by class, or even by language and culture, but by a concept of religious membership with some interesting parallels to nationality. What I am suggesting is that it is valuable for young people to understand that definitions of in-group and out-group are seldom unproblematic and, although they may seem unchanging, are in reality far from immutable; also, it needs to be emphasized that in all such categorizations much depends on who is doing the defining.

The value of exercises of this type is not limited to making the past more accessible, but can also contribute to a recognition that meaningful history, for all concerned, demands a balanced role for all pertinent actors. This is very much what Eric Wolf (1982:19) means when he writes that "The more ethnohistory we know, the more clearly "their" history and "our" history merge as part of the same history." The observation is as pertinent to the historical place of European minorities as it is to the non-European societies that he discusses. For children growing up in Catalonia, a consideration of these times and events is particularly apropos since a vision of a glorious and harmonious medieval past inspired a whole generation of early nationalist intellectuals.
The other important non-Christian population with a critical role in Iberian history are the Moors, or as they are generally identified in modern texts, the Hispano-Muslims. Treatment of Islam in Spain is conditioned by several factors, chief among which is the historical centrality of a centuries-long (711-1492) relationship between Moorish and Christian kingdoms and, by extension, Islam and Christendom. Phrased differently, the peninsula was for hundreds of years both divided and joined by a permeable frontier -- at times stable and peaceful, at others a zone of conflict -- between ideological and cultural systems. To this phenomenon of interaction and competition, which in some measure touched all of Europe and the Middle East, must be added the manifest brilliance of medieval Hispano-Muslim civilization. Given these circumstances, no Spanish text could fail to give due attention to such phenomena as Córdoba and its Caliphate, a state that for generations played a key role in European politics, and a metropolis that in early medieval times was by far the most important city west of Constantinople.

In fact, all the texts that cover this period include separate chapters on Muslim Spain, often with quite detailed information on politics and economics, science, art and literature. Again, all the books that have come to my notice contain good and ample illustrations of Islamic art, pride of place being given to the jewels of Islamic architecture in Córdoba, Toledo, Seville, and Granada. There is also a general recognition that elements of Moorish culture made their way into later Spanish society, for example in the form of the mudéjar architectural style. Some history books hypothesize more subtle linkages -- "The love of the Arabs for nature manifests itself in the abundance of plants which adorn balconies, gardens, and patios; [this] has endured in Spanish customs" (Centeno et al. 1977:69). Nor do the texts fail to point out that, in the wake of the reconquista, substantial numbers of Muslims converted to Christianity (the moriscos), a change in religious/cultural status similar to that imposed on many Jews (conversos). What we have, therefore, is both a recognition of an important Islamic past and an explanation of what happened to it: the centuries-long process known as the reconquest followed by the forced integration (there were several revolts) of the former Muslim population. As
we have noted, the way that the subject of Jewish and Muslim populations is treated can vary considerably from text to text, but the following analysis is fairly typical:

The anti-Semitic process in a Spain in transition to a modern world crested (desembocó) in 1492 in the royal decree of Jewish expulsion. This was the culmination of an authoritarian policy: the conquest of Granada and the end of Muslim domination was joined to the expulsion of the Jews, which signified [the achievement] of religious unity in a state which could count on few [other] unifying links (Balanzá et al. 1986:162).

If in the treatment of such matters one can often detect ambivalence, the authors of texts seem considerably more comfortable -- and expansive -- when dealing with the material culture, particularly architecture, but also visual art in its various forms, of the non-Christian inhabitants of the peninsula. No doubt, at the level in question, the material world is easier to discuss (and illustrate) than philosophy, religious beliefs, or policies of forced assimilation, but it can also be argued that such an approach lends itself particularly well to a type of historical management which, for want of a simpler term, I will call repossessing the tangible past. The transformation of the great mosque of Córdoba into a cathedral is the emblematic case for this type of incorporation.\textsuperscript{41} But even where such symbolically-charged and conscious changes did not taken place, for instance in the case of palaces and fortifications, the sense of appropriation is similar: material vestiges of long ago fall into place as part of the historical landscape.\textsuperscript{42}

The past can also be consumed in the context of specialized institutions, particularly museums, and it is in these that the visitor will find displayed artifacts ranging from Islamic ceramics to Jewish tombstones. I am not suggesting that this phenomenon is uniquely Spanish, but simply that it functions to transform the surviving past in ways that are congruent with present hegemonic needs. The museum segregates, displays, and what is particularly important for our present discussion, it distances exhibits from the human context in which they were originally set. The visitor (particularly the young student) being instructed in that which is material may well fail to
be much aware of that which was human.

The observations expressed in the preceding paragraphs are based primarily on the examination of texts. Unfortunately, I attended only a few classes that touched directly on Hispano-Muslim themes, a situation that can largely be explained by the fact that my stay coincided with the second half of the school year, by which time the more advanced grades had already covered the Middle Ages. Granted these limitations, and taking into account the minor historical presence of Islam in Catalonia, I believe it is nevertheless possible to distinguish some significant differences in the way that the Moorish and Jewish contributions to Iberian history are treated. Essentially -- and at times quite explicitly -- the Sephardic communities are perceived as having formed part (to some degree at least) of the general Iberian culture. This is noticeable in academic texts and also in more popular publications. Thus, a very popular, and explicitly nationalistic, comic book rendering of Catalan history identifies medieval Jewish scholars resident in Barcelona as barcelonins, a term carrying the strongest connotations of in-group membership (Artés-Gener 1977:57). The book also attacks Ferdinand and Isabella, and in particular the former who was king of Aragon, for intolerance, the evils of the Inquisition, and the expulsion of the Jews from Spain (Artés-Gener 1977:76). In contrast, there is very little sense, in text or discussion, that Hispano-Muslims should be categorized as part of the conceptual community -- even retroactively.

I do not believe that this difference in image can simply be attributed to the view from Barcelona. It is worth noting that as early as 1924 Spanish consuls in the Balkans were instructed to facilitate passports to Sephardic Jews, described in the pertinent orders as "individuals of Spanish origin" (Culla i Clarà 1989:68). To cite another example, in the recent 1992 series of events and celebrations, which included the Barcelona Olympics and Expo 92 in Seville, the city of Toledo, which in later medieval times boasted the most flourishing Jewish community in Spain, observed the 500th anniversary of the Sephardic expulsion. Perhaps predictably, plans called for the restoration of the old Jewish quarter and the dedication of a Monument to Jewish Spain (New York Times, April 10, 1988), but notwithstanding this concern for the material, the message still seems to be that Jews not only resided in Spain, but
were in important respects "Spanish". This, as we have indicated, hardly meshes with how things were viewed at the time, but it fits the low-keyed recognition of long-ago iniquities that forms part of contemporar y interpretation. Nor is the issue of identity and "patriality" without significant current social and political consequences: Sephardic Jews, from anywhere in the world, can now reclaim Spanish citizenship after just two years' residency ("What is a European?" The Economist, July 17, 1991).

Islamic Spain, for all its recognized splendor and accomplishments, is seldom perceived as having formed part of core native society. Rather, one can reasonably interpret the designated role of the Moors in Spain as a variant of Said's (1978:70) generalization respecting the place of the Orient in European imagination: "outsiders having a special role to play inside Europe"; in short, quintessential "Others." That this conceptual baggage continues to influence the way that Spaniards -- and many other Europeans -- think and act is not to be doubted. There is, in fact, a high degree of congruence between popular perceptions and the way that scholarship is organized. Islamic studies are rather well developed in Spanish universities but, as elsewhere in Europe, these fields tend to be defined as "non-Western," essentially part of a different world, a distinct intellectual and artistic tradition.

A number of Western societies, most obviously France and Britain, have played a critical role in the Spanish historical process. These two countries, who for almost two centuries were contenders with Spain for Western European -- and in the case of Britain, global -- supremacy, are treated in the history books with a remarkable absence of negative stereotyping. I am not suggesting that such episodes as the defeat of the Armada pass without mention, or that the ceding to France of northern Catalonia (Treaty of the Pyrenees 1659) is not regretted, but that fundamentally the conflicts between Spain and its neighbors are explained in terms of the Realpolitik of emerging modern Europe. What all the texts stress, and what many class discussions elaborate, is the failure of Spain to transform itself into a modern society.43

The reasons cited for this failure are numerous, and they include foreign machinations as well as all manner of domestic problems and
shortcomings, but at no point did I come across a reverse of the "black legend" of popular English historiography which interprets the sixteenth century conflict with Spain as a moral struggle against Spanish cruelty and fanaticism. As the historian Fernández-Armesto has observed (1988:vi), the Armada and related events "had a disproportionate part in defining English self-awareness." The Napoleonic invasion and the resulting long and bloody struggle (known in Spain as the War of Independence, 1808-1814), plays some role in defining the Spanish self, but more than anything else it marks a clear break between a state that could still legitimately claim to be an important power, and all the troubles and dislocations -- including the loss of empire -- that beset Spain in the next century. In short, pride in heroic resistance is mixed with a recognition that these events do not so much signal the beginning of a new era as the collapse of an old system. One could argue that the need to borrow models of modernization from outside its own frontiers (industrialization from Britain, state organization from France) helps to account for an absence of xenophobia in the treatment of recent European history. Probably equally important is the fact that Spain remained a neutral in the two world wars.44

One further category of historically significant societies, the peoples of the Americas and other localities colonized by Spain, warrants a brief mention. Given that the curriculum, specifically the final year of the *bachillerato*, is supposed to integrate the history of Spain with that of other "Hispanic countries," a reasonably informed coverage of colonialism and its aftermath might be expected. This, however, is seldom the case. Texts generally allot limited space (usually in the wider context of the Habsburg world empire) to the conquest and colonization of the New World, but consideration of indigenous societies and what befell them is limited, most of the coverage being devoted to such matters as the discovery itself, European migration and settlement, and the establishment of colonial institutions. Other books (Centeno et al. 1977) contain short chapters on Hispanic America and the Philippines, while the authors of one text insist that the official curriculum is simply impractical and explain that the volume will focus on the crisis of the *antiguo régimen* and the problems of industrialization and
modernization (Balanza 1986:3-4).

It may well be true that too much is expected -- the geography and history of Spain and its former dependencies is a tall order -- but one can also argue that a discussion of the Spanish colonial experience would permit the linkage of the historical corpus to important contemporary issues. Even such a relatively recent event as the loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines following the Spanish-American War is generally approached as one more indication of the inability of the Spanish political system to perform in a reasonably efficient and modern manner, a failure which included, to be sure, the insensitivity of the political establishment to home rule demands in the colonies. Generally speaking, the colonial past is studied as a series of events, circumstances, and processes without much relevance to the "modern" world, even as a kind of historical deviation. Such an approach is understandable and in part defensible, but it does not further consideration of some critical relationships between Iberian society and colonial systems, for instance the linkage between the late survival of a slave economy in Cuba and the industrialization of Catalonia.45

Reduced textbook and class coverage of colonial history no doubt also reflects a rejection of a traditional (and in particular, Francoist) historiography that emphasized Spain's "transcendental mission" as the leader of the Hispanic world. Also, it is not surprising that Catalan teachers spend little time discussing former Spanish possessions since, for politically-conscious Catalans, the very concept of "Empire" has long been viewed as little more than code for Spanish/Castilian domination.

In conclusion, the treatment of history, and within this of marginality in the past, stresses certain types of order and continuity and reflects a generally progressive-liberal interpretation of the dynamics of history, much time, effort and space being devoted to the discussion of legal/constitutional models and documents. The dominant theme, often more implicit that explicit, is that after its share difficulties, Spain has finally found its proper place in the Western world. Still, given the degree of flux and conflict in Spanish history, it is remarkable how coherent -- indeed, how inevitable -- is the rendition that is commonly offered of this past.
Children growing up in Catalonia learn, by the very nature of quotidian experience, that two languages are commonly used in their society and that, roughly speaking, language use correlates with group identity or membership. The matter, of course, is considerably more complex. At the public level, politicians and intellectuals (including anthropologists) discourse at length on what it means to be Catalan, on the role of language and culture in national identity, and on whether it is legitimate to speak of "two communities" in Catalonia, or if the correct societal analysis calls for a common entity made up of two linguistic groups. These are matters of much more than rhetorical importance. They are intimately joined to issues of power and legitimacy, specifically the authority to make critical commentary respecting the political/cultural order in Catalonia and, a most important point, the right to help articulate policies vis-à-vis the central government.

The details of this debate (which, by virtue of the political system, is not limited to those living in Catalonia) fall outside the scope of this essay (Pi-Sunyer 1976, 1987, 1988), but the issues are bound, at some level, to touch all who are growing up in society. I had therefore assumed that consideration of the whole matter of group identity and its ramifications would have a prominent place in social world and related courses; after all, the issues are not only intellectually stimulating, but also very much part of practical social reality.

This is not what I found. Formal class discussion of nationality/identity is pretty well limited to expositions of the Constitution and its relevant articles on democracy, diversity, and pluralism. Nor do the texts offer much in the way of guidance or information: of the three third-year bachillerato books at my disposal, only one (Garcia et al. 1986:382-393) devotes considerable space to the political transition and the autonomy process. I found that individuals, students as well as teachers, were often very reluctant -- in the context of school -- to talk about their identity and what this might mean in political and social terms. This situation, which initially struck me as puzzling, is similar
to the one described by Kathryn Woolard in her study on bilingualism. She writes that "the overt debate over who is Catalan was as rare in daily life... as it was common in the media during this period. People usually did not argue about their identities, they performed them" (Woolard 1989:40). Her research, much of it carried out in five Barcelona schools, was conducted a decade ago, but matters have not changed all that much -- overt debate remains rare and, some would claim, public debate has been toned down.

Language use in the schools is another matter. Since early in the political transition, the goal of the Catalan government has been to "normalize" the use of Catalan in the schools. The official language plan outlined in 1978 for secondary education (comparable ones were developed for other levels) defines as its first objective the control by students of "all the uses and registers of the Catalan language, from the most commonplace and familiar, to the knowledge and practice of administrative, technical, journalistic, scientific and literary Catalan" (Comissió Mixta 1978:1). Today, just as explicit discussion of national identity in the schools is extremely rare, the use of Catalan as a medium of instruction is very common. I witnessed no reluctance on the part of teachers to teach in Catalan and to use texts written in the language, even when the majority of the class might be Castilian-dominant. Other teachers employed Castilian as the language of instruction, but used Catalan texts. The system as it operates on the ground gives individual teachers a good deal of leeway, although the political and linguistic aim remains faculties competent to teach in Catalan (it is correctly assumed that they will also be fluent in Castilian) and fully bilingual students.

How to interpret this situation in which the presence of two languages is a manifest reality, but actual discussion of what this might mean in terms of group membership is hardly encouraged? My sense is that this reluctance is in large part the function of an unspoken Catalan taboo: good manners (and tranquil social relations) preclude the raising of identity issues in multi-ethnic contexts. People are supposed to know (through language use, accent, and other markers) who is a Catalan-speaker and who is a Castilian-speaker. It is assumed -- although certainly this is a questionable generalization -- that language use generally correlates with other attributes, such as political
orientation (statist vs. autonomist), class membership, and even, some would claim, culinary preferences. Teachers in Barcelona, it seems to me, handle discussion of ethnicity and nationalism in a manner that has interesting parallels with the treatment of religion in American schools. In both instances, the subject is marked for special consideration not because of some inherent malefic quality, but because of its divisive and confrontational potential. The difference, of course, is that while the separation of church and state is recognized as a cornerstone of the American system, the post-Franco political agreement actually gives formal constitutional protection to cultural diversity and designated political rights. Another important distinction is that while religious affiliation (as distinct from "traditional values") no longer represents a critical social-political line of cleavage in the United States, the longest-running insurgency in the Western world is the ETA uprising in the Basque Country (Clark 1984; Zulaika 1988). In short, questions of political rights and political legitimacy continue to impact very directly on the lives of ordinary people.

The fear of violence in a population that has, in recent history, been exposed to a great deal of it is not something that should be treated lightly. It seems extreme, though, to interpret the general reluctance to discuss "ethnic" issues simply to fears that this might somehow abet dangerous and uncivil classroom behavior; important and respected public figures, after all, do not seem troubled by such apprehensions. Part of the answer, I suspect, has to do with context. Fundamentally, the public forum of political debate deals with generalities, abstractions and theories, not with how to manage the day-to-day world of interpersonal relations, which in our case is likely to involve the person sitting next to you in the classroom. Whatever weight we may give to this contextual factor, in the two class sessions (both BUP-level at Sta. Eulàlia) in which students were encouraged to discuss ethnicity and nationalism, I was struck by the formality and the highly theoretical bent of the presentations.

No doubt, this formalism was in part a function of the structured nature of the sessions: students had volunteered, or perhaps been encouraged, to present "positions." But granted these constraints, it is unlikely that this
alone fully explains a manner and style that at times appeared more suitable to theological exegesis than to social analysis. It seemed to me that the students were following -- and had been invited to follow -- the model set by intellectuals, to wit, the powerful (and privileged) discourse of legal and constitutional analysis. Powerful when done well, but also a form that may not adequately address the realities of everyday life: the adjustments, the compromises, the very hard individual choices, indeed the contradictions, that one faces all the time when growing up in a place like Barcelona.

I entered these debates towards the end by asking the presenters, a number of whom favored quite radical nationalist agendas, to ponder such tricky matters as the interplay of class, language, and national identity, and how they, as ordinary individuals, managed these variables; and more concretely, the degree to which ideological positions influenced relations with friends and family. All agreed in the ensuing discussion that theory and lived experience, while related, were not the same; and that, at some level, they had been aware of this distinction for a long time. Following the class, the instructor expressed satisfaction with these experimental sessions and explained to me that she had to keep the peace between different elements and factions in a class whose membership covered the ideological gamut from the children of military families to some highly radicalized youngsters. There is little doubt that even a rather formalistic treatment of nationalism and related matters represented a significant pedagogical departure.

What we have been discussing in these last paragraphs is a common enough phenomenon: the problem of bridging the gap between abstract knowledge and concrete social experience. The secondary school students I worked with -- and not simply the ones in the aforementioned debate -- had been trained to extract meaning from formal textual materials, but not really to relate this universe to their own lives. No doubt this is a general educational problem and at least in part reflects the multiple functions of schools, including their role as disciplined and hierarchically ordered environments. In short, even debate that is defined as "open" is in reality encumbered by the constraints of what can best be described as several layers of self-censorship, much of it all the more effective because it is not fully conscious, and thus does
not demand explanation.

If I have spent a considerable amount of space examining the really limited extent to which the multicultural and multilingual nature of the Spanish state (not to mention of Catalonia) enters the formal curriculum, it is because this diversity is hardly hidden. It is there, but goes unanalyzed (in the context of the classroom) and, at the level of interpersonal relations, is more acted out than stated. What this means is that really critical issues -- including the aforementioned matter of what category of people have a legitimate right to comment on the cultural/political order -- is left not only unresolved, but essentially undiscussed. If this is the situation with identities that are commonly recognized as present, and ususally as legitimate, what bearing does such a finding have on the academic treatment of groups and minorities that lack such an established and recognized place?

Perhaps the most evident element of common reference is one that has already been remarked upon, namely the wish to avoid or play down troublesome issues. These issues, controversial or uncomfortable, are not all of a kind. The cautious treatment of national identities in the schools seems to be related to the fear, as one teacher phrased it, that the subject "lends itself to polemics and bad feelings," but it also reflects -- as in other cases we will be examining -- the absence of an appropriate frame of analysis, even a "language". At an earlier point in this essay, I commented that the Gypsy population is never discussed in the classroom, never makes it into the textbooks. Again, we have a situation where all, except perhaps the very youngest children, are fully aware that Gypsies exist. Furthermore, respondents will generally claim to be able to identify them by sight, and readily relate stereotyped descriptions of their life and activities. What seems to be especially "uncomfortable" about Gypsies is that they are felt to reflect badly on society as a whole. Quite apart from their reputation for shady dealing, they are perceived as being the very antithesis of that which is "modern" and "European"; in a word, they are nothing short of a national embarrassment.47

According to the anthropologist Calvo Buezas (1990), who recently undertook an extensive survey of racial and ethnic attitudes among Spanish students and teachers, Gypsies represent the marginal ethnic group which is
most likely to be perceived as dangerous or undesirable. He documents a general reluctance on the part of his non-Gypsy informants to engage in, or even hypothesize, any positive social relationship with Gypsies. At the high end of the scale of rejection, 70 percent of his sample of teachers would be molestados ("upset" or "disturbed") if their own children married Gypsies (Calvo Buezas 1990:30-31). This degree of social distancing reveals a deep-seated xenophobia that is seldom recognized in intellectual circles. Indeed, to bring up the matter of Gypsies in such contexts -- especially if one is a foreigner or lives abroad -- risks opening oneself to a set of fairly predictable responses. A not unusual observation is the claim that a concern for such marginal elements represents little more than thinly-veiled (and very misplaced) romanticism. Another common reaction is the assertion that any problems Gypsies may experience, are very much of their own making -- educators, for example, will generally attribute high levels of Gypsy illiteracy to a reluctance on the part of parents to send their children to school.

Such explanations of Gypsy attitudes and behavior are not so much invalid as badly in need of contextualization. What the Gypsies have achieved is the very successful manipulation of a hostile social environment. In the process, they have managed to retain control over their own culture, resisted the state and its authority, and avoided proletarianization. As Kaprow (1982:400; see also Gmelch 1986:322-323) has expressed it, "neither Gypsies, Basques, nor Catalans disappeared as a result of centuries of exclusion by the dominant society," but this lesson is not being taught in the schools of Barcelona nor, I am convinced, anywhere else in Spain. The Gypsies, I would argue, are not stigmatized because of their resistance to state authority -- there is a long and honorable contestatorial tradition in Spain -- but chiefly because they are viewed as rejecting a constellation of beliefs and practices that structure social life and the management of group relations in the dominant social order. Particularly significant for our analysis is the fact that common opinion holds that they have no place for education, either as a desideratum in its own right or as the premier mechanism for achieving social mobility; in much the same way, they are seen as refusing to participate in the political process.
This perceived, and to some degree real, separation from the workings of civil society goes together with a series of other traits that tend to reinforce alterity, among which is an ethnic division of labor that marks certain occupations -- fortune-telling, entertaining, scavenging, and sundry itinerant professions -- as either Gypsy preserves or callings in which Gypsies play an important role. In reality, contemporary Spanish Gypsies are much more sedentary than is generally assumed and, in common with the rest of the population, they are increasingly to be found in the cities. By the same token, many of the traditional pursuits, especially those associated with horse trading, have virtually disappeared.

But what matters, I think, is that as a class or category Gypsies are regarded as conceptually outside society, linked to occupations that are often despised, and viewed as nomadic or transient (another form of marginality). Freeman (1979: 224-30) enumerates several non-Gypsy groups that, much like the Gypsies, have been labeled as pueblos malditos -- damned or despised peoples. A substantial number of these lived in geographically marginal environments and were involved in occupations, such as herding and animal breeding, carting, and muleteering, that overlap some of the traditional Gypsy trades. Again, like the Gypsies, they resided in segregated districts or neighborhoods and enjoyed few rights. I find it instructive that in most cases these groups did not define themselves as different from the larger society, but rather that their difference and low status were conferred upon them.

What I am suggesting is that there exists a very general model of marginality that, in years past, seems to have been applied to a variety of groups and entities. Elements of this model, I believe, continue to have contemporary salience. It is hardly irrelevant that the most numerous of non-Iberian marginals, the Arabs, are popularly regarded as being both itinerant and engaged in low status occupations. Essentially the same assumption is often made respecting blacks.

In brief, we have a situation in Catalonia where the most critical line of cultural (and often political) cleavage, that between Catalan-speakers and Castilian-speakers, is seldom discussed in the schools, other than in the most formal constitutional terms. People, including students, do manifest group
affinity, but primarily through language use and friendship ties. There seems to be an unspoken agreement that the key issues of culture and power will either not be raised in the classroom or at least will be treated with consummate care when they are. Falling outside this schema are Gypsies and sundry rural enclaves, mostly historical, that have been perceived as not really forming part of the body social or the body politic.

Generally speaking -- and for good and sufficient reasons -- Gypsies have seldom tried to use higher order institutions for the redress of grievances, a circumstance likely to reinforce the impression that they are outside the social orbit by conscious choice. They may also be viewed as peripheral by reason of time and distance. Calvo Buezas (1989:83) observes that not only are several of the few references to Gypsies in his extensive sample of school texts related to the historical past, but that in two text passages the reference is to Gypsies outside of Spain (one in Colombia, the other in Nazi Germany). There is validity in his observation that "it is easier to speak of the discrimination of yesterday than of today" (Clavo Buezas 1989:80); and, one might add, perhaps easier to position it abroad rather than at home.

The conceptual universe that most schoolchildren utilize to make sense of their social world is, as previously noted, quite sophisticated in some ways, limited in others. More than one of my young informants insisted that Gypsies fell outside the structure of class society -- "they are not peasants or workers, and obviously they don't belong to the wealthy classes" -- but not due to the circumstance that they had successfully resisted the state and capitalism, but rather because they "refuse to work," an apparent moral shortcoming (but, no doubt, also an enviable state).

"Work," I found, is one of those concepts or measures that are commonly used in reference to designated outsiders -- often in contradictory ways. Thus, foreigners may be perceived as "taking work away" from Spaniards (reference may be made to the high rate of unemployment that the country is experiencing), but it is also not unusual to be told that many aliens either do not engage in real work or that they make their living in illegal ways, especially as drug traffickers. Even children in elementary grades, I found, are likely to associate the growing drug problem and related violence with
foreigners. They are, of course, unlikely to understand with much clearly the link between illegal (or criminal) activity and the absence of work permits and other mandatory documentation. Further discussion of these issues may well reveal that the archetypical dangerous foreigner is conceptualized either as a Latin American (media coverage plus the substantial Latin American presence in Barcelona?) or an African. Reasonably well-to-do and "respectable" foreigners -- rich retirees, middle class tourists, investors, the people who work for multinationals, and, let me add, visiting scholars -- clearly belong to a different category; nobody, for example, ever ventured the opinion that Swiss (or for that matter, Japanese) managers might make inroads into the available pool of white-collar jobs.

What I am suggesting is that "undesirable" or "dangerous" categories of people are very likely to be perceived as marginal to society, members of some underclass, engaged in criminal activities, actual or potential competitors in a tight job market, and increasingly of non-European origin -- especially when alienness happens to correlate with low socioeconomic status. Needless to say, not all of these attributes need be present in the same individual. The general model fits internal marginals (especially the Gypsies as a long-established pariah group) as well as the majority of more recent non-European immigrants.

Contact between local schoolchildren and non-Iberian individuals, whether adults or age-mates, is, I found, not too common other than in structured and out-of-the-ordinary contexts, such as vacation trips or school excursions. It is true that virtually everyone has met some tourists -- jokes featuring culturally disoriented tourists abound -- but again the forms of interaction tend to be stylized. As one might expect, there is some stereotyping, but basically the attitudes held respecting other European nationalities are positive, often highly so; older and more sophisticated students are not at all reluctant to view themselves as part of a larger European community. My subjective impression is that children are fundamentally reflecting current ideas on the many advantages that are generally believed to accrue to a Spain with close links to its European neighbors.

The degree of contact between my respondents and people of
non-European origin, including those resident in Spain, is even more restricted. Part of the reason for this difference is simply a question of numbers: with 50 million tourists, mostly from Western Europe, entering Spain annually, it is impossible not to be aware of them, to have some degree of personal encounter with this kind of visitor. In contrast, poor non-Europeans are far fewer in number. There are perhaps 700,000 "economic immigrants" (not all of them Third World) in Spain, some 190,000 of whom are Arabs, and of these 25,000 reside in Catalonia (El País, February 17, 1987; Cambio 16, February 9, 1987; Diari de Barcelona, May 30, 1987). What may be equally important in perceptual terms is the circumstance that many non-Europeans are likely to be working (as distinct from vacationing), moving through the country as rapidly as possible (using Spain as a bridge between France and Morocco), or living in the poorest neighborhoods. Estimates of how many of these immigrants lack the necessary legal documentation range from a low of 72,000 to a high of 300,000 (El País [international edition], May 28, 1990; El País [international edition], March 25, 1991; El País, July 8, 1991). Numbers apart -- and non-Europeans are certainly visible in some districts of Barcelona -- the constraints and limitations noted above work to limit the possibilities of easy interaction between the average Barcelona student and this type of foreign resident.

I am not suggesting that poverty and marginality are as distant from the lived experience of the schoolchildren I worked with as the problems of the inner city are, apparently, to many contemporary suburban youths in the United States. The residential pattern of Barcelona is more compact than that of a comparable American metropolis and, furthermore, several of my informants were of working class background or came from families of poor peasant origin. What is striking, though, is the extent to which racial minorities, as distinct from poor people in general, are externalized in social and cultural terms. Some of this comes through directly in the language of categorization: "them" (the entity under discussion) in counterposition to "us" (Catalans or Spaniards). Thus, students told me on several occasions that they personally had nothing against Arabs, but that, of course, "they" would have to become more like "us" if they expected to live harmoniously in Spain. Probing
the matter further, I received a variety of explanations ranging from the general "they have very different customs" to specific observations on hygiene and the treatment of women in Islamic societies. Very little of this commentary was based on first hand experience, and most of it was obviously drawn from the common fund of ethnic and racial stereotypes.

One of the interesting features of this position is that the desired shifts in styles of life (however we may assess an assimilationist perspective) are in reality very difficult to achieve for the individuals being urged to make them. Leaving aside the special situation of illegal aliens, many who have the requisite papers, blacks and Arabs especially, are forced to live an existence severely constrained by what French sociologists term "soft" apartheid: a system of unofficial residential and workplace segregation. One might also add that apart from some wealthy Arab visitors (mostly members of the Moroccan elite and sojourners from the Persian Gulf), Arabs and Africans are nearly all poor, often exceedingly so. What this entails in structural terms is populations composed chiefly of people working at menial tasks; that is, collectivities with very reduced middle class components. Inongo-vi-Makomé (1990), who has written the first major testimony of the African diaspora in Spain, takes special note of the ubiquity of unconscious racism in Spain and, very much a related matter, of how difficult it is for blacks to occupy other than subordinate positions. He is no doubt correct that many Spaniards are simply unable to imagine blacks -- and particularly black women -- filling roles of prestige and authority in Iberian society. It is certainly true that the new immigrant populations as a whole (with the exception of Latin Americans), can count on very few gatekeeper individuals, people not only skilled in the ways of the dominant society, but also enjoying a measure of prestige and position in it. This situation is bound to reinforce segregation and mute the immigrant voice.49

Perhaps because there is, indeed, so little direct contact with such groups and populations, children project on them all manner of qualities and attributes. This became very evident during carnival celebrations at "Valle Inclán." Sufficient to note here that even in the ambit of a school-organized festivity, carnival retains its characteristic as a ritual of reversal and an
opportunity for sanctioned license. To be more specific, the kids took over the school, carried out their plans (a day devoted to loud popular music, a "feast," many practical jokes, the subtle and not-so-subtle mocking of authority, and the production of various skits) while the adults -- who, of course, understood their roles perfectly well -- were expected to take all these doings in good grace and act the parts assigned to them.

This day of high jinks and moderated misrule was simply one variant of the many forms of carnival found throughout the Latin world (see Caro Baroja 1965; Gilmore 1975; Brandes 1988). What is significant for our immediate purpose is that each class of children planned how they, as a group, would attire themselves and act, and that many of these personae can be said to represent "Others." A word of caution is in order at this point. It would be inappropriate to apply culturally-specific American notions of social propriety or ethnic sensitivity to these events and to the fantasies that they encapsulate.

One class of eleven- and twelve-year olds, boys as well as girls, dressed themselves up as fortune-tellers/Gypsies, which by the nature of the role entailed that the boys had to wear skirts as well as bras amply stuffed with cotton. Hilariously funny in context, particularly when the boys came in for a tremendous amount of ribbing from the girls. Another group, somewhat younger, attired themselves as "savages," which meant not only black tights and black-face for everybody, but also a wicked assortment of mock weapons.

What is one to make of such productions? The "savage" girls who surrounded me -- stereotyped grass skirts, bones through frizzy hair, shields ornamented with "fierce" designs, and spears at the ready -- and told me that I was next for the pot (after their teacher!) were acting out a light-hearted ritual of reversal and portraying not real people but a fantasy of power. But, obviously, at some level, they were also tapping into a series of very old ideas and beliefs that linked blackness with geographical and cultural distance (thus appropriate for this scenario), ferocity, perhaps even anarchy. In short, they could utilize a series of culturally coded messages that did not require further explication.

When, some days later, I discussed the matter of these exotic portrayals
with a small group of older students at another school, I was told that "savages" and "cannibals" were standard figures in childish masquerade, that the components of the costume could be easily purchased in toy stores and other shops, and that these figures were not meant to represent anything more than make-believe "wild" people, "such as in adventure stories of jungles and desert islands." Clearly, it was all meant to be taken as innocent merriment. For my part, I am sure that the children (and the adults) never thought that such portrayals might cause anyone distress or injury. Granted these good intentions, it can hardly be doubted that people of color, and black Africans especially, are likely -- even in Spain -- to see matters in a different light. What needs to be addressed is why this possibility was apparently not entertained.

I believe that part of the answer has to be sought in the repertoire of common themes and images. Television and print advertising, for example, not only restricts itself to the use of models that are phenotypically European, but within this range heavily favors the tall, the blond, and the fair skinned. I would say that this is an old theme in new guise, but one that has been reinforced by the economic power of northern countries and their role in mass consumption. In contraposition to this association of whiteness with the good things of life, is the circumstance that many tropical products sold in Spain (coffee, cocoa, rum, etc.) continue to carry labels with what we may term "colonial" connotations. One brand of chocolate products, for example, sports a label depicting a file of loin-clothed black porters, loads balanced on their heads, making their way through the tropical forest. Among the messages being projected, is that of a distant continent inhabited by distant people; in short, a context that is exotically separated from everyday life in Spain.

Perhaps the most egregious representation of the exotic other is provided by "Conguitos," a popular brand of chocolate covered peanuts. The logotype for this candy is a naked infantile black figure ("-ito" is a diminutizing suffix joined to "Congo") with stereotyped black physical characteristics and wielding -- very much like the schoolchildren at the carnival -- the regulation spear. The company also gives away "Conguito" dolls as premiums.50 Russell (1991), who has studied the image of the black other in contemporary Japanese mass culture, argues that in Japan such representations are linked both to
Western graphic conventions, some of which "may have passed out of usage in the West itself" (Russell 1991:21), and to questions of identity and racial hierarchy. In a manner not unlike Japan, Spain has been influenced by American films and other vehicles depicting blackness and primitiveness. Also -- again there are some interesting parallels with Japan -- in part because of geographical location (the European periphery), in part because of an earlier history of relative poverty and economic dependency, Iberian societies have had to confront and manage a whole set of contradictions respecting their own status vis-a-vis an idealized West. The French, after all, long claimed that "Africa begins at the Pyrenees."

Distancing phenomena such as Sambo imagery, or the association of Arabs and Gypsies with a world that is exotic and remote, function to reproduce social stratification and reinforce the hierarchical positioning of subordinate groups (Reed-Danahay and Anderson-Levitt 1991:557). What we have, fundamentally, is a situation where, as Williams (1989:430) has noted, "the metaphors and prototypes that express our understandings of person and group in the identity formation process of nation building" are linked to stereotypes of cultural and biological identities; some individuals or groups are perceived to fit the the appropriate national category (or categories), others do not. One way of handling this lack of fit is to exclude from the conceptual mainstream elements defined as culturally unsuitable or even as racially dangerous.

It is a process that can be seen to operate at many levels ranging from advertising to children's carnival activities, and from the concerns of intellectuals to the offerings of prime-time television. An excellent example of the latter, in fact, was recently provided by a highly popular television program, *La vida en un xip* ("Life in a [micro]chip"), which follows the fortunes and vicissitudes of a fictional "ordinary" family (they own a cafe) and uses the weekly episode, usually elaborated around a problem or a dilemma, to introduce an important ethical or social issue. Following the episode, the matter is first addressed by a panel of "experts" and/or specially interested parties, and then opened up to debate and commentary by the studio audience.

The show of particular significance for our discussion addressed issues
of racism and prejudice in contemporary Spain/Catalonia, and was advertised as such. Among the studio audience was a substantial representation of North Africans and several blacks. The high point of the evening came when a young black woman responded to a particularly bigoted youth by noting that she was not the "problem" (much of the debate had been structured around the concept of the "immigrant problem"), but that he most certainly was. From this she went on to develop a more general critique, essentially making the point that Spanish society needed to reexamine itself and not be deluded into assuming that its social problems were of external derivation. Her comments carried particular weight since they were spoken in Catalan, which implicitly defined her as a legitimate member of the national collectivity; in short, one with the right to speak as an insider.

The privileged nature of her observations was not lost on the audience which was forced to confront the conundrum posed by a conceptual outsider using the symbolically-powerful in-group language to present the case for a change in in-group attitudes and perceptions. She was listened to with rapt attention (almost awe) and received an enthusiastic ovation when she ended her commentary. Her remarks generated considerable debate, including the observation that it was "remarkable" that this young black woman spoke Catalan so well while many "immigrants" from southern Spain continued to speak only Castilian after decades of living in Catalonia. This line of argument promised to open up the "who is a Catalan" debate, the dangerous forbidden ground examined earlier in this section. Not surprisingly, the moderator cut off a discussion ("not relevant," "too political") that would explicitly compare the phenomenon of internal migration (mostly from southern Spain) with the more recent experience of extra-European migration (mostly from Africa).

Even with these limitations, it was clear that for many people (and this was remarked on by several members of the studio audience), the program offered a rare opportunity to begin to think about their society in other than conventional terms. At the same time, however, there was considerable resistance to the unpalatable notion that racism was present and flourishing in the Spanish state; in truth, some who protested strongly that they, their friends, or the nation, were not prejudiced did so in language that revealed not
only the inadequacy of conceptual frames, but also deep-seated fears and unresolved contradictory emotions.\textsuperscript{52}

This unique program, one that surely would have been useful in stimulating classroom and individual discussion, was aired after the period of fieldwork, but the underlying attitudes and perceptions (particularly those of ambivalence) manifested by a substantial number of its participants are fully consistent with what I often encountered among my young respondents. As previously noted, the press, including "serious" publications, frequently reinforces an image of the non-European, especially the African, as being both dangerous and properly belonging to another conceptual universe.\textsuperscript{53} Much the same process of externalization of non-European populations was evident in the media coverage of what came to be known as "the affair of the veil" -- the polemic that convulsed the French educational establishment on the matter of whether Muslim (which in virtually all instances meant Maghrebi) girls should be allowed to wear head-scarves within the precincts of French secular schools. What is interesting about this question is the degree of attention it received in the Spanish media and how the demands/requests of a handful of families were often portrayed as posing a threat to the rule of reason (as distinct from "obscurantism"), the advances of feminism, the structure of secular education, and even the foundations of republicanism and democracy. Granted that the issue is a complex one that involves several conflicting notions of right and legitimacy, the matter of proportion is certainly pertinent. Were these schoolgirls really the advance guard of Islamic fundamentalism? Did they have the potential of so distorting and contaminating the wellsprings of Western education that it was necessary to bar them from the classroom? Was the correct response of teachers to threaten -- and in some cases to undertake -- strike actions? The answers to these and other questions are probably much less important than the fact that the drama and all its subplots were closely followed in Spain; certainly, both text (religious/cultural observance) and context (the schools and their socializing role) reinforced the sense of threat from the little-known, and even less understood, world of Islam.\textsuperscript{54}

Students of Iberian culture might respond at this juncture that there
are also sundry popular images of "blackness" or "darkness" that are anything but negative. The Virgin of Montserrat, most powerful and most esteemed of the Catalan supernatural patrons, is, after all, a black Virgin ("la moreneta"); the most popular of the Magi in the Epiphany celebrations is the one traditionally depicted as a black king; and, in somewhat the same domain of the magical, there are numerous "black" and/or "Moorish" gegants, the "giants" (generally portrayed as imposing regal couples) that symbolically represent particular towns, cities, or parishes in Catalan civic rituals. All of which is true, but these are images safely distanced from everyday life. Equally far is an extensive repertoire of popular theatre and traditional song, including the Catalan sailors' songs known as havaneras (from Havana), that often romanticize the remote and exotic. In summary, images of this type tend to project a particular type of alterity: magical and supernatural, distant and exotic and, perhaps most important of all, safely "domesticated."

The formal structures of instruction do little to challenge the received ideas I have been discussing in this section. My own impression is that the major problem lies less in the absence of a multicultural curriculum, as the term is commonly understood in the United States (although a broadening of the boundaries of knowledge certainly would be helpful), than in a failure to address the reality and social costs of marginality, especially immigrant marginality, in contemporary Iberian society. The best texts and study guides do take note of the fact that the world we live in is characterized by diversity and conflictivity, but most of the cases used to illustrate this position seem to be external, such as the fate of Turkish workers in Germany, the presence of apartheid in South Africa, and life in the favela slums of Rio de Janeiro and other Brazilian cities (Freixenet i Mas et al. 1986: 9, 14-16). The curricular materials and course guides produced by the Departament d'Ensenyament of the Generalitat stress the momentous social and economic changes -- often painful -- that the country has experienced since 1945, but without reference that I could detect to migration from other countries. The professional social science literature, including anthropology, has also paid but limited attention to marginal or minority populations in Spain or to recent shifts in immigration (see Giner 1990 and Cucó and Pujadas 1989).
Given this apparent lack of concern for the changing composition of Spanish society (all the more remarkable if we keep in mind the process of Western European integration), it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the schools in Barcelona are faithfully reflecting a general process that entails a good deal of distancing and denial. What is absent is not only a reasoned and sympathetic account of the culture of some of Spain's nearest North African neighbors -- a task that might be initiated with a limited expenditure of resources -- but a perspective on Spanish society, contemporary and historical, which gives voice to cultures and collectivities that today find scant refuge in the texts and little attention in classroom discussion. In the next and concluding chapter I examine some of the factors that would appear to have contributed to this situation, in particular what might be called the unstated limits on discourse and knowledge.
The Gramscian paradigm fundamentally addresses the relationship between political and economic power on the one hand, and a continuum of group and individual responses to such power on the other. These responses include resistance and opposition, but more commonly entail gradations of acquiescence from passive consent to absolute commitment. In many respects, the issues that Gramsci treats fall squarely into the cultural domain, for instance his concern with language and its uses, and more specifically, the recognition that "every language contains the elements of a conception of the world" (Femia 1987:44). It is from this position that he is able to examine the hegemonic function of language and the degree to which the acceptance of cultural assumptions fixes the terms of discourse and impedes the expression of heretical ideas.

In contrast, what we may term mainstream Marxist interpretations (which certainly come in a variety of forms) are given to economic and materialist primacy, the assumption being that the task of the interpreter or analyst is to strip away the façade of culture to reach the underlying economic foundations of power. Taken to its logical conclusions, such an approachempties culture of any explanatory value: culture is perceived as epiphenomenal, a manifestation of false consciousness. Indeed, very often, materialist interpretations are much more concerned with the boundaries of (and between) cultural systems than with the content or meaning of cultural domains. The Gramscian perspective is not only much more explicitly political, but actually reverses the standard base-superstructure relationship by insisting that systems of power are embedded in underlying cultural orders, the task of the analyst being to understand how these hegemonic systems are constructed, controlled, manipulated and transmitted by those groups and classes who exercise political and economic dominance.

The utility of the Gramscian approach, I would argue, goes considerably further than the value it assigns to cultural domains and ideological formations. It is also a very sophisticated model of particular
relevance for those engaged in the interpretation of modern societies; that is to say, societies characterized by cleavages and contradictions, often with extreme internal antagonisms, and in many instances enjoying a far from secure sense of corporate unity. In societies of this type, the hegemonic process does not resolve the underlying structural problems, but rather, it functions to make the crisis much less manifest.

An approach informed by hegemony also has the virtue that it focusses attention on the relational and social character of systems of power in a clearer and more direct manner than do such concepts as dominant culture or ideological reproduction. As Kinsman (1991:105) has phrased it, "it suggests how social regulation is actively accomplished by individuals in diverse institutional sites and is something that is always 'problematic'."

One critically important hegemonic mechanism is intellectual, specifically the power of state and capital (through institutional pressures and other inducements) to influence and manage intellectual agendas. Even if there is no direct state control over intellectual activity, the elite is in a very strong position when it comes to what Gramsci terms "the battle of ideas." To the degree that intellectuals consciously or unconsciously reflect and project the world-view of the ruling class, this will work to delegitimize not only overt opposition, but also what we may call alternative cultural/social readings. The relevance of these insights for an understanding of educational systems (especially highly centralized and bureaucratized ones) should be evident.

Gramsci's major focus was the capitalist society of his time, but we should remember that his ideas were developed in a particular historical context -- an Italy which had achieved political unification not much more than half a century earlier, a land with extreme class and regional inequalities, a society which was still attempting to respond to all the stresses of recent industrialization. For many in Italy -- some fearing and others hoping -- the potential for social disintegration seemed ever-present. Given these circumstances, it is not so surprising that the Italian economic and political directorate, including the monarchy, rather willingly acquiesced to the fascist takeover (Mack Smith 1989; Stille 1991). Fascism, of course, promised a number of supposedly valuable benefits. For the state, it offered an
image of modernization and, so it was claimed, a rightful place at the table of the great powers; internally, the myth was that of a social and political order free of discord.

Gramsci, coming of political age in this environment, and very much a product of the tensions found in Italian society, at times seemed to be the advocate of personal liberty, at others favoring "totalitarian" solutions which, in the last analysis, were bound to lead to absolutist control by the party-state -- in short, a hegemonic structure erected and controlled by a Communist political elite. However we interpret the extensive -- and certainly not always internally consistent -- Gramscian corpus, one feature comes through very clearly: the ubiquity of power relations and the extent to which these relations are mediated, maintained and perpetuated by systems of knowledge that faithfully reflect elite domination.

If I have gone some lengths to outline the Gramscian paradigm, it is because I feel it offers valuable insights on political and social processes in Spain. Spain and Italy share a number of significant historical and structural characteristics. Perhaps most obviously, they formed part (and in some measure still do) of Europe's southern periphery -- countries of relatively late industrialization and attendant social dislocations and transformations. Not unrelated to this economic marginality has been the previously noted propensity for economic and social elites to espouse, or at least not oppose, various forms of dictatorial and quasi-dictatorial rule (a situation with obvious parallels in Portugal and Greece). Possibly less evident to outside observers is the circumstance that in both Spain and Italy the burden of history takes the form a particularly onerous -- and often destabilizing -- combination of past glories and past catastrophes. I would add one other common ingredient: the tendency for intellectuals to search for all-encompassing, even absolutist, solutions to social and political problems. For many generations the root political paradigm in Spain was more often than not derived from the French experience, and especially from that process of state reconstruction that attended the French Revolution. France, it was hoped, could provide models of and models for modernity applicable to a broad spectrum of issues ranging from the rational organization of the state bureaucracy to the elaboration of a
contemporary sense of nationhood. The essential point is that while the emancipatory legacy of the Revolution is not in question, as a cultural and intellectual movement it tended to be intolerant of diversity and dissent. Equally important for our purposes, this radical experiment in applied social change provided the original case example of modern, as distinct from patrimonial, state absolutism.58

What I am suggesting is that historically the political and social theories of greatest currency in Spain (and in Italy) have stressed a dirigiste role for the state; emphasized the centrality of a guiding, politically inspired, elite; and tended to foster a conflation of state culture and national culture. In these constructs, the underlying assumption is that the state can and should be in the business of cultural formation (especially through the educational system) and that the "culture" in question should satisfy some fixed criteria of orthodoxy or uniformity. At this juncture, readers might reasonably respond that all state systems and associated intellectual establishments are engaged in essentially in the same task. Perfectly true, but the state apparatus may be more or less intrusive and the cultural politics be more or less hegemonic. For reasons we shall discuss below, in Spain the desire of the state directorate to control has seldom been matched by its capacity to put into practice the necessary policies.

I would argue that this directorate has pretty consistently regarded evidence of cultural pluralism as much more of a danger than as a challenge or opportunity. Such an attitude is already very evident in early modern times, especially as the Habsburg system of empire and absolutism come under increasing pressure. The political fragility and economic backwardness of Spain for much of the last two centuries helped to entrench these fears; for their part, the models of state and society discussed above gave legitimacy to a view of the political and cultural order offering, at best, a reduced conceptual space to minority cultures and competing visions of the nature and place of the state.

This stress on hegemony -- various manifestations of orthodoxy, centralization, and control -- should not hide from us the reality of a much greater degree of internal diversity and dissent, often of outright resistance to
established authority, than may be apparent from a superficial consideration of the Spanish past (Sahlins 1989). It is not unreasonable, in fact, to argue that historically the hegemonic process has often taken on the characteristics of an elite response to sundry counter-hegemonic tendencies and forces. As a particularly well documented case, one can cite the early seventeenth century sense of crisis and beleaguerment, what Elliott (1963: 294) describes as "not only a time of crisis, but a time also of the awareness of crisis -- of a bitter realization that things had gone wrong." This perception of a deep societal disorder brought to the fore all manner of reformers (arbitristas) who set themselves the task of analyzing the ills of society and advancing plans and projects designed to cure the "sickness"; generally, the proposed prescriptions called for a stronger dose of authoritarianism. From that time onwards, we can follow a national debate about "decline," some analysts insisting that what the country needed was sufficient "willpower," "discipline" and "vision," others claiming that the only salvation lay in modernization and "Europeanization."

It is particularly vital to have at least some sense of the contested nature of hegemony in Spain since the tradition of British popular historical interpretation, which most English-speaking peoples have inherited, paints an altogether different picture of uniformity and fanaticism. In reality, there has at most times been a goodly distance between the sweeping authority of the state and its abilities to apply all the intimidating powers that it may enjoy on paper. The reasons for this disparity are various and include a history of competing jurisdictions and competing loyalties, and perhaps something equally important -- the strong disinclination of Spaniards to relinquish their personal and corporate autonomy, shall we say their right to make judgments and act accordingly, to the state and its agents; in Gramscian jargon, they are people little prone to "state worship" (Femia 1981:172, 176).

Numerous observers of the Spanish scene have remarked on this characteristic and how it manifests itself in different ways. At times there may be a quite explicit recognition of the limits of power but, as in the well-known Spanish saying, "the law is obeyed but not fulfilled", the myth of authority is not directly challenged; in other circumstances, stresses and contradictions
exacerbate those "cracks in the collective texture of the country" which de
Madariaga (1943:26) and many others since his time have drawn attention to,
and the result is confrontation, even conflict. Spain, we would do well to
remember, has been the only European country in which anarchism -- an
ideology which equally rejects the power of capital, the structures of state
control, and the authority of hierarchical religion -- ever achieved the status of
a mass political and social movement. Expressing the matter differently, what
we must be attentive to in any discussion of the workings of hegemony in Spain
are the enormous pressures that often lurk under the surface, and how these
have led to periodic anti-authoritarian outbreaks and mobilizations.

Does this circumstance have a bearing on the way that the "absent
others" of the title, and the complex issues they raise, are dealt with in and out
of school? In theory it should, since in the last analysis what we are discussing
is the degree to which opinions, ideas, and perspectives that question the
comfort of established verities receive something more than pro forma
attention. Unfortunately, and granted the strong contestatorial tradition
outlined above, there are numerous devices that restrict discussion of such
matters and topics, especially in the classroom. We have examined some of
these mechanisms in detail and there is no need to go over the same ground
once more, but fundamentally, they all function to offer an image of society --
past and present -- in which conflict and contradiction, greed and power,
bigotry and hate, play remarkably little part. As noted earlier, to the degree
that such issues are considered, they are more often than not seen as
particularly applicable to other societies or to a time long removed from the
present.

Intellectually, such an approach is bound to impoverish the
curriculum in ways both direct and indirect. A couple of instances can serve
as illustration. One can readily understand, for instance, why Spaniards today
(particularly in their new-found role as modern "Europeans"), ponder but little
about their imperial past. In truth, from the time of the first wars of
independence in the Americas, through the loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the
Philippines in 1898, to the final evacuation of Spanish forces from the Sahara
in 1975, the general thrust of colonial history has been a disastrously
unsuccessful attempt to hold onto territory in the interests of what is generally termed "national honor." All rather depressing, but to write off five centuries of colonialism is not only too simple, it also assures the loss of valuable lessons and insights. This is very much at the core of Octavio's Paz's complaint (interview in *El País*, April 1, 1990) that "Spain ignores [Latin] America" and his further observation that it is "very curious that there does not exist a single modern important Spanish essay on Mesoamerica." The point is well-taken, and certainly neither ancient Mesoamerica nor the colonial period receive more than perfunctory coverage in the schools. Is this absence of interest important? I would suggest that the loss is, in fact, substantial for several reasons, and not the least because the issues of justice and equality so central in today's Latin American discourse were first articulated in the sixteenth century by such powerful Spanish humanists as Bartolome de las Casas and Francisco de Vitoria. Indeed, the title of las Casas' masterpiece, The Destruction of the Indies (1552), has all too contemporary a ring.

If Latin America receives limited attention, discussion of Morocco, Spain's last significant colonial holding, is even more sketchy. Again, without getting into too much detail, it is important to point out some of the special dimensions of the case. The decolonization of Morocco is quite recent (1956), but more than this, Morocco played a vital (if unwitting) role in the attempt of the Spanish oligarchy, in this century and the last, to claim for Spain the status of a significant European power. The military, political, and rhetorical work of colonial domination followed the usual pattern (Driessen 1987; for a comparison with French Algeria see Alloula 1986), but with the distinction that colonial affairs intruded very directly into Spanish life. It was in Morocco that the professional military nurtured a disdain for everything "political," and it was from Morocco that the military uprising that initiated the Civil War was launched.

While the plans of the generals and the logistics of the war receive coverage in text and classroom, virtually nothing is said respecting the Moroccans themselves, besides the important fact that much of the "Army of Africa" -- the spearhead of the coup -- was composed of Regulares, Moroccan levies; by the end of the war, some 70,000 Moroccan troops had served in the
Nationalist army (Alpert 1984: 219, 224). In popular imagery, all that remains of this episode are anecdotes of cruelty and barbarism, a memory certainly reinforced by wartime propaganda. In short, Franco's moros, as they are generally thought of, continue to be viewed strictly as African mercenaries, and not as the products of a colonial policy expressly designed to destroy the political independence and the subsistence base of the Riffian tribes.

Schools could certainly address some of these issues, and with profit. For instance, it is not too extreme to view the Moroccans in the Nationalist army as the precursors of today's immigrants, filling a similar subordinate role in the ethnic division of labor; it is also perfectly appropriate to consider the degree to which present day prejudice against Africans is rooted in the Civil War experience; and it is certainly within the scope of more advanced students to consider why the Republican government, fighting a long and bloody war against fascism, never offered independence to the inhabitants of Spanish Morocco.63

The point made earlier in this essay, that since Spain had lost its major overseas colonies during the nineteenth century the country did not experience the typical Western European end-of-empire crisis in this one, remains valid; what is important regarding Moroccan colonial history is the extent to which the country -- and its people -- continue to carry negative associations because of the Civil War and an earlier sequence of events and situations. Thus, in the collective memory, Morocco is still very much the place where thousands of Spanish conscripts lost their lives in a series of highly unpopular colonial campaigns.

Morocco, North Africa, Islam, and moros, constitute a cluster of categories and associations that few Spaniards and few Catalans are indifferent to; attitudes tend to be quite firmly delineated and, consequently, opinions -- typically negative -- are readily expressed. In contrast, there is no similar firm configuration respecting the native peoples of the Americas, historical or contemporary, probably because they are generally represented as the exotic inhabitants of an exotic environment. Somewhere between strongly-held opinion (whether negative or positive) and a certain invisibility lies the categorical and attributional space inhabited by Jews and, in
particular, by the historical Sephardic community.

It is in part to this question of conceptual place that Shlomo Ben-Ami (1990), distinguished historian and former Israeli ambassador to Spain, turns his attention. Essentially, he points to a rupture, a violent historical separation, that put an end to a dynamic and pluralistic medieval Iberian culture. As he notes,

In reality, it is not easy to trace a clear line of demarcation between Jewish culture and Arab culture in medieval Spain. The symbiosis was immense; without going any further, Jewish medieval literature was profoundly marked by the linguistic, stylistic and thematic influences of the great Arab literature (1990:10).

The end of what he describes as "the coexistence (convivencia) of the three historical civilizations of the Iberian peninsula" was, he notes, a tragedy for all concerned. The Jews, persecuted and expelled, lost a homeland: Sefarad -- the name they gave to Spain -- where Jewish culture achieved a brilliance "probably only comparable to that of Jewish Vienna at the end of the [last] century"; the separation also did much to sever the links between what we now call the West and Islam; and an intellectually reduced Spain began a process of modern state-building by rejecting much -- primarily diversity -- that would have made it more pluralistic, indeed, more "modern."

The moral, essentially, is the high price paid for narrowness of vision and bigotry, all very much part of hegemonic structures of thought, although Ben-Ami is quick to point out that "historiography is not a tribunal to bring past times to trial; nor is the historian, however well documented, a judge" (Ben-Ami 1990:9). But this is not to deny that history instructs, and the author asks his reader to reflect upon what, in fact, will be commemorated when Spaniards, and much of the Western world, mark the Columbian Quincentennial; as he says, one will be able to find "versions and concepts to suit all tastes."

It is, of course, appropriate, even necessary, to take careful note of the pain and the loss during this time of mythic remembrance. But beyond memory, the events and circumstances of half a thousand years ago also have
a particular pertinence to what is happening today in Spain and throughout Europe. Most obviously -- and very much keeping in mind the enormous changes and upheavals that have continued to rock Central Europe and the former Soviet Union in the four years since the dismantling of the Berlin Wall -- we are seeing a conjunction of liberalization, political self-determination and renovation, uncomfortably joined to ethnic conflict, policies of exclusion, growing racial prejudice and nationalistic chauvinism. Europe has the potential of regaining its centrality in a post-Cold War world (it is geographically and historically well positioned to do so), but only if material advances are linked to actions and ideologies based on genuine democracy and pluralistic values. This Europe, "from the Atlantic to the Urals," not only can transform itself, but extend a hand to the less privileged areas of the world -- including the inhabitants of its own internal peripheries. Unfortunately, as a French observer notes, "in the shadow there is another Europe, one dominated by the return of its past evil genius, fatally attracted by the dark temptations of xenophobia, racism and jingoism, desperately searching for its identity and using exclusion of others to express its inner fears" (Moïsi 1990). As an antidote, she asks that Europeans move beyond the issues of economics, politics and traditional security concerns, to what she terms the "moral dimension," and within this sphere, a conscious effort to reexamine the past:

The treatment of its past will be decisive for Europe's future. Countries cannot move forward without impunity if they are not reconciled with their past and, specifically, with their collective responsibility (Moïsi 1990).

How well is this being done in Spain -- and by extension, in Spanish schools? A reasonable answer is that the record is mixed. As noted earlier, a sense that the historic Sephardic community -- at that time the largest and most prosperous Jewish community in Europe -- had been the victim of a most grave injustice has long informed educated (and to some degree even popular) thinking in Spain. In more recent times, Spain has been a Jewish place of refuge, as was the case during the Balkan wars and especially during the Holocaust. In the course of the past two decades, the Jewish community in Spain has increased in numbers, recognition and visibility, and part of this
visibility can be measured in the growing bibliography on Sephardic themes (El País [Temas], March 26, 1992; Marcias 1991).

Three years ago, Spain's most prestigious prize, the Premio Principe de Asturias, was awarded, as a form of symbolic reparation, to the 700,000 Sephardic Jews around the world. The response of Samuel Toledano, secretary general of the Spanish federation of Jewish communities, is worth quoting: "I am greatly satisfied by this reparation for the injustice done our ancestors 500 years ago. But it is also a tribute that Spain is paying itself. It's a re-encounter with its own past, its own identity" (The New York Times, June 3, 1990). At the ceremony, Prince Felipe de Borbón accompanied the presentation with these words: "From the spirit of concord of the Spain of today, and as the heir of those who 500 years ago signed the decree of expulsion, I receive you with open arms and with great emotion" (El País [international edition], October 22, 1990). A year later, King Juan Carlos came to New York to receive the 1991 Humanitarian Award of the Elie Wiesel Fundation for Humanity. He was lauded for his firm commitment to democracy and for his role in helping to negotiate a Constitution that establishes the separation of church and state (The New York Times, October 5, 1991). On the quincentenary of the edict banishing the Jews (March 31, 1992), King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia, accompanied by President Haim Herzog of Israel, attended a solemn ceremony in the Madrid synagogue. In his declaration, the King paid homage to the long-exiled Jewish community and said that Sefarad was "no longer nostalgia" because the country was once again their home. As to history and the past, he said that "It may seem odd to choose the anniversary of a separation for a meeting of such profound significance," but that "the history of all people and, without doubt, that of Spain, if full of lights and shadows" (El País, April 1, 1992; La Vanguardia, April 1, 1992; Avui, April 1, 1992; The New York Times, April 1, 1992). For its part, the Catalan Parliament passed a motion declaring the expulsion of the Jews in 1492 to have been "an act of religious intolerance and civil injustice" and recognizing the importance of the Jewish presence in Catalonia (Avui, April 3, 1992, June 10, 1992).

In summary, there is convincing evidence that both official Spain and Spanish society as a whole are committed to recognizing a historical injustice.
With this there goes a willingness to express a sense of responsibility -- however delayed -- for a truly horrendous catalog of persecution and obloquy. The gesture of welcoming the Sephardim back to their ancestral homeland carries profound political and symbolic implications. What is at issue is not simply the past, but the reformulation the national memory. As is always the case when this takes place, the substantial reshaping of the national past necessarily entails the remaking of the national present and the national future. In particular, the sense of a plural past should help to reinforce the legitimacy of a pluralistic present. What I find particularly hopeful and valuable in the current discourse regarding Spain's Jewish past is that this engagement helps Spaniards avoid the comfortable conclusion that anti-Semitism is fundamentally a modern phenomenon emerging from the stresses of modernization and industrialization; in short, an experience that Spain largely avoided. The recognition -- often quite explicit in the writing of contemporary intellectuals -- that the anti-Judaism of the Middle Ages was not only a unique evil sustained over many centuries, but should be interpreted as ancestral to modern forms of anti-Semitism, is surely an important contribution to the building of a more just society.

Although anti-Semitism continues to be found in Spain, and sometimes takes strange forms, it is hardly a flourishing ideology. The schools, as noted earlier, have generally neglected the history of Spanish Jewry, and this neglect is very evident in the textbooks, publications that, in Spain as in most other countries, seldom mirror recent developments in social or historical thought. The most obvious changes have been at the top, and I would not underestimate the long-term political and cultural consequences of this willingness to confront, rather than suppress, the history of a particularly European, better said, Christian, design of prejudice and persecution.

It is, of course, perfectly germane to note that the Jewish community in Spain is still tiny (there are some 15,000 practicing Jews), that the Sephardim are commonly perceived as a severed part of the Spanish patria -- "the wandering Spain" -- and that at least since the French Revolution a powerful political current in Western Europe has advocated the granting of full civil rights and liberties to Jewish compatriots (Kates 1990). Spain, with particular
touches of its own, is thus staking its place within the tradition of Western liberalism.

There seems to be much less inclination, unfortunately, to address more recent injustices. One symbolically important example is the unwillingness of the government to make adequate compensation to the victims of Franco prisons and prison camps, an attitude that some have attributed to a readiness "to bury the past" (The New York Times, June 20, 1990). It is, of course, much more comfortable not to have to remember that numerous Spaniards spent a decade or more in the Iberian equivalent of the Gulag; that democracy still has debts and obligations to meet (El País, May 6, 1990).

Injustices from the Civil War and the Franco period are fixed in time and many of the victims are already fast disappearing from the scene (which, of course, should add a sense of urgency). The major current civil rights issue, the place of immigrants in Spanish society, is bound to grow in the years to come; Gypsies, while for the most part Spanish citizens, in many respects fit a conceptually similar structural category, and all the evidence indicates that they too are facing growing problems of harassment and prejudice. One of the interesting -- and disturbing -- features of the whole discourse on immigration is the change that has taken place in roles and perceptions, for until very recently Spain was a major country of emigration. Even if we don't take at full face value the observation made by the diplomat Alvarez del Vayo (1973:127) two decades ago that "in Geneva today one hears more Spanish spoken than French," it is certainly true that Spaniards formed an important component of the postwar "guest worker" migration to richer and more industrialized countries. Understandably, Spaniards as a whole were at that time conscious of the need to protect immigrant rights.

What has happened in the interval is that Spain has been transformed into a relatively prosperous country enjoying a standard of living that compares favorably to that of its neighbors. As one might expect, this circumstance has been attracting substantial immigration, much of it, as we have seen, from Africa. Immigrants claim, and ample documentation bears them out, that in Spain they face not only day-to-day abuse and prejudice, but
an official attitude that is hostile to outsiders, in particular to people of color. In 1990, a report by the European Commission in Brussels (hardly an anti-establishment body) strongly criticized the Spanish government for a failure to implement a humane immigration policy noting, among other shortcomings, "the restrictive clauses of the immigration law," and the "poverty, lack of housing, absence of educational opportunities and of health services" that are the lot of most Third World immigrants in Spain (for a full discussion of the EC report, see El País [international edition], May 28, 1990; also an earlier Cáritas (1987) report and La Vanguardia, February 17, 1987). Nor, as we noted in the preceding chapter, are the numbers inconsequential, although, by the very nature of the problem, statistics are problematic. The EC study gives a total of just under 800,000 foreigners in Spain (a somewhat larger figure than the estimate in most Spanish sources), with about half this number subject to what it terms "economic discrimination." The report is fully consistent with other available information. This includes the protests and appeals -- some 3,000 in the course of 1989 -- lodged with the Catalan Sindic de Greuges (an official ombudsman). In his annual report to the Catalan Parliament, the sindic took special note of the harshness and insensitivity of official legislation and of the policies and measures applied by municipalities to the detriment of minorities, including long-established Gypsy communities (El País, May 23, 1990). Finally, over 30,000 foreigners are detained by the police every year, and some 5,000 are expelled from the country. About one-third of each category are Moroccans (El País [international edition], June 11, 1990).

These figures, and the policies that they represent, offer us an insight into official thinking, and it is not particularly enlightened or progressive, although a recent amnesty could end up benefiting some 100,000 illegal immigrants (El País, December 16, 1991). Popular opinion may actually be more tolerant than government action: in a recent public opinion poll, just over 50 per cent of the respondents were in favor of permitting illegal immigrants to acquire legal residence, and about the same percentage supported an open door policy for political refugees (El País [international edition], June 11, 1990; see also surveys reported in The Guardian, October 4, 1991; The New York Times December 1, 1991). The overall picture, however, is anything but
satisfactory.

Fundamentally, it seems that many Spaniards are in the process of crystallizing a mind-set that increasingly defines "Europe" narrowly; or expressed differently, that what has been variously called "the European house of freedom" and "the common European home" will have exclusivity as one of its prime characteristics and, at least implicitly, a categorization substantially defined by race. Needless to say, this is not even a particularly accurate picture of what constitutes present-day Western Europe with its millions of citizens and residents of African and Asian origin, but the underlying assumption, that the coming [Western] "Europe without frontiers" should also be a body with well-nigh impenetrable external boundaries, is not much altered by the presence of South Asians in Britain, Turks in Germany, and North Africans in France. In all of this, the official Spanish attitude is really not much different from that found in the rest of the EC; a sad irony that Spain has realized in this manner its desire to be truly European.

Restrictive immigration policies are supported by a variety of official arguments and popular impressions. Very often invoked, as we discussed earlier, is the claim that immigrants reduce employment opportunities for Spaniards, although much of the work now done by immigrants would in all likelihood not be undertaken by natives (El País [international edition], December 17, 1990; Cambio 16, July-August 1990). The jobs argument -- especially when presented in "neutral" terms -- obscures a much deeper anxiety: a fear concerning the relationship of immigration to crime and to social marginality in general. The issue has been covered extensively in the press (La Vanguardia [Libros], January 12, 1990; El País [international edition], April 1, 1991; El País [international edition], October 14, 1991). The director of the Spanish Red Cross Center for Assistance to Foreigners is undoubtedly correct in his assessment that "people see refugees sleeping in the parks, and last summer some of them were caught selling drugs on the Plaza de España [Madrid], and they make stereotypical judgments" (Whitney 1991:8).

The matter, though, goes beyond the construction of simplistic popular perceptions. In Spain, as elsewhere in Europe, the last few years have witnessed an upsurge in anti-immigrant and anti-Gypsy violence, much of it
related to the actual or supposed criminal activities of members of these
groups. In a very recent episode, the townspeople of Mancha Real -- led by
the Socialist mayor, no less -- sacked and burned the houses of four Gypsy
families (another was torched some days later) after Gypsies were accused of
killing a bar owner. The Guardia Civil did nothing to protect Gypsy residents,
nor did it apprehend the incendiaries; shopkeepers refused to sell food to Gypsy
families (El País [international edition], May 27, 1991, and El País, July 5, 6,
and 13, 1991). In the aftermath of these events, a group in another town banded
together to form a "Payo [i.e. non-Gypsy] front" to fight "parasitical" Gypsies
reputedly involved in the drug traffic (El País, July 8, 1991). Some months
later, residents of larger communities, including a group from a district in
Barcelona, organized vigilante squads to chase out drug dealers and other
"undesirables" (El País [international edition], October 14, 1991).

The violence of these and similar cases calls for careful and considered
examination. I would agree with the columnist Rosa Montero (1991:48), who
wrote a piece appropriately titled Miedo ("Fear"), that it is much too
comfortable for readers to assume that the people of Mancha Real are "human
monsters" -- and hence, not really like the rest of us. She blames fear, noting
that "fear is a degrading sentiment that frustrates clear thinking," and goes
on to write that "I see racism grow in Europe, nourished by the insecurity of
our wellbeing, by the fear of the poor.... because the indigent come in millions.
They are copper-colored, black or brown. They are, above all, poorly-educated
and needy" (Montero 1991:48). She asks us to ponder how and why ordinary
villagers are transformed into a lynch mob; how one person's possible guilt
can be used to condemn a whole group. A palpable fear is evident in a very
recent Op-Ed piece written by Herrero de Miñon (1992:31), a conservative
Spanish parliamentarian. Taking an incongruous leaf from Karl Marx's
Manifesto, he insists that it is a "reality" and not a "specter" that "is haunting
Europe," and that its name is immigration. In his opinion, "this is a problem
that, in the long run, very seriously imperils the security and identity of our
society and, in more immediate terms, its democratic stability."

That this fear finds substantial resonance in Spanish society is hardly
in doubt. In fact, a similar combination of anxiety and xenophobia have
characterized anti-Gypsy and anti-immigrant violence from Poland to Spain (Miller 1991; The New York Times, March 24, July 25, November 24; November 27, 1991, February 9, 1992; El País, July 22, 1991). For the most part, governments have abdicated leadership, and the press has not always behaved much more valiantly. What, for instance, is one to make of the headline in the Barcelona daily, Avui (July 24, 1991) -- "Crimes in Catalonia would be reduced by one-third with the expulsion of five-hundred foreigners" -- other than a pandering to fear? As is so often the case, there is a lack of context, a lack of perspective, in these common reactions. Gypsy traffickers do exist, a Gypsy spokesman in Madrid concedes, "but they are a tiny minority. Drug trafficking is a problem that affects all Spanish society," an opinion supported by drug enforcement authorities (The New York Times, October 12, 1991).

Fundamentally, Gypsies and immigrants have become scapegoats for many of the current social and economic ills of Spanish society (a situation that again parallels that in many other European countries), and they can count on few mainstream defenders. The established parties of the left have not (as one might have hoped) moved to take up roles of advocacy and explanation, and neither have the autonomous governments. That this failure to sponsor the cause of those most on the margins of society raises contradictions for political organizations that define themselves as progressive, goes without saying; at another level, the failure of Spaniards as a whole to identify with such an important human rights issue has strained Spain's self-image as a humane and tolerant country. The newest variation on the immigration theme is the anxiety that a tide of immigrants might descend from Central Europe and the former Soviet Union (El País, September 30, 1991). In this case as well, Spain's reluctance to help in more than very limited ways, is similar to to the response of other Western European countries (Ash, Mertes and Moïsi 1991).

There are, however, some hopeful signs. Early in 1992, Spain witnessed its first massive demonstrations against racism. In the Barcelona demonstration, some 30,000 people paraded through downtown with a variety of banners and placards, including one that read "Stop Racism! For a Quality Multicultural Education." Other participants shouted, "Racism no, work yes,"
and -- the theme of the demonstration -- "Don't hurt my friend" (El País, February 22, 1992; Avui, February 24, 1992). More recently, following the murder of a Dominican immigrant in Madrid, there were further marches and demonstrations (El País [international edition], November 23, 1992).

These events illustrate a change that was just beginning to appear five years ago at the time of the study, what we may call a shift in paradigms and vocabularies. Historically -- certainly in recent history -- social and political classifications have been structured either on the basis of class or that of internal ethnicity and nationality. The important boundaries of power -- and this was very much the case in Barcelona -- were marked by class, and in particular by the on-going struggles of an emerging proletariat expressed through political resistance and popular ritual (Kaplan 1992). Race, per se, hardly figured in either popular or professional discussion. Class and nationality continue to be the prime measures of definition, but race, particularly in popular parlance, is entering the vocabulary, but still without very much of a sense of historical frame of reference (although this may be changing).

The result is that one finds both a reluctance to recognize racism -- "we are not racists" is a phrase that I have heard repeated countless times -- and the voicing of manifestly racist sentiments, often unrecognized as such by the speakers. Mainstream opinion has borrowed a great deal of the vocabulary that had previously been utilized to describe the metropolitan underclass and applied it without much change to recent immigrants. Itinerants and casual foreign workers, and marginals of one type or another, are commonly identified by a predictable repetition of negative terms: dirty, noisy, dangerous, criminal, drug-dealing, uncivil and uncivilized. There are, of course, some attributes of alterity that are novel, particularly those having to do with a reputed lack of hygiene: by now I have come across "the myth of the goat in the bath" on several occasions, for this is supposedly the locus of choice for Muslims to undertake the slaughter their goats.69

At the same time, many ordinary citizens are likely to insist that the fundamental problems in relation to immigration are those of employment security and public safety, and not really matters of race or culture, except, of
course, that foreigners must be willing to meet certain European standards. What I have been suggesting in these paragraphs is that the old idioms are no longer really adequate to express the shifts that are taking place in Spain and Catalonia; that the salient division of class is beginning to be modified by considerations of race which more accurately reflect a new set of economic and cultural inequalities.

To conclude, there are sundry societal problems and issues that could begin to be addressed as Spain finishes marking an anniversary with so many different, and for some still very painful, associations. The educational system, at all levels, has an unprecedented opportunity of relating past to present: the Columbian discovery of America (the initial step in European hegemony); the expulsion of the Jews; the conquest of Granada; the origins of royal despotism; the victory of religious intolerance -- but also the end of the Middle Ages and the beginnings of the modern world. As the Andre Sassoon, vice president of the International Jewish Committee's "Sepharad '92" expressed it with reference to the goal of his organization, "because of the Jewish experience as victims of intolerance and group hatred, we have learned and affirmed the virtues of coexistence, mutual respect and harmony between groups and nations" (The New York Times, October 25, 1990), words of obvious relevance to the changing face of Europe and to the racial and cultural reconfiguration that is taking place in Spain.

Indeed, the same sense of shared experience which Sassoon mentions has been making itself felt in Spain. I know that my friends and informants have been glued to their television sets as the catastrophe in the former Yugoslavia unfolds. In particular, the agony of Bosnia Herzegovina has touched a genuinely deep chord in the Spanish population. Some 10,000 families from all parts of the state have written to relief organizations and to the Spanish Foreign Ministry offering their homes to refugees. No response on the same scale has taken place in other parts of Europe. Spanish respondents explain their actions with reference to the experience of their families during the Spanish Civil War; as one woman phrased it, "What I've seen on TV of the war is what I have lived when I was 13 (The New York Times, December 27, 1992). Most of the refugees arriving in Spain are Bosnian Muslims, but a group
of Bosnian Sephardic Jews have settled in Catalonia (Avui, September 14, 1992). Clearly, at some level and for some people, the terrible Spanish past still has the capacity to mobilize action and sentiment.

My sense is that the teachers I worked with, given support, are psychologically and pedagogically up to the task of tackling new issues, of affirming the virtues of decency, coexistence and tolerance. As a profession, they strike me as considerably more autonomous and more secure in their role than American teachers are reported to be (Landes 1976:401; Sachar 1991; Brown 1991). There are serious problems, as indicated in several places in this study, with features of the instructional system and its underlying ideology; and, most obviously, the conceptual tools for explaining and analyzing the multicultural and interconnected aspects of the world that the children are growing up in are inadequate. Counterbalancing these debits is a strong anti-establishment, anti-hegemonic, tradition in the teaching profession, and something I encountered in all the schools -- a genuine desire to learn on the part of pupils and a commitment to education and its emancipatory values on the part of teachers. I regard it as hopeful that students from working-class backgrounds do not find it culturally necessary to repudiate the school environment, a rebelliousness that in the United States and in Britain has had the unintended consequence of limiting learning, foreclosing the possibilities of mobility, and hence helping to reproduce capitalist class relations (Willis 1981).

In Spain, education for the poor is still novel enough to be seen as a genuine door to opportunity and a better future. Furthermore, in my particular case, the working class children who were my respondents typically came from immigrant (southern Spanish) families, with all that this generally implies respecting positive attitudes towards education and work.

My sense is that growing national prosperity and higher living standards, if joined to appropriate fiscal and political policies, can indeed improve the quality of education at all levels, although these trends will certainly not alter the privileged role of private secondary schools -- at least not for a long time to come. While the educational system now being planned and discussed is not the one originally proposed by progressive political groups and
most of the teachers themselves, it is clearly far superior to the model inherited from the Franco regime. We should also note that, as a European Community country, all educational levels and standards will, in the years to come, be brought into parity with those of other member states. Fundamentally, this is good news for Spanish education and for Spanish children.

My main concern remains that of race and marginality in the Europe of the 1990s. Specifically, will their new-found place among the wealthy blind Spaniards, and in particular the next generation, to the many remaining internal and external iniquities? Will it deter them from questioning the new set of hegemonic premises that define Western Europe as a territory of privilege? Needless to say, even a partial answer to this question will require work among the new immigrant population, and perhaps in particular the younger people.
1. The past, quite evidently, is in demand. It is being commoditized through such instrumentalities as the concept of "heritage" and the simulated antiquity of locations like Williamsburg. Also, pasts are commonly perceived as the special patrimony of particular groups or classes. The success of Alex Haley's *Roots* (1977) is but the most obvious American example.

2. On the Gramscian approach see Femia (1981) and Hoffmann (1984). The case for analyzing history in terms of present requirements was particularly well articulated by Croce (1941:19): "however remote in time events... may seem to be, the history refers to present needs and present situations wherein these events vibrate." Contemporary cultural analysis utilizes a similar mode that stresses the dynamic, shifting, and even contested nature of cultural domains (Comaroff 1985; Geertz 1980; Appadurai 1966, 1988; Taussig 1980).

3. I did come across a political cartoon from 1886 in a history text. The cartoon is used to illustrate the poor opinion in which politicians were held in the nineteenth century. It shows four politicians dressed as Gypsies with the caption: "Changing governments makes no difference, they all fleece the country. One group is just as much Gypsies as the others" (Tangitanos són els uns com els altres) (Garcia et al. 1986:285). That Gypsies were used a century ago to represent criminality is not surprising, but that the stereotype is reproduced in a modern school text without further comment is a good measure of how little attitudes have changed.


5. Jordi Pujol, President of the Catalan Autonomous Government for the past decade, was one of those who were imprisoned under Franco for acts of cultural and political resistance.

6. Fear of what might occur if a consensual solution could not be worked out did much to bring the various political forces (some of them still not legalized) to the negotiation table. Previous major democratic transformations (1810, 1869, 1931) took place in the context of an institutional vacuum and the sudden irruption of the populace onto the political stage. Much of the credit for devising a peaceful process of change must go to two individuals: King Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suárez, who became premier of the first reform government in July of 1976. On
the utility of the "Spanish model" for sundry dictatorships seeking a 
road to democracy, see James Markham's "There's a Demand for 
he believes, was "a key factor in the transition," as was the willingness of 
Spain to turn "its back on old scores, and on its own blood-stained 
history."

7. A desire to be regarded as "European" has not been uncommon in 
societies that, for one reason or another, have had this status questioned. 
In a case just prior to the collapse of the Romanian dictatorship, a group 
of former Romanian CP leaders castigated the policies of President 
Ceauseescu [then still in power] and reminded him that "Romania is and 
remains a European country" and that "you cannot remove Romania to 
Africa" (The New York Review, April 27, 1989, p. 9). The issue, of course, 
is not who is or is not "European," but what meaning is given to this 
conceptual category.

8. The process of selection is via entrance examinations and the various 
facultades (schools or colleges) establish their respective standards. 
Selectividad was first introduced in 1974 and has always been strongly 
opposed by the majority of would-be university students.

9. Traditional structures of power came under severe pressure with the 
collapse of the Spanish antiguo régimen early in the nineteenth century, 
a period that also coincided with the loss of the mainland American 
colonies.

10. "El hijo del madero, a la Universidad para que no sea como su papá" (El 
País, February 17, 1987, p. 14). Madero can be translated as 
"club-wielder."

11. Children in Catalonia study both Spanish history and Catalan national 
history. In either case, this past can be linked to periods of much greater 
political power and economic influence than either Spain or Catalonia 
today enjoy.

12. A number of students I talked to commented on what they felt was the 
unfairness of the political directorate in limiting educational 
opportunities ("Not long ago they were the demonstrators"; "Now that 
they have power, they don't care about students' demands"). One of the 
paradoxes of the whole situation was that José Maria Maravall, before 
becoming Minister of Education, had made his sociological reputation by 
writing extensively on popular resistance to the Franco regime.

13. Salvador de Madariaga, who was briefly Minister of Education in the 
1930s, was shocked to discover that "the schoolmaster class, like every 
other class of public servants in Spain, carried an overwhelming 
deadweight of time-servers and salary-hunters" (de Madariaga 1943:317).
Gramsci (Forgacs 1988: 277), undoubtedly influenced by the Italian case, noted "the phenomenon of the saturation and fossilization of civil service personnel and intellectuals."

14. During the Franco regime, individuals who had been associated with the Institución Libre de Enseñanza were specifically barred from the teaching profession (López: 1986: 54).

15. The most exhaustive analysis of the Franco regime policy of institutional dismemberment in Catalonia is provided by Benet (1978). Among other materials, he cites the report of Alfonso Iniesta, inspector of primary education, that in Barcelona the Generalitat schools had 75,000 children enrolled, schools maintained by the city of Barcelona another 30,000, while state schools accounted for only 8,000 children (Benet 1978:319). The same inspector described the Catalan schools as staffed by "young and able personnel," having at their disposal "abundant supplies and complete installations"; their "sin" was a failure to teach a pro-Spanish curriculum (Benet 1978:319-320).

16. I have in mind individuals such as Gregorio Marañón who was both a noted scientist and an important historian of the golden age. Somewhat earlier, the "Generation of 98" -- an assortment of scholars, writers, and journalists -- created a rich and diversified intellectual climate within which the process of societal self-examination could take place.

17. The ideological orientation often termed "national-Catholicism" was particularly important in education since the church was the dominant institution in primary and secondary education during the early Franco era. Later, elements within the church, most obviously the Opus Dei lay organization, played important technical and technocratic roles.

18. I am quoting the general syllabus for third year of secondary education. Teachers are supposed to elaborate from these guidelines.

19. As late as 1958, 28 per cent of the test materials in the oposiciones for entry-level teachers dealt with ideological matters (political and and religious). All the boards of examiners included representatives of the church and the Movimiento (López 1986:56).

20. In 1980 -- some three years after the basic educational consensus had been worked out in Madrid -- the Catalan Socialist Party Program still called for "a public, secular, unified, free, autonomous, and Catalan school" (Programa de Gobierno Socialista 1980:207).

21. Taped interview with Professor Isabel Gómez, Escola de Mestres Sant Cugat, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, March 5, 1987. See also, Experimentació de la Reforma Educativa 1986.

23. This is a theme that finds expression in several of the studies on educational planning published by the Generalitat, specifically Vol. 1 of Experimentació del Cicle Superior d'Educació General Bàsica (1985), and Vols. 1 and 2 of Experimentació del Primer Cicle d'Ensenyament Secundari (1985).

24. One of the consequences of the oposiciones system is that it makes for rigid and self-perpetuating professional baronies. It is those who have already won professional standing that constitute the examination boards. To this problem must be added the matter of reduced resources: in a classical example of "limited good" theory, established university departments tend to view new fields or new programs as posing a threat to their funding levels. Proposed university reform will expand the recognized professions (carreras) from about 50 to 150, but if it is to prove successful, this plan will require greatly increased allocations.

25. Several studies, mostly sociological in orientation, examine youth and youth culture in Catalonia and in Spain as a whole (Cardus and Estruch 1984; Casal 1985; Feixa 1986; Zarraga 1985; Funes i Artiaga 1985). For a recent nonacademic survey of attitudes see Cambio 16, July 6, 1987. The reality of youth sexuality is recognized in several programs and publications. The Barcelona city government has launched "Plan Diana," a program for fourteen- and fifteen-year olds, designed to teach sexuality and contraception (including hands-on knowledge of different devices), and to acquaint young people with family planning services. These services are free, immediate, and anonymous. In its "Guide for Youth," the Ministry of Culture notes that "sexuality is autonomous from procreation" and asks young people to be responsible and informed (Ministerio de Cultura 1984:148).

26. The sexual and extramarital activities of Spanish politicians merit little comment in the Spanish press. The Gary Hart/Donna Rice affair, covered extensively in newspapers and magazines (Cambio 16, May 18, 1987, and May 25, 1987), tended to portray Americans as "puritanic" and the fortunes of politicians as particularly vulnerable to charges of "scandal."

27. Due to very high levels of unemployment, there is a substantial segment of marginalized, alienated youth living the Spanish equivalent of "street life." I have had little direct contact with such young people. Much of the terminology used by youth "sects" to categorize themselves and others -- "punk," "rocker," "heavey," "skins," "techno-pops" and the like -- is obviously of foreign derivation.

28. Awareness of the problem and being in a position to do much about it are different things. I was made very conscious of this after spending a good
part of a Sunday morning with a colleague of mine and his teenaged son. Our immediate concern was to ease the anxiety of the boy by seeing how well he had memorized the *apunts*, after which we tried to address the issue of "meaning." The father, a university professor, detested the system he saw as a symptom of the country's educational shortcomings, but felt that he had no choice but to help his son master it. Similarly, many teachers who find the emphasis on notes intellectually stifling, believe that students must learn how to "defend themselves" by learning appropriate note-taking.

29. The names I have chosen bear some broad categorical resemblance -- literary figures, Catalan personages, patron saints, etc. -- to the names of the schools studied. It is also possible that there are actual schools that carry the pseudonyms I have assigned, but if so, this is simply coincidence.

30. CEPEPC (Col·lectiu d'Escoles per a l'Escola Pública Catalana) is made up of 73 schools, 55 of which have already passed into the public system. This transference has not been without problems: some schools fear the loss of enrichment programs (art, music, etc.), others their autonomy and/or their present faculties. (*El País*, July 17, 1987; *Avui*, June 24, 1987). Many educators I spoke to were of the opinion that the Generalitat had shown remarkably little concern for these institutions.

31. I noticed some definite problems in introducing "non-traditional" educational forms. A "cultural week" in one of the schools, a four-day hiatus from the normal round of education, functioned more as an in-house holiday than as a serious attempt to integrate materials and perspectives from different courses or as an opportunity to discuss and consider important current issues.


33. The balance is not explicitly stated, but is evident in such features as a table of military and civilian casualties -- "The Civil War Cost Spain Many Lives" -- that arrives at virtually identical figures for the two sides (Equipo Aula 3 1985:183). Such tables substitute the apparent authority of numbers for explanation, or even for some sense of the problems of daily life during the war.

34. Textbooks are changing and new texts are planned for the expansion in obligatory education. Good and stimulating texts, such as *Sepharad* (Garcia et al. 1986), are already available, as is a fine collection of documents (Ballarini et al. 1983) published for secondary school students. Cost, however, often slows the acquisition of newer texts.

35. Taped interview with Professor Joan Pagès, Escola de Mestres Sant
Cugat, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, April 2, 1987. I raised some of the same questions with classroom teachers. In one particular instance, I tried to ascertain why so little use was made of a book assigned as a supplementary text, Ronald Fraser's (1979) gripping oral history of the Civil War. Time was one reason, the need to prepare students for upcoming exams was another.

36. Obviously, the parents or grandparents of many of the children at Valle Inclán left the south to escape poverty and related evils. That teachers (most of whom are of middle class origin) might be hesitant to discuss the conditions of rural life as they were until quite recently is not surprising since poverty is commonly associated with low socioeconomic standing and lack of cultura. Teachers in other schools, it should be noted, also did not devote a great deal of attention to recent rural misery.

37. The immigrant experience, the poverty that preceded it, and the problems of making a life in the new urban environment have not gone entirely unrecorded and unremembered. Francisco/ Francesc Candel (1957; 1964; 1986) has written an acclaimed series of novels detailing the hard personal and cultural journey that such transformations entail. His novels -- gritty and objective -- initially caused a sensation, for they depicted a world that was virtually unknown to the literate classes.

38. It should be stressed that professional historians, both Spanish and foreign, have not neglected the Jewish experience in Iberia, although the interpretation is often self-serving. Many Catalans, especially of the older generation, unabashedly define themselves as pro-Israeli in the context of the Middle East conflict. It is not unusual to meet Catalans who claim, typically on the basis of their family name, a Jewish ancestry. None of this, however, changes the general and popular notion that the Jewish past of Iberia falls into the domain of archives and museums.

39. For an overview of Jews in Catalonia see the special issue of L'Avenç (No. 81, 1985), "Jueus a Catalunya".

40. One might note also that the history of Barcelona offers some insights on modern religiously (and culturally) divided cities (Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, etc.) and on that weaving together of national and religious loyalties that we generally refer to as "fundamentalism." A reader of the manuscript noted at this point in the text that I seemed to be speaking more to Spanish and Catalan teachers than to anthropologists. If so, it is because I believe that an anthropologically-informed curriculum would greatly facilitate the examination of important issues that now receive limited or guarded attention. Part of the problem is that of finding the intellectual language to discuss such matters.

41. The redefining of places of worship by the dominant culture/religion is, of course, not limited to Spain. The great basilica of Saint Sofia in
Constantinople became a mosque. In Spain, synagogues (most notably those of Toledo) were transformed into churches. In the New World, the conquistadores could not really make over Mesoamerican temples into churches (the styles and functions were too different), but they did the next best thing: they built many colonial churches on top of the temple platforms. Recent Spanish history offers several examples of much the same hegemonic process at work. For instance, the political culture of the Franco regime redefined by fiat everything that was non-Castilian (historical institutions and personages, even toponyms and personal names) as "Spanish". For a provocative discussion of the relationship between material culture (in particular archaeology), ideology and nationalism in the modern Middle East see Silberman (1990). The whole issue of how cultural resource management (CRM) can be interpreted as a modern mode of appropriation is germane to our argument, but beyond the scope of this essay.

Needless to say, this stress on the material lends itself to a guide book approach to history, of which an interesting example is the Spanish Tourist Office's *Viaje por la España judía* ("Journey Through Jewish Spain") (Inprotur 1985). This instructive pamphlet helps the tourist track the vestiges of Spanish Sephardic communities.

This is generally referred to as *La crisis del antiguo régimen* (ca. 1800-1830), which we might render as the failure of eighteenth-century enlightened despotism to transform Spain into a modern liberal society. The expectations, and eventual disappointments, of the Spanish Enlightenment provide the dominant theme of a recent Goya exhibit, *Goya and the Spirit of the Enlightenment* (Boston, Museum of Fine Arts, January 18-March 26, 1989). This interpretation of Goya and his time is totally congruent with how the period is taught in Spanish schools.

I am discussing the current situation. It is well known that the Franco regime (especially in its earlier phases) sponsored a historical interpretation that blamed Spain's many vicissitudes on a combination of alien powers and internal treason. The very terminology of this propaganda -- the Civil War as "Crusade," the West as "corrupt," the Republicans as "puppets of Freemasonry," etc. -- is fundamentally anti-modern.

Slavery and the slave trade were, in fact, closely linked to the early nineteenth century transformation of Catalan commerce and industry (Fradera 1987).

Another good source is the fine selection of documents, "La construcción de la España democrática 1975-1982" (The Construction of a Democratic Spain 1975-1982), in Ballarini et al. (1983 [Part 2]: 251-275). There is more than enough stimulating material in this collection for several lectures and discussions on the current political system.
47. An extensive body of literature, much of it anthropological, has been produced on Spanish Gypsies. One cannot speak of a unitary "Gypsy culture" or a single "Gypsy language." It is reasonable to think of Spanish Gypsies (gitanos) as a stigmatized minority that, although highly acculturated, remains unassimilated. Statistics on Gypsies are notoriously unreliable, but the ballpark population figure for Spain is half a million or more, by far the largest concentration in Western Europe (Puxon 1980). It is of more than passing interest to note that Gypsies in Eastern Europe -- who had always resisted "actually existing socialism" -- are today being made scapegoats for the many problems faced by post-Communist societies (Beck 1989, 1991; "Poles Vent Their Economic Rage on Gypsies," The New York Times, July 25, 1991; "Groping for Minority Rights," The Economist, July 13, 1991).

48. The opinions of my informants reflect quite closely general, and even official, perceptions of the relationship between foreign immigration and social problems. There is a sense that delinquency, especially violent crime, has grown, although some statistics indicate that since 1983 crime rates have stabilized, perhaps even dropped a bit (for a detailed analysis see Martín 1990). What has undoubtedly increased is the sense of insecurity, with the inhabitants of the large cities feeling particularly at risk. Officials liken the Spanish immigration problem to that of the United States, with Morocco playing a role analogous to Mexico (Avui, April 2, 1987, Cambio 16, February 9 and 16, 1987, The New York Times, August 24, 1989). Within Europe, the situation is somewhat similar to that of Italy which, officials claim, operates as a natural bridge between the poorer south and the richer northern shores of the Mediterranean; there too, immigration issues have provoked racial conflict and increasingly stringent controls ("Gateway to Europe," The Economist, April 28, 1990; "Poor Men at the Gate," The Economist, March 16, 1991).

49. Almost everyone can cite one or two examples of successful African immigrants (Latin American political refugees obviously fall into another conceptual category), but the truth of the matter is that there are very few black or brown faces in positions of influence and power. The first judge of North African origin was appointed about a year ago and I have yet to meet, in more than two decades of work in Spain, a teacher or professor of African ancestry. Perhaps most obviously, there is virtually no immigrant and/or post-colonial art and literature of the sort produced by such English language artists and writers as Salman Rushdie, Kazuo Ishiguro, Hanif Kureishi and Nadine Gordimer. These works are at least in part designed to expand European consciousness (for a discussion of the genre and its significance see Fischer and Abedi 1990).

50. For a comparable type of "distancing" I have to delve back into my childhood in England. Two instances come readily to mind: "Camp"
brand coffee extract, the label showing a colonial officer being served by a turbaned Indian bearer, and the "golliwog," a rather grotesque black rag-doll then found in every toy shop. In that England of the late 1930s and 1940s, people from south Asia were few and far between and resident blacks even scarcer. In present-day America we have a phenomenon of a similar order in the use of Native American stereotypes in sports (Washington Redskins, Atlanta Braves, the Fighting Illini [a long-extinct Native American people from whom Illinois took its name], and until recently, the University of Massachusetts Redmen). We do not have teams with appellations such as "Darkies" or "Polacks".

51. La vida en un xip, Joaquim Puyal, host. Aired Friday, January 19, 1990. Produced by TV 3, Barcelona. Other episodes have dealt with class, generational issues, gender and sexuality, and changing patterns of behavior. The program has successfully joined the soap opera format to serious public debate, and viewers are not at all reluctant to invest the better part of a Friday night to watching it.

52. My impression is that a considerable segment of the studio audience had -- at the conscious level -- a quite developed sense of what constituted proper and reasonable attitudes towards race. In the simplest of terms, the educated citizens of a modern, progressive society are not supposed to use "race" as a criterion of judgment. Since for many a prejudice of this type is morally and socially untenable, discussion and commentary is likely to shift to issues of "culture," "custom," "behavior," and so forth -- elements that are presumed to be mutable. This puts the onus of change firmly on the shoulders of the minority or minorities in question and also permits the majority to applaud particularly successful examples of assimilation.

53. I particularly have in mind much of the coverage of Islam and related issues, including the status and security of Spain's two North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. See especially "El retorno de Islam," Cambio 16, February 9, 1987, and "El drama de Melilla, lo que nos jugamos," Cambio 16, February 16, 1987. Needless to say, the fact that many Spaniards fear for the safety of these two pieces of North African territory (which Spain defines as "European" [El País, April 2, 1987]) simply adds another element of tension, a further reason to distrust Arabs in general. While one can point to specific historical, political, and geographical reasons underpinning anti-Arab feeling in Spain, a recent survey in France noted "a soft anti-Maghreb racism spreading like an oil-slick" and found that three-quarters of those questioned for the report thought there were too many Arabs in France ("Mighty Le Pen," The Economist, May 12, 1990; see also "France Seeks a Way to Cope With New Upsurge in Racism," The New York Times, May 27, 1990). Tensions in Spain, while not as high as those in France, are often fueled by similar populist anti-immigrant sentiments.
The coverage included extensive news reports and several articles by important personages in culture and politics. The lawyer and feminist activist Lidia Falcon likened the head-scarf to the "yellow star... of the Jews under Hitler" (El País, January 29, 1990), while Antonio Elorza, a well-known academic, insisted that a modern state could not "tolerate fanaticism" and that while a Muslim who beats his wife might do so "in strict accordance with Koranic precepts," this did not make him less culpable in the eyes of the law (El País, December 28, 1990). What observers did not remark upon was the deeply embedded nature of Catholic symbols and usages in Spanish national life. More recently, the Spanish press has covered in detail (and with some amusement at the problems of the French) Prime Minister Edith Cresson's plans to deal with illegal immigration, in part through forced repatriation, the so-called "Charters Cresson" (La Vanguardia [Revista], July 13, 1991; El País, July 11 and July 24, 1991; Avui, July 9, 1991).

An authority on Catalan popular culture observes that at least some black gegants probably represent the black servants which rich colonists brought back with them from Cuba (Capmany 1978: 46, 125, 132-133). If this is so, these giant figures encode an ambiguous message.

There is, however, an extensive literature, popular and professional, on Spanish emigration both to the New World and, in post-war years, to the industrialized countries of Western Europe.

For a detailed discussion of the various ideological "strands" in Gramsci's writings, see Femia's (1987) chapter "Proletarian Hegemony and the Question of Authoritarianism".

One must be careful not to commit historical anchronisms. Still, it is legitimate to note that Gramsci himself identified the French Revolution in its Jacobin phase as a particularly successful instance of progressive hegemonic control (Femia 1987:46-47, 134). Communist movements and regimes in Europe and elsewhere have often claimed to be the heirs of the French Revolutionary tradition. The Russian Bolsheviks, on the basis of such an assertion, presented their seizure of power as a privileged form of action (Furet 1990:264-265).

Without getting too deeply into Spanish social history, we might note that it was in just this atmosphere that Cervantes wrote his Don Quixote; here, "among many other parables, was the parable of a nation which had set out on its crusade only to learn that it was tilting at windmills" (Elliott 1963:294). Cervantes, who had been seriously wounded at Lepanto (1572), wrote with more than poetical authority.

The debate on the atraso (backwardness) of Spain was the core issue pondered by the intellectuals of the "Generation of '98" in the early decades of this century. There was anything but unanimity respecting
either causes or cures, but they shared a frame of mind which was obsessed with the Spanish problem (for a discussion of decline and regeneration, see Carr 1982:528-532, 790-791). Whether we are looking at the seventeenth century discourse or at more recent manifestations, all such soul-searching points to problems in establishing an unchallenged hegemonic mind-set. This long Spanish debate on state, society, and post-imperial decline shares interesting parallels with the current polemic on America and its future (a parallel explicitly noted by Kennedy 1990).

61. This is a component of the paranoical hostility to Rome and Spain (later transferred to France and in some measure to the Irish) that continues to color English perceptions, including those of some anthropologists (Fox 1987:2; DiGiacomo and Pi-Sunyer 1988:21). In this country, it fueled anti-Spanish sentiment before and during the Spanish-American War and today, I believe, still makes itself felt in the guise of an anti-Latino prejudice.

62. See, for example, Collier's (1987: 206-207) stimulating discussion of how the Socialists of rural Andalusia used the concepts of "honor" and "autonomy" -- central values in agrarian society -- to legitimize their policies of political and agrarian reform.

63. There were, of course, several reasons, most obviously the fact that since the territory was in the hands of those who had engineered the revolt, any grant of independence would be largely symbolic (but symbols do matter and such a declaration might well have had practical consequences in recruitment, desertions, etc.). Also, the French, who controlled most of Morocco, would no doubt have objected. But none of this resolves the obvious contradiction of an anti-fascist government fighting for its life but failing to take the revolutionary step of declaring an end to colonial rule.

64. David Kantor in The Jewish Week (October 26, 1990), states that in his speech the prince said, "It was my ancestors who expelled you. I, on behalf of my father, welcome you now for ever and ever." Early in 1990, the Spanish government signed an accord that officially places Jewish and Protestant denominations on a legal par with Roman Catholicism. The Constitution of 1978 guarantees "freedom of ideology, religion and worship"; the new accord makes some important legal and fiscal changes and recognizes the "manifest rootedness in Spanish society" of the Jewish and Protestant faiths (The New York Times, February 25, 1990). A few weeks earlier, TVE-1, a major state-wide TV channel, had shown the miniseries "Shoah," which one critic characterized as a documentary of "horror and truth" (Bercino 1990).

65. An example of a recent episode with clear anti-Semitic connotations is the attempt on the part of an international committee of clergy and
laymen to seek the beatification of Queen Isabella, who not only was Columbus' sponsor, but signed the edict of expulsion and instituted the Inquisition. In Spain, this attempt at saint-making has been recognized as the work of a highly conservative party within the church, a group that includes Bishop Alvaro Portillo, the head of Opus Dei, and ideological allies on the other side of the Atlantic, among them Archbishop Bernard Shaw of Boston, the retired Archbishop, John Carberry, of St. Louis, and the Colombian Cardinal, López Trujillo (Woodward 1991; Valls 1991). One Spanish intellectual, the philosopher Reyes Mate (1991), not only laments the failure to foreground the memory of an unjust past, but insists that the massive expulsion of Jews from Spain set in motion destructive ideological mechanisms that had their logical conclusion in the Nazi genocide.

Spanish real GDP per capita is $8,989 (1990), which puts it into the lower tier of advanced market economies, but when other factors are taken into account -- literacy, life-expectancy, and other measures of social well-being -- it ranks among the top twenty countries globally (and ahead of the United States) according to the United Nations' "human development index" published by the United Nations Development Program ("The Human Condition," The Economist, May 26, 1990). Looked at from the perspective of the Third World, it is certainly a country of wealth and potential opportunity.

As the title of a lead editorial in the Economist (November 16, 1991) expressed it, "Racism's back" in Europe and elsewhere. It never left, but it is certainly more virulent today than at any time in recent decades. It can be measured by the resurgence of neo-Nazis in Germany (Kinzer 1991:16), anti-Semitism in Poland, the anti-immigrant policies of the French government (extensive coverage in La Vanguardia [Revista], July 13, 1991; El País, July 11 and 24, 1991; Avui, July 9 and 14, 1991), and the success of explicitly anti-immigrant parties in Austria, France, and Switzerland.

There are, of course exceptions. After a Liberian asylum-seeker went on a rampage and killed two police officers, Manfred Rommel, the mayor of Stuttgart, urged citizens to "confront bigotry and violence with the deepest resolve." At the officers' funeral he insisted, "We must not generalize, and we must not judge the innocent as guilty" (The New York Times, November 24, 1991).

This much-told tale enjoys certain similarities with another underclass myth that made the rounds in London in the late 1940s. In the English story, working class people (and particularly Irish immigrants) were said to keep coal in the bathtubs of their council houses. Both stories highlight the backwardness of the customs and habits of the pleb
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