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GREEK ETHNIC SURVIVAL
UNDER OTTOMAN DOMINATION

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When small nomadic bands of militant Seljuk Turks invaded Eastern and Central Anatolia in the eleventh century, they encountered an indigenous peasant population which was Greek Orthodox in religion; the latter were rapidly converted to Islam, the religion of the invaders and turcified in the process. Assimilation was complete. Descendents of this population became the Muslim-Turkish core of later developments of the Turkish nation. By contrast, Greek Orthodox populations in the Balkans managed to survive some 400 years of subjugation to the Ottoman Empire, remaining for the most part ethnically distinct, later to conduct the first successful revolution for national self-determination in the Old World in modern times.

This paper will explore some of the structural factors determining the character of interaction between the dominant Muslim-Turkish society and the subject Balkan Greek population which militated against assimilation and encouraged the maintenance of ethnic boundaries of the subject group. Barth has pointed out that the identity of ethnic groups is a function of the social boundaries which are largely defined by "a structuring of interaction which allows the persistence of cultural differences" (1969:16). He further stated, "Stable inter-ethnic relations
presuppose such a structuring of interaction: a set of prescriptions governing situations of contact, and allowing for articulation in some sectors or domains of activity, and a set of prescriptions on social situations preventing inter-ethnic interaction in other sectors, and thus insulating parts of the cultures from confrontation and modification" (1969:16). The Ottoman system was a poly-ethnic social system par excellence. Historians have noted that if the Ottoman rulers had pursued a different policy toward their non-Muslim subjects than the one which they consciously chose to pursue, conversions to Islam and turcification or assimilation would probably have been more widespread—perhaps sufficiently so to substantially alter the course of European history as well as that of the Ottoman Empire (Stavrianos, 1961:113-115).

The character of interaction and the resulting social boundaries, despite differences in religion, language, and culture, were hardly inevitable. The example of assimilation under the Seljuk Turks and later mass conversions and assimilation of Bosnians, Albanians, Thracian Greeks, and Cretans under the Osmanli Turks highlight the potential for such transformations of Orthodox Christian populations.5 In this exploration of socio-political ethnic boundary maintaining mechanisms, it is instructive to note those instances where assimilation of the subject Orthodox peoples to the dominant Muslim society and culture resulted from the particularities of the contact situation or was, in a limited form, pursued as an instrument of Osmanli policy.

The sources used in this case study are secondary, even tertiary, historical sources of generally accepted respectability in the fields of Greek and Ottoman studies. The interpretations presented here are
neither particularly new nor, unlike the the accompanying papers of the symposium, partially susceptible to field study or contemporary documentation. The social structure and processes of interaction between Greek and Turk described below no longer exist for, though a significant minority of Greeks still live as citizens of the modern Turkish State, the Ottoman State was formally abolished on November 1, 1922 and "passed forever into history." The historical period spanned in this paper falls roughly between 1453 (the Fall of Constantinople) and 1821 (the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence). However, both earlier and later periods must to some degree be considered. Turkish domination of what is today Northern Greece began in the late fourteenth century and continued in Thessaly until 1897 and in Macedonia and Western Thrace until 1912.

During this period considerable regional variations in interaction existed between Greek Orthodox populations and Ottoman society. Some parts of Greece, such as the monastic Republic of Mount Athos and the Inner Mani, though subject to the Sultan, remained free of a Turkish garrison; the Ionian islands never were subject to Turkish domination but passed from Byzantine rulers to Venice to France to Russia to Britain and finally to independent Greece. The Aegean islands, too, were variously possessions of Venice, Genoa, a variety of Frankish rulers, the Ottoman Empire, local Greek primates, and the Jewish Duke of Naxos; Crete remained under Venetian rule until 1669 and Tinos until 1715 before becoming Turkish possessions. Under the Turks, Levadia and Lamia in Central Greece were governed by local Greek magnates, a continuation of privileges earlier granted by the Catalans, and Athens, which was considered the private property of the Sultan, was leased to the highest bidder to administer for a profit.
Aside from the fact that precedent local systems of custom and law were often influential in shaping the policy of the Turkish conquerors toward particular regions, Ottoman institutions and the nature of Ottoman administration, themselves, varied considerably over time. The situation of the Greeks, then, vis-a-vis the politically dominant society differed sometimes markedly from one locality to another and from one period to another, and these variations must, at least, be borne in mind in reading this simplified version of the major regularities governing relations between Greeks and Turks and between the Orthodox and Muslims within the Ottoman system in the Balkans.

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As "people of the Book," according to Muslim law, Christians (and Jews) ought not be forcibly converted to Islam; forcible "conversion-or-extinction" was a policy properly reserved for pagans. Nevertheless, subject peoples not accepting conversion to Islam were treated as tolerated infidels by Muslim society and suffered a variety of liabilities and limitations on the free expression of their religious and communal life. The position of tolerated infidels was that of dimmi, or "contract" peoples, which constituted a distinctive subordinate status in Ottoman society; despite this, some infidel individuals achieved prominence in offices of high administration, in commerce, banking, and of influence generally (Gibb and Bowen, 1957:passim). The dimmi status, intended as a liability, also proved to be a protection against conversion and assimilation. When the Sultan Selim I decided on a death-or-conversion policy with regard to his Christian subjects, it was the Sheikh-al-Islam, himself, the head of the ulema or Muslim religious corporation, who prevented the proposal from being acted upon.
The thesis of this paper is that the conditions favoring ethnic distinctiveness and survival were, at least, as much due to Ottoman administrative policy as to resistance to a succession of conquerors - the latest of which were the Turks. Despite earlier domination by Bulgarians, Serbs, Genoese, Venetians, Franks, Catalans, Navarese, and Florentines, the Turkish domination over Greek populations lasted longest and had the most far-reaching consequences. Hence, it is to the structure of Ottoman society that we must first turn our attention.

Ottoman society consisted of two distinct systems - the Ruling Institution (the Sultan, his "slave" family, the palace administration, the Vizir and Divan, the armed forces, and various associated services) and the ulema or Muslim Institution (the ruler in his role as Caliph, the Sheikh-al-Islam, mosques, courts, schools, religious orders, and various public and charitable services). The Ottoman State, nonetheless, was a theocracy, admitting of no absolute separation between religion and politics (Ware, 1964:2). Islam, as a comprehensive way of life, with religious-civil codes formulated and administered in the councils, schools and courts of the ulema, imposed the only reasonably effective restraints on the freedom of action of Sultans and ensured that religious identity - for Muslims and non-Muslims alike - would be the primary and overriding criterion for the social organization of civil life within the Empire (Runciman, 1968: 167-182; Arnakis: 1963). Muslim civil law, founded on the Quran and later legalistic commentaries, was not equipped to deal directly with non-Muslim populations. The Muslim solution to this dilemma was the millet system.7 Hence, the Orthodox Church under the Turks
became, for the first time in its history, explicitly a civil as well as a religious institution (Runciman: 1968: 171; Ware, 1964:2) - a structural parallel to that of the Muslim community, which also constituted a milet, though that of the dominant social segment of the Ottoman Empire.

The Rum milet consisted of Greeks (from whom it derived its name), Serbs, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Bosnians, and South Albanians. The independent Slavonic Patriarchates that had been established by the Bulgarians and the Serbs during their brilliant but brief periods of imperial expansion were abolished by Mehment II (the Conqueror) who appointed George Scholarios, the monk Gennadios and leader of the anti-Western Greek faction, to the Patriarchal throne. Mehment II also expanded the ecclesiastical authority of the Patriarch to encompass all the Orthodox peoples, with the exception of the Armenians, and the secular authority to cover all the internal civil relations which were afterwards to be regulated and administered by the clergy of the milet (Runciman: 1968: 171-172; Gibb and Bowen, 1957: 216). "The Christian clergy became a mirror image of the ulema, exercising an authority over Christians comparable to that which the legal and theological experts of Islam wielded over Moslems" (Coles, 1968:31). Family law governing marriage and divorce, in particular, was regulated by the Orthodox Church (ibid.:31). The separate civil jurisdiction of the Orthodox Church, it is generally recognized, created conditions of impenetrability between Greeks and Turks which impeded absorption of the subordinate ethnic group (Papadopoulos, 1952).
Ethnic stratification in the Ottoman Empire was based first on the dichotomous classification of Muslim and dimmi; the latter, as stated earlier, were "people of the Book" with whom the Muslim community conceived that a "contact," first articulated by Muhammed, existed. Dimmis were to be tolerated rather than exterminated or forcibly converted but in a clearly subordinate status which set them off as infidels from the "community of equality" of the faithful. Pagans, a third classification, were relatively insignificant in number. Within dimmi status, non-Muslims were organized by millets which gave each recognized religious group a corporate communal character and encouraged communal attachments. Thus, each millet was an ascriptive exclusive community, defined by the dominant Muslim society in its own image and based on religious identity as the "socially relevant factor" of ethnic status. Linguistic and cultural differences were submerged or considered "socially irrelevant" to the organization of Ottoman society. Linguistic and cultural differences were, however, not obliterated and, in time, became the bases for new ethnic identities and national consciousness in the successor nation-states which arose as the Ottoman Empire weakened and dissolved piece-meal.

The Ottomans' policy, unintentionally and intentionally, strengthened the group solidarity of their non-Muslim subjects in several ways; 1) by imposing regulations separating Muslims from non-Muslims; 2) by imposing sumptuary laws which emphasized the subordinate status and maintained the visibility of non-Muslims; 3) by increasing the corporate character of each millet through the use of ecclesiastical organization of the civil life of subject non-Muslims; 4) by granting a
large degree of communal autonomy to the villages and towns of the subject peoples in a decentralized system of indirect rule; and 5) by alternately exterminating and co-opting native aristocracies.

_Dimmis_ were required to pay the _harach_ (land tax), which was also paid by Muslims, and the _cizya_ (head tax), paid only by non-Muslims. Due to many exemptions from tax-paying which Sultans granted for a variety of reasons and in return for a variety of special services to the State, only one-third to one-half of the _dimmi_ population, in fact, paid this annual assessment. At first, it was to be paid only by "free men" capable of making a living; later, it became an assessment levied on local communities, and, as tax collecting was sold by administrators to tax farmers after the time of Suleiman the Magnificent, the system degenerated from a fairly lenient one to a degraded form of exploitation (Gibb and Bowen, 1957:233 ff.). From the time of Mehmet I (c. 1390) until 1638, Balkan Greek peasants were also subject to the _devshirme_, the child-levy, about which more will be said below. _Dimmi_ men could not marry Muslim women, though Muslim men could take _dimmi_ wives; children of the latter were, naturally, considered Muslims. _Dimmis_ were also subject to occasional labor calls and the _droit de seigneur_.

_Greeks_ were excluded from some occupations but, aside from peasants in their village-communities, could become merchants, small industrialists, traders, seamen, bankers, financiers, interpreters, doctors, _armatoles_ (the armed local police in some regions), and diplomatic envoys to the West, without abnegating their religious affiliation.

_Sumptuary laws_ placed limits on corporate Christian visibility while making individual Christians more visible. Laws forbad the build-
ing of new churches, although many churches were converted to mosques, and others destroyed; any minor repairs to a church required special permission of the Turkish regional administrator. Also, bell-ringing and crosses on top of church buildings were forbidden; no outward display of the Christian religion in general was allowed (Ware, 1964:3). Sumptuary laws were also directed at the civil life of non-Muslim subjects. They could not ride horses or bear arms; styles of houses were limited, and the Orthodox were directed to wear distinctive clothing (Gibb and Bowen, 1957:208). The degraded status of dimmis, as a whole, was further emphasized and enforced after 1500 as a consequence of an increasingly more militant and conservative Sunni orthodoxy — itself, a reaction to the growth of Shi'a power on the eastern borders of the Empire and the threat of Shi'ite subversion within the Empire.

As a consequence of expanding the ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch and his church, the corporate character of the Rum millet was reinforced. Orthodoxy became more than a way of life and a religion; it constituted a separate socio-political structure, an enclavement in Ottoman society. Furthermore, for the Orthodox peasantry it was the ascribed ethnic and superordinate status which largely defined his identity and interaction with the Ottoman state.

Walter Zenner has hypothesized that ethnic group corporateness provides barriers to gradual assimilation and fusion in a pluralistic or poly-ethnic society, whereas non-corporateness allows for varying situations in which individual assimilation may readily occur. When there is no clearcut superordinate ethnic status defined by custom and enforced by law, individuals may maintain multiple group memberships or,
at least, be able to view their ethnic relationships as merely attributes of their identities (1967:346). This hypothesis provides a clue for interpreting the contrasting consequences of assimilation under the Seljuks and ethnic group identity maintenance under the Osmanlis, which was cited in the introduction to this paper; the hypothesis, moreover, is supported by the facts of the Greek case. Ethnic assimilation or fusion with Muslim-Turkish society was not sufficiently widespread to bring about a radical transformation of Balkan Greek society. Individuals remained members of corporate religious communities and the boundaries between religious communities were maintained by the structure of Ottoman administration and society. Interaction between groups was structured, even regulated, by the institutions of the dominant political group, as Barth suggested would be the case in such poly-ethnic societies (1969:31). Only rarely were these boundaries obscured or hurdled once the corporate character of the millet was institutionalized. The instances where conversions and assimilation did occur provide insights into the effectiveness of corporateness in maintaining ethnic distinctiveness and separation. For even when the Orthodox Church became weak, venal, and ignorance among the clergy was widespread, through the preservation of the liturgy, religious festivals and feasts, other religious practices, family law, and civil-communal institutions, ecclesiastical organization helped preserve Greek identity and, though unintended, Bulgarian, Serbian, Albanian, and Romanian ethnic identities as well. The Church accepted the privileges bestowed on it by the conquerors and exercised a kind of Patriarchal imperialism over the various Orthodox peoples it embraced in its corporate grasp (Zakynthos, 1958:298).
The separation of Greeks and Turks was further facilitated by the Ottoman policy of treating certain Christian villages (especially those in the Balkan Mountains) and even whole regions and islands as "free villages" (kefalochoria, eleftherochoria) under the jurisdiction of native elders. Though municipal liberties, privileges and concessions resulting in "autonomous" communities and a system of administrative decentralization was a slow development, receiving elaborations and set-backs in ancient, Byzantine and Frankish times, the system took a definitive form under the Ottomans. Autonomous communes of a great variety of internal organizations or types were allowed to function as a force distinct from but interrelated with the millet system due to the administrative and economic exigencies of the conquerors who were more concerned with maintaining the State as a war machine than with the direct administration of the conquered peoples. According to Zakynthos,

Le système communal, tel qu'il a été définitivement formé sous la domination ottomane, avec ses divergences et ses particularités, avec son regionalisme marquée et, malgré cela, avec son universalisme fondamental, procède de diverses sources et d'une tradition historique beaucoup plus complexe qu'on ne le croit (1948:419).

Many local civil privileges which already existed at the time of Turkish conquest were accepted and extended. The koinotis (commune) system reached its apogee in the Cyclades in the eighteenth century where annual elections for a guiding committee and general assemblies of all heads of families of the koinotis were a general feature of political organization. All internal functions of the commune and relations with the Turkish authorities were administered by native officials though
particular communes varied in authoritarian structure from democratic to aristocratic to oligarchic and some communes formed associations, confederacies and even a cooperative-confederation.

Special privileges and the recognition of local law was granted the islands of Chios, Mykonos, Hydra, Spetsai, Naxos, Tinos, and Psara. Mykonos was more democratic in form; Hydra and Spetsai were more oligarchic. In Iprios 46 communes united democratically in a Confederacy (Koinon ton Zagorision) with its capital in the village of Kapessovo and a representative resident in Ioannina, the provincial capital city.

Most of the villages of the Pindos mountains and those on Mount Olympus, Mount Pelion, and Mount Ossa were "free villages;" the latter, associated also with villages in the valley of Tempe, formed an agricultural-commercial cooperative consisting of 26 communes; at Ambelakia in the eighteenth century the development of a cooperative democracy also resulted in remarkable wealthy commercial-industrial as well as humanistic-intellectual activities. Mount Athos was self-governing and, at the other end of Greece, the Inner Mani was governed by a local chief appointed for life by the Sultan. In Chalkidiki an association of 12 villages, known as Mademochoria, received special concessions from the Turkish government which extended those already in existence from Byzantine times in return for the exploitation of silver mines. The Peloponessos had many forms of local communes, and after the reconquest of the Peloponessos by the Turks in 1715 a Peloponessian Senate evolved; most villages were administered by locally elected headmen and councils (dimogerontes, archontes, proestotes, epitropoi, kotsambasides); headmen elected a primate for the province and the provincial primates met as a Council or Senate in Tripolitsa (Peloponnisiaki Gerousia). The primates
(kodjabashis by their official Turkish title) formed an official Greek aristocracy.

Though conversion and assimilation of Greeks en masse did occur in the early days of conquest and by individuals later on, the most dramatic mass conversions of Balkan peasants occurred in somewhat peripheral regions. In sections of Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina many peasants and local clergy had become adherents of Bogomilism, a dualistic creed and therefore heretical to both the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches; Bogomilism also was a millenarian movement of social protest which made it anathema to both churches, which ruthlessly attempted to suppress it. When the Turkish conquerors appeared in the Balkans, the Bogomils greeted them more as saviors than as barbarians. The Ottoman conquerors, though nominally Sunni, were themselves strongly influenced by batini-Sufism, a heterodox, syncretist and universalistic creed proselytized by Bektashi dervishes, particularly before 1500 in the Balkans. It is estimated that approximately three quarters of the Bosnian peasantry converted to Islam shortly after the Turkish conquest of the Serbian Empire (Stavrianos, 1961:62-63). The initial appeal of the "tolerant Turk" in the Balkans had its parallel even in Constantinople where the Grand Duke Notis Botsaris is claimed (by his Unionist enemies) to have said, "Better the turban than the mitre" when faced with the alternative of subjection to the Pope or to the Sultan; whether Botsaris ever made this statement or not, the sentiment was a widely felt and despairing reaction to attempts to effect a union of the churches by subjugating Orthodoxy to the Pope in Rome.
During the early days of Turkish conquest of the Balkans, large numbers of Christians became Muslims (Vakalopoulos, 1970:79). The Sufism of the ghazi conquerors, the akhi brotherhoods, and bektashi missionaries made acceptance of the new order relatively easy. According to Stavrianos,

When the Turks appeared, many of these Christian peasants accepted and even hailed them as deliverers from their unbearable lot. And contemporary evidence indicates that the peasants' lot did improve. Anarchy and terror in the countryside gave way to peace and security. In the place of the former absentee landowners was a new class of small farmers who naturally identified their well-being with Turkish rule (1961:37).

Cole, furthermore, claims that "In accepting Moslem forms of faith a convert from Christianity could easily believe that he was repudiating nothing except the bigotry of his childhood training" (1968:54). Only later, when heterodox Sufism was subordinated to the increased power of the ulema and its brand of conservative Sunni orthodoxy did Ottoman society become less appealing to non-Muslim subjects. Even then, however, large groups of Christians in Albania and in Crete were converted to Islam and assimilated to Turkish society.

Crete, which came under Venetian rule in 1210 as a result of the Fourth Crusade (1204), was conquered by the Turks as late as 1669; thus, the Cretans lived under Venetian-Latin domination for four and a half centuries before being subjugated to Turkish rule for nearly another two and a half centuries. Venetian policy in Crete (as in the Peloponessos when they ruled there) was a combination of mercantile exploitation, heavy taxation, and the suppression of what to them were the heresies of Greek Orthodox forms of worship; despite occasional accommodations, they attempted
to substitute Latin masses and Latin clergy for their Greek equivalents; the Orthodox church in Crete remained weak and, except for envoys, virtually independent of the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate. Though Turkish conquest did bring the Greek Cretans into the Patriarch's ecclesiastical fold, many Cretans converted to Islam at, or shortly after, the conquest. Conversion was particularly appealing to land-owning Cretans who, through conversion to the religion of the dominant group and entry into the "community of equality," could retain their properties and influence."

In areas where Muslim peasants lived in considerable numbers alongside Christian peasants there was an interpenetration of custom and social interaction. On the one hand, many Turkish words entered Greek speech, Turkish cuisine, dress, and institutions such as the coffee house (as the habit of drinking coffee itself) became part of the Greek cultural pattern; on the other, Muslims attended Christian festivals and prayed at Christian shrines, sometimes baptized their children, and participated in the koumbaria by acting as sponsors at Christian marriages or as godparents to Christian children (Stavrianos, 1961:107). Through the frequentation of urban, rural and natural shrines, sanctuaries and tombs, and appeals made to miracle-working ikons, relics and sites dedicated to holy saints and heroes, heterodox Muslim peasants and Greek peasants were able to share much in feeling and practice that was otherwise separated by religious and social boundaries. Christian conversions to the dominant status, whether to avoid sumptuary laws, to avoid the head tax, to avoid losing children through the devshirme, or
to keep property and power which might otherwise be subject to confiscation was, under the circumstances, not difficult, and it is surprising that it was not, indeed, more common.

That tolerance of Christians (and Jews) was not only enjoined by the Quran and the ulema but that Christian separatism in the millet organization was also viewed as advantageous for the supplying of the needs of the State treasury and administration tended to stabilize the relationship between Greeks and Turks and to place a limit on excessive religious zeal for mass conversions by the conquerors. Despite the temporary aberrations of Selim I and Mehmet III, both of whom conceived plans to convert or exterminate all Christian subjects, the need for separation was clearly understood by the Sultans. Treasury money was generally conserved for use in the palace and for the maintenance of a war machine rather than for extensive administrative tasks in governing a vast Empire. Moreover, in the days of Mehmet the Conqueror there were simply not a sufficient number of Muslim government employees to rule over foreign-speaking subject populations which had been acquired in great number and variety since the conquest of the Balkans and were, until the conquest of Asiatic provinces with Muslim populations, in the majority. The central government was Ottoman; the Empire at the local and often at the regional levels was administered indirectly, especially in the Balkans where the Orthodox population, even after Ottoman settlement of Yuruk Turks, was always numerically far greater than the Muslims.

The nature of the Ottoman Ruling Institution required some forced conversion to replenish and expand its personnel; in one sense, the Ruling Institution was one vast recruiting agent. The Ottoman Empire
was not only administered but also defended and expanded by "slaves" (kullan) of the Sultan who were of Christian origin - even to the exclusion of free Muslims by birth. Until the late seventeenth century, with the exception of the Sultan, "every member of the Ruling Institution must have been born a Christian and must have become a Mohammedan" (Lybyer, 1913:62); even the Sultans were often progeny of Greek Circassian, or other ethnic Christian mothers who had been favorites in the Royal harem. The Ottoman ruling class was generally recruited from Christian subjects, particularly from the Balkans; they were conscripted, converted, selected and trained, and advanced to positions according to the needs of the administrative and military establishments and according to the talents displayed by individuals during the period of schooling and training. Ottoman mobility was essentially one of rank and not of inheritance.

All recruits to the Ottoman Ruling Institution were kul, i.e., they were considered to be the personal "slaves" of the Sultan. Adult as well as young slaves were obtained by capture and by purchase, and included South Slavs, Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Russians, Circassians, Greeks, Italians, Frenchmen, and Spaniards. Women were assigned to household tasks and to the harems of the palace and Turkish "nobles;" men were assigned to various military, household and craft duties. But slaves were also obtained through the devshirme, or child-tribute system. Government "recruiters," with a quota for each district, took the best looking and healthiest of available unmarried youths ages twelve to twenty from the Balkan Christian peasantry; at first the
levy was made every four years, but as the needs of the Ruling Institution grew the levy became a yearly exaction. Lybyer estimated that of 8,000 boys trained annually at the time of Suleiman the Magnificent, 3,000 were obtained by the *devshirme*. Eventually these youths were assigned as pages, retainers, attendants, administrators and officials in the palace and administrative services of the State, to the navy, farmed out to Turkish nobility, or assigned to the Janissaries, the crack infantry regulars reorganized by Murad II as the vanguard of further European conquests. "During the period from 1453 to 1623, when the Empire was at its height, only five of the forty-seven Grand Vizirs were of Turkish origin. The remaining forty-two consisted of eleven Albanians, eleven South Slavs, six Greeks, one Circassian, one Armenian, one Georgian, one Italian, and ten of unknown origin" (Stavrianos 1961: 85). Thus, except for the early period of conquests, ethnic boundaries were maintained and mobility out of the subject group prohibited by Sunni doctrine and State policy; some individual mobility, however, was channeled by the State which required Christian recruits who were converted, educated, and trained to fill positions in the government, military, and palace at all levels. These converts acquired Ottoman culture—a distinctive product of fusion.

The Ottoman State supported itself through the plunder of conquest, through land and head taxes, through recruitment of "slaves," and through the appropriation and redistribution of land. Agricultural land in the Balkans was of three kinds. *Miri* belonged to the State (the Sultan) and was distributed to sipahis, officials and favored individuals for their exploitation in return for services to the State. The Turkish
cavalry (sipahis), in particular, were given farmland estates in the
Balkans; by this timar feudal system the Balkan peasants were virt-
ually serfs to the Turkish landlords who were, in general, paternalis-
tic. In the later days of Suleiman's reign (the middle of the six-
teenth century), the system was undermined by tax-farming. The second
major type of land was wakf. This belonged to religious foundations,
both Muslim and non-Muslim, and through constant domination for it was,
with rare exceptions, inalienable. Thus, Orthodox monasteries in
Greece and Macedonia became great landed proprietors with full rights
over their peasant-serf residents and estates (Coles 1968:45). A
third category of land was mulk, or privately owned property. It con-
sisted of houses and gardens, trees (vineyards and orchards) and those
areas in the mountains that were not directly controlled by Turkish
garrisons and, therefore, "autonomous."

When the timar system disintegrated after the reign of Suleiman
the Magnificent concurrently with the increase in tax-farming and un-
controlled exactions, many villages were depopulated. Christian
peasants fled to the mountains to join others who had preceded them.
In Greece, the plains became settlements of the Turks, the mountains
of the Greeks. Greek peasants became increasingly dependent on shep-
herding and subsistence cultivation in the less accessible mountainous
refuge areas. The Greek towns were dehellenized and denationalized.
Turks, Albanians, Jews, and a variety of Balkan merchants dominated
the towns and cities. For example, in the seventeenth century
Thessaloniki, formerly the second city of Byzantium, was composed of
48 Muslim, 56 Jewish, and 16 Greek districts (Vacalopoulos 1963:83).16
By the seventeenth century Ottoman society was far from being the relatively ordered and just system that had been inherited by Suleiman the Magnificent; some of the decay was directly attributable to reforms instituted by Suleiman who had been faced with the problem of financing an Empire that was no longer expanding and therefore at a loss for the considerable State funds and rewards to warriors that derived from plunder. Barth remarks that, "in most political regimes...where there is less security and people live under a greater threat of arbitrariness and violence outside their primary community, the insecurity itself acts as a constraint on inter-ethnic contacts" (1969:36). Migration of Greek peasants was a typical response to growing arbitrariness within the system and consequent insecurity.

For centuries, at least from the time of the Fourth Crusade, Greek intellectuals had migrated to form a Greek diaspora. Again at the time of the Turkish onslaught in the Balkans and especially as a result of the Fall of Constantinople, many Greek intellectuals fled to the West where they persisted in trying to promote a new Crusade and in maintaining the spirit of Hellenism (Zakynthos 1948:297-8). In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Greek peasants joined the diaspora; some migrated to South Italy, Sicily, Corsica, Malta, Dalmatia, and Venetia to found new villages there (Stavrianos 1961: 117-153); others migrated from the towns and plains to refuge areas in the Balkan mountains. Depopulation had proceeded so far that Albanians were allowed to repopulate some areas of Central Greece, the Peloponessos and the islands of Aigina, Hydra, and Spetsai.17
By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Greek attitude toward the Turks had become less ambiguous than during the earlier period of the Pax Ottomanica. It is vividly embodied in Greek folk ballads, such as the following:

The evil Turk came and occupied the land
and overflowed the plains,
But the mountains--these were filled
with brave and handsome men.
(Pontic song, quoted by Vacalopoulos, 1970:230)

In the villages live slaves, in the plains with the Turks,
Hamlets, canyons and desolate places contain the brave men,
Rather than with Turks, it is better to live among wild beasts.

This was also a period of general decline in learning in the Greek monasteries and among parish priests. Some Greeks became Klephts, or brigands—probably more important symbolically as the focus of heroic nationalistic ballads than for their number or direct participation in early rebellions. They did, however, rob the Turks "and sometimes the rich Christian oligarchs and the monks of the well-stocked monasteries, in preference to the poor peasants or the parish priests" and "came to be regarded as champions of the lowly and the downtrodden" (Stavrianos 1961:144).

Following the Treaty of Carlovitz (1699), when the Ottoman Empire suffered its first serious loss of land and prestige, Ottoman diplomacy became more oriented to the increasingly inescapable military and diplomatic pressures from Western Europe. In this crisis the Ottoman resorted to using Phanariot Greeks (a merchant class of Constantinopolitan Greeks) in high positions of administration and diplomacy. Phanariot
Greeks became the Dragomans of the Porte and of the Fleet and after 1716 were also appointed as Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia. These Greeks retained their religious and ethnic identities—so far had the Ottoman system disintegrated since the earlier days of the devshirme!

All the elements for a resurgence of a nationalistic, not strictly Orthodox, consciousness were present by the middle of the eighteenth century. "The period of Ottoman decline in the Balkan lands was characterized also by the rapid development of commerce and industry, with the attendant rise of a class of merchants, artisans, shipowners, and mariners" (Stavrianos 1961: 142). Balkan towns were rehellenized by the presence and prosperity of Greek merchants who developed kin-based commercial networks which extended through the Balkans and into the major trading towns and cities of Central Europe and Southern Russia. Important communities of Greek merchants and intellectuals—for the new middle-class also bred an educational and cultural revival—were to be found in Ragusa (Dubrovnik), Spalato (Split), Durazzo, Venice, Trieste, Vienna, Budapest, Paris, and Odessa by the end of the century. Some of these Greek communities became centers of national consciousness, manifested in publications and propaganda, which began influencing attitudes and behavior in the Balkans, by osmosis and through the activities of secret societies. Aside from the commercial middle class and intellectuals in exile, Phanariot intellectuals, too, influenced by Western-style Neo-Aristotelianism and the ideas of the French philosophes, developed an acute sense of Hellenic "race," an aspect of which was a view of themselves as "the Chosen People" of Orthodoxy.18
The Orthodox Church, under Phanariot control or influence, conducted a conscious program of hellenization of ecclesiastical organization and education in the Balkans—at the expense of Rumanians, Serbs, Bulgarians, and Macedonians. Nevertheless, Greek schools spread literacy making the penetration of Western ideas of the Enlightenment and, eventually, the French Revolution of greater effectiveness. Under Western influence, Aivali, Kula, and some smaller Greek communities were founded on the Aegean coast of Anatolia aimed specifically at a revival of Greek language and education and a hellenization of the interior of Anatolia. The enthusiasm with which this cultural renaissance and nationalistic experiment was embarked on even produced a flurry of voluntary group organization for schools, clubs, and civic activity in Aivali—and observers of contemporary Greek community behavior will understand how extraordinary that was.19

The emerging national consciousness was perhaps epitomized in the career of Adamentios Korais, a Greek intellectual born in Smyrna (Izmir) who lived his adult life, worked and died in Paris. His major contribution to the nationalistic movement was his editing and his commentaries on the ancient Greek Classics, his emphasis on language and literature with which he identified "the nation," and his propagandistic tracts aimed at spreading the ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution among the Greek people. He formulated the ground-rules for a revived "pure" Greek language, by example and by precept, and preached the spirit of Greek nationhood, which he expected his literary and philological works to inspire. His anti-clericalism and attacks on the co-opted Orthodox Church hierarchy precluded his ideas of national ren-
ascence from taking the form of a Byzantine revival or from their being favorably received by the Church hierarchs.

By the time that the Greek revolution did break out in the Balkans, the equating of Orthodoxy with ethnic identity, though far from being a dead letter, was, at least, compromised by the competing identification of the Greeks, as Greeks, with their language, literature, land, and Hellenic past. The conflict between these competing criteria of ethnic identity eventually led to further problems between the Orthodox Church in Independent Greece and the Orthodox Patriarchate which remained under Turkish domination, between the Greeks and the Turks during the exchange of populations following the Greek national disaster of 1922, and between Greek nationals who speak non-Greek mother tongues or are non-Orthodox and the great bulk of the Greek population who are Greek-speaking as well as Orthodox—however, these interesting problems in ethnic assimilation would take us beyond the confines which were set for this paper.
NOTES

1 This paper is a revised and slightly enlarged version of a paper delivered at the American Anthropological Association meeting, November 1970, in San Diego. The notes add qualifications and expansions of some points which could not appropriately be made in the delivered version of the paper.

2 Despite the fact that Anatolia was the core of the revived Medieval Byzantine Empire, many Anatolian peasants were still only nominally Christian. The Seljuk Turks, themselves recent converts to Islam, though avidly Muslim, were heterodox in belief and practice. Thus, acceptance of the religion of the conquerors in this early period was not necessarily a radical "conversion" for the Anatolian peasantry, though presumably more so for the urban populations which were in greater contact with the Orthodox church and doctrines. The invasions of the Turks resulted in the extermination or flight of local populations in many districts. However, absorption of most of the population into Muslim society was even more characteristic.

3 Hellenism in Asia Minor was not totally extinguished by the Seljuks. In parts of Cappadocia, Pisidia and Cilicia, and in the mountains of the Pontos pockets of "Greek" populations survived. Moreover, at least some converts to Islam remained crypto-Christians for several centuries, according to some travellers' reports (Vacalopoulos, 1970: 63,66-68).

4 "Ethnic distinction" of the Greeks did not preclude the hellenization and absorption of other ethnic groups which since the sixth
century had been infiltrating and invading the mainland of Greece in considerable numbers. The Avars, and particularly the Slavs, had penetrated areas as far as the Peloponessos and had settled in some of them. The Slavs left many place names, such as Vostitsa for ancient and present-day Aigion, which have persisted in use until recent times. Also, Albanians, Arvanito-Vlachs and Vlachs, from the fourteenth until the nineteenth centuries, had settled major areas of Northwestern and Central Greece, the Peloponessos and some of the Saronic and Cycladic islands. Though usually remaining linguistically distinct, they participated "as Greeks" in the War of Independence and in the further development of the new nation. As a consequence of extensive Albanian settlement, the Greek national dress up until the twentieth century was the Albania foustanella (pleated skirt) with pom-pommed curved shoes called tsarouchia.

During the early period of Ottoman conquest of the Balkans before the Fall of Constantinople (1453) and before administration of the subject population was regularized, large numbers of Greeks, especially in Thrace and Macedonia, were caught in the Turkish onslaught. Through prior demoralization attendant on the weakness, venality, religious conflicts within the remnants of the Byzantine Empire and prophecies of doom which were widely circulating and which contrasted with the phenomenal success enjoyed by the Turks (interpreted as God's wrath for the immorality and apostasy of Byzantine leaders) and through fear of death or enslavement at the hands of the Turks, many were converted to Islam (Vocalopoulos, 1970:73,79; Stavrianos, 1961:39-41).
To simplify matters, the term "Greece" will be used throughout the paper to refer to those areas which are currently a part of Greece, or the Kingdom of the Hellenes.

The *milet* system of ecclesiastical communities seems to have been formulated by the Abassids to rule over Christian and other non-Muslim populations in the Levant and Mesopotamia. "Muslim rulers had long treated religious minorities within their dominions as *milet*, or nations, allowing them to govern their own affairs according to their own laws and customs, and making the religious head of the sect responsible for its administration and its good behavior towards the paramount power" (Runciman, 1968:167).

*Vacalopoulos* points out that in the fourteenth century all bishops had acquired extensive civil jurisdiction after the judicial reforms of Andronicus III Palaeologus and in particular from the creation of the institution of "general judges" (*catholikoi kritai*) in 1329." (1970:147). Though the reforms set a precedent for the continuation of episcopal jurisdiction during the period of Turkish rule, it was the functioning of the Patriarch as head of the Rum *milet* in the Ottoman system of governance that fully institutionalized the practice of ecclesiastical civil jurisdiction--in the mirror image of the Muslim *milet*.

*Gennadios* was the logical and politically sage choice of Mehmet the Conqueror for the throne of the Patriarchate. He was the leading scholar still to be found in the conquered Byzantine Empire, but more important, he was the leader of the anti-Unionist, anti-Western party within the Church and could be relied on not to intrigue with the West. There was still the possibility that the Pope might be able to organize
sufficient western forces for a Crusade to recapture Constantinople. Gennadios was treated with honors and personally given the insignia of office by Mehmet (Runciman, 1968:168-169).

10 The oral tradition of Mavrikion, a village-community in the Northwestern Peloponessos, in which the author lived, preserves a miracle-story regarding the vengeance exacted by the Andrikopoulos brothers when one of them was killed for resisting the droit de seigneur demanded by a local Turkish Pasa.

11 Special exemptions to this general restriction were occasionally granted. Thessaloniki, Ioannina, and some other Greek settlements that capitulated received in return certain rights and privileges. The "Order of Sinan Pasa, preserved in Greek, states, "The bells of the churches will continue to ring. The Metropolitan will retain his judicial prerogatives and all other ecclesiastical rights, and nobles will be allowed to keep their fiefs. Ancestral rights, property and personal possessions will be guaranteed without question, and anything else you ask for will be granted" (Runciman, 1968:148-149).

12 Whereas many Greeks adopted Turkish style dress, including pantaloons and turban, laws, rather than mere custom, insured that dimnis would not be confused with the "true believers." Gold or gaudy colors were forbidden in Greek dress; Greeks wore long black over-robcs and blue (or blue and white) turban cloths wrapped around a tall black cap (Jews wore yellow turbans) in contrast to the Muslim white turban. After independence wealthy Greeks vied with each other in the elaboration of their dress with gold and silver embroidery and in the non-functional elaboration in silver of their weapons.
The leader of a Shi'a sect, Ismail Safavi, put together an army and expanded his area of rule from 1499. The extension of Ismail's control took the form of a blitzkrieg so that by 1506 the entire Iranian plateau and by 1508 most of Iraq too had become part of a new Safavid Empire. The new regime was avidly Shi'i, and not only threatened the Sunni Ottoman Empire militarily on its Eastern borders, but threatened the Ottomans from within due to widespread sympathy for Shi'a doctrine among the dervish orders and among the janissaries (Cole, 1968:64-68).

"As in Asia Minor, many property owners espoused Islam with the intention of obtaining certain social and material advantages. Religious conversions in continental Greece and in other Balkan lands seem to have been on as large a scale as in Asia Minor" (Vacalopoulos, 1970:79).

Part of the Imperial Household was set aside as a harem, which was the sphere of the secluded women and the eunuchs that guarded them. The wives (in earlier times), concubines (kadıns), imperial children, mothers, and women slaves of various kind (invariably foreigners) constituted a complex society of the harem and could occasionally exert great influence on the Sultans. Though these women only rarely, and then with special permission, left the confines of the harem, some, as favorite concubines or as mother of a Sultan (Valide Sultan), were highly respected and powerful. Mehmet the Conqueror's deeply respected stepmother was the daughter of George Brankovic, Despot of Serbia, his Greek wife was Irene Cantacuzena (widow of Murad II). Suleiman the Magnificent's favorite kadın was the Christian Russian Hoselana. Other kadıns and valide of power were Greek, Circassian, and Venetian (Gibb and Bowen, 1957: pt. I: 74-75; Runciman, 1968: 184).
The high proportion of Jews in Thessaloniki was not characteristic in other Greek cities, though significant communities of Jews also resided in Thebes and Chalkis. A small minority of Jews had lived in the Balkans since antiquity; Paul's visit to Corinth was to spread the gospel among the Jews. Before the Fall of Constantinople Jews had already won the favor of the earlier Sultans and were not subject to sumptuary laws until Christians were forced to conform to them. Jews constituted a miliot and the Chief Rabbi as head of the miliot was, in theory, ranked next to the head of the ulema and before the Patriarch. The conditions of the Jews became somewhat less favorable after the Fall of Constantinople but the Conqueror and later Sultans encouraged their settling within the Empire. The conditions of Jews in the Ottoman Empire "contrasted so strikingly with those imposed on them in various parts of Christendom that the fifteenth century witnessed a large influx of Jews into the Sultan's dominions" (Gibb and Bowen, 1957:217)—especially following 1492 when Spanish Jews fled the Inquisition, forming the communities of ladino-speaking Jews in Thessaloniki, Istanbul, and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire.

The presence of large numbers of Albanians was not new at this time. Their presence in Thessaly was noted before 1318, and they continued infiltrating under the Catalans. In 1382 large numbers of Albanian nomadic settlers appeared in Attica and in 1394 10,000 Albanian men, women, children, and their animals entered the Peloponessos which was then under the Palaeologoi (Vocalopoulos, 1970:7, 10; Stavrianos, 1961:98).
The development of a strong and specifically Hellenic consciousness among some Greeks under Ottoman domination in the eighteenth century is strikingly parallel to the emergence of Hellenism among some Greeks under Frankish domination five centuries earlier. The term Hellene used by Greeks to refer to themselves reemerged after 700 years during which time it had been used to refer to the pagan Greeks of the past. The imperial courts-in-exile in the Despotate of Ipiros and in the Empire of Nicaea in competition with each other for eventual succession to the restored Byzantine Empire when it would be wrested from the Franks, vied in intellectual and cultural activities, as well as political, to be the bearer of the Greek mantle from antiquity to their day. At this time Hellene was widely adopted to replace the term Romaioi. These developments continued with some interruptions and resistance (e.g. the Hesychast movement) under the Palaeologoi so that the words Hellene and Hellas came into use in conjunction with the word nation. (Vacalopoulos, 1970:27-45). (On these developments one should also consult a recent work which came to my attention too late for inclusion: S. Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism: University of California Press, 1970).

The examples of Ambelakia and Aivali, perhaps because of their brief though remarkable successes, contrast all the more strikingly with the general lack of any sustained cooperative efforts in Greek communal life. The paucity of cooperative social forms, or even cooperative activities, on a community rather than a person-to-person level is, however, characteristic not only of Greek social structure but has been noted as characteristic of traditional society throughout the Mediterranean.
The animus of Greek political life throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was "The Megali Idea" (The Great Idea) which was to restore Greece to its earlier greatness, such as under the Medieval Byzantine Empire, or, at least, to include in the Greek State all those areas in which Greeks still lived and which were still under Ottoman or Turkish domination—or in some regions held by Great Britain, Albania, Bulgaria, and Italy. On the conclusion of World War I, the allied powers stalled or reneged on their promises to Greece for her entry in the war, and with betrayal by France imminent due to her new interests in Turkey, the Greeks used Smyrna (Izmir) as their base for their Anatolian "Adventure" to capture the hinterland. Miscalculations of the relative strength of the Greek and Turkish forces led to a Greek disaster and the flight or slaughter of much of the Greek Anatolian population. This was followed by international arbitration and an agreement on a massive exchange of populations, mainly between Greece and Turkey, but also with Bulgaria (Ladas, 1932; Stavrianos, 1961:587-589).
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