Chapter 4, The Maintenance of Ethnic Identity in Catalonia

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Ethnic groups--nationalities is perhaps a better term--preceded the nation-state historically, and interethnic relations antedate international relations. In the medieval world, a multiplicity of languages, dialects, and local cultural traditions were taken for granted and caused little comment; in no way were they incompatible with the ties of personal allegiance which peasant owed to lord and lord to king. Regional rights and regional legal structures were, at least ideally, recognized and protected by the crown. Pluralism was the rule rather than the exception.

With respect to language, diversity was seen as falling squarely within the natural order: it might be unfortunate that men spoke different tongues, but this was attributed to human imperfection and perversity.

This is not to imply an absence of ethnic conflict, but apart from the inhabitants of frontier regions and those individuals whose professions involved travel, very few men were in a position to experience protracted contact with different ethnic groups. Interethnic contact was certainly limited, and interethnic conflict was seldom elevated to a political cause.
In the contemporary Western world, however, the nation-state has become the structure to which the individual is expected to give his undivided allegiance. From the Renaissance to the present, the history of Europe suggests that the national directing elites distrust pluralism and view the monoethnic state as the ideal goal. With only a little exaggeration, post-medieval political philosophy could well be paraphrased as *one state, one language, one culture*.\(^2\) It is vital to recognize that this is something of a constant. Although the monoethnic ideal has its origins in the royal absolutism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, monarchists and republicans, liberals and conservatives, traditionalists and rationalists, all agreed on the virtues of a strong centralized state. The French Revolution did more to combat regionalism, branded in its linguistic aspects with the disparaging label of "patois" (from Poitiers in the Limousin), than all the royal governments of the ancien régime.

Modern political ideologies appear late on the scene and have been superimposed on an existing mosaic of cultural and linguistic diversity. It is somewhat paradoxical that the same forces which contributed so much to the molding of conscious nationality at the center—the erosion of traditional society, social and economic change, and the displacement of traditional elites by new middle sectors—also transformed the old ties of language, institutions, residence, and community, into aspirations for distinct regional identities. Paradoxical, perhaps, but none the less understandable, since the periphery and the center were influenced by much the same philosophies, read the same tracts, and stirred to similar symbols. As Fishman (1967:94) has noted:
Here we find a consciousness of national history, with its heroes and martyrs and national missions, national grievances, national ideals. Here we find a distinction between religion and nationality, even when everyone (or almost everyone) is of the same religion (or irreligion). Here we find pride in national literature with its poets and novelists and with its literary schools, periods and styles. Here we find a consciousness of national language, with its avowed beauty, subtlety and precision. Language...becomes something to love, to fight for, to live for, to die for; something to safeguard, to develop, to enrich....

The difference lies in the frame of reference. The nationalism of ethnic communities pits itself against the weight and power of the state; nationalism at the center is for the most part forged in the fires of foreign wars and the power struggles of international relations. These similarities highlight an essential truth: there is nothing archaic or atavistic in the evolution of ethnic-regional demands. In fact, a good case can be made that in Europe modern regionalism is to a substantial degree a postindustrial phenomenon (Cruells 1969:9). Certainly the recognition of ethnicity and language consciousness has tended to follow the disintegration of traditional society, however much it may look to the past for charters of validation (Huntington 1968; Silvert 1963).

Manifestations of this order may strike the casual observer as somewhat quaint (or even dangerously misguided) at a time when nationalism is often dismissed as an aberration of less enlightened times. However, even the most cursory examination of third world politics, minority aspirations in the United States, and conditions in present-day Europe, indicate that the tides of nationalism continue to run very strong. In fact, not a few European ethnic communities regard themselves as victims of a form of internal colonialism. That the world
at large has generally been slow to see matters in quite this light is
at least in part attributable to the fact that many states have minor-
ity problems of their own. Anticolonialism of the traditional type
directs attention to overseas dependencies (or spheres of influence)
and allows governments, including many with anti-minority policies, to
reap propaganda benefits in the current world political situation. Sup-
port, even of a moral and non-material nature, of ethnic enclaves within
the political borders of another state is an enterprise that few govern-
ments are willing to undertake.

For these reasons, within-country interethnic conflict in Europe
has enjoyed low visibility. But this is much less true today than it
was a few years ago. Just at a time when Europe is witnessing a decay
of traditional nationalism and frontiers are increasingly regarded as
vestiges of the past (the "age of mass consumption" is in part respon-
sible for these changes), there is reawakening in various European
states of internal regional and national rivalries and aspirations. We
see this in Ulster and in the hostility between Flemings and Walloons
in Belgium; the threat of Slovak secession helped the Russians to crush
Czech resistance in 1968; Cyprus is a land divided; in Yugoslavia the
Croats still fear Serbian imperialism; the Bretons and other French
minorities are uneasy under the control of Paris. It would seem that
the winds of change in Europe are favoring both integration on the
grand scale and the reemergence of a localism that has in many cases
remained dormant for the better part of a century (Fontaine 1971).
II

Catalan regionalism and the cultural and psychological mechanisms which Catalans use to maintain identity and cultural integrity are to a certain degree type phenomena which can be duplicated among other Spanish minorities as well as elsewhere in Europe. These situational and functional parallels have not gone unnoticed in Catalonia (Porcel 1970a), but there remain factors, some longstanding, others more recent, that are peculiar to the region and its history.

Catalans are concentrated in the northeastern triangle of the Iberian peninsula and the adjoining French region of Roussillon. Catalans in Spain number some six million inhabitants in a total population of thirty-three million. Given that the national census (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, or INE) does not collect information on linguistic affiliation or cross-tabulate data on place of birth and place of residence, the figures for Catalan speakers which are to be found in the literature must be regarded as informed estimates (Melia 1970:79-80; Maluquer 1965: 135-136; Moll 1968).3 Six million, or something close to it, is not an insignificant linguistic bloc (on the order of Swedish or Bulgarian) but it still constitutes very much of a minority within the Spanish total.

Industrialization is old in the region. The outlines of an industrial society, based originally on textiles, can be discerned as early as the latter part of the eighteenth century. By 1850, Catalonia was experiencing a local variant of the industrial revolution (Vicens Vives 1969: 147-148). Today, Catalonia remains the leading industrial region of Spain, although the disparities between zones of early industrialization (the Basque lands and Catalonia) and the rest of the country are shrinking.
The early development of a modern industrial base in Catalonia is a factor of some significance. In many parts of Europe regional sentiments have been linked to conditions of economic deprivation and general underdevelopment. Catalonia, however, is the opposite to an underdeveloped zone. One consequence of this is that the "brain drain" which has attended provincialization in other countries—the migration of the skilled and the educated to national capitals and other centers of development and employment—is not a major problem in the region. The middle class is substantial and autochthonous, while Barcelona, the regional capital, is fully metropolitan, demographically and otherwise (Saez Buesa 1968: Alzina Caules 1966).

Spain, as Juan Linz (1966:270) has observed, is a land of great internal heterogeneity, not only of the ethnic-regional variety, but also with respect to social composition, levels of development, and the values and attitudes of its constituent regions and sectors. In the taxonomy that Linz (1966:289) proposes, Catalonia falls into the category of "Bourgeois Spain":

an area characterized by a low proportion of unskilled workers—few in the countryside and not too many in the cities—but with a sufficient number of workers to reduce the proportion of those in nonmanual, that is, middle class, occupations in the cities and towns. In it businessmen, managers, technicians, salesmen, and white collar employees constitute a significant part of the middle class.

Working-class institutions, including trade unions and similar associations, have a history of several generations, the first legal trade unions and mutual aid societies in Spain having been organized by Catalan textile workers in 1840 (Izard 1970: 62). By 1917 almost
30,000 workers in the Barcelona area were enrolled in a variety of trade unions, cooperatives, and mutual aid societies (Jutglar 1966).

The urban social structure of Catalonia is modern in the sense that both its elites and working classes are very much products of the transformations that accompanied industrialization. The rural pattern is different, but again somewhat atypical for the Mediterranean. Rural aristocracies were never as firmly entrenched in Catalonia (and other northern regions of Spain) as they were in the rest of the country. Thus, two features typical of southern Spain, the concentration of rural property in a very few large estates and the presence of agrotowns inhabited by masses of landless laborers, are singularly absent (Malefakis 1970: 93-130).

If one of the underlying problems in Spain is lack of national integration due to disparities in regional development, a somewhat similar cleavage has characterized urban-rural articulation in Catalonia. Historically, peasants have felt threatened by a variety of forces emanating from the city: the power of expanding capitalism, the radical political philosophies of the urban proletariat, and the cultural paternalism of the intellectuals. Catalan peasants share with Catalan townsmen a suspicion of state centralization, but for the peasant, the dangers from the center are not the only ones (Hansen 1969).

It would appear that on a variety of counts the cultural configurations of the region do not easily fit recognized categories of classification. Catalans, and perhaps most fervently Catalan intellectuals, regard themselves as a Mediterranean people, perhaps in counterpoise to the essentially inland Castilians. Historically, the fortunes of
Catalonia and related principalities (jointly the Kingdom of Aragon) were linked to trans-Mediterranean trade and political and military influence extending as far east as Sicily and Greece. Catalan medieval high culture had its closest affinities with Provence and Aquitaine. The climatic regime of coastal Catalonia and the arboreal and field crops grown within this zone are clearly Mediterranean.

Nevertheless, some scholars classify contemporary Catalonia as a non-Mediterranean region (Pitkin 1963: 120). Perhaps this is due to a perception of Mediterranean societies as somewhat akin to Sjoberg's (1960) pre-industrial urban-oriented polities: rigidly hierarchial, traditional, administratively centralized, personalistic, and needless to say, maintained on the surpluses skimmed from a subordinate peasantry (Morris 1968: 39-61). A social and cultural entity that is both "Mediterranean" and "developed" is apparently difficult to conceptualize, almost, in fact, a contradiction in terms.

Be this as it may, it is perfectly true that in many respects the social structure of Catalonia finds its closest parallels in Western Europe, and within Spain, the Basque Country. Systems of patronage, dyadic relations, and other interpersonal networks are important, as they are in other Mediterranean lands. Much less evident is the emphasis on codes of honor and shame (Peristiany 1966), a system of values that has been linked to a paucity of institutional ties and the compensatory development of family solidarity (Schneider 1971). Not that family and kin are without importance in Catalonia, but rather that organizational problems are resolved in a variety of ways, of which kin-based structures is only one.
Given the frame of reference we have developed, Catalan nationalism must bridge the interests of diverse groups. Ideally, it should appeal not only to the bourgeoisie, but also to the industrial working classes and to a basically conservative peasantry. The presence of class alignments add an extra dimension to what would otherwise be a simple dichotomy between the state and the region, the center and the periphery.

Also, one cannot escape the impression that Catalans are too prone to dismiss the potential "Ulster" in their midst, the very substantial non-Catalan working-class and lower-class enclaves of Castilian-speaking immigrants and their descendants. The argument that this minority within a minority can, given the right conditions, be assimilated with few problems smacks of wishful thinking and is not borne out by similar historical cases (Kloss 1967).

Finally, any appraisal of Catalan society must take into account the fact that the region is something of a developed enclave within a largely semideveloped country. That this situation colors the perception of Catalans and acts as a further point of friction between Catalans and non-Catalans cannot be doubted. The truth of the matter is that Catalans engage in the same type of stereotyping, indulge in the same sort of harsh judgement, with respect to Spaniards from underdeveloped provinces, as the inhabitants of Lombardy reserve for Sicilians and other southern Italians. In much the same way as the Milanese look across the Alps to Lyon and South Germany, the Catalan middle classes claim a greater affinity with trans-Pyrenean Europe than with Extremadura and Andalusía.
That the economic prosperity of Catalonia has in substantial degree been gained by the importation of cheap labor is recognized by only a minority of Catalans.

III

It may be said that for Catalans language is the prime symbol of group membership and the clearest line of demarcation separating them from other Spaniards. From the other side of the linguistic fence, Catalan is a constant reminder of regional particularism. One can understand, therefore, why Catalan and its uses, the efforts made to nurture it in what continues to be a largely hostile environment, and its prospects for the future, remain matters of deep concern.

Today, most Catalans, certainly most Catalan intellectuals, would agree that the language is in deep crisis, that the odds are heavy, and the struggle is bound to be difficult. These fears find expression in the words of a Catalan linguist:

We have always said that the countryside is our reserve, but today it is very undermined by television, a medium which is very influential... I know small children who are just beginning to talk who learn many of their first words from television. If it were not that we now again have books in Catalan, that the records have helped us so much, that everyday the educational levels are rising, I would see things as very hopeless. Matters have come very close, but I believe that it is not too late.

(Porcel 1970b:21)

Television, of course, is in Castilian. The reference to records concerns the current nova canço (new song) movement. Opinions of the same type have been voiced by informants. According to one young professional:
Even the best intentioned non-Catalans are apt to chide us for what they regard as our stubbornness. We are told that the use of a minority language breeds a ghetto mentality and a ghetto culture. Some say that we are going against the times, that to be burdened by a minority language is a luxury we can ill afford. Other observers sing the praises of bilingualism, but what they generally mean is that we should be fluent in Castilian. Actually, we are already bilingual in a rather special sense: most of us read and write Castilian considerably better that we do Catalan; most of us speak Catalan better than we do Castilian. Believe me, it is not always a very comfortable situation.

This fear of language loss is not without historical precedent. We would not claim that the events of the past influence the current perception of all speakers of Catalan, but for what we may call the literate members of a literate society, history offers models that are readily at hand. In the middle ages Catalan was the language of the peasantry, but flourished also as a major court and literary language. In short, while there were discernible differences between "common" and "polite" speech (as well as local dialectal differences), all segments of society spoke the same basic language.

Late in the fifteenth century the Catalan language entered a long period of decline which was to last until the second half of the nineteenth century. The factors responsible were many and need not be examined in detail. They included catastrophic wars and a series of internal calamities, both social and economic. To some degree these were events peculiar to the region, while in part they also reflected a more general decline in Mediterranean principalities (Reglì 1966).

In 1469 Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Aragon, married Isabella, the heiress of Castile. The union of the two crowns resulted in a shift
in the center of political gravity. In the following centuries, the Kingdom of Aragon underwent changes which transformed an important Mediterranean state into a dependent principality and finally into a cluster of Spanish provinces.

The Catalan directing classes, in particular the higher aristocracy, adjusted to this change by becoming monolingually Castilian, or more commonly, applying a diglossic formula (Ferguson 1959; Fishman 1967; Vallverdú 1970b; Badia i Margarit 1964: 135-148). Catalan might be retained for intimate and personal contexts—the family correspondence of the Borgias is written in Catalan—but Castilian was reserved for serious events and important occasions.

The emergence of Spain as a world power, including her initial dominant role in the New World, coincided with a florescence in Spanish letters, a factor which could not but influence the prestige of the Castilian language. The evidence indicates that it was these determinants and influences, rather than conscious state policies, which by default left the peasantry as the chief guardians of the Catalan language. The realization that in centuries past the elites rather willingly (or at least without much evident resistance) discarded their linguistic patrimony continues to haunt educated Catalans.

The industrialization of Catalonia ushered in a period of cultural and linguistic renaissance, La Renaixença. Initially a movement concerned with literary revival and the formulation of modern grammatical and orthographic rules, it merged in due course with Catalanisme, a more consciously political philosophy which drew support and momentum from the rising bourgeoisie. Such efforts at cultural revitalization linked with
a growing political awareness and nationalist aspirations were not unusual for the Europe of the period. In common with most nineteenth century nationalist movements, Catalanisme was basically conservative-reformist in orientation; it certainly did not emphasize social and political solutions of a radical nature (Solé-Tura 1967). Stress was placed on the reacquisition of some degree of local autonomy and the value of the local language and local institutions. We may take as representative of the demands of the period a petition forwarded by a commission of Catalan notables to Alfonso XII in 1885:

What we desire, Sir, is that in Spain there be implemented an adequate regional system... similar to those found in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain; a system already followed in Spain in the years of our greatness. We wish this not only for Catalonia but for all the other provinces of Spain... Our administrative structures have been destroyed... We cannot use our language except in the home and in familiar conversation... strong attempts are being made to destroy, or at least weaken, our civil rights, which are the basic foundation of the robust and moral Catalan family and of our property....

(Quoted by Jutglar 1969:177)

However, by the early decades of the twentieth century, Catalanisme had sufficiently broadened its base of participation to include substantial segments of the industrial working class and the peasantry. A number of political parties covering the spectrum from conservative to left-of-center subscribed to a core of basic demands, a situation made easier by the fact that tests of ideological purity were never entrenched as part of the Catalanist philosophy. Catalanisme could, and did, shelter such diverse groups as conservative businessmen, middle-class professionals
and intellectuals, socialist workers, and peasant smallholders. Some political parties were frankly regionalist in orientation, but no single party was in the position of being able to claim that it represented the interest of everyone within the region.

This is not to deny that there was a good deal of factionalism in the Catalonia of the nineteen twenties and the nineteen thirties. As in the rest of Spain, these were years of strife and civil war. What may be termed the Catalan coalition was splintered under the stresses of conflicting political philosophies and the pressures of the Civil War, but not before the four Catalan provinces had experienced limited home rule and the opportunity to exercise cultural autonomy within the framework of the Spanish Republic.

The Republican defeat in the Civil War was followed by a period of political, cultural, and linguistic repression. The Catalan language press, which numbered 400 periodicals of all political shades in 1930, was closed down; the use of Catalan in the schools and the university was proscribed; all official business had again to be transacted in Castilian. It is not necessary to claim that the years of the Republic represent some kind of golden age for the people of Catalonia; sufficient that many Catalans are of the opinion that the Republican experiment pointed the way to a better future, although a great number of important problems remained to be resolved.

All such hopes appeared to collapse with the Republican defeat of 1939. The Catalonia of the early seventies is certainly not the same as the Catalonia of the early forties. Pressures have been eased and the physical conditions of life have improved for substantial segments
of the population. There is still no Catalan language press (with the exception of a few magazines), but on the other hand a recent catalogue of Catalan books in print (INLE 1969) numbers over 4,000 titles; television and radio remain virtually monolingual, but records of Catalan music, including modern "protest" works, enjoy a brisk trade. Education at all levels is conducted in Castilian, although a new educational law currently under consideration includes provisions for the use of regional languages in the schools. Censorship of the written word has relaxed, but remains as a background threat. It need hardly be pointed out that no formal political opposition is permitted in Catalonia, or elsewhere in Spain, and that stringent limitations are placed on assembly and the activities of political groups and other associations.

This is not to say that some outlets cannot be found for cultural-political expression. Given the current restrictions, the usual technique is to utilize whatever loopholes are to be found in the legal structure and make the best possible use of a limited range of institutional and interpersonal structures. An examination of the techniques in vogue, and the tactical gains which such techniques allow, will occupy the remaining portion of this essay.

IV

Before 1939, the forms and content of ethnic and political expression were, like the social and economic structures of the region, of the type that one might expect to encounter in an essentially modern industrial society. Ethnic identity did draw on ancient images and, as is the case with most cultural revivals, contained a mixture of antiquarian, contemporary, and progressive themes. Nevertheless, it would be wrong
to view Catalans as an ethnic group operating in a traditional context. What strikes the observer is the organized quality of Catalan ethnic life prior to 1939, the interest in politics and the range of political parties, the educational institutions, and the cultural-ethnic associations which flourished during the first four decades of the present century.

Some ethnic groups are aided in the maintenance of their identity by reason of isolation or dependence upon a given environment (Barth 1969:19; Blom 1969), but no such factors are discernible in present-day Catalonia. Even the concept of the Catalans as a strictly geographic enclave is hardly warranted. As already noted, many non-Catalans reside within the geographic confines of Catalonia, also, substantial Catalan communities are to be found abroad, mostly in Western Europe and Latin America.

Ethnicity for Catalans is above all a matter of ascription and identification: one is a Catalan because one feels oneself to be and is recognized as such by other members of the ethnic group. Outsiders, both foreigners and in some instances even non-Catalan nationals, are hard put to recognize the full range of cultural codes which Catalans utilize to signal group membership. In part, this is a function of the "low profile" which Catalans maintain with respect to activities of an ethnic-nationalist nature, but it is also evidence of the fact that Catalans have for centuries formed part of the larger social, political and economic structures which constitute Spain.

These common cultural attributes hinder the identification of regional traits and patterns, but more than this, the appearance of commonality is reinforced by externally imposed regulations which limit
or prohibit some of the standard expressions of cultural difference. We have already commented on the control of the mass media. In much the same way, street names and advertisements, and virtually all those highly visible indicators that one tends to associate with a distinct cultural and linguistic tradition in a complex society, are rendered in Castilian. If we add to this the observation that Catalans will almost automatically address the obvious stranger in Castilian, it is not surprising that many foreigners can traverse the length of Catalonia without becoming aware that the natives regard themselves as distinct from other Spaniards.

It is nevertheless possible to distinguish at least three levels or modes of cultural affirmation. The first is essentially symbolic and involves the individual use of recognized cultural idioms. The second entails a more formal organizational commitment—working with others—but typically the ethnic-political aims of such groups are not readily apparent. Finally, there are organizations that operate underground and are legally proscribed. I will deal only with the first two categories since they have greater currency and there arise some obvious ethical questions that limit discussion of the third.

An individual may express his ethnic identity in a multitude of ways. Speaking Catalan, reading Catalan books, and listening to Catalan records are in themselves affirmations of ethnicity. Many middle-class Catalans not only make it a point to speak the language, but support their actions by citing inconsistencies in the current situation. For example, quite a few informants were aware that Spain is a signatory of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 1960
UNESCO Convention on discrimination in education. Each of these instruments has some bearing on language use and broader questions of cultural pluralism and the protection of minority rights. In somewhat the same category fall the efforts that have been made to exploit the Vatican guidelines on the use of the vernacular in religious observances and other activities. Most often cited are the recommendations of Vatican II and the Papal encyclical *Pacem in terris*.

Religion also offers a number of visual signals that carry an ethnic message, such as medals or medallions featuring St. George, patron of Catalonia, or the Virgin on Montserrat, a shrine closely associated with ethnic aspirations. More obvious are jewelry items and decals elaborated around the Catalan flag. At times affirmations of this kind are carried off with a certain wry humor, as in the case of a taxi driver who had affixed a notice to the back of the front seat informing the passenger: "I speak French and German," and in much larger type, "I ALSO SPEAK CATALAN."

Before examining groups and associations that engage in activities designed to further ethnic goals, some further elaboration on the Catalan middle class and the patterns of interaction of its members is in order. The reader will bear in mind that it is from this social stratum that most of the field information for this essay is derived. Although we have previously stressed that Catalans are group-oriented—they share with Americans a certain propensity to be "joiners"—the local middle class lends itself beautifully to the operation of linkages of a less formal kind, what have been variously described as networks, quasi groups, action-sets, and cliques (Mayer 1966; Barnes 1954; Frankenberg 1966: 242; Wolf 1966: 15). Coalitions of this sort are more loosely
structured and are functionally less specific than entities designed for a particular purpose.

Catalonia is a society with a small and relatively homogenous elite inhabiting a circumscribed physical and social space. Under such conditions a village-like situation arises—I have heard Barcelona referred to as a "small handkerchief"—that mitigates against anonymity and makes it possible for almost everyone to know everyone else. In the case of strangers from within the middle class it is generally the work of minutes to establish common ground on the basis of a third person known to both individuals.

A number of standard mechanisms are used in establishing affinity: family name and kin (facilitated by the Spanish system of using both patronym and matronym); region of origin; school and university experience; profession and professional associations. Virtually all middle-class Catalans have attended private secondary schools and the vast majority of university graduates have been trained at the University of Barcelona.

Needless to say, such networks lend themselves to a variety of uses and functions, for instance, brokerage and patronage, which fall outside the scope of our present consideration (Wolf 1956; Adams 1970). At the same time, though, they offer an interrelational field within which expression and discussion may be conducted with few fears of outside intervention. I could not escape the impression that the very difficulties inherent in establishing and maintaining associations of a more formal nature has led to a situation in which much activity bearing on ethnicity and nationalism takes place in loosely structured, sometimes ad hoc, networks and cliques. Formal groups are easier to identify and public
meetings require official permits, although this stipulation can be circumvented in a number of ways. But, to cite one example, it is simply not feasible for the authorities to regulate something like the traditional penya, the weekly informal get-together held at some bar or restaurant. The penya has a fairly flexible membership, say a dozen individuals, typically all males. Apart from the congeniality of eating and drinking, exchanging gossip and catching up with the news, the penya provides an excellent forum for political discussion. Since everyone knows everyone else, or at least each individual has established firm bona fides, the atmosphere is relaxed and talk is spirited.

Catalan ethnic identity is also maintained through more formal channels. The trick is to develop groups and associations able to skirt the regulations limiting rights of assembly. Typical of such entities are outing and excursion clubs, folk dance and folk song groups, cinema clubs, and alumnae associations. All such collectivities have one characteristic in common: there is considerable disparity between purported functions and actual aims. Thus, a cinema group may be established for the apparent purpose of showing movies, and in fact, movies are shown; but following the presentation there is a period of discussion, and since "discussion" is broadly interpreted, it is likely to range far beyond cinematographic techniques and the talents of the actors. The over-all approach has been described as follows:

The gambit with us has always been the same: take measures and approaches that are very modest and legal and build on them. What we say is this: "Tread carefully so as not to scare the hare, then catch it before it wakes!" Once we have our foot in the door it is too late for the authorities to do much about it. Thus with song, our big break
came when Raimon [a leading Catalan folk singer] won the first prize at the Mediterranean Song Festival [Barcelona 1967]. The authorities suddenly realized what was going on, but they had lost the game. They then tried to apply pressure and make life difficult for us, but one is never pushed back all the way. And, of course, as soon as performers are known outside the country they develop a certain international following and thus a degree of immunity.

The Catholic Church in Catalonia is difficult to categorize, but one thing is certain: it is not monolithic, either in attitude or organization. At the risk of simplification, we can say that it includes a conservative-traditional (even reactionary) component basically in agreement with the regime, a more progressive wing drawing its inspiration from Christian Democracy and related movements, and an element in tune with the new wave of radical Catholicism that is presently so much in evidence throughout Western Europe, Latin America, and the United States. This division, which barely sketches out the diversity of opinion within the church, is not, of course, limited to Catalonia, but may be found throughout Spain.

Within Catalonia, though, the progressive components, made up mostly of the younger clergy, but including also some established churchmen, have strongly supported regional aspirations. Since the end of the Civil War, the Monastery of Montserrat has been a focal point of resistance and an enduring symbol of local independence. In the years immediately following the Civil War, when the possibilities of cultural and political expression were really limited, many Catalans made the pilgrimage to Montserrat where the monks openly defied the ban on the use of the Catalan language in the pulpit.

The authorities have at times strongly reacted to such manifestations of ethnic and political opposition. Priests and monks have been
exiled and imprisoned and on May 11, 1966, the Policia Armada (a national gendarmerie) attacked a silent march of 130 priests and monks which was making its way from the Cathedral of Barcelona to police headquarters in order to deliver a letter of protest concerning police brutality (Anon. 1966).

Still, and taking into account the very evident dangers of opposition, the church does fall outside the normal areas of government control and consequently constitutes a kind of privileged sanctuary. As a case in point, there are some twenty associations of the lay apostolate in Catalonia, associations recruited from a local base and catering to local needs. Similarly, the greater freedom of church-related organizations from government censorship and other forms of interference has made possible the publication of books and magazines of a kind which no private publishing house would dare to print.

The use of religious organizations in the furtherance of ethnic and political demands is a variant of the technique examined earlier in this section. There is little doubt that everyone understands what is being done, but the regime, which in part bases its claim to legitimacy on a supposed defense of Catholic Christianity, must tread with some care when faced with an opposition that can quote the pope and work within the context of established and recognized ecclesiastical organizations.

The mechanisms which we have described so far all have a direct bearing on ethnic identity. The ethnic factor may not always be readily evident, in fact it may be subsumed or hidden rather than manifest for the very good reason that direct expressions of ethnicity carry the danger of repression. But having stripped away such protective coloration,
the message is clear. Very different, and even harder to recognize without some knowledge of local sentiments, is a phenomenon of displacement or identification that leads Catalans to champion the causes of minority groups other than their own.

There are two non-Catalan groups, the Basques and the Israelis (and by extension Jews in general), that seem to enjoy a psychological special relationship in Catalonia. That the Basques are admired should come as no surprise, but an understanding of the admiration that is felt for Jews and Israelis is initially more puzzling.

Again and again this past summer (1970) informants expressed the deepest regard for Israel and vocally identified with the Jewish experience of suffering and persecution, cultural revitalization, and eventual success in the face of great odds. In contrast to this, Spanish official policy is strongly pro-Arab. The regime does not maintain full diplomatic relations with Israel (no links at the ambassadorial level), but ambassadors are accredited to every major Arab capital. Reactions to the Six Day War cast further light on Catalan attitudes and the gulf separating these attitudes from official government policy. While the Spanish press, no doubt following official guidelines, was generally hostile to Israel, two hundred Catalan intellectuals issued a signed manifesto supporting the Israeli cause.

Strong pro-Israeli feelings are especially marked among the young who, unlike a number of their American age mates, seem to have been little influenced by the mystique of Palestinian guerrillas. In a region where the Israelis lack anything in the way of a natural constituency—there are but a few thousand native-born Jews in all Catalonia—it is surprising to find so many young men and women who dance the hora, sing
Hebrew songs, evidence more than a casual knowledge of Israeli culture, and consume a steady stream of literature with Jewish and Israeli themes. Basques and Israelis are not the only two nationalities or ethnic groups that find emotional support in Catalonia, but they are the two most favored, the two most respected.

Taken together, all these techniques of resistance add up to holding actions, or at the best, tactical victories of a largely symbolic form—an affirmation that "something is being done." Responses of this kind are typical of situations where the organizations of a subordinate group have been proscribed, and where militant (or too overt) activity by the subordinate group is kept in check by force or threat of force.

The cultural codes used to assert ethnic difference and political opposition, the two being virtually synonymous, are well understood within the subordinate group, and to some degree at least, by the agents of state authority. The options open to the authorities are, however, limited by either the diffuseness of the target or by the nature of the terrain that the subordinate group has elected to fight on.

The very difficulties inherent in establishing formal organizations of resistance have, I believe, mitigated against the dangers of factionalism and rigidity. There has been a scaling down of ethnic-national activity to the level of symbolic action and forms of expression likely to have the broadest regional appeal. While my data does not allow me to generalize for all components of the Catalan population, my impression is that such a scaling down has helped to bridge social divisions (class, occupational, rural-urban, generational, etc.) and forced individuals to concentrate on a few fundamentals such as freedom of linguistic
and cultural expression and a return to democratic forms of government. This leaves for the future such potentially thornier questions as the exact nature of the social and economic system to be achieved following the demise of the present regime. Similarly, while it is possible for Catalans to discuss the kind of relationships and links that a democratic Catalonia should have with (or within) a democratic Spain, the formulation of concrete alternatives can await the time when the Spanish people as a whole are once again in a position to make their will known.

Turning specifically to the Catalan middle class, organizational limitations are compensated for by the smallness of scale of the society. In such societies, role relationships tend to be particularistic rather than universalistic. The smallness of the social field means that there is a good deal of overlap, that many roles are played by relatively few individuals. In turn, this means that there is a good deal of on-going contact and that consequently formal structures can to some degree be dispensed with (Gluckman 1955: 18-19; Firth 1951: 47; Parsons 1951; Benedict 1966: 25-27). In part by necessity, and in part by the nature of the social structure, we have a kind of village pump society writ large. This too, has some obvious advantages under the present conditions since it assures communication, the exchange of views and opinions, adjustment and compromise; in short, substantial flexibility.
NOTES

1 This paper is based on the sources cited and on information gathered in the course of my own field work in Catalonia during the summer of 1970. It should be understood that while I interviewed informants drawn from different walks of life, most of my contacts were with middle-class Catalans resident in Barcelona. Field research was financed by a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health. This assistance has made possible the present report as well as related research now in preparation.

2 The concept of absolutism developed together with the modern idea of political sovereignty, two facets of an ideology of power concentration. In concrete terms, this implied that over every individual and over every piece of territory there should be but one undisputed authority with the right to compel uniformity by sanction or threat of sanction. This claim was even extended to the religious field where the principle was formulated as cuius regio, ejus religio, the right of princes to determine the religion of their subjects. As with other ideologies at other times, this one found support in the writings of contemporary philosophers. Jean Bodin's De la République (1576) and Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan (1651) are prime examples of the genre. Books II and V of that handbook on statecraft, Niccolò Machiavelli's Il principe (1532), can be read as an early statement of absolutist and centralist principles.

3 This figure is based on estimates of language use. While Catalan is one language, three mutually understandable dialects are spoken.
in Spain: Catalan as spoken in Catalonia proper (often regarded as "standard Catalan"); Catalan as spoken in Valencia (valencià); and the Catalan used in the Balearic Islands, termed mallorquí after the largest island of the group. These dialectic differences are not without current political relevance. The semiofficial Instituto Nacional del Libro Español (INLE) breaks down the statistics of books published in Catalan into the three dialect categories giving to each the value of a language designation (in Castilian: lengua catalana, lengua valenciana, and lengua mallorquina), thus ignoring the basic unity of the Catalan language (Vallverdú 1970a: 51-52). On the position of valencià and the cultural and linguistic pressures faced by the people of Valencia see Lluís V. Aracil's A Valencian Dilemma (1966). Catalan is also spoken in Andorra, where it enjoys the status of an official language, and across the Pyrenees in Rousillon, today the French Department of Pyrénées-Orientales.

For a review of the literature on population and immigration in Catalonia see Boix Selva (1967). Botella (1968) has written a short survey on recent demographic trends in Catalonia. Two articles (Alzina Caules 1966; Aramburo Campoy 1966) tackle the more specific questions of population and migratory movements in Barcelona. For census data, both national and regional, consult the national census published every ten years and the Anuario Estadístico de España issued yearly, both are published by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística. As might be expected, immigrants from other parts of Spain (and earlier from rural Catalonia) have been especially drawn to Barcelona and its satellite industrial towns. Immigrants, and children of immigrants (individuals of non-Catalan origin) today make up about half of greater Barcelona's almost two million inhabitants. This immigrant population is composed of two distinct entities:
1. A component, almost entirely of peasant and small town background, drawn mainly from the most impoverished regions of Spain: the south (Extremadura, Andalucía), the central meseta, and Galicia in the northwest. When Catalans refer to "immigrants" it is this element they have in mind.

2. A much smaller, but socio-culturally very important, group recruited from the Spanish national elite. Its links are not to regions and localities (although madrileños seem well-represented), but to the national power structure.

Working- and lower-class immigrants are concentrated in the poor neighborhoods near the port and in the industrial suburbs which ring Barcelona. The Castilian-speaking bureaucrats, military, professionals and businessmen reside in middle-class districts throughout the city. They form part of, and strongly identify with, Spanish national culture. Little research has been done on either group. My impression is that contacts between middle-class Catalans and middle-class Castilians tend to be limited to work-related situations. The poorer immigrants warrant a major research effort. Their move to the city is typically a permanent shift in residence and their modes of adaptation and the reception which they encounter should be studied in depth. One aspect of immigrant experience—the conditions of life of the most impoverished elements—has been examined with sensitivity and understanding in two books by the Valencian author Francesc Candel, Donde la ciudad cambia su nombre (1957), a novel, and Els altres catalans (1964), a
piece of descriptive journalism. Badia i Margarit (1969) has conducted a very detailed study of language use in Barcelona. While this research gives us ample information on language distribution and bilingualism in different Barcelona districts, the work is descriptive rather than analytical. A second volume, now in preparation, is devoted to analysis and interpretation of language use patterns.

In many respects, the Catalan bourgeoisie evidenced a kind of delayed political development. In the early decades of the present century, it appears that ideologically they shared more in common with political movements typical of small enclave nationalities, such as Slovaks and Croatians, than with the tides of political thinking then running in some of the larger European countries. During the nineteen twenties and thirties, the industrial directing classes stressed regional values and rejected theories of state intervention in the economy, preferring instead to place their faith on a combination of free market operation (within Spain) and the support of personal liberties. A major consequence of this orientation was that on the whole the Catalan bourgeoisie were little attracted to Fascism and similar ideologies giving to the state a major role in the economy and other areas of national life. On the other hand, some of the solutions proposed for coping with social and economic problems seem hardly realistic. Thus, as late as 1931, when Catalan industry was experiencing the full impact of the depression, the platform of the major liberal party in Catalonia seriously proposed a program of return to the land in the belief that re-ruralization would not only ease unemployment, but be in keeping with an image if society that saw an independent peasantry as the foundation of Catalan tradition (Pinilla de las Heras 1968: 153).
This may not be a phenomenon limited to Catalonia. I noted with interest (New York Times, December 3, 1970) that among the books seized by the Spanish police in the apartment of an arrested Basque nationalist there figured Leon Uris' *Mila 18*, a novel about the Warsaw ghetto uprising.
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