1967

Peasant Society: Economic Changes and Revolutionary Transformation [YUGOSLAVIA]

Joel Halpern
*University of Massachusetts, Amherst, jmhalpern@anthro.umass.edu*

John Brode

Follow this and additional works at: [https://scholarworks.umass.edu/emeritus_sw](https://scholarworks.umass.edu/emeritus_sw)

Part of the Anthropology Commons


Retrieved from [https://scholarworks.umass.edu/emeritus_sw/12](https://scholarworks.umass.edu/emeritus_sw/12)
This is the fourth in the series of articles on peasants in the *Biennial Review* (see also 150, 137, 10). It places particular stress on publications that tend to generalize and synthesize. A main emphasis is to see peasant studies from the viewpoint of other disciplines, as well as from the perspective of the societal context in which American anthropology itself exists. Specific geographical areas are dealt with in concluding summaries.

**PEASANT DEFINED**

Despite much previous discussion, concern continues to exist about the precise meaning of the term peasant and the universe of inquiry that it subsumes. Perhaps a major problem in defining the peasantry has been that in historic times peasants were almost everyone, while during the past century they have been in the process of becoming no one. The process of modernization can in a sense be defined as the progressive elimination of peasant society. Technology is displacing human labor, which is still primarily on the land; the concerns of states are decreasingly with the exploitation of men's physical energies and increasingly with ensuring loyalty. It is becoming necessary for nation-states to be more concerned with the thoughts of indi-

viduals as their physical labor becomes less essential to the main­
tenance of society. It seems clear that future polities will not need to
mobilize agricultural labor, but instead will have to find useful occupa­
tions for those whose work on the land has been replaced by
machines. Forms of organization to ensure interpersonal harmony
are receiving growing stress as societies come to contain more people
who work less, particularly on the land. In most of the world, how­
ever, this situation is potential, not actual.

The study of peasant society is a matter of peculiar concern to
American scholars, since the United States has moved further away
from an existence on the land than almost any other society. Yet the
idealized pattern of life in suburbia, with its house on a private plot,
strongly suggests an abortive return to the soil, an attempted escape
to a kind of rural peace.

Man rushes first to be saved by technology, and then to be saved from it.
We Americans are front-runners in both races. The United States led the
world away from outhouses and toward toilets, away from the virgin forest
and toward the pulp mill, away from scarcity and toward abundance, away
from few loaves of bread that were nutritious and toward many loaves of
bread that are not, away from the peasant and toward the factory worker
(366).

It has been estimated that in an advanced country like the United
States the proportion of “time-lived” taken up with agricultural labor
is about 1 per cent (calculated on the basis of 8,760 hours of life per
year, with approximately 2,000 hours of work in food production by
under 10 per cent of the labor force, or less than 4 per cent of the total
population, i.e., 80 to 90 hours annually of agricultural work per
capita, or a quarter of an hour per day lived) (212). One might add
that much of that time is spent in the manipulation of machines,
rather than animals or human beings. In other words, what is taking
place is the gradual eclipse of patterns of peasant labor, but not of
certain peasant values.

Since peasant societies are ones whose perspective is in the past,
when the major energy resources were human and animal power, it
seems logical that definitions of these groups should focus on the
ways in which these sources of energy were employed in order to
support that other part of civilization that the existence of peasants
implies, i.e., towns with their non-agricultural specialists. The definitions of Kroeber and Redfield, viewing peasant society as a part-society existing only in relation to an urban component, have been discussed in the first article in this series (150). One can also consider the transitions of the peasantry rather than its status at any given time—i.e., its changing relationship to the nation-state, in which both state and peasantry acquire new characteristics. The peasantry can be conceived of not only as a particular segment of society identifiable by a complex of traits and values primarily associated with traditional agriculture and the institutions linked to the distribution of its products; it is also possible to view the peasantry in terms of the ways in which political alterations in the town bring about social changes in the countryside. Although the historical record sees peasant societies from the outside, we can infer much about their internal dynamics. It is as important to view peasant societies in terms of the role they play in the formation of a future polity, through reform, war, and revolution, as it is to understand their status at a particular time.

This review attempts to survey the literature dealing with existing peasant societies, as well as the ways in which they are changing. Cultural and social anthropological studies (excluding archaeology) have tended to emphasize the former; political, historical, and some sociological works the latter. The present review treats both. No forced synthesis is intended, but their mutual interdependence seems apparent.

One of the problems in employing the term peasant is its traditional usage in English, referring originally to people residing in non-English-speaking countries. Peasant is conceived of as antithetical to noble; since the seventeenth century, it has had the specific connotation of boor or clown (yeoman refers loosely to a countryman of respectable standing, i.e., a farmer; as an adjective, yeomanly means sturdy, not boorish). By contrast, although there is no doubt about the traditional low status of the peasant-serf in the Slavic countries, a classic area of peasantries, the term is often synonymous with man in general, as in the word narod, people, perhaps more accurately rendered as folk. The folk, or the more modern equivalent, the masses, are usually distinguished from other groups, such as the in-
telligentsia, nobility, or bourgeoisie. In Russia during the period of Mongol rule, a number of terms were used for the peasantry, among them sirota (orphan) and liudi (people); but by the fourteenth century these and other designations had begun to be displaced by krest'ianin, which originally meant Christian, a term employed from the twelfth century on into the Mongol period to distinguish the Russians from the non-Christians. As time went on it became the name for rural people (38), and has become the French equivalent of paysan, man of the country. English terms reflect, of course, the specific historical development of English rural life; thus the primary meaning of farmer is one who undertakes the collection of taxes, the secondary is as a lessee, and only thirdly does it designate one who rents or owns land for purposes of cultivation.

A recent definition by Norbeck incorporates most of the accepted concepts:

A peasant society is a subsociety of a large stratified society which is either pre-industrial or only partly industrialized. It is further characterized by most or all of the following traits: rural residence; familial agriculture on self-owned small land holdings or other simple rural occupations providing a modest or subsistence livelihood; the family as the centrally important social unit; low social status; economic interdependence in varying degree with urban centers; simple culture; and attachment to the soil, the local community and tradition (295).

These characteristics seem to describe well the New Guinea tribal villages around Port Moresby studied by Rowley (331). Attachment to the soil, however, cannot be said to characterize the Lao, who in many areas combine swidden with flood rice agriculture and move when the ecological possibilities are exhausted (167). This attachment also implies acceptance of the prevailing political system. A significant portion of Russian history is concerned with groups who fled their feudal overlords North to the taiga, East to Siberia, or, like the Cossacks, South to the steppe (267). In Serbia, Greece, and the Balkans generally, villagers fled to the mountains at the time of the Ottoman conquest to escape Turkish domination (94).

Wolf in his recent study (403) emphasizes the economic aspect, stressing the one-sidedness of the economic relationship. The term interdependence employed by Norbeck would not seem appropriate
in the context Wolf uses. As distinct from primitives, he views peasants as “rural cultivators whose surpluses are transferred to a dominant group of rulers that uses the surpluses both to underwrite its own standard of living and to distribute the remainder to groups in society that do not farm but must be fed for their specific goods and services in turn.” In a further amplification of the definition he feels that the city is “a likely, but not an inevitable, product of the increasing complexity of society.” He cites the case of the Bahutu “peasantry” of Ruanda-Urundi, whose Watusi rulers “camped” among them. Reference is also made to ancient Egypt, where the ruler set up his temporary capital near the pyramid built in his honor; and to the Peten Maya, whose political integration appears to have been achieved without well-defined urban centers. The problem of whether African cultivators are to be considered peasants has been discussed (137), but evidently not resolved to general satisfaction. Chiefdoms and kingdoms have had complex, stratified social structures, as have nation-states, but to call the Bahutu “peasants” does not seem to clarify the situation.

If it is accepted that peasants compose a part-society, then what is the other segment of the society, and what are its ideological and religious components? Writing, especially in the form of tax records and law codes administered by a national bureaucracy, is an important consideration. Basically, peasants are part of a society that keeps written records. Banton’s review (22) of Redfield’s works stresses his writing on the Great Tradition “of the literate and critical few.” The peasantry live “beneath and within this high culture.” It seems quite clear why Polynesians, and indeed almost any contemporary people with a non-literate tradition, have been called peasants; they are obviously becoming a part of a great tradition, although no one is quite sure exactly what this entails, or how universal it will be. In Redfield’s terms, peasants seem to be disappearing as a social category, for he saw the peasant as expressing “a set of implicit judgments and disposition, simple, perhaps coarse, but dignified and sure. Beside him, the proletarian and the cosmopolite are very different kinds of human beings.” These clear distinctions no longer seem valid. It is uncertain how subculturally separable were earlier social categories when viewed on a broad, cross-cultural basis. Moreover, the
common pejorative usage of the term peasant in American English, reflecting ancestral memories of unhappier times, would appear to cast some doubt on the dignity of being a peasant.

The definitional boundaries between tribal and peasant, however, continue to be unclear to many, and if peasants exist only with respect to an urban society, the points at which they appear in history remain to be defined. These problems are well indicated in Adams' history of the Diyala Basin (4), which deals with the slowly changing relation of man to land in a relatively small and historically somewhat marginal part of Mesopotamia. Between the fourth or fifth millennium B.C. and the last third of the first millennium B.C. there were cycles of prosperity and decline in this area. When conditions were most favorable, the largest communities were settlements of about 30 hectares, housing not more than 5,000 inhabitants. Regional integration seems never to have been carried very far. The most important center had a population that "generally engaged in subsistence agriculture and had at best a loose hold over the surrounding region" (4). Were these people also peasants, or did they become peasants subsequently, when states clearly defined in the historical record appeared?

From the opposite time perspective, Hoebel (189) comments that "urbanization is spreading, and tribesmen are becoming peasants." This use of the term "peasant," implying a contemporary developmental state, would seem to be clearly at variance with Norbeck's characteristics—attachment to the soil, the local community, and tradition. Certainly, detribalized peoples do not appear to be evolving toward these ends.

Moore (277) defines the peasantry as a group with "a previous history of subordination to a landed upper class recognized and enforced in the laws, which, however, need not always prohibit movement out of this class, sharp cultural distinctions, and a considerable degree of de facto possession of the land." He specifically includes in this group Negro sharecroppers in the present-day American South. Frequently it is the intellectual rather than the peasant who lavishes affection on the land. The peasant, bound to his land, often hates the ties that bind, particularly when an alternative exists that is at all attractive.
A vital aspect of peasant society is the interrelationship between the village community and other segments of the society. This is usually phrased in terms of the obvious and significant relationship to those who are vested with property rights and to whom the peasant is required to pay rents, a category often overlapping with required taxes, labor, and service. Wolf treats property rights in great detail and establishes a typology based in part on the terms of the obligations involved in the land tenure system. He distinguishes three types of domain that have historically affected peasants: patrimonial, prebendal, and mercantile. Patrimonial domain is controlled by lords who inherit the right to receive payment from those who occupy the land. Prebendal domain is not formally inherited, but is granted to functionaries who, in their role as state officials, assess the peasantry. In mercantile domain, land is a commodity that can be traded, the main motive being the owner's profit. Often these types of domain coexist, but it is the proportions of their combination that Wolf feels determine "the organizational profile of a particular social order."

Another important economic relationship, exchange of goods through the market mechanism, links the cultivator to institutions and individuals outside his own community. Wolf (403) treats this in a section entitled "The Provision of Complementary Goods and Services," in which he mentions the *jajmani* system operating within and between Indian villages, where occupations are related to caste membership. He sees this as akin to the medieval peasant community in Europe, in which the community contained both full-time and part-time specialists. He also discusses sectional markets, which result from the traditional interaction of customary (usually village) monopolies in a closed regional system, and network markets, in which the peasant becomes involved with a great number of craft specialists and middlemen. These distinctions are probably of use in identifying aspects of exchange relationships, but it is worth remembering that in this century (and to a degree in the recent past as well), most of the world has been linked in important ways to a universal economy. Prior to the sixteenth century and the beginning of Western European commercial, political, religious, and military expansion into the New World, Asia, and Africa, there probably were delimited areas of trade; but for the past few centuries, there is evidence that peasant
communities have been intimately involved in large-scale, long-distance trade, often carried on by the peasants themselves with or without the benefit of intermediaries. This is true even in societies that may sometimes appear completely self-sufficient and only minimally involved in outside contacts, with the large, extended family seemingly able to provide all its own needs. In fact, this organization often makes the extended household an efficient specialized unit for trade purposes. A case in point is the South Slav zadruga in the early nineteenth century. In Serbia, for example, zadrugas specialized in the export of pigs to Vienna and other parts of central Europe (390). Specialization of a different sort occurred in villages composed of zadrugas that formed resident military units on the Austro-Hungarian–Turkish frontier in the eighteenth century, analogous to the Cossacks on the steppe (330). The key factor in both situations was that the large, household-based kin units, while still retaining an important degree of self-sufficiency, enabled their members to specialize.

Where polities are weak, trade can often be vital in linking lowland peasants involved in irrigated or flood rice agriculture with hill tribes who rely on swidden agriculture. This is particularly marked in Southeast Asia, where institutionalized trade relationships tie together a great diversity of ethnic groups (167).

The existing data is in many ways still inadequate, but before long it should be possible to refine the definition of peasantry by closer attention to the extent and complexity of trade networks in which peasants are involved. It may be that involvement in comprehensive trade networks correlates closely with peasant societies as they have been previously recognized, while tribal societies have trade relationships that may be extensive and elaborate but are not universal. The implicit ideology of status in trade relationships in peasant societies, which often seems to contain considerable equality, also needs further elaboration, particularly in contrast to the hierarchical relationship of villager, lord, and state.

A study of the evolution of a state administration, as seen through the career of the Prince-Bishop of Montenegro, describes the transformation of tribesmen to peasants in a nineteenth-century context, without a preexisting colonial administration or a highly developed
market economy (94). Here, a loose confederation of relatively autonomous lineages evolved into a political unit with the institution of periodic taxation, controls over trade, a legislative body, a professional army, the construction of schools, and a capital city where none had existed before. In view of the criteria previously cited, it is worth reflecting on whether the Montenegrin shepherds and subsistence agriculturalists became "peasants" in the course of their state's evolution.

The Israeli situation poses some interesting questions. Can certain communities of Jews be considered as peasants? Willner (401) discusses a community of Moroccan Jews who practiced farming in the Atlas Mountains; upon resettlement in Israel, they appear, not surprisingly, to have experienced many of the same problems that European immigrants of rural background underwent after arrival in America (in fact, their subsequent voting as an ethnic bloc is specifically compared to the American situation (401). Distinctive to the Israeli case, however, are former Baghdad shopkeepers, Rumanian merchants, and Yemenite craftsmen who have become farmers—often because, in Israel, there were no alternatives. But although all were Jews, bonds to former fellow nationals of the country of origin—and even stronger bonds to families and extended kin groups—continued and took on new corporate forms, as in the Federation of North African Immigrants. They were also categorized in the society at large by their country of origin, e.g., as Iraqis or Hungarians (391). Such phenomena are well known among overseas Chinese. Clearly, ties with kin and place of origin do not quickly lose importance, no matter what the circumstances of resettlement, the minority origins of the group, or their particular occupations in a preindustrial society. Jews are usually thought of as a peculiarly urban people, but a discussion of Polish Jewry specifically refers to individuals as having been peasants, earning a living from small-scale agriculture. These people were, however, very much part of the occupationally diverse small-town Jewish community, which included laborers, artisans, merchants, and Talmudic scholars (181).

In Wagley's view (386), peasant in the Latin American context embraces a great variety of groups, from the Indians inhabiting scattered settlements in Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia
to the small “farmers” of Costa Rica, Chile, and Colombia. They are differentiated from the “family farmers” of Europe and North America and defined as a severely disadvantaged group relative to other segments of the population—economically poor, illiterate, lacking good health, and out of touch with modern trends—and yet at least a potential political force. They can belong to communal landholding villages, or be individual landowners, sharecroppers, and even squatters. They raise subsistence crops but sell a surplus. Some are artisans producing wares for regional markets; others seek seasonal work on plantations. They share what can be called a colonial Iberian culture. Their world view is seen as conservative; that is, it reflects past tradition in customary celebrations and kinship obligations, although they share many traits of other depressed groups, such as plantation workers or slum inhabitants, many of whom have recently come from rural areas. They are divided into two main subgroups, Indian and Mestizo. The latter, although possibly richer or better educated, tend to spend what money they have for individual pursuit of land or goods. They are more likely to engage in extensive trade and to migrate to improve their material and educational condition. The inward-looking or “closed” Indian community is seen as disappearing with time, becoming more fully incorporated into national societies. Wagley feels that “the time may not be too far off when nationally organized peasant groups will wield decisive political power in many nations of Latin America.” It is useful to reflect on this comment from the perspective of the disaster of peasant-based political parties in Eastern Europe between the two World Wars (204, 274) and the inability of the ideology of “peasantism,” with its emphases on the smallholder, the value of tradition, and local control, to adjust to industrialization and modernization (312). The matter is complex. The Communists’ elimination of the peasant parties in Eastern Europe immediately after the Second World War was the climax of an opposition from powerful urban groups of the political right, as well as the left. They were hardly prepared to let peasants decide their own fate. Indeed, the greater degree of self-sufficiency forced on peasant farmers by the depression of the 1930s only temporarily delayed their integration into the total society.

Wagley’s article on peasantry concludes: “Latin American nations
cannot continue with a large segment of their people neglected, impoverished, illiterate, and living in isolation but inside their frontiers. The peasants may not be the wave of the future in Latin America, but certainly they are the material, the human mass, out of which the future will be made." Adams (179) feels that Latin American countries in the near future will have either inadequate reforms or excessive revolutions, with military organizations playing an increasingly dominant role—either the traditionally trained regular military or a recently trained insurgent army, presumably guerrilla based. But the anticipation of revolutionary change because of existing social conditions is one matter, and the specific political setting that makes it possible another.

In a recent discussion of peasant problems in Asia and North Africa, held by researchers at the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, participants noted that although socialism is a higher evolutionary stage, succeeding capitalism, "This does not mean a call for an immediate socialist revolution." They imply that transition may occur peaceably, for they feel "the first important feature of agrarian evolution in the developing countries to be the fact that the reforms have significantly weakened the economic and political positions of the landlords" (6).

The term revolution has come to be applied more and more to studies dealing with peasant people undergoing change. Aiyappan (5), in discussing the situation in a village in Kerala, maintains that the pressure on existing resources is so great that the status quo cannot continue much longer. Wright (406) sees drastic alterations in the political role of the agricultural population in France, the classic land of the European smallholder.

THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PEASANTRY

The political influence of the peasantry on the development of governments is a topic of increasing interest to historians and sociologists. Shanin (344) points out that the peasants are the majority of mankind, and that in most countries the use of the term "the people," as opposed to "the nation," connotes peasant. This was important in the history of nineteenth-century Eastern Europe—particularly in
Russia, where the institutions of the folk (narod), uncorrupted, it was felt, by urban decay, were contrasted with those of the industrializing West. It was hoped that a return to peasant traditions would produce a “spiritual rebirth.” The communal property functions of the village institution (the mir, with its dual associated meanings of world and peace) held its chief significance for Russian intellectuals. The communal aspects of peasant society were an unmitigated good; what was evil was private ownership of land, as well as the ownership of men under serfdom. The feelings of a Balkan socialist are fairly typical in this regard: “Marković insisted that the zadruga and the Russian obshchina [the village community containing the mir] embodied the purest form of collectivism and would, if revived and perfected, elevate society from egoism to altruism, from exploitation to justice” (266).

In the middle of the nineteenth century, Russian intellectuals went into the villages to enlist the peasants in their struggle against the Tsarist government, and their ambivalence toward this task is indicated in the writings of Turgenev: “For a fortnight I have been living [among] the people, and it would be hard to imagine a duller occupation... I am not one of those who get strength from the people; I never use them for my own ailments. I want to act upon them; but how?” This movement of going to the people had a confused and often hostile reception, and it was a pronounced failure. But less than 50 years later, revolutionary tracts circulated widely in the villages, and revolt in the countryside and the seizure of estates accompanied both the abortive revolution of 1905 and the successful seizure of power by the Communists in 1917 (305). Significantly, conditions in the rural areas had improved in that period, and there was greater contact with the cities.

Worsley, in his recent discussion of Populism (405), cites Berlin’s preface to Venturi’s massive study of the Russian Populist movement (381), “It is Populist ideas which lie at the base of much of the socialist economic policy pursued by [the emergent] countries today.” Worsley compares the attitudes of the nineteenth-century Russian Populists (narodniki) toward the mir with the modern African nationalists and North American prairie farmers. The last two groups no longer visualize an anarchist society; but the Africans “sing the
praises of the village society,” and North Americans believe that “farming is a good way of life” which the cities should subsidize even if it is economically inefficient.” Worsley declares, “Africa is its peasantry, subsistence producers or cash-crop producers, but independent peasants. This is the basic fact about the social structure of the new African states.” He points out that anthropologists usually speak of African horticulture, not agriculture. If it is possible to overlook the traditional pejorative use of the term, might not the North American farmers also be called peasants, or perhaps post-peasants? After all, many of them are only a generation or two removed from the European countryside.

How are tribal horticulturalists distinct from peasants and farmers? Is Populism equivalent to peasantism? So far these distinctions seem to have been handled in an ad hoc way in the literature. In his study of revolutions, Brinton (54) points out, “Revolutionary movements seem to originate in the discontents of not unprosperous people who feel restraint, cramp, annoyance, rather than downright crushing oppression.” He suggests that political revolutions seem more likely when the social classes are not widely separated, and that there develops an “intolerable gap” between what they desire and what they receive. The government’s inefficiency in meeting challenges seems more apparent than the skill of the revolutionaries. The English, American, French, and Russian revolutions have made increasing promises to the common man, including “happiness” and fulfillment of material needs. Brinton feels that revolutions may be a sign of strength and youth in societies. These movements, by the nature of their implementation, implied the transformation of rural society by urban leadership. Viewed in this light, contemporary programs of rural development can be seen as increasing the pressures for violent and drastic change rather than relieving them.

American and other Western anthropologists, it would seem, cannot help being somewhat ambivalent in their attitude toward contemporary revolutionary movements based in rural areas and possessing ideologies of agrarian reform. Anthropologists distrust rigid ideologies and are troubled by the brutal aspects of war; at the same time, they are aware of the social costs of ineffectual programs of change, and indeed, have spent much time documenting failures in
open societies. Unfortunately, truly comparative types of investigations that include Communist societies are largely lacking. Too little is known about the intrinsic limits of drastic social planning in post-revolutionary societies.

Beqiraj (34) discusses the role of political revolution, specifically guerrilla warfare, among today's peasant societies. Drawing on his Albanian experience, he postulates that when a peasant society decides not to continue with its traditional ways, "with characteristic religious fervor it decides on total replacement of its whole pattern of living." He sees peasant "collectivities" as employing ideational conservatism to counterbalance the social anomie created by severe structural changes. Specifically, he contends that they continue to value "the archaic principle of sharing (to each according to his own needs) and to distrust the principle of earning (to each according to his performance)." Thus, Beqiraj hypothesizes, peasant groups are able to discard old forms because only by such radical change can they attempt to better articulate their belief system.

In attempting to understand peasant values, it is important to recall that the idealization of rural life ways is not new, as Lowenstein (251) points out. Roman authors found the city a center of vice and corruption, which distorted the "true, natural functions of man"; but Cicero voiced the ambiguity still felt today by posing the respectable connotation of the equivalent of urbane as an antonym for rustic. The dilemma of the writer alternating between the intellectual attractions of the city and the tranquility but isolation of the countryside were then apparent. Horace, in his tale of the country mouse and the city mouse, could opt for the freedom of the countryside; and not having to work the land himself, he could philosophize to his farm foreman that living in the country makes a man happy. It was not, however, the productive functions of agriculture that attracted prosperous Romans to the countryside. Columella attacked the luxury enjoyed on the latifundia: "The chief objects sought were a fine view, absolute quiet, and pleasant surroundings." Here was a haven from the "hell of Rome" (but when refugees had recovered, hellish Rome again became attractive). The contemporary acuteness of this classic situation needs no emphasis.

Baroja (25) examines the classical authors on this topic, particu-
larly on the idea of simple rural virtue and sophisticated urban corruption, in the context of the history of the latifundia in Spain and Italy: "In the countryside of the south one can detect a state of anomie manifested on the one hand in a lack of adjustment to urban codified culture ... and on the other hand in an indifference to the values of a traditional life in religious matters."

In this regard, it is instructive to compare historically the peasantries of Mediterranean Europe with that of the eastern Slavs. The limited ecological possibilities of the former and the continued existence of a frontier for the latter, whether for Old Believers in the northern forests or Cossacks on the steppe or new settlement in Siberia, plus a continued striving for a unique identity vis-à-vis the West from the time of Byzantium and the Mongol conquests, help explain why "peasantism" or the ideology of the folk developed in the latter area. Baroja concludes that it would be profitable to devote more attention "to the historical reality than to the abstractions of the moralists and their disciples, the sociologists." A number of scholars engaged primarily in studying local communities have stressed some of the common features of peasant life in various parts of the world—for example, the pain and stress involved in providing grinding labor for an uncertain return and a certainty of taxation, natural or monetary. Granting the utility of examining common features, it is also necessary to examine those critical variables that govern the distinctive ways in which nations and their peasantry have evolved.

In attempting to understand the political dynamics involved here, Shanin (344) stresses the importance to peasant society of the familial unit, linked together in the most basic aspects of life, defined in Russia as "the people who eat from the same dish" and in France as "the people who are locked behind the same lock." Peasant agriculture is seen as non-specialized and relying on the family as a work group. Peasantry are at the same time felt to be a distinctive social group with a particular way of life, "defining a stage in the development of human society." The growth of urban centers and industry requires specialized agriculture; so the peasant community, which is to a great degree (although never completely) self-sufficient, becomes an outmoded type of social organization.

In Marxian terms, the peasantry is seen as a dissolving remainder
of precapitalist society. But the class polarization of the countryside into capitalist owners and rural proletariat did not occur as predicted, due to the alternatives offered by industry. Further, there is difficulty conceiving of the peasantry as a class and at the same time as a partially self-sufficient way of life. According to Redfield (328), peasants "in their usual and undisturbed condition have no sense of cause. Like other simple people, they know themselves to be a distinct people, a community of the self-respecting, and within that community they hold that justice should be done." Significantly, it is only when they start to change from peasants to farmer-specialists that they become a well-articulated interest group, because their traditional way of life as peasants implies a degree of vertical segmentation into local communities. This lack of internal organization, the inability to organize effectively for long-term objectives, is a significant reason for the failure of most peasant revolts, and of the programs of most peasant parties as well (to the extent that these are political parties of peasants, who are, by definition, partly estranged from the power centers of modern society).

Locally organized rural groups, whether they are a counterrevolutionary and short-lived reaction to specific oppressive government policies, as in the Tambov revolt in Russia in 1920–21 (350), or a chronic, widespread reaction to any kind of endemic social anomie, as in La Violencia in Colombia (400), are notably unsuccessful in achieving any kind of specific social, economic, or political transformation in the society. There is bloody fighting and suppression, and no problems are resolved. Peasant struggles, however, do provide culture heroes; and where there is an attempt to inculcate a view of life emphasizing struggle as opposed to harmony, as in contemporary China, the writing of histories of peasant wars can support contemporary state goals. In the course of this work, categorizations of peasant movements have been devised based on their size, degree of organization, ideology, and effectiveness in producing change (176). In discussing peasant revolts, Hobsbawm (188) makes an important distinction between the expected ends of a peasant revolt and an urban mob. A peasant village can conceive of functioning by consensus if the exploiting landowner and the interfering State are eliminated; but for cities, the only outcome of anarchism can be destruc-
tion. Thus the Don Cossack Pugachev, in his decree proclaiming himself emperor, mimicked the form of the state but negated its substance by phrasing his appeal in terms of the abolition of state prerogatives (conscription, head tax, and labor service) and the division of the land among the peasantry at the expense of the landowners (239).

In the Stalinist view, the Pugachev revolt (1773-74) was a spontaneous and unorganized movement; and although it did upset the feudal-serf structure, the leaders were "tsarists" and did not realize that the system could not be destroyed by acts of revenge against individual representatives in local areas. Such motives are, however, understandable when the social history of the Cossacks is examined. Their settlements were composed of those who found refuge in relatively autonomous communities on the steppe, having run away from the North, where noble landowners were imposing serfdom. Later, as cultivation and settlement of the steppe increased, the bands of hunters and fishers who had formed raiding parties became institutionalized, and eventually were organized into state service as military units guarding the frontier. But as transitional semi-nomads, their seasonal raids against the towns of the Turks and Tartars reversed for a time the exploitation of the countryside by the towns, as McNeill (267) points out.

In contrast to sporadic rural revolts, the T'ai P'ing Rebellion in China lasted over a decade and involved the importation of a foreign religious system, utopian goals, and an articulated ideology. Published documents depict the movement's conception of a highly organized state, which included among other things organization of agricultural production, so that in wartime farmers were to be ready to fight along with the standing army, and in peacetime soldiers were to do agricultural work. The movement's long-range plans read like a catalog definition of nineteenth-century modernization combined with an idealistic religious system (68). The contemporary Communist Chinese regard it as the forerunner of their own revolution.

In premodern and colonial eras, peasant revolts resemble to a degree the nativistic movements of certain American Indian and other tribal groups threatened with extinction. The topic of messianic cults has recently received attention, including a discussion of contempo-
rary phenomena among Brazilian and Chinese peasants (233). John-
son (210, in his recent study of revolutionary phenomena, refers to
Wallace's tripartite categorization of revitalization movements (388),
i.e., movements that seek to revive a traditional culture, to import a
foreign ideological system, or to establish a utopia that has never
been enjoyed by ancestors or foreigners.

Peasant revolts are so inadequately organized, so quickly sup­
pressed, and so poorly reported that the picture we get of their
ideology and organization is often sketchy. Benda's (31) recent study
compares the Samin movement in Java at the end of the nineteenth
century and the Saya San Rebellion in Burma in the early 1920's—
both of which rejected the present and sought to re-create a more
desirable past—with the activities of young professional revolution­
aries in Vietnam in 1930. In contrast to the illiterate peasant leader in
Java and the politically oriented monk in Burma, in Vietnam there
was a group of predominantly French-educated intellectuals; they
were chiefly of mandarin, gentry, and bourgeois background, and
some had studied abroad, the most notable being Ho Chi Minh. The
degree of their success was evidently unanticipated, and they hastily
decreed the establishment of village soviets. The Sakdal Rebellion in
central Luzon in 1935 is of a third type, in which a more conventional
political leader attempted to take advantage of agrarian discontent.
In a subsequent article Benda (32) discusses how, at the local level,
Communists learned or "slipped into" speaking "the language of
peasant expectation of apocalyptic change leading to immediate
justice on earth." He suggests that Communist movements may well
provide a substitute for decaying or vanishing social institutions—in
a way, they become the utopia Wallace discusses. This view may also
help us understand the Chinese definition of revolution as explained
by Johnson (210), where it is the complement of another word re­
ferring to the right to rule or authority of the Chinese Emperor, lit­
erally "the mandate of heaven." Revolution is thus translated as the
means to withdraw the mandate, implying that another is to take its
place. In English there is a different semantic context, although the
outcome of revolution implies resolution and the establishment of
legitimacy, to which violent attempts at subsequent change can be
considered counterrevolutionary.
Contemporary Marxist doctrine often appears to assign virtue to peasant revolts somewhat undiscriminatingly. In the opinion of Fischer-Galati (127), recent discussions by Eastern European historians view all manifestations of rural discontent—migration, brigandage, local disturbances, or revolt—as aiming at social emancipation or national liberation. He points out the obvious difficulties in defining as peasants Albanian tribesmen, Greek armatoles, Czech agriculturalists, Hungarian kulaks, and Rumanian mosneni; and as “oppressors” Turkish sultans, Magyar magnates, Austrian archdukes, and Russian boyars. The consequences of liberation from an Albanian pasha, a Phanariote voevod, a Russian tsar, or an Austrian emperor need separate explication. Although the viewpoint of historical particularism must be considered, this viewpoint does not, of course, exclude generalizations; but the need for clearly defined categories is pertinent.

Communist-led guerrilla armies have successfully achieved power in Yugoslavia, China, and Vietnam, where the preexisting state organization was destroyed by invasion (208). The weaknesses of purely peasant organizations—segmentation, lack of a clearly defined ideology and goals, and stable membership—were overcome by a hard core of professional rebels, often themselves of peasant origin. Johnson (209) characterizes the Chinese case as a “militarized mass insurrection.” But its very militancy, accompanied by a modernizing ideology, alienated the peasantry after the old regime was destroyed. This has made the agricultural programs of Communist countries among the least impressive of their accomplishments. This is, of course, an expected development as agriculture changes from a valued way of life to a low-status occupation. Of all the major groups in society, peasants are by definition least able to adapt to modernization. In contrast to other groups, peasant sons must reject the values of their parents if they wish to achieve higher social status (170).

It seems worth pointing out that in contemporary conflicts, peasants are not only the manpower base of revolutionary movements but also the chief victims of insurgencies (7). The desire to survive can be manifested by abandoning villages and setting up homes in the jungle or forest, more feasible in past wars than today. Relocation in cities, while conceived of as a short-range measure, has important long-
range effects, placing an obvious burden on the political victors. This is an infrequently remarked consequence of "national-liberation wars."

Chinese ideologists, for example, may boldly call for new rural-based revolutionary struggles abroad (248). They may claim (215) that urban-rural contradictions in their country can be overcome by "strengthening the economic basis of the worker-peasant alliance" (the word order of urban-rural, reversed from the usual anthropological formulation, is significant). But organized population transfers, including the return of rural migrants from towns to the countryside and the resettlement of agriculturalists in underpopulated areas, have failed to solve the problem of coordinating occupation, residence, and productive work. Per capita arable land has declined owing to natural population increase; this is true not only in villages, but also, importantly, in urban areas, as a result of the progressive usurpation of arable land by roads, factories, dams, and housing (371).

THE PEASANT AND THE ECONOMY

Almost all cultures or groups have some form of economic contact with the outside world. This can be either with a very rudimentary economy or the most modern of industrial complexes. Of special interest today, however, is the contact between primitive or peasant groups and the modern economies. The process of economic modernization can be seen at a number of different points along the paths from primitive to modern. From an economic viewpoint, the peasant may be thought of as being situated somewhere along a continuum between the self-subsisting, non-monetized (or multi-monetized—see Dalton, 84) economy and the modern, commercial economy. The location of a peasant on this continuum, as well as the manner of his movement along it, will be determined by various factors—accessibility, importance of natural resources, historical environment. A primitive group being modernized may well pass directly into the modern world without ever becoming a peasant group. Nevertheless, though the paths may differ, the process of modernization should contain common elements whether applied to peasants or a primitive
group. All these paths currently converge on the modern economy as a center of attraction.

Theoretical Structure

As Kuznets (229) has pointed out, the concept of modernization is essentially ethnocentric. In the present context, this ethnocentrism implies that one end of the modernization process is not logically fixed. Primitive groups as they exist stand at one end. The other end of the continuum, however, though it is now fixed on the modern economy, could in time shift to some other form of economy. Nevertheless, it is to the modern economy that the peasant must now respond—response to other forms of economy would have to be hypothetical. Kuznets discusses those characteristics of an economy that lead to or are concomitant with what he calls modern economic growth. For him, the modern economy is a dynamic, growth-oriented concept. He postulates four traits essential to modern economic growth (228): a minimum level of skills, production units that are impersonal and bureaucratic, a relatively great weight of "economic" values, and a recognition of the corporation as a non-social entity. The presence of these traits has led, in many cases, to a number of characteristic economic developments (229): rapid growth of per capita output and population, a rapid increase in the efficiency of labor, a decline in the share of agriculture in total output coupled with a rise in the share of manufacturing, large shifts in the pattern of demand for goods to be consumed, a larger scale of production unit, a rise in the share of labor in manufacturing and services implying a shift of people from rural to urban locations, and an extension of economic contacts to most of the world. These seven characteristics of modern economic growth obviously imply considerable institutional and social adjustment (see Moore, 278, for a short introduction to this problem).

There have been several attempts to integrate economics and sociology; one of the most ambitious is that of Parsons and Smelser (308). They treat the economic and sociological aspects of societies as subsystems separated by "boundaries." The economy is considered to be the production of commodities. The allocation of these commodities is handled through "value patterns," which are institution-
alized as part of the social preservation mechanism. Economic values, in other words, are social values that have become part of the personality. Thus any needed adjustment in the allocation process to cope with changing production possibilities will have to come through institutional change—a process likely to be so slow that the integration of the economy and the society may be unstable, as Parsons and Smelser admit.

They understand economics to be the institutions of production and distribution. A recent view (Debreu, 88), however, is that economic “analysis is therefore organized around the concept of ... a value function defined in commodity space.” That is, economics is the study of the functional balance between opposing tensions in a society. As Debreu states, economics deals with those tensions that are resolved through the setting of an economic price. The actual mixture of tensions in any society will vary. Some have no price, for they do not occur or are not active. Others are resolved outside the transactions mechanism, even though they are within the realm of economic choice; one could call these social goods. The actual mixture of tensions that comes within the purview of economics or sociology is immaterial to the general theory of either discipline—but is pertinent to the nature of the resultant society. A more recent work by Smelser (356) deals with some of these problems. As he defines the term, “economic sociology is the application of the general frame of reference, variables, and explanatory models of sociology to that complex of activities concerned with the production, distribution, exchange, and consumption of scarce goods and services” (see also 278). While this definition restores a unity to the frame of reference of economic sociology, Smelser, in this work, does not purport to integrate the economy and the society.

This lack of integration of the economy and the society is set forth by Firth (125) in a new chapter of a work first published in 1939:

What is required from economic anthropology is the analysis of material from non-industrialized, often exotic communities, in such a way that it will be directly comparable with the material of modern economics, matching assumption with assumption and so allowing generalizations to be ultimately framed which will subsume the phenomena of both price and non-price communities into a body of principles about human behavior which will be truly universal.
Firth does not feel that a different social universe will, of necessity, call for a different systematic, functional representation. This universality of economics has not, Firth feels, been achieved. Some of what is taken to be basic by social scientists is of a second order of assumption—i.e., they describe rather than systematize. Firth criticizes many anthropologists for their unsystematic approach to the study of peasant or primitive economies. Observations are recorded without regard to their frequency, representativeness, or place in the functioning of the economic system.

Bailey (20) considers social anthropology to be the study of multiplex relationships. On the other hand, economics studies single-interest relationships. Thus the techniques or analytic tools of the social anthropologist will differ from those of the economist, even when studying a society where single-interest relationships predominate.

Since the publication of Trade and Market in the Early Empires by Polanyi et al. (319) in 1957, there has been considerable debate regarding this question of the universality of economic constructs (150, 288). Polanyi divided economics into "formal" and "substantive" constructs. "Formal" economics is "disembedded" in institutions; "substantive" economics is "embedded." Because "formal" economics is disembedded, it is applicable only to that system of exchange for which it was formed—i.e., market exchange. "Substantive" economics, by virtue of its embeddedness, applies as well to the other two forms of exchange postulated by Polanyi—reciprocal and redistributive exchange. Adding a fourth form of exchange, "mobilizative," Smelser (355) compares these systems to Parsons' four functional subsystems of a society: the reciprocal exchange system is the equivalent of latent-pattern maintenance and tension management; the redistributive exchange system is the equivalent of integration; the market exchange system is the equivalent of adaptation; and the mobilizative exchange system is the equivalent of goal attainment. It is pertinent to ask if these functional subsystems can be meaningfully divorced from each other. Can a society be characterized solely by a single subsystem to the extent that the formal analysis pertinent to another subsystem can have no validity?

Two schools of thought would answer yes to the above: Marxists
on one side and the followers of Polanyi on the other. For Marx, the answer was quite clear: the primitive or peasant economy had no market. Exchange value, as distinct from use value, does not appear until the individual owners of goods face each other "as mutually independent persons." Therefore, "Commodity exchange begins where community life ends" (263). Bessaignet (35), starting from this same position, defines the primitive economy as an economic system with needs (both natural and cultural), techniques of production, a system of distribution (subordinated to the mode of production), and patterns of consumption. The economics of a market exchange system are not applicable because distribution is subordinated to production, which serves only to fulfill needs. Dhoquois (91), although accepting this Marxist position, suggests that the influence of modern techniques of production and of political control might enable primitive and "Asiatic" economies to bypass the market economy stage and proceed directly to a form of guided socialism.

The followers of Polanyi have been accused of harboring "a romantic ideology rooted in an antipathy toward the 'market economy' and an idealization of the 'primitive'" (76). In this view, they are, if not quite like Marx, certainly similar to Marx's socialist and utopian predecessors. The leading theorist of the Polanyi school is his student Dalton (41, 82, 83, 84, 85), who defines primitive economies as "small-scale economies not integrated by market exchange" (84). At another point, Dalton maintains that primitive economies are "small-scale communities without market integration and, therefore, without a general-purpose money." He believes that in primitive economies, the reciprocal and redistributive functions are carried out by means of distinct "monetary objects." Primitive economies are sharply contrasted with "national market economies," which have a general-purpose money and whose governments "deliberately control [its] quantity" (84). In line with his work with Bohannan (41), Dalton divides underdeveloped communities into two categories: primitive (or subsistence) economies and peasant economies. The former are either strictly marketless or have only peripheral markets (i.e., those markets that exist do not substantially affect the society); the latter are market dominated. Peasant economies differ from primitive economies in that peasant production units depend upon the
sale of their produce. Both economies are set apart from national Western economies by their lack of modern machine technology and the retention of traditional social aspects (82). He implies that primitive economies can be transformed into peasant economies—this is the "organizational component of community economic development" (84). The possibility of transition would seem to imply that the difference between primitive and peasant economies is not absolute. On the other hand, this difference is characterized as the fragmentation of the society in the market exchange system. While both the reciprocal and redistributive systems of exchange are motivated by aspects of the more general society, kinship and affiliation respectively, the market exchange system is not so related to the society (83). We thus come back to early nineteenth-century socialist thought, which placed strong emphasis on the alienation of the worker. However, unlike Marx, Dalton holds that the economic factors are determinate only in the market exchange system: before and after this stage, social factors are more crucial (83).

It is not clear from Dalton's work (nor from that of Polanyi) just why different analytical categories are needed for non-integrated economies. He (84) takes up Armstrong's work on Rossel Island (15) and tries to contradict Armstrong's conclusion that this primitive economy was not essentially different from those of the West. Dalton points out many flaws in Armstrong's reasoning. However, it is pertinent to state that Armstrong, an economist, wrote this work nearly forty years earlier, after a short stay on Rossel Island. It would have been more convincing if Dalton had criticized a more recent work—e.g., Firth's study of Tikopia (125), or Pospisil's of the Kapauku (320). As an example of unclear analytical categories for the study of integrated and non-integrated economies, Dalton (84) cites Firth's work as a key supporting proof that a primitive economy is substantially different from a peasant economy. Firth, however, in the first chapter of his work on the Tikopia (125), contradicts Dalton by name and concludes: "I would argue then that the Tikopia in 1929 had an economy in the strict sense of the term, and that this can be studied by the basic analytical approach of an economist."

Sahlins (332, 333), by contrast, is quite definite about the need for different tools to analyze primitive and peasant economies. "The in-
determinacy of [exchange] rates is the characteristic fact of primitive exchange” (332). “The organizing principles of economy” are not to be found in economizing, e.g., profit maximization (333). Instead, rates of exchange are set by non-economic factors, such as kinship distance, relative rank, relative wealth, or urgency of goods (332). He rejects “the historically specific Business Outlook” (capitals in the original) and defines the economy of a primitive society as “the process of (materially) provisioning society.” This definition is “opposed to the human act of satisfying wants” (333).

Sahlins (332) constructs what seems strikingly like a normal economic system, but he calls it a “primitive theory of exchange.” A primitive economy is characterized by “customary trade relations” rather than “customary exchange rates.” This theory describes an economic market system that is essentially dynamic, one in which “good feeling” or tension management leading to stability are marketable goods. Sahlins does not consider his theory to be “economic” (indeed, he talks of his “heresy,” 333). His impressions of economics seemingly come from Marshall, which is like criticizing modern anthropology on the basis of the work of Boas (Marshall died in 1924). Also, he assumes both that only price changes can equilibrate a market and that prices are representative of or apply to material goods alone. However, markets can be brought to equilibrium by changes in quantity as well as price. Moreover, services that make one feel better spiritually are considered to be economic goods as much as bars of steel or bags of grain.

On the other hand, Sahlins brings out several points that are very pertinent criticisms of current economic theory. First, his system is dynamic. Current economic systems generally must make the assumption of temporal independence (what happens in one period does not affect what happens in any other). He points out that the market must equilibrate and stabilize both current demand and supply, and the flow of demand-supply over time, particularly in a system where participants are both buyers and sellers (he is mistaken in separating these two roles, since goods trade for goods). Thus, there are often negative sanctions against taking another’s trading partner (332). This is also the case in the United States, as witness the Chicago jukebox dealer whose legs were broken when he
took his trade to another supplier (recent testimony before a Chicago Grand Jury). More pertinently, one can cite the example of manganese ore, which, though traded in large quantities, has no price-setting market. Transactions take place between established partners, with a reluctance to shift solely on the basis of short-run gluts or excesses. Japanese banks, in times of credit shortage, will lend to established customers at rates that are below those the bank must pay to get the money—the relationship is dynamically more important than the current rate of profit. In addition, Sahlins introduces social factors like kinship and status into the price-setting mechanism. Again, this could be used to explain why food prices in slums are higher than in wealthy suburbs in the United States. Both the above points, but especially the first, are inadequately accounted for in modern economics. It is less that modern economics is inapplicable to a primitive economy than that modern economics has yet to fully explain a modern economy.

Cook (76), in his critique of the Polanyi-Dalton School, points out flaws in Dalton's work, including its ignorance of any developments in economics later than Marshall. Cook also doubts the utility of a dichotomy in which one side is rapidly vanishing. For better or worse, primitive groups are rapidly being absorbed into the modern world. Finally, he places Polanyi and Dalton in the early nineteenth-century school of romantics, since they believe that the material greed of the commercial market has alienated man from his natural imaginative wealth and power. Cook concludes that the influence of the Polanyi-Dalton School is a step backward for economic anthropology.

Firth (125) stands in sharp contrast to Dalton and Sahlins. Although, like them, he does admit that much of what now passes for economics is descriptive of a Western economy rather than general economics, he denies the existence of such a thing as a subsistence economy. The lack of a general-purpose money does not imply for Firth that exchange is impossible. In support of this, he cites his own work among the Tikopia and Pospisil's among the Kapauku. He points out (which Dalton and Sahlins do not) that the lack of a general-purpose money will hamper credit expansion and capital accumulation. But as to the universality of some kind of economic theory, Firth is quite definite: "Nor can there be any other systematic
set of formal propositions of an economic order differing of necessity from the accepted economic ones just because they relate to a different social universe. In my view an analysis of a primitive economic system or of an African or Oriental peasant system can be made without sacrifice of the basic approach of modern economics.

Forde and Douglas (129), in defining "primitive economy," stress the communality of irregular economic benefits. Large animals, only rarely killed, are often shared with the entire group, even if the capture is due to the efforts of only a few members. "By giving away his own surplus he is making a number of people beholden to him. This is an elementary form of credit." "Social ties perform the function of rudimentary credit institutions in primitive economies." Clearly, Forde and Douglas believe that although economic concepts were developed for "complex exchange economies," corresponding categories can be recognized in embryonic form in a primitive economy. The crucial difference between gift and sale is that the first object of gift exchange is the building up of a social relationship, whereas in buying and selling, any continuous social relation between the parties is merely incidental." For these authors, economic development implies an increase in impersonal ties and a loosening of social solidarity. However, this change is felt to be continuous, so that a common means of analysis is possible.

Cancian (61), in a short note, offers his views in mediation of this dispute between "formalists" and "substantivists." He characterizes the former as believing that "maximization is a good way to approach human behavior"; the latter that "human institutions are varied and difficult to categorize." This difference is not seen as relevant to the applicability or nonapplicability of economic theory to primitive societies.

Nash (287, 290) defines the economy as "the institutional cluster where the strategy of economizing is the dominant mode of choice." He agrees with Polanyi and Dalton that "formal" economic behavior is to be seen in only a few of all the societies that have appeared in history (289). However, he feels that Polanyi's complete rejection of Western economics is excessive. While the anthropological approach to the study of economies should be comparative, as is done for kinship, certain tools of the economist would be useful—resource alloca-
tion and choice, quantification, and demand-supply interactions. Nash then describes the primitive or peasant economy in terms similar to those used by Kuznets and cited earlier: simple technology; little division of labor; production units dominated by social factors; relatively non-monetized; and control of wealth and capital established as a sociological function. In Nash's view (290), these categories could include any of the four kinds of markets outlined by Smelser (355) in his review of Polanyi (319). The Polanyi School would, of course, draw a sharp line between market exchange and the remaining three systems. Nash, however, would classify economies by economic institutions, resource availability, the social function of production and consumption units, and the scale and framework of the economy. Using this classificatory scheme as applied to various field studies, Nash (286, 290) suggests four principal types of primitive or peasant economies: primitive, quasi-tribal peasant, solar-system peasant (each village specializing in one product), and adjunct export peasant. He concludes that these economies generally differ from modern economies in their lack of credit institutions and their consequent lack of means for innovating (290).

Belshaw (30) defines the economy as exchange. He takes exception to Parsons and Smelser (308), who place the economy in a distinct subsystem. For Belshaw, the economy and the society are inseparable. "All enduring social relations involve transactions, which have an exchange aspect." Indeed, Belshaw believes Parsons and Smelser would have had to come to the same conclusion if they had not defined the economy to be production alone. Three kinds of exchange are outlined: gift exchange, monetized peasant, and modern. Defining wealth as the command of resources, gift-giving is a means for the accumulation of wealth in the form of obligations for future aid. Thus, "prestation in itself or in association with other economic principles is consistent with enterprise, complexity, and growth." The lack of notable growth among primitive economies is caused by the technological limitations of production in these groups. It is to be noted that Belshaw draws these conclusions, quite at variance with those of Dalton cited above, from the study of those very societies Dalton maintains are most typically primitive: the Trobriand Islanders of the 1920's, the Nuer, and the Kwakiutl. In the monetized peasant market, lack of
capital accumulation possibilities and of credit tends to dampen growth potential. With little growth to mitigate temporary failure, participants in these markets are either gamblers or risk-aversers interested in establishing their security. Security is achieved through credit extension (comparable to gift exchange in its securing of obligations) and/or partnerships. (This system of exchange is to be compared with that of Sahlins.) Belshaw concludes, "The overwhelming majority of societies are achievement oriented, even where roles are heavily ascribed, and the maximization-of-satisfaction principle is at work in all of them." Further, "The entrepreneurial function is omnipresent and a condition of any form of social life." Demand (unsatiated wants) and supply (the assignment of roles to a finite number of participants) form the basis for an exchange system and are common to all economies. The exchange system is coordinated not by freely competitive individual interest, which has never existed, but by value orientations or pattern formation, as well as by individual entrepreneurs, political systems, and bureaucracies. Any needed adjustment in the exchange system comes about partly through the market, but also through factor mobility, information flows, flexibility of social boundaries, and the state of physical communications. Combinations of these several mechanisms will give a multitude of different economies, but only rough categories.

**Credit**

Firth (124) has outlined the importance and diversity of capital formation in peasant societies. Although no sharp line can be drawn, he would distinguish between investment in capital that increments status and capital that increases material output. This difference is basic to a determination of the growth possibilities of the society. Underlying all forms of capital formation is the credit mechanism, which exists "even in the most primitive non-monetary economic system."

Epstein (114) follows the career of a native New Guinean entrepreneur in some detail. She shows that this individual was able to break out of a matrilineal system of capital holding in order to develop his personal investments. His economic growth, however, was blocked by the credit restrictions imposed by the Australians on loans to na-
tives. Belshaw (29), in a study of rural Fiji, finds considerable entrepreneurial ability that is hampered by lack of credit. The modern Fijian political hierarchy seems less adapted to economic innovation than the pre-European Fijian system.

A division between native Javanese and Javanese-born Chinese, coincident with a shopkeeper-farmer dichotomy where there has been little assimilation, has blocked economic growth in a Javanese village (155). The consequent lack of credit has meant that only farmers large enough to have their own supply of capital have innovated. In another study of rural Java, Geertz (151) details the expansion of sugar cane growing during the period between the two World Wars. The expulsion of the Dutch after the Second World War was accompanied by a withdrawal of rural credit and the collapse of the commercial sugarcane market, which needs credit to assure an adequate cane supply.

Nash (285) finds that Central American Indian villages are doubly prone to be left out of economic development. The Indian social system does not generate capital funds, nor are these supplied by the dominant Ladino society, which is very unfavorably disposed toward the Indians. In a study of Haitian rural markets, Mintz (273) describes, in considerable detail, the limits imposed on expansion by the extremely low level of capital available to the individual trader. Halpern (166) finds that ambitious Lao farmers are unable to grow cash crops for lack of the credit needed for the initial investment.

In a restudy of a Malay fishing village, Firth (126) finds that the extension of credit has been a prime factor in the rise of native entrepreneurs. Credit toward the purchase of large-scale nets is readily extended by net dealers and has been an important factor in both the economic development of the village and the increase in the disparity of individual wealth. Greenfield (161) explains the presence of extremely small landholdings in Barbados partly by the ready extension of credit against the standing sugarcane crop. This credit is needed to supplement or finance economic activity in other parts of the economy. Hunt finds that family businesses in rural Mexico grant credit as a means of assuring a labor supply (furnished in order to pay off the loan) when needed in the agricultural or other activities of the business (194). The importance of credit is brought out by Pani (306)
in a study of farmers' demand for credit in India. He finds that small landholders are less able to vary their demand for credit with changes in the interest rate. This would imply that their demand for credit is more pressing or more vital than that of larger landholders.

Cohen (73) and Hill (184) describe the organization of credit in West African cattle markets. In Ibadan, Nigeria, Cohen notes, credit against purchases of cattle is granted to butchers. Extensive cooperation among dealers and widespread spying help mitigate the risk involved. Hill (184), however, finds that in Kumasi, Ghana, the credit system has broken down, to be replaced by a highly competitive and open market. Colson (75) explains the lack of activity in a Central African market for cattle by the inadequate prices fixed by the government. The long-term farm-use value of cattle to the native is generally greater than the government price, which is based on the meat value of the cattle. Geertz (152) and Ardener (12) present comparative studies of the place of various forms of small-scale credit organizations in the introduction of capital into traditional societies. Metge (269) describes a particular variant among the Maori of New Zealand. Dewey (90) presents an overview of the place and forms of credit in Javanese marketing.

**Monetization**

An increase in or change in the nature of the money supply is, in its effect, very similar to the granting of credit. Dubbeldam (102) studies the impact of an increase in the supply of cowrie shells used as a form of money by the Kapauku in New Guinea. This increase tended to equalize income distribution, since the new shells went chiefly to the young, who were better able to work for the European suppliers of shells. Epstein (114) describes a more Europeanized New Britain society, the Tolai, who use both European and shell money. The two currencies are not interchangeable, even where a profit could be made by such trades. The shell currency is used in the native social system, where it occupies a central place because of tradition rather than value. In a long study of a Zulu tribe, Reader (327) notes that conservative natives are reluctant to use European cash to purchase food, which they feel should be self-grown, as was traditional. However, these same tribesmen are extremely price-conscious when buying...
other goods—even to the point of undertaking long journeys in search of cheaper prices. In Zambia, Kay (218, 219) deals with a village so short of cash that over 75 per cent of the males are normally out of the village working in the towns.

Markets

After a flurry of activity in the early '60s, little has been done recently on markets, though these are often a principal avenue for economic incentives and opportunities to be passed on to the peasant. Harding (173) compares traders in different parts of New Guinea. He finds that trade tends to be dominated by the political-social structure of the society. In an exhaustive study, Temple (370) investigates a Ugandan market that seems to have nearly perfect competition and is highly sensitive to price or quantity changes. Skinner (354) shows that effective distance, which is a function of transport possibilities, is a major determinant of market size, as well as of the frequency with which the market meets and the type of goods sold. The peasants' world, Skinner holds, is formed by the area over which the local or standard market operates. Modernization is, in his view, linked to the opening of the market area through the improvement of transport. Halpern (165) discusses the use of bilateral contracts between peasants and urbanites in the process of modernization. These contracts grow out of the rural market and represent extensions by peasants of preferred client status to certain urban dwellers. Kaplan (216) emphasizes the use of marketing in Mexico as make-work where other sectors of the economy cannot absorb the unemployed.

Economic Environment

The economic environment—production possibilities, consumers' preferences, and the like—naturally interacts with the social structure of peasant societies. However, both Orans (301) and Finney (123) attempt to show that Sahlins's theory of social stratification determined by production possibilities is oversimplified. Kay (220) constructs a Guttman scale for consumer behavior in Tahiti. He finds that this behavior is determined by cost and usefulness. Lebar (237), on the other hand, finds less stratification in the use of economic goods among the Trukese, despite wide variance in income. Doutreloux
(99) and Netting (292) find that economic variables can be determined by social structure rather than the contrary. Doutreloux studied an African group in which the value of land is determined by mythical and religious factors and not by its productivity. Netting abstracts from another African example to show that labor utilization will be determined by family structure. According to Netting, the kind and quantity of labor available is a residual, left over after vital family activities have been accounted for.

**Socioeconomic Structure**

Phillips (314), on the basis of SCT and TAT material, deduces that the Thai peasant personality is to be characterized in part by an anxiety of poverty. Weingrod (392) concludes from a study of village development in Israel that successful directed change must make use of the traditional family structure. Village leadership that is tied in with this family structure will be better able to maneuver between the enforcement of directives coming from outside and resistance to them where they prove unacceptable to the village. In another study of Israeli villages, Weintraub and Bernstein (394) find no conflict between traditional family structure and modern agricultural development. In one of the two villages they studied, this did not seem to be the case; however, the authors find that agricultural development there was blocked by a division of the village into opposing factions. Where these factions (centered on traditional families from different origins) did not exist, development was not blocked. Cancian (61) feels that the Indian system of Mexico is not able to expand to meet the pressures of population or economic growth. The growing economic surplus cannot be integrated into the native system of prestige investments. As this surplus comes to be used elsewhere, Cancian feels that the prestige system will lose its only raison d'être.

Foster (131, 132) proposes a model of behavior to explain the importance in the peasant world of what he has elsewhere called the "dyadic contract." Peasants, Foster maintains, view the world as containing only a limited amount of good things. Thus, one person's gain is felt to be another's loss. Therefore, gains are not revealed unless they are perceived as fortuitous. By means of the dyadic contract, the peasant assures himself that there will be reciprocity in all exchanges
he must make. This concept of limited good has generated considerable comment. Kaplan and Saler (217) find Foster imprecise and accuse him of using faulty logic. Bennett (33) points out that this peasant view of the world may in fact be correct—not because of the peasant's psychological structure, but rather because of urban or landlord exploitation, or simply because of inadequate credit. Kennedy (221) criticizes Foster for not adequately integrating the peasant into the non-peasant world. The "peasant" is not a universal, homogeneous concept. Kennedy feels that the "Great Tradition" is more important than Foster's economic determinism. Still, "scarcity" does have a role in society; but it must be integrated into the social structure to be understood. Piker (317) finds that the concept of limited good is impossible to verify. In any case, Foster has not shown, according to Piker, that limited good is a necessary and sufficient condition for producing the peasant interpersonal relations observed. On the other hand, Langworthy (232) finds the image of limited good a very plausible explanation for the failure of cooperative farming in India. Both Underwood (378) and Bailey (19) describe societies in which limited good would seem to be an operating force.

Innovation

Sapre (334), using historical records of land use and prices in an Indian village, finds a definite shift in crop patterns in response to changes in relative prices. Bose (49) believes that the diffusion pattern of new farm practices is much the same in both the United States and India. Dasgupta (86), in studying India, and Hickey (182), in his work on Vietnam, show that innovation tends to occur first among the upper socioeconomic levels. Dasgupta further finds that these first innovators tend to use institutionalized sources for their information, but that late innovators use non-institutionalized sources, as is the case in the United States. By using a questionnaire, Hendry (180) shows that Vietnam villagers are extremely receptive to new ideas, the problem being to find innovations that are profitable.

Schultz (337) maintains that traditional agriculture, as seen in Guatemala and North India, is both rational and profit maximizing. Capital is not invested in traditional agriculture even where available, since the return is too low. Modern agriculture has a higher rate
of return, yet it is not adopted by many peasant groups. Schultz ex­
plains this by the peasants' lack of knowledge of modern agriculture 
rather than by any unwillingness on the part of the peasant to respond 
to economic incentives. Beckford (28), in a review of Schultz's book, 
criticizes the lack of emphasis on non-economic constraints, which he 
feels cannot be neglected.

Economic Adaptation

Many studies have tried to bring out the basic responsiveness of 
peasant societies to economic incentive. Firth (126) finds villagers in 
Malaya extremely responsive to the smallest economic opportunity. 
This response does not seem to have been hampered by social factors 
such as kinship ties. Belshaw (29), in his work on Fiji, also finds that 
there is receptivity to economic opportunity; but he has some doubts 
that this responsiveness can overcome the lack of social overhead 
(e.g., roads). Hoffmann (190) describes a primitive tribe in the Ama­
zon jungle of Peru that has become highly proficient in individual 
trading. This success, however, does not seem to have adapted the 
tribe to consistent contractual work. Beckett (27) describes an iso­
lated Polynesian island community that is highly price sensitive. 
Hitchcock (187) analyzes a Magar community in Nepal where the 
most important external (non-agricultural) source of income is ser­
vice in the British Army's Gurkha regiments, a tradition dating from 
1815. Chambliss (64) shows that taxation can play an important part 
in setting the peasant's response to new opportunities in agriculture. 
In a situation of extreme population pressure on land and on other 
forms of employment, Greenfield (161) finds peasants responding 
primarily to the risk of unemployment. This is done by spreading 
the risk over several small occupations, to avoid ever being entirely 
out of work. These peasants are responsive to economic opportunity 
at a far more complex level than is usual.

Other authors have shown the changes induced in the social struc­
ture by a new economic environment. Epstein (114) describes the 
gradual decay of a matrilineal system with the introduction of cash 
cropping. Since cash crops are a man's job, it seems to be easier for 
a father to get his sons to work for him than it is for a mother's brother 
to get his sister's children. Lang (231) finds that economic pressures
have given rise to a tri-class structure similar to that in the West. Béteille (36) finds that an increase in outside economic opportunities has led, in an Indian village, to a loosening of the traditional social structure. Halpern (167) describes the complex mixture of urban, rural, cash, or barter economies present in Laos. He finds that modern forms of economic transaction may be intermingled with traditional, culture-bound relations. In particular, he points out that the more isolated mountain tribes are often more dependent on trade with the outside world than are the lowland peasants. Swift (365) and Middleton (270) have studied villages where family and kinship ties have been weakened by plantation work and cash cropping respectively. Brokensha (55) describes a village in Ghana where economic change has taken place entirely within the traditional framework. Cornell (77), in a historical study of Japanese villages, traces the response of family structure to changing economic conditions. As land became scarce and the control of its use more pressing, the feudal structure of the rural family gave way first to a pyramidal structure of senior and junior families and later to owner-tenant relationships between different families. The important impact of technology on fishing communities, in terms of motors and new types of nets, is clearly shown in restudies by Fraser in southern Thailand (134) and Firth in Malaya (126).

A few studies have tried to bring out the interaction between social and economic change. Bailey (19) shows how Indian caste restrictions can thwart efficient economic growth. Finney (122) finds “Tahitian peasants” responding rapidly to economic opportunities and shifting from a traditional reciprocal exchange system to a “commercial” exploitation of the new situation. While there seems to have been pressure for some time for the nuclearization of the family, it was only with the change to a commercial economic system that this family system was feasible. Epstein (115), in a summary of her longer, earlier work (113), studies the relationship between economic stimuli, the elicited responses, and the economic possibilities. The author studied two villages in the same area after the introduction of irrigation and the installation of sugar mills to take advantage of the new water supply. One village was within the irrigated area. Its response was no more than a shift from one agricultural crop to another, and this was accomplished with virtually no dislocation of the traditional society.
The other village was on higher ground, above the level of the irrigation water, and could not, therefore, respond to the new stimulus. Any response would have had to be indirect, taking advantage of the increased prosperity in the region. This village has become a service center for the surrounding irrigated area. Its traditional social system has collapsed; its members have become entrepreneurs with frequent urban contacts. By observing reactions and by relating stimulus to response possibilities, Epstein explains differing answers to the same economic stimulus.

A further problem lies in the possibility of a researcher misinterpreting his data. As an example, Goldkind (157) postulates that the classless, homogeneous response to economic development seen by Redfield in Chan Kom was in reality a heterogeneity of social classes.

**Rural-Urban Economic Contacts**

Fukutake (144) shows that in India relative isolation may lead to an easier reduction of castes. An isolated village tends to lose its higher castes to the more promising economic opportunities found in the towns. A lesser degree of isolation may induce the higher castes to stay in the village, since they can travel to the town without any great difficulty. This lack of higher castes in the isolated village seems to inhibit the development of the untouchable castes, who have no city-oriented caste to emulate. Orenstein (302), Tremblay (375), and Bardin (24) find the influence of the city on the village very disrupting. Orenstein describes recent efforts by the Indian government to help the lower castes. Increased contact with the non-rural world has encouraged these lower castes to leave the village. In Acadia (375), contact with an outside market, while reinforcing the conservatism of the well-to-do, has driven the poor to the cities in search of a livelihood. In a Tunisian village, Bardin finds a split along generation lines. The older generation clings to its ways; the younger leaves for the city. Young and Young (411) postulate on the basis of a Mexican sample that farmers are more likely to leave the village the greater their urban contacts (defined as community of orientation in the sense of Lipset, but with the addition of kinship ties). Goddard (156) hypothesizes that although the Yoruba village is economically separated from the town, it is united with it by social and religious links. In an Italian context, MacDonald and MacDonald (256) show that
economic development has taken place in those regions where rural economic power is most concentrated and labor militancy highest. Reina (329) describes an Indian community seven miles from Guatemala City that is involved in trade and touched by political changes but still preserves much of its traditional culture and economy. The contrast with the work of Anderson and Anderson in villages near Copenhagen (8) and Paris (9) reflects degrees of industrialization and economic development in general. Guatemala also clearly contrasts with Japan as described by Norbeck (296), more nearly approximating the situation in Burma in Nash's study (289) or the Turkish villages studied by Pierce (315) and Stirling (360). Rural people, no longer satisfied with the perspectives to be found in the rural community, have created severe housing problems in cities (3), in some cases exploiting the city by degrading their own economic status to maintain kinfolk at a subsistence level in the countryside (48). This phenomenon, now noted by Bose in India, has, of course, a long history in southern Europe and the Caribbean, where remittances from a member of the family working in America or England have helped maintain his rural relatives at a bearable level of poverty. Sometimes emigrants return with savings to invest in the village (258). Whether they are Mexican braceros in California or Greek migrant workers in Germany, ties with the home village remain strong, and remittances are an important factor in the local economy. In Western Europe and North America, it is possible to see the peasant or rural agricultural component of society becoming mainly a specialized occupational group, a minor part of the total labor force (153). In the United States this has, of course, been in large measure the problem of assimilating the European immigrant, and more recently the Negro ex-sharecropper and the former plantation worker from Puerto Rico (247, 343). The role each group plays in the new urban setting is to a significant degree a reflection of the complex of culture values and attitudes that they derive from their original rural setting (154). This carryover of rural values and attitudes to the urban setting has been called the peasantization of the town (169). Suzuki, in a Turkish case study, uses the term "urban peasant" (363).

Those who have succeeded to a degree in the urban setting often seek a new tie to the land in suburbia. This step into the middle class is viewed by Fried (136) as the real break with the past, from what is
often the socially well-integrated kin setting of the working-class community. A study of an Italian working-class community in Boston is entitled *The Urban Villagers* (149). A number of investigators, particularly those dealing with the Middle East, have commented on the lack of sharp cultural breaks between rural and urban areas (112, 163). This may be due to the low level of industrialization in the area, and perhaps in part to the lack of small landholders in agriculture.

**Racism**

Van Velsen (379) finds that Africans in Rhodesia are blocked in their attempts to become urban by the lack of jobs that can support them and their families. Africans given jobs are assumed to be single and without family responsibilities. Rowley (331) finds the same situation in New Guinea, where the Australians base native wages on a subsistence level for a single man. Ravicz (326) goes so far as to ascribe the social structure in Indian villages in Mexico to the extent of the predominantly racial form of contact with Europeans, rather than to the impact of economic factors. Although some readers may note implicit recognition of racial prejudice in studies of villages in, for example, Africa, India, and Latin America, they will find very little to help them weigh the importance of this factor in the process of modernization.

Among approximately 60 case studies discussed in this section, only three deal specifically with the impact of racial prejudice on economic development. In the United States, the urbanization of previously marginal farm groups such as Negroes, Puerto Ricans, and Appalachian whites has been a subject of concern. There is no obstacle to assuming city life as such; but employment is often sporadic, and maintenance becomes a welfare concern (246, 247, 254). A picture of racial contact growing out of Russian conquest in Central Asia is given by Bacon (18). Harris (175) and Mörner (279) discuss race relations in a Latin American context, and Coleman (74) deals with it with respect to the rural-urban variables in the United States.

**Corruption**

Whitten (396) describes the role of graft in an Ecuadorian town. Government officials normally enjoy a standard of living that requires an income 10 to 20 times as high as their nominal salary. Taxes
on merchandise are not specified, and the amount to be paid is arranged between the tax collector and the merchant. Thus new economic opportunities may not offer a clear advantage to members of the lower class. However, the increasing number of officials may serve as a check on the level of graft, thereby allowing greater freedom to the entrepreneur. Whitten concludes that the traditional social system is reasonably flexible and would respond to profitable economic incentives. Nair (284) refers in passing to the situation in rural India. Newspaper accounts speak of corruption and graft in Asia, South America, and other areas, yet studies do not provide information on this topic. In this context, perhaps a kind of censorship, to a large extent self-imposed, is operative.

THE CONTEXT OF PEASANT STUDIES

By and large, anthropological interest has focused inward in terms of methods of study. The units of observation relate to earlier anthropological interests, which focused on the tribe. The debate is not yet over on the extent to which procedures and techniques that were previously appropriate to nonliterate peoples can be carried over to the newer (post-1945) interest in peasant peoples, but a consideration of the scope of urban anthropology has already begun (162). A kind of urban anthropology has, of course, long existed in the study of urban minorities—such as relatively self-contained neighborhoods of overseas Chinese, Indians, Orthodox Jews, and Greeks—existing as specialized groups within modern cities and in certain respects resembling peasant communities.

Besides the interest of anthropologists, folklorists, and geographers, concern with rural peoples primarily employed in agriculture and with their relation to the affairs of the nation-state has been shown by rural sociologists, agricultural economists, agricultural historians, demographers, and researchers in public administration and political organization on the village level. These interests are manifest in the usual ways of academia: scholarly journals and societies, departments or special programs at universities, and research foundations that serve their particular needs. Although contact between these subdisciplines may be fruitful, it is usually apparent only in the introduc-
tions to anthologies. By and large, these separate literatures evolve each in their own way, serviced by separate bibliographical tools. Occasionally specialists meet in the course of field studies, conferences, or participation in common research programs with separately published results.

To say that more interdisciplinary cooperation is needed would seem to offer a mechanical rather than intellectual solution. Rather, what can be most useful is a willingness of researchers to use all types of scholarly evidence in attempting to solve broadly conceived problems. Despite the usual scholastic provincialism there is some evidence that this is being done. For example, the cross-fertilization of the anthropologist and historian occurs when an attempt is made to study in depth a peasant society in which there is a long and well-articulated literate tradition. At the least, the anthropologist makes extensive use of historic documents, or the historian becomes concerned with cultural concepts and social structure in the analysis of his data. This involvement with historical data in analyzing various facets of contemporary community life in perspective is strongly evident in a number of studies dealing with peasant villages in France, Japan, and Denmark (8, 9, 64, 408). Laslett's work (235) focuses on a "sociological history," which, by use of a comparative rather than a chronological framework, attempts to reconstruct society before the onset of the Industrial Revolution, in this instance in England in Stuart times.

Interest in the quality of life of rural people has been an important part of anthropological community studies. There has, however, been discussion of what are the essential qualities of life in contemporary rural societies, and of the extent to which certain groups fit categories like the "culture of poverty" (246). It is appropriate that these concerns also focus on the past. At the end of a chapter entitled "Did the Peasants Really Starve?" Laslett (235) sums up, "It is not possible to give precise reasons why the peasantry found it so difficult to keep their babies alive, or whether the food supply was the governing influence." But much information is available, and he concludes that only now are these important questions beginning to be asked. He phrases this not only as a question of scholarly importance, but as one of finding out how our ancestors managed to stay alive, in this way
providing insight into our contemporary civilization. Appropriately, his book is called *The World We Have Lost*.

This type of research has led to the interesting assertion that (at least in England) the number of people in the household has tended to increase rather than decline with the onset of industrialization; and further that the multi-generational kin group living under the same roof may be more common in the present-day industrial city than it was in the preindustrial city or in preindustrial rural areas. It is asserted that urbanization, better communications, a higher standard of living, and greater life expectancy may have elaborated and diversified kin networks (234). A volume devoted to the reconstruction of social and demographic data in England, based on old parish records and other archival sources, has recently appeared (407). The extensive work of French scholars should also be noted. It is suggested that between 1550 and 1841 the English villager was not liable to the periodic starvation that affected the rural Frenchman (234).

Possibly, we may now know more about Eskimo kinship, for example, than about how past living conditions in Europe have influenced present American values. It is understandable that sociologists of a generation or two ago were more interested in the assimilation of immigrants than in their origins. The precise nature of the Old World rural backgrounds from which most Americans stem remains to be reconstructed; and this topic is debated by historians (380), as well as by anthropologists. Recently, attention to Old World rural origins is evident in Glazer and Moynihan's study of New York political and social life (154). A recent symposium focusing on the theme of honor among Mediterranean peasants explores this concept on several social levels (311). Such approaches offer the possibility of insight into many of our contemporary urban problems, where the values of the administrator or responsible official often differ markedly from those of his constituency.

In many countries the equivalent of cultural and social anthropology exists as a branch of local history and folklore studies. Even where it has evolved beyond this point, there are still local culture heroes whose particular approaches often heavily influence the analysis of data bearing on their own country. A significant part of European ethnology is concerned with museum work, specifically describing
and preserving the folk or peasant component of a given cultural heritage (for example, 323). This is most notable in folklore and material culture, as the abundance of publications on these topics attests. Jacobit (205) discusses the concept of agrarian ethnography, relating mainly to the study of European rural material culture, particularly plows. In North America, by contrast, contact with scholars employed in preserving the colonial and recent historic past, as in National Park sites and restorations, has occupied little attention among anthropologists, whose concerns are limited largely to American Indians in a prehistoric context—they are concerned with a Mesa Verde or a Chaco Canyon, but not particularly with a Greenfield Village or a Colonial Williamsburg. Some European countries clearly distinguish between the study of their own folk heritage and that of other countries or of primitive societies. For example, in Hungary, according to B. Maday, the term ethnography is used in reference to the study of one's own culture. However, when a study is comparative in character or concerns other European cultures, it is stated to be in the field of European or East European ethnology; the term "ethnology" used alone denotes primitive, non-European cultures.

The foreign anthropologist working in developed nations must come to terms with the local scholarly tradition as well as understand the peasant community in which he works. American, British, and French anthropologists working abroad have emphasized social structure and cultural analysis. Those ethnologists who work mainly in their own countries have often, for a combination of historical reasons, avoided involvement in social and value investigations of local peasant communities. Where research on rural societies has been done, it has sometimes been an aspect of political organization. This was particularly true in the prewar period in Yugoslavia (in Croatia) and Rumania, where the growth of research on rural peoples was associated with the development of peasant parties in those countries (274). The question of peasant parties and "peasantism" in Eastern Europe between the two world wars has recently received attention by Jackson (204).

Ishida (196) raises the question of differences between European and American anthropology, focusing on varying emphases between the United States and countries influenced by the Germanic tradition.
Notably absent from the discussion are comments by scholars from England, France, and the U.S.S.R. The Hungarian scholar Gunda makes the point that American anthropologists do not use data from European peasant societies. It is argued that central European scholars have not placed much emphasis on social structure and values, but that this is not the case with regard to material culture, trait diffusion, folk religion, certain ecological factors, settlement patterns, and perhaps most importantly the relation between recorded history and culture process in peasant subculture. The culture area theory of American anthropology is seen as valuable in working out trait distribution in European peasant cultures, now being undertaken through the compilation of ethnographic atlases. In Hultkrantz’s (193) view, European folk life research—or as Americans may interpret it, research into particular peasant traditions—has an important position alongside general ethnology, and should not be subsumed under it, as in American anthropology. He feels that American anthropology is a specifically American product and, far from being a worldwide science of man, is not suitable for export.

The distance that cultural and social anthropology in general and the study of contemporary communities in particular have to traverse before they can become international in approach is indicated by Belshaw in Ishida (196), whose comments can be easily extrapolated to North America and beyond.

Anthropology will not come of age until, for example, we in British Columbia have Norwegian anthropologists studying Canadian fishing and logging communities, French colleagues examining our small interior townships, Japanese looking at our Sikh community here and Italians at our Japanese, and perhaps a student of Srinivas delineating the principles of our religious organization.

Gjessing (quoted in Ishida, 196) points out that American anthropology is strongly influenced by the society that nurtured it, both in its implicit missionary zeal and in what he feels is a weighting of interest on the individual as opposed to society. With the bemused attitude of the Scandinavian viewing his close cultural relatives he relates Russell’s comments on American and German animal psychologists. Those studied by Americans move about frantically with “an incredible display of hustle and pep,” finally attaining the desired results
by chance. The animals observed by Germans, in contrast, “sit quietly thinking, and at last the solution emerges from their inner consciousness.” Perhaps this is in part why Americans sometimes confuse a useful methodology with theory, and why Europeans often prefer to contemplate discrete objects in their museums.

It is not strange that much American anthropological writing on rural peoples seems to contain an implicit “peasantism,” the logical component of a widespread American intellectual anti-urbanism. “America was supposed to remain—or so it was thought by most citizens until well into the nineteenth century—an agricultural nation. Cities were, at first, subordinate to the countryside, in conception if not always in fact” (361). Contemporary Americans may not be the direct intellectual descendants of Jefferson, but as Hultkrantz (193) and other European scholars point out, there is an ill-concealed desire “to proselytize in Europe for the notion of the scope and content of anthropology which had crystallized out in America.” It seems as though, notwithstanding a lingering ethnicity, a unified folk heritage was eliminated in the ocean crossing. Despite a persisting ambivalence about European ancestry, North America is home, and American anthropologists are therefore untroubled by the need for a special academic subdiscipline to deal with a peculiar, peasant “little tradition.” Thus North American folklore can be an embellishment, and rural sociology can focus on transformation. The future orientation of American culture has its counterpart in messianic Soviet Marxism: in both countries, the rural past is selectively revered, and the countryside is transformed by man, not blended with the present.

The limitations of a community-centered approach are generally recognized, but as Arensberg and Kimball (13) point out, employment of the classic ethnographic method has, nevertheless, proved useful in getting at the specific problems of individuals and small groups. Understandably, in recent years stress has been placed on the improvement and sophistication of techniques, and in some instances on combination with survey and statistical methods aided by computer processing. The description and analysis of specific life ways are justified for their own sakes, as well as for the light they may shed on particular problems of structure and process. This is especially true in light of the increasing realization that many of the
specific and unique traits of peasant peoples are disappearing, often as fast as those of tribal groups.

The harking back to a style of community life that has largely disappeared within the past generation has been a theme for American and English writers and artists. This attempt is particularly evident on those occasions of yearly family-centered ceremonials, Thanksgiving and Christmas. Certain regions in the United States assiduously cultivate the image of an archaic rural atmosphere to permit an economically viable transition from farming to year-round tourism as the basic industry. In Vermont, a notable example of this trend, it is estimated that by 1975 there will be only 3,000-4,500 farms, with a total of approximately 250,000 cows. The bovine population will have declined by about 10 per cent by that date, while the number of dairy farms will have decreased by 300 per cent; milk production will have increased 50 per cent (109, 367). The number of men employed full-time in agriculture in one American state will then be equivalent to the total population of a good-sized Indian village. It is questionable whether the Vermont farmer ever was a peasant in the Central European or South Asian sense. However, expressions such as "rural Vermonter" and "proper Bostonian" conjure up nineteenth-century images that might imply more than occupational and class differences.

The connotations of the term peasant in the sense of a member of a rural-based kinship and mutual-aid unit having coherence over time is reflected in certain American and British settings. A study of a Welsh community (by Emmett, who married into the area) stresses the existence of kinship, although she chose to concentrate on other topics (111). A survey of over a hundred rural households in central Vermont that had ceased to derive their major income from agriculture revealed that most of the people concerned had remained on their holdings and 87 per cent stayed within the community (349). Consciousness of living in a community of interrelated kin, with continued long residence in an area, is exemplified in the many community histories written by committees of local people in New England, which stress genealogies. One attempt, for example, devotes a third of its 600-odd pages to genealogies, often including the current residence of those who have left. Many origins are traced back to the latter part of the seventeenth century and almost all to the beginning
of the nineteenth. Accomplishments of kin, past and present, are cited. This undertaking represents a considerable investment of time and funds for a community of less than 500 (211).

American anthropologists often cannot avoid direct concern with problems of large-scale change. Hughes writes that American sociologists, because they were too "professional," failed to anticipate the accelerated movement of the American Negro for equality (192). Of course, his reference is to American sociologists concerned with an American social problem. Perhaps American anthropologists and sociologists can be more detached in studying crises in the life of a Mexican peasant (245) or political radicals in villages in Ceylon (404). Local scholars, however, often cannot help but be deeply involved. Sometimes their reactions appear in the professional literature (28), although more often their comments are reserved for the daily press and political magazines. This is, of course, also currently true with regard to the reaction of many American anthropologists concerning their government's involvement in Vietnam.

From a strictly national professional point of view, there is a growing problem of access to foreign cultures and of the proper working relationship between North American field workers and foreign colleagues. This problem is particularly acute with research on tribal peoples, especially hunters and gatherers, who are often as much a source of embarrassment for many administrators in developing countries as they are a source of concern for individuals and organizations involved in social welfare or scientific research.

Tribal groups with horticulture, livestock, and occasionally plow agriculture are not embarrassments but major political problems, as is abundantly clear in Southeast Asia (59, 168). In dealing with peasant peoples, their concerns and their futures are inseparable from those of the nation-states of which they are part. In Latin America, for example, the transitional status of the mestizo as contrasted with the more traditional Indian poses a problem of cultural transition as well as one of the realignment of state powers (179, 386). In many regions peasants are, of course, the overwhelming component of the population, although they often have many of the characteristics of a disaffected minority. Much of the recent literature stresses their isolation from the outside world, the ways in which they
are discriminated against, and the strongly negative self-image of rural people. This situation is brought out in articles dealing with countries in the Mediterranean area, such as Jordan and Italy (11, 249). Lopreato’s article, “How would you like to be a peasant (in Italy)?” (249), helps explain the eager desertion of traditional agriculture by thousands of southern Italians, who have gone either temporarily or permanently to northern Italy, Switzerland, and Germany in search of jobs (40).

The problems involved in exposing sensitive issues have always been present in field research. The study of corruption has already been referred to. A much broader problem is that of the political implications of rural change. The concept of revolution as related to peasant culture and its transformations has been discussed. But what of formal attempts to study these processes? Mission-oriented agencies of the United States government, such as the Department of Defense, have an obvious interest, as evidenced by their support of Project Camelot. The name derives from King Arthur’s mythical domain: “It connotes the right sort of things—development of a stable society with peace and justice for all.” According to Horowitz (191), “It was a project for measuring and forecasting the causes of revolutions and insurgency in underdeveloped areas of the world.” The project became a source of international embarrassment to the United States in Chile and was subsequently abandoned. Jaspan (207) provides historical perspective on this kind of situation by detailing the case of the Dutch scholar Hurgronje. While in the employ of the colonial administration in Sumatra, he prepared a widely recognized monograph on the Achehnese, and later worked with the Dutch administration in successfully prosecuting a war against the Achehnese. Jaspan’s participant observation in Sumatra was characterized by some Sumatrans as imitating Hurgronje, and it was only with considerable effort that he was able to clearly define his role as an anthropologist operating in the greatly changed situation that existed in 1961.

Most of the world’s “insurgencies” are in rural areas inhabited mainly by peasants. A vital matter in this connection is that insurgencies can be seen as a way of resolving the peasants’ alienation with respect to the state. Anthropological field study of guerrilla war-
fare in peasant areas is theoretically conceivable, and would be similar in some respects to analysis of gang warfare in urban centers or observation of a messianic group; but it is incompatible with the degree of detachment necessary to scholarly study. In warfare participant observation obviously means combatant status. The propriety of making an examination like Lanternari's "The Religions of the Oppressed: A Study of Modern Messianic Cults" (233) in both tribal and peasant societies is a well-established concern of anthropology. If the crisis involving "the clash between the western world and the natives and the upset of the traditional relationships between them" is a fit topic for anthropological discussion, then so are the settings in which revolutions occur.

By-products of warfare and intelligence that are made available publicly can give useful insights into the programs of directed change employed by governments in rural areas in a postrevolutionary phase. Available studies from Russian archives captured at Smolensk by the Germans during World War II, which deal with the affairs of a rural district during the period of collectivization, have been analyzed by Fainsod (118). A more recent example is found in Chinese military documents, which detail problems encountered in instituting the communes (69).

Anthropology, Lévi-Strauss feels, is conceptually a very broad discipline that has in the past deliberately sought the small, marginal tribal culture in its empirical investigations: "Each constitutes a complete experiment, because of its relative simplicity and the limited number of variables required to explain its functioning" (241). But we must be conscious of some of the intellectual underpinnings, as in the older studies where the indigenous inhabitants, be they tribals or peasants, were treated along with the geology, fauna, and flora as part of the scenery described. As Lévi-Strauss indicates,

Anthropology is not a dispassionate science like astronomy, which springs from the contemplation of things at a distance. It is the outcome of a historical process which has made the larger part of mankind subservient to the other, and during which millions of innocent human beings have had their resources plundered and their institutions and beliefs destroyed, whilst they themselves were ruthlessly killed, thrown into bondage, and contaminated by diseases they were unable to resist. Anthropology is daughter to this era of violence: its capacity to assess more objectively
the facts pertaining to the human condition reflects, on the epistemological level, a state of affairs in which one part of mankind treated the other as an object (240).

The transition to the study of peasant societies, most recently of the post-peasant phase, closely linked to what is often called urban anthropology, raises as many moral and philosophical problems as it does methodological ones. In a book appropriately titled Une France sans paysans (153), the authors quote a 1917 statement by the Academy of Agriculture: "We must never forget that it is on this class of small owner-cultivators and rural workers that the fortune and strength of the country rests. From it are recruited its best disciplined and most lasting defenders." In a French textbook used in the middle schools up to the Second World War, 52 of the 128 texts dealt with agriculture and the life of the peasants, 12 dealt with glorious death on the battlefield, 61 dealt with moral lessons or memories of childhood, and the remaining three concerned a potter, a mason, and a merchant. Fifty-one per cent of rural youth who were between 15 and 19 in 1955 had left agriculture by 1962, and from 1950 to 1963 the number of tractors increased more than fourfold.

To a degree, the American experience parallels that of France. There is the same exodus of youth, increasing mechanization, growing size of holdings (a process more hedged in by restrictions in France), and specialized production. As summed up by a non-academic observer of a small Illinois town, "No matter what direction Vandalia's development takes, the rural style of life is slowly passing and with it the tranquility of the community that has always been the core of this farming area" (253).

Problems involved with exposing sensitive issues have always been present in field research, particularly when pursued within the investigator's own culture. A notable example is rural sociology in the United States. A recent review by Olson (300) saw research in this field as characterized by an avoidance of ideological contradictions, a bureaucratic standardization of research, and a focus on detail. Most of the analysis is limited to the level of the community. There is a general avoidance of matters that would question the integrity of the community as a social unit, such as increasing dependence of villagers on industry. Olson sees some of rural sociology's most effective
work as having been in the diffusion of innovations. But ironically, "The rural sociologist is faced with the necessity of defending the rural ethic while at the same time sabotaging it at every level by his emphasis on speeding the flow of technology to the rural community."

With the important exception of American Indians, and to a lesser extent certain minority groups, American anthropologists who have worked in rural areas have generally done their work outside the United States. Discussions of peasant culture, particularly of the negative aspects of farm life, do not generally include reference to the hardships of American farmers. Rural sociology in the United States has grown in part out of an effort in Theodore Roosevelt's administration to improve the lot of the farmer, and his appointment of a Country Life Commission for this purpose (291). Sewell (342) describes the emphases of rural sociological research in the last 30 years, and also summarizes some of the significant foreign-area research undertaken by members of the profession. The role of the rural sociologist in the United States is in some ways comparable to that of the Indian anthropologist studying his country's community development programs. Some of Srinivas' (358) observations on the problems of doing research in his own country and coming to terms with his particular sub-cultural heritage relate to the problems faced by rural sociologists in the United States.

While it is true that there has been some discussion about the village community as a valid analytical unit, there has not been too much questioning by anthropologists of the village-centered approach to national development. Rather, most discussions have revolved around why given programs do not succeed as a result of planners and agents failing to take into account specific values or institutions existing in the local community—for example, Buddhism in Laos (293), or the role conflict inherent in the status of the village-level worker in India (103). Such analyses do have value, but the problem of change in peasant cultures can be approached by asking a different sort of question—what are the implications of the "village fetish" (as one economist phrases it with respect to India)? By this, Lewis (243) means "the unexamined assumption that the single village must continue to be, because it always has been, the key social, political and economic unit in Indian rural life." He examines the
ideological underpinnings of the Community Development Program with respect to future investment decisions and urban planning, and suggests that industry and other urban functions be located in or near relatively small towns (in the 20,000-30,000 range), and that many villagers commute to work. In this connection, it is interesting to compare the Indian program with programs of Eastern European peasant parties as they existed before the war. Mitrany (274), in his introduction to a history of these political movements, explicitly links the two situations.

The image projected by current American anthropological conceptualizations of peasant society is a decidedly negative one. Foster (131) in his article "Peasant Society and the Image of the Limited Good," derived from field data from Tzintzuntzan, Michoacan, Mexico, states:

I mean ... to suggest that peasants view their social, economic, and natural universes—their total environment—as one in which all of the desired things in life, such as land, wealth, health, friendship and love, manliness and honor, respect and status, power and influence, security and safety, exist in finite quantity and are always in short supply, as far as the peasant is concerned.

He continues, "When the peasant views his economic world as one in which Limited Good prevails, and he can progress only at the expense of another, he is usually very near the truth." One wonders how this relates to Diamond's (92) view characterizing anthropology as a revolutionary discipline. He views primitive society as "people off the mainstream of contemporary civilization," to be appreciated not only for their value to scholarship, but also for their intellectual and moral attributes, to which is counterposed "the inadequacy of civilized human associations." Diamond contrasts pushing buttons or work in a mine with fashioning and using a primitive tool, referring to Sapir's critical analysis of contemporary life (based on an implied contrast with the "affective-cognitive-instrumental unity" of tasks in primitive societies). He cites approvingly Stein's (359) critique of Parsonian systematics, which points out that Parsons does not make one aware of the collective or personal horrors involved in particular aspects of the industrial world: "What may be needed is a 'sociology of horror' in which social science tries to be honest with the industrial
world and with itself.” It is tempting to speculate whether the concept of the limited good can be taken as a kind of “anthropology of horror,” describing a debased peasantry. In part, the contemporary concentration on conflict in studies of peasants reflects a reaction to earlier studies, which tended to stress the pervasiveness of tradition and the unity of rural society as opposed to urban social problems and anomie. There is also the thought that the stress on tensions can be more heuristic. The contradictions that perplexed the intellectuals in classical civilizations are very much a part of contemporary social science.

Approaching certain characteristics of the rural community from another point of view, Friedl (139) suggests that peasant societies tend to adopt outmoded urban fashions. Citing the work of Foster and Geertz, she maintains that literate nonindustrial urbanized societies, with their associated less literate (or nonliterate) but culturally linked village counterparts, may be a point of departure or “historical zero point” from which to view subsequent change. It is possible to view segments of urban society as being in the forefront of change toward a mass industrial society, while the peasantry are transformed into farmers or take up other occupations. This concept is in a sense the inverse of what was referred to earlier as the peasantization of the town, whereby rural values among new urban immigrants influenced the urban setting. There is also a counterpart in urban culture, where certain outmoded rural art and recreational forms are preserved as elements of national heritage. In the modern world, these are often stressed as reinforcing a sense of national identity in the face of the universal imperatives of industrialization. In dealing with increasing village-town contacts and decreasing rural-urban differentiation, it is important to bear in mind subcultural class distinctions. For example, those who represent the town in the village are rarely part of the innovating intellectual or controlling administrative groups in the city, so that their own subculture lags behind that of other urban elements. Similarly, it is with these lower status groups that the peasant migrant to the city most frequently comes in contact.

Sjoberg (353), in a detailed review article, places the problem of peasantry in perspective by focusing on the problem of rural-urban
differentiation. In summarizing the history of social-science writings on this segmentation, he refers to the rural and urban subspecialties that developed in the field of sociology in the 1920's, the former evolving a distinct institutional history of its own.

Though there is a growing concern with urban anthropology as opposed to peasant studies, the ideological orientation of anthropology would seem to make a division into subdisciplines, as happened in sociology, unlikely. In fact, the general trend appears to be toward involvement with concerns like kinship, economics, and local politics, which tend to link rural and urban areas rather than separate them. This is, however, a problem for the future. As Gulick (162) points out in his survey article, with the notable exception of Africa, where urban literate traditions date from the time of European colonial penetration, the research of anthropologists in urban areas has been very limited (Lewis being a noted but not exclusive exception). Further, as is well known, British social anthropologists, who have done much of the work in African cities, often refer to themselves as sociologists. This attitude is different from the mainstream of American anthropology, but it does seem worth recalling that the American Indian specialist Wissler, in his foreword to the Lynds' Middletown (255), originally published in 1929, refers to this work as "a pioneer attempt to deal with a sample American community after the manner of social anthropology."

Certainly, the social sciences sensitively and at times indirectly reflect changing national concerns. The Lynds were concerned with power and class, but not with poverty as such. It seems that then it was affluence, not poverty, that had to be explained. Today, in studies of both peasants and cities, the use of concepts like a culture of poverty and the image of limited good has focused anthropological attention on those at the bottom of the social scale. In explicitly emphasizing the dissatisfactions of the downtrodden, anthropologists have in a sense switched from a position of cultural relativism to one at least tacitly endorsing a kind of egalitarianism.

Arensberg (14), in a recent contribution to a symposium on guaranteed income, helps give perspective to the role of anthropology in North American society. He focuses on the market economy and the specific cultural setting in which it has existed. It is his view that it
was not often duplicated outside Northwest Europe. In discussing the cultural role of innovation, Arensberg remarks:

We do know, of course, that ... evolutionary emergence is “multilinear.” ... Alternate theories, especially that of easy monolinear progress, the ever upward straight line of evolutionary advance, have long been abandoned. Indeed we recognize at last that the monolithic, single-minded, single-fronted, lineal evolution of single animals, or a single trait, or a single institution is orthogenesis, overspecialization, overgrowth, and death.

Although the reference is to animal evolution, Russell’s (196) comments about American psychologists observing their rats come to mind, as does Black’s (37) summation of the characteristics differentiating Communist and Western societies. It should be remembered, however, that with contemporary developments in and between Communist states, a multilinear approach is the only one possible. In referring to the problem of evolutionary (as differentiated from revolutionary) change in the development of human culture, Arensberg notes that inventions responsible for change had the effect of first conserving and then “opening unknown new doors.” He also speaks of the consensus among anthropologists that innovation in early culture change was not conscious—as in the domestication of animals, the firecrackers of China, or the steam-driven doors of the Alexandrine temple, with resultant full udders, gunpowder, and locomotive propulsion. Some of the future implications of cybernation (cybernetics in industrial production and data control) are predicted by Davis (87), and the recent effects of automation on the American work force are discussed by Seligman (339). In this perspective, Arensberg’s optimism is perhaps less certain: “Neither blind overgrowth nor destructive revolutionary change need be our choice today. The higher continuity of evolution is neither of these, and we can now begin to perceive its shape.” As to what the current mixture of peasants, computers, automation, welfare capitalism, diverging Communism, semi-industrial socialism, and massive urbanization will produce, the best that one could hope at present is that both the procreative and self-destructive tendencies of man will be limited.

Viewing contemporary developments, Sjoberg (353) points out the interrelationships existing between political structure, ideology, and rural urban patterns. He sees significant differences in the type of
transformation that the peasant is undergoing; or more specifically, the nature of rural-urban differentials in transitional societies varies between totalitarian and democratic states. The totalitarian model is divided into two subtypes: the first promotes industrial-urban development, as in the Soviet Union and China; the second, the "anti-industrial-urban authoritarian model" most notably exemplified by Spain, Portugal, and some Latin American countries, seeks to maintain traditional feudalistic elite-peasant relationships in the countryside. This type is similar to the concept of Catonism proposed by Moore (277). Communists in China and Vietnam are seen by Sjoberg as using the peasantry to acquire political control, since there is no urban proletariat to organize; once in power, they employ more traditional Marxist doctrine, which views the peasantry negatively and seeks to assimilate it in the industrial-urban order as soon as possible, industrial development being seen as the only route to political power. The democratic model, as illustrated in India and the Alliance for Progress, focuses on the rural sector, giving less attention to industrialization and urbanization. In India, the first five-year plan was devoted to agriculture. Sjoberg feels that the democratic model, as it evolved in the United States and is conveyed to developing countries, contains anti-urban values that exist among intellectuals here and find a receptive climate in the developing societies. This is exemplified by the emphases on urban problems and disorganization, and on the political instability that originates in the urban slum. From this vantage point, both urban and rural sociology are seen historically as having played a supporting ideological role. Much of current research, however, does appear to have quite different implications.

If studies of primitive societies can place in perspective what Diamond (92) calls "critical aspects of our society," then surely complementary studies of peasant subculture can do no less. There is, of course, the possibility that their very immediacy may temporarily obscure perspective. For countries composed of people a majority of whom are involved in a culture of poverty or a village-based existence in which the limited good prevails, the alleviation of this situation takes on great urgency. To cite the Mexican scholar Batalla (26),

The magnitude of the problem with which we are faced and the scarcity of our resources place us in a situation far different from that of wealthy
and highly industrialized nations, like the United States of America. . . . These are not opportune times to deceive ourselves into thinking that efforts should be limited to the promotion of small changes, shielding ourselves with the fear that radical changes will produce disorganization. On the contrary, we believe that it is the task of the anthropologist to point to the very frequent uselessness of timid development programs, and that it is also his task to demonstrate with scientific rigor the need to carry out radical changes, that is, changes which get to the root of the problems themselves.

To judge by demographic data, worldwide movement to the city from the village has been irresistible during the past 150 years. From 1800 to 1950, while world population grew by something more than two-and-a-half times, the number of centers of 5,000 or more increased 26 times; those of over 20,000 grew by a factor of 23, and cities of over 100,000 by 20. It is estimated that 3 per cent of the people in 1800 lived in towns of 5,000 or more, but in 1950 a third of the world's people lived in towns this size or larger (178). It is true that many people were pushed off the land by a combination of economic, political, and sometimes military factors; however, it appears that for many it was a case of eager desertion. No matter how horrible the nineteenth-century urban slum seems in retrospect (to say nothing of the favelas of today), the city did, and still does, represent opportunity—preferable, despite its hardships, to a village that offered only further impoverishment or at best a "limited good." The nature of land ownership and the social status of the man who works the land are crucial determinants not only of types of rural economies but also of the nature of adjustment to urban life.

The descendants of slaves and plantation workers, often without extensive supporting kin ties, have become part of American urban life in the mid-twentieth century in quite a different way than have the children of European peasants. Life in what Lyford (254) calls the "airtight cage" of the Negroes and Puerto Ricans on Manhattan's West Side seems quite different from that of the immigrant Italians in Boston's West End of Gans's Urban Villagers (149), or that of the Jews in New York's Lower East Side a half-century ago (336).

The more successful segments of American society do not seem to have permanently resolved the problems of adjustment to modern urban life. Rather, an abortive return to the village life of their fore-
bears is sought—as evidenced by the proliferation of suburbs, whose purposefully adapted, agrarian-derived terminology of the ranch house, estate-size plot, country store, garden-fresh produce, connotes nothing less than an institutionalized nostalgia for a defunct productive system certain values of which are sorely missed. In a sense, the anthropological investigator of peasant society, residing in his ranch house, is himself undergoing traumas not unlike those of the de­tribalized native. He may not grow vegetables, but contact with the soil is renewed in the cultivation of grass, and a tie with the past affirmed in a drink at the town tavern, with its mass-produced, nineteenth-century rustic decor.

The search for the resolution of the traumas of the ex-peasant has been a major ideological concern of man for the past century. The solving of the rural-urban conflict by abolishing the differences—“Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country by a more equable distribution of the population over the country”—was set forth in 1848 in the Communist Manifesto. A historian of Marxism, Ulam (377), sums up one of its major points: “The city and the countryside: two ways of life clashing—neither of them in itself complete and adequate to the requirements of modern life—both of them having to undergo changes and amalgamation before socialism can be established.” While Marx condemns both the “idiocy of rural life” and the poverty and misery of the workers in the cities, he is much bound up with the potential of industry and its future in the city. Unlike some of his contemporaries, he was not given to enthusing over a picture of model factories in a bucolic setting, but was convinced of the indispensability of the city. At the same time, Marx had regard for “the ideal of human existence as embodied in the proletarian’s dream of a ‘natural,’ stable, and egalitarian community.” This was in part a reflection of the new worker’s nostalgia for his former, stable life in the village community, but the impossibility of his return was implied when Marx stressed the grim actuality of the rural poverty that the city migrant had fled.

Marx had, of course, thought that his ideology of revolutionary change would be applied to Western Europe, and not to the pre-
dominantly peasant lands to the east. The nature of the transformations taking place in the Communist countries is of crucial importance to any discussion of peasant society. At the same time, it is not strange that developments in these countries have been largely ignored in most English-language anthropological discussions. With the relatively recent exception of Yugoslavia (and, to a more limited extent, Poland) the region has for all practical purposes been closed to serious anthropological field research. It is perhaps no accident that these countries are exceptional in being the only two where complete collectivization has not taken place, and where the private peasant continues to coexist with a relatively limited state sector in agriculture. The period since the Second World War, of course, has until recently been characterized by the ideological cold war and the consolidation of Communist power in Eastern Europe, China, and the northern parts of Korea and Vietnam. In the process, many people from these countries have moved west, some pursuing anthropology as a career. Unlike many East Europeans and Chinese who have pursued careers in history, languages, and economics with interests focusing on their former homelands, those who have entered anthropology, with its mystique of the field experience, have understandably chosen more politically accessible areas, such as Oceania and Africa. Although knowledge of Russian and Chinese is not uncommon among Western anthropologists, there are relatively few who actively follow the literature in the area. A certainly unintentional result has been that the “peasant” literature existing and discussed in the West pertains most particularly to the lands of Hispanic civilization, especially in the New World, and to an increasing degree to other Mediterranean lands.

The primitive will continue to be important in anthropology; but as Wolf (402) remarks, to the extent that we renew our interest in civilizations “returning to ourselves, after fleeing from ourselves,” it is inevitable that the study of man be influenced by separate national traditions. To acknowledge the difficulty is not to abandon the task. The student of peasant society, whether Soviet ethnographer or American anthropologist, shares a degree of methodology and certain conceptual frameworks. Nevertheless, the world of Soviet eth-
nographers is alien to most Western anthropologists—and in its rigid, programmatic planning, one that many not so committed may find repugnant. Tolstov and Zhdanko (374) write:

According to the Program of the CPSU, the period of building of Communism in all fields will witness a further rapid rise in the living standard and culture of the Soviet people, civic improvements in rural settlements and towns, improvement in the living conditions of working people, and elimination of the residual inequality of women in daily life. . . . Customs and habits which hinder the building of Communism will be finally overcome. The task of ethnographers is to analyze this historical process in its great variety of concrete forms among various peoples, to study its laws and—most important—to assist it in every way.

The points made by Marx over a century ago are now specific goals: "... the progressing process of erasure of the differences between the daily life and culture of peasants and the urban population. The CPSU Program notes that the ultimate elimination of these differences will be one of the very greatest results of the building of Communism."

Black (37) maintains that the Communist and Western views of change both recognize the enormous potentiality and creativity of man, together with the possibility of a future life of economic abundance (such a future state would presumably have witnessed the disappearance of peasant subcultures). The Western outlook, which is implicit in most of the sources cited here, stresses that human costs need to be the major consideration in planning. This approach is influenced by the diversity of the histories of the nations of Western Europe and North America in their relatively long period of "modernization," a major implication of this term being the progressive elimination of the traditional farming sector. Thus future development is seen as being guided in large measure by past experience and diversity; the approach is multilinear and multifaceted. But Communism, as an ideology of comparatively recent modernizing states with a large traditional or peasant population, feels itself implicitly under the pressure of more advanced models; as a result, its approach is radical and unilinear, dogmatically asserting Marxism-Leninism as "scientifically" valid and more advanced from a political organizational point of view, although specific types of deficiencies may be
acknowledged. The future is seen as predictable, determinable, and inevitable.

If it is clear, as Wolf (403) suggests, that "industrial society is built upon the ruins of peasant society," then the way in which the peasant society is destroyed, or, put in a less brutal way, transformed out of existence, is one of the critical determinants of the shape that future world cultures will take. If one takes seriously the conceptions of peasant life in which they are viewed as the primary exploited group, it is not difficult to understand why they form the main cadre of revolutionary armies, knowingly or unknowingly hastening the end of their subculture. Moore (277) hypothesizes:

The assumption of inertia, that cultural and social continuity do not require explanation, obliterates the fact that both have to be re-created anew in each generation, often with great pain and suffering. . . . To speak of cultural inertia is to overlook the concrete interests and privileges that are served by indoctrination, education, and the entire complicated process of transmitting culture from one generation to the next.

Moore (277) employs the term Catonism (derived in part from some of the writings of Cato the Elder), and defines it as a repressive social order that supports those in a position of power; it denies new developments that have adversely affected the peasantry and opposes ameliorative social changes. It is seen as existing in contemporary times among the landed upper classes who use repressive and exploitative methods in response to the increasing role of the market in an agrarian economy. Catonism assumes a romantic view of the past to further its purpose, stressing the "organic" and "whole" nature of peasant culture and the peasant's attachment to the soil. Explicitly opposed to the negative features of contemporary urban civilization, it conceals social causes and projects an image of continued submission. Using data from Britain, France, America, China, Japan, and India, Moore concludes:

The assumption that gradual and piecemeal reform has demonstrated its superiority over violent revolution as a way to advance human freedom is so pervasive that even to question such an assumption seems strange. . . . As I have reluctantly come to read this evidence, the costs of moderation have been at least as atrocious as those of revolution, perhaps a great deal more (277).
He points out that in the Western democratic countries revolutionary violence was linked to the historical process, which made subsequent peaceful change possible. In the Communist countries, violent revolution has been in one sense a break with the past; Communist claims to represent a more advanced and freer society, however, are based on promise, not performance. Clearly, we are now seeing the working out of the process, the beginning of the end of peasant societies; the post-Stalin Soviet Union, Maoist China, and what Moore calls the "democratic stagnation" of India are but temporary stages.

PEASANTS IN THE SOVIET SETTING

The distance between promises and performance is manifest in many Western studies dealing with Soviet rural society. Official Soviet studies dealing with collective farm life emphasize the politically unobjectionable while generally supporting official ideology. A study of Lithuanian collective farm families (383) devotes much attention to house types and diet changes, contrasting the prewar situation with the Soviet period. We learn little, however, about how collectivization of agriculture was brought about. Some formal descriptive data is given on household composition and income, and ideal patterns of family functioning are presented. The progress over prewar conditions in all topics covered is proudly detailed. Another Soviet report analyzes collective farm life, with special attention to the family (340). Conditions in the Baltic area are treated in a monograph by the Dunns (108). The Soviet studies tend to emphasize observable material culture rather than the functioning of social relationships. Krader (227) notes that in the period 1946-55 there were 40 items (allowing for cross-references) in Sovetskaya etnografiya on collective farm life; 97 on settlement patterns, housing, and architecture; 60 on dress. Those dealing with social organization numbered 31, and 69 dealt with economic factors. Vucinich's (384) summary of Soviet ethnography specifically points out that

As a generalizing science, Soviet ethnography is inseparable from the official Soviet philosophy of history, and thus belongs more to the realm of ideology than to the domain of the theoretical sciences. This is particu-
larily true inasmuch as social structure, as a methodological and a substantive concept, is formulated and defined for the scholars rather than by them.

Some informal views of Soviet ethnographers, dealing with investigations of the collective farm peasantry, are presented by the Dunns (107), who have also published materials on the changes under Communist rule experienced by the Russian Old Believers and other sectarian movements. Their data provide insight into changes in rural areas, particularly with regard to the historical role of the religious communes up to the time of their dissolution in the late 1920's (106).

For an understanding of the contemporary values, attitudes, and social organization of Soviet rural life, excellent background material exists in recent Soviet literary writings. Although this material is obviously not a substitute for systematic, planned research, its value is evident when other information is unavailable. Coser's (78) point is particularly relevant here: "It provides the social scientist with a wealth of sociologically relevant material, with manifold clues and points of departure for sociological theory and research. The creative imagination of the literary artist often has achieved insights into social processes which have remained unexplored in social science."

There have been several surveys of recent Soviet writings on rural life (185, 265, 297), and some translations are also available (2).

In contrast to the ethnographic literature, which reflects accepted conservative views, these writings tend to depict life from the point of view of the kolkhoznik, the rural worker on the collective farm. In fact, a number do so in such an unabashed manner, championing the countryman against the townsman, that one Soviet critic has likened them to the Populist authors of the 1870's. This is highly significant when it is recalled that the Populists' successor, the Socialist Revolutionary Party, was in direct conflict with the Communists and was subsequently eliminated when the Soviets came to power. Writing ranges from what appears to be direct reporting, using actual names and places, to fiction in the sense that the specific settings or incidents are created.

It may be, as one authority claims, that since there has been an
improvement in rural life following Stalin's death, the criticisms are an indication that action is being undertaken to correct the defects cited (297). This is the reverse of what one would expect in the West. Briefly, the picture one obtains is that of bureaucratic ineptitude on a massive scale, where reasonable and often essential farm management decisions are countermanded by regional authorities to meet plans set from above. In the process, crops go unplanted or unharvested, and livestock is starved or dies of neglect. The majority of the unskilled labor force is women, and members of the collectives are forever seeking to put in work on their private plots. Mechanization is portrayed as a negative factor in the existing system. One author describes how, when horses were used exclusively, traffic was less, and the roads were not subject to so much wear. Thus, although trips might take longer, arrival was sure. Also, horses did not break down as frequently, nor did they require spare parts (265).

The definition of peasant used in analyzing the Soviet situation is similar to that used for Latin America: "It is almost as if he belonged to a different world. He is not considered, and does not consider himself, a member of the society with the same rights and obligations as workers in factories and offices. His relationship with the authorities seems to differ in character from that of the workers, and it would seem that he feels that this discrimination undermines his human dignity" (265). A specific fact of discrimination is that the collective farm worker is not free to travel and has no internal passport; and often his identity papers are not accepted at the town hotel when he goes on business (141).

The situation is not entirely negative, however. Much new housing has gone up in the villages, and many new consumer goods, such as radios, bicycles, and sewing machines, have appeared where there were none before. One source indicates that the income to build new houses has not come from the kolkhoz but from pensions, work in the timber industry, or a salaried employee in the family (2, 71). Much of the writing refers to less prosperous farming areas of European Russia (outside black-earth regions), which have been among the most heavily industrialized, where, even before the Revolution, local peasants earned much of their income seasonally from handicrafts (and later industrial work). There is a considerable ethnographic
literature on "religious survivals" (357). It is also interesting that certain peasant crafts have persisted in an economy where there has been a scarcity of consumer goods; one critical article describes the krasili, a group of peasants from the Ryzan region who have learned the skill of decorating wall-rugs and blankets with stenciled designs. It is stated that some peasants purchase from a collective the statutory number of required workdays and then proceed to travel as far as Sakhalin, evidently purchasing identity cards as well (265). There is also humorous criticism of collective farm administration, as in a cartoon in the Soviet magazine Krokodil, which depicts the following signs placed in the collective farm barnyard: "Fill in the puddle"; "Collect manure"; "Curl the tails on the oxen"; "Tell the cows to calve by April 10"; "Tie up the dog"; "Rename the bull"; "Repaint the tractor red"; "Find out why the roosters are hoarse"; "Examine roof for holes"; "Hang a box here for the starlings" (294).

Problems of inefficient management and constant bureaucratic interference are not universal in Soviet agriculture. Yet even on a model kolkhoz, there is significant underemployment of labor, despite the fact that many of the men go out to work in industry. Private plots have been important, particularly as a source of support to old people, since kolkhoz members, unlike sovkhoz (state farm) workers, until recently did not receive pensions (271). This section on rural life in the world's geographically largest country can naturally do no more than allude to the extreme diversity of its rural societies—for example, the specialized cotton-growing areas of the Turkic-speaking Central Asian oases, where many aspects of Moslem tradition still prevail (18).

A number of recent studies sketch in some of the historical factors involved in the evolution of the Russian peasantry (214, 347, 409). The extent of the socioeconomic gap separating the rural agricultural and urban industrial components of Soviet society has been detailed by Shimkin (346). Some idea of the relative labor productivity in Soviet and American agriculture, compared in gross terms, can be gained from the fact that in 1960 the labor input was estimated at 32 million man-years in Russia, eight times the amount for the United States in the same year. Considering that a further reduction in the American farm labor force is occurring, and that the percentage of
the Soviet working force in agriculture is declining, the primary question arises of where the people released from underemployment in farm tasks in the Soviet Union will find jobs, assuming that the efficiency of Soviet industry will increase. Urban service occupations are a possibility, but in the Soviet Communist perspective these are generally viewed as "nonproductive," nor do increasingly automated factories seem to provide much of a solution, according to Dovring (100).

Although those people engaged in agriculture in the U.S.S.R. share a common economic and political system, the cultural and ecological differences are enormous, as between Baltic fishermen, Russian grain and livestock farmers, and Uzbek cotton cultivators. Even in the more highly industrialized United States, the cultural distinctions between Midwest farmers (253), New England dairymen (349), Mexican-Americans of South Texas (257), Appalachian mountainers (395), Pueblo Indians (101), and day laborers in the highly mechanized citrus, cotton, and lettuce industries in Arizona (304) give some idea of the rural worker's continuing diversity.

REGIONAL STUDIES

Eastern Europe

The literature on the rural population of Eastern Europe stresses various themes, including the desertion of the land and the increasing importance of both the private plot and a controlled free market for produce (52, 148). Recent literature on Hungary is summarized, and the decline in the population in agriculture and the impact of industrialization and urbanization are evaluated (116). One publication deals specifically with the joint family (280). The Polish Sociological Bulletin has published a significant number of articles dealing with the transformations in peasant society in Poland (145, 259, 309, 376). These changes must, of course, be viewed in the perspective of the political background against which they have taken place, particularly the continuing role of private farming (226). Erlich's extensive documentary study of changes in Yugoslav family life, based on a prewar survey of approximately 300 villages, provides background for the study of the South Slav zadruga (117). Topics that have re-
ceived attention in recent publications are the family (particularly its rural-urban distinctions, 119), symbolic adoption in Serbia (121), and quarrels in a Macedonian village (21). Other articles deal with urbanization, regional variation, and the related significance of rural to urban migration (128, 165, 169). Reports dealing with Poland and Yugoslavia discuss the transitional phase of peasant-worker, that is, a man who remains on his private holding and commutes, usually daily, to a factory job. Studies have appeared that deal with land tenure in Bulgaria in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (260), and with labor brigades in Czech agriculture (369). Surveying the English-language literature naturally touches on only a small part of the research being carried on in this area. Local research, insofar as it is not primarily descriptive, emphasizes a Marxist framework, which, however, tends to be more flexible than in the Soviet Union and reflects general trends toward intellectual diversity in the area.

The Middle East and North Africa

From the point of view of English-language sources the Middle East and North Africa have been among the most sparsely reported areas. The growth in both the periodical and monograph literature in the period under review, however, has been substantial. Of particular significance have been the volume edited by Pitt-Rivers dealing with the Mediterranean (318), and the special issue of *Human Organization* that focused on this region (163). Perhaps most extensively treated have been Lebanon and Israel, the two Middle Eastern countries most open to research. Lebanese studies dealing with peasant society include discussions of the extended family (398), conflict resolution (16), rural-urban contacts (283), and rank and status in a Muslim village (313). There is a growing literature on Israeli immigrant communities (89, 393, 394, 401). Other reports deal with Iranian and Jordanian village communities (272, 252); migrant labor in an Egyptian oasis (1); resettlement in Nubia (120); peasant attitude toward time (50); changing rural society in Algeria (51); and peasant contacts with Istanbul (363). Book-length studies deal with new settlements and Arab border villages in Israel (392, 72), a Jordanian community (252), a settlement on the outskirts of
Khartoum in the Sudan (23), and two Turkish village communities (315, 360).

**Mediterranean**

With regard to research in areas bordering on the Mediterranean other than the Middle East and North Africa, of particular importance is the volume edited by Peristiany (311), a series of studies dealing with the theme of honor and shame in Spain, Greece, and Cyprus as well as among the Kabyle of Algeria and Bedouin of Egypt. Other works deal with politics and religion in rural Malta, patronage (in Italy and Sicily) (43, 42, 348, 44), and the more general questions of the mobility, development, and characteristics of Italian peasant culture (250, 249, 256). For Greece, the social structure of shepherd communities (60), rural health practices (39), dowry and inheritance (138), and the delayed impact of urban values on rural areas (139) have been studied.

**Western Europe**

The number of community study monographs continues to grow. The Andersons have written on villages in the environs of Copenhagen and Paris (8, 9); the Danish village has been transformed into a suburb. There are case studies of villages in Wales and Devon (111, 211), and an analysis of a commuters' community in Devon. Frankenberg has written a general review of English community studies, both rural and urban (133). The rapid changes in the British (57, 160, 261, 276, 373) and French (153, 230, 321, 406, 408) countrysides have received considerable attention. The continuing work of human geographers and agronomists in Europe merits the attention of anthropologists concerned with a comparative analysis of settlement patterns and of differing ecological adaptations (105). Works by sociologists with historical interests give a further dimension to studies of peasant society (235, 277, 372).

**Latin America**

In terms of American anthropology this is perhaps the best documented area, and certainly the region where empirical investigations have been most closely related to theoretical formulations. This is
most obvious in the investigations of Americans in Mexico, from the
time of Redfield (328), whose work in Chan Kom in Yucatan con-
tinues to be the subject of comment (157, 362), to the more recent
investigations of Foster in Tzintzuntzan (130, 131), whose inferences
on the concept of limited good have been widely discussed. Lewis'
restudy of the community of Tepoztlán, earlier studied by Redfield,
has recently focused on the biography of an individual villager from
that area (245). Lewis’ attention has turned to a consideration of
what happened when villagers moved to town, particularly to Mexico
City (244), and from this developed his concepts concerning the
culture of poverty, most recently exemplified in a study of a Puerto
Rican family in San Juan and New York (246, 247).

A number of general surveys deal with the concept of peasantry
(386), the society (179), race relations (175, 279), and agrarian re-
form in the region (110, 310). The number of studies focusing on
small towns and villages continues to grow (61, 63, 93, 95, 195, 329).
Articles have appeared on industrialization, agricultural reform, class
communal ritual, markets, and family businesses in Mexico (411, 203,
140, 216, 194); a sugar plantation in Ecuador (231); a comparison
of the characteristics of rural village and urban slum in Peru (171); the
marginal peasant in Brazil (299); rural education and urbanization
in Guatemala (399, 158); and the interrelationships of politics and
religion in rural Haiti (79).

Japan and China

Much of the literature on Japan reflects continuing modernization
and the gradual disappearance of many aspects of traditional rural
life; in some ways this process is more closely related to changes
taking place in rural England and France than to other parts of Asia
(98, 143, 197, 198, 242, 296, 341, 397, 410). Other studies deal with
historical patterns of land tenure, the urbanization of labor, and the
evolution of kinship structures (64, 77).

Changes in mainland Chinese rural society are surveyed in a num-
ber of publications (338, 384, 387), as well as in specific village
studies by a visiting Swedish journalist (282), resident English
writers (81), an American who writes sympathetically of the revolu-
tion’s initial years (186), and a brief study of the communes (238).
In addition, there have been important studies of markets (354) and of developments in Hong Kong (135) and Taiwan (146, 147, 412).

Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia poses certain unique problems for peasant studies: although it contains historically old and complex nation-states, with literate traditions, for a complex of reasons the boundaries separating peasant from tribal society have not been clearly marked, and ethnic identities tend to shift over time. These factors are brought out in recent surveys and attempts to describe the cultures of the area (59, 236) and are documented in a specific case study in northern Thailand (275) and a survey of Laos (167). Book-length works deal with a village in Leyte, the Philippines (298); an Indonesian town (151); a restudy of a fishing community (126) and an account of a plantation area (365) in Malaya; four studies on rural Vietnam (96, 97, 180, 182), two of them on the same community, written by an economist and an anthropologist respectively (180, 182); four on Thailand (134, 213, 225, 314), one containing elements of a restudy (225), another dealing with peasant personality in a community near Bangkok (314), and another focusing on shifting cultivation (213); and finally a volume on Burmese villages (289). In addition to the Malay study, two others deal with fishing communities, in Vietnam and southern Thailand respectively (96, 134). Two articles, one from Thailand, the other from the Philippines, are focused on individual views of society (172, 177). The war in Vietnam has produced a considerable literature, some of it pertinent to studies of peasant society: Viet Cong organizational techniques in rural South Vietnam (316), counter-insurgency efforts (303), and American technical assistance on the village level (368). There is also considerable information available in English translation on developments in the North Vietnamese countryside, including problems encountered in collectivization of agriculture and population relocation (222).

South Asia

Among non-European countries, the Anglo-American tradition of studies of peasant communities has perhaps taken firmest root in India (this is also true to a significant degree in Japan, but the language barrier prevents much of the literature from being readily ac-
cessible except to area specialists). In India, in contrast to most other areas outside of Europe, North America, and the Philippines, much of the English-language literature is written by Indian scholars. An interesting sidelight in this regard is that Japanese and Filipino scholars have also begun to publish, in English, studies dealing with India (142, 144, 413, 414).

The monographic literature on specific Indian villages continues to be extensive (5, 36, 66, 202, 264, 302, 322, 345, 352). It is possible to refer to only a small portion of the periodical literature here. Major themes are: socioeconomic change; diffusion of innovations and community development (46, 49, 65, 86, 103, 115, 142, 224, 232, 281, 334); the role of politics on the local level (45, 223, 324, 325); the role of politics in Ceylon (404); kinship and social structure (104, 268, 307, 335). The J ajmani system (47), religion (164), medical practices (159), customary law (199), and craft specialties (201) also receive attention. General works include Srinivas’s volume (358), which attempts to assess the general problem of modernization in India in terms of Sanskritization, westernization, caste mobility, and secularization, and a collection of empirical studies of Hinduism and Ther­vada Buddhism in the village context (174). One article deals with tribe-caste and tribe-peasant continua in central India (351). There is also a monograph on Nepal (187).

LITERATURE CITED


Friedrich, P. "Revolutionary politics and communal ritual," in (364), pp. 191–220.


(235) ——— The world we have lost. London: Methuen, 1965.


(249) Lopreato, J. "How would you like to be a peasant (in Italy)?" Hum. Organiz. 24: 298-307 (1965).
(269) Metge, J. "Rural local savings associations (Maori Komiti) in New


(303) Osborne, M. E. Strategic hamlets in South Viet-Nam, a survey and comparison. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program, Data Paper No. 55, 1965.


138 \textbf{JOEL M. HALPERN AND JOHN BRODE}


