The British Army's African Recruitment Policy, 1790-1807

Roger N. Buckley

University of Hartford

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cibs

Recommended Citation

Roger N. Buckley

THE BRITISH ARMY’S AFRICAN RECRUITMENT POLICY, 1790–1807:
Some Further Thoughts on the Abolition Issue*

In April 1792, a motion for the gradual abolition of the British slave trade was carried in the House of Commons by a vote of 238 to 85. After much bitter debate, the crucial word “gradual” was interpreted to mean the trade would come to an end on 1 January 1796. However, Abolition was not achieved until some eleven years later in 1807.

What caused the abolition of the British trade to be delayed until 1807? And what was the role, if any, of William Pitt in this postponement?

The major work which focused on these and other questions was done by the late Roger Anstey. Anstey stressed, among other factors, a number of political reasons for the long delay of abolition. He also strove mightily to exonerate Pitt of any responsibility for the continuation of the trade until 1807. Despite the general certainty and clarity that pervades Anstey’s probing analysis, he retreats before the enigmatic Pitt and is forced to presume the reasons for Pitt’s perplexing actions.

New and substantial evidence, primarily in the form of P. R. O. War Office and Colonial Office Papers, demonstrates that the successive governments of Pitt and Henry Addington used the slave trade to maintain a corps of black service troops and, more importantly, a standing army of professional slave soldiers in the West Indies during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The author will argue in this paper that the British army’s policy of purchasing thousands of African slaves, directly from slaving interests, was an important reason for the delay of Abolition until 1807. The author will also seek to explain Pitt’s perplexing political behavior vis-à-vis the abolition debate (1796–1806) in light of this new evidence.

*Presented as part of the Five College Black Studies Seminar Series, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 25 February 1982.
Britain had historically relied upon African slave labor to support its military establishment in the West Indies. Africanization, or the critical employment of Africans in virtually all branches of the British army in the West Indies, was recognized during the Seven Years’ War and the American Revolution. A corps of slave laborers, for instance, was officially designated as the “King’s Negroes,” and units were attached to each principal fortification in the British Caribbean by the 1770s. As their name indicates, these men were the property of the British government and were quartered in barracks set aside for their use. (It is instructive to note that these Crown slaves were manumitted by a special order from the British government in 1831.) During peacetime their aggregate strength is not thought to have been more than approximately 1,000. (In addition to this contingent, several hundred privately owned slaves were hired out to the army’s quartermaster and engineering departments.)

Several conditions led to the British army’s dependence on African manpower in the West Indies by the end of the eighteenth century. These included the absence of conscription, which severely limited the size of the regular army, global wars which steadily increased the demand for more and more troops, a pestilential climate, particularly for Europeans, and, of course, the presence of a large, captive African population.

The possibility of war with Spain around 1790 prompted the British government to augment the number of black service troops in its Caribbean garrison. Earl Effingham, who arrived in Jamaica early in 1790 as governor, received several “Secret” instructions in July and October, 1790, from Lord Grenville, then Home Secretary in Pitt’s first administration. These instructions authorized Effingham to strengthen the defences of Jamaica by, among other things, purchasing as many slaves as necessary on public account. As a consequence of the friendly turn of events which resulted from talks with Spain and the unlikelihood of war, Effingham was ordered to stop all military preparations. It is not known how many slaves had been purchased by Effingham during his short term as governor of Jamaica; he died in November, 1791. A subsequent report on the state of Jamaica’s defenses indicated that in March, 1793, eighty-seven black pioneers were attached to units of the British army then serving in Jamaica. To this number, however, must be added an undetermined number of slaves similarly purchased and employed at other British garrisons in the West Indies.

The timing of the British government’s decision of 1790 to purchase slaves on public account coincided with the first attack on the slave trade
The British Army's African Recruitment Policy, 1790-1807

in England. At this time abolition was not a government measure because Pitt's cabinet and his supporters in both houses were divided on the issue. However, as events proved, the British government would be placed in a singularly embarrassing position when it subsequently used the trade to purchase thousands of African slaves as recruits for the West India Regiments. Perhaps this was anticipated by Grenville, which may help to explain, at least in part, why he sent classified instructions to Effingham.

There was renewed demand for slave-soldiers during the 1793-1815 war in the West Indies. The revolutionary tone during the early part of the war between Britain and France, coupled with serious British military setbacks and appalling casualties among European troops, compelled the British government to rely heavily on blacks. This reliance was both dramatic, because of the unprecedented numbers of Africans involved, and sustained. In December, 1795, Jamaica claimed that about 2,000 of its slaves were employed daily as pioneers. By September, 1797, the Windward and Leeward Island Command reported it had raised a pioneer corps of 3,509 slaves. All of these men, it is thought, were eventually purchased on public account. However, the largest contingent of purchased Africans were destined for service as regular troops in some eight permanent regiments which were raised in 1795. These units were the so-called West India Regiments. They eventually constituted a standing, professional slave army in the British Caribbean. How many were purchased, by what means, and at what cost?

According to the historian of the British army, Sir John Fortescue, many British activities during the war in the West Indies were cloaked in secrecy, making a complete understanding of Britain's wartime operations extremely difficult. It is certain that London chose to keep certain of its more dubious transactions under wraps and therefore away from public examination—particularly hostile political scrutiny. Nurturing the odious trade with large purchases of African slaves at a time of mounting abolitionist sentiment would have been embarrassing, to say the least. The British government's Army Extraordinaries account provided a place in which politically sensitive financial transactions could be hidden. Army Extraordinaries contained large sums of money allocated to cover extraordinary expenses that could not be foreseen and which were in addition to sums voted by Parliament upon annual estimates. The total amount, for instance, voted by Parliament for the army for 1797, was £10,913,000 of which £4,300,000 was for Army Extraordinaries. The fact that this account lacked a periodic parlia-
mentary audit resulted in massive fraud. The system of Army Extraor-
dinaries became so abused that it was eventually abolished in 1836.\textsuperscript{16} It is
thought that virtually all costs associated with the raising of the West
India Regiments were met from funds drawn from this account. This
burial ground for dubious financial transactions was not the only place
where the accounts of slaves purchased on public account were
recorded. Fortunately, the details surrounding these transactions were
diligently recorded in official dispatches between army commanders in
the West Indies and the ministers, including Henry Dundas and William
Windham. Even George III was privy to the scheme.\textsuperscript{17} These records
clearly show that from 1795 to 1808, the British government bought an
estimated 13,400 slaves for its West India Regiments at the considerable
cost of about £925,000. The average price paid per slave was approxi-
mately £70.\textsuperscript{18} This was, apparently, substantially above that being paid
for new male slaves by civilian buyers.\textsuperscript{19} It must be noted here that the
number 13,400 does not include an indefinite—but probably consid-
erable—number of additional slaves bought by the British government
to perform other military related functions, particularly those carried
out by the quartermaster general's department. It also does not reflect
slaves serving in the Royal Navy, nor slaves purchased in Portuguese
East Africa as recruits for Britain's Ceylon Regiments. British activities
in the Indian Ocean appear to duplicate those in the West Indies.\textsuperscript{20}

Recorded in one of these dispatches are the names of those commis-
sioned to provide slaves to the army from 1798–1807. This telltale list
even includes the names of two British army officers, the governor of
Dominica, Andrew Cochrane Johnstone, and the Commissary General
of the British army in the West Indies in 1807, one Samuel Chollet.\textsuperscript{21} The
presence of the latter's name is a clear indication of conflict of interest as
it was the responsibility of the commissary general to award contracts to
prospective suppliers of slaves.

Based on Philip Curtin's slave trade calculations, and using 15,000 as
the average number of slaves imported into the British Caribbean from
1795 to 1808, total British imports reached about 195,000.\textsuperscript{22} The army's
purchases for the West India Regiments alone represented about 7
percent of this sum. Recent studies into the volume of Britain's slave
trade indicate that Curtin's census figures require upward revision.\textsuperscript{23}
This would require an increase in total British imports and a corre-
sponding decrease in the proportion of this revised estimate siphoned off
to maintain the black regiments. Nonetheless, the British government
was itself the largest individual buyer of slaves and, consequently, the
major promoter of the wretched trade.
Procuring slaves was accomplished by contracting with merchants to raise a specific number by a given date. One of the major contracts was awarded to James Bontein of Martinique in 1797. Although brief, the conditions of the Bontein contract were explicit and illuminating. Bontein was engaged to provide the army with twenty-five hundred recruits within four months of the date of agreement. The proper title to each slave was to be warranted to the British government. No recruit was to be younger than eighteen or older than thirty. The minimum height of each recruit was five feet and all were to be of "a sound Body, and in all points able to carry arms." Moreover, no recruit would be accepted by the army who was "incumbered with a Family or Follower." All slave-recruits were to be delivered to military depôts at either Antigua, St. Kitts, Barbados, Martinique, St. Vincent or Grenada, where they would be inspected by officers and the medical staff and either accepted or rejected.24

A maximum of £70 sterling was to be paid in bills drawn by the commissary general upon the Treasury for each approved slave. Bontein was not permitted any contingent charges. However, he was given the assistance of small recruiting parties from those West India Regiments stationed at the various depôts, and the allowance of six pence sterling per diem in lieu of rations for each slave recruited from the date purchased or attestation to the time when the slave was approved and received by the army. Failing to fulfill these conditions, Bontein was to forfeit a security of £5,000 sterling to the British government.25

Instructions to inspectors and medical officers provide us with an insight into some of the problems of purchasing slaves. The inspectors were to be particularly attentive to the authenticity of the title of each slave accepted by the army. To be genuine, each title had to be certified by crown lawyers in those islands where the transactions occurred. Furthermore, pertinent information pertaining to the identification of the slave had to be registered with the office of the island secretary. No slave was to be purchased as a recruit for British military service until these conditions had been met.26

The age of the slave and the length of time he had lived in the West Indies were additional problems. Sometimes these could be very difficult to determine. The latter was of special importance because a seasoned, fit slave, "a proper Subject for a Flank Company," would cost the princely sum of £70 sterling. On the other hand, the price of a black purchased directly from a slaver would range from only £50 to £56 sterling.27 Inspection teams resigned themselves to the fact that determining the age of a prospective slave-recruit was at best a troublesome
task. Inspectors were warned to be “extremely exact” and to seek the advice of knowledgeable persons. Ascertaining the length of time a slave had resided in the West Indies was somewhat easier. The “principal Proof” was whether or not the slave could speak and understand the European language of the island from which he allegedly came.  

The policy of purchasing slaves as soldiers was an important reason for delaying abolition; it also helps explain Pitt’s puzzling behavior. First, however, what conclusions have historians come to on the issue of delay? Three arguments, only partially explanatory, have been adduced: (1) the unpopular linkage of abolition with Jacobinism and the influence of the latter in causing the revolution in Haiti; (2) the threat of a Haitian-style slave insurrection if British slavery were similarly modified; and (3) the necessity to continue the trade in order to harvest Haiti’s valuable sugar crop after that colony had been occupied by Britain.

The evident connection between abolition and Jacobinism did indeed prove temporarily detrimental to efforts to end the trade. At one point, toward the end of 1792, the most vehement champions of abolition were usually radical groups. But from about 1800 on, the revolutionary excitement on the Continent waned and with it the antidemocratic spirit in Britain. As for the lesson imputed to the upheaval in Haiti and other slave societies elsewhere in the Caribbean, these events genuinely frightened the proprietors. In this climate of fear, many waxed eloquent on the imagined dangers that would befall British colonies in the wake of abolition. However, modification of the slave system in the Danish West Indies in 1803 failed noticeably to unleash the anticipated violence. Moreover, largely because of British military successes in the West Indies from 1796 to 1798, a pronounced tranquility characterized the once-turbulent sugar islands as the century came to an end.

The final argument, that the trade had to continue in order to maintain Haiti’s sugar estates, is a plausible explanation of events up to 1798. At the end of that year, faced with increasing expenditures and enormous casualties in a losing cause, Britain abandoned its dream of extended empire and evacuated the stricken island. As a result of the Peace of Amiens of 1802, Britain returned all West Indian possessions taken from France.

The destruction of Haiti did indeed open for the moment, however, the way for a world sugar boom and a concomitant increased demand for slaves which was being satisfied, even in the Spanish islands, by British ships. Moreover, Britain’s retention of Trinidad in 1802, with its huge expanses of uncleared land, and planter designs on St. Vincent,
which was opened up as a result of the wholesale deportation of dissident groups, certainly titilated British investors. The political consequences of all this, plus the subsequent British reconquest of the rich lands of the Dutch Guianas soon after the rupture of the Amiens Peace in 1803, helped materially to delay the death of the British slave trade.

Still, more recent scholarship comes closer to the mark. As reasons for the delay of abolition until 1807, it stresses royal hostility, the tardy use of the argument that abolition would advance rather than hinder traditional imperial and national interests, limitations of then-current constitutional conventions, opposition in the House of Lords to reform measures, and the absence of cabinet agreement which resulted in free voting on the issue.

There are still gaps in the knowledge represented by these important arguments, and in developing several of these further, Pitt’s policy of purchase sheds some additional light on the controversy.

As I have argued elsewhere, the obstacles to making abolition a government measure were not limited to conventions of the Constitution, nor to the presence of powerful anti-abolitionists in successive cabinets, particularly those headed by Pitt. Looking at the question of cabinet consensus from a different angle, it appears that an agreement had in fact been reached: not an official or public avowal but a privately reached consensus; not one to support abolition, obviously, but concord to oppose it! The chief abolitionists in the cabinet—Pitt, Grenville, and Windham—and the leading opponents of abolition—Portland and Dundas—had reached accord, probably as early as the end of 1795, to use the slave trade to recruit the West India Regiments. This agreement could also have been reached outside the cabinet by the principle parties. According to J. Steven Watson, “Pitt often enough decided policy outside the cabinet with Dundas or his cousin Grenville. In cabinet he would then listen and reveal decisions.” The decision satisfied the immediate interests of all concerned: for those opposed to abolition, it permitted the trade to continue and flourish; and to both abolitionists and anti-abolitionists with responsibilities for directing the war, it afforded an opportunity to prosecute the war successfully in the West Indies and soon in other theatres of operations. Numerous official correspondence confirm the participation of Portland, Dundas and Windham in all stages of the development and implementation of the policy of purchasing slaves as recruits for the British army. As head of government, Pitt is compromised: it is inconceivable that a decision such as this could have been reached and implemented without his cognizance and approval.
The actions and priorities of the abolitionists in cabinet are instructive since they conflicted with those of the cause of abolition and thereby doomed the movement to a protracted birth.

Windham, who had a long and close association with abolition and its leaders, bolted from the movement soon after agreeing to serve under Pitt as secretary of war, a post he held from 1794 to 1801. As the executive head of military administration at the War Office and answerable to Parliament on matters of military expenditure, Windham assumed much of the responsibility for the inner workings and success of Pitt's recruiting policy. Later, as secretary for war and colonies from 1806 to 1807, one of Windham's chief concerns was to provide the soldiers, white and black, necessary for the war effort. From the start of the war in 1793, the manpower needs of the regular army severely taxed the talents and energies of successive ministers. Given the limitations imposed by these imperatives, how could Windham simultaneously fulfill the duties of his offices and champion the death of the trade that provided the African troops so necessary to the protection of the empire in both the West and East Indies?

What part did Lord Grenville play? Given his close personal and political relationship with Pitt, it is reasonable to assume that he was aware of and supported the policy of purchase. Indeed, as Colonial Office records reveal, Grenville probably had the earliest and therefore the longest association of any minister with the measure. In October 1790, as home secretary in Pitt's first administration, he authorized the governor of Jamaica to purchase on public account the slaves needed to service the British garrison on the island. However, Grenville's duties as foreign secretary, beginning in 1791, made him the least ministerially culpable for the execution of the African recruitment policy. For this reason, his impact on the measure is more difficult to judge.

And what about Pitt? Enormous energies continue to be squandered in an effort to exonerate Pitt of any major responsibility for the delay in passing the Abolition Act. But delay he did, for the trade was the mainstay of his policy of African recruitment. Within this context, then, the reason for Pitt's "ambivalent," "dilatory," and generally perplexing behavior becomes discernible. Two examples from this pattern of conduct illustrate the point. First, in 1796, Pitt failed to use privately his considerable talents and extensive political influence to persuade government supporters and others to vote for abolition and thereby forestall a free vote on the motion. He was certainly not restrained from lobbying on behalf of the motion by any political or constitutional conventions, and he had done so before. But if he had, and been
successful, he would have worked against his own war effort. Secondly, in 1805, Pitt refused his official support of abolition at a time when the chances of its becoming a government measure appeared excellent. But appearances were deceiving. How could abolition become a general measure at a time—beginning in 1805 and continuing into 1806—when the number of Africans being purchased on public account was the largest it had been in the entire operational life of the policy of purchase. Total combined purchases for 1805 and 1806 were 2,792 slaves at a cost of £207,708 sterling. By these and related actions Pitt demonstrated clearly that his first priority was winning the war, not ending the slave trade. Until some other exploitable source of African manpower was discovered, abolition would have to be delayed.

On at least one occasion, Pitt was publicly confronted with his duplicity: supporter of abolition and exploiter of the slave trade. During a debate in Commons on 28 February 1805, on the bill for the abolition of the trade, General Isaac Gascoyne, an opponent of abolition who, ironically, became colonel of the 7th West India Regiment in 1805, disclosed the information that the government itself had contracted to purchase five thousand slaves for military service. Although he recognized the importance of having black regiments for service in the West Indies, it appeared to Gascoyne from this action that it was permissible to purchase slaves for military deployment but not for civil use. Another speaker found this action of Pitt irreconcilable with the latter’s support of the abolition movement.

Pitt’s reply to these charges was brief, weak and specious. He had heard of no such contract which his government had made for purchasing slaves; nor could he believe that such a contract existed. He confessed, however, that a contract of this type had been proposed to the British government from an individual in the West Indies, but it had been rejected immediately. The specious part of his reply then followed. He claimed that his government had never conceived the idea of buying slaves for its use. Instead, the plan was to purchase the “redemption” of these slaves from a state of slavery. To Pitt this was totally different from becoming a mere purchaser of human beings.

Pitt had been careful not to mention that his government had been in the redemption-buying business since 1790. Pitt’s retort that his government had been purchasing only the redemption of slaves fooled no one in Commons that day. This argument, born of Pitt’s still creative imagination, was nothing more than a feeble attempt by an embarrassed man to avoid a humiliating situation. Stimulating the wretched trade
with orders for thousands of slaves in order to save them from slavery was hardly the way to bring the trade to an end.

Pitt may have been correct when he claimed that his government had never contracted to purchase five thousand slaves from a single contractor. But, here, again, was yet another attempt of Pitt to move the argument away from the central point, which was the evident duplicity of his government (or at least of certain ministers) regarding the slave trade, by quibbling about numbers and the purpose of buying people.

Finally, abolition of the trade became law in March 1807, with a suddenness that surprised even some abolitionists. What factors produced this historic occasion? The coalition ministry that came to power in 1806, and shepherded the abolition bill through Parliament contained many who supported abolition. Other reasons included the improved tactics and lobbying efforts of the abolitionists, as well as the political leadership of Grenville. But to these factors must be added another: abolition was no longer a threat to national or imperial security on military grounds. The removal of the danger, therefore, ended the need for the quiet agreement among abolitionists and anti-abolitionists in cabinet. Abolitionists were now free to pursue their cause unencumbered. The elimination of the military argument weakened the opposition program by removing a major plank and may substantially account for the rapid success of abolition in 1806 and 1807. How did this finally come about?

Actually, the revitalization of the abolition effort in 1804, prompted considerable activity in London to find alternative sources of non-European manpower for West Indian defense, and not without success. The Mutiny Act of 1807, which was drafted under Windham's overall direction, stipulated that blacks be enlisted for unlimited service only. The Abolition Act, furthermore, decreed that forfeited slaves and slaves taken as prizes of war could be enlisted into Britain's armed forces. And to these was added an Order in Council of 16 March 1808, which directed that all fit Africans taken from slavers be turned over to military and naval authorities for enlistment into Britain's land and sea services. Although it was no longer sanctioned in Britain, the trade would continue to serve Britain's imperial interests.

Britain's use of the trade to maintain a slave army in the West Indies was an important reason for the long delay associated with Abolition. This policy also helps to explain Pitt's ambivalent attitude towards Abolition since he was forced to encourage a trade he both personally and publicly loathed.
The British Army’s African Recruitment Policy, 1790–1807

NOTES

2 See *Atlantic Slave Trade,* pp. 346, 348, 358.
3 Kew, Surrey, U.K., Public Record Office, Colonial Office Papers 137/61, Egremont to Lyttleton, January 1762; War Office Papers 1/51, Calder to Jenkinson, 29 October 1779; and *ibid.*, Vaughan to Jenkinson, 21 September 1780. Hereafter Colonial Office and War Office Papers cited as C. O. and W. O., respectively.
4 See the location of “King’s Negroes” barracks in Jamaican fortifications in the following manuscripts: New York, Hispanic Society of America, Thomas Craskell, *State of the Forts and Batteries in Jamaica, 1773* (HC 336/2294-Craskell) and Jones and Ratzer, *Plans and Sketches of the Forts and Batteries in Jamaica, 1774* (HC 336/2315-Jones).
5 Great Britain, *Sessional Papers* (Commons), vol. 19. “Order sent to the Colonies for emancipating the Slave belonging to the Crown” (no. 305), 1831.
7 *Ibid.*, Grenville to Effingham, no. 7, 6 November 1790.
8 C. O. 137/107, Abstract of Jamaica’s Defence Arrangement, 1790-1802, in Hobart to Nugent, no. 4, 4 February 1802.
12 W. O. 1/86, Jones to Cuyler, 20 September 1797.
13 For a history of these corps during the war, see Roger Norman Buckley, *Slaves in Red Coats: The British West India Regiments, 1795-1815* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).
18 Buckley, *Slaves in Red Coats,* pp. 55-56.
20 For a glimpse at these activities see C. O. 318/25, Myers to Hobart, no. 10, 6 June 1804, enclosure no. 5; *ibid.,* Myers to Camden, no. 13, 31 August 1804; and Geoffrey Powell, *The Kandywan Wars* (London: Leo Cooper, 1973), pp. 147-48.
21 C. O. 318/31, enclosures in Bowyer to Windham, no. 31, 18 April 1807.
24 W. O. 1/86, Abercromby to Dundas, 26 January 1797, enclosure no. 5—"Conditions agreed upon between the Commander in Chief on the part of Government, and James Bontein Esgr. by which the latter engages to raise Two thousand five hundred Black, or coloured Men."

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., enclosure no. 6—"Instructions for the Officers and Medical Staff, appointed by the Commander in Chief, to Inspect the Men raised for Government by James Bontein Esgr."

27 Ibid., enclosure no. 3—"Heads of Instruction to Major General Hunter, for his Guidance in the Purchase and Approval of Blacks and Coloured People, for the West India Regts."

28 Ibid., enclosure no. 6

29 For the effect of Britain's Aftican recruitment policy on abolition, and Pitt's puzzling behavior, see Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, pp. 57-62.


31 For example, Anstey, Atlantic Slave Trade, passim.

32 Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, Table 1, p. 55.

33 His date of rank in the 7th was 10 October 1805. Great Britain, War Office. Army List 1806. Gascoyne represented Liverpool.


35 Ibid., John Fuller's speech, p.656.

36 Ibid., Pitt's speech, p. 668.
