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0 Introduction

As noted by Brown (1999), there is general agreement in the literature on Russian “genitive of negation” (GenNeg) that GenNeg occurs only when the NP in question is within the scope of sentential negation (NEG). The apparent optionality of GenNeg within the scope of negation is a point of difficulty, with authors divided about whether the choice between Genitive and Nominative or Accusative in such cases is accompanied by some difference in syntactic structure and/or in semantics or pragmatics.

A typical illustration of the correlation of Gen/Nom with scope of negation (underlined), is the classic example (1a-b):

(1) a. Moroz ne cuvstvoval'ja.
   Frost-NOM.M.SG NEG be.felt-M.SG
   ‘The frost was not felt.’

b. Moroza ne cuvstvovalos’.
   Frost-GEN.M.SG NEG be.felt-N.SG
   ‘No frost was felt (there was no frost).’ (Babby 1980 p.59)

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Restricting attention to intransitive sentences, we offer new examples that challenge common theories of the relation between GenNeg and the scope of NEG. These examples suggest arguments for the following points, with necessary caveats because of the theory-dependence of central notions.

(A) The biconditional $[\text{GenNeg} \leftrightarrow \text{in scope of NEG}]$ is too strong.

(B) The implication does hold one-way: $[\text{GenNeg} \rightarrow \text{in scope of NEG}]$.

(C) Nominative $ni$-phrase subjects, which are necessarily under the scope of NEG, are possible, but have obligatorily partitive or other “strong” interpretations. There is a systematic difference between nominative and genitive $ni$-phrase subjects, but it is not a difference in scope of negation.

(D) In order to maintain even (B), an account of the apparent “licensing paradox” concerning the cego-nibud’ examples in section 5 must be found.

1 Previous claims about GenNeg and scope of negation

1.1. The stronger claim: $[\text{GenNeg} \leftrightarrow \text{in scope of NEG}]$

In this formulation we abstract away from well-known and uncontroversial factors such as the structural case requirement. And we consider only “subject” genitives; we are agnostic about the role of unaccusativity, and about unification of subject and object genitives.

Babby (1980) is a prime exponent of this strongest claim (although he hedges it at certain points.) He takes occurrence in the scope of NEG to be the heart of the usage of GenNeg. Babby’s final formulation$^2$ of his rule of genitive marking in NES’s is (2):

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(2) \[
\text{NEG} \quad [\text{Rheme} \ V \ NP] \Rightarrow [\text{ne} \ V \ NP_{\text{gen}}] \quad (\text{Babby’s (160)})
\]

Conditions: 
(a) NP is indefinite  
(b) V is semantically empty

But Babby actually makes slightly conflicting statements on this point. In his central chapter 3 on the subject, “Genitive Marking and the Scope of Negation”, he says:

The key to understanding the “genitive of negation” in general, and genitive subject NP marking in particular, can be stated as follows:

/78/ In Russian, an NP in a negated sentence can be marked with the genitive case if and only if it is in the scope of negation.

…. It is only in NES’s that the subject NP falls in the scope of negation; thus it is only in NES’s that the subject NP is marked genitive. (Babby 1980: 69)

Footnote 10 to Chapter 3: … I would like to emphasize once again that /78/ is a necessary but not sufficient condition for genitive marking to operate, i.e., all NPs marked genitive in Russian negated sentences must be in the scope of negation, but it is not the case that all NP’s in the scope of negation are marked genitive. There are a number of other conditions that must be satisfied if an NP in the scope of negation is to be marked genitive. (Babby 1980: 76)

There are various ways that Babby’s “if and only if” condition may be read. As we understand Babby, he means that when the additional conditions are met, the rule is obligatory within the scope of negation. An eligible NP that stays nominative is an NP that is in the Theme, and is hence not under the scope of negation.

Recent syntactic proposals implementing the idea that genitives are under the scope of negation and nominatives are not include Babyonyshev (1996), Bailyn (1997), Brown (1999), and Babby (2000).
1.2. The weaker claim: [GenNeg → in scope of NEG]

As noted above, as we interpret Babby (1980), he is a proponent of the stronger claim, hedged only by the need to observe the additional requirements of structural case, etc.

Other authors have more explicitly endorsed the weaker claim. While Bailyn (1997) sets as his central task the design of a structure within which GenNeg will be obligatory when its conditions are met, he prefaces his analysis with discussion of the widespread view of GenNeg as syntactically optional but influenced by a range of semantic and pragmatic factors.

Descriptively, direct objects normally marked Accusative can appear in the Genitive case under the scope of sentential negation, but need not. Similar, unaccusative subjects can appear in the GenNeg under negation, but need not. Derived subjects of passives also can appear in the GenNeg, but need not. Bailyn (1997) pp. 85-86.

Bailyn cites a number of authors who have made the weaker claim, including Dahl (1969), Timberlake (1986), and Gundel:

Genitive placement is optional, and generally does not apply if and only if the NP to which it would apply is the topic (or coreferential with the topic) of the sentence. Gundel (1974, 1988, p.190)

Babby’s (1980) views can be read as an argument for recognizing the syntactic importance of Theme-Rheme structure, a position also espoused in Prague linguistics (Sgall et al. 1986). On Babby’s approach, the factors concerning the extent of the individuation of the nominal which Timberlake cites as increasing the likelihood of a nominal receiving GenNeg are factors increasing the likelihood of its being part of the Rheme. This is also the position we followed in Borschev and Partee (1998a).

2 Scope of negation and presupposition

Some of the difficulty surrounding the appropriate form of the condition may be due to unclarity about the scope of NEG. On the
one hand, all agree that the relevant kind of negation is “sentential negation”, and not “constituent” negation, which is well known NOT to trigger GenNeg. Babby (1980) gives the following minimal pair: constituent negation in (3a) does not trigger GenNeg, sentential NEG in (3b) does. See also Boguslavskij (1985).

(3) a. U nego v rukax ne slovar’.
   at him in hands NEG dictionary-NOM
   ‘It isn’t a dictionary that he has in his hands.’

b. U nego v rukax net slovarja.
   at him in hands NEG.is dictionary-GEN
   ‘He doesn’t have a dictionary in his hands.’

But there are difficult issues concerning the scope of sentential negation and the question of “what gets negated”. Even if negation has some parts of a sentence under its scope while other parts are “higher” in the tree and thus outside its scope, that is not the whole story. Among Russian linguists, it is common in the analysis of Nom/Gen pairs under negation to put more weight on the difference in ‘referential status’ of the NP. Ickovic (1974) cites a striking case described by Peškovskij (1956): (translating) “Considering the conditions under which the expression Ni odin groš ne byl u menja v karmane ‘[lit:] Not one grosh-NOM NEG was at me in the pocket’ “becomes more possible”, A.M. Pešjkovskij writes: ‘Ni odnogo groša ne bylo ‘Not one grosh-GEN NEG was’ denotes moneylessness, and groši ‘groshes’ themselves play no role here. Ni odin groš ne byl ‘Not one grosh-NOM NEG was’ means that not one of those groši which were being spoken about earlier was [in my pocket], although perhaps there were rubles, even thousands of rubles” (Peškovskij 1956, (3rd ed. 1928) p. 326).” We return to examples like Peškovskij’s in Section 4.

The idea of the importance of definiteness in GenNeg goes back at least to Peškovskij and to Jakobson (1936/1971). Contemporary Russian semanticists have subtle analyses of referential status (a classic work is Paduceva (1985)), and are often inclined to see sentential negation as having the whole sentence in
its scope, with further differences attributed to semantic and pragmatic properties of the constituents under its scope.

These ideas relate to the well-known fact that presuppositions can affect “what is negated” in a negative sentence. Specific indefinites, referential uses of definite descriptions, and the presence of presupposition-inducing constructions can all cause an element structurally within the scope of negation to be interpreted “as if” it were outside the scope of negation. Thus an expression like *a certain friend of mine* or *the man who just walked in*, nearly always used “referentially”, normally carries a presupposition of existence even if it occurs within a phrase that is clearly within the scope of negation. Such presuppositions, including ones relating to the referentiality of NPs, may come from a number of sources, internal or external to the NP itself.

It has often been noted that in a negated subject-predicate sentence, the subject is likely to be presupposed to exist, and what is denied is that the predicate holds of it. Prague school linguists take the presuppositionality of Topic or Theme as more fundamental. Babby 1980 identifies ‘being in the Theme’ as ‘being outside the scope of negation’. In Babby 2000, he interprets ‘being outside the scope of negation’ in terms of a syntactic structure in which themes are always in a position higher than NEG. An alternative possibility would be to say that being in the Theme directly contributes a presupposition, in the manner of Peregrin (1995), without assuming that there is a specific syntactic position for Theme material. We remain agnostic about the syntax, but want to argue that there are indeed cases where Gen/Nom alternations depend crucially on presuppositionality within the scope of NEG, including the examples of nominative *nikto* ‘no one’ in Section 4.

Before presenting our examples in Sections 4 and 5, we briefly summarize in Section 3 some ideas about “Perspective Structure” presented in Borschev and Partee (to appear), with the help of which we will discuss these examples and others to try to find what they all have in common if not differences in scope of negation.
3  Perspective structure and presuppositions of existence

3.1 Existential sentences

There is a distinction, discussed by many authors in many frameworks, involving a contrast in two kinds of sentences each having the parts we call “BE (THING, LOC)”. One kind of sentence is “ordinary”, and has the “THING” as ordinary subject. This kind of sentence doesn’t have a name except when put in contrast with the other kind; this is Babby’s “Declarative Sentence”, often called “Locational”, or “Predicational”. It seems to be an instance of the Brentano/Marty “categorical judgment”. “Existential Sentences” do not have that ordinary structure, but what structure they do have is controversial. In some sense they turn the predication around and say of the LOC that it has THING in it. If LOC is implicit, these are “thetic judgments”.

Babby (1980) was able to explain a great deal about GenNeg using the idea that these two kinds of sentences differ in Theme-Rheme structure. In “Declarative” sentences, THING is both Theme and Subject. In Existential Sentences, THING is part of the Rheme; the question of whether it is still surface subject receives a chapter in Babby (1980) and is still debated.

We have become convinced that the crucial distinction is not in Theme-Rheme structure but something similar which we call “Perspective Structure”. In Borschev and Partee (to appear), we keep some parts of our analysis from Borschev and Partee (1998a), but build on Perspective Structure rather than Theme-Rheme structure.

Among the central notions needed for understanding existential sentences, Arutjunova (1976) distinguishes three components in a “classical” existential sentence: a “Localizer” (“Region of existence”, “L” below), a name of an “Existing object” (“EO”), and an “Existential Verb” (“EV”):

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3 Potentially related distinctions, under a variety of names, may be found in the work of Sasse (1987), Calabrese (1992), and Culicover and Levine (2001).
“There are forests in that region.”

We use the terms LOCATION, THING, and BE, where BE is our proxy for any verb which can be used as an “existential verb”. The core principles behind our analysis are as follows.

(5) **EXISTENCE IS RELATIVE** PRINCIPLE: Existence (in the sense relevant to NES’s) is always relative to a LOCATION.

Distinctions among different LOCATIONS associated with parts of sentence structure and context support GenNeg examples which deny the existence of the THING in one LOCATION but presuppose its existence in “the world” or some other relevant LOCATION.

(6) **Common structure of “Existence/location situations”**: BE (THING, LOC)

(7) **PERSPECTIVE STRUCTURE**: An “existence/location situation” may be structured either from the perspective of the THING or from the perspective of the LOCATION.

Let us use the term Perspectival Center for the participant chosen as the point of departure for structuring the situation. (Our Perspectival Center will play the role that “Theme” played for Babby (1980).) In (8), we underline the Perspectival Center:

(8) (a) BE (THING, LOC): structure of the interpretation of a Locative (“Declarative”) sentence.

(b) BE (THING, LOC): structure of the interpretation of an Existential sentence.

(9) **PERSPECTIVAL CENTER PRESUPPOSITION**: Any Perspectival Center must be normally be presupposed to exist.

When the THING is chosen as Perspectival Center, its existence is presupposed, and the sentence speaks of its LOCATION or other properties. When we choose LOC as Perspectival Center, the sentence speaks about what THINGs there are or are not in that LOCATION and potentially about what is happening in the situation.
Principle (9) allows us to derive the same presuppositions that were derived in Borschev and Partee (1998a) from the correlation of greater presuppositionality with the Theme of the sentence (Hajicová 1973, 1974, 1984), Peregrin 1995, Sgall et al 1986).

3.2 Perspective vs. Theme-Rheme Structure.

Perspectival structure is basically a structuring at the model-theoretic level, like the telic/atelic distinction, or the distinction between Agents and Experiencers, properties reflecting cognitive structuring of the domains that we use language to talk about. Theme-Rheme structure is primarily a matter of information structure in discourse. The kind of example which argues that the distinction we need for explaining the distribution of GenNeg is not standard Theme-Rheme structure is our “kefir example” (10).

(10) [Ja iskal kefir.] Kefira v magazine ne bylo.
    [I looked-for kefir] Kefir-GEN.M.SG in store NEG was-N.SG
    ‘I was looking for kefir.] There wasn’t any kefir in the store.’

In (10), kefira ‘kefir’, in the genitive, is nevertheless part of the Theme, according to two familiar kinds of evidence: (i) the rules governing the interplay of word order and intonation in Russian (Kovtunova 1976, Švedova 1980, Yokoyama 1986), and (ii) the general principle that the Rheme of one sentence is a favored candidate to become the Theme of the following sentence.

4 The problem of nominative ni-phrases

4.1 Nominative-genitive alternation in subject ni-phrases

If GenNeg occurs inside the scope of negation, and nominatives outside, we would not expect a negative-concord ni-word to occur in the nominative if it meets the conditions for GenNeg, since negative-concord ni-words are obligatorily under the scope of sentential negation. But both of the following are good⁴:

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⁴ Thanks to the students in Partee’s seminar at RGGU in Moscow in spring 2000, especially Masha Frid, Lena Model, Yura Lander, and Zoya Efimova.
(11) Nikto tam ne byl.
  Nl.who-NOM.M.SG there NEG was- M.SG
  ‘No one was there.’

(12) Nikogo tam ne bylo.
  Nl.who-GEN.M.SG there NEG was- N.SG
  ‘No one was there.’

It seems clear that (11) is a DS and (12a,b) are ES’s; they have the same differences in presuppositions, natural contexts, etc. as the well-known pair (13a-b) discussed by Apresjan (1980) in connection with differences in ‘reference time’, and by Borschev and Partee (1998a, 1998b):

(13) a. Otec ne byl na more.
    Father-NOM.M.SG NEG was-M.SG at sea
    ‘Father was not at the sea (then / ever in his life).’
  b. Otca ne bylo na more.
    Father-GEN.M.SG NEG was-N.SG at sea
    ‘Father was not (present) at the sea (on that occasion).’

But nikto in (11), like nikogo in (12), must be in the scope of the sentential negation ne. This is the same situation as in Пе́сковский’s examples in Section 2. Similar examples can be found in Babby (1980:66), but the problem they present for “scope of negation” analyses is not discussed. Both (11) and (12) must have the subject under the scope of sentential negation, so scope of negation cannot be directly responsible for Nom/Gen alternation.

Although (11) and (12) do not differ in scope of negation, they differ in presupposition: the nominative nikto must quantify over a known group of individuals, while there is no such requirement for the genitive nikogo, just as with Пе́сковский’s grosh examples. Google searches show that for various word-order variants of the sentences Nikto tam ne byl and Nikogo tam ne bylo, the GenNeg variant is much more common than the Nominative variant (63 vs. 2 for a Latin alphabet search in July 2000, hundreds vs. 33 for a Cyrillic search in April 2001). The contexts made clear that the
nominative *nikto* examples found in the Google search were explicitly or implicitly partitive: ‘not a single one of a given group’, and/or agentive: ‘not a single person had been there (had (ever) gone there)’. In all cases the nominatives presuppose the existence of a non-empty set of individuals who ‘might have been there’, whereas the genitive examples need not.

### 4.2 Evidence of presuppositional differences.

Further examples can shed light on the difference in presuppositions between NES’s and NDS’s. According to our generalization in (7), the Perspectival Center Presupposition, an NES always presupposes the existence of the LOC, while an NDS presupposes the existence of the THING. The examples with *ni odin* above suggest that this claim must be refined: it is not the referent of the NP itself that is presupposed to exist in the case of a quantificational NP, but the domain over which it quantifies. In this section we examine these claims by testing further for presuppositions of both LOC and THING constituents in the two sentence types.

How can we test for existence presuppositions for LOC? One way is by choosing locations like “at the concert”, “at the meeting”, locations involving events which could fail to take place.

(14) (a) Petja na koncerte ne byl.

    Petja-NOM.M.SG at the concert NEG was-M.SG.

‘Petja was not at the concert.’

(b) Petja na koncerte ne bylo

    Petja-GEN.M.SG at the concert NEG was-N.SG.

‘Petja was not at the concert.’

Sentence (14a) can be felicitously followed by (15), but (14b) cannot be, confirming the prediction that the existence of LOC is presupposed in an NES but not in an NDS.
(15) Koncerta ne bylo.
  Concert NEG was-N.SG
  ‘There was no concert.’

The next examples, with *ni odin student* ‘not one student’, are similar to (11-12). We ask in each case whether the sentence can be felicitously followed not only by (15) but also by (16) below.

(16) V našem gorode net studentov.
    In our city NEG is-N.SG students-GEN.M.PL
    ‘There are no students in our city.’

(17) (a) Ni odin student na koncerte ne
    NI one-NOM.M.SG student-NOM.M.SG at the concert NEG
    byl. OK (15) / # (16)
    was-M.SG
    ‘Not a single one of the students was at the concert.’

(b) Ni odnogo studenta na koncerte ne
    NI one-GEN.M.SG student-GEN.M.SG at the concert NEG
    bylo. # (15) / OK (16)
    was-N.SG
    ‘There was not a single student [or: not a single one of the students] at the concert.’

Examples (11-12) and (17a-b) are a problem even for Brown (1999). Unlike Bailyn (1997), Brown can generate (17a) as well as (17b), but she does not predict our observation (C), that (11) and (17a), unlike (12) and (17b), are obligatorily “strong”.

Since the truth conditions of (17a) and (17b) are both in part\(^5\) approximately as in (18), with *one student* inside the scope of negation in either case, scope of negation does not distinguish between NOM and GEN NPs in these examples.

(18) NEG [one (*a, a single*) student x  [ x was at y]]

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\(^5\) We omit representation of ‘the/a concert’, for which the truth-conditions relative to negation may indeed vary.
The next example is like (14a-b), replacing tam ‘there’ by na koncerte ‘at the concert’ so that we can test for presuppositions.

(19) (a) Nikto na koncerte ne byl. OK (15)
   Nobody-NOM at concert NEG was-M.SG
   ‘Nobody was at the concert. There was no concert.’

   (b) Nikogo na koncerte ne bylo. # (15)
   Nobody-GEN at concert NEG was-N.SG
   ‘Nobody was at the concert.

Again we find a presupposition of existence of LOC in the GenNeg sentence (19b) and not in (19a). As for the subject nikto/nikogo, the nominative presupposes the existence of a non-empty set of people, of whom the sentence says that none were at the concert, but (19b) does not. It simply asserts that the concert had no audience; the grammar is compatible with the unlikely explanation that there are no people at all (in the area).

Babby (1980:66) had an example similar to (17a-b): Tam ne roslo ni odno derevco / ni odnogo derevca ‘There NEG grew-N.SG. NI one-NOM.M.SG tree-NOM.M.SG / NI one-GEN.M.SG tree-GEN.M.SG’ ‘Not a single tree was growing there’/ ‘There wasn’t a single tree growing there.’ He considers this a good example of an NDS/NES pair. We agree with his statement that there is a subtle functional difference in these near-equivalent statements, but we believe that the nominative variant is inconsistent with his analysis.

One possible response, advocated by Paduceva (1992), is that the verbs are different in such pairs, with nominative signaling an agentive use and genitive a non-agentive use (possibly unergative vs. unaccusative.) Semantically, it is widely agreed that when the same verb may be used in both ES’s and DS’s, it receives a more agentive reading in the DS and a more stative reading in the ES\(^6\). It

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\(^6\) Manfred Krifka (p.c.) suggests that we consider the hypothesis that Agentivity requires “perspective on the agent”, and that the phenomena of GenNeg might be looked at as related to the puzzling intonational properties of “all-focus” sentences like ‘DOGS are barking.’ He suggests looking at “deep ergative languages”.

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remains an open question whether this difference always reflects lexical ambiguity in the verb or may sometimes reflect a structural difference, a difference in diathesis, corresponding to choice of Perspective in our sense. We remain agnostic so far about the syntactic difference that may correspond to difference in choice of Perspectival Center, but we believe that it does NOT always correlate with scope of negation.

4.3 Consequences of these examples.
In the classic examples like (1a-b), it has always seemed that in GenNeg constructions we deny the existence of the THING and in nominative examples the existence of the THING is presupposed. There have always been problems, e.g. in examples with proper names. In earlier work we explained those cases by relativizing existence claims to particular locations. But the examples with nikto/nikogo and ni odin/ni odnogo raise more serious problems.

What does seem to be in common in all of the cases, even those with nikto and ni odin, is a difference in presuppositions between the GenNeg and the Nominative cases. These presuppositions seem related to the intuition that the predications are different in DS and ES: we predicate something about the Perspectival Center, THING or LOC respectively, and that which we predicate about should not be empty. The presuppositions sometimes concern the “referent” of the THING or LOC expressions (cf. the different ‘referential status’ of moroz ‘frost’ in (1a-b)), but may concern the domain over which those expressions quantify, if they are quantificational. A “presupposition of a non-empty domain” seems to be the most defensible generalization.

Kratzer (p.c.) has pointed out a promising connection of our notion of Perspectival Structure with her work on the semantics of negation in Kratzer (1989). In Kratzer’s terms, we would argue that the evaluation situation for any sentence must be big enough to contain the entire universe associated with its Perspectival Center. Such a requirement systematically carries a presupposition that that universe is not empty. This approach could clarify the
sense in which a nominative subject in an NDS, our Perspectival Center, must be “referential” (carries an existence presupposition) and yet may be a word like *nikto* ‘no one’.

5 A “licensing paradox”: the *cego-nibud*’ example

5.1 The examples

The problematic new example in (20) presents a “licensing paradox” that threatens the uncontroversial generalization (B).

(20) Možet byt’, cego-nibud’ u nego net.

May be, something-GEN (non-specif.) at him NEG.is

‘Maybe there is something he doesn’t have.’

What makes (20) problematic is GenNeg on a -*nibud*’ word. -*Nibud*’ words, non-specific indefinites that need (roughly) a non-veridical context (Pereltsvaig 2000), cannot be licensed by clausemate NEG. The distribution of -*nibud*’ is illustrated in (21). Sentence (21a) is judged bad except in an implicitly “modal context”; (21b), with its overt modal licenser, is good. And (21c) is again bad except in the kinds of “modal contexts” that allow (21a); clausemate NEG does not license -*nibud*’.

(21)a. (*) Cto-nibud’ u nego est’.

something-NOM (non-specific) at him is

[(*) ‘He has something (non-specific).’]

b. Možet byt’, cto-nibud’ u nego est’.

May be, something-NOM (non-specific) at him is

‘Maybe he has something.’

c. (*) Cego-nibud’ u nego net.

something-GEN (non-specific) at him NEG.is

So there are incompatible demands on the form *cego-nibud*’ in (20). GenNeg in (20) must be licensed by its clausemate negation, as in the NPI analysis of GenNeg of Pesetsky (1982) and in fact any analysis consistent with (B). And yet -*nibud*’ in (20) must be licensed by the higher modal, outside the scope of negation. So *cego-nibud*’ in (20) should be impossible. But it’s fine (e.g.,
shopping for a gift for ‘the man who has everything’), and the indefinite unambiguously has scope outside the negation.

The same phenomenon can be found with a higher modal taking a lower infinitival clause, as in (22). Examples with higher možet byt’ and a finite clause complement are also fine, as in (23).

(22) Cego-nibud’ moglo u nego ne byt’.
    Something-GEN could at him NEG be-INF
   ‘There could be something he doesn’t have.’

(23) Možet byt’, oni cego-nibud’ ne našli.
    May be, they something-GEN NEG found.
   ‘Maybe there is something they didn’t find.’

5.2 Possible LF decomposition of -nibud’ words

Brown and Franks (1997) and Brown (1999) had already brought forward evidence that calls into question the connection between “true” scope of negation and the Nom/Gen alternation, pointing toward the conclusion that GenNeg may be licensed by “syntactic” sentential negation, independently of its semantic/pragmatic function.

… previous analyses of GN have linked its occurrence to whether or not the object NP is in the scope of negation. Our data, however, show that GN occurs even when there is no NO [Negative Operator], hence, no negative force, hence, no true scope of negation. The GN is thus completely divorced from the presence of NO. GN seems to require simply a dominating NegP, which in Russian will always have a filled head position, and which universally will have one when negation is pleonastic. Neg P is a necessary and sufficient condition for checking GN. (Brown and Franks 1997, p.152, emphasis added)

They present examples like the following, noting that “in (70) [our (24)], negation is forced, in effect, to be pleonastic”(p.154).
Had he said too much?" (their (70), p.154)

Our examples raise some problems that they did not address, including the ‘licensing paradox’ discussed above. One possible resolution of the ‘licensing paradox’ posed by (20) is hypothesis (D1). On this approach we could suggest that the word *cego-nibud’* is decomposable into parts with different scopes and different licencers. One ‘part’ is licensed by the higher modal (cf. 21b) and is outside the scope of negation, and another ‘part’ is marked GenNeg in the scope of negation. So (20) might be decomposed into a structure similar to that in (25), but details and formal semantic interpretation remain to be worked out.

(25) *Možet byt’, est’ cto-nibud’,*

May be, there.is something- NOM (non-specific)
*cego u nego net.*

which-GEN.M.SG at him NEG.is
‘Maybe there is something that he doesn’t have.’

Another possibility, (D2), also for future research, is a more fine-grained analysis of the semantic properties of licencers and licensees, including presuppositional properties that may inhibit a licenser from affecting a potential licensee in its “scope”.

6 Concluding remarks

What seems to be “outside the scope of negation” may in some cases merely be “immune” to the effect of negation by virtue of presuppositions, which may arise from a number of sources, including Perspectival Structure. Our examples suggest that occurring in the “semantic” scope of negation is not necessary for genitive and not impossible for nominative. One crucial set of examples relies on the behavior of *ni*-phrases: if *nikto* and *ni odin student* are NPIs, and must be in the semantic scope of negation, then nominative can be in the semantic scope of negation. Another crucial set of examples relies on the behavior of -*nibud’*-phrases. It
has been argued that they cannot occur in the semantic scope of clausemate negation, but we can find them in the genitive form where that genitive is apparently indeed (syntactically) licensed by clausemate negation.

In sum: besides supporting the basic scope claims (A-B), we have offered novel evidence on the basis of licensing restrictions for a possible semantic decomposition (D1-D2), leaving it open whether that decomposition should be seen in “structural” terms or not. And the difference of interpretation (C) in (17a-b), and in (20) and its nominative counterpart (21b), sheds light on presuppositional differences in the interpretation of Nom vs. Gen forms that do not correspond to differences in scope of negation. We have not offered full analyses of these phenomena, but suggest that these observations help provide useful new test cases for theories of GenNeg.

References


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