Perfidious Albion: Britain, the USA, and Slavery in the 1840s and 1860s

Marika Sherwood

University of London

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cibs

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cibs/vol13/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Afro-American Studies at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Contributions in Black Studies by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Britain outlawed trading in slaves in 1807; subsequent legislation tightened up the law, and the Royal Navy’s cruisers on the West Coast attempted to prevent the export of any more enslaved Africans. From 1808 through the 1860s, Britain also exerted considerable pressure (accompanied by equally considerable sums of money) on the U.S.A., Brazil, and European countries in the trade to cease their slaving. Subsequently, at the outbreak of the American Civil War in 1861, which was at least partly fought over the issue of the extension of slavery, Britain declared her neutrality. Insofar as appearances were concerned, the British government both engaged in a vigorous suppression of the Atlantic slave trade and kept a distance from Confederate rebels during the American Civil War. But is that the whole story regarding Britain, the trade in enslaved Africans, and slavery? Did the British government prosecute Britons who broke the law with the utmost rigor, for example? And to what extent did that government maintain its professed neutrality in the “war between the states”?

This essay attempts to lift some of the veils which have hidden the reality of British activities regarding the trade in slaves as well as British relationships to slave-holding states. I am concerned neither with Britain’s motives for ending the trade, nor the diplomatic uses to which Britain put her declaration of cessation—a continuing matter of debate among historians. Nor is my concern the relationship between the Whig and Tory parties in Britain, the Republicans and Democrats in the U.S., nor that between the U.S. and Britain, which has also been well-described. My intention is to find some indication as to what was going on in Britain behind the facade of pious exhortations regarding the trade and slavery.

The essay is divided into three parts: Britain’s continuing involvement in the trade in slaves, trade with slave-holding societies, and the American Civil War.

THE TRADE IN SLAVES

The Nightingale, a vessel of 1,066 tons, had been built at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in 1851. Designed as a “cruise” ship, she sailed various routes until 1859. In April 1860, now the property of a Captain Bowen, known as the “Prince of Slavers,” she sailed from Salem, Massachusetts probably to Brazil with 2,000 slaves. A few months later, in September, she sailed from New York carrying a cargo of grain to Britain.

The Nightingale arrived in Liverpool on October 6th. It seems that the ultimate “destination of the ship was well-known to and was freely talked about among a certain class of people.” In fact, the business of the vessel was public knowledge in the city. According to the bosun, the American James Williams, “the shipping master, as I was told by some of the crew, said publicly in sailor boarding houses that it was all nonsense about the ship going to China and the East Indies; that she was going to the coast of Africa for a cargo of “niggers” and the men could make $1,000 a piece if they would go. And it finally got to be common talk that the ship was preparing for a slave voyage, so that the riggers and the pilot talked about it among the sailors.”

The American crew accompanying Nightingale across the Atlantic had been harshly treated, supposedly in order to induce them to leave the vessel. Captain Bowen hired a fresh crew in Liverpool, deliberately seeking out non-English speakers. When some of these men understood for what they had been hired, they attempted to leave the ship, but the officers threatened to shoot them.

The Nightingale sailed from Liverpool on December 1st, that is, some seven weeks after she had arrived—certainly a longer sojourn than would have been required to load the cargo of cotton goods, shooks and hoops (for making water casks), rice, beans, earthenware, and 900 barrels of gunpowder and old muskets. Clearly she had spent such a long time in port for some other purpose.

On 17 April 1860 the USS Saratoga, an anti-slavery vessel cruising off the West African coast, sighted the Nightingale. They decided to keep a watch on her because she was behaving suspiciously. Four days later, U.S. Navy Captain Taylor caught the Nightingale off Kabanda (Angola) in the act of boarding enslaved Africans. There were already 960 on board. While the Navy was preparing the captured Nightingale to sail, Bowen and the Spanish supercargo, Valentino Costina, escaped. It is possible that they had been allowed to do so by the officers Captain Taylor had sent on board, as three of them were Southerners and one was a known slaveholder.

The Nightingale was sent to Monrovia to discharge the slaves, of whom 160 died of fever during the voyage; of those who survived, there were 272 men, 97 women, 340 boys, and 92 girls. From Liberia the Nightingale was sailed to New York, where the case against her was heard in the District Court on 26
June 1861. The New York courts had proved less than efficacious in prosecuting slavers, perhaps because some (many?) of the city’s financiers were involved in the trade in slaves or were plantation owners. No defense was offered and the vessel was purchased by the U.S. government. The three captured mates of the slaver, Haynes (Hinds?), Winslow, and Westervelt, were also tried in New York. For unaccountable reasons it was impossible to prove the nationality of Haynes and Winslow, who were thus held to be immune from American law. Winslow was released on bail. Westervelt, who asked to be tried separately, was from a well-known New York family and produced excellent character witnesses. The jury, after an all-night sitting, could not agree on a verdict and Westervelt was given his freedom on condition that he join the army and help track down the details of mate Haynes’ birthplace. Discovering that he had been born in Maine, the Court now put Haynes on trial. The first jury of the good citizens of New York was deadlocked and so was the jury at the re-trial. Haynes was released on $2,500 bail and the case against the mates of the Nightingale was shamefully closed.

Having learned of the Nightingale’s capture from the reports of the Saratoga, the British press, so silent while the vessel was being illegally outfitted for the heinous trade, now printed a number of articles reviling it. The Liverpool Mercury and the Liverpool Post, both in a position to have been well aware of what was happening on the city’s River Mersey, inquired into the affair. The newspapers confirmed that a vessel named the Nightingale had been cleared to sail to St. Thomas off the west coast of Africa on 24 November 1860 by “F. Bowen of Liverpool.” “Should this be the Nightingale which has been captured by the Saratoga,” the Liverpool papers opined, “there can be no doubt but that the Government will cause inquiry to be made, and if possible, teach those interested in the trade that ‘nightingales’ cannot go a-blackbirding with impunity.” The Times of London, also investigating the Nightingale, wrote that “of course the clearance for St. Thomas was a ruse to deceive the Customs, but we have heard that before leaving the Mersey the destination of the ship was well known. . . .” The Times made no comment on the trade in enslaved Africans.

The New York Tribune offered an explanation for the reason why ships were being outfitted in Britain for U.S. slavers: lately the U.S. Marshall’s efforts had succeeded in preventing such activity on the North-East Coast, so slavers were shipping legitimate cargoes to Britain and there having their ships converted. “Of course, as soon as this state of things is understood, her Britannic Majesty’s Government will put an effectual stop to it,” the editorial commented. The U.S. Marshall at New York, Robert Murray, “believed that it has not been an uncommon thing for vessels to receive their outfit in Liverpool and thence sail on these nefarious ventures.”
But the *Tribune*’s certainty about the British government was misplaced. U.S. Ambassador Adams had already informed Foreign Secretary Russell of the outfitting of the *Nightingale* in Liverpool. Further, he stated that this was not the only case of such illegal practice. Russell replied on 11 November 1861 that he would instigate the “closest investigation . . . and that all the powers of the law shall be put in motion with a view to prosecute to conviction the perpetrators of this odious crime.”

Whether Russell ever initiated an investigation is doubtful. But certainly no one was prosecuted, though the case was published in the annual *Parliamentary Slave Trade Papers*. This inaction led the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society to launch its own investigation and to publish the results, including interviews with some of the *Nightingale*’s crew. The pamphlet, *Slave Traders in Liverpool*, was presented to Parliament in April 1862. M. P. Thomas Fowell Buxton, a stalwart of the Society, posed questions in the House of Commons regarding the case on May 15th; raising the issue in the House of Lords, his colleague, Lord Brougham, elicited enough information to conclude that “the Government had not taken the first step in the matter.” The Society decided to enlist the aid of Mr. Cropper of Liverpool, who had offered “to cooperate . . . in any steps they might take to bring the guilty parties to justice.”

The Anti-Slavery Society noted that the responses of Sir Austen Henry Layard (Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) to Lord Brougham’s questions were mere evasions. Layard had explained, as he had to Thomas Buxton in the House of Commons, that “there had been no circumstances to give rise to suspicion . . . It was only after she [the *Nightingale*] had sailed that the Government was informed that she was a slaver.”

The Anti-Slavery Society Secretary then met with Under-Secretary Layard, who reported that the Crown Law Officers “did not think the actual law could reach foreign vessels . . . when commanded by foreigners.” Secretary Chamerovzow continued this discussion in writing, pointing out that the Act of Parliament “made no distinction on grounds of nationality.” But this question was irrelevant, as the outfitter was the ship-broker brother of the captain, and was British. As the government apparently did not intend to prosecute, would it assist the Society in launching a prosecution? (What the Society did not even bother to mention was that Bowen’s partner, Philip Holzberg, was only a “denizen” of Britain. Presumably, being found guilty of breaking the law, his denization could have been withdrawn.)

Meanwhile, that the outfitting of the *Nightingale* had not been the only instance of such illegal activity in Liverpool was voiced by a delegation of merchants to Lord Palmerston on 17 July 1862. The merchants had met at the London Tavern the previous month to discuss British involvement in the slave trade. They informed the Prime Minister that “within the last few days, it had been publicly stated . . . that a considerable sum of money had been subscribed
in London to carry on the slave trade under the French flag from Marseilles.” Thomas Clegg, a member of the delegation from Manchester, pointed out that “the slave trade destroys legitimate trade.” Clegg, for example, was experimenting with cotton-growing in West Africa. Despite having heard similar allegations made by Lord Brougham in the House of Lords, who also claimed to have received information that a vessel intended for the slave trade was being built in Hartlepool, Palmerston’s reply to the delegation was equivocal at best: France had refused Britain’s proposal for a treaty permitting mutual rights to search vessels suspected of slaving. Nothing was said by the Prime Minister about investigating the allegations of British involvement.

In the same month Foreign Secretary Russell confirmed the Anti-Slavery Society’s analysis: the existing slave trade acts applied to the vessels of all nations. That under the existing laws the firm of Holzberg & Bowen could be prosecuted was not even mentioned. The government did nothing; neither did the press. Lord Russell’s admission, announced in the House of Lords on 31 July, went unreported, except in the Anti-Slavery Reporter of 1 October 1862. In December the Society gave up, presumably having received no assurance of help from the government should it bring a case against Holzberg and Bowen. The Secretary was instructed to report if any “fresh facts transpired.” But nothing new came to light.

**CAPTAIN FRANCIS BOWEN**

In October of 1861 the U.S. Secretary of State William H. Seward informed the British Ambassador that Captain Francis Bowen, who had been officially declared “a fugitive from the justice of the United States,” was in Canada. Seward asked Lord Lyons to issue “the necessary warrant and deliver up Francis Bowen when he has been arrested” to Marshall Robert Murray in New York so that he could stand trial. There is no trace in the correspondence between the Colonial Office and Canada of a request for the arrest of Bowen. Whether Bowen was ever in Canada is doubtful. In March 1863 the slaver *Mariquita*, captained by Bowen, was captured off the Angolan coast; it had cleared from London. Sent to the Courts at St. Helena, for unknown reasons Bowen was released and “returned to the coast in an American whaler.” Commodore Wilmont of the British fleet, visiting Loango, met a “knowledgeable gentleman” at the home of the agent recruiting contract labor for the French West Indies. Only after the visit did he learn that this was the “notorious” Bowen. The British law officers decided not to prosecute the owner of the *Mariquita*, though he was known to live in London.

The captain of the *Nightingale*, Francis Bowen, and the Bowen of the firm of Holzberg & Bowen were brothers. Francis had emigrated to the U.S. in the period 1857-1860. In 1857 Thomas H. Bowen was a “preserved provision merchant and ship’s chandler,” with offices in Liverpool and a
residence in Oxton. Also residing in Oxton, then a small town near Liverpool, was John James Mellhuish, ships’ broker. The firm of Holzberg (sometimes Holtzberg) & Bowen had offices at 66 South John Street in 1860, but had moved to several doors down by 1864—it was still there in 1867, when it is described as a “ship owners, merchants and ship brokers” enterprise. The following year “Holzberg and Bowen” vanished from the directories, but the listing of Thomas H. Bowen as a ship broker at 7 Bedford St. North, remained.27 Clearly the firm had prospered and its partners had not been prosecuted for their activities.

Holtzberg is an evasive a fellow to trace. In the Gore’s Liverpool Directories available in London, he first appears in 1857 as “Augustus Holzberg, merchant (J. J. Mellhuish & Co.), Oxton.” The offices of Mellhuish & Co. were also at 66 South John Street, the address from which Holzberg & Bowen operated. According to the 1861 census, Frankfurt-born Philip was a widower, aged 65, and was a naturalized British subject. By 1871 Holzberg had fallen on hard times: now a lodger, he was working as a clerk.28

Why had Holzberg migrated to Britain? There is no information on him in Frankfurt, according to a kind colleague. But in the Public Record Office, where his denization papers have been preserved, he is described as a relatively prosperous saddler.29 Most curiously, however, Holzberg does not appear in any of the London trade directories, in the Poor Rate records, or in the census of 1841 and 1851—that is, either before or after his denization.30 Thus we have reason to doubt the information in the denization papers.31 Where was he if not in London? Was it his contacts or his money that led to his partnership with Bowen, or some common interest? How did he make enough money, as an unknown saddler, to become a merchant? Was he a saddler at all?

A few months before the capture of the Nightingale, the Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell32 received information from the British Consul in Boston that among the slavers which had landed “cargoes” in Cuba within the past eighteen months had been the Sultana, whose captain was “F. Bowen of New York.”33 Thus Russell and his officials knew the name of Bowen as a slave trader well before he arrived in Liverpool. Yet the government did nothing.

OTHER SLAVERS OUTFITTED IN BRITAIN

Though I have not been able to follow up the allegation that the Nightingale was not the only vessel outfitted for the trade in slaves in Liverpool, as had been charged both by Britons and U.S. officials, the issue cannot be ignored. Readily available evidence shows that the British government ignored other information regarding British involvement in the trade in slaves. In 1864, two years after the Nightingale affair, Russell’s inaction in such issues was again demonstrated. The British Consul General in Cuba had informed the Foreign
Secretary that two steamers which had recently landed 2,200 slaves consigned to Julian Zulueta, had allegedly been “obtained and despatched from Liverpool by one Don Marcos Ysasi of that place.” Russell asked the Home Office (HO) to investigate. The HO duly passed this request to Liverpool’s Lord Mayor, who replied with surprising alacrity. He enclosed the Liverpool constabulary’s report, which stated that the ships involved in the slave trade were the paddle steamer City of Norwich and two “screws,” the Harbinger and the Propontus, all belonging to Don Marcos Ysasi, now residing in Lagos. Ysasi’s son regularly traveled between Africa, Europe and the Americas, “purchasing schooners for the shipment of slaves.” The police officers had obtained this information from “a gentleman of undoubted respectability” and had learned that there were “two persons who recently arrived from the West Coast of Africa who will be able to substantiate the whole of this information on oath, and can supply more information if reasonable expenses are paid to them.” The Mayor did not think it necessary to explain why, if this man’s activities were well known, he had not previously reported him to the authorities.

The Home Office forwarded the Mayor’s letter to Russell three days after it had been written. But Russell took eight days to reply, asking for further information, such as the names of purchasers of the three vessels (information he already had), the port from which they cleared, their cargo, and their destination. This, as he should have learned from the history of the Nightingale, could be a piece of fiction. Russell also stated that there was no “Don Marcos Ysasi residing in Lagos,” but how could he have ascertained this in the few days since he had received the Liverpool constabulary’s information? The HO took three days to forward Russell’s request for information to Liverpool. The police again moved quickly, but the two informants had sailed on January 28th, the day before the Home Office had written. Nevertheless, the officers sought further information, and discovered that Ysasi also used the name of “L. A. Monteiro,” and had used a London address. Ysasi/Monteiro had sailed for Accra from Liverpool on January 31st.

Unfortunately, there is no further information on the file. But it is important to note that again Russell should have been alerted by a name that he ought to have recognized—that of Zulueta. He or his officials should have recalled that in 1842 a Parliamentary Select Committee had been told by the most reliable and knowledgeable witnesses that the British firm of Zulueta & Co., with offices in London and Liverpool, was known to be a partner of two of the largest slave traders on record: Pedro Blanco, who conducted his trade on the West Coast of Africa, and Martinez, who worked out of Havana. In 1841 a vessel named Augusta was captured by Capt. Hill of the West Africa Squadron, taken to the Vice-Admiralty Court in Sierra Leone, and condemned. The owners turned out to be Zulueta & Co. Despite the evidence against Zulueta,
the government refused to prosecute. A private prosecution was then brought and lost on technical grounds. During Pedro de Zulueta’s trial much was learned of how slavers operated in Britain—by acting through agents, changing the names of their crews as well as of their ships, and flying whatever flag was the most convenient. The case excited much interest, Zulueta being not only wealthy but well-connected (to the P&O Line, by marriage), and thus the whole country (and, one would think, the government) learned of the slavers’ machinations.

This makes Russell’s questions to the Liverpool police even more specious. It cannot be easy to forget a name like Zulueta; it is hardly a common name in the U.K. And, even if no one at the Foreign Office was able to remember Zulueta from twenty years ago, his name had cropped up much more recently: twice in 1862 Lord Russell had been told of the Cuban Zulueta receiving cargoes of slaves.\(^3\) (The relationship of Pedro de Zulueta to Julian Zulueta, probably the greatest plantation/slave owner in Cuba, is not yet known.)\(^4\)

**TRADE WITH SLAVE-HOLDING SOCIETIES**

The Act of 1843 for the “more effective suppression of the slave trade” consolidated the previous laws regarding participation in the trade in slaves and added new clauses: the investment of capital, the lending of money, insuring or shipping “goods to partners and agents” in the trade in slaves were clearly forbidden.\(^5\) Nevertheless, according to historian David Eltis,

> a major source of financing in the nineteenth century slave trade was credit advanced by merchants (mainly British) who provided the slave dealers with their goods... [Even] as specie came to be employed instead of goods, British funds remained important. Most of the large mining operations in Brazil were British and all employed slave labor. There were, moreover, *neither legal nor moral barriers* to the extension of British credit to businesses other than those involved in transatlantic slave trading.\(^6\)

There is much evidence to suggest that, despite its own laws, the British government had no problems trading with slave-holding societies. Had Britain seriously intended to bring about the end of slavery the laws would have been enforced, and a trade embargo imposed on such societies. As Britain was the pre-eminent industrial nation at that time, with the largest banking and insurance businesses in the world, such an action would have been decisive.

**CUBA**

Let us take Cuba as an example. In 1842 Consul Turnbull in Havana had informed the Foreign Office that “a mercantile House established here,
having a partner in Glasgow, has for several years past been engaged in the Slave Trade.” Consul Turnbull was satisfied that the present is not an isolated case, but is only one amongst many in which the nefarious trade in slaves is carried on by means of British capital and enterprise. This system would appear to have been in operation for a considerable time past, and to have been carried on through the medium of foreign partners or Agents of British Mercantile Houses, which Partners or Agents are stationed in Cadiz, or the Havana, and furnish the goods required for the purchase of the slaves on the coast of Africa, recovering payment in “Actions” or shares in the Adventure [i.e. the slaves] which are either sold in the Market for what they will fetch, or their value is received in kind.

Turnbull requested his evidence regarding the Glasgow firm to be placed before the Lord Advocate of Scotland. This resulted in both the Treasury and the Home Office being involved, as well as Scottish government officials.

Robert Wardrop of the firm of Wardrop and Villaldo, indicted by Turnbull, was visited by government officials. Wardrop declared that he was the Glasgow arm of the firm and sent “general goods” to the branch in Havana. Of these goods a “part was also suitable for the African market.” He had no accounts or any kind of reports in his possession from his Havana partner, having received only “result of business” notes. The firm had its own vessels and chartered others. The proceeds of the sale of slaves was entered in the company books in Havana as “cash.” Wardrop had remonstrated with his partner over trading in slaves; no, he didn’t have copies of this correspondence and he believed these sales had ceased two years previously. He had no reports on business for 1841. The official sent by the Lord Advocate’s Office saw “no reference or allusion to such a traffic or adventure” in the firm’s letterbooks and accounts. Wardrop gave the name of the only other British businessman in partnership in Havana that he knew of. But apparently neither this information, nor the other firms’ names sent by Consul Turnbull, were ever investigated.

It would be difficult to imagine that British slave traders, the most experienced in the trade, did not participate in the importation of the approximately 400,000 enslaved Africans into the island in the period 1822-1867.

In 1876 exports to Cuba amounted to £2.57 million, some 1.5% of the U.K.’s total exports for that year. Imports of sugar from Cuba hovered around 31% of foreign imports and 15% of total imports in the period 1846-1866. Direct investment in Cuba was £3 million in 1865. (One has to bear in mind that the population of Cuba was about one million at this time.) According to Baron Alphonse de Rothschild of the merchant banking house of N. M. Rothschild, in 1859 its rival house, Barings, was “the chief among a handful of houses making all the profit from commissions, credits and consignations.”
BRAZIL

Another example of illegal British involvement was in Brazil. On 19 February 1845 President Tyler sent a message to Congress stating that he had been informed by his ambassador to Brazil that "American vessels are chartered, or rather purchased, by notorious slave-dealers in Britain, aided by English brokers and capitalists." President Tyler then described the details of the transactions, and charged both Americans and Britons as being "deeply implicated in this inhumane traffic." British "merchants and capitalists," the American President stated, "furnish the very means for carrying it on; manufactures, for which the Negroes are exchanged, are the products of her workshops." He "hoped that her Britannic Majesty's government will... adopt more efficient measures for the suppression of the trade."46 (Though President Tyler had refused to sign a mutual search treaty, he did agree to maintain a naval squadron on the coast of Africa to enforce the U.S. prohibition on trading in slaves. However, Congress never voted sufficient funds to maintain an effective squadron.)47

BRITISH INVOLVEMENT AND ATTITUDES

The British government had to make some kind of response to the flaunting of the law. The Foreign Office prepared a "Memorandum on British Subjects and Capital Engaged in the Slave Trade 1834-1845."48 Drawing on previously published Slave Trade Papers, the report clearly demonstrated that the government knew the extent and the methods used by Britons involved in the trade. But nothing came of the "Memorandum" either on the part of government or of Russell, who was leader of the opposition at the time and then the First Lord of the Treasury in 1846. Moreover, the British squadron was forbidden to burn the barracoons on the coast, on the basis that it was impossible to distinguish between British goods stored there for the legitimate trade and manufactures intended for the slave trade.49

In 1849 £3-4 million in capital and £3 million worth of goods were estimated to have gone to Brazil, where slavery was legal until 1888; in 1880 exports to Brazil were worth £5.9 million or 3.2% of total exports. British direct investment rose steadily from £7 million in 1840 to £93 million in 1885.50 The Brazilian government was able to raise £20.6 million in loans in the U.K. between 1860 and 1875.51 From the early 19th century British trading companies were well-established in Brazil; by the 1870, British companies had built the railways and tramways, the dry docks and bridges, the gas, light and sewerage works, the telegraph and sugar factories, and controlled this slave state's banking, insurance and shipping. Among the earliest shipping companies involved with Brazil were the Liverpool, Brazil and River Plate Steam Packet Co. and the firm of Lamport and Holt, also of Liverpool.52 Though clearly, in
the light of the tale of Wardrop and Villaldo, one has to approach data on investments in slave-states with some hesitancy, one historian has calculated that in 1880 British investments in Brazil were £39 million. Given the data above, I believe this to be an underestimate.

British merchants and manufacturers had ample evidence that the government would not interdict their activities. Pre-eminent among British ports was Liverpool. In the latter half of the nineteenth century half of the United Kingdom’s exports and about one-third of its imports passed through that city. A number of that city’s successful businessmen (and Liverpool itself) had received their start in life from the trade in slaves: as historians Cameron and Crooke demonstrate, “Liverpool’s leading slave traders belonged to the most affluent and powerful sections of Liverpool society. . . . All seventeen Liverpool firms trading with Africa in the years immediately following 1807 had previously been engaged in the slave trade.”

What were these firms trading in? In the early 1840s, Liverpool’s MPs could not rebut charges in Parliament that “part of the town’s exports to Africa were used for ‘some improper purpose’.” Among these exports were the “manacles, fetters and chains” being manufactured, “with very little concealment,” in Birmingham. But in this period Liverpool’s trade was concentrating on the Americas. One prominent import was sugar, which Liverpool had been importing, refining and re-exporting since the mid-18th century. With the equalization of sugar duties (British West Indian sugar had been preferentially treated till 1846), the volume of slave-grown sugar imported from Cuba and Brazil, which had been increasing since 1817, reached twenty-seven percent of total sugar imports in 1866.

Liverpool’s merchants had financed both the railway and the canal linking Liverpool to Manchester which expedited the import of slave-grown raw cotton and the export of cotton goods. Both cities grew fat on this trade, which passed through the port of Liverpool. According to Professor Herbert Merivale, Liverpool and Manchester owed their “opulence to the exchange of their produce with that raised by American slaves.”

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865

The civil war in North America pitted the secessionist slave-owning, cotton-growing Southern states against the North. A major issue of contention was the extension of the institution of slavery promoted by the South and opposed by the North. Though many Britons, and perhaps at first especially the cotton manufacturers, had pressed for British intervention on the side of the Confederates, in May 1861 the British government proclaimed neutrality. The Proclamation stated that neither of the “contenders” was to have its vessels fitted out in a British port; no Briton was to serve in the American armed forces.
or merchant marine; blockades imposed by either side were to be respected; and
that “arms, military stores and materials” were not to be carried by British ships.
British ports were to provide the most minimal aid to any stricken vessel, which
could only be supplied with sufficient coal to reach a port of its own side.61 Despite continued pressure from the Confederates, British policy remained
unchanged throughout the war. Was this because, at least until the outcome of
the hostilities were clear, a divided and war-impoverished America served
British interests well?

The proclamation, according to Thomas E. Taylor, a Liverpool mer­
chant, “awakened no respect whatever. . . . It was a piece of international
courtesy. . . . Firm after firm, with an entirely clear conscience, set about
endeavouring to recoup itself for the loss of legitimate trade. . . . In Liverpool
was awakened a spirit the like of which had not been known since the palmy days
of the slave trade.”62 The method of trade developed was for British ships to take
British manufactures intended for the Confederates, but consigned to agents,
to entrepots such as the British ports of Nassau or Bermuda. There the goods
were transferred to especially fast British vessels known as “blockade runners.”
These took the goods surreptitiously through the blockade mounted by Union
vessels at the entrance to Southern ports. The slower British vessels then loaded
the cotton which had been brought out through the blockade and shipped it
to the hungry mills of Lancashire. In both Nassau and Bermuda, as well as in
Barbados, the neutrality proclamation was brazenly ignored; the resident
British were pro-Confederate, including such senior British officials as the
Governor and Attorney General of Nassau.63 Thus the ports were safe havens
for Confederate—and illegal British—business.

**BRITISH VESSELS FOR THE CONFEDERATES**

According to the U.S. Consul in Liverpool, by January 1863, one
hundred thirty steamers and numerous sailing vessels had left the U.K. with
supplies for the slave-holding states. Ambassador Adams also forwarded
intercepted Confederate correspondence to Foreign Secretary Russell, which
revealed the names of some of the British companies involved in the building
and outfitting of these ships and even in recruiting their crews.64 “Lured by the
prospects of making some money,”65 British naval officers, using pseudonyms,
captained many blockade runners. With such a large number of sailings,
Liverpool traders could certainly recoup their losses: Taylor, the above­
mentioned merchant, calculated that one of his firm’s vessels, which was
captured by the U.S. Navy on its ninth blockade-running venture, had “earned
sufficient on eight successful round trips to pay her shareholders 700% on
investment.”66 So successful were such operations—at least until the U.S.
acquired enough vessels to make the blockade meaningful—that the amount of
customs duty collected on imports in Liverpool showed no real decline until 1863.\textsuperscript{67}

As the Confederates could neither grow as much cotton as previously, nor easily export what was grown, they had to find other means of paying for British manufactures.\textsuperscript{68} U.S. Ambassador Adams informed Lord Russell that confederate gold to “buy and fit out ships of war” was being brought to the U.K. in British ships. In 1863 the Confederates floated a loan of £3 million in Britain, which, according to their agent James D. Bulloch, was oversubscribed.\textsuperscript{69} As the U.S. Consul in Liverpool noted, “the South could not have fought for one year without this aid.”\textsuperscript{70}

Did the British merchants and those Britons who subscribed to the Confederate loan have to employ great subterfuge in their law-breaking activities? No. Any artifice employed was more pro-forma than real as the slaveholding states had considerable support in the U.K. It is very clear from the memoirs of both U.S. officials and Confederates that, broadly speaking, the governing class supported the South. For example, one MP (for Tynemouth and later Sunderland), William S. Lindsay, was alleged to have been part of a “ring of conspirators illegally soliciting funds and laundering currency (among other activities) for the Southern cause.” He was also the secretary of the movement for erecting a national monument to Confederate General Jackson, and had announced his intention to introduce a bill in Parliament to recognize the southern states.\textsuperscript{71} Thus James D. Bulloch, whose autobiography was published in 1884, makes clear that he always received information on the British government’s discussions and intentions from “private and reliable” sources, who must obviously have been privy to the government’s—or at least Lord Russell’s—inner circle. The Confederates’ official representatives, according to Bulloch, were “well known” and “well received outside official circles.”\textsuperscript{72}

To give just one other example of the cordiality extended to Southerners, even those actually involved in the war: when the South’s Admiral Semmes, the very successful commander of the Confederate cruisers Sumter and then the Alabama, came to Britain in June 1864, he was honored with a reception at the Junior United Service Club, whose members presented him with a “handsome sword to replace that which he buried with his sinking ship.” Chancellor William Gladstone’s sister wrote Semmes “a long letter full of sympathy... and offered any aid of which my sailors or myself might be in need.”\textsuperscript{73} (Gladstone himself was a Confederate supporter. In 1862 he declared at a public meeting that “Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy, and they have made what is more than either, they have made a nation.”\textsuperscript{74})
CONFEDERATES AND THEIR SUPPORTERS IN BRITAIN

The U.S. Consul in Liverpool, Thomas H. Dudley, kept U.S. Ambassador Adams and the appropriate U.S. government departments informed of Confederate agents’ activities. The Ambassador virtually bombarded Foreign Secretary Russell with information, sworn affidavits, and other evidence of British citizens’ law-breaking. Such information was also in the public domain: for example, the *New York Times* (6 March 1861: 1) copied a letter from the *London Daily News* (c. 14 February 1863) addressed to the Prime Minister. The letter listed 10 ships which had cleared from British ports laden with arms and munitions for the Confederates in the past twelve months. The writer gave the owners’ and captains’ names, the chief shippers, and lists of the cargoes. One of these ships, the steamer *Princess Royal*, carried goods consigned by W.S. Lindsay & Co., a name which we already know. The anonymous writer questioned Lindsay, who was MP for Sunderland:

> Will the honorable member . . . whose voice has been not so infrequently raised in the House in defense of the slave holders' rebellion, have the temerity to affirm his ignorance of the nature of the transactions in which his name figures with disgraceful prominence? Will he deny that his offices in the City of London are the common resort of Charleston and other American pilots, but especially Southerners, who tout here for hire in this contraband trade?

Then the writer took the government to task:

> It is simply incredible that it [the government] alone is not cognizant of facts notorious in commercial circles, and the evidence of which is more easily accessible to its agents than to lookers-on . . . . The Government [should] prosecute and punish those who violate either the Queen's Proclamation, the Foreign Enlistment act or the Customs regulations.

It is to be expected that in such an atmosphere there was little to hinder British shipbuilders from assisting the Confederates. They built cruisers for the South, armed vessels whose purpose was as much to sink the Union’s war ships as to prevent supplies reaching the North. (Their usual technique was to sink or to burn captured merchant vessels and to confiscate their cargo. Occasionally they ransomed the crew.) The fairly transparent ruse adopted by Bulloch was to name an associate as the proposed vessels’ owners. The ships were built complete with gun-placements, etc., but with no actual armaments on board. The cannon, munitions and other war stores were consigned in another vessel which rendezvoused (*e.g.*, in Nassau) with the unarmed cruiser. The weaponry was transferred and installed. The vessel’s name was now changed and the Confederate flag hoisted. Among the cruisers built in Britain (and subsequently
armed with British weapons) were the *Florida* and the *Alexandra*, built by Miller & Co., and the *Alabama*, built by Laird’s—both Mersey yards; others were built in Glasgow and London. According to Consul Dudley, “a senior member of the firm [Miller & Co.] was during the time of her construction, an officer in the employ of His Majesty’s Government, with an office in the Custom House in Liverpool.” The real owners of these vessels were known in Liverpool: according to one of the city’s newspapers, “everybody knew . . . was built for the Confederate Government, and intended to prey on the property of the merchants of New York, Boston, and other cities of the Union.”

Dudley and Ambassador Adams naturally kept Russell informed of these activities and maneuvers. Russell—as by now we would expect—never accepted any proof offered of British wrongdoing. Or, when he did acquiesce, it was always just a little too late: the ship had left the yards by the time instructions to detain her had reached Liverpool customs. And, as previously, Russell refuted charges regarding illegalities in Britain’s colonial ports and the behavior of some of her naval officers without making the requisite inquiries. Perhaps Russell saw nothing amiss with his denials: in 1864 he admitted—and excused—the role played by British shipyards. “In this conflict,” he wrote, “it so happens that the Confederate States have no ports except those of the Mersey and the Clyde, from which they fit out ships to cruise against the Federals.”

The *Times* and many other British newspapers supported the Confederates. For example, on 1 March 1862, the *Times* contrasted the deaths on the battlefield with “the miseries of thousands of capitalists. . . . What are bullets flying about you compared with the heavy fall of securities which have utterly lost its buoyancy?” From May 1862 the Confederates, seemingly without hinderance, published their own newspaper, the *Index*. Throwing their weight to the southern forces, the ruling and merchant classes counted their profits. Fueling this support was their fear of competition from the growing industrialization (including cotton manufacturing) of the North, and the spread of dangerous republican ideas. The London branch of the nation-wide Southern Independence Association counted among its members ten MPs, the Marquis of Lothian and the Marquis of Bath, and Lords Robert and Eustace Cecil. Even the abolitionist societies were not wholly against the slave-owning South until Lincoln issued his Emancipation Proclamation.

**HOSTILITY TO THE SOUTH**

However, many segments of the English working class were hostile to southern interests. While there is no recorded instance of workers downing tools on Confederate-destined goods, vessels or armaments, many working-class organizations spoke out against support for the South. Even the workers of Lancashire, who were grievously affected by what was called the “cotton famine” supported the North. In appreciation of their support and to alleviate
their suffering the Union sent two food relief ships: one was sunk by the Confederates; the other, the George Griswold, docked safely in Liverpool in February 1863 with a cargo of £27,000 worth of provisions and cash donations of £1,333.87 Liverpool dockers unloaded her without payment. President Lincoln thanked the workers in a moving letter; the weavers of Newmilns in Ayrshire were presented with a U.S. flag by Lincoln as a token of his thanks for their support.

With the first Union victories and the Emancipation Proclamation, a small change of heart overcame at least some sectors of the British ruling class. The Alexandra, a small gun-boat being built on the Mersey by Miller & Co., was seized by HM Customs around March or April 1863, as “the government believes that it was fitted for the Confederate service.” No guns were found, so the vessel was allowed to sail. However, Parliament took up the issue and a number of speakers accused the government of dilatoriness in these matters.

When the issue was debated again the following year, John Laird MP named Baring Brothers, “in common with others, as concerned in the shipment of arms and ammunition to the United States.” Thomas Baring MP defended his firm’s actions by maintaining that “it was notorious that such shipments [i.e. of all manner of goods to the United States and the Confederates, including arms and munitions] were taking place, and . . . there [was] no intimation given on the part of Her Majesty’s Government that the parties engaged in them were in any way infringing the laws.” (my emphasis) He believed that “equipping vessels of war for the use of the Confederate Government was ‘fraudulent’ in the sense that “every species of concealment have been resorted to in order to cover the real intentions of the parties.” However, it was quickly pointed out to Baring that the Queen’s Proclamation forbade her subjects from carrying “the contraband of war to either belligerent.” As Baring Bros. had been engaged in seeing that “warlike supplies were properly forwarded to their destination,” the firm had clearly been acting illegally. Having discussed the issue, a number of MPs called on the government to tighten up the laws and to be more expeditious in administering those that existed. The government’s law officers, as always, stoutly defended themselves.

Rams for the Confederates

Two rams under construction by Laird’s were detained in October 1863, but the firm of Cammell Laird was not charged with any offense. Firstly, Laird’s was held to be a most “reputable” firm engaged in building a number of war ships for the British government. Secondly, the founder of the firm, John Laird, had been elected to Parliament in 1861 to represent Birkenhead. Thirdly, as there was “no lack of sympathy for the Confederate cause . . . especially in Liverpool . . . there is no reason to believe that a Liverpool jury would have
hesitated to give the Confederate agents the benefit of any reasonable doubt.992

The principals of the firm of Jones & Co. were actually taken to court by the government over the Japan, which had sailed from Liverpool in late March 1863 ostensibly for Singapore. Once at sea the officers revealed themselves as Confederates, renamed her the Georgia, and took on ammunition and guns at sea off Brest. However, the derisory fine of £50 for each British seaman shipped would not have deterred the firms involved in such trade from continuing their illegal activities.93

After the seizure of the rams being built by Laird’s, Bulloch turned to buying and converting vessels as Confederate cruisers. The Victor was bought from the Royal Navy in September 1863, outfitted at Sheerness, and renamed the Rappanbannock. In 1864 he bought the Sea King, probably in London, which became the armed cruiser the Shenandoah. There was apparently no government interference with these sales. In his autobiography Bulloch made no serious complaints against the British government until mid-1864, when, he maintained, Russell was applying “the Foreign Enlistment Act so stringently that it was difficult to forward the most essential supplies.”94 By now the war was in its conclusive phase and the final victory of the Union was only a matter of time. It would not augur well for future trade with the re-United States for Britain to still be openly supplying the Confederates.

CONCLUSION

Had Britain seriously intended to bring about the end of slavery the laws would have been enforced and a trade embargo imposed on slave-holding societies. As Britain was the pre-eminent industrial nation at that time, and had the largest banking and insurance businesses in the world, such an action would have been decisive. But, as demonstrated, Britain invested in, financed, imported from, and exported to slave states, and used slave-produced raw materials to feed her industrial machinery. Britons also outfitted ships, invested in, financed, and insured the very trade itself. Simultaneously, for variously interpreted but fairly clear commercial reasons, from 1810 Britain attempted to convince other nations to stop trading in enslaved Africans.95 Britain had expended considerable effort and money to stop the trade in slaves. There is no doubt this policy was motivated in part by moral concerns. But what also must be taken into account is that the focus on “foreign” involvement also tended to obscure the unchecked role of Britons in the trade and the vast profits derived from the country’s continued indirect involvement in both the slave trade and slavery. Commercial interests overcame all others and merchants scrambled not only to engage in trade, but to furnish military supplies, including vessels of war, to southern, slave-holding states. Had the South won, slavery would have continued in North America.
The government was a master of inactivity in all these matters. No proof was ever sufficient to elicit meaningful action. While the reports on slavery accumulated, more and more laws were passed but not enforced. During the Civil War, the U.S. Ambassador presented the British government with ample proof of illegal support of the Confederates by Britons. These reports extracted nothing but denial from Foreign Secretary Russell. However, sitting in Geneva in 1872 to hear the claims of the United States against the U.K. for the sinking of her vessels by the British-built Confederate cruisers Alabama, Florida and Shenandoah, the International Court of Arbitration decided differently. Britain was ordered to pay just over three and a quarter million pounds ($15,500,000 in gold) as compensation.96

The “whole story” of British involvement in the slave trade and slavery has not been told. A reassessment is due: this essay, I hope, possibly indicates some fruitful lines of inquiry.
I would like to thank Manisha Sinha for her careful reading of the first version of this paper and for her helpful suggestions.


4 W. A. Fairburn, *Merchant Sail* (Center Lovell, ME: Fairburn Marine Education Foundation, 1945-55), 2:1558, 3091. I am indebted to the Peabody Essex Museum, Salem, Massachusetts, for this and other information on the *Nightingale*.


6 *Parliamentary Accounts & Papers*, 1862, 61:324-327. (Hereafter cited as *PAP*.)


8 Before 1857, the U.S.A’s anti-slavery squadron on the African coast had seized only 18 slavers; it became more effective 1857-1861, seizing another 20 and landing 2,793 freed Africans in Monrovia. An additional 50 slavers were taken in U.S. waters and another 15 by the Cuba/Brazil patrol (1837-1862). However, there was not one conviction in the U.S. courts until 1860. In contrast, the British squadron on the African coast seized 595 slavers and freed 45,612 Africans. See Alan R. Booth, “The U.S. African Squadron,” in *Boston University Papers in African History*, ed. Jeffrey Butler (Boston: Boston University Press, 1964), vol. 1; and references cited in note 1 above.

9 Log of the USS Saratoga, 5 November 1860 to 25 August 1861, U.S. National Archives, RG 24; U.S. Flagship Constellation at St. Paul de Loanada to Secretary of the Navy 6 May 1861, U.S. National Archives: RG M89, Africa Squadron reports, reel 112;
Perfidious Albion

Octavius T. Howe and Frederick C. Matthews, *American Clipper Ships* (Salem, MA: Marine Research Society, 1926), 434-37. Most interestingly, among the crew of this U.S. naval vessel was a Lascar and three Kru; it was quite common for Kru to be employed on both naval and merchant vessels on the Coast.

10 *National Anti-Slavery Standard* (22 June 1861): 2. Monrovia was used as a dumping ground for "recaptives," *i.e.* Africans freed from slave ships. Sierra Leone served the same function for the British. No attempt was made to aid Africans to return from whence they had been captured.


16 Minutes of the General Meeting of the Committee, 6 June 1862, #371, Anti-Slavery Society Papers, Rhodes House Library: Br. Emp. Mss. s.20, E2/9. The Mr. Cropper referred to was John Cropper, son of Liverpool's leading anti-slavery campaigner, James Cropper (1773-1841). There are no papers of John Cropper either in the Cropper collection at the Merseyside Maritime Records Centre, or in the possession of the family. Letter from the present Mr. James Cropper to the author, 10 June 1994.

17 Committee Minutes #372, Anti-Slavery Papers, 6 June 1862.

18 Committee Minutes #387, Anti-Slavery Papers, 4 July 1862.

19 *Anti-Slavery Reporter* (1 August 1862): 183-88; Mathieson, *Great Britain and the Slave Trade*, 179.

20 Acts Consolidating Laws Relating to the Abolition of the Slave Trade, *PAP* 1824, c. 113; 1843, c. 98.

21 Committee Minutes 5 September 1862, #403 and 5 December 1862, Anti-Slavery Papers.


24 The immigration records in New York have not been computerized for this period; it would be an impossible task, without a firm date, to search the hand-written records. Francis Bowen is listed in the alphabetical section of *Gore's Liverpool Directory* for 1857. Most interestingly, there was another Bowen—*i.e.* William—listed that year as "HM Excise." Could William have been a relative in a very convenient job?

25 The Merseyside Record Office has no information on the firm or its partners. Bowen vanished from the Liverpool directories in 1870 and I could find no will for a Thomas H. Bowen of Liverpool in the Registers of Wills. Could he have gone to Wales, where
so many of the Bowens in these registers lived and died? Or did he follow his brother to the New World? One Francis George Bowen of Bahia, Brazil died there on 14 January 1903, leaving £500 in effects to his widow in London.

I am presuming that Singleton Lodge, of which Holzberg was listed as “head,” in the village of Claughton (population 714 in 1851) was a somewhat grander residence than the lodger’s quarters at 1 Belmont in Birkenhead listed in the 1871 census. I am most grateful for the help of Wirral’s librarian, Ms. E. E. Bisdon, with these details. Holzberg died on 15 May 1880, at 1 Belmont, leaving an estate “under £600.” The executors of his will were Edward Darbyshire, merchant and manager of the City of Liverpool Bank. Somerset House, Register of Wills for 1880.

Born in Amsterdam, Holzberg grew up in Frankfurt and arrived in London in 1814. He stated that his trade was that of a saddler. He had married an Englishwoman in 1822, who had died in 1841. At the time of his marriage he had purchased the lease on a house in Macclesfield Street, which, including repairs, cost £196. In 1843, at the time of his request for denization, Holzberg stated that he resided at 10 Princess Street, St. Ann, Soho in Westminster. At an unspecified date he had obtained a mortgage for £600 on another house at 2 Queen Street, Soho. £600 was a considerable sum of money in the 1840s, so Holzberg must have done well at his trade. The denization papers for “Philipp August Holzberg” are in PRO: HO45/8947.

Holzberg is listed in 1825 at 6 Macclesfield Street, Soho in the Land Tax records, which he appears not to have paid for that year; in 1830 he is still at that address, and paid £11.11.2 Poor Rates. However, five years later, he does not appear in the Poor Rates records.

Both Macclesfield and Princes Streets, Soho, were in the Parish of St Ann’s; the parish records are at the Westminster Local History Archive, as are the census records. As I was now really curious about Holzberg, I tried to check on the men who gave testimonies on his behalf for his denization. Unfortunately some names were illegible. One, Robert Slade of Dean Street, Soho is not in the 1841 Census. Another Soho testator, George Liddle, is in the Census as a wine merchant at Pigot & Co.’s at 67 Princess Street; in the 1846 Kelly’s Post Office London Directory, he is still working at the same address, but for Oliveira, Liddle & Co. The other testators did not live in London. One would have expected that a saddler, and especially one who was doing well, would appear in the London commercial directories. But Holzberg is not listed in any of Kelly’s London Post Office Directories, or in Robinson’s Improved London Directory of 40,000 Commercial Inhabitants for 1820 or in Watkin’s Commercial Directory for 1852. No banns (announcements of forthcoming marriages) were read in the parish of St. Ann’s, Soho for his marriage to Amalia Mitchell of Wiltshire in 1822.

Lord Russell, the Foreign Secretary, had been in Parliament since 1813 as the whig representative of the family borough of Tavistock. He had been Home Secretary, Colonial Secretary and Prime Minister and is described as having the most impeccable liberal credentials: an anti-slaver and advocate of even more unpopular liberal measures such as the removal of Jewish “disabilities.” Yet he had opposed the abolition of the apprenticeship system foisted onto British slaves in the Caribbean after emancipation and supported the subjection of Ireland to English rule. Russell’s father had been lord-lieutenant of Ireland (1806-7); Russell himself represented an Irish borough in Parliament from 1826 to 1830. Another colonial connection was through his father-in-law, Lord Minto, who was at one time governor-general of India. See Jack Gratus, The Great White Lie (London: Hutchinson, 1973), 247.
Perfidious Albion

33 PAP, 1861, 64: 182. According to Fairburn's *Merchant Sail*, 3091, Bowen was an experienced slaver, knew the African coast well, and had operated there as the master of the slave ship *Sultana*.

34 "Extract of A Despatch from Commissary Judge Crawford to Lord Russell, dated Havana November 6, 1863," enclosed with Russell to Under-Secretary of State, Home Office, 5 January 1864, PRO: HO45/7591. I am grateful to Alison Taubman, the Curator of the Trans-Atlantic Slavery Gallery in Liverpool for sending me this correspondence.


36 There is no request for information on Ysasi in the despatches between Lagos and London for 1864; PRO: CO147/6.

37 Report by Central Police Office, 1 February 1864, encl. in Liverpool Lord Mayor to Home Office, 2 February 1864, PRO: HO45/7591. There had been a Ysasi & Co. in London in 1846; the firm was still there in 1860, simply described as "merchant" (*Kelly's Post Office Commercial Directory*); there was also a Monteiro, of Fonseca, Monteiro, Guimavaens & Co., merchants. But the address given by Monteiro, 29 Harewood Square, was inhabited by Mrs. Colonel Hariot G. Beacher and her two servants, according to the 1861 Census, and not by Monteiro.


40 Act of 1843 (c.98). One has to assume that such a succession of laws (they continued until the 1880s) regarding the trade in enslaved Africans was necessitated by the involvement of British citizens in many aspects of the trade.

41 Eltis, *Economic Growth*, 155-56. (emphasis mine)

42 Turnbull's report and subsequent investigation are in PRO: FO45/352. Lord Russell was Leader of the Opposition in 1842.


46 *Journal of the House of Representatives of the U.S.*, 2d Sess., 28th Cong., 2 December 1844. The issue of American (Confederate) vessels sailing under the British ensign was raised some twenty years later, when the practice known as "English godfathers" was apparently quite common. May we deduce that it was the old practice perpetuated now for the purposes of the supporting the Confederates? *New York Times* (28 February 1864): 3, quoting the *European Times* of 6 February 1864. The issue was being raised (and defended) in the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce.

PRO: FO84/616.


L. H. Jenks, *The Migration of British Capital to 1875* (London: 1927), Appendix C. Manchester, *British Preeminence in Brazil*, 75-76, 322-26. The principal shareholders in Liverpool, Brazil and River Plate Steam-ship Co., which had been formed in 1865, were Lamport and Holt. Lamport and Holt was established in 1845; by 1888 the company had 50 vessels in the Brazil service and had the mail contract to Brazil with both the British and Belgian governments. George Chandler, *Liverpool Shipping* (London 1960), 150-151; W. S. Lindsay, *The History of Merchant Shipping* (London: 1874), 2:333.


The wealth of the city is exemplified by the story of the docks, which were continually enlarged; in the 1870s, the construction of new docks cost almost £5 million. The Mersey Docks and Harbours Board was very proud of the fact that all this had been achieved as unaided private enterprise. The borrowed capital of the MD & HB was £20 million in the 1870s. (Lindsay, *History of Merchant Shipping*, 2:432 ff.) However, it should be noted that the MD & HB was only created in 1858; the previous owners had been the Trustees of Liverpool Docks, which in 1811 was wholly, and from 1825 partly comprised of members of the City Council (in those days, the Mayor, Alderman, Bailiffs, and Common Council). The MD & HB was controlled by an elected body of dock ratepayers. See Adam W. Kirkaldy, *British Shipping* (1914; rpt. New York: 1970), 517-521.


Liverpool-Brazil Association had pressed the Foreign Office to equalize the duties in 1839. Arthur Redford, *Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade*, 1794-1858 (Manchester: 1934), 146. Sugar from Brazil and Cuba was 14% of total imports in 1846 and 16% in 1856. “Imports and Exports of Sugar,” PAP 1867-8, 64: 567.

Derrick Knight, *Gentlemen of Fortune* (London: Frederick Muller, 1978), 66-80. See also Cameron and Crooke, *Liverpool*. In 1853, 7.5% of U.K. cotton exports went to Brazil; only India and the U.S. took a greater share of the total cotton exports. Redford, *Manchester Merchants*, 245. Liverpool’s trade increased vastly after the supposed cessation of the trade in enslaved Africans: in 1812 fees of £45,000 had been levied upon 47,000 ton of shipping; in 1872, the docks’ revenue was £592,258 on six and a half million tons of shipping. (Lindsay, *History of Merchant Shipping*, 2: 432.) The duties levied increased from £23,380 in 1800 (slave trade legal), to £65,782 in 1810 (trade in slaves illegal) and £982,378 in 1880.


The British cotton manufacturers imported some 85% of the raw cotton from the southern United States.

London Times (15 May 1861): 5; (4 June 1861): 5.

Thomas E. Taylor, Running the Blockade; A Personal Narrative of Adventures, Risks, and Escapes during the American Civil War (1896; rpt. Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), 9, 10. Taylor, a Liverpool merchant, represented his firm (John T. Lawrence) in Nassau and also on some of the blockade runners. See below.


M. Seward to Adams, 30 January 1863; Adams to Russell, 9 February 1863, Correspondence Concerning the Claims of the US Against Great Britain; Enforcement of Neutrality: Rebel Citizens, 1869, vol. 1. On recruitment of British citizens see 2:75 3. Just on the few pages I looked at in these 6 hefty volumes of correspondence two Liverpool firms were mentioned: Jones & Co., who acted as recruiters and paymasters, and Fraser, Trenholm & Co., who were the Liverpool agents for James M. Mason, Commissioner for the Confederate States in London. George Thompson & Co. of Scotland built at least on steamer; New York Times (30 January 1864): 1. I have not traced the outcome of the court case.

Taylor, Running the Blockade, 87. One who worked under the pseudonym of "Captain Murray" was later in life Admiral Murray Aynsley, RN; Taylor, Running the Blockade, 59, 92.

Ibid, 85. Liverpool saw no reason to hide its support for the slave states. For example, when Confederate General Thomas Stonewall Jackson was killed, the city mourned his death. The Liverpool Post wrote that his fame would "live as long as anything connected to this unhappy war. . . . [He will be remembered] not only for his character, but also for his bravery and military capacity." (Liverpool Post [26 May 1866], quoted in Charles P. Cullop, Confederate Propaganda in Europe, 1861-1865 [Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1969], 88-90.) James Spence, Liverpool merchant and broker and the foremost paid English propagandist for the Confederacy, believed that it was "natural to him [the African] to be a slave." (Tony Barley, Myths of Slave Power [Liverpool: 1992], 84. This excellent book tells the story of the Alabama and British support for both North and South in the war. I must thank my colleague Adam Hussein of Liverpool for giving me as copy of this work.) The manufacturers of arms must have shown equally large profits, but no data seem to be available. The profit from selling coal to the Confederate steamers was calculated to be as high as 500-600%. (Virgil Carrington Jones, The Civil War at Sea, 3 vols. [New York, Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1960], 1:340).


In 1861 the "real value" of imports from the "Southern Atlantic ports of the US" was £26.9 million; the following year it was £1.07 million and by 1864, £365,000. PAP
1865, vol. 52, Imports & Exports, Table 7.


71 Barley, *Myths of Slave Power*, 87; Cullop, *Confederate Propaganda*, 91; *Anti-Slavery Reporter* (1 August 1862). Born in Ayr, Lindsay migrated to Liverpool, worked as a seaman, then as a fitter; he founded a shipping company, W. S. Lindsay & Co.

72 Bulloch, *The Secret Service*, e.g., pp. 238, 241, 261. As the South was not a recognized state, it could have no official diplomatic representation in Britain.

73 Admiral Raphael Semmes, *Service Afloat, or the Remarkable Career of the Confederate Cruisers Sumter and Alabama during the War between the States* (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1887), 786-87.

74 Gladstone was the son of Demerara plantation owner, merchant and MP John, who had received £85,000 compensation for the loss of the free labor of his 2,183 slaves. In 1840 William Gladstone had supported the suppression of the trade, but ten years later he opposed it. (Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*, 175. Other opponents were MP (and later Prime Minister) Disraeli and previous Prime Minister the Duke of Wellington.) There are innumerable books on William Gladstone; I found S. L. Hammond & M. R. D. Foot, *Gladstone & Liberalism* (London: English Universities Press, 1952), perhaps the most interesting.

75 For example, on 17 June 1861 the Metropolitan Police of New York informed Secretary of State W. H. Seward in Washington that he had his “letter of the 15th” regarding the US Consul in Liverpool “having sent information on a privateer with arms having sailed from there bound for the confederate states.” U.S. National Archives: RG M179, Miscellaneous Letters, Dept. of State, reel 181.

76 The *Princess Royal* was captured and served the Federal government as a cruiser. It was also known that Lindsey “negotiate[d] naval store bonds.” George Chandler, *Liverpool Shipping; A Short History* (London: Phoenix House, 1960), 54; U.S. Department of State, Correspondence Concerning the Claims of the US Against Great Britain; Enforcement Neutrality; Rebel Citizens (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1869), 1:563 ff.

77 Even some Liverpool merchants, at least those suffering “pecuniary losses” from the British-built steam-powered cruisers which were “paralyz[ing] the mercantile marine,” asked Lord Russell in June 1863 to amend the Foreign Enlistment Act in order to give “greater power to the Executive to prevent the construction in British ports of ships destined for the belligerents.” It seems that Russell did not respond to this request, as in May 1864 the “memorialists” sent the same petition to the House of Commons. *New York Times* (9 July 1863): 5; (31 May 1864): 1.


The Case of the U.S to be Laid before the Tribunal of Arbitration . . . at Geneva (Washington, DC: 1872), 89.

Quoted in W. O. Henderson, The Lancashire Cotton Famine 1861-1865 (1934; rpt. New York: 1969), 19. In fact, these were years of boom for British capitalists. In 1863, for example, 790 companies were registered with a share capital of £140 million; the following year it grew to 997 companies with share capital of £237 million; and in the final years of the war, £205 million was invested in 1,034 companies. From 1866, the figures decline rapidly. (L. C. A. Knowles, Industrial and Commercial Revolution in Great Britain during the 19th Century [1921; rpt. London: 1966], 130.) The port of Liverpool, which should have suffered from the virtual extinction of the cotton trade, after a brief decline in 1864 exported more goods than in the year before the war. In the same period shipping tonnage entering and leaving the port rose by 25% and 36% respectively. (PAP 1865, vol. 52, "Imports & Exports", Table 20; Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey, 235).

Henderson, The Lancashire Cotton Famine, 5; among the writers who mention the fear of the spread of republican ideas is Philip S. Foner, British Labor and the American Civil War (New York: 1981).


See, for example, the declaration of the Stone Masons Union and Karl Marx's address to the International Working Men's Association in A. L. Morton & George Tate, The British Labour Movement (1956; rpt. London: 1979), 114-115. The definitive account of working-class support for the Union is Foner, British Labor and the American Civil War. Although overall unemployment rose to 6% in the worst "cotton famine" year of 1862, by 1864 and 1865 it had dropped below 2%—a lower rate than, for example, ten years previously. Wages and earnings had also risen; from the base year of 1850, the index was 117 in 1863 and 126 in 1865. However, by 1867, two years after the war ended, unemployment had tripled. (B. R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988], "Labour Force," Tables 8 and 21B).

The Times and other Confederate supporters tried to convince the nation that unemployment among the cotton workers was wholly due to the war. This was not so. The industry had increased its workforce and produced a glut in the period 1858-1861. There had also been a rapid increase in the numbers of power looms, and new, faster, "self-acting" machinery was being introduced. Thus there would have been a reduction in the labor force without a "cotton famine." (Foner, British Labor and the American Civil War, 4-5; Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, "Textiles," Table 24; Stanley Broadbridge, "The Lancashire 'Cotton Famine,' 1861-1865," in Lionel M. Munby, ed., The Luddites and Other Essays [London: Michael Katanka, 1971], 153; Henderson, The Lancashire Cotton Famine, Chapter 2.) To some extent the "famine" was alleviated by imports from the British West Indies, which increased from 1 million lbs. in 1860 to 43 million in 1864. In the same period imports from the Indian subcontinent rose from 201 million to 502 million lbs. (PAP 1865, vol. 50, "Cotton Wool Imports")

About 400,000 workers were employed in the Lancashire cotton industry, of whom, in 1856, 6.5% were children under 13 and 56% were women. (Sydney J. Chapman, The Lancashire Cotton Industry [Manchester: 1904], 112.) The total nation-wide workforce was well over a half million. Probably about half the workers became unemployed; the remainder were on "short-time." In some towns the unemployment was quite horrific:
for example, the number of “paupers” in Ashton-under-Lyne increased from 1,980 in 1858 to 21,306 in 1863. If these were all cotton workers, then cotton manufacturing must have almost ceased: the numbers employed in 1851 were 22,277. “Return of Paupers,” PAP 1862, vol. 49 and PAP 1883, vol. 52.

88 Foner, British Labor and the American Civil War, 50-51, 88, 95.

89 New York Times (22 April 1863), quoting the Liverpool Journal of Commerce of 7 April 1863. The articles also states that “a boat left Glasgow last week for the same service . . . upward of one hundred men . . . with promises of good wages and a large share of prize money. . . . Two suspicious vessels sailed lately from the Clyde.” Hansard, vol. 170, cols. 33-71, 27 March 1863 and vol. 175, cols. 467-513, 13 May 1864.

90 New York Times (12 June 1864): 1; Hansard, vol. 175, cols. 467-513, 13 May 1864. Thomas Baring, a great-grandson of founder Francis, was MP for Penryn and Falmouth. He held various senior government positions from 1857 to 1886, including that of governor-general of India. Baring Bros, who opened their Liverpool office in 1832, boasted the following year that they were “no. 5 in the list of receivers of cotton.” Ziegler, The Sixth Great Power, 131.

91 The rams were bought by the Admiralty at £110,000 each, of which £180,000 was paid over to the Confederates. (Hollett, The Alabama Affair, 74-81.)

92 The London News, quoted in the New York Times (12 June 1864): 3. Liverpool had a Southern Club to which Confederate supporter belonged. It might have been through this club that the organized attempt was made to disrupt a meeting called by abolitionist Henry Ward Beecher in October 1863. Placards had been posted around the city calling on Confederate supporters to attend the meeting—yet the city fathers took no special measures to keep the peace. (Hollett, The Alabama Affair, 93-95) Being involved in blockade-running was no hindrance to rise in social and political status. For example, the father of Mersey Docks and Harbours Board member Charles Livingston had been part-owner of such a vessel. (Mersey 8.8 [April 1929]: 251-52).


95 See, for example, Suzanne Miers, Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade (London: Longman, 1975). Britain did expend considerable sums on maintaining an anti-slaver “fleets” on the African coast. Until 1832 the West African fleet consisted of between two and seven ships; in 1836 the complement was increased to 14; for much of its life it was commanded from the Cape Station, which covered both the East and West African coasts! No wonder one of the fleet’s most successful commanders, Capt. Denman, complained of the “supine authorities” in Britain. Between 1810 and 1864 the fleet captured and liberated 149,843 enslaved Africans, who however, were not helped to return to their homes. (C. Loyd, The Navy and the Slave Trade [London: 1949], 67, 78, 93).