A "Greedy" Institution with Great Job Benefits: Family Structure and Gender Variation in Commitment to Military Employment

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A “GREEDY” INSTITUTION WITH GREAT JOB BENEFITS: FAMILY STRUCTURE AND GENDER VARIATION IN COMMITMENT TO MILITARY EMPLOYMENT

A Thesis Presented

by

KAREN M. BRUMMOND

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS

May 2015

Department of Sociology
A “GREEDY” INSTITUTION WITH GREAT JOB BENEFITS: FAMILY STRUCTURE AND GENDER VARIATION IN COMMITMENT TO MILITARY EMPLOYMENT

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To my parents, without whom this would be impossible.
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ABSTRACT

A “GREEDY” INSTITUTION WITH GREAT JOB BENEFITS: FAMILY STRUCTURE AND GENDER VARIATION IN COMMITMENT TO MILITARY EMPLOYMENT

MAY 2015

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Scholars describe both the military and the family as “greedy institutions,” or institutions that require expansive time and energy commitments, and alter participants’ master status (Segal 1986; Coser 1974). However, the military’s employment benefits may counteract its greedy elements. I use data from the 2008 Survey of Active Duty Members to examine commitment to military employment in wartime, accounting for greedy elements of military service (such as geographic mobility, risk of bodily harm, and separations), job benefits, family structure, and gender. The results show that women in dual-service marriages, unmarried men, and those who experienced separations reported lower career commitment and affective organizational commitment. In contrast, the use of military job benefits was positively associated with commitment. Counterintuitively, parenthood, geographic mobility, and being stationed in Afghanistan were also positively associated with commitment. These findings complicate the military’s label as a greedy institution, and contribute to the literature on work-family conflict and gendered organizations.
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Military service during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) clearly illustrates the “greediness” of the United States Armed Forces. The risk of injury or death can take a psychological, as well as physical, toll on service members. In addition, during the GWOT, deployments, resulting in separations from loved ones, have been lengthier and more frequent than in previous conflicts (D. R. Segal and Korb 2013). At the same time, the military provides economic benefits that are unparalleled in the civilian sector, including housing allowances, health insurance, day care, and combat pay. For service members with families, the remunerative benefits make military service attractive, but do the costs of wartime military service, such as separation from one’s family and the risk of bodily harm, outweigh the economic benefits? Do gender and family structure make a difference?

An increasing number of service men and women balance the demands of both military employment and family. These institutions exemplify “greedy institutions.” Greedy institutions severely limit the time and energy one can commit to other aspects of life (Coser 1974). Mady Welscher Segal’s article, “The Military and the Family as Greedy Institutions” (1986), has influenced many scholars to use the greedy institution framework to research work attitudes among military personnel and their families (Burrell et al. 2006). However, from the time of Segal’s publication until the beginning of the 21st century, no large-scale, prolonged conflict had occurred. Moreover, the lack of prolonged, large-scale warfare since the Vietnam War has prevented scholars from seeing
how warfare with an All-Volunteer Force (AVF), with more women and parents affects the commitment of military personnel. Through examining military career commitment and affective organizational commitment, this project explores just that.

At the same time that the military has become greedier, the average military family’s structure and the armed forces’ gender composition have evolved. The end of conscription and the advent of the AVF in 1973 propelled these changes. Many more junior enlisted personnel are married than before the AVF. More military personnel have children. Among service members with children, more are single. Women’s new roles in the military have increased the proportions of mothers and wives in the military. In addition, with more women joining the military, the number of dual-service couples, in which both spouses serve in the military, has inevitably increased (Segal 1986; Segal and Korb 2013). The morphing of the military’s family structure and gender composition complicates the relationship between commitment, wartime service, and remunerative benefits. Scholars have yet to explore this complex relationship in depth.

Research on family structure, gender, and military work attitudes is limited. Bourg and Segal (1999) used 1989 Army data to show that male soldiers expressed higher organizational commitment when they had children, but having children and being in a combat unit were both associated with higher levels of Army-family conflict. Bourg and Segal did not study female soldiers. A more recent study by Antecol and Cobb-Clark (2009), using a survey taken in 2000, found that the family benefits available in the military create greater career commitment for service members with children and spouses, but that study used gender as an control variable and did not report its coefficients.
Antecol and Cobb-Clark’s (2009) finding that family-related job benefits creates greater career commitment is related to the institutional/occupational (I/O) thesis. Military scholars refer to the (im)balance between the institutional and occupational aspects of the military as the I/O thesis. Some argue that the institutional aspects of the military, like pride in serving one’s country and sharing the military’s values, are declining in importance for service members, and occupational aspects, like pay, benefits and time off, are becoming more salient in military culture (Burland and Lundquist 2013). One would expect this change to affect service members’ commitment to the military. The two types of commitment explored in my study, career commitment and affective organizational commitment, each respectively relate to the military’s occupational and institutional aspects. Differences in these measures by family type, exposure to the greedy elements of the military, and receipt of job benefits will be instructive for policies aimed at increasing retention both in the military and in the civilian sector.

My study expands scholarship on work attitudes in the military by exploring the greediness of wartime military service, accounting for the interaction of family structure and gender, and exploring the offsetting effect of job benefits. I am unaware of any studies that explore work attitudes in the United States military that account for the interaction of family structure and gender; furthermore, almost all military work attitude studies so far have used data from before the GWOT. While the military differs from civilian employers in its unique combination of occupational hazards, extreme time demands, unusual gender composition, and comprehensive employment benefits for service members of all ranks, this study is still instructive beyond the military literature.
because the vast majority of civilian employers exhibit at least one of these characteristics. Moreover, the military’s standardized promotion system and pay scale, which minimize gender and parental status discrimination, make it an ideal laboratory for an analysis of work attitudes, gender, and family.

The present study tests whether military employment’s extraordinary family benefits offset the negative aspects of wartime military service on career and affective organizational commitment. The study also seeks to detect differences by family type and gender. Specifically, I use gender by marital status interactions (including dual-service marriage as a marital status) and parenthood as theorized predictor variables, and do separate analyses on gender, parental status, and marital status/parenthood interaction subpopulations. This study attempts to answer four questions: 1) How does commitment to the twenty-first century military vary by the intersection of gender and marital status? 2) How do the “greedy” elements of wartime military service, like frequent and prolonged separations, risk of injury and death, and geographic mobility affect commitment? 3) Which military employment benefits increase commitment? And finally, 4) Do the relationships between commitment, the “greedy” elements of wartime military service, and military employment benefits differ for service members with children?

This paper begins by outlining the literature on the aspects of the modern family and the military that typify them as greedy institutions. Then, I present background information on the family-oriented benefits of military employment. Throughout those sections, I highlight the gendered nature of these greedy institutions. I use ordinal logistic regression to answer the questions above using data from the April 2008 Survey of Active Duty Members, a survey administered as the controversial Operation Iraqi
Freedom was winding down, and the popularly supported Operation Enduring Freedom (the war in Afghanistan) was in full force. Considering the extreme demands placed on the troops in these operations, an analysis of military work attitudes is well overdue.
CHAPTER II
THE GREEDY INSTITUTIONS

In his book, *Greedy Institutions* (1974), Lewis Coser describes the expansion of institutions that attempt to use all of a person’s energy, leaving the person with no time for other commitments. Greedy institutions not only devour time and energy, but also demand that the member adjust his or her master status to conform to the claims of the institution. Coser distinguishes the “greedy” institution from Goffman’s concept, the total institution: while total institutions physically bar contact with the outside world, greedy institutions have norms, rules, or practices that prevent one from spending time on outside commitments.¹ The military better fits the definition of a greedy institution: although it has severe time commitments and strict norms, service members continue to have outside roles, such as family roles, while in the military. Still, the more one commits to a greedy institution, the weaker his or her outside ties become, and his or her dependence on the greedy institution grows. The greedy institution withers the opportunity to foster outside ties and thus, escalates commitment. Hence, Coser (1974) writes, “Members of greedy institutions must be so fully and totally committed to them that they become unavailable for alternative lines of action” (p.8).

¹ Admittedly, the military more closely resembles Goffman’s total institution than the family does because of its nearly unbreakable contractual commitment, its isolated housing, its regimented attire, and the command structure. However, the contemporary military’s completely voluntary enlistment, the possibility of living outside of the barracks, time off, and short- and long-term compensation differentiate it from Goffman’s primary examples of total institutions, psychiatric wards and prisons (1961).
The greediness of the family, particularly the military family, as an institution may trump the greediness of the military. Coser and Laub Coser’s (1974) description of the family being greedy particularly for wives and mothers is salient with the increasing role of women in the military. For women, the family is greedy because norms dictate that women, unlike married men, prioritize their families, even when working outside the home (Coser and Laub Coser 1974). However, Segal (1986) argues that men may feel conflict related to the family’s greediness when they are unable to fulfill even the minimal family demands expected of them due to either extreme work demands or unusually challenging family roles. Unmarried custodial fathers should feel this greediness more than married men, and perhaps even more than unmarried mothers due to their extreme family demands, which conflict with men’s normative role as a breadwinner, and not as a caretaker. Furthermore, considering that past research has shown that men’s family caretaking responsibilities depend more on the demands of their female kin than on their work demands (Gerstel and Gallagher 2001), married military men may experience family-work conflict related to the family’s greediness as well.

Changes in enlistment demographics have resulted in more service members having parental and marital obligations. Having a family equals more outside responsibilities, but in the military, it also means more in-kind compensation. This begs the question, how does having a greedier family structure affect military commitment? But first, how has the military family become greedier?
A. Greedier Military Families

Several years after Coser defined the greedy institution, Mady Wechsler Segal (1986) claimed that the military and the family resemble greedy institutions, and that the combination of these institutions creates conflict. Segal notes that emerging military family structures, such as married junior personnel, sole-parents, active duty mothers, and dual-service couples, have led to increased work-family conflict. These changes are driven by the advent of the AVF and women’s increasing role in the military. They reflect larger structural changes that have impacted civilian families and the workforce (Segal 1986).

While military policy does not officially aim to encourage the marriage of service members, service members marry younger and at higher rates than their civilian counterparts (Karney, Loughran, and Pollard 2012; Kelty, Kleykamp, and Segal 2010; Hogan and Furst Seifert 2009; Lundquist and Smith 2005; Lundquist 2004). Data from the late 1970s and early 1980s demonstrate that even early in the AVF era, military men and women married younger than their matched civilian counterparts (Lundquist 2004; Lundquist and Smith 2005). During the same period, male service members more often chose marriage over cohabitation (Teachman 2009). More recent evidence confirms that just prior to and during the early years of the GWOT, military men were more likely to be married than male civilians (Karney, Loughran, and Pollard 2012). Considering that Vietnam Era veterans did not marry at a higher rate than non-veterans (Call and Teachman 1996) and that universalistic family benefits available to active duty service members have increased with the advent of the AVF, these benefits likely explain this phenomenon. Lundquist and Xu (2014) provided further evidence of this trend through
interviews of service members who cited family benefits as a reason to rush into marriage; some even married platonic friends to get military family benefits.

While most families in the military still involve a male service member married to a civilian woman, this family structure has dwindled to a slight majority (Department of Defense 2012a). The growing presence of dual-service married couples provides challenges for the military (M. W. Segal 1986; Clever and Segal 2013; Wadsworth and Southwell 2011). According to the April 2008 Survey of Active Duty Members, 8% of all active duty service members and the majority of married service women were in dual-service marriages. Women’s increasing numbers in the military positively correlate with the expansion of dual-service marriages (Department of Defense 2012a). Personnel managers attempt to keep dual-service spouses together, but separation by reassignment occurs frequently. For dual-service spouses with children, deployability becomes an issue. The military requires dual-service parents and unmarried parents to have a care plan for their children in case of deployment (Clever and Segal 2013). Hence, one would expect to find lower commitment among dual-service married couples.

Other non-traditional family structures further complicate military work-family conflict. In 2011, single parents comprised 5.3% of the active duty force. While there is a higher rate of single parent households in the civilian world (17.4%), this family type provides its own challenges (Department of Defense 2012a). The military’s child care system, which recently has been ranked highest among state child care systems (Child Care Aware of America 2013), may mitigate some work-family conflict for unmarried parents, but the extreme time commitments of being the family’s sole caretaker and being
in the military may overwhelm the positive aspect of this benefit. These evolving family
structures combined with military service may affect commitment to the military.

These changes in the military family structure mimic larger societal trends of
women’s mass entry into the labor force and the increased prevalence of dual-earner and
single-parent households (Engelhardt, Kögel, and Prskawetz 2004; Hakim 2004; Mathur,
Fu, and Peter 2013). Previous research on civilian career commitment and affective
organizational commitment most often has not found statistically significant relationships
with gender, marital status, and parenthood (Morrow and Wirth 1989; Phelan 1994;
Korabik and Rosin 1995; Rosin and Korabik 1995; Lee, Carswell, and Allen 2000;
Goulet and Singh 2002; Blair-Loy and Wharton 2004; Scholarios and Marks 2004;
Mohamed, Taylor, and Hassan 2006; Nogueras 2006; Casper and Harris 2008; Major,
Morganson, and Bolen 2013). Some exceptions involved interactions with family-
friendly job benefits. A study using 1991 General Social Survey data found a significant
positive interaction effect of number of young children and having information about
child care services in the community on affective organizational commitment, but
without the interaction, number of young children was not statistically significant (Grover
and Crooker 1995). Allen (2001) found that organizational commitment had positive
relationships with being female and with being married, but the gender relationship
disappeared once controlling for the company making family-friendly benefits available,
and the marital status relationship disappeared once adding the perception of a family-
supportive work organization to the model. Scandura and Lankau (1997) found that while
having family responsibilities and being female alone did not have a significant
relationship with organizational commitment, but interacting these variables with flexible scheduling in the workplace gave significant, positive results.

The rarity of significant findings in the civilian literature is counterintuitive, but the findings in a study of the military may differ due to the military’s extreme job demands and skewed gender distribution. The military’s family-friendly benefits might increase affective organizational commitment because the average service member, who only has a high school education, could not get quality job benefits in the civilian world. Furthermore, service members with families need the family-friendly benefits in order to meet the high demands of military employment.

Moreover, the majority of the exceptions, which found significant gender effects on civilian work-related commitment, involved workplaces and occupations with skewed gender distributions, similar to that of the military. In one study, the degree to which one’s gender was outnumbered in one’s work unit had a negative effect on affective organizational commitment for men and a positive effect for women (Tsui, Egan, and O’Reilly 1992). Three studies of male-dominated careers found some significant effects. Scandura and Lankau’s study of high-ranking managers found that flexible work hours were significantly associated with higher affective organizational commitment, but only for women (1997). A study of head coaches of college athletic teams found that the interaction of gender and marital status had a weak significant effect on affective commitment, but the authors do not specify the direction of the effect (Turner and Chelladurai 2005). Research on commitment in information technology showed that the relative weights of predictors of organizational commitment were similar for men and women, but the relative weights of predictors of occupational commitment were different.
with women placing more weight on work-family culture and men placing more weight on job stress (Major, Morganson, and Bolen 2013).

The significant findings in occupations with skewed gender distributions and the positive influence of family-friendly job benefits in the literature provide promise for the current study. The extreme demands of military employment, the high quality family-friendly benefits, the prevalence of needing these benefits due to early family formation, and the skewed gender distribution make the military a unique case for the study of gender and family structure effects on work attitudes. Thus, I expect distinct patterns of career and affective organizational commitment by gender and family structure for military personnel.

**B. Gender Differences in the Effects of the Greedy Military Family**

Undoubtedly, the changing structure of the military family has created more work-family conflict for all service members, but due to gendered expectations of master status, military women likely feel greater work-family conflict than their male counterparts do. Gendered expectations of the roles of men and women in families and in the military persist. Thus, this study examines the intertwined effects of gender and marital status on commitment to the military.

To understand the gendered family structure differences in commitment to the military, one needs background on women’s increasing role in the military. In 1973, the advent of the AVF propelled the need to recruit volunteer service members. The decrease in supply of male troops associated with the AVF allowed women to fill military roles previously only open to men. In 1993, the military permitted women to serve in all
positions, with the exception of direct combat roles and roles on submarines and other small amphibious vessels. Even before then, women appeared on the battlefield. Seven percent of forces in the Persian Gulf War were women; while none officially served in combat positions, they still faced the dangers of warfare (Titunik 2000; Twine 2013). Women have served in similar roles in the GWOT. Finally, on January 24, 2013, a memorandum from the Department of Defense officially eliminated the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, allowing women into direct combat roles (Twine 2013; Dempsey and Panetta 2013).

The standardized promotion and pay system in the military, not found in civilian employment, may benefit women and mothers. In 2011, the civilian gender wage gap was approximately 18% (Hegewisch et al. 2012). Mothers are penalized more than childless women are. Budig and England (2001) exposed that civilian mothers suffered a gross wage penalty of 7% for each child they had; the authors suggested that the motherhood penalty may result from either employer discrimination or motherhood-related reductions in productivity, and demonstrated that the penalty persists after controlling for human capital, work experience and taking mother-friendly jobs. The standardized military pay system prevents these findings from applying to military mothers. In fact, the lack of gender- and motherhood-related wage deficits may increase women’s commitment to the military. Indeed, a past study found that military women were generally more satisfied with military employment than men, although that study did not include interactions by parenthood status and gender (Lundquist 2008).

While women’s larger scale entrance into the military workforce is a success for women’s rights, occupational and familial gender norms persist throughout American
society and in the U.S. military. The theory of gendered organizations suggests that although jobs and hierarchies are abstractly gender-neutral, men are still perceived as the ideal-worker due to women’s assumed caregiving responsibilities in the home (Acker 1990). Williams (2000) furthers this argument, stating that inflexible and long work hours are discriminatory against women due to the conflicting expectation that women fill the role of the masculinized ideal-worker as well as the primary family caregiver. She argues that when women request a flexible or reduced schedule, workplaces push them out of the promotion track, and give women tasks below the women’s skill sets. Stone’s (2007) analysis of married mothers who had previously worked in high-demand careers confirmed these assertions. These women were put on the “Mommy Track” after having children, and left the workforce for the reasons listed above. Familial gender norms apply to military women; however, the opportunity to have flexible and reduced schedules and even the demeaning “Mommy Track” do not apply. Thus, these norms may decrease women’s commitment to the military, a possibility explored in the present study.

While married military women struggle with balancing worker and caregiver roles, they do this less often than married civilian women. According to the April 2008 Survey of Active Duty Members, 13.1% of female service members had husbands who did not participate in the labor force, compared to 5.4% of all married civilian men (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009). Similarly, military wives participated in the labor force at lower rates than their civilian counterparts (60.9% for military wives vs. 69.5% for all civilian women; April 2008 Survey of Active Duty Members; Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009). Many phenomena explain these differences from civilians, such as the extreme time demands on service members and difficulties in finding paid employment related to
military geographic relocation. These explanations reflect the military’s official stance as a gender-neutral organization that places heavy demands on military families regardless of the gender of the service member. Nonetheless, considering that military women much more often than military men have a spouse in the labor market, family demands impact military women more often than military men, and these demands may overflow into lower commitment.

Just as for civilians, in the military, unmarried women are much more likely to have dependent children than unmarried men are (April 2008 Survey of Active Duty Members). The higher rate of this type of family-work conflict for women compared to men may manifest in lower commitment to the military; however, the greater need for employment and the military’s excellent child care system may raise single mothers’ career commitment to the military.

In addition, women in the military face society’s gendered occupational norms more intensely due to the military’s traditionally masculine culture (Enloe 2000; Brown 2012). This culture, combined with the military’s inflexible time commitments, magnifies the perception that the ideal service member is male. Women service members face the challenge of balancing their masculine occupational duties with their feminine identities, as well as breaking the expectation that women with children are solely caregivers.

Furthermore, women in the military may report lower commitment because they live without the same judicial controls against sexual harassment and sexual assault as in
civilian society. The military has a poor record on these issues. Antecol and Cobb-Clark (2006) found that almost three-fourths of military women experienced sexually harassing behavior over a twelve-month period compared to only one-third of military men. They also found that sexual harassment in the military was associated with decreased job satisfaction, and this indirectly led to lower career commitment. According to a 2008 report on veterans from the Global War on Terrorism era, military sexual trauma, ranging from coerced sex to violent rape, is much more prevalent among women, with one-in-seven having personally experienced military sexual trauma, compared to less than one percent of male veterans (Botti 2008). More disturbing than the prevalence of sexual harassment and sexual assault are the military’s victim-blaming and not prosecuting perpetrators. Survivors of military sexual assault lack access to the civilian justice system. The survivors themselves are often court-martialed for adultery and fraternization (Scully et al. 2012). A report from the Department of Defense stated that of the estimated 19,000 sexual assaults that occurred in the military in 2011, one hundred ninety-one perpetrators were convicted, and only 78% of these convicted perpetrators were “confined” or incarcerated (Department of Defense 2012b). In such a misogynistic environment, one might expect women in the military to be less committed than men.

Previous research on gender and military work attitudes has shown mixed results, but none has interacted family structure and gender. Studies using these variables separately either incorporated them as control variables or interacted gender and race

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2 The military is not alone in having a poor record on sexual assault. Prisons and college dormitories have particularly poor reputations on the issue (Kaufman 2010; National Institute of Justice 2008). A major difference for survivors of military sexual assault is the lack of access to the civilian justice system.
(Moore and Webb 2000; Moore 2002; Sanchez et al. 2004; Antecol and Cobb-Clark 2006; Lundquist 2008). Past studies have shown that married service members were sometimes more satisfied than their unmarried counterparts (Sanchez et al. 2004; Lundquist 2008), but in at least one article (Antecol and Cobb-Clark 2006) marital status was not significant. Perhaps reflecting the tension between generous employee benefits and greedy institutional status, Lundquist (2008) found that having children predicted higher career commitment, but lower overall quality of life in the military; this study did not interact gender with parental status. Moore (2002) conversely did not find a significant relationship between career commitment and having children. With regard to gender, research has produced mixed results, varying by race (Moore 2002; Lundquist 2008), sometimes not being significant (Sanchez et al. 2004), sometimes showing women to be more satisfied (Lundquist 2008, at least with some measures of satisfaction), and sometimes showing women to be less satisfied (Moore and Webb 2000). Thus, we still do not know the nature of female commitment to the military. This paper aims to clarify past results by adding not only gender interactions with family structure variables, but also direct measures of the greedy elements of military service.

C. The Military’s Greediness

Geographic mobility, risk of injury or death, and separations illustrate the greediness of military service.

Geographic Mobility: On average, the military relocates service members every two to three years. The rate at which civilians move pales in comparison. Typically, a service member must move overseas at some point during his or her career, and service
members commonly relocate across state lines (Clever and Segal 2013). While many have studied the effects of geographic mobility on military spouses and children, no studies to my knowledge have accounted for the service member’s geographic mobility with regard to their own commitment to the military.

Relocating strains the career prospects of military spouses. Military spouses’ annual earnings decrease by 2% with every move (Cooney, De Angelis, and Segal 2011). While studies have not covered the connection between spouse’s satisfaction and commitment among military personnel, among civilians, one’s willingness to relocate most strongly relates to the spouse’s willingness to relocate (Brett, Stroh, and Reilly 1993). The mandatory nature of military relocation, creating work-to-family conflict, may strain marriages, and thus, may indirectly create family-to-work conflict and lower commitment.

Military children who move frequently also experience life differently than civilian children do. The effects of moves on military children vary with the child’s age, with primary-school aged children having more difficulties adapting. Separation from peer groups and reconfiguring of recreation activities affect younger children especially hard, but also affect adolescents. If a military child has preexisting mental health issues, the symptoms tend to worsen with relocations (Watanabe and Jensen 2000). In at least one survey, adult children of military parents reported that geographic mobility was the most stressful of military organizational lifestyle demands (Ender 2000). Such stress may rub off on parents who serve. Thus, parents may feel lower commitment, especially when experiencing geographic mobility.
Risk of Death or Injury: The recent wars in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom) and Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom) differ from past wars. With the exception of the first Persian Gulf War, these were the first major wars fought exclusively by an All-Volunteer Force. The military has significantly downsized since the last major wars. Less than 0.5% of the population are in the military today, compared to 9% in World War II and approximately 2% in the Vietnam War (Kennedy 2013, 2). This trend has resulted in deploying personnel in the GWOT more frequently and for longer periods than in prior conflicts. Personnel have less time between deployments than the ideal time for recovery from combat (Korb 2008; Hosek and Martorell 2009).

Combat’s negative effects are well known. In the GWOT, 5,332 Americans have been killed in hostile deaths, 1,457 died through “Non-Hostile” means, and 51,932 have been wounded in action as of April 1, 2014 (Department of Defense 2014). These numbers exclude the commonplace psychological wounds like post-traumatic stress disorder, nor the psychological effects of deployment. One study of active duty Navy personnel being deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq in 2002 and 2003 found that across the three phases of deployment (pre-, during, and post-deployment), at least 90% of personnel reported feeling extremely frightened or very frightened. Suicidal ideation was unusually high for these sailors before, during, and after deployments (McNulty 2005). As of the beginning of 2014, 342 service members had died of self-inflicted wounds in Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation New Dawn (Fischer 2014). This evidence supports the proposition that deployment may decrease commitment to the military.
Many risks associated with military service affect service members after deployment. Nonetheless, fears of injury and death occur during deployment and may be more intense for those who support families. The present study tests for deployment’s effect on commitment to the military, expecting to find lower commitment among service members in Iraq and Afghanistan at the time of the survey.

*Separations:* Geographic mobility, foreign residence, and deployments can separate military families. Separations may occur with civilian employment-related relocations, but the lack of control over military-related relocations creates greater challenges for military spouses. Spouses often cannot follow the service member because of work obligations and the lack of job opportunities near military bases (Harrell et al. 2004). In recent years, due to the mortgage crisis, military homeowners who faced relocation sometimes chose to keep the house and live separately from their families as long as they owed more on the mortgage than the home’s value (National Military Family Association 2014).

Temporary military-related separation can lead to divorce. In 2007, 19% of soldiers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan reported intending to get a divorce, and months deployed was directly related to intention to divorce (*Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) V: Operation Enduring Freedom 8 Afghanistan 2008; Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) V: Operation Iraqi Freedom 06-08 2008*). However, the previous research on the relationship between military separation and divorce has presented conflicting results. Some research showed no change in divorce rate for male service members across wartime and peacetime (Karney, Loughran, and Pollard 2012), Other research showed a higher hazard of divorce the longer one is deployed, especially
if the deployment was unanticipated (Negrusa, Negrusa, and Hosek 2014). In addition, the direct effect of deployment on divorce was stronger for female service members (Negrusa, Negrusa, and Hosek 2014), confirming previous findings that female service members divorce at rates several times higher than male service members do (Karney and Crown 2007). My study does not focus on marital dissolution, but the divorce literature is relevant because of the relationship between life satisfaction and divorce. If deployment causes marital and life dissatisfaction, then deployment may indirectly decrease commitment to the military, particularly for married service members.

On the other hand, the independence and the “break” from family responsibilities related to deployment may boost morale (Faber et al. 2008). This complicates how separation may influence military commitment.

As one can see, separation from one’s family has positive and negative effects, and affects people with families differently than unmarried non-parents. This applies to geographic mobility and risk of bodily harm as well. With all of the greedy aspects of the military, one might ask why someone would stay in the military. This study examines how the military’s extensive job benefits may counteract its greedy aspects and lead to retention of volunteer service members. The next section describes these benefits.
CHAPTER III

MILITARY EMPLOYMENT’S EXTRAORDINARY BENEFITS

The military’s greedy demands contribute to work-family conflict. Nonetheless, the military provides excellent job benefits that mitigate some of the negative aspects of this conflict. In addition to basic pay, active duty service members residing off base receive a housing allowance. An additional allowance pays for overseas housing costs. Service members pay no taxes on allowances, and the military increases the allowances if personnel have legal dependents or a spouse. If the service member lives in a location with a high cost of living, he or she receives an additional cost of living allowance. The military covers work-related clothing expenses. The military pays most moving costs when relocating service members. All service members receive free comprehensive health care and affordable dental care for themselves and their immediate families. Life insurance costs a small premium. The military also backs subsidized home loans (United States Army 2014; United States Navy 2013; United States Marine Corps 2014; United States Air Force 2013). These forms of remuneration entice many people who lack higher education to join the military because other job opportunities lack such benefits (Moskos and Butler 1996; Lundquist 2008).

In addition, the military designed benefits with families in mind. Full-day childcare is available for children aged 6 weeks to 5 years, and for slightly older children, the military provides before- and after-school care. Sports and fitness programs are available for all children. Arts and other types of recreation programs are available as well. More indirect support for parents is available through referrals to services such as
off-base child care, babysitters, and parenting co-ops. The military also offers
counselling, support groups, and money management training for families of service
members (United States Army 2014). With these family-specific benefits, personnel with
families may actually be more committed than unmarried non-parents are.

The above are the standard benefits. The military issues special pay for service in
areas with imminent danger or hostile fire, for duties requiring extra responsibility or
training, and for serving in parts of the world with “living conditions […] substantially
below conditions in the continental United States” (United States Army 2014). It also
pays enlistment bonuses up to $40,000, in addition to reenlistment, continuation, and
family separation pay (United States Army 2014; United States Navy 2013; United States
Marine Corps 2014; United States Air Force 2013). Previous research has shown that
danger pay counteracts the negative effects of combat on career commitment, but has not
examined affective organizational commitment nor variations in the phenomenon by
family type (Hosek and Martorell 2009). My study covers that hole in the literature.

The benefits continue after leaving the military. After 90 days on active duty,
service members qualify for the Post 9/11 GI Bill education benefits, which with further
time in the military can pay for up to 100% of tuition at a four-year college, plus stipends
for books, supplies, and living expenses. In some circumstances, service members may
transfer these benefits to an immediate family member. The military provides a
substantial pension and continues to provide full health care to service members who
retire after 20 years of active duty service, (United States Army 2014; United States Navy
While the military provided in-kind benefits before the advent of the AVF, the military’s move toward an occupational organization and away from an institutional organization has enhanced the focus on remunerative benefits. Early I/O research showed that service members with institutional perspectives on the military expressed greater affective organizational and career commitment than those who viewed their military service primarily as an occupation comparable to a civilian job (Wood 1988). More recent research using data from just before the GWOT exposed that service members’ career commitment depends most on basic pay, an occupational characteristic of the military (Burland and Lundquist 2013). This suggests that receipt of military job benefits will strongly correlate with career commitment. However, these peacetime results might not hold up when examining data from the GWOT era.

Service members with children may lean toward the occupational side of the I/O thesis. The military designs many incentives available for active duty military parents. This may equalize levels of commitment for service members with children, despite work/family conflict. However, the little research on military employment benefits and work attitudes that exists has only explored retention, finding that housing benefits (Sterling and Allen 1983), and deployment and hostile fire pay (Hosek and Martorell 2009) increased retention. These reports did not examine family structure.

Civilian family job benefits and commitment studies are instructive. Capser and Harris (2008) showed gender variation in the relationship between work-life benefits and organizational attachment; women were more attached where flexible schedules and dependent care assistance were offered regardless of use. Men’s attachment depended on their use of such benefits, with men feeling less attached if benefits were offered and they
did not use them, but feeling more attached if benefits were offered and they used the benefits extensively. Grover and Crooker (1995) did not find significant parental status variation in the positive impact of benefits like flexible schedules, parental leave, and child care assistance on commitment, but the interaction of number of children and workplace-provided information on child care improved affective commitment. Studies of service members might find that service member react the same way as the general population.

However, the average service members may derive more commitment from family-friendly job benefits than civilians do because most military personnel only have a high school degree, yet receive more comprehensive benefits than the benefits available in the civilian world. In this low to moderate status, yet demanding occupation, what type of job benefits matter most? With military job benefits being attached to family structure, will the benefits assume different roles in predicting commitment by family structure?
CHAPTER IV
HYPOTHESES

The effects of the greedy military and military benefits may differ by marital status and gender. Married men experience less pressure than married women do to serve as a caretaker for the family, regardless of whether the spouse works, and thus military men, like men in general, may experience less work-family conflict. This phenomenon evolves when both spouses are in a high-demand career like the military. Unmarried service members may experience the pressures of the greedy military in a distinct way because they lack a spouse to take care of or to take care of them. Furthermore, unmarried service members gain less from military benefits. Women service members less often experience the greedy elements of the military due to their combat exemption, so perhaps the shocks resulting from the greedy aspects of the military affect them more. Here, marital status and gender cannot be separated. Thus,

Hypothesis 1: Commitment to the military will vary by the interaction of gender and marital status.

The interaction complicates predicting the pattern of the results. Table 1 details the predicted pattern. Married men who have a civilian spouse may be the most committed, and women married to another service member may be the least committed due to varying levels of work-family conflict. Due to the strains on marriage that are associated with both spouses working in highly-demanding careers, commitment should be lower for men in dual-service marriages than for men married to civilians, but still higher than that of married women and unmarried service members because the dual-
service men are not expected to be primary caretakers, but still have a wife who is
normatively expected to be his caretaker. Unmarried service members’ level of
commitment may be relatively moderate due to their lack of caretaking spouse and lack
of work-family conflict. However, the commitment levels of unmarried service women
may me higher than those of unmarried service men due to their better job opportunities
in the military than in the civilian world. Testing this hypothesis has implications outside
of the military for questions related the impact of marriage on job attitudes and the job
attitudes of dual-earner families in high-demand, yet low-to-moderate prestige jobs.

Both the diametric costs and benefits of military service are enhanced for service
members with families and vary by gender. The present research attempts to discern how
the costs and the benefits described above affect commitment to the military. My second
hypothesis focuses just on the side of the greedy military.

Hypothesis 2: Service members will report lower levels of commitment if they experience
the greedy elements of the military, such as geographic mobility, risk of injury or death,
and separation from loved ones.

While these costs likely decrease one’s commitment, the military provides
extensive benefits that may have the opposite effect.

Hypothesis 3: Service members will report higher levels of commitment if they receive
special benefits for their military service, such as earning college credit during their
military service, receiving special pay, appreciating military health care, or receiving
allowances.

Children change everything. Parents experience more work-family conflict, and
thus, any greedy elements of the military affect them more strongly. However, because of
their greater financial needs and the greater benefits afforded to those with children, they may gain more from receiving military benefits. This extends to the I/O thesis; the greedy elements of the military might affect their affective commitment to the military as an institution, but parents’ greater financial needs may make the greedy elements of the military less affect the occupational aspect, as measured through their career commitment. While the civilian literature generally has not found significant relationships between parenthood and career commitment or affective organizational commitment (Morrow and Wirth 1989; Phelan 1994; Korabik and Rosin 1995; Rosin and Korabik 1995; Lee, Carswell, and Allen 2000; Goulet and Singh 2002; Blair-Loy and Wharton 2004; Scholarios and Marks 2004; Mohamed, Taylor, and Hassan 2006; Nogueras 2006; Casper and Harris 2008; Major, Morganson, and Bolen 2013), the military’s greediness and its unmatched family benefits, which civilians with only a high school degree rarely find, may propel unique results. Thus,

Hypothesis 4a: Commitment to the military as a career and as an institution will differ when comparing the results for parents and non-parents, with the greedy elements of the military more negatively affecting parents and military job benefits more positively affecting parents.

In addition, considering the gendered notions of the family caretaker and breadwinner, the effects of parenthood on commitment should vary by gender and marital status. Thus,

Hypothesis 4b: Differences in commitment to military employment related to parental status will vary across gender/marital status subpopulations.
Table 2 summarizes the predictions related to hypothesis 4b. For both unmarried men and unmarried women, commitment to the military should be higher when they have children due to their role as the sole breadwinner. The opposite is the case for women married to civilians and women in dual-service marriages, who not only have another potential breadwinner in the family, but are expected to be primarily a family caretaker due to their gender and marital status. The negative effect of parenthood should be more pronounced for women in dual-service marriages because of the extreme work demands on both spouses. For men married to civilians and men in dual-service marriages, having children may somewhat increase family-work conflict, but due to gendered ideal-worker/ideal-caretaker norms, their wives carry most of this weight. Thus, I hypothesize married fathers will be more committed than married men without children.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subpopulation</th>
<th>Compared to that of Non-Parents of the Same Subpopulation, Parents' Commitment will be</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Marital Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Married to Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Dual-Service Marriage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Unmarried</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Married to Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Dual-Service Marriage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Unmarried</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER V
DATA AND METHODS

To test the connection between family structure, greedy institutions, career commitment and affective organizational commitment, I used the April 2008 Status of Forces Survey of Active Duty Members provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). Of the 37,198 active duty members requested to complete this online survey, 10,692 returned usable surveys for a 31.4% adjusted weighted response rate. To obtain a representative sample, the DMDC used a non-proportional stratified, single stage random sample, stratifying by service, gender, pay grade group, race/ethnicity, region stationed, and family status, including whether the member was in a dual-service spousal relationship. To qualify for the sample, at the time of the survey one had to serve as an active duty member of the United States Army, Navy, Marine Corp, or Air Force, have served at least six months, and have a rank below flag rank. The survey excluded National Guard and Reserve members.

I used ordinal logistic regression, measuring the impact of demographics, human capital, socioeconomic status, military service characteristics, greedy elements of the

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3 The DMDC incorporated post-survey weighting data to make the data comparable to the military population. I accounted for complex survey design in almost all analyses. I note where I could not account for complex survey design.

To manage missing data in the independent variables, I used single imputation. I included weights in the imputation design. I considered using multiple imputation, but this was not feasible in Stata with survey-weighted ordinal logistic regression. Most independent variables were missing on less than 1% on observations. Five variables had more missing data: Logged Family Earnings (17.3%), Supportive Supervisor (12.0%), Had Financial Problems (7.5%), Received College Credit While Serving (4.6%), and Length of Most Recent Danger Pay (Part of the Danger Index, 3.4%). After imputation, I returned binary variables to that format by rounding to either zero or one.
military, and military job benefits on commitment. In line with previous research, I created two ordinal scales as the dependent variables to assess career commitment and affective organizational commitment. After selecting the candidate variables that I wanted to use in the scales, I verified scale reliability using factor analysis and examining Cronbach’s alpha ($\alpha$).\footnote{I considered using a higher order scale, combining the two dependent variable scales used here. The Cronbach’s alpha was 0.65, below the acceptable level for scale reliability.} The scales ranged from one to five, with five representing the highest level of commitment.\footnote{I coded all component variables in the same direction before factor analysis. Before creating the scales, I standardized the elements of the scales to ensure equal weights. After creating the scales from the mean of the components, I recoded the scales to reflect their ordinal nature. Regression results often showed that the models would fit better with the very not committed and somewhat not committed responses on the dependent variables binned into one category. When doing this, the results qualitatively remained the same.}

A broad range of authors in the civilian and military literature have examined work attitudes using career commitment, or one’s intention to continue in one’s current career (Lee, Carswell, and Allen 2000; Nogueras 2006; Goulet and Singh 2002; Organ and Ryan 1995; Sirgy et al. 2001; Hosek and Totten 2002; Lundquist 2008; Antecol and Cobb-Clark 2009). Based off this, I made a career commitment scale ($\alpha = 0.80$) from two questions: 1) “Suppose that you have to decide whether to stay on active duty. Assuming you could stay, how likely is it that you would choose to do so?” and 2) “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? I am committed to making the military my career.”

In the industrial psychology literature, \textit{affective attachment} means identification with and emotional bond to a foci (Organ and Konovsky 1989; Meyer and Allen 1991). This concept influenced the extensive usage of affective organization commitment as a
work attitude measure (Morrow and Wirth 1989; Phelan 1994; Rosin and Korabik 1995; Blair-Loy and Wharton 2004; Mohamed, Taylor, and Hassan 2006; Casper and Harris 2008; Major, Morganson, and Bolen 2013). For the present study, I created an affective organizational commitment scale ($\alpha = 0.84$) from four questions measuring a member’s level of agreement with the following statements: 1) “I enjoy serving in the military;” 2) “Generally, on a day-to-day basis, I am proud to be in the military;” 3) “Serving in the military is consistent with my personal goals;” and 4) “I really feel as if the military’s values are my own.”

I tested each dependent variable scale on two models constructed from the following independent variables.\(^6\)

*Family structure:* Based off Segal’s (1986) description of the greedy military family, Model 1 presents the main independent variables of interest, which relate to family structure. I created statistical interactions between marital status and gender to allow for separate examination of the effects of marriage among men and women. With marital status, I included whether the service member was in a dual-service marriage. This created six variables for gender/marital status: male married to a civilian (omitted in regressions), female married to a civilian, male married to a service member, female married to a service member, unmarried male, and unmarried female. I also included

\(^6\) The removal of independent variables identified through stepwise regression did not substantially change the coefficients or standard errors for the independent variables of interest. Any changes of note are not included in the findings.
parenthood in this model. Furthermore, I controlled for having younger dependent children, specifically children age 13 or younger.

Model 2 added three categories of variables to Model 1: control variables, greedy military factors, and military job benefits.

*Human capital, socioeconomic status and military service control variables:* I added controls for spouse’s labor force status (employed, not in the labor force, or unemployed), 2007 household logged earnings, reporting at least one of ten financial problems, whether the service member held a bachelor’s degree, ethnicity (non-Hispanic white or minority), officer rank, military branch, years served, and whether the respondent reported having a supportive supervisor.

*Elements of the greedy military measured the military’s greediness:* I used whether the service member was stationed overseas at the time of the survey and whether the service member had ever made a permanent change of station (PCS) to measure foreign residence and geographic mobility. I measured risk of injury and death with whether the service member was stationed in Afghanistan at the time of the survey,

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7 Parenthood here refers to having a child or legal dependent, other than one’s spouse, who “is eligible to have a Uniformed Services Identification and Privilege card (also called a military ID card) or is eligible for military health care benefits, and is enrolled in the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS),” as defined in the April 2008 Status of Forces Survey of Active Duty Members codebook.

8 Age 13 was chosen as the cutoff because it was the only age cutoff obtainable from this dataset.

9 I originally had five nested models, adding control variables in Model 2, greedy military variables in Model 3, dropping greedy military variables and adding military job benefits in Model 4, and including all variables in Model 5 (the unrestricted model). Because of the similarity of results across Models 2 through 5, I only display the results of Model 1 and the unrestricted model, here called Model 2.
whether the service member was stationed in Iraq at the time of the survey\textsuperscript{10}, and a danger index variable. The danger index ranged from zero to three, increasing by one point for having experienced each of the following: 1) having one’s most recent danger pay last more than six months, 2) having been deployed to a combat zone or received imminent danger/hostile fire pay since September 11, 2001, and 3) having been deployed to a combat zone for more than 365 days since September 11, 2001. In addition, five variables measured the impact of prolonged and frequent separations from one’s family: 1) having been deployed three times or more since September 11, 2001, 2) having been deployed more than thirty days in the past two years, 3) having had a deployment last longer than expected, 4) having been away from one’s permanent duty station or homeport more than ninety nights in the past twelve months, and 5) having worked longer than one’s normal duty day (overtime) more than sixty days in the past twelve months.

*Military benefits:* In addition, I included four variables indicating the impact of military job benefits on the service member’s commitment to military employment. One variable measured if the service member had received any college credit while in the military. The second variable indicated whether the service member received any type of “special pay” (e.g., incentive, reenlistment, continuation, family separation pay, hazardous duty pay) in the past 12 months. To evaluate the impact of the military health

\textsuperscript{10} Note that the Currently in Iraq and Currently in Afghanistan variables refer to whether the service member was in those countries at the time of the survey. Service members who had served in those countries previously, but were elsewhere at the time of the survey, scored zero on these measures. I attempted replacing these variables with variables measuring whether the service member had ever been in Iraq or Afghanistan. I also tried adding the ever measures to the models with the Currently in Iraq/Afghanistan measures. The ever measures were never significant in regressions and did not change the coefficients nor standard errors of the Currently in Iraq and Currently in Afghanistan variables.
care system on commitment, I used an ordinal variable ranking whether the respondent believed that military health care benefits were better than the health benefits received by his or her high school classmates. This variable ranged from one to five, with five indicating that the service member believed that military health care benefits were much better than the health care benefits of his or her high school classmates. The last variable in this model measured the number of allowances that the service member received of the following four: basic allowance for subsistence, basic allowance for housing, overseas housing allowance, and cost of living allowance.
CHAPTER VI
RESULTS

A. Descriptive Statistics

As shown in Table 3, most independent variables varied significantly by gender and marital status when not controlling for other factors. Married men were most likely to have children and unmarried service members much less often had children. Among married service members, females were approximately six times more likely than males were to have a spouse in the military.

Married females’ family financial situation differed significantly from that of other groups. As noted in the literature review, married military women were more likely than married military men were to have a working spouse. While married military women have stay-at-home husbands more often than their civilian counterparts, this finding still supports the gendered ideal-worker/ideal-caretaker model. Having a working spouse likely boosted married women’s family earnings to be the most of any group. Despite married female service members having had higher family earnings than their married male counterparts had, they were more likely to have some sort of financial problem.

Unmarried service members were more likely to be stationed overseas, but had less often made a permanent change of station. Regarding variables reflecting risk of bodily harm and death, only unmarried women were less likely than married males to be in Afghanistan, but only 1% of all service members were stationed there. Many more were stationed in Iraq, at 7%. Married men scored higher on the danger index than other groups and were more likely to have experienced the five measures of separation.
Unmarried service members’ fewer years in the military might explain their lesser exposure to the measures of risk of bodily harm and separation while the ban on women in combat explains women’s lesser exposure to these greedy elements of the military.

Significant differences were observed in the measures of military benefits. Married service members were more likely to have earned college credit while serving. Nonetheless, over half of service members in each group had received college credit while serving in the military. Just as married males experienced danger and separation more frequently, they received special pay more frequently. Although there is a direct relationship between these variables, examining both is important because previous research has found that special pay explains away positive effects of being in combat (Hosek and Martorell 2009). On average, all groups agreed that military health benefits were better than the health benefits received by their high school classmates, with married men agreeing less so than other groups. Finally, married women received more allowances on average than married males, but married males received more allowances than unmarried service members of either gender did.

The descriptive statistics present many significant differences. Further variation appeared when looking at the dependent variables by the parental status of the service members. Figures 1 and 2 present parents’ and non-parents’ scores on the career commitment and affective organizational commitment scales. While parents were more committed on both measures, the differences between parents and non-parents were more dramatic for career commitment. This supports hypothesis 4, that parents and non-parents show different levels of commitment, but also emphasizes the I/O thesis because the difference between parents and non-parents was muted when examining the institutional
measure, affective organizational commitment. These patterns will be explored further through regressions, which control for years served, a variable that might drive the relationship between parenthood and commitment because of a survivor effect: service members who are committed to the military will stay in the military long enough to become parents.

**B. Regressions**

Here I discuss the ordinal logistic regression results for career commitment and affective organizational commitment. Table 4 displays the coefficients and standard errors of the regressions.\(^1\) To address gender and family structure differences, I also examine subpopulation models for males, females, parents, and non-parents. I briefly cover the varying impact of having children on military commitment by marital status/gender interactions. I analyze the results more comprehensively in the discussion section.

**Career commitment:** The results in the restricted model for career commitment support hypothesis 1, that commitment to the military will vary by gender and marital status. As predicted, married men had the highest levels of commitment and women in dual-service marriages had the lowest levels of commitment. The coefficient for being an unmarried male was negative and strongly significant. Being an unmarried female or

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\(^1\) Analyzing this data requires accounting for complex-survey design, and using information on the strata to obtain accurate standard errors. At least in Stata, there is no way to obtain goodness-of-fit statistics for ordinal logistic regression while accounting for complex survey design. To obtain the goodness-of-fit statistics displayed in Table 2, I used weighted ordinal logistic regression without accounting for the complexity of the survey data. While these regressions did not give the exact same results as ordinal logistic regression with complex survey design used in other analyses, they are a good approximation for obtaining goodness-of-fit statistics.
being a female married to a civilian also decreased the odds of career commitment when compared to males married to civilians. Overall, these findings support hypothesis 1, that commitment will vary by the interaction of gender and marital status. Theoretically, they show the gendered nature of career commitment, but commitment of unmarried men is surprisingly lower than that of women married to civilians. Unmarried men may feel relatively deprived because they do not have a caretaker-wife. I will explore this further in the discussion section.

In addition, those with children had 127% greater odds of career commitment. This is contrary to what one would expect based on the greediness of having a family. However, this finding is not so surprising because one must have a steady job to support children, and the military has good supports in place for parents. Having a young child had no significant effect on career commitment.

After adding elements of the greedy military, military job benefits, and basic control variables in Model 2, all coefficients for marital status/gender increased (mostly becoming less negative). This means that these new variables explain some of the variation in career commitment by gender and marital status that make other groups less committed than men married to civilians. The career commitment of unmarried females and females married to civilians no longer differed from the career commitment of males married to civilians. Females in dual-service marriages and unmarried males continued to be significantly less committed than males married to civilians. Parenthood still was strongly associated with career commitment, but the magnitude of this association decreased. Having a spouse not in the labor force was positively associated with career
commitment, and family earnings had a negative coefficient. These last two findings will be explored further with subpopulations by gender.

Contrary to expectations, having made a permanent change of station positively affected career commitment. In accordance with expectations, two measures of separation negatively affected career commitment: having had a deployment last longer than expected and having been away from one’s permanent duty station for more than 90 nights in the past year. While these measures of separation made a difference, deployment itself, as measured through whether the service member had been deployed greater than 30 days in the past two years and whether the service member had been deployed three times or more since 9/11 (not shown), essentially had no effect. This complicates the argument that the military is a greedy institution.

As anticipated, receiving military job benefits positively predicted career commitment. In particular, special pay and positive opinion of military health care had significant positive effects on career commitment.

For both dependent variables, I conducted further analyses using predicted probabilities in order to show the isolated effects of the gender and marital status interactions. I calculated the predicted probabilities holding all other covariates from the unrestricted model at their means. Predicted probabilities by marital status/gender (Figure 3) demonstrated that married women were the least committed to their military careers, and married men, particularly dual-service marriage men, were the most committed. These data diverge from the majority of the civilian literature which does not find significant relationships between career commitment and gender or marital status (Lee, Carswell, and Allen 2000; Goulet and Singh 2002; Nogueras 2006). They bring new
light to the military literature, which has shown mixed results (Antecol and Cobb-Clark 2006; Lundquist 2008; Moore 2002; Moore and Webb 2000; Sanchez et al. 2004).

**Affective organizational commitment:** When examining affective organizational commitment using family variables alone, females married to civilians, females in dual-service marriages, and unmarried males and females were all less committed than males married to civilians, with females in dual-service marriages and females married to civilians having the largest negative coefficients. Just as for career commitment, this supports hypothesis 1, that commitment will vary by the interaction of marital status and gender. Parents reported more affective organizational commitment than those without children. While I do not statistically test for differences in the coefficients across the two dependent variables, the parenthood coefficient for career commitment is larger than for affective organizational commitment; this supports the I/O thesis just as the parenthood data from the descriptive statistics do.

The family structure pattern did not change much when adding elements of the greedy military, military job benefits, and basic control variables in Model 2. The strongest negative coefficients again were for females married to civilians and females in dual-service marriages. Being a female in a dual-service marriage was associated with 46% lower odds of affective organizational commitment. Parents had 22% higher odds of affective organizational commitment.

Few of the greedy elements of the military had significant negative effects on affective organizational commitment. Two variables had significant negative coefficients, but the coefficients were not particularly strong: being stationed overseas decreased odds of affective organizational commitment by 17%, and having had a deployment last longer.
than expected decreased the odds of affective organizational commitment by 18%. Having had a longer than expected deployment was also a significant negative predictor of career commitment. Thus, this greedy element impacts both the occupational and institutional aspects of commitment to the military. In contrast, being stationed in Afghanistan increased the odds of affective organizational commitment by 84%. Conversely, being stationed in Iraq had a negative coefficient but was not significant at the p<0.05 level used here. This shows that these war experiences are qualitatively different, and that under certain conditions, war can solidify military commitment.

Among military job benefits, special pay and opinion of military health care had significant positive coefficients. An increase of one on the five-point opinion of military health care scale was associated with 67% greater odds of affective organizational commitment. These positive effects support Hypothesis 3, that those receiving more benefits will report higher commitment.

Predicted probabilities (Figure 4) demonstrate that dual-service marriage women had much lower odds of affective organizational commitment than other groups, with their odds being significantly lower than those of males married to civilians. Females married to civilians and unmarried males also had significantly lower odds of affective organizational commitment than males married to civilians. This supports the ideal-worker/ideal-caretaker model, with unmarried men being less committed perhaps because of working a demanding job, which was not countered by having a caretaker at home.

**Male and female subpopulations:** Table 5 shows coefficients and standard errors for regressions on the unrestricted model separately for males and females. In within gender comparisons, those in a dual-service marriage did not have different levels of
commitment than those married to a civilian. However, unmarried men were significantly less committed on both scales than those married to civilians. In contrast, unmarried women had higher affective organizational commitment than women married to civilians. This provides further support for hypothesis 1, that commitment varies by the interaction of gender and marital status.

Some of the relative career commitment of males married to civilians seen in the full sample likely stems from having the luxury of a spouse who serves as the family caretaker. Having a spouse not in the labor force only had a significant positive effect on career commitment for men.

In addition, higher family earnings had a negative effect on women’s military career commitment; this was not a significant factor for men. More refined subpopulation regressions done for gender-marital status groups (not shown) exposed that this was only significant for women married to civilians, implying that this could be related to the ability of the service woman’s husband to support the family, eliminating the woman’s dependence on the military job. Thus, gendered notions of the ideal-worker and the ideal-caretaker emerge in the military.

When regressions were run separately on the female subpopulation in Table 5, the coefficients for the greedy elements of the military were never significant. They were significant for men. Coefficients in the male subpopulation rarely differed from coefficients in the entire sample. Exceptions included 1) For career commitment, having more than 60 days of overtime in the past year had a significant negative effect; and 2) For affective organizational commitment, being stationed in Afghanistan did not have a significant positive effect, but being stationed in Iraq had a significant negative effect.
While the size of the subpopulations could influence some of the gender differences in findings, systematic differences in how men and women experience and interpret the greedy elements of the military likely exist.

Of the military job benefits, special pay was significant and positive for men only, while opinion of military health care continued to be highly significant and positive for both genders. If military personnel are socialized into the traditional gendered breadwinner/homemaker dichotomy, men may find this extra income to be more important than women do.

Having children is associated with higher military career commitment for both the male and female subpopulations, net of the control variables. This implies that mothers who are currently in the military do not plan to opt out of the military as a career because of parental responsibilities. In addition, for service members of both genders, the financial incentives of steady military employment and fringe benefits could keep them in the service. The positive finding for affective organizational commitment is only significant for men, but the coefficient is similar to that of women. Thus, in the military, a gender-neutral parenthood bonus is associated with higher commitment and is not explained by other factors in the model. This will be explored further with gender/marital status interactions.

**Parent and non-parent subpopulations:** Table 6 shows coefficients and standard errors for regressions on the unrestricted model separately for parents and non-parents.¹²

¹² Some of the variation between parents and non-parents is explained by the greater average length of time in the military for parents. I did additional subpopulation regressions on parent and non-parent subgroups separately for those who had served less than and at least 5 years. Commitment varied by years served, but the differences between parents and non-parents were consistent with the results shown here.
These regressions yield mixed results for hypothesis 4a, that commitment to the military as a career and as an institution will differ when comparing the results for parents and non-parents. They do differ, but not always in the ways anticipated.

Consistent with hypothesis 4a, parents had significantly lower odds of career commitment if they were stationed in Iraq, but non-parents did not. Similarly, having ever made a PCS predicted higher career commitment for non-parents, but not for parents. The other significant results for career commitment showed differences for parents and non-parents, but not in the anticipated directions. Having been away from one’s permanent duty station for more than 90 nights in the past year predicted lower career commitment for non-parents, but not for parents. Furthermore, for parents, higher scores on the danger index predicted higher career commitment, but this did not apply to non-parents. Note that the danger index is based on having experienced the following: 1) having one’s most recent danger pay last more than six months, 2) having been deployed to a combat zone or received imminent danger/hostile fire pay since September 11, 2001, and 3) having been deployed to a combat zone for more than 365 days since September 11, 2001. These activities are associated with lucrative bonus pay and may have happened in the past. While the model controls for special pay and family earnings (which both include danger pay), these variables cannot tell how much nor what type of special pay the service member received. Parents are more likely to need the bonus pay, which might be lucrative enough to increase their career commitment. These findings altogether provide mixed results for the hypothesis that parents’ commitment will be more negatively affected by the military’s greedy elements.
When looking at parent/non-parent subpopulations for affective organizational commitment, the few significant greedy elements of the military have negative coefficients. For parents, as expected, being stationed overseas and having had a longer than expected deployment each predicted lower affective organizational commitment. Considering that military children have reported that the worst part of being a military child was the geographic mobility (Ender 2000), the finding for being stationed overseas is not surprising. Just as for parents, non-parents on average had lower affective organizational commitment if they had had a longer than expected deployment. However, for non-parents, higher scores on the danger index predicted lower affective organizational commitment; this did not occur for parents. This difference between parents and non-parents may be similar to the difference between parents and non-parents in the result for the danger index on career commitment. Parents’ exposure to danger may be neutralized by aspects of danger pay not controlled for in these models, but because non-parents have fewer financial burdens, the danger itself affects non-parents more than the danger pay offsets it.

The parent/non-parent subpopulation results for military job benefits fail to support hypothesis 4a, that career commitment and affective organizational commitment will differ when comparing the results for parents and non-parents. For both groups and for both dependent variables, opinion of military health care was strongly significant, and the coefficients for the subpopulations were similar. Special pay shows differences, but not in the direction anticipated, with a larger positive coefficient and a higher significance level for non-parents on career commitment. For affective organizational commitment, special pay was only significant and positive for non-parents, contradicting the prediction.
from hypothesis 4a. Thus, the higher commitment of parents found in the descriptive statistics is not explained by their greater access to job benefits. Thus, parents who are in the military react to job benefits in a manner similar to how most previous research states that civilian parents react to job benefits (Goulet and Singh 2002; Scholarios and Marks 2004; Casper and Harris 2008; Korabik and Rosin 1995).

Marital status/gender subpopulations: Regressions on marital status/gender subpopulations (Has Children coefficients shown in Table 7) showed that the association between parental status and commitment to the military varied within some gender/marital status subpopulations, but the patterns of higher commitment related to parenthood were not as predicted. As shown in Table 2, hypothesis 4b predicted that all men, as well as unmarried women would report higher commitment if they had children, and married women would report lower commitment if they had children. The results show that for career commitment, men married to civilians, women married to civilians and unmarried men were more committed when they had children. For affective organizational commitment, women married to civilians and unmarried males reported higher commitment when they had children, but the result for males married to civilians was not significant. No subpopulation reported significantly lower commitment related to parenthood.

Note that the coefficients in Table 7 came from regressions that included all controls, including controls for spouse’s labor force status. Although I do not have information on the demands of the jobs of civilian working spouses, one might infer that civilian spouses have less demanding jobs than dual-service spouses do, and thus, the civilian spouse can spend more time caring for children. This permits parents married to
civilians to enjoy a parenthood bonus, while parents in dual-service marriages do not. For males married to civilians, fathers being more committed to their careers, but not to the military as an institution supports the assertion that married men are socialized as breadwinners who prioritize working in a dependable job over their institutional commitment to their occupation. The case is more of a mystery for the gender differences in the effect of parenthood among unmarried service members. Further research should explore this finding.
Table 3. 2008 Survey of Active Duty Members: Weighted Proportions and Means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Married Male (6,541)</th>
<th>Married Female (904)</th>
<th>Unmarried Male (2,428)</th>
<th>Unmarried Female (859)</th>
<th>Totals (10,732)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has Children</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.67**</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has Child 13 or Younger</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married To Civilian</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.46***</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual-Service Marriage</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.54***</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse Employed</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.80***</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse Unemployed</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse Not in Labor Force</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 Family Logged Earnings</td>
<td>10.77</td>
<td>10.89***</td>
<td>10.04***</td>
<td>10.04***</td>
<td>10.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has Financial Problems</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.28*</td>
<td>0.27*</td>
<td>0.29*</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s Degree</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.15***</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.53***</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.45***</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.47***</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.55***</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.83**</td>
<td>0.90***</td>
<td>0.87***</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
<td>0.10***</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.34***</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.07***</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.35***</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Served</td>
<td>10.11</td>
<td>7.90***</td>
<td>5.31***</td>
<td>6.12***</td>
<td>8.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supportive Supervisor (Opinion: Min 1, Max 5)</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>3.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elements of the Greedy Military</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever made a PCS</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.77*</td>
<td>0.55***</td>
<td>0.63***</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stationed Overseas</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently in Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently in Iraq</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danger Index (Min 0, Max 3)</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>0.57***</td>
<td>0.96***</td>
<td>0.70***</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployed 3 Times or More Since 9/11</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
<td>0.15***</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployed &gt;30 Days in Past 2 Years</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.28***</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.36***</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had a Longer than Expected Deployment</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.15***</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td>0.15***</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 60 Days with Overtime in Past Year</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.45***</td>
<td>0.48***</td>
<td>0.36***</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Away from Permanent Duty Station &gt;90 Nights in Past Year</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.34***</td>
<td>0.48***</td>
<td>0.32***</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Benefits</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Credit Earned While Serving</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.58***</td>
<td>0.68***</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Pay</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.42***</td>
<td>0.50***</td>
<td>0.42***</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion of Military Health Care (Min 1, Max 5)</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>4.21***</td>
<td>4.11**</td>
<td>4.21***</td>
<td>4.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Allowances Received (Min 0, Max 4)</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>2.30***</td>
<td>1.64***</td>
<td>1.75***</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (Two-tailed tests for difference from married males).
See text for description of variables.
Table 4. Career Commitment and Affective Organizational Commitment: April 2008 Survey of Active Duty Members Predicting Commitment to the Military

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Career Commitment</th>
<th>Affective Organizational Commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1 Coef. S.E.</td>
<td>Model 2 Coef. S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, Married to Civilian (omitted category)</td>
<td>(omitted category)</td>
<td>(omitted category)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female, Married to Civilian</td>
<td>-0.25 0.13*</td>
<td>-0.21 0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, Dual-Service Marriage</td>
<td>0.07 0.11</td>
<td>0.21 0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female, Dual-Service Marriage</td>
<td>-0.60 0.12***</td>
<td>-0.45 0.13***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried Male</td>
<td>-0.45 0.07***</td>
<td>-0.26 0.08***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried Female</td>
<td>-0.25 0.10**</td>
<td>-0.18 0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has Children</td>
<td>0.82 0.06***</td>
<td>0.33 0.07***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has Child 13 or Younger</td>
<td>-0.04 0.06</td>
<td>-0.02 0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse Employed (omitted category)</td>
<td>(omitted category)</td>
<td>(omitted category)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse Unemployed</td>
<td>0.06 0.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse Not in Labor Force</td>
<td>0.18 0.07*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 Family Logged Earnings</td>
<td>-0.15 0.06*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>0.03 0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elements of the Greedy Military</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever Made a PCS</td>
<td>0.23 0.08**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stationed Overseas</td>
<td>0.04 0.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently in Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.31 0.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently in Iraq</td>
<td>-0.24 0.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had a Longer than Expected Deployment</td>
<td>-0.23 0.06***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 60 Days with Overtime in Past Year</td>
<td>-0.10 0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Away from Permanent Duty Station &gt;90 Nights in Past Year</td>
<td>-0.14 0.06***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Job Benefits</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Credit Earned While Serving</td>
<td>0.01 0.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Pay</td>
<td>0.23 0.06***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion of Military Health Care</td>
<td>0.40 0.03***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Allowances Received</td>
<td>0.05 0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pseudo-R2</strong></td>
<td>0.033 0.101</td>
<td>0.010 0.098</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. Model 2 also controls for the following variables not shown: Has Financial Problems, Education (Bachelor’s Degree), Rank (Enlisted/Officer), Service Branch, Years Served, Opinion of Having a Supportive Supervisor, Danger Index, Deployed 3 Times or More Since 9/11, and Deployed >30 Days in the Past 2 Years. The reported pseudo-R² comes from separate analyses using weighted ordinal logistic regressions without controls for survey strata and Taylor linearized variance estimation. See footnote 11.
Table 5. Career Commitment and Affective Organizational Commitment by Gender: April 2008 Survey of Active Duty Members Predicting Commitment to the Military

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordered Logistic Regression: Predicting High Commitment</th>
<th>Career Commitment</th>
<th>Affective Organizational Commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n = 8,937)</td>
<td>(n = 1,757)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coef.  S.E.</td>
<td>Coef.  S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n = 8,936)</td>
<td>(n = 1,757)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coef.  S.E.</td>
<td>Coef.  S.E.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Family Variables

- Married to Civilian (omitted category)
- Dual-Service Marriage
  - Male: 0.19 0.12  -0.07 0.18
  - Female: -0.06 0.12
- Unmarried
  - Male: -0.25 0.08**  0.02 0.19
  - Female: -0.30 0.08***
- Has Children
  - Male: 0.33 0.08***  0.35 0.15*
  - Female: 0.20 0.08*  0.23 0.16
- Has Child 13 or Younger
  - Male: -0.03 0.07  0.16 0.23
  - Female: -0.13 0.08  0.08 0.22

### Control Variables

- Spouse Employed (omitted category)
- Spouse Unemployed
  - Male: 0.10 0.12  -0.16 0.44
  - Female: 0.03 0.12
- Spouse Not in Labor Force
  - Male: 0.18 0.08*  0.38 0.29
  - Female: 0.07 0.08  0.20 0.29
- 2007 Family Logged Earnings
  - Male: -0.11 0.07  -0.35 0.16*
  - Female: 0.01 0.07
- Minority
  - Male: 0.04 0.06  -0.02 0.13
  - Female: -0.10 0.06

### Elements of the Greedy Military

- Ever Made a PCS
  - Male: 0.26 0.08**  0.05 0.20
  - Female: 0.06 0.09
- Stationed Overseas
  - Male: 0.04 0.08  0.05 0.17
  - Female: -0.20 0.08*  -0.09 0.19
- Currently In Afghanistan
  - Male: 0.30 0.21  0.84 0.46
  - Female: 0.61 0.32  0.67 0.41
- Currently In Iraq
  - Male: -0.24 0.13  -0.12 0.35
  - Female: -0.27 0.12*  0.15 0.40
- Danger Index
  - Male: 0.02 0.03  0.03 0.09
  - Female: -0.03 0.03
- Had a Longer than Expected Deployment
  - Male: -0.23 0.07***  -0.21 0.17
  - Female: -0.19 0.07**
- More than 60 Days with Overtime in Past Year
  - Male: -0.13 0.06*  0.05 0.14
  - Female: 0.02 0.06
- Away from Permanent Duty Station >90 Nights in Past Year
  - Male: -0.17 0.06**
  - Female: -0.06 0.07

### Military Job Benefits

- College Credit Earned While Serving
  - Male: 0.04 0.07  -0.12 0.17
  - Female: 0.03 0.07  0.04 0.17
- Special Pay
  - Male: 0.26 0.06***  0.08 0.15
  - Female: 0.15 0.06*  -0.07 0.16
- Opinion of Military Health Care
  - Male: 0.41 0.03***  0.33 0.07***
  - Female: 0.52 0.04***
- Number of Allowances Received
  - Male: 0.06 0.03  0.00 0.08
  - Female: 0.06 0.04  -0.02 0.08

* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. Coefficients for the following variables that were included in the models are not shown: Has Financial Problems, Education (Bachelor’s Degree), Rank (Enlisted/Officer), Service Branch, Years Served, Opinion of Having a Supportive Supervisor, Deployed 3 Times or More Since 9/11, and Deployed >30 Days in the Past 2 Years.
Table 6. Career Commitment and Affective Organizational Commitment by Parental Status: April 2008 Survey of Active Duty Members

Ordered Logistic Regression: Predicting High Commitment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Variables</th>
<th>Career Commitment</th>
<th>Affective Organizational Commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has Children</td>
<td>No Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n = 6,483)</td>
<td>(n = 4,210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coef.</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, Married to Civilian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female, Married to Civilian</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, Dual-Service Marriage</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female, Dual-Service Marriage</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>0.15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, Unmarried</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>0.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female, Unmarried</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has Child 13 or Younger</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Control Variables                |                   |                                    |              |             |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------|              |             |
| Spouse Employed                  |                   |                                    |              |             |
| Spouse Unemployed                | -0.05             | 0.14                                | 0.10         | 0.13        |
| Spouse Not in Labor Force        | 0.20              | 0.08*                              | 0.08         | 0.08        |
| 2007 Family Logged Earnings      | -0.16             | 0.08                               | 0.16         | 0.09        |
| Minority                         | -0.07             | 0.07                                | -0.15        | 0.07*       |

| Elements of the Greedy Military  |                   |                                    |              |             |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------|              |             |
| Ever Made a PCS                  | 0.08              | 0.13                                | -0.05        | 0.13        |
| Stationed Overseas               | -0.02             | 0.09                                | -0.27        | 0.10**      |
| Currently In Afghanistan         | 0.05              | 0.25                                | 0.48         | 0.33        |
| Currently In Iraq                | -0.41             | 0.16**                              | -0.23        | 0.15        |
| Danger Index                     | 0.09              | 0.04*                               | 0.08         | 0.04        |
| Had a Longer than Expected       | -0.22             | 0.07**                              | -0.22        | 0.08**      |
| Deployment                       |                   |                                    |              |             |
| More than 60 Days with Overtime  | -0.11             | 0.07                                | 0.11         | 0.07        |
|Away from Permanent Duty Station  | -0.04             | 0.07                                | -0.02        | 0.07        |

| Military Job Benefits            |                   |                                    |              |             |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------|              |             |
| College Credit Earned While Serving | -0.05            | 0.09                                | 0.09         | 0.09        |
| Special Pay                      | 0.18              | 0.07*                               | 0.00         | 0.07        |
| Opinion of Military Health Care  | 0.40              | 0.04***                             | 0.51         | 0.04***     |
| Number of Allowances Received    | -0.02             | 0.04                                | -0.02        | 0.05        |

* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. Coefficients for the following variables that were included in the models are not shown: Has Financial Problems, Education (Bachelor’s Degree), Rank (Enlisted/Officer), Service Branch, Years Served, Opinion of Having a Supportive Supervisor, Deployed 3 Times or More Since 9/11, and Deployed >30 Days in the Past 2 Years.
Table 7. Gender-Marital Status Subpopulation Results for Having Children: Career Commitment and Affective Organizational Commitment, April 2008 Survey of Active Duty Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender-Marital Status Subpopulation</th>
<th>Career Commitment</th>
<th>Affective Organizational Commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male, Married to Civilian</td>
<td>6014</td>
<td>0.31 0.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female, Married to Civilian</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>0.87 0.31**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, Dual-Service Marriage</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>-0.08 0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female, Dual-Service Marriage</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>0.25 0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried Male</td>
<td>2416</td>
<td>0.51 0.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried Female</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>0.24 0.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. Results are from regressions on the unrestricted model, but only the Has Children coefficient is shown. See text for description of all variables in the models.

Figure 1: Career Commitment by Parental Status

Figure 2: Affective Organizational Commitment by Parental Status
Figure 3: Career Commitment: Odds of Commitment by Marital Status and Gender

- Married to Civilian: Males 0.623, Females 0.507**
- Dual-Service Marriage: Males 0.667, Females 0.509***
- Unmarried: Males 0.553**, Females 0.545*

Note: *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001; significance measured with differences from Male Married to Civilian; covariates held at means

Figure 4: Affective Organizational Commitment: Odds of Commitment by Marital Status and Gender

- Married to Civilian: Males 0.859, Females 0.792*
- Dual-Service Marriage: Males 0.836, Females 0.727***
- Unmarried: Males 0.817**, Females 0.824

Note: *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001; significance measured using differences from Male Married to Civilian; covariates held at means
CHAPTER VII
DISCUSSION

Some general patterns emerged across both measures of commitment to the military. When examining predicted probabilities, females in dual service marriages, females married to civilians, and unmarried males were less committed than males married to civilians in all models. Men in dual-service marriages were as committed as men married to civilians were. Of the greedy elements of the military, having had a longer than expected deployment most consistently predicted lower levels of commitment. Of the military benefits, only special pay and opinion of military health care predicted higher levels of commitment, with opinion of military health care being a particularly strong predictor. Parents were more committed than non-parents were regardless of the addition of the greedy elements of the military and job benefits to the model. Subpopulation analyses yielded mixed result, especially regarding hypothesis 4a, that the greedy elements of the military will more negatively affect parents and job benefits will more positively affect parents. Below I explore the implications for the stated hypotheses along with possible explanations for the results.

Hypothesis 1: The data provides strong evidence for hypothesis 1, that commitment to the military will vary by the interaction of gender and marital status. The least committed groups were women in dual-service marriages, unmarried men, and women married to civilians. Men married to civilians and men in dual-service marriages were the most committed. Using predicted probabilities, unmarried women were less committed to their careers than men married to civilians were, but they did not report
significantly different affective organizational commitment. These patterns support the theory of gendered organizations and the ideal-worker/ideal-caretaker model. Service women married to working men, particularly service women who have military husbands with demanding work schedules, may feel social pressure to spend more time on care work, thus leading women to have lower career commitment. Married men benefit from this arrangement. Unmarried military men, who may compare themselves to their same-gender married counterparts, may feel deprived for not having such an arrangement. Unmarried women fall somewhere in between, but considering that women have better job opportunities in the military than in the civilian world it is counterintuitive that their career commitment would be lower than that of married men, but not their affective organizational commitment. Future research should explore this finding.

The results described above illustrate the importance of the marital status-gender interaction. When not including these interactions (regressions not shown), gender alone did not affect career commitment, and it only marginally affected affective organizational commitment. In addition, without these interactions, one would assume that all dual-service marriage personnel were less committed than married service members, but this result varied by gender.

Hypothesis 2: Hypothesis 2, that the greedy elements of the military will be associated with lower commitment, was supported for the male subpopulation when looking at having had a longer than expected deployment, being away from one’s permanent duty station for more than 90 nights in the past year, having more than 60 days of overtime in the past year, being stationed in Iraq, and being stationed overseas. On the other hand, it was not supported for the female subpopulation nor by other predictors,
with being stationed in Afghanistan being positive and marginally significant, and having made a PCS positively predicting career commitment. All other greedy military variables were not significant. Only having had a longer than expected deployment had a negative effect on both career commitment and affective organizational commitment. This finding confirms the findings of previous research on military career commitment (Hosek and Martorell 2009) and expands on previous research by demonstrating that broken expectations affect affective organizational commitment as well.

Having been away from one’s permanent duty station for more than 90 nights or having more than 60 days of overtime in the past year were negative and significant predictors of career commitment. In many ways, these variables measure separation more clearly than having had a longer than expected deployment. The negative impact of having had a longer than expected deployment could stem from the danger surrounding being deployed, broken expectations, difficulties managing responsibilities back home, or separation from loved ones. While this variable may also be a proxy for deployment in some cases, such work demands can occur even when one is not formally deployed.

Though loved ones usually expect and accept deployment-related separations, other types of separation interfere with concrete plans and outside social obligations, thus demonstrating the military’s greediness. If one is responsible for caring for a family, these shorter-term separations may interfere with childcare and if married, the spouse’s work schedule. Even if these shorter-term separations do not interfere in such a concrete manner, non-standard scheduling interferes with the service member’s ability to meet the social expectations of family and friends outside the military.
Being stationed in Iraq predicted lower affective organizational commitment for the male subpopulation. On the other hand, in the full sample, being stationed in Afghanistan predicted higher affective organizational commitment, and being stationed in Afghanistan was still marginally significant for the male subpopulation. Why would the effects of being stationed in these war zones differ so much? One might try to argue that the military duties were more violent in Iraq; however, data on fatalities does not fully support that assertion when considering the extent of the operations in each country. Approximately five times as many troops were in Iraq compared to in Afghanistan in 2008 (Belasco 2009). In the six months prior to the April 2008 Survey of Active Duty Forces, the U.S. fatalities in these two countries were fairly proportionate to the number of troops in each country. There were a total of 43 U.S. fatalities in Operation Enduring Freedom compared to 172 in Operation Iraqi Freedom (ICasualties.org 2014a; ICasualties.org 2014b). Civilian casualties might, but cannot clearly explain the differences in commitment. The number of civilian casualties was higher in Iraq than in Afghanistan in 2008, but the number of Iraqi civilian deaths significantly dropped from 2007 (25,284 deaths in 2007 to 9,630 in 2008) (Crawford 2013). For Afghanistan, the number of civilian casualties increased from 1,597 in 2007 to 2,153 in 2008 (Crawford 2011). Perhaps the average service member, who may have entered the military for the thrill of danger and knowing that he or she was entering a violent occupation, was more committed due to violent conditions.

Another plausible explanation for the higher commitment of those in Afghanistan is the political popularity of the war in Afghanistan compared to the war in Iraq. In April 2008, a Gallup poll reported the highest opposition to the war in Iraq to date, with 63% of
Americans believing that the war in Iraq was a mistake (Jones 2008). Another poll conducted the same year reported the opposite result for opinions on U.S. military action in Afghanistan (Morales 2009). At the same time, President George W. Bush announced a plan to send more troops to Afghanistan, and many politicians discussed the withdrawal of troops from Iraq (The Associated Press 2008). While these data do not cover service members’ opinions of the wars, if the opinions of the American populace are reflective of the opinions of service members, then political opinions about the wars likely explain part of the relationship between commitment and being stationed in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Another set of contradictory results was seen in measures of geographic mobility. Being stationed overseas was a significant negative predictor of affective organizational commitment, but having ever made a permanent change of station predicted higher career commitment. Thus, these independent variables measure separate dimensions of the greedy military. Being stationed overseas could decrease affective organizational commitment simply due to the greediness of the military. On the other hand, the exposure to different cultures resultant of being stationed overseas could alter the mindset of service members with regard to the nationalism and violence associated with military service.

Conversely, having ever made a permanent change of station could satisfy the desire of many incoming service members to travel and to escape their hometowns without necessarily exposing them to different cultures. One could also hypothesize that it represents a survivor effect: those who have been in the military long enough to have made a PCS might be those who enjoyed the military enough to reenlist. This is likely the case as the vast majority (about 95%) of those who have served at least five years have
made a PCS, while slightly less than half of those who have served less than five years have made a PCS, and those who have served longer are more committed.

Based on these results, hypothesis 2 was supported for separation-related elements of the greedy military, but was not sufficiently supported for geographic mobility and risk of bodily harm.

**Hypothesis 3:** The evidence supported hypothesis 3, that service members report higher levels of commitment if they receive more military employment benefits. Opinion of military health care was significant at the 0.001 level for both dependent variables, and this applied for both gender subpopulations. Special pay also positively predicted career commitment and affective organizational commitment. This is not surprising considering that the military health care system has been considered the most comprehensive health care system in the United States (Burrelli 2009), and along with other military employment benefits, Gifford (2006) and Gupta and Lundquist (2014) compared it to the social democratic welfare state. However, it is more accurate to think of the military as an employer that successfully retains its employees and keeps them dedicated to the employer through job benefits. Unlike the social democratic welfare state, the military requires that its employees work in dangerous conditions in exchange for pay and benefits. Because service members likely understand that they are signing up for a violent occupation, the greedy elements of the military do not uniformly decrease their commitment, but receiving the benefits, which is likely why they enlisted, increases commitment.

A plausible explanation for the lack of significance of having earned college credit in the military is that once the college credit is earned, the incentive to stay in the
military dwindles. Thus, they would have less career commitment. Those who entered the military in order to get a college education entered the military for occupational rather than institutional reasons. Thus, they would have less affective organizational commitment. Number of allowances received was not statistically significant either, but the lack of significance on these variables does not completely undermine the support for hypothesis 3.

**Hypotheses 4a and 4b:** The results from this study both support and refute hypothesis 4a, that career commitment and affective organizational commitment vary by parental status and that parents are more negatively affected by the greedy elements of the military and more positively affected by job benefits. First, one should note that those with children had higher career commitment and affective organizational commitment than non-parents, supporting the assertion that commitment will vary by parental status. This implies that any family-work conflict created by having children is overpowered by positive aspects related to having children in the military that were not controlled for. The civilian literature generally does not find significant relationships between parenthood and career or affective organizational commitment (Goulet and Singh 2002; Scholarios and Marks 2004; Casper and Harris 2008; Korabik and Rosin 1995). A survivor effect may explain parents’ greater commitment. Those who have stayed in the military long enough to become parents likely have reenlisted at least once, indicating military career commitment. Thus, parenthood might not cause this greater level of commitment, but rather commitment leads to staying in the military, and thus, leads to having children while in the military. Analysis of attrition data is needed to determine if this is the case.
Contrary to hypothesis 4a, the greedy elements of the military did not always affect parents more negatively. While the results for some greedy military variables followed the expected pattern, some greedy military variables showed non-parents being significantly less committed, parents being significantly more committed, or parents and non-parents having similar levels of commitment.

In addition, parents’ commitment was not always more positively associated with military job benefits; for three of the four types of benefits, the coefficients appear to be similar regardless of parental status. However, special pay, especially for affective organizational commitment, had a greater positive effect for non-parents. The relative consistency of the effects of military job benefits on commitment regardless of parental status might result from an anticipatory effect: those who do not have children yet may appreciate the benefits equally because they plan to have children someday. However, the consistency still weakens the assertion that job benefits cause the commitment of service members with children more than they do for service members without children.

The evidence from this study provides mixed support for hypothesis 4b, that differences in commitment to military employment related to parental status will vary across gender/marital status subpopulations. I specifically hypothesized that for all men and for unmarried women, parenthood would be associated with higher commitment, and for married women, parenthood would be associated with lower commitment. I found that men married to civilians reported higher career commitment if they were parents, and parenthood was associated with higher career and affective organizational commitment for women married to civilians and unmarried men. The military, as a high demand career with need-based job benefits, is more likely an attractive career for those with a
spouse who serves as a caretaker for the family and privileges those with children through greater in-kind benefits. Considering the military’s relatively high rate of stay-at-home wives and husbands (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009) and the early childbearing and marriage in the military, which many have attributed to military job benefits (Lundquist and Xu 2014; Karney, Loughran, and Pollard 2012; Kelty, Kleykamp, and Segal 2010; Hogan and Furst Seifert 2009; Lundquist and Smith 2005; Lundquist 2004), greater career commitment for parents among those who are married to civilians makes sense. Even for those with working civilian spouses, having one parent with a less demanding schedule may allow the in-kind military job benefits and pleasure of having children to overpower the stress associated with having children.

For those in dual-service marriages, the extreme work demands for both spouses may leave limited time to appreciate the positive aspects of parenthood, and thus, they do not experience higher commitment as parents despite receiving more in-kind benefits.

Unmarried service men were more committed when they had children, but unmarried service women were not. The gender difference could result from unmarried mothers often having more caretaking responsibilities than unmarried fathers do. The “Daddy Bonus” (Hodges and Budig 2010) may also apply here. Hodges and Budig found that civilian fatherhood is associated with higher earnings even when controlling for a wide array of other predictors of earnings. Perhaps this daddy bonus can be transferred to social psychological measures and persists in the military, at least for single fathers. At the same time, one could then question why the lack of motherhood wage penalty in the military does not improve commitment for mothers among unmarried women. Future research should look for concrete explanations for these findings.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

The results of this study have various implications for the ideal-worker/ideal-caretaker model and for Segal’s assertion that the military and the family are greedy institutions. When assessing the greediness of the family vis-à-vis military work attitudes, one must be careful in defining what qualifies as a greedy family type. In accordance with the ideal-worker/ideal-caretaker model, this differs by gender. Married military men may be the most committed because they have a caretaker at home. Regardless of his wife’s labor force status, societal norms enforce the assumption that the wife serve as the caretaker. Her husband’s greedy occupation puts more pressure on the wife to take care of the home and children, even if the wife is working in the outside labor force.

The lower commitment among military women in dual-service marriages provides evidence for the ideal-worker/ideal-caretaker model as well. When both spouses work in high-demand occupations, household obligations continue to fall more on the woman than on the man. The case may be less so for military women married to civilian men not working in high-demand jobs because the greater time strain for the woman results in the husband taking more responsibility for household tasks.

Lower commitment among unmarried male military personnel provides evidence against the assertion that less greedy family structures will result in higher commitment. At the same time, it provides evidence favoring the ideal-worker/ideal-caretaker model. Unmarried males do not have someone else to take care of the home. When they have to take care of their own living space, they may feel emasculated. Prior research has shown
that the most successful men tend to have wives who are full-time homemakers (Williams 2000).

Furthermore, parental status differences in career commitment and affective organizational commitment supported the I/O thesis. Parents, who have greater financial needs, had much higher career commitment than non-parents did, but the difference between parents and non-parents for affective organizational commitment was much smaller, but still significant. Thus, in future studies, I/O scholars should remember to control for family structure, and consider career commitment and affective organizational commitment as possible measures of the I/O thesis.

While not all of Segal’s greedy aspects of the military negatively affected commitment to the military, substantial evidence from this study supported the assertion that the military is a greedy institution. The evidence demonstrated that the military’s greediest aspect was separation, and that the greed of separation had the strongest effect on service member commitment when separation was unexpected as in the cases of having a deployment last longer than expected and spending many nights away from one’s permanent duty station. The greedy military’s effects were not significant for the variables measuring the number of times deployed or number of days deployed. A greedy institution is one that attempts to use all of a person’s energy, leaving them with no time for other commitments. When a service member expects to have time for other commitments, and then a superior notifies him or her that a break is not permitted, this might cause frustration, and thus, negative attitudes toward his or her work. When service members enter the military, they anticipate the other greedy aspects of the military, like geographic mobility and risk of bodily harm. Service members are mentally prepared for
and may even desire geographic mobility and the risk of bodily harm. Some people join
the military to see the world or to escape bad situations in their hometowns. Others join
to serve and protect their country, and may be motivated by socialization into a warrior
ethic. The risk of bodily harm appeals to men to solidify their masculinity. This oddly
may also appeal to military women, because it helps them fit into an extremely masculine
organization. Thus, when measuring work attitudes, whether for military personnel or for
civilians, researchers should account for employees’ expectations of job responsibilities
and reasons for entering the field. In addition, the military should consider this evidence
in its retention strategies.

For the military, the results of this study should encourage up front policies
regarding the length of deployments and substantial notification for times when personnel
will have to work longer than the normal duty day. Of these, meeting the service
members’ expectations regarding length of deployments is the most important. This
variable most consistently predicted lower levels of commitment. As a deployment
becomes longer than expected, and personnel become less satisfied, they will become less
effective troops, thus negating advantages of longer deployments. The length of
deployments in the Global War on Terrorism has been longer than in previous conflicts.
Thus, extending already long deployments is especially detrimental.

Furthermore, a similar study on National Guard and Reserve forces is essential,
especially considering that separation, particularly longer than expected deployments,
was one of the strongest factors predicting lack of commitment. National Guard and
Reserve forces receive fewer military job benefits to offset military greediness and were
designed as supplementary to active duty forces, yet they have been deployed extensively
in the Global War on Terrorism (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 2007).

This study also has implications for civilian work-family conflict and work attitudes scholarship. The most surprising finding of the present study was that parents were generally more committed than non-parents were. While subpopulation analyses showed that this finding only applied to unmarried men and those married to civilians, this result still requires further exploration. Most civilian literature shows no significant relationship between commitment and parenthood (Korabik and Rosin 1995; Goulet and Singh 2002; Scholarios and Marks 2004; Casper and Harris 2008). Considering that the military is an employer with a particularly inflexible schedule, my findings contradict prior civilian research on family responsibilities and commitment that showed lower commitment among employees who had family responsibilities when in a workplace without flexible scheduling (Scandura and Lankau 1997). The military could be a special case, or the extensive controls that I use, including the interaction of gender and marital status, as well as the greedy elements of the military, might extract these findings.

The present evidence supports that the military’s relatively good job benefits promote commitment, but the benefits examined here do not completely explain parents’ higher levels of commitment. The military’s award winning child care may explain parents’ higher levels of commitment, just as child care provided by civilian employers is associated with higher commitment (Grover and Crooker 1995); unfortunately this data set did not provide sufficient information about child care and other family-friendly military job benefits. These benefits, which are rarely found in civilian jobs that one can get right out of high school, may explain the overall parenthood bonus.
Finally, this research should be extended to greedy civilian employers, that are becoming greedier with modern technology (Sullivan 2014). While many scholars have examined the academy as a greedy institution (Sullivan 2014; Misra, Lundquist, and Templer 2012; Harris 2009; Suitor, Mecom, and Feld 2001), this concept has not been sufficiently extended to other industries. A comparable study of civilian workers, particularly those in dual-earner couples, in low-to-moderate prestige, high-demand occupations is warranted. Greedy institutions abound and exist outside the military and the academy. With the extensive demands of work and family that most people face, uncovering the elements that can ease the tensions between these institutions is imperative.


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