The Colonial Legacies of “Fiesta Island”: A Critical Study of Live-Music Events Production in Puerto Rico

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THE COLONIAL LEGACIES OF “FIESTA ISLAND”: A CRITICAL STUDY OF LIVE-MUSIC EVENTS PRODUCTION IN PUERTO RICO

A Dissertation Presented

by

ANILYN DÍAZ-HERNÁNDEZ

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

September 2014

Communication
THE COLONIAL LEGACIES OF “FIESTA ISLAND”: A CRITICAL STUDY OF LIVE-MUSIC EVENTS PRODUCTION IN PUERTO RICO

A Dissertation Presented

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DEDICATION

A mi familia por su paciencia.
A mis amistades por esperar.
A mis maestras y maestros
por confirmarme que enseñar es un acto político.
A los obreros y obreras de la música,
en solidaridad.

To my family for their patience.
To my friends for waiting.
To my teachers
for showing me that teaching is a political action.
To the music workers,
in solidarity.
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WMUA 91.1FM also provided me with very valuable experience in a welcoming environment where I met very good friends like Glenn Siegel, Priscilla Page, Rosa Oviedo, and Dan Ferreira, who helped me to live the university life in another way. They became part of my family in UMass along with Victor Ernesto Guevara Figueroa, who became a familiar figure for me during my studies at UMass-Amherst.

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Finally, I want to thank my dear family for patiently waiting for me and helping however they could until the very last moment of my degree.

¡Gracias a todas y todos!
This dissertation examines the historical relationship between the state and national culture in Puerto Rico as seen through the case of the entertainment industry, specifically live-music events production. The dissertation is located within two bodies of literature: critical post-colonial cultural studies of cultural industries and cultural policy, and cultural approaches to scholarship on collective action and state-civil society relationships in neoliberal contexts. The research design includes archival work and analysis of organizational material, supported by a cultural ethnography approach to semi-structured informant interviews and group interviews. The interviews focus on the historical development, cultural legacies, and practices of the entertainment industries in relation to musicians in Puerto Rico and links to the Latin American and Caribbean region, and translocal networks. Live-music events producers, musicians, and main institutional actors from the entertainment industry and the state were interviewed, and four state-sponsored live-music events were observed.
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<tr>
<td>ADCC</td>
<td>Autoridad del Distrito del Centro de Convenciones (Puerto Rico Convention Center Authority)</td>
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<td>AFAC</td>
<td>Administración para el Fomento de las Artes y la Cultura (Arts and Culture Promotion Administration)</td>
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<td>APEP</td>
<td>Asociación de Productores de Espectáculos Públicos, a.k.a. Asociación de Productores de Espectáculos y Eventos Públicos (Association of Public Spectacles and Events Producers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAM</td>
<td>Corporación de las Artes Musicales (Corporation for the Musical Arts)</td>
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<td>CPPAP</td>
<td>ICP’s Cultural Promotion and Popular Arts Program</td>
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<td>CODECU</td>
<td>Comisión para el Desarrollo de la Cultura de Puerto Rico (Puerto Rico’s Commission for the Cultural Development)</td>
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<td>COPEP</td>
<td>Colegio de Productores de Espectáculos Públicos de Puerto Rico (a professional association of events producers in Puerto Rico)</td>
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<td>CPRP</td>
<td>Comisión de Parques y Recreos Públicos (Public Recreation and Parks Commission)</td>
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<td>DIVEDCO</td>
<td>División de Educación a la Comunidad (Community Education Division)</td>
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<td>ECLAC</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<td>ELA</td>
<td>Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico (Commonwealth of Puerto Rico)</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>US Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>FCC</td>
<td>US Federal Communications Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>ICP</td>
<td>Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña (Institute of Puerto Rican Culture)</td>
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<td>ICTs</td>
<td>Information and communication technologies</td>
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<td>IDB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>ISI</td>
<td>Import-substitution Industrialization model</td>
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<td>MC</td>
<td>Master of ceremonies</td>
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<td>MPI</td>
<td>Movimiento Pro Independencia (Pro-Independence Movement)</td>
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<td>NEA</td>
<td>National Endowment for the Arts</td>
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<td>NICL</td>
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<td>Oficina de Servicios al Promotor de Espectáculos Públicos (Office of Public Spectacles Promoters Services)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PER</td>
<td>Partido Estadista Republicano (Republican Statehood Party)</td>
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<td>Spanish Broadcasting System</td>
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<td>SMG</td>
<td>Spectator Management Group</td>
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<td>TNCs</td>
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UNAM  
*Universidad Autónoma de México* (Autonomous University of Mexico)

UNCTAD  
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNESCO  
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UPR  
*Universidad de Puerto Rico* (University of Puerto Rico)

U.S.  
United States

WB  
World Bank

WTO  
World Trade Organization
CHAPTER 1
BEYOND “FIESTA ISLAND”

1.1 Introduction

In 1953, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s Visitors Bureau launched a campaign in the United States (U.S.) to promote Puerto Rico as a “fiesta island.” The campaign included a short film that represented Puerto Rico as a “vacation paradise twelve months of the year” (Visitors Bureau 1953). The film portrayed mostly women but also men who were iconic of a whitened, happy, growing professional and educated class in a non-threatening society with a “booming economy.” The campaign relied on these images of civilization, growing infrastructure and transportation means, as well as democratic stability that were deemed favorable for tourism as well as investing. The island’s colonial legacies were reduced to depictions, such as that of the Old San Juan, where “every square block presents the sharp contrast between old Spain and mainstream USA” (ibid). The film focused on Puerto Rico’s industrial and urban development at that time, and also on the many diverse entertainment, sports and recreational events available for tourists. The featured events aimed to be representative of the geographic differences on the island, and were briefly described through celebratory and simplistic notions of the events’ historical legacies. Some events featured cock fights, cultural festivals, variety shows at hotels and beaches, official parades, music and dance performances, and baseball games – all framed, of course, by a map accentuating the island’s small size as a benefit for tourism. The symbols of tropical and beach life were characterized through stereotyped shots of people drinking coconut “milk,” eating local traditional food such as pig or tropical fruits, having fun at pools and beaches, and women wearing swimsuits and
pavas (i.e., straw hats commonly associated with local peasants). These symbols contrasted with a few shots of humble people weaving fishing nets, an Afro-Caribbean calypso ensemble, and poor houses in the countryside. The purpose of the film was to advertise not only a “fiesta island,” but in particular the exotic aspects of this fiesta island within the U.S. colonial territories. The idea of the “fiesta island” transcended until actual tourism campaigns, and only evolved to add rum and some extreme sports and recreational amenities.¹

But beyond the “fiesta island” – and parallel to the context of the development of the local neocolonial state depicted in the film – lies the development of a local vibrant, though often left behind, entertainment industry whose history can help us to draw a cultural study of the state in relation to the legacy of Puerto Rico’s media and cultural industries. Over 600 state, commercial, and community-sponsored events are produced every year in Puerto Rico. Contrary to what people may commonly think, most of these events are produced by the state. The fact that the professionalization of such events production emerged from the private sector and historically preceded the formation of the local neocolonial state tells us a complex story in which the state is always underestimated and where the limits of colonial legacies become evident. Thus I have chosen to examine the history of the entertainment industry vis-à-vis the history of the local state; and I do so through the local state’s exceptional past as an unincorporated organized colony of a new colonial empire that promised the gift of liberalism and progress. This exceptional status represents an urgent entry point for understanding not

¹ These are some of the key facts of Puerto Rico highlighted by the current Puerto Rico’s Tourism Company (n.d.).
only the history and development of media and cultural industries in Puerto Rico, but also the contested role of the nation state in relation to empire.

Given its historical status, there has been a tendency to exclude Puerto Rico from comparable accounts of media and cultural history of the Caribbean and Latin America. As Latin American cultural studies scholar Néstor García-Canclini briefly mentioned, the case of Puerto Rico is an “exception” due to its colonial condition in contrast with most of the countries in the region that gained independence in the 1800s (García Canclini 2001, 4).2 As I have argued elsewhere,3 however, the exceptionality of the case of Puerto Rico goes beyond the anomaly of its neocolonial status. Puerto Rico’s geopolitical complexities are also manifested through the relationship between almost four million inhabitants on the Island along with almost another four million Puerto Ricans in the U.S., as well as through constant migratory flows mostly within the Caribbean. These flows date back to the Spanish colonial rule and even before, with the Taínos, the pre-Columbian inhabitants of Puerto Rico who were massacred by the Spanish colonizers (Picó 2009; Scarano 1993). When examined through the history of the entertainment industry in relation to the neocolonial state, the case of Puerto Rico can help us to expand our understanding of comparable historic-cultural accounts about Puerto Rico within the region and translocal networks, and of the legacy of colonial and neocolonial hegemony over cultural policy, cultural production, and national culture in Puerto Rico.

In the last decade in Puerto Rico, scholars of history (e.g., Pabón 2002; Picó 2009), literature (e.g., Sánchez 2009), and political science (e.g., Rodríguez Vázquez

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2 This comment appeared on the author’s preface to the 2001 English edition, which coincides with a visit that García-Canclini made to Puerto Rico after publishing the Spanish edition.

2004) have made similar arguments about the often unacknowledged case of Puerto Rico.

At the same time, sociological approaches have focused on Puerto Rico’s history in relation to the U.S. (e.g., Ayala & Bernabe 2007); in particular, the sociology of culture field (e.g., Quintero Rivera 2009) has compared the case of Puerto Rico to Latin American and Caribbean nations with similar socio-cultural histories. This project is the first systematic research to expand on these studies by turning to the specific case of Puerto Rico’s entertainment industry, specifically live-music events production.4

1.2 Overview of events and live-music events production

I am specifically interested in the history of Puerto Rico’s live-music production field that has its roots in theater and musical performances and extends to what is today understood as espectáculos (i.e., spectacles, events or performances). These include state and commercial-sponsored events (e.g., community and civic festivals, dance, speech and poetry recitals); risk and competition events (e.g., sports, circus, and special tournaments); media and electronic spectacles; conventions; professional conferences; art exhibitions; events showing particular products (e.g., boat, car, or air shows, etc.); ceremonies; and celebrations with massive or minor audience reach and geographical scale.5 Music or live-music events production is a specialized subfield within this more extensive field of live-events production, also known as live entertainment or events production and understood in opposition to recorded performances or spectacles produced for the mass media of communication, such as music recording and music

4 I will use the term ‘entertainment industry’ as an attempt to translate ‘industria del espectáculo,’ which in Puerto Rico does not include the media and broadcasting industries.

5 I will focus on the live-music production field, differentiated here from music recording and music videos or documentary production.
videos. Live-recorded concerts, for example, are a dimension of recorded media productions mixed with events production that almost always follow the logistics of music recording, film, or television (TV) production. These forms of cultural production or events may have different ancient, modern, or contemporary origins, but what they have in common is that every one is “the result of complex multiscalar planning processes,” as defined by performance and urban studies scholar Marina Peterson in relation to public concerts (Peterson 2007, 41). My principal focus is on these complex multi-scalar planning processes that shape and have been historically constituted in live-music events production by event producers, artists, artistic networks, and national cultural policy in a neocolonial state like Puerto Rico.

I draw from Peterson’s definition of public concerts to define events production as a set of processes of planning the logistics and content of diverse forms of cultural production and practices not limited to the artistic, which are ‘performed’ to audiences free or at a determined cost and ‘staged’ in selected venues. These processes of planning can be partially divided into production stages as in media production; for instance, they have pre-production, production, and post-production stages. There is not, however, a long post-production stage aside from the processes of wrapping up and returning equipment, along with matching account balances and payments. An important stage of events production is planning, and even more crucial is the actual staging of the live event before an audience or ‘the public.’ Unlike live-recorded concerts that end up reproduced in audiovisual tangible formats, events that are produced live on a particular date and time cannot be reproduced: either the audience attends and participates in

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6 Among many other sources on the origins of performances, see Mikhail Bakhtin (1974) and Andrés Amorós & José M. Díez Borque (1999). Amorós and Díez Borque’s book is a useful source to trace the development of events and spectacles in Spain, some of which were imposed in Puerto Rico.
helping to realize what was planned, or they miss it and rely on other people to tell them the story.

The subfield of live-music production involves an array of social actors including event producers, musicians, agents or promoters, state and private-owned venues, ticket offices, state and commercial sponsors, and diverse audiences (see Figure 1.1). The event producers can be part of the state; private corporations sponsoring commercial events; non-profit organizations that range from academic institutions and associations to community groups (including religious groups); and lastly independent producers who work for hire at specific state or commercial-sponsored events for other producers. The event producers usually contact all the social actors to agree on a date and a contract rider. They often serve as intermediaries between musicians and the state, as well as between regional and translocal producers and sponsors. If the musicians have agents or promoters that represent them or if they are unionized, the producers also negotiate with these actors. The promoters – who sometimes produce events – can be independent booking agents, independent public relations agents or publicists, representatives of local or international record labels, or part of an events production company. Live-events producers and promoters also may be unionized, as seen for example in Argentina with the Sindicato Único de Trabajadores del Espectáculo Público y Afines (Sindicate of Public Spectacles’ Workers; SUTEP n.d.). In Puerto Rico, live-music events production also includes a professional association of entertainment producers, which emerged in 1993 in response to state regulations that started ordering and ‘restraining’ their private production practices. This professional association grew into COPEP, which stands for

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7 Locally, only musicians in the Puerto Rico Symphony Orchestra are unionized as part of the Local 555 of the American Federation of Musicians (n.d.).
the Colegio de Productores de Espectáculos Públicos de Puerto Rico (i.e., the Puerto Rico College of Public Performance Producers, as translated in the Law 113 of 2005), made official by the local government under the Law 113 of 2005 in order to protect the local entertainment industry from transnational entertainment corporations that wanted to acquire local venues, among other reasons related to ‘internal’ issues between local producers.

To my knowledge, there is no explicit research account of the field of events production in the literature in media and cultural studies. The scholarship in media studies commonly focuses on eight mass media platforms (i.e., books, newspapers, magazines, music recording, film, radio, TV, and the internet) and two supportive industries that function interdependently with the media (i.e., advertising and public relations). Even though events production historically precedes all these culture industries and often benefits and is benefited by the media and their supportive industries, it is noticeably obviated in this literature. Whenever events production is evoked in cultural studies literature, it is done indirectly and associated mostly with the entertainment industry as a whole, or in relation to the events per se, which are only one of the components of what events production entails. It is more likely to find indirect references to events production through the performing art forms represented at live events (e.g., theater, music, dance, etc.) rather than these and other types of events, as seen briefly in David Hesmondhalgh’s The Cultural Industries (2002) and more frequently in Brazilian scholar Teixeira Coelho’s Diccionario Crítico de Política Cultural (2009). In a recent contribution, Hesmondhalgh and Sarah Baker (2011) acknowledge the general neglect of studies undertaken and published on cultural production in media and cultural studies.
Moreover, the important scholarship that is undertaken and reported on cultural work and creative industries lacks in-depth studies on events production.

Other studies focus not directly on events, but rather on spectacles, such as the filmmaker and writer Guy Debord’s *Society of the Spectacle* which examines the spectacular and the spectacularization of social relations through the media (Debord 1994). Debord’s critique about the representations of consumer culture in the mass media corresponds to a kind of approach in media and cultural studies literature that focuses more on the representational dimensions of spectacles. The spectacles or events as texts – and moreover as extravagant texts – can be understood as ways through with symbolic power is reproduced and transmitted. This understanding is very similar to studies on propaganda, both in communication and political science, that often fail to address how media and political spectacles are produced and received by the audiences. This distinction is why I insist on the “beyond the fiesta island” metaphor so that one considers different dimensions of the spectacles that deserve attention beyond the textual. The logistics of production of four different state-sponsored events presented in this dissertation, for example, speaks to a complexity that the events per se, if studied textually, would not express.

Political scientist Lisa Wedeen does go beyond the representational dimensions of spectacles and, inspired by Foucaultian notions of the disciplinary state, expands to a politics of spectacles in which official public ceremonies in Syria are seen not only as “instances of state intervention,” but at the same time of contestation (Wedeen 1999). Her study looks at state-sponsored public spectacles, understood as “systems of representation,” that do not find translation into daily life. This Syrian context, however,
differs in multiple and diverse ways from the case of Puerto Rico. Nonetheless, if seen strictly through the study of state-sponsored events, Wedeen’s perspective can be useful when considering the challenges and negotiations between the state and other social actors at instances beyond the representational.

When it comes to literature about events production, there is an abyss of work in media and cultural studies. The logistics and practices of events production are better developed in other disciplines such as anthropology of performance and urban studies (Peterson 2007, Peterson 2010), and in a few studies on international trade expositions and specific events in management and business administration (Jackson 2008; Moeran & Pedersen 2011). These studies focus on organizational practices in relation to one or more social actors involved in events production, including the state. Similarly, literature on the history of live performing arts and events (Amorós & Díez 1999; Cohen 2008) and music industry studies (Bennett & Peterson 2004; Burnett 1996) help to support a growing area of inquiry, though dispersed both by fields of study and geographic location.8 The same pattern is seen in Puerto Rico where, despite a long-standing events production industry, only a handful of publications besides journalistic articles on live-music events or events in general have been produced.

In chronological order, the first publication related to events production in Puerto Rico was José Ramón Abad’s memoirs on a pioneering international trade fair and exposition produced in the municipality of Ponce in 1882 (Abad 1885). Almost a century after, music scholar Katherine Dover published a study entitled *Puerto Rican Music Following the Spanish American War*, which indirectly helped to map the live-music

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8 Contributions to this area of inquiry are also found in political anthropology, but from the perspective of the conditions of reception and political action (e.g., Mattern 1998).
events scene in that era in the island (Dover 1983). Late 20th Century scholarship includes journalist Javier Santiago’s research on the musical revolution in the 1960s in Puerto Rico (Santiago 1994), which offers useful detailed historical information on the artists and their managers, and often about the venues and events where they performed during that decade. An examination of more contemporary events is cultural anthropologist Arlene Dávila’s book on cultural politics in Puerto Rico, which focuses on corporate sponsorship and cultural nationalism (Dávila 1997). Hers is a contribution to the history of the institutionalization of national culture in Puerto Rico vis-à-vis cultural festivals, similar but not equal to the focus in this dissertation on these and other kind of live events, such as carnivals and patron-saint fests. My research expands upon these studies to explore similar objects of study, but reaches different conclusions. I consider that Dávila generalizes when she argues for the “sponsored identities” of the producers of the cultural festivals that she observed. Drawing from the representational dimensions of these festivals, she deduces that the organizers ‘selling’ of their identities to corporate sponsorship not only reduces the role of the producers vis-à-vis the market, but also neglects the complex logistics and practices of the production of these events in a neocolonial context like Puerto Rico. My dissertation focuses, by contrast, on the how; therefore in order to explore how events production is conducted, the voices of those who produce need to be included. Other dimensions cannot be overlooked as well, such as the fact that the state is the principal producer of events on the island, that events production as a practice first became professionalized in the private sector, and that individuals in each of the social sectors may challenge national culture in different and very particular ways. This is why Dávila’s work will be one of the first interlocutors in this dissertation.
Other works related to events production in Puerto Rico are Rosalina Torres-Ramos’s master thesis which explores the role of live-music events producers as entrepreneurs within the specific context of the inauguration of a public venue early in the 2000s (i.e., the Coliseo de Puerto Rico José Miguel Agrelot) that was administered by a transnational corporation (TNC or SMG, formerly Spectator Management Group) (Torres Ramos 2005). Moreover, a recent collection of Norma Pujal’s stories based on over 35 years of experience in the entertainment industry focuses on social actors involved in live-events production in general, though it is not an in-depth study (Pujal 2009). Pujal’s work required me to analyze her stories further in order to expand them into an in-depth study that makes sense to professionals like her. Due to the limited scholarship that exists on events production in Puerto Rico and elsewhere, my scrutiny of memoirs went beyond Pujal’s work to other collections of stories on broadcast media literature. For instance, José Luis Torregrosa’s *Historia de la Radio en Puerto Rico* (1991) and Beba García’s *¡Juan, Juan, Juan! Crónicas de la televisión en los tiempos de don Tommy* (2009) were useful resources from which to construct a map of not only the social actors in general but also the particular people identified with the logics and practices of events production.

The connection between live-music events production and broadcast media is not arbitrary. As it can be drawn from Torregrosa and García during the era of radio broadcasting in Puerto Rico in the 1920s and television in the 1950s, live-music events producers worked to find ‘gigs’ for musicians in Puerto Rico and connect local musicians with artists and entertainment producers across Latin America and the Caribbean. In this

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9 Founded in 1977, SMG administers over 230 facilities worldwide (SMG n.d.). I will return to this TNC in Chapter 3.
dissertation, I examine more closely the cultural and political impact of these regional networks of cultural producers during the Cold War in terms of Puerto Rican cultural policy of U.S. as well as local actors. With the end of the Cold War and the emerging process of economic liberalization, the existing networks of live music changed within what we understand as the era of globalization. Scrutinization of the limited numbers of published memoirs helped me to trace how cultural producers involved in this field of cultural production at different local, regional and translocal levels in the era of globalization have negotiated and at times contested the terms of national culture, as defined by the neocolonial state in Puerto Rico.

As evidenced in the work of Sujatha Fernandes (2006), the process of locating the historical formation of local, regional and translocal networks of cultural producers will help us make more meaningful sense of subsequent cultural formations and what we might today recognize as a “transnational cultural space.” Therefore, I trace the competing networks that exist at the local level (private investors, the state and municipalities), regional level (entertainment producers from Latin America and the Caribbean), and translocal level (the Latino/a diaspora, mostly in the U.S.). I limited the scope of my research even more to include only four types of state-sponsored live-music events in Puerto Rico (i.e., the San Sebastián Street’s Festival, Ponce’s Carnival, Jayuya’s National Indigenous Festival, and Loíza’s Patron-Saint Fests), which represent links to different spatial scales as well as other socio-cultural dimensions.10 The logistics of production of these four events also differ in the ways that entertainment producers relate to the state and its national cultural policy in Puerto Rico.

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10 These events are among the most attended by the public in Puerto Rico and exemplify the kind of events ruled directly or indirectly by the Law 223 of 2004, discussed in Chapter 5 (i.e., state-sponsored live-music events).
In this dissertation, I will continue to examine these networks of events production in terms of national culture and national cultural policy, understood as the set of practices and ideas that “provide a means of reconciling contending cultural identities by holding up the nation as an essence that transcends particular interests” (Miller & Yúdice 2002, 8). The main questions driving my research will be addressed through chapters on:

a) the history of the entertainment industry and artistic flows prior to national cultural policy in Puerto Rico;

b) the relationship among the state, its national cultural policy, and the entertainment industry in the neocolonial era until neoliberalism in Puerto Rico; and,

c) the cultural legacies and practices of the entertainment industry in Puerto Rico and the regional and translocal links from the 1970s to present, as the state reshapes national culture through policy in a neoliberal context and a global new media and cultural industries landscape.

1.3 Theoretical overview

This dissertation is located at the intersection of two bodies of literature:

1) scholarship from post-colonial cultural studies of cultural industries and cultural policy and
2) cultural approaches to scholarship on collective action and state-civil society relationships within neoliberal contexts in Latin America and the Caribbean. Together, these perspectives will contribute to explaining the historical, socio-cultural, economic,
and geopolitical complexities of the neocolonial state in Puerto Rico as it continues to struggle with “dislocated processes of modernization and neocolonial power” (Martín-Barbero, 1999). At the same time, these perspectives help to make sense of the Puerto Rican entertainment industry over time up to the current context of neoliberalism.

1.3.1 Critical post-colonial cultural studies of cultural industries and cultural policy

In order to address the debates about cultural industries and cultural policy in Puerto Rico, it is helpful to build on a historical analysis of the hegemonic character of what media sociologist Thomas Streeter (1996) has called “corporate liberalism,” defined as a contested socio-cultural project that favors corporations and limits the state. Following Spanish colonial rule until 1898, the U.S. imposed military governors until 1948 and intervened in almost every aspect of political life as well as the state’s organization in Puerto Rico (Picó, 2009). In addition to political life, U.S. colonial intervention had an impact on social and economic aspects, which altogether, as Streeter asserts, “not only reflect but are necessary to the creation of the corporate economy” (Streeter, 1996, 39). As I have argued in a previous paper,11 there is a neocolonial dimension to the U.S. corporate liberal ideas and values. This dimension needs to be analyzed historically in order to study how the politics of U.S. policy and regulation ignored local complexities, thereby providing opportunities to challenge the empire and ‘take it by surprise’ via cultural production and cultural exchanges within the entertainment industry in Puerto Rico, which is not regulated by the U.S.

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The fact that local and regional cultural exchanges through the entertainment industry, especially music flows, evolved into translocal cultural spaces that could challenge both the imperial power and the local state in Puerto Rico is an important aspect related to cultural industries and cultural policy. With this in mind and considering the fact that “the U.S. has remained very much on the periphery […] in terms of cultural policy research” (Miller & Yúdice, 2002, 3), I will draw from scholarship that expands the analysis of public policy of media and communication to the study of power relations (e.g., Chakravartty & Sarikakis, 2006). These authors argue that policymaking is an inherently political process that in the context of postcolonial societies needs to be understood within the legacy of colonialism and developmental processes. These scholars’ view that liberalization is linked to the legacy of empire is useful for analyzing non-media cultural industries and similar contexts in Latin America and the Caribbean, such as the case of the entertainment industry in Puerto Rico. Media policy researcher Braman (2004), also focusing on the politics of policymaking, incorporates the notion of ‘structuration of power’ within her analyses of media policies. She argues that when analyzing media [and cultural] flows in general terms, not only media policy but also information policy has to be considered in order to account for inevitable links among the processes of production/creation, processing, flows, and use of ‘media products’ (20-21). This is precisely why I turn to the history and development of broadcasting in Puerto Rico in search of these inevitably links that add to the understudied history of the entertainment industry in this region. My research will add a much needed cultural production and cultural labor’s perspective to this literature on the sociopolitical aspects
of policymaking, which in the case of Puerto Rico has been built on a corporate economic model along with unequal developmental processes.

In order to compare the historical facts of the case of the state and the entertainment industry in Puerto Rico vis-à-vis regional and translocal links within a neoliberal and global new media and cultural industries context, I will draw from research of Latin American critical cultural studies scholars (García-Canclini, 2001; Martín-Barbero, 1987; Mato, 2009; Grimson & Mato, 2007; Quintero Rivera, 2009; Yúdice, 2003). These authors question not only the Frankfurt School theorists’ notion of cultural industries as instruments of a modern project of mass deception (Adorno, 1982; Benjamin, 2003; Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002), but also the project of modernization and the forms it has taken in Latin America and the Caribbean both historically and during the neoliberal globalization era. Moreover, I will build from scholarship of what has been called a “culture economy” approach, which expands from traditional media and cultural studies and political economy of media and cultural industries with the assumption that “economic and organizational life is built up, or assembled from, a range of disparate, but inherently cultural, parts” (du Gay & Pryke, 2002, 12; Negus, 1999). What these authors call ‘cultural economy’ is an attempt to treat economy as culture, that is, as a discourse constitutive of and constituted by symbols and power struggles at different scales, especially within the context of network societies. They also maintain that “economics are performed and enacted by the very discourses of which they are supposedly the cause” (du Gay & Pryke, 2002, 6), a thought that is helpful for avoiding technocratic and economically narrow analyses on the politics and history of cultural industries and
cultural policy. I will draw from work from these perspectives in order to perform a cultural study of the state’s role in terms of producing culture in Puerto Rico.

My work also will follow recent scholarship that questions the theory of cultural imperialism and combines political economy analysis with cultural studies, activism and policy studies (Chakravartty & Zhao, 2008). This scholarship has been enriched by a postcolonial critique on local social contexts in relation to legacies of colonialism and empire. This critique is also latent in contributions from the Anglophone Caribbean, such as the work of Hopeton S. Dunn who argues that “the academic prognoses of the imminent demise or ‘synchronization’ of cultural identities have not yet been confirmed despite the region being a classic ‘victim’ of ‘cultural imperialism’” (Dunn, 1999, 11). “Cultural resistance in the Caribbean continues to be strong.” Moreover, Dunn shows that “countervailing patterns of global diversity and fragmentation have also emerged to defy the existing order from below” (Dunn, 1995, xiii). Even though much of this literature comes from scholars working on politically sovereign nation states, what is at stake is the role of the disjuncture between state and national culture, which is still a site of contention in neocolonial Puerto Rico. By turning to a postcolonial critique’s perspective, my dissertation will add to the limited scholarship on the entertainment industry in Puerto Rico; at the same time this research will dialogue with recent similar arguments regarding music performance and cultural exchanges specifically in Puerto Rico and in the Latin American and Caribbean region overall (Quintero Rivera, 2009).

My dissertation thus will explore cultural legacies, but also cultural practices of the entertainment industry in Puerto Rico and links to the Latin American and Caribbean

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12 Dunn referenced “long existing ethnic or religious identities have arisen internally to confront the concept of geographical jurisdiction or of a unified country” (xvii), and exemplifies these patterns through the Muslim militancy in Trinidad & Tobago, among many other examples from abroad.
region as well as to translocal networks. This is why I turn to García-Canclini’s (2001), Negus’s (1999), and Yúdice’s (2003) scholarship on artistic production and industrial workers that frames them not as ‘autonomous fields’ (in Pierre Bourdieu’s terms), but rather as links “in a syntagmatic chain that extends from the creation of the artist’s studio to the marketplace of private galleries” (García Canclini, 2001, xiv). Without denying the fact that cultural products have been commodified, I hope to build on this tradition that strives to make sense of the ways in which cultural production is embedded in “practices, interpretation, and ways of life” of cultural producers and industry workers (Negus, 1999, 3), practices that, as cultural critic George Yúdice argues, relate to the state and shape cultural and artistic expression. Culture, defined as “structured fields of force,” is extended national and regionally through these cultural and artistic expressions (Yúdice, 2003, 4). Under these conditions, as Yúdice says, “culture is much more than a commodity” (ibid, 1). It is “the lynchpin of a new framework in which ideology and the “disciplinary society” (in Michel Foucault’s terms) are absorbed into an economic or “ecological’ rationality.” This rationality is neoliberalism: “a set of policies” that “reduce and privatize the social and the cultural” (7).

I also will follow García-Canclini (2001) and Yúdice’s (2003) general idea on the state and its coercive mechanisms which persist alongside an accelerating global political economy. In this context, as Yúdice asserts, the state must deal with “transnational networks of power” through which accumulation – in the form of cultural capital – flows (Yúdice 2003, 304). The culturalization of the so-called new economy, according to Yúdice, is based “on the expropriation of the value of cultural and mental labor” which aided by new information and communication technologies (ICTs) has become “the basis
of a new [cultural] division of labor” (ibid, 19). In the context of globalization which, for Yúdice, “has pluralized the contacts among diverse peoples and has facilitated migrations,” culture is used as a national expedient. Therefore, culture is defined as a resource for socioeconomic development.

In the case of the neocolonial state in Puerto Rico, the U.S. has limited the local state’s ability to participate in most of these transnational networks of political and economic power. In this sense, García-Canclini and Yúdice’s arguments would not apply to the case of the state in Puerto Rico. Entertainment production in Puerto Rico, however, has been mostly a commercial practice historically connected to regional and translocal cultural spaces even before the invention of broadcasting in the 1920s. This is why an understanding of how local entertainment producers relate to the state in Puerto Rico as well as to the landscape of global new media and cultural industries – regardless of the political and economic limits of the legacy of colonialism and empire in Puerto Rico – is one of this dissertation’s main questions.

1.3.2 Collective action and state-civil society relationships in neoliberal contexts

In this study, I also will engage with recent interdisciplinary discussions about culture, politics, and globalization in Latin America and the Caribbean, within fields such as political science (Fernandes, 2006) and social theory emanating from anthropology, social movements, and collective action (Alvarez, Dagnino, & Escobar, 1998). This interdisciplinary research is linked by a question about the relationship between the state and civil society within the context of neoliberalism, and by a particular focus on culture.
and culture production. I will draw from this literature to assess the current context of neoliberalism and global new media and cultural industries.

Furthermore, I will borrow from Sujatha Fernandes (2006) the notion of ‘transnational cultural space,’ which refers to “spaces of cultural struggle and critique” that are “linked to forces […] beyond the nation” (15). As in the case of Cuba studied by Fernandes, transnational cultural exchanges have existed in Puerto Rico before the 1920s among cultural producers from the entertainment industry, music and other performing artists. In order to analyze how these cultural spaces emerge in Puerto Rico and are organized often around independent groups, I will borrow from the work of Alvarez, Dagnino, & Escobar (1998). These authors argue that social movements and collective action have been facing new antagonisms in the current neoliberal era, often associated with disciplinary politics in relation to ‘civil society’ and individuals. They propose the term ‘cultural politics’ – borrowed from cultural studies – to describe how social movements actually and concretely translate or resignify their demands for democracy, within an increasingly fragile panorama in Latin America (5-10). An important characteristic of cultural politics is, as Alberto Melucci (1996) also argues, that it is not necessarily visible. Considering this argument, my dissertation will require a cultural ethnography approach to research methodology in order to describe how local entertainment producers organize and how they are linked, if at all, to local, regional and translocal networks and to the state as it reshapes Puerto Rico’s national culture through recent policies about live-music and live music events. I also will borrow from this literature to analyze the most recent period of my research, which includes conflicts between COPEP and independent groups of musicians who organized through online
social networks, especially through mailing-lists and online groups with over 1,000 members.\textsuperscript{13}

The purpose of locating my research at this interdisciplinary intersection is the need to describe how cultural exchanges and links have emerged and changed over time in complex and often contradictory ways, without romanticizing or reducing them to ‘mere representation’ or ‘mere politics.’ As Fernandes points out, “while the creation of transnational communities has been an important result of globalization, these communities do not always emerge in opposition to or to the detriment of national frames of belonging” (15). Moreover, following Puerto Rican cultural studies scholar Ángel G. Quintero-Rivera, these transnational communities have a long historical existence, in which culture flows not only through organized cultural producers but also through migration and other processes of internationalization that date back to the Spanish colonial rule (Quintero Rivera, 2009).

1.4 Historical overview

Although I acknowledge that a revisionist perspective towards the history of the local neocolonial state in Puerto Rico must consider the Spanish colonial legacies, the empirical part of this dissertation starts in the period after World War II. This is the period of the era of the professionalization of live events production in Puerto Rico which, as I mentioned earlier, coincides with the transition to the local state’s neocolonial era. In this section, I will provide an historical overview of that period of the organization

\textsuperscript{13} Some of these groups are: 1) Fans de la música Boricua (or Puerto Rico’s Music Fans); 2) Apoyo ley música autóctona de PR ¡Que se mantenga y se cumpla con el 30%! (or I support Puerto Rico’s autochthonous music. Keep and obey the 30%); and 3) Músicos borikuas defienden su cultura a bombazo contra los políticos abusadores (or Puerto Rican musicians in defense of their culture through a bombazo against abusive politicians). Bombazo refers to street performances and improvising through bomba.
of the neocolonial state in which national culture and national cultural policy were reframed from Americanization into a cultural nationalist project that was later institutionalized.

1.4.1 Organization of the local neocolonial state: From Americanization to Puertorriqueñidad (1945-1952)

Puerto Rico is best assessed as a neocolonial state in two ways: first, by its direct transition from Spanish to U.S. colonial rule; and second, through the local state’s organization subordinated to a U.S. corporate liberal framework, which directly structured public policy in Puerto Rico. I maintain that there is a tendency to neglect this neocolonial condition while asserting that the post-War period was the era of institutionalization of culture and cultural policy in Puerto Rico, as if there had been no local state’s organizations and cultural institutions before the contemporary period. Thus, in order to revise national cultural policy in Puerto Rico, it is important to affirm from the start what this policy’s development inherited from a neocolonial state that was built on the legacy of Spanish colonialism to install what sociologists César Ayala and Rafael Bernabe call “a policy of cultural imposition or «Americanization»” (Ayala & Bernabe, 2007, 210). This cultural project of Americanization of the Puerto Rican state is perfectly captured by a legal historian describing a similar process in the Philippines in the following way:

To construct the...colonial government, American military and civil officials built on the remnants of the Spanish colonial administrative structure, staffed it with American personnel, operated it using American practices, employed it to pursue American-style modernization projects, animated it with American principles, and justified its activities within the American liberal constitutional tradition. (Castañeda, 2009, 365)
In Puerto Rico, similar actions were summed up by other examples, such as the separation of powers doctrine, the commemoration of U.S. Federal holidays, and the imposition of English as the official language in public schools. Regarding Americanization and public education up to the 1930s, Aida Negrón de Montilla (1998) traced the development of an alphabetization program through the creation of the system of *Instrucción Pública* (i.e., an early form of today’s Department of Education) and school laws, including one that promoted teacher education in what later became the University of Puerto Rico. This project of Americanization was certainly complex with extensive influence on policymaking in Puerto Rico and other colonies of the U.S. But it is important to note that in Puerto Rico, as in the case of the Philippines, Americanization occurred over “the remnants of the Spanish colonial administrative structure,” which somehow represents a continuation rather than a sharp rupture with the previous colonial regime.

The American liberal constitutional tradition was imposed on U.S. colonies and supported by the military, accentuating its imperial character. As historians Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano explain, U.S. imperialism is another example of “a form of global governance in which a dominant power exercises control over the destiny of others through direct territorial rule (e.g. colonies) or indirect influence (e.g. military, economic, or cultural leverage)” (McCoy & Scarano, 2009, 4). A particular fact that exemplifies the power of the U.S. over Puerto Rico – which somehow justifies multiple recent revisions of the island’s history, including mine on national cultural policy – was the use of local knowledge of the island’s history and people for the empire’s purposes. This reliance on local knowledge was seen when the Spanish colonial archives were
transferred from San Juan to Washington (Schmidt-Nowara, 2009, 230). Yet U.S. imperialism, when mixed with local politics, resulted in a particular neocolonial state’s organization in Puerto Rico in 1952, the *Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico* (‘Commonwealth’ of Puerto Rico, or ELA). The ELA resembled the Philippines first local state’s organization. Puerto Rico’s neocolonial history, however, bifurcates from the Philippines’s case since Puerto Ricans were granted U.S. citizenship with no promise of independence, while the Philippines were not granted U.S. citizenship but achieved their independence in 1946 (Burnett 2009, 340-341). As Rick Baldoz and César Ayala point out, rationales such as “geographic proximity” along with racial, demographic, economic, and strategic military purposes “were given to explain the disparate treatment of Puerto Ricans and Filipinos” (Baldoz & Ayala, 2013, 76-105).

The creation of the ELA was contested and marked by tensions both locally and regionally in the 1940s (e.g., the emergence of regional national-populist movements in Latin America and the Caribbean, local politicians’ demands for Puerto Rico’s independence, and claims mostly from the Nationalist Party and its leader Pedro Albizu Campos against the construction and settlement of U.S. military bases on the island. The U.S. already had established the state of law in Puerto Rico that modified the previous Spanish colonial structure and separated the governmental authority into three branches: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. As Castañeda argues, this was “[a]mong the most important modifications introduced by American colonial policy makers to the Spanish government structure” (Castañeda, 2009, 368-369). In the 1940s, local politicians were allowed to run for the local Senate and House of Representatives in
Puerto Rico. These local politicians collaborated with the colonial regime to institute and secure the New Deal policies on the island.

In 1946, the U.S. appointed the first Puerto Rican governor to the island, Jesús T. Piñero. Governor Piñero did not calm the political tensions on the island, but instead drew from the already organized autonomist movement to develop an anti-nationalist populist counterdiscourse in Puerto Rico (Rodríguez Vázquez, 2004). Piñero is shamefully remembered for passing the Ley de la mordaza or Gag Law, an anti-communist and anti-democratic law that declared illegal any expression in favor of Puerto Rico’s independence from the U.S. This law extremely hurt the pro-independence (independentista) movement, putting in jail many independentistas and forcing exile of many others to the U.S. The Gag Law can be understood as the local equivalent to the controversial Internal Security Act of 1950 in the U.S., commonly known as the McCarran Act.

After a period of crisis in the local politics, some political parties and coalitions dissolved while the Partido Popular Democrático (Popular Democratic Party, or PPD), presided by Senator Luis Muñoz Marín, “was ratified by unprecedented margins” (Picó, 2009, 266-268). In 1947, as historian Fernando Picó adds, “[the U.S.] Congress approved an amendment to the Jones Law which made the position of governor of Puerto Rico an elective one” (ibid, 271). In November 1948, Muñoz Marín won the elections and became Puerto Rico’s first elected governor (ibid). The PPD promoted job creation through a series of state initiatives within the context of striking poverty and illiteracy on the island. A shift from an agrarian society to an industrial and urbanized was planned and roughly imposed on Puerto Rican society. This transformation included agrarian

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14 The Jones Law of 1917 conferred US citizenship to Puerto Ricans.
reforms and an expansionist view linked to a New Deal’s residual strategy for economic development that included the creation of public corporations to offer basic services or developmentalist planning, such as the Economic Development Administration (Fomento Económico, now known as the Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company or PRIDCO). Along the lines of this corporate liberal model, the PPD and PRIDCO’s director Teodoro Moscoso built up an extreme component of the developmentalist state known as Operación Manos a la Obra (Operation Bootstrap), which historically has proved to intensify Puerto Rico’s dependency on both U.S. Federal incentives on the one hand and foreign capital investment on the other. Instead of promoting industrial production through local state-owned companies to serve the needs of the internal economy, this developmentalist-dependant model actually relied more on private capital and external investment which was ‘invited’ to produce goods in a tax-excepted zone what was later exported to the U.S. free market (Picó, 2009, 271; Scarano, 1993, 723). Following Picó, the industrial activity included manufacturing and construction firms, professional services, banking, and tourism (ibid, 271-272). Tourism, as I will expand on in the next chapter, tried to cover up poverty and other social issues on the local level. As historian David Sheinin sustains in reference to Cuba and Puerto Rico, “[t]he image of islands as bombing grounds contradicts a different Cold War-era Caribbean fantasy: the islands as paradise” (Sheinin, 2011, 495). Together with the ‘fiesta island,’ this image is still an epithet used to promote tourism in Puerto Rico. Cultural artistic production – such as live-music events closely linked to the hotel circuits on the island during that period and developed parallel and consonant to these political and economic transformations – is rarely mentioned in similar historical accounts.
The economic policies adopted by the PPD in Puerto Rico were promoted by the U.S. to advance its corporate liberal model in the region. These policies included Operation Bootstrap’s developmentalist ‘industrialization by invitation’ plan and trading agreements with the U.S. The strategy of ‘industrialization by invitation’ was formulated by Saint Lucian Nobel Laureate Arthur Lewis and consisted of “attracting foreign capital through a series of incentives” (ECLAC 2005, 1). As described in a recent United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report, foreign capital was a means of overcoming limitations to industrial development imposed by the small volume of trade of Caribbean economies. It was also a means of acquiring entrepreneurial skills and capital resources which were lacking in small developing economies. (ibid)

In Puerto Rico, as seen in the ECLAC report, ‘industrialization by invitation’ adopted a two-stage strategy. First, the local state would provide the social capital and the required infrastructure financed by the U.S. capital market and local taxes, all supported by government policies and intended to stimulate the expansion of private investment on the island. And second, once these policies paved the way for settlement of U.S. firms on the island, those firms would be ‘invited’ to take advantage of local state incentives such as “tax concessions, grants, subsidized rentals and utility rates and low wage rates” (ECLAC, 2005, 9-10). Manufacturing and pharmaceutical firms benefited the most from these policies, as well as tourism firms. In terms of cultural industries, as I will describe in the next chapter, the settlement of international hotels on the island – such as the Hilton – represented an important fact to consider when studying live-events production on the island. The hotels added new venues where artists could perform, but also brought sociopolitical friction among artists and producers who tried to access these venues. Also, both artists and producers were exposed to artistic networks abroad through tourism,
neither free from such cultural politics. Cultural politics, as a concept developed in British cultural studies to describe social relationships in different historical periods, has evolved from its representational character into different critical “relational” redefinitions. I borrow from the Latin American perspective which defines cultural politics “as the process enacted when sets of social actors shaped by, and embodying, different cultural meanings and practices come into conflict with each other” (Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998). As seen through the bomba – a traditional Afro-Puerto Rican rhythm and dance – cultural politics acted to limit geographies where it could be performed in part because of venues’ decisions and also because, as music historian María Luisa Muñoz argues, it was “ghettoized within certain «folkloric» families” (Muñoz, in Quintero Rivera 2009, 46). This demonstrates that each element in a network of artistic production, in this case the owners of venues or artists, has its own particular practices that may operate under different and mutually exclusive logistics. In the case of Puerto Rico then (and now), the venues’ control over who can perform what and where along with who has access to these performances, became not only problematic but also emblematic of a classist and racist society subjected to local political pressures and changes, such as the stressed cultural politics of the period after the World War II and the New Deal developmental policies imposed on the island.

Since the ‘industrialization by invitation’ strategies were tested first in Puerto Rico, they became known as “the Puerto Rican model,” as anthropologist Donald Robotham notes (Robotham 1998). Local nationalist movements in the Caribbean borrowed from this “Puerto Rican model” of ‘industrialization by invitation,’ “which had a profound effect on the policies adopted” in the region (Robotham 1998, 310). As
Robotham argues, “the Caribbean's relationships to the outside world in this period sought to exclude the direct impact of the global marketplace on the local Caribbean economies and to articulate with the world economy through a series of special, privileged arrangements” (ibid). Those special economic relationships with the U.S. throughout Latin America and the Caribbean – especially related to trading – were similar to other Cold War agreements with ally economies, from Taiwan and South Korea to the Philippines. In this context, a wave of Caribbean national identities, including a ‘Puerto Rican national identity’ constructed to ‘ease’ the fast-track economic changes, was forged precisely amidst the ambivalences between the local and the transnational due to the flow of foreign capital as well as the colonial legacy in the region. But despite the power of transnational capital flows and the geographical and geopolitical proximity of the U.S. to the Caribbean, empire and capital were not fully successful or hegemonic because of local politics. The ‘Puerto Rican national identity’ served for overseas promoting for tourism, investing in the island, and generating a sense of belonging to a ‘free but associated state’ that prevented total U.S. imperial control over Puerto Ricans. This identity formation constituted a complex political culture configured by the PPD that has come to make up part of the distinctive structure of the local state.

The PPD administered the neocolony in a ‘Puerto Rican’ way through a particular form of nationalist culture known as *puertorriqueñidad*. This notion of *puertorriqueñidad* (Puerto Rican national identity or ‘Puerto Ricanness’) was the first attempt to alter the project of Americanization imposed by the U.S. in Puerto Rico. As Ayala & Bernabe emphasize, since 1948 this *puertorriqueñista* notion from which Operation Bootstrap emerged was simultaneously fueled by:
(…) other elements associated with nationhood in the postwar world: an official flag and anthem and representation in international sport competitions, whose impact in generating a sense of collective self in a world of nations has been underlined by several historians. (Ayala & Bernabe 2007, 209)

These nationalist elements, plus the PPD’s victory bringing back Spanish as the official language at public schools, shaped and were shaped by the PPD within the postwar and Cold War context, which was also the context of postcolonization processes and the catalyst for new national identities in the Caribbean and in countries abroad. These postcolonization processes fueled local uprisings by independentistas and nationalists, thus providing strong evidence that the PPD’s power was not as stable as it appeared. For example, in 1950, as noted by Picó, “Nationalist groups joined forces in the attack on police headquarters and other government establishments” (2009, 276). The attacks included La Fortaleza at the Old San Juan, other towns in San Juan, and municipalities such as Utuado and most notably in Jayuya. The attacks were replicated in the U.S. when “nationalists attacked Blair House in Washington, where President Truman was residing while the White House was being refurbished” (ibid).

After the apparent rapid success of the political economic project of the PPD, that generation of Puerto Ricans who were connected to the rest of the world by diverse means outside the narrow view of Americanization – including commercial events producers – acted as ‘a nation to be’ but without a sovereign state in political or economic terms. They expressed their values and hopes through an ambivalent ‘national’ culture that both challenged the U.S. in cultural terms and those complicit in political and economic terms with the U.S. liberal developmentalist and anti-nationalist model. That aspect of Puerto Rican national culture held onto U.S. citizenship while claiming and
reaffirming a ‘Puerto Rican cultural citizenship’ that resembles more an experience of translocality, as Renato Rosaldo (1997) conceptualizes it, but with no necessary or immediate physical displacement.\(^\text{15}\)

The notion of *puertorriqueñidad* was embedded in the PPD’s promotion of a constituent assembly that resulted in a non-traditional relationship with the U.S. since 1952: the ELA. Picó calls it “a new concept of the state” (2009, 265), while Ayala and Bernabe call the ELA “an exception” or “the Puerto Rican anomaly,” in view of the fact that it is an unincorporated organized territory of a new colonial empire that was built upon the basis of liberalism while ignoring Puerto Rico’s colonial legacy (Ayala & Bernabe, 2007, 28). I agree with Scarano (1993) who suggests that the ELA entailed the abandonment of the ideals of Puerto Rico’s independence that were concretized when the United Nations took the island out of the list of colonies in 1953 and cleared the reputation of the U.S. as a ‘democratic’ and ‘non-colonial’ empire.

### 1.4.1.1 From national(ist) culture to national cultural policy

The historical transition to the ELA is important to an understanding of the more contemporary period in which the state promoted a form of Puerto Rican national culture that used national populism and more specifically cultural nationalism as tools for advancing a wider sociopolitical project. Scholars of different disciplines within the social sciences and the humanities have conceptualized cultural nationalism and

\(^{15}\) The fact that this cultural citizenship has not yet been officially acknowledged by the U.S. and UNESCO adds a dimension of constant national identity reaffirmation attached to Puerto Rico, similar to what Toby Miller observes in the case of immigrants in the U.S. who also go through what he calls “a crisis of belonging” (Miller, 2007, 1).
discussed it in relation to the Puerto Rican context and cultural policy. For instance, political scientist José J. Rodríguez-Vázquez drew from the works of Partha Chatterjee in India and postcolonial studies scholars elsewhere to build in an in-depth analysis of the discourse of the nation and nationalism in the Puerto Rican intellectual debates (Rodríguez Vázquez, 2004). Rodríguez locates nationalism within the context of modernity, as “one of its principal political discourses” linked to other ideological expressions, such as liberalism and romanticism, and as a political phenomenon of the 18th Century which expanded to Europe and the Americas in the 19th Century (ibid, 19, personal translation). He warns that “an ethnic” or cultural nationalism “at first could function as an integrative discourse [especially in postcolonial contexts], but ends up tracing frontiers that prevents political unity and interstate conviviality” (ibid, 25, personal translation). In Puerto Rico, as Rodríguez-Vázquez indicates, nationalism was problematic from the start, forged principally around three distinct ideological-political eras linked to the thoughts of writer Antonio S. Pedreira and his notion of a nation that needed to be rescued, to the critical thoughts of radical pro-independence political leader Albizu Campos, and to the thoughts of populist political leader Muñoz Marín.

Dávila’s definition of cultural nationalism frames this concept not as encompassing apolitical development, “but as part of a shift in the terrain of political action to the realm of culture and cultural politics, where the idiom of culture constitutes a dominant discourse to advance, debate, and legitimate conflicting claims (Dávila, 1997, 3). She distinguishes the case of Puerto Rico as an example of cultural nationalism “to highlight the particular circumstances that led to the current emphasis on cultural distinctiveness, over concrete political boundaries and definitions, as the primary
determinant of national identity” (ibid, 9). Furthermore, she argues that cultural nationalism in Puerto Rico is:

a direct result of the limits imposed by colonialism on the development of a politically defined nation-state, which led to the emphasis on culture as Puerto Rico’s “domain of sovereignty” [also citing Chatterjee], a realm wherein the local government could establish a degree of autonomy even under colonial control. (Ibid, 10-11)

Her work on cultural politics in Puerto Rico shows that cultural nationalism and its notion of cultural distinctiveness have “no significance for anticolonial politics,” but still are important for political mobilization beyond the issues of sovereignty and independence (Dávila, 1997, 3). Part of her pessimism may arise from the notion of Puerto Rican cultural nationalism as a result of the state as a whole institution, or from her explicit aversion towards the way “the idiom of culture is increasingly rendered into one more tool to sell consumer goods” (ibid). Even though I agree with her critique about the commodification of culture and how – in the case of Puerto Rico – it may hold up anticolonial politics, my work deviates from Dávila’s in that it combines a description of the local neocolonial state with microanalyses of the contribution of particular individuals within and outside the government whose work may challenge the state overall.

Scholar Jaime Rodríguez-Cancel (2007) borrows from Gregory Jusdanis to define cultural nationalism as “the practices and social relationships that unveil the differences between nations, establishing the fundamentals of the new nations” (72-73, personal translation). He goes on to justify cultural nationalism “as an alternative model to promote integration and the modernization of a national community” when the state’s formation fails, as in the case of Puerto Rico (Rodríguez Cancel, 2007, 75, personal translation). Rodríguez-Cancel believes that cultural nationalism is “a vital manifestation
of our [Puerto Rican] national reaffirmation” (ibid, 13, personal translation). He argues that in Puerto Rico, the political vision and political values were modified through cultural nationalism in the transition years when the ELA was constituted:

[to the extent that the search for sovereignty is substituted by the proposal of the association, the vision of the nation is substituted by that of “the people,” and that of nationality [was substituted] by the concept of “the personality” of the ELA. In this conceptual rearrangement, of important political consequences, the cultural background will be determinant for the survival of the people in the absence of a political nation. (Rodríguez Cancel, 2007, 35; Rodríguez Cancel, 1998, 301-337)

The “conceptual rearrangement” he refers to suggests a resignification of the failure of the local state’s sovereignty with no anticolonial purpose. But Rodríguez-Cancel would not say it in these words because he believes that the creation of the ELA – which is indeed a local state’s formation – solved the problem. Although I agree with most of his arguments and informed descriptions about the transition period before and after the ELA, the same postwar period that I began studying here, I do not consider Puerto Rico to be already postcolonial but rather neocolonial. Also, that apparently slight “conceptual rearrangement” paved the way for a political culture in which, as Dávila asserts, “[y]et despite their lack of political sovereignty, most Puerto Ricans consider themselves a territorially distinct national unit, a nation defined by its cultural distinctiveness, notwithstanding its political and economic dependency on the U.S.” (Dávila, 1997, 2-3). That was drastic change in the political vision and the political values that I will stress while describing the project of the local neocolonial state and its cultural policies.

Operation Bootstrap, the political economic dimension of that project, had a parallel socio-cultural dimension launched by the PPD in these transition years, known as
Operación Serenidad (Operation Serenity); I will further link this operation to state-sponsored events production in Puerto Rico. Dávila directly associates Operación Serenidad with the PPD’s “government cultural policies” which stimulated “modernity and progress accompanied by the strengthening of cultural pride among the citizenry” (Dávila 1997, 35). Ayala & Bernabe add that the goal of Operación Serenidad was very similar to scholar Pedreira’s idea of “reconciling aesthetic sensibilities and economic progress, ‘culture,’ and ‘civilization’ while retrieving Puerto Rico’s ‘fragmented’ soul” (Ayala & Bernabe, 2007, 210).\textsuperscript{16} Dávila accentuates that Operación Serenidad “involved a romanticization and purification of culture by reference to an ideal past” (Dávila, 1997, 34). In fact, longing for the past was part of the PPD’s national culture agenda that the ELA maintained. But that agenda ran the same fate as the project of Americanization. It never fully succeeded.

The PPD’s puertorriqueñista agenda proposed a new national imagery of the Puerto Rican, disseminated through what Latin American literature scholar Catherine Marsh-Kennerley (2009) calls “the cultural-pedagogical project of the muñocista state” in the era of the PPD’s hegemonic populism, also known as populismo muñocista because of PPD’s leader Muñoz Marín. Marsh-Kennerley’s careful and extensive research on Muñoz’s speeches and documents points to the creation between 1947 and 1949 of the División de Educación a la Comunidad (Community Education Division, or DIVEDCO) as an indicator of the historical transition to a new political culture in Puerto Rico. Following Marsh-Kennerley, this new political culture envisioned education, democracy

\textsuperscript{16} Pedreira’s thought, emblematic of the 1930s in Puerto Rico, has been studied in-depth by Bernabe in multiple works, and by Rodríguez-Vázquez (2004).
and culture as “fundamental axes that complemented the project of industrialization” (ibid, 50, personal translation). Muñoz Marín’s pedagogical project included multiple and recurrent visits to rural and urban communities and the *bateyes* (i.e. an Arawak word that refers to villages, town centers or *plazas*). Activities of popular education were held at these places, from community conversations to special talks and political speeches. Many of these activities were held by the DIVEDCO, a community literacy campaign for adults in rural and urban zones through films and books. Muñoz Marín’s *política del batey* or ‘batey politics’ questioned the then existing political culture in Puerto Rico, yet included an evidently paradoxical notion of change and conservation at the same time. Marsh-Kennerley lists an inventory of “good qualities of the countryside that could get lost, preserved, or improved in the city” that was found in a manuscript written by Muñoz Marín (ibid, 49). I will reproduce it below to illustrate Muñoz Marín’s individual imagery of a good Puerto Rican in transition to modernization through industrialization and migration to industrial zones in the cities, which had contradictory implications for the local state in relation to the U.S. and local artistic producers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Cualidades buenas de campo:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Good qualities of the countryside:</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Serenidad de espíritu</em></td>
<td><em>Serenity of spirit</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Gusto de la tierra</em></td>
<td><em>Appreciation of the land</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Relación humana sencilla</em></td>
<td><em>Simple human relationship</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Manera poética de ver las cosas, o sea, con instintiva hondura</em></td>
<td><em>Poetic point of view, this is, with profundity</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sacarle más satisfacción a menos consumo (aunque claramente el consumo de lo necesario debe seguir aumentándose)</em></td>
<td><em>Satisfaction with less consumerism (though consumerism of what is necessary should clearly increase)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tendencia a mayor desinterés personal y político (cuida ahijados; vota por ideas grandes que en alguna forma general</em></td>
<td><em>Tendency to be apathetic towards the personal and the political (care for godchildren; vote for grand ideas that</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As seen in Marsh-Kennerley, this inventory eventually characterized the cultural-pedagogical production of the DIVEDCO. Note that the inventory is written in the third person and in a somewhat poetic and prescriptive tone, is more similar to religious commandments than to political manifestos, thereby adding another level of complexity to the pedagogic-democratic aspect of the DIVEDCO within the context of the Gag Law, as Marsh-Kennerley’s highlights (ibid, 13). Unlike Dávila (2007), who suggests that national cultural policy was institutionalized with the ELA as a byproduct of Operation Bootstrap, Marsh-Kennerley locates this moment parallel to the creation of the DIVEDCO in the mid and late 1940s. I agree with Marsh-Kennerley’s assertion that the DIVEDCO inaugurated Operación Serenidad, even though it was made official in 1955 when other new institutions were created by the ELA. The DIVEDCO also paved the way for the development of a national cultural policy and the institutionalization of a

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17 Let us remember that before becoming a senator, Muñoz Marín was a poet and journalist.
national culture through governmental agencies and other organizations once the ELA began in 1952, as I will demonstrate in a later section.

Marsh-Kennerley insists that the institutionalization of culture in Puerto Rico started as a popular pedagogical project, not based on notions of “high culture” (Marsh Kennerley 2009, 50). Her main argument is that cultural negotiations occurred at different levels and between different sectors and groups. The *política del batey* required the mobilization and attendance of a variety of communities at meetings and open conversations with political leaders, including Muñoz Marín. These conversations ranged from everyday needs and community organizing to educational sessions on diverse matters relating to the PPD’s *populismo muñocista*, mainly those in the inventory which stimulated cultural nationalism and industrialization at the same time. Simultaneously, the DIVEDCO drew from these popular initiatives and matters to produce state-sponsored films, pamphlets and books for which the recruitment of artistic workers was required for their production, such as writers, actors, actresses, photographers, filmmakers and other specialized people of diverse ideological backgrounds including many *independentistas*. Marsh-Kennerley draws from personal interviews with some of DIVEDCO’s artists, such as Emilio Díaz Varcárcel and Rafael Tufiño, to argue that these artists and producers were hired at for modest salaries, yet still had the “space for building up a new project, not only for the people in the rural sector in Puerto Rico, but also for their personal works of art” (ibid, 76, personal translation). Another example is found in the work of writer René Marqués who defended national sovereignty and openly criticized the *muñocista* politics, among other local state’s projects (ibid, 77). Once again, I will emphasize that individuals – in
this case artists with their own thoughts and intentions – who which may contradict in diverse ways the intentions of different sectors, including the state.

Thus, in contrast to arguments on cultural dirigisme, regardless of the ‘true’ intentions of Muñoz Marín or the PPD, what the local state achieved in the case of this initial popular pedagogic project was a governmental patronage that supported artistic work and production based on the specific needs and interests of the populismo muñocista, but undermined by challenges from the communities and from the artists themselves. Moreover, Rodríguez-Cancel (2007) demonstrates how these cultural negotiations and challenges resulted in contradictory relationships among the local state, the U.S., artists, and producers. The local state, as seen in Rodriguez-Cancel (ibid), became a persecutor of nationalists and independentistas, especially after the local nationalist insurrection in 1950. The local state created its own secret police and began files on individuals, including even those artists and other cultural artistic workers hired in the DIVEDCO by the local state itself. At the same time, the local state was persecuted by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) because of the favorable massive reception of its popular and democratic pedagogic project in the Cold War era.18 Thus, the transition years before and after the ELA were marked by a populismo muñocista that sought to neutralize the nationalist and mostly autonomist connotation of the notion of puertorriqueñidad while at the same time being extremely anti-communist and anti-nationalist.

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18 The persecutor-persecuted character of the local state is also studied in the recent documentary Las Carpetas or ‘The Files,’ produced and directed by Maite Rivera Carbonell (2011). Rodríguez Cancel adds that the U.S. also started a file on Muñoz Marín because of his relationships with other Latin American and Caribbean politicians in the Cold War era.
Another contradiction that resulted from this period is related precisely to governmental patronage for the arts. As seen in the case of the DIVEDCO, the local state launched a sociopolitical project that attempted to calm the violent industrial development plan with a complementary cultural one. These cultural efforts, however, were not marginal to the economic ones and turned the local state into an educator and cultural promoter mostly through artistic production, which then made the U.S. empire suspect of Puerto Rico’s neocolonial administration. Furthermore, once the ELA was established in 1952, the local state became for the first time in Puerto Rico’s history “an active agent” of cultural promotion and reaffirmation through literature and the arts, as Scarano asserts (Scarano, 1993, 794). Indeed, the local state became the principal employer of artists and the principal sponsor of artistic and other kinds of events, such as sports and recreational events. This attainment took place at a time when local commercially-sponsored events were already popular, developing rapidly, and virtually unregulated, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter through the examples of music events producers Tommy Muñiz, Paquito Cordero and Tony Chiroldes. In fact, the spectacles that Muñiz and Cordero produced at the beginning of their careers and presented in patron-saint fests around the island, the caravanas, closely resemble the tours of the DIVEDCO around the Island which visited each municipality and used the town centers or plazas as the point of encounter for various communities. The DIVEDCO tours’ provided strong evidence of the success of the caravanas (i.e., tours organized by commercial events producers). Thus, it would be logical to argue that local commercial events producers borrow from the format by which the DIVEDCO travelled around the island and not the other way around.
As I will also discuss in the next chapter, commercial events producers felt they were somehow lacking attention from the state. Nonetheless, they did not want to get involved with the state, at least initially, as Paquito Cordero notes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADH: ¿Había alguna regla por parte del gobierno o alguna regulación que fomentara o impidiera el desarrollo de las producciones? ¿O usted sentía que había total libertad para producir?</th>
<th>ADH: Was there any governmental rule or regulation to promote or limit the development of events production? Or did you feel total freedom to produce?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paquito Cordero (PC):</strong> No, había total libertad… Todas esas leyes tienen que venir después que la cosa se desarrolla. Cuando está por desarrollarse y tú pones ‘peros’…, entonces no se hace nada.</td>
<td><strong>Paquito Cordero (PC):</strong> No, there was total freedom… All those laws need to come after the thing develops. If you put ‘buts’ during the developing stage …, then nothing is done.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADH: ¿Se detienen los procesos [de producción]?</td>
<td>ADH: Would that stop the [production] processes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(PC):</strong> Se detiene todo. No se hace, punto.</td>
<td><strong>(PC):</strong> Everything stops. It is not done, period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Personal interview, 2008)</td>
<td>(Personal interview, 2008, Personal translation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But inevitably, as I will show in the next chapters, governmental patronage for the arts entered into conflict with commercial events producers as the ELA started to produce events and develop national cultural policy through legal and normative means that were both aligned with and challenged the liberal values in which commercial-sponsored events production developed.

### 1.4.2 Institutionalization of culture and national cultural policy (1952-1960)

National cultural policy and policymaking in general in Puerto Rico since 1952 have been part of a set of practices protected by the Constitution of the ELA but always subordinated to the U.S. Constitution and Federal law. Policymaking of culture in Puerto
Rico also has followed the liberal legal principle that Streeter notes in the case of policy overall in the U.S., which separates the public and the private while intervening through law and politics on behalf of a particular sector, public, private or civil (1996, 16). This kind of governmental intervention through law is only one instrumental characteristic of cultural policy, used as the preferred model for the local neocolonial state. Moreover, governmental interventions through law in the area of culture and the arts in Puerto Rico need to be understood on a wider scale that brings other levels of complexity to the ambivalence around the institutionalization of national culture. For instance, through the point of view of the resonance that had locally the establishment of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 and the widely circulated debates on culture and development held at an international scale by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

UNESCO’s priorities thus were linked to peace reconstitution after the World War II and culture as a fundamental right in which everyone and every nation deserves to participate. As seen in an official report on cultural institutions in Puerto Rico, this was how “a vast field for cultural legislation emerged” linked to further notions of cultural reaffirmation as an axis for economic and social development (Senado de Puerto Rico, 2005, 3-12). This idea of cultural legislation resonated locally and reinforced the idea of making national cultural policy as a legal and normative process in Puerto Rico. This idea of cultural legislation also reinforced a ‘national’ confusion in Puerto Rico, as several of the institutions that the ELA inherited from previous colonial governments and the newly created had the legal authority to administer and implement public policy about culture.
National cultural policy in the ELA was understood as governmental policy and intervention through these institutions, made official by laws and regulations.

Contrary to the case of legal regulation of broadcasting in Puerto Rico which is under total U.S. Federal jurisdiction through the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the local state has had relative autonomous jurisdiction over other socio-cultural aspects in Puerto Rico. I insist on the relative character of this autonomy because it is performed under a neocolonial status and dependant on hundreds of millions of dollars that the U.S. Federal government spends every year to support many local state’s agencies and institutions in Puerto Rico. This is a neocolonial dimension of policymaking about culture in Puerto Rico in relation to the U.S. that has not been widely explored.\(^{19}\) Yet it brings in another set of questions about the relationship between the local state and empire, and the way that national culture was defined and institutionalized in state agencies and organizations in Puerto Rico.

1.4.2.1 The Institute of Puerto Rican Culture (ICP)

Scholar Carmen Dolores Hernández’s memories of Ricardo Alegría Gallardo, ICP’s first executive director, provide evidence that the idea of the ICP may have not emerged solely from the PPD and Muñoz Marín, as has been argued repeatedly in other accounts on the ICP (Hernández, 2002). Apart from Muñoz Marín’s fixation with national culture and the ‘serenity of spirit’ of Puerto Ricans, Hernández makes reference to a conversation between Muñoz Marín and Arnold Miles, “a high-ranking official of the U.S. Bureau of the Budget” (ibid, 156, personal translation). Muñoz Marín had it “in

\(^{19}\) As I have argued elsewhere, there is also a neocolonial dimension of broadcast policy in Puerto Rico that challenges the relationship between the local state and empire (Díaz Hernández, forthcoming). But the local state cannot make policy on broadcasting at all.
mind,” she adds, but the clearest indication of that idea is found in a document that Miles sent him on November 18, 1954 (ibid, 156-157). Miles proposed a socio-cultural program entitled “The Preservation of the Cultural Heritage of Puerto Rico” which considered the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>… procesos como los de investigación e identificación, preservación, restauración, presentación y explotación (para actividades educativas y de servicio público, además de relaciones públicas: se pone de ejemplo el caso de Williamsburg colonial) de los recursos culturales del país, sobre todo de los edificios históricos. (ibid, 156)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>… research and identification, preservation, restoration, presentation and exploitation (for pedagogic and public service activities, plus public relations: the case of colonial Williamsburg is used as example) of the cultural resources of the country, especially the historic buildings.[20]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Miles’s document also suggests the creation of a public corporation in charge of these activities, the Commonwealth Trust for Historical Preservation, which had immediate resonance in Muñoz Marín’s speeches (ibid, 156-157). Months later, Muñoz Marín announced to the legislative branch his intention to create an almost identical project and held a meeting with key state representatives to discuss it. Alegría, then a junior professor at the University of Puerto Rico (UPR) and later the first Executive Director of the ICP, attended that meeting (ibid). Hernández does not specify who invited Alegría and how; but he was there. The fact that the fundamental idea which the ICP forged came from a U.S. state representative brings up questions about Operación Serenidad. It makes this project look – not as one planned by the local state as it is commonly conceptualized in similar accounts – but rather conceived by the U.S.

On April 12 of 1955, *El Mundo* newspaper announced that Ernesto Ramos Antonini, then President of the House of Representatives, presented the Project 1381 that

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[20] Colonial Williamsburg is a restored historic area in Virginia. For more information, see [http://www.history.org/foundation/index.cfm](http://www.history.org/foundation/index.cfm).
would create the ICP (*El Mundo*, 1955, April 12). It was about to become “the clearest example of *puertorriqueñista* policies, which characterized a wing of the PPD,” as seen in Ayala & Bernabe (2007, 209). But the project did not go through without resistance and intense debate from the other wing of the PPD (i.e., *the universalistas*, mostly known as the *occidentalistas* or Eurocentric), as well as from previous and recently created political parties and particular groups, such as the nationalist groups, *independentistas* from the *Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño*, and pro-US annexationists (i.e., pro-statehood members) from the *Partido Estadista Republicano* (Republican Statehood Party, or PER). As Hernández puts it,

| Por una parte se perfilaba un anhelo irredento de sustantividad; un temor de que estuviéramos vendiendo, con nuestra imagen y nuestra mano de obra, nuestra alma a los intereses industriales. Pero muchos pensaban que no era el mismo gobierno que había aplastado a los nacionalistas y que había encarcelado a su máximo y más reverenciado líder, Pedro Albizu Campos, el que podría ponerle remedio a esa situación. Se le percibía más bien como parte del problema de enajenación. (Hernández 2002, 160-161) |
| On the one hand there was an independent will for being; a fear of selling ourselves, our image and our work, our soul to industrial interests. But many other people thought that the remedy to that situation could not come from the same governmental administration that had repressed nationalists and jailed their head and most respected leader, Pedro Albizu Campos. It was seen more as part of the problem of alienation. (Hernández 2002, 160-161 –personal translation) |

What Hernández refers to as the problem of “*enajenación*” or alienation is exactly the recurrent and ambivalent national confusion of the *muñocista* policies. These policies were criticized for their tendency towards cultural dirigisme. The *occidentalistas*, mostly scholars and intellectuals of the UPR, were pro-sovereignty PPD members whose idea of culture was universal rather than narrow or focused on cultural nationalism. They feared that the ICP could serve to stimulate cultural production on the basis of “a program
calculated to serve as support for a political ideology” (José Arsenio Torres, as cited in Hernández, 2002, 161, personal translation).

Concurrently, pro-statehood representatives who were already part of the local government, such as Leopoldo Figueroa and Luis Ferré of the PER, argued against making policy from the PPD’s puertorriqueñista point of view (ibid, 162). Ferré went further and deemed dangerous any attempt to defend culture on the basis of static patterns (ibid). While conceptualizing culture as static and not dynamic is indeed an insular point of view, the PER argument is as dangerous as it warns. It comes from a political party which historically has tried to assimilate or ‘Americanize’ any ideas and values linked to puertorriqueñidad. As Hernández asserts, Ferré even opposed the name of the ICP. He proposed to call it *Instituto Puertorriqueño de Cultura* (Puerto Rican Institute of Culture) instead of *Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña* (Institute of Puerto Rican Culture), which exemplifies the interests of a political party that soon became the PPD’s principal opponent on the island. This debate marked the history of the ICP as a political battlefield. Confrontations did not stop when the ICP was approved by the House and the Senate. On the contrary, every step to develop the ICP was – and is still – controversial.

Contrary to what events producer Paquito Cordero says about legislation on commercial events production in Puerto Rico, in the government sector if a law has not been written and passed, nothing happens. And when something does happen, it occurs within a highly bureaucratized organizational culture that can take months or years to take form. However, the Law 89 to create the ICP was a priority for Muñoz Marín and therefore it passed on June 21, 1955, two months after it was proposed and ten years after a postwar period of changes locally and at every level. The ICP became “the third public
institution on culture in Latin America” and in the Caribbean, preceded only by the ministries of culture in México and Ecuador (Acosta Figueras, 2000). As ICP’s specialist Josilda Acosta-Figueras asserts, “the Institute shares characteristics of the Latin American cultural ministries, and resembles in its structure and functions the Smithsonian Institute, the state agencies for the arts, and the arts councils in the U.S.” (ibid, 34, personal translation).21

The Law 89 that created the ICP has been amended more than a dozen times since its approval in 1955, sometimes more than once in a single government administrative period. For instance, six of these amendments were made to this law during the PPD’s hegemonic era until 1968. The original text of its first section reads,

| Sección 1. - Creación del Instituto - Con el propósito de contribuir a conservar, promover, enriquecer y divulgar los valores culturales del pueblo de Puerto Rico, y para más amplio y profundo conocimiento y aprecio de los mismos, se crea una entidad corporativa que se conocerá como Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña y se designará en adelante como Instituto. (Ley 89 of 1955, citada en Harvey 1993, 191-192) | Section 1. - Creation of the Institute - With the purpose of contributing to preserve, promote, enhance, and disseminate the cultural values of the people of Puerto Rico, and for their ample and deep knowledge and appreciation, a public corporation is created and will be known as the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture, and will be designated from now on as an Institute. (Law 89 of 1955, as cited in Harvey 1993, 191-192, personal translation) |

These were the goals of the national cultural policy that the local state set for the ICP: to “preserve, promote, enhance, and disseminate the cultural values of the people of Puerto

21 However, the ICP’s mission – as developed by Alegría – showed great similarities with other ministries of culture in remote places countries like Tanzania in Africa. Tanzania’s government established ministries of cultures around the same years in the mid-1950s, with the intention of “recovering and recuperating the past” and articulating a “national project of social and cultural unification” (Askew 2002, 13). Alegría, I argue, was acting according to postcolonial trends on cultural policy, instead of being driven only by regional tendencies.
It was clear from the start what the character of the institution was going to be. It was going to guard and reproduce the puertorriqueñista policies at its upper limit. Nonetheless, one thing was said and written while another was actually carried out. As in the case of the DIVEDCO, discussed before through the work of Marsh-Kennerley, the official version of the government was constantly challenged by and negotiated with those hired to administer and work at the ICP.

1.4.2.2 Negotiating the rhetorical and symbolic “in the practice”

The institutionalization of national culture and national cultural policy in Puerto Rico has demonstrated rhetorical, symbolic, and material dimensions. Scholar Lawrence Mankin identified these three dimensions in the case of U.S. governmental patronage for the arts during the New Deal era (Mankin 1982). These dimensions are comparable but also distinct to the patterns noted in the case of governmental patronage in Puerto Rico within the postwar context. For instance, first, the local state constructed a discourse (i.e., the *puertorriqueñidad*) which articulated a set of social practices and actions in a particular context, or conditions of existence, in the Foucaultian sense (Foucault, 1972). For a period of ten years after the end of the WWII, Muñoz Marín and the PPD relied on the rhetoric of cultural nationalism that was used as a poetic and persuasive tool for advancing a socio-cultural and political economic project opposed to political nationalism. This tool went beyond the rhetoric in favor of a political ideology to promote and reproduce a certain political culture in which Puerto Ricans were expected to develop a ‘serene’ personality that did not challenge the neocolonial status, far less through armed forces. For the PPD, the status was resolved with the ELA.
Second, the institutionalization of national culture and national cultural policy in Puerto Rico turned symbolic once the national culture was supported by the local state in speeches, bulletins, conversations with the popular classes as well as in the making of cultural legislation and other official instances. The fact that national cultural policy was and is still understood as a governmental and legal domain is also a symbolic expression, since the neocolonial state will always be subordinated to federal law. As I mentioned previously, however, the realm of national cultural policy in Puerto Rico has relative autonomy in relation to the U.S. that may affect the relationship between the local state and empire.

If seen through the case of the ICP, the local state paved the way to its creation with ‘an atmosphere favorable for artistic production’ at rhetorical and symbolic levels. Symbolic gestures promoted artistic production that demonstrated it was a priority to the local state and, of course, one of its developmentalist goals. It is the material or in-the-practice dimension of the institutionalization of culture and national cultural policy that poses the principal challenge to the relative autonomy of the local state. Actually, it has shown that the PPD’s hegemony was never fully achieved, although the present Puerto Rico is still a neocolony. Mankin refers to this third dimension as the level of “programs of support” (Mankin 1982, 116). This dimension includes the creation of monuments, buildings and programs assigned to promote and sponsor artistic production. I prefer to call this the material dimension, in order to include such points as the appointment of staff and personnel, budget assignments, and other practices that may help foster a particular institutional culture at the ICP or any other governmental organization in relation to the population that these organizations reach out to and their artistic
productions. In the case of the ICP, this population includes artists, events producers, the
general public or audience, and many other individuals indirectly. Mankin argues that,
historically, “[i]f one excludes buildings designed to house governmental offices and
various monuments commemorating important events and individuals, federal programs
in support of the arts have been practically nonexistent” in the U.S. (ibid). Thus,
considering Muñoz Marín followed Miles, emulated his proposal, and thought of the ICP
within his lines, it would be simple to argue that the ICP’s further endeavors for the arts
would inherit that negative influence of colonial control. One thing was Muñoz Marín’s
thought while another was Alegría’s, thus providing strong evidence that this argument is
mostly wrong.

The archaeologist and cultural anthropologist Alegría, following Ayala and
Bernabe (2007), was “a moderate independentista” who became “one of the more visible
articulators of the PPD’s cultural policy” (209). Articulator is probably a fair noun to
describe him, instead of reducing his role as first Executive Director of the ICP to a
rubber stamp for PPD’s official intentions. Alegría’s appointment was the first
negotiation to be completed after the creation of the ICP. His father was one of the
founding members of the Nationalist Party in Puerto Rico and also president of this party
in San Juan (López 2011; Hernández 2002). A year before Alegría’s appointment to the
ICP, on March 1, 1954, “three young Nationalists fired bullets in the chamber during a
meeting of the US House of Representatives” (Picó 2009, 277). As a result, nationalist
leader Albizu Campos was arrested for the second time, and “new obstacles [were
placed] in the path of the Puerto Rican independence movement, which was attempting to

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22 The ICP preceded by 10 years the important and widely known Federal program of the National
Endowment for the Arts.
convince people of the desirability and viability of independence” (ibid). In this unfavorable environment generated against nationalists and independentistas, a Board of Directors appointed directly by the Governor recommended Alegría to be confirmed as Executive Director, but Muñoz Marín hesitated (Hernández 2002, 164). Alegría remembered that Muñoz Marín,

\[
\text{[d]ecía que yo era «un ángel nacionalista». Había sido amigo de mi padre, me conocía desde la juventud – yo era amigo de su hijo – y sabía que yo era radical, que defendía la soberanía. Pero a él le gustaba el diálogo; retaba a los jóvenes para que discutieran con él y finalmente firmó. [El historiador] Tomás Blanco le había escrito instándole a que me confirmara y doña Inés [Mendoza, esposa del gobernador] también ayudó mucho porque quería que el ICPR creara un balance contra la industrialización. (As cited in Hernández, ibid)}
\]

\[
\text{[s]aid I was a «nationalist angel.» He had been a friend of my father, knew me since I was young – his son and I were friends – and knew I was radical, that I was pro-sovereignty. But he liked dialogue; challenged the youth to have discussions with him and ended up signing. [Historian] Tomás Blanco wrote and told him to confirm me, and doña Inés [Mendoza, wife of the governor] also greatly helped because she wanted the ICP to create a balance against industrialization. (As cited in Hernández, ibid, personal translation)}
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This quote reflects the tone of Alegría’s 18 years at the head of the ICP, marked by negotiations between his ideas and values and those of Muñoz Marín’s administration and close ones. Note that friendship and professional relations mediated in this first example, as they did when Alegría created the first two positions of trust to appoint Roberto Beascoechea Lota as his assistant and Isabel Gutiérrez del Arroyo as researcher.  

23 “Both were nationalists and the so called «gag law» did not permit them to work for the government” (ibid, 169, personal translation). Hernández notes that the government and the Department of Justice openly opposed these appointments, but Alegría went on and made them. He challenged what was a clear repression of civil rights in Puerto Rico on the grounds of the ICP’s autonomous character of public corporation,

23 Overall, the ICP had only twenty employees then (Acosta Figueras, 2000, 24).
which responded directly to the executive governmental branch. In other words, Alegria used the ICP’s character of public corporation, which reflected the character of governmental public policy overall, to go against the official intentions. As seen in Hernández, Alegria also challenged the members of the ICP’s Board of Directors to act against the ICP through legal channels to stop his decision. But, according to Alegria:

| El caso no se llevó y me salí con la mía. Ahí eché abajo la ley de la mordaza en la práctica. | The case did not go through and I got what I wanted. I pulled down the Gag law in practice. |
| (Ibid) | (Ibid, personal translation) |

It is that particular level of “in practice” what mostly interests me. What people do and how they do it in practice do not necessarily correspond with their supervisors or other people’s plans. Alegria’s example demonstrates, as Ayala and Bernabe sustain, that there were “undercurrents within the Institutions” (Ayala & Bernabe 2007, 218). In fact, that was why the ICP, Alegria himself, and even the artists later hired by the ICP were subjected to governmental persecution as studied in depth by Rodríguez-Cancel (2007). “Those were the people I needed,” added Alegria (as cited in Hernández, 2002, 169). And he needed them to pursue goals that reflected his beliefs which – together with these people’s ideas and values – constituted a culture of production that had further impact on how the ICP produces culture, a perspective highlighted by cultural economy theorists (du Gay, 1997; du Gay et. al, 1997; Negus, 1999; du Gay & Pryke, 2002). Such a culture of production cannot be reduced to official intentions. The ICP promoted another kind of cultural nationalism, different from that of the local neocolonial state. Thus, I disagree with categorical arguments that suggest that the ICP acted by almost blindly reproducing the PPD’s cultural policy (e.g., Dávila, 1997).
The existence of a culture of production in the ICP that challenged the governmental intentions on cultural policy has much to do with Alegría’s notion of culture and nationalism. Certainly, as drawn from his memories related by Hernández (2002), Alegría’s cultural nationalism had a much more opened point of view to the world than did the PPD’s cultural nationalism. When journalist Nilda López (2011) asked him where he developed a patriotic and cultural consciousness, he turned back to his childhood and his school years and said,

| “[m]is primeros recuerdos fue[ron de] cuando me botaron de la Escuela [Elemental] José Julián Acosta, en San Juan, estando en primer grado[,] porque me negué a jurar la bandera americana. […]” (Alegría, citado en López, 2011). | “[m]y earliest memories are [of] when I was thrown out of the José Julián Acosta [Elementary] School, when I was in first grade[,] because I refused to pledge allegiance to the American flag. […]” (Alegría, as cited in López, 2011). |

Moreover, Alegría studied anthropology at the University of Chicago and Harvard University, which helped him to acquire an interdisciplinary perspective on culture as well as to meet people from diverse cultural and ideological backgrounds. Yet the academic experience that had more impact on him was his studying anthropology at the Universidad Autónoma de México (UNAM). It was at UNAM where Alegría “became ascribed to an anthropological vision that inspired the formation of his national consciousness through culture” (Hernández, 2002, xix, personal translation). México’s cultural hegemony in the Caribbean in the early twentieth century and the way that cultural organizations were organized in that country, as noted by Hernández, could have been what inspired Alegría’s fascination for this neighboring country (ibid, xviii and 167). In the period before the ICP he was already in contact with people abroad and aware of cultural legislation not only in México and in the U.S., but also in Brazil, Perú, and Uruguay (ibid, 157). I would say that Alegría’s experience at UNAM and his contact
with people abroad helped him also to develop a Latinamericanist viewpoint that by
contrast during this time the local state seemed to be abandoning.

Another example of how the symbolic may change ‘in practice’ can be found in
Alegria’s endorsement of the objectives set for the ICP by the legislature (i.e., to
preserve, promote, enrich, and disseminate the cultural values of the people of Puerto
Rico). These objectives were administered with strong anti-Americanization, anti-
consumerism, and anti-high-culture-only sentiments on behalf of the national historic and
cultural patrimony. As Scarano adds, that patrimony was seen as representative of “an
autochthonous culture endangered by material progress and the modernization” (Scarano,
1993, 797, personal translation). Both the material progress and the processes of
modernization were part of the ideas and values of the local state, which once again
provides evidence of the dislocation between the ICP and the official intentions.
Alegria’s accounts of the first year of the ICP and his own trajectory demonstrate how he
did not share the view of culture as closed circles but rather he saw them as accessible to
the public, in indirect reference to the cultural circles of intellectuals at the UPR and the
Ateneo Puertorriqueño, among others (Alegria 1960; Alegria 1978; Hernández 2002;
López 2011). His sentiments were funneled through notions of the popular as the
folkloric and autochthonous, as opposed to the market-based popular that were linked to
the culture industries. I agree with anthropologist Jorge Duany in the understanding of
ICP’s promotion of folk arts such as santería (i.e., the art of carving saints out of wood)
and playing the cuatro musical instrument as examples of the accomplishments of this
kind of cultural nationalism in Puerto Rico (Duany, 2002, 135). But the notion of the
popular as autochthonous or folkloric is problematic since it too can be limiting. If seen
from the vantage point of music events production, this notion of the popular as folkloric had short and long-term contradictory implications that I will discuss in the case of ‘autochthonous music’ in an upcoming chapter.

The idea of the ICP’s promotion of the folkloric and autochthonous raised jokes and critiques that described Alegría’s vision and labor as “an attempt to invent a traditional culture that never existed as projected by the ICP, and as sustaining the cultural hegemony of the autonomists elites,” as mentioned by Scarano (1993, 797, personal translation). Alegría himself said that,

[c]uando llegué al Instituto[,] una de las primeras gestiones que me propuse fue rescatar el cuatro, que para mí es nuestro instrumento nacional y observé que estaba desapareciendo, solo se usaba en Navidad por Ramito y cantantes de la música jíbara. Como siempre, algunos intelectuales se mofaron diciendo “En tiempos de la guitarra eléctrica, Ricardo está hablando del cuatro”.  
(Alegría, citado en López 2011)

[w]hen I arrived in the ICP[,] one of the first actions I proposed to do was to rescue the cuatro, which for me is our national instrument and I observed it was disappearing, it was used only at Christmas by Ramito and singers of música jíbara. As always, some intellectuals made fun of me because “In the era of the electric guitar, Ricardo is talking about the cuatro.”  
(Alegría, as cited in López 2011, personal translation)

The case of the rescue of the cuatro, the santería – in keeping with many other examples related to popular culture in Puerto Rico such as Alegría’s ‘rediscovery’ and promotion of the Fiestas de Santiago Apóstol (Saint James the Apostle Fests) in the municipality of Loíza along with many other festivals he helped to revive and sustain – were all based on ethnographic and extensive archival research. These objectives were not included in the highly criticized ambiguous and general language of the Law 89, but they were on his list of anthropological priorities. Again, one thing is what the law says – and another is what is done with it.
The idea of the ICP’s emblem, proposed by Alegría and designed by artist Lorenzo Homar in 1956, was also subjected to mockery and critiques (see Figure 1.2). The emblem is still used at present and consists of “a circle with [three male] representatives of the three races that had been together in Puerto Rico: the indigenous [Taíno], the Spanish, and the Black [African], each carrying an object that symbolizes its contribution” (Hernández, 2002, 171, personal translation). “In the case of the indigenous it was plants (i.e., yucca and corn), in the case of the Spanish it was a book to represent the language, and in the case of the Black it was a drum and a machete to represent music and work” (ibid). Also, the emblem shows three transverse icons or crosses and a lamb that symbolize Christianity (Emblema n.d.) or the Christian colonization, which is another way to understand it. \(^{24}\) Alegría remembered that many laughed at him because “for the first time they were seeing the Black equal to the other two races” (as cited in Hernández, 2002, 171, personal translation). This does not mean that the Taíno was well accepted either, but that people were surprised that the African was there. Alegría’s imagery and portrayal of the three races (tres razas) as “harmoniously integrated” through centuries of mestizaje as seen in Hernández (ibid) and Alegría (1978), however, provoked another set of critiques.

\(^{24}\) The lamb or Agnus Dei also appears as the central image of the official seal of the ELA.
Relatively recent critiques include questions on the ICP’s neutralization of race and class tensions along with the evasion of the question of colonialism (Dávila, 1997). Dávila refers to a study on Ecuador to argue that in Puerto Rico, as in any other colonial and postcolonial context, the idea of mestizaje hides “an ideology of «blanqueamiento» (whitening)” (ibid, 69). Other scholars repeat these questions deliberately and insist that the ICP’s neutralization of tensions ‘covered up’ and tried to harmonize persistent class and racial hierarchies (Duany, 2002, 271; Ayala & Bernabe, 2007, 210). In regards to the case of Puerto Rico and elsewhere, this is a true and unacceptable dimension of the ‘discourse of the tres razas,’ in which “[a] history of conquest, enslavement, and exploitation became the history of the emergence of a Puerto Rican culture through the mixing, in harmonious synthesis, of the Taíno, Spanish, and African traditions,” as Ayala and Bernabe argue (ibid). Still, it is also true that ‘discourse of the tres razas’ has diverse contextual particularities in relation to other cases in Latin America, Caribbean or elsewhere, which in the case of neocolonial Puerto Rico go beyond official written documents and deserve to be studied. Yet, I have not found careful textual and discourse analyses of the emblem that point to the proportionate space that each man has in the
emblem or the position each one occupies on it as a symbol of Alegria’s level of priorities on matters regarding the Taíno, the African, or the Spanish, as well as other political relations that are not limited to race and class. Furthermore, there are not studies on how these priorities were put into practice at the level of everyday negotiations, especially considering Alegria’s personal and academic backgrounds along with the particular culture of production that he helped to constitute against local Eurocentric elites.

A much more recent critique, also to be addressed in subsequent chapters, is related to the “excessively pro-Hispanic bent” of the ICP and other cultural institutions in Puerto Rico (Duany, 2002, 135). Duany locates ICP’s preference for the Hispanic at the level of “ideological and practical limitations” of cultural nationalism, which I prefer to analyze in this section as rhetorical, symbolical and material dimensions. He argues that the pro-Hispanic bent “often reifies the Spanish language as the litmus test of Puerto Ricanness” and produces many consequences, including the “restrictive linguistic and territorial definition of Puerto Rican identity [which] has excluded the diaspora in the U.S.” (ibid). Indeed, ICP’s cultural production does not necessarily reflect the diaspora in the U.S. and its complexities, if we view it from the basic perspective of artistic works produced in English. But at the level of ‘practice’, groups in the Puerto Rican diaspora in the U.S. historically have formed alliances with the ICP in order to create cultural centers in many states. Also, one of Alegria’s legacies in the diaspora – considered by himself as one of his dreams – was the creation of the Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños at Lehman College in New York (López, 2011). As noted by Susan Hoeltzel, “Dr. Alegria had a prior relationship with the Lehman campus. In the 1960’s he was instrumental in
the establishment of the Department of Puerto Rican Studies at Lehman College, which was among the first in the country,” (Hoeltzel n.d.).

These and other critiques challenged Alegría’s vision of the ICP which was in constant negotiation and contention with the local neocolonial state and particular groups. Even so, Alegria did not win all his battles. In fact, there were instances in which the local government imposed its power, such as through an austere budget that limited not only the employment of specialized personnel and their working conditions, but also and most importantly here the sponsorship of artistic production and programs for artistic promotion. The case of the name of the ICP is another example. Alegría preferred the name Comisión para la Cultura (Commission for Culture), instead of Instituto, which for him “was very close to the Instituto de Cultura Hispánica of [the then Spain’s dictator] Franco” (Alegría, as cited in Hernández 2002, 163, personal translation). But the local state “named it «institute» anyway” (ibid). Despite these and many more barriers constantly negotiated by Alegria and his staff, the ICP continued to operate under Alegría’s vision with relative autonomy, impressive success, and public presence until 1968.25

Locally, the notion of the popular as folkloric had an immediate impact on the six principal areas that the ICP sought to serve: anthropology and folklore, history, visual arts, literature, music, and theater (as seen in Hernández, 2002, 165, personal translation). These principal areas of interest materialized into some of the divisions or programs which still operate currently at the ICP, though with several changes. The very first programs that Alegria created were: Artes Plásticas (Visual Arts); Centro de

25 Alegría’s actions at the ICP and his professional career were acknowledged by many countries abroad, with more relevance in Cuba where he helped restoring historic buildings in La Habana.
Investigaciones de las Artes Populares (Center of Popular Arts Research); Fomento de la Música (Music Promotion); Fomento Teatral (Theater Promotion); Publicaciones y Grabaciones (Publishing and Recording); and Zonas y Monumentos Históricos (Historic Zones and Monuments), which covered many other sections that are now separate programs (Acosta Figueras 2000, 34-35, personal translation). “To bring these cultural expressions to all municipalities and sectors in Puerto Rico and to get the community together in a governmental effort, the Program for the Cultural Promotion in the Municipalities was created in 1956” (ibid).

At present, some of these divisions have been merged or separated, and some new have been created resulting in the following programs: Archivo General de Puerto Rico (General Archive); Apoyo a las Artes (Support for the Arts); Arqueología y Etnohistoria (Archaeology and Ethnohistory); Artes Escénico-Musicales (Performing Arts); Artes Plásticas y Colecciones (Visual Arts and Collections); Biblioteca Nacional de Puerto Rico (National Library); Consejo de Arqueología Subacuática (Underwater Archaeology Council); Consejo de Arqueología Terrestre (Terrestrial Archaeology Council); Editorial (Publisher); Museos y Parques (Museums and Parks); Patrimonio Histórico Edificado y Mejoras Permanentes (Historic Built Patrimony and Permanent Improvements); and Promoción Cultural y Artes Populares (Cultural Promotion and Popular Arts). In Chapter 3, I will examine the divisions related to music and music events production in particular.

The neocolonial limits of the local state in Puerto Rico were already evident in the transition to the ELA in the “sexenio de la puertorriqueñidad” [the period of the six years of a puertorriqueña cultural nationalism], as Rodríguez-Cancel calls this period of institutionalization of national culture and national cultural policy (Rodríguez Cancel,
Every attempt of the local state to build up independent projects within the neocolonial status was subordinated to the U.S. and its liberal developmentalist policies, thus leaving the local state constantly to maneuver the balancing of its own ambivalences with different sectors. The notion of *puertorriqueñidad*, supported by the *populismo muñocista* and its cultural nationalism, was not enough to overcome the geopolitical tensions of building up a ‘nation’ without a sovereign state in the context of the Cold War. Neither could the notion of *puertorriqueñidad* overcome the geocultural confusion and crisis of belonging and jurisdiction that Puerto Ricans have had ever since. As Rodríguez-Vázquez asserts, “the *muñocismo* invented the nation through the construction of a national incessant meta-narrative which linked the beginnings, the processes and destiny of a subject-nation” (Rodríguez Vázquez, 2004, 283, personal translation). The symbolic and rhetorical in the *populismo muñocista* and its version of anti-nationalist cultural nationalism, however, was challenged from within by institutions which intended to reproduce national culture and created the official national cultural policy, as I will explore in Chapter 3.

### 1.5 Research design: Methods, questions, and summary

> “Culture is everywhere, thus ethnography can (and has been) also interested in state systems and political economy – and in the historical specificity political economy requires.” (Marcus, 1986, 173-174)

Although this dissertation has a strong historiographical component, it is not a mere chronology, but rather a cultural study of the local neocolonial state and the entertainment industry based on historical and institutional analyses from the postwar

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26 I used the concepts geopolitical and geocultural in direct reference to Rodríguez-Cancel (2007, 409-412).
period until the present. For ten months between October 2010 and August 2011 and the last quarter of 2012, I followed a multi-method research design which included archival research, accessing individual memoirs, as well as qualitative analyses of media coverage and policy reports, supplemented by interview-based ethnographic inquiry at events and cultural institutions. Streeter’s (1996) multi-method approach within a cultural studies framework – which combines historiographical archival research with discourse analysis, critical legal studies, a focus in economic sociology, and a small sample of conveniently selected interviews – served as the primary framework for this research design. I also followed much of Negus’s (1999) study of corporate cultures of recording labels, which combines interviews with historiographical research.

Archival research was used to support the interviews on the history of the entertainment industry in Puerto Rico with periodical articles and news stories about entertainment producers, along with existing memoirs on entertainment producers. I examined the development of cultural policy in Puerto Rico by looking at state and corporate reports and policy documents as well as at media coverage of key moments related to cultural policy in Puerto Rico and the ICP. I relied on national daily newspapers which have had a long history in Puerto Rico (e.g., *El Imparcial* and *El Mundo*), as well as other national newspapers which have the most complete coverage on this topic altogether: *El Nuevo Día, Primera Hora, El Vocero*, and *Periódico Diálogo* (monthly), and *Periódico Claridad* (weekly). Additionally, I searched for documents on comparative studies of cultural industries or specifically on entertainment production in Latin America, the Caribbean, and translocal venues. Much of the archival material was available at the general archive of the ICP, known as *Archivo General de Puerto Rico* (or
Puerto Rico’s General Archive), as well as at the Puerto Rican Collections of the main libraries of the UPR’s Río Piedras campus and Sacred Heart University in San Juan. I also read and analyzed COPEP’s minutes since 2005 and electronic messages (i.e., group e-mails) that I have been collecting from independent groups of musicians since the public hearings on the amendments to a law on autochthonous music were announced (i.e., the Law 223 of 2004).

I also personally conducted semi-structured interviews and group interviews of entertainment producers, musicians, and main institutional actors from the entertainment industry. In addition, I interviewed bureaucrats of policy, such as state representatives who have been involved in the relationship among the state, national culture, and the entertainment industry in Puerto Rico and links to the region. These interviews were done mostly by phone. In total, I conducted over 80 interviews. The state representatives included past executive directors of the ICP since 1955 and those now in positions, current and past directors of the Music Program of the ICP in the capital city of San Juan, ICP’s representatives at the municipalities where the events are held, as well as heads of cultural centers supported by the ICP in those towns, and current and past senators. These representatives helped me to approach other informants (i.e., snowball sampling) and to add a gender-conscious quota sample, especially considering that live-music events production in Puerto Rico is predominantly a male-dominated field. Koichi Iwabuchi’s (2002) methodological approach towards transnational cultural flows is similar to that of Negus and also was an example that I followed to coordinate the

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27 The ICP’s Music Program that I will look at is different from the program that supports the creation of municipal cultural centers, which were at the core of Dávila’s work on cultural policy in Puerto Rico. Even though I will not focus on the ICP’s program on cultural centers, they will play an important role in my research because some local-scale events are organized by these municipal cultural centers.
interviews of cultural producers. Drawing from Yúdice’s (2003) pattern of on-site observation at cultural events, I conducted unstructured on-site interviews of entertainment producers, musicians, and state representatives, along with discourse analyses of events and related organizational material and publications. Moreover, I attended COPEP’s general body meetings as a complete participant, having been a member then.

I also incorporated participant observation of cultural labor at four state-sponsored live-music events and their respective pre-production meetings: the San Sebastián Street Festival, the Ponce Carnival, the National Indigenous Festival of Jayuya, and Loíza Patron-Saint Festival. The San Sebastián Street Festival has been celebrated in Old San Juan during a long weekend in January for the past consecutive 43 years and has an estimated attendance of over 200,000 people (Grupo Editorial EPRL 2009). This event is organized by the San Sebastián Street’s Neighbors Association. The Ponce Carnival has been celebrated for over 250 years since the Spanish-ruling era in the town of Ponce in the south of Puerto Rico. It is held during a long weekend during the month of February [or March], before the Christian season of Lent (Smithsonian Institute n.d.), as do other carnivals in the Americas such as in Brazil, Trinidad & Tobago, and the Mardi Gras in New Orleans. The carnival’s estimated attendance is over 100,000 people. The National Indigenous Festival of Jayuya is celebrated during a weekend every November, close to the polemic ‘Puerto Rico’s Discovery’ holiday. It is the only national event that honors the memory of the Taínos, the pre-Columbian inhabitants of Puerto Rico (Turismo Jayuyano n.d.). From the festivals proposed, it is the only one that has been

28 In 2009, two years before I observed the San Sebastián Street Festival, a record of almost 400,000 attendees was set (EFE 2009). That number commonly increases every year.
studied before in relation to cultural policies in Puerto Rico, though not in the specific
terms of live-music events production (e.g., Dávila, 1997, 220-232). Lastly, the patron-
saint festival is a kind of event that every municipality in Puerto Rico celebrates during
nine days every year, depending on the day the town’s patron-saint was born. In the town
of Loíza, the patron San Patricio’s birthday is before mid-March. Loíza, also known as
Loíza, “is a center for African-inspired traditions, retaining one of the highest percentages
of African descendants of all island’s towns” (Loíza, n.d.). All of these festivals and
carnivals, except the National Indigenous Festival, have Catholic/Christian or Spanish-
related origins. I attended these events every day during the period that they lasted,
recorded characteristics of the production in general terms, and followed in detail the
cultural labor of entertainment producers in relation to musicians and state
representatives at the events and during the pre-production meetings.

Building on this research design, I investigated the following questions:

1) What are the historical linkages that explain the relationship between the state and
national culture in Puerto Rico as seen through the entertainment industry from
the 1950s to present?

2) How do we trace the cultural legacies and practices of the entertainment industry
in Puerto Rico and links to the Latin American and Caribbean region and to other
translocal networks from the 1950s to present?

3) How do global or neoliberal shifts in cultural policy in the 1990s change the
relationship between cultural producers and the state in Puerto Rico?

Overall, the semi-structured informant interviews and the group interviews
addressed the questions on the relationship between the state’s policies and the
entertainment industry, as well as the historical and current cultural practices related to
live-music production in Puerto Rico and regional and translocal links. The participant
observation recorded experiences, on-site interviews, and material for further
comparisons on the logistics and practices of entertainment production in four different state-sponsored live-music events and related meetings. Finally, the archival research and document analyses supported the interviews.

The following chapters will examine the three research questions as such:

- music events production and translocal artistic flows that occurred previous to the national cultural policy in Puerto Rico (Chapter 2);
- national cultural policy and live-music events production in the neocolonial era until neoliberalism (Chapter 3);
- logistics and practices of live-music events production in the current (post)neoliberal era, more specifically how recent global neoliberal shifts in cultural policy alter the field of live-music events production in relation to the state in Puerto Rico (Chapter 4) and examples of four state-sponsored events, the evolution of translocal live-music flows, and recent conflicts among entertainment producers, musicians, and the state (Chapter 5); and,
- conclusions and reflections on the implications of a normative way of doing cultural policy pertaining to the practice of live events production in Puerto Rico, and the challenges that producers have posed on policymaking as well (Chapter 6).

1.5.1 Political action through artistic production: Methodological note

The idea of studying the entertainment industry in Puerto Rico in relation to the state, local, regional, and translocal cultural flows came out after exploratory interviews
to cultural producers Paquito Cordero and Josantonio Mellado in 2007. At that moment, I was interested in conducting research on broadcasting in Puerto Rico, also in relation to the local neocolonial state. It was difficult to separate the history of broadcasting and related fields such as advertising from the history of live events production. The interconnections between broadcasting and the entertainment industry also apply to theater production as well as to both recording and live-music entertainment production. Finally, I decided to focus on the entertainment industry because it is the least explored cultural industry in Puerto Rico. As I will argue in the next chapters, this cultural industry has represented since the beginning a space for contesting, negotiating and generating challenges to the local neocolonial state. Both the exploratory interviews of producers Cordero and Mellado and Ayala & Bernabe’s interest in socio-cultural history throughout their book on the history of *Puerto Rico in the American Century* (2007) helped me to frame the topics and identify some gaps in the existing literature as well as my own gaps on the cultural history of Puerto Rico. I see this research as an opportunity to contribute to a revisionist current in historical narratives about the state in Puerto Rico, especially regarding the understudied field of cultural policy and its intersection with music and live-events production.

I believed that the fact that I was a local media and entertainment producer with musical training would allow me to establish personal connections with other cultural producers as well as provide me with first-hand knowledge of the structure and complexities of producing for these fields in Puerto Rico. But that was not the case. First, I conducted my fieldwork within a delicate sociopolitical context in Puerto Rico amidst a

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29 Mellado is a well-known and long-term producer who presided COPEP during its foundation in 2005.
massive student strike at the UPR; during an economic meltdown in the U.S. with a huge impact on the island; at the moment when a large group of Puerto Ricans serving the U.S. military came back – not always safe – from Afghanistan; and when local groups were carrying out civil disobedience and protests against one of the most abusive government administrations in the history of Puerto Rico that imposed policies ranging from environmental policies to regulations that coerced human rights (e.g., communities protested the construction of communication towers or wind mills in their neighborhoods without being previously consulted, and other groups protested the prohibition by the then Mayor of the capital city of San Juan of personal cameras and pictures in public spaces), among other examples. 2010 and 2011 were indeed hectic years in Puerto Rico’s history. On the other hand, the diversity of the party politics was changing as new and innovative political parties were created. Thus it was also a fertile terrain for undertaking political action through artistic production. Something that surprised me was the new registers of forms of protests through stand-up comics and theater performances, dance, murals and graffiti, artisanship, independent film, but most of all, through live music and live-music events both in the streets and particular open-air or closed venues. Within this context, doing research on live-music events was already suspicious for all the subjects involved: producers, artists, the owners of venues, state representatives, and even the public. For instance, I was constantly asked if I were a policewoman. 30 Doing research about artistic production within this context was also a political action. The second limitation was that – as a local media and entertainment producer – I had never produced a carnival, a street or town festival, nor a patron-saint festival. Despite these obstacles, I

30 I shared more of these anecdotes in Díaz Hernández, Anilyn. (2012). “I’m Not a Cop: Obsering Live-Music Events in Puerto Rico.” Invited speaker, Professor Michelle Bigenho’s Performance and Ethnography course at Hampshire College, Amherst, MA.
entered fieldwork willing to learn the logistics of these forms of entertainment production, and I experienced them first-hand.

During my stay at University of Massachusetts-Amherst, I continued to participate in COPEP’s conversations and voting in membership elections and on points of contention that came up at general board meetings. I also collected the minutes from COPEP’s meetings since 2005, and from independent groups of musicians against COPEP and the state since 2009. In 2011, I decided not to renew my membership in COPEP until I defended this dissertation. The reason was that I wanted to write about entertainment producers – most of them members of COPEP – and therefore I did not consider it ethical to be a member of this association. Nevertheless, I hope that entertainment producers as well as all the social actors involved in this research or related to the entertainment industry and cultural institutions in Puerto Rico find my interpretations of what they do respectful and accurate.
CHAPTER 2

“LA ESTRELLA ES EL ESPECTÁCULO”: MUSIC EVENTS PRODUCTION AND TRANSLOCAL ARTISTIC FLOWS BEFORE NATIONAL CULTURAL POLICY IN PUERTO RICO

2.1 Introduction

The Puerto Rican local state’s ability to participate in transnational networks began to change significantly after the period at the end of World War II and into the early Cold War era. This historical moment and its predominant anticommunist sentiment coincided with the pro-independence movement in Asia and Africa in the late-1940s and 1950s, the formation of Caribbean regional and national identities, and profound changes in the relationship between the Unites States and Latin America and the Caribbean (Ayala & Bernabe, 2007; Robotham, 1998). In this period we can also see a clear shift in how music events were produced and what was understood by music events production. This is the beginning of the era of professionalization of events production within a much broader context of cultural production in Puerto Rico. The principal cultural industries that shaped and were shaped by the practice of events production as we know it today were already organized then (i.e., film, music recording, and radio).

In this chapter I will explore how music events production, which includes the planning of live concerts, festivals, and mixed musical and variety public spectacles in different kinds of venues and scenes, evolved as a professional practice in this geopolitical context. This historical analysis will demonstrate the tension and contentious between events producers, artists, and the state, which represents an important feature of the under-examined context of national cultural policy in Puerto Rico. I will focus on
how and why this context also opened up opportunities for events producers to participate in local, regional, and translocal artistic networks with little or no mediation from the local state.

2.2 Music events production in colonial and neocolonial Puerto Rico

The history of live-music events and events overall production has a long history that predates the Cold War era in Puerto Rico, influenced in diverse ways by the legacies of colonialism and empire. The first notorious events in Puerto Rican history were marked by the binomial power of the Catholic Church and empire, such as the fiestas patronales or patron-saint fests since 1573 (Grau, 2000) and the carnavales or carnivals since the early 19th century (Alcalá, 1977), and by the set of values and ideas associated with growing liberal empires, such as the Feria-Exposición de Ponce or Ponce’s International Exposition in 1882 (Abad, 1885). The Spanish authorities on the island used to support multiple events and huge productions in the late 19th century as part of a colonial and imperial strategy commonly called ‘baile, botella y baraja’ [dance, rum, and gaming], cultivated on the island since the 17th and 18th centuries. Baile, botella y baraja, as critical cultural studies scholar Angel G. Quintero Rivera affirms, was “the political slogan used by some governors during Spanish colonialism to distract the Caribbean subjects and keep them away from their desires if freedom and independence” (Quintero Rivera, 2009, 9-10 –personal translation). Other innumerable music events took place on the island during the transition years to the U.S. domain. These mostly featured classical music –regularly operas and zarzuelas produced by local and
international companies, military bands’ music, and state-sponsored events (Dover, 1983).

Regionally, but also in relation to the U.S., Latin American and Caribbean artists were already travelling to perform abroad before the 1940s (Glasser, 1995). Locally, many artists had already travelled in radio promotional tours, and other musicians acted in local and regional films even before the emergence of record companies in the 1930s.31 Among these artists were singer and songwriters Rafael Hernández and Pedro Flores who travelled extensively through the Americas (mostly México) performing boleros and Afro-Caribbean music with trios and quartets already in the 1920s; singer Johnny Rodríguez, who acted in local films in the 1930s; Hernando Avilés, Julito Rodríguez, and Johnny Albino, who were part of different generations of Los Panchos international trio, along with other two Mexican musicians during the 1940s and 1950s; and singer Virginia López, signed by RCA-Victor, who settled in México in the late 1950s (Santiago, 1994, 8-9). These artistic networks were in great part possible due to regional collaboration between commercial broadcasters since the 1920s, who sustained theater and music touring circuits that date from the 19th Century. This relationship between broadcasters was more evident between Cuba and Puerto Rico, because the first radio stations in each country—PWX and WKAQ—were developed by the same owners, the Behn brothers, who followed the U.S. corporate broadcasting systems. The lack of clear regulation over the radio spectrum in the 1920s and the long-standing tradition of artistic networks within the Spanish Caribbean helped foster a ‘Caribbean radio-common’ with limited direct U.S. control or intervention (Díaz Hernández, forthcoming). This Caribbean radio common

31 There is fairly recent literature in Music Business and Administration exclusively devoted to the topic of touring. A key reference is Ray D. Wanddell, Rich Barnet and Jake Berry’s This Business of Concert Promotion and Touring (2007).
and its historical legacies were the foundations upon which music events production could develop.

In this early period, Puerto Rico was still under direct U.S. rule, with imposed governors and little or no Puerto Rican representation at the local and Federal governmental bodies. In Puerto Rico, a nationalist anti-colonial movement raised against U.S. colonial hegemony overall, but specially against military and economic impositions. Leaders of these movements began to use radio for political purposes since the 1930s, such as the Nationalist Party’s president Pedro Albizu Campos who in 1931 openly demanded independence from the U.S. (Torregrosa, 1991, 183). Sociologists César Ayala and Rafael Bernabe (2007) assert that U.S. political power was still contested directly in the period at the end of World War II and during the Cold War, fuelled by Albizu’s movement, itself influenced by Gandhi’s independence movement in India and movements in Ghana and Egypt (109).

Nationalist anti-colonial movements seen in Asia and Africa began to have an impact on the Caribbean at the end of World War II and during the Cold War era. As anthropologist Donald Robotham (1998) affirms, that time was “characterized by a certain type of political economy and, with it, a certain type of identity and transnationalism” in the Caribbean (309). New national identities, such as the “West Indian identity” as Robotham says, resulted from the development of national consciousness which started to challenge colonial hegemony in the region. In the case of the British Caribbean, those identities were formed in a complex way as they repealed the British rule but incorporated a kind of transnationalism influenced by developmentalist models imposed in the U.S. in the Spanish Caribbean, such as “the Puerto Rican model”
(ibid, 310). In Puerto Rico, on the other hand, the nationalist anti-colonial movement emerged in opposition to that developmentalist model, managed through local nationalist-populist but still colonial governmental programs inspired by New Deal policies.

In this tense historical context, music events production reemerged as an entrepreneurial, independent, deregulated practice. In contrast to other domains of cultural production, music events production faced little or no mediation of the state, and was not regulated through licenses or state permission. Music events production achieved professional specialization through the self-taught experience of local events producers such as the pioneers Francisco ‘Paquito’ Cordero, Tomás ‘Tommy’ Muñiz, Antonio ‘Tony’ Chiroldes, and events managers at foreign-owned hotels and other venues on the island, as it can be deduced from personal interviews with entertainment producers.

The main forms of cultural production in music events production in Puerto Rico were popular music performances. In this sense, this independent practice was not necessarily against the market or the local state’s New Deal extended policies, but defined itself against the ‘high culture’ classical music performances promoted by the local state and elites on the island. Music events production also developed as constitutive of and often in contradiction with the logics of record companies, advertising agencies, film, radio, and later television (TV), and with practices associated to these logics at different local, regional, and international scales. Music events producers in Puerto Rico built upon this complex context and cultural networks, but also from their previous personal relations of friendship and proximity with diverse artistic networks since the early years of broadcasting, to construct an industry that eventually also influenced their own production practices and related networks.
2.2.1 Artists first, then producers (1945-1950)

Immediately after World War II, in 1946, the U.S. decided to appoint the first Puerto Rican Governor Jesús T. Piñero who drew from the local autonomist movement to build up his opposition to the Nationalist Party’s pro-independence stance (Rodríguez-Vázquez 2004; Gobierno n.d.). Piñero is infamous for passing the Ley de la Mordaza or Gag Law of 1948, which declared illegal any expression in favor of Puerto Rico’s independence provoking the exile of many pro-independence Puerto Ricans. Meanwhile, New Deal policies implemented since 1942 led to the nationalization of essential public services related to health, water supply and public works, and the creation of public corporations in industrial development in Puerto Rico, such as the Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico and the Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company (PRIDCO) (Picó 2009/2006; Scarano 1993).

In 1948, Luis Muñoz Marín became the first democratically-elected governor of Puerto Rico, and he fully embraced the U.S. developmentalist plans on the island. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to regulate international business, which had later impact on culture industries and production, was signed a year before. The inability of Puerto Rico’s local state to participate in the GATT served to accentuate the limits of colonialism on the island, at the same time it represented the context of internationalization and liberalization for the private sector in which music events production initiated as an industry.

Before the producers referred to themselves as events producers, they continued to develop professionally with little or no state intervention, but sustaining interdependent
relationships with other cultural producers and culture industries, as seen in the case of Francisco ‘Paquito’ Cordero.

Paquito Cordero (PC): En radio yo tenía varios programas. Primero empecé haciendo lo que le llamaban bolitos, que eran papeles cortos. Pero yo trabajaba en programas de aventura y cada día me iban dando papeles un poquito mejores. Estuve con Yoyo Boing en el mediodía, el famoso Show del Mediodia de Radio El Mundo, El Colmadito Paranpanpán. Esa fue mi primera producción en radio, como productor.

ADH: ¿Y fue con WKAQ [radio] también?

PC: Sí, en el famoso bloque del mediodía de WKAQ. Y ahí es que más o menos empieza la televisión, en el ’54. Ya desde antes estaba trabajando en radio y trabajaba en los teatros y trabajaba en los pueblos de la Isla y en lo que le llamaban las fiestas patronales, con el Carnaval Del Monte –con Tito Lara, el Trío Los Indianos, Vivi González y su trío Los Indianos, Yoyo Boing, y yo. Íbamos por todos los pueblos de la Isla. Y hacíamos unas rifas en la plaza pública. Quiere decir que cuando empieza la televisión, ya pues más o menos nos conocían algo.

ADH: ¿Y quién producía estos espectáculos en las [fiestas] patronales?

(PC): Yo. Yo mismo.

ADH: ¿Y usted tenía la compañía fundada ya para ese momento o lo hacía con sus amigos?

Paquito Cordero (PC): I had various radio shows. I started doing what is called bolitos, or short skits. But I also worked in adventure shows, and every day I was assigned to better parts. I worked with Yoyo Boing [actor Luis Antonio Rivera] in the famous Show del Mediodia of Radio El Mundo, [and in] El Colmadito Paranpanpán. That was my first radio production, as a producer.

ADH: ¿Was it also at WKAQ-Radio [Radio El Mundo]?

(PC): Yes, in the famous WKAQ block at noon. Then is when approximately TV started [in Puerto Rico] in 1954. Before that I was already working in radio, in theaters, and around the island what was known as patron-saint fests, with the Carnaval Del Monte –with [musicians] Tito Lara, Vivi González and Los Indianos Trío, [actor] Yoyo Boing, and myself. We visited all towns on the island. And we used to do raffles at the town centers. This means that when TV started, people already knew something about us.

ADH: ¿And who produced those spectacles at the patron-saint fests?

(PC): I, I myself.

ADH: ¿Did you have your own company already or did you produce with your friends?

(PC): Well…it was officially founded in...
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By the late 1940s everyone on the island knew Paquito Cordero and the artists that participated in his public spectacles, mostly variety shows that included comedy sketches and music performance. These spectacles were presented at events such as the patron-saint fests which were organized and sponsored by the Church with support of the local state. Cordero succeeded in his strategy of using radio as a tool to promote his spectacles. He also toured around the island with the same musicians and actors that were part of the radio shows he produced. Cordero managed to pay the musicians for their free labor as they performed in his spectacles by promoting their records on radio stations. Cordero also found support from his radio shows’ sponsors, mostly marketing and advertising agencies, which also sponsored his spectacles and events. The titles of the spectacles would feature the sponsors’ name. For example, *Carnaval Del Monte* was an event sponsored by the same company that had provided direct sponsorship for his successful radio programs since the 1920s and the 1930s, as discussed in José Luis Torregrosa (1991). In this sense, the format and titles of the first events that Cordero produced were very similar to his live radio shows because both, radio and events...
production were inherently commercial practices based on advertising, not on public funding.

| (PC): Ellos pagaban y se hacían comerciales ahí mismo en vivo. Todo era en vivo. | (PC): They [the sponsors] paid and the commercials were done live on stage. Everything was live.  
(Personal interview, San Juan, 2008)  
(Personal translation) |
|---|---|

Therefore, events production and marketing and advertising agencies became interrelated from the start as a result of the direct connection between events producers and radio, which followed at the moment a commercial-only system. Sponsors included, among others, U.S.-based processed food distributors like Del Monte Foods, and major brands such as RCA-Victor, and General Electric (Torregrosa, 1991).

The relationship between advertisers and broadcasters fomented consumerist values, especially in a historical period when New Deal policies converged with Cold War priorities (Mattelart, 2000, 49). In 1940, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs’ (CIAA) was created to promote pro-U.S. propaganda through Latin American and Caribbean broadcasters dependent on CIAA’s news, films, and advertising (Balderston et al., 2000). However, this also inadvertently allowed a way through which local broadcasters, artists, and audiences had contact and sustained cultural networks with their counterparts in other Spanish Latin American and Caribbean countries, which were also bombarded by advertising in the post-War and Cold War periods. As seen in Torregrosa, it was through direct sponsorship strategies that local pioneer radio station WKAQ-AM was able to transmit popular music programs and radionovelas from Cuba and México since the 1930s (Torregrosa, 1991). That was a commercial-based practice that paradoxically generated regional connections that eventually benefitted music events
production and events production in general, which started to develop and flow in an environment of political instability and control. In the context of a colonial rule and an apparent lack of local elites willing to support popular culture, events producers such as Cordero and his colleagues entered these contradictory strategic alliances with the logics of the market in order to sustain previously built networks of artistic flows and build up their careers. Cordero and future events and music events producers also entered in equally contradictory relationships with the state and Church sponsorship, ultimately leading to the production of spectacles for events like the popular patron-saint fests.

Actor and producer Cordero and actor Yoyo Boing formed a successful creative duo and were “the precursor of the caravans of spectacles that travelled each municipality on the island” beginning in the 1950s (García, 2009, 88 –personal translation). This creative duo was supported and publicized by radio and TV producer Tommy Muñiz. Unlike Cordero, who went from artist to unincorporated producer, Muñiz legally incorporated a production company known as Producciones Tommy Muñiz in 1951, which served as a model for future event production companies in Puerto Rico. Writer Beba García recently published Muñiz’s memoirs and narrates that besides radio shows’ production –mostly produced for WIAC-AM, Producciones Tommy Muñiz also offered the following services: “spectacles for patron-saint festivals, artistic representation, and promotion management” (ibid, 33 –personal translation). Muñiz grouped all these practices as ‘production,’ though there were differences in the logics and practices of each area of specialization. For instance, planning a single public spectacle to be presented at another producer’s event is not the same as planning an entire event that contains a series or spectacles linked by a particular theme for a particular occasion. Also,
producing a spectacle to be presented at an event is not the same as representing artists who planned their performances on their own and hire a promoter to ‘sell’ their performances to event organizers or to producers of public spectacles. Simultaneously, promotion management was a practice carried out generally by marketing and advertising agencies and promoters at record companies, often at odds with public relations efforts.

Muñiz hired a talented team of actors and musicians, and followed the same strategy of using radio and his radio sponsors as a tool to promote his public spectacles, such as _Caravana Nabisco_, and also later _Caravana Del Monte_ (ibid, 91). Beba García notes how stressed Muñiz was with the relationship with sponsors or “los paganini”, who deliberately changed the names of his spectacles and radio shows without previous consultation with the producer (ibid, 93). Sometimes Muñiz’s _caravanas_ were spectacles within major events, such as the _patron-saint fests_; but at other times they were the event per se (i.e., a single-spectacle event). Another characteristic of these spectacles was that both Muñiz and Cordero worked as actors in the variety spectacles they produced, leaving little distinction between the so called ‘above and below-the-line’ workers. They were artists first, then events producers; and once they became events producers they never abandoned their work as artists.

Producciones Tommy Muñiz took the lead in producing and touring the island with variety spectacles at the _patron-saint fests_ in the first half of the 1950s decade. Apart from town centers where these _fiestas_ took place, other venues in which Muñiz presented his spectacles included _cafetines_ and _chinchorros_ (i.e., modest commercial places where alcohol and sometimes food is served), as well as dance halls and theaters constructed in Puerto Rico since the Spanish colonization in the first half of the 19th Century, mostly for
theater and classical music performance. In this sense, Muñiz and also Cordero brought popular culture to *plazas* and into theaters, and opened up opportunities for artists to perform at these venues, especially musicians who were basically confined to performing at night clubs. Additionally, as García adds, “in those times, the most prominent radio stations created a space nearby which served as a radio-theater” where the public could go and watch the live radio shows as if these were also public spectacles (ibid; see also Torregrosa, 1991, 169-172). Such was the interdependency between events, radio, but also theater which definitely infused the talent that nurtured most of the spectacles and events produced by Muñiz and Cordero in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

### 2.2.2 Music stars and music venues (1950-1955)

There were two types of networks for artists in Puerto Rico: The first was regional network that grew out of the early years of radio broadcasting in the 1920s, and the second was a network of artists who traveled between Puerto Rico and the U.S. or elsewhere through international music, theater and film circuits. This latter artistic network was supported on the island by private-owned venues, such as hotels, private theaters, night clubs, and artists who had either recorded for international record companies or performed at international films, Broadway or Las Vegas’ style music shows. The owners of venues started to capitalize on the artists’ music performances usually by selling admission tickets. The artists were the stars of the spectacle, and they were treated as such. The problematic dimension of the private-venues’ star system network was the exclusion of local artists. The people who could not pay for an admission’s ticket to access events at private-venues and hotels were also excluded.
One of the most important indicators of this international artistic network, and the only detailed review on a popular music event then, was the press coverage on the Uruguayan-born Argentinean tango singer Carlos Gardel’s visit to Puerto Rico in April, 1935 (El Día, 1935; El Imparcial, 1935; El Mundo, 1935). Gardel had already performed at international films in the U.S., Germany and France and was an idol in local radio, which in the mid-1930s meant only a few radio stations with high audience reach.

Gardel’s visit sheds light on an early mode of music events production and links it to film in that period. He came from France by ship, accompanied by his agent and friend, Alfredo Le Pera –a journalist who co-wrote many of Gardel song’s lyrics. Gardel was brought to Puerto Rico by Rafael Ramos Cobián and Julio Bruno, directors of United Theatres, also known as Teatros Unidos –a private company dedicated to spectacles (El Mundo, 1935; Santiago, 2006). United Theaters owned most of the theaters in Santurce, including those in the Eduardo Conde Avenue in Villa Palmeras. Ramos Cobián was also a film producer, owner of Cobian Productions Inc., linked to Paramount pictures that later distributed his film “Mis dos amores” in 1939 (IMDb n.d.). United Theaters organized an island-wide tour for Gardel, which included music spectacles at theaters owned by United Theaters, as well as other private and municipal-owned theaters. For example, as journalist and popular music historian Miguel López Ortiz wrote:

Gardel visited […] the Teatro Paramount in Santurce, the Teatro Yagüez in Mayagüez, the Fox-Delicias and the Teatro Broadway in Ponce, the Tres Banderas at the Old San Juan, the Victoria theaters, the Imperial, the Liberty, the San José and Puerto Rico in Río Piedras; the Atenas in Manatí, the Oliver in Arecibo, the Teatro Cayey at the homonymous municipality [Cayey]; the Campoamor in Guayama and finished his stay at the Victoria theaters in Río Piedras, the Eureka in Puerta de Tierra and the Rex in Cataño. (López Ortiz, in Santiago, 2006 –personal translation)
López Ortiz exemplifies how this theater circuit operated locally, covering the island from coast to coast with venues in the principal cities and municipalities, and its links to an international music star network that was at the same time linked to film.

Gardel was an exception in the sense that he appealed to both local elites and a broader and more diverse public interested in popular music, who knew him through radio. Usually, local social elites used their own private venues or booked state-owned venues like the Teatro Yagüez and other municipal theaters to bring the artists featuring live spectacles of classical music, always at a high cost making it unaffordable for most Puerto Ricans.

The local theater circuit was still active between 1950 and 1955, as I noted in many advertisements of music events in the local press of that period. Advertisements for these musical events commonly announced local venues that ranged from private theaters, civic clubs, private or state-owned dance halls or historic buildings turned into dance halls for ‘special’ events, commercial locations and restaurants, night clubs, and ballrooms at hotels. The Club Ponceño in San Juan, the Tropicana Club in Carolina, and the Hotel Caribe Hilton in San Juan are just a few examples of the numerous and diverse venues where music events took place then. The few and brief reviews of events in that period, as well as some interviews to events producers and artists who visited the island, demonstrate that artists performed at the same kind of venues abroad before or after visiting Puerto Rico. It is even possible to trace a route with the common stops included in artistic tours; for example, Cuba and Puerto Rico were often the first stop in the

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32 I found more information on local venues in Puerto Rico through advertisements of music events than in journalistic articles or events’ critical reviews in local newspapers, what speaks to the commercial character of this practice. The advertisements were organized at the bottom or at the sides of the pages, surrounding news articles and designed specifically as social events or spectacles bulletins, often classified by venue.
Americas or the Spanish Americas; then the tours continued in Venezuela, Colombia, Panamá, México, and so on before going back to Puerto Rico or to the point of return, which was usually New York or cities in Europe. This confirms the existence of this artistic network at an international scale.

State-owned venues, town centers or *plazas públicas*, and community centers, such as the Centro Comunal de la Urbanización Pública Nemesio R. Canales in San Juan, municipal theaters as well as the University of Puerto Rico’s theater, were also present on the local press. However, these venues not only served other kind of public but also considered a very different set of artists and musical forms that were not necessarily those desired at the high-brow social clubs and hotels. This denotes first, the existence of parallel music scenes or “contexts in which clusters of producers, musicians, and fans collectively share their common musical tastes and collectively distinguish themselves from others” (Bennett & Peterson, 2004, 1). Second, it speaks of a certain cultural geography or an imaginary construct that “provokes a whole series of questions about the spatial relations that constitute things, about the movements and gatherings of things and about the very constitution of space, place and nature” (as defined by Anderson, Domosh, Pile, and Thrift, 2003, xviii). Music scenes and cultural geographies are two concepts that, given the lack of scholarship on events production, are fairly new to researchers, but have been used by journalists or musicians long time ago to designate extremely old and longstanding practices, not limited to music events. I use them together to represent and stress how a single element in the chain of processes of planning events, such as the venues, may turn into a complex web of imaginaries that evidences exclusion, rivalry, competition, and other set of differences that result in leveling the importance of each
venue and affects other elements and practices of events production. The theater circuit and its related artistic network exemplify this leveling. Gardel did not perform at a night club, after all, because the night clubs were out of the ‘category’ of the theater circuit. Another example, in the context of the late 1940s, is evident in the case of the local hotels.

The two principal hotels in Puerto Rico at the moment were the Hotel Normandie and the Hotel Caribe Hilton, inaugurated in San Juan in 1942 and 1949, respectively (Torres Rivera n.d.a.; Torres Rivera n.d.b.). The Normandie is a beautiful Art Deco building inspired in everything but in Puerto Rico. It was constructed by the colonial authorities on the island and appears under the National Register of Historic Places inventory of the U.S. Department of the Interior’s Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service (U.S. Department of the Interior’s Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service, n.d.). The Caribe Hilton was a project of the Compañía de Fomento Industrial de Puerto Rico or Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company (PRIDCO) which approved its construction in 1945 as a model of “tropical hotel” (Torres-Rivera n.d.a.). As Ayala and Bernabe add, “it turned into a showcase of Puerto Rico’s ongoing modernization” in the context of the Cold War (Ayala & Bernabe 2007, 193). “[Conrad] Hilton accepted the PRIDCO’s president Teodoro Moscoso’s invitation to administer a hotel in Puerto Rico, with what initiated his own worldwide project” (Torres Rivera n.d.a. –personal translation). The Caribe Hilton was inaugurated in 1949, the same year that Luis Muñoz Marin was inaugurated as first democratically-elected governor of the island. The project’s “ideological importance” in a context of local political transitions was linked by the local press to “the hotel’s new and modern image” which “reflected in great part the
promising perspective of the programs and projects of the Popular Democratic Party” [PPD], of which Muñoz Marín was president (ibid). As seen in Johnny Torres Rivera’s review on the history of the Hotel Caribe Hilton,

With that advertising impact [of the hotel as an “open house” associated with the PPD’s promising plans], it was tried to offset the miserable reality of the poor neighborhoods –as the sadly famous El Fanguito, which was highlighted repeatedly by the press in that period. The poor house of the Americas wanted to be transformed into a dazzling sample of U.S. benevolent capitalism.³³

That was the same benevolent capitalism that had reassured a convenient geopolitical and military position in the Caribbean through the construction of other buildings on the island since occupation, such as a series of military bases.

The events managers and artistic directors at hotels like the Normandie, the Caribe Hilton and others either did not consider or were asked not to hire local artists during this period, but only foreign or English-speaking artists and musicians who were internationally known or ‘famous’, and who could communicate with the desired clients of the hotels. In fact, the inauguration of the Hotel Caribe Hilton was organized as an “international fiesta” with prospective well-known clients such as foreign journalists, business people, politicians, and Hollywood celebrities, including actress and singer Gloria Swanson and José Ferrer –first Puerto Rican actor to win an Academy Award (ibid). Also, as Paquito Cordero described, the events managers at hotels preferred variety spectacles with musical performances by multiple artists instead of single-artist musical events (personal interview, 2008 –personal translation). These spectacles were

³³ Torres Rivera built up on a similar argument by Jerry Torres Santiago (2000), who focused on the links between the Caribe Hilton’s design and the progress and modernization plans within a new socioeconomic project in Puerto Rico. *Fiesta Island*, a short documentary sponsored by the Visitors Bureau of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (1953), is a cynical example of how the island was advertised in that era.
also popular during World War II, when the U.S. government brought artists to perform for the troupes in and out of Puerto Rico. Local singers like Bobby Capó participated in these spectacles, such as choreographer Katherine Durham’s show (Santiago, 1994, 6). But they always did so as supporting artists or bands for other stars.

This artistic network built by hotels and other venues operated through logics that were contextual characteristics of international business in a neocolonial developing territory in the Cold War era. The artists traveled within a circuit where they were tied to foreign-owned record companies with ties to local, regional, and international venues that were both privately owned and state-owned. However, as Paquito Cordero pointed out, local artists and producers were excluded from venues controlled by the social elites or hotels on the island (Paquito Cordero –personal interview, 2008). Local artists at this time demanded venues to perform what were popular but not seen as necessarily lucrative genres of music: Afro-Puerto Rican bomba, the plena and Afro-Caribbean musical forms like the bolero and others. As Quintero Rivera adds, artists, mostly dance orchestras, performed at hotels only in special occasions (Quintero Rivera, 2009, 292-293). But hotels and night clubs were mostly places to hang in all night long after performing at other popular venues, as musician local Sammy Ayala said (interviewed in Quintero Rivera, ibid).

Given the racial but also gender politics in the late 1940s and 1950s, Afro-Puerto Rican singer Ruth Fernández’s career paved the way for future artists and music bands. She was “the first woman lead singer for an orchestra in Puerto Rico where that was not well seen” (Santiago, 1994, 4 –personal translation). Her career, in contact with theaters and clubs overseas through a record company, is an example of music stars from Puerto
Rico who traveled to perform abroad in the 1950s. In 1953, she travelled to Spain, and then to Norway and Cuba, where she also recorded an album (ibid). As Fernandez said,

> It was possible to do much considering the prejudices then. First, for being a woman. Second, for being Black. And third, for not having a pretty face. I was not an ogre, but, as we know, there are some typical features that count and other things (which I did not have).... (Fernández, interviewed in Santiago, 1994, 4 –personal translation)

Music events production, as an emergent professional practice that promoted local and regional popular culture, started as a reaction of artists who wanted to produce and challenge these complex pre-existing international networks and related cultural geographies based on the cultural politics in Puerto Rico. The producers complicated even more this music star system through their roles as music events producers. Instead of having the owners of venues producing spectacles and contacting record companies or the artists directly to promote their own events to the public, the music events producers became intermediary agents that connected and negotiated with the artists, the venues, and other related elements and people into a complex set of processes of planning and logistics.

### 2.2.3 Music events and translocal links in the era of TV (1955-1970)

In the early 1950s, precisely in the wake of drastic sociopolitical changes in Puerto Rico, Paquito Cordero continued to work as an actor in Tommy Muñiz’s team, but started to specialize in music events production, especially in representing and developing local artists, still without registering an official company. He was Puerto Rico’s first professional music events producer. But he was not alone. Cuban-born singer Tony Chiroldes, who abandoned a successful singing career in Cuba to settle in Puerto
Rico in 1950 and marry [his first wife] actress Vilma Carbia, became another leading figure during these early years of music events production on the island. Chiroldes also represented artists, but different to Cordero’s local focus, he experimented with bringing artists from other Latin American and Caribbean countries, starting by Cuba (Iglesias, 1968; López-Ortiz n.d.).

Cuba and Puerto Rico had historical political and artistic ties, and the flow of music and artists like Chiroldes from one country to another was constant through radio as well as film and other collaborative efforts not linked to radio. Puerto Rican singers like Lucy Fabery and Myrta Silva, for instance, became idols in Cuba since this decade (Santiago, 1994, 5). Along with Mexico, Cuba and Puerto Rico were the two principal desirable plazas for entertainment and artistic performance in Latin America and the Caribbean at the moment. The bolero was at its peak in radio, and musicians and composers of bolero and related musical forms organized famous trios, quartets, and quintets. These artists, mostly singers and small ensembles, connected most of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and its diasporas in the U.S. through music.

Chiroldes was one of the Cuban music stars that visited Puerto Rico many times since 1947 hired to perform at the Jack’s Club and promote his music in the local radio station WIAC-AM (López-Ortiz, n.d.). Chiroldes networks as an artist and his relationship with owners of venues became important to the development of music events production as a professional practice in Puerto Rico. As seen in a biography compiled by Miguel López Ortiz (n.d.), the artist founded Empresas Chiroldes, which “for more than four decades brought spectacles of innumerable international [music] stars, developed

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34 He is also identified as Tony Chiroldy in many articles. Apparently, he changed his father’s last name to Chiroldes after arriving in Puerto Rico.
multiple local artists’ careers, and later produced various shows that were going to be emblematic in the history of our television” (personal translation). During the first 25 years, Empresas Chiroldes had a reputation as “the most important events production company at the plaza boricua [Puerto Rico],” López Ortiz added.

Before the arrival of TV in Puerto Rico, Chiroldes already had brought his most important ‘box office’ success, Mexican singer and film star Pedro Vargas (Iglesias, 1968, 58). “Pedro Vargas…no doubt about it. I brought him three times in 1953, and the three times it was amazing…” (Chiroldes, interviewed by Iglesias, ibid –personal translation). But Chiroldes’, and also Cordero’s best years as music events producers came after the arrival of TV.

TV arrived in Puerto Rico in 1954 at the peak of the U.S. modernization plans for the island. These plans advanced in the 1950s after the U.S. Congress ratified a constituent assembly organized by the PPD in 1952, which resulted in a non-traditional neocolonial relationship with the United States, known as the Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico (ELA) or ‘Commonwealth. The ELA turned Puerto Rico into an unincorporated organized territory of a new colonial empire that was built upon the basis of liberalism while ignoring Puerto Rico’s colonial legacy (Díaz Hernández, forthcoming). Ayala & Bernabe call this neocolonial status ‘an exception’ or ‘the Puerto Rican anomaly’ (Ayala & Bernabe, 2007, 28).

Telemundo (WKAQ-TV) was the first local TV station in Puerto Rico, and was inaugurated in March 1954, the same month that four Puerto Rican nationalists attacked the U.S. House of Representatives calling international attention to Puerto Rico’s neocolonial status. In this period, as journalist and popular culture historian Javier
Santiago notes, “the terms patria and nation became prohibited words” for their association with the Nationalist Party (Santiago, 1994, 4 –personal translation). National singers were known as “local, native, or del patio” (ibid). Telemundo launched right before the creation of the Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña (ICP, or National Institute of Puerto Rican Culture), which started in 1955 with a mission to “study and preserve our [Puerto Rico’s] cultural-historic heritage and to stimulate, foster, promote and divulge the various manifestations of Puerto Rican culture” (ICP n.d.a). This was the era of the institutionalization of culture and national cultural policy in Puerto Rico, which coincided with the construction of diverse national identities in the region and abroad. However, national cultural policy did not touch on music events or events production in general, with the exception of the revival and promotion of community events such as local festivals with local and traditional artists, as I will discuss in another chapter. Contrary to the music events production that was developing as an entrepreneurial practice or sponsored by the state, these local festivals and the promotion of local artists was basically done by women producers and became the model for community events production in Puerto Rico, although influenced by the other two kinds of events production. But in general terms, music events production as a practice in the early 1950s decade remained operating with little or no relation to the neocolonial state, unlike radio and TV broadcasters whose practice was regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) since 1934.

The first live-local programming that Telemundo broadcasted consisted in soap operas, news, and imported films from México and Argentina. In a tense political context in which the neocolonial status limited Puerto Rico’s decision over its international
affairs and was not considered a nation in international dialogues – apart from being used a model for development that started to bother people in other Latin American and Caribbean countries, these films preserved cultural connections between Puerto Rico and other countries in the region, and allowed for artistic exchange, mostly of actors and musicians, as Paquito Cordero suggested (personal interview, 2008). His connection with México was done indirectly through film because one of his aunts, actress and vedette María del Pilar Cordero, known as Mapy Cortés, married the Mexican actor and producer Fernando Cortés, and settled in México to work in film before coming back to Puerto Rico to work in TV. This is a familiar, affective, and at the same time professional connection that helped Paquito Cordero build up and sustain regional artistic networks later in his career as an event producer. This affective connection, which of course included friendship relationships, was also the link that brought Cordero to the TV.

(PC): Estoy en televisión, desde el mismo, bueno, desde antes de ir al aire. Nosotros fuimos al aire en marzo… pues, desde enero o febrero ya yo estaba dando vueltas por los estudios [con] mis tíos, Mapy y Fernando Cortés, [...]. Así que yo tuve la oportunidad que ellos me dieron de ir allí y ver cuando estaban poniendo las luces… y cuando llegaron las cámaras y todo ese detalle… Tuve la oportunidad de verlo desde el principio, como un pollito saliendo del huevo… ja, ja ja! Y pues, aprendí muchísimo desde ese momento… Entonces, cuando comenzó la TV, el día que fue al aire, desde ese mismo día yo estoy en Telemundo, porque ese día, hicimos unas promociones en vivo, porque todo era en vivo [...].

(Personal interview, San Juan, 2008)

(PC): I have been on TV even before it went on the air. We went on the air in March… so, since January or February I was already mingling around the studios with my aunt and uncle, Mapy and Fernando Cortés, [...]. They gave me the opportunity to be there and see when the first cameras arrived in and all those details… I had the opportunity to see it from the beginning, like a baby chick coming out of a hatching egg… ha, ha, ha! I learned so much since that moment… Then, when the TV started, the day I went on the air, since that very first day I have been in Telemundo, because that day we did promotions live on air, since everything was live [...].

(Personal interview, San Juan, 2008 – Personal translation)
Cordero and, soon after, also radio and events producer Tommy Muñiz became part of Telemundo, as artists and independent producers of variety shows. These programs included comedy sketches and musical performances, similar to what these producers did in radio and the *patron-saint fests*. Besides acting in various TV shows, such as *Mapy y Papi*, and announcing live advertisings, Cordero had his own show *Mímicas Del Monte*. When Muñiz joined Telemundo to produce the show *A reírse con Ola*, he brought new talent as artists who regularly worked with him, including the creative duo of Cordero and actor Yoyo Boing. As Beba García notes, “[t]he program consisted in two 10-minute comedy sketches divided by an intermission [following the logics of theater], during which a guest artist performed a song” (García, 2009, 84 – personal translation). Muñiz gave the chance to *Cortijo y Su Combo* with a song that became a classic in the Afro-Caribbean songbook, *Acángana* (ibid). Better yet, until 1960 *Cortijo y Su Combo* became the house-band for another Muñiz’s TV show, *La Taberna India*. The ensemble also performed in Cordero’s popular *Show del Mediodía*. At a time when Afro-Puerto Rican rhythms were invisible or at most limited to the margins, Muñiz and Cordero were:

…the successful astute entrepreneur[s] who picked up the possibilities of that new medium in regards of the massification of social communication, and invited Black percussionist Rafael Cortijo –formed in the *bomba* tradition of the «rumbones de esquina» [street corner jamming]– to perform with his «Combo». (Quintero Rivera (expanding on María Luisa Muñoz’s argument), 2009, 46 –personal translation)

As seen in their involvement in radio, Cordero and Muñiz were not the owners of TV stations, but artists and producers who contributed and had a great decision-making power in terms of the content for these media in Puerto Rico. That ‘popular’ content gave
the opportunity to similar artists, including musicians, and appealed to the same popular classes than their public spectacles at events. Also like radio, TV gave a boost to Cordero and Muñiz’s promotional strategies for live events, driven again by direct commercial sponsorship.

| (PC): Sí, a principios de los ’50, cuando empezó la TV, [el patrocinio directo] también se siguió, porque entonces era la combinación perfecta de la TV, la radio y las fiestas patronales… | (PC): Yes, in the early 1950s, when TV started, it [the direct sponsorship] also continued because then it was the perfect combination of TV, radio, and the patron-saint fests… |
| ADH: …tanto el espectáculo fuera de la radio y la televisión iba cónsono… | ADH: …both the public spectacle and TV were consonant… |
| (PC): Exactamente…y había más expectación para verlo… | (PC): Exactly…and there was more expectation to see it… |
| *** | *** |
| ADH: ¿En algún momento [los auspiciadores] Del Monte y la Cerveza India le pidieron que trajera también talento de otros lugares? | ADH: Did [the sponsors] Del Monte and Cerveza India ever ask you to bring talent from abroad? |
| (PC): …no, no…Entonces, más adelante, yo comencé a traer artistas de afuera y llevar artistas de Puerto Rico afuera. | (PC): …no, no…From then on, I started to bring artists from abroad and take local artists out of the country. |
| (Personal interview, San Juan, 2008) | (Personal interview, San Juan, 2008 – Personal translation) |

Cordero turned the challenge of a new medium of communication like TV into another opportunity to keep building his career as a music events producer. He also developed new promotional strategies, which added to the techniques of the growing number of advertising agencies on the island in the context of the local neocolonial state’s fierce industrialization plans over Puerto Rico.
(PC): […] Una [estrategia] que nunca nadie pudo igualar, […] como yo también estaba empezando cine pa’ esos años, y yo hice *El Alcalde de Machuchal, El Jíbaro Millonario, Machuchal Agente Cero, El Curandero del Pueblo*, pues yo me relacioné con cine, o sea, 35 milímetros [mm]. Entonces, yo hacía unos tráiler que […] los otros productores no podían hacer... Y yo tiraba una películita en 35mm con los artistas que iban a ir [a su show], invitando al público, además le cantaban un pedazo. Era como una promoción que duraba... era como un tráiler de lo que iba a hacer. Mira, eso nadie lo pudo hacer.

ADH: Porque…

(PC): No contaban con los equipos. Eran carísimos, pero como yo los tenía, o se los alquilaba a Viguié [el dueño de Viguié Films]. Viguié me ayudó muchísimo, sí, porque […] primero que le gustaba hacerlo. Había un…

ADH: ¿Había un interés genuino ahí?

(PC): …no solamente un interés, (a) los técnicos les gustaba hacer las cosas mías porque decían oye, ya yo estoy cansado de estar fotografiando latas de habichuelas...ahora estoy fotografiando a las estrellas de Puerto Rico.

(Personal interview, San Juan, 2008)

Cordero basically added the new logics of TV and new promotional strategies to the interdependent web that sustained the artistic networks in which he had participated since his years in radio. The same can be said for Tony Chiroldes, who went back to Cuba with his wife Vilma Carbia to acquire training for TV. As seen in an interview to TV presenter Eddie Miró, “the television in Cuba had already begun and from there came
many artists, many advertisers, and many people of the media who were ahead of us because they had already worked in that medium” (Miró, in García 2009, 62 –personal translation). Miró’s account reveals the fact that most of those artists and many other professionals were migrating to Puerto Rico (and elsewhere) because the relationship between Cuba and the U.S. was increasingly deteriorating due to political turmoil in the wake of the Cuban Revolution.

Chiroldes returned to Puerto Rico to work as an independent producer at the second local TV station WAPA-TV. As Miguel López Ortiz narrates, “[i]n 1956 [Chiroldes] created the variety show «Rendezvous Nocturno»,” which title changed to «Rambler Rendezvous» in 1965 due to an agreement with the commercial sponsor and Rambler cars distributor Gómez Hermanos (López-Ortiz, n.d. –personal translation). Chiroldes brought into local TV a lot of “international stars” whom he hired to perform at diverse scenes in San Juan (ibid).35 Following López Ortiz (ibid), Chiroldes’ most significant music events included Cuban singer Benny Moré’s debut and tour in various municipalities in Puerto Rico accompanied by Cortijo y Su Combo in 1956, the Sonora Matancera with Celia Cruz at the Hotel Flamboyán in 1958, and the Trío Los Panchos at the Hotel Condado in 1959. In a highly competitive artistic scene in Puerto Rico in the decade of the 50s, as Santiago comments, Rendezvous Nocturno helped Chiroldes “to lay the foundations for his development as an entrepreneur of spectacles at theater and hotels,

35 Following López Ortiz, examples of these artists were: Vicentico Valdés [Cuba], René Cabel [Cuba], Fernando Alburque [Cuba], Wilfredo Fernández [Cuba], Nico Membriela [Cuba], Machito & His Afrocubans with Graciela [Cuba-NewYork], Yolanda Montes «Tongolele» [México], Miguel Aceves Mejía [México], Fernando Fernández [México], Tin Tan & Marcelo [México], Los Cuatro Hermanos Silva [Chile], Los Hermanos Castro [México], Los Hermanos Reyes [Spain], Cuarteto Los Ruffino [Cuba], Roberto Yañés [Argentina], Rocio Dúrcal [Spain], Carlos Pizarro [Puerto Rico], Joe Cuba’s Sextet [Puerto Rico], and the orchestras of Tito Puente [PR-New York], Eddie Palmieri [PR-New York], Ray Barretto [PR-New York], Mongo Santamaría [Cuba], Joe Quijano [Puerto Rico], Pete «Boogaloo» Rodríguez [Puerto Rico], Richie Ray & Bobby Cruz [PR-New York], Joey Pastrana [PR-New York], etc. (López Ortiz, n.d. –personal translation)
and for his own record label Vilton” (Santiago, 1992). Chiroldes finally made it to the theaters and hotels’ circuits. Then, as the events production logics and practices started to complicate, Cordero decided to formalize his own for-profit corporation.

Cordero and Chiroldes could have chosen to establish non-profit corporations, but they did not. Their principal purpose was already to make money and compete in the show business. In doing so, Empresas Chiroldes and Paquito Cordero Productions set up the bases for an upcoming ‘golden era’ of music events productions in Puerto Rico. One of their most important contributions to the local music events scene in the late 1950s was building up connections with the events managers at the hotels, which eventually had a positive impact on local artists.
que no contrataban artistas de Puerto Rico, eran todos artistas americanos. […] …artistas como Sammy Davis Jr., todo el grupo americano, Liza Minnelli, pero a nosotros nos decían que…como que nosotros no llenábamos el público y pa’l turista, porque no los conocían. Y yo…no estaba de acuerdo con eso… […] De ahí en adelante se abrieron las puertas a las grandes estrellas de Puerto Rico [añadió, luego de mencionar el nombre de Lucecita Benítez]. Después vino Chucho Avellanet… […] Iris Chacón fue un palo cada vez que la llevábamos al [Hotel Caribe] Hilton. Usábamos el Hilton y el Hotel San Juan. En el Hotel San Juan hacíamos producciones. […] Haciamos una producción, con bailarines, todo –mejor que las producciones que traían de afuera… […] distinto al Hilton que era un artista [evento musical].

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(PC): …[a] los americanos le era muy difícil [contratar artistas locales]…

Hay que sacar a una persona que nos dio la oportunidad, que se llama Roberto Lugo, murió recientemente. Roberto Lugo, […] …fue manager del Hilton por muchos años y él le abrió las puertas al artista puertorriqueño. […] [Félix] Luis Alegría también, que era el director artístico, pues ayudó mucho al talento nuestro.

(Personal interview, San Juan, 2008)

Among the first artists to benefit from this “open door” achieved by Cordero and Chiroldes were singers Ruth Fernández –who performed at the Hotel Condado Vanderbilt in San Juan, and Lucy Fabery –who debuted at the Voodoo Room in San Juan and then in

36 Félix Luis Alegría is mentioned in Santiago (1994) as a public relationist for the Hotel Caribe Hilton.
The Morocco Club before performing at the Hotel Caribe Hilton and touring in the Caribbean and New York (Santiago, 1994, 4-5). The Hotel Normandie also opened the doors to a spectacle with local artists such as singer Bobby Capô, the Trío San Juan, the vedette Skippy, the dancer [and then choreographer] Leonor Constanzo, and the singer and dancer Juan Luis Barry, but did so through a non-local events producer called Milton Lehr (ibid, 10).

The exposure that local producers like Cordero, Chiroldes and local artist had on TV, certainly facilitated their access to a greater public audience and to the local elite and private-owned venues circuits, which excluded them years before. From then on, local artists and producers competed face to face with foreign producers within an artistic network of international links.

2.2.3.1 Local contrasts and ‘crossovers’

The doors of the hotels in Puerto Rico opened up to local events producers also in part because of other kind of relationships with new generations of producers, such as the case of Alfred Domingo Herger Traverso, better known as Alfred D’ Herger. Not only was he younger than the other music events producers, but he had a different social background and different interests than producers as Cordero, Muñiz, and Chiroldes. He went to bilingual elementary and middle schools in San Juan, participated in the Boy Scout local troops, and was in contact with U.S. popular culture and music either through records owned by one of his uncles or through his grandfather, who used to listen to the Armed Forces Radio station.\(^\text{37}\) These personal experiences plus some films he had seen in

\(^{37}\) The open-air station was part of the American Forces Caribbean Network (AFCN), also a TV station that served mostly the families at military bases in Puerto Rico.
English, or his contact with Elvis Presley’s songs which record companies had attempted to position in local media, fed D’Herger’s fascination with rock & roll. He knew there were other local popular music forms because of an aunt who studied then at the University of Puerto Rico. He recalled his aunt listened to “los trios y ‘los universitarios,’ Tito Lara, Miguelito Alcaide, and the Orchestra of César Concepción” (Personal interview, 2011). But he became a rock & roll fan. D’Herger subscribed to U.S.-based magazines on artists and youth, bought records through catalogs or special petitions in local record stores in Santurce and Condado, and set a goal to insert rock & roll into local media and music scenes.

As Santiago notes in his extensive research on the musical precursors of the Nueva Ola [New Wave] movement, “on December 8, 1956 the Escambrón [night club] announced a rock & roll spectacle with La Vern Baker, the Spence twins, Sil Austin’s Orchestra, and a guy named David Hill, highlighted in the announcement as «Elvis Presley’s menace»” (Santiago, 1994, 15 –personal translation). That was the first demonstrations of this musical form locally, followed by many others through few disc jockeys (DJs) at the few English-language radio stations, but the “tropical rhythms and boleros” still dominated local radio’s content (ibid, 15-16). Still a student of the Central High School, an experience that also inspired his career as a producer because of the many music events he attended at school, D’Herger started to write a weekly column entitled *Tu Hit Parade* (Your Hit Parade) at a recent page dedicated to youth in *El Mundo* local newspaper.

**AD’H:** I went to *El Mundo Newspaper*, introduced myself, and they hired me…as a ‘volunteer’ for writing a column which I entitled *Tu Hit Parade*. That column lasted
D’ Herger took the money he got as a gift when he graduated from high school, and travelled to Philadelphia to meet TV presenter and producer Dick Clark, and to New York to interview DJs at radio stations dedicated to rock & roll. This experience gave him ideas to propose radio shows and later on TV shows based on similar logics than these producers and DJs developed in the U.S.

At that time, the majority of the population in Puerto Rico did not speak English nor were literate, so El Mundo did not target them. In this sense, and in the context of a recently organized neocolonial state in the Cold War era, the rock & roll was distant to local popular classes’ daily life and, even though it eventually became popular among all, it also became a form of social and political differentiation which resonated with much
more force in future decades. At the same time, the rock & roll challenged the values of national culture promoted by recently created culture institutions which soon set their goals opposite to the project of ‘Americanization’ –although these institutions contradictorily emerged based on the U.S. political and economic values and ideas.

Soon after, local musicians of military family backgrounds or with knowledge of the English language, entered the growing rock & roll scene supported mainly by an artistic circuit which consisted in newspaper articles and youth sections, TV programs, and radio presenters like D’ Herger. Furthermore, local artists who were already stars locally and regionally started to record Spanish covers from rock & roll songs. The pioneers were the Cuarteto Los Hispanos, as seen in Santiago (1994, 20-21). Other artists did so in English, a practice known in the show business as ‘crossover.’

In dramatic contrast with the musical tastes of other producers like Cordero, for instance, who devoted the early years of his career to local popular music artists and who tried to open the doors of local venues for local and later regional artists, D’ Herger did so with rock & roll stars signed by independent record companies in the US and he had the professional but also personal networks to do so. First, motivated by D’ Herger, his father started a local company specialized in rock & roll records’ distribution; and second, D’ Herger’s experience in *El Mundo* newspaper had put him in contact with key actors in the hotels’ circuit.

| AD’H:  | [...] Entre esos artistas de los que mi papá traía los discos había uno que se llamaba Paul Anka, para mí era el mejor porque componía y cantaba sus propias canciones. Entonces yo fui al [Hotel] Caribe Hilton, acuérdate que ya yo iba a los hoteles, hablé allí con el director de Food and Beverage, se llamaba Félix Luis  | AD’H:  | Among these artists whose records my dad used to sell, there was Paul Anka, my favorite because he was a singer-songwriter. Then, I went to the Caribe Hilton, remember that I already know the hotels, and talked to the Food and Beverage director, Félix Luis Alegría, brother of Ricardo Alegría the director of |
Alegría, hermano de [Ricardo] Alegría el [director] del Instituto [de Cultura Puertorriqueña].

…pero yo estaba en la Universidad [de Puerto Rico], me había iniciado en la [fraternidad] Nu Sigma Beta de la Universidad y Félix Luis Alegría era de la Nu Sigma Beta. Aparte [de] que yo lo conocía porque cada vez que él traía a un artista yo era de los reporteros que iban a la mesa del cachete. Entonces yo fui y le dije, mira, hay una explosión de cantantes americanos. ¿Por qué el [Hotel] Caribe Hilton que trae a Los Chavales de España y a toda esta gente, no trae a un artista americano [de rock & roll]? Además, que a mí me interesaba porque mi papá era el que distribuía los discos. Y el dijo, «pues a mí me han ofrecido a unos cuantos». Y yo dije, ¿a quién te han ofrecido? Y me dice, «aquí tengo las fotos». Y empieza a sacar fotos y entre ellas estaba Paul Anka. Y yo dije, pues al que tienes que traer es a Paul Anka. Y me dice, «pero, ¿y quién va a ver a Paul Anka?» Yo traigo a Paul Anka, le dije, porque mi papá representa la compañía de discos y ellos nos van a respaldar en la publicidad, pa’ vender discos. Además, que yo trabajo en El Mundo y tengo un programa de radio, ¿qué pasa? Y me dice, «bueno, si tú me garantizas que tú me le vas a dar la promoción y eso, pues yo ‘baqueo’ eso y yo traigo a Paul Anka». Entonces prácticamente quién trajo a Paul Anka fuí yo porque yo le hice toda la propaganda, las relaciones públicas, fue una barbaridad, aquello se llenó…olvidate. No me gané un chavo. Lo que nos ganamos fue que se vendieron discos a la patá. El que se ganó los chavos fue mi papá.

ADH: Ese presupuesto entonces lo puso el Hotel [Caribe Hilton]…

…the Puerto Rican Culture Institute [ICP].

…but I was at the University of Puerto Rico, and had initiated in the Nu Sigma Beta fraternity from which Félix Luis Alegría was part of. Besides, I already knew him because I was one of the journalists that used to go to the food table. Then I told him, look, there is an explosion of American singers. Why the Caribe Hilton, which brings Los Chavales from Spain and all those people, did not bring an American artist [not a spectacle, but a stand-alone rock & roll artists]? Also, I was interested because my dad was a records distributor. And he [Alegría] told me, «I have actually gotten offers from many». And I told him, tell me which artists? And he replied, «here are the pictures». And started to take the pictures out including one of Paul Anka. And I said, that is the one you need to bring, Paul Anka. And he told me, «but who would like to see Paul Anka?» I will bring him, I said, because my dad represents his record company and they will back us up with the advertising, to sell records. Also, I work in El Mundo Newspaper and have a radio show, what is the matter? And he said «well, if you guarantee you will promote it, then I will back you up and bring Paul Anka». Then, practically I was who brought Paul Anka because I did the advertising and public relations, it was chaotic, it was packed…forget it. I did not earn a penny. What we got was selling a lot of records at once. Who made the money was my dad.

ADH: Then, the budget came from the hotel…

AD’H: To pay Paul Anka, the Hotel, but the promotion and so on was done with the record company’s budget [ABC Paramount]. […] Since I was a journalist, I
AD’H: Para pagarle a Paul Anka, el Hotel, pero la promoción y eso lo hicimos con los chavos de la compañía [disquera ABC Paramount]. […] Como yo era periodista, saqué una revista que se llamaba El álbum de Paul Anka, donde puse fotos de Paul Anka, bien chévere, tipo posters, puse la letra de todas sus canciones, la biografía y esa yo la vendí y ahí yo tuve mi ganancia… Aparte que me hice amigo de Paul Anka, porque teníamos más o menos la misma edad, él me llevaba un año, pero estaba tan sorprendido de que este nene, igual que él que era un nene, estuviera haciendo todas estas cosas. Me decía, «tú y yo somos iguales, nosotros estamos adelantados a nuestros tiempos». Lo que pasa es que yo era un nene ingenuo y él era un nene malicioso, o sea que no éramos tan iguales, pero…

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…[…] …yo no sabía traer artistas, yo no tenía chavos pa’ traer artistas, yo convencí a Félix Luis de que el Caribe Hilton pagara por el artista, pero yo me las estaba jugando porque yo tenía que llenarle el Caribe Hilton. ¡Y se lo llené!

(Personal interview, San Juan, 2011)

In fact, D’ Herger’s first music event was successful and so was his career as a radio, TV and music events producer. He, as Cordero and Chirolides did, represented many artists but also developed the careers of many others. D’ Herger’s professional and personal life was reviewed in depth by Santiago, who recognizes D’ Herger’s contribution to new public relations strategies for music events production, starting with Paul Anka’s visit to Puerto Rico, but also D’ Herger’s key role in developing a local musical movement known as Nueva Ola, which drove the career of many young local artists.
artists to internationalization (Santiago, 1994, 26-75). The context in which the local Nueva Ola movement developed, contrasted with the regional musical and political movement known as Nueva Canción [New Song movement], associated with pro-independence and anti-militarization groups in Puerto Rico. In the Cold War period, marked by war conflicts such as the post-War Korean and then Vietnam wars and the Cuban Revolution, musical forms derived from the U.S. were seen as problematic as they tried to displace and eventually limited local artists dedicated to the Nueva Canción from participating at certain venues and music events. Musical performance proves to be, as ethnomusicologist Kelly Askew sustains, “rarely divorced from politics” (Askew, 2001). And so is music events production neither divorced from politics. In this sense, D’Herger’s non-involvement with the local state was highly political and key to avoid challenging the tense geopolitical context and succeed as a producer, which applied to other music events producers in the entrepreneurial trend as well. This was also a way in which commercial, state, and community sponsored events began to differentiate in Puerto Rico.

The practice of bringing foreign artists to perform in Puerto Rico also entered in conflict with a recently formed syndicate known as the Asociación de Artistas y Técnicos del Espectáculo (APATE), inspired in previous culture industry related unions such as the Gremio de Prensa y Radio de Puerto Rico, formed in the early 1950s (Torres-Martinó, Báez & Álvarez-Curbelo, 2006, 143). APATE substituted the previous short-lived Asociación de Artistas presided by singer-songwriter Bobby Capó, in order to extend its inclusion to “all workers on the spectacle [entertainment] industry (radio, TV, film, theater, night clubs, circuses, etc.)” as part of an artistic class in Puerto Rico (ibid).
Years later, Capó, an active member of the union, turned against APATE for its “communist agenda” (ibid, 147-148). APATE’s agenda consisted in negotiating collective bargains with owners of radio and TV stations, venues, and production companies in order to secure the employment and help the artistic class moving out from the precarious conditions in which many workers of the entertainment industry were into better working and living conditions. APATE principally emerged in response to the limits of neocolonialism in Puerto Rico, in this case over media and events production workers (i.e., custom, set, light and audio designers and technicians, directors, actors, etc.). For example, the FCC had total jurisdiction over broadcast media and telecom in Puerto Rico. Also, “Puerto Ricans could not establish quotas in terms of how many foreign citizens could work in the media, since immigration was also controlled by the [U.S.] Federal government” (Santiago, 1994, 23 –personal translation). These neocolonial limits also applied to music and events production in general, and were soon evidenced in APATE’s legal struggles to charge sponsors and foreign productions and events production companies with fees, and in protests against PRIDCO’s granting loans to U.S.-based companies, such as San Juan Drama Festival theater company, directed by Barry Yellen, which produced in local theater in 1961 (Torres-Martinó, et al., 144; Silva-Ruiz, 1993/1985; Santiago 1994, 23-24).38 PRIDCO’s development plans based on “inviting” foreign companies to invest on the island, such as San Juan Drama Festival, but also hotels, and so on, was already attempting too much against a local artistic class claiming for work and recognition.

Overall, as the doors of the hotels opened, and a new generation of producers and artists with different interests and political stances, the local music events production

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38 APATE remained active until 1991.
landscape started to show contrasts. However, I have not found indicators of rivalry between music events producers Paquito Cordero, Tony Chiroldes, Alfred D’ Herger and APATE or between themselves. And neither was I expecting rivalry. On the contrary, they often sustain professional links, as seen when Cordero and D’ Herger founded the local record label Hit-Parade in 1966 (Santiago, 1994, 101-104). Cordero also produced music events abroad for many artists associated with D’ Herger’s Nueva Ola “clan,” as Santiago used to say. I found contrasts and differences in terms of these producers’ social background, musical tastes, as seen in D’ Herger’s case in this section; and in terms of scale and modes of operation in which each of them developed their production practices, as I will describe in the case of Cordero’s translocal artistic exchanges.

2.2.3.2 Translocal artistic exchanges from Puerto Rico as a hub

Once established the role of the music events producer as a mediator between artists, venues, the public, sponsors and other elements constitutive of music events production, producer Paquito Cordero started to venture with new strategies to shift the direction of the artistic flows from one way to multiple ways. He introduced the practice of artistic exchanges to the logics of music events production in Puerto Rico, and did so at a translocal scale. As I mentioned in a previous section in this chapter, Cordero’s immediacy to film through his aunt Mapy Cortés, put him in a vantage position regarding artistic networks in which musicians and actors participated at that time. Also, his previous experience in radio and TV once again played an important role in supporting this new strategy of doing artistic exchanges.

(PC): ...había quien se dedicaba solamente a traer artistas, por ejemplo, Tony (PC): There was who dedicated just to bring artists in, for example, Tony
Chiroldes, me acuerdo…, pero [en] este asunto de llevar y traer artistas y hacer un intercambio, en la radio y en la TV, yo estaba solo…y también los espectáculos de Nueva York, que pa’ aquel entonces eran bien importantes…

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(PC): […] Yo recuerdo que [en] uno de esos primeros, vamos a llamar, intercambios artísticos, yo traje de Venezuela, que fue el primer punto, quizás por quedarnos más cerca, pues [fue] a Héctor Cabrera. Entonces, Venezuela me llevaba a Tito Lara a Venezuela. Entonces, si yo traía, digamos, a Lydia Castillo con su grupo típico venezolano, ellos llevaban a [el cuarteto] Los Hispanos. O sea, […] se hacía un intercambio artístico bien bonito. Más adelante, empezamos a traer [artistas] de España, vamos a hablar de Raphael, Camilo Sesto, [Joan Manuel] Serrat, o sea, todos los nombres españoles, los grandes nombres en aquel momento, hasta luego Julio Iglesias. De México, Marco Antonio Muñiz, de Argentina a Sandro, o sea que teníamos una corriente artística de ambas partes, porque entonces yo le decía a los españoles que tenían que llevar a los muchachos de acá. Y así fue a España Lucecita Benítez, Chucho Avellanet, igual que a Argentina…

ADH: ¿Y lo hacían con música solamente o con otras industrias también?

(PC): No, [solo] con música. Ellos [los artistas] iban a los night clubs… Era una época muy bonita, muy, muy, muy bonita…

(Personal interview, San Juan, 2007)
The practice of doing artistic exchanges through music in the Caribbean has a historic tradition that dates from pre-Spanish colonization and has diverse local or national manifestations since the late 19th Century and contemporary times, as Lara Ivette López De Jesús affirms (2003). These exchanges were often linked to the fact that there were many port cities in the Caribbean where commerce, as well as music, flowed (Quintero Rivera, 2009). In relation to the US, mostly New York, these exchanges were also done since the late 1910’s, as seen in Ruth Glasser’s *My Music is my Flag: Puerto Rican Musicians and Their New York Communities* (Glasser, 1995). But these local and translocal exchanges were mostly cross-cultural encounters due to artistic tours or processes of migration in which cultural exchanges occurred simultaneously, and not literally reciprocal hiring like Cordero did of one artist in exchange for another from a different country. The artistic exchanges fomented by Cordero took place in a translocal dimension which is shaped by and constitutive of transnational processes that occur from individual to individual or groups regardless their formal or informal character, with no necessary mediation of the state, and from one local point to another local point in different time frames. These exchanges were initiated at a translocal scale, as seen in Cordero’s recount, and started from point to point, but then turned into a web of knots in which Puerto Rico was a hub from where the artists took off and he, as an individual producer, operated.

The translocal, as I describe the scale of Cordero’s artistic exchanges, refers to “connections beyond the ‘local’,” including the local actors in more than one location who build those cross or transborder connections (Alvarez; 2000; Freitag & von Oppen, 2010). This translocality perspective has a background that is linked to the contributions
from global and transborder feminism and social movements’ literature. This literature speaks to the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, in which “the particularities of the regional and national political contexts in which feminisms unfolded also impelled local movement actors to build transborder connections from the bottom up” (Alvarez, 2000, 30). This translocal perspective is useful to analyze cases like these artistic exchanges, which preceed global processes and the period associated with globalization, and also to question the tensions and unevennes between the connections and flows in artistic exchanges and the state. In the case of Puerto Rico, where the neocolonial state and national cultural policy in the 1950s and 1960s did not touch much upon the practice of music events production and non-traditional popular music, the translocal perspective makes me question how music events producers like Cordero were not necessarily making connections from the bottom up, but almost completely out of the state and protected by its corporate liberal ideals. However, while it is true that Cordero operated within the logics of the market, he was also reacting to both the state and the market from which he felt he was excluded earlier in his career as a popular culture middle-class local artist and music events producer. This challenges the logics of the market from within and evidences these logics are neither homogeneous nor hegemonic when it comes to music events production.

The fact that a translocal network developed from independent and commercial initiatives in Puerto Rico also shows a lack of intention of the neocolonial state to participate in those networks and promote artistic exchanges at times when the local state and other countries were constructing their national identities. It also brings up questions on the role of independent nations in the region and abroad to do the same, since
producers at those countries were also sustaining direct ties with producers in Puerto Rico with no consultation with the states from which they operated, as can be drawn from a personal interview with Cordero (2008). Nevertheless, the logics behind these artistic exchanges in Puerto Rico had and still have some presence of the state; for example, through the administration of U.S. national policies regarding legal and security issues, such as transmitting visas and similar requirements to control the flow of people, musical instruments and other materials produced for artistic networks across territorial boundaries.

For the neocolonial state in Puerto Rico it was not only an apparent lack of intention to participate in translocal networks and promote artistic exchanges, as much as its inability to do so because of the colonial limits. In the context of the Cold War, and especially after the Cuban Revolution and the U.S. embargo against Cuba, the tensions between local producers, artists, and their counterparts in some countries became particularly visible due to U.S. national policies. These tensions also prevented Puerto Rican artists from participating in artistic events, such as the case of the Primer Festival de la Canción Latina [First Latin Song Festival], celebrated in México in March 1969. This Festival was the precursor of the Organización de la Televisión Iberoamericana [OTI, or Ibero-American TV Organization]. As Cordero remembered, only singers from sovereign nations could participate in the Festival, but local music events producers basically plead the local government to help them negotiating their admission to the Festival (personal interview, 2008). Puerto Rico was finally admitted in 1969, and singer Lucecita Benítez entered and won the competition with the song Genesis – “her passport to internationalization,” and a contract with the multinational record company RCA.
(Santiago, n.d. –personal translation). This exemplifies how a translocal relationship can lead to internationalization through a corporation that operates at a multinational scale, as opposed to translocal. Cordero always regretted the little attention the local government gave to their participation in these kinds of music events as the Festival (personal interview, 2008).

This feeling of exclusion was seen in many others music events producers I interviewed, especially because they knew the state eventually started to promote artistic exchanges but was not including the popular music forms or the music events they used to produce. A possible reason to explain this exclusion, could be that the local state started to do artistic exchanges based on principles ‘taste’ and ‘cultural proximity’ with other countries, and somehow focused only on an ideal traditional-‘folkloric’ representation of Puerto Rican culture in a peculiar opposition to the logics of the market.\footnote{Here I am following Koichi Iwabuchi’s thoughts on ‘cultural proximity’ (Iwabuchi, 2002, 121-157).} This definitely complicates the relationship of the local state willing to get organized as it administers the colony vis-à-vis the fierce corporate liberal and developmentalist U.S. policies over the island. It also ignored that music events production as an entrepreneurial practice was also contributing to build up the history of the popular culture in Puerto Rico. Moreover, it was struggling with the politics of difference in the logics of the market which seemed to be aligned with those of the local state.

When Cordero said, “we had a two-way artistic flow, because then I told the Spanish they had to take the guys from here,” he was referring to the specific case of multinational record companies \textit{using} local producers as mediators to promote Spanish
artists in Puerto Rico through music events. In this sense, Cordero was also advocating for a fair treatment for local artists, whom he always referred to as “las grandes estrellas de Puerto Rico” [the big stars of Puerto Rico], and who were falling short in terms of the balance with local performances by foreign artists. This was critical in a context of industrial development on the island, which struck the image of artistic professions and many musicians started to have economic problems making a living out of music.

In regards of Cuba, which was one of the principal hubs for artistic exchanges with local music events producers in Puerto Rico, in the late 1950s and 1960s the exchanges were forced to stop or were done only through educational activities approved by the state. Actually, Cordero did not mention Cuba in our conversations, which means that it was certainly out of the translocal circuit in Puerto Rico. In Cuba, the venues and other interdependent elements of music events production started to close and record companies became nationalized, which immensely reduced but did not stop the flow of artists and regional artistic exchanges (Díaz-Ayala, 2006, 234-235). In a context in which multinational record companies were mostly U.S. or European-based and refused to accept the Cuban Revolution, the flow of Cuban artists and their music either live, published, or recorded was dramatically affected, as well as the payment of the royalties to music composers (ibid). By then, artistic projects –mostly theater– done through the University of Puerto Rico were important to sustain cultural exchanges both locally and regionally (Ramos-Perea, 2005). Even though the artistic exchanges between Puerto Ricans and Cubans were minimal, the long-standing artistic networks in which local music events producers and musicians participated in and shared with Cuban musicians
before the embargo were sustained through Latina/o music scenes in theaters and night clubs in the U.S., especially in the 1960s in New York.

2.2.3.3 The spectacle as the star of artistic exchanges

Different reasons drove people to migrate from Puerto Rico mostly to the East Coast of the U.S. and principally New York during the first half of the 20th Century. These reasons varied from economic, political, to professional ones. The first massive migration before and during the 1930s was provoked by the struggles for land tenure and income redistribution and the growing and visible inequity that this generated (Scarano 1993 and 2007; Picó, 2009/2006; Ayala & Bernabe, 2007). In the post-War period, as seen in Ayala and Bernabe’s account of the contemporary history of Puerto Rico, a second massive migration of Puerto Ricans “unable to find employment in Puerto Rico, left for the U.S. in search of jobs and higher pay” (Ayala & Bernabe, 2007, 179). Most of these Puerto Ricans became social and politically active, and represented a significant percentage of the growing immigrant population in New York.

New York was the location to the principal multinational record companies, some of which had signed local as well as regional artists way before the 1960s (Santiago, 1994; Díaz-Ayala, 2006; Negus, 1999). The city had also a vibrant set of artistic networks that included theaters and hotels’ circuits, as I mentioned before. Paquito Cordero’s second translocal initiative, this time to reach the Puerto Ricans in New York, consisted in getting access to these circuits of venues mined by fierce competition and not exempted from cultural politics.

(PC): Bueno, fíjate, esa es una historia casi aparte. […] [En] Nueva York, los teatros

(PC): Well, see, that is almost another story. […] [In] New York, the Latin
latinos, los que estaban cerca de donde estaba el grupo hispano, casi siempre traían [a] los artistas de México. Básicamente la estrella era mexicana, entonces, los demás eran artistas de Puerto Rico. Estamos hablando de la época de Felipe Rodríguez, estamos hablando del Trío Vegabajeño, de todos esos grupos. Entonces, yo vine con la idea de [que] yo no necesitaba traer la gran estrella del cine mexicano, que yo podía hacer un espectáculo con las grandes estrellas de Puerto Rico. Y así entré yo productor en Nueva York. Cuando voy a vender mi espectáculo y me dicen que no, porque no tenía estrella mexicana… y yo dije, bueno no, la estrella es el espectáculo. Entonces, llevo la primera, lo que le llamaban La Taverna, que era como La Taverna India. Se llamaba La Taverna, con [el actor] Adalberto Rodríguez “Machuchal”, Cortijo y su Combo, con Ismael Rivera, entonces Los Hispanos, Lucecita Benítez, todo el grupo artístico que estaba fuerte en Puerto Rico, El Gallito de Manatí, pues todo esto yo lo hacía en un show e íbamos a Nueva York. […] Y fue un súper éxito… un palo. Y de ahí en adelante, pues yo empecé a llevar dos shows al año.

ADH: ¿Llevaba La Taverna y cuál era el otro?


ADH: Ahí estamos hablando ya de unas cuantas décadas entonces…

theaters, the ones close to the Hispanic group, almost always brought in artists from México. The stars were basically Mexican then, the others were artists from Puerto Rico. We are talking about Felipe Rodríguez era, the Trío Vegabajeño, all those groups. Then, I thought I did not need to bring the big star of Mexican films, that I could produce a spectacle with the big stars of Puerto Rico. That was how I as a producer entered in New York. When I go to sell my spectacle and they said no, because I did not have the Mexican star… and I said, well no, the star is the spectacle. Then, I brought the first, what was called La Taverna, similar to La Taverna India. It was called La Taverna, with the actor Adalberto Rodríguez “Machuchal”, Cortijo y su Combo, with Ismael Rivera, then Los Hispanos, Lucecita Benítez, and the entire artistic group well-known in Puerto Rico, El Gallito de Manatí, so everything was on the show and we travelled to Nueva York. […] It was super successful… a hit. Since then, I started to bring two shows a year.

ADH: ¿You brought in La Taverna and which was the other one?

(PC): […] The burro was La Taverna India, Cortijo y su Combo, then El Gran Combo, Roberto Rohena, all that group. Then, in early February, I brought the young artists […] Chucho Avellanet, Lissette, […] Tito Lara, Los Hispanos. It was very interesting.

ADH: We are talking about a couple of decades, right?

(PC): Yes, that took all the 1950s and the 1960s, and part of the 1970s… yes, because I remember the big success of Lucecita Benítez…Lucy was […] a big hit
Cordero was able to extend his scale of production and build up new translocal artistic networks in which “the big stars from Puerto Rico” were not alone, but competing with other artists based in New York for the attention of their migrant communities and descendants. In the context of an increasing segmentation of the migrants in that city, Cordero needed to negotiate the booking of his artists at venues in which mostly Mexican artists performed. And he had no Mexican artist because there seemed to be a principle of translocalism, in which artists were represented in New York or elsewhere by music events producers of their home countries whether settled in New York or in their countries of origin. For instance, when Puerto Rican singer Lucecita Benítez travelled to perform in local venues in México in 1969, she did so with representatives of the record company but also with her producer, Paquito Cordero (Cabrera, 1969). An aspect of these practices is that the venues remained operated by local companies or the state, and the music events producers respected those local venues and their respective local artistic networks. These practices as well as the principle of translocalism eventually changed in future decades, as a different set of values and respect domain the international show business at a global scale leaded by multinational companies of venues.

Cordero’s relationship with other producers, artists, and owners of venues in New York also included other Caribbean and Caribbean-descendant artists, mostly Puerto
Ricans but also Cubans, who worked in and sustained their own Latina/o artistic networks. The late 1950s and early 1960s were the years in which the mambo, *guaguancó*, *son guajira*, *guaracha*, bolero, and cha-cha-chá were at their peak, and the charanga-pachanga and boogaloo were emerging and paving the way for the *salsa* (Flores, 2000). The orchestras of Machito, Tito Rodríguez, and Tito Puente were constantly booked at the Palladium and other night clubs, and so did future generations of artists such as those signed by the Fania record label since 1964 (ibid). These artists had also ties with and were influenced by other artists and producers from the U.S. who flowed on circuits associated with other music forms such as the rock & roll, R&B, as well as other public (Flores, 2000; Pacini-Hernández, 2003). Cordero needed to be aware of the tensions in and respectful of these previously established local and translocal artistic networks and the constant hybrid music forms emerging from them. I found no record which indicates he did the opposite. On the contrary, I found that artists that were brought by Cordero to New York, such as El Gran Combo, José Miguel Agrelot, Lissette, and Danny Rivera, were welcome and acknowledged side by side with other artists that were part of the translocal Latino artistic networks in New York, such as Puerto Ricans Ray Barreto, Tito Puente, and even Italian-American producer Jerry Masucci (*El Mundo*, 1969). These artists were part of a list of 40 artists identified as “*puertorriqueños e hispanoamericanos*” who were awarded the most outstanding artists of 1968 and the first quarter of 1969 was published (ibid). ⁴⁰ The ceremony took place in the Academy of Music Theater in New York, and included actors, presenters, singers, composers, and radio, TV, record, and events producers.

⁴⁰ In the late 1960s, local newspapers in Puerto Rico were already covering music and all kinds of events more broadly, though not necessarily critically.
Two aspects of the events that Cordero brought to New York are important to trace how the show business was changing, not only in Puerto Rico but also abroad. First, he brought in variety spectacles, similar to those he produced at the beginning of his career, but different in the balance between theatrical versus music content. As he specialized in music events, the spectacles he brought to New York moved from mostly theatrical with a few musical interventions, to mainly musical with some comedy sketches. Second, as the translocal scale of music events production in the late 1960s—as other culture industries—moved into a global scale run by multinational corporations, Cordero started to treat the spectacle as a commodity. It was no longer a practice of planning the presentations of “the big stars of Puerto Rico” in local and non-local venues, but of planning a spectacle that could compete with the neutral format that was valued in a fast-growing global market supported by the media and other multinationals. Locally, this shift from ‘the artist as the star of the spectacle’ to ‘the spectacle as the star’ had enormous and often disastrous, though sometimes highly lucrative, repercussions for local artists, their music and performances. The logics of affection, friendship, and art for art’s sake, turned into byproducts of corporate relationships and were not necessarily the core and beginning of those relationships. These logics turned into oppositional logics often seen in community music events, though in complex ways. This shift from ‘the artist as the star of the spectacle’ to ‘the spectacle as the star’ also had a tremendous impact on the practices of music events production, which from then on generated a division between ‘big’ and ‘small’ events producers—those who produced locally for commercial, community, or state purposes versus those who produce locally or
translocally within strict—though not homogeneous—logics of the market at a global scale.

2.3 The show must go on

Apart from the translocal and highly competitive commercial turn in the practices of music events producers in the 1960s, the events in general continued increasing locally leaded by Chiroldes and supported by the construction of new state-owned venues, such as the Hiram Bithorn Stadium in 1962. From 1964 on, as seen in López Ortiz (n.d.), Chiroldes was hired to manage the booking of artists and music events at the Monte Casino cabaret, owned by entrepreneur Félix ‘Chiquitín’ Adorno in Bayamón. Adorno also owned the Jacarandas and Tropical dance clubs in which artists like La Lupe, Felipe Pirela, Roberto Ledesma, Orlando Contreras, and Estelita del Llano, among others, had their local debut (ibid). In 1968, Chiroldes had another active year bringing in to Puerto Rico stars related to both music and film, such as Conchita Bautista, Rocío Durcal, Marisol, Armando Manzanero, Miguel Aceves Mejías, Los Panchos, Joselito, Sarita Montiel, Palito Ortega, Pili y Mili, Lola Flores, Hilda Aguirre, and his most successful “life inversions,” Pedro Vargas and the Indio Araucano, as he said in an interview with journalist Manolo Iglesias (Iglesias, 1968—personal translation). Producers Chiroldes, Cordero, and D’ Herger remained active in music events production after this decade; but D’ Herger is currently the only living representative of this generation of producers. As it is commonly heard in events production, “the show must go on,” and it certainly did as music events production continued growing on the island.
State-sponsored events that preceded the era of professionalization of music events production, such as official and military ceremonies, special events, and the carnivals and *patron-saint fests* (of mixed Catholic and state sponsorship) were still produced during this decade. Similarly occurred with community events in the 1960s; for example, charity spectacles, dance galas, and special events that ranged from sport, exhibitions, and music events organized by non-profit organizations, such as the *Sociedad para evitar la tuberculosis en los niños* [Society Against TB in Children] and the *Sociedad de niños con retardación mental de Puerto Rico* [Puerto Rican Society for the Retarded Children] (Dover 1983). These events followed a voluntary set of logics and practices inherited by local elites from the wives of military governors and authorities on the island, as described by musicologist Catherine Dover (1983). Other events—most of which included music performances and dance—were beauty pageants, theater plays, and festivals organized by civic clubs or other kind of communities organized by neighborhood, municipality, particular festivities and ceremonies related to religious observances, or any other particular interests, including academic and student activities, and family gatherings, such as the *bailes de marquesina* [porch parties], which preceded the *disco parties* in the 1970s and are emblematic of a broader project of urbanization in Puerto Rico since the 1960s. It is important to note that the Puerto Rican’s Day Parade in New York was already a recurrent event in this decade, as many other events dedicated to Puerto Rican culture which followed in other cities in the U.S. I will describe other community-organized festivals in another chapter on state-sponsored music events.

Chiroldes, Muñiz, Cordero, and D’ Herger’s lives helped me tracing the history of music events in Puerto Rico, parallel to the history of popular culture and an artistic class
in relation to the neocolonial state. These music events producers managed to work with little or no regulation on events production overall. They professionalize the role of the events producer and music events production following their own criteria and networks. They also followed the logics of the international market which often entered into contradiction with the local neocolonial developing state, increasingly dependent on foreign inversion –from which the artistic realm was not excluded. These producers overcome the neocolonial limits in many different ways, and built up strategies that helped them developing new but also sustaining historically-built local, regional and translocal artistic networks connected through different set of logics within and beyond the commercial. In doing so, they opened up opportunities for participating in those artistic networks with certain distance from the neocolonial state, almost in a post or non-national way. This not only represents a political and economic position that brings up questions of political culture, but also evidences the contested role of the state and national culture in Puerto Rico since its neocolonial (re)organization during the Cold War. I also argue that it often challenges the logics of the market, too, as these are neither homogeneous nor excepted of cultural politics that affect all the elements of the music events production processes, as seen in the case of venues owned by local social elites. These elements mainly involve artists (i.e., musicians, composers, set, light and custom designers and technicians), venues, sponsors, and the public. Often, dancers and presenters or master of ceremonies (MCs) are also part of this practice, as well as other related works and services.

As seen in this chapter, the producers needed to develop, negotiate, and sustain relationships with all the artistic workers and administrative elements of the processes of
events planning, all of which have their internal logics and politics often interdependent with the media and other culture industries, specially the recording industry, radio, TV, film, and advertising. Those relationships were determined locally by non-market forces at the beginning, and became a lot more complex and competitive as music events production professionalized and developed as an industry. This empirical history demonstrates how those distinct relationships and practices allowed for more equity for producers who opened up and accessed a wider set of venues, which consequentially led to new opportunities for more and diverse artists and artistic production in new and different events, at different scales and with different audience reach. The artistic networks described in these decades also allowed for positive features, especially to promote the work of local artists abroad, and sustain local, regional and translocal artistic exchanges and flows of music events with producers and agents in New York, Venezuela, Spain, Argentina, and others. The relationships between events producers, artists, the owners of venues, the audiences, and the state eventually changed as the logics of new local, regional and multinational players entered the music events production industry in times of a much more aggressive liberalization, as I will expand in Chapter 4.
CHAPTER 3
NATIONAL CULTURAL POLICY FROM THE NEOCOLONIAL TO THE NEOLIBERAL ERA

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I described how music events production developed as a virtually unregulated and commercially-sponsored private practice composed of a set of planning processes and individuals that operate in complex ways both within and outside the logics of the market, linked to local, regional and translocal networks of artistic flows. This practice –also known as “show business”– came in to coexist with previous state, religious and community-sponsored events in Puerto Rico, and with other forms and types of events, such as risk and competition, trade and professional events, exhibitions, special ceremonies, and other activities of different audience reach and geographical scale. In this chapter, I will examine the field of music events production from the vantage point of state-sponsorship and its development parallel to the organization of the neocolonial state in Puerto Rico and its national cultural policy in the period after World War II. I will describe music events production within some public institutions, with special attention to the Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña (Institute of Puerto Rican Culture, or ICP), which is the most important governmental institution dedicated to national cultural policy created under the neocolonial state. I will also focus on how the neocolonial state became an active producer of events and its links to local independent and commercial events producers and other elements of events production.

In the final sections of this chapter, I will map the new context in which the relationship between live-music events producers and the state evolved, as the state and
its national cultural policy started to deteriorate due to local bipartisan politics. I will review the cultural legislation in this era to exemplify how bipartisan politics in Puerto Rico have threatened the culture of production developed years before in the ICP to the point of an ultra-fragmentation and almost extinction through budget cuts and highly bureaucratized ways of sponsoring and producing artistic events, among other actions. But however provincial this internal friction is, I would like to suggest that there is another dimension of it that needs to be considered, since the new social context that framed the dismantling of the ICP locally was not exempted from changes at a wider geopolitical context in times of an advanced liberalization and subsequent processes of neoliberalization.

3.2 ‘Inherited’ and new institutions for cultural affairs

Since its organization as the ELA in 1952, the neocolonial state in Puerto Rico decided to continue operating crucial institutions for the stimulation and circulation of national culture, linked to the ideas and values of the puertorriqueñidad. Some of these previous institutions created during the U.S. colonial administrations were the Departamento de Instrucción Pública (now the Department of Education) which hosted the DIVEDCO, the University of Puerto Rico (UPR), and the Comisión de Parques y Recreos Públicos (Public Recreation and Parks Commission, or CPRP) which was then administered by the U.S. Department of Interior and is now known under the ELA as the Departamento de Recreación y Deportes or the Department of Recreation and Sports. The neocolonial state also continued with the Escuelas Libres de Música (i.e., public schools specialized in music), which started in San Juan and later expanded to schools in
the municipalities of Ponce, Mayagüez, Humacao, Caguas, and Arecibo (Law 365 of 1946 in Harvey, 1993, pp.447-451). There was no coordination between these institutions and their cultural projects, with the exception of the Escuelas Libres de Música, which were and are still part of the Department of Education.

A new set of institutions, organizations and state divisions were created by the Operación Serenidad between 1952 and 1968, as I will mention in this chapter. All these new and inherited institutions were made official by means of laws and other normative strategies, some of which dated from both Spanish and U.S. colonial administrations and its respective decrees and laws, including U.S. Federal law which the local state is submitted to. As explained in the introductory chapter, these ‘inherited laws’ were not necessarily revoked once the constitutional assembly that created the ELA took place. On the contrary, they still coexist with laws passed by the neocolonial administrations since 1952, which are proposed mostly by the executive governmental branch to create special offices of the governor, executive departments and agencies, and public corporations that operate under the local governor’s office or specific agencies and departments.

Even though commercial-based events production was already achieving professional status at that moment and had a long historical legacy that dated back to the Spanish colonization, only a few of the inherited laws were related to events and even less to music events. For example, the Law 25 of April 23, 1927 offers a vague definition of what the patron-saint fests were, in favor of the state’s interest for regulating the games by chance and gambling at these fests (Harvey, 1993, p.476; Law 25 of April 1927). This law represented one of the first attempts of the local state to intervene in a

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41 Examples of the games by chance and gambling commonly seen at the patron-saint fests are kiosks with mechanical horse racing game (i.e., picas con hipódromos de caballitos manipulados por...
non-state event, such as the patron-saint fests which are organized by the Catholic Church. It also interfered in part with municipal governments and laws, because the patron-saint fests are held in most municipalities on the Island. Another example of an inherited law that the neocolonial state decided to carry on with was the Law 300 of May 15, 1938, which for the first time intervened with the owners of private venues and “[e]very theater, movie theater and any other venue dedicated to public exhibitions of public spectacles” in order to control selling tickets above the venues’ capacity limit (Harvey, 1993, p.473 –personal translation). It was passed in the context immediately after Gardel’s visits to Puerto Rico, when the music star system supported by private venues developed as a highly lucrative practice. The issue the law responded to was treated then as a public health concern, since there had already been cases of asphyxia at overcrowded venues. The then Departamento de Sanidad (now the Departamento de Salud or Health Department) made a public statement to call in the local governments’ attention on this case. As a result, this law required the owners of private venues to “apply for a license, declare the venues capacity limit, and…inform any changes to the municipality in which the venue was registered” (ibid). This was also the first law to mention the concept espectáculo público or public spectacle per se. None of these previous laws were revoked, but amended many times since the creation of the ELA in 1952.

What was different from this time on was the way national cultural policy was framed normatively to promote the puertorriqueñidad and which institutions were

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42 The Law 300, did not include open-air venues.
43 It is not explicit in the law which agency or state’s institution was responsible for granting the licenses.
created within that normative frame. For the first time in Puerto Rico’s neocolonial history, the possibility of a coordinated effort to organize the government’s action in relation to culture was seen, though not necessarily achieved. Following Edwin R. Harvey’s account on cultural legislation in Puerto Rico, even though there were formal difficulties from the start, such as “the lack of a cultural rights code” at a constitutional level, there were and still are specific classified normative sectors in which national cultural legislation could be analyzed (ibid, 161). These classified sectors added a new level of structure to the initiatives for developing national cultural policy in Puerto Rico. From the period right after the WWII until 1968, and following Harvey (ibid, 166-171), these sectors were the following:

   a) The institutional organization of the governmental cultural action – This sector includes mainly the creation of organizations by means of centralized neocolonial state’s mandate, such as the ICP in 1955. In future decades, this sector of governmental cultural action expanded to include other organizations, commissions, and counsels in which the ICP participates as member-institution.

   b) The nongovernmental institutional areas – This sector refers to governmental partial or substantial support for non-profit organizations, such as the Ateneo Puertorriqueño, which is the most antique cultural institution in Puerto Rico. Founded by artists in 1876 and initially partly funded by the Spanish authorities, the Ateneo was granted funding by the ELA to aid its operations.44

   c) The legal regulations of the cultural patrimony – This sector’s priority is to provide governmental legal support for creating and protecting historical zones, monuments and buildings, archaeological patrimony of different sorts, and commemorating historical dates related to national symbols, artistic forms and the life of artists. Much of this responsibility fell on the ICP. In regards to music and music events, as I will discuss later in this chapter, the ICP’s Music Division celebrates yearly events and ceremonies to honor or commemorate artists and certain musical forms that the institution’s board of directors finds historically relevant.

44 In the absence of a university in Puerto Rico, the Ateneo came to be a meeting place in Old San Juan, inspired by similar spaces in Spain, that seek “to promote and discuss the country’s cultural [artistic] activities” (Picó, 2009/2006, 229). The Ateneo has also served other purposes, such as being used for receptions, recitals of students of the members, concerts to celebrate religious [and national] festivities, and benefit programs (Dower, 1983, 81). It still operates as an independent entity in the Island.
d) Media and socio-cultural communication – This specific sector is highly limited because of the imposition of US Federal law inherent to media and communication on the neocolonial state. In general terms, the sector includes an amendment to a regulation approved in 1937 to control the announcers and total of advertising on radio and TV; the creation of a corporation for a public radio and TV-broadcasting system in 1958 (currently known as the Corporación de Puerto Rico para la Difusión Pública, or Puerto Rico Corporation for Public Broadcasting) –initially under the Department of Education; and a first attempt in 1962 to regulate the owners of cable TV antennas. In future decades, this sector expanded to include the creation of institutions related to local film production and promotion, legislation to secure fairness in the exhibition and distribution of films in Puerto Rico, and legislation on payola or illegal influence on radio and TV.

e) The legal regulations of copyright – Similar to the media and communication sector, the neocolonial state has no much space in copyright law since its use is determined by US Federal law. This sector is even more complicated since the Spanish copyright law of 1879 is still also valid and acknowledged by the local neocolonial state.

f) Other thematic areas – This normative sector refers to specific cultural activities and practices, not necessarily connected to the preservation of cultural patrimony or limited to direct rule of the central neocolonial government. This sector includes other new and previously created governmental executive departments, specific agencies, and public corporations which play an important role as promoters of national culture and cultural policy. This sector may also include support for nongovernmental organizations. The thematic areas included since the transition period to the ELA until 1968 were: The promotion of books and publications through the Instituto de Literatura Puertorriqueña (Institute of Puerto Rican Literature, formed in 1938); the preservation of old and the creation of new libraries, museums, and archives in order to create and promote a local documentary archive –since all historical documents until then were archived in either Spain and the U.S.; and the expansion of music teaching through the creation of new Escuelas Libres de Música, and the establishment of the Festival Casals in 1957 as a public corporation that led to the creation of the Conservatorio de Música (Puerto Rico Music Conservatory) and the Orquesta Sinfónica de Puerto Rico (Puerto Rico Symphony Orchestra) –mainly to train a greater amount of classical musicians who were needed to run the Festival Casals.45

As I mentioned earlier in this section, the local government had already intervened with the owners of private venues through the Law 300 of 1938. However, public spectacles, events producers or any other element of the events production process

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45 The creation of these musical institutions and events was possible due to proposals of legislator Ernesto Ramos Antonini, which also helped to pass laws for the creation of the ICP and the Puerto Rico Corporation for Public Broadcasting (Rodríguez Cancel, 2007, 239).
were not touched again until the 1970s. Other thematic areas, such as *artesanías* (i.e., craftsmanship or artisanship), theater and the performing arts (including a definition of cultural work), fiscal norms on the creation of art, and others were handled in later decades.

These sectors together constitute a broader cultural sector in Puerto Rico. Commissions in the legislative branch also need to be considered as governmental action for the promotion of culture since 1952, because they interfere with all the normative sectors, and its themes and interests. These commissions deal with projects for supporting the arts and artists through legislative funds and policymaking whenever a cultural governmental or nongovernmental institution requires it (Comisión Especial Conjunta sobre Donativos Legislativos, n.d.; Vega Torres, n.d.). The commissions can be part of the House of Representatives (i.e., permanent commissions), the Senate (i.e., permanent and special commissions), or joint commissions between the House and the Senate. Also, each municipality in Puerto Rico eventually created offices, departments or specific projects directed to cultural affairs and special events.

With a state-sponsored new and inherited cultural block, the neocolonial state turned into the principal artistic and music events producer in Puerto Rico. All the normative sectors have direct or indirect relation with music, music events or live events production in general. But it was within academic institutions, sports and recreational institutions and the ICP where most of the responsibility for producing and sponsoring live-music events initially fell on.
3.2.1 Music groups and events in academic institutions

When it comes to artistic production and specifically live-music events production, it is important to stress that each and every new or previous governmental institution has had a particular historical role, but there are some relevant examples. For instance, a quick glance at the UPR shows how important the University has been in matters of artistic cultural production and debates on culture since its establishment in 1903. The relevance of the UPR as a significant site for artistic cultural production has been confirmed by historians like Scarano (1993) and Picó (2009/2007), sociologists Ayala & Bernabe (2007), and many others who focused mostly on literary and intellectual academic production and debates on national culture by different generations since the 1930s on. The construction of the University Theater in 1939 enhanced the practice of live-music events production in Puerto Rico. The theater became a key venue for local and international artists and translocal artistic networks of all kinds of music forms, from popular to classical. The acoustics and beauty of the theater turned it into an important work of architecture on the island desired by musicians, producers, and artists’ managers and agents. The personnel that work at the University Theater became both managers of the venue who deal with commercial producers and producers of the UPR’s artistic and academic events (i.e., internal producers, or UPR employees assigned to produce specific events). As seen in an official document of UPR’s Faculty of Humanities which describes the University Theater,

| desde su construcción [el Teatro] ha sido el centro cultural más importante del país; escenario de una gama de producciones del más diverso perfil, plaza para principales compañías de teatro y baile, orquestas | since its building [the Theater] has been the most important cultural center on the island; stage of a wide range of productions of diverse character, plaza for important theater and dance companies, symphonic |
The University Theater hosted the Festival Casals, founded by Catalanian classical cellist Pablo Casals in 1956. The inaugural concert was held on April 22, 1957 when the Festival became a state corporation (Festival Casals, n.d.). Initially, the Festival hired musicians from out of the country, mostly from the U.S., “with little participation of local musicians” until the 1970s when most of the musicians were Puerto Ricans (ibid – personal translation). Many of the producers I interviewed remembered the University Theater as a venue that competed with private-owned venues which, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, had a closed and highly selective artistic circuit. For example, events producer Josantonio Mellado emphasize on the importance of the University Theater in the 1950s and 1960s, and also mentions another state-owned venue that is administered by the municipality of San Juan, the Teatro Tapia.

Josantonio Mellado (JM): From that era […] I remember to have seen people such as Pedro Vargas, Libertad Lamarque. They came to the theaters in Santurce, the only available then. There were zarzuelas at the [Teatro] Tapia, but the most important events that came from international artists came to the

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Josantonio Mellado (JM): En esa época […] recuerdo haber visto gente como Pedro Vargas, Libertad Lamarque. Venían a los teatros estos de Santurce, que era lo que existía. Había zarzuelas en el [Teatro] Tapia, pero los espectáculos más importantes así que venían de artistas internacionales

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46 In my opinion, the University Theater will be dethroned only by the also state-owned Centro de Bellas Artes (Performing Arts Center), created by law in 1980 and inaugurated in San Juan in 1981.

47 A similar process soon occurred with the Puerto Rico Symphony Orchestra, also founded by Pablo Casals in 1958 (ibid).
Along with the UPR and its later created Department of Music, the Escuelas Libres de Música and since 1959 the Conservatorio de Música have also been producing their own students and faculty music events, most of the times open and free to the general public. These academic institutions have trained numerous generations of musicians and hired faculty in charge of conducting music groups which are often invited to serve at governmental and private events locally and internationally. Also, music groups such as choirs, orchestras, bands, music theater student groups, and many other music groups have historically invited local and international groups at similar institutions to perform locally and vice versa in the Spanish Caribbean and beyond in the Americas and Europe.48 Similar examples of multiple events linked to academic institutions have occurred since the 1950s, but with little media coverage vis-à-vis sports and recreational events which were much highlighted.

3.2.2 Music events and sports and recreational institutions

While music events production linked to academic institutions is not new to the ELA and the 1950s, what is new about this era is the dramatic rise in the amount of state-sponsored live-music events and of the local and translocal artistic networks that music

48 My experience as alum of the Escuela Libre de Música in San Juan, not different from what is usually commented about previous and younger generations is that our music groups visited other schools and participated of artistic exchanges in which those local schools’ music groups also visited us. Our school’s music groups, for instance, had the US and Puerto Rico national anthems always ready in case of performances at local official events. But overall, the faculty chooses the repertoire according to personal motivations and the character of the events. The repertoire often includes equal parts of classical and popular European, Iberian-American, and Puerto Rican musical works.
groups were building on behalf of particular governmental academic institutions or in representation of Puerto Rico, as if Puerto Rico was a sovereign state.49 A similar example can be found in the CPRP in relation to sports events since 1947. As scholar Jaime Rodríguez-Cancel explains, the CPRP eventually hosted the Comité Olímpico de Puerto Rico (Puerto Rico’s Olympic Committee), which had been created in 1933 to send local athletes to the Central American Olympic Games the next year (Rodríguez Cancel, 2007, 154-155). In the transition to the ELA and afterward, local athletes also competed in the world’s Olympic Games which fed even more a ‘national confusion’ on the island. In many occasions ever since, sports teams of Puerto Rico have competed face to face with US teams in the Olympic Games and other international tournaments, constantly reviving the longstanding debate around national culture and the political status of the island.

The CPRP was the agency responsible for administrating the parks and other venues for the practice of sports and recreational activities in the municipalities of Puerto Rico. As seen in Rodriguez-Cancel’s quote on the legislative session that passed the Law 4 of 1947 to create the CPRP, among the responsibilities of this agency were:

| «mantener y conservar los espacios para el público…tales como campos atléticos, balnearios públicos, parques, merenderos, áreas de natación, centros comunales, teatros y salones para la exhibición de películas, de conferencias y de lectura, así como toda otra obra… (y un) programa de actividades, el fomento y la organización de conjuntos musicales, bandas de música y orquestas para conciertos y festivales públicos para beneficio y esparcimiento espiritual de la comunidad». | «to support and preserve the spaces for the public …such as athletic fields, public beaches, parks, picnic areas, swimming areas, community centers, theaters and rooms for film exhibition, conferences and reading, as well as any other work… (and a) program of activities, the promotion and organization of musical groups, music bands and orchestras for public concerts and festivals and the spiritual entertainment of the community». |

49 For information on music events in Puerto Rico in the early years of the US occupation of Puerto Rico, see Catherine Dover (1983).
La sección de recreos públicos «tendrá a su cargo lo relativo al fomento y desarrollo de recursos públicos en la zona urbana y rural... mediante un plan organizado de actividades recreativas en general, incluyendo el cinematográfico, películas, reproducciones fotográficas, radio, periódicos, revistas y demás medios informativos, espectáculos y exhibiciones públicas, así como la utilización de todos los demás medios y facilidades necesarias para la ilustración y fomento general de las actividades recreativas que han de servir al pueblo».

(ibid, 237-238)

| The public recreation section «will be responsible of the related to promote and develop the public resources of the urban and rural zones... through an organized plan of recreational activities in general, including cinematography, films, photographic reproductions, radio, newspapers, magazines and other information media, public spectacles and exhibitions, as well as the use of all other necessary media and facilities for the enlightenment and promotion of the recreational activities to serve the people.» [50]
| (ibid, 237-238 –personal translation, emphasis added) |

Since the creation of the CPRP represents the first time the local state legislate specifically to foment events production, I would like to unpack some points in this quote. First, the CPRP’s responsibilities were too broad to be handled by a single institution, and later overlapped with other institutions’ objectives, such as the Department of Education, municipal events, and later with specialized divisions of the ICP. Second, the language used made a clear distinction between sports and the recreational. The recreational was limited to entertainment related to the media, public spectacles and exhibitions. The word event or the phrase public events was not used as such, but implied through the use of terms like public spectacles and exhibitions, often reduced to music concerts and festivals. This may be worth to consider as entertainment, as a concept, was eventually used pejoratively and may have interfered with the way the state handles the field of events production overall since then. Third, and once again, as seen in the introductory chapter when I mentioned the case of Governor Muñoz Marín’s

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[50] The unit dedicated to film at the CPRP, the Unidad de cinema y gráficas (Graphics and Film Unit), was later merged with the DIVEDCO, and hosted by the Department of Education.
inventory of good qualities of Puerto Ricans, the government used a poetic and populist language in which the state is supposed to assume the role of a guardian on behalf of the ‘spirit of community.’ This is a prescriptive way of promoting national culture through state-sponsored activities and events, as if only the public –and “the spiritual entertainment of the community”– could benefit from the state, not the other way around. Recreation was understood as a state’s service to promote and organize “musical groups, music bands and orchestras for public concerts and festivals” –an example of the dangerous governmental patronage that may characterize the state as a dirigiste events producer. Last but not least, following only part of UNESCO’s notions of culture after 1945, culture was thought as a resource for development, more than as a fundamental right. This is not surprising, since the Constitution of the ELA neither did so. This exemplifies how the lack of a cultural code at a constitutional level may serve contingent and party politics interests. Interestingly, development was thought in spiritual and enlightening terms, often opposed to the logics of the market.

Who will benefit more of this resource for development? Who will benefit more of the public concerts and festivals? The public, but moreover, the public imagined by the state according to its prescriptive goals. This leads to a basic characteristic of policymaking of public events in Puerto Rico which marks all state-sponsored events since the beginning of the ELA in the postwar era: It overlooks other elements beside ‘the public’ which are also constitutive of the set of processes of events planning, its logistics and contents which are neither limited to the artistic or the ‘performed.’ In focusing mostly on the public, and now in direct reference to music events production, the neocolonial state subordinates the role of musicians, event producers, and others workers
in the live-music events production field, who could provide the state with better ideas about their work whenever policymaking to promote live-music events production is needed, both for spiritual and enlightening purposes, but also for generating cultural work. The state’s focus on the public’s spirituality and enlightenment also ignored the work of independent and commercial events producers who may have been challenging the logics of the market through popular music forms appealing not exactly to the public imagined by the state, but to a broader and much more diverse public. However, the state continued to grow and expand widely as an events producer, often reaching the general public in state-owned venues.

3.2.3 Events and state-owned venues

The local state did not only become the principal producer of all kinds of events, but also the owner of the largest amount of venues in Puerto Rico. As seen in the previous section, the local state started to build and put in order venues such as “athletic fields, public beaches, parks, picnic areas, swimming areas, community centers, theaters and rooms for film exhibition, conferences and reading, as well as any other work” (Rodríguez-Cancel, 2007, 237). These venues were used mostly for official and special events open to the public and often free of charge, especially in outdoor venues.

In relation to sports events, the local state started to sell tickets of admission to baseball fields, and food and beverages in canteens at the fields’ premises. Thus, sports events and other public events in Puerto Rico were public as long as the public pays for a ticket. Judging by the amount of press coverage, this started as a successful venture but

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51 Years later, the municipalities started to charge for using the parking lots at the baseball premises, as well as other state-owned facilities and locations, such as public beaches. This service was privatized in most of the state-owned locations in the 1990s.
not for a long time. On April 21 of 1954, *El Mundo* newspaper informed that the neocolonial state’s legislative branch recommended the Administración de Estabilización Económica (or Economic Stabilization Administration) to regulate and raise the costs of products sold in the canteens at baseball games and other public spectacles, in reference to all kinds of events, not only the state-sponsored (Hernández, 1954). The article also mentioned that the House of Representatives was going to held public hearings on that matter and also discuss the possibility of renting baseball fields for private companies, which eventually occurred. The state, however, continued in charge of the tickets office in sports events. A year after, the same newspaper published that the Departamento de Hacienda (the local equivalent of the Department of the Treasury) proposed to regulate again the ticket sells at public spectacles (*El Mundo*, 1955, September 15).52 Hacienda’s proposal was mostly in reference to admission tickets for baseball games, and to thwart an illegal tickets market.

Attendance soon started to decline at the principal two spectacles on the island then, cinematography or film screenings and baseball games. Both kinds of events were produced by commercial-producers that rented state-owned venues and paid revenues to Hacienda. As *El Mundo*’s article follows, “other events with admissions decline were boxing and circuses” (*El Mundo*, 1955, September 15 –personal translation). Statistic provided by Hacienda, as cited by *El Mundo*, demonstrate how the decline was negatively affecting the local state’s income by means of public spectacles from 23,115,243 tickets sold in 1954 for a total of $1,277,000, to a decline of 19,670,117 tickets sold for a total of $1,073,000 earned in 1955 (ibid). The decline coincided directly

52 Decades later, Hacienda created an office dedicated especially to affairs related to live-events production (i.e., the Oficina de Productores de Espectáculos Públicos, or OSPEP), better described in Chapter 4.
with the arrival of TV in Puerto Rico, but it was not explicitly mentioned in press coverage at that time. *Hacienda’s* proposal was to deregulate the ticket sells and made them available to the public in authorized vendors of *Hacienda*. Previous to this proposal, each individual could buy only four tickets and during working hours from Monday through Friday. The proposal pled the government to let the people buy as many tickets as they wanted. This is an early example of what would turn in an aggressive wave of economic stimulation through the deregulation of markets in Puerto Rico, way before the concepts advanced capitalism or neoliberalism were used. Simultaneously, following *El Mundo*, attendance to other kinds of public spectacles raised, such as “horseracing, Double A amateur baseball, basketball games, and miscellaneous events” (ibid –personal translation). Most of these events were also produced by commercial events producers. Considering the apogee in the development of commercially-sponsored events around that same time in the mid 1950s, as seen in the previous chapter, I assume live-music events were part of the broad meaning that the concept of *miscellaneous events* had then. Interestingly, the local state never regulated the top cost of the tickets sold for commercially-sponsored events. In this regard, commercial producers were free from the start, as Paquito Cordero said while acknowledging the little intervention of the local state over commercially-sponsored events in private-owned venues, such as hotels (personal interview 2007). But local commercial events producers and the neocolonial state soon started to deal even more with each other. The position of the local state as the primary owner of venues through the CPRP and the intervention of *Hacienda* as ‘regulator’ and collector of income taxes represented a direct and inevitable relationship with events producers in Puerto Rico. The municipal scale need also be considered, as
private production companies were also required to pay municipal patents. The producers were willing to rent state-owned venues to reach wider audiences, because these were usually bigger than the theaters, and other private-owned venues. At that level, the lack of control of the venues conditioned the commercial producers to the state, which owns the most important venues. The local state always asked for permissions, rental fees, and other bureaucratic documentation in order to rent the venues. Also, the local state started to benefit through taxation on ticket sales.

Early in 1955, the decision of the local state to separate the sport and the artistic components of the CPRP eased the possibilities for commercial events producers to rent state-owned venues for private purposes because the availability was greater than before. This separation of responsibilities between the sport and the artistic was done in a somehow rushed and disorganized way, without previous or resulting evidence of why was the separation done, and no clear division of tasks. The artistic, for instance, was subdivided between the DIVEDCO and the ICP. The DIVEDCO was assigned the responsibility of producing state-sponsored cinematography projects for pedagogic purposes –especially alphabetization; while the ICP was created and assigned to custody national culture through many other kinds of artistic production that also included film and documentary production (Rodríguez-Cancel, 2007). This top-down decision may illustrate how governmental action somehow differentiated between cultural production for governmental purposes in the DIVEDCO versus cultural production for national artistic purposes in the ICP, but this needs further research. What the decision of separating the sports and the artistic components certainly exemplifies is the differential,
disorganized and fragmented character of a subsequent series of governmental cultural action of the neocolonial state, which underlined policymaking overall in Puerto Rico.

The case of the CPRP and its venues, an ‘inherited’ institution through which the neocolonial state consolidated itself as the principal events producer and owner of venues on the Island, also shows that events production in general is risky but could be a highly lucrative practice for the state. The CPRP and other previous and new institutions were managed to fit perfectly with the neocolonial state’s developmentalist liberal ideas of Operation Bootstrap and its cultural counterpart Operación Serenidad, and the ideal puertorriqueñidad. However, the creation of new cultural institutions such as the ICP brought immense challenges for the neocolonial state, as it did for live-music events producers, musicians, and the publics, as I will discuss in the next section.

3.3 The ICP as music events producer

The neocolonial state’s decision to transfer and divide the artistic components of the CPRP between the DIVEDCO and the ICP, left the ICP with the immense responsibility of creating artistic offices or thematic divisions and administering national cultural policy without a single venue, besides the location of its central offices at the Old San Juan. The ICP was an attempt to include and promote as many artistic forms as possible, but it was marked from the start by decisions like this, as well as debates with independent groups and recently created political parties around its creation, purpose, and administrative structure, as mentioned earlier in the dissertation. The organization of the ICP also happened in the context of internal issues in the PPD, which was administrating the neocolony then, at the peak of the muñocista era when the local state was both a
persecutor of nationalists and independentista artistic workers and persecuted by the FBI because its suspicious massive popular and democratic pedagogic projects in the Cold War era (Rodríguez Cancel, 2007). Even so, the ICP started in 1955 and soon became the governmental organizations related to the institutionalization of culture and national cultural policy most related to artistic production, including live-music events.

As seen in the introductory chapter, the institutionalization of culture in Puerto Rico demonstrated rhetorical, symbolic, and material dimensions: Rhetoric through the construction of the discourse of the puertorriqueñidad; symbolic through the representation of that discourse in speeches, printed documents, and policymaking about culture; and material through the creation of infrastructure and institutions to promote national culture and national cultural policy, and sponsor artistic production. The case of the ICP shows how the state was challenged from within, as great part of this material dimension was in the hands of a single individual, Ricardo Alegría, through whom the ICP achieved enough autonomy to foster a particular institutional culture and reach artists, producers, and audiences that by no other means the neocolonial state would have reached. Moreover, Alegría turned the ICP into an institution that not only commemorates important artists or artistic events, but also produces artistic events to promote diverse forms of art, as in the case of music. There was –and there is still– no specific section in the ICP directed entirely toward live-music events or public spectacles per se. As I will describe in the following sections, of all the programs in the ICP since 1955, the most directly related to music and music events are the Music Division – currently part of the Programa para las Artes Escénico-Musicales (Performing Arts Program), and the Programa de Promoción Cultural y Artes Populares (Cultural
Promotion and Popular Arts Program) – which merged two previous different programs in the ICP (i.e., the Cultural Promotion in the Towns Program, and the Artisans and Popular Arts Program).53

3.3.1 ICP’s Music Division and music events production

The Music Division started in 1956 as the Program of Music Arts Promotion, directed by musicians and composers Amaury Veray and shortly after by Héctor Campos Parsi. An internal official document written by ICP’s specialist Josilda Acosta, in collaboration with Marianita Rosas and Sandra Rodríguez, emphasizes that “the principal objectives of the Program are to preserve, enrich, disseminate, and promote the interest and appreciation of Puerto Rican music, and to educate about the music works of Puerto Rican composers” (Acosta, n.d. –personal translation). Alegría’s actions of rescuing theaters and historic buildings through the ICP were important for the Music Division, since most of those buildings were used as venues for concerts produced by the program. Campos Parsi developed the Music Division notably. Until the late 1960s, the Music Division

| “[Durante su incumbencia] se ofrecieron conciertos para divulgar todos los estilos de la música puertorriqueña: folclórica, popular y académica (clásica), se promovieron y se comisionaron obras de compositores puertorriqueños y se desarrollaron las actividades que han caracterizado al Programa” (ibid) | “offered concerts to disseminate all styles of Puerto Rican music: folkloric, popular, and academic (classic); promoted and commissioned works of Puerto Rican composers; and developed activities which have characterized the [Performing Arts] Program.” (ibid) |

53 The ICP also relates to music events production indirectly through the programs of Museos y Parques because some of the museums and parks may be used as events’ venues; the Editorial, which may publish books and instructional manuals on music and music instruments; the Archivo General and the Biblioteca Nacional, which archive, preserve and reproduce documentation for the public use. The ICP’s Theater and Dance Division also produces theatrical events and may produce operettas, and other theatrical events related to music. It was later bought together with the Music Section into the Performing Arts Program.
Some of these activities were—and still are—music events such as the *Fiesta de la Música Puertorriqueña* (Puerto Rican Music Fest) –created in 1966, the *Serie de Conciertos Dominicales* (Sunday Concert Series, mostly on classical music), and the *Concierto Nacional de Trovadores* (National Troubadours’ Concert) –created in 1969 (ibid). Most of these music events are produced at local or regional scales in Puerto Rico, and became protected by means of laws in future decades. The *Concierto Nacional de Trovadores* was the final concert of a series of Regional Contests organized by cultural promoter Lilianne Pérez Marchand, who worked at the ‘Cultural Promotion in the Towns Program’ of the ICP. Since 1956 and mostly in the 1960s, it was common to see the Music Division and Cultural Promotion working together ‘in concert.’

The Music Division, as most divisions and programs of the ICP, also works with other governmental and external components such as municipalities, the legislative governmental branch, and institutions responsible for assigning and approving the government’s budget. For example, the Director of the ICP proposes and presents a budget to the *Oficina de Gerencia y Presupuesto* (i.e., the Office of Management and Budget, or OGP). The budget needs to be justified and defended at the Legislature. This is a tense relationship, since the Legislature often lacks the expertise that the ICP’s personnel has on artistic production affairs, but has the power of approving the ICP’s budget. A representative of the Budget Office at the ICP told me, “that is why the Director of the Institute is key in negotiating the budget” (personal interview –personal translation). The Director needs to be a person who builds good relationships with the legislators in order to negotiate and get the ICP’s budget approved. As legislative projects related to music emerge, the Legislature may (or at least is supposed to) consult the
Music Division and ask for revisions on those projects. Even though national cultural policy in Puerto Rico has been historically thought in instrumental ways, there was not much legislation regarding music or music events in the late 1950s and the 1960s. But that relative calm changed drastically after 1968, as I will discuss in another section. The relationship between the ICP and other governmental institutions and municipalities, was a phenomenon seen in later decades due to governmental initiative and further economic difficulties for which it was necessary to consolidate efforts.

When Alegria was at the head of the ICP until 1973, he created Advisory Boards to help the divisions and programs to propose projects and events to be produced with the assigned budget. Currently, there is no active advisory board to the Music Division. The decision of activating these kinds of boards is now up to whom is in charge of the divisions and programs. However, every time the Music Division employees create a project or organize a music event, as a representative of the Music Division said, “I call and consult advisors every time I am going to prepare a project” (personal interview – personal translation). “One has to be humble and acknowledge when someone else knows more than us. I like to learn from the people who know,” this representative of the Music Division added. This particular case once again exemplifies how people who work in the ICP, as in any kind of organization, use their own criteria which affects how the work is done at individual level but with consequences that may impact other people, but also the image of the ICP. In the case of the Music Division, the principal populations targeted and affected by the decisions at the Music Division are the artists and their artistic production, and the public or audiences.
The relationship between the Music Division and artists may be direct or indirect. Direct and indirect relationships with artists can be noted since 1956 until present through the ICP’s dissemination of past and contemporary Puerto Rican music. For instance, “the Music Division has published music, recorded works by Puerto Rican composers; it has written, published and promoted a method for teaching *cuatro*, recorded distinguished *cuatristas*, similar to was done in recent years with the *tiple*” (Acosta, n.d. –personal translation). One of the specialists in the Music Division told me that recent attention to the *tiple* has tried to overcome what was a mistake with the *cuatro* in the early years of the Division. “The mistake with the *cuatro* was that a single tuning and a single type of *cuatro* were chosen, and the same was happening with the *tiple*” (personal interview – personal translation). This is an aspect of music instruments’ diversity that the current representatives at the Music Division are aware of, since it impacts a different set of musicians and music forms that were excluded from the ICP because of that detail. Apart from a variety of written and published material on the history of Puerto Rican music forms and styles, the specialists that work at the Music Division and any other section in the ICP are responsible for doing research which is later included in the programs handled in to the public at music events, as well as in special acknowledgements to artists and other documents.

The Music Division employs musicians to be part of the *Banda Estatal de Puerto Rico*, currently the *Banda de Conciertos de Puerto Rico* or Puerto Rico Concert Band. The Band, created in 1966, also serve as a source for the employment of arrangers and composers (Acosta, n.d.). It accompanies most of the singers and other artists invited to

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54 Alegría’s memories and the official report on cultural institutions in Puerto Rico add the *bordonúa* to the list of musical instruments ‘rescued’ by the ICP (Hernández 2002, 198; Senado de Puerto Rico 2005, 100).
perform at special and annual music events produced by the Music Division. Its principal objective was

| “crear una banda musical que amenizara en las actividades oficiales del gobierno, conciertos, retretas y actos culturales en cualquier parte de la Isla y en el exterior” (ibid). | “to create a music band that entertains at the government’s official events, concerts, open-air performances, and cultural activities in any part of the Island and abroad” (ibid). |

Note the distinction between concerts and open-air performances. The latter are usually free of charge and open to the public, but the concerts usually require selling tickets of admission. Also, note that one of the objectives was to tour the Island with the Band, but also abroad. Initially, the band offered weekly concerts at the town plazas, as seen in Alegría (1978). Similar to commercial music events producers, the Music Division was building artistic networks throughout the Island but also abroad, mostly in the U.S. The Band is still active at present, but constricted budgets are limiting its capacity for traveling.

Another way in which the Music Division relates to artists is through hiring them to perform at the annual festivals and special music events. The Division is constantly updating a list of musicians who can perform at these events. According to a past director of the Music Division, “these lists are done depending on whom we get to know in shows, auditions, or by direct approaches that the leader of the music group or the entire group do to the ICP” (personal interview –personal translation). “Sometimes they visit or call our offices directly, and the Institute may or may not help them with honorariums, but in turn we give them the venues and the technical support.” The technical support refers to basic lighting and sound services, but may also include elements of the logistics such as printing the program, the ushers, and even air conditioning, maintenance, among
other elements that may result in subcontracting related services. These artists need to be
ascribed to the Cultural Promotion and Popular Arts Program in order to receive any
benefit from the ICP, such as honorariums. The honorariums have always been
previously established by the Cultural Promotion and Popular Arts Program and vary
depending the music event or kind of performance, as I will discuss in the next
subsection. A current representative of the Music Division told me that “sometimes the
petitions for supporting music groups arrive in late as to be processed, and we are [the]
government; it take a while” (personal interview –personal translation). Explicit in this
quote is a claim that I heard many times in my multiple visits to the ICP. It is a complaint
that both representatives of the ICP and musicians have in common and it is the high
level of bureaucracy in the ICP, especially after 1968.

The Music Division also relates to artists by trying to help music groups to
participate at other events produced by independent live-music events producers, but also
to produce the artists’ own events and special activities. In doing so, the ICP helps to
promote and support a different kind of music events production, in which the artists and
other independent groups produce live-music events in opposition to commercial music
events, however under the parameters and full or partial sponsorship of the ICP. These
parameters were, and still are, to produce and perform music closely linked to Puerto
Rican music styles and folklore. Even though folkloric or autochthonous music was not
clearly and explicitly defined in the early years of the ICP, the Music Division has tended
to favor classical music but mostly popular criollo music forms ranging from danza to
música jíbara, which represents a wide range of sub-forms and ways to perform each
musical form while excludes others.\textsuperscript{55} Alegría’s notion of \textit{mestizaje}, as seen in the critiques mentioned in the Introduction, did not necessarily translate in a Taíno, African and Spanish blend of music forms, but in a highlighted representation of a contemporary society seen through the eyes of the staff of the Music Division and other programs at the ICP.

As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the creation of the ICP coincided with the era of music events that featured artists and new multiple African-derived forms of music principally in but not limited to the Spanish Caribbean and New York. That was the era previous to the \textit{salsa}, when the \textit{bolero} still occupied an important position in the popular music at local and translocal scales. Also at these scales, the Afro-Rican \textit{bomba} and \textit{plena} music forms were gaining visibility, especially through family-based community independent groups and other groups linked to private events producers, such as \textit{Cortijo y su Combo}. Private music events producers and the artists they produced for were disqualified from any support from the ICP because the forms of music they performed were popular but linked to the music market and not to the folklore. Even though these music forms were also expressions of the Puerto Rican society, including the Puerto Rican diaspora in the US, they were considered commercial and not folkloric. In this sense, the different notions of the popular created a disconnection between the ICP and its aims for research and preservation of the folkloric, and the commercial music events producers who were struggling to bring artists to perform at venues where local popular music forms were not welcome. Hence, commercial music events producers and the artists they produced were excluded twice, by the local state (because of the kind of

\textsuperscript{55} In the 1970s, as seen in Dávila (1997), the folkloric acquired prominence. But the first attempt to directly deal with the definitions and limit of what is folkloric or autochthonous music occurred in the early 2000’s.
music performed) and by the private venues in which they could neither enter at first (because of class distinction, as seen in the previous chapter). This is not necessarily a high versus popular culture debate, but a situation in which both the ICP and commercial live events producers followed different notions of the popular not exempted from politics of differentiation. These tensions were very similar at those at the Cultural Promotion and Popular Arts Program.

3.3.2 ICP’s Cultural Promotion Program and live-music events production

The Cultural Promotion and Popular Arts Program is an important articulator of many artistic forms promoted by the ICP. This program affiliates music and dance groups, singers, artisans, and poets, but also does research on their artistic production. It is usually the first contact with the ICP for most artists not linked to the commercial music industry. This Program merged the division of Cultural Promotion and the division of Popular Arts –mostly dedicated to the development and promotion of artisans and their artesanías (i.e., artisanship). The fusion between the two divisions is fairly recent, so each carried into the Program a legacy of decades of work. For example, the division on Cultural Promotion was preceded by the Programa de Promoción Cultural en los Pueblos (Cultural Promotion in the Towns), created in 1956 and directed by Héctor Campos Parsi (Acosta-Figueras 2000, 35). The Program for Cultural Promotion in the Towns was created with the intention of bringing all the artistic but also archaeological cultural expressions to most of the people in the municipalities in Puerto Rico (ibid).

56 Note that musician and composer Campos Parsi also directed the Program for Music Promotion, which eventually became the Music Division.
The division on Popular Arts was preceded by the *Programa de Artesanías y Artes Populares* (Artesanías and Popular Arts Program), created in 1957 and directed by Lilianne Pérez Marchand. “When she retired in 1963, [Alegría] appointed Walter Murray Chiesa to the direction of the Program” (Hernández 2002, 197 –personal translation). I agree with Hernández (2002) who argues that in this field, “the contribution of the ICP was absolutely pioneer and possible in great part due to Alegría’s vision” (ibid). As seen in Alegría’s memories,

[n]either the government nor the cultural institutions that preceded the ICP had paid attention to the research, stimulation and promotion of popular arts and *artesanías*. In that sense the lack of precedents permitted Alegría to freely set the guidelines and parameters for a program that included a great number of manifestations and was, no doubt, one of the most beneficial for the ICP’s popularity among the common and ordinary Puerto Ricans, especially out of San Juan. (ibid – personal translation)

The phrase “common and ordinary Puerto Ricans” implies a class differentiation in opposition to the ‘uncommon’ literate and rich Puerto Ricans. The population that the Artesanías and Popular Arts Program reached to was the first, the poor and mostly illiterate then in both the countryside and the towns in the context of big internal migrations to the newly created industrial cities, as seen in Scarano (1993) and Picó (2009/2006). The Program not only reached that general public but also served artisans throughout the Island.

Before the creation of the Artesanías and Popular Arts Program, as Lilianne Pérez Marchand remembers, “some *artesanías* were disappearing. The artisans lived on
sporadic sales to tourists or North American residents in Puerto Rico” (as cited in Hernández 2002, 197 –personal translation). Her job was to travel around the Island to identify artisans, their *artesanías*, and to try to create a market for them (ibid). Also, as I mentioned earlier, there were cultural circles around the Island even before the US invasion. During the mid and late 1950s these cultural circles insisted to be called circles and not centers, “in order to differentiate themselves from the communal centers that were recently built and named as cultural centers in some municipalities” (Acosta-Figueras 2000, 35). The information on communal centers is very limited, but I have visited many communal centers which are currently used as venues for private events and events of families from the popular classes, from live-music events to alums reunions, birthdays, anniversaries, and many other relatively small celebrations. Alternatively, the cultural centers in the 1950s were mostly dedicated to poetry recital, and intellectual and political discussions. The members of the cultural circles knew about Alegría’s work and, despite Alegría was not affiliated to any of their circles, they decided to join him and ascribe the circles to the ICP’s goals. This is how one of Alegría’s major accomplishments at the ICP started: the *centros culturales* (cultural centers), an initiative in which the divisions of Cultural Promotion and Artesanías and Popular Arts joint efforts. The Cultural Centers are formed by voluntary groups registered at the Department of State as non-profit community groups or associations that meet and decide to agree with the ICP’s national cultural policy. Acosta-Figueras, who has researched and interviewed many of the pioneers of the centers, stressed that

[1] La petición vendrá de la comunidad y no de la agencia, con esto clarificamos falsas argumentaciones de dirigismo cultural en publicaciones recientes sobre el Instituto de

[t]he petition came from the community and not from the agency, with this we clarify false arguments on cultural dirigisme in recent publications about the
A current representative of the Cultural Promotion and Popular Arts Program briefly explained the relationship between the ICP and the cultural centers since the late 1950s until present. This person said that

> [e]l Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña afilia estos centros culturales y los ayuda a organizarse por medio de un comité timón y los abarca para que sean ellos quienes busquen a la gente de su área, de su pueblo, para que celebren actividades culturales.

Nosotros les facilitamos para que estos grupos sean lo más folclórico posible, siempre teniendo en cuenta las tendencias del modernismo, porque hay mucho de eso envuelto, pero siempre es importante para nosotros el educar.

(Personal interview)

Until present, the ICP has provided the cultural centers with an organizational set of rules, known as the **Reglamento de los Centros Culturales adscritos al IPC** (i.e., Rules for the Cultural Centers ascribed to the ICP). The Rules follows a legal model, but each organization can adjust it depending on their needs (see Appendix A). Each cultural center designates a delegate to represent it at an annual general assembly, in which issues common to all centers are discussed, including the approval of and possible amendments to the Rules, among other topics. However, as seen in the Rules, the revisions cannot deviate the principal meaning of each statute. In other words, the centers need to keep certain loyalty to the national cultural policy in order to be affiliated. Any person in the community can become a voluntary member of a cultural center by just filling in and

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<th>Cultura, ya que mucho del trabajo realizado no ha sido documentado mediante escritos (ibid).</th>
<th>ICP, since much of the work done has not been documented (ibid – personal translation).</th>
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| [t]he ICP affiliates these cultural centers and helped them to get organized through a committee [board of directors] and guide them to make them look for their people [members and artists], in their municipalities, in order to celebrate cultural activities. |
| We facilitate them in order to [hire] groups as folkloric as possible, always keeping in mind the modern tendencies, because there is a lot of that involved, but for us is always important to educate. |
| (Personal interview – personal translation)                                              |
submitting an application to the Board of Directors of that center. As seen in the application, the center’s Board of Directors should approve it no later than 30 days after submission (see Appendix B). The Board needs to change every two years. This is seen by a past representative of Cultural Promotion as “a structural problem of the cultural centers” (personal interview –personal translation). “It can detract from the organizations’ stability.” Another way in which the ICP helps the cultural center is through managing and canalizing the funds assigned to them by the Legislature (i.e., asignaciones legislativas). In exchange, the cultural centers have to prepare an annual report and submit it to the ICP.

From 1956 until 1973, the ICP affiliated a network of 84 cultural centers. Together, these centers and the programs of Cultural Promotion and Artesanías and Popular Arts explored, produced, and still organize diverse types of events not limited to live-music events. For example, “the work will take two dimensions,” as seen in Acosta-Figueras (2000):

1) the ICP will bring concerts, theater and ballet performances, painting and photographic exhibitions, and artisanship fairs (i.e., ferias de artesanía) to the centers; but also poetry contests in which poets from all over the Island participate, in addition to other initiatives of the centers in which local talent was hired;57

2) the ICP stimulated the participation and collaboration between different municipalities and the commemoration of historic dates (35-36 –personal translation).

The ICP sends music groups or artists such as singers who does not necessarily have a group to these events, but the cultural centers have the prerogative of recommending the ICP which local groups they want to perform at the centers’ events. After all, these are

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57 The locations of the Centers were used as venues for the exhibitions. However, Alegría also proposed and brought a Museo Rodante (Museum on-wheels) around the Island, as seen in Hernández (2002).
the centers’ events and not the ICP’s, although the ICP used to be—and somehow still is—their principal sponsor. As I will describe in the next chapter, most of the talent hired by cultural centers is local and the notion of localism as a principle is an important component of the decisions that the producers of those events make.

The local music groups need to move fast in order to be considered for the events, because they need to be ascribed to the Cultural Promotion and Popular Arts Program. Otherwise, they could not be hired by any cultural center. Both the centers and the artists need to know each other exists. Besides the many possible ways in which artists and members of the centers could get to meet, the ICP provides the centers some help. In the late 1950s, Alegría created the position of cultural promoters and “appointed three women in charge of identifying artists around the Island: Isabel Cuchí Coll, Josefina Guevara Castañeira y Lilianne Pérez Marchand” (Acosta Figueras 2002, 36 –personal translation). As I mentioned before in the case of Pérez Marchand who travelled the Island in search for artisans and artesanías, all these cultural promoters also identified other artists who will be encouraged to become part of the ICP in order to be called for performing or participating in state-sponsored events. These cultural promoters job was similar to what the record companies call the artist and repertoire (A & R) representative, always in search for new talent, but in this case, not for profit purposes. “To help the first centers, [the promoters] travelled by public transportation from San Juan” (ibid). But as the number of cultural centers grew, the ICP created regional offices which at some point reached ten offices.\(^{58}\)

\(^{58}\) That is no longer the case, since the past neocolonial administration on the Island took extreme job cut measures that negatively affected the ICP and its cultural centers. I will return to this topic in the next chapters.
The parameters to ascribe music groups and artists to the Cultural Promotion division are related to the notion of the folkloric, as in the Music Division. In terms of music groups and artists, most of the groups and music events that Cultural Promotion sponsors are *trovadores* (i.e., folk singers or troubadours), contests of *trovadores*, and folkloric ballets—which include both popular *criollo* music ballets and Afro-Puerto Rican *bomba* and *plena* folkloric ballets. Different to the case of the Music Division, classical ballet and music have not the same representation in the Cultural Promotion Division. The better inclusion of *bomba* and *plena* in this program is a sign of differences within the divisions and programs at the ICP, in terms of the music forms prioritized and the audiences reach. These differences reflect that while Alegría’s vision of the ICP and national culture somehow challenges the local state, that vision constituted a culture of production that was in constant dynamism because of the historical context but also because of the staff and representatives who interpret Alegría’s vision and put it in practice. Hence, some divisions and programs within the ICP may be more or less inclusive than others, and challenging to Alegría’s agenda itself.

In the late 1950s, ICP’s cultural promoters toured the Island in search for music groups and artists, and affiliated them. Currently, for reasons I will explain in the next chapter, the music groups and artists mostly visit the ICP’s central or regional offices, or send their information and documents via other means of communication. To become ascribed to the ICP, music groups and artists also need to complete specific requirements, which include a recording sample of the music forms and styles performed by the group or artist, a list of the repertoire and composers, availability to perform for free at an ICP’s sponsored music event, press clippings and other documents that evidence of the group or
artist’s experience, among other requirements (see Appendix C). Cultural Promotion assigns an evaluator (not a promoter, as before) who meets the music groups or artists, make recommendations and, in some cases, offers or coordinates music workshops.

In terms of work opportunities and similar concerns for ascribed music groups and artists, a representative of the Cultural Promotion and Popular Arts Program told me that

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<th>[I]o que les ayuda a afiliarse a nosotros es que nosotros tenemos una serie de actividades para las que podemos contratarlos por unas cantidades que ya están establecidas. Por ejemplo, si es un grupo de un trío, pues se les paga $600 por la presentación. Si es un grupo de trovadores, dependiendo la cantidad de trovadores que sean, se les paga de $200 a $300 por trovador. Si son trovadores que ya están a un nivel un poco más de competencia, pues también se llega a unos acuerdos para la paga.</th>
<th>[w]hat being ascribed helps them for is to be hired in a series of activities for which there is a pre-established payment. For example, if it’s a trio, they are paid $600 for the performance. If it is a group of <em>trovadores</em>, it depends on the number of <em>trovadores</em>, they are paid from $200 to $300 by <em>trovador</em>. If they are <em>trovadores</em> who are at another level of competency, then we can also negotiate the payment.</th>
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<td>Aparte de eso, tenemos también la necesidad de educar. En cuanto a eso, pues damos talleres de bomba y plena, damos talleres de trova, como talleres de aprender a tocar algún instrumento musical. De muchos de estos talleres se beneficia el público general. Pero el Centro Cultural mantiene comunicación con nosotros y usualmente nos dicen, «tenemos un grupo que quieren afiliarse, un grupito muy bueno que surgió de una actividad en la escuela tal o lo que fuera» y nosotros le damos ese tipo de apoyo.</td>
<td>Besides that, we also have the necessity to educate. In that sense, we offer <em>bomba</em> and <em>plena</em> workshops, workshops on <em>trova</em>, as well as workshops to learn to play a music instrument. The general public benefits of most of these workshops. But the Cultural Center is in communication with us and usually tells us, «we have a group that wants to get ascribed, a very good group that came up from a school activity or anything like that» and we give them that kind of support.</td>
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(Personal interview) | (Personal interview –personal translation) |
The fixed payment granted to music groups and artists through Cultural Promotion is honored by other divisions and programs of the ICP whenever ascribed artists are hired and sponsored by the ICP. The range in the amount of the payments is always a point of contention between artists and the ICP. Often, as I will show in the next chapter, music groups and artists either choose not to get ascribed to the ICP and work on their own or with private music events producers and promoters, or refuse the ICP’s calls to perform at certain events and particular gigs. What Alegria once called “fair versus exorbitant” payments to musicians (Alegria, in Hernández 2000), has always been one of the principal differences of music events production sponsored or produced by the ICP versus independent and commercial music events production, which competes with the salaries and payments of the music industry. Another difference is the cost of the tickets of admission to live-music events, which in the case of the ICP and its affiliated cultural centers is commonly free of cost, open to the general public, and usually produced in open-air venues, such as but not limited to town plazas where a familiar environment can be developed. This is a contrast that Alegria and the ICP’s staff who worked with him intentionally wanted to make, in contrast with commercial live events production at closed venues, which are commonly not accessible and affordable for all. Eventually, as people inside the ICP started to change because of local institutional modifications and historic transformations elsewhere in the mid and late 1960s, this culture of production also changed.

3.4 Neoliberalization, bipartisanship, and the decline of national cultural policy

The transition years between 1965 to the early 1970s foreshadowed the conditions for historic changes in Puerto Rico and elsewhere. It was the era post-Vietnam War,
marked by international tension and hostility, local and regional conflicts, an oil crisis of
global impact on external debts, the weakening of the Soviet Union as a fierce opponent
to capitalism, massive student protests and subsequent dissident social movements, and
political and economic transformations that resulted in a new social context accentuated
by economic instability. The model of an “embedded liberalism” as an industrial and
developmentalist strategy driven by Keynesian policies in which the state directly
regulates and intervenes on how market, entrepreneurial, and corporate processes were
done, was showing flaws (Harvey 2005). In that model, the state was understood and
acknowledged as an active social actor—a producer in a general sense. As geographer
David Harvey reviews, in some instances the state had ownership of key sectors of
economic activity, organized in the form of public corporations (ibid, 11). A key
characteristic of that interventionist state was that it also fostered a parallel social and
moral economy “sometimes supported by a strong sense of national identity” (ibid). This
may not sound strange to Puerto Ricans, who had already experience decades before the
violent parallel combination Operation Bootstrap and Operación Serenidad, and its
resulting notion of puertorriqueñidad. As the model of embedded liberalism showed
flaws, all the blame for the social, political and economic crises went to the state as
supposedly the sole responsible actor and central administrator. As a ‘remedy’ for the
survival of capital, a process of advanced liberalization was prescribed by “[a] small and
exclusive group of passionate advocates—mainly academic economists, historians and
philosophers,” as Harvey sarcastically narrates (ibid, 19). These men developed a theory
of political economic practices widely known as neoliberalism, which went beyond the
theoretical and turned into a process of “creative destruction,” known as neoliberalization
(ibid, 2-3). It is this process or series of processes which mostly interest me in this chapter because they entail the ‘disembeddedness’

not only of prior institutional frameworks and power (even challenging traditional forms of state sovereignty) but also of divisions of labour, social relations, welfare provisions, technological mixes, ways of life and thought, reproductive activities, attachments to the land and habits of the heart.

Artists and artistic production deal with the “habits of the heart,” which cannot be unlinked from the rest of the social changes at political or economic levels.

In terms of the state, the processes of neoliberalization run through every aspect of social life and political culture –from ordinary to much more complex practices, such as organizing and administering the state. The neoliberal state, already trying to remedy crises of capital, was expected to release most of its interventionist’s responsibilities in order to create and guarantee “an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (ibid, 2). To accomplish those tasks, the neoliberal state needed to reinforce its legal structures, as well as the military, defense, and police bodies (ibid). It needed to become a much more disciplinary state in both national security and legal ways. Thus, neoliberalization entails not only a restructuration of the state but also of all social structures to the limits of social control. This is why Yúdice (2003) emphasizes on neoliberalism as “a set of policies” that interfere with and limits the social and the cultural, and turns to Michel Foucault’s notion of governmentality, which is more a disciplinary process of social control than a mere set of policies.

In the early 1970s, the Latin American and Caribbean region was deliberately hit by the neoliberal formula, tested first in Chile and Argentina by the imprudent and
humiliating means of “military coup[s] backed by the traditional upper classes (as well as the U.S.), followed by the fierce repression of all solidarities created within the labour and urban social movements which had so threatened their power” (Harvey 2005, 39).

Regionally, the “import-substitution industrialization” model (ISI), similar to the Puerto Rican model of the 1950s and 1960s discussed in the introductory chapter—in which the government stimulated employment and development by means of ‘inviting’ foreign manufacturing companies, started to be discarded (Hershberg & Rosen 2006). The ISI model’s reliance on funds borrowed to US and European banks to get ‘petrodollars’ and the further mayor oil crisis generated conditions of unattainable internal growth and inflation that resulted in the collapse of the region’s economies. Neoliberalism was “the imposed model,” as Eric Hershberg and Fred Rosen call it, used as a remedy for the problem of an external debt and spread throughout the region. Instead of declaring a moratorium on the debt, the imposed model consisted of transferring it back to each country at the expense of its services and social well-being. The goal was to assist capitalism, not the states (especially socialist states like Chile, for instance), and keep US financial institutions alive along with international actors, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), using neoliberalism as a hegemonic model of discourse (Harvey 2005, 3).

Locally, specifically after 1964 when Governor Roberto Sánchez Vilella of the PPD won the local elections and started administering the ELA, the island also went through political and economic changes, which had much impact over the local political culture and cultural policy. It was “a new historical moment, characterized by the acceleration of the rhythm of modernization with the arrival of high-tech corporations” in
Puerto Rico (Colón Rivera, Córdova Iturregui & Córdova Iturregui 2014, 35 –personal translation, emphasis added). This new historical moment opened up opportunities for the formation of new political groups within the PPD’s younger generations, especially after former Governor Muñoz decided not to run for reelection. This context also saw the emergence of new political parties such as the pro-US annexationist Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP, or New Progressive Party) and others, and the strengthening of previously created political groups such as the Movimiento Pro Independencia (MPI, later known as the Puerto Rican Socialist Party or PSP). A recent book by professors and activists Jorge Colón-Rivera, Félix Córdova-Iturregui and José Córdova-Iturregui (2014) studied this transition period in depth, in relation to the emergence of a modern environmental consciousness on the island. As these authors indicate, the MPI and the younger generations at the PPD foster a new ecological vision that challenged the local state’s negotiations with mining corporations to the point of preventing the government from signing any agreement to exploit the land (ibid). In contrast, Sánchez Vilella’s administration was not as supportive of Alegría –the first executive director in the history of the ICP. As seen earlier in this chapter, Alegría played many years as an articulator between former Governor Muñoz’s official intentions toward culture and his own priorities at the ICP. As a pro-independence and nationalist, Alegría negotiated from the outset with previous PPD’s administrations his own position as ICP’s Executive Director, his preferred staff, his culture of production, and other matters related to the ICP. But those cultural negotiations started to fail with Sánchez Vilella’s administration, when Alegría’s ideology was openly questioned in the PPD and the ICP’s assigned budget began to descend (Hernández 2002, 289).59

59 In 1967, when both the Senate and the House of Representatives in Puerto Rico approved
National culture and cultural policy did not seem to be a priority anymore, or at least did not have the same level of importance than in Muñoz’s administration. The panorama got worse as the PPD’s 28-year hegemonic era ended when the party lost the elections versus the PNP in 1968. The PNP openly favored the mining industry and land exploitation, which represented an immediate sign of shifting values vis-à-vis Sánchez Vilella’s mediating attitude toward a new environmental consciousness on the island. From then on, Puerto Rico has been trapped into a bipartisan political system that threatens natural resources in a much more aggressive way that Operation Bootstrap did in the 1950s, because of the lack of consideration of the continuity of the agreements and the benefits of previous administration’s projects for the mere loyalty to a political party that governs every other electoral period. National culture and cultural policy, already under siege, ran the same fate. Once it won the elections, the PNP did not present itself in the position of negotiating, but disarticulating anything the PPD had done, starting with the notion of puertorriqueñidad. As Hernández says, the PNP was “[d]edicated to turn Puerto Rico into a state of the U.S.” (ibid –personal translation). The notion of puertorriqueñidad, constructed to calm down Puerto Ricans in the context of abrupt developmentalism, but also used in a different way to develop the ICP and artistic work, started to be seen as an obstacle toward the island’s annexation to the U.S. Therefore, the PNP launched in a plan and “transformed the government’s attitude toward Puerto Rican culture” (ibid). As seen in Alegría’s memoirs, some members of the PNP started to openly attack Alegría in the local press with constant insinuations that Alegría needed to resign (ibid). And he did resign in 1969, but the Board of the ICP refused to accept it.

Alegría’s project for the construction of a performing arts center (currently the Centro de Bellas Artes), Governor Sánchez Vilella did not sign it. It was years after, under the next political administration, that the project materialized.
Alegría had a dilemma: feeling rejected by the PNP’s members and affiliates on the one hand, but also strongly supported by local distinguished figures in the fields of arts and politics on the other. As he said in his memoirs,

> [People] shout at me in the street: “When are you leaving?” Though I wanted to resign, persons like Nilita Vientós, Noel Colón Martínez, Gilberto Concepción, came in commissions to ask me to stay. [The ex First Lady] Doña Inés begged me to stay in the job: “Ricardo do not resign, Ricardo do not leave,” she said, and reminded me of Albizu who always said that we do not resign to jobs. Maybe [Governor] don Luis Ferré did not want to dismiss me, but he had much political pressure to do so. At the same time, there were republican leaders [of the PNP], people like Genarín Cautiño of Guayama and Aurelio Tió, who told him “do not touch Alegría, because he is doing a good work there through we know he has different political ideas.”

(ibid, 290)

Although resented, Alegría stayed. I see this as a way to face the new government and protect the ICP’s autonomy, which in the end was a project he helped to shape.

Eventually, the relationship with the new Governor Ferré improved, even more when he promised to raise the institutional budget and helped the ICP to acquire old colonial buildings for the restoration of historic zones in different municipalities, such as and not limited to Ponce’s center and the Old San Juan (ibid, 290-292). Following

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60 The case of the Museo de Casa Blanca, a historic fort located at the Old San Juan and occupied by Spanish and US military chiefs for decades, evidenced that these special treatment was not exempted from friction. In this case, for instance, Alegría did not allow the then Major of San Juan to live there (Hernández 2002, 321). Also, in a documentary I worked decades ago, Alegría said he even intervened
Hernández’s notes on Alegría’s memoirs, I understand that the relationship between Alegría and Ferré was sustained precisely by their common interests and priorities on the preservation of historic sites and certain forms of arts such as visual arts, while not necessarily reflected on other sectors of national cultural policy and forms of art related to the ICP or Alegría himself. As I draw from his memoirs, Alegría’s interests for reaching out for the artists and artisans, as well as his passion for archeological and anthropological matters, were put on hold during this period. Similarly, state-sponsored live-music events of music forms others than classical, for instance, were not necessarily highlighted in this context—contrary to what was happening in commercial live-music events production. Yet, the ICP’s Music Division still organized live-music events in the form of occasional concerts that feature Puerto Rican composers, such as the series entitled *El Compositor y su música* (The composer and its music), evidenced in local press coverage of that era (Bover 1971). Since the ICP has no auditorium, as mentioned in the previous chapter, historic buildings such as Casa Blanca’s interior patio in the Old San Juan were used as venues for the series (ibid). The Music Division also started to commemorate—since 1972— the *Semana de la Danza* (i.e., an entire week dedicated to the *danza* music form). As a specialist in the Music Division told me, this commemorative week most of the time entails producing live-music events (personal interview—personal translation). In terms of the venues, journalistic articles also indicates that other state-owned venues, such as the UPR’s Theater and the Puerto Rico Music Conservatory’s Theater, hosted live-music events sponsored by other governmental musical institutions such as the *Festival Casals* and the Puerto Rico Symphony Orchestra (e.g., Bover 1969; with some US Presidents and prevented them from using historic sites such as *El Morro* Fort for recreational purposes others than preservationists, such as sports (Aguiar 1995).
El Mundo 1971a & 1971b; Sánchez Capa 1971a). Live-music events organized by cultural centers affiliated to the ICP, commonly dedicated to traditional and popular music forms, were invisible to the press coverage during this period.

This apparent slow down in state-sponsored live-music events production contrasted with one of the most active moments in the history of commercial live-music events and events production overall in Puerto Rico. While doing archival research, I noted that Espectáculos, a section of newspaper El Mundo, grew very much between 1969 and 1971 and tremendously expanded in terms of pages, stories, and advertisements of live events. The stories and advertisements reflected that the pattern described in Chapter 2, of a circuit of local private-owned venues, local and international hotels, as well as the international artists’ star system connected to film and broadcast media through touring, remained. Magazine artistic shows and single live-music performances were produced at good sounding private-owned venues. These shows included popular music forms such as rock, rhythm & blues, jazz, bolero, salsa, merengue, and even voodoo funk, featuring artists from the U.S. and some from Spain, more often sharing the stage with local artists and bands. Some examples of the venues were the Club Caribe at the Caribe Hilton Hotel, Club Tropicoro at the San Juan Hotel, Salón Carnaval and La Alhambra Restaurant –both at the Puerto Rico Sheraton Hotel, La Ronda Super Club at the San Jerónimo Hilton, and ballrooms in Hotel La Concha, Hotel Excelsior, Hotel Americana, Flamboyán Hotel, and many others. Most of the artists that performed in these venues were foreign international artists, which added to the complaint of local artists trying to get access to those venues, as seen in Chapter 2.61 Other commercial live-

61 Some international artists that performed in hotels in Puerto Rico were Ray Charles, Robert Kole & Ernest Parem, Connie Francis, Engelbert Humperdinck, Steve Rossi & Slappy White, Shirley
music events were produced at local night clubs and venues such as the Café Teatro El Laberinto (for music and theater), El Roosevelt Casino (for salsa and merengue orchestras), as well as the so called country clubs (rock and youth-appealing music). Also, some commercial live-music events production of massive audience reach continued to rent state-owned venues, such as the Hiram Bithorn Stadium –preferred venue for Disney’s Holiday on Ice, and the Teatro Tapia –for opera productions.62 Evidently, the music genres and artists featured at these commercial live-music events, selected by criteria around international tourism and Anglo-Saxon culture, were not the same as the traditional and classic music forms and artists sponsored by the ICP in this period.

Rather than speculating on notions of high versus popular culture, I reaffirm my argument that the ICP stood against commercial live-music events and music forms linked to the mainstream music industry as a way to promote local traditional forms of music. I would like to stress the fact that what is prioritized depends much on individual preferences and –in this particular case– in the negotiation of those preferences. In a case like the bipartisan politics in Puerto Rico, it was crucial for Alegría as head of a governmental institution to share at least some common interests with the governor in power, in order to achieve the ICP’s goals before the government changes again. Again,

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62 Opera producers of that era in Puerto Rico were the firsts to publicly ask for governmental support to cover the high costs of staging those live events on the island (Brignoni 1971). I found no follow up article about whether or not any governmental action occurred. Interestingly, as seen in Bartolomé Brignoni’s article, such a live-event cost $30,000, which was the case of La Bohème then (ibid). Nowadays, opera production is still among the most expensive. As one of the Ballet Concierto de Puerto Rico’s Board members told me in a personal conversation, Carmina Burana –a recent opera staged in Puerto Rico– cost over $200 thousand.
those interests in common were mostly on visual arts. In fact, in 1970 Alegría succeeded in establishing the ICP as an international events producer through the first *Bienal del Grabado Latinoamericano* (Biennial Exhibition of Latin American Engraving), focused on an art form that Governor Ferré, an art collector himself and founder of the Museo de Arte de Ponce, clearly supported. Nevertheless, the Biennial also served to fulfill other goals not necessarily aligned with Ferré or the PNP administration, such as generating international and regional artistic exchanges through events production. These goals went beyond the objectives of the ICP dictated by the law that created the institution, which does not emphasize on artistic exchanges. In the new atmosphere of bipartisanship, this could be understood as a challenge to the PNP’s pro-US annexationist goals, since the ICP was the remaining bastion for *puertorriqueñidad* within that administration.

This is why my dissertation focuses more on the ICP as the most important governmental institution dedicated to national cultural policy in Puerto Rico. Since the beginning, the ICP has been a complex project that no governmental administration could have destroyed completely. As mentioned earlier, the ICP was conceived as comparable to regional cultural ministries that serve as articulating hubs for a wide range of artistic production, sectors and institutions dedicated to cultural production. But party politics started to be used as a highly destructive strategy to penetrate the ICP’s ambitious mission, structure, and its culture of production in times of bipartisanship. I sustain that the dismantling of the ICP in this context was not only imminent but intentional due to governmental action.

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63 As Hernández affirms, “Ferré’s support [for Alegría] was particularly evidenced in the first Biennial Exhibition of Latin American Engraving” (ibid, 292 –personal translation).
64 The only exception to this is a scholarship for visual artists to study abroad. See the ICP’s “purposes, functions and powers” (*Law 89 of June 1955*).
3.4.1 Disarticulating the ICP after Alegría

Alegria left the ICP in 1973. He resented the lack of cooperation from other governmental agencies, such as the Department of Education and the Department of Public Works, and the growing bureaucracy that limited his role as the ICPs Executive director (Hernández 2002, 297 and 323). Even though he had developed a better relationship with Governor Ferré, Alegria did not succeed in everything. After all, the Governor was not the government, and bipartisan politics had already penetrated public agencies and corporations, as well as some positions in the Legislature and municipalities, such as San Juan –whose major Carlos Romero was openly defiant.65 It is true Alegría and the ICP’s staff had succeeded in institutionalizing a complex structure, but as a project it was still under development and needed coordinated efforts with all governmental branches in order to mature. As it can be deduced from the press coverage on live events in that era, the Puerto Rico Symphony Orchestra and the organizers of the Festival Casals, the UPR, the Department of Education, some municipalities and many other institutions and independent groups started to design their own separate artistic agendas, without any agreement on which were the national priorities for the benefit of all social actors involved in state-sponsored artistic production and for the circulation and access to that artistic production. In terms of state-sponsored live events, for instance, the Governor supported the ICPs events on the one hand; but on the other, he actively supported other events organized by agencies in his cabinet that did not collaborate with the ICP and used public funds that could have also been invested in the ICP as a hub for articulating cultural policy. One of these events was an arts festival produced by the

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Department of Education – an agency that Alegría had already said was unwilling to cooperate with the ICP because of political differences. The loyalty was to the political parties and not to the objectives for which the ICP was created – i.e., to coordinate the national cultural policy. Holding Alegría at the ICP could be understood as a symbolic dimension of the government’s intentions toward culture, which were not fully materialized in the practice. On the contrary, the apparent governmental support did not prevent the ICP from being cornered by the dispersion of its programmatic agenda into multiple public agencies and corporations. The dilemma was whether or not governmental cultural policy should be led by an institution like the ICP without centralizing it to the point of dirigisme (and with an independentista as its leader); what levels of cooperation should exist between the ICP and other governmental institutions, including US Federal government (e.g., through the National Endowment for the Arts or NEA, created in 1965); and how that cooperation includes and reflects the interests of all the sectors that may be impacted by governmental intervention. But without clear priorities and the will to collaborate beyond party politics, the solution to this dilemma was not easy and destined to be always incomplete.

In 1972, the PNP lost the elections and the PPD took power again of the neocolonial state. The new Governor Rafael Hernández Colón tried unsuccessfully to keep Alegría at the ICP, but, “created for him the Office of Cultural Affairs” (Hernández 2002, 292 –personal translation). The Office of Cultural Affairs was an institution dedicated to culture created by executive mandate and clearly parallel to the ICP, though

66 This arts festival, as described in a journalistic article, was a massive contest for awarding public school students’ artistic abilities (i.e., a talent show) (Rovira 1971).
67 Collaborating with the NEA was also complicated, as it that institution was also subjected to political changes in the U.S. (Henderson 2005).
with superior character not as a public corporation but as part of the governmental cabinet. The purpose of the Office was “to create the image that the cultural affairs would also have the same importance and priority than the commerce, the industry, the environmental quality, and other governmental departments” (ibid, 325). “The Governor asked Alegría to design the position he wanted to occupy in order to do what he could not do during the previous years” in the ICP (322). Alegría accepted. As Carmen Dolores Hernández suggests, Alegría’s frustration with his inability to complete many of his projects at the ICP made him embrace with enthusiasm the Governor’s offer (323). Alegría was given the opportunity to justify the Office at his will and following his own priorities. He wrote a report entitled *Recommendations to promote the study and appreciation of Puerto Rican culture and the efforts of governmental agencies* (323-325), which will be carried out by the Office of Cultural Affairs. In the report, Alegría started with an argument on the colonial condition of Puerto Rico and how the deficiencies in public teaching had installed a colonial mentality that tried to erase key figures in Puerto Rican history. He charged against the Department of Education for being absent in collaborative efforts to promote the study and dissemination of the national culture. In a clear defense of the ICP, he added that “while the ICP has been struggling, for example, to promote our traditions, the Department of Education has fomented the celebration of events that are strange to our culture” –in direct reference to US culture (in Hernández 2002, 324 –personal translation). Therefore, the basic functions of the Office of Cultural Affairs were to coordinate “the activities of the different governmental institutions in charge of cultural programs, such as the Department of Education, the *Escuelas Libres de Música*, the *Festival Casals*, the Public Recreation and Parks Administration [previously,
the CPRP], the ICP, and others” (ibid, 325). Different to the ICP, as Hernández says, “the Office will not give direct services nor print book or produce cultural events” (326). “The goal was take the most advantage of the already existing resources to avoid duplication of efforts.” However, as can be deduced from Hernández’s notes on Alegría’s memoirs, the Office eventually started to produce cultural events, exhibitions, and other artistic-related events (327-328). Alegría’s plans for the Office also included establishing networks of academic and artistic exchange with the Puerto Rican diaspora in the U.S., especially in the cities of New York and Chicago (327). The ideas for the Office were definitely ambitious but soon frustrated by many reasons. First, during his years at the ICP, Alegría was used to talk directly to the governors, not to their assistants, what made him felt uncomfortable (331). Second, as Alegría said, “there was never money for what I proposed” (ibid). Governor Hernández Colón blamed the crisis of the ‘petrodollars’ to a local recession in Puerto Rico and subsequent cuts in the government’s budget (332). Also again, the lack of collaboration [and communication, I would say] between other public agencies and corporations and the newly created Office of Cultural Affairs made it difficult for Alegría to fully succeed. In a journalistic article cited in his memoirs, he said it was then when he “discovered that Puerto Rico was not an island but an archipelago where each public agency’s head had its own kingdom” (cited in Hernández, ibid, 332 – personal translation). One of the few mentions, if not the only, to commercial live-events producers found in Alegría’s memoirs had to do precisely with a case of miscommunication with the Secretary to the Public Recreation and Parks Administration, who had approved a contract with producer Luis Vigoreaux to turn a public space that the Office for Cultural Affairs had reserved for the recreation and free access of the public
into a private amusement park (325-6). Tired and frustrated, Alegría left the public service in 1976. Even though he still was well respected, many of his projects were blocked or stopped.

In 1976, the governmental administration changed again to the pro-annexationist PNP, and a real local cultural war against ‘the national’ which continues today began. Even though Alegría’s legacy at the ICP was still respected especially by the institution’s employees, any project of his authorship that remained in progress was archived. But since the ICP was a difficult project to destroy before the public opinion, the new governmental administration strategically beat it up by creating more parallel institutions that limited the ICP’s scope and powers, leaving it alone resisting more budget cuts and invisibilization. In the introductory chapter I mentioned two pillars among the limited literature on public policy about culture in Puerto Rico, which evidences what I would call a cultural massacre against the ICP: a book on cultural legislation in Puerto Rico, and a report written by a special commission of the local Senate (Harvey 1993; Senado de Puerto Rico 2005). To my surprise, this scholarship has been minimally used and referenced by recent scholars interested in cultural policy. These studies exemplify how cultural policy historically continued to be seen in normative or legislative terms as in previous decades, and the various institutions that were created to challenge the programmatic agenda of others –especially the ICP– without considering redundancy and the advantages or disadvantages of past institutions dedicated to cultural production and promotion. I focus on three of the already classified normative sectors in which national cultural legislation developed in Puerto Rico, following Harvey’s model described in Chapter 3 (Harvey 1993): a) the institutional organization of the governmental cultural
action; b) the legal regulations of the cultural patrimony; and c) other thematic areas, such as music and other performing arts, and spectacles in general. The changes in these sectors evidence the governmental cultural action created in the specific fields of music and live-music events production since the 1970s in Puerto Rico has been ambivalent, confusing and inconsistent.

3.4.1.1 Institutional organization of the governmental cultural action

First, an examination of the records of the laws concerning the sector of institutional organization of the governmental cultural action between the 1970s and 1990s shows this sector started to include other organizations, commissions, and counsels in which the ICP had direct, indirect or no participation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the ICP –created in 1955 under Muñoz’s administration– was the first institution dedicated to culture. The next institution created in this sector was the Corporación de Desarrollo del Caribe (Corporation for the Development of the Caribbean), created by Sánchez Vilella’s administration by means of the Law 37 of June 1965 (ibid, 230). This corporation promoted cultural exchange, but not necessarily related to the artistic. In the 1970s, the PNP amended this law and substituted with the Law 92 of June 1971 which created the Centro Norte-Sur para el Intercambio Técnico y Cultural (Center for the North-South Technical and Cultural Exchange) (227). This new law was basically inscribed in the technical language of commerce and economic resources, and included cultural activities –in contrast to the economic and the social, but aligned with education. The Center’s objectives included awarding grants for local individuals to study or work abroad, which –in the case of artistic culture– immediately entered in conflict with the
ICP’s agenda and further internationalization plans of the Office of Cultural Affairs. These examples illustrate how, in less than five years, three agencies or public corporations were doing similar work and cancelling each other’s goals at the same time. In 1975, the PPD amended this law again and passed the Law 95 of June 1975 to transfer the Center to the Department of State, which added another level of bureaucracy to the governmental intentions for promoting cultural exchanges.

Following Harvey (1993), other institutions dedicated to governmental cultural action created by means of law in this period were the Performing Arts Center in 1980 (proposed by Alegria in 1970, and assigned to be administered by the ICP); the Comisión Puertorriqueña para la Celebración del Quinto Centenario (i.e., the Puerto Rican Commission for the Celebration of the Fifth Century, which entailed the production of multiple live-music and other artistic events and actions in a highly controversial atmosphere for it being a celebration of colonialism, and for the high budget assigned to the Commission); the Consejo para el mejoramiento de la calidad de vida en áreas urbanas (i.e., the Counsel for the Improvement of the Quality of Life in Urban Areas – ascribed to the Office of Cultural Affairs); and the controversial Fondo Nacional para el Financiamiento del Quehacer Cultural (National Fund for Financing of Cultural Endeavors) – which needed further amendments to laws related to the local Department of the Treasury in order to be able to raise funds from the public, private and mixed sectors. The Fund, proposed by Alegria in public hearings, was created by the Law

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68 In 1993, the PNP government proposed to name the Performing Arts Center, which provoked a polemic discussion when the pro-independence and founding member of the PSP, Juan Mari Brás, proposed to name it after Alegria. The government refused the proposal because “it would not have the name of a living person” (Hernández 2002, 345 –personal translation). Paradoxically, another PNP administration apparently forgot that and named the current Puerto Rico Convention Center after a PNP Governor who is still alive.
115 of July 1988 under a PPD administration and administered by the ICP (231-238). Even though Puerto Rico does not have political sovereignty to participate in the UN, the language used to frame this law was consistent with that of UNESCO, which since the early 1970s had voiced the claims of Third World Countries, as Miller and Yúdice assert (Miller & Yúdice 2002, 171). Instead of culture, it makes reference to cultural endeavors (i.e., *quehacer cultural*); it talks about artists as cultural producers; and talked about collaboration between mixed sectors (i.e., public and private), something promoted by UNESCO in the late 1980s and 1990s. The Fund was created with the intention of helping “all cultural producers, artisans, painters, musicians, humanists, writers, playwrights, and actors, filmmakers, historians and journalists, among other experts, to continue to significant and vigorously enrich our endeavors” (Law 115 of July 1988 in Harvey 1993, 232 –personal translation). The Fund was indeed a good idea, considering musicians and other artists were already suffering the consequences of the reductions in the available funds. But years after, as seen in an official report from the local Senate, the Fund faced problems due to constant changes in its programmatic agenda and the lots of requisites imposed to artists in order to be eligible to apply for funds, as well as in the relationship with the local Department of the Treasury that commonly takes too long to transfer the funds to the ICP (Senado de Puerto Rico 2005, 36-39). The report indicates that even though the number of local artists has increased, the number of application to the Fund has diminished because a lack of credibility in the Fund (ibid, 36). Under a next PNP administration, this law raised contention because of the Fund’s name (i.e., national) and was amended by the Law 139 of 1996 (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2 for evidences of

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69 One of the live-music producers interviewed said the government hired commercial events producers for organizing some of the massive events of the Puerto Rican Commission for the Celebration of the Fifth Century.
internal official communications on this matter). The amended statement of motives (i.e.,
the enacting terms of the law) read as follows:

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<th>EXPOSICIÓN DE MOTIVOS</th>
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<td>El uso del término &quot;nacional&quot;, en el título de la Ley, vocablo con significados diversos, dependiendo del enfoque sociológico o político que se tenga del concepto &quot;nación&quot;, podría prestarse, por dichos enfoques a cierto grado de confusión, debido a nuestra relación con los Estados Unidos. Por esto, se sustituye por una palabra de consenso que expresa más claramente la intención de la Asamblea Legislativa, al elaborar la Ley 115. Dicha intención, según fuera expresada en la Exposición de Motivos, fue la de constituir un mecanismo adicional para promover y facilitar el funcionamiento de la actividad cultural en Puerto Rico, mediante el cual se define y articula la identidad de nuestro pueblo.</td>
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<td>Por tal razón, la Asamblea Legislativa de Puerto Rico, mediante esta Ley, enmienda el Artículo 1 de la Ley Núm. 115 de 20 de julio de 1988, para disponer que se redesigne como &quot;Ley del Fondo Puertorriqueño para el Financiamiento del Quehacer Cultural&quot;.</td>
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<td>(Ley 139 de agosto de 1996)</td>
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<td>STATEMENT OF MOTIVES</td>
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<td>The use of the term “national,” in the title of the Law, vocabulary with diverse meanings, depending on the sociological or political perspective on the term “nation,” could serve, because of those perspectives, to a certain degree of confusion, due to our relationship with the U.S. For this reason, it is substituted by a word of consensus that much clearly expresses the intention of the Legislative Assembly, with the Law 115. That intention, as expressed in the Statement of Motives, was to constitute an additional mechanism for promoting and facilitating the functioning of the cultural endeavor in Puerto Rico, through which the identity of our people is defined and articulated.</td>
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<td>For that reason, the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico, by means of this Law, amends the Article 1 of the Law 115 of July 20 of 1988, to rename it as “Law of the Puerto Rican Fund for Financing of Cultural Endeavors.”</td>
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<td>(Law 139 of August 1996 – personal translation, emphasis added)</td>
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No other change was done to the law that created the Fund (i.e., the Law 115 of 1988), except for the amended vocabulary that erase the word nation. This clearly evidences an intentional agenda to eliminate any symbolic reference to the discourse of the national in governmental cultural policy. The priorities were not to analyze the Fund’s

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70 This Law 139 of 1996 had another further amendment, “in order to raise…the limit of the Funds’ resources for investing in administration expenses” (Law 109 of May 2004, in LexJuris Puerto Rico –personal translation).
performance and how to meet the artists’ needs. Once again, the party politics intervened in the decisions on cultural policy.

3.4.1.2 Legal regulations of the cultural patrimony

The second sector I looked at in this historical period was the legal regulations of the cultural patrimony. This was a priority for doing cultural policy in most countries, especially after UNESCO’s Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and National Heritage in 1972. In Puerto Rico, this normative sector has focused more on historical zones and other kind of monuments, while artists and artistic forms have not gotten the same level of attention, besides commemorating the life of a few artists and some artistic forms. Specifically on music and indirectly on live-music events, only a few laws were proposed and approved from the 1970s to the 1990s: the Law 20 of April 1972 to commemorate the month of the danza music form and the Law 47 of June 1978 which commemorated the Día del Natalicio de Juan Morel Campos y del Compositor Puertorriqueño (Day of Juan Morel Campos’s Birthday and the Puerto Rican Composer). Morel, considered the “father of the Puerto Rican music,” was a prolific artist specialized in the danza in the 19th Century (Law 47 of June 1978, in Harvey 1993, 410). The Article 3 of this law assigned the ICP the responsibility to “recommend and program those acts or public or private demonstrations that could be held to commemorate Juan Morel Campos and to honor Puerto Rican composers” (ibid –personal translation). This law was amended by the Law 179 of July 1979 to limit it to the commemoration of Morel’s birthday. Like in previous decades, this governmental action relied basically on the ICP’s Music Division, which continued in charge of the Banda Estatal de Puerto Rico. Yet,
there is no article in this law that specifies how those acts or demonstrations will be funded. The Day of the Puerto Rican Composer was covered by another law, the Law 23 of May 1984, which left the ICP without direct responsibility on its celebration. For example, the Article 2 says that “[t]he Governor, through public notice, will exhort all the people in Puerto Rico to annually commemorate this date” (412). In the practice, the ICP’s Music Division has stretched its annual budget and continued to produce and co-produce live-music events ever since to honor Puerto Rican composers, as seen in promotional materials, such as the events’ programs, available in the Music Division’s archives. This kind of ambiguous law generated a general assumption that either ‘the Governor,’ the ICP or any other institution in charge of governmental cultural action will produce their live-music events with no special budgetary assignment. Either the government thought producing a live-music event was easy and inexpensive, or the complexity of this practice was totally unknown to the government. I argue there is a combination of both, a lack of awareness of the processes of producing live-music events plus a lack of appreciation of the profession. Indeed, live-music events producers of any kind have never been considered in this sector as a figure that contributes to the promotion of Puerto Rico’s cultural and historical legacy, with such an importance as to deserve recognition.

3.4.1.3 Other thematic areas of governmental cultural action

Finally, I examined the normative sector related to other thematic areas of governmental cultural action that have also been contentious, such as music and other performing arts, and spectacles or live-events production. In terms of music, I already
mentioned that until 1968 various state institutions dedicated to music and subsequently to live-music events production were created: i.e., the Escuelas Libres de Música; the Festival Casals—a subsidiary of PRIDCO; the Puerto Rico Symphony Orchestra—ascribed to the Festival Casals; and the Puerto Rico Music Conservatory—also ascribed to the Festival Casals. All continued to operate with relative calm during the 1970s, but in the early 1970s the tension increased when the then President of the local Senate (i.e., the former Governor Ferré) proposed a law to create the Administración para el Fomento de las Artes y la Cultura (Arts and Culture Promotion Administration, or AFAC).

According to Hernández, “this was a direct action against the ICP” (Hernández 2002, 339—personal translation). The report of the Senate goes farther and says the proposed law was created “fundamentally to omit the ICP” (Senado de Puerto Rico 2005, 17—personal translation). The statement of motives of the proposed law assigned AFAC identical responsibilities than the ICP, but with a notion of culture “without last names,” in opposition to Puerto Rican culture (i.e., cultura “sin apellidos”, Hernández, 340). This provoked local contention, already visible especially through a group of artists, mostly poets and actors, and key figures in the cultural field—like Alegría—who created the Comité Pro-Defensa de la Cultura Puertorriqueña (i.e., Committee for the Defense of the Puerto Rican Culture) to participate in and organize protests during the public hearings on the proposed law (341-342). This debate around national culture got extensive press coverage in that era, especially when the Committee tried to convince the UNESCO to give Puerto Rico a membership on the bases of cultural sovereignty (The Associated Press 1985). But AFAC was created anyway by the Law 76 of May 1980.

After AFAC, many of the ICP’s divisions and programs—including the Music Division—
were dismembered and sent to different state agencies. The Performing Arts Center, managed by the ICP, was also assigned to AFAC. This disarticulation is something the ICP has never fully recuperated from (ibid).

To the detractors of cultural nationalism as a populist limiting notion of culture, AFAC might have represented a progressive project. However, in the context of a neocolony where cultural nationalism also served to reaffirm an identity and sustain regional links vis-à-vis a neocolonial Empire, such notion cannot be easily dismissed for it represent an ideal cultural sovereignty –a phrase mostly used in Puerto Rico by Alegría. All the PNP’s administrations have attempted to achieve full annexation to the U.S. at the expense of erasing the minimal residue of *puertorriqueñidad* in symbolic and material ways, from names and legal vocabulary to dismantling complex institutions like the ICP. In the context of neoliberalism, a much more neutral notion of culture “without last names” also served a symbolic function for easing Puerto Rico’s neoliberalization and adjustment to political and economic changes elsewhere. Besides, I argue that rejecting regional links with other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean was part of a ‘necessary dislocation’ to see Puerto Rico more as part of the U.S. than part of a region where anti-neoliberal sentiments were emerging.

In 1984 the PPD took power again and tried to repair the damage done to the ICP and cultural policy regarding music and live-music events through the elimination of various laws, but also through new state institutions dedicated to artistic culture. AFAC was eliminated from the outset. As for music and live-music events production, the government created the *Corporación de las Artes Musicales* (i.e., the Corporation for the Musical Arts, or CAM). The CAM is a public corporation that gave back the ICP both,
the Music Division and the Performing Arts Center (Law 4 of July 1985, in Harvey 1993, 413). The CAM also took in the Puerto Rico Symphony Orchestra and the Puerto Rico Music Conservatory, which in 1980 had also been separated from the Festival Casals and turned into two different public corporations (ibid). The Law 4 of July 1985, which created the CAM, made clear the CAM will operate without interfering with the functions of the ICP. It also expanded into what was not explicit in the law that created the ICP, i.e., artistic exchanges concerning music as well as the performing arts, not limited to local traditional music forms (Corporación de las Artes Musicales n.d.a). For instance, the Article 3 point (d) indicates one of the purposes of the CAM was “[t]o coordinate the activities that develop the music and the performing arts that deserve dissemination in Puerto Rico or abroad […] ; without excluding musical expressions from other countries with universal patrimony” (ibid, 414 –personal translation). The only possible interference between the CAM and the ICP –as I draw from the original law that created the CAM– was through the Corporación de las Artes Escénico-Musicales (i.e., the Corporation for the Performing Arts) –a subsidiary of the CAM, which has a parallel division at the ICP that has historically produced the Festival de Teatro Puertorriqueño (i.e., the Puerto Rican Theater Festival). However, in the practice, the CAM could have had limited the Music Division’s capacity to produce live-music events, and left it confined to the promotion of musical patrimony and traditional music forms. For example, the CAM was also created to produce live-music events, such as “competitions, contests and festivals of artistic and musical nature” (Article 3 point (i), ibid, 415). Since then, ICP continued sponsoring events overall and the Music Division continued sending

71 Both the ICP and the CAM manage local governmental and US Federal funds.
72 A decade after, in 1995, the Conservatory achieved fiscal and administrative autonomy from the CAM (Law 141 of 1995, in Conservatorio de Música n.d.).
the *Banda Estatal* to several events, but the CAM became the principal state-sponsored live-music events producer—not only a sponsor. Among the events produced by the CAM are the *Festival Casals*, the *Festival Iberoamericano de las Artes* (i.e., the Iberian American Arts Festival), and the *Festival de la Orquesta Sinfónica Juvenil de las Américas* (i.e., Festival of Youth Symphony Orchestras of the Americas) (Corporación de las Artes Musicales n.d.a). The CAM also awards scholarships and helps non-profit organizations, and administers the Pablo Casals Museum and two educational programs: the *Programa Músico-Social Educativo “Conoce tu Orquesta”* (i.e., the Musical-Social Educational Program) –through which the Puerto Rico Symphony Orchestra targets children and youth at local public and private schools; and the *Programa de Orquestas Sinfónicas Juveniles* (i.e., Youth Symphony Orchestras Program) –which reaches out to students in economically disadvantaged communities and surrounding neighborhoods (Corporación de las Artes Musicales n.d.b). Although I acknowledge the CAM is a top-down approach to cultural policy and mostly focused on symphonic music forms, the CAM was and still is an ambitious artistic project that, besides some overlapping with the ICP’s Music Division in the responsibilities assigned by law, in the practice has benefitted a wide range of publics, especially children, youth and their communities, which would rarely enjoy nor participate in these musical forms and related live-music events.

In terms of spectacles or live-events production in general, the first governmental action after a few laws passed during the US neocolonial rule took place also in the form of laws in the early 1970s.⁷³ Particularly, these laws exemplify governmental intervention

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⁷³ The Law 25 of 1927 and the Law 300 of 1938, passed during the US neocolonial rule, concerning the *patron-saint fests* and the venues’ capacity limit respectively, as discussed earlier in this chapter.
into the private sector, specifically commercial live-events production, in order to stand for the local artists—not necessarily for events producers of any kind. For instance, more than a decade after struggles between local commercial producers and artists versus live-events producers at hotels—as explained in Chapter 2, the government passed the Law 72 of 1972, which required the hotels and related restaurants to contract not less than 50% of local artists (Law 72 of 1972, in Harvey 1993, 474). This law was soon amended by the Law 32 of 1973 to revise the title, among other changes, to substitute the term local artists by Puerto Rican artists, and limit the scope to hotels only (Law 32 of 1973). The Law 32, administered by the Compañía de Fomento de Turismo de Puerto Rico (i.e., know now as the Puerto Rico Tourism Company), defined Puerto Rican in terms of birth place or residency. Other relevant definitions are related to the venues per se (e.g., night club or super club, and cocktail lounge), the artists or acts (e.g., any individual or group entertainers, except the musicians that perform with singers or any other artists or acts), and artistic unit (i.e., an artist or act that work a week) (ibid). Local commercial events producers were also struggling to get access to hotels, but were not included in these laws. The Tourism Company was responsible to request the hotels’ quarterly reports on the hiring of artistic units, and charge them with a $500 fine in the case of noncompliance—which in the case of multimillionaire hotels in Puerto Rico was a small amount. Both, the Law 72 of 1972 and the Law 32 of 1973, were revoked by the Law 114 of 1988, transferred to be administered by the local Secretary of Labor and Human Resources (Law 114 of 1988, in Harvey 1993, 474-478). The Law 114 was the first since 1927 to define espectáculos artísticos or artistic spectacles, though simplistically as “those artistic

74 Acts refer to performing acts others tan musical and dance, such as comedians, magicians, etc. In terms of the artistic units, for example, the law specifies that “an artist that works four weeks is equivalent to four artistic units” (ibid).
representations in which artists and musicians performed live and for which they are remunerated” (ibid, 476 –personal translation). This new law sustained the 50% of local hiring limit and an inclusive definition of Puerto Rican, but raised the fines to $5,000 and expanded its scale from hotels-only to every artistic, music or tourist live event produced locally. This law also expanded its reach to include musicians, not only singers as the previous laws. In fact, the language of this law mentioned musicians, side by side with artists, in the title and so on in every article. Interestingly, this law’s statements of motives finally acknowledged present-day musicians and other artists do contribute to forge cultural patrimony. Therefore, the state –through its many cultural institutions to stimulate opportunities and sources of work for these musicians and artists (e.g., the Escuelas Libres de Música, the DIVEDCO, the Puerto Rico Symphony Orchestra, the Puerto Rico Music Conservatory, special scholarships and funds, and the ICP) should be the promoter of “these cultural workers” (ibid, 475). This law also acknowledged that, besides all the governmental efforts to promote musicians and artists’ participation in artistic live events, “Puerto Rican musicians and artists were displaced by foreigners in the local sources of work” (ibid). In an unprecedented act that explicitly used ordinary language that accurately depicted the conditions of work of musicians and artists, this law added that

| [c]omo efectos de tal condición se afecta adversamente la economía personal de los músicos y artistas puertorriqueños al crearse una situación de desbalance con el consiguiente desempleo, sub-empleo, "chiripeo" o empleo casual; se afecta la salud mental de éstos al producirse incertidumbre, zozobra y desesperanza; se afecta su potencialidad productiva, la cual | [a]s effects of such condition the personal economy of Puerto Rican musicians and artists is adversely affected by an unbalanced situation of subsequent unemployment, sub-employment, odd jobs; their mental health is affected by this [situation of] uncertainty, uneasiness and lack of hope; their productive potential is affected, it deteriorates and weaken due to |

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75 See the Law 25 of 1927, as analyzed in the Chapter 2 and earlier in this chapter.
The swings provoked by local bipartisanship since the late 1960s, but especially in the 1970s and 1980s, its resulting ambivalent legislation and priorities, and the disarticulation of the ICP as a hub for promoting artistic work, were already showing these negative consequences on musicians and artists, as well as in the potential of the state as a live-events producer. But this context was not referenced at all in this law. The only principle that seemed to have been prioritized was localism with a limited notion of the reasons for the precarious conditions of work of musicians and artists. This law, which could have repaired some damage done by previous bipartisan legislation, somehow put the responsibility on “the persons dedicated to offer artistic spectacles” (as the law refers to live-events producers), and released the government from the cultural massacre it had done for over 25 years.

Until then, commercial live-events producers remained relatively untouched. However, previous legislation in that era would have further negative consequences on them, too. For example, the Law 108 of 1985 ordered all state institutions to give individuals over 65 years old a 50% discount on tickets of admission to live artistic and sports events produced at state-owned venues (Law 108o f 1985, in Harvey 1993, 478-
479). This law—which original text was only two sections long, had the intention of giving retribution to the senior citizens, but it was not fully matured at the moment of its approval. I argue the principal problem of this law was that it did not consider all possible groups and social actors affected by its application. The historic of this law and further amendments in 2000 and 2004, only served to complicate even more the future of the local field of live-events production. For instance, the Law 276 of 2000 only served to lower the age to 60 years old to stimulate attendance to the events, which had been declining (Law 276 of 2000). But once again, it did not reflect any consultation with producers, owners of venues, and other actors in the industry. Worse yet, the Law 432 of 2004 acknowledged the controversies caused by the previous laws, but passed anyway.

As seen in the amended text,

| [1]a implantación de la Ley antes mencionada ha creado una serie de controversias y problemas operacionales que han estado afectando considerablemente la cantidad y calidad de los espectáculos que se pueden presentar en Puerto Rico para beneficio de sus ciudadanos, sobre todo cuando se trata de salas de teatros o facilidades que tienen una capacidad limitada. Como consecuencia de ello prácticamente las facilidades de teatros en Puerto Rico no están siendo utilizadas competentemente y los propósitos que quiso conseguir esta legislación no necesariamente se están obteniendo, porque en los últimos años se han estado limitando dramáticaamente las opciones de espectáculos para estas salas y cuando se pueden realizar están resultando altamente perdidas para los productores y entidades envueltas, por lo que no hay motivación o incentivos para éstos prosigan con este tipo de actividades. Como consecuencia, en vez de tener más actividades para que los 
| [t]he implementation of the aforementioned Law has created a series of controversies and operational problems that have considerably affected the quantity and quality of the spectacles that could be produced in Puerto Rico in the benefit of its citizens, especially in theaters and venues with limited capacity. Consequently, the theaters in Puerto Rico have not been appropriately used, and the purposes intended by legislation have not been necessarily achieved because in the last years there has been a dramatic decrease in the options of spectacles for these venues, and when they are produced they represent losses for producers and the entities involved, resulting in lack of motivation or incentives to sustain these kind of events. Therefore, instead of having more events for the benefit of the citizens, the events’ quantity and quality has been limited. |
This time, the amended law seems to put a burden on the producers and indirectly on the publics’ attendance for the lack of sustainability of the events and maintenance of this kind of state-owned venues. This way, the Legislature tried to justify the lack of governmental incentives and support for the live-events produced at state-owned theaters, mostly concerts and plays. In the context of a declining attendance to these venues, mostly municipality-owned theaters, the state could have questioned why the attendance was declining, how it was performing in different municipalities, and to what extent does the Department of Education was contributing with other governmental cultural institutions –such as the ICP and the CAM– in teaching appreciation of music and other performing arts. It could have found out various sociopolitical and economic reasons, since arts and music education have historically been underestimated and the ICP have almost been dismantled, which resulted in limited interest for the artistic events produced in state-owned venues. Also, the cost of the tickets was also rising more every year in an unregulated market, but also because of new actors, such as new private-owned venues, that were entering the local field of live-events production in a market exposed to global neoliberal shifts, as I will describe in the next chapter. Passing on the responsibility to the municipalities was neither an option, since those new private venues that competed with the municipal venues were not necessarily in municipalities outside the metropolitan area of San Juan. But that was exactly what the government did, transferring the responsibility to municipalities, especially those sheltered by the law of Autonomous Municipalities.
(Law 81 of August 1991). In the context of neoliberalization, the municipalities could have privatized their venues, an option implied in the Law 432 of 2004 in which the local central state basically acknowledges it has been weakened and cannot maintain the venues. But fortunately that was not the case at least at a municipal scale. The municipalities kept their historic theaters or built new venues, such as the recently inaugurated Ponce Convention Center Juan H. Cintrón, also known as the Complejo Ferial de Ponce (i.e., Ponce’s Exhibition Ground).

To complicate the local field of live-events production furthermore, the Law 432 of 2004 added another aspect to the already amended law: i.e., individuals of 75 years and older would not need to pay for the admission tickets at all (Law 432 of 2004). On the other hand, the live events producers would still need to pay for the state tax per ticket, a fee for the emission of the ticket if the venue has a deal with a private tickets’ office or vendor, and give the elderly free admission without limits on the amount of tickets. This was definitely not an incentive for producing live events in state-owned venues in Puerto Rico, which dramatically affected all the elements in the process of production in an already suffered context for musicians, artists, and state-owned venues. But it did not pass without contention, as I will expand in the next chapter.

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I illustrated how the neocolonial state in Puerto Rico became the principal artistic and live-music events producer on the Island in the period after World War II. An examination of the field of live-music events production from the perspective of state-sponsorship and its development parallel to the organization of the neocolonial
state in that period shows how the field grew extensively due to the institutionalization of a robust national cultural policy, mainly translated into legal and normative governmental intervention. I say robust not in a celebratory tone, but to stress a process that had vast impact over many inherited colonial and neocolonial institutions for the stimulation and circulation of national culture based on ideas regarding the *puertorriqueñidad*.

The making of a national cultural policy during the Cold War era was the first significant attempt to assemble governmental cultural action in almost every different sector of artistic cultural production in Puerto Rico through governmental and nongovernmental institutional areas related to cultural patrimony, copyrights, media and socio-cultural communication, and specific thematic areas including music. However, the fact that events production in general, somehow considered in the colonial era –as seen in the legal cases of 1927 and 1938 discussed in this chapter, was not considered as a specific thematic area in the neocolonial era indicates that it was not a priority for the neocolonial state to consider events production a supportive branch for artistic production. Governmental cultural action related to events production was mostly delegated to sports and recreational institutions such as the CPRP, or indirectly diluted into some divisions of the ICP, as evidenced here. This eventually brought unwanted results as the neocolonial state continued to produce artistic events at a large scale, especially but not limited to music events. Decades after, in the early 2000s, the neocolonial state found itself unprepared vis-à-vis claims from musicians and commercial producers in what respects to regulation or organized procedures on music events and events production. Different to the common idea that there has never been cultural policy at all in Puerto Rico, I argue that there certainly is a national cultural policy, though
fragmented and ambivalent, which has historically vaguely managed the complexity of the logics and practices of events production overall.

In this chapter, I also described music events production within some public institutions, such as academic institutions and two divisions of the ICP that deal directly with music and music events: the Music Division and the Cultural Promotion Program. I gave special attention to the ICP, for being the institution that carried most of the weight of articulating national cultural policy in the postwar period. However, I argue that national cultural policy in that historical context had a double-edged framing as part of a national-populist governmental agenda on the one hand, and an anti-nationalist populist and developmentalist agenda on the other, in constant challenge with the state and its practice of live-events production. In the postwar context, this ambivalent national cultural policy in Puerto Rico was due to widely studied geopolitical reasons (as mentioned in the introductory chapter), but also to contingent and individual reasons which are rarely considered, such as the culture of production developed at the ICP by its first executive director, Ricardo Alegria and some of the directors of the ICP’s divisions, as explored in this chapter.

The historical data presented in the introductory chapter shows that in the postwar period the ICP was created as a neocolonial institution central to the objectives of the Operación Serenidad and intended to generate a calming effect versus the developmentalist policies of the neocolonial state. If seen through the lens of live-music events production, the ICP challenged Operación Serenidad’s symbolic and rhetorical objectives in many ways. For instance, as described in this chapter, far from producing events out of a sudden to satisfy the neocolonial state’s aim for diverting people from the
stress caused by violent economic policies, the ICP embarked in an ambitious project that required the state at both federal and local level to work hard. The ICP’s institutional objectives, developed almost in full by Alegría, included calling for and identifying artists all over the Island; rescuing state-owned theaters and abandoned historic buildings in order to have proper venues to host live-music events; helping to construct an audience for those music events through community-based cultural centers; making budgetary claims at the legislative level in order to operate and produce many concerts and festivals; and above all, forging a national cultural policy with no historical referent both at US Federal nor local scale. These objectives proved to be much more complex than merely hiring an orchestra to perform at state-sponsored events, and far more orchestrated than the detractors of national cultural policy in Puerto Rico have historically alleged. Alegría’s vision, and that of the persons he appointed as division directors –most of them pro-independence nationalists, challenged that lack of awareness by developing the material components in which artists, audiences, and the state as events producer could meet, which make me argue once again that there was and still is a national cultural policy in Puerto Rico.

Moreover, Alegría and his team built up a culture of production that also challenges the developmentalist policies of that time because it often privileged non-commercial music and artists, and community-based live-music events production. This local anti-corporate events production philosophy needs to be understood in a historically context-specific way, not limited to the neocolonial state and its developmentalist policies, but as an aversion (a personal aversion of Alegría and his team) to how capitalism was advancing in relation to artistic cultural production and culture industries.
worldwide. This culture of production certainly produced friction between the ICP and commercial live-music events producers and artists, who were also struggling with professionalizing the practice of events production amidst race and classist issues at a commercial level, as seen in the previous chapter. One can be tempted to dismiss Alegría and his team’s institutional culture for being produced by nationalists in favor of promoting a national culture, but it was not a mere nationalist issue rather than an anti-capitalist position rarely acknowledged as such by the Left and intellectuals in Puerto Rico. This institutional culture, which I observed, makes the ICP a case on its own which cannot be over-generalized nor conflated into the official national cultural policy in Puerto Rico because it generates a particular and complex production of culture, in du Gay’s terms (1997).

However, at the peak of global neoliberal changes and attempts of disarticulating national cultural policy in Puerto Rico as framed by Alegría, the neocolonial state found itself lost in the so much ambivalent normative style of doing cultural policy. And instead of pausing to carefully analyze and sketch its priorities towards cultural policy and consult all the parts affected by the previous legislation and norms, it continued amending previous laws depending on the local bipartisan political swings. This action—which has been in fact increasing inactivity, limits the local state’s capacity for producing or sponsoring live-events and benefitting from it as in previous decades. My analysis of several laws in the neoliberal era illustrates how bipartisan politics in Puerto Rico have tried to dismantle the ICP and the culture of production developed years before in this important institution of governmental cultural action, which in the end has only affected the “habits of the heart” of cultural workers, mainly artists and their artistic production.
(i.e., in this case, of musicians and live-music events production), but also of producers, the publics, and other social actors in the field of live-music events production.

In the absence of a strong ICP as a sponsor of traditional and some popular music forms, musicians started to look for the municipalities and for commercial and independent live-events producers that could hire them. Special commissions in the legislature still were sources for funding, though not totally reliable as they may also change every four or eight years due to bipartisanship. This unstable context also provoked the emergence of new social actors, especially within the producers, the musicians and independent live-events producers, who still struggling in and with the industry, reacted against various laws, and challenged governmental inactivity, as I will illustrate in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4
COMMERCIAL LIVE-MUSIC EVENTS PRODUCTION
IN THE NEOLIBERAL ERA

4.1 Introduction

| Cada cuatro años han cambiado cosas. Dependiendo el gobernador que sea, uno se ajusta. | Things change every four years. Depending on who is the governor, one makes the adjustments. |
| Beatriz Rodríguez, productora (Personal interview 2011) | Beatriz Rodríguez, producer (Personal interview 2011, personal translation) |

My central argument in this and the following chapter is that the local state in Puerto Rico has been challenged in the field of live-music events production, despite its exaggerated normative way of doing cultural policy; this state of affairs is consonant with neoliberal disciplinary ways of governing that in the case of Puerto Rico have not necessarily translated into governmental cultural action, despite political swings arising from bipartisanship that have proved to be detrimental to national cultural policy yet not enough to hinder a lively artistic scene. In order to expand on this argument, specifically in this chapter I will rely on in-depth interviews with local commercial live events producers, as well as on archival research collected on the very latest data in the field of live-music events production and producers in Puerto Rico. I will describe their logistics of production and the ways that the relationships among events producers, musicians, the owners of venues, the audiences, and the state evolved as new local, regional and multinational players entered the live-music events production industry since the 1990s. I will give special focus to new actors in the local live-music events professional field, such as professional associations and transnational corporations (TNCs).
4.2 New actors in the neoliberal live-music production scene

Neoliberal advocates expanded their “new conventional wisdom” into the late 1980s under the rubric of the Washington Consensus so that they could install new labor markets based on new free-trade zones along with labor procedures based on “labor flexibility,” all of which eventually led to labor insecurity and conflicts (Hershberg & Rosen, 2006, 8-9). Miller and Yúdice refer to the new labor market and disciplinary measures as the ‘New International Division of Cultural Labor’ (NICL), a term coined by Folker Fröbel and collaborators (Miller & Yúdice, 2002, 75-77). The NICL, they add, “broke up the prior division of the world into a small number of industrialized nations and a majority of underdeveloped ones, as production was split across continents” (ibid, 76). Production thus became global, as capitalism was pushed to an advanced level in the era of globalization that dominated the 1990s. This “unidentified cultural object” known as globalization is the result of two previous historical processes – internationalization and transnationalization – that paved the way for the intensification, growth, and acceleration of economic and cultural networks which operate at on a worldwide scale and base and at the same time are supported by flows of information and communication technologies (García Canclini, 1999, 45-46, personal translation). I agree with García-Canclini, who draws from Daniel Mato (1996), in viewing globalization not as a scientific, political or cultural paradigm, but rather as “the result of multiple movements, in part contradictory” between the local-global and the local-local (García

76 For Miller and Yúdice, this continental split of production occurred when “[d]eveloping markets for labor sales, and the shift from spatial sensitivities of electrics to the spatial insensitivities of electronics” pushed businesses to see Third World countries vis-à-vis the First or Second Worlds (ibid).

77 In Latin America and the Caribbean, the NICL needs to be understood vis-à-vis the creation and evolution of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) held in Geneva in 1964, and its “positive agenda” toward an imminent New International Economic Order that raised concerns about the abilities of developing countries in the region and elsewhere to stay ‘alive’ under that new social context (UNCTAD n.d.; United Nations 2014).
Canclini, 1999, 47). Within this framework, globalization is a channel through which neoliberalization flows.

For Latin America and the Caribbean, the treatment was worse than the disease. The neoliberal reform packages imposed by the Washington Consensus resulted in inflationary disorder and stagnation in the 1990s, and in turn Latin American and Caribbean nations’ economies failed again. In the era of globalization, failing again was unfavorable to regional economies and social stability versus the rest of the world. This was evidenced in the financial crises in Argentina, Brazil, and México in the mid-1990s (Hershberg & Rosen, 2006, 11). As a ‘rescue’ strategy, another set of reforms known as the post-Washington Consensus was proposed by the United States and international financial institutions, but not necessarily welcomed in the region because of its lack of credibility. Post-Washington Consensus and subsequent post-neoliberal policies found parallel regional opposition to “the construction of a prudent political and economic solidarity in the face of U.S. domination,” such as but not limited to Mercosur as well as local social movements against neoliberalism and the processes of neoliberalization (Hershberg & Rosen, 2006, 13-15; Silva, 2009; Yúdice, 2003 & 1998; Alvarez, Dagnino & Escobar, 1998). This context coincided with the deregulation of financial markets, the boom of global networks of information technologies, and UNESCO’s emphasis on culture for development that lasted until the late 1990s and highlighted the pros and cons of globalization (Harvey, 2005; UNESCO, n.d.).

In Puerto Rico, as economist Argeo Quiñones affirms, Fortuño’s pro-statehood administration – in office from 2008-2012 – seemed to ignore the anti-neoliberal tendencies in the region and the apparent leaning toward social interest programs in
North America and elsewhere (Quiñones, in Toro, 2009). Instead, the local government implemented a structural adjustment plan that limited the role of the state in the economy even more through privatization and deregulation, similar to the plan applied in Latin America in the 1980s and 90s and promoted by the IMF, “which proved to be disastrous to the region” (ibid, personal translation).

In terms of live-music events production, local musicians and music groups that were already supported by transnational record labels made an easy move to globalization, such as the boys group *Menudo* since the late 1970s and especially in the 1980s; this group was managed by Panamá-born Puerto Rican producer Edgardo Díaz who had had previous experience managing an internationally known Spanish group called *La Pandilla* (Andersen, 1983). In the mid-1990s, as record labels started to suffer from the impact of communication and information technologies that dramatically changed the record industry forever, transnational managers and live-events producers began to play an important role in sustaining previously developed artistic networks (Negus, 1999). Such is the case of Puerto Rican entrepreneur Angelo Medina, who works as manager, live-events producer, and promoter of international artists and music groups like Ricky Martin from Puerto Rico and *Maná* from México, among many other popular artists. With over 30 years of experience, Medina is considered one of the best managers and live-music events and concept producers in the Latin American and Caribbean region (Cobo, 2009). The concept producer, whose official definition is not found in scholarship, refers to a producer who develops the whole concept of a live-music event and related tours. It is a much more creative practice than that undertaken by live-music events producers, in the sense that it involves developing an idea from its conceptualization and
design all the way to its staging. Thus, the work of the concept producer differs from that of live-music events producers who buy ‘already made’ live-music events.\(^7\) This practice has been extremely popular since the 1990s when the NICL penetrated the field of live-music events production while production costs rose tremendously.

When local cultural policy and state-sponsored live-music events were unsteady in Puerto Rico, transnational managers and producers like Díaz and Medina reached their peaks both locally in state-owned venues and abroad through circuits of global venues and commercial live-music events production that had not yet entered the island. They helped to turn the local show business into a “pop music machine” that extended throughout the Americas as well as other continents in an unprecedented way, which in the case of *Menudo* has been compared to Beatlemania, as once profiled in *Time* magazine (Andersen, 1983). Only a few local live-music events producers, managers, artists and musicians currently work on this scale in Puerto Rico. They have historically contributed to inserting Puerto Rico into the scope of the circuit of transnational live-events production and international artists, as if it were a sovereign state.\(^7\)

International artists already inserted into the global circuit raised their fees, as transnational record labels continued to decay and live-music events became an important source of revenue. Local commercial live-music events producers did not stop bringing in international artists to perform at local venues, but – as the producers I interviewed

\(^7\) By *buying*, I mean paying to bring the show to Puerto Rico.

\(^7\) The artists who work at a global scale may have their own employees and buy or rent equipment, from audiovisual gear to planes and tour buses. Current examples of Puerto Rican musicians who work for these kind of artists are percussionist Paoli Mejías and drummer José ‘Pepe’ Jiménez (work for guitarists Carlos Santana), drummer Antonio “Tony” Escapa (works for Ricky Martin and other international artists), and many others who are not usually acknowledged by researchers or the press that focus mostly on the lead artists. Recent internationally-known local artists include Daddy Yankee and *Residente y Calle 13*, both within the mainstream urban music form of reggaetón.
confirm – this practice raised production costs which were eventually transferred to the public through admission tickets (Personal interviews). Live-music events producers at local universities once tried to lower production costs by offering international artists and musicians a set of university tours through a network called Asociación Universitaria Pro Actividades Culturales, constituted by the directors of the offices of cultural affairs in local universities in 1986, but no longer active in the late 1990s (i.e., University Association Pro Cultural Activities; Arana, 1986). As I have personally experienced as a student and later university employee in Puerto Rico, the offices of cultural affairs at local universities used to offer live-music events for free or at a very low cost to the public (i.e., mostly university students). In order to cover the production costs, however, these offices either begged for their respective universities’ funds or for private donations and corporate sponsorship where permitted.

Local artists and musicians along with commercial live-music producers – who until then had built connections with particular local producers, artists, and venues in the United States, Latin America and the Caribbean, or elsewhere – remained working but in another international circuit: that is, a translocal circuit. Translocal circuits are not exactly global because they do not necessarily reach massive audiences in multiple venues worldwide, but book artists to perform in specific venues of differing capacities from point to point (e.g., from New York to Puerto Rico, in small, medium or massive capacity local venues). These shows can be performed one time or as part of a tour with different dates booked in Puerto Rico or in other venues in the region. Some commercial live-music events producers who kept developing projects on this scale by renting local venues and getting local press exposure in the 1970s and especially in the 1980s were

80 Booking refers to scheduling the shows in the venues.
Marisela Berti for Producciones Unicornio, Josantonio Mellado for Famma Events, Rafael ‘Rafo’ Muñiz then of Promotores Latinos, José ‘Pepe’ Dueño as well as producers established since previous decades, as mentioned in Chapter 2. These local commercial live-music events producers who either brought in international artists to local circuits in Puerto Rico or moved local artists in translocal circuits abroad, along with the locally-based producers working in global circuits of live-music events, came to be known as the ‘big producers.’ Well-known producers in Puerto Rico with over twenty years of professional careers, such as Maritza Casiano, Antonio ‘Tony’ Mojena, Beatriz Rodríguez, Waleska Serra, César Sainz, and Larry Stein, among others became this type of producer in the 1990s until the present. Rodríguez, who used to work for Medina in the early 1990s, says the majority of the local live-music events producers in Puerto Rico currently work at this translocal scale and have offices only in Puerto Rico, which means they serve the local artists in local venues and bring in international artists to local venues (Personal interview). Rodríguez’s experience best illustrates how live-music production is done on this scale:

Beatriz Rodríguez (BR): I work directly with the artist. We, I have been a partner with Waleska Serra; I have been a partner with ‘Pepe’ Dueño; I have been a partner with César Sainz. Sí… y nos ha ido muy bien.

ADH: ¿Pero cuando hacen el contacto con el artista que quieren traer, es directamente con el artista?

BR: Depende. Por ejemplo, Jarabe de Palo yo lo hice con César Sainz. Los dos estábamos llamándolo [por separado]. Y pues dijimos, vamos a hacerlo juntos. Y lo

Beatriz Rodríguez (BR): Yo trabajo de productora a artista. Bueno, he sido social de Waleska Serra; he sido social de ‘Pepe’ Dueño; he sido socia de César Sainz. Sí… y nos ha ido muy bien.

ADH: ¿Y justo cuando hacen el contacto con el artista que quieren traer, es directamente con el artista?

BR: Depende. Por ejemplo, Jarabe de Palo yo lo hice con César Sainz. Los dos estábamos llamándolo [por separado]. Y pues dijimos, vamos a hacerlo juntos. Y lo
hicimos juntos. […]

**ADH:** …sobre la producción de artistas que no son de acá, por ejemplo con *Juanes*, que es un artista que tú has hecho aquí, ¿cómo se da? ¿Se da por iniciativa tuya o porque ellos te contactan?

**BR:** Cuando yo empecé, pues no había bandas de rock [locales]… No estaba *Viva Nativa*, ni estaba *La Secta*, ni estaba *Cultura Profética*, ni estaba *Gomba Jhabari*, ni había nada… Yo empecé a traer artistas de afuera, que no eran famosos comercialmente, pues no eran tan caros, y siempre le daba oportunidad a dos y a tres artistas locales, porque siempre aparecían bandas… […]

[…] En eso cada artista y cada show es un mundo aparte. Hablas con una persona diferente, unos fáciles de hablar bien, bien fáciles, otros son bastante difíciles. Unos pueden ser bien buenos como *Juanes* lo era conmigo, que era bien bueno, bien bueno, bien bueno; pero cuando, por ejemplo, en el 2005 iba a cobrar $1,300,000 por dos shows, pues me dijo “te hemos sido fieles hasta ahora”… Al menos, Angelo Medina me lo compró. […] A mí me dolió, pero en realidad a mí Dios me vino a ver, porque él no ganó mucho más. Él no ganó mucho más y pagó $1,300,000. No porque el *show* sea más caro uno se gana más. Es que debes más y tienes que vender más boletos para cubrir.

**ADH:** He visto que antes que los productores y las productoras montaban más el *show*. Vamos a darle personalidad a este *show*, vamos a hacerlo a la medida del público local. Ahora es

**ADH:** …about producing international artists, for example *Juanes* whom you have produced, how is it done? Do you call the artist or do the artists call you?

**BR:** When I started, there were no [local] rock bands… There was not *Viva Nativa*, *La Secta*, *Cultura Profética*, or *Gomba Jhabari*, nothing… I started to bring artists from abroad, who were not famous commercially, because they were not expensive, and always gave two or three local artists an opportunity to play, because these bands will always show up… […]

[…] Every artist and every show is different. You talk to different people, some are easy going, super easy, others are rather difficult. Some artists are very good like [the Colombian Latin pop singer/songwriter] *Juanes*, was with me, so good, so good, so good; but for example in 2005, when he wanted $1,300,000 for two shows, he told me “well, I have been loyal until now”… At least, Angelo Medina bought it from me. […] I was hurt, but in fact it was a sign of God, since Medina did not gain much. He did not bring in much and got paid $1,300,000. If the show is more expensive, you don’t necessarily make more money. You need to sell more tickets to break even.

**ADH:** I have noticed that years ago producers used to mount the show. We’re going to give personality to this show, we’re going to gear it to the local public. Now it is practically a ready-made product, you only need to search for the venue, etc.
prácticamente un producto que ya viene montado, tú buscas el venue, etc.

BR: No, lo que pasa es que el artista que traen de afuera viene con su show montado. No toca hacer ninguna creatividad ahí. El show es de ellos. Es el disco de ellos… Pero si es un artista internacional como Ednita Nazario, pues ella hace su creatividad y Ricky Martin también. Igual que ellos [los artistas internacionales] hacen para su país. Y el show que hace Ricky Martin, que lleva su creatividad, es el que lleva igual a todos los países, que lo vende.

ADH: ¿Hay espacio para negociar?

BR: Bueno, hay artistas de afuera, por ejemplo una vez cuando vino Christina Aguilera, ella no vino con su show. Ella se vendió por $200 mil dólares, no sé cuánto fue y no trajo su escenografía, ni trajo sus bailarines, ni trajo nada. […] Cuando Whitney Houston vino, tampoco. Y todo el mundo se quedó como en shock porque las taquillas eran carísimas y ella no había traído el show esplendoroso. Pero mayormente lo traen.

ADH: Sí, y vienen con los [ingenieros y técnicos] de sonido y todo montado.

BR: Bueno, pero en lo de sonido y en lo de luces eso lo encuentro un poco injusto porque le quitan trabajo a la gente de aquí, a los técnicos. […] Cuando aquí hay todo eso. Pero, por ejemplo, ahora mismo el show de Maná que yo vi, esas cosas no las hay. Y hay cosas más nuevas que los suplidores de aquí no tienen. Por ejemplo, yo voy a un show de Maná y está brutal la escenografía. Y yo no puedo pagar eso por un producto que ya viene montado.

BR: No, what happens is that the international artist comes in with a set show. There is no need to be creative then. The show is theirs. The recording is theirs… But a local artist like Ednita Nazario, she creates the show herself and Ricky Martin, too. Just like other artists do for their countries. And the show that Ricky Martin produces, which has his own creativity, is the same he takes to all countries, the one he sells out.

ADH: Is there room to negotiate?

BR: Well, there are artists from abroad, for example, Christina Aguilera, who do not bring their show. She charged $200,000, I do not know how much she brought in and she did not bring her scenery, dancers, nothing. […] When Whitney Houston came, the same thing. And everyone was shocked because the tickets were expensive and she had not brought her very elaborate show. But most artists bring it all.

ADH: Yes, and they come with sound [engineers and technicians] and the whole set.

BR: Well, but in the case of sound and lighting I find that unfair because they limit local people’s work, the technicians’ work. […] When we have all that here. But, for example, I just attended a show by Maná, and there were things we do not have here. And there are new things that local suppliers do not have. For example, I go to a show of Maná and the set design is incredible. And I cannot afford to pay this for [the Argentinean rock band] Enatitos Verdes. […]
[the Argentinean rock band] **Enatitos Verdes.** […]

**ADH:** ¿Has producido en Puerto Rico solamente o has producido en otro lugar, en el Caribe, por ejemplo?

**BR:** No. Me han preguntado y todo eso, pero no, no… porque hay que conocer a la gente de la radio, la gente de la prensa, yo por lo menos no. César [Sainz] ha producido en Miami y en Orlando. Y ‘Pepe’ no, tampoco.

**ADH:** ¿Porque es que es bien local el asunto?

**BR:** Bueno, es que tú tienes tus contactos aquí. En Miami no te puedes ir a meter en el terreno de los de allá.

(Personal interview, 2011)

**ADH:** Have you produced locally only or also abroad, in the Caribbean, for instance?

**BR:** No. I have been asked and all that, but no, no… because you need to know the people from the radio, the press, I do not know them. César [Sainz] has produced in Miami and Orlando, but ‘Pepe’ does not.

**ADH:** Because the business is very local?

**BR:** Well, you have your contacts here. You cannot go and invade the territory of the producers in Miami.

(Personal interview 2011, personal translation)

Drawing from Rodríguez’s interview, one may note that localism plays an important role not only in terms of the professional practice of local live-music events producers who work with local and international artists and musicians, but also in terms of the artists for whom they produce. Localism has evolved into holding a distinctive value midst cultural policy within the live-music events industry in Puerto Rico. The positive impact of this industry compared with that of other sectors of the economy – such as its creation of many indirect jobs related to the logistics of production – has been virtually ignored by the local state. On the contrary, what Paquito Cordero used to do with shows that he flew in from Puerto Rico to New York in the 1960s is rarely practiced currently due to the fierce competition with local producers in other countries or to local

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81 Some of these jobs fall into the formal economy, but other are part of an informal creative economy.
regulations that protect those local producers. Thus, it is true that global circuits exist and include tours of venues all over the world, but the industry in Puerto Rico has developed mostly as a local one with links to translocal artistic networks.

There are several observations of Rodríguez that help to demystify the stereotype about live-music events producers, especially the so-called ‘big producers’ in Puerto Rico. First, while it is true that they compete for the artists and their shows, they also may collaborate among themselves, especially when they realize they are going after the same artists. This is not always respected by other producers, as I will expand in a subsequent section. Second, while they manage large sums of money, they are not necessarily rich, as seen in the example of Juanes. Who *bought* Juanes from Rodríguez was not a local producer who works on the same local and translocal scale that she works, but rather Medina who is a transnational manager and producer who works with global circuits of live-music events. Transnational producers, indeed, accumulate much more economic capital, yet are still subject to risks in the industry, especially in neoliberal contexts of rapid economic changes. Rodríguez insists that producers who work at local and translocal scales need to have some savings in order to be able to make deposits for assuring both the venues and the artists, to pay on time and sustain a reputation vis-à-vis all the cultural creative workers that contribute to produce each show, and to face the industry’s ups and downs (Personal interview, 2011). “The less expensive production [in that level] may cost you around $75 thousand,” she added. Third, while most of the ‘big’ live-music events producers are linked to artists in the mainstream music industry, not all start with nor limit their professional careers to the mainstream. There is a high economic cost if producers want to enter and survive the ‘star system,’ which has been historically
present in the commercial live-music events production due to its close relation to commercial record labels, as seen in Chapter 2. Rodríguez’s case exemplifies how bringing in artists who are not (or not yet) in the star system may help both these artists as well as local artists and musicians be seen by the press and broadcast media. This is another historical relationship in existence since the early years of professionalization of live-music events production, as discussed in Chapter 2. In the case of Rodríguez, which is representative of other cases in Puerto Rico, that historical relationship was challenged and changed in the mid-1990s, as the mainstream local press and broadcast media—especially FM radio stations—turned to independent (indie) Latin American, Caribbean and Spanish rock, ska, and reggae bands. “I love those bands!,” she added with enthusiasm. This is why Rodríguez’s case may be comparable to that of pioneer producer D’Herger, who 30 years before had also established musical trends in the media by bringing in the music that he wanted to hear in live performances. Both live-events producers also offered the public an alternative music that connected them to the United States (in the case of D’Herger) and to Iberian America (in the case of Rodríguez). In particular, Spanish-language rock in the mid-1990s appealed to youth and young adults interested in love songs as well as in protest songs against inequality in the countries where the music bands came from, especially the Latin American and Caribbean region, which immediately resonated in the formation of new local music bands.82 Lastly, Rodríguez’s comments on the ‘already-made’ live-music shows call attention to the need

82 No wonder why the only two local radio stations dedicated solely to Spanish-language rock—SonoColor (independent) and Cosmos 94 (of Spanish Broadcasting System or SBS)—shortly after changed their programming styles. Cosmos 94, which played Spanish-language rock all day long, was substituted by a romantic music station. Spanish-language rock did not ever achieve such level of visibility in local radio in Puerto Rico. Some of the local indie rock, ska, and reggae bands of that era, of which some remain active in the current local music scene and some were signed by record labels are: La Secta All Stars, Circo, Vivantativa, Fiel a la Vega, Millo Torres y el Tercer Planeta, El Manjar de los Dioses, Puya, Cultura Profética, Robi Draco Rosa, Sol D’Menta, Los Goyos, Radio Pirata, among others (Boom, 2003, 18-25).
to look at these kinds of events more carefully: differences in terms of the artists’ fees, technical and technological gear, stage and lighting design, and the conditions of work of local versus translocal or global technicians and support personnel may have affected the decisions that local producers made when experiencing the logistics of translocal circuits of production.

In terms of the venues, as long as the artists tour, these will be localized. Among the most rented state-owned venues used by live-music events producers like Rodríguez, as seen in press coverage and advertising in local newspapers of the era, were the Center for the Performing Arts, the Coliseo Roberto Clemente (opened in 1973), the UPR’s Theater, the Teatro Tapia, all of which are in San Juan, the Teatro La Perla in Ponce, and the Palacio de Deportes in Mayagüez. Privately owned venues were also rented but to a lesser extent, such as hotels, restaurants, and coffee theaters, and thus they slowly displaced the night clubs. Also, the existing local circuit of state-sponsored live-music events production remained, now principally led by municipalities in a much more active way than were the central neocolonial state and independent cultural centers; the latter were already asking for help as the swings in the government and its bipartisan politics and budget cuts left them almost inactive (Cabán, 1985). Commercial live-music events producers who worked with municipalities along with non-profit organizations and independent producers who worked – often part-time or as volunteers for specific community-based groups or cultural centers as I will illustrate in the next chapter – became known as ‘small producers.’

The transnational managers and producers, the concept producers, the local and international artists in global and translocal circuits, along with the municipalities as the
principal state-sponsored events producers in relation to community-based producers all exemplified a new set of actors and elements in the process of producing live-music events in Puerto Rico. Apart from these new actors and elements, in the next subsections I will focus on a particular actor who emerged when the global circuits of venues and live-music events production tried to penetrate the local industry (i.e., COPEP). I also will illustrate not only the new relationships that independent live-events producers developed with the local state and the new social actors, but also elements in the field of live-music events production that are tied to the context of neoliberal neocolonialism.

4.2.1 COPEP and the rise of live-events producers as a professional class

“The venues are theirs,” said local commercial live-music events producer Rodríguez when I asked her what was her relationship with the state in Puerto Rico (Personal interview, personal translation). She added that “for applying for the visas to bring artists to the island we do not need to deal with the local government, except if there is a problem and then the [local] Department of State mediates for us or sometimes the Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration in Washington, if needed” (ibid). Dealing with visas makes live-music events production a matter of international relations that reveal once more the neocolonial limits of locally-based producers. This practice often raises the production costs and prevents producers from bringing in certain artists to Puerto Rico, as producer Benjamín Muñíz notes,

| In el caso de Puerto Rico, como bien sabes, normalmente los artistas vienen, sobre todo los artistas internacionales –o sea que no son nuestros ni de los Estados Unidos, vienen a Puerto Rico como parte de una gira en Estados Unidos. Y eso se | In the case of Puerto Rico, as you know, usually artists come in, especially international artists – or those who are not ours nor from the United States, come in as part of a tour of the United States. And that is explained because there is no other way |
explica porque de otra forma es muy costoso cuando tienes que diligenciar visas, cuando tienes que costear los pasajes desde sus países de origen, mismo desde Miami o Nueva York. Para ellos también supone una inversión mayor de tiempo y, por lo tanto, dinero. Ese es otro factor que dificulta también la presentación de artistas fuera de ese ámbito [de giras internacionales] . Y por eso es que hay gente que si los presenta, pues aprovechan la gira por los Estados Unidos para traerlos a Puerto Rico. […]

(Personal interview, 2011)

to negotiate visas, to pay for air tickets from their country of origin, even if it is Miami or New York. For them it is also a major time investment, and therefore of money. That is another factor that limits the shows of international artists outside that circuit [of international touring]. And thus there are producers that if they bring them in take advantage of the artists’ tours in the United States by bringing them to Puerto Rico […]

(Personal interview, 2011, personal translation)

But apart from the visas, indeed, the principal reason that producers had to interact with the local state until 1995 was renting their venues. As mentioned in the previous chapter, from the time of Spanish colonial rule but mostly in the neocolonial era, the local state carried out the construction of the most important venues on the island (which are also among the most beautiful, in my opinion). For example, the Teatro Tapia, the UPR’s Theater, the Hiram Bithorn Stadium, the Roberto Clemente Coliseum, the Performing Arts Center, and many other state-owned venues like theaters, convention centers, and some hotels were all state-owned and administered by the local municipalities around the island. After 1995, and particularly during the then Governor Pedro Rosselló’s second term (the last second term a governor has ever had in Puerto Rico), the local government moved fully and often violently into neoliberalization. Worse yet, it was a pro-annexationist neoliberalization. Roselló did everything humanly possible to turn Puerto Rico into part of the United States, and neoliberalism gave him the tools for doing so; he did not, however, fully succeed. The neoliberal policies that were designed in the 1970s – which Governor Romero unsuccessfully tried to implement –
were pulled back in the 1990s by Roselló who gave them “a new push for statehood” (Ayala & Bernabe, 2007, 291). Puerto Rico experienced moments of heightened tension, especially when the government intervened with local state employees and labor legislation, “making it more flexible to employers’ need” and cutting back “the regulatory power of public agencies” (292). Scholars Ayala and Bernabe put it clearly, 

> arguing that a large public sector hinders entrepreneurial initiative and hurts competitiveness, the Roselló government embarked on a project of privatization in such areas as jails and school cafeterias; the training of new employees; and shipping, public transport, health, water, electrical, and telephone services. It set out to sell the government-operated hotels, convention centers, and agricultural enterprises. (ibid)

Of course, selling state-owned venues would have an immediate impact over the limited relationship between local live-events producers and the state. But producers did not react immediately to this, but rather to other instances in which they wanted the government to intervene. For example, producers wanted the local state to regulate their profession as new individuals and corporations entered the industry of live-events production. With that in mind, a group of commercial live-events producers constituted the first professional association of events producers in Puerto Rico in 1993: the Asociación de Productores de Espectáculos Públicos (a.k.a. Asociación de Productores de Espectáculos y Eventos Públicos (i.e., Association of Public Spectacles and Events Producers, or APEP). As a consequence – and with the objective of protecting the consumers versus irresponsible producers whose events failed to accomplish what they promoted – the government amended the local income tax law that in turn led to the

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83 As seen in a press article, the Association of Public Spectacles and Events Producers’ first board consisted of José Antonio Mellado (president), Angelo Medina (vice-president), José Dueño (secretary), and Beatriz Rodríguez (treasurer) (Echevarría 2005).
creation of a “Registry of Public Performance Promoters [...]”, to be attached to the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico” (Law 182 of September 1996). The local Department of the Treasury created a special division dedicated to register live events producers and establish the basic requirements to produce in Puerto Rico, particularly the concession of licenses: the Public Performance Registration Office, later known as the Oficina de Servicios al Promotor de Espectáculos Públicos (i.e., Office of Public Spectacles Promoters Services, or OSPEP). OSPEP was in charge of administering the Law 182 of September 1996, known as Ley del Promotor de Espectáculos Públicos (i.e., Law of Public Events Promoters), which is under the Sports and Parks set of laws. The Law 182 of September 1996 set an important precedent since it defined several key concepts and actors in the field of live-events production in Puerto Rico, such as:

(a) **Sponsor**: Company or registered trademarks that – in order to promote its product – contribute, donate, or pay the public performance promoter to organize and hold the public event.

(b) **Public spectacle**: Any public event, concert of song, musical performance, dance performance, sporting event, comedy, or drama, presented at a theater, coliseum, hotel, convention hall or other location, whether closed or open, private or public, where the public is charged admission.

(c) **Bond**: Money deposit which assures that the public event will be held on the date and at the time advertised.

(d) **License**: Authorization issued by the Public Performance Registration Office to practice the profession of public performance promoter in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

(e) **Public performance promoter**: Natural [or] juridical person, whether local or foreign, who promotes or organizes a public

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84 See the application for OSPEP’s license in Appendix G.

85 Note that the government’s language uses the term promoter (versus producers –as the producers call themselves), and public performances instead of live events. This vocabulary still generates confusion.
performance to be held, which entails the search for a location and the entering into contracts, and is in charge of its administrative and advertising phases. (ibid)

Since then, OSPEP became the local producers’ direct governmental interlocutor on the island and the first reason that relates producers with the local government. APEP and OPEP had helped the local commercial live-events producers to officially achieve professional recognition. Yet, more changes in the field of live events production in the context of neoliberalism pushed the relationship between the state and producers even further.

4.2.1.1 SMG and the birth of COPEP

Before finishing Roselló’s second term in 2000s, the local government announced the construction of two important and impressive new venues: the Puerto Rico Convention Center in the Condado/Miramar area in San Juan as well as the Coliseo de Puerto Rico (i.e., the Puerto Rico Coliseum, or Choliseo) in the financial district of Hato Rey.86 The Convention Center was administered by a newly public corporation created in 2000 known as the Autoridad del Distrito del Centro de Convenciones (i.e., the Puerto Rico Convention Center Authority, or ADCC; Law 400 of 2000). The Choliseo, which I am going to focus on, was initially administered by the Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico (Torres Ramos 2005, 77). In addition – parallel to the Choliseo’s construction in the late 1990s – other state-owned venues that the central government had built for recreation and sports were being transferred to the administration of the

86 The Coliseo de Puerto Rico is now named after key artist and comedian José Miguel Agrelot, also known as Don Cholito for one of his television characters. People in Puerto Rico commonly refer to the Coliseo as the Choliseo, also to differentiate it from the previous Coliseo Roberto Clemente, also in San Juan.
municipalities where they were located (Law 432 of 2004). Economic turmoil was foreseen locally and elsewhere, but the construction of the Choliseo continued at an estimated cost of $150 million (Law 432 of 2004). From the outset, the construction of the Choliseo was problematic. As seen in Rosalina Torres-Ramos thesis, the construction got delayed and was not finished until the next governmental administration under the pro-status quo Governor Sila M. Calderón in 2004, resulting in an overdraft that raised costs to $256.6 million (Torres Ramos 2005, 1-2). With an almost insolvent ICP that still had no other venue than interior patios and some historical buildings that the institution had rescued, this costly inversion in a venue that would compete with the commercial global circuit of live-events production seemed unacceptable and reflected the local government’s priorities. That amount of money never made it to music groups and artists ascribed to the ICP nor to other governmental cultural institutions that sponsored non-commercial live-events production. In an impressive contrast, in 2003 – the year before the Choliseo was inaugurated – the ICP’s general budget was $11,708,181 million (Senado de Puerto Rico, 2005, 30-31).

Again, local commercial live-events producers did not react to the overdraft immediately. After all, the Choliseo was going to reassure Puerto Rico’s position as an important hub in the global entertainment industry, which would eventually have a positive effect on their careers. Such an impressive state-owned venue, with up to 18,000-person capacity limit, was an opportunity for commercial live-events producers to participate in the global circuit while operating locally. Yet soon, local entertainers stopped being ‘entertained’ when the government gave them a global neoliberal exposé and turned the Choliseo into a private-public partnership (PPP) managed by SMG, “the
world leader in venue management, marketing and development,” founded in 1977 in the United States (SMG, n.d.). SMG manages state and private-owned “convention centers, exhibition halls and trade centers, arenas, stadiums, performing arts centers, theaters, and specific-use venues such as equestrian centers” (ibid). This company is part of PPP’s elsewhere, and is self-described as “unrivalled in the field of private facility management” (ibid). But that unrivalled status generated contention in Puerto Rico when SMG subcontracted another U.S.-based company to operate the food franchises at the Choliseo and the commercial live-music events producers did not receive any percentage of these profits (Torres Ramos, 2005, 5). Moreover, as one key local commercial live-events producer added, “other limits imposed by SMG were related to letting their sponsors promote their brands inside the Choliseo during the events produced by each producer, and getting SMG’s approval to promote their events” (Personal interview, 2010, personal translation). Local commercial live-events producers considered these limits as “not acting according to the reality of the local entertainment industry,” and asked the local government for normative public policy on the Choliseo and the functions of the managing company (Torres Ramos, 2005, 6). For the first time in the history of live-events production in Puerto Rico, APEP – the local commercial producers themselves – in order to protect the reality of the local industry asked the government to mediate and intervene in the global private sector represented locally by SMG.

As seen in a written speech presented to the then Governor Calderón, APEP reviewed the history and achievements of the live-events production industry in Puerto Rico to demonstrate how important their practice was to the local state and how SMG was threatening both the practices and logics of producing live-events in Puerto Rico.

87 Before changing its name to SMG, the company was known as Spectator Management Group.
while still within the local state’s economy (Asociación de Productores de Espectáculos Públicos, 2004; see Appendix D). APEP presented the Governor with several points to consider that reflected the producers’ concerns. These principal concerns lay with the government’s granting of a managing contract to SMG without previous public policy or agreements about the state’s administrative priorities; with the ways in which SMG would impact the already weakened local economy; and with how the contract would affect all the social actors in the field of live-events production in Puerto Rico that evidently had developed their own culture of production. “Local producers were not consulted before granting that contract,” says APEP’s written speech (ibid). The contract granted SMG vast powers with immediate impact over local producers, artists, and audiences, such as: 1) increasing the Choliseo’s rental fee which in turn would eventually raise the cost of the tickets; 2) subcontracting foreign food and beverage franchises whose profits would not stay in the local economy, thus making it difficult to recover the multi-millionaire infrastructural inversion; and 3) having priority over booking the Choliseo by using its own personnel in alliance with other global and international commercial live-music events production firms, such as Live Nation, thereby acting as a global promoter that makes SMG a producer in Puerto Rico and in the process displaces both local producers and artists as well as adds a wide array of new direct and indirect services related to the current logics of live-music events production (ibid).88 APEP specified which were these services and insisted that,

| La experiencia que se tiene con SMG en Estados Unidos es que utiliza su fuerza | The experience with SMG in the United States is that it uses its corporate power to |

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88 Live Nation is a transnational corporation (TNC) that has also challenged traditional international record labels, as it not only promotes artists globally but signs them in with global record deals that include touring and merchandising (BBC News 2008; Live Nation n.d.).
Indeed, the practices developed by SMG threatened the work of many. Producers in particular found themselves vulnerable as the local industry that they helped to develop for over 25 years was menaced by what they called “unfair competition” (ibid, personal translation). César Sainz of Rompeolas Productions and one of the key figures among local commercial live-music events producers feared that “in ten years the entertainment industry will be even bigger, but the North American giants could exterminate the local producers” (Sainz, in Torres Ramos, 2004, 85, personal translation).

As a consequence, local commercial live-events producers submitted a list of recommendations to the government, starting with an imperative call “to prevent SMG from becoming and acting as a live-events producer in Puerto Rico, unless it does so through a local producer” (Asociación de Productores de Espectáculos Públicos 2004, personal translation). Among other relevant actions that they proposed to the government were to:

1) pay attention to the exclusivity that SMG hold with certain ticket vendors, now also organized through new local and international companies;

2) legislate for making 80% of the Coliseo’s booking time available for local producers, as done in other countries;
make public policy considering measures implemented in other countries to protect the local entertainment industry and the public interest, such as the “impuesto de desplazamiento” (i.e., displacement tax) to foreign companies; \(^{89}\)

limit SMG’s powers that tended to monopolize the local industry and sponsors through the creation of a state organ that cares for the interests of all the affected sectors; and

legislate to create COPEP and make compulsory the membership to this professional association of events producers (ibid). \(^{90}\)

In the context of increasing deregulation locally and elsewhere, it was interesting to see that local commercial live-events producers – who had historically been prevented from reacting to governmental action – were demanding governmental protection and regulatory frames to avoid SMG and similar companies that might operate worldwide and threaten their local practice. Undoubtedly, the industry would not regulate itself and needed the government to intervene. And in making such a claim, I argue, local commercial live-events producers challenged the local state’s decision to surrender its public responsibilities to a PPP with SMG, in order to protect a vibrant local field of global resonance that historically had been unacknowledged by the local state. Even though SMG was and is still contracted by the local state, local producers succeeded in procuring most of their demands. In 2004, Governor Calderón transferred the administration of SMG’s contract from the Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico to the ADCC. Since then, the ADCC has been responsible for establishing the administrative and public policies of the Choliseo, under the supervision of a Board of

\(^{89}\) Colombia and Spain are examples of countries with this kind of displacement taxation, both managed by their respective Departments of the Treasury (Secretaría Distrital de Hacienda 2011; Gobierno de España n.d.).

\(^{90}\) The producers took advantage of the opportunity to address the Governor and presented other recommendations not necessarily related to the case of SMG, but to legislate to prevent producers to commit “illegal practices” in their commercial and business relationships, and to create systems to subsidize local producers (ibid).
Directors (Torres Ramos, 2004, 6). Nevertheless, the project that created COPEP, born principally as a result from the frictions with SMG, had to wait another year to be signed by another pro-status quo Governor Aníbal Acevedo Vilá (Law 113 of 2005).

Those years, the mid-2000s, were tough for the local fields of arts, communication and media. As I have mentioned elsewhere, the case of Univisión demonstrates how transnational media corporations could sweep away local cultural production if there were no state support of any kind, either local or U.S. Federal, with jurisdiction over broadcast media in Puerto Rico (Díaz-Hernández & Subervi-Vélez, 2005). Drawing from a key live-events producer, the case of Univisión posed another new dimension to the local field of live-music events production, as they dramatically raised the fees for advertising the events (Personal interview, 2010). In this context, the case of COPEP versus SMG – under no other regulation than the local state’s newly created law requested by the industry itself – represents an important challenge both to the local state and the neocolonial state of affairs. When I asked Mellado, COPEP’s first elected president, to compare the case of the displacement in local television vis-à-vis the field of live-events production in Puerto Rico, he responded:

| ADH: [...] ¿Por qué usted cree que los productores de eventos públicos no han sufrido el desplazamiento tan duro que sufrieron los productores de televisión? | Josantonio Mellado (JM): Bueno, lo que pasa es que hasta que se creó el Coliseo de Puerto Rico, al Norte no le interesábamos nosotros como plaza, porque las grandes multinacionales como Live Nation o como las otras multinacionales grandes, |
| ADH: [...] Why do you think local live-events producers did not suffer the same displacement that local television producers did? | Josantonio Mellado (JM): Well, what happened is that until the construction of the Puerto Rico Coliseum, we were not important as a plaza for the North, because the big TNCs like Live Nation or other big multinationals like Clear Channel and others larger still were not interested in |
Clear Channel y hay otra más, otra más grande todavía, no le interesaba porque a ellos no le interesaba traer a un artista para hacer 7,000 personas en el [Coliseo] Roberto Clemente o 1,900 personas en el Centro de Bellas Artes.

Cuando se crea el Coliseo de Puerto Rico, el Norte empieza a mirarnos y dice, no ahora nosotros tenemos un venue para llevar a los Rolling Stones, a Paul McCartney y a un sinnúmero de artistas que antes no se podía traer porque no era costo efectivo… ni pa’ los de aquí ni pa’ los de afuera.

Ahí es cuando vemos venir el movimiento, ya que el Coliseo de Puerto Rico contrata los servicios de la compañía SMG, que está trabajando en 160 países alrededor del mundo, administrando coliseos o venues alrededor del mundo. Cuando vemos que viene eso, entonces ahí es cuando nos movemos nosotros los productores, finalmente nos unimos y forzamos crear el Colegio.

Entre ello ha sido un freno, no te voy a decir que sea la solución perfecta, pero ha sido un freno para que de momento los Walmart’s del mundo del espectáculo no nos traguen.

ADH: ¿Y cómo ustedes se enteraron de la alianza con SMG? ¿El gobierno los llamó a cita o se enteraron después?

JM: No. Nos enteramos cuando se encima ya. Nos empezó a afectar y entonces, pues, nos movimos para crear la ley esa para ponerle un freno a eso.

(Phone interview, 2007)

bringing in an artist for 7,000 people in the Roberto Clemente [Coliseo] or for 1,900 people in the Performing Arts Center.

When the Puerto Rico Coliseum was constructed, the North started to look to us and said: now we have a venue to present the Rolling Stones, Paul McCartney, and many other artists that they could not bring before because it was not cost effective… for the people from here or abroad.

That is when we saw the movement coming, because the Puerto Rico Coliseum contracted SMG, which works with 160 countries worldwide, administering venues worldwide. When we saw it coming, then is when we got moving, we finally organized and created COPEP.

While it has been a roadblock, I would not say it is the perfect solution, but has immediately prevented the Walmart’s of the entertainment industry from eating us.

ADH: And how did you know about the alliance of PPP with SMG? The government called you in for an appointment or did they inform you later?

JM: No. We found out when it was already coming to us. It started to affect us and then, well, we lobbied for creating that law to stop it.

(Phone interview, 2007, personal translation)
4.2.1.2 COPEP’s contentious development and lobbying

After attending public hearings in the Puerto Rico’s House of Representatives in June 2005, the project that APEP proposed became Law 113 of September 2005 (Echevarría, 2005). It did not pass without contention, with some representatives and key figures in the government questioning a possible overlap between OSPEP and COPEP. In a press article, producer Medina reacted with “[t]he association validates the profession, while OSPEP regulates it” (ibid). Mellado added that “OSPEP looks after the government’s interests, and COPEP those of the producers” (ibid). As seen in COPEP’s internal documents, Law 113 of 2005 passed “after some producers of this professional class got together in an Association [APEP] and identified many obstacles to appropriately produce their spectacles in different venues on the island” (Colegio de Produtores de Espectáculos Públicos de Puerto Rico n.d.a, personal translation). Some of these obstacles – which implied internal friction among local producers – are pointed out in the statement of motives of Law 113 itself and had nothing to do with the case of SMG, but rather with “new ‘promoters’ or ‘producers’ who were entering the business without the proper skills of live-events production in the local industry or were emerging temporarily with the goal only of making fast cash and then abandoning the market” (Law 113 of 2005, personal translation). Producer Dueño’s argument in favor of creating COPEP pointed to OSPEP’s inability to guarantee the professionalism and the ability of the over 400 licensees until 2005 (Dueño, in Echevarría 2005). To obtain the license from OSPEP “it is enough to pay $200 and have no penal record,” added Dueño (ibid). Producer Medina also argued that OSPEP’s method contributed only to the

91 Note again the indistinctive use of the terms promoters and producers to refer to live-events producer.
proliferation of “inventors or companies without the intention to serve but to be served” (ibid). Therefore, COPEP was created to overcome that loss of prestige that the unskilled practices of these “inventors” were causing in the industry, “often part of the reason why the managers of the venues preferred to work with companies from other jurisdictions” (Law 113 of 2005, personal translation). APEP and later COPEP’s demands were framed against what they called “professional cannibalism” (Echevarría, 2005; Torres Ramos, 2004, 84). Via an office director, a board of elected members, and an administrative assistant, COPEP started to deal with the claims of “professional cannibalism” and new “inventors,” following Law 113 that was written basically by the producers and discussed in many general assemblies. Law 113 specified that COPEP needed to accomplish several functions, such as developing internal rules, organizing special committees, and needed to:

a) adopt a Code of Professional Ethics, which shall govern the conduct of its members as well as the procedures to receive, investigate, and adjudicate complaints relative to the practice and the conduct of the College members and in such manner that OSPEP may impose applicable sanctions; and

b) protect its members, promote their professional development and provide for the creation of insurance and special fund systems and other voluntary protection services for its members. (Law 113 of 2005)

These functions specified by law, as well as issues concerning COPEP’s organizational structure and public image (e.g., the association’s emblem), dominated the first committee meetings and assemblies (see Figure 4.1).
COPEP’s emblem identifies licensed producers in public documents and advertisements

COPEP’s language to justify Law 113, however, was problematic since it implied a correlation between new producers, lack of expertise and experience, and unethical and dishonest practices. On the one hand, it is a fact that local producers did not receive formal education in the field nor the set of laws related to it until very recently. That is why COPEP started offering seminars and continuing education to current or aspiring members and since have created and proposed a graduate certification at a local private university (Universidad del Sagrado Corazón) in order to assure that qualified producers learn the skills to produce locally. Yet the fact that most of the hundreds of experienced and new producers who attended COPEP’s open call for a foundational assembly did not know each other reflects only the same pattern that I have criticized in regard to governmental cultural policy in this dissertation: that there is no research on the diversity and differences among the actors involved in or affected by legislation. Even though many of the ‘new’ producers had been working for decades in the field, they had little or no public visibility, which is not indicative of a lack of expertise or experience. Others were not organized as commercial independent live-music producers, but rather producing under commercial firms such as radio and TV stations (i.e., local or locally-based U.S. Spanish-language networks), local and global breweries (e.g., Cervecería
India, Heineken), and other corporations directly or indirectly connected to the entertainment industry.\textsuperscript{92} This diversity of employers demonstrates that local live-music events producers are not a homogeneous professional class. On the contrary, differences based on the scale of their practices, their years of experience, the size of their companies, the economic capital they accumulate (if some) and the budgets they manage, the kinds of venues they use, and the publics and the kind of artists and artistic forms they serve are just some of the many examples in which they vary. I argue that COPEP needed to assess these differences from the outset, even before passing Law 113 and its subsequent legal definitions of what a live-events producer was, in order to avoid what seemed to be a top-down approach from a few local commercial live-events producers to the producers whom they did not know until that time. At the very least, I acknowledge that the foundational assembly was formed. As a local producer myself, I attended all of COPEP’s assemblies since the foundational in 2005 until mid-2007 and then again during my fieldwork between 2010 and 2011; the friction caused by the lack of recognition of the diversity among producers was strikingly evident. It was common to hear producers referring to notions such as ‘big’ versus ‘small’ producers or producers versus promoters, which could have been clarified instead of ignored to preserve an albeit imaginary collective unity.\textsuperscript{93} COPEP’s first board members urged the general membership many times to stop talking in these distinctions. But the differences were still present and constantly mentioned, especially in discussions on matters that might exclude (or actually

\textsuperscript{92} As producer Mellado recalls, local radio stations were producing live-music events in venues others than the stations per sé since the 1970s. This practice intensified in the 1908s.

\textsuperscript{93} In Puerto Rico, a promoter is an intermediary among artists, producers, and venues. They are usually subcontracted by public agencies, municipalities, private companies or by other producers of any kind to contact artists and musicians to perform at live events. They may also produce live-music and other kinds of events. Therefore, they also need to be licensed by OSPEP and affiliated with COPEP.
have excluded) the so-called ‘small’ producers, such as COPEP’s expensive annual membership fee which is $1,000 no matter their annual volume of business.

Additionally, being educated is not a necessary condition for preventing people from acting ‘unethically or dishonestly.’ To argue for this condition would have been a simplistic way to justify the discomfort of experienced producers who had built up their careers ‘in the doing’ toward people with different values who might alter a culture of production in which competition does not exclude collaboration and communication among local producers. Among these different people were both some ‘new’ but also some experienced producers and promoters who indeed behaved in unethical and dishonest ways toward their peers and artists, as recent cases have evidenced as well as a majority of commercial and noncommercial independent producers and promoters who respectfully worked with local artists or produce as volunteers on a local or community-based scale. Some examples of cases that COPEP found unethical or dishonest were:

a) Producing without a license and ‘selling the license’ to non-licensed producers who wanted to produce live-events in which admission fees were required (e.g., COPEP’s allegations about producer Maritza Casiano ‘buying’ producer Peter Cruz’s license to produce a sport event in which she received $1.5 million from public funds; Ayala, 2012a).

In this case, COPEP also implied misuse of money, and recommended an inquiry from the local Department of Justice.

b) Directly relating to the public (which COPEP usually refers to as ‘consumers’) in inconsiderate ways, such as cancelling live-events, informing the public, and returning the admission fee.

No matter how well-planned a live-events production is, the weather conditions, accidents, and other reasons at times may alter the logistics, resulting in sudden cancellations.

c) ‘Stealing’ artists from previous producers or failing to respect the ‘historical relation’ between artists and the first producer who contracted
them to perform locally (e.g., COPEP’s case against SBS for dealing with Argentinean artists Diego Torres and also Marrero Rodríguez, 2010).

Live-events producers had opposite takes on the ‘historical relation,’ which was approved by COPEP’s assembly in 2009. On the one hand, Pepe Dueño and Rafo Muñiz, who developed their careers in the 1980s, note they did not support the idea of the ‘historical relation’ that put the burden on the artists (ibid). Specifically Muñiz, the youngest son of pioneer producer Tommy Muñiz reports,

I have always opposed the historical relation, because unless the artists have signed a contract or verbally agreed to give their local performances to a producer or promoter, they should be free to perform their shows with whom they want to. (ibid, personal translation)

On the other hand, COPEP’s first president Mellado – who developed his career in the 1970s when the pioneer producers were still alive – maintains that without the ‘historical relation’ the public wins while the producers lose. Regarding the particular case of SBS, Mellado claims that it generates “an uneven relationship with the producer because the media can offer dissemination, promotions, interviews” at a lesser or no production cost, which in turn results in cheaper admission tickets (ibid). Mellado agrees with Dueño and Muñiz that artists have a voice on this, but also that there should be an open communication and honest relationship between artists and producers, something that has been constantly deteriorating while the longstanding artists’ star system remains. Mellado is referring to the ‘old school’s’ non-written agreement, part of a culture of production and individual respect that was a kind of non-governmental cultural policy among local professional producers. This debate, however, evidences how the neoliberal values of a much more aggressive laissez faire permeated and challenged the ‘old school’ and their culture of production. Actually, in the case of COPEP versus SBS, the radio network
prevailed after a local judge ruled in favor of SBS. Thus, live-events production in the neoliberal era in Puerto Rico is highly competitive, involving dealing with these opposite views and ‘cannibalistic’ values in which even capitalists collide; this is particular evident when the local state’s justice system is dealing with a new generation of commercial local producers and new corporate producers and sponsors, such as powerful local and transnational media. These cases and similar ones which have been brought against COPEP’s stability and existence have had their ups and downs as seen in local press coverage on these cases, but are still active (Hernández Mercado, 2010; Ayala, 2012b; Correa Velázquez, 2013; Primera Hora, 2013a).

Other issues directly related to the public – such as public safety and safety in staging – still need to be considered much more carefully by COPEP’s educational component. An accident in which scaffolding collapsed while staging the Juegos Centroamericanos y del Caribe Mayagüez 2010 (i.e., Center American and Caribbean Games) and hurt many lighting and stage workers makes it imperative to provide education on safety issues (El Nuevo Díaz, 2010). Moreover, issues of misappropriation or misuse of private or public funds – which may directly affect artists and publics and in which COPEP has conspicuously tried not to intervene – need to be openly discussed in the committees and general assembly (e.g., the case of live-music events producer and promoter Julio César Sanabria who allegedly handed in false invoices of over $30,000 to at least one local municipality; Bauzá, 2013). The case of Sanabria, which I will discuss further in the next section, added to the bad reputation that commercial live-events producers and especially promoters have achieved among local artists and musicians. Yet no journalist nor representatives from COPEP nor the state have attended to the artists’
voices and opinions on this and similar cases. COPEP’s immobility toward the case of Sanabria raised suspicion among artists, musicians and other local producers who started to believe that COPEP served only the interests of the most vocal producers (Personal interview, 2010). Nonetheless, COPEP, I argue, cannot overlook the artists (not exclusively musicians), given that the field of live-events production is also directly connected with opening and sustaining job opportunities for them that in the neoliberal context have proven to be precarious.

In particular, the conditions for musicians and local live-music events producers who work on a translocal scale but are based on the island – along with related services – have worsened in the 2000s after the Latin cultural entertainment industries settled in Miami. Miami, being one of one of the current principal global cities and “the cultural capital of Latin America,” has been studied extensively by cultural studies scholar García-Canclini (1999), followed by Miller & Yúdice (2002), and Yúdice (2003). As live-music events and radio producer Benjamín Muñíz notes,

<table>
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<th>Benjamín Muñíz (BM):</th>
<th>There are artists, famous cases, in which they acknowledge Puerto Rico was fundamental for launching them into the United States’ market, but I believe that has changed and often more Miami, for example, has turned into a center of diffusion while Puerto Rico has been losing its strength. Along with the fact that, well, there are not those structures of the record labels supporting recording anymore and therefore the artists as well. Currently, for instance, we could bring in an artist like [Spanish] Concha Buika last November, and the support from the record label was minimal. […] In terms of the concerts, they are definitely affected.</th>
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Hoy día, por ejemplo, puede venir un artista como [la española] Concha Buika en noviembre del año pasado y el apoyo de la disquera fue mínimo. […] En términos de Hoy día, por ejemplo, puede venir un artista como [la española] Concha Buika en noviembre del año pasado y el apoyo de la disquera fue mínimo. […] En términos de
los conciertos, pues definitivamente se afectan.

ADH: [...] En los 2000 Miami toma el centro.

BM: Sí y tiene que ver con una cuestión de logística, hasta de viajes, no es casualidad, de transportación aérea. O sea, que Puerto Rico en su momento fuera sede de una red importante, por ejemplo, de American [Airlines] y eso pasara a Miami, y todo el desarrollo que se está dando allá, eso es importante. Lo que pasa es que lo que supone para nosotros es otro reto. La pregunta es…: qué pasa con esa otra parte del espectro cultural y musical que aquí llega de forma muy limitada? Y qué tenemos que hacer para tener éxito presentando artistas de esa índole?

(Personal interview, 2011)

Muñiz exposes several characteristics of the local live-music events industry that may resonate with conditions elsewhere – as changes in the recording industry and fields that may seem unrelated such as international transportation – have a direct impact over live-events, how many are produced and where, at what production cost, and in which venues. The apparent unrelated reasons make more sense if seen within the context of changes in multilateral agreements on international trade, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), replaced in 1995 by World Trade Organization (WTO), an organization that pushed liberalization even more into (post)neoliberalization. Even so, Puerto Rico as a neocolony could not participate nor make decisions regarding the GATT nor WTO; thus these multilateral organizations in global cities and the resulting NICL

94 Miller and Yúdice (2002) devoted an entire chapter to the topics on transnational cultural policy that better illustrates the connections between the GATT/WTO multilateral agreements and cultural policy with examples of sovereign countries.
had a subsequent impact over cultural industries in Puerto Rico, particularly over broadcast media, ICTs, recordings, and live-events production and related services (e.g., international transportation which is crucial for an island). Even more important is Muñíz’s concern – which I share – over how the current logistics affect musicians and the diversity of musical groups and artists who perform for local publics. In a globalized context for the industry of live-music events production, the producers’ access and ability to bring in global artists and the publics’ access to their live-music events appear as highly unequal. These are matters that COPEP also could incorporate effectively into its agenda.

COPEP’s functions included the revision of the definitions provided in the scarce previous legislation on live-events in Puerto Rico, for instance related to live-events producers. The association used the power granted by law as a way to delimit membership eligibility. COPEP’s members are live-events producers whose events include an admission charge. Also, as seen in Article 2 of Law 113, this law defines espectáculo público or live event as “public performance”:

...any public event produced for commercial purposes, whether a sung concert, musical performance, dance performance, sport event, comedy or drama which is presented in a coliseum, hotel, convention center, or any other location, whether open or close, private or public, where admission is charged. Those performances organized by nonprofit civilian groups or associations, religious institutions, political parties, or candidates to public office or to reelection to public office, school organizations or those events produced by public corporations of the Commonwealth or by municipal governments shall not be included under this definition. No convention, trade show, meeting or seminar
intended for professionals shall be construed as a public performance. (ibid)

This definition, which differs from the one proposed before the bill became a law, excludes noncommercial which comprises the majority of the live performing arts events on the island and makes mandatory that any kind of live-events producer who sells admission tickets be a member of COPEP. I noticed, however, that while Law 113 explicitly excludes noncommercial live-events producers whom should be somehow acknowledged both by the law and by COPEP, it is not antagonistic toward noncommercial live-events production overall which in fact continues to be held by the state and community-based groups, as I will describe in the next section. Also, the exclusion of conventions, trade shows, and meetings production is highly problematic, as these events in Puerto Rico usually include live-music performances that (1) require the producers to know how to deal with artists and musicians or otherwise hire a live-music events producer or promoter or (2) are produced by people whose companies serve all kinds of events beyond the artistic.

Apart from the functions assigned to COPEP by law, the association also has devoted much of its energies to lobbying for previous or recommended legislation about the entertainment industry and live-events production. For example, the local legislation which COPEP mostly focuses on contains the following laws and their subsequent rules:

a) Law 182 of 1996, also known as Law of Public Events Promoters, which created OSPEP (discussed in this chapter);

b) Law 107 of 1998, which gives people with disabilities a 50% discount on admission tickets to live-events;

c) Law 113 of 2005, which created COPEP (also described in this chapter);
d) Law 65 of 2008 and Law 432 of 2004, which amended Law 108 of 1985 that gives people over 60 years old a 50% discount on admission tickets to live-events produced in state-owned venues (described in Chapter 3); and

e) Law 189 of 2011 and Law 25 of 2005, both amendments to Law 223 of 2004, which obligates state or private producers to reserve “a fair participation” of autochthonous traditional Puerto Rican music artists.

(Colegio de Productores de Espectáculos Públicos de Puerto Rico n.d.b, personal translation)

Interestingly, some other laws directly or indirectly related to the field of live-music events production in Puerto Rico that I mentioned in the previous chapters are not included and made available for COPEP’s members. Among the laws included on the list, the last two and their respective amendments to Laws 108 of 1985 and 223 of 2004 have generated much contention. As I write this chapter, COPEP’s Director and lobbyist are making an open claim to the local House and Senate to reconsider the tickets’ discount to people over 60 years old. This has been a long-term claim that previous and current local governmental administrations have ignored, but COPEP prioritized from the outset with little or no success. Very recent protests – initiated by theater producer Aníbal Rubio who addressed the public at the end of one of his plays staged at the Performing Arts Center and beg for donations and further supported by the local College of Actors – focused press attention on the negative impact of Law 108 on local live-events producers and artists and fueled a heated public discussion between live-events producers and the local state (López, 2014a; NotiCel, 2014; Peña López, 2014). Rubio’s public relations director told the press that in just one of the performances, 96 tickets were granted for free and 113 at half the price, totalling $5,337.50 in losses for the production (ibid). With
the no-show of any of the people who received these tickets, which commonly occurs, their seats could not be re-sold.95

Figure 4.2 shows a woman named Sofía, producer Rubio’s assistant, in a humiliating position provoked by governmental irresponsibility in keeping this law for so long, as I argued before, without consulting all the possible impacted participants. This is a position in which nobody in the live-events production industry would like to be.

COPEP had been criticizing this law for a long time, as can be evidenced from producer Mellado’s tone when I asked him about it:

| JM: [...] en el caso de los espectáculos, lo más significativo que ha hecho el gobierno contra nosotros ha sido la Ley 108, que no ha venido a ayudarnos, sino al revés. Porque ayudarnos sería que el gobierno | JM: [...] in terms of live events, the most significant thing that the government has done against us is Law 108, which did not help us, on the contrary. Because helping us would be that the government assumes |

95 Live-events producers will not know until very last minute, on the same day and often hours before, the quantity of tickets given away for free or at half price due to the Law 108 of 1985 (López 2014b).
COPEP intervened and lobbied at the Puerto Rico’s Supreme Court to declare the unconstitutionality of Law 108, but did not succeed (Acevedo Denis, 2014). COPEP did succeed, however, in convincing the House to amend Law 108 and raise the age of applicability for the discounts back to 65 years and establish 10% for the venue’s capacity limit that can be used for the public benefited by the law (Gómez, 2014). This amendment did pass in the Senate, which agreed to raise the age limit to 65 in order to get a 50% ticket discount and to eliminate all the free tickets (Banucci, 2014). While COPEP and the local College of Actors celebrated this measure by the Senate, it seems to me a bittersweet victory that proves only once more how producing public policy within the context of bipartisanship works: it is a rushed process that does not take into account all possible voices and swings every four years. In my opinion, the issue was not about taking benefits away from the elderly that another governmental administration had given to them. Rather, it was about knowing once and for all how the live-events production industry works and what will be the impact for all the social actors in the industry so that it becomes a priority for this sector that – despite governmental cultural inaction and
weakness – it evolves into a source of valuable creative and artistic cultural work in Puerto Rico.

As I write this dissertation, COPEP’s lawyers and lobbyist said they plan to make an appeal to the U.S. Federal Court in Boston that has jurisdiction over this neocolonial state (Cordero, 2014). COPEP is also currently developing a related project on public subsidies for live-events production, specifically to include a 75% tax credit for losses caused by Law 108 (i.e., P.S. 184 of 2013; Primera Hora, 2013b). In the past, COPEP also lobbied to pass projects related to Puerto Rican composers and musicians that go through the motions of amending Law 223 (i.e., P.C. 4136 and P.C.4135 both of 2007; COPEP, n.d.b.). Law 223 has been another contentious law dealing with the relation of commercial producers and promoters directly with the state, specifically with the ICP and local municipalities, noncommercial and community-based producers, and musicians, as I will illustrate in the Part 2 of the discussion on neoliberalism in the next chapter.

4.3 Conclusion

| Es un negocio complicado.       | This is a complicated business.  |
| Ni siquiera los que estamos en él sabemos obviamente todo, ni mucho menos… | Not even do we know obviously everything about it, by no means… |
| Benjamín Múñiz, productor | Benjamín Múñiz, producer |
| (Personal interview, 2011) | (Personal interview, 2011) |

Evaluating the current logics and practices of local live-music events producers can be complicated precisely because their work varies from one to another, has

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96 COPEP has also been subjected to recent investigation proposed by Representative Carlos Vargas-Ferrer, who took on the idea of “promoting the spectacle industry,” allegedly without previous connection to COPEP (El Nuevo Día, 2013). Suspicious by this unsolicited will toward a long-term ignored industry by the local government, and worried about some misconceptions on the logics and practices of local live-events producers affiliated to COPEP, the association’s current president producer Tony Mojena accepted to meet Vargas (Guzmán, 2013). This issue did not get much public attention besides a couple of press articles.
developed ‘in the making’ since the early years (as discussed in Chapter 2), and strongly depends on the cultural circuits in which they flow and the character of their organizations (e.g., whether they are commercial or noncommercial), among other differences. In this chapter, I focused on commercial producers and how the neoliberal turn that governmental cultural policy took made them vulnerable within the context of a much more aggressive and global neoliberalism. On the one hand, this context was evidenced in the local state – already debilitated by its own neoliberal policies and bipartisan politics – that also started to abandon its responsibilities toward governmental cultural action and the maintenance of state-owned venues. On the other hand, as the interviews demonstrated, changes in the global entertainment industry that started to concentrate live as well as recorded music production in specific ‘global cities’ such as Miami where most of the Latin cultural entertainment industries moved. In this chapter, I described how the working conditions of local commercial live-music events producers altered, since only a few commercial producers were able to work at a global level while the majority circumscribed local and translocal circuits of live-music events production with local or international artists that in turn impacted the publics and the tickets’ costs. A fact about the participation of local commercial producers in these circuits, as I will also comment in the next chapter on noncommercial producers, is that producers manage these links themselves without taking the state in count, a practice that can be seen as a challenge to the neocolonial state.

The globalization of the field also saw the emergence of new actors, such as global live-music events production firms, global administrators of state and private venues, and other TNCs that the local state in Puerto Rico partnered with to preserve
previous facilities and construct new venues. I explored these partnerships through the case of SMG. This case, as discussed here, fueled contention between the state and local commercial and noncommercial private producers who looked toward the state for recognition as a professional class in order to prevent the negative impact that they foresaw these partnerships would provoke in the local field. As explained in this chapter, these actions transformed the field as producers themselves asked the government to regulate their professional practice, resulting in the creation of both OSPEP, a governmental service office for emitting licenses for the producers, and COPEP, a professional college or professional association of producers. COPEP, described in-depth in this chapter, was also formed to end what commercial producers understood as unethical and undesirable practices by some new producers who were not necessarily following the culture of production that the pioneer producers developed that utilized a ‘softer’ commercial practice incompatible with neoliberalization. I presented the case of COPEP as a challenge not only to the state’s inactivity towards cultural policy on live-events, but also to the processes of neoliberalization in which collective organization of any kind is not favored. What is preferred within this context is a set of neoliberal tendencies and professional habits that some producers – even within the commercial scene – were not necessarily willing to follow or see in new professionals.

I closed the chapter with a revision of COPEP’s lobbying that has generated contention among the producers, artists, and the publics. Laws 108 and 223 dealing with discounted tickets for the elderly and a minimum of autochthonous traditional Puerto Rican live-music in state-sponsored events, respectively, were some of the examples that I commented on critically. Law 223 brings to the field another dimension of new
relationships among private producers, promoters, and the state vis-à-vis musicians and noncommercial live-events producers (which I will discuss in the next chapter) and in the second part of the assessment of the field in the (post)neoliberal era.
## 5.1 Introduction

| [E]l Instituto de Cultura como tal… ya casi no tiene vigencia. Los empleados del Instituto hacen lo que pueden con lo poco que tienen para mantener unos grupos que están realmente marginados y les dan un apoyo pequeño, pero el Instituto no tiene recursos ya. Incluso, los Centros Culturales, que fueron el logro mayor del Instituto, porque los Centros Culturales eran organizaciones autónomas que organizaban festivales, también esa gente se ha quedado sin auspicio porque la economía está tan y tan mal y los pequeños comercios han perdido tanto que ya no pueden apenas apoyar… |
| Roy Brown, cantante  
(Entrevista personal, 2011) |
| [T]he ICP as such… is no longer valid. Its employees do what they can with the little they have to maintain some groups that are really marginalized and give them a little support, but the ICP does not have the resources anymore. Also, the Cultural Centers, which were the principal achievement of the ICP because they were autonomous organizations that produced festivals, those people have also been left without sponsorship because the economy is so bad, and the small businesses have lost so much that they cannot afford to sponsor… |
| Roy Brown, singer  
(Personal interview, 2011, personal translation) |

| El Instituto se ha desmantelado, se ha caído, supuestamente ya no es ni una sombra de lo que era. /…/ Eso fue en su momento. El gobierno, pues como no respalda a la cultura como tal… Antes [en el ICP] había 320 empleados, ahora hay 112, que le quitaron más del 50% del presupuesto, pero mientras más tratan de esquincear –como dice el jíbaro– la cultura, pues más crece porque entonces queda en manos de los artesanos, de los trovadores, de los músicos. […] pero nada, la cultura cada vez está más viva y se están haciendo más cosas y hay mucha gente voluntaria… |
| Aníbal Rodríguez Vera  
Vicepresidente y miembro del Comité Organizador de las Fiestas de la Calle San Sebastián, retirado del ICP  
(Entrevista personal, 2011) |
| The ICP has been dismantled, it has come down, and supposedly it is no longer what it was. /…/ That was in its moment. The government, since it does not support the culture as such… Before, the ICP had 320 employees, now there is 112, they took 50% of its budget, but the more they try to corner – as the jíbaro says – the culture, the more it grows because it is left in the hands of the artisans, the troubadours, and the musicians. […] culture is even more alive each time and things are being done and there are lots of volunteers… |
| Aníbal Rodríguez-Vera  
Vice President and member of the steering committee that produces the San Sebastián Street Fests, retired from the ICP  
(Personal interview, 2011, personal translation) |

These two instances among local cultural producers represent the mixed feelings about the role of the state in relation to artistic production overall in Puerto Rico, especially a year after the local administration of Governor Luis Fortuño declared a state of emergency and implemented an even more aggressive post-neoliberal plan that
resulted in thousands of dismissals and budgetary cuts in the public sector and had a significantly negative impact on the private sector (Law 7 of 2009). On the one hand, local cultural producers acknowledge the role that the ICP used to play in fomenting artistic initiatives, including the support of the cultural centers as live-events producers, while on the other they admit that the ICP is no longer the key institution in state-sponsored production that it once was. They blame both the local government for dismantling the ICP and the decaying economy for limiting state as well as local small commercial sponsorship. However pessimistic these positions may sound, they show traces of a slight optimism which asserts that the ICP is still active – though at a lesser degree – and that its employees are doing “what they can with the little they have;” one might also find evidence of a much more challenging optimism that celebrates vivid cultural production in the hands of artists and volunteers despite governmental inactivity.

In this chapter, I will utilize on-site interviews and observations in regard to three non-commercial community-based live-music events (i.e., a festival and two fests) and a carnival produced by a municipality; these methodologies and subsequent findings will address: 1) how noncommercial live-events production is planned in relation to the state and specific municipalities; 2) how noncommercial producers relate to other commercial producers, artists and musicians; and 3) how noncommercial producers deal with state or private sponsorship. Law 223 of 2004, which is administered by the ICP, will serve as a common denominator for many of the interviews with musicians, since this legislation is fresh in their minds after a year-long series of protests against governmental amendments to the law. This law intends to obligate the municipalities to “preserve fair participation”
of exponents of Puerto Rican music for live-music events in which the municipalities contribute $10,000 or more (Law 223 of 2004).

In addition to shedding light on the relationship between the state and producers, each of the live-music events observed speak to a particular set of questions related to the politics of cultural difference that concerns ethnicity, religion, class, (neo)colonialism, power, and the politics of space. Moreover, I will argue that there is a neocolonial dimension to neoliberalization – and conversely – that can be exemplified through live-music events production vis-à-vis the state in Puerto Rico, particularly through artistic flow and musicians’ participation in local, regional, and translocal cultural networks that are seldom negotiated with the local state or the U.S. empire.

5.2 New relationships between noncommercial live-events producers, the state and local municipalities

Far from being new actors in the live-events production scene in Puerto Rico, though clearly and historically unacknowledged, noncommercial live-events and music events producers organize over 500 community-based events such as festivals, carnivals, patron-saint fests and other kinds of events all over the island that take place mostly in open-air and state-owned venues located in particular municipalities at different intervals of time (e.g., annually or biannually, weekly, during weekends, on a single-day or multiple weekends in a yearly calendar, and subsequent combinations) (Senado de Puerto Rico, 2005, 134). Of these events, approximately 150 are cultural festivals produced by cultural centers in which live-music performances coexist with artisanship fairs and gastronomy (ibid, 135, personal translation). The live-music events usually range from
four to six group performances of local and locally-based international artists each day, whose shows often run from daytime to late in the evening.

This vivid noncommercial and community-based live-events production scene contrasts with the context of an ultra weak ICP, whose responsibility for doing state-sponsored cultural events was diluted and diffused throughout the municipalities, which are fertile terrain for party politics as well as for political controversy. The municipal governments need to maintain a certain local order required to complement the central state. At the same time, they are not exempt from the political, economic and social impact of the processes of neoliberalization that affect the central state. Therefore, the live-events production celebrated in local municipalities – that more or less receives support from the municipal government – is also predisposed to political, economic and sociocultural friction. The cases presented in this chapter and their particularities exemplify how this friction takes shape midst the logistics and practices of producing noncommercial live-events.

5.2.1 Observing noncommercial community-based live-music events production

![Figure 5.1. Jayuya’s Cultural Center (Photo by author)](image)
A veces alquilamos la tarima. Otras veces la preparamos nosotros mismos con ayuda del Municipio, porque son los que tienen los trabajadores verdad, porque a mí, a nosotros se nos hace difícil salir de nuestros trabajos a hacer todo lo que hay que hacer. Si no fuera por la ayuda del Municipio, que también la podemos solicitar, muchas cosas se son complicarían un poco. Esto sería solamente por la noche después de salir de trabajar. Todos trabajamos, sí. Es algo voluntario, pero como nos gusta, pues sarna con gusto no pica.

Félix González  
Miembro del Comité Timón del Festival Nacional Indígena, Centro Cultural Jayuyano  
(Entrevista personal, 2010)

Some times we rent the stage. Others times we construct it ourselves with help from the Municipality, because they are the ones that have the workers, right, because for me, for us it is difficult to get away from our jobs to do all that needs to be done. If it were not for the help from the Municipality, which we can also request, lots of things would get more complicated. The work would need to be done only in the evenings after work. We all work, yes. This is something voluntary, but since we like it, we do not mind.

Félix González  
Member of the steering committee of Jayuya’s National Indigenous Festival, Jayuya’s Cultural Center  
(Personal interview, 2010, personal translation)

Félix González’s optimism is an oasis in the middle of a tense atmosphere in 2010 Puerto Rico. His profile is similar to that of other noncommercial live-events producers whom I met during fieldwork, that is: active or retired professionals who volunteer in their ‘spare time.’ For example, during the day, González works as a mathematics teacher in one of the public schools and as a university professor in the Municipality of Jayuya, in the very core of Puerto Rico’s mountains. And in the evening, he serves as a volunteer for the Centro Cultural Jayuyano Alberto Suárez, officially a nonprofit organization (i.e., Jayuya’s Cultural Center; see Figure 5.1). Jayuya’s Cultural Center – led by a Board and comprised of a group of vocals and two assessors – is in charge of the only National Indigenous Festival on the island (i.e. the Festival Nacional Indígena de Jayuya); this festival has been held annually since 1969, around the time of the November holiday, Discovery of Puerto Rico. Jayuya’s Cultural Center is one of the few that survived the
cultural massacre after the governmental administration of Governor Fortuño passed the neoliberal Law 7 of 2009, cutting half the personnel of the ICP along with many other public agencies and corporations. ICP’s Cultural Promotion and Popular Arts Program (CPPAP), a mediator between artists and community-based cultural centers, was one of the most affected, being assigned more responsibilities with less of a budget and personnel. As seen in the previous chapter, the CPPAP has regional representatives throughout the island, often sharing space with affiliated cultural centers like Jayuya’s. In the late 1990s, 84 local cultural centers were affiliated with the ICP on the island and four in the United States (Acosta Figueras, 2000, 38). According to a current representative of the CPPAP, “a cultural center that may have been assigned an annual budget of $30,000 in the 1990s, now miraculously could get $5,000” (Personal interview, 2011, personal translation). In the 1990s, “there were cultural plazas in every municipality, with a budget of half a million dollars for a single program, but now our Program is granted too little,” the CPPAP representative added (ibid, personal translation). 97 Due to Law 7, the CPPAP lost its representatives in the Central, Southern, and Eastern regions of the island and was left with representatives only in Mayagüez (West), Hatillo (North-Northwest), and Jayuya (Central-Northwest) (ibid). The government cut the personnel and the budget but not the bureaucracy which requires the cultural centers to submit annual reports and proof of cultural events to be able to receive this $5000, in the best of conditions. Thus, the cultural centers needed to prove they were active within an inactive government.

In the last quarter of 2010, I initiated my fieldwork before this unfavorable climate for governmental and community-based cultural production came to be. This

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97 The changes started to be more evident after 1992, the same year the administration of Governor Hernández-Colón spent millions of dollars to present a booth on Puerto Rico in the Universal Exposition of Seville in Spain (i.e., Expo Sevilla ’92).
fieldwork coincided with the first ‘anniversary’ of Law 7 and with subsequent daily protests against similar neoliberal policies. These protests took many forms: massive rallies by multi-syndicated and independent groups along with individual public opposition expressed to Governor Fortuño against Law 7; massive marches against the construction of a gas pipeline and its negative environmental impact; and a three month, international-resonating UPR student strike against raises in tuition fees with another about to start, among other expressions of outrage over what activists accurately framed as abuses to human rights (Diálogo Digital, 2010; Primera Hora, 2009; Primera Hora, 2010a and 2010b; see Figures 5.2 and 5.3). Such tensions were palpable virtually everywhere and live-events were no exception, as evidenced when a group of athletes raised a picket sign at the Central American and Caribbean Games in Mayagüez (Claridad, 2010; see Figure 5.4). I was expecting similar opposition at the National Indigenous Festival that was eventually manifested by the musicians. In this context, I was optimistic when I arrived at my first observation site and met enthusiastic volunteers like González who were bringing together massive audiences with no fear of backlash (as conservatives would have had) and were proud to be producing the 41st edition of Jayuya’s National Indigenous Festival with little or no governmental support.

Figure 5.2. March against a gas pipeline construction in 2010 (Photo: Ricardo Alcaraz Díaz, Diálogo)
5.2.1.1 Producing Jayuya’s National Indigenous Festival

The National Indigenous Festival is produced by the Board of the Cultural Center and a comité timón (i.e., a steering committee) that comprises 12 people from different backgrounds and neighborhoods in Jayuya, mostly professionals. González, for instance,
was part of the steering committee and in transition to becoming president of the Board the subsequent year. Both he and the then president, Ludgeria Colón-Pabón, report that the planning process of the Festival started a year ahead in November or December, right after finishing each edition (Personal interviews, 2011). They also both agree that evaluating each festival is imperative to assessing the reaction of the public whose attendance ranges from 50,000 to 70,000 each year (ibid). The public that usually attends the Festival includes people of all ages and not necessarily residents of Jayuya or Puerto Rico; most hail from the central region of the island. As Colón-Pabón says,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Posterior al festival nos reunimos una semana y ahí la gente, como ya nos conoce, nos dice “mira Ludgeria no me gustó”. No funcionó tal cosa. […]</th>
<th>A week after the Festival we meet and there, since the people already know us, they say “look Ludgeria, I do not like it.” This thing did not work. […]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Y [en] hojas de asistencia al que nos visita al Centro y ahí a veces escriben sus comentarios, pero también la gente del pueblo, “mira esto estuvo bien chévere, esto no”. […]</td>
<td>And people leave notes on the attendance sheets at the Center, but also the people from Jayuya write, “look, this was nice, this was not.” […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y como te dije, el escuchar y a veces decimos “mira esto este año no gustó mucho, vamos a ver cómo podemos mejorar”. Siempre se evalúa el Festival de esa manera, una reunión después del Festival entre los miembros de la Junta y el comité de organización y ahí decimos “mira escuché esto, escuché”, siempre pues, de ahí partimos para el próximo a ver cómo podemos mejorar. […]</td>
<td>And as I told you, listening and sometimes saying “this year people did not like this, let us see how we can improve that.” We always assess the Festival this way, with a meeting after the Festival with the Board members and the organizing committee and then we say, “I heard this, heard…,” always, from there we see how we can improve the next year. […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Entrevista personal, 2011)</td>
<td>(Personal interview, 2011, personal translation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Then, usually in January – as I draw from the interviews – the Board and the steering committee meet again and start a new series of planning that include in the following specific order though sometimes overlapping:
1) Updating all the official and legal documentation to be able to operate the Cultural Center and request public funds (e.g., permits and endorsements from the local public departments of State, Health, Labor, Municipal property taxes a.k.a. the CRIM, the Treasury, and some others);

2) Writing proposals for public and private (mainly commercial) sponsorship (e.g., addressed to the CPPAP, a Special Joint Commission on Legislative Funds a.k.a. Donativos Legislativos), the legislators (i.e., senators and representatives who are supposed to serve this municipality), the PRIDCO, the Municipality of Jayuya, and local small businesses in Jayuya);

3) Developing the annual theme or concept for the Festival, always related to the Tainos (e.g., in 2010 the theme was Taino women); this task is done parallel to writing the proposals and continues while these are sent out;

4) Sending out calls for local public schools to participate in many ways during the Festival, such as by participating in poetry, short story and drawing contests or in the Taino queen pageant (both the child and youth queen) or by selling traditional food and all kinds of beverages in two kiosks that the steering committee reserve for both the middle and the high schools graduating classes so they can raise funds and compete for the best decorated kiosk; this task includes the revision of works submitted to the contests;

5) Designing the stage decoration and mapping out the zones in which the stage, the kiosks, and the concurrent artisanship fair will be (see Figure 5.5); this task includes selecting lighting and sound companies; and

Figure 5.5. Singer Lenny Jeannette Adorno performs in the National Indigenous Festival’s stage (Photo by author)
6) Revising and selecting proposals sent – mostly by email or fax – by artists and music groups interested in performing in the Festival.  

Figure 5.6 demonstrates my map of how I understand Jayuya’s Cultural Center manages this Festival and which social actors are included. For instance, the Cultural Center is at the top, but extends out to five groups, each representative of a particular relationship (e.g., the promoters, the central government, musicians, sponsors, and the municipality). I will discuss sponsorship and the relations with musician and promoters in a separate comparative section. In terms of the relationship between the producers of this Festival and the central state (i.e., through the ICP’s CPPAP) within the context of neocolonial neoliberalism, the ICP still attempts to reach the cultural centers but needs to reinvent its approach from a kind of ‘cultural production coach’ (i.e., an advisory role, as developed by Alegría) into an almost broken sponsor that still prioritizes noncommercial community-based cultural production. As the Director of the CPPAP explains,

| Nosotros reunimos a los centros culturales de todos los pueblos afectados por la Ley 7, los reunimos y decidimos que todas las peticiones las hagan directamente a nosotros. Si hay algún ente cultural, nos llaman, queremos hacer tal cosa, analizamos la situación y le damos el dinero porque, pues, tratamos de abarcar toda la isla. |
| El Instituto siempre ha demostrado que con poco se puede hacer mucho. Se llega, se llega… |
| Carmen Martínez Maldonado |

| We met with the cultural centers affected by Law 7 in all the municipalities, and decided that all petitions should be made directly to our office. If there is any cultural organization, they call us, if we want to do this thing, we analyze the situation and give them the money, because we try to cover the whole island. |
| The ICP has demonstrated that it can do much with less. We reach out, we do… |
| Carmen Martínez-Maldonado Director, Cultural Promotion and Popular |

98 Other aspects related to the logistics and planning, as observed during the four days of the event, include a master of ceremonies (MC) who conducts an opening protocol in which the leader of the steering committee gives a brief speech. The MC, commonly from Jayuya, is also in charge of presenting all the artists and music groups that perform on stage. The processes of staging and dismantling the stage and of doing lights and sound occur a week before and after the Festival.
What is unique about this Festival in comparison with the others observed is that the Municipality of Jayuya does not intervene with direct sponsorship or any decision-making process related to the theme, the artists and musicians hired, or other planning component. In 2010, when I observed the Festival, Jayuya’s Mayor Jorge I. González Otero did not even participate in the opening ceremony, but his picture and special message appeared in a full-color page in the Festival’s program which was printed and sold by the Cultural Center in the Festival for a contribution that ranged from $1 to $3. Instead, a representative from the Municipal Assembly participated in the opening ceremony and read a public announcement that officially declared the days between November 19 and 21, 2010 as the dates of the Festival (see Appendix E). In that announcement, the Mayor González-Otero also encouraged “other guaitiaos from neighbor yucayeques” to attend the Festival, as if he were the leader of an indigenous reservation (Centro Cultural Jayuyano, 2010, 3).99 The current relationship between the municipality and the Cultural Center resides in a significant in-kind contribution from the Municipality of Jayuya that ranges from construction material to building the stage (e.g., wood, painting, etc.) as well as the personnel who eventually build the stage. Also, the municipality owns the venue, which is the town center’s plaza. The steering committee does not rent the plaza; therefore that is also part of the municipality’s contribution to the Festival. As González says, borrowing the plaza used to generate contention with the municipal administration, but not any more:

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99 Guaitiao and yucayeque are Taíno words. Guaitiao means friends or groups with solidarity bonds. Yucayeque means land, usually yucca plantations, but used to symbolize villages overall.
Even though the Cultural Center sustains a cordial relationship with the current administration, the municipality no longer sponsors any part of the Festival other than the venue and the stage, and even that depends largely on bipartisan swings and budgetary cuts.

Another particularity of this Festival is an obvious one, considering its name: the strong racial and ethnic component of Taíno mixed with national reaffirmation, intended as such since the early stages of planning. This is also as a priority of the Cultural Center, which takes from Jayuya’s archaeological importance in terms of the Taíno culture to claim “the Taíno legacy” in a way that I have not yet seen in any other town. The archaeological – as well as geological and historical transcendence – is not unique to
Jayuya; these are characteristics of the Caribbean region overall. In Puerto Rico, for instance, Jayuya’s neighbor municipalities of Ponce and Utuado have materialized the legacy of their Taíno along with their Iñeri predecessors (i.e., the igneri or saladoides), but have done so through ceremonial parks that operate basically as museums, such as Tibes and Caguana respectively. In Colón-Pabón’s presidential message in the Festival’s program, she says,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cada Festival Nacional Indígena en Jayuya significa el rescate de nuestra cultura, auscultar en nuestra historia taina y conocer sobre nuestros antepasados. El recordar nuestra cultura nos hace reflexionar sobre la importancia del legado taino en la actualidad. El Festival Indígena es una celebración donde coloreamos nuestra plaza pública con las raíces que definen nuestra cultura, la taina… […]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Each National Indigenous Festival in Jayuya means the rescue of our culture, to revise our Taíno legacy and know about our ancestors. Remembering our culture makes us reflect on the current importance of the Taíno legacy. The Indigenous Festival is a celebration where we paint our public plaza with the roots that define our culture, the Taíno… […]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Centro Cultural Jayuyano, 2010, 6)

Colón-Pabón’s words are full of cultural meaning representative of the atmosphere that I observed during the Festival related to the Taíno legacy, for example in the stage and kiosks’ decoration, the symbols on the stage, the printed material and artisanship, the contests’ theme and the opening ceremony’s script, and finally the dance performances. These Taíno symbols were often mixed with references to the puertorriqueñidad, mostly through musicians, who may have not necessarily represented the ideas of the Cultural Center. Apart from the live-music performances that dominate the artistic offerings of the Festival and have nothing to do with making direct reference to the Taíno legacy (as I will expand upon in a subsequent section), the performances by the Banda Indígena (i.e.,

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100 The Caguana Ceremonial Park is owned and administered by the ICP. After Law 7, it was left almost abandoned and without employees, but it reopened in 2011 (Pagán Rivera, 2011).
a group of young and young adult dancers who practice all year long in the Cultural Center) are among the most attended artistic presentations and repeated every day at different moments (see Figures 5.7 and 5.8, also 5.9). Their dances are charged with ethnic and cultural meanings, and represent the batú – a ball game – as well as other rituals associated with the Taínos.¹⁰¹ These are of course racialized performances, but they also reflect live-public recreational events that were prohibited and almost extinguished by Spanish colonization, as historian Picó narrates, as well as the way colonization has imposed new practices of differentiation and civilization that have altered our everyday culture – from the ways we eat, dress, and treat each other to the ways we gather at live-public events (Picó, 2006, 2009).¹⁰²

Figure 5.7. The Banda Indígena during a live-public performance at Jayuya’s National Indigenous Festival, 2010 (Photo by Author)

¹⁰¹ Historian Picó refers to the batú as similar to the contemporary soccer (Picó, 2006, 2009).
¹⁰² This was also common to Native Americans in the United States, as seen in John W. Troutman’s study on the attempts of the U.S. government to control live-public performances and practices of music on reservations and in Native singers, dancers, and musicians at Indian boarding schools (Troutman, 2009).
If seen out of context – without considering Spanish colonialism’s negative impact on indigenous cultures locally and the region nor the conspicuous dismantling of national culture and state support for anything that challenges governmental ideological authority in Puerto Rico – Colón-Pabón’s words and the Festival may be reduced to political essentialism. This Festival, however, is organized with strong educational, reflexive and performative components that historically have challenged the context of neocolonialism and the politics of differentiation in Puerto Rico, where both political administrations in power have tried to erase the national cultural identity and covered up racial and ethnic
differences. Nevertheless, notions of “the white man” and the “encounter of two races,”
that were mentioned repeatedly in the opening ceremony (mostly in the Taíno queens’
pageant) are problematic for me, not because of the ethnic claim vis-à-vis the colonizers
per sé, but because of the absence of a public recognition of the African legacy beyond
the actual moment of the invasion (not encounter) in which Spanish conquerors meet the
Taíno; another problem lies in the way colonialism focuses on Spanish without
referencing U.S. neocolonialism and thereby further challenges national culture and
ethnic differences. This is how I see it, along with my questions about the representation
of power and gender relations among the Taínos and the colonizers that cannot be
dismissed as well, yet have no intention at all of imposing concepts on things nor the
producers of the Festival. I was shocked by a comment by one of the artisans who
participated in the Festival as part of the artisanship fair, who stood at my side while I
observed the Banda Indígena. He said, “hay mucho bullshit, pero también hay algo
rescatable” [“there is a lot of bullshit, but there is also something that could be rescued]
which says a lot about how the public could make sense of the performativity of the live
events, without disregarding their historical and educational value, particularly within the
context of neocolonial neoliberalism.

5.2.1.2 Producing Loíza’s Patron-Saint Fests

…[S]iempre hacemos como una
convocatoria, verdad, solicitando a las
personas que quieran trabajar en el comité.
[…] Es durante la misa, empezamos más o
menos con un tiempo aproximado antes de
empezar las reuniones del Comité. Hay
gente ahí que ha estado desde el primer
año, hace 30 años atrás, por lo menos ahí

…[W]e always make a call, right, asking
for the people interested in working in the
committee. […] It is during the mass, more
or less before the meetings start. There are
people who have been on the committee
since the first year, 30 years ago, at least
we are there. In the first years we were shy,
and behind the rest, then, others have left
estamos nosotras dos, quedamos nosotras
dos. En los primeros años nosotras éramos
cobitos, quedamos detrás de los demás,
entonces pues, las otras personas de los
otros años se han ido, la mayoría todavía
está ahí, pero ya hay gente que está más
recogida y no… porque estoy, verdad, hay
que trabajar duro.

Milagros Santiago Dávila
Presidenta del Comité Timón
de las Fiestas Patronales de Loíza
(Entrevista personal, 2011)

the committee, although the majority is still
there, but less involved than I am…
because we have to work hard.

Milagros Santiago-Dávila
President, Steering Committee
Loíza’s Patron-Saint Fests
(Personal interview, 2011)

The *Fiestas Religiosas Culturales en Honor a San Patricio de Loíza* (i.e., Loíza’s Patron-Saint Fests honoring Saint Patrick) are a variation of a specific form of annual live-events – that is the patron-saint fests – which lasts from three to nine days and is held in the town center’s *plaza*. The concept of the Fests is framed by the legend of San Patrick of Ireland, but adapted to an ‘African Saint Patrick of Ireland’ as a reaffirmation of African legacy which underlies the Fests and most of the activities in Loíza (see Figure 5.10). As I mentioned in Chapter 2, the patron-saint fests have historically combined the binomial power of the Catholic Church and empire. In the case of Loíza, however, this variation of the patron-saint fests has taken a community-based turn in contention with different social actors, such as the municipality in which the central state has delegated responsibilities, the community which is divided by regions, and sometimes even the organizing committee and the church. The Fests are produced by a steering committee which makes an open call to the public during a catholic mass, since the town church is the main producer of this live event. Unlike Jayuya’s Cultural Center, the estimated date in which the steering committee starts to plan the next year’s fests is contingent on the availability of the steering committee members and other parochial activities. The steering committee is
composed of one priest and 18 volunteers connected with the town church who are mainly retired but also include some active professionals.

“...este Padre que era puertorriqueño, que era amante de la cultura y defendía su cultura, nos fue metiendo, verdad, en la cabeza para celebrar las Fiestas y por eso se llaman religiosas culturales, pues porque no queremos que se pierda parte de la cultura, como ha pasado con otras fiestas.

(Entrevista personal, 2011)
are held in a neighborhood different from Loíza’s town center, known as Medianía Alta, home to another major church there (i.e., the Saint James the Apostole Church). Even though the people from the town center and Medianía Alta are geographically separated, they both hold a certain animosity toward each other that I perceived in many on-site interviews. The animosity could have emerged from what a member of the steering committee describes as “an unequal treatment” from the Municipality of Loíza toward the town center church and the Patron-Saint Fests vis-à-vis the Traditional Fests in Medianía Alta (Personal interview, 2011, personal translation). Despite both of these fests being devoted to catholic saints, the steering committee has deliberately decided to keep the Patron-Saint Fests as distinct as possible from the Traditional Fest. As Santiago-Dávila evidences,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>La de nosotros, siendo de la iglesia, se distinguen, no se venden bebidas alcohólicas durante las fiestas, siempre son no máximo de dos kioscos que son de la parroquia que podamos atender y lo que se vende es, pues, comidas típicas, refrescos, jugos, por esa parte no hay máquinas, no hay picas, no hay nada de esto que es lo que trae los problemas, hasta ahora hoy día. […] No hay picas ni nada, ese es el origen de esta fiesta.</th>
<th>Our Fests, since they are religious, are different: we do not sell alcohol, we have a maximum of two kiosks run by the parishioners and what we sell is, well, traditional foods, sodas, juices, because of that we do not need amusement rides or games of chance and gambling, nothing of that which brings problems, until today. […] That is the origin of these Fests.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Entrevista personal, 2011)</td>
<td>(Personal interview, 2011, personal translation)</td>
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Certainly religious beliefs play out in these politics of differentiation used by the steering committee, which give the Patron-Saint Fests a small and simple character.

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103 Loíza’s region of Piñones is also often in friction with the municipality for an apparent distance demonstrated by the municipal administration toward this region. But mostly for an evident series of confrontations between the municipality and residents of Piñones who have historically resisted and opposed the construction of major hotels and global tourism chains in the region.
versus the traditional Fests that represent exactly the opposite. In fact, the steering committee’s emphasis on calling the Fests “religious and cultural” resides with this distinction as well as with a broader differentiation vis-à-vis the ordinary patron-saint fests produced in any other municipality in Puerto Rico. The ordinary patron-saint fests usually last nine days, appeal to a general and secular public, and include amusement rides (a.k.a. *machinas*) and games of chance and gambling in the form of kiosks (a.k.a. *picas*) with mechanical horse racing and other games prohibited in any other context but the fests (Law 25 of 1927). The *picas* and the *machinas* are operated by private companies that have been highly controversial, as they directly charge the public and often pay back the municipalities or the private producers and promoters in a variety of ways which are not always transparent. In this context – and also considering the amusement rides also represent a safety issue that results in more production costs and insurances – I understand why the steering committee wants to stay away from these responsibilities.

In terms of logistics, the size and reach of the Fests do not exempt the Catholic Church from its responsibilities as a producer in relation to other social actors. As seen in Figure 5.11, Loíza’s Patron-Saint Fests’ production responsibilities are delegated solely to the steering committee which is in charge of the vendors (i.e., only two kiosks) and reaches out to the sponsorship and musicians on the one hand and to Loíza’s Cultural Center on the other. As the Cultural Center’s Board president Laura Meléndez explains, the Center passes along the steering committee’s petition to the ICP (Personal interview, 2011). The ICP gives a $5,000 sponsorship, but instead of sending it directly to the Cultural Center or the steering committee itself the ICP assigns these funds to the
Municipality of Loíza which in turn creates a city ordinance to assign it to the Cultural Center and therefore to the committee (Ibid). Even though contributing to the Patron-Saint Fests is the principal activity of the Cultural Center, its Board needs to pass through this evidently exaggerated and time consuming level of bureaucracy in order to help the town church located across the street.  

Although the steering committee understands their work as a contribution from the church to the municipality, the Municipality of Loíza does not directly sponsor the event, except for lending the town plaza and its gazebo and providing public security through the Municipal Police. But getting the gazebo or glorieta is not always guaranteed, as it depends much on the political party in power. Before celebrating the Fests in the plaza, the church used to close a small street between the plaza and the church, and all activities were held there. Supposedly, as a member of the committee relates, the committee did not get the permits of use because “they cook fritters in the kiosks and that could damage the floor” (Personal interview, 2011) “There were all ridiculous excuses, all lies” (Ibid). Another member of the steering committee tried to explain why the municipality would limit the Fests and said that,

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104 As Santiago-Dávila says, Loíza’s Cultural Center is historically connected to the town church and the Patron-Saint Fests, since it was ‘rescued’ and reactivated with the help of the same priest that recommended the celebration of the Fests (Personal interview, 2011).
What makes this case unique is the particular combination of party and religious politics – in addition to the animosity between churches – that all generate contention, as I noted in the previous quote. The friction was evident at every stage of the production process, from the steering committee’s organizational meeting (to which I was granted access) to the staging itself. Moreover, I observed that generational differences play a role within the steering committee, as senior members have developed a habitual hierarchy. Fortunately, the steering committee has been able to manage these differences, procure the plaza and the gazebo, and produce a three-day event without major problems other than pouring rain (See Figure 5.12 and Appendix F). The Mayor Eddie M. Manso-Fuentes attended the inaugural mass with his wife and delivered a message at the opening ceremony.

Currently, as Santiago-Dávila narrates, after making the open call for the participation in the steering committee, the planning process starts with several meetings to delegate and follow up on tasks assigned to each member. These tasks include requesting public and private sponsorship to cover mainly the live-music performances; constructing the kiosks; decorating the church and the gazebo; organizing the opening act and the recipient of the Medalla San Patricio (i.e., a special award); selecting an Master of Ceremonies who will serve at the inaugural mass at the plaza; organizing side activities for funding such as a raffle and food and beverage sales after each Sunday
mass; designing and printing a printed program; and contacting Catholic broadcast media
and the press to announce the Fests. Meanwhile, as Santiago-Dávila says,

| …nos comunicamos [con el Municipio], le enviamos por escrito, siempre le pedimos una reunión, pero casi nunca se puede, pero siempre tratamos de que haya una reunión. | …we communicate with the Municipality, send them a letter, always ask them for a meeting, but it is almost never possible, but we always try to meet. |
| Entonces a través de la… ¿de la de turismo es? …o de relaciones públicas, ella nos mueve con el alcalde las cosas. | Then, through the… tourism office? …or public relations, she helps us to move the pieces with the magistrate. |
| (Entrevista personal, 2011) | (Personal interview, 2011, personal translation) |

I do not blame Santiago-Dávila for not recalling the exact municipal office that mediates between her and other noncommercial live-events producers. Since the central government transferred much of its cultural actions to the municipalities, and especially after the Law of Autonomous Municipalities (i.e., Law 81 of 1991) discussed in the previous chapter, the municipalities have been changing their internal organizational structure as they please or following recommendations of the central government and the legislature. For instance, the usual names of the divisions where both live-events producers and artists collaborate may vary from Public Relations, Culture or Cultural Development, Tourism, or a mix of Culture and Tourism, to mention a few possible combinations. Law 81, which chronologically coincided with the implementation of neoliberalism locally and elsewhere, has reinforced bipartisan politics at the municipal level.

Figure 5.12 General public attending a live-music performance at the town center plaza’s gazebo (Photo by Author)
### 5.2.1.3 Producing the San Sebastián Street Fests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autonomía, tenemos autonomía propia y vuelvo y digo, mientras menos tengamos que ver con ellos, mejor.</th>
<th>Autonomy, we have our own autonomy and I say it again, the less we need to deal with them, the better.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rafael Acosta Coordinador de actividades musicales y otras actividades en las Fiestas de la Calle San Sebastián (Entrevista personal, 2011)</td>
<td>Rafael Acosta Coordinator of live-music events and other activities in the San Sebastián Street Fests (Personal interview 2011, personal translation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Noncommercial community-based live-events production takes another form when it is planned by a group of neighbors of Old San Juan who are committed to nothing else but the will to “improve our quality of life and combat the lack of hope in our Street,” as Rafaela Balladares once described (Rodríguez Vera, 2011). Along with artist Antonio ‘Tony’ Maldonado, Balladares, a former syndicalist of the Woman Trade Union League in New York City, founded the *Fiestas de la Calle San Sebastián* (i.e., the San Sebastián Street Fests). The San Sebastián Street Fests are the most important and well-attended annual live-events production in Puerto Rico, including both commercial and noncommercial production of any form. The distinctiveness of this case is that within the autonomy that the organizing committee has and openly defends as an independent group, it extends and shares the production responsibilities with the state, the municipality, and the church. Representatives of these sectors are considered *ex officio* members of the organizing committee.

In fact, as Balladares reports, the initial idea of reviving the San Sebastián Street Fests came from Alegría, who was a state representative:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Un buen día, me encontré con el doctor Ricardo Alegría, director del Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña y de inmediato le</th>
<th>One day, I came across Ricardo Alegria, Director of the ICP, and immediately told him about the deterioration of the Street.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Catholic priest Madrazo stopped organizing the fests when he was transferred to another church in 1954 (Rodríguez Vera, 2011, 51, personal translation). Then, in 1970, Balladares and Maldonado reactivated them as the San Sebastián Street Fests. The Fests were not organized by the church anymore, but had a strong Catholic component, with their inclusion (and still include) a mass and procession dedicated to Saint Sebastián, mixed with artisanship and visual arts exhibitions, a group performing the Baile de Época (i.e., a traditional music dance team), and live-music performances at a stage in the San José' church plaza, also located on San Sebastián Street. Unlike Loíza’s Fests, the San Sebastián Street Fests were not official patron-saint celebrations nor considered cultural religious ones. But the organizers have incorporated some rituals and symbols from those fests celebrated by Spanish colonizers, such as holding them during the same week that the Catholic Church commemorates Saint Sebastián’s Day as well as incorporating – with some important variations – into the popular tradition of the cabezudos (i.e., carnival figures with oversized heads; see Appendix G). In the priest Madrazo’s fests, the cabezudos used to exhibit figures that alluded to the Spanish monarchy (ibid). As Balladares notes, however:

Como no respondían a nuestra cultura, yo los descarté y los sustituí por cabezudos más pequeños y livianos con personajes identificados con la cultura puertorriqueña.

(Balladares, in Rodríguez Vera, 2011, 51; see Figure 5.13).
Eventually, as the San Sebastián Street Fests grew in unimaginable proportion in terms of artistic participation and public attendance, public safety became an issue; thus the organizing committee decided to cut down the celebration to four days and moved the stage to a larger plaza (Plaza del Quinto Centenario) between the San José’s church and the Antiguo Cuartel de Ballajá (the Old Infantry Barracks Building; see Figures 5.14 and 5.15). The previous San José’s church plaza on San Sebastián Street was assigned to more artisans and artists, as space fell short to accommodate them all on the same street, which is one of the longest in Old San Juan (See Appendix H). The year before doing fieldwork, in 2010, the public’s estimated attendance was over 300,000 people. And in 2011, when I observed the Fests, that number rose to over 400,000 people, as member of the organizing committee Rodríguez-Vera reported (Personal interview, 2011; see Figures 5.16 and 5.17).
Figure 5.15 The *Grupo Santiago / Bohemia Urbana* performing in the main stage of the San Sebastián Street Fests, 2011 (Photo by Author)

Figure 5.16 Del Cristo Street (South) in Old San Juan during the San Sebastián Street Fests, 2011 (Photo by Author)

Figure 5.17 Del Cristo Street (North) in Old San Juan during the San Sebastián Street Fests, 2011 (Photo by Author)
The Fests continued to expand and needed to open new spaces so people could move about easily and enjoy the event, without the risk of asphyxia or any other possible accidents.\textsuperscript{105} For instance, the organizing committee built a second stage at the East end of the street from which the \textit{cabezudos} were able to start a daily parade with artists and musicians performing Afro-Rican \textit{plena} (see Figure 5.18). That way, the activities associated with the organizing committee could also spread out during the day, thus providing opportunities for the public to flow into the city. This brings me to highlight another particularity of this live event that took over the city – not only the \textit{plaza} – as its venue. As independent scholar Patria Román-Velázquez has extensively studied for almost two decades, municipal public order codes since the mid-1990s in San Juan had been promoting exactly the opposite and removing people – especially the youth – from zones such as Old San Juan, which is also a residential area (Román Velázquez, 2008). Months after the Fests, in May 2011, the municipal administration even prohibited people from taking photographs of any kind in Old San Juan if they were “with a tripod or any professional lens”, which of course was protested against and eventually revoked when the administration changed in 2012 (Servicios Combinados, 2011). In a neoliberal disciplinary and neocolonial conservative context, using the city as the venue makes the Fests an important urban and sociocultural challenge to the municipality. Distinct from the politics of differentiation in Jayuya’s National Indigenous Festival and Loíza’s Patron-Saint Fests, the San Sebastián Street Fests exemplify the politics of space and urbanism.

\textsuperscript{105} As in any other noncommercial or commercial live-public event in Puerto Rico in the context of the highest criminal records in public spaces, public safety was a serious concern.
Figure 5.18 A cabezudo dancing with the public in front of the second stage at the San Sebastián Street Fests, 2011 (Photo by Author)

The principal role of the Autonomous Municipality of San Juan as an *ex officio* member in the organizing committee is precisely ensuring public safety, but that is not its only responsibility. For instance, as Rafael Acosta reports, the committee invites the municipality to coordinate the general logistics for the four days of the event, from Thursday evening to Sunday, which include producing the live-music event in the main stage on the second day (Personal interview, 2011). As seen in Figure 5.19, the Autonomous Municipality of San Juan delegates that specific responsibility to its Office for Cultural Development, which then passes it along to a local private live-music events promoter in charge of contracting the musicians, as I will expand upon in another section.

Regarding the municipality, Acosta adds,

| … el Municipio provee la seguridad, provee emergencias médicas, provee la limpieza y, como hablamos, el viernes ellos hacen una aportación artística en la tarima y eso pues es más bien… | …the Municipality provides the security, medical services, cleaning; on Friday they produce the live-music event, and that is it basically… |
| Ellos tienen unos gastos fuertes en esa participación, pero sería bueno hacer un estudio económico… la economía se mueve fuerte esos cuatro días, […] Si bien es cierto que ellos tienen unos gastos, también hay unas entradas con el IVU, Impuesto de Ventas y Uso, mejor conocido | They incur heavy expenses in that participation, but it would be good to make an economic study… the economy is much more active during those four days. […] While it is true they incur expenses, it is also true that there take in much income through IVU, the Sales Tax, better known as “Impossible to Live Nowadays,” which |

266
**Table:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spanish Text</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
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<tr>
<td>como el “Imposible Vivir Últimamente”, que deben tener unas ganancias sustanciales…</td>
<td>should result in substantial gains…</td>
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<td>(Ibid)</td>
<td>(Ibid, personal translation)</td>
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Certainly, consumption is key for local commerce during these days as well as for the government which imposes state and municipal taxes on most of the commercial transactions; these taxes were part of a neoliberal ‘remedy’ after a partial governmental shut down in 2006 during the administration of Governor Aníbal Acevedo-Vilá.

Apart from the responsibilities regarding the logistics of the Fests, the Municipality, led during my fieldwork by Mayor Jorge Santini, organized what some members of the organizing committee understood as “the contra-fests,” or a series of live-music events staged in front of the Town Hall (which is not on San Sebastián Street) and held at the same time as the major performances on the main stage of the San Sebastián Street Fests (Personal interview, 2011). Additionally, the municipal administration awarded permits to commercial radio stations which also staged corporate-sponsored live-music events at multiple locations throughout the city. The actions of the municipality – who though cordially invited to the Fests by the organizing committee did not make an effort to coordinate these events with the committee and in turn these events basically competed with the schedule of the Fests’ live-music events – resulted in tremendous contention between the organizing committee and Mayor Santini who had been in office for twelve years. Instead of easing the flow of people in Old San Juan, the municipal action brought even more people into the city, which complicated the logistics of the organizing committee that “tries to be considered with other neighbors of Old San Juan,” a member of the committee insisted (Personal interview, 2011). The Fests and its
live-music performances are also charged with expressions of ‘puertorriqueñidad’. As I will discuss in a following section, the organizing committee also tries “to preserve and reproduce the Puerto Rican culture” through the live-music performances and the general tone of the Fests (ibid). This intention to maintain Puerto Rican culture may have been the cause of the friction with a municipal administration whose Mayor belonged to the pro-statehood PNP which has been historically against the puertorriqueñidad. As Rodríguez-Vera stresses,

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<th>Sí, pero ellos creen que evitando la promoción cultural pues adelantan más la estadidad para Puerto Rico y por eso es que todas estas instituciones de la cultura puertorriqueña no tienen casi presupuesto.</th>
<th>Yes, but they think that by avoiding cultural promotion they move statehood forward for Puerto Rico and because of that all cultural institutions dedicated to Puerto Rican culture are almost destroyed.</th>
</tr>
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<td>(Entrevista personal, 2011)</td>
<td>(Personal interview, 2011, personal interview)</td>
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The other two ex officio members are San Juan’s archbishop Roberto González and chancellor of the Centro de Estudios Avanzados de Puerto Rico y el Caribe, Miguel Rodríguez. The Centro, a graduate studies institution founded by Alegría and located in Old San Juan, organizes a book fair on its own patio and offers live-music performances on a small stage during the day. The Centro also fosters the organizing committee’s meetings, usually three times a year, and has representatives in charge of other tasks assigned by the committee. The rest of the planning process of the organizing committee consists of coordinating activities and parallel events in which these representatives, as well as people from the ICP and other members of the community, collaborate voluntarily. As seen in Figure 5.19, the ICP helps through the Music Division which pays for the Banda Estatal’s music performance on the main stage, and through the CPPA which sponsors a major artisan fair in the Cuartel de Ballajá. Other tasks that the
organizing committee delegates to subcommittees of events and activities’ planning include the live-music and dancing events; two painting and engraving fairs (i.e., one in Ballajá and another on the Street); overseeing of the mass; a contest for wood carvers (i.e. talladores de santos); coordination of the kiosks, the stage, and the cabezudos’ parade; and lastly the selection of key figures to whom the Fests is dedicated as well as of the artists for the commemorative poster and for the San Sebastián’s figurine.

I will return to the live-music component in another section, but want to stress first that planning the live-music event within the Fests, as well as other tasks delegated to the subcommittees of events and activities, also may generate contention among these producers themselves as they differ in notions of musical taste and preferences vis-à-vis what they define as “the character of the Fests.” An example that generated intense public debate and contention among the members of the organizing committee and the specific people who act as heads to those subcommittees occurred during the pre-production meetings when one of the subcommittee leaders proposed the dedication of the Fests to reggaetón artist Tito El Bambino. In sum, the logistics of production of the San Sebastián Street Fests are the result of a complex series of relationships that go beyond the live-music event, which is indeed one of the most prestigious on the island. Nonetheless – since the organizing committee works with a clear agenda and enough time to plan – the results are usually successful. As Acosta says,

| Estas Fiestas prácticamente corren solas. Hacemos una que otra reunión y cada cual sabe lo que va a hacer y nada, están los hechos ahí. (Entrevista personal, 2011) | These Fests practically run by themselves. We meet a few times and each one knows what to do and then it all falls into place. (Personal interview, 2011, personal translation) |

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5.2.1.4 Producing Ponce’s Carnival

<table>
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<tr>
<th>¡Vivo el carnaval, lo vivo! Me gusta. No estoy pendiente a que si el dinero, ni sueldo, no. Quiero que el Carnaval de Ponce sea un éxito, que ese pueblo venga ahí, ese turista venga ahí y si hay duda de la imagen, esto sí es lo que es cultura. Es muy importante la cultura.</th>
<th>I live the carnival, I live it! I like it. I am not waiting for money, my salary, no. I want Ponce’s Carnival to be a success, that the people come in, the tourists come in, and if they have doubts on our image, this is what culture is. Our culture is very important.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guillermo Batista</td>
<td>Guillermo Batista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinador del Carnaval Ponceño</td>
<td>Coordinator, Ponce’s Carnival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oficina de Desarrollo Cultural</td>
<td>Office for the Cultural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipio Autónomo de Ponce</td>
<td>Autonomous Municipality of Ponce</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Entrevista personal, 2011)</td>
<td>(Personal interview, 2011, personal translation)</td>
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Carnivals have been part of the live-public events repertoire elsewhere since the Middle Ages and in Puerto Rico since the early 19th century, when they emerged as an already adapted “pagan ritual” by the Catholic Church and empire (Alcalá, 1977). They have been historically planned either by private noncommercial and community-based live-events producers or by the state and the municipalities which are also noncommercial producers. In fact, Puerto Rico’s most ancient carnival, the *Carnaval Ponceño* (Ponce’s Carnival), has been consecutively celebrated for the past 156 years and is produced by the Autonomous Municipality of Ponce, a major city on the South coast of the island. Besides several parades and popular rituals, this Carnival has a strong live-music events production component on which I will focus. I chose this case as an example of a vertical way of producing live-music events and new relationships with producers or promoters, in evident contrast to the more horizontal ways in which the three community-based events previously discussed in this dissertation are produced. Ponce’s Carnival also exemplifies participatory experiences with community-based groups of different and often conflicting bases, resulting in experiences sustained by a
particular culture of production that is reproduced by those who actually plan the event, a process which often challenges the current neoliberal way of producing within municipalities in the era of neoliberalism.

As mapped in Figure 5.20, the Autonomous Municipality of Ponce delegates the production responsibilities to the Office for Cultural Development. This office constitutes a steering committee of municipal employees – none of them professional producers – but rather individuals passionate and committed to representing their culture to the residents of Ponce as well as tourists, as Guillermo Batista, coordinator of the committee, suggests (Personal interview, 2011). For them, culture is a priority. As Batista details, the Carnival is planned at least eight to nine months ahead of the date of the event (Ibid). The date of the Carnival changes every year according to the week of preparation for the Catholic tradition of Lent, but is also set in coordination with the Asociación de Carnavales Unidos de Puerto Rico, that is a local association of carnivals private or public producers which promotes collaboration among these producers, the ICP, cultural centers, the Department of Tourism, and people interested in Puerto Rican culture (See Appendix I). Regardless of its apparent religious connection, Batista insists that the Carnival is not a religious event:

| No es religioso. Se ha sacado la cultura de ahí, porque recuerda que el carnaval ha corrido, se acogió a la cultura con España, Francia, Brasil, el de Europa, ahí es que nosotros cogemos esa cultura y la traemos, y la traemos para esa época y después es que hace en base a la religión… | It is not religious. Culture has been taken out from there, because remember that the carnival has traveled across time, adjusted to the culture of Spain, France, Brazil, all Europe, that is how we get that culture and bring it, before its religious base… |
| (Ibid) | (Ibid, personal translation) |

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Indeed, as I observed, the church – which has a cathedral located in the town center’s plaza right in front of the Town Hall – did not take part or interfere in any of the planning processes or the live-events per sé.

During an entire week, the steering committee organizes a series of activities that take place mainly on a stage that the municipality constructs and locates right in front of the Town Hall’s main entrance (see Figure 5.21). The stage decoration is also designed by municipal employees, according to a yearly concept and representation of symbols that reaffirm Ponce’s cultural artistic legacy and local strong sense of pride over other municipalities, especially in contrast to the capital city of San Juan. As seen in Figure 5.21, on the year that I observed the Carnival the stage was decorated with a huge mask of a vejigante, who is a folkloric figure of colonial and indigenous influence represented with variations in other carnivals and fests in Puerto Rico, such as Saint James the Apostole Fests in Loíza and throughout the Caribbean. In fact, my impression of Ponce’s Carnival is that it is one of the live-events mostly connected with the Caribbean, not only because of symbols such as the vejigantes, but especially because of the Afro-Caribbean legacy in the music and dances, mostly the traditional plena and steel drum ensembles that accompany the parades held every day. As Batista indicates, every year the steering committee sends out a call to hundreds of community independent groups and groups associated with local schools in Ponce and the southern region of the island as well as to artisans and groups within the Asociación de Carnavales Unidos that participate in at least one of the parades (Personal interview, 2011). The parades is comprised of floats of every kind (including cars that carry the Rey Momo who symbolically opens the Carnival), cabezudos which in the case of Ponce’s Carnival characterize historical figures
of Ponce (e.g., artists, athletes, politicians, and religious leaders), and **vejigantes**
performed by youths and adults who dress in traditional costumes and throw painted cow
bladders at the public (in a gentle or consciously aggressive fashion) (see Figures 5.22,
5.23, 5.24, and 5.25).

Figure 5.21 The stage of Ponce’s Carnival in front of the Autonomous Municipality of Ponce’s Town Hall in 2011 (Photo by Author)

Figure 5.22 The Rey Momo during Ponce’s Carnival inaugural parade in 2011 (Photo by Author)
Figure 5.23 Cabezudos and vejigantes during Ponce’s Carnival inaugural parade in 2011 (Photo by Author)

Figure 5.24 Vejigantes carrying painted cow bladders (Photo by Author)

Figure 5.25 A plena ensemble (pleneros) performing in Ponce’s Carnival inaugural parade in 2011 (Photo by author)
In addition to an apparent Afro-Caribbean character mixed with Spanish colonial symbolism of this Carnival, I also observed that the parades also include marching bands, cheerleading and dance teams, and marches by military youth leagues, evidence of U.S. colonial influence in a way that none of the previous events that I observed did (see Figures 5.26, 5.27 and 5.28). Thus the parades represent Puerto Rico’s neocolonial reality and everyday culture overall. They weave throughout the whole town and surrounding neighborhoods, thus also bringing a spatial component to Ponce’s Carnival, skillfully managed by the municipality through a public order code full of prohibitions included on the last page of the Carnival’s printed program.
All the parades’ routes end at the main stage where the opening ceremony, children and youth pageants as well as ceremonies (acknowledging key artisans from Ponce who are awarded as Presidents and Grand Marshall of the Carnival) and live-events production take place. The Mayor of Ponce participates in all the ceremonies and parades. The year that I observed the Carnival, the municipality produced videos of the Mayor’s public works that were highlighted while the live performances were being set up. This is not unique to Ponce, since politicians of any party in Puerto Rico do not miss an opportunity to stage these propagandistic activities during official events that have such massive audience reach. Yet however official the Carnival is, I understand it as a complex community-based event of local and regional reach, produced within the Autonomous Municipality of Ponce, that has been impacted by but also has transcended bipartisan swings. Batista, for instance, has coordinated this live-public event for over twenty years with evident love and enjoyment for his work, which he considers ‘his life.’ As he describes,

| Es mi vida y de todos mis compañeros, porque no soy yo nada más. […] Muchos | It is my life and that of my colleagues, because it is not only me. […] Lots of |

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106 Some Puerto Ricans serving the US military were returning from Afghanistan in the same month, March 2011, what was mentioned several times during the parade.
compañeros viven el Carnaval Ponceño. Les gusta trabajar el Carnaval Ponceño. Ahí no está el signo de dólar, no. Es nuestro Carnaval, nuestro Carnaval, nuestro Carnaval.

No te voy a decir que no ha sido difícil, pero lo tenemos que continuar. […] Si lo tenemos que buscar ‘fiau’, lo buscamos ‘fiau’, pero tenemos que continuar, porque la tradición del Carnaval Ponceño no se puede caer.

(Entrevista personal, 2011)

coworkers live for Ponce’s Carnival. They like working in it. The dollar sign is not there. It is our Carnival, our Carnival, our Carnival.

I will not tell you that it has not being hard, but we need to continue. […] If we need to buy on credit, we shall buy on credit, but we need to continue, because our tradition of Ponce’s Carnival could not fall.

(Personal interview, 2011, personal translation)

Batista and the steering committee, working in coordination with the state and municipal police, assign tasks to each member. As he details,

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<th>Aquí tenemos compañeros que te corren las órdenes, tenemos compañeros que te hacen los libros y el afiche, hay otros compañeros que corre otra cosa, pues, yo estoy encargado de correr el espectáculo, de buscar grupos, cuadro los grupos, entonces ahí está, la nuestra alcaldesa que es Mayita [María Meléndez-Altieri], que está al frente y nuestro director [de la Oficina de Desarrollo Cultural] y se conectan así. Por ejemplo, si yo veo que hay un tranque, pues yo tengo que resolver con mi jefe, “mira hay un tranque, pues ya te toca a ti”… […] Y si yo tengo todo preparado, pues yo te monto toda la estructura, todo el procedimiento y te hago el plan de trabajo para que corra todo, la tarima…</th>
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<tr>
<td>Here we have colleagues that do the errands, colleagues that do the program and the poster, others do other things, well, I am in charge of producing the live show, of searching for groups, scheduling them, and then the mayor who is Mayita [María Meléndez-Altieri], she is the head connected to our director [of the Office for the Cultural Development]. For example, if I think there is a conflict, I have to solve it with my director, “look there is conflict, so it is your turn”… […] And if I am all set, then I plan the structure, all the procedures and make a time table for the stage”…</td>
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(Entrevista personal, 2011)

(Personal interview, 2011, personal interview)

The Carnival’s organization is strictly vertical but its logistics of production are very similar to the planning processes in Loíza, Jayuya and the San Sebastián Street Fests. The logistics of Ponce’s Carnival, however, differ from the rest of the events observed in terms of one important element that cannot be overlooked: since the 1990s, the
Autonomous Municipality of Ponce began to subcontract a live-music events promoter to help with the live-music component of the Carnival. As Batista recalls,

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Cuando entró, pues, luego el señor, el honorable [alcalde] Rafael ‘Churumba’ Cordero, […] ahí cambió todo, pues… para el procedimiento del papeleo. […] Se cambio el sistema con el promotor.</th>
<th>When Major Rafael ‘Churumba’ Cordero entered, […] then everything changed, … in terms of bureaucracy. […] The system changed to hire a promoter.</th>
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<td>(Ibid)</td>
<td>(Ibid, personal translation)</td>
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This practice is similar to what most municipalities in Puerto Rico currently do, especially when it comes to patron-saint fests. The municipality subcontracts a live-music events promoter and pays this person for contacting and contracting artists and musicians as well as the machineros who install amusement rides and the vendors with kiosks for selling food and beverages. The selection of promoters is often done through a public auction conducted by the Municipal Assembly. The promoter pays these cultural workers; thus the municipality is releases itself from the responsibilities of creating and managing their contracts and of dealing with the machineros. While many municipalities and municipal employees find that this practice accelerates payment to all workers and reduces governmental bureaucracy, I argue that it exemplifies how an intermediary actor emerges in the field of live-music events production while municipalities also take a neoliberal bent.

5.2.2 Noncommercial producers and musicians vs. promoters

<table>
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<tr>
<th>[B]ueno antes uno tenía una relación más directa con el Alcalde, con su director[a] de Relaciones Públicas. Yo siempre mantengo la tradición de enviar cartas todos los años, de hacer mis llamadas, “mira, ¿ha habido algún cambio en tus números de contacto?” … con tal de tener ese contacto personal con el Primer Ejecutivo de cada municipio y con su Director de Relaciones Públicas.</th>
<th>[B]efore we had a much direct relationship with the magistrate, with the public relations director. I always keep that tradition of sending letters every year, doing my calls, “hey, has there been any change in your contact information?” …just to have that direct contact with them.</th>
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<td>[…]</td>
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This musician conducts one of the most famous *salsa* orchestras in Puerto Rico and the region. He suggests that musicians and artists have tried to make sense of the changes in how the municipalities deal with live-music events. Even though his orchestra is part of the mainstream and has worked all year round for a long time, he acknowledges that friction exists between musicians and promoters. In this section, I will illustrate how the neoliberal municipal and state’s practices of subcontracting promoters — or commercial producers who also act as promoters — as intermediaries between musicians and artists can be highly problematic for artistic cultural production in many ways, particularly among those outside the mainstream. In this particular section, I will preserve confidentiality of the names of the musicians who commonly are the weakest link in terms of their relationships with promoters.

The work of the promoters varies. Most promoters create an artist’s portfolio that is presented to the municipalities and other producers who became their ‘clients’. The artists in the portfolios may be exclusive to one promoter or part of many other promoters’ portfolios. Some exclusive artists pay a promoter to manage them or work with them as their agent. Other artists in the portfolio are charged a non-fixed percentage if the promoter gets to insert them into live-music events (i.e., commonly 10 to 15% of
their payment). This is already disadvantageous for artists who cannot pay or do not want to work with the promoters. Moreover, the promoters overprice their ‘clients’ for the live-music performances and other activities related to actual promotion and advertisement of events, in which case the promoter becomes a capitalist and affects also the municipalities, not to mention his or her impact over small advertising agencies and other commercial and noncommercial entities. These practices are not new to anyone in the field of live-music events production and come up in all the on-site interviews with musicians. Only recently have these practices received public attention through a case in which a local municipality brought a suit against a promoter who charged the municipality thousands of dollars for a band that never performed at that municipality’s event (Bauzá, 2013; Caquías Cruz, 2013). In addition to cases like this, the reasons why I argue that promoters and the practices associated with some – if not all – of these emerging neoliberal figures are problematic is because they may not necessarily promote diversity in the live-music performances to which the publics or the private noncommercial producers are exposed; moreover, they do not necessarily open up new employment opportunities for artists and musicians.

The work of live-music events promoters also received public attention when a group of diverse autochthonous traditional music performers challenged the government’s inactivity toward their increasingly limited work opportunities and national culture, and wrote a project that passed as Law 223 of 2004. This law, also known as Ley de Nuestra Música Puertorriqueña and later as Ley de Nuestra Música Autóctona Tradicional Puertorriqueña, was intended to reserve a fair participation:

\[
\text{[a]} \text{t every patron saint's feast day celebration, artistic festival or other musical event in which a}
\]
variety of musical genres are performed and for which the Executive Branch or any public corporation or municipality contributes the total cost of the activity or ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or more, the corresponding government dependency shall and [sic] be bound to secure the fair and reasonable participation of the various exponents of our autochthonous traditional Puerto Rican music. (Law 223 of 2004).

In 2005, the same year that COPEP was created, the evaluation of the compliance with Law 223 was assigned to a new office within the ICP’s Music Division, which re-emerged as an important actor in the defense of national culture through music performance: Division of our Traditional Native Puerto Rican Music, as translated by the ICP (n.d.b). As a key member of the new Division explains, this office needed to analyze quantitative data compiled by state agencies or municipalities in order to provide the ICP with evidence of at least 30% budgetary use for contracting artists or musicians interpreters of autochthonous traditional Puerto Rican music (Personal interview, 2011). The 30% also applies to sponsoring live-music events that “hire traditional native Puerto Rican music performers, such as, Bomba, Plena, Danza, Jíbaro music and their subgenres, and also their historically acknowledged dances” – all musical forms outside the mainstream (Law 223 of 2004; ICP n.d.b. & n.d.c.; see Appendix J). Musicians and artists were required to be ascribed to the Division so that municipalities and promoters could be certain that they were contracting artists within those genres.

The language of the Law was confusing from the outset. First, instead of promoting more opportunities for artistic work within these musical forms, the focus has been on the municipalities’ budget but framed the other way; therefore in theory, one artist or musician who performs more than one genre can be the recipient of the 30%
budget minimum limit. Municipalities also have evaded this prerequisite by producing live-music events of a single genre, such as the *bolero*. Second, the 30% criteria has been vague in terms of the proportion of interpreters of each of these musical forms that could be hired per event, so cases of disproportion in terms of diversity of musical forms started to be more evident than before. As a musician said, “to be ascribed does not guarantee you a gig” (Personal interview, 2011, personal translation). Third, it was done without comparing how similar cultural policy was carried out elsewhere. Also, since the Division was created with a limited budget and only a few employees to cover the 78 municipalities of Puerto Rico and hundreds of state-sponsored live-music events per year, the evaluation processes got delayed. For instance, when I visited the ICP in 2011, the Division had six employees – counting the director – and was evaluating cases from the year 2007. Meanwhile, the municipalities and promoters have been taking advantage of these limits and have continued to develop their relationship, often overlooking the 30% in very strategic ways that musicians protest. As a key exponent of autochthonous traditional Puerto Rican music told me in an on-site interview in Jayuya’s National Indigenous Festival,

| [C]uando se aplicó la Ley, cuando se puso la Ley de la música autóctona, pues pretendían beneficiarse y lucrarse de los fondos que se separaban para esta Ley y empezaron a hacer una serie de movidas y movimientos para quietarle el dinero a los grupos y prácticamente, pues, nosotros desenmascaramos ese esquema y dio al frente con la relación de muchos promotores que entendían que nosotros no cumplíamos con sus propósitos y nosotros, pues, simplemente no trabajamos con ellos.  
(Entrevista personal, 2010) | [W]hen the Law entered in function, the Law of the autochthonous music, they pretended to benefit and profit from the funds assigned to the Law and started to carry out a set of maneuvers to take the money from the groups and we basically unveiled that scheme which revealed the relationship of many promoters who understood that we do not fit their purposes and we, then, simply do not work with them.  
(Personal interview, 2010) |
In fact, some promoters started to block musicians in favor of Law 223. As another musician adds,

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<th>Español</th>
<th>Inglés</th>
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<tr>
<td>Es más lo que tocamos por nuestra cuenta que con los promotores. En el caso mío, en particular, nosotros estamos siendo boicoteados por un sector enorme de los productores, que no son muchos en realidad, tú sabes, pero nosotros sí… […] hay una especie de boicot que no se dice así, pero que funciona así,…es lo que es. ¿Entiendes? Tú sabes, no me contratan o me sacan del programa, si ya estoy.</td>
<td>It is more what we perform by ourselves than with the promoters. In my case, in particular, we have been boycotted by a large part of the producers, who are not that many, you know, but we are… […] there is a kind of underlying boycott but it functions like that, …that is what it is. Do you understand? You know, they do not hire me or they take me out of the artists’ line-up, if I were already in.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Director y músico, Grupo de plena Festival Nacional Indígena (Entrevista personal, 2010)</td>
<td>Director and musician, Plena ensemble National Indigenous Festival (Personal interview, 2010)</td>
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Some promoters who were also part of COPEP asked the college to intervene and to start lobbying to amend Law 223 in order to reduce the minimum percentage of a budget destined to autochthonous traditional music to 10% annually. An argument that promoters started to use was that the musical forms contained in the Law did not bring enough people to the live-music events vis-à-vis the music in the mainstream forms. While the publics’ attendance depends greatly on contingent matters, events such as Jayuya’s National Indigenous Festival that presents almost 100% of autochthonous traditional music provide strong evidence that there is still a public interested in these musical forms, as seen in the following quote:

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<td>…los promotores últimamente más se han dedicado a los espectáculos grandes, a llevar orquestas, reggaetoneros y van quitando poquito a poquito los grupos de música típica y, comentaba horita en la presentación, que este festival se ha mantenido puro, trayendo grupos puertorriqueños en todo momento. No han</td>
<td>…recently, the promoters have been dedicated to big shows, to bring orchestras, reggaetoneros and have been taking out little by little the exponents of traditional music and, as I just said in my performance, this Festival has kept it pure, bringing Puerto Rican groups all the time. The organizers have not had the necessity</td>
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Yet even big orchestras and ensembles have felt the impact of the practices of live-events promoters, as this director of a local *salsa* orchestra indicates,

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<th>Spanish</th>
<th>English</th>
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<tr>
<td>No es fácil trabajar con los promotores. ¿Por qué? Porque ellos tienen su piña, ellos tienen su gente y nosotros como grupo nuevo, [...] tú sabes, estamos dándole, como dicen. Hay algunos promotores que sí creen en nosotros tremendamente y nos están apoyando. Hay otros que nos están dejando pagar el precio de seguir trabajando duro.</td>
<td>It is not easy to work with the promoters. Why? Because they have their <em>piña</em>, their preferred people and we as a new group, [...] you know, we are trying, as they say. There are some promoters that believe in us tremendously and support us. There are others that are letting us pay the price of working hard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director y músico, Orquesta de salsa Fiestas de la Calle San Sebastián (Entrevista personal, 2011)</td>
<td>Director and musician, Salsa orchestra San Sebastián Street Fests (Personal interview, 2011, personal translation)</td>
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In 2011, when I was conducting fieldwork concurrently with the second part of the UPR students’ strike, the governmental administration of Fortuño tried to pass the amendment, which generated even more friction between musicians and promoters affected by these and other normative policies against cultural production in Puerto Rico. The following quotes from some of the musicians whom I interviewed reflect the tensions. The measure did not pass due to intense public protests and campaigns in social media initiated by groups of musicians and artists. For example, groups such as *Fans de la música Boricua* (Puerto Rico’s Music Fans), *Apoyo ley música autóctona de PR ¡Que se mantenga y se cumpla con el 30%!* (I support Puerto Rico’s authoctonous music. Keep
and obey the 30%!), and Músicos borikuas defienden su cultura a bombazo contra los políticos abusadores (Puerto Rican musicians in defense of their culture through bombazo against abusive politicians), among others. In fact, there were bombazos (and plenazos) performing everywhere and happening unexpectedly while I was doing fieldwork, as tensions kept on growing on the island. One of these bombazos was captured by internationally known Puerto Rican percussionist Paoli Mejías in a YouTube channel called Conga Boricua (Mejías, 2010). Another group, Defensores de TU Música Tradicional (Your Traditional Music Advocates), sent out an open letter to Governor Fortuño which, in my opinion, was crucial for advancing the position of the musicians.

An excerpt of this letter reads:

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<th>Señor gobernador, bajar la representación de música autóctona del 30% por espectáculo al 10% anual es sencillamente acabar con la ley. Si además le añadimos que las enmiendas están tan mal redactadas que de aprobarlas se abriría el 10% a representar a todos los géneros musicales, entonces sería legislar para aprobar lo que ya existe, entonces: ¿para qué legislar?</th>
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<tr>
<td>(Defensores de TU música boricua, 2011)</td>
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Mister Governor, dropping the representation of autochthonous music from the 30% per show to a 10% annually is simply to eliminate this law. If we add that the amendments are wrongly written, in the case of their approval, they will make available the 10% to all music genres, then that will be legislating to approve what already exists, therefore: why legislate in the first place?

(Defensores de TU música boricua, 2011)

This group identified the main problem of governmental cultural policy in Puerto Rico in relation to the field of live-music events production: an excessive though inefficient body of laws disconnected from the conditions of the work of those who constitute the field. The musicians, however, did not win this case. Law 223 was amended by Law 189 of August 2011 to return to its original name and concept of autochthonous traditional Puerto Rican music. Yet in another case of the lack of importance that the government gives to national culture, the required percentage of autochthonous traditional Puerto...
Rican music in each live-music event of $10,000 or more in state sponsorship was dropped to 10% of the annual public sponsorship. Worse yet, the drop was justified in terms of ambiguous notions of “Puerto Rican musical preferences of the moment” and musical tastes that were never inquired about through any kind of research; rather they pointed to the dynamism of a “musical development that could not be static” (Law 189 of 2011). Cynically, the government, especially the legislature, based the amendments to Law 223 on language common to the most progressive cultural studies scholarship and the celebration of the dynamism of culture and used such wording against the musicians and their work, which I find highly problematic. Artists, musicians, and mostly intellectuals who have historically argued against the ‘static’ treatment by the ICP to national culture were trapped in their own language, which in my opinion, has not been helpful for the ICP and, therefore, for cultural action. Some commercial producers – in particular the promoters – celebrated the amendment. Even now, producers and promoters have not yet recuperated from the damage that this amendment has caused to their reputation within the local autochthonous traditional Puerto Rican music scene.

5.2.2.1 “Nosotros queremos esto:” Mixed opinions on the promoters and the municipalities

Musicians and artists may hold mixed and opposing opinions about the promoters as mediators with the municipalities and other noncommercial producers. As the music director of a plena and Afro-Caribbean jazz ensemble that has performed at the San Sebastián Street Fest insists, “the role of the promoters is necessary because musicians cannot handle some things such as contracts, permits, patents, insurance, those things” (Personal interview, 2011). While it is true that promoters may prevent musicians and
artists from dealing with governmental bureaucracy and promoters pay them at the venue – which may take from one to three months via the municipality – musicians can indeed do it on their own, depending on the scale and reach of their projects and on how much they need to be focused on creative rather than administrative work. In fact, some musicians interviewed manage to have promoters obtain access to translocal circuits of live-music events, while do what they referred to as “direct marketing” on a local scale.

In my opinion and also drawing from the interviews, musicians may sustain good relationships with promoters, but they need to be built on respect for each other’s work as well as on honesty and fairness in terms of personal and economic treatment. Otherwise, musicians will resent being the ones who always are making concessions, such as dropping the value of their work that in the end is what makes this whole field possible.

In this sense, promoters need to be accountable if they want to remain in the field.

On the other hand, municipalities need to consider the reasons why they need the promoters, and how much responsibility they bestow on them. As this musician puts it,

| Yo entiendo que ellos [los municipios] a veces nos contratan, pero hay veces que yo entiendo que le dan mano libre a algunos promotores y entonces, esto es un negocio. Esto a veces se convierte en una piña y entonces, pues uno no sabe qué negocios él está haciendo con otras orquestas o lo que sea. Y yo entiendo que Ponce siendo un pueblo bien cultural y tradicional, de mucha tradición, pues se le debe dar valor, aunque mi grupo no esté tocando, que es un grupo que representa a Ponce haciendo producciones, haciendo la música de aquí y demás. El espacio debe estar y eso no sucede muchas veces. | I understand that they [the municipalities] sometimes do not hire us, but on the other hand they give free room to some promoters and then, this is business. This sometimes becomes a piña and then, we do not know what businesses the promoter is doing with other orchestras or whatever. And I understand that Ponce, being such a cultural and traditional municipality, deserves to be acknowledged because, even if my group is not performing, it is a group that represents Ponce in productions, doing music from here or elsewhere. The space should exist and that does not happen often. |
| Director, Orquesta de salsa Carnaval Ponceño (Entrevista personal, 2011) | Director, Salsa orchestra Ponce’s Carnival (Personal interview, 2011, personal translation) |
The creation of these spaces which musicians ask for, however, depends largely on the municipality and its priorities toward artistic and live-music events production. As one of the musicians reports, “there are municipalities and municipalities,” stressing that some local municipalities have much more control over their governmental cultural actions. In fact, while most municipalities hire live-music events promoters, some municipalities and noncommercial community-based producers have deliberately opposed hiring them. The cases that I observed present slight differences on this. For instance, Loíza’s Patron-Saint Fests and the San Sebastián Street Fests are totally opposed to hiring promoters and their respective steering committees have at least one person in charge of acting as both producer of the live-music event and promoter of the artists who will be hired to perform at these events. Jayuya’s National Indigenous Festival hired a promoter for the first time when I was on fieldwork, but only for the purpose of advertising the live event through the media. Jayuya’s Cultural Center also opposes the surrender of their production responsibilities to an external member who does not necessarily reflect their culture of production. In contrast – though following the neoliberal tendency to delegate its powers to private entities – the Municipality of San Juan immediately hired a promoter to contract the musicians who would perform at the main stage on the second day of the San Sebastián Street Fests. In Ponce’s Carnival, a promoter was also hired, but under strict supervision of Batista, the coordinator of the steering committee. As he emphasizes,

| No, con la música tenemos que decirle al productor “nosotros queremos esto”, porque si el Carnaval de Ponce es cultural, tenemos que traer música cultural, a la bomba y plena… que tienen derecho, que esa es la música cultural: bomba y plena y otros grupos culturales. Si no, pues, ahí entra la música de salsa, la música de... | No, regarding the music we have to tell the producer “this is what we want,” because if Ponce’s Carnival is cultural, we need to bring cultural music, the bomba and plena… they have the right, that is the cultural music: bomba and plena and other cultural groups. If not, there enters the salsa, the merengue, but we go first with... |

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merengue, nosotros, pues, primero por los pleneros.
(Entrevista personal, 2011)

But even though noncommercial and community-based live-events producers have set limits on the promoters, the promoters do not help themselves much and have been pushing their relationships with noncommercial and community-based producers to another extreme. As I observed in Jayuya’s National Indigenous Festival, the promoter – subcontracting only to advertise the event in billboards, flyers, broadcast media and newspapers – took the prerogative of signing all the advertisements as if he were the “producer” of the Festival. As González, who contracted the promoter, notes:

Sí, él básicamente cogió pon con nosotros porque decía al final “Produce Alfonso Sanabria”.
(Entrevista personal, 2011)

Yes, he basically took a ride with us because at the end he said “Producer Alfonso Sanabria”.
(Personal interview, 2011, personal translation)

5.2.2.2 Stealing the show: Noncommercial live-events production and sponsorship

‘Stealing the show’ from the actual producers is another battle that noncommercial and community-based live-events producers have historically struggled with as they look for public and commercial sponsorship. Sponsorship of any kind is an intrinsic element in the field of live-events production – whether commercial or noncommercial – which has been studied in-depth before in relation to public events in Puerto Rico (Dávila, 1997). In this dissertation I have focused mainly on state-sponsorship, but the particularities of the cases observed bring me to reconsider sponsorship overall as an element that sheds light on the relationship between live-music events producers and the local neocolonial state within the context of neoliberalism. I
argue that a different set of political and power relations can be illustrated regarding sponsorship within the logistics and practices of noncommercial live-events producers in the current era.

As I witnessed in the observed cases, the search for sponsorship of noncommercial live-music events is a task commonly delegated to all or specific members of the steering committees.

In the cases of Jayuya’s National Indigenous Festival and Loíza’s Patron-Saint Fests, for instance, the ICP is the major sponsor and it does so through a maximum of $5,000 assigned to the local cultural centers. As seen in Dávila, Jayuya’s National Indigenous Festival once enjoyed “more government funding than other local ICP celebrations” (Dávila, 1997, 220). That, however, is not the case anymore since Law 7 of 2009 along with consistent budgetary cuts that have debilitated ICP’s capacity to sponsor cultural centers. As a result, some cultural centers also have been debilitated while others have disappeared or stopped production of live-artistic events. In the case of Jayuya’s Festival, Félix González explains how the steering committee negotiates with the ICP in this era:

Nosotros le hacemos la solicitud y ellos, pues, a veces se cantan que no están tan bien tampoco, no se pueden solicitar más que uno o dos grupos, pues eso le solicitamos. A veces, lo que le pedimos es, por ejemplo, “dame un grupo de ballet folklórico” y que ellos consigan un grupo de ballet folklórico…de los que tienen disponibles. Otras veces los pedimos por nombre y si ese grupo no puede, pues entonces, como quiera, ellos consiguen otro. […] Entonces por lo general nos dan dos. Uno para un día, otro para otro, digo, depende de cómo nosotros también lo organizamos… […] En ocasiones anteriores habían colaborado un poquito

We have sent them the request and they, well, sometimes say they are not well either and that we can only request one or two groups, and that is what we request. Some times, we asked them for, for example, “give us a folkloric ballet,” and let them search for it…among those inscribed in the ICP. At other times, we request a specific group and if that group cannot make it, then they find us another one. […] But generally they give us two. One for a day, and one for another day, well I mean, depending in how we scheduled them… […] In previous occasions, they have collaborated a bit more, but now things are a bit tighter…
The rest of the funding for the National Indigenous Festival comes from local commerce in Jayuya that – as in the other cases observed – is mentioned in the opening ceremonies and multiple times on stage, as well as featured in advertisements in the printed programs which are distributed on-site among the public. Jayuya’s Cultural Center has fixed fees for these advertisements. By contrast, as Milagros Santiago-Dávila states, Loíza’s Patron-Saint Fests’ steering committee “does not fix prices; it is what the business could give” (Personal interview, 2011, personal translation).107 Particular to the case of Loíza’s Fests are the contributions made by the members of the church, and not from the church itself which – as an institution– does have funds. As Pedro García, a member of the steering committee reports, the members of the church basically self-sponsor their event, a practice which contrasts with the local businesses that “usually contribute $15 dollars, others with $10, or in rare occasions $150, but others do not contribute at all,” despite the movement that the Fests may bring to these businesses (Personal interview, personal translation). Loíza’s Fests steering committee does count on the Catholic Church’s broadcast media on the island to advertise the event. But as García briefly commented, commercial sponsorship is careful to approach the committee and vice versa, due to the direct religious character of the Fests. Neither Jayuya’s National Indigenous Festival nor Loíza’s Patron Saint Fests exhibited a single banner from commercial or religious sponsors.

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107 Both municipalities, Jayuya and especially Loiza, are economically in disadvantage vis-à-vis others in their same regions.
In Jayuya’s Festival, the presence of the municipality is very obvious, contained primarily in the printed program. On the other hand, group and individual meetings with Loíza’s Patron-Saint Fests as well as with the San Sebastián Street Fests’ steering committee members reveal that these committees somehow resent an exaggerated public display from their municipalities for their events; besides helping with the logistics, they fund partially or not at all, as in the case of Loíza. In Ponce’s Carnival, as discussed here, sponsorship is basically provided by the Autonomous Municipality of Ponce whose visual branding is seen everywhere: from the printed program to the big screen with municipal propaganda to access cards and badges, employees’ uniforms, municipal vehicles, and even the safety cans. The municipality also manages to obtain commercial funding from local business such as universities and higher education institutions, tourism sites, and the vendors during the events. This Carnival has an estimated 100,000 plus yearly attendees from Ponce, other municipalities, and abroad. While the San Sebastián Street Fests triplicate that estimated attendance, it does not get direct sponsorship from any tourism site or the Puerto Rico’s Tourism Company. Nonetheless, the Company pays a private advertising agency to produce a special campaign to attract tourism to the island during the Fests, especially directed to cruise ships that arrive in the port of Old San Juan. That is another way to ‘steal the show,’ as the popular saying goes.

Last but not least, the search for sponsorship to produce San Sebastián Street Fests is similar in many ways to the rest of the events observed, but still different at the same time. The similarity with the other noncommercial community-based live-music events lies with its engagement in many other activities in order to raise funds for paying the live-music events. In the San Sebastián Street Fests, for example, the daily live-music
events production costs nearly $20,000 for solely the use of the main stage. That is a lot of money to raise in a year for a noncommercial neighbors association. As member of the steering committee Rodríguez-Vera indicates,

| Nosotros tenemos los kioscos de comida y bebida, que con eso pagamos algunos [artistas], eso en particular lo pagamos con los fondos. Pero hay auspiciadores que pagan grupos musicales; el del jueves lo corre [el productor] Luisito Vigoreaux, el viernes lo tiene el Municipio, el sábado otros auspiciadores y el domingo Palo Viejo presenta a Plena Libre, pero eso en particular fue de los fondos del Comité porque nosotros, con la venta de los kioscos de la comida, pagamos la tarima, los baños, el sonido y algunos músicos. |
| We have the food and beverage kiosks, which help us pay some [artists], which in particular we pay with funds. But there are sponsors who pay music groups; on Thursday it is run by [producer] Luisito Vigoreaux, on Friday the Municipality, on Saturday other sponsors and on Sunday Palo Viejo presents Plena Libre, but that in particular we pay with the committee’s funds, by selling in the kiosks we pay for the stage, the portable bathrooms, the sound and some musicians. |

(Entrevista personal, 2011)  

(Personal interview, 2011, personal translation)

When I observed the San Sebastián Street Fests in 2011, the steering committee had delegated to Rodríguez-Vera the coordination of a tribute to a particular music form (i.e. décima campesina) with multiple autochthonous traditional music artists. Yet the rest of the events on the main stage on Saturday and Sunday and on the secondary stage during the four days of the Fests were delegated to Rafael Acosta, a marketing professional. Acosta’s volunteer work as events coordinator of the Fests included “running all the bases,” as he said, from “walking with the cabezudos, searching for sponsors, contracting artists, solving last-minute problems with different agencies,” and other tasks related to producing the live-music events within the Fests (Personal interview, 2011, personal translation). Since these live-music events at the Fests have gained a very good reputation among artists, each year Acosta receives hundreds of proposals and pressure from individual artists and record labels to contract artists and musical groups. As Acosta said,
“everybody wants to be in the Fests” (Ibid). Therefore, this committee has not needed to hire a promoter, since Acosta runs all relationships directly with the musicians.

Moreover, the Fests’ main difference in the way it searches for sponsorship in comparison with that of other live-music events is that, in the last decade – given that sponsors want to be in the Fests – the steering committee has not needed to search but rather chooses sponsorship. Thus every year, Acosta is followed and almost harassed by many advertising agencies and commercial brands that want to become part of the Fests (Ibid). Prior to this unusual context for noncommercial (and even for commercial) live-events producers in Puerto Rico, the steering committee and Acosta had set high standards as to whom and which brands they would allow in the Fests; they tended to favor brands that promoted national culture and pride as well as sponsors who contributed to the production logistics of the event. The logistics include contracting the musicians and the MCs, building a stage, renting lighting and sound companies and equipment, site fencing for the stage and areas close to some kiosks in order to somehow manage the flow of publics, renting portable bathrooms, and other aspects related to the artisanship fair on San Sebastián Street. In order to cover these expenses, the committee gives the sponsors the option to pay from $1,000 a page in the printed program to $25,000 for being a principal sponsor, which according to the numbers that Rodríguez-Vera estimated, would cover only one day of the event. “This is nothing, considering the name the Fests has,” said Acosta, who estimates that any other producer would charge $40,000 to $50,000 for similar events.

Yet finding commercial sponsors committed to these opposing requisites – that of covering the production expenses while also helping a group of neighbors in favor of
national culture and often against commercial values – has not been easy. On the contrary, it has generated contention within the steering committee and fostered an historic cultural war that is an advertising war of no proportions locally, popularly known as the *guerra de las cerveceras* (the breweries’ war). It is, however, more than about beer; it is also about telecom companies, radio stations, beauty products, coffee brands and even roof sealing products, both locally-based and TNCs. Some committee members want to keep the Fests simple with no corporate sponsorship other than that of the local businesses on San Sebastián Street, as they were in the past when Doña Rafaela Balladares reactivated them. Other members want corporations to assume responsibility for having ‘stolen their show’ and invaded the city through advertising wars without contributing to the event. In fact, competing brands have made it to the Fests without any deference to the committee for a long time now. From the outside and considering the obvious exaggerated advertising efforts by the agencies to place both media promotion and products samples throughout Old San Juan’s streets, buildings, buses, and even the airspace, one can easily think that the committee is making millions of dollars in corporate sponsorship and in sponsoring their national cultural ideas, as some intellectuals have argued (Dávila, 1997). But no, as Acosta clarified, “almost none of them are in the Fests, but they pay for an entire page in newspapers; I don’t know $8,000 or $10,000 dollars a page” (Ibid).

As this example illustrates, the relationship with commercial sponsors in the San Sebastián Street Fests is much more complex, and has not always been easy or cordial. As Acosta narrates,

| [E]l primero que entró fue la cerveza Coors Light. […] Hicieron una actividad muy, | [T]he first to enter was the beer *Coors Light*. […] They did an activity very, very |
muy exitosa que fue *Plena para la Calle* y la gente vino con comparsas y se llenó la Calle de comparsas, pero hicieron unos compromisos económicos al Comité y no cumplieron.

Entonces, yo tenía esa preocupación de que no teníamos auspiciadores y que todo el mundo se servía de las Fiestas y ahí fue, hace como cuatro años, yo me encargué de empezar a buscar los auspiciadores que se metían en la Calle y a llamarlos. Entonces, pues llamé a la cervecería *India* que es la cervecería de *Medalla* y pedí una reunión con ellos y entraron y valorizaron el trabajo de nosotros y hasta el día de hoy.

[…], y puede venir cualquier firma, como ha sucedido, me han ofrecido e inclusive, me han insinuado pagarme y yo los he parado en seco y yo “no, no, no”, ya. Mientras ellos quieran estar aquí con nosotros, estarán con nosotros; el día que no quieran estar pues entonces yo abro las ofertas a otros…

[…], algunos pues han entendido que una cosa es la conciencia comercial y otra es la conciencia cultural; y hay algunas firmas que la tienen y no les importa que la competencia se meta en las Fiestas y entienden la labor de nosotros y nos respaldan, otras no.

(Ibid)

The committee has tried to prevent these brands from using the image of the Fests by registering the Fests as a brand with the Department of State. Still, commercial brands have kept on challenging the committee and strategically locating people at bus and boat terminals and on the few access streets to Old San Juan with merchandising such as t-shirts, hats, plastic cups, and other plastic-derived products that will add to the tons of
waste produced at the Fests each year, as seen in press coverage, which is something that needs urgent consideration (El Nuevo Día, 2014). These corporations have gone farther and started to brand the Fests in their campaigns as the SanSe, instead of the registered mark of *Fiestas de la Calle San Sebastián*. But asking the government to prohibit the entrance of commercial brands into San Juan will only fuel contention, as the state turns much more disciplinary and people in turn are becoming less tolerant of governmental abuse. Thus, the committee is somehow trapped. It is not only difficult but also unconstitutional to stop these people from entering San Sebastián Street with or without their products. In the absence of a ‘trustworthy’ state, if that exists, and in the context of an evidently much more aggressive neoliberalism, the committee and other noncommercial live-events producers in Puerto Rico need to rethink their relationships with the multiple direct and indirect social actors involved in the logistic of their events, while reframing their ideas and concepts of production to convince the most unscrupulous capitalists to cooperate and help them assuming a sociocultural responsibility that the state can no longer afford or is no longer interested in paying for.

When I observed the Festivities in 2011, for example, 16 sponsors of public, corporate and religious backgrounds were listed on the printed program (See Figure 5.29). Half of these sponsors belong to state, nonprofit education institutions, and the church, contributing as in-kind sponsors that are part of the steering committee and related subcommittees. Since they do not make any monetary contribution, the steering committee still needs to search for more sponsors to pay for the live-music events. At the end of the Fests, most of the time they break even with a few exceptions, in which case they “decide to take the *cabezudos* and the *Baile de Época* to the Puerto Rican Parade in
New York”, as Acosta said (Personal interview, personal translation). As I infer from the organizers of these Festivities and of the other live-music events observed, these noncommercial and community-based producers are willing to work with the state, the municipalities, and especially with the ICP whose presence – at least symbolically through a logo in a printed program – still adds a certain legitimacy to events that promote national culture.

5.2.3 Noncommercial live-music events production and artistic exchanges: DIY

The last feature that I want to illustrate in this chapter on the logistics and practices of noncommercial live-music events production in Puerto Rico is its links to local, regional, and translocal circuits of artistic exchanges and work flows. As in the case of local commercial production that was described in the previous chapter, these links can be observed at two levels (i.e., through the producers and the musicians), and sustained at different geopolitical and geocultural scales despite its relationships with the local neocolonial state. These links through cultural artistic exchanges within circuits of noncommercial live-events production open up opportunities for musicians and artists out of the mainstream – and sometimes those in it – to work in festivals, carnivals, fests, and
other kind of events. Even though sustaining these links is important both for noncommercial (and commercial) producers and musicians, it has not been prioritized by governmental cultural policy in Puerto Rico. On the contrary, the neoliberal neocolonial state has cut down dramatically the opportunities for doing cultural artistic exchanges, which more or less happened in the past, as some of the producers and musicians I interviewed recalled. In this section, I will turn to cultural artistic exchanges in noncommercial live-music events production as a site of contestation for the local neoliberal neocolonial state.

At the level of the noncommercial live-events producers, we can see local, regional, and translocal links through relationships with musicians, participation in other live-music events, and publics that attend the events. The hiring of local musicians from the same municipalities in which the events take place provides evidence that the four events observed share a strong sense of localism. The producers of Jayuya’s National Indigenous Festival, Loíza’s Patron-Saint Fests, and Ponce’s Carnival, for instance, make evident choices under this principle, which I was able to witness in the pre-production meetings I attended, in the interviews with organizers and musicians, and in the musicians’ line up scheduled for the events. Musicians from Loíza, for example, have a better chance of being hired for the Patron-Saint Fests than those who are not natives or residents of Loíza. The same is evident in the National Indigenous Festival, as a member of the steering committee González confirms:

| [C]ontamos con la participación de los grupos de Jayuya. Queremos que eso sea también un foro donde ellos se presenten. No todos, no siempre, yo creo que la única actividad que se presentan es en este | [W]e count on the participation of groups from Jayuya. We want this to also be a forum in which they can perform. Not all, not always, but I think this Festival is the only event in which they perform /and the |

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Localism was present in the hiring of musicians in Ponce’s Carnival, though to a lesser extent, when compared with the persistent references to symbols of Ponce, such as the municipal flag and color in the parade and other parallel activities. The Carnival, as well as the National Indigenous Festival and Loíza’s Patron-Saint Fests, manifested the idea of localism also through the selection of musical groups that performed musical forms that the producers of these events imagined as local. As illustrated in Table 5.1, the hiring of musicians according to musical forms varied from one event to another. For instance, the producers intentionally included plena in Ponce, bomba in Loiza, and other autochthonous traditional musical forms – mainly música jíbara and danza – in Jayuya, as drawn from the interviews with the producers and from observations.

Table 5.1: Musical forms or genres performed by live-music event

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Autochthonous</th>
<th>Bomba</th>
<th>Plena</th>
<th>Salsa</th>
<th>Merengue</th>
<th>Nova trova</th>
<th>Pop</th>
<th>Reggaeton</th>
<th>Jazz</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FNI</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Música indígena, Música Suramericana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSST</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bolero, ‘Batuplena’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Calipso, soka, and other AfroCaribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPSF</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fusión bomba-hip hop-urbana,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Carnival and the San Sebastián Street Fests were the most inclusive, and even had pop music and reggaetón. The inclusion of reggaetón in the Fests in 2011, however, was
not related to hiring music groups, but limited to a minimal performance of Tito ‘El Bambino,’ a reggaetón artist who was recognized in the Fests along with other artists, artisans, and community leaders. This issue caused major contention within the steering committee, but they were able to reach a consensus before the public opinion. For some members of the committee, reggaetón was not as desirable as other artistic and cultural expressions, and thus it was not appropriate to award a reggaetón artist in the Fests. No other reggaetón artist has been recognized. Interestingly, none of the four observed events hired groups that performed jazz and merengue. The reason why the producers did not include merengue was that they chose to clearly distinguish their events from the patron-saint fests organized by other municipalities. Ludgeria Colón from Jayuya’s Cultural Center reports:

| Música típica, que no se convierta en una fiesta patronal, por decirte así, que es, pues, música que le gusta a la juventud; porque no es que no le guste, pero queremos que la juventud aprenda que también hay unas cosas atrás que la cultura lleva, tú entiendes y […] a lo mejor si yo no me llevo eso a mis hijos de aquí a que crezcan, [que no] me digan “yo no se ni qué es el cuatro”.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Entrevista personal, 2011)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional music, that the event does not turn into a patron-saint fest, to say it like that, which brings music the youth likes; but it is not what they like, we want the youth to learn there are also things from the past that the culture carries on, you know and […] maybe if I do not bring my children, from here until they grow up, that they do not say, “I do not even know what the cuatro is.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Personal interview, 2011, personal translation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus the way that the San Sebastián Street Fests organizers wanted to distinguish their event from patron-saint fests may be seen as well in geopolitical terms that go beyond the generational to a matter of cultural preservation framed around the idea of the national and the notion of “national consciousness” as a value, as mentioned in the previous section. In Puerto Rico, the national is still linked to puertorriqueñidad, although in the
live-music events observed here it was also part of a fusion with local aspects of the municipalities where the events are held and subjected to the concepts of each production, as was much more evident in Ponce’s Carnival (see Figure 5.30). Therefore, the notion of ‘national’ may have played a role in excluding the musical genre of jazz which is also out of the mainstream, but stereotyped as either music from the United States or not related to the theme of the events or their public, as implied by some musicians interviewed. Yet I would not put it that way, especially because the notion of entertaining a massive audience in most of the events observed was much more explicit than was the aim of excluding certain musical forms.

Figure 5.30. Vejigantes in one the parade in Ponce’s Carnival, 2011 (Photo by Author)

A noncommercial, community-based live-music event rarely travels as a concept production the way a commercial live-music events production does; instead, noncommercial producers travel and interconnect at local, regional and translocal levels with the public, whether these are participants, special guests, or local or international tourists. As demonstrated in Table 5.2, the National Indigenous Festival’s producers, followed by the producers of Ponce’s Carnival, have demonstrated that they tend to be more active than other producers as witnessed by their traveling to countries and cities in the Latin American and Caribbean regions as well as to various cities in the United
States. When I was there in 2001, the Festival had been featured by Uruguayan television along with the British television series *The Globe Trekker* (see Figure 5.31).

**Table 5.2: Regional and translocal networks of noncommercial live-music events producers’ flows**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Regional (including México)</th>
<th>Translocal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>South America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIF</td>
<td>México, Panamá</td>
<td>Colombia, Uruguay (TV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSSF</td>
<td></td>
<td>NY (PR Parade), Florida (Orlando)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>México</td>
<td>Dominican Republic (Sto. Domingo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPSF (UStream)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2001, a folkloric group from México was supposed to travel and perform in the Festival, paid for by the ICP. Problems with the group’s visas, however, limited its travels. Moreover, the Festival’s producers have participated in cultural exchanges with other indigenous festivals in the Dominican Republic, where the Festival’s queens demonstrate their indigenous-inspired dresses and the *Banda Indígena* is invited to play *batú*. These are two-way exchanges, as González explains:

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108 Both Uruguayan television and *The Globe Trekker* were interested in indigenous festivals, as the Festival organizers explained.

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The producers of Ponce’s Carnival have participated not only in two-way exchanges in which they attend other carnivals on the island and later invited participants from the other carnivals to bring floats or artistic performances to the parade in Ponce, but also in one-way exchanges in the Puerto Rican Parade in New York City, to which most local carnivals also tried to attend by invitation of the Parade’s producers. The Carnival received live press coverage from a major radio station that broadcasts island wide (i.e., Boricua Radio 740 AM), and was visited by The Travel Channel which filmed an episode of the *Sand Masters* reality show at the plaza during the seven days of the event (see Figure 5.32). The San Sebastián Street Fests, despite being the most attended by local and international tourism, showed as well a few direct translocal interconnections with the Puerto Rican Parade in New York City and with the city of Orlando, Florida, the home base of the only non Puerto Rican artist who performed at one of the four observed events (i.e., Manny Fuentes; see Figure 5.33).\(^{109}\) Loíza’s Patron-Saint Fests are mostly attended by local residents or by people from Loíza who return to enjoy the Fests. While the Fests’ staging is much more modest than that of the other three events observed, this was the most technologically conscious and even created a UStream channel called Loíza TV in which the producers live-stream their event while interconnecting mostly with the Loíza diaspora in the United States and elsewhere (Loíza TV, n.d.; see Figure 5.34).

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\(^{109}\) Manny Fuentes traveled alone and performed with local musicians, a common practice currently followed in the salsa circuit. It is a contradictory practice since it works in favor of local musicians while at the same time it limits their possibilities for doing artistic cultural exchanges and traveling abroad.
Figure 5.31. *The Globe Trekker*’s crew filming the *Banda Indígena* in Jayuya’s National Indigenous Festival, 2011 (Photo by Author)

Figure 5.32. The Travel Channel filmed a reality show on sandcarving during Ponce’s Carnival, 2011 (before and after, Photo by Author)

Figure 5.33. Orlando, Florida-based Puerto Rican salsa artist Manny Fuentes on-state at the San Sebastián Street Fests 2011 (Photo by Author)
At the level of the musicians, as I have illustrated in this chapter, the relationship between musicians and live-music events production at a local scale occurs directly between musicians and noncommercial live-events producers as well as through promoters or public employees in the case of the municipalities and the state.

Historically, the local state used to help contact the artists to perform locally and also regionally (including México), as musician Elías Rivera recalls: 110

| Conocimos a ‘Tony’ Mapeyé [José Antonio Rivera Colón] que era el que dirigía, […] era el director de ese programa [de Promoción Cultural y Artesanías Populares del ICP]. Bueno, pues ahí seguimos visitando diferentes festivales, dándonos promoción, hacíamos contratos y nos enviaban a diferentes puntos de la Isla a llevar nuestra música. Y en una ocasión, pues, se nos brinda la oportunidad de hacer un intercambio cultural con México, con la Universidad Autónoma de México, y pues, tuvimos la gracia de que nos escogieron para que fuéramos, ya que México y Puerto Rico están muy identificados con la música de Rafael Hernández. Rafael Hernández en México es como de allí. […] Entonces |
| We met ‘Tony’ Mapeyé [José Antonio Rivera Colón] who was the director […] of that Program [the CPPAP at the ICP]. Then we continued visiting other festivals, promoting our work, we signed contracts and were sent around the island with our music. And on one occasion, we received the opportunity to do a cultural exchange with México, with the Autonomous University of México, and then, we had the grace of being selected to go, since México and Puerto Rico are both very identified with the music of [composer] Rafael Hernández. Rafael Hernández in México was treated as if he were from there. […] And since we had a vast repertoire of Rafael Hernández, that opened the door for |

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110 Rivera was part of a *bolero* trio which is no longer active.
Once again, there is striking evidence that the role of key figures committed to cultural artistic production can make a significant difference in the practice. In that moment, between 1977 and 1993, music leader ‘Tony’ Mapeyé was the head of the CPPA. His name appears in many interviews as an exponent of autochthonous traditional music. As can be evidenced from Rivera’s interview, in addition to the support from the CPPA – the same program that is in charge of the cultural centers – the reasons why musicians travel abroad to work in noncommercial live-events may also be contingent. The musical repertoire that musicians specialize in, as in this case, plays a decisive role at the moment the state as well as cultural producers identify and decide to contract or recommend a musical group; in addition at work are friendship bonds and contacts made through local performances, regional or international touring along with individual promotional activities both in broadcast and more recently in social media. The case of Maricruz Rivera-Clemente, director of Majestad Negra – a bomba music and dance company under the sociocultural and environmental justice project Corporación Piñones se Integra – exemplifies how contingency worked in her group’s favor. After begging the Puerto Rico Tourism Company for public funds to perform at a noncommercial Afro-descending noncommercial live-music event in Ecuador, Rivera-Clemente reports that the Company gave her only $5,000 out of a total of $20,000 needed to cover all her group’s traveling and lodging costs (Personal interview, 2011). The producers of the event in Ecuador covered in-land transportation and other expenses which are usually costly.
Consequentially, she and Majestad Negra embarked in a fundraising campaign to make the trip possible:

| Benicio Del Toro llegó un día a la comunidad de sorpresa buscándonos porque él quería ayudar en la defensa de Piñones, así que yo, nada, yo le dije “mira tenemos esta actividad para recaudar fondos porque las nenas van para Ecuador” y dijo, “pues van para Ecuador, yo pago el viaje” y nos dio 15,000. | One day, Benicio Del Toro arrived in the community by surprise looking for us because he wanted to help in the defense of Piñones, so I told him “look we have this activity to raise funds to travel with the girls to Ecuador” and he said, “Then you will go to Ecuador, I will pay for the air tickets” and he gave us $15,000. |
| (Ibid) | (Ibid, personal translation) |

Another example of how musicians try to sustain links abroad can be seen through the case of Julio Enrique ‘Julito’ Alvarado, musical director of the internationally known salsa duo Richie Ray y Bobby Cruz for the past 15 years, but also recently the music director of his own salsa orchestra Del Sur Al Norte that was out of the mainstream at the moment of the interview. He recalled that the ICP contacted him in the late 1990s through a friend from college who worked at the ICP then and served as a contact for local hiring through this institution (Personal interview, 2011). It was also this friend who later recommended him to perform at the San Sebastián Street Fests. From then on, he has worked directly with the Fests’ steering committee and the state has not intervened in that relationship.

Regarding current links to regional and translocal networks of noncommercial live-events production, however, artists and musicians have needed to be more creative and play the do-it-yourself game. And indeed, they have extended their efforts farther than the producers have, as Tables 5.2 and A.3 display. In the case of Alvarado, although he has not yet traveled with his salsa orchestra, he has been able to use already existing links to regional and translocal networks of artistic flows through his music tours with
Richie Ray y Bobby Cruz and other musical groups subjected to record labels; for these
tours, he interconnects with people in the media to promote his music abroad. Alvarado
already had a self-released record that he could hand to the media, in the hopes that it
might eventually reach local live-music events producers and promoters interested in his
work. In fact, as Alvarado notes:

| [N]o he viajado con la orquesta, pero sí hemos sonado como tres temas fuertes en Ecuador, que me han mandado la información de las posiciones en los charts. Estamos sonando en Colombia. Ahora mismo yo estuve en la Fiesta de Cali con otra orquesta [de Richie Ray y Bobby Cruz] en diciembre y aproveché. | [I] have not have traveled with the orchestra, but we have at least three singles [songs] sounding strong in Ecuador, and they have sent me onto the charts. We have singles in Colombia. Just last December I went to the Fests in Cali with another orchestra [Richie Ray y Bobby Cruz] and took advantage of it. |
| Y donde quiera que yo llego a tocar con la orquesta que sea, hay un enfoque que se llama Del Sur al Norte y yo tengo, consigo mis contactos, me voy a la radio, hago prensa, hago televisión, todo ese tipo de cosas. | And everywhere I go to perform with whichever orchestra, my focus is on Del Sur al Norte, and I find my contacts, go to the radio, do some press and television, all these kinds of things. |
| (Entrevista personal, 2011) | (Personal interview, 2011, personal translation) |

Neither the local state in Puerto Rico and at these regional and translocal sites nor
the promoters mediate these relationships built through individual promotional efforts
directly with key persons. Regarding the United States, the only way musicians and
producers in general relate to the Federal state may be by requesting a U.S. passport and
negotiating visas. This is a neocolonial and geopolitical relationship that may be
questioned and understood as both a challenge to neocolonial neoliberalism and an
exception to it, given that most of the musicians interviewed said they manage to use this
connection to their benefit while at the same time they maneuver to sustain links through
cultural artistic exchanges with countries such as Cuba (as noted in Table A.3) where a passport is of no use to Puerto Ricans due to the U.S. blockage.

The case of Alvarado reflects the importance of musicians’ previous knowledge about the circuits in which they want to perform and move their artistic work and of a personal will to actually carry this careful navigation. This case also shows that the regional links in which artistic work flows depend largely on the music performed, specifically on its form or genre. In this instance, Alvarado mentioned Ecuador and Colombia – and expressly Cali – that accentuate the translocality of these flows in cities within the *salsa* circuit. As seen in the on-site interviews, musicians and artists in other circuits, such as those related to autochthonous traditional music, are more specifically tied to local noncommercial live-music events in Puerto Rico or regional cities in which similar musical forms first were developed, particularly in South America and the Caribbean; still these ties can be seen as well in cities such as New York and Chicago or “wherever there are Puerto Ricans,” as singer and songwriter Andrés Jiménez explains (Personal interview, 2010). Specifically, the salsa circuit is not limited to the Latin American and Caribbean region, and – as *salsa* singer Manolo Lezcano frames it – this flow shows a tendency to move more often to “where Colombians are” (Personal interview, 2011).

Recent scholarship on translocal networks focuses primarily on global cities in which people meet by the same routes that these musicians describe: for instance via language and other cultural commonalities which can be considered as geocultural dimensions of these relationships (Peterson, 2007; Sassen, 2007). Nonetheless, I agree with comparable scholarship on cultural flows that argues that cultural similarities or
proximity are not fixed requirements for this and other circuits to exist (Iwabuchi, 2002; Iwabuchi, Muecke & Mandy, 2004). For example, of the four noncommercial live-music events discussed in this dissertation, three of them include *salsa* music performances: Ponce’s Carnival, Loíza’s Patron-Saint Fests, and the San Sebastián Street Fests. As seen in Table A.3, the artists interviewed at these events have worked in different countries and cities throughout the Americas and abroad and beyond the Spanish Caribbean and the region overall to cities as far as Japan and Europe where cultural resemblance with Puerto Rico is minimal. At the same time, I respect recent and ongoing studies in cities such as London that have examined the construction of spaces for Latin, Latin American, and Caribbean artistic production as a consequence of migrations (Román Velázquez, 1996, 2014). While it is undeniable that migration flows have been increasingly changing the ways that we understand cities elsewhere, I want to stress the dimension of the musical form as a site for dialogue and difference as well as a possible opportunity of work for local artists and musicians in noncommercial live-music events production elsewhere, despite the geocultural. In this sense, for example, not even interconnections through language – which have historically been a point of contention and defense of national culture in Puerto Rico – are necessary.\(^\text{111}\)

As founder of *La Sonora Ponceña salsa* orchestra Enrique ‘Quique’ Lucca describes,

| Ese es el idioma universal. Sí, la música, imagine,…nosotros hemos ido a Alemania a tocar y lo disfrutan y bailan como cualquiera de aquí. Hasta mejor que los de aquí. Sí, una cosa buena, la salsa se ha regado en el mundo entero de tal forma que en todas partes del mundo la gente lo | That is the universal language. Yes, the music, imagine …we have visited Germany to perform and they enjoy it and dance as anyone from here. Even better. Yes, a good thing, the *salsa* has spread throughout the whole world in such a way that everywhere there are people who |

\(^\text{111}\) However, my experience is that at the administrative level of the producers, a minimum language understanding between the producers is needed to better deal with the contracts.
baila y lo disfruta.  
(Entrevista personal, 2011)  
dance and enjoy it.  
(Personal interview, 2011, personal translation)

In the end, it is all about the pleasure of performing for a living.

5.3 Conclusion

“The world of art is one in which neutrality is not expected.  
Everyone is entitled to an opinion, their expertise notwithstanding.”  
Dubin (1987, xiii)

Certainly, I was not expecting neutrality when I began the fieldwork. I was expecting to reach, listen, and give space to the voices of noncommercial live-music events producers and musicians whose working conditions have been long ignored and unexplored by governmental cultural policy and institutions for cultural action as well as by other sectors in the field of live events production and scholarship overall. The ethnographic observations and on-site interviews with musicians – along with the in-depth interviews with noncommercial live-music events producers in the events selected for this dissertation – demonstrate that noncommercial live-music events production involves multiple, complex planning processes similar to those active in commercial production; the main distinction lies in that this production is not motivated by commercial or entrepreneurial values. On the contrary, noncommercial live-music events production has evolved and constantly challenges the entrepreneurial character of the (post)neoliberal sociocultural order by prioritizing different ideas and values related primarily with national cultural consciousness and localism as principles for producing culture and promoting cultural work for artists who are mostly outside the mainstream.

As I illustrated in this chapter, noncommercial live-music events production can be conducted by the state, which in the case of Puerto Rico has been transferring its
responsibilities to the municipalities more each time since the early 1990s; such production also can be undertaken by community-based groups with diverse interests and motivations that are frequently composed of volunteers with no professional training in live-music events production yet with an impressive ability to organize complex events of massive reach. These community-based groups or the producers within municipalities are not exempt from internal friction due to the politics of differentiation; such tension is generally evident in the staging of the events per se as well as in pre-production meetings and organizational decisions related to the concepts in which the events are framed. Thus, noncommercial live-music events production is neither exempt from contention with the state and its politics of space and sponsorship nor with corporate sponsors who often try to ‘steal the show’ from them, as seen in the case of the San Sebastián Street Fests as well as other examples.

As evidenced through the interviews, the lack of will and strength of the state for producing and sponsoring live-music events and cultural action overall has opened up space for the emergence of the promoter as a neoliberal intermediary who complicates the relationships among noncommercial live-events producers, musicians, the state, and the promoters themselves. The interviews also provide strong evidence for how noncommercial live-music events producers have either negotiated or resisted the ambiguous, all-encompassing and often problematic role of the promoters by limiting their functions or excluding them from their events production. As evidenced in the discussion on Law 223 of autochthonous traditional Puerto Rican music, musicians also protested the lack of support from the state vis-à-vis the promoters, particularly from
those who tried to monopolize the live-music events and limit the musicians’ opportunities to work.

I concluded this chapter by highlighting that noncommercial live-music events production in Puerto Rico also travels and percolates outside the boundaries of the island and the limits of the neoliberal neocolonial state, both in terms of sponsorship and geopolitical location. I confirmed that noncommercial live-music events producers and musicians have developed their own links and ways to raise funds for traveling, which in most cases can be contingent, moved by personal motivations, and often developed within a ‘do-it-yourself’ culture of production that does not depend on local political swings. Examples of both noncommercial live-music events producers and musicians demonstrate how cultural artistic exchanges can represent an exception to neocolonialism within neoliberalization as well as another way to understand globalization, as these cultural producers have historically managed to overcome the neocolonial limits and continue to sustain local, regional and translocal links with little or no assistance from the state in Puerto Rico or at the U.S. federal level; rather they keep inserting themselves and participating in circuits outside the mainstream, mostly associated with artistic flows in and from global cities instead of in the opposite directions described through particular cases in this chapter.
CHAPTER 6

WORKING TITLE: BEHIND THE STAGE AND BEYOND THE STATE

“Neoliberalism seems to be dominant everywhere; the market has won, it seems. But the roles of the state, government and public policy are far from dead or redundant.”

Willis (2000, 122)

6.1 Historical linkages and colonial legacies

The geopolitics of an island characterizes a territory as either isolated or opened to the world. In the case of Puerto Rico, this dichotomy becomes relevant given the limits of colonialism and neocolonialism over the local state’s ability to participate in transnational networks of political and economic power. In this dissertation, I explored those limits and the challenges to them through a critical cultural study of the local state and its national cultural policy on live-music events production. The first body chapters are historical accounts on the emergence of the field of live-music events production and national cultural policy, respectively, consistent with the chronological order in which they were created in a context parallel to the development of the neocolonial state from the 1950s to 1970s. In Chapter 2, I traced the cultural legacies and practices of live-music events production in Puerto Rico and its links to the Latin American and Caribbean region and other translocal networks before national cultural policy. I illustrated how live-music events production became professionalized and interconnected with other cultural industries in Puerto Rico. One of the most important features of this era is the role of artists who became independent live events producers ‘in the making’ and fostered a culture of production that initially was not determined by market forces, but by a will to open up opportunities for artists to perform local music forms in local venues. These pioneer artists-producers sustained local, regional and translocal artistic exchanges...
in circuits of music events’ flows that helped them developing the spectacle as a ‘star’ on its own, which could be understood as an artistic cultural form in direct differentiation from the music industry’s star system in which the artists was the ‘star.’ Their independent culture of production challenged and eventually entered in conflict with market forces and new social actors that entered the field decades after, as seen in Chapter 4.

In Chapter 3, I focused on the historical linkages that explain the relationship between the state and national culture in Puerto Rico, from which competing notions on national cultural policy developed between the 1950s and 1970s and changed from the 1970s to the current (post)neoliberal era. I described the efforts of the contradictory anti-nationalist and national-populist governmental administration in which the neocolonial state’s sociocultural policy agenda relied on. This policy agenda materialized through the notion of *puertorriqueñidad* and Operation Serenity, a project that intended to calm down the violent economic reconstruction during the Cold War era in Puerto Rico and was conducted by ‘inherited’ colonial and new institutions for cultural affairs. As I argued in this chapter, governmental national cultural policy in Puerto Rico was ambivalent from the start because of these geopolitical reasons. However, in the whole dissertation I have insisted on contingent and individual reasons that generate particular cultures of production that challenge and construct cultural policy in different ways, such as the anti-market culture of production developed by Ricardo Alegría at the ICP which prioritized local traditional artistic forms, as well as cultures of production developed by the local live-music events producers and artists, as described in other chapters. The case of the ICP received special attention throughout the dissertation, because it was at the core of
the governmental plan for cultural action and its main challenger at the same time, especially after the 1970s when bipartisanship overpowered governmental decision-making processes, and the ICP as well as national cultural policy lost the relative support it had from the local state.

In Chapters 4 and 5, I pointed up to the global and neoliberal shifts in governmental cultural policy in the 1990s and how these shifts changed the relationship between live-music events producers and the state in Puerto Rico. The neoliberal turn in governmental cultural policy and subsequent debilitation of the local state since the 1990s paved the way for the logics of new local, regional and multinational players that entered the live-music events production industry, which altered the relationships between events producers, artists, sponsors, the owners of venues, and the publics. These logics also generated conflicts between producers and the local neocolonial neoliberal state, contested both by commercial live-events producers organized as a professional class, but also by noncommercial and community-based live-events producers and artists who went beyond the neocolonial and neoliberal limits of the state and kept on sustaining a vibrant live-events production scene in Puerto Rico and related local, regional, and translocal circuits of artistic exchanges.

Particularly, Chapter 5 shows evidence of these conflicting relationships through ethnographical observations and on-site interviews in three community-based live-music events (i.e., Jayuya’s National Indigenous Festival, Loíza’s Patron-Saint Fests, and the San Sebastián Street’s Festival), and one event sponsored and produced by a local municipality in Puerto Rico (i.e., Ponce’s Carnival). These cases exemplify how the political and conflict mediate in the logics and practices involved in producing a live-
music event in Puerto Rico in which the state takes partial or major participation. The conflict is not only with the local state and its municipalities as contested spaces in processes of neoliberalization, as seen in the cases of the San Sebastián Street Fests and Loíza’s Patron-Saint Fests which challenge the state’s politics of space. The conflict is also with other social actors involved in the planning processes, including the members of the production committees themselves, sponsorship of public, corporate or religious base, and even neoliberalism as an underlying framework that collides with the work and interests of artists and producers. A special emphasis on the logics and practices of live-music events production as cultural work in relation to the neocolonial state helped me mapping the current local field beyond the stereotyped tone of the “fiesta island” and the representational to reveal a complex web of oppositional and also complementary relationships with other social actors that have been ignored until very recently by the local state and policymakers in Puerto Rico (see Figure 6.1).

6.2 Reflection on the present conditions of policy about live-music events production in Puerto Rico

I will finish up with a personal reflection on the recent conditions of public policy about live-music events production from the vantage point of a research-producer who is wrapping up a dissertation in the middle of an interesting debate on these matters. I will briefly comment on on the Comisión para el Desarrollo de la Cultura de Puerto Rico (Puerto Rico’s Commission for the Cultural Development, or CODECU), created by the present administration of Governor Alejandro García-Padilla, in order to make some recommendations for this Commission as well as others social actors in the current field of live-music events production on the island.
On July 29 of 2013, the local state celebrated the birth of CODECU and the assignment of a $300 thousand budget to carry out a series of responsibilities delegated to this Commission, which include reporting on recommendations about cultural policy before December 2015 (Toro 2013a, 50-51). The local press highlighted the fact that “now there will be cultural policy,” and other positive features of CODECU, such as a composition of a large amount of people committed to culture from a variety of backgrounds –e.g., literature, theater, film, music (a pop music singer-songwriter), plastic and visual artists, and even lawyers, cultural history scholars, journalists, among others (ibid –personal translation). It is indeed a talented cohort, and an interesting initiative applauded by many sectors in the broader field of cultural production in Puerto Rico which have been somehow neutralized with the new governmental administration, especially after struggling hard with the massacre that the previous administration of Governor Fortuño did over artistic culture and work in general. But the debates emerged immediately around CODECU and the relevance of a parallel advisory committee created in the local Senate with apparently no communication between the two groups (Toro 2013b, 60-61).

While recent efforts concerning governmental cultural action in Puerto Rico, such as CODECU, have brought cultural policy back into the public discussions through open calls for community-based dialogues within and outside the academic confines, and have also considered the field of live-music events production and live-events overall, I argue that these efforts have not yet overcome some tendencies that limited previous attempts for doing cultural policy, as I have repeatedly accentuated in this dissertation. For instance, 1) the tendency to disregard the existence of one or more models of cultural
policy that have historically played a role in local cultural history; and 2) the tendency to conspicuously exclude certain sectors and groups of interest that may be affected by governmental cultural action. This exclusion is done either intentionally or due to a lack of awareness on these groups, which in any case does not represent a good precedent nor an innovation on policymaking about culture in Puerto Rico.

Before this scenario, I would like to suggest that cultural policy needs to be based on a genuine commitment to research on cultural history and cultural action by public but also private institutions and independent groups, such as those discussed here which have so much to teach us about policymaking. First, the ICP was a robust governmental effort for cultural action and policy that cannot be dismissed. Its most important project was a community-based one, so strong and well planned that is still responsible for the existence of many cultural centers in charge of producing hundreds of festivals and other kinds of live-public events that have survived the local political swings until present and contribute to promoting artistic work as well as related jobs and income. Why could not CODECU’s budget go to the ICP, and the members as part of an ICP’s new Board with the same commitment to independent thinking they now deferred to the CODECU? In my opinion, the government itself disrespects the ICP and its mission –identical to CODECU’s main responsibilities, and disregards an old history on the institutions for governmental cultural action which CODECU’s efforts may be recycling or duplicating.112

112 In 2008, a local newspaper published an editorial entitled ¿Dónde está la “política cultural”? [Where is the “cultural policy”?], asking for governmental cultural action in areas in which the state had already did research on, but instead were left as only interventions with no transcendence in the practice, such as the report from the Senate already mentioned in this dissertation (El Nuevo Día 2008; Senado de Puerto Rico 2005). Some of the recommendations of the research cited in the press article surfaced again in CODECU’s recent report (CODECU 2014).
This brings me to my second statement, which is that there has always been cultural policy in Puerto Rico. But if coherence and government action are sought as prerequisites to its existence, of course nobody will find it in Puerto Rico. As I have argued in this dissertation, governmental cultural policy in Puerto Rico developed along the neocolonial state and was bifurcated from the start between the propagandistic Operation Serenity and Alegría’s vigorous plan, intentionally fragmented to the point of dismantling by bipartisan politics and neocolonial legacies on the one hand, and neoliberalism on the other. Governmental cultural policy in Puerto Rico has existed in a neocolonial neoliberal form, consistent with a highly normative display of laws and regulations which often remains at the level of intervention but does not turn into action. On the contrary, numerous laws are created every year, sometimes converging and at rush, full of ambivalences, disorganization, fragmentation, incoherence, excessive bureaucratization, lack of budgetary support and continuity, and the exclusion of certain groups while privileging others; all characteristics of the kind of cultural legacies that underline policymaking in a context like Puerto Rico and which are called in every time scholars or groups such as the CODECU want to discharge against cultural policy. Moreover, cultural policy does not always need to be planned and planned by the government, which reflects a colonial and dependant mentality that Puerto Ricans are still struggling with, and which leads to demoralization regarding the locally produced instead of cultural action and contestation. Governmental cultural policy is only part of the multiple discourses on cultural policy that need to be rethought (McGuigan 2004). As seen in the live-music events observed and analyzed in this dissertation, as well as in the historical revision of the logics of the field of live-music events production, the cultures
of production developed by noncommercial, community-based, and even commercial live-events producers are also cultural policy and is defined through the establishment of priorities regarding culture and concepts of production within which their events, the reach of these events, their criteria of artistic inclusion, and their relationships with multiple social actors –including the state– will be framed on, despite of their differences. But this kind of cultural policy that works from the difference and outside the entrepreneurial and the state has historically been left out and invisibilized locally as forms of doing cultural policy. Worse yet, as I mentioned before, it has historically vaguely managed the complexity of the logics and practices of events production overall, and CODECU is not an exception.

CODECU members’ composition reflects variety, which is not equal to diversity. The members were appointed by the Governor, and not representative of all the possible social actors related to cultural production and artistic work in Puerto Rico. For example, not a single representative from COPEP or a live-events producer was included in the commissioners. Also, after years of protests against the neoliberal policies of the previous governmental administration in which groups of artists participated, the artists were called in to the CODECU in an individual character. And the artists accepted with no reply, instead of consulting with the groups they belong to in order to be sure these groups wanted her or him to represent the collective. In my opinion, the participatory approach that CODECU wants to promote could be limited if it fails to recognize the groups of interests such as unions and syndicates, professional associations and colleges, and other collective organizations related to the commissioners or to the cultural aspects they want to dialogue on. And I am not talking about quotas, but equal representation of
artistic cultural producers that their peers could feel represented by. Furthermore, to add to the colonial legacies and the particular logics of current governmental cultural policy in Puerto Rico, a Franciscan priest—who is also a writer, was designated to head the CODECU. Not a single group of interest complaints about it, not even for openly overlooking the supposed separation between the church and the state, which as another law on cultural policy, is written but not enacted.

In terms of cultural legislation on live-music events production, a recent report by the CODECU commented on the Law 108, treated with sensibility regarding both the elderly and the cultural producers affected by the discounted and free tickets. However, the CODECU has pronounced against the Law 113 that created COPEP. Following their first report,

| En el caso de los promotores, esta legislación representa una barrera a la producción independiente, algo que atenta contra la libertad de expresión, diversidad y capacidad de recaudo del gobierno a través del impuesto de ventas y uso. (CODECU 2014, 28) | In the case of promoters, this law represents a barrier to independent production, something that attempts against the freedom of expression, diversity, and the government capacity of income through taxation on consumption. (CODECU 2014, 28) |

This is a challenge that the CODECU poses on local commercial and noncommercial independent producers, who would need to take care of it immediately. I am not sure the CODECU is informed on the historical development and the diversity of logics and practices within the different social actors that constitute the complex field of live-music events production. As a professional field, live-events production has more than 60 years of existence, traveling artists locally, regionally, translocally, and globally, and generates over 5,000 specialized jobs and 300 million in the local economy (Echevarría Báez 2005; APEP 2004). The case of noncommercial state-sponsored and community-based live-
events production is not different, as seen in the interviews on Chapter 5, especially regarding the San Sebastián Street Fests and Ponce’s Carnival which are free and open to the publics and through which the municipal governments also generate millions of dollars. How much of that income returns to artistic cultural production is a matter of inquiry that all, producers, artists and the publics –who are taxpayers– need to ask the government for, as Carmen Dolores Hernández also suggested in an important and rarely referenced essay (Hernández 2004).\footnote{As part of my research design, I conducted institutional ethnography and observed many public hearings at the ICP’s Music Division, especially on the Law 223 on autochthonous traditional music. These were open to the public, but not a single artist or producer attended. To my surprise, apart from the representatives from the ICP (i.e., subcontracted lawyers) and key municipal representatives from municipalities that were sanctioned for not complying with the law, I was the only person who attended these hearings.} It is COPEP’s responsibility to defend live-events as cultural forms which translate into work, and be aware of its own limits and internal conflicts which may affect other social actors in the field, and especially artistic production and the relation with the publics, and be prepared to justify the support it demanded from the neocolonial neoliberal state to be grouped and recognized as a professional class.

In regards of the field of live-music events production, matters concerning ticketing pricing (little regulated in Puerto Rico), ticketing companies as new local and global social actors in the field, and access to the publics to venues and live-events due to issues of ticketing deserve to be better studied. The arena of democracy could be fertile to do so, and also to study cultural policy as a broader political project that aims for democracy and access to culture as a principle. Also, further research can be done on voluntarism which, besides of being analyzed here as a challenge to governmental cultural policy in the case of Puerto Rico, can be also seen as convenient for
neoliberalism, as it definitely represents free labor in which the government does not invest, from which both the state and commerce benefit, as recent scholarship analyze (Alvarez, Dagnino & Escobar 1998; Avritzer 2002; Baiocchi 2005; Encarnación 2003). Last but not least, a recent bent toward cultural development based on entrepreneurialism within the CODECU members and its mission, and in a different way through new proposed legislation on creative industries, also deserves careful attention (CODECU 2014, 11; Pérez Sánchez 2014). While it is true that a governmental cultural policy based on culture and creative industries may generate public funds, the origin of these ideas and the values in which they are cemented on often succumb to neoliberal logics in which the aim for generating economic capital for development give in the role of the state and may collide with the particular and sensible conditions of work of artists and musicians, especially those out of the mainstream. In the context of a debilitated neocolonial neoliberal state in Puerto Rico, and a crisis of the cultural institutions –and not of cultural production, as Hernández would say, the options to promote cultural work and public funds need to be far more creative and inclusive of different voices, not only the governments’ or the administrators’.

6.3 Artists and producers do not live on ‘habits of the heart’

Like recent Latin American, Caribbean, and Latino-oriented scholars, I work with artistic production and creative subjects like live-music events producers and musicians, to whom making shows and music is indeed a ‘habit of the heart,’ in Harvey’s sense (Yúdice 2003, Dávila 1997 & 2013; Negus 1999; Harvey 2005). However, not all producers and musicians could afford to live on habits of the heart –no matter how vivid
the local industry is and how much cultural capital Puerto Rico has accumulated over the years. If cultural policy does not translate into actual work and job opportunities, especially when they are often in-between but also marginal to the local state, its neocolonial limits and its processes of neoliberalization, producers and musicians are left subjected to precarious conditions of work beyond the flamboyant stereotype of the show business or a “fiesta island.” In this dissertation, my focus on the local state carried always the question on producers and artists whose voices I tried to include in a sensible way, aware of the conflicts, friction, and differences that may interfere among them but also with me as an observer of their work. At least, I hope this research serves to raise awareness on the importance of artistic cultural work as a crucial priority that public, corporate and independent-sponsored cultural action should follow in the absence of a strong state in the era of neocolonial neoliberalism, which far from have won everywhere, still can be contested in context-specific cases as those shown here in which the promotion of culture and education become localized political projects that far from being isolated flow in circuits and exchanges sustained by live-music events producers and artists.
APPENDIX A

REGLAMENTO DE LOS CENTROS CULTURALES
ADSCRITOS AL ICP [original version]

http://www.icp.gobierno.pr/documentos#artes_populares [The original 1956 version will be added. The 2000 version will be added in another chapter.]
APPENDIX B

SOLICITUD DE INGRESO AL CENTRO CULTURAL

http://www.icp.gobierno.pr/documentos#artes_populares [It will be added.]
APPENDIX C

PROCEDIMIENTO PARA SOLICITAR ADSCRIBIRSE AL PROGRAMA DE ARTISTAS ADSCRITOS AL ICP

Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña
Programa de Promoción en los Pueblos y Artes Populares

Fax: (787) 722-3526
Apartado 9024184
724-0700/ 724-4517
San Juan, Puerto Rico  00902-4184
Portal: www.icp.gobierno.pr

PROCEDIMIENTO PARA SOLICITAR ADSCRIBIRSE AL PROGRAMA DE ARTISTAS ADSCRITO

1. Enviar carta a la señora Carmen Martínez Maldonado, directora del Programa de Promoción Cultural manifestándole su interés en pertenecer al Programa de Artistas Adscrito.

2. Foto del grupo o individual, según sea el caso, con uniforme y bien tirada, a color, que sirva para promoción. Preferiblemente tamaño 8 x 10.

3. Historial o resume de la trayectoria del grupo, evidenciando su experiencia y labor realizada, así como los objetivos de la agrupación, categoría, composición e instrumentalidad.

4. Copia fotostáticas de recortes de periódicos, programas, carteles, cartas de recomendación evidenciando su trayectoria artística

5. Acompañar con una grabación en audio CASETTE, CD, VHS y DVD no menor de 30 minutos de su repertorio para uso evaluativo, promocional y estudio.

6. Lista del repertorio escrito que incluya título, género y compositor.

7. Todo grupo o artista debe estar disponible para realizar una presentación en vivo, gratuitamente como parte de su evaluación final en una actividad auspiciada por el Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña.

8. El grupo debe tener más de dos (2) años de su creación.

10. Puede enviar dichos requisitos por correo y/o personalmente a la oficina de Promoción Cultural en los Pueblos en el Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña en la calle Norzagaray Final en el Viejo San Juan.

Si desea más información, asesoramiento y orientación puede comunicarse con el señor Juan B. Troncoso Santiago, Especialista en Asuntos Culturales.
APPENDIX D

FONDO NACIONAL PARA EL FINANCIAMIENTO DEL QUEHACER CULTURAL

[SEE SUPPLEMENTAL FILE]
APPENDIX E

ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO RICO

[SEE SUPPLEMENTAL FILE]
APPENDIX F

APEP'S TALK SUBMITTED TO GOVERNOR SILA M. CALEDÓN

REGARDING SMG

ASOCIACION DE PRODUCTORES DE ESPECTACULOS PUBLICOS

PONENCIA

2 de abril de 2004

INTRODUCCION

A través de los últimos 25 años Puerto Rico se ha proyectado al mundo como una plaza de gran importancia en el entretenimiento a nivel mundial. Grandes eventos tales como Miss Universe, Major League Baseball (Expo de Montreal), Torneo Pre-Olimpico de Baloncesto las Américas, NBA y el especial de Jennifer López para NBC han sido presentados por millones de televidentes. Los espectáculos de estrellas internacionales de la emisora de Pavone, Luis Guerra, Madonna, Backstreet Boys, Swing, Santana, Piqué Domingo, entre otros, han sido favorecidos por nuestro público.

La familia ha tenido la oportunidad de disfrutar las vivencias de Toy Story, Disney en los y Grandes Circo, Willie Gómez, Félix "Tito" Trinidad, entre otros, han levantado emociones. Los núcleos como Ricky Martin, Chayanne, Eddie Nazario, José Feliciano, Marc Anthony, Olga Tañón, Gilberto Santa Rosa, Manny Manuel, Danny Rivera, Luis Fonsi, Roberto Ross, Elvis Crespo, Vallenato Monge, entre otros, han dado cátedra de su talento a la par con los mejores del mundo.

Es indudable que el entretenimiento ha sido una parte integral de nuestra cultura. Se han creado más de 5,000 empleos especializados (músicos, técnicos y personal de...)

[Please, see the attached file for the complete document. This one did not copy the whole document.]
APPENDIX G
OSEPS APPLICATION FOR THE LICENSE

[SEE SUPPLEMENTAL FILE]
APPENDIX H

OFFICIAL SCHEDULE OF THE 41ST JAYUYA'S NATIONAL INDIGENOUS FESTIVAL 2011 (SPANISH VERSION)

PROGRAMA

lunes, 18 de noviembre
7:30 p.m. Apertura de la exposición:
Rompiendo El Molde
Lugar: Centro Cultural Jayuyano
Alberto Suarez Martínez, Inc.
Artista Invitado: Gibraros de Altura – Coasipica Abbott
Auspicio: Promoción Cultura – Instituto de Cultura
Puertorriqueña

viernes, 19 de noviembre
10:00 a.m. Feria de Artesanías / Sala de Exposiciones
1:00 p.m. Grupo Guanía
2:15 p.m. Danzantes / Banda Indígena
3:45 p.m. Herencia Campesina-auspicio Promoción Cultural-ICP
5:00 p.m. Sabor Borincano
7:00 p.m. Apertura / Actos Protocolarios:
Plaza Pública Nemesio R. Canales
Encendido del Fuego Teñido – Banda Indígena de Jayuya
Dedicatoria Festival: Centro Cultural
Luis Muñoz Rivera de Barrenquitas
Dedicatoria Feria de Artesanía:
Antonio Rivera Rivera
Orden del Guatlao: Rosa M. Carrero Rivera,
Enriéz Medina Vázquez
Orden de la Juría: Dr. Fernando Abruña,
Arquitecto
Orden del Cocique: Juan C. Martínez Cruzado,
PH.D
Orden del Reley: Rafael Rivera
9:00 p.m. Renacer Boricua- Auspicio Promoción Cultural -ICP
10:15 p.m. Ballet Folklorico Vajari
11:30 a.m. Plena Libre

sábado, 20 de noviembre
10:00 a.m. Feria de Artesanías / Sala de Exposiciones
1:00 p.m. Rondalla de Comerío
2:15 p.m. Danzantes / Banda Indígena
3:45 p.m. Armonía Cultura
5:00 p.m. Tepeu
6:15 p.m. Guateque
8:30 p.m. Reinado Indígena
9:35 p.m. Premiaciones Ceremoniales
10:30 p.m. Taller Rumbacuembé- auspicio Caribe Produce
12:00 m.n. Andrés Jiménez-coauspicio Baxter Healthcare

domingo, 21 de noviembre
10:00 a.m. Feria de Artesanías / Sala de Exposiciones
12:00 m.d. Tuna Imperial Ciudad de México
1:00 p.m. Semi Final Concurso de Trovadores
Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña
4:15 p.m. Danzantes de la Tierra Alta / Banda Indígena
5:30 p.m. Familia Sanabria
APPENDIX I

OFFICIAL SCHEDULE OF THE 31ST LOÍZA’S PATRON-SAINT FESTS 2011
(SPANISH VERSION)

Viernes 29 de Abril del 2011
7:30 Misa Santa en Honor a San Patricio; Plaza Pública de Loiza
Actos protocolares
Ventas de artesanías
9:30 Majestad Negra (Baile Folklórico)
11:00 John Dávila & Son del Este (Salsa)

Sábado 30 de Abril del 2011
5:00 Misa Santa Comunidad Santísima Trinidad
8:00 Zumangué (Bomba)
9:30 Tambores Calientes (Bomba)
11:00 Manolo Lezcano (Salsa)

Domingo 1 de Mayo del 2011
10:30 Misa Dominical Iglesia San Patricio y Espíritu Santo
Procesión de San Patricio
1:00 Tarde Infantil
Actividades para Niños
Exposición Artísticas "Eternos Amigos"
Centro Cultural de Loaiza. (Carlos Ayala & Eddie Rivera)
2:00 Son de Loíza (Salsa)
3:30 Paracumbé (Bomba)
5:00 Bomba Siglo 21 (Bomba)
6:30 Terraplén (Plena)
8:00 Ballet Folklórico Hermanos Ayala (Bomba)
9:30 Orquesta Zodiac (Salsa)

Nota: Todos los exponentes musicales tendrán una participación de una hora. Habrá 30 minutos para cambio de orquestas o grupos folklóricos, prueba de sonido y pautas comerciales de nuestros auspiciadores.

Transmisión en vivo domingo 1 de mayo del 2011 por www.ustream.tv/channel/loizatv
APPENDIX J

OFFICIAL SCHEDULE OF THE 43RD SAN SEBASTIÁN STREET FESTS 2011
(SPANISH VERSION)

**Jueves, 13 de enero**
5:00 p.m. Corte de cinta y desfile de Cabezudos desde la Escuela Abraham Lincoln hasta la Plaza del Quinto Centenario por la Calle San Sebastián.

Tarima Principal Plaza Quinto Centenario

6:00 p.m. Entrega de Premio Nacional San Sebastián 2011 a: Dr. José Vargas Vidot y Luis Maysonet

6:30 p.m. Entrega de Reconocimiento y dedicatoria de las Fiestas de la Calle San Sebastián en su XXXXI Aniversario a Tito El Bambino y Presentación Artística.

8:00 p.m. Así Canta Puerto Rico, con Luisito Vigoreaux, hijo, Tavín Pumarejo P.R. TV.

11:30 p.m. Grupo Da'zoo/ Auspicio AT&T

**Viernes, 14 de enero**
Auspicio: Municipio de San Juan

4:00 p.m. Banda de la Policía Municipal. Tarima Escuela Abraham Lincoln.

5:00 p.m. Desfile Cabezudos con Plenéalo y Taller Tamboricua, hasta la Plaza del Quinto Centenario por la Calle San Sebastián.

Tarima Principal Plaza Quinto Centenario

5:30 p.m. Trucco y Zaperoko

7:30 p.m. Orquesta de Edwin Clemente / Cantantes invitados: Raffu Wagner y Luiggi Texidor.

9:30 p.m. Plenéalo

11:30 p.m. Orquesta de Bobby Valentín / Cantante invitado: Luisito Carrión

**Sábado, 15 de enero**
Tarima Principal Plaza Quinto Centenario
1:30 p.m. Orquesta Jíbara Dr. Francisco López Cruz
3:00 p.m. Terraplén / José Reyes
5:00 p.m. Manny Fuentes y su Orquesta
6:30 p.m. Orquesta Del Sur al Norte / Julio Alvarado
8:00 p.m. Baile de Época con la Banda Estatal de Puerto Rico / Cantante invitado: Andy Montañez
10:00 p.m. Andy Montañez y su Orquesta

Domingo, 16 de enero
11:00 a.m. Misa Tradicional honrando al Santo Patrón San Sebastián. Con la presentación del Cuarteto Clásico. Artista invitado: tenor Carlos Aponte. Catedral de San Juan
Tarima Principal Plaza Quinto Centenario

3:00 p.m. Entrega de Premio Nacional San Sebastián 2011 a: Antonio Cabán Vale "El Topo", Andrés Jiménez "El Jíbaro" y José A. Rivera "Tony Mapeyé".

Homenaje a la Décima Campesina / Patrimonio de nuestro pueblo, con magno concierto
6:30 p.m. Grupo Santiago / Bohemia Urbana
7:30 p.m. Plena Libre / Auspicio: Palo Viejo
9:30 p.m. Entrega de Premio Nacional San Sebastián 2011 a Tito Nieves, el "Pavarotti de la Salsa"
10:00 p.m. Presentación artística de Tito Nieves
APPENDIX K

OLD SAN JUAN (SAN SEBASTIÁN STREET IS HIGHLIGHTED IN GREEN)
APPENDIX L

OFFICIAL SCHEDULE OF 153TH PONCE’S CARNIVAL 2011 (SPANISH VERSION)

Miércoles, 2 de marzo
6:00 PM - Baile de máscaras.
Frente a la Alcaldía
Grupo Conciencia Cultural

Jueves, 3 de marzo
6:00 PM - El Rey Momo hace su entrada al Carnaval
Desde Museo Pancho Coímbre desde las 6:00 de la tarde. De ahí parte a las 7:30 de la noche,
hasta llegar frente a la Casa Alcaldía.
Willie Colón y su Orquesta

Viernes, 4 de marzo
7:00 pm – Coronación de la Reina Infantil S.M. Gabriel
Angelie Bonilla Duque. Se sigue la misma ruta que la noche anterior,
El baile real estará a cargo del Mini Ballet Salsa Sur.
Cierra el espectáculo musical de la noche La Sonora Ponceña.

Sábado, 5 de marzo
7:00pm - Coronación de la Reina del Carnaval, S.M. Solymar Angely Feliciano Montero.
La ruta es la misma de la noche anterior
El baile real estará a cargo de la Academia de Baile Julie Mayoral.
El Ballet Salsa Sur tendrá una presentación especial y contaremos con la participación del reguetonero Divino.

Domingo, 6 de marzo
Es el día del Gran Desfile del Carnaval de Ponce,
Saliendo desde el Parque Pasivo Julio E. Monagas hacia Boulevard Miguel Poe,
continuando por la Calle Isabel hasta llegar a la Casa Alcaldía.
Salida del Desfile 1:00pm
Jorge Brown y su Orquesta amenizarán las fiestas
Frente Casa Alcaldía desde las 12:30 pm

Lunes, 7 de marzo – Gran noche de Baile del Carnaval
y orquestas de salsa desde las 7:00 de la noche en la Plaza.
Con el Grupo Esencia y Moncho Rivera y su Orquesta.
Martes, 8 de marzo – Entierro de la Sardina. Sigue el horario y la misma ruta del Rey Momo, desde las 7:00 p.m. Se efectúa la despedida de duelo, la quema del Júa, la lectura de las simpáticas letanías, y finalmente el entierro de la sardina con el pintoresco llanto de las lloronas enlutadas que pone punto final a la fiesta carnavalesca para dar paso a la cuaresma.
Esa noche se obsequiarán $200.00 en efectivo al que adivine quién es el rey Momo.
Raphy Leavit y La Selecta y el Grupo Baramaya
APPENDIX M

LAW 223 OF 2004’S RULES, AS AMENDED (SPANISH VERSION)

[SEE ATTACHMENT]
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