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A Record of the Defense of Xiangyang's City Wall, 1206-1207

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A RECORD OF THE DEFENSE OF XIANGYANG'S CITY WALL, 1206-1207

A Thesis Presented

by

JULIE JANE AVERY

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

September 2009

Chinese

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ABSTRACT

A RECORD OF THE DEFENCE OF XIANGYANG'S CITY WALL, 1206-1207

SEPTEMBER 2009

JULIE JANE AVERY, B.A., BATES COLLEGE

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This thesis presents an original annotated translation of *Xiangyang shou cheng lu* 襄陽守城錄 [A Record of the Defense of Xiangyang's City Wall] written by Zhao Wannian (ca. 1169-1210) in 1207. In this record, Zhao, a low ranking official in the Song army, describes the events of a two and half month siege imposed upon the city of Xiangyang by invading Jin troops. Currently the only other full translation of this text that is available is in German by Herbert Franke and can be found in *Studien und Texte zur Kriegsgeschichte der südlichen Sungzeit* that was published in 1987. In addition to my translation, an overview of this event in the war between Song and Jin (1206-1208) as well as an overview of Xiangyang's strategic geographic location is included in the introduction. A copy of the *Yue ya tang* edition of the text is provided in the appendices, along with an index of names which appear in the text, an explanation of the translation of titles, a glossary of weapons, a glossary of place names, and supplementary maps and photographs.

Key words: Xiangyang, Zhao Wannian, Zhao Chun, Wanyan Kuang, Southern Song warfare

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The focus of this thesis is the annotated translation of a diary completed in 1207 by a low ranking military officer in the Southern Song army named Zhao Wannian 趙萬年 (ca. 1169- ca.1210),¹ titled *A Record of the Defense of Xiangyang's City Wall*, (*Xiangyang shou cheng lu* 襄陽守城錄; hereafter referred to as *XYSC*). This diary provides a firsthand account of the siege of Xiangyang by Jin forces that lasted from late 1206 to early 1207.

The diary is particularly striking because the author's experience seems to be closer to that of an average citizen than to the experience of an elite. Zhao Wannian never attains a high military rank and his literary works remain widely unknown. Although he shares the same surname as the rulers of the Song dynasty, there are no indications that he held a strong connection to the ruling family. His middle-of-the-barrel point of view is nearly absent from official records, and so the diary presents us with minor characters and deeds that would otherwise have gone unrecorded. In addition, Wannian's diary is very detailed and provides a window into the actual strategies and siege tactics used during the early thirteenth century,² as compared to the theoretical strategies and tactics suggested by Song period military manuals.

¹ These approximate birth and death dates of Zhao Wannian are from the title of Herbert Franke's "Kriegsdichtung der Sung-Zeit: Die 'Gedichte aus dem Stabszelt' (Pei-wo chi) des Chao Wan-nien (ca. 1169- ca. 1210)." I do not know what sources Franke used to estimate these dates, nor have I personally been able to date him so precisely.

² I refer to the author, Zhao Wannian, throughout this text by his given name, Wannian, rather than his surname, Zhao. This is to avoid confusion with the main figure featured in his diary, Zhao Chun, who shares his surname.

Perhaps most importantly from the reader's perspective, Wannian's diary is full of action. Lists of equipment and casualties are interspersed with human interest details—from the commander who was *almost* eaten by his subordinates to the comet that foreshadowed the Song victory by falling into the enemy camp. Wannian's account allows us to see the events, from his perspective, of a siege that took place eight-hundred years ago, and activates our imagination to consider the life of an ordinary officer in early thirteenth century China.

Herbert Franke has done extensive work on the *XYSC*L, especially in *Studien und Texte zur Kriegsgeschichte der südlichen Sungzeit* (1987), which includes his annotated German translation of the diary. Franke also includes a translation of the *Bi wo ji* 裨幄集, a collection of poems and letters which is the only other known extant work by Zhao Wannian.³ Unfortunately, I am not yet able to read German, and thus I was only able to utilize the bibliographies, appendices, and pick through the indices and table of contents of these valuable sources. Franke has also published some excellent sources in English that directly discuss the *XYSC*L. His “Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China” (1974), uses sources from the late 900s to the mid 1700s to discuss “Preparations for Defense” (pp. 152-161), “Weapons and Tactics” (pp. 161-179), and illustrates the principles outlined in these sections with “Three Sieges of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries” (pp. 179-192), one of which is the siege of Xiangyang from 1206-1207 (pp. 181-185). Franke's conference paper, “Warfare in

³ Two different versions of the *Bi wo ji* are preserved within the *Si ku quan shu*. The edition which Franke translates seems to have been longer and more complete than either of these. His bibliography states that the edition he uses comes from “Manuskript Academia Sinica, Taipei, Institute of History and Philology.” I have been unable to access a copy of this edition.

Medieval China: Some Research Problems” (1986), though unpublished and not for citation, is very illuminating and can be obtained from the University of Hong Kong.

Corinna Hana also references the *XYSC*L in her 1970 dissertation titled *Bericht Über Die Verteidigung Der Stadt Tê-an*, a German translation of a record of the siege of De'an, which occurred at the same time and roughly 110 miles away from Xiangyang.⁴ Charles Peterson, in a review of Hana's book, reports that she includes information on the relations between the Song and Jin states during the early thirteenth century, on the 1206-1208 war itself (“becoming the fullest account we have in western literature”), and on Chinese towns and their defense.⁵ Joseph Needham uses the *XYSC*L as a primary source for his *Science and Civilisation in China* sections on “Missiles and Sieges” and “The Gunpowder Epic,” and on pages 168-169 of the latter section, translates selections of the diary into English.

Fang Chenghui has published a most helpful, punctuated, typeset (simplified characters), edition of *XYSC*L with collation notes on the four extant editions of the *XYSC*L.⁶ There are several places in the text where I disagree with Fang's punctuation, and I have noted some of these variations within my translation. With the exception of

⁴ Except for transcriptions in the titles of published articles and books, *pinyin* is used throughout this thesis. Apostrophes are also inserted in several place names to avoid confusing them with English words.

⁵ Peterson, 216.

⁶ Editions of *XYSC*L are in *Zhi hai* 指海, *Yue ya tang cong shu* 粵雅堂叢書, *Bi ji xiao shuo da guan* 筆記小說大觀, and *Cong shu ji cheng chu bian* 叢書集成初編. A punctuated version of the *XYSC*L can also be found on a website sponsored by “The Network of Yue Fei Research and Records” 岳飞研究文献网 and “The Forum on Yue Fei and Song dynasty History and Culture” 岳飞-宋代历史文化论坛.

Fang, I have not found any serious, modern, Chinese scholarship which focuses on this text, though several articles refer to it.⁷

Currently there is no full English translation of the *XYSC*L available and English sources regarding the strategic importance of Xiangyang in the 1206-1208 war between the Jin and Song states are very limited. While not attempting to supercede the work of Franke and Hana, this thesis provides a wider audience access to this fascinating text and time period and adds a new perspective to the text. More than twenty years after Franke's translation and nearly forty years after Hana's dissertation, I have access to more research tools, such as the searchable *Siku Quanshu*, as well as a larger body of scholarship.

The Start of the Southern Song and the Strategic Position of Xiangyang

To place Zhao Wannian's *Record of the Defense of Xiangyang's City Wall* into context, I first outline the political history of the period to introduce the key players, and weave in the geographical significance of Xiangyang's location.

After the Jin state, founded by Jurchen nomads from the north, captured the Northern Song capital of Kaifeng in early 1127, hundreds of thousands of Chinese refugees fled south.⁸ Fighting continued between the Song and Jin dynasties, particularly in the Huai River region, until oath letters were finally exchanged between

⁷ For example, Wang Cengyu 王曾瑜 (1994), Tang Zhaomei 唐兆梅 (1994).

⁸ In her history of China, Valerie Hansen notes that "An enormous number of people fled to the south... in the early twelfth century. Hundreds of thousands of people, including twenty thousand high officials, tens of thousands of their office staff, and over four hundred thousand military and their families moved to the new capital of Hangzhou and its surrounding towns" (p. 281).

the two courts in 1141-1142.⁹ This peace agreement, which was unfavorable to the Song, normalized trade relations and marked the boundaries of the two states. “The Huai river became the border between the two states, the annual tribute [*gong* 貢] was fixed at 250,000 taels of silver and 250,000 bolts of silk, and the Song had to declare themselves vassals of the Jin.”¹⁰ The language of the treaty, deeply humiliating to the Song, reveals just how hard pressed the court must have been after more than a decade of resistance to the Jin.



Figure 1: Map of Northern Song circa 1111 CE. (Based on Tan, maps 3-4).

⁹ In “Treaties Between Sung and Chin,” Franke explains that Chinese “treaties” consisted of “two parallel unilateral declarations” (p. 57), and thus I adopt his term, “oath letter,” to describe the peace agreement.

¹⁰ Franke, “Treaties,” p. 76. The border between the two states is defined specifically within a draft of the short version of the Song oath written in 1141, which Franke translates:
 ...the border to be drawn henceforth should take the middle course of the Huai river as the border-line. In the west the two prefectures of Tang and Deng will be ceded and shall belong to your superior state. The border will be 40 *li* south and south-west of Deng prefecture. What belongs to Deng prefecture beyond 40 *li* in the south and southwest shall all belong to the military district of Guanghua and become [part of] the prefectures and military districts along the borders of our insignificant state” (Franke, “Treaties,” p. 78).

Note that these locations all become critical during the later Song-Jin conflict of 1206-1208.



Figure 2: Map of Southern Song circa 1142 CE. (Based on Tan, maps 42-43).

Peace lasted until the failed invasion in 1160 when the Jin ruler, “Prince Hailing,” tried to take the Southern Song capital (located at present day Hangzhou). Prince Hailing is characterized as being extremely intelligent and brutally violent, and was “obsessed” with crossing the Yangtze River. After being assassinated by his own frustrated generals in 1161, he was not even given the traditional posthumous temple title of an emperor.¹¹ Franke states that the resulting 1164-1165 peace treaty “brought some improvements for the Song. The term *gong*, ‘tribute,’ was replaced by *bi* [幣 ‘valuables’]; the payments were reduced from 300,000 to 250,000 taels of silver and

¹¹ Mote, pp. 232-233.

bolts of silk;¹² instead of the relation vassal-overlord the pseudofamily relation of younger uncle (Jin) and nephew (Song) was adopted.”¹³ Once again “normal” relations between the Song and Jin states returned and lasted for roughly forty years.

During all of these military interactions between the Song and Jin states, the city of Xiangyang and its surrounding area played a key role. The twin cities of Xiangyang and Fancheng (now collectively called Xiangfan), are located in modern Hubei Province on the southern and northern banks of the Han River, just upstream from where the Tangbai River enters the Han. They are at the center of the Han River valley, with the Qinling Mountains to the northwest, the Daba Mountains to the southwest, and the Jiang-Han plains extending east and south. Xiangyang and Fancheng are also nearly at equal distances between China’s two most important rivers—the Yellow River in the north and Yangtze River in the south.

Xiangyang’s location on the Han River is the main reason for its importance. The Han is the largest southward flowing tributary of the Yangtze, and Xiangfan has long been the most heavily fortified area along the Han. Thus, after a vessel passes south of Xiangfan, it is a relatively easy journey to present day Wuhan, where the Han River meets the Yangtze. Once on the Yangtze, a vessel then has easy access to any point from Chongqing to the eastern coast. Therefore, an army in control of Xiangyang and Fancheng can easily control north-south movement to and away from China’s main central waterway.

¹² I am confused by this part of Franke’s statement. Above, he states that the payments were *originally* set at 250,000 taels and bolts, not 300,000.

¹³ Franke, “Treaties,” p. 81.




Figure 3: Modern Location of Xiangfan and surrounding area. (Based on CIA, 1979).

In addition to using the Han River for transporting armies and commodities, a network of overland routes have also been available since the early days of China's imperial history. Xiangyang was directly connected to Nanyang and Jingzhou during the Qin dynasty [221-207 BCE]. A road from Xiangyang to Chang'an (at present day Xi'an) was constructed during the Western Han [206 BCE- 9 CE], and it was a relatively easy journey to both Luoyang and Kaifeng. Thus, because of its location along both water and overland routes, Xiangyang has always been an important stop for travelers, particularly those headed north or south.




Figure 4: Early roads connecting Xiangyang and Fancheng to Kaifeng and Xi'an (Chang'an). (Based on Needham, 28. Civil Engineering, fig. 711).

The city of Xiangyang was especially important during the Southern Song dynasty. Located approximately 50 km from the boundary drawn in 1141 between the Song and Jin States, when sailing south from the Jin border along Han tributaries,

Xiangyang would be the first major city encountered. Because part of the Song imperial family had managed to escape the Jin and flee south to establish their capital at Lin'an (present day Hangzhou), the Yangtze River system became a virtual highway to the capital. Northern tributaries of the Han River reached into enemy territory to the north of Xiangyang, and the Han River was the largest northern tributary of the Yangtze. Thus the city of Xiangyang located at a sharp bend in the river, held a position of extreme military importance. In a letter to the court, Ezhou's Supreme Commandant of the early 1160s, Wu Gong, clearly states this, saying:

“Jingnan represents the gateway to Wu and Shu, and Xiangyang represents Jingzhou's fence, protecting and guarding [the area] upstream, [therefore] it is called a strategic area. If we abandon it and do not defend it, than this [is like] removing the fence ourselves. Moreover, Xiangyang is backed by mountains and secures the Han, and [it's] fertile soil [extends] for a thousand *li*...”¹⁴

Wu Gong's words not only speak of Xiangyang's strategic military position, they also point out Xiangyang's valuable natural resource—arable land. The combination of fertile soil and warm climate makes the area around Xiangyang excellent for growing crops. Unfortunately, during the Southern Song the land around Xiangyang suffered from the frequent fighting between the Song, Jin, and later the Mongols. Although many farms were deserted, the area that *was* farmed produced two grain harvests a year—one of rice and the other of wheat. In addition to exporting grain, the area also produced a wide variety of vegetables and fruits (including watermelon, which had

¹⁴ (*Xu zi zhi tong jian*, ch. 134, p. 3565). This letter was written in 1161 during Prince Hailing's invasion of the Song. Wu Gong had been ordered to retreat from Xiangyang if conditions changed and it appeared the city could not defend itself. In this letter, Wu Gong argues against these orders.

just been introduced to the area).¹⁵ Mulberry leaves (fed to silkworms) were also a valuable crop, and Xiangyang was famous for its *bai hu* 白縠, a type of white silk crepe.

Because Xiangyang is located along convenient transportation routes, it has also been a vital link for trade and is a key economic center. During the Northern Song, Xiangyang's location was in the interior of the state. However, when the capital moved southeast at the start of the Southern Song, Xiangyang suddenly found itself both a border city and a stop on the route for merchants involved with interstate trade. One of the most important exports of the Southern Song was tea, and although tea was not produced in Xiangyang prefecture itself, tea was produced in nearby Jiangling, Xingguo Military Prefecture, Jinghu, and Guizhou.




Figure 5: Tea growing regions around Xiangyang

¹⁵ *Hubei tong shi: Song Yuan juan*, p. 100.

Trade between the Jin and Southern Song was highly regulated. Licensed markets were set up on both sides of the border. Franke notes that the main center of trade for the Song was the county town of Xuyi 盱眙, located where the Bian River entered the Huai River, while the main center of trade for the Jin was located in Sizhou 泗州.¹⁶ Altogether Song and Jin had twenty-two licensed markets along the border.¹⁷

Franke continues, “For both states, foreign trade was a sort of state monopoly. Unauthorized transactions were forbidden, and Song goods were sold to Jin merchants at fixed prices through the government...”¹⁸ It was perhaps these strict regulations that encouraged smuggling. In his article titled, “Tea Production and Tea Trade under the Jurchen-Chin Dynasty,” Hok-lam Chan explains:

It is not difficult to account for the burgeoning illicit traffic between Jin and Song despite the imposition of the government monopoly on mutual trade upon the conclusion of the peace settlement. This is because, first of all, the existing institutional framework on trade was too rigid to allow a sufficient flow of commodities to meet the needs of the other side. Song fared much better in her demands because of the ample resources in south China, but Jin was heavily dependent on Song for many items of daily necessities and raw materials. In the second place, notwithstanding the mutual agreements, Jin did not acquire what she wanted on a regular basis because the Song court deliberately restricted the export of many of her desired commodities as an economic and political bargain, and Jin often had to pay a higher price for her imports which was often fixed arbitrarily by Song in order to reap an handsome profit. This imbalance between supply and demand, therefore, posed an acute problem to Jin, and her pressing needs thus induced the Song

¹⁶ Franke, “The Chin dynasty,” p. 298.

¹⁷ The other licensed border markets of the Song were: Chuzhou 楚州, Huaiyin County 淮陰縣, Anfeng Military Prefecture 安豐軍, Huoqiu county 霍丘縣, Xinyang Military Prefecture 信陽軍, Zaoyang Military Prefecture 棗陽軍, and Guangzhou 光州. Those in Jin included: Shouzhou 壽州, Yingzhou 潁州, Caizhou 蔡州, Tangzhou 唐州, Dengzhou 鄧州, Fengxiang Prefecture 鳳翔府, Qinzhou 秦州, Gongzhou 鞏州, Taozhou 洮州, and Mizhou 密州 (Chan, p. 111).

¹⁸ Franke, “The Chin dynasty,” p. 298.

merchants to smuggle valuable goods to the north, sometimes with implicit encouragement from Jin government officials as circumstances warranted. Finally, the private merchants wanted a greater share of profit from their transactions, not only to avoid the heavy government taxes on trade through the border markets, but also to benefit directly from the attractive prices offered by their counterparts by delivering the needed commodities. These circumstances therefore provided strong incentive to private individuals for indulging in illegal transactions across the border, and both governments had failed to deter such activities despite the imposition of heavy fines and severe punishment during this long period of peaceful co-existence.¹⁹

Chan also notes that the preferred smuggling route was along the Han and Huai Rivers.²⁰ Therefore, Xiangyang must have been a popular stop for both legal and illegal traders alike. Indeed, Wannian mentions in his diary, that the city is able to supplement its government forces with members of the “Tea Merchants’ Army.” Clearly the tea merchants were prominent members of society whose goods (and persons) needed protecting!

The city of Xiangyang was not a city that could be passed up in any Jin led campaign against the Southern Song. The Han River extended into Jin territory, making an ideal path for the Jin army’s supply lines. In addition, since the area around Xiangyang was agriculturally productive, if the Jin occupied Xiangyang, they would not only be able to transport supplies *through* Xiangyang, but would also be able to procure supplies *from* Xiangyang. This would be highly advantageous to the Jin state, saving it both energy and money. Likewise, it was essential that the Song keep control of Xiangyang and the transportation routes along the Han River if the court was to protect its capital in Lin’an.

¹⁹ Chan, p. 115.

²⁰ Chan, p. 115.




Figure 6: Licensed border markets during the Southern Song. Note that the Jin markets of Qinzhou, Gongzhou, Taozhou, and Mizhou are too far west to be pictured here. Xiangyang is only on the map for reference- it was NOT a licensed border market.

The 1206-1208 War

From the peace settlement with the Jin in 1165, the area around Xiangyang enjoyed relative peace for over forty years (with the exception of an attack on Fancheng by the Mongols in 1188).²¹ However, on June 14, 1206, the Southern Song government circulated a declaration of war against the Jin throughout their domain. Franke states that the declaration “is a document combining moral indignation and accusations against the [Jin], with the assertion that the [Jin], through their evil actions, and incompetence, had lost the Mandate of Heaven and thus the legitimate claim to rule their country.”²² But why did the Song government make these accusations? What led to intensified hostilities after over forty years of relative peace? According to the studies by historians Richard Davis, Herbert Franke, Corinna Hana, and F.W. Mote, the Song declaration of war stemmed more from general resentment towards the Jin in the Song court, as well as the machinations of the Song’s chief councilor, than from any new conflict with the Jin.

Because many Southern Song families had experienced personal loss during previous wars with the Jin, there was a general feeling of hostility towards their northern neighbor. In the early 1200s, those between the ages of fifty and sixty would have remembered the failed invasion of Jin Prince Hailing. There may have even been some still living who vaguely remembered the unrest before the first treaty between the Song and Jin in 1141. Certainly everyone would have at least heard family stories about the terrifying times of uncertainty brought on by the initial Jin invasion. As the

²¹ Xing, Jin, and Lu, p. 100.

²² Franke, “The Chin dynasty,” pp. 247-248.

Song general Zhao Chun declared in December of 1206 (as reported by the *XYSC*), “When [our] ancestors commanded Heyang, [our] entire family was killed by the enemy. Only my father escaped.” He also wrote, “My revered dynasty holds irreconcilable enmity [with the Jin state].”²³ Mote summarizes that “espousal of the war policy was meaningful to many...”²⁴ and this included the reigning emperor, Ningzong, who “privately favored the war policy and would be happy to achieve glory by regaining some of the Jin-controlled North.”²⁵ These psychological wounds among the Song population cannot be underestimated as a condition making the Song predisposed to war with the Jin.

Many historians also assert the placement of Han Tuozhou’s assumption of near absolute power in the Southern Song court as the main reason for the start of the 1206-1208 conflict. Davis notes:

“Although never officially appointed chief councillor, Han [Tuozhou] nonetheless functioned as one. From 1197-1207, he reigned as undisputed decision maker at court, the sole formulator of government policy, arbiter of bureaucratic disputes, and shepherd of official advancement.”²⁶

In addition, Han was hated by many, for he had condemned the contemporary teachings of Zhu Xi (1130-1200) and his associated school of “Neo-Confucianism” as “false learning” and had banned anyone associated with this prominent school of thought from court. Davis notes, “His lack of scholarly credentials, identification with the disesteemed Palace Postern, close ties to consorts and eunuchs—all combined to

²³ *XYSC* lines 2Bc, 4Bg

²⁴ Mote, p. 315.

²⁵ Mote, p. 313

²⁶ Davis, p. 86.

make him, in the eyes of officialdom, undeniably undeserving of the throne's confidence..."²⁷ With all of these negative qualities, the question remains, "How did Han get into power in the first place?" Davis answers this question as well:

"Lacking an examination degree, it was principally by being nephew of Gaozong's influential Empress Wu that Han Tuo Zhou was initially selected to serve as supervisor of the Palace Postern (*gemen shi*).²⁸ The Postern, a quasi-military office, was responsible for securing the doors of the palace and, in this way, its chief supervisors could control access to the throne. Han Tuo Zhou readily exploited this privilege, as well as his family ties, to emerge as an important liaison between the palace and court officials in the delicate deliberations leading to the abdication of Guangzong in 1194. With the installation of Ningzong as emperor, his first empress, nee Han, was none other than the grand-niece of Han Tuo Zhou.²⁹ Such preponderant influence among imperial consorts ultimately enabled the Postern official to eliminate his major competitor for court dominance, Zhao Ruyu, and win the imperial favor needed to become irreversibly entrenched."³⁰

Another factor that may have helped Han Tuo Zhou's rise to power was that emotional and mental instability seem to have run in the imperial family. Emperor Xiaozong fell into deep depression after his adopted father's death in 1187, and abdicated to Guangzong in 1189. However, Davis states that "Guangzong had long suffered from mental illness, for which he reportedly received regular medication. The exact nature of his infirmity is uncertain, but it became so acute that he, like his father before him, was incapacitated, this time within months of ascending the throne."³¹ As for the next emperor, Zhou Mi states: "Some say Ningzong was not intelligent and had a slowness

²⁷ Davis, p. 86.

²⁸ Here Davis cites the *Song shi*, ch. 474, p. 13771.

²⁹ Here Davis cites the *Song shi*, ch. 243, p. 8656.

³⁰ Davis, p. 86.

³¹ Davis, p. 84. Davis cites his source of information as being from the *Song shi*, juan 243.

of speech.”³² If the emperor had such a disability, it is likely that Han Tuo Zhou (among others) would have taken advantage of it.

As can be gathered from the paragraph above, Han was a powerful man, but his position was precarious. Therefore Davis believes that “in light of his mounting failures in the domestic realm” Han Tuo Zhou’s “foreign policy offensive was politically motivated, not an outgrowth of revanchist idealism.”³³ Because Han did not leave behind any written statement, it is impossible for us to be certain of his intentions. However, the public records (which, of course, have their own biases) suggest that Han was attempting to distract his opponents from domestic failures by involving the country in what he thought was a winnable war.

What conditions led Han Tuo Zhou, as well as others, to believe that Song would gain from a war with Jin? At the start of the thirteenth century, the position of the Jin court was perceived to be unstable. For years, Jin had fought along its northern and western borders with the Xixia state (1038-1227), and this conflict drained Jin’s military and economic resources. The Mongols were also growing in power and loomed as an increasing threat. Furthermore, during this same period, Jin also suffered many natural disasters. The Yellow River dramatically shifted course from north of the Shandong Peninsula to its south in 1194, destroying crops and causing widespread famine. Significant flooding (and famine) continued throughout the next two

³² Davis, p. 85. Note that Zhou Mi (1232-1308) was *not* a contemporary of the emperor, but was close to him in time, and thus may have had access to primary sources (or to court gossip).

³³ Davis, p. 88.

decades.³⁴ The cultural policies of the Jin court were also under attack from both inside and outside their state.³⁵ Therefore, it seemed to some that Jin's resources could be easy taking, and Song could recover the territory lost under the 1142 settlement.

The actual war declaration, presented on June 14, 1206, seems almost to have been an afterthought on the part of the Song court, since the Song offensive actually began long before the official declaration. According to the "Basic Annals" of the Jin dynastic history, in March of 1205, the Song army violated Jin's border and attacked Qinchuan.³⁶ The following month, they also attacked Laiyuan Garrison. Through their spies, the Jin court learned that Song was plotting a northern invasion. In response, the Jin court ordered the Song court to swear an oath that they would withdraw their troops. Interestingly, the Song "Basic Annals" of the dynastic history makes no mention of these two incursions into Jin territory, nor does it acknowledge Jin's demand for reconfirmation of Song's commitment to peace.

In May, the Jin chief minister, Pusan Kui, ordered the military to make preparations to defend against Song. On June 16, approximately one year before the war declaration, Song attacked Lianshui County (in present Jiangsu) and succeeded in capturing it four days later. According to the *Song shi*, on June 23, 1205, the emperor

³⁴ Hansen, p. 330. Hana, pp. 248-249.

³⁵ Mote (pp. 222-223) explains:

"One can plausibly argue that the way the Jurchens went about adapting their governing institutions weakened them. That is, should one conclude that their increasing acceptance of Chinese models in government and of Confucian values in society so undermined their commitment to the tribal military bases of their dynastic power, and so corrupted the tough resilience of their social order, that their dynasty eventually collapsed? That was the stated belief in China, much debated as early as the thirteenth century, and it continues to be argued. But in fact the demise of the Jin was not brought about solely, or even principally, by such internal factors. Despite the continuous changes in the patterns of Jurchen life in China and in the workings of the Jin dynastic state throughout the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, the immediate cause of the dynasty's extinction was external and unrelated...."

³⁶ Qinchuan 秦川 is a general term for what is now the Gansu and Shaanxi area.

decreed that all of the various armies, of both the capital region and outlying areas, were to secretly produce a plan for mobilizing their armies against Jin. On July 4, the *Song shi* reports the “recovery” of the industrial prefectures Tong’an, Hanyang, and Qichun. Shortly after this, the Jin emperor asked his various advisors about their plans for preparing against Song. Hinting at government propaganda and psychological preparations for war, the *Jin shi* states that all the officials reported that they were “nourishing hatred” within their districts.³⁷

On July 22, the Song emperor granted Han Tuo Zhou the title “Manager of Important National Security Matters” and set his rank above the status of “Chief Minister.” In addition, throughout the summer and fall, Song was busy recruiting and reviewing troops, enlisting spies from amongst the Jin population, and bribing the locals for information.³⁸ The *Jin shi* notes widespread and increasing fear among border residents that the Song military was about to strike in a surprise attack. Indeed, in October, Song troops attacked Biyangsi. In November, they burned down Huangjian; and in December they attacked Luonan’s Gu County, gathered troops at Xingyuan, and began to harass the border towns of Huaibei Province.

³⁷ *Jin shi*, ch 12, p. 271: 皆以設備養惡為言.

³⁸ The Song court specifically reported the recruiting of residents from Hong County (*Song shi*, ch. 38).




Figure 8: Western edge of the Jin-Song border.

Unsurprisingly, the lunar New Year celebrations during February of 1206 were rather tense at both the Song and Jin courts. According to the *Song shi*, the conduct of

the Jin ambassador, Zhao Zhijie, who had been dispatched by the Jin court to offer congratulations for the New Year, “was extremely arrogant.” The “Basic Annals” gives no further detail here, but Franke notes that “At the New Year’s audience at the Song court in 1206 (5 February), the [Jin] envoy mistakenly believed that the Song courtiers had violated the taboo on the personal name of the [Jin] emperor’s father and protested strongly. This was, of course, interpreted by the Song as arrogant insolence.”³⁹ The Song court’s Editorial Director, Zhu Zhi, even sent up a writ requesting that the Jin ambassador be decapitated, but nothing came of this request.⁴⁰

At the Jin court, it appears that the ceremonies were not much friendlier. After the Song ambassadors left the court, the Jin emperor dispatched Scribe Grand Master, Meng Zhu, to go to the Song embassy and deliver the following message:

“At the beginning of the Dading reign period [1161], Emperor Shizong allowed the Song kingdom to constitute a ‘nephew’ state. I, the [Jin] sovereign, have abided by the laws preserved and handed down [to me], and [we] have been reconciled up to the present. How could it be that your state has repeatedly made use of bandits to violate our borders? ...My approach is to regard All under Heaven with magnanimity, not small minded suspicion. Consequently, I shuttered the Pacification Bureau,⁴¹ but soon afterwards the number of robbers and bandits surpassed those of previous days! Recently, a group of officials have again and again said that your state will revoke [our] covenant. I, alone, have abided by it. For a long time, I have bent backwards and forwards, excusing and forgiving [you]. However, I fear that [my] nephew, Song’s emperor, perhaps does not understand this clearly. If we do not become lax about what [our states] previously agreed upon, then we may again [be able to] exchange officials and have something [productive] to say. Even though I have equal love for the common people, how can I bring this business to an

³⁹ Franke, “The Chin dynasty,” p. 247.

⁴⁰ *Song shi*, ch. 38, p. 739.

⁴¹ According to Hucker, during the Song dynasty, the Pacification Bureau (*xuan fu si* 宣撫司) was a common designation of officers leading units of the Imperial Armies (*jin jun*) on campaign” (Hucker, #2661).

end? When you, the ministers, return to your state, you ought to carry my meaning and speak of it in detail to your presidor (*ruzhu*).⁴²

It appears that Emperor Ningzong ignored the Jin emperor's reprimand and did not take his warning seriously. In March, the *Jin shi* reports that after arranging to meet with Song generals at the border, the Jin leaders were ambushed. Violence continued into May, and the Song attacked Lingbi and besieged Shouchun. However, in both engagements they were defeated.

It is also in May that we find more evidence of Jin's suspicion of their southern neighbor, and their preparations for a larger confrontation. The *Jin shi* reports that Commander General Geshilie Ziren dispatched a team of spies to enter the Song city of Xiangyang in order to "observe the enemy's secret affairs."⁴³ It is presumably from this, that the Jin court learned that Huangfu Bin had employed several Jin locals to guide his army to attack Tangzhou and Dengzhou. It is upon gathering this intelligence that the Jin military seems to have begun full scale mobilization.

Song continued its invasion, attacking cities along the Lanjia mountain range of Laiyuan County, as well as Xinxi, Neixiang, Sizhou, Baoxin, Hong County, Yingshang, Shouzhou, Qi County, Caizhou, and Jincheng's seaport. Finally, on June 13, the Jin emperor, anticipating Song's formal declaration of war, reported Song's betrayal of their alliance at Jin's Altars of Grain and Earth. Although news from the Jin court could not yet have reached the Southern Song capital at Lin'an, the next day, (June 14, the seventh day of the fifth lunar month) the Song court, still deeply divided over this issue, jumped into a formal confrontation with Jin. Song had rallied their

⁴² Note that the derogatory term, *ruzhu* 汝主 is used here to refer to the reigning Song Emperor whose posthumous temple title is Ningzong. (*Jin shi*, ch. 12, p. 273).

⁴³ *Jin shi*, ch. 12.

troops under a banner of “moral indignation” and perhaps even vengeance. However, the luck of Song was already beginning to change.

On June 13th the day before the declaration of war, Song was routed at Caizhou; on the 20th, Huangfu Bin was “utterly defeated” at Tangzhou; on the 21st, they were defeated at Suzhou; on July 10th, Li Shuang was defeated at Shouzhou.⁴⁴ Frustration over mounting defeats led to the demotion or dismissal of the defeated Song generals. Davis points out, “...military leaders, including those in strategically vital areas, were quickly replaced for daring to differ with the special councillor over policy or for suffering a single defeat. In this way, military leadership fell into inexperienced hands at the most untimely juncture.”⁴⁵ In his paper, “On Han Tuo Zhou and Kaixi Northern Expedition,” Han Longfu says that many historians seem to place all the blame for these Song defeats on Han Tuo Zhou. They charge that he had not planned the war carefully, and had placed incompetent generals in leadership positions. However, Han Longfu argues that Han Tuo Zhou could not possibly be solely responsible. Because initiating war was so controversial in the Song court, Han Tuo Zhou must have used a great deal of effort and planning to maneuver around the obstacles planted by the peace faction in order to secure a declaration of war from the emperor.⁴⁶ In addition, more factors go into deciding the outcome of a battle than leadership. Franke acknowledges that during the campaigns against Tangzhou and Dengzhou, “Tens of thousands of Song soldiers deserted and dispersed, due partly to the weather, however.

⁴⁴ *Song shi*, ch. 38; *Jin shi*, ch. 12.

⁴⁵ Davis, pp. 88-89.

⁴⁶ Han Longfu, p. 42-46.

It had rained heavily for days; the soldiers had to camp in tents that were soon flooded by water; and provisions did not arrive in time so that the soldiers suffered from hunger. The hay for the Song horses was wet and rotted.”⁴⁷

Because of these catastrophes, it seems that the Song court began to feel that its situation was desperate even before the Jin had launched its own retaliatory offensive across the Huai River and into Southern Song territory in early November of 1206. Consequently the Song court made sacrificial offerings to Heaven and Earth, proclaimed general amnesties, and canceled elaborate banquets.

In contrast, the Jin celebrated victories. After winning back their own counties and garrisons, they conquered territory of the Southern Song. One Jin commander who was very successful at the end of 1206 was Wanyan Kuang.⁴⁸

In November of 1206 Wanyan Kuang took up an army of twenty-five thousand,⁴⁹ went out to Tangzhou and Dengzhou, and then entered Song territory. In December, he brought down Zaoyang, Guanghua Garrison, Shenma Ridge, Anlu,

⁴⁷ Franke, “The Chin dynasty,” p. 248.

⁴⁸ Wanyan Kuang, one of the key figures in *XYSC*, was born in 1152 (or early 1153). His personal name was originally Sasu 撒速, and he was a ninth generation descendent of the founder of the Jin royal family. He initially served the Prince of Bin 邠王, but in 1179 he was selected to instruct the brothers of the (future) Jin emperor, Zhangzong (r.1190-1208). Later, Wanyan was made Zhangzong’s Reader in Waiting 侍讀. In 1185 he received his *jinshi* degree, but apparently this was only because Xianzong 顯宗 (Zhangzong’s father) ordered the examiners to allow him to pass.

After Zhangzong was established as emperor in 1190, Wanyan was made an emissary to the Song. These early trips to the south may have helped him in his later military campaigns. Around 1196 Wanyan became increasingly involved in military activities and border affairs.

⁴⁹ This number of troops, twenty-five thousand, is the number recorded in the “Basic Annals” of the *Jin shi* (juan 12, p. 278). Song sources provide a much larger number for Wanyan’s army—Zhao Wannian reports rumors that Wanyan’s total force was 500,000 (p.1A). In the conclusion of his diary, Wannian gives an estimate of 200,000—probably still an exaggeration.

Yingcheng, Yunmeng, Xiaogan, Hanchuan, and Jingshan Counties.⁵⁰ On December 22, Wanyan Kuang split his forces: one division lay siege to De'an, while the other went to surround Xiangyang, which he attacked on December 25th.

In addition to outright defeats on the battlefield, while the siege of Xiangyang was ongoing, the Song general and leader of the entire western offensive, Wu Xi, defected to Jin and was conferred the title "Prince of Shu." Luckily for Song, it seems that Wu Xi's subordinates opposed his defection, and a month later they killed him. Still this disruption virtually ruined any hope for Song's success in the west.

While Emperor Ningzong avoided the palace's principal hall, and reduced his meals as a sign of mourning for the losses, the "Manager of Important National Security Matters," Han Tuo Zhou, who was now as unsuccessful in foreign affairs as he had been at home, began looking for scapegoats. Davis writes:

"A close confidant who had succeeded him as Supervisor of the Palace Postern, Su Shidan (d. 1207), was among his first scapegoats... Afraid of becoming the next scapegoat, previously loyal supporters began to desert him. Even neutral elements at court joined ranks with longtime opponents in the face of impending disaster... The enemy must have sensed this, for when the Song emissary Fang Xinru (1177-1222), visited their camp to open peace negotiations in the summer of 1207, they demanded no less than the special councillor's head... On his way to court on the morning of November 24, 1207, [Han Tuo Zhou] was seized by guardsmen, dragged to a garden just beyond the walls of the main imperial palace, and bludgeoned to death. For the first time in Song history, a leading court official had been slain, purportedly at the orders of the palace."⁵¹

⁵⁰ If Wanyan Kuang's forces were truly only 25,000, they would have been spread quite thin! One additional detail of interest: Kuang's biography in the *Jin shi* reports that during this campaign, Wanyan sent one-hundred captured Song women as a gift to the Jin emperor and was thus granted the title "Right Assistant to the Marshal"!

⁵¹ Davis, p. 89.

Although there is controversy about the details of this plot, in general all of the alleged conspirators were rewarded with advancements in position.⁵²

After initial successes, Jin's military also lost momentum. In the Han River Valley, Wanyan's troops became weary and an epidemic broke out among them. In late spring, Wanyan Kuang gave up the sieges of Xiangyang and De'an and returned to the Jin capital by way of Bian 汴 (present day Kaifeng).

It almost seems as if Song and Jin simply settled their conflict in 1208 because both sides had exhausted their "fighting spirit." Franke notes that "no major and decisive engagements took place after April 1207,"⁵³ yet both sides were still expending a large number of resources. In addition, the main war proponent on the Song side, Han Tuo Zhou, by this time was already dead.

The stipulations for the 1208 peace agreement were in Jin's favor, although they did not gain any new territory.⁵⁴ The Song was required to pay damages to the Jin for the war, as well as to increase their tribute payments to the Jin by an additional fifty-thousand ounces of silver and fifty-thousand bolts of silk per year. Lastly, Jin requested the heads of the "chief war criminals"—Han Tuo Zhou and Su Shidan. Wanyan Kuang, one of the chief negotiators of the peace agreement, personally escorted the heads to the capital on June 11, 1208. Franke states, "...Han [Tuo Zhou's] head was duly dispatched to [Jin], preserved with lacquer and packed into a box. This

⁵² Davis, p.91.

⁵³ Franke, "The Chin dynasty," p. 248.

⁵⁴ Mote and Davis disagree on this point. Mote claims that no territory changed hands (p. 315), whereas Davis claims that the Song made a "modest surrender of territory in the lower Huai valley" (p. 94). Franke does not mention this at all. At first glance, this point may not seem to be very significant. However, this region was definitely populated, and therefore must have made a difference to someone!

gruesome souvenir of the war was displayed in the ancestral temple of the [Jin] imperial family.”⁵⁵

Consequences of the War and Subsequent Events

The long term consequence of this war was that both Jin and Song were weakened and were already suffering depletion of their resources by the time the Mongols were looking to expand their territory and consolidate their power. (Temüjin achieved the title Chinggis Khan in 1206). In addition, the Mongols were able to play the “nurtured hatred” between the Song and Jin to their advantage. Ralph Sawyer notes that during sieges, the aggressor is often debilitated “as much as the defender, tempting third parties to exploit the ensuing weakness...” (Sawyer, *Fire*, 344-345). In this sense, the end of the 1206-1208 war might be characterized as a siege—with Song as the defender, Jin as the aggressor, and the Mongols as the ultimate victor.

The results of the 1206-1208 Song-Jin war can be seen at the local level in the postwar events of Xiangyang and the surrounding Han River Valley. *Xiangfan bin shi chun qiu* provides an excellent summary of recorded military activity within this region. After the siege, Xiangyang enjoyed a ten year respite from violence, but in 1217 the Jin army invaded the Song again and attacked Fancheng and surrounded Zaoyang and Guanghua Military Prefecture before attacking Xiangyang. Again, the city held and the Jin retreated. In both 1218 and 1219 Jin forces surrounded Suizhou and Zaoyang Military Prefecture but were defeated both times. In 1220, Song troops

⁵⁵ Franke, “The Chin dynasty,” p. 249. (This episode is detailed in the biography of Wanyan Kuang in the *Jin shi*, ch. 97, p. 2169).

retaliated, attacking Dengzhou and Tangzhou, but were defeated and were chased by Jin troops all the way to Fancheng.⁵⁶ In 1231, Mongol troops attacked and defeated Jin's southern border troops and chased them all the way into Wan Mountain. In 1232, the Mongols allied themselves with Song to raid Jin's Dengzhou, Tangzhou, and Caizhou. This alliance continued into 1233 when Mongol troops came to Xiangyang, and joined *with* Song to make a joint attack on Jin's Caizhou. However, in 1234 the alliance had ended and the Mongols returned, this time *attacking* Xiangyang and Fancheng. Nearly a dozen engagements are recorded over a fifty year period until 1257 when the Mongols virtually became a permanent presence in the area. In 1267 the Mongols placed a siege on Xiangyang that would ultimately last six years! Again, underlining the strategic importance of the area, Mote writes, "...the important bastion cities of Xiangyang and Fancheng had to fall before the Mongols could invade. The siege of these two cities is an epic of Chinese and of Mongol military history, full of heroism and spectacular deeds... The Song Chinese were convinced that their great bastion on the Han River could hold out for ten years if necessary. It almost did that."⁵⁷ By the time of this final siege during the Southern Song era, the residents of Xiangyang must truly have been masters of defense!

⁵⁶ Detailed accounts of the 1217-1220 conflict with Jin are recorded in detail within Wei Liaoweng's *Heshan ji*. This would make a fine topic for another thesis!

⁵⁷ Mote, p. 462.

Records and diaries also exist detailing this famous siege and much research has been done on the subject. It would be fascinating to look at this well known siege within the context of the two main periods of attack proceeding it. The recorded use of gunpowder would be particularly interesting as rapid technological advancements were being made during this seventy year period.

Commentaries

There are several extant commentaries of the *XYSC*L. Most are quite critical of the text. Tan Yingyu 譚瑩玉 (no dates) states that the events of the diary are “unverifiable” and asks, “How is it that official historians have left [this record] behind many times? Have they not seen it? Or, regarding it as exaggeration and lacking fidelity, do they not accept it?” The compilers of the *Si ku quan shu* state that “the text has many deficiencies and errors,” and exclaim that the text “is not only questionable, but also lamentable!” (However, even more “lamentable” is the fact that the compilers of the *Si ku quan shu* confuse the 1206-1207 siege by the Jin with the more famous 1267-1273 siege by the Mongols). The unnamed commentator cited by Wu Chongyao 伍崇曜 (1810-1863) is a little more balanced in his criticism and says that although events of the diary seem exaggerated, it is “extremely detailed and generally reliable.”

The most thorough commentary was written by Yu Jiaxi 余嘉錫 (Qing dynasty, no dates) and can be found in *Si ku ti yao bian zheng* 四庫提要辨証. We should keep in mind that this commentary was probably written more than five-hundred years after the 1206-1207 siege of Xiangyang, and therefore without further research it is difficult to evaluate the reliability of Yu Jiaxi’s resources. Nevertheless he provides information not given elsewhere and cites his sources, and therefore I translate the majority of it below:

“...I, Jiayi, note: The *Song shi ji shi* 宋詩紀事, *juan* 77, relies on *Shi cang shi* 石倉詩 and selectively records two of Wannian’s poems. It also does not record [Wannian’s] place of registry. The *Qianlong yi tong zhi* 乾隆一統志, *juan* 334, *Fujian Funing fu renwu* 福建福寧府人物 says: Zhao Wannian, whose courtesy name was Fangshu 方叔 was a person of Changxi 長溪.⁵⁸ During the Qingyuan reign period [1195-1200] he passed the military examinations and he served as Xiangyang’s Supervisor in Charge of Administrators and Managing Officials 制置司乾辦官. In the second year of the Kaixi reign period [1206], when the Jin surrounded Xiangyang, commanders stationed there and various supervisors fled in succession. Wannian regrouped the troops and set up their food supply. He made every effort to assist and console Zhao Chun in making plans to defend to the death. When they had held off the enemy for more than ninety days, the bandits fled and left. Because of his merit he was advanced to the position of Grand Master of Military Virtue 武德大夫. [His written works] include *Shou cheng lu* 守城錄 and *Bi wo ji* 裨幄集.

“Wang Shizhen’s *Ju yi lu* 居易錄, *juan* 26 says, “The Secretary of the Imperial Carriage 車駕主事, Gong Hengpu 龔衡圃 lent a hand written copy of the *Xiangyang shou cheng lu*, one *juan*, which records the affairs of the Jing-Xiang Campaign Commander, Zhao Chun’s, defense of Xiangyang during the second year of the Kaixi reign period of the Southern Song,. At the beginning it records that Student at the Gate and Gentleman of Loyal Instruction, Zhao Wannian compiled it. An anonymous postscript says, ‘According to the record, during the Kaixi reign period [the court]

⁵⁸ Changxi is located 30km south of present day Xiapu County in Fujian Province.

employed troops. [However, the record] only lists altogether two events that are credible and detail this affair. As for Zhao Chun, we only have the record that upon burning Fancheng, he fled. We also have the business of Wei Youliang breaking out of the siege and leaving. Presently the records and comments of “the guest of the tent” [Zhao Wannian] are like this, [but] in this case, shouldn’t Wei [Youliang] have recorded them? How is it that official historians have left [this record] behind many times? Have they not seen it? Or, regarding it as exaggeration and lacking fidelity, do they not accept it? None [of this diary] can be verified, and that is all.⁵⁹

“The postscript of the *Bi wo ji*, which appears in Huang Guojin 黃國瑾’s *Xun zhen shu wu yi gao* 訓真書屋遺稿 (the *Qin nan cong shu* 黔南叢書 edition does not divide it into *juan*), says, “*Bi wo ji*, one *juan*, was compiled by Zhao Wannian of the Song dynasty. Wannian’s [written works] include the *Shou cheng lu* which is entered into the *Cun mu* 存目 of the *Ti yao* 提要.” According to this book, Wei Liaoweng’s preface claims that the two records *Shou cheng* and *Bi wo* originally circulated together. The *Ti yao*, however, has *Shou cheng lu*, but lacks this, [the *Bi wo ji*] composition. It is presumably lost. During the Ming’s Wanli reign period in the *wu-wu* 戊午 year [1618] Wu Shixun carved it. This copy is recorded from Shixun’s block print edition and has been passed down. This fortunately is in the book collection of the treasury of the Imperial Prince, and was a manuscript copy from the beginning of the dynasty. The *Ti yao* claims that Wannian’s place of registry is unknown. Presently, according to the various prefaces, we know that [Wannian] was registered in Changxi of Fujian. In the *bing-chen* year of the Qingyuan reign period [1196], he received his

⁵⁹ This quote is nearly identical to Tan Yingyu’s commentary. It only differs by a couple of characters.

jinshi. During the second year of the Kaixi reign period, the Jin people advanced and surrounded Xiangyang upon the defeat of Huangfu Bin at Tang[zhou] and Deng[zhou]. At that time Wannian, through his position as supervisor and manager, assisted Campaign Commander Zhao Chun to defend the city. Their policy was first to occupy the mountains and passes of the southern Wan Mountains and advantageous terrain and constrict the supply route of the Jin in order to weaken their strength. In the end, [the Jin troops] let go of the siege.

“The [*Bi wo*] *Ji* is divided into prose and poetry. Everything is composed from the twelfth month to the second month while the city was in danger. Attached to the end are [details regarding] the execution of Lü from beginning to end, and it records that Assistant Campaign Commander Wei Youliang made light of the enemy which led to his defeat. Area Commander in Chief, Lü Weisun plotted to seize Youliang’s post. Wannian worked out a plan to delay Weisun, and as a result, Youliang was able to execute Weisun and put down a rebellion. The defeats and losses of the Song commanders were abundant, and they tore each other apart. On the outside [of the city wall], Wannian kept the bullies in check, and on the inside he calmed the strife. His merit is extremely great. He used “*Bi wo*” [tent of the subordinate] to name the collection, presumably because the items within the collection are coarse and contain comments [from within] the army subordinate’s tent. Heshan 鶴山 saw with his own eyes the difficult conditions [they were under],⁶⁰ and states, “were it not for the Supervising administrator circulating amongst them, noble Zhao would not have been

⁶⁰ “Heshan” was the courtesy name of Wei Liaoweng (1178-1237), who is mentioned above.

able to support [the city] on his own. It is apparent that that which is recorded is not presumptuous or exaggerated. The *Song shi* does not write a biography [of Wannian], nor has this piece been recorded yet. What a pity!

“Present comments: The *Song shi* also lacks a biography of Zhao Chun who defended Xiangyang, not just Wannian. *The Basic Annals of Ningzong* records the events of Xiangyang, but it is extremely brief. The *Xu song bian nian zi zhi tong jian*, *juan* 13 says, “On the *yi-wei* day of the eleventh month of the second year of the Kaixi reign period, the Jin people moved their cavalry and crossed the Han [River]. On the *xin-chou* day they surrounded Xiangyang prefecture. Previous to this, the Jin general arrived and Zhao Chun burned Fancheng. Upon this, he grew worried and anxious and became ill. He relied on the various generals to unite efforts to defend against and resist [the enemy], [and so] the city was able to remain intact.” It can be seen that Zhao Chun was simply a cowardly person who lacked a plan. Upon a strong army pressing on the territory and employing [a person] like this as leader, it was as if there was no one there to devise strategies in the army tent. Although various generals combined their strength, they were begging for defeat! Wannian’s merit is thus great! The *Shou cheng lu* probably uses Chun as the chief general, and could not but devolve merit upon him. Liaoweng’s *Preface* is not seen in *Heshan da quan ji* 鶴山大全集 and has presumably been lost. The present *Shou cheng lu* has already been carved and entered into the *Yue ya tang cong shu*, but the *Bi wo ji* has absolutely disappeared. I do not know if there is an extant edition, or not.”⁶¹

⁶¹ As noted earlier in the introduction, Herbert Franke was able to locate a copy of the *Bi wo ji* and has translated it into German.

Further Questions

The extant commentaries of the *XYSC* generate multiple questions. Did Zhao Chun in fact burn down Fancheng? If so, why? Why would Zhao Wannian skip over this major event in his diary? Why, after successfully holding off the Jin, is Zhao Chun remembered as a villain (at worst), or as nervous and incompetent (at best)?

Unfortunately, in answer to most of these questions, I can only speculate.

Zhao Chun is mentioned a total of five times in the *Song shi*. In the first reference, Chun receives his new assignment as Pacification Commissioner of the Capital's Northwest Circuit.⁶² The second reference reads, “[Eleventh Month], *yi-you* day [December 9, 1206]: Zhao Chun burned down Fancheng.”⁶³ After the siege is resolved, Zhao Chun is promoted to serve concurrently as the Vice Commander of the Palace Army and the Military Commissioner of the Jiang and Huai River Regions on October 11, 1207.⁶⁴ The fourth and fifth references to Zhao Chun are found in the Biographies of Xue Shusi 薛叔似, (commander of the troops at Zaoyang and Shenma Ridge),⁶⁵ and Han Tuo Zhou (39/474/13776).⁶⁶ However, these entries do not provide us with any new information regarding Zhao Chun.

A search for the name “Zhao Chun” in the electronic *Si ku quan shu* reveals a few dozen entries. Most of these are relevant but do not necessarily provide any new

⁶² *Song shi* 3/38/740.

⁶³ “乙酉趙淳焚樊城” *Song shi* 3/38/742.

⁶⁴ *Song shi* 3/38/745.

⁶⁵ *Song shi* 35/397/12092.

⁶⁶ *Song shi* 39/474/13776.

information. Of interest is the *Hou le ji* compiled by Wei Jing (1159-1226), which appears to transcribe speeches or edicts of the emperor, and mentions Zhao Chun five times.⁶⁷ In two instances it appears that the emperor refuses to let Zhao Chun resign, but nothing resembling reproach can be found.⁶⁸ It seems that it is only in sources written well after Zhao Chun's time that he is harshly criticized. *Ba xun wan shou cheng dian*, compiled by A Gui (1717-1797), includes Zhao Chun in a list of Song dynasty people who were fired, and Zhao Wannian in a list of people who were demoted one rank.⁶⁹ I have not seen anything else that would support this. Other Qing sources expand on the original *Song shi* entry and state: "Zhao Chun burned Fancheng and fled" (emphasis added),⁷⁰ or alternately, "Upon burning Fancheng, Zhao Chun was extremely troubled and became ill and irresponsible."⁷¹ More extensive research about Zhao Chun might be productive, but barring any unforeseen discovery, it appears that he was only defamed centuries after his death.

Did Zhao Chun burn Fancheng? I have not found any primary sources making this claim. Did Fancheng really burn? I have not found primary sources that would indicate this, either. Perhaps a more extensive search of local histories and current archaeological research from this area could provide clues, but this is currently beyond the scope of this thesis.

⁶⁷ Wei Jing, *juan* 2, 4, 5.

⁶⁸ Wei Jing, *juan* 4: "趙淳辭免殿前司副都指揮使不允詔," and later: "趙淳辭免特轉承宣使不允詔."

⁶⁹ A Gui, *juan* 75.

⁷⁰ For example: 趙淳焚樊城而遁. *Yu ding yuan jian lei han*, compiled by Zhang Ying (1637-1708) et al., *juan* 109, among others.

⁷¹ "...趙淳焚樊城而憂悸成疾賴." *Xu Song ping nian zi zhi tong jian*, compiled by Zhang Haipeng (1755-1816), *juan* 13.

Let us assume for a moment that Zhao Chun *did* in fact burn Fancheng. Why? This question is perhaps easier to answer. I believe the most likely reason would be that Chun evaluated the situation and decided that Fancheng was not defensible. Since we lack maps from the time period, we cannot be sure whether or not Fancheng was walled in on all four sides. Furthermore, even if Fancheng did have sturdy walls, Chun's forces were already spread thin. Did he have enough resources to defend both cities? If Zhao Chun decided that he could not defend Fancheng, it makes sense that he would have burned it. As Franke points out, Chinese strategists concluded quite early that "everything which could be of potential value to the enemy should be transported behind the walls. A sort of 'scorched earth' should surround the town. Another reason for the evacuation (*qing*) measures was obviously a tactical one, that is, to deny the enemy cover for ambushes and to provide the defenders with an unobstructed glaxis."⁷² If Zhao Chun had left the city intact, this would have been like building permanent barracks for the enemy!

Why Zhao Wannian would skip over a detail this important (still assuming that it *did* occur), is quite perplexing. The entire date of December 9, 1206 is notably absent from the diary. Could it be that Wannian was hoping to slip away from any blame? According to the entry of December 8th, Wannian was dispatched on the night of the 8th to admonish Lü Weisun. Presumably on the 9th, Wannian would have been caught up in the ensuing drama (which included an assassination attempt, an execution, and an "attempted" act of cannibalism).⁷³ This well publicized event, which is

⁷² Franke, "Siege and Defense," pp. 152-153.

⁷³ See Translation, lines 2Ab-2Ah.

included in several official histories and other private accounts, could provide Wannian with an excellent alibi, if he needed one.⁷⁴

The reasons for why Zhao Chun seems to have been “defamed,” especially during the Qing dynasty, still puzzle me. My best guess is that scholars misinterpreted the record. Perhaps some scanned the diary and thought that it was a record of the 1267-1273 siege. (The chief defender of Xiangyang at that time, Liu Wenhuan, surrendered the city and defected to the Mongols). Other scholars may have read that “Zhao Chun burned Fancheng,” but, not being military leaders themselves, they did not understand that this might have been an intelligent (although drastic) defensive measure. Thus, they simply assumed him to be incompetent. Still another possibility is that Qing scholars were indirectly supporting the Jin by criticizing Zhao Chun. The Manchus, non-Han founders of the Qing dynasty, claimed to be descendants of the Jin. In fact, the original name for the Qing dynasty was the “Later Jin.” Since the diary portrays the Jin negatively, Qing scholars could have interpreted this as an affront to the Qing ancestors. Without more information, it is currently impossible to draw a solid conclusion. Many other areas of interest surrounding Zhao Wannian’s diary have still not been addressed and would provide excellent topics for further research.

In the second chapter of my thesis, I present my annotated translation of the *Xiangyang shou cheng lu*. This is followed by appendices which include a copy of the Chinese text, and indices of people, official titles, weapons and fortification, and place names referred to in the diary. I also include some additional maps and photographs of the city wall and moat taken in 2005.

⁷⁴ Note, however, that none of the outside accounts specifically list Zhao Wannian as being present!

CHAPTER 2
ANNOTATED TRANSLATION

[1Aa]¹ **A Record of the Defense of Xiangyang's City Wall**

[1Ab] by Zhao Wannian: Student at the Gate,² Gentleman of Loyal Instruction, Ezhou's Campaign Commander,³ Special Official of the Managing Joint Vice-General, and Vice-Pacification Commissioner of the Capital's Northwest Circuit in charge of the Left Dispatch of the Reserves

[1Ac] In the fourth month of the second year of the Kaixi reign period [1206], Jingzhou and Ezhou's Campaign Commander, the Honorable Zhao Chun, was commanded to raise an army to defend Xiangyang. On the fifth day [May 14, 1206], he was appointed to be the Pacification Commissioner of the Capital's Northwest Circuit. At that time [Song] Vice Commissioner Huangfu Bin had personally gone out to lead an army to attack Tangzhou and Dengzhou,⁴ [but] to no avail. The Honorable [Zhao] then gathered the dispersed soldiers and ordered them to prepare to take up a rigorous defense and to ward off [the Jin].

¹ In order to aid the reader who wishes to follow along with the Chinese text, I have inserted a reference at the start of each English paragraph to the page number (1A, 1B, 2A, etc.) and line (a, b, c, etc) of the corresponding text of the *Yue ya tang cong shu* 粵雅堂叢書 edition. For the Chinese text, see Appendix A.

² This title suggests that Zhao Wannian was a student of someone and perhaps had passed some level of the civil service recruitment exam (Hucker, entry 3950). For more information regarding my translation of this, and other titles, see Appendix C.

³ For a map of Ezhou and other places named within the text, please see the Introduction and Appendix E.

⁴ For an index of names mentioned in the diary, please see Appendix B.

[1Ae] On the third day of the eleventh month [December 4, 1206], the emperor also appointed the Honorable [Zhao] to administer Xiangyang prefecture. Before this, it had been reported that the enemy was riding and pressing towards [our] territory; and the people claimed that five-hundred thousand [soldiers] had divided into three columns and were headed here.⁵

[1Ag] On the fifth day of this same month [December 6], the enemy attacked Zaoyang, and Commander-generals Ma Gong, Zhang Hu, and Han Yuan, etc., were all killed in battle. [The enemy] then besieged Zaoyang, [but] Senior Commander-generals Yong Zheng and Ma Jin, etc., led the army and fought with all their might. The siege broke and they left.

[1Ah] On the seventh day [December 8], the army led by Vice Commander Wei Youliang was at Shenma Ridge when [the enemy] attacked. Because the Honorable [Zhao] had heard that the enemy's troops were very numerous, he anxiously commanded me, Wannian, to go and take his orders to Commander Wei that he [should] not face [the Jin's] vanguard head-on.⁶ Instead [Commander Wei should] gather the army and, for the time being, return to Fancheng, and take time to make a plan for this. When I, Wannian, had almost arrived, they had already been attacked by the enemy. Senior Commander-general Yang Qi and others were killed in battle, [but] Commander Wei was able to extract his troops from the siege. On the same day, [the

⁵ The *Jin shi* "Basic Annals" records that as of November 4th, Wanyan Kuang only had 25,000 under his command. The size of the entire Jin force that was mobilized on November 4th to reclaim its territory and attack the Song is reported to be 145,000.

⁶ From this point on in the text, Vice Commander Wei Youliang 魏友諒 is referred to as "Commander Wei" 魏帥.

enemy] attacked Guanghua and Senior Commander-general Zheng Gao and others were killed in battle. Guanghua's old stonework was unable to protect [the city].

[1Bc] The Honorable [Zhao] was worried that the enemy would exploit a victory and that the [Song] vanguard would not be able to hold out against them. Consequently, he ordered that at Qingye, north of the river, we tie together a floating bridge. All of the people from inside and outside of Fancheng who crossed the bridge—soldiers and civilians, old and young—totaled several thousand. When the crossing was complete, everyone requested that the bridge be destroyed. However, the Honorable [Zhao] would not comply. He hurriedly pulled out the government troops from the various places north of the river that had been guarding and blocking [the enemy's] approach, as well as the soldiers who had retreated from battle. One after another, they entered the city wall, totaling several tens of thousands. Then, at twilight, we destroyed the bridge, and moved the people who resided outside of the [city] gates into the market area, and demolished each and every house which was near the city wall. We carried all [of the wood from the buildings] into the city and prepared it to be used as fuel for cooking.

[1Bh] The top of the city wall was divided into four corners. The Left Army's Senior Commander-general from our own squad, Liu Jin, commanded the eastern corner. The Senior Commander-general of Jiangling's Left Army, Wu Qiang, and Commander-General Hu Li commanded the western corner. Jiangzhou's Senior Commander-general, Lin Zhang, commanded the southern corner; and the Commander-general of our squad, Wang Shixiu, along with Chen Jian commanded the

north corner.⁷ [We] promptly transported the weapons and implements for the guarding of the city, and arranged them on top of the walls.

[2Aa] At once, [Zhao] summoned and consulted with Tan Liangxian of the Public Petitioners Drum Office and with Pacification Administrative Clerk, Zhang Shike.⁸ Both of them said that the senior commander-general of the Loyal and Brave Army, Lü Weisun, had seen Commander Wei at the battle of Shenma Ridge, [but] did not know whether or not he had survived. [Weisun] desired to coercively take the Vice Commander's post.⁹ Zhao already knew that Weisun was ferocious and cruel, and so he was afraid that something might happen. During the night, he dispatched me, Wannian, to go and indirectly admonish him.

[2Ad] At midnight, Commander Wei unexpectedly arrived and Weisun lost hope [of getting the post] and held bitter malice [toward Commander Wei]. The following morning, Weisun tried to kill Commander Wei and his son, Pu. In preparation, he had concealed a sword, and on his way, he killed two guards. However [Commander Wei's] attendants killed Weisun instantly.

[2Af] Because Weisun was usually cruel to the troops under his command, their bitterness had collected [until] the men were no longer able to endure his orders.¹⁰ Therefore, when he was executed, they fought with each other to slice him

⁷ Senior Commander-general seems to have been a common title.

⁸ According to Hucker (entry 6353), the Public Petitioners Drum Office was the office which received complaints.

⁹ Here I take the word *yin* 印 (seal, stamp, chop) to symbolically represent Vice Commander (Wei Youliang)'s position.

¹⁰ I think that *kebo* 刻剥 is a misspelling of *kebo* 刻薄 (line 2Ag).

into small pieces, and eat him. Zhao calmed and instructed the commanders and officers of the Loyal and Brave Army. Soon after that, they relaxed and all were content to follow orders.¹¹

[2Ah] On the eleventh [December 12], the enemy arrived at Fancheng. They had already appeared at Qingye, so this was not unexpected. They combined three columns of armies and galloped back and forth [through the territories] along the river, [causing] the officials and the people to be panic stricken. There were those among the officials and their subordinates who deserted one after the other. The Honorable [Zhao] said to his younger brother, (the Inner Administrator of the Provincial Branch), Hao, “For generations our family has received the kindness of this state. While our ancestors commanded Heyang,¹² our entire family was killed by the enemy. Only our father escaped. Today I command Xiangyang, and while on duty, the enemy has invaded. I vow that I shall die to defend my state.”

[2Bc] The inner administrator, [Hao], responded, “My aspirations are the same.” [And so] each time the Honorable [Zhao] spoke to the officials and their subordinates, [he said that] they must strive to adopt the utmost loyalty and die for the sake of honor. [They must] protect and console the residents and not become alarmed.

[2Bd] The Honorable [Zhao] suspected that there might be enemy agents within the city wall, and [so] he commanded [us] to search for them. [Following] the

¹¹ As noted in the Introduction, the “Basic Annals” of the *Song shi* reports that on December 9, 1206, Zhao Chun burned down Fancheng. Zhao Wannian’s diary does not include this date or this event within his diary. This omission is extremely intriguing. Presumably the burning would have occurred while Wannian was off on one of his several errands.

¹² I’m not sure if Heyang is a place name, or simply the *yang* side (north) of the river. Heyang County 河陽縣, as well as Heyang 河陽邑 Town, are located in the southwest of modern day Meng County 孟縣 in Henan province.

strict Community Self-defense System,¹³ the people's lineage groups were all given numbers and recorded. He appointed subordinate staff members to patrol [the city] and be vigilant for fires and theft.

[2Bf] [Zhao] was also concerned that when the enemy came near the city wall, they would surely have incendiary missiles, and so every thatched or bamboo building near the city wall, along with nearby storehouses, were removed. [We] continued to fetch water buckets from the market well for quenching fire, and took them up [onto the city wall] to protect against fire-arrows.¹⁴ We went back to the storehouses and fetched more than a thousand earthen wine jars,¹⁵ stored water [in them], and arranged them by the market well. The plan for distributing them had already been determined.

[2Bh] On the seventeenth [December 18], [we] heard that the enemy was about to tie boats and rafts together at the mouth of Bai tributary and cross the river. The Honorable [Zhao] rode unaccompanied to the river's head to see whether or not the enemy had boats and rafts. When he had reached mid-way, he met Commander-

¹³ Fang Chenghui (p. 191) explains that this is a reference to the "Community Self-defense System" (*bao jia* 保甲, Hucker's entry 4465), which was initiated by Wang Anshi in 1070. According to Fang, this system (the 保伍之法) was a common method for organizing families during times of disaster. Each household was grouped with nine others, and every member of these ten households was responsible for keeping each other in line and for providing a certain number of soldiers and laborers for public projects. Hucker, however, might disagree. He translates *bao wu* 保伍 as "Local Militia Squad" and cautions that the Local Militia squad "Coexisted with, and [is] often confused with, militiamen of the *pao-jia* system..." (Hucker, entry 4503).

¹⁴ The *Yue ya tang cong shu* edition actually reads, "仍取市井潛火水通上以防火箭" But here I choose to follow the *Cong shu ji cheng chu bian* as cited by Fang which reads: "仍取市井潛入水桶，上城以防火箭。" (Fang, 191).

¹⁵ Here I follow the *CSJCCB* and *Zhi hai* editions of the text which use the character 千 instead of the character 十. The *Yue ya tang* edition states, "We... fetched more than *ten* earthen wine jars." Ten jars would hardly seem adequate for an entire city.

general Dong Zhangzhen who reported that [the enemy], who was separated [from him] by the river, had called to him and said that the Honorable Minister Wanyan desired to request negotiations to cease the fighting. Sure enough, just as [Zhao] reached the river's head, Wanyan arrived. Because the edges of the river were separated by a sandbar, the Honorable [Zhao] desired to board a boat and go to the midst of the river [to talk with Wanyan], [but] the troops said that the enemy was very deceitful [and so] no one wanted the Honorable [Zhao] to go. [However], [Zhao] himself said, "I have received the state's abundant kindness. How can one death be regrettable?" and promptly crossed over to the sandbar. [They] faced each other about forty or fifty paces apart. Someone opened a purple parasol and announced the Campaign Commander and Honorable Minister,¹⁶ and there indeed was Wanyan. He was tall and approximately over fifty years old. The people in front and behind him followed good order, and he was surrounded [by guards] several deep. The Honorable [Zhao] only brought along a few people, [but] also spread out a purple canopy and set it up on the sandbar.

[3Ag] The enemy said, "I convey a call for you to submit [to our state]. It will not be easy to control [my] troops."¹⁷

[3Ag] Zhao also returned the offer.

[3Ah] The enemy said, "I have already annihilated Zaoyang, brought down Guanghua, and grabbed up all of Shenma Ridge. In addition, I have sent out men and

¹⁶ A purple parasol is a symbol of status.

¹⁷ Presumably Wanyan Kuang is reminding Zhao Chun that plunder is one of the motivating forces behind his troops: If the Jin enter the city there would likely be much death, destruction, and loss of property amongst the civilians of Xiangyang.

horses to capture Suizhou, Xinyang, and De'an. How could I hear a call to submit [to your state]? Quickly signal your surrender!"

[3Ai] The Honorable [Zhao] answered by saying, "Since ancient times we have employed troops, and there have been victories and defeats. You have an army and cavalry. I also have an army and cavalry, which are presently prepared. How could you ever capture any of our prefectures? As for this kind of talk, it is only meant to scare and intimidate the common people and village farmers. My dynasty's army and cavalry have already killed much of the Northern Army downstream at the mouth of the Qing River and at other places.¹⁸ We have burned eleven hundred of your boats. It is as if you are not aware of this."

[3Bd] The enemy again said, "The troops that you dispatch to fight are without renown."

[3Bd] Zhao answered saying, "Our two countries have been on good terms for many years. My court also wants peace and respite. [This conflict] has only [come about] because of the commercial interactions between the south and north, for when merchants travel to buy and sell, sometimes they produce bitter feuds, to the extent of harming one another!"¹⁹

"[3Bf] My imperial court once sent down an imperial proclamation agreeing to keep the frontier peoples within its bounds. If there is anyone who often crosses the

¹⁸ The "northern army" (北军) is a diplomatic reference to the Jin army. The use of this neutral term suggests that Zhao does not want to directly insult Wanyan.

¹⁹ Here Zhao seems to be blaming the merchants for the unrest that exists between the Song and the Jin. Zhao's claim deserves further research.

northern border, according to military law, he is to be sentenced and beheaded.²⁰ But because small-minded people enjoy disorder, and the southern and northern people both loot and plunder each other's cattle and horses—this has provoked all the trouble. Consequently, we have arrived at today's [conflict].”

[3Bh] The enemy spoke again, “Everything is Huangfu Bin[’s fault].”

[3Bh] Zhao responded, “The real cause is others’ tolerance and sheltering of these affairs! The imperial court has already exiled [him] far away beyond the sea.”²¹

[3Bi] The enemy said, “Then properly submit [to our state], and speak clearly [about it].” He added, “I have received my emperor’s sacred decree that I shall not kill the civilians of the southern frontier.”

[4Ab] Zhao responded, “You have already killed a great number of our border people! How can you deny it and say that you have not killed them?”

[4Ab] The enemy said, “Never [have I killed them]! Everyone is going about their business peacefully, and the families [of our two sides] are very close; they are a

²⁰ Hok-lam Chan writes: “Provisions of severe punishment, including the death sentence, were established against individuals violating the [trade] regulations in order to deter smuggling at the expense of the government and benefiting the other side as well as prevent spies from entering the country.”

²¹ I am not sure what is implied by *hai wai* 海外, which I translate here as “beyond the sea.” There is no evidence in the *Song shi* that Huangfu Bin was exiled “beyond the sea.” The “Basic Annals” records that he was demoted three ranks on July 18, 1206 and another five ranks on July 31. There is no mention of his exile except in the biography of Liu Jia 劉甲 (1142-1214), (*Song shi*, juan 397, p. 12092), which states that Huangfu Bin was exiled to Nan’an Garrison 南安軍. (No date is provided). (The only place name that I can find for Nan’an Garrison that was used during the Song dynasty is located in present day Dayu County 大庾縣, Jiangxi Province. This seems like an unlikely place for “exile,” because the area is not particularly remote. Perhaps it is more likely that Nan’an stands for “the southern pacified [region]”—a Chinese dominated part of northern Vietnam. This area is remote, and many Chinese sent there soon died from malaria).

single family.”²² He added, “At the eastern end, starting from Hai[zhou] and the Si[zhou],²³ to the western end at Chuan and Shu,²⁴ our northern army has two or three million troops and horses. The two forces together will take your prefectures, and upon securing them, they will come [here]. Although Xiangyang has a city wall, you cannot rely on [it]. If you submit [to our state] as I, the Chief Pacification Commissioner, have clearly stated, then wouldn't this be to observe Heaven's intent? I have received the order to capture Xiangyang. Furthermore, I observe that many people of Xiangyang have personally made known their [desire for] early surrender. If you surrender quickly, I will not enter the walls of Xiangyang Prefectural city, and will personally turn back.”

[4Ah] Zhao loudly rebuked him saying, “Each [man] serves his own ruler. It is only proper for me to die for the defense of [my] state! What reason do I have to surrender? I have only the precedent of Wei Xiaokuan.”²⁵ You have an army and cavalry. I also have an army and cavalry. In addition, I hold a strategic pass to the Yangtze and have a limitless number of warships to deal with your arrival.”

²² According to *Hanyu da cidian* 漢語大詞典, *men* 懣 (which commonly means resentful or sullen) can also be used the same as *men* 們, a suffix which makes pronouns plural. This reading seems to make the most sense here.

²³ *Hai si* 海泗 is an abbreviation for *Haizhou* 海州 and *Sizhou* 泗州, which are all located near the Jin-Song border in what is now eastern Shandong.

²⁴ *Chuan* and *Shu* 川蜀 are general terms for the areas located in the vicinity of modern Sichuan province, which is as far west as the Jin empire extended.

²⁵ Wei Xiaokuan 韋孝寬 (509-580 CE) was a general of the Northern Zhou dynasty. He is famous for breaking out of a fifty day siege imposed on Yubi 玉壁 (located in the southwest of present day Jishan 稷山 county, Shandong Province) by the Eastern Wei general, Gao Huan 高歡. Because of Wei Xiaokuan's cleverness and excellent aptitude for manipulating troops, he was able to repeatedly defend against powerful enemy attacks. For this reason, he was admired and considered a great hero (*Zhongguo li dai ren ming da ci dian*, p. 256).

[4Ba] Wanyan was unable to utter a word. Then, he said, “Submit [to my State] so that [we all may] rest.” Then he mounted his horse and upon beating a drum, he left.

[4Bb] The next day, the enemy dispatched Recorder Xiang Ming to present two messages, one from Wanyan together with one from the Vice Controller. The Honorable [Zhao] did not permit [him] to enter the city walls. [Instead he] dispatched [his] younger brother, the Inner Administrator, with Administrative Manager Tan Xuan to accompany the Honorable [Zhao] in opening the letters. Again they contained “this” and “that”—the same kind of talk [as before]. [Zhao] cast it upon the ground and loudly cursed the enemy bandits, “What kind of way is this to treat me?!” He wrote a message answering it, saying:

[4Be] Yesterday [I] entertained the request of the specially-appointed commissioner, Brigade Commander Dong, [who said that you] wished to hold a meeting.²⁶ Even though [I] observed [your] manner from a distance and we were separated by the river, [you] did not seem to be at ease.

[4Bf] [Today] a messenger has come and said that I severely misunderstood what was meant. [Your] Vice Campaign Commander’s message reads, “The Honorable Minister [Wanyan] closely attends his position in office, how can you incite other people to engage in disloyal and unfilial affairs?”²⁷

[4Bg] My revered dynasty holds irreconcilable enmity [with yours], [but] rightly takes up the common people’s cause. [Therefore], for the moment,

²⁶ I believe this is a reference to Commander-general Dong Zhangzhen, whom we first met on line 3Aa.

²⁷ Is this perhaps a reference to Zhao Chun’s request that Wanyan submit to the Song state?

we maintain peace agreements. Over successive years, the state of Jin has permitted its starving people to loot and plunder our cattle and horses, and has frightened and harassed our frontier [people]. [You] have sent emissaries to offer congratulations for the New Year, [but] at [our] court have been without manners.²⁸ In addition, [you] have interrogated and ridiculed our court's messengers! [You] often send out proclamations recklessly adding slander and insults. How could this be [considered] reasonable?

[5Ab] At Zaoyang and other places there have been small victories and small defeats [which have become] the military's routine.²⁹ Nevertheless, your soldiers and cavalry that have been killed and injured are ten times ours in number. As for Fu Jian's invasion of Jin,³⁰ his troops were not small in number. As for his defeat at the Fei River, this affair is presumably known to you. Your Honor boasts that your army is large. [If so], why can I not see this? Presently our city wall is high and [our] moat is deep. We are strongly fortified. We have skilled troops and fine horses, and we have fully gathered at a strategic place. As loyal servants of the battlefield, we only know of joining together to repay our State. We do not know of anything else.

[5Ae] [I] desire that you dispatch someone to report back [that this message has been delivered]. Because [you], the Honorable Minister, have

²⁸ This is a reference to an episode recorded in the *Song shi*, ch. 38, p. 739.

²⁹ Since Zaoyang was one of the nine official trade cities of the Song—this could hardly have been considered a “small defeat”!

³⁰ Fu Jian (苻堅) (338-385 C.E.) was a nobleman of the Later Qin. In 361 he allegedly led 900,000 troops to attack the Eastern Jin at the Fei River (淝水), but was defeated.

reported this morning's affair, and since it is not that which should have been heard, and also should not have been dispatched; for the time being, send someone here to declare your answer and I shall order that all of your letters will receive a reply.³¹

[5Ag] [To] Vice Controller [Xiang Ming] he merely stated, "My reply to you may entirely be seen in the letter to Wanyan." [And with that], Ming left.

[5Ah] On the twenty-second [December 23],³² [Courier for] the Pacification Commission, Xue, brought a message [from the Court] saying that two commanders did not need to both be at Xiangyang. [Therefore the Court] desired to send Commander Wei to coordinate action at De'an. At that time, [because] the Honorable [Zhao] was [also] concerned about Yingzhou and De'an's lack of preparation, he dispatched Commander Wei to command an army to go to De'an.³³

[5Ba] Because the Honorable [Zhao] determined that the soldiers within the city walls were insufficient, he consequently raised a flag to recruit the brave and fierce people among the tea merchants.³⁴ Although there were those who had endured

³¹ I have found lines 5Ae-5Ag particularly difficult to translate. This is my best guess.

³² The *CSJCCB* and *Zhi hai* editions records this date as "the twentieth" [December 21], (Fang, p. 193).

³³ Apparently Wei Youliang 魏友諒 ("Commander Wei") never made it to De'an. He is not mentioned in the *Kaixi De'an shou cheng lu* 開禧德安守城錄. The "Basic Annals" of the *Song shi* reports that on January 16, 1207, Wei Youliang's troops broke ranks at Huaquan 花泉 (which I have not been able to locate) and fled to Jiangling 江陵 (located South of Xiangyang on the Yangtze River). I have not found any other information on his whereabouts from December 23 to January 16. This requires more research.

³⁴ Note that these "brave and fierce people" are not necessarily tea merchants themselves, but are rather armed guards *hired by* the tea merchants to protect them and their possessions from bandits. The fact that private guards played a role in the defense of Xiangyang (as well as others cities) is an interesting detail which, as Charles Peterson points out, deserves further research. It is also interesting that Zhao Chun never questions the loyalty of this group.

being exiled and enslaved, none were asked whence they came; and they were named the Bold and Brave Army. Those that answered the recruitment were drawn together, and the Honorable [Zhao] magnanimously added a great reward of food and drink [so that] these men would all be inspired to act vigorously.

[5Bc] Because the Xiang River has many shoals and banks,³⁵ the Honorable [Zhao] dispatched the government troops to guard them. On several [occasions], the enemy ordered people to measure [the depth of] the water, but time and again [they] were forced to retreat by our archers. Coincidentally, it had not rained for a long time, [and so] the river's flow had daily become increasingly shallow.

[5Be] On the twenty-fourth [December 25], the enemy gathered their army to ford Xiaofan's Anyang Beach. While [they] crossed the river, [we] defended the beach. Our crossbowmen fired in unison, and [our count of] their dead, injured, and drowned came to a few tens of thousands of people. [In spite of this], the enemy chieftain showed no sympathy [to his troops]. He spurred them on, and they crossed over. From the Huaquan Gorge of Wan Mountain in the west, and from Red Bank and Yuliang Plain in the east, they set down stockades like a string of beads and encircled the prefectural city. The soldiers and people were terrified. The Honorable [Zhao] was concerned that the people's hearts would not be steadfast, and thus he ordered that the four gates of the prefectural city wall be filled in with earth to show [the people] that they should die defending [the city], and to prevent the people from harboring any intent to leave.

³⁵ The Xiang River 襄江 is a local name for the Han River starting from its bend at Xiangfan to the Yangtze.

[5Bi] The Honorable [Zhao] reasoned that because the enemy bandits had newly arrived, their fortresses would not yet be secure, [and therefore] they could be attacked. [Thus], on the twenty-fifth [December 26], he sent more than six-thousand men of Dispatcher Lü Shixiong's division of the Bold and Brave Army to raid and burn the enemy's stockades. They rode in boats and met the barbarian army when they reached the Temple of the Five Maidens. [The barbarians] were driving captives and livestock on the riverbank.³⁶ Lü Shixiong's [division] climbed up on the bank to engage in battle. They seized six horses and rescued more than a thousand civilians—both young and old—who had been captured by the enemy. At nightfall, [Zhao] also sent Commander-general Hu Li together with the divisions of the Bold and Brave Army led by tea merchants Liao Yanzhi, Lu Shizhong, and Zhang Ju, etc., to take a thousand men out of the southern gate to go to Tiger Head Mountain and other places to raid [the enemy's] stockades.

[6Ae] On the night of the twenty-sixth [December 27], [Zhao] dispatched Lü Shixiong and Commanding Officer Pei Xian to lead more than six-thousand people of the Bold and Brave Army to go to the river northwest of the city wall and engage the enemy. They seized two boats loaded with grain.

[6Ag] On the twenty-seventh [December 28], the enemy bandits posted a flag to the west of the wall. [On the flag] they had written the word, "SUBMIT!"³⁷ and employed several people to defend it. The Honorable [Zhao] dispatched an audacious

³⁶ Because of its context (see following sentence), I believe that *lu ren* 虜人 here is being used in its more common meaning of "captive" (instead of its usual use in this text—a derogatory term for the enemy).

³⁷ Submit: "*zhao an*" 招安

man, Li Chao, to go down from the wall, grab the flag, and bring it back. The defenders [of the flag] scattered and fled. That night, [Zhao] also dispatched Lü Shixiong and Pei Xian to command a division of the Bold and Brave Army to go outside the west side of the wall. [They] rode in boats and crossed to the river's north, raiding [the enemy] stockades and burning boats carrying provisions as well as boats for crossing the river.

[6Ba] On the twenty-eighth [December 29], the Honorable [Zhao] observed that all of the houses outside of the city walls had been burned down by the enemy except for an earthen walled storehouse that was still standing. Each of the bandits concealed behind [this] wall shot at the government troops on top of the city wall. The Honorable [Zhao] consequently ordered Commanding Officer Xu Jin's squad of thirty government soldiers to go out of the city and hack down the wall. However, more than three-hundred of the enemy's cavalry made a surprise attack on them! Xu Jin killed five of the enemy bandits. He cut off each one's head, and hanging them on a pole, he brought them back [to the city]. Among [the enemy] there had been only two people in battle dress—those must have been the leaders.

[6Be] [Zhao] also dispatched Lü Shixiong and Pei Xian to lead a division of men to ride boats toward the Xiang River's western sandbar to exchange fire with several thousand of the enemy bandits. The bowman and crossbowman fought from early morning until early evening, and the bandits retreated and fled. The number of dead and injured was very large.

[6Bg] On the twenty-ninth [December 30], spies learned that the enemy bandits were building a pontoon bridge at the Eastern Ford in order to move [troops]

back and forth. The Honorable [Zhao] commanded that an old boat be filled with dried grass that had been soaked with oil. He dispatched experienced sailors to release the boat from upstream. When it was about to reach the pontoon bridge, they lit the grass on fire and the boat burned down the bridge. The sailors immediately swam [from the burning boat] and climbed onto the bank. Again [Zhao] dispatched Lü Shixiong and Pei Xian to lead their division of men to the Xiang River's western sandbar as well as the river's northern bank. [There], they fought with the enemy bandits, shooting and causing them to retreat.

[7Ab] On the first day of the twelfth month [December 31], the enemy dispatched a captive, Liu Bao, to the moat east of the city wall to shout to [those] on top of the wall. He said, "The Honorable Minister [Wanyan] desires to send a person to come and exchange words with you. Recorder Xiang Ming will come back tomorrow."

[7Ad] [The next day] the Honorable [Zhao] dispatched Pacification Administrative Clerk Zhang Shike to descend the wall to respond to him. With the moat between them, they had a discussion. What Xiang Ming said was just the same as the contents of previous days' letters. Zhang [Shike] understood the main ideas, and upon his rejection [of the enemy's proposal], [Xiang Ming] left.

[7Af] Also on the second day [of the twelfth month], [January 1, 1207],³⁸ several tens of enemy cavalry rode [to a place] west of the city wall. One person came forward alone, and claimed himself to be "Heaven's Emissary." He shouted,

³⁸ Note that this is the same day that the events in the paragraph above took place. It seems odd that the date is given here.

“Surrender soon!” and spoke insolently. The Honorable [Zhao] commanded some heroic men to burst forth from the abatis to catch and kill him.³⁹ They took his head [and from] below his waist they obtained a wooden tablet strung with a red silk ribbon. [On it] was barbarian writing that no one could decipher. I don’t know what constitutes an “Emissary from Heaven.”




Figure 9: abatis (author’s diagram based on *Weapons*, p. 222).

[7Ai] When night arrived, the enemy bandits transported wood, bamboo, cloud ladders,⁴⁰ goose carts,⁴¹ shielded passageways,⁴² trebuchet attacking equipment, grass

³⁹ An “abatis” *lu jiao* 鹿角 is an obstacle for defense made from felled trees and bushes that are positioned so that their sharpened branches point towards the enemy. Often these were used in combination with a ditch (*Weapons: an international encyclopedia from 5000 BC to 2000 AD*, the diagram group, p. 222). The abatis was most likely positioned just beyond the city wall (or the moat) as another layer of fortification. For a diagram of my reconstruction of the defense layout, see Appendix E.

⁴⁰ “Cloud ladders” *yun ti* 雲梯 are a type of counterweighted ladder commonly used during sieges to scale the city walls. They are described in detail in Needham’s *Science and Civilization in China*, volume 5, part 6, section 30, pp. 446-453.

⁴¹ A “goose cart” *e che* 鵞車 may have been a type of battering ram used to knock down walls. “Goose carts” do not appear in Needham’s discussion of siege equipment (unless *e che* is some sort of abbreviation for *e gu che* 餓鵞車, which is translated in Needham as “hungry falcon cart”). The *HYDCD* only states that it is a kind of cart used to attack a city wall.

In “Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China,” Franke states that a goose cart (or “goose carriage,” as he translates it) is a projecting platform on wheels, which the attackers stand on and which is pushed against the outer wall (p. 170).

⁴² These “shielded passageways” (Chinese: *dong zi* 洞子) were probably made from wood and ox hide. They seem to have been used to protect the attackers from projectiles while they set up and operated their attacking equipment. Franke calls them an “artificial tunnel” and states that they were “a sort of corridor built of wood and covered either with planks and boards or with leather which could protect the attackers against arrow shots” (“Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China,” p. 170).

oxen,⁴³ and sandbags to the base of the city wall.⁴⁴ The Honorable [Zhao] secretly instructed the troops and officers of the four corners of the wall to prepare and set up the gunpowder, arrows, and stones for the trebuchets, etc., and to distribute them [along the top of the wall].



Figure 10: Cloud ladder (*Wu jing zong yao qian ji*, p. 437).

[7Bb] On the third day [January 2], while it was still not yet sunrise, the bandit army arrayed their foot soldiers in the front and their cavalry in the rear. The blockade [extended] limitlessly in every direction. Amidst the drumming, they emitted a cry, and as one they gathered together and advanced. As before, we took up the wooden shields and boarded the gates and windows to screen off and cover ourselves. While [the enemy] moved and transported their weapons and equipment for attacking the wall, the Honorable [Zhao] personally instructed the commanders and soldiers to be solemnly silent and not to make any noise of confusion. We awaited their gradual

⁴³ A “grass ox” *cao niu* 草牛 seems to be a bundle of grass, (perhaps like a bale), usually used as incendiary material.

⁴⁴ Literally “earth cloth sacks,” *tu bu dai* 土布袋, I have chosen to translate this term as “sandbags” since they seem to fulfill the same purpose.

approach until they came within range of our bows and crossbows, and only after this did we shoot at them.

[7Be] In a flash, the enemy arrows were like rain, and the top of the wall was like the spines of a hedgehog! The Honorable [Zhao] himself was shot by two arrows. The number of [arrows] that entered into the city could not be counted. The Honorable [Zhao] ordered that we first employ the gunpowder arrows to shoot and burn the bamboo, wood, grass oxen, as well as the wooden [frames] of the trebuchets and other attacking equipment, that had been carried by the barbarian bandits. Smoke and flames rose up in all four directions, and the bowman, crossbowman, and trebuchets on top of the wall fired in unison. As for the enemy bandits who were shot and killed from dawn to dusk, as well as those who were struck and wounded, we do not know their number. All were defeated and fled, abandoning their weapons, armor, bows, arrows, clothes, and other items.

[7Bi] The Honorable [Zhao] promptly dispatched death-defying men out of the city wall to cross the moat and overtake and kill them. Many [of our men] captured heads and seized military gear, and burned up their cloud ladders and other attacking equipment. Immediately we [took up] all of our victories and made them known.

[8Ab] The next day, the enemy's spirit was broken and exhausted. They shifted their stockades and moved further back. The Honorable [Zhao] ordered us to gather up the enemy arrows that were everywhere. From within a temple outside of the city wall we took more than one million arrows that had been stored there. [Zhao] rewarded the generals and officers with silver, each according to their distinctions. The officers' spirits were greatly raised. In addition, we investigated and discovered

that many of the injured enemy bandits who had attacked the wall were crossing the river and heading north. Consequently, [Zhao] dispatched Lü Shixiong and Pei Xian's division of crossbowman to take boats to the place where [the enemy] was crossing, so that we could intercept and shoot them.

[8Af] When the enemy had first invaded our territory, the Honorable [Zhao] commanded that the Commander-general defending Junzhou,⁴⁵ Wang Hong, send out troops to attack Deng[zhou] in order to hamper [the enemy's movement]. The division of men that Wang Hong commanded started from Zhechuan and entered Neixiang,⁴⁶ burning more than one million [units] of the grain and fodder which had been stored up by the enemy along the roads. They [also] captured the severed heads of Battalion Commanders Du Tianshi and Duan Shouzhong, etc.

[8Ai] On the fifth, [January 4], the message of their victory arrived. However, the spy Zhang Hong also reported that the enemy had learned that Wang Hong's army had entered the territory of Deng[zhou]. Consequently, they put forth several thousand of their enemy troops [that were at] Guanghua, and went back from Qingni to rescue [Dengzhou].⁴⁷ That night, [Zhao] again dispatched Lü Shixiong and Pei Xian, to unite with [the troops of] Commanding Officer Shao Shizhong. They followed the waterway, [and then] split up to raid the enemy bandits. During Lü Shixiong and Pei Xian's raid at Xuanma Shoal, the enemy bandits were pushed back and ran away. We

⁴⁵ Junzhou was the prefecture located upstream from Xiangyang (to the northwest).

⁴⁶ Dengzhou 鄧州, Zhechuan 浙川, and Neixiang 內鄉 were all located in Jin territory. See figures 7 and 8.

⁴⁷ I have not been able to locate Qingni. My translation leans on the assumption that Qingni is a locality subordinate to (and therefore part of) Guanghua.

seized four ferry boats and one large bamboo raft. Shao Shizhong's division of crossbowman fired in unison from above and below the beach's moraine. A great many of the enemy bandits fell into the water, and all of the rest, in dire straights, were defeated and ran away. In addition, [Zhao] dispatched a thousand men from Commanding Officer Meng Bao, Zhang De, and Liu Yan's divisions of the Bold and Brave Army to pass through the Wan Mountains and enter Fulong. [There] we launched a surprise attack on their rear. The enemy bandits broke ranks and ran, and many drowned. We burned down more than three-hundred weapons and tools that had been made for attacking the city walls.

[8Bg] In front of Dongshan Monastery, we also got hold of two beggars. Both said that among the barbarian soldiers there were those who had looked after each other and conversed while in tears. They spoke of a Commandant-escort who had been killed by the Southern Army, [and said] "How can we return home?" [The beggars] did not know who the Commandant-escort actually was, but how could he not have been a noble relative serving as a head [of the enemy troops]?

[8Bi] On the sixth [January 5], we investigated and learned that the enemy bandits were about to come and burn down the abatis that was outside the moat. Consequently we hid the government troops in ambush within the abatis in order to prepare for them. Sure enough, several people came straight away to set fire [to it]. A government soldier, Wang Cai used a spear to kill one person and hacked off his head, severing it, and at the same time seized [his] flag, spear, bow and saber. [Zhao] also commanded Wang Cai to go on a difficult reconnaissance to the foot of the Wan Mountains. There, there were three of the enemy bandits, who were lighting a signal

fire. Wang Cai captured and killed one person and seized [his] severed head. The Honorable [Zhao] was pleased by his bravery, and promoted him to the Support Squad.

[9Ad] On the night of the seventh [January 6], [Zhao] dispatched Guo Wang and more than thirty men from Commanding Officer Wang Heng's squad of government troops. They went out of the city walls and burned down more than five-hundred items such as cloud ladders and grass oxen, etc. At that time, there were barbarian troops within a place called Haizi headed this way, [but] they were chased by Guo Wang, etc., who captured one bronze gong.

[9Ag] On the eighth [January 7], we investigated and discovered that the enemy bandits were about to follow the river north and cross to the southern bank. Consequently, [Zhao] dispatched Pei Xian's division of government troops to ride in ships [in order to] intercept and kill them.

[9Ah] On the ninth [January 8], [Zhao] dispatched Wang Heng together with forty-four men from Head Military Instructor Guo De's squad of government troops to cross the moat and burn down more than one-hundred cloud ladders, and also to burn the grass oxen, bags for sand,⁴⁸ and other attacking equipment.

[9Ba] On the tenth [January 9], [Zhao] dispatched Dispatcher Yang Jian to assemble one-thousand people [along with] twenty-five people from Wei Zhong's squad of government troops, to cross the moat. They burned down more than two-hundred cloud ladders and grass oxen. At night during the fourth watch,⁴⁹ some enemy bandits rode in six small ships and floated stealthily from upstream to use fire arrows

⁴⁸ In this context, I have translated *tu bu dai* 土布袋 as "bags for sand" which makes more sense than "sandbags" in this context.

⁴⁹ The fourth watch lasted approximately from 1:00 to 3:00 a.m.

to burn the passenger ship below the bank of the north gate. [However], on top of the wall, Commanding Officer Lü Xing heard a cry come from [guards] on the boat. Consequently, he ordered the crossbowman on top of the wall to fire together, and the enemy retreated and ran away.

[9Be] On the eleventh [January 10], [Zhao] dispatched twenty-four people from Dispatcher Fan Xing and Head Military Instructor Jiang Qing's, squad of government troops to cross the river and burn down more than one-hundred fifty cloud ladders, as well as grass oxen, etc.

[9Bg] On the twelfth [January 11], [Zhao] dispatched fourteen people from Wang Heng's squad of government troops to cross the river and burn down more than seventy cloud ladders.

[9Bh] On the fourteenth [January 13], [Zhao] dispatched Dispatcher Fang Pu, Head Military Instructor Xu Liang, and the Support Squad's Sun Xiaozhong to lead more than thirty people. They crossed the river and burned down more than one-hundred cloud ladders. In addition, [Zhao] dispatched fifty-nine people from Lu Shizhong, Zhang Ju, and Head Military Instructor Xu Gui's squads of government troops to go forward to the area around the Wan Mountains. They burned down more than two-hundred cloud ladders, more than one-hundred wooden shields, and an uncountable amount of bamboo, wood, and grass oxen. For days, [Zhao] dispatched troops to burn attacking equipment until it was all burned up.

[10Ac] On the fifteenth [January 14], we investigated and learned that the enemy bandits had come back to the Ziyang Temple south of the city wall, and to the Buddhist monasteries, and other such places. Again they were constructing attacking

equipment. Consequently, [Zhao] dispatched thirty-six people from the government troop squad of Fang Pu and the Director of Military Training, Zhu Jian. They went forward and burned down more than two-hundred cloud ladders and seized a mule together with a saddle and bridle. In addition, [Zhao] dispatched fifty people of Cai Xiaoxian's squad of government troops to snatch the large bamboo that the enemy bandits had piled up for making cloud ladders. More than one hundred enemy cavalry came forward to chase them [but] they were killed and pushed back by Cai Xiaoxian and others. We seized their army's weapons, clothing, and armor.

[10Ah] On the night of the sixteenth [January 15], [Zhao] dispatched Zhang Ju, Liao Yanzhong, and others to divide into four columns and go forward to burn and raid the enemy's stockades. Zhang Ju's squad led seventy three men from the Bold and Brave Army as well as thirty-two of the greater army's crossbowman. They crossed the river and starting from the Purple Cliff Monastery they went around Tiger Head Mountain, and raided a bandit stockade.⁵⁰ They seized felt cloaks,⁵¹ clothing, armor, sabers, scythes, etc., and also took back ten of the captives—both elders and children.

[10Bb] Liao Yanzhong led seventy-two people of the Bold and Brave army to Shidingzhuan Monastery and other places to raid the bandit stockades.⁵² They hacked

⁵⁰ If the location that I have for Tiger Head Mountain is correct, it would not make sense for Zhao's men to *cross the river* before going around Tiger Head Mountain.

⁵¹ I have not (yet) found the term *pizhan* 披氍, which I translate here as “felt cloaks.” *Pi* 披 means “to drape over the shoulders,” and *zhan* 氍 means “a blanket” or “felt.” Note that I believe Fang copied this character incorrectly, as he uses the character *shan* 擅 (Fang, 197).

⁵² Fang (p. 197) notes that the *Zhi hai* edition within the *Cong shu ji cheng chu bian* names a Liao Yanshi 廖彦士, instead of Liao Yanzhong as the leader of this group. It also gives the monastery's name as “Dingzhuan 定專” instead of “Shidingzhuan 是定專.”

off two enemy bandits' heads, and [captured] two horses—together with saddles and bridles, clothing, armor, and other military implements.

[10Bd] Sixty-six people from Lü Shixiong's squad of government troops reached the area around the Wan Mountains, and burned up more than five-hundred cloud ladders and battle shields. They also burned up the abatis [around] the stockade, and chased and killed [the enemy], who were defeated and ran away. In addition, [our troops] seized more than five-hundred large bamboo poles to be used for constructing ladders.

[10Bf] Forty-six people of Commanding Officer Ma Anzhong's squad of government troops reached Cloud Peak Monastery, and other places, pursuing and killing the enemy bandits who were guarding the attacking equipment. When [the enemy] scattered and fled, we burned up more than two-hundred cloud ladders, and four heavenly bridges.⁵³

[10Bh] On the night of the seventeenth [January 16], [Zhao] dispatched Lu Shizhong to lead fifty-eight men from the Bold and Brave Army and thirty-one crossbowman from the greater army to the front of the Cloud Peak Monastery located to the east of the city wall. [There], we raided the stockade and killed many enemy bandits. We captured the barbarian soldier, Li Ba'er, alive. He claimed to be Li Talan's son.

⁵³ As best I can gather, a "heavenly bridge" *tian qiao* 天橋 is either a type of cart used to fill in the moat, or a type of cart for scaling the city wall. For example, in the *Song shi*'s biography of Chen Gui 陳規 (ch. 377), one sentence reads: 李橫圍城造天橋填濠... Li Heng surrounded the city wall, made heavenly bridges, and filled in the moat." The *Shou cheng lu* might prove to be a clarifying source, since it mentions heavenly bridges more than twenty times.

In his "Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China," Franke states that a heavenly bridge (which he translates "heaven-bridge") is "a sort of platform mounted on wheels which was rolled against the outer wall with a number of fighters on the platform. If the platform projected, they were also called 'goose carriages'" (p. 170). (He doesn't happen to mention how he figured this out).

[11Ab] On the eighteenth [January 17], the enemy took one-thousand cavalry and put them into ranks west of the city wall. They engaged in battle, exchanging arrows and stones, with the government troops on top of the wall. While the Honorable [Zhao] was in the city wall's tower, he saw one person spur on his horse and charge out from amid the enemy's battle array. Holding a banner and giving a cry, [the cavalryman] lead his troops straight ahead. His will and spirit were fierce and mighty. The Honorable [Zhao] demanded a crossbow, and personally shot him. [The enemy] fell off his horse and died. [Zhao] promptly ordered that [the soldier's] head be cut off, and it turned out that he had been struck in the left eye. The enemy's spirit was broken, and they retreated.

[11Ae] On the twentieth [January 19], [Zhao] dispatched Lu Shizhong to lead fifty-six people from the Bold and Brave Army, and thirty crossbowman from the larger army to go to the front of Cloud Peak Monastery. They burned more than three-hundred cloud ladders and fifty large planks of wood that were to be used for making catapults. They [also] killed more than two-hundred of the retreating men who had been guarding the attacking equipment.

[11Ah] On the twenty-first [January 20], the enemy dispatched Wang Hu, a general who had surrendered [to them]. When he came, the Honorable [Zhao] was pleased by his return, and desired to inquire about the actual situation among the enemy. [Because Zhao] saw that his words and appearance were confused, [Zhao] suspected that [Wang] had another motive and so he commanded his attendants to search him. Behind his elbow, they found a purple cloth that was tied [around] fifteen pieces of silver. We escorted him to the prison in order to make a thorough

investigation, and it turned out that an enemy Campaign Commander had given it [to him] so that he would enter the city walls to set fire and serve as a secret agent. Moreover, he had made a pact to go out from the city wall and report back and would call out “White Flag Army!” as a signal. The Honorable [Zhao] immediately beheaded him. Right after this, Li Zun, who had been captured by the enemy returned, and we learned from him that Wang Hu’s arrival on the previous day really had been to serve as an enemy assassin. The Honorable [Zhao] said, “My heart is without shame [before] Heaven and Earth. Were that he was like me!”⁵⁴

[11Bd] The Honorable [Zhao] learned through investigation that the enemy wanted to attack the city wall on the twenty-fourth [January 23]. At night on the twenty second [January 21], sure enough [the enemy] beat their drums and emitted a cry to the southeast of the city wall. Within the city, all the roof-tiles of the buildings shook. The Honorable [Zhao] commanded that we increase strict preparation on top of the wall, and that we were not to make confused racket. At sunrise, we prayed to the Deity of the Moat and Walls at the various temples. Because [it was] the enemy who had attacked Xiang[yang] and the Han [River], and injured [its] people, we hoped and pleaded for Heaven’s help in driving away [the enemy] so that they would retreat and turn back.

[11Bh] On the night of the twenty-third [January 22], the noise of the enemies’ drums and horde gradually drew closer. At midnight there was thunder, lightning and a great quaking. In addition it began to rain and hail, and as a consequence the sounds

⁵⁴ 王虎其如予何

of shouting moved far away. As a result, [the enemy] did not attack the wall the next day. Was this not a response to what we had prayed for with sincerity?!

[12Aa] From this point on [the enemy] emitted cries every night, yet nobody knew what this meant. When a person who had been captured by the enemy returned, he said that the enemy [made] a special cry in the southeast [because] they were about to [move out] empty [handed] on the west side, revealing that the Besieging Preceptor surely lacked resolve.

[12Ab] On the night of the twenty-fifth [January 24], [Zhao] dispatched Zhang Ju and Liu Tian to lead forty-three men of the Bold and Brave [Army] to go to Tiger Head Mountain and raid the [enemy's] stockade. [There] they encountered more than two-hundred enemy bandits! We chased and killed them, and [the enemy] was defeated and fled.

[12Ad] On the twenty-eighth, [January 27], [Zhao] dispatched Liao Yanzhong and Lu Shizhong to lead one-hundred twenty men from the Bold and Brave Army to go out of the east gate and raid [the enemy's] stockade. When they reached Dabei Monastery, they burned more than one-hundred cloud ladders. They saw that outside of the enemy bandits' large stockade, there was a small stockade [that held] more than two-hundred people. First we used crossbowman to cut [the small stockade] off from the big stockade. [Soldiers bearing] tridents and sickles directly entered the small stockade and killed and scattered the enemy bandits.⁵⁵ They seized cloud ladders and assorted items, etc.

⁵⁵ I translate *cha* 叉 as “trident” even though I cannot be sure how many tines this weapon actually had.

[12Ag] On the night of the twenty-ninth day [January 28], [Zhao] again dispatched Liao Yanzhong and Lu Shizhong to lead men who were part of their squad out the south gate to raid an [enemy] stockade. They killed and injured many. One person was captured and the defending group was chased away. Afterwards, we chopped off the [captive's] head and returned [to the city]. [Liao and Lu's squad] seized saddles, horses, bows, spears, sabers, and armor. They also rescued and returned six of the young and elderly who had been captured by the enemy. [Zhao] also dispatched Special Envoy of the River Transport [Bureau] Zhang Chun to lead fourteen people in ships toward Yuanzhang Beach. They burned and raided the enemy stockades, and seized five enemy passenger ships. Then they also went to the Wan Mountains and burned the stockade. They seized and returned twenty-two of the young and elderly who had been captured by the enemy, as well as clothes, armor, and other items.

[12Bc] On the night of the first day of the first month of the third year [of the Kaixi reign period] [January 30, 1207], [Zhao] dispatched Lü Shixiong and Zhang Chun to lead thirty-five of our sailors to ride boats to Yuanzhang Beach. They raided and burned down the enemy stockade, and seized three ferry boats.

[12Be] On the morning of the third day [February 1], the enemy piled up and assembled platforms for trebuchets,⁵⁶ as well as goose carts, shielded passageways, and other attacking equipment from the area around Yuliang Plain at the south of the city. All day, and without interruption, they proceeded directly to the southeastern

⁵⁶ I am not sure whether *pao zuo* 砲座 refers to platforms for the trebuchets, or is simply a collective term following the modern grammar pattern of noun + measure word= collective (as in *che liang* 車輛, “vehicles”).

[part] of the city wall. The frames of the trebuchets all [had] nine or seven component poles [to their throwing arms] and altogether there were more than ten of them in number which were [all] focused on attacking the southeast corner's resistance watchtower.”⁵⁷




Figure 11: Left—Trebuchet with Seven Component Poles (*Wu jing zong yao qian ji*, p. 604).
Right—Trebuchet with Five Component Poles (*Wu jing zong yao qian ji*, p. 601).

⁵⁷ *Shao* 梢, which I translate here as “component pole” seems to be some sort of measurement, perhaps indicating the size or strength of the trebuchet. In his “Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China” Franke translates *shao* as “lever” (p. 163). However, Needham (with Wang Ling) translates *shao* as “component” and further explains: “This terminology has puzzled several sinologists because *shao* normally means ‘branch’ or ‘tip’, but a study of the text and illustrations in the military manuals shows that the word here was applied to the number of component wooden (or even bamboo) poles which formed the arm when lashed tightly together, or bound with metal bands” (Section 30, “missiles and Sieges,” pp. 212-214). Earlier in this section Needham also quotes Yates, “The arm [of the trebuchet] itself was probably constructed out of several timbers bound together by iron wire. This technique was employed to allow for greater strength and flexibility: an arm made from a single tree trunk would be more likely to fracture after repeated use and with heavy missiles” (p.207). (For a full discussion of trebuchets see Section 30 in Needham’s *Science and Civilisation in China*, pp. 204- 231).

A resistance watchtower *di lou* 敵樓 was a wooden tower constructed on top of the city wall from which the defenders could observe the enemy. According to Needham, “The towers were built on top of the ‘horse-face’ foundations like the hoards on the walls, and the latter were recommended to be 7 feet (*chi*) high in the front, sloping to five feet high in the rear. Each ‘room’, really each section, was to be one pace (5 feet) wide and 10 feet deep and this was to hold approximately 20 soldiers. If the city walls were wider, however, the rooms were to be deeper. Across the top of the sections, large boards called *ta tou mu* 塔頭木 were laid and these fitted into double posts. The floor was also laid with timbers (*di fu* 地袱) and the whole board projected 3 feet from the wall itself. Usually there were two double posts per section, but up to four could be used. To protect the wood from stone and arrow missiles, a three-foot covering of earth was tightly packed down on top and a solution of lime was also plastered on. The rest of the wood was covered with wet felt and the exposed parts of the posts and floor timbers were covered with fresh oxhide to guard against fire arrows” (Section 30, pp. 340-341, picture on p. 342). Needham cites *Chhien Chi*, ch. 12, p. 8-9.




Figure 12: Resistance Watchtower (*Wu jing zong yao qian ji*, p. 535, with author added arrow and label).

[12Bh] Their stone missiles all weighed forty or fifty *jin*,⁵⁸ and they attacked and struck the roofed towers.⁵⁹ There were none that were not damaged. Consequently, the Honorable [Zhao] used ox and horse hides to make leather screens,⁶⁰ and we hung them [vertically] above the roofed towers in order to ward off the stone missiles.⁶¹

⁵⁸ During this time, one *jin* 斤 was, on average, equal to approximately 661 grams. Thus these stone missiles would weigh between 26.4 and 33.1 kg (58.4—73.0 pounds) (Qiu et al., p. 447). According to the chart in *Science and Civilisation* (which takes its information from the *Wu jing zong yao* and others), a rectangular trebuchet with a seven component arm could fire a missile weighing 125 lbs and had a range of approximately 85 yards (Section 30, pp. 216-217).

⁵⁹ My translation for *lou lu* 樓櫓, “roofed towers” comes from *Science and Civilization*, Section 30, pp. 375-376.

⁶⁰ According to Needham, who gets his information from the *Wu jing zong yao*, these “leather screens” (*pi lian* 皮簾) were (usually) “made out of tough water buffalo hide 10 feet wide and 8 feet high, suspended by seven rings from a pole like a mediaeval shower curtain” (Section 30, pp. 371-373). Needham translates this term as “leather mats.”

⁶¹ Because the trajectory of a missile thrown by a trebuchet is an arc, a leather mat hung vertically above the edge of the roof would prevent missiles from landing on and crushing the rooftop (provided the matting extended up higher than the highest point of the arc).




Figure 13: Leather Screen (*Wu jing zong yao qian ji* p. 581).

[12Bi] Because the enemy's trebuchet platforms had been completely covered by fresh ox hides for protection, and [because] the people dragging the trebuchets were on the inside,⁶² arrows and stones could not penetrate [the platforms to kill them]. As before they continued to set up the wheels of the carts, and pushing and turning they came forward. Towering in form, every trebuchet [had] one platform, which was like a house several arch-spans wide! The goose carts and shielded passageways were also covered with ox hide to protect them. The portable shielded passage ways were linked together, uninterrupted, all the way to the side of the moat to a length of a little more than a *li*.⁶³ On the inside [of the shielded passageways] they moved bricks to fill in the moat and they spread out sandbags, grass oxen, bamboo, wood, and other materials in front [of it]. The foot soldiers lined up in front grasped boards to screen their bodies and engaged in shooting the government troops atop the wall.

⁶² The trebuchet platforms must have been designed to be more like a large covered cart than a simple (uncovered) platform on wheels.

⁶³ During the Song dynasty, a *li* 里 would have been approximately 565 m, or about 618 yards.

[13Ae]⁶⁴ In all four directions, [the enemy] arrayed themselves, and we could not count their numbers. Starting from early morning, arrows and stones were exchanged from above and below the city wall in battle. When night came, the enemy attacked the wall with even greater zeal, and their army and cavalry would not retreat. Then the Honorable [Zhao] dispatched more than a thousand men from the Bold and Brave Army. At midnight on that day each one grasped a short weapon,⁶⁵ and in addition bore a bundle of grass on his back.⁶⁶ They surreptitiously went out of the small north gate and passed through the sheep and horse wall.⁶⁷ They [then] split into two sections. They led one group out from the east gate's draw bridge, and one group out from the south gate's draw bridge.⁶⁸ Then combining their sections they went straight toward the enemy. They set fires below the trebuchets and emitted shouts.⁶⁹ On top of the wall, we also emitted shouts and pounded the drums, frequently using

⁶⁴ Needham translates selections from the *Xiangyang shou cheng lu* (13B-23A) in "The Gunpowder Epic," (of *Science and Civilisation in China*), pp. 168-169.

⁶⁵ I assume here that "short weapons," *duan bing* 短兵, include sabers, swords, and axes, etc., used for hand-to-hand combat, as opposed to pole-arms.

⁶⁶ Presumably the bundles of grass were to be used as incendiary material.

⁶⁷ The "sheep and horse wall," *yang ma qiang* 羊馬牆, was a low, supplementary wall located between the moat and the main city wall. The *Wu jing zong yao* recommended that this wall be "from 8 to 10 *chi* high with a parapet reaching 5 *chi* above that" (*Science and Civilisation*, Section 30, p. 336). One *chi* equals about one foot.

⁶⁸ Even in the dark and confusion of battle, would not someone from the Jin side notice the lowering of a drawbridge and five-hundred soldiers crossing the moat—especially if the Jin soldiers were supposedly arrayed "in all four directions"? Perhaps in reality there were not enough enemy forces to truly surround the city.

⁶⁹ Here I follow the *Zhi Hai* edition which reads "砲下" as opposed to "砲人." Although *ju huo* 舉火 often means to light a signal fire, I believe that in this context it means simply to start a fire. The phrase *ju huo* seems to be used similarly in line 14Bb below: ...舉火燒毀砲座洞子

the thunderclap missiles to strike beyond the city wall.⁷⁰ The enemy was terrified and they lost their wits—people and horses broke ranks and fled. Each trebuchet [had] more than two hundred barbarian soldiers below it to haul it, and all of them were killed by the government troops.⁷¹ In addition, we captured alive Company Commander Wang Tong and others—eight people. We also seized weapons, armor, saddles, and horses, etc. There were more than two-thousand dead and injured people. [The fires set by the Bold and Brave Army] completely took over the enemy’s trebuchets and shielded passageways that were near the city wall, and the flames and smoke would not subside.⁷²

⁷⁰ A “thunderclap missile,” *pi li pao* 霹靂砲, also called a *pi li huo qiu* 霹靂火球, is described in *Science and Civilisation* (Section 30, continued), p. 163-167. A translation from the *Wu jing zong yao* reads: “The thunderclap bomb (*pi li huo qiu*) contains a length of two or three internodes of dry bamboo with a diameter of 1.5 in. There must be no cracks, and the septa are to be retained to avoid any leakage. Thirty pieces of thin broken porcelain the size of iron coins are mixed with 3 or 4 lb. of gunpowder, and packed around the bamboo tube. The tube is wrapped within the ball, but with about an inch or so protruding at each end. A (gun) powder mixture is then applied all over the outer surface of the ball...” (p. 163).

⁷¹ Note that Zhao Wannian’s description of the number of haulers for each trebuchet is consistent with the data collected in *Science and Civilisation* (Section 30, pp. 216-217). According to his chart, a rectangular trebuchet with a seven component arm would have had a crew of haulers (including those at rest) of two-hundred fifty as well as two commanders. As many have noted, this is a startlingly large number! In the same chart, Needham provides the technical term *zhuai shou* 拽手 and translates it as “hauler.”

⁷² Other editions of the text state that “the flames and smoke did not subside *until morning*” (Fang, p. 200).




Figure 14: Sheep and Horse Wall (*Science and Civilization*, p. 338. Needham takes this from the *Wu jing zong yao qian ji*, juan 12, p. 3a. His edition is paginated differently from the one I use elsewhere).




Figure 15: Thunderclap Missile (*Wu jing zong yao qian ji*, p. 640).

[13Bd] On the morning of the fourth day [February 2], the enemy returned again and separated, pushing their trebuchets and shielded passageways up near the city wall, and as before they arrayed their cavalry and foot soldiers in front, releasing their arrows and firing their stone missiles. Again within the shielded passageways, they moved and transported grass oxen, sandbags, and other things of that sort. Once again they came and attacked the city wall. Arrows and rocks were crossed in battle from early morning until early evening. [Then] the enemy took their trebuchet platforms as well as their shielded passageways and hauled them into an enemy stockade, presumably to prevent our army from going out at night to burn them.

[13Bh] On the morning of the fifth [February 3], the enemy returned again, pushing and gathering around their trebuchets, shielded passageways, and other attacking equipment so that they were near the moat. They also arrayed their cavalry and foot soldiers and again came to attack the city wall, their power and arrogance were increasingly fervent. Over and over again the Honorable [Zhao] assessed [the situation] and considered it:

[14Aa] If he did not send his troops out, then they, [the enemy], would not be expecting [anything], and would not have any reason to retreat. However, if he openly sent out the troops from within the city wall, then [the enemy's cavalry] would surely also come forward to make a "surprise" attack [since] their cavalry was numerous. [Thus] it would be better to make heavy use of our crossbowman on top of the wall and shoot them.

[14Ac] Because the crenel of the parapet on top of the wall could only support one row of crossbowmen, on the night of the fourth day [February 2] we made arrangements with the storehouses, monasteries, and temples, as well as the people's households to temporarily borrow their tables. We placed them so that the four legs [of the tables] were adjoining,⁷³ and [Zhao] ordered that we arrange them two rows high behind the parapet, so that in all there would be three layers of crossbowman.

[14Ae] As before, we sent out more than one-thousand eight-hundred of the Bold and Brave [troops] and the Government army in advance. Each held weapons and tools and shouldered one bundle of grass. They hid below the city wall, behind the

⁷³ I think that 增接四腳 means that they stacked the tables on top of each other, thus creating a terraced platform, situated behind the parapet, on which rows of crossbowman could be layered.

sheep and horse wall. However, they were still more than one hundred paces from the enemy's trebuchet platforms and shielded passageways beyond the wall. [The enemy] furtively used some small boats inside of the moat and tied them together to build two floating bridges, and as before they set the bridges opposite the sheep and horse wall, first going to pare down [the wall] and make it thin.

[14Ah] When the late morning of the fifth day arrived [February 3] and the enemy swarmed together to attack the perimeter of the walls, they immediately took over the [part of] the wall that they had thinned and pushed it over all at once. Our hidden army suddenly sprang out, and when the enemy stopped to defend [themselves], troops issued forth from the city wall gates. [The enemy] did not anticipate a surprise attack from another route, and were scared out of their wits.

[14Bb] First we engaged the enemy's infantry that was near the moat, killing and causing them to retreat. Next, we set a fire to burn and destroy the trebuchet platforms and shielded passageways. As expected, the enemy's cavalry came to attack our troops who had come out from the city wall. The Honorable [Zhao] immediately commanded the three rows of crossbowman on top of the city wall to combine their power and release [their arrows]. The enemy's cavalry could not endure them. As before, we beat our drums, emitted a shout from atop the city wall, and simultaneously fired our thunderclap missiles out from the city walls. The enemy cavalry, terrified, retreated and ran away.

[14Be] From dawn 'til dusk, the enemy and our army advanced, retreated, split apart and came together dozens of times. The Honorable [Zhao] also continually sent troops out of the city walls to respond [to the enemy] and come to the aid [of our

troops]. The number of enemy bandits who were killed or injured was around several thousand, and their corpses lay all over the ground.⁷⁴ Although some [of the enemy's] trebuchet platforms and shielded passageways had been dragged back [by the retreating army], there were very few that survived. Likewise, the bags for sand, and grass oxen, etc.—as well as the wooden planks which we had seized—were burned and destroyed at the same time. As it happened, a great north wind arose and the smoke and flames covered the sky and flung themselves squarely in the face of our enemy. Our army took advantage of the situation and making a racket of drums, we pursued and killed the enemy, who were defeated and ran away. We seized their saddles, horses, weapons, and tools, and captured a barbarian soldier. He claimed that when the enemy had attacked the city wall last year on the third day of the twelfth month [January 2, 1207], a huge number of barbarian soldiers had been killed. We [even] had shot and killed Campaign Commander Pucha as well as Brigade Commander Yaoer, among others.⁷⁵ In addition, during today's attack, we killed

⁷⁴ This would have been a severe health hazard to those both inside and outside of the city!

⁷⁵ Pucha 蒲察 was a fairly common Jurchen surname. Twenty-six different people with the surname of Pucha can be found within the *juan* of the *Jin shi* that also mention Wanyan Kuang (which would mean they probably shared the same time context). If I systematically searched through all of these references, there is a chance that I would be able to determine exactly who is named in the text. This method would be somewhat problematic because the *Jin shi* obviously does not include everyone with this surname, but it would be a start. In Wanyan Kuang's biography, there is mention of an "Vice Controller Pucha" *fu tong Pucha* 副統蒲察, (no personal name mentioned—c.f. *du tong Pucha* 都統蒲察, which appears here) who captured Yicheng county 宜城縣 at the same time that Wanyan Kuang's army surrounded De'an, and brought down Anlu, Yingcheng, Yunmeng, Hanchuan, and Jingshan, etc. Yicheng County is located just south of Xiangyang along the Han river, so it is possible that after taking the city, he traveled north to join Wanyan Kuang in the siege of Xiangyang. However, this cannot be considered any more than speculation. I have not thoroughly researched the other twenty-five Pucha's who are possibly associated with Wanyan Kuang.

There is only one person in the *Jin shi* who is listed by the name Yaoer 咬兒 (aka Guo Anyong 国安用). However, he died in 1234. There may also be other ways to transcribe this Jurchen name, (and I have checked a few), but there are too many possible combinations to investigate them all.

Brigade Commander Gezha.⁷⁶ We immediately reported our successive victories to make them known.

[15Ac] During the previous several days, there were some people who had been captured [by the enemy] that [managed to] return. All of them said that the enemy's Chieftain Marshal had met with various campaign commanders and ascended Fancheng's [city wall]. [There] he pointed at Xiangyang's city wall and said, "Zhao is very intelligent and manipulates [his troops] well."⁷⁷ Every time he sends out the Bold and Brave Army, we do not know where they come out from. How can we possibly attack this city wall?" In response, the army's campaign commander,⁷⁸ rose up and personally explained, "Marshal, if these few barbarians strike the city wall,⁷⁹ we would just be killing and breaking our own soldiers and horses." The marshal nodded his head [in agreement].

[15Ag] On the sixteenth day [February 14], Commander-general of the Loyal and Righteous Army, Li Liangbi, under the jurisdiction of Suizhou, descended from Baitu Ridge and raided the enemy's grain [supplies]. He killed many barbarian bandits,

⁷⁶ Fang notes that the *Zhi hai* edition names this person as Brigade Commander Ge 葛萬戶 instead of Brigade Commander Gezha 葛札萬戶. The name Gezha does not appear within the *Jin shi* and the surname Ge does not appear within any *juan* that also mentions Wanyan Kuang. Thus I am unable to identify this commander. (I have also tried other combinations of phonetically similar characters, but to no avail).

⁷⁷ Note the colloquial grammar pattern, V+ 得 + compliment: 擺佈得好

⁷⁸ Is this Wanyan Kuang?

⁷⁹ It seems unlikely that a commander would refer to his own troops as "barbarians." I imagine this conversation has been embellished.

and captured numerous severed heads. There was a general, Yan Zheng, who rendered unusually meritorious service, and a message of his victory arrived.⁸⁰

[15Ai] The Honorable [Zhao] knew that amongst the four corners of the prefectural city wall, the southern one faced the large training field of the Seventh Army of Jiangling. [Its distance] from the Yuliang Plains was eight *li*, and all of the land was level and flat. Of all the times the enemy had attacked the city, they had usually used the bulk of their army to attack the southern corner. Beginning from the attack on the city wall [occurring] on the fifth day of the first month [February 2], [the enemy] had persisted in setting up trebuchet platforms, goose carts, shielded passageways, wooden shields, grass oxen, sandbags, etc, and schemed daily to attack the city.

[15Bd] Because all of the trebuchet platforms, goose carts, and shielded passageways that the enemy set up used ox hides to cover them over for protection, with the trebuchet haulers on the inside, our arrows and stones could not enter [and hit them]. [Thus] they continued to set up the wheels of the carts, pushing and rolling [the trebuchet platforms] to the base of the city wall, moving them back and forth to attack. Consequently, the Honorable [Zhao] arranged for us to start opening a channel more than forty paces from the moat, outside the city wall and at the south side of the moat's bank. We engaged in making an obstruction, so that it would be difficult for the enemy to push and turn their trebuchet platforms, goose carts, and shielded passageways, etc, to the base of the city wall.

⁸⁰ There is a Yan Zheng mentioned in the *Jin shi* (*juan* 12) who was sent as a spy into Xiangyang on May 21, 1206, but I don't think this is the same person. Yan Zheng is mentioned again in the "Basic Annals" of the *Jin shi* on June 18, when he is promoted and rewarded.

[15Bh] On the night of the seventeenth day [February 15], we took advantage of the rain and darkness, and secretly dispatched a thousand people to go out of the city walls. We employed six-hundred and fifty workers to open [the moat] from the inside and carry [dirt] on their shoulders [from] the moat's pit.⁸¹ The crossbowman combined with the [soldiers from] the Bold and Brave [army] skilled with tridents and sickles, who guarded and protected this opening of the moat, altogether totaled three-hundred and fifty people. In addition, we went to the top of the wall and secretly arranged three rows of crossbowman.

[16Aa] At night on the twenty-first day [February 19], [Zhao] dispatched two-thousand people. [For] the opening of the moat from the inside and breaking it up, [he dispatched] one-thousand five-hundred people. To defend and protect the opening of the moat, [he dispatched] crossbowman together with [members of] the Bold and Brave [army] armed with tridents and sickles, totaling five-hundred people.

[16Ac] On the night of the twenty-third day [February 21], we used two-thousand people to start carrying [the dirt from] the moat outside of the prefectural city wall.⁸² [Those] protecting the opening of the moat combined their strength with them to [also help] open the moat.⁸³ [Because] the Honorable [Zhao] anticipated night after night that the enemy would surely come while the workers labored and clash with the people who were carrying [the dirt from] the moat, [therefore] the Honorable

⁸¹ I don't understand what is going on here. *Nei kai* 內開, which I translate as "open [the moat] from the inside" (and which also appears in line 16Ab), particularly confuses me.

⁸² Note that the text uses *fu cheng* 府城 here instead of the usual *cheng* 城.

⁸³ Fang notes that the *Zhi hai* edition states, "On the night of the twenty-third day, we engaged in starting to carry [dirt] from the moat [and regarded it as] still shallow, so again we sent people to go out of the city walls." "創挑濠塹" 后為 "尚淺, 再發人出城", 缺 "二千人防護開濠"。(Note that I parse differently)

[Zhao] on this night dispatched three-thousand people: two-thousand people to open and break up the moat, and one-thousand people, [including] crossbowman together with the Brave and Bold [army soldiers] bearing tridents and sickles. In addition, at the top of the wall, we also secretly arranged three ranks of crossbowman.

[16Ag] Sure enough, late at night, an unknown number of the enemy's cavalry, emitted a cry and swarmed forward, united, to clash with the Government troops who were carrying [dirt from] the moat. The crossbowman on top of the wall together with those outside of the moat all fired. [Zhao] also dispatched the Bold and Brave [Army], and they battled with the enemy all the way until just before dawn. Our army advanced and retreated with the enemy, and were split and gathered a dozen times. We pursued and killed the enemy bandits. In this encounter the dead and injured were of unknown numbers. The enemy retreated and ran away.

[16Ba] The part of the moat's trench which was opened and broken-up started from the corner of the round tower at the of the city wall's east gate to the draw bridge outside the city wall's south gate. In length it was more than four-hundred ten paces. It's width on the surface was eight feet or more, and its depth was six feet. In addition [to the obstacle created by our trench], outside the south gate of the prefectural city wall there originally were earthen walls from the residents' dwellings. [Therefore] when the enemy used their cavalry, galloping about was inconvenient. [Thus the enemy] desired to dispatch foot soldiers to break and eliminate [the walls], so that afterwards they could use their cavalry to make a defense. [However], the Honorable [Zhao] dispatched the tea merchant Lu Shizhong and his company's division of Bold

and Brave [men] bearing tridents and sickles, as well as crossbowman, ahead of time to hide amongst the earthen walls.

[16Bf] Sure enough, on the twenty-fourth day [February 22], the enemy bandits' foot soldiers came to break and eliminate the walls. On top of the city wall, we raised up a flag as a signal, and the Bold and Brave Army burst out and killed many of the barbarian troops who were breaking down the walls. We captured the barbarian soldier, Li Wu, alive and burst out quickly to seize boards for keeping out arrows. We burned and destroyed them—altogether more than two-hundred panels. We immediately reported our successive victories to make them known.

[16Bi] The Honorable [Zhao] repeatedly thought that although he had already arranged the opening of the moat which could serve as a barrier, if our troops went out of the city wall and crossed the newly opened moat to attack and raid the bandits' encampment and seize and destroy their attacking equipment, then the enemy cavalry would still surely come to chase and attack them. Although we had our crossbowman to defend us, we feared falling into an evil plot because of the enemy cavalry's strength and number. Consequently, we began weaving bamboo cages—two feet high and six feet long [with] small holes that were six inches around—similar to the shape of a “bamboo lady.”⁸⁴ If the enemy's cavalry pursued and raided us, then we could promptly take the bamboo cages and cast them onto the ground in order to trip them and cause the enemy's cavalry to be unable to move about.

⁸⁴ Fang explains that a “bamboo lady” 竹夫人, is “an ancient implement used for relieving summer heat. [It is made by] weaving green bamboo to make a long cage, or by taking a whole segment of bamboo with hollowed middle and make holes on all sides to allow the passage of wind. When it is hot, one arranges it between the bed and the [sleeping mat].”

[17Ad] Then, on the night of the twenty-seventh day [February 25], [Zhao] sent out one-thousand three-hundred of the Bold and Brave [Army] and Government troops. Carrying the bamboo cages, we stealthily went out of an opened gate in the sheep and horse wall at the southern corner and crossed the floating bridge. Upon placing wooden gags in our mouths and moving forward,⁸⁵ we went directly into the enemy's camp. The enemy's cavalry joined us in battle, and consequently we cast down the bamboo cages. The horses were tripped by the cages and could not gallop, and there were many who fell off their horses. When the bandit army retreated and ran away, the Government troops took advantage [of the situation] and pursued and killed them. There were many dead and wounded. Again we took the goose carts, shielded passageways, grass oxen, and bamboo component poles that had been constructed,⁸⁶ and things such as firewood, and burned them all up. We also seized boards for keeping out arrows, more than one-hundred wooden planks, bows and crossbows, implements and tools, etc.

[17Ba] Since the time we had been subjected to the siege and the roads been blocked, it had only been via a water route to the west that we were able to use small boats to transmit wax ball messages in a roundabout way.⁸⁷ The enemy learned of this and as a result started to establish a small abatis at a sandy, shallow place [along the

⁸⁵ Gags, usually wooden blocks, were used to prevent the soldiers from talking while on a mission that depended on silence.

⁸⁶ Here I use *xia* 下 as a verb compliment “indicating the finalizing of an action.” A “bamboo component pole” is part of a trebuchet. See footnote 51 above for a full explanation.

⁸⁷ “Wax ball messages,” *la dan wen zi* 蠟彈文字, were commonly used to smuggle information. A message written on a small piece of paper was folded into a ball and then covered with wax. This made the message easy to hide and also protected it from moisture. If carried internally by a messenger, it would have been virtually impossible to detect.

route].⁸⁸ On the twenty-eighth day [February 26], [Zhao] dispatched sailors to seize and eliminate the enemy abatis upon the shoal. Following [previous tactics], he dispatched the Bold and Brave Army, led by Lu Xuannie, to go to the bank of the shoal and to hide beneath a dilapidated wall. Sure enough, several dozen enemy cavalry came to the side of the wall. [Our] hidden troops suddenly sprang out and killed one person from their vanguard. In addition, we seized two horses. The enemy broke ranks and ran away. Again we seized army equipment and returned [to the city].

[17Bf] When the enemy realized that a [Song] rescue army would not arrive, a certain [Jin] marshal [surnamed] Li raised an army from De'an numbering several tens of thousands and advanced to join the army's campaign commander to plan an attack on the city wall together. Consequently, they began to raise an earthen mountain within the Seventh Army's training field by the southeast corner. In military strategy [such an earthen mountain] is referred to as a "bird's spur mound":⁸⁹ upon starting out far away, it advances; and upon starting out low it becomes high—[until] it is almost level with the city wall.

[17Bi] Everyday, on top [of the earthen mountain under construction, the enemy] used two parallel rows of shielded passageways made from ox hide. The people inside the shielded passageways went back and forth to transport earth and wood. At the front [of the shielded passageways], they utilized ox stables along with six hide curtains that were shaped like the [square] sails of a boat to protect the people

⁸⁸ Perhaps this abatis (*lu jiao*) was established on top of the shoal, but was still below the water level where it could damage the hull of a ship navigated by an unwary sailor.

⁸⁹ "Bird's spur mound": *ju yin* 距堙

of the work crew so that neither arrows nor stones could enter.⁹⁰ On the two sides [of the worksite], they used people holding boards, [for additional shielding], and they arrayed cavalry to support and protect them at the back. When they were met with evening, [the enemy] then took the hide shielding, and hide curtains, etc, and pushed them below their stockade at a faraway place, to secure them.

[18Ac] In order to meet the many treacherous plans of the enemy, the Honorable [Zhao] sent out [troops] hundreds of times. On a daily basis, [we worked to carry out] our plan of embankment preparation, and twice joined together two floating bridges within the moat in preparation to sending out troops.

[18Ae] By the thirtieth day [February 28], the [enemy's] earthen mountain was approximately one-hundred paces in length and we worried that it was gradually getting closer to the city wall. Consequently, on that night, [Zhao] sent out the government troops—more than three-thousand four-hundred people—to go outside of the moat to destroy and ruin the earthen mountain.⁹¹ More than one-thousand people on the inside [of our battle formation] were specially employed with spades and pickaxes. More than two-thousand three-hundred people [formed] a network of bowman and crossbowman together with [the soldiers] of the Brave and Bold Army's tea merchants, [wielding] tridents, sickles, sabers, and axes, to protect and support the government troops who were destroying the earthen mountain. In addition, on top of

⁹⁰ Presumably these “ox stables” *niu wu* 牛屋 were left behind by the Song when they entered the city walls for protection. Perhaps at the time of the evacuation, they were considered too far away from the city wall to pose a threat (see lines 1Bg-h). The *Wubei jiyao* (not written until c.a. 1830) recommends that “terrain within one *li* from the outer moat should be completely cleared” (Franke, “Siege and Defense,” p. 153).

⁹¹ Here the text actually reads “三千四百人餘人.” However, as Fang notes (p. 203), the “extra” 人 is a “superfluous” character—probably a copyist error.

the city wall, we arranged crossbowman, three ranks deep, to guard against the enemy. Sure enough, well past midnight the enemy cavalry came and charged [at us], not knowing the density [of our defenses], and they were seized and struck down by the Government troops. The group of crossbowman fired in unison, and the enemy cavalry was unable to advance. Those who had spades and pickaxes combined their strength to destroy and cut down the earthen mountain. [For an area of] approximately thirty feet [long] and fifty feet wide, everything was torn apart and destroyed. That night, the government troops crossed in battle with the barbarian army several dozen times in all. The people and horses of the barbarian army that were killed and injured were of unknown number. We seized weapons, armor, bows, crossbows, wooden planks, etc.

[18Bd] On the first day of the second month [March 1], the enemy increased their number of soldiers and horses and continued to push forward, transporting shielded passageways, leather tents, and leather screens, etc. For a second time they [began] constructing an earthen mountain with measurements that were twice those of the previous day. [At that rate], within ten days it would almost be level with the city wall! At the same time, the enemy's chief had repeatedly instituted a reward:

“As for the first person to ascend the wall:

- a commoner will be given the hereditary title of Battalion Commander
- an officer [will be given the title of] Vastly Powerful [General] of rank

6a

-[and he will be given] five-thousand strings of cash.⁹²

As for the second person to ascend the wall:

-a commoner will be given the hereditary title of Company Commander

-an officer [will be given the title] General of Military Integrity of rank

7a

-[and he will be given] three thousand strings of cash.”

Because of this, [the enemy] anxiously began [the construction of] the earthen mountain, their thoughts surely [focused] on capturing Xiangyang.

[18Bi] Every night the enemy arrayed their troops and cavalry and continued to burn fires at several dozen places in order to prevent us from tearing down and destroying [the earth mountain]. The brightness [of the fires] was like the sunrise!

[19Aa] On the night of the tenth day [March 10], the Honorable [Zhao] sent more than eight-thousand two-hundred people of the Government troops to go out from the city wall's south [side]. Among them were more than one-thousand five-hundred people who were specialized in using spades, pickaxes, and metal rakes, more than six-thousand six-hundred people were crossbowman, and there were also those of the Bold and Brave Army's tea merchants who wielded tridents, sickles, sabers and axes. On top of the city wall, we also arrayed three ranks of crossbowman.

[19Ad] Earlier, the Honorable [Zhao] had learned through spies that the enemy had augmented their troops and were about to split into several columns to come forward and charge. On a previous day the Honorable [Zhao] had sent out troops to put bamboo cages in place to trip up the [enemy's] horses. Still we feared that the

⁹² Official government titles were traditionally graded on an eighteen point scale, with 1a as the highest rank, and 9b as the lowest rank.

enemy would devise yet another crafty plan. [Therefore] we made arrangements to order that each person in the front row should hold a small anti-horse barricade and obstruct the approaching column of enemy [troops].⁹³ Behind the front row, we spread out squads [of soldiers] and lined them up. As before, we spread out boards at the front for keeping out arrows, as well as soldiers holding spears and crossbowman to rush forth to defend and help each other.




Figure 16: Anti-horse Barricade (my own drawing, adapted from *Wu jing zong yao qian ji*, juan 10, p. 34b).

[19Ag] When it was time to light the lamps, [Zhao] first dispatched Pei Xian and Shao Shizhong's division of sailors to the city's east and west. [From] within the river,⁹⁴ they beat their drums and shouted, pretending that they would raid [the enemy's] stockade, in order to delay them.⁹⁵ As expected, the enemy pulled back their troops in response. When it was late at night, [our] army followed along the sheep and horse wall at the southern corner, and went out. [Zhao] ordered that we first engage four-hundred people, holding wooden gags in their mouths, to carry one bucket of water each and run swiftly toward the enemy's fires, splashing water on them and

⁹³ An anti-horse barricade, *ju ma zi* 拒馬子, is commonly translated as a *chevaux-de-frise* (Franke and Needham, among others). The Diagram Group describes this device as "a log set with spikes" (p. 222).

⁹⁴ Fang notes that the *Zhi hai* edition lacks the word "river," *jiang* 江.

⁹⁵ Presumably this is a ploy to delay the enemy from detecting the direction of the actual attack.

extinguishing them. [Our troops then] divided up and advanced forward. Coincidentally, the moon was hidden on that very night, [and so we were able to effectively] use the anti-horse barricades to cut off their approaching column, and we killed the enemy men who retreated.⁹⁶

[19Bc] Those with spades and pickaxes used their efforts then and there to destroy and chop down the earthen mountain. When the enemy came to charge again, they were blocked by the anti-horse barricades and could not move about freely. In addition, because of the unison fire of our ranks of crossbows, [although the enemy] repeatedly advanced, they were repeatedly pushed back.

[19Bd] When [the enemy] had started constructing the interior of the earthen mountain, they had used large pieces of wood throughout and had stuck them through [the earthen mountain] like house joists. On top they used a row of beams and piled up brush bundles, grass oxen, and covered it all with dirt on top. For that reason, there was difficulty in tearing it down. From late at night, the Government troops combined strength and joined in the laboring. When it was almost dawn, we were just over one-third of the way [done].

[19Bg] As the enemy went about ordering their camp, they raised a beacon fire as a signal. The Honorable [Zhao] feared that when the sky lightened, the enemy's cavalry would gather from all four sides. Consequently, he ordered the rest of [the people] at the moat and stockade to go forward, take up the oil-soaked dry grass [bundles] that had been prepared, (we named them "fire oxen"), and put them inside

⁹⁶ I think that Zhao is suggesting that they snuck behind some of the enemy to place these barricades. Thus they prevented the enemy from fleeing and also prevented reinforcements from coming to their aid.

the earthen mountain straightaway. We then set fire to it. Just when we had filled the inside with grass, a great wind suddenly arrived, [causing] the smoke and flames to block out the sky!

[19Bi] That night the Government troops and the barbarian army crossed in battle more than twenty times. Many of the barbarian soldiers were dead or injured. The people and horses that died lay all over the ground. We seized enemy weapons and wooden boards used to provide cover from arrows, etc.

[20Ab] On previous occasions when the Honorable [Zhao] wanted to cause the enemy to be unable to figure out [what we were up to], he had sent out troops at night and some of them beat gongs, some raised fires, and some knocked wooden clappers when the army was to regroup.⁹⁷ However, on this occasion our army was mostly at the front lines, and if we again used [the same deceptive signals], [the enemy] would surely come to pursue and attack us. [Therefore] previously on the tenth day [March 10], the Honorable [Zhao] had secretly instructed his generals and officers before hand: “Tonight, when we regroup our army, we will take up the drum to substitute for the gong, [and thus] regard [the signal to] advance as [the signal to] retreat.” On top of this, when the day began to dawn the strength of the fire increased, and on top of the city wall we beat the drums and emitted a shout. [Thus], the enemy thought that our army was advancing again, and in a panic, they broke ranks and fled. When our troops reassembled and returned, we were [all] without injury.

⁹⁷ The beating of a gong often served as a signal for troops to regroup, whereas the wooden clappers (and drums) usually served as a signal to attack. By using various signals at the same time, the enemy would not be able to anticipate their course of action. I would imagine that this tactic also had the potential to cause much confusion amongst Zhao Chun’s own troops.

[20Ag] On the eleventh day [March 11], the enemy came to put out and beat back [the fire on] the burning earthen mountain. They used earth to bank up and surround [the fire],⁹⁸ but left when evening came.⁹⁹ At midnight, the Honorable [Zhao] dispatched people to again burn [the earthen mountain], and the strength of the fire blazed on again.¹⁰⁰

[20Ai] On the twelfth day [March 12], the enemy came again to put out the fire. Consequently, the Honorable [Zhao] sent out two-thousand troops. They arrayed [themselves] outside of the moat and shot the people who were putting out the fire. The enemy considered the fire un-extinguishable and consequently used wooden boards to block off the damaged [part] so that [the fire] would not completely destroy the earthen mountain,¹⁰¹ and they engaged in breaking off the fire's path.¹⁰² At the same time, the Honorable [Zhao] ordered the Government troops to spread out in battle array, and having done so, they advanced. The enemy's cavalry joined them in battle several times, but [the enemy] was killed and pushed back by the government troops. Soon after that, we again used dry grass soaked in oil at the places which had been damaged and where [the enemy] had broken off [the fire's path], and burned it. The enemy feared our powerful crossbows, [and so] they folded their hands, and no

⁹⁸ Presumably this was an effort to contain the fire and preserve as much of the earthen mountain as possible.

⁹⁹ Another version of the text states that "when it became daybreak, they left." However, this reading does not seem to fit in the context.

¹⁰⁰ Note that Zhao's entry for the tenth day of the second month (March 10) seems more disorganized than his previous entries.

¹⁰¹ It seems foolish to try to contain a fire with wooden boards. However, this is my best guess at what the text actually says. (And it seems, both here and at other times, that Zhao Wannian had no intention of making the Jin soldiers seem intelligent).

¹⁰² Here I follow the *Zhi hai* edition of the text: "以斷火路" instead of the base text which reads, "they engaged in breaking off the great route" 以斷大路.

one would advance [to put out the new fire]. Thus the smoke and flames did not cease for several days, and all became ashes. Starting from this time, the enemy's spirit became greatly dejected, and they did not return to repair or rebuild [the earthen mountain].

[20Be] The Honorable [Zhao] saw that throughout [the siege], every time the enemy came to attack the city wall, they were invariably killed by the government army's surprise expeditions. Moreover, spies had learned that because of this the enemy was afraid, and none of them wanted to attack the city wall [again]. Up until this point, the marshal head chieftain had had an insatiable desire for gaining merit, and did not pity his officers or soldiers. Consequently, the Honorable [Zhao] wrote an announcement to be shot into the enemy camp. It laid out the favorable and unfavorable points [of the current situation], and summoned [the enemy soldiers] to come forth and surrender.¹⁰³

[20Bh] That night, a shooting star fell into the enemy camp, and the next day [Jin] Military Training Official and Company Commander, Nahe the Taoist monk, took up the seal of the Right Wing Vice Controller and came to surrender.¹⁰⁴ Because of this, the Honorable Zhao immediately lifted up his voice and said, "The monk comes to surrender." In addition [Nahe] secretly reported that the number of people

¹⁰³ Franke notes in his unpublished conference paper that the manuscript of Zhao Wannian's *Bei wu ji* found at the Institute of History and Philology in Taipei contains drafts of these "pamphlets" which were shot into the enemy's camp. Unfortunately, I have not been able to gain access to this edition. The *Si ku quan shu* and *Qin ding si ku quan shu* editions, which I have scanned, appear only to contain Zhao's poems. Franke includes a photocopied excerpt of what appears to be (one of) the pamphlets in the appendix included in his *Studien und Texte zur Kriegsgeschichte der südlichen Sungzeit*.

¹⁰⁴ In the note on p. 36 of Wang Cengyu's article, he notes that there is no such title as 训武校尉, but that the character 训 was used to avoid a taboo character from Song Emperor Guangzong's name, Zhao Dun 赵惇—thus the title should read 敦武校尉.

wanting to surrender was very large. We also learned the actual situation of one column of barbarian troops in the Wan Mountains.

[21Aa] On the following day, we were to advance together by river and land to surprise and kill the barbarian army. [However] the enemy in the Wan Mountains learned about [this plan], and consequently the next day they burned down their camp and all of them crossed to the river's north. We immediately reported our successive victories to make them known.

[21Ac] The Taoist monk was the son of the Vastly Powerful General, Brigade Commander Wuye. When the enemy troops engaged in attacking our city wall, the number of people who were harmed and broken was large. [The monk knew] that his father was close to the Marshal as well as the Campaign Commander. Therefore, he pleaded and urged [them] not to attack the wall. Wuye was furious and desired to kill him. Consequently, the Taoist monk took the seal and came to us to surrender.

[21Af] On the fourteenth day [March 14], the enemy saw that the earthen mountain was already burnt to ashes and could not be repaired. In addition, they tore down and opened up the great embankment outside of the southern gate and piled up an earthen wall as before with the intention of attacking the southern gate. The Honorable [Zhao] immediately dispatched five-hundred men of Zhang Ju's division of the Bold and Brave [Army] to kill and push back the people who were tearing down the wall.¹⁰⁵ Even after we had killed and pushed them back, we still feared that they

¹⁰⁵ This does not make sense. Wannian has just stated that the enemy is tearing down a great embankment and piling up earth to make a wall. Perhaps I have misinterpreted the text, or maybe the text should read, "The Honorable [Zhao] dispatched... the Bold and Brave [Army] to kill and push back the people who were tearing down the *embankment*" 殺退斷隄人, or maybe: "The Honorable [Zhao]

would attack and strike the southern gate. That night, [Zhao] dispatched two thousand troops of the government army to start opening a channel approximately three-hundred paces [long], five feet wide, and eight feet deep outside of the southern gate. When morning came, the enemy ascended a height to view [the city], and they saw that suddenly there was [a new] channel of moat! None were left unsurprised.

[21Ba] People who had been captured by the enemy were returning one after another. They claimed that the enemy had said that the Southern [Song] Army was successful, so that starting from this juncture, none of their plans [for capturing the city] would be carried out.¹⁰⁶

[21Bc] As it happened, outside of the northeast corner of the wall, there originally was a very old dyke, which was directly opposite [the wall's] round [corner] tower.¹⁰⁷ [This] had the potential of being like a brick-laid path for an earthen mountain.¹⁰⁸ Consequently, because of the dyke's [potential], the enemy added to it and built it higher and wider. The [enemy] soldiers and horses combined together and arranged [the construction materials] day and night. Their use of workers was much quicker than it had been at the eastern corner. Consequently, on the night of the twentieth day [March 20], the Honorable [Zhao] sent out four-thousand government

dispatched... the Bold and Brave [Army] to kill and push back the enemy and tear down the wall” 殺退
斷牆。

¹⁰⁶ This section of the text is problematic: 南軍為事便是一會子自此計無所施. My translation is based on information from the *HYDCD* which says 為事 can mean “to be successful.”

¹⁰⁷ I assume that the “round tower” is a part of the wall. I think that “round tower” *tuan lou* 團樓 is a technical term (perhaps for all round corner towers). However, I have not been able to identify it. Needham identifies the corner towers as *di tuan* 敵團 (Vol. 5, part 6, section 30, p. 339).

¹⁰⁸ The *Hanyu da cidian* notes that the character *man* 漫 (overflow) can also be used as a variant for *man* 漫 (to pave with brick or stone), which makes more sense to me in this context.

troops to start opening the moat at both sides of the ancient dyke. [The channel] was more than four-hundred paces long. Before it was daylight, [Zhao] also sent out one-thousand crossbowman to lie in wait inside the newly opened moat. The enemy was unaware [of this].

[21Bg] The next day, the enemy cavalry came straightaway to charge, [but] the hidden crossbowman fired together and shot down the head of the barbarian army. An extremely large number of people and horses were killed or injured. The enemy's cavalry retreated a little, and consequently [Zhao] ordered the government troops to move forward. More than two-thousand people using spades and pickaxes broke apart the old dyke into three segments and foiled their plans. Day after day we sent out soldiers to engage in battle as we broke up [the old dyke]. The enemy repeatedly came forward and charged, [but] they were all pushed back by the mighty fire from the crossbows and none dared to draw near. The enemy's plan was completely thwarted.

[22Ab] On the night of the twenty-third day [March 23], the enemy took two [siege] towers that faced [the wall],¹⁰⁹ more than ten large trebuchets, and several hundred pieces of leather shielding, and destroyed or dismantled them all. They then burned down their camp and fled in the night. By the twenty-fourth day [March 24], all of [the enemy] had crossed to the river's north. We immediately reported our successive victories to make them known.

[22Ae] The enemy had already crossed to the river's north, but they assembled with the western column's barbarian army from Wan Mountain that had first crossed

¹⁰⁹ I think that *dui lou* 對樓 is a technical term, but I have not been able to find it.

[the river].¹¹⁰ All of them took down their stockades in the areas along the rivers Ku, Bai, and Xinkai.¹¹¹ At the outskirts of Anlu they raised up and built stockades and houses stretching as far as the eye could see for more than thirty *li*.¹¹² A group of cavalry was hiding in the wilds, and from early morning to late [in the day], they put [their horses] out to pasture, appearing and disappearing from time to time. The Honorable [Zhao] was worried that the evil intent of the enemy had not yet ended, and [because the enemy] was still lingering at the river's north, he couldn't afford not to have a plan to get rid of them.

[22Ah] Consequently, on the night of the twenty-fifth day [March 25], the Honorable [Zhao] took advantage of the rain and darkness and hurriedly sent Dispatcher Zhang Fu and Gao Yan to manage more than thirty boats, [both] great and small. [The boats] held one-thousand crossbowman together with five-hundred [men] bearing tridents and sickles, as well as one-hundred drum[ers]. They also carried thunderclap missiles and gunpowder arrows, etc. Stealthily, we sailed our boats and arrived below the bank of the enemy's camp. The Honorable [Zhao] personally went toward the river bank and directed his generals and officers: "Anyone who dares make a loud noise will be beheaded!" As soon as we approached the enemy camp, [Zhao]

¹¹⁰ See line 21Aa above.

¹¹¹ I cannot find the Ku River 枯河 (literally, "dried up river") or the Xinkai River 新開河 (literally "newly cut river") in the *Zhongguo gu jin di ming da ci dian* 中國古今地名大辭典 or *The Historical Atlas of China* (vol. 6, map 63-64). (Perhaps the "dried up river" changed its course and became the "newly cut river").

¹¹² Note that "Anlu" 安鹿 here uses different characters than the "Anlu" 安陸 which is a city nearby. I have not been able to locate the Anlu named here. Thirty *li* would have been approximately 17 km (10.5 miles).

ordered that the crossbowman first go and step up onto the arrow leveling platform.¹¹³

When they heard a drumbeat, they were to release [their arrows] together.

[22Bd] Just as we untied the boats, we were met with a driving rain. The rain's sound mixed together with the noise of the skulling oar [splashing water]. In addition, when we arrived below the bank, the enemy did not detect us. Subsequently, we sounded one drumbeat and the multitude of crossbows fired together. They continued [firing] and the one-hundred drums all sounded. The thousand crossbows shot every which way. Soon after that we released the incendiary thunderclap missiles and arrows into the middle of the enemy camp. We did not know the number of those who had been shot dead or injured. The people and horses were frightened and chaotic, trampling one another. Just before dawn, [the enemy] shouted and fled, scattering to the four quarters. The Honorable [Zhao] then regrouped the army and returned. Not one person had been injured.

[22Bh] Again the next day, in the early morning of the twenty-sixth [March 26], there were more than one-hundred squadrons of enemy cavalry who came forward to clear away the dead bodies. They [piled them] in a circle and cremated them. At that time, the Honorable [Zhao] commissioned boats to carry more than five hundred of our crossbowmen, who joined forces to shoot and kill more than one-hundred enemy cavalry, and to set fire to their camp. The enemy soldiers were greatly routed and abandoned their clothes, armor, and military apparatus. After scattering in

¹¹³ I think that *jian ping pan zi* 箭平盤子, which I translate here as “arrow leveling platform” is a technical term. However, I have been unable to find a description of it. From its name, I would imagine that it is a portable flat surface which archers can stand on for stability in order to take aim at their targets.

every direction, they turned north and fled. We reported our successive victories to make them known.

[23Ab] On the previous night, [March 25], when the Honorable [Zhao] had sent out [troops], they had not expected us, and at that point in time, we only knew that the enemy had been startled and ran away, breaking their ranks. We did not yet know the actual number of people and horses that had been killed and injured by our crossbow arrows. [However], on the twenty-sixth day [March 26], Fan Qi, a man who had been captured, came running back. He claimed that on the night of the twenty-fifth day,¹¹⁴ when the barbarian soldiers in the stockade were sleeping they suddenly heard drums echoing and crossbows firing, as well as the bombardment of the thunderclap catapult missiles which entered the stockade and filled it with alarm and disorder. No one could manage to prepare the horses, and it was too late to clear away the equipment, and [in their panic] they trampled each other. Two or three-thousand barbarian soldiers and eight or nine-hundred horses were killed or injured.

[23Ag] Furthermore, on the twenty-eighth day [March 28], Zhang Yun, a man who had been captured, returned and claimed that he had listened at length to a Brigade Commander state that on that night two or three-thousand people and eight or nine-hundred horses had been shot and killed by the southern [Song] army.¹¹⁵ The [Jin] marshal did not yet dare to report [this] to the court, and would wait until he arrived at

¹¹⁴ The text has “fifteenth day,” but I think the text is missing a character, and should actually read “on the night of the twenty-fifth day [March 25],” which is when the event described above [and I presume, below] took place.

¹¹⁵ Here I follow the *Zhi hai* edition of the text which uses the character 往 instead of 伍 on line 23Ah (Fang, 207).

Dengzhou [where he could] separately tabulate the names and descriptions of the men and horses that had been lost and submit a report.

[23Ba] The Honorable [Zhao] saw that the enemy had been defeated, and even though a great group had fled to the north, [Zhao] still feared that some had not yet left. Consequently, he dispatched some competent people to cross the river. Through thorough scouting, they found out that the barbarian army, as detailed above, had already entered their own territory by way of Dengcheng, the Qingshui River, and Shenma Ridge. In addition, they had gathered up their dead and cremated them. [The enemy] had used horses to carry away those that did not burn completely and dumped them into the river. In the entire area of Yuliang Plain, the Red Bank, and Eastern Ford [along] the eastern road, the enemy had burned their camps and fled at night. Every one of them had crossed to the river's north.

[23Be] The enemy feared that they would be pursued and attacked, and so they abandoned clothes, armor, weapons, tools, grain supplies, ox hides, and countless miscellaneous army supplies. Take for example the pots and cauldrons—even these they abandoned and left! Up until the twenty-seventh day [March 27], the Honorable [Zhao] dispatched people to go and scout for the enemy.

[23Bg] On the twenty-seventh day [March 27], the people who had scouted out the enemy returned. Through their scouting, they had learned that an army and cavalry of more than two-thousand people had again come back from the north to the head of the river at Red Bank where they were using sandbags to fill in the river. [Zhao] inferred that the enemy's intent was surely to return: they would think of the

abandoned military apparatus and miscellaneous items that were quite numerous, and would want to come burn them up.

[24Aa] The Honorable [Zhao] hurriedly dispatched Gao Yan to lead one-thousand of the crossbowman directly to Red Bank. They combined their forces and shot [the enemy], who retreated. Again they abandoned provisions, weapons, and armor and hastily ran far away toward the front of [the walls of] Tangzhou.¹¹⁶ We immediately reported our successive victories to make them known.

[24Ac] From this [time] on, the river's north was free of enemy cavalry! Hence, the Honorable [Zhao] divided up and appointed officials and their subordinates to survey the locations of the enemy stockades. According [to their inspection] they drew a set of maps which showed that the [enemy's] camps and stockades were spread out in the east from Yuliang Plain to Red Bank, and in the west from the Wan Mountains to Huaquan Gorge. They extended in an unbroken chain for more than thirty *li*!¹¹⁷ Considering the extent of this fortified land, [Zhao] was alarmed that [it could have supported] an army of more than two-hundred thousand!

[24Af] The enemy had attacked our city wall at a hundred points, [but] each time we held them back and they retreated. Because none of the [enemy's] plans [to attack the wall] had been successful, they had chiseled an opening more than one-hundred paces wide in the great dyke to the west of the Wan Mountains. They desired to open [a channel] from here that was more than ten *zhang* deep in order to make a

¹¹⁶ I assume that “the front of Tangzhou” 唐州前 refers to the southern edge of Tangzhou since the Song army would be facing Tangzhou from the south.

¹¹⁷ Thirty *li* would have been equivalent to approximately 17km, (10.5 miles).

small river and lead the great [Han] River's water to Tan Brook.¹¹⁸ The river had already started from the east of Honorable Xie's Cliff,¹¹⁹ and entered the mountain's great dyke,¹²⁰ filling and clogging it [with water] and flooding the bridge. They took advantage of the dyke to serve as an embankment and opened up the river's course, desiring it to enter Yuliang Plain where it would meander and enter the [Han] River, cutting off Xiangyang to the river's north.¹²¹ [Their] scheme was definitely not unsophisticated. The Honorable [Zhao] said of it, "Ever since the start of the universe the rivers have held fixed courses.¹²² How could they possibly change them?! Here is an example of their foolishness!"

[24Bb] We could not possibly succeed in counting the amount of the enemy's military implements, attacking equipment and miscellaneous items that we had seized throughout [the siege]. [Zhao] sent out two-thousand people daily to transport the abandoned goose carts, shielded passageways, cloud ladders, anti-horse barricades, clothing and armor for people and horses, stone missiles, pots and casks, spears and sabers, as well as abandoned wood, bamboo, boats, and carts, etc; and it took several days for the area to be cleared. As for their ships and stone missiles, [the enemy] had used ox carts to transport all of them [here] from the northern frontiers. The stone

¹¹⁸ Ten *zhang* deep would have been approximately one-hundred feet. This is quite a depth for a "small" river! Perhaps *shi* 十 (ten) is an error for *yi* 一 (one).

¹¹⁹ Honorable Xie's cliff 謝公巖 is located five *li* to the southwest of Xiangyang.

¹²⁰ Perhaps this is the same "great dyke" mentioned above. I am not sure.

¹²¹ In other words, the Jin commander wanted to change the course of the Han River so that it flowed south of Xiangyang.

¹²² China's natural history of flooding and frequently changing water courses do not support this statement. This must be a rhetorical flourish.

missiles were made from carved granite,¹²³ and they were round like a ball. The workmanship was extremely exquisite. When it came time for them to flee, [the enemy] buried them in pits, and then left; and so there are still some that we have not yet found.

[24Bg] Beginning from [the time] we had been surrounded, the Honorable [Zhao] immediately filed a report to inform the court and begged for troops to provide aid. The court repeatedly sent dispatches down to the Department of the Campaign Commanders at Jinzhou and Jiangzhou [for them] to send out troops to raise the siege. In addition, [Zhao] recruited death-defying soldiers. By way of remote paths, he sent out countless wax balls to report our emergency to various places and beg for a rescue army. During the entire three months, there was not even one person from a rescue army who arrived [at Xiangyang].

[25Aa] The Honorable [Zhao] managed [our troops] with many methods. He engaged in defense by way of attack methods, and [thus] we were able to fight and then retreat. At the start, the enemy had an army of two-hundred thousand to charge the bank and cross the river. They themselves thought that they would accomplish their plan, and intended to use the toes of their boots to kick down Xiangyang's city wall.¹²⁴

[25Ac] The people [of Xiangyang] urged the Honorable [Zhao] many times to send out troops during the daytime. [However] the Honorable [Zhao] alone strongly

¹²³ I translate *qing shi* 青石 as "granite." However, it could also be a reference to an iron ore such as magnetite of which there are large deposits in Shanxi and Manchuria.

¹²⁴ "Using the toe of one's boot to kick down a city wall" seems to be a set phrase which I intuit means that the enemy thought they would be able to march right in and take the city without difficulty.

insisted that [because] their [army] was numerous, and ours was scant; and [because] their [army was made up of] cavalry and ours of infantry; and [because] the land was flat outside the wall, therefore it was suitable for [their] cavalry while it was only suitable for us to raid their stockades during the night. Occasionally, [Zhao] would send an army out during the daytime, but invariably he had calculated beforehand that they would be victorious, and only after [that] would he resort to battle. For this reason, every time we went out we invariably triumphed.

[25Ae] From beginning to end, [there were] twelve great battles. From water and land, we attacked and raided [the enemy] twenty-four [times]. Nearly half of the enemy's men and horses were killed or injured. For instance, when we caught Battalion Commander Xuan Alibeigong he claimed that on the day that the enemy crossed the bank, those that drowned from the various armies totaled nine-thousand twenty-seven men and more than three-thousand horses. During the attack on the city wall, the dead and injured totaled twenty or thirty-thousand men. Nahe the monk also claimed that in the division of five-thousand people led by his father, Brigade Commander Wuye, those who drowned while crossing the river totaled more than one-thousand men. We heard in detail that within one brigade managed by a minor company commander, all three-thousand people went under [and drowned]. Every single army and every single squad that we knew about was like this. It was visible!

[25Bb] Our army repeatedly went out from the city wall to raid and attack, and in comparison [those of our troops] who were seriously injured and died when [the enemy] attacked our city wall only numbered several tens of men, and that was all!

[25Bc] While the Honorable [Zhao] controlled the army, discipline was very strict. Rewards and punishments were not given with partiality. Every time that we raided a stockade and reaped victory, he would reward us with coins and silver. In no way was he stingy. Every time there was a government soldier who risked his life to enter [amongst] the enemy, then no matter how often [this occurred], he promoted him in rank. But for those who violated orders, he invariably followed the military law. Together with his officers and soldiers, [Zhao] experienced the same joys and sorrows.

[25Be] As for Xiangyang's wine shops, [although] their daily income was not less than one or two-thousand strings [of cash], the Honorable [Zhao] universally forbade the selling of wine. [However], each time we went out to fight and encountered snow and cold, [Zhao] would immediately distribute [wine] amongst the officers and soldiers in order to demonstrate his expectation for all to share in the hardship.¹²⁵

[25Bg] Previous [to the siege], the enemy began to set up abatises along the riverbanks and in the shallows. In the deeps, they used huge rocks and let them down with a rope in order to fend off horses and to obstruct the [movement of] boats. The Honorable [Zhao] ordered men to pull up and take away more than one-hundred anti-horse [and anti-ship] barricades,¹²⁶ and to totally destroy their abatises, so that the movement of boats would be unhindered.

¹²⁵ The phrase *tou lao* 投醪 (literally “the hurling of the dregs”) which appears on line 25Bg is an allusion to an episode in the *Lü shi chun qiu* 呂氏春秋. In this anecdote, there is a rich man who has wine, but none of the common people do. Because he sympathizes with the people, he dumps all of his wine into a river, and thus they all share the same hardship.

¹²⁶ I have been translating 拒馬子 as an “anti-horse barricade.” However, here it seems to be more of an “anti-ship barricade.”

[25Bi] Because it had not rained for a long time, the Honorable [Zhao] was worried that the water in the city wall's moat would dry up. Therefore we constructed water wheels [to raise the water level] on the banks of two dykes that were east and west of the city wall. By treading on [the water wheel] the water entered the moat, and we relied [on this] to keep [the moat] from drying up.

[26Aa] [Zhao] also worried that there would be a shortage of food amongst the people. So he took up rice from the Ever Full Granary and divided it amongst all the poor and needy lower-class [families] in the the four corners,¹²⁷ and [Zhao] dispatched officials to establish places that offered relief [to those] buying grain. Hence, although the siege and blockade lasted for a long time, no one starved.

[26Ac] When the frightened refugees from all around entered the city walls, those who did not have anyone that they could rely on were all ordered to enter the prefectural administrative [office] and were provided with coins and rice. As for the sick, [Zhao] commanded the doctors to treat them.

[26Ad] Because the skies had been clear for long stretches of time, we often worried about fires [started by] candles. [Therefore] the Honorable [Zhao] established

¹²⁷ I translate the phrase *chang ping mi* 常平 as the “Ever Full Granary.” This term comes from the law titled *chang ping cang fa* 常平倉法 (literally: the law of the invariably [filled to the] brim storehouse) which, during the Song dynasty, was repeatedly established, revised, and abolished. The law basically set up a system whereby grain collected as tax in the summer and fall was stored in a public granary. In times of famine, when grain prices rose beyond the reach of the lower classes, the public granary would open its reserves and sell grain to the poor at a price that was less than the current market price. Not only did this help keep the lower classes from starving, but it also helped to stabilize the overall market price of grain (*Zhongguo li shi da ci dian*, p. 2692).

an appropriate method: until the siege was resolved, the residents, without exception, were to go to bed [early].¹²⁸

[26Ae] The Honorable [Zhao] [displayed] pure, compelling, personal integrity which did not waver in the face of danger. His loyalty and sincerity continued day after day. [For example:]

[26Af] The enemy had commanded someone to come below the city wall and tell us to surrender. When he arrived he yelled loudly, saying: “Xichuan’s great general, Wu Xi, has already surrendered to us; and our court has already bestowed upon him [the title] ‘Prince of Shu.’¹²⁹ Declare [your] total steadfast loyalty to Our State. Why cause Xiangyang, a city full of living beings, to become completely trapped in the middle of scalding water and fire?”

[26Ai] Sometimes [the enemy] used arrows to shoot letters into the city, the Honorable [Zhao] responded to the letters by immediately bringing people to burn or shred them. However, we could not stop them. Later on, when someone came, we would immediately shoot and kill them. Only after they were afraid, did [the enemy] no longer come.

¹²⁸ Literally, the residents were to “arrange their pillows,” i.e. rest peacefully. I believe Zhao’s meaning is that the residents of the city were made to go to bed early so that they would not use candles, and there would be less chance of accidentally starting a fire, which would be catastrophic under any circumstance, but especially so while under siege—perhaps causing the fall of the city.

¹²⁹ Xichuan 西川 refers to the general area of western Sichuan. The *Song shi* reports that Wu Xi 吳錫 (1162-1207), who was the Song general and leader of the entire western offensive, joined the Jin on June 4, 1206. However, the *Jin shi* reports that Wu Xi expressed interest in joining the Jin on January 12, 1207 and was made the Prince of Shu on January 18. The *Jin shi* dates seem more reasonable—if Wu Xi had surrendered as early as June, surely Zhao Chun would have heard of this before the start of Xiangyang’s siege. Wu Xi was killed by his subordinates during the second lunar month (which corresponds to March 1207).

[26Ba] At first, when the enemy said that Wu Xi had accepted surrender, the Honorable [Zhao] did not believe it.¹³⁰ Only when the siege was resolved did we learn that the business about [Wu] Xi had actually occurred.

[26Bb] The Honorable [Zhao] exerted his mind day and night. When he slept, he [could] not rest peacefully; when he ate, he [could] not swallow. As for his clothes, he did not undo them; and as for affairs—no matter great or small—he invariably devoted his mind and thoughts [to them]. Therefore, he did as the changing circumstances demanded and every time he sent out [a command] he was always right on target. For example, he opened up the berms of the moat in order to submerge [their] trebuchets; he tunneled through the wall in order to send out [our] troops; he wove bamboo baskets in order to trip up [their] horses; and he used overlapping tables in order to array the crossbow[men].¹³¹ At night, he changed the signal for regrouping the army; he stealthily piloted [vessels] to assail the enemy's boats; he made clay missiles and caltrop arrows—all of these are not recorded in [the classic manuals of] military strategy.¹³² Whenever the Honorable [Zhao] met the enemy, each event invariably was meticulously [considered] and only after [this] did he act. He was especially good at seeking council regarding [potential] advantages and disadvantages.

¹³⁰ Interesting word order: “公初不之信” (26Ba). Perhaps it is a remnant of archaic grammar (不 OV) or a colloquial expression.

¹³¹ For a description of this tactic, refer to footnote 73 above.

¹³² A caltrop arrow, *ji li jian* 蒺藜箭, is presumably an arrow with a caltrop or spiked arrowhead attached. The advantage to using a caltrop arrow is that even if an archer missed his target, it would still be able to inflict damage if the enemy (or enemy's horse) stepped on it.

As Franke notes in “Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China” (p. 183), these military strategies *had* been recorded in earlier sources. This suggests that these materials were not widely circulated, Zhao Wannian was not well read on these matters, or Zhao was attempting to deceive his reader.

If there was a plan or scheme, no matter if it was [from] above or below, he invariably selected and employed it, so for this reason none of the [good] policies he considered were lost.




Figure 17: Caltrop Arrow (my own drawing).

[26Bh] The enemy created earthen mountains in two places. They lumbered the forest's trees for a great distance in all directions [to the extent that the trees] were completely depleted. When the enemy fled they inscribed [a poem] on a wall of a stockade room, saying:¹³³

With countless bitterness and suffering, we crossed the river to come here.

On the drill field we built a platform, and toward our hometowns we could
peer.¹³⁴

Although we could not conquer Xiangyang's city wall,

We surely cut enough firewood to last them half a year.

[27Aa] Because the siege's blockade had lasted such a long time, firewood within the city was expensive. Every [string of] one-thousand coins could only buy

¹³³ 千辛萬苦過江來
教場築座望鄉臺
襄陽府城取不得
與他打了半年柴

¹³⁴ In Chinese mythology there is a platform in the netherworld called the "tower for gazing at home" *wang xiang tai* 望鄉臺. As a form of psychological punishment, ghosts of the dead ascend this tower to view their living family to whom they can never return. The use of this allusion is particularly suitable for this poem. Even if the enemy's earthen mountain tactic had been successful, it is still probable that most of the attackers ascending the wall would have been killed by the defenders.

[just] over ten *jin*.¹³⁵ The people reached the point where some tore down their houses or sought the bones of oxen and horses to feed their cooking stoves. When we destroyed the earthen mountain, there was several million *dan* of firewood [and timber] which we supplied to the army and people for burning and other uses.¹³⁶ This is the reason [behind the enemy's] words.

[27Ad] Although [my] words are unrefined, my true sentiments appear. The above records the Honorable [Zhao]'s [actions] from the third day of the twelfth month [January 2, 1207],¹³⁷ up to his successive days of victory during the first month. When [the court] appointed the Honorable [Zhao] to the post of Principal Military Training Commissioner,¹³⁸ the Honorable [Zhao] said, “The royal lineage and altars have impressive and numinous power. If the officers and troops heed your command, what merit could we bring to this?” After the siege was broken, he never again spoke this way.¹³⁹

[27Af] [I], Wannian, have been a subordinate in the army for a long time and have followed the Honorable [Zhao] out to the frontier to put on [armor] and clasp [arms].¹⁴⁰ In addition, I sometimes have had a participant's knowledge of the plans

¹³⁵ At this time, one *jin* was equivalent to approximately 661 grams (Qiu, p. 447).

¹³⁶ Traditionally 120 *jin* equals one *dan* (Cohen, p. 333). Thus one *dan* would have equaled approximately 79.3 kg.

¹³⁷ In this edition of the text, it seems unclear whether the character *ji* 及 or the character *fan* 反 appears on line 27Ad. Fang uses *fan*, but *ji* seems to make more sense.

¹³⁸ I cannot find any reference to Zhao Chun's appointment to this position within the *Song shi* (or within the searchable *Si ku quan shu* database).

¹³⁹ I think that Zhao Wannian is implying that Zhao Chun did not brag about his defense.

¹⁴⁰ I base my inference that the direct objects for the verbs “to wear” *huan* 環 and “to clasp” *zhi* 執 are “armor” and “arms” on the set phrase: *huan jia zhi bing* 環甲執兵 “to put on armor and grasp arms.”

[made in] the army tent. Although my insights are of low status and vulgar, [this record] lacks trivial and petty praise, yet [records] the Honorable [Zhao]’s actions and designs, all of which I saw with my own eyes. It had barely been several days since the enemy was pushed back, when I took up my brush to chronicle [these] occurrences from beginning to end, and without resting I have made this text. In days past, for recording facts and praising merit there was the Grand Scribe.¹⁴¹ In this chronicle, I have also fully engaged in preparing [the facts] and have searched and queried for them. The actual evidence states:

[27Bb] As for Xiangyang, from the time when it was sealed off by the siege to the time the siege was broken it was altogether ninety days. We held off the enemy from beginning to end. Although everything about these events is in the record, the specific details are repeated in a list as follows:

— [27Bd] In all, the circumference of the wall of Xiangyang Prefectural City is nine *li* and three-hundred forty-one paces.¹⁴² Outside of the city wall, there is a horse and sheep wall, and outside this wall there is a moat of water. In addition, outside of the horse and sheep wall, we also set up one row of abatises.

¹⁴¹ The “Grand Scribe” 太史氏 is a reference to the famous historian Sima Qian (ca. 145- ca. 86 BCE).

¹⁴² At that time, nine *li* and three-hundred forty-one paces equaled a distance between five and six kilometers. The current wall is approximately 6.5 kilometers. (Note that this estimate was very unscientifically calculated using a tourist map and some dental floss. My guess is that the dimensions of the wall have not changed significantly, but it would be interesting to find some archaeological information that would back this theory up).

— [27Bf] Outside of the north gate of the city wall there are a pair of wild goose-wing [levies] to the east and west that abut the river bank,¹⁴³ and extend down several feet. Outside of this [portion of the] city wall, below the riverbank, the boats are quite numerous. Because we were afraid that the enemy could launch a surprise attack without notice, we used the area between the pair of wild goose-wing [levies] and the city wall to establish a wooden palisade. By the banks of the two dykes below the city wall, we dug out multiple moats and set up two rows of abatises. In addition, we used broken carts to link the towers and [serve as] anti-horse barricades, and [arranged] brave men lying in ambush to defend it. On top of the city wall we had crossbowman, and we additionally used war ships to transport crossbowman to the base of the riverbank where they stood guard day and night.

— [28Ab] Every time the enemy came to attack the city, we struck them with stone missiles from on top of the wall. However, the enemy would reuse them to throw over the city wall. Consequently, [Zhao] ordered the various troops to mix yellow clay together with the hair of oxen, horses, and deer in order to make clay missiles shaped like balls.¹⁴⁴ Some we sun dried and some we baked with fire. When we threw them at the people outside of the wall, all were lethal. [However] if they hit the ground, then they would smash to pieces and could not be used again by the enemy.

¹⁴³ I have not been able to determine what a “wild goose-wing [levy],” *yan chi* 雁翅, is, nor how it acquired this name.

¹⁴⁴ It may seem strange that Wannian reports that the hair of deer was used. However, during the Song dynasty, Xiangyang was a famous producer of musk, *she xiang* 麝香, which is obtained from a sac beneath the abdominal skin of the male musk deer and used as a perfume fixative. Therefore, there must have been a sizable deer hide supply (*Hubei tong shi: Song Yuan juan*, p. 13).

— [28Af] On top of the old city wall there were only sixteen trebuchets.

Consequently, we make plans to start increasing [the number] and constructed large trebuchets as well as whirlwind trebuchets,¹⁴⁵ so that altogether [we had] ninety-eight of them. We arranged [them] on top of the wall, as well as inside the wall, pressing against the foot of the wall. For example, the large trebuchets that were set in place at the base of the wall all had nine or ten component poles.¹⁴⁶




Figure18: Mobile Whirlwind Trebuchet (*Wu jing zong yao qian ji*, p. 615).

— [28Ai] In order to guard against the enemy's stone missiles, we used wood to make frames at the top of the resistance [watch]towers. Each one, on each side, was more than a *zhang* [high].¹⁴⁷ We used hemp ropes on top of the frames and wove them together to create net walls, and erected them on the top of the resistance

¹⁴⁵ Needham notes that a “whirlwind trebuchet,” *xuan feng pao* 旋風砲, was used for “small-‘calibre’ missiles” and consisted of a single pole that could easily be turned to face any direction (Needham, “Missiles and Sieges,” p. 211-212).

¹⁴⁶ For a discussion of “component poles,” see footnote 57 above. Trebuchets were often placed inside the city walls so that they were better protected from the enemy. This was possible because the trajectory of a missile thrown by a trebuchet forms an arch, thus the missile would rise to clear the wall before descending on the enemy.

¹⁴⁷ A *zhang* 丈 is roughly ten feet in distance.

[watch]towers. On occasions when [the enemy] shot stone missiles [at us], the [rocks] would hit the net and fall down.¹⁴⁸ We also made leather screens outside the resistance [watch]towers, and also used cloth sacks filled with chaff and set them on top of the battle palisades of the resistance [watch]towers. When the enemy's missiles were thrown in, they would hit the hide screens and spring away, or they would hit the chaff sacks and stop, not damaging the towers.

— [28Be] We also created a kind of arrow, which we called a caltrop arrow. On every occasion when we fought with the enemy, we fired them into the enemy ranks. When men and horses stepped on them, all fell down without exception.

— [28Bg] The residents within the city wall were divided into four quarters. [Every] five households were brought together to form a single unit, and they were assigned to mutually detect spies amongst each other. As [had been done] previously, in [each] quarter [the people] were divided into regiments, each with leadership positions. They prepared many tools and implements to quench fires in order to guard against things that could catch fire.

— [28Bi] Through investigation, we heard that the enemy feared the crossbow arrows the most. If an arrow struck, it [could] pierce a horse's belly and pass through heavy armor. Our spies also learned that the enemy was short of [longbow] arrows, so that each time they came and attacked the city wall, they would secretly collect the [longbow] arrows on the ground that had been shot from on top of the wall, and reuse them to shoot into the city. The Honorable [Zhao] passed down an order that we must not [carelessly] release [even] one [longbow] arrow because he feared that they would

¹⁴⁸ Presumably without damaging the tower.

be used by the enemy. Because of this he sought out and asked men, one by one, who were among the [ranks of the] [long]-bowman (and also the spearman, shield bearers, and swordsman) for those willing to change to being crossbowman. All of those who heeded [this call] were paid three strings of cash. Consequently, we obtained more than three-thousand men who changed to become crossbowman, and added them to the top of the wall.

— [29Ae] The [siege and] defense of the city started in winter and ended in spring. The force of the crossbows gradually decreased, so we were afraid that [the arrows] would not be able to reach [targets] far away. Consequently we set up the practice of [attaching] a longbow to the back of the crossbow to help make up for the deficiency.¹⁴⁹ Thus their force increased and did not decrease, and [the crossbows] were able to reach distant [targets].

— [29Ag] Amongst the city people, there were some who were afraid that there would be a shortage of food. Consequently, we established a site to offer relief in buying grain at the four corners of the city wall. We took out rice from the granary, and for a *hu* [of grain] we only accepted the amount of cash that we had originally paid for it.¹⁵⁰ [Zhao] appointed officials to go to the gates and to make an official record of the impoverished lower[class] households and to provide [them] with [ration]

¹⁴⁹ Needham notes that “it was possible to couple two or three bowstaves together in order to increase the energy of tension and hence the initial velocity of the bolt” (Missiles and Sieges, p. 185). In addition to becoming stretched out through normal wear and tear, the contractility of the bowstring would have been affected by temperature and humidity (Missiles and Sieges, p. 186), thus making adjustments necessary.

¹⁵⁰ A *hu* 斛 is a unit of volume. Like all Chinese units of measure, its actual size varied over time and place. Sometimes a *hu* equaled five *dou* 斗, other times a *hu* equaled ten *dou*. During the Song dynasty, a *dou* was equivalent to approximately 2.8 kg.

For a discussion of the grain reserve system, see footnote 127 above.

permits. Day after day we helped them buy grain in order to meet the people's food [needs]. Among [the people], there were shop[keepers], wealthy people, and families friendly with the Honorable [Zhao], who fraudulently went under other people's names to request permits to buy rice. Therefore, [Zhao] appointed officials to go door to door to verify [everyone's permits]. As expected, there were some families possessing wealth [who had permits], [so the officials] took back the permits, and gave them to the impoverished lower class households as well as the frightened refugees.

— [29Bc] Since the weather had been clear for a long time, the moat that surrounded the city wall was becoming shallow and was drying up. Consequently, by the walls of the wild goose wing [levies] near the riverbank, we established two spots where we set up several waterwheels. The [water] wheels carried the river water into the moat. Each [wheel] employed a varying number of government soldiers. [Over a period of] ten days, the moat's water gradually deepened.

— [29Bf] After the siege and blockade had lasted for a long time, we were so short of grass for the horses within the city that [some people] even snapped off roof thatching or fed them straw mattresses. [Zhao] was deeply worried [over this]. Suddenly, the Honorable [Zhao] thought of the green grass inside the sheep and horse wall that was flourishing. Consequently, he ordered us to graze the horses there, and we did not have anxiety about being short of grass.¹⁵¹

— [29Bi] Each time that we engaged in battle, we would use no less than one-hundred thousand crossbow arrows in one day. Although there were [supplies of]

¹⁵¹ This might seem obvious, but I would imagine most people would be afraid to graze their horses outside of the main wall (in the middle of an ongoing siege).

crossbow arrows in the city, we still feared running short [of them]. Consequently, [Zhao] commanded us to seize the enemy's arrows. We cut them to make crossbow arrows,¹⁵² and only lacked the plume feathers. Consequently, two inches below the thick end of the [arrow] we drilled one hole and stuck hemp through it to substitute for the plume. [The arrows] were both able to travel a long way, and especially able to penetrate objects.

— [30Ad] When the residents outside of the city wall saw the enemy cross the banks, they all moved inside the city wall. All of their houses were burned down by the enemy. As for the dogs that each family had, [they were left] outside of the city wall. One-hundred and ten of them would form one pack, and there were several thousand of them [altogether]. Every time [Zhao] sent out troops to attack and raid the enemy's camps and stockades at night, the packs of dogs would attack them and bark. The enemy would then know [what we were up to], and they used [this opportunity] to make preparations. Therefore the Honorable [Zhao] ordered the various troops to weave many bamboo boxes without bottoms, and then hide them near the wall outside of the moat and spread them out. Within ten days the dogs in the packs had all been caught. Not only did the officers and soldiers get meat from them to eat, but also from this point on, whenever [Zhao] sent out troops, the enemy did not know or sense [their presence]. Therefore each time our troops went out, they were invariably victorious.

¹⁵² The crossbow arrow is much shorter than the arrow used in a longbow or compound bow. This seems to suggest that the Jin troops did not have crossbows, which is hard to believe. Perhaps Zhao simply considered their crossbow arrows to be inferior.

[30Ba] The document above organizes all the methods used by [Zhao]. In former times, Wei Xiaokuan's defense of Yubi [lasted] all of sixty days,¹⁵³ and Liu Xinshu's defense of Shunchang [lasted] approximately twenty days.¹⁵⁴ But, as for destroying earthen mountains, burning [the enemy's] assault equipment, and sending out troops to engage in battle, they did this no more than thirty-five times, and that was all. [In contrast] our recent experience of Xiangyang's siege lasted months, and at first we were without the help of even a minuscule army or a scrap of iron. [Yet], we used [only] over ten-thousand soldiers to resist two-hundred thousand wild and ferocious enemy [troops]. Our large battles [numbered] twelve, and the raids on land and water [numbered] thirty-four. Compared with the two Honorable [commanders mentioned above], our task was more difficult and our merit was double theirs. Most certainly, the Honorable [Zhao] possesses the heart of Wei and Liu, and therefore he was able to protect all of Xiangyang.¹⁵⁵ As for future defenders [of this city], they [need] only heighten its city wall, deepen its moat, and [be sure] all the weapons and tools are prepared. If we had been without our Honorable [Zhao]'s loyal and sincere

¹⁵³ Wei Xiaokuan 韋孝寬 (509-580) defended the stronghold of Yubi 玉壁 (located in present day Yuncheng, Shanxi) against Eastern Wei forces led by Gao Huan 高歡 (496-547) in 546. Gao's forces far outnumbered Yubi's defenders, yet Wei Xiaokuan was able to hold off the assault through innovative defense tactics (*Zhongguo li dai ren ming da ci dian*, p. 256).

¹⁵⁴ Liu Xinshu 劉信叔 (1098-1162), whose personal name was Qi 錡, defended Shunchang 順昌 (located in present day Fuyang County, Anhui) against Jin forces in 1140. Reportedly, Jin general Wanyan Zongbi 完顏宗弼 violated the recently signed peace agreement with the Southern Song, and led 100,000 crack troops to attack the city. Against great odds, Liu managed to hold the city (*Zhongguo li dai ren ming da ci dian*, p. 649).

¹⁵⁵ It is interesting that Wei and Liu are referred to by their surnames instead of their personal names. Usually the reverse is done in Chinese texts.

heart, then we could not have easily engaged in even speaking of [Xiangyang's] defense.

Solemnly recorded during the third year of the Kaixi reign period on the fifteenth of the third month [April 13, 1207].

APPENDIX A

TEXT




Figure 19. *Xiangyang shou cheng lu* 襄陽守城錄, *Yue ya tang* 粵雅堂 edition, title page.

B A
i h g f e d c b a i h g f e d c b a

襄陽守城錄

門生鄧州都統副將黃崇勳撰襄陽守城錄

開禧二年四月荆鄂都統趙公淳被命提兵守襄陽五日除京西北路招撫使時皇甫副使斌已出師攻唐鄧失利公方收集潰卒申飭邊備以嚴守禦十一月三日除公兼知襄陽府先是報虜騎逼境眾號五十萬分三路而來是月五日犯襄陽統領馬珙張虎韓源等戰死遂圍襄陽統制雍政馬謹等領兵力戰潰圍而出七日犯神馬坡時副帥魏友諒統兵於彼公聞虜兵甚眾亟

襄陽守城錄

一 粵雅堂叢書

命萬年往諭魏帥勿迎其鋒可斂兵且歸樊城徐爲之計萬年甫至已受敵統制楊杞等戰死魏帥拔圍而出同日犯光化統制鄭皋等戰死光化舊壘不守公恐虜乘勝鋒不可當遂令江北清野縛浮梁盡渡樊城內外軍民老幼凡數千人渡畢人人以斷橋爲請公不從急抽江北諸處把截官兵及戰退卒相繼入城幾萬人薄暮方斷橋徙門外居民入市盡除附城屋宇致城中以備薪爨城上分四隅以本司左軍統制劉津主東隅江陵左軍統制吳強統領扈立西隅江州統制林璋南隅

襄陽守城錄

二 粵雅堂叢書

本司統領王世修陳簡北隅即運防城器具列城上忽宣參譚鼓院良顯章撫幹時可具言忠勇軍統制呂渭孫見魏帥神馬坡之戰不知存亡欲舊取副帥印公素知渭孫凶暴恐生事夜遣萬年委曲開諭之夜半忽魏帥至渭孫失望憤嫉翌早渭孫求殺魏帥并其子普俱被刃仍殺虞兵二人左右格殺渭孫渭孫平時虐所部刻剝倍斂人不堪命及就誅爭鬪而食之公撫諭忠勇軍將士隨即帖然皆樂爲用十一日虜至樊城見已清野竟無所得合三路之眾往來馳騁江上吏民驚駭官屬有相繼而去者公謂弟路分內機誤曰吾家世受國恩先祖帥河陽舉家爲虜所殺獨吾父得免吾今帥襄陽值虜入寇誓當死守報國內機曰渠志亦然公每語官屬必勉以盡忠死節存撫居民無得驚惶公慮城中或有姦細命索之嚴保伍之法民旅皆給號記委屬官巡警火盜又恐虜人臨城必有火砲凡近城茅竹屋并附倉庫者悉撤去仍取市井潛火水桶上以防火箭却於庫務取酒糴十餘貯水列置市井分畫既定十七日聞虜人欲於白河口抓扎船筏過江公單騎至江頭看

5903

Figure 20. Text, pp 1-2.

i h g f e d c b a i h g f e d c b a

虞有無船後至中途遇統領董張珍報隔江有虜人叫
言完顏相公欲請招撫打話及到江頭完顏果至緣水
隔一洲公欲上船渡水聞眾言虜人多詐皆不欲公去
自謂受國厚恩一死何惜即渡往洲上相去四五十步
有打紫傘稱都統相公者乃完顏也其人身材長大年
約五十以上前後人從整整圍繞數重公只將數人亦
張紫蓋立於洲上虜言傳語招撫管軍不易公亦同傳
語虜言我已屬襄陽下光化席卷神馬坡又發人馬去
取隨信德安招撫可聞早拜降公答云自古用兵有勝
有負你有軍馬我亦有軍馬所在為備你何曾取了我
州府這般言語只是恐嚇得百姓莊農我本朝軍馬已
於下江清河口等處殺北軍甚多燒子船千百隻想你
不知虜又言你出師無名公答云兩國和好多年我本
朝亦要甯息只因南北權貨相通商旅因買賣或生讐
隙至相殘害我朝廷曾降黃榜約束邊民如有輒過北
境者依軍法處斬緣小人喜亂南北之人互相抄掠牛
馬因而引惹生事遂至今日虜又言都是皇甫斌公答
云正緣是它容蔽此事朝廷已將他遠竄海外虜言好

襄陽守城錄

三

勇雅堂叢書

好招撫說話分曉又言我得皇帝聖旨不殺南邊百姓
公答云你將我邊民殺了甚多卻如何道不殺虜言不
會都自安業自家懣相近為一家人又言我北軍東已
自海泗西已自川蜀有二三萬軍馬分頭併取你州
府席卷而來襄陽雖有城你不可恃招撫太尉如此分
曉豈不察天意我得指揮取襄陽且看襄陽許多生靈
面聞早拜降若早拜降我也不入襄陽府城便自同去
公即叱之云各事其主惟當以死報國安有降理我只
有韋孝寬故事你有軍馬我亦有軍馬我更有長江之
險無限戰船以待你來完顏語塞遂言招撫好將息上
馬擂鼓而去次日虜遣主簿向明賁完顏并副統二書
來公不容入城遣弟內機與譚宣參管伴公開緘復有
彼此一家之說擲於地大罵虜賊是何相待以書答之
曰昨日承專差董萬戶相請欲得會話雖遠覬風采一
水之隔不得從容承來云殊不曉所謂副都統書云相
公乃近侍職位何為教人以不忠不孝之事我聖朝有
不共戴天之讐正以生靈之故姑守和議連年以來金
國乃縱容饑民抄掠我牛馬驚擾我邊境遣使賀正在

襄陽守城錄

四

勇雅堂叢書

5904

Figure 21. Text, pp 3-4.

i h g f e d c b a i h g f e d c b a

廷無禮又詰誚本朝信使多出榜文恣加毀辱此何理也襄陽等處小勝小負兵家之常然爾士馬死傷十倍我數符堅寇晉兵非不多淝水之敗事蓋可見相公之誇言兵多何不鑒此我今城高池深固若金湯精兵良馬畢集要地疆場之臣但知戮力報國不知其他欲遣人復命緣相公告曉之事既非所當聞亦不當遣姑就來人布答併令賁來書奉還答副統止云回語盡見完顏書中明去二十二日薛宣撫以書來謂二帥不必俱在襄陽欲以魏帥策應德安公方以鄂州德安無備為

襄陽守城錄

五 粵雅堂叢書

慮遂遣魏帥領兵去德安公以城中兵少遂立旗募茶商勇悍之人雖經配隸者皆不問所從來名為敢勇軍應募者翕然公厚加激犒人皆思奮襄江多灘磧公遣官兵防守虞數令人測水屢為射退適天久不雨江流日淺二十四日虞擁眾涉小樊安陽灘過江防灘弩手併射死傷淪沒幾萬人虞酋不恤驅迫而過西自萬山華泉谷東自赤岸漁梁平連珠下寨圍繞府城軍民恐懼公慮人心不固遂將府城四門用土填塞示之死守使人無去志公以虜賊新至營壘未定可擊二十五日

遣撥發官旅世雄部敢勇軍六千餘人劫燒虜寨駕船至五娘子廟迎見番軍在江岸驅虜人畜旅世雄登岸迎戰奪到馬六匹救回被虜百姓老小千餘口至夜又差統領扈立并敢勇軍茶商廖彥志路世忠張聚等部押千人出南門至虎頭山等處劫寨二十六日夜遣旅世雄將官裴顯領敢勇軍六千餘人往城西北江上與虜交戰奪到載糧米船二隻二十七日虜賊於城西插旗書招安字以數人守之公遣膽勇人李超下城奪旗以歸守者散走是夜又遣旅世雄裴顯將所部敢勇軍

襄陽守城錄

六 粵雅堂叢書

出城駕船渡江北劫寨燒毀糧船渡江船二十八日公見城外屋宇已被虜人焚燒而土庫牆壁尚存賊每於牆外隱身以射城上官軍公遂令將官許進部官軍三十人出城毀斷牆壁虜有三百餘騎來掩襲許進殺賊五人各梟首以歸其間二人獨衣戰袍必頭目人也又遣旅世雄裴顯將所部人駕船往襄江西洲與虜賊數千人弓弩交射自辰至酉賊退走死傷甚多二十九日諜知虜賊於東津搭浮橋以便往來轉輸公令以舊船載油灌乾草遣習水人自止流放船將至浮橋焚草船

5905

Figure 22. Text, pp 5-6.

B

A

i h g f e d c b a i h g f e d c b a

燒橋舟人卽浮水登岸又遣旅世雄裴顯將所部人往襄江西洲及江北岸與虜賊交戰射退十二月一日虜遣被虜人劉寶於城東隔濠呼城上云相公欲令人來打話明日主簿向明者復至公遣撫幹章時可下城應之隔濠相議向明所言乃前日書中之意章以大義排之而去又二日虜賊數十騎至城西一人獨前自稱天使叫早降語不遜公命壯士自鹿角中突出擒殺之取其首腰下得木牌貫以紅條番書莫能辨不知爲何等天使也至夜虜賊運竹木雲梯鵝車洞子砲石攻具草

襄陽守城錄

七 粵雅堂叢書

牛土布袋至城下公密諭四隅兵官將預辦火藥箭砲石等分佈三日未曉賊眾擺列步人在前馬軍在後四圍無際鼓譟發喊一擁而前仍將木牌及板門窗榻遮身般運攻城器具公親諭將士肅靜不得譁諱俟其漸近弓弩可及然後射之須與虜箭如雨城壁之上有如蝟毛公身被兩箭射入城內者不可數計公令先用火藥箭射燒番賊所般竹木草牛并砲木等攻具煙焰四起城上弓弩砲石一時併發自卯至申射殺虜賊并中傷者不知其數悉皆敗走委棄器甲弓箭衣裝等物公

卽遣敢死人出城過濠趕殺多獲首級奪取軍器及燒毀雲梯等攻具卽具捷以聞次日虜氣頓索移寨遠去公令四隅打虜箭及於城外廟宇中得所藏備箭百餘萬槁將士白金各有差士氣大振又探聞虜賊打城中傷人多渡江而北遂遣旅世雄裴顯部弩手乘舟往所渡處要截射之虜人初犯境公命成均州統領王宏出兵攻鄧以爲牽制王宏將所部人由淅川入內鄉燒虜沿路所積糧草百餘萬獲千戶杜天師段守忠等首級五日捷書至及開探人張宏報虜人聞王宏兵入鄧境

襄陽守城錄

八 粵雅堂叢書

遂抽光化虜兵數千自青泥回去救援當夜又遣旅世雄裴顯并將官邵世忠從水路分劫虜賊旅世雄裴顯於渲馬灘劫中虜賊退走奪渡船四隻竹籊筏一坐邵世忠部弩手於灘磧上下併射虜賊入水甚多餘皆狼狽敗走又遣將官孟保張德劉彥部敢勇軍千人經萬山入伏龍掩襲其後虜賊奔走多溺死焚毀所造攻城器具三百餘件又於洞山寺前得二丐者俱言番軍有相顧泣語者云被南軍殺了駙馬如何歸得不知駙馬果何人豈非貴戚爲頭目者六日探知虜賊欲來燒濠

5906

Figure 23. Text, pp 7-8.

i h g f e d c b a

i h g f e d c b a

外鹿角遂潛伏官軍於鹿角之裏以備之果有數人徑來放火有官兵王才以槍殺一人斫到首級并奪到旗槍弓刀又令王才硬探至萬山下有虜賊三人在彼舉號火王才擒殺一人取到首級公喜其勇陞爲擁隊七日夜遣將官王橫部官兵郭旺等三十餘人出城燒燬雲梯草牛等五百餘件時有番軍在地名海子裏往來被郭旺等追趕奪到銅鑼一面八日探得虜賊欲從江北渡過南岸遂差裴顯部官兵駕船迎殺之九日遣王橫與教頭過德部官兵四十四人過濠燒毀雲梯百餘

襄陽守城錄

九

粵雅堂叢書

連并燒草牛止布袋等攻具十日遣撥發官楊建合千人魏仲部官兵二十五人過濠燒毀雲梯并草牛二百餘件夜至四更有虜賊駕小船六隻自上流潛來用火箭燒北門岸下客船城上將官呂興聞船上發喊遂令城上弩手併射虜賊退走十一日遣撥發官樊興教頭江清部官兵二十四人過河燒毀雲梯一百五十餘連并草牛等十二日遣王橫部官兵一十四人過河燒毀雲梯七十餘連十四日遣撥發官方溥教頭許亮擁隊孫孝忠將三十餘人過河燒毀雲梯百餘連又遣旅世忠

張聚教頭徐貴部官兵五十九人前去萬山一帶燒毀雲梯二百餘連木牌一百餘面竹木草牛無數緣累日遣兵燒毀攻具將盡十五日探知虜賊復來城南紫陽觀及於寺院等處再遣攻具遂遣方溥訓練官朱建部官兵三十六人前去燒毀雲梯二百餘連奪到騾一頭并鞍轡又遣蔡孝先部官兵五十人搶奪虜賊堆垛所造雲梯大竹有虜騎百餘來前追趕被蔡孝先等殺退奪到軍器衣甲十六日夜遣張聚廖彥忠等分四路前去燒劫賊寨張聚部領敢勇軍七十三人并大軍弩手

襄陽守城錄

十

粵雅堂叢書

三十二人過河從紫巖寺轉過虎頭山劫中賊寨奪到披氈衣甲刀劍等及奪回被虜人老小十人廖彥忠將敢勇軍七十二人至是定專寺等處劫中賊寨斫虜賊首級二顆馬二匹并鞍轡衣甲等軍器旅世雄部官兵六十六人至萬山一帶燒毀雲梯戰牌五百餘件并燒毀虜寨鹿角趕殺敗走又奪到造梯大竹五百餘竿將官馬安忠部官兵四十六人至雲峯寺等處趕殺看守攻具虜賊散走燒毀雲梯二百餘連天橋四座十七日夜遣路世忠將敢勇軍五十八人大軍弩手三十一人

Figure 24. Text, pp 9-10.

B
i h g f e d c b a i h g f e d c b a A

往城東雲峯寺前劫寨殺死虜賊甚多生擒番軍李八兒稱係李撻覽之子十八日虜以千騎擺列城西與城上官兵矢石交戰公在城樓見虜陣中一人躍馬突出執旗招呼引眾直前意氣驕雄公索弩親射之墜馬而死即令斬首乃中左目虜氣奪而退二十日遣路世忠將敢勇軍五十六人大軍督手三十人至雲峯寺前燒雲梯三百餘連造砲大木五十餘殺退看守攻具二百餘人二十一日虜遣降將王虎來公喜其歸欲詢虜中虛實見其詞色錯愕疑有他謀命左右搜之於肘後得

襄陽守城錄
土
粵雅堂叢書

紫袂繫銀十五笏送獄根究乃是虜都統與之俾入城縱火為內應且約以出城相報時稱白旗子軍為號公即斬之繼而被虜李遵回乃知前日王虎之來正為虜刺客也公曰吾心無愧天地王虎其如予何公探知虜欲于二十四日攻城二十二日夜果於城東南擂鼓發喊城中屋瓦皆震公令城上益加嚴備毋得諠譁既曉禱城隍諸廟以虜犯襄漢殘害生靈願求天助趕逐退卻二十三日夜虜鼓譟之聲漸近夜半雷電大震加以雨雹喊聲遂遠明日果不攻城豈非精誠所禱感格而

然自此每夜發喊真曉其意及得破虜人回云虜軍喊東南欲空西邊示圍師必闕之意二十五日夜遣張聚劉耿將敢勇四十三人至虎頭山劫寨見虜賊二百餘人趕殺敗走二十八日遣廖彥忠路世忠將敢勇軍百二十人出東門劫寨至大悲寺燒雲梯百餘連見虜賊大寨之外有小寨約二百餘人先以弩手把截大寨又鍊手直入小寨殺散虜賊奪到雲梯什物等二十九日夜遣廖彥忠路世忠復將所部人出南門劫寨殺傷甚多一人就擒防眾追逐斫首級而還奪到鞍馬弓槍

襄陽守城錄
土
粵雅堂叢書

刀甲及救回被虜老小六口又遣排岸使臣張椿將十四人駕船往源漳離燒劫虜寨奪到虜客船五隻又往萬山燒寨奪回被虜老小二十二口衣甲等物三年正月一日夜遣旅世雄張椿將水手三十五人駕船往源漳離劫燒虜寨奪渡船三隻三日早虜人自城南漁梁平一帶推擁砲座及鴿車洞子等攻具一日不斷徑抵城之東南砲架皆九梢七梢共十餘座專攻東南隅敵樓砲石皆重四五十斤擊中樓櫓無不損者公遂用牛馬皮造作皮簾掛於樓櫓之上以禦砲石緣虜人砲座

5908

Figure 25. Text, pp 11-12.

BA

i h g f e d c b ai h g f e d c b a

盡用生牛皮蒙護砲人在內矢石不能入仍置車輪推轉往來樣製突兀每砲一座如屋數間驚車洞子亦是牛皮蒙護洞子相接直至濠邊約長里許於內般磚填濠土布袋草牛竹木等物前列步人執牌遮身以射守城官兵四向擺列不可計數自卯時城上下矢石交戰至夜虜人攻城愈急軍馬不退公即差敢勇千餘人於當日半夜各持短兵仍負草一束潛出小北門由羊馬牆分爲兩頭領一項自東門吊橋出一項自南門吊橋出合頭徑至虜人砲人舉火發喊城上亦發喊撞鼓

襄陽守城錄

三

唐雅堂叢書

仍用霹靂砲打出城外虜人驚惶失措人馬奔潰每砲下拽砲番軍約二百餘人皆爲官兵所殺仍生擒到謀克王通等八人及奪到器甲鞍馬等死傷約一千餘人盡將虜人砲座洞子臨城煙燄不絕初四日早虜人復別推砲座洞子臨城仍前擺列馬步軍施放弓箭發打砲石及於洞子內般傳草牛土布袋之屬再來攻城矢石交戰自卯至酉虜人將砲座并洞子拽入虜寨蓋防我軍夜出燒之初五日早虜人又復推擁砲座洞子等攻具臨濠及擺列馬步軍復來攻城勢焰益熾公再三

籌思若不遣兵出彼不意無由退却虜人騎軍甚眾若明出城中之兵必併來掩襲須於城上多用弩手射之緣城上女口止立得弩手一層遂於初四日夜措置於庫務寺觀及民戶權借卓子增接四脚令高擺列兩層於女口之後弩手共三層仍預發敢勇官兵一千八百餘人各持器械負草一束伏於城下羊馬牆內却於牆外去虜人砲座洞子百餘步潛用小船於濠內繫搭浮橋二座仍將對橋羊馬牆先次取削令薄至初五日巳時虜人擁併攻城之際即將所削薄之牆一時推倒伏

襄陽守城錄

四

唐雅堂叢書

兵突出虜人止防城門出兵不意他道掩擊倉皇失措先將虜人臨濠步兵殺退次舉火燒毀砲座洞子虜人騎馬果來掩我出城之兵公即令城上三層弩手併力施放虜騎不能當仍於城上撞鼓發喊并打霹靂砲出城外虜騎驚駭退走自早至暮虜人與我軍進退分合凡數十次公亦接續發兵出城應援虜賊死傷約數千人橫屍遍地砲座洞子雖有拽回者所存無幾如土布袋草牛等及奪到木牌一時燒毀適值北風大作烟焰蔽空正撲虜人之面我軍乘勢鼓譟追殺虜人敗走奪

5909

Figure 26. Text, pp 13-14.

B A

i h g f e d c b a i h g f e d c b a

到鞍馬器械據捉到番軍稱去年十二月三日虜人攻城之時殺死番軍甚眾射殺蒲察都統及咬兒萬戶等今次攻城又殺死葛札萬戶即具連日捷報以聞後數日有被虜人回具言虜酋元帥會諸都統登樊城指襄陽城曰趙大裏羅擺佈得好每出敢勇軍不知從何處出來這城如何打得眾都統因起身白元帥這幾番打城牆折了自家軍馬元帥點頭十六日忠義軍統領李良弼於隨州管下白土坡抄奪虜人糧粟殺死番賊獲到首級甚多有正將嚴整立奇功捷書至公知府城四

襄陽守城錄 五 粵雅堂叢書

隅內南隅一面係江陵七軍大教場至魚梁平八里地皆坦平虜人每遇攻城多以重兵攻南隅自正月初五日攻城之後又置砲座驚車洞子木牌草牛土布袋等日謀攻城緣虜所置砲座驚車洞子盡用牛皮蒙護拽砲人在內矢石不能入仍置車輪推轉於城下往來攻打公遂措置於城外濠岸之南離濠四十餘步紮開濠一道以作限隔使虜人推轉砲座驚車洞子等難至城下十七日夜乘雨暗密遣千人出城用工內開挑濠塹六百五十人防護開濠弩手并敢勇又鑣手共三百五

十人并就城上密擺三層弩手二十一日夜差二千人內開掘濠塹一千五百人防護開濠弩手并敢勇又鑣手共五百人二十三日夜以府城之外掘挑濠塹二千人防護開濠併力開濠公料得連夜工役虜人必來衝突挑濠之人公於當夜差三千人內開掘濠塹二千人防護開濠弩手并敢勇又鑣手一千人及於城上亦密擺三層弩手至二更果有虜人馬軍不知厚薄發喊一擁前來衝突挑濠官兵城上并濠外弩手俱發又遣敢勇人與虜人交戰直至五更我軍與虜人進退分合凡

襄陽守城錄 六 粵雅堂叢書

十數次追殺虜賊當陣死傷不知數目虜人退走所開掘濠塹自城東門圍樓角至城南門外吊橋長四百一十餘步面闊八尺以上深六尺又府城南門外元有居民住屋土牆虜人以騎軍馳驟不便欲遣步人斷除之後用馬軍防護公預遣茶商路世忠等部勇敢又鑣手及弩手於土牆裏潛伏二十四日虜賊步軍果來斷除牆壁城上舉旗為號敢勇軍突出殺死斷牆番軍甚多生擒番軍李兀突奪到遮箭牌及燒毀共二百餘面即具捷以聞公復謂雖已措置開濠可為限隔若我軍出

5910

Figure 27. Text, pp 15-16.

B A

i h g f e d c b a i h g f e d c b a

城過新開濠攻劫賊寨奪毀攻具虜騎必來追襲雖有弩手防護緣虜騎勢眾恐落姦便逐柵織竹籠高二尺長六尺眼圓六寸如竹夫人狀若虜騎追襲即將竹籠擲於地上以絆之使虜騎不能施為遂於二十七日夜發敢勇官兵一千三百附帶竹籠潛出南隅自羊馬牆所開門過浮橋銜枚而進直至虜營中虜騎接戰遂擲下竹籠馬為籠所絆不能馳驟多有墜馬者賊眾退走官兵乘勢趕殺死傷甚多又將造下驚軍洞子草牛竹梢柴薪之屬悉皆燒毀及奪到遮箭牌木牌一百餘面

襄陽守城錄 卷之六

弓弩器械等自受圍路梗惟西向水路可用小舟迂回傳送蠟彈文字虜知之遂於灘淺處柵立小鹿角二十八日遣水手奪除虜灘上鹿角仍遣魯選泉領敢勇軍至灘岸及潛伏頰牆之下果有數十虜騎至牆側伏兵突出殺其先鋒者一人并奪馬二匹虜奔走又奪軍器而還虜人見援兵不至有李元帥者自德安府提兵數萬前來與眾都統併謀攻城遂於東南隅七軍大教場內柵起土山兵法謂之距堙自遠而近自低而高欲與城齊每日用牛皮洞子兩行並列於上入于洞中往來

轉運土木前面用牛屋并皮簾六座狀如船帆遮護工役之人矢石俱不能入兩旁用牌手後列馬軍擁護遇晚即將皮洞皮簾等推往下寨遠處安頓公為見虜人姦謀百出日為隄備之計復於濠內再搭浮橋二座預備出兵至三十日土山約長百步恐漸次近城遂於當夜發官軍三千四百人餘人出濠外毀壞土山內一千餘人專用鋤鏟二千三百餘人係弓弩手及敢勇軍茶商又鑱刀斧手防護斷毀土山官兵又於城上擺列三層弩手以為捍敵自二更以來虜騎不知厚薄果來衝突被官兵奮擊羣弩併發虜騎不得前進所有鋤鏟手併力毀斷土山約三丈闊五丈悉皆除毀是夜官兵與番軍交戰凡數十次番軍人馬死傷不知其數奪到器甲弓弩木牌等二月一日虜人增添軍馬仍前推運洞子皮屋皮簾等再築土山規矩倍於前日旬日之間幾與城齊兼虜主重立賞格首先上城人白身與世襲千戶官廣威正六品職事錢五千貫第二上城人白身與世襲謀克官武節正七品職事錢三千貫所以亟勸土山意在必取襄陽每夜擺列軍馬仍燒火數十處明白

襄陽守城錄 卷之六

5911

Figure 28. Text, pp 17-18.

BA

i h g f e d c b ai h g f e d c b a

如晝以防斷毀公於初十日夜發官兵八千二百餘人出城南於內一千五百餘人專用鈎鑊鐵鉞六千六百餘人係弩手及敢勇軍茶商又鑊刀斧手城上亦擺三層弩手公先諜知虜人增兵欲分數路前來衝突公前日出兵用竹籠絆馬恐虜人別生狡計措置令前行人各持小拒馬子一副遮攔虜人來路於內布列陣隊仍前用遮箭布牌又槍弩手迭相衛助於燈時先差裴顯邵世忠邵水手於城東西江內擂鼓發喊陽為劫寨以候之虜人果抽兵以應至三更兵從南隅羊馬牆而出

襄陽守城錄

尤

令先以四百人銜枚各提水一桶疾走往虜人燒火去處潑滅分布前進偶當夜月暗用拒馬子截斷來路殺退虜人鈎鑊手即時用工毀斷土山虜再來衝突為拒馬子所礙不能馳騁又為層弩併射屢進屢卻緣棚築土山之內盡用大木穿貫如屋上用排椽積柴束草牛覆土於上所以難於毀拆自二更官兵併力用工至五更方除三分之一虜人列營舉火為號公恐天曉虜騎四集遂令濠寨余直將所辦油灌乾草名為火牛置於土山之內以火焚之方填草間大風卒至煙焰障空當

夜官兵與番軍交戰二十餘合殺傷番軍甚眾人馬死者縱橫於地及奪到軍器遮箭牌等公以前次遇夜出兵於收兵之時或鳴金或舉火或鳴梆子要使虜人不能測度今次兵多於前若再用之必求追襲公於初十日先次密諭將士今夜收兵以鼓代金以進為退及天色將曉火勢益熾城上擂鼓發喊虜人謂我軍再進倉皇奔走我軍整陣而還並無傷損十一日虜人來救撲所焚土山用土培擁至晚而去公夜半遣人再燒火勢復熾十二日虜再來救火公遂出兵二千列於濠外射

襄陽守城錄

尤

救火之人虜以火不滅遂用木牌護斷毀不盡土山以斷大路公當時令官兵列陣而前虜騎迎戰數合為官兵殺退隨即再用油灌乾草於土山斷處焚燒虜人強弩拱手莫前烟焰幾日不絕悉為灰燼自此虜氣大沮不復修築公見前後虜人每來犯城必為官軍勦殺兼諜知虜人緣此畏懼皆不欲攻城止是元帥曾長貪功不恤士眾公遂作手榜射虜營中開陳禍福招諭來降是夜有流星墜虜營中翌日有訓武校尉謀克納合道僧以右翼副統印來降公因此即揚聲云道僧來降

5912

Figure 29. Text, pp 19-20.

B A

i h g f e d c b a i h g f e d c b a

又密報欲降之人甚多及盡得萬山一路番軍虛實剋日水陸並進勦殺番軍萬山虜人聞知遂於次日燒營盡渡江北即具捷以聞道僧者廣威將軍吾也萬戶之子因廣眾以攻城損折人多知其父與元帥并都統親密求請勸道勿攻城吾也怒欲殺之道僧遂以印來降十四日廣見土山已為灰燼不可修築又斷開南門外大隄仍堆土牆有攻南門之意公即遣張聚部敢勇五百人殺退斷牆人雖已殺退終恐攻打南門是夜遣官軍二千入於南門外棚開濠一道約三百餘步闊五尺

襄陽守城錄 主 明雅堂叢書

深八尺來早虜人登高望見忽有濠一道莫不驚愕繼有被虜人同稱虜人云南軍為事便是一會子自此計無所施偶東北隅城外元有古堤一道直挂城團樓相對勢如山漫道虜人遂因此堤增築高關軍馬併集日夜擺佈比之東隅用工愈急公遂於二十日夜發官兵四千入於古堤兩旁棚開濠塹長四百餘步于未曉時又發弩手一千人伏于新開濠塹之內虜不知覺次日虜騎徑來衝突為伏弩併發射倒番軍頭目人馬殺傷甚眾虜騎稍退遂令官兵前進用鐵鎗手二千餘人

分斷古堤為三段以伐其謀連日出兵且戰且斷虜人屢來衝突皆為強弩射退不敢近傍虜計既窮於二十三日夜虜人將對樓二座大砲十餘座牛皮洞子數百座悉行毀拆燒營夜遁二十四日盡過江北即具捷以聞虜人既渡江北却與西路萬山先渡番軍會合皆於沿江枯河白河新開河一帶下寨安鹿角起蓋寨屋一望三十餘里羣騎蔽壑朝晚牧放出沒無時公恐虜人禍心未艾尚欲留連江北不可不為勦除之計公遂於二十五夜乘雨暗急遣撥發官張福邵彥辦舟船大小三十餘隻載弩手一千人并叉鏹手五百人鼓一百面并帶霹靂砲火藥箭等潛駕船至虜營岸下公親往江岸指授將士敢高聲者斬候傍虜營令弩手先踏上箭平盤子聽一鼓齊放時方解舟會雨急雨聲與檣聲相雜又至岸下虜不知覺遂鳴一鼓眾弩齊發繼而百鼓俱鳴千弩亂射隨即放霹靂火砲箭入虜營中射中死傷不知數目人馬驚亂自相蹂踐至五更號叫四散奔走公遂收兵而回不傷一人次日二十六日早晨復有虜騎百餘隊前來收拾死屍圍繞焚化公當時用船載

襄陽守城錄 主 明雅堂叢書

5913

Figure 30. Text, pp 21-22.

B
A

i h g f e d c b a
i h g f e d c b a

弩手五百餘人併力射殺一百餘騎縱火燒營虜眾大潰委棄衣甲軍器分四路望北而走具捷以聞公以前夜出彼不意當時但知虜人惶惶奔走潰散即未知弩箭所射死傷人馬實數於二十六日有走回被虜人樊起稱於十五夜番軍在寨正睡間忽聞鼓響營發又打霹靂砲入寨滿寨驚亂皆備馬不迭收拾行李不及自相蹂踐番軍死傷二千人馬八九百匹又於二十八日有被虜人張雲同稱聽得久伍萬戶說當夜被南軍射殺三千人馬八九百匹元帥未敢申朝廷候到鄧

襄陽守城錄

三

國朝雅堂叢書

州將折了人馬別撰名色申報公見虜人喪敗雖大隊北走又恐尚有去未盡者遂差得力人過江硬探得上件番軍取鄧城清水河神馬坡路前去已入彼境又將死者焚化及有燒不迭者用馬駝去棄之河內所有東路漁梁平東津赤岸一帶虜人燒營夜遁盡過江北虜恐有追襲委棄衣甲器械米糧牛皮軍須什物無數如鍋釜者亦委之而去至二十七日公差人去探虜二十七日探虜人同探得復有軍馬二千餘人自北再同至赤岸江頭用土布袋填江料得虜意必是回思弃下軍

器什物等甚多要來焚毀公急遣鄒彥將弩手一千人徑往赤岸併力射退又復弃下糧食器甲奔走望唐州前去即具捷以聞自此江北無虜騎矣公乃分委官屬檢踏虜寨地據畫到圖本東自漁梁平至赤岸西自萬山華泉谷分列營寨綿亘三十餘里以寨地計之恐不止二十萬之眾虜人百端攻城皆為勦退計無所施遂於萬山之西斷開大隄闊百餘步欲自此開深十餘丈為小江引大江水入檀溪河已將謝公巖東入山大隄填塞橋洪借隄為岸開成河道要將至漁梁平迤邐入

襄陽守城錄

三

國朝雅堂叢書

江隔襄陽在江北用意甚不淺公謂自乾坤開闢以來江河已有定勢豈容改易其愚如此前後所奪虜人軍器攻具什物不可勝數及所委弃驚軍洞子雲梯拒馬子人馬衣甲砲石鍋桶鎗刀及弃下竹木船車等日差二千人般運幾日方盡如船及砲石皆自北邊用牛車運來砲石鑄青石為之圓如氣毬工極精緻及遁窖之而去尚有未得者公自被圍即申報朝廷乞兵為援朝廷累行下金州江州都統司發兵解圍又募死士從間道賁蠟彈告急諸處乞救兵者不知其幾凡三月救

Figure 31. Text, pp. 23-24.

B A

i h g f e d c b a i h g f e d c b a

兵竟無十人至者公多方措置以守為攻方能戰退初
 虜以二十萬眾突灘過江自以為得計意欲以靴尖蹴
 倒襄陽城入多勸公曰晝出兵公獨堅執以彼眾我寡
 彼騎我步城外地平乃騎軍所宜只宜夜間劫寨聞或
 白日出兵必預料先勝而後求戰所以每出必捷前後
 大戰十二水陸攻劫二十四虜人馬死傷幾半如擒到
 千戶董阿里字供稱虜渡灘日諸軍淹死九千二十七
 人馬三千餘匹攻城死傷三萬人納合道僧亦稱其
 父吾也萬戶所部五千人過江淹死者千餘人細聽萬
 戶小謀克所管三千人全沒一軍一隊所知如此他可
 見矣我軍果次出城攻劫并因攻城傷重而死者才數
 十人而已公馭軍紀律甚嚴賞罰無私凡遇劫寨獲捷
 支犒錢銀畧無所靳每有官兵用命入賊者即不用次
 陞差犯令者必從軍法與士卒同甘苦襄陽酒庫日入
 不下二千緡公皆不容酤賣每出戰遇雪寒即時給
 散士卒以示投醪之意先是虜於灘淺處紉立鹿角深
 處以巨石緹拒馬阻礙舟船公令人拔取拒馬百餘盡
 毀鹿角舟行得以無礙天久不雨公慮城濠水涸乃枒

襄陽守城錄

三

粵雅堂叢書

水車於城東西兩隄岸踏水入濠賴以不涸又慮民間
 闕食凡貧乏之下戶悉以常平米分四隅差官置場賑糴
 故圍閉雖久人無饑民四外驚移之人入城無所依者
 悉令人郡治給以錢米病者命醫治療尋常久晴多慮
 火燭公措置有方迄圍解竟無遺漏居民得以安枕公
 素厲大節忠赤貫日虜又令人來城下說降至大呼云
 西川大將吳曦已降我本朝已封為蜀王招撫固盡忠
 於國奈何使襄陽一城生靈盡陷湯火中或用箭射書
 入城公即對來人焚之或碎之不能止後有來者即射
 殺之方畏而不至虜言吳曦受降公初不之信及圍解
 乃知曦事果然公日夜勞心寢不安枕食不下咽衣不
 解帶事無巨細必竭心思故隨機應變每發必中如開
 重濠以陷砲穴牆道以出兵織竹籠以絆馬用層桌以
 列弩夜易收兵之號潛駕襲虜之舟作泥砲及蒺藜箭
 皆兵法所不載公遇敵凡事必審而後舉尤好咨訪利
 害有一謀一策可取者不論高下必採用之所以算無
 遺策虜凡兩處紉土山採伐林木四遠皆盡既遁賊於
 寨屋壁上題云千辛萬苦過江來教場築座望鄉臺襄

襄陽守城錄

三

粵雅堂叢書

5915

Figure 32. Text, pp 25-26.

BA

i h g f e d c b ai h g f e d c b a

<p>陽府城取不得與他打了半年柴緣圍蔽已久城中柴貴每千錢僅能買十餘斤民至有拆屋或取牛馬骨供爨者及毀土山柴薪有數百萬擔以供軍民燒用故有是云語雖鄙真情乃見上以公十二月三日及正月連日之捷除公為正任團練使公曰宗社威靈士卒用命某何功之有圍解之後亦未嘗言萬年久隸戎行從公出邊以援執之餘或預聞帷幄之謀雖識見卑陋無涓埃裨贊而公之施設皆所目擊廣退方數日桴鼓編次始末不暇為文異時記事贊功有太史氏在此亦足以備搜訪之實迹云</p> <p style="text-align: center;">襄陽守城錄</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><small>三才圖會卷之五</small></p> <p>襄陽自圍閉以至圍解凡九十日却虜始末雖具載錄中所有措置事目復列如後</p> <p>一襄陽府城周圍共九里三百四十一步城外有羊馬牆牆外有水濠復自羊馬牆之外紆設鹿角一重</p> <p>一北門城外東西有兩雁翅抵江稍低數尺其城外江岸下舟船甚多恐虜人不測掩襲遂以兩雁翅城之裏紆立木柵於城下兩堤岸開重濠設鹿角兩層又用破車連樓如拒馬伏壯士守之城上已有弩手復</p>	<p>用戰船載弩手於江岸下日夜為備</p> <p>一虜人每來攻城城上以石砲打之虜復用打入城上遂令諸軍用黃泥以牛馬鹿毛攪和為泥砲如氣毬樣或日晒乾或用火炙打於城外人無不立死如著地即碎不復為虜用</p> <p>一舊城上止有砲一十六座遂措置棚增造大砲及旋風砲共九十八座於城上并城裏抄城脚安頓如城脚下安頓者皆九梢十梢大砲</p> <p>一敵樓上防虜人砲石用木造框子每箇每方丈餘及用麻索於框上結成網色立在敵樓上遇有砲石打來即著網而墜又於敵樓外作皮簾又用布袋盛糠粃置敵樓戰棚上虜砲打入著皮簾即彈去著糠袋即住不損壞樓子</p> <p>一棚造一等箭名曰蒺藜箭每遇與虜交戰射入虜陣中人馬踏之無不倒者</p> <p>一城內居民分四隅五家結為一甲互相覺察姦細仍隨隅分隊各有所部多備潛火器具以防火燭</p> <p>一探聞得虜人最怕弩箭中則貫馬腹穿重鎧諜知虜</p>
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5916

Figure 33. Text, pp 27-28.

B A

i h g f e d c b a i h g f e d c b a

人乏箭每來打城潛拾城上所射在地之箭復射入城公下令弓箭不許放一枚恐為虜用却於此弓箭手并槍牌手刀手內取問逐人願改弩手者聽每人支錢三貫遂得所改弩手三千餘人增於城上

一守城自冬至春弩料力漸減恐不能及遠遂措置以弓於弩背上幫貼勁力有增無減可以及遠

一在城民閒恐有闕食者遂措置於城四隅置場賑糴出倉廩米斛只收元糴價錢委官詣門抄割貧乏下戶給由子日逐賑糴以接民食閒有鋪席財主與公

襄陽守城錄 五 厚雅堂叢書

有情之家冒名請由子糴米乃委官逐門覈實果有物力之家即收回由子給與貧乏下戶及驚移之人

一繞城水濠久晴淺涸遂措置於近江岸雁翅城兩處各置水車數座車取江水入濠每座用官兵人數不等旬日濠水漸深

一園閉既久城中關馬草至於折茅或餵鷹鵝深以為慮公忽思得羊馬牆裏有青草茂盛遂令牧馬于彼得無缺草之患

一每遇接戰一日之間用弩箭不下十萬城中雖有弩

箭尚恐缺少遂將奪到番箭截作弩箭唯缺翎毛遂於筋頭下二寸下鑽一竅穿麻以代翎既遠而尤能入物

一城外居民見虜人涉灘盡般入城屋舍皆為虜人所燒毀各家所養之犬在城外百十為羣有數千隻每遇夜出兵攻劫虜人營寨則羣犬爭吠虜賊知覺得以為備公乃令諸軍多織竹篋潛於濠外近城去處張之旬日之間羣犬捕盡不惟士卒得肉食之自後出兵虜不知覺所以每出必捷

襄陽守城錄 三 厚雅堂叢書

右件措置皆可法昔章孝寬之守玉壁僅六旬劉信叔之守順昌幾二旬如毀土山焚攻具出兵接戰不過三五次而止今襄陽圍之閱月初無寸兵尺鐵之援以萬餘卒抗二十萬狂悍之虜大戰一十二水陸攻劫三十四比之二公事難而功倍之然公有章劉之心故能保全襄陽後之守者惟高斯城深斯池器械皆備苟無我公忠赤之心亦未易以言守開禧三年三月既望謹誌

按史開禧用兵止載畢再遇數有功而詳其事趙



5917

Figure 34. Text, pp 29-30.

B

A

i h g f e d c b a i h g f e d c b a



5918

Figure 35. Text, p 31.

B

A

i h g f e d c b a

i h g f e d c b a

右陽守城錄一卷宋趙萬年撰案萬年字里未詳是
書則紀開禧間趙淳守襄陽事蹟萬年楚淳幕僚云
四庫提要亦著錄附存目中厲樊榭等南宋雜事詩引
用書目亦未之及殆亦罕覩之帙未附案語不知何人
所撰援據各條皆見通鑑綱目續編謂迴不相侔遂疑
是書之夸張失實然首尾完善所言戰守之事綦詳均
鑿鑿可據似非臆撰者 提要謂其文多殘缺不盡可
辨此亦亡友黃石溪明經鈔存本略有舛誤亟校勘以
付剞劂焉噫襄陽爲今古南北朝戰守所必爭之地厥
後南宋末呂文德守襄陽劉整降元請賂文德開權場
築堡壁而襄陽始困長圍六年呂文煥以襄陽降元而
淮南臨安俱不守矣則淳之功亦安可沒哉咸豐甲寅
閏月上浣南海伍崇曜跋

襄陽守城錄跋

一 粵雅堂叢書

粵雅堂叢書

5919

Figure 36. Text, commentary.

APPENDIX B

PEOPLE

Here are the people mentioned in the text, and arranged in alphabetical order. I have also provided the page number and line where they can be found in the *Yue ya tang* edition and briefly stated the role which they play within the diary. I was only able to find additional biographical information for thirteen of the people listed in the text. I have summarized some of this additional information below and listed some sources where the interested reader can find out more. Note that I have reviewed each source and entry listed below, and have listed *only the sources that seem relevant*. Obviously I have probably missed quite a few, and much more sifting could be done. However, this is a good start. (A simple search in the electronic *Si ku quan shu* can result in many “hits,” but many are for people from different time periods who share the same name, or are not names at all but part of phrases).

Cai Xiaoxian

蔡孝先

10Af, 10Ag

Song, no title provided.

Dong Zhangzhen

董張珍

3Aa, 4Be

Jin Commander General and/or Brigade commander.

Du Tianshi

杜天師

8Ah

Jin Battalion Commander.

Duan Shouzhong

段守忠

8Ah

Jin Battalion Commander.

Fan Qi

樊起

23Ad-e

Song escaped captive, no title provided.

Fan Xing

樊興

9Be

Song Dispatcher.

Fang Pu

方溥

9Bh, 10Ad

Song Dispatcher.

Gao Yan

郃彥

22Ai, 24Aa

Song, no title provided.

Ge Zha

葛札

15Ac

Jin Brigade Commander.

Guo De

過德

9Ai

Song Head Military Instructor.

Guo Wang

郭旺

9Ae, 9Ag

Song, no title provided.

Han Yuan

韓源

1Ag

Song Commander General.

Hu Li

扈立

1Bi, 6Ad

Song Commander General.

Huangfu Bin

皇甫斌

1Ac, 3Bi

Song Vice Commissioner. Lots of other information can be found in various records. For complete bibliographic information, see the bibliography.

Song shi: vol. 3, juan 38, pp. 737, 740-741; 747, vol. 34, juan 393, p. 12020; vol. 34, juan 396, p. 12079; vol. 35, juan 397, p. 12092; vol. 35, juan 398, p. 12115; vol. 38, juan 455, p. 13376; vol. 39, juan 474, pp. 13775-13776.

Jin shi: juan 12, pp. 273-274, 276; juan 62, pp. 1474, 1476; juan 121, p. 2645.

Chang gu ji: juan 14.

Da qing yi tong zhi, juan 88.

Fujian tong zhi, juan 26.

Gong kui ji, juan 47.

He shan ji, juan 18, 40, 99.

Hou le ji, juan 11.

Jian yan za ji, juan 6, 18.

Jiangxi tong zhi, juan 30.

Liang chao gang mu bei yao, juan 5, 8, 9, 10.

Qi dong ye yu, juan 3.

Qin ding si ku quan shu zong mu, juan 57.

Qin ding xu tong dian, juan. 99.

Qin ding xu tong zhi, juan 37, 53, 193, 517, 389, 392, 393, 391, 394, 617.

Shui xin ji, juan 10, 25.

Song shi ji shi ben mo, juan 21, 22.

Song shi quan wen, juan 29b.

Tong jian xu bian, juan 19.

Xi shan wen ji, juan 47.

Xu Song bian nian zi zhi tong jian, juan 12, 13.

Yu pi li dai tong jian ji lan, juan 89, 91.

Yu pi xu zi zhi tong jian gang mu, juan 17.

Zi zhi tong jian hou bian, juan 130, 132, 133.

Jiang Qing

江清

9Bf-e

Song Head Military Instructor.

Li Ba'er

李八兒

11Aa-b

Jin soldier captured by Song, no title given.

Li Chao

李超

6Ah

Song soldier, no title given.

Li Liangbi

李良弼

15Ag-h

Song Commander General of the Loyal and Righteous Army.

Li Talan

李撻覽

11Ab

Jin soldier, no title provided, but perhaps a person of high rank since the diary mentions that Li Ba'er claims to be his son.

Li Wu

李兀

16Bh

Jin soldier captured by Song, no title provided.

Li Zun

李遵

11Bc

Song captive who escaped from Jin, no title provided.

Liao Yanzhi

廖彥志

6Ad

Song fighter associated with the tea merchants, no title provided.

Liao Yanzhong

廖彥忠

10Ah, 10Bb, 12Ad, 12Ah

Song fighter associated with the tea merchants, no title provided.

Liao Yanshi

廖彥士

10Bb

Song fighter associated with the tea merchants. Note that this name only appears in the *Zhi hai* edition. In all other additions his name is given as Liao Yanzhong (see above).

Lin Zhang 林璋

1Bi

Song Senior Commander General of Jiangzhou.

Liu Bao 劉寶

7Ac

Song captive of Jin, no title provided.

Liu Jin 劉津

1Bh

Song Senior Commander General of the Left Army.

Liu Tian 劉暉

12Ac

Song fighter associated with tea merchants, no title provided.

Liu Yan 劉彥

8Be

Song fighter associated with the tea merchants, no title provided.

Lü Shixiong 旅世雄

6Aa, 6Ab, 6Ae-f, 6Ai, 6Bf, 7Aa, 8Ae, 8Ba-b, 8Bb, 10Bd, 12Bd

Song Dispatcher, associated with tea merchants, helped lead more raids than anyone else listed in Zhao Wannian's diary.

Lu Shizhong

路世忠

6Ad, 9Bi, 10Bi, 11Ae, 12Ad, 12Ah, 16Be

Song fighter associated with the tea merchants, no title provided. Another famous person with the same name lived during the Song dynasty.

Lü Weisun

呂渭孫

2Ab-c, 2Ad, 2Ae, 2Ae, 2Af, 2Af

Song Senior Commander General of the Loyal and Brave Army. He appears in several records, more information can be found on him.

Song shi, vol. 35, juan 397, p. 12092.

Hou le ji, juan 1.

Jian yan za ji, juan 18.

Jing xiang lu juan 12.

Liang chao gang mu bei yao, juan 9.

Qin ding xu tong zhi, juan 392.

Shui xin ji, juan 25.

Song shi quan wen, juan 29b.

Zhejiang tong zhi, juan 129, 174.

Lü Xing

呂興

9Bd

Song Commanding Officer. A Song dynasty author shares his name.

Lu Xuannie

魯選臬

17Bc

Song fighter, associated with tea merchants, no title provided.

Ma Anzhong

馬安忠

10Bg

Song soldier, no title provided.

Ma Gong

馬珙

1Ag

Song Commander General.

Ma Jin

馬謹

1Ah

Song Senior Commander General.

Meng Bao

孟保

8Be

Song Commanding Officer

Nahe

納合

20Bh, 25Ah

Jin Military Training Official and Company Commander, surrendered to Song.

The monk Nahe is mentioned in several sources, but more time would be needed to translate the dense writing of the passages.

Chang gu ji, juan 6, 29.

He shan ji, juan 29, 30.

Shi cang li dai shi xuan, juan 221.

Pei Xian

裴顯

6Af, 6Ai, 6Bf, 7Aa, 8Ae, 8Bb, 8Bb, 9Ah, 19Ag

Song Commanding Officer, helped lead tea merchant army.

Pucha

蒲察

15Ab

Jin Campaign Commander. This is a common Jin surname; I have not been able to identify him.

Shao Shizhong

邵世忠

8Bb, 8Bc-d, 19Ah

Song Commanding Officer.

Note that a famous person from earlier in the Song dynasty shares his name!

Sun Xiaozhong

孫孝忠

9Bh-i

Song Support Squad member.

Tan Liangxian

譚良顯

2Ab

Song Public Petitioner's Drum Office official. He received his *jin shi* degree during the Chun Xi 淳熙 reign period (1174-1189). His official place of family registry was Wujin 武進 (Jiangnan), (*Jiangnan tong zhi*, ch. 120).

Wanyan Kuang

完顏匡

Only referred to as “Wanyan” and/or “*xiang gong*” 相公

3Ab, 3Ab, 3Ae, 4Ba, 4Bb, 4Bf-g, 5Ac, 5Af, 7Ac, 5Ag-h

Jin Minister. (1152-1210CE). See Introduction for further information (pp. 27-29). I have done more extensive research on Wanyan Kuang than on any of the other people listed and have prepared a nine page annotated bibliography of sources. However, it seems awkward to include it here. Therefore I have only included a list of references:

Jin shi: juan 9-13, 35, 64, 70, 92, 98, 101-103, 121, 128.

Fu shui ji, juan 11.

Qian tong, juan 18.

Qin ding ri xia jiu wen kao, juan 29.

Qin ding cheng jing tong zhi, juan 49.

Qin ding xu wen xian tong kao, juan 34, 75, 85, 101, 135, 199, 201, 204, 206.

Shanxi tong zhi, juan 119.

Song shi ji shi ben mo, juan 22.

Tong jian xu bian, juan 19.

Wu li tong kao, juan 123.

Yu ding quan jin shi zeng bu zhong zhou ji, 目錄, 首上, juan 3.

Yu pi li dai tong jian ji lan, juan 89, 90.

Zi zhi tong jian hou bian, juan 126, 129, 132, 133.

Wang Cai

王才

9Ab, 9Ac, 9Ad

Song government soldier, promoted to the Support Squad. Note that this is an extremely common Chinese name!

Wang Heng

王橫

9Ae, 9Ah-I, 9Bg

Song Commanding Officer.

Wang Hong

王宏

8Af, 8Ag, 8Ai, 8Bb

Song Commander General of Junzhou.

Wang Hu

王虎

11Ah, 11Bc, 11Bd

Song General who surrendered to Jin and returned to Xiangyang as a spy / assassin. This is an extremely common Chinese name.

Wang Shixiu

王世修

2Aa

Song Commander General.

Wang Tong

王通

13Bc

Jin Company Commander.

Wei Youliang

魏友諒

1Ai

Also referred to as “Commander Wei” 魏帥:

1Ba, 1Bb, 2Ac, 2Ad-e, 2Ae, 5Ai, 5Ba

Song Vice Commander. Lots of information available:

Song shi: vol. 3, juan 38, pp. 742, 743; vol. 35, juan 397, p. 12092; vol. 38, juan 455, p. 13376.

Gong kui ji, juan 47.

He shan ji, juan 89.

Hou le ji, juan 5.

Jian yan za ji, juan 18.

Jing xiang lu, juan 12.

Ju yi lu, juan 26.

Liang chao gang mu bei yao, juan 9.

Mian zhai ji, juan 18.

Qin ding xu tong zhi, juan 37, 392.

Shui xin ji, juan 25.

Song shi ji shi ben mo, juan 22.

Song shi quan wen, juan 29b.

Wu li tong kao, juan 95.

Xu song bian nian zi zhi tong jian, juan 13.

Yu pi li dai tong jian ji lan, juan 90.

Yuan shi, juan 74.

Zi zhi tong jian hou bian, juan 132.

Wei Zhong

魏仲

9Bb

Song soldier of the Government troops.

Wu Qiang

吳強

1Bi

Song Senior Commander-General of Jiangling's Left Army.

Wu

伍

23Ah

Jin Brigade Commander. Given name unknown.

Wu Xi

吳曦

26Ag, 26Ba, 26Bb

Song General. Defected to the Jin, then assassinated by his subordinates.

He is listed all over the place! His biography appears in the *Song shi*, vol. 39, juan 475, p. 13811. In the *Jin shi* his entries are concentrated in juan 12 and 98.

Since he is not a central figure in the siege, I have not waded through the mountains of material available.

Wuye

吾也

21Ac, 21Ae, 25Ai

Jin “Vastly Powerful General” and Brigade Commander. Father of Nahe the Monk.

Xiang Ming

向明

4Bb, 5Ah, 7Ad, 7Ae

Jin Vice Controller.

Xu Gui

徐貴

10Aa

Song Head Military Instructor.

Xu Jin

許進

6Bc, 6Bd

Song Commanding Officer of Government Troops.

Xu Liang

許亮

9Bh

Song Head Military Instructor.

Xuan Alibeigong

萱阿里孛供

25Ag

Jin Battalion Commander.

Yan Zheng

嚴整

15Ai

Song General. A Jin person with the same name was sent to spy in Xiangyang before the siege (*Jin shi*, juan 12, pp. 274, 275). I do not think that he is the same Yan Zheng mentioned in the diary. I think more could be found out about both of these people with a little more sifting. However, this is a very common name!

Yang Jian

楊建

9Ba

Song Dispatcher.

Yang Qi

楊杞

1Bb

Song Senior Commander-General.

Yaoer

咬兒

15Ab

Jin Brigade Commander.

Yong Zheng

雍政

1Ah

Song Senior Commander-General. Mentioned in *He shan ji*, juan 89.

Zhang Chun

張椿

12Ba, 12Bd

Song Special Envoy of the River Transport [Bureau]. He received his *jin shi*

degree in 1195. His official place of family registry was Yongxin 永新

(*Jiangxi tong zhi*, ch. 57).

Zhang De

張德

8Be

Song Commanding Officer, associated with the tea merchants.

Zhang Fu

張福

22Ai

Song Dispatcher.

Zhang Hong

張宏

8Ai

Song spy.

Zhang Hu

張虎

1Ag

Song Commander-General.

Zhang Ju

張聚

6Ad, 10Aa, 10Ah, 10Ai, 12Ab, 21Ag

Song fighter associated with the tea merchants.

Zhang Shike

章時可

7Ad, 7Ae

Song Pacification Administrative Clerk. In 1199 he was named the administrator of Poyang 鄱陽. His official place of family registry was Yongkang 永康 (*Zhejiang tong zhi*, juan 126). He is also referred to in the title of a poem by Chen Zao (1133-1203) (*Jianghu zhang weng ji*, ch. 2), but it does not provide any biographical information.

Zhang Yun

張雲

23Ah

Song man who had been captured by the Jin but escaped.

Zhao Chun

趙淳

1Ac

Referred to throughout the text as “the Honorable” 公.

Song Campaign Commander of Jingzhou and Ezhou, Pacification

Commissioner of the Capital’s Northwest Circuit.

Song shi, vol. 3, juan 38, pp. 740, 742, 745; vol. 35, juan 397, p. 12092; vol 39, juan 474, p. 13776.

Chang gu ji, juan 14.

Gong kui ji, juan 47.

Ju jin shi wen lei ju [missing character] *gu jin shi wen lei ju*, juan 11.

*Note that Zhao Chun is conspicuously absent from the *He shan ji*! This is very interesting since the author was the military inspector of Xiangyang ten or so years later and he refers to the 1206-1207 siege. He doesn't mention Zhao Wannian, either.

Hou le ji, juan 2, 4, 5.

Huang dun wen ji, juan 12.

Jian yan za ji, juan 15, 18.

Ju yi lu, juan 26.

Liang chao gang mu bei yao, juan 9, 10, 12.

Qi dong ye yu, juan 3.

Qian tong, juan 22.

Qin ding si ku quan shu zong mu, juan 52.

Shui xin ji, juan 25.

Song shi quan wen, juan 29b.

Tong jian xu bian, juan 19.

Wen xian tong kao, juan 62.

Xi shan wen ji, Juan 41.

Xu Song bian nian zi zhi tong jian, juan 13.

Yu ding yuan jian lei han, juan 109.

Yu pi li dai tong jian ji lan, juan 90.

Yu pi xu zi zhi tong jian gang mu, juan 17.

Zi zhi tong jian hou bian, juan 132, 133.

Zhao Hao

趙昊

2Ba, 2Bc

Song Inner Administrator of the Provincial Branch, Zhao Chun's younger brother.

Zhao Wannian

趙萬年

1Ab, 1Ba, 1Bb, 2Ad, 27Af

Song author of *Xiangyang shou cheng lu*. Multiple titles, see line 1Ab.

Ba xun wan shou cheng dian, juan 75.

Chun xi san shan zhi, juan 31.

Da qing yi tong zhi, juan 334.

Fujian tong zhi, juan 35, 48, 68.

Jiangxi tong zhi, Juan 51.

Ju yi lu, juan 26.

Liang Song ming xian xiao ji, juan 352.

Qin ding si ku quan shu zong mu, juan 52.

Qin ding xu wen xian tong kao, juan 163.

Shandong tong zhi, juan 15, part 3.

Shi cang li dai shi xuan, juan 221.

Song shi ji shi, juan 77.

Yu xuan Song Jin Yuan Ming si chao shi [missing character] *yu*, juan 72.

Zheng Gao

鄭皋

1Bc

Song Senior Commander-General.

Zhu Jian

朱建

10Ad

Song Director of Military Training.

APPENDIX C

OFFICIAL TITLES

The Translation of Chinese titles is daunting. The best Chinese-English Dictionary that I've found is *A dictionary of official titles in Imperial China* by Charles O. Hucker. The Best Chinese-Chinese dictionary that I've found is the *Zhongguo li dai zhi guan ci dian* 中國历代职官辞典 by He Xuzhi 贺旭志. However, there is definitely room for an updated Chinese-English dictionary of titles as well as an expanded Chinese-Chinese dictionary of titles. One of the main frustrations is that there is no agreement amongst translators on a single system of translation. Another frustration inherent in the Chinese titles themselves is that title names usually do not give the reader a clear idea of what function the title has. Below I provide my translation of each title which appears in the translation, the page and line number where it can be located within the *Yue ya tang* edition of the text. If the title appears in Hucker's dictionary, I also list its entry number so that the interested reader can easily reference it.

Administrative Clerk

fu gan

撫幹

2Ab, 7Ad

Hucker: *gan* #3127

Administrative Manager

can guan

參管

4Bc

Hucker: *can* #6865

Area General

jiang

將

4Ba

Hucker: #690.

Battalion Commander	<i>qian hu</i>	千戶
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8Ah, 18Bf-g, 25Ag

Hucker: *qian hu suo* #901

Besieging Preceptor	<i>wei shi</i>	圍師
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Hucker: *shi* #5202

Brigade Commander	<i>wan hu</i>	萬戶
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4Be, 15Ab, 15Ac, 23Ah, 25Ai, 25Ai-25Ba

Hucker: *wan fu* #7620

Campaign Commander	<i>du tong</i>	都統
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1Ab, 1Ac, 3Ae, 11Ba, 15Ab, 15Ad, 15Af, 17Bg, 21Ad, 24Bh

Hucker: #7321

Chief Pacification Commissioner	<i>zhao fu tai wei</i>	招撫太尉
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4Ae

Hucker: *tai wei* #6260

Chieftain	<i>qiu</i>	酋
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5Bf, 15Ad

Commandant-escort	<i>fu ma</i>	駙馬
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8Bh, 8Bh

Hucker: 駙馬都尉 *fu ma du wei* #2083

Commander	<i>shuai</i>	帥
5Ah		
Hucker: #5475		
Commander General	<i>tong ling</i>	統領
1Ag, 1Bi, 2Aa, 3Aa, 6Ad, 8Af, 15Ag		
Hucker: #7494		
Commander General of the Loyal and Righteous Army		
	<i>zhong yi jun tong ling</i>	忠義軍統領
15Ag		
Commanding Officer	<i>jiang guan</i>	將官
6Af, 6Bc, 8Bb, 8Be, 9Ae, 9Bd, 10Bf-g		
Company Commander	<i>mou ke</i>	謀克
13Bb-c, 18Bh, 20Bh, 25Ba		
Hucker: #4039		
Courier for the Pacification Commission	<i>xuan fu</i>	宣撫
5Ah.		
Hucker: <i>xuan fu si</i> 宣撫司 #2661		
Defender-in-chief	<i>tai wei</i>	太尉
4Ae		
Hucker: 6260		
Director of Military Training	<i>xun lian guan</i>	訓練官
10Ad		

Hucker: *xun lian xia* #2747

Dispatcher

bo fa guan

撥發官

6Aa, 9Ba, 9Be, 9Bh, 22Ai

Hucker: *bo fa chuan yun guan* 撥發船運官 #4724

Hucker: 撥發催綱 #4725

General

jiang jun

將軍

21Ac

Hucker: #694

General

zheng jiang

正將

15Ai

Hucker: #398

General-in-chief

da jiang [jun]

大將[軍]

26Ag

Hucker: #5897

General of Military Integrity

wu jie

武節(正六品)

18Bh

Gentleman of Loyal Instruction

zhong xun lang

忠訓郎

1Ab

Grand Scribe

tai shi

太史

27Ai

Hucker: #6212:

Head

tou mu

頭目

6Be, 8Bi, 21Bh

Hucker: #6799

Head Chieftain

qiu zhang

酋長

20Bf

Head Military Instructor

jiao tou

教頭

9Ai, 9Be, 9Bh, 10Aa

the **Honorable** []

gong

公

Used 106 times!

Hucker: #3388

the **Honorable Minister** []

xiang gong

相公

3Ab, 3Ae, 4Bf-g, 5Ac, 5Af, 7Ac

Inner Administrator (of the provincial branch)

(lu fen) nei ji

(路分)内機

2Ba, 2Bc, 4Bc

Inner Administrator

nei ji

内機

2Ba, 2Bc, 4Bc

Inspector

yu

虞

Hucker: *yu hou* 虞候 #8134

Manager

guan

管

3Ag, 4Bc, 15Ah

Managing Joint Vice General

si tong fu jiang

司同副將

1Ab

Hucker: *si* 司 #5533

Hucker: *tong* 同 #7464

Marshal

yuan shuai

元帥

15Ad, 15Af, 15Ag, 17Bf, 20Bf, 21Ad, 23Ai

Hucker: #8244

Messenger

cheng

承

4Be, 4Bf

Hucker: *cheng chai* 承差 #459

Military Commander General

jun tong ling

軍統領

15Ag

Military Training Official

xun wu xiao wei

訓武校尉

20Bh

Hucker: *xiao wei* 校尉 #2456

***Pacification Administrative Clerk**

fu gan

撫幹

2Ab, 7Ad

Pacification Commissioner

zhao fu shi

招撫使

1Ab, 1Ad, 3Ab, 3Ag, 3Ai, 4Aa, 4Ae, 4Ba

Hucker: #282

Prince

wang

王

26Ag

Principal Military Training Commissioner

zheng ren tuan lian shi 正任團練使

27Ae

Hucker: #420 and #7382

Recorder

zhu bu

主簿

7Ad

Hucker: #1413

Right Wing Vice Controller

you yi fu tong

右翼副統

20Bi

Senior Commander General

tong zhi

統制

1Ah, 1Bb, 1Bc, 1Bh, 1Bi, 1Bi, 2Ab

Hucker: #7472

Special Envoy

shi chen

使臣

12Ba

Special Envoy of the River Transport [Bureau]

pai an shi chen

排岸使臣

Hucker: *pai an si* 排岸司 #4392

Special Official

te cha

特差

1Ab

Specially Appointed Commissioner

zhuan chai

專差

4Be

Hucker: 差遣 #67

Hucker: *zhuan* #1485, #1486

Student at the Gate

men sheng

門生

1Ab

Hucker: 3950

Support Squad

yong dui

擁隊

9Ad, 9Ah

Vastly Powerful General

guang wei jiang jun 廣威將軍(正六品)

21Ac

Vice Campaign Commander

fu du tong

副都統

4Bf

Hucker: #2107.

Hucker: *fu* #2032

Vice Commander

fu shuai

副帥

1Ai, 2Ac

Hucker: #5475

Vice Commissioner

fu shi

副使

1Aa, 1Ad

Hucker: *shi* #5197

Vice Controller

fu tong

副統

4Bb, 5Ag, 20Bi

Hucker: *tong* #7465

Vice Controller of Pacification

zhao fu fu tong

招撫副統

Hucker: *zhao fu shi* 招撫使 #282

Vice General

fu jiang

副將

1Ab

Hucker: #2041

Vice Pacification Commissioner

zhao fu fu shi

招撫副使

APPENDIX D

MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND FORTIFICATION

The following is a list of military equipment and fortification terms used within the diary. I have provided descriptions of these terms within the footnotes of my translation, so they are not repeated here.

Abatis	<i>lu jiao</i>	鹿角
Anti-horse barricade	<i>ju ma zi</i>	拒馬子
Arrow	<i>jian</i>	箭
Axe	<i>fu</i>	斧
Bamboo Raft	<i>zhu pai</i>	竹簰

Boats and Ships

Ferry boat	<i>du chuan</i>	渡船
Ship	<i>chuan</i>	船
Passenger Ship	<i>ke chuan</i>	客船
War ship	<i>zhan chuan</i>	戰船
Boat	<i>zhou</i>	舟

I am not sure what the differences amongst these terms are.

Bow	<i>gong</i>	弓
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I do not know if this term is used in the diary to refer to simple, laminated, composite bows, or all three.

Caltrop Arrow	<i>ji li jian</i>	蒺藜箭
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Camp	<i>ying</i>	營
Cloud ladder	<i>yun ti</i>	雲梯
Crenel of a parapet	<i>nu kou</i>	女口
Crossbow	<i>nu</i>	弩
Draw bridge	<i>diao qiao</i>	弔橋
Earthen mountain	<i>tu shan</i>	土山

Equipment, items, weapons, apparatus, and devices

I have not found a clear distinction between these terms. For consistency, I used:

Equipment	<i>ju</i>	具
Items	<i>wu</i>	物
Devices	<i>ji</i>	機
Weapons/ Apparatus	<i>qi</i>	器
Fire arrow	<i>huo jian</i>	火箭
Fire missile	<i>huo pao</i>	火砲
Fire Ox	<i>huo niu</i>	火牛
Floating bridge	<i>fu liang</i>	浮梁
	<i>fu qiao</i>	浮橋
Frame	<i>jia</i>	架
Goose cart	<i>eche</i>	鵝車
Goose wing levy	<i>yan chi di</i>	雁翅抵
Grass ox	<i>cao niu</i>	草牛

Gunpowder	<i>huo yao</i>	火藥
Gunpowder Arrows	<i>huo yao jian</i>	火藥箭
Heavenly Bridge	<i>tian qiao</i>	天橋
Ladder	<i>ti</i>	梯
Leather Screens	<i>pi lian</i>	皮簾
Leather Tents	<i>pi wu</i>	皮屋
Missile	<i>pao</i>	砲
Clay missile	<i>ni pao</i>	泥砲,
Stones [for] the trebuchet	<i>pao shi</i>	砲石,
stone missiles	<i>shi pao</i>	石砲
Thunder clap missile	<i>pi li pao</i>	霹靂砲
	<i>pi li huo pao</i>	霹靂火砲
Ox Stables	<i>niu wu</i>	牛屋
Pickaxe	<i>jue</i>	鑿
Platform	<i>zuo</i>	座
Raft	<i>fa</i>	筏
Rampart	<i>lei</i>	壘
Resistance [watch]tower	<i>di lou</i>	敵樓
Roofed Tower	<i>lou lu</i>	樓櫓
Round Tower	<i>tuan lou</i>	團樓

Saber	<i>dao</i>	刀
Sandbag	<i>tu bu dai</i>	土布袋
Shield	<i>pai</i>	牌
Shielded passageways	<i>dong zi</i>	洞子
	Ox hide passageways	<i>niu pi dong zi</i> 牛皮洞子
		<i>pi dong</i> 皮洞
Sickle	<i>lian</i>	鎌
Spade	<i>qiao</i>	鍬
Spear	<i>qiang</i>	槍
	<i>qiang</i>	鎗

These two characters seem to be used interchangeably within the text, but perhaps one was wooden and one was metal?

Stockade	<i>zhai</i>	寨
Trebuchet	<i>pao</i>	砲
	Great trebuchet	<i>da pao</i> 大砲
	whirlwind trebuchet	<i>xuan feng pao</i> 旋風砲
	Seven component trebuchet	<i>qi shao pao</i> 七梢砲
Trident	<i>cha</i>	叉
Water wheel	<i>shui che</i>	水車
Wooden palisades	<i>mu zha</i>	木柵
Wooden Shield	<i>mu pai</i>	木牌

APPENDIX E

PLACE NAMES AND ADDITIONAL MAPS

Here is a list of place names mentioned in the diary and the corresponding Chinese characters. It is followed by several maps and drawings of the city and some 2005 photographs of the current city wall and moat.

Anlu	安鹿
Anyang Beach	安陽灘
Bai River	白河
Bai Tributary	白河口
Baitu Ridge	白土坡
Buddhist monasteries	寺院
Capital's Northwest Circuit	京西北路
Chuan	川
Cloud Peak Monastery	雲峰寺
Dabei Monastery	大悲寺
De'an	德安
Dengcheng	鄧城
Dengzhou	鄧州
Dingzhuan Monastery	定專寺
Dongshan Monastery	洞山寺
Eastern Ford	東津

the eastern road	東路
Ezhou	鄂州
Fancheng	樊城
Fei River	淝水
Fulong	伏龍
Guanghua	光化
Haizhou	海州
Haizi	海子
Han River	漢水
Heyang	河陽
Honorable Xie's Cliff	謝公巖
Huaquan Gorge	華泉谷
Jiangling	江陵
Jiangzhou	江州
Jingzhou	荊州
Jinzhou	金州
Junzhou	均州
Ku River	枯河
mountain's great dyke	山大隄
Neixiang	內鄉

North of the river	江北
Purple Cliff Monastery	紫巘寺
Qing River	清河
Qingni	青泥
Qingshui River	清水河
Qingye	清野
Red Bank	赤岸
Seventh Army's Training Field	七軍大教場
	(abbreviation of 江陵七軍大教場)
Shenma Ridge	神馬坡
Shidingzhuan Monastery	是定專寺
Shu	蜀
Shunchang	順昌
Sizhou	泗州
Suizhou	隨州
Tan Brook	檀溪河
Tangzhou	唐州
Temple of the Five Maidens	五娘子廟
Tiger-head Mountain	虎頭山
Training Field of the Seventh Army of Jiangling	江陵七軍大教場

the Wan Mountains	萬山
the wilds	埜
Xiang River	襄江
Xiang River's Western Sandbar	襄江西洲
Xiangyang Prefectural City	襄陽府城
Xiangyang Prefecture	襄陽府
Xiangyang	襄陽
Xiaofan	小樊
Xichuan	西川
Xinkai River	新開河
Xinyang	信陽
Xuanma Shoal	渲馬灘
Yangtze	長江
Yingzhou	郢州
Yuanzhang Beach	源漳灘
Yubi	玉壁
Yuliang Plains	漁梁平
Zaoyang	棗陽
Zhechuan	浙川
Ziyang Temple	紫陽觀

Maps of Xiangyang and local area:




Figure 37: Road map of Xiangfan city, 2005. (*Hubei sheng dituce*, p. 72a).




Figure 38: Map of Xiangyang, 1874. (Taken from *Xiangyang xian zhi* 1874 edition, as found in Franke's *Studien und Texte zur Kriegsgeschichte der südlichen Sungzeit*, appendix). Note that the local place names are very difficult to read!




Figure 39: My own sketch of local Xiangyang area, 1206-1207. Note that it is NOT to scale, and I guessed on the locations of many places based on clues from the diary. This drawing is only meant to help the reader visualize events and troop movements as recorded in the Diary.




Figure 40: Rough sketch of Xiangyang's fortification during 1206-1207 Siege.

Photos of Xiangyang (personally taken in 2005):



Figure 41: Small North Gate



Figure 42: Bank of Han River facing west, in front of city wall.



Figure 43: Another small north gate.



Figure 44: Un-restored section of the northeast city wall. (Probably from Qing Dynasty).



Figure 45: Bank of the Han River facing East. Bridge connecting Fancheng (left) to Xiangyang (right).



Figure 46: View of moat and old city wall. Apartment building in background.




Figure 47: Professor Bi Kezhong pictured with me in Xiangfan newspaper. (*Xiangfan Wanbao*, 7/23/2005, p. 1). © (I could have taken the bus, but bicycling was much more interesting!).

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