A structuralist view of the self, parenthood and life pathways, involving transgenerational impact of early experience.

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A STRUCTURALIST VIEW OF THE SELF, PARENTHOOD AND LIFE PATHWAYS, INVOLVING TRANSGENERATIONAL IMPACT OF EARLY EXPERIENCE

A Dissertation Presented

by

Patricia Ross

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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Psychology
A STRUCTURALIST VIEW OF THE SELF, PARENTHOOD AND LIFE PATHWAYS,
INVOLVING
TRANSGENERATIONAL IMPACT OF EARLY EXPERIENCE

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by
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DEDICATION

This research is dedicated to the adults and children who, in psychotherapy, entrusted me with their self experiences, so that I might come to better understand what life is like for them.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many persons to whom grateful acknowledgement is due for contributions to my thought across this work, and for their encouragement.

Foremost among these are Dr. Harold Raush and Dr. Alvin Winder, who in their official capacities served as research advisor of the prospectus stage of the research, and chairman of the dissertation stage, respectively; and Dr. Castellano Turner, who served as academic advisor. These official titles do not begin to account for the extraordinary, above-and-beyond-the-call-of-duty contributions each made, contributions of such diversity and ongoingness that they could not be spelled out. The extent to which Harold Raush contributed to my professional interest as a researcher and the extent to which his research thought undergirds my research directions is spelled out in the Introduction. Very much of Alvin Winder's equally remarkable contribution undergirds the two chapters concerned with my clinical work with young children, mother-child pairs and three generational families for which he served as primary clinical supervisor. Alvin Winder's remarkable capacity for patient, and creative listening—to what must often have seemed markedly far-fetched ideas, made a very great contribution toward my being able to do anything whatsoever with any of the thoughts that arose during that clinical work.

I came to recognize that this sort of provision for thought-interchange—that is, interchange solely at the level of exchange of ideas per se, of no inherent visible "usefulness"—had a marked effect on my capability to think about ideas that spontaneously arose in my head. Eventually, after he had done this across the course of his official "job" as team supervisor and learned the extent to which this activity was
capable of generating meaningful research-thoughts and conceptualizations for me, he agreed voluntarily to continue to serve this exceptional kind of teaching role by permitting me to extend these extensive clinical commitments, within which it had begun to become possible for me to acquire such rare abundance of three generational clinical and naturalistic life-observations, for research purposes, across an entire additional year of 20 hour-a-week clinical research. The adolescent motherhood pilot study was only possible because both Alvin Winder and Harold Raush were willing to make generous-spirited voluntary supervisory-time contributions.

Among the many others who contributed encouragement, support, all manner of assistance and/or thoughtful discussion of ideas, contributions of resource ideas and of case histories, and answers to questions, for all of which I am profoundly grateful, are Dr. Norman Simonson; Dr. Solis Kates; Dr. John Bowlby of Tavistock Clinic, London; Professor Nikolaas Tinbergen of Oxford; Dr. Michael Eigen of Manhattan; Dr. Marian Tolpin of Glencoe, Illinois; Dr. Ernest Wolf of Northwestern University; Dr. Arnold Goldberg of Michael Reese School of Health Sciences; Dr. Anna Ornstein and Dr. Paul Ornstein, both of the University of Cincinnati Medical School; George Rodgers Taylor, Professor Emeritus of Economic History at Amherst College, and Mary Taylor, both Amherst and Pelham historians by avocation; Dr. Howard Garland of the University of Texas; Phoebe Taylor of Northampton who provided me with a paper written for the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology in 1929 by her late husband, Dr. William Sentman Taylor of Smith College, in his role then as psychotherapist for one of the persons whose transgenerational histories I was exploring; Dr. Abigail Adams Eliot of Concord; and John May.
In the fall of 1974 I heard an ongoing series of presentations by a group of university psychologists; each, on a weekly basis, offering his views on research to newly entering doctoral students. While I listened interestedly to them all, there was one I was surprised by: a presentation entitled "Radical Rules for Research, or Some Iconoclastic Propositions," delivered by Dr. Harold Raush.

His talk contained ideas I had not encountered in the prior four years of psychology majoring: they seemed not to "fit in" at all with all of the very much that I had very painstakingly been taught and had learned of what research "is," and how one may go about it. Still, at the time they seemed simply interesting ideas; I did not find myself making some sort of a priori decision that it would be with those rules that I would ever do my own research. At the time I was not yet at a point to think about anything still as far off as what might one day constitute "my" research.

Some good while later, when I had, seemingly by accident and happenstance, come upon an area, in the course of clinical work, that seemed a potentially fruitful area to pursue research in, I came in time to realize that the "research rules" that seemed by far the most appropriate one for that particular research topic, or question were, perhaps, these rules I had come to think of as Raush's Rules for Research." In consultation, he agreed that that seemed likely, but then reminded me that the one rule I had not remembered from his presentation of this different kind of research rules was that in fact the researcher must, along the
way, figure out a fair number of the rules for herself or himself, for the rules one follows must, in this scheme of things, follow the course of the research, rather than lead it. Which is not, of course, to say that there was not very much for a student to learn of the alphabet of this "radical" research craft from another first, and along the way; hence, rewardingly, I learned this alphabet from Harold Raush, and under his guidance worked at learning how a beginner might work at applying it to the particular topic, and questions, of his or her own research. Yet even the good and fruitful rewardingness of that first research experience could not, I think, have impelled me to again set out to employ these rules had not, once again, with this research, those rules seemed to quite particularly apply to the particular question and topic for this research project.

The rules themselves deserve being set down in some written way, for, at least to me, they have made powerful difference to what research, as a remarkably pleasureable professional activity, has come to mean to me. In any case, they warrant being set down here at the least so that a reader might know what the research guidelines were that guided the designing and carrying out of this research, which did, in the end, go somewhat beyond any rules I could have, ahead of time, set for it.

Rule one, which, in the presentation, was attributed to Bridgman was that there is no one scientific method as such, but that the most vital feature of the scientist's procedure has been merely to do his utmost with his mind, no holds barred.

Rule two, attributed to Polyani, was the injunction that our job as psychologists is to "integrate mentally what living beings integrate
practically."

The third cautioned against permitting hypotheses to act as blinders, emphatically underscoring that intimacy with the realm of data should precede hypotheses, if, eventually, hypotheses should come to show themselves as somehow required, or important to the research question at hand.

In rule four standardization was discussed: what is standard for the investigator, Raush said, is not necessarily standard for the subjects, citing here instructions, questions, stimuli, etc. as examples. An important aspect of this rule had to do with the importance of considering that it may be more important to the particular research area to make some quite different aspect standard: level of motivation, rapport or trust for example. It may well be, he said, that a researcher may have to change his methods with different subjects and different populations.

In the fifth, an important insight into design— that I had not recognized before— came up for consideration: that the purpose of design is mostly to insure representativeness to what one wants to generalize to, with this understanding leading to the statement that situations, states, developmental stages or event categories can be as relevant— or at times perhaps more relevant— than subjects. It is not the case, he said, that time sampling is always the best approach.

As the sixth of Raush's Rules for Research, came the question of manipulation of variables, citing a statement of Menzel’s to the effect that one might consider manipulating only as much as is necessary to answer the questions clearly, here again, depending on the particular research in question. Some interventions elucidate, and some disrupt,
he said: in a field situation especially, it is incumbent upon the researcher to seek the interventions that elucidate and to take care to guard against those that might disrupt.

The seventh touched on the difficult question of units of analysis: somehow one must arrive at units of analysis compatible with the processes investigated. Here the guide and goal should be in the direction of attempting to "locate" some units one might describe as "natural": no one knows what a "natural" situation or unit is, he reminded us, but still, some are more "natural" than others.

Rule eight said it is acceptable research practice—indeed, it can be wise research practice—to switch hypotheses, methods, or whatever the data might suggest should be changed, in midstream.

In the ninth he underscored the importance of staying as close as one possibly can to the raw phenomena—unless there is some highly specific goal which would necessarily preclude this, making the perhaps easily overlooked point that one cannot split abstracted data, but can, always, lump data: "While you cannot look at everything, you might know better what you are looking at," if you do not make determinations ahead of time about what would be appropriate abstractions as far as what to look at is concerned.

The tenth and eleventh on quantifying, said simply that this should be done when it helps the researcher; often it will; sometimes not, and that the researcher should remain aware that statistics is a tool and that it is an error to give over the direction of the research to a statistical design: where there is a reasonably decent design, and sensible care, a sound method can always be found.
The next reminded us that it is a good plan to use subjects and protocols from the research of others, and not, as is more frequent, simply the methods and techniques of others. Re-analysis of the data of others is indeed research in itself and in its own right, he included.

There were a few others of these rules, which, while I have long since assimilated them into my research thinking, I no longer have access to in specific terms, except the last, which is, surely, another well worth giving house room to: "If your data say 'Surprise, surprise,' enjoy it and make the most of it." That happened, in this research; it was nothing if not full of surprises.

In a quite real sense, I have learned again, in this second major attempt at research, that the basic rule, in following these rules, is that "it is the researcher's job to find out what the rules are that apply in and to a given research domain." And I learned as well that following rule one means one will follow all of Raush's Rules, for they do not at all apply to "iconoclastic research": it is only the rules as rules—as thinking-about-research rules, that are regarded as iconoclastic. I learned too of this rule one above that following it and hence following all of Raush's Rules can in fact mean one will wind up with no "rules" to follow--none that is that are written down in such a way that one may "begin at the beginning" and systematically follow along, being guided by these written down rules. Only the research itself can, under Raush's Rules, supply the guidelines, and in each case, they can only be different.

It was in following this paradoxical set of rules in which the researcher must follow the guidelines of, and in, the data that I came to find myself working in a domain governed by structuralist laws, without xii
having had the slightest notion that that was what I was working in, and only able to learn that by following the research--domain, questions, subjects and workable methods--where they led.

Knowing nothing, before the beginning of the research, about structuralist laws, nor structuralist activity, nor structuralism, I did not know that I would, by following where the research led, go around in ever-widening concentric circles of inter-relatedness for which the effort would be considerably more prodigious than I had imagined I was getting myself into, and for which the work would be concurrently astonishingly exciting, while yet, often, tedious in the extreme; and for which the work would lead to results impossible to present in a circumscribed way.

I could not have guessed that in following a research project by way of Bridgman's injunction that it is the most vital feature of the scientist's procedure to do her utmost with her mind, and Polyanis to see the job as an attempt to integrate mentally what living beings integrate practically, that I would come to find myself having to call to mind a line of a poem by Dante Rosetti that says "what of the end, Pandora...?" For Pandora's Box was, in time, what this astonishingly rewarding research project came to seem.

Although I have discussed Piaget's thought about structuralist research extensively elsewhere, here it seems worth remarking, in a separate place of its own, the realization that was, for me, a long time coming--that very much of what a researcher does in the course of following Raush's Rules for Research is what one does in structuralist activity, or structuralist research. I will not belabor that point by setting xiii
forth all the point for point concordances between the points Dr. Raush raised in that fall 1974 presentation to a class of incoming doctoral students and those Piaget speaks of as essential for this research activity: a reader can, I feel sure, find those comparisons readily on his own, as he reads along.

One can note too that Piaget sees this sort of "non-atomistic" research quite emphatically as an important and viable paradigm for psychological research— not a "new" (or, I think, necessarily, "iconoclastic") paradigm, for it has been around and in use for a goodly while, but simply one that does, just naturally, present problems for researchers, problems that are exciting problems in the doing of research, but, for sure, problems that do not lend themselves with great ease and simplicity to our view of research as something to be presented in "orderly" presentations of the readily phrased succinct nature our research journals are accustomed to, or whose page allotments are set up to countenance as "research presentations," or accounts.

Here too, one can hear the echoes of Raush's other 1974 presentation, in American Psychologist, on "Research, Practice and Accountability," which I shall point a reader's attention to, rather than quote from, for its usefulness and importance seem to me to require its reading in, not out of, context. The words may be different, but underneath, they seem to be thinking along the same lines when it comes to what would constitute research and ways of thinking about research that can help us to learn more of what we are still endeavoring to learn about the psychology of human beings and human relationships and human problems and human development.
It would seem one could not justifiably leave a discussion of Raush's Rules and where they led a researcher-student to without a mention of some of the places they led Raush himself to, for these rules seem in large measure to have led him, as well as a student setting out on what might at first seem a "separate" or "distinct" topic, to many of the same places. These places, unlike much research—which leads to what we might here call "answers"—that is, "results" that can be neatly summed in columns and rows and show their significance in clear cut terms down to the tenth of a percent—Raush's Rules, if one judges by where they led him to and where they led a student on a quite "different" research topic to, seem to lead more in the direction of questions than "answers."

At first glance, that might seem an upside down place to end up at the conclusion of a major research project, but I came to think not. I think Raush has come to think not. I think what I have learned, as "answer," in this research is more important than all else, what some other questions are in among the remarkable domain of human interaction and human development and human psychology: questions I simply had no idea were questions before.

In a discussion of four papers considering the question "Intra- or Inter-action," in 1976, Raush writes of the "nightmare issues that put to question our assumptions about the research we do and about its relevance to our real lives with others." Having studied couples and families not only in formal research but in the ongoing process of clinical work with troubled marriages and families, Raush wrote of having at times felt that the more he knew the less he could say with certainty. For sure,
that was an echoing reverberation across very much of this research: as Piaget predicts will happen when one is in fact working within a domain of natural life, the research requires a researcher to see that there are still other doors, doors beyond the conceptual boundaries of the arbitrary ascriptions of his "discipline"; one does, so long as one looks at "real people" interacting in real situations in relationships, keep finding that what there are are more questions we have not yet thought to ask. One cannot feel one knows an area with "certainty" as long as he is able to look up and see that the data themselves are in fact saying "But if this seems so and that seems so, then what of this, which one must now ask."

It was to such questions that Raush addressed himself in this 1976 discussion: in discussing a presentation of research touching on issues of context, he felt impelled to say that it is one thing to indicate the power of the contextual situation, but that the more difficult question, then, is that of how we address ourselves to classifying and dimensionalizing different settings. In addition to the kinds of things one might think this statement involved, he goes beyond that: we need to think too of the context in which our concepts are formed.

"Take," wrote Raush, "the issue of task versus socio-emotional emphasis (in one of the papers he was discussing): there, in among the results lay paradoxes--paradoxes which speak to familiar and important dilemmas in studying interaction, wrote Raush.

Because some number of the questions he painstakingly pointed to in this discussion are eminently salient to this research--which surely may be said to be delving into the question of "intra- or inter-action"
(although certainly without having intended to at the outset, but only winding up there while attempting to study naturally occurring relationships in families)—it seems important to look with some closeness at some of them.

"For example," he wrote, "the more I see of couples and families, the less I find I can talk in terms of who is in control, who dominates, who has the power, what is task and what is nontask. Even in the interactions of children...there is the peculiar paradox that a so-called submissive act is more determinative of the recipient's behavior than a dominating act."

The point, he says, is that is "takes two--and sometimes three--to tango," and his concern, that "we shall never comprehend the tango by studying one partner apart from the other and apart from the context of the music, other dancers, and the physical scene."

Right in the midst of studying interaction, with married couples, the findings were clear about the fact that what was happening would have to be termed "interaction": the couple do "form a system." And yet, "even within the study of interaction we seem to be enmeshed in individualistic conceptual biases (emphasis mine)."

Interestingly, at that point, the appropriate and justified inference did seem to be as he wrote: "such biases perhaps tell us of the cultural contexts which underlie our research approaches." But what he was really doing, of course, was pointing to a question, not an answer: what shall we make of these individualistic "conceptual" biases we find in among our interaction studies: what shall we make of the fact that it was possible for Raush, et al, in 1974 to see how some couples could
escalate a simple decisional conflict to an all-encompassing battle for personal integrity, whereas other couples could transform a severe conflict into an opportunity for mutual exploration and growth? It would seem that what is being pointed up there is the need to find a way to take into account both the inter- and the intra-action as part of the same context, perhaps whatever the context, while yet taking into account the individualistic conceptual biases of our researches.

From an intra-action perspective, we are apt to fail to attend to the verbal or nonverbal mesh between parent and child or between peers or between older and younger children: "a focus on intrapersonal skills will bias us to miss the sequences by which interactions develop and change. We are led to neglect the process by which even such simple pairings as the alternative between speech and non-speech--the pause to listen to the other--occurs, or the way patterns of interaction are maintained and changed; or what determines the span, the transition points, the punctuation of interaction," were among Raush's comments.

I myself had come, in the course of this research to believe that the world of people going about the business of being human beings seem to sound as if they very nearly never focus on intrapersonal phenomena, with regard to the person they are observing: most attributions, it seemed to me, focused quite directly on the interpersonal skills of the person--I found, time and time again, people describing persons from the standpoint of their impact on others, or their ability to "get along with others," etc., with seldom if ever a consideration given to what might at the moment be going on intrapersonally for that person. Clearly, most often, when questioning which might be causing him to be doing
whatever he or she is doing in that interaction, the "conclusion" was one remarkably far from what that person, in his own "self report" was experiencing: for example, remarkably often, a person experiencing "fear" of others' response to him would be regarded, in the midst of experiencing that fear, or anxiety, etc., as "cold, aloof, haughty," etc. Certainly at least equally often "misinterpreted" was what others perceived as "hostility," or bad temper," while the person reported experiencing pain.

That was when attributions were being made of "the other person." Just as unvaryingly did I find persons, when they were thinking about themselves--whether in conversation, in diaries, journals, letters, etc.--often all but completely oblivious to all thought that there might have been any such phenomena operating for the other person at the intrapersonal level, while yet focussing with very considerable intensity on what their own intrapersonal situation was. In other words, each person was very often very highly aware that his or her own self experience, or intrapersonal phenomena, were eminently involved, whether for "good" or "bad" in the interaction they had just been involved in (or were still involved in), but aware of the other very largely from any of a wide array of perspectives, almost none of which managed to focus on what might be going on intrapersonally for that other person, for "good" or "bad."

Take one of the examples Raush cites:

When husband and wife are in conflict and when she is being reasonable--her arguments cognitively oriented--he is fairly likely to respond with coercion and attack, to which she again responds reasonably. If you look just at that phase you have a reasonable wife (who has developed cognitive skills) and an incompetent or nasty husband. But if you look at what
happens when she is nasty or coercive, you get a contrary impression. He appeals to her judgment, her sense of fairness, her motives, and she responds with attack to his appeals, whereupon he responds with appeals to her attacks (p. 69).

The point, Raush wrote, is that we cannot understand their interactions by "attributions" to a single person: the locus of interaction is between persons and it is in the process by which persons influence or fail to influence and modify or fail to modify one another; interaction is a between thing.

Discussing the next paper, Raush underscores the high probability of getting caught in traditional cause-effect modes of thinking, where interaction becomes the cause of attitudes, beliefs and values. One could as readily argue the reverse, he wrote: the data provide no answers. His point, as he makes clear, is not whether one or another of these is true, but that questions like this are not particularly useful, and that they can and do distract us from understanding properly what goes on in human relations with one another and social institutions.

The phenomena we are concerned with, he wrote, are overlapping and interrelated: We cannot speak of interaction without referring to the situation in which it occurs; we cannot speak of situations without referring to their different meanings for different participants. Moreover, we cannot speak of situations without referring to their different meaning for different participants. And more.

We need, he wrote, "to give up simple cause-effect and dependent-independent single variable deterministic notions in our research. When we deal with interaction we are dealing with structured quasi-independent systems which intermesh to form new systems--most often with continuing feedback--and within a hierarchical structure of other systems."
I have pondered interaction and intrapersonal phenomena much in this research. The data here seemed to be saying that it is not "skills" that need to be taken into account, but the vulnerability of the self structures. "Located" intrapersonally, these structures seem first to arise from the interpersonal situation and thenceforth, to be the most heavily-weighted variable in influencing the course all interaction, and interaction sequencings, would take.

All of these questions, and just such thoughts, to which Raush's research led him, this same research found repeatedly arising in the data of human lives in different spheres of life, and different times—whether the subject under focus at that moment in the research was an infant and its mother going about the business of mother and baby interaction, or at the level of high level intellectually powerful interactions between two philosophically minded writers communicating—or interacting--on paper. Always, it was possible to see interrelatedness phenomena as holding important clues.

Some of these questions seemed, in this research, to get helped along the way toward answers. But always behind each "answer" lay another question. I have not myself come anywhere near the point of having come to grips in any "final" way even with all of the questions these data have already led to, and my research experience thus far seems to say clearly that as each further question is explored, another will arise to take its place. But the exciting thing about this particular research is that structuralist activity seems, as far as I am able to judge that in my first attempt, to provide a running supply of clues to where and how to look, for further ways to think about and explore these
questions it continues to raise.

I cannot justifiably term this research other than research still in progress, but perhaps that is the best place a research project might be reported to have brought a researcher. Because of that, and because of much that is inherent in structuralist activity in general, and in the phenomena of interrelatedness in particular, it will perhaps seem a less than well-circumscribed account, but that is what interrelatedness phenomena seem to insist upon.
ABSTRACT
A Structuralist View of the Self, Parenthood and Life Pathways,
Involving
Transgenerational Impact of Early Experience
September 1979
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M.S., University of Massachusetts;
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Alvin Winder

A view is presented of an innovative structuralist means and method for exploring and conceptualizing human self experience (often referred to as narcissistic experience, but here meaning neither only negative, not only positive self experience), and for exploring and conceptualizing etiology of self experience. This transgenerational view of human development describes and discusses an underlying self-matrix posited as arising from the early experience not only of the individual adult; but equally and concomitantly a function of the early experience of the adult's parents and the early experience of the grandparents on the self experience of the then-child two generations removed.

This structuralist approach to the study of child, adult and family development, and of human problems, strongly suggests that both specific and pervasive infancy and childhood experience will, when a child grows to maturity, influence his or her parenthood, and, in influencing his or her parenthood give rise to a concurrent influencing of his or her offspring's early experience; with a repetition of this same sequential
chronology and configurational juxtaposition posited as occurring in the next generation (and subsequent ones), but implying no repetition of phenomenal occurrences per se.

In this view, each child's rudimentary self is being influenced by its parents' outlook and presence at a pervasive experience level and continues to feel unconscious reverberations of both specific and generalized early experience across adulthood, including the time of parenting the new generation: at the time of parenting the new generation, the continuing impact-echoes of the now-parents' early experience here appear to manifest impact on his or her parenting in ways which will comprise and characterize the current early experience of his or her baby, and in so doing provide the basis for that baby's future parenting pathway.

Additional aspects of the transgenerational self structure suggests an interrelatedness between the self-structure matrix, and the intertwinability of form and content propounded in linguistic theory and Piaget's disadaptation concepts while also suggesting integrated conceptual understanding for the formulations of Jacques Lacan with regard to the universe of shared significations, and for the concept of the mirror role of the mother, in child and family development, as suggested variously by Heinz Kohut, Donald Winnicott and Jacques Lacan.

The research found appearance of convincing pre-eminent integratability with Heinz Kohut's psychology of the self, and with Jean Piaget's cognitive process phenomena, as well as appearing to manifest the structuralist laws of self-regulating and transformational natural order posited by Piaget and Claude Lévi-Strauss.
Elucidating this structuralist view is accomplished through multiple means, endeavoring to provide broad sampling of some of the forms and transformations of self-experience at the individual adult level, the parent-child intergenerational level, and the transgenerational familial matrix level, all of which forms and transformations the research suggests as phenomena of human developmental vicissitudes.

The data for the research was three generational and mother-child clinical case material and a wide amalgamation of biographies, autobiographies and ethological observation.

The primary intent of this research is not the presenting of a set of data nor results achieved through this means and method: such accomplishment could not yet be forthcoming at this stage of exploration of boundaries, constituents, and ways of using and understanding this transgenerational structuralist means and method.

Rather, the intent is to provide a presentation of this additional means and method for exploring human developmental vicissitudes and to discuss its apparent theoretical integratability with research and formulations from other areas, as well as some of the wide array of spheres, levels and aspects of human psychology and human development it appears potentially capable of bringing additional perspective to.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</td>
<td></td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td></td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td></td>
<td>xxiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>WHOSE CHILD IS THIS NO MOTHER KNOWS:</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THE ADOLESCENT MOTHER AND HER CHILD:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THE RESEARCH PROJECT'S PILOT STUDY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SELF</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Selected Bibliography for the Psychology</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of the Self</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>WHOSE CHILD IS THIS NO MOTHER KNOWS:</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THE GRAPES OF WRATH REVISITED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>WHEN WRATH TURNS NOT TO GLORY BUT TO VENGEANCE:</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAGES FROM A NATURAL HISTORY NOTEBOOK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>ON SUBJECTS AND METHOD</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.</td>
<td>A LONG RANGE VIEW OF SOME OF THE PHENOMENA</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OF TRANSGENERATIONAL PATTERNEDNESS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII.</td>
<td>AN INTRODUCTION TO STRUCTURALIST THOUGHT,</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ACTIVITY AND RESEARCH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX.</td>
<td>A BRIEF HISTORICAL EXAMPLE OF A TRANSGENERATIONAL</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TRACING OF THE IMPACT OF EARLY EXPERIENCE ON ADULT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DEVELOPMENT, FUTURE PARENTHOOD, AND SUBSEQUENT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GENERATIONS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X.</td>
<td>MISUNDERSTOOD ELIZABETH ANN AND BILLY-WHO-COULD-NOT</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>YET-SPEAK-FOR-HIMSELF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI.</td>
<td>NOW WE SEE AS THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY WHAT ONCE WE</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SAW FACE TO FACE: REFLECTIONS ON ACTING LIKE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A BABY AT AGE 26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This research account is one which follows from an intensive exploration across scores of lives generationally overlapping along the sands-of-time-line. It is both an account of the self and the self-experience of many members of the same family line, and of the self and self-experience of many persons not at all related to one another. It is an account of research which traced each of scores of entire lifespans from birth to death, and which included, in every case, concurrent explorations of the lives of the parents, the grandparents, the offspring and the siblings of persons. It is an account of research which brought forth, in among the explorations of many scores of generationally-overlapping lives, the discovery of a new means of conceptualizing, and of exploring, human development, human relationships, and human problems.

This additional means of conceptualizing and exploring aspects of human psychology is both means and method—both conceptual framework and complex research method. Although both in one sense represented the guidelines for the research activity, they also, paradoxically, were discovered in the course of the research activity. That there could be such a phenomenon was one of the surprising findings of this research.

It has been necessary to introduce much across the account of this work that does not give ready appearance of falling easily into cognitive place for a reader: a reader can only, I believe, come to
the end of an account such as this with a sense of heartily wishing the presentation of the research could have more satisfyingly followed along, along a less frustrating plethora of pathways.

The unavoidability of that seems the cost a researcher must put up with in opting to attempt to explore domains of interrelatedness rather than the less tangled and less overlapping, circumscribable domains capable of bowing to the demands of linear language. But the lack of linearity is in itself not the entire dilemma-generator for the researcher working in domains of interrelatedness such as these: clearly, added to that surely troublesome enough obstacle on the path to readily assimilated presentation must go the inordinate welter of data abundance themselves, among which these phenomena are so widely scattered and so otherwise non-visible except as seen in the context of their background's overabundance of life-data-bits.

Before a reader sets out attempting to work his or her way through that collection of selected aspects of some of the array of feature and phenomenon applicable to this research, it has been suggested to me that it would perhaps be both helpful and important for me to attempt to include some sort of guideposts—of what I see as some of the most important summarizing points of what this research might be seen as contributing, at the outset.

Such a statement must first, I believe, begin with what it is most clearly not contributing. I set out initially to attempt to follow only five or six families in a longitudinal transgenerational way,
intending to trace several overlapping lives in each of these unrelated families from birth to death, endeavoring to take careful note of what occurred at each step of the way for each family member, and endeavoring to trace whether there was any level of impact discernable on adult development as a function of early experience.

Included in what I imagined an exploration of the adult part of each lifespan might possibly yield up was whether there is any visible impact on the parenting practices, or the parenthood in general, of an adult, which could somehow be traceable to that parent’s early experience. And then, I had imagined continuing to trace that process into and across still another generation. And another and another. I had no set idea of what I might find—or if I would "find" anything. No one seemed to know whether one could hope to locate such later life, or subsequent-generation, impact, even if there should be such. Many, in fact, felt convinced that there could be no direct impact in the first place, on adult development, or on parenthood; and, particularly, not on subsequent generations, as a result of early experience. Some minor or fleeting impact perhaps, in some few instances, but even there, the thought that any such impact might be observable, or even accrue at all, into the next and the next generations, met with little credence and less belief that such a research effort could learn anything of any usefulness.

By the end of my efforts at exploring these first half dozen or so lives I had to agree: it had not been possible to learn anything, nor to discover any traceable impact. I shall not go into the matter of my coming to wonder if it might be simply that a half dozen longitudinally traced familial histories, despite these having included many lives in
each familial history, might simply be too few for any impact to become visible through, and my deciding eventually to broaden the data base to see if that made any difference, except to say that what I was in time to learn was that one could eventually find ways to trace the impact of early experience—impact visible at the level of adult development, at the level of parenthood, and subsequent generations—if one were to study a minimum of fifty longitudinal familial histories in this way, to reach the beginning stage of discovery, and then another 50 to continue the work, and some number more for checking each hypothesis that a large data base was able to bring forth.

What turned out to be the case, as I learned from the research effort, is that there is a means and method by which and through which this task can be accomplished. It is that fact which represents the contribution this research effort was able to make.

It is true that in order to learn how one might accomplish that, it was necessary to actively work with these data of hundreds of lives in a transgenerational framework, and in the process, both possible and necessary, for some interesting and surprising phenomena to come to light, and other interesting and surprising phenomena to appear to come to light; phenomena which required much effort even to begin to grasp the significance of, beyond the time of their simply coming to light.

Only in the actively working with the data in the multiplicity of ways I have attempted to describe and detail and give examples for here, was it possible to discern that there is a means and method by which it can be possible for a researcher to perceive some of the important phenomena of human development, human families, human relationships,
human interaction and human problems in an additional light, that of the intergenerational and transgenerational impact of early experience.

Hence, of necessity a researcher coming to be able to discern evidences of these impacts would at the same time have access to what it was that she was doing that had made these manifestations of impact come forward in visible ways. The research's primary result was the learning how to make these impacts visible, and to come to intellectual grips with them as something other than isolated curiosities. This involved first figuring out how they fit together themselves, and later how and where they seemed to fit together with what is known and/or thought by others, and to follow up hypotheses that led to other fields.

But what may be misleading to a reader is the fact that in attempting to describe a means and method for making visible that which has here-tofore been largely outside our awareness, and with that attempt's having required the researcher to include repeated mention of the kinds of phenomena it was possible to locate, trace and discern in among vast aggregates of life phenomenal data bits, it cannot help appearing, at first reading, as if the researcher is endeavoring not to describe a means and method she has been able to discover for making visible, and tracing, impact of early experience through an array of spheres: rather, it can only appear that she is attempting instead to present a set of results of such tracing and explorations, even though, in actuality, it could only be very much too soon for that.

This research's activity was, in essence, akin to the discovery of an alphabet in among a vast collection of what had appeared to be a random mass of squiggly lines. One can only discover an alphabet through coming
to recognize letter configurations regularly appearing in word-like formations and some number of word sequences forming themselves into phrases, etc., all of these, those phrases etc., formed with that alphabet.

One can only present that alphabet by showing examples of some of the sets of squiggly lines that had always before seemed just random assortments, and thereby showing some of the ways that alphabets' letters, words, and word sequences fit together, to make certain kinds of sense.

But deciphering the basic constituents of an alphabet, and some number of its lawfulnesses by which and through which it can be visible as an alphabet and showing some of the uses one can put this alphabet to is a very, very long way from being able to write a novel, a poem or a scientifically creditable report employing that alphabet.

That, I must underscore decisively, is not an intent of this research account. It is not an intent of this research account because it would not, and could not, be possible for one researcher working on her own even for the two years devoted to this research effort, responsibly to report specific transgenerational pattern data from use of this alphabet-like structuralist activity's means and methods at this stage.

The research effort was all but entirely devoted to the attempt to find if there were, or might be, such a means and method, and then, subsequently, to defining the characteristics of this means and method which had only after prodigious effort been possible to bring to light as a way that impact of early experience can be explored, and hence a way that early experience and later experience can be viewed in additional lights. It was possible to detect a great many pattern sequences: it is nonetheless too early in the research to report these until further study can
elucidate their further significance.

Concurrent with, and following on, the discovery of this means and method for enabling early experience to yield up evidence of impact on adult development, parenthood and subsequent generations, a second, equally prodigious effort was required to attempt to discover some measure of conceptual understanding for these many surprising and difficult-to-grasp, and difficult-to-understand, phenomena which the structuralist approach was bringing up into the research net.

These six aspects—a) the discovery of what a means and method for accomplishing tasks involving tracing impact of early experience across one and more lives looks like; that is, what form it takes; b) the coming to be able to define many of the parameters and characteristics of this additional way of exploring human developmental vicissitudes, including their antecedents and precursor phenomena, for persons in human situations and human relationships; c) the coming to be able to define some of the array of kinds of phenomena this approach has shown itself capable of helping to elucidate; d) the coming to be able to define some of the array of disparate-seeming spheres and levels of phenomena this approach has shown itself as encompassing; e) coming to be able to locate the interrelatedness between these varied spheres and levels; and f) beginning to come to grips with some of the conceptualizations and formulations which appear to be intrinsic to this structuralist means and method—those six are the crux of this research.

Worthwhile as it would surely seem to be—and as this research most certainly seems to suggest it can only be—to come eventually to know the much more advanced level—the what of what this means and method can
provide reportable data for—such an accomplishment could not have been a concomitant of this initial research for which so large a proportion of research effort was required to find, and learn some measure of how to use, and to understand the significance of, this means and method holding potential for such further research effort.

Toward the end of elucidating this means and method, I have endeavored to provide a wide and representative sampling from among the remarkable number of spheres and aspects of life this structuralist way of approaching the data of lives and families has shown itself capable of yielding additional perspectives for.

For most of these I have endeavored to make it clear that what I was reporting was not intended as "reporting of specifics of pattern results," but only providing aids to knowing what this method is capable of and what phenomena it seems capable of shedding light on, and how it seems to show goodness of fit in an integrative way.

In other places, where the apparentness of seeming order or pattern had come forth in among the data of interrelatedness with such remarkable order and regularity, for these varied subjects whose explored lives provided the phenomenal wherewithal, I intentionally tried to be as emphatic about that as I could, because that seemed of great importance for interested persons to know, but here too not yet reporting data.

I have tried to be emphatically clear about those areas where the regularity of what came forth did so in orderly, patterned ways, time after time after time, retest after retest—solely so that people might know that, as one of this method's surely important defining characteristics. But, again, this expression of conviction on the researcher's part
about what she has seen across the research might at first glance strike a reader as seeming after all to be "reporting results," in the traditional sense. That seems unavoidable. Nevertheless, I myself think that reporting that this high degree of orderedness was capable of becoming visible must be said in a research account on this particular topic, simply because to my view it is an important thing to report was the case.

What I am here endeavoring to do is to elucidate a vastly complex structuralist means and method which I believe holds remarkable potential for future research, clinically and developmentally, and interdisciplinarily, but to make clear that it is a means and method which requires a very considerable commitment in order to work with it: for this reason, it seemed essential to me to attempt to spell out as clearly and as fully as possible, as many as possible of those areas as I can that I have found this approach to be capable of yielding different kinds, different levels, and different spheres of data for. It seemed critically essential to attempt to spell out in as full detail as possible just what sorts of questions and domains the research showed this approach capable of yielding up information about and what sorts of topics this method seems to apply to and seems to be able to perhaps add very specific kinds of phenomenal understanding for.

One can only do this in a useful way, it seems to me, if one reports with as much specificity as possible, precisely what had thus far seemed possible of being eventually elucidated at one or another level of the approaches I had thusfar been able to detect within this structuralist view, while yet avoiding possibly misleading premature results.

As example, despite the fact that I cannot expect a reader to accept
the findings of this research where it has not yet been possible to present a report of data supporting the phenomena that emerged in the research activity—I think a very large proportion of the potential usefulness of this means and method lies in providing an awareness of the existence of conceptual possibilities and integrative possibilities—of some of the disparate-seeming phenomena a researcher working in a defining and discovering way found recurring. That a researcher was able eventually to become convinced of an array of findings which she initially found it possible only to roundly doubt, I think warrants her calling attention to these phenomena and aspects, and admitting that she has become convinced of them as structural phenomena.

I did decide to forego the temptation to present excerpts from these voluminous data extracts in any sort of systematic way. Doing so would, I believe bring more ready scientific acceptance of the existence of these structural phenomena related to developmental vicissitudes; yet, perhaps at a cost of scientific responsibility. Some stunning findings came forth in exploring generationally-overlapping lives through this structuralist method: many of these could not help but receive credibility in view of their marked redundancy. The fact that they could only be presented in a pars par toto way presented a dilemma. Like the old story of the five blind men describing the elephant, the research graphically suggested that it would be misleading to present systematic data reports for discrete, or circumscribed segments of transgenerational research at this stage.
When one's research is exploring critical aspects of human relationships and human development it seems surely essential to be more certain that it could yet be possible to be to report that "I found thus and so to be the case"—for example that "parenting practice x" is followed by "impact y, or z" in a child's life, in say 25 cases out of 26, or 48 our of 50.

Despite the fact that "findings" have come forth in this fashion, what I believe I have learned from the larger aggregate of the research is that there is nonetheless a possibility that these emphatically visible and dramatic "results"—which have thus far appeared to yield such remarkable regularity that they give a compelling sense of appearing as "truths"—may nonetheless be only "half truths." What I have repeatedly learned across the continued surprises this research has brought forth echoes an old epigram—one I think attributed to Aristotle—to the effect that one should beware of half truths, for one may have "the wrong half." One of the ways this aphorism has impressed itself upon me through this research has been the capacity this means and method appears to hold for casting quite different perspective on some of the things that have guided psychological beliefs or hypotheses in the past, when seen in the life of transgenerationally explored lives.

In addition to this important-seeming reason for not presenting data or results prematurely, transgenerational research also involves a greater need for concern for the privacy of subject individuals and families seen in psychotherapy: to a considerable extent, the more traditional means for insuring patients' privacy is largely mutually exclusive with regard to lives studied in the context of three and more
generational overlap: in this atypical structuralist situation these distinguishing characteristics are inherently tied to the data and results, so that systematic presentations seem not appropriate here.

In addition, it is important to permit a reader to know in advance that a research exploration of lives studied in a transgenerational context turns out to be one in which linearity cannot and does not prevail, and in which it is not possible to circumscribe a segment of the research or reporting and yet provide conceptual visibility for the structuralist phenomena of interrelatedness.

What this turns out to mean is that the linear language in which we express (and read) our thoughts is hard put to provide means for easeful following along—for the writer as much as for the reader. Non-linear coherence, so I learned, has a great tendency to sound like muddle.

This was, for a long time across the research activity itself, a perplexing phenomenon to understand. At the time of endeavoring to frame the research activity into a written account, the dilemma generated by these non-linear phenomena became a more significant one. The non-linear phenomena involved in the research follow paths akin to overlapping series of concentric circles—like ripples formed in a pool by the dropping of a pebble, rather than things one can discuss "in an orderly" straight line way. Then, in studying overlapping lives, a new pebble is dropped; and a new set of ripples set in motion, each time a new life enters the familial matrix at its place along the sands-of-time-line.

Because of the interrelatedness aspects the research account will try to make understandable, the life-ripples emanating from a life-pebble dropped at one generational point along this sands-of-time-line
touch against the already rippling circles still emanating from the pebble drops at the previous generational place along the same families' sands-of-time-line. All of this brought about two paradoxical results: one, a possibility to be able to discern specific and generalized impacts of early experience on later life and on subsequent generations; but two, because of the very considerable amalgam of disparate-seeming spheres, levels, and aspects the research data threaded their way through to provide this first possibility, a real dilemma ensues in attempting to present some modicum of clarity to a reader. In the end it became clear that one could, here, only present an account which may well have appearance for a reader of a collection of perplexingly unsatisfying woolen threads perhaps difficult to see as capable of all knitting together: the parts which could permit a reader to see how they all knit together are, in structuralist interrelatedness research, scattered throughout the entirety of non-linear longitudinal life-data. The researcher in structuralist activity is left with no alternative but to present a collection of knitted threads, and to try to make visible some sense of their connectedness through an array of non-traditional means.

It will, I think, be helpful to a reader before beginning this account to know that this research has a highly specific connectedness with the formulations presented by Heinz Kohut in his newly presented psychoanalytic psychological outlook, the Psychology of the Self. Although the research did not set out with that as a goal nor a hypothesis, the research means and method reported here came, across the research itself, to provide what appears as highly convincing research data in clear empirical support for the validity of the tenets of this new
psychoanalytic theory of human development and narcissism.

In addition, transgenerational familial research appears to have educed a supplement to the psychology of the self, along with bringing forth an array of new, or different, perspectives on a variety of psychological and developmental phenomena not yet specifically included in the psychology of the self: these too, however, appear to manifest clear integratability, and goodness of fit with the Kohutian theory.

In less comprehensive ways, transgenerational research also appeared to provide visibility of the applicability of the pediatrically-oriented formulations of Donald Winnicott, with regard to the mirror role of the mother in child-and-family-development, and with regard to the maturational processes and the facilitating environment; and, more surprisingly, to provide visibility of the interrelatedness of a number of the formulations of Jacques Lacan, with the transgenerational familial self-structure matrix reported here, and hence, with the Kohut and Winnicott formulations. It has not yet been possible to include a comprehensive explication of all these areas and aspects of interrelatedness.

Transgenerational familial research appears also to provide possibility for visibility of the interrelatedness with the structuralist cognitive process formulations of Jean Piaget: these too have not yet been possible to set forth in the kind of comprehensive detail the research provided conceptual access to, but represent, as do the more complete Winnicottian and Lacanian expositions, part of a larger work in progress.

This research account is intended primarily to describe and discuss
a new means and method and perspective for exploring, for conceptualizing, and for responding to, human problems, human developmental vicissitudes and parent-child relationships. This means, method and conceptual framework is here termed the transgenerational familial matrix, and is described as appearing, at the level of abstract theory, to be guided by what has been earlier put forth by Jean Piaget, Claude Levi-Strauss and others as naturally ordered structuralist phenomena, phenomena characterized by an underlying dualistic self-regulating transformational activity.

Such structuralist activity had heretofore been viewed by Piaget as undergirding the human cognitive process phenomena, and believed by Piaget and others to inhere to all naturally occurring structures when and where discovered and to encompass a pervasive biologic and psychological constellation of interrelatedness phenomena, but such structuralist activity has not heretofore been conceptualized, located nor hypothesized as discoverable with regard to child and family development at the transgenerational level, nor at the self structure matrix level.

This research followed two paths which came to be importantly associated with Heinz Kohut's newly presented paradigm for psychoanalysis: where Kohut had, in his psychoanalytic researches, reconstructively traced individual adult lifespans in their own separate right, looking back to the now-adult's infancy and childhood and redundantly discovering faulty parental empathy as the baseline common denominator, this research concentrated on studying "chains" of generationally overlapping lifespans, across three, four, five and more generations, along a transgenerational
sands-of-time-line, concurrently studying in each instance the entire lifespans of, for example, each of four grandparents, and all of the grandparents' children; then following the entire lifespans of each of those grown children across their adult times of marriage and, then, in each case, concurrently including a study of the life and transgenerational history of each marriage partner of the now-grown children of the grandparents. The set of grown children additionally provided in each case, a sibling-array of lifespans following from the same set of parents.

At the time of the birth of each of the offspring of the by-then grown children, additional concurrent tracings were begun of those lives associated as new additions to the familial matrix, with those again, in each instance, comprising arrays of siblings, related as sisters and brothers to one another, while also comprising an array of children of one set of parents, and concurrently comprising an array of grandchildren, with different sets of of parents and the different permutations of sets of partially common grandparents.

While in some cases it was possible to include more intensive studies of many of these subject lives than in other cases, and at times possible to include considerably more longitudinally extensive studies of many of these lives (e.g., some familial histories were explored across eight and more generations), in over 100 cases, at least two generations of generationally overlapping lives were studied which included some measure of transgenerational history for both sets of parents and the parents' infancies, and following of life pathway of as many siblings as possible at each generational level. Most often a minimum of three generations was traced in this way; often more than three
generations.

In this way it was possible to trace, and to compare and contrast, later life pathways, following from early experience which was a function of the same parents as persons, and yet somewhat differing early experience configurations per se, for each individual child. This method made it possible then to trace, into the next generation, in what specific ways these early experience phenomena could be seen to be differently and/or similarly affected, with regard to unfolding life pathways, to relational phenomena, to marriage patterns, parenthood patterns, affective phenomena and temperament, to behavioral manifestations, to levels of work accomplishment, to life attitudes and attributions, to physical health patterns, energy level patterns, etc. This then could permit subsequently tracing the life pathways of each of the offspring of all of these well-traced and well compared lives from the perspective of impact of early experience on subsequent generations.

Within such a longitudinal multi-person, multi-sibling, multi-generational study it was possible to discern patterns across lives and across generations by comparing many such transgenerational familial studies with many other such transgenerational studies, with these very often involving persons and families from different countries, different timespans and different educational, economic, and cultural contexts.

Through this means and method, it was possible for specific permutations of later life impact, arising from specific permutations of early experience, to become visible per se, and to become visible as affecting marriage and parenthood pathways in specific ways, and subsequently
possible to become visible as affecting the lifespans of subsequent generations in specific ways, always then possible to retrace one's research steps in the other direction along the sands-of-time-line and discern patterns of phenomenological, developmental impact on a child or adult traceable to the early experience of the grandparent, or great-grandparent generation.

What became discoverable through this means and method was the existence of a phenomenon here termed the transgenerational familial self matrix, and its relationship to the self and to narcissism.

When viewed at the one lifespan level which takes into account only the early experience as it involved that person's parents' empathic responsiveness, it was possible repeatedly—across scores of lives and families—to trace vividly visible manifestations of every aspect of the systematic and comprehensive formulations Heinz Kohut had believed he was reconstructively perceiving as the tracing of impact of early experience and of faulty empathy, and the effects of these on later life pathways, in his psychoanalytic psychology of the self.

The Kohutian formulations regarding parental empathy failures and their impact on the self-experience of adults, and on the unfolding pathways of adult lives, were redundantly corroborated and substantiated across every life studied across this research.

In addition, the additional etiologic phenomena which a longitudinal multi-sibling, multi-generational exploration of many contrasted lives, and their children's, and children's children's lives, was able to make visible, could be seen as showing perfect goodness of fit with the basic principles of the psychology of the self from the standpoint of making
it possible additionally to discern the "next step beyond" Kohut's formulations: where Heinz Kohut was able to posit faulty parental empathy as the etiologic factor for self disturbance, transgenerational familial research was able to add to that an exploration of the etiology of the faulty empathy of the parents.

In view of the fact that it was possible to discover that the etiology of the parents' faulty empathy followed an identical (but different permutation) pathway across the prior generation, i.e., to discover that the parents' faulty empathic provision to their child had in fact arisen from faulty (or absent) empathic provision by the grandparents in the parents' infancy and/or childhood; and then eventually possible to discover that the etiology of the grandparents' faulty empathy was once again traceable to the grandparents' having been, in their infancies and childhoods, provided with less than optimal empathic responsiveness—in all cases where profound disturbance of self experience was manifesting in the lives of the grandparents' grandchildren—it becomes possible to say that faulty parental empathy is a function of faulty capacity for empathy, and that faulty capacity for empathy is in itself an impact of early experience.

Thus, it becomes further possible to say that transgenerational research further corroborates the quintessence of Kohut's basic one-lifespan formulations even within that formulatory aspect which extends beyond the basic Kohutian theory as it applies to the individual lifespan.

Additionally, in all of the considerable number of cases where it was possible to locate a "beginning point" of these repeated inter-generational transmissions of faulty empathy, the etiologic factors were
capable of becoming visible as, apparently, events of a kind which in
themselves continue to show goodness of fit with Kohut's formulations.

As prefatory guidelines to the account, I have, in chapters II and
XII utilized considerable portions of three generational clinical case
history material from my own clinical work. Despite the fact that the
fragment of one of these case histories covers most of two lengthy
chapters, it represents here only the smallest fraction of this multi-
generational case study which, in its comprehensivity, comprised an impor-
tant part of both the pilot study on adolescent motherhood reported on
in chapter II, and of the subsequent overall transgenerational familial
matrix study.

In chapters II and XII I have used this clinical case material to
provide an understanding of some of the kinds of three generational
mother-child interactional patterns which include an array of difficul-
ties which may culminate in adolescent parenthood, and of profound paren-
ting difficulties which arise for the adolescent parent: from the child's
perspective these parenting difficulties become profound developmental
vicissitudes.

Additionally I have attempted to provide, through this case material,
an example of some of the aspects of the integratability which this
research demonstrates with regard to key aspects of Heinz Kohut's psycho-
logy of the self.

In chapter IV I have used a naturalistic observation study of a 97
year old mother and her 81 year old offspring to provide a longitudinal
perspective to these same reciprocal developmental vicissitudes which
here too involve the adolescent motherhood phenomenon, the Kohutian
selfobject phenomenon, and the impact of early experience on adult development, on parenthood and on subsequent generations.

As with chapters II, XI, and XII, an additional aim of this chapter IV is to provide examples of reciprocal developmental obstacles engendered by deficits in responsiveness to a child's maturational-process nurturant requirements.

In chapter XI, I have utilized a lengthy published clinical case study involving the psychoanalytic therapy of a 26 year old woman in residential treatment in order to provide a second comparative example presented as analogous to the developmental disturbances visible for the young child in the adolescent mother case study. Here in chapter XI, I have presented a different perspective on the distressed communications of a profoundly disturbed young woman, and on the interpretive efforts of the therapist encountering difficult-to-translate messages from a hospitalized patient.

In this chapter also, the intent is multidirectional, aiming to elucidate some of the ways parent-infant interactional vicissitudes appear to give rise in later life to reverberations of early infant experience, and aiming to provide a fine-tuned example of the ways in which these reverberations from early experience appear to be directly traceable to communication anomalies—communication anomalies I believe to have arisen from asynchronous parenting efforts. Additionally, an example is provided here of some of the ways in which the patient's "central message" can be seen as trying to evoke responsiveness from the therapist to her central self-structure deficit, later showing the patient's dramatic response to a responsiveness to that central self-
message once it has managed to evoke the desired responsiveness from the therapist.

In this chapter this last facet is additionally intended to serve as an example of one of the aspects of superimposable template, involving what the research suggests as the kind of intertwinability of form and content posited by Jean Piaget in somewhat different spheres of conceptualization. Variants of this superimposable template, and this phenomenon of intertwinability of form and content also appear in the chapter mentioned which contain the young mother-child case study examples and the chapter containing the naturalistic observation study of the 97 year old woman and her daughter, and, in less systematic ways, across other chapters.

Across these same four chapters presenting three lifespan stages of the effects of developmental vicissitudes on personal maturation and on reciprocal interaction, there are provided examples of some transformations of disturbed early experience which, the research suggests, affects the self-structures' unfolding developmental pathway. Specifically, these include the transformation from painful self-experience to rage; and to fragmented and isolated bizarre distortions of eroticized fantasy content. As with a preponderance of the account, both of these provide additional examples of the ways in which this structuralist transgenerational self-matrix view appears corroborative of the formulations of the Kohutian psychology of the self, as well as further examples of some of the transformations involved in the self's continuing efforts to struggle within the therapeutic situation toward directing the therapist's attentions to its essential deficits and therapeutic needs.
A reader is encouraged to view these four chapters (II, XII, XI, and IV: the chapters discussing Meredith, John and their mother, the chapter discussing Meredith and John in therapy, the chapter discussing Mother Emma and Daughter Emma, and the chapter discussing Miss F. and her psychoanalytic psychotherapist) as four interrelated parts of a larger whole, in which key concepts of the psychology of the self may perhaps be able to be seen in clearer focus, and in which intergenerational, and transgenerational, impact of early experience may be seen in a multiplicity of forms, aspects and echoing reverberations.

In chapter V, I have presented a second naturalistic observation study, as an ethological example of a self-experience transformation, from a situation experienced as a failure of empathic responsiveness to the needs of a young woman, to her subsequent experience of rage, and the subsequent transformation of self-experience from rage to vengeance.

In chapter III an introduction to the developmental aspects of Heinz Kohut's psychology of the self is presented, along with my own interpolations of some infancy and childhood phenomena, and conceptualizations derived in part from Heinz Kohut's work, and in part from other sources such as the work of Donald Winnicott, as well as from my own clinical experience and research. These interpolations are intended simply to provide "concrete" examples as answer to some of the questions people have earlier asked me to try to clarify in discussing Kohut's formulations in abstract terms. I have here (and elsewhere) omitted attempting to include any of Kohut's therapeutic formulations, and have instead attempted only to cull the essential outlines of the purely developmental aspects of his psychological outlook, in simplified form.
Obviously, in attempting to cull out and set forth this kind of simplified precis of key aspects of an exceptionally complex constellation of theoretical formulations of another, I cannot present this chapter to readers saying "this is an exact precis" of the developmental aspects of Heinz Kohut's psychology of the self, but can only say that I have presented what careful efforts at understanding it have led to, as my own understanding of his formulations, in simplified form. One point worth noting here is that, as with any complex comprehensive theory, Dr. Kohut himself has felt it important to maintain a flexibility of awareness to minor changes further research would give rise to a need for: hence, across the time he has been evolving the more complete theory's constellation of concepts and formulations, from time to time one or another minor revision appeared called for in light of later thought alone and with others. Thus, his own later publications may be seen to reflect some few distinctions (largely at the level of terminology clarifications and revisions) from his earlier, less complete, explications of aspects of the psychology of the self. It is possible that in the time of preparing this account, one or another additional fine-point terminology-adjustments may have arisen, but I believe it is fair to say that nonetheless this chapter may nevertheless serve to provide a reader with a substantial working-introduction to what the psychology of the self puts forth, (except at the therapeutic level which I have intentionally omitted).

In chapter X, in the presentation of Misunderstood Elizabeth Ann and Billy who could not yet speak for himself, I have presented two examples from published sources in order to provide two close-up views
of parent-child developmental interaction. Here the intent is to present examples of some of the variants discerned across the research which represent some of the aspects of the term "early experience," discussed throughout the research as traceable to later life impact on adult development, parenthood and subsequent generations.

One of these, extracted from a clinical case study presented by an interdisciplinary therapeutic team effort directed toward saving the life of a five month old infant at high risk for failure to thrive, presents a microscopic view of an adolescent mother, this time with her young husband, and their profound difficulties at providing minimally adequate nurturant facilitation to their child. The original published account, far longer than the excerpts I have extracted, devoted itself primarily to the clinical therapeutic efforts involving rescuing the infant failing to thrive, and involving therapeutic treatment of the parents to enable them to surmount their profound parenting difficulties. I have again intentionally omitted these aspects, and extracted from the background material in this account those aspects which can present simply the example of this kind of close-up view of what John Bowlby had referred to as the "crucial bit in the middle"—the "what actually goes on between mother and child" that we need to have more clear awareness of if we are to come to better understand developmental vicissitudes and later life problems across unfolding life pathways. The other provides another side of the coin: an example of parenting efforts which are failing to understand the child's developmental requirements while yet devoting very considerable effort in that direction. This example, as is explained in the chapter, is from a long-ago "children's story,"
written in 1913.

In chapter IX—the "brief historical example"—as contrast to the bird's eye view example of close-up details of early experience in a one generational context of a few months in the life of one baby and a few months in the life of one young girl and her caretakers, I have attempted to provide an oversimplified example of some of the kinds of ways it was possible to employ the structuralist means and method presented here within the transgenerational context for which biographic studies made up the great bulk of the subjects and data source.

In chapter VIII—in the chapter on a long range view of some of the phenomena of transgenerational patternedness—I have tried to provide additional examples of the sorts of phenomena the research brought forth as appearing to comprise impact of early experience on later development. In that chapter I have attempted to point to some of the structuralist aspects which came to be visible as inherent to these transgenerational familial research explorations. In the next chapter, I have attempted to provide a more thoroughgoing elucidation of the theoretical abstractions involving the conceptualizations and formulations Jean Piaget, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Roland Barthes and others have posited for naturally occurring structural phenomena.

Chapter XIII presents a third natural history account, in this instance of the life experience of a large-city taxi driver orphaned in childhood, who felt a desire to share his life history with strangers in a way that would make clear his early experience and the impact of that early experience on his unfolding life pathway.

I have included in an appendix an extensive series of extracts from
two recent comprehensive surveys of current day mother-infant, and father-infant, interaction research, which bring together findings from an array of varied disciplines and sources. These are presented as further examples of corroboration of the interrelatedness among the Kohutian psychology of the self, the Piagetian structuralist equilibration formulations, and the transgenerational familial self-matrix which this research, seems strongly to suggest.

Through these capsulized sophisticated contemporary research findings, a reader not in a position readily to have access to these important literature sources, may, I believe, acquire a fuller appreciation for a conceptual element important to the whole question of transgenerational self-structure impact—the interplay of the two levels of phenomenal experience—the highly specific and the generalized—which this research hypothesizes are intimately involved in characterizing parental responsiveness (whether synchronously or asynchronously) to the child's maturational requirements.

This additional opportunity for further appreciating the reciprocal interplay between these specific and general levels of events and experiences is, I believe, helpful, and essential, in coming better to understand the many levels and spheres across which synchronous and/or asynchronous parental responsiveness characteristics may become part and parcel of the structuralization of the baby's self maturation.

This research suggests that it is by way of the pervasive interrelatedness among a wide array of levels and spheres of experience—across which a parent's interaction has impact on the developing infant and child (e.g., visually, tactiley, aurally, affectively, cognitively,
physiologically, etc.)—that the pervasively interrelated impact on many levels and spheres of later life become possible, and understandable, including the impact on the child's unfolding life pathway itself, the "grown child's" parenting functions, and the parenting functions' impact on subsequent generations.

Included in among the account's chapters, I have additionally included small exemplary references to a very small handful of some of the persons who, along with a dozen or more members of his or her family in each case, made up that major portion of subjects for whom data was retrievable from prior biographic research and published autobiographies, letters, etc.

To cite these examples by name—e.g., Julia Ward Howe, John Steinbeck, Dorothy Canfield Fisher, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, D.H. Lawrence, Lewis Carroll, Mickey Rooney, Henrik Ibsen and W.B. Yeats—is, I believe, more apt to be misleading than helpful, for it too readily leaves an impression that a) "analyses" of these lives may be anticipated in the presentation and that b) these persons were studied in their own right—that is, as if one data source had been, say, "a study of the life of Henrik Ibsen" rather than what was the case: that the data source which included Henrik Ibsen was one which involved equally important data retrieved from exploring the life and unfolding life pathway of Knud Ibsen, and the unfolding life pathways of the step-siblings of Knud, who had the same mother but different father, along with as much as was possible to locate of the lives of Knud's parents, and their forebears; and the life of the Marichen who became Knud's wife—and the lives of her parents, to the extent possible; along with a study of the lives and unfolding life
pathways of all of the children of Knud and Marichen, including Henrik; then later coming to include a study of the life of Susannah who became Henrik's wife, and of Susannah's parents, and Susannah's sister, and Susannah's stepmother; and the life and unfolding life pathway of Tancred, son of Henrik and Susannah.

It is, I believe, probably more helpful to a reader to have this kind of example in mind as a prefatory guide in setting out to attempt to "fit" the reading of the research account to its sources, rather than a list either of those "known names" who happened to have been cited as fragmentary examples across the account; or even the very much larger list of "known names" whose familial histories rather than their individually distinctive lives comprised perhaps 75% of the research's source material.

While it is true that this compendium of lives, along with the transgenerationally-studied lives of several families and individuals who were my clients in longterm psychotherapy, and the transgenerationally traced lives which a small number of generous-spirited colleagues and friends volunteered the time and effort for to contribute oral histories for this research purpose, along with the supplementary natural history recordings of fragments of unfolding life pathways, came eventually to make possible the discovery of the means and method for structuralist research and conceptualization of the transgenerational familial self-matrix, it is the aim and intent of this research presentation to present as representative an account as possible of the details distinguishing, exemplifying, and elucidating this means and method, along with its potential uses, implications and complexities: it is not an aim or intent of this
account to (additionally) attempt presentation of the data of any of these transgenerational familial matrices, nor of discoverable patternings across any of the lives whose histories provided the research wherewithal to make visible the transgenerational familial self-matrix reported here: such a reporting could only be premature.
CHAPTER II

WHOSE CHILD IS THIS NO MOTHER KNOWS:
THE ADOLESCENT MOTHER AND HER CHILD
THE RESEARCH PROJECT'S PILOT STUDY

This major research project reported here included, in its pre-rudimentary-major project stage, a pilot study.

The idea for the pilot study arose in the course of a clinical practicum, in which the needs of the client-family-members dictated, to supervisor and student-therapist-trainee alike, need for a radical innovation in the format of the psychotherapeutic intervention, one which led to the student-therapist's not only working in the client's home with the family as a family group (the nuclear family consisted of a single parent mother and two young children) but, additionally, and concurrently, long term individual intensive psychotherapy, with the mother, on another day-per-week; as well as individual intensive play therapy, in a clinic playroom, on still other days of the week, for each of the two young children. Because of the needs specifically dictated by the client's needs, the family therapy session required the therapist's being in the home for a "session" period covering approximately a 2 to 3 hour time frame, despite the fact that no more than hour or an hour and a quarter comprised what we normally think of as a "family therapy" session.

This family could not coalesce, and remain in a coalesced state, for more than a few moments at a time, until very far into the therapy. Had a therapist walked in and insisted the family members do what they were not capable of doing, there would have been no therapy. The
therapist had to learn this; it took time. It eventually became clear that each member of the family was always out of synchrony with the others. Nor had they had sense of continuity—of time, space, thought organization, ideation, etc. They had no capacity, initially, for bringing synchrony to bear on a therapy session. In time, the therapist realized that it was she who could provide the continuity-base upon which they might come to have a sense of continuity, by making herself adapt to their requirements for therapy rather than the other way around. One has only to attempt to do this—to proceed in therapy on the basis of the client's needs rather than the therapist's in this (and many others) situation which required the therapist to try to maintain a therapeutic easeful stance while attempting to adjust her self and her frame of reference to what the client's need dictated with regard to time and continuity to get a remarkable sense of how difficult it must be for the client to have to try to adjust her, or his, self or themselves, to what the therapist's needs, or rules, etc., dictate with regard to time and continuity.

We have taken this for granted, because we know we (and many) can, in a taken for granted way, adjust to the time and timing requirements dictated by the therapist. I think differently now about what it is like for the client to attempt to adjust to a therapist's dictates regarding time, because I saw that I, far more in control than they, had trouble with this and had to struggle to learn it.

What this came to mean in this particular situation was that it was required of me, dictated by the client's needs and abilities, to be able to adjust to their lack of continuity, their asynchronicity,
their deficits in time and timing capacities. It was necessary for me to learn to sit still, patiently, at the dining table we used for all family therapy sessions, and represent a phenomenon of continuity, one that could simply continue, and not fragment, or disorganize, or become agitated, angry, hostile or demanding, nor become a dictator, or admonisher, nor abandon them, when others were not immediately capable of responding to my needs, and desires, housed inside a frame of reference I was capable of having awareness of which they were not.

I learned simply to be there, patiently, responding to their fragmentary and fragmented requests for responsiveness. I sat at the table, as if that were a natural order of things, which they might learn to be able to take for granted in the easeful way I could take continuity for granted. In very short order, through this means, each of the three members of the family began to try hard to work in a "family therapy way": they liked the idea that someone was available to help them somehow come to terms with their extreme chaos; they felt it was of great importance to them. They eagerly awaited my coming. But none of that meant that they could all for that reason adjust to my continuity-based time frame. No therapy began until I changed my frame of reference and attempted to learn to simply be, as a phenomenon of continuity, as a sort of master-clock by which others unconsciously could attempt to synchronize their watches by, simply because it, unlike their watches which never kept time for more than two minutes at a time, continued reliably to tick off the minutes and hours, weeks and months.

In other words, they did turn to me for fragments of family therapy
--in increasingly remarkably creative and vital and critical ways, as long as I could sit, still and patient, simply being the clock that worked, doing what working clocks do, just measuring off the minutes to make visible a representation of synchrony and continuity when one happened to or had occasion to turn to it to check on how time was passing.

When I had, earlier, attempted to "be" a family therapist by my notions of what a family therapist should be, and do, and be like, it was just natural, so I thought, for me to look at my watch rather than simply be the representation of the fact that there is a phenomenon of continuity of time and synchrony which we can think of the watch or clock as being representative of. I looked at my watch to tell me when to arrive, and to tell me when to leave. Within my continuity markers, they were to appear for family therapy and I was to dispense it.

It had taken some adjustment of perspective for me to come to terms with the fact that I, the easefully mobile one of us, should do the travelling to where they, the non-mobile for whom attempts to cross the continuity of space in a synchronous way was not possible, were. It had earlier seemed the one reasonable perspective for it to be the other way around. The paradox was not within my awareness.

As long as I was not able to transcend that paradox, attempts at "therapy" had been a shambles of absurdity: not even the young mother herself was able to succeed at the task of getting herself from her home three or four miles away, according to my watch-timing of her, more than once across twelve weeks. She tried far harder than non-involved observers were "willing to believe". So much did she want to come for
therapy that she endured the most remarkable struggles in a Herculean effort to try to fit herself into these things like continuity of space which enable us to start out from one place and get to another—and which enable us to organize ourselves in order to be able to do that—and things like continuity of time which enable us to endure the phenomenon of sometimes not mastering the time requirements set by the outside environment, as when we might, for unavoidable reasons, arrive 55 minutes late for a scheduled commitment.

For this young mother, arriving 55 minutes "late" for a scheduling commitment could indeed be viewed as arriving 55 minutes late. Each time she did that, it was viewed in those terms. On the times when she instead arrived one hour and forty five minutes late; she was then viewed as "too late"; her "failure" to "be responsible" in meeting her appointments seemed to require that the therapist overlook what she had done in managing to arrive.

Always it was necessary to spend great amounts of effort in helping her to feel that the end of the world had not come because she had, once again, failed in trying to surmount these somehow insurmountable obstacles in her path for traversing space in a continuity frame of reference and travelling through time from a continuity frame of reference.

At first I thought that her great distress in not being able to "arrive on time", or on other days, not be able to arrive at all, despite her great efforts, were because she imagined she would have met with my displeasure or anger, irritation, etc. When it became, in time, possible to see that not even learning that I could accept that and
view her efforts from a standpoint of her efforts rather than from a standpoint of "failures," kept her from experiencing some great awfulness, it became possible to learn that it was good to learn that she could "count on me," for indeed that was important to her, but what brought the far greater distress was the fact that she could not count on herself; that no amount of effort, wishing, wanting and good intent permitted her to manage these things that I could so readily take for granted that it was near impossible to appreciate the fact that some could not. I was a long time coming to learn that an enormous amount of her great distress in life, distress that had now been at the overt level for at least fifteen years, since age 13, hinged upon the fact that she could not take for granted any of the great range and array of "ordinary business of living" things that most persons can so take for granted that they are unaware that they are there to be taken for granted.

That aspect of things my supervisor and I were eventually able to learn, and to see the strange paradox which had enabled us to view it as "reasonable" that she, who could not take getting to where I was in order for therapy to be "dispensed," should be the person of whom it was taken for granted would be the person who would come to where I was, and that I, who could with the greatest of ease take for granted the travelling to where she was in ten minutes which required no hours of prior organizing myself for the struggle, should be the person who would not do the travelling. That aspect of things I was able to come to terms with not too great difficulty.

This matter of time continuity, that was something else again.
That was a great deal harder, for some reason, to learn to revise my perspective about. But I learned it eventually, and in the learning, after some good struggle with the paradox again, learned a very great deal about therapy, and about family therapy, and the family received a very great deal of family therapy, although very little of it in the aggregate mounted up to an aggregate of time spent in a group "conducting family therapy". We did engage in the sitting around the table in a group, in "our family therapy sessions", eventually, and they were tremendously rewarding experiences for each member of the family. But in order for them to be able to occur, it was necessary for me not to demand that the family members be able to do that in anything like the kind of phenomena which have to do with our taken for granted notions involving time continuity.

What finally helped me to see the role I played in this regard was that I finally realized that it was not until I was there serving as a focus of synchrony that any of the family members could begin their efforts to coalesce and their efforts to adjust themselves and to "get themselves together" as individuals so that they could bring themselves together as a group. That took sometimes an hour, sometimes an hour and a half, in rare situations—when the disorganization of their individual selves had been under greater stress than usual, it occasionally took two hours. Sometimes it was not able to happen at all, and at the end of three hours I would see that they had been "receiving family therapy" while I was sitting waiting for it to be able to "begin."

This is not an account of that family's therapy, nor their case
history, but simply an introduction to what some of the features were that made this a radical therapy configuration and a radical contextual and temporal configuration, which would have been otherwise anomalous to a reader. Without that introduction it would not have been possible either to understand how it was that I could have had opportunity, in the course of serving as a family's therapist, for naturalistic observation for an aggregate of seven to fifteen hours a week with one small three-person family, nor for the other work.

In this context a great many questions presented themselves, questions for which neither the supervisor nor the therapist could hope to know the answers a priori. Indeed it was not always easy even to recognize, or to become aware of, the questions we needed to be asking or exploring.

By the time the year of clinical practicum had ended, we had together become aware of some of those questions as questions. By dint of spending a great many hours beyond the ordinary routine supervisory working together on trying to understand some of the anomalies this family was able to teach us of, it had been possible, after a year, for some hypotheses to emerge.

Because of the needs of the young children, and the adult mother client, and because we believed this situation to represent an optimal clinical research situation through which a pair of researchers could endeavor to make a comprehensive clinical research exploration of a roundly un-understood series of phenomena, we agreed to continue to provide these same constellation-components of family and individual therapy for a second year, this time not within a clinical practicum
team format, but within a tutorial practicum cum research independent study, in which the therapist would continue therapeutically treating the family members, and in which the pair of clinical action-researchers would meet to pursue their research explorations on a twice-weekly basis, concurrent with a concentrated consultation-interchange regarding the proceeding of the therapy for each member individually and the family group as a whole (which by then had come to include the persons it did in its natural state include: the two grandparents who, while not having official residence in the home, nonetheless spent a great deal of each day and/or week there).

From the standpoint of the therapeutic gain it was possible to provide for three human beings in this way to whom psychotherapy was both essential and otherwise impossible, the gains they were able to make, and the enrichment to their existence that was possible to become a possibility, pointed up the reasonableness of deciding the therapeutic parameters on the basis of the client's needs rather than other factors.

The research design we decided upon was one in which I would become the therapist with a second young family, one in which the only necessary feature would be that the mother had been an adolescent at the time of the birth of her first child. Such cases do not often present themselves, and the possibility of that had been a question but soon thereafter the local public school screening coordinator made a similar referral, for a four year old child due to enter kindergarten the following year, who was having some degree of distress.

By the kind of concentrated attention it was possible to bring to bear on the work with these parent-child pairs in itself and because
of the continuity of concentration over a two year period, it was possible to learn a great deal about a phenomenon that would have continued to escape our notice. I worked clinically with both young families, in the same way; individually with the mother; individually with the child, and with the family group, including the grandparents. It was within this concurrent intensive therapy work with two young mother child pairs in which the mother had been in each case sixteen when the child was born that we came in time to begin to become aware of evidence of clear suggestion of what appeared to represent some manner of transgenerational structuring phenomenon which clearly involved a psychological configuration having to do both with motherhood and with the fact of the mother, in one of the generations, having been an adolescent.

It was this awareness, evanescent as it was, which generated my decision to design this much larger, more ambitious project. We had had no idea of what might be giving rise to the kind of patternedness we had come to believe we were witnessing fleeting evidence of in that earlier clinical research study. We did assume that it somehow pertained to adolescence, and to adolescent motherhood, and to a three generational patterning. Later, in the course of literature searches, I located evidence of what appeared to be a replication of this adolescent mother phenomenon which showed a five generational repetition of much of what we had observed and or hypothesized in these three generational studies. Intriguing as the growing evidence I was able later to gather about adolescent motherhood as an apparent psychological phenomenon per se, and as a phenomenon part of a transgenerational pattern configuration, the pilot study had
generated far more in the way of questions than answers: one of these, clearly, was whether this possibility for three generational pattern-evidence across generations was idiosyncratic to adolescent motherhood, or whether it was some phenomenon akin to the story of the five blind men describing an elephant: where there might be some larger significance to the matter of transgenerational pattern-phenomena—with which motherhood was perhaps but a variant. The later research study, of which this adolescent motherhood study had been a pilot study, retrospectively bore out that possibility. At the same time, the larger research study, which did not focus on adolescent mothers in any way, in fact brought forth a very considerable abundance of additional data on adolescent motherhood, simply in the course of exploring many scores of lives within a longitudinal transgenerational framework.

What the later study came to make clear was that there is a very great deal, which is of very real significance, in the whole question of adolescent motherhood: one cannot know whether this would be so in all cases in which a mother had been an adolescent at the time of a child's birth but, the later research yielded up evidence that in many cases, highly specific patterns seem to be involved, both for the adolescent mother, and for the unfolding pathways of the child born to her. The later research also made clear that this adolescent motherhood phenomenon is but one aspect of a far larger phenomenon involving very much more than just adolescent motherhood: these other aspects will be taken up in the course of the account, as so too will examples of adolescents being mothers.
What is important to say here is that is was through the kind of concentrated attention, and continuity of concentration, with several generationally overlapping members of a family along with naturalistic observation of the mother child interactions for three generational levels, that it was initially possible for any hint of this psychological configuration to show itself within any other research or clinical format. I believe that this phenomenon would have continued to seem something quite different. Very much of the efforts of the two year pilot study provided a bottomless wellspring upon which to draw in the attempts to filter, sort and sift the complex data involved in the second, larger research endeavor endeavoring to explore intergenerational and transgenerational phenomena. Often across the course of this larger account, reference will be made to one or another of the experiences of these clinical research encounters, because so very much of what was learned in the course of the clinical study came to have such surprising relevance across the later research; so much so that an entire later chapter will be devoted to case history material from two small segments of the therapy aspects of the clinical work with children of an adolescent mother. Here it makes sense to provide some sense of what there was to observe in the naturalistic situation.

For that purpose I will begin this account with a paraphrased example of one day's observation--paraphrased, because I observed it repeated so many scores of times that is is near-verbatim for many occasions.

Across from me at the dining table in the small, simple, but neat
apartment living room sits a young woman, her wide-eyed expression and her shy, gentle voice create an impression more like that of a young girl of 12 than a woman of 25. She is speaking poignantly, in a gentle manner, of her great concern for her two small children: Meredith, her 8 year old daughter, and Johnnie, the boy almost five. Genuine concern in her soft voice, she is speaking of the thought and effort she has given to the ways she had treated these children for the first years of their lives, when, as she says, she was really messed up; meaning, as she sees it, until she entered psychotherapy over a year ago. With seriousness of intent, she is speaking of the many ways in which she has come to realize how distressing much of her past behaviors must have been to her children, for whom she is at this moment expressing real pity. A tear comes into her eye and trickles down her cheek as she speaks of the sorrow she feels, mixed with painful guilt, that Meredith is so severely disturbed a child, and that Johnnie is so confused by life, so mute and violent by turns.

"Do you think there is any hope for Meredith?" she asks, wide-eyed timid and tender-voiced. "I really get scared lately that Meredith is really going to grow up, well, crazy. Lately, she seems like maybe she is going to have a nervous breakdown: I'm not sure if that's what you call it. Poor baby, I feel so sorry for her. I'd give anything to think she might be gonna be able to get all right. Do you think it will be possible to cure her?"

Anyone listening to this touching young woman's tone would be hard put not to feel moved by the poignant sense of concern and the tenderness her voice seems to express: she sounds like perhaps the quintessence of gentleness and caring. Suddenly, the front door burst
open signalling that the schoolbus has just deposited Meredith and Johnnie at the front door of the apartment. Within seconds, Meredith has run into where her mother is sitting. Johnnie is not far behind her. Tense, yet bright-eyed and eager, the lithe and pretty eight-year-old girl bursts into the living room shouting "Mommy, mommy, guess what, guess what!"

As the small, slim child eagerly and effusively spills out a not atypical burst of childlike words for her mother's soothing and accepting response, the young woman's voice, interrupted in mid-sentence as she had been recounting her gentle concern for the non-present child, shifted with chilling abruptness to a tone of sneering, contemptuous coldness and rage: "How many times have I told you not to interrupt me when you see I'm talking! And what's that junk you got spilled all over your new outfit! I told you you'd ruin it if you wore it to school, but you never listen! You get upstairs and change into your play clothes this minute and don't let me hear none of your smart mouth. You heard me! What are you standing there for? Get upstairs and don't come down until you've cleaned up that mess you left all over your floor with that damn game I told you to put away last night. You'd better move, I haven't got any patience at all today for you to start giving me a headache all over again. Do you hear me?"

The words themselves carried in their content as much as their tone a viciousness and venom hardly possible to believe could have come from the same waif-like wide-eyed face of a few moments before. Meredith's mother had an idealized conception of herself as capable of responding empathically to her children: often her image of herself
—and her often expressed goal—was of the soft, caring, gentle-voiced mother. Yet, unvaryingly, the child's real live presence, intruding her ordinary little-girl needs for her mother's attention even in the midst of her mother's articulating her concern for the child's need to be empathically responded to, instantaneously evoked from the mother instead—scornful and hostile reactions.

Within the split second it took for the child's face to register the stunned shock as if of a literal blow to the face, the eager child's expression contorted from the reaching out, assertive child to the grim-visaged, momentarily silent person—suddenly looking older than her eight years as her brow knits in a deep frown and her eyes narrow to barely open.

Then, a little girl again, though more restrained, she begins in a sort of standing still prance, to explain that "some kid spilled soda on me". Before the sentence is out of her mouth her mother is snarlingly reminding her that she doesn't want to hear any of her excuses and that she has been told to go to her room. The child tries again: "But Mommy, you see..." "I said I don't want to hear you!" "But Mommy." "Don't push me too far, Meredith", says her mother, the mother's eyes narrowed to grim slits.

This interchange continues for two or three more rounds, with the child trying harder to get in her explanation, and the mother getting more and more furious at the child for "disobeying me". Eventually—always—the mother snarlingly announces that for talking to her mother "like that", she is going to have to stay in the house for three days, not allowed to go out and play in the summer afternoon with her play-
mates. Snarlingly told to go upstairs, the child makes a tiny detour, just far enough to the right to be able to kick her little brother an extremely fierce kick in the leg. The five year old who had been silently watching the earlier scene, and who is stronger than his 8 year old sister, instantly attacks her savagely, both screaming loudly. "He's hurting me. I'm gonna kill you for that Johnnie!"

Enraged, the mother demands that they stop, shouting loud threats, as to what things she will do to them if they do not, threats which escalate as the children seem not to hear her.

The girl looks up and quietly says to her mother, "You started it." The mother's face contorts for a second, her shoulders stiffen reflexively, her mouth begins to form a fiery retort. And then, she relaxes her shoulders and her expression and looks across the table at the therapist. A thoughtful look on her face and nodding her head gently, she says quietly, "She's right". The therapist looks up at Meredith, who is watching the scene intently, holding her breath, and the mother lets the direction of her face silently be directed by the therapist's gaze.

In a gentle, subdued voice, the mother says to the still-stunned child, "You're right, Meredith. I lost my temper. I'm sorry that I lost my temper." "Can I go out to play, mom? Please? The kids are waiting for me." "Yes" says Meredith's mother, softly letting her arm encircle the small not-quite-five-year-old Johnnie who had come over to her and stood beside her as she spoke. "What is it, Johnnie? Did you have something you wanted to show Mommy?" she says in a voice such as many mothers greet a small child with.

A year earlier, the scene would not have ended that way. For the
first several months during which this young mother, her 8 year old
daughter, and her 4 year old son were each in individual psychotherapy
with me on a concurrent basis, with the mother's therapy sessions
conducted in the family's small apartment because the mother was too
depressed and so completely lacking in vitality that she could not
find her way to the clinic, nor get up out of her chair most days,
the stunned shock on Meredith's face would have been from a literal
blow. The eager child's expression then would have contorted from the
reaching-out child to the frenetic, strident, shrill-shrieking face
of a vicious attacker, a string of lurid pornographic obscenities in-
congruous for even a much older adolescent pouring forth from the
girl's mouth.

In the caricature of a choreographed nightmare in which the mother's
violent lunges up from her chair kept time with the vicious threats
announcing her assaultive intent as soon as she "got her hands" on small
Meredith for "daring" to let her mother hear her say those kinds of
things (to which Meredith would have spat back that her mother says them
all the time) Meredith would have ducked and bobbed, at first taunting-
ly, and suddenly clearly showing in her face how frightened she was
around chairs, under the table. And then, in the nick of time, into
the momentary safety of the nearby open bathroom, slamming the door and
locking it behind her within a hair's breadth of her now steely-eyed
mother's last frenzied grab for her hair.

The voices would have escalated second by second, in vivid counter-
point to the searing barbs of the intendedly demolishing statements of
utter loathing hurled back and forth at each other.
"You better open up that door this second, Meredith," her mother would have said on such a day a year ago, in ice cold voice to the by-then silent and unseen child behind the door. "This time you have pushed me too far. I told you you kids were gonna make them have to put me away in the nut house. I am god damn sick of your crap and I ain't puttin' up with it no more, do you hear me? Just open the door before I break it down!" From the other side of the tight closed door would have come only silence.

By the time still another year had gone by beyond this day the changes would have become far more dramatic. The shades in the apartment would no longer be kept drawn all day long shutting out the sun and daylight. The vicious assaults on either of the children would be no more, as would the threats to have the children sent away to an institution where someone could figure out how to make them behave. The meal times would no longer be scenes of chaos and hostility and rage in which the mother sat endlessly locked in a bitter battle to force the children to put in their mouths and to swallow the food they would continue as endlessly to refuse.

The fits of "madness" that had for so long and so regularly over-taken the small girl as she would erupt into shrieking two-syllable tirades of white noise would have been a forgotten part of the past, as would have the child's terrified phobias that food not prepared by her mother was probably poisoned, or that robbers would climb in her window if she dared to sleep.

The little boy's relentlessly recurring bouts of walled off silence in which he seemed not to hear and from which nothing and no one had
been able to get through to him would have come to be a thing of the past, and his language, once so strangely articulated as to be all but incomprehensible would have transformed itself into the cheerfully assertive, completely intelligible speech of others his age.

Gone too would be the mother's pathological consumption of alcohol, her use of drugs, her shoplifting, her prostitution, her haunting bars to pick up men whom Meredith and Johnnie would find the next morning asleep in their mother's bed. Meredith's overwhelming and disintegrating dread of leaving the house with me would no longer be a factor in her life, and she would have come to often have an ability to distinguish between fact and falsehood or fantasy. Or to say afterward that maybe that "falsehood" had been "another one of those times I get mixed". A far cry from the days when she would report with tense conviction the most bizarre experiences she had observed of others in her neighborhood.

Johnnie would have left off setting fires in one part of the apartment complex or another, and forgotten his old habit of silently smashing one item of his mother's or Meredith's belongings after another. By the time these two years had passed, it would have come to be possible for their mother to dare to venture into a store with Meredith and Johnnie in tow, no longer having to fear that they would, while her back was turned, systematically wreak havoc and destruction to the store's merchandise.

Many changes were to come about for each of the members of this once overwhelmingly chaotic family in the course of their two and a half years of therapy. Many others would be still unresolved. It
would still be a question whether the children in this family would be able to grow to adulthood safe from the devastating fragmentation that had for 25 years so dramatically colored their mother's life, and theirs.

Most of all, it would still be a question whether the children in this family would themselves be able to become parents who would not disintegrate into the kind of brutally abusing and destructive father or mother their own parents had been. And still in the present, many urgent problems would still have to be faced on a daily basis as Meredith and Johnnie continued to struggle to experience the world as a reliable and predictable place to be small children in.

So chaotic and for a long time untranslatable were the many reciprocal nightmare-like experiences of this young family that it had not at first seemed, when I first began the unusual experience of being therapist to each of them, that there could be a pattern to the fragmented and bizarre behaviors that colored their days and weeks and months. That there might be a pattern traceable in all of this frenzied madness that was transferable even outside this family to another, unrelated, very differently situated, young woman's family had seemed eminently impossible. Only after long exposure to the subjective experiences of this first young family's members—including the grandmother and grandfather of the young children—the young woman's parents—had finally taught me to be able to comprehend the clear pattern underlying their chaos, did I undertake to experience another such family in like format, for purposes of clinical research, choosing as the one constant variable the one that my formulations had brought me to believe might be the key factor in all of this.
That factor was the fact of the mother's having been an adolescent at the time of the first child's birth. I had come to wonder whether perhaps for some reason I could not know, people who became mothers at 15 or 16 lacked some pre-requisite capacity for mothering responsiveness. Something was incapable of letting this mother provide that. It was not from wanting to.

I had not known, when I first undertook the therapy of the first young mother referred to me for her chronic depression, that I would one day find myself in the exceptional therapy situation that was to evolve. Since Meredith had been in kindergarten, attempts had been made to manage these children and to bring about improvement in their behavior through "special needs" therapists in the local elementary school as mandated to provide for "problem children". When the school learned that these children were simply not capable of permitting any therapy, they were subsequently changed to a kind of special-needs-academic tutor for the girl, and an enrichment tutor for the autistic-like four year old, along with enrolling him in a program for the most severely disturbed preschool children run by the school system.

After many abortive attempts to engage the mother in various school parent-assistance programs, like parent-effectiveness-training groups, had failed, from the mother's giving up after one session, the mother was unsuccessfully referred to several psychologists and psychiatrists in the community, all of whom refused to take her in treatment seeing her as unhelpable, untreatable, as needing hospitalization, etc.

Eventually she was referred to me, in a clinic setting
where clinical research is, at times, an important component of the program.

For a complex list of reasons not salient for this account, the highly unusual therapy constellation had evolved, on the basis of careful assessment. As noted earlier, the only kind of situation this young mother could manage and the only kind that seemed to stand any chance at all of being even of minimal help, was one in which I undertook individual psychotherapy with the young mother in a role carefully regarded and spoken of as her therapist, not, then, the "family therapist"; individual psychotherapy with each of the children; and, on a concurrent basis, I assumed the role of "the family therapist" in a weekly three hour session at their home.

In time, again for reasons having to do with the complex nature of the multi-level, multi-person disorders in this family, some of these family sessions came to include the grandparents--the parents of the young mother. As often as not prior to that time, the grandparents showed up at the home at the time of the family sessions in any case.

Eventually it came to be possible bit by bit to piece together each of the children's individualized experiences of their mother. Although these were spoken in a self-language that had to be learned, it was hard to learn, and both researchers struggled months to try to come to be able to translate one "sentence". Once, after 1½ years, in a particularly unscrutable set of phenomena, when I was finally able to understand the child's self language, her bizarre shrieking white noise stopped, all her panic and frenzy abated like a summer breeze that had abruptly followed a tornado, and wide-eyed and surprised and
suddenly looking and sounding like a little girl instead of a "wild monster" gone beserk, she said softly, "Whew! I was afraid you'd never get it!" So had I been.

It had been possible too, in time, to piece together the mother's experience of each of the children, along with the young mother's re-enacted experiences of her mother and father, here too this was possible through the utilization of empathy and introspection on the therapist's part. It was in these contexts that it had become possible to discern what seemed a potentially significant psychological configuration relevant to adolescent psychology. The actual pattern configuration first presented itself in a surprising form, coming forth as a spontaneous reflective abstraction after 1½ years of empathic exposure to these chaotic situations, in the form of a "poetic" structure, "Whose Child is This No Mother Knows" (which appears on p. 539).

The experience with a second such family—one from a vastly different social class, educational and occupational and cultural background, coupled with a lengthy period since completing the two years of clinical study of garnering a sizable compendium of anecdotal data from a variety of other sources, has brought me to believe that the formulations which arose from the initial work with the first family might well represent a consistent and traceable psychological configuration and a particular developmental line. At the time I believed this configuration might pertain to an aspect of adolescent psychology and psychopathology per se, not realizing the further implications.
Beyond that, this pattern and this developmental line had seemed possibly to represent a formulation with not inconsiderable meaningfulness for some seriously important social problems, including child abuse and childhood disorders of behavior.

From the standpoint of human development per se line, however, the pilot had suggested there might be singular importance in the fact this patterned configuration seemed to make a very strong case for: the view that there might be some ineluctable concomitant to adolescent motherhood per se which perhaps might inescapably mitigate in the direction of less than optimal maturational process for her child.

The one most powerful and far-reaching phenomenon which had seemed an ineluctable hypothesis emanating from this psychological configuration lay in the fact that the young adolescent who becomes a mother is apparently both impelled to become a parent, while yet at the same time, and following on the same genesis, wholly incapable of even the most minimally adequate parenting, in at least some number of cases. The possibility must, this research suggests, be explored, that it may be that this is universally so of motherhood which begins below a certain chronological age. While only a perhaps remote hypothesis, there is much in the available literature to suggest the need to learn hard facts about such a possibility, and not yet research which might refute this.

I continued this clinical project across other published data sources, and I came to feel convinced from a sociological, demographic frame of reference, that there appears some generalizability of data
surrounding these phenomena pointing to the concept of adolescent motherhood as a highly specific psychological configuration.

Research and theorizing have in the past led to a plethora of unsystematic, facile explanations for this escalating social problem. The dimensions of the phenomenon clearly mark it as one deserving of psychology's consideration, and the field's attempts at understanding the escalating human tragedy which does ensue for at least some percentage of human life parented by mothers not yet fully mature physiologically and psychologically.

In the first hand clinical observations of disorganized families which I followed across a considerable period, in each case, the mother had been an "adolescent mother" at the time of the first child's birth. I found, in searching the literature that the age of a mother at the birth of her child is almost never a factor noted in case histories, nor in research: not even where the mother of a 20 year old, say, might be described as "looking younger than the patient", in hear 100% of cases no clue exists in decades worth of clinical and research literature on whether a mother (and/or father) may have been 14, 15, 16, etc. (cf. the case of Miss F., in this account). One can only assume that it has been assumed that the age a mother was when a (now-adult) person is experiencing life difficulty could not "matter". This research suggests that assumption may perhaps be in error.

More than one million adolescent girls get pregnant every year, according to the Planned Parenthood Federation of America. Of these, about sixty percent go on to have the baby. About 600,000 of these
babies are born every year—21 percent of all births in the country—and their mothers range in age from 12 to 19. (The mothers comprehensively studied in this research presented here were both 15 when they got pregnant.)

Some 94 percent of those who, after getting pregnant during adolescence, opt to have the baby, and do not give up their babies for adoption at the time of the baby’s birth: they choose instead to keep the baby and to give over their adolescence, even at twelve, thirteen and fourteen years old, to become, at least by their definition of the word, a mother.

This decision to become a mother while for all intents and purposes little more than a child (if not, in some cases, literally still a child, depending upon where one chooses to determine that childhood has ended,) most often, if not always, comes after lengthy counselling during which the abundance of grim facts and experience-based positive predictions about all that this decision will mean for her life are often carefully pointed out.

I learned that this choice of adolescent motherhood is made after the young girl has had opportunity to be informed, or reminded, that choosing this course will in all probability mean—based on scores of thousands of similar cases—that the adolescent mother will find herself totally dependent on her family or on welfare, that she will find herself going without any sort of solid education, that her chances of ever finding a meaningful job will fall to near zero.

The adolescent mother-to-be makes this choice after having heard carefully (and often caringly) underscored that the situation of a
teenager trying to make it in a competitive, mobile society while shouldering the responsibility of a child is one of the most difficult in our society today. Almost invariably, she has heard from many sides that she will later find herself pining for the freedom to go and to do things of her choosing with her "free" friends. It is (often gently) made clear to her that she will come to resent being tied down to the relentless care of a child, who will just as a matter of course place many difficult and trying demands on her.

Some force more powerful than all of these clearly influences the young girl's choice to become an adolescent mother. Scores of self-reports of very young mothers would indicate that many, if not all, of these young pregnant females do not make this choice in a spirit of adolescent rebellion nor of bravado: the words from one published newspaper account of what the decision-making process was like for one 16 year old echo those of many such."You have to decide between having an abortion or keeping it. Some of your friends are happy about it or are jealous and some are worried--'How are you going to take care of it?'-- and that brings a lot of confusion and heartache. You don't know what to do. You find yourself going into your room and saying, I got to make some decision before it's too late to make a decision. You feel so lonely and lost and you don't know what to do. I was always thinking about it up until it was almost too late. And then I finally decided to keep it." By far the most, (including the case of Kathy and Billy, of Meredith and John, and of the 4 year old boy's mother in this account) had no such ambivalence: they would never give up their child: this baby will be mine, all MINE! they say.
What of the father in all of this? Is the young girl's choice being somehow influenced by the force of a sexual drive, or a desire for the companionship, or attention, or the being taken care of, by a mate? From many sources it is widely, pervasively reported that the male who fathered the child seems unimportant to the adolescent mother-to-be.

Counselors from both coasts who specialize in social work with young pregnant females report that this young mother-child unit often makes its way without much reference at all to, or input from, the father.

Again, from a published newspaper account, from a different part of the country, one can hear in the words of a 15 year old high-school sophomore the echo of many like her: "I knew I didn't want to get married. I thought, I'm only 15, not even out of high school, what would I be doing getting married?" She did not know where the father was, and it did not seem to matter. "Yeah, I know I'm young to be a mother, but I don't mind; whatever the problems, it will be worth it to have a baby all my own."

Many others are reported as instead rushing into unsound marriages, the marriages depicted as tending to break up quickly, statistics show, or, at least, be unstable and inflict further hardship. My own clinical experience brought forth a third route, which perhaps may be the real life version of that which is demographically reported as the second: far from rushing into unsound marriage on their own volition, in each of the two cases of adolescent motherhood I have extensively explored, the immediate action on the part of the girl's parents was
to demand, and see to it that the demand was carried out, that the girl and the male who had presumably fathered the coming baby marry instantly. Although the girl was accorded the "right" to have the final say about whether she would keep the baby, no such option was accorded her by her parents with regard to the choice of whether or not to marry. In each case, the marriage was riddled with violence and abruptly terminated within a year or so of its inception. The powerful force influencing the adolescent female to become a mother appears to have little, if anything, to do with a desire for, or the prospect of, a relationship with a male, with sex, companionship or setting up a situation in which she might be "taken care of".

There are those, and they are many in number, who believe that the root of the problem lies in inadequate sex education, but one need only listen to a score of young mothers or mothers-to-be to realize that many had had fully as much "sex education" as those who do not get pregnant. And sex education alone would not, of course, account for the fact that once pregnant, 60 percent of those opt not to have an abortion; this is an age when abortion is far more readily accessible than in days past: indeed, the percentage of teenagers getting abortions has risen 60 percent since 1973, a not-surprising statistic corroborative of the more-ready availability. In many states, the ability to pay for an abortion is no longer a factor.

While the percentage of teenagers having abortions performed has risen so dramatically in the past several years, oral contraception—and other forms of birth control as well—has become far more widely available. Government statistics are reported in newspaper accounts
as revealing that the birthrate in the country has significantly declined. **Except for adolescents.** While the number of females in all other age groups of women choosing to become mothers dropped dramatically, the number of those giving birth among adolescents aged 14 to 17 went down **not one notch.** Among those 14 years old and younger, the number choosing to become mothers, that is, the birthrate, has moved up a notch.

Clearly, this powerful force influencing the adolescent mother's decision is unrelated to availability of contraceptives, availability of abortion, or any of the other powerful social factors that appear to have been capable of influencing the birthrate patterns of females in every other age group except adolescents.

Even more ubiquitous than the notion of inadequate sex education is the widespread notion that social class--the educational and/or economic, or socio-cultural, status of the girl's family--is the key to understanding the social phenomenon of the girl clearly too young to be a wife who nonetheless becomes a mother. While in many instances, one or more of these social factors may in one of its "negative" aspects appear in the demographic biography of such an adolescent mother, it is by no means a necessary concomitant.

A survey undertaken of newspaper accounts reveals not infrequently demographic statements like those attributed to a 15 year old mother whose parents were described as "both prominent people with professional position." Or one might glance at the demographic roster of the classroom for 20 pregnant girls aged 14 to 18 in a densely populated suburban area outside San Francisco described in a newspaper account:
listed as parents' occupations one finds teachers, mechanics, clerks, salesmen and one doctor. In my own first hand investigation, I decided to keep constant the variable of the mother's adolescent age at the time of the first child's birth, with as many other demographic variables as unsimilar as possible, a goal I feared might not be easy to come by among available referrals to a relatively small general-population psychological services center not specializing in any way in work with young mothers or young children.

However coincident, one cannot too easily brush aside the fact that the first young mother and child pair referred to me soon after I decided to investigate within a psychoterapeutic framework a second family in which an adolescent girl had some years earlier given birth to, and kept, her child, was one in which almost every demographic variable lay at the far distant pole on the social continuum from the first such family I had earlier begun treating in a variety of psychotherapy situations.

The Demography of the Pilot Study, of Two Adolescent Mothers:

For one of these two young mothers whose experiences provided the foundation of this study, the family was one in which both parents had graduated from college, the father holding an advanced degree and a high level administrative post in a large educational institution. In the other, although they too owned their own well kept, albeit considerably, more modest home and automobile, the father had left school before the sixth grade, the mother had edged through high school, and
the father had worked for some 30 years in a semi-skilled factory position. While both families were white, in one, the less well-educated, family, one of the parents was bilingual in her growing up years although she never spoke the second language in the home of the adolescent's growing up years. The two sets of parents had themselves grown up in quite different geographic locales, one in an urban area, the other, the family of the college educations, in a rural setting in another state. Among other things, these differences meant that the two adolescent mothers attended vastly different types of junior high schools, the school setting which was to mark their final educational experience during adolescence.

In one family the parents had been aware of the concept of psychotherapy and child guidance counselling and had abundantly availed themselves and their children of such services, the young girl who was to become pregnant at 15 having spent a sizable portion of her young childhood, as had her parents, devoted to one form of therapy or counselling or another. The other family had no concept whatever of psychotherapy nor child guidance counselling and had never given thought to any of the kinds of community agency provisions which had been a hallmark of the childhood of one of these two who embarked upon motherhood at age fifteen.

Family size and birth order were additional polarities: in one family the young mother was the older of two children; in the second, the adolescent mother was the youngest of six, born around the time of her mother's menopausal stage in the life cycle. The first mother read many books on childrearing during her children's infancy and child-
hood; the second did not read at all, any kind of books.

In the one family, not surprisingly, extreme pressure was put on the child (on both children) to achieve in school, and to go on to college. The other family had put no pressure of any kind on their children regarding school achievement: it was a concept for all intents and purposes beyond their ken.

However coincident, or concomitant, they might sometimes be, the demographies inherent within this tiny sample of two adolescent mothers seemed to question the relevance of sociological, or cultural factors involved in the psychological configuration both culminating, and going beyond, the phenomenon of adolescent motherhood. Although I could not know this for certain at the time of the pilot, the pilot seemed loudly to say it is not socio-cultural factors which carry the powerful influence determining the girl barely past pubescence to embark on motherhood.

One cannot justifiably leave the discussion of statistics and the relevancy of the societal factors involved in this growing human tragedy without acknowledgment of the all-important fact that the tragedy does not at all rest solely in its impact on the life of the young mother. For these same powerful statistics which point so dramatically to the urgency of the "desire" on the part of some 60 percent of all adolescents who become pregnant to become mother to a child while still a minor must, of course, be set alongside the perhaps more powerful statistics which point so dramatically to the fact that there is no correlation, for adolescent mothers, between the powerful desire to become a mother and her capability to assume that role.
My exploration of published accounts from many parts of the country of the attitude and feelings expressed about the kind of mother she will be, and her expectations, failed to turn up a single instance to oppose the universal-seeming intransigent conviction, among adolescent mothers-to-be, that their mother-child relationship—against all overwhelming statistical evidence to the contrary—will be one characterized by tenderness, caring, concern, love and warm enjoyment of the soon to be born baby. Before the baby's birth the young near-mother—in hundreds of examples quoted, (e.g. from centers for unwed mothers, etc.) speaks with beatific facial expression of the truly wonderful mothering she intends to provide for her child and of her conviction that she and the baby will flourish in an atmosphere pervaded by love and delight. The facts of life, for adolescent mothers, turn out otherwise.

According to statistics: babies of young adolescents are two to three times more likely to die before they are a year old\(^1\) than those born to all other post-adolescent mothers. For many such babies, death may be a blessing, for the adolescent mother, according to published reports based on sociological studies, will be far more likely to become a perpetrator of cruel child abuse. Reports of those who are concerned with the phenomenon of the pregnant, or recently delivered adolescent and who have some idea of how things go for the mother and child while the child is still very small, report, or make

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\(^1\)I heard President Carter say in a speech in early Summer 1979 that the infant mortality rate in the U.S. is higher than in any other industrialized nation: could this be related to the fact that the birth rate per se has gone down for all age groups except adolescents for whom it has steadily risen among the youngest (who are in fact provided with welfare support for keeping and "raising" their child)?
obvious by not commenting at all, that they don't have any data at all about how these children fare past infancy and very young adulthood.

The pilot strongly suggested on its own that one may accurately predict how these children will fare past childhood, as far as their parenting abilities were concerned.

Worth noting is the fact that phenomena salient to adolescent motherhood have been relatively often intentionally excluded from the copious number of studies of motherhood, of mother-child interactions, and of parental attitudes. In my search for more broad-based empirical data or naturalistic observation data in this area, what seemed to be representative of at least very many studies of parent-infant interaction, parenting patterns, etc. was that mothers young enough to have given birth during adolescence had been specifically excluded from consideration in the research, or, no mention was made in research results of age of the mother at all (e.g., the Mahler separation-individuation studies). This would seem to point to the possibility that much of the vast array of developmental data, may, for all we know, be inapplicable in the case of mother-child pairs, when the mother was an adolescent at the time of the child's birth. I was able to locate no mention of consideration of adolescent mother phenomena in any major clinical or developmental research study.

The view of adolescent motherhood garnerable within the framework of this research is a view which sociological studies of the phenomena would presumably be unable to include. It is a view unlikely to be possible of arriving at through the classical psychoanalytic methodol-
ogy reconstructing childhood events through its theoretical base of drives, conflicts and fixations: the phenomenon I found pervading the experience of the adolescent mother, and of her child, would more often than not perhaps insure that such patients would be unlikely to appear for intensive therapeutic help in the first place, or not be able to continue, even if only for "failure to keep appointments", etc., school and crisis situations appear to be the predominating instances when these families might come into the purview of psychologists. In order to understand the seemingly self-regulating aspect across the generations of this psychological configuration, what was essential was the opportunity to observe the re-enactment of an array of phenomena pertaining to the individual child, the mother, the mother-child pair(s), and the grandparents, and to piece together these complementary fragments of reciprocal experiences into a cohesive whole. I believe it would perhaps be not possible to discern a comprehensive picture of the several reciprocal intergenerational aspects important to this configuration in the absence of natural habitat observation over a long period of time as an adjunct to the transference-like phenomena that were possible within the concurrent psychotherapeutic situations.

This phenomenon, centers on what appears to be akin to what Heinz Kohut describes as the only newly understood "self-object transference" (see Chapter on Psychology of the Self). The understanding gained in the adolescent motherhood clinical research included a fragmented self configuration for adolescent mothers, and for their children, another concept which was later found clearly described in a larger, systematic
and comprehensive framework in the psychology of the self—it is important to note that no part of Kohut's researches had focussed in any way on adolescent mothers, or on children, yet these phenomena followed Kohut's systematic description with remarkable facility.

This was not a case of the researcher's having "found" what she was looking for: neither therapist nor supervisor were aware of Kohut's work at the time these conceptualizations had come to seem what the data demanded.

This seems to suggest, too, a powerful corroboration for the validity in "real life" of the formulations Kohut posited as having that kind of universal generalizability. The fact that a researcher who carried none of these theoretical formulations into this research situation could perceive these configurations, conceptualizations and formulations derived solely from the real-life, long-time observations and clinical work with three generations of family members individually and collectively, which dovetail in every respect with Kohut's analysis of the self, seems to suggest important statements about long term observation, about Kohut's formulations, and about the possible generalizability of the phenomenon of adolescent motherhood.

This psychological configuration leads to the adolescent's keeping her child against all odds, all reason and all counselling—and to her becoming in fact the mother of a child while yet little more than a child herself. In the pilot study a pattern was seen to appear in a tandem-track framework, that is, with a clearly visible constellation of factors at two different levels of discourse: factors which were
garnered from conscious self-report and experience-distant observation, and factors which required use of empathy and introspection as research tools (as therapy technique, with children, and parents, and grandparents in cases such as these).

These phenomena which were repeatedly observed, appear to fit precisely with Kohut's findings for phenomena arising in the psychoanalytic situation between analyst and analysand, which Kohut terms the selfobject transference: here, in the real life setting with the adolescent mother and her child, phenomena which function precisely as do selfobject transference phenomena, arose regularly, daily, between the adolescent mother and her child—in a reciprocal fashion, i.e., as if each were serving as selfobject for the other, or as if the phenomenon akin to the selfobject transference extends, in the adolescent mother-child pair in both generational directions.

It may be that the most readily presentable selection from all of this material would be to attempt to present a number of excerpted examples of factors which pervaded the conscious experience, or "life history" experience, of both of these adolescent mothers of disparate background as commonalities, against the earlier background focussing on the extensiveness of dissimilarities in their family upbringing experience. And then, a brief sketch of some of what I believe constitute aspects of the psychological self-configurations of the adolescent mother.

Perhaps one of the most interesting commonalities, from one frame of reference, pervading the life experience of these adolescent mothers
(the term descriptively relevant despite the fact that at the time of this study each of the young women was in her early or mid-twenties) is that of transgenerational family relatedness, here meant to imply the opposite of alienated, or isolated, family networks. It is a not infrequently expressed view that much of the psychopathology evident today is somehow related to the widely prevalent conceptualization of today's society as one in which there is not the close interplay and association between the generations once one has reached adulthood. Repeatedly one encounters conceptualizations of the adult experiencing psychological difficulty in which a key variable entering the conceptualization has to do with a view of modern life as life in which relatedness with one's nuclear family, or family of origin, is missing. The distressed young mother is often depicted as living cut off from the helping hand or supportive assistance, or the company and companionship, spoken of as having been an ongoing feature of the daily life of many in "the good old days": writers make it clear that the distinction they feel bound to draw presumably demarcating an earlier time when families lived close to one another, and visited back and forth, and spent time with one another—a time when a young woman's mother was on hand to offer support or protection from feelings of isolated aloneness as she raised her babies; a time when young children could know the close tie to grandparents—from the current time when families live at far distances, in an absence of familial visiting on any kind of regular basis of spending time together—a time when a young woman's mother does not have opportunity nor make opportunity to offer support or protection.
from the isolation of raising small children; a time when young children must grow up unacquainted with their grandparents except in perhaps annual vacation visits—the writers who ubiquitously draw these distinctions most often make it clear that their distinctions are intended to characterize the distinction between the good and the positive of the earlier time with the bad and the negative of the stark isolation of today.

In both of the living situations of the young women, a striking feature was the very regular presence in their lives and homes of both their mother and their father.

In one instance, the mother and father lived in the same town. In the other, they lived some 25 miles distant yet travelled to their daughter's home as regularly and often as did the family living a mile apart: both young women saw both of their parents on an average of several times a week, never less often than once a week. In both, the fathers were abundant in their giving of advice; in both the mothers offered an abundance of what they felt to be supportive assistance involving homemaking, childcare, and an array of other questions. Both sets of grandparents were devoted in their affectionate attention to their young grandchildren and generous in their gifts to both the children and the young mother. Both made not inconsiderable efforts to come to the daughter's assistance in times of stress or emergency. Both mothers spent time with their daughters simply in a spirit of company and companionship, in both cases sometimes with the father also present and sometimes when the father was occupied elsewhere. Both families, in addition, joined on occasion with a wider network of other relatives, although in neither case was the presence of more distant relatives as
frequent an occurrence, the relatives living at somewhat more of a
distance although not so far as to preclude large family gatherings.

In both, the grandparents not infrequently came by to take the
grandchild, or grandchildren along on an outing—to marketing or doing
errands, etc. In both families, the small children exhibited consi-
derable feelings of affection for their grandparents, which the grand-
parents clearly reciprocated. In both, many meals, and all holidays,
were jointly shared events.

Lest a reader erroneously draw the inference that these were happy,
or positive, experiences, it is important to add that what largely
characterized much of the experiences described above was not at all
anything that could be realistically spoken of as happy, or positive,
experiences. This despite the fact that in almost every instance both
grown daughter and her parents bent not inconsiderable efforts to have
them be happy or positive experiences.

Time, attention, money, effort, concern and good intentions—on
all sides—went into the efforts extended by both sets of parents
toward their adolescent mother-daughters. As psychotherapist in each
family situation to the adolescent mother on an individual basis, to
each of the children on an individual play therapy basis, and as family
therapist for an extended family-group session on a weekly basis in the
context of their home-sessions infrequently, came to include the young
woman's parents, I had ample opportunity to observe first hand as well
as to receive a many-sided depicting of very many such experiences from
the long list outlined above.

Across the widest possible variety of these intergenerational
experiences of relatedness, it was eventually possible to perceive that one common thread underlying the largest proportion of the grandparent's offerings in all of the remarked-upon ways was the remarkable consistency with which their responses, words, messages, efforts and intentions, even their gifts, missed the mark.

Despite the great amount of time the "older generation" appeared to have given to this business of being "good parents" and "good grandparents", it eventually became vividly obvious that they were incapable of empathy: even in their seemingly most carefully thought out gifts, either to the grandchildren or to the young mother, they seemed almost unbelievably to decide upon the one thing which was glaringly "all wrong", to say the one thing in response to another that was glaringly "not right", etc. (and which infuriated their daughter or perplexed the grandchild).

No amount of experience seemed capable of making a dent in their amazing proclivity for missing the mark about how their daughter or their grandchild would experience something. Speaking of this was near impossible for the daughter, or the grandchildren.

It was, however, in their more general manner of responding, in the course of what one might call everyday conversation or exposure to one another, that their signal lack of capacity for empathic responsiveness stood out in its most bold relief. Time and again, I watched, or heard the next day's description of, the adolescent-mother-daughter's subjective experience of the empathy failures of one or the other of her parents, and watched, or heard the held-in rageful fury which the daughter experienced in reaction to these colossal empathy failures, a fury which the daughter never under any circumstances, now that she was
herself a mother, expressed to either of her parents but instead struggled to contain and to suppress, then permitting it, eventually, (after a long time of psychotherapy) to pour forth in the safe psychotherapeutic setting.

No such constraints had operated during the adolescence of either of these young women, according to their retrospective accounts. Here we can back up and skim quickly over excerpted comments gleaned from their peripheral comments which happened, in a variety of contexts, to attach to some other topic the young woman might be speaking of from her past.

At least as she now recalls it, each of these young women spent a very considerable time enjoying the company of her father, or feeling close to her father, as a very young girl. One remembers no recollection whatever of her mother's existence, but only her father's, until about age seven, although her mother was regularly living in the home; the other has memories of her mother's abrupt shifts into rageful anger, and far more painful as recollections, the times when her mother played "cruel tricks" on her, like telling her 8 year old daughter that she was taking her to a picnic when, in reality, she was taking her to the dentist. Yet it is no less for the father for whom the most violent of rageful feelings came to find expression as existing only a hair's breadth below the surface expression of how great a father he was, now, in her twenties. Both young women spoke of having experienced violent hostility toward their mothers during their pre-pubescent and early adolescent stages. While both spoke of having felt much closer to their fathers, there eventually appeared in both accounts of early adolescence
responses from the father which included considerable distortion of perspective to their daughter's incipient femininity maturation.

In neither family did either of the parents, as far as is known, make any sort of conspicuous consumption of alcohol or drugs: from all reports and appearances in the current setting, intoxication was not a factor for any of these parents. Nor was any history of anti-social behaviors which would have brought either set of parents to the attention of any legal or community authorities: in both families there appeared to have been a history, where the parents were concerned, of keeping within the bounds of societal and social expectation: neither the father nor the mother in either family was regarded by the community as in any way antisocial, nor in fact, as other than as civil and polite according to the accepted norms.

At approximately age 13 both of these young girls, living in different towns attended vastly different kinds of junior high schools. One from the "better educated family" sought out the other crowd in their respective environments who "got into trouble", and joined in the activities of that antisocial group. The other, from a smaller town, became close friends with another 13 year old girl. They spent all their time together. It wasn't possible to speak of "getting in with the wrong crowd" for the one young girl as that which compelled her into being a heavy drinker at 13, quitting school at 14, running away from home by 15, getting pregnant by the driver of a truck she hitchhiked a ride from in the process of running away. He invited her to go "home" to live with him and she did; she stayed until her baby was 2 years old.

When the girl's very highly educated parents learned of the girl's
whereabouts, their insistence was only that she marry.

At 13 each girl began what was soon to be an excessive use of alcohol and not long after of drugs. These activities were of sufficient nature to come to the attention of school authorities, and the parents, both of whom were roundly disappointed, and censuring, of these activities. While both girls engaged in shoplifting, only one was caught, an occurrence which from the standpoint of bringing her to the attention of the police was to be repeated in dizzying regularity over the ensuing years prior to beginning psychotherapy.

During that same period, both girls became erotically involved with boys, recalled as having been not unlike the erotically-tinged pubescent activities of early adolescents who would follow very different developmental lines in the years to come.

Although the fine-point specifics varied somewhat, by fifteen each of these young females was pregnant, in one instance with a man she had never seen before, from whom she had hitched a ride in his truck on a highway in the act of running away from home, and with whom she went on to his home, many states away and began living with him.

The other adolescent became pregnant while still living at home, with a man she picked up in a bar. When she told her mother she was pregnant, the mother literally, according to her report, took the girl and the presumed father by the hand and, demanding that they marry instantly, physically saw to it that they did. The marriage that ensued was characterized by relentless stormy tirades and physical violence apparently most often emanating from the side of the female, she who was to become mother to Meredith and John. The marriage finally
ended as abruptly as it had begun, a little over a year after Meredith's birth, although 8 years later, the young mother had not yet "adjusted" to the loss of this man. (He had been married 3 additional times since then, each time fathering one or more children, and leaving.) There followed a long concatenation of hard drugs, pathological consumption of alcohol, and exceptional promiscuity and prostitution and not inconsiderable run-ins with the law, although not for the fairly extensive participation in theft. It was to these un-lullabye strains that the infancy and early childhood of Meredith, and John (born of unknown father a few years later) had its ears and eyes attuned.

The 15 year old who had her baby far from home, instead of a few miles from the reported supportive and generously offered familial assistance surrounding the births of Meredith and John, alleges that the shocking violence that was part of her daily experience throughout the nine months of her trauma-ridden pregnancy (according to her, she was several times hospitalized, while pregnant, as a result of the viciously violent beatings of the man she had chosen to live with and to remain with) emanated, in contrast to the other mother's, entirely from the man, without any participation from her.

However, I later came to learn that, unlike the mother of Meredith and John, this young 21 year old mother of five year old Michael (her only child) had almost no ability to distinguish between truth and untruth in the reporting of facts, and her own extraordinary propensity toward violence would suggest her participation.

Upon arriving at the distant state where she would take up residence with the father of her child-to-be, she telephoned her parents:
her father immediately journeyed to the scene, in her words, "to marry us". When the child not yet born was two years old, and had lived out his infancy watching and listening to the violent beatings and brutalities between his father and mother (and he was receiving his share as well), the adolescent mother's report of what then occurred was that she again telephoned her parents, this time to report the circumstances, whereupon, in her words, her father again journeyed to the scene, this time "to divorce us", bringing both daughter-mother and child back to the parental home, where they lived until the young woman was twenty and the child around four.

A not dissimilar pattern of promiscuity, drugs, etc. colored the vastly differently life style and life circumstances of this young daughter of well-to-do parents, whose flashy sports car in which she darted off to the beach for the day could well stand as symbol for the vivid contrast with her life and that of the mother of Meredith and John, who struggled to eke out a sustenance for her small family from the monthly welfare check which she was incapable of managing to hold onto long enough to buy food for the family or pay the rent. (Her parents assumed the responsibility of holding her welfare check for her, doling out what money she needed for groceries, etc. to insure that she would be able to pay the rent in her modest, subsidized apartment.)

All of this is, while leaving out a very great deal, more than enough, perhaps, to appreciate some of the differences of experience for these two young adolescent mothers: while the distinctively different aspects are many, it is against those disparate backdrops
that the startling pattern of similarities and commonalities of developmental line stand out in such vivid clarity.

When one moves to the present, to the time when each is in the process of performing the role of mother, in one case to two children, in another to one, each of them now single and each now living in a separate apartment apart from the residence of their parents, one finds once again a background of important disparities a dramatic concatenation of commonalities.

Again, the abundance of important detail is so vast that it is only possible to skim over the surface, selecting a few for commenting upon.

In their current-day lives, at the time of beginning therapy, some of the most pervasive characteristics involving the three-generational constellation serving as outline to the overt self of these adolescent mothers were these:

Both young women exhibited many aspects of what is commonly thought of an immaturity. In each case this was so to an extraordinary degree: not only do their parents ubiquitously treat them in a fashion only appropriate for much younger children, but these adolescent mothers, at 21 and 25, both seem to accept it unquestioningly: to be glad that they have such good helpful parents. They call their parents on the phone for help and the parents freely, willingly give it.

Their parents seem to perceive them even in adulthood as having no independent center of initiative, no capacity for self-direction nor of self-reliance, and their daughters clearly feel no sense of a capacity for independent initiative, self-reliance nor self direction. Both
consult almost daily by telephone with their mothers about minor matters, and their mothers regard this as right and reasonable. The parents of both regularly take their daughter, at 21 and 25 years old, to do her grocery shopping and her clothes buying, for her and her children as well. The parents have much comment to make about their daughter's friends. Interesting across the course of the therapy was to watch the young mother of Meredith and John in tiny incremental steps transform to a point where she felt completely capable of buying all her own clothes, groceries, etc., felt a keen sense of self reliance, self direction and initiative and resented strongly her parents' view that "they were only being helpful to her" in wanting to continue performing these functions for her.

Both were prone to bouts of severe depression, abrupt pendulum shifts from calm conversation to vicious rageful attacks or icily-cold withdrawal; both experienced a regular experience of being about to shatter into fragments and "go nuts". This experience not infrequently reached intolerable proportions and on several occasions, the one young mother made a decision that she would have to go, that day, into the state hospital, and made telephone calls attempting to gain admission. Always these experiences occurred in the absence of the therapist (e.g., over the weekend); always she was in the end able to "hold together" (although there were many occasions on which she was not able to hold together within a different context not discussed here) until the therapist's return, and, in the course of one session, to achieve the capacity to refrain from hospitalizing herself, accomplishable only because the powerful force of impending fragmentation had, she said,
somehow abated after an hour of the therapist's presence. (Also interesting was the fact that despite having been told she could, at such times, telephone the therapist, (for example, when fragmentation threatened,) she was never, even in the most powerful emergencies, able to bring herself to do that. It was as if, like an abandoned infant, she were capable only of waiting passively for my return, with no capacity for the kind of initiative required to reach out to me on her own. In part, this, as it turned out, was related to the fact that if she had to come after me, I would not really be responding empathically to her needs, for her needs were not for someone who had to be summoned as if to give her assistance, but someone who would magically be there without her having asked.

Of the two, one was pathologically manipulative, given to pathologic lying, much more frequently in a generalized state of frenzy, devoid of any sense of guilt, and incapable of modulating her voice below that of a strident, very loud tone, with a pronounced whining quality attached. These were not characteristics she held in place of those which characterized the mother of Meredith but in addition to. (These were some of the threads it was possible to follow to a varying permutation of self object failure in infancy, which was, however, not involved in the fact of her becoming an adolescent mother.)

Much about the parental behaviors of these young women might be termed a kind of infantilization, at the overt self level of discourse, Seemingly incongruously, self reports of the time when these young mothers were small included in both case many instances of experience that could only be interpreted as their mother's having appeared to
turn to the child for a kind of solace, rather than to be there to provide it.

The little girls were often spoken to, and even confided in, as if they were much, much older than their years, but also as if they might somehow have the capacity to be understandably responsive to their mother's communication.

These communications were ones that were specifically told to the young girl as ones which she was not to confide to the child's father—but that were to be just between the two of them. Responsibilities were placed on these children, as well, in very subtle ways, that were wholly incongruous for their years.

In one family, the girl was given the "right" of deciding whether the family would move to a town nearer to where the mother had recently taken a night job—so that the mother would not have to remain away from home on nights of bad weather, etc.—or whether they would remain in their present home, which the girl had expressed, to her father, great reluctance to leave. The girl decided she did not want to leave her friends. This meant that the mother had to live-in on the premises where she was self-employed because it was not possible to commute that distance each day. The father and the mother both regularly put the young girl in these situations: there was actually a sense in which some of the important family decisions were given to the small child to decide (this same child who, as an adult, the parents would see as unable to decide which groceries to buy for that week). Much about these parental behaviors might be termed a kind of "parentification," at least those provided by the mother in her requirement that
the child permit her to confide her personal and emotional concerns to the child.

Now mothers themselves, each spoke of herself in terms of her colossal failures at being a mother: both were aware of monumental failures at the parenting role where their children were concerned. Overtly they perceived their own parents as having been fine parents, or excellent.

Central aspects, from the level of discourse centering on overtly observable behaviors, of the mothering patterns of both young women included their appearing also to "parentify" their young children, seeming to expect behaviors and attitudes and responses from their children that would seem more congruent as expectations from a mother rather than a child.

When chastising the children for some behaviors or demands, etc., the mother(s) makes it regularly clear, indeed in no uncertain terms, that she thought the child's behavior or demands, etc. an insult because of their seeming not to show concern for the mother: even when any of these children expressed a desire to eat no further food, or said simply that he or she was not hungry, the mother's escalating anger centered around her conviction that it was for her that the eating was to be done, and to drive her crazy, or to give her a headache, or to make her sick, the child's intent in refusing to eat more.

Interestingly, the grandmother too regarded the child in this way: the grandmother seemed to have transferred her former parentifying of the adolescent mother onto the child, but with the important distinc-

Term used in Boszormeny-Nagy's family formulations and many others.
tion that the grandmother seemed to regard the child not as performing parent-like functions for her, but for her daughter, the adolescent mother. The grandmother, in each family, ceaselessly adjured the small child to take care of his or her mommy, not to make her mommy sick, not to give his poor mommy a headache by making a lot of noise, to clean the house for her poor mother, etc.

No one in either family, neither the grandmother, the grandfather, nor the young mother herself, seemed to think of nor speak of the small child with any consistency as his or her actually being a small child, experiencing life from the vantage of a small child, with needs of his or her own to be responded to simply for their own sake. Any childlike behaviors or requests on the child's part, for attention, or confirmation, or being listened to, or attended to, by her or his mother were, at the ages explored across the two years of this study, seen as offensive, thoughtless, insulting and cruel to the young mother—as indicating that the child just didn't care at all about taking good care of his or her mother. This was a refrain I heard many hundreds of times in my experience of these two families. Both the grandmother and the grandfather and the young mother regularly told these things, in harsh, or sometimes, snarling tone, to the grandchildren, but as often in honeyed tones as well, (as when the grandparents were leaving after a visit and would extend those words as their final pleasant-voiced greeting to the children.)

What seemed most to characterize the lives of these children was that an impressive finding was the role of toys: although they were showered with toys (—in both the family on welfare and the family with
expensive sports cars, the number of toys provided for these children was startling in its overabundance and extravagance--as if in demonstration that they were regarded as children, they seemed not to be permitted to behave as children. They seemed not to be permitted a childlike childhood. These things were apparent from naturalistic observation. In the psychotherapy situation it was possible to learn that the kinds of emotional responsibilities demanded of the young mother had created an experience of her childhood that was unchildlike in its coloration. As the young adolescent mother had, in her childhood, tried vainly to live up to the unchildlike expectations of her mother--the now-grandmother--so too did I observe across two years, the two small boys and the young girl trying vainly to live up to the demands and expectations imposed by their mothers, and by their grandparents. What came of all of this was the opportunity to observe many instances of impotent rage toward a parent: in the intergenerational constellations surrounding the adolescent mother, it was possible to experience this impotent rage directed at the young mother by her children, and at the grandmother by the adolescent mother, her daughter; as well as at the grandfather by the adolescent mother.

Often this rage centered on the traumatic failures of empathy: as a component of that, this rage was often associated with the child's (or the adolescent mother's) impotent ragefulness at being unable to live up to the idealized parent-like perfection the parent imposed as condition for being regarded as deserving of approval or acceptance.

Both of these young women had a pervasive and exceptional low self esteem. Included in that was their unshakable conviction, since
earliest memory, that each was "stupid", homely and incapable of any of the ordinary accomplishments of their peers.

The grandparents in both families experienced the young children as appropriately expected to live up to parent-like responsiveness to their mother's needs and wants: of their own daughters, the mothers of these children, their conception was as if she were the infant of the mother-infant pair. This is doubly interesting inasmuch as it had come to seem to me that the adolescent mother's unconscious intent in having these children was so that she could experience the role of infant—that is, the perfectly, unconditionally responded-to member of the mother-infant pair.

At both generational levels, the notion of this unconscious "fusion" pervaded the experience of both generations, but seemingly with an important distinction. Within the older of these two intergenerational pairs, the "grandmother" and her adolescent-mother daughter, the experience was one of fusion in both directions.

The daughter even in adulthood experienced herself as an extension of her parents, unable to get through any day or week without continued reunitedness with both of her parents. The parents for their part clearly felt the same. In one family the parents both registered enraged shock on the one occasion on which I was present when the 21 year old daughter momentarily played with the idea of perhaps "moving away"—by which, it turned out, she meant, a matter of 30 miles or so. In the other, there was an account of an occasion, one not regarded as unique, on which the older mother had, when her grown child had temporarily contemplated moving away, lain on the kitchen floor, kicking her
heels on the floor, shrieking, "Nobody's going to take my baby away from me!" over and over again. We tend to think of these as "enmeshed families," but clearly that does not tell us enough.

Within the younger generation, the children found any separation from their mother wholly overwhelming and unbearable: in the most literal sense a situation which brought about severe fragmentation and an array of disintegration products of bizarre sorts. In the other direction, however, the adolescent mothers seemed identical in the pervasive character of their experience in this regard toward their own children, which was the polar opposite of that of their mothers and of their children: pervading an extraordinary amount of their experience was an all but overwhelming desire to "get rid of" their child or children. Both had endless continued fantasies about a score of ways they could be permanently separated from these children. They worked at thinking of ways they might be able to manage this. Both eventually asked my aid in finding other parents, or residential placements for the children. One gave her child away to an unrelated 65 year old woman who lived in the same town and whose only reason for offering to take over the entire care of this non-related child--from 8 a.m. until suppertime, 7 days a week, 360 days a year--to her home, was fact that she "loved children".

The young mother of Michael had felt no compunction whatever of gleefully accepting this "stranger's" offer (she had chanced to meet the woman through the fact that she was mother to a boy the young woman dated for a month and met her at his house) to take care of her child for her. This arrangement began soon after she and the child had re-
turned to her parent's home, when the boy was two years old.

During that time, Michael and his mother were living in her parent's home. At the time the grandfather, the girl's father, had "secured a divorce for her", he had had himself made legal guardian of the two year old child. As the legal guardians of the child, these educated professional people made no attempt to prevent his entire daily care being accorded to a highly unstable older woman. Each night the woman returned the child to the grandparent's home where the young mother lived. It was after this relationship came to an abrupt end (for reasons too complex to attempt to include in this account to this paper) that the young woman began in earnest to contemplate giving the child up for adoption, secretly. For she lived in terror of what her parents would say if she were to do so. She shared this with me, as if she were but concerned and motivated by the best interests of the child. (And certainly this would have been in the best interests of the child, because anything would have been a improvement for that child, as he, at 4 years old, quietly told me, in literal words in the course of his play therapy.) When I gently replied yes, I could understand that: trying to be a mother was too hard for her, and painful, her voice instantly altered from its extreme "shrill high pitched whine" that set all hearers' teeth on edge, and looked wide eyed, like a small child: then a grin spread from ear to ear.

She was unable to contemplate it in earnest because her parents reacted with cold rage on the one occasion when she tried to suggest it as a possibility. Throughout the time that the child was present in the grandparent's home, that is, during the evenings and early mornings,
it was they who served as parents to him, including instructing him to call them mom and pop. The young mother spoke of her relationship to her son during those two and a half years as "a big sister-little brother thing".

When the young mother impulsively became involved with a young man who wanted her to live with him, she moved from her parents' home and they insisted that she take the child with her. They knew, they later said, that she was incapable of providing adequate mothering care, but they were "hot going to let her get away with out any responsibility for the child at all." Yet even after the move, the grandparents continued to regard the boy as their child, regularly taking him overnight, and on weekends, and for one or two weeks at a time, and on vacations with them, leaving the daughter at home, which was exactly what she wanted.

Although she was always "about to", the young woman did not work, and was herself available and on hand during all of these occasions on which she voluntarily permitted others to assume the care and company of her child. At first, she did not "have to" work to support the child because her parents had provided full support for both, as for two children in the home. Later, she applied for welfare.

In the second family too the parents had, beginning on the day the child was born, taken over the child's care, coming regularly to the young mother's home on a daily basis, where, while the grandfather worked, the grandmother remained for ten or twelve hours a day, some of these 12 hours of course including the evening meal time, which the
grandfather joined them for upon his return. As in the first family, they were vocal in their assertion that they did this because the daughter was not capable of taking care of a child, or children, and required the parenting functions be performed by the grandparents. Here too, the grandparents were right: she was not capable of parenting. She knew this. She had eventually been able to say this to me. The other young woman too described the first several years of her mother-child experience of Meredith as "a kind of big-sister-little-sister thing."

In time, it had become inescapable that only a view encompassing all three generations would begin to make comprehensible the small childrens' experience of life, or understandable, the young mother's experience of her child, and of her parents, and of her self.

I made a concentrated search for published accounts referring in any way to adolescent mother configurations. I found abundant examples in which the grandparents feel a strong impulsion to parent their adolescent's child as if it were their own, and the daughter's being all too ready to acquiesce in this arrangement, and the adolescent mother's perception of her relationship with her child as a sibling relationship. These appeared in abundant redundance in anecdotal data of adolescent motherhood.

In time, I had to question the grandparents' experience: from life history material that came forth over the course of the clinical work, it came eventually to be possible to learn that both grandmothers had themselves experienced severe deprivation of adequate mothering. The childhood experiences of the grandmother of Meredith and John, from 65 years before their birth, serve as an illustrative
example of what had come to seem transgenerational pathways leading to
the profoundly fragmented-self which characterized these three poign-
antly fragile, brittle little children struggling against insurmountable
odds to make sense of life, the world, their mother, their father and
themselves. They could not do so.

As recalled second-hand by her daughter's memory of her mother's
once-upon-a-time account, the adolescent mother's mother lived, during
her childhood, for five days out of every seven, not with her mother but
with her grandmother. This, the identical pattern of the small boy in
one of these families (who was given to an (unrelated) "Granma" every
day, was not in that family, but in the other family). This despite the
fact that her own mother was alive and well enough to be then caring for
her other children, the now-grandmother's siblings. Following the death
of a younger sibling of the now-grandmother, the now-grandmother's mother
became depressed: it was during that period that the now-grandmother
went to live (I know it is hard to keep track of all this: here we are
speaking of the mother of Meredith's mother) with her grandmother. That
grandmother (this is going back five generations from Meredith and John)
reportedly "simply wanted so much to "mother" a small child that she
kept the child (remember now, that when we say child here we are meaning
the mother of this young mother of Meredith and John) living with her,
and indeed sleeping in her arms in bed with her for the many years
extending from when the child was small until the child was grown--
until the day before the now-grandmother in this current familial matrix
was a young woman who married and moved into a separate apartment
with her husband.

Although here of course it had been possible only to conjecture, one could see what appeared to be evidence of the same pattern, in this current generation: that of the grandmother taking over the mothering function for her daughter's child (and at least in that instance, later learning that the now-grandmother who did this had herself been deprived of her mother as a child). It was difficult to keep from conjecturing that not only did the now-grandmother's mother feel willing to give up her child to the grandmother, but also that the grandmother who had felt a need back there 5 generations ago to take home someone else's child to "keep", had herself, back still another generation, been somehow deprived of empathic responsiveness from her mother in her childhood. Here again, the mother had in fact abdicated the care of the child without nominally abdicating it. In name, she remained "the mother": in name, on all records, the child 4 generations back was recorded as having a mother across her lifespan, and as having as official residence, her mother's home. But what, we must ask ourselves, did "having a mother", or a home, or a family, feel like, and seem like, to this small child? To help a reader tie the right threads through this maze, this "child", at 40 years or so of age, careened onto the kitchen floor, howling at the top of her lungs, "They can't take my baby from me." She was, there, speaking of her son, who was, by the defining criteria of the United States Government, an adult, a man. This same "child", at 50 is having to come 10 hours a day to assist her daughter in the mothering of her infant: the new
young mother is "only a child" (so said the grandmother to me).

In this instance, the child (the now-grandmother) lived with her grandmother during her entire growing-up years for five days of the week, and returned to her home on weekends, while the other two children remained at home with the mother for five days of the week and changed places on weekends, going to stay with the grandmother while the "grandmother's child" stayed at home with her mother, only to be displaced at the end of the weekend and returned to her grandmother.

The grandmother's mother was unable to provide one of the components of what Kohut terms the empathic mirroring environment, that of continuity of care, of reliably being there for the child's mirroring. She was unavailable for the mirror role of the mother, which Winnicott speaks of. When the adolescent mother's mother told this tale (many times) to her growing-up daughter, no mention was ever made of the now-grandmother's father in all of this. One can however, at the very least, empirically assume that if he was present at all, he acquiesced in this discontinuous arrangement for the upbringing of his daughter. Even if we need wonder if he fuss ed about it (which my research suggests we need not assume, but even if we assume that possibility): in any case, he was not available to her for idealizing on any consistent basis, if at all. In like manner, there was no grandfather available for idealizing in the lonely home of the grandmother with whom she spent her days. Certainly the sleeping arrangement points to the notion that this grandmother enveloped this growing girl in a narcissistic fusion of that first grandmother's devising.
According to the adolescent mother's account, there was no compelling reason for this unusual kind of mothering arrangement: in her mother's account of her unusual childhood, the arrangement prevailed simply because the mother and grandmother both "liked it" that way. Sociologists, and others, are fond of presenting examples of this sort of thing rather frequently: this is not at all a phenomenon social scientists have missed. But they have looked at it within a social, or cultural, or economic, or racial context, and arrived at the conclusion that the context was what "counts". When sociologists found some poor Mexican families engaging in this phenomenon (only because they were looking in Mexico, or at Mexican families) they presented these chaotic lives in a way that appeared (to me) to say: here you see redundant examples of the sort of family life which occurs in poor Mexican families. And so of course it does. When sociologists found, with an enormous federal grant, that this sort of thing redundantly appears in some sampling they took of Appalachian families (they were studied where they wished to understand the "roots of futility") they naturally looked for families where operationally defined phenomena of "futility" appeared, and systematically weighed, Rorschachted, interviewed and questionnaired, and or naturalistically observed (from the sociologists' vantage) these "pathetic mothers of pathetic" children. They discovered these same sorts of phenomena, and presented them in an impressive volume about how it goes in Appalachia. Many have located these phenomena in poor black families, in one or another place, where poor black families were available in sufficient concentration to yield up the abundant redundancy of these patterns
which include the grandmother taking over the upbringing of one or more of the children, and presented their "findings" of how things go among poor blacks. When found among "poor Puerto Ricans," this came to be regarded as a "poor Puerto Rican phenomenon".

But this mother, 5 generations back, was neither black, nor Puerto Rican, nor Appalachian, nor Mexican, nor, as far as I could judge "poor," certainly not in the terms social scientists have meant. If we look for further consistency in that family situation of five generations back with that of the adolescent mother, many of the same puzzle pieces seem to fit: the grandmother who assumed the mothering of her daughter's children in a mutuality of agreement with her presumably capable daughter, had in her daughter a mother who a) would be willing to allow her mother to assume this role in part for her; b) would herself feel no responsibility for continuity of attachment to her own child, and c) would, in this arrangement, raise a daughter who would become a mother whose own daughter would evidence signs of traumatic empathy failures. These elements seem to fit.

Although it does not show up in an overt way until several generations later, and a detailed understanding of the phenomenon was beyond the scope of the pilot study, it was possible to see in this one family for five generations of parenting a distinctly evident steadily increasing severity of impact of these "parenting practices" with each successive generation.

Although there was what psychologists would term gross pathology underlying the thin public veneer of the adolescent mother's mother's surface presentation (had they observed her with her three genera-
tional family long enough), she, and the generations before her, had nonetheless been able to hold things together well enough for a veneer of eminent social "acceptance" to be possible. That is, until the generation of the adolescent mother, it had been possible for there to exist a stability of marriage relation, however unfulfilling; it had been possible, until the several generations had gone by culminating in the adolescent mother, for economic stability to be part of the family picture—to own a home, a car, to dress well, to go on modest vacation trips, to buy material wants rather than only needs.

By the time the granddaughter of the woman who kept her daughter's child five days a week for 14 years, and kept her sleeping in her bed until age 18, had herself grown to womanhood, had children and raised one of them to become an adolescent mother, no semblance of that modicum of cohesiveness remained.

By the time five generations of repeating the cycle of the fragmented self had passed, the picture had become as I found it upon entering the scene: one in which the psychopathology was of such severe proportions that a child had grown to age thirteen, begun to drink heavily, dropped out of junior high school, become suicidal, been admitted to a psychiatric hospital at 15--at her parents' insistence, been removed a week later by her parents' decision, become pregnant at 15, had a baby at 16, gone on to engage in prostitution, hard drugs, alcoholism, excesses of pornographic profanity, all the while not maturing to a point of being able to cross the street to buy groceries by twenty-six years old without her parents' holding her hand; was summoned to court for assault and battery as, alternatively,
plaintiff and defendant; was threatened with eviction by her landlord in perhaps the most lenient of residential areas, been involved in larceny, in shoplifting, and a few other experiences prudence leads me to omit. By twenty-five she was profoundly suicidally depressed, "refusing" to get out of bed for days or weeks at a time. These phenomena were the lullabye strains which lulled the small children who were my clients to sleep from day one.

In this generation, there is no economic stability whatever, no marital stability, no ability to maintain even a modicum of remaining within the limitations of societal requirements. By the time this young girl's children had become the next generation in the endlessly repeating cycle, the manifestations were evidencing themselves not at pubescence but in earliest childhood, unable to keep from finding their way to public attention at the earliest beginning of public school. Without question, the manifestations of psychopathology for Meredith, John and Michael were of far graver proportion than those reported (including the therapist's reports from the childhood of the mother of Michael) as manifested in childhood by these two adolescent mothers. The mothers did have trouble in childhood, but "nothing serious." The adolescent mothers' pathology, when discerned from the standpoint of overt manifestations, was grave; it is reported in each case (though one cannot be certain) of a less grave proportion than that of their children, but of a more grave proportion than that of their mothers, in both the wealthy family and the nonwealthy, the educated and non, the successful and non.

While the conceptualization was a speculative one, there as it
appeared, in time, to be strong evidence for the proposition that severe forms of psychopathology do result from disorganized early experience: from what Kohut terms "empathy failures on the part of the childhood selfobjects." Above and beyond the formulation that sees the gross empathy failures on the part of the parent(s) as a progenitor of profound childhood disturbance, the adolescent mother research also suggested a formulation that there might deserve to be superimposed the more adequate formulation, that empathy failures of gross-enough nature to give rise to truly gross disorders of the self may in fact represent the "end-product" of perhaps as many as five or more generational developmental cycles of mothering (and/or fathering)--reciprocal selfobject phenomena through which a fragmented self is endlessly recreated, with each generational cycle producing a steadily increasing incapacity to adequately sustain the self of the next generation. What I came to hypothesize was that the adolescent mother's self structures are fragmentation-prone; that it is this factor which impels her to become a mother and this factor which insures that her child will have an even more profoundly fragmented self (all of these terms are discussed in the chapter on the Psychology of the Self).

I came to believe, that after only a brief but chaotic struggle to survive the disintegrating experiences ushered in by the beginnings of adolescence, the young adolescent-mother-to-be felt impelled to attempt to recreate a second experience of the mother-child relationship for herself, in a kind of desperate attempt to acquire what she had missed: at least some adolescent mothers (but perhaps all: we simply have no
data) do suffer from a profound feeling or deficit: one which calls into question in their minds from time to time whether they can continue to "be", and one which far more often calls into question whether they can continue at all "being a mother".

Beyond that, there seemed to be, for the adolescent mother, the sense not that she was creating (or re-creating), a baby, but rather that what she was creating (or re-creating) was a mother-baby relationship, a unit. It was not, I came to believe, the baby itself that held importance for the adolescent mother-to-be, but the joined-together combination of the mother-and-baby. And it was what she, not the baby, would derive, in responsiveness from this baby, that mattered more than anything in the world. My sense was, and is, that what the adolescent mother felt this impelling need for was to begin all over from the beginning: she wants, and desperately "needs", to go back and again be part of a mother-child pair. At the earliest beginning point, the mother-child pair is a unit, an undifferentiated unity, from the baby's perspective; to return to such a stage would be to return to a time when there was no distinction as to who, or what part, of this pair was mother and what part, or who, held the role, and the rights, of the baby. In this sort of psychological configuration, so I believe, the young adolescent who is impelled to re-create for herself a second version of this undifferentiated mother-child relationship, is employing a powerfully creative means through which to secure what her basic survival seems to require: by giving birth to a baby, and
thus incontrovertibly establishing an undifferentiated mother-child unity over which society permits her unchallenged control and authority, she is able to make for herself a situation in which she will herself again be able to be part of a relationship between mother and child in which for her there will be no distinction between who is mother and who is baby. As the person in entire control of this relationship, she will, in experiencing the role of mother, experience the role of baby—of baby in perfect blissful relationship with a mother who, this time around, will care about the baby; this appears to be her goal.

The adolescent mother's unstoppable pursuit of her goal of the mother-child relationship is dictated by her sense that here, within this relationship, she will be permitted to experience the occasions of being responded to in the way essential to a child—of being responded to perfectly.

In a sense then, since it is she who is looking forward to being responded to perfectly in this mother-child relationship she is going to such lengths to create, it is perhaps not at all surprising that she ascribes the other role's essence, the doing the perfect responding, to the baby's half of the relationship. "My baby will really love me: we will have a perfect relationship" is echoed in scores of reported anecdotal accounts of the expressed statements of adolescent mothers-to-be in talking with counsellors and social workers.

The problem, of course, comes with the birth of the baby, for the baby has the same idea the mother does about being the one whose needs and desires are responded to perfectly and unconditionally. The baby at first has no ability to be aware of the mother's needs—no capacity
for attempting to respond. Still, some adolescent mothers seem to be able to experience the relatively undemanding, easily-made-quiet infant and his close "attentiveness" as capable of meeting her needs, (although apparently some cannot tolerate the baby even at this stage). But it is when the baby begins to be able to articulate demands for responsiveness in more decisive, and less readily satisfied, terms, that the fury and rage begins to take over. In any case, regardless of the time sequence, the disintegration of the young adolescent which in its incipiency had called forth the desperate attempt on the adolescent's part to stem the tide of the disintegration through recreating a perfect mother-infant relationship appears clearly to have arisen as a function of her not having been permitted to partake of a mother-child relationship in which her needs were what mattered instead of the other member of the mother-child pair.

I am suggesting the adolescent mother requires the re-experiencing of a mother-baby relationship, for her own self needs. When she has finally managed to recreate that experience a second time, this time with the goal of having her self-needs be the ones that matter, this adolescent mother can only find motherhood a pain, for her, the sense can only be that she is confronted with a mother child relationship in which once again, the demand is on her to give up the role of the person whose needs will be seen as the ones to be responded to by the other member of the mother-child pair. Two factors seem to follow ineluctably from this point. One is that the baby becomes, from the beginning, ineluctably bound up in a situation in which every single one of his needs to be responded to will automatically be perceived by the adolescent mother as the rival baby's usurping of her right to be the one (of the mother-child pair)
whose needs matter this time around. From the beginning then, all hope is foreclosed, for the baby, of his or her being the one whose needs are seen as the ones that are supposed to matter. The baby's adolescent mother has, from the beginning, (but really from many years before the beginning,) no concept available to her related to the notion of responsiveness to another's needs. for responsiveness.

Since the sort of needs the baby requires this responsiveness about are those related to what he or she experiences as state of disequilibrium, the adolescent mother's baby seems destined from the beginning to exist largely in a state of continual disequilibrium. Hence, the baby will not find it easy to behave in ways the young mother will find tolerable, for this young mother whose expectations from this baby are for a perfect mother-child relationship has, from the beginning, set up a situation where the only route open for the baby is one which the adolescent mother will experience as the polar opposite of perfect. Since the perfection of the responsiveness of the baby is what she needed to have the baby for in the first place, in order to stem the tide of her disintegration, her disintegration will relentlessly be rekindled by each instance of the baby's being less than perfectly responsive to her needs, so I now believe.

By the time the child is the age of Michael or John, he will have had ample opportunity to learn that his own needs are not going to get responded to. But more than that, he will also have been told many thousands of times that it is he, or she, the baby, who is expected to regard the mother's needs in this relationship as the ones that matter. And he will have had ample opportunity to learn the powerful price he
will have to pay for not doing the kind of responding to her needs that the mother will insist upon. The child will, of course, consistently fail, for it is not within the capability of a child to be empathically responsive to the needs of an adult. But also intrinsic to this configuration is the fact that not only will this child be unable to meet the demands and expectations of his or her parent, and not only will he or she ubiquitously evoke the rage of that parent, but concomitant to this process is its other side of that coin—that this child, if a girl, in turn, may then be destined, from before her birth, to have to grow to pubescence and find in that disintegration through one means or another. For the girl born to an adolescent mother, it is difficult to imagine that she could ever be capable of minimally sufficient mothering functioning, for she will need all her time and attention to her own profound needs. On the basis of a great many more conceptualizations, and pieces of evidence in corroboration than it is possible to include in a limited presentation, it seems that once this psychological configuration is set in motion, there is an extraordinary high likelihood that trouble will result. Thus far in the course of the larger work in progress, I have been able to find evidence of this pattern's having repeated itself across six successive generations of mother-daughter pairs.

However convincing the results of this research study had made this configuration appear, it was not until the opportunity arose to consider these findings and formulations in the light of Kohut's systematic analysis of the self and the restoration of the self that it became possible for me to become aware of the definitive corrobora-
tion the psychology of the self provides for a comprehensive, and far more detailed, understanding of the psychological configuration and developmental line of adolescent motherhood. For it is in the light of Kohut's work that it became possible to place the concept of the fragmented self of the adolescent mother, its endlessly repeating cycle, and its reciprocal selfobject transferences, as I have now learned to term these observations, within a solid theoretical framework, a framework which not only clarifies many of the aspects that without it could be seen only in hazy outline and speculation but which also makes possible the orientation from which further research can go forward in attempting to discover more optimal psychotherapeutic methods with which the fragmented self of the adolescent, and the abusive mother, can perhaps be restored, and to better understand the specific transgenerational precursors to adolescent motherhood.
CHAPTER III
INTRODUCTION TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SELF

The most dramatic and far-reaching of the revised outlooks in psychoanalytic psychology has come into ever-clearer focus within the past few years and has stirred the interest of psychoanalysts on both sides of the Atlantic to a degree perhaps not equalled since the days of Freud. A predominant focus within this revitalization is a new psychological outlook for psychoanalysis—at the level of both theory and therapy—characterized by a new psychoanalytic view of the self, a new outlook on narcissism, and a new outlook on psychoanalysis itself, as well as on its relationship to the other sciences of man and its place in the scholarly community.

While many outside the field continue to think of the term "Freudians" as synonymous with "psychoanalysts", there is much in psychoanalytic thought, theory and therapy today to underscore the error inherent in that remarkably persistent notion. Yet it undergirds a phenomenon that psychoanalysts themselves have had a hard time coming to terms with as a group: extraordinary efforts have been bent through the forty years since Freud's death to the task described by one noted contemporary psychoanalyst as attempts to graft thinking and discoveries to the Procrustaeen bed of Freudian metapsychology, a more or less widely recognized phenomenon in the field.

Although there have been many formulatory forays out from psychoanalytic theory's beginnings, both by those who work with Freud and
those who came after him, most psychoanalysts would, I believe, agree that for non-technical purposes, the most significant changes would be those which represent a shift in the major focus of psychoanalysis as a theory of mental functioning. Such shifts may be said, oversimplistically, to have occurred three times since Freud's earliest setting forth of his principles: first, from being predominantly an id psychology to an id-ego psychology; thence to being predominantly an ego psychology, and—most recently—to the sharp focus on the self. Until the most recent thinking, psychoanalysts, however far afield their new concepts might have taken them, remained all but unanimously and intransigently loyal to the notions of instinctual energies processed by a tripartite mental apparatus and even more staunchly loyal to the notion that all human beings must survive an Oedipal complex as a routine part of human development, the relative success of which would determine key aspects of their view of life in adulthood and much of their behavior.

Often in the past history of psychoanalysis and its efforts at aligning clinical experience with Freudian classical metapsychology, "new" terminology and new concepts, have surfaced: often, in a variety of formulatory settings, one of these "new" terms, and new concepts, has been distinguished by the often re-used word self.

True to the policy that so long held psychoanalysts in loyal grip, each of these new terms and new concepts, including those under the rubric self, were seen as an additional puzzle piece giving rise to repeated attempts to find still another grafting place in the increasingly overwhelmingly superstructure that the theory of psychoanalysis had evolved into. Many perceptive psychoanalysts in past years recognized anomalies in their
daily clinical work that could not adequately be explained within Freudian theory: like the astronomers of old, the greater majority did not elect to believe that perhaps it was in some basic aspect of the field's theory that things were amiss. The only option, as long as there continued to be a feeling of necessity to attempt to fit all clinical findings, however anomalous, into the existing theoretical superstructure, was to incorporate all findings as additional concepts or formulations. For many decades in psychoanalysis many contributed to the ever-growing body of explanation of clinical data, almost all attempting to explain their findings within the strictures of drive-mediated conflict theory. Some few did make bolder strokes than others in their efforts at reformulation. Some of these evoked compelling interest and admiration in many quarters. But none took the essential step beyond evolving perceptive formulations, however clear their insight and perceptive sensitivity to the human condition.

Of these earlier changes and theoretical formulations associated with them, which represent changes in focus viewable only through a basically Freudian lens, we will not be concerned in this account: painstaking comprehensive treatments of them are widely available elsewhere, at least in one case written by non-psychoanalysts for interdisciplinary readership (Yankelovitch & Barrett, 1971). The modern-day psychoanalytic view which represents the subject of this account is one which looks at man not as a constellation of drives or instincts, nor of drive-mediated conflicts, nor as a tripartite mental apparatus of warring ego, id and superego, but one which considers the whole human being and the self of the human being, its experiences of others, and with others, in
all of the important human relationships of life.

The self of today and its discoverer

The step that would be required for a potential paradigm shift to be set in motion, as would be seen with the groundbreaking presentations of Heinz Kohut, was returning to first hand human data and beginning anew in understanding of psychoanalytically-derived data. What would one make of the psychoanalytically-derived data of human lives if one were not hearing it all filtered through the classical Freudian meta-psychology? Such a task was almost unaccomplishable for a long time dedicated classical analyst: the indoctrination is too deep; too immutable. Although he did not set out with any such intent, he did listen and think, and did admit it to himself when, redundantly, the human lives he worked with seemed to be saying with their lives that there was something very much awry in the classical view of what motivates man's unconscious thoughts. Around Kohut's view of the self some think a bellwether sound has begun to reverberate, portending the possibility of a change far more profound than a change of focus—a change more in the order of a scientific paradigm shift in the strictest sense of the term.

What would turn out to be involved in the psychological outlook capable of generating consideration as the new psychoanalytic paradigm would be a thorough-going systematic theory within which human health as well as psychopathology; normal human development as well as developmental disturbances; man's joys, creativity, life-asserting enthusiasms, goals and ideals and ambitions, as well as his depressions, incapacities, withdrawals, rages and cataclysmic drops in self-esteem, and his "hurt
feelings", could be perceivable as making psychoanalytic sense. What would turn out to be involved in the new psychoanalytic paradigm—contender would be a systematic theory within which all of these life elements, and others, could be meaningfully and integrately explored, understood and appreciated; and, when necessary, could be more optimally encountered in therapeutic treatment.

The man who managed to accomplish a task of this description, Heinz Kohut, is currently being hailed by a growing number of perceptive and thoughtful psychoanalysts—and some interdisciplinary scholars—as having presented psychoanalysis with a vital and viable new paradigm: by a surely courageous few he has been spoken of as the Freud of our time (courageous because few sentences can so narrow the eyelids of the psychoanalytic world). True to the Kuhnian conceptualization of the structure of scientific revolutions, the Kohut paradigm is indeed evoking the reportedly requisite rankling of some number of the psychoanalytic community.

Heinz Kohut's "new psychological outlook", as he speaks of it, has been named the Psychology of the Self.3

While the term 'self' has for many years commanded the considerable attention alluded to above, in various presentations of psychoanalytic and psychological conceptualizations by others, it was not until Kohut's

3 In communicating within the psychoanalytic community itself, the prefix psychoanalytic would be an assumed given; hence, most writings on the subject of the Psychology of the Self omit that word from the paradigm's "title": it is intended, as sometimes articulated, as the psychoanalytic psychology of the self. With all multi-word titles, usage usually finds people abbreviating them: it is not uncommon to hear or read the psychoanalytic psychology of the self referred to as self psychology.
work that the term 'self' has come to have distinctive pivotal significance for psychoanalytic thought, theory and therapy: with Kohut's work the self—not the ego, or the drives, or instincts, complexes or conflicts—is presented as the critical, all-important fundamental concept necessary for understanding the psychology and psychopathology of human lives across the entire life span. Kohut's paradigm for psychoanalysis systematically explains and explores the self at the level of depth psychology and views the self as the fundamental force underlying the fully-lived and fully-appreciated life.

Heinz Kohut's theories, additionally, present a seemingly viable potential for bridging the long-existing gap between psychoanalysis and the other sciences of man: its richness of theoretical possibility for adding enriched dimensions to the understanding of history, of cultures, of religion, of man's creativity, and other areas of man's endeavors, has already begun seriously to capture the interest of scholars in a variety of academic disciplines.

Thus, at many levels, the Kohutian self is a very different sort of concept, carrying a vastly different set of meanings, than whatever references might appear in prior psychoanalytic or psychological writings.

Given the near century-long reign of the Freudian paradigm, the strong cohesion of paradigmatic allegiance in psychoanalysis and the relatively short time since Kohut's second major work decisively defined its features in a way which underscored that a new paradigm was in fact being presented in his work, one cannot predict the Kohut theory's fate. As with any incipient paradigm shift it must yet survive the long road history suggests, as does reality, as a fact of life. Such oppositional
factors, however much they quite naturally might be expected to befog the lens through which the exact power and magnitude of the new theory might otherwise be more readily recognizable, have reportedly not served to distort the clarity of Kohut's vision for those who have thus far reported having tested his discoveries and ideas in the real world of human psychology—in their daily encounters with the real-life facts of human self-concerns. For these psychoanalysts and psychologists—in several countries—the real-life human self is reported to dramatically corroborate the validity and viability of the Kohutian self, and the psychology of the self, as one may readily discern in the writing of proponents of Kohut's theories, both in American and Europe.⁴

What Kohut's theory does appear to have done, in the views of many, is to have presented a theory with the potential capacity for understanding complex mental states in profound fashion.

The theories involved in Kohut's new psychological outlook are a product of depth psychology. As such they belong to a different level of discourse than, say, direct observation of children, or than the self-report, or laboratory studies and experiments of social psychology, developmental psychology or experimental researchers studying behavioral manifestations of personality. This is not to say that the understandings gained through the psychology of the self are seen as not holding considerable promise of useful application within these other fields (indeed some developmental psychologists have already begun adopting Kohut's understanding of the self into their university research and teaching), but rather that it could not be possible for the data of such other levels of discourse—that is, for those for which the data are not

⁴ See—page 165— for selected bibliography of others' writings.
the data of depth psychology— to give the appearance, on the surface, of substantiating phenomena salient at the discourse level of depth psychology.

As turned out to be the case after Kohut's initial discovery, it had required a new key for unlocking the comprehensibility of the data of depth psychology before it could be possible to arrive at the level of understanding which would come in time to make up the psychoanalytic psychology of the self. Once Heinz Kohut provided this different psychoanalytic approach at the level of listening to the patient from a different perspective, others who opted to avail themselves of his keys to understanding were able to perceive within their own clinical experience these elements which had so long evaded their full understanding.

Although one must delve extensively into reams of clinical material to acquire any sort of thoroughgoing understanding of Kohut's contribution in this particular area, this additional key to understanding the messages transpiring in the therapeutic setting in essence involves a reversal of priority of significance: phenomena long thought of as of secondary import, if not entirely irrelevant, Kohut came eventually to be able to appreciate in a light which he (and others) see as transposing the relative significance of a great preponderance of clinical data; certainly that seems to exist as a possibility.

In the beginning, when there is no self

There is, as one would expect, very much—at the conscious and the unconscious levels of the person's self experience, and at many points in the life span, and in health and in health's absence—involved in the
psychology of the self. It is not possible to present in any limited portrayal a comprehensive exposition of all of the theoretical formulations that go to make up this current-day psychoanalytic image of the self. Instead I will try to touch upon some few of the most basic aspects, in an introductory format, and to present a modest awareness of some of the key elements both of the Kohutian image of the self and of its psychology. Despite the essential importance of the clinical aspects of the psychology of the self, I will not try to include those aspects. It should be underscored, however, that a full understanding of the bases of this work requires a study of these aspects at the primary source level obtainable via Kohut's voluminous writings themselves.

The psychology of the self is regarded more importantly as a new psychology concerned with the understanding of unfolding developmental pathways—those leading to abundances of human health and full enjoyment of life fully as much as those leading to vulnerabilities and disturbances in relationships and in enjoyment of life. It perhaps goes without saying that this would have as a concomitant a different way of viewing, and treating, those in need of therapeutic assistance.

A place to begin an attempt at setting forth some of the key elements of the psychology of the self might be with the disarmingly simple, but key, construct that a person must have a firm, cohesive self in order to exist as a fully functioning adult optimally capable of participating in and appreciating life's dimensions.

In Kohut's view—a view shared by others—an integrated, cohesive self experience is not present at the beginning of human life: this self required by each human exists only in rudimentary aspect. Kohut's
psychoanalytic research led him to the belief that there exist instead self nuclei—the isolated fragments of an incipient, potential self. The singlemost critical aspect of all human development appears to be the coming together into cohesive form of these isolated self-experience fragments: failure to achieve this basic developmental task leaves the person in the untenable position of experiencing mental and physical phenomena as isolated phenomena, and unable to experience a consistent sense of continuity in time and space. Kohut's findings indicate that the elemental integration of the self nuclei, however, represents only the most minimal beginning point for the self's maturational requirements. A highly complex, very gradual, epigenetic structuralization of the self as a unified structure optimally follows from that early beginning place.

Severe failures in this structuralization along its epigenetic pathway can result in a self which will fragment in later life, or remain in the fragmentation-prone state, a state Kohut has found to carry with it a wide array of exquisitely painful experiences in response to many otherwise relatively innocuous life phenomena.

**Self experience: Equilibrium states and disequilibrium's tension**

Kohut's new paradigm for psychoanalysis includes a highly detailed analysis of what he believes to represent the basic structure of the self, and of the means by which the self achieves, or fails at achieving, optimal structuralization. It includes a detailed analysis of the evolutionary points in later life to which various aspects of the self's basic structural aspects appear—according to his analysis of much psychoanalytically-obtained data—to mature, as well as pinpointing
highly specific vulnerabilities, disturbances and self disorders to which specific failures in basic structuralization of the self will, in his view, give rise.

Additional insights Kohut believes he has been able to derive from his findings are new understandings of man’s violent rage and aggression, of his paranoid fears, phobias and fixations and of many of the phenomena often viewed as "antisocial", "perversions" and "instinctual". Capable of evoking perhaps the most widespread resistance of all may be Kohut's conviction that the world-renowned Oedipus Complex, long at home even in the common dictionary, is not, after all, a universal part of the human development of Everyman, but a misleading artifact of what Kohut describes as a defective self structure.

Although adult humans, ineluctably and of necessity, strive to formulate a "name"—or verbalizable ideational content—for their self-experiences, at least for their unpleasant, or painful, or distressing, ones; self experience, so Kohut is convinced, manifests at bedrock level wholly as experiences of equilibrium or disequilibrium tension states, not consciously congruent with discernible circumstance. One small example of a particular kind of unpleasant self experience manifesting as a sudden onset of the disequilibrium state at the self level would be that of a person who experiences a sudden great drop in self esteem, and becomes extremely tense, upon hearing a quite mild and constructively-intended non-positive comment about some work that he has shown to another for that person’s critical appraisal.

The tension states brought on by a tilting of the equilibrium balance or by the ongoing experience of disequilibrium's tension at the
self level in the self with structural deficits is so painful an experience that the self will, unwittingly, exert one or more of a vast compendium of reactions, in Kohut's view, as attempts to ameliorate the self's intolerable distress. A detachment from one's fellows and from "contact" with other human beings likely to "touch off" one's self-vulnerabilities is a representative example of such self-defensive maneuvers perhaps helpful to include here as one polar extreme.

A highly representative area in which the not-optimally-structured self will be subject to very considerable vulnerability is the area of self esteem: Kohut believes that persons with relatively successfully structured self have, in the course of the self's structuralization, acquired the requisite self structure whose function is the regulation of self esteem; those with defective self structure most often lack the requisite structure making this possible and thus have no recourse but to turn to the environment as an external regulator of self esteem.

Most environments will in time ineluctably fail at that task, particularly when, as is most often the case, the environment is not at all aware of its filling that role with regard to a given individual's unconscious self experience: while we may not be surprised to realize that another--a friend or neighbor perhaps--is "pleased" when we praise him, most of us can only be dumbfounded to learn that he is crushed on an occasion when we happen not to praise him in situations where we were in no way aware of his having done something for which he feels praise from us to be forthcoming. A major finding of his research, reports Kohut, is that the person for whom this kind of experience of woundedness in the (logical) absence of praise occurs is one whose defective
self structuralization has left him required to look to the environment as guardian of his self esteem and its regulation.

All of this is intended only to give a highly oversimplistic idea of at least some of the sorts of things Kohut is talking about in referring to self experiences, and to the self's experiences of equilibrium and disequilibrium, in order to make it possible to carry some few relatively concrete notions over into the necessarily more abstract level required for some of the theory's discussion.

Kohut is saying in all of this analysis of the self's structuralization and its vicissitudes that a particular definable compendium of life phenomena, including joy, rage, self-esteem regulation, etc. are directly and intimately associated with the epigenetic structuralization of the self. This epigenetic structuralization, says Kohut, begins at the first moment of each new life. The first steps in the process which must facilitate the coming together of the isolated fragments of the rudimentary self begin in the first days of an infant's life, according to Kohut's theory.

It is helpful in getting an understanding of Kohut's thinking, I think, to reflect upon some of the aspects salient to that early beginning point. From all that I have been able to bring together from reading in a great many sources, my own sense of how things apparently go in early infancy—in a simplified formulation—is that the only manner in which experiences are capable of registering on the new, young human being are as equilibrium states, and interruptions in those equilibrium states. Any of us can readily observe such states arising in the course of any given few hours of the life of a young infant; anyone who has
ever spent any time at all in a home where there is a young infant knows that any one of a wide array of phenomena will find the infant moving from the state in which he or she is contentedly sleeping, cooing or interestingly watching his toes to a condition of urgent distress: the same generalized distress can be seen to affect the child whether that which has come along to disturb the child's equilibrium state is a need to be fed, to be made warm, to be made dry, to be soothed, or to have an open safety pin closed, or any one of a number of other tension-generating phenomena. Once someone in the environment becomes aware of the distress signal from the child, he or she most often responds to the perception that something is wrong. Even if one can "see" nothing wrong, our sense is that something is "wrong"; that something has come along to impinge upon the baby's calm, or joyful experience of himself. With no way for the baby to conceptualize, let alone put words to, just what it might be that the environment might provide to restore the child's experience of contentment, the baby can only make some sort of signal that something is now making him or her feel that his inner world of experience has gone awry. These generalized experiences of equilibrium--of feeling peacably contented; and these generalized experiences of dis-equilibrium--of feeling that something has gone very much wrong that needs to be righted are, regardless of what evoked them, in the domain of "self" experiences.

Just as one can say that the newborn physical organism we call a baby "expects" there to be an environment capable of meeting its requirement for oxygen, we don't question that the new human life "expects" an environment which will be omnipresent, omniscient and ever at the ready
to maintain the infant's basic experience of self in a tolerable state of equilibrium, through anticipating and/or discerning—and "magically" providing—whatever it might be that is required in the way of provisions from the environment. There appears to be a thoroughgoing dedication among humankind to the unspoken but universally-shared notion that it is the environment's "duty" to see to it that a baby be kept as free as humanly possible from all distress. Few question the "built-in" shared belief that if a baby cries, or whimpers, or fails to smile, or turns away from food, or does not sleep, or seems to find life, himself, or the environment not possible of being experienced pleasurably—"something is wrong"; and that it is the unquestioned task and responsibility of those in the baby's environment to figure out, with no reliable help from the baby, what it is that is impinging on the baby's equilibrium and to remove, provide or alter whatever that might be.

One can observe an infant's caretaker trying out perhaps five different such provisions in response to a baby's assertive distress signal: a mother, say, will often first make a quick scan of the external environment—for open pins, overtight clothing, a cold draft from an open window, a foot caught in a crib bar, the presence of an angry-seeming toddler-sibling. Within seconds she will also have picked up the baby, as if somehow that might do the trick. With remarkable near-universality, she will concurrently also be "speaking to" the baby, and we are not surprised when we hear the baby's mother using a quite different tone of voice and set of inflections, than she employs in any other area of life. Nor will we raise a puzzled eyebrow to hear her interspersing a series of noises rather than words—noises which no one
has "taught" her, which are not written down in any book as having any "meaning" whatever. My own conviction is that rare indeed is the human being who will be unable to give the universally-shared "answer" to the question of what the mother's "noise" in that situation "means". Nor will we be surprised if she should, as if an integral part of all these other phenomena, employ a gentle rocking movement once she has picked up the infant. This rhythmic component too no one has taught her, yet adults would, surely, be surprised to hear anyone question a mother's behavior in moving her body back and forth in order that the young being in her arms may experience that motion without himself being personally in motion, whether they were to observe that particular behavior in Buckingham Palace or a slum tenement in Newark, New Jersey.

Even the words themselves which find themselves being said in among whatever else comes forth from the mother's mouth seem to share a near-universal equivalency in translation: few would sense incongruity to find an author assuming in any language that in such circumstance the mother might be found saying in essence, "There, there, everything's going to be all right: Mother will find out what's troubling you and make it all right". Many, if not all, would unquestioningly take it for granted to encounter, in life, lore or literature, a mother's assuring the young infant too young to comprehend the spoken word as such, with words that ascribe to the mother, and assure to the baby, the mothering person's embodiment of this kind of omnipotence, omniscience and potential for providing blissful perfection. And in fact, it seems to strike most adults as not at all incongruous, apparently, to encounter a mother's intoning just these words even at the times that reality would
seem most to contradict the possibility of there being any "truth" or "reality" whatever to her thus assuring the baby--as for instance when some grave misfortune like serious illness, or no money for food, calls into real question the mother's ability to provide for the child's restoration of "all right-ness".

But returning to the ordinary everyday circumstance in which all that is happening is that an ordinary average baby is being robustly assertive about the fact that some quite-possibly ordinary impingement has temporarily disrupted his equilibrium: the ordinary average mother will, we know, often, proceed to try out a continued variety of possible provisions from the environment, if none of those earlier ones managed to restore contentment to the small child. Food and drink are two of the certainly often-\textit{tried} possibilities, no matter that the mother's sense of relative proportion raises a question for her of that: "Could it be that he is hungry? Even though I fed him only two hours ago? It doesn't seem likely, but maybe that's what is bothering him" would not strike most observers as an unlikely response on the mother's part to the crying infant for whom she "sees" nothing visible in the environment that might be calling forth the baby's inability to go on peacably with the business of being a baby. If, in response to the proffered food or liquid, the baby only continues more assertively to signal disequilibrium, the mother will either say, or think, "No, that wasn't it: I'll have to try something else", and she does so.

What we expect will bring her ongoing attempts to an end is the baby's signaling, by a return to the state of no longer asserting that something is awry for him, that his equilibrium is once again within bal-
ance. "So that's what he wanted", we would not be surprised to overhear in the Newark kitchen or the royal nursery once one of all her list of responses causes the baby to seem to "feel right".

Human beings seem to agree in seeing it as an unassailable right of each new human life that there will be in the external environment other human beings, who will assume responsibility for anticipating and/or discerning—and for providing or removing—anything and everything required to maintain and/or restore the child to a state where the child can continue along experiencing life, the environment, and his relationships with others, in a non-distressful way.

The fact that we do indeed all know all of these things so well that we must wonder at anyone's finding a point to set them down on a printed page points up the extent to which it is taken for granted that we accept that there is a requirement so basic and elemental to the existence of each new human life that it can be regarded as an "expectation" in the natural ordering of Life, or Nature—that there will exist in the environment surrounding young human life other persons who will just "naturally" provide the environmental provisions necessary to see to the maintenance of a tolerable equilibrium state for the new life. The pervasively-shared notion seems to be that this situation will continue until the time that new life has matured to an age or stage where those same persons who initially just naturally experienced such responsibility to be their obligation, come to just naturally experience that responsibility no longer to be their obligation. In much-simplified essence, the idea that each human life is born with a "built-in" set of requirements from the environment, of a sort that can be thought of as
expectations from the environment in the same way that each new life is born with the "expectation" that there will be oxygen for it to breathe, is helpful to have in mind when first encountering Kohut's theory of how things go for the human self's development and developmental vicissitudes.

What Heinz Kohut believes is that each one of these ordinary everyday responses of the mother (and, as we will get to later, the father, at a somewhat different level) is in fact, minute by minute, response by response—with each word, noise, motion, assurance, attempt, facial expression and response itself—directly involved in the structuralization of the human self. In Kohut's view this self-structure, first formed in infancy, is directly tied to all self experience across the life span. He sees his psychoanalytic researches as demonstrating that it is these self-experiences which underlie, and color, and to a remarkably large degree, direct or guide, very much of all phenomenal experience across the life span. My own sense is that it's not difficult to think in those terms at the level of the infant and his equilibrium states—I think we can probably accept that the infant's experiences share as a common denominator that they are his self-experience: if the baby's equilibrium is completely disturbed because an open safety pin is sticking in his back, we can accept that the baby doesn't "know" that "a pin is sticking in my back", but only that his experience of life and self are not now within tolerable limits. And I think we have no problem with the notion that in such a situation the baby is not going to be able to find satisfaction in being given a warm bottle of milk—no matter how much of a physical requirement for food he may be having at that very moment. Nor will we
expect the baby to find any pleasure in having someone play pattycake with him while a pin is sticking in his back. As long as something is impinging on his underlying experience of himself/his life, regardless of its cause, we can and do expect the baby to be incapable of making reasonable contact with the persons or pleasures in his environment. Only when the basic underlying equilibrium state is within some degree of reasonable balance can the baby relax enough—or be relaxed enough—to get on with the ordinary business of living like playing pattycake and enjoying his milk. When it comes to distress that we can be aware of, we take it for granted that the child must rely on external sources to maintain these sorts of balance of self-experience. And, in gradual increments over many years, we expect the growing human being to take over the responsibility for maintaining these balances for himself.

Keeping the distress part of things to tolerable limit does have a lot to do with how the self structures get formed, formed and filled in, in Kohut's view, but he is convinced there is much more to it than that—much more that has all to do with very much of the positive, and abundantly healthy, vibrant aspects of adult living. Kohut believes he has discovered these self structures to be comprised of clearly defined constituents, and that the self's structures, and the self-experiences throughout life, all come under the rubric on which Kohut has been able to shed startling new light: that of narcissism.

When the baby's self-experience is within reasonable balance—when he is not experiencing there being some undefinable something wrong for him—he has no "need" to experience "awareness" of his self experience, in a sense we can say that that's what makes it so that he can attend to
other people and other experiences and other activities. What calls into awareness the matter of what's happening with regard to one's self-experience is when something has come along to upset the self's equilibrium. Just as with the baby, those adults for whom self experience remains more or less within a relative balance of equilibrium or of readily restored equilibrium when something in the environment upsets it, are not ordinarily consciously aware of their self experiences as such. (Not unlike a statement I once heard attributed to an orthopedist about back problems: "The person who has a strong, healthy back can be said to be characterized by the fact that he is never "aware" of having a back.")

We tend not to think of most of our other, pleasurable—or satisfying—experiences as "self-experience": to think of things like joy; healthy assertiveness; goal-directed ambition; guiding ideals; creativity, sense of humor—as "self-experience", or as having anything to do with "narcissistic" experience. Kohut is convinced that his researches have redundantly discerned that all of these life-facets are as much a part of narcissistic phenomena as are the "negative" phenomena we are more ready to concede the label "narcissistic" to. What led him to these convictions were his redundant findings that all of these come into being positively, or negatively, or fail to come into being in direct correlation to the degree that the self structures were first formed, adequately, or defectively. Says Kohut: Only if a person has first, long since, managed to acquire relatively firm, well-strengthened, cohesive self structures, can he attain, and enjoy, a satisfying life. With well-tempered self structures as an undergirding, one can, Kohut
believes, both enjoy the sunny days and weather the stormy ones; without this even many of the sunny days will be stormy ones, in more senses than one. Many stormy days may becloud the self with structural deficits, because, so Kohut's research has convinced him, abrupt shifts into anger or rage will have a remarkably high tendency to be set off by even the "mildest" of ordinary life experiences. So too, feelings of detachedness, or of gloom, or of pervasive apathy, or of frenzied uncertainty and great self-doubt, will dull one's ability to feel like a success even in the midst of achieving success, for the person with self structures rendered vulnerable by structural deficits.

Difficult as it might perhaps be for many an adult human to feel comfortable with the idea that so much for the later experience of life of the individual will hinge upon their functioning as parents in the daily care of their child, Heinz Kohut's presentations of the data undergirding his theory appears to provide compelling, and abundant, support for his view that minute by minute, across all the years of the child's early development, from the beginning, it is the highly specific, actual responses of the parents, to each of the emotional needs of the child, which ineluctably form the substance of which the self structures are formed, firmed, filled in and strengthened.

Kohut postulates that there exists for human life a highly specific set of requirements that stand as sine qua non for the acquisition of a later-life viable self-experience: requirements that are inherent (says Kohut, on a par with oxygen for the physical organism) to the human condition. Kohut has been able to gather not inconsiderable data in support of his view that these requirements exist at the level of "expecta-
tions" for the human infant of what will--because must--be there in the
surrounding environment, as with oxygen.

If the environment fails to provide these requirements (and the par-
ents are in fact just about the only aspect of the environment around to
provide them), the rest of the human being--the physical being (or what
some have referred to as the "outer shell" of a human being), may grow,
develop and struggle towards maturity--and appear to onlookers to be de-
veloping right along. (Although this is not to say that there will not
be signs that things are going wrong, misinterpreted as Kohut believes
they often are.) But in Kohut's view the inner core self will fail to
thrive, the degree depending on the degree of failure from the parents
in meeting these natural requirements.

By adulthood such an individual will, unlike those who can take their
self experience for granted and hence can exist oblivious to awareness of
them as self experience, be preoccupied much of the time with his self-
experiences--experiences which will underlie, color and characterize many
other aspects of his life. This despite the fact that the person may
well appear to others as charming, outgoing, accomplished and even high-
ly successful. Kohut sees a wide range of self-structure success or
failure, and many persons with self-structure deficits will fall at the
far other end of the continuum of later life manifestations of the self
disturbance, with these persons being more clearly distinguishable from
their fellow man as preoccupied with self experience. Kohut believes his
research shows the existence of such a continuum of later life self-
experience-culminations as clearly stemming from presence or absence of
self structure deficits, a discovery he sees as pointing up his finding
that all self disturbances are not at all necessarily apparent from the
standards man often judges his fellows' experience of life by.

The new image of narcissism

This might be a good place to insert another important element of psychology of the self: that Kohut's new outlook on the self necessarily encompasses a wholly new outlook on the term and concept of what is "narcissism". One of Kohut's contributions has been to assert that narcissism--healthy narcissism--is a vital, essential, elemental part of all human experience (where parental responsiveness has paved the way to the acquisition of firm and healthy self structures). Narcissistic experiences, and narcissistic interests, have long been thought of as comprising only pathological phenomena in adults, and thought appropriately applicable only to a small child's solipsistic view of life: even before adulthood this business of narcissism, it was thought, was something one was to hurry up and grow out of. While tolerable in an infant, any sort of manifestation or notion of narcissism was thought of only in pejorative terms, at best, with regard to an adult. Very rare was the person who would dare admit to any feeling that might be labelled narcissistic.

Kohut's beginning point in his work was simply an attempt to better understand the hitherto largely untreatable severe disorders labelled the "narcissistic disorders". (Often these were, and still are, labelled a lot of other things as well: it has not been at all easy for the mental health professions to be certain just what all should come under the heading "narcissistic disorders".) In time, Kohut came to gain an awareness through his work that led him to believe that he had come upon
a quite different nature of the narcissistic sector of the personality --to believe that the narcissistic sector of the personality represents the entire core self. Then, gradually he came to appreciate what he believes to be its far greater significance in human life, a significance quite beyond what psychoanalysis and psychology had long believed.

In essence, one might I think say that Kohut came to be able to perceive that it was not that narcissistically-colored experience was an aspect, nor a symptom, of "narcissistic personality disorders", so much as it was instead that narcissistic disorders were but one manifestation --a defective manifestation--of a hitherto completely misunderstood concept of the crucial role of narcissistic experience in human life. Narcissism, says Kohut, is a life-long part of man's healthy life, his experience of relationships, and of his emotional life and achievements.

What Kohut's psychology of the self sets forth as a key concept is that narcissism is an all-important basic component of man's most psychologically healthy, adaptive, and culturally valuable experiences. And, as would follow from that, that it is an error to label narcissism with any of the derogatory labels long accorded.

Those who experience faulty structuralization of the self across the course of its maturational path will, in later life, Kohut believes, be subject to narcissistic pain and narcissistic vulnerability at many levels of experience. Their later life experiences can be thought of as "narcissistic wounds" and their faulty parental-milieu experiences sometimes thought of as "narcissistic injuries". Although they are phenomena regarded by adults--including the person experiencing them--as very often bizarre in the extreme, Kohut believes his research supports the view that the narcissistic experiences of those whose self-structuralization has suffered
from deficits in one segment of the self or another are either identical to the completely healthy, normal, ordinary narcissistic responses of infancy and early childhood (translated into an adult's ideational content or behavioral repertoire), or are directly traceable equivalences.

Kohut sees these narcissistically-disturbed experiences falling into one of two major categories: either as efforts to achieve amelioration of profound narcissistic disequilibrium feelings, or as reactions to the intolerable pain in response to a failure on the part of the environment in providing needed help in achieving, or sustaining, equilibrium balance. Kohut's belief is that he came to be able to translate the language of the injured, or deficient, self and thus to perceive the narcissistically-vulnerable self as stuck having to attempt to elicit the same sorts of essential responses from people in the environment which were not provided by his parental milieu during the time(s) that they were appropriate responses. In childhood, says Kohut, a certain kind of responsiveness from the parents is required in order for the self's structure to mature beyond experiencing a profound need for such responses to stave off the adult's intolerable tension of narcissistic disequilibrium.

In short, the adult who was not provided the responses required for his self's structuralization across infancy and childhood cannot consistently experience life, nor react to life, in an "ordinary" manner because he lacks the requisite fully-filled-in self structures which would make that possible. If the supply of the needed responses was inadequate in childhood and infancy, Kohut believes these responses simply remain, immutably (albeit unconsciously) at the same level of essential
requirement, (and expectation) from the environment as they were in infancy and childhood. Much as a grown man or woman may look alike, sound like--and feel like--a jackass for becoming furiously rageful at someone in the environment "over nothing"; at the level of self experience, Kohut believes this is eminently understandable as the self's unconscious reaction when a needed provision from the environment is not forthcoming.

What Kohut is saying in all this is simply that the self structure deficits in childhood will have their say in adulthood--willy nilly--and that not infrequently, that say will come forth in a sudden, and violent, burst of fury's rage, wildly out of all proportion--(or so it appears to those with taken-for-granted self structures--) to the occasion evoking all the fuss. In Kohut's view, the self which was faultily provided for in childhood, recognizes in adulthood no standards but its own inescapable structural requirements; and no defectively-structured self is immune to "flying off the handle" when the environment lets it down in its hour of unconscious need for admiring, or approving, or soothing responsiveness, be it the self of prince, or professor; president or pizza maker--unless some subsequent means has been found to compensate for the defects in the self's primary structures.

For the well-tempered self structures, Kohut traces highly specific direct lines of maturational evolution across the life span. In the course of the maturational evolution of the self, the narcissistic experiences of infancy gradually evolve, Kohut believes, into the most mature, adaptive and culturally valuable aspects of an adult person's life and personality, including guiding ideals, creativity, humor and wisdom.

Kohut speaks also to the notion that narcissistic experiences are
thought of as having to do solely with individual experience; that is, that narcissistic experiences are not associated with relationships with others. Not so, says Kohut: one's relations with others are from the beginning, very profoundly intertwined with one's narcissistic experience, at a variety of complex levels.

In Heinz Kohut's "new outlook for psychoanalysis", he makes explicit that it is decidedly not a matter of drives and conflicts, nor inherent struggles for ascendancy between an id and ego, nor successful resolution of an oedipal complex, which determines the path the emerging human life will follow. Rather, from the beginning, it is, in Kohut's view, entirely the ways in which the child is responded to—which will determine whether the child will—or will not—grow to be an adaptive, fully functioning adult capable of responding to others in a joyful and enthusiastic way. Although in very technical psychoanalytic format, Kohut presents an abundance of supporting evidence through which one can follow the developmental pathways of varied human lives that led him to these formulations and findings. He presents extensive evidence to permit the reader to follow along and to observe in human lives the point his theory arrives at; that that which governs the extent to which the structuralization of the self succeeds at proceeding across its inherent developmental pathway appears to be the extent to which the parents were (or were not) available, and optimally able, to regulate the balance between narcissistic equilibrium and disequilibrium.

It is of course within the broad strokes and fine points subsumed under this broad and much-encompassing rubric of regulation of optimal balance between equilibrium and disequilibrium that Kohut's psychology of the self proceeds beyond generalizations and takes its definitive
shape as a systematic and comprehensive psychoanalytic, developmental phenomenological psychology of the self. And it is at those levels that the real complexities arise. It is to some of these broad strokes and fine points that we can now turn our attention.

What parents "do" that permits the self structures to flourish

Uppermost among the environmental requirements which Kohut sees the human infant born into the world with an oxygen-like expectation for is the combination of a mother's affectionate, soothing and admiring presence on a consistent and reliable basis, and a father's availability for being admired and "looked up to" by the child, along with the father's approving presence. (The father's responsiveness he sees as apparently existing, from the standpoint of the self-requirements being discussed here, as a requirement of a slightly later developmental period than those required by the mother.) These are the parental provisions he regards as requisite in order for the fragments of the rudimentary self to become integrated into a unity, and so that the structuralization of the core self for a lifetime will have opportunity to fill in and fill out around the basic rudimentary-ness.

Although he does not couch it in these terms, my own sense of what Kohut, has in essence, set forth is a view suggesting that the same concept of "parental twofoldness" which nature set forth as required for the creating of, or conceiving, this new human life, appears also to be the same twofold environmental proviso in which are located the "environmental expectation" factors necessary for the successful maturation of that new being's self from the frame of reference of the components of the
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self's structuralization. In other words, that what are required for optimal self structuralization are a) certain specific provisions from a mother and b) certain specific provisions from a father.

What Kohut is describing in all of this cannot be adequately defined as "providing the child with love", nor of "caring" about the child. The kinds of parental responsiveness Kohut points to as making the crucial differences to the successful structuralization of the self certainly does not exclude aspects which could well come under those definitions, but in and of themselves he does not at all see "love", or "caring" as capable of facilitating the successful structuralization and subsequent viability of a self free from narcissistic vulnerability. The presence of a mother and/or a father intending to "do the right thing" in the raising of their children can—as we clearly know—nonetheless result in their children's coming to suffer one or another of the evidences of less-than optimal acquisition of some number of the elements of the fully enjoyed life. There has to be "something more" to it than that, he believes.

This something more, which must exist within the environmental surround in order for the mother and the father to "do the right thing", and to know what the right thing probably is (without knowing what the "right thing" is "supposed to be") Kohut terms empathy, but he spells out in much detail what—all he means to be encompassing in that term.

Kohut believes his work has been able to distinguish a seemingly comprehensive constellation of the specific expectation-level environmental/parental elements necessary for the basic structuring of the self, as well as for its later firming, strengthening, etc. His findings,
(and the corroboration now of others working in this area) suggest that the child must be provided with these quite specific requirements Kohut spells out, or, if not thus provided, the child will know the pain of one degree or another of self-disequilibrium's pain or distress in later life.

In addition, Kohut's theory asserts that these requirements must be met when and as they are required, not at random, nor on some sort of predictable schedule, nor through a rote learning of them as requirements. Nor can the child articulate them for the parent, in the commonly-thought of sense of that term.

What is required of the mother is, on the one hand, is that she provide at least a minimal sufficiency of these myriad essential requisites of the child's developing self. But, in a sense, what is also required of her is that she manage to do this without needing to be told what these requisites of the child-self are: it is not, in other words necessary that she "know what these requirements are" in order for her to manage to provide them. Nor in fact is it likely that she will have any conscious idea of what she is providing in the way of self-requirements while in the process of abundantly providing them. In large measure, one might think of the self structure's requirements, I think, as non-visible by-products, which happen to occur in the course of the mother's doing whatever else she does for, to, with, and near the child. From the standpoint of the development of the self and its structuralization, what is "required" of her in Kohut's view is a) her consistent and reliable presence per se, and b) that she be empathically responsive.

Although it is difficult to phrase this in a way that does not
sound meaningless, what she must be empathically responsive to are a reasonable proportion of the child's specific (and highly varied) requirements for her empathic responsiveness. I think it would be accurate to say that what the child needs is to be empathically responded to: the child's requirement is to experience himself as a person regarded by the environment (and hence, the parents) as one entitled to be empathically responded to, as well as entitled to a series of specific kinds of responses. Through their empathic responsiveness to the child and to everything about the child, Kohut believes that the parents in a sense hold up a mirror through which the child is provided with this requirement to experience himself being regarded by the environment as entitled to its empathic responsiveness. Mirror-like, he sees his mother, say, (although he needs this from his father also) seeing him as one entitled to empathic responsiveness. As Kohut spells out in detail, in his view there will be many occasions on which the mother will have ample opportunity—in the course of her ordinary caretaking and spontaneous experience—to be empathically responsive to the child's ongoing emotional need to be empathically responded to. Because there are, both concomitant to that need and subsumed under it, a vast array of multifaceted kinds of responses required; nature has so Kohut believes, not left it up to chance that the mother will yield up all of these spontaneously. Kohut is convinced from his research that if the child has gotten any indication at all that there is room to hope that his parents will come forth with this all-important empathic responsiveness, the child will see to his own ordinary, normal needs for responsiveness. The child manages this by relentlessly drumming up, dreaming up, making
up, and literally manufacturing by hand, an endless stream of occasions, occurrences and objects for the mother to greet, if she will, with a goodly stockpile of empathic responses. This drumming up of all manner of displays, exhibitions and gifts is done by all normal, healthy children as part of their ordinary, everyday being-in-the-world: it is not necessary for either child or mother to be aware that such presentings are functions of the natural ordering through which the mother may be "prompted" to provide the very specific provisions required for the structuralization of the developing human self, says Kohut.

In Kohut's premises, the child can be counted on to be magnificently creative in all of this at his end: highly selectively will the child drum up those objects and occurrences, appearing to unconsciously "design" these so as to insure that there will be ample opportunity inherent in the particular object or occurrence for it to elicit the very specific mode and manner of responsiveness the child's self requires at that time, and at that developmental phase of the structuralization of its self. Like all else about the self's developmental pathways which Kohut has elucidated, the sorts of occurrences and objects which the child assertively brings to its mother's attention follow, from the standpoint of feature and format, a clearly epigenetic pattern-unfolding consonant with the epigenetic maturational unfolding of the self structures. This simply means that in infancy, where what the baby needs is, say, to have his physical body joyfully responded to, the baby in fact cavorts his arms, legs, etc. around for the mother's delighted response. If the baby is fortunate enough to have a mother who will respond with admiring delight at the baby's physical body.
Kohut has presented an abundance of clinical evidence in support of his view that in the absence of some minimal sufficiency of empathic responsiveness, the self structures will fail to thrive. (Although we are here following the child's own temporal sequence in discussing the mother first, and separately; the same general principles apply to the father's self-structuring provisions as well, despite their including some number of quite different features, which seem to predominate at a slightly later stage.) One can acquire as good a list as any of what these things are that constitute the "surface" provisions for meeting the essential expectation requirements of the developing self simply by watching an empathically responsive "ordinary" mother in relationship with her child, much as we did earlier in simply noting some of the near-universal responses of the mother to the distress-signals of the earliest infant. Empathic responsiveness to the child's needs must, by definition, be phase-appropriate as well as situation-appropriate; and responsiveness, and responses, during one part of a child's life, temporally or situationally, would be either somewhat, largely or entirely different from those appropriate for other times or situations. The non-empathically-responsive parent will, in some cases, work hard at being responsive, but will not be in tune with the developmentally appropriate phase determining what the child's self needs.

There is not room for perfection in the perfect structuralization of the self.

Mothers are not, we will no doubt all readily agree, as consistent about responding with what the baby or child seems to need from the en-
vironment as is the oxygen-atmosphere, but even that inescapable fact of life—that is, the non-perfectness of responsiveness of the ordinary mother, Kohut believes to be the specific environmental provision for one of the requirements essential to the developing human self. Were a mother to devote herself so singlemindedly to the job of "being a good mother" to her child as to respond absolutely perfectly, and immediately, and 100% of the time, to all of the child's wish for her responsiveness, she would not be being what Kohut regards as empathically responsive; she would not be meeting the requirements for successful structuralization of the self. The "average mother" so Kohut, and Donald Winnicott believe, and no doubt others, is remarkably adept at determining what the specific, correct, and phase-appropriate responses are for meeting the epigenetically changing requirements for the self's unfolding, without having any idea that she is at the moment meeting critically essential requirements for the structure of the child's self for a lifetime. She is also remarkably adept at incorporating an appropriate, and required, amount of failure to provide the empathic response of the moment. When such failures occur within the overall milieu of empathic responsiveness, Kohut (and, again Winnicott as well) believe these constitute precisely what the burgeoning self requires in order to flourish and thrive. What guides the mother in the accomplishment of all of this is what Kohut terms empathy. Her empathy both permits and directs her to respond empathically. In so doing she meets the child's built-in re-

5Here, and throughout, the term "average mother" is used to mean the mother doing as good a job as the self-structures require, i.e., an average, empathic parent, with an ordinary share of failings.
quirements that there exist within the child's surround an environmental milieu which will provide the wherewithal for the structuralization of his self. The requirement the mother fills specifically through her failing to respond perfectly one hundred percent of the time and immediately, contains a number of technical complexities which would be difficult to encompass within an introduction to Kohut's work of reasonable length, but it is worth noting at least briefly that an important concept in Kohut's formulations is the highly essential formulation he terms the principle of optimal frustration.

This Kohut regards as a critical feature in the actual laying down of self structure, involved in that which makes it eventually possible for the provisions supplied by, first, the mother, and subsequently, the father, to become internalized by the child as integral parts of his or her own self. It is, in the theory of the psychology of the self, by way of optimal frustration that "transmuting internalization" takes place. It is by this means that the child becomes capable of assuming the self-maintaining and self-regulating functions initially required of the environment. Another reason this is important to note here is that it helps to underscore that Kohut is not at all propounding that what the child requires of "good" parents is "perfection", or perfect responsiveness to every demand and whim, but rather optimal responsiveness.

Here again, what appears as the distinguishing feature between perfect, optimal and not nearly adequate responsiveness is empathy: empathic responsiveness is, by definition, and in practice, optimal responsiveness, because it is responsiveness guided by the child's maturational need, which the child demonstrates, and the average parent appears to recognize.
Some of the "mother requirements" and "father requirements" in Kohut's view

To turn briefly to a few of the more specific pervasive elements within this developmental paradigm, we can hark back to the acknowledgement that, as often as not, what the baby requires to restore, or sustain, his equilibrium is to be soothed, calmed, rocked, and held. For each of these Kohut has traced the specific part each plays in self-structuring and the developmental route it takes in adulthood. I mentioned earlier that much in the way of the self structure's requirements are provided in the course of the mother's providing other caretaking activities: food is a fairly representative example of this, one that is present at that earlier, infant, stage when rocking and holding are primary needs, yet which continues far beyond the time in which infant-level responses are phase-appropriate. While the needs of the physical organism call for recurrent replenishment of food, there are many alternative ways in which this physical requirement can be satisfied. At the physical level, it makes little difference to the human being which of these ways the physical organism receives what it requires. At the level of the self's structure, however, Kohut spells out the specific difference it will make whether the food is provided by an empathically responsive mother or by a depressed, or angry, or cold, or detached mother, or by an automaton. At the level of the self structures, he sees it as critically important that the child experience an empathically responsive food-provider. The same holds true with all "physical" requirements: each fills—or fails to fill—a twofold natural purpose in the course of parenting, in Kohut's view (and in Winnicott's).
One of the most pervasive needs regarded by Kohut (and others) as of singlemost critical importance from the standpoint of development of the self is for admiration.

The self very emphatically requires, says Kohut, the ongoing presence of a parent(s) who demonstrates a joyful admiring of the child, from the beginning. He believes the child quite literally needs to see in his mother's eye, and father's eye, a gleam of pleasure at the fact of his existence.

A rapidly growing body of recent, and ongoing, research in academic developmental psychology at the laboratory level seems wholeheartedly to corroborate this, as a later chapter will discuss. But here I think it will help lay the groundwork for later integrative efforts, to interject a small reference to some of the very recent mother-infant interaction research.

One can see, as I did in observing some of this laboratory research well outside the area of depth psychology conceptualizations and formulations, the profoundly powerful impact on even an 80-day infant of the mother's admiring facial expression, tone of voice and directed admiring gaze, on the child's pervasive physical and emotional state and overall equilibrium. One can see equally powerful—and almost unbelievably devastating—impact brought on for the child even at this young age by the mother's shifting into an expression altered only by her removing her smile and look of delighted admiration while remaining within the normal mother-infant range and position in the face to face position: Even when she assumes a non-scowling, straight, sober face within the briefest of time spans, and even when the baby was moments before wholeheartedly enjoying himself and his experience of himself and his experience of his mother and his world.

I had occasion to watch other adult observers wince with what they
later unanimously described as their own very considerable emotional distress at the so-evident and untenable emotional distress (and concomitant physical constriction and tensing) being experienced by the two and a half month old infants in these experiments.

The baby whose mother consistently or repeatedly fails to look with admiring pleasure at him, nor smiles approvingly at him in the course of their interaction, is more than just unhappy for the moment, in Kohut's view: at the level of depth psychology, rather than these sorts of overtly visible behavioral manifestations, the satisfactory development of the infant's self is at stake; and the stakes, from Kohut's retrospective findings, are high.

In the view of the psychology of the self, it is the ongoing compendium of specific admiring and approving and confirming responses to the child, and to the performances, presentations, gifts and displays which the child relentlessly puts forth in order to elicit the responses required for this self's structuralization, which provide the essential wherewithal for the successful integration, cohesion, filling out, firming and strengthening of the self structures.

Kohut's research has led to the inference that the forms in which the parent's admiring, approving and confirming responses will be provided, as well as the forms in which the child will attempt to elicit these responses, will change in direct proportion to the epigenetic structuralization of the self as it progresses: in the natural ordering of human life these requirements on the part of the self, and the responses required by the parents to meet those self-requirements, move through a long complex series of phase-appropriate, many of them overlapping and, at time, reverting to those predominating at an earlier
developmental stage. The parent's job is to empathically respond, not by the calendar showing time elapsed since birth, says Kohut, but in accord with the self's structural requirements. My own sense of what he is saying here is, for example, that the parent who snarls "stop acting like a baby!" is, in Kohut's view, reacting to a chronologically-derived notion of what the parent thinks the child "should" do at that "age"; but the child's requests, reactions and responses know no such chronology. By and large, so Kohut's theory suggests, the child is guided in his requests, reactions and responses of and to parents and environment by the state of the self structures, that is the epigenetic level thus far reached.

In other words, right as the parent well may be that the child is indeed "acting like a baby", there is, Kohut's theory suggests to my reading, a good likelihood that whatever the child was doing that elicited the remark from the parent that he was acting like a baby, was in fact an attempt to elicit from the parent an empathic response (still) required (perhaps only temporarily) by the child's self structuralization. My own sense of all this is that the fact that the parent provides a non-empathic reprimand in place of the empathic responsiveness to the child's having set up a situation for the parent to empathically respond to, would be an indicator that the parent may have failed to respond to the self's requirements of an earlier period with adequate empathic responsiveness. Such an indicator would not at all necessarily mean that the parent responded unempathically to the child at that earlier stage: failure to provide the required empathic responsiveness of a given period can with equal likelihood mean that the parent was not present to provide any responses at all; or wasn't in a position to respond.
For the purposes of the structuralization of the self it makes no difference why its essential requirements were not adequately met, no more than it makes any difference to the undernourished physical organism that the reason it may not have received sufficient food-nourishment was because the family did not have enough money.

My own understanding of all this is, in effect, that telling a child (or an adult) to "stop acting like a baby" is analogous to telling a person who has not had enough to eat to "stop being hungry". Not only does such a response not "work", it makes the person feel woefully misunderstood. And since what seems to happen when a child's needs are not accurately (and hence empathically) responded to is that the child feels woefully misunderstood, it is readily possible to see the vicious circle this would have to lead to.

If a baby's needs are not understood correctly (or just not responded to), the baby "acts like a baby" to try to get his needs met. When they continue to go unmet, he has to continue to act like a baby, to try to get his needs understood and hence met. To the child, acting like a baby is his way of showing his earlier needs have not been met; to the parent who failed to meet those needs--so that the child now has to act like a baby--acting like a baby can seem like something that "does not deserve to be empathically responded to", but that in fact, "deserves"

I think an analogous phenomenon sometimes occurs in therapy situations: as in some of the situations which a therapist perceives as the client's "resistance", or the client's "engaging the therapist in a power-struggle", or in fact, the therapist--perhaps irritatedly--perceiving the client as "acting like a baby": I think we tend to call up a ready image when another is described as acting like a baby, and to see this as something the person has no business doing, and as something that "does not deserve to be empathically responded to".

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the opposite—reprimand, anger and punishment.

Beyond this, Kohut has constructed an extensive articulation of the wide array of potential possibilities through which the self may strive to achieve what he terms defensive and/or compensatory self structure elements, to offset failures in empathic responsiveness in childhood: the natural ordering of things Kohut outlines is not one comprised of an "all or nothing" requirement for the self's survival. Nonetheless, Kohut is convinced that it is beyond human capability for a self to provide for its own optimal structuralization solely through its own later compensatory structures, despite the very great importance he attaches to the role of compensatory structures. It thus far—to Kohut—appears to be the case that, even if raised in a total absence of empathic responsiveness, a semblance of a "whole person" may develop to adulthood, but the self cannot make it unaided by some measure of empathic responsiveness to its emotional and narcissistic needs from human sources outside itself.

One of Kohut's premises is that a self which has received nowhere near adequate empathic responsiveness may, in adulthood, remain in a fragmentation-prone state. Depending on the particular self-deficits, such a self may later turn in urgency to another in an unconscious effort to achieve relief from the distress arising from self deficit through an emotional alliance with that person. For highly complex reasons which Kohut discusses in much technical detail, that seems most often to turn out not to be a solution useful to the one in need of such whole-
sale provision from an environmental other. From the standpoint of the relationship itself, the course Kohut describes is one fraught with insurmountable difficulties, unless it becomes possible, perhaps in the course of therapeutic treatment, for the person to achieve a greater measure of adequate self structure.

Kohut's discovery of the bipolar nature of the self

As a final segment of this introduction to the Kohutian self theory, I will try to present a simplified version of some of the features of the basic structure Kohut describes in his characterization of the human self, in an effort to round out a mention of the key constructs.

In addition to the concepts of the importance of the cohesion of the self in human life across the life span; and the initial nuclei state of the fragments of the as-yet rudimentary self, as well as the powerful importance of empathy, and of admiration, approval and mirroring of the child, along with the revisionary understanding of narcissism, there is of paramount importance in Kohut's psychoanalytic phenomenological developmental paradigm the highly refined concept he has formulated with regard to the bipolar nature of the self.

In Kohut's work this bipolar nature of the self is importantly associated with two different tracks of maturational evolution: the one pole related in evolutionary fashion to later life elements which include healthy assertiveness, initiative, enthusiasm, ambitions, joy, humor, creativity and wisdom; the other pole related in like evolutionary manner to later life ideals, values, and goals, and to self esteem and its
regulation.

In this new self-image for psychoanalysis these two poles are termed descriptively the pole of the grandiose self, and the pole of the idealized parental imago.

The grandiose self—sometimes thought of as the grandiose-exhibitionistic self in light of its behavioral manifestations—is associated with the infant's self-experience of the uninhibited exhibitionism which characterizes babyhood per se as well as the initial developmental pathway of the pole of the grandiose self. While on the other hand thought to be related to some sort of grandiose-like fantasies of boundless and limitless power and perfection (which the environment's responses in infancy can be seen as perhaps having largely contributed to) which many believe arise for the infant during some part of this stage, the unmodified exhibitionism of himself in the presence of the mother can be seen as serving the purpose of eliciting the unconditional approval, admiration and mirroring responsiveness believed required by the infant-self from the parenting person during this stage for its structuralization. (Kohut presents very detailed fine-tuned technical expositions of all these processes: here I am intentionally attempting to present a more readily graspable précis.)

Kohut cites the parental empathic responsiveness—through admiring, approving and confirming these endless displays which serve to elicit these required responses—serving as the wherewithal through which the child comes in time to be able to modify, to modulate and to channel this "grandiosity-like experience", and this uninhibited exhibitionism, into directions useful at later developmental stages. Eventually the natural
and healthy exhibitionism inherent and "appropriate" for each human self will, when modified in aim-inhibited directions and modes, evolve into potentially realizable and achievable ambitions, and into healthy assertiveness, making possible the realization of goals and achievements.

Deficits in the self structuralization associated with the stage, and the pole, of the grandiose exhibitionistic self will, says Kohut, leave the self unable to progress beyond this unmodified exhibitionism.

For such persons their overabundant, under-inhibited exhibitionism will be often channeled not in the direction of aims and achievements but in directions which in adulthood will be necessarily inappropriate, many of them, when translated into adult-level ideational content, culminating in behaviors viewed as socially unacceptable. Very much else accrues to the self faultily responded to at the pole of the grandiose self, but this can perhaps serve as sufficient example for now.

The content of the other pole of the Kohutian self relates to "the idealized parental imago". During the appropriate stage in the self's development, the child experiences a need for a merger with a person other than himself, a person perceivable as omnipotent and unquestionably perfect. That is, the child-self-structures have a requirement for an external, human embodiment of all-encompassing power and absolute perfection: the young child presents himself (usually to his father) for this purpose of "attaching to" an embodiment of perfection and power in the environment. The father may respond empathically to the small child's needs for this sort of temporary idealization, and the concomitant attachment; or he may not. Or, as with the mother, he may not be there and hence, cannot provide for this part of the self's need.
In an earlier developmental stage, the child, says Kohut, felt himself to be part of a unit, made up of himself and the mother, experiencing no sense of boundaries nor awareness of the concept of other-ness at that stage. During the developmental phase predominantly associated with the flowering of the pole of the grandiose self, the infant's experience is one of limitless, boundless power and perfection—in a sense, as if it were him who was this "thing of all perfection and control." The view of the infant's self experience as a more or less merged unit seems to fit reasonably with that—a view posited by many.

In the course of normal development, Kohut believes it is, specifically, the mother's empathic responding to the child's grandiosity and exhibitionism which brings about self-structuralization development which epigenetically then enables the infant-self to mature beyond the initial experience of wholesale merger. Concomitantly, through the principle of optimal frustration, which enables the child to taste of reality, he is introduced to the fact that in actuality there are limitations to his previously experienced notions of being himself a creature of omnipotent and limitless and blissful perfection. In time, says Kohut, the child begins to lose this unbounded sense of his own omnipotent control of the environment. Perhaps unwilling to part so unstintingly with such an experience because of this awareness of not yet being able to get very far without the fairly persistent power of another, the child-self then experiences—so Kohut's research led him to believe—a need to acquire an external source of global perfection, and omnipotence, which he may feel as if part of.

At this stage the child "assigns" global omnipotent perfection to
parent, as an idealized embodiment of strength and power. Although not always, and perhaps not necessarily, it is often to the father that the child turns for this self-structure requirement. As with all idealizations there is, during this stage of idealizing the parent, little sense of realistic limitations with regard to this parent and what he is capable of and represents (not unlike the earlier phase in which the child had no awareness of any sense of limitation with regard to himself). There is no perception of the realistic contradictions to this all-encompassing perfection and power the young child vests in a parent, however vividly visible these contradictions may be in reality. The child's experience of being merged with this idealized parent is at the level of unconscious self-experience; it's one of a unity in which his self is again a part of great strength and perfection.

Kohut presents considerable evidence in support of his formulation that it is a highly specific requirement for the maturation of the human self to temporarily perceive a parent figure as grandiosely, ideally, perfect and powerful. It is also a (subsequent) requirement that the self progress beyond the point at which this experience is a requirement. True to the epigenetic nature of the self's unfolding, moving beyond this requirement to perceive another as idealized, all powerful and all perfect, and of being "attached" to that person, can only come about where there has first been a successful experience at the earlier stage (the stage in which the requirement is to experience this merger with the idealized parent figure).

As with all of the self structures' requirements, what enables a given self structure to be successfully tempered is the empathic respon-
siveness of the parent to the child's need-experiences during that stage.

With the grandiose, exhibitionistic self pole the great need was for the child's grandiosity and exhibitionism to be approved and admired and responded to with mirroring and confirmatory echo of the parent. These responses were required only so that the baby-self could eventually come to the self-structure point where he could move beyond experiencing this pervasive and unbounded need for such admiration and confirmation from the environment.

So, too, with the idealized parental imago pole of the self. Only if there is an empathic response to the child's need to be permitted (joyfully, says Kohut) to experience a parent in an idealized form, and to experience himself as if merged with those idealized qualities, will the requisite self structures get laid down which will make it epigenetically possible for the self to progress beyond experiencing that need for idealized attachment to such a figure.

Once having been provided with the requisite empathic responsiveness from the parent to this need, again the combination of responsiveness to the need and the principle of optimal frustration eventually enable the child gradually to come to experience reality, and hence, to come to more realistically perceive the parent, and accept these human limitations. (Again, here I am not presenting the full complement of fine-tuned technical complexity Kohut's formulations involve.)

In the course of this, the pole of the self associated with the idealized parental imago becomes "filled in" with an "imago" comprised now not of the merger-with-a-powerful-perfect person, but with a set of ideals which arose from the qualities of the idealizable parent. A self filled in with guiding ideals now has the capacity for achieving ambi-
tions, goal-directions, etc. As with the later life culminations emanating from the "filled-in" grandiose self, Kohut makes extensive presentation of the many life phenomena he believes associated with all of this business of the idealized parental imago stage, and pole, of the bipolar self which he postulates. In short, a capacity for realistic goals and ideals replaces the requirement for an external source of idealized power, strength and perfection. Kohut's research has been able to present the view that from this evolutionary beginning point, the self structures importantly associated with many important cultural, ethical and value aspects of the self arise and proceed, along with crucial self-esteem regulating capacities.

Where this developmental sequence is not permitted its normal evolution—(again because of either the failure, or the absence, of empathic responsiveness to these needs on the part of the parent(s)) the later-life self is seen as experiencing a number of distinguishable self-features, seemingly traceable to this lack of provision.

One such phenomenon is that in which the self continues to experience an addictive-like yearning to find a substitute for this missing psychological structure. As with other aspects of the self, this structure-requirement is experienced by human beings as sine qua non-essential to their well being and their narcissistic equilibrium. Where it is missing, the necessarily still-yearning self may attempt to utilize non-human substitutes to provide some of the essential equilibrium-maintaining functions the self structures are incapable of providing on their own. In some instances, Kohut has discerned what appears to be the addictive employment of alcohol—and of drugs—as an effort to
employ an external source for regulating defective equilibrium-regulating self structures. Not at all uncommon, however, is the self's attempt to accomplish this equilibrium management through the merger-like association with another human being in the environment. If such a person is available and willing (although being willing is apparently not an absolute necessity here), the self will idealize, and experience a merger with the idealization of this person, as an external source of power and perfection and guiding ideals, and regulator of self-functions. Such a maneuver on the part of the self, although it can serve the purpose of the defective self's equilibrium management during the time that the adult is able to experience the consistent presence, and the approval, admiration and confirmation, of this idealized other can leave the deficient adult self, says Kohut, in a highly precarious and vulnerable position. Apparently, in many instances such an adult-level merger with an idealized parental imago will serve only as a stop-gap measure and cannot accomplish in and of itself what such an idealized attachment would have done during the self's early development. In other ways, it does not appear to serve to pave the way for the self's coming to be able to move beyond requiring an idealized other, but instead leaves the person having unconsciously to guide his actions largely toward ends which can provide opportunity for being near the idealized other.

As with deficits at the other pole of the self, Kohut describes a plethora of compensatory-structure-possibilities which a self may endeavor to employ through a wide array of creative means and methods. Some of these carry greater potential of success than others. The area of the compensatory structures is perhaps the most complex and multi-
facetted of Kohut's theory, from the standpoint of the very great number of possible permutations involved in this aspect of the psychology of the self and its structuralization and unfolding pathways. This aspect of compensatory structures Kohut has said will continue to require further research exploration to more comprehensively define its parameters.

Kohut's most far-reaching concept in the analysis of the self's elements: the selfobject

Although it would be impossible to provide here a comprehensive elucidation of the Kohutian selfobject concept, the psychology of the self, (and Kohut's work) cannot be understood without mention of this most complex, and most critical, of Kohutian formulations. From the combined standpoints of human development, clinical treatment, and relevance for human life, as well as for enriched understanding of a broad spectrum of human phenomena in many spheres, it would seem to hold potential for far reaching significance for understanding human relationships.

In a highly over-simplistic precis, I think one might say there is no such thing as a selfobject. The concept selfobject, represents the level, the form and the manner in which the self experiences those in the environmental milieu to whom the self looks for empathic responsiveness to the self-needs.

Confusion arises very readily around the concept selfobject because in infancy and childhood (or, until such time as the self structures are well-tempered enough to "be on their own") the parents are "selfobjects", although here too, very early on the child does also perceive the "objective reality" of the mother and father as embodying their "person" state as well as their selfobject-ness.

In personal communication, 1979.
Yet the child's experience of parents as "selfobjects" occurs at a different level of awareness and understanding, entirely unrelated for all intents and purposes to that parent-person's separate "real-life" existence, and unrelated to that adult's experience of the relationship with the child. Such "person" is experienced by the self as not having an independent center of initiative, but rather as if "part of" the child's self structure. In essence the self's perception of its self-object(s) is not differentiated from the functions the parent performs through empathic responsiveness—functions which either work to structure and strengthen the self-structure, or functions which impede, arrest or injure the self-structure. In the instances touched on earlier, in which the child experienced himself as merged with the mother, and later with the father, as idealized parents, these merger experiences were with the mirroring mother-as-selfobject, and with the idealized-father-as-selfobject.

It helps here I think to recall the notion that during its long formative and maturational stages (while it is "acting like a baby", whether phase-appropriately, or phase-inappropriately) the self is not yet able to perform, or provide for, its own self-regulating functions. At those times, the actions and attitudes, etc. of the person who is in the position to perform, or provide for, the functions for the not-yet-self-sufficient self are what are experienced, in selfobject form or fashion. Here I am only again trying to underscore the attempt to make clear that the selfobject is not intended to be understood as meaning the person (or the parent), but their self-need functions—or potential for serving such functions in the expectation of the child (or, adult)—
despite the fact that the term is used in self psychology writings in such a way as to sometimes lead to that interpretation, e.g., "the selfobjects of childhood failed to provide needed mirroring", etc.

A self experiencing another wholly in selfobject form (as contrasted with Kohut's conviction that all healthy, mature love relationships in adulthood have some important, and healthy, selfobject aspects) perceives that "selfobject" (that is, that provider of "narcissistic supplies") as unspokenly but absolutely under the control of--or "attached to"--the child's self-experience.

The adult for whom defective self structuring has resulted in considerable self structure deficit will continue, under some circumstances, to experience others within his immediate environmental surround at the selfobject level (now no longer referring only to family members), in Kohut's view: the adult needing to look to the environment for the sorts of essential responses which were not provided by his parental milieu during his childhood, and who settles on his friend, say, for praise and admiration as one potential source of the provision of that much needed narcissistic sustenance, experiences the same kind of sense of "being entitled" to "expect" praise and admiration from his friend as the infant expecting the joyful mirroring responsiveness to himself, his performances, products, etc. from the parental environment. To do otherwise is here not within the adult's control.

To adults whose adequate self structure permits them to take self-regulation for granted, this sense of entitlement seems "irrational", and so it is: the self does not proceed in any sort of concert with "reason", but proceeds only in concert with its needs, where essential
needs went unmet. One could say that the only reason the sense of entitlement is experienced is because the self's originally appropriate entitlement from the environment went unmet. Hence, the potential provider of that need is (or rather his or her functioning as provider of these narcissistic supplies is) experienced at the level of selfobject, because epigenetic maturation could not proceed just there.

As second hence, the self can only experience it as a literal shock when the person perceived as in a position to provide an urgently needed self function fails to perform that function. (For example, fails to provide needed admiration and praise.) It is the intense and painful shock to the self of this failure for what is literally (unconsciously) expected as ineluctable entitlement which calls forth a persons' abrupt "irrational" rage or cold withdrawal: the self's experience of entitlement from the person the self is unwittingly turning to for self-regulation (the selfobject other) is one in which there does not exist conceptual possibility that the selfobject might fail to provide something required by the self, for the self "expects" the selfobject environment to just be there providing what it needs like the oxygen in the air. The inadequately responded to self unconsciously "expects" the "selfobject" to be there, to be empathically aware of and to provide whatever the self requires for the maintenance of its equilibrium--much as the person's cognitive apparatus expects the arm to raise when needed, says Kohut. When needed selfobject functions fail to be forthcoming in some instance of specific experience of unconscious expectation, the experience is one of acute pain: the anger, rage or withdrawal are in reaction to this hurt.
In the original infant-self state the infant's experience was one in which this selfobject-mother existed for the sole purpose of being guided entirely by a concern for the wants and needs of this infant, in other words, ever at the ready to be empathically responsive to whatever self-requirement might arise. What Kohut's research led him to was the view that this is the way the adult with defective self structures experiences those from whom he finds himself expecting selfobject functions and provisions. As if aware of this, we often term these behaviors "acting like a baby", or "being immature", or "self-centered", all of which are of course apt and accurate statements. What is inaccurate is the common assumption that this is something a person could "stop" doing if he simply "wanted to grow up", etc.

In Kohut's theory of human development, then, there is presented a systematic and comprehensive understanding of much of the behavior which appears irrational or "childish"; and, very specifically, of why the narcissistically vulnerable adult can embarrass even himself with some of his startling outbursts of outrage (along with manifesting a wide array of other difficult-to-understand life phenomena) when the environment does not respond as his self wants it to, while also presenting a like-mannered understanding of abundantly healthy, or positive, life phenomena.

Conclusion

Deficits in the self-structure give rise to what Kohut sometimes speaks of as narcissistic imbalance. While a narcissistic imbalance can interfere more or less seriously with the capacity to work and/or be
productive, and decidedly so with the capacity for happiness or inner peace or contentment, Kohut has found that often such persons are relatively quite active, socially-comparatively well-adjusted and reasonably well-functioning by everyone's standards but their own. Often, for the person who has experienced "selfobject failures" in childhood, there is, says Kohut, a felt need for recurrent replenishment of self esteem from external sources, irrespective of the degree of acclaim or applause, etc. already received. And often a need to idealize another.

In my own view, what seems to represent the most pervasive common denominator across all such experience is that narcissistic imbalance, or narcissistic vulnerability, is tantamount to the person's being unable to take his own self (i.e., his self's experience) for granted: unable to take his self for granted, he must instead go about the business of living while having to have an awareness or consciousness of his self as a more or less constant, or recurrent, factor to contend with. Such self-consciousness need not preclude being able to do other things (although in profound cases it of course can and does) but always, at the very least, "gets in the way" of just proceeding through life with the same ease as can those whose adequate self-structures permit them to take their self for granted. Kohut does not spell this out in this way, but I believe, from my own research, that this is a viable, and useful, way to think about this. The self-conscious person has no option but to be "self-centered" when his self experience jars his easeful equilibrium, in at least some life-situations.

Many instances of self structure deficits will manifest as experiences of inner emptiness, lack of initiative, and various malfunctions
or distresses in the social and sexual sphere, to cite a few other representative examples of Kohut's findings across his psychoanalytic reconstructive research. Others include, among persons who suffered empathy failures from childhood selfobjects, those who are charming and enthusiastic on the surface but who inside may variously harbor extremely painful lack of self worth and a deep sense of uncared-for worthlessness and rejection, a yearning for reassurance, an incessant hunger for response, and/or a need for revenge or retribution. The need for revenge or retribution, says Kohut, is most often perhaps more directly associated with specific selfobject letting the self down at a vulnerable time of need for empathic responsiveness: that is, of not having received from a "potential" selfobject what one experienced a conviction of being entitled to. A feeling of inner "deadness" is another in Kohut's catalogue of not uncommon, more-pervasive manifestations of early parental selfobject failures of empathic responsiveness.

In all cases of early selfobject failure, Kohut has found there to be a heightened vulnerability to slight or rebuff, with a ready ability suddenly to withdraw into a silent coldness or to erupt as suddenly into an explosive rage which seems out of all proportion for the extant circumstances as a concomitant to this heightened vulnerability. Often there is, as well, impairment of the ability to experience a sense of connectedness with others, frequently despite surface appearance to the contrary.

All of these, and a wide array more, are what Kohut believes to be later-life manifestations—often quite circumscribed and well concealed from acquaintances—of traumatic failures in appropriate responsiveness
from selfobjects after the core self had achieved a beginning state of convergence of self fragments. For those subjected to far more traumatic failures of empathic responsiveness on a sustained basis and/or failures extending back to the time before the self nuclei had achieved convergence, the result is a far more profoundly disordered self, one apt to disintegrate, and to manifest equally comprehensively defined transformations, e.g., bizarre isolated eroticized fantasies, etc.

At the opposite end of the continuum of selfobject failures are those which may have occurred in highly circumscribed time periods within an overall otherwise-empathically-responsive milieu. These appear as more apt to have involved a time of unavoidable absence of the selfobject parent, (as for instance, during a prolonged parental illness). In such cases later life narcissistic vulnerability might occur only in very highly circumscribed areas of the person's later life experience--for instance, only in reaction to very specific experiences of a highly particular nature which in themselves might occur only rarely. Far less profound, these experiences of narcissistic vulnerability are nonetheless distinctly unpleasant and uncomfortable and often embarrassing to the adult, who cannot avoid such reactions.

In some of the less clearly defined contexts--particularly regarding compensatory structures--it's not a simple matter to be certain one is extracting Kohut's most precise thinking, but my sense is that the self's inherent capacity for impelling the person in the direction of compensatory structures is able to be of more sustaining benefit in direct proportion to the relative severity, or non-severity, of defect in the self structures. However, this does not mean that persons with
quite profound self-structure deficits are not strongly impelled toward self-attempts at creating compensatory structures. It seems clear in Kohut's clinical data accounts that they do, but it seems clear too that in the case of profound self structure deficits the self's own compensatory-structuring capacities can't do the job alone. 8

Though the manifestations are many and the degree of disorder for one often far distant from the degree of disorder of another, the commonality that Kohut has discovered to thread its way through the histories of the people suffering from any of the life-limiting, or pleasure-limiting, disturbances of the self is the fact that for some period of time—perhaps most often as a regular part of their consistent childhood experience—they did not get to see themselves reflected in the responsive, admiring, mirroring empathy of the mother, nor to hear the confirmatory echo attesting to a parent's joyful delighting in the fact of their existence as an individual self—and/or there was not an opportunity happily to attach themselves as toddlers to a pleased paternal figure in a wide-eyed, smiling but serious wonder. Or both.

In this current day psychoanalytic paradigm which Heinz Kohut presents as the psychology of the self, there are no boundaries separating "psychoanalysis" in one conceptual camp, and "psychology" in another: within this paradigm, Heinz Kohut has presented a psychoanalytically perceived view in which he can justifiably say, (as he does say) psychoanalysis now comes to be what it deserves to be, an integrated part of psychology.

8 The largest bulk of Kohut's writings has to do not with the developmental model I have tried to present here but with the revolutionary therapeutic formulations for restoring self structure deficits.
It is not only psychoanalysts whose conceptualizations would need to shift to make room for the developmental phenomenological psychoanalytic psychology of the self: the Kohutian formulations speak clearly I believe, to the field of non-psychoanalytic psychotherapy, and, importantly, to academic psychology. Students, researchers and thinkers in behaviorism, in human development, in social psychology and in personality psychology, have, in many instances, long felt it not necessary to include psychoanalysis in their view of what needs to be understood and taken into account by workers in their disciplines: psychoanalysis—as I have heard many behaviorists remark in passing, is not, so they could earlier believe, "relevant", or "salient", to "behavior"; psychoanalysis deals with "esoteric unconscious fantasies", etc., and not with the everyday business of living, and doing.

Without here remarking on this earlier attitude, such sweeping dismissals of psychoanalytic thought by behaviorists and others could no longer serve, I believe, as other than a mark of not yet having had opportunity to become acquainted with contemporary psychoanalytic thought. Psychology need not automatically agree with Heinz Kohut's systematic and comprehensive theory, but neither, I believe, should they automatically disagree with it, nor dismiss it a priori: the psychology of the self presents a potential paradigm which appears to hold a wide array of possibility for useful inclusion in academic psychology's theory, research and practice; it would seem to behoove psychology to give the kind of serious attention to this view which could permit its full usefulness, aspects of validity and integratability to come to be discerned and known.
In the research, and the clinical practice, of one psychologist, here presenting this account, the Kohutian formulations were eminently testable, and demonstrated, in this one person's view, remarkable power and usefulness for both psychotherapy and for research, as well as providing a wide range of new perspectives within which to ponder human problems.
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The above represent a small sampling of the steadily growing number of theoretical and/or clinical writings by others on aspects of the Psychology of the Self.

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The Psychology of the Self: A Casebook, is a collection of clinical writings by six authors, intended to exemplify psychoanalytic treatment as guided by the Psychology of the Self and to clarify its specific clinical aspects.

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Heinz Kohut's major writings appear in:


"Emmmmmmm-MAAAAAAA!!!...I have to peeeeee!"

Thus began one of the many episodes of human life of which I have, in the course of this long research journey, taken on the role of a natural historian--of the natural history of human lives that begins with the sudden nerve-jangling banshee wail that could be heard for surely a half block.

I think it may be that in the studies of many an aspect of human development, human psychology and patterns of human communication in family systems, science has not learned all that there might be to learn from attending to and reflecting on such phenomena as the nerve-jangling banshee-wail emanating at the top of a mighty pair of lungs from the mother-child interactions, or the family patterns, of representatives of the species *homo sapiens* who do not show up in our consulting rooms or experimental laboratories nor leave behind them distinguishable footsteps in the historical sands of time.

Aware that medical science, genetic science, and behavioral and psychoanalytic science have recorded for some many decades many a pattern of physical growth, of human inheritance, of stimulus-response learning patterns, of enmeshed, disengaged and double binding communication patterns in families, of Oedipal configurations, dream symbolism and anal, oral, phallic and genital fixation patterns, of styles neurotic, psychotic, phobic, dyslexic, epileptic, alcoholic, sociopathic,
delinquent, hyperkinetic and underachieving; as well as patterns of assimilation, accommodation and egocentrism, and patterns ascribed to cultural patterns, geographic patterns and to the influence of the prevailing tenor of the times, or the presence of ill-considered television programming, or of an unexplainable madman; aware as I am of all these, yet the person shrieking "Emmmaaa! I have to pee!", above—and others—have, in the course of my own research journey taught me that the role of developmental natural historian of human lives can be a useful means of coming to know of some other sorts of patternings among human lives that we may have managed to miss. 9

Although I had recorded the mother-child interactions between Emma and her mother in a naturalistic context, as opposed to clinical, experimental-laboratory or even psychologist-at-work, I knew no means nor method through which to contemplate the larger significance nor transgenerational pattern-implications at the time; I recorded that part

9 And hence seems to have some measure of worthwhile significance as a psychological specialty. As Niko Tinbergen has written, and underscored in personal communication on this subject, the role of ethologist, or naturalistic observer, is one requiring considerably sophisticated skills, which must be learned and long practiced, before one can expect to employ them in meaningful ways. Naturalistic observation—the work of the natural historian or ethologist—is not just a matter of looking or listening passively, says Tinbergen. I myself have, with his invaluable advice, been working at learning it, and practicing it, and am only now coming to understand how little I knew of what I was doing before I began to take the role of natural historian seriously, as something one needed to become proficient at. This, my first natural history recording, was done when I had no idea whatever of such a field, and in fact, as I now realize, missed vast amounts one could have learned from such observations, by having made these observations the relatively passive way I did then. However, in this instance, no other possibility was open to me, in one sense, and even as much as I was able to learn I think can be seen to represent an example of the kinds of useful research contributions a natural historian might be able to contribute.
of them as I did, only as a natural historian might find himself or herself moved to record the existence of a rare-seeming flower or rock or star on a walk through a foreign field en route to his real work. I was not, at the time I chanced by accident and happenstance across the interacting lives of Emma and her mother, engaged in "collecting the data" for my research.

Through no pre-design nor intent, I had found myself some few years ago unwittingly set down inside the ongoing, daily intimate life-space of a mother and her child, and found myself wide-eyed in wonder in the presence of a human interactingness I had not seen nor heard nor read of.

At first I only marvelled, in silent surprise, not thinking even of setting any of it down for pondering on, that not being the purpose for which I was in that place where so too were they. And, additionally, not realizing at first that their interactions of the moment were other than idiosyncratic interchanges of the moment. It was only after a few days of being in fact unable, because of circumstances, to take myself beyond their enforced company that I came to realize that what I'd taken for idiosyncracy was all, and that it represented the pattern of their two commingled lives and life patterns, that I was moved to record some bit of it, although at the time I could see no use nor usefulness that could accrue from having done so, but only a phenomenon I wished to preserve a memory of, for pondering.

Since that time, five years ago, I have come to believe that there is much that psychological science can find of use and usefulness in collecting specimens of human thought and behavior in naturalistic set-
tings; although, for me, much intermediary directed thought and inten-
tional effort in non-naturalistic settings was required before I would
come to discern what I believe to be a means and method for translating
such natural history observations into scientific use and usefulness.

Nonetheless, what I found was that at that later time, after having
amassed a measure of longer segments of data, from a variety of sources
--clinical, biographic, interview, etc.--one can turn to one's natural
history data collection, and look through it for "specimens" of "slices of
real life"--of life that has not managed to find its way into our clinics,
our analytic offices, our research labs, or our textbooks--(nor even
into what we think of as our "naturalistic observation") to complement,
and hence meaningfully and importantly supplement our clinical data,
and other research data. In the role of natural historian I have found
the psychologist can (effortlessly, I might add, and at no cost or cost
to his other work, etc.) accumulate specimens of life that can then be
viewed in contrast and comparison to what one has gathered from case
and clinic, or "selected persons to be interviewed on a certain topic,"
and so on. Since these are, after all, slices of life as it is in
fact lived which the natural historian records whenever he or she happens
to come upon one that captures his attention, these data must "fit in"
somewhere in one's attempt to understand human conditions. Certainly any
attempt at constructing formulations in any sort of theoretical way
should require of us that real life examples will be able to show
goodness of fit.

The first of such directed and intentional thought and effort
(which I believe prerequisite to a beginning researcher's understanding
any naturalistic observation) came about in what I now believe may be the only medium through which it was possible for me as a researcher to become privy to the earlier ongoing level of discourse prerequisite to becoming able to discern potentially meaningful transgenerational patterning possibilities, that is, in a series of an ongoing intensive clinical endeavor.

What I set out to pursue and ponder was whether one could learn of the impact of parenting experiences in childhood on the course of later life development, on future parenting and on subsequent generations—impact that could phrase itself in something more than conclusion by assertion, or by selecting out a collection of some parts of disparate theories that each seem to "fit" for one part, and then "adding" them together as if a "whole" explanation, or by etceteras, or such like.

It was within and among an aggregate of several such ongoing intensive clinical settings that a sense of an underlying transgenerational patterning first began, faintly and fleetingly, to intrude upon my awareness; a patterning for which I had, at the time, no pre-learned understanding nor theoretical reference point. It made no sense to me, and making no sense, it seemed I should dismiss it from my mind, and learn to stop letting myself be distracted by whim and fancy.

For a long time, I could not even identify any of the outlines of any such patterning; they were ephemeral, evanescent and recondite. They alternated between seeming to be as the tiniest of odd-shaped pieces of some vast life jigsaw puzzle of which I was "seeing" only some infinitesimal percentage of the actual collection of jigsaw pieces; and at other times seeming instead like phenomena I was unable even to be sure
I'd not imagined. Indeed, they persisted in seeming always to have to be relegated to figments of my imagination since they often seemed "gone" before I could even be certain I had in fact encountered them with any certainty. Yet they nonetheless continued to arise, and to seem to require being reflected on simply by virtue of the persistence, over time, of my experiencing one or another of these sensations of perceptions after I'd found these thoughts weren't so easy to dismiss, since they were after all part of my experience of and with my clients.

I did come in time to feel conviction that such phenomena must in fact be elements of actual psychological patternedness. Along with clinical work of lesser duration and of what I thought of then as less complexity--cases which had not in themselves aroused any great sense of unexplained puzzledness--there were, among my few years of clinical training encounters, four "cases" which, individually and collectively, fell into this rather relentlessly perplexing category. Three of these four cases were what we tend to classify as "family cases"; the fourth a long term intensive clinical encounter with an adult, single and never-married man in his forties, a clinical encounter which we do not think of in family-system terms.

This man is one whom family theory and therapy does not take into account; the person unable to form or be part of a family ever. In time he was able to enable me to understand that life, as life, was, and had always been, excruciatingly painful for him; and to appreciate his experience of what it was like for him, and what it cost him to live behind what he termed the 12-foot brick wall that separated him, all his life, from all other human beings.
This man's "presenting problems" were simple and straightforward: indeed, in the perception of a most competent and long experienced intake person, the man's "case" gave every appearance of such simple solution and resolution for a clinician that it was regarded as representing a clinical case ideally suited for a supervised training encounter of the clinical trainee I was when his case was assigned to me. Eminently believably he had presented himself as a person desiring therapy simply because of some difficulties he was having establishing priorities for getting his newly-undertaken mid-life college studies satisfactorily completed. He did not lightly let the depth of his life problems show. Some year or two later he was eventually able to make it clear that, for him, one of the truly meaningful parts of his life configuration patterns was his inability to form or be part of a family, or friendship, or casual acquaintanceship, or of marriage, or a parenting situation, or any degree of intimate relationship.

He took great care to keep it from being observable to the naked eye and ear of both casual acquaintance and trained clinical observer that underneath his reserved and intellectual concern with making an accomplishment in a field of endeavor, for him, all and any human relationships, in his words, were all-and-only unutterable pain: and that hence, throughout his life it had been necessary for him to "anaesthetize" himself against all and any human contact.

The great vast mass of family systems studies and extensive research on intimate human interaction in relationships, and their vicissitudes and communication patterns and family systems patterns do not speak of this representation of human life and family life. A man of
very considerable awareness and intelligence, he had himself devoted a
goodly measure of his time and energy to attempting to understand himself,
for he knew, if no one else did, the extreme extent to which he suffered
intolerable pain throughout even the smallest, most seemingly insignifi-
cant and simple parts of human life and human contact. On his own, he
had attempted to gain an understanding of his grave problems and pains
and inability through the theory of Skinnerian behaviorism, to no avail.
In addition to assiduous efforts to make sense of what was "wrong" with
him, he had read much more than most people of Freudian psychoanalytic
two and two years in his mid-twenties
to a time of classical psychoanalysis. There were, (he was after a very
long time, able to share) instances in both theories which he described
as "tempting to think of as providing an explanation" for his "problems,"
and his life pattern, but "somehow the pieces in the end, did not really
fit" when one took—as he could not help having to do--"all of him" into
account. He had, at other times, tried reading about the brain, thinking
that it might help him gain a glimmer of what made him so unlike his
fellow human beings. He had come to wonder whether there was something
neurologically wrong with him: he had noticed, for example, on many
occasions, that his reaction patterns were not in synchrony. At most
time, he was forced to assume he just wasn't "trying hard enough," to
regard himself as damnably lazy, or just "not assertive enough," or not
having enough "will power." For such, of course, are the kinds of
things so glibly tossed off by others for persons who aren't making a
go of getting down to business and "getting things done" in this
business of living.
It is to the fact that this fellow human being was, after a very long time, able to permit himself to trust in another human being for the first time in his adult life, to a great enough extent to share many, many instances of his life and thoughts that I too was able to come eventually to realize that behaviorism, nor classical psychoanalytic theory, no more than family systems theory, provide an understanding for "all of him," as a whole human being for whom human relationships are so painful that the greatest proportion of his existence must be relentlessly spent in a far reaching effort to anaesthetize himself against them, and for whom no minimal success, at life, or school, or job, had ever been realizable. Yet for all that, it was a very great time before I was to come to realize that he had, also, taught me as much, if not more, about family patterns, and parenting patterns, and the impact on subsequent generations, as with those whom I did study as "families," from an intergenerational and transgenerational perspective.

It was a very long time before I was to come to realize that along with all of the transgenerational families among which I had been attempting to understand the impact of early childhood experiences on subsequent generations by studying "subsequent" generations following from one or another pattern of early experience—that this person had, without my having for a long time been capable of perceiving it, been providing me with a very great abundance of first hand life data about one "category" of persons for whom there is perhaps the most significant of all possible patterns of impact from family systems upon subsequent generations; and the one category of person whom family systems does not direct its attention to—those for whom there will be no subsequent generations;
those who, in a sense, represent the point of extinction of that particular species, or variety, or branch in the family of man.

Five years after having recorded some few naturalistic observations of their family interactions, I was retrospectively able to perceive that Emma-and-her-mother, whose banshee-reverberating howl began this chapter, also represent a final chapter in the history of their particular species; after Emma there will be no subsequent generations to experience the effects of early childhood experience on the course of future parenting and on subsequent generations, and to recognize that, as with this vastly differently characterized man of quietness, reserve, intellect, and multiple interests, for the Emmas too, human relatedness seemed to encompass little-if anything—that was other than painful; little that did not require a need to be away from, or anaesthetized against, or retreated from. Even to one with whom they did not opt to clinically share what

I have not encountered others who use the defining term "species" for a given "family" of man, yet in fact there is no reason for regarding such a way of thinking as "incorrect." Various definitions of the term species would seem to suggest one may not incorrectly view a family designated by a given name as a species, e.g. in one biological glossary species is defined as "populations considered by specialists, on the basis of various criteria, together to represent a natural self-producing group which is therefore worthy of formal recognition (in systematic biology)." One need only note that systematic biology has thus far had no occasion to study the self-producing group represented by a trans-generationally-descending particular human line. In Webster's Dictionary, various species are defined as 1. a distinct kind; sort; variety; class; as, various species of villains. 2. a single distinct kind of plant or animal, having certain distinguishing characteristics: a category of biological classification: cf. genus. 3. in logic, a group of individuals having certain distinguishing attributes in common, given a common name, and comprised with other similar groups in a more comprehensive grouping called a genus. "The species" is tantamount to "the human race," with species here designated as a plural form of the similarly spelled "species" designating the singular form. Darwin pointed out in Origin of The Species that classifiers may disagree as to whether a given group should be called a species or a variety (1859).
their experience of their separate lives were like, nor what life cost them in pain, they made this eminently apparent.

We can stop here, for a moment, and ponder--before going on to more complex and multi-faceted aspects of transgenerational patternings, and the more complex aspects contributed by, first, the families along my clinical encounters, and then the research pathways that clinical work led me to--this small, isolated naturalistic observation I was able to record five years ago in that unusual setting: I am not unmindful that I left things, before this necessary digression, with Emma being loudly summoned with the loud clarion call "EmmmmmmmmmMAAAAAAA!!!! I have to pee!!" nor unmindful that that is a frustrating position in which to leave a reader as much as a person needing to make such call.

A record of the naturalistic observation of the unfolding developmental pattern of Emma must begin with the fact that in fact there were two Emma's. One Emma was mother to the second Emma, her daughter. Although they did not themselves thus address one another, there seems no way around needing to address them here as Mother Emma and Daughter Emma, for the sake of clarity. Mother Emma most often addressed her daughter as Emma; Daughter Emma almost never addressed her mother by any specific name: what clearly distinguished those occasions on which Daughter Emma was addressing her mother from those on which she was addressing one or another of the persons she was to address during my two-week period of 18 hour-a-day, seven-days-a-week observation, was her tone of voice, distinguished to the point of unmistakability. Once in the course of two weeks, the Emma who was daughter did in fact address the older Emma by her "rightful title," Mother.
This then is the naturalistic observation of the parent-child reciprocal interactions of a mother-child pair, a pair whose interactional style as mentioned earlier, may perhaps be regarded as unlikely to have been included in the clinical or experimental accountings of individual or family psychology, nor of human development nor mother-child interactions.

Although I now realize that these facts are in and of themselves not at all the meaningful aspects inherent in their relatedness, at the time of my experience of them, I knew, at first, only two facts: that Mother Emma was 97 years old, and that her daughter was 81. Somehow those facts served as blinders, at the time, to the very much that was far more significant from the standpoint of the impact of early experience on the course of adult development, on future parenting and on subsequent generations. The context in which these observations were recorded, and in which they took place, was a semi-private hospital room. As a patient temporarily assigned to one of the two beds in that room for post-surgical recuperation, a room in which Mother Emma had been earlier assigned the other bed, I found myself through no design nor intent of my own, forced intruder into the intimate daily, ongoing life space of Emma and her daughter, Daughter Emma who spent a large portion of every day visiting her mother in the same, quite small room, (and hence—now—with a quite random sampling of mother-child pairs).

10 Rather than, say, the quite possibly skewed sample who make up our clinical samples (as persons who do choose to present themselves for therapy), or our "research" samples (who do choose to participate in research, interviews, etc.) and hence are at least representative of those sampling factors.
Hence, anomalous as such phenomena would be in all other aspects of human life, I was to be a sharer in all of the waking moments, life-observations, reactions and responses, and interpersonal interchange with others, of a total stranger destined for some number of weeks to spend twenty four hours a day at a distance of approximately four or five feet at most from the woman who was to come to be the Mother Emma of my enforced observations, and to spend many, many hours a day five feet from the ongoing mother-child interactional patterns between her and her daughter.

Among other things I was to learn in that somewhat atypical situation was the existence of a remarkable phenomenon I had not earlier encountered nor read of. With no way to escape from the fact of my presence in their life space, I came to be aware that Mother Emma and Daughter Emma had been able to proceed with their intimate and personal exchange patterns as if they were alone; that is, as if there had been no perfectly obvious observer and listener present lying four feet from their intimate life space. As one small interesting observation, I noted that Mother Emma, in fact, was able to ignore my existence and my observer's proximity at all times from the standpoint of her impact upon me, as if I were not there, and not unable to avoid hearing all of her interchanges. Not at all was this, however, a phenomenon that had to do with her mental alertness or perceptual acuity and powers of observation: she was in fact acutely aware of me, but the only awareness she had of me was my impact on her. From any other frame of reference I did not exist in her awareness. To my surprise, although I was no nuisance at all in any way, simply lying quietly, the impact I had on Mother Emma was to cause her
extremes of very great distress.

On these occasions she was very vocal about it—to others, in my presence, never to me. She made comments about he regularly, as if I were not there to hear, although of course she "knew" I was because what she was commenting on were highly specific awarenesses of me in interaction with others. In time, I came to realize that to Emma I simply did not "exist" as a "person"; that is, as someone with any feelings, awareness, identity, etc. Rather I existed only insofar as I had impact on Emma's experience; in that role I was capable of causing Emma great overwhelming agonies of distress, which called forth all manners of shrieks, of snarls, of blasphemies against me, or torrents of rage. I was completely powerless to lessen my impact on Emma—for these profound impacts I was having had at one and the same time "everything to do with me—-and, quite obviously, only with me," and yet, as if paradoxically, nothing whatever to do with "me." In a sense that seemed truly astonishing to me at the time, it was as if, even while looking right at me, I both existed as a person and yet only existed from the vantage point of Emma. Emma was an extremely acute and perceptive observer of me. She watched me a lot, and kept close tabs on me and remembered every last thing that occurred about me and around me and to me. She was extraordinarily aware of me, yet paradoxically all that she was aware of "me" was her own experience.

Daughter Emma, too, was clearly obvious to my observer's presence while in interactional exchange with her mother, but she, unlike her mother, underwent a very striking and dramatic shift on all other occasions, that is, when she was interacting with any other persons other
than her mother. Then she seemed acutely aware of how and what I and others were hearing her say. But Daughter Emma too seemed to lack any awareness of what my experience of her or her mother might be. There was, for example, a mild concern on her part of what others would "think of her" when her mother carried on, but none whatever of what I might feel when snarlingly cursed, blasphemed against, etc. And none whatever of my experience of observing her and her mother engaging in extraordinary interchange. For Daughter Emma too, I somehow existed yet didn't. I did not know, then, what to make of these phenomena: in the absence of any knowledge or understanding, I readily permitted myself to "make up" an explanation. Mother Emma is "senile," Daughter Emma "too old" to have patience with a senile person, and no doubt an "impatient person" to begin with. I was unable to see that I was permitting myself to use as "explanations" concepts that explained nothing, and were meaningless substitutions for explanation, as if they explained something.

I could not have guessed that, long before five years had gone by, I would have observed these identical mother-child interactions between a child of four and a mother of 20; a child of four and a mother of 26; and a child of nine and a mother of 26. I might have guessed that I would never be able to recognize the Emma patterns as like these others: for that, I had first very much to learn in other ways.

Although I observed—perforce—much more than I recorded, we can begin with an arbitrary point where Mother Emma and Daughter Emma are sitting in bedside chairs, almost, but not quite, facing each other. In time, one cannot help noting that neither mother nor daughter looks at one another, ever, when speaking to one another; but that instead
they "miss" each other in their visual directions.

The chairs are at the foot of the bed right in my prone visual field. Both are at this moment participating in a ritual which I have observed for ten days now: Daughter Emma arrives each day shortly before noon and remains until approximately three o'clock, when she remarks on the fact that she is then returning home.

The first visit of each day's visits begins with Daughter Emma's "assisting" her mother with her lunch. (No objective observer, unquestionably, would agree with Daughter Emma's concept here.) Mother Emma, I had by then become aware, had among her behavioral repertoire a collection of socially atypical habits, among them a marked tendency to engage in what is sometimes termed swearing, and sometimes termed crudeness, curses, blasphemies, foul language, and dirty talk. All of these almost invariably in an extraordinarily loud voice.

One could, in fact, readily say that unusual extremes in loudness of voice were among Mother Emma's most startling characteristics, although not the only one. Even when incapacitated, and physically "frail," at perhaps 97 pounds and 97 years old, this was not a 97 pound weakling. She would on occasion shift her tone of voice from its most customary range—that commonly described as yelling, hollering or howling—to one which was closer to what we might call a stage whisper; a tone "below her breath" but by no means other than amply loud enough to be clearly perceived (with this appearing to be the apparent intention), by all others in the room—which was often only me.

Her mother's tendency for swearing and for "dirty talk," along with in fact all of her mother's interpersonal proceedings, habits, mannerisms,
and conversations, generated extremes of distress in Daughter Emma; Daughter Emma was intensely vocal about her reaction to her mother's habits and behaviors: she found everything about her mother, so it appeared to me, intolerable, and difficult to endure. But she had endured her mother, for 81 years.

It had become possible to note, over time, that Mother Emma's outbursts, which were many and variegated, were of one kind: they were in all and every case highly specific reactions to the manner in which she was being treated (or believed she was being treated) by others in the environment. In several instances these reactions were to occasions in which she perceived that what was happening to her was that she was being ignored by the persons around her in favor of someone else: in other words, her reactions to how she was being treated by others around her were simply reactions to omissions of anything happening; times when she was not, so we would have thought, experiencing others. While her daughter found it intolerable to have to pay attention to her mother, her mother, I came to learn, found it intolerable not being paid attention to. Not just with regard to her daughter, but in general. With regard to her daughter this had a different quality. Not a more intense quality, but a less intense one, so far as one could tell. The most intense reaction, or rather the loudest and hence most obvious in intensity was, inexplicably it seemed then, with regard to me.

When treated in any way that she experienced as not caring about her, and not empathic to her feelings, needs and desires, Mother Emma alternately roared like a banshee at the very top of her very strong lungs (this was a marvel; she could project her 97 year old voice, regularly,
the entire length of a long hospital corridor, while not herself in the corridor, but inside a room off the corridor: many persons commented on this), or swore like a trooper, or rattled off a majestic concatenation of obscenities. At other times, when she did not wish to hear any more of what the other person was distressing her sensibilities with, she would emit a filibuster-like white noise of loudly chanted alternating syllables which very effectively drowned out the other person's words, and eventually their efforts to continue communicating with her. (Yet she was only angrier if they then gave up trying to communicate.)

All of the communicational interchanges emanating from Daughter Emma, on the other hand, took on a pattern subtly different from that determining her mother's communications: Daughter Emma's contribution to their familial interchanges were all but entirely directed to her disgust with her mother's behaviors, in general and in specific. (At the time, I "heard" these as somehow more "objective"; that is, I somehow "saw" this as if Daughter Emma were responding to what her mother was actually doing, that is, to "her mother" as a person, rather than simply doing the identical thing her mother was doing—reacting solely to her own, entirely subjective experience, which experience arose from her mother's purely subjective experience of others.)

While it is true that here these can easily be seen as phenomena which Daughter Emma experienced as distressing, and as her mother's not being responsive or not empathic to her feelings, needs and desires; there was, it seemed to me, a clear difference: at no time did Mother Emma appear to express overt anger with the way in which Daughter Emma spoke, nor with what Daughter Emma did per se; while Daughter Emma
regularly ceaselessly, expressed overt contempt to her mother. This seemed puzzling: one would have "expected" anyone to be furious at Daughter Emma's treatment.

As an example, while Daughter Emma was assisting Mother Emma with the eating of her lunch, Daughter Emma evidenced a considerable number of specific behaviors which most observers would probably classify as inordinately cruel, harsh, callous, and unfeeling—both in her manner of feeding her mother and her manner of speaking to her mother about the business of eating. But Mother Emma, on her part, never once expressed anger at these things that were being done to her in the process per se; rather she reserved her angry expressions almost solely (if not solely) for those occasions on which she felt that what was being done or not done was "not caring about her," rather than the manner in which it was done or said, when it was done. Mother Emma, one could say from her enduring the astonishing way in which her daughter "fed" her, could tolerate being paid attention to in cruel ways; it was, clearly, when her daughter stopped paying attention to her that she made it clear that it was this that was not endurable. ¹¹

On this day, little different from all the others, the tray arrived bearing Mother Emma's lunch. Mother Emma, looking at it, emitted a loud denunciation: "This damn lousy food!" Daughter Emma was at that moment in the process of taking her coat off, having just arrived as the tray did.

¹¹I could not then know the significance of this phenomenon. But a reader may hold onto this sequence to compare with the experience of five year old John when he eventually begins to speak of an identical feeding situation, in chapter XII.
Before she had her coat off, it was clear that Daughter Emma was experiencing an infuriated anger with her mother: "God damn it, you're always complaining! You make me sick; I can't stand it another minute the way you are always complaining!" The tone in which Mother Emma had greeted the tray with "this damn lousy food!" was more in the manner of a whining angry-like complaint against the food. In great and vivid contrast was Daughter Emma's tone of voice, which was, in effect, denouncing her mother for having expressed a feeling about the food, a feeling which was no direct reflection on her daughter. But her daughter was unable to accept, or permit, her mother's need, or wish to express a feeling about the food, and instantaneously reacted in terms of how she experienced her mother, rather than in terms of her mother's feeling upset about the food. 12

Most observers would, I'm sure, have regarded Daughter Emma's as the sort of tone reserved for persons for whom one wishes to convey the utmost of despised contempt, and perhaps few could refrain from reacting

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12 It may help a reader here to underscore that what is happening here is that one person (Mother Emma) is offering another an opportunity to be responsive to her; "I want someone to know (and care) that I feel upset about the food," says Mother Emma, in effect Daughter Emma has, here, several choices of response, but only one which will be responsive to what her mother has expressed, i.e. empathically responsive to Mother Emma. That would be one in which she replied from the perspective of the other's feelings; in essence, acknowledging that she heard her mother's upsetness about the food and saying something accepting of the fact that sometimes a person might be upset about food. Or, Daughter Emma could respond in a way that completely ignored the other's feelings or experience and instead was a reply concerning her own experience; in a sense, discounting any "right" of another to have, or experience, a feeling. In that instance, Daughter Emma is saying, in essence, "I don't care about your feeling; what I care about is only how it makes me feel when you express your own feeling about something: I don't care that you are upset by the food; what I care about is that I get upset hearing you." This is
to being thus spoken to: Mother Emma was not among those few. She reacted
with a snarled epithet which was, clearly now, not about the food, but in
reaction to her daughter's contemptuous tone. The epithet she selected
was one some would be shocked by, even among the relatively inured.

In the next interchange of this unchanging daily ritual, Daughter
Emma's turn is to register great dismay over the fact of her mother's
snarling epithet directed at her: she makes it clear that she feels inten-
sely wounded by her mother's so addressing her. Clearly, Daughter Emma
is wholly oblivious that her mother's epithet was in fact in reaction to
her having entered the conversation with the most contemptuously toned
communication to her mother, who was at that point only expressing her
mentioned here simply by way of pointing out a concrete example of failure
to provide empathic responsiveness to another, or, equally, to another's
need to be empathically responded to. We have met this concept in Heinz
Kohut's Psychology of the Self, although there it had to do with a mother
(or) father being (or not being) empathically responsive to a child.
Here we are seeing a "reversal" of that. The view of this research, and
Kohut's work, is that Mother Emma here experiences profound inner pain—at
the level of self experience—not by her daughter's tone of contempt per-
se; but by the fact of her daughter's failing to perceive, or to under-
stand her need to be empathically responded to. And that pain, or wound-
edness, experienced by a vulnerable self will give rise to rageful reaction.
And that vulnerability to the business of experiencing lack of responsive-
ness as painful, and as then evocative of rage, is always indicative of
an experience in infancy and/or childhood when for some reason it was not
possible for a parent to provide empathic responsiveness as a matter of
course in daily living. This understanding does not at all necessarily
imply a lack of responsiveness on the part of the parent, but can arise
solely from the parent's having been unavoidably unable to be on hand to
provide it. In case of profound deprivation of empathic responsiveness
(either from parental absence extending over a long period, or of the
presence of a profoundly unempathic parent) the condition of self vulnera-
bility and of self woundedness and subsequent rage will be widespread; in
other cases, only in highly circumscribed situations. With both Emmas it
is clearly the former. It will perhaps be helpful to interject here too
the interpretation based on this research, and on Kohut's work, that the
impact of the Emmas on one another is, so I believe, a vivid example of
selfobject phenomena: each perceives, and responds to, the other entirely
from a subjective perspective which experiences the other in terms of the
self functions she serves, rather than as a person in her own right.
response to the food. (Or to food in general perhaps, but not at all to her daughter.)

At this point Daughter Emma (as daily ritual unchanging) enters upon a bitter, venom-laden diatribe about her mother's having shown her "true colors," and after a lengthy scathing, contempt-filled, tongue-lashing, ends that segment by telling her mother precisely what she and "everyone else thinks about how you behave."

Mother Emma, in her turn, reacts very loudly and very sharply, with another, more colorful obscenity-concatenation, to thus being told in no uncertain terms how despicably her daughter and all others perceive her.13

One very striking difference between the two participants at this point is that Mother Emma is making all of her statements in a very loud pitched voice, readily audible to anyone passing outside in the hospital corridor, and indeed for a considerable distance down the corridor as the nurses are fond of pointing out; while Daughter Emma goes to great pains to keep her voice pitched at a level which, while very obviously amply audible to the nurses in the hall outside the room (although in fact she talks this way to her mother only when they are "alone": when only I am in the room with them, they behave as if alone. I know this for certain now because there is a very clear and dramatic difference in the way Daughter Emma speaks to her mother whenever "anyone" enters the room. It is her "voice-for-when-another-is-around" and she does not use the

13 Kohut's clinical research, as so too mine and others', indicates that this sequence arises from the initial instance in which one person expresses his or her personal experience (of something) and another fails to respond and instead reacts from the perspective of his or her own experience; and that any comment simply indicating a reply made from the other's perspective dramatically alters such sequences.
voice that is her "voice-for-when-another-is-around" when only I am around. It is ineluctable to eventually conclude that some phenomenon that was both evoked by her need to enter into this contempt-filled, rageful interchange with her mother, and which remained throughout the course of her interchange with her mother once it was set in motion, effectively brought about (or at least was intimately associated with) some other, concomitant, phenomenon which in some way altered her perception of what was in the environment outside her mother's and her interchanges. At all other times, she was quite different with regard to her awareness of me-as-observer: on those times, she would occasionally speak to me in a "sweet-little-old-lady" manner, not at all as if she were aware of my having been observer to these sequences, but as if I were an observer of her as a dutiful visitor. However, in fact, there were not many such times, since a good part of her very lengthy visits were taken up with ongoing interchange with her mother. Even, as we shall see, when she was attempting not to be in interchange with her mother, but was resting, and sitting silent.

When the nurse is actually in the room, Daughter Emma, unlike her mother, manages to keep a tight hold on all of what she says, and speaks to the nurse and to her mother alike, in a sweet, amicable and understanding tone, if somewhat on the overburdened side. To the nurse, it appears regularly as if the mother (who is audible outside the room) is, of the two, the only participant in these daily blasphemies and scurrilous interchanges; and that Daughter Emma is the all-virtuous, all-patient, wholly undeserving victim of her mother's "cantankerousness" (and senility).
One of the major effects of this is that the nurses have become convinced that Mother Emma is a wholly eccentric person who swears wholly inappropriately and kicks up a most extraordinary fuss in the course of being lovingly treated. The nurses for some reason find Mother Emma's expressions of distress very funny; they laugh, and make jokes, about her "carrying on" to her. She herself regards their laughter as inappropriate, just as they, the nurses, regard Mother Emma's howling, and "complaining" as inappropriate, and, because of her colorful obscenities, ludicrously, hilariously funny as well. Apparently the obscenities seem hilariously funny because Mother Emma is the age she is. 

"Just eat, will you please, just be quiet and eat," says Daughter Emma as she forcibly attempts to force her mother's spoon into her mouth while Mother Emma was trying to tell her daughter something. Mother Emma finds it impossible to eat at the rate her daughter demands; and Daughter Emma finds it impossible to refrain from becoming infuriated that her mother will not eat as her daughter demands. To an observer it appeared wholly impossible to eat food that was pushed that forcefully into the mouth, and at that rapid a pace, in which the next spoonful arrived forcibly and impatiently before the first had been swallowed. It seemed, as well, that it could have not been easy to eat while someone was criticizing every mouthful: Mother Emma seemed to be experiencing that in that way. Here, Daughter Emma experiences this as clearly indi-

14 I tried imagining that they would regard it as delightfully funny if I, for instance, were to take to swearing in great strings of obscenities at them, even if not at the top of my lungs.
eating that her mother is purposedly trying to infuriate her by not eating. Or, at best, is refusing to do as she is supposed to do, and, as her daughter seems to be convinced, that her mother could well do it if she would just "shut up and eat!"

Finally, the mutually exasperating interchange quiets down, Mother Emma is apparently managing to proceed with her lunch on her own, and her daughter settles back in her chair. Within a few minutes the mother makes a sudden loud request to her daughter to take her to the toilet. Daughter Emma jumps forward like a shot, instantly furious. "Oh God! Wouldn't you know? Listen, are you sure you have to go? Are you really sure you definitely have to do? Oh, God, listen, you just better really have to go after I go to all the trouble to get someone... Well, do you? Are you sure?" All this is a tone of extraordinary extremes of contempt and viciousness.

Each day, Mother Emma takes this all in, silently thinks it over, frowns, and then quietly shakes her head no. "There," says Daughter Emma in a tone of great honeyedness and smiling, "I knew you didn't really have to go. You just had a little gas, I'm positive." And so perhaps she did.

Later, on one given day the nurses were applying (discreetly, behind the white curtain they had decided to pull between the three foot space separating my bed and Mother Emma's) some type of treatment to some part of Mother Emma's anatomy, apparently—from the conversation—a heat lamp. Daughter Emma had opted to go inside the pulled curtains for the purpose of "assisting." Throughout the entire procedure Mother Emma trumpeted like a lion—or perhaps an elephant—bellowing at the top of her lungs,
but seeming to make it clear that, on this occasion, her caterwauling was directly a result of the procedure being physically painful to her in some way, and of people seeming not to care about aht perhaps, but definitely the real pain, too I thought.

Daughter Emma, throughout, said relatively "sweetly", "Oh Mo-ther!" The nurse laughed. Not, of course at Mother Emma's distress or pain—she was responsive about that. What she laughed at was the seeming hilarity in a 97 year little old lady emitting words and phrases rarely heard even in "rough talking places," or X-rated movies.

"There," the nurse said finally, in departing from the room, "we're all through." One second after the nurse had left, Daughter Emma lit into her mother, chastising her, again with extremes of contempt, for her "terrible screaming" while, "we're only trying to help you, you know!"

In response to this, Mother Emma had a singularly surprising retort: she said in the loudest and roundest of tones, "Ha! Not you! You only wanted to look at my asshole."

To this, Daughter Emma's reaction was swift and sure: "I'm going home, that's all there is to it, I am just, simply going home. Here I am going to all this trouble, to come all this way every day, and for what? To be treated like this? No, thank you!" But even I, who have been living with Mother Emma and Daughter Emma only little more than a week know, from daily experience, that Daughter Emma is not really going to go home, but has only sounded the opening round of the next stage of the daily ritual, during which she repeatedly threatens her mother with abandonment.

During the remainder of the afternoon ritual, which is repeated
again in the evening, the two ancient white haired women, the octogenarian Emma, and the near centarian Emma who bore her, who—I had come to learn—had lived out their lives side by side as a two person family for 81 years, remain seated side by side, each wrapped in the well-worn mantle of her own thoughts and habits and in the common mantle of thoughts and habits apparently long commingled and at times seemingly difficult to differentiate.

Part of the afternoon ritual is for Daughter Emma to sit, stern-visaged and saying nothing, and for Mother Emma to interrupt her daughter's silence every now and then to make conversation, the conversation primarily consisting of asking her daughter what time it is. "What time is it?" "One-thirty" (snapped). Time passes: four minutes perhaps.

"What time is it?"
"Oh for God's sake!" ...
Time passes...
"What time is it?"
"Oh, for God's sake!"...
Time passes.

Whether the reason for Mother Emma's waiting a bit and then asking again was that she had not heard it the time before (for it has been made amply clear by Daughter Emma in her asides to me now and again that"Mother" is a bit hard of hearing, and the replies to what time it is are in fact not made in a very loud voice) or because she has forgotten, or because that is her way of saying that time is passing slowly in her infirmity; or simply that she wishes her daughter would talk to her instead of sitting there with her eyes closed, there was no way to know. What it was drama-
tically possible to know was how infuriated it made her daughter when her mother would again ask what time it was. Eventually, so goes the daily ritual, Daughter Emma, *sotto voce*, instead of telling her mother what time it is, says with great contempt, "Oh shut up!"; and re-closes her eyes.

Once the "Oh shut up!" comment has been made, Mother Emma regularly shifts to attempting to elicit her daughter's open-eyed attention by asking her what time she is leaving. Daughter Emma says, each day, "Three o'clock," with more than a bit of a snap to her voice, and again closes her eyes; having opened them only long enough to say the three syllables. Mother Emma sits quiet for another ten minutes perhaps and then broaches the subject again, repeating in a somewhat plaintive tone, "When are you leaving?"—eliciting again, as in the several subsequent attempts, the same three syllables followed by a re-closing of the daughter's eyes, with the only change being in the exponential increase in the contemptuous tone in which the three syllable reply is spit out.

Finally the time arrives when Mother Emma's conversational gambit elicits instead a different, petulant response. Instead of the words "Three o'clock," the words which come forth are "Well, I don't have to stay that long you know!"

Another important part of the ritual of each day is the ritual involving the rosary beads. At several points during the visit (always when she has become more exasperated than usual), Daughter Emma ferrets out her mother's rosary beads and rather abruptly thrusts them into her mother's hands without prior announcement, with the injunction to "Here! Say your beads!"—again in the sharply snapped hostile tone.
As far as I could tell, there was not an occasion during the two weeks or so of our living together on which Mother Emma had any intention of "saying her beads," nor on which she actually did so. After her beads had been thrust into her hands, Mother Emma would continue as before, either asking what time it was, or when Daughter Emma was going to leave, or, more often, making some other remark such as those she not infrequently made about me—which I will get to in a moment.

Regardless of what her mother did say once the beads had been thrust into her hands, Daughter Emma's reply from that point on was largely confined to a repeating of the, increasingly sharp, "Just say your beads!" and, eventually, as today, "Oh, shut up and say your beads." When her mother evidences, at that juncture, no intention at all of desisting in her conversational attempts and shutting up and saying her beads, Daughter Emma then proceeds to take the rosary beads away from her mother, announcing curtly, "Well, then, I am going to say my beads," which she then proceeds to do.

What is interesting in this last exchange is that, above and beyond the inherent benefit derivable from the saying of the rosary per se, there seemed to be—as an additional intent somewhat in the form of secondary gain—the inference that during the saying of the beads silence would be guaranteed to prevail; that is, there seemed to be an accepted rule that one person would not speak to another while either was engaged in the saying of her beads.  

15I later learned this is so: "...while the 'Pray for us sinners..' are being said (on the rosary beads) the mysteries of the faith are being reflected upon. The complete rosary (or "saying" of the beads) consists of going around the ordinary form of (50) beads three times and reflecting upon fifteen mysteries (contributed by Fulton J. Sheen)." (World Book).
There was a clear sequential pattern which becomes understandable in that light; it was always when Daughter Emma had clearly reached a point of near-end point tolerance for her mother's communications (which were often also request for communication), that she would come up with the idea of telling her mother to say her beads. Or so it seemed. On this occasion Daughter Emma got very much annoyed with her mother and told her to say her beads, in an exceptionally angry—even for her—tone. Her mother sharply retorted, "No, I won't." In extreme irritation Daughter Emma reached over and grabbed the beads and announced that then she was going to say her "own beads"—which she proceeded audibly and visibly to do.

On this occasion, Mother Emma seemed unwilling to abide by the code, and after a bit of a wait, began, very loudly, to request a drink of water. Daughter Emma steadfastly refused to acknowledge her mother's request, or the hearing of it, and while the one woman sat tensely grimacing and reciting "Hail Mary, full of Grace, the Lord is with Thee. Blessed art Thou amongst women and blessed is the fruit of Thy womb, Jesus. Holy Mary, Mother of God, pray for us sinners..." in increasingly irritated tones and atypical emphasis; the other, her mother, sat tensely grimacing and reciting her litany of requesting a glass of water --ever and ever more loudly, in an escalating effort to have herself rather than the Mother of God attended to, although to no avail. Daughter Emma's eyes remained tightly shut and her concentration fiercely bent upon her intoning. At last, Mother Emma roared forth at what I by then knew to be the top of her astonishingly robust lungs, "You are so Goddam mean to me! I want a drink of water!!"
With that—for it was a roar over which it would have been difficult even for the most determined to continue to keep her place among the rosary beads and prayer sequence—Daughter Emma cast aside the rosary and in a low voice, loud enough so only the other two persons—her mother, and me—in the room could not help but hear, said, "Oh Jesus! SHUT UP! I can't EVEN say my BEADS! Damn it all! It makes me sick! Just be QUIET! Here's your cup! Drink it and shut up!!!...And lay off with the dirty mouth too, understand me!....HERE!! You wanted some water, drink some MORE!!"

Because of its intrinsic interest in helping me retrospectively, long after, better to understand these two women whose life I shared for a small number of days five years ago, I will include, too, one other segment of my observations, as a representative example of the mother's comments demonstrative of her reactions of my presence in the room in which she lived. I, I might add, had, as one would, been quietly amicable to Mother Emma, and entered upon some small modicum of polite and friendly interchange within the limits of my postoperative recuperation, which is to say that I had not ignored her presence nor appeared to be oblivious to it, and had smiled in saying good morning to her and that sort of thing. Thus it was that at first I had not realized that it was to me she was referring on the first occasion on which a moment after the nurse had left the room after delivering some prescribed medication to me, Mother Emma began first loudly wailing at the top of her lungs, "My God, no one does anything for you around here."

I did not at first realize that it was indirectly with reference to me that Emma had set in motion an evidence of her distress the following
day, the day on which at six a.m. she had emitted a loud wail, followed by a stridently blared obscenity, followed by the astonishingly shrieked "EmmmmmmmmmMAAAAAA! I have to pee! I got to pee, Emma," which had effectively summoned the nurse to attend to her. Emma, of course, was not there at 6 a.m. but her mother thought she "damn well" ought to be, and was enraged that she should not be there the minute Emma woke up and needed her.

The references to me did not begin until somewhat later, following the nurse's having walked in at ten a.m. to administer some medication to me; and then, on her way out of the room, had cheerily greeted Mother Emma with a "Good morning, Emma. How are you today?" Emma's reply was not intelligible to me, spoken in a tone of reasonable quiet though ill-veiled anger, to the nurse as she passed on the other side of Emma's bed.

As soon as the nurse had left the room, however, her commentary was amply loud and clear: "You son of a bitch!" she snarled, quite clearly intended as an expression of her feeling toward the nurse's having left, although why I did not until later realize. Some time later the nurse returned to the room, again to dispense some additional routine minimal nursing attention to me.

This time as the nurse left, as soon as she was clear of the door, Emma emitted a loudly wailed, "My God, no one does anything for you around here!" "My God, who the hell do you think she is, God damn it!"

As the morning wore on, I needed no further attention, and Emma's needs clearly more abundant than mine, required that she receive a goodly amount of nursing, and other attention. For example, approximately five minutes after this second leave-taking of the nurse, Emma hailed a passing atten-
dant to ask if she knew where her glasses were, which the nurse located for her. Not long after another nurse came into the room and volunteered to assist Emma to the bathroom. As the nurse took Emma's arm to assist her from bed, Emma curtly announced "I can move without your help!" next requisitioning someone to find her pink sweater. Not long after, an attendant and a nurse arrived to take Emma downstairs for physical therapy, about which there was a not inconsiderable amount of sharp-tongued commentary from Emma in the process of assisting her there, and later, back again. When she returned, a friend was visiting me, as had happened at various times across the few days over which Emma and I had by then been roommates.

Soon after this particular visitor left, Emma emitted a loud-voiced wail: "I wished I could get some glory!" In response a nurse who had been passing entered the room and asked Emma if there were something she could do for her. In reply Emma loudly announced "I wish I could get some kind of attention like that girl over there; they do anything for her; she has menfolks all around her all the time."

This retort met with gales of delighted laughter from the two nurses who by that time had entered in response to her loud tirade, despite the fact that Emma herself had said this with very considerable anger: in fact she was rageful.

I had come to realize that her expressions of anger or "temper" very often evoked giggles or outright laughter at the point at which a remark of hers became either unusually socially unacceptable, or deviated from the conventional even more than Emma's run-of-the-mill comments most often did.
Finding her serious comments and her angry wrath greeted with laughter did not sit well with Emma, and regularly evoked more anger from her. On this particular occasion it soon became clear that she was endeavoring to report to one and all in the environment the extreme distress it evoked in her when, in her perception, people were entering the room to attend, not to her, but to me.

In time I came to realize that it did not matter if each of the five, ten, or more, preceding occasions on which a person entering the room had come specifically to minister to Emma, or to visit her, or spoken only to her: regardless of the proportion of "attention" directed solely to her, or spoken only to her, an occasion on which a person entered the room and directed attention to me evoked extremes of distress in Mother Emma— to which she reacted as if to a very real and very painful experience--in the way she responded to all "slights" except for those rendered her in actuality by her daughter: those, she, surprisingly, more often than not was able to react to with far less specific evidences of hostility. Or so it seemed to an observer.

In time I came to see that the distinction for Emma seemed to lie solely in the realm of "being paid attention to," where her daughter was concerned. That is, as if somehow on a "quantity" basis, whereas surprisingly this same quantity criterion seemed not at all to hold up when it came to her extraordinary reaction to my being paid attention to. At first I had been struck simply by the fact that she could have been so violently enraged at such a thing as a nurse coming in to the room to deliver me my medication, with minimal friendly small talk. Certainly from the standpoint of attentiveness, the amount of attentiveness Emma
required and/or received in a just plain friendly, or teasing way, was perhaps twenty times greater in her case than in mine.

In seeming contrast, I was struck by the fact that she could see such a phenomenon as the nurse giving me my medication as even worthy of her note, let alone calling forth a snarling contempt-filled oath against the nurse as the nurse left the room, (not without a friendly greeting to Emma). Yet it seemed not to call forth any such contemptuous loathful tone when her daughter plied her with the most scurrilous harsh contemptuousness, etc. rather relentlessly. True, she would emit a string of Emma's famous "dirty talk" to Emma the Younger, in rebuttal to her daughter's having responded to something Mother Emma did or said or asked, but it was not the same as her tone to the nurse for having paid attention to me, and nothing at all like the rage blasts called forth by my having had a visitor once every day or so for a relatively brief visit most times.

Of "visitors," Emma had, in addition to a visit every now and then from the priest, daily visits from the physical therapy people who took her on an excursion to another part of the hospital, and a very great deal of nursing time: in addition to the care prescribed for her, and routine nursing, always one or more nurses came running in response to Emma's trumpeted blasts; frequent visits from aides, doctors, etc. along with the twice daily many-hours-long visits from her daughter, who occasionally brought an acquaintance who stayed for a few minutes.

All this was in great contrast to the fact that throughout most of the day and evening I lay quietly by myself, reading (when the Emmas' dialogue static would permit reading) or just lying still, with the nurses having to attend to me but rarely and briefly. On some days I
did not happen to have visitors throughout a day.

Yet in Emma's eyes, "that one over there gets all the glory."

She made a truly extraordinary to-do over me in this regard, so that it was not possible to keep one's thoughts from returning to the phenomenon, especially in a situation where there was nothing else to do but lie alongside her, and think, whenever she made reading impossible: her caterwauling in fact went on for good long stretches once set in motion.

In time I realized that it was futile to try to read except when Emma was sleeping,¹⁶ and eventually it became clear, that it was most often not possible to think either, in that room, except about Emma: when the two of them were together, they created so ongoing a din much of the time that nothing else availed.¹⁷

In the course of this forced contemplation of Emma, when she demanded that I myself come into her orbit of discourse, I was struck by what it was that she saw me as receiving that she was not getting her share of: by all criteria I could at first conceive of, she was getting so much more extreme a "share" of attention paid her, that it was not possible not to be puzzled by that phenomenon.

On the one hand, I could see that one might think in terms of Emma's being guided by some concept like "no amount is ever enough." But she had issued her contempt at the nurse for bringing me medication in the

¹⁶The hospital personnel had apologized for housing me with Emma, fearing I would not be able to endure it, but aside from its not permitting me to read as much as I liked, it was not anything one could justifiably call unendurable.

¹⁷It had finally occurred to me that I could better tolerate the tedium of long enforced lying immobile by directing my thoughts to the only thing their racket left room for: their interaction patterns.
form of one of Emma's milder curses, clearly then directed at the nurse, from whom she did expect attention to herself. But when she really became trumpeting, unceasingly, overflowing with rage against me, it had been, she made clear, following on my having had a visitor. Unlike the briefly hurled epithets cursing the nurse for paying attention to me, which was seemingly done with and forgotten by Emma in short order, she went on endlessly about me, to anyone and everyone, following a visit from a friend, or perhaps following two or three days, in which two visitors might have come. Something in that order. No sort of groundswell of great numbers of persons such as one might think Emma must be referring to from her running bursts of relentless commentary. But more important, because of the clear distinction between her low intensity anger when the nurse came to see me and her relentless fury when my friends did, seemed the fact that these persons were complete strangers to her, from whom, unlike the nurses, Emma would have no reason to have expected attention. (They did speak to her going and coming, as people do.)

There, in those instances, Emma had given a name to what it was that I was getting: "glory." A visitor walking into my room and having a friendly visit—that could evoke for Emma so magnificent and unusual a word as glory.

The reader is asked to hold in his mind all that transpires in this next sequence with the Emmas, as well as those that went before, for comparing with events in later chapters, which I will say more about in the discussion following this last vignette from the natural history of Mother and Daughter Emma.

Back at the bedside, Daughter Emma is assisting her mother in the
eating of her lunch. Each time Mother Emma opened her mouth to try to say something, Daughter Emma seized the opportunity to pick up a spoonful of food and thrust it with some vigor into her mother's mouth, evoking in the mother a spluttered spitting out of the food, which in turn elicited a stream of anger from Daughter to Mother about her "disgusting way of acting when someone was trying to help" her.

"Now be quiet and just eat, do you hear, just eat!"

But instead, Mother Emma opened her mouth and began, each time, to speak, of me. "You are going to eat your lunch; you are going to eat your lunch, I hope!" snarled her daughter.

"That new one there she has all kinds of men..."

"I don't care anything about that, I only care that you eat your lunch, dammit!" retorted her daughter.

"That girl gets all the glo-

"Will you shut up and eat your lunch: here!"

"Goddam her! Son of a..."

"If you don't quit it and eat, I am leaving you: do you hear me? I'll just go and I won't come back. Now eat!"

At one point, I looked up from my lunch to find old Mother Emma glaring at me. Her daughter, following her mother's turned away gaze, found herself looking at me as well and quickly looked away. At that moment a nurse walked in to ask if everything was all right. Daughter Emma said in a childlike whining tone, "I was afraid she was going to say something; she looks as if she were going to say something about someone in here." The nurse patted Emma's shoulder and turned and walked out. When the nurse was out of earshot, Daughter Emma picked up where
she had left off: "Just be quiet, do you hear me? Just be quiet and eat your damn lunch!"

As if perhaps endeavoring to hit upon a more neutral topic, Mother Emma asked her daughter, "What dress is that you have on?" when lunch was over and they had taken up their chair sitting at the foot of the bed. "Oh, it's an old rag, full of holes," snapped her seemingly well-dressed daughter. This reply evoked a retort of obscenity or two, and soon Mother Emma was loudly giving forth with some number of her favorite pornographic vocalizations here and there, in reply to which her daughter grew ever angrier and more vocal, eventually turning to me and saying as if in aside, and in an abrupt shift to a poles-apart pleasant tone, "She has an awful vocabulary; she talks like the cooks."

At that Daughter Emma reached over and helped herself to some food from her mother's tray, then saying, "That's all I want; that's all I want; I had my dinner you know."

Apparently deciding for a change to discuss her mother's communicational style with her in between hot tempered interchanges, Daughter Emma, as if providing advice, said, "If you yell one more time I'm not coming back after dinner. Now, here, eat your dessert!" (which Emma had saved from the tray).

"I don't want none!" wailed Mother Emma.

"Well, I am not coming back then," snapped her daughter.

Mother Emma snapped in her turn, "Well then you don't have to come back. Gee, you're awful mean." (Each word of all these exchanges exist verbatim in my "Meredith" notes.)

"Now, here, try this: drink your milk and hurry up, I've got to go,
snapped Daughter Emma. It's *pudding*, that's good; come on. There's only a little bit left," she said in a chance to a kind of crooning with an edge to it.

"Don't give me anymore," Mother Emma said.

"Just open wide so you don't spill it all over everywhere," was her daughter's reply, followed by, "I want you to be very quiet; I don't want another sound out of you," at which Mother Emma began spluttering, leaving her customary stream of obscenities in the wake of Daughter Emma's ongoing commentary and rigorous insistences that she eat, hurry and be quiet.

That was as much as I happened to record, other than in my memory, of the specific interactions between these two women. The farthest thing from my ken at the time would have been to think of them, or their interactions, as anything associated with any sort of patternedness outside of their own exquisitely idiosyncratic lives. What had captured my attention was the extraordinary anomaly between their so advanced ages and the extraordinary manner of speaking to one another; that and the interesting fact that they were able to continue their intimate manner of socially atypical interaction in the close presence of a stranger despite the daughter's very great concern for what "other people" would think if they heard her speak as she regularly did in private, to her mother.

For the next five years, I forgot entirely that I had ever lived with an Emma, or observed the interactions between two Emmas. I had thought about these Emmas far more concentratedly than I would ever do about another person until I began my research, simply because I had found myself within the Emmas' domain for an enforced period where that was my only recourse. As soon as there was no longer a demand on me to
spend time thinking of them, I forgot them as entirely as one would forget someone once sat next to in a bus, however much they might have, for some reason, interested one's thoughts at the time.

In the course of my research I was to learn a very great deal about mother-child interaction patterning and a very great deal about the concept of glory, and about rage. Because I had forgotten all about Emma, it took me a very long time to understand the connections between some very puzzling and very redundant phenomena among my data, which spanned centuries and geographic boundaries.

I did not realize until I came upon my old notebook, after my research was largely completed, that every word, every nuance, every action, that had passed between Emma and her daughter were verbatim replays of perfect superimposability template for mother-child interactions I had, since Emma, observed hundreds of times.

Even now that I have become accustomed to the idea of this phenomenon, it still stands as extraordinary. The fact that one might encounter an entire constellation of ongoing interaction sequences observed between one mother-child pair, identically spoken, in a kind of verbatim replay, word for word, phrase for phrase, tone for tone, snarl for snarl, obscenity for obscenity, nuance for nuance, topic for topic, by another, unrelated mother-child pair seemed near unbelievable. The fact that the two sets of mother-child pairs for whom this was in fact encountered should in one situation be a mother of 25 and a child of nine and one of five, and in the other a mother of 97 and a daughter of 81 was something it took some while to ponder the significance of.

It was, even then, not immediately that I was able to perceive Mother
Emma as another representative of adolescent motherhood, 81 years past the birth of her child when Mother Emma was an adolescent of 16.

What I realized was that the hundreds of hours of first hand observation of the family of Meredith and John and their mother represented a completely superimposable template of verbatim reproduction of every word, tone, topic and nuance of those of Emma and her daughter.

This phenomenon, of coming upon persons from two different time spans, or two different countries (or the same century or country as well, of course) seeming to share one another's life pattern, and thought pattern, was one of the most startling things of this research. At first I would not believe it: eventually I could no longer disbelieve it: it came up too many times. Inasmuch as I was, at the time that I learned of such phenomena, then and there in the process of studying all the other phenomena of their lives, their early experience, and their parents and grandparents' early experience, it was possible to see the superimposability of templates at many levels concurrently.

For me, none of the surprising phenomena which became eventually visible across this research were simple matters to believe, and less simple to come to grasp the significance of, and to search for an understanding of. I have tried to stay with the research long enough to be able to do that, and I believe I have been able to do that to a far greater extent than I would have thought possible. As I shall probably be found saying more than once across this account, the great difficulty lies in attempting to articulate these understandings, for they hold no brief whatever with the linearity that makes up our only way of communicating in words.
Emma and her daughter represent one of the very few occasions on which it was possible for me to have opportunity to observe a perfectly superimposable template for a mother-child pair, in the process of interacting; in both instances it is for that reason that I have taken this kind of reader's time and gone into this kind of detail. Not for any inherent interest in the interactions of the Emmas themselves, interesting as that might be, but because they are, in the most extraordinary way possible, living manifestations of one of the many surprising findings of this research: that early experience, under certain specific conditions, and for a complex of highly specific and understandable reasons, gives rise to extraordinary patternedness across the lives of each of the generation's persons for whom this is the transgenerational familial matrix variant.

Without awareness of the Emmas (for I had not only forgotten them, but in addition, my perceptual blinders had not permitted me to recognize the fact of Mother Emma's "adolescent motherness" hidden in among the more "obvious" factors of her "eccentricity" and the very advanced age of her and of her 81 year old daughter), I had come to perceive this very interaction pattern which they manifest, as perhaps one generalizable to a very specific life phenomenon—that of becoming a mother in young adolescence. But the particular mother-child interaction patterns themselves—and certainly the words they spoke to one another—those I had at the time of my clinical research with "adolescent mothers" in their 20's, thought of as pertaining only to the time of childhood: that the identical words and interactions are capable of still ongoing at the age of 97 and 81, seems an extraordinary phenomenon. That in the process of finding them repeating themselves one should also find the cast of characters reversed
--so that the words and inflections and anger, etc., I had for two years watched visited upon the child by the mother, should, in the 97 and 81 year old adolescent mother-child pair, be found in the words and inflections and anger, etc. of the daughter to the mother, and the words, the experience of insatiable entitlement and rage at imagined slight, etc., which I, for hundreds of hours, had observed coming forth from the adolescent mother's daughter, to her once-adolescent mother, should at 81 and 97 be found coming from the once-adolescent mother to her 81 year old child is a phenomenon amazing in the extreme, in my view. And yet, at the same time, one which fits perfectly into the formulations the research with two young families of adolescent mothers had made it possible to construct.

When one adds to that the fact that I had hypothesized that in the case of the adolescent mother and her child, the young woman has in fact been impelled to become a mother because of herself not having been able to receive minimally sufficient or adequate mothering nurturance and therefore for that reason being led to anticipate the possibility of receiving mothering nurturance from her own infant; and that the adolescent mother was hypothesized, as a result of that clinical research pilot study, as perceiving her child, unconsciously, as her nurturer, with the child then left never able to have a chance for minimally adequate mothering on her side, it seems inescapable to conclude that the Emmas are bearing out all the hypotheses of the adolescent mother aspect of this research. Beyond that, it appears that with Mother Emma we are seeing those very phenomena which had in the pilot study been suggested as the adolescent mother's unconscious experience, at 97 having become conscious verbalization and behavior.
So too, on her role's side, has the daughter overtly, by 81, taken on the role of her mother's official nurturer. Further, in the interaction sequence between Mother and Emma, I was able to verify that all of the feeding and all of the responding and reacting pattern sequences which I had long observed in the adolescent mother once feeding, responding and reacting to her small child, have here become, in old age, the very same feeding, responding and reacting pattern sequences, in literally verbatim translation, which I hundreds of times observed in the case of an adolescent mother feeding her small boy and girl as well, now seen as enacted by the now-grown child feeding her mother.

It bears pointing out too that the hypothesized fusion between mother and child—the difficulty "knowing," for the participants in the adolescent mother-child pair, who is the mother and who the child becomes eminently visible in a dramatic way with the Emmas.

We may see Daughter Emma, in light of the pilot study, as never having had a chance to be a child, because being the child was the role her mother needed to retain for herself. We may see her too as angry about that. We may also see in Daughter Emma a person who, never having had opportunity to be a child, grew up to never herself be a mother. The adolescent mother clinical research pilot had hypothesized that a child raised by a child-mother seeking from her child a mother rather than a child to mother, would not find herself able to be mother to a child.

The subsequent research, being here reported, seemed very strongly to bear out that hypothesis, just as do the natural history of the near-hundred year history of the Emmas.

Although I will not here present these identical sequences for the
latter day adolescent mother and her child, who were both my clients in psychotherapy, because the complete and identical redundancy would be wearing, I will later present instead other interaction sequences from their lives, in another context. (Some appeared too, in the pilot study chapter.)

I think there is little question that a reader would not be far wrong if, when he or she comes to the chapter dealing with Meredith, her small brother John, and their mother (Chapter XII) he permits himself to envision young Emma at five or at nine, and Mother Emma at 25.

In the "real life" situation of Meredith and her mother and brother, whose interactions comprise this striking superimposable template with the Emmas, there is yet another template superimposable as part of this same remarkable pattern; in this different instance, one related to the identical self-phenomena which characterized the eight year old Meredith's time of very profound disturbance, before her long time of psychotherapy.

In listening to a clinical case presentation of a 26 year old woman patient in a residential treatment center, I was dumbfounded to again hear a verbatim replay, this time of all of the verbalizations, bizarre thought patterns, and response and reaction patterns which I had come to know so well in the individual psychotherapy, the family therapy and the naturalistic observations in which the small eight year old (and later nine, and ten year old) Meredith was involved: this time it was in the psychotherapy of a 26 year old single woman in whose thoughts and behaviors, etc., those identical to the words and behaviors of small Meredith were coming forth.

Such astonishing phenomena seem to me to require our attention: there is no way it could be chance coincidence when an eight year old and
her mother, a 26 year old with her therapist, and a 97 year old with her 81 year old daughter can be found to display identical word for word, thought for thought, response for response, experience replays, at both the standpoints of the individual child and the mother-child pairs: these were not just occasional incidental repetitions, but repeated sequences of considerable complexity.

But this research did not remain fixedly at one level of discourse, or one sphere or domain: the research's guidelines which were to follow where the data led, in time led through the phenomena of interrelatedness from mother-child interaction patterns to considerations of concepts like glory, and so for that too we must again return to ponder glory through the 97 year old adolescent Mother Emma's eyes, to see what light she can shed on that.

A visitor walking into my room had evoked for the wrathful Emma-acting-like-a-baby, the Emma with the "dirty talk" vocabulary, the poetic word glory. That is a word no one—I know ever uses in conversation; there seem very few phenomena in life for which we ever use that word other than in patriotic or religious contexts.

Emma's vocabulary, one must note, was not at all of a kind that included patriotic or religious sentiments, concepts or words: most patriotic or religious folk might imagine themselves fainting dead away at Emma's other word choices, many of which were nothing if not exceptional even to the ears of an observer with reasonably wide general experience of the world and its language use. I was convinced that Emma's vocabulary would be thought extraordinary by most people for whom profanity is a part of their common parlance—it was a kind, perhaps, such as Shaw might
have had in mind in *Pygmalion* about "words that would make a sailor blush." Yet Emma had, out of nowhere it seemed, come up with the magnificent, and perhaps poetic, word *glory*. That surprised me.

Somehow, for Emma, the idea of glory was the same as "getting paid attention to," I thought puzzledly. Because the word glory was evoked by seeing strangers pay attention to one another, it seemed at first that glory was "getting paid attention to," and that it did not matter by whom, or what the reason.

But thinking of the way Emma kept up about me to everyone, it became in time, clear that there was more to it than that. Her continued emphasis always contained the reference to "men-folks!" It seemed possible that she *might* be thinking in terms of "lovers" or whatever word Emma might use in that context, but *that* would seem no more of an explanation for the *extremes* of unceasing distress and rageful torrent this brought to her.

In other words, even if she herself did still wish for relationship with a man, that in itself would not after all make it necessarily follow that such ceaseless torrents of anguish and anger, and then, later, it seemed, even plaintiveness—in her continued attempts to tell her daughter of this again and again while her daughter was pushing food in her mouth—should follow. Emma had kept this up about glory and menfolks day after day: perhaps "maleness" was the wrong translation of Emma's "meaning." Perhaps she thought of "men-folks" in terms of the expression "admirers." In that sense her dwelling so intently on that word only in that one context, and not when the nurses, etc., paid attention to me, seemed to provide a more clear distinction point for what glory might be about for Emma.

Emma got enormous amounts of attention, yet in fact she didn't receive
"admiration" from the persons who paid her attention.

There was one kind of distinction between the bright, shining faces lit up with beaming smiles of the friends who had come to visit me, and a somehow very different sort of smiling faces, or laughter, or teasing, or even the compassion, of the nurses, who popped in to visit Emma, or to tend to her needs. And, or course, a clearer distinction where Emma's daughter was concerned. I think we need to recognize the very great likelihood that it was this which this woman of nearly one hundred years detected as what someone else was "getting" that she was not, that could and did call forth relentlessly trumpeted torrents of anguish, wrath, and plaintive efforts to get someone to understand, and to care. "I wished I could get some glory!" to Emma, could not have meant just getting attention—that she got lots of, but even in just the two or three persons who stopped by to visit with me over a few days she recognized something that she was not getting—and that, it clearly hurt her not to get.

I think we need to assume that this was the genuinely smiling, approving, accepting, caring faces of empathically responsive friends: the fact that in these few peoples' brief visits what they seemed to be making clear was simply that they were glad to see me. Since that seemed the only discernable distinction, I think we must assume that, to Emma, that was glory. And that its absence from the faces of her visitors was not only recognizable, but it hurt. I believe now that the reason it hurt was because it touched a 96 year old chord in Emma—back to the time nearly a hundred years ago when somehow genuinely admiring approval of Emma was never available: that there was never enough of what Emma called glory, for Emma. That is what this research has suggested.
Emma seemed never to look at me; she seemed to make it clear that she did not wish to talk to me, but I had, at first, thought that was a factor of her being wrapped up in her own concerns, and perhaps her own physical health, which seemed reasonable. But she was paying tremendously fine-tuned attention to me, if she was perceiving things like tone of voice, smiles, facial expression—if that is what it was. I could think of nothing else, that might be the answer for her glory concept.

At the time I thought of all that simply in terms of having figured out a tiny puzzle in Emma's eccentric and idiosyncratic vocabulary and thought process: for this "senile" old woman, I thought, the word glory meant a highly specific phenomenon: apparently, it meant being paid attention to in an endearing, warm, affectionate manner of face, tone and overall attitude. That she would wish for that did not seem at all eccentric; only her word for it was what I had thought of in those terms.

I did not remember this nearly one hundred year old woman I had long forgotten as I pored over the lifespan data of hundreds of generationally overlapping lives and came, time and again to someone at some point in one or another transgenerational matrix who would speak, or write in her or his diary, or letter to a sister or a brother, or close friend, of having had a religious experience, or suddenly felt the most remarkable experience, as if a great and wondrous light had suddenly shone around them, or a light had become visible in front of their eyes.

I was a very long time coming to recognize that this was related to not getting enough of the glory, and to the wrathful rage that came to abide inside them, until, for some number for whom the rage was particularly painful, they came to see the glory with their own eyes, shining
down on them and reported that when that happened, somehow the rage was quieted—although it did always seem to manage to burst forth again now and then, when things did not go as they thought they should.

I was a long time coming to understand, through the data of my research, the startling realization that this rage I redundantly encountered across many lives was always and ineluctably part of a life pathway which had included early experience of not getting their share of the "glory" from their mother and their father, and that this particular kind of early experience had left them exquisitely sensitive to any sense that they were not being paid the right kind of attention to, or responded to as they thought they should, and that it was the insult on top of injury to this exquisite vulnerability that never failed to call forth pain, and then rageful and wrathful anger.

I was an even longer time coming to understand through the redundantly repeated lives of this research that this was the grapes of wrath which Julia Ward Howe had written about in the Battle Hymn of the Republic, and that John Steinbeck, from sharing a like transgenerational familial matrix with Julia Ward Howe, would just naturally also know about the grapes of wrath. In the letter he sent off to his editor with The Grapes of Wrath, Steinbeck was insisting that his book could not be published without all of the words and music of the Battle Hymn of the Republic because all of its words and all of its music were the same story as his book. Worried that perhaps the editor might not have understood the seriousness of all that, he wrote again, this time underscoring the importance for his book that the entire set of words to the Battle Hymn of the Republic be published along with it: not just a verse or two, he wrote, "but all, all,
all of the words: every single one of them is important."

I can well imagine that a reader might wonder how the Battle Hymn of the Republic or The Grapes of Wrath got into this account of Emma and her daughter; even more vividly can I imagine the frown on the face of a reader on encountering a) such odds-bodkins discussion as this being injected into a scientific paper at all; let alone b) such abrupt and incoherent changing of topic, and losing the thread of one's narrative. I considered most seriously leaving out any mention of such anomalies as suddenly dropping The Battle Hymn of the Republic into this account, or a letter by John Steinbeck to the editor working with him on The Grapes of Wrath. Most seriously of all did I ponder omitting all mention of the fact that this research was permitted to contemplate, and even countenance, notions like people who go around getting up while still half asleep and finding a stream of words like "Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord; he is trampling out the vintage where the grapes of wrath are stored; He hath loosed the fateful lightning with his terrible swift sword; His truth goes marching on," coming unbidden from their pen.

The result would have been a far tidier, less questionable research account had I stopped with the report that it was possible to find evidence that the words, thoughts and interaction sequences between a 97 year old onec-upon-a-time adolescent mother could come forth three quarters of a century later in the daily-life ongoing interchanges between a rageful young mother and her bizarrely confused small daughter in verbatim replay, and that the bizarrely confused interchanges of this same small daughter

\[\text{18 These are not all the words.}\]
and her therapist could come forth in the same two year time span 100 miles northward between a bizarrely confused 26 year old woman and her therapist.

I did weigh the risks to scientific credibility in suggesting such roundly unacceptable inclusions. But the truth of the matter is that as long as I continued steadfastly to refuse to permit myself to contemplate, let alone countenance, such "unscientific" notions, and such unthinkable wandering digressions and losings of the thread of internal consistency and coherence, I continued steadfastly not to be able to locate answers to any of the mind boggling perplexities of the "scientific data," and the scientific theories for understanding the data of these human lives I was studying.

I spent many weeks in attempting systematically to disprove the hypotheses associated with the formulations about the glory, and the wrath, and the trampling out of that wrath that a religious experience had been seen in the data countless times to accomplish in the course of some visual anomaly; and with other scientifically unacceptable formulations the data had seemed relentlessly to demand. Repeatedly I was not able to disprove them, but instead only to find more and more support for them. It was robustly difficult for me to accept the formulations the data had led to. In time it came to be more difficult not to.

John Steinbeck was the only other person I knew of who had ever literally thought in terms of the grapes of wrath: as I thought of what his Grapes of Wrath had been "about"—of Oklahoma dustbowl migrant workers during the Depression—once again, despite my earlier convictions I doubted my own prior-tested-formulations. I thought that perhaps Steinbeck might
have included some statement in among his letters or other writings in which he articulates what the grapes of wrath meant to him, and what perhaps in this way I might be able to disprove some part of these hypotheses which involved conceptualizing a universe of shared significations which demanded such leaps of faith, and such willing suspension of disbelief.

I found instead Steinbeck insisting and underscoring that a true understanding of his *Grapes of Wrath* could only be possible if it were made crystal clear to the reader that the key to grasping the real meaning of his *Grapes of Wrath* required that one accept that the *Battle Hymn of the Republic* is, in effect, a perfectly superimposable template for this nonfictional fictitious story he had crafted. The understanding of the title, he was struggling to make clear, is not imagining the words "grapes of wrath" as if a metaphor for angry dust bowl families, all right--families for whom for both parents and children, there was never enough--of anything--but the "meaning" of all this, he was underlining and insisting in as many ways as he could think of, was located, physically, right there in the words of so unlikely a thing as an odd-sounding poem written by a polite lady named Julia Ward Howe, who would presumably--even if she had lived in the right century--had known nothing about migrant workers of the Oklahoma dust bowl or children who did not have enough food to eat. This woman had in fact written an odd-sounding poem that people regularly take to be talking about the topic of the Civil War, which in itself represents a goodly leap of faith once one looks with any scrutiny at all at the words; all, all, all the words to the *Battle Hymn of the Republic*, once I took Steinbeck's advice to read them all.
Once one decides to adopt the quite different conceptual framework of simply listening to what that person is saying, in literal words, about his or her own personal experience, it is something that requires a fair sized willing suspension of disbelief to hear Julia Ward Howe saying that she woke up from sleep early one morning, only half awake, went to the desk alongside her bed, and found the words "Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord, etc." pouring forth "unbidden" from her pen; after which she went right back to睡眠, unaware when she later woke that she had even waked earlier at all; and then to imagine that in writing a long stream of words about her eyes seeing the glory of the Lord, she was not just writing something of her own most personal experiences at some level, but instead writing about the Civil War. I am not at all certain now that it does not take a far greater willing suspension of disbelief to accept the notion that such an odd-sounding collection as comprise all, all, all the words of the Battle Hymn of the Republic could have anything whatever to do with the Civil War rather than entirely the private, personal experience of the person who found them coming forth from her pen in the way many poets have written that poems do.

For analogy's sake, one might image a client's coming in and reporting such an experience to a therapist and the therapist's interpreting that experience as in actuality—or even in metaphor—a statement about the Vietnamese War, or World War II, say: in that context it seems clearly a leap none would make. John Steinbeck seemed to want very much to underscore that it is a leap one should not make: that it misleads the reader down a completely wrong path, one which results in losing all grasp of the author's meaning, and all sense of the author's personal self-
Becoming ragefully wrathful seeing another "get" the admiring glow of the smiling face of an empathetically responsive man was, for the 97 year old hollering out in a trumpeted banshee wail at 6 a.m. the call of a baby to her mother "Emmmmaaaaaa! I have to pee!", translated far outside the normal range of her pornographic vocabulary, into the poetic word glory. It is not really difficult to decide to ignore the thought that there might be any "significance" in Emma's word choice here. It was not at all difficult to do so once I was myself outside her intimate domain. When I was living inside her intimate domain, it was not just difficult to ignore the thought that there might be any significance in her word choice, about glory; it was impossible: she shrieked its significance day in and day out; it colored even many of the bites of food she was in the process of having pushed too fast and unfeelingly into her mouth.

We can, as readily, decide it is unscientific nonsense to "see" scientific significance regarding the vicissitudes of human development in the fact that John Steinbeck insisted that "all, all, all" the words of the Battle Hymn of the Republic represented a superimposable template for his Grapes of Wrath. It was only to John Steinbeck for whom that was an option not open. While he was alive, he saw to it that all copies printed of the Grapes of Wrath included, at the beginning, a complete duplication of all the words and music of the Battle Hymn of the Republic. When he was no longer around to insist on his message being heard as he meant it, the publishing world, and perhaps the literary world, so it would seem, decided they were a better judge than John Steinbeck about
what his meaning was, and they summarily dropped off including such whimsical nonsense as reproducing the words and music of Julia Ward Howe's poem in the front of any of the endless stream of copies of this book whose central message was so readily able to touch such an infinity of readers.

I found this across this research a not uncommon theme among writers whose works had the capacity to deeply stir readers across time boundaries and geographic boundaries and language boundaries: this notion that, "dammit, people reading my work are not getting my meaning but are instead insisting on interpreting it in terms of their meaning." Henrik Ibsen was a quintessential example of this: he all but wore himself out trying to insist relentlessly that he was not at all writing about social issues—that A Doll's House, for example, was not any kind of statement about women's rights—but that the only thing at all that he was doing was writing about human lives and human problems. Ibsen was to say over and over again across his lifetime that only if a person is willing to listen to what Ibsen says about his works, to read all of them (all, all, all the words said from beginning to end) and to read them in the same order in which he wrote them across his lifetime, will a person be on the right track, and have any chance of understanding his works.

I am not at all sure if I have managed to make it clear that the reason it was necessary to make such an abrupt digression from the path of the topic of Emma and her daughter, or of the superimposability of the daughters, is because those phenomena were eventually found, albeit in decidedly non-linear manner, to be in each case but one small part of a
vast complex of interrelatedness having all to do with the impact of early experience on adult development, on future parenthood and on subsequent generations, across entirely unrelated persons and families and that, at a vastly different level of discourse, the superimposability of thought and inner experience and of basic underlying themes between writers and thinkers and do-ers otherwise unrelated to one another were also found to be another small part of the very same vast complex of interrelatedness having all to do with the impact of early experience on adult development, on future parenthood and on subsequent generations, across entirely unrelated persons and families.

For sure, I am aware that to make such a statement is, by itself, saying nothing that anyone could be asked to believe, or to accept on another's say so: I would not myself. The statement, qua statement, says nothing, for it does not give a clue to how all this comes about, what forms it takes, how one could ever come to know of such phenomena (or to believe she has come to know of such phenomena). I don't think it will be possible for me to make a very great deal of that clear within the boundedness of one presentation of research, both because of the vastness of the complex of phenomena involved, and because of the excruciating limitations of the linearity of our language and other factors having to do with the ongoing work of this research.

Here I am only saying that these are the things I have found to be some of the places, disparate, and nonscientific, as they can only seem, to which the data of transgenerationally traced lives across times, circumstances and conditions led, once I would agree to follow. These mentioned here—the intertwinability of form and content where mother-child
interaction patterns are concerned and the intertwinability of form and content where fictional, dramatic and poetic writing are concerned—are by no means the only two sets of such phenomena; it was the staggering number of other such phenomenal "coincidences"—more empirically pointable to yet at the same time more difficult to discuss in any way because of their extraordinary appearance of having no meaning of any kind about anything, except the entirely idiosyncratic or circumstantial minutiae of living—that led me eventually to recognize that there is nothing mystical nor magic nor fantastical about any of these anomalous sounding experiences not even the seeing the glory in the coming of the Lord. It was, in time, possible to come to appreciate these phenomena as derivable from entirely reasonable and knowable, and indeed, in many instances, long known scientific phenomena, physiological phenomena, cognitive process developmental phenomena, etc. It is only the non-linearity, coupled with the great difficulty the human mind seems to have in acknowledging an other-than-linear, or other-than-atomistic aggregate, sense of things, that makes all of this so difficult to work with in research, and later, so near-impossible to work with in trying to make a lucid presentation.

There were many such phenomena which arose in this research: in some cases they threaded what appeared to be their unfolding transgenerational matrix pathway by way of some thread of visibility template potential adhering to their lives. Once the research had gotten to the advanced stage where it could be possible, through knowing (by way of their redundancy) what element clusters were that were parts of sets of sets—it was, in those cases, always possible to follow the transgenerational familial matrix template superimposability aspects that were, even histo-
rically, possible of becoming visible. In those cases where instead the element of visibility lay at the level of the intertwining of form and content in the realm of acknowledged (e.g., published) thought, it was possible to trace universe of shared significations in this way. Regardless, in the end, it was always possible to locate at least part of the threads that formed some measure of the vast complex of interrelatedness at all of the other levels that appear to comprise, at least in part, this astonishing "wholeness," which while wholeness, is not, and never could be wholeness by virtue of its being always and eneluc-tably in the process of being and becoming.

It would not have done to have tried to present an account of this research using those kinds of scientific data and scientific formulations, despite the paradox, to me, that they do seem to behave with as much (perhaps more) ordered regularity than any of the orderness find-able in most scientific phenomena by other definitions.

The aim and intent of this chapter was, in large measure, to pre- sent some sense and semblance of some measure of all of the very much that is critical to a complete and comprehensive understanding of the "wholeness" of this research, despite the unavoidability of not being able to set forth a wholeness as articulation about the research—at the same time underscoring that it was not by any means possible to determine the answers about any of this, but rather what some of the surprising questions are, and to trace them across a remarkably wide, and remarkably disparate-seeming, array of phenomenal levels.
94. Battle Hymn of the Republic

Julia Ward Howe

1. Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord; He is
2. I have seen Him in the watch-towers of a hundred circling camps. They have
3. I have read a fiery gospel writ in burnished rows of steel: "As ye
4. He has sounded forth the trumpet that shall never call re-treat; He is
5. In the beauty of the lilies Christ was born across the sea, With a

trampling out the vintage where the grapes of wrath are stored; He hath loosed the fateful
build-ed Him an alt-a r in the evening dew and damp; I can read His righteous
deal with My contem-ners, so with you. My grace shall deal." Let the He-ro born of
sifting out the hearts of men before His judg-ment-seat. Oh, be swift, my soul, to
Glo-ry in His bos-om that trans-fig-ures you and me; As He died to make men

lightning of His ter-rible swift-sword: His truth is march-ing on.
sentence by the dim and dar-ling lamp: His day is march-ing on.
woman crush the ser-pent with His heel. Since God is march-ing on.
answer Him! be ju-bilant, my feet! Our God is march-ing on.
bo-ly let us die to make men free. While God is march-ing on.

Chorus.

Glo-ry, glo-ry, hal-le-lu-jah! Glo-ry, glo-ry, hal-le-lu-jah!

Glo-ry, glo-ry, hal-le-lu-jah! His truth is march-ing on.

An example, courtesy of John Steinbeck, of a superimposable template manifesting the intertwining of content and form. These are all the words.
The infant psychiatry researchers and infant developmental psychologists have been endeavoring to observe and record samples of mother-infant behavior in research situations constructed to be as naturalistic as possible: in all of them the mother is simply asked to interact with her child in the way she would normally do, whether this be in the research laboratory where she might be instructed to play with the child, talk with him, or something of the sort, and alternately to spend a few minutes in a specifically selected "negative" condition, say, "looking at the child with a straight face, not smiling", or in some cases, to observe the mother interacting with the infant under more naturalistic situations, in the home. In these situations, it is assumed that some degree of allowance must be made for the fact that an observer has requested the mother to interact with her child for a specific amount of circumscribed time in the presence of an observer there for that purpose.

From these situations researchers have been able to learn a great deal about what Bowlby referred to as the "crucial bit in the middle", of how things proceed between a mother and her developing infant. The longitudinal researches of Mahler, et al., have constructed a more comprehensively "naturalistic" environment within which to observe, over many months, the interactions between mothers and their toddlers, in a daycare/nursery school-like environment, among parents who were in a position to partici-
participate in such a program on a sustained basis, and wished to participate in such a project. It was possible for Mahler, et al, to provide a great deal of information about other aspects of the "crucial bit in the middle" through these researches, as too it has been, and continues to be in the Yale Child Study Center, the Hampstead Therapy Clinic in London, and the planned environment for autistic children at which Niko Tinbergen and his wife have found it possible to concentrate intensive ethological observations on normal and pathological child behaviors and development, and of the interactional processes with parents and other adults of such children. Other such controlled observation projects have since undertaken such attempts to record these segments of what goes on between a child and its mother in an attempt to proceed along the long and complex path of endeavoring to compile a comprehensive understanding of developmental vicissitudes.

One of the things I have learned across this research, as remarked upon earlier, is that other varieties of naturalistic observations may be made, in what I am referring to as the perspective of the natural historian, which may be fruitfully added to such compendia as complementary and supplementary, or corroborative, data which may add to our awareness of some others of these crucial bits in the middle which may fall into a category that can be thought of broadly as mother-child experiences, or early childhood experiences, which might seem to have likelihood of eluding our systematic research attempts, even under simulated naturalistic conditions, or somewhat skewed naturalistic situations from the standpoint that they do not necessarily represent what might have been taking place had that not been a day or a time when the observer
had made appointment to be on hand. Additionally, Dr. Tinbergen has underscored the point, both in his writings and in personal communication, that there are particular research skills involved in ethological, or natural history, observation which are not the same thing as simply "looking" at what is going on. Dr. Tinbergen emphasizes that there are highly refined ways of observing natural life, whether one is observing flora and fauna, or human infants, which permit the natural historian to perceive considerably more than he would otherwise do. I have attempted to learn these particular research skills through his helpful descriptions to the extent it has thusfar been possible for me to study, practice and refine them, and I have found that by applying Dr. Tinbergen's ethological techniques, it is possible even for a relative newcomer to the role of natural historian to perceive things in a way I had not previously done, in the position of naturalistic observer. One of these Tinbergian techniques which I have only recently begun to be able to gain some skill in has to do with attending to "what happens a short time after" what one has observed. From his teachings I find that I am able to think back, in recording as comprehensively as possible what I have observed, and realize what many of the places were in which I, this time again, failed to manage to keep that critical concept in mind to the extent that it would have been optimal to do so: that is, in "looking back" in order to record observations, I am now able to see, in retrospect, what I failed to see. This seems to me to hold capacity for enabling me to do better next time. From the perspective of one who has been endeavoring to learn ethological techniques, I can attest to the fact that they are not as easy to learn as a description of them might at first seem.
I mention these things, aside from the inherent usefulness, I think, in mentioning useful things one has learned in the course of one's research that seem useful contributions, but also so as to be able to preface the natural history observations which are about to follow with the statement that I now know there was much more I could have learned in and from this situation had I been more proficient a naturalistic observer than I yet am. I will try to point, in the course of this account, to those things I failed to observe as well as to those I did.

I have learned that observations from the perspective of the natural historian seem more potentially fruitful in a situation where one can observe across some chunk of time, but that it is not essential for this chunk of time to be in all cases many days or weeks. That is, while it is, so I have learned, possible to learn some useful things about human interaction over a few hours of observing, it is not very useful, if useful at all, to attempt to learn anything by attempting to employ a natural historian's perspective while walking down the street, say, or observing the passengers in the next car while stopped for a red light. One needs some measure of continuity, but that measure of interaction possibility of continuity between parents and children need not, in all cases, be greater than a few hours.

One of the places I chose to attempt to employ naturalistic observation for two relatively small chunks of time was in a situation where it seemed to me possible for an observer to attend to the interactions between parent and child over several hours as they went about their activities for that day in the way they would have done had I not been there. In having occasion to have to walk through a small municipal
building in a small country town some months ago, I came to learn that there is a section of that building on which on both sides of a long corridor are lined up long wooden benches against each side of the corridor walls, and that on these benches on certain days persons who are to appear before a judge for one or another of the reasons for which persons are required to present themselves before a judge sit, for several hours, waiting for their turn. I learned that many of the persons who spend these hours are mothers and their infant or small child or children, as well as other persons, who are, for the most part or entirely, there not for the purpose of themselves appearing before the judge, but simply having accompanied some other person there. I learned that during these days in which "court is in session", juvenile court, and adult court, alternate, and that the persons who wait on these benches represent both of these groups.

Having been told it was perfectly appropriate for me to sit there for as long as I liked on such days—that anyone was permitted to sit there who wished to do so—I spent two such days, of four hours each time, some weeks apart, simply observing whatever there might be to observe among human beings doing what it was they would have been doing on those days of their lives had I not been present.

Across much of that time, there did not seem to be occurring situations which would represent other than random jigsaw puzzles pieces, to which I could attach no connectedness, and no inherent visible meaningfulness, and hence found no reason to record. Some persons—indeed many—simply sat quiet, did nothing, said nothing to anyone, eventually got up when their name was called, were gone for a time, returned and
took up sitting again until whatever it was they were waiting for had again arrived. Some other persons, visibly in pairs, a mother and an adolescent boy, for example, interacted for a good while directly across from me, and in visibly meaningful ways, but recording them would have resulted in no more than a duplication of many such angry mother-angry adolescent communicational patterns—seeming in no way unlike those with which our psychological awareness abounds.

Across the two days of naturalistic observation in this setting, I found four small slices of human life seeming inherently worth recording from the perspective of a psychologist-natural historian's perspective. They seem to me to hold potential for serving a useful purpose in my research, and I will try to set them down as I remember them from simply having sat quietly in their presence.

One of these days, some dozen and a half persons were in attendance. The age range represented seemed to span a wide gamut: from two young infants in arms (one of them in the arms of a young pregnant woman), to five or six white-haired and grey haired persons in their mid sixties to mid seventies. There were some half dozen small children, from approximately age four to approximately age ten (the day was a day that would be considered a "school day" for children of public school age, but these children were not in school, but with their mothers). There were two young adolescent girls, clearly sisters, and their mother, in brisk three way interaction. There were some half dozen adolescent boys, ranging from perhaps fifteen or sixteen to the age where adolescence over laps with young manhood, and several young men in what appeared to be their twenties. A few men seeming to be somewhere
between 35 and 45 sat beside adolescent boys quietly waiting their turns. There were several grandmotherly looking women, some of whom looked like school teachers with their relaxing clothes on. Most, or many, seemed to fit the sorts of descriptions one would expect to encounter in a description of a friend's uncle, or the woman behind the desk at the bank, or the man behind the counter at one or another self-owned business, or on a committee at the local P.T.A. or church fair. Some would not have fit these descriptions, the height of their heels, or the thickness of their eye makeup, or tightness of clothing exaggerated in the ways one does not conjure up in one's imagination when thinking of the school teacher in the elementary school, the man at the insurance agent's office, the woman behind the bakery counter. Except for the one or two with slightly exaggerated appearance styles, there was nothing to call one's attention to any one of these persons any more than any one else's at some other place. All of these persons were, and had been for some time, sitting quietly on their bench places, as if sitting still were not a thing beyond their endurance.

Suddenly into this quiet peaceful and quiet scene, a considerable uproar invisibly somersaulted. Someone near by said to someone else, "Wow! did you see those guys they just brought in, in handcuffs!" I turned my gaze down the corridor, but whoever was brought in in handcuffs had vanished from sight at a far end of the corridor, where the entrance was, and I did not think further of them. Then, within minutes, there appeared a group of a half dozen women, and one white haired man. They too were there for the same purpose of the others in this corridor place of benches for waiting for others, but everything about them
was as different from those who had been sitting for two hours or so as it would be possible to imagine.

Although very many aspects of the kinds of things we might think of as characterizing persons hit one's perceptual faculties at once, the one overriding phenomenon was the difference in energy level: none of them sat down; they stood, and moved, back and forth--pacing would denote too calm a word for this movement; the movement back and forth took place even as they spoke, in a vibrating knot, with one another. These persons had elected to stand, and move back and forth in the three or four foot space of corridor floor they determined upon as the space they required to stand and wait, back and forthing in, happened to be the space directly in front of me, so that they were approximately three feet from me, at most.

The person whose energy pitch dominated the other moving persons in the group was, unlike the others, unable to stand still even for a second; she took forceful step toward each person, with a lunging, body-swinging type motion accompanying each communication: she did not stop communicating, and hence, did not stop the forceful lunging, circling, body-swinging movement. The voices of all of these six were many decibels above all of the 18 people who had comprised the corridor's population for the earlier two hours; these people all spoke very loudly, in conversing with a person or persons along side, or some 18 inches across, the tight knotted group. The clothing of the most non-still young woman--she was, it seemed, in her late twenties or early thirties--was not unlike that of many of the persons who had been waiting that day. Like many others, she had very casual clothes on, slacks, casual shirt, sandals;
yet for all the similarity, hers had a quality which compelled attention to her and to her body: the slacks she wore stopped perhaps two inches or so below the waist, and her shirt, coming down in the other direction as shirts do, stopped perhaps four inches before it got to her waist, the overall composite providing a bare space of about six inches of exposed naked torso and belly button, a clothing configuration noticeable by its non-usualness for other than swimming wear by adults of that age group.

Far more compelling, however, at this particular time, was the fire in her eyes, and the venom and vengefulness which did not so much spill over as was spat out by her, even though she made it clear that the persons who she saw as the objects of her vengefulness were not the persons to whom she was speaking in these tones and spitfireness. In fact, it became clear that vengeance was on the minds of all, but, more it seemed, by way of agreeing, heartily, with the enraged fury spewing forth from the woman of the exposed belly button. What it was that she was rageful about was not at first clear because she could not stand still longer, as she said to her acquaintances, for her to do other than emit half sentences, curses and threats directed down to the other end of the empty hall. Approximately six times in ten minutes, she stormed away from the group to some other spot in the corridor, or perhaps in the building, returning a few minutes later with gathered fury, spewed a bit of it out, and was off again.

Eventually it became clear—since each time she returned, she would report to the group some semblance of what had transpired, that what her perception of what was going on was that she had "just tried to go
"inside" to take "him" his cigarettes, and those "________'s" had advised her it was not permissible for her to "go inside". It was this interchange, or this perception of an interchange, she repeated many times, in very loud and fury-laden tones, that had given rise to all of the rage with which she had first hurled herself into the spot in front of me in the corridor. Her many abrupt leave-takings had been, it turned out, for the purpose of returning to the site viewed by the municipality's employees as one to which was not at that time regarded as open to the public, to force her way in. She had viewed each attempt to advise her of the customary regulations for that part of the premises as cause for level of enraged fury such as one but seldom sees, in reaction to any cause. Each time she returned, she described what she viewed as the definitive characteristics of the persons who had attempted to apprise her of the prevailing regulations in long strings of obscenity-filled curses, interspersed with equally long strings of what she intended to do to the one of these municipal employees, the one whose job it was to advise persons of the prevailing regulations about such matters as a particular part of the court building's being at that time not open to the public.

No one restrained her from saying, in remarkably graphic, and remarkably loud, tones and terms, what she planned to do to this man, and she continued to give vent to her extraordinary driving force of energy, which seemed to be bursting its seams. Eventually, her uproar, at the door of the part of the building to which she had been attempting to force entry, resulted in a municipal employee's being directed to where she stood and offering to take the cigarettes, which she had been
endeavoring to take into someone, into that part of the building to
give them to that person for her. She gave this man the cigarettes, and
he returned to tend to this. The situation which had been explained
as the situation having given rise to the fury and energy pitch did not
abate with the accomplishment of the goal; neither she nor any of the
other persons elected to do their waiting sitting down, but continued
to stand, and to move, and to talk loudly. The subject of the conver-
sation, which had theretofore centered only on "they can't get away with
that", and "who the hell does he think he is not letting you in to give
him his cigarettes" kinds of commentaries, had now changed to a dis-
cussion of what would be the best course for getting back at the man
who had refused the young woman permission to enter the room she wished
to enter. It was this same young woman who led the collect about the
best mode of vengeance to employ against this man, and when, and by what
means, in a great heat of energy, and accompanied by the same lunging,
body swinging movements at each sentence—and as before, the others'
role was vocally and loudly nodding in agreement, praise or applause
at the creative imagination she brought to the topic of the best choice
of revenge. The more attention she gave to this subject, the greater
her fury rose, if such a thing is possible: in any case, so it seemed
to a close up observer.

That seemed at first anomalous: it had seemed that having obtained
what she had desired, and in a way that should have left her feeling
pleased instead of angry, her fury might have abated a bit, or even
entirely, and turned to worry, say, or concern, or frustration. But
there was only one phenomenon in operation, rage, and rage seemed to
have literally overtaken her, so that there was no other topic she could
even begin to touch upon, other than some consummatory activity against
which this rage might be directed. The direction which seemed appro-
priate for dispelling rage that presented itself to her as one that
would do the job was, loudly, spelled out as revenge. Over time, I
observed that the rage little by little gave way until it had become
completely traded for vengeance; when a fully satisfying formulation
had finally come to light through which what seemed to her the most
thorough goingly concordant means through which her rage could be satis-
fied, a means through which she could "get even", and "make up for"
what this municipal employee had "done to her", the rage itself had left
her, and only the vengeance remained.

What seemed to make that certain was that the rageful energy force-
fulness abated, the fire in her eyes went out, or at least became banked;
and in the final telling of the scheme, of what she was going to do to
this man, she was smiling broadly. While rage had been in the process
of having overtaken her, she was violently angry; the rage alternated
between forceful attempts and threats to return again and again to the
scene of what had evoked her fury and do physical violence to persons
and property to accomplish her goal, and violently angry struggles for
the best plan through which something might be again be "made even",
for which it was clear that only something she could herself regard as
"enough" would in fact make things even.

When the goal arrived on its own, without force or struggle, and in
a polite fashion, the rage remained unabated; and the search for the
optimal means through which to make things even, to "get even", continued,
in violent fumes of wrath and rage. When the means through which to attain this revenge—to make things even—had been arrived at conceptually, and articulated several times over in rageful tones, suddenly, as I observed, all rage was gone, and the revenge became a thing of not of anger but of pleasure. So striking was this—and so clearly not my subjective perception—that the others, who had been listening throughout, and cacophonously interjecting each in her and his turn their own contributed ideas to what to do to this man, and who had themselves been violently filled with visible rage and white heat anger, began to smile, then to joke about this coming revenge mission, then to respond to one another's joke's about it, and to laugh together, as so too the woman. Not at all by making light of it: the mission was still seen as itself as serious and necessary as before; the only thing that had altered was that the rage that had brought it forth had called forth a need to make something even, and that a search for what that would be brought forth the realization that only revenge—paying the person back for what he had done—would suffice, had turned the revenge-mission into a situation in which the great discomfort so clearly accompanying the rage-visibility had become no longer a source of extremes of discomfort. Now comfort prevailed: I could only conclude that there had in fact been something that had, desperately, needed to be "made even", in order to replace that extreme of discomfort with something other than an extreme of discomfort, and that whatever it had been that had needed to be made even again in order for tolerability and comfort to again prevail had occurred.

The plan that had in the final analysis, after trying on many that
seemed to need to be discarded (although this was not articulated—they simply were, one by one, discarded; as if their extraordinary violent and unusual nature rendered them not suitable for the purpose at hand of making things even because they were so extraordinary as to make it highly unlikely that one person could actually undertake any of them, let alone succeed) was, as the young woman saw it, that the next night she would venture to a particular bar, where she knew that "he" (the municipal employee) would be likely to stop in, as she had seen him there on some past occasion or occasions. Describing exactly and precisely each word, inflection, step, and movement with her words, her facial expression, and her body movements, as she stood before me, it seemed quite like an actress on the stage portraying that scene as part of a play, with my few-feet-away-bench a front row center seat in the audience. What the scene, and the words, portrayed—quite as she had worked it out with great care as the perfect resolution to her distressed rage—was that she would walk over to where he stood, and, whammo!, "throw my beer right smack in his face!". As her arm swung forward and she let fly the imaginary mug of beer so close that a few imaginary drops splashed up onto my shoes, and the curtain came down on that preparatory act, an expression of very great pleasure came over the young woman's face. It felt so good, clearly, that it was impossible to resist going through it again: "He'll see: Here's what I'm gonna do to him. I'm gonna walk right up to where he's standin', and....", and she went through the entire scene again, again culminating in a markedly blissful expression.

At that point, the neatly dressed, white haired man, of perhaps 50,
who had been the only male in the party, and who had earlier introduced himself to a person who came late to the group, as the father of one of the other young women of the group, grinned broadly and leaned over to the young woman who had been speaking, and said in a pleasant, friendly tone, "Listen, I was going out tomorrow night to have some fun; if you want me to, I'll be glad to come along, and we can really have some fun out of it."

What was interesting about the last comment, of the white haired man, was that he, by interjecting such an anomaly into the otherwise so different scene, had jolted my awareness back to the realization that, although some of the characters were missing, this was not at all a solo performance on the stage before me by this woman with the atypically exposed several inches of midriff, as it had for a moment seemed, but that it was but one half hour segment in a 28 or 30 year old parent-child interrelatedness, both parts of which were filled with many a cluster of elements which I could not know.

One of these young women was pregnant; another had a small child astride her hip as she stood in the initially vibrantly angry knot. I thought of a time when that two year old child--of whose life experience this day and perhaps others like it, in which all was very loud noise, and great bursts of rage, and great fantasies of vengeance, was the stuff of him and his development and his experience of life at the young end of it--when that two year old child would be the middle-aged woman who was perhaps some adolescent's mother. I thought, as I have tried to learn to do, of the fact that these experiences I had seen make up one days' worth of the crucial bit in the middle for that child's experience of himself and the attention his mother paid, or didn't pay
to him.

I watched the child throughout much of this volatile and surging constellation of fiercely angry, and overflowing adult women, and one white haired man. Her mother held her on her hip, sideways. The child held on, with some effort, since the mother's one arm was not held as firmly as it is with some persons, but it was clear it was tight enough that the child would not fall to the ground. She looked as if suspended on a seat that was designed to hold her a few inches from her mother's body, except for the small part of her that managed to be astride the bone of her mother's hip. The mother never looked at the child throughout this time; there was no occasion to look at the child: what was the object of her attention was the matter that had brought her, and her infant, to this place—apparently related to that which had brought the five handcuffed persons someone had exclaimed about a few minutes before the young women had appeared. The child did not make a noise, or a motion to request her mother's attention through out the long time the group was there in front of me; she sat, hanging on, staring at the corridor wall she was facing with an uninterested gaze. and a thumb in her mouth.

I had tried to learn, across the course of this research in which I have been attempting to explore the pathways from childhood to adulthood, parenthood, and from there to subsequent generations who will in their turn follow the same road, to teach myself to recognize, when I observe small children, that what I am observing are some of the many small bits and pieces that will one day represent the "impact of mothering experiences in childhood on adult development, future parenthood and
subsequent generations. I tried to look at this little girl and make my mind grasp the reality of the fact that this is one day in the early childhood experiences of her mother's attention to her, and one day in the early childhood experiences of things being consistent, predictable and manageable by a child, for a twenty six year old mother with her infant; or of a 46 year old mother with her adolescent, or of a 60 year old person who has never married and perhaps never had any children. I find it not easy to try to force my mind into those perceptions of a small child in the course of an naturalisitic observation, but it is somehow capable of generating a startling jostle to my perceptual abilities when I can manage to do that.
CHAPTER VI
ON SUBJECTS AND METHOD

In exploring more than 150 lives in transgenerational matrix format, apparent patterning became most redundantly visible when the natural constellation comprising the transgenerational familial matrix was explored in its comprehensiveness, i.e., a matrix including all the offspring of all offspring, at each succeeding generational, as well as the accompanying transgenerational familial matrix of each of the persons who come, by marriage, to enter into the familial matrix for each offspring who bears offspring, as well as those who come, by marriage, to enter into the familial matrix for each offspring who does not bear offspring. It is this level of comprehensivity which is being referred to in each instance in this research account when the term transgenerational familial matrix is referred to: despite the fact that it was not possible to garner entire lifespan data for every one of the persons comprising an entire transgenerational familial matrix in any case among the several hundred lives comprising the more than 100 such matrices studied, for perhaps twenty or twenty five of them, it was possible to garner entire lifespan data for very representative samplings of the comprehensive breadth of persons, along with their own precursor transgenerational familial matrices, comprising a very large proportion of the "whole," and to do this comprehensively for the longitudinal aspect as well. At least ten transgenerational matrices were traced back across four generations, and three were traced back across eight generations, in some considerable detail.

246
More than fifty families were studied in comprehensive detail from the standpoint of following an individual child, along with all of its siblings, from the day of its birth to the day of its death, taking note of all phenomena accruing across the experience of that person, both as he or she himself or herself reported and/or recorded his or her personal experience in letters to family members, to friends, acquaintances and strangers; in diaries, memoirs, journals and in autobiographic writing, and as others--family members, including siblings, parents, nieces and nephews and spouse, and later, children--recorded and/or reported their observations, responses, reactions, perceptions and attributions regarding this person in all of these capacities and relationships.

In many instances these data had already been gathered together through the concentrated effort of a single professional biographic researcher who had spent some number of years painstakingly ferreting out all of these data from archival sources, personal interviews with family members, co-workers, teachers, students, and friends, as well as from collections of letters of others whose paths the person in question had crossed at some time in his or her life.

Through these means, as well as through the additional means of acquiring autobiographic and biographic writings of family members themselves, who were documenting either the entire life span of a relative, or the entire life span up to that point of himself or herself--which provided a re-exploration of all of the previously explored familial data on the earlier person explored in that familial matrix, it was possible to garner a remarkably comprehensive data collection
for the entire life span of one individual life from its beginning to its end, from a wide array of perspectives and relationships, and a wide array of life circumstances, as well as the developmental sequence.

In the first several lives explored, the same intensive, and extensive level of fine-tooth-comb exploration of an entire life span was followed by a similar exploration of the entire life spans of one or more of the offspring of that individual earlier studied. In the course of the study of the "first" individual, it had been possible to systematically and comprehensively explore and trace all of the adult's reactions, responses, activities, commentaries, and parenting practices as they had to do with an infant being born, a toddler being for example played with, fed, nursed, bathed, taken on outings, treated for illness, compared with other siblings, taken along or left home while parents travelled, all instances of parental absence, depression, preoccupation, external stress for financial, relational or other reasons, etc.

During the study of one, (here, the "first) individual, careful note was taken of all of the parent's (and the other parent's as well) "activities", and "attitudes", as catalogued above, as phenomena part of the parent's unfolding lifespan development, that is, as following upon that person's own early experience; so that it was, in each such case, possible to get a clear sense of what the "parent role" was phenomenally like and comprised of, for that individual.

At the same time, note was taken of all of those same phenomena in a "separate" way, so as to be able to return to them in considering the lifespan development of that once-upon-a-time infant, toddler, and adolescent as he or she appeared as "peripheral" to the study of the
life of the "first" individual, and from the perspective of the now-second generation's "grown-child" writing his own autobiographic recollections of those same times, experiences, etc., it had been earlier possible to observe that child, in a sense "living through", as part of its parent's life, and its parents' shared lives.

In all of those cases where it was possible to garner biographic accounts to which a professional biographic researcher had devoted intensive research to this second generation representative as well, it was possible to add to all of the family member's own personal accounts the collective accounts of several different-perspective biographic researchers, with all of the extraordinary contribution they were able to provide in the way of archival material in special collection, access to the personal family letters through the solicited cooperation of a family descendant, etc.

As an example of some of the ways this sort of data-garnering proceeded, for one transgenerational familial matrix, it was possible to garner first hand extensive autobiographic accounts from one member of what we will here term the "first" generation (although it had in fact been possible to garner some measure of important data concerning the parents and parents' relatives of that "first" generation, in such a manner and degree that a very great deal was knowable about the first individual's early experience)—as well as extraordinarily voluminous biographically researched accounts in several volumes—and to garner first hand extensive autobiographic accounts from two of the offspring of that first generation, along with a good measure of biographic material on a third of the offspring.
In such autobiographic accounts, each person in each generation included, as a matter of course, a great deal of information about all other family members—parents, siblings, aunts, grandparents, etc. All of these were taken into careful account as representatives of the transgenerational familial matrix, and both included in that "child's" early experience compendium as well as kept track of from the perspective of their respective "parent-child" role in the context of the transgenerational familial matrix as a whole, from the standpoint of searching for evidence of any possible patternedness that might show up in any form or format.

In this family, there was one, among the children of the first generation, who did not show up for mention in any great detail in her own right: she was included in among accounts of the children, and the family, activities, etc. but no biographic research, or other accounts were available for her. I had felt fortunate in being able to garner such prolific quantities of autobiographic and biographic entire life span data for the parent and two of the children, and did not feel the research suffered from the non-availability of information about this one family member for whom no biographic or autobiographic material was available. I did, nonetheless, wonder if any of these phenomena which had, eventually, come to seem to follow clear patterning across families for whom a specific configuration had become visible at the underlying level, would necessarily hold up for all of the children in a large family.

Some good while later, when the research data-gathering and data analysis had been largely completed, I happened upon an autobiographic
account written by a woman, which gave such a clear and dramatic description of the parenting function of her mother that I felt it important to carefully explore this one life, simply to trace the unfolding developmental pathway across her entire life span for a person for whom the parenting function had been so vividly and comprehensively detailed, and was of such a highly specific configuration.

It was not until I had managed to acquire considerably more auto-biographic data on the life of this woman that I learned that her grandmother had been this one daughter of the earlier studied familial matrix for whom there had been no biographic material available. This woman, whom I would never have known or thought to connect with that other familial matrix, gave an extraordinarily detailed account, as it turned out, of both of her parents, from the standpoints of both of their lives, and from the standpoint of each of them as parents, whose parenting, in each case, followed a highly idiosyncratic path, a path I had earlier traced in other families, but without such vivid, graphically detailed close-up portraits of the parenting-process in daily operation across the child's life span segment which involved being part of the child-parent pair.

Her father was the son of this "child" of the earlier studied family for whom no biographic data had been available on her, but in which familial matrix I had explored voluminous masses of data tracing the entire life span of two of the children in the "second" generation, and the father and mother in the first generation. Because of having so thoroughly studied both of those generations, and all of the influences on each of them, it was possible to have a vast wellspring
of "first hand" accounts of the antecedent transgenerational data prior to the place where she herself picked up the thread, filled in the missing data by giving an account of her grandparent in relatively scant detail--but in this instance I knew an extraordinary amount about all of the influences on that grandmother, from the standpoint of her early experience, up until the time that she got married and left home.

Here, her granddaughter picked up the thread right at that place, and then presented a vivid account of that grandmother's son, in the person of this woman's father, from the perspective of his parent function and role, as well as his role as husband of her mother. She presented, as remarked, additionally, a vivid picture of the kind of mothering she received, after which she went on, for hundreds of pages chronicling, from her then-kept daily diary, an extraordinary account in systematic order of all of the experiences, reactions, responses and perceptions across her life. (She died, as a result of suicide, very shortly after completing that account.)

Included in this account, which began by concentrating on her parenting experiences as a very small child and following right along through each year of her childhood and adolescence, was a detailed study of herself as a young wife, and as becoming on a given day, a mother. She then went on to describe, in the same graphic detail, what being a parent was like for her, that is, what each of her highly specific reactions, responses, perceptions, etc. were with regard to this infant to which she was now mother, and then to trace the entire remainder of her life span, most of which was spent, until many years later, without her child, for she had discovered upon attempting to
"be a mother", that it was literally not possible for her to endure the experience and had found it necessary for her own survival to abandon the child, and her husband, and to "live her own life".

While this woman's experience, and the graphic nature of her account of first her own childhood and parenting experiences, and then her own detailed development across each step of the life span, making explicit and graphic each of her own cognitions and sensations on each occasion at each developmental period, and then her detailed graphic account of her experience of parenthood as a literally not endurable experience at the level of her own self-experience, would have been a profoundly valuable contribution to the study of the impact of early experience on adult development and future parenting and subsequent generations in its own right, the fact that is was possible to perceive all of the experiences of this woman, and of her own parent, from the extraordinary perspective of previously having devoted a prodigious number of research hours to the most detailed of all possible explorations of two siblings of this woman's grandmother, as well as the parents of her grandmother made visible a saga of great systematic comprehensivity from the standpoint of the patterned impact at the level of the underlying structural self-regulating transformational phenomena of the transgenerational familial matrix.

Here was not the only account in which it was possible to garner, explore, trace and sift through this abundance of data, nor the only account in which it was possible to explore the entire life span of one or more members of several generations: I make this much detailed
description of one such "case" as an example of the kinds of data of this research, so that a reader need not incorrectly infer that a concentration on multi-person breadth and longitudinal tracing of a long sequence of overlapping generations necessarily resulted in an inability to concurrently concentrate on what John Bowlby refers to as "the crucial bit in the middle--what actually goes on between a mother and her child". I believe that it was this very simultaneity--this capacity inherent in these kinds of data for observing, concurrently about one and the same person(s), both the close-up, "microscope-lens", crucial bit in the middle, and the long range telescope-lens of where and what things arose from, and give rise to, that made these data so powerfully able to yield up their own fruits in such abundance.

In addition to the approximately ten families studied in extraordinary extensivity and intensity and the approximately fifty studied in very considerably extensivity and intensity, and in addition to the three multi-generational explorations of impact of early experience on adult development, future parenting and subsequent generations for which clinical work with three generational family members served as first hand participant-observation data source, all hypotheses generated by these data were themselves tested and re-tested, by resorting to an exploration of another 50 or more briefer familial matrix-segments.

In those instances, it was not, of course, possible to study more than a handful in any serious extensivity: rather, in those instances, a search was made for persons whose lives were known to have included one or another of the phenomena which the data analysis had yielded up hypotheses for, hypotheses in all cases related to some factor of early
experience at one or another generational level antecedent to the one in which the phenomenon related to the hypothesis appeared.

Nonetheless, in the course of intending but to read these additional biographies or autobiographies for purposes of retesting a hypothesis, what very often happened was that I would see within that familial history, "a missing link" to one of the collections of by-then-long-held "half-truth" threads, for which I had been unwilling to accept their need to be regarded as "unexplainable individual difference".

In those cases, when a new link in all this vast complex of inter-relatedness had appeared to be capable of becoming visible, I would purposely allow myself to "get off the track", knowing by then that that was how to get on the track in this paradoxical research project that had for so long seemed so bewildering, and now was beginning instead to show an orderedness of a magnitude beyond my earlier capacity ever to expect to come upon.

In all these cases, I would back up and start in at the beginning, making the rounds of libraries, old books, writing to a guessed-at university archive, or to a state or county or town historical society, to newspaper archives, to genealogical archives, to current day descendants, to bureaus of vital statistics in some few special cases, and some very few times, when all else failed to unearth a missing needed clue, to a biographer who had immersed himself or herself in that person's life. All these sources were appealed to only in one instance, one where it was clear that vastly important links could be forged. Most often, only a few of them. This only applied after I knew what
sorts of specific data one needed in any given instance.

To return to the main data use as a criterion only after the identifying marker of that control person's being ascertainable as having had as part of the phenomena of his or her life the phenomenon for which a transgenerational hypothesis had arisen, I then made an exploration of that person's antecedent history, in a specific search directed at learning whether the hypothesized earlier generational experience had occurred in that unrelated person's transgenerational matrix.

When I had done that, I then searched for still another, and another, entirely unrelated person also ascertainable as having had as part of the phenomena of his or her life the phenomenon hypothesis had arisen for.

On other occasions, I would proceed from the "opposite direction": I would set out to ascertain some person or persons whose early experience per se had included some particular phenomena, and trace across accounts of their autobiographically and/or biographically recorded lives in an attempt to learn whether mention of the phenomena generated by the data as hypothesis related to specific early experience, and to the later course of adult development, appeared.

Each hypothesis generated in this research was only a hypothesis related to the topic of the research per se; that is, a hypothesis generated from the appearance of redundancy across some number of the first sets of lives comprehensively explored, of some phenomenal interrelatedness existing between phenomenon A in early experience and phenomenon B in later life experience, or in subsequent parenting, or with regard to a "grandchild", etc.
Very many of these hypotheses pertained only to highly ordinary life phenomena, for which I myself was not even able to hazard a guess as to how they might be capable of being thought of as having anything whatever to do with early experience, or the transgenerational matrix. I never followed a hypothesis on the grounds that I had devised any possible, or likely connections, nor to test out the formulations or hypotheses of others, but only and always because the data had somehow shown in among the data a lead that suggested itself to my imagination as possibly worth following upon. It was these which determined the form the research should follow, and the sole guide for what to "count" for consideration in the research data: analysis patterning was never based on my "creative imagination" or inference, but after applying imagination and hunch, clue, lead, etc. and testing it, only redundancy of empirical evidence appearing in more than one unrelated life was "counted".

It did not matter however from the standpoint of this research, what the phenomena were, or were related to or associated with—or seemed otherwise well explained by—nor even whether it seemed incontrovertibly not relevant to, nor capable of being relevant to, anything at all; at the beginning when I had no working hypotheses, if a phenomenon of any kind showed up as worthy of even passing comment in among the entire life span accounts of more than two persons, I took notice of it, and then kept an eye open for that phenomenon across all other lives studied, regardless of which generational "place" along the sands-of-time-line it might have appeared in, in one matrix, and which possibly quite far-removed generational "place" along the line in another unrelated familial matrix, of another country, and another
Later, once armed with hypotheses, then with, also, a rudimentary knowledge of some few elements, and of cluster-possibilities I looked for these, but always, simultaneously, continued on in the original process as well: noting always anything that showed up across unrelated lives, however, "irrelevant" my own "common sense" chose to try to talk me out of believing this phenomenon was "worth bothering with."

This sort of thing was representative of some of the ways the process went, with regard to slightly different aspects of the work: one of the hypotheses generated by the data seemed to suggest that in some specific situations, persons who felt a strong attraction to one of a small number of choices of vocation or avocation might share in common a particular phenomenon within their transgenerational familial matrix. In order to test out the different-facetted hypotheses arising in each of these situations, I sought biographic sources for a small number of persons known to me to have no more in common than that each had directed his or her life along the path in question, then tracing the transgenerational familial matrix to determine whether there was any commonality for that particular phenomenon.

Additionally, I eventually included a small study of a sampling of the written works by a fairly large sample of lives studied, to test out a number of hypotheses suggested by the data which related to a particular aspect of particular kinds of written works.

As was the case with all hypotheses generated by this research, none of these hypotheses, e.g., regarding a particular kind of vocation-al or avocational choice, a particular phenomenon related to written
works, or a particular phenomenon occurring in one or another place in among the transgenerational familial matrix, were seen as holding any intrinsic "meaning" of their own, most of all not in any case from the standpoint of what we have often come to think in terms of the concepts of cause, or of effect.

Indeed, it was my profound conviction following upon a careful exploration of such a large number of familial matrices and such a large number of lives from such a large number of perspectives, that society as a collective concept— as, in a sense, dole out of the "rewards", and "punishments", attributions and ascriptions in more or less official ways, and individuals—including family members themselves—as, in a sense, attributors or ascribers of one or another "label" to related family members, as well as to themselves (here echoing the reflection of themselves by the collective others), have, across recorded history been over-hasty in making ascriptions of "cause" or of "effect", of praise and of blame, where an awareness of more complete information would, so I believe, have led them to different conclusions. I do not mean here that those accorded praise should have been accorded blame, for example, or any such simplistic concept, but simply that such concepts themselves seem not in consonance with what such a study of transgenerational familial matrices make visible as appearing more salient concepts.

I am aware that such a commentary seemingly related to findings, results or implications would not necessarily, or ordinarily, appear to be appropriately placed in among a discussion of commentaries on method; yet despite the fact that results, etc. will be discussed in
other sections, it seems important to note here too, for purposes of underscoring, that all of the aspects of this research, including hypotheses tested and found substantiated or supported, are not to be taken as phenomena which may appropriately, nor even responsibly, be viewed—in any instance—out of context, e.g., as if I were suggesting discrete phenomena such as point for point relationships.

Rather, all phenomena of this research, however much some of them might give appearance of seeming to fall into such classifications, represent in all cases only phenomena which happen—not to be interrelated, but simply to exist in among the phenomena of a given individual life span, and in among the phenomena of a given parent-child pair, and in among the phenomena of a given transgenerational familial matrix, as infinitesimal links in a highly complex aggregate of interrelatedness, none of which is either random nor arbitrary, nor chance, nor cause, nor determiner. In fact, most, if not all, phenomena in this research possess an inherent duality, a duality which necessarily precludes their being either cause or effect, of their being either "that which gives rise to" or that which has arisen from. The whole "point" of structures is that they are, inherently, and ineluctably, dualities in which each and every link is simultaneously and at all times, both that which has arisen from and that which is here, now, in process of giving rise to (or, later on, needs to be spoken of as, having, then, given rise to).

In other words, all phenomena capable of becoming visible as existing in among any "state of interrelatedness" and hence any appearance of patternedness across this research, possess all and any inter-
relatedness; and patternedness only by virtue of their interrelatedness one with another; at the most elemental level, and at the levels of clusteredness across any one life time, or of trangenerational sets of clusters, the true significance of each of these appearances of relatedness and patternedness lies only in the fact of their interrelatedness; neither alone, in pairs, nor in clusters do they possess any "meaning" of their own. Despite the fact, they do possess a meaning of their own, as "elements of interrelatedness. The data have presented clear and redundant evidence that it would be grave error to confer any other meaning on them, while at the same time presenting clear and redundant evidence of the extraordinary propensity for human beings to appear drawn in the direction of doing that. I myself found it a very uphill struggle to grasp this concept at all, let alone to not slip back into forgetting to hold onto it cognitively, for a very long time, in the face of "real life" data-bits.

It is important to note that an additional, and separate (while yet part of the larger set of data) effort was made across the entire span of this research which seemed to carry potential for clinical relevance from the standpoint of coming better to understand the individual human life from the perspective of its own human needs, fears, stresses and motivations. At this level a very important aspect of the project was to take careful and explicit note of any and all comments by an individual himself or herself; of verbatim accounts (most often statements from the person's own private diary, or letters to an intimate friend, confidante or relative) of precisely how that person felt, responded, reacted and perceived all factors in any way touching on his
own life, or the lives of parents, children, siblings, etc., as well as the lives of competitors, critics, strangers, and so forth.

Note was taken of visible differences between how this person was feeling within himself about one or another phenomenon or relational encounter or episode in his or her life, and the way others assumed, from his external "appearance" or behavior, he was then feeling or responding. And of what others called that. This became in time a powerful help. Once I learned, for example, what a person was experiencing in his terms, words, etc., when he stopped leaving the house, say; or stopped going to work, or frequently changed his profession; or did not "decide" to marry until age 40; or decided to become an "expatriate", or turned red in the face and stammered when trying to speak to a woman, or "flew into a rage" at another's comment or lack of comment—and once I had then checked and rechecked all of those (and many more) with graphic, articulate verbatim accounts, in diaries, etc. of others experiencing any of the same phenomena, I was far more able to "listen" when, in some far removed context (where access to a first person private confession was not available) a sister, or mother, or father, say was described by one and all as having "become reclusive", or "began staying home and attending only to the home and family" or of "retiring" from his job at 48 (despite lack of financial wherewithal), or of "deciding to give up the law" and become a small business man; and then, a few years later, deciding to try farming, etc., or "marrying at 40", or "re-settling in Paris", etc.

I did not decide anything from these statements, but rather, used those as red flags to look for the other cluster-elements I knew to be
associated with the experiences others had personally described that sounded like these phenomena. They were, in all such cases, always there, which is why I speak of this as a powerful tool indeed.

In all instances when the person manifested a particular emotional reaction, for example, an abrupt shift into infuriated rage, or "temper tantrum", etc., careful note was taken of precisely what had occurred at the phenomenal level for this person immediately prior to the appearance of rage, or of whatever the emotional response might be.

In each case, note was taken too, of what seemed to bring about a shift back away from the emotionally charged reaction, e.g., again, in the instance of rageful reaction, note was taken of what seemed to characterize the kinds of things that had given rise to the appearance in the data of the often equally sudden shift to a completely non-rageful, non-angry feeling. Eventually, many of these phenomena appearing as random and unexplainable bits of life data scattered in among the life of one or another person, came, when recorded separately, in this way, to present clear evidence of following a patterned orderedness of highly specific and distinguishable kind.

At the same time that note was taken of the accounts of the person's own feelings, perceptions, responses, reactions, etc., a similar detailed account was kept of any and all accounts of others in the environment of that particular person and in their own accounts, of their perspective of the events, relational phenomenon, etc. remarked upon in other places by that "first person".

This made it possible exceptionally often to have access, in the context of studying an entire individual life span, to a remarkable com-
pendium of how others were at that time perceiving that person with regard to that other person and to that phenomenon, and what their views and/or attributions were.

Of the "population" defining the subjects, it is possible to say that they included persons from the United States, from several European countries, including England, Holland, Austria, Scotland, Scandanavia, Switzerland, Norway, Germany, Italy, France, Russia and Poland; from the island of Santo Domingo, and some few other places.

They included studies of families of great wealth and great poverty, families affected by the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, the First World War and the Second World War, the French Revolution and other wars; persons alive during the depression, and in the "roaring twenties," the "turn of the century" and an abundance of Victorians, as well as members of contemporary counterculture and drug cultures.

They included many families whose lives were influenced by, or associated with, Calvinist doctrine, with Unitarianism, with Roman Catholicism, and with Judaism, as well as agnostics, atheists, pantheists, Lutherans, Quakers, Presbyterians and Congregationalists. They included doctors of philosophy and doctors of medicine and doctors of divinity, and persons who never went to school at all, persons who had private tutors, or were sent to boarding school, or were taught by a parent, and persons who flunked out time after time, along with those who won high honors with regularity.

They included those who "made millions" and became bankrupt, and those who never made any success of holding a job at all. They included persons who only once or twice left the immediate vicinity of their home.
town and those who were expatriates and world travellers on a grand scale, including explorers to the South Pole.

They included people who never married, who married while still barely out of childhood and were in fact reluctant to give up playing with their dolls upon getting married, in three remarked upon accounts in unrelated families; and persons who believed they would surely never marry, e.g., confirmed bachelors, who, at age 40 or so, suddenly surprised themselves by marrying; along with persons who married in their twenties and early thirties. They included persons who never had children and who loved children and persons who never had children and couldn't stand children; persons who had children and found themselves falling into one or another of these categories, which, in some cases, made it seem necessary to abandon their children or child, either temporarily or permanently. They included persons who had one child and persons who had fourteen, among whom were included a population of persons some of whose children failed to thrive, and/or some of whose children lived to young adulthood but not beyond, and some who lived very long.

Although clearly the population was not able to encompass all of the population groups one might wish could have been possible, all of this is simply an attempt to give some notion of the breadth of environmental circumstances and influencing features among which the impact of early experience per se was here studied. In such an array of environmental features, it would seem that very many of the redundancies which appeared across unrelated familial matrices cutting across these environmental features might be thought of as not a function of the
times, the culture, the economic situation, educational levels, etc.

It is worth mentioning that approximately 90 percent of the transgenerational familial matrices studied included a person (sometimes rarely, two, three or four persons) who would, in some ways, be regarded as distinctive. Except for the fact that we seem in common parlance to reserve the term distinguished for what we regard as notably positive accomplishments, it would be possible to say that some 90 percent of the families included a person who could be regarded as distinguished: in fact, some were distinguished for reasons we regard as something other than distinguished, by virtue of the fact that in those cases these persons were distinguished for things we regard as negative.

While on the one hand, one might say that the fact of such a preponderance of these matrices having included a person who was in some way distinctive might have a tendency to distort the data, it is important to bear in mind that at no time was the life of a distinguished person studied in its own right, but only as "one of the several children (except where he or she was the only child) of two other individual persons", who were themselves studied, in each case, "as one of the several children" of still another pair of individuals; and that the siblings of the "distinctive" or "distinguished" person were studied in precisely the same way as that individual.

In other words, while this study may in fact have been able to shed some light on any commonalities which might perhaps accrue to the phenomenon "becoming distinctive" or distinguished, by no means does the fact that a matrix which happened to include a distinctive person mean that one was not, while studying that distinctive life,
also, concurrently studying an abundance of very undistinctive or non-distinguished persons. So that in the aggregate of persons whose overlapping lives made up this study, only a very, very small percentage were distinguished or distinctive persons.

In addition, it was possible, through including clinical case studies, both from my own personal experience, and published sources, to include a good sampling of transgenerational familial matrices whose families included no distinguished persons at all, so far as is known. Additionally, natural-historian records were resorted to throughout: both those I made natural-history notes on myself, simply of vignettes of real life being lived as I happened to be in their vicinity, and those in newspaper accounts, and, in a few instances, first hand, and/or second hand accounts spontaneously contributed by friends or acquaintances.
CHAPTER VII

A LONG RANGE VIEW OF SOME OF THE PHENOMENA OF TRANSGENERATIONAL PATTERNEDNESS

In exploring the large number of lives who served as subjects in this research within a transgenerational format focussing on impact of early experience on adult development, on future parenthood and on subsequent generations, the data provided much evidence that specific phenomena of early experience are capable of being distinguished as having highly specific kinds of impact on adult development across the life span.

This impact cannot justifiably be termed either positive or negative: in this instance such a term is inapplicable and inappropriate: the research abundantly demonstrated time and again in all of its aspects that "positive" or "negative" ascriptions are entirely within the eye of the beholder, and that they bear no relationship whatever beyond random chance to the ascription that any given person himself puts on these phenomena as they apply to himself or herself. Remarkably often, the research was able to make visible evidence of the beholder (often as represented by society, but equally so with individuals, friends, etc.) ascribing blame to phenomena clearly traceable to early experience beyond the person's power to alter, high praise within the same purview and, unusually often, regarding some attribute or phenomenon as an evidence of giftedness which the person himself or herself experienced as a painful cross to bear, and again, a phenomenon traceable, through the data's redundancy, to early experience.

268
Leaving aside the question of whether the impact is in the realm of positive phenomena or negative phenomena, what was vividly and abundantly clear is that early experience has extraordinary capability for clearly visible, direct impact on a wide array of later life experience, characteristics and in some cases, general life direction including choice of vocation. These the data of the transgenerational matrix are emphatic about.

This impact of early experience is dramatically possible of becoming visible at three levels: the level of the unfolding lifespan development across the entire lifespan of the individual; the parent-child interaction level, intergenerationally; and the level of the underlying transgenerational familial matrix across generations.

Any impact which was capable of becoming visible as such at the level of the individual adult lifespan did not fail to continue to show one of the range of permutations the data made visible as permutations of that impact at the level of parenthood in the course of the individual's adult development. Any impact which was capable of becoming visible at the level of the individual adult did not fail to continue to show that impact's transformation at the level of the ongoing transgenerational matrix across scores of life pathways traced.

In brief, across several hundreds of lives—sizable numbers of them familially related as a matter of course given the research format—and far more sizable numbers, while familially related to some number of others within their own transgenerational matrix, unrelated across individual lives, and individual transgenerational familial matrices—findings suggesting clear impact were redundantly visible.
In very many instances there was a high degree of order, and of patternedness, visible among the impact of early experience at all three of the levels mentioned earlier—the adult lifespan, the matter of parenthood, and the longitudinal familial matrix across generations—the "order," or "patternedness" becoming visible when compared to other, unrelated, lives and familial matrices.

The data provided abundantly redundant evidence suggesting that early experience of the sort shown by the data as capable of giving rise to impact at these levels does appear to follow a patternedness, this patternedness appearing in the form of structure as defined by Jean Piaget—that is, as underlying self-regulating, transformational activity—at the transgenerational level.

The kinds of impact the research made visible appeared not solely at the level of psychological phenomena, but rather at a level that could only be described as both biological and psychological. Such impact included, as example, what is often regarded as temperament: the "mercurial" temperament, an adjective not infrequently used for a person for whom "losing his temper," or "abrupt mood swings," or "hotheaded," or "fiery tempered," for example, or "sensitive to slights, or to rebuffs," or "shy, reticent and reserved" as other examples among very large numbers of others, appeared with great consistency across the research to be traceable to impact of particular constellations of early experience.

Yet, although I set forth such examples in reply to the question understandable in the reader's mind as to what is specifically meant hereby "impact," any examples, so I have come to learn, can
only be misleading, for in fact what the research has made extraordinarily clear is that the impact of early experience is far more importantly in the "general" category, a category for which there is no categorical label or term that would come near fitting, even though at the same time including impact phenomena of remarkably fine-point specificity.

Still only in the interest of trying here to present some general idea of what "sorts" of things this great general-ness and this great specific-ness may be thought of as including, although not limited to, it is possible to say that such phenomena as overall "energy level," across the lifespan, is one such impact, as is, in some specific situations a clear pattern of alternations in energy level--from the whirling dervish energy level we might in one instance term "manic," and in another "hyperkinetic," say; to the barely getting around level we are apt to term "depressive," "lazy," "indolent," or "unmotivated," or "exhausted," or "lethargic," depending on the voice of the beholder and the circumstances.

Sensitivity to sound, to music, to smells; facility for learning foreign languages, a marked proclivity to go far from home and stay far from home, or a marked proclivity to stay at home and never go more than a block or two from one's doorstep, are some others of the phenomenal impacts which were traceable as phenomena interrelated in patterned ways with early experience permutations and variants. A complete lack of "business sense," an impelling urge for restless wandering from place to place, and an uncontrollable sporadic eruption into rage were some among many others.
A marked proclivity for calling attention to one's physical body, an equally marked proclivity for hero worship, as well as a marked proclivity for speaking in public, and an inability ever to speak up in public are still others. Never marrying, deciding not to marry ever and abruptly changing one's mind at 40, and marrying five times over are still others. Such early experience impact phenomena it was possible to discern as suggesting self-matrix redundancies. Feeling a compelling urge to devote one's life to philanthropy is another, as is feeling throughout life an entitlement to all manner of help from others. Reacting to one's child or children as if their every request were an offensive affront or a failure to obey is another. While these do not begin to catalog the large array of such phenomena, perhaps they provide, at the outset, some sense that the word impact is here not referring to vague generalizations while yet including things that do come, in the course of a lifetime, in some of these (and other) instances to carry a sense of "vague generality."

Importantly, what appeared the primary impact on a person in early adulthood in some specific matrix variants, showed a redundant tendency for an abrupt shift to an "opposite"-termed impact by late middle age. This could only be known by studying entire lifespans, just as the fact of this change-phenomenon being an element in an apparent pattern could only be known by comparing many lifespans.

What is essential to underscore at the outset, however, is that there is an anomaly—a paradox—in this research. For while the account must report that it has been possible to trace with utmost vividness a wide array of later life phenomena directly and undeniably traceable to
the early experiences with a parent or parents, it must qualify that, by denying it; or so it can only seem when it is necessary to say that the research also, at one and the same time, provides unmistakable evidence that in no case may any of these impact phenomena be spoken of as having their cause, their origin, or their root in this same early experience with a parent or parents: not even in the most blatant or flagrant of cases. None of this can be made clear in a brief overview such as this chapter is intended to provide: a very great deal of the research account will be devoted to an attempt to discuss at least some of the very many factors which are involved in this last point--the "how can this paradoxical statement be so? How could one have come upon evidence that would paradoxically yield up clear and unmistakable evidence in the nature of directly traceable phenomena from later life back to specific, and general, experiences in infancy and childhood, while yielding up refutation of that same phenomenon?"

In part, the beginning to this answer lies in the domain of structuralist activity: the research, in all of its facets, proceeded from a structuralist frame of reference, and explored structuralist domains, despite the fact that the researcher was not aware of this at the time of engaging in the research and exploring these domains so characterized by what seemed perplexing paradox across the major part of the research time.

At the level of abstract theory, it is what are termed structuralist activity, and structuralist laws, which appear to account for, and make visible, the paradoxical phenomenon that direct tracings could be made from adult development back to infancy and childhood experiences, while
at the same time providing clear and unmistakable evidence that it would be egregious error to point to these early childhood experiences with the parent or parents as the cause, root, etc.

Because a great deal of what must otherwise seem paradox is explainable by turning one's thoughts in the overall direction of structural thought, activity and lawfulness inherent to structures--and because there is a great deal at a highly complex level of conceptualization involved in the turning of one's thought in the overall direction of structural activity and research such as involved in this study, I have presented an extensive discussion of structuralist thought, structuralist research and structuralist activity at the general level, as conceptual guides to the research and to its findings, directly from the thoughts and conceptualizations of one of structuralist thought's principal conceptualizers and researchers, Jean Piaget.

I have, in the course of doing that, included as well, some measure of Piaget's thought regarding the whole question of the structuralist approach to psychological research in general, inasmuch as he has given a great deal of thought to this, and made careful and thoughtful analyses of distinctions between one and another level of scientific thought which I myself would not have been able to do.

A highly important aspect of Piaget's discussions in this regard, discusses the kinds of distinctions it is necessary and important to make when dealing with structure and structuralist concepts. Another seriously important part of Piaget's discussion lies in that part which relates to interdisciplinary coordination: Piaget is emphatic about the fact that search for structures cannot but result in interdisciplinary
coordination. This is quite a different concept than the way I had always thought of that, and heard others speak of it: as something one might speak of a "need for," with the clear meaning that someone ought to "see to that," with "that" meaning the piecing together the findings of another discipline if and when there was clear reason to do so, or things of that sort.

Here Piaget is saying what this research also showed to be the case: in structuralist research, the work itself, right in the process of doing it within one discipline, requires the researcher then and there to begin taking other intradisciplinary and interdisciplinary research formulations, understandings, etc., into consideration. In research involving phenomena distinguishable only by their interrelatedness, one cannot avoid having to do this.

One of the aspects Piaget discusses with regard to structuralist activity is important to point to at the outset, for it is one which can lend some measure of understanding to why it was not possible to include all of the aspects of this research in this account, despite the very real need for all of them to be included so that the account might have internal consistency and logical coherence.

This is the matter of there not existing a circumscribable research domain which a researcher has any way at all of drawing a line around and saying just this I will concentrate on and no more. Or, at the time of preparing one's presentation, just this I will decide to set off from this great complex of material for presenting and no more. Tracing life-spans for evidence of phenomena of interrelatedness will not work that way in the doing of research.
Later, in endeavoring to frame a report of the research, I had to again learn, across repeated trial and error, that one could not locate a circumscribable portion within which one might proceed in a reasonably coherent linear fashion to construct an account. Yet I continued to be unwilling to believe that it could not be done simply because my mind could not for a long time conceive of a domain of activity or thought or experience which could not be directed in a linear, or circumscribed way.

I did eventually have to bow to this inevitability, and I think the discussion on structuralism will perhaps be able to make that more clear than I have been readily able to do in various places across this account. The research itself continued to generate surprises in its repeatedly dictating that the only way to "get on the right track" was to get off the track. Until I learned that, I was unable to locate what Piaget terms the "entities" I was studying. For a long period I continued stoutly to resist following the data where they kept trying to lead, because I saw that that would be getting way off the track, which I believed it was my research responsibility to robustly avoid.

Eventually, I came to learn that it was only be going repeatedly "off the track," in an extraordinary number of disparate directions, that one located the track in this research, and became able to get on the track. But when one comes to attempt to formulate a presentation of a research activity whose integral parts are all located off what we just naturally assume to be "the track," while in fact it is at those seemingly off-the-track places that the track is located, trying to formulate a coherent, or meaningful, presentation becomes a dismaying enterprise: because many of those "off the track" places are where essential links
to understanding the research were located, and yet attempting to
discuss phenomena which are both off the track and on the track can only
give the reader a dismaying sense of going around in a series of concentric circles. In fact, as I came to learn, the study of transgenerational self-matrix phenomena do function in a manner akin to overlapping series of concentric circles. Yet without an endless going off the track, the presenter is left with no viable means of presenting any measure of totality of links which make up the "whole" within which the phenomena of structuralist interrelatedness can only become visible, to the researcher, and to a reader.

The biggest problem--from the standpoint of presenting one's research in structuralist activity--is that one has no alternative but to choose only some of the aspects (since it is not physically possible to present all, here), yet with there being no hierarchy of relative importance in this system where the phenomena of interrelationships themselves are the only "entities that count," and in which all can only count equally in importance.

I have remarked on this elsewhere, but here it seemed salient to point to this from the standpoint of Piaget's discussion on structuralist research per se--since there is an important principle, or set of principles, at this level of conceptualization--before one gets into any specific structuralist activity. This structuralist principle inherent in this whole business of inability to locate the entities one is endeavoring to study while yet remaining within one discipline's circumscribed arbitrary delineations is the duality principle.
This research eventually brought forth what appears to warrant being regarded as the duality principle of the self and its structuring. This duality principle is intimately associated with the inherent lack of possibility for presenting a more "satisfying" account of a transgenerational structuralist research study: it is the duality principle found to be inherent in the transgenerational self-matrix which yields the non-linearity of the phenomena involved in the research, and the non-linearity which gives rise to the inherent difficulty in making a coherent-seeming presentation of the research phenomena.

All this means that there will be a great many things it will not be possible to say in this account, simply as a function of the research activity's inherent, intrinsic inability to meet circumscribed—or linear--language requirements.

Despite all that it is not possible to say, however, there are a great many things it is possible to say, unsatisfying as they can perhaps only be from the standpoint of its not being possible to present a "complete" compendium of all link-parts.

One of these is that these appearances of patternedness, which the research turned up in remarkable abundance, do appear to take the form of self-regulating transformational activity. The self-regulating nature, where this research is concerned, appears to operate at a great many levels, many of them--in a certain sense, all of them--pertaining to the parts of life which involve parenting in any and in every way. This is not immediately as obvious as it later becomes.

There is no ready way to "explain this," because of its being so pervasively involved in among three levels of data (the individual life,
the intergenerational overlap and the transgenerational matrix), and in among several spheres of discourse: hence it is simply necessary to note this as that which will be pervading all examples and discussions here, so that a reader may perhaps be alerted to the general concept, or at least to the notion that there is such a concept. In doing the research I could not know this ahead of time and eventually, in analyzing and re-analyzing data from many perspectives, nomothetically and ideographically, was able to perceive that the data "said" "There is this duality principle, and it is important." That is as much as one can say here.

I have found that when there have been circumstances in infancy or childhood such that impact of a structural nature follows, this appears to be a result of disadaptation, a Piagetian concept which, in essence, means that there was that to be assimilated in the child's early experience (i.e. stimuli of whatever sort in his environment) which did not follow the natural order of the kinds of experiences an infant or child is by nature equipped to handle in an easyful way. When stimuli assimilated cannot be easily accommodated, the result is a lack of equilibrium, or disadaptation. This is in itself an exquisitely complex matter, one which would require very many pages of discussion to present complete discussion of, and is here being intentionally oversimplified for the purposes of overview, with a hope that the examples will clarify this.

I have observed, redundantly, that there is no one sphere in which this disadaptation, or "out of balance-ness" has dominion: it pervades cognitive, emotional, and physiological phenomena; it affects psychological and physical states, in an integrated way. This makes common sense it seems to me, and hence came to seem not surprising to discern.
When disadaptation remains a characteristic of some period of infancy or childhood, or when it is the characteristic, things will be—pervasively—out of balance: the child's entire experience (which must then include his experience of himself and himself in relation to others and to "the world") will be one of things being "somehow not right."
The child will not be able to take things for the same kind of easeful granted he would be able to do if equilibration had been easefully able to take place. One cannot point to examples here, because this is pervasive. It clearly and vividly affects the physiological and the psychological, the cognitive and the biological, including the sensorimotor aspects. It helps, I found, at the beginning simply to think in terms of a kind of general overall sense of things somehow "not feeling right" for the child, and of that just naturally having capacity to affect things for him.

Remaining purposely still at the oversimplified level, this pervasive feeling of things not being quite right for the child, in the child's own sense of things, will, because of the way interactive things go, come to mean that a great many more things will in fact not go right. By the time the child is grown and married and having children, the accumulation of things that have not gone right is considerable, unless some other things have managed to come along that were powerful enough to make up for that out of balanceness. There are consequences.

Just here it is important to interject that the data provided overwhelming evidence that there appears to exist a "natural order of things" where the business of getting each new human life started is concerned. According to the redundantly appearing evidence manifest in this data
amalgamation tracing scores of lives from infancy to the end of the lifespan (concomitantly observing what was going on for adults that might be "indirectly" influencing their child, and continuing that identical tracing in a continual line across several generations), there arose multiple opportunities through which it was possible to discern the outlines of a seeming "order" of what needs to "happen" at the beginning of each life in order for things to not show adverse impact; and to eventually construct what appears to be involved in this natural order-like phenomenon.

I traced lives from infancy to the end, all the while keeping tab on what is happening for the child of this person, from his infancy to the end of his life, and all the while being able to keep tabs on what is happening for him when his child comes along, again from both the parent's perspective and the child's, and so on, across as many generations as there are data available for that particular family. (All this, in actual practice takes into account both parents, and siblings--and their histories, as noted elsewhere: here the intent is to make a point through overview sketch, not "accuracy" of what goes on in the research, or what all the salient factors are.)

There appeared seemingly incontrovertible evidence that there is, for each new life, this natural orderedness, of a very specific sort, for the nurturant developmental facilitation of each new human life. This appears to include a highly specifiable array of kinds of provisions of nurturing. Judging from the compared and contrasted impact patterns at many levels, it appears that these "natural order requirements" for a specific assortment of parenting function provisions continues across the
first twelve or more years, at least.

It also appears highly convincing from the data that this required nurturant developmental facilitation of each new human life is not at all what we would perhaps think of when we read that sentence. It is, however, what most people do, just naturally, do, in the natural order of things like having babies.

It is overwhelmingly clear from the data--at the level, I am myself convinced, of incontrovertibility—that this natural order for nurturant facilitation which appears necessary at the sine qua non level for the naturally ordered maturational development of each new human life includes very specific features. It appears too that these must be provided in very specific ways, from a representative of each of the representatives of the two genders of the human species whose reproductive coalescence is required in the same sine qua non manner in order for a new human life to be conceived. This too seems, in retrospect, eminently common-sense-like, and in accord with nature.

This clear, dramatic and emphatic evidence of these data support the view that there are highly specific maternal parental functions, and a quite different set of highly specific paternal functions, and that each new human life must be provided with both, or some degree and manner of consequence will be experienced later.

These functions--irrespective of all other parenting characteristics, environmental characteristics, etc. are, so I now believe, in each case, the agents of transmission of an array of highly specific later life phenomena, including the later life phenomenon I believe appropriately termable, judging from the data of this research, generative capacity--
capacity for providing these naturally-ordered parenting functions.

Both the degree and the form of these parenting functions appear, from the abundantly redundant data, to be part of a natural order, in the way that oxygen in the air is a part of the natural order. Just as each new life requires oxygen, and is in fact born into the world with an "expectation" that there will be this which it requires for its maturation into a "matured" human being; so too, according to these data, with a like kind of expectation-level of requirement. The requirement involves specific functions be provided from each of the representatives of the species whose coalescence was—like ineluctability—the prime requirement for there to be this new human being. I myself was surprised at how "logical" what came forth from the data seemed, although I had never been able to think in those terms before the research data insistently impressed them upon me. Here it might help a reader to understand how any data could yield up so abstruse a thing as a rather clear description of what such complexity of requirements might consist of, if it is in fact something other than that which has been "apparent" to us when we sat down to think about such things, or indeed, even when we observed parents and children.

That which made it convincing that there was such an order was being able to trace, across scores of unfolding developmental pathways, the remarkable and extraordinary and dramatic regularity of what specific phenomena later developed in the lives of persons for whom a highly empirically-countable event as the loss of one parent, through death, occurred, and what later developed in the lives of persons for whom there was the loss of the same gender parent, but at a different age; and what
later developed in the lives of persons for whom there was the loss of the other gender parent, at ages x, y, and z, (as one small example, although only one of very many quite different others). Each such apparent patternedness was then regarded as hypothesis, and tested as often as possible. The accumulation of such tested hypotheses eventually showed an ordered pattern, that could only, so it would seem, represent a natural set of requirements, where nature is concerned.

In time it came to appear that there was an underlying orderedness appearing across unrelated lives, which was different for some groups and remarkably alike for others. Some of those for whom there came to appear this astonishing alikeness across the entire span of their later lives were those for whom the same discrete, observable event—say, the loss of a mother at age three—was the only across-the-board commonality in the early experience of some number of persons who spent their adult lives in quite different centuries, quite different educational levels, quite different economic, cultural or social situations.

None of this was visibly "apparent" in among these data for a very long time; it required sorting through the vastnesses of data bits for each life and its matrix many times before I was able to realize that it was in that commonality that an order appeared, although this is here given as a hypothetical example and not intended as a specific pattern being reported. In fact there were very many other kinds of ways I eventually began to see that the experience of childhood, which might include things quite different from the loss of a parent, ordered themselves in the same way when familial histories were compared.

From all this it was eventually possible, after sorting through
hundreds of overlapping lifespans, to come to the place where it seemed that indeed, in the natural order there was very much in the way of orderedness: for those children who did not, for whatever reason, receive a minimally sufficient complement of these "provisions required by the natural order," there were clearly traceable consequences across the lifespan, consequences which fell into a surprising array of categories.

What the great compendium of life data seem to say, when looked at concurrently through a long range telescopic lens at the transgenerational level, and the "entire lifespan level," for even two overlapping lifespans, is that a) there is this kind of oxygen-like expectation-level requirement, and b) that these requirements appear to be, in a sense, "life aspects", which in most cases each parent will just naturally, transmit to the child. It was clear that the child requires these parent-provisions for very many other life aspects," including but not limited to parenting in a natural-order-like sequence involving the presence of two parents.

The data provide much support for the formulation that in the process of just naturally transmitting these to the child, which the child requires, the parent is at one and the same time transmitting the wherewithal for the child which will enable the child, in his turn, to grow and eventually to follow along in the natural order with regard to the generative function: having received it, he or she can and does, it appears, later just naturally transmit it. What this seems to mean is that people who have arrived at a life place where they are, in addition to what-all else they are doing with their own lives, following along in the natural order of having babies, provide them, just naturally, with the wherewithal to be able to do the same in their turn. Except for
discrete accidental occurrence, it appears that parents are unable to keep from providing the requirements of the natural order; in quite the same way that it is not possible to keep there from being oxygen in the air for the baby to breathe—apparently, it just happens, so long as things are going along within the natural order.

What the data of this research convincingly suggest, in many replications, is that the adult who was not provided with this nurturant developmental facilitation seeming to be part of a natural order for human life, can provide parenting efforts but not parenting generative function, or at least not the optimal "amount," or "degree." Awesome as this view seems to be, the data seem to insist that this is the case: it appears that a person may try hard, be well meaning and devote attention to the task, and even seek instruction, but that if they have not themselves received a sufficient amount of these developmental nurturant facilitation requirements in their childhoods, the data redundantly showed some measure of consequences nonetheless resulting are concerned; in other words, things do not go long smoothly in an easeful natural seeming order, but rather there is one degree or another of things not seeming as they should, for both the parent and the child.

It is at this level, so I believe from having observed hundreds and hundreds of examples of this across scores of lives, that the interaction phenomena which Raush (1974) and others have been able to observe, analyze and understand (where what A does influences B's next move, and what B then does influences A's next move, with this having the kind of capability we now know it can and does have in family systems, say, but also in all other human relationships) begin to come into play.
The data appear to make abundantly clear that parenting efforts are somehow not the same thing as this generative facilitative function, not even when they appear on the surface to be in this kind of formulatory form. Such a statement might at first glance seem surprising; certainly in part at least it is saying nothing more than what we have all watched and observed and known of as a part of life for a very long time: that there are some parents who cannot seem to make things go along right where their children are concerned and some who can; some who fly off the handle with great regularity at their children and some who can somehow manage not to do that, but to take a child's messiness, or sassiness, or rebelliousness, or his putting a dent in the fender of the car, or getting less than perfect grades, or keeping his clothes in less than perfect order, etc. for granted.
CHAPTER VIII
AN INTRODUCTION TO STRUCTURALIST THOUGHT, ACTIVITY AND RESEARCH

When I first engaged in my pilot research project, on adolescent mothers, I did not know that I was following a path for which there in fact existed a title and a definition: it was with an enormous sense of relief that I discovered that the activity which had presented itself to me as the only means through which I might hope to seek what I wished to learn could, with only a few minor changes of terms, be subsumed under the solid and "real"-sounding name Structuralism.

The relief arose perhaps as much from the fact that I was thus enabled to enter upon a study of structuralism and learn what sorts of thoughtful criticism the method I was following had been earlier regarded as warranting, as from the fact that very often across the course of this research the method I had decided upon as the logical-seeming one—and the thought behind the method—had given me cause to wonder if in fact this course I had earlier envisioned as reasonable, and as followable, were not perhaps after all only the wildest of flights of ill-considered fancy.

To come to learn that some other persons had, at the very least, also imagined such a possibility, let alone devoted serious research to it, was indeed a source of succor. To find that they had analyzed it, dissected it, understood the formulations which would arise in the process of utilizing it was balm of Gilead.

288
Much, so I have learned, that is written of structuralism is not easy to follow; little is readily translatable, in words, into a definition of the specifics of the course I have followed, nor the details of the method. One writer, however, presented an analogy by way of attempting to define structuralism that seems a good one for borrowing for the purpose of attempting to capture the essence of the underlying basis of the activity which formed the bulk of this research. Howard Gardner, in his book The Quest for Mind: Piaget, Lévi-Strauss and The Structuralist Movement (1974), in a chapter entitled The Relationship Between Two Varieties of Structuralism, included these thoughts:

Suppose you, as the proverbial visitor from a distant planet, were to land in Yankee Stadium. A baseball game is in progress and, curious about the folkways of earthlings, you follow the action with great attention. At first, the activities seem senseless; you do not understand the reasons for uniforms of two patterns and colors, the crowd of people in the stands, the numbers on the scoreboard, the public-address system, the peculiar behaviors of the players. Ignorant of the spoken language, you must rely exclusively on your visual perception of these activities if you are to unravel their meaning. Within a reasonably short period of time, however, you should begin to discern certain regularities. You notice that the men in the dark blue uniforms remain stationary throughout; that the "players" fall into two distinct groups, housed in two separate "dugouts"; members of each team alternatively remain each at one place in the field, then take their turns at bat; after about three hours everyone leaves. It would take longer to discern the subtleties of play: the way in which balls and strikes are determined, the rules governing runs, hits, and errors; the system of innings and complete games. And you would probably have to watch for many months before successfully sorting out the gyrations of the first- and third-base coaches, groundrule doubles, earned-run averages, pennant races, the unique features of each contest. Eventually however, given sufficient ingenuity and patience, you should be able to achieve a fairly complete picture of the game, teasing out the merely
incidental features (color of uniforms, the seventh-inning stretch, peanut vendors, size of the ballpark) from the essential ones (number of men on a team; rules for pinch-hitting; procedure for a double play).

From there Gardner jumps out of Yankee Stadium into the structuralist ballpark and aligns the analogous activities, seeing the task confronting the structural analyst as of course akin to that of the visitor from the distant planet.

In both cases, the observer stands removed from a human activity, one which he does not understand, but which he assumes to be characterized, like all forms of behavior, by perceivable regularities. He first watches the activity very carefully, making preliminary guesses about what is going on. He tries out these hypotheses, dropping those which are consistently refuted, embracing those which receive consistent confirmation, waiting for crucial tests of ambiguous ones. He devises preliminary models of what is going on, utilizing those elements he feels are basic to the activity, and reduces to a secondary status those features—often equally salient—which appear to be random and nonfunctional. Ultimately, he may well decide that the actors themselves are only partially aware of the rules governing their behavior; they may be enacting their parts in a structure while innocent of its wider significance. The man from outer space may see the ballplayers as part of a larger social and economic structure serving interests of which the athletes are ignorant.

Crucial to the analyst's view is the assumption that despite the numerous apparent differences between one game, activity, or culture and another, a sufficiently probing analysis will detect deep-seated continuities across the range of individual occurrences. The analyst not only points out these underlying regularities, but also singles out for particular attention those rules or factors which can account for the differences between two games, activities, or cultures. Basic elements in the two specimens will be the same; only their arrangement will be different. Therefore, the rules of transformation between the possible arrangement of elements become a pivotal concern for the structural analyst.

Considering, for example, the outcomes of two baseball games, the analyst may propose that a combination of three basic elements—pitching, hitting, and fielding—will account for a team's performance. In the case of game 1, a team triumphed through a combination of good pitching and fielding, despite poor hitting, while in game 2, success followed upon
strong hitting, despite indifferent pitching and fielding. The simple operation of reversing the signs of pitching, fielding, and hitting—all positive elements become negative, all negative ones positive—establishes the winning combination in the two games. Although the value of each constituent factor varies from one contest to the next, the underlying structure of victory or defeat is shown to be a simple structure or its complement.

The analogy becomes somewhat more ponderous when he attempts to describe the way a structural analysis of the relationship might proceed between several different kinds of games, such as hockey, football, baseball and basketball, and following that through seems to add little that would be helpful here, except perhaps to note that each game, in that situation, is defined by its differences from other games, rather than on its own terms.

Gardner depicts structuralism as "a method or approach rather than a carefully formulated catechism: an attempt to discern the arrangements of elements underlying a given domain isolated by an analyst." "The structuralist," writes Gardner, "notes variations in these arrangements; he then attempts to relate the variations by specifying rules whereby one can be transformed to another. Structuralism in psychology and anthropology (here meaning as practiced by Piaget and Lévi-Strauss, respectively) takes its inspiration from mathematics and allied disciplines, such as logic, linguistics, and physics. Typically," he continues, "one seeks a structural model whose elements and transformations can be couched in formal-mathematical terms." My own sense, simply from the doing, at this juncture, is more that one applies the structuralist activity, and then, the model that comes forth from the analysis would have to dictate what sort of terms
its elements and transformations can be couched in. Another of Gardner's defining statements, relevant here, has to do with the fact that what the structuralist is seeking are underlying regularities among seemingly disparate phenomena, since a "determination of basic structures" will result in a simplification of data as well as confirmation of the existence of laws governing that domain.

Remarking on three principal elements he perceives in the structural approach, Gardner comments on the strategic aspect (such as he outlined in his discussion of football) in which the strategy is to focus upon the unconscious "infrastructure" of a realm, rather than upon its superficial aspects; to look at the relationship between elements rather than at the elements per se; to search for an organized system governed by general laws. The belief structuralist proponents Piaget and Lévi-Strauss, and others, have arrived at is this: if one is in fact working with a structure, then meaningful accounts of structures can be given; that structures really exist in the behaviors under observation and are not merely the product of the analyst's imagination but a true system which does have an underlying natural regularity; that structures in disparate realms can ultimately be seen to be related, where each in fact, represents an area of natural structure. Structures are believed to be something quite distinct from a pretty invention of man or machine, but rather a reflection of the biological properties of organisms: "Even as a biological organism is viewed as a totality whose parts are integrated into a hierarchical whole, so structures are seen as biological wholes, with a dynamic as well as a stasis aspect to them," writes Gardner.
Beyond that, the structuralist view is one in which any change in an organism will affect all the parts; that no aspect of a structure can be altered without affecting the entire structure and that each whole contains parts and is itself part of a larger whole. Structuralism, then, stresses the integration of related facts; the perception of relations rather than absolute properties; the centrality of configurations and Gestalten.

Clearly, as he himself points out, Gardner is depicting, in structuralism, no one unique definition nor a single method of approach; he notes in passing that the quintessential Structuralist-researchers, (and conceptualizers), Jean Piaget and Claude Lévi-Strauss will usually tackle problems in a different way each time and that others employ yet other techniques. As Piaget and Gardner discuss the structuralist activity; its thinkers believe it to represent a potential new paradigm in the social sciences: "They (structuralist researchers) look for organized totalities which may be said to exist at a level between the biological and the logical; they seek to express in formal terms the relations which govern the behavior of organisms; they focus on questions and domains which seem on an intuitive basis to have coherence and to be central in human experience."

As Gardner terms unnecessary to add "structuralists have not achieved these ambitious goals, yet adding as well that there is certainly reason to believe that its leading practitioners have sensed which questions need to be asked, have developed methods which significantly elucidate these questions, and can be seen as laying the groundwork for a more completely integrated social science."
Roland Barthes, writing in 1964, says of structuralism that it is not a school, nor even a movement (at least, not yet, he adds parenthetically), "for most of the authors ordinarily labeled with this work are unaware of being united by any solidarity of doctrine or commitment. Nor," says Barthes, "is it a vocabulary." Following a lengthy discussion most helpful perhaps in understanding many of the recondite things that structuralism is, validly, Barthes notes that in his view it would be better to try and find its broadest description (if not its definition) on another level than that of reflexive language. We can, he writes, in fact presume that there exist certain writers, painters, musicians, in whose eyes a certain exercise of structure (and not only its thought) represents a distinctive experience, and that both analysts and creators must be placed under the common sign of what we might call structural man, defined not by his ideas or his languages, but by his imagination—in other words, by the way in which he mentally experiences structure.

Hence, writes Barthes, the first thing to be said is that in relation to all its users, structuralism is essentially an activity, i.e., the controlled succession of a certain number of mental operations: "The goal," he writes, "of all structuralist activity, whether reflexive or poetic, is to reconstruct an 'object' in such a way as to manifest thereby the rules of functioning (the 'functions') of this object."

Structure, as he describes it, makes something appear which otherwise remained invisible, or if one prefers, unintelligible in the
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natural state of the object.

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"We recompcse the obj ect
in.prder to

certain functions appear,
and it is, so to speak,
the w^_that

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this is why we must,"
writes Barthes, "speak

of

the structuralist activity
rather than the structuralist
work."

Barthes

definition of the structuralist
activity begins by
citing two typical operations:
dissection and articulation. To
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dissect the "first object"

is to find in it certain
mobile fragments

whose differential situation
engenders a certain waning; the
fragment
has no meaning in itself, but
it is nonetheless such that
the slightest
variation wrought in its configuration
produces a change in the whole.
What is of interest in Barthes

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definition is that he

is here
viewing structuralist activity
identically appearing in art and in

anthropological science.

Barthes continues:

"Once the units are

posited, structural man must discover
in them or establish for them

certain rules of association; this is
the activity of articulation,

which succeeds the summoning activity.

What is happening," writes

Barthes, "is a kind of battle against
chance; this is why the con-

straint of recurrence of the units has
an almost demiurgic value:

it

is by the regular return of the units
and of the associations of units

that the work becomes capable of being seen
as possessing an inherent

structure.

The newly constructed envisionment does not, in
Barthes

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view,

render the world as it has found it, and it is
here that structuralism
is important.

First of all, it manifests a new category of the object,
which one

need not term the real nor the rational, but the functional

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thereby


joining a whole scientific complex which is being developed around information theory and research.

Barthes speaks to the criticisms that structuralism "withdraws history from the world": replying that in fact structuralism does not withdraw history, but that it seeks rather to link to history not only certain context (this has been done a thousand times, he reminds us) but also certain forms.

In Piaget's introduction to his book Structuralism (1970) he speaks of structuralism as often regarded as hard to define because it has taken too many different forms for a common denominator to be in evidence but not, he makes clear, undefinable.

After discussing linguistics and mathematics, Piaget writes that in psychology, structuralism "has long combatted the atomistic tendency to reduce wholes to their prior elements", as one of the several non-common denominators to which he is pointing in that discussion.

It is possible, he continues, to readily define structuralism if one focuses on the positive content of the idea of structure. There we come upon at least two aspects that are common to all varieties of structuralisms: first, an ideal of intrinsic intelligibility supported by the postulate that structures are self-sufficient and that to grasp them, we do not have to make reference to all sorts of extraneous elements; second, certain insights—-to the extent that one has succeeded in actually making out certain structures their theoretical employment has shown that structures in general have, despite their diversity, certain common and perhaps necessary properties. In Piaget's words:
As a first approximation, we may say that a structure is a system of transformations. In as much as it is a system and not a mere collection of elements and their properties, these transformations involve laws: structure is preserved or enriched by the interplay of its transformation laws, which never yield results external to the system nor employ elements that are external to it. In short, the notion of structure is comprised of three key ideas: the idea of wholeness, the idea of transformation, and the idea of self-regulation.

The discovery of structure may, either immediately or at a much later stage, give rise to formalization. Such formalization is, however, always the creature of the theoretician, whereas structure itself exists apart from him. Formalization sometimes proceeds by direct translation into logical or mathematical equations, sometimes passes through the intermediate stage of constructing a cybernetic model, the level of formalization depending upon the choice of theoretician. But, it is worth repeating, the mode of existence of the structure he earlier discovered must be determined separately for each particular area of investigation.

The notion of transformation allows us to delimit the problem of definition in a preliminary way; for if it were necessary to cover formalism in every sense of the word by the idea of structure, all philosophicists that are not strictly empiricist would be let in again—those which invoke Platonic forms of Husserlian essences, not to forget Kant's brand of formalism, and even several varieties of empiricism (for example, the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle, who stress syntactic and semantic forms in their analysis of logic). Now in the narrower sense we are about to define, current logical theory only rarely takes account of "structures", for in many ways it has remained subservient to a rather stubborn atomistic tendency and is only beginning to open up to structuralism.

Then, in going on to elaborate on the definition of structuralism he proposes, Piaget comments on his sense that this proposed definition might do away with the otherwise difficulty in understanding why a notion as abstract as that of a "system closed under transformation" should raise such high hopes in all domains of inquiry.

In his first defining term, wholeness, Piaget underscores the distinction between structures and aggregates, the former being wholes,
the latter composites formed of elements that are independent of the complexities into which they enter. To insist on this distinction, writes Piaget, is not to deny that structures have elements, but the elements of a structure are subordinated to laws, and it is in terms of these laws that the structure qua whole or system is defined. Moreover, he writes, the laws governing a structure's composition are not reducible to cumulative one-by-one association of its elements: they confer on the whole as such over-all properties distinct from the properties of its elements.

As an example of what he has in mind here, he cites integers:

they do not exist in isolation one from another, nor were they discovered one by one in some accidental sequence and then, finally, united into a whole. They do not come upon the scene except as ordered, and this order of the integers is associated with structural properties (of groups, fields, rings, and the like) which are quite different from the properties of number individuals, each of which is even or odd, prime or non-prime, and so on.

As Piaget admits, the idea of wholeness itself raises a good many problems, and he takes up just the two principal ones, the first bearing on its nature, the other on its mode of formation (or preformation).

We can note here, then, that Piaget is speaking of two epistemological alternatives, wholes defined in terms of their structural laws, and atomistic compoundings of prior elements.

It would be a mistake, he remarks, to think that, in all domains, these are the only two options: "modern structuralism is one of two alternatives to atomism that has made its way into the history of ideas."
Of this other alternative, Piaget writes

"The first consists in simply reversing the sequence that appeared natural to those who wanted to proceed from the simple to the complex (from sense impressions to perceptual complexes, from individuals to social groups, and so forth)."

The whole which this sort of critic of atomism posits at the outset is viewed as the outcome of some sort of emergence, vaguely conceived as a law of nature and not further analyzed.

"Using Comte's proposal to explain men in terms of humanity instead of humanity in terms of men, Durkheim's view of the social whole as emerging from the union of individuals in much the same way as molecules are formed by the union of atoms, or the Gestalt psychologists belief that they could discern immediate wholes in primary perception, all reminded us that a whole is not the same as a simple juxtaposition of previously available elements......but by viewing the whole as prior to its elements or contemporareous with their "contact", they simplified the problem to such an extent as to risk bypassing all the central questions--questions about the nature of a whole's laws of composition."

Operational structuralism is distinct from both the schemes of atomist association on the one hand and emergent totalities on the other. Operational structuralism adopts from the start a relational perspective, according to which it is neither the elements nor a whole that comes about in a manner one knows not how, but the relations among elements that count.

What is primary, in Piaget's view of the wholeness aspect important to operational structuralism, is the logical procedures or natural processes by which the whole is formed, not the whole: the whole itself is consequent on the system's laws of composition, not on its elements.

But then, writes Piaget, at this point, a second, and much more serious problem springs up, the really central problem of structuralism: Have these composite wholes always been composed? How can this be? Do
structures call for formation, or is only some sort of eternal preformation compatible with them?

It is on the question arising from that dilemma, whether structuralism calls for formation, or is only some sort of eternal preformation compatible with them, (that is, what Piaget terms a structureless genesis on the one hand and ungenerated wholes or forms on the other) that opinion is most divided. If structures call for formation, Piaget sees this as making it revert to that atomistic association to which empiricism has accustomed us. If instead they represent some sort of eternal preformation, this latter alternative "constantly threaten to make it lapse into a theory of Husserlian essences, Platonic forms, or Kantian a priori form of synthesis."

This whole problem arises, says Piaget, with the notion of wholeness itself: it can be narrowed down once we take the second characteristic of structures, namely, their being systems of transformations rather than of static forms, seriously.

I might insert here that it should by now be becoming clear to the reader why it was that I found myself breathing a great sigh of relief when I was able to become aware that others had pondered these problems, which meant that these phenomena had presented themselves as entities necessitating pondering, to others; in all honesty these questions that the data and analyses of my research raised sui generis, and of necessity demanded that I contemplate had earlier, on my own, given me great pause. All of my own thought rebelled against the notion of Husserlian essences and Kantian a priori forms of synthesis,
and at the same time I found myself continually confronted with what on the one hand seemed clearly to represent a whole, yet at the very same time, not a whole; a system that defied being reduced to its elements, despite the fact that the very mental process through which I had become able to discern the "whole" was through recognizing its elements. Clearer than anything else to me had been the fact that the only way I knew they were elements was because of their being related to other elements which were also only recognizable by virtue of their being related to the first ones, and to others, but with none of them possessing any of the linearity which all of my mental training across life had taught me to perceive as connoting association.

What the data of my research themselves had clearly been repeatedly insisting upon being recognized as, were aspects of what I could only perceive as a simultaneous duality; that is, all of the parts were not so much parts as relational aspects, or what I had come to think of as elements of clusters, but these "parts", or related clusters, were on the one hand that which I had to think of as having been formed, but on the other hand, they constituted at the very same time that which in fact insisted, to my view, that it was serving the function of "being" the structuring aspects of another aspect.

The data themselves were, so I firmly believed, empirically derived; yet they stoutly refused to obey any of the rules for empiricism as I imagined it had to be. It was as if all of the structures I had come to believe my data had permitted to become visible were concurrently "end points" to a process and "beginning points" to a process, but with neither of them either end or beginning, because
each beginning was an ending, and vice versa. Perhaps in the "verb
following noun" form in which I have set down these sentences the
perplexity does not seem as great as it did in the encountering masses
of data "being" what seemed non-compatible entities concurrently; but
for me, at the time, the problem of how to determine which of these
I was in fact "seeing" as I attempted to analyze the great mass of
unsorted data in my mind, in search of its meaning, if any, was a
heady one; for in one segment of the research it would seem clear that,
of course, thus and so was the, or a, "beginning point" of a structured
system, only to be forced to realize that it was both beginning point,
end point, and neither, if one were to think "logically".

It was a great relief to come upon Piaget's work and find him
having written—as if there really were "such a phenomenon" after all:
"If the character of structured wholes depends on their laws of compo-
sition, these laws must of their very nature be structuring: it is
the constant duality, or bipolarity, of always being simultaneously
structuring and structured that accounts for the success of the notion
of law or rule employed by structuralists." I see now that he was
providing an accommodative schema for me within which I could achieve
equilibration of those perceptions for which I had no accommodative
schemata. It felt good.

Although the history of structuralism in linguistics, with its
beginning with the work of Ferdinand de Saussure, and in Gestalt psy-
chology, might at first lead one to believe that this formulation is
not born out, it is, writes Piaget, "unwise to view an intellectual
current exclusively in terms of its origin; it should be seen in its
flow." In any case, the main point Piaget comes to at this part of the discussion is to remark that all known structures—from mathematical groups to kinship systems—are without exception, systems of transformation.

"The very centrality of the idea of transformation makes the question of origin, that is, of the relation between transformation and formation," writes Piaget, inevitable. Again, the points he proceeds to from here are of such crucial import that it seems unavoidable to set them forth verbatim:

Certainly the elements of a structure must be differentiated from the transformation laws which apply to them. Because it is the former which undergo transformation or change, it is easy to think of the latter as immutable. Even in varieties of structuralism which are not formalized in the strict sense, one finds outstanding workers who are so little concerned about psychological origins that they jump straight from the stability of transformation rules to their innateness.

Here Piaget cites Noam Chomsky as a case in point: "for him generative grammars appear to demand innate syntactic laws, as if stability could not be explained in terms of equilibrium mechanisms, and as if the appeal to biology implied by the hypothesis of innateness did not pose problems of formation just as complex as those involved in a psychological account."

The third basic property of structures in Piaget's proposed definition is that they are self-regulating, self-regulation entailing self-maintenance and closure. An example he cites here is the simple one of adding or subtracting any two whole numbers: what one obtains is a third whole number, and one which satisfies the laws of the "additive group" of whole number. It is, he writes, in this sense
that a structure is "closed", with closed being a notion perfectly compatible with the notion of a structure's being considered a substructure of a larger one and yet, while treated as a substructure, nevertheless not losing its own boundaries: the larger structure does not "annex" the substructure. If anything, writes Piaget, "we have a confederation, so that the laws of the substructure are not altered but conserved and the intervening change is an enrichment rather than an impoverishment." I might add here that I found that it is one thing to become aware, through structurally perceiving one's data, that there is a self-regulating going on, and another to come to grips with what elements are accounting for that self-regulating law one can come eventually to perceive.

It is these properties of concentration, along with stability of boundaries, despite the construction of indefinitely many new elements, that presuppose structures as self-regulating:

There can be no doubt that it is this latter conception which makes the idea of structure so important and which accounts for the high hopes it raises in all domains of inquiry: Once an area of knowledge has been reduced to a self-regulating system or "structure", the feeling that one has at last come upon its innermost source of movement is hardly avoidable...

And from there, one must next consider Piaget's belief that:

Self regulation may be achieved by various procedures; processes, and these can be ranked in order of increasing complexity; we are thus brought back to our earlier question about a system's construction, i.e., in the last analysis, its formation.

At the highest level (Piaget here interjects the reminder that what we call the top of the pyramid may be viewed as its base by others) self-regulation proceeds by the application of perfectly explicit rules, these rules being, of course, the very ones that define the structure under consideration.
Clearly important to this research is Piaget's inclusion of the view that there exist an immense class of structures which are not strictly mathematical, this is, whose transformations unfold in time: linguistic structures, sociological structures, psychological structures, and so on:

Such transformations, are governed by laws which are not in the strict sense "operations", because they are not entirely reversible. Transformation laws of this kind depend upon the interplay of anticipation and correction (feedback).

Piaget cites rhythm, regulation and operation as the three basic mechanisms in his view, of self-regulation and self-maintenance.

Attempts to reduce the complex to the simple lead to synthesis in which the more basic theory becomes enriched by the derived theory, and the resulting reciprocal assimilation reveals the existence of structures as distant from additive complexes.

Later, in discussing psychological structures, Piaget writes of structures as inseparable from performance, that is, from functions in the biological sense of the word, then raising the question whether in including self-regulation or self-governing in our definition of structure, we might seem to have bypassed the set of necessary conditions: "granting that structures have laws of composition, which amounts to saying that they are regulated, the necessary question becomes but by what or by whom?" If, writes Piaget, the theoretician who has framed the structure is the one who governs it, it exists only at the level of formal exercise. To be real, a structure must, in the literal sense, be governed from within... And then, of course, we must ask the question Piaget raises as well: "If structures exist and each is regulated from within, what role is left for the subject?"

Not one to raise questions and then leave them unanswered, Piaget
moves deftly through a heady maze of thought processes which culminate in the view that one can demonstrate that the role of the subject, self-regulating structures notwithstanding, is as the center of functional activity: the subject, in his view, retains the role of mediator, suggesting perhaps the "self" of psychological theories of synthesis, as example of which he cites the proposed "self" theory of P. Janet in L'automatisme psychologique; in my own view, the self theory of Kohut was what I arrived at as the center of functional activity in association with neurological concomitants. In any case, he writes, the subject will, more modestly, and realistically, have to be defined as the center of activity. The variety of divergent disciplinary views as to what constitutes that "center of activity" comprises a formidable array: from genetically determined heredity to theories of unconscious forces to learned stimulus-response mechanisms to family systems communication feedback.

Piaget writes, in Structuralism, that we can, lacking any sort of "overarching power of synthesis", nonetheless define the role of the subject with relative modesty and relatively realistically, in terms of the center of activity: that seems a good place to leave that for now.

Let us for the moment, however, follow along with Piaget and see where he goes from there with that notion. In the construction of which perhaps persons are most aware in Piaget's thought and research, the "atomistic" (Piaget's term) concept of "association" is substituted for by Piaget's formulation of "assimilation". Biologically considered, writes Piaget, assimilation is the process whereby the
the organism in each of its interactions with the bodies or energies of its environment fits these in some manner to the requirements of its own physico-chemical structures, while at the same time accommodating itself to them.

Piaget's discussion of assimilation, accommodation and schemata is complex, and requires lengthy discussion of terms not necessarily essential for this discussion here, but we can note in passing that he underscores that assimilation itself is not a structure. Assimilation is the functional aspect of structure-formation, in Piaget's view, "intervening in each particular case of constructive activity, but sooner or later leading to the mutual assimilation of structures to one another, and so establishing ever more intimate inter-structural connections." This is how I found the activity to proceed.

A perhaps helpful analogy worth noting here, if only for the sale of balancing out a bit of the heaviness which is so difficult to keep from discussion of ideas that would otherwise, if only there were a way to discuss them without such abundance of weighty-sounding words and concepts, be able to be enjoyed as fascinatingly interesting, is Gardner's interjection which suggests that we might think of assimilation and accommodation in terms of a rabbit eating a cabbage. "Assimilation is what the rabbit does when he takes in the cabbage. Accommodation is the transformation that takes place once the rabbit has done this: the rabbit does not then become cabbage, but rather the cabbage becomes rabbit." And, although Gardner does not continue with this, to me it was helpful think in terms of thenceforth whatever
the rabbit later assimilates must be, ineluctably, assimilated into a rabbit who is a "Rabbitcumcabbage", for no other or more complicated reason than that the rabbit has in fact become a Rabbitcumcabbage by virtue not of having taken in the cabbage per se but by virtue of the cabbage's having become rabbit. The next assimilation (perhaps a carrot), taken in is taken into not a plain rabbit but a "rabbitcumcabbage", and now the accommodation means the carrot must become rabbitcumcabbage.

What is, I think, truly potentially useful in holding onto Piaget's views of assimilation and accommodation is that they lend themselves with high degrees of explicitness to both psychological, conscious and unconscious, phenomena, and to the physiological, as well as to the interactional level from which we shall come to discuss the impact of the environment.

All of which leads us, so I think, back to the matter of the center of functional activity, and to nature/nurture, and the mammoth mountains of related and unrelated disciplinary viewpoints on what constitutes and influences the center of activity we regard as a phenomenon ascribable to the human person/subject. My own belief following from the long journey which comprised this research is that a serious understanding of the human person, and the forces which influence the pathway along which his developmental pathway will unfold across the course of his life --and which will in turn perhaps be shown to hold potential for influencing the developmental pathways of others--cannot, in some arbitrary manner (such as choosing a discipline within which to do one's research, or ply one's profession) choose to investigate
an aspect of the human being and as a consequence then move to formulate statements about what constitutes and influences the center of activity, from that standpoint. But we do it all the same: as Piaget says, it is difficult for us to think in terms of interrelatedness.

Saussure's structuralism, having to do as it did with linguistics, was unlike the "transformational" structuralism of Chomsky today and led many to think of structures as independent of history precisely because Saussure's formulations arose in a context in which he was endeavoring to give himself over to "the study of the immanent character of language without being distracted by historical considerations." Structures derive their wholeness not from descriptive and static laws, but from laws of transformation; whole orderliness is a matter of self-regulation, and Piaget includes in his writing a discussion of the contemporary Chomskian work exploring the hypotheses of there existing a structural basis concordant for language and onogenesis in its reciprocal interaction with phylogenesis. He also briefly discussed as well the Lacanian efforts to discover a modern psychoanalytic structuralism with an inherent concordance with linguistics. Fascinating as both of these are, there would be no great point in going into them here were it not for the fact that, particularly in Chomsky's case, some of the hypotheses he has arrived at seem to hold a potential concordance with some of the findings of this research, and thus cannot perhaps justifiably be omitted from mention.

Despite the very strong arguments for keeping linguistic structuralism within the confines of a specific paradigmatic framework (as
propounded by Saussure, not salient for inclusion here in any specific way), Zellig Harris, and then, more pronouncedly his pupil Noam Chomsky, approached linguistics (via a structuralist approach) from a wholly different perspective, one termed, (as regards syntax) "generative". Chomsky's theories, writes Piaget, place linguistic structures among those maximally general structures which derive their wholeness, not from descriptive and static laws, but from laws of transformation; and whose orderliness is a matter of self-regulation."

The reasons, Piaget continues, for this striking change of perspective are of two kinds, well worth analyzing he believes, because they are relevant not only to the comparative study of structures but also to the comparative study of theories of structure. Their effect, is therefore, truly interdisciplinary.

The first reason relates to the recognition of what Chomsky has called the "creative" aspect of language, earlier noted by Harris and M. Halle, which comes to light mainly in individual acts of speech (as opposed to language is a more abstract sense) and is therefore studied by psycholinguistics. In fact, notes Piaget, after decades of suspicion toward psychology, linguists have re-established their connection with psychology through psycholinguistics. Chomsky, wrote Piaget, was at the time of his writing, very much involved in these new developments, and continues:

A central topic of much current research is what we may call the creative aspect of language use, that is, its unboundedness and freedom from stimulus control. The speaker-hearer whose normal use of language is "creative" in this sense must have internalized a system of rules that determines the semantic interpretations of an unbounded set of sentences;
he must, in other words, be in control of what is now often called a **generative grammar** of language.

The second reason for Chomsky's interest in the transformation laws of "generative grammar" is quite paradoxical, since it seems at first sight oriented toward a radical "fixism" opposed to any notion of genesis and transformation: the idea that grammar has its roots in reason, and in an "innate" reason. In fact, as Piaget elucidates in a way I shall not attempt here, Chomsky's theory finds the rules of transformation including "derived sentences" arising from certain fixed "kernel sentences" of subject-predicate form. Writes Piaget, "That new rationalism," which Chomsky describes as a "return to traditional ideas and viewpoints rather than a radical innovation in linguistics of psychology" completely inverts logical positivism, does not bother him in the least.

In the discussion, which takes into account the analysis of Chomsky's work by others which follows, Piaget helps us to place this in perspective: noting that the work of American linguists between 1925 and 1957 was "altogether Baconian in method", inductive data gathering, heterogeneous domains of research--phonetics, syntax, and so on--pyramidally arranged and more or less loosely connected in retrospect, distrust of "hypothesis", indeed of ideas, a program of making "protocol sentences" serve as epistemological "bases", and so forth.

Chomsky's method, on the other hand, which we find contrasted with the Baconian by its being placed under the auspices of Kepler, turns on the recognition that there are no such "bases", that science calls
instead for "hypotheses (indeed, interjects Piaget, for those "least probable" hypotheses which Karl Popper (in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, New York, Basic Books, 1959) could call "best" because, when falsifiable, they enable us to eliminate so large a number of consequences at one stroke).

Instead of looking for an indicative step by step procedure to help us collect the properties of particular languages and ultimately language in general, Chomsky inquires: What grammatical postulates are necessary and sufficient to describe the universal principles of language structure and to furnish a general method for selecting grammar for any given particular language? We can, here, omit a discussion of the means by which Chomsky actually arrived at this conception of linguistic structure since it takes us beyond the scope of this work.

Piaget briefly sets forth Chomsky's theory as follows: Employing recursive methods, we can obtain a set of rewriting rules of the form a A → Z, where A is a symbol for categories like "noun phrase, verb phrase, and so on, and Z is a terminal or non terminal strings (that is, strings which can be further rewritten) and it is the set of transformation rules which constitutes any particular "generative grammar", that is, a grammar capable of establishing connection in an infinity of possible combinations.

Piaget terms Chomsky's procedure a genuinely structuralist one in its devising. This genuine structure he terms a coherent system of transformations (in effect, more or less complex "networks"), and views it as not only an excellent instrument for comparative study but
possessing the additional interest of applying to "individual competence" (being the 'internalized grammar' of the speaker-hearer) as well as to language as a social institution.

In this manner, as Piaget points out, it is possible to conceive of language and linguistics from the standpoint of ontogenesis and in reciprocal interaction with social development.

This idea of an interaction between ontogenesis and linguistic structure can provide room for potentially useful application in the affective domain and that of unconscious symbolization, Piaget remarks. (It is in this context that Piaget includes mention of Lacan's Écrits, which, assuredly fascinating an appeal as I find in Lacan's thought, is unfortunately outside the scope of this particular research report and must be here omitted except perhaps to note in passing that Lacan "has tried to use linguistic structuralism and familiar mathematical models to devise new transformation rules which would make it possible for the "irrational ingredients" of the unconscious and in the inef-fable features of private symbols to make their entry into a language really designed to express the communicable," in Piaget's view).

Now, again because this question, as will Chomsky's theory, becomes clearly more relevant further on in this work, it is worth inserting a paragraph of Chomsky's outlining the thinking of those who view linguistics by way of what Piaget terms "structuralist tendencies" but who distrust psychogenesis and history and view the subject in these terms: (here what is being questioned is whether linguistic structures need be thought of as social formations, innate, or the results of equilibration). Here the thesis is defended that ties
"innate Ideas" to heredity:

...if the grammars of natural languages are not only intricate and abstract, but also very restricted in their variety, particularly at deeper levels, it becomes necessary to challenge the widespread assumption that these systems are "learned" in some significant sense of this term. It is perfectly possible that a particular grammar is acquired by differentiation of a fixed innate scheme, rather than by slow growth of new items, patterns or associations...and the little that is known about the structure of language suggests that the rationalist hypothesis is likely to prove productive and fundamentally correct in its general outline...

Here, writes Piaget, we have the transformation processes by which particular grammars come to be differentiated and go into action in the course of development:

...only the "kernel" or "fixed scheme" is innate, along with the most general features of the transformational structure, while the variety of natural language derives from the "creative aspect of language" mentioned earlier. By distinguishing between "kernel and husk," "deep" and "surface" structures, Chomsky allows for both description and formalization.

Nevertheless, counters Piaget, Chomsky leaves us with the fundamental problem of the nature and origin of the fixed innate schema.

Such a view, says Piaget, contains many inherently paradoxical and problematical and inherently contradictory or at best unsolvable problems, all of which he outlines: if, however, we descend to the terrain of ontogenesis, where Piaget describes the details of acquisition and transformation as verifiable, we meet, says Piaget, with facts which, though presenting certain connections with Chomsky's assumption, differ as to the importance or range of the hereditary points of departure.

The reason for this, says Piaget, is that Chomsky is seeing only two alternatives—either an innate schema that governs with necessity, or acquisition from outside (cultural and therefore variable determination such as cannot account for the limited and necessary character of the
schema in question), while in fact there is a third possibility. In addition to heredity versus acquisition from outside there is also the process of internal equilibration, according to Piaget's thinking:

Now such equilibration processes, such self-regulation, also yield necessities; we might even say that their results are more necessary than those determined by heredity, for heredity varies much more than do the general laws or organization by which the self-regulation of behavior is governed.

Moreover, continues Piaget, heredity applies only to traits that either are or are not transmitted, bears on "contents"; whereas self-regulation sets a direction compatible with a construction that becomes necessary precisely in being directed.

The conclusion Piaget arrives at in all of this is that there are reasons for trying the equilibration hypothesis and suspending Chomsky's innatism while preserving the rest of his theory; (linguistic-oriented reasons not possible to include here), and that if adoption of the equilibration hypothesis should prove warranted, we would have an explanation of linguistic structures that dispenses with what Piaget calls "too heavy-handed innatism." He concludes this aspect with the statement that the necessary research work in these areas has only relatively recently been begun and must await further work.

Having left linguistics behind, Piaget at last arrives at the more familiar ground for psychologists of the social sciences. Here he elucidates the distinctions between what he refers to as "global" structuralism, for which he cites Durkheim as a noted proponent, and "analytic" structuralism, ascribable to the work of Levi-Strauss. Durkheim's "global structuralism," says Piaget. "treats totality as a
primary concept explanatory as such: the social whole arises of itself from the union of components"; it "emerges." Durkheim's collaborator, Marcel Mauss, on the other hand, Piaget notes, is regarded by Lévi-Strauss as the originator of authentic anthropological structuralism: Mauss, in his studies of the gift, sought and found the details of transformational interactions.

Very important distinctions between the two sorts are that global structuralism holds to systems of observable relations and interactions, which are regarded as sufficient unto themselves, whereas the peculiarity of analytic (which Piaget terms authentic structuralism) structuralism is that it seeks to explain such empirical systems by postulating "deep" structures from which the former are in some manner derivable. Structures in this sense of the work are ultimately, says Piaget, logico-mathematical models of the observed social relations, and do not themselves belong to the realm of "fact" (presumably because they are not in themselves directly observable).

Now what this means is certainly important: it means, among other things as Piaget points out repeatedly, that the individual members of the group under study are unaware of the structural model in terms of which the constellations of their social relations can be interpreted.

In Piaget's view, it is when one takes into account that the two characteristics of analytic structuralism are obviously connected, that is, that the search for deep structures is a direct consequence of the matter of transformation laws, certain striking analogies between structuralism in anthropology, in physics, and in psychology become apparent.
As in physics, where causality is related to physical laws, psychological structures do not belong to consciousness but to behavior. Only when there is some sort of dis-adaptation, says Piaget, does the individual become aware of structures, and this awareness is, he believes, always quite dim and partial.

While discussing the structuralist-like uses to which some sociologists and psychologists have attempted to explain some phenomena, it is within anthropological studies of Levi-Strauss that, in Piaget’s view, the seriously constructive (and creative) work in structural analyses has taken place: Piaget sees Lévi-Strauss’s work as capable of showing what could be achieved in the social sciences by employing structuralist methods. (And in fact, Piaget notes that he cannot help thinking that his own constructivist theory of cognitive structure is intimately connected with Lévi-Strauss’s doctrine of the primacy of structure in social life.)

Yet, writes Piaget, the problem of how eventually to coordinate sociological and anthropological structuralism with biological and psychological structuralism remains, so he believes. One thing, in his view, is clear: in biology and psychology structural analysis must, at all levels, from homeostasis to operations, be supplemented by functional considerations.

Piaget’s concluding remarks summing up his writing on structuralism are interesting, for in them he comments on some of the reasons why, although structuralism itself is not new and has a relatively lengthy history, it should have taken so long for its possibility to
be discovered. The primary reason, in Piaget's view, is that he sees human minds as having a natural tendency to proceed from the simple to the complex, and hence to neglect interdependencies and systematic wholes—until such a time as problems of analysis force them upon our attention. But important, too, is the fact that structures are not observable, as such, being located at levels which he speaks of as able to be reached only "by abstracting forms of forms or systems of the nth degree; that is, the detection of structure calls for a special effort of reflective abstraction.

Certainly important is his commentary that the study of structure cannot be exclusive and that it does not suppress, especially in the human sciences and in biology, other dimensions of investigation. Quite the contrary, says Piaget, it tends instead to integrate them, and does so in the way in which all integration in scientific thought comes about, by making for reciprocity and interaction.

His second general conclusion is that the search for structures cannot but, so he believes, result in interdisciplinary coordinations. As reason, Piaget cites the notion that if one tries to deal with structures within an artificially circumscribed domain—and any given science is just that—one very soon hits on the problem of being unable to locate the entities one is studying, since structure is so defined that it cannot coincide with any system of observable relations, the only ones that are clearly made out in any of the existing sciences. I encountered this problem across this research and found it for a long time a supremely dismaying problem. As an example of this—-not a
simple one in my view—Piaget sees it as ineluctable to "locate" the structural elements and relationships discovered by Levi-Strauss in kinship systems "somewhere midway between the nervous system and conscious behavior". (It is perhaps worth noting, too, just for the record, that Piaget, more than once, expresses very considerable dismay over so many of the "modish" directions in which what contemporary folk in an array of disciplines have opted to term structuralism: some philosophical traditions, believes Piaget, have piled up such confusion on the topic that what they call the subject is undermined, as one example of a problem that has arisen from what someone else has referred to as the "hip" notion or way of thinking of structuralism. (The being of structures consists in their coming to be, that is, in their being under construction: there is no structure apart from construction, either abstract or genetic.)

Those two notions are not as far removed from one another, writes Piaget, as is commonly supposed.

Since Gödel, logicians and students of the foundations of mathematics distinguish between "stronger" and "weaker" structures, the stronger ones not being capable of elaboration until after the construction of the more elementary, that is, weaker systems yet, conversely, themselves necessary to the "completion" of the weaker ones.

The idea of a formal system of abstract structures is thereby transformed into that of the construction of a never completed whole, the limits of formalization constituting the grounds for incompleteness, or as he put it earlier, incompleteness being a necessary consequence of the fact that there is no "terminal" or "absolute" form because any
content is form relative to some inferior content and any form the content for some higher form.

If, writes Piaget, Godel's theorem may fairly be interpreted in this way, "abstract construction" is merely the formalized inverse of "genesis", for genesis too proceeds by way of reflective abstraction, though it starts lower down the scale. It is, writes Piaget, only natural that, in areas where the genetic data are unknown and beyond recovery, as in ethnology, one puts a good face on the bad situation and pretends that genesis is quite irrelevant. But in areas where genesis obtrudes on everyday observation, as in the psychology of intelligence, one cannot help but become aware that structure and genesis are necessarily interdependent.

Genesis is simply transition from one structure to another, nothing more; but this transition always leads from a "weaker" to a "stronger" structure; it is a "formative" transition. Structure is simply a system of transformations, but its roots are operational; it depends, therefore, on a prior formation of the instruments of transformation--transformation rules of laws.

Beyond that, Piaget makes an interesting point for psychologists: The problem of genesis is not just a question of psychology; its framing and its solution determine the very meaning of the idea of structure. The basic epistemological alternatives are predestination or some sort of constructivism. (For the mathematician, notes Piaget, it is of course tempting to believe in ideas and to think of negative or imaginary numbers as lying in God's lap from all eternity; Piaget is of the opinion that, since Godel's theorem, not even God's...
lap sits static, however). Thus, only if we are willing, or able, to forget about biology as out there existing, can we be satisfied with Chomsky's theory of the innateness of human reason, say. Piaget finds the same problem, whether to settle for the epistemological alternative of "predestined from the beginning", or viewed as the products of an evolving process of construction.

Mercifully, Piaget comments on the ideal of a structure of all structures as unrealizable, but as with every thought that is generated in Piaget's remarkable mind, this one too has its therefore: Therefore, the subject cannot be the a priori underpinning of a finished posterior structure; rather, it is a center of activity. And, writes Piaget, whether we substitute "society" or "mankind" or "life" or even "cosmos" for "subject", the argument remains the same. (Or the self.)

In sum, Piaget repeats what is in fact worth underscoring, that structuralism is a method, not a doctrine, one whose doctrinal consequences have been quite various. Because it is a method, its applicability is limited; while yet at the same time it is capable of bringing very powerful instruments of analysis, so Piaget believes, to the benefit of other methods and studies, such as genetic and functionalist studies. And, surely important, at the same time it must be emphasized that its methodological character also makes for a certain openness.
A BRIEF HISTORICAL EXAMPLE OF A TRANSGENERATIONAL TRACING OF THE IMPACT OF EARLY EXPERIENCE ON ADULT DEVELOPMENT, FUTURE PARENTHOOD AND SUBSEQUENT GENERATIONS

In the 1700's, in England, a man whose ancestry is uncertainly ascribed to various nations and religions, became a silversmith. On the surface little is known of him for certain, other than he and his wife had two sons. However, from what is known of one of his sons, Richard, it is possible to learn a bit more of his father, who was John. Richard was born in the mid-1700's, in London.

During the American Revolutionary War, Richard, then 20 years old, ran away from home, to Paris. In Paris, Richard attempted to make contact with a famous reformer and agitator: he wrote him a letter expressing his "ardent desire to serve in the Glorious Cause of Freedom". Richard's father, apparently not one easily inclined to permit his son to do anything as rash as to make choices for himself at age 20, nor to take such liberty with freedom, hurried after him, and is said to have "captured" his son, and apologized to the famous reformer for his son's presumptuousness and brought him back home.

Richard was apparently somewhat chastened, if we may judge by the fact that young Richard from then on, as far as is known, remained in London, where he became a lawyer. It is recorded by various sources that Richard studied law quietly and practiced in the city of his birth without adventures notable to public notice of the sort that would find its way into any sort of record, since he was an obscure and undistinguished person in the city of his birth.
It is, however, also recorded—by many who knew him as personal acquaintance—that Richard maintained across much or all of his life what his friends regarded as very considerable idiosyncracy: he held the American General George Washington in exceptionally peculiar honor, hung a portrait of Washington in his living room as an adult, and according to several different sources, "forced" his guests to take their hats off when they looked at Washington's portrait, and then to make a "respectful bow".

Richard was not a personal acquaintance of Washington's and seemed simply to have found himself in a relationship with what we might most accurately regard as the idea of Washington, and to have rather fanatically idealized the person, or at least the image of this person, Washington, which he kept always in close proximity to himself across his lifetime. He himself is reported to have placed the large imposing portrait where he could always see it while at home, and to bow to it, and sit gazing at Washington's face for a part of each day.

In his behavior, and the way he thought about and felt about at least some things, appeared to have been somewhat outside the rather broad continuum within which the majority of persons most often fall. But aside from this, and his twenty year old idealistic journey, Richard seems, from all that is known, to have conducted his life and his professional career apparently no differently from that of the very large majority of other persons. Included among his behavioral proclivities was that he drank overmuch.

This Richard married a woman Elizabeth. They had two sons, Junius and Algernon, and then, at the birth of the third child, a daughter; the
mother of these children died.

Richard is known to have given his sons what was regarded as an "excellent classical education". Almost nothing is recorded of Algernon and we have no record of his life. Richard ensconced one of his sons, Junius Brutus, in his law office.

However, before that young Junius had had a young adolescence which included an event not a universal part of the experience of thirteen year olds: he fathered a child. According to biographers, Junius' father "paid off" the young servant girl of his neighbor, whom Junius had made pregnant. The next reported fact of Junius' existence is his enlisting at the age of seventeen to go off to sea. At the last minute he was kept from sailing by a court summons requiring him to appear in court to answer another such charge, by another young woman. By 17, Richard's son Junius was at least twice father of a child; father of a child who would never know his father, for Junius felt no desire to be part of the life of either of the mothers of his children, nor of either of his children. Richard went into court himself to be Junius' lawyer, but the father and son lost their case and the father was compelled to pay up again.

At that point Junius was working in his father's law office, but it was his feeling and assertion that the law bored him, and he walked away from it. Junius is said to have had a great affinity for very many of the arts and tried his hand at first one, then another, then another of them, never staying for long with any one. He tried painting, writing, sculpture, each in turn, then turning his direction to the stage. Eventually he was drawn to attach himself to a travelling group of
strollers, whose gypsy lifestyle seemed very much to appeal to young Junius.

In the course of his acting travels (which he stayed with as a lifetime profession) he met and eloped with a woman named Adelaide. Sometime later when they showed up at Junius' father's house, they were married, in 1815, and shortly thereafter a baby girl was born to them. This time things felt differently for Junius: he now experienced a sense of wanting to associate himself with the mother of his child, and presumably, though we cannot know that, with the child.

It was not very long before Junius' acting talent began to draw considerable acclaim. Junius and Adelaide and the baby lived the wandering life of travelling players or strollers.

Meanwhile, the first child had died in infancy, and another, a son, was born. Junius and Adelaide are reported to have been a seemingly well-matched pair, much attached to one another. Junius, however, in time yielded to an urge to leave his family, and to go to Amsterdam, where he was awarded an opportunity to perform for the Prince of Orange. This was regarded as a thing of considerable glory and honor, and it was assumed he had left home for this reason. When he failed to appear for the performance, a friend searched for him and located him in a saloon. Despite this remarkable gaffe (for so it was regarded to be invited to perform for the Crown and get too drunk and not ever show up for the performance while the Prince and the Court sat there waiting) and that his professional reputation wasn't helped along, Junius Brutus became very quickly very well known on the London stage. He very soon became as well known for his violent temper, his singular lack of patience, his
arrogance, singular "touchiness" and stormy temperament.

The effect of his remarkable acting talent was to be offered an opportunity to appear in America; the effect of his violent temper was that his English employers were glad to have him accept it, and so he did.

Blithespiritedly marrying a second time, to an 18 year old, Junius peremptorily abandoned his wife and child and emigrated to America, where he became in time an extraordinarily acclaimed actor—a Shakespearian tragedian, described as having a magnetic personality, and capable of evoking extremes of emotion from the audience by his performance of tragic roles on the public stage. That is, when he showed up for the performances. Which was not at all in the tradition that the show must go on: Junius with considerable frequency failed to show up when he was scheduled to do so. Because the other players and producers most assuredly felt the show jolly well must go on, Junius Brutus came to be known fully as much for his inebriated excesses and his prodigious failure to meet his responsibilities as for his extraordinary successes when he did meet them.

He and his second wife had ten children, all ten of them much interested in dramatic play-acting. Four of the children died during childhood. Junius became an uncompromisingly strict vegetarian and forbade any of his family to eat any meat. He relentlessly urged the strenuous life on his family.

Eventually Junius' father Richard gave up being a lawyer in England and also emigrated to America, coming to live on the farm that Junius had bought but had himself not succeeded in working at nor being respon-
sible for.

Junius himself spent a very great deal of his time away from home, much of it travelling—in the name of his occupation—in other countries. He became very prosperous, because of his ability to fill theatres and consequently his employers' willingness, up to a point, to put up with increasingly erratic behavior, which included suicide attempts, and bizarre incidents of many varieties, e.g., once attempting to hire the services of a clergyman to perform a complete church funeral for a dead horse. The clergyman, who did not learn until quite far into the arrangements between himself and Junius that the dear departed was not a human being, declined. Junius had not intended this request in the way the clergyman believed—as an offensive practical joke, but had felt profoundly the death of this mare and had been sincere in his request for a religious funeral such as human beings are accorded. At one point in his life, Junius, although still a "success" by the world's standards, as an actor, applied for a job as a lighthouse keeper.

Although not often home, when he was home, he played, in an exuberant, roughhousing way, with his children; that is, with all of his children except the one who had, by the age of thirteen, been assigned the role of his father's protector while "on the road"—which was almost all the time.

Edwin, the oldest son, did not, for this reason, get to live at home, although he pined for home, but was made to accompany his father while his father performed. Without a caretaker and fulltime guardian, his father, increasingly, would fail to appear at the theatre but would instead lose all track of time and place in complete inebriation. The
parents had decided to give Edwin the full time job, while yet a child, of serving as his father's guardian, overseer, and all-around caretaker. It was the boy's job to insure that his father not stay out all night, not be too drunk to remember to appear at performances, and to find his father and make him come home when he wandered away and got into trouble.

Although Edward manifested extraordinary concern in his role as his father's caretaker, the boy Edwin never got to go to school, although education was held in high esteem by Junius and the family, and all of the other children were educated. Edward was very resentful, and saddened by this lack of education because Edwin believed himself a person who should live in the company of the learned and important. His time was devoted primarily to anxious searches for his father in saloons and, in their various hotel quarters, attempting to keep his father from going out at night (for when he did, it was often not possible to find him for one, two or three days or more). Junius himself had received a good education and was a natural linguist. Edwin was considered brilliant and had bent extremes of effort in trying to educate himself while travelling with his father, becoming noted for carrying heavy tomes to read while his father was carrying out his performances on stage.

In time, Edwin too became an actor, and equalled, if not surpassed, his father as a charismatic tragedian capable of evoking extremes of emotion from the audience. Edwin became internationally known as the Crowned King of Tragedy.

As an adult Edwin became notable for "self-possession" which was
described regularly as "verging on polite hauteur." He was often invited to social functions where he found himself in the company of scholars, or educated persons. In later life he wrote to his daughter that he was always to find his "idiocy and vanity too weak to support him against a full-charged scholar". "I get scared at trifles and "I cannot get over my schoolboy awkwardness, in meeting professors." By others he was seen as highly reserved: by himself, as shy and awkward. Edwin was not at all assertive.

The daughter named Asia was spoken of as passionate and sensitive a girl who shut herself in her room to weep and write poetry. She spent whole days glowering with resentment over imagined slights. Another daughter was noted for her "long sulks". The other son, John was recorded by very many as "a born charmer."

As he grew into adolescence, John was often seen storming through the woods on a horse, "screaming his throat dry at invisible enemies and whirling a saber over his head." A daughter, Rosalie, Richard's oldest, was noted as painfully shy, a girl who stayed home and helped her mother with the chores: she was thought "somewhat odd" and never left home. Another son, Junius Jr., married an actress considerably older than himself. He later deserted his wife and children, moving on to a relationship with another woman and having children by her.

John, the son regarded as a charmer of great charisma and considerable acting talent, was also profoundly attracted to the business of being an actor, and never considered any other career: despite his classical education he became an actor. Of the two sons whose lives are most known of, both were to become eminently distinguished, one--Edwin--
as an extraordinarily famous actor of international reputation, who did in fact fulfill his ambition to live among the great and important and, additionally, as a man never able to control his drinking or his eruptions into rage; the other—John—for the murder of a world-renowned public figure, an act John regarded as a true heroic act of idealism. John was profoundly puzzled to find himself despised for this murder, rather than applauded.

The son who spent the largest part of his youth absent from his mother, with no settled homelife, and required to look after and protect his father, became an electrically charismatic actor, a rageful, eccentric, wrathful, and brilliant actor—eminently well-loved by many of his fellows: it was said of Edwin that "he is Hamlet", not only because the role of Hamlet was the one he played with such fervid passion but because the audience experienced his performance of the role as if indeed they were watching not a drunken actor but as if there on the stage was a living Hamlet. All unanimously believed that the reason Edwin Booth seemed "actually to be Hamlet" on the stage was a function of his giftedness—his exquisite talent as an actor: it was "because of his incredible acting ability, skill and talent that he could make people believe that they were watching the actual life of Hamlet being not "played", but "lived", on the stage in front of them. John, who was an actor as well, said the same of Edwin when John's Hamlet performance was acclaimed: "My brother is Hamlet", said John.

Edwin was able to survive beyond middle age, to marry and to have a child, who herself was able to marry and have a child. John,
who was enabled to remain at home in a consistent homelife with a mother in regular attendance, and a father who alternated his long absences with brief and irregular periods of returning home to romp and play exuberantly with his children, was extremely popular with the opposite sex but seemed to have no interest in marrying and having children. His life ended prematurely for what he perceived as an act of high virtue and right: his final public performance where his gun ended the life of Abraham Lincoln. The sister Asia died at 52 of heart disease: she too had been able to marry, had had one child, who as a very young man had been "mysteriously lost at sea".

A theatre was named after the amazing Edwin: people often spoke of the great torrential turbulence of temper and the high tragedy which dogged his footsteps all the days of his life as no doubt related to the terrible burden it was to him that it was his brother who had plunged the country into despair by shooting Abraham Lincoln. To me, John Wilkes Booth had always been just a name: "the assassin's name", the man in the box who shot Lincoln. It had never occurred to me to think of a John Wilkes Booth as a fellow human being, once engaged in the same kinds of "ordinary-business-of-living-life" as other human beings. It had never occurred to me to think of John Wilkes Booth as a little tot growing up, playing with his brothers and sisters. Nor to think of them. Nor of John Wilkes Booth's
When a passing newspaper mention about John Wilkes Booth's brother came to my attention recently, I decided to try to briefly look up a very brief bit about their transgenerational matrix and attempt to use that as a brief, over-simplified, example, of how I see some of this structuralist activity that had become visible across this research.

For the several hundred persons I had used as subjects in the research each data set is voluminous: the structuralist research activity, for even one matrix, requires volumes of material. Even the extracted data adds up to an exceptionally large accumulation. Unlike non-structuralist research activity, here the data and the research activity and the findings, inferences, etc. all exist only in the form of great complexes of interrelatedness in the form of elements, element clusters and sets of element clusters. Hence, one would need to ask a reader to read through an extraordinary amount of extract material even to look at one matrix.

At first this had seemed to preclude possibility of including any examples for the recondite-sounding abstractions that emerged from the research. It occurred to me to attempt to use some briefer accounts from other sources rather than the subjects' great masses of data extracts to provide such examples. This very much oversimplified account represents one such effort: it necessarily excludes any sense of complexity or comprehensiveness involved in the research activity, but is intended as a kind of line drawing of a few parts, so that a reader can get an idea of how things seem to go in this work.
Discussion

Because longitudinal transgenerational study of lives requires that one back up a good way into past history in order to be able to trace a number of generations "forward" along the sand-of-time-line, in order to look for impact of early experience on lifespans, and on subsequent generations, much of this research centered on lives studied in a biographic context.

One great advantage in using published biographic sources for data is that in each familial instance on professional biographer has earlier devoted some number of years to intensive biographic research into as many facets of the life of that person as possible. Often biographers include a remarkably complete history for lives which preceded the life under study, and in so doing provide a researcher with a great many clues about where to look for other data. The biographic researcher's reference notes additionally include wellsprings of suggestions of other sources and resources it was possible to pursue.

As remarked on earlier, biographic--and historic--research was both unusually fruitful from a research standpoint, and unusually time consuming from a research standpoint. The unusual time consumption resulted from the extraordinary amount of written material it is necessary to read through, and extract pertinent data from, in order to garner sufficient data for one entire lifespan, and from the multiples of that great amount for each added life in that transgenerational familial matrix.

What was necessary in studying transgenerationally overlapping lives was regularly alternating between exploring the long range view of the
familial matrix—as if looking at a family's history along the sands-of-time-line through a telescope, and the close-up view of the family members in one generation interacting with one another, as marriage partners, parents and children, etc.

Much of what is presented in this account are examples of the close up view of persons interacting with another: the great amount of life data retrieved from historical biographic data sources defies presentation in a circumscribed account. In searching for a way it might nevertheless be possible to provide some concrete suggestion of at least some idea of what some of the parts of that aspect of the research was able to include, I decided to attempt to make a brief foray into the lives of a family not studied in the research, and to make only the briefest kind of line-drawing sketch of some of the phenomena of their overlapping lives which might make it possible to provide a measure of suggestion about the notion of phenomenal elements that came to emerge—those things I have mentioned elsewhere as the alphabet-like facets it was eventually possible to discover in among the squiggly lines making up the great mass of life data in studying biographically recorded lives and autobiographically recorded.

I chose this particular example for several reasons. One was simply that a recent newspaper article about the Booth Theatre—and Edwin Booth—had called him to mind, while at the time reminding me that this Booth was the brother to the Booth who shot Lincoln. That called to mind the notion of unfolding life pathways, and the fact that we are long accustomed to thinking in terms of the unfolding life pathway for one or more others. Certainly this seems a question that a researcher
must ponder when exploring, and conceptualizing, impact of early experience, if early experience is to be characterized by the responsiveness, the presence, the attitudes, etc. of the parents, and the child's environmental milieu.

I decided not to explore the lives for this brief example, in the ways I had been doing across the research, but simply to take a very brief look at these two lives, and attempt to discover what, if anything one could discern in the early experience of two children of the same parents, as one leading to the hangman's noose and one leading to having a Broadway theatre erected with one's name on it.

I made some few pages of notes from this non-intensive, non-extensive exploration. Although this is not the way I proceeded with the research subjects the result seemed a good illustration of some interesting points. Some of these are interesting from the standpoint of longitudinal transgenerational impact, because one can, even in this very brief and oversimplified vignette, see visible indication that things are not going well for the young boy who was one day to be the grandfather of these two latter day brothers.

Knowing only a very few, but very dramatic, incidents of the unfolding pathway of that Richard, now a grown man, we come to know of his life pathway, which included his being parent to Junius. From there it is possible to trace some of the—significant life phenomena for these two person who were Junius' sons even in a quite brief sketch, once extensive prior research has brought forth an awareness of elements.

Because their life culminations came out so dramatically differently, and because each in his way seemed to present a concise snapshot
illustrative of some of the phenomena I was able to identify as elements--and because this vignette seemed capable of providing a manageable framework with some specificity of "real life" to it--this seemed a way in which to provide a small measure of concreteness for some of the abstractions discussed elsewhere in the account.

As with many of the examples in the account, the exaggerated extremes of life phenomena in this example are of a quite different order entirely from the more "mundane", and "ordinary" life phenomena, and lives, and outcomes representative of this research. This same vignette also presented an opportunity to provide a concrete illustration of two important Kohutian concepts: as would follow, these examples are also extreme exaggerations of Kohut's concepts--which also derive from more ordinary lives and manifestations.

A way to proceed would seem to be to begin by skimming quickly through the vignette simply noting each time we come to one, those phenomena which I have come to be able to recognize as elements of interrelatedness. (It is not possible in a circumscribed account to provide examples of clusters of elements, nor transgenerational sets of sets, but all of these elements would come to be elements within those two larger aggregates.) As reminder, I am using the term element to represent phenomena which showed themselves to be phenomena of interrelatedness within a cluster which showed itself to be a cluster in comparing unrelated lives across two or more overlapping generations. When element clusters matched for each of two overlapping generations across unrelated pairs of generationally overlapping lives, the phenomena within those element clusters are knowable as elements.
Needing to leave home, to go far away, to another country, is an element. Wishing to make contact with a famous reformer is an element. Having an "ardent desire to serve in the Glorious Cause of Freedom" is an element. Having a father who would rush after you all the way to Paris when you were 20 years old, and bring you back home, is an element.

Coming back home after having once ardently answered to the battle cry of freedom and settling down to be a quiet plier of one's profession or trade is an element.

Being profoundly drawn to the "thought of" another person one has never met, in an idealizing way, is an element. [In fact, here it is clearly a considerable exaggeration of the far more customary content of this particular element. For example, George Bernard Shaw idealized Henrik Ibsen, and gave some public lectures about the Quintessence of Ibsenism, and published them in a slim book, when he was a young man. This is more like the kind of thing I much more often saw in this regard. In fact Richard Booth was unique in his remarkably unusual manner, to my knowledge, of requiring guests to bow to Washington's portrait, but not at all unique in his attention to the portrait.

One of Broadway's most successful and eminent directors, a man named Jose Quintëro, who is in fact regarded as the O'Neill director, and has devoted his career to the directing of the plays of Eugene O'Neill has, in addition to vast quantities of O'Neilliana in his home, and O'Neill's ring on his hand, a very large portrait of Eugene O'Neill which hangs in his living room, and to which he readily admits, he speaks. This is an element.]

Drinking overmuch is an element.
At this point in the narrative across which I have been signalling elements, we come to the point of Richard's marriage, their having three children, and then, at the birth of the third child, this young mother dies. What would be important—indeed essential—to take note of here if one were including these data in a structural analysis is that elements (here, the assumption required is that one has already had opportunity for the work identifying these as elements) have arisen in the earlier history of Richard before his marriage to the "Elizabeth who died when the children were very young".

Although there is a great deal more to this than it is possible for me to report here (which is important at other levels and levels of discourse) it is essential that note be taken of the fact that one would be incorrect in taking the "death of the mother at any early age" in this instance as the "discrete event". In this instance it is not "discrete event" in the sense that we have been thinking heretofore of the term with regard to structures, because there would be found in the history of Richard, and for all we can know, of Elizabeth, a prior discrete event. Of Richard we know this is so, by the elements, and clusters of elements which preceded the entrance of Elizabeth on the scene.

It is now necessary to recognize that this particular phenomenon—when death of a parent at an early age follows after the prior appearance of clear evidence of structure, that one has come upon a permutation. Although in fact it is my best judgment that it is not possible, given the early stage of this research, and the extraordinary amount of sorting that would be required to make a clear statement, the data thus far have given appearance of clear and definite and seemingly unmistak-
able hypotheses suggesting that when discrete events of this type double (or triple, or quadruple, as I have found attimes occurring in the trans-generational matrix) a permutation of structure arises which appears to be exponentially more potent in its disruptive capacity than a single discrete event, in terms of impact at the inter-generational level, and the "subsequent generations level".

I may be in error about this. Not because I have not seen it, but because I believe, from all that I have come to be able to learn about structures thus far (which I believe is probably relatively very little, but there is no way of knowing that in degree), that a researcher has no way of knowing what the true boundaries of the system are, nor the totality of the wholeness. Thus, my own best judgment is that it would be inappropriate to attempt to make any hypotheses whatever regarding the doubling of a discrete event known to appear in the antecedent transgenerational familial matrix as an antecedent to structure.

One should restrict oneself, so I feel convinced, simply to making note of the fact that a second discrete event has once again interrupted the natural order. It well may be that it would be beyond our power to ascertain the distinctively specific features of significance of the doubling of a discrete event in this way; in other words, in identifying the appearance of an event which holds potential for interrupting a natural order which in fact appears already to have been interrupted. The "exaggeration", or "increased power", or "potency" however, appears clearly to hold in terms of "later impact" at all levels of experience. Nevertheless, there are variants clearly visible. Noteworthy is the fact that it is not necessary to assume that exaggeration, increased
potency of impact, etc. applies only in "negative" directions, for it seems also to hold for increased potency in what we tend to regard, or view, and in fact believe with great conviction are "positive" phenomena.

What all this means however, as I have learned from the data and careful analyses of them, is that what follows after the appearance of a second discrete event, or a doubling factor, should never be taken as even remotely representative of the "kinds" of elements" nor element clusters one would find following after the appearance of only one chance discrete event but with "kinds" translatable into "degree", although the fact that the "difference" is really one of degree rather than kind was only learnable through the sortings of vast abundances of life phenomena at the level of the individual's own experience. Hence, if I were to say degree here, rather than "kind," I would mislead the reader, but only because of our assumptions rather than the underlying actuality inherent to the phenomena.

Indeed, as I finally was able to realize, there is really no way to ascertain whether any discrete event one is able to ascertain is not in fact perhaps a duplicative one. There do, however, appear to be vivid clues, as this example demonstrates.

It was my not understanding either of these things— that is, not realizing their potential for considerable significance in their own right—that made the data very perplexing for a long time: it was very difficult to grasp what might be accounting for the very great differences in power, degree and distortion—quotient for some trans-generational familial matrix "outcome" generations following after what appeared to be the arising of a discrete; and some others. (Especially
when, for a long time I erroneously assumed "kinds" rather than degree.)

In some the impact was definitely at a level which called forth an unease for subsequent generational offspring, as one could determine from the data, but not disordered in a powerful way.

As will be seen in this vignette, there is some other factor to which must be attributed not the patternedness per se, but the added power for distortion; the greater imbalance at the level of self experience, which pervades these lives forward from this discrete event of the death of Elizabeth is not representative of the degree of disorganization I have traced across very many lives in this same appearing matrix variant.

The detection of elements in the antecedent experience of Richard, and apparently of John are visible. Although we cannot be sure what meaning to impute to John's appearing to "be" asynchronous for parenting function (in his rushing out to "capture" his 20 year old son to return him to his parental home because the father did not like what the son was doing) we must here simply hold on to the fact that the father has in fact demonstrated one overt manifestation of what might have been representing an element, but we are not yet justified in calling it that without knowing more of the circumstances, although later we will come to be able to give credence to this hypothesis from its cluster elements: the set of sets which we will come to learn that it is in fact an element.

Some elements are so clearly identifiable that one can know them from reports at that lens-magnitude level, from afar, as it were. Returning one's son home per se is not "an element", in the absence of
more qualifying information. For example, it is possible, in such an instance, to imagine some possible reasons where the father would in fact have been being either grossly asynchronous to the child's needs at the time or appropriately attentive to the son's needs at that time: it could even be, for a far fetched example (although not far fetched from the standpoint that I have encountered such occurrences in the course of the data collection) that Richard might have become fearful and written his father asking him to come and get him. To outside observers, this could well "objectively" appear as if Richard's father were "capturing" him, when he might in fact have been rescuing him, for all that we can know. I am here trying to show an example of the kinds of thought processes one must bring to bear, and the distinctions one must make in making assumptions about elements, element clusters, etc.

I might add that had Richard requested his father's rescue say because he felt in profound need of rescuing, say because he became fearful when he found himself far from home, this would incontrovertibly represent an element, for Richard. Here, of course, we are simply not justified in counting that at all, and so simply mentally hold on to that awareness, in the event that any later information might come to light which would shed any qualifying light on that incident which might enable one to know the significance of that incident.

The matter of Junius Brutus's having fathered a child at 13 and a child at 17 has high element-probability, as far as I have yet been able to determine. For females, this was very definitely always an element, when the pregnancy was not pregnancy per se (which is not, ever
an element) but only when the pregnancy, for an adolescent, is permitted to come to term, i.e., the "becoming a mother," in adolescence, is always as far as I can judge, an element. The data suggests this is true for very young males as well, but it is, for an array of reasons, more difficult to know this for sure, than it has been possible to come to know it with regard to adolescent females.

The incidence of having been known to have fathered a child at a very young age has only arisen in the course of the data perhaps eight times at most; I think less than that. However, in at least some of those situations in which it did arise, it did clearly seem an element, but it is not possible to be certain.

The fact of this occurrence's having arisen twice in the life of a person so young would make it seem more likely to represent an element, but we do not know, and hence do not count it as an element encountered but simply a mentally held onto thread, which in and of itself represents, at a considerably far along stage, the primary method of structuralist research, as far as I can lift out after the fact what cognitive and intellectual operations were proceeding in that sort of specificity over all: the detection of a possible element, the taking time to think carefully through whether it is possible for any (even unlikely) alternative "meaning" to adhere to something; if so, not counting it in this instance, yet most importantly holding onto it as a thread, which may a) find a place provided for its being woven into (some many years later, say) in this life, or a subsequent one, in this matrix, or—even if "nothing comes of it in this matrix", holding mentally onto the thread, along with a very large assortment of other
"threads discrete" (so as to not be blinded by context in another context) and "threads-in-context" (so as to be, hopefully, alerted to context per se) even if the element thread does not at first make its presence readily visible. This was a very useful thing. Once I learned to apply that, I began making a sort of "insistent" search for more data pertinent to that particular context of that person's life, which taught me to create resource-sources I would a) never have thought to turn to and b) not known how to use. Extraordinary "missing link" possibilities arose; the links were missing only because the data had happened not to include them (say, because of a prior generation being discussed succinctly), when looked for (or, in effect, "asked about specifically") by sources who or which might "know" or be able to yield up additional data, near-invariably the link being sought was there. Only the thread's being additionally regarded as "thread in context" permitted this visibility-outcome.

Feeling bored by one's profession and walking away from it is an element if it occurs with any repetition: in itself, once or twice, it would not seem to hold that capacity. Having a great affinity for very many of the arts is an element. "Trying first one, then another, then another and never staying for long with any one" can be, but one needs in such a case to have access to the first hand data of the person's own experience to be sure of this. (In most of my own data, I did have access to such data of the personal experience in these regards and then it was clear. In all instances in which this particular configuration arose in extensive data, it was an element.

Being drawn to attach oneself to a group of actors, and being drawn
to what is here termed a gypsy way of life has thus far in the research always been an element.

Staying with acting as a lifetime profession is an element.

Living a "wandering" life after marriage and after the birth of a child is an element— in the life of both the parent and the child, as separate elements, which must be recorded separately in order for patterning to become visible in underlying structural ways; in addition, forcing oneself to note them down, in writing, separately, helps train one's perceptions away from damnabley powerful blinders. The reason performing the necessary operation involved in so simple a phenomena as just writing these down separately is important in this way was that it forces inherent duality and transformational nature of the structure to become available to one's awareness, perception, and conceptualizing operations (apparently as accommodative schemata). But additionally, and clearly as important, it permits what is otherwise inherently not "workable"— (which I was stuck at for a long time by not grasping), the attempt to compare "discrete" generational clusters in one matrix with discrete generational clusters in another so as to ever be able to locate their respective alignment places in the sands-of-time-line. Without doing that, one still has good possibility of correct alignment, but only in some cases and not in others, which misleads one again off the track: only if one has either by chance, or by aligning by one's own efforts begun to compare two unrelated trans-generational matrices in equivalency of location on the sands-of-time-line can the patternedness of a transformational system show up. (I of course had no understanding of this because I had no idea even what a
transformational system was, let alone that what I was working with, or looking at, was anything related to transformations or "a transformational system". I did finally figure out the sands-of-time-line alignment principle by going about all this in an absurdly time-wasting way because of not understanding that and hence needing to learn it through the only available means, which was just making scores of false starts, and trials which began well, but ended in blind alleys of a maze, requiring backing all the way and starting in again, only to again "take the wrong conceptual turn" and get stuck but not be able to figure out why, or what to do about it.

Whenever one arrives in the domain where there is a child born to a person or persons (that is when one is thinking from a standpoint of structuralism) it is essential thence forward to consider each phenomenon, element, etc. in terms of duality principle, i.e., from the dual standpoints of its being an element in the generational frame of the parent, and of the child, separately. In other words, in this instance, (at one level of discourse: many levels apply dualistically here) living a wandering existence is an element in the life of Richard and may be thought of as an impact of his early experience—even though we do not know what his early experience is, but simply because it is one of the elements which has become possible to identify as such, from great redundancy of prior appearance of this as an element.

In the life of Richard, it was a thing he selected. In the life of the baby, the element in fact becomes instead an element in the child's parental nurturant milieu—no settled home seems to be the common denominator underlying all such subsumable phenomena. For
Richard, it is a self-experience element. For the baby, a feature of a very different nature.

One child dying in infancy is, at least, in some cases, an element. We are not justified in calling anything an element in a given life or matrix when we cannot be certain. Often later data will make it possible to be certain.

Yielding to an "urge" to leave one's wife and child, for whatever cause, is an element. Failing to show up for a performance or other obligation or commitment because of inebriation is an element.

A violent temper is an element. Always. Regardless of all other circumstances. This is one of the most redundantly appearing of all elements, as such. It is a clear indication of structure; although not at all an indication of a particular matrix pattern: it is an element of many element-cluster-patterns, ranging from "mild impact" to extreme impact, hence providing an excellent example of how elements may serve as road markers but may never be taken as discrete in one sense, even though must be taken as "discrete" elements in another sense because it is one. I will return to this.

So too is a singular lack of patience, arrogance, touchiness, and stormy temperament: all are, unvaryingly, elements, but of an array of matrix patterns.

Travelling across an ocean to work is an element. Travelling across an ocean to work when one has a wife and baby is an element. Abandoning one's wife and child is an element.

Becoming an extraordinarily acclaimed actor is an element. Being described as having a magnetic personality is an element. Being capable
of evoking extremes of emotion from an audience is an element—always.

Failing to show up when scheduled to do so with considerable frequency is an element.

Having children interested in dramatic play acting is an element. For both the parents and the children (although all of these are also "for both" at a different level of discourse).

Having four children die in childhood is an element. This is in contrast with "having one infant die in infancy", which was earlier noted as not possible to determine. This is not the case when a number of one's children die in infancy or childhood.

Being an uncomprisingly strict, or rigid, restrictor of choices pertaining to one's food intake is an element. Forbidding the members of one's family to engage in any activity (including food choice) purely based on one's own personal subjective preference or choice is an element. (For both the parent and the child/children.) Relentlessly urging the strenuous life on one's children is an element, unvaryingly, among these data.

Buying a farm, or a business, and "then not tending to it" is an element; having one's parent come from far off and take over the responsibility for some enterprise which one took on of his own volition and then did not accept or manage responsibility for, is an element. Junius's father's emigrating, and becoming an expatriate is an element located in the generation of Junius's father (and in the generation of Junius).

Spending a great deal of time away from one's home when one is married and has children is an element. Spending a great deal of time
travelling in the name of one's occupation is an element (when one has children this is always an element in the lives of the children).

[Although in a dualistic transformational system there is also the rule, so I learned from the data, that there is "no such concept possible of an element's being "located" in a particular generation, since all that these elements "are" are elements of interrelatedness, which includes interrelatedness across generations.]

Suicide attempts are an element. Feeling profoundly, and/or engaging in any extreme activities associated with, the death of an animal is an element.

Applying for a job as a lightkeeper is an element. (One might be surprised to find that such an event had arisen a sufficient number of times in the data so as to be able to show element status, but so in fact it did.) In addition, applying for a job as a lighthouse keeper is also an element under the rubric: "felt drawn toward withdrawing to a job or location away from human contact", and should be noted as both, that is, separately, for future conceptual availability.

Playing in "exuberant, roughhousing way" with one's children as a characteristic is an element. Assigning a child the role of a parent's caretaker, whether overtly or covertly is an element. Any time when, such as this, it has been very difficult to detect whether those two are one and the same element, with the one possibility simply a more powerful element than the other, I myself noted both, and this distinction had later conceptual usefulness. Even though both may be subsumed under one rubric, both apply.

Needing another to serve as one's protector, regulator, and accom-
panier on travels is an element. So too is pining for home, for a child. Being very resentful as a child, as in the case of Edwin, is an element ("as if" in the generation level of Edwin).

Being a linguist is an element. Here, for Junius, having a parent who is a linguist is an element. This represents a surprising finding of the research, which took me one and a half years of encountering, redundantly, before I could remove my own prior-assumption blinders forcing me to believe that I could, of some phenomena, know they could not hold element status, and hence did not have them enter my awareness even though I could later clearly recall the great number of times I had encountered a fleeting reference to one of its variant labels in our speech, e.g., has great facility for learning foreign languages: "is fluent in French, Italian, German and Latin", "speaks (or knows) five (or seven), (or fourteen) languages, etc. It took me another half year of effort before I was able to comprehend how this did make perfect sense as an element from the standpoint "impact of early experience" at the transgenerational level. This, again, despite the fact that all one needed to know to come to terms with this understanding was right there in among the data, in the words, thoughts, etc. of the persons themselves; my perceptual blinders precluded awareness of the "explanation" even more robustly than of the ability to suspend my disbelief that the phenomenon itself could warrant any attention whatever.

Being an actor, and being capable of evoking extremes of emotion are elements in the generation of Edwin and John, his brother, as they earlier appeared as such for Junius.

Being notable for self possession is an element. Being self
possessed well may not be an element, I am not sure; because I am not certain what these person "meant" by self possession. Being notable, i.e., regarded by others for self possession is an element, as is "verging on polite hauteur": all are just ways of saying haughty, hauteur and such like. The verging on and the polite are meaningless ascriptions having to do only with the subjective word-choice of the beholder; beholding hauteur, however, has apparently near universal recognizability and will tremendously often be redundantly labelled as such by all persons speaking English, regardless of century, etc. (not necessarily using that specific word: the word choice is a function of education etc.). But with many other phenomena, the actual notion of what they are seeing that other person do or be has extraordinary variety that hauteur does not have. What makes this one of the many such compelling examples of a finding of this research is that hauteur was never, ever, even remotely close to what the person himself was feeling, thinking, or involved in whatsoever, that was being perceived—entirely erroneously—(and with near one hundred percent redundancy) as this hauteur, etc. The person's own experience was what one might term, for succinctness sake here, rather than go into a long discussion of the phenomena itself since that would be a considerable digression, the "polar opposite", in other words, the person was always being tremendously badly misjudged by all others. There were, always, consequences of this phenomenon, when it was an element in a person's life; consequences associated both with the person's own self experience, and with the phenomena which accrued as a function of this misperception, on the part of observers.

Feeling one's vanity too weak to support oneself in the company
of other adults is an element. The words people do, unvaryingly, use to mean a given self experience, e.g. feeling ones vanity too weak etc. translates out to, variously, one's "pride", one's feeling of "self worth", one's feeling of "self esteem", one's experience of oneself when compared by oneself to others when there is no need or reason to do so, except one's own "weakness" of self experience, in this example.

Getting scared at trifles is an element with readily recognizable variant word choices, but has also many ways of being described which do not sound anything at all like this business of getting scared at trifles, which is what the person himself will first speak of it as, until later, when he will be able to say more explicitly what this phenomenon to which he is imagining the term scared is appropriate, at which point it then becomes possible to know that scared is not quite the right word. But for purposes of this particular presentation, that distinction is not necessary to go into. Not being able to get over one's schoolboy awkwardness is an element: the same "translation principle" as above applies here; I had learned this from hundreds of "listenings" to what those people themselves called their experience when they were explicitly describing what they were feeling when they subsumed these self experiences under such a rubric.

The same redundancy principles make it eventually possible to now recognize in this phrase its element status.

Being seen as highly reserved is an element. Always. Being spoken of as passionate, as sensitive, and shutting oneself in one's room to weep is an element. Spending whole days glowering with resentment over imagined slights, along with "long sulks" are elements. Being noted
for being a "born charmer" is an element.

"Storming" or some other unusually high-energy verb regarding one's locomotion is a decided element. So too is an unusually low-energy verb (adverb, etc.). For both of these this is so either when these are spoken of as pervasive states, or specifically sporadic, or alternating states. They are not elements for a specific instance when some circumstance itself calls for, or calls forth, either (in the self-evident situations that abound).

When this, as a "general" feature is what, of all possible things, others come up as recollections, memories, observations, I have learned these are elements of a remarkably high accuracy, for they do not then reflect any particular other influencing factor such as a person himself might mean of a given week, say. I learned that this is especially true the farther back in history one is garnering data for: if all there is of recollections of someone from 150 years earlier are three adjectives, say (e.g., in the handed down description of a great grandmother) it is a very safe bet that those are elements (that is, if holding up element potential) rather than responses to a circumstance which was in itself influencing that sort of "behavior", "attitude", etc.

By the same token "shutting oneself in one's room", and "spending whole days glowering with resentment over imagined slights" have so very many times been explicitly and graphically described from the "experience-context" perspective, by the people, in their own words, in terms of precisely what and how they are themselves feeling "self experience" from their perspective, that it is possible to later "recognize" these objective statements describing the non-experiential aspect as "stand-
ing for" quite specific phenomena, phenomena which are elements.

These have been, as have many other elements, even more graphically and explicitly described for me in terms of their "meaning" for the person himself, and herself, by clients in intensive psychotherapy, always in this element instance with near one hundred percent redundancy, internal consistency and "part of a large picture of self experience". Then, my clinical experience provided corroborative possibility with the self reports in diaries, letters, and reports of others in their environment, so that it is later possible to appear to be making inferences which are not in themselves in the category of what we more customarily are implying by that term, inferences that have much empiricism undergirding them rather than such conviction a priori.

Carrying on shouting communication with non-present others, whether or not they are necessarily "identifiable" as "enemies" is an element—one equally redundantly corroborated by the explicit self experience descriptions and self reports of others for whom it has been possible to have other than this kind of remark by others.

Painfully shy is an element, always, as is being described as a person who "stays home", regardless of whether that is "to help mother with the chores" or some other qualifier (such as, in the case of an older person herself the mother rather than daughter, e.g. "devoted all of her time and attention to staying home caring for the children", or the home, or whatever). As can be noted in this brief, and thus foreshortened vignette, it had become possible in among voluminous biographic data simply to come to learn that eventually, or long-after retrospectively, the much later notation "never left home" would arise,
time and again, in the history of someone who many hundreds of pages earlier, or years earlier, had been noted as a person who stays home, etc.

It might be worth noting here, however, that this is not to be taken to mean that persons who eventually come to appear as persons who "never leave the house" have always been so characterized. In fact, the polar opposite was far more often true: that person who eventually became persons who "never left the house", or "reclusive", or "agoraphobic" had most often earlier gone very readily and relatively easily far from home.

Being profoundly attracted to the business of being an actor is, here again, in the data exploration we are following along with, an element. Here it is showing up for a mention for a second sibling; such comments had much earlier been among the general kinds of factors which eventually came to be recognizable as road markers of their having potential as elements because of the possibility of their having been in some way an impact of early experience.

Being profoundly attracted to the idea of acting as a profession appeared in the life histories of so many scores of persons, including those for whom it was but the most fleeting of comments from their pre-career choice years, or their pre-marriage and adulthood years, that it eventually demanded consideration as an element, even though at first it had not seemed so, when reading the histories of persons who have no association in anyone's mind with the acting profession and were only fleetingly mentioned e.g. as one of the things they "liked to do" in their spare time, or had once thought they would like to do, etc.
In any case, it did eventually turn out that attraction to the acting profession is in fact an element, with being profoundly attracted to this profession a "different", while yet the same, element by virtue of its being an element of a higher power, or intensity, and/or appearing as an element in clusters of elements in which other elements are what can readily be seen to represent "higher intensity", or higher power elements. It is in this light that one begins to notice, at the intergenerational level of analysis such phenomena as a parent having been also attracted to, or drawn to, a particular phenomenal element.

Once it is possible to know that being seriously attracted to the profession of acting is an element, and that elements by their own inherent nature, i.e., their "existence" as elements of interrelatedness at the level of underlying transgenerational familial matrix structure, are dualistic, it is then possible to recognize that whatever early experience this is, in this generation, an "impact of", was also, in some degree, form or manner, also "present" in the early experience of the earlier generation as well. That in itself seemed an exceptionally important concept to have learned as the research progressed; it provided opportunity for eventually being able to achieve syntheses between wholly perplexing gaps, although still each of them was, for me, an inordinately hard struggle. It seemed the data would yield many links, but only in return each time, for struggles.

Here one may note, for example, that in the earlier generation, Junius Brutus considered many another profession or vocation, none of them "feeling right" until he eventually "happened upon acting--when a group of strolling players came to town--and he left town with them,
after having "tried" the profession of law for which he had been trained, tried the vocation or profession of painting, sculpture, and writing.

The one that had power to "take", of many alternatives, helps make visible the fact that "becoming an actor", say, is not after all necessarily what it had seemed in the biographies of many other "actors", for whom it had seemed ineluctable, as if the only available alternative, either by virtue of having had no education or training, or because, as in the case of Mickey Rooney, for a random example, one's parents had been actors, one had been "raised in series of actor's dressing rooms, etc." and hence "was the only thing one knew".

In the next generation, one finds John--despite his classical education--not trying on any other professions whatever, but instead remarked upon in quite different terms from Junius Brutus--as "never having considered any other profession". While it was for a long time tempting to think of this in the terms biographers, and all around them, referred to it--as "following in his father's footsteps", it eventually became possible to see that this might also be said to represent having been "drawn to", or finding a sense of "goodness of fit", in the same kind of activity which had felt right, or eventually "taken", in the case of one of the members of the parental generation, and, by virtue of the qualifier in the second generation, of never having considered any other profession, of a higher intensity phenomenon in the second generation.

It is, at the same time, important to be aware of the distinction between this and the infinitely more common phenomenon of "following in one's forefather's footsteps across generations", which the data
suggests happened far more often in cases where there was no evidence of element or structure.

Extraordinarily redundant examples included findings like "for over two hundred years there had been a family tradition of "ship building", or "being captain of a fishing boat", or "of tilling the soil", or "watchmaking", as just a few of the data's examples which come readily to mind.

In these cases this phenomenon never signalled the presence of elements or structure that I could detect any evidence of--but instead came to seem representative of the easeful flow of the natural order, in which a father was available for providing a role model, or the profession was in fact the most reasonable alternative, etc., etc.

In these cases, it turned out that these choices, diametrically opposite to those professional choices which came to appear as elements, were indicators of what we might call a kind of "contentment" with the way things are, by which I do not at all mean unmindful of any of life's or society's struggles, hardships, pains, etc. Not that meaning of contentment, but rather as a contrast to discontent, or malcontent; of experiencing no need to alter things on the basis of one's own self experience.

Paradoxical as it perhaps can only sound, it was, the data yielded abundant evidence to suggest--remaining within such an unchanging "tradition", profession, lifestyle, etc. (as e.g. these above examples) which constitute randomness of choice, rather than the opposite, the purpose-deliberate appearance of making a choice on one's own, which turned out to signal the strong possibility of that randomness of choice no longer
being a possibility for a person at some generational level, randomness now needing to be, as it were, traded for a choice directed by a need to search for something: some profession, location, mode of living, etc. which felt "right".

What was a long time coming through to me was that this translated out to things not "feeling right" for that person—to that person's no longer being able to take for granted the matter of how he personally "felt" about his own "being in the world-ness", precisely because it had now entered his awareness—become something of which he was "conscious". (Here the 'paths one's family had trod" doesn't necessarily mean literally doing just what one's father did, but rather a kind of maintaining the status quo rather than a great search for a way to reshuffle things. The array of "reasons" people "gave" for these great shifts (of place, life styles, etc.) were remarkable in their variety. The variety was in vivid contrast to the extraordinary patternedness it was later to come to be possible to discern underlying the lives of those who had made a "free choice", a patterning I was not able even once to discern in the lives of those who just "continue on in the same tradition".

I made a very extensive study of this phenomenon, from many aspects, in an effort to come to understand it at all, in an effort to test, re-test and test again some of its many hypotheses each new link led to. For example, I did a very intensive study of two families whom I followed across ten generations, including two and three generations before they migrated here to this country as members of its "first settlers", in an attempt to learn what was happening in their lives before they
opted to set sail in a delapidated boat to go 3000 miles across a storm-tossed and dangerous ocean to a wilderness with, at the time, nothing but danger, hardship, hunger, illness and a 50-50 chance of dying en route to suggest it. I knew I would raise my eyebrows very wide if someone today were to tell me of savage wilderness 3000 miles away that I could leave my life's acquaintances forever for and set sail in a boat which stood a 50-50 chance of not even getting there. Not even if they called it Mayflower II. I learned a great deal, all of it in support of the overall findings of this research, in studying emigrant patterns.

What I was finally able to learn about the phenomenon of this particular aspect of life was that in a very real sense, it does not appear to matter where they are living, nor specifically what their means of livelihood is, to those who can take their own self-experience for granted: they appear to be in a position to be far more flexible in adapting themselves to the situation in which they find themselves.

If that situation is one in which the "logical-seeming" vocational choice is being a sea captain, or tilling the family farm, or whatever, they can accept it as a matter of course— not because they have no choice or because it appears to them that they have no choice, or because that is what their parents expect of them, or because they have not been trained for anything else, but instead precisely because it is not necessary for them to make a choice dictated by their own needs at that level. It seems "natural" to do what they do, or so these data suggest.

This was a very difficult concept for me to grasp, for a very long time, perhaps particularly because very much that very many said, and wrote, about such phenomena invariably remarked upon such a phenomenon
in more or less opposite direction terms—as if it had been finally possible for that generation's person to be free to make a choice and hence did so. Sometimes this might have been attributed to the "sudden appearance" of a certain kind of talent, or a certain kind of interest, or a certain level of intelligence, which was regarded as having impelled the person to just naturally seek an alternative vocation, lifestyle, etc.: the research provided a different perspective.

What it was finally possible to posit from a careful attention to what these person's own self experience was across the span of their life times was that instead of having been more free to make a choice than their two hundred years of sea captain forebears, it had been the other way around—that they were less free to accept the "choice" at hand. Many wrote explicitly of that—Yeats as just one example that comes readily to mind: he was convinced that choosing to be a poet by profession had nothing to do with choice, but was something one did, not chose, because one had no other choice. He reflected that he had often found himself thinking that taking up "poet" as his life work seemed to hold high probability of being something on the order of the way cats will search for, and eat, valerian. (I had to look up valerian, but by the time I'd got to reading Yeats, I knew what he meant just from the hypotheses the data had insisted on: valerian is a plant whose roots serve as a sedative and antispasmodic.)

I find these concepts far less easy to articulate than to comprehend, because in the process of articulation, the moment one attempts to formulate any of these things into the linearity our language forces us into, it keeps coming back to seeming as if we were here speaking of
"collections" of elements, which had meaning in their own right, and only that, whereas all of these things in fact represent only infinitesimally "small" links in a complex chain of interrelatedness per se.

What made me particularly aware of that right at this point was the realization, in the course of setting down an articulation regarding this matter of flexibility of choice, etc., of the fact that, say in this very instance, it may not be remaining clear here that it was really only "all the things that came before", and all the things "that came after" these phenomena, which eventually made it possible to grasp these concepts which now, in needing to attempt to speak of them at all, require a kind of "freezing of a frame" which is inescapable: in meeting the demands of articulation, one has in the process pushed out of sight, and appeared to have leftoff attending to, the demands of comprehensibility, as well as accuracy.

For example, it is, here, now necessary to again stop and articulate the fact that there are, of course, as a reader will want to argue, many, many times, instances in which some other circumstance has arisen which would set in motion this business of making a choice for oneself of a different vocation, place to live, etc., than that of one's forebears, say, that would not require that this event would then be necessarily an element, or an "impact of early experience", etc. Such a statement has a hard time, it seems to me, as I had no choice but to articulate as if seeming to dispute that, seeming other than inherently contradictory: how can one think, or say, that one can come to recognize or identify elements such that one can say, as I have been doing in this chapter, "Such and such is an element", and "there is no question
that this is an element", and then have to turn around and say "Such and
such is not unquestionably an element". From there, I am forced to
realize that the only possible response one can give in order to make
"sense" of that seeming inherent self-contradiction is by saying an
even more paradoxical statement: that this is because there is no such
entity as an element. Despite the fact there are very definitely such
entities as elements.

I can here again perhaps only make this somewhat less recondite
by endeavoring to turn to an analogy in which I can attempt to
use letters in the alphabet and words and sentences as representations
of all of this. Perhaps if we were to say, with regard to this particu-
lar example of "vocational choice", etc. that "making a specific de-
cision on one's own to change from the vocation of one's forefathers"
and to "break away from the family tradition", that that "entity" is
tantamount to the alphabet element "T", and that it is incontrovertible
that the larger element TABLE will always and ineluctably contain this
element T, and that in no instance does the "word" TABLE ever appear
without the element T [which whole process of course readily translates
into any other non-English language, simply by substituting the "first"
element in whatever complex of letter elements that language requires
for the word equivalent in that language to our TABLE], but that it is
also possible for there to exist a word TEAPOT", a word that has no
relationship whatever with the word TABLE, despite the fact that it too
appears to contain the element T, except that in this case the T in
TEAPOT both is and is not the same element as the T in TABLE.

I see I may have managed to make that appear more recondite rather
than less. All that I am trying to articulate is that the T which is an integral, inherent and ineluctable "part" of the word TABLE is the same element as the T in TEAPOT by virtue of the fact that they are both the same phenomenon we have earlier agreed upon as here being tantamount to the element T when it is alone and by itself occurring, arising, or whatever. But that it is nonetheless the case that the element in the word TABLE and the T that is an element in the word TEAPOT are not at all the same element, specifically by virtue of that other part of the defining characteristics of each: that the element T in TEAPOT is, in addition to "just" being a T is also "the T that is integrally, inherently and ineluctably part of the word TABLE", and that therefore the element T in TEAPOT is not the element T in TABLE, at the same time that it is the same element.

It may be that this would seem to have once again backed me into a conceptual corner, because once again I see now that that again comes out seeming to say that therefore it must be so that one cannot do as I am doing in pointing to an element and saying that is an element—that I cannot do this precisely because of the existence of TABLE and TEAPOT as having no relationship whatever with one another.

Here one must perhaps say that after all the word TABLE nor the word TEAPOT has any inherent "meaning" of its own other than that meaning it can only acquire once either TABLE or TEAPOT acquires that meaning by virtue of coming together in a larger set of sets which includes, say, TABLE, and seven other words, each of which is in itself only a collection of elements, none of which has any inherent relationship whatever with one another, and each of which has no inherent mean-
ing of its own. Although it does have a meaning of its own, at the same time that it is most appearing not to have a meaning of its own; that is, once it has become nothing more than a taken for granted first letter in TABLE.

When however, one combs through, let us say, twenty thousand letters, and twelve thousand words, and finds that T "forms itself" into TABLE five hundred times more often than it forms itself into TEAPOT, and that when one finds that the sentences which are formed which include the word TABLE (and hence, the element which is the element T, but really the element T in among TABLE) are not only formed far more often than the sentences which include TEAPOT, but that also there appear to be a finite-appearing range of sentences which include the word TABLE, whereas those sentences which include the word TEAPOT appear to show no visible redundancy, and hence appear to show no particular patternedness, and hence appear to show no particular restriction in terms of the range of choices available when it comes to the word TEAPOT, it is then, so I believe, that one can find it seeming reasonable to think in terms of there being some restriction factor involved in the range of alternatives open where the word TABLE is concerned; otherwise why in the world would it not show the same randomness, and non-redundancy, found for the appearance of the word TEAPOT.

The facts themselves, whether or not one can say there is any "reason" for this being the case (or whether or not one can imagine there being any reason for this being so, or any reason being visible) simply say, without bowing to anyone's demand, requirement or wish for a "satisfying" reason, that in actuality per se, the word TABLE shows up
with far greater frequency than the T of TEAPOT, despite the fact that there is no visible difference whatever between the T of TEAPOT and the T of TABLE when regarded as a discrete entity.

I can now try to bring that back to the business of following in one's father's footsteps as most often representing a randomness, and a freedom from restriction in the matter of choice of profession, at the same time that there can be such a thing as following in one's father's footsteps which means that one has no freedom of choice, or a very greatly restricted range of choice; and that very often the act of making a choice is the representation of no longer being guided by one's own free choice but by restrictions which do not bind the person who does not feel impelled to make a choice at all but can accept what is there to be done, and what place is there to be lived, and simply busy himself with the matter of living life rather than with finding places and vocations that will "feel right", etc. I am still not sure I have managed to articulate this with any clarity: this represents my best effort so far to attempt to come to terms with the particular kinds of patterns that seem to have been appearing.

As to Edwin, John, and Junius Brutus, the particular clusters of elements, and hence the elements themselves, as if entities, do definitely support this thesis: in their case the patternedness of their lives, from the standpoint of elements, not the standpoint of superficiality of patternedness, follows exactly the pattern the structural rules as far as I am yet able to understand and grasp them at this early stage in this necessarily ongoing research would suggest, including the most recent hypothesis, that of a range of outcomes which of
themselves are to an extent random despite the fact that it has thus far always been possible to detect distinctions at the level of early experience which support the distinctions, making them on the one hand not random, but at the same time random because randomness was involved in the differences in early experience. I will try to point to one tiny aspect of this which was able to be discernible even in such a small vignette as this.

After stopping to think about the fact of John's knowing from the beginning that he would be an actor, we can return to the vignette, and resume the thread of the brief tale simply to comment on the conclusions of these unfolding pathways—in which, as we saw, the early years of Edwin Booth and John Wilkes Booth had as commonalities the same two parents yet within that, the extremes of dichotomous experience.

At the next juncture appears a mention of Edwin again: Edwin became the extraordinarily famous actor of international reputation, and who did fulfill his ambition to live among the great and important. Despite his remarkable success at meeting his goals and ambitions at several levels of great success, he was, throughout his entire life, "a man never able to control his drinking, or his eruptions into rage". Both of these, as was noted before, are elements, and when couched in such extreme terms, have, in the research itself, shown themselves later to have been elements part of the element clusters marked by far greater power, magnification or intensity: those seemed, after very careful analysis of all the data on an overall basis, the three words which came to seem justifiably to serve as the common denominator for almost all of the elements characterizing some matrix configurations.
and constellations. In these two persons' lives the "culmination" of their unfolding life pathway was, for both John and Edwin, marked by a most powerful and high intensity culmination, simply from the standpoint of looking back through the telescope down the sands-of-time-line: billions upon billions of human beings have trod that line for some number of years: of those billions some handful have left so powerful a footstep that we can look back and realize we know such and such a one by name.

We tend to take that for granted, as if "ah well, that just means they were famous".

In this research, I have learned there were many who were famous, even famous enough to have had biographies written of them, etc., yet their footstep in the sands of time was not--after all--so loud that we can, any of us, know even that such a one ever lived.

Of the grandchildren--of Richard who bowed to Washington's portrait after his father had run after him to Paris to capture him after he had tried, at 20, to run away to his passionate idol the famous John Wilkes; and of Elizabeth who died very young,...of these grandchildren who were also sons of Junius Brutus who was two times an adolescent father--at 13 and 17--before he went to sea, and who gave up his law profession in a search for what would be his career, and then took instantly to the life of an actor and a wandering tragedian, who married the fellow-wandering actress, Adelaide, then abandoned the child and Adelaide to try another country's limelight; his alcoholic fights with his employer making him good riddance so that although still in the legal sense, married to Adelaide, he could marry. in America, an
adolescent girl who could be mother to ten children, including Edwin and John, and the Asia who locked herself in her room to weep and write poetry and who was glowering, sulking, revengeful, and rageful,...and to four other children, who died in childhood, and three grandchildren/children we do not know what paths their lives unfolded on: these grandchildren/children of Richard and Elizabeth--children of expatriate Junius and his teenage illegitimate bride, in their early years were separated: one got to go and live a frenetic rootless life that made him pine for home and mother and made him his father's caretaker, had him live nonetheless with a father, however drunken and strange a one who'd call the preacher in to preach a funeral for a horse who'd died; but never got to live in a home or with a mother.

John on the other hand did get all the things Edwin pined for--a home, a mother, sisters and brothers, a classical education but envied Edwin, for Edwin had the father.

We are expecting in light of the matrix data that whatever comes to pass for John and Edwin will manifest itself not in mundane ways of more ordinary folk--for every element of all their parent's lives and their grandfather's (which is all we know of here) were of a higher energy intensity, but seeming to have more distinction in degree, than kind, or sort, of patternedness across their lives. And so we need not, really, put any great emphasis (just because great emphasis was their way) on the degree, but look instead just at the sort and kind of things they did, and felt, and were.

For one of these men the supreme culmination of his life was to be remembered most of all, above and beyond his towering fits of violent
rage or his complete inability to have any control whatever over his thoroughgoing inebriation, for his place on the public stage, standing in the limelight to the end of his days where people could come night after night to look at him, to admire him and to provide him with great preponderances of thundering applause. By his extraordinary theatrical efforts, Edwin Booth was to see to it that his name would never be forgotten, but that it would live on after him, in lights, on Broadway. Other actors might have their name on a Broadway marquee now and then, but there is no actor's name who can have top billing over Edwin, not even long after he has been dead and gone for a hundred years, for all other actors must make do with having their names come second: Edwin's name, for whatever passes for eternity in theatres, is secured in the grandiose billing that could only be ensured by having a theatre take over his name and name itself after him.

His brother was profoundly drawn to the theatre, to a career on the public stage, fully as much as Edwin, and some had earlier said that his talent, as talent, equalled that of his brother. But applause in the limelight on the public stage was not, somehow, enough for John; for John some force more powerful than the great attraction to the footlight and the nightly admiration captured John's view of what he needed to do, as his life task. We can turn to Kohut's views for a way to think of this.

To John, Lincoln was not "a person Abraham Lincoln who has worries, eats, sweats": Lincoln had been an ideal, an idealized hero [in Kohut's terms, a representative of the idealized parental imago, whom John Wilkes Booth was perceiving, and experiencing in selfobject terms, i.e., only as the "idea" of Lincoln affected John's self experience].
As I hope the Kohut chapter will make clear, there is no "reality, or actuality" attached to selfobject experiencings of another, or of the idea of another: these are functions "left over" from a time of archaic experiencings when all there was were self experiences: when there were not yet concepts like external reality or actuality that had some "separate meaning" beyond its meaning salient to its effect on the baby.

When profoundly not-met, and when the self structures themselves have not had even enough of a chance to form into a firm, cohesive structure capable of maintaining itself, not even the wonderfully adaptive human capacity for forming compensatory structures for itself, to "fill in" those parts not well met in childhood, can serve, in Kohut's view.

When some of the important self structure needs had opportunity to be met; then, even in the face of very considerable deficits or trauma at the level of other childhood needs, defective self-structuring can be compensated for by the individual, alone or in concert with others. The human self just naturally seems to direct itself in ways to see to it that it can happen. John's reaching out to try to use Lincoln in this way was a very common phenomenon, one used by a very great percentage of the population; it's natural. But for John, it wouldn't work: his needs were at too archaic a level, John had not been provided even the minimum amount of cohesive self structure that can permit a person to get by by resorting to extremes of admiration seeking, as Edwin could do, nor with extremes of idealization of a hero, as others can do. I believe this is how Kohut would see this.

Lincoln's "flaw", for which he had to die, was that he had failed to
accurately perceive John's needs in the absence of spoken communication, and to give them first order priority above and beyond Lincoln's needs to do what he believed was best for the country, in this view.

Lincoln had actually let John down intolerably in making a decision --about abolition--that was contrary to the way John wanted it to come out. John's reasons for wanting Lincoln's decision to come out in a different way than they had, had nothing to do with any interest John had in the slavery question qua slavery question: he was not "thinking" at anywhere near that level; he had managed to decide that the question of slavery should be decided on the basis of some minor financial consideration of the moment for John. But since that is what John wanted, he just naturally assumed that that would be the way Lincoln's decision would go, because John's capacity for understanding anyone else's needs was impaired: that is a capacity that can only come along and mature when the first one has been met, the one of having had opportunity in childhood to have a time of having one's own needs accorded first order priority. At the archaic level of idealizing, it is "grandiosely" taken for granted that the other (the parent) will just naturally provide what the infant or child needs: John needed Lincoln to put John's concerns first; the content just happened to be slavery, which in itself was literally of no interest to John. (Again, this is simply a way of thinking.)

When that does not happen, there are consequences, the degree depending directly upon the degree of "failure" to receive these needs in childhood (at a perfect level of correlation as near as I could judge by the computer-analogy of my mind in analyzing these voluminous data). When the degree of intensity of early experience failure is as profound
as it was across the childhood of John, the consequences are of extra-
ordinary intensity: there is, then, no margin whatever for error.

When Lincoln's selfobject function suddenly showed up as "not
having given a damn about" John's needs, violent destructive rage en-
sued—murderous rage. Kohut's work and Booth's life suggest this, I
believe.

Throughout this attempt to provide a description of the understand-
ing my research has given me of phenomena such as the one here under
discussion, it is not possible to keep from having to weave back and
forth between speaking in terms of the Kohutian psychology of the self,
and the findings of the transgenerational familial matrix research, both
because they both inherently require a constant going back and forth
across the life span between infancy/childhood and adulthood, and, more
importantly, because as mentioned elsewhere there emerged a seemingly
perfect superimposability template between the findings of every
single piece of these data in all of those areas Kohut's work had been
able to have access to (i.e., those not spanning the transgenerational
familial matrix, and those having to do solely with parent-child inter-
actions, early experience and later life unfolding pathway).

Hence, it was both eminently possible and eminently useful to
incorporate Kohut's thinking in understanding some of the finer points
of the self structures even when I am at that point talking about the
external manifestations. Initially, I viewed Kohut's ideas as things
to test out, rather than to accept a priori in this work or to "infer
from", theoretically.

Hence, when I seem to be speaking at one moment of kinds of results,
inferences, conclusions, etc., I could have made from my data, and others I could not have made, e.g., the idealized parental imago phenomena as it pertains to the person's self report, this is because Kohut has been able to provide me with this kind of complementary data, and because I have, in more comprehensively and intensively studied cases tested and retested hundreds of times, the Kohut formulations against all levels of my data and they appear to show this kind of transposable goodness of fit. Appearance of "perfect" correlation seemed odd to me, and made me wonder if I were somehow "making" that happen. In time I came to realize that this was made eminently understandable by Piaget's commentary about naturally occurring structures (cf. Chapter VII): I realized that this goodness of fit was what Piaget had said would be the case if two or more researchers were working in an area of natural structure, since the structure's laws will show greater regularity than a researcher's imagination.

If, as Piaget posits, natural structures abide by extraordinarily unvarying laws, it would seem to follow that the Kohutian self structures and the findings of this research would either have to "agree" nowhere or everywhere; that is, if we were both uncovering aspects of formal structure laws of parent-child interaction in attempting to look beneath the superficial differences in content, we should, if there is such a thing as self-structure, find the same things regardless of whether they are being looked at through a psychoanalytic microscope, or a transgenerational telescope, if some of the findings agree.

If either of us had been attempting to interpret content imaginatively, (or arbitrarily circumscribed off some data as worthy of atten-
tion and some not) Piaget's work suggests that no such goodness of fit would emerge. Interestingly in those places where Kohut speaks of imaginative speculation this exceptional degree of goodness of fit does not regularly hold: this was the case where Kohut has said in effect, just here we cannot yet say with certainty, until it has been possible to explore some point through further research, etc. Hence, the fact of the degree of concordance of Kohut's formulations seems worth going into in this way within this account, since here, that fact seems of very considerable import: the degree of concordance, across many levels seems in itself to support the hypothesis of this research—that there do exist such entities as formal structure and formal laws for structures at the level of parent-child intergenerational overlap and its impact across the life span, and subsequent life spans.

To return to John Wilkes Booth and Lincoln then, Lincoln had made a decision that was contrary to John's need: I am suggesting that he let John down, in a way that John's self structures could not allow for: for John's need for the ideal of Lincoln as one who would be perfectly omnisciently responsive to John's needs was simply not at a level of functional maturation where any sort of mature conceptualization could be possible.

As with John's grandfather Richard, I think we must assume that it had made John feel better to think of himself "in association" with President Lincoln—just as today, at this minute in a luxury apartment in Manhattan, it makes a native Puerto Rican American, an eminently successful, hardworking person, well loved by all his associates; feel better to have a portrait of Eugene O'Neill in his living room, and to
wear O'Neill's ring on his hand, and to celebrate O'Neill's birthday—and to speak to O'Neill's portrait on his way out the door to an opening night of an O'Neill play, Quintero is bringing to the public stage for the admiration and applause of others.

These are not "symptoms of madness": these are just the self's ways—its natural ways—judging from my research, and from Kohut's research in a quite different domain—of looking around in the external world for what it happened to have missed out on. These are ways the self tries to secure what it requires in order for the person to feel less out of balance—to feel that things are less asynchronous at the level of his experience of himself as he goes about the ordinary business of being a person, and doing whatever he does.

This research redundantly insists that having a female parent and a male parent fairly consistently available across infancy and childhood is a naturally occurring requirement for optimal easeful success at the business of getting started at being a human being. The self's adaptability at finding creative ways to make up for what it missed was remarkably apparent throughout this study of lives.

Having a hero was one way which abounded: this did not have to be a famous person; often it was a colleague or employer, (here we are referring to situations where a person missed out on having a male parent available). [It may be that there is more opportunity to think of someone as invested in your personal welfare if he has in a sense taken on that job, as in the case of a president; this I am only guessing about.]

In the lives studied people often chose famous people but more
often when they were somehow literally available, for actual association in some way. (Not necessarily in person, but that's another whole domain I eventually researched, and learned much that is extremely interesting but simply cannot attempt to include here.)

It was equally clear that a person need not be a famous person. What he did need to do however, was even more clear: he must maintain the appearance of caring about the person, and of being somehow taking that person into consideration. As with all of the impact on adult experience I was able to trace from infancy across adulthood, this business of having a hero, of idealizing another person, could clearly be seen to fall along a wide continuum of degree. In all cases studied, it was possible for this to be seen as serving a function: the function in every case, one traceable to the person's experiencing a need, at the level of his own experience of himself, to find a way to feel less uncomfortable with himself per se and in relation to the world of others.

Always there was indication that things had been asynchronous on a wide, pervasive and amorphous basis, for this person, up until the time of encountering this other he was able to come into idealizable association with. When the person was a person he could enter into real association with, things got better. Sometimes this was as an employee, sometimes as a member of an organization together, workers for a common cause, etc. (It was later possible to locate a connection between this phenomenon and Lacan's concept of the universe of shared significations, which cannot be included here.)

When John Wilkes Booth idealized a hero, we would expect it to be at a quite different degree of intensity from the many who find it
"feels good" to associate with an idealizable person.

But the key principle is the same: there exists, with regard to the parent in childhood, a clear need for him to understand, even without spoken communication, the child's need; and a clearer need for him to give first order priority to—not his own needs—but to the child's.

The parent can get away with all kinds of non-perfectness, so long as he makes sure not to let the child down in the one all-important area—the understanding and the giving first order priority to the child's needs when a choice has to be made between the two. (Here meant not in the realm of discrete events, but an overall sense of "caring").

I am suggesting that in the profoundly high intensity failures such as John suffered in this area—because of the insatiability of Junius' own needs—John was never able to have that need met. In adulthood he would be expected to do what I found many people doing (differing only in degree) when that need had been less than optimally met: he found a hero. But John still required perfect understanding of his needs by his hero: I am suggesting that he still required his hero to know, without spoken communication, what John's needs were, to care, and to show it by giving first order priority to John and his needs. Kohut's work and this research strongly suggest this.

Here, however, is the part that is not easy for many of us to understand at the superficial level: it is not just the need to be admired and approved of that the infant needs from the mirroring persons of childhood in order for things to seem to be going along in a way that lets the person take things for granted: with Billy (in another
chapter) it looks that way, and with Meredith and Miss F. (in other chapters), but with Elizabeth Ann we can see right away that that can't be all there is to it.

What Elizabeth Ann says loud and clear is that what's really needed is to be understood: then, the rest seems almost to take care of itself e.g., to be understood as "a baby who needs to be admired"; to be understood as "a child who needs, just now, to idealize a father", etc. In part, this means, in infancy, to have one's own self experience considered without the baby's being able to say, in words, what those needs are. But, first, says Miss F., and Meredith, you have to "get my meaning"; "you have to know how to understand my central message, and then just show that you care, about my meaning, not yours."

The same principle holds for the idealizable parent: it's not that he has to go around being perfect; he just has to seem to have a "perfect understanding" of my meaning--of my needs; not "ignore them."

It was this, among my data, that people said, in plain words, over and over across the data of this research, that hurt: when a parent left them for instance: "he seemed to care only about his own needs; it didn't seem to matter to him that I was left here pining for him".

It was that which Charlotte Gilman, for example, could not forgive her father for: she could try to think about his needs, for why he'd abandoned his children, but it was the fact that that meant that if he would go away because of his needs, then it just wasn't mattering to him what Charlotte's little girl needs were; that was not tolerable.

That was intensely painful to her, and brought forth the great anger against men, in general, who "made women dependent on them", which
she made into her life work crusade against this "universal oppression". Not even when the actuality was visible—that the person did have to give first order priority to his own needs (as Charlotte herself later had to do when she abandoned her child, and when Maria Montessori abandoned hers, or when Junius Brutus abandoned his as Richard had done before him of his first two children, in his adolescence). At the level of self experience people said in words that that hurt, a lot; across the life span for some. The impact of that part of experience was always, ineluctably, traceable across the life span—in direct proportion, in degree of impact, to the degree of intensity involved at the level of early experience on the matrix level. Such impact showed great regularity.

Heinz Kohut describes the bipolar self in terms of unconscious experience. Here, of course, surface manifestations are capable of being seen, and one would need a far greater measure of information to make a serious analysis of the self of John, or of Edwin, in Kohut's terms yet despite this admitted lack, it was interesting the extent to which one could detect that faint echo—even at a hundred year distance, and even from amid all the hectic chaos of their lives—of the outlines of the two poles of the self as Kohut describes them, both in terms of the needs they will lead to in adulthood if profoundly unmet in infancy and childhood and in terms of the self polarities associated with the grandiose exhibitionistic self, and the idealized parental imago.

It is not my purpose here to attempt to explicate a detailed concordance between the findings of this research and Kohut's systematic formulations about the early requirements for responsiveness from a
mother and those from a father (along with all which overlap) and their later life pathways, nor to comprehensively cover the psychoanalytically obtainable data on the analysis of the self with regard to later life pathways in the several permutations represented by all of the Booths. Rather I thought this purposely superficial, very bare-outline sketch might help a reader see the trees and the forest by clearing away the very great deal of sublimely complex thicket we would both get lost in were I to attempt such an undertaking within this larger context. The purpose here is simply so that a reader interested in how I am seeing my transgenerational formulations and hypotheses as capable of integratedness with the newly presented paradigm for a psychoanalytic psychology of the self, can perhaps get one very small glimpse of that here.

In that vein, I can, then just point lightly again to what is briefly discussed in the chapter, attempting to provide an outline of some of Kohut's basic human development formulations at the unconscious self level which one can get only faint glimmers of here: the grandiose exhibitionistic pole of the self becomes integrated, formed and firmed into a structure largely as a function of the admiring, mirroring empathically appropriate responsiveness of the mother. Where there is profound deficit in meeting that aspect of the self's early experience, in Kohut's view, an overall lack of cohesiveness will result: for this person, there will be an overriding need to exhibit himself or herself for continuing external sources of admiring approval.

In view of the overwhelming abundance of rageful violence in the lives of both John and Edwin, it is worth underscoring a key Kohutian
clinical reconstructively derived formulation: that destructive rage is an isolated breakdown product of the profoundly inadequately-structured self. Here this can help put Edwin's rage and, importantly, John's capacity for murder into perspective. Here too we can see that the idealized parental imago missing from John's life: to John, (but not Edwin) the father has literally abandoned him. In Edwin we see impact of profound deficit in this area instead.

A self that gets off to a fair start (or that is provided for at one pole) can and does generate compensatory structures (through life work and other means) to compensate for even traumatic deficits at one pole. The self for which parenting function failures abound at both poles, from the beginning, may not have a cohesive enough structure to generate compensatory structures from. Such appears to be the case to a greater degree for John than Edwin.

My own first thought had been that the supremely traumatic environment for Edwin--no home, no mothering past early childhood, no education, such as all others in the family got, on top of added stress or of having to be, as a child, one's father's keeper and nightly bear the brunt of his violent inebriated rageful attacks, abandonment, etc. suggested Edwin as getting the worst of things. Yet it was John for whom the ultimate self-fragmentation product ensued, while Edwin, despite massive and profound turbulent disturbance all his life, managed against great odds, to hang together, and to work successfully, even manage to marry--a relational tie John was not able to make.

Here other perspectives might perhaps call forth instinctual drive-mediated conflicts or complexes as "explanation": explanations based on
a "superego" might be resorted to, or "constitutional factors", or individual differences. But analysis of unfolding life pathways does not require such concepts. Throughout this research activity the procedure was to attempt to look for the phenomenological data to yield up the traceability of impact of early experience in as direct a way as possible, with the lowest possible level of inference.

Here, I applied all that I had learned of recognizing elements, what had emerged from the data about paternal parent functions, and maternal parent functions, and about the transgenerational matrix. Wherever it was possible for me to see the clear Kohutian template, I also attempted, within the limitations of my ability, to bring to bear all that I could of Kohut's thinking as well. I thought in terms of the areas in which early experience had differed for John and for Edwin, and in terms of what functions each missed, and where the research had suggested each of these factors might lead, etc. For a time it continued to seem that one would need to leave as "unexplainable" so critical a factor as John's having made empirically manifest the most extreme of all life pathways--one which could disintegrate to the point of murderous violence, and the killing of another human being, which I am suggesting represents John's one last desperate attempt to align the self structures that simply couldn't do the job.

Even the seemingly more profoundly traumatized Edwin managed short of that. Yet if it is early experience that gives rise to such profound self-fragmentation, and if a study of lives can trace impact of early experiences on later life pathways as this research had demonstrated, one would posit a conceptually-supportable difference between
the early experience of John and Edwin. Although I would not suggest that such distinction would ordinarily be traceable in so superficial an exploration as this involved, it was possible to find one such among the data.

One of the findings of the research was that one can miss perceiving an element among the data because it does not always readily announce itself—by being termed something else, said as its opposite, etc. That was the case here.

A place one could locate a hypothesis for John's so different, while yet so alike, life pathway which was traceable to their specifically different "early experience" was this: I had thought in terms of each of these two children—John Wilkes Booth and Edwin, as having had one (different) parent on hand to perhaps at least derive some measure of parenting need from. And I had thought in terms of what parenting functions each definitely missed receiving simply from not living together over the many years that Junius (with Edwin) was always on the road living in hotels. Certainly one could say that John had missed having a parent on hand for idealizing, and that Edwin had missed receiving mother-mirroring by not living where a mother was available. None of the research findings supported those distinctions as capable of yielding anything like the distinctions of later impact seen in this example.

One of the things the research had thus far seemed strongly to suggest, seemed in fact at first quite at odds with the telescopically-seen impacts in this case: what the research so far seemed strongly to suggest was that there is clear impact on later life traceable to
the absence of a parent, but that in most (perhaps all) such instances, the impact of an absent parent appears thus far in the research to be very considerably less severe, or profound, than a child's having been exposed consistently to a disorganized or profoundly unresponsive, un-empathic parenting person.

Edwin was exposed consistently to such a person, and his adult development manifested dramatic manifestations both of missing the provision of mirroring responsiveness from a mother, and of consistent exposure to a disorganized parent whose own needs would have had to result in a considerable degree of failure of responsiveness to Edwin. Yet it was John whose self structuring held graver deficit than Edwin's.

What I repeatedly missed perceiving the first many times I pondered this was that these data were also making a clear distinction, one fully consonant with the transgenerational research findings. This was that while Edwin had missed receiving optimal mother-mirroring by not being at home; he had also missed being consistently exposed to the kind of mothering which John was consistently exposed to. Here we must conclude that a distinction of major import in the early experience of John and Edwin was that Edwin was fortunate in being able to be protected from exposure to the maternal milieu John was consistently exposed to. [We can note in passing here that John's mother had been an adolescent at the time of the birth of her first child, which the research has repeatedly found associated with profoundly disorganized mothering.]

Often across this research I was to learn that one fact can often serve as perceptual blinder to another, more important one. I had not thought of Edwin's perhaps having been more fortunate, however sad,
that he was able to live far from home, away from his mother. It was when I recalled the dramatic way in which a 4 year old child had impressed upon me the child-self's active desire to move in the direction of its own self structural needs, even if they mean having to give up a mother at 4 years old, that I recognized the perceptual blinder that had led me to think of Edwin's loss of mothering only in terms of a loss rather than a net gain.

For this small child, Michael, who was once my client, violence between his adolescent mother and his father had begun before he was born: he had been exposed daily to this from birth to age two. What continued beyond age two--from birth to age four--was the exposure to one parent who was a wellspring of such vast anxiety and fears and profound self needs of her own that even without physical abuse, the child was relentlessly exposed to chaotic demands on him to meet his mother's bizarre standards for his behavior: there had been no occasion, since his birth, on which his mother had been able to permit the child's needs or sensibilities to have first-order priority over hers--not even when she, briefly, tried to learn to do that. (The mother had not been raised in a violent home, nor by a family regarded as disturbed in any way.)

During his therapy (recommended by pre-school screening personnel) I learned that a sense of self-fragmentation \(^{19}\) was part of his daily

\(^{19}\) Heinz Kohut's therapeutic formulations are specifically directed toward the therapeutic goal of restoration of self-structure deficits. Although the psychology of the self has thus far worked at that level primarily with adults, others are directing efforts toward learning the range of self-deficits which can be ameliorated through this new psycho-therapeutic method.
inner experience, although overtly, he went to great lengths, to avoid punishment for "being bad", which was the family's interpretation of any expression of his fears, feelings, anxieties, vulnerabilities, or inner chaos. In therapy he was relieved to find a place where it was safe to do that, for he lived in fear of his fragmentation. Although a very bright, quick, perceptive (and affectionate and charming) little boy, he was incapable of drawing a picture of a person. In trying to draw a "little boy" (himself, he said), he exerted great extremes of effort, in the end each time presenting as "a picture of me" a page filled with bizarre isolated "meaningless" fragments scattered across the page, none of them resembling a child or anything else.

After some while in therapy he was able to draw this same kind of picture but now with a large lopsided head, with two enormous round circles as eyes, circles almost half the size of the face. The "eyes" were empty circles. There were no other features. In the middle of the drawing he had begun to stab the paper sharply with the point of a pen, saying "Kill!, Kill! Kill!" to himself. When he handed me the drawing he told me to write on it the legend "This picture is a clue to why Michael wants to kill himself some days". This child who had been in therapy only a very brief period, had told me quietly and soberly on his last day of therapy that he was going to have a chance to go far away, to live with relatives: "I hope I can live in Michigan forever so I'll be safe and protected" he said, as he said goodbye for the last time.

It had not been readily possible for me, even after many months of learning to try to think in those terms throughout the research to
look at the lives of John and Edwin Booth and think of John in terms of a 4 year old boy perhaps never able to take for granted the fundamental aspects of everyday life, like feeling protected, nor to think of Edwin who had to live in a long series of one-night hotels taking care of an alcoholic father, as the fortunate one in the family.

This "analysis" of the Booth family is but a line-drawing sketch, and not intended to serve as a systematic nor comprehensive tracing of any of the several aspects involved in this research, but only as an example of some of the ways I came to think and look at the very much more complete, complex, systematic and comprehensive data sets which made up my research studies.
This research required a continual back-and-forthing along the sands-of-time-line, between the telescopic lens long-range transgenerational matrix view, which was sometimes also, of necessity, a "historical" view, and the bird's eye view of the day-to-day, here, now, today, mother and baby, or child; going about the ordinary, or every day, business of being a mother and baby.

There were a remarkable number of ways in which it was possible to become privy to just what these every day mother and child experiences were like, far more than I had expected to find data for: I had, naively, assumed it would have been necessary to infer, or "imagine" what the day to day mothering patterns had been like from the standpoint of real life actuality. This was emphatically not the case. I found that scores of my subjects kept diaries when their children were babies, in which they recorded very specific accounts of every day interaction, etc., or did so in voluminous letters to a sister, aunt, husband-away-on-business, or husband away at war, etc., and in countless other ways provided first hand accounts. Often these appeared in the accounts of the parents' lives: autobiographies were exceptionally useful here.

In addition, the extent was remarkable to which "grown children" opted to sit down and record in exquisite detail what being a child had been like for that person-as-child--child of the parent I was also concurrently studying the entire lifespan, and intergenerationally overlapping lifespans of and for.
One such person, remarked on earlier, was Charlotte Perkins Gilman. Seldom did I encounter quite such a fine-tooth-comb detailed account of an entire life which included such fine-tooth-comb details of the day by day, year by year, parent-child experiences.

Her father had found himself not able to endure the proximity of children, and had lived his life as director of one or another large library, in the absence of familial relationships. Her mother, as Mrs. Gilman made clear, would not touch either of her children. Charlotte vividly recalled, at the end of her life, the poignant pain it had been for her, and the great pining she had relentlessly felt, to be touched by her mother, but never was. She longed even for the feel of the touch of her mother's finger on her cheek, but did not receive it. Her mother "dutifully" prepared meals, and "kept a roof over their heads," but although Mrs. Gilman tried not to speak disapprovingly of her mother (inasmuch as her mother had not, after all, abandoned her), she was not able to keep her account from being filled with instance after instance in which her mother's understanding of children's real needs was a little left of zero. (So too later were Charlotte's.)

I traced this woman's entire lifespan very thoroughly, and the lives of many generations of familially related persons before her. I learned by way of the research itself---including her account of course---a very great deal about the highly specific impacts of early experience with a mother who did not wish to touch her child, who wanted her child not to get to know loving attachment (so that it would not have to experience the pain of losing that love some day, her mother said as reason).
A detailed account of the early months of an infant's life can never be provided by the later-grown child: they simply have no medium for verbalizable remembering, other than at the level of inarticulable self experience impact, what the very early experiences were that they lived through. In adulthood, verbalizations are actively sought for, to "explain" these "nameless" memories which can only come forth as "feelings," "deep inside." In a quite real sense, we have to "make up" imaginative notions of what this or that "feeling" might be "about."

There was one mothering variant for which it was unusual to find subjects having described in the course of their letters to others, etc. This was the mothering pattern in which the mother is depressed, and/or does not wish to have this baby: the mother who does not want to touch the baby, or cuddle the baby, ever. As in the case of Kathy, this did show itself as a cluster phenomenon.

We cannot know for certain if the mother of Charlotte Perkins Gilman, who refused ever to cuddle, hug or hold her child during the years that the child could remember, would have demonstrated the kind of mothering pattern displayed in this chapter by Kathy, the mother of Billy when he was yet too tiny and new to this world to speak for himself, or, later, to remember for himself.

We can know, from Charlotte Gilman's account, that she shattered, like a broken mirror, when the time came for her to touch, or care for, her own child. Fragmenting, she tried, but found it not within her capacity to endure; and for elemental survival, was, she said, forced to abandon her child. and her husband—who she found equally unendurable,

20 Kathy, although by the time Billy is five months old, tells the therapist she "never wanted this baby," in fact she did, of her own decision and volition, choose to become pregnant and to have this child.
not as "a person," but as a "relatedness," at an intimate level.

We can know, from psychoanalytic reconstructive accounts—such as Heinz Kohut and others have been able to provide—that it is possible for persons to come clearly to remember this kind of mothering pattern for which Billy and Kathy provide a compelling example; and to remember it with intolerable, unendurable pain, and feelings of devastating dread, and despair, and fear-filled awe. One can, however, trace the entire lifespan of Charlotte Perkins Gilman which begins with her vividly graphic account of her mother as a mother who would not permit Charlotte to see herself reflected in her mother's eyes: although she was eventually to come to be able to associate with people, after a long hard struggle, she was not able to alternate exchange with others with the world of seen things. She lived a life of very-near fragmentation; when she had a child of her own, she described herself as quite literally fragmenting. She found that it was excruciatingly painful and unendurable in the extreme to try to have anything to do with a baby. Eventually she found she needed, for her own elemental emotional survival, to abandon her child. At the same time she had learned that she was, as well, unable to tolerate being married. Although later in life she came to be able to marry, it was never a physical relationship and not even one of continued companionship, but rather a base to come home to in between her restless touring to stand in front of people to speak. In her own words, she lived a life permeated by a plethora of strange feelings, of abrupt changes in energy from overflowing to none, of great difficulty with intimate relationships, of great difficulty "having a home" or home life or very much else, and of eventual suicide.
The example of Billy whose mother would not cuddle him, taken from real, current, life, was possible only because a team of clinicians so thoroughly recorded and reported an exceptionally lengthy and detailed account of a child who was failing to thrive (we do know that one of Mrs. Gilman's siblings failed to thrive) and for whose "rescue" this team instituted emergency measures which required extensive observations of the child and its mother and father.

The very large majority of this account centers upon the therapy per se, and the health measures it was necessary to institute in order to save the baby from death. I have extracted out from that clinical account a series of the non-clinical excerpts which provide a vivid first hand account of what "goes on" between a mother and an infant in at least some of the cases where an infant fails to thrive, and in at least some of the cases in which a person later reports that he or she was never touched, never looked at, never cuddled, etc., in the course of psychotherapy, or in the course of autobiographic accounts.

Following the account of Billy at five months old, is an example of a child's eye view of another of the mothering patterns it was possible vividly to distinguish across the research many, many times. Surprising as it may seem, this account comes from a child's story book, a book entitled Understood Betsy, written in 1913, by a woman named Dorothea Canfield Fisher. Mrs. Fisher is one of the subjects of my research, although one who only latterly became one-- which here means that instead of representing one of those for whom months were spent tracing a multi-generational familial history, the person represented an instance of a hypothesis testing, raised by the great mass of extensively
studied family histories.

In the first mothering pattern to which Elizabeth Ann is exposed, Elizabeth Ann regards herself as "very happy," as certainly very much loved, highly regarded, as having a person attending to her mothering care who is certainly attentive, exceptionally empathic, warm, loving, concerned, and above all, interested in being the best possible mothering person for the little girl. By no means would any one have called Elizabeth Ann deprived; least of all Elizabeth Ann herself, at first.

Only later does Elizabeth Ann, introspectively, come to recognize that there was something very much wrong about the kind of care she received, although she has great difficulty at first realizing what it could have been— for she had everything a child could possibly want in the way of love, warmth, affection and attention. so she was told.

A fair number of subjects in the research made these same statements; so too did some few of my clients in psychotherapy. There was much in all of those discussions, from clients and from subjects, that said, quite literally, very many of the same things Elizabeth says of Aunt Frances; or Aunt Frances says, and does, in among her caring. There seems good reason to believe that these specific interchanges between Aunt Frances and Elizabeth Ann are very accurately reported accounts of a distinct variant of mothering care, a variant which in itself is part of a variant of unfolding life pathway traceable along the transgenerational matrix.

In later life, Mrs. Fisher wrote many books, stories, and speeches on the subject of parenting, including a book entitled Fables for Parents, in 1937, by which time she was a grandmother. There, the mother, and the
grandmother, are trying tremendously hard to "understand" their children, and are not managing to do so. Although there the vignettes she recounts seem more immediately recognizable as parts of her own, adult, experience, it is difficult to keep from assuming that in Understood Betsy she was not giving equally clear account of a childhood experience which she knew in fine detail.

She herself, of course, was not at all an orphan. She did have aunts and uncles in Vermont, the scene of the second half of the book, when she becomes Understood Betsy, and in real life, she lived all the rest of the time with her parents, but in the summer went to stay with aunts and uncles who are clearly visible as the aunts and uncles in the second half of the book, what she remarks of her parents are their troubles.

We can opt either to read the short account of what this mothering was like, from a child's eye view, from the belief that here Mrs. Fisher was, in young adulthood, recounting her own experience with a mother, or, if we choose not to do that, we may instead view it simply as an imaginary account of a mothering pattern of a specific kind of interaction, and concentrate instead on the fact that the author regarded the single, all important, overriding feature of what mattered as the child's having the child's needs understood: it was that that took place, with no fuss made about it at all, in the second half of the book, where she gradually (and painfully, by trial and error) overcomes the hurdles in her life which arose from having been mothered by Aunt Frances' mothering, and begins to try to take the ordinary business of life for granted, as the persons around her do. They take themselves, and the ordinary business of living for granted, and just so do they take the business
of caring for Betsy for granted. It seems clear that the message the author went to a great deal of trouble, and fine detail about mothering interaction patterns, to explain is that it makes a very considerable difference for how a person feels about herself, and how she manages in the worlds of others, whether her needs are understood in childhood.

Both of these accounts are here provided primarily to make possible a sense that there do appear to be highly specific mothering patterns, and that by no means is a study of the impact of early experience a study of lives in which child abuse, of child abandonment, or necessarily profound trauma made up the basis of that impact. Nor is it a study of whether children are "loved", or "cared about", or even empathized with", with those seen as "characterizing early experience", as I have read a fair number of studies on the impact of early experience describing the relevant variables included in their questionnaires, etc.

The account of Elizabeth Ann and Billy are intended to provide simply a feel for two of the distinctive patterns of interaction in early experience which the research came upon; and to say that there are distinctive impact events traceable to "positive" early experiences as well as "negative" early experiences. Positive and negative are not intended as words associated with this research, but from the reference point of common parlance, or of other research on this topic: neither the early experience nor the later life impact seem to make sense when described in evaluative statements of that nature, it seemed more helpful, in the research, to try to concentrate instead on what those early experiences consisted of, and of what they felt like for the child, and of how the grown child later regarded them, retrospectively, rather than labels.
In those ways it was possible to begin to detect the evidences of apparent patternednesses through which it was eventually possible to trace redundancies of impact of early experience across the lifespan: it seemed worthwhile to include "real-life" examples of such ways of "characterizing" early experience, rather than attempting to "define", or "operationally define" the sorts of things meant here by one or another "kind" of early experience by adjectives or adverbs.

In real life examples even a child who cannot speak for himself seems to hold the capability of speaking for himself, and a child being lovingly, attentively mothered can provide a reader with aspects of what that experience can be like that do not come forth in the operational definition "loving and attentive mothering." In reading the account of Billy, a reader might want to try a mental exercise I tried regularly to apply: to try to imagine this Billy a grown man, perhaps interacting with his own adolescent children; perhaps having difficulty understanding them, or being responsive to them. Perhaps he will come, with his wife and children, glowering into a family therapy session. I do not know what help it might be to us to know that some of Father Billy's ways of interacting with his children will, in the view of research, be traceable to these scenes which Billy will never remember, nor even be able to tell a therapist about when he is grown. It might be useful for us to at least ponder such questions.
Of Billy Who Could Not Yet Speak For Himself 21

...An infant boy was referred to Infant Mental Health program at 5 months of age in a grave nutritional state. The baby was starving. His growth curve showed an ominous downward plunge which our pediatricians read as the profile of an infant who was moving toward the critical (and sometimes irreversible) state which is broadly covered by the term "failure to thrive". The term "failure to thrive" describes those infants who show growth failure in the absence of any organic cause. In strict usage it is employed for infants whose weight has fallen below the third percentile. It is almost universally associated with the impairment of the mother's capacity to nourish both in the concrete and in the psychological sense of the word....

The typical course of medical treatment for a failure-to-thrive infant is hospitalization with intensive one-to-one nursing care. With nurse-mothering and the introduction of a good nutritional regime, the baby begins to thrive. When his nutritional state is stabilized, he returns to his home. Typically, these gains are lost within a few weeks and the baby may return to the hospital again--and the cycle renews itself....

It is the mother who is the key. Whether or not the baby will thrive outside of the hospital depends upon the mother's capacity to follow the medically prescribed regime to insure adequacy in caloric intake for her baby and to provide the psychological nutriments for growth and development....

21 Excerpted from Fraiberg, 1976.
Billy at 5 Months

Billy Douglas was referred to our project by the Child Health Center at the University of Michigan Medical Center when he was 5 months old. Billy vomited after each feeding. He had not gained weight in 3 months. He was a full-term healthy baby, whose birth weight of 8 pounds put him in the 70th percentile. At 5 months he weighed only 14 pounds 5 ounces and was in the 25th percentile. He had become a tense, morose, somber baby who looked, in the doctor's words, "like a little old man". Dr. Robert Larson, then a pediatric resident at the Child Health Center, had worked intensively with Billy and his young mother for 2 months. Sensing the potential gravity of Billy's situation, he had begun to see Billy and his mother weekly at the outpatient clinic. He did extensive diagnostic studies and tried various medical interventions. He was puzzled, however, because there seemed to be no observable medical explanation for Billy's feeding difficulties. He also realized that the mother was becoming increasingly depressed.

Kathie Douglas was an anxious 17-year-old girl who had married Billy's 21-year-old father, John, only 2 months before Billy's birth. She was often unable to carry through with suggestions regarding food and medication. Dr. Larson called in a public health nurse to see Billy and his mother weekly at home. Despite their best efforts, however, the doctor and the nurse observed that Kathie and Billy were not responding to their advice. At 5 months Billy's situation was critical. He was regressing and hospitalization was being considered. Further, Kathie seemed even more depressed, distant, and sometimes confused....
Initial Observation of Billy and His Parents

When the therapist first arrived at the Douglas's small apartment, she met a timid, sad faced 17-year-old girl, who was Billy's mother, and a gaunt young man, the father, barely out of his teens, who was so uneasy that he did not acknowledge her presence until almost the end of this visit.

The therapist's first impression of Billy brought the doctor's words to mind. "Billy looked like a little old man". Billy was in his crib. He was up on his hands and knees, staring at the door, when she entered the room with his mother. His eyes met the therapist's with an intense stare and a fixed smile. His stare never wavered.

Billy was motorically very precocious and was able at 5 months to turn over quickly, to creep, to grasp and manipulate objects. On the whole, however, he was a very tense baby. All of his movements and efforts at communication had an urgency that was unusual in a baby of this age. When the therapist held him for a moment, she could feel the strain and tension in his body.

Billy seemed unusually aware of sounds. In particular, his mother commented that Billy responded quickly to any sounds related to feeding. She illustrated this by opening the refrigerator door while Mr. Douglas held the baby. Billy almost jumped out of his father's arms, his mouth opened, anticipating food, and his whole body strained toward the refrigerator. As his mother approached him with an eyedropper with vitamins, Billy, still in his father's arms, leaned back, opened his mouth, his hands became inert, and he looked like a starving baby bird.
awaiting food from his mother. Mother and father seemed uncomfortable with Billy. They treated him like a newly arrived stranger whom they had to approach cautiously and from a distance.

In the early home visits the therapist saw that Billy spent his day either amusing himself on the floor or in bed. He was capable of spending a lot of time in solitary play with toys. There were few signs of human attachment. Even though he could creep, Billy rarely approached his mother. He rarely made eye contact with her. He rarely smiled unless his mother put him to bed with a pacifier and honey.

Billy's mother said sadly that Billy did not enjoy cuddling. She said that when she held him in her arms, he seemed to turn away from her. In fact, neither mother nor father held Billy in a close ventral position. They held him so that he was constantly facing away from them.

Already, it was obvious to us that this baby and his parents were out of synchrony with each other. There was none of the normal spontaneity or joy in mutual gazing one would expect between parents and baby at this age. Billy was a somber, tense baby who seemed to be starving. His mother was also morose and somber and, as we shall see, both parents were hungry and starving in their own way.

Kathie said that most of the time she was holding back feelings of rage that were so strong that "if I let go, I would kick the walls out of the house". She was having many somatic complaints, headaches, backaches, gynecological problems, and was also overweight. She sadly spoke of herself as feeling and looking like a fat old lady. She felt guilty about imposing on her husband for his time and attention.
John Douglas was also very young. At 21, he was haggard, thin, frightened, and embarrassed by difficulties he could no longer cope with by himself. He was much more hesitant than Kathie to engage in any interaction with the therapist. He literally turned away from her during her first few meetings with him. When he did talk to her it was through a teasing question to Billy. "Billy, do you want to go home with her?" We believe he was simultaneously expressing his ambivalence about Billy and questioning the therapist's attitude toward his own worth as a parent. The first time he looked at her and smiled was about a month after she had started visiting when he told her that Billy seemed happier, that he liked to play more....

Billy's state and his feeding problem made intervention imperative, yet, after two sessions in the home, we had not yet observed a feeding which would provide tangible clues. Although the therapist had arranged to come at mealtimes, Kathie avoided feeding Billy in her presence. Kathie was, perhaps, not yet sure of her, not yet ready to reveal herself in the situation in which she was most inadequate. It was in the third session that Kathie volunteered to let the therapist see how Billy was fed.

How is Billy Fed?

As part of our assessment a video play session was arranged at our office playroom. This session was primarily planned so as to permit the baby's own play as well as spontaneous mother-baby interaction. What occurred gave us a sobering picture of the isolation and the estrangement of baby and mother. As if he were alone in the room, the
baby engaged in solitary exploration of his toys and furniture. He never once sought his mother with his eyes. He was mobile, but never crept toward his mother. His mother looked distant and self-absorbed.

Then Billy uttered sounds of complaint. His mother said that it was time for his bottle and volunteered to feed Billy. She said, "Watch what he does when I show him the bottle." She placed the bottle on the floor, several feet away from Billy, who was on hands and knees. Billy's face registered alertness and urgency--no smile, but urgency. And the 5-month-old baby began to creep the long distance toward the bottle. He reached for it unsteadily, but could not quite grasp it. Finally he did grasp it, mouth open hungrily, but it was bottom up. He could not quite orient it. At last he got the nipple into his mouth. He sucked solemnly, greedily.

While the therapist watched this scene, masking her inner pain and horror, the schoolgirl mother explained that this was the way Billy took his bottle. "He likes it that way. He likes to have his bottle alone, on the floor."...

After a while the therapist suggested that Mrs. Douglas sit with Billy in our rocking chair and feed him. The second observation gave us another piece of the puzzle. Kathie now held Billy loosely in her arms. Billy was still supporting his own bottle. The mother, looking tired and apathetic, said that Billy usually finished his bottle in 4 minutes. "Sometimes, however, if the bottle is slow, it takes an hour." She talked as though it were his feeding, not something that she had anything to do with. She herself looked distant and empty. Our impression was that although Billy was in his mother's arms, he
was still feeding himself. There was no mutual gaze, and little tactile contact. The mother was right: the baby turned away from her. She looked uneasy and sad and sometimes irritated.

Later in this visit Kathie started to rock herself in the rocking chair while holding Billy loosely in her arms. She looked like a little girl rocking herself, almost a parallel play situation, the hungry adolescent mother rocking and nurturing herself, allowing her baby to drink his bottle in her arms. Yet, as cold as the scene appeared to us, Kathie seemed to get some pleasure from this unusual closeness between herself and Billy. While watching this videotape later she commented that this was in fact a good feeding, a better feeding than usual.

Kathie began to respond to the therapist's deep concern for her as well as the baby. She began to speak of deep revulsion in the feeding of Billy. She was repelled by Billy's vomiting, she confessed and had been since his birth. She was sickened by the sight, the messiness. The therapist saw for herself the horror and panic which came over Kathie when she anticipated—or only imagined—that the baby was going to spit up or vomit.

At the end of a bottle feeding (Billy was taking his bottle on the floor), Kathie hurriedly picked up Billy to burp him. We would expect, of course, that she would hold Billy upright against her shoulder. Instead, she rushed to the bathroom with the baby, faced him over her arm so that he was hanging over the bathroom sink—and Billy vomited his meal into the sink. In this way Kathie avoided her worst fears that the baby would throw up in her arms. And the strategy that she
employed virtually guaranteed that the upside-down-baby would throw up his dinner!...

Until the therapist discussed her observations with Kathie, it had not occurred to the mother that she was precipitating the baby's vomiting. In her mind the only alternative was dreadful: to have the baby vomit in her arms...

Thereafter Kathie could tell us more. She had noticed that when Billy was 3 months old and had began taking solids in his diet, the hue and texture of the vomit had changed. She was so repelled that she reduced Billy's solids to a minimum as a way of avoiding the revolting mess. We now had another vital clue: the decline in Billy's weight curve had started at 3 months...

What, in fact, constituted Billy's daily food intake? Kathie was not sure. During the first visits the therapist often heard Billy's piteous cries of hunger. When she said to both parents that Billy seemed very, very hungry, they were astonished. The father said, "Do you think he is still hungry? I think he is just like me. I could never be satisfied. I could eat everything that was given to me right now." The mother said resentfully that Billy never seemed satisfied; he was always begging for food. "If we gave him everything he wanted he'd eat us out of house and home."...

It soon became clear that neither of these young parents had any real sense of how much food Billy really needed. Actual hunger was part of their daily experience and they had to severely limit their own appetites in many ways. At some level both Kathie and John seemed to feel that Billy would simply have to share in their hunger...
Apparently, they did not fully understand that his life was at risk.

**Assessment and Intervention Plan for the Emergency Period**

Our initial assessment gave us many of the vital clues to Billy's feeding problem. Billy was starving. But he was not "refusing food", he was being deprived of food. The vomiting, according to our observations, was induced by his mother's unique procedures for burping, which were in turn related to her dread of being defiled by vomit.

The psychological picture was beginning to emerge: a teenage mother who avoided contact with her baby; a baby who crept towards his bottle on the floor and fed himself; a mother who had a deep inner revulsion against messiness and possibly toward the baby himself; a mother who was afraid of her own destructive rage; a mother who was an adolescent with unsatisfied bodily and psychological hungers.

The baby was in nutritional peril and in great psychological peril, for in none of our observations did he show signs of attachment to either of his parents. At an age where preferential smiling and vocalization should emerge toward the baby's partners, we saw none. At an age where the baby normally seeks eye contact with his partners, we saw gaze avoidance. At an age when a mobile baby seeks his partners through his own mobility, Billy sought no one. He did not enjoy closeness in his mother's arms, and was still and resistant in the arms of any human partner. His mental abilities seemed well within the Bayley ranges, which testified for some adequacy in stimulation and experience. But what could not be measured through any existing scale was the effect of emotional impoverishment and unsatisfied body hungers in this baby, now
almost 6 months old....

The Therapeutic Relationship

The therapist found out very quickly that if she responded to Kathie's own needs and feelings, either covertly or overtly expressed by her, Kathie would soon, and often in the same session did, attend to some of Billy's needs. For example, as the therapist acknowledged that she understood how hard it was for Kathie to try and hold a baby who turned away, Kathie was able to hold Billy with tears in her eyes instead of putting him down....Kathie had said that Billy did not like to be held; she knew this because he turned away....It was obvious that Kathie's bland, sad face could not hold Billy's attention when she was trying to feed him in her arms. Stern (1973) describes "normal baby talk expression" as elongation of smile, rise and fall of voice, exaggerated nuances. All of these are typical exchange behaviors between baby and mother. All were missing from Kathie's conversation with Billy. . . .

A major concern was the burping process. The therapist had made many suggestions to Kathie about burping Billing, and had tried to help Kathie understand how her method would precipitate vomiting. It was only when the therapist actually stood beside Kathie, however, and shared with her the tension she was feeling, as she put Billy gently over her shoulder with the diaper underneath him, that she was gradually able to begin burping Billy in a normal fashion. . . .

Kathie began to feed Billy the bottle in her arms on a regular basis, but did not yet give him solids. During a number of interviews it
became clear that this was part of more complicated feelings about feeding Billy. At this point we identified two fears: Kathie's fear that "Billy would eat the family out of house and home" and that he would throw up endlessly.

While we recognize that these fears were deeply rooted in Kathie's personality, we knew that we could not uncover the origins of these fears in the emergency period.

Mr. Douglas came from a large, impoverished family and had suffered physical and emotional privations in his own childhood.

The Extended Treatment Phase

While Billy had made progress, we still regarded him as a baby "at risk" in the psychological sense.

In the area of human object relations we saw much we considered ominous. Billy did not respond to his parents in ways that were appropriate for a child of his age. Billy still avoided eye contact with his mother, by turning away. He preferred play with toys rather than human partners. When he was hungry or in need, he still cried helplessly and piteously.

It seemed to us that Kathie was now able to follow much of the therapist's advice, but her responses were always mechanical. She was still unable to mother Billy in a harmonious and spontaneous manner. She still seemed estranged from her baby. She appeared to hold back food and only slowly responded to Billy's hunger cries. She was not empathic with Billy's attempts to communicate distress or hunger. The interaction between mother and baby was still erratic, and Billy could
never really count on a pleasurable response from his mother. Very often Kathie teased Billy with food and seemed to be competing with him...

As part of our continuing assessment, when Billy was 7½ months old, we videotaped another payroom visit which included a Bayley developmental assessment and a spontaneous feeding. This tape spoke eloquently for the mother's ambivalence toward her baby and for pathological tendencies in both...

In one scene Kathie was holding Billy in her arms in a close and tender way while she was feeding him his bottle. Suddenly, Kathie pulled the bottle away, tossed back her head, dropped some milk in her own mouth, and then engaged Billy in a teasing game, in which she was competing with him for his bottle. It was painful to watch, but more painful was our witness to the baby's reactions: he was laughing. He had become a partner in this sadomasochistic game, a game that was repeated several times...

We have learned to give such "baby games" serious clinical attention. Some of our most important clinical insights have been derived from observing parents at play with their babies. The parent in conflict frequently reveals the essence of the conflict in play, in the "harmless games".

What we saw on tape, then, was a young mother competing with her own baby for his bottle. The moments of tender mothering were interrupted by an intruding thought, and feeding the baby became "teasing the baby", "taking food out of his mouth", "jealousy", "competition".
As we watched this tape as a staff, we were struck by the thought that the mother behaved as if her baby were a sibling....

Kathie had regarded herself as the unwanted middle child of her family, the no-good child who could "never do anything right". While Kathie had spoken with some control about her mother and her older sister, she could barely control her rage when she spoke about Essie, her sister younger by 5 years....In nearly every session childhood grievances appeared with more and more intensity and violent hatred....

The flow of memories: the figure of the mother who "rejected" Kathie. Along with these memories came overwhelming feelings of grief, depression, mourning for herself as a neglected, unwanted child. These were the feelings which had been revived with the birth of Billy.

"My mother never listened to me", was Kathie's reproach, a recurrent theme in these hours, but the therapist listened and responded to Kathie's feelings of grief and rage. "My mother said I was bad. It was bad to hate my sister"...."My mother never understood me"...."My mother said I couldn't do anything right"....Kathie believed that her own mother did not find satisfaction in motherhood and did not provide a model for mothering that Kathie felt she could use....

Kathie

Memories emerged with rage when Billy was 8 months old. Kathie was still a reluctant mother to her baby, mechanically following the advice on feeding, now holding Billy for feedings and providing adequacy in caloric intake, but with little spontaneity or joy in her exchanges
with the baby.

For weeks the therapist was puzzled by a complaint from Kathie: Billy, Kathie said, drove her to distraction when he followed her around the house. From the therapist's point of view, Billy's following of mother and touching base with her were most welcome signs of the growing attachment between Billy and his mother. Kathie found it nearly intolerable and took a dim view of the therapist's ideas on the subject.

One aberrant tendency remained. At 9 months of age he still avoided eye contact with his mother. Even in baby games with Kathie when she smiled and encouraged him, he turned his head away from her. In one sequence on tape we saw Kathie playing pat-a-cake with Billy on her lap, facing her, and the baby though participating in the game, averted his head to avoid eye contact with his mother. Kathie, encouraged by the therapist, repeated the game until finally Billy rewarded his mother by smiling and cooing, but still turned away from her. Perhaps soon he would also give her the reciprocal gaze she so wanted as affirmation of his affection toward her. Kathie, we saw with sadness for her plight, had to work very hard to woo her baby after the many months of avoidance and neglect.

**Kathie and Her Mother**

There was another important theme. We had often observed her seeming indifference to Billy's cries. Many times it seemed as if she and Billy were crying together. There was no mother present in the room. With great sadness and anger Kathie would say that her mother had not
understood her.

The therapist asked many times what it was that Kathie most wanted her mother and perhaps the therapist to understand. Gradually her true feelings emerged. She did not want to be a mother, she had never wanted to be a mother, and she was not ready to give up her role as a child.

With great sadness Kathie told the therapist of the very painful relationship she had had with her own mother. She felt that her mother was never satisfied with her, especially as a daughter. As a little girl she had never played with dolls, but had always preferred to play with the neighborhood boys. As she approached puberty, she was accused by her mother of being too seductive. Nothing she did was right. The fantasy of renewed babyhood for Kathie never materialized.

Billy was approaching 12 months of age, a time when he did not yet have words for needs. As Kathie would weep for herself and berate the mother who never heard her cries and needs, Billy oftentimes needed her.

At first she was unable to interpret Billy's cries and the therapist would talk for him. For example, many times Billy was in his playpen and wanted to get out. Kathie was unable to respond.

We did observe that John still occasionally teased Billy in words or games (Kathie did not) and that Billy at these times did not participate in these games, but turned away from his father, typically moving toward other games or toys.
Of Misunderstood Elizabeth Ann,  
Who Became Understood Betsy

Elizabeth Ann lived with her Great-aunt Harriet in a medium-sized city in a medium-sized State in the middle of this country. In the household were: Aunt Harriet, very small and thin and old; Grace, a servant, very small and thin and middle-aged; Aunt Frances, a first-cousin-once-removed, small and thin and young; and, Elizabeth Ann, very small and thin and little. [And yet they all had plenty to eat. I wonder what was the matter with them?]

It was certainly not because they were not good, for no womenkind in all the world had kinder hearts than they. You have heard how Aunt Harriet kept Grace (in spite of the fact that she was a very depressing person) on account of her asthma; and when Elizabeth Ann's father and mother both died when she was a baby, although there were many other cousins and uncles and aunts in the family, these two women fairly rushed upon the little baby-orphan, taking her home and surrounding her henceforth with the most loving devotion.

They said to themselves that it was their manifest duty to save the dear little thing from the other relatives, who had no idea about how to bring up a sensitive, impressionable child, and they were sure, from the way Elizabeth Ann looked at six months, that she was going to be a sensitive, impressionable child. It is possible also that they were a little bored with their empty life in their rather forlorn, little brick house in the medium-sized city.

There was certainly neither coldness nor, hardness in the way
Aunt Harriet and Aunt Frances treated Elizabeth Ann. They had given themselves up to the new responsibility; especially Aunt Frances, who was conscientious about everything. As soon as the baby came there to live, Aunt Frances stopped reading novels and magazines, and re-read one book after another which told her how to bring up children. She joined a Mothers' Club which met once a week. She took a correspondence course from a school in Chicago which teaches mother-craft by mail. So you can see that by the time Elizabeth Ann was nine years old Aunt Frances must have known a great deal about how to bring up children.

And Elizabeth Ann got the benefit of it all.

Aunt Frances always said that she and the little girl were "simply inseparable." She shared in all Elizabeth Ann's doings. In her thoughts, too. She felt she ought to share all the little girl's thoughts, because she was determined that she would thoroughly understand Elizabeth Ann down to the bottom of her little mind. Aunt Frances (down in the bottom of her own mind) thought that her mother had never really understood her, and she meant to do better by Elizabeth Ann. She also loved the little girl with all her heart, and longed, above everything in the world, to protect her from all harm and to keep her happy and strong and well.

Yet Elizabeth Ann was neither very strong nor well. She was small for her age, with a rather pale face and big dark eyes which had in them a frightened, wistful expression that went to Aunt Frances's tender heart and made her ache to take care of Elizabeth Ann better and better. Aunt Frances was afraid of a great many things herself, and she knew how to sympathize with timidity. She was always quick to reassure the
little girl with all her might and main whenever there was anything to fear. When they were out walking (Aunt Frances took her out for a walk up one block and down another, every single day, no matter how tired the music lessons had made her), the aunt's eyes were always on the alert to avoid anything which might frighten Elizabeth Ann. If a big dog trotted by, Aunt Frances always said, hastily: "There, there, dear! That's a nice doggie, I'm sure. I don't believe he ever bites little girls....Mercy! Elizabeth Ann, don't go near him!...Here, darling, just get on the other side of Aunt Frances if he scares you so" (by that time Elizabeth Ann was always pretty well scared), "perhaps we'd better just turn this corner and walk in the other direction." If by any chance the dog went in that direction too, Aunt Frances became a prodigy of valiant protection, putting the shivering little girl behind her, threatening the animal with her umbrella, and saying in a trembling voice, "Go away, sir! Go away!"

Or if it thundered and lightened, Aunt Frances always dropped everything she might be doing and held Elizabeth Ann tightly in her arms until it was all over. And at night—Elizabeth Ann did not sleep very well—when the little girl woke up screaming with a bad dream, it was always dear Aunt Frances who came to her bedside, a warm wrapper over her nightgown so that she need not hurry back to her own room, a candle lighting up her tired, kind face. She took the little girl into her thin arms and held her close against her thin breast. "Tell Aunt Frances all about your naughty dream, darling," she would murmur, "so's to get it off your mind!"

She had read in her books that you can tell a great deal about
children's inner lives by analyzing their dreams, and besides, if she did not urge Elizabeth Ann to tell it, she was afraid the sensitive, nervous little thing would "lie awake and brood over it." This was the phrase she always used the next day to her when Aunt Harriet exclaimed about her paleness and the dark rings under her eyes. So she listened patiently while the little girl told her all about the fearful dreams she had, the great dogs with huge red mouths that ran after her, the Indians who scalped her, her schoolhouse on fire so that she had to jump from a third-story window and was all broken to bits—once in a while Elizabeth Ann got so interested in all this that she went on and made up more awful things even than she had dreamed, and told long stories which showed her to be a child of great imagination. These dreams and continuations of dreams Aunt Frances wrote down the first thing the next morning, and tried her best to puzzle out from them exactly what kind of little girl Elizabeth Ann was.

There was one dream, however, that even conscientious Aunt Frances never tried to analyze, because it was too sad. Elizabeth Ann dreamed sometimes that she was dead and lay in a little white coffin with white roses over her. Oh, that made Aunt Frances cry, and so did Elizabeth Ann. It was very touching. Then, after a long, long time of talk and tears and sobs and hugs, the little girl would begin to get drowsy, and Aunt Frances would rock her to sleep in her arms, and lay her down ever so quietly and slip away to try to get a little nap herself before it was time to get up.

At a quarter of nine every week-day morning Aunt Frances dropped whatever else she was doing, took Elizabeth Ann's little, thin hand
protectingly in hers, and led her through the busy streets to the school building where the little girl had always gone to school. There were six hundred children under that one roof. You can imagine, perhaps, the noise on the playground just before school. Elizabeth Ann shrank from it with all her soul, and clung more tightly than ever to Aunt Frances' hand as she was led along through the crowded, shrieking masses of children. Aunt Frances took her safely through the ordeal of the playground, then up the long, broad stairs, and pigeon-holed her carefully in her own schoolroom.

Then at noon Aunt Frances was waiting there, a patient, never-failing figure, to walk home with her little charge; and in the afternoon the same thing happened over again. On the way to and from school they talked about what had happened in the class. Aunt Frances believed in sympathizing with a child's life so she always asked about every little thing, and remembered to inquire about the continuation of every episode, and sympathized with all her heart over the failure in mental arithmetic, and triumphed over Elizabeth Ann's beating the Schmidt girl in spelling, and was indignant over the teacher's having pets. Sometimes in telling over some very dreadful failure or disappointment Elizabeth Ann would get so wrought up that she would cry. This always brought the ready tears to Aunt Frances's kind eyes, and with many soothing words and nervous, tremulous caresses she tried to make life easier for poor little Elizabeth Ann. The days when they had cried they could neither of them eat much luncheon.

After school and on Saturdays there was always the daily walk, and there were lessons, all kinds of lessons--piano lessons of course, and
nature-study lessons out of an excellent book Aunt Frances had bought, and painting lessons, and sewing lessons, and French. She wanted to give the little girl every possible advantage. They were really inseparable. Elizabeth Ann once said to some ladies calling on her aunts that whenever anything happened in school, the first thing she thought of was what Aunt Frances would think of it.

"Why is that?" they asked, looking at Aunt Frances who was blushing with pleasure.

"Oh, she is so interested in my school work! And she understands me!" said Elizabeth Ann, repeating the phrases she had heard so often.

Aunt Frances's eyes filled with happy tears. She called Elizabeth Ann to her and kissed her and gave her as big a hug as her thin arms could manage. Elizabeth Ann was growing tall very fast. One of the visiting ladies said that before long she would be as big as her aunt, and a troublesome young lady. Aunt Frances said: "I have had her from the time she was a little baby and there has scarcely been an hour she has been out of my sight. I'll always have her confidence. You'll always tell Aunt Frances everything, won't you, darling?" Elizabeth Ann resolved to do this always, even if, as now, she sometimes didn't have much to tell and had to invent something.

Aunt Frances went on, to the callers: "But I do wish she weren't so thin and pale and nervous. I suppose the exciting modern life is bad for children. I try to see that she has plenty of fresh air. I go out with her for a walk every single day. But we have taken all the walks around here so often that we're rather tired of them. It's often hard to know how to get her out enough. I think I'll have to
get a doctor to come and see her and perhaps give her a tonic." To Elizabeth Ann she added, hastily: "Now don't go getting notions in your head, darling. Aunt Frances doesn't think there's anything very much the matter with you. You'll be all right again soon if you just take the doctor's medicine nicely. Aunt Frances will take care of her precious little girl. She'll make the bad sickness go away." Elizabeth Ann, who had not known that she was sick, had a picture of herself lying in the little white coffin, all covered over with white....In a few minutes Aunt Frances was obliged to excuse herself from her callers and devote herself entirely to taking care of Elizabeth Ann.

One day, after this had happened several times, Aunt Frances really did send for the doctor. Elizabeth Ann was terribly afraid to see him, for she felt in her bones he would say she had galloping consumption and would die before the leaves cast a shadow. This was a phrase she had picked up from Grace, whose conversation, perhaps on account of her asthma, was full of references to early graves and quick declines.

And yet--did you ever hear of such a case before?--although Elizabeth Ann when she first stood up before the doctor had been quaking with fear lest he discover some deadly disease in her, she was very much hurt indeed when, after thumping her looking at her lower eyelid inside out, and listening to her breathing, he pushed her away with a little jerk and said: "There's nothing in the world the matter with that child. She's as sound as a nut! What she needs is..."--he looked for a moment at Aunt Frances's thin, anxious face, with the eyebrows drawn together in a knot of conscientiousness, and then he looked at Aunt Harriet's thin, anxious face with the eyebrows drawn up that very
same way, and then he glanced at Grace's thin, anxious face peering from the door waiting for his verdict--and then he drew a long breath, shut his lips and his little black case tightly, and did not go on to say what it was the Elizabeth Ann needed.

Of course, Aunt Frances didn't let him off as easily as that. She fluttered around him as he tried to go, and she said all sorts of fluttery things to him, like "But Doctor, she hasn't gained a pound in three months...and her sleep...and her appetite...and her nerves..."

As he put on his hat the doctor said back to her all the things doctors say under such conditions: "More beefsteak...plenty of fresh air...more sleep...she'll be all right..." but his voice did not sound as though he thought what he was saying amounted to much. Nor did Elizabeth Ann. She had hoped for some spectacular red pills to be taken every half-hour, like those Grace's doctor gave her whenever she felt low in her mind.

And then something happened which changed Elizabeth Ann's life forever. It was a very small thing, too. Aunt Harriet coughed. Aunt Harriet had been coughing like that ever since the cold weather set in, for three or four months now, and nobody had thought anything about it because they were all so much occupied in taking care of the sensitive, nervous little girl....That was almost all that Elizabeth Ann ever knew of the forces which swept her away from the life which had always gone on, revolving about her small person, exactly the same ever since she could remember.

The family talked over and hurriedly prepared to do what the doctor said they must. Aunt Harriet was very, very sick, he told them
she must go away at once to a warm climate. Aunt Frances must go, too, but not Elizabeth Ann, for Aunt Frances would need to give all her time to taking care of Aunt Harriet. Anyhow the doctor didn't think it best, either for Aunt Harriet or for Elizabeth Ann, to have them in the same house.

She had a great many relatives. It was settled she should go to some of them till Aunt Frances could take her back. For the time being, just now, while everything was so distracted and confused, she was to go stay with cousins, although it was very evident that these cousins were not crazy with delight over the prospect.

Aunt Frances was so frantic with the packing up, and the moving men coming to take the furniture to storage, and her anxiety over her mother--she had switched to Aunt Harriet, you see, all the conscientiousness she had lavished on Elizabeth Ann--nothing much could be extracted from her about Elizabeth Ann. "Just keep her for the present, Molly!" she said to Cousin Molly. I'll do something soon. I'll write you. I'll make another arrangement...but just now..."

Her voice was quavering on the edge of tears.

Elizabeth Ann did not of course for a moment dream that Cousin Molly was thinking bad things about her, but she could not help seeing that Cousin Molly was not any too enthusiastic about taking her in; and she was already feeling terribly forlorn about the sudden, unexpected change in Aunt Frances, who had been so wrapped up in her and now was just as much wrapped up in Aunt Harriet. Do you know, I am sorry for Elizabeth Ann, and, what's more, I have been ever since this story began.
Well, since I promised you that I was not going to tell about more tears, I won't say a single word about the day when the two aunts went away on the train, for there is nothing much but tears to tell about, except perhaps an absent look in Aunt Frances's eyes which hurt the little girl's feelings dreadfully.

Then Cousin Molly took the hand of the sobbing little girl and led her back to the Lathrop house. But just at this moment old Mrs. Lathrop took a hand in the matter. She was Cousin Molly's husband's mother, and, of course, no relation to Elizabeth Ann at all, and so was less enthusiastic than anybody else. All that Elizabeth Ann ever saw of this old lady, who now turned the current of her life again, was her head, sticking out of a second-story window; and that's all that you need to know about her, either. It was a very much agitation old head, and it bobbed and shook with the intensity with which the old voice called upon Cousin Molly and Elizabeth Ann to stop right there where they were on the front walk.

"The doctor says that what's the matter with Bridget is scarlet fever, and we've all got to be quarantined. There's no earthly sense bringing that child in to be sick and have it, and be nursed, and make the quarantine twice as long!"

"But Mother!" called Cousin Molly. "I can't leave the child in the middle of the street!"

Elizabeth Ann was actually glad to hear her say that, because she was feeling so awfully unwanted, which is, if you think of it, not a very cheerful feeling for a little girl.
NOW WE SEE AS THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY WHAT ONCE WE SAW FACE TO FACE:
REFLECTIONS ON ACTING LIKE A BABY AT AGE TWENTY SIX

In this chapter I would like to present a natural history vignette of human beings interacting in such a way that it may eventually be possible for a reader to perceive as visible some of the transgenerational pattern segments which make up the infinitely greater array of transgenerational patterningsthis research has generated visibility for, at the same time discussing the language of the self.

Because the pattern parts which have to do with times or circumstances when a human being is alone only become visible after one has sifted through a great many of those involving others, it will be necessary to present at least one example with a detailed attention to interaction with one other. The best succinct examples I was able to garner which serve to make such examples readily visible were reported clinical cases, (since published clinical reports very often include the response, reaction and perception of the clinician to the person being presented). These then served eventually, as additional levels of exploration for deriving the kind of transgenerational pattern findings which became possible in this research. When it came time to attempt to present examples through which a reader might "see" some of the interrelated examples, the overlapping lifespan data necessary for deriving the findings which were possible in this research turned out to be too voluminous for presenting even in excerpt form. The excerpted lifespan data for some transgenerational familial matrices amounted to
over 100 pages, and three such matrices turned out not to be enough even to begin to display the aggregate patternings at the transgenerational level.

It is through the overall aggregate of a hundred or more lives that the return of elements becomes visible. At a later stage, after one has gathered in a wide enough array of lives to make visible the individual-life, and the transgenerational patternings through observing individual(s) both in interaction with another, and through the eyes of that other, it is more readily possible to perceive the underlying commonalities across unrelated lives.

In attempting to bring together a collection of examples through which what was possible to learn through other, non-clinical data can readily be discernible in terms of its patternedness by the reader, published clinical reports appeared to represent the most appropriate examples for elucidating certain aspects of the transgenerational familial self-matrix explorations.

What is particularly helpful in published clinical accounts in making some measure of succinctness of presentation possible, is that through such accounts one has ready access to the reactions, responses and perceptions of another to this human being whose life account seems capable of serving as one example-segment. While there is a disadvantage in that the examples are necessarily heavily weighted on the side of pathology [the research itself concentrated on the lives of human beings not regarded at all as examples of psychopathology, but simply as lives of life] there is a measure of
advantage on the other side of the scale in that pathology is, so I now believe, but notably exaggerated manifestations of the business of living life, and hence will serve not only to appear with greater visibility through their own inherent exaggeratedness, but also later serve the dual purpose of serving as examples of the thesis that pathologies are but exaggerated manifestations of the business of the ordinary living of life, for those who cannot take the ordinary business of just being-in-the-world for granted.

In presenting excerpts from published clinical material from the literature, it will be necessary to make repeated interjections regarding the clinician's perceptions, reactions, and responses. Such interjections are necessary only from the standpoint of the role they will later be seen to play in the transgenerational patternedness are thus very definitely not to be viewed as critical commentaries on any of the responses, etc. of the clinician, however much they might in one or another instance appear to include that possible interpretation. Any and all such interjections will be made only when they relate directly to the findings of this research which necessitate a careful analysis of the responses and reactions and perceptions of others to the lives under exploration here, and in the examples for which only published clinical material seemed to present readily visible exam-
pies, the only other present happens to be the clinician. [Indeed, it might be helpful to interject here that in all cases these were published clinical reports I was aware of from having read them before I had completed this research and in all of those earlier readings, I was completely unaware of any of the possibilities for any of the kinds of interjected analysis of the clinician's findings in this research. Those additional elements of these clinical accounts only became visible to me after a very lengthy research exploration of transgenerational familial matrices outside clinical situations.]

A woman of twenty six seen through the eyes and responses of a clinician (Corney, 1978):

This woman, Miss F. was a patient in an open residential treatment hospital in intensive psychotherapy four times weekly. These things excerpted from the clinician's published account have later relevance to the findings of this research at the transgenerational level:

She returned to her parent's home following graduation from college. For the last two years of college she had become "increasingly phobic and withdrawn". She was "fearful of venturing outside the house, lost interest in maintaining contact with these friends, eventually refused to leave her room, which then took on the character of a miniature hospital with her parents in attendance.

Following a lengthy and detailed account of the stereotyped agenda of her daily life in her room at home (sleeping 12 hours, binge eating of cookies and potato chips, 15 cups of coffee, three packs of cigarettes, at least three occasions of masturbation, and watching television nonstop), the therapist notes the young woman's (at that time)
seeing, twice a week, a therapist, whom she has been seeing through the previous six years.

Miss F. is reported to have felt that only through the support of her therapist had she been able to remain in college. When she returned home the distance made it no longer possible to continue these visits that often. On one of the occasions Miss F. was advised that the therapist was retiring.

Miss F., at hearing this, "was thrown into a panic, feeling that the last shard of 'meaning' was about to vanish from her world". We may take from the author's having set the word meaning in quotation marks that it was the precise word Miss F. used, and that it seemed to have a reason for being notably set off in his account in this way, despite its being a wrod we would have accepted as quite ordinary in that context, and despite the fact that he does not later inform us what determined him to elect to set off only that one word of Miss F.'s in quotation marks in an entire page (and again many pages later) of remarks attributed to, or citing, Miss F. in which no other quotation marks were used about any of Miss F.'s statements: only "meaning.

It was following Miss F.'s being thrown into a panic that her parents, on the advice of the retiring therapist, brought their daughter to the hospital where she is now in four times a week therapy with the author of this account of Miss F.

He begins his account of his responses, reactions and perceptions of her from a description he had written of her after a few weeks of therapy
with the sentence "Miss F. is an obese woman with long straight hair and large, rich brown eyes." The clinician reports that "unquestionably her obesity is the most immediately striking thing about her", and obesity comes first in his account. We may take it that her hair and her eyes are close runners up once one has got past the immediate point he had reached when writing this description.

There follows a very long, very detailed account of the therapist's impressions, reactions and responses to Miss F.'s physical appearance, her "image of herself" which requires her "dressing in baggy clothes", and, predominantly, an account of the manifestations of what the author terms her "bizarre anal, urethral or masturbatory concerns".

The author includes in among the account of these manifestations in the therapy times, the information that "invariably, her first comments [when she enters the room] call attention to her body; that she may complain of a rapid heartbeat, her menstrual period, some experience in the bathroom just before seeing him" reports of "inexplicable vaginal smells or sensations." He notes that "Indeed, references to bodily functions, most often having to do with the vagina or anus and often quasi-delusional, occur repeatedly during contact with her," and that these intrude into her thoughts and their conversation "as anxiety is triggered". He interjects after these notations the fact that Miss F.'s typical response to any question or comment of mine that suggests some alternative way of looking at things is to withdraw, look terribly hurt, and rather quickly drift off into bizarre anal, urethral, or masturbatory concerns." He concludes the section with the remark that "At this point, I know a good deal more about her activities in the bathroom
and under the bedsheets than I do about the vicissitudes of her inner experience during the past 26 years."

At the time of first encountering this account a year and a half before completing this research, I shared the view of the author with regard to the last sentence of that section. After having spent a long time exploring the transgenerational familial matrices of well over one hundred families made up of many intergenerationally overlapping lives, I believe, based on my research, that the clinician was wrong, at least from the frame of reference in which he meant that sentence—since it seems clear that what he was intending to say was that "At this point, Miss F. has presented me with a good deal more about her activities in the bathroom and under the bedsheets than about the vicissitudes of her inner experience during the past 26 years."

The view that the empirical data of my research has seemed to insist upon after many sortings of the data, is that Miss F. had in fact made the clearest presentation a person could possibly make of the vicissitudes of her inner experience during the past 26 years, repeating it many times during each session, but that the perceptual orientation of the clinician left him unable to perceive that this is what she was presenting, and all that she was presenting. This is only my belief but it is my belief.

It is in this light that it becomes, I think, important to turn back to the author's earlier page, on which the one word he recognized as so distinctly important in all of Miss F.'s initial introduction that it required to be put into quotations, was her word "meaning".
Clearly, she had managed to impress on the clinician the resounding significance for her of this word, for there was no other reason one can imagine for his having experienced it as the one word to invest with notably set off qualities from the rest of her introduction. On the next page of the report, we learn, if my research is leading me in the redundantly empirical direction I believe it to be, that the meaning of all of Miss F.'s relentless presentations of the vicissitudes of her inner experience had eluded the clinician.

In this light, one must reconsider the "meaning" of her statement that with the leaving of her former therapist, "the last shard of 'meaning' was about to vanish from her world." Inasmuch as the therapist was not acquainted with Miss F. prior to the time of her having become his patient at the hospital, we must assume that she reported this remark to him, about her fear that the last shard of meaning was about to vanish from her life when she heard that her former therapist was retiring during the time she was in therapy with him, (or that, her parents reported this statement of Miss F.'s to him). In either case the message has the same relevance, except that is she said it to him, as seems more likely (since he is careful to ascribe to the parents their quotations about their daughter), that remark about her former therapy has the additional relevance of representing her trying still another way to let him know the vicissitudes of inner experience for the past 26 years: in any case so my research leads me to now believe.

At this point, it has been possible to provide a reader with all that the clinician writes of having himself known up to the time where
he is able to say "At this point I know a good deal more about her activities in the bathroom and under the bedsheets than...etc."

"At this point" in Miss F.'s therapy, I believe, based on this research, that it is more reasonable to believe that the clinician's orientation led him to believe that she was not presenting him with an accurate account of the vicissitudes of her inner experience for the past 26 years and that she was instead presenting him with an array of odd and unintelligible craziness which it was his job to generate interpretations for. As indeed he tells us he had been working hard at doing.

Before going on to attempt to demonstrate the direction in which my research leads my thoughts of Miss F.'s presentation thus far, it is helpful I think to include here the next statement of the clinician: "I was most puzzled by this woman. During the early weeks of treatment I could not imagine what sort of person she really was or how she had come to be this near caricature of symptoms and complaints. She chattered about thoughts that were bizarre, and very intimate, with little discernible anxiety, and with seemingly no awareness of her possible impact upon me. He notes that she was unwilling to talk about her past life, parenthetically including (and perhaps unable).

The therapist was very empathic about the extent to which he was distressed by his very great difficulty understanding the meaning of the bizarre verbal outpourings of this 26 year old woman, and by the fact that she would not (or could not) talk about her past life.
One of the reasons Miss F. provides a particularly excellent example for the purposes of attempting to elucidate life data through which to later bring together some of the transgenerational patterns made visible through this research is the fact that Miss F. did not talk about her past life. I now believe that it is when a patient talks about his or her past life that it is a more difficult task for the therapist to grasp what Paul Ornstein and Anna Ornstein (1972) regard as the "central message" in among the patient's verbal content.

In Miss F.'s failing to do this, she is, so my research indicates, presenting a considerably more clear message about the vicissitudes of her inner experience of the past 26 years. Had she done so in words, which could have led the therapist astray, he might well have presented some of that content; at least he would not have, we must imagine, instead presented so clearly the pattern Miss F. was permitting him to be privy to, as he was able to do from the clear messages she was, in the absence of a "verbal story of her past life," redundantly providing him four times a week. Or so I now believe.

In order to discern what Miss F. made clear about her inner experience of the past 26 years, we must again back up and go over the account presented us thus far, of the reactions, responses and perceptions of another to this woman. For the moment we will skip over a repetition of her reported behaviors of the time she spent in her room with her parents in attendance, and her therapy of the prior 6 years, and college years and begin instead with the therapist's introductory remarks after a few weeks of therapy. In that, we may also for the moment skip over
the detailed physical descriptions of Miss F.'s corpulence and begin instead with the fact that she "arrives in the office [4 times a week] cheery, chortling, and smiling", and then to the next statement of "Invariably her first comments call attention to her body." Many of these (perhaps all; the therapist does not say) are of a nature that seem to the therapist bizarre, out of place; they are the sort of references to bodily functions that don't fit what one would expect from a 26 year old person in conversation with a relative stranger.

Indeed, since the person reporting the account speaks from the vantage of a therapist full time in a treatment center for persons whose pathology is so severe as to require them to be inpatients, we must assume from the impact her comments have on him that they are the sort of references to bodily functions that do not fit even with what one would expect from a patient in a psychiatric hospital: Miss F.'s many allusions and references to bodily parts and bodily functions are not only colored by a nature the therapist senses as "quasi-delusional" but as beyond the sort of bodily function and parts remarks a therapist in a psychiatric hospital might not-infrequently encounter.

Hence at this point, we know that Miss F. a) arrives in the office four times a week cheery, chortling and smiling (while simultaneously gasping from the long walk up the stairs); b) invariably her first comments call attention to her body, and c) this calling attention to her body is not the sort of calling attention to her body that a writer might be referring to in writing about other 26 year old women, who, for quite different sorts of behaviors than are being described here,
are described as calling attention to their bodies in ways that might be said to be more appropriate to their young adult age. Hence, we know that Miss F.'s calling attention to her body is not here running the risk of being misunderstood by the therapist as attempts to seduce him into a sexual response: the author makes it perfectly clear that Miss F has made it vividly clear that what is normally referred to as "seductiveness" on the part of an adult woman would not be an appropriate interpretation for what she is engaging in, or presenting, in invariably beginning by calling attention to her body. Which makes it possible for us to say that she is, after arriving cheerily, invariably beginning by calling attention to her body in ways adults do not do unless something is very much amiss.

Now, up to this point, in the absence of awareness of any theoretical formulations which might enable a therapist to understand the meaning of a person who comes into a therapist's room cheerily smiling and invariably calls attention to her body and bodily functions in ways adults do not do unless something is very much amiss, the therapist may justifiably feel he has not had opportunity to learn anything about the vicissitudes of Miss F.'s inner experience of the past 26 years. [In fact, Heinz Kohut's psychology of the self does provide just such theoretical formulations, but reference to them is not necessary in this situation in order to present what my research leads me to believe Miss F. was loudly saying about her inner experience of the past 26 years: that is to say, while it is unquestionably valuable to have the added benefit of a systematic theory which might elucidate all of this and
alert the therapist to these particular symptoms which are otherwise, as the therapist says, so puzzling as to make it not possible to imagine what sort of person she really was or how she had come to be this near caricature of symptoms and complaints, and make it understandable in the larger context; I nonetheless believe that prior theoretical awareness does not make Miss F.'s presentation of awareness of her inner experience of the past 26 years any more visible than Miss F.'s own presentation of herself in interaction is doing all on its own.

For that we must look not to theory but to what the other who was in regular interaction and encounter with Miss F. reports of her and of his perceptions, responses and reactions to her; in other words, we must simply look to what is actually occurring in the real situation in front of the therapist, (or now, in front of us as observers of this bit of natural history of one life interacting with another).

The next thing we learn from observing this other's report of this woman in interaction is that these references to bodily functions that are so out of place for a 26 year old "occur repeatedly during contact with her, intruding into her thoughts and our conversation as anxiety is triggered." She comes into the office smiling and cheery, invariably first calls attention to her body, and then, in the course of contact with another, she begins repeatedly manifesting intrusions into her thoughts of more bizarre commentaries on bodily functions, now in quasi-delusional form, when something happens in the interaction between her and another that somehow triggers anxiety in her.

Before continuing, I think it is important to again interject—only
so that the reader not lose hold of that thread of things as we go along—that there are specific reasons for needing to go back over each of these points, and to re-look at them both individually and cumulatively, for future purposes which have no way of being discussed until we have managed to amass a fair collection of such carefully analyzed natural histories of interacting persons. In this example thus far, the primary need is to attempt to show an example of some of the ways in which a person can be seen to be manifesting what we will later be able to see, through the collection of several examples, as representing the clearest possible presentation a person can make of the vicissitudes of her inner experiences of the past x number of years, and yet be perceived by the rest of us as if he or she had either intentionally or unintentionally not given us a clue about those vicissitudes of inner experience, or that inner experience per se.

The author next notes that Miss F. is "superficially friendly", and that she is "compliant", and repeatedly states that she 'loves' therapy and likes her therapist. The therapist is saying that she is not really being friendly, that it only looks that way on the surface, and that despite all of her obvious distress, she finds herself of a mind to be compliant and to speak in amicable terms of the therapy, so it would seem.

Here we must rely on our own empathic inferences, since we do not have access, as we do with the therapist's perceptions, responses and reactions, to her verbal account, but we can nonetheless stay only with the specific things we have been told of her by another who was face to face with her throughout all this time that the therapist was receiving
his own impressions.

We know that she brought with her into this series of interactive encounter—experiences, an immediately preceding time of having found it somehow not comfortable for her to be able to leave her house, and eventually her room; and somehow not comfortable for her to any longer maintain contact with her friends; and that for two years previous she had been becoming increasingly phobic and withdrawn, (which seem to be saying pretty much the same sorts of things, except that at first she had been able to manage that discomfort well enough to remain in college but now things are obviously a lot more uncomfortable for her since she now has to keep herself shut in her room).

And we know that during the time that she was able to go about, however restrictedly, and to remain in college, she also had an enduring six year relationship with a woman, who was her therapist; and that things had got worse starting when she left college by graduating, which put her at too great a distance for the regular twice weekly visits that appear to have sustained her even when she was phobic and withdrawn while at college, since she actually managed to graduate.

We know that once she got home things got worse, and once she could no longer remain in regular contact with the former therapist, they got much worse. We don't know whether both of these factors, or only one, is what should be inferred as associated with things rapidly growing worse once she graduated from college and returned home and never left the house again. We next learn that the young woman was "thrown into a panic", of such proportions that the therapist should feel it
necessary for a young woman only shortly previously able to attend to her college requirements, graduations, etc., to be placed in a residential treatment center: we can certainly feel safe in inferring that something about this woman had in fact been making it possible for Miss F. to hold herself together to some minimal degree at least. But now, nothing is managing to hold her together. Now she is someone the therapist cannot even imagine what to make of: a bizarre "caricature".

Although we can imagine that she well may not have been able, or willing, to spell out all of what the severing of that relationship meant to her, even the Miss F. who does not spell out her inner experience in words could not keep from making at least part of her inner experience in that context loud and clear: she impressed on the therapist that Miss F.'s feeling when she was informed by her former therapist of her imminent plans to retire was "that the last shard of 'meaning' was about to vanish from her world". She did not, surely, tell him to set that one word in quotation marks; the only one. He gives no clues in words, for why he would set off but one word in a paragraph in quotes, an ordinary, everyday word like meaning.

We may take those comments to mean, along with the fact that she comes in smiling and cheerily, that it is not in response to the fact of having to come to his office, or of having to be in a place she dislikes, or to some internal disposition that Miss F. feels anxiety but to quite specific events in the environment, that anxiety is "triggered", bringing with it these odd-seeming phenomena. And fortunately for the natural historian, the author next spells out for us what these
specific events are, and what Miss F.'s highly specific reactions to these events in the environment are. "Her typical response to any question or comment of mine that suggests some alternative way of looking at things" spells out for us what the specific events in the environment are that trigger things off in distressing ways for Miss F. and her typical response to these events is "to withdraw, look terribly hurt," and, then, "rather quickly drift off into bizarre anal, urethral, or masturbatory concerns."

The next important aspect of how things go for Miss F. which the author permits us to know of is that his orientation did not permit him to think of what Miss F. was presenting to him of herself in those terms: this too he spells out in quite specific detail by informing us that his analysis of all this that he has presented of what Miss F. was making it possible to know of her thus far is a quite different one; that his analysis of what she had been doing is simply making it possible for him to know a very great deal "about her [specific] activities in the bathroom and under the bedsheets", and nothing at all about her inner experience, either of the past 26 years or the current time in interaction with this other person.

Now, I think, it helps to attempt to put ourselves in Miss F.'s shoes for a minute and try to reconstruct--not in any interpretative way, but simply from what we have observed of her here and now--what has been going on for Miss F., so that we may line that up with what has been going on for the therapist.

In addition, he tells us of his perception, response and reaction
her and her presentation of herself to him thus far (after some
weeks of four times a week, he has said, is the time of these thoughts):
his response to her presentation of herself was to be "most puzzled," to
feel that he "could not imagine what sort of person she really was," nor
how she got to be this way. His perception of her now, he says, is a
near caricature of symptoms and complaints. He notes too that
he also finds it seemingly significant that she has "seemingly no aware-
ness of her possible impact upon me".

All of this so far seems to be saying that we know that something
about this former therapist had been capable of enabling Miss F. to
hold herself and her life somewhat together, so much so that when she
got a far distance from her so that she could only see her less fre-
quently than before, Miss F. could no longer hold her life together and
had to stay home in her room; and that when the therapist was going to
vanish from her world altogether, things got abruptly so much worse that
she was no longer able to hold her self together and could not even
manage in a home-hospital with her parents in attendance, but had to
remove to a real hospital. A hospital where there would be another
therapist.

It would seem that for someone for whom things had been that dif-
ficult, and who had so recently suffered such a disintegrating loss,
it might feel scary to be walking into another--strange--therapist's
office. For someone who could not even come out of her room, it might
not have been overly surprising to have read that she had not been able
at all to come out of her hospital room to present herself to a stranger.
But instead we read that Miss F. did so willingly—invariably entering smiling, cheerily and chortling. Bizarre perhaps, but cheerily.

A fair assumption from the data themselves so far would seem to be that a) Miss F. felt a great need for another such experience such as her former therapist had been—that is, a great need for someone who knew how to help her hold herself together and keep from continuing to disintegrate. When she said that she felt that the last shard of meaning was about to vanish from her world now that the other therapist was retiring, it seemed clear that she was saying that neither her mother nor her father could manage that "whatever it was" that the former therapist could, of enabling her to hold herself together, even if feebly. That thought of having no such person brought panic in its wake, and panic was intolerable. So it seems a fair assumption that she came willingly to try to make such a relationship happen a second time, with a new therapist.

We know that the second she got in the door she began calling attention to her body, and of the wide array of different "bizarre" aspects of that which she brought to his attention. Of the therapist's responses to her invariable and immediate callings of attention to her body, thus far we know only that he responded with "questions or comments of mine that suggest some alternative way of looking at things". And just as invariably as she continued to bring up one or another from this wide array which the therapist defines as her ongoing business of "calling attention to her body", the therapist continued to suggest alternative ways that she could look at things, and just as invariably
as the therapist continued to suggest alternative ways that she could look at things, Miss F. regularly, "typically", reacted by withdrawing and looking terribly hurt and then "rather quickly drifting off into her bizarre anal, urethral or masturbatory concerns.

Since there would seem to be no logical or necessary reason to not infer that when the therapist reported that she looked terribly hurt, she was looking that way because she felt that way, it would seem a fair assumption from the spelled out facts that Miss F. was terribly hurt by these regularly repeated suggestions that she look at her concerns about herself in some other way, of the therapist's. And that she was terribly hurt to keep coming in smiling and cheerily and working hard at calling attention to her body, and having the therapist never just respond to all of her attempts to call attention to her body, but instead to tell her in many different ways that he believed her meaning was something else, and tried to suggest his meanings to her.

My transgenerational research strongly suggests that what triggered off Miss F.'s anxiety was the repeated demonstration that there had vanished from her world the only person who understood her meaning when her former therapist retired, just as she had feared. My research suggests that it was in fact the great dread of being in a world in which not one person understood the meaning of anything she did or said which had plunged her into panic, which is as good a word as any to encompass anxiety. Each time the therapist demonstrated to her that she had been right in being afraid of that, the anxiety was triggered off again. An important clue in all of that, as well, is that each
time the anxiety was triggered off by being misunderstood she withdrew. These are not inferences or interpretations, these are simply the facts, in sequence, which the therapist reported, phenomenologically.

Since gradual withdrawing from people was in fact what she had been visibly doing over the past two years, and since profound withdrawing from the outside world had been what she had been doing since she got home to her parents, we can infer that something about being around other people triggered off anxiety so distressing to her that it was necessary to withdraw from them: just as she was now again repeating with her encounters with the therapist. He had admitted to the reader that he not only did not understand her but that he could not even "imagine" what "sort of person she really was", all the while that she was, so it appears from the facts reported, trying to make it clear that the sort of person she really was was "a person who found it so painful when other people did not understand her meaning, and who wanted to insist on substituting their 'alternative' meaning that hurt so terribly that it was necessary for her to withdraw from people altogether, so that they could not hurt her that terribly."

Across many dozens of natural history accounts of entire life spans I was able to trace the life experience of persons who, mostly in far less severe distress than Miss F., (although one cannot know that except in the analytic situation) followed this identical sequence of gradual withdrawing from friends, from outside activity and very often but not in every case, into the seclusion of their homes, in reaction to the unendurable pain it caused them that others were never able to
understand them and their needs and feelings, and hence, never able to respond appropriately to their feelings and needs.

I was additionally able to trace these identical sequences of life experience across extended intensive psychotherapy situations with three young children, and one adult, and to come, by way of the additional level of discourse possible in psychoanalytic psychotherapy, to know that these phenomena of "drifting off into anal, urethral or masturbatory concerns", in ways that are not integrated into the rest of the person's personality, are the patterned concomitants of their experience of not having their needs and feelings accurately understood by others: at least they were for the person with whom I worked. I myself knew these phenomena only by observation in therapy; but not their systematic understanding. I have since learned to understand them, in a systematic theoretical framework through Heinz Kohut's work.

I have been able to trace this identical larger constellation so many dozens of times, across lives of persons from so very many walks of life, and so very many time frames and geographic regions, that its validity and generalizability seems unquestionable to me.

Additionally, beyond tracing the sequential patterns of the phenomena themselves, (that is the sequence and configuration of the manifestations of their experience) I was able to trace for many dozens of human lives the parenting experiences that colored their earliest years, as well as the more longitudinal transgenerational familial matrix of which this one "parent-child" generational sequence was a part. Hence I believe Miss F. is not only demonstrating her current,
present, here, now, today, inner experience, but also in so doing she is reproducing an identical superimposable template of the experiences of her infancy and/or childhood.

While it is of course eminently understandable that in a therapy situation where the therapist was encountering this person's "bizarreness" as a patient that this should be so, in fact the therapist's response too can be seen as superimposably on the template of the person's early experience, which would seem to make it eminently logical that the patient, in this case, should manifest a literal concrete replay of her infantile inner experience, in the content she is described as employing (the quasi-delusional concerns with anal, urethral and masturbatory concerns) and repeated efforts to call attention to her body in ways not consonant with her chronological development.

What this is saying is that the overall category into which the therapist's perceptions, reactions and responses can be seen to fit—however understandable in such a situation—appear to be simply repeating a configuration not unlike the perceptions, responses and reactions the child who would grow up to experience life and others as Miss F. is doing here has elicited from her parents in her infancy and/or childhood; i.e., she simply arrived before her parents each day smiling; she called attention to her body; they did not understand her meaning, instead invariably insisted upon their meaning, and she found that painful, felt terribly hurt and withdrew. This is not at all, of course, meant to say that the descriptions provided for the parents of Miss F. have any relationship whatever to anything about the therapist as a
person, but something quite different, which I will try to show, both here and as we go along.

Here, it will probably be helpful to interject the description the author does provide of the parents of Miss F. They "both are from poor small town families, worked their way through college and maintained a modestly affluent, suburban lifestyle throughout their marriage." None of those factors enter into the transgenerational (nor intergenerational parent-child) patterning associated with this developmental pathway I am permitting Miss F. and the therapist to analogously present here, for succinctness sake: I found this pathway unfolding across all demographic factors (which is not necessarily the case for all of the sequences it was possible to trace in this research).

In the therapist's brief contact with the father he found him to be "a taciturn, remote individual", and one who "possessed little understanding of psychological processes", and who "was highly invested in minimizing interpersonal conflict within the family". Of these four, which comprise the sum total of the author's descriptive picture of the father, the last two are not translatable into a frame of reference that could permit me to know whether they would or would not be part of the parental characteristics which I found to be salient through my research. That is, I understand what the therapist means in the context he is speaking of, but I do not know how to interpret the actual things about the father that would have led him to make those inferences, and hence cannot translate them for this purpose, as phenomena.

I found too, in this research, that there are parents who are des-
scribed from brief, or even extended, encounters who are perceived as
taciturn and remote by persons outside their families, who **behave**
**strikingly** differently, i.e., exuberantly, or playfully within the
context of their families, as well as parents who are **always** taciturn
and remote. So, although I found in the course of analyzing the life
spans of the parent generations concomitant with analyzing the life
spans of the child-now-adult generation a **like configuration**, it was
also very often the case that a quite ebullient and "playful" **father**
entered the picture as well. What did characterize the fathers in every
instance of the pathway we are here tracing through, in a distressed
adult's replay of the template of her early experience, was their in-
ability to **understand** and/or **respond accurately** (or empathically) to
the child's needs, which very largely meant the father did not under-
stand the child's **feelings** about very much of anything. This was as
true when the father worked very hard at being a "good father", as he
and often others saw it, as when he seemed not to be doing so.

Of course none of these things we can know from this account, and
so for the moment we can say little about how the father's impact fig-
ures into this particular transgenerational sequence involving Miss F.

Of the therapist's brief encounter with the mother, he reported
that she impressed him as a "highly anxious, controlling, brittle woman"
one who was "trim and looked younger than the patient", and whose "in-
cessant chatter, banter, and nervous laughter were most difficult to
endure." He writes too that he found the mother's reasoning quite hard
to follow,"her use of language often peculiar and obscure."
Here too, it is difficult to translate into objective terms the words "controlling" and "brittle", since I came eventually to recognize that these, and similar, words were often used by others to describe persons but when I analyzed the life span of such persons via their perceptions, reactions, responses of their experience of themselves, those words seemed to imply something quite different from what the person could more accurately be, so I believe, described as. Here I am only trying to make clear that in endeavoring to learn to recognize what the elements were that formed the clusters literally descriptive of human beings, I came to believe that some of the terms we are accustomed to use seemed to fall into the category of subjective inference on the part of the other, and, while there is nothing wrong in making statements about one's subjective inference of another, I found it necessary to restrict myself to the domain of terms that were more literally descriptive of phenomena to as great an extent as possible, until and except when persons would a) describe their personal experience and, concurrently, I would also be privy to what others around them inferred and called that. After I had amassed some hundred such references, I came to know from research analysis what inference I could validly infer from some of the subjective ascriptions of others. Hence I can say here that if the author experienced the mother as controlling and brittle, one of the counterparts I very often found to be the more objective statement associated with persons so described may very well have been Miss F.'s experience of her mother. Across several hundreds of lives, I encountered this or a not unlike view of another with regard
to persons who were not well able to accurately perceive the experience of another (here based on my first hand comparison of A's report of his experience of himself--say in his diary--and B's mistaken perception of A's feelings, etc.) and who, as a result of that perceptual difficulty experienced a child's demonstrations of need as not being that at all, but rather as being an affront, a rebuff, a slight, or an unfair or thoughtless demand on them.

For example, a child might feel afraid and experience a need to be soothed and comforted by his or her parent, and go to the parent in search of that. The parent able to perceive that the child is frightened and experiencing a need to be soothed and comforted, I found almost invariably made an effort to do that, regardless of the difficulty or inconvenience that might at that moment entail. And, across several thousands of instances in the several hundred life spans I explored, I came eventually to be able to recognize that in almost every instance in which the parent did not respond to a child in some situation analogous with the one I am here using just as a representative example, it was because the parent was incapable of perceiving that the child was feeling frightened, or of recognizing that what the child needed when frightened was to be soothed and comforted.

Unable to perceive the child's current feeling accurately, the parent would not respond but would instead react to the child's bid for attention or comforting, etc., as if to an affront or thoughtless demand. For example, if a child were feeling frightened about something and in need of the reassuring comforting and soothing of a parent
and got out of bed to go where the parent was so as to be able to experience the parent's comforting presence, a parent not able to perceive that this was the determiner of the child's experience would greet the child's getting out of bed with a demand that the child return to bed. Here the child always felt profoundly misunderstood, where the parent is making an erroneous interpretation of why the child is there. Sent back to bed is a demand that the child accept the other's erroneous perception of his or her meaning. The parent who does not understand this, erroneously perceives the child's not going back as an affront to the parent: there is now no place for the child's meaning.

For his or her part, the child could not very readily return and leave the parent until comforted and reassured, for the very reason that had impelled him in the first place. So instead of obeying the parent's direction, the child would attempt to ignore it, so as to be able to do a better job this time at making his real need known. The parent unable to perceive the child's feeling or experience, I found, invariably experienced this as a "refusal to mind", i.e., a denial of the parent's right to tell the child what the child was to do. A redundant maternal statement in this patterned matrix was "he never minds me!", often this meant "he does not accept my meaning of his actions."

It was after an extended exposure to these phenomena that it eventually became clear to me that parental responsiveness to a child appears to come under two broad categories, responding and reacting. The distinctiveness between these two concepts as I have found it pervasively insisting upon being heard, or on becoming visible at an under-
lying level, is that the person able accurately to perceive the feelings and needs of the other will in fact perceive a sense of its being "all right" to hold in abeyance one's own feelings and needs, and respond to the child on the basis of the child's needs and feelings.

Not surprisingly, I found that all parents will react some of the time, e.g., when they are ill, or overtired, or necessarily preoccupied with a profound concern, but I found that there appears to be a clear dichotomy nonetheless between those parents who can respond to the child's need, and those who are by and large not able to respond, and instead, regularly react to the child's demonstration of need.

In the large majority of instances, this was invariably traceable to faulty perception on the part of the parent, and it was this misperception—or, as I came eventually to think of it, perceptual distortion, that gave rise to the behaviors of parents described as "controlling."

I found, too, that it was not the case that parents who experienced this kind of perceptual distortion with regard to their child necessarily experienced a like inability where (outside) others were concerned; I found this to be sometimes the case and sometimes not, and where not, this was in turn (in the parent now) often traceable to the fact that here the parent (to other/non-child) was herself or himself feeling (and being) misunderstood.

My purpose in digressing into this interjection was to illustrate as one of the findings of this research that the term "controlling" does not seem to me, on the basis of this research, accurately to portray the person, nor the person's experience, nor the phenomenon itself, which is rather widely regarded as, and termed, a "controlling person"
and that in all instances in which one subjectively experiences another as a "controlling" parent, or a controlling person, this research suggests that as a primary sign that one might consider the possibility of perceptual deficit whose result is inability to perceive the need or feeling of the child for what it is, and instead experiences it as something the child is "doing" to the parent. Which in turn leaves the child reacting not to "the parent" or other things, but simply to being misunderstood, misperceived, etc., and hence, not being responded to accurately. The whole matter of perceptual deficit, and concomitant inability to respond accurately to a child's need, or, in other words, to respond empathically to the child, is one that I believe this research has been able to teach me a great deal about, but a full discussion of that will not be possible in this account. It seems worthwhile from the reader's standpoint to interject examples of some of the research findings in context, and I have tried to do that instead.

It appears that the person unable to perceive the child's needs and feelings accurately, according to the relentlessly redundant life pathways traced in my research, is unable to do so because his or her own needs are of so compelling a nature, and so pervade that person's experience, that they "drown out" the awareness of the child's needs and feelings. In other words, what became compellingly clear to me was that whenever a parent was consistently missing the mark (whether dramatically visible or at a level of subtlety that made it difficult even for the child to be certain that was what was happening) in their interacting with and overall parenting of their child and children, it was
almost invariably possible in later tracing the parent's life experience to discern that the person's needs made it not possible for the parenting "part" of the person to accurately discern the child's needs and/or impossible to hold in abeyance his or her own.

In such situations, the parent is no longer in a position to respond to the child's needs, but must, in all circumstances, (wholly unbeknownst to the parent) react to what is experienced by the parent as an unconscionable, completely-inappropriate something which the child is doing to the parent.

Many instances of this abounded, but none so vividly, nor dramatically than in a young mother who I regularly observed with her 4 year old son. Each time he would demonstrate any ordinary child need for attention or responding, she would insist on her need being, instead, the determiner: when the child would attempt to get his needs responded to, the mother would first raise her voice (again to demand that her--often purely arbitrary--desires be the determiner; by the next round, she was invariably shrilly shrieking her insistent demand that he do what she said; at which point, if I was not there, she would, regularly, "give him a good smack", or a slap in the face (as she told me). When I was there she would instead turn abruptly to me and say, in a loud, shrill whine--"See what he does to me: he does that to me all the time! He never minds!" She viewed my role as the child's therapist as one whose end result would be "to get him to mind me."

This is the same child mentioned in another chapter as "a four year old boy who came to say goodbye to me."
If we now apply even this small concept to Miss F., and her mother say (we are for the moment simply making no assumptions about the father here, only on the grounds that we have no reliable evidence on which to do so yet), and hypothesize that what the author has experienced as "a controlling mother" is in fact a mother whose own needs are of so compelling a nature that they drown out all awareness of the feelings and emotional needs of her daughter, who is thus incapable of accurately perceiving or understanding her daughter's demonstrations of her needs and feelings as only that and nothing more, and who will hence instead react to them as if they were unconscionable and completely inappropriate somethings which the child is doing to the parent, we may be in a position to think in terms of the impact on the infant who was Miss F. starting back 26 years ago.

Such a hypothesis would require us to imagine the infant Miss F. as, from the beginning, having gone about the business of demonstrating her baby needs to her mother, only to repeatedly experience the jolting startle of having something else happen in response to her demonstration of ordinary little baby needs other than what would have "felt right". I don't think we need to concern ourselves, at this developmental level, with whether or not there were fantasies attached to the baby's experience of any of this: certainly were we to do that for Miss F. on the basis of what we can here know, we would be taking great liberties with the data before us, as well as the data of the hundreds of lives for whom I was able to trace template-analogies of this phenomenon. But we can without doing any violation to the data, simply on the basis of
any adult's common experience, feel convinced that if in fact the baby Miss F. were to do whatever it is that babies do to make known that they are in need of some sort of understanding of what this demonstration the baby is making means—and if the person there to tend to the business of what the baby's demonstration does mean, pretty regularly fails to understand the meaning of baby's demonstration of some baby need or other; then at some point this baby would begin to have a rather pervasive sense that something is not right between her and the world, even before she has any cognitive grasp of the "fact" that there is a "world" outside of herself.

For now, we can simply hold onto the possibility that Miss F. got started in life in an interacting situation where something she had no capacity yet even to conceptualize was repeatedly startling her by its falling wide of the mark whenever she had occasion to be responded—or reacted—to. And in this same light, we can also hold onto the fact we know about, that there had come along, by the time Miss F. was 20 or so—by which time things were not going right at all between Miss F. and the world outside herself—one person seeming to have some grasp of the meaning of Miss F.'s presentations of her complex of "symptoms".

Now we can turn back again to the author's text, and take up where we left off—in the middle of his description of his perception, responses and reactions to this person who had had the job at the beginning, of Miss F.'s introduction to the world and who applied her perceptions, responses and reactions to the new baby just getting
started in the business of being Miss F. The therapist had said that in addition to experiencing Miss F.'s mother as brittle and controlling, he perceived her also as highly anxious. We have no way from the data of knowing whether she was highly anxious when Miss F. was a baby, so we cannot say that, although we can hold in abeyance as one possibility, in thinking of Miss F.'s infancy, that her mother may have been highly anxious then too, and we can hold on to the thought of how it might have been for an infant to have been held, fed, etc. by a person who was highly anxious. Or perhaps only somewhat anxious. We don't know.

As the therapist continues in his description of his perception, responses, and reactions to Miss F.'s mother--from one brief encounter in his adulthood, he remarks on her "incessant chatter, her banter, and her nervous laughter: the responses or reactions they evoked in him were feelings of interaction with her as being "most difficult to endure without growing irritation". If our earlier hypothesis about Miss F.'s mother's having compelling needs which make it not possible for her to respond, but instead react, (with this coming out experienced by others as controlling and brittle) should be correct, we can imagine as a possibility that what an adult therapist long accustomed to interaction with adults of all varieties of expression experiences as most difficult to endure in the course of a brief encounter, might have been considerably more difficult to endure for an infant, toddler and small child--who did not have the benefit of his experience of many others, and who did not have the benefit of having to interact with her only for a brief
He remarks too that he, as an adult, experienced much of her reasoning as quite hard to follow, and her use of language obscure and often peculiar. It seems safe to assume that by her reasoning the author was referring to the way Miss F.'s mother understands the meaning of things. He, as an adult, got a strong sense that Miss F.'s mother did not seem to attach the same meanings to things that one might reasonably expect the average person to make of things, and that she additionally put her meanings in words that were difficult for another to understand the meaning of.

Then we can go on to the reported statement that the first four years of Miss F.'s life she had only this one parent around representing the responding environment: Mr. F. was in the military for four years, the first four years of Miss F.'s life. During these first four years of life, Miss F. was mostly alone with her mother: "We were together all of the time. We were inseparable maybe because we were lonely."

Without needing to resort to any inferences regarding the specific impact on Miss F. of being alone, and inseparable from a lonely woman, we can find in this account the fact which my research was consistently demonstrating: that the absence of a father per se across the beginning years of a child's infancy redundantly presented itself as one of the factors regularly appearing in an analysis of the early childhoods of a very great many persons who experienced one or another variety of sense of things not being quite as they should in the adult experience
of the person about himself or herself.

Although I take this, in the light of my research, to be a highly important addition to our knowledge of how things went in the course of this business of getting to be Miss F., it is important to remain clear about the fact that at this point one can, equally definitively, make no further inference based on that fact alone. In other words, while I did, redundantly, find that in all cases where there had been a literal absence of the father for a protracted period in the child's infancy, it was then possible to trace one or another of a seemingly finite range of later life phenomena appearing in what I have come to believe is clearly patterned form, I also found that a) this phenomenon, in all such cases, always existed only as one element in a patterned configuration of other elements significant to the child's early experience—so that there is most clearly no statement being made here about the "absence of the father" per se as a causative factor in Miss F.'s arriving at the point she is now at in life, just as my research has repeatedly demonstrated that it would be patently incorrect to infer that the business of Miss F.'s mother having been highly anxious, or difficult to follow, or any of the other factors mentioned, was a causative factor. Which permits us to move on to the b) part of that, which is that I found the absence of the father for a significant period in infancy as one of the elements in a given range of unfolding developmental pathways, and that by no means did any greater proportion of those unfolding patterns appear in life pathways that led to the kinds of trouble Miss F. is having, than to quite different, other,
unfolding developmental pathways, some of them in directions the outside world regards as making quite a success of one's life. The absence of the father—along with the cluster of other elements of which that fact is in a given pattern-instance a part—research has found to be clearly traceable at the level of the individual lifespan, the intergenerational parenting level, and at the level of the transgenerational familial matrix.

Next the author remarks that when Mr. F. returned home permanently a baby brother was born, and Miss F.'s mother experienced a "nervous breakdown" following a post partum depression. And that it was at this time that the mother began to engage in a "chronic pattern of episodic bouts of heavy drinking in which she unleashed verbal and physical abuse at family members, particularly her daughter."

My analysis of several hundred life spans very strongly supports the belief that enables a different perspective on Miss F.'s current situation than those facts perhaps more customarily lead to. It is true that one can readily imagine without the benefit of extensive transgenerational or intergenerational research that toddlerhood and childhood would have to be difficult at best for a little child whose mother first became depressed, then next has a "nervous breakdown". We do not need to know at all what form that took, I learned; what is significant for the purposes of understanding Miss F. (and her mother as well) is that two experiences came along right on top of one another in which it was not possible for her mother to be other than entirely preoccupied with her own needs; and having no way available to the mother to accurately perceive her daughter's demonstrations of her ord-
inary child's needs of the sort a child just naturally turns to its mother for. Knowing nothing more than the fact that her mother was first in a state of profound depression, and second, in a state capable of being termed a nervous breakdown, we know that when the four year old Miss F. looked to her mother for an understanding of the meaning of her demonstrations of her child needs, her mother did not understand little Miss F.'s meaning; she was not able to perceive Miss F.'s needs or feelings accurately and not able to respond to them in any way that would be capable of feeling right to the small Miss F.

What my research has been able to show in a patterned way is that very often in the tracing of the life span of a wide array of persons, it was clearly discernible that part of the unfolding developmental pathway which included the mother's having a nervous breakdown and a depression was that she did in fact have needs of so compelling a nature that she was entirely unable to accurately perceive the feelings or needs of the infant and young child, and reacted to the child's demonstrations in terms of their impact on her, the mother, rather than responding in terms of the needs of the child.

In my exploration of lives which included this element along with all of these thus far noted of a mother's experience, the added element of heavy drinking on the part of either parent invariably coincided (from the standpoint of interrelated elements) with the finding that such a person had the sort of perceptual deficit I noted earlier, which ruled out the possibility that the parent, if the mother, could accurately perceive the meaning of the child's demonstrations of his
or her ongoing and changing constellation of child-needs.

An awareness of the clusters of interrelated elements from my research, points in a way that has appeared so redundantly that I now am convinced that precisely those few pages of clinical reporting which the author provided us with in introduction to Miss F., (and which led to his saying at the conclusion of that segment "At this point I knew a good deal more about her activities in the bathroom and under the bed sheets than I do about the vicissitudes of her inner experience during the past 26 years"), in fact represent precisely the few pages of clinical reporting necessary to make it possible to know an extraordinary amount about Miss F.'s inner experience. We can know that what Miss F. is providing the therapist is an identically superimposable template of her current inner experience, and of her inner experience of the first several years of life from the beginning: the inner experience of the Miss F. of 26 and the inner experience of the infant Miss F. can (with no violation of any sort to the data she presents, and no interpretation whatever), be perceivable solely from an analysis of what precisely Miss F. is doing, rather than from words she is using to describe her activities in the bathroom, along with an analysis of the perceptions, responses and reactions of Miss F. to the therapist's perceptions, responses and reactions to her demonstrations, so my research supports. An analysis of these sequences of interaction--once divorced entirely from the words used to provide verbalizability to them--can be seen as coinciding with one of the kinds of parenting phenomena
cluster which would be concordant with the kinds of demonstration Miss F. is providing to the therapist (and to any others with whom she is able or willing to interact). This, not at all something uniquely associated with the therapy per se at this point of analysis, seems to lend strength to the view that one is on the right track in thinking of Miss F. in those terms.

Miss F. began life as an infant in the sole care, for her first four years, of a woman who had a perceptual deficit in the realm of being able to perceive a child's demonstrations from the perspective of the needs of the child, (and who was thus unable to accurately perceive the child's demonstrations of even the most ordinary baby needs such as the average ordinary mother just naturally does in the course of her everyday caring for the infant child. In short, her mother who, from the unavoidable frame of reference of her own perceptual deficit, was unable to perceive the accurate meaning of any of the child's ordinary baby demonstrations, and hence failed to respond to the child in consonance with the child's feelings and needs: Miss F. additionally, began life in the context of a four year span in which there was no such thing as father. With those thoughts in mind, we can turn back to Miss F. in the context of her 26 year old therapy.

One of the things we need to take note of, because of its significance for Miss F. in perhaps helping to trigger off all the sorts of seemingly bizarre phenomena from the therapist's perspective (and, more importantly, that which helps to confirm for us that what we are
seeing here is in fact an identically superimposable template of Miss F.'s earliest experience) is that the therapist felt, as one of his perceptions, responses and reactions to Miss F., the sense which seemed important to him: that she chattered about thoughts that were bizarre, and very intimate, *seemingly with no awareness of her possible impact upon him*.

One of the findings of my research has been that the adult who behaves in ways that seem strange or inappropriate to others and which appear entirely to disregard their possible impact on the other person quite unvaryingly was capable of being seen, in the analysis of that person's life span, as a person raised by one or both parents who experienced the child, as a function of the parent's perceptual deficit, as a child who should be thinking about his demonstrations of ordinary child needs from the perspective of the distressing impact they were having on the parent, rather than feeling just naturally entitled to demonstrate his ordinary child needs so that they might be responded to from the perspective of his ordinary child needs. In other words, the parents of the child reacted to the child's ordinary demonstrations of childlikeness as if they were inappropriate *demands* on the parent: demands which meant the child "didn't care at all about the mother's feelings," say, or in which the child "just didn't seem to give a damn about whether his father or whether his mother had a headache or was tired" say; or "refusing" to remember to put his toys away or "refusing to go to sleep and let us have company in peace", or would "purposely" make a lot of noise when he knew his father was trying to work in his
study. These are intended not at all as representative but as only an infinitesimally small sampling out of the many thousands of very different kinds of reactions on the part of the child in which the child's needs, or the child, just doesn't come into the picture and in place of the child and the child's feelings and the child's needs, what dominates the picture instead is the parent's perception that the child ought to be taking into consideration the impact that the things he is doing are having on his parent(s), instead of the other way around.

What seems to happen in the course of the unfolding development of persons for whom this sort of perspective has been a good part of the picture from his or her parents' standpoints (whether or not the parents otherwise work very hard at being good parents, and care very much about the business of doing all that is good for the child, and regard themselves as quite excellent and giving parents) is that to one degree or another, some part of their later life will include aspects which will include phenomena which include things which are experienced by others as the therapist experienced Miss F.—as seeming not to care about the possible impact all of these things she was saying and doing might be having on the therapist.

At the profound distress level to which things have got for Miss F., this comes across as simply seeming nothing more than her need for others who will regard her and her demonstrations wholly from the perspective of her and her needs, and not be busy being concerned with the impact on them of her needs. However, I was able to trace this same phenomenon at a far less distressed level across the lives of many per-
sons, many of them eminently successful by ordinary standards, who had a similar need. In them it was considerably more possible to perceive that what this was about from the standpoint of the experience of that person was a sense (often unconscious) of being entitled to the unconditional responsiveness to them and their needs on the part of others in the environment, more than just simply a need for unconditional responsiveness from others.

Persons who held this (most often unconscious) sense of entitlement appeared to have no notion of the impact of this exceptional stance on those from whom they felt entitled to grand scale responsiveness. They clearly experienced it as a given that others would share this view of their entitlement: the person sensed nothing unusual about it, and hence did not think in terms of impact of this on others.

For many subjects who manifested this entitlement-experience there was data available on their childhoods through which it was possible to trace the degree, level, and/or kind of responsiveness to the child's needs on the part of his parents. Of these, for all who manifested this later life entitlement-experience, I found evidence that parents had either been absent (often for reasons related to the parent's self-needs) and/or that parents had reacted to the child on the basis of impact on the parent's sensibilities, needs, feelings, etc. and/or simply not responded or reacted to the child's needs at all (e.g., when depressed, preoccupied, etc.). In many such instances, the common denominator was that the parent was not attuned to thinking, speaking, behaving, in terms of the child's sensibilities, needs, etc.
The therapist had reported that one of the compellingly noticeable things about Miss F. was that she seemed to lack awareness of her impact on him. I believe this is directly related to the research data discussed here. That is, concomitantly, Miss F. experienced an archaic sense of unconditional entitlement to the therapist's understanding responsiveness to her infant-needs (perhaps because she had received this from her former therapist, who she had suggested, understood her meaning). And, when she did not receive this responsiveness (to what she was demonstrating need for)—because the therapist did not, as he said, understand her meaning in these demonstrations—Miss F. experienced a sense of woundedness: she looked terribly hurt, the therapist said.

Because of her profound vulnerability where self experience is concerned, the painful self-experience of having her meaning understood, and of having another repeatedly put forth his "meanings" instead, regularly evoked panic, as the therapist reported. The panic appears regularly to have evoked further regression, or fragmentation. If the view of this research, and of the psychology of the self, is correct, Miss F.'s patterned regularity, in the therapy situation, of "regression" to fragmentation of self experience, when regularly evoked by failure to respond accurately to the particular kind of self-structure need she is at that moment attempting to communicate, would represent a superimposable template, or reply, of her actual early experience.

Hence, in the view this research suggests (as so too the psychology of the self in more systematic and comprehensive detail), I believe we may say with justification that Miss F. is regularly making available
to the therapist, in each session, a considerable amount about her inner experience of the past 26 years. This research suggests, as substantiated by the Kohutian formulations, that these content verbalizations about "what went on under the bedsheets and in the bathroom" contain next to nothing (or, I think nothing) which requires interpreting, or paying any heed to. In the case of Meredith very many of the words and sentences said by Miss F. about these "bathroom things" etc., were identically verbatim with Meredith's bathroom incidents and comments. In the case of Meredith my paying any attention to them whatever, (and particularly, my attempts to suggest some meaning to these verbalizations, regularly evoked the identical fragmentation as happened with Miss F. and her therapist. Ignoring these verbalizations proved, in time, the way of getting on the track of what the fragmenting child was talking about: in the cases of Meredith, John, Michael, and the mothers of both, they eventually each made clear that there was a sharp distinction between the words (of content) they said (including fantasies, etc.) and "what they were talking about" at the time. For them, what they were talking about was not related in any way to anal concerns, etc. but about my failure to understand their meaning, about the unendurable pain and panic that caused them, and about the way in which my failure at correct understanding called forth resurgence of that same experience in early life.

Overall, this research--both the clinical aspects and the life history aspects--suggests that it is incorrect to perceive a patient or client as "unwilling" to talk about her past life, and that perhaps that is, unvaryingly, a situation in which it is not possible for the person to manage that without a terrifying sense of risk. I believe that what
the risk is about is a great unconscious fear that one might permit a therapist to be privy to one's need for responsiveness, by talking about his past life, and in return the therapist might let the person down by not understanding his or her meaning. If we were to accept the view that it is quite possible for a person to experience a painful sense of woundedness and possibly panic and regression to fragmentation, meaning when a person provides the therapist with a demonstration of a particular self structure need for which responsiveness is a requirement, it becomes possible to think in quite different terms about the business of a patient's being unwilling to talk about his past life. Resistance, attempts to control the therapist, not getting started in his therapy, etc., find other perspective in this view.

For some in my clinical research experience, by the time things have reached a point where the person needs to seek therapy, the person could not manage to risk that until the therapist had given clear evidence that she was going to be able, or willing, to respond on the basis of that person's inner experience needs. Also, the research made it possible to know that the person does not at all demand perfection on the part of the therapist at discerning the precise meaning immediately. The precise meaning seems not to be the thing of greatest importance. The real importance seems to lie in the therapist making it clear that he or she has intentions of responding to the person from the standpoint of the person's meaning; and that the therapist is aware that there is a meaning which is the person's own meaning, which is not possible to articulate, and hence not easy for the therapist to grasp.
Hence, I think, we can trust a patient in Miss F.'s shoes, to be
telling us a very great deal simply by her invariably coming into the
office calling attention to her body. With no further elaboration
beyond the simple declarative statement of what Miss F. brings up for
the therapist's unvarying attention, immediately upon coming in the door
(that is, with no further elaboration beyond what the therapist is able
to perceive with great clarity as underlying all that Miss F. says and
does in the course of all of her many-splendored demonstrations) i.e.,
that she is doing her damnedest to call attention to her body. I think
we may trust that just that is Miss F.'s inner experience: she is
needing to relentlessly work hard at calling attention to her body,
like a baby.

Miss F. is now seeing as through a glass darkly what once she
saw face to face; that is, of recapitulating her infant experience, in
her fragmenting in the face of no one's getting her meaning: her looking
terribly hurt when others try to say their meanings are the right ones,
her drifting off into anal, etc. concerns, and so forth we could, I
think, say that Miss F. is still feeling the echoes of that early
mirroring failure, and that what she is doing now at 26 is simply acting
like a baby.

If we were to accept as a working hypothesis that in a situation
where the words seem bizarre, or not making sense, or not saying what is
really bothering them, etc. the person is nonetheless letting us know
where the most important trouble is. We would have to begin with the
notion that for some reason Miss. F. is calling attention to her body—
and not at all in ways appropriate among adults.
If we were to accept as a working hypothesis that one can trust the patient or client to know what it is that she requires from us with respect to her inner experience when she is making it also a shared outer experience in this way, we can then say that Miss F. is experiencing a need to have her demonstrations of calling attention to her body empathically responded to.

Given this working hypothesis, we might then expect Miss F. to withdraw and feel terribly hurt if she comes in, four times a week, week after week, calling attention to her body and receiving in reply a series of interpretations that say that once again, the other person is not willing to let her have her own meaning, or to let her baby needs for mirroring responsiveness to her body get responded to.

Many persons are well adept at not letting us see that they are terribly hurt under circumstances where we have fallen wide of the mark, but not Miss F.: she makes eminently visible (as her typical response, wrote the therapist) that it is in direct reaction to what has just been said to her each time she calls attention to her body that she becomes immediately withdrawn, and terribly hurt. In addition, each time she calls attention to her body, and is responded to on the basis of our own thinking about how one might interpret that, she experiences that as so painful that she immediately thereafter drifts off into her bizarre quasi-delusional anal, urethral and masturbation concerns. She seems to be relentlessly permitting us to see that there is a direct ineluctable and unvarying connection between the attempts to call attention to her body, the receiving a reply that hurts her terribly
and these strange concatenation of bizarre seeming expositions on bed-sheet and bathroom phenomena.

It seems worthwhile recalling here that the Kohutian psychology of the self frames as one of the, if not the, earliest inner experiences for the new infant the need to call attention to its body, for the purpose of eliciting from the mother what Kohut believes represents one of the very earliest requirements for the developmental maturation of the human self: a smiling, approving admiration of the baby's physical body.

Kohut sees the business of getting to be a human being, as getting started by the mother's providing ordinary smiling, approving admiration of the baby's physical body with the natural order of things helping that along by seeing to it that the ordinary baby will just naturally kick and wave his arms and legs around in smiling, cheery, chortling ways to make sure the mother notices.

This research suggests that some parents fail to respond in that way—either because they are not around, or because they are depressed, or because they are preoccupied with concerns of their own that drown out their ability accurately to perceive things in the ordinary way that most mothers just naturally do in the presence of a new baby.

Most babies just naturally manage to get some modicum of response to this need for their infant body-self to be greeted with smiling, approving admiration even if the mother is depressed, or
preoccupied with concerns of her own, etc. because there is usually at least one other person around who will, at least some of the time, respond in the ordinary parent-like way to the young baby's displays of pink little toes and shortles. With Miss F., as one impact of her father's having been gone for the first four years of her life, and of her mother's statement that the two of them were always together and always alone, and lonely, there was the fact that there was no one else around to provide any of the responsiveness to ordinary baby needs for empathic responsiveness.

Along with a very vast amount else, Kohut predicts that in the absence of consistent responsiveness on the part of the parent in the first weeks and months of life to the ordinary demonstrations from the baby for smiling, admiring admiration, the baby will be unable to achieve a coming together of the initially not-yet-cohesive fragments of the rudimentary self. Since Kohut has been led by his psychoanalytic reconstructive data to perceive the maturation of the human self as following an epigenetic maturational pathway, the things that are supposed to happen—in the natural order of things—happen not chronologically, but epigenetically—with the next step in the self's maturation following along after the step before it has been got through. Once the self's maturation has actually got started along on its unfolding
developmental pathway, a progress of sorts can be made even when something happens in the environment to make it so that the baby might not get optimally helped along by the appropriate provision from the environment (of parenting persons).

Missing out on receiving the particular responsiveness sorts of things that appear to make up the natural order of things where the developing self is concerned at any step along the way will lead to some degree of vulnerability in the self structures, in Kohut's view, but the later such failures on the part of the environment occur in the child's development, the less pervasive will be the extent of deficit in the self structure, and the less pervasive or profound the vulnerability to later life stresses. But missing out at the beginning, missing out to the extent that not even the most elementary requirement—that the baby's body itself be smillingly, approvingly admired, on a regularly recognizable basis that the baby is able to appreciate as responsive admiration of himself and the physical body: missing out at that level, and to that degree, has no alternative but to result in the most profound of all possible defectiveness in the core self of the person. For such a person says Kohut, there will be profound vulnerability to self fragmentation, with little, if any, cohesion of the self structures; the person will look, on the outside, like a person, but inside the core self will have remained in the state appro-
appropriate only for the time of earliest infancy. With the rudimentary self fragments never having received the requisite admiring responsiveness without which his research finds the self not able to form into a reasonably firm, cohesive entity, the subsequent epigenetic steps along the unfolding developmental pathway cannot proceed, and serious consequence in some form is all but unavoidable.

For such a person, the vulnerabilities of their profoundly defective self structure will be so pervasive that only with very considerable shoring up from the environment will the person be able to attempt to proceed through the ordinary aspects of living. Hence, we can see the fact of Miss F.'s having required the concentrated assistance of her former therapist for 6 years as following from what one would expect to find in tracing Miss F.'s unfolding developmental pathway prior to reaching the profoundly fragmented state she finds herself in at 26.

The therapist remarks at a later place that in addition to the six years with the former therapist, in fact Miss F. required assistance from at least four other therapists in addition to the former therapist and the present therapist: she had twice been hospitalized for acute psychotic episodes in adolescence, had earlier been expelled from school for having experienced a severe school phobia from age 13 to 16, and was "maintained continuously on a daily regiment of phenothiazines" for some years. Later, upon being accepted at a "prestigious" college she looked forward to attending, she became increasingly phobic within a few months at school despite her growing attachment to the former therapist with whom she had by then begun to be in therapy.
The sense that things have been extraordinarily difficult for Miss F. from the beginning, seems corroborated by these accounts, as well as by the brief details of other aspects of her unfolding life pathway which follows; (these having been much later derived from the therapy experience).

At age four the patient had begun waking at night screaming, and complaining of intense vaginal pain and distress, eventually hospitalized for two days of tests which showed no discernible overriding physical causation, but which was followed by nightly ointment applications to the vaginal area for some extended period up to age six.

The next seven years were reported as a time "of relative quiescence", and the patient reported to have been an "intelligent, vivacious and talented youngster who was socially and academically successful", until "overt trouble" erupted again at age 13, reported as associated with sexual intimacy with a girl friend, and weight gain for which her mother insisted she see a "diet doctor" who placed her on amphetamines for the next three years--the amphetamines being stopped at 16 when Miss F. realized she was "disoriented" and unable to concentrate in school and attributed this to the amphetamines.

For the ten years following this time of becoming disoriented at age 16, Miss F. was "continually in treatment" clearly, to no avail.

Once in therapy with her former therapist she moved out of her parents' house and took a job as a clerk, recalled feeling glad to be on her own and swiftly became involved with a young man, in which her first and only sexual experience of her 26 years was experienced
by her as "exciting" and "terrifying". A formerly slim and pretty young woman, Miss F. had transformed her body self into an obese condition and maintained that—with her obesity being remarked on by the therapist in his introduction to his account as unquestionably the most immediately striking thing about her.

Despite the fact that this girl, and young woman, was in excellent physical health, had lived in a two-parent home in which there was neither desertion, death or divorce; was physically very pretty, cognitively very intelligent, had been accepted to and graduated from a prestigious college; had been able to make friends, and had tried repeatedly to make a go of life, it had never worked— from the beginning.

At 26 it has become necessary for her to take up living her life within the bounds of a psychiatric hospital, and not even there does she seem to fit the readily recognizable experience of the staff therapist accustomed to spending all of his professional days treating those who have found it necessary to take up living their lives within the bounds of a psychiatric hospital: "I was most puzzled by this woman", he wrote, "During the early weeks of treatment I could not imagine what sort of person she really was or how she had come to be this near caricature of symptoms and complaints".

In the therapist's published account, his intent was to present the treatment modality new to him which he was attracted to by his bepuzzlement as to what sort of person Miss F. really was or how one might proceed in therapeutic treatment with a person such as Miss F. The treatment orientation he endeavored to use to help him understand
Miss F. was the psychoanalytic formulations of the French theoretician Jacques Lacan, who has for two decades or so been engaged in attempting to construct a new understanding for psychoanalysis, or for the understanding of inner experience, by employing a structural analysis in which his goal has been to show that the unconscious is structured like a natural language. Inspired by the early linguistic formulations of Ferdinand de Saussure, Lacan has constructed a vast and profoundly complex compilation of formulations based on premises related to such concepts as the relationship of the signifier to the signified, the concept that the unconscious originates in the discourse of the other; participation in the universe of shared significations, and concepts of resonance between persons in therapy based on their intersubjectivity.

Employing a measure of these concepts, the therapist writes (in very considerably more completeness and detail than this) of his having devoted himself to the task of "employing his own associations in resonance with the patient's to join in the quest for that which is signified at a nodal point in the vast chain of signifiers comprising the signifying chain in which signifiers can be related to each other in a particular linguistic space and may form sequences in accord with semantic and syntactical laws and conventions... The technical importance of... the concept of resonance is not that it leads to interpretations on the part of the therapist, but rather that it permits the therapist to speak evocatively, therein facilitating an enrichment in the polyphony of the discourse of the other (Lacan, 1968, p. 62)."

In the continuation of his account of the treatment, the author
notes that "on beginning participation in the psychoanalytic situation the language of the patient generally consists of 'empty words' signifying an imaginary, objectified image of himself, alienated from the possible full speech of his authentic subjectivity. In Lacan's formulation," the author continues, "such use of language, in which the voice of the subject cannot be heard, is rooted in the development of the ego in the 'locus of misunderstanding' and repression." The account continues across a finely wrought complex of Lacanian formulations, and the therapist's efforts at employing them, and of the impact these eventually came to have on his work with Miss F., who, up to that point in the therapy he had been, he says, experiencing as a "very stubborn woman" who "clung tenaciously to her symptoms as if they were the only meaningful things she possessed, across the first twelve weeks of the therapy and beyond."

After twelve weeks of despairing of ever finding even a beginning point of how to "find within myself some useful way to be with this very troubled and troublesome woman", he came to a writing of Masud Khan on the vicissitudes of being, knowing and experiencing in the therapeutic situation [1969], which led him to reflect on Khan's observation that a person such as Miss F. needed first to feel that it was relatively safe to venture being herself before she could ever begin upon the subsequent task of actually experiencing her present and past and eventually knowing their meaning. Neither an attempt to put into practice Masud Khan's guidelines, nor the stance with which he alternated this helped: "at times I tried actively to understand her words via inquiry
and clarification. This only seemed to provide further confusion and seemed to have a reinforcing effect, stimulating further intrusive thoughts and stereotypic verbalizations. At other times, I tried interpreting and gently confronting her with the defensive quality of her schizophrenic thinking and verbal obfuscation with me. "I commented," he continues, "on how little of her past and present experience she was revealing to me with her repetitive complaints. This kind of intervention only served to bring about temper tantrums, feelings of rejection, sulking, and serious misunderstanding between us." He was, he reports, beset by mounting frustration and feelings of impotence, at which point he consulted with colleagues and began to realize that his determined efforts to understand "might be interfering with my ability to hear the melody constituted by the words." It was, (significantly, he notes) at this point that he joined a seminar studying the thought of Jacques Lacan. It was at this point that he was led to initiate a "radical inquiry in the patient's own, and my own, use of language," swiftly formulating the impression that "for Miss F. words had become the permanent status of an objectified ego through which the voice of the subject could not be heard."

A line of Lacan's: "In order to liberate the subject's word, we introduce him into the language of his desire" seemed to frame words for what seemed to be needed, yet, he wrote, "how this might actually be accomplished remained obscure to me. I was trapped in the emptiness of her words just as she remained untouched by the emptiness of mine."

Eventually, some time later, Miss F. brought into her session some
Before we move beyond the close look at the account itself, it will be helpful to back up and interject some number of commentaries that will help build the framework for the pattern presentation of which this lengthy interactive excerpt is intended to form a part.

At the last interjective place, the concentration was on Kohut's conceptualization of the person whose efforts at calling attention to his infant body failed to bring forth from the mother a kind of admiring responsiveness that is essential for the baby's rudimentary self structuring (in highly specific ways). Such failures block developmentally appropriate needs. Kohut does not believe that such a decisive blocking of a child's maturing natural tendencies could be carried out by parents who are in even minimal empathic contact with the ordinary maturation of their child.

Writes Kohut: "My clinical experience with patients whose severe personality distortions I would formerly have attributed to a fixation of the drive organization at an early level of development (orality), and to the concomitant chronic infantilism of their ego, has increasingly taught me that the drive fixation and the widespread ego defects are neither genetically the primary nor structurally dynamic, most centrally located focus of the psychopathology."

Rather, he underscores: "It is the self of the child that, in consequence of the severely disturbed empathic responses of the parents, has not been securely established, and it is the enfeebled and fragmentation prone self that (in the attempt to reassure itself that it is alive, even that it exists at all) turns defensively toward pleasure aims.
statement that seemed to the therapist to connote that Miss F. had lived with her bizarre experiences for so long "that her litany of empty syntonic words had become a necessary means of providing some objectified formulation of herself, signifying her living with a persistent inner experience that felt uncanny and beyond the communicative power of speech. He remarked on that to her, saying "Somewhere over the years in the midst of your words, you have gotten lost."

Miss F. began to weep softly "for the first time without the customary exaggeration... After a very long pause she stated that this was what she had been trying to tell her therapists for ten years, but only Mrs. K. [her former therapist] had begun to understand...For the first time she spoke movingly of feeling utterly hopeless, terrified of the future, obnoxious to everyone around her, physically repulsive, and just plain "bad" for having any problems at all." A week earlier Miss F. had given the therapist a book of poems she had written in college; it seemed to him an apt moment to respond to her by telling her the impression the poems had made on him. He noted that for the first time Miss F. left the session without her customary list of somatic worries --after his commenting admiringly on her poems.

The therapist in his account remarked that what had taken place between them suggested to him that he had found the words to call her by her real name for the first time and had achieved resonance with the zone of her genuine subjectivity: that in Lacanian terms, her "je" was what had "gotten lost in her words, and when addressed properly, it had spoken in return."
Despite the therapist's sense that things might now begin to progress, and some measure of objectified speech became possible for Miss F., certain repetitive concerns predominated for many months: these were her intense anxiety and dread preceding sessions and at the beginning of sessions; her pressured requests for assurance in regard to all real and imaginary physical problems, including obsessive fears; urgent requests for reassurances against these fears, and a constant need to know of the therapist's potential availability between sessions.

What pervaded the first half of the work with Miss F., wrote the therapist, was the grindingly obsessive nature and repetitive language of those concerns, all of them recurring several times in an hour like a stuck record, in piercingly whiny tones. Most difficult to endure for the therapist was the relentless repetition, session after session, month after month, of Miss F.'s piercing whined question "Do you know what I mean", which unfailingly served to set the therapist's teeth on edge. Again the therapist provided naturalistic observations:

"Outside the therapy, Miss F.'s world was colored by times of fury and opposition in response to any sense that she might be pushed to change in any way: she tended to experience any suggestion made by another person as a moralistic command, such as those given to her by her mother. In therapy she repeatedly asked if it would be acceptable for her to talk about how she really felt with me and the hospital staff: the therapist noted that he did not hesitate to reassure her repeatedly that she was free to speak fully of herself.

Following an experience of panic in the evening after first having
to be moved into a new room, "Miss F. was up all night in a delusional state, hysterical wailing." Following that, in the office her speech became "increasingly delusional and repetitive" and very often she would repeat such phrases as okay, or all right, scores of times in sequence. When she did this it reminded the therapist "of the sound and purpose of a white noise machine, a contentless auditory interference with the transmission of words between one person and another."

"In time the patient had further delusional and panic episodes, one of which gave rise to a phobic fear of having to go in a car in which car fumes would cause her to become psychotic and require her being locked up." From this instance it had been possible for the therapist to raise the thought of ether, which gave rise to a forgotten memory from her fourth year when she was hospitalized for the removal of her tonsils and had feared as the mask went over her face that she would never wake up. "And that she had been driven to the hospital in a car." She was "then able to speak of the parallels between those feelings and her feelings during the terrifying hospitalization for gynecological tests after having waked screaming in the night." From there the therapy went on to evoke communication of her terror at being moved to the new room, and of her feeling that she had not deserved to have pleasure from sexual feelings.

The account goes on considerably beyond this, across the course of Miss F.'s therapy, and moves beyond the point where it serves as graphically as this earlier part can, I believe, be seen to do in the trans-generational frame of reference. I think these early aspects of the case history do this, when viewed with other examples.
through the stimulation of erogenic zones, and then, secondarily, brings about the oral and anal drive orientation and the ego's enslavement to the drive aims correlated to the stimulated body zones" (1977), [p. 4].

Kohut makes an important point that it is not easy to describe the phenomena associated with the child's use of his body's erogenetic zones; I need to make an effort in that direction—because of the part this can be so vividly seen to play in the unfolding pathways of an array of self difficulties, which I am presenting in a series of juxtapositions in different parts of the account.

When the child's self is not able to progress beyond a state of enfeeblement, or fragmentation, the child will be a depressed child literally having great difficulty feeling himself alive, which is apparently a frightening, and panic producing feeling. What Kohut has been able to arrive at in his reconstructive research is that the depressed child goes to great lengths to attempt to find ways to counteract the experience of the fragmentation or enfeeblement of his core self experience: in his frantic efforts, he discovers that stimulation of erogenic zones manages to produce some measure of sensation which accomplishes the tragically pathetic function simply of assuring the child that he is alive or exists at all.

The breakthrough that Freud and later Abraham achieved was in recognizing that there was a correlation between certain characterological features and persisting fixation on certain "pregential drives", for example, in the conceptualization of "anal" penuriousness. This pro-
vided a "brilliant explanation of a complex set of psychological phenomena", in Kohut's words, but "the very brilliance of this intellectual achievement has prevented us from recognizing the limitations of insight provided and has instead actually skewed our attitude toward the certain psychological far and away from the place where the important etiological understanding of what all that is about is located, and hence, far and away from the kind of understanding that could help such persons therapeutically." Kohut gives a nice example of this in a brief section in which he includes the words:

"We do indeed, I believe, reach a more satisfactory explanation if, in addition to the drives, we consider the self of the anal period a self during an early stage of its consolidation. If a mother accepts the fecal gift proudly—or if she rejects it or is uninterested in it—she is not only responding to a drive. She is also responding to the child's forming self. Her attitude, in other words, influences a set of inner experiences that play a crucial role in the child's further development. She responds—accepting, rejecting, disregarding—to a self that, in giving and offering, seeks confirmation by the mirroring selfobject "functions of the mother". The child therefore experiences the joyful, prideful parental attitude or the parent's lack of interest, not only as the acceptance or rejection of a drive, but also—this aspect of the interaction of the parent and child is often the decisive one—as the acceptance or rejection of his tentatively established, yet still vulnerable, creative-productive-active self. If the mother rejects this self just as it begins to assert itself as a center of
creative-productive initiative (especially, of course, if her rejection or lack of interest is only one link in a long chain of rebuffs and disappointments emanating from her... or if her inability to respond to the child's total self leads her to a fragmentation-producing preoccupation with his feces) then the child's self will be depleted and he will abandon the attempt to obtain the joys of self-assertion and will, for reassurance, turn to the pleasures he can derive from the fragments of his body-self. All of this will be to the detriment of the cohesion establishing involvement with her feces-producing, learning, controlling maturing, total child. The adult's "anal character"—his penuriousness, for example—cannot be explained adequately by reference to his anal fixation or to his anal retentive inclinations. The anal fixation is present, of course, but it becomes fully meaningful only on the basis of the genetic reconstruction that, as a child, feeling that his self was crumbling and/or empty, he had tried to obtain reassuring stimulation from a fragment of his body-self."

Later, in a discussion of disintegration products, Kohut recalls us to this earlier discussion above and speaks of his belief that the primary psychological configurations in the child's experiential world are not drives, that drive experiences occur only as phenomena related to a self that has not been adequately supported in its efforts to become a self-sufficient self. These phenomena he terms disintegration products.

Here it is instructive to examine the disintegration of the two basic psychological functions Kohut posits as associated with the
two poles of the self, and with the two parents contributing together.

"When the child's self-assertive presence is not responded to by the mother (in her role as provider of mirroring selfobject function for the developing self) the child's normal healthy exhibitionism will eventually be given up; and isolated, sexualized exhibitionistic preoccupations concerning single symbols of greatness (the urinary system, feces, phallus, etc.) will take over. And similarly, when the child's search for the idealized omnipotent selfobject fails to provide the developing self its requirement for an idealizing merger, then again, the child's healthy and happy wide-eyed admiration will cease; the broad psychological configuration at this pole of the self will break up, and isolated sexualized voyeuristic preoccupations with isolated symbols of the adult's power (the penis, the breast) will take over.

Ultimately, the clinical manifestations of an exhibitionistic or voyeuristic perversion may arise in consequence of the breakup of those broad psychological configurations of healthy assertiveness and healthy admiration with the need for mirroring selfobject functions and the admiration associated with the need for merger with the idealized parent image."

Manifestations of these profound failures on the part of the parental providers of these self structuring functions include exhibitionism of parts of one's body, and voyeuristic interest in parts of the body of others, in Kohut's view.

The critical aspect in all of this is that phenomena which present themselves appearing as isolated sexualized phenomena, whether on the
oral, anal, urethral, or phallic level have only and entirely, (according to Kohut's systematic reconstruction of the self from the perspective of the family system of which it began life as a part), to do with the child's experience of the relation between the self and its parental providers of responsiveness to its developing self: drive manifestations in isolation establish themselves only after traumatic and/or prolonged failures in empathy—that is, failures to respond from the perspective of the child's feelings, sensibilities and needs. Only if the self is seriously damaged, or destroyed, do the drives become powerful constellations in their own right, in Kohut's view.

The child turns to oral, anal and phallic sensations on those occasions when this is necessary, to escape, from either unempathic responses to his self and his self's needs or the absence of anyone to provide empathic responses to him; for in order to escape from the overwhelming experience of deadness and depression that can now regularly get triggered off, once the self is seriously damaged. Empathic responsiveness from then on assumes the quality of a life sustaining matrix, according to Kohut.

Thus I believe we can, while accepting this view of things as a working hypothesis through which to attempt to understand the quandary that Miss F. is to the therapist, say that her entering the office each day smiling, cheerily, and chortling; and immediately calling attention to her body by way of an array of isolated sexualized phenomena on the oral, anal, urethral and phallic level (which we are now seeing as drive manifestations in isolation that could have established themselves in this way only after repeated and traumatic failures in re-
spending to the child on the part of the parents) was her way of trying regularly to evoke the life sustaining matrix of empathic responsiveness to her earliest self experiences and her concomitant feelings of overwhelming fear that she may not have a self.

For the first half year or so the therapist's responses immediately following those callings of attention to her body were not in response to her need for admiring approval of her body, nor were they in response to her panic, evoked by the fact that hers was a basically fragmented self unable to sustain life on its own without the empathic responsiveness of an admiring, approving mirroring of her body as something capable of being approved of in its own right, and of her self as something capable of being cared about in its own right. Miss F. regularly and repeatedly demonstrated withdrawal, and a look of having been terribly hurt, and immediately thereafter "a drifting off into a now quasi-delusional concatenation of bizarre anal, urethral and masturbatory concerns". From the reported fact that each time the therapist endeavored to make any analytic interpretation whatever from any standpoint other than the simple statement of responding to her need for approval of her body, or her need for life sustaining matrix of empathic responsiveness, Miss F.'s bizarre responses set the therapists teeth on edge with their wholly inexplicable and maddening quality, we can, I think, say that Miss F. presents herself as having begun the moment she first entered the therapy room providing the therapist with a vivid account of her inner experience of the past 26 years, by way of self-language.

For his part, the therapist was for a very long time convinced that all that Miss F. was doing was providing him with a very strange
list of activities under the bed sheets and in the bathroom, and he wished more than anything that he could get her to begin to provide him with something about her inner experience, either now or in the past, so that he could begin the business of trying to be therapeutic with her. Throughout all that time, as he underscores in many ways, Miss F. set his teeth on edge by endless asking him over and over again, "Do you know what I mean?" (emphases the therapist's). She also made a great point of putting equal emphasis on the fact that the word "meaning" was the singlemost critical word associated in her mind with the news of the departure of Mrs. K., her former therapist, from her life. At the time, the therapist clearly took Miss F.'s saying that with the retirement of Mrs. K all "meaning" would vanish from her life (and that this threw her into the panic so profound that hospitalization was necessary), that she meant this from the ordinary frame of reference—that her life would be without meaning. At this point, if one leaps over all of the profoundly interesting Lacanian formulations having to do with the universe of shared significations, and arrives at the point where Miss F. is for the first time ever, able to walk out of the office without her "usual litany" of bizarre bodily references, we find that in that session the therapist had remarked that somewhere over the years in the midst of your words you have gotten lost". In response to that remark about her experience, Miss F. had been able for the first time to weep softly. When Miss F. was able to weep softly, instead of her bizarre litany and piercing whine, the therapist then recalled the prior weeks gift of her poetry, and he thought it seemed an appropriate time to comment on her
poetry: he responded with approving admiration to her poetry as the session ended.

In the following session Miss F. confided to the therapist that the words in her poems had felt to her as if they often came from her real self. He presents a finely detailed analysis of sequential thoughts which is too lengthy and complex to be discussed in all of its aspects, but it focusses on chains of metaphors, and Lacanian thought about nodal linguistic points. The therapist had become greatly encouraged by Miss F.'s having wept softly in response to his remarking "somewhere over the years in the midst of your words you have gotten lost". He wrote that he believed that what had helped to reach Miss F. was his comment about her poetry not having an ounce of excess fat and that this had led him into an intriguing connection between the excess fat on her body and the excess fat in her customary use of language. In this he posited a few beginning links of linguistic significations having been revealed and he had thus been able, he said, to decide to "henceforth attempt to orient myself with her by listening for the thin voice of a thin person hiding beneath the empty words". But just as he had felt "clarity about to emerge, confusion descended." He was discouraged and perplexed.

For the next several months Miss F. was to present in "grindingly obsessive and repetitive language" her intense anxiety and dread preceding sessions, and at the beginning of sessions, and pressured requests for reassurance in regard to all real and imaginary physical problems,
profound and compelling fears about her masturbatory activity, obsessive fears of being on the verge of or in the middle of a gross psychotic episode and a constant need to know of the therapist's potential whereabouts between sessions. Throughout came the endlessly repeated piercing whine intoning the shrill question "Do you know what I mean?"

In time, Miss F. experienced a wholesale bombardment of terror in the night, filled with great terrifying delusional fears of masturbation, of having injured herself, followed in a few days by the psychic explosion the staff had by then begun to sense was imminent. When it came Miss F. ran into the therapist's office, this time shrieking at the top of her lungs about her fear that she had been poisoned by fumes, from which eventually arose an awareness for the therapist that it was "the smell of death that Miss F. was in terror of." Things were not good.

Somewhere later, Miss F. tried another means through which to call attention to her body. This time she had managed to think of a means which would not be so offputting to another perhaps; a packet of photographs of Miss F. when she was a young girl, and a teenager. In these the therapist saw at last the body of a Miss F. that could be smilingly, approvingly admired. Although the therapist's account continues for some good while beyond that point, there is not again a mention of Miss F.'s bringing her bizarre anal, urethral and masturbatory quasi-delusional concerns to the therapy. Gone from the account is the relentlessly echoed piercing whine imploring the therapist if he knows "what I mean?" While certainly still a person with grave concerns, the account, beginning with the therapist's smiling, approving admiration of Miss F.'s
photographs calling attention to her once-upon-a-time body, takes on a dramatically different tenor, going simply on what the therapist presents of their now calmer, now capable of being fruitful, therapy.

The author does not see his account in this way, nor see the therapy as having been influenced by his having responded empathically to that. He presents a finely wrought account of his understanding of the change in the therapist's and Miss F.'s ability to endure her therapy sessions in terms of the nodal linguistic polarities that had suggested themselves to him in his linguistic analysis of the nodal words he had used in his remarks to Miss F., on different points in the session in which he had also happened to feel it an apt time to make responsive remarks to her gift of poetry, and in the session in which he also happened to provide smilingly approving admiration of her once upon a time body, when she brought along old photographs.

At the conclusion of this fine paper, the author includes an extended addendum on his belief that we should return to careful scrutiny of the moment to moment transactions which occur within the psychoanalytic encounter toward the end that we might work toward dispensing with some of the excess baggage accumulated over the years in clinical practice; a task which Lacan has devoted efforts to, and this author as well. A problem he found, he said, was that Lacan does not simplify the work of the psychotherapist; he does not make clear just how the therapist is to accomplish what he sees as the primary tasks of treatment—the establishing of response and the evocation and elucidation of subjective speech. Nonetheless, he makes clear his committed belief
that we must learn to listen to the language of the self. Because I think these things important fully as well, I have in the course of my research endeavored to learn some of the language of the self in just the ways the therapist here speaks of as a goal we might profit by sharing in—by working at trying to learn to attend to the moment by moment interactions between persons, in therapy and in real life, across life spans and across small segments from published accounts of such interactions. Although I have an admiration for the brilliant thinking of Jacques Lacan, I now think, after my research, that the language of the self sometimes can be heard in less difficult to follow voice than the nodal linguistic polarities. My research has led me to believe that the self will speak for itself to help us learn its language, if we will trust it to do that.

By the time I had read this account perhaps five times, with a good bit of reading Lacan as well, I came to believe that, for me, I could perhaps, in this instance, learn more of the language of the self from Miss F., and from simply attending, with an interest in resonance and subjectivity, to both Miss F. and the therapist. Comparative biographic research had led me to believe that one could learn much from the plain looking at people, and listening, in the ways I had in the transgenerational biographic explorations of lives. There I had observed things like what responses brought what reactions, what responses made things "get better"; what kinds of things made things "get worse" for people, always just staying only with the people's own words to one another, and the words each used in describing his own perception, cognition, reaction, etc. to the other, as well as perceptions, responses, etc. to non-
present others.

In the course of this some things had emerged about the kinds of later life impact that follow from different kinds of early experience. For persons for whom there had been asynchronicity of response at in childhood, the research seemed convincingly to suggest that one might later find a superimposable template in their interactions with others in some situations. Therapy was one of these; parenting and marital relationships were others. In work with disturbed children a superimposable template often appeared to show direct concordance with asynchronous parenting interactive patterns.

I had wondered if a minute analysis of the interaction sequences in a series of therapy sessions might perhaps yield up the same sort of superimposable template—in the interactions between therapist and adult—as had occurred in the direct therapy situation with children, and as had occurred in the naturalistic observations between unrelated mother-child pairs of adolescent mothers. If one should find evidence of that, that might have significance at several levels. One of them would involve a different way of thinking about the process that exacerbates a person’s symptoms in real life, and once exacerbated, keeps them there.

Such a view seemed to require that one be willing to consider the possibility that profound disturbances and other less severe forms of life distress, might arise solely from a parent’s having been unwittingly out of “synchrony” with a child’s attempts to engage the external environment with the impact of that asynchronous early infant experience in turn ineluctably holding power to evoke reactions rather than empathic responses from nearly all other persons in the environment. My clin-
ical work with profoundly distressed children, and adults, had prepared me to be able to wonder about such a hypothesis when the research data began to seem to suggest glimmers of such possibility across the biographic, longitudinal transgenerational studies. There, where the data were lives in everyday circumstances, an exceptional concordance with early experience had suggested itself, with great regularity, in a direct phenomenal way, a way that also evoked reactions from the environment that made these people feel worse and hence then appear to be "acting worse". The research analysis strongly suggests that all of that may be backwards, that it is not that the person is "acting bad", but that the environment is not being able to respond to him in a way that is endurable to him, and, in reaction to unendurable pain unwittingly inflicted by the environment, the person's reactions to the environment's failures to respond accurately escalate, ad infinitum.

The research suggests that the crux of the matter may lie in our perceiving what is happening for such persons from the wrong perspective, a perspective which fails accurately to understand the person ineluctably insuring he will be reacted to in a way which would set up a vicious circle.

The research suggests that asocial, antisocial and "perverse" behaviors may be subsumable under this rubric. It suggests too that we might need to revise our perspective about the "resistant" or "recalcitrant" patient, and the client "attempting to control" the therapy, or "locked in a power struggle" with the therapist, or "not working hard enough" in his therapy: this study of lives suggests these may be therapists' misperceptions of the client's experience of the therapist and of
himself or herself, to which the therapist is unwittingly reacting (in those situations where things are going badly, only meant here).

In a quite real sense, this research, and child clients, and three generational family-group clinical work, led me to hypothesize that "disturbed clients" (and perhaps all) articulate with a "life language" that we find difficult to translate. What the research has led me to believe is that we have very often thought of this life language as something that had to be translated (into what's really the problem and what should we do about it, etc.) but that then, instead of just looking at it in an ordinary way, as if just words quite accurately telling us— or showing us—the problem, we have gone on the premise that these ordinary life phenomena must "stand for something else, must "mean something", the something we opt for a function of one theoretical orientation or another. All of which leads to arbitrary dichotomous viewpoints, e.g., therapists who do not "wish to get involved in the person's unconscious" (and all that psychoanalytic esoterica", as one student or several students have said), but also leads to having to more or less guess what the "correct" interpretation might be.

If the person really is showing or just saying outright what the problem is—and we are unwittingly saying, in reply, "I wonder what the problem might be that you are not saying", the client might feel unhappy, and rather misunderstood.

Aside from its own inherent interest, I was drawn to wish to understand the language of Miss F.'s self and its vicissitudes for a quite different reason as well. I did not, across my research, devote
any great amount of my research effort to attending to accounts of one individual life: instead I concentrated the great bulk of my efforts on entire life spans, in a moment by moment unfolding, and the lives of all of those for whom I could garner any life data whose lives overlapped with one another in the transgenerational familial matrix of which each of these life spans was a part. Some of these transgenerationally studied lives were through first-hand experience, in which the persons were in psychotherapeutic treatment with me. One member of one such family, was a little girl, who was 8 when treatment started, and near 11 when it ended: Meredith.

I had thought of this little girl as puzzling in the extreme in many ways at the beginning. I had no frame of reference whatever through which to begin to understand the profound distortions life and people were for this little girl. I had been working with her, and with a goodly number of other persons in her family for perhaps two years when I first encountered the paper presenting Miss F. As I listened, wide-eyed, I heard what I had taken to be the entirely arbitrary and idiosyncratic words, ideation, reactions, etc. of my 8, 9, and 10 year old client in the words of a 26 year old unrelated client of another. Page after page after page, I saw that one would need only to change the name and the age of the client and every word and thought and reaction of Miss F.'s could be entitled with the name of my 9 year old client and neither I nor my supervisor would have thought that not her transcript. He, hearing Miss F.'s account agreed. Somehow Meredith and Miss F. were speaking the identical language,
but more than just that, they were both reading from all of the same pages of the same script.\(^\text{22}\) I was so surprised I could not begin to comprehend the magnitude of that, or what it might mean. Here, it means that I need not present Meredith's account because I would, except for the therapeutic interaction, be repeating every word of Miss F.'s (except that Meredith had not ever had a therapist who understood her meaning). Instead I will let this stand for Meredith's transcript as well, enabling me to present another aspect of life for Meredith and her brother in the next chapter, which we may wish to think about in terms of how any of that might possibly apply to Miss F. In chapter IV, on Emma, still another verbatim replay—from Meredith's, her mother's and her brother's transcripts—is presented, that time as I found it—still another time—reproduced in a 100 percent verbatim superimposability template—word for word—nuance for nuance—in the natural history of a 97 year-old mother and her daughter. Here again, the single only content difference is in the one stance where a sociocultural circumstance, the different religions of Meredith and Emma called for the one brief sequence which Meredith could not have provided verbatim content template, the sequence about the rosary.

In all three, the tones of voice, voice levels, word choice, reaction pattern, and vocabulary are interchangeable in the one instance between Meredith and Miss F., in another between Meredith and Meredith's mother, superimposed on a common template, "belonging" to Emma and her mother. Here, however, there is one overwhelming

\(^{22}\) I communicated this phenomenon to Miss F.'s therapist.
difference in the template's superimposability. In the *Emma* mother-child situation, the mental transcript I have of Meredith, the child, speaking, is the transcript of the mother in the *Emma* pair. The mental transcript I have for the mother of Meredith speaking, is the transcript of the daughter in *Emma*’s case: _everything_ is reversed.

I had hypothesized that Meredith and her mother were part of a strange phenomena in which the mother _did_ experience the child as the mother, at the level of unconscious experience, and hypothesized that the mother of Meredith had had the child who became Meredith because she, the mother, had not been adequately mothered (nor parented) in childhood; and had subsequently felt impelled to have a child, in early adolescence, for the _purpose_ of finding, in her own infant, a person who would permit her the self-experience of _being responded to_.

However, I had assumed this to mean in a metaphoric way: I had not anticipated that it would hold a validity as vividly dramatically _visible_ as the *Emma* chapter will make clear. There too, there is no need to present a Meredith and her mother transcript, because it would be repeating verbatim the form and content of the *Emma* and her mother transcript, in _all_ aspects except that the _dramatis personae_ roles are reversed, and that a tiny handful of words are not identical.

Here too we would want to recall Miss F. and her superimposability with Meredith, and try to ponder *Emma* while holding _both_ Miss F. and Meredith in mind.

There is a good deal to ponder among these three sets of superimposable interactions, but much to ponder too of Miss F., in her own right.
CHAPTER XII

WHOSE CHILD IS THIS NO MOTHER KNOWS: FORM AND CONTENT INTERTWINED WITHIN A SELF-REGULATING TRANSFORMATIONAL STRUCTURE

Aspects of silence which I have encountered in treating, and observing, young children have led me to believe that in some instances silence in children may be the only means available for transmission of an essential communication, and that it may be possible to see in a report of a child's silence and its evolution a possible precursor to aspects of misperception of content, or of "disturbed" behaviors.

In clinical work with a young family with 2 children, a girl, who was 8 when therapy began, and a boy, John, who was then four, it was possible to obtain many hundreds of observations of individual and family life including the tiny examples presented here.

The girl, Meredith, was always on the edge of frenzy (when not overtly engaged in what her mother referred to as her "fits"—sudden eruptions into a "mad" frenzy lasting from five to thirty minutes usually); she clearly exerted great energies holding a nascent panic in check most of her waking hours. She was never silent. The boy exhibited prolonged periods of silence: he underwent periods sometimes lasting up to a half hour or more (which seemed to come without warning, and often for no discernible reason) of complete silence.

The boy had been regarded, like his sister before him, as a "special needs" child at the time of the local community pre-school screening. Special needs children were here classified by degree of severity of what were regarded as their needs (which meant physical limitations as well as emotional disturbance), and were then enrolled in a special
needs pre-school program where, for example, speech problems were worked on. This child, John, was classified as belonging in the "highest risk" group, of children whose emotional or intellectual classification made it appear almost certain that they would not be able to attend regular kindergarten the following year.

The special needs teacher regularly consulted with me, as is the custom when the child is in treatment; in this case primarily because of her concern over John's abrupt shifts into what she described as "total walled-off silence", or "closing down", from which nothing or no one could seem to budge him, nor get through to him. His mother reported the same experience, and I, in time, came to experience my share of it.

During the periods when John was clearly open to communication, he heard and listened, openly; indeed avidly, as if very much intent on hearing everything that was said. Unless otherwise occupied with his own doings, he watched intently the face of the person talking when the conversation was not directed at him. Invariably, when he himself was being spoken to, he averted his gaze, never looking at or near the face of the person talking during the first year of my observing him or of speaking to him myself.

He did react to what he heard and at times these reactions were in words. He did not articulate at all well and until about five and a half it was often not possible much of the time to distinguish much of what he was saying--certainly not without exceptional effort on the listener's part, and gentle requests for him to say again what he was trying to impart. At times he responded with gestures, often appropriate
gestures like nodding his head for yes, turning his back when he did not want to participate in an activity suggested by the teacher, etc. At other times, if he did not like what was being suggested, he might strike the person with a sudden blow or bring his foot down sharply on the other's foot. During his episodes of being out of control, he made shrieking, pandemonium-like noises. The wild noises, like the wild behaviors, abated not long after therapy began, when I told him that I understood that he very much wanted to be able to know that someone could control his wild behaviors for him until he was able to control them himself. I said I thought he felt a need for there to be someone around who was capable of controlling his wildness and that part of my job was to try to help his mother become strong enough to be in better control of things. In the meantime, I said, I was capable of controlling his wildness and would manage that aspect of himself for him until he was able to do so. He immediately took me up on this and set about testing, in a remarkable servies of barrages of noise, of impressively strong assault tests, whether I could in fact really pass the test involved in enduring the aid of his sister the pair suddenly assaulted me physically, one lying on the floor on her back, wiry legs wildly flailing the lower part of my body in piercing sharp repeater-blows remarkably rapid fire, while gripping one of my wrists with her hands and pulling me down in a doubled over bent-forward position. I was as much startled by the unbelievable amount of strength in these children as I was shocked by the abrupt physical attack. The boy had concurrently leaped onto my bent-over back, with his hands gripping my throat as he hung on that way
and used his legs to flail my thighs with the heels of his shoes.

They, as I was to learn well, had no awareness that any of this might hurt me: they assumed I could endure the physical part; what they wanted to find out was a) could I, really stop their wildness once it began—for it went instantly out of their control the moment the hair trigger of their own excitability was applied to it; no one else had ever been able to stop it until it was "too late", and until much destruction had been wrought. But even then, always by powerful blows, and alarming threats, and words of great contempt. It was clear that to pass this test I was to be able to somehow bring these savage assaults to a halt without losing my temper, without getting angry, without yelling, hitting, swearing or threats of punishment, etc. The trouble was I could see that part, but didn't have any idea how to stop this hyper-maniacal craziness—and was meanwhile concerned that I would be seriously injured. Quickly and firmly I told them to get off me: their wildness escalated. Over their screeching I yelled that I did see how they would want to test someone out to see if she was strong enough to be able to control them, and that they would need to see how I took that and if I could understand that and not get mad: so now that you've tested me out, you see that I do still respect you and I am telling you now to stop, instantly, right now." And they did. I, who had fearfully doubted anything could stop that sort of thing (the mother said it was uncontrollable), was astonished, and relieved. They were astonished and relieved. Their mother was dumbfounded.

At times in the course of many of my observations, the mother would spontaneously and abruptly heft the boy onto her lap, which he often, although not always, gave appearance of enjoying.
On these occasions, she at times was responding empathically to some part of John's needs", (he might, for instance, have come in from outside wanting to show her something.) When he would try to interrupt her to tell her of this, she would at times interrupt what she was doing and greet his communication with concentrated interest, concerned for his feelings if he had been hurt, or brightly admiring of whatever he might have brought for her admiration. Most of the time, however, there was a sense of age-inappropriateness to this, that is, her manner of speaking to him on those occasions seemed what one might more customarily hear in a mother speaking to a considerably younger child. This seemed the case too with regard to her manner of interacting with him on her lap. While affectionate, interested and admiring on these occasions, there was often a sense, from the observer's vantage, of over-stimulation.

John, however, could not count on this sort of reception: it was not at all consistent (although it became remarkably more consistent, and more moderated, over the course of the mother's own therapy--which was of course concurrent with the boy's own therapy, so that the child to whom she was responding had also become increasingly less demanding and more moderated in his own behaviors toward her). As often as not, she might be apathetic and largely unresponsive in any form, or hostile, or preoccupied in aggressive interchanges with her daughter, or other activities.

John did not at any time speak with the frequency of others his age, but during those periods he was clearly open to communication. He heard, and listened openly, indeed keenly; and he reacted to what he heard, sometimes with words (he did not articulate well, but it was not
impossible most of the time to gather what he was saying for the most part) and other times with gestures, appropriate gestures like nodding his head for yes, shaking his head for no, turning his back and doing something else when he did not want to participate in some activity suggested by a teacher or other child. And he made many pandemonium-like very loud yelling or screeching noises during his uncontrolled times and his hypermanic times, which were often.

On some of the occasions in which I observed John being held on his mother's lap, she would, after a time of over-stimulatedly hugging and kissing him and speaking strongly affective "love" phrases to him, she would turn her attention elsewhere and keep him held sitting on her knee with one arm around his waist. He sat there quietly and I had occasion to observe, at times, a glassy-eyed vacant stare come over his face. During these times he seemed definitely not to perceive what was happening or being said around him. These were not, however, identical with his times of stopping "going on being": one could return him to a state of attentiveness by speaking to him, and there would be only a momentary delay between that and his "snapping out of it". Left to itself, this state would often continue for as long as fifteen minutes, after which John would give the sudden appearance of having waked up: an alertness to his surroundings returned.

On a few such occasions while John was perched on his mother's knee, his mother suddenly emitted a shocked, sharp shriek of pain and John would look blankly and benignly at her. He had, so it appeared, surprised himself no less than his mother by silently fiercely breaking the skin on her arm or leg with his fingernails: on one occasion when
she had instead had him cradled on her lap in the manner of an infant, and had a few minutes before been cooing to him, which he had seemed to enjoy, and then left him in that position while she turned her attention elsewhere in a benign manner during which time his vacant stare had resumed, he had suddenly fiercely bitten the side of her breast. His own expression appeared to be one of dumbfoundedness, as if he had not been consciously aware of having engaged in those aggressive behaviors until after the fact. Inasmuch as these always occurred during periods in which his mother was attending to him in a benign, silent way (i.e., they never occurred, for example, while she was actively caressing him, nor while she was pushing him away, as she sometimes did, but while she was holding him in a quiet, seemingly unstimulating way), the effect they brought about was an abrupt shift in his mother's attitude toward him, and her behavior toward him, from one of benignly responsible attention to one of wholesale infuriated rageful hostility, in which she would push him violently away from her, and loudly and harshly denounce him, then meting out some prolonged punishment and withdrawal of privileges, etc.

At other times I had occasion to observe John's mother, moments before speaking benignly, abruptly erupt into verbal rage at him when she interpreted one or another of his child behaviors, or refusals to do her bidding, as personal insults or affronts to her "right to control him or his behaviors". (It later became acknowledged that her rage was expressed other than verbally when I was not present, although this improved to a very great extent over the course of therapy.) On these occasions I watched him shift into the state of "not going on being".
At these times, when his seeming to have disappeared behind an invisible, impermeable shield effectively removed any pretense of control over him, his mother became infuriated and would ragefully denounce him, accusing him of trying to drive her crazy by "doing that to (her)". She was most often driven to shake him violently when he "refused" to answer or appeared not to hear: he gave every appearance of being completely oblivious to her aggressively shaking him while shouting for him to "answer me, do you HEAR! Or brother, you are really going to get it." He did not answer, nor blink. "He does that on purpose, to torment me!", his mother said to me in a tone of powerful fury on such occasions.

It was necessary to retain an empathic responsiveness to the mother's experience on such occasions: the effectiveness of this in such instances of her eruptions of rage at one or the other of the children was dramatic, almost from the beginning; expressing attempts at understanding the meaning of the mother's rage at the child for her, invariably had a wholesome effect on the mother and her behavior. And, inasmuch as the children were present and privy to this quite different perspective through which one might view her behavior toward them had a wholesome effect on the children as well. It appeared that one might build small elements of empathic bridges between the mother and the child in this way.

His teacher tried to draw John out of his walled-off silences (which in school occurred during times when no visible stress was present) by gentle conversation, or by a large assortment of attempts to draw his attention to interesting or pleasant things. His mother tried by yelling at him, by threatening him with dire punishment and by physically
shaking him. For both, the result was the same. As both said, nothing worked: when John shut down, he was oblivious to anything said or done to him.

After one and a half years of therapy John's overall condition was much improved. As one aspect, his previously wild and uncontrolled behaviors were within a much more reasonable range of self control. He seemed now to be able to consciously decide when he wished to behave in a wild exhibitionistic manner, and he did so only infrequently and with considerable moderation. He had long since stopped assaulting me physically, and destroying household furnishings and items in a store, which had formerly been regular occurrences. His language development was greatly improved. It had been predicted that he would not be able to be enrolled in a regular public school kindergarten, but after one and a quarter years of therapy he was able to be enrolled in a regular kindergarten, where his school behavior was seen as within acceptable limits. (For which of course a great deal of credit must go to the kind of environmental provision the school and kindergarten teacher were willing and capable of providing: certainly in a less facilitating environment, John would not have been able to adapt, at that time, as he did.) But even in this optimal environment, the school staff regarded it as difficult to believe that John was now capable of managing as well as he did. His grandparents reported near-disbelief that the formerly chaotic conditions in the children's home, and their interactions with their mother (and their grandparents) had undergone such striking change.

John's periods of complete vocal withdrawal were reported as now non-existent at school. Although he did not, for some time, initiate
conversation with other children nor answer them in words when they spoke to him, he did become adept at initiating conversations with a familiar adult in non-threatening situations.

His mother reported that he no longer resorted to this method of trying to purposely drive her crazy, by which one can assume that he shut down less frequently at home, at least during periods when his mother was attending to what he was doing, which was by no means yet consistent. While much had improved for John and for his mother, much remained amiss for all of the family.

Yet John's periods of shifts into walled off silence continued to occur in our hours together. As part of his, and his sister's, therapy, it was necessary for me to drive to their home and to transport each of them (at different times) in my car to the clinic playroom. His mother was incapable of performing this function and there was no one else. (The grandparents had steadfastly remained hostile to the idea of any of the family's being in therapy for a very long time, and had exerted considerable effort in attempts to forestall it. Only after extending therapeutic empathic responsiveness even into the third generation did abrupt and dramatic transition in their "sabotaging" efforts occur, which was accomplished as part of an effort to build a bridge of empathic responsiveness between the young mother and her mother.)

John was, in any case, as was his sister, very fearful of leaving his home, afraid that his mother might not still be there when he returned. She had often threatened to leave them, or to "go crazy and have to be put away, locked up"..."because of the children." She had often threatened, too, to give them away--to have them put into an institution-
al home—so that she would not have to put up with them, in her words. (This appeared to have a far graver impact on the girl.)

The behaviors resulting from these fears of leaving the home brought about a situation of requiring therapeutic management enroute to the clinic. In effect, we used these half hours in the car as part of our therapy sessions. I found that there were some things which I could say to John on the trip—and in the clinic sessions—which, after some time, became capable of evoking typically garrulous five-year-old responses. At other times, something would suddenly evoke abrupt lapses into his complete shut-down silence. The provocation for these was not apparent.

I did not experience this as simply silence. To me it had a quality as if the little boy, who a moment before had been talking excitedly, had disappeared: he was simply no longer there. Suddenly, he gave the clear impression of having stopped going on being. His silence seemed to engulf his whole self and I had the vivid impression that he had become a vacuum. He sat perfectly still, did not look at me no matter what I might say to him, and seemed not to hear if I spoke to him. At times, in the beginning, I was unable to keep from asking him if he could hear me, but he sat mute, as if indeed he did not hear.

I tried on many occasions one interpretation after another, attempts at empathically understanding the meaning of his disappearance. Silence. Nothing. Not an eye blink. However quietly and gently I tried to communicate with him, as long as I did try, he remained walled off, and I remained without a clue as to why this had come about, this time again. I searched vainly for clues. He was, after some time in therapy, running eagerly from his house into the car (initially, it had
required patient efforts to overcome his, and his sister's, great fear of me: for the first several weeks, it was necessary for them to remain at the far side of a room in their home, watching me out of the corner of an eye from behind a door, or a piece of furniture) and he would often be talking away interestingly before the silence came. On the occasions in which we were in the car, it seemed the clue had to lie in something that I had said, but the silent vacuum would come on the heels of what seemed to me often innocuous comments.

Once the silence came, the only thing that ever made it go away (it seemed such a "concrete" thing that one could think of the silence as "going away") was after I would give up trying to communicate with him, and silently be content to just go on being with him in the car. At first I experienced great frustration while I was silent: I was not at all able to feel contented myself about what seemed like ignoring whatever fear or pain it was that had been reenacted. I felt distressed and irritated at my helplessness in being unable to understand John's experience. I now realize I made this clear to him by my ceasing to try to communicate with him for a short period, and then, after a bit, trying gently again to offer an interpretation, an empathic attempt at understanding his experience. At these times his silences continued for a long time.

Eventually I came to realize, or to believe, that he was experiencing my attempts at communication as impingements from the environment, having been helped in this understanding by Winnicott's (1960), and Khan's (1969) discussions of impingement and reactions to impinge-
ment.¹ (Khan, for example, speaks of the mother's failure to provide a protective shield for the child and the concomitant cumulative trauma the child can come to be forced to endure and to re-experience).

When I began to think of these experiences from that possibility, I attempted to be content to try experiencing this silence with him, with silence on my part meaning a willingness to accept his silences in the same way that I was accepting of his other communications. I let him know, through my changed attitude, and through words, that his silence was all right, that is, that I was not annoyed by it, nor expecting more from him.

After a while of now-peaceful silence, (although I did not imagine that John was, inside, feeling peaceful contentment of course), he would spontaneously begin to talk, with astonishing abruptness, as if he had just found himself—suddenly cheerfully speaking of some far-removed, everyday five-year-old topic.

He never alluded, not permitted allusion to, his periods of silence. It seemed he did not remember having been shut down. On the few times when I had tried asking him, when he had come back and was so obviously in a pleased and contented frame of mind, if he could tell me about why it was that he had to shut down—so that I would know better and be able to keep from doing it again—I quickly learned not to do that from

¹ Most such comments refer not just to the therapist, but the psychologist who had become as interested as I in the research and clinical aspects of this work and who voluntarily collaborated on a consulting basis vis-à-vis the therapy, and a collegial basis from a research standpoint which included our sharing readings which seemed to suggest a possibly helpful thought. This was Dr. Alvin Winder.
his responding to the most gentle allusion with a second abrupt shift back into the vacuum. For a far longer time, I saw that I had misunderstood something important.

It seemed that he was able to assimilate my being acceptingly silent as my having erased the impingement, and then—eventually—he could be freed to begin again, although I, for my part, had no idea what the impingement was that I had erased in so doing. This went on for a long time. Searching for a pattern to what triggered it off did not help. Only my accepting, contented silence would help him back: my not trying to help him over it, except by sitting with him as if it was all right that way.

It seemed to have something to do with great fear. The silences did not seem directed against me in any way (which is the same experience Khan reported in his adolescent case). With time it came to seem that there was some specific communication that he was giving me through these silences. It did not so much seem as a communication he had deliberately tried to give me, but one over which he had no control. He seemed in some way to be experiencing a need for me to come to be able to understand this communication—which could only be transmitted through an absence of words—so that, just as had earlier been necessary for him with regard to his being able to bring under his own control his wildness and unbridled destructiveness—there might be someone capable of understanding and thus able to help alleviate the terrible fear and dread it seemed both to arouse and be aroused by.

It is not possible in a circumscribed account to attempt to reconstruct the many, ongoing attempted therapeutic interactions which came
to transpire in working with this child, nor those which intermeshed with others of his family, but with time he was able to build, incrementally, increasing trust in the consistency and reliability of another human being as empathically responsive to him and to use that person in a variety of ways to assist himself in beginning to learn to make some kind of integrated sense of the world, which he had heretofore experienced in distorted and fragmented ways to a remarkable extent. His self esteem and his pride in his own abilities very slowly and very gradually increased and he came to be able to experience some amounts of childlike joy in some of his accomplishments and in some of his play. Not surprisingly, none of this progress was on a smooth course, and much violence and wildness would spontaneously erupt for a long time, at home, although no longer with me.

The aspect of my experience with him that I would like to turn to is the experience which turned out to be, for this child, the last occasion on which he experienced "not going on being" in his times with me, and, to my knowledge, the last occasion on which he experienced them at all.

I had come to believe that John was feeling sadness at my failure to be able to understand the communication his abrupt silences were transmitting. I did tell him that, saying that I believed he was hoping very much that I would continue to try to understand his experience, while admitting that it was difficult for me to do so in a way that felt correct to him. On one occasion when I ventured that he might well be feeling anger at me for failing him in this way, I observed an only barely perceptible shudder of tension spread through
him, and he shifted into his walled-off state. John's mother had
that week reported to me a scene of extraordinary rageful violence
between herself and the man she was only recently in a fitful and stormy
relationship with.

She had said that John had been sound asleep and knew nothing of
the violent occurrence.

John knew what rageful reactions from his mother were like. When
I was not there his mother would, she said, find her rageful "crazy"
self emerging—less so now than when treatment first began: now it
emerged in the context of this relationship with a man, which was new.

Only the mother told me of the mother's violence, which was extra-
ordinary and enormously destructive. Neither child ever spoke of it.

across 2½ years of therapy, when alone with me. Only eventually, in the
family therapy, was it possible for the topic to be spoken of by the
children, and then only in exceptional circumstances. Her rage spilled
over onto the boy, and the girl. In time I realized that my having com-
plied with John's request for sameness of opening remarks—his wanting
me to greet him as he got into the car with asking how things had
been for him during the time I had not seen him—had served for him
as a means through which he could let me know whether or not he had
been exposed to his mother's rage or not, while I was not with him,
even though this was a topic he never spoke of.

I had, after a time of making it possible for John to come to terms
with his wildness and assaultiveness and lack of control, told him, when
he had become quite comfortable with the idea of me, that our time to-
gether was a time when it would be helpful to him to talk about things
that worried him. He had, after a long time, come to be able to do that. All except the rage, and the violence and the fear. Eventually I had, naively, tried telling him that it might be helpful to him if he were to tell me of the one most important thing that had happened for him since our previous session and that that was part of my job. At first he simply changed the subject, as if I had said nothing. When I tried repeating it, he said simply, "It's no use telling me that: I won't do it".

Both children, but particularly Meredith, while travelling in the car, seemed to lack the capacity to trust the non-human environment to remain predictably consistent or reliable as well.

For example, the distance we had to travel to the clinic was short, less than three miles. We travelled this distance through very peaceful, simple surroundings with no moving distractions, always taking the same route. Nevertheless, for a very long time, episodes of panic would erupt whenever one of the children would happen to look out of the car window and not instantly recognize some previously discussed landmark: at such times, which were often, they would be thrown into panic and great fear, certain that we were on the wrong road, and that in itself was enough to convince the child that a terrifying ominous catastrophe could be the only result. There was no capacity to question whether a momentary failure to not see a known landmark might mean that we had taken a different route even: a hint of the possibility of a lapse of reliability seemed to have only one meaning: positive and certain loss of all possible safety and instantaneous panic. Likewise, it was not easy for them to accept my assurance
that this was indeed the very same road we had always taken, indeed not until long after I had managed to build an extraordinary amount of structure into the trip.

Along with constructing a litany of landmarks, which I would verbally nod to each time we passed one or another of them when we were not otherwise engaged in talking, it proved unusually helpful to them for me to say and do the same things, in the same order, each time they got into, or out of the car—for example, on getting into the car, while saying "Every child needs to feel safe and protected and to be safe and protected, so first we will buckle on your seat belt. And then make sure the door is locked", etc. Although they would for a long time vigorously protest or attempt to disrupt say, the putting on the seat belt, often loudly or firmly refusing or pinching my arms sharply as I buckled it, on the rare occasions when I would momentarily forget to do so, (perhaps because I was occupied with some violent behavior or tantrum going on for the child) he or she would, on seeing me turn the key in the lock, say abruptly, "You forgot about protecting me."

Their great need for sameness included other parts to their car-ritual as well: John always waited, before he would be content, for a specific opening question once in the car, that was simply an ordinary greeting kind of sentence. But I had to remember to say that one.

When I would begin his trip with the customary opening question, sometimes John would happily begin, telling me some ordinary, everyday happening, often something at school. Not something "good" or "bad", but some "news item", usually something that he had distortedly perceived from something a classmate, or the teacher, had said or done.
He would report this small "fact", with no comment. And then he would wait for my reaction. I came to learn that this was his way of learning about reality. There was much that went on the world that John did not understand even remotely—that he was thoroughly bewildered by. He did not feel it was safe to ask about anything; even the most innocuous things.

When he was unable to find a perspective for something that had occurred at school, he had devised this way of asking about it without asking about it. He would, he learned, be able to learn from my response, if this thing that had happened was all right or not all right (as for instance, he reported that one child had pushed another down. John had no perspective through which to judge whether the boy had done something he should be beaten for, or not). He had eventually come to be able to make use of me in this way about things in his home too—about frightening dreams, or things that went on between him and his sister, or perplexing things a neighbor might have said. But not about anything pertaining to his mother's craziness, or rage, or John's fear.

What I came to believe was that somehow it was this that the silence was describing to me. When John's mother did or said any of the things that constituted, for John, not-good-enough mothering, to borrow Winnicott's term, it was necessary for him to stop going-on-being, to try to protect himself from the effects of what Khan speaks of as cumulative trauma (1963). When I innocuously made any sort of comment that happened to have to do with the time that I was not with him, and in those instances in which such time happened to have included a
traumatic impingement, (which John had, at the time, just naturally reacted to with stopping going on being) he communicated this to me by abruptly re-enacting the not-going-on-being. John's silence was the most dramatic of all possible ways of communicating to me what he most wanted me to know: since for him their primary experience lay in his stopping going on being, he repeated this communication to me, endlessly.

I believe one of the reasons for his never having given up on me, despite the very long time it took for me to be able to understand this communication was that I shared with him my belief that he was telling me something with his silence, and I admitted that it was very hard work for me to try to figure out what it was that he was letting me know, but that I would not give up trying.

Winnicott and Kohut speaks of the child at times being in a state of overpowering fear—the fear of the disintegration, as concomitant to failures in technique of child care. And I saw that the boy would of course have to be experiencing great rage himself about all this, which in itself would present a problem for him, for his mother had made it clear long since that one thing she would not tolerate from him was any expression of anger.

I told John that I had at last come to believe I understood what his shutting down was about. Immediately upon my saying that, he shut down. But this time I continued, gently, to speak to him. I said that this time, I thought I understood why it had been necessary to stop being there, and not to hear, and not to speak: that it had been just naturally necessary for him just not to be. And that I thought I
understood how sad and angry he was about these things, and how frightening it was to him to be angry. I waited for a moment, and continued, "I would be very angry if I were four years old and those things had happened to me."

For a moment there was silence. Then abruptly John began talking, excitedly and with heat, in a manner he had not spoken before. "Would you be mad if someone yelled at you?", he asked in a clear crisp staccato. "Yessir! I sure would be angry if someone yelled at me!" I answered in much more dramatic tone than I had ever employed with him, making sure that I affectively demonstrated by my tone of voice that of course I would be angry.

Up until this point John had never been able to voice any verbal articulation having anything to do with anger, nor to tolerate any mention of the word, nor any suggestion alluding to the possibility of such articulation. Earlier in the treatment, any reference to anger in any manner would evoke either an episode of hypermanic behavior, or a shutting down, or, later, a "casual" changing of the subject, as if the other subject had simply not come up. It was not possible for John to hear the word angry, or mad. On my replying as I did, suddenly John's face became quietly alert. For the first time, he looked directly into my face as he spoke, with quiet animation. He did not reply to my answer to his question. Instead he initiated another similarly phrased question: "Would you be mad if someone made you go to bed without any supper!" "Yessir! I certainly would be mad if someone made me go to bed without any supper!" I again answered with angry affect. "Would you be mad if someone made you sit in the chair for
ten hours and eat stuff you hated and put it in your mouth?", John
demanded, now permitting angry affect, for the first time, into his
own words. "Yessir! I certainly would be very angry if someone made
me sit in the chair for ten hours and eat stuff I hated and put it in
my mouth", I answered.

In a clear experience of joy in being able to feel, and to express,
his own realness—to hold up his own frozen-off aspect of self to the
light of livable day and to experience this realness being reflected
back to him in simple, undistorted, accepted fashion—John continued,
as if reciting a litany of his four-year-old life, to call up a near-
exhaustive catalog of those failures of infant care and of the environ-
ment which he had reacted to as impingements, as cumulative trauma.
He amply demonstrated that what was needed here was not interpretation,
nor sympathy, nor any allusions to his mother in any way. What was
needed, as John was joyful at being able to make clear, was a mirror
through which he could, one by one, hold up his reactions to these
failures and see in my face and hear in my tone his inner, long silent,
feelings reflected as sharable, and as shared reality. To observe this
was a powerful learning experience for me; I was quite literally stunned
by the extraordinariness of watching such a phenomena.

I had observed it seeming a natural part of ordinary life that
babies and children would, just naturally, need to have opportunity
to see (and of course hear and feel) themselves reflected in their
mother's (and others') response to them in order to have a chance to get
some sense of who they were—of whether they were valued, worthy, wanted
persons, or not. Watching children, one could not help seeing them
being quite open about this need. Just naturally, provided the environment permits it at all, the child will begin very early exhibiting himself, or something he had found, or made, or thought of, to his mother, and others, just to be able to learn what sort of a response he will generate. In early months, the child accomplished this through smiling, or making a greeting-like gesture. Observations of infants and children in everyday settings seemed regularly to serve up, as a homely life-truth, the notion that children who saw themselves reflected in an ongoing fashion in a predominantly reliably consistent way, undistorted by the other's needs, through the mirror of their mother's face and voice as a valued, worthwhile and acceptable human being, just naturally thrived, surviving the mother's mistakes and lapses.

I saw, as an aspect of every day life, that children whose mothers were given to holding up a reflection of the child, through her face and voice, that was predominantly negative, distorted or unreliable and grossly inconsistent seemed not to be finding childhood a pleasurable time, and that they "got into trouble." Such ordinary observations seem to abound: one could pretty regularly, for instance, come upon a mother and child in a supermarket, where the child was intent on exploring the interesting-looking items on display and the mother seemed intent on conveying to the child that in so doing he was generating some rather powerfully hostile and derogatory reactions about himself as a person in her eyes.

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23 Developmental psychiatrists and psychologists have made research studies of these reciprocal interactive phenomena and corroborated what ordinary experience leads one to conclude.
She on the other hand seems convinced that she is responding appropriately to this infuriating child who walks along behind her taking cans off the bottom shelf, or touching a soft-feeling loaf of bread. One of my client's children had a pronounced proclivity for walking up to strangers in stores, and looking into their face as one would do only with a close acquaintance and asking them a very direct and "personal" question, e.g., to an old woman, "How old are you?" This as her mother shriekingly told me, was "driving her nuts!" "I am never going to go shopping with her again if we have to starve! She is hopeless!"
The child (then nine), standing alongside her, looked puzzled: groaning, she said, "but I just wanted to know; I didn't know it was bad, honest." "Oh, Meredith!! You know you're always doing stupid stuff like that!"
It was the tone here that was devastating, not only the comment. As if to make it underscored in still another way, she turned her back on the child then and spoke to me now, instead of to the child. Now, about the child, she said, "This kid is gonna drive me nuts!!" The mother's words and her turning away said clearly "the child is not worth communicating with."

Most vivid and important of all, I think, is that I was to watch, across long and intensive and multi-faceted therapy, the mother report her own progress (which was marked) in terms of that phenomenon (as well, of course, as in terms of her own self, relationships, abilities, etc.): "Meredith's really getting so much better; she's definitely stopped tormenting me like she always used to."

Later the small child seems to want to spend a good bit of his time bringing something—a flower, a song he learned at school, a present he
has made for her—to his mother, and then watching her face to learn what it has to say about him.

I have observed this phenomenon hundreds of times now; each time the child shows, observably, in facial expression, posture, tone of voice, and subsequent activity, a clear presentation of experience at the unspoken level of his own self experience, one markedly dichotomous in terms of only one variable whether or not the mother accurately perceived his meaning. If she indicated that she understood what he wanted her for, then the child could, if necessary, wait, or even "forget it", turning to other activities; if instead she simply said how come she could not attend to him then, (whether by silence, angry snapping "You see I am busy and can't do that now!", or in more subtle ways, the child either becomes more insistent (but Mommy, I...), or drops his face to dejected expression, or withdraws, but not to contented activity—and often to "annoying", or even destructive activity in another room, as if unrelated to this event.

In like manner I "observed" countless repetitions of adults (including parents—of the children I observed concurrently in therapy, in my written-record data, and in natural history observations) "just naturally" experiencing this same need to have opportunity to see themselves reflected in an undistorted and reliably consistent way, through "a new mirror".

Whatever else might have gone wrong for them, it was very often observable that they appeared to have missed out somewhere along the way on getting hold of, or of being able to hold on to, a notion of themselves as esteemed, valued persons in their sight, even when in
the view of others, they "were" esteemed, valued persons, etc. I do know we know all this, I am only trying here to say here is where I see that fitting, in an integrative way, even though we know that too, I think. In other words, I am just gathering in bits of what we do know and setting them down together.

In itself the "missing out" would seem to hold the potential for possibly developing with less than optimal images of themselves, with the result that adults and children may, often, be feeling a natural human need to have a chance to be reflected through a new, perhaps clearer mirror—one which "understands that they might 'feel bad'" from having missed out on that. All of this seems to me simply a reflection of what Lacan, Kohut and Winnicott have written (even though not quite in the same frame of thinking) in terms of the mirror role of the mother—and of the analyst or psychotherapist—in the course of human development and in working therapeutically with human beings.

Their varied conceptualizations go into tremendously greater theoretical and technical complexities than the ordinary way I had earlier thought of this, yet I think one might hypothesize a consensus among their views that my just naturally having happened on an opportunity to mirror John's emerging sense of himself even without knowing any sort of complex systematic understanding of what that might add up to, simply says "Well, that was able to come about because it is just a part of the natural way human beings are—at both sides of the equation that then happened to be small John and 'his therapist.'" And that the reason it was "therapeutic" for John (later weeks and months showed it definitely was a milestone of progress for
him) was simply because it was a major part of a natural human process of the way things are for human beings—except when, as in John's and Meredith's and their mother's case, the natural order had somehow got out of kilter, and meant that John, here, had just "missed" a part of that. Once he happened across something he had missed from the natural order, he could just naturally make use of it, and "make progress" because things did not feel, now, quite so out of kilter; since one small part that had been awry had got back on the track.

One needs to purposely sift away all of the vast, complex interplay of multiple interactiveness, family "craziness", wild fantasies, bizarre ideation, etc. which, in a bombarding, overwhelming way, served as content, to be able to say this at all about John, so that here, of course, the whole process sounds probably much too facile. There was much more to his therapy, his progress, his regress, etc. This is not any sort of representative entity, yet putting in their content serves only to make the account stunning, but drowns out what I think is important here.

Winnicott's two lines on the mirror function, as it pertains to childhood and therapy seem to fit well here, to tie this back to that.

When I look I am seen, so I exist.
I can now afford to look and see.

These were words with which Winnicott wrote of his postulating a historical process in the individual which depends on being seen, not just looked-at: when the baby looks at the mother's face, ordinarily, says Winnicott, what the baby sees is himself or herself.

It was near this same time that his sister Meredith made one of her most effective uses of "silence" as communication. After a period of
intensive and extensive chaos, during which the children, initially, exhibited their manic (defensive) behavior and their rage and destructiveness to my physical body and the furniture during our family sessions, things eventually settled down to a considerably lessened pandemonium, which gradually grew possible of fruitful accomplishments at being able to live in the same house together without wholesale destruction going on, and eventually, with a capacity for concern and a modicum of empathic responding where all had, earlier, been reacting to the impingement of the other, which caused pain, for all.

The children's mother, who is not being discussed right now, found it more comfortable to present completely unrealistic versions of herself during the family sessions and would most often greet me in a socially acceptable fashion, regardless of the degree of rage that might have occurred prior to my arrival. Eventually, after a long time of therapy, once the session got under way, the children would regularly find a way to enlist her cooperation in reinitiating the current ongoing trauma, in order that I could see for myself what none could dare say: then I could dare say and they were relieved, and it could be worked on as a family. I saw that I not only served as one who would see, and who would "dare to say", but more importantly, I was the sine qua non requirement: a protective shield for all members who would protect each of the three from the rageful destruction of one another from these phenomena which in themselves were, always, manifestations of rageful destruction of one another. This was clearly as true for the mother as the children in this way: if an example of what was destroying the children was to be made manifest, it would a) evoke for the children the experience of being overwhelmed by the
mother's rageful words, behavior, etc. which were their experience needing to be brought back and b) would also, in becoming manifest, replay a situation which had had the power to evoke the mother's destructive rage and hence would ineluctably do so again, before my eyes.

The mother dared not bring up what had left her powerless to keep from destroying the children in rageful abuse (even after she was able to speak of that as what did happen when I wasn't there, and to say how terrified of it she was in herself, but also how powerless in its wake to not do it) not because she didn't want me to see it, but because she did not want to be again ragefully destroying her children. The children, for like reason, could not do so either.

As long as I did not understand this, no one ever could take a chance. Only when I had shown, hundreds of times, in lesser ways, that (mirabile dictu, so it seemed to them) I could turn off the wrath of one who was erupting into rage, and they saw that my helping one to turn off the rageful fury suddenly made possible a dramatically different perception on the part of the enraged one, of the other—which then made possible some sort of interchange—did the children "decide" to purposely initiate scenes of their own experiences of being literally destroyed by their mother's rage, simply by doing or saying the thing required to bring forth the mother's most violent rageful attacks. For a long time (since I of course had no idea what they would suddenly do such a thing for, which would instantly find the rafters shaking with torrential chaos in all directions) I felt I was trying, in vain, to do therapy in a "snakepit"-like mad house.
Only when one child said, after the worst of these, "Whew! I was afraid this time you'd never get it!" did I begin to realize that things are not always what they seem.

The more they could trust my protective shield function for their mother and hence for them, the less inclined they were to exhibit a false front, and worked out for themselves communicative ways to let me know how things were for them.

I came to understand that when things were relatively bearable in Meredith's world, she could permit us to draw pictures, though most often frenetically. When things were not bearable, then Meredith signalled this by total silence to me, looking through me as I sat at the table as if I were not there, or as if she, though three feet from me, could not see that I was there (starting when I arrived and continuing). She would stand not far from me, (two feet), or sit at the table with her mother and me, and at times John, (John was often lying under the table), talking frenetically to her mother as if alone with her. In time, I came to understand that this was a message to me that I was to expect that during the session she would eventually engage in quite mad, apparently psychotic behaviors, directed toward me, and, as I gradually learned, that it was her intent that I realize that these things represented a metaphoric dramatization, in silence, of what it was that had happened in the house that she, Meredith, was terrified she was going to breakdown from.

On those occasions when things occurred that were so traumatic that Meredith did experience fragmentation, she behaved quite differently from all other times. These behaviors, enacted in a way which
would make an onlooker convinced that Meredith was completely mad, were distinctly intended as communication that she was afraid that she might, because things were that bad. These unvaryingly, and increasingly, terrified her mother, who would tremble at the cataclysmic display of "overt psychosis", "nervous breakdown", "insanity", happening in front of her (always with me as the target being vilely, obscenely, pornographically, pervertedly, villified in torrents of sneering contempt from Meredith, not remotely recognizable as her voice, but sounding unquestionably like a middle aged woman—as if of her grandmother's age: Meredith's mother's voice was like a 12 year old child's, when she was not in rage.

The children's mother had improved greatly in her ability to keep from fragmenting and erupting into rage at the children or from withdrawing into walled-off depressed state. Such phenomena occurred far more infrequently after a time, and after a year there were relatively long periods during which the mother would be quite capable of providing some marked degree of adequate mothering technique and empathic responding. An important gain had been her having come to want to become an empathically responsive mother—to ask for help in that specific area, recognizing that it was, and was not, that the children were driving her crazy. She had come to see that it was her responses to them which called forth their "driving her crazy." This she came to see by observing (and having it eventually sink in via redundancy) that each time I could serve as protective shield, and respond to her in a way that turned off her rage, she could then perceive the child's need for her response rather than perceiving the child as a rotten tormentor.
Then she responded of her own spontaneity to their need, and the child abruptly shifted to a "good child". She said she wanted me to help her come to be able to manage that on her own, to be able to take it for granted, so that she would not continue to be unable to keep from destroying them when I was not there.

Eventually she did not require the children's telling me metaphorically that things had gone bad for her in my absence: she would speak of this herself when I arrived, which of course was far more healthy for the children, since it permitted them to be consciously aware of the reality of her failure, which she had come to be able to allow herself to know, and then to allow them to know that she knew. This made a marked, vivid difference to all. But at this time she was not yet able to know of her failure and imagined that the failure lay in the children's failure to "be good" for her.

The children were vividly aware of the danger to themselves resulting just from her failures at good enough care, and understood the urgency to protect themselves from the effects of any more cumulative trauma than was unavoidable. They had come to realize that I could be helpful to their mother, and thus to them, and they continually constructed creative ways of attempting to make the best use of me for their mother during the family sessions. (During their individual sessions, they had no desire to use me in this way: in their individual treatment, each family member had no desire to focus on anything other than his or her individual personal needs; almost never did either the child or the mother mention the others, to my surprise. What became clear was that what each needed very much was to be permitted a
mirror not for the actuality of what things, interactions, traumas, violent brawls with men, etc. were going on around them, but only his or her wish to have someone who could see the sense of ignoring that in favor of the really important; how that person felt about something, just from the stand point of his own feelings. This for a long time was staggering to me: the only analogy suitable is if a person's (non client, university person say) house has that day burned down, and what the person wants to talk about is that last week a person passed him in the hall and didn't say hello. (In time, I became not at all surprised: this "little" thing mattered to this person, and this, the mother or child was in effect saying, is what "my" therapy should be for, not the more visible things you, therapist, might be convinced are the important things for me.) In the family sessions, both mother and children appeared literally to "forget" that I was "his" or "her" therapist on another day: now, en masse, all perceived me as "the family's therapist." No one ever, not even once, brought into his or her individual therapy anything that occurred in the family session, not even things "between me and that person": that was between that person and "the family's therapist": there was no overlap in their perception; this wasn't something anyone worked at (the only one who, at times, had to work at it was me, e.g., when a particularly overwhelming event had arisen in the family session between mother and child, of a nature so profound I was certain the mother would need to use her individual session the next day to continue.) On one such occasion, I thought that perhaps it was simply that the earlier scene had been so powerful that she did not feel easy returning to it. I
asked. I learned in a hurry not to make that erroneous assumption again; a look of very hurt feeling darted across the mother's face, for my having put her in a position where it looked as if I would be thinking it uncaring, etc. of her, in her mother role, for her to concentrate on some entirely different thing she had thought about, about a "small thing" from her last week's session.

During this creative use of silence which Meredith employed during family sessions at the worst of times, Meredith herself was not at all silent: she carried on loudly, most often screeching, to her mother, as if about everyday things that demanded her and her mother's attention: for example, she would often become involved with her mother over a request to be permitted to wear, the next day to school, some item of clothing (which she knew in advance that her mother would not permit). In this way she could insure that she could carry on her altercation, escalating it almost instantly to a fever pitch.

Throughout this, she had not even acknowledged my presence in the room (although at other times she regularly greeted me, and sat immediately at the table, engaging me in immediate conversation, often accompanied by insisting on our drawing squiggle type pictures together until the family session actually began--and sometimes during it). She had, however, come to stand 24 inches from me, and not "see" that "someone" was there. (Her mother called this "rude".)

Meredith gave all appearance of having gone mad during these occasions. Her reactions to her mother's replies were as completely lacking in relevant responsiveness as it was possible to be. In very short order she would add to this verbal display a series of physical
demonstrations of bizarre sorts, for example, continuing unabated the
torrential thrust of words while walking a few feet away and lying
down on her back in the middle of the kitchen floor (in the 4 feet away
adjacent room).

At first, I sometimes said some words of acknowledgement to
Meredith of what I thought was being communicated.

Regularly, any words, however gentle and empathic, would evoke
displays of wholesale scornful, sneering contempt at me: "You just
bug out of this, you creep: I ain't talking to you!" was the only one
she ever said that would not sizzle the paper here.

When her mother would insist that she refrain from talking to me
in that way, Meredith, at other times a quite different little girl.
would sneer contemptuously and retort to her mother, "I'll talk to her
any way I feel like, she's a stupid jerk and she don't know nothing.
I don't have to listen to her! Why don't she get out of our house.
We don't want no creepy ther'pis around here. This is my house; I'll
kick her out myself." etc. etc. ad infintem.

Eventually Meredith would manage to provoke her mother into a dis-
play of her real-life attitudes and behaviors toward Meredith, which was
what Meredith wanted to bring about all along.

Then she could, often, be satisfied, and the family session could
begin, with Meredith having insured that it would deal with the real
feelings provoked by the real experience of their lives together, which
had for so long been hidden behind the massive shades of paranoia drawn
against the outside world.
At other times—and the lying on the kitchen floor was one of them—Meredith's use of silence was even more creative. These were occasions which began to arise after Meredith's mother had become involved in a relationship with a man, who now occasionally slept at their home, and of whom the children were very fearful of admitting to their mother their terror, and their hatred.

For some time after the relationship began, the children's mother described him as a gentle and good man. The children, who had been at first enthusiastically delighted by the man's presence, in their pining for a father, had become **gravely concerned for their own welfare** when they came to realize that he possessed considerable capacity for cruel and terrifying behavior toward them (only some of which their mother was aware of).

Meredith's positioning herself on the kitchen floor while acting in a truly fragmented manner was a use of silent communication intended to communicate to me that the night before her mother and this man had engaged in a chaotically violent altercation, during which the man had first thrown a knife and then had a seizure. While lying on the floor to "give me the message of what the situation message was" (she **told** me this afterwards, this is not my speculative interpretation) she used the cataclysmic torrential displays of psychotic maelstrom madness (directed at my name, face, physical parts, intellect (lack of), sexual perversion, all in the most archaic conceptualizations quite novel to me—**all** of them **far** beyond my own wildest imaginings of what a human mind could **conceive** of as thoughts, concepts, words, etc.) to make manifest to me what was evoked in **her** by the terror and rage which arose
from the situation there being depicted in the situation message.

Each time I tried to respond in any way, Meredith made that not possible; each time I got so much as one word (like "I", even) out of my mouth to try to respond, she escalated the whole business, including the power of her decibel-level shrieking: white noise two-syllable filibuster blasts intentionally to drown me out; that went on for perhaps 30 minutes. I was frightened out of my wits, certain the child had disintegrated for good, now, and that there was no coming back. I was also finding it an intensely hard struggle, emotionally, to withstand a non-stop torrential verbal abusive assault to every single part and facet and aspect of myself. It may not seem, on paper, that one might find it very stressful to hear oneself taken apart physical "piece" by physical piece, aspect by aspect, and have a collection of vile, incredibly horrible words attached to oneself, in a systematic way from A to Z, covering all possible areas of one's self and being, when it was after all only a "mad child" spewing forth words, but I have to say that to my surprise I did find that there was something extraordinary about what was happening to my inner experience, something that definitely would have to be termed a sense that this which was happening a) "could not be happening, --there could not exist an experience like this" and b) "if it doesn't stop soon, it feels as if I could not continue to endure it," and c) "what will I do if it never stops."

I found I had to bring to bear a kind of stamina and literal teeth-gritting I'd never dreamed anything could require, simply for endurance sake: in such a context it was straining my intellect to what felt like,
literally, the breaking point—even though I could still know and say to myself that fact: that this felt frighteningly convincingly as if someone were actually capable of pushing me to a breaking-point, where my mind would simply not be able to endure the continuing to try to be responsive. I literally sat there, by the time 20 minutes of it had gone by, with sweat pouring down my forehead, struggling to force myself to not just quietly get up and walk out the door, away from this extreme torment, which was like a shrieking machine.

So extreme and excruciatingly painful was this mental strain to not get up and walk away from it, that only one thing could have had the power to enable me to not yield to the compelling desire to escape this tormenting painful experience: that I was this child's therapist. I found that the only thing that managed to keep me in the room was forcibly pushing aside each relentlessly repeated insistence from my mind to leave, with a mental picture of what I would be doing to this child if I were to thereby be committing what I knew would demolish her: the ultimate blow of my abandoning her in the middle of her torment, as a result of her torment. I had to keep reminding myself that, however, excruciating to me, it was Meredith's torment. And finally her message got through. As nothing on earth could ever have got it to sink in to me. Meredith was simply enabling me to "see what it feels like," to be Meredith, daughter of the young mother (who was, throughout, cowering in wide eyed terror at what Meredith was doing to me) and at the extremes of madness Meredith was capable of. The five year old boy sat throughout this, huddled in a corner, staring with an unblinking terrified intensity, unable, now, to take himself
into his "glass booth". The small apartment was silent, except for the shrill mad non-stop shriek of the pretty, wiry little 9 year old Meredith lying spread eagle on the kitchen floor spewing forth a bottomless wellspring of archaic contemptuous vilification of my body parts, intellect, self worth, etc. and of my equally relentless efforts to shout loudly enough, and quickly enough, messages of reassurance to Meredith in a vain and futile hope that I could manage to get one of them out before she instituted the white noise two-syllabic chant-blast drowning out my only hope of ever stopping the torment she was causing me to experience.

Only because I could not think of any other possible thing to say, I kept endlessly restarting the same sentence-sequence: "I respect you, Meredith, it's okay, I understand that something is very wrong that you want me to know, and I'm TRYING; Don't worry, I won't give up. I'm sorry it's taking me so long to figure it out, but it's hard to figure it out; but I do respect you; and I will keep trying." I said that litany about 100 times; each time getting at most, a word sequence out, before she came back with scathing invalidation of whatever I had just said, e.g., "Well, I don't respect you; just shut up, do ya hear!", or "There ain't nuthin' wrong, that just shows how stupid you are, fartface --you think you're sooo smart, ha! Big smart Ther'pis, well we don't want no ther'pis around here, see, so just get the hell out of my house!!" or "There damn sure is something wrong, and it's you: you smell, you're making the whole house stink. If you just bug off and get the hell out, everything would be okay, the only thing wrong in this house is that you're in it, etc." That presents, I see, a misleading picture, for it sounds
-on-paper-as if a "rational" dialogue sequence were going on, whereas it was like some kind of 'race with the devil,' to the underlying melody of Meredith's incredibly ear-splitting white noise--dah-dee-dah-dee-dah-dee in 100 blasts at a time, each of them abruptly clipping fast over each of my attempts to say anything, while yet becoming far more bizarre in escalation if I said nothing (which I regularly did, for perhaps two minutes at a time, so I could rest, and try, in vain, to think what in the world to do, and try to struggle with myself against giving up and leaving).

The worst part about trying to force myself to keep trying was that I did not really, eventually, believe there was any point at all to my trying. Meredith had actually convinced me she meant all those things about me, now, and that there was no way I could help; I believed her content—that I had, in her mind, become now "the hindrance and harm" rather than a hope for help. In the face of that belief, continuing to try was, in truth, near overwhelming.

Finally, after it sank in that Meredith was forcing me into a "double bind" where my only escape was to harm her by abandonment, and yet where all of my efforts to help were thrown contemptuously back in my face, all in a torment of chaotic noise blasts that were near unendurable, and hence letting me (and her mother) experience what she experienced when her mother did "crazy" things to her, or around her, I stopped attending to Meredith, and turned to her mother, having to yell over Meredith's now escalated contempt diatribe to make myself heard. "Think", I said, "are you sure Meredith was asleep the other night when Alex came back and you and he had a fight? And did anything worse happen that night than what you told me?" Her mother looked wide-eyed.
"I know she was asleep, cuz I had just checked before Alex came, and she sleeps like a log. There was a scary part to it, but it didn't make no noise. He just passed out on the kitchen floor, in one of his seizures, after he threw a knife at the wall near me. But she couldn't have heard nuthin'."

Throughout this Meredith had been white-noising and sneering over and over "Nosy ther'pis, who do you think you are buttin' in our private business," etc., etc. But I took one last effort, even though I knew it was absurd, and I did so only in desperation by then, and in knowing I couldn't stand it if the madness didn't stop soon. Shouting over Meredith's contemptuous refusals to let me talk, I yelled that I thought that I now understood what she was trying to tell me (which is, of course, now, in this retrospective account, what I've already said here--that she had heard the frightening battle between her mother and Alex, had sneaked downstairs, and had seen him throw a knife at her mother and seen him have a seizure on the kitchen floor, and that no one had said in words to her that this had happened, and that her mother had acted like it hadn't happened, and so Meredith had to keep inside all the terror and craziness that brought her, or rekindle her mother's rage.

My own voice was hoarse, and I knew I could not try one more sentence, to help Meredith; she had used up all my capacity to be able to force myself to keep trying. I could not believe my own eyes or ears when all noise, all madness, stopped, instantly; Meredith quietly got up from the floor, came over to the table, resumed her everyday ordinary place at the table for family therapy, saying, with a gentle little girl face and voice, only a bit above a whisper, "Whew! I was
afraid you'd never get it."

And the family therapy started.

Meredith's mother was without a word able to turn to the child in the most empathic and gentle tones, and say, "I just didn't know--I thought you was asleep." "I saw it all," said Meredith; "I always see it all; I always sneak downstairs when I hear the fights: I'm always afraid you'll get killed and I won't have no more mother."

That day, for the first time ever, Meredith's mother was able to touch her child, for some reason other than to hit her; that day, for the first time ever in the child's life, the mother put her arms around the child who was her daughter and the child felt what it was like for a mother to soothe her, with words of softness, and arms of nurturance. For the first time ever, the little girl too brittle to endure anyone's touching her even on the arm, sat in her mother's lap. She turned to me and said, "Would you sing that song I heard you sing before, that you said was a lullaby." The five year old got up from the crouched-corner-clinging, came over, did not demand, as he always did, to be allowed to get on his mother's lap, or try to push his sister off as he would, without question, have done under any other circumstances. Instead he came, stood next to me where he could watch this scene of mothering, in silent wonder.

I was worried for him, wondering how he could possibly keep from needing so badly to be part of that that he wouldn't have to interrupt it. But I was again not giving human beings enough credit for comprehending life's realities when things are going as they are apparently supposed to. With quiet gentle tone the mother said, "Oh, John, you
want to be on Mommie's lap too. You wait John, Mommy will rock John lat-
er." John was not at all perturbed: he seemed to want not to disturb
the scene. He simply looked at me, and said with clear easeful assertion
"I want you to rock me like that." And so, to my therapist's astonish-
ment, I saw what was, in that one singular never-to-be-repeated instance,
the appropriate thing for a family therapist to do: to rock a five year
old boy, while quietly singing Brahms' Lullaby at the request of a bea-
tifically-enraptured mother rocking her beatifically-enraptured daughter.

They were oblivious to my presence, even the John on my lap: the
three of them were now, for the first time, being together in their own
presence. Yet, remarkably, when I had come to the end of the very quietly
sung brief few lines that is Brahms' Lullaby, the little boy said "I
want you to sing it again" and the little girl said, "Please sing it
again, over and over," and the mother said, "Gee, that's beautiful, I
think I heard the tune on the radio once, but I never heard the words.
Do you have time to just sing it a little longer; it's really so beauti-
ful, and I'm really so amazed how peaceful everything is, like a real
family. But I know it's late and you've probably got to get home."

"Oh, please Patty, please sing it some more times--don't go yet,"
gently, softly said the little girl without moving her head up from its
cradled spot. "Yeah!" said the five year old, with a crisp assertive
smiling voice, "We don't want you to stop!"

I said I did indeed have to go, but could and would stay five min-
utes "And then I'll get up and make our supper--gee, the whole after-
noon got away from us; it's supper time." "I'll help, Mommy," said
Meredith, "Me, too!" said the little boy.
The next five minutes seemed to me the most remarkable five minutes I might ever experience as a psychologist: here in this house where earlier that morning the mother had, in her own private session, announced she had arrived at the end of her rope and had asked me to authorize committing her to a hospital--so she could get away from all the screaming craziness of trying to be at all, and having on top of that to try to be a mother, which was just too much for her--because she was scared to death that her daughter had become a "psycho" by the bizarre way she'd been behaving all week--and where that afternoon a small child had engaged me in an experience that brought me to the end of my rope, by her seemingly unstoppable maelstrom of psychotic madness, I was being privy to a scene of such peace and contentment as I had never, let alone that day, or month, expected could be possible in this house. It was so overpoweringly awesome a thing to have myself experienced such a threesome pair of experiences in one day that I realized I was glad for the 5 minutes of being able to sit still outside their family-peacefulness, to gather up some energy to go return to my own world.

As I got up to do that, the mother gently eased the sleeping-like Meredith from her lap into a rocking chair, and said "Listen kids, I want you to know that I want to be like this, and I am really gonna work really hard to be this kind of mother. I know how awful it is for all of us when everybody's always screaming and crazy, and I know I'm not able yet to be the way I want to be, but I'm not going to give up working in my therapy to get better so we can have this kind of life." "Yeah", both children said, the little girl said. "It's lucky we got a
ther'pis, so you can get better.' The mother smiled. The boy nodded.

Now this scene is not presented here for its own poignant sake—there were in fact many scores of scenes equally as moving, or poignant, and many, far more dramatic: and many that involved having to work hard at learning to understand the "central message" that the content kept pulling me off the track from. But this one was so exemplary an example of the power of being not understood—of simply not having one's messages understood, of not having one's ordinary childlike needs met or responded to, in powerful contrast to the equal power of being understood (here, it was not, as I hope the presentation made clear, only I who came to be able to understand one other person's need—message, (or self-experience message) but all parties who all came, reciprocally, to "perceive", and hear and "see" one another's communication, message, needs, etc. As soon as that happened, all spontaneously began to behave toward one another completely differently—all now responding to one another, (as contrasted with reacting to his or her own awful inner experience of all others), in a kind of natural rhythm.

And the little girl had, again, underlined that doubly, by asking me to be not there as a person, but yet while completely outside their now-functioning bit of the natural order of life to "supply" that which does, in the natural order, go with the natural life rhythm they were here "catching up on". All 3 had missed out on that part of things—the just being contentedly peacefully soothingly rocked for a brief period the underlying melody of the natural order of that beginning period which had been so awry for them—the infant's lullabye.

All of this had come to pass through the communication of silence:
the mother had been silent to the little girl about the extreme murderous rage she'd participated in some nights before; she had acted as if no such thing had happened when the little girl had come downstairs next morning. (She had also acted as if she could not tolerate the children that week, when what she could not tolerate was her own experience, which evoked the children's experience.) The little girl was so devastated by witnessing it that she could not keep from bringing forth isolated breakdown products of a fragmenting self (the obscenity-ridden archaic thought content filled with bizarre body-parts, anal, urethral, masturbatory, etc. concepts for herself—which she gave me so I could experience what even that was like: to know the chaotic awfulness of having each of one's body parts, intellect, and all else fragmented into incredibly horrible-sounding perverted horribleness—the horribleness of one's self coming to pieces and disintegrating).

She could not put into words archaic experience of self fragmentation—only a cohesive self experience can form words and thought for things at the cohesive self level. So she had had to manifest her experience without words, silently, to her mother. Her mother "flipped out" at that, as she had told me—into the terror that she had created a "psycho" by her rageful inability to keep from harming them verbally (physically, she was, by then, much better about; over that she had reached a point of having some control). And she could not put any of it into words for me to know it by what words could she have used, I asked myself, that could ever have given me even a glimmer of what she meant; of what the meaning was for her, of these experiences. And had she even tried, she would have had to "report" what she had
witnessed of her mother, which, before she had got it half out in word form, would have called forth her mother's cascading torrents of rage onto the child—as the re-evoking of the situation which called forth the mother's rageful violent fight with the knife-wielding man.

She took a big risk, in "pushing me to my endurance's limit." But we must ask ourselves—where was an alternative? She was afraid I'd "never get it" this time. I was surely equally as afraid as she. It was necessary that this communication be made through silence, as far as content was concerned. Content would not do. I cannot imagine a more creative means of using a therapist to try to acquire what one needs. It was this experience, and hundreds like it that finally began to teach me the awesome capability of the human being to struggle for its own requirements, but also these experiences that began to teach me that really my role as a therapist seemed to be to learn to listen better, rather than to "know more," in my own "knowledge" collection, of what to "do" for people in therapy.

It was this particular constellation of therapeutic encounters, plus one quite like it with another family, plus one nothing like—yet everything like—it in another sense, that returned my clinical efforts a hundred-fold from a research standpoint.

However much it might seem unlikely—given the degree of troubledness here in these "cases"—I was dumbfounded (until I got used to it, in time) to find how infinitely I was able—in the course of attending to the research data garnered from individual, intergenerational and transgenerational written sources—to draw upon one or another of these persons' individual child, individual mother, individual grown-child-single-adult, personal experience for that person, and upon the mother-child pair and
three generational interplay phenomena I had come to know so intimately in the course of three years of this sort of clinical practicum training.

I would not have thought to do this sort of research had it not been for these three long term therapy situations, but also I myself feel convinced that I would not have been able to figure out how to, if it had not been for what these persons permitted me to learn.

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WHOSE CHILD IS THIS NO MOTHER KNOWS

Will you call this child Mother; Mother's Child yet the same? Of the child-mother's Child, left for her no Child's name. Child-mother to a mother who could never have a child So the Child would be Mother and thus know no child's Child; And the price for Not-A-Child that the Mother would require Was to keep her Child-Ever, in her Never-Child mire; Then on growing to pubescent must the Never-Child mother; There to search for Child's Mother in small body of another; That small child's Child must yield up, to be Child-Mother's Mother While the howl of "Where's my Child," wails from Child's Mother's

"You can't take My Baby from me," wailed Not-Mother-Of-Them-All; "How dare you to call her Mother, Little Mother in the hall"; In her wide-eyed softspoke echo to her never-child-mother Whispered Never-child's Child, "Shall I then know never Mother?"

"Knock it off you little bastard, just shut up and feed your brother."

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After the first 1½ years of work with this family, the chaotic, and paradoxical communications, with which my accommodative process had often felt overwhelmed, worked at sifting what orderedness might be inherent to all of the year and a half of content, and surprised me by bringing this to my mind while thinking of them one evening while writing the day's notes. I did not then know these 15 lines represented the formal self-regulating transformational structure for this transgenerational matrix pattern.

[Later I was to discover a detailed understanding of this phenomena --cognitively, linguistically and structurally, in the writings of Roman Jakobson, (deGeorge & deGeorge, 1972).]
CHAPTER XIII

WHOSE CHILD IS THIS:
FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS TO LET US KNOW
THAT NO MAN IS AN ISLAND UNTO HIMSELF

One of the findings of my research has been that persons who have experienced certain configurations of parenting experience have a desire to share important aspects of their lives with other persons. At first glance that statement will not seem a very interest-evoking phenomenon; it would seem to be saying what we know as the most commonplace matter of course. I believe there is more to the statement than is perceivable on first encountering it. We tend to think of ourselves as knowing that is so from the fact, for one, that we know that persons who are experiencing distress will seek psychotherapy; in the course of therapy persons might perhaps be seen as experiencing a desire to share important aspects of their lives with another person. My belief is that the phenomenon remarked on here is, while a variant, a distinguishable variant: it involves, here, persons who are not necessarily experiencing a need for therapy, and who have a desire to share important aspects of their lives with strangers, and who will, in the ordinary course of things find ways to do that, because it is a requirement for them.

At the level of "sophistication" we associate with those who have acquired more than the average amount of required formal education, and/or those who are thought of as above the average in intelligence, or verbal facility, I have found in analyzing many lives that this phenomenon evidences itself in writings, almost all of which can be said to be subsumable under a distinguishable category of kinds of writings, which I am
calling autobiographical, although not all are termed "autobiography".

These include the actual decision on the part of an individual that his life, which is to say his experience of his life, warrants his writing an "autobiography" for publication. What I am saying here is that I have been able to determine simply from finding it redundantly appearing as empirical fact in hundreds of lives that the desire to write an account of one's life, for the purpose of publication as an autobiography to be read, (as naturally follows: by strangers) is an element in the transgenerational system of interrelated patternednesses I have been able to delineate.

Judging from a large sampling, it appears that all persons who write autobiographies share some number of clusters of other identifiable phenomena, at the transgenerational and individual level, as pattern-like antecedents.

These empirical findings appear to corroborate phenomena well described by Heinz Kohut's analysis of the self, regarding the developmental process he regards as a part of all normal early childhood development at the pole and stage of what he terms the grandiose (or grandiose exhibitionistic) self, at which the normal developmental requirement is to be looked at, and admired. Kohut has found that this is ineluctably coupled with the "grandiose" inner experience at the level of the self that can be thought of as "of course, I am somebody others will want to look at."

Kohut's theory posits that persons for whom the early parental milieu did not provide the requisite empathic responsiveness to this developmental need to have the child's exhibitionism admiringly responded to in infancy, the person will not be able, at the level of self experience, in adulthood, to experience the degree of diminution of that need to exhibit one's self for the view and mirroring approving acceptance of others, of the
concomitant conviction that "of course others will, just naturally, want to look at me. This suggests to me that such persons will experience it as "just natural" that strangers will want to read a detailed account of all of his self experiences, not for any interest in his accomplishments, but for what he is, and how he feels about himself, and what he thinks about, and this is so as an impact of early experience.

In addition, I found sharing at least some number of these same clusters of identifiable phenomena at the transgenerational and individual level persons who write their memoirs; persons who are variously termed "veteran diarists," or "inveterate journal keepers" which is to say persons who experience a rather compelling desire to record in written form an account of each of the days of their lives, from a personal perspective.

Among other interrelated phenomena identifiable (the vast majority of which phenomena have "nothing to do with" writing, or sharing their life experiences, nor recording them), I found redundantly among these persons--one that can be thought of as, I believe, clearly related: very many persons who experience the desire to record the important aspects of their lives in ongoing, lifetime diaries, journals or memoirs, and/or autobiographies, are also unusually greatly drawn to the writing of rather extraordinary numbers of letters, often numbering many thousands.

It was also discernable among my transgenerational, cross-cultural, cross-epochal data that persons who choose as their life vocation that of poet share many of the same clusters of identifiable elements, at the individual and transgenerational level as do diarists, journal keepers, and autobiographic writers. Persons who choose as their life vocation that of poet, and/or that of playwright share, at these same two levels
of data-gathering, clusters of identifiable elements with one another, and other clusters of the identifiable elements characterizing the individual and transgenerational lives of the persons remarked on above, with some of these considerable number of groups of clusters overlapping.

This is not intended to imply that the elements discernible in the individual lives of transgenerational matrices as commonalities among the "groups" of persons referred to here do not also share many of these same clusters of elements as do other persons, some of whom can also be thought of as "identifiable" in the term used here as a function of their vocation --for they do. For example, many of the clusters of elements, including many of those salient to this discussion, arise redundantly in the individual and transgenerational lives of persons who become elected politicians, and those who announce themselves as candidates for public office even if defeated, and in the lives of actors and actresses, and orators, and evangelists, to make note of a few such.

As an appropriate interjection, I was on one occasion in a delicatessen in Chicago: standing waiting at the counter my attention was captured by the presence of an entire wall of large glossy photographs, each bearing a close-up of the face of an actor or actress, of the type distributed to "fans." I found myself pondering the phenomenon of a person's being "willing" to distribute en masse photographs of his or her face to countless strangers.

Later, while analyzing many lives, I came to learn that the lives of those who experience a compelling desire to "go on the stage," that is, to be an actor or actress, share with one another a great many common phenomenal elements, and common clusters of phenomenal elements, across
their lifespan, from infancy on (and that so too do their transgenerational familial matrices share common elements and clusters of elements).

Among these were the cluster of elements which these persons could be seen to have in common with persons distinguishable by having wished to make a public presentation of a written record of their experience of themselves and the world, which I have remarked accords with Kohut’s view that persons who share as common experience insufficiency or inadequacy of mirroring will in later life also share as common experience a continued need to be looked at, admired, approved of, etc. Kohut is convinced that this is an ordinary part of natural-experience; along with its developmental counterpart: the sense that others in the environment will, just naturally, see one as someone they want to look at, admire, etc.

The way Kohut’s extensive clinical research has led him to regard this is that the need’s unfulfillment leaves “unfilled-in” that aspect of the self’s epigenetic structuring which would make possible the diminution of that need, the diminution being prerequisite to the self-structuring’s proceeding beyond the self’s developmental stage where that will no longer be a need. In this research, the data provided redundancy of visibility for the fact that some several of the clusters of elements common among “autobiographers” are also common clusters among the lives of poets and dramatists, and also common clusters among the lives of actors and actresses, and also among evangelists, orators, and persons who seek but do not obtain public office. The data also revealed that in addition to the common clusters shared alike by all of these (as if a “large group” comprised of all whom I have mentioned) there are other clusters of elements which appear as commonalities at the individual and transgenerational data
levels among actors and actresses which do not appear in the analyses of the lives of politicians, say; and clusters common in the data analyses of actors and actresses which do not appear in data for poets, for example. (These are here intended only as representative examples of the kinds of ways the data divided and/or coalesced; simply to show that a process was capable of becoming visible analogous to the Venn diagram, or the logician's syllogism.

It is important to add here that no attempt whatsoever was made to study these (or any) "groups" or "categories" of persons as such: I did not, in the research, categorize people in any way, but rather erased all categorizations to the greatest extent I could teach my mind to do that: the data brought forth these alignments.

Anything that a person ever did do (or thought, felt, etc.) in his life (vocationally or otherwise), was noted down as a possible element. Everything he wanted to do but didn't was noted as the element "wanted to (act) but didn't". "Wanted to run for public office" was one notation, and "Ran for public office" was another, separate category; "very often got drunk" was another, and "very often got drunk and as a result failed to show up at performance time at theatre" was another, different, category. As was so for the James who also happened to be Eugene O'Neill's father, and the grandfather of Shane O'Neill and Eugene O'Neill, Jr., both of whom committed suicide in adult life. An element underlying that he showed up at the theatre 1700 nights in a row, even the day after his young child died" was another (which automatically then announced itself as a category entitled "the show must go on"): "more importantly than the lives of one's family" perhaps, might warrant hypothesizing here, as a self-need for James.

At the end of more than 1000 hours in highly concentrated sequence
of reading and noting all phenomena of any kind appearing in any life, it was then possible to determine what the relevant "categories" were: even then none of the categories in the research itself ever became "actors," or "politicians," etc.—the notation "was an actor," for example, existed equally as one among all the other phenomenal notations about a person and his life and relationships.

In this way it was possible for it to become visible what phenomena did constitute elements, simply by seeing which phenomena constituted the components of clusters, with clusters themselves being recognizable as such by their appearing as commonalities among unrelated lives. (Then this same process was applied to each of the lives which were intergenerationally related to the lives being studied, after which the same "Venn diagram-like" process could be repeated at the two-generation-commonality-of-clusters level, and the three-generation level, etc.)

In this way it became possible to know what facts and factors in a person's life did warrant being regarded as elements, and in the case of actors, "became an actor" was one of very many.

Although I have discussed this process further in other sections, here I wanted only to note that I am compelled to use the term "actors," etc., in examples such as this only because that is a "category" which identifies these persons I am referring to to others, even though it did not identify them in the research itself but represented only an element. In instances where "the actor" shares some commonalities with some other "group of not-actors," he, and they, are, additionally members of that "group."

Here then, I am only trying to show that as another of the common elements in the lives of all who either became actors or who experienced
a desire to become an actor which failed to become fulfilled (all of those people later became "avidly interested in the theatre" and "avid theatre-goers," even when profound obstacles stood in their way.) For these persons, the data indicated particular parenting experiences of the kind Kohut describes as associated with insufficient or inadequate mirroring.

When I came to a recognition of this in the course of my data analyses, I remembered my pondering the delicatessen hall in Chicago, which had evoked in my thoughts the question of the phenomenon of a person's being "willing" to distribute en masse large glossy close-up photographs of his or her face, for countless thousands of strangers to hang on their walls. Again, although in a very small way, a mental page from my natural historian's notebook provided an element that had not had occasion to get itself recorded in my data sources. (In fact, as I realized, this omission of mention from biographic subject data reports was because it is so pervasive a phenomena among persons who become actors that it is thought of as a thing that "goes without saying.")

That delicatessen data source filled in two important thoughts for me. One was that it enabled me to see more vividly a level of distinctiveness between the actor who wishes to present himself, in person, to strangers; and the autobiographer who manifests the feeling a need and a desire to

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24 For example, Lewis Carroll had a "compelling and passionate" interest in the theatre. The fact that he was a clergyman at Christ Church College at Oxford, all but forbade his attending the theatre. It was considered absolutely outside of the question for a holder of the ecclesiastical sinecure he held to attend the theatre. Despite the fact that he regarded obeying the dictates of society and of his position, etc., as things importantly to be complied with, and was the polar opposite of defiant, he nonetheless was forced to take this risk and modify this attitude when it interfered with the theatre. For Carroll, "the show must go on with him in attendance as a spectator" was very much the case, (so too was writing 1000s of letters.)
present a written record of his experience of life. In the case of autobiographic writers it was possible to see more fine-tuned levels of distinctiveness among the array of vehicles visible. At one level, that of the outright autobiographic writer, the person in effect says "these are my experiences: this is ME, and I think that on that account alone, strangers will just naturally want to buy this, read this, and know me. In the case of persons who write autobiographic plays, poems, and novels, the person in effect says, "This is a play I have written (or a novel, story, poem, etc.) in which I am in fact presenting my experiences and me: while I am acting as if these are the life experiences of fictitious others, I am nevertheless expecting that you will see through the mask behind which I portray my self and admire me all the same. This was clear from their letters.

Two significant possibilities seem to exist here: one is that the "fictional" autobiographer is employing a level of creativity which may not be available to the outright autobiographer. But since analysis of scores of such lives has taught me that the autobiographer is as often the highly creative "fictional" artist as well (and does both) and that some who are outright autobiographers are not "creative" artists, and some who are the fictional autobiographers have, as another element in their lives, "has a dread of providing any outright autobiographic material about himself", (e.g., Ibsen, Lewis Carroll and Thomas Hardy), this cannot hold up as an "explanation," for it does not "exist as a category" on its own evidence, and another explanation must exist. Another possibility is that the explanation might lie in the evident fact that the outright autobiographer is able to risk presenting himself in such a way that if his autobiography is rejected, it would seem clear that what was being rejected
was him, his life, his experience: Such ability to risk self exposure would seem to imply lesser **vulnerability** to rejection.

The fictional writer takes far **less**-great a risk: if the play or the book is rejected by these persons to whom it is offered, the author has many rationalizing possibilities open—all of which are in fact the sorts of things I found redundantly recorded in the letters, journals, etc., of playwrights, poets and novelists, e.g., that the critic is not intelligent enough to understand this work and hence cannot be taken as valid criticism.

Here then, the outright autobiographer seems conceptually perhaps "less vulnerable" than the fictional autobiographer: the data **very** often supported this in the analyses of lifespans of both outright autobiographic authors and those who spoke of their creative writing as autobiographic (e.g., O'Neill and Ibsen).

Some fictional autobiographers, who could brook no criticism or rejection whatever, yet had so great a need for the response that they could not ignore critical reviews, say; would react with rage, excoriating the unvalid perceptiveness of the critic. Henrik Ibsen suffered mercilessly from this kind of agony, far beyond the time one might have expected he could have earned enough high praise to offset such devastation.

Many others simply shipped out their fictional autobiographic self-presentations for the purview of strangers and in a sense let it go at that. They spoke of actively withdrawing their gaze from critical commentators, making clear that they could not bear to have to tolerate the negative response, while yet invariably couching such references in a way that made it clear that that was because there was no point to attending to the
response of a person who lacked the sensitivity, etc. to appreciate it. They seemed always to be making it clear that what really mattered was simply the writing of it per se; the need to set it forth was what was compelling; and most often, this was expressed, for writers, in terms of an unstoppable hell-or-high-water drivenness, until it was "finished." Then, a great feeling of relief. I found this stated many hundreds of times by creative writers in a letter, say, to a close friend about a given work just finished.

Although they never spoke of it in this way, it was clear that that wasn't quite enough—for none ever wished then simply to forget it. Many spoke of completely forgetting about a given work as soon as it was done. But what they really meant (as the facts rather than their words show) was "I can forget about it as soon as it has been finished—so as to be able to be sent off to someone who will make it available for the purview of strangers."

These and many other redundant related facts make it clear that the need is to set forth some exposition of something of one's self—for others to "look at." ² Marianne Morre was very explicit about this.

Those whose energy permitted it finished one such, and began in again on the next. There was no sense of being done for good and all. It was eminently possible to come upon redundancies of statements to the effect that the author wished to present these plays, or poems, etc. in order to be understood. Ibsen was emphatic in his repeated insistence that one could only understand him (and his plays) if one read all of his plays,

²The wish for admiring approval was, they admitted, pervasively there, and was delighted in when it came. But the risk of looking, in case it might be negative, was too great; they "ignored" the "reviews."
and if one, in so doing, read them in the correct sequence.

It was possible to see from an analysis of the commonalities redundantly appearing for actors a phenomenon perhaps epitomized by the Chicago delicatessen wall: "I am not asking that you understand me, just so long as you will look, look, look at my face—whomever you are: hang it on your wall and look at my face." Simply shipping the face off to a total stranger seems to be the level at which this particular need has remained, the need which seems strongly to suggest a failure at the level of the mirroring function of the mother as admiring the child's exhibitionism per se.

I asked a dozen "non-actors" if it would seem good, bad, or neutral to have "photographs of their face sent out en masse to strangers to hang in their rooms. Each expressed a startle at such a thought, then said something like "God, no! I wouldn't mind having a photograph in the home of a friend, or relative--but a stranger? It seems somehow eerie, or bizarre, to think of a picture of my face hanging in the home of a stranger--I don't know quite why." This seemed in accord with Kohut's epigenetic view of the self: until a given need of the self structure is met, the need remains, compellingly; and is experienced as ordinary and natural, as it once was, developmentally. Once met (appropriately in childhood) the need diminishes and hence the desire and the next stage is given rise to, a stage in which that old need has been developmentally left behind as a thing of infancy--it no longer seems at all ordinary or natural once it has been superceded in the epigenetic maturation of self structures but rather a thing that would seem an odd thing indeed by adulthood, except for persons who were not then adequately mirrored.

One can think too in terms of the timing and duration and intensity
of insufficiency and inadequacy of mirroring responsiveness. In the earliest stages the view suggested here is for pure and simple admiration of the infant's physical body: in the data of lives of actors and actresses whom I studied, the timing, duration and intensity of failures in provision of maternal mirroring responsiveness was more intensive and/or extensive, and hence more profound, than that pervading the early lives of many autobiographic writers. The combination of the profession chosen—one involving putting oneself behind footlights to be looked at and applauded night after night, and of the willingness—or desire—to have large close-up photographs of their faces hanging in the rooms of admiring strangers—suggests a concordance with the view that very early, and more thoroughgoing insufficiency of mirroring responsiveness will in fact leave a person's self-experience with an ongoing need to have the physical body and the face admired, and a sense of that as a logical, natural life pathway; as part of the self's creative adatability in terms of moving in the directions of fulfilling its own not quite optimally-met self-structure needs. [cf. The case of Miss F., who was additionally a poet.]

Those who wrote outright autobiography had manifested varying degrees of need in adulthood for the kind of responsiveness Kohut believes the vulnerable self's structuring requires, but visibly less profoundly so than for the "acting" persons I studied. This would seem to accord with the fact that in their case the parenting insufficiencies were not as profound, which the data showed to be the case.

There is much more about all of these lives which research has made visible which cannot be included in this account, but here, I will interject only the first few lines from the autobiography of the actor Mickey
Rooney, who wrote a book of his experience of himself while in his fifth marriage: "after four broken marriages, several spent fortunes, and extraordinary triumphs and disasters, what am I like?" he began. He took it for granted that there would be strangers who would want to know; who would pay hard earned money to buy a book so that they might know of only that: "What am I, Mickey Rooney, like?"

After a few more lines he added this thought that often came to him: which he wished to share with others.

"Stand before the glass and consider yourself," he suggested. Inch by inch; wrinkle by wrinkle, imperfection by imperfection, scar by scar. The enterprise is doomed to failure. See, here the glass is flawed. Or is it the image that is flawed? Or is the flaw in the vision of the beholder?" The book itself was remarkable for its pathos while yet for its conviction that others would wish to continue through some hundred or two hundred pages of listening to Mr. Rooney examine all of the "triumphant and disastrous experiences" of his life—til—that—point inch by inch, scar by scar, in the form of remembered conversations, with former wives, etc., childhood memories and so on.

I learned an interesting point in this way, through a sincere attempt to read at least a few autobiographies of persons, for research purposes, which I would not have ever happened to read otherwise. Among these were that of Mickey Rooney, the autobiography of Gypsy Rose Lee, Admiral Byrd, Richard Peary, one of the many wives of one of the sons of Franklin Roosevelt who wrote a book entitled _I Love A Roosevelt_, and others which I decided it was not important to record the titles of and cannot now remember. What I learned was that, up until I undertook to read all
manner of lives, for purposes of comparison and contrast only of life phenomenal elements and impact of early experience on later development, I had been largely reading autobiographies which happened to have been written by talented writers. Reading an autobiography of Yeats, say, or Mark Twain, was such "literary enjoyment for its own sake" (that is, above and beyond the research purpose) that it simply escaped my notice for a good while that each of these persons was not just pursuing his literary "trade" here, or exercising his creative talents, but was instead evidencing conviction that strangers would just naturally wish to devote themselves to an inch by inch, scar by scar, blow by blow, pain by pain, conversation by conversation, reaction by reaction, response by response account of this never-to-be-personally-encountered person. Not until I began to try to read the autobiographies including Mickey Rooney's did I find myself shaking my head in marvel, asking myself, "Whatever could have made this person imagine anyone would actually wish to know these things, a whole book full?" did I realize that I had not ever thought to ask myself that question I needed to ask regardless of the book's artistic merit or the book's delight. Only then could I see that I had been "seeing" the artist's autobiography as a "literary work" rather than "an autobiographic writing by an artist."

I am pointing to these aspects of life-patternning only by way of mentioning some few of the elements of the far wider constellation(s) of interrelatedness which have become discernable as elements (that is, as phenomena that "count" as elements by virtue of their being clearly in each instance, an element, the element having no significance per se but only as an element by virtue of its interrelatedness), simply as examples. Because it was necessary for me to arrive at the vast majority of my
data from among the life histories of persons "educated" enough, or "sophisticated" enough to have evidenced what I am calling these desires to share with strangers their experience of their lives through writing, (in any of the ways referred to above, and some other ways as well) I was interested in whether the clusters of interrelated elements I was able to discern at the individual and transgenerational level of these persons would also adhere to persons who differed from these persons by virtue of not being "intelligent" enough, "sophisticated" enough, or "educated" enough to make writing in any form a likelihood or even, in some cases, a possibility.

Is it possible, I wondered, that among the elements not capable of here becoming visible, which would also number itself among the elements interrelated with these large numbers of other interrelated elements at the individual and transgenerational level which have been possible to discern among those who "write," is an element having to do with the level of education, intelligence and/or sophistication we might think of prerequisite for writing in these ways per se? Is it possible that if one could have access to any of the life history of persons who do not write, and/or who do not have the "prerequisites" (education, sophistication of awareness, etc.), that in such lives this sort of desire to share one's experience and conviction that strangers will wish to hear it does not fit with early mirroring failures? In such lives would it be discernible that one might either rule out or rule in the matter of "above average education, intelligence and/or sophistication" as one of the elements belonging with these other elements of interrelatedness which I have been able to perceive as identifiably numbered among the elements for such persons?
I wondered about that, but could arrive at no means through which it might be possible to have access to such a life history in this particular research: if there was one thing clear, it was that I could not continue to pursue additional data sources beyond the far more than one hundred already gathered in. I had assumed that that meant that, for now, I would have to leave that question unanswered, and unanswerable. Still, it seemed an important question.

As it turned out, I was serendipitously offered a segment of life history by a person who might be described as distinguishable from the aggregate of persons commonly regarded as "above average in intelligence, education and/or sophistication." I was offered this segment of life history from an unexpected source, and under what was perhaps one of the very few situations in which I would have been able to manage the time for concentrating on still another life. The man who provided me with this segment of the natural history of man was a taxi driver, who had been randomly selected by a computer on the basis of his availability at the moment, to drive the taxi cab it was necessary for me to ride in en route to an airport—a journey of considerable length, the airport being a considerable distance from the town in which it had recently been necessary for me to spend a day.

At first I did not realize that the man was expressing a desire to share aspects of his experience of life with a stranger; in fact, the circumstances under which he began to communicate with me at all were circumstances which I found unusually unsettling, and which aroused concern about the man's ability even to drive the taxi cab with reasonable safety: he was, in short, not a person I was perceiving
as a subject in my research, role as natural historian.

His manner, and his words, at the beginning of the taxi journey, were of such unusual nature as to evoke cause for concern, even from someone who had never before thought of taxi drivers in any way other than persons who could, as a matter of course, be eminently trusted to be wholly capable of piloting an automobile with due safety. Thus it was with real surprise and a sense of wonder that I found myself being made privy to so poignant and beautiful a chronicle of the life experience of a fellow human being. It had not, at first, occurred to me to think of it in terms of research: when I arrived at the place where it was necessary for me to change from one airplane to another, and to wait for an hour in an airport, I found myself wanting to record, for him, the fact of his having lived on this earth, for it had moved me to realize that one of the things of his life history, at the individual and transgenerational level which he had shared with me, a stranger meant that there would be no one else to do that, ever: that he was, unlike many members of the family of man who do so in one of very many forms, to leave no footprints in the sands of time. What he had shared with me, among the details he wished to share with a stranger--so I later realized--was that he was the last of his kind; that with him the transgenerational matrix of which he was the last surviving member, would become extinct, with no word set down anywhere to record his having lived other than the administrative record the world endeavors to keep of there having existed its individual human lives, of births, and of deaths. He had no family relations any where, of any kind.
As I sat in the airport, after having recorded this poignant natural history record of a human life, I thought about this account he had shared, and I came to realize that there existed in his natural history a corroboration that ruled out the notion that education, writing, sophistication, etc. should be among the cluster of pattern elements I had discerned among the individual and transgenerational lives who shared as redundant commonality of impact of early experience this matter of presenting one's life-experience for a stranger's approval. All of the cluster of elements these others had shared, comprising interrelatedness, were, he permitted me to know, elements in his life's history as well. I felt a strong wish to make a permanent record of his experience, for it was my belief that he had given it to me for that purpose, the same purpose for which others, who share many elements of interrelatednesses in common with him, write autobiography, or diaries, or memoirs, or poetry, or plays—so that they may provide an opportunity for others to be aware of them as individuals, and to be aware of their experience; to have opportunity to "pay attention" to them, as unique human selves, in their conviction that strangers will wish to know, and to serve a mirroring function.

The taxi was unusually long in arriving, much longer than the taxi driver the day before bringing me in the other direction from the airport, had told me to allow for a taxi to arrive. When the taxi stopped, the man who got out and walked around to pick up my suitcase presented a highly remarkable physical appearance. He was perhaps somewhere between forty and fifty years old, perhaps somewhat older than that. He lumbered when he walked, and it seemed that this might be due
in part to his very considerable girth: his physical structure was not of a form seen with great regularity; it gave the appearance of being at once very round, while at the same time the word square seemed the most appropriate word with to frame the appearance of the back of him as it appeared from the passenger's seat at the rear of the taxi cab; his back and his shoulders seemed like a great vast bulky squareness; his very thick neck seemed not to extend above his shoulders to the height characterizing most persons we come in contact with and his head was large. From behind, his head seemed to continue the sense of somehow large and round yet with a feeling of squareness. His hair was black, and seemed characterized by the absence of the aspects that seem to connote hair that is somewhat regularly combed and washed.

When he turned around, I was somewhat startled by the appearance of his face, which until then had not been in a position to be visible: the most extraordinary face I believe I have ever happened to see. Along with a continuation of that same unusual aspect of which his hair evoked a sense--here a sense of the absence of the aspects that seem to connote a face that is somewhat regularly washed--the features of his face were of such configuration as to evoke an instantaneous realization that perhaps very many people would momentarily draw back or look away from his face. Ugly, I thought, would almost certainly be the word most persons would find themselves unable to keep from needing to describe his face. Adding to the configuration of his features was the presence of a very remarkable number of what looked like astonishingly large pock marks, as if a face covered by pock marks. The man's appearance was not of a variety which would evoke the admiring gaze of others,
I thought.

What he had turned his face toward me to say was—in a surprisingly slurred manner of speaking, "Ah'm sorry, where'd you say you uz goin'?" "The airport," I said. "Oh, th' airport," and he turned back to tend to watching the highway. I on my part had just settled back into the seat, and was aware that the blasts of air blowing in from all four open cab windows were apparently going to make for an uncomfortable ride. Before I had come to the end of that thought, the driver again turned and in the same slurred speech, said "Would you like some of them windows closed; is that too much air blowin' in on you?" "Yes," I said, "I would appreciate that."

Turning away from the steering wheel, he reached over the back of the seat and rolled up the windows, saying "Lemme jus' close 'em, 'at's a lot of air blowin'. See, thing is I just waked up and opened all the windows so, well, you know when you wake up you're all sweaty?" he had continued after having turned his attention back to the road. I had no idea what he was referring to, and paid close to no attention to his conversation, which at that point I took for the sort of monologue of remarks I had in the past heard taxi cab drivers make, seeming intended not as actual conversation but a kind of talking to oneself. But he resumed again after just a minute or so, saying "Fact is, I been asleep three arrs." And then he nodded his head in a way that, when he did it, seemed more like a slow motion rocking back and forth of the whole top of his torso, keeping time with his rocking nod with an inflected "Ummm-mmm" which seemed a way of agreeing with himself.

"I uz, tell the truth, I uz exhausted! I slept three whole arrs
jes now and jes now waked up. Exhausted that's what I was, yessir."

Although all of this had been said facing the road, and in a tone which had not yet begun to sound as if he were actually talking to me, he did in fact capture my attention with his last few sentences: suddenly I felt a frown come over my face, wondering what in the world he was talking about; what might he be conveying in needing all the wind blowing in on him to get himself awake and in these words of being so utterly exhausted that he had only a few minutes earlier waked from having been asleep in the cab (he had gestured to indicate that the three hours of sleep from which had just awakened had been spent in the cab: it was then 11 o'clock in the morning. He continued to repeat in one way and another how inordinately exhausted he was, and finally said quote loudly, "Matter a fact, tell you the truth I didn't get more'n two arrs a sleep any night all week long. For a week."

At this I felt moved to express my very real concern, for whatever the reason might have been for his having been so exhausted that he needed to sleep for three hours in the middle of the morning, and his very evident great difficulty in coming fully awake, the news that he had had only two hours of sleep for a whole week suddenly evoked great concern for me as to whether there was something wrong for this man that might compound the already unsettling enough news of his not having had sufficient sleep to, perhaps, be capable of coordinating well enough to be in control of a car. "I hope you're awake enough now to be driving", I said with real sincerity.

He was surprised at my reply. "Who me? Oh, yes. Fact is,..." and here he turned and fixed his eyes on me for a second as he paused in
mid-sentence; his voice changed tone, as if dropping infinitesimally in a way that seemed to express confidentiality. Following on the pause after the beginning "Fact is..." he asked in the dropped tone, following his having paused to, visibly, think for a second, "You're not from Columbus, are you miss?" "No," I said.

He turned back and began a conversation in which he had his eyes on the road a good part of the time, and in which he interspersed his attention to the road with regular and frequent turnings to speak directly face to face: there was no question that he intended to be communicating with me, and I, for my part, wasn't eager to enter into conversation with the man, having planned to get through some necessary reading on the trip to the airport.

"Well, ya see, me and my girl friend we been goin' together for about eight years?...(The question mark is meant to indicate that he raised the last word of the sentence in the inflected way more customarily reserved for questions) "Well, maybe closer to seven, no, I think about eight...well, somewhur around thur....And ya see, we lost her little boy last week."

After a pause of perhaps a half minute, he said quietly, "we took it awful hard. Last Sarrday. Him and another little boy they drowned. So that's how come I couldn't get no night's sleep." He turned full around and looked at me, as if needing to see in my face what my response might be to his having told me of this. Uncertain of any of the dimensions of this human tragedy, I felt a wish to respond to his wish for a response, yet a wish to refrain from intruding into areas I could not know the significance of. I opted for a "safe" tonic: "How old was the little boy?", I said quietly. "How
old? Nine. He was nine years old." He was no longer slurring his speech; apparently that had in fact been due to his experiencing great difficulty getting fully awake when I had first got into the cab. Now his speech was firm and clear; he said most words with slow, firm emphasis. When he began at the point of saying "And ya see, we lost her little boy last week," his tone became both gruff and yet as if brushed with an aura of tenderness ensconced below the gruffness. The tenderness was, I thought, more audible than the gruffness. "Him and another little boy they both drowned. Down at the river. He just wandered away from home, you know how boys'll do. Just a regular boy he wuz."

"We don't know yet jus what happened. Might a been the undertow, or whether they fell in or what. See there wuz another little boy, there wuz three of 'em. The other little boy the firemen saved him. See, we can't ask him nuthin' yet cuz it's too soon. Stevie and the other little boy, they drowned." Again he turned and looked at me for some words in response. Quietly I said what a great sadness that must be, for both him and the little boy's mother, and he nodded his head again, with the slow swinging of his vast torso. "It was," he said. Then, he turned to look again, as if to know if there were anything more I might say in response to his tragedy. Having no real sense of what the conditions surrounding the little boy's death might have been, or even of what the relationships were that were involved among himself and the child, and perhaps other people, I asked again the only question I could think of that would express the interest he understandably wanted very much to be forthcoming, yet at the same time trying not to
intrude myself into his personal life. "Was the little boy a swimmer?"

I asked.

"Swimmer? I don't know if you could say he knew how to swim. A little I guess. I kinda took him swimmin' with me a few times. I don't know if you could say he knew how to swim. We don't know just what did happen, whether they was in the water or on the bridge and fell in or what. See we can't ask the other little boy nuthin' just yet. We don't know just what happened." And then, in a brighter tone, a tone gentle, and assertive, as if he had suddenly decided it would be helpful if he were to enable me to understand about little boys

"But all boys do them kinda things. Why I remember I used to sneak off and do thing jus like that when I uz a little boy. Put it another way, boys will be boys! Isn't that true. Why if our parents knew half the things we get into when we're little kids ....they would jus hold their breath, is the fact....."

"He was jus a regular boy...."

"We buried him Wednesday, the other little boy was buried yesterday."...

"Well, last night I said to his mother, "Well, we just got to accept the fact that Stevie's gone, and we got to go on. That's what you got to do." He turned, to look at my face.

"It must be very hard for her," I said. He turned more fully and fixed me for a second with his eyes: "For both of us," he said quietly but very firmly, by way of clearly correcting me. "Well, of course, she is the mother and so naturally it would be hard on her. But it's both of us it's that hard on. Me and her, we both lost him. She's got
other kids. One who's fourteen years old; then she's got three others who're all married. One of 'em, the oldest, is having a baby next month. The fourteen year old, she's taking it better'n us. Well I should say she seems to be taking it better, probably you can't always know them things. Us, we're takin' it hard. But I said to Norma, Norma, we got to accept the fact that Stevie's gone. We got to accept that now that he's gone. And we got to go on. I told her that.

We drove for a few minutes in silence, the driver attending to the road. The conversation seemed to have come to a close. As if to mark that he said, in passing, "It looks like another steamy day today." Then, a minute or two later, "What part of the country you from?" "Massachusetts," I said, "Western Massachusetts."

"Oh, I hear it's real pretty there."

"Yes, I said, it's out in the country, with small towns, and cows on the hillside."

"That's the way to live, I say! I always lived in a city this size. But I'm not from Columbus originally. I'm from Indiana originally, a city just about this size. Called Indianapolis, I dont know if you've heard of it? I been here in Columbus in fact eight years, "he said in his slow, careful speech that seemed to take each word and set it firmly in place. There was no sense of speaking over-slowly, but just the unusual sense of setting each word firmly in its place along the line. It seemed to be somehow in accord with his great girth.

"Put it another way, I came to Columbus because...you know that lady I told you about that's my girl friend? The lady whose little boy
"We lost? Well, I came here on account of her! Fact is, I met her on the phone!" he said a sudden enormous grin spreading happily across his extraordinary face. "Yup, I did! Well see, her oldest daughter she called up for a cab—I was drivin' a cab in West Virginia at the time—and she didn't have but $2, see her car broke down? Well, we talked on the phone, and, see this other lady that I was goin' with then, she lived out in a little house in front and I fixed it with her so she could stay there for five days while we got her car fixed? And we talked on the phone occasionally and after she got back home I would call occasionally on the phone. To talk. And she wrote now and then. And then one day, I called and her mother answered!" At this point he looked back with a marvelously expressive face, and a smile lighting his eyes.

"Well, we got to talking' and one thing and another and then we'd call on the phone occasionally. To talk. And then one day Edith and her boy-friend, they drove down to see me and they brought a picture of her mother. Well, one time we uz talkin' on the phone and I tole her I was comin' to Columbus and me and her was gonna go together! She told me I was crazy!" he said with a beaming grin of enormous pleasure in the telling of his tale. "I tole her I was comin' to Columbus and me and her was gonna go together! And she told me I was crazy! Yup."

A few seconds went by, as if perhaps that was the end of that tale as well. Then, "So, put it another way, I came to Columbus, and in about a year and a half we uz goin' together."

"That's her little boy we lost."

After a few more minutes the man made some reference to Indiana,
which led him to comment that he didn’t go back to Indiana any more
and then again he turned to me as if seeking a direction he might take
his desire to continue sharing his experience. "Is Indiana where your
family's from?" I asked.

"I dont have no family." His tone had perceptibly shifted, and
his face blankly sober, the fleeting frown gone before it had touched
his face's expression. "My mother died when I was eight," he said in
a voice that said this sentence wholly, without affect or emphasis or
inflection of any sort, as if he were reading seven words out of a
dictionary. The next two sentences came with the same sober, mechan-ical tone. The man's words were not said as if he anticipated any re-
sponse at all, nor in any tone that would connote an expression of
self-pity. "I never did have no other family but her", to the empty
silence. "I was brought up in a orphan's home." "It must be a very
hard thing for a little boy to lose his mother," I said.

Reverting again to the firmness of tone with which he seemed to be
feeling he was providing helpful instruction, he said firmly and
assertively, still looking at the road, "Well, I say, fact is little
kids dont take things hard as when they're older, is what I say. Kids
they just accept life the way it is, and take what comes. They don't
think about things like older folks; things dont really have the same
kind a reaction to kids. They just go on, jus' bein' kids, doing
little kids things." "I would have thought it would be hard sometimes,
for a child, living in an orphan's home, I said quietly, for I was
unable to keep from feeling much moved by his having lost a boy of the
same age at which as a boy he had lost his mother.
"Well, that's true," he said soberly. He reflected a while and said, "Back in those days. Nowadays it's different from what it wuz back in the 40's and 50's--nowadays they watch out for little kids in orphans' homes; they got people who see they dont do the way they used to. They take care of orphans now." Then, a minute's silence later, he said, "I ran away from there when I uz thirteen; I've been on my own ever since."

I don't remember just how he got onto the subject of his not planning to marry, but after some time of driving, and some remark that led him to speak of it, he said, "No, I dont spect me and her will ever get married," And then he turned and smiled sheepishly, as if confessing something rather remarkable, but which in his view another person might be willing to try to understand: "Fact is, well ya see, we have...arg'ments with each other sometimes." There was no question that his smiling self-consciously and sheepishly looking down for a second was implying that he believed himself to be making an embarrassing admission, or an admission of something considerably more profound than the metaphor he had chosen. When he continued it was to say, "Then, sometimes we might not talk to each other for two, three months. Then, eventually one or the other goes sneaking back around tail between our legs, and we start in goin' together agin,' he said with a shift to obvious smiling pleasure in his voice.

That seemed definitely to have ended that topic, but then, as if he had been thinking about his having described himself as certain he would never marry, he said, now as if thinking aloud, (and not at all in the firm or assertive tone of the earlier conversations) quietly and
uncertainly, "Well, if we ever wuz to get married, I know it'd not be as long as she still had kids around. Her grown daughters, they're all outta the house now. I know she'd never want to marry long's she had kids around. She's a good mother! She wants to raise her kids right."

And we were at the airport.

I do not know this man's name, but I left feeling somehow enriched as if he had made me a gift of a poignant saga of a human life and of the lives that came before it, and the lives that will not come after it.

It was important to him that I be a stranger; that was the only criterion he asked of me, and he did pause to check, to ask if I met that criterion: "Your're not from Columbus, are you miss?", when he realized after his first three words that he might be mistaken in assuming without asking that I was in fact a stranger.

Aside from the poignancy and the wonder of human life this awkward-appearing man felt such strong wish to share with a stranger the specific experiences he wished to share—the selections he made of what to share, spontaneously, out of all of the bits and pieces that made up the forty or fifty years worth of life that he had available to select from—in themselves form a quite remarkable configuration: from what I have thus far been able to learn from my research explorations across transgenerational familial matrices, it is possible for me to discern that the very elements he chose, above all else, to share, were entirely those which comprise (although obviously here constituting only a tiny sample) elements, in the definition of elements we have been considering
in this research account.

Because he chose to share not just any of the bits and pieces of his life, but instead found himself concentrating on those I have found to be numbered among the vast concatenation of elements countable as elements by virtue of their interrelatedness—in other human lives—it is possible for me to think in terms of this man's life from the standpoint of its interrelatedness along a longitudinal matrix in a way I could not have done had I not encountered these same elements in many other lives, lives of which it had been both necessary and possible to know very much more in order to sift through all of the great volumes of bits and pieces that seem on the surface indistinguishable from those bits and pieces I have come to believe represent elements in an underlying structure.

Because the man represents such a wholly random, wholly unselected, sample of the natural history of human life, it might be useful to attempt to remark briefly on some of the things this particular research makes it possible to say about this human life—over and above its inherent poignan human qualities—simply to help elucidate some few aspects of the method and process here.

The first such thing I have already remarked upon: one of my findings has been that persons who have experienced certain configurations of developmental vicissitudes make manifest a desire—here understood as a need—to share important key aspects of their lives with other persons. For those persons of whose lives I had discerned this as one of the very, very many other elements of interrelatedness at the individual and trans-generational level, the large majority had evidenced this desire through
writing autobiographical accounts of their lives, some through becoming a poet, and some through other sorts of writing down of their personal experience. This man might be thought of as demonstrating that the phenomenon can be regarded as existing at the level of form, and that "content" (which I believe here to represent what we might in some other context think of as "the form") includes whether that elemental experience of desire will express itself in written or verbal manner, as well as in what words, and what medium. In other words, those aspects may differ; may be selected, as content is selected, but with the basic form—the actual sharing of key life elements with others—remaining as the constant common denominator.

For very many of those persons, the loss in childhood of a parent appeared with considerable frequency as one of the many longitudinal elements; for others where that is not the case, I have found that often the person's parent had, a generation earlier, experienced the loss of a parent. The research makes very clear that in no instance can this "autobiographic" phenomenon be "attributed" to the "loss of the parent" itself, but there is additional opportunity to know that in this man's case this cannot be the case, nor can the fact that he "lost" both parents, nor that he never knew a father, in and of themselves be termed the "cause(s)" for the particular unfolding pattern of his life pathway. Yet it is nonetheless the fact that indeed these factors of loss of a parent at an early age for either the parent or the grandparent are demonstrated in this research, as having far greater impact on unfolding life pathways than we have believed before.

An important aspect of the findings of transgenerational explorations
is that these phenomenal elements spoken of here constitute two dual aspects; each element serves simultaneously as an element involved at the transgenerational level in the process of "having arisen from" the constellation of elements occurring in the preceding generation, and at the same time each element is also involved at the transgenerational level in the process of forming part of the constellation of this generation which will "give rise to" the constellation of elements occurring in the subsequent generation.

Of necessity this can only mean that each of the generational constellation of elements (and of course the constellation, or "set," itself), of the preceding generations which were involved in the business of giving rise to the constellation of elements in the present generation were themselves the constellation of elements which, in addition to having given rise to the constellation of elements involved in this generation, were at the same time the constellation of elements which "arose from" the constellation of elements comprising the constellation of the generation earlier. This same duality of "directional" phenomenal involvement is involved at each succeeding (and each further back preceding) generation, except in the one exception which constitutes the first generation in which such phenomena arise.

I will try to present a concrete example of this difficult-to-phrase abstraction. I have remarked that the research has demonstrated that the "loss of a parent at an early age" forms one of the (many) elements in several meaningful constellations of apparent patternedness. In some of these the constellation or configuration of elements is one shared by persons who evidence, as another of the elements concomitant to their
life and longitudinal history, this desire to share elements of their experience with strangers. Rousseau, whose mother died when he was nine days old, is perhaps the most quintessential example of this. Thoreau, whose father lost his mother at seven and his father as fourteen, and whose mother's father died before his mother was born, is another quintessential example of the person for whom the desire/need to share meaningful parts of life with the world emerged although as part of a different transgenerational matrix permutation from Rousseau, with a quite different result-impact on the manner of their manifesting this desire. Golda Meir is another example, from a still different time, as are Ludwig Lewisohn, Eugene O'Neill, Mark Twain and Eleanor Roosevelt, to name a small sampling of persons sharing the phenomenal element of being moved to share details of his or her life in public ways.

One might certainly ask what useful "meaning" is to be attributed to the occurrence of such phenomena, and the answer must simply be that the initial stage of the research can state with certainty only the fact of such phenomena occurring in an ordered way, with fuller significances perhaps yet needing to be more fully understood. For now one can point again to the goodness of fit with Heinz Kohut's formulation regarding the unfulfilled self-structure need for mirroring approval from others in the environment as discussed earlier. Beyond that, they are elements of interrelatedness. As in the greatest majority of cases, it was very often possible to come to know, or to hypothesize with very great likelihood based on prior occurrences in that life, that rageful outbursts, or withdrawals evoked by a "silent fury" were themselves reactions to experiences of pain elicited by failures on the part of persons in the environment to be
empathically responsive to the person's unconscious need of the moment for praise, approval, admiration, or for "being included," i.e., not "abandoned" or "deserted," or "left out."

"Loss of the mother" has been discernible as a finding of the research as an element, both at the individual and the transgenerational level, but, additionally, situations labeled "loss of the mother at early age" may constitute different variants, i.e., two different configurations of elements. "Rage" phenomena may occur in only one such. The research suggests that the specific age of the child at the time of the loss leads to different impact, when it occurs at one age, from another age.

Across many scores of examples, it was not possible to locate an instance of loss of the mother in childhood where there was no discernible impact (here along the sands-of-time line, defined now as elements in element clusters) in later life, and parenthood and consequently for subsequent generations, ("impact" here does not mean "negative" impact).

The manner in which these different variants manifest themselves beyond the individual life in the biographic and clinical cases studied was that that configuration which includes as one of its elements "loss of the mother in childhood" could be seen as giving rise to a particular discernible configuration in the subsequent generation.

When that subsequent generation "arrived," or "occurred," its configuration of elements could be seen to have undergone a shift in the configuration of elements, from its perspective: there will, now, of necessity also be the element "having as a mother a person for whom as an element from her perspective there was "loss of the mother in childhood", this then becomes an element (from two perspectives) at both generational
levels, whose impact is different at the generational level of the person for whom this element is "loss of the mother in childhood," and the person, in the subsequent generation, for whom the salient element is instead "having as a mother a person who lost her mother in childhood." In the second generation, there would, additionally, be the element, say, "mothered by a person who experienced episodes of rage"—where this was the case, or "mothered by a person who manifested silent fury and abrupt withdrawal from others" where that was the case.

To again restate the attempt to frame this formulation for its transgenerational significance, it is, I believe, self-evident how, in such situations, the early loss experience of the parent in the parent's infancy or childhood makes its ineluctable way into the early experience of the child of the next generation. The same sequence cannot help, in this configurational situation, repeating itself into the still-further-along generation in like manner: if loss of a mother (or a father) at an early age leaves the person with a vulnerability capable of evoking an experience of "hurt feelings," of pain or sense of woundedness, which pain experience gives rise to a resurgence of the childhood pain brought on by or subsequent to the loss; that person will, during parenthood, be more apt than not to continue to respond or react on the basis of that vulnerability's need. Reacting on the basis of one's own vulnerability appears clearly to be something that is not subject to rational "decision" or thought process, but rather to be a phenomenon which functions at the level of childhood phenomena, before rational thought became part of the mental picture; it will, judging from this research, almost invariably take first priority over other features the person might well choose,
consciously, to give first priority to, e.g., the needs of a child for empathic responsiveness. Hence the child whose parent suffered loss in the parent's early childhood may simply be unable to give first order priority to the child's needs on a reasonably consistent basis and hence this child will, the research strongly suggests, suffer deprivation of empathic responsiveness, whether or not, in this generation, the parent is on hand—when there has been loss in an earlier generation—unless some amelioration is able to occur.

The failures in providing empathic responsiveness proved traceable to the early childhood experience of an earlier generation. The same situation can only repeat itself when this child, raised in a milieu not capable of providing empathic responsiveness, will experience a like-vulnerability at the level of self experience, which will, again in the next generation, have dominion over the parents' priorities regarding reacting versus responding, to a child's need for responsiveness.

Perhaps contrary to what we might expect at first thought, this impact does not appear to "lessen" with the passing of time—that is, with the passing to the next or subsequent generations, but rather to be interrelatedly associated with a different and delineable configuration of elements in subsequent generations.

The research insists that it is exceptionally important to preclude the use of negative and positive ascription to any phenomena contemplated in this research—because it was possible to discern such ascription as a profoundly confounding factor in prior developmental research, as well as a factor which was seen to have obscured the perception of elements. Elements, so the research emphasized, became capable of being perceived...
as elements far more clearly in the absence of negative or positive ascription.

With regard to the life of the man from Ohio, the configuration which includes the elements "never having known a father," and "the mother's having no parents alive at the time of the birth of her only child" appear, from the tracings possible through this research, to represent elements of a configuration which has arisen from a configuration in earlier generations, a configuration which included loss of one or more parents in childhood in an earlier generation (i.e., prior to the childhood of the man from Ohio), and then, in subsequent generations, underwent what we may call for the moment increased impact. Hence, by the time the little child was born who was to grow to be the man who drives a taxi cab in Columbus, Ohio, the elements which numbered themselves (by virtue of their interrelatedness at the individual and transgenerational level) among those constituting the constellation of elements associated with his life, may be hypothesized on the basis of this research as including elements of increasing impact across two or more generations prior to the time he was born into a situation in which no father would claim him and in which his mother was devoid of family members. In other words, this is saying that for this person, the research itself strongly suggests that in this man's situation, loss of the mother at an early age is not an isolated phenomenon, but, for his life, at the level of the transgenerational matrix, one element of many in among a transgenerational set of sets in which increase of impact has already occurred prior to the death of his mother—so that for him, there are other impact phenomena of his early experience above and beyond his having
lost his mother at the age of eight. Such phenomena would have had to be of a nature having their impact beginning at the time of his infancy, for this research strongly suggests that such additional impact-elements could not have occurred in any context except one which had its dominion on his early experience by way of his mother's (and father's) needs to give first order priority to their own needs.

The elements which he describes as associated with his later life number among themselves elements I have been able across the research to discern associated with the lives of persons who have themselves lost their mother early and for whom element configurations of earlier generations had (here prior to his birth) been increasing in their potential for impact on the lives associated with them (or, less judgmentally, altering the descriptive characteristics, as clusters of elements, associated with them).

One such element which I have traced across many transgenerational matrices is that which we may label "profoundly affected by loss during adulthood. It is the loss of a child of a friend which the man in Ohio experienced as the paramount aspect of his experience so profoundly influencing him a week later, that he wished very much to share it with a stranger. He wished to make it emphatically clear that he saw no distinction between the profound effect this loss had on him and on the mother of the child. The loss had, he wished to share of his experience, profoundly affected his ability to sleep.

It seems equally meaningful to contemplate here the example of the awesome nobility of the human species this man has spontaneously provided: raised in a world where, from infancy, there was no father ever to look to
or lean upon, or to hold the hand of, or buy an ice cream cone with; then losing the only other human being who even knew of his existence other than peripherally while still a very young child; then deposited into an institution from which even the need to belong somewhere was not powerful enough to make tolerable; then at the "advanced age" of having just turned 13 years old, finding himself literally on his own in the world, with no aunts, grandparents, brothers, parents or money, to learn to quite literally find out how to live, and work, and survive as if a man schooled in all the intricacies of supporting oneself, this truly remarkable example of human personhood made it. Even despite his surely great obstacle on top of all else that his physical appearance would, with surely great regularity, find others of his kind at first repulsed.

Even with the little that is all we know, we must, I think, think hard of this man's remarkable example--for we in psychology would not know of him and his "kind" otherwise, I think.

It seems to me important for us to attempt, even with the little that is all we have of his amazing unfolding developmental pathway across life, to see what we can learn of how he manged to do this--for this is a person shorn from the beginning of all aids and assistances from the environment--all of those factors which have such power to becloud our vision of how human beings do manage, down there at the elemental human life level where there is nothing shoring them up, not even house and home, or, by 13, someone making available some kind of meals; nor provision of education, nor clothes, nor advice, instruction, nor anything. We can perhaps learn much from thinking hard of just what he did do, and just what he was able to do...and, for this he can teach us as well,
what he could not do, given this particularly barren early experience. In this last, we may perhaps be able to learn something more of the functions that are served by having been permitted to be part of the natural orderedness of parental nurturant functioning, by pondering the life pathway of a person for whom those, nor little else, was available.

What we can know of his life's pathway is that he found work in an area where his appearance would not "matter," and where his education would not matter, and, perhaps most important, where he would not have to try to adapt to the interactive intricacies of an on-the-spot employer on a daily basis. This, obviously, he could not have done until he was at least eight or so years older than he was when he first had to support himself, and we cannot know, unfortunately, what adolescence was like for this person.

Most vivid in his account—and most important to him of his life (for he mentioned only fleetingly his work, i.e., the fact that he had "always" been a cab driver) was the account, given completely spontaneously, of the unfolding pathway of his human relationships. It seemed clear from his puzzled expression, or perhaps bemused is the better word, that marriage was not something he was "for," or "against"—but that rather, it was somehow something he did not mentally "associate" with himself. Not, here, in the same sense at all that other people might mean that who think in terms of the word "marriage" as meaning the "piece of paper" officially registering their otherwise marriage-like shared intimate living with another person of the opposite sex. Here I am speaking of the basic "marriage-like" phenomenon—of living in a shared intimate relationship with another of the opposite sex, when I say that
he appeared to not mentally "associate" the phenomenon itself with himself. In actuality, we know that he did not physically place himself in a shared-living milieu.

To him, "living together" is, so it seemed he was saying and implying, a phenomenon beyond his ken. Quite simply and naturally, he saw relationships—that is, his most intimate relationship, in terms not of living together, but in terms of "going together." At first I had thought the different terminology was just that, a difference in terminology, but as he recounted his previous such relationship, seemingly it too a long-term stable relationship such as the one with the Norma who was the little boy's mother, and this one, I came to see that he did not mean simply a different terminology, but a quite different phenomenon—one which involves living as something one, just naturally, does alone. He made it clear in his tone, and pauses, etc., that not for a moment did he contemplate the day ever arriving when he and Norma might marry. What was clear was that "going together" was, in a very natural way, "enough": he spoke of it as if that were "all there is"; not at all as if he thought another might regard it as at all unusual that "going together" should be the ultimate goal in a long term intimate relationship.

He was making it clear that he had been drawn to human relationships, and to human relationships characterized by commitment, by caring, by concern, by sharing, by mutual supportiveness. And to human relationships on a strictly one-at-a-time "monogamous" basis. He had had, he said, a relationship with another woman before Norma, a woman who "lived in a house out front" from where he had earlier lived. He had asked this woman to put up a young woman who was stranded for five days,
because her car broke down and she had no money. The woman had complied.

Some human relatedness drew him, gently and quietly, to continue the association with this young woman (she—a sister to the little boy who died—must have been, at the time, an adolescent, judging from other things he said). He must have been a meaningful person to her, for every now and then she wrote to him. And every now and then he called her, long distance to another state; to talk. It seemed clearly a simple and natural relatedness between two persons. Until the day "her mother!!" answered the phone. Just there a goodly glimmer of excitement entered his voice. The relatedness between him and the young woman underwent a shift; now it was to the mother that he, increasingly, directed his telephone calls. The daughter travelled with her boyfriend (or perhaps husband) to his state and brought a photograph of her mother.

Before long, he had made up his mind, as a simple, assertive act. He was very clear about the form his decision took: he simply informed Norma that he was moving to Ohio, in effect to uproot his entire life situation, for the sole purpose of their "going together."

He made a point, an underlined point, of just when this had happened. They had been going together about seven years. He had, he said, done as he had asserted, and moved to Ohio. "Within about a year and a half we was goin' together," he had said, so that it was about eight and a half years earlier that he had found himself moved deeply enough to want to leave the place he knew and the relationship he had been in, to begin anew with a person he had never met.

The little boy who drowned was nine years old. Eight and a half years earlier, Norma had been a mother, a mother with a brand new infant.
We cannot say with any justification that it was only to Norma as a one-person-entity that this man decided to uproot his life and move to another state for the purpose of "going together," for she was not Norma as a one person entity at the time: she was Norma-and-an-infant: an infant-in-the-process-of-being-mothered-in-the-way-infants-are-mothered. We can know that it was to this Norma to whom he came, because that is the Norma she was at the time.

One of the most redundant findings of this research has been that persons who were themselves orphaned, do experience a compelling desire to manage their life somehow so that it can come to encompass "being where there are babies" or very young children. The same was true of an extraordinary proportion of those who were profoundly deprived of mothering per se: in these instances there were distinguishable several distinct variants of what that "deprivation" consisted of. These deprivations of mothering were distinguishable from another kind of deprivation of mothering which seemed to be followed by choosing a lifestyle where there would quite certainly not be babies, which included not having children of their own. This I mention here only so as to make clear that I am not saying that some such phenomenon showed up in the data such that one could say "all persons deprived of mothering" were routinely drawn to a life that would bring them into close ongoing contact with babies. That was not the case. But what was, dramatically, the case was that there was, with great redundant clarity, a range of early experience which, for those transgenerational variants, did lead to a compelling desire to be with babies and/or toddlers.

Very often this desire to be "around babies" was coupled with a
"lack of desire" to marry—insofar as so ephemeral a thing as "lack" is possible to know from the self reports of persons intensively studied, to marry. Many of these, however, did speak of deciding not to marry.

Maria Montessori was one such person studied, Frederich Froebel another, but the data turned up very many who are not so "well known" for their having found a way to be always involved with small children. Lewis Carroll was another. All of these many persons made it clear that it somehow made them "feel better" to be around children. That it made them "feel better" to be unmarried was at times articulated; at other times inferrable from their not choosing to marry or to live with a person of the opposite sex.

Although it is clearly a decided variant from the phenomenon detailed with regard to the adolescent mother, I came, by the end of the research, to recognize that this phenomenon described here was, and is, a variant on that same phenomenon. As with the self of the adolescent mother—albeit through a clearly distinctively different and distinguishable self pathway—the self of persons for whom one of a series of particular kinds of permutations of maternal deprivation has been the case seems once again to manifest the remarkable adaptability of the human being to "look around" in the environment for some means of helping its self to right the balance in that quite specific area in which a specific configuration of developmental nurturant needs were not met at the appropriate maturational phase or stage.

We cannot know what infancy was literally like for this man: we

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25 Throughout, the concept of marriage in this context is taken only to mean the long-term stable intimate relationship involving living together as a pair of persons of the opposite sex, in a heterosexual relationship.
cannot know whether his mother may have been an adolescent and hence perhaps provided him with the kind of mothering environment which Meredith and John, or Emma the younger, received. We cannot know whether his mother followed the pattern of Billy's mother, or of Elizabeth Ann's Aunt Frances, or another mothering pattern.

We can, however, know—for he tells us this—that he followed the pathway in later life, of those several distinctive patterns of early experience, pathways within which a man or a woman will alike be drawn to "be" in a mothering environment, as if himself or herself were the "mother," much as the adolescent mother, for all of her quite different level of patternedness and need that this follows, is drawn to "be" in a mothering environment, as if the "mother." Also—again not unlike the adolescent mother at the elemental level—in order to experience the effect of being mothered.

This man managed to find for himself, even though it was apparently necessary to use long distance telephone contact to a stranger in another state to do so, an environment in which he could experience both being mothered, and being the mother. "We both lost him," he said with very considerable correcting of any notion I might have had that it was "the mother" who had lost this child. Of Norma, his crowning words of praise—and the words which to him made perfect sense for why she would not have contemplated marrying had all to do with her being what he glowingly spoke of as "a good mother!" He underscored that in many ways: a "reason" she had not
contemplated marrying was that she "still had kids around"—although here he is in fact meaning one fourteen year old, (or, even before that, one fourteen year old and one nine year old). He "knew" she would never think of marrying "while there are still kids around," he had said.

And then after a few seconds reflection on that, he had come forth with his glowing encomium: "She's a good mother." The little boy, as he had made earlier eminently clear, had been a good little boy.

But there was yet another "reason" why he would not marry, he said, which had come forth separately from Norma's "reason." This, he said, was because "you see, we have arguments." Arguments of such power, or that touch such sensitive vulnerabilities, (which the research seems to indicate is not in fact two separate phenomen but one and the same), that Norma and this man whose name I do not know must remove themselves from one another's company for two or three months, until the wounds have healed. Then, eventually, one or the other "goes sneaking back, tail between the legs," to resume once again what is clearly a good, stable, caring commitment.

Few phenomena appeared more abundantly across the research data than the compelling characteristics of almost all persons who have had profound maternal deprivation. (Sometimes these appeared in situations in which there was also paternal deprivation; other times not: these two distinguishing characteristics in themselves, as "modifiers," clearly made for different permutations of the impact of maternal deprivation per se; this the data were emphatic about as well.) One of these compelling characteristics was a tremendous sensitivity and vulnerability to overwhelming drops in self esteem in response to some often relatively
minor abruptness on the part of another. Almost invariably such great sensitivity appeared in manifestations traceable to what one person termed the "howling pain of the loss", meaning the loss of adequate mothering. The loss, or lack, of adequate mothering appeared repeatedly among the data of lives to have given rise to an overall sense of "loss," at a pervasive level, one which expressed itself in a variety of ideational contents and contexts across the lifespan, a variety which was markedly similar in its various later life transformations for scores of unrelated persons who had visibly in common only the loss, or lack of adequate mothering.

In among the life phenomena of persons who early experienced this loss or lack of adequate mothering and who later experienced this generalized sense of loss (which underwent associational transformation with a variety of other phenomena) there appeared with unvarying regularity, regardless of other circumstances or affiliation, etc., an exquisite vulnerability upon being treated unempathetically or unresponsively by another (or others) in situations where empathic responsiveness (or admiration, say) was expected or regarded as warranted, deserved, etc.

The effect of this very-much-heightened vulnerability to the non-responsiveness of others appeared to be markedly similar across scores of persons in different situations, times, and circumstances with very great regularity and it was possible to discern these persons manifesting (and reporting) sensations of great anguish, woundedness, and/or pain—at a pervasive physiological and psychological level.

This sensation of anguished woundedness appeared in the life studies of presidents, kings, professors, poets, playwrights, philosophers,
actors, senators, authors, scientists, assassins, physicians, lawyers, salespersons, persons whose work was primarily or entirely the care of house, home and family: it seemed undaunted by achievement, accomplishment, wealth, acclaim or any other factor, and was seen as holding potential for giving rise to a sense of temporary devastation with equal power across all persons. This phenomenon appeared clearly to evoke a more powerful sense of woundedness when the perception of lack of "caring" or failure at empathic responsiveness was associated with a person from whom the vulnerable person felt some reason to expect responsiveness, caring, understanding, etc., but also occurred in situations where the expectation was associated more with what the vulnerable person felt was his due as a result of what he or she had done, given, contributed, etc., than with a generalized expectation from another person.

Not at all infrequently the pain or wounded sensation manifested itself in an abrupt wrathfulness, like Emma's trumpeting like a lion, like Meredith's mother's torrential cascade of abuse; like Meredith's blast of two-syllable white noise (a phenomenon in itself repeated verbatim out of the mouth of Emma and Miss F.), like the torrential outbursts of Junius Brutus, Edwin, and John Wilkes Booth, for example, but equally in those for whom these extremes of deprivation and of intensity were not the case.

Not infrequently the "deprivation" seemed traceable to a quite well circumscribed period of time when the mother had not been able to be on hand to provide the kind of good responsiveness the child received at all other times (e.g., because she had to be in the hospital for an extended time, for instance).
For these persons, it was, across their lives, possible to discern equally highly circumscribed areas of vulnerability, in which, on some rare occasions, this "howling pain of the loss" would come forth, even if considerably less cataclysmically than with Meredith, Miss F. and Edwin Booth.

"Quick to snap back" at someone who was being critical was a frequent ascription in these less profound cases: there the pain of the loss would seem to call forth "simply" what passed for a "sudden flare-up of temper," which was later apologized for, and for which the person was greatly embarrassed that he or she could so foolishly have "lost his temper." We do, of course, take it for granted that there is some entity, a "temper," which all have, and some, without explanation, can in highly specific situations lose. We seem to regard "losing one's temper" as somehow self-explanatory; as if losing one's temper were the explanation, rather than a phenomenon requiring explanation. In this research, no instances arose of persons' "losing their temper" for whom the lifespan study did not bring forth early experience characterized by either a parental milieu in which faulty parental empathy prevailed, or in which one or both parents were literally absent, at least for a prolonged period, during the now-adult's infancy or childhood.

The research made repeatedly apparent that the persons for whom profound loss of temper—that is, truly uncalled for—seeming great outbursts of "violently angry temper" occurred, were remarkably often later surprised that the person to whom the intemperate outburst had been directed in so "violent-sounding" a way should still be even "remembering" that. Often the person who had suffered the very con-
A considerable outburst of "temper" (or "temper tantrum" as it was often termed) had little or no awareness at all of his or her having done anything amiss in so bursting forth with roaring angry outburst at another. Rather, quite the contrary was the case; the person who had done the "losing of temper" had believed this eminently justified (even if he or she was embarrassed at having "made a fool of himself"). The sense of justification lay in the fact that in the experience of the person losing his or her temper, this other person had inflicted pain on this person, through their unresponsiveness. Very often unresponsiveness was perceived, cognitively, by the person vulnerable in this area as the other person "not caring" about him or her—or "not caring about anyone but himself (or herself)."

The phenomenon of actual loss of a parent was traceable for lives of persons who in later life manifested abrupt shifts to rage or "angry outbursts," or "sharp tongue," or "unusually sensitive to slight." This eventually announced itself as an empirically testable hypothesis.

Across the rather considerable number of persons for whom I tested this hypothesis, it was in well beyond fifty cases discernible that loss of a parent had occurred either in the early experience of the subject person, or in the early experience of that person's parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent.

Additionally, it appeared, from the data (to the extent that it was possible to know this)—often it was very readily possible to know this with great specificity, other times not as possible—26 that there was a

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26 In only fewer than ten cases was it not possible to locate a sufficient data to have any idea of that other than in the impact.
very high degree of correlation between extensiveness of the loss, and extensiveness and intensity of the "temper outbursts." Eventually, it appeared as if there were a direct thread making its way along the life-span from early experiences of loss of mothering (and/or fathering) and a capacity for angry outbursts, sharp tongue, and tendency to lose one's temper. This was not at all confined to persons ordinarily thought of as "angry" or "hotheaded" people, but appeared for all "classes of persons, levels of education, status, etc. For persons who were regarded as "hotheaded," or "angry persons," the loss was very often quite distinctly discernible as of a more profound nature, e.g., occurring earlier in infancy, involving abandonment by a parent, etc.

I think it was this sort of thing that this man in Ohio was referring to when he spoke of the "arguments," which kept him and his clearly cherished Norma apart for two or three months at a time. The research with lives explored in ways not possible with the life of this man strongly suggests that these arguments had not been instances of anger having to do with either's regard, or feelings, for the other, but rather, repeated instances of exquisitely sensitive vulnerability associated with early experience of loss of adequate mothering (and, here, fathering) in childhood, and associated with experience of "failures" of empathic responsiveness on the part of a cherished other in adulthood. The fact that their regard and commitment to one another had endured across eight years despite the relentless succession of apparently quite rageful arguments necessitating two to three months of recurring apartness, seems corroborative of that.

The loss of the child, who had clearly meant an overwhelming amount
in the life of this man, was, as he made clear, devastating. Sleep had become, for over a week, out of the question.

In the research's study of scores of lives, occasions of the loss, in adulthood, of a child or spouse, appeared as exceptionally profoundly experienced by persons for whom loss of a parent in infancy had occurred. Such persons, despite their much-heightened vulnerability; their frequent difficulty with self esteem regulation, and the concomitant experience of great sensitivity to real or imagined slight, rebuff, etc. which frequently gave rise both to outbursts of temper and abrupt withdrawal experienced by others as "cold," or "steely" withdrawal—despite all these distressful experiences—these persons who had suffered loss in childhood very often endured. Often in the face of considerable actual hardship.

What came through across the account the man from Ohio gave of his life was the awe inspiring nobility of this remarkable human being, in his ability himself to somehow yet endure; and, even in the face of overpowering loss—for the second time in his life—of the severing of the attachment between parent and baby, that he could hold out a noble hand of supportiveness to another person, and offer words of enduring to her, the person who yet made up the other half of his human relatedness family, in addition to the child to whom he had belonged, and who had now lost him.

It was his desire to share this account of himself and his most profound self-experiences across his life with strangers: it seemed a thing he would have appreciated to make it possible for him to do that, in a way that would make it possible for him to have made a valuable contribution in so doing. I think he has done that.
Neither summary nor conclusions can follow the traditional path in a work of this nature: summarizing a non-linear constellation of interrelated parts is not readily accomplishable in its own right, and much less so when the intent of a presentation is largely to provide an array of representative examples from a larger whole--examples representative of some number of the varied spheres, levels and aspects involved in a discovery of an additional perspective for exploring and conceptualizing some facets of human psychology.

Any attempted summary would perhaps have to fall short. Included in a summary should be the finding that a sampling of six transgenerationally explored family histories--intensively studies in painstaking detail, had not been able to yield any discernable or useful data. Despite their comprehensiveness, and systematic exploration across entire lifespans longitudinally researched and despite their endeavoring to take into account all developmental aspects and all facets of early experience, and all familial relationships, a year's worth of intensive research effort had at first given all appearances of having been wasted, and fruitless, effort.

Only when the data base was multiplied manyfold was the entire research picture reversed; only when it was possible to compare and contrast scores of family histories of systematically traced individual lives and familial relationships among generationally-overlapping lives along a longitudinally-explored sande-of-time-line, and concurrently
analyzing the telescopic view of impact of early experiences on subsequent generations in concert with the close-range bird's eye view of what actually went on for parents and between parents and children that comprised instances of early experience, and the close-range view of individual unfolding life pathways did it become possible for the underlying structuralist configurations—and subsequent conceptualizations—to become visible.

Only when this much larger data base was employed did it become apparent that transgenerational phenomenal elements, clusters, and sets could make interrelatedness visible in other than fleeting fragmentary ways. A summary should also include the finding that with remarkable frequency, much of what others perceive of another's affect, cognitions and experience of self was found to be diametrically opposite to that individual's affect, cognitions and experience of self: in other words, remarkably often, others in a person's environmental milieu ascribed great numbers of attributions to another—and reacted or responded to that person, or evaluated him or her, on the basis of those ascriptions—when the attributions were not only erroneous, but the polar opposite of how or what the person was thinking, feeling, etc. Concomitant to this was the resultant phenomenon redundantly encountered, in which the person erroneously perceived—and hence erroneously evaluated, or erroneously reacted to—or responded to—experienced considerable distress at being thus misunderstood and thus reacted to, etc., and subsequently found himself or herself reciprocally interacting with the original misperceiver in an ongoing cycle of increasingly error-generating asynchronous communications. What was noteworthy about this finding was
that such initial misperceptions of others' affects, cognitions, and experience of self were all but never idiosyncratic, but involved a remarkably consistent constellation of near-universal misperceptions and misattributions in which persons could be seen making the identical misperceptions and misattributions ubiquitously to identical phenomena manifested by the other, across all situations, times and circumstances. This was so consistent a finding that it came eventually to seem analogous to there existing a guidebook which enumerated a catalog description of human phenomenology, with an accompanying definition, e.g., if you perceive a person doing x, you may reasonably make attribution y, and with this and other catalog entries being in fact universally accepted and employed—but with the fact of the matter being that when a person is perceived as doing x; y is totally incorrect, and warrants being replaced with attribution z. Persons experiencing fear but having anger instead attributed to them; persons experiencing loss of self esteem or self confidence when arrogance and self satisfaction is instead attributed to them, are but two wholly unrepresentative examples—unrepresentative because the range of phenomenal experience and events for which this finding appeared was not in itself categorizable in any way, (as I have endeavored across the account to present multiple examples for).

It would not be reasonable to summarize any of the specificities of impact of early experience discussed in the account because in each case such discussions employed specificities of impact (or of antecedent) only for the purpose of providing examples through which the trans-generational familial matrix means and method and conceptualizations might be appreciated, rather than as reportable research result-
specificities in their own right at this time; but a summary should perhaps include that fact about the research account.

The predominant conclusions responsibly possible at this early stage in research use of this structuralist view is principally that there does exist a means and method through which impact of early experience may be explored, and that this means and method provides an additional perspective through which human development, human relationships, and human problems may be conceptualized; that this means and method appears convincingly to be inherently associated with the same principles, at the level of abstract theory, which Jean Piaget, Claude Lévi-Strauss and others have described as a structuralist natural order associated with self-regulation and transformation of structures; and that this means and method, when applied to human beings studied at the level of individual lifespans, and longitudinally traced ongoing series of generationally-overlapping parent-child pairs, appears convincingly to be integrally linked with the same principles, at the level of phenomenological developmental experience and of self experience, which Heinz Kohut has systematically and comprehensively described in his psychoanalytic Psychology of the Self and to add an additional etiologic fact to this theory.

Additionally, this structuralist view of the self, of parenthood and of family pathways appears to be integrally associated, at one level and in one sphere, with the life-aspects described by Donald Winnicott in his formulations associated with the maturational processes and the facilitating environment, and, importantly, including Winnicott's concept of the mirror role of the mother in child and family development (this concept complemented and supplemented by further aspects of this phenome-
non described by Heinz Kohut at one sphere and level, and by Jacques Lacan at another).

At another level and in another sphere, the structuralist view presented here appears to be integrally associated with abstract theoretical formulations propounded by Jacques Lacan in his conceptualizations of the universe of shared significations and allied conceptualizations.

From the standpoint of implications for further research, the trans-generational familial self-matrix means, method and conceptual perspective appears to hold potential for lending itself to future research efforts aimed at achieving clearer understanding of the biologic, and physiologic, components of the phenomena appearing importantly involved in the self-regulating and transformational aspects of the familial self-matrix, at the conceptual point of transmission by parents to children of the impact of the parents' early experience. The research provided ample reason to hypothesize that biologic and physiologic aspects of development and developmental vicissitudes are fully as much an integral part of self experience, and fully as integrally involved with the etiology of self experience as are the psychological and cognitive components. The means and method presented in this account appears to hold potential for a researcher's coming to be able to pursue questions of this nature across disciplinary boundaries, and perhaps to be able to come to better understand those aspects of interrelatedness of human experience, through its capacity for bringing new questions to light.
An American historian has looked at "current day America" and determined that there is narcissism in abundance, and that it therefore is a reflection of the times. An American natural historian has looked at both current day Americans and at history and determined that there has always been this "narcissism" of which the American historian speaks, and determined that it is therefore a reflection of the inner self and its transgenerational history.

As an American and a natural historian, I have looked at both current day Americans and at history, and determined that there has always been this "narcissism" of which the American historian Christopher Lasch speaks, and I am convinced, it is a reflection of the inner self.

A non-American, a man who lived his life in another culture and another time, and who was regarded as a thinker of some note—one Aristotle of Greece, is recorded as having said sometime between 384 and 322 B.C. that the times echo the eternities. Inasmuch as Christopher Lasch finds in his exploration of current-day America reason to disagree with Aristotle's belief, and inasmuch as I find in my exploration of Americans current and gone before, and Greeks and those from other isles, more data in support of Aristotle's view than Lasch's, it seemed to me important that I attempt to reconcile some measure of that mutually-exclusive conundrum for myself if I am to present a thesis requiring that this "narcissism" be viewed as a reflection of

27(Lasch, 1979)
the self and hence of the eternities. How might we have both looked around us in the interest of serious research and arrived at such seemingly dichotomous determination?

Perhaps it is particularly relevant for me, as an individual psychologist, to attempt to challenge at least some of Christopher Lasch's somewhat dogmatic generalizations because in his sweeping description of current day America, I am included as one of those he describes in his electing to categorize academic psychology. I find myself there swept into a great powerful broom's swoosh that says of "academic psychology": (of the 1970's) "retreats from the challenge of Freud into the measurement of trivia." I was surprised, for not only did I fail mightily at recognizing my academic psychology self, nor my professors and colleagues and fellow students, in that category, I do not recognize even the broom's sweep as being directed in the appropriate direction. My own sense of "current day" academic psychology was that it was, at long last, moving away from the measurement of trivia, a phenomenon, I would have said, that began having its day not far from the time that Freud's thought began having its day. Today, increasingly, those inside academic psychology would, I think, be apt to describe themselves as working hard at attempting to rise to the challenge of interaction, of family systems, of human development in terms of real life, of matters like the impact of death on families, and the impact on youngsters of the socialization phenomena inherent in the public schools, to name but a few. And these do not begin to touch on the growing number in academic clinical psychology who must surely be thought of as responding to the challenge of Freud in their growing
attempts to learn to understand human beings within a framework which takes into consideration phenomena of the kind Freud's work brought him into contact with. Yet Christopher Lasch has for some reason seen fit to sweep all these folk up with one fell broom sweep and deposit them into the tidy half sentence describing them as categorizable (and indeed damn-able) by the tidily succinct phrase "retreats from the challenge of Freud into the measurement of trivia." Not at all, of course, do I question that there are today, as there were in Freud's time, academic psychologists who engage in what Lasch might view as measurement of trivia: it is only the sweeping nature of the broom, its inherent erroneousness and its direction that I find myself having no choice but to question Lasch's lens when he says his half sentence is 1970's academic psychology.

Not long after the paragraph describing the new academic psychologist Lasch describes the "new narcissist". The new narcissist, he writes, is haunted not by guilt but by anxiety. Although at this point Lasch has not yet given any clue to any definition for this word narcissist, I will assume that his giving none means that he assumes I will know that he means it in the sense that many others use it. In that sense, I would agree with him in his definition of the new narcissist. But my research has found it necessary for me to say that this was also true for the "old narcissist", meaning the persons who possess the same sorts of characteristics Lasch and others are alluding to in that use of the word, in other times and cultures. They too were haunted by anxiety.

"He seeks not to inflict his own certainties on others but to find a meaning in life." Although I believe that my research leads
me to believe that there are many of today's "narcissists" who fall into that first category (e.g., the Reverend Jim Jones, for one readily-called-to-mind example; Richard Nixon, the novelist John Ehrlichman and the evangelist Billy Graham for three others, but among scores of others) I would definitely agree with the second half of his sentence as well. But my research insists that both were as prevalent in all bygone ages and cultures as today's America. Some giving more visible appearance of one facet of that purportedly dichotomous description and some of the other, and some in the form Lasch describes as uniquely characterizing today's "new" narcissist. Henry David Thoreau is a prime example by Lasch's explicit definition, of the new narcissist of 1979.

I find these same arguments at each step of the long broom sweep with which Lasch describes this "new narcissist". For each step of his all-collecting description, my research enables me to call readily to mind dozens of examples of actual human beings, as individuals, who would have to be described in the terms in which he describes this new narcissist of whom he writes as if he too were somehow speaking of an individual human being and at the same time of a vast category of human beings it is not necessary to identify even from the standpoint of providing even a clue as to the sampling methods from which he drew his human beings who somehow managed to come together as one supremely representative "person"--"the new narcissist".

It is difficult for me to imagine that were I to attempt to present a specific challenge from past times to support my view, Lasch would not wish me to do so in specific terms, which would permit him to assess my "generalizations" in terms of my specific human beings.
Yet he seems, with astonishing dogmatic assumptions, to regard no such wish on his reader's part as their privilege.

So that here the reader perhaps not acquainted with this particular work of Lasch's may know the more full description of the generalized new narcissist encompassed in Lasch's rubric it would seem useful to include the remainder of this particular section without interruption:

"Liberated from the superstitions of the past, he doubts even the reality of his own existence. Superficially relaxed and tolerant, he finds little use for dogmas of racial and ethnic purity but at the same time forfeits the security of group loyalties and regards everyone as a rival for the favors conferred by a paternalistic state. His sexual attitudes are permissive rather than puritanical, even though his emancipation from ancient taboos brings him no sexual peace. Fiercely competitive in his demand for approval and acclaim, he distrusts competition because he associates it unconsciously with an unbridled urge to destroy. Hence he repudiates the competitive ideologies that flourished at an earlier stage of capitalist development and distrusts even their limited expression in sports and games. He extols cooperation and teamwork while harboring deeply antisocial impulses. He praises respect for rules and regulations in the secret belief that they do not apply to himself. Acquisitive in the sense that his cravings have no limits, he does not accumulate goods and provisions against the future, in the manner of the acquisitive individualist of the nineteenth-century political economy, but demands immediate gratification and lives in a state of restless, perpetually unsatisfied desire.

The narcissist has no interest in the future because, in part, he
has so little interest in the past. He finds it difficult to internalize happy associations or to create a store of loving memories with which to face the later part of his life, which under the best of conditions always brings sadness and pain" [xvi-xvii].

I realized with a painful wince while copying down that segment of Lasch's description what it was that was causing me such sadness as I got farther and farther along in copying it. Very many of these phenomenae are not far from the way Lasch speaks of them for persons with profound narcissistic vulnerability. [In truth, these persons—whom Lasch depicts as "the new narcissist"—are persons with profound narcissistic vulnerability, which is but another way of speaking of profound and painful vulnerability at the level of one's inner self.] I know this to be so because it is my professional role-function to work with many such persons in the course of clinical practice of psychotherapy and in clinical research. Yet I could not keep from wincing at this description, not for its few deviations from quite precise accuracy, but from the recognition that other readers, who do not have opportunity to have come to know such persons in the ways possible for me, would not recognize from Lasch's stunning description that he has done these "narcissists" of whom he writes a grave and profound injustice in this compelling description. For he leaves the reader with the impression that these—this staccato concatenation of sentences—describes them. As people. As human beings. It is, surely, important for someone who knows them as human beings to say, no, no, no—this is not a description of these narcissistically vulnerable human beings: these are only a concatenation of some of the aspects of what life is like for them. In-
indeed, I myself have come to know that these are in one quite important sense phrases describing the manifestations of their painful vulnerability, but I could excuse Lasch for not knowing of that, for very much not available to a professor of American history or an analyzer of culture is required in order to know narcissistically vulnerable persons in ways that would permit access to that level of knowledge. It was not that I winced over this as missing from his unleavened litany, rather it was the absence of all of those things that would just naturally be included in anyone's description of any human beings of whom one was discussing phenomena at that encompassing a level.

I find it important to say that Christopher Lasch has left an impression with the reader in this description of the new "narcissist" that is wrong: one that comes across sounding as if this person was someone despicable, someone one would be repulsed by, shrink from, go to great lengths to have nothing to do with. If not an outright monstrous horror, the person labelled the narcissist by Lasch sounds truly little short of that. I cannot believe that anyone reading those few pages would come away with any sense that these are people—fellow human beings—who are in very many ways warranting very much more description if one is not to be wholly misled about this narcissistically vulnerable man or woman. [For despite Lasch's litany of "he"'s, there are fully as many "she"'s with fully as much narcissistical vulnerability as "he"'s.]

In at least as many cases as not, the "narcissist" is someone you know, reader. He, or she, is someone you know and like, unless you live in a tiny enclave so cut off from an average supply of human ac-
quaintances that would somehow magically preclude that occurrence. Most of the attributes Lasch ascribes to the narcissist (and in fact, most narcissistically vulnerable persons would, at most, experience most--but not all--of these phenomena as part of their self-constellation) are not the aspects you would know them by: Lasch's description errs in writing of them [or rather him] as if this were so. What he has done is to write of their inner experience, of the way life feels to them; he has not mentioned that most often it is not by how life feels to them but for the very many other, often quite appreciated, aspects of them that one would be most apt to know them by. Although it is true that I can only speak with accuracy from the perspective of my own experience, it is certainly possible for me to speak from that perspective and say that invariably I personally have found very many very human and very likable things about each of the narcissistically vulnerable persons I have come to know.

It is true that it is not uncommon for a narcissistically vulnerable person to have erected a kind of facade over his greatest areas of vulnerability, so that the full extent of their likableness may not always be immediately apparent (although it is just as true that this can often be the case as well). But that is because being a "narcissist" hurts: it is, surely, that that is most missing of all from the sense one carries away from Christopher Lasch's thoroughgoing depiction.


616


APPENDIX

MODERN INFANT-INTERACTION RESEARCH

Attached here in appendix form are extracts from two recent comprehensive surveys of current day mother-infant, and father-infant research, which bring together findings from an array of varied disciplines and sources.

These are included for interdisciplinary demonstration of another area of corroborative goodness of fit with the views presented in this account: the psychology of the self view, the Piagetian equilibration view, and the transgenerational self-matrix view.

In among these findings from a wide range of laboratory research, much of it employing highly sophisticated freeze-frame analyses of microscopic bits of parent-infant interaction phenomena—phenomena which are otherwise non-visible to human perception—a reader may find example after example of some of the ways a parent's presence, attitudes and responsiveness can now be seen to create that which comprises the baby's early experience at both the highly specific and the generalized, pervasive levels which Heinz Kohut's reconstructive psychoanalytic research, and this transgenerational exploration of generationally overlapping lives, each suggests as intimately involved in characterizing parental responsiveness to the child's maturational requirements at many levels and across many spheres, become part and parcel of the structuralization of the baby's self-saturation.

In addition to providing further examples—here at the microscopic level—of what a baby is capable of perceiving and experiencing of the "crucial bit in the middle," of what actually goes on between parent
and infant; these research extracts provide additional examples of the two levels of phenomenal experience—the level of highly specific phenomena and the level of more generalized experience phenomena—which both the reconstructive psychoanalytic research of Heinz Kohut with individual lives, and the transgenerational explorations of generationally overlapping lives, each suggests as intimately involved in characterizing parental responsiveness to the child's maturational requirements.

Opportunity for further appreciating the interplay between these specific and general levels is, I believe, helpful in coming to better understand the many levels and many spheres across which synchronous, or empathic, parental responsiveness, characteristics, and events may become part and parcel of the structuralization of the baby's self-maturation.

This research suggests that it is by way of the pervasive interrelatedness among a wide array of levels, and of spheres of experience, across which a parent's interaction has impact on the developing infant and child (e.g., affectively, visually, tactiley, aurally, cognitively and physiologically), that the pervasively interrelated impact on many levels and spheres of later life experience become both possible, and understandable, including the impact on the child's unfolding life pathway itself, the "grown child's" parenting functions and the parenting functions' impact on subsequent generations.
APPENDIX A

Extracts from a representative sampling of the most recent infant-mother, and infant-father interaction research, and infant development.

Wolff (1959) described for the first time six separate states of consciousness in the infant, ranging from deep sleep to screaming. The state with which we are most concerned is state 4, the quiet, alert state. In this state the infant's eyes are wide open, and he is able to respond to his environment. Unfortunately, he may be in this state for periods as short as a few seconds. This made original detection of the state difficult and explains why it was not identified until 1959. However, Desmond and co-workers (1966) observed that the infant is in state 4 for a period of 45 to 60 minutes during the first hour after birth. After this discovery it was possible to demonstrate that an infant can see, that he has visual preferences, and that he will turn his head to the spoken word, all in the first hour of life. After this hour, however, he goes into a deep sleep for 3 or 4 hours. Thus for 1 hour after birth he is ideally equipped for the important first meeting with his parents.

Reciprocal Interaction

The fascinating question of why the development of maternal attachment progresses so rapidly during the early postpartum period can only be answered by minutely examining what happens between the mother and infant during this crucial time. What pulls them together, ensuring their proximity through the many months during which the infant is unable to satisfy his own needs? What are the rewards for the mother's commitment and efforts? Each is intimately involved with the other on a number of sensory levels. Their behaviors complement each other and serve to lock the pair together. The infant elicits behaviors from the mother which in turn are satisfying to him, and vice versa, the mother elicits behaviors in the infant which in turn are rewarding to her... These [interactive] behaviors do not occur in a chain-like sequence but rather each behavior [touching, looking, turning toward, etc.] triggers several others. Thus the effects of an interaction
are more like that of the stone dropped into a pool, causing a multitude of ever-increasing rings to appear, rather than like a chain where each link leads to only one other. In as sense we see a fail-safe system that is overdetermined to ensure the proximity of mother and child.

Because of the limitations of language, the interactions must be described sequentially rather than simultaneously, dispelling momentarily the richness of the actual process for the sake of understanding it. We therefore will have to present each system singly, although it is important to remember that they interlock.

We will first describe the interactions originating in the mother that affect the infant.

1. Touch. A most important behavioral system that serves to bind mother and infant together is the mother's interest in touching her baby. Although no studies have yet defined which neonatal characteristics elicit maternal touching, three independent observers have described a characteristic touching pattern that mothers use in the first contact with their newborns. Rubin (1963) noted that human mothers show an orderly progression of behavior after birth while becoming acquainted with their babies. Klaus and associates (1970) observed that when nude infants were placed next to their mothers a few minutes or hours after birth, most mothers touched them in a pattern of behavior that began with fingertip touching of the infant's extremities and proceeded in 4 to 8 minutes to massaging, stroking, and encompassing palm contact of the trunk. In the first 3 minutes mothers maintained fingertip contact 52% of the time and palm contact 28% of the time. In the last 3 minutes of observation, however, this was reversed. Fingertip contact had greatly decreased, and palm contact increased to 62% of the total scored time. Rubin (1963) observed a similar pattern but at a much slower rate. In her study mothers usually took about three days to complete the sequence, but the infants were dressed, which may account for the difference. Mothers of normal premature infants who were permitted early contact followed sequence of touching, but at an even slower rate; even at the third visit mothers of premature infants were not using their palms. Much more progress in tactile contact occurred in mothers of full-term infants in just 10 minutes.
In a study of home births, Lang (1972) observed that almost always the mother rubs the baby's skin, starting with the face. Rubbing is done with the fingertips and is usually a gentle stroking motion. This occurs before the initial nursing and before the delivery of the placenta. The baby is usually offered the breast but often does not suck at first. The most common action for the baby when given the mother's nipple is to continually lick it.

Thus we have fragmentary evidence for what we believe is a significant principle—that human mothers engage in a species-specific sequence of behaviors when first meeting their infants, even though the speed of this sequence is modified by environmental and cultural conditions. Is this related to what was described in animal mothers earlier?

2. **Eye-to-eye contact.** Another interaction that proceeds from mother to child originates in the eyes. The mothers studied by Klaus and associates (1970) expressed strong interest in eye-to-eye contact. Seventy-three percent of the mothers verbalized an intense interest in waking the infant to see his eyes open. Some even voice a relationship between the condition of the baby and his eyes, for example, "Open your eyes. Oh, come on, open your eyes. If you open your eyes I'll know you're alive." Several mentioned that once the infant looked at them, they felt much closer to him.

The mothers of full-term infants studied by Klaus and associates (1970) showed a remarkable increase in the time spent in the en face position from the first to the fifth minute.

Lang (1972) observed in most home births that immediately after the birth of the baby, but before the delivery of the placenta, the mother picked up the baby and held him in the en face position while speaking to him in a high-pitched voice.

Eye-to-eye contact serves the purpose of giving a real identity or personification to the baby, as well as getting a rewarding feedback for the mother (T.B. Brazelton).

There seem to be other mechanisms that foster the rewarding eye-to-eye contact. As Robson (1967) so
aptly describes, "The appeal of the mother's eyes to the child (and of his eyes to her) is facilitated by their stimulus richness. In comparison with other areas of the body surface, the eye has a remarkable array of interesting qualities such as the shininess of the globe, the fact that it is mobile while at the same time fixed in space, the contrasts between the pupil-iris-cornea configuration, the capacity of the pupil to vary in diameter, and the differing effects of variations in the width of the palpebral fissure." 23

Brazelton and co-workers (1966) reported that the infant can see at birth. An infant born of an unmedicated mother will easily follow a moving hand at a 12- to 15-inch distance. One would expect the seeing infant to focus on the most interesting visual stimulus, which, as described by Robson, may be the human eye.

In the course of performing the Brazelton Neonatal Behavior Assessment on large numbers of infants, we have been repeatedly struck by the greater appeal of the examiner's face than any inanimate object.

The neonatal data on vision point to the infant's preference for both moving, moderately complex stimuli and those which are ovoid and have the ungarbled contents of the human face. Goren (1975) shows that the neonate at birth will follow an ungarbled representation of a face for 180 degrees, but significantly less (60 degrees) and far less time if it is garbled. He is programmed for the human face at birth (T.B. Brazelton).

3. High-pitched voice. Lang's (1972) observation that mothers giving birth at home usually speak to their infants in high-pitched voices prompted us to watch for this phenomenon. Interestingly, after hearing about this, we also have observed mothers speaking to their newborn infants in a much higher pitched voice than that used in everyday conversation. They may turn and speak to the doctor or nurse in their regular voice and then abruptly return to the higher frequency speech as they address their neonates. As Brazelton reported, a neonate alerts and attends to a female voice in preference to a male voice because of its higher pitch. The

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mother's use of a high-pitched voice, then, fits with the infant's sensitive auditory perception and his attraction to speech in the high-frequency range.

4. **Entrainment.** The microanalysis of sound films shows that human communication is not sound alone but also includes movement. When a person speaks, several parts of his body move in ways that are sometimes obvious and sometimes almost imperceptible; the same is true of the listener, whose movements are coordinated to the elements of the speech. When two people are filmed, the microanalysis reveals that both the listener and the speaker are moving in tune to the words of the speaker, thus creating a type of dance. The rhythm or tune of the dance is the pattern of the speech (Condon and Sander, 1974). 29

Recent exciting observations by Condon and Sander (1974) reveal that newborns also move in time with the structure of adult speech. "When the infant is already in movement, points to change in the configuration of his moving body parts become coordinated with points of change in sound patterns characterizing speech." In other words, as the speaker pauses for breath or accents a syllable, the infant almost imperceptibly raises an eyebrow or lowers a foot. The investigators demonstrated that live speech in particular is effective in entraining infant movement. Neither tapping noises nor disconnected vowel sounds showed the degree of correspondence with neonate movement as did natural, rhythmic speech. Interestingly, synchronous movements were found with both of the two natural languages tested, English and Chinese. As noted by the authors: "this study reveals a complex interaction system in which the organization of the neonate's motor behavior is entrained by and synchronized with the organized speech behavior of adults in his environment. If the infant, from the beginning, moves in precies, shared rhythm with the organization of the speech structure of his culture, then he participates developmentally through complex socio-biological entrainment processes in millions of repetitions of linguistic forms long before he later uses them in speaking and communicating.

Although the infant moves in rhythm to his mother's voice and thus may be said to be affected by her on the other hand the infant's movements may reward the mother

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and stimulate her to continue. The point is that these areas of contact are interactive.

By this subtle entrainment of his movements to the rhythm of her speech, the newborn give the mother feedback that she can hardly resist. We have found that this synchrony becomes the important ambiance for their affective communications thereafter. Their communications become a sort of "mating dance" (cf. swans) when they are analyzed on film by frame-by-frame analysis (T.B. Brazelton).

5. Time-giver. Synchronous movements are part of a much more comprehensive phenomenon of entrainment between a mother and her baby, which has been identified by the intensive and meticulous studies by Sander and associates (1970). We can speculate that while the baby is in utero many of his actions and rhythms are attuned to those of the mother. This is due to a variety of rhythmical influences—her own sleep-wake cycle, the diurnal rhythms of her hormones, the orderly patterns of the mother's day, the regular beat of her heart, and the rhythmic contractions of the uterus preceding the onset of labor and continuing up to the time that the baby emerges from the birth canal. By carefully monitoring the states and activities of normal infants rooming-in with their mothers during the first 2 weeks of life, Sander has confirmed the existence of those behavioral phenomenon in the first hours of life that have been emphasized by others, such as an unusually prolonged alert state following birth. In addition, he has shown that on the second day there is a breakup of the rapid-eye-movement (REM) and non-REM sleep pattern present on the first day. In succeeding days the length of each period of sleep decreases progressively. Concurrently, there is an increase in crying which reaches a peak on the third day. Thus the disruption of birth seems to upset the baby's prior rhythms and throw his systems into a state of disequilibrium. He must reorganize and retain the bio-rhythmicity of his states and behavior to fit his extra-uterine environment.

By following a steady routine in the early days, the mother helps her infant to reestablish biorhythmicity. As evidence of this, Sander has identified a progressive increase in the co-occurrence of the infant's being in an alert state and his mother's holding him. This increases from less than 25% on the second day to 57% co-occurrence on the eighth day.
Cassel and Sander (1975) describe the mother as the time giver (Zeitgeber) for the baby for the entrainment of rhythmic neonatal functions. They compare the mother’s effect on the infant to the effect of a magnet in organizing and lining up iron filings.

Sander has emphasized that the alert state in a young infant is extremely stable. He has shown that if the baby is in any state other than the alert state and the mother intervenes, it is likely that he will become alert. However, if the baby is already in the alert state and the mother intervenes, there is only a slight chance of a change in state. The high occurrence of the alert state results from the interaction of a sensitive mother with her infant. When he is alert, he is ready to respond to the mother, to dance in rhythm to her speech or movements.

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Other studies have emphasized other aspects of the mother-to-infant interaction. Cassel and Sander (1975) pointed out that the infant has an advanced sensory system when he enters the world, but is greatly retarded in his motor abilities. Motor dependency results in an obvious need for continuous caretaking from a mothering figure. Most important, this dependency serves a second function by involving the infant in interaction, through which the newborn can regulate his circadian rhythms. Although he functions and those of his caretaker are temporarily desynchronized and disorganized in the first days after birth, the baby becomes reorganized by repeated mother-event situations.

Cassel has demonstrated evidence of the newborn's perception of the interaction through experiments in which he has the mother wear a mask and be silent during one feeding on the seventh day of life. The infant takes significantly less milk, scans the room when placed in the crib, and has significant disruption in rapid-eye movement and nonrapid-eye-movement sleep following the masked feeding compared with the usual feeding.

Meltzoff and Moore (1975) have recently demonstrated the remarkable finding of neonatal imitation of visually perceived stimuli through facial and manual gestures at two weeks after birth. These remarkable
findings were obtained by presenting four gestures (tongue protrusion, lip protrusion, mouth open, sequential finger movements) to six infants on four occasions and recording the subsequent performance of the infants. Each behavior occurred significantly more frequently in the 20 seconds after it had been demonstrated to the infant than did other behaviors. Thus the neonate might respond to his mother with a form of mimicry.

Two other observations that demonstrate the "neatness of fit" of maternal and infant behaviors are Salk's (1973) set of tentative findings that (1) neonates quiet when exposed to the natural beating of the human heart and (2) mothers characteristically hold infants on their left side near the heart. Thus if the newborn cries and is picked up by his mother, chances are that her holding will soothe his cries, thus encouraging proximity in times of neonatal distress.

The following interactions originate with the infant:

1. Eye-to-eye contact. The visual system provides one of the most powerful networks for the mediation of maternal attachment. This fact is emphasized by the work of Fraiberg and colleagues (1974) who have described in detail the difficulties that mothers of blind infants have in feeling close to them. Without the affirmation of mutual gazing, mothers feel lost and like strangers to their babies until both learn to substitute other means of communication.

Interestingly, the distance between the eyes of the mother and infant when the mother is breastfeeding or holding him in her arms is about 12 inches, which is the distance at which infants can best focus on an object. These positions provide opportunities for eye-to-eye contact during a mother's care of her neonate.

Robson (1967) has suggested that eye-to-eye contact is one of the innate releasers of maternal caretaking responses. Some research experiences have shown how powerful it is. For example, three researchers who were participating in a study...were required to assist with Brazelton Neonatal Behavior Assessments on infants each day. [The experimenters] were distressed to hear all three say that they did not particularly
like babies, found newborns particularly unappealing and planned never to have a baby. They grumbled about learning the behavioral assessments. As they carried out the assessment, each of the women had her first experience with a baby in the alert state who would follow her eyes with his own, and an amazing change occurred. Suddenly each became enthusiastic about "her" baby, wanted to hold him, and came back later in the day and the next day to visit. At night she would tell her friends about this marvelous baby she had tested. In a few weeks all three decided they would like to have and even breastfeed a baby. This anecdote about the three women demonstrates the compelling attraction of a newborn infant moving his eyes to follow an adult's eyes, and the layer upon layer of emotional meaning that the viewer may place on this.

2. Cry. The voice of the infant also affects the mother. Lind and colleagues (1973), using thermal photography, have reported on yet another biological level where reciprocal behaviors pull mothers and infants together. After being exposed to the hunger cries of healthy newborns, fifty-four of sixty-three mothers demonstrated a significant increase in the amount of blood flow to their breasts. The infant's cry caused a physiological change in the mother that is likely to induce her to nurse.

3. Entrainment. ...numerous clinical experiences suggest that an essential principle of attachment is that parents must receive some response or signal, such as body or eye movements from their infant, to form a close bond. [Researchers] hypothesized that for most parents this takes place in the first days of life, when the infant is in the quiet alert state and moves in rhythm to his parents' speech....

Maternal and infant behaviors complement each other in several sensory and motor systems, thus increasing the probability of interaction occurring. These behaviors seem to be specific and innately programmed to start the process of locking mother and infant together in a sustained reciprocal rhythm. For example, [researchers suggest that] the mother's use of a high-pitched voice appears to fit perfectly with the infant's especially sensitive auditory perception and attraction to speech in the high-frequency range.
Thus if the observation that humans characteristically speak to newborn infants in high-pitched voices is correct, nature has provided a means by which stimulation from humans is especially attractive to the young of the species and will easily evoke a response. Similarly, a mother's interest in her new baby's eyes corresponds to his ability to see, to attend, and to follow. Nature appears to have preferentially developed in the occipital cortex the visual pathways so that these sensory and motor functions are ready for the newborn infant to receive stimulation from his mother and to interact with her.

Kaila (1935), Spitz and Wolff (1946), and Ahrens (1954) have established that one of the earliest and most effective stimuli for eliciting a social smile in an infant is a visual configuration consisting of two eyes and a mouth shown en face. Goren (1975) has demonstrated that this is the innate form preference of newborns, minutes after birth, even before there has been any opportunity for the infant to see human faces. Thus mothers tend to look at their babies in a way that increases the chance that their babies will attend and follow and then, a bit later, smile back. Since smiling is an extremely powerful reinforcer, the visual interaction helps to cement the proximity of the mother and child.

It should be noted that Condon and Sander's (1974) studies on entrainment to the human voice were done with infants a few hours old and that all of the babies were bottle fed and were in United States hospitals. Would the entrainment progress more rapidly, would the co-occurrence of the mother's holding and the infant's alerting take place more frequently, and would the breakup in the baby's sleep and awake states be less marked and less prolonged if mother and baby were together continuously from birth and if the baby were breastfed?

Hearing and vision assume greatly enhanced importance in Western industrialized nations, where mother and baby are separated for many hours of the day. In some developing nations, where the baby remains on the mother's body from birth on, these states changes might well be different. A woman in Africa who carries her baby on her back or side is identified as a poor mother if her baby wets or soils on her after the seventh day—that is, if she cannot anticipate these elimination behaviors and hold the baby away before they occur. This finely tuned
awareness of the movements of the baby is almost inconceivable to those in nations where mother and baby are kept apart much of the day and sleep separately at night.

These observations are especially provocative because they extend the perceptive observations of Bowlby (1958), Ainsworth (1970), and Ainsworth and associates (1974), who distinguished between executive and signal behaviors. Executive behaviors consist of responses such as rooting, grasping, and postural adjustment, which tend to maintain physical contact between infant and caretaker, once established. Signal behaviors, on the other hand, comprise responses such as crying and smiling, which increase proximity or establish physical contact between infant and mother... (Brazelton et al., 1974)

** Excerpts from a review of recent research on father-infant, and father-child, interaction. **

Researchers from a number of disciplines using ingenious new methods now suggest that the father-infant relationship is not what we thought it was; that, for example, there are few significant differences in the way children attach to fathers and to mothers; that fathers can be as protective, giving and stimulating as mothers; that men have at least the potential to be as good at taking care of children as women are; and that the characteristic interplay of father and infant, when scrutinized minutely, is distinctive in many fascinating ways. The new fathering research offers fresh insights about the "distant" father and about fathers' roles across disparate cultures; it reveals that fathers have been ignored in research and in medical practice in curious and interesting ways; and it offers a synthesis of the relationship between fathers, children, families and society.

James Herzog, M.D., a psychiatrist who teaches at Harvard, says this of the new findings: "We're in what I call the post-competency phase now. We don't need to prove that fathers 'can do it, too.' The question now is, what is the specific role of the male parent, and what is the difference between being a father and being a mother?"

[30] (Collins, 1979)
...Research scientist at the University of Michigan's Center for Human Growth and Development, Michael Lamb's first key study of attachment appeared in 1975; in it, 7- and 8-month-old boys and girls and their parents were viewed in the home setting. An observer dictated a detailed account of the behavior he saw into a tape recorder. That narrative was then analyzed by applying 10 measures of attachment and affiliation: whether the baby "smiles," "vocalizes," "looks," "laughs," "approaches," "is in proximity," "seeks to be held," or "fusses to." Lamb and his co-workers found that no preferences were evident for one parent over the other among these infants, at the age when they should, according to Bowlby's theory, be forming their first attachments.

Lamb and his colleagues reported that when mothers held their infants, it was primarily for things like changing, feeding or bathing; fathers mostly held their children to play with them, and initiated a greater number of physical and idiosyncratic games than mothers did. This paternal play tended to be boisterous and physically stimulating. Furthermore, boys were held longer than girls by their fathers; fathers start showing a preference for boys at one year of age and this preference increases thereafter.

Ross D. Parke, Professor of Psychology at the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, measured the amount of milk that was left over in a baby's bottle after feeding time; infants consumed virtually the same amount of milk whether fathers or mothers did the feeding. They found that fathers were equally competent in correctly reading subtle changes in infants' behavior and acting on them; fathers reacted to such infant distress signals as spitting up, sneezing and coughing just as quickly and appropriately as mothers did. Parke asserted that men had at least the potential to be as good at caretaking as women. However, fathers tended to leave child care to their wives when both parents were present.

In the last three years, Parke, Douglas Sawin of the University of Texas and their collaborators have conducted two major studies involving 120 families. They observed family interactions, and used high-speed electronic "event recorders" with 10-button keyboards and solid-state memories to tap out four digit codes that recorded behaviors as they saw them.

At the Child Development Unit of Children's Hospital Medical Center in Boston, originally, father-
infant and mother-infant pairs were videotaped periodically during the first six months of babies' lives. The unit's newer work involves the father-mother-infant triad.

...Infants are placed in an alcove created by a blue-flowered curtain, and are taped with father or mother. These laboratory situations, though artificial, place the maximum communicative demand on the parent and child, the researchers say; they bring out the kinds of intense play situations that normally occur only during brief periods during an ordinary day.

Two trained observers play back the videotapes of these sessions and perform a "microbehavioral analysis" of the interaction of both the parent and the baby. The researchers assign numerical scores that rate such facial expressions as frowns, pouts and smiles; sounds like gurgles or coos; motions of hands and feet, and even eye movements. Ultimately, the observers note clusters of these behaviors and chart them during each second of elapsed time over the entire interaction.

Graphs of fathers' and mothers' behaviors show distinctive patterns. In all of the families studied by the Child Development Unit, the chart of the mother's interaction is more modulated, enveloping, secure and controlled. The dialogue with the father is more playful, exciting and physical. Father displays more rapid shifts from the peaks of involvement to the valleys of minimal attention.

There are other characteristic differences: Mothers play more verbal games with infants, so-called "turn-taking" dialogues that are composed of bursts of talking or cooing that last four to eight seconds and are interrupted by three-to four-second pauses. Fathers tend to play more physical games with infants; they touch their babies in rhythmic tapping patterns or circular motions.

To provide conceptual models for the ways babies interact with adults, the Boston researchers have employed the theories of cybernetics, the discipline that studies the control and regulation of communication processes in animals and machines. Researchers have broken with the traditional lexicon of rat psychology, and talk about the "interlocking feedback of mutually regulated systems" and "homeostatic balances between attention and non-attention."
baby, in its reciprocal interaction with an adult modifies its behavior in response to the feedback it is receiving. Infants, they say, seem to display periods of rapt attention followed by recovery intervals, in an internally regulated cycle that maintains the balance of the infant's heart, lung and other physiological systems.

"It's important to say that father doesn't offer some qualitatively better kind of stimulation; it's just different," says T. Berry Brazelton, M.D., director of the Child Development Unit, a pioneer in the study of family interactions. "Mother has more of a tendency to teach the baby about inner control, and about how to keep the homeostatic system going; she then builds her stimulation on top of that system in a very smooth, regulated sort of way. The father adds a different dimension, a sort of play dimension, an excitement dimension, teaching the baby about some of the ups and downs—and also teaching the baby another very important thing: how to get back in control."

There are also interesting similarities in infants' relationships with both parents, says Michael Yogman, M.D., the pediatrician who videotaped James and Eddie, and who has specialized in the study of others at the Child Development Unit since 1974. "With both parents," he says, "we see that behavior is mutually regulated and reciprocal, that there is a meshing of behaviors."

Dr. Brazelton says that "there's no question that a father is essential to children's development. Our work shows that babies have this very rich characteristic model of reaction to at least three different people—to father, to mother, and to strangers.

"It seems to me," says Dr. Brazelton, "that the baby very carefully sets separate tracks for each of the two parents—which, to me, means that the baby wants different kinds of people as parents for his own needs. Perhaps the baby is bringing out differences that are critical to him as well as to them.