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THE PEACE OF NICIAS

A Thesis Presented

By

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# Table of Contents

I. **Introduction** .................................................. 1  
II. **Toward Peace** .................................................. 5  
   Strategic Considerations ...................................... 5  
   Finances .......................................................... 9  
   The Truce .......................................................... 13  
   Delay For The Present: Scione Revolts ....................... 21  
III. **The Instrument of Peace** .................................... 24  
    Basis For Peace ................................................ 24  
    General Terms .................................................. 25  
    Specific Terms ................................................ 28  
    Formal Conclusions ........................................... 40  
IV. **The Peace in Action** ......................................... 51  
    Immediate Consequences ...................................... 51  
    Document Of The Spartan-Athenian Alliance .................. 52  
    The Aftermath: Military and Diplomatic Confusion ........ 60  
V. **Conclusions: Whose Victory?** .................................. 65  
APPENDIX: The Peace Of Nicias And The Financial Recovery Of Athens .......................... 73  
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................... 76  
MAP ............................................................... 80
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 421 B.C. Athens and Sparta signed an agreement which officially ended the ten-year Archidamian War. This treaty became known as the Peace of Nicias, after an Athenian commander who had been instrumental in its creation. The present paper will examine the events that led to the Peace, the document that embodied the Peace and the failure of the major powers to effect a more permanent settlement. It will be shown that the treaty dealt with extremely difficult problems and that circumstances in the North Aegean precluded all hope of real reconciliation from the very start. In view of the complexity of the situation that existed in 421 and the relative immaturity of Greek diplomacy, our treaty will appear as a considerable achievement despite its flaws and ultimate failure.

The Archidamian War was to date the longest and most violent war fought between Greeks on the Greek mainland. During these years pressures developed that finally enabled certain personalities and factions in both states to open negotiations. These pressures became particularly severe in Athens, since Pericles' war plans called for most of the Attic population to be sheltered behind the "Long Walls" that led down to the Piraeus. The social, moral and economic effects of the war were graphically illustrated by Aristophanes beginning in the mid 420's.¹ His effectiveness

¹Aristophanes, trans. Benjamin B. Rogers (Cambridge, Mass., 1924), 3 vols. All subsequent texts and translations of Greek authors will be taken from the Loeb editions of the Harvard University Press at Cambridge, unless otherwise indicated.
as an agent of anti-war propaganda is difficult to gage, however, since his aims appear neither clear nor consistent. In discussing the background of the Peace this paper will focus on the more concrete material contained in the principal historian of the age, Thucydides, to whom political and strategic considerations were paramount. We will begin our study in chapter two with a survey of the various disasters that befell both sides and prevented a successful prosecution of the war by either. We will then proceed to the subject of finances in order to determine the extent to which the Athenian treasury was depleted and her ability to maintain the offensive impaired. The rest of chapter two will deal with the Truce of 423 and its breakdown. Since it is the purpose of this thesis to treat the Peace as a document as well as an event, particular attention will be given to the text of the Truce so that we may better appreciate the influence it had on the agreement of 421.

In chapter three we will turn to the negotiations and final compromise that took place in 422-421. As the various parts of the treaty are examined, this paper will seek to interpret and clarify each provision in the light of historical circumstances and probable intentions. In the process we will have an opportunity to see how well our document typified the Greek diplomatic tradition and in what ways it was innovative. Although scholars have devoted considerable effort to solving the problems posed by the text of the Peace, the modern inquirer must be prepared to evaluate old interpretations and to seek new ones. At times he may even need to question views that are held by A.W. Gomme, whose

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commentary has had an all-pervading influence on recent studies in Thucydides. There is, for example, his contention that the document of the Peace betrays signs of haste that proved its undoing in the end.\(^3\)

In chapter four we will move onto the consequences of the Peace, including the Spartan-Athenian Alliance. The period immediately following the signing of peace was one of the most confusing and complicated in Greek history and cannot be given full justice in our present study. For now, a brief survey will have to suffice as we seek to discover some of the reasons behind Athens' and Sparta's failure to reach a more satisfactory solution. In our discussion of the Alliance and its relation to the Peace it will be necessary to give some consideration to the nature of Greek alliances and the difficulties of interpretation occasioned by the particular one at hand. During the writing of this paper it became evident that modern historians have been somewhat lax in setting up standards by which we might distinguish between different kinds of alliances. Much work remains to be done in the field of early Greek diplomacy, though the number of treaties surviving from the fifth century is limited.

The final chapter will venture to pass judgment on the accomplishment and significance of the Peace. Among the views presented will be the more or less traditional one held by Eduard Meyer,\(^4\) that the Peace

\(^3\)A.W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford, 1945-56), 3 vols. See 3.668. A fourth volume was added by A. Adrewes and K.J. Dover in 1965.

was a diplomatic victory for Athens, and the opposing view held by Donald Kagan, that the Peace was a poorly conceived document and a poorly timed event that could not have possibly benefited Athens in any way.\(^5\) Though Kagan's conclusions are not new they have been given new emphasis and prestige by his recent book, *The Archidamian War*. In his attempt to be controversial however, he has produced some questionable arguments that must not go unchallenged.

CHAPTER II
TOWARD PEACE

Strategic Considerations

The greatest disaster to befall either side during the Peloponnesian War came in the form of a deadly plague which ravaged Athens in 430-29 and 427-26. Athens lost 4400 regular hoplites out of a total of 13,000 and at least a fourth of her 1200 cavalry.\(^6\) We may safely assume that between one-fourth and one-third of the entire population was carried away. In 430, after the second invasion of Attica and the first year of the plague, Athens made peace overtures to Sparta to no avail.\(^7\) The plague not only hindered immediate operations but had an adverse effect on the population trend, as evidenced by the size of the army at Delium in 424

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\(^6\)Thucydides, 2.13, 2.31, 3.87. All subsequent references are from Thucydides unless otherwise noted. By "regulars" we mean hoplites of the 20-30 year age group.

\(^7\)This was against the wishes of Pericles. As a "General" (Strategos) he had no official say in foreign affairs, since that was the prerogative of the Assembly. The right to declare war, and by implication, the right to make peace, is spelled out in a constitution written in 410 B.C., but harkening back to an earlier age. See H.T. Wade-Gery, "Attic inscriptions of the fifth century: The charter of the democracy," British School at Athens, n.33 (1932-33), p.121. We also know from Thucydides 5.45 that foreign envoys had to explain their mission to the Assembly after presenting their credentials to the Senate (Boule). Furthermore, all agreements made in the field had to be approved at home (2.70). Although the actual agenda of the Assembly was supposed to be at the discretion of the Senate, the Assembly might insure future discussion on a matter by passing a decree to that effect—as in the case of the Truce of 423 (4.118.14). The Senate and Assembly were also required to bring up any questions presented by the Generals. See Aristotle, Athenian Constitution, trans. H. Rackham (1935), 22.5-7, and C.A. Hignett, A History of the Athenian Constitution (Oxford, 1952), 242-46.
In 425, however, the war turned decidedly in Athens' favor, for in that year 120 Spartans and 172 Perioeci were captured on the island of Sphacteria after a combined total of 148 of their force had been killed. Michell calculates that the Lacedaemonian army included about 3400 regulars in 418 B.C., of which half were Spartans. The battle at Sphacteria, then, cost the Spartans about 13 percent of her field army or 12 percent of her citizenry, depending on which way one views the affair. A loss of this magnitude was far too great for a country trying to hold down a large subject population of dissatisfied serfs ("Helots"). The continued occupation of Pylos by the Athenians also created serious problems for the Spartan government, since a large covering force was now needed to contain the enemy. To make matters worse, retaliation against Attica was impossible because of the danger to the prisoners. Due to the small size of the citizen population, these 120 Spartan prisoners had many important and influential relatives back home, all eager for their safe return. Even before the final assault on the Island, Sparta realized her predicament

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8 2.58, 4.93.3.

9 4.38. The island of Sphacteria and the neighboring peninsula of Pylos are situated off Messenia along the western coast of the Peloponnesus. The Perioeci were free allies who lived in Lacedaemonia but did not possess the citizen rights of Spartans. They were always brigaded with the Spartans during the Peloponnesian War, though their training could not have been as thorough.

10 Humfrey Michell, Sparta (Cambridge, 1952), 239-42.

11 5.15.1.
and made a temporary truce in order to sue for peace. Cleon, demagogue, war-hawk, and future victor at Sphacteria, persuaded the Assembly to ask for impossible terms and refused to let the Spartan negotiators work behind closed doors with an Athenian committee. Obviously the Spartans could not openly make concessions and take the chance of being rebuffed, since her allies might take offense and leave the Peloponnesian League. The truce was terminated shortly afterward and the Athenians took care to find some excuse to keep the 60 Peloponnesian ships that had been placed in their hands at the start of the negotiations. In view of the incompetency of the Peloponnesian fleet, however, it is doubtful that this loss made any difference.

Athens became more aggressive in her prosecution of the war after her unexpected victory near Pylos. Nicias made landings against Corinth the same year and achieved some limited success. More important was his occupation of the island of Cythera off the Laconian coast in the following year. As the Athenian navy continued to make depredations on the coast the Spartans appeared to be totally incapable of putting up an effective defense. At this point, Brasidas, a Spartan of unusual abilities, arrived on the scene with part of the Peloponnesian army and was able to prevent the Athenians from seizing Megara, though they took

12.4.16-23. The text of the truce is given in some detail in 4.16 and shows the author's increased interest in official documents. In this particular case it seems that Thucydides has reworked the official copy. Perhaps he had to rely on a careful oral report for his information.

13.4.42
14.4.53
15.4.55-57
He then proceeded to raise a new army of 1700 Helots and Peloponnesian mercenaries which he promptly led north into Thrace. By a combination of force and persuasion he was able to foment revolts and gain valuable allies, creating a diversion that would ultimately force Athens to the conference table. Meanwhile, the Athenian field army was in Boeotia taking part in a complicated operation that failed to develop according to plan. On their return march a battle ensued at Delium in which the Athenians lost 1000 killed, including their commander Hippocrates. A month later the Athenians lost another 200 men to the Boeotians as prisoners, thanks to a primitive form of "Greek Fire". During the same winter (424/23) the Athenians received news that Brasidas had taken Amphipolis in Thrace. This caused great alarm because of the town's importance as a source of ship timber and other revenues, not to mention its strategic location. It appears then, that by early 423 both sides were in a position to continue doing damage to the other though both had suffered grievously. The absurdity of prolonging the conflict was now evident to all and the time was ripe for peace. Before consumating the Truce of 423, however, we need to consider the role that finances played in shaping government policies and public opinion.

16 4.73
17 4.75-88
18 4.89-102
19 4.103ff., 108. Benjamin D. Meritt, H.T. Wade-Gery and Malcolm F. McGregor estimate the yearly revenue of Amphipolis at 70-75T, though they offer no direct evidence to support this claim. See Athenian Tribute Lists (Princeton, 1950), 3.339, n.58. Hereafter this work will be referred to as ATL.
Finances

Athens needed a dependable source of revenue to pay for the ships, crews and hoplites of her expeditions. A trireme cost about a talent a month to operate, apart from the incidental expenditures needed for repairs, and a hoplite with a servant cost as much as two drachmae per day.\textsuperscript{20} The brief operation against Cythera in 425, for example, involved 60 ships and 2000 hoplites and cost 100T.\textsuperscript{21} Athens paid for these campaigns out of a special reserve fund that was created in 434-33 as a result of the Callias Decree.\textsuperscript{22} In that year most of the 3000T remaining in the state treasury were removed to the treasury of Athena Polias. Perhaps it was thought that a single fund would be easier to manage. Since the new arrangement also required a special vote of the assembly prior to any expenditure, it would appear that many felt a need for stronger democratic control over state finances. In a speech delivered in 431 Pericles tells us that the reserve contained 6000T, surely enough for the war that he envisioned.\textsuperscript{23} Shortly thereafter, the Athenians decided to take 1000T from the reserve in order to create a special emergency fund for use in case of an attack on the city itself.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{20}3.17. See Russell Meiggs and David Lewis, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions (Oxford, 1969), #61 and 72, IG i\textsuperscript{2} 295+, 306, 324+. IG i\textsuperscript{2} = Inscriptiones Graecae I, editio minor, ed. Hiller von Gaertringen (Berlin, 1924).

\textsuperscript{21}See Meiggs and Lewis, #72.

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., #58, IG i\textsuperscript{2} 91, 92.

\textsuperscript{23}2.13.3.

\textsuperscript{24}2.24.
It is clear from Thucydides and insessional evidence that most of the reserve fund was exhausted during the early years of the war, leading us to conclude that Pericles badly miscalculated the length of the conflict. When Potidea fell to the Athenians in the winter of 430/29 the siege had already cost a staggering 2000T. We also learn from Thucydides 3.17 and other passages that the Athenians maintained a large fleet upwards of 250 ships during the first four years of the war. When we turn to the official records, we are informed by IG i² 306, 324+ that 4791T had been "loaned" by Athena to the state by 426. The same inscription gives us a detailed list of expenditures from 426 to 422, from which ATL calculated a reserve fund of only 444T by the summer of 422. This was hardly enough for a good year of campaigning. A determination of the size of the fund is made difficult, however, by other events.

In 428 the Athenians agreed to a property tax of 200T to help meet the challenge posed by the revolt of Mytilene and the dwindling reserve. Furthermore, it is possible that the tribute was being slowly raised during the twenties, though the evidence is sketchy and uncertain. A drastic increase took place in 425, however, a change that may reflect the rise to prominence of Cleon and pro-war factions after the victory at Pylos. The details of the new assessment are found in IG i² 63, where the total

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25 2.70.
26 ATL, 3.342-44.
27 3.19. We are not told how long this extraordinary tax lasted.
amount is best restored as 1460T.29 The pre-war figures never exceeded 388T and never involved more than 175 cities at any one time, compared to the 380 or so towns of the new assessment. Since it is unlikely that Athens would have been able to collect from most of the new towns in Pontus and Caria we can suspect that the actual collection was closer to 1000T.30 Whatever the exact figure may have been, Gomme believes the tribute and property tax together could have brought in at least an additional 1000T to the reserve fund. By his calculations the fund still held 1400T in 422, giving ample justification for the policy of Pericles.31 Unfortunately we have no way of knowing how much was added to the fund during the war, though ATL's figure of about 100T per year seems useful in the absence of other evidence.32 The weakness of Gomme's argument is that

30 Meiggs and Lewis, 227. See also ATL 3.345.
31 Gomme, 3.687-89.
32 It is beyond the scope of this paper to present a detailed discussion of Athenian finances, but some brief comments may be in order here and in a later chapter. Aristophanes' Wasps (422 B.C.) gives Athens' total income as 2000T, admittedly an approximation (11.656-63). In Thucydides 2.13.3 we are told that income from foreign sources amounted to 600T, of which 400T or so must have been from tribute and the remaining from indemnities (including 50T from Samos and 30T from Aegina) and other revenues. We learn from Xenophon's Anabasis (7.1.27) that Athens' total income in 431 was 1000T, a figure not attested to elsewhere and doubted by Gomme. If correct, Xenophon's figure would leave us with about 400T from internal sources, including the mining rights, rents and harbor dues mentioned in the Wasps. During the war some adjustments took place in the indemnity figure, such as the addition of 100T from Mytilene (3.50) and the possible loss of money from Aegina. The disposition of Potidea is uncertain. It appears then, that Aristophanes' figure of 2000T was not far amiss if he was thinking of the full tribute assessment of 1460T. ATL assumes that the routine cost of the Empire is to be taken solely from the 600T given in Thucydides 2.13.3. Since 200T was regularly added to the reserve before the war and an additional 80T in indemnity belonged to athena any-
it assumes Athens would have embarked on a policy of building up her reserve fund while the conflict still lasted. But nations at war do not save money—they spend it.

Spartan finance is an easier subject for discussion for the simple reason that it was practically nonexistent. King Archidamus himself recognized the absurdity of fighting a naval power like Athens without sufficient funds. In fact, it was the appearance of Persian gold and disgruntled Ionian sailors which finally made a Spartan victory possible in 404. The League war fund, such as it was, depended on the voluntary contributions of individuals and towns. We have an example of several such contributions in CIG 1511, though the date of the inscription is unfortunately in question. The gifts amount to only 12T, but it is interesting to note that some of the donors are from Chios and Ephesus, members of the Athenian Empire. Though the limited invasions of Attica might cost little and Brasidas might survive on Macedonian and Chalcidian pay, the navy was a different matter. Thucydides tells us that Corinth sailed with 90 ships against Corcyra in 433 and that the total Peloponnesian force was 150 ships. By 427 they were sailing against Corcyra with only 53 ships and way, we are left with a figure of 320T. ATL's assumption may not be valid, however, nor can we be sure what came under the "cost of empire". See ATL 3.345, 354 and Gomme 3.504. For Xenophon's *Anabasis* see the text and translation by Carleton L. Brownson (1922).

\[1.80.\]

\[33\] See Meiggs and Lewis #67. CIG = *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*, ed. A. Boeckh (Berlin, 1828-77), 4 vols.

\[34\] See Meiggs and Lewis #67. CIG = *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*, ed. A. Boeckh (Berlin, 1828-77), 4 vols.

\[35\] 1.46.
even this force was inferior to an Athenian squadron of 12 ships. Whether or not we are inclined to accept the earlier figure at face value, we must conclude that a significant reduction had taken place by the mid-twenties. Corinthian commerce must have been all but destroyed by Athenian ships operating out of Naupactus, and without trade there could have been little money in the Corinthian treasury by 423. As for Sparta, her citizens paid no tax beyond the produce customarily brought to the mess halls. The Perioeci may have paid some sort of tribute at this time, but the amount is unknown.

In summary then, the depletion or near depletion of the Athenian war fund must have caused many at Athens to doubt the wisdom of prolonging the war. We may also suspect that a lack of funds prevented the Athenians from providing Cleon with a more sizeable force in 422, when he undertook to recapture parts of Thrace (see below). As for Sparta, she was no better off than at the start of the war and her allies were certainly the worse for it.

The Truce: Hope For The Future

In the early spring of 423 a truce (ἐκκένωσις) was agreed to by Athens, Sparta and the Peloponnesians. The immediate reasons for the Truce are given in 4.117 where we are told that the Athenians wanted to

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36.69,76.

37.69. Naupactus is in Locris at the western end of the Gulf of Corinth.

38. Michell, 312.
stall Brasidas so they would have time to make appropriate preparations. The Spartans were anxious to get back their prisoners while Brasidas' luck still held. Furthermore, they believed Athens would be more inclined to come to serious terms once she had experienced a brief respite from the conflict. 39 Before dealing with the text of the agreement we need to take a brief look at Thucydides' historical method.

It was alien for Thucydides and Greek historians in general to take documentary material into their works without first reworking and summarizing that material. 40 Examples of such treatment may be found in 1.45, 2.24 and 3.114. It is noteworthy that most of Thucydides' documents are found in books five and eight, the least polished books of the entire History. There are also many manuscript problems in the texts of all his documents, lending weight to the theory that he never intended to introduce these treaties intact. By placing these materials in his draft copy, however, he would have been in an excellent position to make final revisions in the narrative. As it turned out, the author died before many of these revisions could be made, with the result that we find information in the treaties that is not mentioned elsewhere. The lack of revision in books five and eight is understandable, perhaps, in view of the fact that Thucydides was not in a position to obtain official copies of state papers from the Athenian archives (the "Metroon") until his return from exile in 403. Although this explanation seems plausible, we should not completely

39 The Spartan viewpoint is not completely dealt with here because of the serious textual difficulties in 4.117. See Gomme 3.594-96.

exclude the possibility that Thucydides was toying with the idea of quoting the treaties verbatim before death intervened. Mention has already been made of the lavish care he took in presenting the text of the brief truce of 425 (4.16) when a far briefer statement would have sufficed.

The text of the Truce is found in 4.118-119 and is unique in that it gives us a picture of what is actually taking place. The first section, 4.118.1-10, consists of a series of Spartan and Peloponnesian proposals delivered directly to the Athenian Senate and ultimately, of course, the Athenian Assembly. The use of the third person in reference to the Lacedaemonians suggests that we have the actual minutes of Phaenippus, the secretary. Apparently the Spartan envoys came with full powers in response to an earlier request of the Athenians. It was spring now, and the two governments would have to come to terms quickly if they wished to avoid another year of campaigning.

In the first clause (118.1,2) the Spartans oblige themselves to persuade Boeotia and Phocis to open their borders to Athenians and Athenian allies seeking access to the shrine at Delphi. In 118.3 they agree to investigate a case of fraud against the treasury of the same shrine. Clearly the Spartans are trying to show their good intentions while giving a sense of solemnity to the proceedings. The next paragraph recognizes the status quo and gives the specific terms of the Truce. Athens was to

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41 See note 7.

42 Adolf Kirchoff, Thukydides und sein Urkundenmaterial (Berlin, 1895), 4-5.

43 The ἐκεδέως in paragraph 10 of the manuscript should be changed to the past ἐκεδέωτε or it makes no sense. See Kirchoff 12-13.
hold onto places she had taken during the war, including Coryphasium (Pylos), Cythera, Nisaea, the island of Minoa, an unnamed island, and the territory she then held in Troezen in accordance with her treaty with Troezen. There was to be no communication between any of these places and the Peloponnesians, particularly at Pylos and Megara, where the boundaries are carefully drawn. Clearly the Peloponnesians had the most to lose by any such communication as long as the Athenian navy remained in an offensive posture. They were particularly vulnerable at Megara, because of the democratic faction within the city, and at Pylos, because of its proximity to the Helots of Messenia. In paragraph 118.5 the Spartans and Peloponnesians agree not to use any war ships and promise to restrict themselves to oared vessels of 500T tonnage or less. In paragraph 118.6 all heralds and envoys are guaranteed safe passage so that the two parties may work toward a more permanent peace. There is mention of settling disputes by "arbitration" (προσκέκυκλωμα), though we cannot tell for sure if this refers to third-party arbitration. The next paragraph underscores the importance of maintaining the status quo by making it illegal to receive deserters. This clause was intended to benefit the Spartans since they must have been

44 Near Nisaea, the port of Megara.

45 Possibly the Atalante of the peace treaty of 421 (5.18.7).

46 Athens occupied Methana in the Saronic Gulf in 425 (4.45.2). The treaty is not elsewhere attested to, but we have an Athenian defensive alliance with nearby Halieis from 424/23 (IG 12 87). See Hermann Bengtson, Die Staatsverträge des Altertums (Munich and Berlin, 1962), v.2, #184.

47 This was probably a vessel of fairly small size. Merchant vessels depended on sail and are not included here, though everyone knew they could be used to transport troops. It should be remembered that the Peloponnesians had few warships remaining after the disaster at Pylos.
losing Helots by the thousands. Paragraph 118.8 guarantees the settling of differences by custom and arbitration without force, merely reinforcing what has already been stated in paragraph 118.6. In paragraph 118.9 the Spartan envoys tell the Athenians that any changes to the proposals must be taken up with the Spartan government, preferably by Athenian envoys with "full powers". Generally speaking, this term implied that the envoy so designated had the power to make a binding agreement, provided he did not deviate significantly from his instructions. Finally, the Spartans want the Truce to last for one year. This last clause is in a rather peculiar position, which led Gomme to suspect that it was added after some discussion in the Senate.\textsuperscript{48} For no apparent reason the Truce fails to mention anything about Thrace, though it is clear from later events that Thrace was meant to be included.\textsuperscript{49} Either something has dropped out of the text or the parties concerned did not have a clear enough picture of the situation to make a concise statement on Thrace possible.

The next part of the text consists of the prescript of the Athenian decree authorizing the Truce. The opening words present an immediate problem since the proper formula is εἴθοειν ἵνα βουλὴ καὶ ἱερὰ ἱερεία ("It seems good to the Boule and the people"), not εἴθοειν θὸς ἱερεία, as we have here. The easiest solution, of course, is to put the missing words back into the text. Wilamowitz believed we should keep the wording as it now stands. He suggested that the Senate wanted to consider further negotiations but that Laches, proposer of the decree, harangued the Assembly and persuaded

\textsuperscript{48} Gomme, 3.602.

\textsuperscript{49} 4.122.2.
it to act on its own initiative. There may be some constitutional justification for such a move, though the evidence is slim. In Xenophon Hellenica 7.7.1-4 (369 B.C.) there is the implication that the Assembly could adopt a solution entirely different from the one proposed by the Senate. Andocides indicates that negotiations for a peace treaty with the Spartans in 392/91 B.C. were being conducted in the Assembly, though in his case we note that the Athenians had a special forty-day period of grace. The most serious objection to Wilamowitz's explanation is that the senators were ordinary citizens who were chosen by lot to serve in the upper house for a year. As such they should have better gauged the feelings of the demos than Wilamowitz would have us believe.

The decree then proceeds in normal fashion and gives the tribe of the Prytany, the clerk, the president and the proposer of the decree. At some point the actual wording of the decree ends and is replaced by a summary that is beset with textual problems. As a result, the technicalities of moving from a truce to a peace treaty are not entirely clear.


53 Each of the ten tribes sent fifty men to the Senate during the annual turnover. For one tenth of the year these fifty formed a committee called the Prytany, whose job it was to take over the everyday business of the Senate.

54 See Kirchoff, 16-21 and Gomme, 3.603-4.
The Truce was to begin on 14 Elaphebolion on the Athenian calendar, which Meritt calculates as 24 March.55 Envoys were to be dispatched for discussions aimed at ending the war and the Generals and Prytanes were to call an assembly which would make decisions on peace and the introduction of embassies.56 The Spartan embassy now present was to pour libations before the Assembly. In 119 we are told that the Spartans and Athenians and their respective allies confirmed the Truce with oaths at Sparta on the 12th of Gerastius.57

At the end of our document we find the names of those who actually

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56 The text is very obscure at this point.

57 The 12th of Gerastius (Spartan calendar) was probably the equivalent of the 14th of Elaphebolion. Kirchoff (20-21) believed that these introductory remarks before the signatures belonged to the decree itself, or more properly, a rider such as is found in the first Methone decree of 430 (IG i 57, Meiggs and Lewis #65). The problem here is that we are dealing with Spartan proposals, an Athenian decree and a summary all rolled into one, making it difficult to recognize the individual parts. It is quite possible that the clerk also ran the proposals, decree and rider together on his papyrus. The wording of the introduction is of some interest because it reveals some of the standard vocabulary used in the treaty-making process: "And those who concluded (έρετί έπετο) and ratified (επηνδόμενο) the truce ...." As a rule, ευνόμην refer to formal written agreements. Andrewes and Dover (Gomme's Commentary, 4.24) found 36 instances of the word being used in such a fashion in Thucydides, including the verbal form ευνόησα. It is sometimes difficult to interpret the term συνόν, though it generally refers to a libation poured during the consummation of a formal agreement. In 4.119.3 it appears as a synonym for ἐκεκερητία, though these are probably the words of Thucydides and not the document. In the Alliance of 421 (5.23.4) the word is practically interchangeable with ευνόησα. The distinction that we see here in 4.119.2 may be due to the slight shade of difference that appears in 5.19.1. There we are told that the συνόν begin at Lacedaemonia in the Ephorate of ...." Apparently the word refers not so much to the written agreements as to the actual period to be covered by the agreement.
poured the libations. These names all have their patronymics, a feature typical in Thucydides but unusual for official Athenian inscriptions. Since the Truce does not require any inscription to be made, however, we have no reason to be alarmed. The "signers" included three Spartans, two Corinthians, two Sicyonians, two Megarians, one Epidaurian and three Athenians. The two notable absentees were Elis and Boeotia. The Boeotians had nothing to gain by a truce and were in no way bound by the decisions of the Peloponnesian League. Of the Spartan signatories we know that Philocharidas signed the Peace of 421 (5.19.2) and that he was on good terms with the Athenians, to judge from Thucydides 5.44. Athenaeus and his father, Pericleidas, both have names suggestive of pro-Athenian sympathies. Pericleidas may have been the same one who asked Athens for help against the Helots forty years earlier. Euphamidas of Corinth was a general in 431 and his fellow citizen, Aeneas, was related to Adeimantus, Corinthian admiral during the Persian War and friend of Themistocles. Of the Athenians we know that Nicias was for peace but can say nothing of the opinions of Nicostratus or Autocles. Both of these men shared command with Nicias in the expedition against Cythera. Laches, mover of the decree, signed the Peace of 421 and was an important

58 For a discussion of the signatories see Wilamowitz, 614-15 and Gomme, 3.604-5.
59 Aristophanes, Lysistrata, 1138.
60 2.33; Herodotus, 8.5, 55ff. See text and translation by A.D. Godley (1920-25), 4 vols.
61 4.53.
figure in the peace negotiations. 62 For the moment he was under a cloud for having lost his command in Sicily in 426/25 and may have been subject to harassment by Cleon. 63 Despite the Sicilian debacle, however, Laches seems to have been very adept at personal diplomacy. Besides the Peace, he is mentioned in connection with treaties involving Leontine, Camarina and Halieis. 64

In summary then, the Truce was a sensibly written document that sought to divide the two warring camps. Its principal fault was that it failed to foresee the complications that would quickly develop in Thrace. It also failed to provide precise instructions for the settling of disputes, a shortcoming that would be repeated in the Peace.

Delay For The Present: Scione Revolts

Two days later, before news of the Truce could reach the North Aegean, Scione in the Chalcidice revolted and joined Brasidas. Mende followed suit shortly thereafter. 65 Rather than risk arbitration, the enraged Athenians decided to launch an expedition under the command of Nicias and Nicostratus to retake the rebellious towns. 66 Their efforts were made easier by Brasidas' decision to campaign with Perdiccas off in Macedonia. When he returned he found that Mende had been retaken and that the siege

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625.43.
63Aristophanes, Wasps, 240–42.
646.6,75. On Halieis, see above note 46.
654.120.1, 122.3, 123.
664.122.5.
of Scione had begun.\footnote{4.129.} In the spring of 422 Cleon was given command of a second Thracian expedition and was successful in assaulting Torone and Galepsus, though he failed at Stagirus.\footnote{5.3,6.} There followed the great battle outside of Amphipolis, in which the Athenians lost Cleon and 600 hoplites. Since Brasidas was also killed, the two chief firebrands of the war had been effectively removed from the political and military arena.\footnote{5.7-11,16.} In 5.14-15 we learn that the Athenians were no longer confident of a military victory and that the Spartans were concerned over the failure of Argos to renew her thirty-year treaty. During the winter of 423/22 Tegea and Mantinea had taken up arms against each other and there was a real danger that Argos would intervene and draw Athens into the struggle.\footnote{5.16.} The factor which finally made peace possible, however, was the personal intervention of Nicias and King Pleistoanax.\footnote{4.134.1. These towns were in Arcadia and were members of the Peloponnesian League.} Nicias was eager to preserve his good military record, while Pleistoanax was growing tired of being maligned every time Sparta suffered a new reverse. Plutarch tells us that Nicias decided to act when he noticed that the older and wealthier men with a stake in the land had become more desirous of peace. He took the first step of inviting the Spartans to negotiate and was heeded, thanks to his

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{4.129.}
\item \footnote{5.3,6.}
\item \footnote{5.7-11,16.}
\item \footnote{4.134.1. These towns were in Arcadia and were members of the Peloponnesian League.}
\item \footnote{5.16.}
\end{itemize}
reputation for fairness and his kind treatment of the Spartan prisoners. \textsuperscript{72}

We should also keep in mind that the Truce was still being honored outside of Thrace \textsuperscript{73} and that the document of the Truce furnished a ready-made guideline for discussion.

\textsuperscript{72} Plutarch, \textit{Nicias}, 9.3,4.

\textsuperscript{73} 4.134.1.
CHAPTER III
THE INSTRUMENT OF PEACE

Basis For Peace

Conferences were held during the winter of 422/21 and a determined effort was made to reach common ground. Both sides finally agreed that the underlying principle of the new accord should be the return of all places captured during the war.\(^\text{74}\) At some point the Thebans took part in the discussions and protested that Plataea had come over by agreement and not by force or betrayal. Athens then used the same argument for Nisaea, with the result that neither found mention in the treaty.\(^\text{75}\) In fact, both claims were inaccurate; Plataea surrendered to Sparta while under siege and Nisaea was handed over by a Peloponnesian garrison, not by the Megarians.\(^\text{76}\) Considering the strategic location of Plataea, Sparta could not have afforded its loss to Athens and probably did little to persuade the

\(^{74}\text{5.17.2.}\)

\(^{75}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^{76}\text{3.52, 4.69.3. Steup noted that none of the towns to be returned actually fell by assault and concluded that a large part of 5.17.2 should be expunged from Thucydides as a later interpolation. It should be noted, however, that the instances of Plataea and Nisaea violated the spirit of the agreement. It is true that in 3.52.2 (427 B.C.) the Spartans hesitated to assault Plataea because of what a future peace treaty might require, but this hardly gave them the right to use the same argument six years later. Too many towns had changed hands for such fine distinctions, and all of the negotiators knew that Greek towns rarely fell by direct assault anyway. Thucydides' statement on the basis of the Peace is also supported by Plutarch (Nicias, 10.1) and Diodorus (12.74.5), though these authors add the return of the prisoners as a second prerequisite. See Julius Steup, Thukydideische Studien (Freiburg and Tubingen, 1881), v.1, 56-9. For Diodorus see text and translation of G.H. Oldfather (1933), 12 vols.\)
Thebans to abandon it. Other than this single instance, however, Sparta’s allies must have had little influence on the course of the negotiations. There is no mention of the return of Sollium and Anactorium in the treaty, and it was for that reason that Corinth refused to sign the Peace.77 The Boeotians had nothing to gain from peace with Athens and could not be expected to sign a treaty that involved the loss of Panactum, as the present one did.78 The Megarians, of course, refused to participate without the return of Nisaea. Elis was in the midst of a quarrel with Sparta over a local issue and declined to take part.79 But Sparta could not let the Corinthians, Megarians and Eleans stand in the way now that she felt her national survival was at stake. After obtaining a majority approval from the League, she went ahead and ratified the document that we will now examine in detail.80

General Terms

The text of the Peace is found in Thucydides 5.18 and 5.19 and, for

77 These towns were on the northwest coast of Greece. Sollium was taken by force in 431 (2.30) and Anactorium by treachery in 425 (4.49). Athens relinquished control of these areas to her allies, however. See 5.30.2 on the Corinthian refusal to sign.

78 5.18.7.

79 5.31. In 5.31.5 Elis complained that Sparta was preventing her from regaining control over Lepreum in violation of the formal agreement (τὰς τοιαύτας) whereby each town was to hold everything it held before the war with Athens began. It is likely that the Eleans were referring to some agreement made between the members of the Peloponnesian League at the start of the war, and not to the treaty between Sparta and Athens.

80 It would appear from 1.87, 5.17.2, and 5.30.1 that the votes of Sparta and a majority of the League were necessary for war or peace. In the present case it should be noted that the more important members refused to sign.
the purpose of discussion, may be divided into general terms, specific terms and formal conclusions. The introductory remarks are as follows:

The Athenians and the Lacedaemonians and their respective allies have concluded a treaty and sworn to it state by state upon the following terms:

Στοιουδας έποιησεν το Αθηναίοι και Λακεδαιμόνιοι και οἱ Εύμακοι κατὰ τὰ δε, καὶ Ομοσαν κατὰ Πόλεις.

Since we can find parallels to these opening lines in other treaties, such as the Argive-Athenian Alliance of 420, we can accept them with little difficulty. One might object to Smith's translation, however, since he takes the word "allies" to refer to both sides. A comparison with the rest of the text would seem to indicate the word refers only to what comes immediately before (i.e., the Lacedaemonians). Athens speaks for her dependent allies in the Aegean and her independent allies in the West. Her allies find less mention than those which Sparta represents, since the latter are all independent states. The Peloponnesian allies must have included Sicyon, Phlius, Tegea, Pellene, Epidaurus, Hermione and Troezen. Allies outside the League, like Phocis and Northern Locris, may also have signed. Mantinea was under suspicion at

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81 Texts and translations are from Smith.

82 Kirchoff (29) thought these lines were an interpolation from paragraph nine, since Sparta's more important allies never signed the Peace. Legally speaking, however, all of Sparta's allies were bound by oath to follow the will of the majority of the League and Sparta continued to press for their assent (5.30.1). For the text of the Argive-Athenian Alliance see 5.47. A large portion of the latter survives in IG i" 86+ and, as restored, tends to verify the accuracy of Thucyrides. See Bengtson #193 and Marcus N. Tod, Greek Historical Inscriptions (Oxford, 1933), v.1, #72.

83 Gomme, 3.667. The independent allies would have included Corcyra, Zacynthus and Cephallenia.
the time and may have held off.  

The rest of 5.18.1 and the paragraph following it concern religious matters, as did the first part of the Truce:

With regard to the common sanctuaries, whoever wishes may offer sacrifices and consult the oracles and attend as a deputy according to the customs of the fathers, both by land and by sea, without fear.

5.18.2

The precinct and the temple of Apollo at Delphi and the people of Delphi shall be independent, having their own system of taxation and their own courts of justice, both as regards themselves and their own territory, according to the customs of the fathers.

These remarks are not typical of Greek treaties, though the subject of sanctuaries was obviously turning into a major issue in Spartan-Athenian relations. The second half of 5.18.1 was clearly meant to benefit Athens and her allies, since Delphi and Olympia could only be reached through hostile territory. Although suppliants were supposed to have free access in time of war or peace, their activities must have been severely curtailed during the Archidamian War. The remarks on the town and temple of Delphi in 5.18.2 may have been directed against Phocian interference. Though nominally allies of Sparta, there had always been strong pro-Athenian elements in their midst ready to cause trouble whenever the opportunity arose. This interpretation is supported by the fact that our document as a whole reflects an attitude of give and take on each issue, as one would expect in a treaty between equals.

In the next two paragraphs we learn the length of the Peace and find

84 4.134.

85 1.112.5, 2.9, 3.95.1, 4.76.3. See Kirchoff, 32 and Gomme, 3.667.
certain basic understandings that are typical of many Greek treaties: \footnote{86}{1.115.}

5.18.3

The truce shall be in force for fifty years between the Athenians and their allies and the Lacedaemonians and their allies, without fraud or hurt, both by land and sea.

5.18.4

It shall not be lawful to bear arms with harmful intent, either for the Lacedaemonians and their allies against the Athenians and their allies, or for the Athenians and their allies against the Lacedaemonians and their allies, by any art or device. And if there be any dispute with one another, they shall have recourse to courts and oaths, according as they shall agree.

The choice of fifty years may have been made as a deliberate improvement over the thirty-year period called for by the peace treaty of 445. \footnote{87}{1.115.} The method of settling disputes is left vague and we may suspect that the oversight was intentional. No doubt Athens would have been suspicious of third-party arbitrators from places like Delphi or Olympia. Third-party arbitration does not become a way of life in Greece until the fourth century, when Persia found herself in a position to interfere in Greek affairs. \footnote{88}{For an early example see Meiggs and Lewis #42 and Bengtson #148. The treaty dates to around 450 and involves Argos, Cnossus and Tylissus.}

Specific Terms

Now that the formalities were out of the way it was time to get down to the real business at hand. In their detail and scope, paragraphs five through eight are unique for an ancient document. A large number of difficult problems had to be solved by two equal parties in a manner con-
sistent with the overall aim of the treaty. Gomme believes that paragraph five betrays signs of haste which proved to be the treaty's undoing in the end. 89 Given the complexity of the situation, however, and the inability of either side to enforce its will in the Chalcidice, it is doubtful that any care in composition would have produced a better product. A final revision would have improved the grammar and logical sequence of some portions, but that effort would have been time consuming and hardly worth the effort. When solutions appear to be vague, it can be safely assumed that the negotiators intended them to be so. Sometimes diplomatic skill can be exercised by avoiding unpleasant realities in the hope that they will eventually solve themselves. Of the four paragraphs containing "specific terms", 5.18.5 is the most difficult to interpret and will require most of our attention. In our discussion of textual problems we shall try to limit ourselves to those which significantly affect the meaning of the passage. Paragraph five is concerned with the Thracian area and deals with the return of certain towns to Athenian control:

5.18.5
The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the Athenians. But in the case of cities delivered by the Lacedaemonians to the Athenians, their inhabitants shall be allowed to go away wherever they wish, having their possessions; and these cities, so long as they pay the tribute that was fixed in the time of Aristeides, shall be independent. And it shall not be lawful for the Athenians and their allies, after the ratification of the treaty, to bear arms against the cities to their hurt, so long as they pay the tribute. These cities are Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Stolus, Olynthus, Spartolus. These shall be allies neither of the Lacedaemonians nor of the Athenians; but if the Athenians can persuade these cities it shall be lawful for the Athenians to make them, with their own free

89Gomme, 3.668.
Some sort of classification must have been in the minds of the drafters when paragraph five was written. The towns are listed in order as they stand on the coast, the first being farthest away. Amphipolis, however, stands at the top of the list because of its supreme importance and not because of an accident of geography. Although the wording and punctuation of the first clause closely resembles that of paragraph seven, there are good grounds for altering the text as it now stands. To begin with, what does \( \text{σος \ de \ Πόλεις \ Παρέδωσαν} \) refer to? The verb \( \text{Παρέδωσαν} \) implies that some towns are to be physically handed over to an Athenian garrison, though there is no need to make any sharp distinction between this verb and \( \text{αποδόσης} \). As Steup rightly saw, these towns cannot be the same ones that are enumerated later in the paragraph (Argilus, etc.), since the latter are to be "autonomous" except for the payment of tribute. 90 Panactum cannot be referred to either, since it is found in 5.18.7. Steup also refused to believe that the treaty would be concerned about the freedom of movement from autonomous towns, noting that it would make far better sense

90 Steup, 31-3.
to apply this privilege to Amphipolis and other towns to be surrendered.\textsuperscript{91} In order to deal with these problems he proposed a lacuna after Amphipolis and inserted καὶ Ὀἰσύμης καὶ ᾿Ειν ἄλλην ἔχουσιν ἐν τῇ Ἀθηνίᾳ Ἀκτῆν Πόλιν. This addition would account for Oisyme and the towns of the Acte Peninsula, about which nothing has been heard since their capture by Brasidas in 424/23.\textsuperscript{92} Kirchoff believed they were reconquered by Cleon on his way from Torone to Eion, and cites as evidence the loss of Thyssus from the Athenian Empire in the summer of 421.\textsuperscript{93} The case of Thyssus is hardly conclusive, however, since it could have been returned just as easily in 421 as a result of the Peace.

Our next objective must be to separate the six towns in the last

\textsuperscript{91}This clause was probably inspired by previous agreements made by Brasidas when he took Amphipolis and Lecythus (4.105.2, 4.114). There have been other attempts to explain the problems encountered in 5.18.5, none of them very convincing. Kirchoff thought of changing Παρέδοσαν to Παρέλαβον and translating "...in the case of any cities taken by the Spartans, the Athenians should be allowed to leave, as many as wanted." But a statement like this would be completely unacceptable to Athens, since it would admit that Athenian power was not paramount in the Chalcidice. Kirchoff had also hoped to solve a grammatical problem since Παρέδοσα is in the indicative aorist, as though the event had already taken place. What we expect is άν + the subjunctive. Steup, however, believed we could accept the verb in its present form if we took it as a Futurum Exactum subordinate to an imperative being used as the main verb. He believed the same could hold true for ἡτέταλς or ἰπωκαὶ ἀφε δειτο later in the paragraph. This explanation is difficult to accept without substantial epigraphical evidence. Clearly there are serious problems in 5.18.5 that may never be resolved. See Kirchoff, 38-9, Gomme, 3.671-72 and Steup 37.

\textsuperscript{92}4.107, 4.109. These towns may also be referred to in 5.35.2, where we are told that Sparta has failed to hand over Amphipolis and "other places" and has failed to force her allies in Thrace to accept the treaty. Obviously these "other places" are distinct from the six Thracian allies mentioned in 5.18.5.

\textsuperscript{93}5.3.6, 5.35.1; Kirchoff, 42-44.
part of the paragraph from what goes before. Steup adopted the simple expedient of changing *Tóωδε Πόλεις* to *Tóωδε ἔλας*, an alteration that would effectively begin a new clause and a new category of towns. The *ἐπειδὴ ...ἐγένετο* clause is best taken with *ἀποδοῦσιν τοῖς Φόροις* only, so that Athens could not demand back-payment. Gomme would allow Athens to collect arrears as far back as the the Truce of 423, but it is highly improbable that the Peace would have mentioned another document without making the reference perfectly clear.

Paragraph five was in effect a compromise. Athens promised to refrain from bearing arms against the six towns as long as they paid the tribute. Sparta, for her part, recognized Athenian suzerainty and financial interests in the Chalcidice. Of the six towns, Argilus, Stagirus and Acanthus had come over to Brasidas and received strong obligations from Sparta. Stolus, Olynthus and Spartolus had revolted from Athens before the war and had no intention of letting any Athenian garrisons within their walls. It must have appeared to many as if Sparta were abandoning her northern allies, but Spartolus and Olynthus had held their own during the war and Sparta knew they could not be retaken

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94 Steup, 37. Note that Smith's translation does not attempt to make this distinction.

95 Gomme, 3.672.

96 4.85-88, 103.


98 Corinth presented it as a desertion and the Chalcidians must have heartily agreed. In actuality, however, she was only using this as an excuse. See 5.30.2.
without a costly siege. She had to allow Athens the theoretical right to use force in collecting the tribute, however, since she could not guarantee payment herself. The Athenian negotiators, realizing their city was in no position to mount an immediate offensive in the Chalcidice, made sure there was enough flexibility in the wording of the document to cover future contingencies. Amphipolis, on the other hand, was occupied by a Peloponnesian garrison and could be handed over directly to an Athenian commander. Athens' demand for tribute was made with a view to confirming her overlordship in Thrace, not replenishing her treasury; the actual sums involved amounted to no more than a paltry 10T.99 The reference to the tribute of Aristeides was probably meant to be understood as the pre-war assessment and not literally the assessment of 478. No doubt our Spartan negotiators were concerned that Athens might try to collect on the basis of the decree passed in 425, when many towns of the Empire had their payments doubled or tripled.100

The final clause in paragraph five gives our six towns the right to

99Ironically, none of the surviving lists tell us what these towns were expected to pay after the Peace was signed in 421. It is doubtful that they paid anything at all, since Athens was not able to bring Olynthus or Spartolus to heal. Argilus paid 10 1/2T in 454-53 but only 1000 drachmae (1/6T) by 433, possibly as a consequence of the founding of Amphipolis in 437 and the diversion of trade to that center. Olynthus paid 2T after 454-53 and Acanthus paid 3T as of 446-45 when it was reduced from 5T. Spartolus had its assessment increased in 434-33 from 2T to 3T as Athens sought to tighten her control of the Bottic region. Scolus (Stolici of the tribute lists) paid between 2/3T and 1T before it revolted in 432. Stagirus paid the nominal sum of 1000dr. since 454-53. See ATL 3.20, 26, 319, 348 and Gomme 1.211, 277, 3.669.

100The lowering of the tribute for Sparta's former allies has generated some controversy over Athenian financial policy for the period following the signing of peace. See appendix for a brief discussion.
form alliances with Athens, if they so desire. Gomme sees something devious in the use of terms like "persuade" and "free will" and believes that Sparta allowed the Athenians to put these ambiguous terms in the text to mask the fact that she no longer had any interest in Thrace.¹⁰¹ But one might just as easily say that the words were carefully and deliberately chosen by Sparta to prevent Athens from justifying the use of force in the near future. Kirchoff believed the towns had the right to join either side in theory, but that it was in Athenian interests to have one of the options clearly stated. Given Macedonian interests in the area, the towns might well find a new alliance with their former rulers desirable.¹⁰² What he failed to realize, however, was that paragraph five deals with the Spartan evacuation of Thrace and the end of Spartan interference in Athenian spheres of influence. Athens could not allow the Chalcidians the right of forming alliances with a potential enemy. Athens herself had taken advantage of just such a loophole in the Thirty-Year Peace when she allied herself with Corcyra in 433.¹⁰³ She would not give Sparta the same opportunity in 421.¹⁰⁴

The next paragraph concerns the disposition of certain Chalcidian towns and reads as follows:

101 Gomme, 3.670.
102 Kirchoff, 45.
103 1.35, 44, 45, 53, 87.
104 Steup suspected that the final clause was added by the Athenians during a later stage of the negotiations. As it stands, the six towns are found in the middle of the paragraph in an illogical position. See Steup 40.
5.18.6

The Meicybernaeans, Sanaeans and Singians shall dwell in their own towns on the same terms as [κοινα] the Olynthians and Acanthians.

For some reason not immediately apparent in the text, these three towns were singled out for special treatment and were not included with the other Chalcidian towns in paragraph five. Of the three towns, Sane is known to have repelled an attack by Brasidas in 424/23. The other two have not been mentioned previously by Thucydides, but are known to have paid the nominal sum of 10dr. each in 425-24 and 422-21. This sum suggests that most of the inhabitants of Meicyberna and Singus abandoned their homes during the revolt and synoecismus of Olynthus in 432. Steup reasoned that the Meicybernaeans finally grew tired of Olynthus and reestablished their town shortly before or after the signing of peace. To support his claim he drew attention to 5.39.1, where we are told that their town was important enough to hold an Athenian garrison when it was seized by Olynthus in the winter of 421/20. The paragraph has generally been interpreted as an Athenian demand that Meicyberna and Singus be left independent of Olynthus and that Sane be left independent of Acanthus in the same way that Olynthus and Acanthus are to be independent of Athens. It is difficult to make the Greek literally say that, but cir-

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105 4.109.
106 1.58.2; Gomme 3.672.
107 5.39.1; Steup, 47.
108 Steup, 41-3; Kirchoff, 48-9; Gomme, 3.672-73; Wilamowitz, "Das Bundnis zwischen Sparta und Athen," SBA, v.43 (1919), 939. ATL takes the paragraph more literally and surmises that the three towns are to be given independence from Athens. It is hard to believe, however, that Athens would have agreed to such a concession. See ATL 3.90.
cumstances point to such an interpretation. When the three were taken into the Empire in 445 they were probably dependents of the two larger towns. It had always been Athenian policy to discourage her allies from exercising suzerainty over weaker neighbors, especially where seaports were involved. We are not told the relationship that our three towns were to have with the Empire since such a statement would have been unnecessary; Athens controlled the sea and everything on it. Sane had never left the Empire and Mecyberna may have already returned by the time peace was made. The order in which the towns are given may not be particularly important, but it is worth noting that Mecyberna was the most vulnerable to attack and the most valuable to Athens, in case fighting should break out again. Singos, on the other hand, was geographically the least vulnerable.

The next paragraph includes a rather motley assortment of towns and prisoners that were to be returned or exchanged. Steup and Kirchoff were both bothered by the illogical organization of 5.18.7 and the necessity of inferring Athens as the subject of the long middle portion. This lack of polish hardly justifies their revision of the text, however. The paragraph reads as follows:

5.18.7
The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall restore Panactum to the Athenians. The Athenians shall restore to the Lacedaemonians Coryphasium, Cythera, Methana, Pteleum and Atalante; also they shall set at liberty the Lacedaemonian captives who are in the public prison at Athens or in public prison anywhere else that

\[109\] The fact that both Sane and Acanthus were Andrian colonies (4.84, 109) lends weight to this theory.

\[110\] Steup, 59-60; Kirchoff, 54.
the Athenians hold sway, and the men of the Peloponnesus who are being besieged in Scione, and all besides who are allies of the Lacedaemonians in Scione, and those who Brasidas sent into the place, as likewise any of the allies of the Lacedaemonians who are in the public prison in Athens, or in public prison anywhere else that the Athenians have sway. In like manner the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall restore whomsoever they have of the Athenians and their allies.

The first two clauses are primarily concerned with the return of coastal towns that had been seized by Athens during seaborne operations in central and southern Greece. The return of Panactum to Athens was placed first, either to maintain continuity with the previous paragraph, or to show deference to the Athenians. Panactum was a fortified town on the Boeotian border that was seized by treachery in the summer of 422. Since it was presently in Boeotian hands, its disposition would prove to be a source of contention in the near future. Coryphasium, Methana and Cythera have already been mentioned in connection with the Truce. Atalante was an uninhabited island off the coast of Northern Locris that was occupied by Athens in 431 as a protection against pirates. Pteleon is not mentioned elsewhere by Thucydides. There is a town by that name on the coast of Achaia Phthiotis and a lesser known one in Triphylia, north of Messenia. If we wish to preserve the geographical succession, however, our Pteleon must be placed somewhere between Methana and Atalante. There is a Pteleum in Boeotia southeast of Thebes that would meet this requirement, but Adcock doubts the Athenians would have occupied this town after the loss of

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111 5.3.5. For a discussion of its exact location see Gomme, 3.633.

112 2.32.
Panactum. 113

The remainder of paragraph seven is devoted to the return of prisoners, particularly those held by the Athenians. The Spartan envoys now began to write down every conceivable type of prisoner that the enemy might have or would shortly have in jail. The length, detail and redundancy of this section ably demonstrates their concern over a very touchy subject. Not only did Spartans and Peloponnesian allies have to be accounted for, there were also the men of Brasidas and his Chalcidian allies. It was clear that Scione would soon fall and that nothing could be done to save face in that matter. Inside, however, were the survivors of Polydamidas' original force of 500 Peloponnesians and 300 Chalcidians. 114 Sparta now demanded and obtained their release, though we cannot be certain if they were allowed to evacuate before the town actually capitulated. She also wanted to get back the troops of Brasidas that had been taken prisoner when Torone fell. 115 It is interesting to note that prisoners from places like Corinth and Megara have to be understood from the phrase "any of the allies", as if they counted for very little in the eyes of Sparta and her negotiating team. The return of prisoners held by the League also receives brief notice, since their repatriation was not very high on Athens' list of priorities.

The next paragraph was added at the insistence of Athens, either to

113 For a discussion of the various possibilities see F.E. Adcock, Cambridge Ancient History (Cambridge, 1927), v.5, 251-52, n.1.

114 4.123, 131.

115 5.3.
clarify the provisions just covered or to counter specific Spartan proposals. The passage reads as follows:

5.18.8
As to Scione, Torone, Sermyle or any other city which the Athenians hold, the Athenians shall determine about these and the other cities as they may think best.

It is possible that the Spartans tried to secure better terms for the Toroneans and Scioneans, though obviously without much success. As it turned out, the Toroneans were later exchanged for Athenians or Athenian sympathizers by private agreement with the Chalcidians. The unfortunate citizens of Scione, on the other hand, were executed by decree as soon as their town fell. The third town, Sermyle, drops from sight in Thucydides following an attack by Aristeus the Corinthian in 432. Since the name also disappears from the tribute lists, Gomme assumes that Aristeus or the Chalcidians took control of the place and that the Athenians later recaptured it or were on the point of recapturing it in March of 421. Apart from this explanation, Sermyle's association with the other two places makes no sense. For "any other city" Gomme suggests we understand the other

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116 Kirchoff, 59.
117 A better translation of εξοικείωσι might be "hold by conquest".
118 5.3.
119 4.122.6, 5.32.1. The decree had been passed in 423.
120 1.65.2.
121 Gomme, 3.675.
towns that had been retaken by Athens, like Galepsus and Mende.\footnote{122}{Ibid.} Most of the attention in our treaty seems to be focused on those towns which Athens has not yet recaptured, so it is not surprising that 5.18.8 avoids naming places that are no longer of major concern.

The last part of the paragraph is of some importance since it clearly recognizes Athens' right to rule her Empire as she saw fit.\footnote{123}{Wilamowitz, "Bundnis," 940.} Sparta's prestige could not have been helped by such an admission on her part, though it was probably not the intention of the Athenian negotiators to damage her reputation. We will return to the subject of prestige in the final conclusions of this paper, when we consider the war aims and achievements of the two antagonists.

**Formal Conclusions**

Now that the negotiations were over, there remained the business of making the agreement official. First came the requirements for taking the oath:

5.18.9

The Athenians shall bind themselves by oaths with the Lacedaemonians and their allies, city by city [κατὰ Πολείς]; and either party [ἐκάτεροι] shall swear its customary oath in the form that is most binding, seventeen men representing each city. The oath shall be as follows: "I will abide by this agreement [ἡρθήκα] and this treaty [οἰνωδία] justly and without deceit." For the Lacedaemonians and their allies there shall be an oath, in the same terms, with the
Athenians. And both parties shall renew the oath year by year.

Although each state might use a different invocation formula, they all had to recite the same words in their promise to abide by the treaty. The number seventeen seems unusual. If it is of Spartan origin, it may be the result of having as signatories two kings, five Ephors and a group of ten. Since the number ten is not an unusual number, there is no serious objection. A second problem of interpretation arises from the method of oath taking. Gomme assumes that Athenian representatives were to go to each city of the League to take the oath. He believes the term "either party" refers to each of the two parties in turn—Athens and Sparta, Athens and Sicyon, etc. The document at hand would be a copy of the agreement between Athens and Sparta, as the signatures indicate. Steup had earlier rejected such an explanation, thinking it inconceivable that Athens would have bound herself by oaths to each and every member of the League. He also noted that 5.47.10 of the Argive-Athenian Alliance could not be used to support such a theory, since that passage refers only to the renewal process, not the original ratification. Steup would solve the apparent problem by simply rearranging the elements of the text to give a more desirable translation and a more logical grouping of events. He would

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124 Kirchoff, 63-4. The Ephors were important magistrates in the Spartan state who exercised considerable authority in foreign affairs. Ambassadors could not enter the country or present proposals to the Assembly without permission from the Ephorate, according to Xenophon Hellenica 2.2.13 (405 B.C.) and 5.2.11 (383 B.C.). If Kirchoff's theory is correct, we may assume that the remaining ten men constituted a special committee from the Spartan Senate. For the Ephorate see also Michell, 126-31.

125 Gomme, 3.676.
also add another row of signatures at the bottom of the document. Unfortunately, we cannot simply change the text to suit our interpretation. It is hard to believe, though, that Athens intended to send a commission of seventeen men around to every sovereign state in the League to exchange oaths with seventeen counterparts. If that were true, they would have needed a different contract for each town, since our copy refers only to inscriptions in Athens and Sparta and to dates on their respective calendars. The oaths of the League representatives in Sparta, whatever their number might be, would serve her purpose equally well. Perhaps the Athenians were satisfied with the Spartan oaths for the moment and did not realize that a serious breach was developing within the League. The major flaw of this counterargument is that we do not find the signatures of Sicyon and Epidaurus, though they were important enough to be represented in the Truce.

The last part of 5.18.9 concerns the renewing of oaths. Since this act was to be performed annually, it is clear that each side distrusted the fickleness of the other. New magistrates came to power every year

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126 Steup, 65-6, 70-1.

127 In 5.22.1,2 we are told that Sparta’s allies were in Sparta for the purpose of accepting the Peace which the majority had already approved in 5.17.2.

128 We know all of our signatories are Spartan because they appear again when the Alliance is made. It is possible that the Athenian clerk is compiling his list from those actually present in Athens during an early stage of the ratification, and that the inscription is made from this list. One might object, however, that the five Ephors and two kings would not have come to Athens before the Peace was ratified in Sparta.

129 The Argive-Athenian Alliance, by contrast, was to be renewed every four years (5.47.10).
in both Sparta and Athens, and with them could come a change of heart.

In Athens the situation was even more unstable, since the mood of the people mattered more than the attitudes of the magistrates. The unknown author of the Constitution of the Athenians, sometimes affectionately known as the "Old Oligarch", left this stinging rebuke of his fellow countrymen sometime in the late fifth or early fourth century:

"But when the people is making agreements, it is possible for it to blame it on the individual person who has made the proposal or taken the vote, and for the others to protest, "I was not present, and do not like it either", carryings which, one is told, have been made by a well-attended general assembly. And if it does not suit the people that this comes into force, they invent innumerable pretexts for omitting to do what they do not wish."

The Athenian Assembly rarely, if ever, bound itself by oaths. The closest example of such an oath is found in the treaty with Chalcis in 446-45, where the Senate and a full panel of 6000 jurors swear in. In the alliance with Argos the Athenian Senate and "home magistrates" (ἐνδημοῖς ἀρχαῖς) take the oath, again indicating the superior confidence these two cities had in each other.

Paragraph ten concerns the official inscriptions that are a part of all Greek peace treaties:

5.18.10
They shall erect pillars at Olympia, Delphi, the Isthmus, and on

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130 The Constitution of the Athenians, Hartvig Frisch, ed. (Copenhagen, 1942), translated from the Danish by Niels Haisland, 29 (2.17). The translation unfortunately leaves something to be desired.

131 IG ii² 39. See Meiggs and Lewis, #52 and Bengtson, #155.

132 These would have included the Archons, treasurers, auditors and possibly the ἐνδημοῖς created by Cleisthenes to take care of local affairs and naval armament in the demes. See Aristotle, Constitution, 21.5.
the Acropolis at Athens, and at Lacedaemon in the temple of Apollo of Amyclae.133

Of the three panhellenic shrines, two were under the control of League members who refused to sign the Peace. We may suspect that no attempt was made to erect a pillar at the Isthmus in view of the hostility of Corinth and Megara. The inscription at Athens may be referred to in 5.56.3, though the reference might just as easily be to the Alliance.

The next paragraph was clearly designed to give some flexibility to the document and some freedom of action to the participants:

5.18.11
If either party forgets anything about any matter whatsoever, it shall be consistent with their oath for both, by means of fair discussion, to make a change [μεταβεβαία] at any point where it may seem good to both parties, the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians.

Once again Spartan and Athenian supremacy over their respective spheres of influence is taken for granted. In the Alliance it is more specifically stated that both parties may agree to add or subtract anything, though the present clause admits of the same interpretation.134 The rest of the Peloponnesians found this clause particularly galling since they were not only excluded from proposing changes, but might prove to be the victims of any such changes.135 Besides, the provision was clearly at variance with the principle of majority rule exercised by the League Congress on questions of war and peace.136 Gomme thinks we may have an example of one such

133 Amyclae was a few miles south of Sparta.
134 5.23.6.
135 5.29.2. The words are from the Alliance, but the Peace is meant.
136 See footnote 80.
"change" in 5.35.3, where it is agreed that those who continue to reject the Peace after a certain date would become enemies of both Athens and Sparta. The clause is also of some interest in that it probably represents a new development in diplomatics. Further examples of this clause are found in the Argive-Athenian Alliance of 420 and the Athenian alliance with Perdiccas which dates to 423/22. The amateur diplomats of the late 420's knew that events were moving at a rapid pace and that problems could quickly materialize and wreck new agreements before they had a chance to bear fruit. It was hoped that a new flexibility would give their efforts a better chance of success.

The next section of the treaty gives the date on which the Peace is to take effect:

5.19.1
The treaty begins at Lacedaemon in the ephorate of Pleistolas, on the fourth day from the end of the month Artemisium, and at Athens in the archonship of Alcaeus, on the sixth day from the end of the month Elaphebolion.

In 5.20.1, however, we learn that the treaty was concluded immediately after (Eutous) the City Dionysia, which ended on the thirteenth of Elaphebolion. Since the Truce of 423 was signed on the fourteenth of Elaphebolion. For a discussion of the calendar and the possible date see Gomme 3.709-13. He believes that 25 Elaphebolion fell on March twelfth for the year 421, as opposed to Meritt, who chose April eleventh (Athenian Financial Documents, 178). The choice of dates involves a difficult series of calculations and a detailed consideration of the length of the war as given in 5.26.
Elaphebolion, it is safe to assume that the final negotiations and preliminary ratification of the Peace also took place at Athens during a regular meeting of the Assembly. The final ratification ("city by city") probably took place in Sparta, as already noted. The lapse in time between the signing of the agreement and the actual beginning of the Peace could have been as long as twelve days, depending on our interpretation of εὐθὺς above. The best explanation of the long delay is that the negotiators wanted to allow time for final ratification and dissemination of the treaty. Otherwise, there might be a recurrence of the situation that upset the Truce in 423.\textsuperscript{141} Once again the negotiators appear to be taking practical steps to ensure the success of the new accord.\textsuperscript{142}

We now come to the names of those who took the oath.\textsuperscript{143} A basic assumption made by Andrewes and Lewis is that a man with a known public career is more likely to be found among the signatories than one who is relatively unknown. The first two names, Pleistoanax and Agis, are missing in the manuscripts but can be safely restored from the signatures of the Alliance in 5.24.1. As kings their names rightfully belong at the top of the list. They are followed by Pleistolas, who has just been named Eponymous Ephor in the preceding sentence. The next four names probably

\textsuperscript{141}Steup, 70. See also Gomme 3.678 and p.21 above.

\textsuperscript{142}Steup's only other example of an "effective date" is from the fourth century (CIG 193). It may be presumptuous, however, to argue that we are dealing with a new technique in 5.19.1 without a more thorough investigation of fifth century treaties.

belong to the four remaining Ephors, as Kirchoff had guessed. 144 The last ten Spartans probably belonged to a special committee. In 418 we find the Spartans appointing another committee of ten, this time to keep an eye on Agis. 145 Diodorus speaks of a board of ten in connection with the Peace, though he may have been confused in placing them after the time of ratification. If his group is the same one that helped to negotiate the settlement, it must be their names that appear on our list in 5.19.2. 146 Of these we know that Ischagoras commanded the reinforcements sent to Brasidas in 423 and that Philocharidas signed the Truce of 423. 147 We may suspect that Tellis was the father of Brasidas and that he was not kindly disposed toward the Peace. 148 Of the Athenians, Lampon was a well known religious figure 149 and Isthmionicus, no doubt, a famous victor of the Isthmian Games. Nicias, Laches and Euthydemus were probably serving as active generals for 422-21, and there is no reason to assume otherwise. 150 We recall that the Truce was also signed by three generals and that one of them was Nicias. Andrewes and Lewis believe the next ten individuals form

144 See above p.41.
145 5.63.4.
146 Diodorus, 12.75.4; Andrewes and Lewis, 177.
147 4.132. As mentioned previously, Philocharidas was chosen because of his pro-Athenian leanings (5.44.3).
148 2.25.2.
149 Plutarch, Pericles, 6.
150 Andrewes and Lewis, 180. Euthydemus appears as a general on IG i² 302 (418-17 B.C.). We know none of the names for 422-21 (except for Cleon), but Nicias and Laches are certainly good possibilities in view of their records.
a counterpart to the Spartan board of ten and believe they can detect a tribal series. The first of this group, Procles, may have been one of the secretaries of the Senate in 421-20. He is followed by Pythodorus, best identified as the chairman of the treasurers of Athena in 418-17 and general in 414. Hagnon, founder of Amphipolis (437), was still serving as a general as late as 429. We have a comic poet by the name of Myrtilus and a general by the name of Thrasycles (412-411). Theagenes may have been the man elected to investigate Pylos with Cleon in 425. Aristocrates was wealthy enough to have been a choremus at one time and was chosen as a general in 413-412. The next two, Iolcius and Timocrates, are not identifiable. The last of the ten, Leon, may have been a general for the year 439-38, but the evidence is slight. Andrewes and Lewis conclude that "the board as a whole was composed of sound and trustworthy men, not specially committed to war or peace, and not the leading

151 Ibid., 177. The tribal identifications are important for establishing the validity of their argument, but need not concern us here. The "discovery" of such a committee is not at all surprising, since it would be in keeping with the principles and organization of the democracy set up by Cleisthenes.

152 IG i² 82, 84.
153 IG i² 315; Thucydides 6.105.2.
154 2.95, 4.102.
155 8.15.
156 4.27.3.
157 IG i² 772; Thucydides 8.9.2.
politicians of the time."¹⁵⁸  Leon would have represented age and experience, while Pythodorus and Aristocrates would have stood for property and wealth; Hagnon would have represented all of those characteristics. Pythodorus, Thrasyycles and Aristocrates were all younger men, but were due to reach the office of general within ten years. Procles and Theagenes were already public figures, though their affiliations are unknown.

Now that the religious, athletic, military and tribal representatives had been picked, two additional names were needed to bring the total to seventeen. Andrewes and Lewis suggest that the speaker of the Assembly asked for two more and was given Lamachus and Demosthenes. In view of Ἀρχανίας 572ff. and other passages in Aristophanes, it is doubtful that Lamachus was a friend of peace. The loss of ten ships near Heraclea in 424 probably kept him off the board of generals till the Sicilian adventure.¹⁵⁹  Demosthenes was suffering from a similar loss of prestige, thanks to the Boeotian disaster of 424 and a minor defeat at Sicyon shortly thereafter.¹⁶⁰  One can hardly expect disgraced generals to be eager for an end to the war while there was still hope for another command and a brilliant victory. It is likely that the Assembly chose these two men for their hostility toward Sparta, thinking they would be more inclined to protect Athenian interests. This inordinate desire for symmetry and balance is found again in the appointment of the commanders for the Sicilian expedi-

¹⁵⁸ Andrewes and Lewis, 180.
¹⁵⁹ 4.75-76, 6.8.
¹⁶⁰ 4.101.
tion of 415. Their presence would also serve the purpose of giving Athens' friends and enemies an impression of strength and unity.

161 6.8-26.
CHAPTER IV
THE PEACE IN ACTION

Immediate Consequences

The Spartans quickly freed all their prisoners and sent three envoys to Thrace to order the surrender of Amphipolis and a general acceptance of the Peace.\(^{162}\) The Chalcidians refused to cooperate and Clearidas, the Spartan commander at Amphipolis, informed the envoys that he was in no position to surrender the town in the face of popular resistance. When he returned to Sparta to defend his actions he was ordered to surrender the town or evacuate, a clear violation of the treaty.\(^{163}\) Meanwhile, the allied representatives who refused to sign the treaty were still at Sparta, demanding that a better treaty be made.\(^{164}\) The Spartan government finally lost patience and dismissed them. It was now obvious that the allies were prepared to cause trouble and that some of them might join with the Athenians or the Argives. Worse yet, the Athenians would be furious when they found out about Amphipolis and might go so far as to annul the Peace and keep the prisoners. If she were held by the closer bonds of an alliance, however, these unpleasant alternatives might be avoided. Since Athenian represent-

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\(^{162}\) 5.21. Thucydides says that the lot fell to the Spartans to make first restitution. This is hard to believe. It is more likely that the Athenians insisted they do so. Plutarch tells us in *Nicías* 10 that Nicías arranged the lot by bribery, but this was based on the comments of an untrustworthy historian by the name of Theophrastus.

\(^{163}\) 5.21.

\(^{164}\) 5.22.1. The text of 5.22 is plagued by textual problems and the tortuous attempts of scholars to solve them. See Gomme 3.691-92.
atives were already present at Sparta, a conference was held and oaths were exchanged. It seems best to assume that the seventeen Athenians who came to Sparta to ratify the Peace were still in town, since it is they who sign the Alliance. If the Athenian Assembly had already given them permission to make an alliance, they were in a position to exercise their "full powers". If not, they would have found it necessary to send back to Athens to obtain the needed consent.

Document of the Spartan-Athenian Alliance

The text of the alliance is given in 5.23 and 24 and begins as follows:

5.23.1
The Lacedaemonians and Athenians shall be allies [έκβολοι] for fifty years on the following conditions: If any enemy invade the territory of the Lacedaemonians and be doing them harm, the Athenians shall help the Lacedaemonians in whatever way they can most effectively, with all their might; but if the enemy, after ravaging the country, shall have departed, that city shall be the enemy of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, and shall suffer at the hands of both, and neither city shall make peace with it without the other. These conditions shall be observed honestly, zealously, and without fraud.

Paragraph 5.23.2 is an exact duplicate of the one above, except that the roles of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians are reversed. There is nothing unusual in these provisions for a Greek defensive alliance. Both sides are obliged to help the other in case of an invasion and to treat the

165 5.22.2-3. In 5.24.2 we are told that the Alliance was made "not long after" the treaty. According to Plutarch Nicias 10 the Athenians were persuaded by Nicias to make the Alliance in order to help stabilize the Peace. But what is Nicias doing back in Athens if he is supposed to be in Sparta? Did he leave town with the proposal or before the proposal was made? Does Nicias actually realize what is happening between Sparta and her allies? Unfortunately, Plutarch and Theophrastus raise too many questions and furnish too few answers.
invader as an enemy until peace is mutually agreed on by the contracting parties. An unexpected obligation is incurred, however, in the next provision.

5.23.3
If there shall be an insurrection of slaves, the Athenians shall aid the Lacedaemonians with all their might, to the utmost of their power.

This promise brings to mind the assistance brought to Sparta in the days of Cimon. Since we hear nothing of slave revolts among the Athenians during the Archidamian War, there is no reason to expect a corresponding promise from the Spartans. The passage is interesting in that it reveals the weakness of Sparta and the influence of Nicias. Perhaps Plutarch was right in attributing the success of Sparta's appeal to the persuasive arguments of the chief Athenian negotiator.

The next clause concerns the taking of oaths:

5.23.4
These articles shall be sworn to by the same persons who swore the other treaty on both sides. They shall be renewed every year, the Lacedaemonians going to Athens at the Dionysia, the Athenians to Lacedaemon at the Hyacinthia.

The reason for insisting on the same signatures is not readily apparent. One may suspect, however, that Sparta is trying to enhance the Alliance by making it look like an extension of the Peace. If some of the more influential Athenians had already left for home, she would have been particu-

166. 1.102, 3.54; Plutarch, Cimon, 14-17.
167. Gomme, 3.693.
168. See note 165.
larily eager to see them return before any new ratification took place.  

The last two paragraphs make provision for official inscriptions and amendments. Paragraph six closely resembles paragraph eleven of the Peace and reads as follows:

5.23.6

If it shall seem good to the Lacedaemonians and Athenians to add or take away anything pertaining to the alliance, it shall be consistent with the oaths of both to do whatever may seem good to both.

Sparta's allies had every reason to fear this last clause, since the defensive alliance could now be turned into an offensive one on short notice. Eduard Meyer believed it was this potential threat that finally drove Corinth into the arms of Argos. In 5.27.2 we find her encouraging Argos to take the hegemony before Sparta and Athens enslave the whole Peloponnesus.

Before leaving the document of the Alliance it will be necessary to touch on some points of controversy that affect our understanding of the treaty. The first problem of interpretation concerns the release of the prisoners. In chapter 24, immediately after the signatures and the conclusion of the Alliance, we learn that Athens returned all the men she had captured from Sphacteria. As a result, we are left with the impression that the Alliance had something to do with their release, though there has been no indication that any such obligation existed. Kirchoff thought the two events were completely unrelated, despite the way the author chose to combine his material. He suggested a reconsideration of the terms of the

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169 This clause lends some weight to the implication in Plutarch that Nicias is now back in Athens where he can best influence the course of events. Whether he returned to Athens with the Spartan proposals or is just now learning of them makes little difference.

170 E. Meyer, Forschungen, 2.293 and Geschichte, 4.181.
Peace and proposed that the prisoners were to be released by both sides in turn, followed by the surrender of places held by the Peloponnesians.\textsuperscript{171} This explanation overlooks the fact that Spartan prisoners in Athenian jails were worth a great deal more than Athenian prisoners in Spartan jails. As a minimum, Athens should have held out for the return of Amphipolis. Perhaps Gomme is right in seeing the incident as a generous gesture on the part of Nicias, a gesture that would cost him prestige when his countrymen repented of their generosity.\textsuperscript{172} Then again, Nicias may have concluded that the best way to enforce the Peace was to bolster Sparta's morale as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{173}

The second point of controversy concerns the basic nature of the Alliance. The following passages must be considered:

5.35.3

...nor had they [the Spartans] made their allies in Thrace accept the [peace] treaty, nor the Boeotians, nor the Corinthians, though they continually professed that they would join the Athenians in coercing these states if they were unwilling; and they proposed dates, without making a written agreement, on which those who did not accede to the treaty were to be enemies of both.

5.39.3

But the Boeotians refused to give them up [Panactum and the Athenian prisoners], unless they [Sparta] would make a separate alliance with them just as with the Athenians. Now the Lacedaemonians knew that they would thereby be wronging the Athenians, inasmuch as it was stipulated [ἐκπομένων] not to make either peace or war with anyone without mutual consent....

\textsuperscript{171}Kirchoff, 173-4.

\textsuperscript{172}Gomme 3.696; Thucydides 5.35.4. The Spartans must have received firm assurances on the release of their men before they gave Clearidas the option of evacuating Amphipolis.

\textsuperscript{173}See note 165 on Plutarch.
5.42.2.
...the Athenians were very indignant, thinking that they were wronged by the Lacedaemonians, both in the demolition of Panactum, which ought to have been restored to them intact, and because they heard that the Lacedaemonians had made a separate alliance with the Boeotians, although they had said before that they would join in coercing any that did not accept the treaty.

5.46.2.
So he [Nicias] persuaded them [the Athenians] to send envoys, himself being one, to urge the Lacedaemonians, if they had any just intentions, to restore Panactum intact and Amphipolis, and to give up the alliance with the Boeotians - unless these should accede to the treaty - in accordance with the stipulation which had been arrived at [ενθέοντο] that neither should enter into an agreement with any third party without the consent of the other. The ambassadors were instructed also to say that, if the Athenians had wished to do wrong, they would already have made the Argives allies, as their envoys were present for that very purpose.

In both 5.39.3 and 5.46.2 there is reference to an agreement which obliged the two parties to make war and peace only by mutual consent. Since no such agreement is found in the document at hand, we must try to discover the circumstances under which it was made. It will prove useful to begin our inquiry by examining other treaties that are associated with a similar "war and peace" clause. In so doing we shall attempt to distinguish between different types of alliances in the hope of better understanding the one just studied.

To begin with, we need some basis of classification. In 418 B.C. the Spartans and Argives concluded an alliance which contains a provision for joint expeditions.\textsuperscript{174} The presence or absence of such a provision seems to furnish the best criterion for separating the offensive alliances from the more innocent defensive variety. Shortly thereafter, the Argives and

\textsuperscript{174} 5.79.3.
Spartans went a step further and voted to make peace and war by common consent. Obviously this decision involved more than just a promise to treat invaders as common enemies, since that was the basic underlying assumption of all Greek alliances. The Argive-Athenian alliance of 420 also allowed for joint operations, but had no clause concerning peace and war other than the standard proviso. A closer examination, however, reveals that such an agreement must have existed. In 5.48.2 we are told that the Corinthians acceded to the first Argive coalition because it was defensive and only obligated its members to "help one another". She refused to join the second alliance, however, since it involved making joint expeditions and making peace and war by common agreement. The implication is that the third Argive alliance, which Corinth also refused to join, had similar provisions attached. When we turn to the inscriptive evidence we find instances where the "war and peace" clause was written directly into the treaty, as in the alliance between Tylissus and Cnossus from 450. Neither party could make a friend an enemy or an enemy a friend without the approval of a federal assembly, and neither party could make a new treaty without the same approval. There were also some regulations for joint operations, indicating that offensive action was contemplated or at least deemed possible. Another example is found in the treaty between the Athenians and

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175 5.80.1.
176 5.47.3, 4, 7.
177 I.e., the coalition of 420, involving Argos, Elis, Mantinea and Athens.
Bottiaeans from 422, where both parties are bound to "hold the same city as friend or foe". The agreement does not appear to have aggressive intentions, however, and its main object seems to be the isolation of Spartolus.

So far the evidence would seem to indicate a close relationship between "war and peace" clauses and offensive alliances. We may well begin to wonder, then, if the Spartan-Athenian Alliance was merely an ἔθνεια. Carl Meyer believes the continued occupation and final demolition of Panactum by the Boeotians late in 421 was never regarded as a casus foederis by Athens or Sparta. This fact led him to conclude that Argos was the only party the two sides had in mind when the Alliance was made, and that the Alliance was defensive in nature. Since the text of the treaty also has nothing out of the ordinary for an ἔθνεια, it is difficult to see our treaty as anything else. Clearly then, our "war and peace" agreement was an exceptional arrangement brought about by extraordinary circumstances. A closer examination of 5.39.3 and 5.46.2 reveals that the mysterious clause was an oral agreement, leading us to suspect that it was made concurrently with the oral agreement found in 5.35.3 and 5.42.2. The event probably took place within a few months of the signing of peace, but we have no way of knowing if either votes or oaths were taken. The agreement was partly intended to offset any unfair

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179 IG i² 90, line 18. See Bengtson #187.

advantage Sparta might reap from her alliance with Athens. 181 Without the proper assurances, Sparta would have been free to form separate alliances with those states still at war with Athens. 182 At the same time, Athens would have been hindered from approaching Argos, a course of action she did not even contemplate until 420. 183

Although both unwritten agreements might be viewed as an outgrowth of paragraph eleven of the Peace, the one found in 5.35.3 and 5.42.2 is best taken with the thinly veiled threat of force found in paragraph six of the Alliance. In theory, the Spartan-Athenian ἐνέργεια 184 could now turn into an offensive alliance overnight, if the Corinthians and Boeotians continued to stand aloof after a certain unspecified date. The whole episode ably demonstrates the variety of forms that particular compacts could take to meet existing needs. Our two informal agreements were designed to enforce the Peace and prevent any two coalitions from occupying the same space at the same time. Unfortunately for the Peace, the informal understandings were short-lived.

181 See Max Pholenz, "Thukydidesstudien III; Nachtrag zu S.67," Wissenschaft Gottingen, 1920, 79-82. Pholenz believed he could safely insert our "war and peace" clause into the text of 5.35.3. Although his alteration makes good grammatical and historical sense, it was unnecessary and therefore unwise.

182 See Bengtson, 81, for a discussion of Greek alliances. According to his understanding, Sparta might have an alliance with Athens, but could still legally bring aid ("partiellen Hilfeleistung") to Boeotia if the latter was invaded by the Athenians, provided the Boeotians also had an alliance with Sparta.

183 5.44.

184 There is no specific Greek word for an offensive alliance. The word ἐνέργεια is used for both types.
The Aftermath: Military and Diplomatic Confusion

The period following the end of the Archidamian War was filled with secret negotiations, double crosses, and general confusion as Corinth, Argos and Sparta sought to set up rival coalitions in the Peloponnesus. Consequently, historians have had a field day trying to discover the "true intentions" of the various parties and individuals involved.\(^{185}\) As for the Peace, Clearidas' failure to act promptly at Amphipolis had effectively sabotaged the letter of the treaty. Despite the continued occupation of conquered territory and hostility of former allies, however, the Peace did accomplish its primary mission of bringing an immediate end to military operations. Although Athens still held Pylos, she withdrew the Messenian raiders at the request of Sparta and allowed things to return to normal in that quarter.\(^{186}\) Now that Sparta no longer supported the war effort, the enemies of Athens found it necessary to hold fast and await new developments. Athens and Boeotia proceeded to sign an uneasy truce that had to be renewed every ten days, and several other towns followed suit.\(^{187}\) Corinth was rebuffed in her efforts to obtain a similar agreement, but recognized a de facto truce nevertheless.\(^{188}\)

The outlook for peace darkened somewhat during the winter of 421/20

\(^{185}\)See bibliography.
\(^{186}\)5.35.
\(^{187}\)5.32, 6.10.3.
\(^{188}\)5.32.
with the election of two war-hawks to the Ephorate, Xenares and Cleobulus. Although we cannot accurately assess their influence on subsequent history, their election serves to demonstrate that public opinion in Sparta was now divided on the question of war. During the following winter the Spartan government made a determined effort to bring about the evacuation of Pylos. They planned to appease the Athenians by turning over Panactum and all the prisoners held in Boeotia. The Boeotians finally conceded, but demanded and received a separate alliance in return. This only served to infuriate the Athenians and to damage the prestige of Nicias, especially when they found out that the Boeotians had demolished the fort. The war party in Athens now began to gain strength under the leadership of the ambitious and unscrupulous Alcibiades. In the summer of 420 he tricked a Spartan delegation into lying before the Assembly and then exposed their duplicity. When a last minute effort on the part of Nicias failed to dislodge the Spartans from their Boeotian alliance, the Athenians lost all patience and joined the Argive coalition. During the following winter the Argives persuaded the Athenians to bring the Messenians back to Pylos in order to create a diversion. Since Athens would now appear as an aggressor, it was decided to inscribe on the "Laconian column" that Sparta had not kept her oaths.

One might say that the Peace and Alliance were annulled by the affair at

189 5.36.

190 5.39, 42.

191 5.45-46. Most Spartans must have looked on their union with Boeotia as an act of desperation. Their refusal to break that union may reflect religious scruples, the influence of the war party, or common sense.

192 5.56.
Pylos, though Athenian forces refrained from actually attacking Laconia until 414.\textsuperscript{193} When fighting broke out around Epidaurus in the summer of 419, Argos summoned her allies to the fray.\textsuperscript{194} The following year witnessed the defeat of an Argive-Athenian army near Mantinea and the restoration of Spartan supremacy in southern Greece.\textsuperscript{195} Intermittent fighting would continue on a smaller scale till 415, when the Sicilian campaign began to take shape.\textsuperscript{196} Meanwhile, the Athenian position in Thrace had deteriorated somewhat. In the summer of 421 Dium seized Thyssus, though both towns were members of the Empire.\textsuperscript{197} The winter of 421/20 saw the seizure of Mecyberna by neighboring Olynthus, the very act that the Peace sought to avoid.\textsuperscript{198} Last of all, Dium felt strong enough to revolt in the summer of 417. This event must have caused some excitement, since an expedition was sent north under Nicias in the winter of 417/16. The expedition proved unsuccessful, however, because of Perdiccas' refusal to furnish the necessary support.\textsuperscript{199} In view of Macedonia's defection, it was clear that a major effort would be needed to set things right in the Chalcidice.

Now that we have reviewed the important events, we need to speculate on

\textsuperscript{193}6.105.
\textsuperscript{194}5.54ff.
\textsuperscript{195}5.70-73.
\textsuperscript{196}6.1ff.
\textsuperscript{197}5.35.
\textsuperscript{198}5.39.
\textsuperscript{199}5.82-83.
the author's purpose for burdening us with so much diplomatic activity. Much of this activity consists of the efforts of Xenares, Cleobulus, Alcibiades and the Corinthians to bring Argos into an alliance with their respective states. Westlake notes that most of these efforts proved abortive and that all of them were prompted by fear, suspicions and supposed grievances. The Greeks' natural proclivity for argument in politics and private life, combined with their fierce love of local autonomy, made diplomacy a tortuous affair at best. Divisions of public and private opinion made decisive foreign policies difficult, if not impossible, without the firm leadership available during the administration of Pericles. Leaders are shown to be irresolute, selfish, deceitful and maladroit and are frequently left unnamed. They "...allowed themselves to become involved in immensely complex intrigues in which they seem seldom to have appreciated that the aims of their allies or prospective allies were different from their own." The temporary desertion of the Eleans from the Argive coalition immediately before the battle of Mantinea furnishes us with one such example. Westlake concluded that Thucydides' chief concern in Book Five was to emphasize the leaders' lack of intellect and the utter bankruptcy of their statesmanship. In all fairness, however, we must admit that the figure of Nicias does not fare badly in Thucydides, though his portrayal


202 5.62.
in Plutarch is less flattering. At the same time, there is no doubt that Nicias lacked the charisma and persuasive force of Cleon and Alcibiades, both of whom were detested by Thucydides.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS: WHOSE VICTORY?

Any study of the Peace of Nicias must seek to determine what it actually represented and what it might have accomplished, if things had worked out differently. In Eduard Meyer's opinion, the Peace represented a victory for Athens and an extraordinary diplomatic achievement for Nicias and his compatriots. In spite of all her military defeats, Athens had attained Pericles' goal of having her imperial pretensions recognized. She had gone even further and had captured Nisaea and replaced Corinth in the Ionian Sea. Sparta, on the other hand, had been forced to ignore the interests of her allies and had run the risk of losing her hegemony. Her foreign policy had become so dependent on Athens that she was forced to seek an alliance. Since none of Sparta's allies were individually a threat to Athens, it would be possible for the Imperial City to recover her strength and win back the rest of Thrace.\footnote{E. Meyer, \textit{Geschichte}, 4.132-3, and \textit{Forschungen}, 2.180.} The problem was that she had no real statesman, one that could restrain the demos from making impossible demands on Sparta or from meddling in the Peloponnesus; things would take care of themselves there without outside interference. But leadership of that caliber was not forthcoming, and the extreme democracy bequeathed by Pericles was incapable of a meaningful foreign policy on its own. Despite this serious flaw, however, Meyer was convinced that the Athenians still would have reaped the benefits of peace, if the imposing figure of Alcibiades had not chanced on the scene. Their willingness to send Nicias to Sparta with a
delegation in 420 is a testimony to the hope for peace still entertained by many of the demos.\textsuperscript{204}

A more cautious appraisal is made by Legon.\textsuperscript{205} He characterizes the Peace as a stalemate and a limited Athenian victory because of Sparta's failure to achieve any of her professed goals. She had failed to liberate more than a handful of the approximately 200 towns subject to the Empire. She had also failed in her more modest aims, such as the repeal of the Megarian Decrees, the political autonomy of Aegina and Potidea, and the end of Athenian interference in the Ionian Sea.\textsuperscript{206} The fact that most of these goals had been first proposed by Corinth did not lessen her humiliation. As for the treaty itself, Legon doubts it could have accomplished anything permanent since it "...resolved no basic issues, displeased most (if not all) the belligerents, and proved impossible to enforce."\textsuperscript{207} He concludes that the "...episode illustrates the difficulty of securing a lasting peace through negotiations when neither side holds a decisive military advantage, and especially when the war has involved coalitions of states whose vital interests and war fortunes may differ."\textsuperscript{208} Perhaps in deference to his magazine editor, he hesitated to add that permanent understandings between open societies and closed ones are rarely achieved by peaceful means.

\textsuperscript{204}Idem., Geschichte, 4.184, 190, and Forschungen, 2.355-57.
\textsuperscript{206}1.68-71, 120-122.
\textsuperscript{207}Legon, 324.
\textsuperscript{208}Ibid., 334.
Donald Kagan takes a more pessimistic view of the Peace and refuses to concede that Athens received anything worth her expenditure in lives and money. He points out that the original war aim of Pericles had not been to merely maintain the status quo, but to demonstrate the permanence of the Empire and the futility of Sparta’s intimidation or interference. In his view, Pericles would have been "appalled" by the new situation in Thrace, where Athenian supremacy was limited in fact and theory. The settlement there totally ignored the right of dealing with one's dependents as one saw fit, the very same right claimed by Corinth under the Thirty Year Peace. Kagan also notes that the circumstances surrounding the signing of peace are not exactly suggestive of an Athenian victory. Sparta was forced to negotiate because of accidents of history like the disaster at Pylos and the expiration of the Argive treaty, not because of the overwhelming strength of a powerful enemy. But when Athens finally came to terms, she did so under the threat of another invasion (according to Thucydides 5.17.2). At the same time, there is nothing to indicate that the war faction in Sparta had been destroyed or permanently discredited. Kagan sees Athens' problem, then, primarily as a military one: "The only conclusion of the war that would leave Athens secure required either that Spartan power be broken and incapable of menacing Athens, or that the Athenians acquire control of such

209 See Thucydides, 1.144-145.
210 See 1.40.5.
211 See also Thucydides, 6.10.2.
strategic areas as to make them invulnerable.\textsuperscript{213}

In discussing the treaty itself and its chances of success, Kagan arrived at conclusions similar to those of Legon. He perceived that the treaty of 445 "...was agreed to by an Athens firmly under the control of Pericles, a leader sincerely committed to observing both its letter and spirit, while the Spartans [and their allies] had reason honestly to be satisfied with its terms."\textsuperscript{214} The Athens of 421, on the other hand, lacked stable leadership and only signed the Peace because no one had stepped in to fill the vacuum left by Cleon. The important allies of Sparta rejected the treaty, of course, because it was unfair and unrealistic, a product of poor imaginations.\textsuperscript{215}

Since some of Kagan's conclusions stand in sharp contrast to the more traditional view of Eduard Meyer, we will take this opportunity to examine the arguments of the former in greater detail. To begin with, it is hardly reasonable to say that Athens received little in return for her expenditure in men and money. Much of this money had been spent in the reduction of Potidea, an operation only indirectly related to the war. Although one might question the maintenance of a large fleet and the wisdom of an attack on Epidaurus\textsuperscript{216} during the early part of the war, one cannot criticize Athens for investing moderate sums on Corcyra, Pylos, Cythera and the rebellious towns of Thrace. As for casualties, battle deaths amounted to something less

\textsuperscript{213}Ibid., 360.
\textsuperscript{214}Ibid., 348. One might wonder how far Pericles' commitment went, in view of the Corcyra affair of 433.
\textsuperscript{215}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{216}2.56.
than 2500 hoplites and far fewer sailors, hardly severe when compared with the losses sustained in the mid-century wars against the Persians and Peloponnesians. What made these losses serious was the plague, an event that could not have been foreseen or compensated for.

Kagan also drew attention to Sparta's plan to establish a permanent fort in Attica and suggested that the Athenians ran to the negotiating table when they heard the news. At the same time, he found no evidence to show that the so-called "war party" in Sparta had been thrown out of power or discredited. It is very difficult, however, to picture the Athenians being terrified by a Spartan bluff. The navy was still intact, and the navy was not a bluff. Sparta may not have been "overawed" in March 421, as Nicias himself admits, but she had suffered serious reverses during the war and could do so again.

Kagan's comments on the war party at Sparta are not convincing either, since Cleobulus and Xenares came to power at least six months after the treaty was signed. Their election was probably a result of the trouble with Argos more than anything else. Except for the matter of keeping the alliance with Boeotia, these two men had little influence on the actual course of events; the Spartans as a whole wanted to avoid war with Athens, not start one.

Some further points of criticism raised by Kagan are based on a comparison of the Peace with its predecessor of 445. He noted that Sparta's allies accepted the earlier treaty as a fair one, but he failed to consider the circumstances surrounding their approval. Athens was forced to make con-

217.1.109-10. Losses in Egypt alone included two fleets and an army of 6000 killed or captured.

218.6.10.2.
cessions in 445 because she had overextended herself in an attempt to gain a strategic stranglehold of Greece. In 421 Athens was not obligated to surrender anything until Sparta handed over Amphipolis. If Sparta failed to comply, then Pylos and Cythera could remain in Athenian hands as bargaining points or valuable bases from which to launch future attacks. True, nothing had been done to placate Corinth or Megara, but Athens felt no special need or pressure to accommodate them. Besides, she could not give Corinth back her dependencies without a major effort. As for the leadership of Pericles, it hardly needs to be pointed out that his guidance was sorely missed during the critical years following the end of the Archidamian War. Nevertheless, the Peace worked about as well as could be expected, given the caliber of leadership available.

Kagan offers an alternative to the solution arrived at by Nicias and his supporters, but it is far from adequate. He believes that Cleon, Demosthenes and, to a lesser extent, Nicias decided to abandon Pericles' defensive policy in 425 and to take measures aimed at knocking Sparta out of the war. This policy should have continued, in his view, since Athens had no more to gain by peace in 421 than she had in 425. In his hurry to find fault, however, he chooses to ignore the fact that Athens had been through ten years of war and had seen the loss of Pericles, Cleon, the reserve fund, at least one-fourth of her population and most of her farms and olive groves. Although

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219 1.113-14. She was thrown out of Boeotia and Megara shortly before hostilities ended and was forced to surrender Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen and Achaea.

the new assessment made further campaigns theoretically possible, she had no idea how badly the other side had been hurt and had just suffered two serious reverses herself.

It is therefore concluded that the Peace of Nicias represented a limited diplomatic victory for Athens. Truces, if timed right, could be almost as valuable as victories on the battlefield. The one signed in 421 compensated for two recent defeats and proved to be humiliating to the enemy. We may also interpret our event as the successful climax of an Athenian "diplomatic offensive" launched in the late 20's. Ironically, this effort to limit the conflict and shore up defences was undertaken at the very time that Cleon and others were pushing for a more aggressive military policy.

When we stop to consider the benefits of the Peace, it is clear that Athens was afforded a precious opportunity to rest from the conflict (though the same might be said for Sparta and Corinth). Despite Thucydides' own caustic remarks on the hypocrisy, violence and general distrust prevalent during the years following the settlement, it remains a fact that Athens was able to avoid incurring serious losses for at least six years. By 415 Nicias was able to say that the Athenians were making progress in recovering

221 5.46. These and other remarks of Nicias seem self-congratulatory and retrospective. In 421 he was not interested in humiliating Sparta.

222 Besides the Truce of 423, attention has been called to treaties with Halieis, Troezen, Macedonia and the Bottiaeans. A treaty was also made with Persia in 424/23. It may have been a renewing of the Peace of Callias on the accession of Darius II. See Bengtson, #183 (IG ii 8). IG ii = Inscriptiones Graecae II, ed. U. Kochler (Berlin, 1883–1895). See notes 46, 139 and 179.

223 5.25.3, 5.26.2.
their strength in men and money. But Nicias himself had no illusions about the "phoney peace" he had helped to create. While his fellow citizens might wax confident in their renewed strength and the inactivity of their chief opponent, he recognized the need to remain vigilant against Boeotia and certain allies of "dubious allegiance". He, more than anyone else, seems to have realized that Athens needed to secure her empire by enforcing the provisions of the Peace in Thrace. But the demos was lured by the magnet of Sicily, the grave of ships and men.

And ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars; see that ye be not troubled, for all these things must come to pass, but the end is not yet.

Matthew 24:6 (KJV)

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224 6.12.1. See appendix on Athenian financial recovery.
225 6.10.5.
APPENDIX

The Peace Of Nicias And The Financial Recovery Of Athens

The Peace of Nicias stipulated that six Thracian towns would remain autonomous within the Empire and be taxed at the pre-war rate. Some controversy has arisen over the way this provision affected Athenian financial policy in the years following the signing of peace. The authors of ATL believe that the new assessment of 422 was postponed to await the outcome of negotiations. They are also convinced that the new assessment lowered subsequent collections to pre-war levels, though the collection of 421 must have been on the scale of 425. This fits well with the total scheme of Athenian finances as interpreted by ATL. According to Andocides, the fruits of peace included the deposit of 7000T with Athena as well as the acquisition of 300 ships and 1200T in annual tribute. Andocides probably had an actual decree in mind, no longer surviving, which provided for payment over a twelve-year period. ATL calculates that 5800T were actually collected before the Sicilian adventure began to reduce the fund in 415. We can arrive at a figure of 7000T by allowing an initial deposit of 1000T and a yearly deposit of 500T thereafter. In addition,

226 5.18.5.


228 Andocides, On The Peace With Sparta (393 B.C.), 8-9.

229 ATL calculates that Sicily cost at least 3420T and probably much more. IG i 2 99 alone may indicate 3000T. See Meiggs and Lewis, #78. ATL's figure of 5800T seems too high by about a thousand talents.

230 A similar procedure was followed in 449.
Athena would have earned about 100T in normal income from various indemnities.\(^{231}\) ATL believes Andocides' figure of 1200T referred only to the year 421, and that it included at least 200T in indemnities and other foreign revenues. Assuming a return to pre-war conditions, ATL puts the new assessment at 500T and the internal revenues at 400T.\(^{232}\) Out of a total of 900T, then, Athens could have afforded to pay Athena the 100T that was normally hers and an additional 500T to fund the debt. This would leave 300T to run the Empire, a figure compatible with the 320T required before the war. But could the Empire still run on 300T a year, or even 400T? Limited military preparations and inflation must have cut into her earnings, not to mention the expenditure needed to repair the damage caused by the Peloponnesians and Boeotians. Our question becomes more real when we consider ATL list 33. Meiggs and Lewis deny ATL's date of 422 for this list and prefer to place it in 418 on epigraphical grounds.\(^{233}\) The fragment is important because it shows Cyzicus paying 20T, whereas before the war she paid only 9T. They also dispute ATL's total for the 422 assessment of the Hellespontine District, of which Cyzicus is a part. By following the precedent of 425 (indenting one space) the figure of 96T may be changed to 196T. The rate for this region in 425 was at least 250T. Meiggs and Lewis also noted some exceptions in the Island District, though the evidence there does indicate an overall lowering of the tribute. They suspect that most of the islands were given favorable

\(^{231}\) See note 32 for a discussion of Athenian finances and the reserve fund.

\(^{232}\) See note 32.

\(^{233}\) See Meiggs and Lewis, #75.
treatment after 421 because Athens heavily depended on them for trireme crews. They do not believe, however, that ATL was justified in applying this reduction to the whole Empire, especially in light of the controversy over list 33 and the Hellespontine assessment of 422. Since the decree of 425 called for severe penalties if a new assessment was not carried out during the next Great Panathenaia, there is no reason to assume a delay in the assessment. Meiggs and Lewis conclude that the tribute was lowered from 1460T to about 1000T in 422, because the individual figures of 425 had proved unrealistic. A figure of 1000T is certainly more comfortable to work with than the meager 500 ATL would allow us. The provisions of the treaty were in no way applicable to the Empire, and were probably never enforced in the six rebellious towns of the Chalcidice. It is unlikely that the other Thracian towns were given special treatment either, in view of their recent defection. Regardless of how we choose to interpret the records, however, Athens was clearly on the road to full recovery by the time of the Sicilian intervention. In 415 Nicias could honestly say that his city had "recovered somewhat" in men and money.

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234 Ibid.
235 Their figure would also help to corroborate Andocides.
236 6.12.1.
There is presently no major work that deals specifically with the Peace of Nicias. There is also a general dearth of scholarship in the area of fifth century diplomacy, except for the material that can be gleaned from epigraphical handbooks (see books by Bengtson, Meiggs and Tod). Serious study of the Peace began with the rise of textual criticism in Germany during the late nineteenth century. Although much of this work proved counterproductive, real advances were made in elucidating the text of Thucydides and the documents of the Peace. Foremost among these pioneers was Kirchoff, and it was on his work that Gomme largely depended when writing about the treaties. Although Gomme's monumental Commentary is an indispensable tool for any study in Thucydides, it is occasionally guilty of drawing false conclusions from inadequate or controversial evidence. The same fault is noticeable in many of the shorter articles written about the Peace over the last half century. A more valiant attempt was recently made by Kagan in his book, The Archidamian War, but little that is new can be found in its pages. Kagan was also guilty of questionable arguments on several occasions. More fertile ground was discovered in the field of financial documents by Meritt and others, and we have the Athenian Tribute Lists as an excellent tribute to their investigations. For a general survey, the reader is directed to old classics like Meyer's Geschichte and more recent works like Meiggs' Athenian Empire.

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*All translations are from Cambridge, Mass. unless otherwise specified.*
SETTLEMENT ACCORDING TO PEACE OF NICIAS

LEGEND

Pylus Returned to Sparta
Panactum Returned to Athens
Olynthus Autonomous
"/////" Under Athenian Control in 421 (Thrace)