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Eurocommunism, Spain, and the views of Santiago Carrillo.

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EUROCOMMUNISM, SPAIN, AND THE VIEWS OF
SANTIAGO CARRILLO

A Thesis Presented
By
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INTRODUCTION

The Eurocommunist phenomena in Western Europe has gained great notoriety since 1976. In that year, a conference of the European communist party organizations was held in East Berlin. The meeting ended in dissension and discord. The cause of this discontent was inter-party wrangling over the desire for ideological independence from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Several national party delegations pushed for greater freedom in their interpretations of Marxist-Leninist thought.

The core of the insurgent group consisted of the Spanish (P.C.E.), French (P.C.F.), and Italian (P.C.I.) Communist parties from Western Europe and the Yugoslavian and Rumanian parties from Eastern Europe. Behind the Western bloc's insubordination was the desire to find an accommodation between Marxist-Leninist dogma and political success in advanced industrial nations with functional electoral systems. The Spanish, French, and the Italian parties have formed the center of what has been termed the Eurocommunist movement. The P.C.I. and the P.C.F. have attempted electoral or parliamentary coalitions with some success while the Spanish Communists have presented themselves as a leading ideological and moral force in the movement.

Although the particularities of the Spanish situation differ from those in France or Italy, the goal of forging a coalition of progressive forces is a very common trait. The need to project a safe
yet progressive image and the weakness of the left vis-a-vis the center and the right have made coalition politics a pragmatic alternative.

This thesis argues that the P.C.E. has played a vital role in the recent developments of Eurocommunism. It will also demonstrate that the fashioning of Eurocommunism has been an evolutionarily process that began before the Second World War and has continued until today. The importance of the P.C.E. itself, in constituting a Eurocommunist theme, has gradually increased over this period. The many influences which contributed to ideological and political changes in the present day Eurocommunist parties can be observed in the history of those parties and in other important events. Within the Spanish party, an extremely fundamental influence upon the development of Eurocommunism has been the personality of its Secretary-General, Santiago Carrillo. The rise of the Spanish party to its positions as an acknowledged center of the Eurocommunist philosophy is closely tied with Carrillo's career as the party's leader.

A developmental overview of Eurocommunism will explore those events which influenced the loss of loyalty to the Soviet Union by the Western European parties. Not all of the actions that undermined the authority of the C.P.S.U. took place within Western Europe. Yet each incremental loss of international discipline contributed to the centrifugal forces out of which Eurocommunism was spawned.

An exposition of the general themes of Eurocommunism will follow this overview. It will portray the salient points of the common
Eurocommunist understandings. The general strategies and political desires of the Eurocommunist parties will be addressed in this section.

A brief history of the Spanish Communist party will be presented in order to trace the development of its Eurocommunist positions and to understand the particular influences which have helped to shape the Spanish variant of Eurocommunism. The experiences of the Spanish organization have been the base upon which Santiago Carrillo has built a new, revised theory of Marxist revolution. In doing so, he has broken the historical ties which had bound the Spanish Communists to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This relationship had been of particular importance in the party's early days, but it changed as new developments surfaced both within Spain and the world movement.

The last part of this work covers the career of Carrillo and his most important publications concerning Eurocommunism. In Problems of Socialism Today, Dialogues on Spain, and Eurocommunism and the State, Mr. Carrillo has evolved a general theme of Spanish Eurocommunism which also has implications for the Eurocommunists throughout the rest of Europe. Santiago Carrillo has become a major spokesman for a strategy which stresses achievement in electoral politics. He proposes a "type of socialism with universal suffrage," It is clear that the Italian Communist Party leader Togliatti and the Italian "new road to socialism" were an influence on Carrillo and other Eurocommunists. In recent years however, the P.C.E. and its leader have been at times the most vocal and ideologically deviant of the Eurocommunists.
This study has utilized printed material concerning a number of issues within the Communist world. Attention has been paid to not only the Eurocommunist parties but to texts dealing with East European, Soviet, and Chinese Communism as well. Personal observations in Europe in January and February of 1979 were helpful in organizing the paper and in understanding some of the more subtle aspects of the subject. In considering the views of Mr. Carrillo, extensive use of direct quotations was made in order to present as accurate a picture as possible of his theories in a paper of this type. Articles by and about Eurocommunists as well as other relevant communist subjects have been an important source in compiling this study. All printed sources appear in the bibliography at the end of the work and footnotes will be found at the end of the appropriate chapters.

The P.C.E. Today

It is ironic that the P.C.E. should push so vehemently for a theme of evolutionary socialism. It had once been the most faithful of servants to the C.P.S.U. In addition, the decision to promote the electoral process as an avenue of social revolutionary change comes from a party which had been outlawed for close to forty years in its own country. The particular conditions in Spain have influenced the development of the revisionist line. Legalization of the P.C.E. has placed it in a position to compete for power in the same manner as the Italian and French Communist Parties. Given its past conditions of existence, stunning electoral victories will probably not be likely in
the immediate future. Coalition building and moderate electoral gains seem to be in store for the party before it becomes as domestically important as are the P.C.F. and P.C.I. in their respective countries. However, legalization may not have even taken place without the establishment of the revisionist line. Although the larger French and Italian parties have at times received more publicity because of their immediate electoral potential, the party in Spain has been fundamental to the development of Eurocommunism and the schism between the West European Communists and the C.P.S.U.
CHAPTER I

THE DEVELOPMENT AND THEMES OF EUROCOMMUNISM

The emergence of the Eurocommunist phenomena can be traced as early as the "popular front" era of the international Communist movement. These popular front activities were usually undertaken in order to benefit the C.P.S.U. and the designs of the Soviet Union's foreign policy. Tito's post-war challenges to the political and ideological centralism of the U.S.S.R. and the C.P.S.U. were a precursor to the West European disaffection. When Mao Tse Tung succeeded in bringing the Chinese Communist Party to power despite Stalin's skepticism, the authority of the Soviet Communist party in world affairs was further undermined. At the time of the 20th Party Congress of the C.P.S.U., Kruschev was ready to denounce Stalin and blame him for the excesses of the past. The Italian Communist leader, Palmiro Togliatti, claimed it was not Stalin in particular, but the structure of the Soviet system in general that was to blame. This claim further damaged the credibility of the Soviet Union's ideological leadership.

By 1960, the solidarity of the international movement was ruptured when a rift developed between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. Moscow was no longer the only major center of world communism. The Soviet response was to prevail upon the other Communist parties to ostracize the Chinese. Although some parties were willing to condemn the C.C.P., formal censure of the organization
was regarded as not being in the interest of the international movement by many members. Furthermore, it appeared that a Soviet chauvinism was tainting the international character of the movement. The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia that was sponsored by the U.S.S.R. demonstrated to many national parties how brutal Soviet repression of delinquent parties might be.

At this juncture, the themes that are basic to Eurocommunism began to take root. The West European parties were dismayed by the Soviet actions, and the Spanish party was particularly annoyed. From this time onward, the Italian, Spanish, and French all began to development autonomous lines of national political power. These developments took place at different speeds and in different contexts. They did share the common foundation of their autonomy from the interference of the C.P.S.U. By 1976 the three parties were willing to present a united front to Moscow to protect their independence and the need for electoral competition by the party organizations. Since that time they have continued to explore avenues of co-operation and joint action.

The Popular Fronts

Each of the Eurocommunist parties shares the legacy of creating political coalitions and participating in anti-fascist military alliances. The Spanish Party came to be the predominant anti-Franco force in the Spanish Civil War. The French Communists were members of the electoral coalitions such as the United Front and the Popular Front
during the 1930s. They were also involved in organizing resistance to the Nazi occupation of France. The Italian party was driven underground in 1926, but it was actively involved in anti-fascist propaganda and resistance until its participation in the immediate post-war Italian government.

These anti-fascist struggles and political coalitions were not simply cases of national parties following their own predilections. To be sure, nationalism and patriotic intent often played an important role in determining the actions of the parties and their members. Another extremely important factor which contributed to the actions of these parties was the relationship each had with the U.S.S.R. and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Each of the parties was closely tied to the C.P.S.U. through the organization of the Communist International. This organization was sponsored by the Soviet Union in order to cultivate Bolshevik-style socialist parties in different countries. The Soviet Union used its position as the only revolutionary socialist state in existence to influence and direct the parties affiliated within the Communist International (Comintern).

In the twenties, increasing domestic political intrigue and several reversals of Soviet foreign policy initiatives prodded the leadership to adopt a cautious policy vis-a-vis the revolutionary movements in other areas. The Soviet party leadership became less concerned with promoting revolutions outside the U.S.S.R. and more interested in the notion of building "socialism in one country." As a result, the Comintern's organization was utilized as an instrument of
Soviet foreign policy. The intention was to have the affiliated parties take actions in order to protect the U.S.S.R. In doing so, the parties would facilitate the consolidation of socialism in that country. Once this had been accomplished, then other revolutions could proceed with the Soviet Union as their base. In September 1928 this program was described:

The U.S.S.R. is the base of the world movement of all oppressed classes, the center of international revolution, the greatest factor in world history . . . she is the international driving force of the proletarian revolution that implies the proletariat of all countries to seize power . . . In view of the fact that the U.S.S.R. is the only fatherland of the international proletariat, the principal bulwark of achievements and the most important factor for its international emancipation, the international proletariat must on its part facilitate, the success of the work of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and defend her against attacks of the capitalist powers by all the means in its power . . . This international discipline must find expression in the subordination of the partial and local interests and in strict fulfillment by all members of the decisions passed by the leading bodies of the Communist International.¹

This statement set the tone for future relationships between the Comintern and its affiliated members. Prior to 1928 the party organizations had depended on the Comintern and the C.P.S.U. for leadership and support. The terms of relations among the parties were founded in the Leninist ideal of "democratic centralism." When the Soviet leadership had been a collective effort, foreign communists could hold divergent views under the patronage of various members of the Soviet oligarchy. Once Joseph Stalin had successfully outmaneuvered the Trotskyite wing of the C.P.S.U., this association changed. The demise of Trotsky and later Zinoviev and Bukharin foreshadowed the end of diversity. The fading of these internationally respected men
meant that to be a communist, one must necessarily be a Stalinist. Differences in Marxist-Leninist thought became subject to the interpretations of Stalin since no one but he was capable of enforcing them.

The result of this situation was the centralization of the international movement and the duplication of the Stalinist model of organizational structure in the national communist parties. Within each party a hierarchy of leadership loyal to Stalin was expected to follow the directions of the Stalinist dominated Comintern.

At first, the Stalinist leadership's scorn for "bourgeois democracy" and Social Democrats made the West European governments and socialist parties the objects of contempt. Coalitions of the left were rejected vehemently immediately following Stalin's victory over his rivals for leadership within the C.P.S.U. As the Soviet chief composed his appraisal of Fascism's development, a shift in strategies began to take place. The fascist associations had formerly been considered useful in catalyzing working-class solidarity with the national communist parties. It was believed their effect would be to undercut the attraction of other leftist groups such as the Socialists, Anarchists, Trotskyites, and Anarcho-Syndicalists. By 1935 the Soviets had become apprehensive that fascist movements were becoming more of a threat to the Soviet Union than either western capitalism or social democracy. Throughout Europe governments were being discredited by fascist parties which played on popular discontent at the expense of the communists. Their appeals, based on nationalist principles, ran contrary to the tenets of "proletarian internationalism" that were
upheld by the Comintern affiliates. While parties such as the French Communists were maintaining a militantly anti-nationalist posture, the reactionary groups were gaining momentum by touting nationalist ideology and militarism. It became apparent that the destruction of the center and center-left political parties' credibility was spurring this growth of anti-Soviet forces and isolating the national communist parties.

The ensuing shift in Soviet strategy produced an attempt to co-operate with center and leftist political parties. It was clearly intended to neutralize or retard fascist development. A 1935 report to the Seventh Congress of the Communist International stated in part:

The first thing that is to be done is to form a United Front, to establish unity of action of the workers in every factory . . . The Communist International attaches no conditions to unity of action except one, an elementary condition acceptable to all workers, viz. That the unity of action be directed against the offense of capital, against the threat of war . . . we defend and still continue to defend every inch of bourgeois Democratic liberties which are being attacked by fascism and bourgeois reaction because the interests of class struggle of the proletariat so dictate.  

While this change in strategy produced co-operation among the anti-fascist forces within each country, it underscores the influence that the Comintern exerted over its affiliates. Parties' policies for national participation were determined not in those countries but in Moscow and the intention of the popular fronts was to serve the strategic interests of the Soviet Union. The programs were not formulated with the notion of utilizing nationalist sentiment for the indigenous parties' own success. It was not expected that the participation in
broad coalitions would become a permanent method for dealing with the pressure from reactionary and conservative forces.

The arrangements made between the communists and their coalition partners were expected to yield strategic benefits for the U.S.S.R. and not the political success of the European organizations. The purposes of the coalitions were designed solely with a monocentric character. As an example, when the Soviets became involved in the Spanish Civil War, they perceived the Spanish Anarchists as an ideological threat. The Spanish Communist Party was in a position of great political leverage and strength because it was the Soviets' channel for the aid which kept the Spanish Republic from toppling. The Soviets urged the P.C.E. to promote the isolation and repression of the Anarchists because the Stalinists were concerned that a revolutionary success by the Anarchists might establish a far-leftist regime with the potential for political heresy. 5

It was evident that the Stalinist-dominated C.P.S.U. and Comintern would not tolerate dissent over ideological or political strategies. The master-servant relationship that had developed as a result of Stalinist centralism clearly defined the limits of the national parties' independence from the Soviet Union. The Leninist legacy had generated a dislike for social democracy within the Comintern, yet the disdain for other parties of the left or center did not prohibit co-operation in times of dire necessity. It did rule out long term partnerships for the purpose of socialist transition. National communist parties were expected to refrain from collaborative tendencies
and maintain the discipline of the international order. The Soviet Union was to be considered the focal point for ideological, political, and moral leadership and Soviet socialism was to be a model for other socialist systems.

If nationalist tendencies were operative in this scheme, they were Soviet in nature. The client parties were cut-off from an important source of mobilization when they were forced to dogmatically consider "proletarian internationalism" as the only appropriate worldview. While other groups made gains by professing a concern for national issues, many communist parties acted unswervingly to protect the interests of the Soviet Union. This characteristic was later nullified in part by the parties active in resistance movements during the Second World War. The identification of the communist parties with patriotic anti-fascist activity bolstered their support in several nations. Although the Soviets disbanded the Comintern in 1943, Stalin still believed that internationalist discipline had been and could continue to be maintained. Events would prove otherwise.

Still another effect was the development of broad based coalitions in counter-acting reaction from extreme conservative elements. Although the fronts were not successful in halting the advance of fascism internally, they did serve to illustrate the alternatives to isolation and simple opposition that had been the norm of the parties in the thirties. After the war, this lesson would become a part of the developing strategies and policies of some European parties.
**Titoism**

Joseph (Broz) Tito was made Secretary-General of the Yugoslav Communist Party in 1937. All the previous Yugoslav Secretaries-General had perished in the Soviet purges of the 1930s. A member of the Yugoslav organization since 1921, Tito returned to rebuild the party after several years in exile.

From 1939 until 1941 the party remained subservient to Moscow's direction. As a result, the communists played very little part in anti-fascist activities until the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was voided on June 22, 1941. After this time, the Yugoslav party became a main source of military resistance and an organizing agent for anti-fascist partisanship. Although it was faced with a rival partisan group, the communist partisan activity became increasingly intertwined with Yugoslav nationalism. The eventual dominance of the communist partisans in post-war Yugoslavia was the nationalistic mobilization of the population on a supra-ethnic basis.  

When the Second World War ended, the Soviet Union moved to consolidate its strategic gains in Eastern Europe. In order to avoid endangering its sphere of influence, the U.S.S.R. tried to avoid provoking its western allies in their own perceived spheres. This resulted in both the Italian and French parties being instructed to be co-operative in establishing new national governments.

In Eastern Europe the Soviets sponsored the establishment of "Peoples Democracies." Yugoslavia also established a socialist regime
with Soviet participation. The Yugoslavs did not consider themselves to be particularly indebted to Soviet assistance for their liberation. It soon became apparent that Yugoslav national interest would become a direct influence on the relationship between the C.P.S.U. and the national party. Tito was not hesitant about challenging the western allies over such issues as the occupation of the Trieste region or about proposing a Balkan federation to the Soviets.

A Communist Information Bureau was established in 1947 so that the new socialist states and the non-governing communist parties could be organized into an international forum for the conveyance of C.P.S.U. doctrinal and political leadership. The Yugoslav party boldly assured the delegates to the first meeting that it was responsible for Yugoslavia's liberation and this position embarrassed the Soviet Union. The slight seems to have been forgiven when the Yugoslavs bitterly criticized the French and Italian parties for their collaboration in their countries' post-war governments. Yugoslavia's action seemed to confirm its reliance upon the Soviet Union for direction, yet within one year the situation changed.

The Soviet veto of a proposed Balkan federation was the immediate cause of the change in the Yugoslav-Soviet understanding. The disagreement over Tito's diplomatic aspirations was actually the culmination of growing resentment over Soviet infiltration of the Yugoslav regime. The Yugoslav Communists rooted out C.P.S.U. sympathizers and agents and neutralized them. This represented a threat to Stalin's authority and control over the international movement.
When the Soviet Central Committee attempted to bully its Yugoslav counterpart in March 1948, its action proved counterproductive. Tito and his clique were in complete control of the Yugoslav party apparatus and no attempt to foment an insurrection from within was successful. The Soviet Union then chose to condemn Tito and brand him a heretic.

The ensuing external pressure caused the Yugoslavs to become steadfast in their defiance of Moscow. "Proletarian internationalism" became an issue. A new Yugoslav ideology held that since the Soviet Union was no longer the only socialist state, the old rules of unswerving loyalty to Moscow were no longer valid. The new conditions dictated absolute equality between communist parties and reciprocal non-interference. The Soviet Union was pronounced guilty of promoting and practicing "hegemonism," while the structure of the Soviet state was criticized as state-capitalist-despotism.

This critical view contributed to disunity within the international movement. A key element in the Titoist break seems to have been the reconciliation of communism with nationalism. Tito was able to break through the ideological stranglehold of the C.P.S.U. and the Cominform. Previously, this control had been fairly effective at directing the policies and actions of the national communist parties. Aside from the Yugoslavs, only the Chinese Communist Party had been successful in pursuing an independent, nationally oriented path. The Yugoslav revision had serious political and ideological implications. Although the intention of the Yugoslav leadership may not have been aimed at developing an alternative ideology, the existence of an
independent, nationalist Yugoslav party in control of a recognized socialist state seriously damaged the monocentric facade that Moscow had projected since 1928.  

The basis for ideological heresy had been established, but discipline did not totally dissolve. The international socialist brotherhood, still mainly Stalinist in composition, held fast behind the Soviet Union. In Western Europe, a few individuals did defect from the rigid Stalinist ideology. Groups of French and Italian communists were interested in exploring the potential for political coalitions and there were some schismatic deviations from the Soviet influences. Some members of the Italian Party formed Unione Socialista Indipendinte and disaffected members of the Spanish Party joined together in Accion Socialista. Members of the national parties who were expelled during a series of purges either joined these reformist groups, left the party, or just disappeared. In East European countries the purges were often more violent and vicious. The official Soviet response to the heresy of Tito was to rid the movement of dissent in order to maintain ideological conformity and discipline.

Mao's Challenge in 1949

Another important and contemporary challenge to the monocentric attitude of the Soviets was the sinification of Marxism by Mao Tse Tung. Mao assumed command of the Chinese Communist Party in 1935. The history of the Chinese Party prior to Mao had been one of pronounced intra-party squabbles and botched Soviet attempts to direct the Chinese
revolution. After Mao became the chief of the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.), a definite, nationalist ideology began to develop. This nationalist character included the belief in the revolutionary potential of the peasantry and a willingness to reach an accommodation with the middle-classes.  

The growth of the Chinese revolution presented the C.P.S.U. leadership with an uncomfortable situation. The existence of friction between the Stalinist clique leading the C.P.S.U. and the Maoist led C.C.P. predates the Sino-Soviet split of the early nineteen sixties. During the thirties and forties each party had occasion to criticize the other for dogmatic excesses and tactical errors. Since the Maoist line was strongly nationalist in content, such an approach necessarily conflicted with the "internationalist" character of the Soviet model. Because the Chinese had decided that Stalinist strategic objectives were not always beneficial to the C.C.P. aims, controversy seemed inevitable in the Sino-Soviet relationship. The C.P.S.U. leadership could not reconcile itself with the fact that an independent Chinese Communist Party could act outside the parameters of Soviet desires.

In 1945 the Soviet leadership advised Mao and his compatriots to reach an accommodation with the Kuomintang forces of Chang Kai Shek. This policy was proposed for the benefit of Soviet strategic considerations. Although the C.C.P. agreed with the Soviets on a formal inter-party basis, it continued to pursue its own revolutionary policies with the intention of completely defeating the KMT. This disregard for C.P.S.U. advice and international discipline was not viewed
favorably in Moscow.

Mao's eventual victory in 1949 underscored the fallibility of the Soviet leadership's interpretation of the international communist movement. The Chinese victory did not prevent the C.P.S.U. from welcoming the People's Republic of China into the fold of socialist states, but it did make the top party leaders apprehensive about the future. Besides having flaunted the authority of the C.P.S.U. and the Cominform, the C.C.P. success elevated the theories of Mao Tse Tung. This led to a developing competition in revolutionary ideology which further damaged the Soviet monopoly on determining the correct and prudent course for the attainment of socialism. Stalin had been skeptical about the chances for the Chinese Communist success. The C.C.P. victory in the face of this skepticism served as another subtle lesson to both the Chinese and others. While the specific conditions of Maoism might not be applicable to West Europeans, the concept of a nationalist communism was once again demonstrated to be a valid, pragmatic and successful approach. This served to further undermine Moscow's credibility and control in the international movement.

De-Stalinization

Stalin's death in 1953 further weakened the monocentric character of the international movement. With the advent of the Twentieth Party Congress of the C.P.S.U., important changes took place that affected the relationship between Moscow and the affiliated parties. Nikita Kruschev's criticism of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress is
commonly recognized as the introduction of "De-Stalinization" to the broad reaches of the international movement. The campaign to undercut the Stalinist traditions and influences opened the way for more ideological non-conformism.

A major feature of the De-Stalinization campaign was a declaration that "Peaceful Co-existence" was now possible between socialist states and capitalist states. This policy was intended to lessen the tensions between the Soviet Union and the western powers in order to help avoid a nuclear confrontation. The policy became an important point of dissatisfaction among some members of the socialist community. Disagreement over the validity of this interpretation within the parameters of Marxist-Leninist ideology upset both Europeans and Chinese.

A second extremely important condition of the De-Stalinization campaign was establishment of a theory of "different roads to socialism." Since the 1948 break with Yugoslavia, this notion had been considered a dangerous challenge to international discipline. During the Twentieth Party Congress, the C.P.S.U. leaders now recognized there might be a certain particularity of revolutionary conditions among different nations. Kruschev also spoke about the possibility of achieving socialism by a parliamentary path. He indicated that the transition to socialism was not necessarily preceded by armed conflict. It was explained that this parliamentary path had not been available to the Russian Bolsheviks, but new developments made it possible for different revolutionary methods to now be employed. This view was supported by citing the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. The decision to
adopt such an erstwhile reformist policy was intended to cement a
developing rapprochement with Yugoslavia, and explain the successes of
national communist parties.

The reaction among the present Eurocommunists was mixed. The
French, long ardent Stalinists, decided to praise Stalin's merits and
remain indifferent to the new ideological shift. The Spanish welcomed
the change, but in a manner which belied their devotion to the C.P.S.U.
For the Partito Communista Italiano the situation was perplexing but
potentially advantageous.

The P.C.I. hierarchy had been dominated by dedicated Stalinists
from the late twenties. The issue of De-Stalinization made the Italian
party leaders a bit uncomfortable. In the years prior to the 1956
events, the Italian party had been disrupted by arguments over the
correct road to socialism. In 1950, notable party members had ques-
tioned the P.C.I. policies toward collaboration. This dispute arose
out of the concern that the satisfaction of Moscow's desires was re-
tarding the advance of socialism in Italy. De-Stalinization exacerbated
the pressures by placing doubt on the leadership's political wisdom.
At the top of this hierarchy was Palmiro Togliatti, a dedicated commu-
nist and a former Comintern operative. Togliatti had led the P.C.I.
since 1926. Although he harbored some reservations about Stalin's
consolidation and centralization of power in the late twenties, he
remained loyal to Stalin's directions. As a result, he and others
at the top came to be closely identified with Stalin and his policies.
The events in Moscow now presented a new challenge. Growing
dissatisfaction in both the left and right wings of the party put increasing pressure on Togliatti. In light of previous Stalinist inspired policies, the left wing felt that Moscow was acting to restrain the revolutionary confrontation between the party and the state. The right wing of the party was unhappy because it seemed Moscow was denying it electoral success and direct, meaningful access to the Italian government. After the Yugoslav criticisms in 1947, the party had followed an ambiguous course.

De-Stalinization and the denunciation of the cult of personality provoked an internal crisis for Togliatti which forced him to deal with disillusioned Stalinists and renegades alike. In answer to this crisis he began to shape a policy which would take advantage of the new positions within the C.P.S.U. Togliatti proposed that serious study of the situation would reveal that it was not Stalin or his excesses which should be a point of concern, but rather the nature of the system itself. Perhaps Professor Donald Blackmeer's quote from Togliatti succinctly describes his approach.

Stalin was at one and the same time the expression and the author of a situation, for the reason that he proved himself to be the most expert organizer and director of a bureaucrat-type apparat. At the moment when it got the better forms of a democratic life as well as because he gave a doctrinal justification of what was in reality an erroneous line, one on which is personal power was based, to the point of assuming degenerate forms.15

Togliatti also stated that while a high degree of solidarity within the international movement had once existed, it was time to recognize that the Soviet party should not be the only model for
communist organizations. For him, it was apparent that the world movement had now become polycentric. This observation was a recognition of what the Soviets had already learned through their experiences with Yugoslavia and China. The Stalinists within his own party were not totally discouraged while anti-Stalinists and nationalists were comforted by thoughts of more ideological freedom. By attempting to redefine openly the nature of inter-party relations, Togliatti was leaving the P.C.I. leadership room to satisfy both wings of the party.

Togliatti's statements were open acceptance of the changing conditions in the world. His appraisal was delivered to the party members in a philosophical tone. The fact that such statements came from a man so closely identified with Stalin underscores the pragmatism and political realism involved in maintaining the cohesion of the Italian Communist Party while charting an Italian version of Marxism-Leninism. Inside the party the Stalinists were not completely disgraced and they were prevailed upon to agree with the new C.P.S.U. views in the best Stalinist tradition.

If the reliance on the C.P.S.U. for central direction was diminished, it was because the Soviet leadership had encouraged a reevaluation of strategy by its actions. The criticism of Stalin revealed for Togliatti the solution to his party's problems. By demonstrating that it was not simply Stalin but in fact the Soviet Union that had gone astray, the P.C.I. could move more positively toward assuming responsibility for its fate. A concept of polycentrism took advantage of the Soviet toleration for various revolutionary techniques
and enlarged upon it so that self-interest and bilateral party relations were included. Togliatti moved farther ideologically than the Soviets expected because he foresaw an end to their involvement in directing his national electoral policies. Soviet direction of parliamentary coalitions was not interpreted as a necessary outgrowth of the "different roads to socialism." The Soviets had probably meant to maintain their influence while creating more flexible tactics; but the Italian Party embarked on a policy which changed the framework of inter-party relations. It was expected by the P.C.I. that non-ruling parties remain sovereign in their own affairs and be treated in the same manner as socialist states under the new polycentric policy.

After 1956 the P.C.I. began a program which considered participation in the electoral system to be a legitimate tactic for transforming it. This shift, along with the advocacy of polycentrism, became the chief ideological contributions of the P.C.I. The institution of strategy and objectives tailored to fit the problems of the Italian nation was coupled with the intention of making important decisions about the direction of Italian socialism within Italy. This approach posed an alternative program from which Eurocommunist attitudes subsequently developed.

During the time that followed the Twentieth Party Congress, several events took place which served to undermine the Soviet influence within the socialist bloc. Togliatti's statements influenced others to begin criticizing the Stalinist domination of socialism. There soon developed political unrest in Poland and Hungary. Reformist
tendencies in both countries forced the Soviets into an ideological retreat. As national parties attempted to replace Stalinists, the Soviets became anxious. In Poland reformers were successful in moving into the Party hierarchy without large scale violence. In Hungary the situation developed into one of severe internal conflict and Soviet armed intervention.

After the violence and intervention in the latter part of 1956, the C.P.S.U. leadership attempted to re-impose a more strict discipline on the affiliated parties. In November of 1957, an International Communist conference was held. It was the largest to take place since 1935 and it had taken one year for the conference to be organized and convened. There were sixty-five national parties in attendance. The Soviets were able to regain some control by having it agreed that although the C.P.S.U might not necessarily be the prototype socialist party, the U.S.S.R. was still the leading state in the international socialist bloc. An agreement was reached so that a declaration of solidarity could be issued. The concept of "different roads to socialism" was discouraged and the dangers of revisionism repeated. These actions made it clear that Soviet leaders had become concerned with the centrifugal potential of De-Stalinization. The 1957 conference was not entirely successful for the Soviets as it had become increasingly difficult for the C.P.S.U. to influence the actions of various parties. Perhaps when the post-Stalinist leaders had formally recognized the differences in opinion within the C.P.S.U. and other parties, they somewhat legitimized reformist tendencies. The
international conference did not put a brake on the growth of such sentiments. In 1958 the problems of the C.P.S.U. increased over renewed conflict with Yugoslavia and worsening relations with C.C.P. By the end of the decade, the international socialist community would suffer its most severe rupture.

The Sino-Soviet Split

The Sino-Soviet split is an important event in the evolution of the Eurocommunist positions. The disintegration of relations disrupted the entire communist movement. The division into two bitterly opposed grounds undercut the Soviet claim to be the leading socialist center. The Yugoslav crisis and the post De-Stalinization shifts had undermined Moscow's authority to interpret the correct course for revolutionary movements. The break with Peking brought the correctness of The Soviet's own ideology and organizational development into question. Chinese displeasure over the C.P.S.U. debunking of Stalin played a part in the rift. The Soviet policies set forth after the Twentieth Party Congress were taken to be too conservative and mistaken. By 1960 the C.C.P. had become convinced that the Soviet Union was falling into a dangerous revisionist policy. Peking perceived this revisionist line as a serious threat to the purity of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist orthodoxy. The notion of Peaceful Co-existence and an apparent disregard for Lenin's thesis about the inevitability of a clash between the socialist and the capitalist states were considered mistakes. Maoism expected the inevitable confrontation between these two blocs to be
grave but not catastrophic. The Maoist position was to discount the importance of nuclear weapons and reject any notion of peaceful relations between the capitalists and the communists. 17

This position challenged the wisdom of the C.P.S.U. leadership and thereby subjected it to a critical review. The C.C.P. rejected Soviet assurances that peaceful transitions from capitalism to socialism were possible. The Chinese felt compelled to respond to what they regarded as a gradualist revolutionary program. 18 These attacks on the Soviets' revolutionary credentials were accompanied by the argument that national liberation movements had become the main thrust of revolutionary struggle. The Maoists also demanded that the undue interference in the Soviet aid programs could not be tolerated. Maoism promoted relations of equality and respect. The role of the U.S.S.R. as a leading socialist state was also rejected. Peking had decided it could no longer accept monocentric Soviet policies.

The C.C.P. view was somewhat similar to the perspective that the Italians had developed in that it criticized the organization of the Soviet state and questioned the correctness of monocentrism. However, the Italians and the bulk of the Europeans preferred to stay close to the Soviets. Since the U.S.S.R. had been the traditional patron of these parties this could be expected. An interesting facet of this rupture did soon develop concerning the extent of this European loyalty.

At a conference of international parties in November of 1960, the issues dividing the C.P.S.U. and the C.C.P. were the center of
attention. A bitter dispute over ideological rigidity and Soviet revisionism was followed one year later by open Chinese defiance at the Twenty-Second Party Congress of the C.S.P.U. None of the European parties were particularly interested in supporting the Chinese view; but when the Soviets tried to organize the formal ostracism of the C.C.P., they were not successful. The Italians, in particular, were cool to the idea of formal censure. Such an action would imply condemnation of polycentric attitudes and other parties which were ardently Stalinist were not concerned with justifying Soviet revisionism through excommunication of the Chinese.

During the years following the Sino-Soviet split many Communist parties suffered internal disputes over the question of revolutionary principles. Both the C.P.S.U. and the C.C.P. laid claim to having the correct revolutionary ideology. While the bulk of the national party organizations remained more inclined to accept the Soviet revisionism, small pro-Maoist splinter groups appeared in many parties. During the 1960s however, the Italian, Spanish, and French parties all worked at moving themselves out of their traditional, isolated, anti-establishment positions and towards increased co-operation with other political elements.

**Czechoslovakian Crisis**

In 1968 a crisis emerged which had a profound effect on the relations between the West European parties and the Soviet Union. The event was the Soviet sponsored invasion of Czechoslovakia. The purpose
was to suppress reforms taking place within the Communist Party apparatus. This invasion came as a great disappointment to the West European parties which had regarded these reforms with sympathy and interest. The French and Italian parties condemned the invasion. The Spanish lodged a formal protest with the Soviet leadership and its complaint was of a more vehement tone than either the French or Italian parties. Each of these parties considered the implications of the Soviet power politics to be dangerously imperial.

The Czechoslovak invasion represented a clear threat to the independence of communist party organizations. The French and the Italians were vocal in their criticism, but the Spanish party even more vigorously questioned the Soviet intentions. The Spanish, because of their size and isolation in exile, paid for their efforts when the Soviets succeeded in promoting a party schism in 1970. These actions further alienated some Spanish communists and widened the gulf between the two parties.

The Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia had undermined the credibility of the Spanish, Italian, and French parties among their national political peers and it was probably inevitable that these parties criticize the events. In France and Italy the socialists and non-communist left parties could exploit the harshness of the Soviet intervention. The same was true of Spain, for the U.S.S.R. had given the Franco propaganda machine much anti-communist ammunition. The Italians, faced with the prospect of a disintegrating centrist governing coalition, could ill afford to see prospective supporters
frightened away. Each of the parties needed to disassociate themselves from the Soviet invasion and reassure the citizens of Italy, Spain, and France about their intent to preserve national sovereignty.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia led the Italian party to view the C.P.S.U. even more critically. Togliatti had promoted the notion of polycentrism. The Soviet invasion was viewed as the logical consequence of an international strategy which utilized a concept of bipolarity and the subservience of communist parties to Soviet leadership. The French position remained notably ambivalent since they had never been comfortable with polycentrism. The P.C.F. leadership did not wish to completely disassociate themselves from the C.P.S.U. and the international character of French membership in the world communist movement. Some Spanish Party leaders had been enamored with the egalitarian foundations of polycentrism. When they were rudely rebuffed by the C.P.S.U. leadership, it became apparent to the Spanish that they would not be considered equals for quite some time. The Italians and Spanish began to ignore the Soviet desires and tried to create avenues for co-operation between Communist parties and other elements. This included the willingness to accept anti-Soviet attitudes on the part of potential partners.

A Turning Point

This divergence set the one for the 1970s. The Italians, Spanish, and eventually the French formulated strategies intended to protect themselves from domestic political isolation. Invariably this
meant compromise with the center, center-left, or Socialist parties. The parties deliberately moved toward the mainstream of national politics. The P.C.F. feared a loss of support to the French Socialists. The Italians found they could influence the government by making themselves the most important coalition partner for the ruling Christian Democratic Party. The Spanish were interested in reaching a rapprochement with anti-Franco forces for a united front. This was believed necessary in order to facilitate a post-Franco liberation.

Each of the parties marked carefully the downfall of Salvador Allende's Marxist government in Chile. The lessons of this collapse were not lost on the European leaders. They determined that a center-left coalition with a broad base would be necessary to avoid reaction and civil disturbance. A successful Socialist-Communist coalition was simply not strong enough to stand alone, especially against foreign subversion like that of the C.I.A. in Chile. It was for this reason that the leaders of the P.C.I., P.C.F., and P.C.E. chastised the Portuguese Communist Party for its tactics in the Portuguese revolution.

By 1976 the parties were openly directing challenges against Moscow over C.P.S.U. ideology and the usefulness of the Soviet model. The French, Italian, and Spanish parties presented Moscow with a united anti-Soviet line when they met at a conference in East Berlin. Their co-operation consolidated the positions taken in an earlier communique issued by the P.C.I. and P.C.F., and the Spanish affinity for the Italian policies. The co-operative effort presents still
another stage in the evolution of the Eurocommunist movement. Although the parties were not in total agreement, their joint effort provided an alternative which could not be dismissed as simply the work of one renegade party. Later these parties' leaders met in Madrid and confirmed their common desires. Strict dogmatic stipulations are not a part of the present solidarity. A free-wheeling style and disagreements over strategy mark this group. It was at the Madrid conference that the party leaders publicly accepted the label of Eurocommunists. The general thesis of the group was that their parties had the right to adapt communist tenets to the conditions of their own countries and retain independence on an international plane. The parties have not agreed upon a specific and clearly defined program. They choose instead to adopt general principles and tailor them to the specifics of the individual countries. A combination of broad guidelines supplies the organizations with the methodology for achieving a democratic form of socialism in Western Europe. An examination of these guidelines will further illustrate the basic content of the Eurocommunist movement.

**Eurocommunist Trends**

There are several trends in the Eurocommunist evolution which are the result of the Western parties' experiences since 1928. One such factor has been clearly analyzed by Pio Ulassi:

The first and most obvious trend is growing independence of the parties, their cautious but ultimately unequivocal rejection of any extra-national source of authority or control, including a strictly regional one. The revolutionary implications of this change have only partially been tempered or camouflaged by appeals to "unity in autonomy and diversity." The unity of the movement
now appears to be little more than a myth encapsulating historical memories, vestige loyalties, and fading ideals. The autonomy of the parties in contrast, is real enough already, and this has enabled the Western Communists to erase some of the stigma of subservience to foreign interests.23

The question of autonomy is central to the aspirations of Eurocommunism. This desire for independence has been evolving since Kruschev opened the international movement to divergent tendencies in 1956. Palmiro Togliatti's theses concerning the degeneration of the Soviet state and the concept of polycentrism became an important foundation for abandoning not only Soviet direction but their model as well. The Italians openly broke the tradition of Communist Party allegiance to the C.P.S.U.24 Many of the communists' problems had been the result of their subservience to Moscow. The era of national liberation groups had been a time for the Italians and the French Communists to reduce the level of confrontation with the other domestic political groups within their nations. When the movements were no longer underground organizations, the Communist Parties suffered from the return of their allegiance to the Soviet Union. An astute observation of this problem has noted:

. . . . The advent of the Cold War unmasked the Communists as servile defenders of Soviet interests and policies and this undermined the Communists' own efforts to accommodate themselves to nationalist and even chauvinist sentiments in their countries. In addition, the parties' ties to Moscow helped strengthen and perpetuate precisely those features of communism which (though based partly on indigenous traditions) conflicted with western liberal ideas, and thus cut the parties off from the Democratic groups whose tolerance and co-operation they needed if their moderate strategies were to have any success.25

This has prodded today's Eurocommunists to change their position vis-a-vis Moscow and adopt an autonomous, independent line that is more
akin to the national communism of Yugoslavs or Chinese than the rigid "proletarian internationalism" of the Soviets. Having experienced the disadvantages of being political outcasts in their own countries, the parties have sought to adopt their own paths to socialism. There are other parties which choose to remain faithful to Moscow and within the realm of doctrinal rigidity. This is not true of Western Europe because the conditions are not similar to those in which the Soviet model developed. The Soviet Union's programs for building socialism and industrialization are not considered appropriate for countries already possessing a relatively high degree of industry and a sizable middle-class. Each country has cultural and national heritages different from the Soviet Union. The parties now wish to become identified with the dominant political cultures and more sensitive to the demands of local circumstances. These conditions have led the Eurocommunists to venture forth with their own programs. As challenges to the parties evolved on both the national and international scene, the various organizations experimented with policies intended to fit the demands and conditions of domestic politics and their countries' foreign affairs. The parties have come to the point of refusing to accept Soviet Socialism as the model on which to base the new social order which they wish to implement.

The result of this change in attitude has been basic re-evaluations of the Eurocommunist parties' analysis of the world conditions. A nationalist content is something that might be considered outside the traditional Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. Yet an
interest in national independence has taken form in the advancement of theories such as the "Italian road to socialism," "socialism in French colors," or Spanish collaboration in national coalitions like the pact for liberty. National pride and patriotism are endemic to the new Eurocommunist style. Nationalism is a powerful phenomenon and the Western Communists have become more comfortable about making it part of their ideals.

The revisions of Marxist-Leninist theoretical ideals are said to be based on the principles of Marx, Engels, and Lenin themselves. These revisions have resulted in a willingness to abandon principles such as the "dictatorship of the proletariat, anti-establishment attitudes, and the need for a revolutionary Bolshevik-style vanguard. In addition, the parties have openly promoted such ideas as freedom of opinion, freedom of the press, right to strike, free movement, and respect for the verdict of universal suffrage.

The Eurocommunists have moved out of isolated positions in their own countries and into new political and ideological territories. While the European parties have rejected some of the more familiar components in the Soviet interpretations of Marxist-leninist thought, they have remained willing to approve the Soviet sponsorship of revolutionary and insurgent movements. This does not prevent them from being critical about interference by the U.S.S.R. in the internal affairs of sister parties. The Eurocommunists might pledge their solidarity to "international proletarian revolution," but this is a matter of their own prerogative. They are generally not afraid of a confrontation with
Moscow, although it is not necessarily their desire to provoke one. The only notable exception to this format has been the actions of Santiago Carrillo of the Spanish Party. He has often openly attacked the Soviet Union on a variety of issues and even rejected its claim to be a socialist state. Aside from Carrillo, the general sentiment within the Eurocommunist parties seem to be such that if the Soviet Union sponsors the invasion of a socialist state or represses dissent, then party leaders may feel justified in speaking out. This is still a breach in the discipline and solidarity that characterized the previous period of rigid "proletarian internationalism." In earlier years, few communists were willing to make iconoclastic statements for fear of seriously damaging the entire international movement. Some leaders have been more critical than others, but all have renounced at least certain aspects of Soviet orthodoxy.

The Eurocommunists also disavow any claim to a monopoly of power. They counter this claim with their own proclamations about desiring electoral mandates for a transition to socialism. The P.C.I. and the P.C.F. can rely on their records of electoral participation to support this assertion. Their activities, while sometimes anti-establishment in tone, have taken place within the context of constitutional democracy, and in the same manner as those other parties when election turnovers have occurred. The Spanish Communist Party, only recently legalized, must build a reputation of such compliance with the rules of constitutional democracy in order to ease its acceptance among Spain's political parties.
The decision to participate in national politics instead of the traditional opposition has, for Western Communists, worked to encourage efforts to broaden the appeal of the parties among electoral participants. Perhaps the reasons for this are best described as such:

So long as the Communists considered the use of existing political and governmental institutions simply as an interim or at best auxiliary strategy of poor, faith in their ultimate success could survive electoral weakness and parliamentary impotence. But once they adopted seriously the idea of non-violent and essentially parliamentary transition to socialism, electoral and parliamentary strength became a uniquely critical measure of their success or failure and their prospects.29

The Eurocommunist parties are trying to project an image of responsibility, moderation, and fair play. If they are to successfully abandon the more conspiratorial nature of their past actions, they must be able to draw widespread support from the middle-class and those who do not traditionally vote communist. Even if this new image can successfully increase the parties' electoral support, the Communists will still need political allies. The gains will not be enough to satisfy the parties' ambitions. Each of them requires help if they are to come to power or have a measure of influence on national affairs.30

This situation has forced the parties to insist on broad coalitions and inter-party co-operation. These intentions began to materialize with a rapprochement or "opening" to some of the other political groups which participate in electoral contests. Co-operation is deemed essential and the communists have joined in some type of effort which will reflect the vagaries of their national conditions.

In each country the strategy of co-operation is different. In
France, the French Communist Party must be mindful of the strength of the Socialists. Therefore the P.C.F. formed a tenuous and unstable alliance with the Socialist Party to prevent themselves from being isolated. The Italian Communist Party has been successful in becoming a partner of the Christian Democrats, though without ministerial representation. The Spanish Communist parliamentary strength is small, but it has become a valuable ally of the Suárez government. Both the Italian and Spanish have opted for co-operation with centrist parties because in each country there is substantial fear that even if a Communist-Socialist government or some other coalition of leftists forces garnered a plurality (or even a narrow majority) of votes, the resulting government could not be effective. A violent reaction by non-leftist groups, similar to that which caused the downfall of Salvador Allende's Marxist government in Chile, is expected to occur. Accordingly, each party wants to avoid the polarization of political groups and have tended to approach the issue of a strictly leftist coalition carefully. Indeed, the French may be less fearful of reaction than the Spanish or Italians, but they too realize care must be taken not to seriously provoke the conservative elements.

The tendency for co-operation had become a fundamental quality of Eurocommunist strategy. The Communist Parties have decided to make the best of electoral strategies and techniques. The French and Italian parties have decades of at least some electoral experience. The Spanish Party has only recently joined the ranks of legalized parties. This has stunted its growth as a mass party in the past, but now it may
be able to reverse this situation. Already, the Communist Party of Spain has been able to become important to the center politicians by providing its support. While the French and Italian parties constantly experience difficulty when they demand a greater share of power, the Spanish have been more modest in their requirements. Since their strength domestically is small compared to the other parties, this is to be expected. It would seem that the Spanish will continue for a time in their moderate course. If this is so, they may remain the most revisionist of the parties. A closer examination will demonstrate that the Spanish Party has a long tradition of moderation and restraint.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I


3. Ibid., p. 193.


14 Ibid., p. 50.

15 Blackmeer, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

16 Ibid., p. 55.

17 Leonhard, op. cit., p. 236.


24 Tiersky, op. cit., p. 287.

25 Uliassi, op. cit., p. 278.

26 Ibid., p. 282.


29 Uliassi, op. cit., p. 286.

30 Ibid., p. 228.

CHAPTER II

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF SPAIN

The development of the Communist Party of Spain has had a great influence on the nature of its policies and programs. In this chapter, a general history of the party's evolution and political experiences will portray the background from which the Eurocommunist positions of the Spanish have appeared. The Partido Communista de España (P.C.E.) first began in the years directly following the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia. The early activities of the organization were marred by instability and structural weakness. In the thirties, the P.C.E. reached its zenith as a political party. After the defeat of the Spanish Republic during the civil war in Spain, the P.C.E. went into a traumatic period of decline under the pressure of Francoist repression. The fifties, sixties, and the early seventies witnessed an attempt by the organization to rebuild itself. Recently, in the wake of Franco's death and an ongoing liberalization of the Spanish Government, the party has once again become a legal participant in the electoral contests for political office. The General-Secretary of the P.C.E. has often stated that the course which the Spanish Communists follow in this new era is tempered by reflections upon the party's past history. It is therefore important to consider the passage of these affairs.
The Early Days of the Spanish Communists

The first Spanish Communist Party came into being in 1919. The formation of this Communist Party was the result of steps taken by sections of the Socialist Youth in response to Socialist reticence over joining the Communist International. The Spanish Socialist Party soon reconsidered its position in light of the defection by members of the youth group. A delegation was dispatched to Moscow in order to observe the International's Third Congress. The two Socialist delegates left the meeting with conflicting views and the Socialist leadership decided to remain firm in its boycott of the International. A section of the party's left wing bolted the organization and formed a second communist group, the Spanish Communist Workers's Party, in April of 1921. The two parties were merged in November of 1921 at the urging of the International. This new, unified party was known as the Communist Party of Spain (P.C.E.).

In its first years of existence the party was unstable. A succession of quarrels and schisms rocked the party for over ten years and prevented the Spanish Communist movement from making many new converts. This penchant for divisiveness caused the defection of members and the intervention by agents of the Comintern. Involvement by foreign agents in the affairs of the P.C.E. became a regular occurrence.

In 1923 the government of Primo De Rivera banned the Communist Party and forced it to become an underground organization. The Party's efforts at organizing and propagandizing were thus further weakened so
that during Rivera's dictatorship its membership was no larger than a few hundred. Two notable achievements in this period were the recruitment of a National Confederation of Labor (CNT) group to support it and the promoting of a miner's strike in the Asturias region. These two simple successes were not sufficient to counteract the centrifugal forces within the group. Ideological and strategic differences caused the Party organization to be in a constant state of flux.

The leadership ran afoul of the Comintern in 1927 over a disagreement about participating in elections that Rivera was holding. The P.C.E. did not want to get involved even though the Comintern advised it. It did accept a Comintern decision to oppose both the bourgeois and socialist parties, but this acceptance of international discipline only served to further its political isolation. Communists fought openly with both the Socialists and the Anarchists, thus alienating two powerful leftist groups. When a Spanish Republic was proclaimed in 1931, the P.C.E. pursued attempts to undermine the success of the new government. The policy of opposition continued despite the fact that the party had become legalized. Having made many enemies, the P.C.E. did not fare well in the Republic's elections of 1931. It polled under five per cent of the popular vote and received no seats in the parliamentary body called the Cortes. The Socialists and left-Republicans did well and dominated the new government.

During the early thirties the Comintern began to re-evaluate its position vis-a-vis leftist and bourgeois parties. In 1932 the Communist International decided to accept the establishment of the Spanish Republic as a positive event. Changes in the leadership of
the Spanish Party were made and José Díaz became head of the P.C.E. in October 1932. This marked a change in the tactics and views which would eventually lead to a rise in the fortunes of the party. The results of this change were not immediately evident, however, as it took another two years before the P.C.E. could begin to increase its prestige through better relations with other parties of the left. As the notion of co-operation and coalition against conservative reaction grew, so did the strength of the P.C.E.

In elections held in 1933 the P.C.E. received one seat in the Cortes. This was accomplished in the face of a strong reactionary trend which produced a government dominated by Rightist elements. This new government began the retraction of reform policies promulgated under the first Republican regime. In 1934 disenchanted elements participated in a number of uprisings. The most successful of these was one in Asturias. Collaboration among leftist groups made this particular disturbance difficult to quell and far-reaching in its implications. Though the effort eventually failed, the Rightist government grew uneasy about its occurrence. This event increased the bitterness between it and the Leftist parties. For the left it was an important lesson demonstrating the potential of united and collaborative policies. For a time, a united leftist action had resulted in a rebellion which had reached the proportions of a revolt.

The P.C.E. had been involved in the Asturias rebellion and this greatly increased its prestige. The basis for a co-operative effort had been established. The Spanish Communists were now inclined
to begin serious efforts at establishing closer contacts with other lefting parties. The development of a "popular front" strategy within the Comintern had been inspired by the success of French Communists participating in a popular front alliance with French Socialists in 1934. After 1935, this tactic became an official theme of the Comintern. The Spanish began to explore the potentialities of the idea and better relations were soon established with the more powerful Socialist Party. Once again the Socialist Youth, reflecting an onset of radicalization within the Socialist Party as a whole, became a point of interface between the two parties. The Socialist Party leader Largo Caballero drew closer to the communists' ideology and the possibility of Soviet assistance. By 1935 the Socialist Youth had banded together with the Communist Youth to form Juventud Socialista Unificada.

The dissolution of the Cortes and a call for new elections in 1936 presented the parties of the left with an opportunity for electoral cooperation. The agreement of the organizations to participate in a united electoral group was cemented by a distribution formula for the seats in the Cortes. The association was known as the Popular Front. It was victorious in the electoral contest and 16 seats were given to the P.C.E. This represented a sharp rise in the size of their representative strength and it is clear that the Communist Party greatly benefited from the arrangement.

The Spanish Socialists were the most powerful of the Popular Front parties and intended on eventually controlling the new government. This appetite for hegemony was fed by the radicalization of
elements in the membership. The Communist Party worked to exploit this radicalization while moving itself toward a more moderate stance. The P.C.E. hoped to restrain the Socialists from embarking on too dangerous a revolutionary program. This maneuver reflected the influence of the Comintern on the course of Spanish Communist decisions. The Comintern had often acted in a manner intended to benefit the diplomatic initiatives of the Soviet Union. It was feared in the U.S.S.R. that revolutionary events in Spain would alienate the western democracies to which Stalin was making diplomatic overtures at the time. Therefore, the Comintern endorsed a Spanish policy which was to take advantage of Communism's revolutionary reputation to increase the influence of the P.C.E. and protect Soviet interests. This strategy was determined by the dual problems of satisfying Stalin's foreign policy and enlarging the ranks of the P.C.E.  

The Civil War

With the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, the Communists found it even more important and advantageous to continue in a moderate role. The party was given the opportunity to further expand its ranks while pressing the appropriate policies to protect the vital interests of the U.S.S.R. Guy Hermet describes the reasons for these actions:

The Communists had in fact nothing to gain from trying to outdo the Anarcho-Syndicalists and Largo Caballero's Socialists in extremism. It would have been virtually impossible for them to have used more immoderate language than these people or to have been more precipitate in socialization. Even had such a policy been practicable, it would have been most unlikely to detach any supporters from these two political movements in any significant numbers, since their popular following remained
substantial in the years 1936-39. By taking a moderate line on the other hand, the P.C.E. was able to gain support of the mass of the "non-party" public, frightened by the prospect of an immediate revolution and not at all confident of the power of the weak republican parties to protect them. At the same time the P.C.E. was the only more or less reliable of these parties, whose effectiveness depended almost entirely on the goodwill and material aid the communists could alone provide once that the Soviet Union was the only foreign country helping the Spanish Republic.\(^8\)

The first few months of the Civil War saw no official communist involvement in the government of the Republic. In September of 1936, however, the P.C.E. had placed two representatives in a government that had been formed by Socialist leader Caballero. The outstanding feature of the new cabinet was not its Leftist nature, but the strength that the moderate elements were able to hold for themselves in the face of increasing revolutionary fervor. The new arrangement strengthened the government's cohesion by co-opting some of its more severe revolutionary critics. The Communists had been the advocates of this solution for the preservation of moderation.\(^9\)

In October, 1936, Stalin sent a message to the Spanish Communists advising them of his support for the survival of the Spanish Republic. Although some non-military aid had already been sent, after October the U.S.S.R. became more resolute in its efforts to supply the Republican government.\(^10\) The German and Italian states had begun to supply extensive aid to the rebel nationalist forces. Victory by Franco would represent a dangerous spread in the fascist threat to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the U.S.S.R. vacillated because it feared close identification of the Spanish Republic with Communism might endanger its
attempts to establish alliances or security arrangements with the United Kingdom or France. As late as December, 1936, the Soviet leadership was urging Caballero to be careful not to alienate the middle-class. The Soviets, already fearing fascism's growing power, were intent on aiding the Spanish Republic to defeat the Nationalists but cool to the idea of supporting a socialist revolution for fear of its international results.

The Spanish Communists were to become the political lever by which Soviet pressure was applied to the Republican regimes. Since the U.S.S.R. did not want to risk the establishment of a revolutionary government, it consistently tried to retard the rebellious fervor of the government. The Spanish Communists were ordered to restrain the Anarchist and Socialists from radical pursuits. As George Orwell observed in his classic work of the Spanish Revolution entitled *Homage to Catalonia*:

> The country was in a transitional state that was capable either of developing in the direction of Socialism or of reverting to an ordinary capitalist republic. The peasants had most of the land, and they were liley to keep it unless, Franco won: all large industries had been collectivized, but whether they remained collectivized or whether capitalism was reintroduced would depend finally upon which group gained control.

The alliance of the P.C.E. with middle-class elements and moderates was intended to produce a bourgeois-democratic government. The events of the war made the Soviets apprehensive about the real possibility of Spain becoming a Socialist state. Their policy was executed in a manner to prevent such a situation from developing. Russian arms were supplied via the Communist Party and its allies who
saw to it that as few as possible got to their political opponents.\textsuperscript{13}

It was because of a complex set of foreign policy requirements by the U.S.S.R. that the Spanish Communists acted in a counter-revolutionary manner. The discipline of "proletarian internationalism" demanded as much.

As a result of this discipline, the Spanish Communist Party worked to force Caballero out of office. Since the Socialist politician refused to tone down his revolutionary rhetoric, the P.C.E. turned against him and also began violently harassing other revolutionary parties such as the "Trotskyite" P.O.U.M. or the Anarchists. Caballero was replaced and new government under Negrin moved to consolidate its counter-revolutionary position. Once again, Goerge Orwell supplies a concise description:

The war was essentially a triangular struggle. The fight against Franco had to continue, but the simultaneous aim of the government was to recover as much power as remained in the hands of the trade unions. It was done by a series of small moves—a policy of pin-pricks, as somebody called it—and on the whole very cleverly. There was no general and obvious counter-revolutionary move, and until May 1937 it was scarcely necessary to use force. The workers could always be brought to heel by an argument that is almost too obvious to need stating: "unless you do this, that and the other we shall lose the war." In every case it appeared that the thing demanded by military necessity was the surrender of something that the workers had won for themselves in 1936. But the argument could hardly fail, because to lose the war was the last thing that the revolutionary parties wanted.\textsuperscript{14}

The Communists' appeals for unity were supplemented by the use of force and as time passed the P.C.E. pushed the government to suppress the revolutionary movements. The help of Soviet agents and provocateurs was often employed to neutralize or destroy Socialist and
Anarchist groups. By 1939, the Communists had infiltrated the Republican Army and disrupted its effectiveness. The army counter-espionage service was transformed into a political police and utilized to eliminate revolutionary elements. This was at the root of an anti-government and anti-communist coup in the last days of the civil war. The Spanish Republic, outgunned and under-supplied, collapsed by virtue of its own internal disintegration. Cohesion was lost because of the ongoing factionalism and strife.

The P.C.E. Underground

The collapse of the Republic and Franco's victory forced the P.C.E. to become once again an underground movement. After 1939 the P.C.E. organization and membership became distributed between exile in foreign countries and a clandestine existence within Spain. Some of the leadership went to France and then on to the Soviet Union. Most of the exile membership got as far as France and was trapped there when the Nazi invasion came. Refuge in Latin America was also sought and some party members turned up in Mexico or Cuba. An internal conflict soon developed between the remnants of the central Party machine in Moscow. This dispute centered over the selection of various party members to live within the Soviet Union. People considered politically questionable by the Soviets were either denied access to the U.S.S.R. or severely restricted in their movement once inside the country. The crisis resulted in open confrontation when Jesus Hernandez clashed with the new party Secretary-General Dolores Ibarruri in 1942. This quarrel
lasted until 1946 when Hernandez quit his disruptive ways and disappeared.

Within Spain the party organization was badly shattered during the years of the Second World War. Some feeble attempts were made to maintain a party structure, but the Spanish police were extremely successful at preventing any real progress. These conditions in Spain resulted in a gulf developing between the exile leadership and the few members left within the country. In 1944 the Spanish partisans who had fled to France and become part of the French resistance invaded Spain. The forces were eventually withdrawn when party functionary Santiago Carrillo determined that the group could not succeed in its invasion of the country. 17

The invasion, while not successful in its purpose, marked the beginning of a period of escalated armed resistance to the Franco government. This policy was expected to incite a war of national liberation among the general populace. That also proved to be an ineffectual tactic and a landing by an armed force on Spain's north coast in 1946 failed. From 1946 until 1949 the P.C.E. guerillas fought a losing battle with the Spanish forces. During this time the party advocated a policy of replacing the Franco regime by armed force with a socialist-style state apparatus.

In the late forties the party was shaken by internal disputes and the repercussions of the Yugoslav-Soviet rift. The exile leadership criticized the failures of the Party organization within Spain and acted loyally to root out "Titoist" sympathizers, real or imagined,
that it found within its ranks. At this time the P.C.E. top leadership was invited to see Stalin and discuss strategy with him. Stalin urged the Spanish to expend greater energies to infiltrate the labor organs.18

Although hesitant about adopting this line of action, the Spanish Communist leadership eventually undertook a program of infiltration and participation within the labor groups. A strike in Barcelona in 1951 was the party's first successful experience at encouraging mass resistance to the Franco government. By this time, the guerilla movements had lapsed into silence. After 1951, the Communists began to make substantial progress in their attempts to organize mass participation and infiltrate the officially recognized labor organs. In the early fifties the party was able to move operatives about more freely as a result of the opening of the Spanish-French border. This caused a more thorough appraisal of the actual conditions within Spain at that time. The party became occupied with a new form of anti-Franco action in the fifties. The P.C.E. started more frequently to use the infiltration of student and labor groups as a means for opposing Franco. In 1953 the party began to actively promote unified resistance to the government and by 1954 the P.C.E. had stated its preference for a provisional coalition government. This constituted a further refinement in the P.C.E. policies aimed at creating a post-Civil War, anti-Franco coalition. Greater participation in the leadership by Party cadres from within Spain was also instituted during this era.

The Twentieth Party Congress of the C.P.S.U. in 1956 acted to reinforce the moves towards political coalition that the Spanish had
initiated. The Soviet denunciation of the "cult of personality" and the general dimension of the De-Stalinization campaign had its effect on the Spaniards. Santiago Carrillo addressed the party about this problem within the P.C.E. and tried to relate it to the predominance of Civil War era Communist exiles in the top leadership positions. He admitted that while no one individual was despotically in command of the Spanish Party's apparatus, it was still true that a limited number of people had great power. The top party officials also debated the implications that the "cult of personality" might have in regards to actions they took during the Titoist purges. The question of arbitrary and sectarian behavior on the part of some top leaders was posed and some purged members were rehabilitated.

These criticisms of the top leadership did not sit well with Delores Ibarurri. She was still acting as the Secretary-General of the Party, but during this time Carrillo and Fernando Claudin pressed for a greater degree of democracy within the party structure. In the wake of the De-Stalinization campaign, Carrillo maintained that Kruschev was in the process of democratizing the Soviet party system and that Stalin's past actions were aberrations in that model. Claudin promoted a line closer to that of Palmiro Togliatti, which criticized the nature of the Soviet system itself. The 1956 invasion of Hungary proved to be a decisive test for the two Spaniards. Claudin interpreted the Hungarian actions as a significant rejection of the Soviet model while Carrillo considered the Soviet reaction necessary to prevent counter-revolutionary activity.
Despite this disagreement over ideology, the Spanish Party continued to develop the formula of "national reconciliation." This idea of "reconciliation" surfaced in 1958, but even before that both Ibarurri and Carrillo had promoted the idea of concession towards other elements within Spanish society. In 1958, however, Carrillo was prepared to go further than Ibarurri in accepting the role of the official unions and in finding an accommodation with Catholic labor organizations. The intent of all this activity still was to formulate a united and co-operative political force through which pressure might be brought to bear on the Franco government. This tactic of creating a governmental crisis failed during ill-organized strikes of 1958 and 1959. Although this "General Strike" philosophy was not paying the political dividends expected, Carrillo was successful in deflecting most criticism of it that came from party membership. In 1959 he became Secretary-General of the party.

Carrillo argued that the strike policy was working and that Franco's government was suffering a serious undermining of its legitimacy and authority. Elements within Spain argued that in fact the policy had been ineffective and had jeopardized valuable party cadres. The most important source of this disaffection was Jorge Semprin and Fernando Claudin. They argued that economic progress under Franco had resulted in the institution of a successful capitalist economy which was employing workers, raising the standard of living, and short-circuiting proletarian revolution. Claudin in particular seems to have recognized the emergence of a stronger middle-class element.
not so prone to revolutionary actions.22

This basic split over the nature of Spanish society carried on into the sixties. The official Party line continued to endorse strikes. To some extent this policy witnessed increased success as the number of disturbances grew. The strikes helped nudge diverse elements towards the co-operation that was necessary to organize a unified movement for democratic reform. This notion of a reform movement began to develop as a more viable alternative to a revolutionary toppling of the Franco government. Ironically, Claudin was expelled from the P.C.E. for his criticism, even though this reformist tendency continued to grow. Carrillo later acknowledged his own transition towards a moderate line acceptable to the middle-class, but charged that Claudin had been premature in his analysis.23

The party also suffered from disenchantment among its members on its left wing. Militants were concerned about its willingness to reach accommodations with other Spanish political elements under the guise of the national reconciliation policy. Thus a split occurred when pro-Chinese elements bolted the party. They were followed by Trotskyite and Maoist splinter groups. These defections were not as severe as the Claudin expulsion or the actions that were to follow.

The Spanish Party After the Czechoslovak Crisis

The events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 further damaged the party's structural integrity. The Communists had started to initiate a rapprochement with middle-class elements that were in the trade union
and political organizations. They also had continued their own efforts at infiltrating and influencing labor organizations. Since the P.C.E. had committed itself to accommodation with other parties in an effort to organize opposition to Franco, it had moved closer to the principle of a democratic transition period. In order to maintain their credibility, it was necessary for Spanish Communists to take a firm position on Soviet intervention.\(^{24}\) In addition, the P.C.E. had been slowly evolving its program in accordance with the aspirations of its own leadership. This growing independence was threatened by the Soviet's proclivities for interference and intervention. The P.C.E. response to the Soviet invasion was vociferous and more critical than others. The Spanish had supported the reform initiatives undertaken in Czechoslovakia, and their criticisms of the actions taken by the U.S.S.R. left no doubts about their displeasure over the course of events there. The Soviet Union was not receptive to this criticism and the response was one of insult to the P.C.E. This proved to be a decisive turning point for the Party and its Secretary-General. From this time onward Carrillo fostered a growing anti-Soviet line.\(^{25}\)

The anti-Soviet stance precipitated still another crisis for the party. A schism developed between elements loyal to Carrillo and those who had pro-Soviet inclinations. The leaders of the "Sovietophiles," Eduardo Garcia and Augustin Gomez, were expelled from the party in 1969. Enrique Lister, who had also criticized Carrillo for being anti-Soviet, anti-Marxist, and nationalistic, left the party in 1970. The Soviet Union encouraged these people to set up rival Communist organizations. Although these new elements suffered from
their own internal disputes and factionalism, their flight from the P.C.E. was a serious blow in terms of party morale and prestige. Lister had been a highly regarded hero of the Civil War days and his absence put Carrillo's leadership and the policies of the Party under close scrutiny by many within the underground movement.

After 1970, the Spanish Communists and other political groups stepped up their efforts to reach a common understanding about the direction of their policies vis-a-vis the Franco government. In the early seventies the parties had come to realize that Franco would not be toppled from his position. The new problem was to decide which course of action should be taken to profoundly affect the post-Franco transition that would ultimately take place. At first, the options looked bleak, for the formation of the Carrero Blanco government appeared intent to carry out a holding operation instead of a transition period. Such a strategy would delay the liberalization and democratization of the regime. In 1973 Blanco was assassinated and the Franco government was forced to change its tack.

The political parties opposed to Franco sensed the potential advantages that a co-operative effort might bring. The P.C.E. moved closer to the neo-capitalist elements wishing for reform in late 1973 and by mid-1973 Carrillo along with ex-Opus Dei theorist Rafael Calvo had announced the formation of the Junta Democratica. The Junta's manifesto called for a provisional government, amnesty for political prisoners, trade union liberties, the right to strike, freedom of the press, independent judiciary, separation of church and state,
elections, and entry into the Common Market. The Socialists and the Christian Democrats chose to steer clear of the pact and formed a rival group. In any case, most parties except for those on the extreme left, had accepted the strategy of moderate coalition.

The Francoist government soon came under increased pressure by these groups to liberate and democratize itself. The authoritarian regime experienced a severe strain as 18 per cent inflation and labor unrest threatened its stability. To complicate matters further, Franco himself became ill and died in 1975. The Democratic Junta and the Socialist-Christian Democrat Democratic Platform had joined as Franco's death drew near to call for a referendum that would decide what form the post-Franco government would take. The two groups continued to pressure the government which was placed under the tutelage of Prince Juan Carlos after Franco's death. Their efforts resulted in the freeing of many political prisoners. Although some repression and arrests followed this initial overture, the government did not continue its severe repression. From Rome, Carrillo encouraged demonstrations by all elements of the Spanish people to illustrate their desire for reform. Suggestions by a government official that Carrillo be allowed to return to Spain were treated as scandalous, but its very mention exemplified a growing tendency to ease restrictions against the P.C.E.

Although the new government pledged to keep the Spanish Communists in check, the increasing violence and civil disruption attempted to undermine its authority. By March 1976 the Democratic Junta and the Democratic Platform had formed a united front. This front, called the
Democratic Coordination, allowed the P.C.E. to outmaneuver the government and avoid its exclusion from the political reforms. Communist labor leader Marcellino Camacho and others in the group were arrested and held for advocating change in the Spanish government. The P.C.E. continued to pressure the government with mass rallies which mocked the official ban placed upon it. In Rome, Carrillo announced his return to Spain, but the government refused him a passport. The Democratic Coordination pledged to organize demonstrations throughout the country for wider reforms. More Communist organizers were arrested, yet flagrant displays of defiance by other party members continued. Carrillo, who had clandestinely entered Spain, was arrested and then released. With his release came de facto recognition of the P.C.E. Shortly afterward, the Spanish government declared the P.C.E. a legal party. This event placed the Spanish Communists officially within the arena of electoral politics and secured for them the same conditions of participation that existed for the Communist parties in France and Italy. Given this condition, the P.C.E. has since embarked on its self-proclaimed Eurocommunist strategy. The Communist co-operation with other political elements had benefited the Party, since the Spanish government had proved unable to isolate and exclude them from the political arena. From 1976 onwards, the P.C.E. has proclaimed itself a party of Eurocommunist intentions in order to clearly define its strategy as a legal party seeking electoral status. The stress on democratic reform has continued, and the party has again taken its place as a participant in the Spanish government.
The organization of the P.C.E. has been criticized for not being democratic. The structure of the party is fundamentally very similar to those in other countries. The rule of democratic centralism makes it difficult for internal opposition to be effective in influencing the course of party policy. This rigid command establishment seemingly encourages disunity because it does not allow for satisfactory conflict mediation. Divergent viewpoints must seek expression in the form of splinter groups. The Spanish Party has on numerous occasions been debilitated with dissent and rent with sectarianism. The conditions of clandestine operation and a leadership in exile often served to exacerbate the situation. Now that the P.C.E. is once again legal, perhaps its functions will encounter less internal tension.

The structure of the party resembles that of a pyramid. It consists of local committees, sector committees, regional, provincial, and then a central committee. Members of the Central Committee are elected by regional and provincial representatives in a Party Congress. The Central Committee appoints an Executive Committee and the General-Secretary of the party. The Central Committee is expected to convene plenums for the purpose of general policy discussions.

During the Party's underground existence many of these functions were difficult to execute. Widescale repression had made interface between rank and file and leadership difficult. Santiago Carrillo has recently declared that there must be more open discussions in the Party now that it has been legalized. Although some dissidents continue to be purged, the internal affairs of the Party have become more visible.
Whether or not the Party will be able to continue on the road to internal democracy will depend on the particularities of the Spanish situation and the personalities who succeed Carrillo. In the meantime, however, the Spanish Communist Party remains a Party of divergence searching for a satisfactory element of cohesion.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II


2 Ibid., p. 17.


7 Ibid., p. 307.


9 Cattel, op. cit., p. 66.

10 Ibid., p. 70.


13 Ibid., p. 54.

14 Orwell, op. cit., pp. 54-55.


16 Hermet, op. cit., p. 32.

17 Carrillo, op. cit., pp. 94-95.

18 Ibid., p. 97.
19 Carrillo, op. cit., p. 113.


24 Preston, op. cit., p. 620.

25 Markham, op. cit., p. 78.

26 Preston, op. cit., p. 620.

27 Ibid., p. 621.

28 Markham, op. cit.
CHAPTER III
SANTIAGO CARRILLO AND THE EVOLUTION OF A EUROCOMMUNIST POLICY

Having discussed the general nature of Eurocommunism and the fundamental background of the Communist Party of Spain, it is now possible to explore the development of these Eurocommunist tendencies within the country. In entering into any such discussion, it is useful to consider the career of Santiago Carrillo. Through his position as General-Secretary, Carrillo has become the determinant force in the development of the Spanish variant of Eurocommunism. It is his ideas that may make him the most outspoken of all the Eurocommunists. The Spanish Party has evolved its own particular strategy in the years since it began, and Carrillo's career has been intertwined with most of this growth. Carrillo was, in his early years, committed to the Comintern's directions. He later pursued the policy of "national reconciliation" which can be viewed as a prelude to the fashioning of a distinctive Eurocommunist position. In 1968, his party's criticism of the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia was a bold step toward the expression of autonomy from the U.S.S.R. Events such as those in Chile continued to influence the General-Secretary's analysis of the fortunes of west European Communism. By the mid-seventies, Carrillo had become a major spokesman for Eurocommunist themes and the driving force behind the Spanish Communists' passage to this position.
Carrillo's Early Career

Santiago Carrillo was born in 1915. His father was an ardent Socialist and became a Socialist Party functionary. Carrillo himself was a member of the Socialist Youth and eventually its Secretary-General. The Socialist Youth was the "Bolshevik" left wing of the party and courted by agents of the Comintern. In March 1936, Carrillo visited the Soviet Union and in April 1936, the Socialist Youth and the Communist Youth merged. Carrillo joined the P.C.E. in November of that year after becoming convinced that only the Communists would be capable of effectively resisting the national rebellion. This decision coincides with the first real Soviet efforts to supply military aid to the Spanish Republic.

Throughout the war Carrillo carried out several tasks for the P.C.E. It was during this time that he became acquainted with Palmiro Togliatti, who was acting as a Comintern agent. Carrillo came to regard Togliatti highly and found himself greatly influenced by the Italian Communist's personality. In a 1974 interview, Carrillo mentioned this admiration when he told the interviewers:

He was an extraordinary personality. I believe he was the most cultivated, the most intelligent leader in the communist movement. It was he who went most profoundly into the problems after the 20th Congress, and he might have gone into them still more profoundly if conditions had been more favourable.

It is clear that Carrillo's respect for Togliatti lasted past the Spanish Civil War and affected his own future ideological views.

Carrillo was one of the last Communist leaders to leave Spain. He fled to France, then to the Soviet Union. From there he moved to the
United States, but differences of opinion with American Communist Eugene Dennis led him eventually to Cuba. During this time Carrillo was acting as an agent of the Comintern and bound by its rules of discipline and proletarian internationalism. Yet, after a stay of some months in Cuba, Carrillo left for Mexico without clearing his actions with Moscow. There he worked for elements of the Spanish Communist Party in exile. Since Carrillo's main task soon became working for the Spanish Party, he was sent to Buenos Aires. From there he maintained direct contact with Spain. He eventually migrated once again to Algeria in 1944.

This period of service for the Comintern has been considered by Carrillo to be the most appropriate conduct for the time. He has agreed that the Comintern did act as an instrument of the Soviet Union, but he has defended that situation by repeating that the primary task of a good Communist was to defend the first worker's state in the world. Of his association with the Comintern and his experiences with the international Communism at the time, Carrillo has said:

For me, at the time, the defence of the U.S.S.R. came before everything else, to such an extent that if I had been asked in 1936 "Are you in agreement that the revolution should triumph in Spain at the cost of that in the U.S.S.R. collapsing?" I shouldn't have hesitated to answer" "No," because the U.S.S.R. was a continent in itself, an immense force capable of carrying the world movement on its shoulders, whereas in little Spain our triumph would have only been ephemeral. One has to remember what the period was like.\(^5\)

This unswerving loyalty to the Soviet Union was a condition which many Communists adhered to. Carrillo was to continue in this deference until well after the 1956 De-Stalinization campaigns.
In 1944, Carrillo was planning an invasion of Spain when he was directed by the Spanish Communist leadership in the Soviet Union to go to France. From there he was quite active in directing the Spanish guerilla movement which tried unsuccessfully to unseat Franco during the late forties. In 1946 he was part of a provisional Republican government-in-exile in which he was given the position of Minister without Portfolio. The Communist Party participation in such an exercise did not halt it from continuing its guerilla struggle. By 1948, however, Joseph Stalin had decided a change in tactics was needed. Thus, it was that top Spanish leaders including Carrillo, were instructed to have party members infiltrate government sponsored labor organs. Although Carrillo maintains he was hesitant about this policy, it was soon accepted as a party strategy.

Also accepted by Carrillo and a good many other Communists was the Stalinist interpretation of the Soviet-Yugoslav rupture of 1948. Titoist elements were found to be existing within the P.C.E. and Carrillo was quick to act in urging they be purged. Carrillo's own interpretation of this period is that it was a mistake to have so blindly followed the Stalinist lead, but that this failing was not apparent at the time. It is essential to realize that the internal politics of the party, although strongly influenced by Stalin, were played out against the backdrop of this crisis in the international movement. Internal differences among political leaders may have been settled by the most expedient means available and charges of ideological heresy might have been motivated by conditions within the party. It is known that
many of the "Titoites" were Communists who either threatened the command of the P.C.E. or who were leaders in the underground within Spain. It is also common knowledge that the relations between internal and external elements suffered greatly, from a lack of communication and understanding. The record does show, however, that Carrillo was a willing accomplice in many of the purges of the era.

De-Stalinization in Spain

This devotion to the Soviet Union also continued into the fifties. At that time the Spanish party was beginning to consider co-operation with bourgeois elements to force a government crisis for the Franco regime. Carrillo joined the Spanish Communist Political Bureau in 1954 and he was later instrumental in the Spanish version of the De-Stalinization campaign. His speech at the plenum meeting of the P.C.E. Central Committee in 1956 dealt with the problems of the "cult of personality." Carrillo agreed in principle with the Soviet view that Stalin's actions were an aberration. He maintained his loyalty to the ideal of the U.S.S.R. being the leading state in the Socialist world and he did not become as ideologically revisionist as his mentor, Palmiro Togliatti. He did seem to agree with the potential of the "different roads to socialism" theory. He had already begun to consider rapprochement with the moderate opposition and the Catholics to be a useful strategy. 6 Carrillo's tactics became increasingly moderate in order that a policy of national reconciliation become a useful tool in rallying opposition to the Franco government.
In promoting the policy of "national reconciliation," he was determined to expand the influences of the Party into as many sections of the political spectrum as possible. In this respect he was willing to have Communists form alliances with Catholics, Socialists, and others who would be willing to enter into an anti-Franco front. These policies were not always popular, but Carrillo energetically promoted them. This enthusiasm made him a highly visible member of the party in the fifties. His willingness to pursue rapprochement policies in the face of Colores Ibarruri's reserved stance helped him to capitalize on an element of discord within the Party. He was able to ride a wave of inner-party reform into the position of Secretary-General. This move marked the beginning of Carrillo's domination of Party apparatus and ideology. In this sense the sixties and seventies have been the "age of Carrillo" in the Spanish Party.

After his rise to the top of the Party, Carrillo was not inclined to accept criticism from below. The most obvious example of this in the sixties was the expulsion of Fernando Claudin. He held the reins of ideological interpretation firmly and directed the Party's policies with the intent of making it part of a wide Democratic Front. After Carrillo's ascension, the Spanish party began to move more resolutely towards reaching accommodation with middle-class elements and intellectuals. It was expected that among Catholic workers a new potential for co-operation would become possible. During the early sixties the main thrust of the Spanish policy continued to be "national reconciliation." The interest for reform in a wide anti-Franco front
was coupled with Communist attempts to infiltrate labor organizations.

After 1964 the P.C.E. showed a growing attachment for the fundamental concepts of Palmiro Togliatti's analysis for the prospects of international socialism. Carrillo had long admired Togliatti and had considered the Italian approach to socialist transition to be a valuable source of inspiration. When Kruschev was removed as head of the U.S.S.R., the Spanish reaction reflected Italian influences. The P.C.E. questioned the nature of the Soviet system. The Spanish General-Secretary remarked upon this:

But I believe it was Togliatti who was from 1956 onwards, after the 20th Congress, had the clearest insight into the question of speaking of the system, and it is true that at the time conditions were not favourable for him to develop his ideas. But the essence of the problem certainly is the political system of socialism. 7

By 1964 the head of the P.C.E. apparently felt the time had come to begin developing these ideas more fully. In 1965 closer contacts were established with the Italian Communist Party and later in 1966 more intimate relations began with the Rumanian Communists. With these steps, Carrillo began to develop more independence from the Soviet Union.

In 1967, Carrillo published a pamphlet entitled A New Look at Present Day Problems. This work contained an overture to progressive Catholics within Spain and, more importantly, it discussed the relevance of the Soviet models of socialism for Spain. He criticized "Stalin's error," which consisted of generalizing the Soviet forms of the dictatorship of the proletariat and making those forms a theory of universal validity. 8 The importance of developing a revolutionary
ideology suited to the conditions of Spain was stressed. A
self-criticism over the party's failures at revolution in the past was
offered as well. The pamphlet discouraged elements that sought the
guidelines for revolutionary action solely in the past experiences and
conditions of the Soviet Union or any other revolutionary movement.
There were many quotes from Engels and Lenin which were intended to
demonstrate that strategic and political flexibility must be part of
the revolutionary ideology.

In 1968, Carrillo addressed the Executive Committee of the
P.C.E. on international issues. In that speech he credited the role
of nationalism in socialist revolution. He also considered the role
of the Soviet Union in world affairs and commented on the extent of
its intervention.

A policy of direct intervention in every quarter of the
globe, utterly foreign to the socialist character of the Soviet
regime, would have caused it to degenerate and become trans-
formed into a new Bonapartism.
The Soviet Union and its Communist Party have had the wisdom
to maintain a judicious policy of help for those people strug-
gling, without affecting the national character of that
struggle of meddling in the internal affairs of other
countries.9

The General-Secretary, although developing a theory of inde-
dependent action, was still able to reconcile this need for specific
revolutionary programs with the foreign conduct of the Soviet Union
and the role that it played in influencing the international socialist
movement. In the text of his speech he urged action by Europe's
Communist Parties to seize upon the revolutionary potential of the con-
vergence of middle and working class desires. He said that it was
increasingly important that each Communist party should know how to use
the autonomy and independence which were present in structures of the international Communist movement.

This did not prevent the Spanish leader from underscoring the importance he still attached to the role of the socialist states in the preservation and development of socialism.

There is one essential point of departure when one starts talking about the socialist countries, and that is the recognition that these countries are the vanguard and the strongest bastion of world revolutionary movement. Among the socialist countries, the U.S.S.R. occupies a fundamental place which is determined by history, by the U.S.S.R.'s immense potential and by its international policy.

We Communists regard solidarity with and defence of the Soviet Union and those countries where the socialist revolution has triumphed as a fundamental duty.

This statement exhibits a belief that the Communist parties could still regard the Soviet Union as the premier socialist state. He did acknowledge, however, that the duty of defending socialism extended to protecting even the Chinese should they find themselves subject to imperialist attack. This indicates that Carrillo was willing to deviate from the Soviet's monocentric view openly in order to recognize the validity of Chinese socialism. In doing so he was implicitly promoting a polycentric approach.

Carrillo then moved on to one last important recognition, which would influence the future development of the Spanish Eurocommunist line. He endorsed the events that had recently taken place in Czechoslovakia in which the Novotny leadership had been replaced and steps were being taken to democratize the Czech party and state apparatus. He indicated that the experiences of Czechoslovakia once again confirmed that socialism was a system that could foster the broad participation
of the working class, the intellectuals, and the people.  

Throughout the sixties the Spanish party had worked to create the conditions for re-establishing itself as a mass party. This course was made even more difficult by the fact the organization was not legally recognized. In order to rebuild the party's strength and function effectively within the Spanish system, the P.C.E. was developing its own parameters for co-operation. It appears that by 1967 or 1968 Carrillo had come to recognize notions of polycentrism and mutual respect among parties to be natural and accepted rules of the international Communist brotherhood. The Spanish had declared in 1967 that they considered themselves in sole charge of their country's progress towards socialism. Therefore, support for both China and Czechoslovakia were to be expected in this recognition of self-determinism. The P.C.E. was willing, it would seem, to follow the Soviet Union as a leading example of socialism, but no longer consider the best arbiter of each party's interest.

The desire for autonomy and non-interference along with the ability to formulate specific, nationally oriented programs also seems to have been expected by the Spanish. This expectation was not met by the Soviets willingly. It became apparent to the Spanish and also the French and Italians that in order to be granted this independence, it would be necessary to demand it. Carrillo's words about Soviet interference and Bonapartism were prophetic when one considers the events which occurred at the end of 1968. It was from this period onward that the Spanish party started to become an important influence on the
Eurocommunist development. This notoriety and influence was not the product of some arbitrarily arrived at policy but the result of the historical conditions of both Spanish politics and the relations of the Communist Parties to the Soviet Union.

Carrillo versus Moscow: 1968

The first significant contribution for the Spanish Communists to the Eurocommunist movement dates from the events following the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. The P.C.E. response to the intervention of Warsaw Treaty forces in Czechoslovakia went further in its criticism than that of either the French or Italian Communist Parties. When the armies invaded Czechoslovakia in August of 1968, the P.C.E. leadership lodged a formal protest with the Kremlin. This protest was treated in a cavalier manner and the Spanish party was admonished for its audacity in criticizing the Soviet Union.

Santiago Carrillo’s response to the Soviet moves was disappointment and dismay. The Soviet Union had not only shown a complete disregard for the internal affairs of a socialist state, she had dismissed the views of an erstwhile faithful and loyal servant as immaterial and unimportant. The Executive Committee of the Spanish Party expressed its distaste for the Soviet Union’s actions and they declared that Czechoslovakia’s internal problems should be resolved from within. Then the Spanish criticized the conduct of the U.S.S.R. in their party newspaper as being ill-conceived and mistaken.

Even though the Spanish Communists were the most critical, they,
like other west European Communist Parties, were still not inclined to emulate the Chinese Communists and suspend their relations with the U.S.S.R. Indeed, it would seem that Charrillo chose to retreat a bit when he wrote in late 1968:

Those Communist parties, including our own, which have disapproved of the intervention, stress at the same time that nothing has altered in our attitude towards the Great October Soviet Revolution, towards the Party of Lenin or towards the Soviet Union. . . . We continue firmly to defend the Soviet Union and all socialist revolutions, which constitutes the highest gains of the world working-class and the forces of progress.

Those who cherish illusions about the emergence of a "new Communism" of a geographical nature, of a "western Communism" like those who once cherished illusions about a "national Communism"--are in for a rude awakening.13

Carrillo thus tried to preserve the integrity of the international movement. It must be remembered that, at this time, the United States was engaged in a war with the People's Democratic Republic of Vietnam, another socialist state. The signs of a lack in solidarity on the part of the international movement might have given the United States encouragement in its pursuit of the war. This did not keep the Spanish Party from calling for an acknowledgement that national sentiment is an important political force that cannot be lightly dismissed. It had to be admitted that diversity did exist and that to rebuild unity this diversity must be recognized.

Carrillo also noted that socialist states played a dominant role in determining the direction of the international movement and that non-ruling parties were being treated as weak sisters constantly in need of guidance. His reply to this situation was that no Communist Party which seriously proposes to make a socialist revolution within its own
country could accept the position of a satellite or place itself in the orbit of another party. He maintained that each party needed to plot its own revolutionary course, taking into account the concrete situation within its own country while applying Marxist-Leninist thought in a creative and original way.\textsuperscript{14}

Carrillo defended diversity within the socialist camp as not only a reality that could not be ignored, but a manifestation of a healthy socialist group able to deal effectively and practically with the conditions particular to each member. In this respect he went on to write:

It must be understood that diversity is not a sign of weakness, incoherence or confusion, nor of abandonment of principle. Diversity is essentially a sign of strength, of development it is a characteristic of the great strength of our movement and its roots in the life of the people.\textsuperscript{15}

He also defended the concept of national interest as being an acceptable consideration for any party. This, of course, is an important change of attitude for the Spanish Communists. The P.C.E. had not hesitated in the least when it was necessary to sacrifice the Comintern directives. It was for this reason that the Spanish General-Secretary wrote:

Today a real Communist Party, nationalist and internationalist at one and the same time, must maintain its own independent character, its own strategy, its own concept of the application of Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of its own country.\textsuperscript{16}

The invasion of Czechoslovakia was considered as unjustified ideologically or strategically. Carrillo's position had come to be that there was no need for intervention because the resolution of reform within Czechoslovakia was the business of the Czech party. He then
enlarged on that premise to state that while there would be no schi- 
smatic break with Moscow on the part of Western Communists, the C.P.S.U. 
had to accept the validity of diverse policies within the international 
movement. Common strategies on common problems may in fact be possible, 
but there could not be one specific strategy or program which could be 
universally applied.

It would seem that the Spanish did not intend to cause an 
irreparable split between themselves and the Soviets. To do so would 
have been an ill-conceived policy considering the fact that the P.C.E. 
was an illegal party in need of refuge for its exile leadership and 
support for its party infrastructure. The insubordinations of the 
Spaniards was more vocal than those of the Italian and French parties, 
but Carrillo was careful to try and appease the Soviets in an article in 
_Nuestra Bandera_. Nevertheless, the incident touched off internal dis-
sent on which the Soviets sought to capitalize.

Two Central Committee members living in the Soviet Union, 
Eduardo Garcia and Augusto Gomez, refused to accept the Party's stand 
and began a campaign to discredit Carrillo. Other members of the P.C.E. 
living in the Soviet Union denounced this activity and the "dividing and 
splittest" activities of the two members. It was clear to these people 
that the Soviet Union was resorting to the time honored device of try-
ing to split the party. It was claimed that the two were sending "let-
ters, documents, spreading confusion and creating distrust, thus bring-
ing discredit to the policy and decisions adopted by the Central 
Committee."17
These two dissidents were expelled from the Central Committee and later from the party. They persisted in their efforts to undermine the Party leadership. Another member of the Party, Enrique Lister and four other Central Committee members were expelled in 1970 after they too repeatedly criticized Carrillo. Lister and the others formed a rival party and published their own version of the Spanish Communist newspaper, Mundo Obrero.

The actions of these dissidents, backed by the Soviet Union, caused Carrillo to draw closer to the Yugoslav and Rumanian parties and confer with the P.C.I. The Spanish Party's radio transmitter was moved from Czechoslovakia and into Rumania. Carrillo also solicited support from the Italian and Belgian Communist Parties over the expulsion of pro-Soviet elements. Carrillo blasted east European countries for their sudden willingness to establish relations with the Franco government as a betrayal of Communist solidarity. The Soviet Union was held responsible for this action and others designed to undermine the position of the P.C.E. In 1970, the Soviets shipped coal to Spain in order to relieve the pressure from coal-miners strike in the Asturias region. Such actions as these only further embittered the Spanish Communists and encouraged the P.C.E. to deviate further from the Soviet orbit at the end of the decade.

An Increased Desire for Autonomy

The actions of Carrillo and the Spanish Party during the first years of the seventies were intended to further the success of a
specifically Spanish policy designed to form a broad anti-Franco coalition. The willingness to work with the elements from the Falange, Opus Dei, Catholic organizations and other interested elements such as intellectuals and students became the main domestic concern. The relations between the P.C.E. and the C.P.S.U. were strained but not suspended. The Spanish remained content to explore closer contacts with other Communist Parties while also investing their energies in endorsing the *Pact for Liberty*. First begun in the Catalonia region, this common understanding continued into 1974. After the death of Carrero Blanco, the P.C.E. intensified its drive towards accommodation with the middle-classes. During the summer of 1974, the *Democratic Junta* was formed so that a more formal organization could be used to galvanize a broad anti-Franco movement. The assassination of Blanco, destined to be Franco's successor, added an enormous momentum to the activities of the party. With this increase in interest, the Spanish Party began to openly flaunt its self-proclaimed independence from Moscow and clearly define its national and international policies.

The anti-government coup in Chile had a sobering effect on Carrillo's strategy. He and other European Communist leaders were concerned about the ramifications that the affairs in Chile meant for the course of socialist transition in Europe. Carrillo's own analysis of the situation led him in 1974 to plan a strategy based on these observations:

As I see it, there are three lessons to be learned from it: 1. It is essential for the proletariat to remain allied with the middle strata and not become isolated.
2. If you try to carry out a socialist experiment along the Democratic road and if you don't have the support of the majority of the people, you must be able to resign in good time from government, so that tension doesn't degenerate into civil war, and must submit the question to universal suffrage, so that you can try to return later when you are stronger.

3. When you propose to remain in power, you should take all the necessary measures to fight at the right time, if the enemy abandons legality and resorts to force.\(^{19}\)

These statements reveal a clear illustration of the development of the Eurocommunist positions for domestic action. Allende's troubles in Chile influenced many of the Communist leaders who were in the process of developing Eurocommunist strategies for their parties. Carrillo, like other interested parties, had concluded that the lessons of Chile could be applied to both the Spanish situation and other European countries as well.

It was Carrillo's aim to develop a strategy which would actively involve the P.C.E. in political co-operation with other groups to avoid polarization. Since Spanish Communist policy had long intended to create a broad, moderate, anti-Franco popular front, the adjustments made after the Chilean coup were not really extraordinary in nature. As Carrillo so bluntly put it:

\[\ldots\] either one does this, which will make it possible to emerge in a new situation and turn socialist aims into something real--or else one preserves one's "revolutionary virginity" and does nothing. That is the problem \ldots\] our Party is capable of conducting this policy of broad union, of convergence, even with the neo-capitalist sectors, without becoming trapped in these tactics and while maintaining all its strategy.\(^{20}\)

On the subject of international affairs and the world Communist movement, Carrillo had also reached a number of conclusions. Alexander Solzhenitsyn's book *Gulag Archipelago* had given rise to new anti-Soviet
feelings within Europe. The revelations contained within the work were damaging to the Soviet Union's prestige. Carrillo supported Solzhenitsyn's actions and wondered why the Soviets should repress what he considered constructive criticism. This marked a renewal of the Soviet-Spanish conflict. Carrillo was also willing to join with other European Communists in criticizing the Portuguese Communist Party for its actions in the wake of the coup which swept Caetano from the leadership of that nation. Carrillo went so far as to declare that the events of Portugal demonstrated the correctness of the line that the Spanish had been developing. He maintained that progressive Spanish elements, including some in the army, could and should be courted by the P.C.E. He stated that, "The possibility of a compromise with the neo-capitalists has never arisen until now. Before the events in Portugal, practice had never demonstrated that the choice of such a course was correct." 21

In June of 1975 the head of the Italian Communist Party, Enrico Berlinguer, and Carrillo issued a statement at Livorno which criticized the Portuguese and underscored a co-operative line that was developing between the Spanish and the Italians. The P.C.I., which had undertaken its own program of moderation and compromise, had been uneasy about the Soviet actions vis-a-vis Solzhenitsyn. The Italians had also recently encountered difficulties in their relations with the C.P.S.U. and they found it comforting to make common cause in resisting Soviet pressures. During this time the Soviets were pushing the parties to organize an all-European Communist Conference with the intent of re-couping their
position as the leading state in the world socialist movement.

It is interesting to note that the French Communist Party leader Marchais had in May of 1975 criticized the Chinese for deserting Marxism-Leninism. Marchais referred to Ten Hsiao-Ping, then on an official visit to France, in a contemptuous tone. He appeared to stop just short of calling for the ouster of the Chinese leadership and praised the merits of Stalin. Marchais rejected the idea that West European Communists were divided between a "centralizing" or pro-Soviet group and one that favored autonomy. This event was accorded greater notoriety than the Carrillo-Berlinguer meeting a month later. The most ironic quality is that six months later Marchais and Berlinguer issued a statement in Rome which was intended to demonstrate French-Italian autonomy and insure the appearance of French independence from Moscow. The French maintained the action was aimed at the Portuguese who had tried to bypass a popular democratic process. This event was front page news and considered a dramatic ideological statement.

It is clear that the Spanish Communists had earlier reached this analysis concerning the Portuguese and had taken action to demonstrate their position. The fact that it was a small party, whose existence within Spain was still clandestine, obviously affected the visibility of the P.C.E. and the importance accorded to its actions. This, however, does not contradict the evidence that the P.C.E. was one of the first Eurocommunist parties to explicitly define its position vis-a-vis Moscow and the Portuguese coup.

It was during 1975 that the Spanish Communists were steadily
employing the tactics of rapprochement with the middle-class and neo-capitalist elements in an effort to bring about a democratic revolution. The last half of 1975 witnessed an upsurge of violence and terrorism as the Francoist government began to de-stabilize. The Communists were responsible for acts of defiance, but the violent activities within Spain were the product of a variety of groups covering a wide range of the political spectrum. The P.C.E. was devoting the bulk of its attention in this part of 1975 to pressuring the Spanish government for the democratization and liberalization of the regime. The pressures for reform continued throughout 1976. In June of that year Carrillo attended the European Conference of Communists in East Berlin. At this meeting, Carrillo, who had yet to see his own party become legalized, attacked the Soviet Union and insisted that there was no directing center. It was important for Carrillo to establish his independence from the U.S.S.R. at this point, because the struggle within Spain for democratic reforms was being intensified. The Communist-led Democratic Junta and the Democratic Platform had joined forces in March. In April there had reportedly been a suggestion by some officials of the U.S.S.R. that the Spanish Communist Party leadership should and would be changed if such action would make the party legal. This suggestion must have angered Carrillo and contributed to his conduct at the European conference.

Leonid Brezhnev had opened the conference with a conciliatory speech which conceded that each national party owed its allegiance to the working-class of its own nation. Carrillo then attacked the Soviet
leadership after this speech. Italian Communist leader Berlinguer took a less antagonistic line against the Soviets. Other party leaders promoted the idea of greater autonomy, though none other than Carrillo was as critical in their statements.

In his speech Carrillo stated that the essential question in Western Europe was how to arrive at an understanding with the Socialists, Social-Democrats, Christians, radicals, and other movements with democratic convictions. The plans for socialism would have to be based on a respect for political and ideological pluralism, without the rule of one party and in accordance with elections. He stated that diversity was a necessary and important part of the international movement. He insisted that no one should elevate his own conceptions to the rank of dogma and that the character and position of each party should be respected.

After the conference had disbanded Carrillo had further comments for the international press about the course of socialism within Europe and Spain. It must be remembered that Carrillo was speaking at a time when his own party was an illegal organization which was involved in a popular alliance designed to pressure the Spanish government for a liberal, democratic regime. When interviewed after the conference, Carrillo chose to make his actions comparable to those of Martin Luther's rejection of Rome's authority.

Yes, we had our Pope, our Vatican and we thought we were predestined to triumph. But as we mature and become less a church, we must become more rational, closer to reality.

Carrillo continued on to point out that each individual has a
private life and individual perception. In this respect, Carrillo assured the interviewer that a person's choice of friends, music, literature or even religion had nothing to do with the Communist party, which must be concerned with problems of politics and social struggle. The course he had chosen was expected to renew and expand the appeal of the party. He emphasized once again that diversity was a healthy and valuable quality for Communists to enjoy. Heretics, he postured, were usually correct and ahead of their time while conservatism was a condition which discouraged party vitality and vigor.

As for the nature of conditions in Spain, he insisted on the need for a bourgeois democracy. Given this premise, Carrillo foresaw a situation in which the Communist parties of Spain, France, and Italy could compete and co-operate with various political groups for the right to rule their nations. Their desires for electoral victory would be coupled with each party's hopes for affecting their countries' internal policies without external interference. To this end, Carrillo attempted to define the nature of the competition that would exist.

We want a type of socialism with universal suffrage, alternation of government, not control of power for the Communists, but an alliance of forces that in no way would allow a Communist monopoly. He later spoke of the way in which the system would function as the fortunes of parties rose and fell.

We mean the Communist party could be in one co-alition government, and if it lost out in the next elections, it would be outside. Some economic changes would have been achieved and would remain, but there would be a whole range of political issues.
From this interview it is clear that Carrillo actively sought the appearance of a moderate, almost reformist, line. For the success of the party in Spain this would be a necessary course. Wild radical policies and the advocacy of revolutionary tactics would have played into the hands of the post-Franco government that was hoping to isolate the P.C.E. The Conference in East Berlin had afforded him much publicity and a chance to send a message to both the Francoists in power and the coalition partners of the Front working to pressure the Spanish regime. The course the Spanish leader chose at this meeting marked him as a political renegade and pushed him to the forefront of the autonomy movement within West European Communism. Neither the French nor the Italians had gone as far as Carrillo in objecting to Soviet influence.

The question of the necessity for this extremism must be entertained with the French and Italian reticence in mind. Carrillo obviously had much to gain by opposing himself to Moscow. The giant power against a small, but courageous party and its leader, was certainly a scenario which could produce a high sense of dramatic effect within Spain. The P.C.I. and the P.C.F. must not have felt the same need for posturing as they remained less vocal in their differences of opinion with the Soviet leadership. In light of Carrillo's past experiences with the C.P.S.U., and especially its remark concerning a leadership change, it is not surprising that he would appear at the conference with such an anti-Soviet line.

It might have been Carrillo's desire to embarrass the Soviets
through his actions. He could exploit the image of a small, illegal party, challenging the omnipotent Soviet party and escaping essentially unscathed. The post-conference press coverage was a coup for the Spanish, because they emerged from the conference as celebrities, while the Soviets had to suffer the indignity of insubordination by one of Communism's lesser parties.

It does not seem likely that in this case, Carrillo and the Spanish Communists were consciously playing the role of ideological and political vanguard for the Italians and French. Each of these parties had made its own declaration of autonomy publicly long before the meeting. Both parties were substantially larger than the Spanish party, and both were functioning as legal parties within electoral systems. The French and Italians could have benefited by the anti-Soviet, nationalist position taken by the Spanish much sooner than the P.C.E. It would seem that whatever Carrillo's intention when he scored the Soviets, he was not acting specifically as a "point-man" for the Italians and French. Whether he intended to or not however, Carrillo had expanded the boundaries of dissent within the international movement.

After the conference, it was the P.C.I. and the P.C.F. which endeavored to come to Carrillo's aid. The heads of all three parties met in Madrid in early 1977. It was at this meeting that the three stressed that their parties should be known as "Eurocommunists." They took this to mean that each party should have the right to adapt Communist tenets to the conditions within its country and retain its independence on an international plane. This call for independence was likely to be a
benefit for the Spanish in their own dealings with suspicious domestic allies. For Carrillo, the prestige of having Marchais and Berlinguer visit Madrid and make common policy with him must surely have helped his position inside the P.C.E. Within the Spanish political scene, a Spanish party independent from the Soviet Union would greatly ease the fears of Spanish politicians who remembered the Civil War and the unwavering loyalty of the P.C.E. to the Comintern.

If Carrillo were to make his new Eurocommunist policies successful, he would have to convince the Spanish populace of his sincerity. He had been pushing a line of national reconciliation since the fifties. During the sixties he had come to consider the strategy of alliances for the purpose of attaining "bourgeois democracy" to be the most prudent course for his party. After 1968, his increasingly independent attitude had helped him to overcome the Civil War legacy. In the early seventies he had managed to establish a working understanding with other political elements in Spain. He had taken the initiative in speaking out on what he considered foolhardy Communist policies in Portugal. At the Berlin Conference he had made himself the most visible anti-Soviet party leader. In bringing Marchais and Berlinguer to Madrid, he was once again gathering momentum. Although neither the French nor Italians were prepared to go to the reformist extremes he sometimes pushed, Carrillo was intent on establishing his own credibility as a bonafide "Eurocommunist." It was therefore a logical step for him to define his Eurocommunist ideology. He did this in a tract which presented his views to the Spanish public and all the others. This statement appeared as a book in
1977, entitled *Eurocommunism and the State*. It is Carrillo's projection of a new, more autonomous European Communism. It is his primary definition of the general aims of Eurocommunism and the specific conditions of the Spanish Communists' variant.

**Eurocommunism and the State: Carrillo's Eurocommunist Views**

In the introduction to his book, *Eurocommunism and the State*, Carrillo states that there is no precise definition of Eurocommunism. He is convinced that practice outpaces theory and therefore theory is a generalization of practice. The Spanish General-Secretary is quick to point out that Eurocommunism is a tendency, not an organized movement. There is no one common program, simply an interest in general principles. It would be incorrect to consider Eurocommunism as a "third force" because this notion itself runs contrary to the basic themes of autonomy and particularity. Eurocommunist attitudes should not be considered a re-capitulation of more traditional social-democratic tenets, but a re-evaluation of the revolutionary conditions in certain types of states in the world today. Indeed, Carrillo has at times regarded the label "Eurocommunist" to be a misnomer because the underlying assumptions might also be valid in other industrialized, westernized, states such as Japan.

The key to understanding the revisions in Marxist ideology that Carrillo proposes lie in what he assumes to be changes in the modern state. These revisions are totally in keeping with his
conception of the spirit of Marxims. He is concerned that his position not be mistaken for a social-democratic revisionism or an opportunist ploy for a political acceptance. The primary intention is to develop a "firmly based" conception of the possibility of democratizing the capitalist state apparatus, thereby adapting it for building a socialist society without its forcible total destruction. The transformation of the State apparatus is of utmost importance, and this must be carried out according to the dual considerations of ideology and objective reality. Carrillo makes an issue of the need to closely observe the development of the means of production in any socialist transformation. The technological and economic accomplishments of a society must serve as the basic foundation for the transformation of the State apparatus. He states:

Socialist relations of production which rest on an insufficiently developed basis of the productive forces, can have only formal socialist aspects, in the same sense as we refer to formal freedom in Bourgeois society.29

It is possible for there to be an ideological commitment to socialist transformation, but it is inevitable that the development of the means of production become a concern of the socialist vanguard. It is at this point, Carrillo believes, that leaders commit the "anomalies" and "aberrations" of history as they try to force economic development. In that observation, an insult to the Stalinist heritage can be recognized, and also an explanation of why it occurred. It is Carrillo's intention to put some ideological distance between himself and past Soviet developmental models. He also wishes to disown any conservative ethic of Soviet Marxism which contradicts the need to
re-define existing social and economic relationships.

For this purpose, it is necessary to consider the changes in the structure and function of the State that have taken place since the passing of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. It is said by Carrillo their attitude toward the state was that it was an instrument for the domination of one class by another. Carrillo also acknowledges further contributions by Gramscii and Althusser which define the ideological apparatus that supplements the coercive character of the State. Carrillo adds to these facets still another factor.

... one should now add another dimension which the capitalist State is increasingly assuming as representative of the major dominant economic groups: The control of economic development, which means that those parts of social activity which escape the direct intervention of the State become constantly more insignificant.30

Carrillo considers the modern State still an instrument of domination, but the structures and roles of the State have grown to be far more complex than those which Marx, Engels, and Lenin had analyzed. As a result of its new functions, Carrillo considers the modern capitalist state to be a **Director** State which involves itself in all sectors of the economy as both employer and guardian.31 Within the Eurocommunist countries this description of the modern state is easily recognized and applicable. In France, Italy, and Spain there is a mix of private and state ownerships in which the governments play an important part. The Spanish government was in fact the focus for modernization and development within that country. The Italian and French governments have also moved into the forefront of their national economies.
Carrillo explains that this form of state intervention no longer serves the whole of the bourgeoisie which modernization has created. Presently, the only sector whose interests are served is that of the monopolistic groups which control the economically fundamental industries and concerns. This creates a situation in which there is a confrontation by not only the proletariat but also directly by the broadest social classes and strata including some of the bourgeoisie. This provides the potential for a common political interest among various segments of the society against monopolistic interests.

This development is betrayed by a crisis of the ideological apparatuses of the State. For Carrillo's Eurocommunist strategy, the absorption of these control apparatuses by the rising socialist trends is an important strategy. He states that:

The strategy of revolutions of today, in the developed capitalist countries, must be oriented to turning these ideological apparatuses around, to transform them and utilize them—if not wholly then partly—against the Statepower of monopoly capitalism.

Carrillo expects there to be an opportunity for the Spanish Communists, and the Italians and French as well, to take advantage of the crisis developing in certain appendages of the State apparatus. Through prudent manipulation of these crises the Eurocommunist can speed the convergence of the diverse political elements.

The first such sector which is undergoing a crisis is the church, and more especially for Spain, Italy, and France, the Catholic Church. Progressive elements are beginning to question the basic dimensions of a policy which has kept the church closely allied with
conservative interests. Carrillo maintains that there is a potential for creating an understanding with Catholic elements over the aspects of capitalism which run contrary to Christian notions. Appeals can now be made not only to the Catholic working class but also to the theologians and intellectuals within the Church hierarchy. This potential has been made more evident by the appearance of worker-priests in France, de facto recognition for the Communist vote of the Catholic working class in Italy, or the political accord that has often been struck-up with Catholic labor organs in Spain. The controversy over the "theology of liberation" is still further proof of the possibilities which exist for Marxist-Christian dialogue. This attempt at closing the classical anti-clerical breach is considered by Carrillo to be of utmost importance throughout the Western European scene.

The opening of education to greater sectors of the population has provided what Carrillo considers to be another source of revolutionary potential within both Spanish society and also those of Italy and France. He considers the needs of the modern state to have promoted the pre-conditions for a Marxist appeal to the non-monopolistic segments of society.

There is no doubt that this has been induced by the end of education as the privilege of a small aristocracy, isolated from the people; by the spread of mass education as an imperative for technological development, and the fact that the extraordinary growth of the means of production objectively carries within itself—even before socialism—the tendency to sweep away differences between manual and mental labour.34

Such a crisis in education has for some time been evident in France and Italy and it is also appearing more frequently in Spain. This has
created the possibility for greater participation by more diverse elements in programs intended to bring about socialism through electoral means. Carrillo believes when underemployment or unemployment begins to affect the educated elements, they will become increasingly radicalized. As with the Church, the Eurocommunist position is to take advantage of this process in order to mobilize those disaffected elements for support of Communist Party initiatives.

Carrillo also sees a general crisis affecting such areas as the family, the legal system, and the destabilization of European political systems. He is much less specific on each of these subjects and he is also brief in a discussion of the role of the communications media. He does make it quite clear that the problem Eurocommunists must tackle is the struggle to win positions which dominate the ideological apparatuses with revolutionary ideology. He explains that this does not mean only one party should influence such areas, but that all revolutionary and progressive forces must combine to reverse the traditional roles of these apparatuses.35

Therefore, developed capitalism presents for Carrillo a likely pre-condition for socialist transition. This is because the changes that have taken place within advanced capitalist systems have provided the revolutionary left with a number of opportunities to establish its credibility among broad sections of the middle and working classes. Among these changes that Carrillo has pinpointed are the following: (1) The development of productive forces and the use of mass education to support this development. (2) The inability of private enterprise
to organize this development and the increasing intervention of the
State in underwriting private enterprise. (3) The assumption by the
State of social functions which the State must undertake to avoid im-
balance and serious social conflict (welfare state). (4) The sharpening
of differences between the oligarchic minority and the rest of society.
Carrillo notes here a consumer society less able to fulfill its desires.
This is the "proletarianization" of professional people. (5) The
greater dependence on nations which are continually increasing the
price of their raw materials. He explains that just as bourgeois
society was formed in the womb of the feudal regime, so socialist socie-
ty has matured in the womb of developed capitalist society.36

Also of great interest to Carrillo is the coercive apparatuses
of the State. This is, of course, particularly significant in the
Spanish situation because of the Army's traditional restraining role in
politics. In both France and Italy the Army and the state security
forces have also shown signs of a strong conservative bias. However,
Carrillo notes that recently within Italy and France, sections of the
state security forces have begun to reconsider their conservatism and
to support revolutionary parties. He sees the same possibility in
Spain, but it will be necessary for the Spanish, the French, and the
Italian Eurocommunists to continue to exploit these tendencies. This
can be accomplished by adopting a new attitude toward the security
forces. Part of this new attitude is to recognize the need for police
forces, but with narrower parameters for action.
The forces of public order, the police, should exist to defend society from anti-social elements, to control traffic, to protect the population. Popular demonstrations and strikes are not conflicts of public order. . . .

This view is willing to concede the necessity for the police apparatus, but insists that they not be used for political purposes. It is indeed an ironic statement for a Communist Party General-Secretary to make. In the context of Spanish politics, however, it is to be expected. The past Francoist policy of suppression of political opposition had heavily relied on the State security forces and the Army to quash any serious threats.

Carrillo wants to end the traditional role of the Spanish army as an internal security force and organize it for the specific purpose of national defense. He calls for a moderation of the army and a greater degree of professionalism in its ranks. In order to accomplish this, the army must be de-politicized and the officer corps must be democratized. In calling for a professionalism and modernization, Carrillo writes:

The forces of the left, and particularly we Marxists, must actively tackle military problems as a very decisive component in the socialist transition of society. 38

Carrillo is convinced that society cannot be transformed without changing the State, and in order to change the State its army and police forces must also be changed. He offers the army modernization in return for a democratization of its structure and its abstention from politics. He regards the army as a necessary safeguard on national independence, but makes it clear he cannot accept military meddling in social issues. In keeping with his other theses of reversing the
traditional roles of the State apparatuses, Carrillo poses the question of whether a democratic transformation of the military can be attained through a social crisis other than war. He provides the reader with the answer that if the role of the military can be restructured so that officers become technicians, scientists and intellectual educators of men skilled in protecting Spain from external aggression, then this section of the State apparatus will no longer be an obstacle to socialist transition.

... in this modern conception, the military man is not a member of a kind of closed order, isolated from and above society but a participant in a teaching body devoted to imparting certain specific information to the citizens so that they can defend the country's territorial integrity in case of need.39

This is far removed from the traditional role of the Spanish army. The Eurocommunist platform calls for the military retreat from the field of politics and its retraining as a viable defense force. The Communist Party must have a military policy which can attract the professional military man and redirect his involvement. If a democratically installed government intent on socialist transition is to remain stable and survive, Carrillo considers this military reorientation an absolute necessity within Spain.

The dimensions of democratic transition to socialism lie at the core of Carrillo's Eurocommunist tract. Carrillo recognizes that in order to make this Eurocommunist transition agreeable to the middle-class sectors he must accept the co-existence of public and private forms of property. The integration of the social forces is destined to come about in a natural process without coercion. Social
and political differences will exist, but the basic control of the means of production will move increasingly into the public sector. Carrillo's vision of this enlarging of the public sector includes provisions for technocratic direction tempered by input from organized labor forces.

Criticism of the Spanish Eurocommunist policies as reformism is ignored by the top Spanish leadership. The conditions and analyses attending the other socialist transitions throughout the world are viewed as complex and particular aspects. Each party has acted accordingly and every revolutionary situation has its own characteristics. It is Santiago Carrillo's position that his Eurocommunist themes are the best possible for the Spanish. He considers them to be the product of a concrete reality. In this manner, he refuses to accept the criticisms of the Soviets or any other Communist party over strategy in the Spanish Communists' conduct of their domestic programs.

For socialism to proceed democratically in Spain, the validity of the democratic process must become accepted fully by all the political participants. Both the right and the left have often denigrated the parliamentary method. The success of fascism is said to have demonstrated not the uselessness of democracy but the powerless position of a divided working class without middle class partners. Now, says Carrillo, the time has come in Western Europe when true socialist forces can become part of the government through universal suffrage. Once in power, they must still be subject to popular approval in order to assure accountability. Eurocommunist parties must be willing and able to accept criticism of their programs without violent or suppressive
reaction. Since these parties themselves have adopted critical attitudes toward the political systems of other socialist states, Carrillo expects self-criticism and the complaints of others to be considered useful as well. He is very quick to point out that he distinguishes between serious criticism and slander. Yet he repeats that:

The masses must have the right to deprive their elected representatives of their mandates if they do not fulfill them, and to elect new ones. They must have the possibility of intervening at all levels of power, in the economic, social, and cultural fields; this underlines the value of forms of democratic self-management and peoples control. 40

This intervention includes the right to demonstrations and political strikes. Only terrorism, violence, libel and slander are considered anti-democratic and anti-social.

The Communist Parties in Western Europe are now on the verge of undertaking new roles and functions and the Eurocommunist parties should continue to be the vanguard of socialist transition. This is held to be especially true since they are now the prophets of a new creative Marxist conception. However, these organizations must no longer consider themselves the only parties capable of organizing political forces for socialist transition. The Eurocommunist attitude towards competition from other socialist parties should be one of respect and healthy competition. This is a far cry from the practices of the Spanish Civil War when the P.C.E. worried as much about the far-left parties as it did the Francoist forces. If modern Communists are to accept the historical validity of Marxism, then they must also realize that non-Communist parties are capable of unconsciously being part of the eventual socialist transition.
The Communist parties are also expected to further democratize themselves and to elicit a new wave of creative opinion. Collective discipline must be maintained, but outside of the party's political tasks the members should be free to participate in their own private interests. Culture, art, science, humanities, and the like are not to be disciplined. It is these elements which should provide the basis for a continuing re-appraisal of the party's own direction.

The West European Communist Parties cannot aim to be the sole political force in the societies or states. Their role must be that of contributing to the victory of progressive forces and the attainment of socialism. There is no question of a party obtaining a monopoly of power, for each progressive element must combine in a co-operative effort which reflects the strength and political significance of the participants.

This means a "rectification" of the traditional roles of the Communist parties. These rectifications are the result of changes that the advanced capitalist societies have undergone, and means there will be a "new political formation."

The idea of the new political formation is linked with that of the hegemony of the bloc of the forces of labour and culture in society. . . . That is to say, this new political formation would be something like a confederation of political parties and various social organizations, which would act on a consensus basis, respecting the individuality and independence of each of the parties and organizations.41

Each party or segment would retain their own independence, though they would continue to endorse a co-operative effort for the restructuring and reorganization of the society and the economy. The
formation of such a widespread common effort cannot be accomplished in a single tactical maneuver. The Eurocommunists must build it one step at a time, aided by the Communist Parties' careful formulation of programs intended to deal with social crises as they arise.

This Eurocommunist approach is not a political ploy by the Soviet Union. Carrillo is adamant in his position that these policies are "an autonomous strategic conception in the process of formulation, born of experience of those concerned and of concrete reality." It is not a continuance of Soviet policy, but one which is aimed at being independent of super-power spheres of influence. At times, Carrillo appears to advocate a socialist United States of Europe.

... The socialist forces of each state cannot detach themselves from a certain common strategy on the European level. This tendency, in order to maintain itself and achieve victory, needs coordinated action on a European scale. It is precisely this that can contribute decisively to the creation of a united Europe standing on its own feet, bringing the continent's resources into play and making it possible for it to fulfill a role of its own within the global balances of forces.

Eurocommunism is not concerned with the administration of the modern capitalist states in Europe, for its intention is to transform them. It promises to bring about a convergence of a socialist, social democratic, democratic parties, and progressive Christians in Spain and throughout the rest of Europe. Having accomplished this, the European states would then be able to better organize themselves for their own benefit. Carrillo's aim is to have a Europe independent of both the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

Spain will then exist in a Europe of peoples, oriented toward socialism, in which it can preserve its own individuality.
structure of Western Europe's political institutions (Parliaments, pluralism, decentralization, separation of powers, etc.) can be utilized and enhanced in Spain by a socialist economic reorganization. It will also be necessary for the Spanish to open new channels of trade and communication to the Third World and socialist countries. Furthermore, the P.C.E. will not push for actions that might encourage the leaving of large sums of investment capital. Carrillo considers it unlikely that economic transformation will happen in one stage. He is therefore prepared to allow foreign investments which underwrite Spanish development.

This will mean that investments of foreign capital and the functioning of the multinationals in our country will not be hindered, and consequently that foreign capital in Spain would extract profits.45

This capitalist-socialist symbiosis is already taking place in Carrillo's view, and Spain's main concern must be that foreign investment be integrated into a national plan and kept from interfering in the internal affairs of the Spanish state. Carrillo is realistic about the terms of trade and commerce in the world economy.

The laws of the market, with certain exceptions dictated by the needs of political solidarity, also govern, the commercial relations among socialist countries, and these countries often give preference to commercial transactions with capitalist countries because of technological advantages and favorable credits.46

He criticizes the nature of trade imbalances within the East European COMECON arrangement. This is why a Spanish Eurocommunist economic policy will have to co-exist with foreign capital investment in its future. The key element in this relationship must be the continued independence of the Spanish state to pursue the growth of socialism.
It is Santiago Carrillo's position that the Eurocommunist parties generally agree on the need to advance socialism with democracy, a multi-party system, parliaments, representative institutions, popular input through universal suffrage, trade unions independent of the State and political parties, freedom for opposition, human rights, religious freedom, freedom for cultural and scientific creation, and the development of popular participation. The parties must also maintain a total independence from an international leading center in their relations to socialist states. Solidarity with the Third World countries in their struggles against neo-colonialism and imperialism from any quarter is another important component. Each of the Eurocommunist parties is striving for cooperation and peaceful co-existence while overcoming the international organization of military blocs, the dismantling of foreign bases, the prohibition of nuclear weapons and international policy of disarmament.

Carrillo recognizes that the parties have not all developed their policies in exactly the same manner or at the same time. He does insist that each of them share these common policies. He acknowledges the long and difficult path by which each of the parties have come to these positions. Carrillo's contribution to the Eurocommunist movement cannot be denied. There may very well be questions about its political feasibility or ideological consistency, but there is no question about its direction. The Spanish Eurocommunist position is very often criticized by the Soviet Union for its aspirations and contents. The Soviets denounce the Spanish for their revisionist attitudes while their own
response has constantly been one of profound mistrust. These reactions have characterized the prevalent Soviet conceptions of Eurocommunist autonomy as a whole. In order to successfully employ their programs, the Eurocommunist parties will have to court their respective domestic electorates while reacting cautiously to the foreign policies of this Communist super-power.

Reactions to Carrillo's Theses

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union reacted strongly to Carrillo's document. The leadership of the C.P.S.U. considered it to be a serious threat to the heavy Soviet influence upon the ideology of the international movement. In the June 25, 1977, issue of the Soviet magazine, New Times, an editorial appeared which harshly criticized Carrillo's book. It accused him of trying to pit the Communist Parties of Western Europe against the Soviet Union and its socialist allies, discredit existing socialism, and the formation of an anti-Soviet bloc. The Soviet article also stated that:

The concept of Eurocommunism is erroneous also because it affords grounds for assuming that what is in question, as has been rightly scored in many documents of Communist Parties, is not some specific features of strategy of Communist Parties of some countries, but some sort of specific brand of Communism. Yet there is only one Communism--if we speak of true, scientific Communism--mainly that whose foundations were laid by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and whose principles are adhered to by the present day Communist movement.47

The Soviets maintained that Carrillo had mistaken strategy for ideology. They also assailed him on his desire for a non-aligned Europe.
The underlying idea is the "union" of Western Europe on what is in effect an anti-Soviet platform. No wonder Carrillo's projections of this kind meet with approbation on the part of bourgeois propagandists and ideologues.48

It was the Soviet position that Carrillo's intention was to split the international socialist movement. The Spanish General-Secretary's analyses were rejected as being solely in the interest of imperialism. Long passages of the editorial then went on to extol the revolutionary virtues of the Soviet state in an answer to the criticisms that were perceived in his Eurocommunist text. The editorial then questioned:

How other than anti-Soviet can one qualify Carrillo's monstrous statement that the Soviet Union is to blame for the arms race, and that it pursues great power objectives? What other interpretation can be given to his slanderous allegations that the Soviet Union makes use of the class struggle and internationalism as an instrument of achievement of precisely such aims?49

The article went on to attack Carrillo's credibility and encouraged the membership of the P.C.E. to carefully consider the implications of following the General-Secretary's leadership.

Today too, the C.P.S.U. holds that the highroad of relations between our parties is the road of friendship, co-operation, and joint struggle. However, Carrillo's crude anti-Sovietism is plainly causing considerable damage to these relations. Responsibility rests with him.50

The Soviet Union had apparently taken quite seriously Carrillo's Eurocommunist positions. An editorial in the New York Times later remarked that it was not the Spanish strategies that provoked criticism or endangered Soviet interests, it was the publication of Carrillo's ideas which the C.P.S.U. feared would be disruptive.51

Within Spain, the Soviet remarks were treated simply as an attempt to discredit the P.C.E. and damage the co-operation being forged
among the Eurocommunist parties. The Spanish Communists' Central Committee responded with a statement which read:

For Spain and for other capitalist societies with similar characteristics, the way called Eurocommunism offers the only valid alternative for the advanced socialism.\textsuperscript{52}

Carrillo lamented the timing of the attack because of its potential consequences:

My only complaint was that the attack was not launched 8 days before the elections, because probably it would have gotten us many thousands of votes.\textsuperscript{53}

The Spanish Communist Party continued to appear unconcerned and unified in the wake of the Soviet criticism. While some internal differences were reported to have surfaced, the public image was one of cohesion and strength.\textsuperscript{54}

The Yugoslav party was quick to come to Carrillo's aid. It attacked the Soviets for the way in which they had responded to Carrillo's book. The following statement illustrates the Yugoslavs feelings.

These methods are one of the reasons that the so-called "real-socialism" that exists in nations like the Soviet Union cannot be presented as the actual model of socialist society.\textsuperscript{55}

The Italians also supported the Spanish, but not as aggressively. The P.C.I. said its position called for a Europe independent of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. The Italians also noted that Carrillo's book contained some mistakes and ambiguities. The French Communists simply reprinted the Italian statements and then commented that the "Soviet denunciation where anathema replaces a profound analysis of complex problems comes at a time when the Spanish Communist Party is conducting
a difficult and courageous struggle to liquidate the aftermath of dictatorship in Spain."

The responses of the Soviets and also the other Eurocommunists removed any doubt about Santiago Carrillo becoming the most radical Eurocommunist leader. Neither the Italian or French parties were willing to go as far as the Spanish in responding to the Soviet criticisms. The Italian Party openly admitted in their newspaper that their position was somewhere between the Spanish and the French. The French criticized Moscow for its tactics, but did not challenge the Soviet assertions. Carrillo's impression was that both the P.C.I. and the P.C.F. had been very tranquil after the Soviet attacks. The Yugo-slave party analyzed the situation as being one in which the C.P.S.U. and the P.C.E. formed two opposite poles between which Communist Parties would eventually have to choose.

This may in fact be the case, but the general polarization has not yet come about. The Spanish have proceeded with their Eurocommunist programs while the Italians and French vacillate between opposition and co-operation in their own countries. For the Italians, the Eurocommunist path has been rocky because of Christian Democratic intransigence. The French have been distristful of their Socialist allies and their co-operative efforts have lacked consistency. The Spanish Communists, now at the front of the Eurocommunist movement, go their own way as a party with 10 per cent of the vote and as the partners of Adolfo Suarez's centrist government. Perhaps as their strength increases they too will experience the difficulties of the Italians and French. Yet,
a socialist transition and the development of Eurocommunism in Europe may well take place under the tutelage of the Spanish Communists. In the most recent years, the P.C.E. has become important enough to develop a program which frightens the C.P.S.U. and commands the respect of many European Communist Parties.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III


4 Carrillo, op. cit., p. 60.

5 Ibid., p. 63.


7 Carrillo, op. cit., p. 150.


9 Ibid., p. 154.


11 Ibid., p. 166.


13 Ibid., pp. 175-176.

14 Ibid., p. 187.

15 Ibid., p. 188.
16 Ibid., p. 196.


19 Santiago Carrillo, Dialogue on Spain, p. 187.

20 Ibid., p. 188.

21 Ibid., p. 134.


26 Ibid., p. 2.

27 Ibid., p. 2.


30 Ibid., p. 20.

31 Ibid., p. 24.

32 Ibid., p. 24.

33 Ibid., pp. 27-28. For an enlightening review of Communist electoral policies in advanced industrial states in a vein similar to Eurocommunism, see "The J.C.P.'s Parliamentary Road" by Hong N. Kim in Problems of Communism, vol. 26, no. 2.

34 Ibid., p. 33.

35 Ibid., p. 44.

37 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
38 Ibid., pp. 63-64.
39 Ibid., p. 70.
42 Ibid., p. 103.
43 Ibid., p. 103. See "The Eurocommunism of Santiago Carrillo" by Giovani Russo in Corriere della Sera (Milan), February 26, 1976.
44 Ibid., p. 105.
46 Ibid., p. 107.
48 Ibid., p. 11.
49 Ibid., p. 12.
50 Ibid., p. 13. See also "Spain's Red Luther" by Milton Benjamin and Miguel Acoca in Newsweek, August 16, 1976.
55 Ibid., p. 1.

CONCLUSION

The development of the Eurocommunist programs has been an evolutionary process which has unfolded gradually over the years. The notoriety attached to the independent policies promoted by the Italian, French and the Spanish Communist Parties is of a more recent vintage. This study, focusing particularly on Spain, has traced the overall development of the desire for autonomy on the part of the three Eurocommunist Parties. It is clear the ideological shift has not taken place at any one particular step, but has been the product of an ongoing re-evaluation of revolutionary strategy by the concerned organizations.

The several stages of Eurocommunist growth were all marked by certain challenges to the discipline and leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the international Communist movement. Not all of these challenges originated within the domain of the Eurocommunist parties, but at each turn there occurred an event which benefited or influences their own reorientation. By the middle of this decade the parties had defined for themselves basic themes on which to build their own specific domestic strategies and international policies.

The rise of the Eurocommunist tendencies had been interpreted by some as being a unified, anti-Soviet movement. It might be better to consider it a trend which has captured the imagination of a set of adherents. As Santiago Carrillo has stated, the Eurocommunist themes are actually applicable to any region which exhibits the same types of
advanced capitalism and its ensuing crises. The convergence of middle and working classes is an important and fundamental observation upon which the Eurocommunist strategy is based. The Communist politicians in Spain, Italy, and France feel that this convergence is an authentic social phenomenon and that it can and must be utilized by them. As a result, each Communist party has adjusted its own domestic policies in order to forge a wider based coalition of progressive forces. This strategy is not considered an automatic guarantee of victory. It is believed to be a more pragmatic and potentially successful method than the past faithfulness to Soviet inspired ideological analyses.

The Eurocommunist parties have not turned away from the Soviet Union completely. The French, Italians, and the Spanish have simply reordered their priorities and re-established their patriotic and nationalistic identities. While the Spanish are at present the most radically revisionist of the Eurocommunist parties, there is nothing to prevent a rapprochement with the Soviet party should there be a change of methodology or leadership within that organization. For the time being, however, each party seems content to continue in overcoming intransigence and opposition on the part of their domestic competitors. It is obvious to the different leaderships that this Eurocommunist road will still be difficult and filled with confrontations. By limiting these differences to electoral and political contests, the Eurocommunists feel certain that they will establish democratic credibility with the electorate and eventually become part of a triumphant political coalition. Along the way they must be wary not to provoke internal
violence or international intervention.

The role of the Spanish party and Santiago Carrillo has served to illustrate the changes in dogma that have taken place within the Eurocommunist camp. The Spanish Party has become the leading exponent of the Eurocommunist themes by way of its historical experiences and the ideological revisions of its General-Secretary. It is certain that the Spanish party has contributed to the evolution of the restructuring of Marxist ideology in Western Europe through both philosophy and action.

The Spanish party was formerly a loyal servant of Soviet interests. Its actions during the Spanish Civil War and after betray the degree of subservience to the wishes of the Communist leaders in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Like the other Eurocommunist parties, its disaffection with the Soviets was a gradual process. This drift away from the Soviets was a combination of domestic necessity and irritation at Soviet methods. The P.C.E. had been badly scarred by its experiences during the clandestine period of existence. In order to renew itself, it became necessary to develop policies that allowed for accommodation with non-communist political groups. If accomplishing this meant pulling away from Soviet influence, then Carrillo was willing to take that step. The growth of his independence from the dictates of Moscow has been the yardstick by which one can measure the establishment of a Spanish Eurocommunist approach to socialist transition.

Carrillo's book, Eurocommunism and the State, marked a new era
in Spanish communism. It defined in general terms the facets of revolutionary conditions that are particular to Spain. It is also an extremely important contribution to the understanding of the nature of the Eurocommunist tendencies. This statement about Eurocommunist aims is an exposition of the basic qualities to be found in the shifting strategies of the Eurocommunist parties. The work has firmly established Carrillo's credibility as a leading Eurocommunist tactician among not only the Eurocommunists themselves, but the other parts of the international communist movement. An indication of Carrillo's new importance is the pains the Soviets have taken to discredit him. It is obvious that they perceive him to be a threat to their initiatives. Both the Italians and the French have openly recognized the extremity of Carrillo's positions. While neither party is ready to move as quickly, and as far ideologically as the Spanish have away from the Soviets, the P.C.E. is now watched carefully for its successes or failures.

The Eurocommunist methods are continually being tested in the proving-ground of European politics. Adjustments and revisions are constantly taking place within the context of each party's particular situation. The evolution of Eurocommunism is an ongoing process that is in need of unending attention. Having defined the role of the Spanish Party in this process may help to provide a comparative tool in understanding the actions that take place under the umbrella of Eurocommunism. It is clear, however, that further diligent study is necessary to contribute even more to the knowledge of this particular subject.
The nature of the phenomenon lends itself easily to the task of gathering new viewpoints, but its spontaneity makes the compiling of these proposals difficult. The future of Eurocommunism on the European continent and within Spain is still undecided. It will probably remain so for quite some time, and it will be the task of political scientists to monitor and analyze the Eurocommunist course as it further unfolds. Although not always easy, it is bound to be interesting.
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