Ethos maintenance in Peruvian politics.

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ETHOS MAINTENANCE IN PERUVIAN POLITICS

A Thesis Presented

By

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Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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ETHOS MAINTENANCE IN PERUVIAN POLITICS

A Thesis Presented
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In October of 1968 the Peruvian military deposed the then current elected government and started on a path of change and conservation. The Revolutionary Military Government of Peru has been in power for ten years and has gone through one coup and several reversals of fundamental policy. This historical experience has made it unique amongst the military regimes of contemporary Latin America. In the wake of the establishment of this singular military regime, a small rivulet of literature has sprung forth. Sociologists and political scientists have fixed upon this Hispanic society, and produced works trying to classify and analyze this phenomenon. I, too, want to contribute to this effort to explain this experiment. In my effort I shall offer a coherent accounting of the actions and policy formation of the military in Peru, in the period of 1968 to 1978. This paper will analyze Peruvian politics as part of a larger whole. In this analysis I would like to establish the concern with ethos management as one of the dominant forces in the Peruvian political process.

Political analysis deals with part of the mix of motivations that actualizes human behavior. Although culture has been accorded a place in contemporary political analysis, I want to place a different emphasis on it. To that end this paper will present a logical progression of investigation. First this paper discusses the nature of South
American culture and the process of cultural evolution. The paper then reviews a newer category of interpretation for Latin American politics. This is the corporatist school of thought. The significance of investigating corporatist elements in Latin American politics is explained next. That is followed with a review of the current Peruvian government. This review is split into two parts. The first part is an account of the Velasco government in the period from 1968 to 1975. With the ascension of Morales Bermudez in 1975 there is a genuine sea-change and the second part analyzes the significance of events in the period from 1975 to 1978.
CHAPTER II
THE PURSUIT OF ETHOS MAINTENANCE

The impact of a nation's culture uniquely shapes its political experiences. However, the evaluation of cultural traits is often assigned a low degree of relevance in political analysis. The case of Peru is no different. Since the ruling military junta took over, a significant body of literature has been produced. With rare exception the central concerns have been to look for "progress" or a change in the system. Who possesses power and to what ends power is used are the questions. The significant indicators are usually portrayed to be decisions about the redistribution of wealth and decisions about social mobilization. The less tangible concerns in political activity are not as readily analyzed.

Ethos maintenance is a phrase that describes the concern of a significant body of political actors with preserving a value system. It is a value system that facilitates some very specific activities. Ethos, per se, is a general state of mind:

The ethos is taken to mean the constellation of acquired drives or motivations that are characteristic of the culture, plus the goals, both explicit and implicit, toward which cultural activities are directed or upon which high value is placed.¹

The activities and goals upon which high values are placed by the inhabitants of Peru are very diverse and sometimes diametrically opposed. For matters of political analysis, one ends up focusing on the educated, professional or clerical, catholic, metropolitan, caucasian or acculturated mestizo, middle, upper middle, and upper economic strata of Peruvian society.

This minority possesses almost all private wealth in the country. It runs the newspapers, universities, and schools. They populate the government civil service, the officer corps of the military, the leadership of most political parties, and the native Peruvian enterprises. The existing society is the product of the goals and ideals of these people and they are its chief beneficiaries. Both what is good and what is bad in Peru may be attributed to them.

The established norms, values, and goals of Peruvian society have been put to an escalating questioning in the last thirty years. In the last fifteen years there have been formal attempts to overturn the established society in Peru. Continuing today, a basic questioning of the society's operating values is being forcefully made in the Peruvian political arena. All aspects of the established value system are on the line. The ethical norms that make acceptable many of the mundane activities of the powerful minority are being subject to trial. Examples of this are the questioning of the uses of private wealth, and the questioning of the very possession of private wealth. The right of a free press gets questioned in a society, where a wealthy few owned the "private" press and pursued their special interests. The validity of the idea that political parties will represent the
people is questioned in a society where literacy requirements keep
large numbers of adults unenfranchised. These issues are specific
instances of a questioning of the larger value system that accepts and
legitimizes the existing order.

The goal of ethos preservation is pursued because it provides
a much broader analytic focus. Political analysis has expanded tremen-
dously in the post-World War II world. The wide range of human motiva-
tion that animates political actors is still not satisfactorily ex-
plored. To establish a plausible reason for the emphasis on ethos
preservation I want to explain how human motivation is more fully
covered by emphasizing ethos-oriented analysis. I also want to relate
the emphases of political analysis to a typology of human motivation.
With that for a starting place, I will look for the reasons the place
of ethos is difficult to find in political analysis.

Looking for the place of a national ethos in political analy-
sis is something of a problematic task. It is my contention that this
is difficult because contemporary political analysis is oriented to
the evaluation of the concrete products of human activity. The sig-
nificant aspects of human motivation are presumed to be discernible
in the conventional concerns with wealth, control of structures of
coercion, and formal political organization. These concerns with the
concrete aspects of power must be complemented with an appreciation
of the place of psychological utility.

The place of psychological utility becomes significant because
it goes further in helping to interpret human motivation. The concern
of psychological utility gets treated by many authors, but there is one
author in particular that has created a more fruitful base for understanding human motivation. This writer is the psychologist Abraham Maslow.


Interpreting human behavior offers insights into the nature of human decision making, and this gives one a firmer base for making analyses of the policies and actions of political actors.

Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs is prefaced by some general qualifications. Maslow prefaced his theory with the observation that,

Behavior is determined by several classes of determinants, of which motivation is one and environmental forces is another. The study of motivation does not negate or deny the study of situational determinants, but rather supplements it.²

This is further qualified with the observation that "not all behaviors or reactions are motivated, at least not in the ordinary sense of seeking need gratifications, i.e., seeking for what is lacked or needed."³

These qualifications set limits for extrapolating reasons for political action. I have read these reservations as a statement that human behavior is multidimensional and sometimes less than purposeful. The possibility that human behavior is not one dimensional and is not


³Ibid., p. 30.
rational limits the potential for constructing very comprehensive laws of political action.

The hierarchy alluded to consists of a succeeding chain of claims that people are concerned with meeting. Schematically, this can be shown as a ranked scale starting at the bottom and moving towards the top:

7. The Aesthetic Needs;
6. The Desires to Know and to Understand;
5. Desire for Self-Actualization;
4. The Esteem Needs;
3. Belonging and Love Needs;
2. Safety Needs;
1. Physiological Needs.

The most pressing needs are the physiological needs. If all needs are neglected then the person who is so suffering finds all other needs disappear, and they find that the dominant concern is for food, sex, shelter, sleep, etc. As soon as these needs are satisfied they recede into the background and the next complex of needs emerges. This cluster is referred to as the safety needs and they are specified as "security; stability; dependency; protection: freedom from fear, from anxiety and chaos; need for structure, order, law, limits; strength in the protector; and so on." This cycle keeps repeating itself until conditions allow the person to meet the full complex of human needs.

It should be pointed out that the Hierarchy of Needs is not an immovable fixed order, and it should be pointed out that acts or

4 Ibid., p. 39.
5 Ibid.
wishes express multiple motivations.\footnote{Ibid., p. 23.}

Throughout this scheme there is an implicit statement that people (most people that is) are always concerned with looking after their conscious and unconscious felt needs. This comprehensive concern with meeting your felt needs I interpret as a concern with psychological utility.

Political analysis is concerned with analyzing the use, possession and transfer of power. As practiced, political analysis often ends up preoccupied with the material correlates of power. As an example, wealth can be shown to be a source, tool and end-product of power. It cannot, however, be established as the exclusive or universally paramount concern.

I am asserting that psychological utility is ubiquitous in human motivation, but this does not help to greatly simplify analytic matters, as there is direct utility and indirect utility. The economic correlates should be looked upon as an expression of direct utility. Matters of direct utility deal with the directly measurable power resources; who occupies what social base of power, who possesses which material goods and how existing institutions operate are primary concerns. These factors can all be shown to have economic correlates, hence the temptation to do analysis centered on class interest or economic benefit. Political analysis that is concerned with indirect utility tries to deal with those social manifestations of values, culture, worldview, ethos, and personality that channel political activity.
This is observably difficult. Political culture analysis is
the only established mode of this type of analysis. Coming up with
measurable variables becomes a harder task. One of the results is that
one often ends up making generalizations instead of formulating theory.

The modes of analysis can be related back to Maslow's elabora-
tion of needs in human motivation. As argued by Maslow, human needs
cover a wide range of endeavors. Once the matter of moment to moment
survival is met all of these needs make themselves felt. An analysis
concerned with direct utility pays attention to those events that in-
fluence the physiological needs and the safety needs. It also meets
some of the belonging needs and actualization needs. Analysis oriented
towards indirect utility pays attention to those events that affect
the esteem needs, and the desire to know and understand needs, plus
some of the belonging and love needs and some of the self-actualization
needs.

In brief summation Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs offers a defini-
tion and model of human behavior. This model of motivation allows one
to classify analytic schemes with regard to the facets of human motiva-
tion. This in turn allows you to see what is being looked at and what
is not being looked at. Ethos-oriented analysis is a vital analytic
scheme. It will produce information that will complement the informa-
tion generated by analytic schemes concerned with direct utility.

Another reason that ethos maintenance is going to provide use-
ful information for the analysis of a political system is because of
its concern with cultural patterns. This will provide a unique source
of information because individual cultures are unique, and:
No one culture system completely satisfies all human needs and potentialities, each system has defects corresponding to its virtues. Underlying historical, cultivated human nature we may assume a metabolical human nature which contains a reservoir of potentialities and capabilities which are available for future cultural exploration.\(^7\)

Hence the necessity of finding a focus to weigh this.

Culture is construed as the agency that people have developed to meet their needs within the context of their society. It is a tool, a psychological prosthesis. Cultural values have been portrayed as original products of the concern with finding ways to meet human needs. This interpretation of culture shows that it is a way to meet a Hierarchy of Needs as postulated by Maslow. Once instituted culture becomes a force in its own right, and an analytic entity in its own right. This institutes a dilemma as,

Once begun, the process becomes cyclical, societies developing cultures, and the cultures in turn affecting their societies. There is no a priori logical necessity for setting up a linear, one-way cultural or societal determinism and to regard another culture or society as the primary determinant of the other.\(^8\)

Having covered my assumptions of human nature I operate on and the concepts of cultural concerns related to political analysis in this paper, I would like to explain my choice of analytic action. In the citation where the cyclical nature of society and values were stated, I see an obstacle to establishing comprehensive theories to deal with specific variables examined in political analysis. This dilemma may push one back to another question that must be dealt with. That is the

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\(^8\) Ibid., p. 104.
matter of deciding whether your interpretation of events can be ordered into a theory.

As the field of political science has developed there has been a consistent concern with basing the field on a firm scientific footing. In order to improve the reliability of political analysis, and to produce laws and models, practitioners of political science have been doing their best to pattern their analytic activities on adaptations of scientific method as it developed in the physical sciences. While trying to appropriate the fruits of positivist philosophy, many empirical political scientists have been consistently producing unsuccessful models. From my readings I have come to the conclusion that most of the effort to construct political theory has failed. What has happened is that a great volume of analytic approaches has been generated and described as theories.

Constructing political theory requires a decision to single out a phenomenon to be explained. After one has formed the question one should construct a hypothesis that will specify a relationship between the dependent variables and one or more independent variables. If you are interested in a direct statistical relationship, you will want to formulate a null hypothesis. This states that there is no relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable. You may reject your null hypothesis if you establish a significant relationship between your variables. This establishes a positive relationship for your hypotheses.9

Bill and Hardgrave go into great detail categorizing the analytic schemes utilized by political scientists in comparative government. Using the categories that Bill and Hardgrave list, I have created a tree to show how the analytic approach diverges from theory formation. This tree starts with the generalization and then proceeds,

- **Generalization**—statement of uniformities in the relations between two or more variables of well-defined classes;
- **Hypothesis**—a generalization presented in tentative and conjectural terms;
- **Approach**—a predisposition to adopt a particular conceptual framework and to explore certain types of hypotheses towards the generation of theory;
- **Theory**—a set of systematically related generalizations suggesting new observations for empirical testing;
- **Law**—a hypothesis of universal form that has withstood intensive experimentation.

The analytic approach is the form that will be used for my analytic comment, however, I will make an effort to speculate on some theory formation in my summary.

A pursuit of ethos maintenance is a valid concern. Human needs are diverse, you cannot Balkanize them or explain motivation and behavior by referring to a few aspects of the whole human organism. Political analysis has to operate under these imperatives also. I have argued that analytic schemes become preoccupied with one aspect of utility, while ignoring other aspects of utility. This general observation applies to the study of Latin American politics also. In the 1970s the scope of Latin American political analysis was expanded

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by the emergence of a corporatist conception of Latin American politics. The tendency, however, to focus on either direct utility or indirect utility has persisted. This prompts me to make this effort to advocate the utility of ethos maintenance.

In extrapolation I am stating that politics in Latin America are observably different from the conduct of politics in other parts of the world. What makes this so are the unique characteristics of Latin American society. Many authors have argued that there is a larger cultural unity that permeates the world view of Hispanic America. My readings of Latin American society impel me to agree with this argument. The nature of this unique Latin American culture will be described in detail in a succeeding chapter. The significance of a regional culture system lies in the ethos generated by it. It is my contention that politics in Peru are dominated by the concern with maintaining the ethos of the existing society.
CHAPTER III

NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF A RELEVANT LATIN AMERICAN CULTURE MODEL

The conduct of politics in Latin America is observably different from the conduct of politics in other parts of the world. What makes this so is the unique characteristics of Latin American society. Latin America has repeatedly been described as a culture area in its own right. This cultural differentiation provides a critical insight for the student of comparative government.

Many authors have argued that there is a larger cultural identity unifying the worldview of Hispanic America. Both historians and anthropologists have pursued this topic, often in a separate development.

Historians concerned with government in Latin America frequently start at Richard M. Morse's "Toward a Theory of Spanish American Government." Morse's work is seminal as he is the first contemporary historian in the Anglo-American world to argue for the unique historical experience of Spanish America as the critical explanatory factor.

A common starting point for an anthropologist developing the topic of Latin American culture is "Modern Latin American

Culture by John P. Gillin. Gillin is the most commonly cited author in books examining Latin American culture. He is commonly credited with creating and championing the concept.

Examining both the efforts of historians and anthropologists to expand upon the idea of a common Latin American civilization, I have found that there is a line of anthropologists who have made a very sophisticated effort to construct a model. It is this line of development that I will follow in this chapter. This chapter is concerned with describing the nature of a Latin American culture system and how Peru is a part of it. I will then explain Emilio Willems description of the Latin American cultural dynamic and what that does to the political process.

People like John P. Gillin, Charles Wagley, George M. Foster, Richard N. Adams, and Emilio Willems have done some fundamental work in analytic concepts related to the study of Latin American culture and it is with Gillin that I start.

In a series of articles between 1942 and 1947 Gillen argues for the designation of Latin America as a bona fide culture area in its own right. Although Gillin is sensitive to regional variations, Spanish America and Brazil are seen as recipients of a comparable Iberian heritage and a comparable Colonial experience. The generalized Latin American experience is hypothesized accordingly:

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... all are nominally Roman Catholic, and many of the details of content and organization are those of Iberian Catholicism as distinguished from the Northern European type. ... Ideologically this culture is humanistic rather than puritanical. ... Intellectually it is characterized by logic and dialectics, rather than by empiricism and pragmatics ... the worth of the logic lies in the manipulation of concepts, not in the empirical investigation of premises. ... [We] find a vast variety of ideas derived from numerous sources—ideas from the Enlightenment; from the French and American Revolutions; and more recently from Marxism. ... We see other Spanish or Spanish Colonial patterns in town planning ... in family organization, official male dominance, double standard of sex morality ... specific concepts of personal honor and emphasis upon form in interpersonal relations; and in the patterns of Roman law and certain political statuses still persisting from the colonial system. ... 13

A detailed description of agriculture, architecture and clothing is also made by Gillin.

Gillin states that his formulation is speculative and leaves open the concept for expansion. He lists several points that investigators should pursue. The nature of the sixteenth and seventeenth century Spanish donor society was not well defined at the time of his speculation. He calls for such an investigation. The colonial experience of Spanish America and Brazil is presumed to be comparable but detailed proof is not furnished. Regional variation is mentioned and attributed to the environment with little explanation. Change in society is attributed to cultural diffusion with sparse example. The cultural environment is a somewhat stark Latin American or non-Latin American environment. These reservations give copious room for refinement and several authors pick this up.

Wagley takes up the challenge and deals with several of the

13 Ibid., pp. 82-84.
larger gaps in Gillin's formulation. Accepting the "cultural common denominator" of Gillin, Wagley creates a typology of subcultures derived from the larger tradition. These are nine interrelated subcultures. The physical environment, the local economy, and the rural-urban dichotomy is credited with creating subcultural groupings across Latin America. Similar sub-cultural groupings are described as having arisen in different countries. These different subcultures give different emphasis to the general aspects of the larger Latin American culture. As various countries contain different mixes of the subcultural groupings their individual focus is different from one another. This is offered as an explanation of how the countries of Latin America can have a common cultural heritage while being visibly different societies.

Gillin's original typology was a native culture and a Latin American culture. Wagley sees nine distinct subcultural groupings and is open to his types being redefined into more groups, if this is analytically relevant. These groups are:

1. Tribal Indian Cultures (lowland societies);
2. Modern Indian Cultures (highland societies);
3. Peasant cultures;
4. Engenho Plantation (traditional);
5. Usina Plantation (modern);
6. Town Culture;
7. Metropolitan Upper Class;

8. Metropolitan Middle Class;
9. Urban Proletariat.15

One of the salient characteristics of these cultural subgroupings is the linkage of societal groups. One of the characteristics of the Modern Indian Culture is the presence of Hispanic peasants. Part of the Town subculture is a response to the presence of peasant communities. The interrelated parts do not function in isolation, there are many symbiotic relationships.

An example of how societies which are part of the same larger culture can be distinctly different would be a comparison of Bolivia and Uruguay. Uruguay is the most urban of the Latin American societies—82%—while Bolivia is one of the most rural societies with only 39% of its population in cities. Bolivia, one of the centers of the highland Indian population, has an Indian population of 63%, while Uruguay has no known Indian population. The presence of different mixes of emphasis on the nature of the Latin American culture renders hopeless analytic assumptions that they are interchangeably similar.

George M. Foster has handled one of the other points that must be established for the argument of Gillin. Foster did the detailed research on Spanish society of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He also carefully researched the social practices and culture items present in contemporary Latin America. Foster established an obvious cultural continuity between the Spanish donor society and contemporary Latin America. Foster argued for the concept of reduction and crystal-
Reduction and crystallization may be summarized so. In a conquest situation the dominant donor culture wittingly and unwittingly goes through a process of screening and simplifying the elements of their culture that they convey to the subject population. During the initial period of contact there is a general acceptance of the different elements of the donor culture and some internalization of elements of the recipient culture. After an initial pattern is set up the colonial culture becomes less permeable and is more resistant to latter attempts to modify the newly established society. This is called crystallization.

The process of reduction and crystallization explains why aspects of colonial society were noticeably different from the donor society. It also explains why older patterns, extinct in Europe, persist in Latin America.

One of the contemporary extensions of the concept of a Latin American culture is the work of Emilio Willems. Willems has taken up the initiative of Gillen, Wagley, Foster, and Adams and written Latin America: An Anthropological Synthesis. Willems proceeds to tie up looser ends left by his predecessors. He describes the historical experience of Spain and Portugal before the discovery, as significantly similar. He also describes the colonial experience as producing the same results. In both Brazil and Spanish America, although some


things took place under different auspices (viz. the Indians being reduced by the conquistadors compared to the Indians being reduced by the bandeirantes), the result over time was often the same.

In his noticeably more comprehensive work, Willems tries to outline the larger dilemmas that Latin American societies have to deal with. Willems devotes space to the problems of governing a society that operates under the impetus of the larger Latin American experience. In Willems's eyes, there are four complementing experiences that set the parameters of Latin American problems: the Iberian heritage, the conquest, the colonial legacy and the belated modernization of Latin America via secondary development. This created some very fundamental obstacles for any government trying to rule a Latin American society.

Government in Latin America has had to operate with the tradition of a patrimonial state. Willems makes a direct extension of Max Weber's concept of patrimonialism to explain the traditional state. A pervasive characteristic of the state in a patrimonial society is the lack of differentiation between what is public and what is private. Governmental positions bestow personal privilege, they do not entail obligations. The people are subjects, not citizens. The governmental machinery is expected to grant favors on a personal basis, not to give out services. All power flows from the head of state, and in theory it is limitless. In practice, the executive's power is limited by the traditional expectations of the subjects. Beyond this attitude to

18 Ibid., p. 89.
power and government there are four currently operating traditions that influence government in Latin America.

These four legacies are a tradition of rebellion and a tradition of autocracy, a tradition of non-compliance with the law, and the pattern of military involvement in politics.

There is a tradition of rebelling against unacceptable oppression. Willems notes some seventy-six major rebellions on a citywide or province-wide basis prior to independence.¹⁹ Negro slaves, Indians, mestizos, and creoles found cause to rebel on a regular basis. The desire for freedom, the encroachment of land by big landowners, the need to replace a particularly venal or inefficient bureaucrat, the need to repeal a tax ruinous to a local economy or the operation of a trade monopoly that bore harshly on the citizenry—all these prompted large and occasionally successful rebellions.

The idea that the citizenry ought to rise up when faced with an unbearable wrong is closely complemented by the idea that non-compliance with the law is acceptable. The combination of predatory tax systems, restrictive trade monopolies, and an absolutist rule of a distant colony rendered it necessary or desirable for large numbers of the inhabitants to ignore the law.²⁰ Law enforcement became problematic as the inability of the colonial government to enforce unpopular statutes was established. It is here that colonial functionaries created the philosophy of obedzco pero no cumplo.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 23.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 179.
Two other complementary patterns are the autocratic heritage and the involvement of military tradition. The autocratic heritage is a function of a patrimonial state where all decisions are a prerequisite of the king. The granting of authority to regional or local governments might have been functionally desirable, but it was regarded as too potentially subversive. A strong central government ruled by an executive, with discretionary powers to take personal action, was thought to be necessary if not desirable. \(^{21}\)

The authoritarian tradition worked with a pattern of military involvement in politics to produce the high incidence of military government. Willems starts with the caudillo and gives a common interpretation of the breakdown of authority, after the independence, as the cause for the participation of the military in politics. \(^{22}\)

These ongoing traditions have made the conduct of politics unique in Latin America.

Viewing Latin America as a culture system is significant for the study of comparative government as it may reveal or suggest the centrality of integration in a society. Willems does this and arrives at a conclusion held by many political scientists. That is, the conclusion that the crisis of Latin American culture and the crisis of the different Latin American societies is a crisis of national integration.

Willems describes a cultural dynamic centered around adaptation

\(^{21}\) Ibid., p. 92.

\(^{22}\) Ibid., p. 88.
and integration. The author's points may be abstracted into the following statements.

1. A culture must be able to adapt to a changing environment. The raison d'être for a given society's culture is to meet the need to cope with internal or external dilemmas (viz. how to propagate the group identity that will impel people to work for common goals). This is a response to the need to adapt to a changing or potentially changing environment.

2. Cultural evolution is a necessity for a society's adaptation. The ultimate test of a successful culture is the survival of the society. Cultural evolution is a necessity for all but the most isolated and static societies.

3. Although cultural evolution is a necessity it depends on the internal differentiation of the society. Willems specifically states that,

   ... cultural evolution of a society refers to all the processes that produce internal diversification and increasing specialization of the diversified parts. In the social structure, evolution is virtually identical with divisions of labor (i.e., the dividing and subdividing of social groups and the assignment to them of specific activities). Evolution of the social structure goes hand in hand with evolutionary changes in technology and economy.

4. Internal differentiation depends on integration. The problem of Latin American societies becomes the problem of national integration. Willems states the proviso for successful evolution: "The
viability of growing internal differentiation depends of course on
integration—the maintenance of a common structure capable of relating
the different units to one another." 26

These statements taken in a sequential progression infer that
the success or ultimate test of a society is its ability to viably re-
late the different social groups to one another. Failure to devise or
maintain a mechanism for national integration may push a country into
a state of anomie or class warfare (depending on your analytic predilec-
tion).

It is at this point that we may make the transfer from anthropo-
logical survey to political analysis.

Many analysts of Latin politics have made the point that
all Latin American countries are beset by varying degrees of conflict
that results from the lack of national integration. Carlos Astiz is
one such social scientist. Astiz is concerned with analyzing Peruvian
politics and he is quite sure about what the basic issue is in that
society. The issue is what kind of society shall we have and what
will the power relations be. This is stated so: "The most pressing
issues in Latin America generally, and in Peru specifically, are those
cconcerned with the fundamental character of the social order itself,
not whether this or that group should be favored by a particular
policy that will achieve common goals." 27

Peru is a country that is intimately involved in the Spanish

26 Ibid., p. 166.

27 Carlos Astiz, Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian
American tradition. It has been subject to the same larger cultural legacy as its Latin American confrères. And Peru like the rest of Latin America has come into the modern world through a process of secondary development. (Willems here accepts Richard N. Adams's thesis. 28)

National integration is a problem that most Latin American societies have inherited. The withdrawal of Spanish authority, following the wars of independence, was the first serious impairment of integrating mechanisms in Latin American society. The second common disequilibrating experience was the wholesale movement into modernity via secondary development. Peru operates with this legacy.

There are many local characteristics that produce a potential for conflict. Peru is a diverse society and a traditional one. Frictions between the Indian and non-Indian community can and do arise. The rural and the urban populations have different interests, and an urban proletariat has a hard time marshalling acceptance in a society in which it is not paramount.

A society as conflict-prone as Peru is going to be concerned with integrating mechanisms. And the current political situation reflects this. The government of Peru has been cast as a corporativist experiment by several authors. I will examine the idea of corporativist politics and explain why this is attractive to the dominant political actors in Peru.

28 Willems, p. 164.
CHAPTER IV

CORPORATISM AS AN ANALYTIC APPROACH

Corporatist political philosophy is not new. In the West, the Middle Ages saw a feudal society that first proposed the idea that society's best interests are met by organizing interest on a functional basis. The ideal of defining society by functional sectors faded under the dual impact of the Enlightenment and the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. As society became more urban, industrial and anomic, interest in the idea reemerged in Europe.

Corporatism in another branch of European cultural expansion, Latin America, had a different history. It can be argued, as Richard Morse has argued, that a body of late feudal institutions and ideas never quite disappeared from Latin American society. Corporatism can be shown to be present in varying degrees in the political and social concerns of Ibero-Latin society. This in turn renders corporatism a useful focus for political analysis.

Three general approaches for corporatist analysis have evolved so far. They share some assumptions and disagree on other aspects. I would like to outline these three approaches, and then offer my unified analysis of the corporatist nature of Latin American politics. The three authors that have staked out new territory in the conceptual-

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29 This is part of an essay written by Morse, included in Louis Hartz, ed., The Founding of New Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964).
ization of corporatist analysis are Howard Wiarda, Phillipe Schmitter, and Guillermo O'Donnell. These three authors are the primary referents for contemporary articles arguing for a corporatist analysis of Latin American politics. All three authors can be reconciled to a general definition of corporatism. For the example I will use a definition that Phillipe Schmitter has proposed:

Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.  

The authors do differ on several points. These reflect two dimensions. One of these dimensions is scope and the other is an economic or culture dichotomy. Phillipe Schmitter argues that corporatism is an universal phenomenon, with two different types. One of these types is most prevalent in Latin America. It is not uniquely Latin American and neither is it a cultural manifestation. Howard Wiarda acknowledges the universality of corporatism, but argues that Latin America is part of a larger Ibero-Latin tradition and thus possesses its own unique brand of corporatism that is reemerging. Guillermo O'Donnell enters, third, with his conception of populist and bureaucratic/authoritarian corporatism. O'Donnell argues against any unique cultural forces and further restricts his thesis to South America

proper, excluding Middle America and Iberia. O'Donnell insists that events can only be meaningfully interpreted by examining the nature of capitalist development in the society being observed.

Chronologically, Wiarda precedes the other two authors. As the other authors make some effort to state their arguments in juxtaposition to Wiarda, I will start my abstraction of arguments with the work of Wiarda. Wiarda's analysis is grounded on the observation that there is a real, definable, cultural tradition in the Ibero-American world. In this common historical experience, and common cultural background, there are common conceptions of state, legitimate authority, and the individual's relation to society. There are common conceptions of how you should channel political activity. The central arguments will be summarized in the following paragraphs.

1. The West in general and the U.S. in particular has been undeniably ethnocentric in trying to fit Latin America into universal analytic schemes.

Wiarda argues for a recognition that Western social science has done a poor job of explaining political dynamics in Latin America, for most of the post-World War II period. Although some deficiencies can be chalked up to ethnocentricity, specific insensitivities in American scholarship can be explained by the polar opposition of major environmental characteristics. The American academic milieu can be seen as an essentially secular and scientific establishment. It is operating in a predominantly Protestant and pluralist nation. This can raise problems with efforts to analyze an essentially Catholic society that possesses "as its basis a moral idealism, a philosophical certainty, a sense of continuity, and a unified organic-corporate concep-
tion of the state and society."\(^{31}\)

2. The Iberic-Latin tradition represents a fourth world of development.

In trying to compensate for the tendency to use Western norms of analysis it is not enough to realize that you are dealing with a non-Northwestern European phenomenon. You must take into account some fundamental characteristics that are unique to the region. Wiarda detects "fragments and remnants of a peculiarly Iberic-European tradition dating from approximately 1500, with a political culture and a socio-political order that at its core was essentially two class, authoritarian, traditional, elitist, patrimonial, Catholic, stratified, hierarchical and corporate."\(^{32}\) This heritage has channeled politics into functional interests, hence the special relevance of a corporatist model of politics.

3. Political change in the Ibero-American region has been a process of adjustment. The goal has been one of accommodation.

Reference is made here to Richard Adams and his theory of secondary development. Adams has proposed that national development in the parts of the world that were isolated from the initial industrial revolution is going to be different. In this sphere of secondary development, modern patterns of social and political organization are borrowed and added on to the established socio-political system.\(^{33}\)


\(^{32}\) Ibid., p. 209.

\(^{33}\) Ibid., p. 227.
this scheme of affairs, there is neither a gradual evolution of the society or an abrupt change of the larger society. Instead institutions and practices are added on to the original society. It is Wiarda's contention that the Iberic-Latin society's developmental experience has been one of secondary development. Politics in most of the twentieth century has been a prolonged debate over how and under what conditions the elements of modern industrial society will be integrated into the existing political structure. The result has been a continuing parry and riposte between the older Ibero-Latin tradition and successive waves of Western political formulas for social and economic organization.

4. The analysis of politics in Latin America must come to grips with the dissolving of the older power bases.

Although the older tradition persists it does not exist in a vacuum. Some real changes have taken place, not all of the established intereses have managed to age gracefully. Some of the old power bases are eroding. In several countries landed wealth has been neutralized, the social and legal influence of the church has been restricted and the military has been steadily losing its ability to monopolize violence. Politics is persistently becoming more dominated by class, issues, and interest groups. Although there has been some real change, no clear alternative pattern has established itself in most of the countries. The older order is faded, but what if anything can successfully replace it has yet to be made definite.

In contrast to Wiarda, the next two authors play down cultural

\[34\] Ibid., p. 230.
inputs. Schmitter makes a determined effort to establish corporatist politics as a broader Western phenomenon. In Schmitter's opinion, corporatism is more an ideology than a function of cultural expression. Schmitter's arguments can be classed into three basic assertions.

1. There is no sound basis for considering corporatism in Latin America as an articulation of an unique historical tradition.

   First Schmitter points out that the advocates of corporatism in the Iberian peninsula, and Latin America, based their movements or programs on the writings and government from Europe. Schmitter draws up a bibliography of works, from 1850 to 1950, concerned with corporatism. If this list is examined, it appears that there are very few Latin American or southern European authors who appear before the second quarter of the twentieth century. This argument that the theoretical elaborations of corporatism are an European construct is important. This places a valuation on formal theory over de facto practices.

2. Corporatist systems can be differentiated into societal corporatism and state corporatism.

   Schmitter makes reference to the work of the Rumanian corporate theorist, Mihail Manolesco. Manolesco distinguishes two types of corporatist relations. In corporatisme pur, "the legitimacy and functioning of the state were primarily or exclusively dependent on the activity of singular noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered representative corporations." Schmitter calls this societal corporatism.

36 Ibid., p. 102.
Corporatisme subordonné is different because similarly structured corporations are created by and kept as auxiliary and dependent organs of the state which founded its legitimacy and effective functioning on other bases. Schmitter calls this state corporatism. Societal corporatism is a tendency that is found in advanced Western pluralistic societies. State corporatism is explained as a development of a floundering pluralist political system.

3. The emergence of corporatist politics is a direct function of the needs of capitalism to reproduce the conditions for its existence and continually to accumulate further resources.

On a more fundamental level, Schmitter argues that such sympathetic analysts of capitalism as John Maynard Keynes and Andrew Shonfield have shown that capitalist-oriented societies have an interest in establishing corporatist interest formation. In an essay entitled "The End of Laissez-Faire" (written in 1926), Keynes suggests that private self-interest is neither inevitably efficient or inevitably in society's best interest. Because of the complex nature of modern society there is a seer need for semi-autonomous interest associations to mediate between the individual and the state. Specifically, Keynes is cited as suggesting "a return, it may be said towards medieval conceptions of separate autonomies." In more recent times, Andrew Shonfield, the author of Modern Capitalism, is cited as arguing that complex, interdependent, modern societies need to be able to predict

37 Ibid., p. 103.
38 Ibid., p. 110.
their future environment if they are going to be able to make extended plans for future economic activity.39 This imperative biases state and economic interests to favor establishing interest associations and to them encourage them to conclude modus vivendis. In this instance, rational self-interest is supposed to be propelling people towards the construction of a corporatist society.

Guillermo O'Donnell is one of the late contributors to the corporatist school of analysis. O'Donnell originally formulated a theory for explaining the development of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes throughout Latin America.40 O'Donnell's original work implied an emergence of a corporatist "solution" and it does not require very much of an extension to make this an analysis of the corporatist phenomenon. In a later article this extension is made.41 O'Donnell's general conception of corporatism as a structure is compatible with Wiarda and Schmitter, but his differences are sufficient to detail his contribution.

1. There are old ideological continuities, but corporatism in Latin America, as an operating set of societal structures, is an historically recent phenomenon.

Corporatism is seen as a result of a crisis of the state in a society that has been penetrated by international capital. Specifically

39 Ibid., p. 112.


O'Donnell states that "our topic is 'Latin America' only in the trivial sense; the pertinent historical context is provided by the political-economy of nations that were originally exporters of primary materials and were industrialized late, but extensively in a position of dependency upon the great centers of world capitalism." O'Donnell goes on to restrict himself to discussing corporatism in Latin America. He proceeds to restrict himself geographically. He then says that his hypothesis does not really apply to Meso-America. O'Donnell notes that special situations (such as large exports of oil) change his formula. Although he does not say anything further I read his work as a discussion predominantly concerned with Argentina. It is in this tier of states that the bureaucratic-authoritarian state looks representative.

2. Corporatism must be further differentiated into the inclusionary corporatism of the populist state and the exclusionary corporatism of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state.

Inclusionary corporatism was a policy of the populist state. Under the stimulus of the collapse of the Republican regimes in the great depression, the state expanded itself with a new coalition. The middle sectors and the military abandoned the commodity export oligarchy, their liberalism and their laissez-faire. Instead they felt compelled to establish a new coalition that would protect the national economy and come to terms with the emerging and disgruntled urban working class. If the established sectors were to avoid the choice

42 Ibid., p. 54.
43 Ibid., p. 78.
44 Ibid., p. 67.
between repressive stagnation or economic leveling, they were going to have to generate meaningful growth. It is at this point that the state is expanded to meet the inadequacies of the national bourgeoisie, and avoid the total control by foreign capital. Under these regimes the national government sponsored the creation of labor unions and interest associations, created extensive public welfare programs (at least for the politically recognized), and established state enterprises.

Within this inclusionary corporatism two unexpected relationships developed. One was the escalating demand for more economic benefits and political control by the urban working class. The other was the quick exhaustion of the import-substitution opportunities by the newly protected private firms and the newly created national enterprises. Under the dual pressure of escalating and seemingly uncontrollable labor demands and exhaustion of the benefits of a program of import substitution, those countries that had embarked on a program of populist corporatism were forced to reconsider their commitments. It is under these conditions that bureaucratic-authoritarian states were established to implement an exclusionary corporatism.

Bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes are portrayed as established on two principles. One principle is that a prominent place for dynamic international capital must be established to invigorate the national economy. The other principle is that the strident and dangerous demands of the popular sector will have to be deactivated in order to bring foreign capital in. A policy that corporatizes political relation-

\[45\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 68.}\]

\[46\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 70.}\]
ships can be constructed to do this. This progression of affairs is, I see, an attempt to explain events in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.

3. The bureaucratic-authoritarian state contains two components, these are statizing corporatism and privatist corporatism.

The bureaucratic-authoritarian state is the main interest for O'Donnell. This is seen as the ultimate product of capitalist development in Latin America. The bureaucratic-authoritarian state engenders a bi-frontal corporatism. The first element of bi-frontal corporatism is statizing corporatism. Here a process of conquering and subordinating the private organizations of the society is created. After that there is privatist corporatism. Privatist corporatism is the process of opening the organs of the state to colonization by private interests. It is O'Donnell's opinion that statizing corporatism is practiced on the popular sector while privatist corporatism is open to the dominant classes.

In the previous pages of this chapter, I have described and summarized the association of corporatism with the analysis of politics in Latin America. As my discussion of corporatism has been descriptive so far I would like to offer some interpretation to flesh out the possible significance of a corporatist analytic approach. The emergence and expansion of a corporatist school of analysis for Latin American politics has been an abrupt phenomenon. Douglas A. Chalmers acknowledges that Latin American authoritarian regimes seem to fit logically

\[47\] Ibid., p. 48.
into this perspective. However, he cautions that "It is sobering to remember, however, that each wave of regimes since World War II (at least) has brought analyses which seemed to show that the most recent type of regime was likely to endure because of its fit with underlying conditions." It is with this forewarning that the proposed models of corporatist politics must be examined.

As the speculation about the possible nature of corporatist politics has preceded over time, hypotheses have grown and elaborated in reaction to prior speculations. Although much of what the cited authors have written may appear to be in conflict with one another, much of their analytic efforts are compatible. The general propositions put forward by the three authors contribute to each other, and some of the elements are already combined. O'Donnell acknowledges that there is an ideological continuity with the past (from Wiarda), although he is uncomfortable with the idea that there is a persistent cultural tradition. Wiarda, in the Pike and Stritch book, sees the societal corporatism and state corporatism typology (from Schmitter) as a relevant expansion.

It is in the cultural versus economic realm that the difference crops up. The perception of value systems and the relative degree of autonomy that such systems possess seems to be where the dispute lies. Both Schmitter and O'Donnell seem to feel that corporatism is an ideology, a rationalization of relationships produced by the rule of economic interest. Corporatism is a tail wagged by the economic

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dog. In Wiarda's formulation, value systems are ceded enough autonomy to motivate political actors by themselves. It is noted that an economic crisis is a strong reinforcement. It is also noted that an economic crisis may act as a trigger mechanism, but there is a conscious attempt to avoid a drift toward economic determinism.

The question of motivation behind the creation of corporatist structures is the hazy area. All of the countries of Latin America have seen a profound change in the nature of their economies within the last fifty years. They have also witnessed a profound change in the constitution of their social order. Keeping this in mind there are two general foci that the competing theories must deal with. One of these foci is the lack of a tight socioeconomic interchangeability among the Latin American countries. The other focus is the persisting but variable influence of some non-economic interest groups in the different societies. Functional groups such as the Church, students, military, or the state tecnicos can exert a critical influence in domestic politics.

Once you move beyond the question of the source of corporatist structures and face the question of the impact of corporatist movements or corporatist-based policies, there is a higher order of compatibility. As a base it can be asserted that there is a real corporatist tradition present in most Latin American societies. Its influence and autonomy is debated. In addition, a succession of Latin American military juntas have displayed a strong interest in establishing formal corporatist structures.

The newly proliferated governments can be classified by a com-
pound typology extrapolated from the original three authors. In order to classify a government in Latin America you should first ask oneself a series of questions.

**Corporatism.** Does the government reserve the right to structure, subsidize and control all political activity? As a further qualification you would have to ask whether the government is predisposed to structure political activity along the lines of functional representation. A government that tries to structure, subsidize, and control political activity along the lines of functional representation may generally be referred to as corporatist.

**Societal corporatism.** In order to further classify corporatist governments, your next question would be whether the government you are observing is committed to a program of societal corporatism or state corporatism. If the legitimacy and functioning of the state depend upon the activities of the functional interests, then you could classify your government as an example of societal corporatism.

**State corporatism.** If, however, the government can be observed to draw its legitimacy from other sources (such as the army or a political party) and it becomes committed to keeping its functional interest groups as auxiliary and dependent organs of the state, then you are observing state corporatism.

**Inclusionary corporatism.** A state committed to a policy of inclusionary corporatism is interested in using its corporatist structure to activate social groups for its support.

**Bi-frontal corporatism.** A state committed to the structure of state corporatism and following an exclusionary corporatist program
is further marked by a bi-frontal corporatism in which a privatist corporatism and a statizing corporatism are operating.

**Privatist corporatism.** Here in privatist corporatism, the corporatizing policies are used to open the offices of the state to select groups, as a means of controlling those groups.

**Statizing corporatism.** In the statizing corporatism the corporatizing structure is used to infiltrate and subvert independent social groupings to exercise control over them.

This compound typology is a range of activity that a government committed to a de jure corporatizing of society may engage in. It is helpful as the people who wish to investigate the motivation behind a corporatizing government have some kind of model to derive intent from. An active interest in ethos maintenance is the intent I am investigating. I am asserting that this is propelled or activated by a keen awareness of the current, dominant, political forces. That is, the lack of national integration.

The previously mentioned process of change has repeatedly raised crises of national integration. It is the crisis of national integration that produces an interest in erecting corporatist structures in the twentieth century. I would like to propose that attempts to attribute the reemergence of corporatism to any one single cause are going to prove fruitless. Although there is a general historical tradition common to all of the countries, and although there are some general economic relationships common to all, all Latin American societies do not operate in an interchangeable environment. A wide range of Latin American governments throughout the twentieth century have repeatedly
stated that they want to find an authentically national solution. This ubiquitous desire is a realistic reflection of the critical differences that I have mentioned. It is my feeling that these traits should be accounted for whenever an understanding of Latin American politics is attempted.

The crises of national integration have a potential for crystallizing along class lines, ethnicity lines, regional lines, or any combination of the three. The different potentials for conflict are represented in the statistics about these societies. Tables 1 and 2 will be used to point out the differences.

Countries like Argentina, with a population that is 82% urban and an economy that is strongly oriented towards manufacturing, commerce and services, has a much greater potential for classical class conflict than a country like Paraguay. Paraguay is predominantly rural (60%) and possesses an extremely simplified economy with the bulk of the population engaged in hunting, fishing, agriculture and forestry. That is 55% of the economically active population.

Countries like Peru, with an Indian population of 47%, or Bolivia, with an Indian population of 63%, have a high potential for ethnic polarization. Columbia with an Indian population of 1.6% or Uruguay, with no listed Indian population, will never have to face the stresses of a society stratified on ethnic lines. The net effect of the observable statistical differences is that the type of crisis of national integration varies from society to society. As the type of crisis of national integration varies so the variety of corporatist response will differ.
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*KEY: 1 = Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting and Fishing;
2 = Mining and Quarrying;
3 = Manufacturing Industries;
4 = Construction, Utilities, Sanitation;
5 = Commerce;
6 = Transport, Storage and Communication;
7 = Services;
8 = Other.

TABLE 2
RURAL AND URBAN POPULATION (1975) AND ESTIMATED AMERIND POPULATION

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The related concerns in this paper are national integration, ethos maintenance and corporatist politics. It is these three subjects that I will establish an interrelationship between.

The concern with the crisis of national integration sets the other two concerns into perspective. The crisis of national integration in Peru has been steadily evolving for almost fifty years. The dimensions of the crisis have reached a point where the very nature of the future Peruvian society is in doubt to large numbers of the current power holders. This anxiety over the imminent overturning of the social order has had a two-fold effect. The first effect is to generate a strong consciousness about just what exactly is the nature of Peruvian society. The second effect is to stimulate a great deal of thought in examining exactly what will serve as the previously established "common structure capable of relating the different units."

The evolution of this crisis and the development of a political response will be the focus of the arguments in the following chapters.
CHAPTER V
CRISIS OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN PERU: FROM THE ONCENIO OF LEGUIA TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Politics in Peru in the middle third of this century have centered on the very fundamental questions concerning the nature of society. The topics of contention have been issues such as which populations should be included in the national society. The question of how power and wealth will be distributed has been prevasive also. But the paramount issue is the dilemma on how to handle national integration. During most of this period there has been a lack of a comprehensive political consensus. Given this lack of a guiding value system, many of the efforts of Peru's political actors are concerned with establishing a legitimacy for their goals.

I would like to argue that one of the products of the political conflict in this period is the development of a consensus on what the "rules of the game" are for the political actors. This consensus has been contributed to by noted Peruvian intellectuals, and Peruvian political activists. It has spread amongst the contending political parties and even reached what is called the paramount interest group, the military.

The Revolutionary Military Government, inaugurated by General Velasco and his associates, is the culmination of a process of diffu-
sion of values. It is also an assertive act of ethos maintenance. It is a realization that the pressures for a radical disruption of society had to be dealt with in a comprehensive fashion. This is why the military feels compelled to affirm the nature of Peruvian society and search for a compatible structure for national integration.

The society that the military springs from and that society's attendant problems can best be established by examining the work of three authors. François Bourricaud, Julio Cotler and Carlos Astiz have done the best job of describing the nature of pre-coup Peru. I will sketch this society to suggest its dynamics and identify the context that the political conflicts operate in. With the nature of pre-coup Peru established, my next step in this chapter is to cover the operational guidelines for Peruvian politics. That is the ethos that the military has striven mightily to maintain. Having established the nature of the society and the value system in question I can finish my chapter and go on to explaining how this has stimulated the corporatist experiments of the military.

When studying modern-day Peru, one soon finds out that there is no one good book on Peru. Sociologists, historians and political scientists have all written extensively, and these individual authors have emphasized different subjects. One of the better analysts of power and society is François Bourricaud. Her book, Power and Society in Contemporary Peru, is cited by a wide range of authors to substantiate their description of pre-coup Peru. Indeed, much of what is

49 Some of these works include: Carlos Astiz, Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
written by other authors is an expansion or fleshing out of Bourricaud's original, insightful analysis.

Bourricaud emphasizes the salient points of Peruvian society. The characteristics of her contemporary Peru are a society that is dualistic. It is a society that operates on the exclusion of a large segment of the population. It is a society split along the lines of Indian and non-Indian. It is a society marked by the presence of an oligarchy, a society slowly and reluctantly being dragged into the process of the democratization of that society.

Peru prior to the 1968 coup was a society dominated by its oligarchy. This oligarchy was essentially white, hispanic, urban, and centered in the city of Lima. Living in physical and cultural isolation is a large "undigested" rural Indian mass. This non-acculturated, rural, Indian peasantry is the largest single segment of society. They are closely complemented by a group of Indians who have acquired some degree of acculturation. These are the Cholo's. There is also a small but expanding middle sector. The people of the middle sector are white, mestizo, professionals, government employees, shopkeepers, and small entrepreneurs. A significant degree of education, and the absence of an involvement in manual labor, are important in defining their status.

Bourricaud emphasizes exclusion in the culturally stratified Peru she describes. The important middle sectors are defined by what they are not. That is,

... in a country where the oligarchy is so sharply distinguished as in Peru, the middle class may be expected to define itself by its exclusion, whether forced or voluntary from the elite. And as the country also comprises a large percentage of illiterate Indians, the middle class is bound to be conscious of all that distinguishes it from them: the more so as the hierarchical scale is symbolically reinforced by the racial and cultural distinction.\footnote{François Bourricaud, Power and Society in Contemporary Peru (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 58.}

Into this negatively defined middle class the skilled laborers and unionized plantation workers may sometimes be cast. The working class in the urban industrial sense is statistically small and not particularly effective in politics prior to the 1968 coup.

Politics in this society have been centered around the attempt at one end of the traditional elite to maintain its privileged position wherever possible, and to minimize the erosion of power and wealth over time. At the other end one find the forgotten ones, los olvidados, whose legal or extralegal focus has been on improving their precarious existence. The politics conducted by the established actors have been described as a very elaborate process of accommodation, sometimes referred to as "superaccommodation." Political change has been limited as,

Actually the old order, based on the cold-shouldering of the illiterate masses, is being replaced, not by genuine integration but by the partial acceptance of more and more differentiated categories of persons who may succeed in
organizing in defense of their interests or becoming acknowledged factors in the political game.51

Peru is described as the explosion that does not have to take place, the cataclysm that never arrives. The basic power issues, and the contending forces in Peruvian politics, are then succinctly summarized as,

An oligarchy controlling at a distance a society with which it does not feel a sense of identity; a rebellious but prudent middle class; and a mass of under-privileged citizens who find an outlet by organizing in defense of specific and narrow interests or by committing brief acts of violence whose political consequences have so far been abortive—such is the picture of Peruvian society.52

This sketch that Bourricaud has produced is one of a society defined in terms of its cultural groupings of oligarch, mestizo and the Indian underclasses. In the Mechanics of Internal Domination, Julio Cotier goes one step further and describes the power of these oligarchs and mestizos as the product of a system of internal domination of the Indian.

Cotier describes power relations in Peru as the product of a linked system of international domination and internal domination. Both by accident and by design the dynamics of power in Peru may be described as a functioning system of domination. Within the country there is a linked system of domination between the modern costa and the traditional sierra. Within the regions there is a linked system of domination between the hispanic mestizos and the Indian underclass. This distribution of power in Peruvian society is defined on a cultural

51 Ibid., p. 123.

52 Ibid., p. 137.
basis. To the degree that power has been held and exercised by culturally delineated groups, this establishes politics as a matter of ethos maintenance.

The structural dualism of this society is a dualism of unequal power. There is an unequal relationship between the larger international economy and the Peruvian economy. In Peru the modern, urban, mechanized, industrialized and politically potent costa receives the bulk of the domestic capitalization. The yet traditional, rural, primitive, agricultural and politically lame sierra transfers most of its wealth to the coast. It is saddled with an under-capitalized economy. Within the regions the mestizo segments own the land, the stores and whatever investment resources there are. The mestizo population of the costa and the sierra, and in particular the mestizos of the high puno, is located in a strategic position that makes this group the lynchpin of the existing political, economic and social relations.  

The mechanics of mestizo domination that Cotler argues for are described as,

The necessary and sufficient requirements of the system of domination described are a function of the mestizo's access to the system of authority through his knowledge of Spanish and through literacy which allows him to elect or be elected and to designate or be designated to fill positions within the system of "national authority or within the public administration" thus securing state resources to legitimate his lineage and his domination of the Indian masses.

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54 Ibid., p. 47.
This access to the system of authority, that the mestizo elements monopolize, gives them the opportunity to maintain themselves in a system of domination. The strategy for maintaining power centers around the privatization of the state and segmentary incorporation.

The privatization of the state put the mestizo element in power and it is aimed at keeping them in power. Suffrage has been carefully restricted. A potential voter must be literate, and literate in Spanish. The huge Indian segments of society have never voted in any of Peru's elections. Although Indians may not vote, they are counted for the purposes of representation. This gives the rural mestizo population a disproportionate representation in the congress. In some districts rural representatives only needed a fifth the vote that a representative in Lima needed to achieve office. This privileged position has given the mestizo access to the power resources on a regional and a national basis without having to give more than scant consideration to the Indian masses.

The discriminatory election laws have given the mestizo elements an invaluable power resource. That in turn has led to privatization of more of the state resources for limited group benefits. One of those benefits was the use of state lands. Prior to the establishment of agrarian reform, the government of Peru had been endowed with some agricultural lands over the years. The state rented these lands

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55 Ibid., p. 49.
56 Ibid., p. 51.
57 Ibid., p. 52.
out in allegedly public auctions. In order for a citizen to bid he had to prove that he was literate, held a voting card, and could get a commercial guarantee.58 This was something beyond all but the most exceptional Indian. Other privatizing measures have cropped up over the years. Parliamentarian initiatives were established. The initiative gives individual representatives the power to personally direct a specific budget outlay to any purpose he chose.59 Surname laws were established. Surname laws are any piece of legislation directed to one particular individual or group of individuals. 60

Accompanying this privatization of the state was a pursuit of a comprehensive policy of segmentary incorporation. Confronted with a changing society and with a progressively mobilized population, the established power holders had to deal with demands from the larger population. These were demands for wealth and power. In a system of segmentary incorporation the benefits of society are awarded only to select groups or parts of select groups. 61 The different social groups are incorporated into the national society in a partial or incomplete manner. For example, some labor unions but not all labor unions receive the cooperation of the government. A union that petitions the government for recognition, insists upon government arbitration for a conflict, and supports a "reasonable" settlement from the

58 Ibid., p. 58.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., p. 55.
labor ministry may find itself favored with a pay raise or a good contract settlement. Other kindred unions that do not seek to cooperate may risk being given nothing.

This picture of pre-coup Peru that is emerging is a picture of a society defined on rigid socio-cultural grounds, a society marked by struggles over the control of basic power resources, and a society where politics operate in a very well-defined structure. The third author that rounds out the description of Peru's political context is Carlos Astiz. One of the hallmarks of Astiz's book is his detailed description of how the extant parties fit into the larger Peruvian social setting. Astiz's description of Peruvian parties offers insights into how they fit into the process of ethos maintenance.

Like many Latin American countries, Peru after independence was headed by military caudillos or by civilians installed by military caudillos. As Peru progressed further into the twentieth century, the military found that it had to deal with a larger and more diverse society. Simple force offered a smaller and smaller chance for political control. Political parties became more and more indispensable to the process. So-called "modern," effective, and successful political movements arose and absorbed most of the political activity.

To describe the political process, Astiz uses the dichotomy of electoral machine and ideological party. Political movements in Latin America are seen as producing one of these two types of organizations. It is often hard to differentiate between local examples. It is the degree of these qualities that provides the basis for definition. The ideological party can be identified by its commitment to a
set of principles, its strong concern with nationalist issues and its ability to maintain its following in the periods it is out of office and out of power. The electoral machine is created to meet the immediate election needs of an individual or of a very specific group. Nationalist concern is more likely to lose out to the special interests of the group. Losing office or being pushed out of power can be fatal to such organizations, as patronage is necessary to maintain much of its following.

In the Peru that the Revolutionary Military Government took over there were three established ideological parties. These are the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), Accion Popular (AP), and the Christian Democrats (DC). In addition, small but significant Communist and Socialist parties have kept themselves on the scene over the years. All of these organizations periodically produce splinter groups. These organizations all operate as members of the Peruvian power establishment.

Both the ideological party and the electoral machine have operated in agreement in the political arena. The extant political parties have operated in a culturally and economically stratified society, a society marked by the lack of national integration and a lack of a unifying political consensus. The ideological parties and the electoral machines have agreed and cooperated in ethos maintenance. They have accepted the "rules of the game" that the military and some

62 Ibid., p. 89.
63 Ibid.
elements of the oligarchy had insisted upon. All of the political parties that I have mentioned are committed to a significant change in Peruvian society, but all of them have accepted a very well-defined operating code. This agreement, I will reemphasize, is a commitment to ethos maintenance.

The insistence, that ethos maintenance is the guiding principle in Peruvian politics, is a recognition that there are very concrete codes that regulate the conduct of politics. These are canons that derive from the impetus of the larger Latin American ethos. These principles are a product of the Peruvian historical experience. They are an adaptation and hence a very specific articulation that may not be evident in other countries. Elements of this guiding ethos may be seen in five concrete principles. These issues have been accepted either in whole or in greater part by "those organized in defense of their interests," as it is phrased by Bourricaud. The only significant rebel had been the Apristas. However, after a 30-year running battle with the Peruvian establishment, APRA bought into the larger guidelines.  

I am asserting that the Peruvian military has been trying to preserve the following very specific tenets. These are:

1. Elite Politics;
2. Segmentary Incorporation;
3. Catholic Christian Ideals;
4. Authentically National Solutions; and
5. The Middle Sectors Are Vital.

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64 Astiz, p. 101.
These principles can be expanded upon. I will try to show how they are reflected in the commitments of the major political parties of pre-coup Peru.

**Elite Politics**

A curious characteristic of Peru's political system is its insistence that politics is best conducted by elites. Direct popular control of society is considered to be dangerous or irrelevant. No significant actor in pre-coup Peru advocated universal suffrage. The Peruvian constitution had insisted that voters be literate, and literate in Spanish. It seems plausible that the oligarchy would be hostile to letting the impoverished and illiterate masses vote their immediate desires. It is less plausible that the reform-oriented parties or the revolutionary socialists should be indifferent or hostile to the idea of popular control of political office. But this is the case and the political parties reflect this.

This is true of APRA. In May of 1924, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre founded the APRA party. Ever since, APRA has been a significant part of the Peruvian political spectrum. The Apristas have been portrayed as the more successful of Peru's political parties. They have been a well-organized, popular party, and they have received the support of large numbers of Peruvians (literate voting Peruvians) over many years. One of APRA's characteristics has been a commitment to working through a political elite. The party has long held that

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society has to be changed before universal suffrage becomes meaningful.\textsuperscript{66} They have maintained that a small, restricted, specially educated, elite drawn from the vital middle sectors would transform Peru.

A similar disaffection with mass politics may be found in the writings of José Carlos Mariategui. A contemporary of Haya de la Torre, and founder of both the Communist and Socialist parties of Peru, Mariategui mixed orthodox Marxist analyses of society with a strong Indigenista sympathy. As a committed Marxist, Mariategui believed in the necessity of forming a revolutionary vanguard.\textsuperscript{67} In addition he was greatly influenced by the ideal of the Andean civilizations. "Natural" Indian communism as evidenced in the Inca society was held up as a goal to be pursued. Mariategui strongly discouraged looking for solutions in European models and that included liberal democracy.\textsuperscript{68} Mariategui set the direction for the communist and socialist parties in Peru and has been a strong influence in later revolutionary groups.

The newer political parties were not significantly different from the older parties on this item. Accion Popular and the Christian Democrats evolved out of the political ferment of the 1940s and 1950s.

Accion Popular was founded by Fernando Belaunde Terry, nephew of the noted Catholic intellectual Victor Andres Belaunde.\textsuperscript{69} AP arrived on the political scene with the advantage of having witnessed

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., p. 244.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., p. 237.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} Astiz, p. 112.
the travails of the Apristas. Accion Popular deemed it wise to avoid making threats to the basic nature of the society. The question of pressing for popular control of political office has been put to the party in the past. A typical response has been quoted as,

... there is very little interest in this matter as it would arouse too much opposition. ... Internally many in the party would oppose such a matter. ... The vindication of such a measure would be unpopular, we would be very much criticized and moreover we would have major opposition from the Army.70

The Christian Democrats were organized in this same period by a group of Catholic laymen. Inspired by the Christian Democrats of Europe, the Democristianos have pushed for major structural changes in Peru. One of the characteristics of the party is a rejection of violence as an acceptable path for change, and an insistence that reform be pursued through the appropriate constitutional channels.71 Given the literacy requirements of the Peruvian constitution this becomes a commitment to elite politics.

This skirting of controversy, this aversion to empowering the people, is symptomatic of the widespread belief that the people can't manage their affairs unaided. The idea that some people are better qualified to decide government policy, i.e., politics within an elite, is a principle that the Revolutionary Military Government is committed to defending.

71 Astiz, p. 126.
Segmentary Incorporation

Another aspect of Peruvian politics has been the development of the practice of segmentary incorporation. Bourricaud made the point that the old order based on the exclusion of the popular sectors had been replaced. It had been replaced by a system centered on the conditional acceptance of some sectors of society. This is called segmentary incorporation. The practice of segmentary incorporation has been accepted by the established political actors. One study in particular does a good job of highlighting how that is established. David Collier has done a case study of squatter settlements and government policy. One of the points he establishes is the use of land invasion for instituting segmentary incorporation.

Collier focuses his study of squatter policy on the metropolitan Lima area. The city of Lima witnessed spectacular growth, soaring from having 6.2% of the national population in 1931 to having 24.2% of the national population in 1972. \(^\text{72}^\) As the population of Lima grew the large number of poorly housed urban inhabitants began to look to the seizure of vacant lands abutting the city. As these seizures occurred, different political actors recognized the potential for political control in these legally vulnerable and politically dependent group actions.

The advent of power brokering with land invasion incidents is traced to the dictatorship of General Manual Odria. General Odria

took power in an anti-APRA coup that followed the abortive APRA coup of 1948. General Odria and his supporters were not merely concerned with repressing the APRA party. They were actively engaged in an attempt to build a popular movement that was independent of the Apristas.

Odria established a common format for squatter invasions. This became the norm for this type of political brokerage. He established a pattern of seeking out prospective land invaders and suggesting covertly or announcing publicly that the government would not evict squatters. The seizure would be organized, and carried off en masse. After the territory was seized a community association would be organized. To move into the settlement or to be given legal title to a lot, one had to work through the organization. It was expected that the residents would be appropriately appreciative and turn out for designated government rallies. Towards the end of his term, when the dictator was considering running for the office of president, squatters moving into the settlements were expected to join his party. Another part of the pattern of power brokering was the illegality of the land seizure. Although land seizure was encouraged and facilitated by the government, the government rarely granted title. The resultant illegality of the occupation was an overt government policy. This was calculated to keep the residents obligated to the government and to make them dependent on staying on good terms with the officials.

73 Ibid., p. 135.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., p. 141.
With the end of the Odria government, the following APRA supported Prado government tried to change the dependent relations of squatter and government. Law 13517 of 1961 set up a procedure for legalizing the existing settlements and for granting land titles. Unfortunately the law included many stringent provisions that made it hard for the designated government agency to grant land titles. This had the effect of subverting the law. Government authorities soon reverted to ignoring the law and dealing with the settlements on a case by case paternalistic fashion. Accession of a new government produced little change. After Accion Popular achieved power, land seizures were not encouraged, but the status of squatters was not altered. This state of affairs continued up to the last few months of the Belaunde administration. As a result, the inhabitants of the squatter zones of Lima were held in a state of legal limbo up until the initiation of the Revolutionary Military Government.

The opportunity for political incorporation on a segmentary fashion was not limited just to those who control the government. Squatter invasions could also be organized by political parties that didn't control the resources of the national government. Towards the end of Odria's term, conservative backers of Pedro Beltran began to organize a land seizure of their own. Although they did not have access to the authority of the government, they did have money to back

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77 Ibid., p. 142.
78 Ibid., p. 143.
79 Ibid., p. 136.
their efforts. They also had access to public opinion and political influence through Senor Beltran's newspaper. On the local level, land seizures could be organized to embarrass the national government and aid municipal governments controlled by opposition parties. After the Belaunde government came into office in 1963, several municipal governments used their resources to organize land seizures. This included several local governments controlled by the Apristas.

Collier's case study offers a pertinent example of the acceptance of segmentary incorporation by the political establishment. Needless to say, squatter settlements are not the only sphere open to policies of segmentary incorporation. Dependent, paternalistic relations between the government and the different social groupings have persisted and may be found in the policies of the Revolutionary Military Government. Although initially chary of such an activity, the necessity or desirability of segmentary incorporation has been recognized by the present junta. They have continued this practice and made it part of the ethos they want to preserve.

Catholic Christian Ideals

Like the rest of the former colonies of Spain and Portugal in the new world, Peru is a Catholic society. The depth of the church's penetration of some Indian regions may be open to question, but there is no denying that the church has held a near monopoly position on

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80 Ibid.
religious activities. The church has been present since the conquest and has made a concerted effort to tend to the spiritual, ethical and educational needs of the host society. The days when the church could operate without hindrance passed with the wars of independence and the resultant growth of secularism. In spite of this the teachings of the Catholic church have had a strong influence ever since.

The terms of political discourse in this Catholic society reflect Catholic Christian ideals. This is done both explicitly and implicitly. An organization such as the Christian Democrats is rather obviously motivated by the spiritual and ethical pronouncements of the church. Other political movements such as the Apristas have been formally anti-clerical. Disenchantment, however, or hostility towards the church as an institution has not interfered with political movements accepting the larger values.

The political significance of the church has long been appreciated by Peruvian politicians, and has figured in several major conflicts. Political conflicts involving the church have been central to the political development of Peru. In this century the Dictator Leguía initiated his Oncenio (1919-1930) with an attempt to dedicate the country to the Order of the Sacred Heart. This controversial ploy by Leguía, himself a high order Mason, sparked a massive political outcry that started the political careers of such student activists as Victor Raul Haya de la Torre and Jose Carlos Mariategui. As the twentieth century progressed and more of the citizenry became disen-

81 Astiz, p. 163.
chanted with Criollo liberalism. The position of the Church on social issues became a base for castigating the semi-democratic and semi-capitalist Peruvian establishment.

The importance of championing Christian ideals has been given different priorities. The short-lived fascist movement in Peru was the most fanatical in the advocacy of Catholic Christian ideals. Popular with the clergy, the fascists did not hesitate to attribute all the problems of the country to the abandoning of Catholic moral and ethical norms. Frederick Pike succinctly describes their concerns as: "Fascism in Peru was characterized by a disillusionment with liberal capitalism, which was pictured as a selfish, Godless, materialistic system concocted mainly by Protestants, Masons and Jews and in total opposition to the Christian spirit of the middle ages." 83

Moving along the political spectrum one can find much more sophisticated advocates of Catholic Christian ideals in post-World War II Peru. Prominent Catholic layment began to search for an answer to the foundering Catholic institutions of Peru. General José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, president from 1946 to 1949, was one of the first to voice such concern. Bustamante y Rivero articulated the concerns as:

There is more and more the impression that too much emphasis on the doctrinaire aspects is often placed from the pulpit, without insisting enough on the usual Christian norms of living. . . . There is sometimes a lack of human emotion and of Christian indignation to harass social injustices and merchants' greed. There is fear of injuring the powerful, and respectful euphemisms are employed to condemn authoritarian abuses. From it grows the widespread

83 Ibid., p. 257.
belief that the church goes along with the interest groups and maintains an implicit alliance with the temporal powers. . . .

This concern with the erosion of Catholic norms spawned a commitment to political activism among Catholic laymen. This activism was channelled primarily to two political movements. These movements are the Christian Democrats and Accion Popular.

Chronologically AP evolved first. Fernando Belaunde Terry was the moving spirit behind this movement. Astiz imputes that Belaunde modeled much of his program around the programs of the Christian Socialists of Europe and the Christian Democrats of Chile. Belaunde had the good fortune to have one of Latin America's noted Catholic intellectuals, Victor Andres Belaunde as his uncle. Accion Popular fashioned a program in tune with the concerns of the Catholic establishment and successfully won the approval of Church over the Christian Democrats in the 1963 elections. Although Accion Popular was not set up as a vehicle to advocate Catholic Christian ideals, it was more electorally successful than the Christian Democrats and was able to successfully preempt it.

The Christian Democrats evolved in the same period as AP. They may be accredited with giving the advocacy of Catholic Christian ideals a high priority. The Christian Democrats made an effort to offer a comprehensive analysis of Peru's problems. The Democristianos

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84 Astiz, p. 126.
85 Ibid., p. 112.
86 Ibid.
rejected both Marxism and Capitalism as valid ways of organizing human society. The excessive egoism of Capitalism and the excessive materialism of Marxism had to be combated, and the norms of Catholic humanism had to be championed. The party sought to define a "third position."

The Christian Democrats have described themselves as the first Peruvian political movement to base itself on Christian thought. Moving down the scale of priority, for Catholic Christian ideals, one comes to the Apristas and sundry revolutionary socialists. APRA was formally anti-clerical and hostile to the Church, as an institution of the Peruvian establishment. That, however, did not prevent them from seeing man and state in terms that the church had defined. Society is defined as an organic entity and the state is charged with a paternal role. The ends of the state are defined as "guaranteeing the life, health, moral and material well-being, education, liberty, and economic emancipation of the working classes . . . "

Political crises are seen as being moral crises. Apristas see the political solution for Peruvian society in a functional democracy that will meet society's needs because it is a "political system in which the citizen has rights and duties as a citizen and also has rights and duties flowing from his participation in the economic life

87 Ibid., p. 126.
90 Ibid., p. 60.
of the country." The theme of the spiritual renovation of Peru is emphasized by the Apristas. Aprismo is described as more than a political party. It is described as a philosophical and moral movement. The use of religious metaphor may not be anything more than a recognition of the powerful symbolism of Christianity in Peruvian society. Whether it is or is not valid, APRA has not hesitated to assert that "As surely as Christ suffered upon the cross, to the Apristas must suffer to win the redemption of Peru."

Moving to the bottom of the scale of priority, one examines the Marxist organizations in Peru. One of the unique aspects of Marxist movements in pre-coup Peru is the pervasive influence of José Carlos Mariategui. Mariategui established himself as one of the outstanding Marxist writers of Latin America. Within Peru his influence has marked revolutionary groups ever since. One of the paradoxes of his writings is his insistence that communism was primarily a spiritual movement, not a materialist movement. Part of the validation of the communist revolution in Peru was to be the spiritual renovation of a Peru corrupted and debased by the capitalist penetration of society. Elements of Christian mysticism were not seen as incompatible with a Marxist society. Mariategui argued that "There is a mysticism in Marxism and those who adhere to it come very close to the spirit of

91 Ibid., p. 70.
92 Ibid., p. 60.
93 Ibid., p. 64.
the Christianity of the catacombs.\textsuperscript{95}

In my preceding paragraphs I think that I have established a concern for Catholic Christian ideals in the Peruvian political establishment. Throughout the twentieth century there has been a persistent concern that the ideals of a Catholic society were not being adequately safeguarded. There has been an ongoing concern that this must be championed in the political arena. That concern has carried over to the military and they have made it a part of their program of ethos maintenance.

**Authentically National Solutions**

Another one of the guiding principles for Peruvian politics has been the insistence that political programs reflect a truly Peruvian response to the problems facing society. One of the persistent debates that ran through Peru in the early twentieth century was the argument between the proponents of \textit{Indigenismo} and the proponents of \textit{Hispanismo}.\textsuperscript{96} These two parties argued over the true nature of Peruvian society. This conflict affected the political actors. The \textit{Indigenistas} succeeded in casting doubts on how useful non-Peruvian practices or ideals would be in ordering a society that contained a large Indian population.

By the 1920s, significant elements of Peru's political establishment had begun to incorporate a rejection of European models of

\textsuperscript{95}Ibid., p. 238.

\textsuperscript{96}Ibid., p. 233.
political programs. The issue appears to have become a popular theme of Peruvian intellectuals in the 1920s. The ever-wily dictator Leguia seized upon this and warned that his dictatorship was necessary to prevent the advance of communism in Peru.\textsuperscript{97} The communists in turn were quick to assert that it was the Indian communism of the Inca society that would provide the model for their society.\textsuperscript{98} The Apristas reflected this trend when they argued, "Since Peruvian economic reality is completely different from that of Europe, Peru cannot take European socialism and introduce it into the country."\textsuperscript{99}

That period of ferment successfully established the principle. By the time the Christian Democrats and AP had arrived on the scene it was a central part of their programs. Accion Popular claimed that the significance of their program was due to their having searched for truly national solutions.\textsuperscript{100} The Christian Democrats put less of an emphasis on the truly national solution. What they did emphasize was that their party offered a third way, a way that was neither capitalist nor communist. This was an implicit appeal to nationalist sentiment.

This insistence on truly national solutions and the hostility to "foreign" ideologies was picked up and is one of the tenets the military has chosen to champion.

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., p. 217.

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., p. 237.

\textsuperscript{99} Kantor, p. 74.

\textsuperscript{100} Astiz, p. 115.
The Middle Sectors Are Vital

Peruvian politics has also contained a call to look after the interests of the middle sectors. This appeal for the protection of the middle sectors has had many different justifications. Victor Andres Belaunde is credited with describing how the fragility and impoverishment of the middle sectors was responsible for many of the country's difficulties. He began to circulate this idea in 1914, and by the 1920s it had gained wide currency. 101

This theme was seized by several opposing groups. Leguia and his backers felt it was important for the country to look after the interests of the middle classes. This was seen as a necessary part of building a strong, modern nation and a healthy capitalist system. 102 Haya de la Torre argued that the country had to advance the welfare of the middle classes for different reasons. Haya, philosophically at least, argued that a large and vital middle class was necessary to usher in the socialist revolution. It was his argument that the middle class was the revolutionary class in the underdeveloped countries of the world. Specifically,

... the imperialism to which underdeveloped countries are subjected is the first stage of their capitalism. Hence the weak nations must encourage the imperialist process, for it will create the capitalism which will generate a powerful proletariat together with the middle sectors necessary to lead the downtrodden in a socialist revolution. 103

102 Ibid., p. 217.
103 Ibid., p. 242.
From this point on the middle sectors were courted by almost all of the mainstream political actors. The only notable exceptions were the communists, who stuck to the working classes as the vehicle of the revolution.

Accion Popular and the Christian Democrats evolved in a political environment in which the importance of the middle classes was a given. Accion Popular offered a program to meet the needs of the middle sectors. AP emphasized the expansion of bank credit, industrialization and the importance of domestic entrepreneurs.\textsuperscript{104} The Christian Democrats appealed to the desire of the middle sectors to prevent a radical transformation of society.\textsuperscript{105}

This concern with the welfare of the middle sectors has been a pervasive part of Peruvian politics. It has been an important principle, and it is an issue that the military has decided to work for.

These principles have been given and a priori. They have formed a code of conduct for political actors in pre-coup Peru. They had been part of a common structure capable of integrating the different units. This system of elite politics, segmentary incorporation, Catholic Christian ideals, authentically national solutions, and an advocacy of the middle sectors was part and parcel of the dominant value system. These practices were part of a value system that has defined Peruvian society. It is a value system that defines the pos-

\textsuperscript{104} Astiz, p. 114.

\textsuperscript{105} Lowenthal, \textit{The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change under Military Rule}, p. 357.
session of wealth, power and status in Peru. These practices include people and exclude people. They designate who is eligible to participate in the allocation of power, and they are the mechanisms for perpetuating many of the features of Peruvian society.

In the 1960s the basic nature of Peruvian society was challenged. Revolutionary groups tried to set up a successful destruction of the extant order. Society in Peru had become sufficiently differentiated for significant groups in the population to be alienated from the larger system. They were sufficiently alienated to organize for the purpose of destroying the existing political and economic relations in Peru. That well-defined structure had been shaken. The larger society was not incorporating the more widely differentiated sectors of society. The political system was not preventing the emergence of attempted cataclysmic change, neither was it defusing that revolutionary thrust.

The complaint that "criollo liberalism" had failed Peru has circulated since the 1920s. By 1968 a large percentage of the officer corps of the Peruvian military had come to accept this. The military had also become convinced that there was a real chance that Marxist guerrillas could incite a successful revolution. Faced with what they considered to be a serious breakdown in the political system, combined with a violent appeal for revolution, the military saw little else to do but intervene. The purpose of the resultant intervention was the establishment of an alternative political economy. This alternative political economy was supposed to preserve the larger political ethos of the Peruvian status quo. It would, hopefully, leave the established
social groups reasonably intact.

The description of events that I have related in this chapter suggests that the political actors in Peru believed that they had three ideals of political economy that one could choose to organize society around. This would be a system of liberal democratic capitalism, a system of revolutionary socialism, and a system of corporatism. The alternative political economy that might provide the common structure for integrating the differentiated units was seen as a corporatist system.

Peru had an established counter-tradition that promised to provide a working social system. Throughout the twentieth century a sizeable chunk of the Peruvian electorate had insisted that "criollo liberalism" had to be replaced. They had also insisted that revolutionary socialism had to be avoided. The fascists had advocated a corporate society. The Apristas had called for functional democracy, and the Christian Democrats had decided to press for a third way that would replace capitalism. This counter-tradition was invoked by the military. It was invoked because it was seen as the most plausible avenue for the preservation of significant elements of the existing social order.

The principles I have enumerated are believed to be necessary to the continued operation of society. To this end the Peruvian military has embarked on a program of corporatist experimentation.

In my following chapters I will describe how the policies of the military have worked to preserve that specific political ethos. I will describe how the system of corporatism is designed to maintain designated parts of Peru's society.
CHAPTER VI

THE VELASCO REGIME

On October 3, 1968, the armed forces of Peru staged a coup and overthrew the civilian government of Fernando Belaunde Terry.\textsuperscript{106} Charging the existing political order with corruption, incompetence and abusive self-interest, the Revolutionary Military Government issued the First Statute of the Revolutionary Government. This called for the dissolution of the legislature and the assumption of legislative power by the president and the cabinet.\textsuperscript{107} The military, in turn, filled these positions.

Relying upon a Peruvian counter-tradition of political organization, the military formally committed itself to instituting a new corporatist government. This was deemed necessary because the military felt that the Peruvian political system was incapable of realizing the interests of the country. In the evaluation of the military, they were going to have to supplant the immoral extant system of politics.

Once instituted, this singular government became the object of close scrutiny. One subject that has engendered heated debate and much questioning is the motivation for the policies of the Revo-

\textsuperscript{106} Palmer, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{107} Deadline File for Data, Card 5 (Greenwich, CT: DMC Corporation).
volutionary Military Government. By examining the choice of policies and other actions of this junta I would like to offer a description of the type of corporatism produced in Peru. Utilizing the compound typology of corporatist systems I abstracted in Chapter IV, I will try to place the military government in a specific niche of corporatism. I will also describe how that choice of corporatist organization works to preserve the ethos I allude to.

The first phase of military rule in Peru covers the period 1968 to 1975. It is in this period that the military sets up the corporatist structure. Interpreting the actions of the government has to be done by hindsight. In and of itself the original proclamations and initiatives of the government did not make it easy to divine the intent of the government. Much of what the government proclaimed was vague enough to have several possible implicit meanings.

This is evident from the start. Leader of the coup and later president, General Juan Velasco Alvarada, gave as a rationale for the military government the following famous declamation. The central figure of the junta stated that:

... formal democracy ... represented nothing more than the interplay of political interests, for which the people and its great problems were always secondary matters.

The legitimacy of this Revolutionary Government cannot rest on the respect for the rules of a politically decadent game which only benefitted the privileged groups of the country. Our objectives have nothing to do with the traditional forms of criollo politics. ... Our legitimacy does not come from the votes ... of a political system which is rotten to the core because it has never served to defend the authentic interests of the Peruvian people.108

108 Palmer, p. 53.
Such a rationale does not help place the military government in a scale of corporatism. It speaks of what must be avoided. Please note the forms of criollo politics are labeled as reprehensible, not the criollo social order. Also note that it is the interplay of political interests that causes problems, and not the value orientation of criollo society.

The commitment of the military was made much more concrete when they explained that the revolution would offer a system of revolutionary humanism. Politics as such would be replaced by a system of participatory social democracy. Revolutionary humanism would be achieved by establishing social justice. Social justice was somewhat circumspectly defined as "The provision of each citizen with the economic means to move from subsistence, to pursue in harmony with society full social and cultural development." 109

Palmer deduces four facets of participatory social democracy. These four factors are the moral order of solidarity, worker management, social property, and self-government within the individual's day-to-day associations. 110 As defined by the government these characteristics place their political experiment squarely in the corporatist continuum.

The moral order of solidarity is to be fostered by the creation of a corporate system of participation. The people will be formed into local units of participation to manage their workplaces and resi-

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109 Ibid., p. 52.
110 Ibid.
dences. The people will be instructed in government; they will then acquire experience and a change in their economic status. As the citizens are judged to have acquired the ability to rule themselves, their role in government will be expanded to include local government. After this, governance of the nation will be achieved. Labor and capital will be given equal input into economic enterprises.  

Now with this type of commitment it is possible to start moving down the scale of corporatist systems. The functional interests have a very clear relation to the state in these pronouncements. Society is defined as groupings of functional interests. And in this corporate system of participation the government has decided it will organize these interests and instruct them. To this end the government set up an agency. By proclamation, on June 24, 1971, SINAMOS was set up and charged with:

1. Training, orienting, and organizing the national population;

2. The development of corporate organizations for society;

3. Handling communication between the government and the national population.  

This is a clear commitment to State Corporatism. The functional interest groups are set up as dependent organs of the state, and the government draws its legitimacy from another source. In this case, it is the armed forces.

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111 Ibid., p. 54.
112 Ibid., p. 91.
113 See page 39 of this thesis for this typology.
With that point established one next has to look at the commitments the government has made in the period 1968 to 1975. This will allow you to further classify events and determine if this has been an Inclusionary Corporatism or an Exclusionary Corporatism.

The government in Peru has written its policies here, in clear and unmistakable terms. It has both initiated positive programs and reacted in a repressive manner. The government's initiatives turned to the formation of new national communities. With the Agrarian Reform Law of June 24, 1969, the government nationalized the large agricultural holdings of the native elite and foreign companies. Agrarian cooperatives were established. The accompanying political units were organized into Agrarian Social Interest Societies (S.A.I.S.). This was followed by the establishment of an Industrial Community on July 27, 1970. The Fishing Community was organized on March 26, 1971, and the Mining Community was organized June 9, 1971.

This concern with establishing state-sanctioned functional interests continued in an unblushing carrot-and-stick fashion. Not only were groups encouraged to seek out the government's path, many were punished for failing to stick to the straight and narrow. In 1969, the older National Agrarian Society tried to contest the Agrarian Reform Law. In retaliation the government declared it illegal and created the National Peasant Association to replace it.

114 Palmer, p. 131.
115 Ibid., p. 116.
116 Ibid., p. 117.
117 Ibid., p. 156.
also moved to secure a monopoly on public access to information. On November 10, 1971, the government passed a law giving the government the right to reorganize the radio and television stations of the country. 118

As the government was presented with resistance it continued to react. In November 1973, the national teachers' union, SUTEP, was captured by Marxists in internal elections. That elicited a swift withdrawal of recognition by the government. 119 Political parties also drew more than scorn from the government. In May 1974, the government outlawed APRA once more. 120 And finally, after a long running confrontation, the government nationalized the country's newspapers on July 27, 1974. 121

In differentiating between Inclusionary Corporatism or Exclusionary Corporatism, you must decide if the government has pursued a policy of activating or deactivating social groups. As the government has acted in a two-steps-forward-and-one-step-back fashion, this becomes a subjective judgment. My reading of its activities is a reading that sees the government as concerned with control. The government insists on structuring participation, and is very concerned that things do not get out of control. That strikes me as a decision to engage in Exclusionary Corporatism.

118 Deadline File for Data, Card 20.
119 Ibid., Card 20.
120 Ibid., Card 21.
This commitment to State Corporatism and a program of Exclusionary Corporatism is also marked by a policy of Bi-Frontal Corporatism. In this system of Bi-Frontal Corporatism that the military operated, one can see both Privatist Corporatism and Statizing Corporatism. The Privatizing Corporatism can be seen in the commitment of the military to setting up economic communities and allowing them to receive benefits from the government. Here the offices of the state have been opened to select groups to give the government a greater degree of control.

Statizing Corporatism is evident in the policies of the government. There is no question that the government has been interested in penetrating and subverting independent social groupings. The extant political parties have been the object of a policy of repression and co-optation. Witness their being cold-shouldered by the creation of SINAMOS to do many of the functions they once did. The labor unions have not fared well either. The creation of communities to manage sectors of the economy eliminates the management-labor split and works to subvert that existing independent social grouping.

This system of State Corporatism with its program of Exclusionary Corporatism, its Bi-Frontal Corporatism, and its dual policy of Privatizing Corporatism and Statizing Corporatism; this political program also conserves elements of the older value system. The corporatizing program of the military has effectively worked to maintain the specific ethos that I outlined in the last chapter. The clearest example of this is the linkage between Catholic Christian ideals and government policy. The Revolutionary Military Government has never
hesitated to portray its concerns as one with the Church. The "moral message of Christianity" was affirmed in the "affinity of the thought of the Church of the poor and the exploited and that of the Armed Forces and the revolutionary population in the common cause of building a new society in Peru."\(^{122}\) The military has also felt it advantageous to explain its temporal concerns as consistent with the Church's teachings. The hostility of the military to class struggle is officially related to the concern with a moral order of solidarity as "workers and management should be a family, the class struggle has no place here, in a society of solidarity."\(^{123}\)

On a less obvious level the military's commitment to Catholic Christian ideals is reflected in its choice of advisors and consultants. Substantially prior to the coup, the military had displayed an interest in contemporary Catholic thought. At the much-touted Center for Higher Military Studies (CAEM), the military began inviting prominent clerical figures such as Msgr. Lebret, to lecture.\(^{124}\) After the military seized power, their commitment to Catholic Christian ideals may be seen in their acceptance of sizeable segments of the Christian Democratic program. Social property was given political credence by the Fifth International Christian Democratic Congress in October 1959.\(^{125}\) In the 1960s, the Christian Democrats of Peru committed themselves to establishing empresa communitaria. In the fall of 1968,

\(^{122}\) Palmer, p. 52.

\(^{123}\) Ibid., p. 58.

\(^{124}\) Knight, p. 358.

\(^{125}\) Ibid.
the concept was proposed in legislation. Once the military came in they turned to this ideal and the people who championed it.

The commitment to elite politics also stands out in a clear manner. It is the military as a qualified and self-prepared elite who has set themselves up to save the country. Policy, initiatives, and decisions flow from the top to the bottom. This is recognized and referred to by many analysts. It does not appear to be seriously disputed by anyone.

The issue of segmentary incorporation is more complex. The military has advocated a strong, revolutionary ideology and it has been rather strongly committed to democratizing society. The junta has, however, been ambivalent about dismantling segmentary relations. It was also not unduly concerned with avoiding programs that produce de facto segmentary incorporation. De facto segmentary incorporation may be observed on a wide spectrum. The government talked of creating social property to create a new relationship between workers and property. The government offered this as evidence of its good revolutionary credentials. Studies carried out at a later date suggested that no more than 10% of the industrial work force would benefit from the enabling legislation. That left the greater part of the work force unincorporated into the new order.

The economic communities offer an example of the junta's uneasiness over discontinuing policies of partial or incomplete incorporation. Economic communities were set up to reorder the relationship

126 Ibid., p. 359.

of workers, management, and capital. They were also intended to establish a direct relationship with the government. This establishing of economic communities did not confer equal economic benefits for all parties. The well-to-do Fishing and Mining Communities were allowed share in the rather good-sized profits they generated. The less-well-off Industrial Communities and the impoverished Agricultural Communities only had access to the revenue they generated. Within communities, there was little transfer of funds.\textsuperscript{128} Well-to-do sugar coops did not have to make significant transfers to subsistence highland dairy operations. This overt program of conferring unequal economic benefits to different sectors of the economy was coupled with a refusal to reorganize the tax structure to transfer wealth.\textsuperscript{129} This is an example of a decision to continue the segmentary incorporation of society.

The acceptance, more than the advocacy, of segmentary incorporation is also reflected in the Revolutionary Military Government's policy on urban land seizure. Initially, the government was hostile to using land invasions for political brokerage. Allegedly this was due to a concern of the armed forces that the government should function through the military as an institution, not through personalismo.\textsuperscript{130} Land seizures did not stop with the promise of a better life under the


\textsuperscript{130} Collier, p. 151.
Revolutionary Military Government. There were repeated attempts to establish squatter settlements. Faced with the reality of a housing shortage that was not disappearing any time soon and a population versed in the potential for successful land seizure, the military chose to give SINAMOS the responsibility for new settlements. SINAMOS was charged with settling people on suitable lands.\textsuperscript{131} The flagrant brokerage that characterized pre-coup Peru was avoided. The military, however, maintained a control mechanism to channel incorporation.

The emphasis on authentically national solutions may also be readily established. Taking up the old cry for solutions that reflect the special problems of Peru, President Velasco stressed the importance of creating new forms of economic organization. The creation of social property was offered as proof of the government's commitment to seeking out that which is neither capitalist nor communist.\textsuperscript{132} This emphasis is a direct continuation of programs the civilian political parties have advocated. The experience of professionalization in the military has been a force for seeking Peruvian solutions. The previously-mentioned Center for Higher Military Studies is cited as a force for raising a strong nationalist consciousness amongst the officer corps.\textsuperscript{133} An insistence on national solutions is attributed to the learning environment of the CAEM. The insistence on national solutions that is cited in government programs is an honest appeal to a long-standing

\begin{footnotes}
\item[Ibid., p. 151.]
\item[Knight, p. 351.]
\item[Lowenthal, The Peruvian Experiment, p. 30.]
\end{footnotes}
intellectual and political tradition.

The concern with the middle sectors is also part of a long-standing tradition. Jane Jacquette has produced an argument for this in her essay, "Belaunde and Velasco: On the Limits of Ideological Politics." Jacquette discusses the discernable continuity between the policies of APRA, AP and the Revolutionary Military Government. She very concretely argues that:

The purpose of comparing ideology and practice under Belaunde and Velasco is to discuss parallels . . . through the identification of key similarities between Belaunde's ideology and that of the Velasco regime. These similarities rest on shared middle class and technocratic values, including a deep fear of violent revolution.134

Beyond a sharing of larger middle-class values, there are very specific policy issues that display this. This is evident in the economic policy of the Velasco regime. Consonant with their civilian predecessors, such as APRA or AP, the economic policy of the junta shares the belief that the motor force of economic development lies outside the state bureaucracy.135 The labor communities received much publicity, however the national bourgeoisie was seen as a vital force for national development. As a result the government has channelled credit, created incentives and tried to exhort the middle sectors to join the programs and support the Revolutionary Military Government.136

This affirmation of ethos that I argue for is an important goal. The corporatist structure and the corporatizing programs have

134 Jacquette, p. 402.
136 Ibid., p. 422.
been set up to make structural changes. It has been hoped that these programs would successfully maintain a very important value system; an operating code thought vital if not indispensable for the continuation of civil society. This situation, alas, did not work out as desired. The Revolutionary Military Government set up by Velasco and his circle of backers fell upon dire circumstances. A series of conflicts in the period between the Spring of 1974 and the Spring of 1975 resulted in the replacement of Velasco by General Francisco Morales Bermúdez. With the advent of Morales Bermúdez the revolution takes a substantially different tack.
CHAPTER VII

THE SHIFT IN NATIONAL POLICY

With the advent of the regime of General Francisco Morales Bermudez the "revolution" of the military took an abrupt turn. The issue of ethos maintenance was handled in a radically different manner by the two regimes. During the ascendancy of General Velasco and his "radicals" in the military, ethos maintenance was pursued by an organized program of corporatist institution building. The regime of Bermudez may be characterized by its emphasis on repression. With the failure of many corporatizing programs and the active opposition of a growing sector of the Peruvian establishment, the government abandoned institution-building. The majority military opinion was that ethos maintenance would have to be pursued by repressing disruptive elements.

The move to an emphasis on repressing disruptive elements was precipitated by an expanding crisis. The organized and the established elements of Peruvian society had not silently acquiesced to the Revolutionary Military Government. Neither had they succumbed to their involuntary suspension. Instead the period from 1968 to 1975 was marked by several general strikes, a series of bloody mine strikes, politically inspired riots and unregulated peasant invasions. At the same time the government had taken control of the radio and TV stations, banned the political parties, seized the newspapers and engaged in a
program of jailing and deporting political activists. In spite of the government's display of force, a police rebellion was fomented in 1975. This persistent and spirited resistance resulted in a retrenchment and reevaluation by the military.

By 1975, serious internal and external problems beset the military. The corporatizing programs were neither producing the support desired nor eliminating as much of the resistance as was needed. The international economy faltered and produced undesirable terms of trade for Peruvian commodities. The Humboldt current became sufficiently erratic to disrupt the fishing industry. The IMF began to pressure the junta to make severe alterations in its budget. The pressures on the military multiplied dramatically and the military's ability to control the political arena began to deteriorate. Differences increased within the military. This led to a progressive polarization of the armed forces. The resultant institutional conflict produced an interest in withdrawing from the risk-fraught process of governing.

The retreat into a program of repression was precipitated by a convergence of crises. The crisis is a composite one. There is an economic crisis, a political crisis and an institutional crisis. Holding center stage is the economic crisis. The combination of massive international borrowing and a distressed economy have kept the Peruvian economy in jeopardy since 1976.

This economic crisis is both of the military's making and not of the military's making. After seizing power the junta engaged in a massive program of investment to build a strong national economy. The major engine of development was the national government. The
principle source of capital was foreign loans. Between 1965 and 1973, the government's share of the economy rose from 16% to 55%.\textsuperscript{137} Between 1972 and 1977, the government quintupled its international debt from one billion dollars to five billion dollars.\textsuperscript{138} This government directed program of investment was predicated on several assumptions. The government was committed to the export of commodities to support the economic plans. After the discovery of oil in the Amazon basin, the government began to look forward to the export of oil. The government assumed that the number one foreign exchange earner, the fishmeal industry, would be reliable. It also looked forward to significant returns from the copper deposits it was opening.

Events, alas, worked against the Peruvians. The anchovies disappeared from Peruvian waters.\textsuperscript{139} This was damaging enough. Worse luck yet, the Amazonian oil deposits failed to prove out. Members of the international banking community had expected to see Peru export a billion dollars of oil a year by 1980.\textsuperscript{140} On these grounds the government had secured a 750 million dollar loan to build a questionable trans-Andean pipeline.\textsuperscript{141} The government had also invested heavily in new copper mines. Unfortunately, the second half of the 1970s saw a depressed international market for copper.\textsuperscript{142} This com-

\textsuperscript{137} New York Times, November 6, 1974, p. 2.


\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., p. 17.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., p. 1.

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., p. 17.

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
mitted the Peruvian government to large fixed loan payments. As the strategic Peruvian industries failed to produce the needed foreign earnings the government was forced to curtail the national budget. Due to severe differences over how to alter the budget and a reluctance to believe that the economy was imperiled, Peru wobbled close to default on its international loans.

The blame for this state of affairs is hard to place. International lenders had sought out Peru as a prudent investment. As late as 1975, experts from the IMF, the World Bank, and major private lending institutions were agreed that Peru could comfortably handle $2.8 billion in additional development loans.143 The military in turn eagerly rose to the occasion and came up with 84 projects that could absorb $6 billion in loans.144 They were able to secure some $3 billion in loans before things began to collapse.145

In an environment of shrinking earnings and growing debt obligations the government found itself confronted with a no-win situation. Continued investment in Peru and access to foreign capital goods, energy and armaments were seen as an absolute necessity. Failure to meet loan obligations might deprive Peru from access to these items. The only sure formula for meeting these debts were austerity budgets. This had been insisted upon by both the IMF and private lenders. Substantial cuts in the government's budget meant choosing between restricting the large armaments purchases or severely cutting

143 Ibid., p. 1.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid., p. 17.
social expenditures. Stringent pursuit of either option would be an explosive policy for the reigning administration. Needless to say, Morales Bermudez waffled on this as long as possible. Events became sufficiently dire to bring about action. A consortium of private banks monitored the Peruvian economy for six months. Allegedly they abstained from giving the Peruvian government any direct orders. After the sol was devalued by 30%, the budget severely cut, imports cut, price controls removed and wage controls set up, a $390 million loan was extended.\textsuperscript{146} These austerity measures were bitterly unpopular. They weakened the government and drove people into the waiting arms of the political parties. As neither the Peruvian economy improved nor the debt service disappeared this scene was repeated later. This time around it was the IMF that was appealed to. The IMF pointedly insisted that the huge budget deficits were the cause of the Peruvian government's difficulties. In the 1977 budget, the Peruvian government had allowed for a deficit of $625 million.\textsuperscript{147} The fact that arms purchases were estimated at $300 million a year for the two years prior did not sit well with the IMF.\textsuperscript{148} A compromise was struck that gave Peru $100 million in stand-by credits and improved their standing with private lenders.\textsuperscript{149}

This extended down-spiral of the Peruvian economy coupled with

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{146}\textsuperscript{146} Business Week, March 21, 1977, p. 117.
  \item\textsuperscript{147}\textsuperscript{147} The Wall Street Journal, September 1, 1977, p. 17.
  \item\textsuperscript{148}\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
  \item\textsuperscript{149}\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
the abrasive austerity measures has alienated some supporters of the regime and driven many people from quiescence into active opposition. This has pushed the government into a repressive role.

The political crisis has centered on the resiliency and effectiveness of the pre-coup political parties. The government had been concerned with supplanting independent political groups with state-created and state-regulated interest groups. The chosen vehicle had been the government agency SINAMOS. The efforts to erect corporatist interest groups never met the expectations of the military. SINAMOS failed abjectly. Many interest groups and all the political parties survived. The organizations created by SINAMOS either languished for lack of participation or were captured by political activists of the pre-coup political parties.

The labor organizations were an immediate object of the government's corporatizing programs. APRA had long been established in many unions. The communists controlled the largest labor organization, the Confederación Generale de Trabajadores (CGT). SINAMOS set up the rival Central de Trabajadores Revolucionario Peruana (CTRP). The government-sponsored organization failed to make inroads into established labor constituencies and never became relevant to the labor scene.

The efforts of SINAMOS to organize the agricultural sectors was not much more successful. The Confederación National Agraria (CNA) was set up to organize the agricultural sector. Although the CNA

successfully incorporated many agricultural units, the APRA-controlled sugar coops stayed out of it. And even more ominously, a communist-backed Confederación Campesinos del Peru (CCP) developed. The CCP actively competed with the government for the sympathies of the distressed campesinos.

On another front SINAMOS had been set the task of organizing a competitor to the leftist-controlled teacher's union, SUTEP. The government set up the Sindicato de Educadores Revolucionarios del Peru (SERP). Operating under the auspices of SINAMOS, SERP was to wean the teachers from their independent ways. That never came to pass. In the national elections for the state teacher's agency SUTEP-backed candidates absolutely trounced the SERP slates.

The original strategy behind setting up a national organization to channel political participation had been an interest in controlling political activities. SINAMOS had produced a dismal record. Not only did the programs fail to undercut the established political organizations, but SINAMOS prodded many groups into active opposition. SINAMOS's reputation as an agent of government control was negatively received. It made it a liability to be associated with SINAMOS.

Another disturbing development was the Frankenstein evolution of some organizations. The CNA was set up to organize the agricultural

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151 Latin America, May 9, 1975, p. 42.
152 Latin America, January 24, 1975, p. 29.
153 Ibid.
154 Latin America, October 31, 1976, p. 343.
sectors for the government. By late 1976 the CNA had displayed signs of being both critical and unresponsive to the government. 155 The CNA had evolved into an active opponent of the government.

The lackluster record of SINAMOS and its government-sponsored organizations disappointed large numbers of the military. By 1976, the government had stopped looking for a solution in nationally-sponsored institutions. This visible retreat by the government spurred more resistance from the Peruvian political establishment.

The third crisis was the institutional crisis of the military. From the beginning of the Revolutionary Military Government there has been a demand that the institutional integrity of the military remain intact. Personalismo, alliances with the political parties or plotting to overthrow the revolutionary junta of the three branches of the armed forces was strictly off limits. General Velasco was removed by a Pronunciamiento Institutional of the revolutionary council. 156 Bermudez did not seize his office for his own ends.

The military was seriously rocked by bitter internal disputes over the course of the revolution. This became evident in the period between February 1975 and April 1976. Throughout the larger period of the Revolutionary Military Government, there had been differences. However, by 1975 the military had become seriously polarized. Significant numbers of the officers could be placed in the category of radical or conservative.

155 Latin America, October 8, 1976, p. 311.
156 Latin America, September 5, 1975, p. 274.
Under the leadership of General Velasco much of the policy of the government could be described as "radical" or change-oriented. The dissatisfaction with the results of these programs culminated in the removal of Velasco. Domestic turmoil escalated and more and more of the military began to advocate a comprehensive program of repression to keep events under control. The fragile majority opinion held that the political turmoil would be worsened by abandoning the revolution and openly warring against radical elements. The conservative minority was large enough to plot and intrigue without serious hindrance from the government.

The police rebellion of February 5, 1975, was taken as a sign by many officers that the government had foolishly encouraged radical elements with its policies. From then until Morales Bermudez declared a second phase for the revolution, the institutional integrity of the military was sadly neglected by many officers.

The pressures on Velasco resulted in his replacement by Morales Bermudez. The departure of Velasco did not placate all of the conservative elements in the military. These disgruntled officers were sufficiently distressed to look for an occasion to stage a successful coup.

On the night of February 13, 1976, General Gonzalo Briceno issued an ultimatum to the government to stop dealing with radical elements and start a crackdown. Other military units failed to join General Briceno and he was successfully censured and dismissed from
Briceño's ill-timed gambit was not an isolated incident. Later that summer General Carlos Bobbio Centurión ordered the troops out of the Lima barracks to take up defensive positions around the city. Alleging that a compact mass of people were moving on the city he ordered the troops out to their preplanned defensive positions. Bobbio neglected to contact his superior officer General Jorge Fernández Maldonado. The furious Prime Minister Fernández Maldonado (a radical) demanded and received Bobbio's resignation. These ill-concealed invitations to a coup clearly communicated that conservative elements were insisting on comprehensive changes if the Revolutionary Military Government were to remain in power.

These cracks in institutional integrity were slowly patched up by Morales Bermudez. He recognized that the military would no longer support the unrestrained turmoil produced by the attempts at policy innovation. He therefore accepted the message being communicated to him. In April of 1976, Morales Bermudez propounded a theory of revolution that described all revolutions as having two phases. The first phase of change and innovation had been adequately explored by the Velasco regime. The second phase of the revolution was a phase of clarification and consolidation. In the future the government

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157 Latin America, February 27, 1976, p. 71.
158 Latin America, July 16, 1976, p. 186.
159 Ibid.
160 Latin America, April 9, 1976, p. 116.
161 Ibid.
would concentrate on meeting the demands of the original innovations.

The three converging crises that I have described have combined to push the government into a reversal of policy. The program of corporatist institution-building has given way to a program of repression. The military is still very much concerned with ethos maintenance. They have, however, lost faith in the ability of corporatist institutions to do the task by themselves. The military appears to hold the attitude that elements of the old ethos can be kept functioning by using the simple expedient of repression. This is something of a regression for the military and I do not see it holding much promise.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

The corporatist politics of the Revolutionary Military Government have been a singular experiment. No other government in Latin America, military or civilian, has made such a comprehensive attempt to fall back upon the corporatist counter-tradition that has coexisted with most of the formally liberal-capitalist systems of the region. The decision to save the old value system while discarding the old power structure is a remarkably sophisticated program that few militaries in Latin America have thought of trying.

How events worked out for the military is another matter. The seemingly well-intentioned military was greeted with resounding disapproval. Taking heed of the lack of support and determined resistance, the military decided to opt for the traditional course for military governments. The military abandoned its program of corporatist institution-building and reverted to the familiar threat of gruesome repression if events proved too outrageous. The head of the Revolutionary Military Government, Morales Bermudez, announced the withdrawal of the military and the scheduling of a constituent assembly and elections.\(^{162}\) SINAMOS was abolished along with one of its more vital creations, the Confederaciön National Agraria.\(^{163}\)

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out the withdrawal the government declared a general amnesty for all political and social prisoners. This was followed by an announcement that the newspapers seized by the government would be resold to their former owners.

Faced with a completely unsatisfactory set of affairs, the military gave politics back to the civilians. There are many lessons here. Perhaps one of the most pertinent lessons illustrated here is the limitation of enlightened self-interest as a vehicle for change. The military had assumed it could successfully appeal to the Peruvian political establishment. There was an assumption that "those organized in defense of their interests" could be made to see the wisdom of the military's action. In return, the military could count on their support while reorganizing society to coopt or suppress revolutionary elements. The military, unfortunately, never got a very high degree of support from the Peruvian political establishment. Neither the unions nor the activists from the major political parties ever had a very great degree of trust in the military. Although the Peruvian establishment will close ranks and back the military in the face of violent revolution, and possibly a foreign war, things break down for less dramatic events. If the stakes do not appear to be as high, then the different elements of society strike out to preserve their own interests. A situation like this guarantees a vigorous and coherent repression of revolutionary forces. It also means that it will be

165 Ibid.
difficult to make structural reforms.

Another aspect of the limitations of enlightened self-interest may be seen in the military. When it became apparent that the initial program of corporatist institution-building was inadequate, and the population was turning against them, the military reverted to old-fashioned repression. The military should have known from their own experience that repression alone will not stop forces for change. Their original decision to be, selectively, as revolutionary as the revolutionaries was a much wiser course of action. As pressure mounted on the military, rational self-interest failed to reassure many officers. An anxious military chose to employ threats of violence, rather than move into an unfamiliar environment.

The whole issue of ethos maintenance remains in the political arena in Peru. The need to establish a common structure capable of relating the different units is still a major concern. Although the military is handing power back to the civilians, it may not have abandoned its concern with ethos maintenance. What the unsuspecting military put itself through may serve as a powerful enough object lesson to keep the political parties sensitive to the need for ethos maintenance.

The military experimentation has had a conservatizing effect. The point has been made that the significant redistribution of wealth and power means a transfer of wealth from productive sectors to less productive sectors. It also means a transfer of power from the sectors of society already well organized in defense of their interests to the numerous unorganized and impoverished people. Such a course of
action would produce a severe diminution of wealth and power among the extant power holders. Attempts by the military to do this have been bitterly unpopular. It would be expecting a lot to have the established power holders redistribute themselves out of power and out of influence. The popular pressures for change have not diminished. However, reform will not be so blithely entered into. The military had attempted to implement many of the traditional Aprista and Christian Democrat reforms. Some of these programs were not particularly successful, and other programs were very controversial. The Apristas and others have had the benefit of having the military stick its neck out and receive the onus for a number of failures. The military's actions may have convinced reform politicians that it is wiser to advocate less sweeping change.

For the time being, it appears that the politicians are not about to leap into very many fundamental changes. The one exception is the subject of universal suffrage.

One of the elements of the Peruvian political ethos that I argued for in my paper was a commitment to elite politics. Universal suffrage was the issue I suggested that reflected this. The Peruvian political parties had displayed an extreme allergy to the idea of universal suffrage. No political party in the twentieth century has advocated universal suffrage. Not APRA, not Accion Popular, not the Democristianos, not the communists, not the left-splinter parties. With the recent (1978) exception of Hugo Blanco's FOCEP (Frente de Obreros, Campesinos, y Estudiantils Popular), no political party has felt it could threaten the politically significant minority with such a bald-faced commitment to a radical redistribution of power and goods.
This has radically changed. Hugo Blanco, the former Trotskyite guerrilla, has successfully pushed for universal suffrage. Although the institution of a system of one man/one vote has a strong potential for change, there is an irony here. The implacable demand of the forces for radical change is now centered on voting rights. This is a significant change from 1965. At that time, Hugo Blanco and others established a peasant rebellion with the avowed goal of creating a successful socialist revolution. The fact that Hugo Blanco was permitted to be politically active, and the fact that Blanco seemed to feel that the proper focus for the radical forces was the vote indicates a change.

Although repression by itself is no solution, the military has demonstrated that it can successfully destroy guerrilla operations. Events have also displayed that the political establishment will back the military in an environment of immediate threats to the system. Given these demonstrated realities the radical establishment is now pursuing the path of non-violence.

The question of the success or the failure of a program of ethos maintenance can also be addressed. The military pursued its program of institution-building out of the fear that "criollo liberalism" had failed and would fail to protect the true interests of the Peruvian social order. Going by its own avowed goals, the Revolutionary Military Government has failed, and it is withdrawing from politics. Pure cor-

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poratism will not be instituted in Peru.

What stands out is the durability of the Peruvian political system. "Criollo liberalism" is every bit as much a part of the established system as government-sponsored interest groups. The forces of "criollo liberalism" successfully withstood twelve years of suspension, and occasional repression. The military could not operate without the support of the "system" and neither can the radicals. It is a tribute to the political acumen of Blanco that he is choosing to push for non-violent reform. It may be the only path open to him. The advent of universal suffrage may also work for ethos maintenance. Voting rights in and of themselves confer no inherent changes. Opponents of this move have raised specters of tax leveling, the election of large numbers of Indians, and immediate change. There is no guarantee that this will come to pass. The political brokers have not disappeared from politics in Peru. There is a tremendous potential for manipulation of a large mass of political ignorant people. Universal suffrage can also be a force for conservatism, for ethos maintenance. Given that the military was not panicked into a coup by this, there is a tacit acceptance of this. They may see the conservative potential here.

This durable Peruvian political order is not well appreciated by other analysts of Peru. The theory of politics in Peru has yet to be adequately explained. There are forces operating, and my analytic approach does a good job of explaining them. I argue that an analytic emphasis on the elements of the political ethos gives an investigator information that has to be accounted for. I believe that
this is a productive path. Ethos maintenance is an ongoing process and it has not stopped. The military has succeeded in having the terms of political discourse defined to protect most of the value system. Although its formal experiment is over, it has guaranteed the avoidance of violent and radical change.
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