"On Wittgenstein's approach to language and reality."

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"ON WITTGENSTEIN'S APPROACH TO LANGUAGE AND REALITY"

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"ON WITTGENSTEIN'S APPROACH TO
LANGUAGE AND REALITY"

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The general purpose of this thesis is to develop some of the notions of Ludwig Wittgenstein which are concerned with language. In order to make his ideas clear, I present a historical background for the ideas with which he deals. Thus, the views of Plato, Leibniz, Locke, and Russell, point out the nature of the problems surrounding the relation between language and reality. The second chapter seeks to demonstrate, however briefly, several of the ways philosophers have tried to resolve the problems that accompany this relation; and, at the same time, to show how none of their solutions are adequate. Proceeding from this backdrop of exposition, I attempt to indicate, with some degree of clarity, how Wittgenstein surveys the problematic connection between language and reality. I shall conclude that there is actually no connection between language and reality. Therefore, the very object of this thesis is to illustrate that there is no relation between language and reality, in fact, that language is reality.
to Joe Swanson for his unceasing temperance
and
to Wolfgang Yourgrau for his great kindliness.
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Perhaps if ideas and words were distinctly weighed and duly considered, they would afford us another sort of logic and critic than what we have hitherto been acquainted with.

Chapter I

LANGUAGE AND REALITY: FOUR VIEWS

This first chapter explains how four philosophers treat the relation between language and reality. The accounts of how they deal with this relation shall be brief, mainly because they only serve to illustrate the views of Ludwig Wittgenstein which shall occupy later chapters. Moreover, their four views are arranged according to the two, general, philosophic approaches they seem indicative of: Plato (A) and Leibniz (B), an idealist approach; Locke (C) and Russell (D), an empiricist approach. By 'idealist' I mean a philosophic conception maintaining that reason alone provides substantial knowledge concerning the nature of the world; and by 'empiricist' I mean a philosophic doctrine maintaining that substantial knowledge concerning the nature of the world is derived from experience, i.e. from the senses. Both of these become more explicit as the chapter proceeds. Furthermore, it is believed that the historical situation of each philosopher allows the four views to be rendered without confusion; and that the presentation of these views is such that the latter in each approach exhibits the greatest development. Finally, I have found it necessary to hurry over, and at times ignore, some of the main tenets of these philosophers, in order to: (i) be brief; (ii) prevent drifting from the point; (iii) present the best case for each philosopher.
To understand the connection between language and reality in the works of Plato, I shall concentrate on the relation of language to 'essence'.

How language relates to 'essence' appears, among other places, in the Sophist, the Cratylus, the Phaedo, and the reasonably authentic Seventh Epistle. I now proceed with an exposition of Plato's position, taken mainly from the Seventh Epistle, but which has the support of references from several other Platonic texts.

"Every existing object has three things which are the necessary means by which knowledge of that object is acquired." (1)

(i) The object has a name. This name (a sensual intimation of an essence) is either a noun or a verb, e.g. the nouns (subjects) 'circle' or 'beauty' and the verbs (actions) 'sleep' or 'eat'.  

(ii) The object has a definition. For example, the object with the name 'circle' might have the definition "that which is everywhere equidistant from the extremities to the center"; and definitions themselves are "composed of nouns and verbs." (2)  

(iii) The object also has a "sensory copy" or image which resides, after the object is perceived, in the mind (soul) of the perceiver. This is to make clear that a person has an image of the object in his mind, and not the object itself. It then seems to follow, on Plato's view, that 'knowledge of that object' is possible in virtue of the intricate combination of those three things which the object has. The name, the definition, and the image combine to form what Plato calls knowledge. (3)
Plato also seeks to establish the existential character of knowledge by saying that it "does not exist in the vocal utterances or in bodily forms but in the soul." Thus, knowledge of the circle, for example, differs, both from the nature of the circle, i.e. its essence, and from the object, which is sensed. This is what I am recognizing as an idealist approach, wherein the objects of common experience are known as mental images. Furthermore, on this view, the validity of these images, as they represent pieces of knowledge, is not determined by the fact that they are immediately presented to the mind by experience, but rather is determined by what they are mediately an expression for. Plato wants to maintain that the images (which are "expressions of the mind in speech") are expressions of, i.e. plenipotentiaries for, their respective essences. Essences "are, as it were, patterns fixed in nature," and of particular interest here is the word 'pattern.' For, if essences are patterns in nature, then the relation image to essence can be construed as structural, and not necessarily as the relation of a picture to that which is pictured.

It is Plato's idea that the essences play an important role in determining the truth of their respective images. They do this in two ways. (i) Essences provide the conditions for the existence of images; and thus, for knowledge itself. (ii) They also determine the truth or falsity of an image by a formal relation, which Plato calls 'participation.' He characterizes essence (being) as: in space immutable, in
Therefore, knowledge "of all which we stamp with the name of essence in the dialectical process" is acquired "before we are born," so Plato contends; and after birth, by the process of recollection, knowledge of essences is prompted, though not verified, by the senses.

The Platonic connection between language and true reality, i.e. essences, is twofold. (i) On the one hand, words (the sensuous signs of mental images) express their referent essences; and as a result of this, they can promulge knowledge. However, because of the ephemeral nature of words, they do not establish knowledge, in the sense of establishing the truth value of particular propositions. The truth value claim of knowledge is a function of that formal relation, perhaps an isomorphism, existing between the mental image and its essence, i.e. a relation of participation. (ii) On the other hand, words, in either their written or vocal form, are the only means whereby essences can be known. Only as the essences are represented in language can they be known, with this qualification: though language signifies the essences, it also can easily lead to ambiguities, for it effects the senses of different men in various ways. In this connection, Plato mentions that "the stream of thought which flows through the lips and is audible is called speech." However, what language represents—essence or reality—remains the same in the perceptions of all men; it is the degree of participation which varies, and not the aprioristic character of the essences.
Therefore, I conclude, that knowledge, once obtained, is identical from man to man; and is a function of words, which is to say—ideally, knowledge is conveyed in the commerce of discourse.

In summary, the main points found in Plato are three. They are: (i) the degree to which reality is known is a function of the formal relation between words in combination, and those essences which they express; (ii) language is a sensuous sign which expresses reality; and finally (iii), language and thought may, ideally, be considered the same.

(3) Leibniz.—Basically, Leibniz proposed what he called a *characteristica realis* in which 'primitive ideas' were to be represented by symbols, after the example of mathematics. In some respect, however, the linguistic contributions of Leibniz are derived from certain Platonic notions. Therefore, in what follows, I shall first point out (1) the Platonic presuppositions upon which Leibniz' position seems to depend, and then (2), give an account of how I believe language and reality are related in the works of Leibniz.

(1) Plato and Leibniz.—The Platonic notions which appear to have influenced Leibniz are the following. (i) The *a priori* nature of Plato's essences, a necessary condition for the inter-subjectivity of knowledge, appears in Leibniz as that universal, unitary principle of knowledge, which he termed the *sapientia humana*; and which is the claim that knowledge always
remains one and the same from man to man. (ii) Leibniz is in complete accord with Plato in regard to the superior power of reason, also contrasting its certainty with that of the senses. However, (iii) where Plato must make a logical distinction between the immutable and transcendent essences, and their expression via some ephemeral representation, Leibniz finds this an unnecessary distinction. He assumes that the reason already contains the essences (what he calls 'primitive ideas') in their pure form; and that they only await the proper symbolization in an adequate calculus to fill out the Characteristica Universalis. And finally (iv), the forms of the Leibnizian 'ideas,' i.e. Plato's essences, are expressible in, are represented by, the forms of language, such as they were in Plato. Therefore, having now pointed out these parallels, I believe that a detailed study, more than space presently allows, would show that the seeds of many Leibnizian notions were first cultivated in Grecian soil some 3000 years prior to his birth.

(2) Leibniz: language and reality.—Leibniz was stimulated by the mathematical developments in his day to propose "making use as mathematicians do, of characters, which are appropriate to fix our ideas, and of adding to them a numerical proof." There are two thoughts here: (i) that ideas be represented by characters of symbols, and (ii) that of providing a calculus ratiocinator, a device for 'numerical proof'. I will consider each in turn, in so far as they display the manner in which
Leibniz relates language to reality.

(i) Ideas and characters. — Leibniz regards language mainly as a vehicle for thought; and in consequence of this, language is instrumental in his logical analysis of ideas. Thus, once ideas are reduced to their simplest forms, i.e. to primitive ideas, and associated with specified symbols, the symbols are fashioned into the Characteristica Universalis. Theoretically, these symbols would "reduce all questions to numbers, and thus present a sort of statics by virtue of which rational evidence may be weighed." In this manner, knowledge, which is now symbolized, set in a calculus, and propositionally related to the clear and distinct primitive ideas, can be quantitated, making knowledge amenable to that same kind of manipulation particular to weighing and measuring. Thus, having reduced "reasoning in ethics, physics, medicine, or metaphysics to these terms or characters," and having a corrected language which resembles the preciseness of a mathematical calculus, "we shall be able to introduce the numerical test in such a way that it will be impossible to make a mistake." Here, then, the ideal language for Leibniz would perfectly represent and express reality, leaving no grounds for philosophic controversies. "If controversies were to arise, there would be no more need for disputation between two philosophers than between two accountants. For it would suffice to take their pencils in their hands, to sit down to their slates, and to say to each other (with a friend as a witness, if they like): Let us calculate."
(ii) **The calculus ratiocinator.**—In his axiomatic programme Leibniz tries "to reduce traditional forms of syllogistic and immediate inference to something like an algebraic calculus." By this reduction he hopes to establish the "two first principles of all reasoning, the principle of contradiction...and the principle that a reason must be given," the latter being known as the principle of sufficient reason. These two fundamental laws of thought are the basis of Leibniz' logical calculus. This calculus laid down the formal rules according to which, in a reductive analysis of complex ideas, the most primitive ideas are ultimately arrived at. In consequence of its application one arrives at a distinct, clear 'idea', which, under the ideal conditions of a complete, reductive analysis, is represented by its proper character. That character completely expresses the 'idea', and as the primitive idea is a part of reality, language completely expresses, what it expresses, i.e. reality. In other words, if ideal conditions obtained, language would perfectly mirror reality. Therefore, Leibniz held that on his view the formal aspect of the *Characteristica Universalis* perfectly expressed or represented the form of reality—"in reason, an "alphabet of thought".  

Summarizing then, there are five major points which Leibniz seems to maintain. They are: (i) that ideas can be completely represented by ideograms (characters) which would constitute the *Characteristica Universalis*, and (ii) the logic
of this calculus sets out the laws of thought after the example of mathematical processes, providing a framework from which all possible knowledge could conceivably be derived, and (iii) by which present knowledge is testable; (iv) since thought and language (ideally) are one, the laws of thought express, in the Characteristica Universalis, the actual form of reality; and finally (v), and as a result of (iv) certain knowledge of reality is possible in the Characteristica Universalis.

(0) Locke.--The views of John Locke represent the first of the two empiricists, the other being Russell. In looking at Locke's position, and especially for pertinent remarks on the language-reality relation, one fails to find any explicit reference to this relation. However, it is implicitly indicated in those three aspects of Locke's philosophy shown below. They are: (1) the nature of knowledge; (2) language and knowledge; and (3) reality.

(1) The nature of knowledge.--Locke holds that the mind of a new-born child can be likened to that of a blank piece of white paper "void of all characters, without any ideas." That material which gradually furnishes the mind, i.e. the constituents of the understanding, come from "Experience." This is what I am recognizing as the empiricist approach, in which the *fons et origo* of all knowledge is experience. Locke distinguishes two respects in which 'Experience' furnishes the
understanding with materials: (i) by sensations (ideas resulting from sense impressions), which are "the great source of most of the ideas we have"; and (ii) reflections growing out of "the operation of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got." Knowledge, then, is the result of an experience of the connection of agreement or disagreement between ideas. Thus, Locke continues, when the reflective experience "is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas," there is knowledge; but when the reflective experience presumes the connection "before it certainly appears," there is judgment.

Here, it is seen that the character of knowledge is twofold. (i) On the one hand, knowledge is revealed in perceptions containing an unconditional certainty which is intellectually visible; and (ii) on the other hand, judgment (not certain knowledge) encompasses those perceptions containing conditional assurance, resulting from a presumption of probability on the part of the intellect. What is important to notice here is, that either directly or indirectly, all ideas have their source in sensation, i.e. all knowledge is directly or indirectly derived from the senses. Moreover, ideas are, for the most part, either reflectively developed (transformed sensations), or, merely a concatenation of simple ideas, themselves transformed sensations.

(2) Language and Knowledge.---"Words, in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the
mind of him that uses them." 57 It may be said that words
have a double function: (i) "recording of our own thoughts," 58
and (ii) "communicating of our thoughts to others." 59 I will
mention more about the former in considering the third aspect
of Locke's philosophy. As to the latter, Locke mentions the
' imperfections' and 'abuses' of language 60 which interfere
with the "communication of our ideas to others." 61 The test
for whether or not a language is infested with 'imperfections',
or whether it is being 'abused', is suggested where he sets
forth the ends of language; and again when he proposes a cri-
terion for establishing whether or not those ends are being
approximated.

Locke's programme seeks to establish three ends along
with their criteria. (i) The first end of language is that
of "making known one man's thoughts or ideas to another." 62
And, by noticing (a) "when men have names in their mouths
without any determinate ideas in their minds, whereof they
are the signs; or, (b) when they apply the commonly received
names of any language to ideas, to which the common use of
that language does not apply them; or (c) when they apply
them very unsteadily, making them stand, now for one, and by
and by for another idea," 63 one may ascertain whether the end
is being approximated. (ii) The second end of language de-
clares that it convey "one man's thoughts or ideas....with
as much ease and quickness as possible," 64 which is determined
by seeing if (a) language is rich enough to possess a signification

(11)
for that particular idea, or (b) man has yet learned the
proper signification for that particular idea which does exist
in the language. And finally (iii), Locke mentions that end
concerned with the assertion of truths about things; which is
determined by looking at the constituent ideas being signified
and properly securing their epistemological origin. In keeping
with those ends, and their criteria, language is viewed as a
tool which is used by human beings to communicate; and also
a tool whereby ideas are privately entertained, manipulated,
and catalogued. In short, words are signs for ideas.

(3) Reality.—Ideas which can be either simple or complex,
are catalogued in the mind of an individual by means of lan-
guage; and the original, blank piece of paper eventually is
filled with two kinds of things; (i) Mental propositions,
composed of "a bare consideration of the ideas, as they are
in our minds, stripped of names," and which are called 'truths
of thought'; and (ii), verbal propositions which are "mental
propositions as soon as they are put into words," and which
are called 'truths of words'. Only the latter actually ap-
ppear in discourse—following from the nature of discourse be-
ing either verbalized or written words, i.e. signs for ideas.
Locke goes on to say that propositions are a more or less
arbitrary putting-together of signs; and that the 'truths of
words' (actual propositions) are determined by whether or not
the ideas those words signify stand in that same order, agree-
ing or disagreeing.
It seems that the crux of this position rests in Locke's argument having to do with the linking of simple ideas to reality. Briefly, I believe the argument to proceed in this fashion. All simple ideas are viewed by the understanding as immediate, distinct ideas "without taking notice of the causes that produce them." However, an examination of these causes does draw the attention of Locke, and he notes that the power 'in a substance' which produces ideas is to be known as a primary quality. Moreover, he distinguishes two kinds of quality. (i) Primary qualities, e.g. solidity, extension, motion or rest, number, and figure, all of which exist independently of man's perceiving them, produce ideas exactly resembling those in the real substances. And (ii) secondary qualities, e.g. cold, sweet, loud, blue, heavy, etc., which (a) depend necessarily on the primary qualities, but (b) have a different ontological status, existing in the mind of the perceiver and not in the substances themselves. The reality of simple ideas is the product of their provocation by "those powers of things which produce them in our minds; that being all that is requisite to make them real." In conclusion, it seems that the strongest statement connecting simple ideas and substances, which "we are to know and distinguish," is Locke's remark to the effect that: the reality of a simple idea lies in its steady correspondence with the constitution of the 'real' thing from which it is derived.

In summary, then, I believe that the important points
to be found in Locke, regarding the relation of language to reality, are six in number. (i) All knowledge is ultimately based upon some form of simple ideas. (ii) Simple ideas are produced in individuals primarily by the senses, i.e. by experience. (iii) Simple ideas are real, in that they are present before the mind, but they do not exist in the substances which produce them. (iv) Primary qualities are made obvious by the occurrence of simple ideas, i.e. the form of their presentation being an exact copy of the real form in the substance. (v) Words are signs for ideas. (vi) Language, vocalized or written, is an expression of an individual's ideas.

(R) Russell.—It was the conviction of Bertrand Russell, that Logic, which studies the laws of thought, was 'the essence of philosophy'.76 In one of his many books, Our Knowledge of the External World, he remarks that

the function of logic in philosophy... is all-important... the true function of logic... as applied to matters of experience... is analytic rather than constructive... while it liberates imagination as to what the world may be, it refuses to legislate as to what the world is. ??

I shall be concerned mainly with 'matters of experience'; specifically in reference to what I believe Russell to have arrived at in his epistemological analysis. To demonstrate this outcome, I shall treat three notions of Russellian philosophy: (1) knowledge of the external world; (2) sensibilia; and (3) a logically perfect language. The role of language
is implicit in the first two, and explicit in the last.

(1) **Knowledge of the external world.**—The world is known via two kinds of data—hard and soft. Of the two, only 'hard data' are important, for only they "resist the solvent influence of critical reflection", and preserve certainty, except for incorrigible cases of 'pathological' doubting. Russell indicates that there are two sorts of hard data. They are (i) "the particular facts of sense, and (ii) the general truths of logic." Since "sensations are obviously the source of our knowledge of the world," the particular facts of sense must be the basis of this knowledge. Therefore, as it seems, Russell grounds this knowledge in a 'primitive' acquaintance with what is 'completely self-evident', i.e. the immediate facts of sense. He draws a distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge which is inferred, where knowledge by acquaintance is "essentially simpler than knowledge of truths; and is logically independent of knowledge of truths," in fact, it is such that "we are aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference."

Now, Russell goes on to say that inferred knowledge, or knowledge by description, is actually the knowledge whereby physical things are known; acquaintance is with sense-data, not with the physical object. For example, a 'table' is a construction of a specific class of sense-data. Thus, that which makes up the appearance of my table are things with which I have acquaintance, things immediately known to me just as
they are. The distinction he is making here is between that with which one is directly acquainted, a datum, and that which one infers, the class of data; which is the essential difference separating knowledge by acquaintance from knowledge by description. The known 'table' is inferred from a construct of sense-data, because all that one (actually) is directly acquainted with, are single, raw data. "The real table...is not immediately known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known," i.e. various occurrences of data.

Therefore, "My knowledge of the table is of the kind which we shall call 'knowledge by description'." The 'table' then, which supposedly exists in the real world independent of its being perceived, is ex concesso, inferentially known. Thus, knowledge of the 'table' is knowledge by description, where the 'table' is described by means of phrases of the form "a so-and-so" (indefinite descriptions) or "the so-and-so" (definite descriptions), and inferred to be the class of those sense-data which occur.

What Russell tried to accomplish here, I believe to be the following. (1) He wanted to construct physical objects, and all things which are known, out of their appearances, i.e. out of sense-data. (ii) Philosophy had historically dictated that an underlying substratum (an unknown 'X') supported the attributes actually perceived as the physical object; and, by means of the sense-data, the 'table' is described; but
there is no possibility of an acquaintance with that underlying substratum. "This 'X' is an ontological surd, a component which not only eludes detection but which is incapable of being described." This 'ontological surd' Russell dispenses with by invoking the principle of Ockham's Razor.

(iii) He then says that

a 'thing' will be defined as a certain series of aspects...which would commonly be said to be of the thing. To say that a certain aspect is an aspect of a certain thing will merely mean that it is one of those which, taken serially, are the thing.

It is in this manner that the 'table' is known by description because: (a) it is inferred to exist in virtue of a collection of aspects, and (b) it is inferred to be describable as the class of such aspects. "All our knowledge of the table is really knowledge of truths"; the word 'table' designating the collection of aspects "with which we are acquainted." The inference being made here is that the collection of aspects 'with which we are acquainted' constitutes what is known as the real 'table'. "The actual thing which is the table is not, strictly speaking, known to us at all." We know a description of the thing, but not the thing itself. And it is because a knowledge of the thing itself is impossible (logically), that the 'X' of antiquity disappears, i.e. is dispensed with.

(2) Sensibilia.—Russell contends that the fact that only sense-data are immediately known, is no reason to assume that they are all that there is to be known. He elaborates on
this assumption by developing the concept of sensibilia. (1) The name sensibilia labels those "metaphysical" objects which are "the ultimate constituents of the physical world."101 (ii) A sensibile, i.e. one of the many sensibilia, "becomes a sense-datum by entering into the relation of acquaintance."102 All sense-data, then, are sensibilia. However,

It is a metaphysical question whether all sensibilia are sense-data, and an epistemological question whether there exist means of inferring sensibilia which are not data from those that are....What the mind adds to sensibilia, in fact, is merely awareness.103 Therefore, a sense-datum is a sensed sensibile.

Since the world is constituted of sensibilia, the possibility of their realization as sense-data is the world. This not to say that the totality of sensibilia is ever sensed, as there are an infinite number of them. Accordingly, Russell is able to establish the persistence of physical objects because their existence is not logically dependent on perception. In contrast, sense-data are logically dependent on sensibilia, and in this way the TABLES have been turned on a classically, vexing problem. Moreover, in a most intricate architecture, rather gothic in design, including, among other things, a six dimensional space,104 Russell paves the way for that kind of knowledge of the 'table' which has the possibility of being the 'same' knowledge for two or more people. Subtleties aside, Russell admits that his theory 'may be true' and not that it is 'certainly true', for he concludes that his theory is 'avowedly hypothetical'.105
Logically perfect language.—An adequate statement of Russell's views on 'names', 'adjectives', and 'relations' would probably encompass several volumes, including such things as: the theory of proper names; the idea of universals; the theory of descriptions; the theory of logical constructions and many other notions. I shall touch on none of these in this short rendering of the function of words in Russellian, epistemological metaphysics.

Russell's analysis brought him to the conclusion that ordinary language, at least in the sciences, should be replaced by a logically perfect one. The logical analysis which eventuated in logical atomism had but one task left after positing the logically simple sensibilia. That task was to link language to those metaphysical entities—the sensibilia. Ordinary language did not seem to serve Russell's purpose, as it "is imperfect because its words are often ambiguous and more or less infected with vagueness." Therefore,

The fundamental principle in the analysis of propositions containing descriptions is this: Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted.

Here, I understand Russell to mean that knowledge by description is logically dependent on an acquaintance with sense-data, and that the class of such sense-data is what the word, e.g. 'table', is generally recognized to designate. If this interpretation is correct, then the heart of this position seems to reside in that relation which sense-data bear to the
'External World'. Hence, Russell holds that

in a logically perfect language the words in a proposition would correspond one by one with the components of the corresponding fact, with the exception of such words as 'or,' 'not,' 'if,' 'then,' which have a different function. In a logically perfect language, there will be one word and no more for every simple object, and everything that is not simple will be expressed by a combination of words, by a combination derived, of course, from the words for the simple things that enter in, one word for each simple component.111

That is, the words which are not further definable, "the indefinable terms of language,"112 would correspond one-to-one with the logical simples. These undefinable terms, Russell says, "would represent symbolically what I mean by 'the ultimate furniture of the world'."113

However, as noted earlier, knowledge by acquaintance is confined to one's own sense-data, and not to those of others. What is logically simplest, in so far as it is known by acquaintance, is privately known. Russell acknowledges this point with respect to a logically perfect language when he says

its vocabulary, would be very largely private to one speaker. That is to say all the names that it would use would be private to that speaker and could not enter into the language of another speaker.114

And even though the one-to-one correspondence (undefined term to logical simple term) is a matter of form where the "complexity of the symbol corresponds very closely with the complexity of the fact symbolized by it,"115 Russell's logically perfect language remains a private affair. This epistemological reductionism which ends in knowledge by acquaintance, yields a unique connection to reality, but at the same time, one which

(20)
is avowedly both hypothetical and private.116

In summary, I believe the important points covered in Russell to be five. (i) The world is a logical construct of sensibilia. (ii) A sensibile with which one is acquainted is a sense-datum; and a complex (infinite) of sensibilia, organized in accordance with certain laws, is a physical object. (iii) A physical object is regarded as a class of sense-data—as a logical construct. (iv) Undefined words symbolically represent and are in a one-to-one formal correspondence with the logically irreducibles, which are known by acquaintance. (v) As all knowledge revolves on an acquaintance with the 'logical simple', and since such acquaintance is a private affair, knowledge of the world can only be expressed in statements such as 'this is my world' or 'this is red' which are, in reality, meaningless to others as the referent (this) can only be known by the speaker.
Footnotes—Chapter I

1. Often referred to as 'form', 'idea', 'universal', general idea or concept', etc.


3. Seventh Epistle, 342. All the works of Plato cited are taken from Plato, The Dialogues of Plato (New York: Random, 1937) trans. B. Jowett, and the numbers refer to the marginal citations, and not to pages.


5. Ibid, 262.

6. Seventh Epistle, 342; Cf., Timaeus, 33; Parmenides, 137.

7. Ibid.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid, and also mentioned in this quote are 'intelligence and true opinion' which I have not touched upon further.

12. Ibid.


14. Phaedo, 100.

15. Parmenides, 132.

16. Phaedo, 100.

17. Statesmen, 286; Cf., Sophist, 248.


19. Phaedo, 75.

20. Ibid.


22. Cratylus, 430.

23. Theaetetus, 208.

27. In the *Sophist*, 263, Plato says "Thought is the unuttered conversation of the soul with itself."
31. Latta, op. cit., p. 368n.
32. *Supra*, p. 3.
33. In Leibnizian metaphysics the ultimate particles are called 'monads'. For clarity, I shall call them 'ideas'. For the connection between Plato and Leibniz on 'monads' Cf., *Philibus*, 15; *Phaedo*, 105; 101; Leibniz, *Epistola ad Hanschium* (1707), E. 445b.
34. *Supra*, p. 4.
35. Wiener, op. cit., p. 35.
37. Wiener, op. cit., p. 34, ("Toward a Universal Characteristic").
38. Ibid, p. 52, ("The Art of Discovery"); Cf., C. I. Lewis where the order in which the various philosophic disciplines would be taken up by Leibniz are mentioned in *A Survey of Symbolic Logic* (Berkeley: Berkeley, 1918) pp. 12n-13n.
39. Ibid.
40. *Supra*, p. 4.
42. Wiener, op. cit., p. 26n, ("Principles of Logical Calculus").
44. Lewis, op. cit., pp. 5-10; Cf., Gratylus, 424.

45. Ibid, Appendix, (Two Fragments).

46. Russell, op. cit., p. 282, (quoting Leibniz) "When (definition) pushes analysis until it reaches primitive notions, without presupposing anything whose possibility requires an a priori proof, the definition is perfect or essential."

47. Cassirer, op. cit., p. 135.

48. A.C. Fraser, John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon, 1904), Bk. II, Ch. 1, Sec 2, referred to from now on as JL.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid, Sec. 3.

51. Ibid, Sec. 4, 5.

52. JL, Bk. IV, Ch. 1, Sec. 2; Cf., Sec. 3-7.

53. Ibid, Ch. 14, Sec. 4.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. JL, Bk. II, Ch. 7, Sec. 10; Cf., Ch. 19, Sec. 1, 4.

57. JL, Bk. III, Ch. 2, Sec. 2; Cf., Ch. 9, Sec. 21.

58. Ibid, Ch. 9, Sec. 1.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid, Ch. 10, Sec. 23; Cf., Ch. 9-10.

61. Ibid, Sec. 1.

62. Ibid, Sec. 23.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid, Sec. 24.

65. JL, Bk. IV, Ch. 5, Sec. 1-3.

66. JL, Bk. III, Ch. 1, Sec. 5.

67. JL, Bk. IV, Ch. 5, Sec. 2.
68. Ibid, Sec. 3.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid, Sec. 5.
71. JL, Bk. II, Ch. 8, Sec. 2.
72. Ibid, Sec. 1-21.
73. Ibid, Ch. 30, Sec. 2.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
77. Ibid, p. 15.
78. Ibid, p. 60.
79. Ibid.
81. OKEW, p. 58.
83. Ibid.
85. PP, p. 47.
86. Ibid, p. 11.
87. Ibid, p. 47.
88. It is noted here that Russell held two views regarding the knowledge of the existence of things—one a causal view, and the other a logical view. That is, in the earlier view, seen mostly in the PP, an underlying substratum caused the sense-data, from which one knew physical objects. Later on, however, Russell finds it "merely expedient to abstain from asserting this
unnecessary entity," i.e. the underlying substratum, and physical objects then become the class of sene-data, which serve just as well to explain physical objects and, moreover, do not enter one into the classical quandaries of 'substratum'. And yet, it is further noted that Russell does not deny an underlying substratum, but merely finds it expedient to disregard it, since it is an unknowable. Cf., ML, p. 155; supra, pp. 14-5; PP, p. 47.

89. ML, p. 207.

90. It is noted at this point that terminological difficulties are inevitable, unless one makes the following equations of terms in the succeeding text on Russell: (a) the particular facts of sense may be regarded as sense-data; (b) an appearance is the same as a group of sense-data; (c) an aspect is also a group of sense-data. Russell uses these different terms at different times in his philosophic career, when developing more circumspect epistemological systems. However, I believe the preceding interpretation is correct. Cf., W. T. Stace, "Russell's Neutral Monism" in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, ed. P. A. Schilpp (Chicago: Northwestern University, 1944), pp. 353-84; E. E. Harris, Nature, Mind and Modern Science (London: Allen and Unwin, 1954), pp. 274-93.

91. What Russell wants to get rid of is the same notion Berkeley mentions in reference to primary and secondary qualities where some people "will have our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call matter. By matter, therefore, we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist." They both seem to want to get rid of 'substratum'; however they differ in the means they use toward this end. Cf., G. Berkeley, "Of the Principles of Human Knowledge" in The English Philosophers From Bacon to Mill (New York: Random, 1939), p. 525.


93. OKGW, pp. 81-7.

94. Ibid, p. 85.

95. Ibid.

96. PP, p. 47.
97. Ibid, p. 53.
98. Ibid, p. 47.
99. Ibid.
100. ML, p. 143.
102. Ibid, p. 143.
104. OKEW, pp. 73-6.
105. ML, p. 138.
109. PP, p. 58.
110. OKEW, p. 158.
112. Ambrose, op. cit., p. 15.
113. Monist, op. cit.; and it also seems quite evident at this point to mention that the influence of both Locke and Leibniz, "Russell's position, cannot go unnoticed.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid, p. 519.
Chapter II
IMAGE AND IMAGED

I believe that both the idealist and the empiricist entertain and ultimately reckon with a particular kind of putative entity that is of primary importance in their approach to the problematic relation of language to reality. This putative entity and its related notions I shall designate the concept of an image. Such a concept, I feel, is common to both the idealist and the empiricist as they inevitably posit this entity in the mind; the location of which lies between language and reality. To point out the various roles of this entity, I undertake a threefold task in this chapter. (A) I shall display and briefly explain schematically the functions of this intervenient entity as it arises in the programme of each philosopher; then (B) in exposition, I compare the uses of this putative entity as illustrated in the two approaches. (C) Finally, I shall indicate how idealist and empiricist alike are beset by a common problem when they try to explain the nature of the relation between (i) the entity and reality on the one hand, and (ii) the entity and language on the other hand.

(A) **Schematic function of entity.**—A schematic representation of the intervenient entity serves two purposes. First, it facilitates an understanding of the entity's function. Thus, its function in each philosopher's doctrines can be seen

(28)
quickly, divested of extensive exposition. Secondly, the schema reduces the chance of any later confusion which might arise when I refer to the putative entity employed by each philosopher as an 'image'. That is to say, the word image is used later to encompass 'sensual image', 'concept', 'simple idea', and 'sense-data'.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Philosopher</th>
<th>Signs (1)</th>
<th>Thought Content (2)</th>
<th>Reality (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Idealist</td>
<td>Plato</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>sensual image</td>
<td>validated by essence validated by monad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leibniz</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>concept</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empiricist</td>
<td>Locke</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>simple idea</td>
<td>validated by substance validated by sensibilia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russell</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>sense-data</td>
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Brief explanation of the schema.—As a rule it is true that on the view of each philosopher reality (column three, C3) tends to be explained metaphysically;¹ the image (C2) functions as an intermediary abridgement, from language to reality;² and language (C1), a similar factor for each philosopher, draws its model from natural discourse.³ Language, irrespective of the philosopher, is regarded as the expression of thought content. The words 'validated by' are actually the subject of the third section of this chapter. I shall only mention here that they imply that some kind of correspondence subsists between the putative entity (C2) and reality (C3). The character of this correspondence dictates the degree to which a specified image is valid. This, however, shall become clearer as I proceed.
(B) **Comparative function of entity in the two approaches.**—
This section deals with comparisons of the function of the image (C2) in the idealist and empiricist approaches. Each philosopher shall be summarily treated and compared; then the two approaches shall be compared with one another.

Initially, all thought content, on the view of Plato and Leibniz, is inspired in the mind because of the individual's empirical orientation. Such an impure, empirical beginning of thought does not embarrass either philosopher for two reasons. (i) According to the Platonic theory, the essences which are known after birth, are empirically stimulated images. However, by definition, the essences have an eternal nature, preceding any particular perception and, as it were, mankind in general. Both the concept of essences, and the Leibnizian theory of monads, explicitly state that 'essence' and 'monad' are of an eternal nature. (ii) The a-temporality of essences and monads provides a means whereby these two philosophers have an 'absolute' standard with which to match the individual's relatively pure images. Validation of images, for either thinker, is determined by the degree and kind of correspondence obtaining between the image (C2) and reality (C3). Experience is used only as the temporally-primitive provocation of mental images.

The empiricists are somewhat different. The Lockean 'simple idea' and the Russellian 'sense-datum' are both stimulated by, and derive their validation from, some kind of
empirical orientation. Simple ideas enter an individual through the senses, on the force of primary qualities. Sense-data discharge themselves upon an individual as he is immediately acquainted with things. It is an empirical orientation of this type that causes the empiricist to postulate, or assume, some sort of continual reality, from which springs the flux of experience.

To compare these two approaches, I shall ask, and try to answer the following question: How do the idealist and the empiricist account for the identity of images from person to person, in order to achieve some certainty of there being a similarity of knowledge from person to person? The answer to this question leads to further, and irritating questions in both camps. The idealist seems to be in less difficulty because he claims an absolute standard with which all his images can be tested; and, as a result of the strength of each 'matching', he is assured of some similarity in the thought content (C2) from person to person. However, the method of matching (for Plato 'participation' and for Leibniz clearness and distinctness), remains a most obscure and ambiguous part of their philosophies. Nevertheless, it is only in accordance with some kind of matching—and this is characteristically only a matter of degree in each of the idealists being considered—that surety can be reached, i.e. that there can be a measure of similarity found in the thought content of two or more people.

(31)
The empiricist is in no better possession of an adequate answer to this question. Indeed, it seems that Locke merely assumes the continuity of an underlying substance; then tries to connect it with thought via the concept of 'primary qualities' which, he maintains, are inherent in the abiding substance. Russell's answer is grounded in a "strong hypothesis," backed by the contemporary Laws of Physics. However, the consequences of Russell's position result in a theory of knowledge which is almost completely subjective, in a Berkeylian sense. The best job that either of these empiricists can do, by way of assuring the validity of an image, is to collate the non-serial occurrence of apparently similar images, and to assume that that similarity is reality. The occurrence of a criterion of similarity, exterior to the images, presents a multitude of confusion for the empiricist.

In summary then, there are two points. (i) Neither the idealist nor the empiricist can give an adequate account of how the image of one person coincides with that of another person. (ii) They share a common problem in this respect. It is that of matching the image with reality.

(c) A problem common to both the idealist and the empiricist. The heart of the question regarding the similarity of images, lies in the kind of matching which validates the image. This section plans to inquire about what this relation could be, between (i) the image and reality, and (ii) the image and
language. Generally speaking the relation is one of structure. That is, both idealist and empiricist lean toward a relational correspondence of structure. This does not discount the fact that the correspondence might be that of the picture to the pictured. At the present time, and following from the schematic representation, the most essential relation to establish is that between thought and reality, for it is in the establishment of this relation that it is possible to understand how thought is 'hooked up' with reality; which is to say: in virtue of determining this relation, thought is given content. Then, and only then, does language have anything to express. This shall become clearer in the following presentation.

(1) The entity (C2) and reality (C3).—Each approach maintains some sort of formal relation which, it is presumed, validates the image, and at the same time connects thought to reality. I think this point is significant. Plato speaks of a 'formal' relation in opposition to an empirical relation because of its permanence, in contrast to that of the ever-changing, empirical images. Leibniz adopts the principle of formal relations (i.e. the pre-established harmony of the monads) suggested in the earlier Plato. Thus, the Leibnizian 'concept' is formally related to its corresponding monads; and the 'concept' gains its validity when the patterned arrangement of its constituents correspond to the fundamental pattern of the irreducible monads. When such a correspondence occurs, Leibniz says there is a true,
clear, and distinct idea, i.e. an image.

Locke also alludes to a formal relationship between what he has called the 'simple ideas' and reality. I want to demonstrate carefully wherein I feel this formal relationship lies, because I do not believe it is always obvious. To begin with, Locke distinguishes primary and secondary qualities. The former are independent of perception, but are also, upon perception, exact 'resemblances' of what is in reality. What is of interest here is just what constitutes a perception of primary qualities. Locke holds that primary qualities are known only through the secondary qualities, i.e. through simple ideas. Now the question is how are they known through the simple ideas, which are themselves subjective and not a reliable picture of reality. I believe it is in the form of the manifest simple ideas that primary qualities are known. Locke holds that the secondary qualities are dependent upon the primary qualities, and that the known primary qualities are exact resemblances of what is in reality. I conclude that if the secondary qualities are necessarily dependent upon the primary qualities, and if the primary qualities are known through the form of the manifest simple ideas, and if the primary qualities produce ideas exactly resembling those in reality—then there is a formal relation between the simple ideas and reality. In so far as Russell is concerned, I shall only mention that almost all the relations he is concerned with, are formal relations, and that they issue from one's
acquaintance with things. These formal relations were previously found to be empirical in character and subjective in character. 7

The difference in the idealist and empiricist position, aside from the fact that they both advocate some kind of formal relation between the image (C3) and reality (C3), can be seen in the manner they use to depict this relation. In the case of the idealist the formal relation is rationally entertained without empirical considerations (aside from provocation); whereas in the case of the empiricist, the formal relation is grounded in a non-serial, supposedly similar experience of simple ideas or sense-data. The continual approximation of such repetitious images leads the empiricist to believe that these similar forms are the forms of reality. However, it is nothing other than the empirical fact of an assumed constant conjunction of images that leads the empiricist to believe that this form and that form, are faithful editions of reality.

I regard the correspondence between image and reality to be of three possible types. 8 To guarantee the validity of the image, it must be (a) an exact copy of the corresponding reality, such as might be exemplified by a mirror image; or (b) in one-to-one correspondence with those elements of reality of which it is a picture; or (c) identical in structure with the reality of which it is a picture. I shall examine these various characterizations necessarily implied by this intercurring entity, touching briefly on some of the difficulties particular to each.
(a) **An exact copy**.—The copy theory intends to reduce the image to what is comparable to a mirrored reflection of reality, which is the same as to say that thought content is a mental reflection of reality. There appear to be two general criticisms of this view. First, the nature of the image is intrinsically different from that of which it is a reflection. Certainly the copy in the mirror looks like that of which it is a copy, but it only 'looks' that way and does not feel, smell, taste, or sound that way. The copyist, then, must cope with the formidable problem of stating an account which describes exactly how this copy is a copy. This is not in the least accomplished by merely asserting that the image is a mirrored image of reality.

Secondly, when the image is a true image, i.e. one which matches reality, the copyist must explain the need for the presence of both the image and that which the image came from. There would then be two, qualitatively identical, things: the image and the imaged. If they are qualitatively identical, and only quantitatively differentiated, then it seems unnecessary to multiply entities, and to insist on the existence of both the image and the imaged. Moreover, the qualitative identity (if carried to the extreme) would require that the copy-image of an elephant seen at the circus be, in mind, another elephant. This, to use Russell's phrase, is "medically impossible". The copy theory then suffers on two counts. First, the image, on principle, is different in nature from that which it images. And secondly, if the image is not different
in nature from the imaged, then an unnecessary multiplicity of identical entities results, in addition to the qualitative impossibility of conception.\textsuperscript{13}

(b) **Correspondence of elements.**--The second characterization maintains that there is a one-to-one correlation between the elements of the image\textsuperscript{14} (G3) and those of reality (G3). Again, there seem to be two general criticisms of the position. First, take the case in which 'A' and 'B' are elements in the image, and 'a' and 'b' are the corresponding elements in reality.\textsuperscript{15} If 'A' bore a certain relation to 'B', e.g. 'A' was more so-and-so than 'B', then 'a' would have to be more so-and-so than 'b' in reality. These asymmetrical relations are the very type of relation that renders this view so irritating. For it follows that if just the elements have to correspond, and not their arrangement too, then the image 'AB' could correspond to either reality 'ab' or 'ba' and be regarded as a true picture in both instances.\textsuperscript{16} Such a picture would not be very informative.\textsuperscript{17} The only thing that can be said in this context, is that a one-to-one correlation of elements may function as a necessary reason for the validation of the image, but not as a sufficient reason.\textsuperscript{18}

A second, and further difficulty, arises when the correlated elements are conceived to be qualitatively identical.\textsuperscript{19} Even if they just correspond 'in some respect', the two criticisms in (a) are applicable.\textsuperscript{20} Moreover, if it were granted that the elements could be related 'in some respect' and that
this respect was not one of copying, then there would have to be a criterion upon which the respect could be established. If such a criterion were adopted, it could neither be a part of the elements of the image, nor of the elements of reality, and at the same time remain a part of either approach. That is to say, neither an extra-sensory, nor a transcendental criterion would be acceptable to the empiricist, and the idealist would be hard pressed to account for the public use of such a criterion.\footnote{21} The second characterization then has two main defects. First, it cannot explain asymmetrical relations; and second, it cannot explain the type of correlation coupling the elements of the image to those of reality.

(c) **Identical structure.**—The last characterization holds that an identity of the structure of the image and that of reality validates the image in virtue of its presence. The structure of the image elements corresponds to the structure of the real elements. Some of the previous criticisms are applicable here. However, in addition to them, structural correspondence seems inadequate for the following reasons.\footnote{22} Since the validity of an image depends solely on its correspondence to that identical structure in reality, the image consisting of elements \(\text{ARB}\) would be validated by any real structure \(\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\)'. The use of blanks reveals how they could be filled in by any elements in reality, such as \'bre\' or \'arc\' or \'hrt\' etc., and thus validate the image \(\text{ARB}\), as long as the structures remained identical. Certainly these
indiscriminate 'filling-in' would not do; structural identity, then, seems like an untenable position to support as an account for the validity of the image. In conclusion I think that the characterization by structure (c) and by one-to-one correlation (b) severally, or in combination, fails to give a sound explanation of the type of correspondence which would endow the image with validity.

(i) The entity (C2) and language (C1). I can now say, after an historical exposition (Ch. I) and a critical evaluation (Ch. II, Sec. A, B and C, 1.) that the general concern of this paper is avowedly that of the intervening image, in so far as it seems to draw a curtain, separating language from reality. The means of validating this interjacent image apparently determines the function of its attendant language; whether the image is construed as a picture picturing the structural multiplicity of reality, or as a copy copying each qualitative detail in reality: language must somehow follow suit. I therefore want to examine the relation of language to image, and see how language follows suit.

Previously I have concentrated on the image-reality relation, but with a full appreciation of the fact that the idealist as well as the empiricist, indeed, each representative philosopher, treat language as a system of signs which serve as agents for expressing the objects of thought, i.e. images. Language functions in each view as a system of signs which are expressions for a complex of images; and only, quite
indirectly, does language function as a system of signs for the objects of reality. For each philosopher the image is in some kind of formal correspondence with reality; and also there is the general tendency to hold that the image is empirically initiated. However, I readily admit that it seems that the sign (Cl) is in some way formally related to an adjacent reality, but this is true only by indirection. In each of the aforementioned theories, language is a system of signs acting as expressions for the images, i.e. for the thought content. The images are in some kind of correspondence with reality. It is only in an indirect, and rather secondary manner that language is in some sort of correspondence with reality, according to the views of the four philosophers. It makes no difference on this view, if the interpretation of the secondary role of language is correct, whether or not words, i.e. signs, signify the 'form' of the image which somehow corresponds to the real objects, or signify the image in its qualitative correspondence to the real objects: words are merely the signs for the images. Words need not be copies, nor pictures. And though each philosopher provisionally equates language and thought, interpreting language as a system of signs which, in some manner, are copies of 'objects' in reality, each philosopher also alludes to 'objects' of thought. These objects, intervening between language and reality, I have designated by the concept of the image. On the view of each representative philosopher the image: (a) seems to have
a picture-like reality; (b) has either a formal or a qualitative resemblance to reality; and (c), is that which language signifies. Each approach is then beset by the problem of accounting for the privateness of subjectively oriented images, to which, supposedly, people's words refer—-for their meaning. The idealist approach suffers from the fact that, by definition of 'essence' or 'monad', his image cannot approximate either essence or monad without becoming the respective 'essence' or 'monad'; and the relative character of a mere approximation does not allow him to know whether others have as true an image as he has. The empiricist assumes a substantial continuum, but his assumption is only born out by what amounts to nothing more than his own, private perception of a non-serial collation of past instances he uses to make a further, and even bolder assumption, namely that his image is both identical with reality, and with that of others. This might well be the case. But, his own collection of instances could, conceivably, not resemble, indeed, be identical to, any one else's.

In conclusion then I find that both approaches make two things quite clear. First of all, that the meaning of a word (i.e. its referent image) is bounded on all sides by that publically inaccessible and even unapproachable medium: the philosopher's own mind. And secondly, that neither the ontological character of 'reality', nor its structure, can be established by an examination of language. This is especially true in the light of the apparently solipsistic position each philosopher ultimately seems to arrive at.
Footnotes—Chapter II

1. A.D. Wooll, Theory of Knowledge (London: Hutchinson, 1957), pp. 137-41; it is also noted that pictures, facts, state of affairs, events and etc., are subsumed under (03).

2. The image, or putative entity, resides in the mind, and is the thought content.

3. That the ideal language of the Principia Mathematica by Russell and Whitehead fell short of its purpose, J.O. Urson states out in Philosophical Analysis (Oxford: Clarendon, 1956), pp. 130-34; mainly because of the arrival of alternative logical structures which were also equated with language. Urson says that "they thought that language had meaning through a structural similarity" with reality, yet the advent of new structures deprived Ideal Language of its privileged position. p. 188.

4. ML, pp. 140-73.

5. Urson, op. cit., pp. 134-5; as mentioned earlier, Russell includes a programme for six dimensional space to assure the possibility of two persons having similar images of a 'table'.


8. Wooll, op. cit., p. 141.


11. If one were to ask 'What way?' I can only answer by saying that that is the very point. A further testing question would be 'is the image three dimensional?' or 'is it in space at all?'

12. G.E. Moore, in Some Main Problems of Philosophy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1953) p. 50, mentions that "On the view...with regard to sense data, our knowledge of the existence of material objects by means of the sense...must consist in our knowing that there exists something different from my sense-datum or image which we are directly apprehending at the moment."

13. OKEW, p. 66.
14. Ryle, *loc. cit.*, p. 167, says that "I do not see how, save in a small class of specially-chosen cases, a fact or state of affairs can be deemed like or even unlike in structure a sentence, gesture or diagram." In other words the question is 'how would one judge that the structures were the same?'


16. A.J. Ayer, *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* (New York: Macmillan, 1940), pp. 153-54; one also might substitute 'A is taller than B' where 'B' cannot be taller than 'A', but the latter is represented in 'bra.'


22. This view of the image is a picture-complex in which the picture is composed of many elements.

23. Both views taken together incur just as much trouble as when they are taken severally.


26. Ayer, *op. cit.*, p. 106, suggests that "The adherents of the formalist theory of language have seen that a symbol need not be connected with what it symbolizes, either causally, or by having the same structure, or indeed by any other natural relation."


28. Urmson, *op. cit.*, p. 144, says that "The doctrine of picturing...implied, wrongly...some structural likeness of language and fact."
29. F. Waismann says in an article "Verifiability" in *Logic and Language* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965) p. 141, that language "contributes to the formation and participates in the constitution of a fact; which, of course, does not mean that it produces the fact."

Chapter III
WITTGENSTEIN: SOME VIEWS ON PRIVATE LANGUAGE

In this chapter I shall try to present a relatively short exposition of Wittgenstein's views with respect to private language. According to the text of I, it appears evident that language functions, in both the idealist and empiricist approach, as some sort of bridge which extends from the image, or personal thought content, to the real world. Moreover, and most concisely, at this point in our survey, it seems that a solipsistic position is the result of each philosopher's programme. This happens as a consequence of being led by that recurrent tendency in the history of western philosophy to postulate a copy of reality, which is then posited in the mind, and in connection with which words are supposed to obtain their meaning. If the preceding exposition of these various postulations has been correct, then each philosophic doctrine embraces the trappings of what Wittgenstein calls private language. Terminologically, though, he usually speaks of 'sensations' or 'feelings', rather than of images or putative entities. However, I think it is possible to substitute for 'image' what Wittgenstein terms 'sensation'; and assuming this identity, I proceed to use the term 'sensation' instead of either 'image' or 'entity'.

At the outset of this chapter I should stress that any reading of Wittgenstein's views is generally confronted with a number of problems. I shall mention four particularly
pertinent ones. First, it is noted that Wittgenstein's aphoristic style does not always lend itself to paraphrasing, mainly because his ideas, when initially encountered, seem stark, without point, and thus often require a contextual setting not yet common to normal philosophic discourse. Second, there are a great number of philosophic problems that gain the attention of this aphoristic style. Among them are 'naming', 'private sensations', 'infinity', 'language', 'logic', 'mathematics', as well as a host of others. At many points in Wittgenstein's writing, it is not evident just which (problem) is being developed, or, as he would say, which problem is being dissolved. It is, therefore, actually a matter of personal choice, that one problem rather than another should be singled out of his text as being especially relevant. Thus, any separation, i.e. abstraction from context, runs the danger of misinterpreting Wittgenstein's views. I do, however, hope that I have done a measure of justice to his position. Third, it is necessary to mention that, at times, I shall have to attribute ideas to Wittgenstein, the justification of which can only be realized through interpretation; and that no interpretation carries precedence over the original work itself. And fourth, there are several concepts which I have found it necessary to mention, but which cannot be completely developed in this survey. However, they might be touched upon, to the extent that their general tone and function becomes obvious. Wittgenstein says that a private language is one which
only the speaker understands.² The natural question to ask then is 'What would such a language be like?'; or maybe 'What would the words of a private language mean?'; or perhaps 'Where would the words go for their meaning?' Generally speaking, these questions call attention to the function of language, and in particular to the possibility of there being such a thing as a private language. What then would a private language be like? It would probably be a language in which

I simply associate names with sensations and use these names in descriptions.³

These names, associated with a particular individual's sensations, would be employed in conversations as surrogates for the appropriate sensations. Two problems attend this position. The first one (A) is whether or not those hearing a certain name have the same associative sensation as the speaker. The second problem (B) faces the question of whether the speaker himself accurately associates a given name with the same sensation each time he uses that name. The former I treat under the heading 'external feasibility' because it has to do with the speaker's words being understood by others. The latter I treat under the heading 'internal feasibility' because it has to do with the speaker understanding his own words.

(A) External feasibility.—It is genuinely difficult to see how others could understand the names in a private language.⁴ For, Wittgenstein remarks that the speaker, presumably, associates a sign "J" with a specific sensation which he has. He
assume that by concentrating his attention on that sensation the associative sign "J" receives its meaning. On this view, the concept of meaning is construed as a process in which the spoken or written "J" occurs in conjunction with a kind of inner pointing at a sensation, i.e. a brand of 'private extensive definition'. To repeat: the meaning of "J" seems to be established by concentrating the attention on a sensation, and this impresses on the mind of the speaker a connection between the sign "J" and a j-sensation; and in this manner "J" becomes meaningful.

If the meaning of "J" depends on the kind of concurrency described above, Wittgenstein finds it logical to assume that no one but the speaker knows what "J" means. Certainly the speaker's audience does not have access to his j-sensation, and short of having the same conjunctive sensation, "J" could mean (refer to) anything they wished it to mean, i.e. they might all associate it with different sensations. In conclusion, then, it appears that a private language cannot be publicly understood because: (i) the meaning of a sign "J" depends on an associative j-sensation, and this is privately determined; therefore (ii), the public (a) would not know to what sensation the speaker's sign is conjoined, or, even if it were somehow possible for them to secure such knowledge, (b) they could not have the same sensation.

(E) Internal feasibility.—Initially, it would seem that at
least the speaker himself knows what his words mean. After all, he determines what signs to associate with his manifold sensations. If nothing else, he is wont to proclaim, "I know...only from my own case." However, upon close examination he finds several annoying questions which he is hard pressed to answer.

The first thing the speaker asks himself is 'Does the same sensation appear in conjunction with those various written or vocal occurrences of the sign "J"?' Indeed, the possibility that a different sensation could appear, and therefore, that any sensation could be used as the referent sensation for "J", would prove ruinous to his theory of meaning. This had to be the case because such a diversity of sensations would imply that there was no continuity to the meaning of "J", e.g. it could be associated with this sensation at one time, and with that one at another time. It is from just this type of question that the speaker realizes he had merely been assuming, on previous occasions, that the same sensation appeared with the various written or vocal occurrences of "J". Now, however, he is forced to search for some test with which to judge whether or not the same j-sensation does, in fact, return each time "J" is written or spoken. In other words, he is forced to question the very assumption upon which he had been acting without hesitation whatsoever.

In developing a test to check the same sensation, the speaker has to confront further difficulties. For, if a sensation is conceived to be like a miniature model (like a model
of a 'square rigger' to the real square rigger riding the waves), sitting on a shelf in the mind, he is led to believe that in order to see if this sensation is the same as that sensation, the speaker would only need to look at them, and compare. The speaker confesses, however, that in the past he had not done this sort of thing, that he had not checked his referent sensations in any way at all. What he regarded as a j-sensation, was a j-sensation, i.e. the criterion for his correct use of "J" was what he said it was. And, as Wittgenstein points out, in such cases

whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'.

The speaker now realizes, since he had only assumed the same sensation to appear with each occurrence of "J", that he actually had no criterion for judging whether or not the same, or a different sensation appeared. Because of an awareness of this state of affairs, (a) that a different sensation could appear, and (b) that if it did his meaning for "J" would necessarily be completely unstable—the speaker quickly tries to formulate a means of assuring the continuity of his j-sensation.

Again, if sensations are little models in the mind, there would be no trouble in remembering from time to time if one model looked like another. But sensations are not models, they are sensations. Assuredly, if two models compared were like two sensations compared everything would be fine for the speaker. Yet note what happens if this imagery, i.e. that of models, takes over in a description of sensations. It can be
said that 'this model looks like that one'; however, it cannot be said that 'this sensation looks like that one', because the latter, on the speaker's approach, reduces to 'this sensation X is the same as that one Y, because of a third sensation Z'. The significance of this sudden propagation of additional sensations is that the speaker could not compare X to Y short of invoking another sensation Z, itself open to further verification via an illimitable array of linking sensations. What Wittgenstein wishes to indicate here is that any appeal to a criterion for judging the identity of X and Y must, on the speaker's view, be another sensation. He is left in a quandary, wondering if his sensation Z (that X is identical to Y at t'), is the same as his sensation A (that X is identical to Y at t''), ad infinitum.

Finally, the speaker asks himself 'What does same mean?' For, if 'same' is a commonly used word, i.e. a word in ordinary language, and the speaker is not certain of anything which is public (because he only has his own sensations upon which he can rely), then 'same' must have an associative sensation—like all other words—in order to invest it with meaning. On the one hand, an appeal to an outside criterion for confirming the similarity of sensations is ruled out on his view, and on the other hand, an appeal to his own sensations eventuates in an infinite regress. The crucial point to be brought out here is that the formulation of a criterion necessarily consists in appealing to something independent,
speaker is methodologically incapable of realizing, and mainly because that would mean appealing to something other than his now tenuously recurrent sensations. However, it is clearly evident to him that his sensations may be different upon their every presentation. Nevertheless, his position logically refuses him the right to petition an outside source, and I hardly believe it is sensible to consider that he would petition himself.17 Thus, the speaker is stranded in the wilderness of his private sensations. It is, then, without meaning for him to speak to anyone about this sensation being different from that one, or of their being the same—unless 'difference' or 'sameness' are public terms, which, on his grounds, is inconceivable. The speaker is apparently situated in that position I would like to characterize by paraphrasing Gertrude Stein: a sensation is a sensation is a sensation....18

I conclude that this picture of a private language leads nowhere, even though it constitutes what is ordinarily understood as a private language, if not as language in general. Clearly, it can be seen, to use Wittgenstein's expression,

if as a matter of logic you exclude other people's having something, it loses its sense to say that you have it.19

For what would be the object of talking to a group of people about "J" if it were impossible for them to gain access to the j-sensation of the speaker, which, on his view, would be the only sufficient condition he would accept as their understanding what was meant by "J"? They would obviously have no
idea what "J" meant. They would have no way of differentiating "J" from "M" or "O" etc.; and in instances of this kind, "j" would mean to them, and, in fact, to the speaker also, everything and nothing. Therefore, the concept of meaning in a private language admits to no evidence of criteria, either external or internal, whereby either the public or the speaker, respectively, could ascertain the continuous use of a certain sign, i.e. whether or not the same sensation was being employed for the various written or vocal occurrences of a specific sign.

Moreover, Wittgenstein, who was always aware of those who continue to have doubts about a private language, recognizes the basic nature of the problem of meaning when he suggests that

There is a temptation for me to say that only my own experience is real: "I know that I see, hear, feel pains, etc., but not that anyone else does. I can't know this, because I am I and they are they." On the other hand I feel ashamed to say to anyone that my experience is the only real one; and I know that he will reply that he could say exactly the same thing about his experience.

And going on, he adds, how could I mention anything about the possibility of another person's experience unless there was some evidence for there being such?

After all, one can only say something if one has learned to talk.

This seeming truism, this apparent platitude, has the greatest significance when it is thoroughly scrutinized.
Footnotes—Chapter III

1. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophic Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, 133; now referred to as PI; the numbers refer to paragraphs in the first part, the page references are to the pages in the second part.

2. PI, 256.

3. Ibid.

4. PI, 294.

5. PI, 258.

6. PI, 263.

7. PI, 372.

8. PI, 246.

9. PI, 293.

10. PI, 295.

11. PI, 258.


13. PI, 202, "to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule, if obeying a rule is a practice. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same as obeying it." I have taken the liberty to reverse the order of this quote, but in doing so, I do not believe I have misrepresented Wittgenstein, indeed, I should hope not.

Cf. also 259, "Are the rules of the private language impressions of rules?--The balance on which impressions are weighed is not the impression of a balance."

14. PI, 215; 265; 378; 380; 382.

15. There are further problems in appealing to sensations to give meaning to such words as 'if' 'or' and so on, and these are touched upon by G. Ryle in "The Theory of Meaning" in British Philosophy at the Mid-Century, pp. 239-244.

16. PI, 265.
17. What would constitute 'petitioning one's self'? Certainly if this were the only court of appeal, i.e. one's self, and this were the only court to begin with, there is no 'sense' to appealing. Thus, if sensations are all there are to which one may appeal, the J U D G E can only be sensations in that court.

18. PI. 265, "As if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true."

19. PI. 398.


21. PI. 271.


23. PI. 338.
Chapter IV

LEARNING A LANGUAGE

One way of demonstrating how incomprehensible 'meanings' are in a private language is to ask 'How would I teach the meaning of a word?' Questions of this order are especially qualified to disclose how referent sensations in private language elude any public detection. And if the referent sensations cannot be detected, then it is necessary to conclude that on such a view 'meanings' of words have no inter-subjective significance. Moreover, by parity of reasoning, I am assured there must be another concept of 'meaning' which does not associate meaning with an 'occult process'. Just what this other concept of meaning might look like is the broader concern of this chapter.

I believe that by careful examination of diversely composed cases in which words are learned, or (and what is even more telling) one in which a word is being taught, it is possible to arrive at a potentially clearer concept of 'meaning' than has hitherto been encountered. Generally, when setting out to teach a word, one describes those actual situations that circumscribe the word's usage. From the ensuing descriptions of these situations the meaning of the word will emerge. Therefore, I shall propose that the prime emphasis in investigating the 'meanings' of words in a language, should be that of describing the collective occurrences of those words. Each word's meaning, it is claimed, evolves from these descriptions.
With this idea as a motivating force, I shall try to accomplish four things in this chapter: (A) to explain a prevalent fallacy pertaining to the possibility of substantives being supported by co-existing substances; (B) to show how a word does not obtain its meaning; then (C), to allude to what is involved in learning a word; and finally (D), to suggest how it might be established that a word has been learned.

(A) The substantive fallacy.—Ordinary discourse, in which I include the polemics of Philosophy, contains a strong tendency to think, and often quite deeply to feel, that every substantive is somehow connected with a substance. A paradigm for this would be the substantive "dog" which supposedly refers to the 'somatoic' dog. Such a tangible example need not inspire any quibbling, but it usually does when the logic of its spatial-temporal character is imposed upon, and takes over in the descriptions of 'meaning' for what are regarded as 'abstract' terms like "bright", "thought", "knowledge", and a host of others. What happens in such cases is that the spatial-temporal logic of 'material' things leads one to believe that there is a material object related to every word. In Wittgenstein's words:

We are looking for the use of a sign, but we look for it as though it were an object co-existing with the sign.

Now, to try and bring out the confusion implicit in this type of witch hunt, I shall turn from asking 'What is the meaning?'
(after the apparent model 'What does "dog" mean?') to an alternate construction, namely 'What is an explanation of meaning'\textsuperscript{11} The latter formulation should unmask the impossibility of conceiving that a word's meaning could have a tangible referent.\textsuperscript{12} Therefore, an 'explanation of meaning' is understood to be a description of a word's function in those linguistic situations in which it occurs; which, I believe, is a correct reading of Wittgenstein's position. In the following presentation I shall pay attention, mainly to the function of words in their various linguistic environments.

Before undertaking the descriptive part of this chapter, I want to relate an analogy which exists between learning a language and learning a sport. This analogy should prove helpful in the present context because it distinguishes some interesting aspects of language. The similarity runs as follows. In learning the sport of hunting, say, it is necessary to master two things: (a) the physical co-ordination needed to carry out the activities of riding, shooting, skinning the game, and etc., and (b) the rules of the sport, which are not entirely separate from (a) but could conceivably be learned without ever being actually performed, e.g. rules learned by a blind man for the sake of theory and not for the sake of practice, so as not to get shot, or cut with a knife, and so on. Learning a language also requires the mastery of a skill:\textsuperscript{13} (a) in the production of written or vocalized signs, and (b) for using the language in conformity with the set of rules particular
to that language. Moreover, when one finally learns the sport of hunting, it is said that its techniques have been mastered; and similarly "To understand a language means to be master of a technique." In effect, then, to know a language implies not only that one can make sounds, but also that the rules of language are understood.

The body of rules in a language, i.e. its grammar, is not used here in a restrictive sense, e.g. as the mechanics of sentence structure alone, but in a much broader sense, encompassing an entire 'way of life' that surrounds the language—for a language is a part of its circumjacencies. That is to say: to adequately understand a language, one must have cultivated a knowledge of his environment and be able to find his way about with a certain facility. It is a truism to affirm that to separate the utterances of a person from his attendant actions is a dangerous thing. For example, if someone riding in the hunt turns and shouts back to the rest 'Look out for the low branch' when there are obviously no low branches in sight, no one regards this remark as important. But if there is a low branch each time he shouts from up ahead 'Look out for the low hanging branch', his positive exclamation has behind it a whole way of life (the mastering of a technique) entailing such cautions as the possibility of being slapped in the eye, or pushed from the horse, or accidentally shooting oneself, and so on. This example "is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an
activity, or of a form of life.18

Here, in this quote, is a rather concise statement of the general theme of this thesis. Its expansion, presently, shall render it more intelligible, especially when it has the support of a number of examples. These provide the illustrative material needed to demonstrate how a word comes about its meaning. In each instance I shall describe some of the complex circumstances in which a word is learned. Indeed, I am reminded that there are various circumstances, and not just one, which is a testament to the fact that none of the descriptions presented below claim to be the description of how a particular word is learned. Understanding the intricate nature of a language is not an easy (though not an impossible) task. To use Wittgenstein's idiom, it is like encountering "a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about."17

It is as if "Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares,"18 where "A multitude of familiar paths lead off from these words in every direction";19 and more times than not "In the actual use of expressions we make detours, we go by side roads. We see the straight highway before us, but of course we cannot use it, because it is permanently closed."20 Perhaps these are some of the possible causes of philosophic 'disquietude',21 "puzzlement and mental discomfort,"22 that beleaguer the philosopher
when he gets 'bumps' on his 'understanding' from running "against the limits of language" in doing philosophy. He might be heard saying to someone on a grand boulevard (metaphysics) or in a blind alley (solipsism) "I don't know my way about," and at that time, perhaps, he would have penetrated to the "depth of philosophy." With these most perceptible (if slightly complex) metaphors in mind, I shall try to keep away from those perplexities "based on a misunderstanding" of a word, which almost habitually issue from instances of not having "considered its application sufficiently." The examples of learning words which I employ, intend to show "how the words in question are actually used in our language."

(B) How words do not obtain meaning.—Conceive of a situation in which A requests B to fetch him a red flower from a nearby field. If B upholds the view of a private linguist, he will undoubtedly leave for the field with a red-image (interchangeable with 'red-patch' or 'red-sensation') in his mind, with which he intends to compare the flowers of the field. He eventually hopes to pick a flower the color of which can be identified with the red-image. When this happens, he will rush back to A and say 'here', handing him a red flower. However, if A asked B to imagine a red patch, certainly B's temptation to feel he had a privately stationed, 'paradigmatic' red-patch would be called into question. For if he had to imagine a red patch, he would first have to call-up a red-patch
as his paradigm for occurrences of 'red', and then actually imagine (another) red patch (no. 3) to cover those conditions necessary for announcing that he had imagined what he had been asked to imagine. Not only would B become disconcerted when he tried to ascertain whether or not he had a red-patch as a paradigm (as opposed to another color which he appears to call 'red'), he would also contract insurmountable hardships in showing his colored patch (whatever it was) to anyone. There are two things involved here: (1) B's own red-patch; and (ii) the possibility of his showing someone else what "red" means.

(1) B's own red-patch.—It was shown in the last chapter that sheltering a private image, as the basis of a word's meaning, is insufficient grounds for ascribing meaning to a word. And furthermore, that this is brought to the attention of the person who maintains the private language view, when he asks himself (as he could not ask others) questions of the order—"What does a correct image of this colour look like?"

His failure to find an answer to questions of this sort is not due to a lack of imaging ability, but the fact that no last image could validate the use of any succeeding image. An image is an image; and the verification of one image by another only breeds fresh images ad infinitum. This is an inevitable outcome, short of seeking some sort of justification by "appealing to something independent" of images. But his position does not allow outside appeals. (This predicament of private validation is
analogous to the one encountered in the previous chapter. Therefore, I shall not repeat it.) If the private linguist says he actually does accept a private red-image as the basis for the meaning of 'red', he probably, as Wittgenstein points out, is saying both (a) that "the word 'red' means something known to everyone; and in addition (b), for each person, it means something known only to him". "(Or perhaps rather: it refers to something known only to him,)") (63)

It is as if when I uttered the word I cast a sidelong glance at the private sensation, as it were in order to say to myself: I know all right what I mean by it. 33

The question then arises 'Does it render the meaning of 'red' any clearer to hold both (a) and (b)?'

(ii) B tries to tell what 'red' means.—Certainly the red-patch, which is imagined as the paradigm for each expression containing "red", is of a completely different constitution from that red rose in the garden.34 The red-sensation and the red rose are decidedly not the same thing; and once this is admitted, it is exceedingly trying to understand how "red" in either 'Imagine a red-patch,' or 'I don't imagine a red-patch,' or 'Here is a red rose'—how each refers to the same red-sensation that serves to give "red" its respective meanings. If 'red' in the first two examples refers to dissimilar red-sensations, and if the red rose and the red-sensation are fundamentally different things, then there are several occurrences of "red" which do not have the same referent red-sensation. But this is not the kind of argument the private language
person is anxious to support. To the contrary, he holds that the red-image is the same for all occurrences of "red". Moreover, he does this at the expense of a number of inconsistencies in his approach.

No cause is served by entertaining (b), the idea that "red" means something private, and irrevocably and indeterminately different for each person, as well as (a), that "red" means the same thing for every person. The latter idea makes sense, the former ends in numerous confusions not even the private linguist can resolve. Therefore, I shall now attempt to show what happens to "red" in ordinary language. And this can be done by drawing attention to the fact that it is used much in the same way as a carpenter's tools are used. This state of affairs is not hard to recognize once it is seen that an explanation of the meaning of "red" entails a description of those occurrences of "red" in various linguistic situations in the same way in which the use of a carpenter's 'cross cut saw' would be described to an apprentice. Moreover, in order to give the meaning of "red" it is unnecessary to implicate a red-sensation—it is the description of several instances of its use that ultimately unfolds the meaning of "red". When 'the meaning of a word' is formulated as 'an explanation of the meaning of a word', the idea that a private sensation must be present to bestow meaning on 'red' "drops out of consideration as irrelevant." For assuredly it would make no sense to say that a private sensation constitutes the meaning
of "red", if the judgments as to whether "red" means something or not, are determined by all those who use 'red'. Which is only to say that

if I need a justification for using a word, it must also be one for someone else.\(^\text{39}\)

On this view it makes no difference if the red-sensations are as numerous as the individuals using the word "red"; even if the sensations are identical, or, irrevocably dissimilar. None of these conditions would interfere with 'this' or 'that' being 'red' if everyone agreed that 'this' and 'that' were 'red'.\(^\text{40}\) That is to say, when 'red' is understood as a tool (with a noteworthy function) in the vast workshop of language, and is used by everyone for the same work, then the meaning of "red" is determined by those human beings who agree that it is what they "say that is true and false...they agree in the language they use."\(^\text{41}\)

This last remark, however, reveals once more the very thing that the private linguist shows an unwillingness to accept: agreement with others. To bring into the light a few other difficulties having to do with 'agreement with others', it is interesting to speculate on what would happen if the private linguist had to falsify his images. That is, what happens if he says "falsely that something is red",\(^\text{42}\) Wittgenstein remarks. In the previous account it was noted what happened when he had to consider the truth of 'This is red' or 'This is not red' both of which generated certain irresolvable

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puzzles. But now, if he has to give an explanation covering their falsification too, i.e. when 'This is red' is false, and 'This is not red' is false, then he encounters further confusions. The expansion of these difficulties I believe can help to provide a wider understanding of the private linguist's position, and at the same time make one aware of how a word does not come by its 'meaning'.

Earlier, it was found that internal feasibility encountered its greatest difficulties when trying to establish the truth of 'This is red' and 'This is not red'. The trouble grew out of two areas: (a) verifying the consistent use of the same image on diverse occasions, and (b) reckoning how "red" in 'This is not red' means (refers to) a sensation that is not there, i.e. how "red" means anything at all in such cases. Presently, in having to account for falsification, he faces increased difficulties because: (c) he must clarify the meaning of "red" in 'This is red' when this is yellow, and also (d) 'red' in 'This is not red' when this is red. (c) 'This is red' when THIS is yellow. --On the one hand, it might be possible to say that a slip had been made and that a second chance should be granted to the speaker who made the mistake. But the private linguist holds that his red-sensation is incorrigible. Therefore, an endless number of chances would only announce that he never knows whether or not he has made a mistake, because whatever he says is red, has to be red. In effect, his utterances would impart no 'information'. As Max Black has
indicated in dealing with this very subject:

The incorrigibility of the pure observation statements is achieved at the cost of their utter futility for the purposes of communication or influence.46

Thus, the assailability of the private linguist's position is exposed. Certainly he wants to be heard, and to have his views understood by others. However, he can only accomplish this by acknowledging that "red" has a common meaning; and this does not grant him the right to continue his espousal of private language.

On the other hand, he might tentatively allege that his sensations are also in others, i.e. in their minds. If this were the case, statements like 'I can feel in other bodies as well as in my own' would, on the surface, indicate the acceptance of an agreed usage for "red", because in now appears to be 'in others.'47 However, as Schlick remarks, the private linguist's statement, on his own grounds, reduces to 'I can feel only my own in others' which does not imply that in others', is the same as their in distributively. What has happened is that the private linguist has merely projected a proto-type of his own into the minds of others; without stating whether or not others have the same . If, on the one hand, the private linguist should maintain that other people do in fact exist as well as himself, then the a prioristic, truth-claiming character of his assertions about what is and what is not "red" are rendered senseless; and if, on the other hand, he maintains a position of privileged access to the red-sensation

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(which is the meaning of 'red' for him), then, indeed, it would be logically impossible for anyone, other than himself, to know what he meant by 'red'. To stand clear of this perplexity, Wittgenstein advises that the private linguist must recognize the meaning of 'red' as something other than "a queer connexion of a word with an object," which he alone possesses. Realizing that this would relieve him of the entanglement accompanying the claim that

his private impression of φ means that he has imagined, in a sense in which φ cannot mean this to others, which, in terms of information, most certainly would render φ meaningless, and its use by the private linguist conveys nothing to others.

(d) 'This is not red' when TH I S is red.--In so far as this case can be considered by the private linguist, it only provides him with the reinforcement of his old problems. Once more he would find that it is questionable how 'red' in 'This is not red' could entail a red-sensation (which is necessary for 'red' in this expression to have meaning). On top of this, he must show, if only to himself, how 'red' has any meaning when 'This is not red' is false, i.e. when TH I S is red. In addition, he must tell how something is 'red', when he says it is not. Surely, to assert: 'This is not red', and at the same time: 'This is red,' is contradictory in the same way as it is to assert: 'This is three sided' and 'This is square' of the same thing. What I want to bring out here is that

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"true" and "false" (in the same fashion as all other words in language) are meaningful, mainly because it is customary to regard language as a means of communication. That is, to use Wittgenstein's words, in language there is an agreement not only in definitions but also...in judgments.50

It is not sufficient simply to be in accord with a person on a certain verbal definition of "red", for this does not necessarily include the ability to employ 'red' properly in all its linguistic contexts.51 Furthermore, to agree in 'judgments' means to become aware of the fact that the sentence 'this is not red' has sense only as a member of a system of language,52 and to say 'This is red' or 'This is not red', where 'this' refers to the same thing, must have some kind of meaning if 'it' is in a language. The sense of a sentence is ascertained, neither in company with a process of 'introjection',53 nor by hypostatizing entities that can only stimulate empty boasts of 'privileged access',54 but rather by 'looking at the sentence as an instrument' or a tool, and appreciating that 'its sense is its employment' in a given language.55

(C) Learning a word.—In this section I shall first comment upon several factors which seem to be necessary in teaching a language, and then exemplify the commentary with two illustrations. From section (A) of this chapter, it will be remembered that the meaning of words is characterized as a "physiognomy";56 and from section (B) that "Language is an instrument"57 with (69)
which this 'physiognomy' may be explored. The method of exploration is to ask "On what occasion, for what purpose, do we say this":58—to examine just "how the words in question are actually used in our language."59 In consequence of observing and asking how they are used, it is possible to learn their meanings.60 As a result of these explorations Wittgenstein finds that it becomes increasingly evident that

Our criterion for someone's saying something to himself is what he tells us and the rest of his behaviour; and we only say that someone speaks to himself if in the ordinary sense of the words, he can speak.61

He further notes, however, that the above method can be destructive, as well as constructive, if it is not cautioned that many times the role of words in our language (is more involved)...than we are tempted to think;62 often being employed as 'different instruments' in our language but nevertheless

instruments characterized by their use.63

Thus, in his programme which observes the use of "the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence"64 in their actual language situations, it is believed by Wittgenstein that the "common criteria—the criteria, i.e. which give our words their common meaning"65 are necessarily delineated. The criteria elicited in this fashion provide the means for discovering if a given word has been learned, i.e. is being used in accordance with the public standard.

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It is often said that learning a language is like learning a game which is to be played with others. Moreover, it is usually held that a person has learned a game when it has been mastered; which is deduced from the manner in which the game is practiced. There is an analogy with words which Wittgenstein draws here, between learning a game and learning a language: "to understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to master a technique." It directly follows then, that any acknowledgement to the effect that a word has a certain significance (a 'meaning' in this instance) implies the general rule that "The use of the word in practice is its meaning." That is, the meaning of a word is its manifest biography, revealed by observing its diverse employment in a plethora of linguistic circumstances. To appraise properly whether or not a word has been learned "in different circumstances we apply different criteria", because "There are different kinds of justification" applicable to the diverse occurrences of that word. Furthermore, exactly what it is that people accept as justification—is shewn by how they think and live.

Therefore, Wittgenstein goes on, in order to "command a clear view of the use of our words" it is obvious that a thorough interpolation of each of them "in certain contexts", circumscribing them, would explicitly disclose 'the use of our words', i.e. their meanings. Wittgenstein asserts: "what we
observe will be what the word means." This is clearly to state, that the diverse instances of a word's occurrence have to be observed and compared. Briefly then, and to elaborate on what has been said in the first section (A) of this chapter, "the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life,\textsuperscript{75} i.e. "to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life";\textsuperscript{76} and "if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign (the sentence), we should have to say that it was its use,"\textsuperscript{77} for "Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life?--In use it is alive."\textsuperscript{78}

(1) Illustration of learning: a color word.--The first illustration brings into play those factors necessary in teaching a word such as "red" to someone. I now assume, tentatively, that one must know how to operate in a language in order to understand the terms of that language. Furthermore, that when asked

\textbf{How do I know that this colour is red?--It would be an answer to say: "I have learnt English".}\textsuperscript{79}

The point being that to "keep on steering towards the idea of the private ostensive definition"\textsuperscript{80} only directs one to that seemingly untenable concept of meaning wherein "One thinks that learning a language consists in giving names to objects."\textsuperscript{81}

This course directed towards a private kind of tagging, deeply ingrained in our culture, seems to be based upon the credo that "a name ought really to signify a simple,"\textsuperscript{82} i.e. some form of entity; upon our being eager to go on and insist that

\textcopyright{(72)}
all words are names of this sort. This position advocates that "naming is something like attaching a label to a thing" often characterized by the meaningless assumption, as Wittgenstein so beautifully puts it, that naming is "some remarkable act of mind, as if it were a baptism of an object." Here, when there are such 'baptisms' parading as the actual concepts of meaning, "language goes on holiday" of the most costly type.

Perhaps I should pause for a moment and see what happens when it is assumed that language is a concatenation of words which are 'names' in the above, reproachable sense. I shall set out what I consider to be four consequences which result when such a position is upheld. (a) If learning a language is constituted solely by an 'occult naming (or baptismal) process', then "a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it." But this is surely an improper analysis of meaning because not only, as has been shown, does the incorrigible nature of a private referent lend a word meaningless, but (b) a public label also would be devoid of meaning without a public referent. That is to say, when the meaning of a word is its 'bearer', then the ontological status of that bearer is essential (must be identical to) to the meaning of the word. Take the case of 'Mr. N. N.', certainly

When Mr. N. N. dies one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. Clearly, after 'Mr. N. N.' passes away his family might wish to speak of him, yet they would be unable to, should they accept a naive name-object concept of meaning, because then when

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the bearer goes out of existence, so too, in effect, does the meaning of the word. (iii) A similar instance would occur with regard to the name of a tool 'N' in a primitive society. Does the breaking of 'N' entail the non-existence of 'N' if there is no expression in that language for 'N is broken'? Thus, when 'N' is broken, and A asks B to bring 'N', what would B do? Would B bring 'N'? B, I think, would not know what A was referring to. Finally (iv), suppose A said to B 'bring me z' and B had never heard the word 'z' employed in the language before. Certainly there would be a perplexity about B's countenance as he groped around for some reaction to A's utterance; indeed, B might not respond at all, feeling A had made an unmannerly sound.

Again, the non-existence of an immediate bearer in the name-bearer concept of meaning leads to inaction on the part of those who are confronted with the four situations just mentioned. In summary then, it appears plausible to assume that

For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer. But, if there is a name-bearer relation, that which the name signifies must be indestructible; for it must be possible to describe the state of affairs in which everything destructible is destroyed. And such a description would necessarily contain the name of that which was destroyed, therefore, the name cannot be destructible in the sense of being broken, dying,

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or in any other way passing out of existence. "I must not saw off the branch on which I am sitting."90 Now I shall return to the first illustration.

To teach the word "red", with the above consideration of the 'name-bearer' concept of meaning in mind, one might well proceed along the following lines. Initially Wittgenstein mentions that

What one generally calls "explanations of the meaning of a word" can...be divided into verbal and ostensive definitions.91

A mere verbal definition of "red", regardless of whether that definition included 'red', would end in an obvious circularity, going from 'verbal definition' to 'verbal definition'. In like manner, an ostensive definition alone has trouble in making itself clear. For example, say someone were taught the use of the word "red" merely by means of an ostensive definition. First a red patch would be pointed to, then maybe a white patch and/or several other primary colors, in hopes of making a distinction between the red one and the others. Yet, if after some time of such pointing, the request 'Show me a red one' results in the designation of a blue one, or a white one, then it is clear that a purely ostensive definition of 'red', at least in this case, was for some reason a failure. Perhaps the original pointing was taken to mean the patch itself, or, the design of the patch;92 for, as Wittgenstein suggests,

There are cases where experience teaches us that a person is not able to carry out an order, say, of the form "Bring me x" if he did not see what was in common between the various objects to which I pointed as an explanation of "x".93

(75)
However, in combination, the verbal and ostensive definitions produce a situation in which appeal after appeal for a 'red' object results in the ostentation of that red object; and because of this,

I shall say that he has seen the common feature of the objects I showed him.94

Therefore, in virtue of observing his actions when a request is made to point out the red object, it is logical to assume that his "Carrying out the order is now the criterion for his having understood."95

The conditions for learning the language just described, are of a most elementary nature. That 'red' corresponds to a certain color on a public chart, and that it can be pointed to correctly, can be viewed as a type of assimilation in which the patch (on the chart) is

an instrument of the language used in ascriptions of colour....it is not something that is represented, but is a means of representation....when we name it by uttering the word ("red"): this gives this object (the red patch) a role in our language game; it is now a means of representation.96

However, the criterion for understanding 'red', from observing the proper designation of a red object each time it is requested, allows only for a most limited use of 'red'. Subtle shades of red might be indistinguishable, i.e. meaningless; a 'red Indian', or a 'Russian red,' or a 'red herring' all might present difficulties if the red exemplar (above) were used in connection with these words.

To illustrate this point, suppose 'red' had, so far as
was known, two functions in a given language. One was for referring to a specific color, and the other to designate a particular person of the U.S.S.R. governing body. In part, it should be noted that the words in this last sentence provide a partial criterion for judging the meaning of 'red' in each respective case, which is to indicate, Wittgenstein says, that "As the criterion for a word's having two meanings, we may use the fact of there being two explanations given for a word." In the case of the color, pointing at it and verbalizing about it, serve as the criteria for its use; the same is also true for the Soviet politician. These two uses of "red" are, then, two meanings for the word 'red'. The explanations act as paradigms by which these two meanings are understood, they record instances. However, "red" would only have these two uses, no other red politician than the one pointed to, nor any other instance of the color red could fall within the range of the above criterion. It is in this way that the use of "red" is, so far, relatively limited.

(i1) Illustration of learning: a pain word.—The second example brings into play those factors necessary in teaching a word having to do with pain. To have to teach such words may appear, at first, somewhat odd, because during one's life pain is certainly encountered without being given the word for their hurting ('paining'). That is to say, it is only too plausible to assume that one could speed through life without knowing what "red" meant, and never be the worse for it; but this is
not true of "pain". In the case of "red", once I know the word I can recognize 'red' things. Certainly, if I know the name of a pain, this does not create the license to say that new pains are recognized that went unnoticed before. What appears to be a distinction, however, between color words and pain words (in so far as pains seem 'closer to home') can easily direct one into trouble. For where it now seems reasonable to accept the thesis that it is false that the meaning of "red" stems from a sensation which is harboured in the inmost reaches of one's own mind, it hardly seems to follow that pain, which is by nature particular to the person 'paining', can be a matter of public determination in the same way that color words can. Nevertheless, as will now be shown, pain is no different. To demonstrate the connection between "pain" and "red" I shall postulate a situation analogous to that in which the private linguist might maintain that pain is private.

Supposing A said to B that he had a wicked pain, and B sympathised with A's hurting. After a few moments A thinks B does not really appreciate the extent of his (A's) painfulness; and finds out that B is figuring A's pain on the model of his own (B's) pain. A contends that this is impossible, for it entails that B would have to maintain something like

...I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the model of the pain which I do feel 98 (which is slightly confusing, upon some reflection); and A goes on to give B three reasons why it is impossible for B to understand his (A's) terrible pain, if B continues to hold the

(78)
position he has just mentioned. 39 (a) In the first place, if B has previously had φ (sensation of pain) and uses this as a model for understanding A's condition, then B can only use φ as a model when B feels φ. Clearly, however, it is A who is in pain, i.e. claims to feel φ, and not B who says he feels fine; therefore B could not possibly know how A felt. (ii) Or, granting that B felt φ too, could he not project it into the same region in which A claims his φ resides? This would be a feat, and even if B could carry out this remarkable type of projection, he still would not have a more precise understanding of A's φ, because A's φ would, in fact, be only B's projected φ. 101 (iii) A then strengthens his argument with the claim that if B uses his own φ as the example for knowing how he (A) feels; and if B can only use his own φ when he feels φ; and if B claims not to feel φ, then, because B's feeling φ is essential for knowing how A feels, it is therefore inconsistent for B ever to say he knows how badly off A is feeling. In other words, if B uses his own φ as a model of A's pain, and B does in fact say he also feels φ, B's φ, even if it is projected, is still not A's φ. Moreover, there is always the problem of judging if B's φ is as intense as A's. With these three reasons laid out, A then feels thoroughly satisfied with his dialectics; in fact, he tells B he thinks he has let him off easily, for aside from not being able to recognize the 'same' φ as it occurred in him (B), 102 B would also end up uttering non-sense. Wittgenstein out the latter point this way:

(79)
The proposition "I don't know whether I or someone else is in pain" would be a logical product, and one of its factors would be: "I don't know whether I am in pain or not"—and that is not a significant proposition.103

Needless to say, B is perplexed, having operated in the preceding fashion, in regards to pain at least, during his entire life. He complains that A's thesis appears to end in saying that pains themselves are nothing, whereas B wants to hold, that each time he has $\phi$, 'by golly' he has something, whether or not it is the same thing each time, and whether or not A ever had the same $\phi$.104 A now tries to show B how it is that he is being tormented by questions about his own (B's) $\phi$ (though it appears to B that he is being tormented by questions of A's $\phi$).105 That is, it is quite evident that B has "a preconceived idea to which reality must correspond",106 and with which reality does not correspond. This dichotomy causes B to feel something is wrong; his only solace seems to be that at least he (B) knows that 'come what may': when he has $\phi$, he has it.107 B also tells A that he wants to have it both ways, and that this is especially true when A says about pain that

It is not a something, but not a nothing either!
The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said.108

However, A merely retorts that a private model of $\phi$ serves no significant purpose; and that in B's expression of $\phi$, if the words are to be incorporated into a language,
The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.109

But B wants to know how he can learn about the use of the word 'pain'. A obliges him by clarifying the prior point on 'something' and 'nothing' by explaining that quite often we feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena...110 rather, the investigation has a much different emphasis than that which would make one search for 'phenomena'. To explain this to B, A goes on to say that the tendency is to take something like B's pain, and to

predicate of the (pain) what lies in the method of representing it.111

As an example of this A shows B, how B had taken 'pain' to be something substantial like a truck or a pin; because he (B) could predicate of pain such things as 'it throbs', or 'it pricks'; and in both instances, B is in the spell of a 'misleading designation'.112 As for the former, the 'it' makes it look like there is, in fact, something there, and in the latter the 'it' makes it look like there is a place, some location where the 'pain' is. But regarding 'pain'—A maintains that they would both be better off letting

what we observe...be what the word means!113

Moreover, that "the subject of pain is the person who gives it expression,"114 which is neither an obscure entity, nor a secret place. This is a major point in favor of the method
of investigation which A wants B to adopt.

The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things.115

Therefore, the method by which A proposes to describe to B how he is confused, is to question utterances like 'I have ϕ', and ask "how is this sentence applied—that is, in our everyday language?"116 After all, says A, "You learned the concept 'pain' when you learned language."117 And certainly if there is 'something', as B would like to say—if there is, so to say, some object 'pain', Wittgenstein declares that

**Grammar tells what kind of object anything is.**118

The question now is "How do words refer to sensations?", which is to ask "how does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations?—of the word 'pain' for example."119 These questions momentarily deceive B, who interprets them as reflecting on his old means of recognizing pain. He cautions A:

Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour,—for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.120

A 'begs off' an immediate answer, but promises one if B will follow him in a short example illustrating how the connection between the word 'pain' and 'that in pain' comes to pass.

Imagine a child learning to tell its parents that something is painful. At first, and no one would deny this, the child is in pain when it cries, waves its hands, turns red, and makes horrible faces; but the child has not learned to

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say 'it hurts' yet. The signs the child makes are called 'primitive' or 'natural expressions' of pain; and—so A tells B—when they talk about such signs they shall refer to them as 'pain behavior'. Doctors are necessarily more apt in detecting signs of pain, i.e. they know more signs, and can tell if a child is not well when otherwise the illness might go undetected—but this does not mean that the doctor gives the child pain that was not there before, when he or she indicates certain signs of pain. That is to say, with the same child present before the doctor and the mother, the doctor just sees more. In fact, that is why people go to doctors, says A.

Now, as the child matures the parents teach the child new 'pain behavior', and quite often this is in the form of words. Thus, when the child has a piece of dust in its eye, after reaching a certain age, the child says 'it hurts' and may even help with some purely ostensive demonstrations, where the child previously just cried without giving any indication as to where or what, and nothing short of a complete examination would have revealed what all the noise signified. It is, then, peripicus that the declaration 'it hurts' replaces the aforementioned primitive pain-behavior. That is to say,

the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.121

I.e. the word 'hurts' does not predicate anything of 'it' because there is no object 'it'—it hurts is the method of representing 'pain'.

In this way A elucidates how it is wrong to suppose that one should "try to use language to get between pain and
The words for pain, after all, are just that: words for pain. The language of 'pain' is constituted by those signs which, in adults, run ahead of the more demonstrative expressions of pain. A mature person, however, in extreme pain, can cry, yell and make noise, with a commotion equal to that of any child, if not better, for the adult knows how to get attention better than an unknowing child. Suddenly B seems pleased, smiles from ear to ear, and announces that the only reason he did not know A's $\phi$ was really giving A a hard time, was because A did not show any other sign than to say 'I have $\phi$', whereas most people whom B has met with $\phi$ have not been in very good shape, most of them get all so-and-so. Well, A has to admit that he was deceiving B, and tells him that it probably did not hurt as bad as he was 'making out' (note the telling nature of this expression in the light of what has been said about 'pain behavior').

B, however, continues to have a few reservations, and he returns to his unanswered question. Repeating it he says: certainly, he does not learn from his own behavior, that he himself is in pain. He (B) either has pain or he does not have pain—and that is that. Exactly, says A, seeing that B has maneuvered himself directly into his (A's) hands.

The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.123

B then immediately realizes that "he cannot be in error as to whether he is in pain; he cannot say 'My leg hurts,' by mistake,
any more than he can groan by mistake."124 If B has pain, and his statement to this effect is 'incorrigible', and if the pain is bad enough so that he needs help, B admits that his expression will improve proportionately. A states that if B is still unclear about the concept of 'pain', he would go on to show B more; that is, to

   teach him to use the words by means of examples and by practice.--And when I do this I do not communicate less to him than I know myself.125

A then goes on to describe how he would teach B the vocabulary of pain.

   Perhaps by means of gestures, or by pricking him with a pin and saying: "See, that's what pain is!" This explanation, like any other, he might understand right, wrong, or not at all. And he will show which he does by his use of the word, in this as in other cases.126

When B does use the word with a certain continuity, according to the accepted conventions, this will be evidenced by his practice, which, A says, looking in his dictionary, perspicuously instantiates that B has mastered a technique--in this case, the use of pain words.

(D) Criteria: judging the learned word.--The purpose of this section is to set out a few "sign posts"; as Wittgenstein says, "A rule stand there like a sign post."127 These sign posts are to assist A in judging whether or not B has learned a word which A has been trying to teach B. That is, when the meaning of a word is taught by A to B, A would like to have some means
whereby he can be sure that he has accomplished something. Thus, should B merely point at, and say, the same things that A pointed at and said while he was teaching the meaning of a word to B, all that could be ascertained from B's performance, i.e. the results of A's teaching, would be that B was a very good mimic. Therefore, the criterion for determining whether or not B has learned a word from A must be more than A's witnessing a recapitulation of the very things he did in teaching B. Malcolm brings out exactly what would be required to satisfy A when he notes that it is only when

you have succeeded in bringing to mind what it is that would show that he had grasped your teaching, that you have elicited the criterion for their use, i.e. then A has elicited the wherewithall to judge whether the meaning (use) of the word has been learned by B. And more times than not, this includes using a word in situations other than those which were used in the teaching situation; for, as Wittgenstein mentions, in regards to the diverse occurrences of the same word, "in different circumstances we apply different criteria"; which is to say that "There are very different kinds of justification" for the use of the same word in different situations. Furthermore, Wittgenstein suggests that

What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the word and the application still be different. Was it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not.

Here again, it is seen that when "The use of the word in practice is its meaning", the ability to judge the proper use, is some sort of criterion which tells if a certain practice
is in accordance with the customary conventions or not.

Moreover, this criterion, as I shall bring out shortly, is in no way connected with a private image in A’s head, hidden from the public in such a manner that only A would be able to tell if B had learned a certain word. In the light of this, A is not plagued by the question: “How do we compare images?” (especially private images). He only seeks to establish what would satisfy his acceptance of the fact that B had grasped a particular word which he (A) tried to teach B. A is not in the least concerned with how B knows the word; A finds that all that really matters is that B uses the word (whatever it is) according to various conventions. Certainly, if the meaning of a word is its use in a language and not some occult image (entity or phenomenon), one is relieved of the search for an obscure entity which would determine the meaning of a word. Therefore, one has only to establish the rules for a word’s use, i.e., a criterion for its use, to be able to know whether or not that word has been learned by another. This, as was previously mentioned, is manifest by what B says and does; and has nothing to do with an image. As Wittgenstein puts it, this is not a case of “analysing a phenomenon... but a concept... and therefore the use of a word.” He goes on to mention, however, that there is a danger in construing “meaning” as a concept, for one is then tempted to lapse back into the old habit, where

You have a new conception and interpret it as seeing a new object. You interpret a grammatical movement
made by yourself as a quasi-physical phenomenon which you are observing.137

Wittgenstein suggests that one must not be led to conceiving that occult images are the "meanings" of words, but rather that meanings are concepts, free from the stigma of being quasi-physical phenomena which inevitably brings about confusions and muddles.

In a most concise way, Wittgenstein holds that for "red"138 and "pain"139 it would be enough to say that one has learned their meaning in virtue of the fact that one had learned the English language. That is to say, to imagine a language, is to imagine a way of life;140 or, in other words,

"the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life."141

However, these remarks of Wittgenstein are presently a bit too compact for current purposes, although they do indeed convey the basic principles of his position. I shall now develop Wittgenstein's view in such a manner that the notion of criterion formation, or exactly: what is a criterion?, will become clearer. Toward this end I shall try and do two things: (a) show how one might come about recognizing the criterion for a word's use; and then (b), mention briefly the requirements of an ideal language which quite often seem implicit in language.

(a) **Criterion.**—As was mentioned above, Wittgenstein maintains that to "command a clear view of the use of our words,"142 it is essential to realize that there are "different kinds of justification"143 for the use of the same word in various situations.
Furthermore, that "in different circumstances we apply different criteria" for ascertaining the various meanings (uses) of the same word. Thus, Wittgenstein points out that the word "agreement" and the word "rule" are related to one another, they are cousins. If I teach anyone the use of the one word, he learns the use of the other with it.145

And further on he says that "the use of the word 'rule' and the use of the word 'same' are interwoven."146 From these statements, it is not difficult to see that if people agree within the language they use, and if learning a language is to learn a form of life, then the concept of meaning which construes the employment (use) of a word as its meaning, i.e. the employment of a word is its "sense"147 or meaning, necessarily depends on various rules or agreed-upon-public-conventions as sign posts for the proper use of the various words in a language. These agreed-upon-public-conventions are the "common criteria--the criteria, i.e. which give our words their common meanings...."148

Keeping in mind that "It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use,"149 which on Wittgenstein's view "is not agreement in opinions but in form of life,"150 he holds that in order to come upon the meaning of a word one cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that.151

That is, to establish a criterion for a word's use, which is to say, to establish that which would allow A to proclaim that
B had learned the word A had taught B, A need only consider the application of that word (e.g. "red" or "pain", etc.) sufficiently, to see "On what occasion, for what purpose, do we say this". The results of his enquiry will give A the rules for judging B's ability to use that word in diverse instances; and more than likely, rules that are in excess of those which B evidenced in the original teaching situation. In the end, what B accepts as the justification for his own use of a word, what he manifests as his understanding of the meaning of a word, shall be shown by how he thinks and lives. For, as Wittgenstein points out,

If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also in judgments. And this is the twofold agreement which characterizes the criteria for a word's use. Thus, it is more than the mere witnessing of a recapitulation of the teaching situation; more than just the mimicking of a verbal definition; more than just the mimicking of an ostensive definition. The criteria for a word's use in diverse instances are elicited from "observing" the biography of that word, i.e. observing the "behaviour" of the person who uses the word, and, as it were, chronicling those instances. The application of this information is what A uses in deciding if B has learned the word he has been taught.

(b) Ideal language.—As soon as one mentions "rules" or "criteria" it is believed that one attempts to set out "to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in
unheard-of ways, and thus to restrict the use of words, to restrict their meanings. The word "rules" or "criteria" seem to imply the imposing of limits or boundaries wherein a word can be used, such that a word would only be able to be used in those ways which the rules declared possible. Yet Wittgenstein asserts that he is not trying to establish "the order in our knowledge of the use of language," but, rather, to show that language is not modeled after an ideal "calculus", and that such an ideal is impossible. Referring to this ideal, he says

When we believe that we must find...order, must find the ideal, in our actual language, we become dissatisfied with what are ordinarily called "propositions", "words", "signs". The proposition and the word that logic deals with are supposed to be something pure and clear-cut. And we rack our brains over the nature of the real sign. 158

He continues to expose the 'normative' understanding of the function of language by noting that

The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty.—We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground! 159

Thus, so often there is the desire to talk, to say something, but the restriction incurred in the application of strict rules of meaning, make for nothing but slipping, perhaps being analogous to circular talking, or conversations which are extremely
limited as they are particular to one specific area of thought, from which they cannot diverge without jeopardizing their meaning. Moreover, the ideal language which is supposed to be (or reflect) the "structure of the real world" is but a man made requirement, as Wittgenstein indicates above, which has been forced upon language, and upon a close inspection

We see that what we call "sentence" and "language" have not the formal unity imagined....160

For Wittgenstein avers that all in all "Our ordinary use of language conforms to this standard of exactness only in rare cases."161

Rules, or criteria, have a threefold character in Wittgenstein's programme. (i) There are times when one proceeds by definite rules; (ii) times where "we make up rules as we go along";162 and (iii) times where "we alter them—as we go along."163 The point being that not only do words occur in different circumstances, but they occur in new circumstances, ones foreign to previous uses of a word; and, to repeat,

What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the word and the application still be different. Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not. 164

Here then, in seeing "how the words in question are actually used in our language",165 there is the tendency to notice that there exists no ideal way of expressing so-and-so, in fact, there are many ways, each depending on the factors particular to the situation, i.e. the people involved, the subject matter under discussion, the purpose for the discussion and so on.
Therefore, the ideal, of an ideal language, has only a limited application, e.g. in mathematics and in some of the more theoretical sciences; and ordinary language is more flexible than is usually appreciated, encompassing, for a single word, several instances each of which demand separate rules for judging their proper use in each instance. Remembering, however, "that the application of a word is not everywhere bounded by rules." 167
Footnotes—Chapter IV

1. PI. 375.

2. PI. 244.

3. BB. p. 25, "I call 'symptom' a phenomenon of which experience has taught us that it coincided in some way or other, with the phenomenon which is our defining criterion...we shall easily be persuaded to define the word by means of what, according to our first use, was a symptom."

4. BB. p. 1; cf., PI. 340, "One cannot guess how a word functions.

5. The use of double quotes around single words like "red", "pain", "dog", etc., means that such words are merely to be regarded as "words", i.e. those mounds of ink.


7. BB. p. 31; cf., PI. 95.


9. BB. p. 5.

10. PI. 109.

11. Note that in 'What is a dog?' and 'What is an explanation of (the word) "dog"?', there is little appreciable difference; and one would probably get the same answer to both questions. However, note the difference in 'What is a dog?' and 'What is the meaning of "dog"?', and 'What does an explanation of the meaning of the word "dog", look like?'; in the latter phrase the subtle point of the new Wittgensteinian formulation comes out, for here there is no longer the tendency to point at a somatic dog.

12. BB. p. 5.

13. PI. 150.

14. PI. 199.

15. PI. 19.

16. PI. 23; cf., 480.

17. PI. 203.

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34. M. Schlick, "Meaning and Verification" in Readings in Philosophical Analysis (New York: Appleton-Century-Croft, 1949), p. 163: "When I see a green meadow the 'green' is declared to be a content of my consciousness, but it certainly is not inside my head. Inside my skull there is nothing but my brain; and if there should happen to be a green spot in my brain, it would obviously not be the green of the meadow, but the green of my brain."

35. PI. 11.

36. PI. 13.

37. PI. 560.

38. PI. 293.

39. PI. 378.
40. W.V. Quine, "Semantics and the Philosophy of Language" in Semantics and the Philosophy of Language (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953), ed. L. Linsky, p. 199: "The useful ways in which people ordinarily talk or seem to talk about meanings boil down to two: the having of meanings, which is significance, and sameness of meaning, or synonymy....The problem of explaining these adjectives 'significant' and 'synonymous' with some degree of clarity and rigor—preferably, as I see it, in terms of behavior—is as difficult as it is important. But the explanatory value of special and irreducible intermediary entities called meanings is surely illusory."

41. PI. 241; cf., W.V. Quine, Word and Object (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), p. 264, "any subjective talk of mental events proceeds necessarily in terms that are acquired and understood through their associations, direct or indirect, with the socially observable behavior of physical objects."

42. PI. 429.

43. N. Malcolm, op. cit., p. 534, develops the argument for the logical impossibility of a Private Language.

44. PI. 311.

45. PI. 295.

46. M. Black, Problems of Analysis, op. cit., p. 78.

47. Again I refer to the logic of an argument of Schlick, op. cit., pp. 161-68.

48. PI. 38.

49. PI. 280.

50. PI. 242.

51. PI. 439.

52. BB. p. 42.

53. Schlick, op. cit., p. 163: "The mistake of locating consciousness or mind inside the body ('in the head'), which has been called "introjection" by R. Avenarius, is the main source of the difficulties of the so-called 'mind-body problem'. By avoiding the error of introjection we avoid at the same time the idealistic fallacy which leads to solipsism."
54. BB. 70; cf., 48.
55. PI. 421.
56. PI. 568.
57. PI. 569.
58. PI. 489.
59. BB. p. 56.
60. PI. 559.
61. PI. 344; and also it is noted here that when 'behavior' is used, it is not to be equated with Watsonian psychological behaviorism, but something much broader ('transcending', perhaps) in which one is to envisage an entire way of life; this is best brought out by Wittgenstein when he says, in his rather aphoristic style, in PI. 472, "The character of the belief in the uniformity of nature can perhaps be seen most clearly in the case in which we fear what we expect. Nothing could induce me to put my hand into a flame—although after all it is only in the past that I have burnt myself"; and it would only be OUR way of life that would make the statement 'Don't put your fingers on the stove!' meaningful.
62. PI. 182.
63. BB. p. 67; the underlining is mine.
64. PI. 23.
65. BB. p. 57.
66. PI. 199.
67. BB. p. 69.
68. PI. 164.
69. PI. 527.
70. PI. 84; cf., F. Waismann, op. cit., pp. 117-44, for a similar idea on various modes of justification of the same word in different S T R A T A of discourse.
71. PI. 325.
72. PI. 122.

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73. BB. p. 9.
74. PI. 318; the underlining is mine.
75. PI. 23.
76. PI. 19.
77. BB. p. 4.
78. PI. 432.
79. PI. 381.
80. PI. 380.
81. PI. 26.
82. PI. 39.
83. PI. 26.
84. PI. 38.
85. Ibid.
86. PI. 40.
87. Ibid.
88. PI. 41.
89. PI. 43.
90. PI. 55.
91. BB. p. 1.

92. J. Bentham mentions a similar and enlightening point in his *Logic* when he says "It is evident, however, that great mistakes may frequently occur in learners' minds in these cases—if, for instance, all the things represented as being in motion happen to be red, and all those which are spoken of as being at rest are white, he may just as well attach to the words *I move* the meaning red, and to these at rest the meaning white, as the signification intended to be conveyed." Quoted from J. Wisdom, *Interpretation and Analysis* (London: Kegan Paul, 1931), p. 40.

93. BB. p. 131.
Ibid; cf., A. d'Abro The Evolution of Scientific Thought, (New York: Dover, 1927), p. 368, remarks that "We have no means of discovering whether what one man sees as red the other might not see as blue were our observers to exchange eyes and brains while retaining their memory of past sensations. On the other hand, we can assert from experience that, for normal human beings, two objects which appear to be of the same colour to one observer will appear to be the same colour to the other."

Schlick, op. cit., pp. 161-68, from which the logic of this argument has been taken.
111. PI. 104.
112. PI. 280.
113. PI. 316; the underlining is mine.
114. PI. 302.
115. PI. 122. I have reversed the order in this quotation.
116. PI. 134.
117. PI. 384.
118. PI. 373; the underlining is mine.
119. PI. 244.
120. PI. 246.
121. PI. 244.
122. PI. 245.
123. PI. 246.
125. PI. 208.
126. PI. 286.
127. PI. 85.
129. PI. 164.
130. PI. 527.
131. PI. 140.
132. BB. p. 69.
133. PI. 376.
135. PI. 344, "Our criterion for someone's saying something to himself is what he tells us and the rest of his behaviour; and we only say that someone speaks to himself if, in the ordinary sense of the words, he _can_ speak. And we do not say it of a parrot; nor of a gramophone."
163. Ibid.
164. PI. 140.
165. BB. p. 56.
166. PI. 218, "Whence comes the idea that the beginning of a series is a visible section of rails invisibly laid to infinity? Well, we might imagine rails instead of a rule. And infinitely long rails correspond to the unlimited application of a rule."
167. PI. 84.
CONCLUSION

This conclusion is in two sections. In the first (i), I shall give a summary of the preceding four chapters. In the second (ii) I shall make four concluding remarks which I believe can be made from the major points developed in the body of this thesis.

(i) **Summary.**—The first chapter was concerned with developing the ideas of two idealists, Plato and Leibniz, and two empiricists, Locke and Russell, especially in so far as these ideas were related to the connection between language and reality. Generally, it was found that both approaches ultimately arrived at a concept of meaning which depended upon some sort of private entity (image) in the mind. That is, each of the above philosophers concluded that the meaning of a word was determined by some kind of image which the speaker held in his mind while he was speaking. In consequence of this standpoint these philosophers were most often interested in establishing the connection between their postulated entities and reality, and also, between those entities and language.

The second chapter dealt primarily with those problems that were incurred by the two approaches when these thinkers tried to establish the kind of relationship that obtained between the putative entity and the real world; and also between this image and language. It was shown that each philosopher ran up against tremendous difficulties, both logically and epistemologically, as he tried to establish some sort of iso-
morphism between these heterogeneous 'things'. And also, that both approaches made it quite clear that the meaning of a word (i.e. its referent image) was bounded on all sides by that publicly inaccessible medium: the philosopher's own mind. As a result of this, these attempts to ascertain the ontological character of reality and the structure of the real world by means of an examination of language, were rendered futile, mostly because no one could get at the image which the philosopher had "in mind".

In the third chapter, I tried to develop the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein on private language. The purpose of this disquisition was to show that it is both logically and epistemologically impossible to maintain that a private image is the meaning for a given word. Moreover, this chapter pointed out that on two grounds the idea of a private language was impossible. For, on the one hand, it was shown that the speaker could not be understood by others; and on the other hand, that the speaker could not be sure that he himself was using the same meaning (private image) each time he used the same word.

In the fourth chapter, I proceeded to indicate just what it was that Wittgenstein construed the "meaning" of a word to be. Generally, it was shown: (a) how the idea of an image in the mind as the meaning for a word came into being, and this was demonstrated by what was called the substantive-substance fallacy; (b) how a word does not come about its meaning—in order to indicate some of the reasons why a private
linguist would have trouble in teaching "his" word to others; (c) how one might come about learning a word, with the avowed realization that the projected method was only one of those found in the works of Wittgenstein, and meant, in no way, to be the way a word is learned; and finally (d) how one comes about a criterion whereby it could be established that a word had been learned by another person. The principal purpose of this chapter was to elucidate how the meaning of a word is its use in a language. This was the concept of meaning which I felt Wittgenstein most earnestly propounded. Its contingencies were brought out in the course of the exposition, and as a result of this, it was seen that many of the classical problems centering about that notion of meaning as a private entity, were called into question.

(ii) **Concluding remarks**.--(a) I do not wish to conclude that Plato, Leibniz, Locke and Russell are completely wrong in their doctrines relevant to the topic at issue. I do, however, call into serious question that aspect of their philosophy, mostly epistemological in nature, which seeks to interpret language as being meaningful only when there is an image (private) connected to its word. Thus, I have merely tried to point out where, in the light of this common epistemological problem, each of these philosophers has gone astray, and how, in the light of Wittgenstein's remarks, the direction of their views, in this above-mentioned, limited respect, can be called into serious question.
(b) Moreover, support for private language seems to stem mainly from entertaining a concept of meaning which is chained to the idea of a subjectively perceived image, or sensation, or putative entity, as it has been variously termed in the above exposition.

(c) I also conclude that the primary interest of the four philosophers mentioned above, in regard to language, was to develop a definite kind of relation between language and reality mainly because they believed there to be some kind of connection between the two. As was shown, their concern produced a third "thing", the putative entity, which was to be the bond between language and reality. However, the idea of meaning as an image harbored in the mind of the speaker (which grew out of this postulated entity) has been shown to be no problem at all, as there is actually no connection between language and reality.

(d) Finally, I conclude that Wittgenstein's notion of "meaning" as use, substantially removes the problems which surround the 'imagistico' concept of meaning. In fact, the full force of Wittgenstein's argument has been directed towards the dissolution of the idea that there is a connection between language and reality. On Wittgenstein's view—language is reality.
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