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MAO'S AMERICAN STRATEGY AND THE KOREAN WAR

A Dissertation Presented

by

WANLI HU

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

February 2005

History

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
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

MAO'S AMERICAN STRATEGY AND THE KOREAN WAR

FEBRUARY 2005

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Even though the Korean War has been labeled by some as a forgotten war, scholars continue to seek the root of the Sino-U.S. confrontation and Mao's decision to enter the war in Korea. Among the five interpretations I examined, Steven Goldstein compares Mao's intervention to a Greek tragedy. In my opinion, this comes closest to explaining this historical puzzle. However, this interpretation has been largely overlooked by scholarship in the field.

My dissertation relies on an understanding of "Mao's American strategy" to comprehend Mao's motivation to enter the war. Mao developed his American strategy in late 1944 and by mid-1945 it was established as the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) approach to the United States. The CCP's concept of the United States was based on its analysis of Washington's long-term strategic interests in China after World War II. Washington's strategic objective was to insure its influence on China through a pro-America government. The best means to reach this objective was to establish a coalition government, which would follow America's multi-party democratic system. Considering its obvious weakness at that time, the CCP leadership welcomed a coalition government

in which the CCP and the Guomindang (GMD), could enjoy equal power. However, after analysis of GMD-CCP relations, Mao reached the conclusion that Jiang would not abandon autocracy no matter how hard Washington pressed him. Therefore, a GMD-CCP clash was inevitable. The United States took the position that it had no choice but to stand on the side of the GMD and to interfere with the Chinese revolution sooner or later.

Truman's blockade of the Taiwan Straits, and the United Nations troops' crossing the 38th parallel and marching toward the Yalu in 1950 triggered Mao's intervention. To meet an unavoidable clash, Mao decided to dispatch his army to Korea.

In addition to explaining Mao's American strategy, I introduce an international factor: the clash between the National Independence Movement and the constraints of the Cold War. With Mao's American strategy as a chronological line and the international factor as a horizontal circumstance, this dissertation asserts that Mao's involvement in the Korean War can be seen as inevitable—a Greek tragedy.

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CHAPTER I

A REVIEW OF THE SCHOLARSHIP ON MAO'S FOREIGN POLICY AND THE KOREAN WAR

It has always been a perplexing as well as a controversial topic: why did China decide to enter the Korean War to challenge a seemingly insurmountable opponent? Bruce Cumings, the most prominent American historian of this conflict, having devoted well over a decade and some 1500 pages to studying its origins, could conclude as late as 1990 that “no one and everyone” was responsible: “Who started the Korean War? This question should not be asked.”¹ John Lewis Gaddis also mentioned that “The reasons why are controversial, even today.”²

However, it is the motivation of historians to study, understand and interpret a historical event no matter how complex it is. A thorough picture of the Korean War and its origin may need to be drawn out with many people's efforts from different aspects and in different times. Thus the author here is going to attempt to answer this question: Why did Mao Zedong decide to enter the Korean War to fight a seemingly undefeatable enemy?

Generally speaking, there are five different answers to this question in the existing scholarship on the Korean War. This chapter will analyze each interpretation for its strong points and apparent problems. Based on the analysis of current scholarship on review of recently declassified documents, the author aims, in the subsequent chapters, to shed new light on Mao's motives for dispatching his armies into Korea.

¹ Bruce Cumings, *The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p.621.

² John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p.71.

1. Communist Expansion: the “Heroic Phase” of the Cold War

The first well-known major interpretation of Mao’s U.S. policy was developed in the 1950s, and was closely connected to the intense atmosphere of the Cold War. The outbreak of the Korean War, in President Harry Truman’s eyes, occurred because “Communists have passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.”³ In Dean Acheson’s words, “We are fighting the second team, whereas the real enemy is the Soviet Union.”⁴ Following this line almost all the scholarship, except for the books written by I. F. Stone and Melvin B. Voorhees, treated the war as a conspiracy between Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang to expand the sphere of the Communist world.⁵ In this view, Moscow was the commander of this expansion, while Beijing and Pyongyang were the running dogs. Mao was merely the aggressive tool of the Soviet Union in Korea. David Rees’ orthodox analysis in his book *Korea: The Limited War* was typical among the scholarship at that time. Rees pointed out that Acheson’s Press Club speech “would influence the Chinese to acquiesce in the Soviet plans for the invasion, for a successful take-over in South Korea would help to implement Chinese ambitions everywhere throughout South East Asia: “Stalin must surely have told Mao of his grand Korean design during the Chinese leader’s ten weeks in Moscow which ended in March 1950.”⁶ Robert Tarbell Oliver in his book *Why War Came in Korea* made it clear that the war was the Communists’ challenge to the free

³ Statement Issued by the President, June 27, 1950, *USFR*, 1950, 7:202.

⁴ Walter Lafeber, *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad Since 1750* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989), p.489.

⁵ I. F. Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952); and Melvin B. Voorhees, *Korean Tales* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952).

⁶ David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1964), p.19.

world.⁷ Philip E. Mosely's article "Soviet Policy and the War" assumed that "The signal for the attack of the North Korea forces against South Korea was given by the Soviet leadership.... It is probable that the final preparations for the Korean campaign were decided on in Moscow, in January 1950, during Mao Tse-tung's extended conferences with the Soviet leaders.... Having completed the conquest of the Chinese mainland, Mao Tse-tung was probably glad to learn of the Soviet decision to expel the 'Western imperialists' from their last foothold on the mainland of Northeast Asia. In this respect Soviet and Chinese Communist sentiments and interests are directly parallel."⁸ Alexander L. George listed five subsidiary interpretations: the "diversionary move"; the "soft-spot probing"; the "will testing"; the "demonstration" and the "Soviet Far East Strategy". All these interpretations treated the war as part of Moscow's well-planned expansion in the world.⁹ D. F. Fleming in his works *The Cold War and Its Origins* said that these five interpretations merged into the "attrition" theory.¹⁰ Stalin had responded to the logic of the containment policy by using his satellite troops to wear down the United States in a series of small wars around the vast rim of the Communist world.

These interpretations reveal popular understanding of the Korean War as a "heroic phase" of the Cold War. In Philip West's words, "In the heroic phase, historians dwell on the sins of the enemy and the virtues of their friends."¹¹ The contribution of this interpretation, in the author's opinion, is that it attributes the Korean War to the Cold War. However, it reveals little autonomy on the part of Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong in

⁷ Robert Tarbell Oliver, *Why War Came in Korea* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1950).

⁸ Philip E. Mosely, "Soviet Policy and the War" *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. VI (Spring 1952): 1-2.

⁹ Alexander L. George, "American Policy Making and the North Korean Aggression" *World Politics* 7 (January 1955): 211-217.

¹⁰ Denna Frank Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961).

¹¹ Philip West, "Interpreting the Korean War," *American Historical Review*, 94 (February 1989): 81.

the decision to go to war. Actually, to engage in the conflict, as recent revelations from the Russian archives show, it was Kim Il Sung rather than Stalin who promoted the invasion.¹² Chinese sources also show that the CCP's involvement in the war was more because of concern for its national security than obedience to Stalin's instructions. It appears probable that Mao played an independent role in the decision to send his troops into Korea.

2. China's Defense of Her National Security

The second major interpretation appeared in the 1960s and 1970s when scholarly understanding of the war passed from the heroic phase into an academic phase. Scholars now liked to give more attention to the other side of the conflict. They strove hard to understand the Communist motives for entering the war. Allen S. Whiting was a pioneer in this field and his views deserve detailed attention. In his book *China Crosses the Yalu*, Whiting disagreed with the first interpretation by arguing that it was Mao's fear for China's national security under America's threat that led to Beijing's intervention. It seems that Whiting's analysis came quite close to explaining Mao's true motive for entering the war. However, Whiting concluded that "the entirely new war [that] resulted" was due to a

¹² Who initiated the North Korean attack on June 25, 1950? Kathryn Weathersby pointed out: "the impetus for the war came from Pyongyang, not Moscow. This was Kim Il Sung's war; he gained Stalin's reluctant approvals only after persistent appeals." See her article "New Findings on the Korean War" *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (CWIHP), Issue 3, p.14; Weathersby in "Korea, 1949-50: To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War" provided seven very important ciphered telegrams between Pyongyang and Moscow to justify her argument. See *CWIHP Bulletin* Issue 5, pp. 1-15. Weathersby's conclusion also agrees with Khrushchev's memoir, which mentioned that "the war wasn't Stalin's idea, but Kim Il Sung's." Strobe Talbott, ed., *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little Brown, 1970), pp. 367-8. William Stueck also said: "The initiative throughout was squarely on Kim's side." See *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 31.

miscalculation, where failure to analyze the enemy's intentions and to anticipate his response to alternative courses of action may raise the level of violence to thermonuclear proportions.... Inadequate communication, or the failure to convey accurately to an opponent one's intentions and one's probable responses, played a pivotal role between August and October 1950 in precipitating war between CPV [Chinese People's Volunteer Army] and U.N. forces....

Korean developments were affected in other ways by the absence of direct relations between Peking and Washington. On the one side, Chinese Communist calculations depended primarily upon Soviet interpretations of American and U.N. intentions. This introduced a Soviet bias into the information available to the decision makers in Peking. On the other side, American knowledge of Chinese Communist views came, to a considerable degree, through Indian channels. For a number of reasons, this made such information difficult and, for some officials, impossible to evaluate. Hence Chinese calculations exaggerated the threat posed by American policy, while American calculations downgraded the seriousness of Chinese concern.¹³

Moreover, it seemed to Whiting that Beijing would not have participated in this war if Washington could have convinced the CCP that the United States only wanted to "unite Korea by force while avoiding an expansion of the conflict to Korea's neighbors."¹⁴

My interpretation as to why Mao entered the Korean War differs from Whiting's on several points. Beijing's decision to enter the Korean War depended largely on its own perception of the U.S. and the UN's action rather than on Moscow's interpretations. I will argue that the Sino-American confrontation in Korea was, in fact, the result of China's century-long, anti-imperialist revolution in general and Mao's 30-year long national-liberation war in particular.

Moreover, Mao may not have exaggerated the potential consequences America's action in Korea and Taiwan. Not only did Beijing's national security come under threat, but the CCP's new regime also faced a serious internal challenge. Beijing feared that "reactionaries" remaining on the mainland of China, social classes which were hostile to

the new regime, and Jiang's army in Taiwan, would take advantage of this crisis to make trouble. Moreover, the Communist regime had not yet gained legitimacy among the Chinese people. A failure to manage this crisis could cause the CCP to lose face before the Chinese people, which would greatly weaken its political control of China. Because of these considerations, the CCP had to take America's involvement in Korea and Taiwan very seriously.

Whiting assumed that the Sino-American confrontation might have been avoided if Beijing had not misunderstood Washington's intentions. His assumption was based on the fact that Beijing's national security was limited to its border. But this may not have been Beijing's perception of its national security. Traditionally, China has always regarded it as essential to its safety to maintain friendly neighbors. The tributary relations between China and its neighbors such as Korea and Vietnam in the past embodied this mentality.¹⁵ Based on Michael Hunt's analysis of the relations between China's core cultural areas and peripheral areas, Chinese rulers always identified and secured those peripheral areas important to the security of the core. "The clash of arms with the United States in Korea, maintenance of an occupation army in Tibet and Xinjiang, the border war with India, and the military tensions generated by a Vietnam occupied in the south by the

¹³ Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 168-172.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.171.

¹⁵ Korea and China maintained a tributary relation for many centuries. This tributary relation led to a peace between these two countries. Korea adapted to her needs all the main features of Chinese culture. For centuries, the Korean government sent regular tribute missions to China. Japan began to compete with China to control Korea since the 19th century. A friendly neighbor would become a hostile neighbor if Japan took Korea away from China. Regarding herself as the protector of Korea, China declared a war against Japan when Japan attempted to take Korea as her own in the second half 19th century. The Sino-Japan War broke out in 1894. The triumph of Japan came to the end of the tributary relations between China and Korea.

United States and aligned in the north with the Soviet Union must be counted as but the costly byproducts of contemporary China's inherited strategic policy.”¹⁶

It appears that Mao felt that China's national security was under threat as soon as the UN armies had crossed the 38th parallel. Zhou Enlai expressed Beijing's concerns with its national security in this way: “The United States inherited the mantle of the Japanese militarists, and followed the history since the war of 1895. The United States might attempt to conquer China, namely, to occupy Northeast China before annexing China and to occupy Korea before grabbing Northeast China.”¹⁷

Even if Mao may have been persuaded that Washington would not invade China, the CCP could not tolerate the replacement of a friendly neighbor with a hostile enemy. Korea was located next to China's most important industrial heartland, the region which would play a significant role in China's economic restoration and development. Mao had not bothered to protect this region before the outbreak of the Korean War, because it had friendly neighbors in the Soviet Union and North Korea. But Mao had to send a great number of troops to guard this area when it came under the threat from a hostile regime. Zhou pressed this issue: “How many troops are needed to guard the Yalu River of one thousand kilometers? Moreover, this army would be tied there year after year since we don't know when the enemy would launch its attack.”¹⁸ Mao also showed his determination to defend China's national security: “Reactionaries at home and abroad would become very arrogant if we allow the enemy to stay along the Yalu River, which would place us in a very disadvantageous position.... We believe that we should enter the war and we must enter the war. Entering the war can be most rewarding; failing to do so

¹⁶ Michael Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*, pp.16-7.

¹⁷ *Zhou Enlai Xuanji*, [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1984), II:51.

may cause great harm.”¹⁹ The Whiting interpretation did, however, produce a deep impact on later scholarship on the Korean War, despite its limited definition of national security. Tang Tsou in his *America's Failure in China* agreed that Beijing's entrance in the war was due to “their estimate of the threat to their security posed by an American victory in North Korea.”²⁰

In the 1960s to 1970s, in the atmosphere of opposition to the Vietnam War and with the normalization between the U. S. and China, revisionist historians seemed to deviate even further from the heroic interpretation. They began to question the Korean War policy of the Truman administration and behavior of South Korea on the one hand, and on the other they argued that China was reluctantly drawn into the war, because Beijing leaders had many other urgent things to do in order to build up their war-torn country. Robert R. Simmons characterized the Truman administration in this way: “Washington, it should be further noted, was not simply ‘reacting’ to the war, but rather took positive stances of its own to which the communist states felt impelled to reply.”²¹ Then he suggested that an overriding concern with security determined Beijing's policy: “China's entrance into the Korean Civil War, which stalled its economic reconstruction and brought the threat of an American invasion, was taken reluctantly”²² Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang in their book *China under Threat* went even further: “The P.R.C. responded with force to U.S. action in Korea, which most Chinese leaders perceived as an imminent danger to China's national security. The Chinese seemed to fear that

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 11:52-53.

¹⁹ “Mao's Telegram to Zhou,” October 13, 1950, *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao* [Manuscripts of Mao Zedong from the Period after the Nation's Founding] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993), 1:556.

²⁰ Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China 1941-50* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p.576.

²¹ Robert R. Simmons, *The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. xvi.

invading UN and U.S. forces would occupy North Korea and push their attack beyond the border of Korea into China.”²³ And a number of scholars speculated that China would not have intervened if UN forces had stopped at the 38th parallel.²⁴

With more declassified documents at hand, some scholars in the 1990s, such as Jonathan Pollack, Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, gave more detailed arguments which increased the credibility of Whiting’s hypotheses. Pollack demonstrated how the Beijing leaders were unwillingly drawn into the war when they felt an increasing threat from America’s involvement in Korea.²⁵ In their article “China’s Decision to Enter the War: History Revisited,” Hao and Zhai provided first-hand materials based on their interviews of a number of high Chinese officials. They emphasized Mao’s concerns with China’s national security as the determining factor for the decision to dispatch the Chinese army into the Korean War. Hao and Zhai concluded: “It is fairly clear that the reasons why China entered the Korean War were primarily for security concerns....Retrospectively, if the CCP and the Truman Administration had better understood each other’s intention, this tragedy could have been avoided.”²⁶ Thomas J. Christensen made use of Mao’s telegrams to Stalin and Zhou Enlai to suggest Mao’s motives for sending the Chinese army into Korea. His analysis confirmed Whiting’s assumption that the reason why Mao

²² *Ibid.* p.165.

²³ Melvin Gurtov, and Hwang Byong-Moo, *China under Threat* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p.25.

²⁴ The books mentioned here seemed to endorse this view: Ronald C. Keith, *The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989); Richard Whelan, *Drawing the Line: the Korean War, 1950-1953* (Boston: Little Brown, 1990); Peter Lowe, *The Origins of the Korean War* (London: Longman, 1986); Edward Friedman’s “Problems in Dealing with an Irrational Power : America Declares War on China” Edward Friedman and Mark Selden eds., *America’s Asia Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971).

²⁵ Jonathan D. Pollack, “The Korean War and Sino-American Relations” Harry Harding and Yuan Ming eds., *Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade* (Wilmington, Delaware: SR Books, 1989).

²⁶ Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited,” *The China Quarterly*, 121 (March 1990):114.

entered Korea in October 1950 was due to the fact that China felt threatened by the American presence in North Korea.²⁷

The dominant theme of the scholarship on the Korean War from the China side has much in common with Whiting's argument. That is, Mao was forced to make decision to enter the war when China's national security was under threat. Chinese scholarship on the Korean War from perspective of academic research did not start, in fact, until 1980 when Peng Dehui, the Commander-in-Chief of both the CPV and the Chinese-Korean Forces in Korea, was rehabilitated in 1978. The scholarship on the Korean War in China, generally speaking, can be divided into two parts. The first one is personal accounts and the second one is scholars' research.

Personal accounts come from high-ranking officers of the PLA or CPV. For example, Yao Xu, Vice Secretary-General of Political Department of the CPV, published his article "The Brilliant Decision in the War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea" in 1980.²⁸ Peng Dehuai's *Peng Dehuai Zhishu* [Peng Dehuai Own Account] came out in 1981.²⁹ Nie Rongzhen, Acting Chief of Staff of the PLA, published *Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu* [Nie Rongzhen Memoirs] in 1984.³⁰ Yang Dezhi, Vice-Commander of the CPV for Operations in 1951 and Commander of the 19th Army in 1952 published *Weile Heping* [For the Sake of Peace] in 1987.³¹ Cai Chenwen, head of the PRC's military mission to Pyongyang in 1950 and chief administrative officer for the Chinese negotiating team at Panmunjom,

²⁷ Thomas J. Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lesson of Mao's Korean War Telegrams" *International Security*, Vol. 17 (Summer 1992).

²⁸ Yao Xu, "Kangmei Yuanchao de Yingming Jueding" [The Brilliant Decision in the War to Resist America and Aid Korea] *Dangshi Yanjiu Ziliao* [CCP History Study Materials], No.5, 1980, pp.5-14.

²⁹ Peng Dehuai, *Peng Dehuai Zishu* [Peng Dehuai's Memoir] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1981), An abridged version of Peng's Memoir is available in translation: *Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1984).

³⁰ Nie Rongzhen, *Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu* [Nie Rongzhen's Memoirs] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1984).

wrote *Banmendian Tanpan* [Panmunjom Negotiations] in 1989.³² In 1991, both Hong Xuezhi, Vice-Commander of the CPV with responsibility in the CPV's logistics and Du Ping, head of the Political Division of the CPV, completed *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Huiyi* [Recollections of the War to Resist the United States and Aid Korea] and *Zai Zhiyuanjun Zongbu* [My Years at CPV Headquarters] respectively.³³ These personal memoirs revealed detailed information and personal accounts of important decisions of combat operations, logistics, field command and daily communications between the CPV headquarters, Mao, Stalin and Kim. Even though they disclosed different aspects of the Sino-US confrontation, they shared a common ground. That is, they followed the Party line strictly. They treated this war between Washington and Beijing as a challenge-and-counterchallenge competition. They showed their admiration for Mao's decision and praised highly the CPV soldiers' sacrifice. For example, Yao Xu argued that the outbreak of the Korean War proved the CCP leadership's fear that the U.S. would attack China through the three directions of Korea, Taiwan and Indo-China. To avoid a perceived war in the territory of China, Mao decided to initiate his attack in the territory of Korea. In retrospect, Mao's decision was correct. Li Jijun, Vice President of Academy of Military Science, said that it was not Mao's original intention to confront the United States in Korea because of China's own domestic difficulties. However, China

³¹ Yang Dezhi, *Weile Heping* [For the Sake of Peace] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1987).

³² Cai Chenwen and Zhao Yongtian, *Banmendian Tanpan* [Panmunjom Negotiations] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1989).

³³ Hong Xuezhi, *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Huiyi* [Recollections on the War of Resisting the U.S. and Assisting Korea] (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe, 1991). Du Ping, *Zai Zhiyuanjun Zongbu* [In the CPV Headquarters] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1991).

had no other better choice when her national security was under threat of American forces from both north and south.³⁴

Chinese scholars also pursued the national security argument. In a joint Sino-US senior scholar conference in 1989, Chen Xiaolu presented “China’s Foreign Policy toward the United States, 1949-1955.”³⁵ Chen thinks the Korean War was not the cause of the Sino-American confrontation. On the contrary, it was the result of the tension between Washington and Beijing that existed prior to the war. Facing this inevitable clash, the CCP decided to initiate an attack which would turn China from a defensive position into an offensive action. Moreover, China could gain three advantages of timeliness, topography and popular support by initiating the attack. The book *Zhongguo Renmin Zhiyuanjun Kangmei Yuanchao Zhangzhengshi* [The Chinese People’s Volunteers in the War to Resist the United States and Aid Korea] in 1988 insisted on the Party line and attributed Mao’s decision to a reaction to Truman’s military challenge.³⁶ Xu Yan’s book *Diyici Jiaoliang: Kangmei Yuanchao de Lishi Huigu yu Fansi* [First Test of Strength: a Historical Review and Evaluation of the War to Resist the United States and Aid Korea] appeared in 1990.³⁷ Xu thinks that the clash between Washington and Beijing is the continuation of China’s civil war and the CCP’s anti-imperialism revolution. Li Haiwen described “When Did the CCP Make Decision to Enter the War?”

³⁴ Li Jijun, “Mao Zedong de Junshi Zhanlue Siwei” [Mao Zedong’s Military Strategic Thinking], *Bainianchao* [Hundred Year Tide], No. 10, 2003, pp.5-11.

³⁵ Chen Xiaolu’s “China’s Foreign Policy toward the United States, 1949-1955” in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming’s *Sino-American Relations, 1949-1955*, (Wilmington, Delaware: SR Books, 1989), pp.184-197.

³⁶ *The Military History Institute of the Chinese Academy of Military, Zhongguo Renmin Zhiyuanjun Kangmei Yuanchao Zhangzhengshi* [The Chinese People’s Volunteers in the War to Resist America and Aid Korea] (Beijing: Junshi kexu chubanshe, 2000). This book was published in 1988 as internal use.

³⁷ Xu Yan, *Diyici Jiaoliang: Kangmei Yuanchao de Lishi Huigu yu Fansi* [The First Contest: Recollections and Rethinking on the War of Resisting America and Aiding Korea] (Beijing: Zhongyang guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 1990).

in 1993.³⁸ According to this study, it took a whole month from mid-September to mid-October for the CCP leadership to make final decision to enter the war. It proved that it was when China was pushed into the corner that her leaders made the decision to enter the war. Shen Zhihua, a well-known specialist on the Korean in China, published more than 10 articles and three books on the Korean War since the 1980s. In his article, “The Process of the Decision to Dispatch the Chinese Troops into Korea,” Shen made it clear that Mao had no choice but to endorse Kim’s proposal to unify Korea. It was Mao’s last choice to dispatch the Chinese troops into Korea.³⁹

2000 is the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War. Contemporary China History Studies, an institute as well as a journal, held a seminar to commemorate the Korean War. Li Li’an, Director of the institute made his argument by analyzing the eight Chinese characters: Kangmei Yuanchao, Baojia Weiguo [Resist the United States and aid Korea, protect our home and country]. Li interpreted that the first four characters showed the means and action while the last four characters revealed the purpose of the war.⁴⁰ Qi Dexue from the Chinese Academy of Military Science said that China had neither intention nor capacity to launch such a war against the United States at that time. But China made her best to meet this challenge inserted by America.

In August 2000, Beijing University and the Eastern Historical Institute held a symposium of the Cold War and China. More than 30 scholars from Chinese Academy of Social Science, the CCP Central Committee Documents Institute, the CCP History Institute,

³⁸ Li Haiwen, “Zhonggong Zhongyang Jiujing Heshi Jueding Zhiyuanjun Chuguo Zuo-zhan? [When Did the CCP Central Committee Make Decision to Dispatch the CPV to Enter the War?” in *Dang de Wenxian* [The Party’s Documents] No. 5, 1993, pp.85-94.

³⁹ Shen Zhihua, “Zhongguo Chubing Chaoxian de Juece Guocheng” [The Process of the Decision to Dispatch the Chinese Troops into Korea] in *Dangshi Yanjiu Ziliao*, No. 1, 1996.

⁴⁰ “The Seminar on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the War to Resist the United States and Aid Korea,” *Dandai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu* [Contemporary China History Studies], No. 6, 2000, pp.7-9.

Nanjing International Institute participated in this symposium. They reached three conclusions about the origin of the Korean War. First of all, there was a moral issue. Secondly, they considered Moscow's plot, and finally, North Korea's manipulation of the USSR and the PRC. As far as the moral issue was concerned, some scholars argued further that China's decision to enter the war was a rational consideration from these three perspectives: (1) the PRC's response was a reaction against Washington's action to bloc the Taiwan Straits; (2) China shouldered her international responsibility to help a socialist brother in Asia; (3) China was forced to intervene when her national security was under threat.⁴¹

For that occasion a group of Chinese scholars wrote articles to commemorate and rethink the war. Niu Jun, the Director of American Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Science, published his article "A Comparative Study of Chinese and American Decision-Making during the Korean War" in 2000.⁴² Xu Kui wrote an article "Achievements and Failings in the Interaction between Politics and Military Affairs during the Strategic Decision of the Korean War".⁴³ Both of them focused their attention on tactical operations of the Korean War. Based on Niu's argument, it was Washington's military interference and involvement in Korea, Taiwan, Indo-China and the Philippines that made the Beijing leadership feel a threat. To prevent a domino chain reaction, Mao decided to confront the American troops in Korea. Both Washington and Beijing experienced three similar phases: from unanticipated reaction to aggressive challenge and

⁴¹ Liu Ronggang, "Lengzhan yu Zhongguo Xueshu Yantaohui Zhongshu" [A Summary of the Symposium on the Cold War and China], *Zhonggong Dangshi Jianjiu* [The CCP History Studies], No. 6, 2000, p.105.

⁴² Niu Jun, "Chaoxian Zhanzhengzhong Zhongmei Juece Bijiao Yanjiu" [A Comparative Study of Chinese and American Decision-Making during the Korean War] in *Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu* [Contemporary China History Studies], No. 6, 2000, pp.36-55.

return to realistic defense. It was the realistic belief of a limited war that restrained them from escalating the war into a global conflict. Xu Kui analyzed the interaction between political objectives and military strategy. According to Xu's opinion, both Washington and Beijing had to readjust their political objectives after military setbacks. Zhang Baijia published his article "Looking at the Mao's Decision to Enter the War from the Perspective of Solving Crisis."⁴⁴ Xie Hainan published an article "The Life-and-Death Fight of the New China."⁴⁵ Jian Xianzhi and Li Jie wrote a book entitled *Mao Zedong yu Kanmei Yuanchao* [Mao Zedong and the Korean War].⁴⁶ Liu Tong wrote "The CCP's Prediction and Policy in the Early Korean War" in *Dang de Wenxian* [The CCP Documents].⁴⁷ These scholars concluded that Mao's entry into the war was a reaction to Washington's anti-CCP policy and military challenge. In short, the scholarship on the Korean War from the side of China shared Whiting's national security tones in terms of Mao's motive to dispatch Chinese troops into the war.

It seems that this interpretation blames Washington more than Beijing for the PRC-US confrontation. However, these scholars might reach a different conclusion if they look at the war from a larger perspective. The Truman administration adopted a disengagement policy beginning in 1947 when George Marshall became Secretary of State. Acheson, who

⁴³ Xu Kui, "Kangmei Yuanchao de Zhanlue Juece zai Zhengzhi yu Junshi hudongzhong de Deyushi" [Achievements and Failings in the Interaction between Politics and Military Affairs during the Strategic Decision of the Korean War] in *Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu*, No. 6, 2000, pp.76-83.

⁴⁴ Zhang Baijia, "Cong Weiji Chuli de Jiaodu Kang Kanmei Yuanchao Chubing Juece" [Looking at the Mao's Decision to Enter the War from the Perspective of Solving Crisis] in *Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu* [The CCP History Studies], No. 6, 2000, pp.22-7.

⁴⁵ Xie Hainan, "Xinzhongguo de Shengsi Zhizhan" [The Life-and-Death Fight of the New China] in *Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu* [Contemporary China History Studies], No. 2, 2000, pp.13-27.

⁴⁶ Jian Xianzhi and Li Jie, *Mao Zedong yu Kangmei Yuanchao* [Mao Zedong and the War of Resisting America and Aiding Korea], (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2000).

⁴⁷ Liu Tong, "Zhonggong Dui Chaoxian Zhanzheng Chuqi Jushi de Yuce Yu Duice" [The CCP's Prediction and Policy in the Early Korean War] in *Dang de Wenxian* [The Party's Documents] No. 6, 2001, pp.53-7.

succeeded Marshall, followed this policy and went even further to exclude Taiwan from America's defense perimeter in his speech on January 12, 1950. Why did the United States change its policy overnight when the Korean crisis took place? Obviously, America's national security was under serious threat when Kim launched his attack on South Korea. First, the United States considered South Korea as part of its sphere of influence. In Truman's eyes, to attack South Korea was to attack the U.S. itself. Second, Washington felt its position as leader of the free world was being challenged. In light of its intense competition with Moscow, Washington had no choice but to fight back. It is this defensive offense that triggered Mao's strong reaction.

The Whiting analysis was very convincing in shedding light on Mao's motives for deciding to enter the war. However, the analysis was flawed by the inference that the Sino-American confrontation might have been avoided if there had not been miscalculations and an absence of diplomatic channels between Washington and Beijing.

3. Misperception, Miscommunication and Miscalculation

The third major interpretation of the Sino-American confrontation stressed the aspect of misperception. In John W. Garver's critique: "Among American scholars, over the last ten or fifteen years a paradigm of mutual misperception has gained near dominance in the study of Sino-America relations in the 1950s. According to this paradigm, there was no fundamental clash of American and Chinese interests in Asia in the early 1950s."⁴⁸

⁴⁸ John W. Garver, "Polemics, Paradigms, Responsibility, and the Origins of the U.S.-PRC Confrontation in the 1950s," *The Journal of American-East Relations*, Vol. 3 (Spring 1994): 1.

Zhang Shuguang's argument is typical. He attributes the conflicts between the United States and China to pure misunderstanding, misperception and confusion. "To recount what happened," Zhang intended "to probe into how each side's misunderstandings of the motives and actions of the other paved the way to conflict and crisis; how the conflict of interests, rooted in the Cold War context, furnished and reinforced the misperceptions; and how cultural differences concerning national security and, more important, ignorance of these differences on the part of each state's policymaker caused and enhanced the likelihood of military conflict."⁴⁹ Zhang stated his argument clearly:

Here we have not an aggressor and a defender, but two defenders. Both China and the United States perceived the other as the aggressor state attempting to overturn the status quo, always ready to expand its sphere of influence at the expense of its opposite number. As a result, both relied on deterrence rationality to influence the other's behavior. In retrospect, we can see that neither state had the aggressive intentions that the other so consistently attributed to it. There is no evidence that the United States sought to expand its sphere of influence in Asia by attacking the Chinese mainland, nor is there any indication that Beijing authorities ever sought to eliminate U.S. influence by encroaching on the non-communist countries in the region. Each side misjudged the other, both in the short and long term.⁵⁰

Michael Hunt makes a similar argument: "Misperception, miscalculation, and confusion were prominent, perhaps dominant features of the policy process on *both* sides. Beijing and Washington came to the crisis with attitudes that were ambivalent, even contradictory, and as each explored options ranging from inaction to all-out assault their view did not so much clarify as shift messily about."⁵¹ William Stueck in his book *The*

⁴⁹ Zhang Shuguang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949 - 1958* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p.9.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.2.

⁵¹ Michael H. Hunt, "Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950 - June 1951," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 107, No. 3 (1992): 477.

Korean War: An International History also held the same position that “The war is laden with miscalculation on all sides.”⁵²

The misperception paradigm did a good job of displaying detailed interaction between Washington and Beijing before their final confrontation. True, there was misperception, misunderstanding and confusion on both sides, and these elements escalated the suspicion and tension between Washington and Beijing. Misunderstanding alone, however, could not have led to three years of brutal conflict if the two opponents’ interests had been compatible.

The inference behind the misunderstanding interpretation is that there was no fundamental clash of American and Chinese interests in Korea. Therefore, the Sino-U.S. confrontation could have been avoided if this misunderstanding were to be solved. To understand whether there was a conflict of interest, we need to analyze the concepts of national security and interests of Washington and Beijing respectively.

What was the definition of the national security in the minds of policy makers in Washington and Beijing? The national security and national interest of both Washington and Beijing included sphere of influence, credibility and image. Washington and Moscow had divided their own spheres of interest at the end of World War II. The United States was regarded as the leader and defender of the free world. Any Communist offensive in America’s sphere of influence would be considered a challenge to her own national security. Even though Kim Il Sung looked at Pyongyang’s attack as an internal affair of Korea, the Truman administration treated it as a Communist conspiracy to expand its sphere of influence in Asia. Moreover, credibility and image also played a very important

⁵² William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995,) p.353.

role in America's national security. Dean Acheson made it clear that Pyongyang's invasion

was an open, undisguised challenge to our internationally accepted position as the protector of South Korea, an area of great importance to the security of American-occupied Japan. To back away from this challenge, in view of our capacity for meeting it, would be highly destructive of the power and prestige of the United States. By prestige I mean the shadow cast by power, which is of great deterrent importance. Therefore, we could not accept the conquest of this important area by a Soviet puppet under the very guns of our defensive perimeter with no more resistance than words and gestures in the Security Council. It looked as though we must steel ourselves for the use of force.⁵³

Acheson believed that few countries in Asia would come to the aid of the United States in a polarized world if Washington's credibility was damaged because of its failure to defend its allies under the threat of the Communist camp. He thought that a domino reaction would take place in the whole of Asia, if the United States could not stop this invasion. There was no way for the United States to stand by in the face of Kim's military challenge.

One action caused another. First, Washington's military action in Korea, Taiwan and Indo-China triggered Mao's long-term suspicion that the United States would interfere with China's revolution directly sooner or later on behalf of the Guomindang [GMD] forces. Second, Beijing's national security was not simply bounded by the territory of the mainland of China. North Korea was part of China's national security, since it was regarded as a buffer area essential to the security of Manchuria and economic development of China. Traditionally, China needed friendly neighbors. This need became more urgent in the environment of the Cold War. China could not concentrate on her economic development if a friendly neighbor were to be replaced by a hostile and

powerful enemy. Under such a threat, Mao's logic for dealing with the Korean crisis and his will to fight were somewhat comparable to John F. Kennedy's logic for coping with the Cuban crisis in 1962. Third, Mao's regime had not yet established its legitimacy among the Chinese people. Mao's failure to stop the challenge in Korea would not only cause him to lose face, but more seriously it could threaten his mandate as leader. Mao's enemies and those hostile and suspicious social groups would take advantage to make trouble to the new regime. Worse, Soviet forces might take the opportunity to reenter Manchuria in the name to protecting China. The goal of the CCP revolution to drive out all the foreign occupations would become an illusion. In conclusion, the threat experienced by both Washington and Beijing was broad and substantial. Pyongyang's military invasion of South Korea jeopardized the national security of the United States. Based on the same logic, Washington's blockade of the Taiwan Straits and its crossing the 38th parallel and marching toward the China border pushed Mao and his regime into a corner. It was this solid and concrete threat that led to the Sino-U.S. fight.

Zhang Shuguang mentioned correctly that neither the U.S. nor China were aggressors in Korea. It is true. But we need to understand the Sino-U.S. confrontation from a larger perspective, namely, the conflict between the two frameworks of the national independence movement and the Cold War. It was the national independence movement after WWII that stimulated Kim Il Sung to initiate his attack against South Korea. However, Kim's action of unifying Korea challenged Washington's national security in both Washington's sphere of interest and its prestige as leader of the free world. The Truman administration had no other choice but fight back. Washington's

⁵³ Dean Acheson, *Present At the Creation: My Years In the States Department* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company. Inc., 1969), p.405.

defensive measures became an offensive action that provoked Mao's reaction. The U.S.-China confrontation was not a spontaneous accident, but a step-by-step process of escalation of the war. The first step was Pyongyang's attack of Seoul. The second step was Washington's involvement into the internal struggle between N. Korea and S. Korea. Mao's decision to enter the war was the third step in response to Washington's blockade of the Taiwan Straits and march toward the Yalu border. Each later step was a reaction to the previous step. From this perspective, this Sino-U.S. clash in Korea was beyond the control of either Truman or Mao.

4. Mao's Challenge toward the Domination of the United States

Chen Jian, another U.S. based Chinese scholar, proposed this interpretation by attributing Mao's decision to enter the war to his commitment to continuous revolution. In his argument, Stalin and the Soviet Union became more interested after the Yalta Conference in maintaining the status quo than exporting revolution because Moscow had become "an insider of the big-power club."⁵⁴ However, the establishment of Mao's PRC had the effect of "breaking the Yalta system."⁵⁵ Therefore, "from its birth date, Mao's China challenged the Western powers in general and the United States in particular."⁵⁶ "How to prevent the continuous revolution from losing momentum emerged as one of Mao's major concerns."⁵⁷ Mao's seizing power in China was only the first step. This revolution "aimed at transforming China's state, population, and society, and

⁵⁴ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p.4.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.4.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.4.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p.11.

simultaneously reasserting China's central position in the world.”⁵⁸ In order to find the means to spur his Party and mobilize the masses, Mao realized that the adoption of a revolutionary foreign policy had great relevance. In this scenario, the outbreak of the Korean War became a good opportunity, in Mao's eyes, to realize his desire.⁵⁹

Chen used the following concrete evidence to support his argument. “From 1949 to 1950, in meetings with North Korean leaders. Mao made it clear that the CCP supported the Korean revolution but hoped that the Koreans would not initiate the invasion of the South until the PLA had seized Taiwan. In the meantime, during Mao's 1949-50 visit to the Soviet Union, the CCP chairman shared with Stalin his belief that it was unlikely for the United States to involve itself in a revolutionary civil war in East Asia, thus enhancing Stalin's determination to back Kim's plans to attack the South. Furthermore, from summer 1949 to spring 1950, the Chinese sent 50,000 to 70,000 ethnic Korean PLA soldiers (with weapons) back to Korea. As a result, Mao virtually gave Kim's plan a green light.”⁶⁰

But other evidence points toward different conclusions. Kim Il Sung dispatched his representative, Kim Il, to visit China from late April to early May 1949, attempting to win Mao's support for Pyongyang's plan for unification.⁶¹ Kim Il met Zhu De and Zhou Enlai four times and Mao once. After Kim Il raised the issue of unifying Korea through military means, Mao tried to dissuade him from taking such action. Mao argued that the CCP's troops were far away in Southern China fighting against Jiang's army, whereas Douglas MacArthur could transfer troops and weaponry from Japan to Korea very

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.7.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p.11.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p.54-5.

quickly should a war break out there. Mao asked the Northerners not take any action until the international situation became more favorable. Finally, Mao made it clear that he had to gain Moscow's permission before he could support Pyongyang's military plan.⁶²

The telegram sent to Gromyko through Grigorii Ivanovich Tunkin, charge d'affairs of the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang, on 14 September 1949, confirmed the information mentioned above. When Tunkin asked Kim Il Sung how the Korean people would regard the fact that the Northerners started a civil war, Kim told him that such a military action would face a very negative response among the people. Then he mentioned the reasons why Mao told his representative, Kim Il, in May 1949, not to launch a military operation. First, Pyongyang would place itself in a disadvantageous position politically. Secondly, the CCP could not provide them with efficient aid because Mao's armies were still occupied with fighting the Chinese civil war.⁶³

In May 1950 Kim Il Sung visited Beijing to inform Mao that Stalin had granted him permission to invade the South. The meeting again revealed Mao's caution, as Mao decided to halt the discussion immediately when Kim told him about this new information. He needed to confirm whether what Kim said was true or not. It was obvious Mao doubted what Kim had said. Otherwise, he would not need to ask Stalin for confirmation. In a telegram to Stalin on May 13, 1950, N. V. Roshchin, Soviet Ambassador in Beijing, reported that Zhou Enlai, on behalf of Mao Zedong, had paid an urgent visit to him at 11:30 that night. Zhou requested Roshchin to clarify whether Stalin

⁶¹ Shen Zhihua, *Mao Zedong, Stalin yu Chaoxian Zhanzheng* [Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War], (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books Ltd., 1998), pp.210-11.

⁶² Shen Zhihua, "Zhongguo Chubing Chaoxian de Juece Guocheng," in *Dangshi Yanjiu Ziliao*, No. 1, 1996.

⁶³ "Ciphered telegram from Tunkin to Soviet Foreign Ministry" (in reply to telegram of September 11), 14 September 1949, *CWIHP Bulletin*, Issue 5 (Spring 1995) p.7

had said: “North Korea can move toward action,” because “the present situation has changed from the situation in the past.”⁶⁴

Mao received Stalin’s reply the following day clarifying that in a conversation with Korean comrades, Filippov [Stalin] and his friends expressed the opinion that, in light of the changed international situation, they agreed with the proposal of the Koreans to move toward reunification. In this regard a qualification was made, that the question should be decided finally by the Chinese and Korean comrades together, and in case of disagreement by the Chinese comrades the decision on the question should be postponed.⁶⁵ Mao had no more excuse to say no when he realized the implication of the message: he would be blamed if Kim’s attempt at unification was dropped simply because of his disagreement.

Already in 1949, Stalin had asked the CCP to take more responsibility to guide and support socialist revolutionary movements in Asian countries. Stalin argued that the CCP had more experience of transforming Marxism and Leninism into practice in Asia and proposed a division. He should take more responsibility in the West while Mao should influence countries in the East.⁶⁶ As leader of the largest Asian socialist revolution, Mao felt very hard to oppose a brother party’s request for national unification and independence. Marshal Peng Dehuai recalled that “Mao disagreed with Kim’s proposed action but had no way of opposing or stopping it.”⁶⁷ In fact, Kim did not treat Mao’s opinion seriously at that time, since he had already gained Stalin’s approval to attack the South.

⁶⁴ “Ciphred telegram from Roshchin to Filippove” 13 May 1950, *CWIHP Bulletin*, Issue 4, p.61.

⁶⁵ “Ciphred telegram from Vyshinsky to Mao” 14 May 1950, *ibid.*, p.61.

⁶⁶ “Liu Shaoqi’s Telegram to the Central Committee of the CCP,” See Shen Zhihua’s *Mao Zedong, Stalin yu Chaoxian Zhanzheng*, pp.134-5.

Now let's look at the second issue raised by Chen. During Mao's visit to Moscow, Stalin told him about Kim's military plan to unify the whole of Korea and he asked Mao whether the United States would participate in this conflict if a war should break out between the North and the South. After some thought, Mao said: "The Americans might not come in because this is Korea's internal affair, but the Korean comrades need to take America's intervention into account." Shi Zhe, Mao's interpreter during his Moscow visit, recalled that Mao had reservations about Kim's plan.⁶⁸

Chen regards it as an evidence that Mao supported Kim's invasion plan because Mao did not turn down Kim's military proposal during his talk with Stalin in Moscow. But this issue can be understood in the following way. On the one hand, it was Mao's consistent position that the Kim-Rhee conflict was "a Korean internal affair," which was not very different from the civil war in China. Mao "had anticipated that Kim Il Sung would attack the South no matter what happened."⁶⁹ Mao did the same thing when Stalin tried to prevent him from crossing the Yangtze River during the Chinese civil war. On the other hand, Mao did reveal his concern that the United States might come in if a civil war should break out in Korea. That was why he did not fully support Kim Il Sung's offensive proposal at that time.

As a mature politician, Mao stressed one aspect and underemphasized the other in different situations. The reason why he emphasized the possibility of America's non-intervention was that he had just asked Stalin to provide his troops with military materials, particularly Moscow's air cover for his Taiwan campaign. Stalin would have

⁶⁷ Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners*, p.146.

⁶⁸ Chen Jian interviewed Shi Zhe in August 1992. See Chen's *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press), p.88.

had an excuse not to meet his request had Mao given much consideration to the possibility of Washington's intervention. Therefore, Mao's answer was instrumental and tactical in that situation.

The following ciphered telegram from P. Yudin, Soviet Ambassador to China, also reveals the fact that there was no a consensus between Stalin and Mao to support Kim's military plan of invasion during Mao's Moscow visit. Mao complained to Yudin in a conversation that "On the Korean question, when I was in Moscow [in December 1949-January 1950] we came to an understanding about everything. The issue was not about the seizure of South Korea, but about the significant strengthening of North Korea. But subsequently when Kim Il Sung was in Moscow, some kind of agreement was reached, about which no one considered it necessary to consult with us before hand." Mao continued: "It should be noted that there was a serious miscalculation in the Korean war about the supposed impossibility of intervention of international forces on the side of South Korea."⁷⁰

The third issue that Chen brought out was the CCP's sending a great number of Korean Chinese soldiers back to North Korean in 1949 and 1950. We must trace the origin of this case and its context to understand the real. In talking with Mao in May 1949, Kim Il asked the CCP to return all Korean-Chinese soldiers who had joined the CCP's armed forces during the Anti-Japanese War and the Chinese civil war. Mao gave a very positive response to this question. He also added that China would provide these soldiers with military equipment, if a war were to take place between North and South

⁶⁹ Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: the Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp.87-8.

⁷⁰ 20 April 1956, "ciphered telegram, excerpt from cable from Soviet Ambassador to the PRC P. Yudin re meeting with Mao Zedong," *CWIHP Bulletin*, Issues 6-7, p.83.

Korea. The reason Mao agreed was that the soldiers in question were ethnic Koreans. China had no reason to retain them when their own countrymen wanted them back. But a stronger reason for Mao to return all these soldiers to North Korea was that he gained an impression from Kim Il that Rhee's army would invade the North soon. Kim Il had told him that the American troops planned to withdraw from Korea soon and that Pyongyang was afraid that Japanese troops would come in. The Southerners might make use of Japanese troops to attack Northerners. Mao expected that these Korean-Chinese soldiers would strengthen Kim's ability to resist Rhee's predictive invasion from the South. With a pessimistic view about Pyongyang's situation in mind, Mao even suggested that the DPRK abandon some territory before the South's attack in order to preserve its military force. Particularly, Mao warned that North Korea should not take the initiative to attack the South. Otherwise, Pyongyang would fall into a disadvantageous condition politically, and it should not expect Beijing's military aid due to the CCP's own civil war at that time.⁷¹ Thus two divisions totaling 20,000 ethnic Korean soldiers returned to Korea in July 1949.⁷²

When Mao during his stay in Moscow heard of Kim's request for more troops and Stalin's fear that Kim's regime might collapse due to Rhee's presumptive invasion, Mao proposed to "transfer some 14,000 Korean Chinese from the PLA to the North Korean army."⁷³ With the permission of the CCP Central Committee, these soldiers returned to Korea in the spring of 1950.⁷⁴

⁷¹ "Ciphered telegram from Kovalev to Fillipov," 18 May 1949, Ed. Shen Zhihua, *The Korean War: Declassified Documents from Archives in Russia*, (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2003), 1:189-190.

⁷² Ibid., p.51-2.

⁷³ Goncharov's *Uncertain Partners*, p.144.

⁷⁴ Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1982), p.744. Also see *Uncertain Partners*, p.140 and Chen Jian's *China's Road to the Korean War*, p.88 and his *Mao's China and the Cold War*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p.55.

In addition to Mao's interest in having these Korean soldiers strengthen Pyongyang's military force, Mao had other motivations. Lin Biao, Commander of the Fourth Field Army, had reported to Mao that some ethnic Korean soldiers complained and asked to return to Korea when they were marching toward Southern China. Lin suggested that these soldiers be sent back to Korea, because the Chinese civil war was almost over. Mao relayed Lin's report to Moscow. In a cable dated January 8, 1950 the Soviet Foreign Ministry asked Shtykov to find out Kim's opinion about this issue.⁷⁵ Shtykov met Kim Il Sung the following day and told him about Beijing's suggestion. Kim said that he hoped that these soldiers would be transferred to the People's Army of Korea. He planned to organize these soldiers into one division and two regiments, and the rest into a motor regiment. Kim hoped that the Chinese government would allow them to stay in China till April, since Kim needed time to find a place to station these troops. Kim told Shtykov that he would soon send three representatives to Beijing to talk about this issue.⁷⁶

Another element linked with transferring the Korean-Chinese soldiers to Korea was China's own financial problems. The direct military spending on military actions took 60 percent of the CCP's budget in 1949. The rate would be larger taking into account all the indirect military supplements.⁷⁷ Feeling a heavy financial burden, the CCP Central Committee asked its troops to take part in economic production as early as December, 1949. The CCP raised the issue of cutting back a large number of its troops in

⁷⁵ "Ciphred telegram from Soviet Foreign Ministry to Shtykov," 8 January 1950, Shen Zhihua, *The Korean War: Declassified Documents from Archives in Russia*, 1:128.

⁷⁶ "Ciphred telegram from Shtykov to Soviet Foreign Ministry" 11 January 1950, *ibid.*, 1:281

⁷⁷ Chen Yun, "Kefu Jingrong he Jingji de Yanzhong Kunnan" [Overcome Serious Difficulties of Financial and Economic Condition], and "Faxing Zhengfu Gongzai, Jianshao Jinrong Chizhi" [Issue Government Bonds to Reduce Financial Deficit], *Chen Yu Wenxuan, 1926-1949*, [Selected Works of Chen Yun, 1926-1949] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1984), pp. 2, 6 and 34.

April 1950, when the Chinese civil war was over. The Military Demobilization Committee was established in May 1950. Therefore, it would be doubly advantageous to meet Pyongyang's request for returning Korean soldiers in China.

Generally speaking, Mao's ambiguous attitude toward Kim's proposed plan reveals that he was not interested in Kim's military campaign of unification either before or after the founding of the People's Republic of China, even though he had to consent to support Kim under pressure from Stalin and Kim. Later Mao commented on how a "consensus" was reached between Stalin, Kim and himself: "It is a chariot of three horses. Two horses pushed hard forward. The third one [referring to China] had no choice but be dragged forward."⁷⁸ From this point of view, he was more nationalist than internationalist. What he was concerned with most was not international revolution but the survival of his own new regime. As a historian, Mao knew very well what it would mean if North Korea, a friendly neighbor, were to be at a war. It was the issue of Korea, a tributary state of China, in the 1890s that had led to the military confrontation between China and Japan in 1894. China was humiliated by her defeat in that war. Mao could readily appreciate that China might face a clash with the United States, if war should break out in Korea.

Despite these concerns, Chen emphasized again in the conclusion of his Chapter 4 that Mao's motive to enter the war was "the CCP leadership's desire – and Mao's desire in particular – to use the challenge and the threat brought about by the Korean crisis to cement Communist control of China's state and society, as well as to promote Communist China's international prestige and influence."⁷⁹ Yet, the PRC's own domestic priorities were challenging enough to keep its cadres on full alert, not to mention the

⁷⁸ *The Journey of An Ice-Breaker*, documentary television series from Phoenix Television Station, Oct. 20, 2004.

coming Taiwan and Tibet campaigns. Actually, Mao changed his mind four times as to whether and when the CCP should intervene in the Korean War, because of China's inferior and America's superior military forces at that time.⁸⁰

Thus it is surprising that since the 1990s it has become a growing trend to highlight the aggressive elements of Chinese policy since the 1990s. Andrew Scobell mentioned this change in his article "The China Challenge: Soldiers, Statemen and Strategic Culture," "Interpretations of the logic behind China's decision to enter the Korean conflict have shifted from emphasizing Beijing's reluctance and caution to stressing Beijing's enthusiasm and recklessness."⁸¹ This interpretation might be affected the Tiananman Incident in 1989, the significant growth of China's economy and military strength and constant tensions between Beijing and Taiwan.

5. The Sino-U.S. Confrontation - A Greek Tragedy

In contrast to the paradigm of the third interpretation of misunderstanding, Steven Goldstein advanced the case for the near inevitability of the Washington-Beijing conflict. In his article "Sino-American Relations, 1948 to 1950: Lost Chance or No Chance?" Goldstein argued that the Sino-American conflict "from 1948 to 1950" was "a Greek tragedy" where "characters seem inexorably driven to a final end due to circumstances

⁷⁹ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, p.116.

⁸⁰ Mao made decision to dispatch Chinese troops into Korea on October 2, 5, 13 and 18 respectively. Chapter VI will give specific description to show what factors made Mao change his mind again and again.

⁸¹ Andrew Scobell, "The China Challenge: Soldiers, Statemen, Strategic Culture," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 8, No. 22, Nov. 1999. John Lewis Gaddis also shared Chen's view. In his book *We Now Know*, Gaddis argued that the ideology of communism was Mao's primary consideration for entering the war. In Gaddis' eyes, "Mao, unlike Stalin, views this challenge as an opportunity." By killing "hundreds of thousands of Americans, the Chinese army would demonstrate that the Chinese people had 'stood up,' thereby consolidating the revolution at home, advancing it abroad..... Intervention in Korea was, thus, an investment in geopolitical, ideological and personal credibility." p.160. This view also appeared in these works: "Shuguang Zhang's Mao's Military Romanticism and Michael Sheng's "Beijing's Decision to

beyond any individual's control.”⁸² In another article “Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States: Opportunities and Constraints, 1944 - 1950,” Goldstein pointed out that: “As the United Nations troops moved north, the CCP became increasingly alarmed. The fears the Party had been nurturing for years that the United States would attempt to overcome the Chinese revolution by means ranging from internal subversion to a massive invasion seemed about to be realized. Despite Washington's assurances that its intentions were not aggressive, the Chinese Communists entered the Korean War. Given their perception of the United States, there were little likelihood of their following any other course.”⁸³

To trace the reasons for the “Greek tragedy,” Goldstein posits two patterns of Mao's perception of the United States: “the United Front Paradigm” and “the Teheran Paradigm.” The united front was a strategy that Mao adopted during the war against Japan, when the whole of China was under direct threat from the Japanese invasion. Based on the principle of the united front, the CCP could work with the Nationalists and the United States as allies when they were facing a common foe. But the United States was only treated as temporary ally, since it was an imperialist power and might become an obstacle to the Chinese revolution by supporting the Nationalists after Japan was defeated. Mao believed that the CCP should readjust its position whenever Washington began to intervene in China's internal affairs.

Enter the Korean War: A Reappraisal and New Documentation,” *Korean and World Affairs* 19 (2), (Summer 1995), pp.294-313.

⁸² Steven M. Goldstein, “Sino-American Relations, 1948 to 1950: Lost Chance or No Chance? in *Sino-American Relations, 1945 - 1950: A Joint Reassessment of A Critical Decade*, ed. Harry Harding and Yuan Ming (Wilmington: SR Books, 1989), p. 120.

⁸³ Goldstein, “Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States: Opportunities and Constraints, 1944 - 1950,” *Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947 - 1950*, ed., by Borg, Dorothy and Heinrichs, (Waldo, New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 270.

After 1943 the Teheran paradigm, in Mao's eyes, promised CCP-U.S. cooperation in the post-war period. At the Teheran Conference, Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill pledged to "work together in the war and the peace that will follow."⁸⁴ Earl Browder, the leader of the American Communist Party held an optimistic view that the war-time cooperation between the Soviet Union and other capitalist countries would continue when the war was over. His belief was based on the assumption that progressive forces under the leadership of President Roosevelt would be in a dominant position in the United States. To show his sincerity toward working with the progressive forces in the United States, Browder formally abolished the American Communist Party. Even though Mao disagreed with Browder's domestic policy, he shared Browder's view of post-war world affairs. Mao believed the CCP did not need to choose one side in the post-war period since great power cooperation was the main current of the world. The Dixie Mission and Hurley and Marshall mediations seemed to confirm Mao's optimistic view.

However, the Teheran paradigm fell apart at the beginning of 1947 due to Washington's increasingly pro-Jiang stand. From then on distrust and hostility set the tone of the CCP-U.S. relationship. Based on the mutual suspicion and antagonism for two years before the outbreak of the Korean War, Goldstein inferred there was little likelihood of the CCP's following any other course but to fight when the UN troops marched toward the Yalu.

These studies provide an important contribution to the Korean War scholarship. However, Goldstein's interpretation has not been recognized by scholars of the "lost chance" and the Korean War in as much as few articles or books have treated his understanding as a major interpretation to explain the CCP's decision to enter the Korean

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 124.

War.⁸⁵ This may be because Goldstein's articles did not deal directly with the Korean War or because his conclusion was regarded as a hypothesis which would need more detailed analysis and textual verification.

My analysis therefore will focus on the origins and rationale for this "Greek Tragedy" hypothesis. In addition to the historical suspicion and hostility between the U.S. and the CCP which Goldstein has elaborated, I will also introduce an international factor: the conflict between the independent movement and the constraints of the Cold War. Thus, the Sino-U.S. confrontation in the Korean War becomes more a historically-determined event.

Chapter I is the literature review of the scholarship on Mao's foreign policy and the Korean War.

⁸⁵ Chen Jian in his book *China's Road to the Korean War* gives a summary of the scholarship on the Korean War. He classifies the literature on the Chinese intervention into three major interpretations. The first one is that "Western scholars, strongly influenced by the intensifying Cold War, generally viewed China's entrance into the Korean War as a reflection of a well-coordinated Communist plot of world-wide expansion, believing that the entire international Communist movement was under the control of Moscow, and that neither Beijing nor Pyongyang had the freedom to make their own foreign policy decisions." The second one is Allen S. Whiting's *China Crosses the Yalu*. Whiting makes it clear that "Beijing's management of the Korean crisis was based primarily on the Chinese Communist perception of America's threat to China's national security." Influenced by the wake of the American debacle in Vietnam, the normalization of Sino-American relations, and the declassification of new archival documentation, the third groups of scholars on the Korean War "paid more attention to Chinese Communist Party leaders' concerns for China's national security as the decisive factor underlying their decision to enter the Korean War." Some scholars, including a large majority of Chinese scholars, "speculated that if UN forces had stopped at the parallel China would not intervened." Actually, the third interpretation here is not much different from Whiting's conclusion. Chen Jian himself provides the fourth interpretation which attributes Chinese intervention to Mao's desire to restore China's past glory and maintain revolutionary momentum.

Michael Hunt in his essay "Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950 - June 1951," and Rosemary Foot in her article "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade" [*Diplomatic History*, v. 15, (Summer 1991)] and Allan R. Millett in "The Korean War: Historiography," in *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (March 2001) list almost all major Western, Chinese and S. Korean literature on the Korean War which has been published since the 1960s. John Lewis Gaddis in his latest book *We Now Know* also mentioned many scholars on the Korean War. As to why Mao decided to enter the Korean War, Chen, Hunt, Foot and Gaddis have almost mentioned all the scholarship on the Korean War. However, they seem to have overlooked Goldstein's two articles.

Chapter II traces the historical and ideological roots of Mao's world view as it developed from Mao's teenage years to 1944. It argues that Mao and his generation were greatly impacted by China's anti-imperialist tradition since the Opium War. The sinocentric mindset could explain why Mao and his generation set up a historical mission to regain China's previous glory through driving imperialist countries out of China. The Leninist ideology seemed to provide Mao and his generation with the means to reach their ends because of its anti-imperialist characteristics. Marxism-Leninism and the history of the Soviet Union became the CCP's spiritual and institutional model. The ideology of Marxism-Leninism introduced a new worldview to Mao. Based on this new worldview, Mao regarded the competition between the CCP and the GMD as a part of the international struggle between the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union and the capitalist camp under the leadership of the United States. Washington was regarded as the most dangerous proponent because of its pro-GMD stand and its powerful military strength.

Chapter III deals with Mao's personal contacts with the American government from 1944 to 1945. The focus is Mao's interaction with the Dixie Mission and Ambassador Patrick Hurley. One well-accepted theory is that Mao had the illusion of a possible CCP-U.S. cooperation because of his pleasant contacts with the Dixie Mission. This illusion was broken because of Hurley's anti-Mao and pro-Jiang position. Many scholars blamed Hurley for his alienation of Mao and the CCP, which led to the lost chance hypothesis. This chapter will demonstrate that Mao was very concerned even from the very beginning about contacts with the American government. Based on its analysis of Washington's post-war strategic objectives in China, Mao and the CCP

leadership recognized the limits to cooperation between Yanan and Washington. Shortly after, Ambassador Hurley's pro-GMD and anti-CCP position confirmed Mao's original assumption that America's strategic objectives were incompatible with those of the CCP. The impact of the long telegram from the CCP Southern Bureau in August 1944 and Chen Yi's letter in November 1944 on Mao's American strategy could be regarded as the most important part of this dissertation.

Chapter IV analyzes the Marshall mission and Mao's reaction. The Marshall mission was Mao's second most important personal experience with the American government. Even though Marshall was a more skillful and fairer diplomat than Hurley, he failed to convince Mao to join a coalition government with Jiang at the cost of the CCP. This chapter will elucidate how these two missions impacted Mao's perception of the United States and ultimately resulted in Mao's anti-American position.

Chapter V focuses on the interaction between Mao's CCP and the Truman administration from 1947 to 1950. Even though Washington pursued a disengagement policy and Mao cautiously neutralized the U.S., they failed to reach an accommodation. This chapter attributes this tragedy to a fundamental clash between Mao's anti-imperialist revolution momentum and American counter-revolution offensive in which the former intended to break the old world order and the latter sought to maintain the status quo.

Chapter VI addresses the collision between the People's Republic of China and the United States (PRC-U.S. hereafter) in the Korean War. The emphasis of this chapter is on which elements led to Mao's decision to enter this war. Many scholars have stressed how difficult it was for Mao to make a decision to enter the war. This chapter explains how difficult it was for Mao *not* to enter the war.

Chapter VII concludes by outlining how the Chinese anti-imperialist tradition since 1840 and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism shaped Mao's world view in general and Mao's perception of the United States in particular. It will also review how Mao's understanding of the United States impacted his U.S. policy and his determination to confront the United States in the battlefield of Korea.

In summary, this study focuses on two factors: Mao's American strategy as a chronological line; and the clash between the historical trend of the national independence movement and the constraints of the Cold War as horizontal circumstances. Briefly speaking, Mao's American strategy with the integration of three parts of China's anti-imperialist tradition, Marxist-Leninist ideology and Mao's personal experience with the United States convinced Mao that a U.S.-CCP conflict, in the form of intervention and anti-intervention, was to happen under certain circumstance sooner or later. The clash between Pyongyang's provocative campaign for national unification and Washington's defensive fight to terminate North Korea's communist regime seemed to justify Mao's perception that a CCP-U.S. confrontation was coming. To deal with such unavoidable clash, Mao decided to meet the American troops in Korea. Thus a chain reaction between Kim's invasion for national unification, Truman's defensive response to guard Washington's national security and Mao's long-term suspicion of the United States, led to the war's tragedy and costly outcome.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF MAO'S WORLDVIEW

Mao's worldview in general and his perception of the United States in particular were largely impacted by China's anti-imperialist tradition since 1840, and the ideology of Marxism and Leninism. These two elements reinforced each other. On the one hand, it was his historical mission of overthrowing imperialism in China and his attempts to find a means to meet this end that led him to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. On the other hand, Marxism-Leninism provided Mao with a theoretical and spiritual weapon and integrated the Chinese revolution into the world communism movement. This chapter will describe and analyze these two factors and see how they shaped Mao's worldview, particularly, Mao's perception of the United States.

The Historical Sources of Mao's Worldview: Pre-Marxist Nationalism

The sinocentric mindset of the Chinese elite was smashed by the challenges from the West starting with the Opium War in 1840. China became a semi-colonial country and suffered "a century of humiliation, defeat and exploitation."¹ It became a mission for the Chinese elite to eliminate this national disgrace. Anti-imperialism in the history of modern China turned into a tradition and a catchword to rally the masses.

Born in 1893, Mao shed light into this pattern. As the result of the Sino-Japanese War, China lost her suzerainty over Korea and had to cede Taiwan to Japan after the failure in the Sino-Japanese War. Mao was seven years old when foreign powers occupied

¹ Hugh Dean, *Good Deeds & Gunboats: Two Centuries of American-Chinese Encounters* (San Francisco: China Books & Periodicals, 1990), p.2.

Beijing in 1900. After each defeat, the Qing government paid huge indemnities and suffered endless humiliation. Mao was aware, as were all Chinese of his generation, of all the ills caused by the invasions from the West and a Westernized Japan. From his early teenage years, he determined to devote himself to the cause of ending the disgraceful treatment to which China had been subjected. He read *Warnings to the Seemingly Prosperous Age* by Zheng Guangyin, a famous patriot and reformer, and this shaped his determination to stop farming and to continue his education in order to find a way to save China.² He also read a brochure entitled *The Danger of Imperialist Partition of China* four years later. The first sentence "Alas, China will be subjugated" hit him with the realization that each citizen was responsible for the prosperity and decline of his own country.³

The first test of resolve came in 1915 with Japan's Twenty-One Demands. The Chinese government's weak-kneed response precipitated a nation-wide protest. Shi Rongshan, a teacher at Hunan's First Normal Institute, was so enraged that he published a book entitled *Shame* to describe Japan's ambition to subjugate China. Mao was deeply affected by this book and wrote on its cover: "May 7th, National Shame-Day. Who can avenge our hatred? We students and scholars!"⁴

The following year, Mao expressed his worries about Japan's ambitions toward China in his letter to a close friend, Xiao Zisheng: "Japan is the most threatening enemy to China. It is incredible that China, with its huge land and four hundred million people, can be subjected by a little island country with only a population of thirty million....China cannot survive if she does not want to launch a war against Japan within twenty years. It is a great pity that our

² *Mao Zedong Nianpu* [Chronology of Mao Zedong, hereafter Mao Nianpu], (Beijing: Zhongyan wenxian chubanshe, 1993), 1:8. Also see Li Rui's *Sanshixui Qiande Mao Zedong* [Mao Zedong before the Age of Thirty] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1994), p.25.

³ *Ibid.*, p.28.

fellow countrymen are still sound asleep and pay no attention to the threat from the east [Japan]."⁵ History proved Mao's vision to be correct. The Japanese army began to seize Manchuria in 1931. Six years later an all-out invasion was launched.

Mao was eager to find a group of friends who shared his intense desire mission to save China. He published an advertisement to invite young men to meet him, and ready to make sacrifices for their country. Five or six students contacted Mao, two of whom, Luo Zhanglong and Li Lisan, later became prominent CCP leaders.⁶

Mao felt it necessary to establish a larger and more closely knit organization in order to gather more patriots together. He founded the New People's Study Society on April 14, 1918 when he was 25 years old. Its mission was to "introduce new thoughts, cultivate character and purify our souls." Later almost half of the 13 original members became the CCP's leaders.⁷

Following the May Fourth Movement of 1919, Mao helped establish the Hunan Student Union in Hunan Province on May 28, 1919. This organization called for an immediate province-wide student strike immediately to protest the treaties signed at the Versailles Peace Conference. The Strike Declaration said, "Diplomacy has failed, interior political forces split, the nation is in great danger of extinction.... What is the use of learning without the existence of our own country? From our consciousness of the urgency of the current situation, we students have decided to strike from June 3 on. We will give our full

⁴ Ibid., p.120.

⁵ *Mao nianpu*, 1:24.

⁶ Li Rui, *Sanshixui qiande Mao Zedong*, pp.113-4.

⁷ Li Rui, *Sanshixui qiande Mao Zedong*, p.223.

support to back up our nation's diplomatic action."⁸ This patriotic movement spread very quickly to residents, merchants and workers in Hunan Province.

In order to raise people's consciousness in Hunan, Mao also established *The Xiang River Review*, a weekly journal of the Hunan Students Union, as a vehicle to continue his patriotic anti-imperialist struggle. His articles pointed out that the Versailles Conference was nothing but a meeting for dividing spoils among imperialist countries even though they [Britain, America, France and Japan] wore the mask of equality and national self-determination. Mao predicted that the Versailles Conference would lead to another world war because of the humiliations that the French Government and other Western allies imposed on Germany.⁹

Anti-imperialism was Mao's repeated theme. In Mao's eyes, modern Chinese history was a history of China's subjugation into semi-colony and then colonial oppression as the result of imperialist aggression. The nature of China's modern history determined that the targets of the Chinese revolution should be imperialism and "feudalism."¹⁰ Of these two revolutionary targets, imperialism was the foremost and most ferocious enemy.¹¹ It was China's anti-imperialist tradition dating from the Opium War and her mission of salvation that nurtured Mao's thinking. Mao was a nationalist by 1919. His ideal to this period was a utopian society as described by Confucian scholars and Kang Youwei, a leader of the 1898

⁸ Li Rui, *Sanshixui qiande Mao Zedong*, P.343.

⁹ Ibid., p.356.

¹⁰ "Feudalism" in China is a very different concept in Europe. In China feudalism is a political and social system based on Confucianism. The core of Confucianism is its emphasis on three relations - between ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, in which the latter must obey the former. Hierarchic and authoritarian family patterns embodied in Confucianism provided a basis for social order in political as well as in social life. The role of the emperor and his subjects was only that of the father writ large. Feudalism became an obstacle to any progress in China's modern time. The dominance of warlords and landlords became symbols of feudalism in China when the Qing Dynasty fell in 1911. Warlords were also a symbol of imperialism because their domination in China largely depended on foreign powers.

¹¹ "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1975), II:314-5.

“Hundred-Day Reform”. He knew little about Marxism and he did not mention class struggle, dialectics, the materialist view of history, or proletariat dictatorship in his early articles. Yet it was already clear that Mao had the ambition to help China out of her semi-colonial oppression and restore her previous glories. Edgar Snow picked up on this ambition when he wrote: “There would never be any one ‘savior’ of China, yet undeniably one felt a certain force of destiny in Mao.”¹²

The Impact of Marxism-Leninism on Mao’s Anti-imperialist View

In his research for a suitable means to save China, Mao began to encounter Marxism and Leninism through Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao. These two people had enormous impact on Mao’s thinking. Mao told Snow: “I... admired the articles of Hu Shih [The initiator of the New Culture Movement] and Ch'en Tu-hsiu very much. They became for a while my models, replacing Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Kang Yu-wei.”¹³ Mao also told Snow that: “Under Li Ta-chao, ... I had rapidly developed toward Marxism, and Ch'en Tu-hsiu had been instrumental in my interests in that direction too. I had discussed with Ch'en... the Marxist books that I had read, and Ch'en's own assertions of belief had deeply impressed me at what was probably a critical period of my life.”¹⁴

1920 was a critical turning point in Mao’s ideological development. He went to Beijing in February hoping to help remove Zhang Jinyao, the Governor of Hunan. It happened that Russia’s decision to repudiate the unequal treaties came to China in the spring of 1920. Impressed with Russia’s decision, Mao gave more attention to the Russian Revolution and Marxism-Leninism. “Russia,” in Mao’s mind, was “the number-

¹² Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, (New York: Crove Press, Inc., 1961), p.90.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p.148.

one civilized country in the world.”¹⁵ In June Mao set up a Russian Studies Association. This organization not only held a series of seminars to discuss the Russian revolution, but also sent people to Russia to learn first-hand knowledge of the revolution and organize overseas students to study in Russia.¹⁶

During the summer a debate took place among the members of the New People's Study Society in France. Cai Hesen, a close friend of Mao, attributed the victory of the Russian Revolution to its class struggle and proletarian dictatorship. He insisted that the Russian way was what China should take in the future. Cai advocated establishing a Russian-style party in China because, according to him, it was the only right way to save the country. Xiao Zisheng, one of the founders of the New People's Study Society, preferred a more moderate social reform through education. Both Cai and Xiao wrote letters to Mao to ask him for his opinion. In his reply on January 21, 1921, Mao said, “What you say in your letter [to the effect that China needs a proletarian dictatorship exactly like that in Russia] is extremely correct, there is not a single word with which I disagree.” Then Mao explained, “The reason is that education and the media are in the hands of imperialists, landlords and capitalists. How could this ruling class allow people to make use of the tools of education and the media to launch a social reform to overthrow their rule? Therefore, class struggle and proletarian dictatorship are applicable.”¹⁷ Mao accepted Cai's argument that all socialism must necessarily be internationalist, and should not have a “patriotic colouration.”¹⁸

By late 1920, Mao had become a Marxist. He told Snow:

¹⁴ Ibid., p.157.

¹⁵ Philip Short, *Mao, A Life*, p.102.

¹⁶ Li Rui, *Sanshixui qiande Mao Zedong*, p.459.

In the winter of 1920 I organized workers politically for the first time, and began to be guided in this by the influence of Marxist theory and the history of the Russian Revolution. During my second visit to Beijing I had read much about the events in Russia, and had eagerly sought out what little Communist literature was then available in Chinese. Three books, especially, deeply carved my mind, and built up in me a faith in Marxism, from which, once I had accepted it as the correct interpretation of history, I did not afterwards waver. These books were *the Communist Manifesto*, translated by Chen Wang-Tao and the first Marxist book ever published in Chinese; *Class Struggle*, by Kautsky; and a *History of Socialism*, by Kirkup. By the summer of 1920 I had become, in theory and to some extent in action, a Marxist, and from this time on I considered myself a Marxist.¹⁹

Mao's intellectual searching drew to a close when he found his faith in Marxism and his mission to set up a communist society in both China and the world.

Grigory Voitinsky, dispatched by the Bolshevik Party's Far Eastern Bureau, helped Chen Duxiu establish a Communist Group, a Socialist Youth League and a journal *Gongchandang* [the Communist Party] in Shanghai. He also helped draft the Party Manifesto in 1920. That same year Chen entrusted Mao to set up a communist group in Hunan. The following July, Mao participated in the founding conference of the Chinese Communist Party on behalf of the Hunan Communist Group. As a communist member and a revolutionary leader, Mao was not only constrained by, but also made contribution to, the CCP's orthodoxy.

How Mao Made Marxism Chinese

Mao was a faithful student of Marxism-Leninism and he sincerely believed that Russia's today was China's tomorrow. However, Mao's experience told him that "Any ideology - even the very best, even Marxism-Leninism itself - is ineffective unless it is

¹⁷"Mao's Letter to Cai Hesen," *Mao Zedong Shuxin Xuanji* [Selected Letters of Mao Zedong], (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983), pp.3-4.

¹⁸ Stuart Scharam, *The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.28.

linked with objective realities, meets objectively existing needs and has been grasped by the masses of the people.”²⁰

Treating the Comintern’s proposal to set up a united front with the GMD in 1922 as a betrayal of the CCP revolution, Mao stood on the side of Chen Duxiu to reject this suggestion. However, the failure of the Beijing-Hankou Railway Strike in 1923 forced Mao to realize the weakness of the proletariat in China. Therefore, he became an active supporter for Maring’s [his real name is Henricus Sneevliet] proposal to set up a united front with the Nationalist Party at the Party’s Third Congress in 1923.²¹

The CCP sensed a possible GMD-CCP split in 1926, the Central Committee of the CCP requested Moscow for 5,000 rifles to arm its own peasant force in 1926. But this request was rejected by Stalin because he was afraid that this action might cause mistrust of the GMD. Stalin insisted that the CCP maintain the united front with the GMD at all costs before this break.²² Mao and other Chinese Communist leaders learned their first hard lesson from Jiang Jieshi’s coup on April 12, 1927. This lesson told Mao that Moscow’s instructions were not always correct.

At the urgent conference on the 7th of August. Mao expressed his opinion about the failure of the united front. First, He pointed out that the lesson the CCP had learned was that the Party had only paid attention to mass movements and ignored military force

¹⁹ Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China*, p.155.

²⁰ Mao Zedong, “Bankruptcy of Idealist Conception of History,” in *Selected Works of MaoTse-Tung*, IV:457.

²¹ Maring was dispatched by Lenin to set up a united front between the CCP and the GMD in 1922. Because of his advocate to Maring’s proposal, Mao was elected to the Central Bureau [politburo] of the CCP at the Third Congress. He was also elected as an alternate member of the GMD Central Executive Committee in 1924 and he became acting minister of the GMD Propaganda Department in 1925.

²² Philip Short, *Mao A Life*, (New York: A John Macrae Book, 1999), pp.189-190. Stalin turned down the CCP’s proposal in March 1927 to have uprising against the right wing of the GMD. See “Stalin’s Speech on the Chinese Revolutionary Situation at the Moscow Bolshevik Activists Conference” in *Dang de Wenxian*, No. 6, 2001, p.68.

in the past. He made it clear, “From now on we should pay the greatest attention to military affairs.... Political power is obtained from the barrel of a gun.”²³ The meeting resolved to respond to the GMD’s military force with the CCP’s military force. It would launch a land revolution, set off uprisings in Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong and Jiangxi. Qu Qiubai replaced Chen Duxiu in the CCP leadership, and Mao was elected as an alternate member of the Politburo.

Following these decisions, insurrections in the four provinces mentioned above broke out. All of these efforts failed including Mao’s uprising in Changsha. The united front had collapsed, and the uprisings in big cities had also fizzled. It was clear that the Chinese revolution could not follow the pattern of the Soviet Union. In Mao’s mind, the only way to preserve the revolutionary force was to go to the mountains and establish a revolutionary base area there, since the backward countryside was the weakest link in imperialist and warlord domination. With this new understanding of the Chinese revolution, Mao established and maintained a Soviet Republic of China in the mountains of Jiangxi from 1931 to 1934.

Why did Mao take what might have been his final stand amongst impoverished peasants? As early as 1923 Mao had grasped the importance of the peasantry. In the Third Congress of the CCP, he said: “The number of workers in Hunan is very small. Members of the GMD and the CCP are even smaller. But peasants are everywhere.” Based on the history and the current situation of China, Mao concluded: “Peasants are a very important revolutionary force.... If the CCP pays attention to the peasant movement and draws peasants to be involved in the CCP’s revolution, the result will be very

²³ Li Weihai, “Wodui Baqi Huiyi de Huiyi, [In My Memory of the August 7th Meeting] in *Dangshi Yanjiu*, No. 4, 1980, p.70, also see Jin Congji, *Mao Zedong Zhuan* [The Biography of Mao Zedong], (Beijing:

different.”²⁴ Mao’s involvement in the peasant movement in 1925 convinced him that that was a real revolutionary force that could determine China’s future.²⁵ In the article “The Chinese Revolution and the Peasant Movement” in 1926, Mao pointed out that “the matter of peasants was the key issue of the Chinese revolution. The Chinese revolution would not succeed without peasants’ participation.”²⁶ In his “Report on An Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan” in 1927, Mao anticipated that millions of peasants would enter the revolution in a short time. Nobody could stop them. All the imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials, landlords, local tyrants and evil gentry would be swept into their graves by the peasants’ movement.²⁷

From the failure of the urban uprisings and his revolutionary experience in Jiangxi, Mao realized the linkage between armed struggle, land revolution, and the revolutionary base areas. The land revolution could not be launched or the base areas established without armed struggle. The Red Army could not obtain support from peasants or the base areas consolidated without the land revolution. Thus the Red Army had no place to operate, and the fruits of the land revolution could not be maintained without the base areas.

But at that time Mao’s political line and military strategy were strongly challenged when the Provisional Central Committee of the CCP led by two Returned Students from Moscow moved its headquarters to Jiangxi from Shanghai in 1932.²⁸ The

Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1996), I:139.

²⁴ Jiang Xianzhi, *Mao Nianpu*, I:114.

²⁵ *Mao Nianpu*, I:144.

²⁶ Jin Chongji, *Mao Zedong Zhuan*, I:117.

²⁷ “Report on An Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, I:24 and 117.

²⁸ The CCP held its Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Congress in January 1931, and Wang Ming and Bo Gu, two Returned Students, seized the power of the CCP. The term of Returned Students refers to a special group of the CCP who received their political education in Russia. These people enjoyed privileges in the

Returned Students regarded Mao's policies as heresy. They criticized Mao for having made the following mistakes, for lack of a firm stand on class, for being too soft toward rich peasants, for poor military strategy, and for failure to expand the base area.²⁹ A three-man group of Bo Gu, Zhou Enlai and Otto Braun became the highest authority of the CCP. Braun took Mao's military power into his own hands. Zhang Wentian, another Returned Student from the Soviet Union, replaced Mao as Chairman of the Soviet Republic. Before long Mao's strategy of defensive guerrilla war was replaced by offensive position warfare in 1934. The Red Army was boxed in and forced to embark on the calamitous Long March.

By the time the Red Army arrived in Zunyi in January 1935, its numbers were already reduced from 84,000 to 30,000. In the eyes of many top leaders Mao's unorthodox political policies and military strategy began to look persuasive. Through Mao's persuasion, Wang Jiaxian and Zhang Wentian decided to shift allegiance to Mao. In the enlarged Politburo meeting on January 15 and 17, 1935, not only Wang and Zhang, but also Zhou, criticized Bo Gu and Braun's errors. Mao was elected to the Standing Committee at the Politburo and from then on Mao was in effect the final authority, even though he was in name only the assistant of Zhou Enlai.³⁰ The base-building experience in the Jiangxi Soviet Republic and the military strategies that broke Jiang's first four encirclement campaigns gave Mao confidence to overcome the difficulties the CCP had sustained. Under his leadership The Red Army survivors limped into Northern Shaanxi in October 1935.

CCP because of their learning experience in Russia and their connections with Russian leaders. Actually, according to Mao, the dogmatism of these people, brought huge damage to the CCP's revolution.

²⁹ Jin Chongji, *Mao Zedong Zhuan*, 1:270-1

³⁰ Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism*, pp.20-1.

By then the situation in both the world and in China had changed dramatically. In the West, Fascist movements had seized control of Germany and Italy. In China, Japanese troops had crossed the Great Wall and invaded Hebei. The Japanese government had then demanded that the Chinese government cede five provinces; Hebei, Shangdong, Shangxi, Charharl, Suiyuan and three cities, Peiping, Tianjing and Qingdao to the Japanese troops.

Facing this increasing Fascist threat, the Soviet Union proposed to establish a unite front with Western democratic countries in the Comintern's Seventh Congress. In this situation, as Goldstein pointed out, Mao realized that China's domestic politics was not only linked to the international environment but actually affected by foreign powers. Mao needed to know how to understand and, where possible, to manipulate the international environment to expand the influence and advance the cause of the revolution as well as reduce pressure from the GMD.³¹ Therefore, Mao decided to follow the Comintern's instruction to establish a united front both at home and abroad. The CCP held an enlarged Politburo meeting in Wayaobao from December 17 to 25, 1935. Based on the new world situation and the Comintern's directive for a united front, the CCP decided to "combine the revolutionary war and the national anti-Japanese war together."³² Mao gave a report "On the Policies against the Japanese" on December 27. He pointed out that class relations had changed after Japan's invasion of China. Not only workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie were a basic anti-Japanese force, but the national bourgeoisie would also join the anti-Japanese war. Even big bourgeoisie and landlords

³¹ Goldstein, "The CCP's Foreign Policy of Opposition, 1937-1945" in ed. James C. Hsiung & Steven I. Levine, *China's Bitter Victor: The War with Japan 1937-1945*, (New York: M.E. Shaper, Inc., 1992). P.107.

³² Jin Chongji, I:377.

might split in the face of this new situation, since they belonged to different imperialist camps. The Party must oppose “closed doorism” and bring together all the classes to fight the Japanese. The Party also agreed to change the Workers, Peasants and Soldiers Soviet Republic to the Soviet People’s Republic in order to set up a national united front. However, Mao continued to target Jiang as the CCP’s enemy and excluded him from the united front, because Jiang’s priority at that time was to destroy the CCP through military means.³³

Then the Xi’an Incident irrupted on December 12, 1936 during the nation-wide anti-Japanese atmosphere in China. Mao’s first thought was to put Jiang on public trial when he heard of the news that Jiang had been placed under house arrest by Generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng.³⁴ Persuaded by the Comintern’s argument that the disappearance of Jiang from political stage would cause chaos in China and offer the Japanese more opportunity to defeat China, Mao decided to accept Moscow’s advice to solve this incident through peaceful means.³⁵ But mindful of the failure of the first united front, Mao insisted on the CCP’s autonomy. After negotiations with Jiang, the CCP won legal status and also maintained the autonomy of its military force and base areas.

Mao’s proposed autonomy within the united front met a challenge when Wang Ming, the CCP’s representative in Moscow, was dispatched to China by Stalin and the

³³ Jiang actively prepared another military invasion of Mao’s base area in Shaanxi at that time. Zhang Xueliang’s Northeast Army of 130,000 was ordered to abandon Manchuria and move to Shaanxi to fight the Red Army. Jiang appointed himself as Commander-in-Chief of this military campaign.

³⁴ Mao said that Zhang Xueliang’s action “takes us out of prison. The Xi’an Incident has revolutionary and historical significance. We should support it.” Then he thought “it would be beneficial to us if we can get rid of Jiang.” He even expected to make Xi’an the center of the war to resist Japanese in China. See Zhang Peisen, “Zhang Wentian yu Xi’an Shibian” [Zhang Wentian and Xi’an Incident], in *Dang de Wenxian* [the Party’s Documents], No. 3, 1988.

³⁵ Yang Kuisong from Chinese Academy of Social Science presents many details to show how the Comintern made Mao change his radical policy toward Jiang in the Xi’an Incident. See his book *Zouxiang Fenlie* [Go to Split], Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co., LTD, 1999, pp.55-7.

Comintern to make sure that the united front went smoothly. Both Dimitrov and Stalin had talks with Wang before his departure. Dimitrov recommended that the CCP adopt a policy that everything should be subordinated and channeled through the national united front. Stalin told Wang to urge Mao to give full support to Jiang's leadership in this war of resistance against Japan.³⁶

In a CCP Politburo meeting in December 1937, Wang Ming conveyed these instructions which obviously conflicted with Mao's plans.³⁷ In a Politburo meeting in Luochuang in August 1937, Mao had stressed that the CCP must maintain its independence in the united front. Facing Mao's unwillingness to yield, Wang argued that the most important issue was "to consolidate and expand the unity between the GMD and the CCP" on the base of "mutual respect, trust, help and supervision." And the principle that the CCP should keep its leading role was only secondary.³⁸ Wang's new political line gained support from Zhou Enlai and Bo Gu. It seemed that Wang would overshadow Mao because of his connection with Stalin and the Comintern. Mao complained later that "my authority did not extend beyond my cave."³⁹

Not only did Mao receive a political challenge from Wang, Wang also questioned Mao's military strategy of guerrilla warfare. Wang was invited to go to Wuhan to meet Jiang after the December meeting. Here he reorganized the Changjiang Bureau to become the CCP's headquarters. Wuhan became a target of the Japanese when Shanghai, Nanjing, and Xuzhou fell into the hands of the Japanese one by one. Wang called on the inhabitants of Wuhan to defend the city just as the Spanish people had Madrid. Wang's

³⁶ Jin Chongji, *Mao Zedong Zhuan*, II:505-6.

³⁷ CCP Central Secretariat, ed., *Liuda Yilai* [Since the Sixth Congress], (Beijing: People's Press, 1980), 1:992-3.

³⁸ See Jing's *Mao Zedong Zhuan*, II:505-9 and Philip Short's *Mao a Life*, p.361.

call to “defend important positions to stop the enemy’s advance” in 1938 reminded Mao of Bu Gu’s slogan, “defend every inch of soviet territory” in 1934.⁴⁰ Mao urged strategic withdrawal, and followed by guerrilla warfare and support from the countryside to wear down the strength of the enemy. As Mao had anticipated, Wuhan was lost in October 1938.

Facing confusing policies between Mao and Wang, the CCP decided to dispatch Ren Bishi, Political Director of the Military Commission, to Moscow to seek further instructions in March 1938. Ren and Wang Jiaxiang, the CCP’s representative in the Soviet Union, provided Stalin and Dimitrov with first-hand information about China’s reality. Stalin and Dimitrov changed their initial proposal and now expressed support for Mao’s policy of insisting on the CCP’s autonomy in the united front. Wang Jianxian returned to Yanan in July bringing with him the news of this change in policy.⁴¹

With Wang’s failure in Wuhan and the stance of the Comintern, Mao was able to establish his leadership in the CCP. He publicly questioned Wang's proposal to subordinate party activities to the united front during the CCP's Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Congress from September 29 to November 6. He charged that subordinated everything to the united front was wrong. “If we have to secure the Kuomintang’s consent beforehand for everything we do, what if the Kuomintang does not consent? Since the policy of the Kuomintang is to restrict our growth, there is no reason whatever for us to propose such a slogan, which simply binds us hand and foot.” The right policy

³⁹ Philip Short, *Mao a Life*, p.362.

⁴⁰ Yang Kuisong, *Zouxiang Fenlie*, p.70

⁴¹ Jing Congji, *Mao Zedong Zhuan.*, II:515.

was both of unity and of independence.⁴² The next day Mao gave another speech on “Problems of War and Strategy.” He claimed that seizure of power by armed force was the central task and the highest form of revolution. Every Communist must grasp the truth that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Whoever wanted to seize and retain state power must have a strong army.⁴³

For Mao, it had been very challenging to deal with relations with the Comintern and with those Returned Students who held key positions in the CCP central leadership.⁴⁴ However, one can conclude that Mao felt that the major failures thus far were connected with the Comintern’s leadership and with the Returned Students. The power and privileges that the Returned Students enjoyed depended largely on their familiarity with Marxist theory and their connections with Moscow. Thus one way for Mao to deal with the Returned Students and with so-called Marxist theorists was to improve his own theoretical capacity to explain the CCP revolution. He began to spend more time on Marxist study. Edgar Snow was very impressed with Mao’s theoretical studies and told the following story. One day, Mao proposed to postpone the talks between himself and Snow because Mao had just received a couple of philosophy books. Mao read these books day and night for three or four days before he was available to talk with Snow. Mao did not confine his reading to Marxist philosophers, but also read writings of the ancient Greeks, of Spinoza, Kant, Goethe, Hegel, Rousseau and others.⁴⁵

⁴² “The Question of Independence and Initiative within the United Front,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, II: 215-6

⁴³ “Problems of War and Strategy,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, II: 219-225.

⁴⁴ Mao was very nervous to give lectures to the CCP Central Committee Carder Institute before the Rectification Campaign. See “Kangsheng’s Report to the CCP Central Committee Carder Institute,” in Yang’ *Zouxiang Fenlie*, p. 112.

⁴⁵ Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China*, (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1961), pp.94-5.

Mao wrote several important articles and booklets from 1936-1937 including “On the Strategy against the Japanese,” “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolution War,” “On Practice” and “On Contradiction.” In these lectures and articles, Mao summarized the lessons of the first united front and the Agrarian Revolution from political, military and ideological perspectives with the aim of demonstrating the transformation of communism in China. Mao’s contribution to Marxism was that he had made Marxism Chinese when he adapted it to the reality of China.

“Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolution War” came from Mao’s lectures at the Red Army University in autumn 1936. Mao pointed out the importance of connecting Marxism with China’s specific conditions:

China’s revolutionary war... is waged in the specific environment of China and so has its own specific circumstances and nature [and]...specific laws of its own... Some people...say that it is enough merely to study the experience of revolutionary war in Russia... They do not see that these... manuals embody the specific characteristics of the ...Soviet Union, and that if we copy and apply them mechanically without allowing any change, we shall...be ‘cutting the feet to fit the shoes’, and will be defeated... Although we must value Soviet experience...we must value even more the experience of China’s revolutionary war, because there are many factors specific to the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Red Army.⁴⁶

Where did knowledge and theory come from? Mao theorized in his article “On Practice,” that knowledge originated in practice and experience. Marxism and Leninism were theories created by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin on the basis of practice, and their general conclusions were drawn from historical and revolutionary reality. But “dogmatists” [meaning Returned Students like Wang and Bo] denied the necessity of practice and experience and replaced it with book-worship. Such people applied recited Marxism to guiding China’s revolution without considering the specific characteristics of

Chinese society. They refused to study Chinese society, therefore, they could not understand the features of the CCP revolution. A revolutionary theory needed to be tested in reality before it could be used to guide a revolutionary movement. Even a valid theory [Marxism-Leninism] still needed development in a new situation.

In his article “On Contradiction,” Mao argued that contradictions existed in every situation. There were many contradictions in the process of the development of a complex phenomenon. The principal one was the one whose existence and development determined the existence and development of the other contradictions. The relationship between the principal contradiction and subordinate contradictions changed at times. All the other relationships changed once a subordinate contradiction became a leading one. To take the Chinese revolution as an example, Mao said that the principal contradiction from 1921 to 1927 was the one between the Chinese people including bourgeoisie and proletariat on the one side and imperialists and their warlord running dogs on the other. This principal conflict led to the first united front between the GMD and the CCP from 1924 to 1927. But Jiang’s betrayal of the revolution resulted in a new principal contradiction between the GMD and the CCP. When Japan launched its war of aggression against China, all China’s various classes could temporarily unite in a national war against the Japanese invaders. That was why the CCP supported the second united front between the GMD and the CCP. However, Mao warned that the proletariat [i.e. the CCP] must pay close attention to the bourgeoisie’s [the GMD’s] political vacillations, and its corrupting and destructive effect on the CCP, in order to guarantee the independence of the Chinese Communist Party.⁴⁷ Readers could infer

⁴⁶ Philip Short, Mao’s lectures entitled “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” in *Mao a Life*, p.356.

⁴⁷ Here is a brief summary of Mao’s works *On Contradiction*.

that the contradiction between the CCP and the GMD would become a principal one once Japan was defeated.

These theories became the foundation for Mao as a Marxist theorist. By 1941, Mao thought it was time to introduce his understanding of the CCP's revolution to his Party through a Rectification Campaign. The theoretical purpose was to summarize the lessons of CCP's history and identify the social historical and ideological roots of past mistakes in order not to repeat similar errors in the future. Mao also hoped the Campaign would help his Party understand the differences between real and fake Marxism. Thus one purpose of the Campaign was to target Wang Ming and his "ultra-leftist deviationist" line which had been influential from 1931 to 1934. The other purpose was to purge those people who resisted to accept Mao as the highest authority of the CCP.

To help the CCP understand the elements and importance of the sinification of Marxism, Mao wrote a series of important articles including "Reform Our Study," "Rectify the Party's Style of Work," "Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing," "Our Study and the Current Situation," and "The Resolution to Some of the Party's Historical Problems."⁴⁸ Mao established his authority as a Marxist theorist after the Rectification Campaign, which greatly strengthened his political power in the CCP.

Even though Mao did not criticize Stalin and the Comintern, his rectification targeting 'rightist' and 'leftist' lines implied his criticism of Stalin and the Comintern's

⁴⁸ Mao wrote *the Resolution to Some of the Party's Historical Problems* in later 1941 as a conclusion to his Rectification of senior leaders. However, this resolution did not achieve consensus among his colleagues. Wang Ming, in particular, refused to accept it. Mao had to set it aside until 1945. Mao set up a committee to rewrite this resolution based on his original draft. Mao's emotional language was taken away. It was passed on April 20, 1945 at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth National Congress. See Hu Qiaomu's book *Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong* [Mao in Hu Qiaomu's Memories], (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1994), pp.306-339.

policies.⁴⁹ For example, it had been Stalin's instruction to "maintain the united front at all costs" which had led to Chen Duxiu's 'rightist thinking' and 'capitulationism.' The failure of the Agrarian Revolution and the loss of the Jiangxi base area had been caused by the political mistakes of Wang Ming and Bo Gu, two Returned Students, and the military strategy of Braun, a representative from the Comintern. It was the instructions of the Comintern that everything be subordinated to the united front that led to Wang's 'rightist error' in 1938. Mao later admitted, "The target of the Rectification was Moscow. We criticized the mistakes of Stalin and the Comintern, but we did not mention their names at all because we did not want to cause any resentment from Moscow."⁵⁰ Another example illustrated Mao's view of the Comintern. When Dimitrov informed the CCP of the decision that the Comintern would come to its end on May 22, 1943 because of the new world situation, Mao called a Politburo meeting immediately to convey this decision to his colleagues. In the directive to the party, Mao said that the CCP leadership had been mature enough to deal with its own problems. The Comintern would be an obstacle to the Chinese revolution if it continued.⁵¹ Based on the report from the Russian liaison in Yan'an, Mao made it known that the Comintern had existed too long. It did not understand the specific conditions and needs of the CCP. Wang Ming told Moscow that Mao and his supporters felt relieved. Mao's hands became free and he would not be bothered by obligations to the Comintern any more.⁵²

⁴⁹ In Mao's opinion, those political lines or policies that failed to reflect the law of the Chinese revolution or they went beyond given situation were called either rightist or leftist lines. Generally speaking, rightist lines means too conservative or too soft toward the CCP's enemy while leftist line refers to those too radical policies.

⁵⁰ Yang, "Mao's Talk with Yugoslavia Delegation," *Zouxiang Fenlie*, pp.158-9

⁵¹ "The Report on the Disband of the Comintern" *Mao Zedong Wenji* [Collected Works of Mao Zedong], (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe), III:20-1.

⁵² Yang, *Zouxiang Fenlie*, pp.143-4.

However, Mao's disaffection with the Comintern does not mean that he did not care about his relationship with Moscow. On the contrary, Mao showed high respect to Stalin and the Comintern and kept close contact with them. For instance, after the Xi'an Incident happened, Mao sent three urgent telegrams to the Comintern in twenty four hours to seek advice.⁵³ After he had received Moscow's suggestion to solve the Xi'an Incident peacefully, Mao dropped his proposal to get rid of Jiang politically. In Stalin's sixtieth birthday, Mao wrote an article to praise Stalin as China's real friend because,

No other country has renounced its privileges in China; the Soviet Union alone has done so. All the imperialists opposed us during our First Great Revolution; the Soviet Union alone helped us. No government of any imperialist country has given us real help since the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan; the Soviet Union alone has helped China with its aviation and supplies.⁵⁴

Here Mao's words were very sincere. We could describe the relationship between Mao, Stalin and the Comintern in the following way. In principle, Mao was a faithful follower of Marxism and Leninism and he never or seldom doubted the final victory of socialism in China. In practice, Mao was very cautious toward the Comintern instructions and policies. Through his revolutionary practice and lessons, Mao realized that Marxism could be prevail in China only when it adapted itself to China's reality. Therefore, Mao kept exploring the conditions of the Chinese revolution and adapting Marxism-Leninism to China's circumstances. Moreover, China's anti-imperialist tradition also impacted Mao's relations with Moscow. Mao could not forget the fact that Russia had participated actively in the invasion and partition of China in the 19th century. In short, Mao could tolerate destructive actions by Stalin when the GMD controlled China, because any

⁵³ Ye Yonglie, *Guogong Fengyun: Mao Zedong yu Jiang Jieshi* [The Competition between the GMD and the CCP: Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi], (Wulumuqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 2000), pp.161-3

⁵⁴ "Stalin, Friend of Chinese People," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, II:335-6.

action at the cost of Jiang's China would benefit the CCP. He could not tolerate Soviet destruction once the CCP became the political leader of China.

In the process of making Marxism Chinese, the CCP gradually became an independent political party and autonomous policy maker. After the Recognition Movement, Mao not only purged his opponents – Wang Ming and his followers--but also established himself as the authority in Marxist theories. The Seventh Congress of the CCP in 1945 formally recognized Mao's theory as Mao Zedong Thought. By then, since the Comintern had been dismissed, institutionally, the CCP did not need to submit to Moscow's authority. Philosophically and theoretically, Mao Zedong Thought became the guiding principal of the Chinese revolution.

The CCP and Mao's Foreign Policy toward the West, Particularly, the United States

The CCP and Mao's foreign policy toward the West, particularly toward the United States, from the birth of the party to 1944 was constrained by its identification with the Soviet Union, its own anti-imperialism tradition, the CCP-GMD relations and international environment.

In the Second CCP Congress in July 1922, the CCP decided to join the Comintern and became a branch of this international organization. The CCP passed a manifesto outlining its basic objectives of eliminating warlords and imperialism and seeking national unity and independence.⁵⁵ This Manifesto not only analyzed the nature of interdependence between the imperialist powers and warlords, it also warned of the danger of the Washington Conference, which made use of the Open Door policy to gather all the

imperialist powers together to exploit the Chinese people effectively.⁵⁶ Actually, this warning was influenced by the Comintern's "Conference of the Toilers of the Far East" in Moscow which was a few months earlier than the CCP's Second Congress. The major goal of the Comintern conference was to criticize the Washington Conference.

In February 1923 the worker movement led by the CCP confronted warlord Wu Peifu. Wu killed Lin Xianqian, the head of Beijing-Wuhan Railway Worker Union, and more than forty workers. The railway worker strike was suppressed ruthlessly. At the same year, the Zhili Clique, a group of warlords, led by Wu Peifu and Chao Kun seized the government of Beijing with the support of Britain and the United States. The CCP attributed these actions to Western imperialist power, particularly, the United States' support. Therefore, Mao himself wrote an article to condemn "America, the most murderous of hangmen."⁵⁷

In 1924 the CCP considered that the warlord competition between the Zhili and Fengsi Cliques was actually a struggle between Britain and United States on one side and the Japan and France on the other. The analysis pointed out that Washington was the latest comer in China and it did not have its own sphere of influence. Therefore, the United States attempted to make use of the Dawes Plan to realize its economic control in whole China.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ The CCP Central Archive, "The Decision on the Relations between the International Imperialists and China and the Chinese Communist Party," *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji* [Selected CCP Central Committee Documents], (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, 1988), 1:62-63.

⁵⁶ "The Manifesto of the Second Congress of the CCP," *Ibid.*, 1:106-110.

⁵⁷ The CCP's Position On the Current Situation," in *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji*, 1:175, (Beijing: Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1989.). See extract from an article of July 1923, "The Peking Coup d'Etat and the Merchants," in Stuart R. Schram's *Political Thought of Mao Tse-Tung*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1963), p. 266. Also see Warren I. Cohen's article, "The Development of Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States, 1922-1933," in *Orbis*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1967, p.225.

⁵⁸ "The Manifesto of the CCP on the Current Situation in September" and "The CCP's Opinion on the Current Situation in November" in *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji*, 1:287-294, and 303-308.

In 1925 the May 30th Movement broke out in 1925 after British soldiers fired on demonstrators protesting in Japanese-controlled textile mills. The incident soon grew into a nation-wide anti-imperialist movement. Even though Japan and Great Britain became the major target of this anti-imperialist movement, the United States did not escape criticism. Americans soldiers were condemned as accomplice of Japan and Britain.⁵⁹

One of the CCP's motives for launching the May 30th Movement was to take advantage of this incident to terminate the "unequal treaties." Facing Washington's unyielding position toward China's demand for treaty revision, the CCP Central Committee issued this statement:

In fact, if the United States really has deep sympathy with China's demand to correct the unequal treaties and to do away with extraterritoriality, then it should follow in the footsteps of the Soviet Union by automatically discarding these treaty privileges, and set a good example themselves so as to lead other countries. Why wait for an international conference? Do you not clearly know the result of an international conference?... We have been deceived before and will not be deceived a second time....⁶⁰

Since 1927 the close relationship between the GMD and the United States made Washington the CCP's primary target. Among the three major imperialist countries of Japan, Britain and the United States, the CCP treated the U.S. as the most dangerous enemy. In its report to the Comintern in November 1928, the CCP Central Committee pointed out that Washington actively supported the Nanjing government on the one hand, and on the other, the Chinese comprador bourgeoisie were attractive to America's financial power and they were eager to obtain loans from the United States. The

⁵⁹ "Inform All of the People for the Purpose of Opposing Imperialism's Savage and Cruel Massacre," in *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji*, 1:419-424.

⁶⁰ "Proclaim May Thirtieth Movement as Masses Struggling for National Freedom," in *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji*, 1:426.

conclusion was that the Nanjing government led by Jiang was a national bourgeois power under the influence of the United States.⁶¹

Even though Mao was greatly excluded from decisions on the foreign policy mentioned above before the Zunyi Meeting in late 1935, he agreed with these criticism and attacks. When the Soviet Republic of China was established in Jiangxi in 1931 and Mao was elected to be chairman of this new red regime. Mao, Ren Bishi and Wang Jiaxian were entrusted to draw up a constitution. The core of the foreign policy of this constitution was to drive imperialists and their influence out of China thoroughly and completely.⁶² Again, during Mao's talks with Edgar Snow on the united front in 1936, he expressed great concern about the Western countries' military and financial aid to the Nationalists, because this aid had been directly used to fight against the Communists.

In the past, Nanking has received much help from America, England, and other countries. Most of these funds and supplies have been used in civil war. ...According to a recent article by the banker Chang Nai-ch'i it has cost the Chinese people about \$80,000 for every Red soldier killed by Nanking. Such 'help' therefore does not seem to us to have been rendered to the Chinese people. Only when Nanking determines to cease civil war and to fight against Japanese imperialism, and unites with the people's revolution to organize a democratic national defense government - only then can such help be of real benefit to the Chinese nation.⁶³

After Mao entered the top leadership of the CCP at the Zunyi Meeting in 1935, he began to play an increasingly important role in deciding the CCP's foreign policy from then on. What was Mao's foreign policy toward the West from 1935 to 1944?

Following the Comintern's decision to set up an international united front with Western democratic countries, the CCP Central Committee began to separate Western

⁶¹ The CCP's Report to the Comintern," in *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji*, IV:714-5,

⁶² "Dangshi Ziliao Zhengji Tongxun" [Newsletter on the Collected Materials of the CCP History] in Wang Tingyue's *Queqi de Qianzuo* [The Prelude of the Victory], (Beijing: Shiji zhishi chubanshe, 1995), pp.7-8.

⁶³ Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, p. 103.

powers into different interest groups. It “announced that the communists would cooperate with anyone who would oppose Japanese imperialism - that all who helped would be considered friends.”⁶⁴

Thus after the Xi'an Incident Mao changed his hostile attitude to the Western democratic countries. In his talk with Snow, Mao said that: “Japanese imperialism is not only the enemy of China but also of all people of the world who desire peace. Especially it is the enemy of those peoples with interests on the Pacific Ocean, namely the American, British, French, and Soviet Russian nations.”⁶⁵

Actually, Mao's foreign policy was very changeable from 1937 to 1941 because of the confusing international politics. Goldstein divided Mao's foreign policy at this time into three periods: (1) from the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War until July-August 1939; (2) from the summer of 1939 until June 1940; (3) from June 1940 until June 1941. Mao's changes back and forth could be understood as arising from his view of Soviet foreign policy, his views regarding the foreign policies of the United States and Great Britain, and his prescriptions for Chinese foreign policy.⁶⁶

After Japan's out-out invasion on July 7, 1937 the CCP called for anti-Japanese pacts and mutual military aid from all countries opposed to Japanese aggression. Mao made it clear that these countries referred to the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States. But even in this situation, Mao made a distinction between the Soviet Union and non-Fascist Western countries in the anti-Fascist united front. The Soviet Union, in Mao's eyes at this time, was the most reliable, powerful and capable friend.

⁶⁴ Cohen, “The Development of Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States, 1934-1945,” *Orbis*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1967.

⁶⁵ Snow, *Red Star over China*, p.103.

Britain, the United States and France were regarded only as momentary allies. Even though Mao was eager to gain material and moral assistance from the West, he kept alert to their intentions in case they took advantage of the war to endanger China's territorial integrity and administrative sovereignty.⁶⁷

The Munich Agreement reached between Britain, France, Germany and Italy in September 1938 implied the failure of Stalin's collective security with the Western democratic countries. Stalin told his Party on March 10, 1939 that since 1937 the West had experienced another economic depression. An imperialist war had started because of intensive competition for markets and raw materials.⁶⁸ Now Stalin began to define the competition between the Fascist bloc and the British and French bloc as an imperialist war.

The situation at home seemed also very gloomy in 1939. Domestically, Wang Jingwei and a group of GMD high officials began to prepare to surrender to Japan.⁶⁹ Jiang gave more attention to "restrict Communism, corrode Communism and combat Communism" when Tokyo tried to split the alliance between the GMD and the CCP.

Abroad, Britain began to adopt an appeasement policy toward Japan after Germany increased its military action in Europe. Mao thought the CCP would be under attack from both the Japanese troops and Jiang's army should a "Far Eastern Munich" take place. Therefore, on July 29, 1939, the CCP urged resistance to the possibility of a "Far Eastern Munich." Mao gave such a warning on June 30, 1939 when he heard of a

⁶⁶ Goldstein, "The CCP's Foreign Policy," in Levine's *China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937-1945*, p.108.

⁶⁷ "Policies, Measures and Perspectives for Resisting the Japanese Invasion," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, II: 17.

⁶⁸ Stalin's speech to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on March 10, 1939 in Chinese translation in *Jiefang* [a weekly journal of the CCP], no. 74, June 25, 1939.

⁶⁹ Wang surrendered to Japan and established a puppet government in Nanjing on March 20, 1940.

projected Pacific international conference being organized between Britain, the U.S., France, the GMD and Japan. It seemed that the treaty reached between Britain and Japan on July 24 proved Mao's prediction. The CCP immediately issued a statement to denounce this treaty.⁷⁰ With all these changes, Mao began to look at world politics based on Stalin's analysis.

The Soviet-German Non-aggression Treaty caused a shock to the world and to China as well. But Mao expressed support for this treaty because of the Munich Agreement in Europe and the "Eastern Munich" between Britain and Japan. Mao justified Moscow's action in this way: "the treaty has shattered the intrigues by which the reactionary international bourgeoisie represented by Chamberlain and Daladier sought to instigate a Soviet-German war, and has broken the encirclement of the Soviet Union by the German-Italian-Japanese anti-Communist bloc, ...in the East it deals a blow to Japan and helps China; it strengthens the position of China's forces of resistance to Japan and deals a blow to the capitulators."⁷¹

When the Second World War broke out, Mao described this war as "an unjust, predatory and imperialist war" and refused to support either side, the Anglo-French or the German.⁷² Mao suggested, "In the name of neutrality, U.S. imperialism is temporarily refraining from joining either of the belligerents so as to be able to come on the scene later and contend for the leadership of the capitalist world."⁷³

However, as far as the Moscow-Tokyo Non-Aggression Treaty was concerned, Mao expressed a positive attitude. He looked at this treaty from two perspectives. First,

⁷⁰"The Instruction against an Eastern Munich" *Zhonggong Zhongyan Wenjian Xuanji* (Selected Works of the CCP Central Committee), (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991), 12: 150-1.

⁷¹ "Interview with a Correspondent" *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, II:263.

the interests of the Soviet Union and China's national liberation were identical. This treaty was beneficial to both the national security of the Soviet Union and to China [the CCP] since the Soviet Union was the headquarters of the Communist movement in the world. The CCP's security would be guaranteed if Moscow were safe.⁷⁴ Secondly, Moscow no longer needed Jiang's military forces to draw the Japanese threat away. Jiang, on the other hand, had to rely on Moscow's continuing military and financial aid. Therefore, Jiang could not ignore Moscow's warning not to attack the CCP military forces and its base areas. In Mao's own words, "The Soviet Union gained its freedom from the Moscow-Tokyo Non-Aggression Treaty. It would be more difficult for Jiang to surrender to Japan and to attack the CCP."⁷⁵

Instead, Mao felt very nervous about Washington's minute aid to the GMD Nationalist government. The United States began to support Jiang's anti-Japanese efforts after the failure of the talks between Washington and Tokyo in 1940. Considering the rapidly changing world situation, Mao predicted on September 10, 1940 that there were three possibilities for China's anti-Japanese war. First, Jiang was eager to draw the United States into the war against Japan. Washington would greatly increase its military support and financial aid to Jiang's national government if it participated in the war. Second, Jiang would have to continue his pro-Soviet policy if the United States did not join the war, because at that time most of Jiang's foreign aid came from the Soviet Union. So Jiang would not break from the CCP as long as he maintained his pro-Soviet position. Third, the Japanese army might seize Chongqing. As a result, part of Jiang's troops

⁷² "Identity of Interests between USSR and Mankind," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, II:277.

⁷³ "Interview with A Correspondent" *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, II:265-6.

⁷⁴ "Identity of Interests between USSR and Mankind," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, II:281-2.

⁷⁵ *Mao Nianpu*, pp.287-8

would surrender and part of them would continue their resistance. China would be thrown into more chaos. The advantage of the third possibility was that the GMD would be destroyed. What worried Mao most was the first development because Washington's involvement in the war would obviously reinforce the strength of the GMD troops. In Mao's mind, it would be better if Jiang were defeated by Japan than if Japan was defeated by the United States. Mao revealed his worries in his telegram to Zhou on October 25, 1940:

The darkest scenario is that.... the U.S. Navy concentrates its force and defeats the Japanese Navy and Japan surrenders to the U.S. and the Japanese Army withdraws from China. [Then] the United States will arm China's pro-Anglo-American clique financially and militarily, and China will become an American colony instead of a Japanese one and the GMD-CCP cooperation will be replaced by a large-scale civil war. Nothing else could be more gloomy than that.⁷⁶

Mao delivered a warning again in May 1941 after the New Fourth Army had been ambushed by the Nationalists at the beginning of the year. In an inner-Party directive, Mao said: "A compromise between Japan and the United States at the expense of China and the creation of a Far Eastern Munich against communism and against the Soviet Union - such is the new plot which is now being hatched by Japan, the United States and Chiang Kai-shek. We must expose this plot and fight it."⁷⁷ Mao's anti-West position did not change until the Soviet Union was invaded by Germany.

⁷⁶ The CCP's Central Archive, "Mao's Prediction on the International and Domestic Situation and Correspondent Instructions," *Wannan Shijian Ziliao Xuanji* [Wannan Incident Material Collection], (Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1982), p. 34. Also see *Zhou Enlai Nianpu* [Chronology of Zhou Enlai]. Ed. By Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushe, (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1989), p.576.

⁷⁷ "Expose the Plot for a Far Eastern Munich," *Selected works of Mao Tse-Tung*, III:27.

Even though Mao's long-term experience and his class prejudice told him that he could not and should not trust the West. Germany's sudden attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 made Mao reconsider the nature of the Second World War and the political and military strategies he had previously adopted. The CCP's revolution in China might not succeed if the Soviet Union were defeated by Germany. Mao made up his mind to establish an international united front with the Western democratic countries. In its resolution "On The International United Front Against Fascism" on June 23, the Political Bureau of the CCP claimed that: "the task now is to mobilize the people of all countries and organize an international united front to fight fascism and defend the Soviet Union, defend China, and defend the freedom and independence of all nations." In order to win this war, the CCP called on the Chinese people to "unite against the common foe with everybody in Britain, the United States and other countries who are opposed to the fascist rulers of Germany, Italy and Japan."⁷⁸

In order to clarify the confusion and misunderstanding among the CCP members, Mao gave a new definition to World War II which he had earlier denounced as an evil imperialist war:

"Under present conditions, no matter whether they are imperialist states or the capitalist class, all who oppose Fascist Germany, Italy, and Japan and aid the Soviet Union and China are good, helpful, and just. All who aid Germany, Italy, and Japan and oppose the Soviet Union and China are bad, harmful, and unjust. By these standards, Great Britain's past war against Germany, America's action in aiding the Soviet Union, Britain, and China, as well as a possible American War against Germany and Japan are not imperialist in nature, but just, and all of these are welcome."⁷⁹

⁷⁸ "On the International United Front against Fascism," *ibid.*, III:29.

⁷⁹ "The Detective on Drawing All the Anti-Fascist Countries and Peoples," *Zhonggong Zhongyan Wenjian xuanji*, (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991), 13:164.

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill declared their determination to stop the spread of Fascism in the world in the Atlantic Charter on August 14, 1941. The CCP published its "Statement on Current International Events" five days later. The statement declared that an international anti-Fascist front had been established when America joined the war on the side of anti-Fascist countries.⁸⁰

Japan's sudden attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 signified the completion of the international anti-Fascist united front. Mao no longer had any fear of the possibility of a compromise between Japan and the United States at the expense of China. Mao issued the "Directive on Establishing the Pacific Anti-Japanese United Front" immediately after the Pacific War broke out. He instructed CCP members to cooperate with Britain and the United States closely in their efforts to fight the Japanese and to protect American and British people in the occupied areas.⁸¹

The CCP was clear that Washington needed a unified China and efficient military strength to tie up a large number of Japanese forces in the China theater. Mao hoped that his party could take advantage of this situation to achieve three results. First, the CCP intended to constrain Jiang's anti-CCP activities through the influence of the United States. Secondly, the CCP desired to be recognized by the U.S. as an anti-Japanese ally. Thirdly, the CCP was even eager to obtain some military aid from the U.S. In their talk with John Carter Vincent and John Stewart Service in November 1942, Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao expressed their view that "foreign influence (obviously American) with the Kuomintang is the only force that may be able to improve the situation (of internal

⁸⁰ "The CCP's Statement on the Current International Events," Ibid., 13:194.

⁸¹ "The CCP's Instruction on the Anti-Japanese United Front," Ibid., 13:251-2.

disunity).⁸² Moreover, Zhou and Lin requested “some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist army as a participant in the war against fascism... [and] a proportionate share of American supplies sent to China.”⁸³

In establishing a good image with the anti-Japanese Western allies, the CCP managed to invite or meet with foreign journalists, scholars and officers either in Yanan or in Chongqing. From 1936 to 1944, Edgar Snow, Colonel Evans Carlson, James Bertram, Helen Foster Snow, Philip Jaffe, Agnes Smedley, Owen Lattimore, T. A. Bisson, John Carter Vincent and John Stewart Service, to name a few, had the opportunity to talk directly with CCP leaders. Many of them gained the impression that the CCP represented the interests of the Chinese people. What they struggled for was no more than to reform Jiang’s corrupt government. The anti-Japanese Allies could expect cooperation from them during and after the war.

The CCP’s efforts to woo the anti-Japan Western Allies were effective. After the Southern Anhui Incident in early 1941, Currie claimed in February that Washington could not continue its military aid to China if a civil war broke out between the GMD and the CCP. Before his departure for the U.S, Currie again urged Jiang to reform the government.⁸⁴ In the summer of 1943, George Marshall met Song Ziwen, China’s Ambassador to Washington, and revealed his concern about China’s domestic situation after he received Stilwell’s report about Jiang’s military action against the CCP.⁸⁵ Later Stilwell demanded that Hu Zongnan withdraw his military blockade of Yanan. Vice President Henry Wallace, as FDR’s representative, visited China and delivered the

⁸² *FRUS*, 1943, China p. 197. See Goldstein’s “The CCP’s Foreign Policy, in ed. Hsiung Levine, *China’s Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937-1945*, p.121. Also see Mao’s Telegram to Liu Shaoqi,” on July 31, 1942, *Mao Nianpu*, p.396.

⁸³ *Zhou Nianpu*, p.542.

message that Washington did not want to see a contrast between Jiang's aggressive anti-CCP activities and a passive anti-Japanese attitude.⁸⁶ The CCP's activities to enlist the U.S. to restrain Jiang's anti-CCP policy was, in Niu Jun's words, "the most successful diplomatic action of the Party during wartime."⁸⁷

Did Mao really change his anti-Western views? Actually, Mao expressed his concern over a possible threat from the United States from time to time. In a Politburo meeting on July 30, 1942, Mao showed his fear toward the United States. The Fascist countries would be defeated at the end of the Second World War. The United States was likely to become a giant. All those Fascist countries had to depend on the United States after the war. It is very possible for the U.S. to dominate the world.⁸⁸

In 1944 the GMD troops suffered heavy losses from the all-out attack of the Japanese army. In early June the CCP held a Politburo meeting to discuss this situation. Mao predicted four possibilities in the near future: First, the strength of the GMD would diminish under the blows of the Japanese armies. However, the GMD would recover with help and aid from the United States. Second, Jiang would refuse to surrender even though his weak position was unchanged. Third, a split would take place in the GMD with some surrendering and some maintaining their resistance. Finally, a complete surrender of the GMD would occur. Mao leaned toward the first possibility. Actually the CCP must prepare to seize major cities before the GMD and the United States could do so. Whoever controlled key cities would dominate

⁸⁴ Jin Congji, ed., *Zhou Enlai Zhuan*, [Biography of Zhou Enlai], (Beijing: Remin chubanshe, 1989), p.491.

⁸⁵ *USFR*, 1943, China, p.97.

⁸⁶ Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism*, p.78. Also see Goldstein's "the CCP's Foreign Policy," *China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937-1945*, pp.118-122, and Hunt's *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*, pp.148-158.

⁸⁷ Niu Jun, *Cong Yanan Zouxiang Shijie*, [From Yanan to the World] p.135.

⁸⁸ *Mao Nianpu*, II:396.

China. In Liu Shaoqi's words, "the first would be the ruler and the second would only be the subject."⁸⁹

Despite the changes in Mao's attitude toward the West, class struggle remained Mao's guide to understanding the world as well as China. From the point view of class struggle, the security of a nation-state was not as important as who controlled that state. Any state ruled by the bourgeoisie and landlords was an enemy and any state under the leadership of the proletariat was a friend. Mao supported the Soviet-Germany Non-Aggression Treaty and the Moscow-Tokyo Non-Aggression Treaty based on this understanding. He viewed the security of the Soviet Union and that of the CCP as identical. The safety of the Soviet Union guaranteed the safety of the CCP. From the perspective of class struggle, Mao felt very nervous and worried about Washington's military and financial aid to China during the Sino-Japanese War even though it was good for China. The reason why Mao feared the aid from the U.S. was because it went to the hands of Jiang, a past and future enemy.

Cohen argued that the CCP's opposition to the United States was not fair and reasonable:

Among the Powers, the United States simply did not interfere in Chinese affairs to the extent that Japan and England did. It had no sphere in which its influence prevailed. There were too few examples of its imperialist behavior, too few threads with which to weave a strong fabric of hatred. But the United States was nonetheless a capitalist country; regardless of how small the scale on which it operated, how great its reluctance and sense of guilt, the United States was one of the imperialist powers-and as such, a member of the enemy camp.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Yang Kuisong, *Zouxiang Fenlie*, p.174.

⁹⁰ Warren I. Cohen, "The Development of Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States, 1922-1933," *Orbis*, Vol. 11, No. 1, p.236.

That was the point. The United States had revealed its influence and potential power because of its decisive role in the First World War. Its increasingly close connection with the GMD became of increasing concern to Mao and his colleagues. From Mao's perspective, his enemy's friend must be his enemy.

Conclusion

In his early years, Mao used to be a strong nationalist with a historical mission to drive all imperialists out of China and restore China's prominent position in the world. Why did Mao and his CCP colleagues select Marxism-Leninism as their ideological guidance to realize their mission? In Mao's retrospect, "The reason why Marxism-Leninism has played such a great role in China since its introduction is that China's social condition call for it, that it has been linked with the actual practice of the Chinese people's revolution and that the Chinese people have grasped it."⁹¹ Not only, in their eyes, did this ideology reveal the root of China's suffering since the Opium War, but also it showed them how to reach their ends. Moreover, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism provided them with a new worldview. This worldview divided the world into two camps between socialist society and capitalist society. It also made Mao an internationalist. Regarding the CCP revolution a part of the world communist movement, Mao identified the Chinese revolution with the Russian revolution and China's fate with that of the Soviet Union.

Mao never doubted the guidance of Marxism and Leninism, but revolutionary practice told him that whether Marxism-Leninism could win or not depended on whether

⁹¹ Mao Zedong, "Bankruptcy of Idealist Conception of History," in *Selected Works of MaoTse-Tung*, IV:455-6

it could adapt itself to the realities of a given country or society. The reason why Marxism became dominant ideology in Russia was because revolutionary leaders there combined Marxism with Russia's reality. In the same way, Marxism and Leninism must match China's reality. From his experience, Mao concluded that the strategies that led to the success of the Russian revolution could not guarantee success in China. Therefore, he treated the strategies, policies and instructions from Moscow and the Comintern critically. Mao would accept them if they matched the conditions of China and if they could benefit his revolution. Otherwise, he would resist or ignore them. Mao's efforts to make Marxism Chinese won the label of "Margarine Communist" among Russian leaders. His resistance to Stalin's instructions also led Stalin to distrust him.

But Mao never gave up his objective to get rid of the Western powers out of China. We could say that Mao's adoption of the united front policy was an extension of China's diplomatic strategy of checking barbarians through barbarians [yi yi zhi yi]. Different revolutionary objectives in different historical periods determined who would be the primary enemy of the CCP. Great Britain and Japan were regarded as the CCP's primary enemies in the 1920s because they suppressed industrial labor strikes. Then Japan was targeted as the most dangerous enemy after its all-out invasion of China in the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s. Because of its support for the Nationalists, the United States was increasingly highlighted as the most threatening enemy later. To deal with the CCP's major enemy, Mao was willing to make friends with his less threatening opponents. That is why the CCP adopted an international united front with Britain and the United States when they were facing the same foe. However, Mao's treatment of the Western democratic countries was conditional and expedient. As Goldstein pointed out:

“Mao advocated that China should seek two kinds of alignments - one with the Soviet Union based on a joint commitment and a shared world view, the other with the Western powers based on transitory shared interests in opposing Japanese aggression.”⁹² The Former counted more than the latter.

⁹² Steven M. Goldstein, "The CCP's Foreign Policy" James C. Hsiung & Steven I. Levine, ed., *China's Bitter Victory* (New York/London: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1992), p. 109.

CHAPTER III

MAO'S REACTIONS TO THE HURLEY MISSION, 1944-1945

The period from late 1944 to late 1945 was a critical and confusing time for the CCP, marked by Japan's last all-out offensive and her sudden surrender. It was during this time that the American government sent missions to approach the CCP and the Soviet Union sent forces into Northeast China. Washington, Moscow, Chongqing and Yanan had to readjust their policies based on their strategic objectives and military and political conditions in this transitional period. How to deal with the tangled relations between the United States and Moscow, the United States and the CCP, the Soviet Union and the CCP, and the GMD and the CCP was a huge challenge for Mao and his Communist colleagues. Among these complicated relations, the interaction between Mao and Hurley forms the focus of this analysis. As far as the CCP-U.S. relationship was concerned, Mao's position shifted from cautious hope to disappointment and growing hostility, with momentous consequences for U.S.-China relations.

Mao's Mixed Attitudes to the Dixie Mission

On June 28, 1944, Mao was very excited when he was told that President Roosevelt would dispatch an American military mission to visit Yanan. In Mao's mind, if the United States were to work together with the CCP it meant that the Yanan regime would be recognized by the world. Once he received the news, Mao instantly sent a telegram to welcome such a military mission. On July 4, he also instructed *Jiefang ribao* [Liberation Daily] to write an editorial entitled "Celebrating American Independence Day-A Great Day of Liberty and Democracy". This editorial expressed the CCP's support for America's foreign

policy: "The foreign policy under the leadership of President Roosevelt and Vice President Wallace advocates a unity among the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China during the war and after the war.... It is beneficial to the interests of all human beings as well as that of the United States.... We hope that this policy of President Roosevelt and Vice President Wallace will become a long-term guideline for the United States."¹

Jiefang Ribao issued another editorial "Welcome the American Military Mission" on August 15, 1944 when the American mission arrived in Yanan. Mao added three Chinese characters "comrades-in-arms" to this title to show how much he valued the relations as allies between the United States and the CCP. He said that "[the American government's contact with the CCP] is the most exciting event since the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War." The significance of American military mission, in Mao's eyes, was that the United States had realized the importance of the CCP as a military force. Therefore, "it is very difficult for the GMD to prevent the CCP from having contact with the outside world."²

Even though the situation looked very promising, Mao and his colleagues felt that they had to find out the true motives of the American Government in deciding to approach the CCP. They were still not sure what kind of relations could be established between the United States and the CCP after the war. Particularly, Mao was eager to know how the Roosevelt administration would deal with the rivalry between the CCP and the GMD and what was the bottom line of Washington's China policy.

Mao was not naïve however, as his reaction to a telegram from the CCP's Southern Bureau on August 16, 1944 demonstrated.³ The telegram argued that the United States

¹ *Jiefang Ribao*, July 4, 1944.

² Hu Qiaomu, *Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong* [Mao Zedong in Hu Qiaomu's Memoirs] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1994), p.336.

³ The Southern Bureau was a CCP agency that took charge of all the Communist organizations in the south of China including Chongqing. This agency was also responsible to collect information from Chongqing and abroad and send its analysis on important issues to Yangan. Zhou Enlai took charge of this agency.

wanted to approach the CCP, because they had gradually realized that there existed two Chinas in the anti-Japanese War. In making their policies toward China and their strategies in the Pacific area, and in designing the entire postwar world peace, apart from dealing with Jiang's regime, Washington had to consider the orientation of the military forces of the CCP. In order to win final victory against Japan, the Southern Bureau pointed out, Roosevelt hoped that the American government could obtain support from the Soviet Union and a China which included both the GMD and the CCP. Even though the situation looked encouraging and promising, the Southern Bureau warned that the CCP should not have any illusions about American good will because of hostile groups in the United States such as the American isolationists, the conservatives within the Democratic Party, and many Catholics. The replacement of Wallace with Harry Truman was a good evidence to show the limits of Roosevelt's progressive policy. Even Roosevelt, at best, represented the bourgeoisie. He continued to offer Jiang political, military and economic support even though he was dissatisfied with Jiang's fascist tendency and ineffectiveness in resisting Japan. The United States would never give up its influence on China's central government. If Jiang's fascist policy failed to adapt itself to the changing situation or to the changing needs of the United States, the United States now had the power to prop up a new government which would carry out a policy completely approved by the Americans. But the Southern Bureau did not think the United States would naturally recognize the CCP as China's political center after Jiang's fall. A struggle was inevitable if the CCP wanted to become China's real political center. Based on the analysis above, the Southern Bureau suggested that the CCP's foreign policy be to take "self-reliance as the foundation and foreign assistance as the supplement." The conclusion was that "we must make ourselves stronger, thus making ourselves a main

element in determining China's future. Only by doing so will we be able to take the initiative in using foreign aid, avoid being dominated by others.”⁴

Mao read this telegram carefully and underlined some important points. It seemed that he agreed with the analysis of the Southern Bureau, because such was reflected immediately in the CCP's foreign policy guidelines. The CCP Central Committee's “Directive on Diplomatic Affairs” drafted by Zhou Enlai on August 18, 1944 clarified the nature, contents and stand of the CCP's foreign policy. It stated that the CCP's diplomatic policy should be a part of the international united front and its main goals were to fight against the Japanese and to create democratic cooperation with the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain. It cautioned that the CCP “should not expect too much at this point, because the foreign policies of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union are now still centered on the GMD....In order to avoid committing mistakes in our diplomatic activities, we must first of all adhere to our national stand.”⁵

This became the cornerstone of Mao's American strategy. Even though the CCP welcomed the visit of the American military mission and gave it cooperation to some extent, Mao and his colleagues were aware that the American government would not give wholehearted support to the CCP due to fundamental ideological differences and America's long-term friendship with the GMD. Therefore, they cautiously watched to see what the American government would do next.

Actually, the analysis of the Southern Bureau of the CCP and the corresponding measures which Mao adopted were very much close to the nature of Washington's China policy. What was President Roosevelt's China policy and how did he view the

⁴ “Chinese Communist Foreign Policy in the Making: Fourteen Documents July 1944-August 1945,” *Chinese Historians*, vol. VI. No. 2, Fall 1993, pp. 66-7.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 68-73.

Nationalists and the Communists, the two rivals in China? Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, said of Washington's China policy: "Toward China we had two objectives. The first was an effective joint prosecution of the war, and the second was the reorganization and building up of China as a major power entitled to equal rank with the three big Western allies, Russia, Britain, and the United States."⁶

These two objectives could be regarded as short and long term China strategies. The short-term policy required keeping China in the war. It was vital for the Chinese armies to engage a huge number of Japanese troops while the United States and its allies were occupied by the war in Europe. The long-range policy for drawing China into the Big Four was part of Washington's post-war global strategy. Washington expected to insert its influence effectively in China and Asia through a friendly Chinese government.⁷

Facing the two major rivals of China, Roosevelt gave more positive attention to the GMD rather than the CCP. As early as 1941, the President sent his aide Dr. Lauchlin Currie to explore the nature of the Nationalist government. Currie returned from China with the understanding that Chiang followed "Roosevelt's example of promoting liberal economic and political reforms to undercut the radical opposition," and the United States "could steer Chiang toward democracy by sending 'liberal advisors' to supervise the KMT administration."⁸ Currie's report laid out the broad outlines for Roosevelt's China policy and the President accepted his description and interpretation of Jiang's regime. Later Roosevelt confirmed his belief that "the Generalissimo was the only Chinese leader who

⁶ Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York: Macmillan Co, 1948), 2:1583.

⁷ Robert Dallek, *Franklin Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 507.

⁸ Michael Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, 2nd edition (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 61.

could keep the Chinese armies in the field against the Japanese and who would be able after the war to hold the Chinese people together."⁹

However, the President did worry about a possible confrontation between the Nationalists and the Communists. Sumner Welles recalled that in September 1943: "what he [Roosevelt] feared most of all was the flaring up of civil war in China after Japan's defeat. The danger there was that the Soviet Union would intervene on behalf of the Communists, and the Western powers would be tempted or forced in their own interest to back the anti-Communist side."¹⁰ If such an assumption proved true, President Roosevelt was afraid that he would face the same situation that the world had witnessed during the civil war in Spain. To avoid such a disaster, Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss recommended setting up a coalition government in China. Roosevelt accepted this suggestion, and it became of primary importance in Roosevelt's mind in order to realize his China policy.¹¹

The arrival of the American mission to Yanan was a part of Roosevelt's grand strategy in China. This military mission had two purposes. Militarily, the American observers would collect battle information on the Japanese army and make preparations for America's military forces to attack the Japanese armies on the Chinese mainland. Politically, they would also obtain political intelligence on the nature of the Communists, and explore the orientation of the CCP and the possibility of a coalition government.¹²

Even though Mao felt suspicious about President Roosevelt's diplomatic action, he wanted to take this opportunity to expand their international influence and to constrain Jiang's

⁹ Sumner Welles, *Seven Decisions that Shaped History* (New York: Harper, 1951), p. 151.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

¹¹ Steven I. Levine, "On the Brink of Disaster: China and the United States in 1945," in Hurry Harding and Yuan Ming's *Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955* (Wilmington: SRBooks, 1989), p.11.

¹² Michael Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 181

anti-CCP actions. This orientation was reflected in the CCP's decision to cooperate with the United States, ask America for military support, start a CCP-GMD negotiation, and persuade Jiang to change his central government and abandon the one-party autocracy.¹³

The interviews between Mao, Zhou and Service in late August clearly revealed the CCP's intentions mentioned above. As Joseph Esherick pointed out, Mao carefully designed the interviews beforehand because he assumed he hoped that Service as an American diplomat would deliver the CCP's message to Washington policy makers. Mao purposely delayed his meeting with Service in order to give Service time to "get acquainted first."¹⁴ Once they met, Mao expressed the view that "the hope for preventing civil war in China rests to a very great extent - much more than ever before - on the influence of foreign countries. Among these, by far the most important is the United States."¹⁵ Mao spent much time talking about how much the CCP was interested in a democratic China. The message was clear that the CCP and other non-GMD parties would enjoy equal position with the GMD in a coalition government. Zhou told Service more frankly that the more military aid Jiang received from the U.S. the more likely he was to launch a civil war. To avoid such a grave consequence, Zhou suggested that "the only way to be sure of decisively winning the war in China and avoiding civil war is to give arms to both Kuomintang and Communists."¹⁶ From Mao and Zhou's seeming enthusiasm for democracy, CCP-U.S. cooperation, and world peace, Service obtained the impression that the CCP sincerely hoped to work with the United States to build a democratic China. This response was just what the CCP leadership had desired.

¹³ Hu, *Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong*, p. 339.

¹⁴ Joseph W. Esherick, ed. *Lost Chance in China*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p.291.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.297.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.302.

The Interaction between Mao and Hurley: from Hope to Disappointment

In September 1944, the CCP felt that the time had come to put its plan into practice. Mao decided to invite Patrick J. Hurley and some other Americans to visit Yanan in November of that same year. The CCP also instructed its agency in Chongqing to propose a national meeting of all the political parties to reform the central government and abolish one-party autocracy.

As President Roosevelt's personal representative, Hurley was sent to China with the task of solving the conflict between Jiang and Stilwell and unifying the Chinese military forces to concentrate on the war against Japan.¹⁷ However, neither the White House nor the State Department seemed to have given him any explicit instructions on how to implement his task. Hurley possessed considerable autonomy because of his close personal relationship with the President. In answer to a query from Edward Stettinius, the Under-Secretary of State, on December 24, 1944, Hurley interpreted his understanding of his mission in China in this way:

(1) To prevent the collapse of the National Government, (2) to sustain Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Republic and Generalissimo of the Armies, (3) to harmonize relations between the Generalissimo and the American Commander [Joseph W. Stilwell], (4) to promote production of war supplies in China and prevent economic collapse, and (5) to unify all the military forces in China for the purpose of defeating Japan.¹⁸

Later Hurley's interpretation was confirmed by his contacts with the President. From the very beginning, Hurley knew that Jiang played a key role in whether or not a compromise was to be reached between the GMD and the CCP, because the Nationalists possessed

¹⁷ "General Hurley's Instructions," *The China White Paper* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 71.

¹⁸ "Hurley's Review of Soviet-Chinese Communist Relations," *The China White Paper*, p. 71.

superior military forces to those of the Communists. The CCP, in his mind, would have no reason to reject a GMD proposal intended to show its good will by treating its long-term rival as an equal partner. Therefore, Hurley suggested to President Roosevelt that Washington persuade the Nationalist government to make more liberal political concessions in order to make possible a settlement with the Communists before the Yalta Conference. But his suggestion was turned down by Roosevelt.¹⁹ This rejection indicated to Hurley that the goal of his mission to China was to establish Jiang as the highest authority in China. Thus the CCP was only supposed to play in Washington's perspective a subordinate position in the coalition government.

With such an understanding of his mission in China, Hurley began to put the plan into practice. First of all, Hurley hoped to force Yanan into a coalition government based on its relationship with Moscow. He believed that "the influence of the Soviet Union will control the action of the Chinese Communist Party.... Without the support of the Soviet Union the Chinese Communist Party will eventually participate as a political party in the National government."²⁰ Hurley therefore decided to go to Moscow first to win Stalin's support for his China mission in September of 1944. He was delighted to learn from his talk with V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, that Moscow advocated Washington's China policy. The Soviet Union did not support the so-called Chinese Communists because they were not in fact communists at all. Moscow did not have any desire to see a civil war in China and it therefore recognized the National government.²¹ As a result of this visit, Hurley was confident that he could draw the Nationalists and the Communists into a united front.

¹⁹ "Hurley's Review of Soviet-Chinese Communist Relations," *The China White Paper*, p. 99.

²⁰ "Ambassador Hurley's Review of Soviet-Chinese Communist Relations," *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

²¹ "Agenda for Dr. Soong's Moscow Conversations," *ibid.*, p. 93.

Hurley attempted to win favor from the Chinese Communist Party in order to realize his goal of mediation. During his first two contacts in October 1944 with Dong Biwu and Lin Boqu, the CCP's representatives in Chongqing, Hurley admitted that Jiang's government was not democratic, albeit a recognized leader of the Anti-Japanese War. He said that he regarded the CCP's army as a well-trained and disciplined military force, and it would be an important factor in deciding the future of China. Therefore the CCP should have its own legal status in China. Hurley assured Lin and Dong that he would treat both sides impartially and give them the same treatment including the distribution of America's lend-lease materials.²² At their third discussion, Hurley told Dong and Lin that he had rejected Jiang's proposal on October 21 to let the Japanese armies wipe out the Communist military forces, while preserving Jiang's own troops. Hurley said that he would not accept such an idea if he were the leader of the CCP.²³ Because of these three talks, the CCP placed high hopes on cooperating with the United States and establishing a coalition government with the GMD through Hurley's mediation.

Hurley arrived in Yanan on November 7, 1944. After three day's talks with Mao, Zhou and Zhu De, the Commander-in-Chief of the CCP's army, they reached a five-point agreement entitled "Agreement Between the National Government of China, the Kuomintang of China and the Communist Party of China."²⁴

²² Hu, Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong, p. 343.

²³ Ibid., p. 343.

²⁴ Here are items 2, 4 and 5 of the Five-Point Agreement: 2) The present National Government is to be reorganized into a coalition National Government embracing representatives of all anti-Japanese parties and non-partisan political bodies.... At the same time the National Military Council is to be reorganized into the United National Military Council consisting of representatives of all anti-Japanese armies. 4)The supplies acquired from foreign powers will be equitably distributed. 5) The coalition National Government of China recognizes the legality of the Kuomintang of China, the Chinese Communist Party and all anti-Japanese parties. See "The Five-Point Draft Agreement, November 10, 1944," The China White Paper, pp. 74-5.

The key factors in this agreement were item 2 requiring reconstruction of Jiang's Nationalist Government into a coalition government and the National Military Council into a united high command, item 4 calling for to distribution of foreign supplies equitably among all anti-Japanese forces, and item 5 affording the CCP an equal position to the GMD in this new government. Hurley was delighted with such a smooth achievement and he and Zhou left for Chongqing two hours after signing the agreement on November 10.

Mao had given a report about his talks with Hurley and the agreement one day earlier at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee. Mao said that the CCP's agreement to cooperate with Jiang's corrupt government was a big concession, and that the CCP had to yield because of the obvious gap between Jiang's army of two million and the CCP's forces of 630,000. Even though the CCP had made a big concession, it had won legal recognition.²⁵ Zhou pointed out further that Jiang's intent to force the CCP to join his government and the CCP's proposal of a coalition government were two different things. But Hurley equaled these two issues. Thus it was quite possible that Jiang would reject this agreement.²⁶

What happened later was just as Zhou had predicted. Jiang and his colleagues were shocked with the five-point proposal which Hurley brought from Yanan. Song Ziwen, the Foreign Minister, commented, "The Communists have sold you a bill of goods. Never will the National Government grant the Communist request." Jiang told Hurley that "the proposed agreement would eventually result in giving the Communists control of the government."²⁷ Having rejected the five-point agreement, then the GMD government gave a counterproposal of three points.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 354-355.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 355.

²⁷ "Major General Patrick J. Hurley to the President Roosevelt, November 16, 1944," *FRUS*, 6: 699.

The key to this counterproposal was item 2 which demanded that "The Communist Party undertakes to give its full support to the Nationalist Government in the prosecution of the war of resistance, and in the post-war reconstruction, and to give over control of all their troops to the National Government through the National Military Council."²⁸

In effect there was a big gap between the five-point proposal and the three-point counterproposal. The former required a coalition government and united high military command in which both the GMD and the CCP were equal. But the latter offered the CCP legal status only on the condition that the CCP had to place its military force under the GMD's control.

After his failure to persuade Jiang to accept the Five-Point Agreement, Hurley began to realize that he faced the same dilemma Stilwell had encountered. He knew that he had to give in if he did not want to meet the same fate as Stilwell. Hurley made an about face since his priority was to sustain Jiang's dominant leadership in China. Hurley decided to submit Jiang's counterproposal to Zhou and induce the CCP to accept it.

Zhou asked Hurley what had happened and whether he still supported the five-point proposal. Hurley replied that the proposal of a coalition government was a proper issue, but it was not his decision to agree or disagree because he was only a witness rather than a negotiator. Contrary to what he had indicated in Yanan, he urged Zhou to accept Jiang's proposal, because, he said, the CCP would gain legal status and enter the policy-making organs of the National government. It was obvious to Zhou that Hurley had changed his position of neutrality.

The CCP faced two choices after this deadlock. The first was to make further compromises, which meant the CCP would have to join the National government on Jiang's

²⁸ "The Three-Point Plan," *The China White Paper*, p. 75.

terms; the other was to stop negotiations and insist on the Mao-Hurley agreement. The second choice might put an end to the peaceful negotiation with the GMD and alienate the United States. Zhou and Dong opted for the first choice. They even drafted a new proposal to keep the door of negotiation open. Mao hesitated. He asked Chen Yi, Commander of the New Fourth Army, for advice.

After a thorough consideration of all elements and the situation, Chen wrote a long letter on December 1, 1944 to clarify the complicated relationship between the CCP, GMD, and the U.S. Chen predicted two prospects for the CCP-GMD negotiation. The first was that Jiang might sign the Hurley-Mao agreement under the CCP's insistence and Washington's pressure. Chen preferred this choice. However, even this possibility could not solve the CCP-GMD conflict. If anything, it might produce an illusion, which would mislead both the United States abroad and the Chinese people at home. Chen argued that Jiang would allow at most one or two CCP leaders to join his cabinet. There would be no reform of the GMD's corrupt regime unless a great number of Communists and progressive people were able to enter the GMD government. But clearly Jiang would not allow such a thing to happen no matter how much the United States pressed him. The second was that Jiang would insist on replacing the five-point agreement with his own three-point proposal. This would be most likely, because the historical lesson would remind Jiang that he should not give any chance for the CCP to expand its military force at will. Otherwise, he could not maintain his autocracy in China. If the CCP should yield to Jiang's pressure and accept Jiang's new proposal, this compromise would only mollify the tension between the GMD and the CCP for a time. But the GMD could still maintain its one-party rule in China.

As far as Hurley's mediation was concerned, Chen argued that the American government only wanted to make use of the CCP's military force while trying to maintain

Jiang's political system. Hurley, said Chen, was of course very happy with the CCP's willingness to recognize Jiang as the national leader of the Anti-Japanese War, but he was not really interested in the political reforms which Yanan pressed Jiang to take. The American Government might give Mao's army some military materials if they were to accept Jiang's proposal, but on the condition that the CCP must counterattack into the Japanese occupied regions. Thus the United States would at little cost gain what it wanted at the expense of the Chinese armies, particularly, the CCP's forces. This was the method of the American imperialists, i. e. they knew how to use others to fight for their own interests. Based on such an analysis, Chen said that it would be beneficial to the CCP if Jiang insisted on the counter proposal. The CCP then had a reasonable excuse not to join Jiang's government. The CCP, Chen reasoned, needed time to strengthen its military force and expand its base areas. Therefore, the CCP should insist on the Mao-Hurley agreement and refuse to enter Jiang's cabinet at the cost of the CCP military independence.²⁹

Having read this letter, Mao sent Zhou a telegram immediately instructing him to insist on the five-point agreement and not to present the new proposal that he and Dong had made. Then he gave Chen a reply, "I have read your letter, and this letter gave me so much inspiration. Thank you very much, indeed. I have cabled Zhou and Dong not to bring out this new proposal. We shall wait and see what happens. As far as the basic policy is concerned, we have no other alternative but following what you suggested."³⁰

Chen's analysis clarified for Mao the nature of the relations between Washington, Chongqing and Yanan. Washington's mediation was aimed at joining the GMD and CCP together to fight Japan. But America's success in achieving this goal depended on whether

²⁹ Hu Juchen, *Chen Yi Chuan* [The Biography of Chen Yi] (Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 1993), pp. 309-312.

³⁰ Ibid., 312.

the GMD and the CCP would make compromises to set up a united government. Chongqing, for this part, would refuse to give Yanan an equal position in a united government because of the obvious political, military and ideological gap between the two sides. Further, Chongqing would probably insist that Washington abandon the CCP and would use the long-term friendship between Washington and Chongqing to achieve that result. No matter what happened, the CCP could not expect much aid from Washington in this situation. This analysis was persuasive for Mao. It could be inferred that Chen's subsequent promotion to succeed Zhou as foreign minister of the People's Republic of China (hereafter PRC) could be attributed to his ability at understanding complex international relations.

Zhou delivered Mao's decision to Hurley the following day. He stressed that the coalition government and united military command were the keys to solving the problems. The CCP could not make any concession on these points. Responding to Hurley's continuing pressure on Zhou to join Jiang's National government, Zhou replied that "we must be responsible for the people. We cannot enter a government in which we have no power of decision."³¹ Angrily, Zhou left for Yanan in early December after Hurley's radical shift.

After he had arrived in Yanan, Zhou wrote a letter to Hurley to tell him that the CCP could not find any fundamental common basis between the two proposals. Further, in order to inform the public and point to shifts in Jiang's position, the CCP was considering publishing the Mao-Hurley proposal. Irritated by Zhou's letter, Hurley wrote Zhou reminding him that such an action would deviate from Mao's promise not to publish any proposal drafts before the negotiation was concluded. He warned that this action would lead to a great tragedy and close the door of the negotiations.³²

³¹ Hu, Hu Qiaomu Huiyi *Mao Zedong*, p. 359.

³² "Reply of the Chinese Communists," *The China White Paper*, pp. 76-77.

Responding to Hurley's protest, Mao instructed his representatives in Chongqing to explain that it was not the intention of the CCP to split with Washington. What they had wanted was to make Jiang change his rigid position. At the same time, Mao also pointed out that "We will never make such a cheap deal... to sacrifice the coalition government, to sacrifice the principle of democracy, and to betray our people for just a few offices in Chongqing. This is the consistent position of our Party. I hope our American friends will not try to make us do so."³³

The Dixie group in Yanan noticed the new attitude of CCP leaders pretty soon. One of the observers reported this change in the following way:

The Communists, on their part, have no interest in reaching an agreement with the Generalissimo short of a genuine coalition government. ... They are now so confident and so little concerned with Chungking that if the current negotiations break down, they intend to bring together the heretofore decentralized areas which they control under a centralized administrative federation. This would be a blow to Chiang which he could not effectively counter.³⁴

In deed, the honeymoon between the CCP and Hurley did not last long. When Zhou received Hurley's proposal made in January 1945 to place both the GMD and the CCP's military forces under the leadership of an American commander, the Communist leaders rejected it. Mao said angrily that this plan would put Chinese troops under the control of a foreign military commander and degrade Chinese military forces into a colonial army.³⁵

Competition to Win Roosevelt's Support among Hurley, Foreign Service Officers and Mao

On the other hand, one can assume that Mao was able to discern the differences between Hurley and the members of Dixie Mission and those young American diplomats.

³³ "Mao and Zhou to Wang Rofei, December 12, 1944," *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, 14:412.

³⁴ *FRUS*, 1944, 6:725.

³⁵ Hu, *Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong*, p. 361.

Suspecting that Hurley might have abused his power and misinterpreted Roosevelt's intention, Mao decided to take a bold action to bypass Hurley and to contact the President directly. Taking advantage of cooperation by American officers, Yanan attempted to present its views to the highest American policy-makers. On January 9, 1945, the American Military Observers Group transmitted to General Wedemeyer a message expressing Yanan's request for President Roosevelt to consider meeting with Mao and Zhou to gain the first-hand knowledge about China. Zhou said clearly that he did not want this letter to fall in the hands of Hurley, because Zhou did not trust Hurley's discretion.³⁶

Hurley, however, obtained Zhou's message immediately because of an agreement with Wedemeyer to share all information. Moreover, Hurley also saw a telegram from Zhu De asking Wedemeyer for a twenty million dollar loan to finance the CCP's military projects in 1945.³⁷ Hurley was enraged with Yanan's attempt at secret negotiations. He was determined to block any further attempts by Yanan in the future. In his report to the President on January 14, 1945, Hurley claimed that he had "discovered the real reason for the change of attitude of the Communists toward negotiation with [the] National Government and toward me," because of the connections between the Dixie Mission and the CCP. In Hurley's eyes, "The military plan... offered them [the Communists] exactly what they wanted, recognition and Lend-Lease supplies, for themselves and destruction of the National Government. If the Communists, who are an armed political party, could succeed in making such arrangement with the U. S. Army, it would be futile for us to try to save the National Government of China."³⁸

³⁶ "Zhou to Wedemeyer through the Dixie Mission, Jan. 10, 1945," *Hurley Papers*, In *Practicing History*, Barbara Tuchman gave a very clear description about the personal relations between Jiang and Hurley, and the fight between Hurley on the one side and American officers, diplomats and the CCP on the other.

³⁷ Russell D. Buhite, *Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 186.

³⁸ "Hurley's Letter to the President, January 14, 1945," *FRUS*, 1945, 7:176.

Even though informed of Mao's desire to meet him, Roosevelt did not respond positively. From Roosevelt's perspective, such a meeting would increase the reputation of the CCP at the cost of the GMD and would weaken his China policy. To avoid two different China policies, the President ordered General George C. Marshall to carry out an immediate investigation and prevent a similar incident from happening in the future. Wedemeyer subsequently apologized to Hurley for this incident. As the result, McClure and Barrett were ordered to leave China. Moreover, Wedemeyer required his subordinates to sign a pledge saying that: "We American officers, we American military people...support the Central Government" and "will not give any assistance to any individual, to any activity, or any organization on [sic] within the China theater."³⁹ Then Wedemeyer made this pro-Jiang stance public at a press conference on February 15. One can assume that this was a heavy blow to Mao's attempt to set up a direct line with the White House.

Serious controversies also sprang up between Hurley and several American career diplomats. Based on their own personal contacts with the CCP, GMD and their first-hand knowledge of China's situation, these foreign service officers felt that Hurley's pro-Jiang policy would alienate the Communists and seriously damage America's interests in China. John Davies recommended that Washington "make a determined effort to capture politically the Chinese Communists rather allow them to go by default wholly to the Russians," since the Communists were becoming the strongest and the most constructive unifying force in China. George Acheson, the Charge d'Affaires of the American Embassy in China, pointed out that "the KMT is becoming weaker while they [the Communists] are not" and the collapse of the National government was likely in "a perhaps not very distant future."⁴⁰

³⁹ *FRUS*, 1945, 7:233.

⁴⁰ "Memo by Davies, Nov. 15, 1944," *FRUS*, 1944, 6:695-7, "Acheson to Secretary of State, Nov. 24, 1944," *ibid.*, 715.

Despite Hurley's order that nobody be allowed to send any reports to Washington without his permission, American diplomats decided to state their opinions frankly to the Department of State. The report dated February 28, 1945, pointed out that the U.S. pro-Jiang and anti-Mao position had led to a serious consequences, and "if this situation continues, and if our analysis of it is correct, the probable outbreak of disastrous civil conflict will be accelerated and chaos in China will be inevitable." To avoid the tragedy, the report suggested that "the President inform the Generalissimo in definite terms that military necessity requires that we supply and cooperate with the Communists and other suitable groups who can aid in this war against the Japanese, and that to accomplish this end, we are taking direct steps." They believed that "this ...would have profound and desirable political effects in China." The report further argued that approaching the CCP would "hold the Communists to our side instead of throwing them into the arms of the Soviet Union, which is inevitable otherwise in the event the U.S.S.R enters the war against Japan."⁴¹ Aware of the importance of the report, acting secretary of State Joseph Grew submitted it to the President on March 2, 1945.

Hurley became furious when he read this report at the Department of State on March 4. He yelled at John Carter Vincent, "I know who drafted that telegram: Service! I'll get that son of a bitch if it's the last thing I do." ⁴² Determined to fight back, Hurley and Wedemeyer explained to leading members of the State and War Department that the U.S. should not give any American aid to Yanan. Then Hurley managed to meet the President twice on March 8th and 24th to convince him to give full-hearted support to the Nationalist government. There are no records of the details of these two private talks, but evidently the President did not object to Hurley's stand in China. The State Department did not receive any response from the President to the February 28 report. Thus Hurley could use his authority to get rid of the

⁴¹ "The American Charge's Recommendations," *The China White Paper*, pp. 87-92.

⁴² Michael Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945* p. 215.

insubordinate diplomats. Very soon afterward, Davies, Service and George Atcheson, the American Charge d'Affaires at Chongqing, were removed from China service one after another.

Thus, both Mao and those younger American diplomats failed in their efforts to win the President's support. Their failure was due to the fact that they did not know that the policy Hurley implemented was the policy Roosevelt had made.⁴³

The Russian Card and the Yalta Conference

The Russian card was a strategy both the President and Hurley adopted in their dealing with the CCP. Hurley wrongly thought that the CCP could not play a significant role without Moscow's support and permission. Having visited Moscow on his way to China, he expected that the Russian card would coerce the CCP to join the National government as a political party.

After the failure of the first round of negotiations, Hurley turned to his attention to Moscow again. He told the State Department that "with the support of the Soviet Union, ... they [the Chinese Communists] could launch a civil war while without such Russian support they would eventually participate as a political party in the National Government."⁴⁴ He suggested to the President on January 14, 1945 that the American government win Stalin and Churchill's support for its China policy in the coming Yalta Conference in order to make the CCP return to the negotiating table.⁴⁵ It appears that the

⁴³ Tao Wenzhao, "Hurley Shihua he Meiguo Fujiang Fangong Zhengce de Queli" [Hurley's Mission to China and the Formation of the U.S. Policy to Support Chiang Kai-Shek against the Chinese Communist Party], in *Jindaishi Yanjiu* [Modern History Studies], No. 2, 1987; Xian Liling, "Hurley he Roosevelt Duihua Zhengce" [Hurley and Roosevelt's China Policy] in *Essay Collection of American History*, (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co., Ltd., 1983);

⁴⁴ "Ambassador Hurley's Review of Soviet-Chinese Communist Relations," *The China White Paper*, p. 100.

⁴⁵ "Hurley's Telegram to the President, Jan. 14, 1945," *FRUS*, 1945, 7:176.

President also shared Hurley's assumption that the Chinese Communists did not possess the capability to overthrow the Nationalist government without the support of the Soviet Union. Roosevelt decided to win Stalin's support for his China policy at Yalta.

Because of conflict over ideology and interests, the Soviet Union and the Democratic countries in the West remained suspicious of each other. On the eve of anti-Fascist victory, this competition intensified. To secure control over those countries and regions which were vital to their perceived national security, Stalin and Churchill reached an agreement which allowed Stalin to have upper hand in East Europe and Britain to control Greece. It seemed that Roosevelt had to follow a similar pattern when he considered how to resolve the Washington-Moscow competition in China.

As far as China was concerned, the American government had two primary objectives in the Yalta Conference. Militarily, Washington made an effort to draw Moscow into the Pacific War in order to reduce the anticipated heavy casualties. Politically, Washington needed Moscow's cooperation to recognize Jiang's regime as the legal government of China. Taking advantage of its geopolitical position, Moscow was eager to regain its privileges in Manchuria which it had lost during the Russian-Japanese War in 1905. After bargaining and compromise Stalin and Roosevelt agreed that: Port Arthur would be leased to the Soviet Union, Dairen would be made a free port under international control, the Manchurian railways could be put under a joint Sino-Soviet commission, the Soviet Union would possess pre-eminent interests in both Dairen and the Manchurian railways, and Outer Mongolia would be recognized as an independent identity. In return for Roosevelt's concessions, Stalin promised to dispatch Russian armies to Manchuria to fight Japanese troops two or three months after the defeat of Germany, and he recognized the National government as only legal government of China.

Both Roosevelt and Stalin felt satisfied with the Yalta agreement. On the American side, Roosevelt obtained Stalin's promise to enter the war against Japan, and he won Stalin's support for his China policy. Roosevelt felt that the United States could effectively control Asia and China through Jiang's National government because of Jiang's pro-America position. In addition Roosevelt believed that his concession to Stalin's demands in Manchuria would constrain Moscow's expansion in China. Otherwise, Stalin could take advantage of his "rising land power.... and the center of a revolutionary movement having powerful Chinese adherents" to take more spoils of war.⁴⁶ From the perspective of the Soviet Union, Stalin was very pleased that Moscow would resume its lost privileges in Manchuria. He was quite sure that Jiang had no other choice but yield before the pressure from Washington and Moscow, and the threat from the CCP. Manchuria would become a buffer area to ensure the security of Russia's eastern border. Even though Stalin knew that he could even win more from Washington, he knew that the Soviet Union needed time to restore its economy and construction after the war. Therefore Stalin had no desire to provoke the United States at the Yalta Conference. As pointed out by Steven Levine, both Roosevelt and Stalin treated China from the perspective of Washington-Moscow competition.⁴⁷ In short, Roosevelt and Stalin would continue their post-war cooperation once they had found common ground at the cost of China's interests, particularly the interests of the CCP.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941-50*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p.239.

⁴⁷ Steven Levine, "On the Brink of Disaster: China and the United States in 1945," in *Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955*, pp.10-12.

⁴⁸ Xian Liling, "Hurley and Roosevelt Duihua Zhengce;" Niu Jun, *Cong Hurley Dao Marshall* [From Hurley to Marshall], (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1988); Tao Wenzhao, "'Yijiu Siwunian Zhongmeisu Guanxi de Yimu-Cong Yalta Mimi Xieding dao Zhongsu Youhao Tongmeng Tiaoyue'" [An Act in 1945 Sino-U.S. Relations-From the Yalta Conference to the Sino-Soviet Treaty], in *Meiguo Yanjiu* [American Studies], No. 4, 1999.

The Hostility between Hurley and Mao

Roosevelt showed Hurley the agreement which he had reached with Stalin at Yalta during their meeting in March 1945. Both the President and Hurley decided to exploit the Russian card to force the CCP to enter the National government as a minority party. Hurley informed the Secretary of State later: "It was the President's suggestion that I undertake to obtain cooperation from the British and Soviet Governments for the American policy to support the National Government of China."⁴⁹

Hurley thought it was time to adopt a harder position toward the CCP. At a State Department press conference on April 2, he equated the CCP with the warlords and demanded that Washington only support the National government. At the same time, he lauded Jiang with such comments as: "Chiang Kai-shek... is not fascist-minded. His ambition is to relinquish all the power he possesses to a government of the people, for the people... by the people."⁵⁰

Then Hurley began his effort to win international support to his China policy. First he visited London from April 4th to 8th to win Britain's support for America's China policy. Churchill reaffirmed his previous promise to Roosevelt that Great Britain would support the American policy for the unification of the Chinese armed forces under the leadership of Jiang and the National government.⁵¹

Hurley arrived in Moscow after his London trip. Moscow gave Hurley a positive response toward Washington's China policy during Hurley's visit on April 15. Hurley informed the State Department that Stalin would endorse America's China policy of establishing a free, united government and endorse the National government led by Jiang

⁴⁹ "Hurley to the Secretary of State, Apr. 13, 1945," *Hurley Papers*.

⁵⁰ "Transcript of Press & Radio News Conference by Hurley, April 2, 1945," *FRUS*, 1945 7:318.

⁵¹ Russell D. Buhite, *Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 207.

Jieshi. The Soviet Union would be very glad to cooperate with the United States to reach this objective. In Stalin's words, Jiang was a selfless patriot and Stalin would be very happy to be friends with him.⁵²

Returning to China, Hurley told Jiang of his talks with Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. They all agreed to the following objectives: to realize the unification of the Chinese armies under the leadership of Jiang, and to build up an independent, democratic and unified China. He held a press conference on April 28 to declare that a consensus on Washington's China policy had been reached between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.⁵³

Even though Mao was in dark about these diplomatic actions, he could sense Hurley's increasing hostility. Having learned of Hurley's statement on April 2, *Xinhua Ribao*, the CCP's newspaper in Chongqing, issued an editorial entitled "Our Firm and Clear Attitude-On General Hurley's Speech." The article stated that Hurley completely misunderstood and distorted the true Communist effort to collaborate with the United States against Japan. It also warned that Hurley's statement "will increase disruption, promote civil war and postpone victory."⁵⁴

What had happened in Europe in late 1944 and early 1945 could not escape the CCP's attention. On the one hand, the uprising of an indigenous Polish anti-Fascist resistance was ruthlessly suppressed by Nazi forces while the Soviet armies remained on the sidelines and Moscow blocked aid from American and British troops. On the other hand, the Greek Communist Party and its anti-Fascist forces were defeated by Britain's armed intervention on the side of the pro-Western groups, and the Soviet Union

⁵² "Ambassador Hurley's Interview with Marshal Stalin, April 15, 1945," *The China White Paper*, pp. 94-6.

⁵³ Niu Jun, *Neizhan Qianxi* [On the Eve of the Civil War], (Taiwan: Babylon Books, 1993), p.132.

⁵⁴ Jiang Xianzhi, *Mao Zedong Nianpu*, 2: 589-590.

acquiesced to this action. Even though the CCP did not know about the agreement between Stalin and Churchill for their division of spheres of influence in Europe, Mao was aware that the CCP could not place its fate in the hands of the Soviet Union. The CCP must depend on its own efforts.

On April 20, 1945 the CCP passed a Resolution to Some Questions of the Party's History during the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Sixth Congress. This resolution formed the conclusion of the Rectification Campaign and signified Mao's total victory over his opponents in the party. Before this campaign, Wang Ming had been Mao's most threatening challenger. But Wang Ming's rightist line advocated supporting Jiang as the center of the Anti-Japanese War was criticized and was abandoned. This shift highlighted Mao's consistent intention to maintain the autonomy of the Party; have its own military forces; and consolidate and expand its base areas. Moreover, the resolution asked the CCP members to make preparations for a transition to cities from the countryside because the CCP planned to seize major cities occupied by the Japanese.

The CCP held its Seventh Congress from April 23 to June 11, 1945. Mao and his colleagues expressed their worries about Washington's interference in China's internal affairs. In his speech On Coalition Government on April 24, Mao revealed his concerns about the danger of civil war: "It [the National government] also hopes that the generals of certain allied countries will do the same job in China as the British General Scobie has been doing in Greece.... It is planning to plunge China once again into the maelstrom of civil war."⁵⁵ Then Mao urged the American and British governments not to carry out a policy that ran counter, as he put it, to the will of the Chinese people. He warned, "if any

⁵⁵ Mao, "On Coalition Government," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, III:225.

foreign government helps the Chinese reactionaries and opposes the Chinese people's democratic cause, it will be committing a gross mistake."⁵⁶

On May 31, Mao told his party clearly about the danger from Washington. The United States would adopt a policy of reinforcing the GMD and opposing the Soviet Union and the CCP, in order to dominate the Far East. Mao speculated that China might become a semi-colony under the domination of the United States after war. If such a result were to take place, this would cause a long-term trouble. Mao listed 17 possible consequences: The CCP would be condemned by the United States and Britain abroad and by Jiang at home. It would lose quite a number of base areas. The Chinese communist armies would suffer from heavy losses. A civil war would take place in China. China would become Greece and be ruled by the United States. Many party members would quit the CCP. The CCP's legal status could not be recognized in the world. The CCP could not receive any aid from the Soviet Union. A split might happen in the CCP leadership. In a word, Mao urged his Party to prepare for a worst possible case scenario.⁵⁷

The Amerasian Incident took place on June 6. Six Americans, including John Service, were arrested on charges of spying for the CCP. Service had won the trust of the CCP leaders because of his friendly attitude toward Yanan. In fact, when Service was suddenly ordered by Hurley to return to Washington on March 30, Mao had the wrong impression that Service had been recalled to Washington for important consultations. Mao, Zhou and Zhu De, the top three CCP leaders, had long talks with Service. Mao asked Service to convey to Washington Mao's pledge to fight Japan and assist American forces "whether or

⁵⁶ Ibid., 257.

⁵⁷ Mao, "The Conclusion at the Seventh Congress of the CCP," *Mao Zedong zai Qida de Baogao he Jianghuaqi* [Mao Zedong's Reports and Speeches at the Seventh Congress of the CCP], (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1995), ?? pp. 192-8. Also see Hu's Hu Qiaomu Huiyi *Mao Zedong*, p.384.

not they received a single gun or bullet" from the United States. The CCP, Mao stated, hoped that Washington and Yanan would avoid conflict after the defeat of Japan. Mao even implied that Service would be invited to observe the upcoming Party Congress if he could stay for ten more days.⁵⁸ Thus, from the perspective of the CCP leaders, Service's arrest indicated the defeat of those Americans who supported cooperation between Washington and Yanan. *Jiefang Ribao* soon published an article entitled "Look at America's Two Lines from the Arrest of the Six Persons." It argued that there were two political lines in the United States: a progressive line that recognized and supported China's democratic force - the CCP, its army and its base areas - and a counterrevolutionary line that supported the GMD and Jiang Jieshi. This incident signified that the counterrevolutionary line could now significantly impact the American government. The article concluded by warning the American government to pay serious attention to "the voice of the Chinese masses" and "not deviate from the will of the Chinese people. Otherwise, the American government would make grave mistake."⁵⁹

In his speech at the end of the Seventh Congress on June 11, Mao again criticized the American government, "The U.S. government's policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek against the Communists shows the brazenness of the U.S. reactionaries. But all the scheming of the reactionaries, whether Chinese or foreign, to prevent the Chinese people from achieving victory is doomed to failure."⁶⁰

With Hurley's support, the Fourth People's Political Council of the National government [PPC] opened in Chongqing on July 7 without the CCP's participation. All indicators thus showed that the United States stood completely on the side of Chongqing.

⁵⁸ Michael Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945*, p. 215; John Paton Davies Jr., *Dragon by the Tail* (New York: Norton, 1972), p. 404.

⁵⁹ *Jiefang Ribao*, June 25, 1945.

⁶⁰ Mao, "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, III:273.

What was happening then seemed to prove what the South Bureau and Chen's analysis had earlier indicated: Washington was interested only in establishing the Nationalists' authority in China, while exploiting the Communists' military forces to fight the Japanese.

The CCP Central Committee announced that the CCP refused to attend the PPC. Instead, it convened a Preparatory Conference of the Chinese Liberated Areas People's Representative Congress and it decided to hold a Liberated Base Area Representative Congress in November.⁶¹ It seemed that Mao was determined to establish his own government.

In a future riposte to Hurley's pro-Jiang policy, the CCP issued orders to restrain the activities of the American military officers in the base areas. American officers and soldiers were not allowed to collect information. Any airborne troops entering CCP's base areas without permission should be arrested. No more secret information was to be supplied to the American armies. The requests of the American armies to build airports, communication networks, emergency medical clinics and weather stations were all rejected. Five American soldiers who landed in the base area of Jin-Cha-Ji [Shanxi, Chahaer and Hebei provinces] without permission were disarmed. Even those who had permission to work in the base areas were closely watched.⁶² The purpose, the CCP central committee pointed out, "was to prevent a U.S.-GMD conspiracy and increase American difficulties in conducting military activities in Japanese occupied areas."⁶³

After the Seventh Congress the CCP launched a large-scale of anti-America propaganda campaign. Mao wrote two articles, *The Hurley-Jiang Duet Is a Plot* and *On*

⁶¹ Ibid., July 14, 1945.

⁶² Instruction, CCP Central Military Commission, "On Our Strategies toward the Reactionary U.S. China Policy," July 1945, in Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen's *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Documentary Evidences, 1944-1950*, (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1996), pp.25.

⁶³ Niu Jun, *Neizhan Qianxi*, pp. 138-9.

the Danger of the Hurley Policy, to publicize the dispute between the CCP and Hurley. Mao condemned Hurley as an imperialist, adding that "the policy of the United States towards China as represented by its Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley is creating a civil war crisis in China." He characterized the Mao-Hurley agreement as duplicitous and said that Hurley's pro-GMD and anti-CCP policy "is not just Hurley's personal view but that of a group in the U.S. government". Finally, he warned that "If the Hurley policy of aiding and abetting the reactionary forces in China and antagonizing the Chinese people with their immense numbers continues unchanged, it will place a crushing burden on the government and people of the United States and plunge them into endless trouble."⁶⁴

Mao's Struggle to Maintain the Autonomy of the CCP on the Three Fronts

Having no further illusions about U.S. goals, Mao and his colleagues prepared to seize power by military force. The tone of the Seventh Congress of the CCP was to "mobilize the masses and expand the people's forces so that, under the leadership of our Party, they will defeat the Japanese aggressors, liberate the whole people and build a new-democratic China."⁶⁵ Mao emphasized their determination to remove the "two mountains" of feudalism and imperialism and he required his representatives to propagate the line of the Congress, to build up the confidence of the whole Party and the entire people, and to arouse their political consciousness so that they would willingly and gladly fight together with the CCP for final victory.

In August the situation became more urgent. The United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Japan on August 6, 1945 and two days later the Soviet Union declared war against Japan. It was clear that Japan was on the ropes. The sudden end of the war took Mao

⁶⁴ "On the Danger of the Hurley Policy," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, III: 285-7.

⁶⁵ Mao, "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains," III:271.

by surprise because he had anticipated that it would last one or two more years. The CCP had planned to make use of that time to expand its military forces and base areas. Now the CCP began to worry that Washington would give Jiang full support since it no longer needed to seek military cooperation from Yanan.

To deal with its perceived conflict with the GMD and the United States, the CCP took a series of urgent measures. In the order "On the Current Tasks of the CCP after the Surrender of Japan" issued on August 11, the CCP Central Committee demanded its armies to take two steps immediately. (1) Force Japanese troops and puppet armies to surrender to the CCP's military forces; expand the liberation base area; occupy cities, big or small, and communication lines as many as possible; seize military materials and arm people with the seized weaponry, and (2) Prepare for the upcoming civil war."⁶⁶ On the same day, Zhu De ordered his four field commanders to mobilize their armies to enter Manchuria and open base areas in that region.⁶⁷ On August 13th Mao published two articles "The Situation and Our Policy after the Victory in the War of Resistance against Japan" and "Chiang Kai-Shek Is Provoking Civil War." In which he pointed out that a civil war was coming. The American imperialists, he said, were attempting to make China their colony through interfering with the Chinese civil war on the side of the Nationalists. To deal with Jiang's intention to launch a civil war, Mao announced that the CCP's policy was to "give him tit for tat and fight for every inch of land."⁶⁸ Taking advantage of Jiang's troops being far away from the major cities of Shanghai, Nanjing, Beijing and Tianjing, Mao approved the decision of the Central China Bureau to seize Shanghai through a people's uprising on

⁶⁶ Jiang Xianzhi, *Mao Nianpu* [The Chronology of Mao Zedong], 3:1-2.

⁶⁷ Liu Congwen & Chen Shaoshou, *Liushaoqi Nianpu*, [The Chronology of Liu Shaoqi] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1996), 1:476-7.

⁶⁸ "Situation and Our Current Policy after Victory Over Japan," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, IV:14.

August 20. On the same day, he also ordered his armies in northern China to seize Beijing and Tianjing and other cities if they had the chance.⁶⁹

While the CCP was busy preparing for the coming civil war Hurley speed up his diplomatic activities. He assumed that "the Chinese Communists still believe that they have the support of the Soviet Union. Nothing will change their opinion on this subject until a treaty has been signed between the Soviet and China in which the Soviet Union agrees to support the National Government."⁷⁰ On June 15 Hurley informed Jiang of the Yalta agreement and he persuaded him to make the necessary compromises in order to ensure Moscow's support for the National government.

The negotiation between the Nationalist government and the Russian government went on from the first week in July to August 14. A Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R. was signed on August 14, 1945 after intensive bargaining and arguments. Moscow promised to give moral support and military aid entirely to the National Government as the central government of China and recognized Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. Chongqing agreed to the independence of Outer Mongolia if a plebiscite confirmed that was the desire of the Outer Mongolian people. Dalian (Dairen) became a free port open to the commerce and shipping of all nations. The agreement on Port Arthur provided for the joint use of the area as a naval base by the two powers. The railway agreement provided for joint ownership and operation of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian Railways.⁷¹

The Sino-Soviet Treaty was obviously achieved at the cost of the CCP. Why did Stalin betray the interests of his Chinese communist ally? Stalin's reasons for adopting this

⁶⁹ *Mao Nianpu*, 3:9.

⁷⁰ "Ambassador Hurley's Review of Soviet-Chinese Communist Relations," *The China White Paper*, p. 99.

⁷¹ "The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, August 14, 1945," *The China White Paper*, pp. 117-118.

stance were seen in talks he held in 1944 with the Soviet Ambassador to China, "Theoretically, the CCP should be closer to us than the GMD. We should give the CCP more help in principle. However, the CCP is too weak to play the role of leadership in this anti-fascist war. It will take much time for the CCP to win the support from the Chinese people. Moreover, the imperialist countries cannot bear the fact that the CCP would take place of the GMD in China."⁷² In other words, Stalin selected Jiang as the preferred candidate not only because he thought 'Chiang Kai-shek was the only Chinese leader qualified to undertake the unification of China,'⁷³ But also because he needed a friendly but weak neighbor that was not able to threaten the USSR's national security in Asia. Stalin did not think that Jiang was competitive enough to build a powerful China, due to the corruption and inefficiency of the Nationalist government. He did think that Mao might become a Tito in the future because of his independent diplomacy and strong personality.

Jiang and the GMD were satisfied with the agreement because "the Sino-Soviet Treaty indicated (1) an intention to assist in bringing about unification of the armed forces in China; (2) an intention to support Chinese efforts to create a strong, unified and democratic government; and (3) an intention to support the National Government of China."⁷⁴ Jiang and his wife expressed their great thanks to Hurley and President Truman shortly after the agreement.

Washington was also satisfied with this agreement because both the Soviet Union and the Nationalist government issued a statement affirming adherence to the Open Door policy, equality of opportunity and non-discrimination in matters relating to the

⁷² Yang Guisong, *Zouxian Fenlie*, pp. 194-95.

⁷³ "Soviet Views on the Agreement," *The China White Paper*, p. 115.

⁷⁴ "Chinese Reaction to the Treaty," *The China White Paper*, pp. 120-1.

management and operation of the railways and free port of Dairen.⁷⁵ Hurley was delighted with the result of the negotiations. Not only did this agreement, in Hurley's eyes, earn him great credibility, but also it would press the CCP to return to the negotiating table. He thought that it was time for Jiang to "have an opportunity to show his qualifications for leadership of the Chinese people in peace as well as in war." ⁷⁶

At the suggestion of Hurley, Jiang wired Mao four times inviting him to come to Chongqing for another attempt at peace negotiations. General Wedemeyer also extended Mao an invitation at the same time. Hurley expressed his willingness to go to Yanan and escort Mao to Chongqing, thus assuring for Mao's personal safety. To Mao's surprise, Stalin also sent Mao two telegrams to urge the CCP not to involve itself in a civil war, because a civil war would lead to the death of the nation. Stalin, in his second telegram, told Mao that he would be blamed at home and abroad if he rejected Jiang's invitation to peace negotiations, since China as well as the world needed peace badly. Stalin assured that Mao's personal safety would be guaranteed by both the United States and the Soviet Union.⁷⁷ It was thus clear that Stalin intended to implement his agreement reached in the Sino-Soviet Treaty to support the unification of the Chinese armies under the leadership of Jiang Jie-shi.

Mao began to realize that the CCP was facing pressure from three fronts: the GMD, the United States and the Soviet Union. Mao was clear that his party would be in a very disadvantageous position and would face several negative consequences if he tuned down Jiang's proposal for peace negotiations. The CCP would disappoint the Chinese people's desire for peace. The American troops would interfere with military force if the CCP took

⁷⁵ "United States Reaction to the Treaty," *Ibid.*, pp. 121-2.

⁷⁶ "Chinese Reaction to the Treaty," *Ibid.*, p. 121.

⁷⁷ Hu, *Mao Zedong in Hu Qiaomu's Memoirs*, p. 402.

action to seize big cities like Shanghai and Nanjing. The CCP would have no hope to win the civil war at all if the Soviet Union did not give the CCP military and spiritual support.

The hostility of the GMD and the U.S. had been anticipated. But Mao was shocked by Stalin's pro-Jiang attitude. Mao had told his party in the Seventh Congress that he was quite sure that the CCP could obtain international proletariat aid [i.e. help from the Soviet Union].⁷⁸ When he was informed of the Russian army's advance into Manchuria on August 9, Mao was delighted. He announced this news in a Central Committee meeting in the same afternoon, "It is great that the Soviet Union has entered the war. It is pleasant to be an ally of the Soviet Union. Previously we thought that we had to work with the Americans. That would have been very troublesome."⁷⁹ But after reading Stalin's telegrams, Mao could not control his resentment. He said angrily: "I do not believe at all that the Chinese nationality would be destroyed simply because of people's struggle for liberation."⁸⁰ Mao never forgot this unhappy experience. He mentioned Stalin's interference even as late as 1956, "The Soviet Central Committee sent a telegram to the CCP Central Committee urging us to make peace with Jiang. Otherwise, I would be responsible for all the consequences. Actually, I did not want to go. But I had no other choice, since Stalin insisted on his view. Even though I followed his instruction to go to Chongqing, I paid no attention to his order 'not to make revolution,' We became the winner after just three and half year's fight."⁸¹ Yet, no matter how reluctant Mao was, he had to give way in the face of such pressures.

An enlarged CCP Politburo meeting was held on August 23 to analyze the current situation. The meeting reached the following conclusion: Internationally, the United States

⁷⁸ Mao, "The Conclusion at the Seventh Congress of the CCP," *Mao Zedong's Reports and Speeches at the Seventh Congress of the CCP*, p.199.

⁷⁹ Yang Kuisong, *Zouxiang Fenlie*, p.208.

⁸⁰ Shi Zhe, *Zai Lishi Juren de Shenbian*, [Alongside the Giant of History] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1991), p. 308.

⁸¹ Yang Kuisong, *Zouxiang Fenlie*, p.212.

and the Soviet Union did not want a Chinese civil war to take place, which might lead to a Soviet-American confrontation. Domestically, the GMD was not ready to launch a civil war, either. Finally, the CCP's military force was obviously inferior to Jiang's armies. Therefore, the CCP decided to negotiate with Jiang himself.⁸²

The Chongqing Negotiations lasted from August 29 to October 10, 1945. Mao and Jiang talked face to face at negotiating table after 28 years of life-and-death conflict. Neither side gave substantial concessions. The CCP asked for legalization of its Party and liberated base areas, nationalization of all the military forces and democratization of the National government. The GMD agreed to offer the CCP legal status only on condition that it should integrate its armies into the National government and give up its liberated areas.

During the Chongqing Negotiations, the CCP adopted its new military strategy of "expanding to the north while taking a defensive posture toward the south."⁸³ Based on this strategy, Yanan would withdraw its southern military forces to the north of the Yangtze River and send a large number of troops to covertly enter Manchuria. This strategy had two advantages. First, it could concentrate the CCP's military force to deal efficiently with Jiang's military attack. Second, it would publicly present the CCP's desire for peace and thus increase its popularity at home and abroad.

Chongqing also did not slow its military mobilization. In fact, its preparation for the coming civil war intensified. The U.S. dispatched 50,000 American troops to protect major transportation lines on behalf of Jiang. At the same time, the United States helped transfer 800,000 GMD troops to control big cities such as Shanghai, Nanjing, Beijing and Tianjing.⁸⁴

⁸² Jiang Xianzhi, *Mao Nianpu*, 3: 10-11.

⁸³ Liu Congwen & Chen Shaoshou, *Liu Shaoqi Nianpu*, 2: 493.

⁸⁴ Niu Jun, *Neizhan Qianxi*, p. 145, also see Jim Peck "America and the Chinese Revolution, 1942-1946: An Interpretation," in Ernest R. May and James C. Thomason Jr.'s *American-East Asian Relations: A Survey*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp.351-3.

Under Hurley's insistence, President Truman agreed to extend Land-Lease support for six months, through which the Nationalists were given stocks of ammunition, airplanes and other equipment held in depots in the China-Burma-India area. Washington also met Jiang's request to equip and supply thirty-nine divisions.⁸⁵

On October 10, 1945 a peace agreement was signed between the National government and the CCP. But neither side was interested in implementing it. Once the Nationalists had consolidated their control in big cities and major communication lines, they targeted Manchuria. Based on the contents of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, Jiang assumed that he would obtain Manchuria from the Russians smoothly. The result was quite different from what he had expected.

Even though Stalin's promise to support the Nationalist government made Hurley very happy, some American diplomats viewed Moscow's promises differently. George Kennan, the Charge d'Affaires in Moscow, made the following comment: "to the Russians words mean different things than they do to us." Stalin, in Kennan's eyes, would take "a fluid resilient policy directed at the achievement of maximum power with minimum responsibility on portions of the Asiatic continent lying beyond the Soviet border."⁸⁶ Although American Ambassador Averill Harriman attended the meeting between Hurley and Stalin, he also was not as optimistic as Hurley. Based on his experience with the Russians, Mr. Harriman made the prediction that: "Marshal Stalin would not cooperate indefinitely with Chiang Kai-shek and if and when Russia entered the conflict in the Far East he would make full use of and would support the Chinese Communists even to the extent of setting up a puppet government in Manchuria and possibly in North China if

⁸⁵ Russell D. Buhite, *Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 253-4.

⁸⁶ "Comments on Ambassador Hurley's Report," *The China White Paper*, pp.96-7.

Kuomintan-Communist differences had not been resolved by that time.”⁸⁷ The facts would later prove these predictions correct.

As soon as its request for a joint occupation in Japan was rejected by Washington at the Foreign Ministers’ conference of the U.S., the USSR, Britain, France and China in September 1945, Moscow decided to adjust its policy of cooperation with Chongqing. The Soviet government was keenly aware that its interest in Manchuria would be challenged if the region came under exclusive control of the Nationalist government. After the talks between Yanan and the Russian armies in Manchuria on September 15 and 16, an unwritten agreement was reached. The CCP’s forces could enter Manchuria if they did not use the name of the Eighth Route Army. Although the Chinese Communists should not begin their activities in big cities or in Russian-occupied areas, they could set up their base areas in the countryside, and they could control the major passes entering Manchuria. With the assistance of the Soviet armies, the CCP took control of Jinzhou and Shanghaiguan, the strategic chokepoint which controlled the route to Manchuria by land, and Yingkuo and Huludao Island, the sea route to Manchuria. At the same time, Russian armies in Manchuria rejected Jiang’s request to allow the Nationalist army to enter Dalian, giving the excuse that Dalian was a commercial city.

Taking advantage of Moscow’s new stand, Mao sent 100,000 soldiers and officers to Manchuria. Realizing that his newly gained land in North Manchuria could provide him with a reliable base, Mao was confident that he would win his struggle with Jiang. Mao’s dream for years of setting up a military base next to the Soviet Union was at last coming true. Mao instructed Zhou to inform Jiang in a telegram on November 3, 1945 that Manchuria should be under the control of the Manchuria People Autonomous-

⁸⁷ “Comments on Ambassador Hurley’s Report,” *Ibid.*, pp.97-8.

Defense Army (the CCP's military force). Nationalist troops would not be allowed to enter Manchuria. Otherwise, Chongqing would be responsible for the civil war.⁸⁸ In the process of negotiation with Moscow from October 13 to November 15, Jiang lost almost five valuable weeks in competition with the CCP, during which each day counted. Finally Jiang decided to enter Manchuria through Shanghaiguang by force.⁸⁹ The GMD-CCP peace agreement turned out to be nothing but empty promises.

Resignation of Patrick Hurley

On November 27, 1945 Hurley abruptly resigned. Several reasons explain his decision. First, Hurley's failure as mediator was obvious once military confrontation between the Nationalists and the Communists broke out again. Secondly, Hurley's China policy came under criticism in the United States. The *New York Herald Tribune* attributed the resumption of the civil war to Hurley's biased China policy. Congressman Hugh Delacy attacked Hurley on several fronts. Delacy criticized Hurley for standing with Jiang's "reactionary" regime and for pursuing an imperialist program that had led China back into resumption civil war. Hurley, he said, was responsible for the resignation of Clarence Gauss, the reversal of Roosevelt's China policies, and the purging of capable Chinese Hands. Hurley felt that he faced a conspiracy within the Department of State as he had heard that Acheson and Service were appointed to the Far Eastern Commission to serve as General MacArthur's advisors. The nature of the evidence which Delacy made use of seemed to confirm Hurley's perception that the State Department had provided Delacy

⁸⁸ "The CCP's Telegram on the Current Situation to Zhou Enlai," in Yang's book, *Zouxiang Fenlie*, p. 230.

⁸⁹ Niu Jun, *Neizhan Qianxi*, pp.192-208.

with materials. Finally, he heard rumors that he would be relieved from his position anyway.⁹⁰ All these factors led to Hurley's final decision to resign.

Conclusion

The Hurley mediation took place from late 1944 to late 1945. Washington's China policy during the Hurley mediation, was to draw both Chongqing and Yanan together in order to fight the Japanese armies during the war and prevent Moscow's intervention after the war. Yanan initially welcomed Washington's proposal due to the obvious gap in military strength between the Nationalists and the Communists. By accepting Washington's embrace, the CCP expected to increase its political influence both at home and abroad, and hoped that it could participate in a coalition government in which both Yanan and Chongqing enjoyed equal status. But this was not President Roosevelt's intention. The President hoped to set up a coalition government in which the GMD would play a leading role, while the CCP would be in a subordinate position. Both Washington and Yanan began working together before they understood each other's strategic goals. Once they learned each other's fundamental needs, cooperation was no longer possible.

Jiang was a key factor in this complicated relationship. He was not interested in Washington's mediation at all. But he had to obey Washington's pressure to be involved in the negotiations for a coalition government, because he needed America's moral and military support badly in order to deal with the dual threats from the CCP and Japan. Of course, Jiang refused to recognize the legal status of the CCP unless Mao agreed to disband his armies and give up his base areas. But this was the last thing the CCP would

⁹⁰ *Baltimore Sun*, Nov. 28, 1945, as quoted in Russell Buhite, Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy, (Cornell University Press, 1973) pp. 266-7, Also see Lohbeck Don, *Patrick J. Hurley* (Chicago: Regnery Co., 1956), p.426.

agree to because Mao could never forget Jiang's bloody coup in 1927. As James Reardon-Anderson pointed out that the CCP would hardly give up their effort to win power through military force because of three prevailing factors from 1944-1946: the favorable opportunity for military expansion; the CCP generals' war-oriented lobby; and the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States in China.⁹¹ Thus an unyielding stand by both Jiang and Mao thwarted Washington and Moscow's joint efforts. The failure of Roosevelt's China policy and the Hurley mediation proved Churchill's assertion that it was "America's great illusion" to try to draw Jiang and Mao together.⁹²

How can one understand Mao's efforts to win President Roosevelt to his side in late 1944 and early 1945? Actually, this falls under Mao's attempts to understand Washington's China policy. Even though Mao and the CCP leadership recognized the limitations for CCP-U.S. cooperation in late 1944, they needed more evidence to justify their analysis and their assumptions. They were unsure whether what Ambassador Hurley did accurately reflected Roosevelt's China policy. Therefore, Mao decided to contact Roosevelt directly. Roosevelt's failure to respond to the overture and Hurley's increasing hostility to the CCP confirmed for Mao that America's China policy did not support him or his goals.

⁹¹ James Reardon-Anderson, *Yenan and the Great Powers*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).

⁹² Some American scholars thought that the American government overestimated the influence of Washington and Moscow, and underestimated the strength of the CCP revolution. With its increasing dominance in the world, the United States became anti-revolution and anti-radical reform oriented. This orientation determined that they stood on the side of the GMD, the elite ruling class in China, and opposed Chinese peasants' desire for thorough social transformation. Once Washington linked its fate in China with the GMD, a counterrevolutionary minority, it could not avoid a failure in China. See Jim Peck's *America and the Chinese Revolution, 1942-46: An Interpretation*, and Steven Levine's "On the Brink of Disaster: China and the United States in 1945," in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming's *Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955*; and see Niu Jun's *Neizhan Qianxi*.

Some “Lost Chance” scholars blamed Roosevelt for this lost opportunity to make friend with the CCP. Was there a chance or not? We need to analyze both Roosevelt and Mao’s fundamental position in order to answer this question. Roosevelt’s grand strategy was to support Jiang’s national government to ensure America’s influence in China. Therefore, there was no possibility for him to invite Mao to the White House. The consequence of this meeting would definitely weaken his China policy. Even though Roosevelt agreed to meet Mao in Washington, would Mao convert the character and strategic objectives of the CCP based on American criteria? The answer is certainly no. Actually, Mao even refused to consider changing the name of the CCP. To answer the question whether the CCP should change the name, Mao said that this change would damage the image of the CCP. Moreover, Mao interpreted his understanding of democracy in this way, “peasants like communism. Communism is just democracy.”⁹³ It was clear that any effort from both sides to become friends was doomed to be a failure because of the fundamental ideological differences and different strategic objectives between Yanan and Washington.⁹⁴

To establish Soviet influence in Manchuria and strengthen the national security of the Soviet Union, Stalin maneuvered Hurley and Jiang together to restrain Mao’s military plan to seize Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjing at the end of World War II. Mao was forced to temporally abandon his plan. However, Mao adopted a Machiavellian stance in dealing with his opponents. What happened then was just as Stalin later acknowledged,

⁹³ Mao, “Explanation to the Article on Coalition Government,” in *Mao Zedong Wenji* [A Collection of Mao Zedong Works] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1999), Vol. 3, p.275.

⁹⁴ In the Symposium: Rethinking the Lost Chance in China, a number of scholars such as Michael Sheng, Chen Jian, John W. Garver and Odd Arne Westad expressed their analysis that there was no chance for Mao to betray Moscow and stand on the side of Washington given the U.S.’ commitment to the GMD against the CCP, and the ideological and interest ties between the CCP and the USSR. Even though Warren I. Cohen initiated this assumption of the lost chance, he acknowledged that the opinions from China’s side including scholars and diplomats dismissed the lost chance ideal. See *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter 1997).

After the war we invited the Chinese comrades to come to Moscow and we discussed the situation in China. We told them bluntly that we considered the development of the uprising in China had no prospect, and that the Chinese comrades should join the Chiang Kai-shek government and dissolve their army. The Chinese comrades agreed here with the views of the Soviet comrades, but went back to China and acted otherwise. They mustered their forces, organized their armies, and now, as we see, they are beating the Chiang Kai-shek army. Now, in the case of China, we admit we were wrong. It proved that the Chinese comrades and not the Soviet Comrades were right.⁹⁵

Hurley's mediation played a profound role in forming Mao's American strategy, since it was the first time the CCP had direct personal contact with the American government. An illusion of post-war cooperation between the CCP and U.S. probably seemed attractive to Mao before he realized the nature of Washington's China policy. However, the long telegram from the Southern Bureau and the letter from Chen Yi helped Mao comprehend the nature of the Hurley Mission. Hurley's openly pro-GMD and anti-CCP words and actions confirmed the analysis which the South Bureau and Chen Yi had made. The CCP's Seventh Congress became a watershed in the CCP's foreign policy toward the United States. Mao's repeated warnings in the Congress revealed the fact that Mao did not have any illusion of receiving aid from the American government. Even worse, the United States became the CCP's opponent when Washington stood firmly on the side of Jiang's Nationalist government. Having no more illusions about the United States, the CCP announced its split with Hurley to the public after the Seventh Congress. Now the CCP would have to depend on its own efforts to win a victory.

⁹⁵ Vladimir Dejijer, *Tito Speaks* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1953), p. 331.

CHAPTER IV

MAO'S RESPONSE TO THE MARSHALL MEDIATION

The Marshall Mission formed the second stage of U.S. mediation between the Nationalists and the Communists. Marshall's mediation took place during the transition from Washington-Moscow cooperation to opposition. In this chapter I will analyze how this transition affected the relation between Washington, Moscow, Yanan and Chongqing and their interaction. I will also assess how Marshall's mission affected Mao's concept of American government and how it shaped Mao's U.S. policy.

The Dilemma of the Marshall Mediation

Having heard of the news of Hurley's resignation at a cabinet luncheon on November 27, 1945, Truman told his cabinet that "unless we take a strong stand in China, Russia will take the place of Japan in the Far East."¹ Realizing this urgent state of affairs in China, Truman announced the appointment of General Marshall to take the place of Hurley to continue the mediation between the GMD and the CCP. Truman instructed Marshall to utilize the influence of the United States to achieve "the unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods" as soon as possible.² On December 15, 1945 President Truman issued his new China policy. His statement spelled out five objectives: (1) The Truman administration hoped to see a united and democratic government appear in China; (2) The United States would not intervene in Chinese affairs with military force; (3) The United States recognized and would continue to recognize the National Government of China and cooperate with it in international affairs; (4) The United States was cognizant that

¹ *The Truman Administration and China, 1945-1949* E.R. May ed., (Philadelphia/New York/Toronto: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1975), p. 10.

² "General Marshall's Appointment and Instructions," *The China White Paper*, p. 132.

the present National government was a "one-party government," and it needed undergo democratic reform to draw other political elements into its government; and (5) The existence of autonomous armies such as the Communist army was inconsistent with, and actually made it impossible to achieve, political unity in China. Therefore, the Communists should eliminate their army and integrate their military forces into the Chinese National Army.³

With the understanding that Jiang was the key person for the coalition government, the President asked Marshall to tell Jiang and other Chinese leaders frankly that a China disunited and torn by civil strife was not a proper place for American economic assistance in the form of credits, technical assistance or military aid.⁴ James Byrnes, the Secretary of the State, instructed Marshall to transfer Jiang's armies into Manchuria and North China using the American Army and Naval fleet there. Byrnes asked Marshall to keep the plan a secret in order to take advantage of surprise and to force both the CCP and GMD to make more concessions.⁵

Facing seemingly ambiguous instructions, Marshall needed to find the true intent of Truman's China policy. Marshall interpreted his mission in this way:

I stated that my understanding of one phase of my directive was not in writing but I thought I had a clear understanding of his [Truman] desires in the matter, which was that in the event that I was unable to secure the necessary action by the Generalissimo, which I thought reasonable and desirable, it would still be necessary for the U.S. Government, through me, to continue to back the National Government of the Republic of China—through the Generalissimo within the terms of the announced policy of the U.S. Government.

³ "The President's Policy Statement of December 15, 1945," *The China White Paper*, p. 133.

⁴ "General Marshall's Appointment and Instructions," *The China White Paper*, p. 132.

⁵ "Memorandum of Conversation, by General Marshall, Dec. 11, 1945," *FRUS*, 1945, 7:767

President Truman and Mr. Acheson, the Under Secretary of State, confirmed Marshall's understanding.⁶

Moscow's Two-Sided Policy in Manchuria

Meanwhile in Manchuria, Stalin was implementing a two-sided policy. On the one hand, he gave the CCP encouragement and concrete aid to expand in Manchuria. On the other hand, he tried hard to maintain a neutral or even pro-Jiang stand. Stalin knew that Moscow's violation of its treaty with the GMD would reveal its ambition to control Manchuria; it would also endanger its cooperation with the United States and damage its image of a peace protector in the world. Moreover, Stalin still believed that it was only a matter of time before Jiang unified China. Stalin did not want to alienate Jiang and push him into Washington's arms. Therefore, Stalin began to limit the CCP's military expansion in Manchuria. The Soviet army in Manchuria notified the CCP on November 10 that Moscow allowed Jiang's troops to land in the big cities by plane five days before the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. The CCP troops were warned not to attack these Nationalist troops. Two days later, the CCP troops in Manchuria were ordered to withdraw from all the airports, major cities and communication lines. They were not be stationed within fifty kilometers of the major communication lines. When Peng Zhen, the head of the Northern Bureau of the CCP, complained, a Soviet general warned, "If you do not leave, we will use tanks to drive you out." "The army of one Communist Party using tanks to drive out the army of another!" Peng told his colleagues angrily, "Things like this have never happened before."⁷ Yet, the CCP had no other choice but acquiesce.

⁶ "Memorandum of Conversation, by General Marshall, Dec. 14, 1945," *FRUS*, 1945, 7: 770.

⁷ Philip Short, *Mao, A Life*, pp. 402-3.

At the same time, Stalin invited Jiang Jingguo, Jiang's son, to visit Moscow during the month of December 1945. Stalin met Jiang Jingguo twice during this visit and outlined his China policy on three major points. First, the Soviet Union would maintain a good relationship with the National government and would continue its financial aid. Moscow said it had no intention of being involved in the GMD-CCP competition, and it said it supported setting up a coalition government. Second, Moscow hoped that Jiang's government would adopt an independent and neutral policy between Washington and Moscow. Third, American troops should not be allowed to enter Manchuria, and they should not stay in China.⁸ During his talks with Jiang Jingguo, Stalin promised to help the Nationalist troops take all the big cities. The Soviet authorities agreed to withdraw from Manchuria soon. But they also hinted that the CCP would control Manchuria if the Soviet troops left immediately. Jiang had no other choice than to request Stalin not to withdraw from Manchuria until January 3, 1946. This was later extended to February 3.

The GMD lost no time in its military advance toward Manchuria. Jiang's troops broke the CCP's military defense line in Shanhaiguan on November 16. Several days later, Jiang took Jinzhou, the gate of Manchuria. There was now no way for the CCP to stop Jiang's entrance into Manchuria.

On November 16, *Jiefang Ribao* published Mao's article "The Chinese and American People Joined Together to Stop the Spread of the Civil War in China," in which Mao announced that Jiang had ordered his six best armies to invade Shanghaiguan. Jiang's new military campaign, according to Mao, exposed Washington's open military intervention into China's internal affairs because these six GMD armies were all armed

⁸ Niu Jun, *Neizhan Qianxi*, pp. 248-9. Even before young Jiang's visit to Moscow, an agreement had been reached between Jiang Jing-guo and Marshal Malinovsky, the head of the Russian armies in Manchuria, on

with American weapons and trained by American military advisors. Moreover, the troops were transported and protected by American gunboats. Mao urged that the Chinese and American peoples should work together at this critical moment to stop Jiang's military action and its facilitation by the American troops in China.⁹

Mao and his CCP Colleagues' Response to Marshall's Mediation

Facing pressure from Jiang's military attack and Stalin's diplomatic measures, Yanan had to adjust its original strategy to occupy Manchuria exclusively. In this difficult situation Mao fell sick of neurasthenia. Since 1924 this illness had affected Mao whenever he was in a political crisis. During his sickness Liu Shaoqi took over leadership of the CCP. Liu decided to change the CCP's original plan in Manchuria and adopted a strategy of "withdrawing from the main communication lines and occupying two flanks."¹⁰ That is, the CCP troops would retreat from the communication lines and set up base areas in rural regions and middle and small cities.

In this critical moment, the news of Marshall's appointment to replace Hurley came to Yanan. Zhou Enlai noticed the differences of America's China policy before and after the Anti-Japanese War. The U.S. adopted a policy of supporting Jiang and making use of the CCP first. After the war Washington continued its pro-Jiang policy, but began to pressure the CCP, because the U.S. did not need the CCP military forces any more. Washington took three approaches to realize its post-war China policy. First, Washington applied military pressure as Hurley did in his recent mediation to transfer Nationalist

December 5, 1945. This agreement allowed the GMD to airlift one division to Changchun and transport two divisions by land to Shenyang (Mukden), the capital city of Liaoning.

⁹ *Jiefang Ribao*, November 16, 1945, in Mao Zedong Ji. See *Mao Zedong Ji* [Collected Writing of Mao Zedong], ed. Takeuchi Minoru (Tokyo: Hokubosha, 1971-72), 10 volumes. [hereafter Mao Ji].

¹⁰ Yang Kuisong, *Zouxiang Fenlie*, p. 233.

troops to occupy major cities, protect main communication lines with the American troops, lease military materials and dispatch military advisors. But these actions only intensified the tension between the GMD and the CCP, and led both parties to the verge of a civil war. The second approach was non-military way and led to the five-point agreement between Hurley and the CCP. This did not work either, because Jiang refused to accept it. The third was to put pressure on both the CCP and the GMD in order to avoid civil war. Even though, in Zhou's view, Marshall's mission would not differ much from Hurley's China policy, he might apply the last two approaches in his mediation.¹¹ Moreover, the CCP realized the fact that the Chinese people were tired of endless war and longed for peace.

The CCP therefore decided to adopt a strategy of military defense and political offense. Yanan hoped that it could take advantage of this opportunity to reduce Jiang's military pressure, consolidate the CCP military force and base areas; and win the support of the Chinese people and the third force politicians. Consequently it accepted Marshall's mediation and resumed peace talks with the National government.

On December 19, The CCP Central Committee issued the "Directive on the Shift of U.S. China Policy and the CCP's Response"

Even though Washington's China policy did not change its fundamentally pro-Jiang position (it was Washington's consistent policy to support the Nationalists, even Roosevelt was no exception, therefore, we should not have any illusions in this regard), the Truman administration's decision to stop the civil war, reform Jiang's one-party-dictatorship, and restrain American troops' interference in the

¹¹ *Zhou Enlai Yijiū Siliū Nian Tanpan Wenxuan* [Selected Works of Zhou Enlan Negotiation in 1946], (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1996), pp.5-6.

internal affairs of China was favorable to the CCP. Therefore, the CCP would welcome Marshall mediation.¹²

Actually, the CCP had already decided to adopt a policy of “neutralizing the United States” even before it expressed its willingness to accept the Marshall Mediation.¹³ Its “Directive on a Strategy to Deal with the United States and the Nationalists” was issued on November 28, 1945

The central issue of the world is Washington-Moscow competition. The CCP- policy is to neutralize the United States in our struggle against Jiang’s regime, in order to reduce our difficulties. To reduce Washington’s excuse to attack us, we will not challenge the United States. However, this policy does not mean that we won’t oppose Washington’s policy to treat China as its colony.¹⁴

In his mediation, Marshall attempted to promote a multi-party system to China with focus on two principles: (1) The GMD's system of "political tutelage" and one-party rule should be modified to give all major political elements fair and effective representation in the Chinese government;¹⁵ and (2) The national army should be based on western military tradition which separated the army from politics.¹⁶

Based on these principles, Marshall proposed three actions: (1) Implement a cease fire; (2) Convene a political consultative conference; and (3) reorganize Chinese military forces. With 100,000 American troops and huge military supplies under his control, Marshall forced the GMD to make concessions satisfactory enough for the CCP to accept. Actually, he found that the Communists were more cooperative than the Nationalists during his early mediation. Chongqing and Yanan reached a truce on January

¹² “Directive on the Shift of U.S. China Policy and Our Party’s Response,” in *Zhonggong Zhongyan Wenjian Xuanji*, 15:494-5.

¹³ “Directive on Strategy to Deal with the United States and the Nationalists,” *Zhonggong Zhongyan Wenjian Xuanji*, 15: 455.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 15: 455-6.

¹⁵ “General Marshall's Appointment and Instructions,” *The China White Paper*, p. 133.

10, 1946. On the same day, the Political Consultative Conference (PCC) opened. Several agreements were reached during this conference: the Agreement on the Military Issue, the Agreement on the Constitutional Draft, and the Agreement on the National Congress. The Military Reform Plan was also passed on February 25, 1946.

These new changes brought new hope for a post-war peace to the CCP. On January 31 the PCC was over. Immediately after the PCC, the Central Committee of the CCP issued "A Directive on the Current Situation and Tasks." This document pointed out that the establishment of the National Political Consultative Conference and implementation of these agreements would eliminate the GMD's autocratic rule and guarantee national democracy and national peace. The CCP and its army had gained legal status. This was a great victory for the new democratic revolution.¹⁷ "China" it said "has stepped into a stage of peaceful and democratic construction." In this new stage, the GMD's autocratic rule would begin to erode. National politics would change from armed conflict to peaceful negotiations in parliament. The CCP would enjoy an equal position to the GMD in a new coalition government. However, the Communist Party would not control the army directly because all troops would belong to the state rather than to any party. The directive also predicted that the greatest danger in this new situation was a narrow "closed-door" trend, which would be harmful to the new situation.¹⁸ The Soviet Ambassador in Chongqing, however, thought the danger of a civil war was over. He told the CCP that the party should learn from France's experience and give attention to winning votes among the Chinese people.¹⁹

How did Mao view these developments? It seemed that the results of the CCP-GMD compromise achieved under the leadership of Liu Shaoqi were not what Mao was willing to

¹⁶ "The Military Reorganization Agreement of February 25, 1946," *Ibid.*, p. 141.

¹⁷ Hu, *Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong*, p. 428.

accept. For instance, “the Military Reform Plan” decided to have a national army of sixty divisions, with fifty nationalist divisions and ten Communist divisions. The ratio of deployment of these divisions represented a fourteen to one Nationalist superiority in Manchuria and a five to one Nationalist superiority in Central China.²⁰ It was clear that the agreements reached in the first three months of the Marshall mission “recognized the preponderant strength of the Kuomintang position in the National Government.”²¹ John Carter Vincent acknowledged, “My concept was that the Communists would come into the Government on a minority basis and that... through support of the Chiang Kai-shek government... [and] with help from us we could eventually strengthen the Chinese government enough to eliminate the Communists.”²² Actually, what the Marshall mediation hoped was to follow the model of France and Italy. From November 1945 to January 1946 Mao’s poor health did not allow him to give adequate attention to the negotiations between the CCP and the GMD. But Mao warned the Party that the parliamentary path was not suitable to China’s reality, and he even blamed this “parliamentary attempt” on Liu’s “rightist deviationism.”²³ One can see Mao’s thinking in a directive of 1 February starting that, “the GMD is still likely to launch a military assault on us, and we should tighten our vigilance. Generally speaking, armed struggle is over now. But to safeguard peace, the CCP everywhere should make use of the current situation to launch a three-month campaign to train our troops.”²⁴

¹⁸ “The CCP Central Committee’s Decision on Current Situation and Tasks,” *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji* (Selected CCP Central Committee Documents), 16:64-6

¹⁹ Yang Kuisong, *Zouxiang Fenlie*, pp. 235-6.

²⁰ Tang Tsou, *America’s Failure in China*, p. 410.

²¹ “The Military Reorganization Agreement of February 25, 1946,” *The White Paper on China*, p. 143.

²² Tang Tsou, *American’s Failure in China*, p. 372.

²³ Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism*, p. 124.

²⁴ “The CCP Central Committee’s Decision on Current Situation and Tasks,” *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji* (Selected CCP Central Committee Documents), 16:64-6. Liu sent this directive to Mao before it was issued to the public.

As if to justify Mao's worries. The GMD right wing proceeded to disrupt efforts to celebrate the National Consultative Conference. On February 10 GMD special agents beat up several prominent intellectuals, including Guo Moruo, Li Gongpu, and Si Fulian who were regarded as left-wing by the pro-democracy organizations. During that month anti-Communist demonstrations took place in several major cities.

On February 12 Mao chaired a Politburo meeting. This was the first time Mao attended a Politburo meeting since he became sick in November. Mao warned that

the United States and Jiang are attempting to eliminate us through integrating the CCP's troops into the national army. We want unification, but we do not want to be eliminated. It is most dangerous to let Jiang integrate our troops and to deploy them in different places.... We must deal with this new challenge carefully and properly. In principle, we have no choice but support his military reorganization. In practice, we must take action based on concrete circumstances. This is where we differ from the French Communists.²⁵

What happened soon justified Mao's concerns. An unfavorable situation arose with the appearance of a series of political events. On February 20, the government agents raided the CCP's newspaper *Xinhua Ribao* and *Minzhu Daili*, the newspaper of the Democratic League. In March the Second Plenary Session of the Sixth National Congress of the GMD passed five resolutions which violated the principle of a constitutional government. Three days later, Jiang gave a public speech claiming that the Political Consultative Conference was not a constitutional conference at all."²⁶ What Jiang meant here was that the PCC could not impose its decisions on the National government. Jiang also emphasized that "There

²⁵ *Mao Nianpu*, III: 57.

²⁶ Jin Chongji, *Mao Zedong Zhuan* (The Biography of Mao Zedong), (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1996), II: 753-5.

would be no internal peace without taking the sovereignty of Manchuria back into the GMD's hands."²⁷

Facing these challenges from the GMD, the CCP held a Politburo meeting on March 15. Mao insisted that Jiang never forgot two principles:

The first is to root out all revolutions. The second is to tolerate the revolutionary force for a certain time, while Jiang is unable to destroy it. Jiang is determined to eliminate all revolutionary partisans once he is capable of doing so. Our comrades won't forget his first such attempt. But the second is different. Many comrades forgot Jiang's threat, when he hid his aggressive face for a while. For instance, we forgot Jiang's threat from February 1st to 9th; but we remembered it again after the Jiaochangkou Incident [of February 10th].²⁸

As far as Marshall's mediation was concerned, Mao viewed it as a trick to put out a long cord with a hook at the end to prepare to catch big fish [the CCP's armies]. Later Liu Shaoqi also admitted that he and some other colleagues were so optimistic about the situation in January and February that they even forgot the danger of the GMD reactionaries.²⁹

Competition for Manchuria

During this time the struggle for controlling Manchuria never ceased even though a cease-fire agreement had been reached. Considering Manchuria's industrial capacity, rich natural resources, and strategic significance, neither the GMD, the CCP, the U.S. nor the USSR wanted it to fall in the hands of opponents. In Mao's mind, controlling Manchuria would allow the CCP to hold a reliable base area bordering on the Soviet Union. Conversely, Jiang believed that the CCP would be sandwiched from both north and south if he was able to seize control over Manchuria. In the eyes of Washington, it was largely Japan's occupation of Manchuria that led to the Pacific War. The Truman

²⁷ Jin Chongji, *Mao Zedong Zhuan* II:755.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, II: 755.

administration was determined to prevent this possibility from taking place again.

Meanwhile Moscow treated Manchuria as its former sphere of influence and Stalin now needed it as a buffer area to avoid direct confrontation with the United States. As a result of these conflicting priorities, Manchuria became a major battlefield.

Taking advantage of the competition between the GMD and the CCP, Moscow seized the opportunity to gain several economic benefits. Soviet troops removed the best and the most valuable industrial equipment valued at \$858 million. Then demanded joint Sino-Soviet operation of 80 per cent of the heavy industry in that region.³⁰ Facing reluctance from Jiang, the Soviet authorities threatened to not withdraw their troops. They informed the National government that all industrial enterprises in Manchuria should be regarded as “war booty” of the Soviet Union. In the end, Jiang had to give in to secure the withdrawal of the Soviet troops.

Believing that Moscow’s intention was to control Manchuria, Washington sent an identical note to both the Chinese and Soviet governments warning that Moscow’s actions violated the principle of the Open Door. Washington and London then unilaterally published the secret items of the Yalta Treaty. This exposed Moscow’s ambition to control Manchuria and caused deep resentment among the Chinese people. The right wing of the C.C. of the GMD took advantage of this nationalism to launch large-scale anti-Soviet and anti-Communist protest demonstrations in many big cities. Moscow became enraged because of these anti-Soviet actions.

As a result of this mounting hostility, the Soviet authorities delayed the date of withdrawal of their forces to the end of April and encouraged the CCP to send more troops into Manchuria. But on March 8, 1946 Soviet troops withdrew abruptly from

²⁹ “The Minutes of Liu’s Speech in a Politburo Meeting on November 21, 1946.” Ibid., pp. 755-7.

Fushun and Jilin, yielded these two cities to the CCP troops. Then the Soviet authorities revealed their planned date of withdrawal from Changchun to the CCP. Therefore, the CCP troops seized Changchun by force only a few days later after the Soviet forces left on April 14. Control of Changchun constituted the control of Northern Manchuria. Both Marshall and Jiang treated the seizure of Changchun as a blatant violation of the January Cease-Fire Agreement. Jiang was determined to take Changchun back by force. In this new situation, Marshall agreed to Jiang's request to transfer nine armies into Manchuria, and he also allowed Jiang to visit the National troops in Manchuria in his own plane on April 23.³¹

When Mao's troops and base areas in Manchuria were under critical attack, Moscow encouraged the CCP to extend the civil war out of Manchuria. Mao followed this advice and spread the war into southern Manchuria and other regions of China. Thus the competition around Changchun re-ignited the civil war and led to a breakdown of the truce and all of Marshall's peace efforts in China. Because of the CCP's effective military actions and pressure from Marshall, a brief truce took place from June 6 to June 30. But the possibility of unifying China through a political approach was gone, since both sides took advantage of the truce to make preparations for the perceived upcoming confrontation.

What happened in China reflected the increasing tension between Moscow and Washington on the world stage. Stalin asked his people in February to prepare for a new war with the capitalist nations. In the same month, George F. Kennan sent his famous "long telegram" to predict the coming of a cold war. The following month, Churchill made his famous "iron curtain" speech calling on all English-speaking nations to join

³⁰ Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941-50*, p.335-6.

together to deal with the threat from the Communist movement. Throughout 1946, Washington made great efforts to deal with Moscow's ambition to control Iran and Turkey, and sought to consolidate its position in Japan and South Korea and to resolve the diplomatic stalemate over Germany.

In this new situation, the Kremlin and the White House backed the opposite sides in China. The CCP could not have seized Changchun and the other big cities in Northern Manchuria without the covert assistance of the Soviet armies. Nor could the Nationalist government start its spring offensive campaign without America's military aid.

Open Split between the CCP and Marshall

Mao and the CCP leadership were now adopting an aggressive position toward both the Nationalist government and the Marshall mediation. On February 24, 1946 they published Stalin's warning of an unavoidable confrontation between the socialist and capitalist camps in *Jiefang Ribao*. It was clear that Mao welcomed Stalin's remarks, since they matched his consistently aggressive posture.

The anti-Soviet demonstration and protests encouraged by the GMD and the corresponding reaction from the Russian armies in Manchuria had revealed the split between the Soviet Union and the Nationalist government. On February 25, *Jiefang Ribao* published a long article on "The Chongqing Incident and the Manchuria Issue." The article attributed this political action to Jiang's anti-Soviet campaign. Two days later, *Jiefang Ribao* issued a statement given by a spokesman on behalf of Marshal Malinovsky in Manchuria. This statement promised that the Soviet troops would withdraw from China soon. But it hinted that the Russian troops would not withdraw from Manchuria completely until the

³¹ Niu Jun, *Neizhan Qianxi*, p. 302.

American troops left China. At the same time, the Soviet troops began to contact the CCP troops in Manchuria again and urged them to take more radical military actions in that region.³² This open USSR-U.S. competition encouraged Mao and his colleagues to take a stronger stand on the CCP-GMD negotiations.

In the CCP Central Committee's instruction, "The Northeast Problem," of March 5 1946, Mao pointed out that Moscow's request for more economic gains in Manchuria had been turned down by the United States and Jiang. As revenge, the Soviet troops had delayed their withdrawal. As a result, Mao predicted that "the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States and Jiang Jieshi will continue." Therefore, Mao decided that "the tentative compromises we have reached with the GMD regarding internal affairs in the Northeast will not be put into effect until a solution to the diplomatic problem there is achieved."³³ Furthermore, Mao asked his troops in Manchuria "to take the opportunity while the Soviet troops are still there, to mop up the local bandits,... and mobilize and organize the masses."³⁴

In the chilly atmosphere of the emerging Cold War, Marshall began to look at the CCP-GMD clash from the perspective of Moscow-Washington competition.³⁵ Therefore, Washington made a series of efforts to strengthen the superiority of the Nationalists. On June 13, the Department of State sent a proposal to Congress requesting the dispatch of American military advisory groups and increased military aid to the

³² "Northeastern Bureau's Telegram to the Central Committee of the CCP, February 23, 1946," Yang Kuisong's *Meisu lengzhan de Qiyuan jidui Zhongguo Gemin de Yingxiang* [The Origin of the Cold War and Its Impact on the Chinese Revolution], *Lishi Yanjiu* [Historical Research] No. 5, 1999, p.21.

³³ "Instruction, CCP Central Committee, "The Northeast Problem," 5 March 1946, *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjia Xuanji*, Vol. 18, pp.172-3.

³⁴ Ibid., p.173.

³⁵ *Zhou Enlai Yiji Siliu Nian Tanpan Wenxuan* [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai Negotiations in 1946], pp. 323 and 328; *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai] p.692; also see Shi Yinhong's dissertation, *Truman's New China Policy-From Hostility to the War*, History Department, Nanjing University, 1987, p.20.

National government; Congress promptly passed the State Department proposal. The Truman administration extended lend-lease to China under the terms of the new military aid agreement of June 28, 1946.³⁶ Even though Washington terminated lend-lease to other countries, Jiang's regime on June 30 received a land-lease "pipeline" credit from the United States of \$51.7 million.³⁷ This financial aid and military support gave Jiang the signal that he could gain Washington's support whether he compromised with Mao or not. In the following negotiations during the June truce, Jiang intended to provoke civil war by making an unacceptable proposal to his opponent. Some of the National government military officers and politicians said openly that only a policy of force would satisfy the situation and that the Chinese Communists could be quickly crushed. Jiang told Marshall, "given time, the ripe apple will fall into our laps."³⁸ On July 3, the National government declared that a national congress under exclusive leadership of the GMD would be held on November 12. This statement revealed the fact that Jiang was no longer interested in drawing the CCP to his own government. This was the last straw in the negotiations. Once they broke down, civil war was inevitable.

To the CCP leaders American military and financial aids were a sure sign that the United States once again stood openly on the side of the Nationalist government.³⁹ With the illusion of Marshall's impartiality broken, Mao began to think of a possible split with the American mediation. Hu Qiaomu, Mao's political secretary at that time later recollected that Mao had found it very difficult to make two decisions in his life: One was to dispatch the Chinese army into the Korean War; the other was to break with the GMD and the U.S.

³⁶ "Report Received from the Chinese Embassy on Shipments under the \$125 Million Grants," *The China White Paper*, p. 969.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 363, 969.

³⁸ "The End of American Mediation," *Ibid.*, p. 214.

³⁹ Zhang Baijia, "Zhou Enlai yu Marshall Shihua" [Zhou Enlai and the Marshall Mediation], *Jindaishi Yanjiu* [Modern History Research] No. 5, 1997, P.206.

on the eve of the Chinese civil war, for instance, when Zhou had intended to increase pressure on Marshall in April 1946 at a time, when Jiang's national armies prepared to launch a large-scale military campaign in Manchuria. Mao had telegraphed Zhou with the following instruction: "Do not make enemies with both the Nationalists and the Americans.... We are not afraid of targeting Jiang as our enemy. However, we should not take a hostile attitude toward Marshall unless he resumes Hurley's policy and gives full support to Jiang's autocratic rule and Jiang's preparations for a civil war."⁴⁰

But faced with Washington's series of measures during May and June to strengthen the Jiang's regime, Mao decided to take risk of splitting with the Marshall mediation by exposing Washington's pro-Chongqing and anti-Yanan's position.⁴¹ On June 5 he asked Hu Qiaomu to write an editorials to be published in *Jiefang Ribao* entitled "U.S. Should Stop Its Support of the Chinese Civil War Immediately."⁴²

When the CCP heard the news that James Byrnes, the Secretary of State, had sent a new China aid bill to the Senate on June 14, Mao instructed Lu Dingyi, the head of Propaganda Department, to write an article entitled "Oppose Byrnes' Aid-Jiang Act." The subtitle was: A Statement from a Yanan Authoritative Person. Mao added the last paragraph:

China's peace and democracy belong to the Chinese people's holy rights. Nobody is allowed to interfere with or take away these rights. If the Chinese reactionaries insist on civil war and despotism, if they play the role of traitors like Qing Hui, Zhang Bancang and Liu Yu, and if the GMD President as a son-emperor knees in

⁴⁰ Hu, *Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong*, p.430; also see Michael Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism*, p.120.

⁴¹ Hu, *Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong*, p. 436.

⁴² Jiang Xianzhi, *Mao Nianpu*, (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe and Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993), III: 80.

front of his foreign masters, the Chinese people must fight until they lose their last drop of blood.⁴³

The Yanan Radio Station also broadcast this statement at the same day.

On June 23, *Jiefang Ribao* issued the article "Chairman Mao's Statement against America's Military Aid to Jiang Jieshi." This statement argued that the weapons and other war materials sent from the United States during the Anti-Japanese War had been largely used by Jiang's regime to attack and blockade the CCP base areas. After the Anti-Japanese War, the U.S. government not only continued but increased its financial and military aid. Moreover the U.S. government had sent a large number of military force to China. These actions, Mao charged,

have proved to be the fundamental cause of China's civil war.... They represent America's interference in China's internal affairs. They can only strengthen the GMD's autocratic government and reduce China to civil war, division, chaos, fear and poverty. ... They threaten China's national security, territorial integrity and state sovereignty. They will only hurt the glorious friendship between the Chinese and American peoples and the future of Sino-U.S. trade.... Therefore, the Chinese Communist Party firmly opposes any military aid, through sale, lend-lease, or donation, to Jiang's regime. The Chinese Communist Party firmly opposes sending American advisory groups to China. The Chinese Communist Party strongly demands that the U.S. government stop doing this immediately, take back all the military aid and withdraw all its troops from China.⁴⁴

Based on Mao's request, *Jiefang Ribao* issued a long article on June 25 enlisting details of Washington's military, financial and personnel support to the Nationalist government since the Japanese surrender. It cited American transportation of large numbers of GMD troops equipped with American arms as well as additional large amounts of arms and ammunition, from southern China to the civil war front in northern

⁴³ Wen Jize, "A Statement from a Yanan Authoritative Person" in *Dang de Wenxian*, No. 3, 1996, pp.32-3.

⁴⁴ "Chairman's Statement against Washington's Aid-Jiang Act," *Jiefang Ribao*, June 23, 1946, See *Mao Ji*, 10:45-6.

and northeastern China. The United States had supplied the GMD over a thousand planes, hundreds of tanks, tens of thousands of trucks, and several dozen battle vessels. American military personnel had continuously assisted the “Chinese reactionaries” in training large numbers of naval, land, and air forces, who had been constantly sent to the front lines of the civil war. They had also provided the GMD with military intelligence information. Tens of thousands of GMD special agents organized, trained and equipped by the Americans, were deployed on the front lines. The conclusion was that “Marshall’s mediation had thus become pointless lip service.”⁴⁵

Following Mao’s instructions, the CCP issued a manifesto on July 7 containing a harshly worded attack on Washington’s China policy. The manifesto stated that the “American imperialists and Chinese reactionaries” had joined together to transform China into an “American colony.” It emphasized the CCP’s determination to deal with Jiang’s attack and America’s intervention on the side of the GMD.⁴⁶ The following day, Zhou submitted the manifesto to Marshall and told him that Washington should make a careful choice between the Communists and Nationalists at this critical moment.⁴⁷ These actions indicated that Marshall’s mediation had lost all credibility for the CCP leadership.

Marshall was now in a very embarrassing position. He was aware that his success depended largely on whether Jiang made enough concessions to draw the Chinese Communists into a coalition government. But even though Jiang refused to agree to a satisfactory compromise, Marshall had to help maintain the superiority of the Nationalist military forces. The paradox was that the more powerful the Nationalists became, the more reluctant they would be to work with the Communists. In the end, Marshall

⁴⁵ “The Details of America’s Interference of China’s Internal Affairs,” *Jiefang Ribao*, June 25.

⁴⁶ “The CCP Central Committee’s Manifesto in Memory of the Seventh Anniversary of the Anti-Japanese War,” *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, 16: 232-240.

"blamed his failure in China less on the Communists than on the Nationalists."⁴⁸

Frustrated with Jiang's determination to deal with the CCP by military means, Marshall decided to place an arms embargo in August 1946 on the National government. But this arms embargo did not affect Jiang's military plans since "the Nationalist Government had reached the peak of its military holdings."⁴⁹

On August 10, 1946 Marshall and Stuart issued a statement on the failure of the American mediation because their efforts could not control Mao and Jiang's determination to fight. From their part the CCP leaders reached a consensus that open fighting and a major confrontation will become the dominant factor for a fairly long period in the future. The problem can only be solved by eliminating Jiang's forces through superior performance in the fighting.⁵⁰

Thus on August 29 *Jiefang Ribao* published an editorial *One Year's Lesson*, pointing out that "What the American government spoke about was Roosevelt's four freedoms, US-China equality, U.S.-Soviet cooperation and the fight against the Japanese invaders." But what the United States did in the last year was nothing but help Jiang Jieshi to realize his autocracy."⁵¹ Another editorial in *Jiefang Ribao* on September 12, 1946 concluded that

The Chinese people did not expect the U.S. government to help the Chinese people. They only hoped that the U.S. government would carry out President Roosevelt's policy, that is, one of neutrality and one that does not intervene in China's internal affairs and that supports China in establishing a coalition government that represents the workers and peasants as well as Jiang Jieshi. Within the last year, the Chinese people hoped twice that this would happen. The first time was during the period when Hurley and Wedemeyer were in China. The second time was the period when Marshall was in China. After

⁴⁷ Niu Jun, *Neizhan Qianxi*, p.325.

⁴⁸ E.R. May, Ed., *The Truman Administration and China, 1945-1949*, p. 12.

⁴⁹ "Communist Resentment of American Aid to China," *The China White Paper*, p. 181.

⁵⁰ Hu Qiaomu, *Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong*, p.441.

⁵¹ *Jiefang Ribao*, August 29, 1946.

these two experiences, the Chinese people no longer have any doubts about the real nature of the U.S. government's imperialist policy.⁵²

During an interview between Mao and Arch. T. Steele, a journalist of *the New York Herald Tribune*, on September 29, 1946, Steele asked Mao what it would happen if Washington continued its mediation. Mao replied:

I doubt very much that the policy of the U.S. government is one of 'mediation.' Judging by the large amount of aid the United States is giving Chiang Kai-shek to enable him to wage a civil war on an unprecedented scale, the policy of the U.S. government is to use the so-called mediation as a smoke-screen for strengthening Chiang Kai-shek in every way and suppressing the democratic forces in China through Chiang Kai-shek's policy of slaughter so as to reduce China virtually to a U.S. colony.⁵³

At the end of the interview, Mao indicated that the continuation of the American mediation would not be welcomed.

At the same day, the CCP issued an instruction on "Forcing American Troops to Withdraw from China." It charged that the Truman administration "has obviously ordered Marshall and Jiang Jieshi to expand military operations while at the same time continuing the peace initiative. Therefore, we should no longer negotiate for an unconditional ceasefire," because this "unconditional ceasefire will only allow Jiang Jieshi to occupy a convenient position to consolidate the areas his troops have occupied in the past three months, and allow him to again more time to strengthen his forces. In order to break the American smokescreen of a peace initiative, our propaganda should now focus on 'forcing American troops to withdraw from China.'"⁵⁴

⁵² *Jiefang Ribao*, September 12, 1946.

⁵³ "The Truth About U.S. 'Mediation' and the Future of the Civil War in China" *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, IV:109,

⁵⁴ "The CCP Central Committee's Instruction, 'Force American Troops to Withdraw from China,' 29 September 1946," *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji*, Vol. 16, pp.299-300.

On October 4, the CCP Central Committee wired Zhou that there was no necessity for the CCP to request Marshall and Stuart to continue their efforts should they make the decision to terminate the mediation. The door to negotiations was completely closed on November 15 with the opening up of the National Assembly of the National government. Zhou and the CCP delegation left for Yanan four days later.

After the CCP's negotiating group returned to Yanan a meeting was held on November 21 between Mao, Zhou and Liu Shaoqi. One year's negotiations, Zhou said, had exposed Jiang's determination to continue his autocratic rule and maintain his power through civil war. The CCP had also understood that America's goal was to put China under its exclusive control. Therefore, the CCP had no other choice but meet this challenge through armed struggle.⁵⁵ Mao commented that the CCP at its Seventh Congress had predicted that a civil war was unavoidable. The situation, Mao said, seemed favorable to us in early 1946. However, what had happened later proved what CCP had prediction at the Seventh Congress was correct. The civil war was not a question any longer. What the CCP should do was to establish people's confidence in its ability to defeat the National government.⁵⁶

In this situation, the CCP Central Committee told the whole party that they should completely abandon any illusions for the American government; they should completely abandon the notion that peace and democracy could be achieved soon and the civil war would be over in a short time.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Zhou Nianpu, (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1989), p.706.

⁵⁶ Hu, *Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong*, pp. 440-441. Also see Jiang Xianzhi's *Mao Nianpu*, 3:150-1.

⁵⁷ Gao Ming, "Jiefang Zhanzeng Yingzi Tingjin Zhongyuan Shi" [The War of Liberation Should Start from the Time When the PLA Armies Had Entered the Central China], *Dang de Wenxian*, No. 3, 2002, p.87.

Manipulate the CCP and the People for a Civil War

Having decided to win state power through military means, Mao began to make use of opportunities to diminish people's fear of the United States and increase the confidence of his party and troops to win the civil war from July on. Because of lacking confidence to win a civil war, Li Fuchun and Huang Kecheng, two commanders of the Manchurian Democratic Army, had suggested that the CCP make more concessions to the Nationalist government. In his telegram on July 6, Mao criticized them for overestimating the strength of the GMD and the American imperialists and underscored the strength of the CCP military force. Mao insisted that "the key note of our policy must be struggle, not compromise. If our Party struggles firmly against the unreasonable pressures and demands of the Americans and Jiang, the result will be better than making bigger and more concessions. If we fail to show the spirit of struggle, the consequences will be grave."⁵⁸ Two days later, Mao urged his Party and the media to arouse the confidence of the Chinese people to defeat the joint efforts of the United States and the Nationalists.⁵⁹ In his talk with American journalist Anna Louis Strong on August 6, 1946 Mao ridiculed his American and the Nationalist opponents as "paper tiger." He linked that the fate of the nationalist government and its American supporters to that of the Czar, Hitler, Mussolini and Japanese imperialism.⁶⁰ On September 21, 1946, *Jiefang Ribao* published an editorial "Jiang's Failure Is Certain" written by Lu Dingyi, who was in charge of the CCP's propaganda. Following Mao's edit, this editorial proclaimed that the Chinese people had seen through the imperialist nature of the American government during the Hurley and Marshall mediations.

⁵⁸ Mao, "The Major Policy toward the U.S. and Jiang is to Fight rather than Concession, July 6, 1946" *Mao Zedong Wenji*, III:146.

⁵⁹ Mao, "The Announcement on How to Study and Propaganda the Party's July 7th Declaration," *Mao Zedong Wenji*, III:148.

⁶⁰ Mao, "The Talk with American Journalist Anna Louis Strong" August 6, 1946," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, IV:97-101.

Three facts would determine the CCP's victory. They were the base areas, the strength of the CCP military forces and the CCP's policy of land reform.⁶¹ Eight days later Mao wrote a letter to Lu Dingyi again in which he said, "The priority of the media now is to increase the confidence of our people and our armies how to win the civil war. Even though Jiang has an army of two million and the aid of the United States, the victory of the CCP army and the failure of the Nationalists are out of question."⁶² On October 1, 1946, Mao wrote *A Three Month's Summary* concluding that "We can defeat Chiang Kai-shek. The whole Party should be fully confident of this."⁶³

In order to gain public support, the CCP manipulated anti-Jiang and anti-U.S. emotions among the people and students in GMD-occupied areas to squeeze US troops out of China. The CCP's activities in cities were now under the direct leadership of Zhou. The CCP Central Committee on June 24 issued the "Directive to Mobilize the People against the U.S.' Pro-Jiang Policy." In September a pedicab worker in Shanghai was beaten to death by an American soldier. Taking advantage of this incident, the CCP Shanghai Branch and 14 organizations and parties launched a campaign to drive Americans out of China. On December 24 a female student in Beijing University was raped by an American soldier. More than 5,000 students in Beijing participated in an anti-American demonstration. The CCP made the decision to make use of this incident to launch a nation-wide political campaign to stop U.S. involvement in the civil war, boycott American goods, and abolish the Sino-U.S. Trade Treaty. From December 1946 to January 1947 more than half a million students in major cities of China participated in this campaign supported by workers, peasants, bourgeoisie and intellectuals. Because of this anti-American pressure, the U.S.

⁶¹ Hu, *Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong*, p.439.

⁶² Mao, "The Letter to Lu Ding-yi," *Mao Zedong Wenji*, III:185.

⁶³ Mao "A Three Months' Summary," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, IV:113.

government was forced to reduce its military forces in Beijing, Tianjing and Qingdao and even cut off military aid to the Nationalist government for a short time.⁶⁴

The Intermediate Zone and the Two Camps Theories

Faced with the increasing tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States abroad, and the tension at home between the CCP and the GMD, a large number of the CCP members, including some high-ranking CCP leaders worried about the possibility of a third world war. In order to help his Party have a clear understanding of the new situation and be prepared for the coming confrontation with the GMD and the U.S., Mao presented the theory of “the intermediate zone” during his talks with Anne Louise Strong in August 1946. According to this theory, there was not an immediate war going on at the time between the Soviet Union and the United States, because the two rivals were separated by many capitalist, colonial, and semicolonial countries in a vast zone of Europe, Asia and Africa. It was America’s long-term goal to fight against the Soviet Union. But at present its anti-Soviet propaganda was a smoke screen to cover its short-term aim to control the countries and areas in the intermediate zone. The peoples in this intermediate zone should recognize the nature of the struggle between them and the U.S., and should insist on fighting for their own independence and liberty.⁶⁵ Mao’s concept of the intermediate zone was presented to the public through Lu Dingyi’s article “Explanations of Several Basic Issues in the Postwar Period” dated January 2, 1947. Mao added in a conclusion that: “It can be predicted that the situation in China and the world will be quite different in three or five

⁶⁴ *Zhongguo Gongcandang Dangshi: 1921-1949* [The CCP History: 1921-1949], (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2002), part II, Vol. 1, pp. 912-5.

⁶⁵ "Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong," *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, IV: 99.

years. The whole party and all the Chinese people should continue our brave fight for the coming of a new China and a new world.”⁶⁶

With the establishment of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in September 1947, the bipolar camps of the Cold War became an acknowledged fact. Mao introduced Andrei Zhdanov's two camps theory to describe the world situation at the end of 1947. One was the “imperialist camp” under the leadership of the United States. The other was the “anti-imperialist camp” led by the Soviet Union. The Chinese revolution led by the CCP belonged to the “anti-imperialist camp.”⁶⁷ From the fact that Mao had created the intermediate zone and had accepted the two camps theory, we can see how deeply and how far China’s anti-imperialist tradition since the Opium War and Leninist class struggle had influenced Mao during the CCP revolution. Actually, Mao’s viewpoint could be traced back almost to the very beginning when the CCP was founded. Influenced by Lenin’s theory on imperialism, the CCP declared in its Second Party Congress that imperialist countries in the world had joined together to control and exploit proletarians in China and other nations. Therefore, the Chinese revolution must emerge with the revolutionary trend of the oppressed classes and nations in the world. This was the only way for the Chinese people to gain their own freedom.⁶⁸

Conclusion

The Marshall mediation occurred during the transitional period from Moscow-Washington cooperation to competition. While this cooperation delayed the outbreak of a

⁶⁶ Hu, *Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong*, pp. 443-4.

⁶⁷ “Present Situation and Our Tasks,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, IV:172-3.

⁶⁸ “The Statement of the Second Party Congress of the CCP” July 1922, in *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji*, 1:107-109.

civil war, the increasing Moscow-Washington competition undermined any hope of compromise and peace between Jiang and Mao.

In reviewing Mao's attitudes towards the Marshall mediation, scholars differ with regard to his priorities. For instance, Niu Jun thinks that in early 1946 Mao "overestimated the U.S. capacity" to solve the GMD-CCP conflict. "Mao even openly proclaimed that, as for the coming of China's peace and democracy, the initial 'impetus' came from the international compromises between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, even going so far as to praise Marshall as an 'outstanding benefactor' to China's peace and democracy." Only when the CCP realized that Washington did not have capacity to militarily intervene in the Chinese revolution, it "readjusted its revolutionary goal to seizing the seat of power by means of war."⁶⁹

Zhang Baijia held the same position as Niu did. He argues that the CCP was more interested in a peace because the CCP military strength was obviously weaker than that of the GMD; the CCP leadership was more confident of winning the support of the Chinese people in a parliamentary competition; and both the United States and the Soviet Union were unwilling to see a civil war in China because it would lead to a direct confrontation between these two powers. It was Marshall's absence in March that led to the failure of his effort.⁷⁰

Odd Arne Westad had similar argument that Mao's moderation was over his revolutionary action from 1944 to 1945. He intended to win power through political

⁶⁹ Niu Jun, "On the Internally-oriented Characteristic of China's Diplomacy from 194 to 1955" in Harvard University Asia Center's Triangular Relations Conference, July, 2002, http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/archive/TR_Niu.htm, p.3; Niu also expressed this view in his book *Neizhan Qianxi* and other articles such as "Yijiusiwu Nian zhi Yijiusijiu Nian de Meisu Guogong Guanxi" [The Relations between the U.S., the USSR, the GMD and the CCP from 1945-1949], *Lishi Yanjiu*, No. 2, 2002.

⁷⁰ Zhang Baijia, "Zhou Enlai yu Marshall Shihua" [Zhou Enlai and the Marshall Mediation], *Jindaishi Yanjiu* [Modern History Research], No. 5, 1997, p.186.

approach when the U.S.-USSR war-time cooperation continued. However, Jiang and Mao became more warlike when an intense competition took place between Moscow and Washington in China. He concluded that it was the Cold War that led to the Chinese civil war.⁷¹

Michael Sheng attributed Mao's seeming willingness to accept the Marshall Mission to the pressure of both the Soviet Union and the United States. "Stalin's warning of a possible U.S. direct intervention against the CCP" in early 1946, "was not off the mark." "Stalin's caution served as a balancing mechanism to Mao's often impulsive and radical policy." Thus "Mao's handling of Marshall was tactful enough not to provoke American direct participation in the civil war on the GMD's behalf." But Mao was actively pursuing a delaying tactic. He needed time to strengthen the CCP military forces. At the same time, he took part in the parliamentary struggle to undermine the GMD's political institutions and to enhance the CCP's political power.⁷²

Wang Yongxiang and Qin Lihai argued that the Yalta Conference established a foundation for the U.S.-USSR cooperation in Asia, particularly in China. It was the consensus and compromise between Washington and Moscow to avoid a Chinese civil war so as to ensure their own privileges and control in China that led to a corresponding compromise between Nanjing and Yanan. The concrete result was the convening of the Political Consultative Conference in January 1946. ⁷³ Here readers could draw an inference that this GMD-CCP compromise was only temporary and opportunistic, since

⁷¹ Odd Arne Westad, *The Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

⁷² Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism*, pp.120-4. James Reardon-Anderson in *Yenan and the Great Powers* had a very convincing analysis to this regard.

⁷³ Wang Yongxiang and Qin Lihai, "The Relationship between the Intervention in the Current Political Situation of China by U.S./USSR and the Convention of the Political Consultative Conference" [The Relationship between the Intervention in the Current Political Situation of China by U.S. /USSR and the Convention of the Political Consultative Conference] in *Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu*, No. 3, 2000, pp.19-25.

both sides just made use of international pressure to weaken their opponent and to prepare for a military showdown.

In his article “On the Origin of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War and Its Impact on the Chinese Revolution,” Yang Kuisong attributed Mao’s willingness to ignore or even criticize the Marshall mediation to the growing competition between Moscow and Washington. Washington’s exclusive control of Japan and its intense competition with the USSR in Europe and the Middle East made Moscow change its pro-Jiang policy in China. Not only did Moscow provide Mao’s troops in Manchuria with military materials, but it also encouraged the CCP to fight in Shangdong and other areas. By contrast, Washington was unwilling to be tied down in China’s civil war because of its Europe-first grand strategy.⁷⁴

As indicated in this chapter the CCP leadership as a whole differed over how to deal with the Marshall mediation. It was clear that Liu Shaoqi was more optimistic about reaching a compromise between the GMD and the CCP and a peaceful future. Mao, by contrast, had few if any illusions in this regard. From the outset, the Directive of the CCP Central Committee on the Marshall Mediation of December 19, 1945 had asserted that it was America’s consistent policy to support Jiang’s regime and the Truman administration did not fundamentally modify this position. It cautioned the Party not to have any illusions about the Marshall mission. Then when a series of agreements of peace were concluded, Mao urged not to implement them in March, since he noticed an increasingly open split between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Finally, Mao made up his mind to split with the United States after the Congress had passed a new China aid bill.

As for the United States, Tang Tsou argued forcefully that it faced a dilemma of imbalance between ends and means in China. The United States was either unwilling or unable to apply military force purposefully to realize its ambition to control China. The United States was also unwilling and unable to abandon unattainable goals in order to avoid entanglement in a hopeless pursuit.⁷⁵ This was the tragedy of Hurley and Marshall's mediation.

The author noticed another factor that could explain the failure of Washington's diplomatic efforts. It should not simply be attributed to Hurley and Marshall's own personal capacity, but rather to the irreconcilability of the different cultures in the United States and China. Compromise is a very important characteristic in Western culture. It was compromise that helped the original thirteen colonies to pass the Constitution and become a united country. Based on the principle of compromise, the democratic government of the United States could overcome crises such as the Civil War and the Great Depression. However, the political system of Chinese culture performed unified rule by a single authority, by which one contestant won the rest lost. Because of his strong belief in class struggle, Mao was fundamentally opposed to compromise. In Mao's mind, socialism and proletariat dictatorship were the highest goal of the CCP's revolution. Because he represented big bourgeoisie, big landlords and allied with Western imperialist powers, Jiang was number one the target of Mao's revolution. After nearly two decades of life-and-death fighting between the Nationalists and the Communists, neither Jiang nor Mao had any illusions about sharing power together. Both of them exploited Washington's mediations to prepare for a final confrontation.

⁷⁴ Yang Kuisong, "Meisu Lengzhan de Qiyuan Jidui Zhongguo Gemin de Yingxiang" [The Origin of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War and Its Impact on the Chinese Revolution], ed., Zhang Baijia and Niu Jun, *Lengzhan yu Zhongguo* [The Cold War and China] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2002), pp.51-88.

It was clear that the Marshall mission confirmed the CCP's analysis of late 1944 that Washington's strategic objectives were different from that of the CCP. A Chinese proverb says that a person could be deceived once or twice but not the third time. It was from this perspective that *Jiefang Ribao* in its editorial of September 12, 1946 concluded that "After these two experiences, the Chinese people no longer have any doubts about the real nature of the U.S. government's imperialist policy."⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Tang Tsou, *American's Failure in China 1941-50*, Vol. 1, p. ix.

⁷⁶ *Jiefang Ribao*, September 12, 1946.

CHAPTER V

THE FAILURE OF ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

With the shared understanding among President Truman, Marshall and Acheson from 1947 that Washington should not be drawn into China's civil war, the American government adopted a strategy of gradual disengagement to distance the U.S. from the Nationalist government. However, the American government was unable to implement this policy vigorously because of the constraints of American domestic politics on the one hand and its own anti-Communist mindset and determination to maintain the status quo of the world on the other. At the same time, the Chinese Communist revolutionary momentum also reached its peak. Inevitably, these two historical trends with their hostile ideologies and opposing strategic objectives clashed within the overriding framework of the Cold War.

The Parallel of Acheson's Disengagement Policy and his Open Anti-CCP Stance

Marshall began to adopt a policy of non-intervention when he became Secretary of the State in early 1947.¹ But Marshall felt a "wave of sentiment in favor of aiding China" when he faced powerful pressure from the American public and the American political arena.² He wavered, then changed his disengagement policy back to limited commitment. The arms embargo was lifted on May 26, 1947. When the American marines withdrew from north China, they delivered 6,500 tons ammunition to the Nationalists. The China

¹ Marshall's non-intervention policy embodied the following actions: (1) phasing an arms embargo on the Nationalist government to protest Jiang's determination to launch a civil war. (2) Having lost his illusions of joining the two rivals together, Marshall requested President Truman to terminate his mission. (3) He took a negative attitude to Wedemeyer's proposal to give Jiang a full support.

² "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) Nov. 13, 1947," *FRUS* 1947, 7:1215.

Aid Act of 1948 was passed with the addition of military aid. Marshall also decided to remove restrictions on the Army Advisory Group by authorizing the advisory group to commence a limited training programs for Chinese combat forces in Taiwan. Marshall was clearly reluctant to make these changes: "We must recognize that we have the problem of prolonging the agonies of a corrupt government, and that we probably have reached the point where we will have to accept the fact that this government will have to be retained in spite of our desire to change its character."³

Acheson succeeded Marshall as Secretary of the State in January 1949. Foreseeing the inevitable defeat of the National government and the possibility of a coming Sino-Russian split, Acheson was also interested in the China policy of disengagement that Marshall had advocated. The first step of the China policy that Acheson decided to take was to "cut loose" from Jiang and stop a shipment of \$60 million in supplies. Then, in a meeting with GOP congressmen on February 24 Acheson made the famous remark that the next step the United States might take could not be foretold "until the dust settled." This statement was later modified to a policy to "wait until the dust settled."⁴ By the spring of 1949 Acheson's disengagement policy received endorsement from the President and the National Security Council.

The Truman administration adopted a series of measures to implement this disengagement policy. To help the American public understand and get prepared for Jiang's perceived collapse, and to avoid an attack on the China policy of the Truman administration, Acheson decided to issue the *White Paper* on China in August 1949. On January 5, 1950, Truman issued a statement reiterating Washington's support of the Cairo

³ "Minutes of a meeting with Secretary of State Marshall, Secretary of Defense Forrestal, and others, November 3, 1947," *FRUS*, 1947, 7:911.

⁴ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), p. 306.

Declaration of December 1, 1943, which had agreed to return Taiwan to China.

Moreover, Truman indicated that the United States had neither the desire to set up a military base in Taiwan nor any plan to offer military aid to Taiwan at that moment.⁵ On January 12, 1950 Acheson made it clear that Taiwan, Korea, Indochina, and Indonesia were not included in the American defense lines, and that they should rely on themselves to resist attack and seek protection from the UN, if these areas were under threat from Communist forces.⁶ These statements were intended to avoid a CCP-Soviet alliance during Mao's visit in Moscow.

Acheson's China policy of disengagement aroused strong resentment from the China bloc in the Congress, the China lobby, and some government officials in the Truman administration. Later McCarthyism also joined this anti-Acheson chorus. In order to obtain Republican votes and public support to carry through its grand strategy, the Truman administration was forced to make concessions one after another.⁷ First, Acheson had to agree to extend the China Aid Act beyond April 2, 1949. Then in a letter to Connally on July 1, 1949 Acheson promised them that the Foreign Relations Committee would be consulted before any decision was reached to recognize the People's Republic of China [PRC].⁸ Acheson's reaction was in fact a big concession to

⁵ "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State," *FRUS*, 1950, 6: 264.

⁶ Department of State, *Bulletin* (January 23, 1950), p. 111.

⁷ Thomas J. Christensen argues that the purpose of this grand strategy was to maintain Washington's domination in those industrial centers and resource-rich regions such as Western Europe, Japan and the Middle East. The Truman administration distinguished Moscow and Beijing separately and Beijing was only regarded as a sideshow. Marshall, Acheson and Truman intended to adopt a disengagement policy toward Mao's regime in order to concentrate limited military force and material resources on their struggle against the Soviet Union. However, it was very difficult to tell the American public why the United States should oppose communist Russia while compromising with communist China. To win a consensus among the American people and the Congress, the Truman administration had to continue its seemingly-hostile attitude and policy toward China. See *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflicts, 1947-1958*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

⁸ Foster Rhea Dulles, *American Policy toward Communist China, 1949-1969*, p. 49.

congressional critics, which would restrain the State Department's freedom of action.⁹ On the same day, Acheson rejected Stuart's request to visit Beijing to explore the possibility to set up a formal diplomatic relations.

If Acheson could be regarded reluctant to continue America's aid to the Nationalist government, he did not hide his contempt and hostility to the CCP revolution. Acheson's hostility became even more intense when Mao became Stalin's ally.

During the contacts between American Ambassador John Leighton Stuart and Huang Hua, the head of the Foreign Affairs Office in Nanjing, Stuart was required to pressure Mao with a warning that "should the situation appear to constitute a threat to the national security and interests of the United States, the U.S. government would have to re-examine the situation in China."¹⁰

The People's Republic of China was established on October 1, 1949. Very soon Acheson declared three criteria of recognition to confront Mao's non-recognition policy.¹¹ When Acheson heard that both India and Britain planned to recognize the PRC, he tried to stop their diplomatic actions. I will discuss this topic in details later.

Actually, Washington's expansion and competition with the USSR in Asia started as early as the time after Japan surrendered. It supported a Japanese puppet to become the Philippine President in 1946. It imposed the Philippine Parliament the Bell Act through which Americans could enjoy a system of preferential tariffs and a special constitutional rights. It also gained military bases in the Philippines through supporting a pro-Western

⁹ The executive responsibility in the matter of recognizing foreign governments had been generally accepted since 1900.

¹⁰ "Acheson to Stuart, April 6, 1949," *FRUS*, 1949, 8:231.

¹¹ Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China: 1941-50*. p. 516.

elite.¹² Washington began to change its original policy of demilitarization and democratization in Japan from 1947-1948. On May 17, 1947, Dean Acheson, by then Undersecretary of State, set up a new goal which required the U.S. to rebuild the two industrial workshops of Germany and Japan, in which the "ultimate recovery of the two continents so largely depends."¹³ In October 1948 President Truman approved NSC 13/2 which established economic recovery as primary objective in Japan. Therefore, "reparations would end, restrictions would be lifted on most industries, and the anti-monopoly program would cease."¹⁴ At the end of 1948, Mao's coming victory in China and the insurgencies in Indochina, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies drew Washington's attention to the importance of Southeast Asia. John P. Davies from the Policy Planning Staff urged the U.S. to "promote Southeast Asia's major function as supplier of raw materials to Japan, Western Europe and India."¹⁵ Acheson showed strong support for this proposal. In July 1949, Acheson appointed a special State Department advisory committee to explore possible plans, costs, and necessary forces to halt the spread of totalitarian communism in Asian countries around China.¹⁶ On March 7, 1950 Acheson requested economic assistance for South Korea. On June 1, Truman asked the Congress to offer an additional 75 million dollars of military assistance to countries in the general

¹² Glenn Anthony May, "The Unfathomable Other," ed. Warren I. Cohen, *Pacific Passage, The Study of American East-Asian Relations on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp.295-8.

¹³ Dean Acheson, "the Requirements of Reconstruction," speech of May 8, 1947, *Department of State Bulletin* 16 (May 18, 1947), 991-94. See Michael Schaller, *The United States, Japan, and China, 1948-51 and 1969-73*, *Harvard University Asia Center Triangular Relations Conference*, 1999, p.3.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.4.

¹⁵ Memorandum by Davies, "U.S. Policy with Respect to the Far East," December 6, 1948, box 222, FEC Records, RG 43, *ibid.* p.5.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

area of China to deal with the threat from international communists.¹⁷ In June 1950, he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the people of Indochina, Burma, Thailand, and Malaya were under a threat from the PRC. To reduce the threat, the United States should give strong support to France and the countries of the French Union in Indochina – Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.¹⁸ As Michael Schaller pointed out, Washington's policy in Southeast Asia largely came from "the geopolitical priority of containing the Soviet Union, and after 1949, China."¹⁹

With the permission from Acheson, John Foster Dulles visited South Korea to tell the National Assembly there that South Korea did not stand alone in its struggle against communism as long as it behaved in a worthy fashion.²⁰ Dulles also visited Japan to discuss the issue of Taiwan with MacArthur. Dulles sent MacArthur's memorandum to Acheson on June 22 from Tokyo in which MacArthur emphasized that Taiwan possessed both military and political significance to American global strategy and Western ideology. MacArthur urged Truman to give the Nationalists in Taiwan military, economic and political support.²¹ Acheson sent a telegraph at the same day to show his appreciation of MacArthur's memorandum. Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense, and Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also traveled to Japan to consult

¹⁷ "Presidential Papers: Truman (1950), p.448, in Lewis McCarroll Purifoy, *Harry Truman's China Policy* (New York: A Division of Franklin Watts, 1976), p.183.

¹⁸ Stephen Pelz, "U.S. Decisions on Korean Policy, 1943-1950: Some Hypotheses", Bruce Cummings, ed., *China of Conflict*, p.183.

¹⁹ Robert J. McMahon, "U.S.-Vietnamese Relations" in Warren I. Cohen, *Pacific Passage, The Study of American East-Asian Relations on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century*, p.322.

²⁰ Pelz, "U.S. Decisions on Korean Policy, 1943-1950: Some Hypotheses", Bruce Cummings, ed., *China of Conflict*, pp.126-7.

²¹ MacArthur's opinion on Taiwan is revealed through Memorandum on Formosa, by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, Far East, and Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan, June 14, 1950, *FRUS*: 1950, 7:161-5.

MacArthur on the issue of Taiwan. They returned home with a memorandum from MacArthur strongly requesting the extension of aid to Taiwan²²

Republicans still blamed the Truman administration as too soft on the Communism. The Gallup poll in May 1950 showed that Truman's support among the American people had declined: 44 percent disapproved his performance; 19 percent did not reveal their opinion; only 37 percent approved.²³

The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 seemed to be the last straw for the Truman administration. Already blamed for having "lost" China, the Truman administration could not survive the criticism of losing South Korea. At a meeting on June 25 with Acheson, Johnson, and the Chiefs of Staff, Truman condemned the hostilities as "lawless" and "unprovoked aggression." He promised that the United States would "vigorously support the effort of the [Security] Council to terminate this serious breach of the peace." The Korean War also brought a fundamental change in policy toward Taiwan. Truman declared after a meeting on June 27 that the United States had decided to neutralize the Taiwan Strait in order to prevent the Communist China's military action against Taiwan.²⁴ Even though the Truman administration with Marshall and Acheson as Secretaries of State did not intend to be drawn into the Chinese civil war, overnight the outbreak of the Korean War changed the direction completely.

²² Pelz., "U.S. Decisions on Korean Policy, 1943-1950: Some Hypotheses", Bruce Cummings, ed., *China of Conflict*, p.126.

²³ Pelz, "U.S. Decisions on Korean Policy, 1943-1950: Some Hypotheses," Bruce Cummings, ed., *China of Conflict*, p.127.

²⁴ "Statement by the President," Earnest R. May, ed., *Anxieties & Affluence: 1945-1965*, (New York: Mcgram Hill Book Company, 1966), pp.123-4.

Mao Was Determined to Squeeze the United States out of China

By the end of the Marshall mission, the CCP had grasped the reality of Washington's pro-GMD policy. On November 19, 1946, Zhou returned to Yanan and two days later the Central Committee held a meeting. Mao said at the meeting that Jiang's policy was to eliminate the CCP and its military forces completely. Therefore, the CCP's policy must also be war-oriented. There was no other choice.²⁵ Now Mao was determined to win power through military means. As far as the United States was concerned, Mao decided to drive it out of China.

Mao from 1947 was no longer interested in any negotiation. In response to Jiang and Stuart's proposal for restoring negotiations, Mao sent Dong Biwu the following instruction on January 16: We believe that the American-Jiang proposal of restoring negotiation is nothing but a plot, and we should not give it our approval....With regard to America's mediation, the time has not yet come for us to oppose it openly, but actually we should not go long with it."²⁶ On January 30, 1947 the CCP Central Committee set up the tone of propaganda,

The American termination of the Committee of Three²⁷ indicates that the American side has finally broken the ceasefire agreement and will no longer be bound by it.... The Chinese people strongly demand that our own problems should be solved by ourselves, and the United States should end its interference with China's internal affairs and should stop all of its assistance to Jiang Jieshi. The termination of the Executive Headquarters gives the American troops no excuse to stay in China. We thus request that the United States withdraw all of its naval, air, and ground force military advisors, and training agencies from China.²⁸

²⁵ Jing Chongji, *Mao Zedong Zhuan*, II:781.

²⁶ "Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Dong Biwu, 16 January 1947," *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia*, pp.77-8.

²⁷ The Committee of Three was the top mediating body during Marshall's mission to China. It consisted of George Marshall, CCP representative Zhou Enlai, and GMD representative Zhang Qun.

²⁸ Instruction, CCP Central Committee, "On the Termination of American Mediation in China," 30, January 1947 from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen's *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia*, p.78-9.

Making use of what Washington did in the Philippines as a lesson, Mao warned that

The circumstances in which this situation has arisen are that U.S. imperialism and its running dog Chiang Kai-shek have replaced Japanese imperialism and its running dog Wang Ching-wei and adopted the policies of turning China into a U.S. colony, launching a civil war, and strengthening the fascist dictatorship.... The Chinese people have no way out except through struggle.²⁹

The CCP also made use of international stage to impose pressure to the United States. On February 19 Zhou requested Stalin to express the CCP's following view in the second Moscow Conference of the Big Four Foreign Ministers: the American forces should withdraw from China and the U.S. government should restrain its military and financial aid to the GMD during China's civil war.³⁰

After the American Dixie group left Yanan in the morning March 11, 1947, Jiang immediately launched his attack on Yanan through heavy air bombing that afternoon. From the CCP's perspective, this military action reflected close cooperation between the U.S. and the GMD.

On May 30, Mao wrote an article to the New China News Agency connecting China's economic crisis and the civil war with the U.S. policy of "colonizing China,"

The extremely reactionary financial and economic policies long pursued by the Chiang Kai-shek government have now been aggravated by the Sino-U.S. Treaty of Commerce, the most treasonable treaty ever known. On the basis of this treaty, U.S. monopoly capital and Chiang Kai-shek's bureaucrat-comprador capital have become tightly intertwined and control the economic life of the whole country. The results are unbridled inflation, unparalleled soaring prices, ever-spreading bankruptcy of the industry and commerce of the national bourgeoisie and daily deterioration in the livelihood of the working masses, government employees and teachers.³¹

²⁹ "Greet New High Tide of Chinese Revolution," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, IV:120-1.

³⁰ Zhou Nianpu, p.720.

³¹ "The Chiang Kai-shek Government Is Besieged by the Whole People," May 30, 1947, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, IV:136.

Having heard the news that the United States could control China's customs service based on a secret treaty between the Nationalist government and the U.S. government, Mao, on December 2, 1947, attacked this action as Washington's latest violation of China's state sovereignty. He claimed a series of treaties to show that the United States was making China a new colony: Jiang "sold" the U.S. eight army bases, one naval base and three air bases; Jiang allowed the U.S. to supervise his budget. The American government, in return, offered Jiang more military and financial aid, which could only extend the civil war and increase the Chinese people's misery.³²

On December 25, 1947, again Mao identified the United States as new colonist in his address at an enlarged CCP Central Committee meeting,

We must defeat him [Jiang] because the war he started is a counterrevolutionary war directed by U.S. imperialism against the independence of the Chinese nation and the liberation of the Chinese people.... After the victorious conclusion of the anti-fascist Second World War, U.S. imperialism and its lackeys in various countries stepped into the shoes of German and Japanese imperialism and their lackeys and formed a reactionary camp against the Soviet Union, against the People's Democracies in Europe, against the workers' movements in the capitalist countries, against the national movements in the colonies and semi-colonies and against the liberation of the Chinese people.³³

Mao decided to expose this strategy in the summer of 1948 when he was told that Washington was considering replacing Jiang with the Guangxi Clique under the leadership of Li Zhongren,

The current policy of the U.S. State Department is still to sustain Jiang's anti-CCP activities. At the same time, the U.S. is discontented with Jiang's inability and military defeat. [The U.S. recent move] was to force Jiang to yield more power so that when the Jiang camp collapses the U.S. can unite various other reactionary cliques including possibly a portion of the bourgeoisie for the common cause of

³² "A CCP Spokesman Condemned An American-Jiang Dirty Deal," *Mao Ji*, 10:93-4.

³³ "The Present Situation and Our Task," December 25, 1947, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, IV:158-9.

anti-communism. Thus, the State Department is plotting all sorts of activities in the dark,... We should expose this sort of U.S. trick.³⁴

On the New Year Eve of 1948, Mao wrote an article "Carry the Revolution through to the End" for the New China News Agency to emphasize the anti-imperialist nature of the Chinese revolution. Jiang's regime, Mao claimed

had relied on U.S. imperialism to slaughter millions upon million of men and women, young and old, with bombers, fighter planes, guns, tanks, rocket-weapons.... U.S. imperialism on its part has seized China's sovereign rights over her territory, waters and airspace, seized inland navigation rights and special commercial privileges, seized special privileges in China's domestic and foreign affairs and even seized the privilege of killing people, beating them up, driving cars over them and raping women, all with impunity.

In his conclusion, "Only by completely destroying the Chinese reactionaries and expelling the aggressive forces of U.S. imperialism can China gain independence, democracy and peace."³⁵

At the Second Plenary Session of the CCP Seventh Central Committee in March 1949, Mao decided to adopt a policy of non-recognition toward the Western powers

As for the question of the recognition of our country by the imperialist countries, we should not be in a hurry to solve it now and need not be in a hurry to solve it even for a fairly long period after countrywide victory. We are willing to establish diplomatic relations with all countries on the principle of equality, but the imperialists, who have always been hostile to the Chinese people, will definitely not be in a hurry to treat us as equals. As long as the imperialist countries do not change their hostile attitude, we shall not grant them legal status in China.³⁶

Later Mao described this policy in such vivid expressions as "to set up a new kitchen" and "to invite guests after a general cleaning."³⁷ "To set up a new kitchen" meant that "The CCP should not be bound by the traditional international rules and regulations.

³⁴ *Mao Nianpu*, III:329-30.

³⁵ Mao, "Carry the Revolution through to the End," *Selected Works of Mao Tze-Tung*, IV: 303.

³⁶ "Report to Second Plenary Session of Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, IV: 370-1.

³⁷ Hu, *Mao Zedong in Hu Qiaomu's Memoirs*, p. 546.

All the treaties signed by the Nationalist government should not be recognized.”³⁸ “To invite guests after a general cleaning” meant getting rid of all the remaining privileges in China.

Under Mao’s non-recognition policy, the United States became the primary target. “The Directive on the CCP’s Foreign Policy” pointed out specifically that “American military officers should be under supervision, since they interfered with the Chinese civil war directly on the side of the Nationalists.”³⁹ On November 8, 1948, Zhu Qiwen, the new mayor of Shenyang, visited the U.S. consulate there. American Consul General Angus Ward was impressed with Zhu’s friendliness. He told Ambassador Stuart that the new Communist regime left a “definite impression of desiring to be friendly and helpful.”⁴⁰ Mao became very angry when he heard of this visit. In his telegram to Gao Gang on November 17, Mao criticized Zhu Qiwen’s actions as “ridiculously naïve.” Then he approved Gao’s proposal to “squeeze the American, British, and French consulates out of Shenyang.”⁴¹ Very soon Angus Ward became the first victim of this policy. Following the advice of I. V. Kovalev, a liaison between Stalin and Mao, local Communist officials charged Ward with spying when he refused to surrender a transmitter. Facing Ward’s resistance, they entered the Consulate, seized the transmitter, and took all the American diplomats there into custody. The incident ended one year later with the trial of Ward, and the expulsion of all the American diplomats in Shenyang. The whole process was approved by Mao.⁴²

³⁸ “The CCP Central Committee’s Instructions on Diplomacy,” *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji*, 18:44-5.

³⁹ “The CCP Central Committee’s Instructions on Diplomacy,” *Selected CCP Central Committee Documents*, 18:44-5.

⁴⁰ Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism*, pp.171-2.

⁴¹ Telegram, Mao Zedong to Gao Gang,” 17 November 1948, ed., Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia*, p.92.

⁴² Michael Sheng attributed this radical action to Mao’s jizou fangzhen [“squeeze out” policy]. See *Battling Western Imperialism*, pp.172-3.

Mao also targeted British forces. On April 30, 1949, he issued a statement "On the Outrages by a British Warship" denouncing Churchill's claim that British warships possessed legal status to stay in China because of the permission from the Nationalist government. He restated the non-recognition policy and demanded that all foreign warships withdraw from China.⁴³

The CCP noticed that the American embassy did not withdraw to Guangzhou with the Nationalist government after the CCP had seized Nanjing in late April. Mao thought it might be a sign that "Washington's aid-Jiang and anti-CCP policy has proved bankrupt. The American government may be exploring the possibility of setting up a formal diplomatic relationship with the new China."⁴⁴

It happened that on May 6 Ambassador Stuart initiated contact with Huang Hua. In his statement "On the Outrages by a British Warship," Mao had mentioned that the CCP would like

to consider the establishment of diplomatic relations with foreign countries. But such relations must be based on equality, mutual benefit, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and, first of all, on no help being given to the Kuomintang reactionaries. A foreign government which wishes to consider establishing diplomatic relations with us must sever relations with the remnant Kuomintang forces and withdraw its armed forces from China.⁴⁵

These two opposite demands sounded hostile to both Huang and Stuart even though they were logical and reasonable from their own perspectives.

Thus at the outset Huang was ordered to restate Mao's position that the United States should stop its intervention in the Chinese civil war and cut off all connection with the Nationalists if it wished to set up diplomatic relations with the new regime.⁴⁶ Stuart,

⁴³ "On the Outrages by British Warship," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, IV:402.

⁴⁴ Jiang Xianzhi ed., *Mao Zedong Nianpu*, [Chronicle of Mao Zedong], III:490.

⁴⁵ "On the Outrages by British Warship," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, IV:402.

however, insisted that the CCP commit itself to China's existing international obligations if the CCP regime wanted to receive recognition from the American government.

Other factors militated against compromise. Mao could not consider setting up formal diplomatic relations with Washington just when Liu Shaoqi and a Chinese delegation were preparing to visit Moscow and win Stalin's trust and support. On the U.S. side, Washington could not recognize the CCP regime due to Mao's non-recognition policy and constraints arising from domestic politics.⁴⁷ Not only was Stuart's request to visit Beijing rejected, but also the State of Department in August declared that Washington would continue its policy of supporting the Nationalist government. The "lost chance" scholarship, perhaps unfairly, blamed the Truman administration for its rigidity in failing to seize this chance to negotiate with the CCP. But Goldstein argued convincingly that

For accommodation to have been reached in the later 1940s, the Chinese Communist movement would have had to behave as something other than what it was: a Marxist-Leninist party committed to achieving a national, anti-imperialist revolution. Similarly, the United States would have had to behave as something other than what it was: a major imperialist state, with a history of involvement in China, that was coming increasingly to confront the Soviet Union in the global Cold War. But each side was what it was, constrained in making the choices that would constitute acceptance of the other side and its conditions. Indeed, each behaved in such a way as to exacerbate the differences in worldviews.⁴⁸

After the State Department published its *White Paper* on China, the CCP increased its condemnation of the United States. *The White Paper*, intended by the State Department to deal with partisan criticism, offered the Communists evidence of how strongly the American government supported the GMD at the expense of the CCP. Mao wrote five

⁴⁶ Jiang Xianzhi ed., *Mao Zedong Nianpu* [The Chronicle of Mao Zedong], III: 499.

⁴⁷ Huang Hua, "My Contacts with John Leighton Stuart after Nanjing's Liberation," *Chinese Historians*, Spring Volume 5, pp.47-56. Huang was told later that Acheson asked Stuart not to visit Beijing at that moment in order to avoid criticism at home.

articles attacking Washington's China policy. *The White Paper* proved, in Mao's view, that "It is a war in which the United States supplies the money and guns and Chiang Kai-shek supplies the men to fight for the United States and slaughter the Chinese people."⁴⁹ Secondly, Mao hoped to persuade Chinese intellectuals that the United States intended to make China into its colony.⁵⁰ Finally, Mao warned that Washington would continue to provide military support to the Nationalist government. Therefore, the Communists should prepare for further struggle against American intervention.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China in October 1949 the CCP-U.S. relations came under heavy strain. Mao sent out requests for recognition as soon as the PRC was established. A spokesman from the State Department declared that the American government would not take any action to recognize the PRC because Mao's recognition requests did not promise to fulfill China's international obligations.⁵¹ The American government not only refused to recognize the PRC, but also tried hard to keep its allies in line on non-recognition. Acheson told the Indian Ambassador to the U.S. that "the democratic countries should act together" not in hurry to recognize the CCP regime.⁵² Then he persuaded the British Ambassador that "the Chinese Communists were to follow the Russian example of considering themselves a revolutionary regime which seeks all the rights and only those obligations they choose to undertake." He made it clear that "We did not believe that hasty recognition would confer any permanent benefits on those who undertook it."⁵³ Actually, Acheson had made great efforts from early 1949 to

⁴⁸ Steven M. Goldstein, "Sino-American Relations, 1948-1950: Lost Chance or No Chance," ed., Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, *Sino-American Relations, 1945-1944: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade*, (Delaware: SR Books, 1989, p.138.

⁴⁹ "Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle," Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung. IV: 426.

⁵⁰ "Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle" and "Friendship or Aggression," *ibid.*, IV.

⁵¹ *New York Times*, October 4, 1949, p. 1.

⁵² "Memorandum of Conversation, December 6, 1949," in *Papers of Harry S. Truman*, Truman Library.

⁵³ "Memorandum of Conversation, December 8, 1949," in *Papers of Harry S. Truman*, Truman Library.

January 1950 to prevent Britain from recognizing Mao's new regime. It was because of London's concerns for Hong Kong, its relations with India and its commercial interests in China that the British government decided on January 10, 1950 to establish a formal diplomatic relationship with the PRC.⁵⁴

In a press conference on October 12, Acheson issued three criteria for America's recognition of a new government: (1) that it control the country it claimed to control; (2) that it recognize its international obligations; (3) that it rule with the consent of the people who were ruled.⁵⁵ The second criterion was just what Mao wanted to dispense with, for he was determined to "destroy imperialist domination" in China "systematically and completely." The first task when the CCP enters the big cities, Mao announced in March, 1949, is to "refuse to recognize the legal status of any foreign diplomatic establishments and personnel of the Kuomintang period, refuse to recognize all the treasonable treaties of the Kuomintang period, abolish all imperialist propaganda agencies in China, take immediate control of foreign trade and reform the customs system." Only in this way, Mao thought, "the Chinese people will have stood up in the face of imperialism."⁵⁶

Even though Truman declared his new China policy of nonintervention on January 5, 1950, the long-term hostility and suspicion made Mao doubt Washington's new policy. Moreover, Acheson's speech on January 12 discounted its effect as long as he labeled Mao's regime as Moscow's running dog.

Mao was in Moscow when Acheson made his speech on January 12, 1950. Thus Acheson's speech could not achieve the aim of splitting the two Communist countries,

⁵⁴ Shi Yinhong, "Yu Liangji Bingcun de Duoyanghua Tujing: Yingguo, Yindu ji Meiguo Duihua Zhengce" [The Parallel between the Two Superpowers and Diversity: British, Indian and America's China Policy, 1949-1950], ed. Zhang Baijia and Niu Jun, *The Cold War and China*, (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2002). pp.89-96.

⁵⁵ Tang Tsou, p. 516.

since Mao was seeking military and financial aid from Stalin. Instead, his speech pushed Mao even deeper into Stalin's arms. Stalin told Mao on January 18, 1950 that the two governments should issue an official statement to condemn what a Polish newspaper called Acheson's intention to "force a wedge between the Chinese and Soviet nations."⁵⁷ Accepting Stalin's suggestion, Mao spent a whole night writing an article condemning Acheson's speech. He charged that the speech was full of lies. The fact was, said Mao, that the American government gave the Nationalist government 6 billion dollars to kill millions of Chinese people. The article made it clear that such a speech could only anger both the Russian people and the Chinese people, and could only strengthen friendly cooperation between China and the Soviet Union.⁵⁸

Mao's non-recognition policy also targeted at the "third force" composed of non-GMD and non-CCP factions. As early as 1946, Marshall had placed his hope in the "third force." In December 1948 Mao received a report from a unnamed American news reporter in Hong Kong that Washington would create and support non-CCP opposition forces in China's coalition government so that these forces could undermine the CCP's united front with other political groups. Mao sent this report to all the Politburo members. He warned, "We must pay immediate attention to plots like this, and we must not allow this U.S. imperialist plot to prevail in the new Political Consultative Conference and the coalition

⁵⁶ "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China" *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, IV: 370.

⁵⁷ Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 66.

⁵⁸ "Mao's Telegram to Condemn Acheson's Lie," *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao* [Manuscripts of Mao Zedong from the Period after the Nation's Founding], I:245-7.

government.”⁵⁹ During late December 1948 and early January 1949 Mao turned up the heat,

The U.S. imperialist policy toward China has changed from pure support of the GMD's anti-Communist military campaign to a two-sided policy. That is, while continuing their support to the remnant GMD military forces and the forces of local warlords in their continuous resistance of the PLA's advance, they are dispatching their running dogs to infiltrate the revolutionary camp to organize a so-called opposition faction in an attempt to sabotage the revolution from within. When the PLA is about to achieve the nationwide victory, they may even adopt a strategy of pursuing legal status in the People's Republic by recognizing it, so that they would be able to go on with this conspiracy of 'sabotaging [the revolution] from within.' We must raise our vigilance and smash this conspiracy resolutely.⁶⁰

During his meetings with Huang Hua, Stuart stated clearly that one of the conditions under which the United States would recognize the CCP new regime depended on whether the CCP could “try its best to absorb all the democratic enlightened personages to participate” in the future new government.⁶¹ This demand just confirmed Mao's suspicion. In order to eliminate the illusions of the “third force,” Mao condemned America's educational, medical and religious activities in China a form of cultural invasion.⁶²

Mao's non-recognition policy was influenced by intense nationalism among the CCP middle and lower-ranking officers and the populace. From the very beginning, the CCP identified its revolution as an anti-imperialist revolution. In its propaganda, the final victory of the CCP meant the end of Western privileges in China. In order to arouse the Chinese people to join the CCP's anti-GMD and anti-imperialist revolution, the CCP's

⁵⁹ “Mao Zedong's Remarks on a Report, Allegedly, by an American Correspondent in Hong Kong, 4, December 1948,” ed., by Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia*, p.93.

⁶⁰ “To Carry the Revolution through to the End,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, IV:301-2; “The Current Situation and the Party's Tasks in 1949, 8 January 1949,” in *Zhonggong Zhongyan Wenjian Xuanji*, 18:17-18.

⁶¹ “The Talk between Huang Hua and Leighton Stuart,” June 7, 1949, in the CCP Central Archives, from Niu Jun's “On the Internally-oriented Characteristic of China's Diplomacy from 1945- 1955, See http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/archive/tr_niu.htm.

propaganda attributed the Chinese people's poverty, China's humiliation and the GMD government's corruption to the Western powers, particularly, to the United States. For example, Shen Cong, a female Beijing University student, had been raped by an American soldier on December 24, 1946. The CCP made use of this incident to launch a nation-wide anti-American demonstration.⁶³ With the coming victory of the CCP revolution, Chinese nationalism intensified. The search of Stuart's residence and mistreatment of William Olive, an American consular officer in Shanghai, demonstrated China's anti-American sentiment. Even though the CCP's foreign policy required that "we should combine the sense of principle with flexibility so we may adhere to our principles while being flexible and keeping options open,"⁶⁴ few PLA middle and lower-ranking officers and soldiers would follow it. In his report to the CCP Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping said it was very difficult for the lower-ranking PLA officers and soldiers to be "capable of being flexible," unless the Central Committee "stipulated some more rigid rules."⁶⁵ But from Mao's perspective, one needs to surpass the line in order to correct a long-term bad habit. Even though the CCP could greatly benefited from its anti-imperialism propaganda, its foreign policy and flexibility were obviously constrained.⁶⁶

⁶² See his article are "Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle," "Farewell, Leighton Stuart!" "Why Is It Necessary to Discuss the White Paper?" "Friendship or Aggression?" and "The Bankruptcy of the Idealist Conception" in *Selected Works of Mao Tze-Tung*, Vol. IV.

⁶³ The GMD government released the American soldier in January 1947 and the American Navy set him free in August. Mao took this case as a strong evidence to condemn both the American government and the GMD. See "Friendship or Aggression," *Selected Works of Mao Tze-Tung*, IV:447-9.

⁶⁴ "Instruction, CCP Central Committee, 'On Diplomatic Affairs,' 19, January 1949," *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji*, 18:44.

⁶⁵ "Deng Xiaoping's Report to Chairman Mao about the Situation around Crossing the Yangtze River, May 10, 1949," see Niu Jun's "On the Internally-oriented Characteristic of China's Diplomacy from 1945-1955." P.7.

⁶⁶ The following scholarship analyzed how Chinese nationalism affected the CCP's foreign policy. Steven M. Goldstein, "Sino-American Relations, 1948-1950: Lost Chance or No Chance," Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, *Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955*, pp.133-5; Suzanne Pepper, *Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-49* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp.52-92.

Mao's American Strategy in the Liberation War

The CCP labeled the civil war from 1946 to 1949 as a “War of Liberation.” Its objectives, in Mao’s words, were “Down with Jiang Jieshi and Liberate all China.” The CCP’s “Liberation War” experienced three stages: military defense from June 1946 to June 1947; military offense from July 1947 to June 1948; and military victory from July 1948 to June 1949.

Mao always had a thought that the U.S. would intervene in the civil war either directly or by proxy. In his conversations with Chen Yi in January 1948, Mao claimed that the U.S. had never stopped its effort to help Jiang in the civil war. Washington, Mao claimed, advised Jiang to abandon Manchuria, to defend North China, to consolidate the defense line along the Yangze River, and to ensure its control of South China. Then Mao revealed his worries about U.S. military intervention,

[We] are not going to eliminate Jiang as a person; we are going to extinguish his clique and the class he represents. Imperialist countries will, [therefore] for sure, intervene in our revolutionary country, and their ways of intervention can vary. If [the U.S.] sends its armies to participate in the war, [we] can defeat them as well.... The United States has a few years to play tough. If we are going to be scared by this, we will be playing right into their hand; but if we are not going to be scared by the U.S., we can win.⁶⁷

By January 1949 it was certain that the CCP would gain a final victory against the GMD. As a result, Mao became more nervous about a direct intervention by the United States. “The Present Situation and the Party's Tasks in 1949” addressed by Mao at a CCP Politburo on January 8, 1949 warned that “When we make war plans, we have always taken into account the possibility that the U.S. government may send troops to occupy some of the

⁶⁷ *Mao Nianpu*, III:274-5.

coastal cities and fight us directly. We should continue to prepare for this now so as to avoid being taken by surprise if it really occurs.”⁶⁸

On April 20, 1949 Mao ordered his armies to cross the Yangtze River. Stalin was concerned that the United States and Great Britain might interfere on the side of the Nationalists. He cabled Mao that the Western powers might intervene in China's civil war either by means of a blockade or through direct military involvement which the PLA troops were preparing to cross the Yangtze. He added that it was quite likely for British and American forces to attack the CCP's rear areas by sea.⁶⁹ Given his suspicion toward the U.S., Mao took this warning seriously. The Central Military Committee ordered the Second Field Army on May 23, 1949 to delay its march into the Southwest; “its major task was to assist the Third Field Army to deal with the possible military intervention by the United States. This preparation, as a necessary step, can thwart America’s wild ambition and deter its direct military intervention in China.”⁷⁰ Five days later, hearing of the increase of the American fleet in Qingdao and British forces in Hong Kong, Mao sent an order to the commanders of all the field armies to prepare for a possible imperialist united military intervention.⁷¹

Based on the understanding that the U.S. might intervene in China’s affairs directly, the CCP decided to adopt the following military strategy: take the Southeast and coastal areas first, then the Southwest, and the Northwest last. The CCP assumed that the United States would lose their chance to interfere in the Chinese civil war once the PLA controlled the coastal cities and ports.⁷² Following the battle across the Yangtze River on April 20, the PLA

⁶⁸ “Present Situation and the Party's Tasks in 1949,” *Zhonggong Zhongyan Wenjian Xuanji*, [Selected CCP Central Committee Documents], 18:17.

⁶⁹ Michael Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism*, p. 170.

⁷⁰ “The CCP Military Central Committee's Plan to Liberate the Whole China,” *Zhonggong Zhongyan Wenjian Xuanji*, [Selected CCP Central Committee Documents], 18:292.

⁷¹ “The CCP Military Central Committee's Strategy to Prevent the Imperialists from Interfere with the Chinese revolution,” *ibid.*, pp. 308-9.

⁷² “The CCP Military Central Committee's Plan to Liberate the Whole China,” *ibid.*, 18:292.

took Nanjing, Shanghai, Qingdao, Fuzhou, Guangzhou and other coastal cities in half a year. After 28 years of life-and-death struggles with the Nationalist government Mao and his Communist Party took control of China. The People's Republic of China was established on October 1, 1949. Two months later Jiang Jieshi escaped to Taiwan.

Mao Insisted on Establishing a Strategic Partnership with the USSR

As early as December 25, 1947, Mao declared "The Chinese people's revolutionary war has now reached a turning point. That is, the Chinese People's Liberation Army has beaten back the offensive of several million reactionary troops of Chiang Kai-shek, the running dog of the United States of America, and gone over to the offensive." Mao predicted that this turning point "will certainly culminate in victory throughout the country."⁷³ With the CCP's final victory in sight, Mao had two primary considerations. First, he began to "consider the state-building task ahead" and "the role that the USSR might play in defending and building the new China." Secondly, Mao's worries of possible U.S. intervention also approached the stage of phobia. In February 1949, the CCP passed a "top secret plan" to Stalin through his liaison, Kovalev. Washington, according to this top secret, would launch a third world war in Asia by joining with Japan and GMD forces. Following atomic bombing in Manchuria and Siberia, three million American troops and a large number of GMD and Japanese troops would attack the PLA and Soviet armies in the Far East. Even though Stalin did not take this scenario seriously, Mao would not let it drop.⁷⁴

With these two considerations in mind, Mao was eager to build up a strategic partnership with the Soviet Union. Consequently, from 1947 to 1949 he made several

⁷³ "The Present Situation and Our Tasks, December 25, 1947," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, pp.157-60.

⁷⁴ S. N. Goncharov, "Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Zedong," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Winter 1991, pp.45-76.

requests to meet with Stalin face to face to discuss these domestic and international issues. In his request on August 28, 1948, Mao made it clear that he expected assistance in dealing with the U.S. and Jiang's regime, the diplomatic relations with France and Britain, and the problems of domestic restoration and economic development.

Stalin decided on January 14 to dispatch Anastas Mikoyan, a Politburo member, to visit Xipaipo, where the headquarters of the CCP's Central Committee was located, and learn about Mao's post-war plans and policy. From January 31 to February 8 Mikoyan paid a secret visit to the CCP. He explored with Mao areas for cooperation and sources of potential disputes between the USSR and the CCP once the CCP became dominant power in China. Generally speaking, Mikoyan's visit reduced distrust between Mao and Stalin.

After Mikoyan returned to Moscow Mao revealed his desire for China to be an ally of the Soviet Union. In the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, Mao argued that it would be impossible for the CCP to win its victory without Washington's attention being distracted by the Soviet Union and other socialist forces in Europe. Therefore, the CCP should stand on the side of Moscow, and should take every opportunity to spread this view to the public.⁷⁵

On June 30, 1949, Mao published this "lean-to-one-side" policy in the article "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" issued.⁷⁶ The purpose at that time was to lay the groundwork for Liu Shaoqi's visit to Moscow in early July. Actually, Mao had expressed this idea two months previously. To reply to Zhang Zhizhong's proposal on April 1 to urge the CCP to take a neutral position between the U.S. and the USSR, Mao said that nobody could keep a middle road in a polarized world. Either you should lean to the

⁷⁵ Hu, *Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong*, [Mao Zedong in Hu Qiaomu's Memoirs], p. 548.

⁷⁶ "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, IV: 414-5.

Soviet Union or to the United States.⁷⁷ Mao's "lean-to-one-side" statement could be regarded as a big gift to Stalin at that time when the CCP was eager to request military and material support from Moscow.

During Liu's visit, Stalin met the CCP delegation several times. He asserted that the revolutionary center had shifted from the West to the East, and that currently, the center was in China and East Asia. He suggested that both the USSR and the CCP should shoulder more responsibilities in the international Communist movement. He urged that the CCP to aid the national democratic movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries, because of the applicability of Chinese Communist experience to such movements. To Liu's surprise, Stalin also asked him whether Moscow had ever issued improper instructions in the past. Stalin admitted that Moscow was not familiar with the realities in China, and had issued mistaken directions. Shi Zhe, Liu's translator, said that Stalin's apology referred to his telegram in August 1945 in which Stalin had urged the CCP not to engage in civil war. Stalin had thought that the civil war would lead to the end of Chinese nationality. But what Stalin predicted at that time had proved wrong. Stalin also acknowledged that Roshchin had followed the Nationalist government to Guangzhou, because Moscow needed to observe what the GMD would do next.⁷⁸

Liu achieved two major results in his Moscow visit. The Soviet Union would recognize the People's Republic of China as soon as it was established and would provide the PRC with material, financial and personnel aid. Seemingly Stalin indicated that he would welcome Mao's visit to Moscow as soon as the CCP gained complete control over China.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Niu Jun, "The Evolution of New China's Diplomacy and Its Main Characteristics," p.24. Zhang Zhizhong was the chief-negotiator of the GMD. This was the first time for Mao to say so.

⁷⁸ Shi Zhe, *Zai Lishi Juren de Shenbian* [Working with the Historical Giant] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1995), pp. 412-5.

⁷⁹ Hu, *Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong*, pp. 549-50.

Liu's visit in turn set the stage for Mao's trip to Moscow from December 16, 1949 to February 1950. Although Mao visited Moscow on the pretext of attending Stalin's birthday celebration, the real purpose was to sign a new Sino-Soviet treaty, to replace the 1945 treaty signed with the Nationalist government. Mao anticipated this new treaty would increase pressure on the Western countries to abolish all the treaties signed in the past. In his own words,

The new Sino-Soviet Treaty will inspire Chinese workers, peasants, intelligentsia, and the left-wing of the national bourgeoisie and isolate the right-wing of the national bourgeoisie at home. We will acquire more political capital to counter imperialist powers abroad. We can examine all the old treaties concluded by China with the imperialist powers in the past....This action will put new China in an advantageous position to make capitalist countries yield to our demand. It will make other countries recognize new China without any given restraints. It will help us abolish the old treaties and establish new ones. Capitalist countries will not be able to do whatever they want at will.⁸⁰

Stalin was very reluctant to replace the 1945 treaty because the treaty guaranteed Moscow's privileges in China he had received from the Yalta Conference. However, he yielded before Mao's determined persistence. Molotov informed Mao on January 2 that Stalin agreed to decision to jettison the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty. Mao was delighted with this news. Immediately he summoned Zhou Enlai to Moscow to negotiate a new treaty.

In order to now express his more overtly pro-Moscow position, Mao instructed Liu Shaoqi on January 13 to seize an American barracks in Beijing, order all the American Embassy and consuls to leave China, and confiscate all the materials in the hands of the American Economic Cooperation Administration in Shanghai. Mao informed Stalin of these actions on January 17 after Liu had implemented all them. "The purpose of these actions," he assured his hosts "is to drive all the American diplomats out of China."⁸¹

⁸⁰ Mao's Telegram to the CCP Central Committee," *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*, [Manuscripts of Mao Zedong from the Period after the Nation's Founding], 1:211-3.

⁸¹ "Mao's Telegram to Liu Shaoqi," *Mao Zedong Wejiao Wenxuan*, [Selected Diplomatic Documents of Mao Zedong], p. 125.

The negotiation of the new treaty started on January 22, after Zhou had arrived in Moscow. Both sides reached agreement on the issue of Port Arthur and Darien without difficulty. Stalin agreed to return these two port cities to China while Mao was willing to retain Russia's legal rights to station its troops in Port Arthur until a peace treaty with Japan was signed. Darien was returned to China, but it was closed to the Americans. The two sides, however, had more difficulty reaching an agreement on the Changchun Railroad. After tough bargaining at the summit meeting and the ministerial talks, both sides agreed to shorten the duration of the agreement from the original thirty years to the time when a peace treaty was signed with Japan, but not later than 1952; an equal partnership replaced Russia's leading role in the joint management of the Changchun Railroad.

On February 24, 1950, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was signed. In addition to economic aid, Mao obtained security guarantees from Stalin, designed to achieve the vital goal of "preventing Japan and its ally [the United States] from possible invading China."⁸² Mao's two essential conditions to protect his new regime were the people's democratic dictatorship and an international united front. The Sino-Soviet Treaty achieved the latter objective. The new China could concentrate on her domestic construction and use the Soviet Union to deter American hostility.⁸³

Three factors seem to have influenced Mao's decision to stick with Moscow at any costs. First, Mao reached his objective to have replaced the 1945 treaty even though Stalin was reluctant to do so. The new treaty maintained China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Secondly, Mao's intermediate zone theory of 1946, the two-camp theory of 1947

⁸² "Telegram, Mao to the Central Committee, January 2, 1950," *Mao Zedong Jianguo Yilaide Weigao*, [Manuscripts of Mao Zedong from the Period after the Nation's Founding], 1: 213.

⁸³ "The Significance of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance." This is Mao's report at the Sixth Session of the Central People's Government Council, 11 April 1950, *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan* [Selected Diplomatic Documents of Mao Zedong], (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe & Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994), pp.131-2.

and the lean-to-one-side policy of 1949 revealed his recognition that the world had polarized and China had to choose side. Congruence in ideology and institutional relations made it inevitable that the PRC would ally with the Soviet Union. Mao's efforts to establish an international united front was largely to deal with Washington's united front with Japan and other "reactionary" regimes in East Asia and Southeast Asia. Particularly, Mao and his colleagues kept alert to Japan's revival. As early as 1948, the CCP's propaganda decried America's decision to rebuild Japan.⁸⁴ A major reason why Mao agreed to return all the Korean-Chinese soldiers to North Korea in 1949 and 1950 was because of his concerns about a Japan's military campaign against Kim's regime.⁸⁵ One of the purposes of signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty in 1950 was aimed against aggression by "Japan and any state allied with her."⁸⁶ In his speeches after 1950, Zhou repeatedly linked Washington's policy of rearming Japan with its military involvement in Korea and East Asia.⁸⁷ It was largely Mao's sensitivity to a threat from both the United States and a rearmed Japan that made Mao desperate to be an ally with the Soviet Union. The last and perhaps most important factor was Washington's long-term pro-Jiang policy and hostility toward the CCP revolution. One can conclude that this new Sino-Soviet Treaty was obviously anti-U.S. oriented.

⁸⁴ Thomas Christensen, "US-Japan Relations and China's Strategic Thinking 1948-51" in Harvard University Asia Center's Triangular Relations Conference in 2002, p.9.
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/archive/TR_Christensen.htm.

⁸⁵ Shen Zhihua, Ed., *Chaoxian Zhanzheng: Erguo Danganguan de Jiemi Wenjian* [The Korean War: Declassified Documents from Archives in Russia], p.187.

⁸⁶ See Thomas Chsistensen's "US-Japan Relations and China's Strategic Thinking, 1948-51," p.9.

⁸⁷ "The International Situation after the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Diplomatic Tasks," March 21, 1950; "The PRC's Foreign Policy" September 30, 1950, *Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan* [Selected Diplomatic Works of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1989).

Conclusion

The Chinese history from 1947 to 1949 witnessed the defeat of Jiang's regime and the failure of America's China policy. Why did the disengagement policy which the Truman administration adopted failed to make an accommodation with the CCP?

This chapter provides three answers. First, the failure of U.S.-PRC accommodation was the result of confrontation between Mao's revolution and American counter-revolutionary. The CCP revolution sought to get rid of Western and, specifically, American power in China. But the United States sought to maintain the status quo and contain the expansion of international communism. There was no room for compromise between Mao's non-recognition policy and Acheson's three criteria. As John King Fairbank pointed out

Recent speculation that we could somehow have been friends with Mao when he comes to power overlook the larger forces at work. How could a movement bent on expunging the century-long humiliations of the unequal treaties effect a compromise with the vested interests that the unequal treaties had produced?⁸⁸

Harry Harding's argument also reveals the conflict of the two different moral principles

Each side believed then,...that it was acting on the basis of morel principle. China thought that its conduct was rooted in the principles of national independence, revolutionary justice, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and that the actions of the United States violated or challenged those fundamental premises. During the same period, American policy makers believed that they were acting on the basis of principles of the rule of law, the undesirability of totalitarian regimes, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Conflict between nations is always intensified when, as in this particular case, both parties believe that they are following deeply held moral principles, and when the values adopted by the two sides lead to divergent conclusion.⁸⁹

Niu Jun also attributed Mao's lean-to-one-side selection as an unavoidable result of the Chinese Communist revolution of more than 20 years. It came not only from its original and consistent revolutionary objective to overthrow imperialist control in China,

⁸⁸ John K. Fairbank, "Introduction" in Gary May, *China Scapegoat: The Diplomatic Ordeal of John Carter Vincent* (Washington, DE: New Republic Books, 1979), p15.

but it also came from its current revolutionary need when Mao's communist regime was under threat from the United States in a polarized world.⁹⁰

Secondly, even though the Truman administration intended to keep distance from the GMD and the civil war, it could not pursue and implement a vigorous distance-Jiang policy because of political restraints at home. These opponents of Acheson's China policy, as Nancy Bernkopf Tucker pointed out, "fought him on every appropriations measure, every authorization, every policy directive."⁹¹ Moreover, the anti-CCP mentality and activities the Truman administration had adopted challenged the CCP revolution from the following aspects: it continually implemented the China Aid Act, rejected a direct dialogue with CCP policy makers, refused to recognize the PRC, set up an international front to isolate the PRC, created trade obstacles, attempted to separate Taiwan from China, supported the French Union in Indochina and rebuilt Japan. It was these actions that alienated Mao even further.⁹²

Last but not least, the polarized world and perceived American threat either from direct military intervention or subversion from within coupled with Mao's fear to be

⁸⁹ Harry Harding, "The Legacy of the Decade for Later Years: An American Perspective," in Harry Harding's *Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955*, 317-8.

⁹⁰ Niu Jun, "Xinzhongguo Weijiao de Xingcheng ji Zhuyao Tezheng" *Lishi Yanjiu* [The Evolution of New China's Diplomacy and Its Main Characteristics], No. 5, 1999, pp.23-42.

⁹¹ Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "China's Place in the Cold War: the Acheson Plan," *Dear Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed., by Douglas Brinkley, p. 112.

⁹² A group of scholars argued that Acheson did not change his hostility to the CCP revolution even though he did try hard to distance the U.S. from the GMD. See Wang Jianwei, "Xinzhongguo Chengli Qianhuo Meiguo de Duihua Zhengce Paoxi" [An Analysis of America's China Policy before and after the Founding of New China], in *Shijie Lishi* [World History], No. 1, 1991; He Di, "The Evolution of the Chinese Communist Party's Policy toward the United States, 1944-1949," Yuan Ming, "The Failure of Perception: America's China Policy, 1949-50," and Wang Jisi, "An Appraisal of U.S. Policy toward China, 1945-1955, and Its Aftermath," in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, *Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955*; Shi Yinhong, "Dulumen Zhengfu dui Xinzhongguo de Zhengce" [The Truman Administration and Its PRC Policy], in *Shijie Lishi* [World History], No. 1, 1991; Tao Wenzhao, "Yijiu Sijiu - Yijiu Wuling Nian Meiguo Duihua Zhengce yu Chengren Wenti" [America's China Policy and the Issue of Recognition from 1949-1950], in *Shijie Lishi*, No. 4, 1993;

regarded as another Tito determined Mao's decision to choose his lean-to-one-side position and to target the United States as his opponent.

CHAPTER VI

WHY MAO MADE THE DECISION TO ENTER THE KOREAN WAR

In the trend of national independence movements following World War II, the conflict in Korea, in the eyes of both Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee, was a war for national unification and independence. However, both Stalin and Truman regarded North Korea and South Korea as territories in their own sphere of interest during the Cold War. In addition, Mao treated North Korea as a buffer area for his new red regime in the tradition of patron-tributary relations between China and her neighbors. All three powers--the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China--were involved from the beginning of the Korean War. In the end, this war became a direct confrontation between Beijing and Washington, the last thing Mao and his colleagues wanted. How did this Sino-U.S. confrontation come to be? What were Mao's considerations in dispatching the Chinese troops into Korea?

A Reluctant Response to Kim Il Sung's Initiation of the Korean War

The world was shocked at the outbreak of the Korean War, which began on June 25, 1950. However, because of intensive hostility between both Korean governments, people in North Korea and South Korea were not very surprised by this military confrontation.

In 1945 Korea had been divided into two parts, with the Russian-occupied area to the north of the 38th parallel and the American-controlled area to the south of the 38th parallel. Two regimes were established according to the wills of Moscow and Washington respectively. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea [DPRK] under the leadership of Kim Il Sung and the Republic of Korea [ROK] led by Syngman Rhee were

antagonistic to each other, and each was eager to realize Korea's national unification by conquering the other. The withdrawal of Soviet troops in late 1948 and of American troops in June 1949 paved the way for the Kim-Rhee collision.

Actually, the DPRK planned to attack the ROK even before the American army left Korea. Kim led a Korean delegation on an official visit to Moscow from March 4 to April 7, 1949, when he signed a series of economic and cultural agreements with Stalin. Kim told Stalin about his plan to unify Korea by military means during his Moscow visit. Stalin made it clear that Pyongyang should not take such a military action unless Seoul were to launch a large-scale attack on the North first. Stalin thought not only that the Northerners were not as strong as the Southerners, but also that this attack would draw Washington into a confrontation, because American troops were still in the South.¹

T. F. Shtykov, Soviet Ambassador in Pyongyang, sent a telegram to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky on September 3, 1949, reporting that Kim requested permission to take the whole Ongjin Peninsula and a portion of the territory of South Korea to the east of this peninsula, such as Kaesong, in response to Rhee's intention of attacking the part of Ongjin Peninsula to the north of the 38th parallel. Kim also planned to continue to extend this fight further to the south if the international situation allowed. Kim assumed that his army could occupy the South in two weeks, or, at a maximum, two months.²

Having received this report, A. A. Gromyko, first deputy minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, instructed Grigorii Ivanovich Tunkin, charge d'affairs of the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang, to clarify the following questions as soon as possible: How did

¹ "A ciphered telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky," 19 January 1950, Cold War International History Project [CWIHP] *Bulletin*, Issue 5 (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995), p. 8.

North Korea evaluate the military strength of both the South Korean army and its own? Were there any American troops in the South and what kind of responses would the American government take in case of an attack by the Northerners first? How would Korean people react toward Pyongyang's initiating this fight? Gromyko also wanted to obtain Tunkin's personal opinion about Kim's proposed plan.³

Tunkin met Kim and Pak Hon-yong, North Korea's Foreign Minister, on September 12 and 13 and reported his talks with Kim to Moscow on September 14. Kim said that Pyongyang's army was obviously superior to Seoul's with its military equipment (tanks, artillery, and planes), its discipline, training of its officers and troops, and also soldiers' moral. But Kim acknowledged that the North could not win this campaign completely without additional Soviet arms. Kim admitted this military action might lead to a civil war between the North and the South. In Tunkin's opinion, both the political situation in Korea and the military preparation of Pyongyang were not suitable for launching this military attack. Militarily, North Korea was not strong enough to complete this fight in a successful and quick operation. A protracted war would draw Washington's involvement on the side of Rhee's regime. Politically, the Truman administration could take advantage of Kim's invasion to start a new anti-Soviet propaganda campaign. Moreover, this attack would cause the Korean people to resent Kim's regime because this invasion might ignite a civil war. In conclusion, Tunkin made it clear that this partial operation was not advisable.⁴

After discussing the Korean situation and the reports from Tunkin at a Politburo meeting on September 24, 1949, Moscow decided to restrain Kim's plan to invade the

² "Ciphred telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky," 3 September 1949, *CWIHP Bulletin*, Issue 5 (Spring 1995) p. 6.

³ "Ciphred telegram from Gromyko to Tunkin at the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang," *Ibid.*, p. 6.

South. Shtykov was required to read to Kim Il Sung Moscow's decision as inflexible. Militarily, "it is impossible to consider that the People's Army is prepared for such an attack" because Pyongyang "does not have the necessary superiority of military forces in comparison with South Korea." Politically, "a military attack on the South....is also not prepared for." The reason was that "until now, very little has been done to raise the broad masses of South Korea to an active struggle, to develop the partisan movement in all of South Korea, to create there liberated regions and to organize forces for a general uprising." The instruction pointed out further that such a partial military operation would touch off a civil war, and a protracted war "can give to the Americans cause for any kind of interference in Korean affairs." The decision concluded, "It is necessary to acknowledge that, at present, the tasks of the struggle for the unification of Korea demand a concentration of maximum effort, in the first place, for development of the partisan movement, creation of liberated regions, and preparation for a general armed uprising in South Korea in order to overthrow the reactionary regime and successfully resolve the task of unifying all Korea, and secondly, to further strengthen in every way the People's Army of Korea."⁵

Although Kim Il Sung did not dare to challenge Moscow's instructions openly, he never abandoned his desire to conquer the South. At a luncheon with Shtykov on January 17, 1950, Kim took the opportunity to raise the issue of unification again. With the founding of the People's Republic of China [PRC] as the beginning of the topic, Kim turned his conversation to the liberation of the Korean people in the South. He said emotionally, "The people of the southern portion of Korea trust me and rely on our armed

⁴ "Ciphered telegram from Tunkin to Soviet Foreign Ministry" (in reply to telegram of September 11), 14 September 1949, *ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

might. Partisans will not decide the question. The people of the South know that we have a good army. Lately I do not sleep at night, thinking about how to resolve this question of the unification of the whole country. If the matter of the liberation of the people of the southern portion of Korea and the unification of the country is drawn out, then I could lose the trust of the people of Korea." Then Kim asked Shtykov whether he could meet Stalin to request him to reconsider PROK's military plan of unification. Kim even mentioned that when he returned from Moscow, he would meet Mao Zedong because Mao had promised to give him assistance after the completion of the Chinese civil war. Here Kim referred to the meeting between Mao and Kim Il, chief of the Political Administration of the Northern Korean army, in spring 1949. Kim knew how to make use of the mutual suspicions between Stalin and Mao to reach his goals. Shtykov replied to Kim's question cautiously based on the principle of Moscow's decision of September 24.⁶

However, Stalin began to reconsider Kim's request for unification after he had read Shtykov's report sent on January 19. In his reply to Shtykov on January 30, Stalin said, "Comrade Kim Il Sung must understand that such a large matter in regard to South Korea such as he wants to undertake needs large preparation. The matter must be organized so that there would not be too great a risk." But, Stalin clearly told Kim that he was "ready to help him in this matter."⁷

It seemed that Stalin's new attitude toward Kim's military campaign of national unification was closely connected with Dean Acheson's speech at the Foreign Press Club on January 12, 1950, that excluded Taiwan and South Korea from America's military defensive perimeter. V.P. Tkachenko, former head of the Korean section of the Central

⁵ "Politburo decision to confirm the following directive to the Soviet Ambassador in Korea," 24 September 1949, *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

⁶ "Ciphred telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 19 January 1950," *Ibid.*, p. 8.

Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, said in 1992 that Acheson's speech was quickly sent on to Moscow, and it was carefully studied by Stalin. This presentation really had a significant impact on his thinking.⁸ An implication could be drawn that the United States might not intervene if a conflict should take place between Pyongyang and Seoul, particularly, if the clash were to be over in a short time. Acheson, in his speech, also exposed Moscow's desires and intention to annex some territories of China such as outer Mongolia and Manchuria.⁹ Stalin felt that Washington's new China policy contained a strategy that attempted to split the unity between Moscow and Beijing. As the authors of *Uncertain Partners* pointed out: "Acheson was close to the truth when he spotlighted Stalin's designs on Manchuria and Xinjiang, a fact that undoubtedly did enrage Stalin and perhaps even caused him to wonder about leaks in his own hierarchy. To make matters worse from Stalin's perspective, Acheson appeared to reiterate the hands-off policy toward Taiwan that Truman had announced the week before."¹⁰

From Stalin's perspective, Taiwan was the largest obstacle for the normalization between Washington and Beijing. An approach between these two hostile sides could take place. This mutual accommodation would be very harmful toward Moscow's interest not only in Asia but also in Europe because Washington could increase its competition in Europe significantly. Kim's request to invade the South would be the best solution to this problem. Stalin anticipated that he would kill two birds with one stone through supporting Pyongyang's offensive action. On the one hand, Kim's invasion would enlarge the sphere of influence of the Communists in the Far East. On the other, Stalin would tie Mao more tightly on his side as well as win Kim's loyalty. That was why Stalin tried his

⁷ "Ciphared telegram from Stalin to Shtykov," 30 January 1950, Ibid., p. 9.

⁸ Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 1993, p.101.

best to draw Mao into his conspiracy with Kim before the outbreak of the Korean War. Moreover, Stalin expected that Beijing could be employed to confront Washington should Pyongyang's invasion draw the United States into this war.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Symposium of the Cold War and China in Beijing University gave three reasons for the origin of the Korean War. One of them had to do with Stalin's intrigue.¹¹ In his book *Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War*, Shen Zhihua argued that the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950 took away all the privileges Stalin had obtained in the Yalta Conference. Stalin was very upset with these changes, particularly, with the loss of the strategic unfrozen harbors of Port Arthur and Dairen. Therefore, Stalin turned his attention to Korea. It happened that Kim Il Sung again requested help for his military campaign to unify Korea. Stalin thought that it might provide a good opportunity for the USSR to gain unfrozen ports in Korea if Kim won the war with Stalin's support. This was the strongest motivation behind Stalin's decision to give the green light to Kim's proposal.¹²

Kim was very excited with Stalin's new attitude. Kim asked Shtykov to express his great thanks and eagerness to meet Stalin. From April 8 to 25 Kim and Pak Hon-yong, paid a secret visit to Moscow and met Stalin personally during their stay. Kim told Stalin that both the Northerners and Southerners were ready for unification. Pak told Stalin that the Southerners were expecting to be liberated by the North, and they were eager to carry out the land reform and other democratic transformations. He also ensured Stalin that a "200,000-strong detachment of Communists in South Korea was ready to rebel at the first signal from the North." In addition to Kim and Pak Hon-yong's

⁹ Ibid., p.101.

¹⁰ Ibid., p.101.

arguments, Yoo Sung-chul, chief of the Operations Department of the Korean People's Army, brought out four reasons to convince Stalin that the United States would not interfere: (1) it would be a decisive surprise attack and the war would be won in three days; (2) there would be an uprising of 200,000 Party members in South Korea; (3) there were guerrillas in South Korea; and (4) the United States would not have time to interfere. Stalin "reluctantly consented to his proposals for the attack" under "Kim's persistent assertions and request."¹³ However, Stalin told Kim that the Soviet Union would not join the fray if the United States participated in this confrontation.¹⁴ Then Stalin asked Kim to consult with Mao, because Mao had "a good understanding of Oriental matters."¹⁵ He skillfully kicked the ball to Mao. If Mao gave Kim his permission for such an invasion Beijing would have to shoulder the burden.

What was Mao's real thinking to Kim's request to invade the South? The four personal and telegram contacts between Mao and Kim, and Mao and Stalin from spring 1949 to May 1950 revealed Mao's attitude. In May 1949, Mao rejected Kim Il's request for military invasion with the excuse that his troops were far away in southern China. A serious collision at the border of the DPRK and the ROK broke out in October 1949. On October 21 Mao sent Stalin a telegram to criticize Kim's irrational action. On November 5, in Gromyko's reply on behalf of Stalin to Mao, Gromyko said that Stalin completely agreed to Mao's opinion; the Soviet Union would persuade Kim to change his plan.¹⁶ In

¹¹ Liu Ronggang, "Lengzhan yu Zhongguo Xueshu Yantaohui Zhongshu" [A Summary of the Symposium on the Cold War and China], *Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu* [The CCP History Studies], No. 6, 2000, p.105.

¹² Shen Zhihua, *Mao Zedong, Stalin yu Chaoxian Zhanzheng*, pp.198-200.

¹³ Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 144.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

¹⁶ Shen Zhihua said that Andrei Ledovskii, a Russian professor, told him that he saw these two telegrams in Russian Presidential Archive. See Shen's "Introduction of the Soviet Union and the Korean War," *Chaoxian Zhanzheng: Russian Dang'anguan de Jiemi Wenjian* [The Korean War: Declassified Documents from Archives in Russia], 1:7 and 276.

his visit in Moscow, using diplomatic language, Mao expressed his reserved attitude toward Kim's proposal to invade South Korea through military means. However, Mao could not say no when he was told that Stalin had given the green light to Kim's military plan in May 1950. See my detailed argument to this regard in Chapter I.

The following concerns were the reasons why Mao did not want to see a war in Korea. In the first place, the CCP badly needed a peaceful environment for its economic restoration and political consolidation. Mao told Stalin, in his visit to Moscow on December 16, 1949: "The most important question at the present time is the question of establishing peace. China needs a period of 3-5 years of peace, which would be used to bring the economy back to its pre-war levels and stabilize the country in general."¹⁷

To Mao, nothing was more important than economic rehabilitation when the Chinese civil war was over in 1950. The PLA had numbered 5,400,000. This huge army was a heavy burden for the PRC. After liberation, it became a priority to cut its troops. As early as December 1949, the CCP Central Committee and the Central Military Committee issued instructions requiring the PLA to take part in economic production.¹⁸

Mao gave a speech at the Seventh Meeting of the Central Government on April 13, 1950: "It is a very good phenomenon that our national financial conditions have turned in a favorable direction. But three conditions are needed if our financial situation wants to have a fundamental change: the completion of land reform; the reasonable adjustment for industrial and commercial construction; and a large-scale reduction of government and army expenditure."¹⁹ The Military Demobilization Committee was established under the leadership of Zhou in May 1950. The MDC planned to cut its

¹⁷ "Conversation between Stalin and Mao, Moscow," 16 December 1949, *CWIHP Bulletin*, Issue 6-7, p. 5.

military force to 3,000,000 from 5,400,000 through two stages. The MDC and the State Counsel issued "the Decision of the Demobilization" in 1950, signed by both Mao and Zhou on June 30, 1950.²⁰

Another issue which Mao was concerned with was to take Tibet back. The Chinese government took it for granted that Tibet was a part of China. Mao issued the order on January 2, 1950: "Tibet's international position is particularly important even though its population is quite small. We must occupy Tibet and reform it into a people's democratic society." Mao appointed the Southwest Bureau to take charge of this task, which was supposed to be completed by October 1950.²¹ Even though the CCP also considered how to solve the issue of Tibet in a peaceful way in May 1950, the plan did not materialize because of the resistance of Tibet. The PLA occupied Tibet by military means finally in October 1950.

One military action which the CCP had to take after the founding of the PRC was to root out GMD soldier remnants. The GMD left a great number of special agents and spies in mainland China. Several hundred thousand GMD soldiers hid in mountain regions in the Southwest and organized guerrilla warfare. All of these GMD sympathizers, special agents, spies, bandits and soldiers, were a great threat to this infant Communist regime and to the safety of local residents. Dealing with these elements took great amounts of energy and a large number of the PLA.

¹⁸ "The Central Military Committee's Instruction for the PLA's Participating in Economic Development," 5 December 1949, *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao* [Manuscripts of Mao Zedong from the Period of the Nation's Founding] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1987), I: 182-183.

¹⁹ The Speech at the Seventh Session of the Central Government Committee, April 13, 1950, *Ibid.*, I: 296.

²⁰ Lei Yinfu, *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Jige Zhongda Juece de Huiyi* [My Recollection of the Decision Making on Several Crucial Issues], *Dang de Wenxian*, Part I., No. 6, 1993, p. 76.

²¹ "The Telegram to the Southwestern Bureau for Its Tasks of Occupying and Controlling Tibet," 2 January 1950, *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*. 1:208.

Invading Taiwan was the CCP's most important military objective after the founding of the PRC. It was one of the priorities to gain Stalin's support to attack Taiwan in both Liu and Mao's visit to Moscow. The CCP prepared sixteen armies, about a half million soldiers, for the Taiwan campaign. On March 15, 1950 *Renmin Ribao* published an editorial: "The Chinese People Must Liberate Taiwan." Mao emphasized again at the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh CCP Central Committee in early June 1950 that the major tasks of the PLA was to root out the GMD remains and liberate all the territory including Taiwan and Tibet.²²

Facing so many priorities in his agenda mentioned above, Mao was shocked with the news that Kim had started his military operation on June 25, 1950. He had been kept completely in the dark while Pyongyang was busy with full preparations at the assistance of Moscow. Shi Zhe recalled that Mao told him the news that the Korean War had broken out when he took a walk on the morning of June 26. Mao said that he heard the news in a report from Paris. Mao complained to Shi Zhe again on June 28 that this neighbor [the DPRK] had not given any notification before taking action when Kim Il Sung sent his representative to inform Mao of the Korean offensive operations three days later.²³ Mao was even more surprised with the news that the United States had decided to join the war on the side of the ROK: President Truman ordered American sea and air forces to render full support to the ROK and to block the Taiwan Straits with the Seventh Fleet on June 27; Truman ordered American ground forces to join sea and air units in support of the

²² The following scholarship describes details of the Taiwan military campaign. He Di, "The Last Campaign to Unify China: The CCP's Unmaterialized Plan to Liberate Taiwan, 1949-1950," *Chinese Historian*, no. 1 (Spring 1992); Zhou Jun, "Xinzhongguo Chuqi Renmin Jiefangjun Weineng Zuxing Taiwan Zhanyi Jihua Yuanyi Chutang" [The Initial Studies on the Reasons Why the PLA Failed to Carry out its Taiwan Campaign after the Founding of the PRC], *Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu*, No. 1, 1991, pp. 67-70.

ROK on June 30; the Security Council of the United Nations passed the resolution to establish the UN army to intervene in the Korean War on July 7; and General Douglas MacArthur was appointed as Commander of a UN army the following day. The reality was that the war was not only between Pyongyang and Washington, but involved Beijing also because of America's blockade of the Taiwan Straits.

Difficult Decision

Truman's statement immediately reminded Mao of his unhappy experience with the American government. Mao's first personal contact was with the Hurley mediation from late 1944 to late 1945. Hurley's openly anti-CCP and pro-GMD position smashed Mao's illusion that the U.S. would treat him and Jiang equally and fairly. At the Party Seventh Congress Mao delivered warning to his party that the United States attempted to change China as its "colony." The Marshall mission from late 1945 to late 1946 confirmed Mao's suspicion that the bottom line of America's China policy was to support Jiang's regime at the cost of the CCP. "After these two experiences [the Hurley mediation and the Marshall mission]," Mao claimed, "the Chinese people [the CCP] no longer have any doubts about the real nature of the U.S. government's imperialist policy."²⁴ Mao continued, "The policy of the U.S. government is to use the so-called mediation as a smoke-screen for strengthening Chiang Kai-shek in every way and suppressing the democratic forces in China [the CCP]."²⁵

²³ Li Haiwen, "Zhonggong Zhongyang Jiujing Heshi Junding Zhiyuanjun Chuguo Zuozhan?" [When did the CCP Central Committee Make the Decision to Dispatch the Chinese People's Army into the Korean War?] *Dang de Wenxian*, Issue 5, 1993, p. 85.

²⁴ *Jiefang Ribao*, September 12, 1946.

²⁵ "The Truth About U.S. 'Mediation' and the Future of the Civil War in China" *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, IV:109,

Acheson's continued military and financial aid to the GMD government and his effort to organize a united front not to recognize the PRC and block the PRC's way to enter the United Nations only justified Mao's perception that the United States' government would not abandon its intention to intervene in China's internal affairs. The closer he came to final victory, the more nervous Mao became about a possible direct armed intervention into China's internal affairs by Americans. As I described in Chapter V that Mao in the "war of liberation" took a series of measures to prepare for a perceived U.S. military intervention.

It seemed that what Mao had worried about came true after hearing the Truman statement. On June 27, Zhou Enlai claimed that this was "an open exposure and putting into practice the long-prepared [American] plan to invade China and to dominate Asia."²⁶ At the Eighth Plenary Session of the Central Government on June 28, Mao denounced Washington's decision to neutralize the Taiwan Straits. He said angrily, "Truman declared this January that the United States would not intervene in Taiwan. What he said has been proved to be nothing but a lie. Moreover, he destroyed all international agreements not to interfere with China's internal affairs. America's behavior has revealed her real face as an imperialist."²⁷

On the same day, on behalf of the PRC, Zhou, made an announcement:

Truman's statement on June 27 and the American navy's action is an armed invasion into the Chinese territory and a thorough violation of the UN Charter. This looting action of the American government does not go beyond the expectation of the Chinese people. It only increases Chinese people's rage.... In fact, it was America's planned step to encourage Rhee's puppet army to invade the People's Republic of Korea. The purpose of this action is an excuse to invade Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam and the

²⁶ *Renmin Ribao*, June 27, 1950.

²⁷ *The Compilation of the Sino-American Relationship Materials* (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1960), 2: 91.

Philippines. This is also one further action which the American imperialists have taken to interfere with Asian affairs.²⁸

From July 30 to 31 Douglas MacArthur visited Taiwan. He gave a speech calling Taiwan an important part in America's defensive perimeter in the western Pacific.²⁹ These actions increased Mao's uneasiness. *Shijie Zhishi* [World Knowledge] denounced, "The barbarous action of American imperialism and its hangers-on in invading Korea not only menaces peace in Asia and the world in general but seriously threatens the security of China in particular."³⁰

Preparing for the worst, the State Council, the Central Military Committee, with Mao's instruction, held two meetings on July 7 and 10 respectively, presided over by Zhou and Nie Rongzhen, the Acting Chief of the General Staff. The CCP's major military leaders participated in these meetings at which the following decisions were reached: (1) The establishment of the Northeast Border Defense Army [NEBDA], which was composed of the Thirteenth Group Army, including the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd armies of the Northeast Military region; the 1st, 2nd and 8th artillery divisions; and three anti-aircraft artillery corps, totaling 255,000 men; (2) the appointment of Su Yu and Xiao Hua as Commander and Vice-Political Commissar of the NABDA; (3) logistics preparation; (4) army recruiting; and (5) political mobilization under the call of Defending the National Security.³¹ The general purpose of these arrangements was to protect the Northeast from the possible U.S. attack. However, it did not exclude the possibility of entering the war if something unexpected should happen. Lei Yingfu recalled that Zhou

²⁸ *Renmin Ribao*, June 29, 1950, see *Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan*, pp.18-9.

²⁹ Jonathan Pollack, *The Korean War and the Sino-American Relations*, Harding and Yuan Ming's *Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955*, p.217.

³⁰ *Shijie Zhishi*, August 26, 1950.

³¹ "Mao's Letter to Nie to show his Approval of the Resolutions Passed by the National Defense Conference," 7 July 1950, *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao* [Manuscripts of Mao Zedong from the Period after the Nation's Founding], 1: 428.

transmitted Mao's consideration to all the participants at the meeting that Chinese armies might go to Korea to join this war in case something worse took place.³² Mao approved all these arrangements the same night when the meeting was over.³³

Mao sent a further instruction to the PLA on August 1, 1950: The Chinese Liberation War, basically speaking, was over. In addition to the issue of Taiwan and Tibet, the major task the PLA faced was to deal with possible imperialist invasions.³⁴ With more American troops participating in the war, the CCP sensed that the Northerners' advantage was being lost. The CCP held a Politburo meeting on August 4 analyzing the development of the situation. Mao told his colleagues at the meeting: "The American imperialists will become arrogant and threaten us should they win. We have to help North Korea. We should send our volunteers there. Surely, we need to choose a suitable occasion, but we have to make some preparations [now]."³⁵ Zhou Enlai also pointed out: "If the American imperialists were to defeat North Korea, it would be harmful to the peace and they would become haughty. If the Northerners hope to win, they need China's help. The international situation might be changed with an account of our help. We have to be far-sighted."³⁶ The following day Mao issued an order demanding the NEBDA to complete all the preparations at the end of the month and made ready to enter the war at any moment.³⁷

³² Lei Yingfu, "Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Jige Zhongda Juece de Huiyi," Part 1, *Dang de Wenxian*, No. 6, 1993, p. 77.

³³ "Mao's Letter to Nie to show his Approval of the Resolutions Passed by the National Defense Conference," 7 July 1950, *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*, 1: 428.

³⁴ "The Instruction to Start Literacy Education in the Army," *Mao Zedong Junshi Wenji* [Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong], (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe & Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993), 6: 86.

³⁵ Bo Yibo, *Guanyu Zhongda Juece yu Shijian de Huigu* [The Retrospect of Important Decisions and Events] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991), 1: 43.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 1: 43.

³⁷ The Telegram to the Northeast Border Army," 5 August 1950, , *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*, 1: 454.

On August 8, Chen Yi, Commander of the Third Field Army, suggested that the Taiwan campaign be postponed to 1952. The CMC accepted Chen's suggestion and made the following decision: The Taiwan campaign would not take place in 1951. It would depend on the situation in the future whether the Taiwan campaign should resume in 1952 or not.³⁸

Gao Gang, according to Mao's instruction, held a meeting discussing military preparations on August 13. Quite a few high officers of the NEBDA at the meeting listed many difficulties in weaponry, logistics and communication. Therefore, the meeting concluded that the NEBDA could not meet Mao's deadline to complete the preparations. Considering the reality of the situation, Mao agreed to give more time preparations. But he required that "the preparations definitely be ready on September 30th."³⁹

Contrary to Kim's optimistic view that August would become the month for victory, the General Staff and Foreign Affairs Ministry of the PRC concluded that American troops would soon launch an offensive. The Operations Office of the General Staff anticipated that the UN army might land at the rear of Kim's army. Inchon was the best possible target for this landing. Lei Yinfu, Director of the Operation Office, reported this analysis to Mao and Zhou on August 23. Mao and Zhou paid close attention to this prediction. The CCP decided to take three urgent measures immediately. First, The NABDA must complete all its preparations for the war by the end of September. The army should be ready to participate in the war at any time. Mao said that they could be in favorable situation if they were to have full preparation in advance. Second, Beijing should inform Pyongyang and Moscow of the possibility of the enemy's landing somewhere at the rear of the People's Army so as to let them be ready for it. Third, the

³⁸ He Di, "The Last Campaign to Unify China," p. 15.

General Staff and Foreign Affairs Ministry should fix their eyes on any change in the war.⁴⁰

The Second National Defense Meeting was held on August 26. Zhou pointed out at the meeting that it seemed unlikely to win a quick and thorough victory. The prospect was that American troops might land at Inchon. The People's Army at the front had to retreat. It looked like the task of wiping out the American troops would definitely fall on the shoulders of China. The situation required the NEBDA to make a full preparation by the end of September. Otherwise, the PLA would be in a disadvantageous position if the situation deteriorated. Their enemy was the American imperialists. It was very hard for the PLA with poor weaponry and equipment to deal with the American troops. Zhou also transmitted Mao's belief that a third world war would not take place at that time. But the American government would not stop limited local wars, either. The PLA should attend to coping with each fight and prevent them from developing into a large-scale world war.⁴¹

Meanwhile, the CCP decided to accelerate its own preparations when Mao informed Lee Sang-jo, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People's Army, of the likely landing, urging Pyongyang to take measures immediately.⁴² Mao told Peng Dehuai, Vice-President of the CMC, on August 27 that twelve armies needed to be transferred to the Northeast in order to accommodate the current situation.⁴³

³⁹ "The Telegram to Gao Gang," 18 August 1950, *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*, 1: 469.

⁴⁰ Lei Yingfu, *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Jige Zhongda Juece de Huiyi*, Part 2, *Dang de Wenxian*, No. 1, 1994, p. 24.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

⁴² Xu Yan, "Chubing Ruchao Canzhan Juece Zuihuo Queding de Quzhe Guocheng" [The Tortuous Process of the Final Decision to Dispatch the Troops to Enter the Korean War], *Danshi Ziliao Yanjiu*, No. 4, 1991, p. 9.

⁴³ "The Telegram to Peng Dehuai," 27 August 1950, *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*, 1: 485.

Just as the CCP had predicted, the UN troops landed at Inchon on September 15, cutting Kim's army into two parts. Realizing the seriousness of this landing, Zhou decided to dispatch an advance group to Korea immediately. Actually, the NEBDA had made this suggestion much earlier, but Zhou did not accept it until then. Zhou thought it was not proper to call this advance group before the PLA's participation in this war. Therefore, some people went there as military attachés with the task of familiarizing themselves with the military situation, studying geographic conditions, and making preparations for the coming troops. Cai Chengwen, counselor of the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang, was asked to bring this group to Korea. On the way through Shenyang, Gao Gang showed Cai a telegram which Mao had just wired. Mao pointed out: "It seems impossible not to send the army there. We must accelerate our preparations."⁴⁴

At the same time, through diplomatic channels and propaganda, the CCP tried to stop Washington's further actions. On September 24, 1950, at a mass rally protesting America's air raids on some border cities in Northeast China, Zhou warned: "The flames of war being spread by the United States in the East are burning more fiercely. If the representation of the majority of states attending the UN General Assembly should continue to play deaf and dumb to these aggressive aims of the United States, they should not escape a share in the responsibility for setting the fires of war in the East."⁴⁵ The following day, Nie Rongzheng told Indian Ambassador Panikkar clearly that China would not "sit back with folded hands and let the Americans come up to the border.... We know what we are in for, but at all costs, American aggression has to be stopped."⁴⁶ In his

⁴⁴ Cai Chengwen and Zhao Yongtian, *Bannendian Tanpan* [Panmunjom Negotiations] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1992), pp. 69-70.

⁴⁵ Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 107.

⁴⁶ Kavalam M. Panikkar, *In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat* (Longdon: G. Allen & Unwin, 1955), p. 108.

speech to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on September 30, Zhou characterized Washington's policy to rearm Japan as its invasion tool in East Asia.⁴⁷ He declared: "The Chinese people will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists."⁴⁸

On September 30, Zhou expressed his worries again, "The American government has proved that it is the PRC's most dangerous enemy. American troops have invaded our territory and this kind of military action is very likely to expand at any time."⁴⁹

Hearing the news that Rhee's troops had crossed the 38th parallel on October 1, China decided to make a last ditch effort for a peaceful solution. Zhou requested an urgent meeting with Panikkar on the morning of October 3 to deliver the message to the United States that the entry of the American troops into North Korea would force China to "intervene." In order that Washington not overlook Beijing's warning, Zhou asked his secretary to find a suitable English word to express the accuracy of the Chinese word *guan* which would reveal the CCP's determination to defend its national security.⁵⁰

The UN army achieved one victory after another after the Inchon landing. Seoul fell into the hands of the UN troops on September 27. MacArthur restored the government of the Republic of Korea on September 29. Feeling their days were numbered without help from Moscow and Beijing, Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-yong decided to ask Moscow for direct military assistance. They begged Stalin to organize international volunteer units in China and other countries of the people's democracy to

⁴⁷ *Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan* [A Selection of Zhou Enlai's Writings on Foreign Affairs] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1990), pp.22-3.

⁴⁸ Alexandre Y. Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16-October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," *CWIHP Bulletin*, Issue 6-7, p. 99.

⁴⁹ "The PRC's Foreign Policy," September 30, 1950, *Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan*, p.23.

⁵⁰ Li Yueran, "Wozai Zhou Zhongli Shenbian Gongzuo de Pianduan Huiyi" [The Memoirs When I was working with Premier Zhou], *The Diplomatic Struggles of the New China* (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1991), p. 97.

give military assistance in case the Soviet Union could not provide Kim's regime with direct military assistance.

On receiving the urgent telegram for help from Pyongyang on October 1, 1950, Stalin took three steps. First, he sent a telegram to Shtykov instructing him to tell Kim to mobilize all the forces to prevent the enemy from crossing the 38th parallel. Korean comrades also needed to prepare to start guerrilla warfare in both the North and the South; Moscow would provide them with necessary weaponry and equipment. As to the request of personnel assistance, Stalin said that he needed to talk with Chinese comrades.⁵¹ Second, Stalin dictated a telegram to Mao and Zhou informing them of what had happened in North Korea. The DPRK had suffered tremendous losses. Kim did not possess any decisive military force to resist the UN army's counterattack and the road toward the 38th parallel from the South was wide open. Stalin requested that Mao, if possible, "should move at least five or six divisions toward the 38th parallel at once so as to give our Korean comrades an opportunity to organize combat reserves north of the 38th parallel under the cover of your troops."⁵² Third, after his discussion with Mao, Stalin had his Foreign Affairs Ministry send a Soviet resolution to the UN which called on for an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of all foreign troops, and a general election in all of Korea to be held under international supervision by the Political Committee of the General Assembly.

In addition to asking Moscow for rescue, Kim also sent Lee Sang-jo to Beijing on October 1. Lee delivered Kim's personal letter, a desperate plea for help.⁵³ Facing all

⁵¹ Kathryn Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence," *The Journal of American-Asian Relations*, vol., 2, no. 4 (Winter 1993), pp. 455-456.

⁵² "Ciphred telegram from Filippov to Mao and Zhou," October 1 1950, CWIHP *Bulletin*, Issue 6-7, p. 114.

⁵³ Hong Xuezhi, *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Huiyi* [The Anti-America and Aid-Korea Memoirs] (Beijing: Jiefan jun wenxue yishu chubanshe, 1991), pp. 14-15.

these new changes, Mao made several decisions the following day. First, he wired Gao Gang to fly to Beijing to attend a Politburo meeting. Secondly, Mao instructed Deng Hua, Commander of the Thirteenth Army Group, that the NEBDA's preparation for the war be concluded ahead of time; the army must be ready to participate in the war at any time fighting against new enemies.⁵⁴ Thirdly, Mao sent a telegram to Stalin informing him that: "We have decided to dispatch a portion of our troops in the name of [the Chinese People's] Volunteers to Korea, assisting Korean comrades to fight the troops of the United States and its running dog Syngman Rhee. We regard the mission as necessary. If Korea were to be completely occupied by the Americans and the Koreans revolutionary force fundamentally destroyed, the American invaders would be more rampant, and such a situation would be extremely unfavorable to the entire East."⁵⁵ Mao had decided to enter the war.

Here readers are faced with a puzzle when they study Mao's telegram mentioned above, because Russian archivists have released another of Mao's telegrams also dated October 2. The second one contradicted the first one. Actually, the second was sent by Roshchin, who transmitted Mao's reply to Stalin's request to send Chinese troops to Korea. Mao told Stalin that the CCP "originally planned to move several volunteer divisions to North Korea to render assistance to the Korean comrades.... However, having thought this over thoroughly, we now consider that such actions may entail extremely serious consequences." Then Mao listed three justifications for his decision. "In the first place, it is very difficult to resolve the Korean question with a few divisions (Our troops are extremely poorly equipped, and there is no confidence in the success of military

⁵⁴ "The Central Military Committee's Telegram to the Northeast Border Army," 2 October 1950, *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*, 1: 538.

operations against American troops); thus the enemy can force us to retreat. In the second place, it is most likely that this will provoke an open conflict between the USA and China, as a consequence of which the Soviet Union may also be dragged into war (due to the Sino-Soviet Agreement).” The last reason was that the Sino-American confrontation would completely ruin the PRC’s peaceful construction and arouse people’s resentment toward the new red regime. With all these considerations, Mao concluded with great sorrow that the Korean comrades should change the form of the struggle to a partisan war. However, Mao told Stalin that this decision was only provisional and the final result should depend on another meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP, and a consultation between Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao and Stalin.⁵⁶

Because of these two controversial telegrams, the authenticity of Mao’s first telegram published by the CCP’s Central Documents Press in 1987 has been questioned. For instance, Alexandre Y. Mansourov argued that Mao’s telegram to Stalin on October 2 was “unreliable, inaccurate, unsent, or perhaps misdated.” He even did not exclude “the possibility that the text was altered or falsified by Chinese authorities to present what they deemed to be a more ideologically or politically correct version of history.”⁵⁷ How do we understand this contradiction? It has caused a heated debate among scholars of the Korean War. It seems the telegram which the Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation declassified in 1993 was not a false one, because some responses which Stalin and his colleagues adopted were based on this telegram. For instance, the Soviet Union made the decision to curtail the Soviet presence in Korea. Hearing that Beijing refused to

⁵⁵ “Mao’s Telegram to Stalin informing him of the CCP’s Decision to Enter the Korean War,” October 2, 1950, *Ibid.*, 1: 539.

⁵⁶ “Ciphered telegram from Roshchin to Filippov, 3 October 1950, conveying 2 October 1950 message from Mao to Stalin,” *CWIHP Bulletin*, Issue 6-7, pp. 114-115.

⁵⁷ Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16-October 15, 1950,” *CWIHP Bulletin*, Issue 6-7, p.107.

send its army into Korea, all Soviet Politburo members "agreed that a direct Soviet-American confrontation should be avoided at any cost, even if the USSR had to abandon North Korea." Stalin, in an unusual mood in October, tried his best to persuade the Chinese comrades to send their troops to Korea.

The telegram which China published seems not to be a false one, either. There is a possibility that something unexpected had happened after Mao decided to wire his first telegram. On the night of October 1 after Mao had received Stalin's telegram and Kim's personal letter, an urgent meeting was held for the members of the Politburo Standing Committee. Mao's proposal to participate in the war was passed because of Zhou's support. The meeting also decided that an enlarged Politburo Standing Committee including China's top military leaders would meet the following day.⁵⁸ Mao drafted the mentioned telegram informing of Stalin's decision to enter the war. However, Mao did not expect that the enlarged Politburo meeting summoned the following day would not endorse the decision for entering the war which he had promised to Stalin in his drafted telegram. It seemed that a majority of participants preferred giving more cautious consideration toward the decision to enter the war.⁵⁹ In particular, Lin Biao opposed joining the war, refusing to accept the appointment of Commander of the People's Volunteer Army with the excuse that he was sick.⁶⁰

In Mao's mind, Lin was the best candidate for the position of Commander of the NEBDA. The core of the NEBDA was the Fourth Field Army, and Lin had been the commander of these troops during the Chinese civil war. The Northeast was the revolutionary base area of Lin's army. Lin had established his high reputation because of

⁵⁸ Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*, pp. 172-173.

⁵⁹ Shen Zhihua, *Mao Zedong, Stalin yu Chaoxian Zhanzheng* [Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War] (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books Ltd., 1998), p.252.

his glorious achievements in the Northern Expedition (a joint military campaign between the GMD and CCP to unify China), the first civil war, the Anti-Japanese War and the second civil war. His military experiences and wisdom ranked him as one of the best commanders in the PLA. Moreover, he was just 44 years old when the Korean War broke out. Lin's refusal to accept Mao's appointment as commander of the NEBDA was no doubt a blow to Mao's arrangement. Facing the substantial reluctance at the enlarged Politburo meeting, Mao had to cancel the first telegram, which he had, in fact, not sent out. Then Mao told Roshchin, the Soviet Ambassador in Beijing, that the CCP could not meet Stalin's request.

The difficulties which Mao mentioned in his telegram to Stalin were not only what Mao's colleagues had emphasized in the meeting, but also Mao's own concerns. Even in his first telegram agreeing to dispatch the Chinese troops to Korea, Mao did not hide his worries:

Since Chinese troops will fight American troops in Korea (although we will use the name Chinese volunteers), we must be prepared for an American declaration of war on China. We must be prepared for the possible bombardment by American air forces of many Chinese cities and industrial bases, and for attacks by American naval forces on China's coastal areas... We consider the most unfavorable situation would be that the Chinese forces fail to destroy American troops in large numbers in Korea, thus resulting in a stalemate, and that, at the same time, the United States openly declare war on China, which would be detrimental to China's economic reconstruction already under way, causing dissatisfaction among the national bourgeoisie and some other sectors of the people (who are absolutely afraid of war).⁶¹

These two contradictory telegrams prove just how difficult it was for Mao to make this decision to have a Sino-American confrontation. Since the Opium War in 1840, China had never won any war against foreign powers single-handedly. Beijing would face the

⁶⁰ Shen Zhihua, "The Process for China to Make Decision to Enter the Korean War" *Dangshi Yanjiu Ziliao*, no. 1, 1996, p. 8.

most powerful opponents, the United States and the UN army, if the CCP were to enter this war. The American army possessed an obvious superiority over China in military equipment. The American army had about 1,500 pieces of artillery while the Chinese army possessed only 198 pieces. In addition, China had no air force to support her ground troops.⁶²

But Mao would not easily give up his determination. He told Roshchin clearly that the decision not to enter the war was only provisional and the final decision would depend on another CCP Central Committee meeting.

The enlarged Politburo meeting on October 5, 1950, approved of Mao's proposal that Peng Dehui be commander of the NEBDA. Peng was the Vice-President of the CMC as well as the Commander of the First Field Army at that time. He enjoyed a high reputation both in the Party and in the army because of his outstanding military performance. His position and prestige were influential enough for him to take charge of these troops. It is very interesting that Mao's first priority was to select a commander, even before the decision was reached whether the PRC should join the war or not. Obviously, Mao assumed that his proposal to enter the war would pass without a problem.

A plane was dispatched by Mao to take Peng to another enlarged Politburo meeting on October 4. But Peng did not have any idea that the Central Committee had chosen him as a candidate for commander of the army since he assumed that he had been asked to come to Beijing to report on how to revise the economic construction of Northeast China. The Politburo meeting had started when he reached Zhongnanhai, the location of the CCP Central Committee. Mao told Peng immediately that the meeting was

⁶¹*Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*, 1: 539-540.

to discuss whether the CCP should participate in this war or not since the enemy had crossed the 38th parallel.

The participants at the meeting were divided into two groups based on their different stands. Those people who opposed the war listed many difficulties: The new regime was busy with restoring the damage caused in the war; some regions were still in the hands of the GMD; land reform had not started in some newly liberated areas; the PLA was far inferior to the American army; and a great number of officers and soldiers resented more fighting when they had experienced endless wars. According to Nie Rongzhen's recollection, the majority preferred that the CCP be cautious toward this war. The general consensus at the meeting was "We should not become involved in this war unless China is forced into the corner."⁶³

Mao commented at the end of the meeting, "All of what you have said is reasonable. No matter what we say, I feel quite pained when our neighbor is in crisis and we only stand by, without helping."⁶⁴ Peng did not say anything at the meeting because he had not made up his mind about what to do. Peng could not go to sleep the whole night thinking of the critical situation: "Due to its military base in Taiwan, the United States was a threat to Shanghai and Eastern China. It would be another great threat to the security of Northeast China should it control Korea. In the future Washington could take advantage of its occupation in Taiwan and Korea to invade China at any time and with any excuse. China should meet this challenge now in order to save North Korea and protect her own safety."⁶⁵

⁶² Ibid., 541.

⁶³ Wang Yan, *Peng Dehuai Zhuan* [The Biography of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe), p. 402.

⁶⁴ Peng Dehuai, *Peng Dehuai Zishu* [Autobiography of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1981), p. 258.

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 259-260.

Deng Xiaoping, at Mao's request, took Peng to Zhongnanhai at 9 o'clock the next day. Mao said frankly to Peng that the CCP faced many difficulties in participating in the war, but he also wanted to know whether Peng could figure out some favorable elements. Peng replied that after his careful consideration the previous night, he supported Mao's position to join the war. Then Mao said that the CCP Central Committee was considering him as commander of the army. Mao's words took Peng by surprise. He said that he had heard that Lin Biao had been selected as commander of the army. Mao told him that Lin was unable to take leadership because of his physical unfitness. After some thought, Peng decided to accept this appointment. Mao said emotionally, "I feel relieved now. The American army is rushing toward the 38th parallel in several directions. We need to dispatch our troops as soon as possible in order to seize the initiative. Tell us your opinion please when we have the Politburo meeting this afternoon."⁶⁶

Peng expressed his position at the meeting that afternoon: "It is necessary to send an army to Korea. It only means that the victory of our liberation war will be delayed for several years at most even if we should fail. But if the American army were to control the border of the Yalu River and Taiwan, the United States could find an excuse at any time to launch an invasion. The situation would be more complicated if the United States were to occupy the whole of the Korean peninsula. Therefore, it is more beneficial for us to fight earlier than later."⁶⁷ Peng's speech played a significant role in changing the pessimistic atmosphere of the meeting. The Central Committee decided to send the Chinese army into war. Mao told Peng that his army had only ten days for preparation. The time to dispatch the army was fixed for October 15.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Wang Yan, *Peng Dehuai Zhuan*, p. 402.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 402.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 403.

Zhou transmitted the CCP Central Committee's decision to participate in the war at the CMC Standing Committee meeting the following day. Then he asked the participants to discuss the details of the war preparations. Lin raised his argument against joining the war again: It was not worth it to rescue tiny Korea at the expense of China. The PLA had confidence to defeat Jiang's troops. But it was very hard to say whether the PLA could win a war against the American army. America possessed a huge military force with an infantry, air force, and navy and atom bomb as well. China would suffer too much if the American army should attack China with nuclear weapons or air bombing. The best way was not to send the army there. The CCP should adopt a policy of sending its troops into Korea just for deterrence rather than fighting. Zhou criticized Lin that the time was not for discussing whether the CCP should send its army to Korea or not. It was the time to consider how to win this war.⁶⁹

Not knowing the decision that the CCP had reached, Stalin wired Mao again urging him to send his troops to war on October 5. Stalin tried to convince Mao that the United States was not ready for a world war. Then he told Mao that Beijing would not only lose all the concessions which Mao expected through his passive wait-and-see policy, but also he would lose Taiwan, because the United States would attempt to make use of Taiwan as springboard for invading China. Finally, Stalin tried to spur Mao to assist Kim Il Sung with the words: "Should we fear this [a world war]? In my opinion, we should not, because together we will be stronger than the United States and England, while the other European capitalist states do not present serious military forces. If a war is inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few years when Japanese militarism will be restored as an ally of the USA and when the USA and Japan will have a ready-

⁶⁹ Lei Yingfu, *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Jige Zhongda Juece de Huiyi*, Part 2, *Dang de Wenxian*, No.

made bridgehead on the continent in the form of the entire Korea run by Syngman Rhee."⁷⁰

On October 7, the UN General Assembly passed the resolution that the UN army was entrusted to take "all appropriate steps to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea." The same day, America's First Cavalry Division began to cross the 38th parallel.⁷¹ The following day, Mao issued the order in the name of the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Commission:

(1) In order to assist the Korean people's war of liberation, repel the invasion launched by the American imperialists and their running dog, and defend the interests of the Korean people, the Chinese people and the people of all Eastern countries, it has been ordered that the Northeastern Border Defense Army be turned into the Chinese People's Volunteers and that the Chinese People's Volunteers move immediately into the territory of Korea to assist the Korean comrades in their struggle against the invaders and to strive for a glorious victory.

....

(3) Comrade Peng Dehuai is appointed as Commander Political Commissar of the Chinese People's Volunteers.⁷²

The same day, Mao informed Kim Il Sung of this decision: "In response to the current situation, we have decided to send Volunteers to Korea to assist you in fighting against the invaders."⁷³ This was the second time that Mao decided to enter the war.

Actually, Mao's decision to enter the war revealed the caution of the CCP's leadership not to take any risk or have any illusion about its opponents. Zhou's reflection expressed such an alert: "Our intelligence is that [the Americans] planned first to cross the 38th parallel without provoking China and then to direct their spearhead at China. We saw through their tricks.... Nehru told me that [the UN forces] would stop 40 miles short

1, 1994, p. 27.

⁷⁰ "Letter from Fyn Si [Stalin] to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov)," 8 (7) October 1950, *CWIHP Bulletin*, Issue 6-7, p. 116.

⁷¹ Allen Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, p. 94.

⁷² "Mao's Order to Set up the Chinese People's Volunteer Army," 8 October 1950, *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*, 1: 543.

of the Yalu River after crossing the 38th parallel.... Obviously, this was the second time [for them] to fool us. If we did nothing, the aggressive enemy would surely continue its advance up to the Yalu River and would devise a second scheme [against China].”⁷⁴

After the CCP had made the decision to enter the war, Mao wired Stalin on October 7 that the CCP would send more troops to Korea than Stalin required. But Mao made it clear that these troops were not supposed to leave until his representatives had talks with Stalin about the details of military cooperation. The details which Mao mentioned referred to air cover and Soviet military equipment, which were extremely important for the Chinese army in this war.⁷⁵

Zhou left for the Soviet Union on October 8, and he met Stalin two days later. The major goal for Zhou's talks with Stalin was to ask for air support, which Stalin had promised several times before.⁷⁶ No written record of this Stalin-Zhou talk has been revealed up to now. However, we can figure out major points based on memoirs of participants and other indirect written materials such as several telegrams between Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang. It was clear that Zhou could not achieve his aim because Moscow was unwilling to provide Beijing with air cover until two or two and half months later.⁷⁷ As a reaction to Stalin's unwillingness to provide air cover, Zhou

⁷³ “Mao's Telegram to Kim informing him of the CCP's Decision to Enter the Korean War,” 10 October 1950, *Ibid.*, p. 545.

⁷⁴ Zhou Enlai, “Kangmei yuanchao, baowei heping” [Resist America and Aid Korea, and Safeguard Peace] October 24, 1950, *Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan* [Selected Diplomatic Works of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing, 1990), p. 30.

⁷⁵ “Ciphred telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Filippov [Stalin],” 3 October 1950, *CWIHP Bulletin*, Issue 6-7, p. 115.

⁷⁶ Shen Zhihua, *Mao Zedong, Stalin yu Chaoxian Zhanzheng*, pp. 270-272.

⁷⁷ Xiong Huayuan, “Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Qianxi Zhou Enlai Mimi Fangsu” [Zhou Enlai's Secrete Visit to the Soviet Union before China Crossed the Yalu], *Dang de Wenxian*, No. 3, 1994, pp. 84-85. In his telegram to Zhou on October 13, Mao mentioned that China had decided not to cancel its plan to intervene in the war even though Moscow could not provide China with air cover for two or two and half months. During the talks between Mao, Zhou and Kim in 1970, Zhou said that he went to Moscow with two opinions: to be or not to be. Mao's final decision to dispatch the Chinese troops depended on whether Stalin could meet Beijing's request for air cover or not. But Stalin refused to satisfy Beijing's request.

seemed to tell Stalin that China could not join the war.⁷⁸ Neither Stalin nor Zhou could convince the other. Finally, Stalin and Zhou "parted, reportedly, both confused about each other's true intentions."⁷⁹ Based on this decision, Stalin informed Kim with regret on October 13, 1950 that it would be better for him and the remnants of his forces to retreat to China and the USSR because of China's inability to enter the war at this time.⁸⁰ Kim II Sung and Pak Hon-yong were greatly shocked by Stalin's telegram. Kim II Sung stated that it was extremely hard for them to implement such advice; however... they would implement it.⁸¹

Zhou told Mao of the frustrating result on October 12.⁸² Having received Zhou's telegram, Mao immediately cabled Peng, Gao and Deng Hua, the Commander of the 13th Army Corps: "(1) The order of October 9 will not be implemented for the time being; all the units of the 13th Army Corps are required to stay where they are to undertake more training, not to begin operations. (2) Comrades Gao Gang and [Peng] Dehuai are to come to Beijing for further discussion tomorrow or the day after tomorrow."⁸³ Mao himself told Peng of this new decision by phone when he heard that Peng had arrived in Andong, a small city near the Yalu River, preparing to cross the river to meet Kim.⁸⁴

Mao summoned another urgent, enlarged Politburo meeting on October 13. Hearing the news that Moscow could not provide air support until two or two and half months later, Peng was very angry, and he wanted to resign at once. Mao managed to

⁷⁸ Mansourov's article confirmed that Stalin informed Kim II Sung of his talks with Zhou on October 13 and he suggested that all Kim's remnant troops retreat to China immediately since China was not ready to enter the war. *CWIHP Bulletin*, Issue 6-7, p. 104.

⁷⁹ Mansourov's article, *CWIHP Bulletin*, Issue 6-7, p. 103.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁸² Xiong Huayuan, "Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Qianxi Zhou Enlai Mimi Fangsu," *Dang de Wenxian*, No. 3, 1994., pp. 86.

⁸³ "Mao's Telegram to Peng," 12 October 1950, *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*, 1: 552.

⁸⁴ Li Haiwen, "Zhonggong Zhongyang Jiujiing Heshi Jueding Zhiyuanjun Chuguo Zuozhan?" [When Did the CCP Make Decision to Dispatch the CPV to Korea?], *Dang de Wenxian*, No. 5, 1993, p. 88.

persuade Peng to change his mind. After thorough consideration and discussion, the meeting made this decision: considering the fact that American troops were marching northward, the CPV should enter Korea immediately even without the Soviet air cover. Then Mao informed Zhou of the CCP's decision that the Chinese troops be dispatched on the original schedule. Mao pointed out:

The adoption of the above-mentioned active policy will be very important to the interests of China, Korea, the East, and the whole world. If, on the other hand, we send none of our troops and allow the enemy to reach the banks of the Yalu River, the international and domestic reactionary bluster will surely become louder; such a situation would be very unfavorable to us and it would be even worse for the Northeast. The whole Northeast Border Defense Army would be tied down there, and the electric power in southern Manchuria would be subject to the control [of the enemy]. In short, we believe that we should enter the war and that we must enter the war. Entering the war could be most rewarding; failing to do so may cause great harm.⁸⁵

Mao, Peng and Gao studied the operation plan the following day and decided to order their troops to cross the Yalu on October 18 and 19. This was the third time that Mao revealed his determination to fight Washington.

With Pyongyang surrounded by the UN army, Kim sent Pak Hon-yong to Shenyang on October 15 with a desperate plea for rescue. Peng told him about the CCP's decision. The same day, Mao sent Peng and Gao another telegram requiring that the advanced troops march on October 17, one day ahead of the original schedule, because Pyongyang was in danger. All the troops should have crossed the Yalu River within ten days.⁸⁶ Receiving Mao's telegram, Peng and Gao held a high officers' meeting on October 16 and transmitted Mao's new order to them.

On October 17 when the Chinese troops were about to cross the Yalu River, Peng and Gao got another urgent telegram from Mao saying that the date for the two advanced

⁸⁵ "Mao's Telegram to Zhou," 13 October 1950, *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*, 1: 556.

armies to cross the Yalu be postponed to the 19th and that Peng and Gao should fly back to Beijing for more discussions. Something new must have happened again. This change was also linked with the cooperation between Moscow and Beijing.

On October 13, Mao had instructed Zhou to stay a few more days in Moscow to make sure that “(1) China can purchase the weaponry and military equipment from the Soviet Union with credit if possible, or otherwise with cash. Our army can enter the war without worries, endure a long-term war, and unite the majority of the Chinese people if we can secure \$200,000,000 for economic construction. (2) We do not fear the enemy's air attack if the Soviet Union is able to send its air force in two or two and half months to help our fight in Korea and protect Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Nanjing and Qingdao.”⁸⁷ Molotov told Zhou that China could purchase Soviet weaponry on credit and that the Soviets would offer China air cover with 16 air regiments.⁸⁸ Zhou wired a telegram requesting further whether the Soviets could dispatch bombers to work with the Chinese army in Korea.

Stalin replied to Zhou's question, through Molotov, that the Soviet air force could operate only in Chinese territory.⁸⁹ That is, the Chinese armies would fight in Korea without air support at all. Obviously, Beijing and Moscow had different understandings of air cover. For Mao, air cover meant that the Russian air force would go wherever the Chinese armies went. For Stalin, the Russian air force would not fight beyond the territory of China; otherwise, he feared that a direct confrontation between Moscow and Washington would not be avoided. Zhou realized that China had been fooled by Stalin.

⁸⁶ “Mao's Telegram to Gao Gang and Peng Dehui,” 15 October 1950, *Ibid.*, 1:564.

⁸⁷ Li Haiwen, “Zhonggong Zhongyang Jiujiang Heshi Jueding Zhiyuanjun Chuguo Zuozhan?” p. 88.

⁸⁸ Xong Huayuan, “Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Qianxi Zhou Enlai Mimi Fangsu,” pp. 86-87.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

He left for China with this unexpected news on October 16. That was why Mao urged Peng and Gao to return to Beijing at once.

Mao presided over the Politburo meeting and discussed whether the CCP should enter the war or not in such a unexpected situation. Zhou summarized his talks with Stalin and Molotov, and Peng reported on war preparation at the meeting. Even though Stalin refused to provide air cover for the Chinese army in Korea, he agreed to offer all other military equipment and weaponry. Mao made the final decision: "The enemies have attacked Pyongyang and they will march to the Yalu River in a few days. The decision that the CPV enter the war will not change, the schedule will not be postponed, and the troops should cross the river on the original schedule."⁹⁰ Mao cabled Deng Hua after the meeting: "It has been decided that the four armies and three artillery divisions will follow our original plan to enter northern Korea for war operations. These troops will start to cross the [Yalu] River from the Andong-Ji'an section tomorrow (the 19th) evening."⁹¹

This was the fourth and last time that Mao made up his mind to meet the challenge from Washington. In their conversation in Moscow in 1952, Liu Shaoqi told Wang Ming that it was when U.S. forces drove toward the Yalu that Mao finally made up his mind: "Now, we cannot afford not to engage the Americans."⁹² Li Yinqiao recalled that Mao could not sleep for several days. When Nie reported to Mao that the Chinese People's Volunteers had crossed the Yalu River on the evening of October 19, Mao said, "I am going to bed," and he went to sleep immediately.⁹³

⁹⁰ Wang Yan, *Peng Dehuai Zhuan* [*The Biography of Peng Dehua*], p. 407.

⁹¹ "Mao's Telegram to Deng Hua," 18 October 1950, *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*, 1: 568.

⁹² Jonathan Polladck, "The Korean War and the Sino-American Relations," p.219.

Conclusion

Most scholars have asked this question: Why did Mao enter this war, which was the last thing that Mao wanted? Here the author will ask a similar question, but from an opposite angle. How could Mao not enter the war? This paper traces Mao's considerations of a series of grave results if China were to adopt a passive wait-to-see stand.

From the perspective of national security, a buffer area would be gone if Kim's regime were to be replaced by Rhee's government. The PRC had not needed to worry about the safety of the Northeast before. But facing a hostile regime at the Sino-Korea border, Chinese leaders would have to dispatch massive forces there. As Zhou worried, "How many troops are needed to guard the Yalu River of one thousand kilometers? Moreover, they have to wait there year by year without knowing when the enemy may come."⁹⁴ In a talk with his old friends, Wang Jifan and Zhou Shizhao on October 27, 1950, Mao also expressed his worry in this regard:

It is correct that we need a peaceful environment badly for our socialist construction. I can give you tens of thousands of reasons for peaceful development. But these so many reasons cannot overshadow these six characters "buneng zhizhi buli" [cannot pay no attention]. Currently, the U.S. threatens the Northeast. If the U.S. defeats North Korea, even if its troops stay on the other side of the Yalu River, the Northeast would be under threat and our socialist construction would be in grave trouble. If we tolerate the Americans' aggressive invasion, they will be more arrogant. The U.S. would follow Japan's example to invade China. They would be even more aggressive than the Japanese. The United States would direct its three sharp swords toward China. The first one is on our head from Korea, the second on our waist from Taiwan and the third on our feet from Vietnam. They would attack us from any of these three directions if the situation is favorable to them. We would be in a very disadvantageous position if they invade us from these three directions at the same time. Our intervention in Korea is to thwart their calculated actions....Our intervention was only to aid

⁹³ Xu Yan, "Chubing Ruchao Canzhan Juece Zuihuo Queding de Quzhe Guocheng," p. 14.

⁹⁴ Zhou Enlai, "Kangmei Yuanchao, Baowei Heping" [Resist America, Aid Korea, and Safeguard Peace], in *Zhou Enlai Xuanji* [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai], Vol. 2, p.51.

Korea and protect our own country. Unfortunately, many people in our own party do not think in this way.⁹⁵

The GMD would also take advantage of this situation to launch military attacks from the southeast and southwest of China. Here I will take an episode of communication between Stalin and Mao to see how it impacted another worry of Mao. On October 6 Stalin urged Kim to set up a government in exile in the Northeast of China and organize guerilla war there. From Mao's perspective, this would offer an excuse for the United States to invade China to fight Kim's remnants. Such a Sino-U.S. confrontation would take place in the territory of China. Moreover, the Soviet Union could take advantage of this opportunity to dispatch its troops to the Northeast. With the pretext of fighting Japanese troops in 1945, the Soviet Union made Jiang recognize its privileges in Manchuria. The diplomatic fruits Mao had obtained through tough bargaining with Stalin would be lost. Stalin could do the same thing if Mao's regime needed such desperate help from the Soviet Union. China's political independence and territorial sovereignty would be empty words.

From the perspective of economic development, this region with rich natural resources, advanced industrial equipment, and skilled laborers would be threatened. There was no way for CCP leaders and the people in this region to concentrate on industrial production and China would lose her most powerful engine of economic rehabilitation and industrial development. The following quotation of Zhou Enlai showed the concerns of the CCP leadership: "Once the Eastern front is open, the enemy will be able to draw closer to our door, and then how can we consider national reconstruction? If

⁹⁵ Wang Yuqing, "Mao Zedong yu Qinyou Tan Chaoxian Zhanzheng" [Mao Zedong Talks about the Korean War with Family Member and Friends] in http://military.china.com/zh_cn/dljl/09/1142/20001025/5357.html.

Korea suffers defeat, our Northeast will accordingly be in jeopardy. If American imperialism extends its aggression to the Yalu, how can we carry out our production tasks?”⁹⁶

From the perspective of domestic security, GMD remnants in Mainland China would be bold enough to make troubles when they had hope of overthrowing this new regime. The legitimacy of Red China would be questioned and challenged by the Chinese people, particularly by the national bourgeoisie who resented socialism and intellectuals who were pro-America oriented. As Mao feared, “If we send none of our troops and allow the enemy to reach the banks of the Yalu River, the international and domestic reactionary cry will surely become louder. Such a situation will be very unfavorable to us and will be even worse for the Northeast.”⁹⁷

From the perspective of international environment, Zhou had the following concerns:

The U.S. imperialists aim to open a breach in Korea and to turn Korea into a base for their actions in the East for starting a new world war. They hope that they will at least be able to push the Korean People’s Army to areas north of the 38th parallel. Therefore, Korea is indeed the focus of the struggles in the world. Taking advantage of the Korean War, the U.S. imperialists have succeeded in seizing the banner of the United Nations on the peace front. They have also used the Korean problem to begin domestic mobilization. As the strategic emphasis of the United States lies in Europe, Americans are also doing everything possible to use the Korean problem to mobilize capitalist countries in Europe, so that these countries will yield to domination by the United States. [The Americans] wanted also to take this opportunity to remilitarize Japan and West Germany, with the consent of other capitalist countries. After suppressing Korea, the United States will certainly turn to suppressing Vietnam and other colonized countries. Therefore, the Korean problem is at least the key to the East.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Zhou Enlai, *Zhou Enlai Xuanji* [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai], Beijing: People Press, 1984), Vol. 2, p.51.

⁹⁷ “Telegram, Mao Zedong to Zhou,” 13 October 1950, *Mao Zedong Junshi Wenxuan*, [Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong] p.347.

⁹⁸ “Zhou Enlai’s Speech at the Central Military Commission’s Enlarged Meeting,” 26 August 1950, Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, ed. *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia*, (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1996), pp.158-9.

If Mao and his CCP colleagues had to struggle for their survival, how could they realize the CCP revolutionary objective to build an independent, prosperous and powerful China?

In addition to these disadvantages if China waited passively, Mao had other reasons for China's initiating the attack to deal with a perceived unavoidable confrontation from a positive angle. The CCP leadership assumed that the United States would interfere with China from three directions of Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam.⁹⁹ From Mao's perspective, Korea among these three areas would be the location where the risks and consequences would be more manageable. Korea was a mountainous country, which would greatly reduce the capacity and advantages of America's modern military forces. Bordered by the Northeast, the most advanced industrial base in China, and the Soviet Union, Mao's troops could receive sufficient logistic and weaponry supplies. The timing for Chinese troops to enter the war would take their adversaries by surprise, since they did not expect that Mao would dare to engage the war. When China was forced to meet this challenge at her border, Mao expected that this decision would receive support among the Chinese people, particularly, when the slogan of guarding their families and defending their nation, which the CCP propaganda created, linked this war with the Chinese people's own interests and the national security.

With all these factors taken into consideration, Mao made up his mind to enter the war to fight a seemingly undefeatable enemy.

⁹⁹ *Renmin Ribao*, November 6, 1950.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

It seemed that the CCP-U.S. confrontation in Korea was a historically determined event. Obviously, this military clash was not what either Truman or Mao wanted. Why did Truman make the decision to interfere with the internal affairs of Korea, which went against the hands-off policy announced by Acheson in his speech on 12 January 1950? Why did Mao make the decision to fight American troops, which was the last choice Mao wanted? Could they have made other choices which would have avoided this bloody fight between Chinese and Americans in Korea? Karl Marx's interpretation on man-made history seems able to answer the question: "men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past."¹

To understand why Truman and Mao made such a choice against their own wills, we need to trace the circumstances which they were facing. This historically determined event should be understood on these elements: the clash between the national independence movement and the bipolar world environment; the conflicts between the two different concepts of national security held by Washington and Beijing; and Mao's own American strategy.

The National Independence Movement vs. the Cold War

The occurrence of the Korean War was actually a clash between the national independence movement and the Cold War. National independence became a historical

trend after the Second World War. Some former colonial empires such as Germany and Japan were defeated in the war. The power of other colonial empires like Great Britain, France and Netherlands declined because of the war. Germany and Japan were forced to give up their colonies. Britain, France and the Netherlands could not control their colonies effectively as they had done before the WWII. The colonies had their own military forces, political parties and governing bodies which they set up during the Second World War. They were eager to become their own masters in their own lands. Therefore, nationalist revolutions broke out one after another in India, Vietnam, Indonesia and some other countries of Asia. North Korea as well as South Korea, like their Asian neighbors, were eager to gain a Korean unification and independence in this world trend. Both Kim and Rhee harbored an ambition of unifying the Korean Peninsula through military means. It was only a matter of time for a Korean civil war to break out since both sides intended to fight.

However, the world was dominated by the Cold War and the two superpowers in the postwar period. Washington adopted a global strategy after the Second World War. John Gaddis in his article “The Strategy of Containment” mentioned that “universalism” might be regarded as one important feature of American foreign policy. Americans always tried hard to reach congeniality through homogeneity in the course of their history. They hoped that they were able to make other nations and cultures resemble the United States as much as possible. Their assumption was that no threat would come to the United States once other nations followed their model.² The National Security Council Paper No. 68 made it clear

¹ Robert C. Tucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), p.595.

² Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, ed., *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p.26.

that "Our overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish."³

Washington's global strategy, however, faced a strong challenge from the Soviet Union. Competing with Washington's preponderance of power after the war, the Soviet Union also possessed overwhelming power on the Eurasian land mass. The Soviet regime had annexed strategic strips of Finland, three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, a few parts of eastern Prussia, a third of prewar Poland and a part of Ruthenia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia. Stalin obtained President Roosevelt's agreement at the Yalta Conference in 1945 for the reannexation of Kurile Islands, Southern Sakhalin, and some concessions on the Manchurian railroads, Port Arthur and the city of Dairen. Moreover, Moscow could effectively control its Eastern European satellites Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania and in the Far East Outer Mongolia. Besides Moscow's historical tradition of expansion, it had the ideologies of Marxism and Leninism, which imposed on the Soviet Union a historical mission to bury the capitalist system. In his election speech on 9 February 1946, Stalin warned that there could be no lasting peace with capitalism and he declared that the Soviet Union would overcome the American advantage in weapons technology.

Korea became a victim of the Moscow-Washington competition. A civil war in Korea, no matter who initiated an invasion, would be a challenge to the status quo of the postwar situation. Therefore, Pyongyang's invasion of Seoul, in Washington's eyes, was a provocation to America's national security.

³ Thomas G. Paterson, ed., "National Security Council Paper No. 68, 1950" *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy* (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989), 3rd edition, vol. II, p. 301-2.

The Confrontation between Two Different Concepts of National Security

How does the United States look at its national security? America's national security has two important contents: its sphere of influence in the world, and its prestige and image. To thwart Moscow's threat, Washington intended to establish a vast anti-Communist front including military alliance, mutual commitments, and economic aids to client states. As the leader and defender of the free world, any Communist offensive action in America's sphere of interests would be considered a challenge toward her own national security. Even though Kim looked at Pyongyang's attack as Korean internal affairs, the Truman administration treated it as a challenge toward America's sphere of influence and her prestige and credibility. The Communist world would extend this expansion into the whole of Asia if the United States were not to stop this invasion. Moreover, prestige and image also played a very important role in America's national security. Washington would have lost credit among its allies if it had yielded before the Communists' pressure. Nobody would have dared to stand on the side of the United States against the Communists if Washington had failed to defend its allies. Therefore, Acheson claimed that Americans must "steel ourselves for the use of force" to meet this open challenge from the Communist camp.⁴

The Truman administration had faced a crisis when it "lost" China; it could not stand to lose South Korea. The White House had no other choice but launch a counterattack in this situation. Once the Truman administration was involved in the war, just as Walter Lafeber had pointed out: "The American policy of containment was to be replaced by a new idea of rollback. The Communists were to be removed, not merely contained, and Truman intended to roll them back to the borders of the two Communist giants themselves, Russia and

⁴ Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), p.405.

China.” Actually, it was beyond Truman’s choice to adopt a rollback policy when we include the following elements: America’s superior military force; Republicans’ criticism; McCarthyism; and the domestic majority’s support for driving the Communists beyond the Yalu.⁵

However, one cause triggered another. Washington’s crossing the 38th parallel, in Beijing’s opinion, was an unbearable challenge to its national security, which would threaten the existence of its new regime. China’s national security assumed that buffer areas were essential for her safety. A very well-known Chinese proverb states that “teeth are under threat without the protection of the lips.” North Korea was regarded as lips, the east gate of China. Even though the United States had no plans of invading China, its occupation of North Korea had already pierced the shield of China’s national security, let alone the fact that the United States had blockaded the Taiwan Straits and bombed China’s border cities long before China took any action to fight against America. To Mao, the U.S. in Korea was comparable to JFK’s view of the USSR in Cuba. Beijing seemed to have no other alternative but to meet this threat by sending its troops into Korea.

One cannot deny in retrospect that the Truman administration did not have plans to invade China even if the United States had gained its control of the whole of Korea. But the long-term suspicions and hostility worried Mao. A war is like a game of chess. A player’s next step depends largely on what situation he finds himself in and on what his opponent does. The Truman administration had no plan to cross the 38th parallel at the beginning of the war. However, it began to take more and more aggressive actions when the UN army had won an increasingly favorable position. Zhou exposed Washington’s “cheating” at a

⁵According to polls, nearly two-thirds of Americans wanted to drive the Communists out of all Korea. See Walter Lafeber, *The American Age*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989), p. 496.

meeting of the standing Committee of the Political Consultative Conference on 24 October 1950. He said that Jawaharlal Nehru passed two messages to Zhou after the UN army took back Seoul. The first one was that the meeting of the three foreign ministers (America, Britain and France) had reached an agreement not to cross the 38th parallel. The second message reversed the first promise saying that the UN forces would stop forty miles away from the Yalu River if the UN troops should cross the 38th parallel. The fact that Washington broke her promises made Beijing wary of the promises passed through India. The CCP did not dare to have any illusion that the U.S. would stop its military marching when it won a favorable position. Zhou revealed his worries: "If Korea falls, the enemy might continue to advance.... If we do not resist American imperialism now and yield to them, we would be placed in a passive position.... On the one hand, if we strike now, the enemy would be bogged down in Korean quagmire, it will then be unable to extend its aggression against China." ⁶

Mao's American Strategy

Moreover, Mao's decision to fight the American armies in Korea had much to do with his perception of the United States. Based on Mao's American strategy, U.S. global expansion was incompatible with the CCP's anti-imperialist struggle and China's national independence. Mao believed that a conflict would take place between the United States and the CCP sooner or later. The CCP should avoid or delay this clash. But the CCP should take the initiative once this confrontation was unavoidable.

Mao's American strategy was composed of three parts: anti-imperialism, Marxism-Leninism and his personal contacts with the American government. His foreign

⁶ *Zhou Enlai Xueji*, Vol. 2, pp.52.

policy could be largely understood from the interaction of these three factors. Anti-imperialism had been a tradition since the Opium War. From the perspective of Mao and his generation, imperialist penetration and domination in China brought about her political and economic destruction and social division. Overthrowing imperialism had been a priority of the CCP revolution. "The concept of it [imperialism]," in Hunt's words, "had a dual appeal: it offered a systematic explanation for the workings of the international system then tormenting China, and it served as a politically effective rallying cry for Chinese deeply aggrieved by foreign encroachment and abuse."⁷ Marxism-Leninism offered the CCP and Mao an ideological tool to comprehend the humiliation and suffering imposed by the Western powers. Based on this orthodoxy, imperialist countries' economic exploitation and political and military domination in colonial and semi-colonial countries such as China was intrinsic to the nature of capitalism. In order to survive, a capitalist country needed adequate raw materials, markets and cheap laborers, which they could easily find in those non-capitalist countries. Not only did this orthodoxy point out the root of imperialism aggression, but it also "helped give the CCP an identity—a sense of its place in Chinese history and in the ongoing global struggle for a new order." What the Soviet Union had achieved was just what Mao was eager to do for China: "a strong state, a reformed society, and a new basis of foreign relations."⁸

Prior to 1944, Mao's concept of imperialism, in general, and the United States, in particular, was more theoretical and abstract. The arrival of the Dixie group and Hurley's mediation offered the CCP an opportunity for personal contacts. Under foreign

⁷ Michael H. Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p.88.

occupation by Japan and facing domestic hostility from the Nationalist government, Mao tried to gain the support of the United States when the Soviet Union was busy fighting Germany. However, Mao and his colleagues needed to find out exactly what America's post-war China policy would be before making up their minds whether to have sincere cooperation with Washington or not. In other words, which side would the U.S. take if the GMD refused to follow America's proposal of establishing a coalition government. The CCP leadership needed to figure out the GMD-CCP relationship first, which would, in turn, help the CCP leadership understand Washington's China policy. Based on the analysis of the telegram from the CCP's Southern Bureau in August 1944 and Chen Yi's letter three months later, a consensus was reached between Mao and his colleagues that Jiang would never give up his autocratic rule. Therefore, because of the differences in ideology and strategic objectives between the CCP and the United States, the U.S. would support Jiang's regime at the cost of the CCP. The unhappy experiences with Hurley and Marshall confirmed Mao's analysis and hypothesis. The mutual-benefit relations between the United States and the Nationalist government, from Mao's perspective, proved Marxist theory that an imperialist country would control a weak country by supporting an indigenous proxy. Mao began to target the U.S. as a threatening adversary of the CCP from 1945 on. As Goldstein commented on my dissertation, the three factors "interacted and shaped each other - i.e. anti-imperialism shaped the way Marxism was accepted and interpreted which, in turn, shaped the manner in which American policy was perceived by Mao."⁹

⁸ Ibid., p.84.

⁹ This quotation comes from Goldstein' comment on my dissertation.

In the context of the Cold War, Mao was aware that his regime was unlikely to survive unless he selected either the United States or the Soviet Union as an ally. Mao's American strategy naturally led to his decision to lean to the side of Moscow. It was based on simple logic: the friend of my enemy could be my enemy, and the enemy of my enemy could be my friend. The United States became the CCP's enemy when it chose the GMD as its ally. The CCP chose the Soviet Union as its friend when Moscow and Washington became competitive opponents. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance allowed Moscow and Beijing to become strategic partners. Beijing needed Moscow's assistance to help with its Taiwan campaign as well as to cope with a possible direct military intervention from Washington. Moscow could make use of Beijing to resist Washington's expansion and control in China and Asia. Even though there were different considerations and contradictory interests between Moscow and Beijing, they knew it would benefit both sides to join together by 1950.

Mao's American strategy, once it was established and confirmed, had an enormous impact on Mao's policy making. Mao predicted that a CCP-U.S. confrontation would take place in Korea, Taiwan or Vietnam because of possible American intervention. Mao warned his party repeatedly to make military and psychological preparations for the coming of such a moment.

It happened that a civil war broke out in Korea on 25 June 1950. As soon as Washington declared its involvement in the Korean War Mao felt that the long-expected CCP-U.S. confrontation around the corner. Preparing for the worst, Mao decided to seize the initiative in order to reverse America's advantage in the field. Mao's American strategy

efficiently guided China's military actions in the Korean War. The Korean War, in turn, confirmed further the validity of Mao's American strategy.

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