

1-1-1975

Roosevelt and the sultans : the United States Navy in the Mediterranean, 1904.

William James Hourihan
University of Massachusetts Amherst


Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation

Hourihan, William James, "Roosevelt and the sultans : the United States Navy in the Mediterranean, 1904." (1975). *Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014*. 1340.
<https://doi.org/10.7275/k3yt-as23> https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1340

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

UMASS/AMHERST



312066013544453

ROOSEVELT AND THE SULTANS:
THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1904

A Dissertation Presented

By

William James Hourihan

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

February 1975

History

(C) William James Hourihan 1975

All Rights Reserved

ROOSEVELT AND THE SULTANS:
THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1904

A Dissertation

By

William James Hourihan

Approved As To Style And Content By:

Robert A. Host

(Chairman of Committee)

Robert H. Mural

(Head of Department)

Gerald W. McFarland

(Member)

Peter T. Muen

(Member)

February 1975

Roosevelt and the Sultans: The United States Navy in
the Mediterranean, 1904 (February 1975)

William James Hourihan, B.S., M.A.,

Northeastern University

Directed by: Dr. Robert A. Hart

When Theodore Roosevelt became President of the United States in 1901 it was the navy to which he turned as the vehicle for his diplomacy. At first Roosevelt proceeded cautiously. He pushed through the Congress legislation for the construction of new battleships and armored cruisers, and he began bringing the navy's scattered warships together in the Atlantic as a single powerful force. During the winter of 1902-03 this fleet held the navy's first peacetime maneuvers, and by the summer of 1903 Roosevelt's battleships were conducting naval exercises off the Azores in the mid-Atlantic.

All of this prepared the way for a naval display which dwarfed anything similar in the past, and which took the American navy in large numbers into the Mediterranean Sea. During the summer of 1904 a total of fourteen warships (60% of the navy's first-class armored ships; and over 30% of the navy's strength, cruiser-class and above), along with a number of support vessels, embarked on this cruise; the greatest demonstration of American naval power ever seen outside of

the Western Hemisphere. The heart of the fleet were the six battleships of the Battleship Squadron, the single most powerful unit the navy possessed.

The cruise served a number of purposes. It gave Europe a first-hand exhibition of American naval strength. If Roosevelt was to participate on a basis of equality with the great powers he had to establish the robustness and reach of the American navy, and what better way to do this than a cruise by a powerful fleet off the coasts of Europe. Also, on a more practical level, Roosevelt decided to employ the fleet in putting pressure on the Ottoman Empire to settle certain outstanding problems which the United States had long been trying to resolve with Constantinople.

However, before this demonstration could take place the fleet was involved in another bit of gunboat diplomacy. The kidnapping of an American in Morocco coincided with the arrival of the fleet in European waters, and Roosevelt had no hesitation about using its presence to put pressure on the Sultan of Morocco. For almost two months American warships prowled the Straits area, much to the discomfort of Spain and France.

To cruise the Mediterranean with such a large force was in its own right an important and significant employment of United States sea power, but the use of the fleet in aggressive naval demonstrations against the Sultans of Morocco and Turkey underlined for Europe the practical capabilities of Roosevelt's navy. What the President established by

displaying his battleships at close range to the great powers was a concrete exhibit of America's right to be accepted as an equal.

Historians who have dealt with the role of the navy during the Roosevelt years have generally examined two distinct manifestations. The first of these was the physical growth of the navy -- a growth which brought the United States to a position as the third largest naval power in the world by the time Roosevelt left office. The second was the sending of the fleet on an epic round the world voyage during Roosevelt's second term. What has been largely ignored, however, was the use of this naval power in the years between 1902 and 1905. The Mediterranean cruise of 1904 was an important chapter in a growing application of the navy as a diplomatic tool, and it represents the culmination of Rooseveltian naval policy in the first three years of his presidency.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	v
CHAPTER I. THE ROOSEVELT NAVY	1
CHAPTER II. PREPARATIONS FOR A CRUISE	24
CHAPTER III. A KIDNAPPING	44
CHAPTER IV. "WARSHIPS WILL BE SENT"	63
CHAPTER V. EUROPE LOOKS ON	84
CHAPTER VI. "PERDICARIS ALIVE, OR RAISULI DEAD"	107
CHAPTER VII. "A BATTLESHIP TO PLAY WITH"	136
CHAPTER VIII. THE SCHOOL QUESTION	153
CHAPTER IX. ROOSEVELT GAMBLES	167
CHAPTER X. "THE PRIMACY OF THE WORLD"	183
FOOTNOTES	207
BIBLIOGRAPHY	232

INTRODUCTION

"It is said . . . in some quarters that America, being so distant a Power, can have no good reason for interference; but that, surely, is /a/ matter for her own decision, not the decision of Europe. She has as much right to her own ambitions, her own purposes, and her own complaints as any other Power. . . . Seated on two oceans, with unlimited wealth, and a population possibly more patriotic than that of any white State, her weight must be felt in every corner of the world."¹

There was nothing unusual about this editorial opinion which appeared in the influential English periodical The Spectator during the summer of 1904. The imperialistic impulse held full sway in the world The Spectator's readers knew, and the casual racism and unapologetic acceptance of Europe's right to exert its power across the globe was not questioned. This was also a time when diplomatic relations between the United States and Great Britain were becoming increasingly warm after over a century of thinly veiled antagonism, and, for the most part, Britons were now looking at Brother Johnathan as an undeclared ally in a world increasingly divided by potentially dangerous alliances.

What was exceptional about the editorial was that it did not refer to the United States in the Caribbean or South

America as one might have expected; nor did it concern American penetration in the Orient -- the "ambitions" which were alluded to lay in Europe, specifically in the Mediterranean.

The United States had, in a sense, taken on the status of a world power with its victory over Spain in 1898, and in the acquisition of a fairly substantial colonial burden in the Caribbean and the Far East. But what was the basis upon which this new world power rested? The American army at the turn of the century was a small force composed mainly of regiments more skilled in indian fighting than in modern warfare. A large, unwieldy and inefficient militia system existed, but it was an anachronism in the twentieth century and could not compare with the well-trained conscript armies of Europe. Only in its navy did the United States possess a respected tool which gave substance to its newly gained great power status. In an age lacking air power and intercontinental ballistic missiles it was the battleship which was the principal agent of national pride and aggrandizement.

When Theodore Roosevelt became President in late 1901 it was the navy to which he turned as the vehicle for his diplomacy. The fleet was to be his "big stick." At first Roosevelt proceeded cautiously. He pushed through Congress legislation for the construction of many new battleships and armored cruisers, and he began bringing the navy's scattered warships together in the Atlantic as a single powerful force. During the winter of 1902-03 this fleet

held the navy's first peacetime maneuvers in the Caribbean, and by the summer of 1903 Roosevelt's battleships were conducting naval exercises off the Azores in the mid-Atlantic.

All of this prepared the way for a naval display which would dwarf anything similar in the past, and which would take the American navy in full force into the Mediterranean Sea. During the summer of 1904 a total of fourteen warships, along with a number of support vessels, were to embark on this cruise; the largest demonstration of United States naval power ever seen outside of the Western Hemisphere. The heart of the fleet would be the six battleships of the Battleship Squadron, the single most powerful unit the navy possessed. These were the navy's newest and best armored vessels, and comprised over one-half of its strength in first-class warships.

The cruise would serve a number of purposes, both diplomatic and practical. It would give to Europeans a first-hand exhibition of American naval strength. If Roosevelt was to participate on a basis of equality with Europe he would have to establish the robustness and reach of American naval power, and what better way to do this than a voyage by a powerful war fleet off the coast of Europe. Also, the cruise would give the navy a splendid chance to train and exercise both its personnel and ships.

The presence of the American navy in the Mediterranean in such large numbers would alone have justified the comments in The Spectator, but the cruise was to

serve an even more useful purpose. Roosevelt decided to employ the fleet in putting pressure upon the Ottoman Empire to settle certain outstanding problems which the United States had long been trying to resolve with Constantinople. The latter part of 1904 would see an election, and a successful naval display against Turkey could be of great benefit to the President in an age in which the use of force was generally seen as the right and proper response of a great power seeking to establish its proper place in the world. Also, the "sick man of Europe" was easy prey, and Roosevelt could be fairly sure of a prestigious yet unexacting victory.

However, before this demonstration could take place the fleet was involved in another bit of gunboat diplomacy. The kidnapping of an American in Morocco by a bandit chief-tain coincided with the arrival of the fleet in Europe, and Roosevelt had no hesitation about using its presence to put pressure on the Sultan of Morocco. For over a month American warships prowled the Straits area, much to the discomfort of Spain and France.

To cruise the Mediterranean with such a large force was in its own right an important and significant employment of American sea power, but the use of the fleet in aggressive naval demonstrations against the Sultans of Morocco and Turkey underlined for Europe the practical capabilities of Roosevelt's navy. The role the President was to play in world diplomacy in the course of the next two years at Portsmouth and Algeciras was undoubtedly helped by the

expression of sea power shown by the 1904 cruise. What the President established by displaying his battleships at close range to Europe was a concrete exhibit of America's right to be accepted as a great power, a right underscored by the aggressive use of the fleet in Morocco and Turkey, and a right recognized by The Spectator. What made a nation respected and feared in this age of imperialism was not economic strength alone -- nor was a large population or land mass in itself necessarily a factor -- the key lay in a nation's military strength and its willingness to make use of this factor.

Historians who have dealt with the role of the navy during the Roosevelt years have generally examined two distinct manifestations. The first of these was the physical growth of the navy -- a growth which brought the United States to a position as the third largest naval power in the world by the time Roosevelt left office. The second was the sending of the fleet on an epic round the world voyage during Roosevelt's second term. What has been largely ignored, however, was the use of this naval power in the years between 1902 and 1905. The Mediterranean cruise of 1904 was an important chapter in a growing application of the navy as a diplomatic tool, and it represents the culmination of Rooseveltian naval policy in the first three years of his presidency. What this study will attempt to do will be to deal with this cruise and the events which occurred during

it, examine its wider ramifications, and place it in a proper historical perspective.

CHAPTER I

THE ROOSEVELT NAVY

The great bay of Guantánamo lies some forty miles east of Santiago de Cuba, and sixty miles from the eastern end of Cuba's southern coast. It is a large well-sheltered bay some ten miles in length and about five miles at its widest, boasting a narrow, easily-defended entrance. The bay flanks the strategic Windward Passage which provides access from the Atlantic into the Caribbean. During most of its history it played a role of little importance as the port of Santiago had been the main focal point of Spain's interests in the area. After the Spanish American War, due to increased United States naval penetration of the Caribbean and the distinct possibility of a transoceanic canal being built across the Central American isthmus, the bay was leased in 1903 for use as an American naval base.¹

Today "Gitmo," as it is called by navy personnel, is a well-developed base of marginal military importance. Surrounding the bay there exist large complexes of buildings, docks, and repairshops. In February, 1904, when its military significance was much greater, only a few rudimentary shore installations were visible against the low green hills and white beaches. The broad waters of the lower bay, however, presented a picture that was anything but tranquil, for

anchored there was a gleaming array of white-hulled battle-ships, cruisers, gunboats, and auxiliary vessels. The resting armada included the Battleship Squadron of the North Atlantic Station under the command of Rear Admiral Albert S. Barker.

In the years following the Spanish American War the navy, attending to Admiral Mahan's concept of concentration, had consolidated its main strength in the waters off the east coast of the United States on its North Atlantic Station. Of the several squadrons in this fleet Barker's was by far the most important, comprising six of the navy's eleven first-class battleships. One more, the Iowa, was due to join it within a month. Of the remaining battleships, the Indiana was out of commission at the New York Navy Yard; the Oregon and Wisconsin were in the Orient; and the eleventh, the Kentucky, was on her way home from the Asiatic Station.²

Barker's six battleships were the Kearsarge (flag), Missouri, Alabama, Maine, Illinois, and the squat, monitor-like Massachusetts. All were grouped together except for the Maine, which because of an outbreak of measles on board lay alone, "far from the rest with the yellow flag at the fore. . . ."³ Clustered around the battleships were a number of smaller warships. Among them puttered steam launches, tenders, whaleboats, and officers' barges.

The senior officer present at Guantánamo was Rear Admiral Barker. A Massachusetts native, he had graduated from the Naval Academy in 1861, and had been aboard the steam

frigate Mississippi when she sailed with Farragut's squadron to capture New Orleans in 1862. After a long and distinguished career he had been promoted to rear admiral in 1899, and was commandant of the New York Navy Yard before taking over the Battleship Squadron in early 1903. Barker was, as Theodore Roosevelt noted in a letter to Mahan, an officer "excellent in point of decisions," and one who shows a "willingness to accept responsibility."⁴

In July of 1903 Barker had led his battleships, along with other warships, in maneuvers off the Azores in the mid-Atlantic -- a radical strategic departure in that American ships had never before moved out of the Western Hemisphere in such numbers during peacetime. After an autumn naval review by President Roosevelt off the Maine coast Barker brought his command south into the Caribbean. He arrived at Guantánamo Bay on December 7th, and took possession of the anchorage for the United States.⁵

For the next two months the battleships were occupied off the island of Culebra "in drilling, maneuvering, boat exercises, etc., and for the greater part of the time under war conditions." On the 15th of February the squadron returned to Guantánamo and found the battleship Maine there in quarantine. The Missouri came in on the 17th bringing the squadron's strength to six. Rear Admiral Sigsbee, the former captain of the old Maine sunk at Havana in 1898, anchored on the 18th with the cruisers which made up his South Atlantic Squadron.⁶

On the 26th the converted yacht Mayflower entered the bay. With her large marble bathtub and other luxuries, the Mayflower would one day serve as a presidential yacht. Now she bore the Admiral of the Fleet, George Dewey; the head of the Bureau of Navigation, Rear Admiral Henry Clay Taylor; and the Assistant Secretary of State, Francis Butler Loomis.⁷

Admiral Dewey was at Guantánamo primarily to view the winter exercises of the fleet, however, he also had a secondary commission. He had been ordered by President Roosevelt to "go to Santo Domingo, investigate conditions and give a full, impartial searching account of the situation as it now presents itself to your eyes."⁸ Santo Domingo was going through one of its periodic revolutions, and the delicate diplomatic situation which existed in the Caribbean in 1904 gave the potential change in government increased importance in Roosevelt's eyes.

On the morning of the 29th, a Saturday, the entire fleet cleared the bay and stood out to sea where the battleships maneuvered against the cruisers, while Dewey and Taylor watched from the bridge of the Mayflower. Rear Admiral Taylor was, like Dewey and Barker, a veteran of the Civil War. A former president of the Naval War College, he had commanded the battleship Indiana during the Spanish American War, and his present position as head of the Bureau of Navigation corresponded with that of the Chief of Naval Operations today. Taylor found neither the battleships nor

cruisers brilliant in their evolutions, but he felt that this was only natural, "for with all our efforts in the last two or three years we find it difficult to induce fleets to have these really effective drills, their tendency being to confine themselves to purposeless wheelings and countermarches." Overall, however, he found the Battleship Squadron in good order, and the individual ships efficient. He saw some room for encouragement, and he wrote the Secretary of the Navy, William H. Moody, that "we still go forward, though perhaps for the moment a little slowly."⁹

That evening, after the warships had returned to the bay, Taylor revealed a startling aspect of that forward movement. Barker, it seemed, was to command an operation of unprecedented scope -- a cruise of the Mediterranean with his battleships and other units.¹⁰

The battleships would join with the European Squadron and "visit Lisbon, Trieste, and possibly one of the French Mediterranean ports, remaining in each port about six weeks, after which they would proceed together to Gibraltar." It would be, as Secretary of State John Hay wrote, "by far the most formidable fleet of battleships ever sent by this Government to Europe" While these two squadrons were traversing the Mediterranean a third, the South Atlantic, would be cruising along the North African coast.¹¹

The combined strength of the three squadrons would total fourteen warships, not counting a number of auxiliary vessels. This was approximately 30% of the commissioned

fighting strength of the navy, cruiser class and above; and about 60% of its first-class vessels -- an impressive undertaking by any measure, and one which could have a number of diplomatic repercussions.

Before examining the strategic considerations that dominated United States naval thinking in 1904, and lay behind the cruise, it would be advantageous to briefly review the growth of the modern American steel navy from its inception almost a quarter century before. In 1880 the navy of the United States was distinctly that of a third-class power, lagging behind such nations as Chile and Turkey. It consisted almost totally of rotting wooden steam frigates, corvettes, and sloops, as well as a number of rusting Civil War monitors. During the mid-1870's, in a move born of desperation, the navy surreptitiously laid down five large iron-hulled monitors and gave them the names of useless older monitors. It was only through the deception of repairing existing ships that funds could be wrung from a reluctant Congress. The period was typified by Grant's Secretary of the Navy George M. Robeson, who was once described as a "first-rate judge of wines, second-rate trout fisherman, and a third-rate New Jersey lawyer."¹²

Congress, in 1883, finally passed an appropriation for the construction of a number of new steel ships. The first four authorized were the protected cruisers Chicago, Boston, Atlanta, and the despatch vessel Dolphin. The ships

were built by the John Roach Company of Chester, Pa., which unfortunately went into bankruptcy in 1885 while work was still in progress. They were completed in Roach's shipyard by the navy -- the Dolphin in 1885, the Atlanta in 1886, the Boston in 1887, and the Chicago not until 1889. They were transitional vessels, carrying tall wooden masts and sailing rig above their steel hulls, and their performance was generally less than satisfactory. Yet their building represented a major breakthrough for the navy, and the four ships with their white hulls -- a change from the black hulls of the old navy -- provided the foundation upon which the new navy would be built.¹³

The first battleships for the navy were authorized in 1886 but not commissioned until 1895. They too were hybrid, smallish steel ships, variously designated as second-class battleships or as armored cruisers. They were unlucky vessels. The Maine blew up in Havana harbor, and the Texas was accident-prone, developing a reputation as a "hoo-doo." By the time of their commissioning both were considered anachronistic.¹⁴

The navy's first true battleships were the three vessels of the Indiana class (Oregon and Massachusetts) authorized in 1890. These ships were designated as coast battleships, a misleading term which, for political reasons, was applied to all capital ships until 1901. They carried a strong armament and heavy armor. Critical weaknesses involved slow speed and poor seagoing qualities. They were,

in a sense, simply an advancement on the monitor design which had dominated naval thinking since the Civil War. A fourth battleship, the Iowa, an improvement on the Indiana type, was laid down in 1892. These four battleships formed the pivotal strength of the navy during the Spanish American War.

Of the other ships built prior to the war a couple stand out from a heterogeneous collection of cruisers and gunboats. The two armored cruisers New York and Brooklyn were excellent, well-founded fighting craft. These armored cruisers were the only vessels of this type the navy possessed until 1905. Another, the large protected cruiser Olympia was one of the finest warships built in this era, "with her admirable blend of heavy armament, thick protected deck, high speed, and great endurance." At 5,870 tons she was the navy's third largest protected cruiser, and she still exists today at a berth on the Delaware River in Philadelphia, the only vessel to survive from the period.¹⁶

Between the end of the war and 1903, seven battleships joined the five pre-war armorclads for a total of twelve. Most were products of the patriotic excitement induced by the war. By 1901 this fervor had expended itself and no battleships were authorized by Congress in that year. When commissioned in early 1900, the Kearsarge and Kentucky were the first new capital ships to join the fleet since 1897. Both possessed the unusual feature of superposed turrets. Within eighteen months the three battleships of the Illinois class had been commissioned (Alabama and

Wisconsin). They in turn were joined in 1902 by the Maine, and finally in December, 1903, by the Missouri. The third vessel in this class, the Ohio, was not put into service until late in 1904.¹⁷

In this era the battleship was the primary index of national strength, and by early 1904 the existence of twelve gave America a rank of fifth or sixth place among the powers. However, the United States had in various stages of completion, authorized, or to be shortly authorized fourteen more battleships and ten armored cruisers. This paper total of twenty-six battleships and twelve armored cruisers was expected to raise the United States to third place after Great Britain and France. Behind this second spurt of American naval power lay the energy and determination of Theodore Roosevelt.¹⁸

The strategic considerations which dominated American naval thinking in the nineteenth century were profoundly conservative and defensive. They rested on the twin pillars of coastal defense and the disruption of an enemy's commerce. The navy fought the War of 1812 with Jefferson's gunboats and the large frigates of the Constitution class. The latter were the pocket battleships of their day. Very fast, they could run away from British ships-of-the-line; heavily-gunned, they could overcome most of the frigate types then extant in the Royal Navy. Their primary target was an enemy's commerce, not his fleet.

The Civil War underlined the use of this strategy. Confederate raiders such as the Alabama showed what commerce destroyers could do, while the Union monitors were the direct, albeit more successful, heirs of Jefferson's gunboats. After the war the navy continued this policy, as much as funds allowed, when they began building the monitors Puritan, Amphitrite, Miantonomoh, Monadnock, and Terror in 1874-75. They also introduced the fast cruisers of the Wampanoag type. The latter failed not because of technical problems, but because of economic ones. They were felt to be too costly to run and thus laid up.¹⁹ As late as the 1890's the navy was still building monitors and commerce raiders with even less success.

After 1865 United States warships returned to their historically fixed peacetime occupation -- cruising in foreign waters and showing the stars and stripes, nearly always singly, and never more than two or three ships at a time. There was little thought given to operating as a fleet in being.²⁰

The concepts of coast defense and commerce raiding had considerable logic to them given the geographical position of the United States. The wide expanse of two great oceans provided an important barrier to aggression and as long as the nation looked inward, as it did for most of the nineteenth century, it was felt that there was no need for a powerful, wide ranging navy. Even Commander Alfred T. Mahan, in 1885, could write that the "surest deterrent will be a

fleet of swift cruisers to prey upon the enemy's commerce Running away is demoralizing" to the enemy. However, Mahan also included the important caveat that his observations were "based upon the supposition that we don't have interests out of our own borders."²¹ When, in the 1890's, the eyes of Americans began to lift beyond the limits of their own coastlines, Mahan was there with new naval concepts to fit the political and emotional change.

At first the navy's tactical arrangements were largely based upon lessons gained in 1866 at the naval battle of Lissa. In that action the Austrians had defeated the Italians by using tactics "of ramming, line abreast formation, and bow fire." The results of this engagement influenced naval tactics and architecture for almost thirty years. Most of the warships in this period were built with rams, and the navy's first two armored vessels, Texas and Maine, were especially constructed to give their strongest performance while firing at the charge.²²

The development of the self-propelled torpedo in the 1870's and 1880's effectively destroyed the concept of the charge and of ramming, as it became next to impossible for warships to close with one another. In the next great naval engagement after Lissa the Japanese at the battle of the Yalu in 1894 used the old, classical in column, or line ahead tactics of Nelson's time to defeat the Chinese charge. American naval tactics changed too, but slowly. In 1898 Dewey used the line ahead evolution against the Spanish at

Manila, while at Santiago Sampson used a modified charge against Cervera's armored cruisers -- the last use of the maneuver in naval warfare.²³

The Sprouts' have characterized the period from the end of the Spanish American War to the advent of Theodore Roosevelt to the presidency in 1901 as one of "reaction and drift" for the navy. The armored ships were dispersed to overseas cruising stations, and the Bureau of Navigation had "frankly no fleet policy." Long, the Secretary of the Navy under McKinley was, as Roosevelt wrote to Mahan in 1897, "only lukewarm about building up of our Navy, at any rate as regards battleships." Long was still the Secretary of the Navy in 1901, and still as conservative. The entrance of Theodore Roosevelt as President changed all of this, for with him "Mahan's philosophy entered the White House."²⁴

Roosevelt's military service had been limited to a brief tour of duty with the Rough Riders in Cuba, however his identification with the navy was a strong one and it stretched back to his early years. As a child he had idolized his two Bulloch uncles, one a former Admiral in the Confederate Navy, and the other a junior officer who had served on the raider Alabama. His choice of a subject for his first literary effort was a naval one. He began writing The Naval War of 1812 while still an undergraduate at Harvard, and completed it in his spare time while attending law school at Columbia. Roosevelt found the study of the law boring and used the writing of the book as an escape.

It was, as he wrote Anna Roosevelt, that "favourite chateau-en-espagne of mine" ²⁵ The work was a labor of love and it remains today the most readable of his efforts.

Roosevelt's appointment as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1897, and his later succession to President gave him the stage upon which to develop this early interest in the navy and the uses of seapower.

The link between Roosevelt and Mahan began in the early 1890's. He was deeply influenced by Mahan's writings, and when he became Assistant Secretary of the Navy he wrote him that he was doing all he could "toward pressing our ideas into effect" It was an unusually humble Roosevelt who could write Mahan that there "is no question that you stand head and shoulders above the rest of us." ²⁶

Mahan's naval philosophy was neither new nor radical. It was profoundly conservative in that it went back to the naval concepts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for its inspiration. The battleship was to be used in the same way as Rodney and Nelson used the ship-of-the-line. The old wooden walls of 1800 became the high tensile steel armor walls of 1900. Mahan "stressed the significance of the sea as logistical highway and avenue of enemy approach: he emphasized the power which 'due use and control' of sea communication would endow any belligerent, and argued that this 'due use and control' had been and was attainable by powerful battle fleets organized and operating as units." There was only one primary function for the fleet: the

"destruction or confinement of the enemy's fighting fleet, as a preliminary to commercial blockade or military invasion." The old concepts of coast defense and commerce raiding while not abandoned were relegated to a secondary role. The protection of one's own commerce and trade routes were best achieved by the destruction of the enemy's battle fleet. The defensive role assigned to the navy since the late eighteenth century was now abandoned in favor of an offensive one.²⁷

The strategic consequence of this conception was that of concentration. The fleet must never be divided and must, through constant practice, learn to operate as a unit. In this fleet in being principle lay the origin of the North Atlantic Battleship Squadron. The General Board of the Navy, that intellectual heart of American naval strategic thinking, declared in 1903 that "the proper military policy, taken as a general principal, for the distribution of the fleet, is the concentration of all the battleships in the Atlantic."²⁸

No longer did United States warships prowl the oceans of the world as lone sentinals of American power. Now, more often than not, they were found in groups. Before 1902 the navy had never engaged in formal fleet exercises during peacetime. The need to, as Rear Admiral Taylor affirmed, "think in squadrons," was first satisfied by the navy's fleet maneuvers in the Caribbean during the winter months of 1902-03. Roosevelt felt the exercises were of

great importance, and he personally wrote Admiral Dewey asking him to take overall command of "our first effort to have maneuvers on a large scale in time of peace."²⁹

The crisis with Germany over Venezuela which occurred during the exercises has tended to obscure their importance, but for the navy they marked a new departure. Roosevelt was beginning to use the navy as a tool, and in the months following these first maneuvers he constantly expanded its range. By the summer of 1903 his battleships were cruising off the Azores, halfway to Europe. During the summer of 1904 they were to reach the Old World, steaming along the southern coasts of its periphery, announcing the new naval might of the United States at first hand to the European powers.

Planning sessions required the designation of projected enemies. After 1898 Great Britain the nemesis of the American navy in the nineteenth century began to recede as a threat, although Roosevelt felt that America's new friendship with England was based more upon practicality than on Anglo-Saxon brotherhood. "If we quit building our fleet," he said, "England's friendship would immediately cool."³⁰ The growth of Japan as a viable enemy had to wait until after 1905 and Tsushima. The primary adversary during the period from 1898 to 1905 then, at least in the minds of most strategists, was the German Empire.

As early as May, 1900, the General Board -- a little over a month after its first formal meeting -- suggested the

development of a war plan positing, "an attempt by Germany to occupy a portion of /the/ South American continent south of Rio /de/ Janeriro /sic/ in 1905. A declaration of war by the United States. Possession of the Cape Verde Islands by Germany. Advance of the Germans upon Puerto Rico and Hayti /sic/ and a consequent centering of the theater of action in those Islands." As late as July, 1903, the General Board approved a memorandum which suggested "that the most important war problem to be studied is that which is based upon the supposition that Germany is the enemy" ³¹

American mistrust of Germany was not without some foundation. In December, 1899, the Kaiser ordered the Chief of Staff of the Navy Admiral von Diederichs, and the celebrated General von Schlieffen to develop a war plan for a conflict with the United States. The Kaiser wanted a plan to seize Cuba, draw out the fleet and defeat it, and then invade the American mainland. The Army General Staff, however, preferred a direct attack on the United States, focussing on Cape Cod and using Massachusetts Bay and Provincetown as the center of operations. This scheme was dropped in 1902, but the Kaiser continued his interest in other plans "at least until March, 1903." ³²

The War Game, or Kriegspiel, was a favorite pastime of naval officers before 1914. The most famous of these was the Jane Naval War Game, developed by the influential compiler of Jane's Fighting Ships. The only Kriegspiel ever to appear in that then quarterly Bible of the American navy the

United States Naval Institute Proceedings, was published in September, 1903. It featured a naval war between the United States and Germany of almost Wagnerian proportions. The destruction of warships was frightful. Six mutually costly sea battles lead up to a final action off Key West, Florida, where the American navy achieved a Pyrrhic victory only by the successful use of its submarines -- an unusually prophetic dénouement.³³

This Kriegspiel is interesting because it reveals, like the war plans of the General Board, the essentially defensive nature of American naval thinking vis-à-vis a European antagonist before 1904. The navy would wait off the coast of the United States for the German High Seas Fleet or any other enemy to come to it. This was a perfectly viable strategy given the strength of the American navy -- Japan would use this strategy in 1904-05 to deal with a numerically superior Russian navy. The United States had only fourteen armored warships (excluding monitors) in 1904, but it fully expected to have almost forty in commission within two years. More than enough to defend the coast and yet take aggressive action. The naval lesson for Europe, particularly Germany, which would be underlined by the Mediterranean operations of 1904 was clear; if the United States could bring six battleships with attendant cruisers and auxiliaries to Trieste, Austria, it could just as easily bring them to the mouth of the Elbe.

The advantages to the prestige, as well as to the diplomacy, of the United States by the 1904 cruise are more difficult to measure than the strictly naval considerations we have previously examined. One historian, Walter Millis in Arms and Men, sees the navy and its ships as providing "the dramatic and obvious symbols of the new militarism that ruled after 1898." However, he also sees them as of "no visible use under the actual international contexts of the time" They had, Millis asserts, "no more than a peripheral effect upon the main streams of American foreign policy." This judgement is incorrect. The navy, especially after Roosevelt became president, was the primary tool of American foreign policy. It was, as another historian has aptly put it, "the 'cutting edge' of that diplomacy."³⁴

One might paraphrase von Clausewitz's dictum that war was an extension of diplomacy, by saying that the tools of war are also an extension of diplomacy. What indeed would be the effect on European perceptions of the United States by the steaming of a fleet composed of some fourteen highly visible, powerful warships through the Mediterranean, visiting various ports, and conducting naval exercises?

The ostentatious employment of fleets of warships to gain prestige, and to influence or celebrate diplomatic events was well known to the European powers. In the early 1890's a large French fleet that visited Kronstadt had a great deal to do with cementing the Franco-Russian rapprochement. The fleet's visit "was a diplomatic gesture of the

most open type; it was not misunderstood anywhere"35

Another, even more graphic example of the use of fleets occurred in 1903. The Kaiser, feeling that the young King of Spain Alfonso XIII was impressionable, sent his sea-going brother Prince Henry of Prussia to Vigo in May, 1903, with eight cruisers. "The object of the demonstration was to impress the King with German military might and, indirectly, to show her ability to help Spain." The French, with the encouragement of Prime Minister Silvela of Spain, sent twenty-one warships commanded by Admiral Pottier to Cartagena in June to counterbalance the effect of the German visit.³⁶

The United States also began to play this naval game of prestige diplomacy with its new navy. After the commissioning of the Chicago in 1889 the navy sent its first three cruisers, along with the gunboat Yorktown, on a cruise in European waters. It was on this voyage of what came to be known as the squadron of evolution that American naval officers "received their first real experience in modern fleet operations." A permanent European Squadron, composed of cruisers and gunboats, was established in 1901 and the "appearance of American warships in European ports took on a political meaning unconnected with the traditional duties of promoting American commerce and protecting American property."³⁷ However, it was not until 1903 that any peacetime cruise would equal the effect of the squadron of evolution.

In that year the European Squadron consisted of four warships under Rear Admiral Charles S. Cotton, flying his flag on the armored cruiser Brooklyn. Its cruise would be a successful dress rehearsal for the more powerful demonstration which would follow in 1904. The Caribbean exercises in the winter of 1902-03, the maneuvers of the Battleship Squadron off the Azores during the summer of 1903, and now the cruise of the European Squadron were all part of a gradual outward movement of American naval power toward Europe. The master diplomat behind this movement was Theodore Roosevelt. Like chess pieces he pushed his ships further and further from American shores, and the great cruise of 1904 was part and parcel of this policy. That Roosevelt was behind this naval development cannot be doubted. He jealously guarded his control of the fleet and woe to anyone who interfered with their movements without consulting him. Once, when he thought that Secretary of State John Hay had done this in 1903 with the Battleship Squadron, he sent the startled Hay a vigorous telegram which ended with the curt order: "Do not let the fleet alter arrangements without my sanction."³⁸ If warships were to be moved only Roosevelt would do it.

The European Squadron was at Marseilles on April 30, 1903, to participate in ceremonies welcoming back President Loubet of France from a highly important tour of French North Africa. Cotton met with Loubet on board the French armored cruiser Jeanne d'Arc, and then accompanied the President to

Paris as an honored guest of the French government. Germany looked askance at these developments and exerted strong diplomatic pressure on the United States to send Cotton's warships to the annual Regatta Week at Kiel where the Kaiser would be reviewing the fleet. Roosevelt, in order to pacify the Kaiser, and to prevent embarrassment to his friend Speck von Sternburg (the German Ambassador), detached the Kearsarge from Barker's squadron in the Azores. Cotton hoisted his flag on her at Southampton and proceeded with his ships to Kiel. In the hothouse atmosphere that typified the European power balance of the period the British government now requested an official visit, and the squadron steamed to Portsmouth for a naval review celebrating President Loubet's visit to England.³⁹

Cotton was to cap the cruise by spending the rest of the year in Turkish waters around the port of Beirut. The squadron was in the eastern Mediterranean engaging in the not so subtle use of naval diplomacy in wringing concessions from Turkey. Although Roosevelt's dispatch of the cruisers to Beirut in August, 1903, was initiated by the false report of an attack upon the local American consul, the warships were kept in Turkish waters for another reason. Roosevelt and the State Department had been under strong pressure from missionary societies in the United States because of the highly ambiguous status of American run schools in the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁰ Sending Cotton to Beirut was one answer to that pressure.

The European nations had already come to satisfactory agreements with Turkey on the school question. France even seized part of the Aegean island of Mytilene (Lesbos) in 1901 in order to underline her demands. As missionary pressure mounted Roosevelt attempted to engage by letter in direct personal diplomacy with the Turkish Sultan, a favorite Rooseveltian tactic. It failed, and the naval operations in 1903 were an attempt to redress this failure. The Turkish government marked time, and the ships were finally withdrawn. In part because the Porte indicated that it would be more amenable to a settlement if the vessels were recalled, but mostly because the Navy Department wanted them back.⁴¹

It was an election year in 1904 and this fact was never far from Roosevelt's thoughts. He had already protested Russian actions against their Jewish minority, and the domestic political benefits which could be obtained from a highly visible parade of naval diplomacy against Turkey were obvious.⁴² It was decided that along with the prestige to be garnered from the battleship cruise, perhaps an even more concrete benefit might be gained.

Secretary of State John Hay in a letter found nowhere in the official despatches of the period, but in his personal papers, put the case bluntly. "Within the next six weeks," Hay wrote to the American Minister at Constantinople in late May, 1904, "an imposing naval force will move in the direction of Turkey. You ought to be able

to make some judicious use of this fleet in your negotiations without committing the Government to any action." The careful Hay ordered the Minister to "keep this letter absolutely confidential, and not place it upon your files." He closed by asking him to "destroy it, and so report to me."⁴³

The road that began at Guantánamo in late February was the result of a number of trends in American naval and diplomatic thinking. It was a road which would lead Barker's warships from one end of the Mediterranean to the other; from Tangier by the Straits of Gibraltar to Smyrna in Asia Minor; from the island of Corfu in the Ionian Sea, through the Straits of Otranto, to Trieste in the Gulf of Venice. The screws of six American battleships would churn the waters of the Aegean and the Adriatic, and the strength they represented would humble two Sultans.

Commenting on the cruise, the Italian newspaper Nuova Antologia (Rome) pointed out that it was "certain that the period of American indifference to questions non-American is closed, and that their policy is one of expansion, moral or material American imperialism has assumed an aggressive character, not only in South America and the extreme East, but also in Asia Minor, and now in the Mediterranean, -- that is to say, in Europe itself."⁴⁴

CHAPTER II

PREPARATIONS FOR A CRUISE

Two months were to pass before the warships that lay at anchor in Guantánamo Bay would move out of the Caribbean and begin their voyage to the Mediterranean. Two months in which the fleet would engage in training exercises and maneuvers, and lose one-third of Barker's Battleship Squadron to explosion and collision. It was also to be two months filled with diplomatic preparations by the State Department for the cruise.

"In my judgement, we never had as good a Secretary of the Navy" The man Theodore Roosevelt extolled was William H. Moody, who along with Admiral Taylor would carry out the planning of the cruise. When Roosevelt became president one of the first cabinet changes he initiated was the replacement of the conservative Long by Moody, who, besides being a personal friend of Roosevelt, had a similar philosophy of naval power. Moody had made a name for himself in Massachusetts as a state prosecutor in the notorious Lizzie Borden murder trial of the early 1890's, and on the strength of that reputation was elected to the U. S. House of Representatives in 1895. He would later serve Roosevelt as Attorney General and finally be appointed by him to a seat on the Supreme Court.¹

In its search of the greatest possible exposure for its naval power the Roosevelt administration had begun planning the Mediterranean cruise as early as June, 1903, in the afterglow of the successful Caribbean maneuvers, and while the summer exercises off the Azores were just getting underway. It was decided to begin the operation following the spring Caribbean exercises of 1904, and February 20th of that year saw the beginning of detailed discussions between the State and Navy departments.²

After suggesting to Hay certain ports the navy preferred to visit, Moody asked about the "propriety of sending the battleships on such a cruise," and whether the State Department was of the opinion that they could be sent "without giving offense."³ The question of propriety was a necessary one. Although most of Europe was at peace in mid-February the balance of power on the continent was tenuous, and the alliances which the powers would take into World War One were at this time in the process of assuming their final configurations. On February 8th war had broken out between Russia and Japan, and some of these newly fashioned alliances were experiencing their first real tests.

On the 26th of February Hay replied to Moody's query, approving the suggested itinerary and finding no insurmountable barriers to overcome in carrying it out. Hay wrote that he had that same day sent despatches to the American ministers in Portugal and Austria-Hungary appraising them of our intentions. The United States ambassador in

Paris was also informed of the navy's desire to touch at a French Mediterranean port, but since the port had not as yet been selected this request was to be left in abeyance for the time being. No firm dates for the visits were fixed except that they would occur sometime between June and August. No other countries were mentioned, and Hay went out of his way to tell United States missions in the principal countries of Europe that any invitations to the fleet "would be inconvenient and embarrassing in consequence of the derangement" it would cause.⁴

Europe in 1904 lay basking under the high sun of a general peace which, except for a brief conflict between Russia and Turkey, had lasted unbroken since the Franco-Prussian War. Almost thirty-five years of war-scares, alliances, counter-alliances, and tensions -- but no war. The soldiers of Europe still died, but not along the Rhine or in the fir forests of East Prussia; instead they fought and fell at such exotic places as Isandhlwana, Majuba Hill, Tel-el-Kebir, El Obeid, Adowa, and Omdurman. The tensions of Europe were played out in Asia and Africa, and when colonial expansion reached its limits -- when there were no more spoils to be divided -- only then would the great powers turn on themselves.

The tranquility which Europe enjoyed, however, was in the process of becoming unravelled. The alliance system with which Bismarck insured the peace of Europe and the security of Germany had come under increasing strain since

his departure from power in 1890. Kaiser William II's servile ministers could not match the skill and daring of the iron chancellor. First France broke through her isolation in the early 1890's and allied herself with Russia -- a marriage of opposites -- the most republican of European powers and the most autocratic. England had gone from a friendly neutrality toward Germany in 1890 to a poorly-concealed enmity by 1904. In the Krüger telegram of 1896, and, more importantly, the great naval expansion undertaken by Germany after 1898 lay the basis of this change.

The Russo-Japanese War which broke out in February, 1904, demonstrated the potential fragility of the European peace. Japan was allied with Great Britain and Russia with France, yet in Europe both England and France were beginning to come together out of a mutual fear of Germany. If this new war should spread it could bring about agonizing conflicts of interests. It was into this seething cauldron of shifting interests and alliances that the American fleet would steam.

When Hay informed United States ambassadors and ministers in Europe of the proposed cruise he stressed its peaceful intent. "The object of this visit," he emphasized, was "simply to afford the vessels and their crews the opportunities for practice incident to an extended trans-Atlantic voyage . . . the visit is without significance of any kind."⁵ If some of the European nations did not quite believe this explanation, they at least suspended judgement. Hay's

clarification would later be seen as important in partly allaying Russian alarm about the fleet's movements.

At the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War American sympathies lay with the Japanese. Not only was Japan seen as the underdog, but Russia's recent harsh treatment of her Jewish subjects had been deplored by Americans and protested by their government. Russia was regarded as the aggressor, hungry for land and warm water ports. Later, with Japanese successes, both official and popular support declined as Japan slowly became the embodiment of the yellow peril with each additional Russian defeat. But in the beginning American opinion supported Japan and the Russian government was well aware of it.⁶

In an article which appeared in the respected monthly The Nineteenth Century in April, 1904, an important connection was drawn between the United States, its fleet, and Russia. Demetrius C. Boulger's "Coming Continental Complications," examined the Russo-Japanese War and its effect on the European power balance, especially Great Britain's relation to it in the light of her two-year-old treaty with Japan. It would be a "distinctly pacific measure" by President Roosevelt, Boulger wrote, if the "United States were to send half a dozen battleships across the Atlantic to spend the next few months at the mouth of the Thames, the evidence thus afforded that England did not stand alone in the world would effectually baffle German machinations, and procure the interval needed for French opinion to become solid on

the point that sentimental grounds are not sufficient for France to risk her whole future on behalf of Russia" ⁷

Boulger's curious article predicting the exact number of battleships the navy planned to send to Europe before that information had been officially revealed evidently worried the Czar's government. The American Minister to Russia, Robert S. McCormick, brought this to Hay's attention in a long despatch on April 4th. McCormick contended that the foresight with which Hay and the State Department had communicated through him to the Russian government the peaceful intent of the cruise would mitigate the article's unfortunate effect. ⁸

It is doubtful that Russian suspicions as to the intent of the voyage were settled by McCormick's assurances, and the later movements of the fleet off the Turkish coast would do even less for Russia's peace of mind. Toward the end of the cruise the St. Petersburg daily Novoe Vremya would be editorially complaining that America had "evidently decided to take advantage of the present moment to establish her supremacy in the Near East." ⁹

The first port which the fleet would visit was not in the Mediterranean, but in the Atlantic. In 1903 the European Squadron under Cotton had visited Lisbon in mid-July with a great deal of success. Later the King of Portugal had fondly recalled the American presence in a speech to the Cortes, and with this background the request that a larger fleet be allowed to touch at Lisbon in 1904

was readily accepted by the Portuguese government. Charles Page Bryan, the American Minister in Lisbon, foresaw no problems arising to hamper the visit.¹⁰

Preparations for a call at Trieste were not as easily expedited. The American Minister in Vienna, Bellamy Storer, approached the Austro-Hungarian foreign office unofficially and received a somewhat unenthusiastic reply on April 12th. The Austrian Under Secretary of State Ritter von Mérey acknowledged Storer's request, saying the "naval section of the war department of Austro-Hungary has received the news . . . with the greatest pleasure." But there existed a certain problem, the Austrian added, which would limit the scope of the visit.¹¹

Mérey said the Austro-Hungarian law forbade more than three warships "of the same foreign navy to anchor at the same time in the same port." The law also extended to the number of foreign warships allowed in Austro-Hungarian waters, no more than six at any time. Mérey, having heard that the American fleet far exceeded these limitations, informed Storer that "special authorization through the diplomatic channel" must be applied for by the United States. Hay acquainted Moody with the restriction, and Moody asked the State Department to officially request that they be temporarily suspended. This request was duly made by Storer.¹²

After a short delay the necessary permission was granted by the Vienna government, but it was contingent upon

certain modifications to be made in the fleet's schedule. Although the proposal appears to have been offered by Storer, it was probably suggested to him by the Austro-Hungarian foreign office as an acknowledgment to Hungarian national sensibilities.¹³ Trieste was the chief port of the Austrian part of the Empire, but about 150 miles by sea from Trieste, on the other side of the Istrian peninsula, lay Fiume, the principal seaport of Hungary.

Storer wrote Hay that in "view of the intense national pride that Hungary has in her only seaport," one or two of the navy's ships should be sent to Fiume as a "politically gracious act." Storer pointed out that the State Department, in emphasizing America's "old sympathy and friendship" with Hungary would gain a great deal of prestige. Also, as an enticement to gain the Navy Department's approval for the visit, he noted that Fiume "is the headquarters of the Austro-Hungarian torpedo boat fleet and the place of manufacture of the Whitehead Torpedo Company and this" would be in itself ample apparent reason for such a visit."¹⁴

Thus the port of Fiume was added to the itinerary of the cruise. Villefranche was selected as the French Mediterranean port to be visited, and by the middle of May all of the necessary diplomatic maneuvering to prepare the way for the fleet had been accomplished.

The government was somewhat premature in telling other nations that they would be visited by six battleships. The fleet at Guantánamo lost its first major unit when Taylor and Dewey decided that the Massachusetts, which they had observed in maneuvers with the newer battleships, must be taken out of the Battleship Squadron and sent to join the Coast Squadron. Although "her battery is . . . as formidable as any vessel's in the world," Taylor judged that "her inferior speed" and "low freeboard with seas breaking continually over her decks makes her unfit" for service in Barker's squadron.¹⁵ Her place would be taken by the newly arrived Iowa. There was to be no easy replacement for the next loss.

On March 1st the battleships again left Guantánamo for further exercises as well as to see Admiral Dewey's Mayflower off to Santo Domingo. In the midst of a drill, with the battleships steaming at ten knots, the Missouri's steering engine broke down causing her to swerve and ram the Illinois. The collision was serious enough to force the fleet back into Guantánamo, while the Mayflower and Dewey went on to Santo Domingo. Back in the confines of the bay it was discovered that while there was only minor damage to the bow of the Missouri, the Illinois had suffered a bent shaft and could not use her port engine. The damage was temporarily repaired, but the Illinois had to be sent north for more extensive repairs and would be lost for at least part of the Mediterranean cruise.¹⁶

The Court of Inquiry which investigated the collision caused not a little embarrassment to President Roosevelt, for the captain of the Missouri was William S. Cowles, Roosevelt's brother-in-law. Cowles was fifty-seven years old, and had commanded the Missouri, the newest of the navy's battleships, since her commissioning in December, 1903. In the 1890's he had been naval attaché at the U. S. Embassy in London, and during the Spanish American War commanded the gunboat Topeka. Prior to his command of the Missouri, Cowles held the prestigious post of naval aide to the President. He was a well-connected, much smiled-upon naval officer at the pinnacle of his career.¹⁷

The official proceedings of the Court praised the captain of the Illinois as well as Cowles for correct actions taken after the collision. The Court seemed inclined, however, to hold Cowles partly responsible for causing the accident, the primary accusation stressing a failure on Cowles' part to display the correct signals warning the Illinois of the coming collision. "This failure," said the Court, "to convey to the Illinois as to the actual conditions on board the Missouri was, in the opinion of the Court, after the accident to the steering gear, the secondary cause of the collision."¹⁸

Proper signals, it was stated, could have allowed the Illinois to avoid the Missouri. The Court recommended, however, that no further proceedings be taken against Cowles. His battleship, after all, was a newly commissioned ship,

"introduced into a squadron of evolution without previous" experience in such maneuvers.¹⁹

Moody was a bit troubled by the obvious ambiguous findings of the Court and wrote to Admiral Dewey asking him to review all the facts in the case. Was the Navy Department, asked Moody, "justified in acting upon the recommendation of the Court, approved by the Commander-in-Chief, that no further proceedings in the premises be taken, or, if, in your opinion, the Department is not justified, what actions would you recommend?" Dewey carefully reviewed the Court's proceedings and advised the Navy Department to approve the findings.²⁰

Roosevelt wrote Cowles after the inquiry saying that the Court had used language which "conveyed an entirely wrong impression." He felt that they laid too much stress on the unimportant point of the signals, while not giving enough credit to Cowles' quick reactions after the collision. Roosevelt then, somewhat ungraciously, told Cowles that if the Missouri had to come back to the United States for repairs he would be best advised to "stay pretty steadily with the ship and not come up to Washington" Until the election was over, Roosevelt said, "there would be in a lesser degree the same necessity for caution on your part as on mine."²¹

Cowles' problems were far from over. Reviewing the accident and the actions of the Court of Inquiry in its April issue, The Army and Navy Journal brought attention to

the family connection between Roosevelt and Cowles, as well as the ambiguous nature of the final report. The Journal also stated that the members of the Court received two telegrams from influential sources to save Cowles from a courts martial and removal from his command. Roosevelt ordered Moody to investigate these allegations, and Moody reported back on April 4th that a careful preliminary investigation "does not show that anyone sent telegrams to the court of inquiry."²²

Suspensions of the Court's results still lingered in the air. If Cowles was not incompetent he was certainly unlucky, and in the military an unlucky commander was one to be avoided. Undoubtedly the naval high command did not receive any direct pressure, but it certainly was aware of Cowles' position vis-à-vis the President and drew its own conclusions. The fate of a less well-connected commander might have been unhappier.

After the accident the Battleship Squadron remained at Guantánamo until the afternoon of the 9th of March, when it steamed for Pensacola, Florida. Barker arrived there on the 14th and found in the anchorage nearly all the warships of the North Atlantic fleet, including those of the South Atlantic and European squadrons. At Pensacola the squadrons went through a reorganization with ships detailed to new assignments and new commanders appointed. Except for bringing the warships out of the harbor to engage in target practice off the Santa Rosa Island ranges the fleet stayed

at the Pensacola anchorage for almost two months.²³

Two events would break the boredom in this period between cruises: a riot of considerable proportions and the reduction of Barker's strength by yet another battleship.

The Saturday night riot took place on April 16th when a large group of sailors from the fleet and "a few artillery men from Fort Barancas" fought a battle royal with the Pensacola police. One soldier was killed, and four sailors from the Iowa and Alabama were wounded. Over three hundred soldiers and sailors were involved in the riot, which began when the police attempted to arrest an obstreperous sailor. The police had fired into a yelling mob while being rushed under a barrage of stones and bottles. The situation was prevented from becoming more serious when Barker ordered the fleet's marines ashore to disperse the men and patrol the port. Numerous attempts by sailors to smuggle arms and ammunition in from the warships were aborted and many blue-jackets arrested and sent back to their ships in chains.²⁴

The loss of the second battleship occurred just three days before the riot. Cowles' Missouri was at target practice about ten miles off Pensacola in the company of the Texas and Brooklyn. The Missouri had fired a number of rounds from each of her four twelve-inch guns when, around noon, an explosion shook her main aft battery. There was no loud report, but only a dull thud followed by flames and billowing black smoke pouring from the wounded turret.²⁵

Five officers and twenty-eight enlisted men died that day. The few who were not immediately killed in the explosion survived only a short time. Among the dead was Marine Lt. J. P. V. Gridley, the son of Dewey's commander of the Olympia at Manila Bay. All of the casualties were located in the turret and the handling room. Below the latter lay the magazine, and only quick action prevented an explosion which would have torn the stern off the navy's newest battleship and sent her to the bottom.²⁶

The most important of these actions in insuring the Missouri's survival was that of Chief Gunner's Mate Monson. On hearing the explosion Monson immediately entered the magazine, put out the fire he found there, and secured the hatches. He remained locked in the magazine when Captain Cowles had the compartment flooded. Some hours later he was found up to his neck in water and barely alive. Monson was decorated for his heroism and Admiral Barker later wrote that naval history "records no more heroic act than that of Monson who crawled through a hole into a burning magazine to put out the flames."²⁷

Captain Cowles' quick response in the crisis also came in for praise. Before rushing from the bridge he ordered the affected area flooded, and had the Missouri steam for shallow water so that if she sank there would be a better chance of salvaging her. He then hurried aft and personally led a number of attempts to enter the still smoldering turret. Driven back by the intense heat and smoke he could only

manage to bring out one already dying man.²⁸

The dead, with the exception of those bodies which were sent home at the request of the family, were buried near the Pensacola Navy Yard. Roosevelt and Moody sent expressions of grief, a fund was set up, and numerous benefits for the victims staged throughout the country. A Court of Inquiry, headed by Rear Admiral French E. Chadwick, concluded that the explosion was caused by a flare-back, or back-flame; an "inexplicable combination of oxygen with certain latent gasses in smokeless powder."²⁹

Admiral Barker, in his endorsement of the report issued by the Court, was critical of the navy's smokeless powder. The "properties of which," he complained, "have not been fully understood either by those using it on board our ships or by those who make and issue it for service."³⁰

No blame accrued to Cowles because of the accident; indeed, a similar, if less grave, mishap had occurred on the Massachusetts in 1903.³¹ But his unlucky Missouri was now unable to participate in the cruise and had to limp north for repairs. With the loss of the Missouri and the Illinois Barker's battleship force was now down to four. There remained some hope of regaining the two cripples while the fleet was still in the Mediterranean if damages could be repaired in time.

By the end of April, 1904, the three squadrons involved in the cruise were ready for their departure from

Pensacola. Two of them, the Battleship and the European, left on May 5th and headed south for Guantánamo. The re-organized European Squadron consisted of the Olympia (flag), Baltimore, and Cleveland. It also had a new commander, Rear Admiral Theodore Frelinghuysen Jewell. He had captained the cruiser Minneapolis in Schley's Flying Squadron during the Spanish American War. The command of the European Squadron was to be his final service before retirement.³²

The two squadrons reached Guantánamo on the 9th of May where the ships took on stores for the voyage. On the 13th Barker ordered Jewell to steam for St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands to coal, and then sail for the Azores where both squadrons would rendezvous at the port of Horta. Meanwhile Barker's four battleships coaled at Guantánamo and on the afternoon of the 15th, forming a double column, headed out of the bay bound for the Azores.³³

Although glad to be finally underway Barker felt some concern about the condition of his battleships. The "bottoms of the vessels," he grumbled, "were more or less foul from having been out of dock a long time, but for some reason the Navy Department did not wish us to touch at any Navy Yard before proceeding to Europe."³⁴

The third squadron to steam for the Mediterranean was the South Atlantic. Commanded by Rear Admiral French E. Chadwick, it was composed of the armored cruiser Brooklyn (flag), the old protected cruiser Atlanta, and the two large gunboats Machias and Castine. Chadwick was perhaps the most

interesting of the three admirals on the cruise. Known as an "intellectual," he was a writer and a naval theorist of no mean accomplishment. A veteran of the Civil War, Chadwick served as the first United States naval attaché in London from 1882 to 1889. He commanded the gunboat Yorktown on the squadron of evolution's European cruise, and later headed the Naval Intelligence Office and the Bureau of Equipment. During the war he captained the armored cruiser New York, and was Sampson's chief of staff. At Santiago he was cited for his "eminent and conspicuous" conduct in the battle. Between 1900 and 1903 he had held the prestigious post as head of the Naval War College at Newport, R. I.³⁵

Characterized by a contemporary as a man "very direct in speech, even almost to brusqueness," it was as a writer that Chadwick had achieved his greatest eminence. His best-known work was a highly praised and quite popular two-volume edition on the diplomacy and military operations of the Spanish American War. Indeed, it served as an early official history of the conflict. Chadwick was well known to President Roosevelt and John Hay, and had a fairly close personal relationship with the latter.³⁶

Chadwick took command of the South Atlantic Squadron on April 9th, left Pensacola later that month, and arrived at San Juan, Puerto Rico, on May 6th. On the morning of the 14th he sailed, bound for Santa Cruz, Teneriffe, in the Canary Islands. The operational plan of the squadron called for it to steam along the coast of North Africa, calling at

Gibraltar, Algiers, and Alexandria, Egypt, before passing through the Suez Canal. Chadwick was to cruise independently from Barker's and Jewell's warships, but would be in the same general area during the month of June.³⁷

That the Navy and the State departments may have had other plans for Chadwick's squadron was hinted at in a letter sent to him by the Bureau of Navigation (with inserts to be delivered to the ships of his squadron) containing illustrations of the various Turkish flags and signals. An innocent gesture? Perhaps. But since Chadwick's plans called for him to go nowhere near the Turkish coast why was he sent the inserts, and why only for Turkey? Hay's instructions to the American minister in Constantinople informing him of a large fleet heading for Turkey also mentions Chadwick's squadron as part of this force.³⁸

The voyage across the Atlantic was uneventful except for the gunboats. The Machias broke down on the 17th and had to be towed most of the way by the Brooklyn; the Castine almost ran out of coal. Lt. Commander Edward J. Dorn of the Castine lamented in his diary that he would "never get over this seasickness." The gunboats were built to serve in coastal waters and in the deep mid-Atlantic swells they wallowed dreadfully. Late in the afternoon of the 26th the Brooklyn's lookout sighted the great mountain rising from the ocean which was Teneriffe, and from the flagship's yard blossomed the signal: "We see the Peak!"³⁹

The ships entered the harbor of Santa Cruz on the morning of the 27th, but their stay was to be brief for waiting were emergency orders from the Navy Department sending the entire force to Tangier, Morocco -- an American citizen had been kidnapped by bandits and was being held for ransom.⁴⁰

Over a thousand miles to the northwest the same scene was shortly to take place at Horta in the Azores. Barker had arrived on the 26th and coaled from two colliers he found waiting for him in the harbor. Early on the 28th Jewell's cruisers came in, and that afternoon the fleet, except the Iowa (her departure delayed because of a very ill crewman), cleared Horta bound for Lisbon.⁴¹

The warships were not yet over the horizon when the Kearsarge, which had been testing her new wireless with the Iowa back at Horta, received an urgent message from her ordering Jewell and his squadron to Tangier. Jewell's ships immediately broke away from the battleships and headed for Morocco. As Barker later ruminated, this little experience showed "how easy it is to reduce the strength of a fleet." From an originally planned force of six battleships and three cruisers, Barker steamed on to Lisbon reduced in strength to four battleships.⁴²

There were now seven American warships heading toward a small Moroccan seaport near the Straits of Gibraltar. Their mission: to rescue a single American citizen of Greek descent by the name of Ion Perdicaris, living in a dusty

third-rate seaport at the fringe of civilization.

CHAPTER III

A KIDNAPPING

From aesthete to imperialist: if the life of Ion Perdicaris can be summed up in a phrase, this might be it. The kidnapping of Perdicaris was a strange affair, but it was no stranger than the life of this long-term American expatriate living in Morocco. Independently wealthy; painter; sculptor; playwright; businessman; novelist; wife-stealer; imperialist; and humanitarian. He had been a resident of Tangier for thirty years, and was the wealthiest and best-known of that port city's foreign residents. The path which had led Ion Perdicaris from Trenton, New Jersey, to Tangier, Morocco was no less uncommon than the man himself.

His father, Gregory Perdicaris, was born in Greece but had been forced to flee that country after becoming involved in revolutionary activity. His brother, not as fortunate, was beheaded by the Turks. Arriving in the United States in the 1820's he graduated from Amherst College and became an instructor of Greek at Harvard, rising to a Professorship of Latin and modern Greek and Greek history. He later settled in South Carolina where he married into a well-established Charleston family, the Hanfords. His wife's father was a professor at South Carolina College, and a first cousin a justice on the state Supreme Court. Perdicaris

returned to Greece as the Van Buren-appointed Consul-General in Athens, and it was here that his only son, Ion Hanford, was born in 1840. Deprived of his diplomatic appointment by the Whig victory in that same year, Perdicaris and his family returned to the United States. By now the revolutionary ardor of Gregory's early years had substantially cooled, and he began to turn his attention toward the making of a fortune -- a not unusual desire in Jacksonian America.¹

Gregory proceeded to amass a considerable amount of money in the illuminating gas industry. He built gas works in a number of American cities, including Charleston and Trenton, New Jersey, and it was in the latter city that the Perdicaris family settled in the years before the Civil War. In later life Gregory went to live with his son in Tangier, and when he died there in the early 1880's he left Ion an inheritance of over a million dollars. Ion received his early education at the Trenton Academy, and in 1856 he entered Harvard but left at the end of the first term of his sophomore year. Later, when he was in his fifties and sixties, Perdicaris took great pride in having gone to Harvard, if only for a brief time, and kept in regular correspondence with the class secretary.²

The Class of 1860, of which Ion was a part, was one of those Harvard classes decimated by the Civil War, names which can now be found on brass plaques lining the walls of Memorial Hall. It lost about one-third of its graduates in the conflict, including Robert Gould Shaw, the young

commander of the Army's first black regiment.³

Ion was more fortunate. After leaving Harvard he studied art in Europe, including a period at the École des Beaux Arts in Paris. The outbreak of the Civil War found him in Athens, and in a very curious position. Still a legal resident of South Carolina, he was given the option of returning to America and serving with the Confederate forces or losing part of his inheritance. Perdicaris took a third road, initiating proceedings designed to divest him of his American citizenship. Forty-two years later this attempt would come back to haunt both him and Theodore Roosevelt.⁴

The next few years were spent by Ion in Europe and the United States studying, painting, and writing a number of articles dealing with literary and aesthetic subjects. He was also a serious student of spiritualism and occult phenomenon -- a then quite respectable fad which had swept the United States and Europe during the mid-nineteenth century. In the late 1860's he went to live in England, studying under and living in the home of the well-known electrical engineer Cromwell Fleetwood Varley.⁵

Varley was a fellow of the Royal Society and had been associated with the development and construction of the first Atlantic cable. It was their mutual interest in spiritualism which had brought the two men together; however, the relationship was suddenly and dramatically ended when Perdicaris ran off with Varley's young wife. After the divorce in 1872, Ellen Varley and he were married at Wiesbaden,

Germany. The newlyweds, along with Ellen's four children, then settled for a time in the United States. Family responsibilities seem to have settled Ion down, for he now ceased his peripatetic life and began to look for a place in which to establish a permanent residence.⁶

Perdicaris found this haven in Tangier, Morocco; although he and his family spent a great deal of time traveling in Europe, Tangier remained home at least for the summer months, and then, from 1884 on, more or less permanently. He loved the old Moorish port "with its ruined battlements overlooking the horseshoe curve of its silver beach." In one lyrical description of Tangier he wrote of the "white walls of the terraced houses, the mosques and minarets," and the "emerald verdure" of the gardens, "now redolent with the perfume of the orange and lemon, and overlooked by the wooded slopes of the Spartello headland." From here one had a view "commanding a wide range of sea and mountain, whilst the distant peaks of the Beni Hassan range add the lustre of their snow-tipped summits."⁷

Some of his paintings were exhibited at the Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia during 1876, and one called Tent Life was critically acclaimed. As vehicles for a stage-struck step-daughter, he wrote and produced a number of plays. One was a comedy called Social Questions and another, Nadine, was a melodrama. In 1879 he brought the latter from England to New York where it ran for a week. Perdicaris persevered, putting the play on the road, but his

stepdaughter -- whose stage name was Nard Alymane -- ran away with the leading man, an alcoholic actor by the name of Decker. Ion disinherited his stepdaughter, who had married Decker, went to England, had a son, and sued for divorce. When Perdicaris took back his stepdaughter he also accepted the child as his own.⁸

In Tangier Perdicaris became an important member of the foreign community. He had two handsome residences. One in Tangier, called El Minzah (Beautiful View), was a "villa standing in extensive grounds, a little outside the city walls, an ideal house," as one visitor remembered it, "in which the Orient and the Occident meet in comfort and adornment." The other was a former royal residence on the Spartello headland about five miles west of the port. It was called Aidonia (The Place of the Nightingales), and rested on a small hill patriotically renamed Mount Washington by Perdicaris.⁹

Aidonia was a Moorish styled building painted white "with green shutters, an open forecourt, red candles on the dining table, a large telescope on the terrace, and groves of myrtle, roses and arbutus falling into the sea." Several monkeys, some tame pheasants, and a demoiselle crane scampered and strutted about the well-kept grounds. In the cork woods surrounding the estate Perdicaris often sat at an easel painting, according to a wry observation by Sir Arthur Nicolson (British Minister in Tangier), "huge, symbolic pictures of Virtue pursuing Vice" ¹⁰

Perdicaris welcomed many foreign visitors, especially any American who might happen to wander into Tangier. With over thirty servants dressed in scarlet knee pants and gold-embroidered jackets he enjoyed "an Edwardian gentleman's life amid elegant bric-à-brac of Oriental rugs, damasks and rare porcelains" Just prior to his kidnapping he had royally entertained Princess Louise of Schleswig-Holstein.¹¹

One American visitor to Tangier, Linn Boyd Porter, had on occasion observed an oared boat in the harbor, handled by sailors in bright uniforms, with a strange flag fluttering from its stern. He asked his Arab guide what it was, and the guide replied, "English boat." Porter responded that the flag was not the English "bandera," and asked what nation it represented. The guide calmly answered, "Perdicaris."¹²

Taking an important role in the public life of Tangier, Perdicaris showed yet another side of his character. He organized and subsidized a sanitary commission in the 1880's, which turned Tangier "from a pest-hole into a healthy town." The Tangier Hygienic Commission of which he was the Vice President was known to the native officials as the "Street Sweeping Commission," but it was, over and above its sanitary function, the chief foreign-controlled organization in Tangier, actually a government within a government. When he first settled in Morocco Perdicaris engaged in some casual importing, but by 1895 he had no "active occupation on account of defective health, other than developing his

properties at or near Tangier."¹³

As he grew older the aesthete of the 1860's gave way to the humanitarian-imperialist of the 1880's and 90's, an age in which these terms were seldom contradictory, one sometimes rationalizing the other. Perdicaris' humanitarian aims appear to have been honest, though he was not known for ignoring the economic side of imperialism. He was not engaged in business in Morocco, but he did own a great deal of property and had a vested interest in the stability of the country. A stability which the crumbling power of the Sultanate could not provide, and which, in Perdicaris' view could only come from an outside force.

He was a staunch defender of the native population, and had developed some very deep and close personal relationships with a number of upper-class Moors, particularly the Wazan family. In the mid-1880's this stance led to a serious conflict with the United States Consul in Tangier, an individual by the name of Mathews; and at one point Perdicaris found himself thrown into the Kasbah (Fortress) at Tangier for twenty-four hours, after harboring a native who had complained to him of extortion at the hands of the American Consulate.¹⁴

The experience was such that Perdicaris wrote his first and only novel, detailing the encounter, and as with most first novels it is autobiographically revealing. Titled The Case of Mohammed Benani: A Story of Today and published in London in 1888, the novel changes the American Consul into

the Russian Consul; Tangier was called Tingizirah; and Perdicaris renamed Ivan Paulovitch. Perdicaris/Paulovitch was portrayed as a defender of the natives of Tingizirah against the claims of money lenders supported by the Russian Consul, Count Mazenoff (Mathews).¹⁵

To resolve the case of one such native Paulovitch goes to Russia (United States) to bring the problem to the highest authority. He tells his story to the Foreign Minister, de Giers (Secretary of State Bayard), and attempts to obtain an interview with the Czar (President Cleveland). The matter was finally settled through the good offices of the leader of the Civil Service Party, Curtieff (George William Curtis); Paulovitch sees the Czar and the issue is satisfactorily resolved with the recall of Count Mazenoff. At one point in the novel Perdicaris describes his alter ego Ivan, as a "preux chevalier," a "knight errant," and "one of the most perfect gentlemen social life could show."¹⁶

The novel was based on actual events, for Perdicaris did go to the United States and did manage to have Mathews removed from office. The case caused something of a stir in the European and American press and gained Perdicaris some notoriety on both continents. The young lawyer who helped represent him in America, Samuel René Gummeré, would later become with Perdicaris' help the United States Consul-General at Tangier.¹⁷

In his desire to protect the natives -- as well as his own interests -- Perdicaris saw the answer in more, not

less, foreign control. Here the humanitarian becomes the spokesman for a benevolent imperialism. The rapid breakdown of conditions in Morocco during the 1880's and 1890's provided the basis for this attitude, and the clearest expression of his position on foreign intervention can be found in his writings on Morocco.

In 1886 Perdicaris published a book in London, supposedly authored by a foreign resident, containing a number of long essays on Morocco by Perdicaris and others. Called American Claims and the Protection of Native Subjects in Morocco, the work was essentially concerned with the absence of law and order; and the Moorish administration was condemned as being "so defective that it offers no security either for property, liberty, or life."¹⁸

Perdicaris carefully pointed out the benefits to be derived from intervention. "If Tangier and the surrounding territory could be rendered secure," he wrote, the growth in trade would be "highly advantageous to European commerce." The nation which took the first step in this direction could "look back with pride and satisfaction on the beneficial results that cannot fail to attend the consummation" of such a take-over. At one point in the book he declared that he was an American citizen and because of local violence was very concerned with the protection of American nationals in Morocco -- a concern which he would have cause to remember eighteen years later.¹⁹

Throughout the 1890's Perdicaris was a prolific contributor and letter-writer to a number of American and English periodicals and newspapers. In a series of articles for The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly he consistently wrote on the impending collapse of Morocco as an independent power, expressing the hope for eventual English intervention as he did not look upon either French or Spanish control with any equanimity.²⁰

By early 1904 he was writing that "/a/ny day, any hour now, may give the Sultan's tottering authority the last fatal push which will send him at last, all unwilling though he may be, reeling into the arms of France" ²¹ Little did Ion realize when he wrote these lines that he would, albeit unwillingly, supply some of the force behind that fatal push.

At the turn of the nineteenth century only three nations on the continent of Africa had managed to maintain their independence against decades of European incursions. Liberia, lying on the inhospitable Guinea coast, kept its freedom by combining a vague sort of protection afforded by its association with the United States with a complete lack of any exploitable resources. In East Africa Abyssinia, ruled by the warrior-emperor Menelik II, had recently thrown back an Italian attempt at conquest. The third nation was Morocco, a vulnerable feudal state lying too close to Europe to be ignored, with only jealousy between the great powers

preventing her partition. The Moroccan Empire by 1900 was drifting into anarchy and chaos, waiting for European power politics to decide whose colony she would become.

The French conquest of Algeria in 1830 had presented a potentially grave threat to Morocco's autonomy. Conflicts with France in 1830, 1844, and 1851 brought the Sultanate the bombardment of its seaports and a not too advantageous settlement of her eastern border with Algeria. In 1859 Spain engaged Morocco in a short, successful war, and by 1873 only the combination of Morocco's last strong ruler and the defeat of France by Germany gave the country thirty more years of relative independence.²²

The Sultan who came to power in 1873 was Moulay el Hassan, and he was to spend over twenty years in the saddle trying to repress an endless series of rebellions against his authority. Indeed it took him two months of hard fighting to gain control of his capital after he came to the throne. Commanding an army of 40,000 men, he campaigned through the Atlas Mountains, with the Scotsman Sir Harry Maclean drilling his infantry and a former French Army lieutenant directing his artillery. While campaigning in the Tadla region of the Middle Atlas in 1894 he died, worn out like the country he had tried to hold together.²³

At the age of fourteen Moulay's son Abd el Aziz, became Sultan, with the crafty Vizier Ba Ahmed (sometimes called the "Bismarck of Morocco") and the Sultan's Circassian mother as the powers behind the throne. Shortly

after Ba Ahmed's death in 1900, French forces from Algeria began a series of border attacks and backed a serious rebellion within Morocco. Abd el Aziz was young and weak, completely unfitted for the role which he inherited, and without Ba Ahmed he could not even begin to grasp the reins of power.²⁴

Sir Arthur Nicolson, appointed the British Minister to Morocco in 1895, described the then fifteen-year old Sultan as "not bad looking, but podgy and puffy," just like "a boy who ate too much." One of the presents which Nicolson brought from Queen Victoria was that black metal symbol of British military superiority over these swarthy lesser breeds, a Maxim gun. The young Sultan was a little nervous when the gun was first fired but soon became interested. "He fired off a good many rounds himself and was delighted," said Nicolson, "biting his lips to prevent breaking out into a broad grin of delight."²⁵

As the threat of a European take-over grew, the Sultan retreated into his Palace at Fez which was equipped with the latest wonders of European technology. Correspondent of The Times (London) Walter B. Harris, a frequent visitor at the Palace, provided a ludicrous picture of the Sultan "playing bicycle-pole with some of his European suite, which included at this time an architect, a conjurer, a watchmaker, an American portrait-painter, two photographers, a German lion-tamer, a French soda-water manufacturer, a chauffeur, a fire-work expert, and a Scottish piper."²⁶

By 1904 Morocco was in a state of anarchy, rebellion spreading throughout the countryside and local bandits making life unsafe for European and native alike. The royal prerogative existed only in the towns and cities, and even then only tenuously.²⁶

It was France which had the greatest interest in Morocco. Except for Spanish enclaves in the north and south, French colonies surrounded the country on its land borders. In the late 1890's France, under the direction of its Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé, began to move forward on a "very circumspect policy" of gaining full control in Morocco. French forces, in 1900, first seized the Tuāt oasis in the southwest, and then the fertile Road of the Palms -- a line of oases stretching along the caravan route to Timbuctu.²⁸

But the most important barrier to French hegemony in the Sultanate lay in Europe, and in December of 1900 Delcassé obtained an agreement with Italy giving France, as far as Italy was concerned, a free hand in Morocco in return for the same Italian right in Tripoli. This agreement was the first official European recognition of the primacy of France in Morocco.²⁹

From 1901 Morocco "ceased to be a backwater in European diplomacy," and quickly "became one of the main channels through which, with ever-increasing speed and volume, the water of policy poured towards the cataract." Great Britain represented the chief stumbling block to French control. England's interest in Morocco lay mainly

in Tangier, and a glance at a map shows what the strategic location of the port meant; for if Gibraltar commands the Mediterranean and the life line to India, then Tangier commands Gibraltar. Britain could not tolerate a Tangier in unfriendly hands and in 1901, only three years after Fashoda, France was still suspect.³⁰

As conditions in Morocco deteriorated, and French incursions on the border grew more frequent, a settlement became increasingly desirable. France was especially concerned over the numerous English advisors around the Sultan -- the so-called Engling Ring -- in particular Kaid Maclean, the commander of the Sultan's army, who, "arrayed in a turban and a white bernous," would often stride around the Palace grounds "blowing into his bagpipes."³¹

In 1902 France opened negotiations with Spain for a Moroccan settlement, and on August 6th of that year the French Ambassador in London, Paul Cambon, tried to sound out Lord Lansdowne (the British Foreign Minister) on England's attitude "in the event of Morocco passing into liquidation." Lansdowne put Cambon off this time, but as a result of King Edward's amicable visit to France in 1903, negotiations were opened between Lansdowne and Delcassé. Lord Lansdowne was concerned with the status of Tangier as well as the maintenance of an "open door" for British investment. Delcassé gave him assurances on these points and also of German lack of interest in the country. Whether or not the Germans lacked interest in Morocco, they were surprised and shocked

by the signing of the Entente Cordiale; the Kaiser's Foreign Office had felt that Great Britain and France could never settle their historical and colonial differences.³²

The accord was signed on April 8, 1904, and gave Great Britain a free hand in Egypt while France "pledged not to alter the political status of Morocco"; Britain agreed, however, that France "should preserve order in Morocco and assist in all necessary reforms." The remainder of the accord, including some secret clauses, dealt with Spain's rights in the Sultanate, as well as various adjustments of Franco-British territorial problems and spheres of influence throughout the world.³³

It was the term "preserve order" which would give France the excuse to introduce armed force into Morocco, and then use this wedge to obtain full control. One month after the accord was signed the kidnapping of Ion Perdicaris provided an excuse for the establishment of a French-Algerian police force and a permanent French naval presence at Tangier -- the first steps in the eventual French domination of Morocco.

The evening of Wednesday, May 18, 1904, saw the start of a tangled episode involving the decaying Sultanate of Morocco, an elderly American expatriate, and the navy of the United States.

It had been a typically mild late-spring day, and only a slight haze on the sea interfered with the view of the

Spanish mainland from the Spartello headland. Perdicaris and his wife had come to Aidonia from Tangier on Monday, accompanied by Cromwell Varley, Ion's stepson, with his wife and two daughters. After dinner on Wednesday they had all gathered in the drawing room, when about 8:30 P.M. they were interrupted by a series of loud screams emanating from the servant's quarters.³⁴

Perdicaris and Varley rushed out, thinking at first that it was a squabble among the servants, for Perdicaris had in his employ a German housekeeper from Switzerland and a French chef, "a fiery ex-Zouave," who were feuding. The chef had recently come to blows with the housekeeper after being "irritated by some insulting allusions to the French defeats at Metz and Sedan," and when the German butler Albrecht ran past him in the hall Ion thought that the "zouave has been too much for the Fatherland all long the line."³⁵

What he and Varley found in the servants' hall was not a group of enraged domestics but a party of armed Moors, who Perdicaris at first assumed were members of his household guard. Then he noticed that some of his servants were bound and helpless. When he asked the identity of the armed men they only smiled blandly. Next Albrecht came running back, closely followed by Moors who were beating him with their rifle butts. When Perdicaris attempted to interfere he was also seized and clubbed, and his arms bound behind his back. Varley was repeatedly struck by rifle butts and received a knife slash across the hand when he tried to seize one of

the intruders by the throat.³⁶

The two bound men were pushed out of the house and down the hill toward the stables. As they passed the guard-house where the government had stationed a few soldiers, Ion saw by lamp-light "our guards, our gardners, and the other native servants under cover of the rifles of another party of mountaineers" The government soldiers were arguing with one of the bandits who stood apart from the rest, and here Perdicaris recognized the leader of his assailants -- the infamous brigand Mulai Ahmed ben Mohammed, better known as the Raisuli.³⁷

In a Morocco teeming with petty bandits Raisuli had already won a notorious name for himself. His ancestry, according to Walter B. Harris, was of "particularly ancient and holy lineage," and as a young man he had studied law and theology in Tetuan. He later turned to banditry and gained a reputation as a cattle-stealer. Captured by treachery, he had been imprisoned at Mogador for a number of years. Here he was chained to the wall of a dungeon, and the scars left by the chains on his wrists and ankles were a perpetual reminder to him of the men who had put him in prison. One of these men was the Governor, or Pasha, of Tangier, Raisuli's bitterest enemy.³⁸

Released in 1894 in a general amnesty granted by the new Sultan, an embittered Raisuli returned to the mountains of northern Morocco and to his career as a brigand. Over the years the Moroccan government had sent troops after

Raisuli, but they had never managed to run him to ground. In 1903 a particularly strong effort to take him was mounted. It almost succeeded, but Raisuli seized Walter B. Harris while the correspondent was covering the campaign and held him for ransom. In return for Harris the brigand obtained not only the withdrawal of the government troops but also the return of some of his men who had been captured. When Moorish forces began another campaign against Raisuli in 1904 he reacted, as he said later, by searching out another European, "an important man who would make the world realize my wrongs."³⁹ His choice was Perdicaris.

Raisuli was in his late thirties, well built but short and heavy looking. He had a meager beard and a shaven head, "with the exception of one long scalp-lock, which, neatly plaited, he wore tucked under the folds" of his turban. Harris described him as having strikingly white skin, with very red lips which "gave him almost an effeminate look." He had under his command between 400 and 1000 tribesmen, and possessed a renown for great cruelty. At one time a nobleman who was married to Raisuli's sister announced his intention of taking a second wife. The sister complained to her brother, and an enraged Raisuli "proceeded from the mountains to his brother-in-law's house, where he broke in by force and shot the girl and her mother."⁴⁰

Perdicaris was familiar with the reputation of Raisuli, and, as wrote later, the name "was indeed one with which to conjure." Ion accepted the brigand's assurances of

safety provided he and Varley did not attempt to escape. Then, mounting horses brought from the stables the two men, along with their captors, moved off, carefully circling Tangier and struck out east towards the mountains.⁴¹

CHAPTER IV

"WARSHIPS WILL BE SENT"

In 1867 Mark Twain left the United States for a cruise of the Mediterranean and the Holy Land. His steamer touched at Tangier on the way over, and Twain's adverse reaction to the small port town was summed up in a bit of gratuitous advice he gave to the American government. "I would seriously recommend," he wrote tongue-in-cheek in The Innocents Abroad, "that when a man commits a crime so heinous that the law provides no adequate punishment for it, they make him Consul-General at Tangier."¹ With Samuel René Gummeré's appointment to the post in 1898 the government had not exactly taken Twain's suggestion, but the relative obscurity which the famous traveller found had changed little in the intervening years. The representative of the United States to the Sultan of Morocco was not one of those positions avidly sought out by fevered hoards of Washington place-seekers.

Gummeré had been born in Trenton, New Jersey in 1849, the son of a well-known and respected lawyer. The family was descended from a certain Johann Gómere, a Huguenot who emigrated from French Flanders and settled in Pennsylvania in the early eighteenth century. Gummeré, as had Perdicasaris, received his early education at the Trenton

Academy. He graduated from Princeton in 1870, was admitted to the New Jersey Bar in 1873, and worked in his father's law office for a number of years. He experienced his first taste of the diplomatic life when he served as secretary to the American Minister at The Hague from 1881 to 1884. Both the Perdicaris and Gummeré families were well acquainted with each other and Samuel, who was an inveterate European traveller, often stayed with Perdicaris in Tangier. Gummeré helped represent him in the United States during the Mathews affair, and as a result Perdicaris used his influence to clear the way for his friend's appointment as Consul-General.²

A bachelor, Gummeré has been described as a diplomat of some polish and ability, as well as a "brilliant conversationalist and raconteur." Another, somewhat caustic appreciation was later given by Commander Dorn of the Castine, who "did not take /a/ fancy to" the fifty-five year old Consul. Dorn particularly did not think much of his overly fastidious style of dress, as well as his affected English accent. He found him a man "swelled /up/ with /his/ own /sense of/ importance."³

Gummeré was also a child of his age and quite willing to make use of force in order to increase the influence of the United States in the Sultanate. Less than a year after taking his post in Tangier he was asking the State Department to send an American warship in order that certain outstanding problems be settled with Morocco. He eagerly

pointed out that German and British claims against the Sultanate were quickly settled by naval visitations, and that this "only goes to prove what was told me by some of my colleagues shortly after my arrival here that only in this way can claims for damages be collected." State approved the request and sent it on to the Navy Department which in turn despatched a warship to Tangier, where Gummeré was able to make use of its presence in obtaining a settlement.⁴ It was a lesson well-learned, and in 1904 he would make good use of it when faced with a greater challenge.

Gummeré was dining with some of his friends in the diplomatic community on the evening of May 18th, when around nine o'clock he received word of the events at Aidonia. The brigands had not thought to cut the telephone line to Tangier, and a housekeeper had immediately called for help. Gummeré first contacted the British Minister, Sir Arthur Nicolson, and then rushed to see the Lt. Governor of Tangier, as well as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and asked them that government troops from the city garrison be sent out after the fleeing bandits. He then gathered together his own three guards and an interpreter and hurried to Aidonia where he tried to calm the Perdicaris household. There was to be no sleep for the indefatigable little Consul that night, and by the morning of the 19th he was back in Tangier conferring with Nicolson as to the best way they should proceed in the crisis.⁵

Cromwell Varley was a British subject and this brought Arthur Nicolson into the affair. Nicolson was the senior member of the diplomatic community, and since it was Great Britain which has the greatest interest in the strategic future of Tangier he was a valuable confidant for Gummeré. The latter considered himself "fortunate in having the aid /and/ the trained experience" of Nicolson, "with whom /he was/ co-operating in every particular."⁶

At fifty-five Sir Arthur Nicolson was the same age as Gummeré, but unlike the American he had behind him a lengthy career at important diplomatic posts. The youngest son of a knighted British admiral, Nicolson was originally intended for the Royal Navy, but after brief service as a midshipman he had gone on to Rugby and then to Brasenose College, Oxford. Entering the Foreign Office in 1870, he rose steadily in the service at such varied posts as Berlin, Peking, Constantinople, and Athens. Between 1885 and 1888, as Secretary of Legation in Teheran, Persia, he played an important part in the revival of British influence in that country. He followed this with service as Consul-General in Budapest, and later as legation secretary in Sofia and Constantinople. In 1895 he was appointed as British Minister to the Sultanate of Morocco. His son Harold was later to describe him as "neither imaginative nor intellectual; he was merely intelligent, honest, sensible, high-minded and fair."⁷

Both Gummeré and Nicolson agreed that the situation was serious. Acting in concert they immediately despatched on the 19th a strong message to the Grand Vizier at Fez demanding that orders be sent to the Sultan's Minister of Foreign Affairs at Tangier, Sid El Hadj Mohamed Ben Arby Torres, that "all demands made by the bandit chief should be accorded at once" The same morning they held a hurried consultation with Torres, and found him very upset and well aware of the "gravity of the situation." They received from him a promise of all possible aid in order to free the two men.⁸

Around noon on the 19th two messengers came into Tangier from Raisuli with a letter from Perdicaris to his wife. The letter was a brief one informing her that he and Varley had not been treated badly, and asking that some clothing and other necessities be packed and sent to them with the messengers. In questioning the two men it was learned that the captives were at a place called L'homs in the Benider Mountains east of Tangier and would soon be carried further back into these rocky fastnesses. There was no communication from Raisuli on his demands, a state of affairs which Gummeré found rather ominous.⁹

In his initial despatch to the State Department Gummeré requested that a warship be immediately sent to Tangier to enforce demands upon the Moorish government. He also hoped that this vessel would "be of sufficient size and importance to impress the natives." The situation, he felt,

was very serious and he considered it of "immense importance to have a war vessel here to show what gravity my Government consider the situation and support me." He saw the standing of the United States in Morocco as a somewhat less than important one, and impressed upon State that only strong measures would gain the respect of the Moors.¹⁰

Nicolson notified the British Foreign Office of the steps he and Gummeré had taken, and that the latter had requested a warship. The Foreign Office replied that Nicolson should let them know if he felt British naval units would be desirable, but cautioned that as "a general rule such demonstrations tend rather to make negotiations for release of captives more difficult." Nicolson agreed, "for the present at any rate," especially since the Americans were sending a vessel. However, on the 20th a small torpedo boat was sent over to Tangier from Gibraltar to serve as a despatch vessel.¹¹

Gummeré's report of the kidnapping reached Washington in the late morning of the 19th. Secretary of State Hay was absent from the capital, and Assistant Secretary Loomis could present little opposition to whatever action the President would decide to take. The diversion of warships to Tangier was a serious decision and could not have been made without Roosevelt's direct approval, as witnessed by the President's quick reaction in 1903 to what he mistakenly thought was an unauthorized change in the itinerary of the

Battleship Squadron. In the past Hay had often helped to dampen Roosevelt's enthusiasms by acting as a break upon the exuberant President. Henry Adams saw Hay as playing a Seneca to Roosevelt's Nero, a role with which the President was, like Nero, becoming increasingly uncomfortable. It was quite possible that Hay might have managed to soften Roosevelt's action, but he had left Washington on the 13th to represent the President at the St. Louis Exposition and would not return until the 23rd.¹²

The President quickly decided to make use of one of the squadrons heading for Europe. Loomis referred Gummeré's request for a warship to the Navy Department on the same day as he received it. The next day, the 20th, Loomis and Admiral Taylor held consultations, and orders were cabled ahead of Chadwick to Tenerife directing him to take his entire squadron to Tangier.¹³

The State Department sent Gummeré a despatch informing him that "warships will be sent" to Tangier as soon as possible. Gummeré was undoubtedly reassured by the increase in naval strength which was to be put at his service -- he had asked for one vessel and now he was to get at least two. He little realized that he would shortly see the small harbor of Tangier filled with seven of his country's fighting ships. In addition State told the Consul that the warships would arrive in "two or three days." Here the Department badly miscalculated the time element for Chadwick's squadron was still struggling across the Atlantic,

unaware of what was happening in Tangier, being held back by its two slow and balky gunboats.¹⁴

Political pressure quickly arose in the United States over the outrage, although its effect on the President's decision to send Chadwick's squadron can only be conjectured. The name of Perdicaris was well-known in New Jersey and both of that state's senators wired the State Department asking it to do all it possibly could to secure his release. Senator John Kean referred to Ion as "his intimate personal friend," and Senator Dryden urged that vigorous measures be taken and demanded the "punishment of his captors." Another telegram expressing concern came from New Jersey Representative W. N. Lanning.¹⁵

The reaction of the American press was, with some exceptions, in full accord with the administration's action in sending warships to Tangier. It was still the age of Hearst, Grozier and the yellow press, and both reporting and editorial comment mirrored that muscular imperialism to which most Americans subscribed at the turn of the century. The Cleveland Plain Dealer, in an editorial titled "Teaching Morocco A Lesson," called for sending guns and men instead of a ransom. The government of Morocco "must be taught at this late date," warned the Plain Dealer, "the lesson which other Barbary states learned from American gunners more than a century ago."¹⁶ The heroic shades of Decatur, Preble, and Bainbridge were consistently drawn upon as an historical reference point by many newspapers. It was felt that what

the young American navy had done to the Deys of Algiers and Tripoli in the early 1800's, it should be quite willing to do in 1904.

The Boston Globe, while admitting that "Ion Perdicaris isn't exactly what you would call a Yankee name," affirmed that he was an American citizen and fully deserved the protection of his country. In New York, The World felt the abduction had laid Morocco "fairly open to a dose of the blessings of civilization from the mouth of a thirteen-inch gun." The Washington Times caught much of the popular mood when it reacted to the decision to use naval force by declaring that, "if the lawless people of Morocco need a lesson on the danger of monkeying with the Anglo-Saxon they will probably get it." Like the Globe, the Times also made note of Perdicaris' dubious heritage but affirmed that he "was born in this country, and is better entitled to the protection of the Stars and Stripes than are a good many members of Tammany Hall."¹⁷

Roosevelt's action drew some muted protests in the press, mainly from newspapers with Democratic sympathies. The chief newspaper in Perdicaris' home town of Trenton, the Daily True American, urged that before the United States proceeded to the use of force it should wait for all the facts to be presented. It also said that Perdicaris' residence in Morocco "was a known risk," and this must be given due consideration by the government. The newspaper had full sympathy for the plight of its native son, but the situation

was so complicated "as to make any rash act most momentous." Nothing would be secured by threatening Morocco, and instead of force the ransom should be paid by Perdicaris who was quite wealthy, and not the United States.¹⁸

The central character in the affair remained unaware of the widening diplomatic ripples caused by his abduction. As the horsemen struck out across the plain of Bubana toward the mountains, Perdicaris remembered thinking how unfamiliar the land was at night. He recalled the many games of polo and the steeple-chases he had engaged in on this plain, but now in the dark it was all strange and new to him. There were, he wrote, "no applauding public; but only the black night, and the wild mountaineers striking our horses with their guns and dragging us over rocks and across streams"¹⁹

As dawn broke the party halted for a brief rest. Perdicaris approached Raisuli and asked that he be allowed to communicate with his wife in Tangier, explaining that he needed certain medicines and heavier clothing. Without replying the bandit chief took paper and pencil from beneath his cloak and gave them to Ion. Perdicaris wrote down what he needed and the note was taken back to Tangier by a somewhat reluctant messenger, but only after Perdicaris promised Raisuli that he would not be arrested. Ion also wrote a second letter to be taken to the Wazan family asking that they help obtain his release.²⁰

Before starting out again Raisuli had his two captives dress in Moorish turbans and haiks (cloaks) so that they would not draw undue attention. As the party rode on the heat steadily became more oppressive and both Perdicaris and Varley suffered acute discomfort. About one in the afternoon they stopped to dine on a "few very gritty dried figs and a little hard and pungent goat cheese." Perdicaris was sickened after a few mouthfulls and was only too glad to mount his horse and be off.²¹

They now began to climb the rocky foothills into the mountains -- a district inhabited by the Beni M'Saour, the Beni Idder, and the Beni Arroze. These three Kabyles, or tribes, had for some time been united into a successful military confederation against the Fez government and were friendly to Raisuli. The ground became steeper and more impassable with each mile, and as they passed through the small miserable villages which lay along the primitive road ragged women and children would emerge from wretched huts to hoot and jeer at the two captives. By now the elderly Perdicaris was extremely fatigued, and his condition was not helped when he fell from his horse while scrambling up the side of a ravine.²²

Late that evening, about ten or eleven, the weary procession reached its destination -- a small mountain village called Terdants, "perched upon a spur or extended flank of Mount Nazul," about forty-eight miles from Tangier. Perdicaris was in great pain as a result of the fall and

could not lift his damaged leg "which was swollen from the calf to the waist." Both men were roughly shown into a small, primitive hut containing two rooms with a dirt floor. Neither got much sleep that first night at Terdants, and because of his injury Ion was forced to stay in bed for two full days.²³

The second morning after they arrived Raisuli, alarmed at the state of his elderly captive's health, visited the hut. The brigand was assured by Perdicaris that he was now feeling much better, and Raisuli then told him what he intended to demand for his release. Even though he promised Ion that he would not be harmed, and that the goods and horses taken from his house would be returned, Perdicaris later wrote that "he felt his heart sink" at what Raisuli was demanding. He was sure the conditions would never be granted and told the bandit, "why not ask to be proclaimed, out and out, Sultan of Morocco." He then wearily settled down for what he envisaged would be a long captivity.²⁴

Back in Tangier both Gummere and Nicolson were still attempting to establish some basis by which to negotiate the captives' release. On the 19th Torres, with their backing, despatched a relative of Raisuli to find out what the brigand wanted. In the early morning hours of the 22nd the man returned with letters from Perdicaris, as well as Raisuli's terms for the return of the two men.²⁵

The first of these demands was for the release of a large number of Raisuli's men held in Moorish prisons. Second, the Governor of Tangier, Abd el Saduk -- the brigand's cousin and old enemy -- was to be dismissed. Third, the government troops which had already been withdrawn into Tangier from their campaign against Raisuli in the countryside were to be sent to Fez. Fourth, a large ransom of about \$70,000 was to be paid, raised from the sale of properties belonging to Abd el Saduk and his family. The brigand would not accept payment from any other source. Fifth, and most importantly, the Sultan was to cede two districts to Raisuli for him to govern as an almost independent fief. Finally, there were two other demands relating to free passage for some of his men back to their villages, and the arrest of three of his other enemies.²⁶

Perhaps the most disturbing factor in the letter was a request for American and British guarantees of the Sultan's compliance with the terms. Raisuli knew quite well that if he released the two men without a great power guarantee of some sort there would be nothing to prevent the Moorish government from reneging on its promises. This question of a great power guarantee was to be a major sticking point in all further negotiations, as both the United States and Great Britain consistently refused to make this concession. Neither had any wish to be in a position of backing such a threat to the Moroccan government, as well as becoming so deeply involved in Moorish internal affairs.²⁷

Nicolson informed the Foreign Office that if Raisuli were to be given all of what he wants "he would practically become a ruling power in this part of the country." He thought the demands exorbitant, but felt that "without admitting them all, an arrangement was possible." He conferred with Gumméré and Torres and together they decided upon the tactic of a counter-proposal to Raisuli. The services of the Wazan's were enlisted and the two young Shereefs of that family were sent out with the offer. The Wazan family, as we have seen, had enjoyed an amiable relationship with Perdicaris, and it was mainly that which persuaded the two young men to enter the affair as intermediaries. The Wazan's possessed religious and social prestige and commanded great respect even though under French protection.²⁸

The counter-proposal offered less than what Raisuli wanted. It mentioned no territorial transfer and gave no great power guarantees, except for a pledge of an American and British-backed pardon. It demanded that the two prisoners be returned to Tangier by the 26th. The reply came on the 24th when a letter was received from Muley Ali, the eldest of the Wazan brothers. He said Raisuli not only rejected the counter-proposal, but also revealed that he had added two new demands -- including one of more territory -- for his captives' release.²⁹

A letter was sent to Muley Ali the next day pointing out that it would be in Raisuli's interest to release the prisoners, and again offered a British-American guarantee of

pardon. Nicolson felt the brigand's acceptance of it would now be improbable, and he was proved correct in this when Ali replied on the 26th that Raisuli was inflexible. Ali added that Raisuli was in daily communication with persons in Tangier, and he suspected they were urging him to resist. The bandit had also received letters from many tribal leaders exhorting him to use his prisoners to help gain the release of their men from the Sultan's prisons. Ali ended by saying that he would stay at Terdants in order to "prevent as much as it will be in my power any bodily harm being done to the captives." He urged that Raisuli's demands be met.³⁰

Nicolson was baffled by this turn in events and wrote the Foreign Office that he could see no end to Raisuli's demands, for "in all probability as time passes they will increase." The brigand was a desperate man and quite willing, Nicolson felt, to carry out his threat of killing the men. As for the demands, Sir Arthur saw them as "difficult for any Government to accept, and are beyond all . . . reason." He then requested instructions on how he should proceed, and whether Raisuli should be offered a guarantee.³¹

Faced with the failure of their diplomacy as far as Raisuli was concerned, the two diplomats turned toward the central government in Fez. They had previously written to the Grand Vizier on the 19th demanding that orders be sent to Torres giving him full authority to meet the demands of Raisuli. The American Vice Consul-General Hoffman Philip,

near Fez on a shooting expedition, was contacted and ordered by Gummeré to make a direct approach to the government. On the 25th Gummeré received a despatch from Philip telling him that he had not only seen the Grand Vizier, but had been given a special audience by the Sultan. Abd el Aziz expressed his outrage at the incident and directed Philip to inform Gummeré that "he would acquiece in every demand, in every detail" ³²

Even with this vague verbal acquiescence there remained two central and difficult problems. First, Raisuli's demands had now been increased and neither Gummeré or Nicolson was sure how Fez would react to the change -- especially the idea of handing over even more territory. Second, the bandit continued to demand a great power guarantee from the United States or Great Britain. By the 27th matters were stalemated and both sides settled down to a waiting game with the Moroccan government in the middle.

The situation of foreign residents in Tangier was growing increasingly precarious in the days after the abduction. Most of the foreigners living outside of Tangier poured into the city seeking protection. Walter B. Harris, writing in The Times (London), reported that "several people have received warnings of future outrages," and that the "demeanour of the natives towards Europeans seems daily to become more arrogant." ³³

Gummeré informed Washington of the declining situation in Tangier, calling it not reassuring, and adding that

he had "a well grounded suspicion" that other outrages were in the offing. He was almost desperate in his need of a warship. He hoped that the State Department would "pardon his insistence on this subject," but "nearly double the time" had elapsed since the Department had said a warship would arrive. "No vessel has been heard from," he plaintively cabled, and "I am growing more and more anxious."³⁴

The reaction in Washington to the stalemate in negotiations and the apparently deteriorating situation in Tangier was a decision to make an even stronger show of naval might. In London, the Foreign Office also hardened its attitude.

Lansdowne cabled Nicolson on the 28th that the British government could not press the Sultan to bow to the demands, but he asked him to inform Torres that the Moroccan government would "be held responsible if any harm befalls /a/ British subject." It was felt that the Sultan could afford to make considerable concessions, but His Majesty's Government would not demand the Sultan make these concessions -- only hold Morocco responsible if any harm came to Varley. To back up this new diplomatic approach the Foreign Office offered to send a warship, but Nicolson felt it would not be needed at this time.³⁵

In Washington a similar decision was being made on that same day. The President held a Cabinet meeting in the morning where Hay told Roosevelt that Raisuli's demands were

preposterous and the idea of guaranteeing them "impossible of fulfillment." Roosevelt agreed and it was decided to augment the naval force being sent by including Jewell's warships as well as Chadwick's. The primary reasons for the increase in force, Hay wrote Moody, were "the disturbed conditions in Morocco and the unsatisfactory progress of the negotiations" By now Hay was in complete agreement with Roosevelt as to the necessity of a naval demonstration, confiding to his diary that "a nation cannot degrade itself to prevent ill-treatment of a citizen."³⁶

Morocco was caught in the middle. If it did not act it would have to face the threat of British and American intervention -- if it did act and gave Raisuli what he wanted it would create a powerful internal threat to itself. In addition, the affair was beginning to assume larger proportions not only in Fez, Washington and London, but also in Paris.

Initially French interest in the kidnapping was minimal, but as the crisis lengthened without any settlement in sight, and with the arrival of American naval units imminent, French concern began to deepen.

At first the French Minister in Tangier, Saint-René Taillandier, thought that the situation might result in an increase of French influence in Morocco. In Paris the semi-official newspaper Le Temps editorially agreed with this view. Taillandier also began meeting regularly with Gummeré and Nicolson, and it was he who cleared the way for the

Wazan brothers to act as intermediaries.³⁷

The French Minister was soon sounding out his colleagues on the idea of establishing a local European controlled police force. He said he was in contact with his government about this possibility, using the "infusion of a few experienced Algerian elements" as its backbone. By the 24th Le Temps was calling the kidnapping a grave incident, saying it showed "the necessity of assuring the assistance of France to put an end to the anarchy and unrest which are laying waste the region."³⁸

The French position was quite well understood in Washington and at the same Cabinet meeting which decided to send a second squadron to Morocco, Roosevelt ordered Hay to cable our ambassador in Paris and have him officially request French good offices.³⁹ The President was covering both of his flanks with this maneuver. It was Rooseveltian diplomacy at its best with both the big stick and the soft words. The President was being very careful and was giving himself as many options as possible. He could either continue to apply an increasing measure of force, or, if European reaction became hostile, dump the entire matter in the lap of the French.

However, some saw another reason behind the American request of French good offices. The Times of London reported that the request had actually been initiated by a feeler from the French government. The New York Tribune stated flatly that it was French overtures which prompted

the appeal, and that the catalyst was the President's decision to send warships.⁴⁰

Whatever the origin of the American request for good offices, the prospect of French involvement was well received in the nation's press. The Sun (New York) praised the action, as well as Hay's good sense in bringing France into the affair. It wrote of the "age-long friendship between France and her foster child," and felt French assistance was "the quick, the easy and, probably, the only means of solving the Perdicaris problem."⁴¹

The crisis entered a new stage after the events of the 28th. It was no longer simply a local matter, but instead began to take on international implications. A fleet of American warships was heading for Europe, and part of that armada anticipated daily in Tangier. What was to be expected from them? Was the sending of warships to Morocco simply a way in which the President was attempting to placate public opinion as American Ambassador Porter in Paris assured a worried Delcassé; or was there something more to it?⁴²

From his post in Madrid Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador to Spain, apprehensively observed the development of the crisis and the despatch of American warships. He feared, he wrote Delcassé on the 29th, "the tendency which the United States has shown at times to get into Mediterranean questions," may be a cause for alarm, and "may go contrary to the ideas and influence of which France has made herself the promoter."⁴³ Cambon was not alone in his

ruminations, and the events of the next few weeks would cause them to be echoed in the foreign offices and chancelleries of Spain, Germany and Russia.

CHAPTER V
EUROPE LOOKS ON

Chadwick's warships, strung out in a long line, steamed toward Tangier at their top cruising speeds. Leading the way was the flagship Brooklyn, her powerful engines moving her far ahead of the next vessel astern. On May 30th, some sixty-five hours after clearing the harbor at Santa Cruz, Chadwick's white flagship emerged from the early morning mist off Tangier and anchored in the harbor. By mid-afternoon the Atlanta arrived, followed in the early evening by the two gunboats, Castine and Marietta.¹

As each of the warships slid into the anchorage their guns boomed salutes which were answered in turn by the Moorish shore batteries. All day long the sound of cannon seemed to echo over the old port -- an experience which Gummeré found impressive and reassuring.²

Soon after the Brooklyn anchored Gummeré came aboard for a long conversation with Chadwick. When the Consul-General had fully explained the situation both men agreed that "no further steps should be taken" until the attitude of the Fez government was known concerning Raisuli's new demands. Chadwick and his staff came ashore in the afternoon, and, along with Gummeré, went to visit Torres. They impressed upon him the gravity with which the United

States viewed the situation, and urged him that there be no relaxation in his efforts to secure the release of the captives.³ As the old Moorish diplomat looked out over the harbor, the presence of a squadron of powerful warships underlined the seriousness of the situation far more than could Gummeré's threats and demands.

Chadwick continued his busy day by meeting with Nicolson and then Mrs. Perdicaris. To calm Gummeré's fears of a Moorish attack upon him or the Perdicaris family he ordered ashore four Marines, bearing sidearms but not rifles. Two were detailed to Gummeré's residence and two to El Minzah. Also two navy signelmen were stationed at the Consulate, "in order to be able to communicate with the vessels in case of attack and need of assistance."⁴

To Roosevelt and Hay Rear Admiral Chadwick was a known and respected quantity, and they would look to him rather than the untried Gummeré for a true picture of events in Tangier. Chadwick's initial impressions were sent to Washington the next day. The situation was, he reported, "a very serious one." He cautioned that the only thing possible for the United States to do was to wait on events, while "pressuring the Sultan to accept" Raisuli's demands.⁵

The next two days brought more naval activity to Tangier. On the morning of the 31st the British despatch vessel Surprise arrived from Gibraltar carrying on board Rear Admiral Sir William Cecil H. Domville. Domville commanded that part of the British Mediterranean fleet at

Gibraltar (the other units were engaged in maneuvers off the coast of Italy), and he was soon ashore conferring with Nicolson about the situation.⁶

On June 1st Jewell arrived with the European Squadron, bringing the total American strength to seven warships. Although both Chadwick and Jewell were rear admirals, Chadwick was senior and thus took overall command while the squadrons remained at Tangier.

For most foreign residents the arrival of the warships gave them that feeling of solid security lacking since the 19th. Gummere was much relieved, stating that the naval moral support was of immense importance to his bargaining position. Nicolson also valued the arrival of the Americans. The town's Europeans were somewhat reassured, he told the Foreign Office, as they felt that the vessels could give them protection by sending landing parties ashore in case of serious trouble.⁷

Al-Moghreb Al-Aska, a Tangier weekly newspaper published by and for Europeans, greeted the arrival of American warships with pleasure, sorry only that the stay of the Americans could not be of a more permanent nature. It openly called for the United States to join with Great Britain and help to civilize Morocco. "Perhaps no better ornament could crown the pillars of Hercules," said Al-Aska, "than the Star-spangled banner, and the Union Jack."⁸

The warships were also welcomed from a somewhat more unexpected quarter. One day while walking and

conversing with each other, Raisuli and Perdicaris were approached by a breathless messenger who described to his chief the arrival of "eight frigates" which had entered the bay one after the other. He said the town was mkloub, or "upside-down," and added that all feared an imminent bombardment. Perdicaris watched Raisuli closely for he feared the news would cause the brigand to move him and Varley deeper into the mountains. Surprisingly, Raisuli broke into a wide grin and turned to Perdicaris to congratulate him. Ion replied that he did not understand, and Raisuli good naturedly answered that the presence of these ships would now compel the Sultan to grant his demands -- "and then," he promised, "you will be able to return to your friends."⁹

In the United States governmental vigor in having despatched the warships ten days earlier had produced enormous headlines, after which the story gradually faded from front pages. The arrival of the squadrons in Tangier touched off a new wave of journalistic enthusiasm.

Hearst's Evening Journal (New York), in a baroque mixture of bombast and misinformation, informed readers on June 1st that the "U. S. Threatens To Bombard Tangier" and that "Fifteen American Warships Will Turn Their Guns On Morocco." In a more responsible but no less festive vein, the New York Tribune heralded the arrival with a large front-page picture of the Brooklyn, including an insert of Admiral Chadwick. The Tribune called it "the largest representation of the American navy that has ever visited a foreign

port" The American navy, thundered the newspaper, had returned to "the scene of some of its earliest glories," there to deal "with a brigandage on land no less detestable than piracy at sea." The Tribune added that not even the "Little Americans" -- a reference to the anti-imperialists -- could argue against the validity of our response in this case.¹⁰

The New York World, a political opponent of Roosevelt and suspicious of his motives in Morocco, joined the outbreak of martial speculation. It found Roosevelt "anxious to stir up a fight of some kind," hoping it would aid him at the polls later in the year. A front page headline proclaimed: "U. S. Cavalry May Be Sent To Morocco." The reason for the need of army cavalry, said the World, was that the marines from the fleet had no experience with horses and would not be effective in the coming campaign. The World believed that the invasion of Morocco "will be a strictly friendly one so far as the Sultan is concerned." The story optimistically assumed that the Sultan's army would probably co-operate with the American invasion force, "and act as guides."¹¹

The American warships, however, had a much larger audience than the residents of Tangier and the American reading public. The Perdicaris incident and its naval aftermath brought excited speculation to the press of Europe -- particularly in Spain and France, the two powers which had, along with Great Britain, the greatest interest in the

future of Morocco.

In Madrid the arrival of the two squadrons created a sensation, and Le Temps (Paris) reported that Spanish officials considered the United States naval presence "unwise and liable to aggravate the situation." Spain feared not only American intervention but an international one. The latter, she felt, would upset the balance of power in the region.¹² In a Europe of hungry colonial powers, Spain might lose her preferred position in Morocco once the door was opened to outside intervention.

On June 2nd a request was made in the Spanish Senate that the government despatch a warship to Tangier. Maura, the Foreign Minister, while not committing himself to a naval demonstration promised that measures would be taken to defend Spanish subjects in Morocco -- and, by inference, Spanish colonial rights. Cambon told Delcassé on the 6th that rumors were sweeping through Madrid of the imminent seizure of Tangier, or some other Moroccan port, by the United States for use as a coaling station.¹³

It had only been six years since Spain had suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of the United States, and the sensitivity of Spain to such a gathering of American naval power so close to her shores was bound to excite an adverse reaction. The rumors were vehemently denied by the State Department, as well as by Ambassador Choate in London. The Spanish Ambassador to the United States, Don Emilio de Ojeda, publicly declared that as far as he knew the American

government had no desire to seize a port in Morocco. Finally, the Army and Navy Journal reacted to the rumors by calling them "both ludicrous and deplorable." It was, said the Journal, "a gross representation of the humane purpose" for which the naval demonstration was instituted.¹⁴

Another rumor which originated in Madrid and made the rounds of other European capitals concerned a supposed exchange of notes between the great powers. The notes would affirm, reported Le Temps, that the United States would be allowed to take only those actions needed for the release of Perdicaris; the notes were also said to assert that the great powers would not consent to an extended intervention.¹⁵

If the exchange of notes and the American desire for a coaling port were a fiction, the concern on the part of the Spanish government to end the stay of American warships in the area was not. Ambassador Ojeda, while praising the careful handling of the affair by the United States government, precisely pointed out that he expected the purpose of the naval demonstration be limited to the release of Perdicaris and Varley, and nothing else.¹⁶

Spanish concern was underlined in a more dramatic way by the well-publicized movement of naval units toward the Straits area. As a result of 1898, Spain had few major naval units remaining, but during the first two weeks of June these ships were suggestively concentrated at Cadiz -- a port which lay only a day's hard steaming from Tangier. On the morning of June 5th a squadron of three armored

vessels cleared the harbor at Malaga bound for an unknown destination. Led by Spain's only battleship, the Pelayo (known affectionally as "El Solatario"), the squadron consisted of the new armored cruiser Cardinal Cisneros and the coast-defense ship Numancia. At first, it was reported that this force was bound for Tangier, but on the 6th Foreign Minister Maura publicly stated that the warships were to go to Cadiz. Nevertheless the meaning of the move was quite clear, and on the 8th it was underscored by the despatch of a second squadron to Cadiz, this time from Cartagena.¹⁷

French anxiety would also lead to diplomatic and naval maneuvering, although not so blatant as the Spanish. The French government was uncomfortable with the situation and it was generally felt she would view favorably the quick departure of the American warships. Le Temps wondered if such a formidable demonstration of naval power was really appropriate. A front page editorial stated that "the presence of the American fleet complicates the situation," and that it would not aid in a settlement.¹⁸ Since Le Temps was generally considered to be an outlet for official opinion, its editorials were seen as a reflection of the government's views.

Delcassé, on May 31st, played down exaggerated rumors that France was planning a naval demonstration or other radical action at Tangier. He called these rumors purely fanciful. Yet, as can be seen in his correspondence with Taillandier on the 9th of June, Delcassé saw the

necessity for French participation if any landing at Tangier by the United States or Great Britain was attempted. The day after he broached this possibility with his Moroccan envoy, unconfirmed reports circulated in Paris that French Minister of Marine Pelletan was in communication with Vice Admiral Gigon at Loulon as to the possibility of sending one or two warships to Tangier.¹⁹

In the United States the authoritative Army and Navy Journal again took editorial note that the appearance of American naval might on a large scale had "provoked a good deal of speculation in continental Europe." It scoffed at rumors that the fleet had been ordered to the Mediterranean in connection with the Russo-Japanese war or to seize a coaling port. The Journal stressed that the plan for the cruise had been made several months before and that the American government had pointed this out informally to the great powers.²⁰

If some of the European powers could be said to have had one eye on events in Morocco, the other was undoubtedly drawn to an occurrence some four hundred miles to the northwest. At Lisbon, Portugal, another American force was engaged in a different aspect of Rooseveltian naval diplomacy -- not the gunboat diplomacy of threat as seen at Tangier but the prestige diplomacy of display; not the naked fist but the velvet glove.

It was a clear and pleasant first of June as Barker's battleships steamed up the Tagus River in a single column. Anchoring off Lisbon the three ironclads (the Iowa arrived three days later) and the Portuguese forts and batteries on the shore exchanged thunderous salutes. American sailors often referred to duty of this sort as a "permanent yachting party," and events of the next two weeks would not disappoint that belief.²¹

Soon puffing steam launches filled with officers in spotless dress white uniforms and cumbersome ceremonial swords were shuttling between the battleships and the shore. Barker and his captains made their first call at the American Legation and met with the Minister, Charles Page Bryan. Bryan was a former journalist turned diplomat. A political power in Illinois, he had started out in the foreign service at the top. In 1897, at the age of forty-two, he had been appointed by President McKinley as the American Minister in China. Bryan followed this with service as Minister to Brazil, Switzerland, and, beginning in 1904, Portugal.²²

Bryan and Barker then called on the Prime Minister of Portugal and members of the Cabinet, as well as the Civil and Military Governor. Later that afternoon at the Arsenal the Americans attended a ceremony in which the young second son of the King, the Infante Don Manuel, was enrolled as a member of the Naval School. After the ceremony Barker and his naval contingent were presented to King Carlos and Queen Amelia by Bryan. In the harbor the battleships were dressed

in honor of the occasion, and while sailors in dress whites lined the rails, hundreds of multi-colored signal flags were raised, and for the second time that day the battleships were engulfed in white billowing smoke as their guns roared out the appropriate salute.²³

There ensued in the following days a glittering round of balls and official ceremonies, at which Barker was often accompanied by his wife who had sailed in a passenger liner to be with him in Europe. At one gathering the Queen charmed the Admiral and his wife by telling them proudly that her father, the Count de Paris, had been a member of General McClellan's staff during the Civil War.²⁴

On the 8th Minister Bryan gave a Grand Ball at the American Legation which was attended by the King and Queen and most of the court. United States Marines from the battleships in full dress uniforms of red and blue, with spiked helmets in the Prussian style, stood at attention on the broad stairway leading from the entrance hall to the first floor. As each member of royalty entered officials of the Portuguese Cabinet and the American Legation escorted them up the stairway. Liveried attendants with lighted candelabra proceeded a stately procession led by the Queen Mother. Providing a suitable background a navy band sounded bugles and drums, gave four ruffles, and then played the Portuguese and American national anthems. Bryan was very proud. This was the first time in some years that the royal family had attended any legation ball -- a signal honor for both Bryan

and the United States.²⁵

On the 11th King Carlos with his Minister of Marine and other officials visited the squadron. Approaching in an ornate State Barge, the King was greeted by a salute of twenty-one guns as he came alongside the Kearsarge. After breakfast in the wardroom and a toast by Barker in which he saluted the King, "as the mariner who maintains the traditional maritime glory to which Portugal is indisputably entitled," Carlos inspected the ship. He expressed himself as "much pleased with the condition of the ship and crew," and later stood with Barker on the Quarterdeck as the ship's company marched past. Barker fancied that the King as a former naval officer "understood and appreciated what he saw." When the King departed in the afternoon he was cheered by the men of the Kearsarge and the other battleships, and with the rails manned and the Portuguese ensign at the main, each ship fired a twenty-one gun salute. The King would later tell the British Minister, Sir Martin Gosselin, that while the battleships were "fine specimens of their type," he found them lacking in homogeneity.²⁶

"In order to cultivate more carefully the friendly relations" existing between Portugal and the United States, Barker held another reception on board the Kearsarge, this time for the "leading people of Lisbon." At least a thousand "gentlemen and ladies" crowded onto the battleship, filling the compartments and passageways, and looking bemusedly, or, in some cases knowingly, at the great guns and

gleaming machinery. The Kearsarge was awash, as Barker later remembered, with "Dukes, Duchesses, Counts, Countesses, Admirals, Ministers, Bishops, and Cabinet Officers." By the time the squadron left Lisbon it was little wonder that instead of being refreshed by the visit the men "were pretty well tired out."²⁷

Bryan was elated with the Portuguese response, and wrote Hay of the "very favorable impression on the whole community created by the warships and their officers." The visit had, according to Bryan, "added greatly to the prestige of our country in Portugal." Roosevelt's personal interest in the visit and its happy results was indicated by a much appreciated telegram from the President to King Carlos.²⁸

The success of the sojourn was mirrored in the Portuguese press. For the Liberal the visit was a startlingly vivid revelation of how in so short a time the United States had entered into the international life of the great powers. "The world moves," said the paper, and Europe should not be surprised at "this march of American power." Although the visit was a peaceful one, the Liberal's editorial made clear that the fleet's call at the strategic estuary of the Tagus would have its effect on the great powers.²⁹

Another newspaper, Novidades, acclaimed the visit in glowing terms, and saw it as strengthening "the bonds of friendship between the great Republic, and this smallest power of Western Europe." Tarde, also applauded the visit

and its effect. It reported that the King had come back to Lisbon from his country palace at Cezimbra expressly to see the battleships. Both newspapers printed in full Roosevelt's telegram to King Carlos, as well as the King's reply to the President.³⁰

But events at Tangier and their effect on Europe added a note of seriousness to the Portuguese sojourn. The Lisbon correspondent of the Madrid daily Impartial reported on "rumors of the gravest character," which if unconfirmed were "nevertheless received as true by well-informed persons." The United States was in the process, according to these rumors, of obtaining the lease of a naval base in return for America's payment of part of Portugal's national debt. The Portuguese government had been reported as having refused this offer, as well as one for a coaling station on the coast of Portugal itself. Yet the cordial reception given to the battleships, the story went on, lent "credit to rumors of certain understandings whereby the North American Government will secure important advantages."³¹

Later the semi-official Berlin Post picked up the rumor and saw in it the beginning of a portentous endeavor by the United States "to obtain influence in the Mediterranean." The New York Times reported that "one of the highest authorities in the Administration" -- probably Hay -- had denied such allegations. "We may be negotiating for a coaling station in the Mountains of the Moon and for a training station on Mount Atlas," the Times quoted the

unnamed source, "but we are not after any of the Azores or any part of Portugal any more than we are after a coaling station in Morocco."³²

The Perdicaris incident also affected the itinerary of the Battleship Squadron. Both Chadwick and Jewell were sending regular reports on the developing situation to Barker. On the 6th of June Barker was ordered by the Navy Department to remain in Lisbon until the 16th, and later the stay was extended until the 18th. The visit to Villefranche was scrapped, and by the 12th the possibility of Barker going to Tangier made exciting reading in American newspapers. The Navy Department decided that, instead of proceeding directly into the Mediterranean after leaving Lisbon, Barker's ships would steam to Gibraltar -- a few hours from Tangier -- and wait on events.³³

For the officers of the Battleship Squadron the anticipation of a coming clash in Morocco was a welcome one. It was felt that even if the affair was settled without the use of force, the navy would have to remain in Moroccan waters to collect the expected indemnity. Portuguese Rear Admiral Amaral, the commandant of the Navy Yard at Lisbon, was telling American officers that the best way to settle the situation was for the United States to pay the ransom and then compel Morocco to double the amount, or face the seizure of one of its ports.³⁴

While Europe puzzled over American naval concentrations on both sides of the Straits, the situation in Tangier had settled down to a stand-off. Weary messengers travelled constantly between Tangier and Raisuli's camp, and between Tangier and Fez, but little progress was evident.

The day before Chadwick's arrival the younger of the Wazan brothers returned from Raisuli's stronghold, telling Gummeré and Nicolson that the brigand was now insisting that all of his demands be immediately met. If they were not he would kill the two captives. He set a time limit of two days for a satisfactory reply. The two diplomats quickly informed Raisuli that they must be given more time as approval of the demands must first come from Fez before Torres could act on them. They also pointed out to Raisuli that if he killed his captives he would have to deal not only with the Sultan -- but with two of the great powers. Gummeré poured out his frustration to the State Department over this, saying that everything depended upon Raisuli's whim and that any false step on his or Nicolson's part would lead to the deaths of the captives.³⁵

At a Cabinet meeting on May 31st Roosevelt, Hay and Moody discussed this turn of events. They viewed Chadwick's initial despatch as inconclusive, and Roosevelt and Moody agreed with Hay that a guarantee to Raisuli by the United States was out of the question. To deal with Raisuli's latest threat Hay read to the Cabinet the draft of a sharp despatch he was going to send Gummeré. Later in the day a

despatch was received from Ambassador Choate in England which gave some hope for a settlement through British and French efforts, and because of this Hay toned down the telegram. As sent it called for Gummeré to inform the Moroccan government that if Perdicaris was killed the United States would demand the same fate for Raisuli. It implied that if the Sultan could not carry this out the American government would be quite willing to do so. The next day at a noon conference Roosevelt and Moody chided Hay, saying "they wished /his/ first draft had gone, as it would have sounded better on the stump"; however, they felt the second would serve the purpose.³⁶

Even the toned-down despatch created a flurry in the nation's press when it was publicly released. "Awful Vengeance Threatened By Hay," headlined the New York World. If Perdicaris was harmed, "the United States will hunt /Raisuli/ to his death, whether it takes weeks or months or years." The Boston Globe's front page proclaimed, "Secretary Hay To Fraissuli /sic/: Must Not Harm Perdicaris: Capture And Death If He Does." The Washington Times somewhat more colorfully stated: "Raisuli's Head For Perdicaris'."³⁷

Beyond the supposed political effect of the despatch and the exaggerated newspaper interpretation of it, lay a potentially serious problem. Roosevelt was gambling. How could he predict the Sultan's compliance to the demands? Who could guess Raisuli's response to the threat against his life? Was he cowardly or proud, reasonable or insane? And

what if the elderly Perdicaris died of natural causes while in captivity? In a largely unpredictable set of circumstances, Roosevelt had engaged his own reputation for "pluck" as well as the honor of the United States Navy. He had drawn the attention of the world to his fleet by committing it at the focal point of the Perdicaris trouble. With his easy-going approval of Hay's toned-down despatch he had discarded the last of his options. His hand was pat. There was no question of backing down. War, involvement in Morocco, complications with Europe -- all awaited the whim of a daredevil Moroccan bandit.

In Tangier no quick solution to the problem had presented itself. Gummeré and Nicolson, as well as Torres, still waited on Fez for official approval of Raisuli's increased demands. Joined by the Italian cruiser Dogali on June 3rd the seven American warships lay quietly in the harbor: "Lean white ships," wrote the special correspondent of the London Daily Mail, Edgar Wallace, "flying a flag that has absolutely no right to be within 3,000 miles of Tangier."³⁸

Nicolson was apprehensive over what the Moorish government might decide. He told the Foreign Office he could not "say what might happen if the terms are refused . . . or if negotiations are prolonged." He felt Perdicaris and Varley were in no immediate danger, but he was not sure in which direction the Fez government would decide to go. He informed Gummeré and Taillandier that he was seriously considering asking the Foreign Office to send over a warship

from Gibraltar, and he warned the French Minister of the distinct possibility "of landing men for the protection of the British colony." Nicolson realized that certain risks might follow from such an extreme act, but he felt the alternative would invite greater dangers. Taillandier was vigorously opposed to any measure which would mean American and British marines landing in Morocco, and protested strongly to Nicolson.³⁹

On the 5th Nicolson, feeling events were at a critical stage, asked for a warship. The Sultan's reply was due in a day or two and if it was a negative one, force might be needed. On the morning of the 7th the Prince of Wales weighed anchor at Gibraltar and steamed for Tangier. Under the command of Captain G. A. Callaghan, the black and buff painted battleship was one of England's newest and most powerful warships. As she entered the harbor at Tangier late that same morning the guns of the American ships crashed out their answer to the Prince of Wales thirty-four gun salute -- twenty-one for the American flag and thirteen for Chadwick.⁴⁰

The United States Consul in Gibraltar reported an even more important development to the State Department. The British warships under Admiral Domville which had been scheduled to join the rest of the Mediterranean Fleet at Rapallo, Italy, had been "ordered to remain in port until further orders."⁴¹

The situation temporarily eased on the 8th when a letter was received by Torres from the Grand Vizier, Sid Abdelkrim Ben Sliman, agreeing to give in to Raisuli's demands. The Grand Vizier said the Sultan had acquiesced in order "to please the two great Nations and the families of the captives." Torres was instructed to see that all the demands were carried out as quickly as possible. The Grand Vizier also ordered Torres to ask for the removal of British and American warships from Moroccan waters. The Moorish government, reported Gummeré, "hopes that we will send away the vessels so the people will be calmed." Gummeré refused this request, as did Nicolson, saying that the warships were sent to show the gravity which each nation felt as to the affair, and they would not be removed until the captives were released.⁴²

Torres told Nicolson and Gummeré that he doubted Raisuli would be satisfied even now, and asked Nicolson for suggestions on how compliance with the terms could best be brought about. Both diplomats emphasized that this was strictly a matter between Raisuli and Morocco, and that they would not interfere in any manner. They could only reiterate that their governments would hold the Sultanate fully responsible if anything happened to the captives. Torres, Nicolson wrote, was "much depressed and agitated" over how to meet all the demands. He refused to send his son to act as an intermediary as the Vizier had asked him to do, fearing Raisuli would take him captive. Torres' chief problem was

how to deal with the Sheikhs the bandit demanded be arrested. They were powerful tribal figures with many well-armed followers, and the matter must be carefully negotiated with them. Torres felt he would not be able to inform Raisuli of complete compliance with the demands -- except, of course, the great power guarantees -- until at least the 13th, a time lag which Gummeré found very dilatory.⁴³

While waiting for Torres to comply with the demands two minor events occurred which briefly caused a flurry of excitement. The first took place when Perdicaris was reported ill and plans were immediately made to send a ship's doctor from the squadron to aid him. Fortunately, word came that Perdicaris' condition had improved. Yet the incident was proof of what a frail reed the negotiations rested upon -- the old man's death, even of natural causes, could have instigated American intervention. By now even Nicolson was telling the Foreign Office that more vigorous measures than warships were necessary (Gummeré was also dunning the State Department for stiffer action). Nicolson suggested that Great Britain consult with France on using stronger methods.⁴⁴

The other episode, while trivial, measured the state of the tension in the United States. On June 8th Chadwick, at Gummeré's request, placed a Marine guard at the Belgian Legation just outside Tangier. The reaction in America was instantaneous. "American Marines have landed in Africa," trumpeted the New York Tribune. "It was the first display

of American force in Africa," echoed The World, "since Stephen Decatur, just a hundred years ago, whipped the Barbary pirates into submission." The front page headline of the Washington Post was simple and to the point: "Our Marines Land." The Belgian ambassador to the United States, Baron Moncheur, could only express that he was greatly surprised at the entire event.⁴⁵

A somewhat red-faced explanation came the next day. Only two Marines had made up the landing force. The wife of the absent Belgian Minister was an American, the daughter of a certain General Story, a high Army official in Washington. She had received threats from some Moors and Gummeré decided that she needed protection.⁴⁶

Reports of busy naval activity on America's east coast were associated in the press with the increasing seriousness of the Perdicaris affair. "Hurry Orders To Missouri," headlined a report from Newport News in the New York Tribune on the 11th of June. Cowles' battleship lay at dock "awaiting the arrival of a naval collier which is loading ammunition at New York." The Tribune reported that the Missouri had taken on a considerable amount of ammunition in the past few days, and the supposition prevalent around the naval base was that the battleship "is to carry a large supply of ammunition to Barker's squadron."⁴⁷

That same day the Philadelphia Public Ledger reported that officers at the League Island Navy Yard were giving serious credit to a rumor sweeping the base that the

new cruiser Denver, lying "fully equipped for a long voyage," was going to be sent to join Chadwick's squadron at Tangier. The Ledger also intimated that the auxiliary cruiser Yankee would sail with the Denver.⁴⁸

On June 14th the situation in Morocco took its most serious turn yet -- Raisuli again increased his demands! Even before Torres had managed to satisfactorily settle all the previous conditions, the brigand's appetite had gotten the better of him.⁴⁹

CHAPTER VI

"PERDICARIS ALIVE, OR RAISULI DEAD"

The new crisis in negotiations began on the evening of the 13th when Torres received a letter from the elder Wazan brother in which Raisuli was reported to have again demanded great power guarantees. These guarantees were to be written and signed by both Gummeré and Nicolson. The brigand, Muley Ali wrote, feared that if he let the captives go without the guarantees he and his men would be molested by the Moorish government, and unable to till their fields in peace. Raisuli insisted that the Sheikhs be arrested and their "detention in prison guaranteed" by Gummeré and Nicolson.¹

On the 14th Torres received a second letter, this time directly from Raisuli. In it the requirement for the arrest of the Sheikhs was repeated, and two more new demands insisted upon. The first was for the release of additional prisoners from the government's dungeons; the second, that four more districts around Tangier be turned over to him. Torres on behalf of his government agreed to the new demands, only pointing out that he did so conditionally as he still had to get confirmation from Fez. As for the Sheikhs, Torres arrested one of them on the 15th along with two of his brothers, but told Raisuli that if he wanted to arrest the

others he had the authority to do it himself as the government was incapable of doing so.²

Gummeré wrote the State Department that Raisuli was probably going to insist upon receiving great power guarantees before he released the captives, and since neither the United States or Great Britain would do so the question of what to do then must be considered. He said the Moroccan government was impotent, and its army laughable and in no position to punish Raisuli. The only option open other than direct force, Gummeré wrote, was a firm warning by the United States that Raisuli release the prisoners. If the warning went unheeded the "threat of punishment must be fulfilled to the letter or the lives of all Christians in this country will be jeopardized."³

In Washington the news of the new impasse created consternation. Hay's reaction to the increased demands was an observation in his diary on the 15th that Raisuli had a bad case of megalomania. To Roosevelt Hay was just as blunt. "You see," he wrote in a note to the President on that same day, "there is no end to the insolence of this blackguard." Both men agreed that there would be no American guarantee. "Of course," Roosevelt wrote Hay, "it would be out of the question to surrender to the demands of those Moorish brigands." He felt that the United States had "gone just as far as we possibly can go for Perdicaris. Our position must now be to demand the death of those that harm him if he is harmed."⁴

Strong words, but a basic question remained unanswered: just what action was the American government prepared to take in backing up its position? On the 15th Roosevelt wrote Hay that he thought it might be advantageous "to enter into negotiations with England and France, looking to the possibility of an expedition to punish the brigand," if Morocco was unable to do it.⁵ On the very next day, the 16th, Rear Admiral Chadwick began drawing up a plan for the seizure of Tangier.

There exists no record of Navy Department orders to Chadwick concerning a landing operation at Tangier. There is, however, a good possibility that he received such orders -- at least on a contingency basis -- on the 15th or the 16th. On the other hand, he may have gone ahead on his own in reaction to Raisuli's increased demands. Whatever the reason, the fact remains that Chadwick, after sitting in the harbor at Tangier for over two weeks, now began serious preparations for military intervention.

To be sure, Chadwick had landed a few marines and navy signalmen, and a plan had been developed between the Admiral and Gummeré on a series of provisional signals, using flares, to warn of trouble in Tangier. On board the warships "marines and one company of bluejackets were made ready for landing if it should be necessary." But beyond these measures little else had been done to prepare for serious action before the 16th.⁶

On that morning Chadwick appointed a Board consisting of Commanders W. H. H. Southerland (Cleveland), Henry Morrell (Marietta), and E. J. Dorn (Castine) to "collect strategic information and prepare without delay a plan of military operations of a foreign power in Morocco." The plan was to be set up in such a way "as to be immediately available for use in case of necessity." Finally, Chadwick ordered that great secrecy be observed in gathering this information. Copies of the order were sent to Admirals Barker and Jewell.⁷

As ultimately established the plan called for a seizure of the port by a force of over twelve hundred armed sailors and marines, further equipped with five three-inch field guns, and fourteen machine guns. The landing force was to be divided into two brigades -- one from the South Atlantic Squadron and one from the European Squadron. The initial landing was to be made by the South Atlantic Brigade, its marines seizing the Custom House and main pier. In the harbor the warships were "to be prepared to shell batteries at Customs Pier and at north-east battery in case landing is opposed."⁸

Chadwick began to take other preparatory steps in addition to the war plan. He asked Nicolson to recall the Prince of Wales from Gibraltar (she had gone there on the 13th for some repairs). Nicolson agreed with Chadwick, "especially," he said, "as trouble may be caused when the guarantees to Russouli [sic] are refused." Chadwick also sent a

hurried request to the United States Government Despatch Agent in London asking him to send "immediately two copies /of Stanford's map /of Morocco," a topographical study compiled by the British Intelligence Department. By the 18th he was requesting from the captain of the Brooklyn his plans on the composition of the landing force, as well as the "number and type of guns /with field mounts available for light field artillery."⁹

While Chadwick was putting together his plan for a landing, an occurrence in Tangier added to the instability of the situation. On the morning of the 16th two small chartered steamers, the Spanish Millan Carrasco and the French Moselle, pulled into Tangier after a voyage up the coast from Casablanca. On board were some three hundred Moorish infantry and seventy cavalry. Nicolson had been notified of their departure by the British Consul at Casablanca and had gone to Torres demanding that the movement be halted. Torres complied and Chadwick was just about to send out the Marietta to stop the ships at sea when they steamed into the harbor.¹⁰

One of Raisuli's first demands had been that the government troops in the Tangier area be removed to Fez. This had been done, but the new influx of soldiers could threaten the negotiations by destroying Raisuli's belief in the good faith of the Moroccan government. Torres sent a message to Casablanca ordering a halt to the sending of more troops, two hundred of which were rumored to be embarking.

The Moorish soldiers already landed were, in Chadwick's words, "a mere rabble in appearance." Walter B. Harris of The Times was even more caustic in his description, calling them "evil-looking, filthy specimens of the worst type of Moorish soldiers, whose reputation during the time they have been camping uselessly at Casablanca has been of the worst."¹¹

Chadwick felt their arrival might cause a serious complication in the negotiations, while Nicolson saw the situation as having been needlessly aggravated. The question then arose as to why the troops had been sent. At first Nicolson thought orders to send the men had been drafted by the Fez government under the supposition that the captives would have been released by this time. Soon, however, more significant motivations were being suggested. Harris reported in The Times that a high Moorish official in Tangier had told him that the French Legation in Fez had "urged and practically insisted upon this course" to the Sultan and Grand Vizier, "in order to lessen the chance of the disembarkation of American and British marines."¹²

Both Nicolson and Gummeré agreed that French diplomacy was behind the landing. Nicolson in a confidential despatch told the Foreign Office that inopportune pressure by the French had evidently caused Fez to move in the troops. In Washington Hay called in Jules Jusserand, the French Ambassador, and asked him why this army of Moroccan "tatterdemalions" had been sent to Tangier. Jusserand professed ignorance of the entire matter.¹³

Despite the presence of the soldiers some progress in negotiations was being made. Raisuli had apparently decided to ignore the Moroccan landing and accepted the terms offered for the ransom part of the settlement. All of the brigand's other demands had been more or less acceded to, except for the great power guarantees, and, probably realizing that he was never going to get these, he had decided to settle.

Raisuli demanded that the money, as well as the men being freed by the Moroccan government, be brought to his village at Terdants where the exchange would take place. Gummeré and Nicolson strongly objected to this plan, feeling that Raisuli would simply take the ransom and the freed prisoners without releasing Perdicaris and Varley. Torres sent a message to the brigand on the 17th proposing the exchange take place at a neutral village six hours, or eighteen miles from Tangier. Zellal, the chief of the tribe living in the area -- the Beni Msur -- was friendly to Raisuli, and his land would probably be acceptable as an exchange point. Raisuli agreed, but hopes for a quick settlement were dashed when Zellal, fearing repercussions, refused to have anything to do with the exchange.¹⁴

This new obstacle, imposed at such a promising time, infuriated Gummeré. He sharply told Torres that he and the American government "were very much dissatisfied with the manner of negotiations," and it was ridiculous that Morocco "had no authority over a petty chief." Gummeré informed

Torres he would be held responsible for every hour's delay. . Torres, although much bewildered by this turn of events, promised to send out a negotiator and attempt to persuade Zellal to change his mind.¹⁵

Meanwhile, the Battleship Squadron had left the Tagus on the 18th and steamed south for Gibraltar. Early next morning, a Sunday, the four battleships were sighted from the mainmast of the Prince of Wales as they sailed close by Tangier heading east towards the Straits. Barker took the opportunity as he passed to use his wireless to inform Chadwick on the Brooklyn and Jewell on the Olympia of his presence. Chadwick told Barker that Raisuli could be expected to release the captives in a few days; however, this was before Chadwick had heard of Zellal's refusal.¹⁶

On reaching Gibraltar Barker found the cruiser Cleveland from Jewell's squadron in the harbor coaling. After a series of salutes, official visits were exchanged, and stores which had been awaiting the arrival of the battleships were taken on board. On the evening of the 21st Barker and his captains dined with the Governor of Gibraltar, Field Marshal Sir George White, the hero of the seige of Ladysmith. Barker found most informed opinion on the Rock entertained grave fears for the captives, feeling that they would "not be released as soon as expected." Nevertheless, Barker decided that, unless orders to the contrary arrived, he would leave Gibraltar on the morning of Wednesday, June 22nd.¹⁷

No orders came from Washington. There were more than enough warships crowded into the small harbor of Tangier to deal with any possible emergency, and the battleships could return if needed. The Roosevelt administration had other uses for battleships at the eastern end of the Mediterranean.

The most critical point in the Perdicaris affair was reached on the 21st. Gummeré sent to Washington that afternoon his most gravely worded despatch. He was convinced, he stated, that Moroccan authorities were delaying the release of Perdicaris and Varley. Gummeré accused them of "double dealing and treachery," and felt the United States was being put in an undignified and humiliating position. If Zellal refused to let the exchange take place Gummeré said he wanted authority to present an ultimatum to the Moroccan government. Specifically he advised the landing of marines and the seizure of the Custom House. Gummeré ended his despatch by saying that Rear Admiral Chadwick agreed, and "cables to same effect."¹⁸

But Chadwick did not agree, and it was perhaps this lack of agreement which prevented Gummeré's threat from being carried out. On the morning of the 21st Commander Dorn on the Castine was notified by the watch that a signal from Chadwick had been received ordering him to immediately come aboard the Brooklyn. When he arrived Dorn found Chadwick and the other captains of the two squadrons gathered in the

wardroom. The Admiral then showed them the text of a telegram in cypher which he said he was going to send to Washington.¹⁹

The telegram, according to Dorn, informed the Roosevelt administration that Chadwick felt the "negotiations /were/ being thwarted by the authorities," and that he, Chadwick, considered "it advisable to seize the Custom House as /an/ indemnity for every day's delay in /the/ delivery of the captives." He then told Dorn that he was to command the battalion of bluejackets and marines which would land. A happy Dorn hurried ashore "to lay out the principal points to be seized," and soon established "a clear enough idea of the surroundings" in which he and his landing force would have to operate. To be chosen to lead this expedition was a feather in Dorn's cap, and if carried out successfully it would be a great advantage to his career.²⁰

When Dorn came back on board the Castine in the late afternoon he was surprised to receive a signal from the Brooklyn ordering his gunboat to Gibraltar the following day for stores. Early the next morning a confused and disappointed Dorn went over to see Chadwick. When asked about the drastic change in plans Chadwick told Dorn he "had not sent the /first/ despatch but another /one/, much milder" in its assessment of the situation. Chadwick said that after dismissing the meeting he had taken a short mid-afternoon nap, and on awakening decided to change his mind.²¹

Chadwick's decision was fortunate. It is quite probable that if he had sent the telegram to Washington immediately after speaking to Dorn he would have been locked into a course of action, and the seizure of the Custom House could have taken place on the 22nd -- the same day word came that Zellal had agreed to the use of his village as an exchange point. Chadwick had been given a great deal of leeway by Roosevelt and Hay, and his judgement was respected by both men. Gummeré, on the other hand, was an unknown quantity, and his recommendation to use force without being backed up by Chadwick simply did not carry enough weight. However, if Chadwick's first assessment had been sent it probably would have been accepted by the President, resulting in a landing at Tangier and opening up an entirely new situation.

Half a world away, at the very same hour that Chadwick told Dorn of his intention to seize the Custom House, the Republicans opened their Convention in Chicago. The nomination of Theodore Roosevelt by the party to be their standard bearer in the election of 1904 was a foregone conclusion. As the Republican faithful gathered in the windy city on the weekend of June 19th they came for a coronation, a coronation to the "undisputed inevitably" of Theodore Roosevelt.²²

Some in the party's leadership did not look kindly upon the President. He was his own man and, travelling in his own direction, so unlike the more amenable McKinley.

However, just four months prior to the Convention Mark Hanna, the "Kingmaker," had died, and this had left no one to rally around in opposition to Roosevelt. So the nomination was in the President's pocket, and he bestrode the Republican Party like a latter-day Gulliver. The Republican delegates were left, reported The Times (London), "idly watching the lake from piazzas, and wondering why they came to Chicago."²³

On Tuesday, June 21st, the Convention opened. The Chicago weather seemed only half-hearted in its approval of the affair, and there was a "suggestion of rain in the air and the sun had a struggle with clouds banked up over the lake." The site for the Convention was Chicago's Coliseum. From a distance it looked like a great medieval fortress somehow mysteriously transported to the middle of this raw and bustling American city. Stone towers and castellated walls decorated the outside while drawbridges led into its dim and humid interior.²⁴

Reporters found few of the customary hoard of vendors of badges and souvenirs who usually inundated the streets on such occasions. Those who had come were not doing well. "All the merchants are waiting for St. Louis (site of the Democratic Convention)," said one vendor, "we'll make up for it in St. Louis." For sellers of campaign buttons and other such paraphernalia two or three candidates for the nomination were needed in order to show a profit. One of the more popular souvenirs being sold on the streets was an inch square biography of the President titled The Candidate. As they

hawked the diminutive volume the vendors would call out:
"Smallest life of the greatest man. Put Roosevelt in your vest pocket."²⁵

Inside, the Coliseum was a great rectangular steel girdered hall capable of seating nine thousand people. A single gallery ran around the periphery of the hall, and hanging from it was a continuous strip of red, white and blue bunting, adorned at intervals with pictures of Roosevelt festooned with small American flags. From a temporary stand the First Regiment Band of Pullman, Illinois, crashed out patriotic marches. At one end of the hall was strung a large flag decorated with an American eagle and the Great Seal of the United States. Above it a placard proudly stated: "Under this banner both Harrison and McKinley were twice nominated." Near the roof a great black banner, inscribed in gold, read: "Home Market Club, Boston. American wages for American workmen. Protection for American Homes."²⁶

Political etiquette of the period called for the President to stay away from the Convention and be officially informed of his selection later. This did not much hamper Roosevelt, for in the basement of the Coliseum the chief of the White House telegraphic force had set up a direct wire to the President's Office Building in Washington. The President was ensconced in his apartment in the southeast corner of this structure, and could therefore "feel the pulse of the convention as it proceeds, in addition to learning of the more important transactions in committee rooms and

hotels as they are completed."²⁷

"Convention Dull And Delegates Wish To Go Home," read the front page headline in The Sun (New York) after the Convention's first day. There were great patches of empty seats said the Sun, and applause at the first mention of Roosevelt's name was formal and brief. The greatest cheer came when a large painting of Mark Hanna was unveiled. When the same was done for a smaller portrait of the President the reaction, declared The World (New York), fell flat.²⁸

The image being presented over the telegraph must have been an appalling one for Roosevelt. Although the nomination was assured, the election was not, and it was obvious that something had to be done to put a bit of life into the delegates and gear them up for the coming campaign. The arrival of Gummeré's alarming despatch gave Roosevelt his opportunity.

The next day of the Convention, the 22nd, featured two of the Republican Party's biggest stalwarts. First came a fighting speech by "Uncle Joe" Cannon, Speaker of the House and the Convention Chairman. After some intervening political addresses Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts approached the speaker's lecturn. "Tall and slender, dressed all in black," and looking like the statesman and scholar he was, Lodge began reading the Republican platform "sprinkled with words that had the broad 'A's' and twang of Yankee land." One of the planks in the platform was a vigorous call for the protection of American citizens in foreign lands, and it

brought a loud cheer from the hall.²⁹ A perfect background for what was to follow.

When Lodge finished he moved that the platform be adopted. Cannon put the question to the delegates, "and after a rousing vote in the affirmative, declared the report unanimously adopted." It was now three in the afternoon and the proceedings were just about to be adjourned for the day when Cannon moved to the lecturn and began reading aloud from a copy of a telegram Hay had just sent to Gummeré. This government, said Cannon as he finished reading it, wants "Perdicaris alive, or Raisuli dead."³⁰

The announcement was greeted with wild cries and cheering, the delegates rising to their feet, clapping and stamping with loud abandon. This act of Cannon's closed the Convention's second day, and the delegates surged out into Chicago's streets in a fighting mood. All that evening the delegates talked about the telegram. The platform and the speakers of the day had been forgotten, and only the President and Hay stood at the center of attention.³¹

"It was good, hot stuff, and echoed my sentiments," said Congressman John W. Dwight of New York. "The people want an administration that will stand by its citizens, even if it takes a fleet to do it." Senator Depew called the message magnificent, and Representative Sereno E. Payne, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, felt that there was "no use fooling around with those people any longer."³²

One delegate, W. A. Elstun of Moline, Kansas, when approached by a reporter and asked if he liked the telegram replied: "Bet your bottom dollar I like it. Roosevelt is behind that cable message to that fine old body-snatcher Raisuli. Out in Kansas we believe in keeping the peace but in fighting against wrong." A member of the national committee later commented that the Convention would go down in history as the "catch him dead or catch him alive convention."³³

Reaction in the nation's press was predictably split along party lines, for the telegram was quickly recognized as primarily a domestic political ploy. The Daily True American (Trenton) called the message boastful, and "evidently coined to fit a party gathering." It felt that the State Department "should have been above playing to the galleries in a partisan convention." The World (New York) humorously headlined the story: "Convention Yells At Cry For BL-O-O-D!" It factiously pictured the delegates screaming "Fee, Fi, Fo, Fum, give me the blood of a Mussulman." The World also composed its own series of telegrams from famous figures in a parody of Hay's message. One went to the Mayor of Indianapolis from Hay and read: "Produce the miscreant who stole Senator Beveridge's railroad passes. Use an axe on him. Put the mutilated remains in a cask and let me have them."³⁴

The Springfield Republican saw the telegram as more a political expedient than a valid diplomatic initiative.

It reminded the newspaper of the fiery queen in Alice in Wonderland. "'Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead' -- doesn't it thrill you? Mr. Perdicaris might not approve of such sentiments regarding his charming host and friend, but then, Mr. Perdicaris doesn't understand the exigencies of our politics."³⁵

Historians have tended to emphasize the telegram as a strictly domestic political move with little or no relation to events in Tangier. Luella Hall, for example, goes so far as to write that Perdicaris and Varley had already been released before the despatch reached Tangier. In the part of the telegram not read to the Convention, Hay ordered Gummere not to "arrange for the landing of marines or seizing the Custom House" without specific instructions from the State Department. This has often been cited as a proof of the telegram's lack of serious intent. Also, Hay's slightly superior entry in his diary saying how curious was the way "a concise impropriety hits the public," has added to the opera bouffe aura surrounding the incident.³⁶

Yet, if the despatch was an obvious domestic political response, it also had a very serious side. Roosevelt and Hay were unaware that the most recent roadblock to the release had been overcome -- word only reached Washington on the evening of the 22nd, four hours after the telegram had been read in Chicago.³⁷ In addition Perdicaris and Varley were not freed until the 24th, and until the exchange was completed no one in Washington or Tangier knew if Raisuli

would go through with it. The brigand had increased his demands in the past and could easily do so again. The still serious nature of the situation in Morocco can be understood when one remembers that Hay's famous message could have been even more momentous. Except for Chadwick's afternoon nap, the 22nd might have seen American bluejackets swarming over Tangier, negotiations probably ended, and an even more riotous response at the Convention.

On the same day as Hay's telegram to Gummeré, Zellal told Torres' negotiator that he would allow his village to be used for the exchange, but only on receipt of a written promise by Torres that no harm would come to him or his people. This promise was duly forwarded, and a courier sent to Raisuli telling him to start out for Zellal's village early next morning. Gummeré felt prospects for the captive's release rather more promising now than a few days ago, but he still was not completely confident -- everything depended upon the whim of Raisuli.³⁸

The younger Wazan brother, Muley Ahmed, took the ransom money out from Tangier in the early morning hours of the 23rd, and headed for Zellal's village. With him went the forty-two Moorish prisoners who were to be freed to Raisuli, as well as some forty armed mounted guards. The courier to Raisuli had for some unknown reason been delayed on the road and did not deliver the letter setting up the exchange until late on the 23rd. Because of this Raisuli and

his captives did not start out until the morning of Friday, the 24th. This was just as well for the younger Wazan's party also encountered problems in getting to the village.³⁹

It was still dark on Friday morning when Raisuli left Terdants and headed down the mountains with his prisoners. Perdicaris was understandably elated that his six weeks of detention was coming to an end. The sun rose as they left the village and the recollection of that last sunrise at Terdants remained etched in Ion's memory. He would later remember the white swirling mist which remained around the base of the mountains, while the "peaks and turrets were now flecked with crimson or lilac, now shaded with purple, by some passing cloud." On his left rode Muley Ali in a spotless white silk bournous, and on his right Raisuli riding a grey charger. The brigand was in an expansive mood at his success and engaged Perdicaris in long rambling conversations. At one point when complimenting Ion on his horsemanship he told him that if the Sultan "indulged in fewer European fads, and had a little more grip, and would use the spur more freely, he would have a better seat in the saddle."⁴⁰

As the sun continued to rise Perdicaris could see both the Mediterranean and Atlantic, as well as the Spanish mainland. Once Raisuli pointed to a white fleck on the African coast and said it was Tangier. At noon they found themselves at Zellal's village, a "semi-fortified place, hanging on to the steep hillside," half castle, half village.

Raisuli sent out scouts to make sure that the government had not laid an ambush for him. Entering the village they found it empty of government representatives, for Muley Ahmed, held back by his prisoners, had not yet arrived. They were quite weak because of their long imprisonment and, as they had to walk, unable to keep up the pace.⁴¹

Soon, however, Muley Ahmed's party arrived and the prisoners and ransom were exchanged. Raisuli was given \$20,000 in Spanish silver dollars and \$50,000 in certified checks drawn on the Comtoir d'Escompte, the French bank in Tangier. Perdicaris assured Raisuli the checks were valid and the brigand accepted Ion's word. Fortunately Raisuli made no mention of the great power guarantees. When Ion took leave of Raisuli the bandit told him that he had now come to look upon him as a friend, and promised that if ever Perdicaris ran into trouble his men would hasten to his relief.⁴²

Ion made the trip to Tangier in a litter that had been especially provided for him, but as he came near the town he mounted a horse and rode to his home. It was early Saturday morning, just past midnight, when he reached El Minzah. Chadwick and Gummere were there to meet him, as well as his wife and family. The armed escort rode into the courtyard first and raggedly presented arms as Perdicaris and Varley entered through the gateway. As soon as the men dismounted both were surrounded by their friends, "shaking hands and talking with them." Afterwards, in his house, Ion talked for a while recounting his adventures; and then, as

Chadwick wrote to Hay, "Perdicaris was sent to bed, the rest took a little supper, and the incident closed."⁴³

Reaction in the United States to the release of the captives generally gave full praise to Roosevelt's and Hay's diplomacy. The Sun (New York) headed its editorial on the release, "Flag Follows The Citizen." To The Sun the large naval demonstration was the key to the release. Although its size was criticized in some quarters as inordinate, the newspaper felt that this "is what ships are for." The President's action was a practical success, and an "impressive illustration of a fixed national purpose with regard to all who have the right to claim the protection of the American flag." The New York Tribune said of the release that long ago America's rule with respect to the Barbary pirates had been, "millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute." It was a good rule, and "the sending of warships to Tangier and the demand for 'Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead' were simply a worthy twentieth century revival, or, rather maintenance, of the same spirit." The London correspondent of the Tribune reported great relief in official circles in Great Britain over the settlement of the affair, and Roosevelt was receiving "full credit for his resolute and determined action."⁴⁴

Looking over his shoulder as his battleships steamed into the Mediterranean, Rear Admiral Barker was even more appreciative of the settlement. "It was fortunate for all of us," he said, "including the Government and people of the

United States" that Raisuli gave Perdicaris up. If the brigand had kept him a prisoner, "it would have cost a pretty penny to reach him with a force of sailors and marines."⁴⁵

Curiously, the telegram had nothing to do with the exchange. The brigand would certainly not have been aware of its existence until long after the release had taken place. He had already decided to exchange the captives some days before; however, in all fairness, no one outside of Terdants knew this for sure. Roosevelt's telegram was, although outwardly directed at Raisuli, really meant for the Moroccan government. At this stage the only action the United States could take, or would want to take, was a seizure of Tangier. The port could then be used as a pawn to put pressure on Morocco to deal with Raisuli. It would indeed "have cost a pretty penny" to track the brigand down, and with the recent experience of the Philippine insurrection in mind, Roosevelt would have had little desire to engage American power in an expedition to the Atlas Mountains.

There was one small dark cloud on the horizon for Roosevelt in the midst of his small coup, and it had to do with Perdicaris' citizenship -- or, to be more precise, the lack of it. It had been made frighteningly clear to the President and Hay during the affair that Perdicaris just might not be an American citizen. If this information was to prove correct and become public, the resulting laughter could put a large dent in any election victory Roosevelt

hoped for in November.

The first intimation that something was amiss came at the beginning of June when Hay received a letter from a Mr. A. H. Slocomb of Fayetteville, North Carolina. Mr. Slocomb raised certain questions concerning the citizenship of Perdicaris, and on June 5th the State Department asked the United States Minister in Athens, John B. Jackson, to investigate Slocomb's allegations. Jackson in a confidential despatch on the 7th informed Hay that an Ionnas Perdicaris had been naturalized a Greek citizen on March 19, 1862. This individual, wrote Jackson, was described in the records as "an artist, unmarried, aged 20." The Minister was "unable to ascertain anything in regard to his other antecedents."⁴⁶

On the 10th Jackson cabled Hay that although he could not find any positive proof that both men were the same person, he felt it highly probable that they were. Jackson said that while he was in the navy a warship he was aboard had pulled into Tangier in 1883, and he remembered that Perdicaris "was frequently spoken of in a contemptuous sic manner as a 'Greek who had run away from New Jersey with another man's wife.'" At the time Jackson had not thought of Perdicaris as an American citizen.⁴⁷

By now Roosevelt and Hay had no choice but to continue playing out the game, having already made the commitment to intervention, and having no real proof that both Perdicaris' were the same individual. They kept their counsel until after the release. On June 28th Hay cabled

Gummeré ordering him to sound out Perdicaris about the validity of the allegations. Gummeré quickly contacted Ion, then in Paris, and was informed by him on July 18th that the charges were true. On July 24th Gummeré forwarded this embarrassing confession to Washington.⁴⁸

The Roosevelt administration's reaction was to bury the problem. Hay called it a bad business. He felt that we "must keep it assiduously confidential for the present." So successfully was the damning information hidden, including, as Hay wrote, "Paregoric ['s]" confession, that it did not surface until twenty-nine years later. In 1905 the administration introduced a bill, probably inspired by the Perdicaris problem, which when passed in 1907 covered the questions raised by Ion's ambiguous citizenship. He was issued a passport as an American citizen and was recognized and registered abroad as such.⁴⁹

The players in the drama soon went their separate ways. Perdicaris, old now, and most of his desire to remain living in Morocco gone, settled in Chiselhurst, England. He died there some twenty years later at the age of eighty-five. Gummeré later served as the second-ranking member of the American delegation at the Algeciras Conference, and was made the first United States Minister to Morocco when the government raised the status of American representation to the Sultanate. He retired in 1909 to the life of a country gentleman in Wimbledon, England, and died in 1920. Sir

Arthur Nicolson went on to greater service in the Foreign Office, eventually becoming Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and Lord Grey's right hand man in the early days of World War I. For their services the two Wazan brothers each received an appropriate gift from Roosevelt -- Winchester lever-action repeating rifles with a suitable engraved inscription.⁵⁰

Raisuli's later career was even more adventurous. He became the most important power in the Tangier area as a result of the kidnapping, acquiring such prestigious titles as, "The Sultan of the Mountains," and "The Eagle of Zinat." His reputation became legendary among Moroccans and many natives firmly believed that only a gold pistol ball cast in the holy city of Mecca could kill him. He even acquired a fleet of small ships to prey on coastal traffic.⁵¹

In 1906 Abd el Aziz tried to depose Raisuli from his position, but the wiley brigand pulled an old trick from his pocket and kidnapped the Sultan's chief general, Kaid Maclean, and quickly checkmated the attempt. In the years that followed Raisuli sometimes fought the Spanish, sometimes took their subsidies, but always maintained his independence. Strangely this independence was ended not by foreigners, but by a fellow Moor. Abd el Krim's native rebellion achieved a great deal of success against both the Spanish and the French in the early 1920's, but a jealous Raisuli refused to recognize him as the one leader of the Riffian state and Krim was forced to march against him.⁵²

Raisuli made a last stand in his fortress palace at Tazrat in January, 1925. Captured after a fierce battle, the old brigand, "/s/wollen with dropsy and constantly in pain," was carried away to confinement in a litter. When the American correspondent Vincent Sheean talked to him, Raisuli said he wanted to die. "I have asked to die. I do not want," he said, "to be the prisoner of dogs and sons of dogs." He declared that he would never "be a prisoner and a slave to dogs in a place where Raisuli reigned as a lord. They have taken my horse and saddle. Let them take the rest. The Prophet will receive me in Heaven." By April he was dead, within a few months of his old captive Perdicaris.⁵³

But what of the long range diplomatic impact of the Perdicaris affair? The incident gave France the chance to introduce the armed force which was the necessary first step in the eventual French control of the Sultanate. The excuse would have undoubtedly been found even if the kidnapping had never taken place -- the Perdicaris incident simply made it convenient. On June 28th the Foreign Office was informed by the British Legation Secretary in Tangier that Tailandier had confidentially informed him that France had reached agreement with Morocco on "a police force for Tangier with French and Algerian advisors." By the end of July a French naval force arrived composed of the armored cruiser Kleber, and the smaller cruiser Galilee. They were, Gummeré told the State Department, to remain at Tangier for some time.⁵⁴

The significance of the affair for the United States lay not in its relationship vis-à-vis Morocco, but in what it showed about the potentialities of Roosevelt's naval diplomacy. It was the naval power which the President had concentrated in Moroccan waters which was important. In itself the kidnapping of an American would not have caused the reaction it did in the United States, and especially in Europe, if the fleet had not been involved. Americans living and travelling abroad, including a number of missionaries, had been kidnapped or killed before with much less fuss. But in 1904 the coincidence of an aggressive President and a new naval policy had combined to give the Perdicaris affair a meaning far beyond the rescue of a lone citizen with a quaint name, and of dubious national heritage.

American involvement might have gone much further, but Chadwick's last minute decision not to land troops prevented this. If they had landed it is probable that they would have been there a long time. Chadwick could hardly have gotten away with simply seizing the Custom House, and the taking of the entire port would have in all probability followed -- plans for such a contingency were already in the works.⁵⁵

The central government in Fez, its authority already weakened by rebellion and anarchy, could not have given any more to Raisuli without jeopardizing its own existence. Morocco would also have found it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to use force. The brigand was well

protected in his mountain eyrie, and in addition held Perdicaris and Varley as valuable trumps. Landing American marines and bluejackets in Tangier to put further pressure on the Sultan would have had little effect on the situation as the Moroccan government did not control events -- Raisuli did; and if he had decided to bide his time all the blustering by the United States and all the promises from Fez would have meant little. The best that could be hoped for would have been a stalemate, with the negotiations suspended for the time being and Perdicaris and Varley still held captive.

Once in, could the United States have gotten out, or, would Roosevelt have wanted to? The British would have certainly landed forces to protect their special interests in the port, and Spanish and French naval units most assuredly would have been sent. In one way the British might have been perfectly happy to have the Americans in Tangier. This was the period of the Anglo-American rapprochement, and having the United States there, even permanently, would have been much more acceptable than France or Spain controlling this key port.

But these are only speculations. What was established by the Perdicaris affair was the introduction of American sea power to Europe; not just as touring naval units, but as a force which had been used in a vigorous and practical way, and which would be used again. At the other end of the Mediterranean lay another Sultanate, with more

American interests and citizens to be protected, and four of Roosevelt's battleships were steaming toward it.

CHAPTER VII

"A BATTLESHIP TO PLAY WITH"

The length of the *Perdicaris* affair seriously disrupted the planned itinerary of the three squadrons, but none more so than Chadwick's. The Navy Department and he decided that because of the time lost the South Atlantic Squadron should not proceed into the Mediterranean, but immediately head south along the African coast. Chadwick requested that the Brooklyn be allowed to go to Genoa, Italy, for a brief visit, and join the rest of the squadron later. This permission was granted and the Brooklyn left Gibraltar on June 29th, while the other warships left for the Canary Islands on the 30th. It was here that Chadwick rejoined them, and on July 16th the reconstituted squadron steamed south for Sierra Leone.¹

Meanwhile, Jewell's European Squadron left Tangier on the 29th for Gibraltar and remained there until July 5th. Jewell had intended to follow Barker's squadron to Greece, but the Navy Department ordered him to take on stores in Gibraltar and await the arrival of the battleship Illinois and the auxiliary cruiser Mayflower. Roosevelt's desire "that the fleet be made as imposing as possible," as well as the *Perdicaris* incident had combined to hurry repairs on the two battleships, Missouri and Illinois, which Barker had

lost earlier. Both had left the United States in mid-June. The Missouri crossed the Atlantic at an average speed of almost fourteen knots -- an amazing performance for a battleship in this period -- and arrived at Gibraltar on June 23rd. Here Captain Cowles found that the Battleship Squadron had already left for Greece and that events in Morocco were rapidly drawing to a satisfactory conclusion, so after taking on coal and stores he quickly hurried after Barker. The Illinois was late in arriving at Gibraltar, and because of this Jewell decided it would not be feasible for him to take his ships to Greece; accordingly he cabled the Navy Department and Barker that he would join with the Battleship Squadron at its next port of call, Trieste.²

It took Barker seven days to steam through the Mediterranean to Greece, and on the morning of June 30th his four battleships and the collier Abarenda sailed into Phaleron Bay at Piraeus. This visit to Greece had not been a part of the original plan for the Mediterranean cruise. When Moody wrote Hay on February 20th, asking that the State Department prepare the way for the fleet, no mention was made of a stop at Athens. The farthest east the fleet was to go was Trieste in the Adriatic. At the time Hay made no effort to add Greece to the itinerary, and indeed he went so far as to warn United States legations in Europe that requests for the fleet to visit would be inconvenient and embarrassing.³

Sometime between the end of February and the beginning of May a decision was made in Washington to add Athens to the cruise. Unlike the visits to the other ports there exists no record of diplomatic preparations for the Greek sojourn. The arrangements were in all probability discussed and decided upon during the month of April when the American Minister to Greece, John B. Jackson, returned from Athens and held conversations with Hay in Washington.⁴

Why this need for a visit to Greece, and why the apparent necessity for secret consultations in laying the groundwork for the visit? The reason was to be found in Turkey. In order to settle outstanding problems with the Ottoman Empire the Roosevelt administration had elected to use the fleet in order to put diplomatic pressure on the Sultan. Chief among these problems was the ambiguous status of American-run missionary schools and institutions in the Empire. The administration was under increasing pressure from missionary societies to settle this question, and the failure of a naval demonstration to obtain results in 1903 only made Roosevelt's resolve to gain a satisfactory settlement stronger. A confidential letter from Hay to the United States Minister in Constantinople, John G. A. Leishman, on May 24th made crystal clear the primary reason behind the Greek stopover. Hay bluntly informed Leishman that a large fleet would be cruising near Turkey in about a month, and that Leishman "ought to be able to make some judicious use" of this concentration of warships in his negotiations with

the Turkish government.⁵

The Roosevelt administration was being very careful in its use of battleship diplomacy. Leishman was ordered by Hay not to commit the fleet to any direct action. The appearance of the warships off the Turkish coast was to take the form of an implied threat. The Straits lay only twenty-four hours away from Piraeus -- as did the great port of Smyrna -- and Turkish authorities could hardly fail to draw the obvious conclusion.⁶

Reports of a coming clash with Turkey began to appear with increasing regularity in the nation's press during the month of June. The New York Times openly speculated that after the Perdicaris affair had been satisfactorily settled the fleet would sail on to Turkey. The Public Ledger of Philadelphia in an editorial on June 22nd wrote that America's relationship with the Turkish Sultan "at times grows unbearable." It called for the fleet to be used against Abdul Hamid, saying its appearance in Turkish waters would show the displeasure and dissatisfaction of the American government, and "might be fruitful of good results."⁷

As early as June 3rd the New York World reported that the "strenuous Roosevelt hand will fall next upon Turkey," with the likely bombardment of Smyrna or Beirut if the Sultan did not come to terms. By the 26th the World was headlining: "Turkish Sultan's Turn Comes Next." With the conclusion of our problems with the Sultan of Morocco, it warned, our warships will go east. "Abdul Hamid owes us a

big bill long overdue," and "Yankee guns are expected to inspire the Turk with a desire to settle."⁸

Just as the appearance of American warships in Morocco caused a vigorous response from Spain and France, the two powers with the greatest interest in the area, so the possibility that these same warships would soon be heading for Turkey occasioned a similar reaction from another European power.

Russia was engaged in a life and death struggle in the Far East, but the imminent movement of a large American fleet toward Turkey and the vitally strategic Straits area brought forth a warning from the Czar's government. The approach was an unofficial one. Count Cassini, the Russian Ambassador to the United States, met with Hay on June 11th and attempted to sound him out on reports that the Roosevelt administration was about to send warships into Turkish waters. Hay admitted the reports were true, and Cassini then unofficially informed him that this act would be offensive to Russia and if carried out would undoubtedly bring a formal and vigorous protest. It was reported that Cassini also told Hay that while Russia would not object to one or two warships, the Czar's government would certainly challenge the arrival of a fleet of battleships.⁹

The battleships were sent and Russia, beset by war, could do nothing except grumble. For Abdul Hamid the presence of a fleet in Phaleron Bay was a display of naval power which he and his government could not afford to ignore. How

long did they intend to stay? Where would they go next? And how far was Roosevelt prepared to go in using them? All were unanswered questions which hung over the Topkapi Palace, where the Sultan and his ministers pondered on how they would deal with these barbarians from the Yenghi Dunia (New World).

It was just a little over one hundred years before that the first official contact between the Ottoman Empire and America had occurred and it too had involved the navy. Before the United States went to war with the Barbary powers it, like many of the nations of Europe, had paid tribute for a number of years to these pirate states. In 1801 the corvette George Washington under the command of Captain William Bainbridge sailed into the harbor of Algiers with that year's tribute installment. After the money had been turned over the Dey of Algiers informed Bainbridge that he was to take his special ambassador to Constantinople under the flag of Algiers. Bainbridge at first refused, but as his warship lay helpless under the guns of the Dey's harbor forts he was finally obliged to give in.¹⁰

Soon the George Washington was playing host to the ambassador and his wife. Also crowded on board the small corvette was the rest of the ambassador's suite, consisting of one hundred men, one hundred Negro female slaves, four horses, twenty-five cattle, four lions, four tigers, four antelopes, and four parrots. The voyage was an unpleasant one, and the frustrated Bainbridge took particular delight in tacking his corvette wildly as soon as the Moslems began

their prayers, forcing them "to swing round like pinwheels" as they tried to continue facing Mecca.¹¹

When the George Washington arrived at Constantinople Bainbridge was told he was lying when he informed Turkish officials which nation he came from. They knew of no such country. It was only when Bainbridge explained that he came from "a new world discovered by the Italians and belonging to the English" that he was believed.¹² In 1904 things were quite different. The Turk now knew full well where and what America was, and the humiliating circumstances of that first meeting promised not to be repeated under President Theodore Roosevelt.

If an observer had looked out over the European continent on New Year's day of the year 1500, his attention would certainly have been drawn to what was happening in the Balkans. Up this mountainous land mass in the last half century had poured a new and dynamic threat to Europe. In the eighth century the Franks had beaten back an earlier Moslem tide, but this new invasion promised to be even more formidable. The expansion of Turkish power received a tremendous strategic and psychological victory when the armies of Muhammed II took Constantinople in 1453, and in the years that followed they marched steadily up the Balkans menacing the very heartland of Europe.

Yet within a century this power was in decline and by the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire was steadily

contracting under continuous European pressure. Only jealousy between the great powers over control of the Straits and a vague protection offered by Great Britain allowed this "sick man of Europe" to survive. Like its sister Sultanate at the other end of the Mediterranean, Turkey in 1904 was a colonial pie waiting to be divided.

Nothing could typify the chaotic condition of this formally great state better than its current ruler and the sad plight of its once proud navy. Abdul Hamid II was an absolute despot in the fullest sense of the word. His empire still stretched from the Adriatic to the Indian Ocean, but it was fatally riven by exploding internal nationalisms. He had come to the throne in 1876 and soon proved himself to be the most reactionary of rulers. There had been a number of attempts to rejuvenate the Empire in the nineteenth century, but with the accession of Abdul Hamid these efforts largely petered out, and Turkey slumped back into a state of lethargy and decay.¹³

The Sultan was a living proof of Lord Acton's dictum on the corrupting influence of absolute power. Like Sultan Abd el Aziz of Morocco, Abdul Hamid had his little ways. His physical appearance suggested a calculating and sensual character. A great hooked nose dominated a face made more striking by heavy lidded eyes, a dyed beard, and brightly rouged cheeks. He personally ran the foreign affairs of his nation through the Sublime Porte (named for the gate of the Sultan's Palace where justice was administered).

In this absolute monarchy it was his decision which counted -- often to the despair of the more moderate and forward-looking officials of the Porte.¹⁴

He suffered from insomnia, constantly smoked pungent cigarettes and drank endless small cups of sweet Turkish coffee. Great rages alternated by severe fits of melancholia dominated his waking hours. Living under the constant threat of being overthrown or assassinated he had developed into a deeply fearful and suspicious monarch, and was quick to see menace where there was none. He always carried a pistol with him and once killed a young slave girl when he caught her playing with another pistol which he had left on a table. Visitors were often warned before an audience with Abdul Hamid not to suddenly strike a match in his presence as he had a tendency to confuse the sound made with that of a pistol. The consequences were left to the visitor's imagination.¹⁵

Yet he could be charming on occasion. He loved collecting birds, and was often to be found puttering around a carpentry shop which he had installed in the Palace. One of his favorite occupations was having Sherlock Holmes stories read to him. Lounging in his well-stocked harem, playing with his angora cats, and idly talking with his favorite wife, a fairhaired little Belgian, Abdul Hamid had whiled away almost thirty years of rule watching his shrinking empire slide toward its inevitable destruction.¹⁶

Between the 1840's and the 1870's the growth of Ottoman sea power had been one of the more concrete expressions of Turkey's attempt to modernize her institutions in the face of a resurgent Europe. Under the reign of Abdul Hamid the navy, which at one time was the third strongest in the world -- after Great Britain and France -- was allowed to fall into decay and disrepair. The British engineers and advisors who had formed the backbone of the navy were sent home, and by the end of the century this rusting fleet of ironclads had settled into the mud of the Golden Horn. Caretakers grew flowers on the decks and raised families and goats in the ship's interiors.¹⁷

Only once did Abdul Hamid's warships (those still afloat) dare emerge from the Straits. During a war with Greece in 1897 some of the best were sent to the mouth of the Dardanelles but not allowed to go further. Even if the Sultan had wanted them to steam into the Bahri Safid (Aegean) they probably would not have been able to get back -- in their decrepit state the greatest enemy was the sea itself.¹⁸

In demonstrating American naval power against Turkey Theodore Roosevelt had little to fear. Turkey, with her rusting, immobilized ironclads, could be counted upon not to interfere with the exercise of Rooseveltian naval diplomacy.

Relations between the United States and Turkey in the nineteenth century primarily revolved around that formidable figure of Western civilization, the Christian missionary.

Indeed, according to the American diplomat Lloyd G. Griscom, the words American and missionary in Turkey were practically synonymous with each other.¹⁹ These mainly Protestant missionaries were looked upon with deep suspicion, and in recent years a long and bloody series of revolts by some of the Empire's numerous Christian minorities had made the figure of the missionary even more suspect in Turkish eyes.

The first important outrage against American missionaries occurred in 1862 when two of them were murdered by bandits. The speed with which the authorities tracked down the killers won for the Grand Vizier of the day a gift of two solid silver pistols from President Lincoln as a token of American appreciation. In 1879, when the next American missionary was murdered, the Turkish government seemed less eager to bring the culprits to justice. An attack on some missionaries in 1883 led to the first United States demand for an indemnity. This demand was haughtily dismissed by the Porte because "the laws of the Empire in no case permit it."²⁰

A number of other attacks against American citizens and their property occurred in the early 1890's. In April, 1895, the American cruisers San Francisco and Marblehead called at Turkish ports, including Beirut and Smyrna, in a thinly veiled warning to the Sultan and the Porte that the United States was able and willing to protect its interests in the Empire.²¹

Another serious occurrence took place in November, 1895, during the great Armenian revolt. At Harput and Maras there was extensive damage to missionary property, prompting the United States to demand an indemnity of \$84,519. The Porte denied any responsibility for the destruction and categorically refused to pay the indemnity. The attacks caused a tremendous stir in the United States, and Congress reacted by passing the Cullom Resolution. This invited President Cleveland to ask the great powers to "stay the hand of the fanaticism and lawless violence" of the Turk, and it pledged congressional support for the President "in the most vigorous action he may take for the protection and security of American citizens in Turkey, and to obtain redress for injuries committed upon the persons or property of such citizens."²²

Abdul Hamid was now sure that the Armenian rebellion was a plot by Christian missionaries, and he reacted by trying to end their influence. In America missionary pressure on the State Department to intervene was intense. Lloyd C. Griscom, serving in Constantinople as United States chargé d' affaires at this time, later wrote that almost every instruction to the American Minister from State included an exhortation to "get that Armenian indemnity." The Secretary of State, said Griscom, "used to quake when the head of a Bible Society walked in."²³

The American Minister in Constantinople in late 1897, James B. Angell (former president of the University of

Michigan), asked for some warships "to rattle the Sultan's windows." Any temptation for President McKinley to agree to this course of action was sidetracked by the Spanish American war and the need for United States warships in the Caribbean. Even the firing on the gunboat Bancroft by Turkish shore batteries as she entered Smyrna in December, 1897, did not produce a strong American response. However, the victorious conclusion of the war and the appointment of John Hay as Secretary of State promised the missionaries a more sympathetic hearing in Washington -- Hay was a cousin of George Washburn, the president of Robert College in Constantinople and the most powerful missionary presence in Turkey.²⁴

In December, 1898, a new United States Minister managed to secure from the Sultan an admission of Turkish responsibility on the claims, and was led to believe that the indemnity would be paid. But Turkish procrastination continued and it soon became evident that the Sultan did not wish to pay the claim outright, but to do so "behind a screen." Other powers had similar claims against Turkey and if the government publicly gave in to the Americans it would have to submit to the rest. The screen was to be provided by the purchase of a protected cruiser from a private ship-building company, Cramp of Philadelphia. The indemnity would be secretly added to the final bill for the warship.²⁵

Even this face-saving device was now subjected to the inevitable Turkish delaying tactics. In September, 1899, the American Minister was informed during the course of an

audience with the Sultan that the purchase was still being studied by the Minister of Marine, but he was assured that it would be favorably passed on. In January, 1900, the Sultan again promised that the contract would be signed within a few months.²⁶

The settlement of the indemnity and the purchase of the cruiser was finally brought about through the efforts of a twenty-eight year old American diplomat, Lloyd G. Griscom. As the American legation in Constantinople was between ministers for the better part of 1900 Griscom found himself the senior United States representative, and he used his position as only a younger man with a name to make in the diplomatic service might be tempted to do. In April Hay had sent a handwritten note to the legation which, among other things, told Griscom that he might "make as unprincipled a settlement as you please." For the brash young diplomat nothing more was needed. He imposed upon a young friend of his who was temporarily in charge of the Reuter's Telegraph Agency in Constantinople to send out to the world a series of inflammatory reports, written by Griscom, about the growing troubles between the United States and Turkey. These reports achieved their purpose and caused a great deal of newspaper comment in America and Europe. Rumors swept Constantinople that a force of three American battleships was steaming for Turkey.²⁷

Griscom's target was the Sultan who he knew was an avid reader of foreign newspapers and periodicals. In the United States Hay refused to deny the rumors of a fleet

movement, and, according to Griscom, "subtly encouraged them." However the Sultan still refused to commit himself on the cruiser or the indemnity. On May 23, 1900, Griscom submitted a formal demand and hinted at an ultimatum if the answer was not satisfactory. Again he was put off, this time with the excuse that a Turkish admiral was in the United States inspecting cruisers and that the Porte would have to wait for his report.²⁸

Griscom still did not give up. In October, 1900, he wrote Hay and asked him if he could persuade the Navy Department to send a cruiser to Turkey. He assured Hay that "nothing unpleasant would happen." Writing some years later Griscom was still amazed at his cheek in taking this action. "Had I been older," he wrote, "I would never have taken such a risk."²⁹

Again Griscom caused inflammatory reports to be leaked to the world's press through Reuters. This time he got an immediate response in the form of a Palace courier with a message from Abdul Hamid asking him to have the American press stop printing these stories. Griscom refused, saying that it was not within his power to do this. Within a few days he had more good news for Hay cabled that the battleship Kentucky, on her way to the Philippines by way of the Mediterranean, would make an unscheduled four day layover at Smyrna.³⁰

The main problem now for Griscom was "to frighten the Turks enough to make them sign the cruiser contract",

yet not stir them up so that they really would defy us." Cleverly using the battleship as a powerful pawn Griscom began to put increasing pressure on the Turkish government. One of Griscom's friends wrote him during the crisis that "/f/ew boys of twenty-eight are given a battleship to play with. Be very careful it doesn't go off." On December 2nd the Kentucky steamed into the harbor at Smyrna cleared for action, with her guns run out. The Governor of Smyrna telegraphed the authorities in Constantinople that he feared the port was in immediate danger of being bombarded. The roads leading out of Smyrna were clogged with panicked refugees fleeing the city with their belongings.³¹

After a few day's delay the Sultan gave in, but asked that the Kentucky come to Constantinople. This was a way for Abdul Hamid to save face, as it would publicly show the visit of the battleship to be a friendly one. Griscom received approval from Hay and the Navy Department to extend the stay of the Kentucky, and the battleship proceeded to Constantinople. Captain Chester and Griscom were royally entertained by the Sultan at a state dinner in the Palace on December 10th, and the Kentucky then continued on her voyage to the Orient.³²

As days passed without any new word on the contract Griscom's initial satisfaction turned to gloom. He met with Tewfik Pasha, the Turkish Foreign Minister, on the evening of December 24th and demanded that the contract be signed. If not, he said, he would feel his utility in Turkey to be at an

end and would ask his government to withdraw him. He demanded an answer by midnight. This last ditch threat worked and one hour before Griscom's deadline word came from the Palace that the signing of the contract would take place at ten the next morning.³³ It was a welcome Christmas gift.

Griscom had proved himself a master of bluff, willing to take the desperate chance in order to gain success. Some months later in Washington, where he had gone for re-assignment, he met with Hay. "As head of our foreign service, Lloyd, I suppose I ought to reprimand you for some of those chances you took," said Hay, smiling quizzically. "You know we might have landed in a lot of trouble."³⁴

Hay was undoubtedly pleased with the work of his young diplomat and his willingness to take a calculated risk -- it was a quality he was to bemoan as missing in the new American Minister to Turkey.³⁵ For as one problem with the Empire had been solved another one had taken its place; this would lead to more naval diplomacy by the United States and on a much larger scale. What had been successful once could very well be successful again.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SCHOOL QUESTION

John G. A. Leishman's appointment as Minister to the Ottoman Empire in early 1901 initiated a new phase in American relations with Turkey. The great problem which Leishman had to confront revolved around the rights and protection of American schools and property in the Sultanate, and most of his efforts in the next few years were to be directed toward this issue. Leishman was a former steel baron turned diplomat. He had been born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 1857 and raised in an orphan asylum. Apprenticed as an office boy in an iron and steel works at the age of twelve the young Leishman rose to a clerkship, saved his money, and entered the steel business on his own. Soon he came to the notice of Andrew Carnegie, joined the Carnegie Steel Company, and later became its president. Like Carnegie he was a physically small man, and like him completely self-made. In 1897 the wealthy Leishman left the steel business and entered the diplomatic service. Prior to coming to Constantinople he had been Minister Plenipotentiary to Switzerland for almost three years.¹

Before Leishman could settle down to dealing with the school question he was faced with another, more immediate problem. On September 3, 1901, a certain Miss Ellen Stone

and a companion, both Protestant missionaries, were kidnapped near Salonika in European Turkey. On the 28th word came from the kidnappers demanding that a ransom of \$100,000 be delivered by October 8th, or Miss Stone would be killed. Unlike the Perdicaris incident the United States government did not send a fleet to Turkey and instead of pressuring the Porte to pay the ransom allowed a private campaign to be organized in America to raise the necessary funds.²

During October \$66,000 was collected by missionary societies and handed over to the State Department. In January, 1902, the brigands agreed to accept this amount, and by the end of February it had been turned over and Miss Stone released.³ The American government acted with great restraint during the incident, as well as understanding the great difficulties faced by the Turkish authorities. Roosevelt had only just recently come to the Presidency with the death of McKinley in September, 1901, and he was still unsure of himself in this new seat of power. Also the United States had no naval units in the area. By 1904 Roosevelt was a much more confident President, and he had a new naval policy with which to back up this confidence.

In November, 1901, France showed one way to influence Abdul Hamid. During that month a French fleet seized part of the island of Mytilene (Lesbos) and held it as ransom for a satisfactory settlement. The Sultan capitulated in the face of such a vigorous move, and French schools and property in the Empire were given full rights and protection.

By 1903 all of the other great powers had come to similar agreements with Turkey, but not the United States.⁴

The need for American intervention to humble Turkey was forcefully expressed in an article in the North American Review in late 1901. "To show the Bloodstained Sultan a few battleships," wrote Urbain Gohier, "and warn him that every human head that falls under the knives of his assassins will be paid for by the destruction of one of his palaces -- this would not be the work of a conqueror, but the action of a noble heart."⁵

Roosevelt himself had no great love for the Turk. In 1898 he wrote William Wingate Sewell that "Spain and Turkey are the two powers I would rather smash than any in the world." During the Balkan War of 1912-13 Roosevelt told Henry Cabot Lodge that the conflict would be "a benefit to humanity because it will put a stop to that chronic condition of massacre, murder and bloodshed" existing in the Ottoman Empire. Yet, the President was fully aware of the hazards present in any general military involvement with Turkey. He once warned Elihu Root about the dangers of recent talk in the United States about "pushing matters to a conclusion with Turkey and taking Smyrna." While he felt the Turkish navy was absolutely impotent and could not oppose an American fleet, he cautioned that the army was a different matter. Turkish ground forces were "a most formidable body," and man for man there "are no better fighters in Europe."⁶ Roosevelt would not forget this earlier judgement, and when

he came to deal with the Sultan, first in 1903 and then in 1904, he would use naval power.

In the summer of 1903 a large delegation of prominent Americans representing missionary opinion in the United States, and led by the Reverend Stuart Dodge, came to Washington and laid before Roosevelt a memorial which urged the President to gain for the United States the same rights and protection already "secured by the ambassadors of the Great Powers of Europe for their subjects" in Turkey. Another powerful leader in this protest was John W. Foster, a former high State Department official, and now a fervent lobbyist for missionary interests. Roosevelt, however, was continually frustrated by the inability of Leishman to get a satisfactory solution to the problem from the Porte.⁷ It had taken over five years of protests, threats, and finally a naval demonstration to settle the Armenian claims; and the much more serious matter of the school question promised to take even longer to resolve unless some type of strong action was initiated.

Roosevelt found an excuse to use something more than mere words in August, 1903, when a cable was received from Leishman reporting that the American Vice-Consul in Beirut, William C. Maglessen, had been assassinated. Lying in the harbor at Villefranche, France, was the European Squadron under Rear Admiral Cotton composed of the cruisers Brooklyn and San Francisco. The President did not hesitate to make

use of them, and they were immediately ordered to steam for Beirut.⁸

The assassination report turned out to be a false alarm, but as the warships were already on their way the decision was made to make use of their presence in order to put pressure on the Sultan. The news of the squadron's despatch to Beirut brought the Turkish Minister in the United States running back to Washington from vacation. Chekib Bey expressed his anxiety over the incident and begged Hay to understand the chaotic conditions now existing in the Empire. In an interview with the Washington correspondent of The Times (London), Chekib Bey compared what was happening in Turkey to some of America's internal problems. "Unhappily massacres sometimes occur," he declared, "but do they not occur in Christian lands? Nobody would be so foolish as to hold the United States Government responsible for the lynchings of negroes." Turkey deplores these incidents and was doing all she could to prevent them. The outside world, he said, must be patient.⁹

On August 31st Hay told Roosevelt that the sending of the squadron had, according to Leishman, "made a profound impression" on Turkey. Leishman felt confident, Hay reported, that the Turks would now make an effort to settle the school question. Four days later Hay informed the President that the government should be able "to finish up our little chores" in Turkey within a few days. He said that he had recently had two long meetings with Chekib Bey and told him

that if the Sultan did not want American warships in Turkish waters it would be very easy to make them depart -- just settle the school question and a few other matters "which have dragged on for too long."¹⁰

Most of the American press supported the administration's action, although some like the New York Times expressed concern over the impression made by this aggressive move on the European powers. Their "sensibilities might be ruffled" should Cotton remain in Turkish waters for any length of time. "We cannot afford," affirmed the Times, "to give any of the European Powers occasion to say or suggest that we are meddling over there. The incident," it warned, "would surely return to plague us."¹¹

A slightly more acid view of Roosevelt's gunboat diplomacy was expressed by the Berliner Neueste Nachrichten, when it charged that the United States appeared to be following in Russian footsteps with its aggressive policy against Turkey. The newspaper tartly pointed out that this action was being initiated by "the same American Chauvinists who want to forbid European intervention in American affairs on the ground of the Monroe Doctrine." How could the United States raise such a terrible outcry when Germany acted in Venezuela, and yet expect to freely get away with the same performance in the Mediterranean?¹²

Hay left for a short stay at his vacation home in Newbury, N. H., regretfully leaving Assistant Secretary Adees and Roosevelt "to struggle with the Beirut proposition." He

humorously wrote Adee that after his last "long tussle with that poor writhing worm of a Turk," Chekib Bey, he almost did not have the strength of wind to go, but wanted "to give up my ticket, dismiss my carriage, ring my wife and stay indefinitely." On September 14th he wrote Adee that as he saw it things were going pretty well for us in Turkey, and the administration should certainly be able to "make something out of /the/ incident."¹³

But Hay had not counted on the age-old Turkish maxims of Bakalum (We shall see!) and Yarum gel (Come tomorrow!) which had defeated other diplomats. Leishman's "wordy and not very helpful" despatches brought Washington no news of a settlement, only accounts of constant delays. By the end of September no solution had presented itself, and the American squadron at Beirut settled in for a long stay.¹⁴ The next move was up to Roosevelt. If the Sultan refused to settle what could the President do? Bombard and seize Beirut? Cotton's squadron (recently joined by the gunboat Machias) had obviously not impressed the Turks enough. Perhaps it should have been larger? Perhaps Beirut was too far away from Constantinople? Roosevelt was understandably loath to take the next obvious step -- the use of force. As a result the American warships just stayed in the area while Leishman fruitlessly tried to persuade Abdul Hamid and the Porte to come to terms.

The next two months passed fairly quietly. There was a brief flurry of activity in early December when the

American Consul in Alexandretta, Turkey, was set upon by local police as he was escorting an Armenian (a naturalized United States citizen) on board a steamer. Immediately after the incident the Consul lowered the American flag and left for Beirut by the same ship. Cotton, who had taken his squadron to Alexandria, Egypt, for stores and repairs, was ordered north. Taking the Brooklyn Cotton picked up the Consul and brought him back to Alexandretta where the Governor of the port offered an official apology. The incident ended, Cotton sailed back to Beirut.¹⁵

The lack of any settlement despite all of this naval activity caused increased pressure on the State Department and Roosevelt by the missionary lobby. In answer to a letter from the Reverend Stuart Dodge urging action, Adee complained that the main problem was the "inertia of the Turkish Government." He forcefully impressed upon Dodge that he did not think it would be of any use to bring his committee to Washington again for another protest, as both the President and Hay were in complete accord with his views. Adee told him that the United States would keep up the pressure on the Sultan, always hoping that "circumstances may arise which will enable" the government "to profit by the situation to the advantage of the Missionaries." One immediate problem, he informed Dodge, was that Cotton's warships had been overseas for quite a long time and the Navy Department wanted "our men-of-war elsewhere."¹⁶

Leishman's year-end report to the State Department was a bleak one. He called opposition to an agreement on the school question bitter and determined. There was no sign of an immediate settlement, and he had "no confidence in the daily promises which are broken with as little compunction as they are lightly made." He compared himself to a shuttlecock, constantly passing back and forth between an "irresponsible Porte and an invisible Sultan." The warships were no longer considered a threat, complained Leishman, only a nuisance. In some ways the continued presence of the squadron without it being forcefully used was "more of a hindrance than an assistance."¹⁷

With the Sultan apparently unimpressed by Cotton's squadron, and the Navy Department pressuring to have the warships withdrawn, Roosevelt and Hay were faced with finding a way of removing the vessels without seeming to have given in to Turkish intransigence. The decision to withdraw was made in mid-January, 1904. Informed of this, Leishman wrote State that a withdrawal without having obtained a settlement would be bad, but since the administration was not prepared to "adopt more drastic measures" he had no objection to their removal. The Turkish government had made up its mind that it could "hold off with safety resting easy under the impression that forcible measures will not be resorted to."¹⁸

In reply the State Department asked Leishman to intimate to Turkey that the ships were being "withdrawn for the

time being," in order to facilitate discussions. Later Leishman was told to present the withdrawal as evidence of Roosevelt's good will. The Minister was also ordered to express to the Sultan and the Porte the President's warm interest in the school question. Leishman replied that giving this face-saving impression would be difficult as the Turks were well aware why the United States was withdrawing its warships -- all they had to do was read American newspapers.¹⁹

On January 30th Leishman cabled Hay that Tewfik Pasha had written to the Sultan recommending a settlement, but he believed that Abdul Hamid would never receive the letter as his chief advisors would keep it from him. Leishman said that as the Sultan had now made it a rule not to give audiences to any foreign diplomat below the rank of ambassador, it was impossible to deal with him personally. The raising of American representation in Turkey to the ambassadorial level was another one of those small problems with which Leishman was attempting to get the Porte to agree. The unusual tactic of seeing only ambassadors appears to have been a devious ploy especially designed to isolate the persistent Leishman. By February, faced with delay after delay, he was plaintively writing Hay that everything was "so different here from other countries that one is seldom in a position to give a good reason for thinking anything"²⁰

At the beginning of April the final blow fell. Leishman cabled Hay that the Porte had officially declined to take favorable action on the schools. Leishman was terribly

disappointed "after so many months of hard work and constant labor and patient waiting" to reach this dead end. The Grand Vizier, he felt, was the chief culprit. It was his influence on the Sultan which had offset the favorable position of the Porte.²¹

Back in the United States missionary pressure on Roosevelt and the State Department to do something remained strong. The domestic correspondence of the Department of State for this period contains many soothing letters sent out to irate clergymen by Hay and Adey. One from Hay to a certain Reverend Judson Smith of Boston might stand as an example. Hay defended Leishman against a charge of "not having acted with sufficient energy," and told Smith that the United States had been given promise after promise, but nothing was ever done. He ended the letter by declaring that the government would continue its pressure "to get justice done," but said we "have not yet come to the point of using measures of violence."²²

But if not violence, what then? It was during April that Roosevelt apparently decided to use his navy again -- this time in an even greater demonstration of naval strength -- to try and force Abdul Hamid to come to terms. Faced with the seemingly intransigent attitude of the Turkish government as outlined by Leishman on April 1st, as well as pressure from missionary interests, Roosevelt began unlimbering the big stick in the form of his battleships.

With a display of American naval might in the offing Leishman told Hay on June 5th that the visit "would prove more irritating than beneficial, as in the absence of an ultimatum the Porte would be very apt to treat another visit with the same outward tranquillity and indifference." To get the maximum benefit he suggested the American government play upon the Turk's suspicious nature. He proposed that he ask the Porte if the fleet could pay a friendly visit to several Turkish ports. Given the Turkish way of looking at things -- they "generally view frankness as a cloak to hide covert intentions" -- this would worry them much more than an open approach.²³

The morning of June 8th Hay had a stormy interview with John W. Foster. Foster, representing American missionary societies, told Hay he wanted the government "to growl" at Turkey. Hay informed him of what the Roosevelt administration was proposing to do with the fleet and Foster went away in a more reasonable frame of mind. The next day Hay sent Leishman a strong cable ordering him to ask for an immediate audience with Abdul Hamid and put the school question before him. He said to ask for the audience "in the name of the President." Hay confided to his diary the hope that this solemn warning and the arrival of the battleships would have "some effect on Leishman's negroes."²⁴

Tewfik Pasha quickly responded to this new threat by promising Leishman to bring the school question up before the Council of Ministers for review, and begged Leishman "to

grant him sufficient time to have the matter reconsidered." Leishman felt this response, while not completely satisfactory, offered some promise. He gave Tewfik Pasha to the end of June to produce an acceptable response. On the evening of the 16th the Grand Vizier informed Leishman that the Council of Ministers had reviewed the case and referred it to the Minister of Public Instruction "with a favorable recommendation." Leishman was by now very optimistic, and gave full credit for the apparent success to the demand of the 9th as well as the approach of the battleships. He found the Sultan and the Porte rather disturbed by recent events, and both were now attempting "to find a way of backing down gracefully." But in Washington Hay, remembering his past experiences with Abdul Hamid, still had reservations.²⁵

As the end of June approached a confident Leishman wrote Hay that the Secretary's "medicine was working." The Sultan was quite alarmed over the approach of the fleet, and was unsure of just what would happen when it arrived in Turkish waters.²⁶ The strategy appeared to be successful, but with Abdul Hamid no one could be sure of this until the royal decree on the schools had actually been signed.

Roosevelt's options in the event of continued Turkish obstinacy were fairly limited. He could send the fleet directly to a Turkish port, possibly Smyrna, but then what would he do? He certainly would not bring his battleships home in this election year without a satisfactory settlement. The example of the French in 1901 might have been

in his mind, for their seizure of the island of Mytilene (lying just off the coast of Asia Minor near Smyrna) had gained them a successful settlement. Roosevelt had little desire to engage the Turkish army in battle and this would apparently rule out the seizure of a mainland port; but along the coast of Turkish Asia Minor in the Aegean lay a necklace of small islands, one or two of which could easily be taken and held with the superior American naval strength. However, all depended upon the response of the Sultan. Would he give in as he had done in December, 1901, to the presence of an American battleship, or, was this a more important matter of principle to Abdul Hamid than a simple indemnity? Only time would tell.

CHAPTER IX

ROOSEVELT GAMBLES

Barker's leisurely week-long journey across the Mediterranean was necessitated by the presence in Phaleron Bay of a large French fleet. During the slow passage Barker took the opportunity of engaging his battleships in various maneuvers and drills, including a number of torpedo exercises. Except for a lone Russian corvette the anchorage at Phaleron was empty as the American warships steamed in on the afternoon of June 30th. It was on these same protected waters that ancient Athens had first launched its galleys. It was here too that the shattered fleet of Xerxes had fled for safety after being defeated by the Athenians under Themistocles at the battle of Salamis.¹

The American Minister at Athens, John B. Jackson, was a graduate of the Naval Academy and a former naval officer. In 1886 he had resigned his commission, studied and practiced law for a few years, and in 1890 entered the diplomatic corps. Prior to coming to Greece in 1902 he had served in Berlin as legation secretary and chargé d'affaires for almost twelve years.² When the battleships arrived it was Jackson, like Bryan in Lisbon, who was to officiate over the visits and festivities which were to follow.

On July 3rd Barker and his officers met with King George of Greece in a special audience held at the Royal Palace. The meeting marked the renewal of an old acquaintance, for Barker had met with a recently crowned King George and his new wife Queen Olga in 1873 while he was executive officer on the Wachusett. At the audience the King expressed his pleasure to Barker and Jackson at the visit of the battleships, only regretting that the stay would be so short and that during the hot season the officers might find things a bit dull socially in the capital. Barker took the opportunity of extending to the King an invitation to call on the squadron, which George enthusiastically accepted and asked if he could come aboard as soon as possible. This was acceptable to Barker and the visit was scheduled for the next day, the Fourth of July.³

The afternoon of the 3rd the battleship Missouri arrived at Phaleron bringing the squadron's strength up to five armorclads, and the next morning all were dressed with flags and booming out salutes over the bay celebrating the nation's birthday. In the early evening Jackson came aboard the Kearsarge, followed shortly by the King, Prince Andrew and his wife Princess Alice, and a number of high officials. As King George's party was piped over the side the Royal Standard was hoisted to the main truck of the Kearsarge, and each of the battleships roared out a twenty-one gun carronade. All were completely outlined with electric lights and in the fading sunlight they made a splendid sight on the bay.⁴

Before sitting down to dinner Barker took the King and his party on a brief tour through the Kearsarge. Because of the warm weather tables had been set out on the Quarterdeck, and the banquet was held under a covering of white canvas. The entire affair, Barker wrote Moody, "passed off pleasantly," and a little after eleven the Royal party left the flagship, its way along the water to the shore brightly illuminated by the searchlights of the battleships. Other searchlights played on the large American flag hanging from the stern of each vessel, as well as the Royal Standard, and for a second time that evening each of the battleships fired off a twenty-one gun salute. On the shore of the bay and in the port of Piraeus the entire nighttime tableau was witnessed by thousands of Greeks who lined the wharf area and sandy beaches.⁵

The next day Barker and Jackson headed a group of twenty-three officers from the squadron on a journey to Tatoie, the King's country residence about twenty miles from Athens, for a luncheon. Tatoie lay in a forest at the foot of the mountains enclosing the Attic plain, and the luncheon took place outside under the pines. Afterwards the King graciously escorted Barker and his officers through the extensive grounds surrounding the Palace.⁶

Jackson told Hay that one of the more favorable impressions made by the squadron on the Greeks was the exemplary behavior of its enlisted personnel. The twenty-five hundred sailors who streamed ashore on liberty had just

received a month's pay, and their conduct in Athens and Piraeus compared most favorably to that of the French crews who had preceeded the Americans a few days before. On the afternoon of July 6th the battleships steamed out of the bay and headed for the Greek island of Corfu in the Ionian Sea.⁷

Meanwhile, in Constantinople, Leishman was still unable to give Washington any satisfaction on a settlement. The end of June passed without a definite reply from the Porte, only the usual promises. Leishman informed Hay on July 2nd that he would wait for a few more days and then, if an acceptable response was not forthcoming, he would demand a meeting with the Sultan.⁸

When the Battleship Squadron left Phaleron on the 6th it still appeared that the naval display had had a salutary effect on the Turkish government. The Porte had agreed to review its earlier refusal to deal with the school question, and although it was continuing to delay a final decision there were still grounds for optimism. More importantly, the fleet was scheduled to be in the Mediterranean for a month or more, and, if nothing came of the American diplomatic initiative it could easily be sent back to Turkish waters.

The five battleships reached Corfu on the morning of July 8th, and after calling on the local American Consul and engaging in a brief round of sightseeing Barker left the next day bound north into the Adriatic. He reached Trieste early on the 12th, followed in the afternoon by Jewell's

three cruisers and the Mayflower. The battleship Illinois came in on the 13th and her arrival finally brought the fleet together for the first time in its full strength. Ten white warships, and six of them -- Kearsarge, Maine, Illinois, Missouri, Iowa, and Alabama -- battleships.⁹

Jewell had gotten himself into a bit of hot water with the Navy Department by his decision to proceed directly to Trieste and not join Barker in Greece. The Roosevelt administration wanted the fleet at Athens to be as imposing as possible for the purpose of impressing Turkey, and the halving of its numerical strength by Jewell did not sit well at all in Washington. The Navy Department cabled Barker on July 6th that since Jewell had already sailed from Gibraltar it could not override his decision, but it would certainly request "an explanation in the matter." Jewell's decision to let the Illinois proceed to Trieste on her own also came in for criticism. The navy's allegiance to the tactical concept of concentration gave "the greatest importance that vessels should at all times, when practicable, cruise and make passage in company," and by letting the Illinois steam alone Jewell quite obviously violated this principle.¹⁰

On his way to the Adriatic Jewell attempted to intercept Barker's warships at sea and accompany them to Trieste. On July 9th and 10th he spread his four vessels across the entrance to the Straits of Otranto where the ships were to keep in touch by wireless while they searched for the battleships. Unfortunately, Jewell's exercise failed due to

engine trouble on the Baltimore and a breakdown of the Olympia's wireless, and Barker's squadron slipped through the net.¹¹

Lying in the crescent-shaped bay of the port of Trieste the ten warships were an impressive sight. From the great medieval castle on the steep hill called the Schossberg, below which the old town had been built, the battleships and cruisers looked like miniature model ships in a storybook setting. Although Trieste was the chief seaport of the Austrian Empire, it was Italian at heart and the atmosphere was Latin. The names of the city's churches -- San Giusto, Santa Maria Maggiore, and Sant' Antonio Nuovo -- further proclaimed the Italian spirit of the city. It was through Trieste that most of those citizens dissatisfied with conditions in the Empire had immigrated to America, and it was from here in 1863 that the Archduke Maximillian and his wife Carlotta had left their pseudo-Norman castle of Miramar, four miles up the coast, in search of an illusory empire in Mexico.¹²

One immediate problem which Barker ran into was the Austrian government's impression that the primary reason for the fleet's presence in the Mediterranean was instructional, and therefore official entertainment would be limited. Barker promptly corrected this notion and there soon began the usual series of dinners and receptions; the first given by Admiral Jedina, the commander of the naval base, followed by a grand fête by the Governor of Trieste, Count Goess, two

days later. On the 18th Barker gave a dinner for Austrian officials on board the Mayflower. He then left Trieste for a few days and joined his wife at Cortina in the Austrian Tyrol for a brief vacation.¹³

While its Admiral was absent the fleet received a serious scare when a number of cases of typhoid broke out on the Kearsarge. Luckily, the outbreak was confined to the wardroom, and an investigation pointed to a supply of ice taken aboard in Piraeus as the cause. Officers feared the total water supply taken on in Greece was infected, and knew that typhoid racing throughout the fleet would end its effectiveness. The humiliating spectacle of the heart of the United States Navy lying helpless and isolated in the harbor of Trieste would have quickly terminated any benefits which the Mediterranean cruise had brought the Roosevelt administration, and it would have certainly emerged as an issue in the election. Contamination, as it turned out, was limited to the ice.¹⁴

On July 24th the fleet left Trieste, and while the Battleship Squadron and the Mayflower continued on to Fiume the European Squadron steamed for Corfu. There Jewell would coal his cruisers and then sail for Villefranche.¹⁵ The visit to Fiume was another stopover not originally a part of the itinerary. The American government, bowing to a strong hint from the Austrian foreign office, decided to honor the port as a nod to Hungarian national sensitivities.

Fiume lay on the other side of the Istrian peninsula from Trieste. Situated at the head of the Gulf of Quarnero this chief port of Hungary, like Trieste, was essentially an Italian city. Sir Osbert Sitwell once visited Fiume and wrote romantically of "its clustered houses and its bay, a spur of hills sinking into the opalescence of the far seas, and the quivering misty outlines of the islands." Its chief historical sights were a Roman triumphal arch erected in the 3rd century A.D. in honor of the emperor Claudius II; the Austrian Emperor's Palace; and the Municipal Palace. The latter, wrote Sitwell, was "built in the well-known Renaissance-elephantoid style that is the dream of every Municipal Council the world over."¹⁶

The six battleships and the Mayflower arrived at Fiume in the early morning hours of the 25th. Barker and his staff first called on the Governor of Fiume, Baron Evin Roszner, and then the American Consul-General in Budapest, Franklin Chester, who had come to Fiume especially for the visit. Baron Roszner came aboard the flagship later that same day and brought with him a telegram from Count Stephen Tisza, the head of the Hungarian state, welcoming the fleet to Hungary. On the evening of the 26th the Governor gave a large reception at the Municipal Palace for Barker and his officers. The Facade of the Palace was resplendently lighted, while the extensive grounds around it were illuminated by hundreds of colored Japanese lanterns. "Palms and flowers abounded," wrote Barker, "and a fountain of crystal

water played in the bright moonlight."¹⁷

Inside the Palace a large American eagle with outstretched wings formed by electric lights was the center of attention, while the national flags of Hungary and the United States were prominently displayed on the walls. A concert by the celebrated Hungarian Opera Troupe of Budapest was followed by dancing and refreshments. The cobblestoned streets outside the Palace were densely packed with people all hoping to catch a glimpse of the festivities as well as the Americans.¹⁸

The next evening it was Barker's turn to entertain. At a dinner on the Mayflower the Admiral in a brief speech was careful to salute the Apostolic King of Hungary, the Hungarian title for Franz Josef. All during the visit great care was given to Hungarian sensibilities, even to the playing of the Hungarian national hymn on all occasions. However, one small gaffe did occur. When Barker's guests sat down to dinner on the Mayflower Baron and Baroness Roszner pointed out to the Admiral that the menu and the musical program had been printed, "Fiume, Austria." Both expressed themselves, only half-humorously, that their patriotism was wounded at this slight, and an embarrassed Barker immediately sent his flag secretary over to the Kearsarge to have new menus and programs printed. This was quickly done, and before the dinner had ended the new programs were being passed out to the delight of the Hungarians.¹⁹

Another incident which could have been potentially damaging occurred when the Kearsarge lost one of her torpedoes in the harbor. The Whitehead Torpedo Company had a large factory and practice area at Fiume and the director, Count Hoyas, had invited the American officers to visit and inspect the plant and its equipment. On the 26th the Kearsarge test fired two Whitehead torpedoes from her tubes. Both contained explosive but did not have primers. Boat crews managed to recover one but the other could not be found, and it was believed that it had sunk to the bottom of the harbor. Nevertheless, watches were set and small boats continued to hunt the waters in the area while the warships remained in port. Even though not primed for firing the torpedo did contain explosives and could have possibly detonated if jarred forcefully enough. The loss or damaging of an American battleship by one of its own torpedoes was not an experience which would have resounded to the glory of Roosevelt's navy.²⁰

On the 30th Barker and his staff made their parting calls upon local officials. Baroness Roszner graciously told the Admiral that she wished he were the American Minister to Austria. The visit to Fiume had been an outstanding success and Barker told Moody that the "greatest curiosity was shown by the people to see the Americans and their white ships." All during the cruise, he wrote Admiral Dewey, he was consistently told how "pretty your ships look painted white." To which Barker always replied that although his warships

were always "prepared for war we believe in peace -- and paint our ships accordingly."²¹ Alas, the day of the white man-of-war was drawing to a close. The nations of Europe were already turning toward less conspicuous coloration for their warships. Within a few years the more practical and less visible hues of grey's and green's would predominate -- display giving way to utility.

As Barker steamed back across the Mediterranean toward Gibraltar he could be well satisfied with both the performance and excellent effect created by his battleships and cruisers. Leishman, however, could not claim the same success for his diplomacy. With the removal of the fleet from Turkish waters at the beginning of July the seeming willingness of the Sultan and the Porte to come to terms began to dissipate, and Leishman was face to face again with the same old series of delays and procrastinations which he thought had ended.

Leishman called on Tewfik Pasha on July 5th and, finding that the Foreign Minister could still not offer him any conclusive sign of an immediate settlement, he asked for an audience with the Sultan in the name of the President. Tewfik Pasha tried to dissuade him, saying that the school question was being reviewed by the Porte and would be brought before the Council of Ministers the following day. Leishman refused to be mollified and the audience was scheduled for Friday, July 8th.²²

The meeting was not to take place. Early Friday morning Leishman was informed by an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the audience with Abdul Hamid would have to be postponed. The Sultan was very fatigued and unable to see anyone. It was a much chagrined Leishman who later found out that the Sultan's incapacities had not prevented him from seeing both the Austrian and Russian ambassadors that very same day.²³ The reason for this deliberate insult -- the other two audiences could not have been concealed nor did the Turks try -- was not hard to perceive. On the 5th there had been five battleships at Piraeus; by the 8th they had gone. Turkish sensitivity to American diplomacy was directly related to the amount of coercion Roosevelt was willing to apply.

When Leishman next saw Tewfik Pasha "prudence and policy," he told Hay, forced him to make no mention of his knowledge of the ambassador's visits. "Compelled to swallow his indignation and express . . . sorrow at the ill health of the Sultan," Leishman asked for an audience with Abdul Hamid as soon as he was feeling better. He informed Hay that he still felt "the Turks are slowly awakening" to the idea that they could not continue putting the United States off, but thus far he could report nothing of substance except the usual broken promises.²⁴

On July 15th Leishman again attempted to see Abdul Hamid, and this time he was apprised that the Sultan would not receive him that day "on account of important visits in

the harem." The Turks were laughing, no longer inventing serious excuses. Adding to the affront was the Sultan's reception of the Persian Ambassador the same day. Leishman was now in the position of having been twice refused an audience with Abdul Hamid, both times with undisguised discourtesy, even after asking for the meetings in the name of the President. He resentfully declared to Hay that he felt it "beneath the dignity of the American Government" to again ask for an audience under these conditions, and requested that the State Department send him further instructions.²⁵

In response to this state of affairs Leishman was ordered to again ask for an Imperial audience in the President's name at a fixed date and time in the near future. He was also instructed to tell Tewfik Pasha that the government of the United States failed to comprehend the delay in according its representative the treatment which should exist between two supposedly friendly powers. Implicit in this was a threat that if the audience was not granted it would be taken as an unfriendly act. In anticipation of a refusal the State Department asked Leishman which of the Turkish ports would be best suited for a visit from the fleet.²⁶

Faced with a fresh and strong demand from the United States the Turkish government granted Leishman's request for an audience. The meeting took place on Friday, July 29th. In a long and outwardly friendly interview Abdul Hamid "spoke very favorably" with Leishman about the school question, promising to take "matters under immediate consideration and

to give [a] definite reply not later than Tuesday next."²⁷

The problem would have to be settled now or never. There could be no more delays as Roosevelt was about to lose the strong position given him by his battleships. Barker was steaming toward Gibraltar where, after taking on coal, he would be heading back across the Atlantic. Jewell's European Squadron was at Villefranche and would stay for a few more days, but soon it too would be leaving the Mediterranean. If the Sultan could manage to hold off these insistent Americans and their white warships until then, he would be safe for at least another year.

In the United States there was a great deal of hope that a satisfactory settlement would now be gained since Abdul Hamid finally had been brought personally into the negotiations. The New York Times reported that because of this the State Department was very optimistic. The key to the Sultan's present amicability, said the Times, was a direct result of the pressure exerted by the American fleet, "so that the cruise of the squadron has served its purpose, and it is not regarded as necessary now to extend the trip into Turkish waters."²⁸

Hay sincerely hoped Leishman could get a settlement, "now that we have given him such a handful of trumps [battleships] to play." Assistant Secretary of State Loomis informed Leishman that the Sultan's response on the 29th was gratifying, but just in case problems arose Barker's six battleships were going to be held at Gibraltar "in readiness

subject to orders." He was also told by Loomis that the American government fully expected its wishes to be complied with and he was ordered to keep Washington advised about the situation as it developed.²⁹

Tewfik Pasha sent his secretary to see Leishman on the evening of August 1st to tell him that Abdul Hamid would not be able to see him the next day. He blamed this delay on the fact that the Council of Ministers had not yet concluded its report on the school question, but he promised he would definitely have a reply on Thursday, the 4th. Leishman was disturbed but still optimistic. "The active consideration which the matter is now receiving," he explained to Hay, "warrants the belief that a definite decision will be reached before the end of the present week." His confidence, however, was misplaced for the 4th passed without the promised reply, and no word was offered on when one could be expected.³⁰

For Roosevelt this was the final insult. It was now quite evident that the display of warships alone had not worked. Something stronger was obviously needed, and on the 5th orders were sent to Rear Admiral Jewell at Villefranche to immediately steam for Smyrna. Barker's battleships would be held at Gibraltar.

Roosevelt had been actively trying to settle the school question with Turkey for well over a year. His use of the navy had not met with success in 1903 and he had been embarrassingly forced to withdraw his warships. In 1904 the

President attempted to end the stalemate by the display of a much larger naval force, but had been again rebuffed. Although often accused of engaging in a blustering, half-cocked diplomacy Roosevelt, as far as Turkey was concerned, had acted with great restraint and had been very careful in his manipulation of force against the Empire. He had not sent the fleet directly to Turkey in 1904, but instead to neighboring Greece in the hope that the Turks would draw the obvious conclusion. They did, but their reaction had been simply more delay while giving the surface appearance of trying to come to terms.

The decision of August 5th to send warships directly to Turkey was not the hair-trigger response of a warrior President, but an integral part of a slow, purposeful buildup of pressure. Yet a gamble was involved. As in Morocco, Roosevelt was apparently locking himself into a situation with only two alternatives: either he or the Sultan would have to back down. Roosevelt had done the surrendering in 1903, but 1904 was a year of election -- now only two months away -- and it was doubtful he would withdraw this time without some kind of settlement.

CHAPTER X

"THE PRIMACY OF THE WORLD"

It was August and the city which L'Enfant had laid out in the swamps beside the Potomac River sweltered in the humid, tropical heat of late summer. The House and Senate were in recess, and the broiling weather had managed to drive most of the rest of official Washington to its vacation abodes by the sea or in the mountains. Just about all of the foreign community had also left the city, and even the dutiful Hay managed to slip away to his summer residence in New Hampshire. The great diplomat was not well and indeed had less than a year to live. A few months earlier Henry Adams had watched the sculptor St. Gaudens modeling Hay's head as well as John Singer Sargent painting his portrait, "two steps essential to immortality which," Adams observed, Hay "bore with a certain degree of resignation." The failure of the Sultan to give Leishman an answer on August 4th brought the weary Secretary of State hurrying back to Washington from his mountain retreat by a fast train.¹

On the morning of the 5th Roosevelt gathered the Cabinet in a special session given over entirely to dealing with the Turkish problem. After considering all the options available to the government it was finally decided to order the European Squadron to immediately steam for Smyrna, and

Hay cabled Leishman that afternoon of the President's decision. In the evening Hay dined with Roosevelt at the White House where they again discussed the crisis.²

When the European Squadron separated from Barker's force on July 24th Jewell headed for the island of Corfu from where, after spending a few days taking on coal, he left for France. Arriving at the Riviera port of Villefranche on August 3rd he planned to spend about eight days, then steam out of the Mediterranean and head for northern Europe. The Navy Department's order of the 5th to take his three cruisers to Smyrna caught him off guard. Most of the squadron's officers and men were scattered ashore on liberty, and the warships were low on provisions and coal. By the time the men were gathered back aboard and stores taken on there had been a delay of almost forty-eight hours. Around noon on Sunday, August 7th, the cruisers led by the flagship Olympia cleared the harbor at Villefranche and headed south along the eastern coast of Italy bound for the Straits of Messina.³

Compared with the despatch of warships to Morocco in May the sending of the European Squadron to Smyrna created much less of an impact in the nation's press. The New York Times reported that the Roosevelt administration was exasperated by the course which the negotiations had taken, and had "become weary of the persistent evasions and obstruction" being practiced by the Turkish government. The American list of grievances was real but not impressive, said the Times, however, it hoped that the Sultan "would come down and yield

the satisfaction required."⁴

The New York Tribune gave the news front page coverage and carried pictures of the Olympia, Baltimore and Cleveland, as well as an insert of Rear Admiral Jewell. Under the headline "A Warning To Turkey," and "Guns Back Of Demand," the Tribune wrote that the State Department had taken this necessary action after having been "exasperated to the last degree by the dilatory and unsatisfactory methods of the Porte."⁵

The Tribune argued that only a powerful show of naval might could force the Sultan and his government to come to terms. Unfortunately raw power seemed to be the only message the Turk could understand. It pointed out that in December, 1903, it was only the arrival of a warship at Alexandretta which persuaded Turkey to officially apologize for that incident. Jewell's squadron should be enough, but if more warships were required Barker's command, "the most powerful fleet in the American navy," would be standing by at Gibraltar. High administration officials, confided the Tribune, were seen as feeling confident that Barkers' battleships would not be needed, but their appearance in Turkish waters "may be necessary for its moral effect."⁶

A report in the New York Times from Paris said that official French opinion viewed the despatch of warships with equanimity, and did not expect their use to cause international complications. It was felt that the Americans would not be "as promptly successful" in Turkey as they had been

in Morocco. "The Sultan of Turkey is a greater master of the art of temporizing than the Moorish potentate," these sources believed, "and the satisfaction which America demands from him involves a much more complicated problem than the freeing of Mr. Perdicaris." The reason for this spate of naval activity was seen in France as being directly related to the presidential campaign, and that Roosevelt's "reputation for a strenuous European policy needs to be maintained."⁷

Early Monday morning, the 8th, Hay went to see Roosevelt to discuss the developing situation. The President immediately showed him a letter he had just received from General Daniel Edgar Sickles protesting the "hostile demonstration against Turkey." Sickles was one of the more colorful figures produced by America in the nineteenth century. A Union Major General in the Civil War, he fought at the battle of Gettysburg, lost a leg, and after the war entered the diplomatic service. His career was short but included a controversial tour as United States Minister to Spain during the Virginius affair. He later entered politics, served in the House, and became a power in New York.⁸

Beyond sending warships to Smyrna nothing had been apparently decided Friday or over the weekend about what they should do once they got there. If left to his own ends Roosevelt might have been prepared to overreact as he had done in Morocco, but the presence of the experienced Hay provided the President with an ingenious compromise between the

actual use of force and abject retreat in case the Sultan remained adamant. Hay advised Roosevelt that when the squadron reached Turkey Leishman should be instructed to "demand an answer to our claims," and if the Turks refused to do so he should come away on one of the warships. Hay counseled there should not be a hostile demonstration, and the withdrawal of the American Minister would suffice for now. Later the entire matter could be put before Congress for appropriate action.⁹

Roosevelt agreed to adopt Hay's strategy, and in a letter written that same day to Sickles the President answered his complaints and outlined the steps he was prepared to take. He told Sickles that because of Turkish intransigence it was "imperative that some action should be taken" by the American government, but assured him that he knew he had no right to start a war with Turkey, and had "not the dimmest or remotest intention of doing so." The President ended by informing the General of the conservative course of action he had earlier in the day decided upon; i.e., to withdraw the American Minister and lay the matter before Congress if Abdul Hamid refused to agree to a settlement.¹⁰

The strategy was extremely adroit for the serious consequences of a full scale incident were to be avoided -- at least for the time being -- while the domestic benefits to be gained from withdrawing Leishman and placing the problem before Congress would be as satisfactory as an actual bombardment of Smyrna, or the seizure of an island. It would

satisfy the missionaries for a while, quiet the jingoes, and answer those critics who were attacking Roosevelt for indulging in a too aggressive foreign policy. Putting the issue before Congress would also keep the matter alive as an election issue.

Neither the Sultan nor the Porte, however, knew of this decision, and there still remained an excellent chance the Roosevelt administration could bluff an acceptable agreement out of them without having to actually withdraw Leishman.

When Hay returned from seeing the President that morning he found the Turkish Minister, Chekib Bey, waiting for him at the State Department. That "poor writhing worm of a Turk" was full of "great perturbation about the fleet." Hay attempted to set him somewhat at ease but told him "things could not continue as they were," and that the United States had been forced to act by his government's dilatory action on the school question. Before Chekib Bey saw Hay he had told waiting reporters there was nothing to recent reports that Jewell's ships were being sent to Smyrna to menace Turkey. After the meeting he refused to discuss what was said, but admitted he would be staying in Washington instead of leaving on vacation as originally planned. To the reporters he appeared nervous and anxious.¹¹

The same day Hay cabled Leishman that the European Squadron would be at Smyrna in a few days, and that he should use the time before it arrived attempting to obtain a

settlement. If none could be gained he was ordered to leave on one of Jewell's warships, putting the legation in charge of the legation secretary.¹²

Next morning Hay found on his desk an unusual despatch from Constantinople. In it Leishman told him that late the previous evening the Turkish Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had called on him and asked that he use his influence to prevent the fleet from coming, promising a reply on the school question "not later than Thursday." Leishman was certain that the sending of the navy had achieved its purpose, and begged Hay to detain it for a few days.¹³

Hay was just a bit baffled by this despatch, for the day before Leishman had sent a cable in which he told the State Department "that unless strong measures are adopted to force fulfillment, matters may continue to drag along indefinitely." Hay felt that Leishman, who had been begging for over a year for firm action, was now being inconsistent, and he advised him that as the squadron was at sea it could not be communicated with until it reached Turkey. Hay also told him that he was to be governed by his instructions of the 8th if he had not obtained a settlement by the time the warships arrived.¹⁴

Late in the evening of the 9th a second cable from Leishman reached Washington repeating the Turkish hope that the fleet's visit would be deferred. The Minister added he was quite sure the Turkish authorities were "at last thoroughly alive to the situation and most anxious to avoid an

unfriendly demonstration." He again requested that Jewell be ordered to come no closer than Piraeus; however, he did acknowledge Hay's most recent cables and said he would follow the instructions of the 8th.¹⁵

During the afternoon of the 9th Jewell's warships passed through the Straits of Messina, and by the morning of the 10th the squadron was steaming across the Ionian Sea at a steady speed of ten knots. Press reports in American newspapers were optimistic about a quick settlement now that the administration had opted for stronger measures. The New York Times, although conceding the demonstration had not been simply made for a mere parade, felt there would be no hostile action and that Washington expected "the presence of the war vessels at Smyrna will produce" good results. The worst which could happen would be a severance of diplomatic relations. The New York Tribune agreed with this estimate and headlined its report of the situation on the 11th: "Turkey Likely To Yield, Another Triumph For Secretary Hay's Diplomacy In Prospect."¹⁶

But Europe, like Turkey, was unsure of just how far Roosevelt intended to go in this affair. It did not know how limited were his aims. It only knew that within the past nine months the American President had used his navy aggressively in Panama and in Morocco; and with American warships steaming down upon Turkey, seemingly bent on a mission of obvious intimidation, it expected the worst.

In London The Daily Express was anything but optimistic and commented on the uneasy feelings prevalent in European diplomatic circles over the direction in which Turco-American relations were evolving. It stated that the cruisers had received imperative orders from Washington to stay clear of a British fleet under Admiral Domville operating in the area. The American government "desire it to be known they are acting entirely on their own initiative."¹⁷

The conservative Daily Telegraph (London) said that the United States had no desire to seize Smyrna as a coaling station, and claims to that effect appearing in the European press were unwarranted. The Telegraph reported that Roosevelt's critics in America and elsewhere, faced with the President's vigorous use of naval diplomacy in the past few months, along with accusing him of waving the big stick were now describing him as "brandishing the marlinspike."¹⁸

The official attitude of the British government to this new American exercise of naval power in the Mediterranean was, unlike the rest of Europe, quite mild. The close diplomatic co-operation shown by Great Britain and the United States during the Perdicaris affair was again being repeated. Indeed, the British view of the fleet's activities was throughout looked upon both in the press and by the government with generally benign or approving interest.

The British Ambassador to Turkey was Sir Nicholas Roderick O'Connor. Born in Ireland, he had previously served as British ambassador to China and Russia before coming to

Constantinople in 1898. O'Connor informed the Foreign Office that he expected Turkey to yield to the American naval demonstration, but in the event it did not he was concerned about how the United States Minister would leave Constantinople. He did not think the Turks would allow an American warship to enter the Dardanelles under these circumstances, and rather than inflict upon Leishman the humiliation of taking the regular mail steamer O'Connor asked if he could offer the American the use of the British cruiser Imogene which was anchored at Constantinople. He did not feel Turkey "would take it in ill part," but wondered if the United States would consider "its acceptance consonant with their dignity." Lord Lansdowne approved O'Connor's request, but cautioned him to make sure the "Turkish Government will not be offended," as "it would be a pity to vex them."¹⁹

O'Connor assured Lansdowne that Leishman had shown great patience during the negotiations, and the Sultan's refusal to negotiate in good faith was "difficult to explain." The ambassador still expected that the movement of American warships and the "veiled threat of coercive measures" would bring about a speedy settlement. O'Connor was also confident British support of the American position (not to mention the offer of the Imogene), as well as the friendly relations existing between him and the United States legation, would gain for England "a powerful support for our views and policy" in Turkey.²⁰

On the Continent, however, speculation about Roosevelt's Turkish diplomacy was rife and none too flattering. As with the Moroccan incident less than three months before the presence of American naval power in the Mediterranean being used aggressively stirred up deep misgivings. The New York correspondent of the Berliner Tageblatt cabled home that the entire incident was nothing more than a gross election maneuver designed to increase the President's standing at home. Le Temps (Paris) reported official circles in Germany had expressed hostility at recent American moves against Turkey, and in Vienna it was rumored that the government "vigorously disapproves the idea of a naval demonstration."²¹

But it was in Russia that the greatest fear of American intervention was most evident. Turkey lay within Russia's sphere of influence and an American fleet belligerently nosing around near the Straits was something to be watched carefully. The St. Petersburg daily Russ condemned the energetic response of the United States as unnecessary when compared with the unimportance of the question involved. It cautioned the Americans not to become "too enterprising in trying their strength on the various weaker powers of Europe, as this might easily lead to a combination of the stronger powers against them." Novoe Vremya (St. Petersburg) viewed the action as a blatant attempt to gain influence in the Near East while Russia was engaged in a war with Japan.²²

Another newspaper, Birzheviya Viedomorz (St. Petersburg), warned that Europe was now faced with a new and worrisome diplomatic problem. The United States, not content with her hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, was seeking to apply the Monroe Doctrine to the Near East -- an application which could easily produce an "explosion of fanaticism" among the Moslems with grave consequences to the Christian population in the area. Not only was Turkey being menaced by the naval aggression of the Americans, it admonished, but the very peace of Europe itself.²³

Russian fears of what the Americans might do if the Sultan failed to give way apparently took a more practical turn than impassioned editorials. In a report from Constantinople by the correspondent of The Daily Telegraph the Russian Ambassador was said to be urging the Sultan and the Porte to yield to American demands, "in order to leave no pretext for interference by the United States, whose methods are more drastic than those of the European Powers."²⁴

In Washington European concern about the developing situation was vividly expressed by the hasty gathering in the capital of a number of diplomats who had hurried back to their posts from vacation. Both The Times (London) and The Daily Mail (London) informed their readers that the signatory powers to the Treaty of Paris (which had ended the Crimean War, and contained vital clauses concerning the neutrality of the Straits) were beginning to take an active interest in the affair. The Times said they were pressuring the Sultan to

give in "rather than force the issue to a point at which the United States might regard the use of force as necessary."²⁵

On August 9th Baron Hengelmüller, the Austrian Ambassador, returned from his summer vacation home at Bar Harbor, Maine, ostensibly, as he told reporters, to present to Roosevelt "a compilation of Austrian statistics which Emperor Francis Joseph has sent to the President with his compliments." The very same day he had a long luncheon at the White House with Roosevelt, Hay and Senator Spooner of Wisconsin. The latter was a prominent member of the Senate Foreign Relations committee and had been summoned back to Washington by Roosevelt because of the crisis. What was discussed at the luncheon was not announced and Hay's diary is silent on the meeting, but it seems obvious that the conversation was not given over to an exposition of Austro-Hungarian agricultural and industrial production figures. Later in the day the German Ambassador, Baron Speck von Sternberg, arrived from his summer hideaway in the Massachusetts Berkshires at Lennox, and had dinner with Roosevelt and Hay. He told reporters that he had come back to Washington "to attend some business of an unofficial character." The next morning Portes de la Fosse, counsellor of the French Embassy, arrived at the State Department for a meeting with Hay.²⁶

This sudden return to a humid capital of numerous European diplomats all "imbued with a desire to see President Roosevelt" did not pass unnoticed, and although none of those

involved would admit the cause for this precipitate burst of high level diplomacy it was patent the reason was Turkey. Two days before, the New York Times reported, Washington had been "almost completely deserted by the diplomatic body," but since then "representatives of the German, Austrian and French Embassies have appeared here, and all of them have communicated with the State Department or the White House."²⁷

What the diplomats obviously wanted from the President was some knowledge of just what he was up to in Turkey, and how far was he prepared to go. It is not known just what Roosevelt and Hay said to them, but it seems reasonable to assume they were given assurances that American intervention in the Empire would be limited and would not at this time include force. One fairly reliable indication that this segment of the crisis had been successfully dealt with was the disappearance of the story from American newspapers after August 12th.

While intensive diplomatic activity was taking place in Washington Jewell's squadron was steadily nearing Turkey, and Leishman had still not cabled any word of a break in the negotiations. Almost a week had passed since Roosevelt had ordered the navy to Smyrna, but beyond a plea by Tewfik Pasha to hold off the warships the Turks had remained obstinate. It remained to be seen whether the physical presence of three cruisers would spur them to give in.

The port of Smyrna, now called Izmir, was the third largest city in the Empire and the one most accessible to sea power. Founded by Alexander the Great it was known to the Turks as the "eye of Asia Minor." It had been built on the slopes of a large, steep hill called the Pagos, on the crest of which sprawled the ruins of a great Byzantine citadel.²⁸

When Jewell arrived off the old port on the morning of August 12th he was prepared for any eventuality. The previous day, while steaming across the Aegean, all the ships had held preparedness drills, including General Quarters. On the Olympia there had been an ammunition drill with live rounds being placed in the hoists and tested. In the harbor at Smyrna the Turks could only muster a single opposing warship, the small gunboat Sureyya. Going ashore in the afternoon with his three captains the Admiral was received by the Governor of the port "with much ceremony, a guard of honor being paraded and a band playing 'Hail Columbia.'"²⁹

Meanwhile, in Constantinople, the imminent arrival of the navy had finally forced the Turkish government into a sort of conditional capitulation. Realizing the squadron would not be withdrawn or stop at Piraeus, and that the old game of delay would no longer suffice -- at least for the present -- Abdul Hamid gave in as he had in November, 1901, to the advent of naval power. Rooseveltian marlinspike diplomacy had succeeded again.

On the afternoon of the 11th the Sultan sent one of his private secretaries to see Leishman, and after a long conversation the secretary submitted an informal memorandum. In it Abdul Hamid declared "that there should be no distinction between American schools and those of other nationalities." However, the Sultan also informed Leishman that Turkey would be unable to raise the rank of its Minister in Washington to the ambassadorial level because of financial considerations. This, of course, would in turn prevent the United States from raising its representation in Constantinople -- a condition which did not at all appeal to the ambitious Leishman.³⁰

He cabled Hay that the capitulation, once one had delved beneath its surface compliance, was "rather ambiguous and misleading." In his conversation with the secretary Leishman had come to the conclusion that the memorandum gave less than what the French had secured after the Mytilene incident, and that there still would be many problems for American schools in the Empire. He was none too happy with the Sultan's refusal to raise the level of Turkish representation, and he saw problems if he was denied access to Abdul Hamid in the future. Leishman told the secretary he wished his objections to the memorandum be submitted to the Sultan, and an acceptable answer be "furnished by formal note through the Minister for Foreign Affairs."³¹

The general tenor of Leishman's interpretation of the Turkish submission was a negative one, and he warned Hay

that if matters were "not definitely settled" he would ask Jewell "to send a ship to take me off."³²

Leishman once described himself as feeling like a shuttlecock flying between the Sultan and the Porte, but his performance in the past few days could be equally given that same interpretation. Previously an advocate of strong measures, he had temporized when they were finally introduced. Now, faced with a partial success, he had again hardened his attitude. For Roosevelt and Hay the problem was similar to Griscom's in 1900; i.e., to force the Turkish government to act, but not force it into a position which did not allow it enough room to save face.

Unlike his minister, Hay felt the Sultan had "virtually agreed to all our demands," and that the surrender was sufficiently complete. He did not share Leishman's suspicions, and in any case they "did not justify a break of diplomatic relations." Roosevelt agreed and when Hay showed him a cable he intended to send Leishman, ordering him to accept the first note, the President, fearing he still might leave his post, "seized the despatch and wrote it all over again."³³

The cable which Roosevelt rewrote informed Leishman that the United States did not regard the first memorandum unfavorably, and because of this he "would not be justified to leave" Turkey. The matter of raising American representation was to be left in abeyance. Allowing the Turks to win on this point would permit them to keep a modicum of face.

Leishman was further instructed to inform Jewell that his warships were no longer needed and he could withdraw from Smyrna. He was told to advise the Porte that the fleet was being withdrawn because of the acceptable response contained in the note of the 11th; however, if these agreements were not carried out Leishman was to warn Turkey that the President would be forced to lay the entire matter before the Congress.³⁴ It was a threat which, by its very ambiguousness, could mean anything -- even a declaration of war.

On the morning of the 13th Leishman cabled that he had received another note, this time directly from Tewfik Pasha, which attempted to answer Leishman's objections to the first memorandum. The Foreign Minister especially tried to make clear that it had "never entered into the intention of the imperial Government to treat on a different basis the schools, the institutions and the citizens of the United States in the Empire." Leishman told Hay he hesitated to recommend the administration accept this clarification. He would have been willing to take what the Turks now offered before the present crisis, but since the United States had the Sultan quite obviously on the run perhaps even greater concessions might be gained.³⁵

When Hay received this last despatch it was at once evident that Leishman had not gotten the Secretary's cable of the 12th and was still pressing the Turkish government for more concessions. Hay immediately sent a second despatch directing Leishman "to accept the Porte's first note with

our own interpretation," and repeating his order to have the warships withdraw. The Secretary wrote in his diary that he hoped this would close the school question for a while. But, he noted ominously, "not forever, for the Sultan must grow wise and honest, before we can be at peace with him altogether."³⁶

A somewhat chagrined but still obstinate Leishman finally replied, accepting Hay's orders, but hinting that if he had been allowed to take matters to the breaking point he might have obtained a better settlement. Leishman told Tewfik Pasha on the afternoon of the 13th that the United States accepted the agreement outlined in the Sultan's memorandum of the 11th and would order its warships to immediately leave Smyrna.³⁷

In a despatch sent on the 15th Leishman again pointed out that the agreement was "not as satisfactory as he hoped for, but was the best obtainable without resorting to extreme measures which he judged the Department wished to avoid." He reasoned that the main problem now would be to have the agreement "put into execution." For Leishman the apparent end of the problem only increased his disenchantment in trying to work with the Turkish government. One could not deal with them, he wrote Hay, as one could deal with other nations. He seemed to be unsure how he should act with the Sultan and the Porte in the future, and he asked the State Department to send him instructions "as to the line of action it wishes me to pursue."³⁸

Leishman's doubts were answered in part by a soothing letter sent by Hay on August 22nd which attempted to put the settlement into its proper perspective. Hay admitted the agreement had "not brought in the millenium," but the United States had "accomplished a great deal" and had put itself in a much better position in Turkey. He told him the President could go to Congress during the winter "and get authority for the next step required." Hay did not elaborate on what this next step might be, but to Leishman it obviously meant stronger action. As for now, Hay wrote, he should not do or say anything which would throw doubt on the idea that the United States had received anything but a satisfactory settlement.³⁹

The apparent triumph of Roosevelt's and Hay's diplomacy was, on the whole, greeted enthusiastically by the nation's press. The New York Tribune called the settlement, "A Triumph For Mr. Hay." In an editorial it said the President and the Secretary of State had "gained a noble victory for the rights and honor and dignity of the nation."⁴⁰

The Brooklyn Eagle, however, saw the guns of Jewell's squadron aimed more at Judge Parker, Roosevelt's Democratic opponent in the campaign, than Abdul Hamid. We could have attained an adequate settlement "at pretty nearly any time," avowed the Eagle, and it seemed quite suspicious that the incident had suddenly burst upon the nation so near the election. The Detroit Free Press, like the Eagle a newspaper with Democratic sympathies, took a different view.

"That drastic measures should have become necessary just on the eve of a political campaign may perhaps be unfortunate," it judged, "but it does not necessarily follow that there is any political significance."⁴¹

It was the New York Times which came closest to the mark when it prophesied that there would be no permanence in the solution gained by Roosevelt. The Empire had been humiliated by the American display of naval power, and it warned that an "exhorted assent leaves him who yields it in no amiable frame of mind." The Times judgement was to prove correct, for as soon as Jewell's warships departed the same old series of delays and procrastinations began anew, and Leishman soon found himself more or less back in the same position he had been before.⁴² There was to be no next step for Turkey. By 1905 the election was over and Roosevelt had moved on to playing for larger stakes in the world, and the President was too perceptive to involve himself permanently in a minor backwater at the expense of other, more profitable, game. In truth, the Ottoman Empire was almost incapable of dealing with other states on a rational diplomatic level. Its internal order was rapidly breaking down, and the central authority in Constantinople unable to look beyond the narrow world of palace intrigue.

With the incident seemingly settled Barker's battle-ships left Gibraltar on August 13th and headed back across the Atlantic. Before dispersing his command for a much needed

refit he took the Battleship Squadron to New York in September in order to celebrate the launching of the new battleship Connecticut. It was perhaps as good a way as any to officially end the largest and most wide-ranging voyage of American warships ever seen outside of the Western Hemisphere, for the Connecticut was to be the flagship of another, even greater, fleet which Roosevelt would send on an epic round the world cruise three years later.⁴³ To the President the Turkish affair had been a qualified success, and, when added to the international prestige gathered by the cruise and the rescue of Perdicaris, it could only be viewed as an eminently felicitous employment of the new American naval power. This first use of the big stick in the Mediterranean would give Roosevelt increasing confidence in the power and range of his fleet, and it would be increasingly employed by him in the next four years.

At home Roosevelt would use the success of the cruise as an election issue with which to attack the opposition. At one point the Democrats accused him of not providing adequate efforts to protect American citizens abroad. Roosevelt answered that in making this charge the Democrats were showing "ignorance of the facts or insincerity. Do they object," he charged, "to the fact that American warships appeared promptly at the port of Beirut when an effort had been made to assassinate an American official, and in the port of Tangier when an American had been abducted, and that in each case the wrong complained of was righted and expiated, and

that within the last few days the visit of an American squadron to Smyrna was followed by the long delayed concession" from Turkey?⁴⁴ It was a record of minor triumphs which few could argue with, and all achieved at little cost.

In Europe the cruise had a much more important impact. The sudden appearance of the fleet in the Mediterranean during the summer of 1904 gave Europeans notice that the United States was a world power in the fullest sense. No longer would it be confined to its own hemisphere and to occasional and halting inroads into the Far East. Europe must now confront this power in its own province. The uneasiness felt in Europe was mirrored in apprehensive press comment after the fleet had left. In Germany the Hamburger Nachrichten, conveniently forgetting the recent proclivities of its own ruler, complained that "American arrogance in recent years has been increased to an unendurable extent." The National Zeitung (Berlin) saw strong imperialistic pressure in America as forcing "Roosevelt to vindicate the freedom of the American citizen even beneath the crescent."⁴⁵

Le Figaro (Paris) agreed, and wrote that "these movements of the American fleet were dictated by considerations of domestic policy rather than by diplomatic necessities." These "repeated interventions in European politics," it acidly reported, "singularly flatter Yankee Jingoism." In Russia the departure of the fleet from the Mediterranean was greeted with undisguised relief. The semi-official Vienna daily Fremdenblatt's analysis of the cruise contained

a warning for the European powers. The American navy, it said, was the primary instrument of Roosevelt's foreign policy, and the President unfortunately had come to view this fleet of his "as a bulwark of peace." Europe must be cautious in reacting to it for "the laurels of war are highly prized in this modern Carthage."⁴⁶

Only in England was the new American naval presence greeted with something less than fear and suspicion.

"America," affirmed The Spectator, "has become one of the great civilized Powers, and the first claim of every such Power is that it is entitled to act throughout the world as seems best to itself in pursuit of its own purposes and the general interests of civilization." Europe had no right to order the United States not to interfere in its politics, and it must instead treat her "as an honoured member of that great European family which claims the primacy of the world."⁴⁷

The editorial judgements found in the European press added a fitting postscript to the cruise of the fleet. The Roosevelt administration had proved the long-range effectiveness of the American navy, and the President's decisions to use the fleet in naval demonstrations against Morocco and Turkey underlined this effectiveness. The voyage had been a first-hand exhibition that the United States was a world power. Europe could hardly ignore its implications.

FOOTNOTES

For the most part footnotes are in brief form, and it is necessary to refer to the Bibliography for full citation. For example: books are generally described by giving the last name of the author, first word in the title, and page number (Griscom, Diplomatically, 147); articles by the last name of the author, first word of the article's title, name of the periodical (usually abbreviated), and page number (Perdicaris, "Morocco," National Geographic, 197-8). There are variations on this rule where further clarity is necessitated.

The most frequently used official documents are the despatches from U. S. ministers and consuls to the State Department. Their use will be indicated by the date sent, and the heading Despatches/Tangier, or Despatches/Turkey, etc. Communications from British ambassadors and ministers to the Foreign Office will be indicated by the abbreviation F. O.

The designation Area File 4, refers to the Area Files of the Naval Records Collection, Geographical Area 4.

Unless otherwise noted, such as in the case of a diary, all references from collections of personal papers are from general correspondence.

INTRODUCTION

¹The Spectator, XCII (June 18, 1904), 950.

CHAPTER I. THE ROOSEVELT NAVY

¹"Morocco," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th ed., X, 982-3.

²R. G. 45, Entry 290, Cruising Reports of Vessels, IV.

³Ibid.; quote, H. C. Taylor to W. H. Moody, 2/29/04, Moody Papers.

⁴Hamersly, Records, 16-7; Biography ("ZB") File; quotes, T. R. to Mahan, 5/3/1897, Morison, Letters, I, 607.

⁵Annual Reports of the Navy Dept., 1904, 523, 526-7; Barker to Moody, 1/10/04, Area File 4.

⁶Annual Reports of the Navy Dept., 1904, 526-7; quote, Ibid., 526.

⁷Barker, Everyday, 396; bathtub, Alden, Amer. Steel Navy, 117-8.

⁸T. R. to Dewey, 2/20/04, Dewey Papers.

⁹Barker, Everyday, 396; Taylor biography, Hamersly, Records, 22; Taylor quotes, Taylor to Moody, 2/29/04, Moody Papers.

¹⁰Barker, Everyday, 396.

¹¹"visit," Moody to Hay, 2/20/04, Area File 4; "by far," Hay to Bryan (U. S. Minister to Portugal), 4/14/04, Foreign Relations, 1904, 277; South Atlantic Squadron, Chadwick to Moody, 5/7/04, R. G. 313, Entry 85, Corr., South Atlantic Sq.

¹²Alden, Amer. Steel Navy, 93-4, 366; quote, Roscoe and Freeman, A Picture History, Plate No. 935.

¹³Alden, Amer. Steel Navy, 12-6, 370.

¹⁴Ibid., 31-2.

¹⁵Ibid., 77-8.

¹⁶Ibid., 55, 65-7; quote, Ibid., 58.

¹⁷United States Naval Institute Proceedings, XXX (March, 1904), 235; Alden, Amer. Steel Navy, 89, 135-6, 368-9; Brassey, Brassey's Annual, 1904, 28-30.

¹⁸Sprouts', Rise, See Chapter 15.

¹⁹Ibid., See Chapter 11.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹quote, Mahan to Samuel Ashe, 3/11/1885, Ashe Papers, as quoted in, Karsten, Naval Aristocracy, 334.

²²Stevens and Westcott, A History of Sea Power, 255-62; quote, Ibid., 262.

²³Ibid., 263-87.

²⁴"reaction," Sprouts' Rise, 245; "frankly," Ibid., 246; "only lukewarm," T. R. to Mahan, 6/9/1897, Morison, Letters, I, 622; Sprouts' Rise, 249; "Mahan's philosophy," Ibid., 250.

²⁵Putnam, T. R., 47-9, 216-7; Harbaugh, Power, 7-8; "favourite," T. R. to Anna Roosevelt, 8/21/1881, Morison, Letters, I, 50.

²⁶"toward," T. R. to Mahan, 5/17/1897, Ibid., I, 611; "is no question," T. R. to Mahan, 3/21/1898, Ibid., I, 797.

²⁷"stressed," Millis, Arms and Men, 145; "destruction," Sprouts' Rise, 254; Also see, Karsten, Naval Aristocracy, 326-47, for a fuller explanation of Mahan's ideas. Levy, Alfred T. Mahan, gives an excellent in-depth study.

²⁸"the proper," Proceedings of the General Board of the Navy, 12/5/03.

The General Board of the Navy was established in early 1900. Its purpose was to give the Navy a central conceptual center in which to deal with the problems of naval warfare and growth. It could be likened to the General Staff concept which had widespread influence on military thinking in this era.

²⁹"think," as quoted in Morison, Letters, I, 283; Also see, Taylor, "The Fleet," U.S.N.I.P., (December, 1903), 799-807; "our first," T. R. to Dewey, 6/14/02, Morison, Letters, III, 275; Also see, T. R. to Senator Platt, 6/28/02, Ibid., 283.

³⁰"If," as quoted in, Brebner, North Atlantic, 262.

³¹"an attempt," Proceedings of the General Board of the Navy, 5/21/1900; "that the," Ibid., 7/29/03; Also see, Challener, Admirals, Chapter I.

³²Grenville and Young, Politics, 305-7; quote, Ibid., 306.

³³Jane, "The Jane Naval War Game," U.S.N.I.P., (September, 1903), 595-660.

³⁴"the dramatic," and "of no visible," Millis, Arms and Men, 154; "cutting edge," Karsten, Naval Aristocracy, 142.

³⁵quote, Brogan, The Development, I, 315.

³⁶Pilapil, Spain, 36-7; quote, Ibid., 36.

³⁷"received," Alden, Amer. Steel Navy, 18; European Sq., Livermore, American Naval Development, 105; "appearance," Livermore, "The Amer. Navy," A.H.R., 865.

The term "European Squadron" had been used by the Navy to designate the employment of warships on the European Station throughout the nineteenth century. However, until 1901, there had never been a permanent squadron on duty.

³⁸Livermore, "The Amer. Navy," A.H.R., 866; "Do not," T. R. to Hay, 5/2/03, Morison, Letters, III, 473.

³⁹Livermore, "The Amer. Navy," A.H.R., 865-9.

⁴⁰Ibid., 869; Cotton's report on the affair, R. G. 45, Subject File VI, Box IX, Syria.

⁴¹Mytilene, see N.Y. Times, 10/30/01 to 11/11/01; for missionary pressure, T. R.'s personal diplomacy, and factors relating to the removal of the squadron, see Chapter VIII.

⁴²T. R.'s Jewish protest, Bailey, A Diplomatic History, 511.

⁴³"Within," Hay to Leishman, 5/24/04, Hay Papers.

⁴⁴"certain," Nouva Antologia (Rome), as quoted in, "The United States and the Mediterranean," Review of Reviews, XXX (September, 1904), 358.

CHAPTER II. PREPARATIONS FOR A CRUISE

¹"in my," T. R. to Paul Morton, Morison, Letters, IV, 847; Malone, Dictionary of Amer. Biography, XIII, 107-8.

²Moody to Hay, 2/20/04, Area File 4.

³Ibid.

⁴Hay to Moody, 2/26/04, Domestic Letters of the Dept. of State.

⁵Hay to Storer, 2/26/04, For. Rel., 1904, 44.

⁶Bailey, Diplomatic, 516-9.

⁷Boulger, "Coming," The Nineteenth Cent., 568; McCormick to Hay, 4/14/04, Despatches/Russia.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Novoe Vyrema (St. Petersburg), as quoted in, McCormick to Hay, 8/13/04, Despatches/Russia.

¹⁰Hay to Bryan, 6/22/03, For. Rel., 1904, 256; Bryan to Hay, 1/20/04, Ibid., 270; Bryan to Hay, 3/22/04, Despatches/Portugal.

¹¹Storer to Hay, 4/14/04, For. Rel., 1904, 45; quotes, Mérey to Storer, 4/12/04, as contained in Ibid.

¹²Ibid.; Hay to Moody, 4/26/04, Area File 4; Moody to Hay, 4/29/04, Ibid.; Storer to Hay, 4/30/04, Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Taylor to Moody, 2/29/04, Moody Papers.

¹⁶Taylor to Moody, 3/2/04, Ibid.; Annual Reports of the Navy Dept., 1904, 527; Barker, Everyday, 396.

¹⁷Who Was Who in America, 1897-1942, I, 267; Hamersly, Records, 150.

¹⁸N.Y. Times, 3/30/04 (6:3); Also see, N.Y. Times, 3/23/04 (5:1).

¹⁹N.Y. Times, 3/30/04 (6:3).

²⁰Moody to Dewey, 3/25/04, Dewey Papers; Dewey to Moody, 3/26/04, Ibid.

²¹T. R. to Cowles, 4/1/04, Morison, Letters, IV, 766-7.

²²N.Y. Times, 4/5/04 (1:2); T. R. to Moody, 4/3/04, Morison, Letters, IV, 767; N.Y. Times, 4/7/04 (5:2); quote, Ibid., 4/5/04 (1:2).

²³Barker, Everyday, 397; Annual Reports of the Navy Dept., 1904, 527.

²⁴N.Y. Times, 4/17/04 (1:4); Ibid., 4/18/04 (1:3).

²⁵N.Y. Times, 4/14/04 (1:1).

²⁶Ibid.; Ibid., 4/15/04 (1:1).

- ²⁷Ibid.; Barker, Everyday, 398.
- ²⁸N.Y. Times, 4/14/04 (1:1); Ibid, 4/15/04 (1:1).
- ²⁹Barker, Everyday, 398; N.Y. Times, 4/19/04 (3:5); quote, Ibid., 5/3/04 (9:5).
- ³⁰Barker, Everyday, 398-9.
- ³¹N.Y. Times, 4/14/04 (1:1).
- ³²Annual Reports of the Navy Dept., 1904, 482; Jewell biography, Hamersly, Records, 101-2; Biography ("ZB") File.
- ³³Annual Reports of the Navy Dept., 1904, 528; R. G. 24, Entry 118, Deck Log of the Olympia, May, 1904.
- ³⁴Barker, Everyday, 399.
- ³⁵Annual Reports of the Navy Dept., 1904, 542; Chadwick biography, Hamersly, Records, 97; Biography ("ZB") File; Malone, Dic. of Amer. Biog., III, 586; quote, Ibid.
- ³⁶quote, Thomas Ray Dille to Charles A. Paullin, 12/4/1928, Biography ("ZB") File; Malone, Dic. of Amer. Biog., III, 587; T. R. to Chadwick, 9/13/1897, Morison, Letters, I, 674; T. R. to Chadwick, 11/4/1897, Ibid., 707; Cornelia J. Chadwick to Hay, 5/30/04, Hay Papers.
- ³⁷Annual Reports of the Navy Dept., 1904, 542; plan of operations, Chadwick to Moody, 5/7/04, and Chadwick to Moody, 4/18/04, R. G. 313, Entry 85, Corr., South Atlantic Sq.
- ³⁸flags, Chadwick to Moody, 5/6/04, R. G. 313, Entry 85, Corr., South Atlantic Sq.; Hay to Leishman, 5/24/04, Hay Papers.
- ³⁹Dorn biography, Hamersly, Records, 233; See Dorn diary, 5/17/04 to 5/26/04, Dorn Papers; "never," Dorn diary, 5/25/04, Dorn Papers; "We," Ibid., 5/26/04.
- ⁴⁰Annual Reports of the Navy Dept., 1904, 543.
- ⁴¹Ibid., 528.
- ⁴²Barker, Everyday, 400; quote, Ibid.

CHAPTER III. A KIDNAPPING

¹Harper's Weekly, XLVIII (June 4, 1904), 853-4; The World (New York), 6/4/04 (7:5).

²Boston Globe, 5/21/04 (2:2); The World (New York), 6/4/04 (7:5); Boston Transcript, 4/27/87 (1:6); New York Times, 4/27/87 (5:4); Tuchman, "Perdicaris," Amer. Heritage, 21; Harvard University, Class of 1860; Report of 1866, 72; Ibid., Report of 1895, 49.

³Harvard University, Class of 1860; General File.

⁴Ibid., Personnel File; Davis, "Citizenship," J. M. H.

⁵Tuchman, "Perdicaris," American Heritage, 21.

⁶Varley biography, Stephens and Lee, Dic. of National Biog., XX, 149-50; Harvard University, Class of 1860; Report of 1895, 50.

⁷quotes, Perdicaris, "Present Aspect," Imperial and Asiatic, VII (Jan. - April, 1899), 343-4; Perdicaris, "Tangier," Putnam's 22-9; Harper's Weekly, XLVIII (June 4, 1904), 853.

⁸Tuchman, "Perdicaris," Amer. Heritage, 21; The Sun (N.Y.), 5/22/04 (3:1); Boston Globe, 5/21/04 (11:1); Washington Post, 5/21/04 (1:6).

⁹quote, letter from Linn B. Porter, Harvard University, Class of 1860; Report of 1910, 104; The World (N.Y.), 5/21/04 (1:8); Tuchman, "Perdicaris," Amer. Heritage, 21.

¹⁰Nicolson, Portrait, 111.

¹¹Boston Globe, 5/21/04 (11:1); quote, Tuchman, "Perdicaris," Amer. Heritage, 21; The World (N.Y.), 5/21/04 (1:8).

¹²Harvard University, Class of 1860; Report of 1910, 104.

¹³"from," Harper's Weekly, XLVIII (June 4, 1904), 853; Boston Globe, 5/21/04 (11:1); "Street," Perdicaris, "The Sultan and the Bashadours," Imperial and Asiatic, XIII (Jan. - April, 1902), 302; "active," Harvard University, Class of 1860, Report of 1895, 49.

- ¹⁴Ibid.; Hall, U. S. and Morocco, 238-40; New York Tribune, 6/22/04 (10:1).
- ¹⁵New York Tribune, 6/22/04 (10:1); Hall, U. S. and Morocco, 238-40.
- ¹⁶New York Tribune, 6/22/04 (10:1).
- ¹⁷Ibid.; Harvard University, Class of 1860, Report of 1895, 50; Hall, U. S. and Morocco, 238-40.
- ¹⁸Perdicaris, American Claims, 9.
- ¹⁹Ibid., 16; citizenship, Ibid., 23.
- ²⁰See Bibliography for list of articles by Perdicaris during these years.
- ²¹quote, Perdicaris, "Land of Paradox," Imperial and Asiatic, XVII (Jan. - April, 1904), 123.
- ²²"Morocco," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 13th ed., XVII, 857-8.
- ²³Hoffman, Realm, 192-3, 196.
- ²⁴Ibid., 197-6.
- ²⁵Nicolson, Portrait, 87-8.
- ²⁶Harris, Morocco That Was, 81.
- ²⁷Hoffman, Realm, 198.
- ²⁸"very," as quoted in, Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, 736; Hoffman, Realm, 198.
- ²⁹Langer, Diplomacy, 736-7.
- ³⁰quote, Nicolson, Portrait, 101; Langer, Diplomacy, 737; Taylor, "British Policy," English Historical Review.
- ³¹Nicolson, Portrait, 84.
- ³²"in the event," as quoted in, Ibid., 108; Ibid., 109-10; German Reaction, Eubank, Camhon, 88-9.
- ³³Ibid., 88.
- ³⁴weather, Al-Moghreb Al-Aska (Tangier), 5/21/04 (1:2), Perdicaris, "In Raisuli's," Leslie's, 511.

³⁵"a fiery," New York Tribune, 6/14/04 (3:1);
 "irritated," Perdicaris, "Morocco," National Geographic, 141;
 "zouave," Perdicaris, "In Raisuli's," Leslie's, 511.

³⁶Perdicaris, "Morocco," National Geographic, 142;
 Perdicaris, "In Raisuli's," Leslie's, 511; Also see, Varley,
 "Captured," The Independent.

³⁷quote, Perdicaris, "Morocco," National Geographic,
 142.

³⁸"particularly," as quoted in, Furneaux, Abdel Krim,
 35; Also see, Harris, "Raisuli," The Independent; Forbes,
The Sultan, Chapter VII; "Perfect Gentlemen," Current Lit.,
 (December, 1907).

³⁹Ibid.; quote, Forbes, The Sultan, 62.

⁴⁰Harris, "Raisuli," The Independent, 201-2.

⁴¹quote, Perdicaris, "In Raisuli's," Leslie's, 512;
 Perdicaris, "Morocco," National Geographic, 144-7.

CHAPTER IV. "WARSHIPS WILL BE SENT"

¹Twain, Innocents, 67.

²Malone, Dic. of Amer. Biog., VIII, 50; family tie,
 Gummeré to Loomis, 5/20/04, Despatches/Tangier.

³"brilliant," Malone, Dic. of Amer. Biog., VIII, 50;
 Dorn diary, 5/31/04, Dorn Papers.

⁴Gummeré to Hill (Assistant Sec. of State), 4/4/1899,
 and Thomas W. Cridler (Third Assistant Sec. of State) to the
 Secretary of the Navy, 4/29/1899, R. G. 45, Sub. File VI,
 Box V, Morocco.

⁵Gummeré to Loomis, 5/20/04, Despatches/Tangier.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Stephens and Lee, Dic. of Nat'l Biog., XXXVII,
 637-8; Nicolson, Portrait; quote, Nicolson, Diaries, 21.

⁸Gummeré to Loomis, 5/20/04, Despatches/Tangier;
 "gravity," Nicolson to Foreign Office, 5/21/04, F. O. 99
 (413).

⁹Gummeré to Loomis, 5/20/04, Despatches/Tangier.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Nicolson to Foreign Office, 5/21/04, F. O. 99 (413); "a general," Foreign Office to Nicolson, 5/21/04, F. O. 99 (415); "for the," Nicolson to Foreign Office, 5/22/04, F. O. 99 (416); torpedo boat, New York Tribune, 5/21/04 (3:4).

¹²T. R. to Hay, 5/2/03, Morison, Letters, III, 473; Adams, Education, 417; Hay Diary, 5/12/04 to 5/23/04, Hay Papers.

¹³Loomis to Sec. Nav., 5/19/04, Domestic Letters of the Dept. of State; Taylor meeting, New York Tribune, 5/21/04 (3:4); Chadwick to Moody, 5/31/04, Area File 4.

¹⁴Tuchman, "Perdicaris," Amer. Heritage, 19.

¹⁵Kean, New York Times, 5/21/04 (1); Dryden, Public Ledger (Philadelphia), 5/21/04 (13:1); Lanning, Ibid.

¹⁶Cleveland Plain Dealer, 5/23/04 (4:2).

¹⁷Boston Globe, 5/21/04 (6:2); The World (N. Y.), 5/23/04 (6:1); Washington Times, 5/21/04 (6:1).

¹⁸Daily True American (Trenton, N. J.), 5/20/04 (4:2); Ibid., 5/21/04 (4:2).

¹⁹Perdicaris, "In Raisuli's," Leslie's, 513.

²⁰Perdicaris, "Morocco," National Geographic, 147-8; Perdicaris, "In Raisuli's," Leslie's, 513.

²¹Ibid., 514; Perdicaris, "Morocco," National Geographic, 148.

²²Ibid., 149; Perdicaris, "In Raisuli's," Leslie's, 514.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Perdicaris, "Morocco," National Georgraphic, 150.

²⁵Nicolson to Foreign Office, 5/26/04, paraphrase of telegram contained in Choate to Hay, 5/27/04, Despatches/G. B.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸quotes, Nicolson to Foreign Office (Sanderson), 5/22/04, F. O. 99 (413); Gummeré to Loomis, 5/23/04, Despatches/Tangier; Wazan, Chadwick to Moody, 5/31/04, Area File 4.

²⁹Nicolson to Foreign Office, 5/26/04, F. O. 99 (412).

³⁰Ibid.; Nicolson to Foreign Office, 5/26/04, F.O. 99 (416).

³¹"in all," Nicolson to Foreign Office, 5/26/04, F. O. 99 (416); "difficult," Nicolson to Foreign Office, 5/26/04, F. O. 99 (412).

³²Gummeré to Loomis, 5/26/04, Despatches/Tangier.

³³The Times (London), 5/26/04 (3:4); Ibid., 5/27/04 (3:5).

³⁴Gummeré to Loomis, 5/26/04, Despatches/Tangier.

³⁵Foreign Office to Nicolson, 5/28/04, F. O. 99 (415).

³⁶Hay diary, 5/28/04, Hay Papers; Hay to Moody, 5/28/04, Domestic Letters of the Dept. of State.

³⁷Taillandier to Delcassé, 5/19/04, Documents Diplomatiques; Affaires de Maroc, 1901-06, 135; For entire published correspondence see Ibid., 135-58; Le Temps (Paris), 5/21/04 (1:2); Gummeré to Loomis, 5/23/04, Despatches/Tangier.

³⁸Ibid.; "infusion," Nicolson to Foreign Office, 5/26/04, F. O. 99 (412); Le Temps (Paris), 5/24/04 (1:2).

³⁹Hay diary, 5/28/04, Hay Papers; For. Rel., 1904, 307-8.

⁴⁰The Times (London), 6/2/04 (5:4); New York Tribune, 6/1/04 (1:1).

⁴¹The Sun (New York), 6/2/04 (6:1).

⁴²Porter and Delcassé, Hall, U. S. and Morocco, 340; Cambon to Delcassé, 5/29/04, as quoted in, Ibid., 381.

CHAPTER V. EUROPE LOOKS ON

- ¹Chadwick to Moody, 5/31/04, Area File 4.
- ²Gummeré to Loomis, 6/3/04, Despatches/Tangier.
- ³Ibid.
- ⁴Ibid.
- ⁵Chadwick to Moody, 5/31/04, Area File 4.
- ⁶The Times (London), 6/1/04 (5:6); New York Tribune, 6/1/04 (2:3).
- ⁷Gummeré to Loomis 5/31/04, Despatches/Tangier; Nicolson to Foreign Office, 6/3/04, F. O. 99 (416).
- ⁸Al-Moghreb Al-Aska (Tangier), 6/4/04 (1:1).
- ⁹Perdicaris, "Morocco," National Geographic, 153.
- ¹⁰New York Evening Journal, 6/1/04 (2); New York Tribune, 6/1/04 (1:1); Ibid., 6/2/04 (6:3).
- ¹¹cavalry, The World (New York), 5/30/04 (1:4); invasion, Ibid., 5/31/04 (1:8).
- ¹²quotes, Le Temps (Paris), 6/1/04 (2:1); Spanish reaction, Jules Cambon to Delcassé, 6/1/04, see Hall, U. S. and Morocco, 340, 381.
- ¹³Cortes, The Sun (New York), 6/3/04 (2:5); Cambon to Delcassé, 6/6/04, see Hall, U. S. and Morocco, 340, 381.
- ¹⁴rumors, New York Tribune, 6/9/04 (1:1); Choate, Ibid., 6/7/04 (3:1); Ojeda, Ibid., 6/9/04 (3:3); Army and Navy Journal, XLI (June 11, 1904), 1071.
- ¹⁵Le Temps (Paris), 6/7/04 (2:3).
- ¹⁶New York Tribune, 6/9/04 (3:3); Also see, Public Ledger (Philadelphia), 6/8/04 (8:7).
- ¹⁷The Times (London), 6/6/04 (5:5); The Sun (New York), 6/6/04 (1); Maura, Ibid., 6/7/04 (4:1); second sq., Le Temps (Paris), 6/9/04 (2:3); "El Solatario," Wilson, Downfall, 60.
- ¹⁸Hall, U. S. and Morocco, 340; Washington Post, 6/5/04 (3:3); Le Temps (Paris), 6/5/04 (1:1); Ibid., 6/10/04 (1:2); Also see, New York Tribune, 6/5/04 (5:1).

- ¹⁹Delcassé, Public Ledger (Philadelphia), 6/2/04 (4:1); Delcassé to Talandier, 6/9/04, see Hall, U. S. and Morocco, 340, 381; New York Tribune, 6/11/04 (3:4).
- ²⁰Army and Navy Journal, XLI (June 18, 1904), 1095.
- ²¹weather, R. G. 24, Entry 118, Deck log of the Kearsarge, 6/1/04; "permanent," Alden, Amer. Steel Navy, 316.
- ²²National Cyclopaedia, XII, 452.
- ²³Barker, Everyday, 401; R. G. 24, Entry 118, Deck log of the Kearsarge, 6/1/04; Barker to Moody, 6/6/04, Area File 4.
- ²⁴Barker, Everyday, 401.
- ²⁵Ibid., 401-2.
- ²⁶R. G. 24, Entry 118, Deck log of the Kearsarge, 6/11/04; Barker, Everyday, 402; "as the," Novidades (Lisbon), 6/14/04, see Bryan to Hay, 6/21/04, Despatches/Portugal; "much" and "understood," Barker, Everyday, 402; Barker to Moody, 6/13/04, Area File 4; Gosselin to Foreign Office, 6/14/04, F. O. 63 (1411).
- ²⁷"In order," "leading," "gentlemen," Barker to Moody, 6/19/04, Area File 4; "Dukes," "were," Barker, Everyday, 402.
- ²⁸Bryan to Hay, 6/21/04, Despatches/Portugal.
- ²⁹Liberal (Lisbon), 6/1/04, see Ibid.
- ³⁰Novidades (Lisbon), 6/14/04, and Tarde (Lisbon), 6/15/04, see Ibid.
- ³¹Diario De Noticias (Lisbon), 6/16/04, see Ibid.
- ³²New York Times, 7/10/04 (5:7); Also see, Army and Navy Journal, XLI (July 16, 1904), 1195.
- ³³The World (New York), 6/8/04 (1:3); New York Tribune, 6/8/04 (3:2); Ibid., 6/12/04 (4:2); Barker to Moody, 6/6/04, Area File 4; Washington Post, 6/12/04 (3:1); The World (New York), 6/12/04 (8:1).
- ³⁴New York Tribune, 6/12/04 (4:2).
- ³⁵Gummeré to Loomis, 5/31/04, Despatches/Tangier.
- ³⁶Hay diary, 5/31/04 to 6/1/04, Hay Papers.

³⁷The World (New York), 5/31/04 (1:8); Boston Globe, 5/31/04 (1:1); Washington Times, 6/1/04 (1:1).

³⁸Dogali, New York Tribune, 6/3/04 (3:4); The Daily Mail (London), 6/12/04.

³⁹"say," Nicolson to Foreign Office, 6/3/04, paraphrase of telegram contained in, Choate to Hay, 6/3/04, Despatches/G. B.; Gummeré to Hay, 6/3/04, Despatches/Tangier; "of," Nicolson to Foreign Office, 6/4/04, F. O. 99 (412).

⁴⁰Nicolson to Foreign Office, 6/5/04, F. O. 99 (416); Deck Log of Prince of Wales, 6/7/04, Adm 53.

⁴¹R. L. Sprague to Loomis, 6/7/04, Despatches/Gibraltar; New York Times, 6/7/04 (3:1).

⁴²Gummeré to Hay, 6/9/04, Despatches/Tangier; Gummeré to Grand Vizier, 6/9/04, see Ibid.

⁴³Nicolson to Foreign Office, 6/9/04, F. O. 99 (412); Nicolson to Foreign Office, 6/8/04, F. O. 99 (416); Gummeré to Hay, 6/9/04, Despatches/Tangier; "much," Nicolson to Foreign Office, 6/9/04, F. O. 99 (412); Nicolson to Foreign Office, 6/10/04, F. O. 99 (416); Gummeré to Hay, 6/10/04, Despatches/Tangier.

⁴⁴Gummeré to Hay, 6/9/04, Despatches/Tangier; Nicolson to Foreign Office, 6/9/04, F. O. 99 (416); Nicolson to Foreign Office, 6/9/04, F. O. 99 (412).

⁴⁵New York Tribune, 6/9/04 (1:1); The World (New York), 6/9/04 (1:1); Washington Post, 6/9/04 (1); Baron Moncheur, Ibid.

⁴⁶New York Tribune, 6/10/04 (1:1).

⁴⁷ibid., 6/11/04 (3:4)

⁴⁸Public Ledger (Philadelphia), 6/11/04 (1:5).

⁴⁹Gummeré to Hay, 6/14/04 and 6/15/04, Despatches/Tangier.

CHAPTER VI. "PERDICARIS ALIVE, OR RAISULI DEAD"

¹Muley Ali, Gummeré to Hay, 6/14/04, Despatches/Tangier; "detention," Nicolson to Foreign Office, 6/14/04, paraphrase of telegram contained in, Choate to Hay, 6/15/04, Despatches/G. B.

²Gummeré to Hay, 6/15/04, Despatches/Tangier; Nicolson to Foreign Office, 6/15/04, F. O. 99 (412).

³Gummeré to Hay, 6/15/04, Despatches/Tangier.

⁴Hay diary, 6/15/04, Hay Papers; "You see," as quoted in, Tuchman, "Perdicaris," Amer. Heritage, 99; "Of course," T. R. to Hay, 6/15/04, Roosevelt Papers.

⁵Ibid.

⁶signals, Order No. 293 of the Brooklyn, R. G. 313, Entry 85, pg. 340, Corr., South Atlantic Sq.; "marines," Chadwick to Moody, 6/4/04, R. G. 313, Entry 85, Corr., South Atlantic Sq.

⁷Chadwick to Board, 6/16/04, R. G. 313, Entry 85, Ibid.

⁸Board to Chadwick, 6/24/04, Ibid.

⁹"especially," Nicolson to Foreign Office, 6/15/04, F. O. 99 (416); Darling (Assistant Sec. of Navy) to Hay, 6/16/04, R. G. 45, Entry 20, Confidential Letters, IV; "immediately," Chadwick to U. S. Despatch Agent (London), 6/18/04, R. G. 313, Entry 85, Corr., South Atlantic Sq.; "number," Chadwick to Captain of Brooklyn, 6/18/04, Ibid.

¹⁰Nicolson to Foreign Office, 6/16/04, paraphrase of telegram in, Choate to Hay, 6/18/04, Despatches/G. B.; Al-Moghreb Al-Aska (Tangier), 6/18/04 (1:2); Chadwick to Moody, 6/16/04, Area File 4.

¹¹Ibid.; The Times (London), 6/17/04 (5:4).

¹²Chadwick to Moody, 6/16/04, Area File 4; Nicolson to Foreign Office, 6/16/04, F. O. 99 (416); The Times (London), 6/18/04 (7:4).

¹³Chadwick to Moody, 6/16/04, Area File 4; Gummeré to Hay, 6/17/04, Despatches/Tangier; Nicolson to Foreign Office, 6/17/04, F. O. 99 (416); Hay diary, 6/18/04, Hay Papers.

¹⁴Gummeré to Hay, 6/17/04, Despatches/Tangier; Gummeré to Hay, 6/20/04, Ibid.

¹⁵Gummeré to Hay, 6/20/04, Despatches/Tangier.

¹⁶Deck Log of Prince of Wales, 6/19/04, Adm 53; Barker, Everyday, 403; Barker to Moody, 6/21/04, Area File 4; Barker to Moody, 6/20/04, Ibid.

- 17 Barker to Moody, 6/21/04, Ibid.; Barker to Moody, 6/20/04, Ibid.
- 18 Gummeré to Hay, 6/21/04, Despatches/Tangier.
- 19 Chadwick to Moody, 6/22/04, Area File 4; Dorn diary, 6/21/04, Dorn Papers.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Dorn diary, 6/22/04, Ibid.
- 22 quote, The Times (London), 6/23/04 (5:5).
- 23 Tuchman, "Perdicaris," Amer. Heritage, 100; The Times (London), 6/23/04 (5:5).
- 24 New York Tribune, 6/22/04 (1), (5:6).
- 25 vendors, The Sun (New York), 6/23/04 (2:2); The Candidate, Public Ledger (Philadelphia), 6/23/04 (4:5).
- 26 Washington Times, 6/21/04 (1), (2:1), (6:7).
- 27 New York Tribune, 6/23/04 (2:3); The Sun (New York), 6/23/04 (2:3).
- 28 Ibid., 6/22/04 (1:5); The World (N. Y.), 6/22/04 (1:8).
- 29 Lodge, Daily True American (Trenton, N. J.), 6/23/04 (1:7); plank, Washington Times, 6/24/04 (4:3).
- 30 "and after," Boston Globe, 6/23/04 (4:7); Hay to Gummeré, 6/22/04, Diplomatic Instructions/Tangier.
- 31 New York Tribune, 6/23/04 (2:3); Boston Globe, 6/23/04 (4:7).
- 32 New York Tribune, 6/23/04 (2:3).
- 33 Ibid.; "catch," Washington Times, 6/24/04 (4:3).
- 34 Daily True American (Trenton, N. J.), 6/24/04 (4:2); The World (N. Y.), 6/23/04 (2:4), (1:8).
- 35 Springfield Republican, 6/24/04 (8:1).
- 36 Hall, U. S. and Morocco, 341; Hay to Gummeré, 6/22/04, Diplomatic Instructions/Tangier; Hay diary, 6/23/04, Hay Papers.

³⁷Gummeré to Hay, 6/22/04, Despatches/Tangier.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Chadwick to Mocdy, 7/6/04, Area File 4; The Times (London), 6/25/04 (10:1).

⁴⁰Perdicaris, "Morocco," National Geographic, 154-5.

⁴¹Ibid., 155; The Times (London), 6/25/04 (10:1).

⁴²Perdicaris, "Morocco," National Geographic, 156.

⁴³Chadwick to Hay, 6/25/04, Hay Papers.

⁴⁴The Sun (New York), 6/26/04 (6:1); New York Tribune, 6/26/04 (8:1); Ibid., (3:1).

⁴⁵Barker, Everyday, 403.

⁴⁶Davis, "Citizenship," J. M. H., 518-9; Jackson to Hay, 6/7/04, Despatches/Greece.

⁴⁷Jackson to Hay, 6/10/04, Ibid.

⁴⁸Davis, "Citizenship," J. M. H., 519.

⁴⁹Hay to Adey, 9/3/04, Hay Papers; Tuchman, "Perdicaris," Amer. Heritage, 101; Davis, "Citizenship," J. M. H., 517-20.

⁵⁰Perdicaris, Tuchman, "Perdicaris," Amer. Heritage, 101; Gummeré, Malone, Dic. of Amer. Biog., VIII, 50; Nicolson, Weaver, Dic. of Nat'l Biog., 1922-1930, 638; Tuchman, "Perdicaris," Amer. Heritage, 101.

⁵¹Woolman, Rebels, 45, 47, 49.

⁵²Ibid., 50, 162-3.

⁵³"swollen," Ibid., 163; "I have," Sheean, An American, 296; "be a," Woolman, Rebels, 163.

⁵⁴White to Lansdowne, 6/28/04, F. O. 99 (416); Gummeré to Loomis, 8/1/04, Despatches/Tangier.

⁵⁵See footnotes 7 and 8.

CHAPTER VII. "A BATTLESHIP TO PLAY WITH"

¹Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1905, 397-441 (See Brooklyn, Atlanta, Machias, Castine); Chadwick to Moody, 7/3/04, Area File 4.

²Jewell to Moody, 7/5/04, Area File 4; "that the," The World (N. Y.), 5/19/02 (4:1); R. G. 24, Entry 118, Deck log of the Missouri for June 1904.

³Barker to Moody, 7/6/04, Area File 4; Moody to Hay, 2/20/04, Ibid.; Hay to Moody, 2/26/04, Ibid.

⁴See Despatches/Greece, March-June, 1904.

⁵Hay to Leishman, 5/24/04, Hay Papers.

⁶Ibid.

⁷New York Times, 6/18/04 (9:6); Public Ledger (Philadelphia), 6/22/04 (8:4).

⁸The World (New York), 6/3/04 (7:5); Ibid., 6/26/04 (8:1).

⁹Boston Globe, 6/12/04 (9:8); The World (New York), 6/12/04 (7:1).

¹⁰Pratt, The Navy, 116.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., 116-7.

¹³Background for previous paragraphs, see "Turkey," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th ed., XXII, 369-83.

¹⁴Haslip, The Sultan.

¹⁵Ibid.; match story, Griscom, Diplomatically, 162.

¹⁶Haslip, The Sultan.

¹⁷Griscom, Diplomatically, 147; Pears, Forty, 170-1.

¹⁸Ibid., 171.

¹⁹Griscom, Diplomatically, 134.

²⁰Gordon, American Relations, 236-7.

²¹Ibid., 239-40.

²²Ibid., 240-1; Griscom, Diplomatically, 134; quote from Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy, 43.

²³Ibid., 44; Griscom, Diplomatically, 134.

²⁴quote from Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy, 44; Ibid., 45; Bancroft incident, Rear Admiral Thomas O. Selfridge to Kiamil Pasha, 12/4/1897, R. G. 45, Subject File VI, Box IX, Turkey, Corr. to Affairs in, 1897-1910.

²⁵Gordon, Amer. Relations, 241.

²⁶Ibid., 242.

²⁷Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy, 45; Griscom, Diplomatically, 162-3.

²⁸Ibid., 163-4.

²⁹Ibid., 166-7.

³⁰Ibid., 167, 169.

³¹"to," Ibid., 169; Ibid., 169-72; "few," Ibid., 172.

³²Ibid., 172-3.

³³Ibid., 173.

³⁴Ibid., 176; For correspondence relating to this incident see, "Turkey," For. Rel., 1900, and For. Rel., 1901.

³⁵Hay to Adey, 7/26/04, Hay Papers.

CHAPTER VIII. THE SCHOOL QUESTION

¹Malone, Dic. of Amer. Biog., XI, 155.

²Gordon, Amer. Relations, 243-4; For. Rel., 1902, 997-1023.

³Ibid.

⁴See New York Times, October-November, 1901; Washburn, Fifty Years, 285-6.

⁵Gohier, "American Intervention," North Amer. Review, 626.

⁶T. R. to Sewell, 5/4/1898, Morison, Letters, II, 822; T. R. to Lodge, 1/12/13, Selections From the Corr. of T. R. and Henry Cabot Lodge, II, 430; T. R. to Root, 4/20/1900, Morison, Letters, II, 1268.

⁷Foster, The Practice, 30; See "Turkey," For. Rel., 1903, and For. Rel., 1904.

⁸The Outlook LXXV (September 5, 1903), 12-3; Moody to Cotton, 9/25/03, Area File 4; Cotton to Moody, 10/22/03, Area File 4; For Cotton's report on the incident see, R. G. 45, Subject File VI, Box IX, Syria.

⁹The Times (London), 8/31/03 (3:6).

¹⁰Hay to T. R., 8/31/03, Hay Papers; Hay to T. R., 9/3/03, Ibid.

¹¹New York Times, 9/1/03 (6:1); Also see, The Independent, LV (September 24, 1903), 2297-9; The Outlook, LXXV (Sept. 5, 1903), 12-3.

¹²Berliner Neueste Nachrichten, as quoted in, The Times (London), 9/1/03 (3:4).

¹³Hay to Adee, 9/10/03, Area File 4; Hay to Adee, 9/14/03, Ibid.

¹⁴"wordy," Loomis to Hay, 9/17/03, Hay Papers; Adee to Hay, 9/21/03, Ibid.; Also see, "Turkey," For. Rel., 1904; Cotton's Report, see footnote 8.

¹⁵New York Times, 12/9/03 (8:2); Ibid., 12/17/03 (8:6); Ibid., 12/18/03 (8:7); Ibid., 12/20/03 (9:2); Ibid., 12/23/03 (8:6).

¹⁶Adee to Dodge, 12/7/03, Hay Papers.

¹⁷Leishman to Hay, 12/31/03, Despatches/Turkey.

¹⁸Loomis to Leishman, 1/15/04, Diplomatic Instructions of the Dept. of State/Turkey; Leishman to Hay, 1/17/04, Area File 4; Hay to Moody, 1/18/04, Ibid.

¹⁹"withdrawn," Loomis to Leishman, 1/19/04, Diplomatic Instructions/Turkey; Loomis to Leishman, 1/30/04, Ibid.; Loomis to Hay, 1/21/04, Area File 4; Leishman to Hay, 1/21/04, Despatches/Turkey.

²⁰Leishman to Hay, 1/30/04, Ibid.; Leishman to Hay, 2/6/04, Ibid.

²¹Leishman to Hay, 4/1/04, Ibid.; Leishman to Hay, 4/4/04, Ibid.

²²Hay to Smith, 4/29/04, Domestic Letters of the Dept. of State.

²³Leishman to Hay, 6/5/04, Despatches/Turkey.

²⁴The World (N. Y.), 6/9/04 (3:3); "growl," Hay diary, 6/8/04, Hay Papers; Hay to Leishman, 6/9/04. For. Rel., 1904, 821; Hay diary, 6/9/04, Hay Papers.

²⁵Leishman to Hay, 6/15/04, Despatches/Turkey; Leishman to Hay, 6/17/04, Ibid.; Hay diary, 6/17/04, Hay Papers.

²⁶Hay diary, 6/24/04, Hay Papers.

CHAPTER IX. ROOSEVELT GAMBLES

¹Barker, Everyday, 403; Robinson, A History of Greece, 117, 126.

²Malone, Dic. of Amer. Biog., V, 548-9.

³Jackson to Hay, 7/6/04, Despatches/Greece; Barker, Everyday, 404.

⁴Ibid.; Barker to Moody, 7/8/04, Area File 4.

⁵Barker, Everyday, 404-5.

⁶Ibid., 405.

⁷Ibid.; Jackson to Hay, 7/6/04, Despatches/Greece.

⁸Leishman to Hay, 7/2/04 and 7/8/04, Despatches/Turkey.

⁹Barker, Everyday, 405; Barker to Moody, 7/22/04, Area File 4.

¹⁰Moody to Barker, 7/6/04, Area File 4; Barker to Moody, 7/22/04, Ibid.; Jewell to Barker, 7/23/04, Ibid.

¹¹Jewell to Moody, 7/14/04, Ibid.

¹²"Trieste," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 13th ed., XXVII, 269-70.

- ¹³Barker, Everyday, 406-7.
- ¹⁴Ibid., 407; Barker to Moody, 7/22/04, Area File 4.
- ¹⁵Barker, Everyday, 407; Barker to Moody, 7/30/04, Area File 4.
- ¹⁶"Fiume," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 13th ed., IX, 449-50; Sitwell quotes, Jullian, D'Annunzio, 287.
- ¹⁷Barker, Everyday, 407-8; quote, Barker to Moody, 7/30/04, Area File 4.
- ¹⁸Ibid.; Barker, Everyday, 408; Chester to Loomis, 8/8/04, Despatches/Budapest.
- ¹⁹Ibid.; Barker to Moody, 7/30/04, Area File 4; Barker, Everyday, 408-9.
- ²⁰Barker to Moody, 7/30/04, Area File 4; R. G. 24, Entry 118, Deck log of the Kearsarge, 7/26/04 to 7/29/04.
- ²¹Barker, Everyday, 409; "greatest," Barker to Moody, 7/30/04, Area File 4; white ships, Barker to Dewey, 8/12/04, Dewey Papers.
- ²²Leishman to Hay, 7/9/04 and 7/11/04, Despatches/Turkey.
- ²³Leishman to Hay, 7/11/04, Ibid.
- ²⁴Ibid.
- ²⁵Leishman to Hay, 7/15/04, Ibid.
- ²⁶Loomis to Leishman, 7/16/04, For. Rel., 1904, 823; Leishman to Hay, 7/21/04, Despatches/Turkey.
- ²⁷Leishman to Hay, 7/22/04 and 7/29/04, Despatches/Turkey.
- ²⁸New York Times, 7/31/04 (6:4); The Times (London), 8/1/04 (4:3).
- ²⁹Hay to Adey, 7/26/04, Hay Papers; Loomis to Leishman, 7/29/04, For. Rel., 1904, 823-4.
- ³⁰Leishman to Hay, 8/2/04 and 8/4/04, Despatches/Turkey.

CHAPTER X. "THE PRIMACY OF THE WORLD"

¹Adams, Education, 465; Hay diary, 8/3/04 and 8/4/04, Hay Papers.

²New York Times, 8/6/04 (1:2); The Times (London), 8/6/04 (5:5); orders, Hay to Leishman, 8/5/04, Diplomatic Instructions of the Dept. of State/Turkey; Hay diary, 8/5/04, Hay Papers.

³Jewell to Moody, 8/3/04 and 8/12/04, Area File 4.

⁴New York Times, 8/6/04 (1:2); "become," Ibid., 8/7/04 (3:1); Ibid., 8/11/04 (1:2); "would," Ibid., 8/11/04 (1:2).

⁵New York Tribune, 8/7/04 (1:4).

⁶Ibid., 8/7/04 (1:4), (2:6).

⁷New York Times, 8/8/04 (2:7).

⁸Hay diary, 8/8/04, Hay Papers; Malone, Dic. of Amer. Biog., XVII, 150-1.

⁹Hay diary, 8/8/04, Hay Papers.

¹⁰T. R. to Daniel Edgar Sickles, 8/8/04, Morison, Letters, IV, 885.

¹¹Hay diary, 8/8/04, Hay Papers; Boston Herald, 8/9/04 (1:8); New York Times, 8/9/04 (2:4).

¹²Hay to Leishman, 8/8/04, For. Rel., 1904, 825.

¹³Leishman to Hay, 8/8/04, Despatches/Turkey.

¹⁴Ibid.; Hay diary, 8/9/04, Hay Papers; Hay to Leishman, 8/9/04, For. Rel., 1904, 825.

¹⁵Leishman to Hay, 8/9/04, Despatches/Turkey.

¹⁶New York Tribune, 8/11/04 (3:1); New York Times, 8/10/04 (7:1).

¹⁷The Daily Express (London), 8/9/04 (1:5).

¹⁸The Daily Telegraph (London), 8/8/04 (9:3).

¹⁹Stephens and Lee, Dic. of National Biog., 1901-11, 37-9; O'Connor to Lansdowne, 8/11/04, F. O. 78 (5339); Lansdowne to O'Connor, 8/11/04 and 8/12/04, F. O. 78 (5339).

- ²⁰O'Connor to Lansdowne, 8/10/04, F. O. 78 (5335).
- ²¹Le Temps (Paris), 8/12/04 (2:5).
- ²²McCormick to Hay, 8/13/04, Despatches/Russia.
- ²³Le Temps (Paris), 8/13/04 (2:3).
- ²⁴The Daily Telegraph (London), 8/15/04 (9:2).
- ²⁵The Daily Mail (London), 8/11/04 (5:1); The Times (London), 8/11/04 (3:4).
- ²⁶"a compilation," "to attend," New York Tribune, 8/10/04 (8:5); Ibid., 8/11/04 (3:1).
- ²⁷New York Times, 8/11/04 (1:2).
- ²⁸Baedeker, Mediterranean, 531-2.
- ²⁹Jewell to Moody, 8/12/04, Area File 4; R. G. 24, Entry 118, Deck logs of the Olympia, Baltimore, Cleveland, 8/10/04 to 8/12/04.
- ³⁰Leishman to Hay, 8/12/04 (12:00 A.M.), Despatches/Turkey.
- ³¹Ibid.
- ³²Ibid.
- ³³Hay diary, 8/12/04, Hay Papers.
- ³⁴Hay to Leishman, 8/12/04, For. Rel., 1904, 827.
- ³⁵Leishman to Hay, 8/13/04 (12:45 A.M.), Despatches/Turkey; "never," Tewfik Pasha to Leishman, 8/12/04, attached with Ibid.
- ³⁶Hay diary, 8/13/04, Hay Papers; Hay to Leishman, 8/13/04, For. Rel., 1904, 827.
- ³⁷Hay diary, 8/13/04, Hay Papers; Leishman to Hay, 8/13/04, Despatches/Turkey.
- ³⁸Leishman to Hay, 8/15/04, Ibid.
- ³⁹Hay to Leishman, 8/22/04, Hay Papers.
- ⁴⁰New York Tribune, 8/14/04 (1:1); "gained," Ibid., 8/15/04 (6:2).

⁴¹The Literary Digest, XXIX (August 20, 1904), 218;
Also see, Army and Navy Journal, XLI (August 20, 1904), 1315.

⁴²New York Times, 8/15/04 (6:1); Also see, Ibid.,
4/22/05 (8:2), and "Turkey," For. Rel., 1905.

⁴³Barker, Everyday, 411; New York Tribune, 9/20/04
(4:3).

⁴⁴New York Tribune, 9/12/04 (1:5), (2:1).

⁴⁵The Literary Digest, XXIX (September 10, 1904),
329-30.

⁴⁶Ibid., XXIX (October 15, 1904), 497.

⁴⁷The Spectator, XCII (June 18, 1904), 950.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

PERSONAL PAPERS AND MANUSCRIPTS

Chadwick, French E., New York Historical Society, New York, N.Y.

Dewey, George, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

Dorn, Edward J., Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

Hay, John, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

Moody, William H., Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

Roosevelt, Theodore, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

Taylor, Henry C., Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

UNPUBLISHED ARCHIVAL RECORDS

National Archives, Washington, D. C.

General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, Department of State Branch.

Despatches From United States Consuls in Beirut, 1836-1906.

Despatches From United States Consuls in Budapest, 1876-1906.

Despatches From United States Consuls in Constantinople, 1820-1906.

Despatches From United States Consuls in Gibraltar, 1791-1906.

Despatches From United States Consuls in Tanqier, 1797-1906.

Despatches From United States Ministers to Austria, 1838-1906.

Despatches From United States Ministers to France, 1789-1906.

Despatches From United States Ministers to the German States and Germany, 1799-1906.

Despatches From United States Ministers to Great Britain, 1791-1906.

Despatches From United States Ministers to Greece, 1868-1906.

Despatches From United States Ministers to the Italian States and Italy, 1799-1906.

Despatches From United States Ministers to Portugal, 1790-1906.

Despatches From United States Ministers to Russia, 1808-1906.

Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906.

Despatches From United States Ministers to Turkey, 1818-1906.

Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906.

Domestic Letters of the Department of State, 1784-1906.

Naval Records Collection.

Area Files of the Naval Records Collection, Geographical Areas 4 and 5, 1903-1905.

Record Group 24, Entry 118, Deck Log Books of the
Kearsarge; Maine; Illinois; Missouri; Massachusetts;
Indiana; Iowa; Alabama; Brooklyn; Olympia; San
Francisco; Cleveland; Atlanta; Machias; Castine;
Baltimore; Marietta; Mayflower.

R. G. 45, Entry 20, Confidential Letters Sent by the
Secretary of the Navy, IV.

R. G. 45, Entry 290, Cruising Reports of Vessels, Movements of Vessels, IV, 7/2/03-6/22/04.

R. G. 45, Subject File 00, Box XVIII, Operations of Fleets, Squadrons, Flotillas and Divisions, North Atlantic Station, 1903-1906.

R. G. 45, Subject File VI, Box V, International Relations and Politics, Morocco, Correspondence Relative to, 1803-1910.

R. G. 45, Subject File VI, Box IX, Syria, Reports of Affairs, 1903-1910.

R. G. 45, Subject File VI, Box IX, Turkey, Correspondence to Affairs in, 1897-1910.

R. G. 313, Entry 85, Correspondence, South Atlantic Squadron.

Naval History Division, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D. C.
Biography ("ZB") File.

Proceedings of the General Board of the Navy, 1900-1905.

Public Record Office, London, England

Admiralty, Ship's Logs (Adm 53), 1799-1920.

H. M. S. Prince of Wales, 1904.

Foreign Office, Confidential Print, Morocco, 1839-1954.

_____, General Correspondence, Morocco, Series II, 1836-1905.

F. O. 99, 412.

F. O. 99, 413.

F. O. 99. 414.

F. O. 99, 415.

F. O. 99, 416.

_____, General Correspondence, Portugal, 1781-1905.

F. O. 63, 1411.

_____, General Correspondence, Turkey, 1780-1905.

F. O. 78, 5335.

F. O. 78, 5339.

PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS

United States

Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1900-1905, Washington, D. C., 1900-1905.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898-1905, Washington, D. C., 1898-1905.

France

Documents Diplomatiques Francais, 1871-1914, 38 vol., Paris, 1929-1953.

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Documents Diplomatiques; Affaires de Maroc, 1901-05, Paris, 1905.

Germany

Lepsius, Johannes, et al., Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914, 50 vol., Berlin, 1929-37.

Great Britain

Gooch, George P., and Temperly, Harold, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, 13 vol., London, 1926-1938.

NEWSPAPERS

United States

Boston Daily Globe.

Boston Herald.

Boston Transcript.

Brooklyn Eagle.

Cleveland Plain Dealer.

Daily True American (Trenton, N. J.).

Detroit Free Press.

New York Evening Journal.

New York Times.

New York Tribune.

Public Ledger (Philadelphia).

Springfield Republican.

The Sun (New York).

Washington Post.

Washington Times.

The World (New York).

Austria

Fremdenblatt (Vienna).

France

Le Figaro (Paris).

Le Temps (Paris).

Germany

Berliner Neueste Nachrichten.

Berliner Tageblatt.

Hamburger Nachrichten.

National Zeitung (Berlin).

Great Britain

The Daily Express (London).

The Daily Mail (London).

The Daily Telegraph (London).

The Times (London).

Italy

Nuova Antologia (Rome).

Morocco

Al-Moghreb Al-Aska (Tangier)

Portugal

Diario De Noticias (Lisbon).

Liberal (Lisbon).

Novidades (Lisbon).

Tarde (Lisbon).

Russia

Birzheviya Viedomorz (St. Petersburg).

Novoe Vremya (St. Petersburg).

Russ (St. Petersburg).

Spain

Correspondencia (Madrid).

Epoca (Madrid).

Impartial (Madrid).

CONTEMPORARY ARTICLES

Bigelow, Poultney, "The Mind of Muley Aziz," The Independent, LVII (July 14, 1904), 75-8.

Bonsal, Stephen, "Raisuli, The Brigand Who Made Himself King: The Story of a Moorish Feud Which May Disturb the Peace of the World," Harper's Weekly, LI (March 9, 1907), 338.

Boulger, Demetrius C., "Coming Continental Complications," The Nineteenth Century, CCCXXVI (April 1, 1904), 555-68.

- Chester, Colby M., "Turkey Reinterpreted," Current History, XVI (September, 1922), 939-47.
- Dodge, Edmund Arthur, "Our Mohammedan Subjects," Political Science Quarterly, XIX (March, 1904), 20-31.
- Gohier, Urbain, "American Intervention in Turkey," North American Review, CLXXIII (November, 1901), 618-26.
- Harris, Walter B., "The 'Good Old Days' in Morocco," Blackwood's, CCVIII (December, 1920), 729-50.
- _____. , "Morocco and the Anglo-French Agreement," The Independent, LVI (June 9, 1904), 1320-5.
- _____. , "Raisuli," The Independent, LVII (July 28, 1904), 201-4.
- _____. , "Raisuli," Blackwood's, CCVIII (January, 1921), 28-53.
- _____. , "Three Weeks' Captivity With the Moorish Rebels," Blackwood's, CLXXIII (September, 1903), 323-36.
- Jane, Fred T., "Naval Lessons of the War," Forum, XXVI (1898), 294-305.
- _____. , "The Jane Naval War Game," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, XXIX (September, 1903), 595-660.
- Leach, Henry, "The Heart of Things," Chamber's Journal, XI (1920-21), 753-6.
- Meakin, Budgett, "The Fate of Morocco," Westminster Review, CLXII (July, 1904), 9-16.
- Perdicaris, Ion, "The Condition of Morocco," The Imperial and Asiatic and Oriental and Colonial Record, II Ser. 2 (1896), 315-29.
- _____. , "The Condition of Morocco: The Angera Revolt," I. A. O. C. R., IV Ser. 1 (1892), 330-9.
- _____. , "The Conflict in Morocco," I. A. O. C. R., XV (1903), 93-8.
- _____. , "Consular Protection in Morocco," Fortnightly Review, XLIX (May 1, 1888), 729-32.
- _____. , "England and North Africa," National Review, XVIII (December, 1891), 570-6.

- _____. , "An Experience in Bow Street," Putnam's Magazine, I (March, 1907), 746-50.
- _____. , "The General Situation in Morocco," North American Review, CLXXXI (November, 1905), 745-53.
- _____. , "In Raisuli's Hands: The Story of My Captivity and Deliverance, May 18th to June 26, 1904," Leslie's Monthly Magazine, LVIII (September, 1904), 510-22.
- _____. , "The Moroccan Conference," Appleton's Booklovers Magazine, VII (May, 1906), 580-4.
- _____. , "Morocco, The Land of the Extreme West, and the Story of My Captivity," The National Geographic Magazine, XVII (March, 1906), 117-57.
- _____. , "Morocco, Land of Paradox," I. A. O. C. R., XVII (1904), 120-4.
- _____. , "Morocco: The Mogador Conflict, December, 1899," I. A. O. C. R., IX (1900), 84-97.
- _____. , "Morocco: The Sultan and the Bashadours," I. A. O. C. R., XIII (1902), 294-305.
- _____. , "The News From Morocco," The Spectator, LXIX (July 9, 1892), 55-6.
- _____. , "Piracy in Morocco," I. A. O. C. R., IV (1897), 325-9.
- _____. , "The Possible Collapse of Morocco as an Independent Power," I. A. O. C. R., X (1900), 63-81.
- _____. , "Present Aspect of Affairs in Morocco," I. A. O. C. R., VII (1899), 338-40.
- _____. , "The Situation in Morocco," I. A. O. C. R., IX (1895), 58-64.
- _____. , "Tangier in the Early Seventies," Putnam's Magazine, I (October, 1906), 22-9.
- Pritchett, Henry S., "The Roosevelt Doctrine of a Strong Navy," The Outlook, LXXXVIII (January 11, 1908), 73-9.
- Roosevelt, Theodore, "Military Preparedness and Unpreparedness," The Century Magazine, LIX (November, 1899), 149-53.

Straus, Oscar S., "Citizenship and the Protection of Naturalized Citizens Abroad," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, XXX (March, 1904), 121-43.

Taylor, Henry C., "The Fleet," U.S.N.I.P., XXIX (December, 1903), 799-807.

Van Norman, Louis E., "President Roosevelt As Europe Sees Him," Review of Reviews, XXX (September, 1904), 299-305.

Varley, Cromwell, "Captured by Moorish Brigands," The Independent, LVII (August 25, 1904), 424-6.

(No Authorship Acknowledged)

"An American Kidnapped by Moorish Brigands," The Literary Digest, XXVIII (June 4, 1904), 799-800.

"The Disintegration of Morocco," Current Literature, XLIII (October, 1907), 386-8.

"A European Flurry Over Mr. Roosevelt's World Politics," The Literary Digest, XXIX (September 10, 1904), 329-30.

"Europe Talks of Roosevelt," Public Opinion, XXXVII (December 1, 1904), 678-9.

"Europe's Verdict on Mr. Roosevelt's Alleged Militarism," The Literary Digest, XXIX (October 15, 1904), 497.

"France Placed Between Morocco and the United States," The Literary Digest, XXVIII (June 25, 1904), 925-5.

"France to the Rescue of Perdicaris," The Literary Digest, XXVIII (June 11, 1904), 840.

"The Future Coaling Stations of the United States: From a French Point of View," Scientific American, Supplement, No. 1343 (September 28, 1901), 21529-30.

"Germany's Alleged Rivalry," and "Germany's Aims and Attitudes," Review of Reviews, XXVII (March, 1903), 274.

Harper's Weekly, XLVIII (June, 1904), 853-4.

"Human Side of Raisuli," The Literary Digest, XXIX (July 2, 1904), 6-7.

"King Carlos' Welcome to American Battle-ships," Harper's Weekly, XLVIII (July 30, 1904), 1185.

- "Morocco and the Powers," The Literary Digest, XXVIII (June 11, 1904), 857-8.
- "Morocco, Present and Future," Public Opinion, XXXVII (September 1, 1904), 266-7.
- "Outbreak of the Holy War of Islam," Current Literature, XLIII (October, 1907), 369-73.
- "The People of Morocco Against All Europe," Current Literature, XLIII (September, 1907), 257-62.
- "The Perdicaris Episode," Review of Reviews, XXX (October, 1904), 495-6.
- "The Perfect Gentleman of Morocco," Current Literature, XLIII (October, 1907), 386-8.
- "President Roosevelt Jars Europe Again," The Literary Digest, XXVIII (June 18, 1904), 892.
- "Russia and America," The Spectator, XCII (June 18, 1904), 949-50.
- "Turkey and the Big Stick," The Literary Digest, XXIX (August 20, 1904), 218.
- "Turkey and America," The Outlook, LXXV (September 5, 1903), 12-3.
- "The United States in the Mediterranean," Review of Reviews, XXX (September, 1904), 358.
- "We Should Deal With Morocco As We Dealt With Other Barbary Powers," Harper's Weekly, XLVIII (June 18, 1904), 928-9.
- "What the Sultan Fears," The Independent, LV (September 24, 1903), 2297-9.
- "What the United States Navy Owes President Roosevelt," Review of Reviews, XXXIX (January, 1909), 97-9.
- "Why the United States Needs a Navy," Review of Reviews, XVII (February, 1898), 206-7.

MEMOIRS AND LETTERS

- Adams, Henry, The Education of Henry Adams, Modern Library, New York, 1946.
- Barker, Albert S., Everyday Life in the Navy, Boston, 1932.
- Griscom, Lloyd C., Diplomatically Speaking, Boston, 1940.
- Jusserand, Jules J., What Me Befell, Boston, 1932.
- Morison, Elting E., ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 8 vol., Cambridge, Mass., 1951-4.
- Nicolson, Nigel, ed., Harold Nicolson: Diaries and Letters, 1930-9, Fontana Books, London, 1969.
- Pears, Sir Edwin, Forty Years in Constantinople, London, 1916.
- Roosevelt, Theodore, An Autobiography, New York, 1922.
- Selections From the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918, 2 vol., New York, 1925.
- Washburn, George, Fifty Years in Constantinople and Recollections of Robert College, Boston, 1911.

SECONDARY WORKS

UNPUBLISHED DISSERTATIONS

- Collins, George W., United States, Moroccan Relations, 1904-1912, University of Colorado, 1965.
- Levy, Morris, Alfred Thayer Mahan and United States Foreign Policy, New York University, 1965.
- Lewis, Thomas T., Franco-American Diplomatic Relations, 1898-1907, University of Oklahoma, 1970.
- Livermore, Seward W., American Naval Development, 1898-1914: With Special Reference to Foreign Affairs, Harvard University, 1944.
- Moore, John H., America Looks at Turkey, 1876-1909, University of Virginia, 1961.

- Pilapil, Vicente R., Spain in the European State-System, 1898-1913, Catholic University of America, 1964.
- Snow, William R., Britain and Morocco, 1900-1906, University of California at Berkely, 1970.
- Wheaton, James Otis, The Genius and the Jurist: A Study of the Presidential Campaign of 1904, Stanford University, 1964.

BOOKS AND ARTICLES

- Alden, John D., The American Steel Navy, Annapolis, Md., 1972.
- Baedeker, Karl, The Mediterranean, London, 1911.
- Bailey, Thomas A., A Diplomatic History of the American People, 7th ed., New York, 1964.
- Beale, Howard K., Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power, Collier Books, New York, 1968.
- Bishop, Joseph B., ed., Theodore Roosevelt and His Time: Shown in His Letters, 2 vol., New York, 1920.
- Blake, Nelson Manfred, "Ambassadors at the Court of Theodore Roosevelt," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLII (1955-6), 179-206.
- Bowman, Isaiah, "A Note on Tangier and the Spanish Zones in Africa," Foreign Affairs, II (March 15, 1924), 500-3.
- Brassey, T. A., ed., Brassey's Naval Annual, 1900-1905, Portsmouth, England, 1900-1905.
- Brebner, J. B., The North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain, New Haven, Conn., 1945.
- Brodie, Bernard, A Guide to Naval Strategy, 2nd ed., Princeton, N. J., 1959.
- _____, Sea Power in the Machine Age, Princeton, N. J., 1951.
- Brogan, D. W., The Development of Modern France, 2 vol., Revised edition, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1966.
- Carrison, Daniel J., The Navy from Wood to Steam, 1860-1890, New York, 1965.

- Challenger, Richard D., Admirals, Generals and American Foreign Policy: 1898-1914, Princeton, N. J., 1973.
- Childs, F. Rives, Foreign Service Farewell: My Years in the Near East, University of Virginia Press, 1969.
- Clinard, Outten J., Japan's Influence on American Naval Power, 1897-1917, Berkeley, Calif., 1947.
- Cortissey, Royal, The Life of Whitelaw Reid, 2 vol., New York, 1921.
- Davis, George T., A Navy Second to None: The Development of Modern American Naval Policy, New York, 1940.
- Davis, Harold E., "The Citizenship of Jon Perdicaris," Journal of Modern History, XII (1941), 517-26.
- de Card, E. Rouard, Les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et le Protectorat de La France au Maroc, Paris, 1930.
- Dennett, Tyler, John Hay, New York, 1933.
- _____, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, New York, 1925.
- Dennis, Alfred L. P., Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896-1906, New York, 1928.
- Dulles, Foster R., America's Rise to World Power, New York, 1955.
- Encyclopaedia Britannica, 13th ed., New York, 1926.
- _____, 14th ed., Chicago, 1972.
- Esthus, Raymond A., Theodore Roosevelt and the International Rivalries, Waltham, Mass., 1970.
- Eubank, Keith, Paul Cambon: Master Diplomatist, University of Oklahoma, 1960.
- Field, James A., Jr., America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882, Princeton, N. J., 1969.
- Forbes, Rosita, The Sultan of the Mountains: The Life Story of Raisuli, New York, 1924.
- Foster, John W., The Practice of Diplomacy: As Illustrated in the Foreign Relations of the United States, Boston, 1906.
- Furneaux, Robert, Abdel Krim: Emir of the Rif, London, 1967.

- Gollwitzer, Heinz, Europe in the Age of Imperialism, 1880-1914, Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., New York, 1969.
- Gordon, Leland J., American Relations With Turkey, 1830-1930: An Economic Interpretation, Philadelphia, 1932.
- Graber, D. A., Crisis Diplomacy: A History of United States Intervention, Policies and Practices, Washington, D. C., 1959.
- Grabill, Joseph L., Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927, Minneapolis, Minn., 1971.
- Graham, Stuart H., The International City of Tangier, Stanford University, 1931.
- Grenville, John A. S., and Young, George B., Politics, Strategy and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917, New Haven, Conn., 1966.
- Hall, Luella, "A Partnership in Peacemaking: Theodore Roosevelt and Wilhelm II," Pacific Historical Review, XIII (December, 1944), 390-411.
- _____. , The United States and Morocco, 1776-1956, Metuchen, N. J., 1971.
- Hamersly, Lewis R., The Records of Living Officers of the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 7th ed., New York, 1902.
- Harbaugh, William Henry, Power and Responsibility: The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt, New York, 1961.
- Harris, Brayton, The Age of the Battleship, 1890-1922, New York, 1965.
- Harris, Walter B., Morocco That Was, Westport, Conn., 1970.
- Harvard University, Class of 1860; Report of 1866, Cambridge, Mass., 1866.
- _____. , Class of 1860; Report of 1895, Cambridge, Mass., 1895.
- _____. , Class of 1860; Report of 1910, Cambridge, Mass., 1910.
- Hasendever, Adolf, "Theodore Roosevelt und Marokkokrisis von 1904-1906: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen vor der Welthriege," Arch. Politik, X (February, 1928), 184-245.

- Haslip, Joan, The Sultan: The Life of Abdul Hamid II, London, 1973.
- Heffron, Paul T., "Secretary Moody and Naval Administration Reform, 1902-1904," American Neptune, XXIX (January, 1969), 30-53.
- Hill, Fredric S., The Romance of the American Navy, New York, 1910.
- Hill, Howard B., Roosevelt and the Caribbean, Chicago, 1927.
- Hoffman, Eleanor, Realm of the Evening Star: A History of Morocco and the Lands of the Moors, New York, 1965.
- Jessup, Philip C., Elihu Root, 2 vol., New York, 1938.
- Johnson, Arthur M., "Theodore Roosevelt and the Navy," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXXIV (October, 1968), 76-82.
- Karsten, Peter, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism, New York, 1972.
- Knox, Dudley, A History of the United States Navy, New York, 1948.
- Kraft, Herman F., and Norris, Walter B., Sea Power in American History, New York, 1920.
- Langer, William L., The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, 5th ed., New York, 1968.
- Livermore, Seward W., "The American Navy as a Factor in World Politics, 1903-1913," American Historical Review, LXIII (July, 1958), 863-79.
- , "Theodore Roosevelt, the American Navy and the Venezuelan Crisis," A. H. R., LI (1945-46), 452-71.
- Livezey, William E., Mahan on Sea Power, University of Oklahoma, 1947.
- Malone, Dumas, ed., Dictionary of American Biography, 10 vol., New York, 1946.
- May, Ernest R., Imperial Democracy, New York, 1961.
- Mende, Elsie P., and Pearson, Henry G., Horace Porter: An American Soldier and Diplomat, New York, 1927.

- Millis, Walter, Arms and Men: A Study of American Military History, Mentor Books, New York, 1958.
- Mitchell, Donald W., History of the American Navy from 1883 to Pearl Harbor, New York, 1946.
- National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, 49 vol., Reprint, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1966.
- Neaser, Robert W., Statistical and Chronological History of the United States Navy, 1775-1907, 2 vol., New York, 1909.
- Nevins, Allen, Henry White: Thirty Years of American Diplomacy, New York, 1930.
- Niblack, Albert, The Office of Naval Intelligence: Its History and Aims, Washington, D. C., 1920.
- Nicolson, Harold, Portrait of a Diplomatist, New York, 1930.
- O'Gara, Gordon C., Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of the Modern American Navy, Princeton, N. J., 1943.
- Parsons, F. V., "The 'Morocco Question' in 1884: An Early Crisis," English Historical Review, LXXVII (October, 1962), 659-83.
- Perdicaris, Ion, American Claims and Protection of Native Subjects in Morocco, London, 1886.
- _____, The Case of Mohammed Benani: A Story of Today, London, 1888.
- Perkins, Bradford, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914, New York, 1968.
- Philippe, Jullian, D'Annunzio, New York, 1973.
- Porter, Charles W., The Career of Théophile Delcassé, Philadelphia, 1936.
- Pratt, Fletcher, The Navy: A History, Garden City, N. Y., 1938.
- Putnam, Carleton, Theodore Roosevelt: The Formative Years, 1858-1886, New York, 1958.
- Robinson, Cyril E., A History of Greece, New York, 1962.
- Roscoe, Theodore, and Freeman, Fred, A Picture History of the United States Navy, New York, 1956.

- Sapin, Burton M., and Snyder, Richard C., The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, Garden City, N. Y., 1954.
- Sheean, Vincent, An American Among the Riffi, London, 1926.
- Sprout, Harold and Margaret, The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918, Princeton, N. J., 1938.
- Stephen, Sir Leslie, and Lee, Sir Sidney, eds., Dictionary of National Biography, 63 vol., London, 1964-67.
- Stevens, William O., and Westcott, Allan, A History of Sea Power, New York, 1939.
- Stillson, Albert C., "Military Policy Without Political Guidance: Theodore Roosevelt's Navy," Military Affairs, XXV (Spring, 1961), 18-31.
- Stuart, Graham H., "The Future of Tangier," Foreign Affairs, XXIII (July, 1945), 675-9.
- Taillandier, G. Saint-René, Les Origines Du Maroc Francais: Récit D'Une Mission, 1901-06, 4th ed., Paris, 1930.
- Taylor, A. J. P., "British Policy in Morocco, 1886-1902," English Historical Review, LXVI (July, 1951), 342-74.
- Thayer, William R., ed., The Life and Letters of John Hay, 6th ed., 2 vol., Boston, 1915.
- Tuchman, Barbara W., "Perdicaris Alive or Raisuli Dead," American Heritage Magazine, X (August, 1959), 19+.
- Twain, Mark, The Innocents Abroad, New American Library, New York, 1966.
- Weaver, J. R. H., ed., Dictionary of National Biography, 1922-30, 4th Supplement, London, 1937.
- Westcott, Allan, ed., Mahan on Naval Warfare, Boston, 1918.
- Wilson, H. W., The Downfall of Spain: A Naval History of the Spanish-American War, London, 1900.
- Who Was Who in America, 1897-1942, 4th ed., Chicago, 1960.
- _____, 1943-50, 3rd ed., Chicago, 1960.
- _____, 1951-60, Chicago, 1960.

Woolman, David S., Rebels in the Rif: Abd el Krim and the Rif Rebellion, Stanford University, 1968.

Zabriski, E. H., American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East, 1895-1914, Philadelphia, 1946.

