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LIBERTY BEFORE UNION:

MASSACHUSETTS AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR

A Dissertation Presented

By

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Liberty Before Union: Massachusetts
and the Civil War (July 1975)
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In the years before the Civil War, Massachusetts underwent a great social and economic transformation. Agriculture declined as a source of state income and rural areas lost population. Changes in the factory system lead to the creation of a large, permanent laboring force of Irish, dependent on daily wages for survival. The status of Massachusetts' artisans was imperiled by absentee ownership and new technology. Economic power gravitated to a small group of textile magnates who also gained influence over cultural, educational, and political institutions. The political history of the fifteen years before the Civil War is largely a contest between these Cotton Whigs and those who resented the changes in Massachusetts society. As long as the Cotton Whigs were able to clothe themselves in the mantle of social and moral conservatism they were able to dominate the politics of the state. But when the slavery issue made the Cotton Whigs appear to place their economic interests above their ethical sensibilities, their antagonists seized the opportunity to displace them. Republicans, who represented the middle-class voters of the small towns and the countryside, became Massachusetts' new dominant political force.

Having consolidated their hold over Massachusetts by 1857, the Republicans turned their attention toward the presidential selection of 1860. Initially they feared that the Harpers Ferry raid would upset their carefully laid plans. But after success in the 1859 elections, Massachusetts Republicans began to look more favorably at John Brown, seeing in him the incarnation of their Puritan values. During the election of 1860, Massachusetts Republicans were careful to mute the divisions within their party and campaigned upon

the moderate platform of anti-extensionism. Initially the Massachusetts Republicans refused to concede the significance of the secession movement. Their opponents attempted to use the political crisis to divide the Republican party. However, no serious economic panic occurred in Massachusetts and the state's Congressmen generally ignored conservative pressure to compromise. Conservative mobs silenced abolitionist meetings but their efforts merely helped the abolitionists achieve a new respectability. The Massachusetts Republican party came closest to dividing itself when Charles Francis Adams proposed the admission of New Mexico to statehood, a proposal denounced by the radicals.

Massachusetts radical Republicans and abolitionists shared considerable common ground. The Garrisonians believed that the election of Lincoln was their victory as well. They welcomed the secession crisis and believed that they had been instrumental in weakening Massachusetts' devotion to the Union. Massachusetts blacks likewise welcomed the crisis as an opportunity to abolish slavery, but feared that compromisers might seek to limit their own rights, earned after decades of struggle.

There was a close relationship between the social and economic composition of Massachusetts' churches and their teachings on slavery and politics. Conservative clergymen argued that Christians should regard the Constitution as divinely inspired and viewed disunion as a threat to morality, order, and even Protestantism itself. But many reformist ministers wondered if the Union had outlived its usefulness and saw the crisis as punishment for the nation's sins. Of all the denominations, the most conservative on slavery was the Catholic Church. Seeing a connection between antislavery and nativism, Irish Catholics gravitated toward the Southern

cause. They hoped to prove their loyalty to their adopted country by fidelity to the Union in a time of crisis.

Massachusetts political conservatives defined their identity by reference to the Union, but Republicans considered themselves as New Englanders first. Most Massachusetts Republicans did not believe the Union was worth sacrifice of party principles. Thus they fought modification of the state's Personal Liberty Laws, opposed the adoption of the Crittenden Compromise, and obstructed the Washington Peace Convention. Many were willing to allow the South to leave in peace as long as secession was accomplished through orderly and legal means.

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CHAPTER I

WORKING MEN AND MILLIONAIRES

Massachusetts, on the eve of the Civil War, was a society in the throes of a great social and economic transformation. The Commonwealth was no longer the homogenous, agricultural society of her Puritan past. As the dams went up along the Connecticut and Merrimack rivers and hill town farmers and Irish peasants streamed into the cities, thoughtful men in Massachusetts wondered if traditional New England values could survive. The rude Irishman with his authoritarian church, unclean cities with their vices and temptations, the new breed of factory worker who depended on his boss for sustenance--all seemed to threaten the temperate self-reliance that was the hallmark of the Yankee way of life.

No figure in Yankee folklore is more predominant than the sturdy independent farmer. He had wrested the Bay Colony from the wilderness. As minuteman, he drove out the British oppressor. He was responsible for his own destiny, free from servile relationships. But the ante-bellum years were not easy for the Massachusetts farmer. In the hill towns of Western Massachusetts the thin soil eroded; and the farmers followed the streams which had washed away their soil into the valleys. In the decade of the 1850's ninety-five towns in the Commonwealth lost population; some like Wendell and New Salem in Franklin County diminished by almost a quarter. Pelham, despairing of its decline, voted to surrender its charter of incorporation. These towns, avoided by the railroads, had become isolated backwaters. Many of their fields turned once again into woodlots, as the new agricultural machinery--so useful on the

broad level prairies of the West--was unsuited to the small, rocky fields of the New England hills.[1]

The factories that began to open in the 1830's brought with them some opportunities to the farmer. Once operating on essentially a subsistence basis, certain farmers could take advantage of new markets which the mill towns provided. In areas of the Connecticut Valley and in Worcester and Essex counties, farmers discovered that the rivers which provided relatively fertile soil also attracted consumers of agricultural products. As the mills grew so did market crops such as cereals, pork, beef, and wool.[2]

But the economic expansion that created these new markets soon destroyed them. The building of the western railroads brought the New England farmer into competition with areas far more suited to the production of these staples than his own land. The Massachusetts sheep herd of 1860 was barely a third of its 1840 size. By the mid-1850's more than half the state's beef came from the West and its production of pork and cereals had become a relatively minor industry.[3]

It would be a serious misstatement, however, to suggest that Massachusetts' agriculture was in a state of collapse. Some new products, such as apples, cranberries, and tobacco, helped take up the slack. In areas such as the Connecticut River Valley, whose rich soil was amenable to new techniques, the farmers prospered. From 1845 to 1855 the value of agricultural production in Massachusetts rose from $22,590,000 to $37,867,000. But these figures also tell a different story. In 1845, agriculture accounted for nineteen percent of Massachusetts' productive wealth; but in 1855 it provided only thirteen percent. In addition, the 1855 statistics show that agriculture was in the hands of fewer individuals

working in fewer towns. Only individuals in those areas favored with fertile soil could make agriculture a field for ambition. Other farmers were forced either to accept the prospect of a static economic life or leave their homesteads for industrial pursuits.[4]

While Massachusetts' social theorists argued that agriculture was the healthiest and the most desirable of all occupations, Massachusetts' farmers were likely to disagree. In some agricultural areas there were fewer hands than there was work. One example was Hampshire County, whose farmers, as the 1860 Agriculture Report revealed, had switched from dairying to raising beef cattle largely because there were not enough help available to milk the cows. Young rural folk who had seen the city and its diversions were unwilling to return to the farm. Their elders worried that the Irish hired men and servant girls who took their places would be corrupting influences. Simon Brown, editor of the New England Farmer, reported a final blow to the dignity of agriculture. He discovered in his conversations with young women that nine in ten would prefer a husband of almost any occupation other than farming.[5]

A primary function of the county agricultural societies was to convince farmers to stay on the land. At the annual meetings, non-farmers--often leading politicians--would warn about the pitfalls which awaited those who went west or entered industrial life in town. Speaking to the 1860 meeting of the Norfolk Agricultural Society, George Hillard urged the farmer to ignore the temptations of the West: "These corn-bearing plains are the prose of earth and not its poetry; and the imagination languishes and dies amid those wastes of fertility." He warned his audience that the West had no mountains or oceans and that it was lacking the "blessings of civil society." What would happen to a New Englander

deprived of his schools and lyceums, his town meetings and his cattle shows? At home he had good laws and good roads; and, above all, he had order. Should he exchange all this for the chance of economic gain?[6]

Other commentators emphasized that the New England farmer enjoyed greater freedom than his Western counterpart. In Massachusetts he could deal directly with his market, but in the West he would be at the mercy of voracious middle men. In the West he would find the waters "turbid" and "stagnant," and succumb to "diseases of miasmatic origins, chills and fever." One county orator, John L. Russell, offered another reason to persevere on the stony New England terrain. He declared that "the hardier the soil and more obstinate the earth, the freer and more developed the race which subdues it," and suggested that Yankees might degenerate on the rich soil of the prairies.[7]

But if the West was unhealthy so were the Massachusetts cities to which New England farmers moved in substantial numbers. Indeed, during the ante-bellum years, more migrated to these cities than to the West. In January 1861, concerned citizens organized the Massachusetts Sanitary Association to inquire into the deterioration of health in urban areas. The organization noted that the death rate in the cities was twice that of the rural areas and that the life span of Massachusetts farmers was sixty-four years while a Massachusetts cobbler could expect to live only forty-two. Theodore Parker, in his sermon "The Material Condition of the People of Massachusetts," noted that the average death in Boston was at age twenty, far below that in rural areas of the state, and that, of all occupations, printers were most subject to a premature death. He offered as an explanation that "the farmer breaths air; the shoemaker

wax and leather; the printer, ink and typemetal." Parker looked at Boston with disdain. He liked neither the dependent workmen nor the upper classes. The latter, by avoiding manual labor, had become a "puny set of men . . . spindle legged . . . ashamed of their bodies, yet pampered . . . with luxuries." These men, divorced from the land, needed some honest work to perspire away the "effete matter" hanging to their bodies.[8]

To farmers who felt that urban employment might be less grueling, Silas Brown pointed out industrial alternatives. The farmer's work was clean compared with that of the slaughter-house worker who all day stood ankle deep in blood and filth, his days short compared to the shoemaker toiling fourteen to sixteen hours over his bench. The Springfield Republican warned young men who hoped to earn their fortune in the city that the chances of success were less than one in a hundred. Cities were places where young lives were wrecked and aspirations crushed. Farmers were secure from the anxieties and uncertainties of the commercial world; they were not subject to the economic fluctuations which might impoverish the merchant overnight. And not relying on a fortunate rise in the stock market to fill his barns, the farmer was entitled to more respect than the businessman. Josiah Quincy was particularly indignant that many Massachusetts' youth mistakenly had emulated Amos Lawrence; they ought to understand the joys of farming and reject the trouble of commerce.[9]

But beyond these moral exhortations, how could one keep the Massachusetts farmer on his land? Many anxious commentators saw agricultural education as the answer. Josiah G. Holland, a colleague of Samuel Bowles on the Springfield Republican, worried that constant labor on the farm was

degrading the farmer, and that he needed to exercise his mind as well as his body. Work alone could be dangerous if unrelieved by creativity. Holland warned that Yankee farmers could become as debased as the Irish laborer and pointed to rural Ireland as an ominous example of the effects of mindless toil. Massachusetts' rural population was in danger of decay as the brighter and more ambitious boys left for the towns.[10]

The trend could be reversed only by making agriculture a science and turning every farmer into an inventor. The Massachusetts farmer needed new ideas more than he needed new tools; his mind was more in need of regeneration than his soil. George Boutwell, a leading Republican politician, echoed these sentiments in an address before the Middlesex North Agricultural Society. He emphasized that labor was respected only when it combined with a high order of intelligence and degraded whenever it was associated with servility or ignorance. This concern with the quality of work became more pervasive as the changes in society accelerated.[11]

II

Concurrent with the changes in agriculture, there were alterations in the New England industrial system that made the factory's image more threatening to traditionalists. The entrepreneurs who had erected the first mills in Waltham and who had founded the industrial community of Lowell, were aware of the prejudices which existed against their new establishments. The Lowells, the Lawrences, the Appletons, and their peers realized that popular fears of a permanent, dependent factory class could impede the recruiting of a labor force and could breed an ill-will that would have political repercussions. To meet these objections, the millowners developed a paternal labor system. They recruited young,

unmarried women from the declining hill towns and placed them in boarding houses under the watchful eyes of matrons. The Boston Associates--the capitalists who owned the majority of the New England textile mills--announced that they would refuse to hire anyone "habitually absent from public worship on the Sabbath, or known to be guilty of immorality."[12]

The girls, who came from rural areas of New Hampshire, Vermont, and Massachusetts, usually stayed in the mills no longer than a few years. Saving something for their dowry, they generally returned to their native towns to marry. Their experience often provided a period of adventure and relative independence in an otherwise restricted life. These girls, whose backgrounds were steeped in native New England values, posed little threat to traditionalists. They were less susceptible to the vicissitudes of the business cycle than any other potential labor force. If orders were slack and the mills forced to close, these girls had no hungry children to feed. They could return to the family farm to await better times. As an early Lowell historian wrote: "While most of our operatives are born and bred in virtuous rural homes, and after working for a few years in the mills, return to agricultural pursuits, the interests of Lowell will rest secure."[13]

With the influx of the Irish the paternalism of the mills ceased. The Irish began to enter the factories in the 1840's, but it was not until the 1850's that they made their full impact. Country girls no longer traveled to the Merrimack mills as the presence of aliens made employment less respectable. Unlike Yankee girls, the Irish newcomers were often illiterate and unruly. One Native American paper in Lawrence complained about the Irish propensity to attack policemen, brawl on Sundays, and deface trees. While one has to recognize the bias of the

author of these remarks, there is little doubt that these impoverished immigrants were a disruptive force in the new urban environment.[14]

Nevertheless, the Irish, by providing a tremendous source of inexpensive labor, were a great stimulus to the Massachusetts economy. As Oscar Handlin has noted, Massachusetts' low wages, which were well below those in New York, gave the Commonwealth's employers a substantial advantage. Furthermore, the mill owners could now pursue economic objectives more singlemindedly. They did not feel constrained to look after the morals of these unruly newcomers, nor would they require attendance at religious services for Catholic employees.[15]

Massachusetts now had a permanent laboring class dependent on daily wages for survival. More ominous, there were now large numbers of laborers whose annual earnings averaged from $300 to $350 a year, and were thus unable to support a family by their own efforts. This fact--along with Irish hostility to the Protestant-dominated schools--accounted for the willingness of Irish parents to send their children into the mills at an early age. As child labor became more common, the Massachusetts factories began to assume the odious aspects of the European industrial system. The Irish had little chance to rise to positions of responsibility; they were relegated to the lowest operative positions in the mills or to a lifetime of casual day laboring. The Irishman's only mobility was in a physical sense. As Stephen Thernstrom and Peter Knights have pointed out in their studies of Newburyport and Boston, the Irish laborer was often transient, drifting from one community to another in search of work to sustain him. This floating population of alien workingmen, unsusceptible to traditional social control, was another source of anxiety to the native New Englander.[16]

Along with the Irish came an increase in expenditures for the care of the destitute. In 1860 Boston's North American Review noted with alarm that since 1845 expenditures for the city's House of Industry had increased six-fold. The Overseers of the Poor spent seven times what they had needed fifteen years earlier. Those Yankees who did remain in the textile mills found that their interests conflicted with the Irish. In 1853, native workers in Salisbury and Amesbury went on strike when their employers abolished the traditional morning break. In response the employers fired them and hired Irish replacements. In Chicopee, in 1858, native workers refused to support a strike led by dissatisfied Irish workers. Cultural differences prevented the two groups from perceiving their common interest.[17]

The experience of Lawrence is typical of the transformation of the Massachusetts industrial city. Created in 1845 and named after entrepreneur Abbott Lawrence, it resembled in its first few years an idyllic planned community. But the city quickly changed. Along the Merrimack River, rank with sewage brought down from Lowell, grew an Irish shanty town. The city suffered from a typhoid epidemic brought on by the pollution of the water supply. Ten years after its birth, Lawrence had become an unhealthy, immigrant city, unloved and alien to its rural neighbors.[18]

III

Despite their importance, cotton mill workers represented only a fraction of the ante-bellum Massachusetts labor force. The 1860 census listed 57,032 persons as "agriculturists," 69,049 as laborers or factory operatives, and 122,251 as mechanics. The latter group, overwhelmingly

Protestant and native-born, had an identification and value structure distinct from the Irish operative.[19]

Although the Massachusetts textile industry has served as a symbol of nineteenth-century New England manufacturing and has attracted the attention of historians as the first American industry to revolutionize the factory system, it was second in importance to boots and shoes. In 1855 the value of cotton textiles produced in the state was $26,000,000 while that of the boot and shoe industry was $37,000,000. As the shoe business was far less technologically sophisticated, the number of persons employed was far greater than in textiles. In 1855, some 74,326 earned their living by producing shoes while 34,787 were employed by the cotton industry. There were striking differences between the wage scales of the two groups. During the latter 1850's the average weekly wage for a shoemaker was nine dollars while that of a male mill operative was from $3.75 to $6.00.[20]

These disparities in productivity and wages hint at some of the differences between the two work forces. Paul Faler, in his study of the ante-bellum shoemakers of Lynn, Massachusetts, describes their work as being "halfway between the cottage industry of the subsistence farmer and the mechanized factory system." Cobblers still owned their own tools, worked in small shops known as "ten-footers," and aspired--occasionally with success--to become bosses. Unlike the Irish day laborer or operative, the shoemakers formed a highly stable community. Due to a relative lack of mechanization, their industry required greater skill and allowed them greater independence. One of the pillars of their value system was the Methodist Church with its emphasis on the availability of salvation for all men. The other was their mechanic's ideology--the labor theory of

value--which maintained that the source of all wealth was the application of human labor to raw materials. The mechanic identified himself--along with the farmer--as the producing class and considered himself superior to such non-producers as aristocrats, capitalists, and paupers.[21]

But while the shoemaker-mechanic of 1860 was proud of his status as a skilled artisan and convinced that he was the backbone of the Commonwealth's industrial health, he was becoming increasingly convinced that he was not reaping his fair share of the rewards. Shoemaking had no tradition of absentee ownership, but the signs were clear that the industry was becoming concentrated in fewer hands with new machines making the expense of establishing a shoe manufactury prohibitive for anyone without great wealth. In 1854 the sewing machine first found its way into shoemaking; and while it initially replaced only the female stitchers--the least skilled and most poorly paid workers in the industry--the male cordwainers worried that their turn would be next.[22]

Outside market forces were increasingly dictating the work patterns for the New England shoemaker. The agent who sold shoes was unconcerned with the craft satisfaction of the worker and urged the production of more cheap brogans destined to be worn by Southern slaves. This demand for speed rather than skill threatened the very basis of the shoemakers' way of life, for work divorced from creativity and thought was as debasing to the mechanic as it was to the farmer. By 1860 shoe manufacturers were shipping much of their business to rural areas where unskilled hands were willing to work at lower rates. As the real wage for shoemakers declined, another unwelcome element entered the industry; by 1860, twelve percent of the Lynn shoemakers were Irish. A few years earlier there had

been virtually none.[23]

But the shoemakers, seeing that forces were making them more like the Irish, made every effort to establish their cultural differences. If the Irishman was known for his affection for hard drink, the mechanic's alternative was to form temperance societies and affirm the inappropriateness of liquor in an industrial society. If Irishmen were sterotyped as slothful, immoral, and illiterate, the mechanic formed self-betterment societies which emphasized thrift, punctuality, and moral behavior. If the Irishman was attracted to the Democratic party and its proslavery sympathies, the mechanic would support the Republicans and their emphasis on the dignity of labor and the immorality of the plantation system.[24]

IV

While farmers and mechanics suffered from the pressures of declining status and income, a small, tightly-knit group of capitalists were reaping the benefits of the changing economic conditions. In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, this group of aggressive and resourceful entrepreneurs, led by the Lawrences and the Appletons, left their homes in the hinterland and penetrated Boston's commercial world. Though Nathan Appleton was the son of a middling New Hampshire farmer and Amos Lawrence started his career as a clerk in Groton, Massachusetts, they became the symbols of power and wealth in the Commonwealth. By marriage and by business partnerships they allied themselves with such established trading families as the Lowells and the Cabots. Together they formed the apex of the class that dominated Massachusetts for much of the nineteenth century. Based on the ownership of the great textile

mills, their holdings also included most of Boston's banking and insurance and much of Massachusetts' railroad system.[25]

Economic power was the foundation of the cotton elite's authority, but not its entire compass. As Thorstein Veblen has noted: "In order to gain and hold the esteem of men it is not sufficient merely to possess wealth or power. The wealth or power must be put on evidence." The vulgar display of wealth typical of the late nineteenth-century millionaires was inappropriate to the values of ante-bellum Boston. The Lawrences and Appletons were too close to their Puritan roots to build garish mansions on Beacon Hill to overawe the masses. But the control of cultural institutions was an accepted and even necessary part of the creation of this new elite class.[26]

As Ronald Story has argued in his study, "Class Development and Cultural Institutions in Boston," Harvard University was one of the primary vehicles of cultural control. The leading educational institution in New England and an important symbol of historical continuity with previous upper classes, Harvard in the 1850's came under the close control of the manufacturing elite. Harvard's support had once been based on a fairly broad public subscription and on periodic grants from the state legislature. But by the eve of the Civil War a handful of wealthy contributors had taken over the support of the university; they now dominated the Harvard Corporation and carefully selected a faculty to conform to their political and social outlook.[27]

Harvard remained a small, largely provincial institution. Though the class size increased slightly during the pre-Civil War years, due to the increased enrollment of Southern students, the senior class of 1860 still had only 106 members. College authorities intentionally kept

the enrollment limited as a way of preserving the elite character of the school. Their conception of Harvard was patterned after the British example. The college was to be a place where the children of the upper class would become acquainted with one another and recognize their social unity. This function was even more necessary in Massachusetts than in England due to the mobility of American society and the newness of the elite; young Lawrences and Appletons needed a consciousness of their position instilled upon them.[28]

Harvard's role as a class arbiter was not lost on the rest of the Massachusetts population. Those outside the social pale of Cambridge sent their children to less expensive institutions such as Amherst, Dartmouth, Bowdoin, or Brown--institutions which often demonstrated a greater tolerance for antislavery and unorthodox economic opinions. Those in Western Massachusetts, particularly, complained that Harvard was the "College of Boston and Salem and not of Commonwealth." Henry Wilson, speaking for the artisan viewpoint complained that the men who controlled the Corporation "assume it to be their mission to keep Harvard College from the influences of the outside barbarians." John Murray Forbes--whose fortune was made in Western railroads after those of the textile magnates and was thus not of the inner circle of Massachusetts society--complained that Harvard was a club of the favored few and became a supporter of the embryonic Massachusetts Institute of Technology.[29]

Edward L. Pierce, a close friend and biographer of Charles Sumner, has left a keen description of the ante-bellum Boston elite. "There was but one society to which admission was sought, and everyone in it knew every one else who was in it. It was close and hard, consolidated, with a uniform stamp on all, and opinion running in the grooves,--in politics

Whig; in faith, Unitarian and Episcopalian." Intellectual, despotic over individual thought, ante-bellum Boston, Pierce argued, was comparable only to ancient Athens. An integral part of the elites' prestige was the preservation of its rectitude. They were deeply concerned with the esteem of those who were their fellow citizens, if not their social equals. And to gain their esteem it was insufficient to wield mere economic power. One had to prove one's moral virtue as well.[30]

Understanding the traditional New England emphasis on community responsibility, the elite was concerned with their duties as well as their privileges. In this regard, Boston's elite was significantly different from its most important economic rival--the New York merchant class. New York's upper class was a far more mobile, heterogeneous group than that of Boston. At the same time, it was more singleminded. The New York merchants were satisfied to increase their fortunes and leave other elements to wrestle with the problems of morality and social control. New York's upper class, living in a city both larger and more diverse than Boston, had less sense of responsibility and less concern for reputation than did their counterparts in Massachusetts.[31]

Still, paternalism flourished in Boston. The journals and memoirs of the Boston elite are filled with expressions of social responsibility. Amos A. Lawrence was a pious example. On signing the papers for an important business transaction he hoped that, in the event it was successful, "I may not forget my duty in using it, not for my own aggrandizement, but for the advance of Christ's Kingdom on earth." Robert Winthrop, in his 1861 memorial of Nathan Appleton, wrote that "the very investment of so large a part of his property in domestic manufacture had many of the best elements of charity." Winthrop suggested that Appleton's satisfaction

with his own success "was not a little enhanced by the consideration that he had been the means of affording employment to so great a number of operatives . . . who might otherwise have failed to obtain work and wages."[32]

The elite's sense of moral accountability would make the question of slavery especially agonizing. On the one hand, their economic position depended on the continued supply of slave-grown cotton and, partly, on the Southern market for textiles. Many of the elite had close relationships with Southern planters through both business dealings and class ties at Harvard. Some had marriage alliances with Southern families. Furthermore, as a ruling class, the Boston elite were psychologically disposed to sympathize with the efforts of the planter class to avert social turmoil.[33]

But antislavery contentions to the contrary, the Boston elite did not cower cravenly at the feet of the slaveowners. The elite were aware of the New England repugnance to slavery and sensitive to charges that they were abandoning traditional values for economic gain. During the 1850's they were repelled by the crass, proslavery tactics of the Democratic administration and desperately hoped to find some solution which would ensure sectional peace without wholly supporting the slavery position. But the Cotton Whigs found it impossible to satisfy both their consciences and their pocketbooks, and in their failure lies much of the history of Massachusetts politics in the fifteen years before the Civil War.

CHAPTER II

THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION

Until slavery uprooted the old parties, the Cotton Whigs--an amalgam of conservative business interests led by the textile manufacturers--dominated Massachusetts' political life. The cotton magnates, whose economic power had developed so dramatically in the 1820's and 1830's, had quickly translated their new fortunes into political power. An event symbolic of the passing of authority into new hands was Boston's 1830 Congressional election. In that year Nathan Appleton defeated Henry Lee, the representative of the older mercantile families and their principles of free trade. At about the same time, Daniel Webster, sensing the changing winds, embraced the tariff as the touchstone of his political creed and became the primary ornament of the Massachusetts Whigs.[1]

The enormous financial resources of the textile manufacturers, which enabled them to support conservative pulpits and a conservative university at Cambridge, gave them great influence within the Massachusetts Whig party. Due to their generosity, the party was rarely without funds enough to stage enormous rallies for their candidates, subsidize friendly newspapers, or flood the state with pamphlets that proved that prosperity was inseparable from the protective tariff and Whig rule. In order to keep Webster in public life, the mill owners gave their foremost statesman substantial shares in their corporations. When these gifts failed to maintain Webster in the style of life to which he was accustomed, the leading manufacturers subsidized him with substantial cash payments.[2]

A weapon nearly as effective as the purse was the threat of social ostracism. Those who embraced political heresies found themselves unwelcome at the most fashionable homes--a significant snub in a closely-knit society like Boston. Thus, in the 1840's, Charles Sumner became a social outcast for his excessive zeal in promoting prison reform. George Ticknor, an arbiter of Boston society, explained to one of Sumner's friends the necessity for such action: "I am sorry as you for the effect these discussions produce upon society in Boston; but the principles of that society are right, and its severity toward disorganizers and social democracy in all its forms is just and wise." Ticknor asserted that, by disciplining the apostles of unsound opinions, public morals--that is, those of the ruling oligarchy--could be maintained. Antislavery men whose family ties normally would have admitted them to the inner circles suffered under this rule. Richard Henry Dana once drove down Beacon street and commented to his companion: "There was a time when I was welcome at almost every house within two miles of us, but now hardly any are open to me."[3]

As long as the tariff remained the foremost political issue, the Cotton Whigs remained in a commanding position. Leading politicians such as Webster, Robert Winthrop, and Edward Everett had successfully convinced a majority of the native-born operatives and artisans and the more prosperous market-oriented farmers of their interest in a protective tariff. The Massachusetts Democrats appealed to those who, for a variety of reasons, considered themselves outsiders in the Commonwealth: businessmen unable to crack the inner circle of the Lawrences and Lowells, religious dissenters (especially Methodists and Baptists), farmers in the poorer and more remote areas, and the Irish. These groups, though

substantial in numbers, were not a majority in Massachusetts. The Democrats voiced their suspicion of the banks and opposed special privileges for corporations. They called for reforms in the election laws and in the penal system and for a more democratic judiciary. They denounced Massachusetts' liquor laws (which forbade the selling of spirits in quantities less than fifteen gallons) as imposing temperance on the poor but allowing indulgence to the rich. But as long as the Whigs could clothe themselves in the mantle of social and moral conservatism and while the majority of the Massachusetts voters identified them with the traditions of the Commonwealth, the Whigs would remain in power.[4]

It was the escalation of the slavery issue that finally destroyed the political supremacy of the Cotton Whigs. By seeming to place their economic interests before their ethical sensibilities, they could no longer convince their constituency that they were defenders of the traditional values of the Puritan Commonwealth. Their antislavery opponents could claim with credibility to represent the moral sentiment of Massachusetts and could assert that the Cotton Whigs were a narrow, self-interested clique apart from the mainstream of the state. Such an assertion found a receptive audience among those who were coming to resent the dislocation the manufacturers had brought into their lives.

Sentiment in Massachusetts had been always at least mildly antislavery. But except for a few abolitionists, most people prior to the mid-1840's regarded slavery as a relatively unimportant issue. An upright citizen of Massachusetts would look upon the South's peculiar institution as an unpleasant, though happily remote, problem. And most men agreed that the federal Constitution prohibited Northern citizens from any substantive action. When the Texas issue arose in the 1830's all Massachusetts Whigs

joined to oppose annexation. Many New England conservatives had long opposed expansionism as disruptive of the fabric of the nation. They believed that men on the frontier would be without law and civilization. As the nation expanded, the influence of New England would decline. These Whigs feared that the interests of the newly settled areas would be closer to the agrarian South than to the Northeast. Furthermore the continued westward migration might draw away a work force needed in the mills.

President John Tyler, already unpopular in Massachusetts for abandoning Whig economics, pushed for the annexation of Texas, and the Boston establishment rallied against him. Abbott Lawrence, declaring that the North "must resist every attempt at the acquisition of territory to be inhabited by slaves," became a leader of the anti-Texas movement. Robert Winthrop, Boston's representative in Congress and a leading spokesman of the manufacturers' interests, announced that should Texas be added to the Union it would "break up the balance of our system, violate the compromises of the Constitution, and endanger the permanence of the Union." The Massachusetts Whigs united as they never would again when the Democrats nominated the ardent expansionist James Polk for the presidency in 1844.[5]

Shortly after Polk's election, the Massachusetts legislature sent Samuel Hoar, a leading Concord lawyer, to South Carolina to protest the practice there of arresting black sailors--some of them Massachusetts citizens--when their ships stopped at South Carolina ports. The South Carolina legislature, hearing of Hoar's mission, passed with only one dissenting vote a resolution declaring the Massachusetts emissary _persona non grata_ and directed the governor to expel him from the state.

With an angry mob milling in front of his Charleston hotel, Hoar quickly slipped away to Boston.[6]

Massachusetts reacted angrily to the incident. The legislature drafted a resolution accusing South Carolina of an act of war and warned that she had attacked the basic foundation of the Constitution. She had forfeited her right to ask Massachusetts citizens to uphold Constitutional provisions that benefited Carolinians. The Hoar affair, in addition to straining the relations between the two states, gave political leverage to a group of younger antislavery Whigs--men like Charles Francis Adams, Charles Sumner, and Henry Wilson--who had grown restless in their subordinate role in the party.[7]

In March 1845, Congress narrowly voted to annex Texas, setting in motion a series of events that would shatter Massachusetts' dominant party. The conservative Whigs disliked Texas annexation as heartily as ever, but argued that the national government had now entered into a compact it was required to honor. These Whig leaders understood that any continuation of the controversy would only further strain relations with their Southern friends. With a Democratic administration taking office in Washington, they recognized that the Southern Whigs were necessary allies if they were to retain a favorable tariff. But if Texas annexation presented difficulties for the leaders of Massachusetts Whiggery, it provided an opportunity for the antislavery Whigs. Led by Adams, Sumner, Wilson, Horace Mann, and John G. Palfrey, this young and ambitious group became known as the Conscience Whigs. Though the artisan Wilson was a notable exception, many of the Conscience Whigs were men of influence, education, and breeding. But they were not part of the powerful textile class whom they often viewed as parvenus with crass materialistic instincts.[8]

Mobilizing the popular sentiment stirred by the expulsion of Hoar and Texas annexation, the Conscience Whigs pushed through the legislature resolutions that opposed the acquisition of any new slave territory and denied the legality of Congress' action on Texas. As the debate over Texas continued, the Boston manufacturers grew more upset with their upstart opponents. Thomas G. Cary, a state senator from Boston, urged that the inflammatory speeches cease lest the South take offense and retaliate against Boston's commerce. Ebenezer Rockwood Hoar, son of Massachusetts' emissary to South Carolina and later Attorney-General of the United States, declared in response: "It is as much the duty of Massachusetts to pass resolutions in favor of the rights of man as in the interests of cotton."[9]

In May 1846, President Polk announced to the nation that Mexican troops had drawn American blood on American soil. Many in Massachusetts were skeptical of the President's account and believed that his call for a declaration of war was a move to conquer additional territory for slavery. The state refused to appropriate money to support volunteer companies, and recruitment in Massachusetts met with less response than in other sections of the country.

Polk's actions placed the Cotton Whigs in a difficult position. If they opposed the President they would run the risk of seeming unpatriotic, but if they supported him the antislavery faction at home would accuse them of being tools of slavery. Webster was happy he was out of Washington when the vote on war came. But Boston's representative in the House was not so fortunate. Though he disliked the war, Winthrop reluctantly voted to authorize it, and became one of only two Massachusetts Whigs to do so. "Blood! Blood! is on the hands of the representative from Boston," wrote

his former friend Sumner; "Not all Neptune's ocean can wash them clean." Winthrop's vote made him the Conscience Whigs' primary target. Though Samuel Gridley Howe did poorly when he challenged Winthrop in the 1846 election, the antislavery forces had their revenge in 1847 when John Palfrey's refusal to vote for Winthrop cost the Bostonian election as Speaker of the House.[10]

The final breach in the Massachusetts Whig party came in 1848 when the national party nominated Zachary Taylor for the presidency. A slaveholder so inexperienced in politics that he had never voted, Taylor was known solely for his military record in the recent Mexican War. To the Conscience Whigs, Taylor's nomination was a conspiracy between the cotton planters and the Northern manufacturers--"the Lords of the Lash and the Lords of the Loom," as Sumner called them. The Conscience Whigs then joined with disaffected Democrats and members of the abolitionist Liberty party in supporting Martin Van Buren and the new Free Soil party. The nomination of Charles Francis Adams for Vice-President helped the new organization become the second party in the Commonwealth and denied the Whigs a majority in Massachusetts' state and national elections. The Cotton Whigs took this as an ominous sign; for, by combining forces, the Whigs' opponents could remove them from power.[11]

In the wake of the Mexican War came the problem of governing the newly conquered territory. Inevitably, this involved the question of slavery. Henry Clay, hoping to avoid a serious conflict, offered a broad compromise designed to settle the outstanding differences between North and South. For Daniel Webster, looking ahead to 1852 as his last hope for the presidency, the Clay proposals came as an opportunity to remove slavery from national politics. He had discovered that his position on slavery--that

it was morally evil but politically insignificant--appeased neither his constituents at home nor his friends in the South. He thoroughly disliked antislavery agitators and called the Wilmot Proviso--the resolution to prohibit slavery in territories acquired from Mexico--"a mere abstraction" which would prohibit "a naked possibility upon which no man would act." Slavery was a political albatross around Webster's neck, and as he strode into the Senate chamber on March 7, 1850, his intention was to remove it once and for all.[12]

Speaking, he said, not as a Massachusetts man but as an American, Webster urged his colleagues to accept the compromise proposals, which included a stronger fugitive slave act and the organization of New Mexico without a prohibition of slavery. Most of Massachusetts received the speech with surprise and disapproval. Even Robert Winthrop thought Webster had gone too far and worried that support of the compromise would "overturn every Whig state north of the Potomac." Antislavery men responded immediately and vigorously. In John Greenleaf Whittier's cruel phrase Webster was now Ichabod:

> So fallen! so lost! the light withdrawn
> Which once he wore!
> The glory from his gray hairs gone
> Forevermore.

Most of the Massachusetts delegation in Congress, sensing the unpopularity of Webster's position, refused to support the compromise when it came to a vote.[13]

But while the Commonwealth as a whole rejected the compromise, Boston's economic elite--though dubious at first--rallied to Webster's cause. Their representative in Congress, Samuel A. Eliot, was the sole Massachusetts Congressman to vote for the Fugitive Slave Law. Webster had convinced the Boston business community that without an appeasement of the South

their commerce was likely to suffer. He quoted an unnamed Southern Senator as saying that "the Lowell mills might and should all stop unless the North quit this violence of abuse." The Boston Advertiser, a spokesman for Boston conservatives, noted that the Fugitive Slave Law might put the South in a frame of mind to accommodate on the tariff. As the Compromise of 1850 became law, hundreds of Boston's most influential men rushed to sign a letter praising Webster as the savior of the Union, and a hundred cannon volleys sounded on the Common.[14]

II

Boston's Whigs might celebrate the enactment of the compromise but they would pay a heavy political price for their association with it. The compromise, and especially the Fugitive Slave Law, served as a catalyst for forces which had long resented the domination of the Boston Whigs but which had been divided among themselves. The Free Soil movement had been a tentative step in the direction of an antislavery coalition, but the Whigs of 1848 had still retained a certain credibility as an antislavery party--a credibility that vanished on the seventh of March, 1850.

In the 1850 elections a new coalition of Free Soilers and Democrats swept the state. Loco-foco as well as Free Soil, the coalition was anti-Boston as well as antislavery. It was strongest in the small towns and rural areas, among artisans and farmers. Though its most dramatic act was to give Daniel Webster's old Senate seat to Charles Sumner, most of those gaining office under the Coalition were men of humble backgrounds and anti-aristocratic views. George Boutwell, the new governor, was a Democrat and the son of a farmer. Nathaniel Banks, the Speaker of the

Massachusetts House, was a former Waltham bobbin boy. The coalition had great appeal among the shoe towns of the Commonwealth, and at least three of its prominent members had been cobblers: Henry Wilson, who became President of the State Senate; Amasa Walker, the new Secretary of the Commonwealth; and John B. Alley, a member of the Governor's Council. All this prompted Caleb Cushing, an anti-Coalition Democrat loyal to the slavery views of the national party, to ask scornfully if "the state were to be shoemakerized or not."[15]

An important objective of the Coalition (which upper class Free Soilers such as Adams and Palfrey found too radical) was to weaken the institutions that gave the Cotton Whigs their hegemony, and to restore the influence of the countryside at the expense of Boston. Harvard, with its aristocratic airs and its opposition to antislavery, was a primary target. The Coalition-dominated legislature sought to control the election of the Harvard corporation and to secure the appointment of more liberal members of the faculty. The Coalition also supported the passage of a general incorporation law as a way to weaken the financial oligarchy of Boston. Previously, a bank charter could be obtained only by special act of the legislature--a favor that was restricted to a select few during the years of Whig rule. Some of the mill owners, correctly perceiving the Coalition as a threat to their interests, threatened operatives who voted for the reformers with dismissal. Here was primary evidence for the Coalition of the arrogant power of their opponents and the need for electoral reforms such as the secret ballot.[16]

Even though the Cotton Whigs had lost control of the state government, they retained their authority in Boston and were anxious to demonstrate their fidelity to the 1850 Compromise. Massachusetts had never

returned a fugitive slave and its mercantile community considered the rendition of a Negro necessary to prove reliability to Southern clients. E. L. Pierce, recollecting the atmosphere of Boston at the time, wrote that "the capital, the society, the culture and intellect of the city took part with no apparent regret or sense of shame but with alacrity, in a service which in other days would have been shunned as unworthy of humane or Christian men."[17]

In anticipation of this sentiment, a group of militant abolitionists, led by Samuel Gridley Howe and Theodore Parker, formed a Vigilance Committee to frustrate the enforcement of the law. They successfully prevented the abduction of two of Parker's parishioners, William and Ellen Craft, and assisted twenty Negroes to burst into the Boston Court House and rescue the fugitive Shadrach. In April 1851, a Georgia slaveowner claimed that Thomas Sims, a black man living in Boston, was his property. The civil authorities of the city were determined that this time their efforts to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law would succeed. They placed an armed guard outside the courthouse where Sims was held and strung iron chains before the entrances to frustrate a rescue. Abolitionists were quick to note the symbolism when Justice Lemuel Shaw stooped low beneath the chains as he entered his courtroom to send Sims back to slavery. Antislavery journalist William S. Robinson claimed that the money and the Websterism of Boston were responsible for this outrage: though the return of Sims humiliated the entire state, the infamy belonged to the city alone.[18]

Spurred in part by the Sim's case, the Coalition mobilized behind a new state Constitution that would institutionalize their attacks on the Whig establishment. Of primary interest to the reformers was the reduction of the political influence of Boston which annually sent a solid

block of forty-four conservative Whigs to the lower house of the legislature. The Coalition's newspaper, The Commonwealth, argued that "with a vast accumulation of capital on the one hand and the influx of a poor, ignorant, foreign population on the other," the cities no longer represented "historical Massachusetts." The proposed constitution greatly increased the representation of the rural areas at the expense of the cities. Had it become law the Whigs would have lost any chance to regain power. But by combining with the Irish--who disliked the new charter because it prohibited the use of state funds for religious schools--the Whigs were able to defeat the new constitution. This "Cotton and Catholic Coalition"--of Abbot Lawrence's wallet and the Irish vote--infuriated the Coalitionists and stimulated latent nativism. Sumner, though not a nativist himself, mourned the defeat of the constitution; "It would have broken the back of the Boston oligarchy, the stumbling block of all reform," he wrote. Following this setback in 1853, and with the insistence of the new Pierce administration that Massachusetts' Democrats eschew all alliances that might offend the South, the first antislavery coalition to govern Massachusetts disintegrated.[19]

III

After the defeat of the Coalition the Whigs regained office. But their tenure would be brief, as the events of 1854 stirred an antislavery storm that would remove them forever as the ruling party of the Commonwealth. Stephen A. Douglas' Kansas-Nebraska Act opened the fertile areas of Kansas and Nebraska to slavery by repealing the Missouri Compromise. At this betrayal Massachusetts' conservative Whigs roared

with anger. Had they not acted in good faith in upholding the Compromise of 1850? Had they not risked severe political reprisals by aiding in the return of Sims? This new act dashed their hopes that slavery--with its damnable tendency to incite fanatics--could be put to rest, and that in the return to older issues, they could re-establish their preeminence in Massachusetts politics. Amos A. Lawrence wrote of the occasion: "We went to bed one night, old fashioned, conservative, compromise Union Whigs and waked up stark raving mad Abolitionists." This proved to be a substantial exaggeration, but Lawrence and his peers did pack Faneuil Hall to denounce Douglas' bill in uncompromising and unwhiggish terms. Theirs was the bellow of a man on a limb who had just heard the buzz of a saw.[20]

In May, two days after the House of Representatives passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act, federal officers in Boston seized Anthony Burns, a fugitive Negro from Virginia, and held him for transportation back to his master. Boston's merchant class, who had made the return of Sims a token of their Unionism, now came forward with funds to aid in Burns' legal defense. Richard Henry Dana, the slave's attorney, noted that men who for years had spurned him because of his antislavery activities now greeted him like an old friend. But neither the protests of the merchants nor a desperate raid on the court house led by Worcester minister, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, could save Burns. Federal Attorney Benjamin F. Hallett, working closely with President Pierce, mobilized the militia and called in federal troops. Boston had not seen such an occupying force since the early days of the Revolution. On June 2, with the city under virtual martial law, lawmen escorted Anthony Burns through the streets of Boston and put him aboard a South-bound ship.[21]

The unhappiness of the Cotton Whigs over the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the Anthony Burns affair was as much out of self-interest as moral indignation. As Robert Winthrop noted, these events formed "a recipe for reinflating Freesoilism and Abolitionism" with all their potential for disruption of authority. But those conservatives who continued their protest against the Kansas Act after 1854 usually did so outside of politics. They were attracted to the New England Emigrant Aid Company, which textile magnates such as Amos A. Lawrence and Providence's John Carter Brown could control and which was confined to such safe objectives as the spread of New England industry and values in the West. Had the Cotton Whigs joined an antislavery political coalition at this point, they would undoubtedly have had to share leadership with Banks and Wilson--men they considered their social inferiors.[22]

In the fall of 1854 an unparalleled political tidal wave struck Massachusetts. A new political party, the Americans, won every statewide office, all of Massachusetts' Congressional seats, the entire State Senate, and all but three of the 380 seats in the lower house. Unlike the narrowly anti-foreign Know-Nothingism of many states, the Massachusetts American party was a highly diverse coalition of voters. Some saw the Slave Power as their greatest enemy while others were more concerned with the foreigners in their midst who increasingly made Massachusetts' cities alien places. There was, however, no necessary conflict between antislavery and nativism--indeed, many New Englanders believed slavery and Popery to be parallel evils. In their minds both the slave owner and the priest were agents of monstrous conspiracies to subvert individual freedom and judgment. But there was a serious conflict among the Americans as to their fundamental direction. Certain leaders, like Henry Wilson, saw the movement as a step

toward a thoroughly antislavery party. Others like Henry Gardner, the Boston dry-goods merchant who became governor in 1854, hoped that nativism could divert popular attention from slavery and unite North and South in a common antipathy toward foreigners.[23]

The Americans enjoyed their greatest strength among the artisans and farmers who had supported the anti-Whig program of the old Coalition. The men who served in this Know-Nothing legislature--whom the Whigs ridiculed for lacking experience in government and eloquence in debate--represented those elements of Massachusetts society who felt their independence slipping away. They struck out at forces in society which represented a threat to the ascendancy of the Protestant artisan and yeoman, whether it be the millowner, the Catholic Church, or the Slave Power. The 1855 legislature passed a spate of bills which registered the frustration of the working men of Massachusetts against those who controlled the state's economic institutions. The new legislators worked in a loco-foco spirit: they abolished imprisonment for debt, restricted child labor, and enacted a mechanics lien law. They also showed great interest in, though failed to pass, a Ten-Hour Law.[24]

The Americans, recalling the role of Catholic voters in defeating the 1853 Constitution, were determined to reduce the newcomers' political influence. The party's platform demanded that immigrants wait twenty-one years before voting and be permanently barred from holding office. The Know-Nothings charged that the Massachusetts Irish were loyal supporters of slavery. As evidence they pointed to the aid provided by the Irish Columbian Artillery in the return of Anthony Burns. Nativism and antislavery coalesced as the Massachusetts legislature abolished all foreign-born military organizations in the Commonwealth.[25]

Revenge for the Burns affair did not end with reprisals against the Irish militia. Antislavery legislators were determined to punish Edward Loring, the Federal Commissioner who had sent Burns back to slavery. They petitioned Governor Gardner to remove Loring from the county judgeship he also held. Gardner, with a record of accommodation to the Fugitive Slave Law, emphasized the old Whig principle of the independence of the judiciary and refused to follow the legislators' request. Later the legislature enacted over Gardner's veto a personal liberty law which nullified the Fugitive Slave Law in Massachusetts by making it practically impossible to enforce. This signaled an open split between the Governor and the antislavery majority of his party.[26]

The emerging leader of the Massachusetts Americans was Henry Wilson. His election to the United States Senate was a galling blow to the Whig establishment. Sumner's victory had been bad enough, but at least he was a Harvard alumnus and a man of letters. But now a cobbler was sitting in Edward Everett's former seat. Wilson was no less objectionable to those conservatives who had hoped to forge an alliance with the Southern Americans. By 1855 it was clear to Wilson and his allies that the national American party was dominated by conservatives who sought to mute the slavery issue. Wilson's subsequent search for a new antislavery coalition lead to the foundation of the Massachusetts Republican party.[27]

In order to complete his coalition, Wilson needed the support of the Conscience-Whig Free Soilers like Dana and Adams who had spurned the Know-Nothings. Despite overtures from the Americans, the antislavery upper class wanted no part of this plebian movement. The secret ritual of the working-class Know-Nothing lodges repelled these men of family and culture. Their disapproval hardened as the legislature pursued an

unsavory investigation of the state's nunneries under the leadership of Joseph Hiss, the Grand Worshipful Instructor of the Massachusetts Know-Nothings.[28]

In 1854 the upper-class Free-Soilers had formed an antislavery party which they called "Republican." But this tentative attempt met with ignominious defeat in the year of the great Know-Nothing sweep. The true foundation of the Massachusetts Republican party occurred only when these old Free-Soilers joined with Henry Wilson's antislavery Americans. For Massachusetts Republicanism could only be complete when it tapped all the sources of antislavery in the state, and this included the nativists and artisans represented by Henry Wilson as well as the reformers who supported Sumner. Nevertheless, their 1855 gubernatorial candidate, Julius Rockwell, lost to the incumbent Gardner. But this indicated only that they had failed to build their organization and discover winning issues. This would come the following year when "Bleeding Kansas" and "Bleeding Sumner" became the catalytic forces for Massachusetts Republicanism.[29]

On May 21, 1856, proslavery raiders from Missouri rode into Lawrence, Kansas, looting and burning, and left the free-soil town in ruins. John Brown retaliated by killing Southern settlers at Pottawatomie Creek, and soon the entire territory was in a state of civil war. Massachusetts antislavery men responded by pledging arms and money through the State Kansas Committee to the beleaguered free-state settlers. On the day following the Lawrence raid, South Carolina Congressman Preston Brooks, enraged over Charles Sumner's recent speech against slavery, approached the Massachusetts Senator on the Senate floor. Using a gutta percha cane, Brooks beat Sumner until he was bloody and unconscious. Brooks was showered with

testimonials from throughout the South; a group of students gave him a gold-headed cane. When the House of Representatives failed to expel the assailant, resentment in Massachusetts rose to explosive levels. What better proof, Republicans argued, of the barbarism of slavery and the shallowness of Southern attachment to the Union.[30]

The presidential election of 1856 was well suited for the consummation of the Massachusetts Republican party. The party had in John C. Fremont a candidate whose political record was obscure enough to offend no one. The trouble in Kansas gave Republicans an issue--the non-extension of slavery in the territories--which could unite all voters of an antislavery persuasion. Still, Massachusetts Republicans were uncertain of their strength and entered into a compact with Gardner not to challenge him, in return for the governor's neutrality in the presidential race. The Fremont ticket swept the Commonwealth, receiving sixty percent of the vote. Especially encouraging to the Republicans was the defection en masse of the Whigs from Western Massachusetts and Worcester County. The Boston Whigs watched glumly as their candidate, Millard Fillmore, was crushed.[31]

In his excellent study of ante-bellum Republicanism, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, Eric Foner notes that Republican ideology was more than merely an attack on Southern slave society; it was "an affirmation of the superiority of the social system of the North." But there was an added dimension to the struggle for free institutions in Massachusetts. Unlike those in the more purely agricultural states of the North, Massachusetts Republicans believed that the threat to free labor was internal as well as external; it came from the mill owner and the Irish immigrant as well as from the Southern cotton planter. Moderate antislavery became the common bond that united those who resented the changing structure of

of Massachusetts society. Loco-focoism and nativism, though they touched deep well-springs of sympathy, could not unite both a Wilson and an Adams. Some might resent the domination of the cotton elite because they saw them as obstacles in the path of upward mobility, while others saw them as materialistic usurpers of traditional authority. But all could agree that compromising Cotton Whigs had acquiesced to the wishes of the slaveowners for the sake of preserving and expanding their manufacturing enterprises--the most visible cause of the social dislocations they resented. To say that the Republicans used slavery as a symbol for a myriad of frustrations is not to say that they were either cynical or hypocritical. Most Massachusetts Republicans genuinely disliked the South's peculiar institution. But slavery was politically useful because it was the evil most universally understood. Men of many backgrounds could see in slavery the epitome of all they disliked.[32]

By 1857 the Republicans were strong enough to defeat Gardner. Their candidate was Nathaniel Banks, the former bobbin boy, who had risen through the ranks of Massachusetts politics and had served as Speaker of the United States House of Representatives. Though the Sumner wing of the party thoroughly distrusted Banks, even they admitted he was an improvement over the Hunker Gardner. To professional politicans like Wilson, Banks' moderate position on slavery was an advantage in attracting a broader spectrum of voters to the party. The following year the Republicans completed their capture of Massachusetts' political offices by winning control of both houses of the legislature.[33]

By 1859 the Republicans were so dominant in the Commonwealth that it is easiest to define the party by the groups that refused to support

them: the urban commercial elite and the Irish Catholics. The broad middle classes of the Commonwealth were solidly within the Republican ranks. With a sprinkling of reformers and intellectuals, it was the party of the Protestant farmer and artisan, the countryside and the small town. The Republicans considered themselves the backbone of Massachusetts society. They looked hopefully to the future and the opportunity to instill their Puritan values into the federal government.

CHAPTER III

HARPERS FERRY AND BEACON HILL

On the night of October 16, 1859, John Brown and his small band of whites and free blacks slipped into Harpers Ferry, Virginia, and seized the federal armory. The raiders hoped to initiate a massive rising of slaves and topple the South's "peculiar institution." Except for a handful of conspirators--who were privy to Brown's plans--Massachusetts was perplexed by the strange events that were unfolding along the edge of the Blue Ridge Mountains. First reports indicated that workers at a government dam near Harpers Ferry, enraged when a contractor had absconded and left them unpaid, had seized the town, and that local Negroes had joined the rioting "out of compulsion." Each telegraph report increased the numbers involved in the disturbance, and Bostonians scanning their newspapers on the evening of the 18th were informed that as many as 500 to 600 armed Negroes were involved.[1]

The Boston Evening Transcript could discover a lesson in this event, even on the basis of these fragmentary reports. Such a labor dispute, should it occur in the North, could never cause the alarm it was generating in Virginia. For the South "glories in a social condition making it subject to continual trepidations," while the North's social system was based on the firm bedrock of free labor. "At times like these the inherent weakness of a state of society where large numbers are held in a state of servitude is revealed." Only when later reports indicated the leader and the purpose of the raid did the Transcript's editor realize how meaningful his comments had been.[2]

By the morning of October 19, the nation knew that the mysterious old man at the head of the Harpers Ferry raiders was the Kansas warrior John Brown. Brown had a long connection with New England and Massachusetts. Born in Torrington, Connecticut, he later lived in Springfield, Massachusetts, where he ran a wool business that ended in spectacular failure. Returning to Springfield in 1851 he organized the "League of Gileadites," a secret group pledged to resist the Fugitive Slave Law. After he made his reputation as a Kansas guerrilla captain, Brown was in demand with Massachusetts antislavery groups, speaking in several cities and meeting figures like Emerson, Wilson, and Sumner. In 1857 he testified before a committee of the Massachusetts legislature to urge an appropriation for the defense of Kansas.[3]

As further information about the raid became known, a feeling of uneasiness spread among influential circles in the Bay State. Virginia authorities had discovered letters in Brown's possession with Massachusetts postmarks, which suggested that their authors had helped Brown. Implicated were: Thomas Wentworth Higginson, a radical Unitarian minister from Worcester; George Luther Stearns, a wealthy suburban businessman who dabbled in reform; Frank Sanborn, a Concord schoolteacher and minor-league Transcendentalist; Samuel Gridley Howe, head of the Perkins School for the Blind; and Theodore Parker, the controversial Boston minister who was dying of consumption in Italy. These men were all uncompromising radicals and their involvement in such a desperate activity might not have come as a surprise, but the newspapers also reported that the New England Emigrant Aid Company had supplied Brown with rifles. Respectable and conservative businessmen had been associated with the company during the Kansas troubles: men like Amos Lawrence, the great textile magnate, and John Carter Brown,

Rhode Island's most important merchant. Many of these men had Southern commercial connections and prudent reputations to preserve. Brown's confiscated letters also mentioned, though less directly, politicians like Henry Wilson and William Seward. With the Massachusetts elections only a few weeks away, Republicans wondered anxiously if the Harpers Ferry raid would hurt their chances of retaining political control of the state.[4]

The Republican newspapers of Massachusetts--such as Boston's Atlas and Daily Bee and the Springfield Republican--were loyal and effective organs of the party. Like most partisan sheets of the period, they carefully presented the news to conform to the opinions of their readers and to advance the objectives of the party. Their first objective after the Harpers Ferry raid was to establish the fact that Brown was not a Republican. Indeed, the old fanatic was "a denouncer, a bitter hater of the Republican party." He was no friend of responsible statesmen like Seward and Wilson but only of extremists like Gerrit Smith and Frederick Douglass. He differed from them only in that they, unlike Brown, had too much regard for their personal safety to engage in such violent expeditions.[5]

The Republican editors reminded their readers that the party's policy was one of "pure State's Rights" with respect to slavery. If Southerners wanted to retain their "peculiar institution," it was of no concern to Republicans as long as they did not attempt to expand it beyond its existing boundaries. Republicans were but followers of those great Virginian statesmen, Washington and Jefferson, who believed that "the silent yet potent laws of political economy" would eventually favor freedom. Some Republicans resurrected Daniel Webster and claimed that he had never

concealed his belief that slavery was an unparalleled evil and that its expansion ought to be curtailed. His position, they claimed, was essentially the same as the Republicans. Had Brown staged his raid on March 8, 1850, could anyone have claimed that Webster had encouraged it? The editor of the Boston Traveller suggested that Brown's actions were more in keeping with Democratic principles. In an aimless attempt at historical parallel, he claimed that Democracts from the Whiskey Rebellion to the Dorr War had justified the right of rebellion. Furthermore, Brown's raid was but the practical application of Popular Sovereignty--the right to do anything without respect to the Consitution.[6]

It was in the interest of the Republicans to portray the Harpers Ferry raid as a bit of opera bouffe, to emphasize how ludicrous it was that a ragged little band could attack the sovereign state of Virginia and arouse the entire South. It was, as the Springfield Republican wrote, a farce, and not even the hanging of Brown could turn it into a tragedy. Besides no more serious consequences would result than an occasional slave getting an additional lash in order to make him "contented in his natural and proper place."[7]

Lest it be asserted that Harpers Ferry was the logical result of antislavery politics, it was also essential that Republicans portray Brown as insane. And how better to maintain the Republican position than to assert that the Democratic administration had driven Brown mad. The press pictured Brown as a peace-loving man who had gone to Kansas to establish a new home for his family but had been brutally attacked by the forces of slavery. The Republican, choosing to ignore Brown's messianic and controversial career as a Springfield wool merchant,

remembered him as "naturally a quiet man" who had enjoyed the trust and respect of his neighbors. It was men in the service of Buchanan who had murdered two of Brown's sons and had destroyed the old man's reason. Two years before the Harpers Ferry raid, Brown had lectured in Massachusetts, exhibiting a heavy chain and relating a story of great brutality. In October 1859, Republican papers told the story again of how Brown's sons, bound in oxen chains, were forced by federal troops to march thirty miles under a broiling Kansas sun.[8]

When Brown's trial began in late October, Republicans shifted their attention to the indecent haste with which the Virginia authorities were trying their prisoner. Judge Richard Parker denied motions for time to gather affidavits to demonstrate that Brown was insane; and when two Northern lawyers arrived to replace the court-appointed Virginians, Parker allowed them no recess to become acquainted with the case. The Evening Transcript rhetorically asked whether anyone had ever heard of such a request being denied in a capital case. "Never in a Protestant country," the paper replied. There was old Brown, lying wounded on his cot, unable to hear clearly the proceedings of his trial, while the Virginia authorities railroaded him to his doom.[9]

Behind this attack on Virginian justice was a deep Republican anxiety. The Middlesex County Republican convention met in Charlestown, Massachusetts, to nominate candidates for local offices and the subject of Brown was an unwelcome embarrassment. As the delegates debated how to best preserve the party's image, a majority seemed ready to support a resolve deploring the raid but blaming it on the Buchanan administration, until someone suggested that the most expedient course was to avoid any mention of Brown at all. In Concord, the town Republican

committee asked local author Henry Thoreau to refrain from giving his "Plea for Captain John Brown."[10]

First term Congressman Charles Francis Adams worried that Harpers Ferry would make his new position more difficult. Would Washington become a more chaotic and dangerous place for a Massachusetts Representative? "I have lived so little in any school of trial in late years that I know not how weak I am." Adams wrote to his son Henry then studying in Dresden that "in your little German corner of the world" the recent events in America might seem distant and obscure, but there was nothing occurring in Europe that would have such a profound impact on the world.[11]

II

No one was more unsettled by Harpers Ferry than Henry Wilson, who feared that Brown might destroy the coalition which formed the Massachusetts Republican party--a coalition which Wilson had been instrumental in creating and which represented his life's work. If Charles Sumner were the symbol of the Massachusetts Republican party, Wilson was the engine that made it work. Sumner, the ideologist, was temperamentally unfit for compromise. Wilson was the pragmatic politician who pursued immediate objectives, seeing that the war against slavery would be won one skirmish at a time. Politics was the vehicle which had enabled Wilson, born to a poor family in a declining New Hampshire hilltown, become an influential Senator. Politics had enabled "the Natick Cobbler" to lay aside the tools with which he once made the cheap brogans destined for Southern slaves. Now he was a man of influence sought out for advice by the leading men in New England.

Wilson was so totally immersed in politics that he left his wife on their wedding night to deliver a campaign speech.[12]

Wilson was a state legislator when Daniel Webster delivered his Seventh of March address upholding the Compromise of 1850 and its fugigive slave bill. Wilson rose in the Massachusetts House of Representatives to condemn the speech and introduce a resolution instructing Webster to vote for the Wilmot Proviso. When the resolution was defeated Wilson defiantly announced to his colleagues: "I will go out from this hall and unite with any party or body of men to drive you from power, rebuke Daniel Webster and place in his seat a Senator true to the principles and sentiments of the Commonwealth." For over a decade Wilson moved through the shifting alignments of Massachusetts parties from Whig to Free Soil to Know-Nothing, until he at last discovered in the Republicans the vehicle to banish the influence of slavery from the Bay State.[13]

For Wilson, the Republican party was the party of free labor and the common man. It represented social mobility and material reward for honest endeavor. Not surprisingly, he considered himself a grand example of the process. Wilson's Republicanism opposed the arrogant Southern aristocracy and the Boston commercial elite, for both despised honest self-made men. While Hunker politicians like Caleb Cushing contemptuously asked if Massachusetts' government was to be "shoemakerized," Wilson sought the support of those who, in his opinion, were "more intelligent but less wealthy" than the Boston Whigs. In a letter to Sumner, he expressed his contempt for the upper class: "I for one don't want the endorsement of the 'best society' of Boston until I am dead--then all of us are sure of it--for it endorses everything that is dead." By 1859 Wilson could relish the political destruction of his old enemies in

Massachusetts and could look forward to the triumph of Republicanism on the national stage. Surely this party was too important to let "a damned old fool" like Brown jeopardize its success.[14]

Wilson had particular reason to fear the results of the Brown raid. In May 1858, Hugh Forbes, an Englishman who had been hired by Brown as drillmaster for his antislavery "army," approached Wilson on the Senate floor and excitedly related an almost unintelligible story. He had fallen out with Brown, was denied his salary, and now wanted to even the score by exposing Brown's plans for a dramatic attack on slavery. Forbes, speaking "in a towering passion," incoherently expressed his grievances against Brown and left Wilson anxious and confused. Wilson then wrote to Samuel Gridley Howe, told him of his strange visitor, and asked what Brown was up to. Howe responded that Brown would confine his activities to Kansas and that Forbes was unbalanced and unreliable. Satisfied, Wilson let the matter slip his mind. But now the memory of that meeting came rushing back and Wilson worried that he would be accused of foreknowledge of the raid.[15]

Wilson also recalled that during the previous May he had first met Brown at a dinner with the Bird Club, an influential group of radical antislavery politicians and businessmen that ate at the Parker House. Wilson was suspicious of Brown, in part because of the incident of the preceeding year, but more fundamentally because he disliked those who let their passions overrule their reason. As Brown and Wilson sat side-by-side at the dinner table their conversation was brusque. "Senator Wilson, I understand you do not approve of my course," said Brown. Wilson replied curtly: "I am opposed to all violations of law and to violence, believing they lay a burden on the antislavery cause."[16]

Wilson was on a tour of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania when he received word of the Brown raid. These states, with local races in early November, were crucial for the presidential contest of 1860 and this fact was undoubtedly on Wilson's mind as he completed a long series of speeches. Would all his effort be ruined by this rash old man? He could not know, but he was certain that "Brown's invasion has thrown us, who were in a splendid position, on the defensive . . . . If we are defeated next year we owe it to that foolish and insane movement of Brown's."[17]

III

While the Republicans denied any association with Brown, their opponents made every effort to link them with the old Kansas warrior. Benjamin Franklin Butler opened the barrage in the Massachusetts Senate. The most flamboyant politician in the state, Butler possessed an instinct for the jugular that made him notorious even in an age of bare-knuckled politics. He told his Republican colleagues in the Senate that they must bear a heavy responsibility for the events at Harpers Ferry: "Ye are the men who abetted him in Kansas in his attacks on peaceable citizens there and paraded him as a martyr to freedom. Upon your head is his blood." Butler suggested that the Republicans made their mistake by letting Brown believe that they were in earnest when they talked about fighting for freedom rather than merely posturing for political effect.[18]

Many of the anti-Republicans celebrated when "bushels of letters" were discovered in the Maryland farmhouse that Brown had used as his headquarters. Though only abolitionists such as Sanborn, Howe, and

Gerrit Smith were really implicated by these letters, the anti-Republicans were in no mood to observe such distinctions; they claimed that this discovery proved that important Republican leaders were privy to Brown's plans. They insisted that Brown was a member of the Republican party, a man "petted and flattered and used" by their inner circle. The Boston Post, mouthpiece for the Buchanan administration and a major dispenser of federal patronage throughout the Commonwealth, claimed that Republican luminaries such as Wilson, Banks, and Congressman Anson Burlingame, had wined and dined Brown on his recent trip to Boston and had honored him for his militant attacks on slavery. The Boston Courier, voice of the most conservative remnants of Massachusetts Whiggery, reminded its readers that Governor Banks had once said he was willing to "let the Union slide" and that Burlingame had boasted that the Republicans, when they came to office, would "grind the 'Slave Senate' between the upper and nether millstones of our power." Thus Brown's fanaticism, according to the anti-Republicans, was but "the evil fruit of the evil tree" of Republican agitation. The "Black Republicans" had become the "Brown Republicans." Their irresponsibility had led to an inevitable result: "The knife of the black man at the throat of the white man."[19]

On one point Massachusetts conservatives agreed with their bitterest enemies, the abolitionists: Brown was not insane. For if the abolitionists needed a sane martyr, the anti-Republicans needed a sane criminal. They argued that the insanity plea was a mere attempt by Republicans to cover up their responsibility, and that the affidavits collected by defense lawyers proved only a tendency to insanity in Brown's family, but nothing about the old man himself. They claimed that the affidavits' description of Brown sounded like that of any abolitionist: honest,

benevolent, mild mannered on all subjects except slavery with which he was completely absorbed and totally unreasonable. If Brown were insane, conservatives argued, so was one quarter of Massachusetts and three quarters of its clergy.[20]

Much of the anti-Republican propaganda was aimed at those conservatives in the Commonwealth--basically former Whigs--who had drifted into the Republican party. "Good will come out of this if it serves to open the eyes of tens of thousands of well-meaning men," the Post declared. These men must be made to realize the danger which abolitionism posed to all property. What if Southern politicians and clergymen advocated that free traders burn the mills at Lowell and divide the property of the owners among the operatives? What if a Southerner had rented a farm near Lowell, and used it as a base to seize a factory and incite the workers to revolution?[21]

Urging Massachusetts property owners to empathize with Virginians had its limitations, however. Though strong class lines existed in the Bay State, the bourgeoisie was reluctant to acknowledge them. The image of an open society based on free and happy labor was important even to conservative Republicans. To admit that Massachusetts workers represented a potential source of discontent and instability would be to concede a good deal of the proslavery argument. Though Republicans, who were usually of native stock, had little affection for the Irish laborer in their midst, few would admit that these workers were a potential target for revolutionary activity.

Two anti-Republican tickets contested the 1859 election. In addition to the Democrats, an "Opposition Party" was formed by old Whigs and conservative Americans. They met on October 19, to nominate former Governor

George Nathan Briggs for his old office. Many wealthy and influential men were in this movement--men who had once controlled the Commonwealth, but whose day of political power had passed. They gathered in Faneuil Hall to denounce both major parties. They found the Democrats guilty of kindling a fire in Kansas which "created confusion and distraction everywhere." In traditional Whiggish fashion they complained about Democratic opposition to measures which would "expand the resources and encourage and protect the industry of the country." But these old Whigs saw the Republicans as no less an evil: their policies, contrary to the Constitution, were a threat to the Union. These "old fogies"--as the Republicans called them--could nevertheless perceive some fundamental contradictions in their upstart opponents. They noted that Republicans claimed to be the friend of the Negro in one state while, through exclusion bills, denied them "the liberty of breathing its air" in another; and that Republicans condemned alien influences in one section while they "pandered to the worst passions of the foreign element" in another. The Opposition hoped to convince conservative Republicans that the struggle over the expansion of slavery into the territories was essentially over, that the whole issue was now an abstraction capable of exciting only fanatics like Brown.[22]

Some Massachusetts Whigs wanted to join with the Democrats and form a united opposition to the Republicans. A few already had supported Buchanan in 1856 as the only way to prevent Fremont's election and its presumably disastrous consequences. Moreover, the Massachusetts Democratic party itself had been changing. Having abandoned many radical economic positions, it was not so offensive to conservative Whigs as in the past. And the solid connections many Democrats enjoyed with Southern

commercial interests were an enticement to the Boston business community. But when the Democrats nominated Benjamin Butler for governor, fusion became impossible. Butler's political base was among the factory workers of his native Lowell; and although he was an immensely successful lawyer with extensive holdings in New England textile mills, he continually attacked the vested economic interests of the Commonwealth--especially the banks. Even an intense dislike of the Republicans, compounded by the shock of Harpers Ferry, could not induce an old Whig to support a man like Butler.[23]

While the Opposition stayed close to moderate antislavery respectability, the Democrats embraced the proslavery hunkerism of the Buchanan administration. The real objective of Massachusetts Democrats, after all, was not in winning state elections--at best a very long shot--but in staying in the good graces of the President and enjoying the federal payroll. Benjamin Hallett, a leader of the state party, made no effort to hide his proslavery views. In a speech at Lowell, the center of the New England textile industry, Hallett asserted that the Republican party was based on twin follies: enmity to foreign labor and hatred of the South. New Englanders should recognize that the Republican party was attacking the basis of their prosperity; for it was Southern cotton and foreign labor that kept Lowell alive. He reminded his audience that Massachusetts built her mills, her ships, her houses, and her cities out of slave cotton. She was as responsible for the employment of thousands of slaves as if she owned them herself.[24]

The Democrats' major contention was that Republicans, concerned with distant and exotic problems, ignored the common white man at home. Butler argued the Republican obsession with Kansas proved this: "We

flew into a fever because a few men were killed out in Kansas. We subscribed Sharps Rifles, we threatened dissolution of the Union, . . . we put our handkerchiefs to our eyes and turned our eyes up and showed the whites of them in holy horror." But for every white man who died in Kansas, Butler claimed that twelve died in the unsanitary almshouses of Massachusetts. In Governor Banks' latest executive message there were five pages on Kansas and five lines on the problems of Massachusetts' poor. "Is it not time to have an administration of the government that will devote five lines to Kansas and five pages to our own home institutions?" asked Butler. The pugnacious Democrat denied that New Englanders should be concerned with the expansion of slavery into the territories, any more than Southerners should worry if Massachusetts settlers brought their pigs into Kansas.[25]

On October nineteenth, shortly after Harpers Ferry, Massachusetts' legislature repealed the last of the Commonwealth's discriminatory black laws. Over the previous two decades, Massachusetts had removed laws that had condoned segregation in schools and public transportation and which had forbidden miscegenation. Now the Republican-dominated legislature repealed the law which prohibited blacks from joining the state militia.[26]

Though Massachusetts had relatively few blacks, there was enough anti-Negro feeling in the state to make this an attractive issue to the Democrats. Butler, a general in the militia, objected strenuously to serving alongside "the blackest Negro that came out of Guinea," and warned that the morale of his men would suffer from the forced integration. Anyone who did not agree, Butler said, "had better exhibit

his taste in that line by taking to himself a black wife." According to the Boston Post, there could be but one purpose in enrolling blacks in the militia at this time: to aid future John Browns burn and pillage. Massachusetts Republicans, the Democrats argued, would never use a black militiaman to curb internal disorders; for any law they enforced would become so odious it could never be maintained. A black militia could only serve unconstitutional purposes such as assisting in an insurrection of Southern slaves. Democrats hoped that the image of Negroes with guns would bring a sharp reaction at the polls.[27]

IV

The Republicans conducted a quiet campaign. From their perspective, it was best that little interest be generated in this election. If Massachusetts voters did not become alarmed over the sectional crisis or if their negrophobia did not get out of hand, they would vote as they had in the past elections and return Banks and a Republican legislature to Beacon Hill. Some Republicans--Banks among them--had opposed the militia bill arguing that, since the Supreme Court had ruled that Negroes were not citizens, it was unconstitutional to admit them to the militia. Furthermore, they felt the bill needlessly handed their opponents an effective issue. Other Republicans like William S. Robinson--who wrote the "Warrington" columns for the Springfield Republican--minimized the issue by ridiculing the militia: "Surely the least we can do for our downcast brethren is to give them a chance to amuse themselves in that harmless way that is so agreeable to General Butler." Robinson noted that Butler had been a sponsor of Irish companies and suggested

that most people in Massachusetts would sooner trust their lives and property to Negroes than to Irish.[28]

Nativism proved another problem for the party. Some Massachusetts Republicans still referred to themselves as "American Republicans" and wanted to pursue a vigorously anti-alien position. Thus, the friends of Micah Dyer, a candidate for the state senate from Boston, promoted him as a man who had kept the public schools "pure" and free from "superstition and bigoted invasion"--a reference to the long struggle over which version of the Bible was to be used in the Boston public schools. But other Republicans wanted to minimize this appeal; their eyes were on the large German vote in the West.[29]

Butler's comparison of slaves with livestock gave the Republicans an opportunity to go on the offensive and to instruct the voters on slavery's degrading effects on white men. If there was no difference between property in pigs and property in men, one could accept the claim that all laboring men--white as well as black--ought to be held as slaves. This was a subject Republicans preferred to John Brown.[30]

At the November election, Republicans retained solid control of the state. Although the Democrats had increased their delegation in the House by twenty and in the Senate by three, they were still a tiny minority. Banks' 1858 majority slipped to 8,000, but his percentage of the vote actually increased. Republicans were relieved at the results and felt they had weathered the storm unleashed by Brown. As the Evening Transcript put it: "There will be less harping upon Harpers Ferry . . . as the elections will be over for a year."[31]

CHAPTER IV

THE PURITAN WARRIOR

John Brown was not banished from the public mind merely because the elections had passed; his Puritan heroism made him a figure not easily forgotten in Massachusetts. Among those most deeply affected by the old man was the antislavery lawyer and Republican politician, John Albion Andrew.

Andrew had been a Maine boy of modest circumstances who, in the tradition of many ambitious adolescents of northern New England, had set off to Boston to forge a career. When he arrived in Massachusetts in search of a tutor who would instruct him in the mysteries of the common law, he carried with him a commitment to social reform. Although he established a reputation as a lawyer of uncommon integrity and more than average skill, Andrew never forgot the ills that plagued his society and spent far too many hours in his philanthropic activities to become one of Boston's wealthy attorneys. To Andrew the law was a moral force rather than a tool of commerce. He regularly visited local prisons and listened to the stories of poor men and women who had been convicted without legal advice. Invariably he would prefer to help them--often without fee--and pass by the more lucrative, if less socially purposeful, cases that appealed to his colleagues.[1]

Andrew was among the Massachusetts Republicans with a foot in the abolitionist camp. He was a devoted friend of James Freeman Clarke, the radical minister who, like Emerson and Parker, had clashed with the conservative forces that dominated New England Unitarianism. Andrew was,

in fact, a member of Clarke's Church of the Disciples, a congregation that attracted reformers and dissenters of every stripe. Andrew spoke from the same platform as Parker and Phillips, and joined the "Anti-Manhunting League" to prevent the capture of fugitive slaves in Boston. But while Andrew shared the abolitionists' passionate dislike of slavery, he retained a respect for law and the Constitution that made him temperamentally distinct from them. Unlike the majority of Massachusetts abolitionists who waged their war on slavery outside of the political process, Andrew saw in the Republican party a vehicle for progress.[2]

Andrew served a term in the Massachusetts legislature, in which he earned his reputation by matching wits with Caleb Cushing, Attorney-General in the Pierce administration, who made a formidable presence in a legislative body of farmers and small-town lawyers. Andrew took the lead in replying to his attacks on Massachusetts' Personal Liberty Law, denying it was a violation of the Constitution, while deftly ignoring Cushing's charge that the law was a step in the direction of Negro social equality. By 1859 Andrew had become an important member of the radical wing of Massachusetts Republicanism, a close ally of Charles Sumner, and a charter member of the influential Bird Club. Radical Republicans considered Andrew an excellent candidate for statewide office.[3]

Andrew was also the friend and attorney of Samuel Gridley Howe and through him became closely involved in the Brown defense. He might have gone to Virginia and defended Brown personally had he not felt that an antislavery lawyer from Massachusetts would infuriate a Southern jury. Unlike some of Brown's friends, Andrew was more

interested in preserving the old man's life than in presenting an ideologically pure case, and he reportedly had hired Benjamin Butler to defend Brown, until Butler injured his ankle and was unable to travel. He then contacted Maryland Republican Montgomery Blair, who though declining to serve in the case, recommended Samuel Chilton of Washington. Andrew also corresponded with George Hoyt, an Athol, Massachusetts, lawyer who was in Virginia to defend Brown, and urged him to pursue an insanity plea. It would be a difficult tactic, Andrew wrote, as Brown would deny he was insane. Hoyt agreed to go along with Andrew's advice: "Whether he is insane or not, we ought to try on the garment."[4]

Andrew also chaired a committee that included such radicals as Howe, Emerson, and Samuel Sewell, whose task it was to raise funds for Brown's defense. They approached a broad range of individuals and even met with favorable responses from a few conservatives. Some Republican politicians, however, were wary of association with the cause. Charles Francis Adams replied that, while he had a strong sympathy for Brown and his family, he thought it best for him to start his term in Congress "unencumbered" by any association with Harpers Ferry. He confided to his diary his fears that Brown's attorneys were unsympathetic to the antislavery cause and that they might use their information to embarrass donors.[5]

How much did Andrew know about his friends' involvement in the Harpers Ferry raid? This is a difficult question to answer with certainty. As attorney for Howe and Sanborn, Andrew had to convince the public that his clients were not criminally implicated with Brown. In this role he sent letters to several Boston newspapers denying that Howe had supplied

Brown with arms. Howe may have wished to save his friend from the embarrassment of politically sensitive information, and in one letter he told Andrew that the Kansas Committee had given Brown rifles on condition that they be used in Kansas alone. Sanborn maintained in his memoirs that he had refrained from telling Andrew the "full particulars of the case."[6]

But the nature of Andrew's advice to his two worried clients indicated that he was aware of their predicament. He gave them the hypothetical example of a man in Maine who gives a cannon to someone who then uses it illegally in Texas. The Maine man could be tried for conspiracy but only in Maine. This thinly veiled advice convinced Sanborn, after a short trip to Canada, that he could return home and rely on Massachusetts to defend him. Andrew also came into the possession of five letters which Higginson wrote and which apparently contained incriminating information. Sanborn urged that Higginson recover them, and Andrew, sensitive to their nature, insisted that Higginson pick them up personally rather than trust them to the mails.[7]

Andrew's involvement with those close to Brown complicated his political career, especially when he ran for governor the following November. Had he been a mere politician he would have kept his distance from the entire Harpers Ferry affair. But Andrew was also a romantic perfectionist who was deeply touched by the old man's heroism. In his younger days Andrew had written that "a few bullet holes through the bodies of reformers, though they destroy mortal life, are only so many sky lights for the truth to shine through." Now, in Brown, he saw the practical application of this abstraction.

Andrew had always believed it was in the struggle against evil that men raised themselves to moral heights. How could a man of such sentiments refuse to rally to one who, in the face of such odds and at such sacrifice, had fought the sin which stained the national character? The heroism of men like Brown would destroy slavery--that "unnatural thing"--which stood as an obstacle to human progress. Andrew believed that Harpers Ferry was one of the great events of his age; he felt compelled to play his part in the unfolding of history.[8]

Andrew's emotional commitment to Brown was not without other difficulties. Always an advocate of non-violence, Andrew reflected on the day of Brown's execution that he had never fired a gun nor struck a blow in his life. But Brown the martyr transcended the violence of Harpers Ferry. Andrew made this clear when he spoke before an anti-slavery audience at Tremont Temple. He stated he did not know whether the raid was wise or foolish: "I only know that whether the enterprise itself was the one or the other, John Brown himself is right."[9]

II

Many came to share Andrew's feelings about Brown's courage and dignity in the face of death. As the old man stoically waited for his execution, public opinion grew more favorable towards him, often divorcing the individual from his deeds. No doubt an important reason for this was the coverage given him by the New England press. He remained the most compelling news story throughout the autumn of 1859 and editors hungered for any information they could obtain. Brown's friends willingly channeled his eloquent letters to friendly journalists.

Brown's sense of drama never failed him in his last few weeks. No

man ever made a more convincing martyr. At his trial he used the opportunity to speak to an audience far broader than the several hundred spectators who crowded into the Charlestown courthouse. After Judge Parker sentenced him to hang, Brown rose and delivered a speech that electrified much of the North. He disavowed any desire to incite murder, treason, or slave insurrection. All he had hoped to do was to run slaves off to Canada and awake his fellow citizens to the unchristian nature of slavery. He reminded his audience that the Bible teaches "to remember them that are in bonds as bound with them," and thus, that as a Christian, the sufferings of the slaves were his personal responsibility. Erect and unruffled, he stated that he had no regrets that his blood would be mingled with that of his sons and with the blood of the millions who perished under slavery.[10]

Among the spectators in the courtroom was Thomas Russell, an anti-slavery judge from Boston who had once hidden Brown from federal officials. Russell later wrote an account of Brown's address for the Boston Traveller which told of the old man's absolute calmness and self-control and the respect which his courage had won from even his most bitter enemies. He emphasized that, as Parker's sentencing had come earlier than expected, Brown's remarks were neither affected nor prepared. Rather, they came naturally from an honest, rustic heart.[11]

Brown projected an image as a latter-day Cromwell, the avenger of a Puritan God. Many New Englanders found him plausible and welcome. Even though the Victorian mind held that ethical sensibility was the special gift of women, the ante-bellum Yankee retained an Old Testament morality which visualized moral enforcement as a vigorous and masculine

task. In a period when Massachusetts was undergoing profound change, Brown was a timely figure. The transformation from a rural, agricultural society to an urban, manufacturing one and the introduction of large numbers of non-Protestant non-Yankees created a fear of moral laxness among older stock citizens. Commercial relationships were replacing personal bonds; the value of a man's word was not what it once had been. Although the vigorously moral society of the Puritans had long since vanished, Massachusetts still identified with its historical past.

In this time of moral flabbiness when (as the Worcester Transcript wrote) "we have worshiped God on cushioned seats," John Brown had a special significance. For those who believed that the days of the Puritan martyrs had long passed, Brown seemed to step out of the pages of Foxe to confront his generation with a moral example, to exemplify "the spirit of those old Biblical saints and martyrs who encountered bonds and death in righteous causes." The Congregationalist, an organ of New England Orthodox Trinitarianism, called Brown a genuine disciple of Christ "whose acts were without doubt the agency for strengthening the antislavery ranks and dispelling moral apathy." Other writers eagerly compared Brown to John the Baptist, John Hus, and even Joan of Arc. His address to the court was like Paul's speech before Agrippa.[12]

No one did more to further Brown's reputation as a Puritan hero than James Redpath. In his series in the Atlas and Bee, Redpath asserted that Brown and his modern Ironsides were unparalleled successes for rendering slave property insecure throughout the South. Brown would teach Massachusetts to emulate Harpers Ferry the next time a slave-hunter came after a fugitive. Redpath recalled stories of camp life in Kansas that

would gladden the heart of the sternest Puritan, of how the old man gathered his rough followers around him every morning and evening for prayers, how no food was ever served without a respectful grace, and how no profanity, no man of loose morals was allowed in his camp. Brown had captured several proslavery Missourians after his successful deliverance of slaves. The prisoners swore profusely at their captors, and when they continued their blasphemy despite warnings, Brown ordered them on their knees at gunpoint and demanded that they pray.[13]

Boston readers discovered through an interview with Brown's wife that her husband had never taken tobacco or liquor, that his life had been one of self-denial, that he had instructed his family: "Let us save money and give it to the poor." Mary Brown related that, when an admirer sent John a fine coat that she recognized he would never wear, she returned it for a coarse one. These revelations were bound to have an effect on a society as concerned with recititude as Massachusetts. By December, Samuel Bowles' Springfield Republican, which in October had dismissed Brown as a madman and a fool, was calling him a "true man and a Christian," whose spirit would live on to inspire the North and whose influence would never be excluded from any planter's mansion or Negro hut in all Virginia.[14]

Many in Massachusetts relished the idea that Brown would trouble the sleep of Southerners. Harpers Ferry ignited the anti-Southernism that had long smoldered in the Commonwealth. Anti-Southernism had as its core a genuine revulsion to the ownership of human beings; but by the 1850's it had developed into a sentiment much broader than simply antislavery. A gap had widened between New England and the South that made the two sections into virtually separate nations. Many New

Englanders saw the South as a backward, slothful society whose lack of industry was almost un-American. Hiding behind the mask of chivalry was a society lacking fundamental decency. Slavery, bad for degrading blacks, was worse for degrading whites; by creating a leisure society the South had made itself susceptible to all the sins of idleness. Wendell Phillips' image of slavery as an enormous brothel did not go ignored.[15]

Thus Virginia's difficulty in dislodging Brown's small band was an occasion to point out the moral failings of the South. Most people in Massachusetts believed that, had a similar raid taken place in their state, a handful of local citizens would have quickly suppressed it. Massachusetts would have never succumbed to panic and called on federal troops. Virginia was a sorry sight. Once she had nurtured some of the nation's greatest men; now she spawned ruffians and cowards. Slavery had exhausted the fertility of her soil and the character of her people. Cowardness was inevitable in a people who needed to enforce their social institutions with whips, fetters, and coffles.[16]

All autumn the Massachusetts press delighted in reporting evidence that the South was gripped with hysteria. Their readers smiled at a report that the Virginia militia, believing a Shaker peddler's cart was an infernal machine, had inspected it from "apple-sauce to pumpkin seed" before expelling him from the state under armed guard. The Massachusetts Spy told of a man near Harpers Ferry who, on hearing the whippoorwills of the forest, thought it was the cries of his neighbors being slaughtered by abolitionists and rode into town to raise the militia. According to Redpath, the South would need diapers before it heard the last of Brown.[17]

Behind this ribaldry was genuine earnestness. For these anti-slavery Yankees had found a real weakness in their antagonist. At the very least, preached the Reverend A. L. Stone at the Park Street Church, Southerners had learned that they best not attempt to expand slavery. The Springfield Republican noted that the possibility of servile insurrection increased daily as the planters, through their sexual indiscretions, continued to diffuse more white blood into the slave population, thus making it more aggresive and intelligent. Southerners would never be able to keep word of Harpers Ferry from even the most obscure slave hovel, and formerly submissive slaves would receive new inspiration by the knowledge that there were white men willing to die to smash their chains. The Puritan warrior had apparently enjoyed a great victory.[18]

III

Harpers Ferry presented a formidable dilemma to William Lloyd Garrison. As a disunionist seeking to end the North's complicity with human bondage, Garrison saw that Brown had advanced the cause of unraveling this unholy compact of states. But how could he endorse Brown's actions without repudiating his own lifelong pacifism? Brown and Garrison had met at Theodore Parker's house in 1857 where, each convinced he was God's agent to remove the scourge of slavery, they argued over the questions of violence and non-resistance. Garrison had lectured Brown on the ungodliness of force and fortified his position by ample quotations from the New Testament. But the pietistic perfectionism of Garrison had little influence on Brown, raised on the Calvinist belief that man was a sinful creature entirely dependent

on God's grace. For every New Testament evidence that Garrison could muster, Brown retorted with citations from the Old. Though Garrison, at least, came away from the meeting with a healthy respect for Brown's character, there was no way in which these two could act in unison.[19]

After careful consideration, Garrison made his pronouncement on Harpers Ferry in the Liberator of October 28. He reaffirmed his peace principles and called the raid "well intended but misguided," but he also attacked the hypocrisy of Brown's proslavery enemies. "By the logic of Concord, Lexington, and Bunker Hill," Brown was justified. Though Garrison emphasized that this was not the logic by which he lived his own life, he noted that most Americans revered the heroes of 1775. If men were justified in resorting to force over so trivial an issue as a three-penny tax on tea, how much more so were those who, bound in chains, saw their children marching off to the auction block. Slavery itself was a form of violence; one must choose between the spirit of Bunker Hill and the servility of the slave plantation. Garrison chose Bunker Hill.[20]

Having determined how best to reconcile antislavery with non-resistance, Garrison was typically intolerant of those who did not follow his views. When John Greenleaf Whittier published a poem about Brown which condemned the "folly which seeks through evil good," Garrison reminded Whittier that he had glorified the Revolutionary War heroes in many of his other works. He noted that, unlike himself, Whittier participated in elections and thus upheld the Constitution and its protection of slavery. Whittier was also struggling with the conflict Brown had raised between his antislavery and his pacifistic

views. Truly repelled by the violence of Harpers Ferry, he had seen one of the pikes that Brown had made for use by liberated slaves. He blanched and declared: "It is not a Christian weapon." But while condemning the Harpers Ferry raid, the Quaker poet saw in Brown the qualities of love and justice. It was he who popularized the apocryphal scene of Brown, on his way to the gallows, kissing the slave child.[21]

Garrison's charge that he had been inconsistent in his pacifism stung Whittier deeply. When he wrote to Garrison, his gentle Quaker style could not conceal his irritation. He denied that he had ever glorified the violence of the Revolution and accused Garrison of omitting those sections of his poems in which he specifically called for peace. The controversy between the two men indicates the narrow intellectual path on which many non-resistant abolitionists were forced to walk after Harpers Ferry. In accusing Whittier of a double-standard on non-violence, Garrison may have been projecting a sense of doubt about his own consistency.[22]

Wendell Phillips was less circumspect in his praise of Brown. Invited to lecture at Henry Ward Beecher's Pilgrim Church in Brooklyn, Phillips delivered "The Lesson of the Hour"--one of his greatest speeches. There was no question in his mind that bullets were better than fetters. He denied that Brown could be held accountable for treason as Virginia had no foundation in law. No government could exist except on the basis of willing submission by its citizens. Virginia was but "a pirate ship," and John Brown "a Lord High Admiral of the Almighty, with his commission to sink every pirate he meets on God's ocean." Brown had twice the right to hang Governor Wise that Governor Wise had to hang

John Brown. Phillips, who had long sought the dismemberment of "this Sodom of a country of ours," believed the Harpers Ferry raid had brought disunion closer. He saw the raid as a vehicle to incite antipathy to the national government; he reminded his audience that it was not Virginia militia who had captured Brown, but Federal troops "with the Vulture of the Union above them"--marines whose salary was supported by every taxpayer.[23]

Brown had so animated the abolitionists that a non-resistant like Parker Pillsbury could revel in the prospect of a coming Armageddon. "The time is at hand," he wrote a friend, "when mothers will count it a joy to give up their sons in such a conflict as ours, . . . so that the slave may have his liberty." Every antislavery sermon, act, or prayer, Pillsbury believed, worked directly for insurrection. Oliver Johnson saw Brown's martyrdom as the means of exterminating "pro-slavery hunkerism" from the North, and James Freeman Clarke felt Brown had lifted antislavery sentiment to a "loftier and more Christian attitude." George Luther Stearns, apparently recovering from the hysteria of October which had promoted a journey to Canada, by March of the following year could see the success of Harpers Ferry in political terms: "It will force the Republican party upward."[24]

The abolitionists were aware that it was Brown the martyr who was valuable to their cause. Higginson wrote his mother that if Brown were freed "it would not do half as much good as his being executed." While most of the abolitionists did not express themselves so cold-bloodedly, many undoubtedly realized that the gallows erected in Charlestown, Virginia, were of more value to their cause than many volumes of the Liberator.[25]

The Liberator of November fourth reported that among John Brown's achievements at Harpers Ferry was that he "awakened the hermit of Concord from his usual state of philosophic indifference." No other event had so captured Thoreau's imagination. Brown, the perfect transcendental hero, had successfully confronted the amoral, commercial values of mid-century America; Thoreau relished the instructive value of Brown's passing. Life was a paradox for Thoreau. Man had within himself a noble potential but usually never recognized it. Some became "serfs of the soil" like the farmers who toiled near Walden pond; others achieved the sham success of the merchant potentates of Boston. But Brown's death would be an affirmation of his greatness. For in order to die a man must first live, and Brown was among the few that had lived.[26]

Thoreau read his "Plea for Captain John Brown" in Concord, Worcester, and Boston. He probably attracted more attention during these lectures than at any other time in his life, including the suggestion by the Springfield Republican that he imitate Brown and do good by rushing to the gallows. But Thoreau had never been concerned with popularity; he was out to sear the conscience of Massachusetts. In his "Plea" he emphasized a common theme among the abolitionists: Massachusetts was an accomplice in the sins of slavery. She was one of the "confederated overseers" which had pledged itself to keep the slaves in bondage and return them to their masters should they escape. Thoreau showed no remorse over the violence of Harpers Ferry. For once the Sharps rifle had been used in a righteous cause rather than in the hunting of Indians or of fugitive slaves. Let us not now weep for Brown, he declared to his audience; it is too early for that. We can

weep after the slaves are free. Now let us take our revenge.[27]

No less impressed with Brown was Lydia Maria Child. The author of a long shelf of sentimental, popular fiction and one of the most militant women in the antislavery cause, Child wrote to Governor Wise asking permission to go to the Charlestown jail and nurse the wounded Brown. Aware of the dangers that might face any abolitionist in the South, Child was nevertheless determined to carry out her "mission of humanity," until Brown persuaded her that he was recovering and under the watchful care of a compassionate jailer. Though the trip was aborted, Child's correspondence with Wise and with the wife of Virginia Senator James Mason, became one of the most eloquent and popular defenses of Brown, selling over 300,000 copies.[28]

The Garrisonians would have been less than human had they not felt some sense of satisfaction following Harpers Ferry. The decade of the 1850's had been a frustrating one for them. Garrison had alienated a majority of the antislavery movement. The ranks of the ideologically pure Garrisonians had dwindled as some of the old stalwarts died, while others drifted toward the Republican party. Few young men appeared to refill the ranks. The Liberator limped along with its slim list of subscribers--mostly Negroes who presumedly needed little instruction in the evils of slavery and racism. Where Garrison had once provoked controversy, he now found indifference. It was one thing for an agitator to be mobbed, but quite another to be ignored.[29]

Brown put the Garrisonians back in the spotlight. Like the Turner raid which projected Garrison to notoriety almost thirty years earlier, Brown's exposure of the South's weaknesses made the Garrisonians appear (depending on one's point of view) like prophets or incendiaries.

Phillips' lectures were front page news and Garrison spoke in a Tremont Temple overflowing to the rafters. Disunion, once merely the topic of a poorly attended 1857 Worcester conference, now seemed a distinct possibility. A crucial moment in the slavery conflict had arrived. The nation could not avoid the confrontation.[30]

IV

On December 2, fifteen hundred troops were in Charlestown, Virginia, to assure that the execution of John Brown would proceed without interruption. The old man faced death as calmly as he had faced the judge who had sentenced him. In Massachusetts the day was an occasion to express both respect and contempt for the departed warrior. Bells tolled in mourning in Saugus, Lynn, Plymouth, and New Bedford, but in Westfield local Democrats fired cannons to celebrate the hanging. Effigies of Governor Wise hung in Woburn and Natick; while in Concord a mock-John Brown swung in front of the Town Hall, with a ribald will making Thoreau one of the chief heirs. The abolitionists of Concord wanted to lower the town's flag to half-staff but were dissuaded when they learned that conservatives had planned to forcibly prevent them.[31]

In the Massachusetts legislature, a representative from Nantucket proposed adjournment in Brown's honor at the hour of the execution. This brought the angry retort from Richard Spofford of Newburyport that honoring a felon would disgrace the Commonwealth. He noted that a few days earlier a truly great American, Washington Irving, had died and that the legislature had taken no notice. John Tucker of Boston denounced Brown as a criminal and said that he and "the coward Howe" were guilty of disturbing the peace of the Union. John Griffin of

Malden replied, suggesting that his colleagues direct their "Union-saving speeches" to South Carolina rather than to Massachusetts. Though some Republicans in the legislature praised Brown's character, few thought it useful to make such a provocative gesture as adjourning in his honor. A similar motion in the Massachusetts Senate lost by a narrow margin.[32]

On the evening after the execution several thousand persons crowded into Boston's Tremont Temple for what the press described as the largest meeting of its kind ever held in the city. A portrait of the recent martyr rested on the podium, surrounded by a wreath of evergreen and amaranth. Conspicuously displayed was the remark by Brown: "I don't know as I can better serve the cause I love so well than to die for it." Other posters carried Biblical and political quotations with a heavy emphasis on the antislavery statements of noted Virginians--Washington, Jefferson, and Patrick Henry. Above the speaker's desk was a large replica of the great seal of Virginia. This had become a favorite device of Brown's admirers because of its insurrectionary appeal: a warrior with his foot on the neck of a fallen tyrant and the motto, SIC SEMPER TYRANNIS.[33]

According to the Liberator, there was no "funeral drapery" in the hall. The spirit of the meeting was not one of mourning but of "faith, trust, and the renewed conservation of spirit." As the proceedings were about to begin, a man rushed to the front of the hall and unfurled a banner to the enthusiastic response of the crowd: "He dies by the mandate of the Slave Power, yet still lives by virtue of his heroic deeds." Boston witnessed a resurgence among the abolitionists as well. Never had they reached such an audience, never had so many respectable

people been touched by their words. The long list of speakers echoed the theme established by Garrison: "Today Virginia has murdered John Brown; Tonight we witness his resurrection."[34]

No group was so deeply affected by John Brown as Massachusetts' blacks. On the day of the execution hundreds wore black crepe arm bands and attended memorial services in their separate churches. Most black shopkeepers closed their stores and the Post complained that it was impossible to get a haircut or to have one's shoes blacked all day. In Chelsea a black man trying to lower the flag to half-staff was chased off by a group of objecting whites.[35]

But though Brown was deeply respected among blacks, the Harpers Ferry raid presented some definite embarrassments. Most whites--and even many abolitionists--believed that the black man was less aggressive and less sensate to oppression than the Anglo-Saxon. Brown had hoped to disprove this in Virginia, but the results of the raid had the opposite effect. Pro-slavery forces argued that the failure of slaves to rally to Brown's side proved that blacks were content in their servile role.[36]

Wendell Phillips discussed this problem in "The Lesson of the Hour." He noted that in the history of the world only one people had ever cut their own chains: the blacks of San Domingo. Anglo-Saxons who talked of the black man's cowardice and servility should remember that their ancestors had endured serfdom for generations. Nevertheless, Phillips thought that the redemption of America's blacks would come through the "interference of a wiser, higher, more advance civilization."[37]

Some blacks were affected by self-doubt following the raid. Charles L. Remond, a black minister from Salem, expressed deep disappointment that

there was no general uprising in Virginia. He disagreed with Phillips, arguing that blacks would have to free themselves. He warned his peers that prayers alone would never break chains. Freedom was never won without sacrifices like that of Brown; blacks should emulate him in the future.[38]

But the Reverend J. Sella Martin, a former slave himself, vigorously defended the slaves in the Harpers Ferry region. At the huge meeting at Tremont Temple he claimed that because Brown had not shed willingly the blood of the owners, he was unable to gain the slaves' trust. The slaves did not act cowardly in declining to rally to Brown; they were merely showing the distrust of whites that they had learned through generations of treachery. But Martin too looked forward to the day of a black John Brown.[39]

CHAPTER V

MASSACHUSETTS FIGHTS THE SENATE

Many powerful men in Massachusetts were disturbed by the deification of Brown. Conservative politicians feared the growing appeal of antislavery. Businessmen grimaced at Boston's tarnished image among their Southern customers. The Boston Post, on the day of Brown's execution, reinforced these concerns. It reported that the Richmond Enquirer had expressed surprise that the conservative men of New England had not publicly denounced Brown's raid and displayed their determination to uphold the Constitutional rights of the slaveholding states. The Virginia paper hinted that commercial reprisal against Massachusetts business might be in the offering.[1]

While antislavery orators were lauding Brown inside Tremont Temple, a crowd of angry anti-abolitionists gathered outside. There was talk that night of emulating the Boston mob of 1835 that had put a rope around Garrison's neck and dragged him through the streets. But the crowd, which contained some of those very conservative and influential men that the Enquirer had referred to, decided to call for a Union meeting in Faneuil Hall, to be held as soon as arrangements could be made.[2]

It was by no means assured that conservatives would respect the the rights of abolitionists to hold their meeting. As radical antislavery views gained acceptance in Massachusetts, conservatives questioned whether free speech was compatible with a stable society. Certainly Brown's relationship with Massachusetts radicals seemed to

testify to this tendency: those oily-tongued agitators had led that simple farmer to his act of fanaticism. The Courier suggested that freedom of speech presumed a moral disposition to restrain abuse. Only when men were intelligent and self-disciplined was complete freedom in the public interest. Conservatives worried that New England was particularly subject to excesses. Nehemiah Adams, the orthodox minister of Boston's Essex Street Church, noted that in the South the soil which grew the largest sugar cane also supported the largest alligators. Likewise, New England's rich cultural soil supported more distinguished men than any other region, but it also produced more charlatans, more unreasonable and wicked men. The Courier claimed that freedom from the Southern code of dueling and from the lynch law was a mixed blessing. Their absence gave license to the most vituperative abolitionists.[3]

Some of Massachusetts' leading citizens signed the handbills which called on all who "honor and cherish the Constitution" to meet at Faneuil Hall. Former governors of several dethroned political persuasions leant their support: Democrat Marcus Morton, Know-Nothing Henry Gardner, and Whigs Levi Lincoln, George N. Briggs, and J. H. Clifford. Other prominent supporters included industrialists Nathan and William Appleton. On the evening of December 8, Faneuil Hall was packed with respectable and prosperous men, eager to rehabilitate Massachusetts' reputation.[4]

This "union-saving" assembly saw a marathon of speeches and resolutions which even Edward Everett found "long and languid." Resolves were proposed by George Lunt, editor of the Courier, and were unanimously adopted. They stated that the purpose of the meeting was to prove that Massachusetts had been "falsely exhibited in the eyes of the nation," and

that its true nature was sound and conservative. But most of those present came to hear Everett make his reappearance into political life.[5]

After the deaths of Daniel Webster and Rufus Choate, Edward Everett stood unrivalled as the paragon of Massachusetts conservatism. His career had touched virtually all the honors to which the upper-class Bostonian might aspire. At the age of nineteen, he became minister of the Brattle Street Church, the largest and most fashionable congregation in the city, where he instructed the Brahmin class in morality and theology. He travelled in Europe and conversed with scholars and princes, and when he then returned to Massachusetts to accept Harvard's chair in Greek it was with all the proper international connections in hand. Everett soon discovered an affinity between academics and politics and made an easy transformation to the national House of Representatives. Later he served as Governor of Massachusetts, Minister to England, President of Harvard, Secretary of State, and United States Senator. Everett dedicated his life to the preservation of New England culture and the strengthening of the American Union. He was convinced that the civilization of upper-class New England was without peer and believed in the Constitution with the tenacity of a fundamentalist. Like Webster and Choate before him, Everett used his golden throat to raise the moral homily and the patriotic address to an art form.[6]

Despite the many trophies of his career, Everett's public life was not without pain. The slavery issue, his _bete noire_, hounded him for decades. Like Webster and other Massachusetts politicians who served in the national government, Everett found that the demands of his antislavery constituency at home were incompatible with the strong Southern influence in Washington. As

a young Congressman, Everett had sought to assure his Southern colleagues that he was not an untrustworthy radical. In an emotional and ill-advised speech he announced that there was "no cause in which I would sooner buckle a knapsack on my back" than to put down a slave insurrection in the South. Domestic slavery, he maintained, was not an "immoral and irreligious institution." These words would haunt Everett for years.[7]

By 1838, Everett was running for re-election as governor and Massachusetts was beginning to take an interest in the politics of slavery. That year he advocated the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, the end of the interstate slave trade, and opposed the admission of additional slave states. He won the endorsement of the Liberator, but lost many of his Southern friends. Two years later when President Tyler nominated him to become Minister to England, Southern Senators bitterly attacked him for his views on slavery. W. R. King of Alabama claimed that his confirmation could spell the dissolution of the Union; and the vote on the nomination was an uncomfortably close one, twenty-three to nineteen.[8]

A Senator in 1854, Everett watched with great misgivings as the Democrats introduced the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. When the bill came to a vote and Everett was absent, he faced the charge of cowardness and unfaithfulness to his constituents. A few days later, he submitted to the Senate a petition signed by 3000 Protestant ministers, protesting the Nebraska act. Democrats now criticized him for aiding in the prostitution of the clergy. Shortly afterward, Everett resigned from the Senate, deeply pessimistic over the future of his country. Writing to his close friend Robert Winthrop, he concluded that "there is no course left for men of moderate counsels between the extremists at both ends of the scale."[9]

After his retirement, Everett dedicated himself to raising money for the purchase and restoration of Washington's home at Mount Vernon. It seemed a fitting task for his eloquence, asking his countrymen, North and South, to open their purses for a patriotic cause. Until the attack at Harpers Ferry, Everett believed that his public career was over. But John Brown's raid convinced him that his beloved Constitution was in mortal danger, and he once again was willing to enter the public life he had left with such bitterness five years earlier.[10]

Everett was in a black humor when he moved to the Faneuil Hall podium. He was convinced that leading Republicans had prior knowledge of Brown's plans, and that they were exploiting the South's hysterical response for political advantage. He felt his country was on the edge of a precipice and that Brown's adventure was but "the precursor of a final catastrophe." Soon the country would be in a state when "houses will be attacked, their owners mobbed, statues knocked over, and other lawless outrages become the order of the day." For Everett, the radical antislavery spirit was not only a danger to peace between the sections, but a threat to the internal order of Massachusetts society.[11]

Everett's Faneuil Hall speech was a jeremiad worthy of the best efforts of Cotton Mather. He warned his audience not to be complacent, not to believe that their society was healthy merely because commerce and industry continued to run normally. He noted that French stocks were never higher than on the eve of the Revolution of 1848, that the theaters of Paris were packed during the height of the Reign of Terror. "The great social machine moves with a momentum that cannot be suddenly stopped," but may conceal an inner cancer. And what would either side accomplish by tearing apart the

fabric of the Union? Would the South find her social institutions more secure outside the Union? To antislavery men he asked whether disunion would not merely aggravate every evil which they deplored in slavery? And would not this division debase us in the eyes of the world? Would we not have to submit to the dictation from European powers in our affairs?[12]

Everett asked his audience to remember the horrors of the Haitian insurrection: the midnight burnings, the merciless tortures, the white babies impaled on pikes, and "other abominations not to be named by Christian lips." Southern whites, Everett reminded his audience, are our compatriots; they worship the same Bible that we do. Yet Brown sought to turn their homeland into another Haiti by placing New England pikes in the hands of "an ignorant subject race." And what if the abolitionists were successful in ending slavery by other than Haitian means? Would Massachusetts be willing to welcome two or three hundred thousand emancipated Negroes?[13]

Everett sat down, succeeded at the podium by Caleb Cushing--one of the few men in Massachusetts who could follow him without embarrassment. Cushing was one of the most learned men of his generation, a brilliant linguist and essayist. Even the abolitionists agreed on this point, thinking it criminal that such talents should be used to the detriment of human liberty. Cushing had once supported a moderate antislavery position. His first publishable essay as a young man was on Haiti, and he submitted it to the North American Review, then edited by Edward Everett. It was a somewhat compassionate article which suggested that blacks were capable of moral and intellectual development. But Everett thought it too strong for the Review's Southern readers and asked Cushing to rewrite it, noting that publishers "must submit to the servitude of public opinion." Later, as a member of

the American Colonization Society, Cushing attacked slavery for promoting idleness and "vicious indulgence." When he served in the House of Representatives in the 1830's, he was a strong supporter of John Quincy Adams' fight against the proslavery Gag Rule, and by the 1838 election he even had won the endorsement of the Liberty party.[14]

The turning point in Cushing's political life occurred in 1841, after the death of President William Henry Harrison. "His Accidentcy," John Tyler, vetoed the charter for a third National Bank and alienated virtually the entire Whig party. Cushing was one of a few Northern Whigs who supported the new President, a move that brought him into close contact with Southern politicians and that exposed him to the Southern viewpoint. This had an enormous impact on him. Read out of the Massachusetts Whig party, Cushing became a Democrat. This was a great advantage; for, unlike Everett, Cushing would never find himself caught between the proslavery requirements of national politics and the antislavery demands of Massachusetts. He virtually turned his back on his home state and forged a career of power and influence as one of the nation's most notorious "doughfaces."[15]

Central to Cushing's outlook was his faith in the destiny of white America. His militant expansionism lead him to further his political identification with the South. Under one Southern President, he served as Minister to China and worked to increase the penetration of American trade into Asia. Under another Southern President, he fought the Mexicans as a general of volunteers. The Massachusetts legislature had refused to appropriate funds to send men to the Mexican War, claiming that it was a conspiracy to grab lands for slavery; but Cushing joined with other private citizens and paid for the equipment of his men out of his own pocket.[16]

For Cushing, Negro slavery was merely part of a larger master plan for white domination of the world. Indians and Orientals were also inferior and must submit to the white race which was "the consummate impersonation of intellect in man and beauty in woman." The white man's duty was "to Christianize and to civilize, to command and to be obeyed, to conquer and to reign." No section of the country and certainly no state could check this inevitable tendency. Massachusetts was trying to be a "drag or brake" on the wheel of history, but Cushing warned his fellow Yankees that they must decide whether they would lead or be led. It was impossible to deflect history from its ultimate purpose.[17]

During the turbulent years of the Kansas conflict, Cushing's prophesy had the ring of truth. As Pierce's Attorney-General, Cushing was, next to Jefferson Davis, the most powerful man in the national administration. He was shaping the course of events while Massachusetts' other prominent men, denied appointments because of their antislavery views, were merely spectators. He helped author the Administration's Kansas policy and wrote a legal opinion later to emerge under Taney's signature as the Dred Scott decision. In addition, he controlled the Democratic party in Massachusetts with its attendant federal patronage.[18]

As Cushing spoke at Faneuil Hall, he was a man alienated from his home state. He had worked so closely with Southerners that he had come to accept their viewpoint--even to the point of justifying secession. If Southerners could not live within the Union in security, it was their right--even their duty--to withdraw. And if disunion came, would Northerners march into the South and attempt to destroy her peculiar institution? Cushing looked out over the sea of faces and asked: If this is attempted are there not men who will seize the abolitionist traitors by the throat? Yes, his audience cried

enthusiastically. If there is war, Cushing continued, it will not be along the Mason and Dixon's line but within New England, and it was be waged between those who love the Constitution and those who call it a covenant with Hell.[19]

II

Republicans varied in their reaction to the Faneuil Hall Union meeting. Some conservative Republicans, genuinely concerned over the prospects of sectional conflict, had attended the assembly as a gesture of national reconciliation. They believed that the party cause in 1860 would be served by demonstrating that even a state as strongly Republican as Massachusetts "still steps to the music of the Union." But the most vocal Republicans ridiculed those who "poured out their wailings like a host of Jeremiahs" at Faneuil Hall. They alleged that organizers of the meeting had circulated lists of its supporters in the South and that Massachusetts merchants, fearing to lose an important part of their trade, had quickly fallen in line. Thus, those who had so loudly proclaimed their love of the Union were in reality declaring their love for their pocketbooks. Henry Wilson denounced the meeting on the floor of the Senate and claimed that its supporters did not "weigh a feather's weight in my state." Proof of this, he claimed, was the fact that Boston had recently elected a Republican mayor in repudiation of the compromisers.[20]

Though Wilson taunted the "Union-savers," he and the other Massachusetts Congressmen agreed that the winter was a time for tact and moderation. Even Charles Sumner, recently returned from Europe and his agonizing search for health, saw the wisdom of this policy. Their eyes were on the upcoming

presidential election and the conservative voter who, though incensed at the Democratic administration, might fear that a Republican victory could lead to a national disaster. Now was the time to convince the timid that there was an important distinction between the radical abolitionist and the solid Republican.[21]

Of particular concern to Republicans was the organization of the House of Representatives where the party held a plurality but not a majority of seats. Southern Democrats justified their intransigent opposition to John Sherman, the Republican candidate for Speaker, on the grounds that he had endorsed Hilton Helper's inflammatory appeal to the non-slave holding South, The Impending Crisis. Republicans believed this was part of a Democratic strategy to convince the country that Republicans were unfit to govern. Wilson was conciliatory and defensive on the issue. He said that Sherman and the other Republicans who had been listed in Helper's preface had never seen the book but had endorsed only an extract that contained statistics on slavery. Through patience and moderation the Republicans were able to elect William Pennington, a moderate from New Jersey.[22]

But there was a good deal of unhappiness among the radical Republicans back home. William S. Robinson wrote in his "Warrington" column that the behavior of the Massachusetts delegation proved that Congressmen lost both their manhood and their senses once they took office. Frank Bird worried that the public might believe that the only forceful men in public life were on the side of slavery. But though the policy of silence caused friction at home, the delegation felt that, in the long run, it would preserve Republican unity. The example of the Democrats proved it: they had talked about slavery without inhibition and in the process had widened the divisions in the party.[23]

Abolitionists made life for Henry Wilson difficult that winter. Mississippi Senator Albert G. Brown attacked Wilson for having appeared with disunionist Henry Wright at a Natick meeting that had endorsed the right of slaves to revolt and the duty of Northerners to assist them. Wilson was quick to explain the circumstances. He informed Brown that it was a New England custom to tolerate all shades of opinion and that persons of all views commonly attended Natick meetings. He pointed out that the Democratic postmaster of the town who was "as sound on the slavery question as the Senator from Mississippi" was also present. Wilson further maintained that Wright had been talking about moral resistance to slavery not armed resistance.[24]

Wilson was incensed over the incident. He believed that Wright had maneuvered him into an embarrassing position and wanted it to appear that Wilson endorsed violent attacks on the South. Wilson wrote Wright and accused him of an act of "personal unkindness." In this letter, intended for public attention, Wilson declared that if Massachusetts were to abandon peaceful and constitutional reform to adopt Wright's policy of insurrection, he would vacate his seat in the Senate.[25]

Wilson was also disturbed at Lysander Spooner who had planned to publish a letter that Seward had written five years earlier praising Spooner's book. Wilson wrote John Andrew and asked him to use his influence to change Spooner's mind. He feared that Seward's Southern enemies would use the letter to increase their attacks on the leading candidate for the Republican presidential nomination. To Wilson this was but another example of how the abolitionists helped the slavery forces abuse antislavery statesmen.[26]

In an especially vituperative speech in January, Wendell Phillips had called Wilson a man whose soul could be "made out of the sweepings of a caucus room." This attack prompted Wilson to write a long and revealing letter to James Freeman Clarke in which he spoke of the pain inflicted by his impatient constituents. Our antislavery people at home, he wrote, do not understand what we must endure year after year in Washington. They speak at home "surrounded by sympathetic throngs." We face a hostile majority lead by men of great talent and walk through streets and live in hotels filled with men who "pour upon our heads bitter curses." We must moderate our language because many of the men who stand by our Republican principles come from "dark sections of the country" like Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Illinois, where people are coming to our position but coming slowly. "If we sometimes explain a word or act, or fail to speak all our hearts send to our lips, because we want to aid our true friends who have districts five or ten years behind us . . . our friends at home see nothing in our action but timidity."[27]

One additional threat hung over the Republicans. Shortly after the Harpers Ferry raid, Virginia Senator John Mason had demanded an investigation to look into the source of Brown's support. Republicans, not wanting to appear as if they had anything to hide, reluctantly went along with Mason, but were fearful that the committee's Democratic majority might attempt to portray Republicans as the secret sponsors of abolitionist violence. Wilson worried that they could "cast a drag-net over the North." Knowing the impetuous qualities of his antislavery constituents, Wilson was concerned about what the committee might uncover.[28]

III

The Republicans were not alone in fearing the probings of the Mason Committee. Conservative industrialist Amos A. Lawrence found himself suspected of complicity with Brown and likely to be called before the Mason Committee. These accusations stemmed from Lawrence's service as treasurer of the New England Emigrant Aid Society in the mid 1850's, at a time when many conservative New Englanders had become indignant at the national government's proslavery policy in Kansas. By 1859, Lawrence thought that his antislavery activity was a closed chapter of his life. He had resigned the post, the experience of working with the radicals of the Massachusetts Kansas Committee leaving him convinced that they were an untrustworthy and dangerous group. Furthermore, the Kansas troubles had subsided and Lawrence was now concerned with building a conservative alternative to both the Republicans and the Democrats.[29]

But Lawrence knew that trouble was ahead when reports identified the Emigrant Aid Society as the source of Brown's arms. He was reminded that he had once called Brown "the Miles Standish of Kansas" and had sent him sizable sums for his personal use. Now Lawrence heard Southern politicians denounce him as "the cotton speculator who employed Brown to do his work." This was truly unfortunate for Lawrence as he was both a purchaser of Southern cotton and a leading supplier to its textile market. As a leader of conservative businessmen, it was unseemly to be identified with a dangerous radical like Brown. To blunt these accusations, Lawrence now dedicated his energies to proving to the South that he and Massachusetts were dependably conservative.[30]

Shortly after Brown's capture, Lawrence wrote to Governor Wise, warning him that it was imperative that Brown receive a fair trial lest he become a hero in the North. If he were executed under any other condition, "an army of martyrs would spring from his blood to emulate his activities." Lawrence added that the people of Massachusetts respected Brown not because they approved of his violence but because of his piety and bravery; he asked Wise to do all he could to avoid any additional conflict between North and South. And, of course, he emphasized that the aid he had given Brown was merely out of respect for his past sufferings and that he had no knowledge of plans to attack Virginia.[31]

The Union meeting at Faneuil Hall was precisely the kind of demonstration that Lawrence believed was needed to prove that "the dreams of the philanthropists" did not govern Massachusetts. He had hoped to use the meeting as a forum to demonstrate his own political soundness. Lawrence planned to introduce a resolution that called on Governor Banks to offer the Massachusetts militia to any Southern state faced with an armed attack against its institutions. Though preempted by Banks' assertion that the offer had already been made, Lawrence was enormously pleased by the proceedings at Faneuil Hall. "Massachusetts folks are peculiar," he wrote; "but on the great question of the Union they are sound."[32]

Lawrence's first objective was to avoid testifying before the Mason Committee. He wrote to Jefferson Davis, a member of the committee, whom he had known from Davis' 1859 trip to Boston. Lawrence told Davis that the Senate had been "duped by vile fellows" to believe that he was involved in the Harpers Ferry project and expressed his aversion to testifying.

Apparently the appeal was successful, for the committee never called Lawrence to Washington. But the affair taught Lawrence a lesson in prudence that he would not soon forget.[33]

IV

Although the Mason Committee treated Lawrence gently, its members were not so charitable towards those of a more definite antislavery persuasion. The conflict between the committee and those whom it wished to question would engage Massachusetts' attention for several months, and would increase an already widespread distrust of the federal government. State's rights was an argument that could be used on both sides of Mason and Dixon's line. As long as Washington was in the hands of the "Slave Power," many in Massachusetts would challenge the right of federal authorities to intrude in local affairs.

Even before the Mason Committee began its proceedings, some Massachusetts Republicans feared that one of Brown's raiders might be turned over to the federal judiciary for trial. This would allow the District Court of Virginia to "ransack the country from Maine to Georgia," nominally seeking evidence against the defendant, but actually hoping to tyrannize the antislavery men of the North. Howe was particularly alarmed that, in such a case, he could be extradited to Virginia where his life would be in the hands of men pledged to hang abolitionists on sight. Howe shrewdly played on Yankee suspicions in a letter which he wrote to the Boston newspapers from his Canadian sanctuary. He warned that among the statutes of the Federal Union were weapons "concealed as are the claws of the cat in a velvet paw." They seemed harmless, but were in fact, instruments that compelled the North to uphold slavery. A Southern

judge, on the basis of any white man's testimony, could force a Massachusetts citizen to appear before a Southern court to meet an uncertain fate. Howe asked the readers of Boston papers if their state was "so trammelled by the bonds of the Union" that it could not protect its citizens.[34]

The appeal struck a sensitive nerve. The Worcester Transcript declared it a disgrace that a distinguished individual like Howe was not safe in his own home from a "mob of Virginia slaveholders and slavebreeders." The Massachusetts House passed a bill granting the writ of habeas corpus to anyone arrested by federal authorities. Though the state Senate revised its language to remove the specific challenge to the national government, the new law made clear the state's distrust of the federal judiciary.[35]

By February, the Mason Committee was conducting its investigation, and Howe--largely on the advice of Andrew--decided he could safely go to Washington and testify. Andrew's advice may have been influenced by pressure from Republican politicians such as Henry Wilson. Wilson, who blamed Howe for the subpoena he himself had received from the committee, was indignant that Howe had initially refused to testify. Wilson believed that such action only played into the South's hand by making charges of conspiracy more credible.[36]

The Mason Committee posed its questions so loosely that Howe could deceive its members without actually lying to them. The interrogation of Wilson was equally unrevealing, though in this case because Wilson had nothing to reveal. Andrew, questioned because of his role in the Brown defense, testified under protest. He claimed that the proceedings had no legislative

purpose but were an exercise in political harassment. But both Republicans were careful to emphasize that, while they admired Brown's character, they deplored his attack on the residents of Virginia. Others whom the committee tried to question were not so cooperative. John Brown, Jr. and James Redpath dropped out of sight; while Frank Sanborn and Thaddeus Hyatt directly challenged the Senate's authority.[37]

Sanborn, after a hasty trip to Canada, returned to his Concord home to wait for the Senate's next move. But Hyatt, a New Yorker who had been the president of the National Kansas Committee, went to Washington to confront the Senators on their own territory. His lawyer, Andrew, prepared an elaborate argument for the case which he showed to Sumner suggesting that it "will enable a good debator to shake the Senate and stir the country." Sumner drew on this material and delivered an impassioned Senate speech condemning the committee's behavior as a violation of the separation of powers. He compared the behavior of his colleagues to that of the Jesuits "at the period of their most hateful supremacy."[38]

Hyatt's object was to dramatize the contention that the Senate was a tool of the Slave Power. He was not unhappy when the Senate found him guilty of contempt and threw him into jail. At least one Massachusetts Congressman was moved by Hyatt's plight. Charles Francis Adams visited this latest of antislavery martyrs; and, while he concluded that Hyatt was "a natural enthusiast" whose "logical facilities do not keep up with his moral sensibilities," he was appalled that the Senate chose to "wage war" on such an essentially harmless individual. Surely this was evidence that the Senate was tending toward Star Chamber proceedings. But Hyatt's plight did not stir Massachusetts. Sumner's abolitionist friends complained that Republican

politicians were not eager to have his speech on Hyatt's case publicized and that the Boston papers had ignored it. Only when the arm of the Senate reached into Massachusetts itself would the Bay State be aroused.[39]

V

Frank Sanborn was in his Concord home on the evening of April third, sitting at his desk with his slippers on. Answering a knock at the door, he discovered a boy who presented a note that described him as being in need of employment. As Sanborn began to read the letter, a tall grey-haired man rushed through the open door, placed handcuffs on Sanborn's wrists, and whistled to four associates lurking in the bushes. "I arrest you," cried one of the men. "By what authority?" replied Sanborn. "By the authority of the United States Senate," responded the figure who identified himself as a federal marshal and read an arrest warrant issued by the Senate's Sergeant-at-arms.[40]

Sanborn was in no mood to go without a fight. He wrestled with his captors until they lifted him off the ground and carried him to a waiting carriage. The noise of the struggle alerted his sister who, after rousing the neighbors, grabbed one of the federal agents by the beard and forced him to release Sanborn. The entire village of Concord sprang to life at the news that the national government had come into their midst to seize one of their own. Sanborn's pupils ran from door to door carrying the disturbing news, church bells sounded, and soon a crowd of townsfolk arrived to confront the federal authorities. Men of all political views came with clenched fists to protect their neighbor. A group of Concord ladies climbed into the marshal's carriage to prevent him from carrying his captive off to Washington. Even

George Haywood, known as "an old ultra-conservative hunker," was so enraged at this "kidnapping" that he hit one of the marshal's assistants.

Judge Ebenezer Hoar of the the Massachusetts Supreme Court, who lived only a hundred yards from the scene of the commotion, quickly issued a writ of habeas corpus. When the federal agents refused to obey the order to surrender their prisoner, the Concord deputy sheriff formed a posse from the crowd, snatched Sanborn from his captors and chased them halfway back to Boston. Sanborn, recognizing the drama of the moment, turned to his rescuers, held his handcuffs over his head and exclaimed: "Citizens, look and see what the United States Senate have done for me!"

In the Massachusetts legislature the next day, the Sanborn arrest was the topic of debate. John Griffin compared Concord's rescue of Sanborn to the events of April 19, 1775. The British officers who marched on Concord that day were supported by an outside authority but it was those who resisted who are now revered as patriots. John Eldridge of Canton rejoiced that "the whole power of the government was not able to take an unarmed man out of Concord." And Concord's representative offered a resolution that directed the state's attorney-general to represent Sanborn when he appeared in court on his writ of habeas corpus. The House supported the resolution by a wide margin.[41]

Sanborn's lawyer was John Andrew, who rarely missed an opportunity to strike a legal blow against slavery. In his argument to the court, largely a repeat of his brief in the Hyatt case, Andrew warned that the powers claimed by the Senate were greater than those that had been exercised under British rule. Andrew argued that the Senate had no right to compel witnesses to testify, no power to arrest except in specific cases such as impeachment trials. The court, under the leadership of conservative Lemuel Shaw, chose to avoid a

direct challenge to federal authority. It ruled that the Senate's warrant empowered only the Sergeant-at-arms to arrest Sanborn and that this authority could not be transferred.[42]

Whatever the basis of the decision, Sanborn was a free man; the Senate would soon decide that it was not worth the effort to pursue him any longer. Sanborn returned home a hero, cheered by a crowd of eight hundred and saluted by the Concord Artillery Corps. Concord citizens were proud that day, believing themselves the true heirs of the eighteenth-century minuteman. Emerson recorded that he had overheard a man say a house in Concord was worth more than one elsewhere because Concord people were willing to protect one another. Only two men in town had supported the arrest--the postmaster and an official of the Boston Customs House--and both of them were tainted with the corruption of federal patronage.[43]

This was a satisfying, if symbolic, victory for many chauvinistic Massachusetts citizens. Friends of Sanborn commemorated the occasion by presenting his brave sister with a Colt revolver engraved with the Pine Tree flag. Charles Sumner condemned his colleagues in the Senate for trying to kidnap "a quiet citizen engaged in the instruction of youth" and arranged to send a coded warning should the Senate again try to arrest Sanborn. But the Boston Post observed this antifederal sentiment with foreboding; it was nothing but the celebration of a victory over the Constitution. From the Post's point of view, the Sanborn affair demonstrated that Massachusetts Republicans looked at Washington as a foreign power. While Buchanan and his Southern allies were in office, the Post's comments held more than a grain of truth.[44]

CHAPTER VI

THE ELECTION OF 1860

In the early months of 1860, Massachusetts Republicans anxiously surveyed the political skies for storm clouds that might upset their campaign for the presidency. While Harpers Ferry was undoubtedly the most unsettling episode for election-oriented Republicans, it by no means stood alone. A real concern was that volatile issues could split the fragile coalition which constituted their party.

Many Massachusetts Whigs had joined the Republican party when they perceived that it would become the focus of power in the Commonwealth. They sought to influence the direction of the new orgniazation and, hopefully, to make it resemble the old Whig party whose passing they still mourned. Charles Hale, the editor and publisher of the Boston Advertiser and member of an old Boston family with impeccable conservative connections, was the foremost representative of this faction. He had fought the Coalition of 1850 and the Know-Nothings, thinking them irresponsible radicals, and came over to the Republicans only after the Kansas conflict left him with no other viable political home. He used the Advertiser's influence to encourage those of similar inclination to join the Republican ranks and to act as a counterweight to radical tendencies within the party. Hale's efforts culminated in his election as Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives. There he fought extension of the state's Personal Liberty Law and led a divisive attack on plans to build a statue of Horace Mann on the State House grounds.[1]

But the conservatives were not alone in seeking to alter the direction of Massachusetts Republicanism. The radicals, who considered themselves to be the true and original Republicans, chafed at the timidity of many of their colleagues. They looked at Governor Banks as an unscrupulous trimmer and resented Hale's conservative imprint on the legislature. Most of all they worried lest their efforts to construct a new political organization end merely as old and sour Whig wine in a new Republican bottle. When the 1860 legislature convened in January, the radicals enjoyed a stunning victory by replacing Hale as Speaker and electing a more thoroughly antislavery replacement.[2]

Hoping to pursue their success, the radicals proposed a strong new Personal Liberty Law which would free any slave setting foot on Massachusetts soil and impose heavy penalties on those trying to return a fugitive to his master. But despite the pronounced antislavery leaning of the new legislature, a majority of the representatives was dubious of taking such a provocative step in an election year. More pragmatic Republicans substituted for the proposed law a series of antislavery resolutions culled from the early addresses of Caleb Cushing and Edward Everett. Through this clever stroke they avoided legislation that would invite the charge of nullification and embarrassed two political opponents by resurrecting sentiments they preferred forgotten.[3]

Another threat to the unity of the Republicans lay in nativism. The American wing of the Massachusetts party was still powerful; the previous year nativists had succeeded in attaching the "Two-Year Amendment" to the Massachusetts Constitution. This amendment required that foreign-born citizens wait two years after naturalization before becoming eligible to vote. Though this act was far less stringent than the twenty-one year waiting period the

Know-Nothings had demanded earlier, immigrant voters in Massachusetts and elsewhere resented it as unjust and insulting. Benjamin Butler recognized the potential of this issue and told his Irish constituents that Republicans supported unrestricted Negro voting while placing impediments on the white immigrant. Even in distant Illinois a provincial politician named Abraham Lincoln recognized the danger of the Massachusetts statute.[4]

Massachusetts radicals also were attuned to the danger. E. L. Pierce had written a pamphlet which he hoped would attract the self-interest of Republicans. It was true, he wrote, that foreign-born voters in the Northeast generally supported the Democrats and were often friendly toward slavery; but in the West--where the coming election would be settled--the immigrants were of substantial German and Scandinavian stock and voted for the Republicans. Pierce argued that, by offending immigrant voters, Massachusetts Republicans hurt their party's chances for the presidency and diminished the influence of their own spokesmen in national affairs. Pierce's arguments reflected the thinking of many Republican leaders, including Henry Wilson, himself a former Know-Nothing. These leaders did not expect that Republicans would change their attitude toward the Irish, for among the Massachusetts middle class dislike of the Irish was too deeply seated to be easily altered. They only asked that these sentiments be subject to greater discretion and that they be kept out of politics. But a substantial faction of Massachusetts Republicans were unwilling to renounce or even mute their nativism. These "American Republicans" were still an influential element in the party. Claiming Governor Banks as one of their own, they had in the Boston Atlas and Bee a strident and effective voice. And when the national party repudiated state legislation that restricted voting by the foreign-born, the Atlas and Bee angrily replied that

Republicans ought to remember that more than half their victories were due to nativist help. In Massachusetts the figure was undoubtedly higher.[5]

Wary of the social and political implications of the transformation of Massachusetts industry, Republicans found new reasons to be concerned in the early months of 1860. In January, the huge Pemberton mill at Lawrence crumbled into a pile of ruins when the poorly laid foundation gave way. As a raging fire swept through the rubble, over one hundred persons died--almost all of them Irish laborers. For days Massachusetts newspapers carried accounts of rescue teams sifting through the debris uncovering mutilated bodies. No industrial tragedy of this magnitude had ever occurred in New England, and there was widespread shock at the negligence that could permit such a massive tragedy. The Pilot spoke for more than merely its church when it condemned the soulless and speculating proprietors who hid behind the shield of incorporation. It demanded that the mill owners be indicted for manslaughter.[6]

Many Republicans inclined to the Pilot's sentiments. After all, the party had been built in large measure on opposition to the mill-owning class. But Republicans recognized that a tragedy such as this had its political as well as its ethical consequences. For example, the Democratic Worcester Bay State asked why Lydia Maria Child--who was so eager to rush and comfort the Harpers Ferry raiders--had not gone to Lawrence to assist the wounded Irish mill hands. Perhaps, the paper suggested, it was because there was among the victims no "fragrant, intellectual, ideal Negro." Though Child was no Republican, the argument that antislavery enthusiasts were more concerned with black men than with whites touched a tender subject for Republicans, one that might open a Pandora's box of resentments.[7]

An article in the New York Herald helped put Republicans on the defensive. James Gordon Bennett's inflammatory pro-Southern organ claimed the Pemberton disaster demonstrated again that black slaves fared better than Northern working men. Since a slave was valuable his master would shield him from dangers. But Northern mill owners insured only their property and cared nothing about the lives of their employees. The Atlas and Bee, though long a vigorous antagonist of the "silver spoon and white cravat aristocrats," quickly defended New England institutions faced with outside criticism. This position was similar to the response of those Southerners who were discomforted by slavery but who defended their region against abuse by Northern abolitionists. Citing the schools, libraries, and churches built with corporate funds, the Atlas and Bee argued that Massachusetts capitalists treated their employees with a "liberality unequaled elsewhere."[8]

Later in the winter thousands of Lynn shoemakers went on strike, distressed by their dwindling incomes and the new methods of production that threatened their artisan status. They refused to pick up their tools until demands for a stable wage scale were met. For weeks Lynn was the scene of mass rallies and processions as the shoemakers achieved a sense of solidarity seldom seen in the industries of antebellum New England. Strikers roughly handled those few who defied the strike by attempting to send shoes to market. When worse violence threatened, Stephen Phillips, Massachusetts' Republican attorney-general, sent a force of Boston police to restore order.

As the strike spread to other shoemaking centers in the Commonwealth, Republicans recognized the potential dangers of the situation. The shoemakers were among the most stalwart supporters of Republicanism and an essential part of the governing coalition of the Commonwealth. Now the cobblers were in

deadly earnest, striking in defense of their very way of life. If the Republicans failed to support them on such a crucial matter, would the shoemakers retaliate and deal the party a severe blow?

The situation was rife with paradox. The shoemakers were acting to defend their middle-class self-image. But in the minds of many Republicans, the tactics which the cobblers had chosen disqualified them from middle-class status. The shoemakers now revealed themselves as dependent on others for their livelihood and as disturbers of the public peace. The bourgeois sensibilities of most Massachusetts Republicans simply would not admit the necessity for strikes. Though the Massachusetts middle class (like its peers in most periods and locales) was highly class-conscious itself, it was deeply apprehensive when other segments of society recognized the reality of class.[9]

The Springfield Republican expressed such sentiments. It denounced the strike leaders as demagogues and accused them of seeking to turn the conflict to proslavery politics. The paper expressed great sympathy for the workers and noted the forces that had transformed their occupation: "It is no longer a trade . . . as shoes are now made." But striking was no solution; those who wanted to escape poverty and dependency should leave shoemaking and settle in the virgin lands of the West.[10]

Democrats were quick to see the possibilities in the Lynn conflict. Again they argued that the black slave with "sufficient food, clothing, and a patch of land for cultivation" was better off than the wage slave of the North. The reason for the shoe industry's problems, they argued, was antislavery agitation. The Post quoted a Virginia legislator's appeal against wearing shoes made by "bloody propagandists of antislavery." It argued that recent

John Brown meetings in the shoe towns and widespread belief that Henry Wilson was the archetypical Yankee cobbler caused a Southern boycott of Massachusetts shoes. The Boston Herald also found a lesson in the strike: "Let our mechanics vote for men in Congress who care as much for white men as they do for niggers and they will not often be compelled to strike for decent wages."[11]

But even though Republicans remained cool to the strike, shoemakers remained impervious to Democratic arguments. The cobblers refused comparison with Southern slaves; they remained convinced that their problems lay with New England capitalists rather than with antislavery orators. And they retained their vision that a nation governed by Republicans would be invested with virtue and would reward honest labor. But Republicans could not know in March that the shoemakers would remain loyal to the party of free labor in November; and the Lynn strike serve as another cautionary note in the early months of the presidential campaign.

As Massachusetts Republicans began to elect delegates to the Chicago convention, events in Rhode Island raised additional concern. There a coalition of Whigs, Americans, and Democrats nominated a conservative Republican William Sprauge for governor. This coalition gained a substantial victory by convincing a majority of the voters that the Republican nominee, Seth Padelford, was a dangerous radical. Here was an ominous precedent in a neighboring Republican state that might be repeated in Massachusetts. Republicans knew that Amos Lawrence--with great resources at his disposal--was attempting a similar arrangement in the Bay State. Southern threats to boycott Massachusetts commerce seemed timed to promote such a combination, as stories appeared that names of "constitutional" and "unconstitutional" merchants

would circulate in Southern newspapers. Charles Francis Adams was one who saw a developing plot of "intimidating the moneyed interests among us and persuading them to exert themselves to secure the triumph of the slave candidate."[12]

A substantial majority of Massachusetts Republicans supported William Seward as the logical choice for the presidential nomination. He was the party's foremost spokesman and a man of broad experience and talents. But even among the radicals, dedication to Seward's cause was thin. Shortly before the Republicans met in Chicago, old Whigs and Americans had convened as the "Constitutional Union" party and nominated John Bell of Tennessee. Now conservatives who might find Seward's "irrepressible conflict" unpalatable had an alternative. Even the tumultuous Democratic convention in Charleston that had split the party in two, raised questions about the wisdom of nominating a controversial candidate. Could there be, some Republicans asked, a plot to stalemate the election and place selection of the President in the hands of the Senate?[13]

The correspondence of two thoroughly antislavery Republicans--E. L. Pierce and Charles Francis Adams--indicated the drift of thought on the eve of the convention. Pierce, a delegate from Adams' district, wrote that he would prefer to vote for Seward if he were "as available" as any other candidate. But after condemning those who would sell out Republican principles and nominate John McLean or Simon Cameron, he emphasized that the party should select the man most likely to win in November. "No one man owns the party," Pierce declared; "it has done more for its leaders, more than they have done for it."[14]

Adams, a personal friend of Seward, was distressed by the intrigues he saw organizing against the New York Senator. But he also was upset by reports of the scandals involving Seward's Albany cronies. He replied to Pierce with

a lecture on the grave responsibility which delegates to Chicago carried, solemnizing that a victory not based on Republican principles would be meaningless. Seward was still his choice as the most competent statesman in America. "And yet," he added, "I am no partisan of his, nor shall I be ready to sacrifice the probabilities of a victory merely to indulge my notions of abstract propriety." In a final flourish, Adams revealed the depth of his frustrations: "It is to be regretted that we have not some popular young military man to stand in the gap just now." Of the other Massachusetts radicals, Wilson was actively working against Seward, while Sumner restricted his activities to urging Republicans to select "an old and constant servant of the cause."[15]

Many moderate and conservative Massachusetts Republicans hoped to channel disillusionment with Seward's candidacy into a presidential bid for Governor Banks. Congressmen Dawes and Burlingame, Boston Journal editor Charles O. Rogers, Charles Hale, Samuel Bowles, all hoped to make the Massachusetts governor a credible candidate at Chicago. Their strategy was to hold the Massachusetts delegation for Seward in the early balloting and await a deadlock. Then they would urge Banks as a compromise candidate and collect their debt from Seward's allies. Samuel Bowles wrote Banks of the plan: "Let us look on calmly and see the murders, and pray that the blood of the martyrs shall be the seed of your church." Banks' friends sought to present him as one Republican whose election would not alarm the South unduly. W. O. Bartlett urged Banks to remind the delegates that after his election as Speaker of the House, South Carolina's largest slave owner escorted him to the chair. And the Springfield Republican argued that Banks' Democratic antecedents would attract many voters who would otherwise support Douglas and that

his nomination would answer the charge that the Republican party was merely "Old Whiggery resuscitated."[16]

But Banks' presidential hopes were short-lived. Radicals who had little sympathy with their governor dominated the state and district conventions that elected delegates for Chicago. These radicals remembered Banks' attempt to turn the issue from slavery to the Pacific railroad during the Fremont campaign, and noted his increasingly friendly relations with Massachusetts' commercial interests. They also recalled his abortive attempt in 1858 to edge Sumner into retirement and replace him in the Senate. More recently Banks earned their enmity for his second veto of a bill allowing blacks to enroll in the state militia. Frank Bird wrote a stinging rebuke in which he compared Banks' veto to Missouri and Arkansas' recent expulsion of free blacks. All were based, he wrote, on the faulty premise that it was "a right of the majority to proscribe . . . the minority." Bird also accused the Governor of forcing the legislature to adopt the Two-Year Law--"the anti-American, undemocratic, odious, Know-Nothing amendment," Bird called it. Bird's charge was somewhat overstated; but nevertheless, Banks' association with the Know-Nothings eliminated him from serious consideration by a party so intent on wooing the German vote. The governor's friends accused Henry Wilson of leading the "Lager beer Germans" against him, but foreign-born voters needed little encouragement to oppose Banks' nomination.[17]

A large majority of the Massachusetts delegation stood by Seward during the three rounds of balloting, although four members did support Lincoln as early as the first ballot. More might have voted for Lincoln had they not felt bound to honor their constituents' preference for Seward. But all Massachusetts Republicans felt Lincoln was a candidate they could accept

even if some like John Murray Forbes worried about a repetition of the log cabin and hard cider campaign of Harrison. As for Banks--he set his sights lower, but received only a scattering of votes for the vice-presidency. The Chicago delegates found in another New Englander with a Democratic background--Maine's Hamilton Hamlin--a candidate untouched by Know-Nothingism.[18]

II

Amos Lawrence was one man who worried Massachusetts Republicans throughout the winter and spring of 1860. Still repenting his association with John Brown, Lawrence was actively soliciting his wealthy acquaintances to support the organization of a new conservative party. He hoped to build upon the enthusiasm of the Union meetings that had followed Harpers Ferry and to exploit the divisions within the Republican party. When the Republican National Committee issued its call to the Chicago convention, Lawrence noted its rejection of nativism; he saw this as an opportunity to split the Banks Americans away from the Republican party. Looking further at the Chicago call, Lawrence noted that "it contains nothing about the manufacturing and producing interests of the country." Certainly America's businessmen could be roused by such an oversight. Lawrence hoped to create a well-organized, anti-radical Union party that would nominate a Border State moderate. He believed that such an organization could strengthen the hand of conservative Republicans and that they would lead their party to accept the Union candidate. Lawrence was certain that John J. Crittenden could sweep the nation and Massachusetts with it, and he worked hard to convince the Kentucky Senator to accept the nomination.[19]

But Lawrence found that conservative Republicans were unreceptive to his plans. Many blamed the Fillmore ticket of 1856 for the election of Buchanan and did not want the Democrats to profit from another conservative movement. As one Boston businessman wrote, the Constitutional Union party could only serve to play into the hands of the administration's "nigger drivers." Pragmatists, these conservatives sensed success in the Republicans but only failure in the Unionist movement.[20]

Lawrence was further disappointed when the Constitutional Union convention in Baltimore chose John Bell of Tennessee as its presidential candidate and Edward Everett for vice-president. Everett's response to this dubious honor further demoralized the Union effort in Massachusetts. Everett had hoped for the presidential nomination; and when it went to Bell, Everett wired his agent at the convention, George Hillard of the Courier, to withdraw his name from any further consideration. But the order miscarried; and the convention, believing Everett's illustrious name would be helpful to their cause, placed it on the ticket. Everett was furious, believing the nomination an insult since he was placed behind a younger man. (Everett was sixty-six; Bell, sixty-three.) Everett agreed to the nomination only when he recognized that it might be more embarrassing to reject it, and the chore proved as distasteful as he had imagined. Southern fireaters resurrected Everett's youthful speeches against slavery and condemned him for having sent his son to a school that had a Negro pupil. By autumn he was weary of accusations that he supported "amalgamation, political equality, and all the horrors of abilitionism."[21]

The Massachusetts Union party--consisting of old Whigs and conservative Americans--found its notable men equally hesitant to stand for governor.

Though William Appleton offered John Clifford a campaign chest of twenty thousand dollars if he would run, the former governor declined. Only after several others had refused to accept the nomination did Amos Lawrence grudgingly agree to become the candidate. This disinclination of leading conservatives to re-enter politics--"overfastidiousness" the Courier called it--would seriously hamper the Bell-Everett cause in Massachusetts. The Courier reminded conservatives that they had most at stake in the preservation of the Union and that, possessing wealth and education, they carried a grave public responsibility. If these natural leaders abdicated their proper role they invited demagogues to fill the gap. As a result, the Courier warned, "a lower range of thoughts and a lower range of human propensities" would govern, leading inevitably to anarchy and "the man on horseback."[22]

The managers of the Massachusetts Union campaign showed that they never understood why the Whig party had disintegrated in the crucible of recent events. Their orators defended protectionism and the Southern trade without understanding how narrow and antique this appeared in 1860. Sounding like Federalists, the Bell-Everetts lauded their lack of a platform. Platforms, they argued, debased political morals and brought into office the unworthy and the unreliable. As in the days of Washington and Adams, voters ought to select the most virtuous men and let them judge matters of substance. The Unionists argued that they would stand on the Constitution pure and simple and let their opponents--like demagogues--woo the masses with promises and policies.[23]

This Olympian attitude opened the Bell-Everetts to penetrating Republican criticism. Whose Constitution did they stand on? Wilson asked. Was it Clay and Webster's or Taney's or Breckinridge's? Andrew attacked the conservatives

for their simplistic belief that by merely declaring loyalty to the Union the conflict over slavery would disappear. It was an insult to the popular mind, Andrew declared, when party leaders taught that great issues should not be debated in public.[24]

Republican ridicule of the Bell-Everett ticket bit deep. The Springfield Republican called it "worthy to be printed on gilt-edged satin paper and laid away in a box." The Atlas and Bee compared attempts to resurrect the Whig party to William Miller's prophecy of the end of the world. But despite the ridicule and the Unionist organizational problems, the Republicans still recognized the Bell-Everetts as a potential threat in the November election.[25]

III

Massachusetts Democrats travelled comfortably to their party's convention in Charleston on a boat specially chartered for the occasion. They brought a brass band to help them pass time on their cruise South and to entertain the delegates who would assemble in Institute Hall to select a presidential candidate. But when the band stopped playing and the business of politics took over, little harmony prevailed among the Massachusetts delegates.

It was not the Massachusetts Democrats who were in a quarrelsome mood. As a minority party, they recognized that their only chance for success lay in maintaining their own unity while they hoped for divisions among their opponents. But they were inevitably drawn into the bitter struggle between the friends of Stephen A. Douglas and those of President Buchanan. Douglas had opposed the administration's efforts to make Kansas a slave state and had steadfastly maintained his allegiance to popular sovereignty. In return, the administration had waged a persistent campaign to defeat Douglas for re-election to the

Senate; and, when this failed, Buchanan's allies in the Senate had stripped him of his chairmanship of the Committee on the Territories. Douglas was determined to be avenged; and with the support of a vast majority of Northern Democrats he set out to win the Democratic presidential nomination.[26]

The local conventions that selected the Massachusetts delegates expressed their overwhelming support of Douglas and expected their representatives to vote for him in Charleston. But these delegates found themselves between the conflicting demands of their constituents and of their patron, Buchanan. It is not surprising that a majority of them chose the latter; for Massachusetts voters rarely elevated a Democrat to a lofty position. A Massachusetts Democratic politician set his sights on the Post Office and the Customs House. And Emerson's harsh remarks about federal office holders of the period was not far off the mark. They were sneaks, he wrote, "who read the administration paper every day and loudly defend the last measure of the Government." On the first ballot at Charleston, only eleven of the twenty-four Massachusetts delegates supported Illinois' "Little Giant." The rest cast their votes for Virginia Senator Robert Hunter and for Jefferson Davis.[27]

Delegates from eight Southern states seceded from the convention after failing to get a platform favorable to a slave code for the territories. After fifty-seven bitterly deadlocked ballots, the Democrats adjourned to meet in June at Baltimore. Again many of the Southern delegates withdraw; but this time they were joined by a number of Northerners. Among them was a majority of the Massachusetts delegation, including its leading figures--Caleb Cushing, Benjamin Butler, Benjamin Hallett, and George Loring. The Massachusetts seceders maintained that they had left because of the convention's refusal to seat Hallett. (Butler added another argument--he could

not sit in a body where the African slave trade was openly advocated. Douglas supporters in the hall laughed raucously at Butler's sudden scruples).

But these arguments were insufficient to explain why the Massachusetts delegates--alone among New England Democrats--joined the anti-Douglas convention. A more plausible explanation concerns the influence of Caleb Cushing, whose loyalty to the administration was reenforced by his ambition for a seat on the Supreme Court. Shortly before the Baltimore convention the administration had informed Cushing that his appointment to the Court was likely, should an expected vacancy materialize. Here was a tangible prize that a lame duck administration might tender to a faithful servant.[28]

Cushing had presided at Charleston and at the original Baltimore Convention; now he became the president of the seceders. His lieutenant, George Loring, nominated Vice-President John Breckinridge for the presidency with the promise that Massachusetts "will stand by the South in her struggle for constitutional rights." On the evening of June 23, the rival Democratic gatherings chose two separate presidential candidates--Breckinridge and Douglas--leaving many office holders and voters with a painful decision.[29]

Cushing helped the office holders in Massachusetts make up their minds. His correspondence for the summer of 1860 was filled with reports on the loyalty of federal appointees to the Breckinridge candidacy. Those who wavered found themselves quickly unemployed. Butler also enthusiastically endorsed this policy, maintaining that the removal of Douglas supporters "would do us more good in organizing than anything else." Six Massachusetts newspapers endorsed Breckinridge: in each case either its editor or publisher held a federal office.[30]

The Boston Post was the leading Breckinridge organ. Its campaign rhetoric took it far from the loco-foco egalitarianism that had once characterized the Massachusetts Democracy. Unlike Republican papers which lauded their candidate's humble origins, the Post ridiculed Lincoln as a common rail splitter. In justifying slavery it cited the "same immutable laws" that made some men kings and others subjects, some rich and others poor. "Such social distinctions are the lot of mankind and doubtless permitted by Providence for the good of society." Attitudes like this placed the Post and its allies well beyond the tolerance of most Massachusetts Democrats. Delegates who failed to support Douglas at the conventions returned to hostile local constituencies. Democratic meetings throughout the Commonwealth denounced the Breckinridge men as doughfaces who had bowed to Southern extremism. When Butler tried at a Lowell meeting to explain his recent actions, angry Douglas supporters shouted him down.[31]

Massachusetts' Douglas Democrats were so intent on attacking the Breckinridge wing of their own party that they had little energy left to assault the Republicans. The Boston Herald, a penny-paper whose daily circulation of 50,000 made it the most widely read newspaper in New England, denounced the Vice-President as the candidate of the slave code and disunion. The Pilot, which labeled Buchanan as desperate and vindictive, warmly embraced Douglas as an old friend of the Irish. Douglas' popularity among the Irish was evident when--avowedly on his way to Vermont to visit his aged mother--he stopped for speeches in Boston and Worcester. Though the charge by administration Democrats that Douglas was leading his followers into the "pit of Abolitionism" was obviously far fetched, there was little doubt that the Douglas Democrats would not support the Breckinridge stand on slavery.[32]

IV

"There is a crack in the Democratic Party," the Springfield Republican crowed, "and there is a nigger in that crack, and the nigger cannot be got out of it." Asserting that the Republicans would put "the nigger question . . . where the interests of the white man of this country demand," the Republican assured its readers that their party was united on important matters. But although Massachusetts Republicans attempted to keep their differences from public view, radicals and moderates continued their struggle to shape the direction of the party.[33]

The strain between the party's factions increased when, on June fourth, Charles Sumner rose in the Senate to give his first major address in over four years. "The Barbarism of Slavery," as Sumner called his speech, was a comprehensive indictment of the Southern institution designed to place the Republican party on a firm antislavery footing. Sumner argued that the presidential campaign, like the struggle against slavery itself, was no "holiday battle," but rather "a solemn battle between Right and Wrong, between Good and Evil." Such a battle could not be fought with rosewater. Sumner was confident that the Republican voters of the North were more enlightened than many of their political leaders; now was the time to ensure that a Republican victory meant more than merely a change in place-seekers. He suspected the motives of many of those entrenched within the party organizations--men who "use principles as counters by which they keep tally." Better that the Republicans lost than that their ideals became prostituted.[34]

"Barbarous in origin, barbarous in law, barbarous in spirit, barbarous wherever it shows itself, Slavery must breed Barbarians." Sumner spoke

passionately as Southern Senators sat glowering. Such rhetoric worried Republican moderates. Would it invite another violent Southern response that could upset well-laid political strategy? The uncompromising language obscured the fact that the substance of Sumner's speech was well within the bounds of acceptable Republicanism, for its primary thrust was a paean to free labor. Sumner's arguments were familiar. Unlike the free institutions of the North which promoted prosperity for all men, slavery--based on the appropriation of all the toil of its victims--enforced ignorance, immorality and a contempt for the dignity of labor. The South enjoyed a substantial advantage over the North in navigable rivers, in climate, in arable land; but its development had fallen far behind. "Slavery plays the part of the Harpy, and defiles the choicest banquet," Sumner declared. Though the population of the two sections had been nearly equal in 1790, the North now had twice the inhabitants. Massachusetts alone, despite its small size, contained more real property than Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and Texas combined. The slave states lagged in all areas of education but were most conspicuously negligent in providing public education for the common man. A Northern Negro was more likely to receive education than a poor Southern white.[35]

Outside of Sumner's own circle, Republican leaders in Massachusetts were unenthusiastic about the speech. The Springfield Republican, though admitting its eloquence, doubted the address' "present usefulness to the cause of liberty." An acquaintance of Charles Francis Adams wondered if Sumner might not have overdone his medicine considering "the delicacy of the patient's stomach." And Adams, himself, though he refused to judge Sumner by the standard of ordinary politicians, wondered about the expediency of the speech. Sumner

was depressed by this lack of support, and perceived an effort to read him out of the party. "I expect very little and ask nothing," he wrote Pierce; "but it seems hard that there is not a single paper in Boston--if in Massachusetts--which does by me as papers in other states do by their Senators."[36]

But Sumner's friends were determined that the speech have the impact its orator intended. Thaddeus Hyatt, Frank Bird, and E. L. Pierce mailed out thousands of copies of the address, especially to rural areas of New England and the upper Mid-West where Sumner was popular. Bird, though he held no political office, enjoyed strong influence in the legislature which he used to obtain a resolution praising Sumner for his "thorough, truthful, and comprehensive examination of slavery." The radicals mentioned Wilson in the resolution as well; Pierce explained to Sumner that this would induce the junior Senator "to maintain cordial support for you." By mid-summer popular response throughout the rural North was strongly favorable to "The Barbarism of Slavery," and Sumner was convinced he had enjoyed a great triumph.[37]

Massachusetts' radicals longed to be rid of Governor Banks and replace him with one of their own. But they doubted that a presidential year was an opportune time for such a divisive intra-party contest. In a July column, "Warrington" lamented that Massachusetts had never had a genuine antislavery governor; Banks, he said, grudgingly yielded to the antislavery sentiment of the state without ever sympathizing with it. "Warrington" suggested that John Andrew would be an ideal governor but that 1861 should be the year to fight over the control of the Massachusetts Republican party.[38]

But during the summer Banks decided to accept a lucrative position with the Illinois Central Railroad rather than to seek re-election. The governor

wanted to keep his decision secret until the eve of the state convention, hoping that he could retain control over the party and hand the gubernatorial nomination to Henry Dawes, the moderate Congressman from Berkshire County. C. Russell Train, an eastern Massachusetts Congressman privy to the plan, advised Dawes to run: "Andrew will be urged by the Plug uglies; but his nomination in my opinion would strengthen the Bell ringers by the thousands." William Claflin, a state Senator and chairman of the Republican State Committee, heard of Banks' plans and immediately went to Sumner. The Senator jumped from his chair exclaiming: "Give me my boots. John Andrew must be the next governor of Massachusetts." Soon Sumner and other members of the Bird Club were out convincing the delegates to the state convention of Andrew's virtues. Their success, despite opposition from the major Republican newspapers is testimony to the influence of radical antislavery at the grass-roots level of the party. At the convention Andrew gained 723 votes, his opponents 338. The radicals were ecstatic. Not only had they placed one who shared their ideals within reach of the governor's chair, they had delivered a rebuke to the "little joker" Banks.[39]

Initially, the moderates complained about Andrew's victory. Samuel Bowles, who had been active in promoting Dawes, wrote that the Republicans' enemies would make much of Andrew's "John Brown sympathies and speeches, his Garrisonian affiliations, . . . his Negro-training predilictions." The nomination, Bowles thought, should have gone to someone who had remained a Whig until the formation of the new Republican organization; for this important element in the party was seriously under-represented in important offices. The Republican's publisher complained that the old Freesoilers--"bold, radical, clever and grasping"--now controlled everything of importance.[40]

The anti-Republicans inevitably played upon the theme of Andrew's radicalism. The Pilot accused him of justifying "the torch of the incendiary whenever there is a colored man who does not enjoy civil and political rights equal to a white man." The Courier solemnly predicted that if Andrew became governor he would appoint Wendell Phillips to the Supreme Judicial Court. And Democrats sang an obscene anti-Negro jingle that ended:

Tell John Andrew
John Brown's dead.[41]

In the face of this attack, Republicans thought it best to smooth over their differences for the duration of the campaign. Henry Wilson persuaded Dawes to speak in Andrew's behalf at a Boston Rally. Andrew, hoping to get the endorsement of the conservative Boston Journal, made assurances that if he were elected he would keep Frank Bird in line. Out on the stump Andrew assured the voters that he was radical "not in the sense of destructiveness, but radical in the honest cause of preserving . . . the good and the true." Conservative Republicans likewise saw the virtue in unity. The Advertiser was soon making the implausible defense that Andrew was no more an abolitionist than most of the Bell-Everetts.[42]

Republicans of all stripes were anxious to prove that their success would not result in civil war and that talk of Southern secession was merely for political effect. In a Framingham speech, Sumner listed seven occasions when slave state politicians had employed the disunion menace: during the discussion of the slave trade at the Constitutional Convention, during the Jay Treaty, the Missouri Compromise, the Nullification crisis, the gag law controversy, the Wilmot Proviso, and the election of 1856. Sumner assured his audience that there was nothing to the threats "which should not be treated with indignant contempt." Andrew echoed this theme. Such little disunionism as existed in

the South was "stimulated by Northern speculators in national politics practicing on Southern apprehensions." And should disunionists make an overt move, the South had Union men enough to drive them into the Gulf of Mexico without Northern aid.[43]

Republicans also sought to blunt the Democratic claim that they sacrificed the interests of white men in favor of Negroes. Some Republicans argued that colonization was the best way to end the Negro question and suggested Haiti as a likely destination for American blacks. This policy, they claimed, would bear rich political fruit by attracting slaveless Southern whites to the Republican party. Other Republicans emphasized their party's policy of allowing each state to regulate its own Negroes without interference from the outside. A. M. Bullock, a Worcester Republican speaking at Faneuil Hall, turned the Democratic charges against them. He argued that Republicans had attempted to legislate in the interests of the white man. But "whenever we have endeavored to obtain a homestead bill, or a little encouragement for our domestic industry," he complained, "they have filed before us, every mother's son of them, bearing a Negro upon his back. They have kept <u>him</u> between us and our business." We have had Negro administrations long enough, the Newburyport <u>Herald</u> wrote; it is time the white man had his chance.[44]

Radicals as well emphasized slavery's impact upon whites. Though they eschewed the conservatives' racism, they sought to avoid the impression that their primary concern was with blacks. Andrew continuously emphasized that the real question of the campaign was whether "all poor men shall be slaves or all slaves shall be made free." Nothing but universal white suffrage had prevented the frank advocacy of the ownership of white labor; nothing but free schools and the free press had prevented a Dred Scott decision for white men.

Andrew warned a working-class audience in Boston that, if the Republicans lost and the slave forces extended their influence, there might well come a Supreme Court decision that, by permitting slavery in the North, would ruin the white laboring man. "The power of the Supreme Court to argue the colored man out of the Constitution," he advised, "may argue you out of it and me out of it . . . tomorrow." Henry Wilson, speaking to artisans in East Boston pursued a similar theme. He presented himself as an example of the benefits of a free labor system, but warned that slavery had "degraded the white laboring man of the South and dishonored the white laboring man of the North."[45]

V

During the presidential campaign, Charles Francis Adams visited Worcester to speak at a political rally. While there he stayed at the home of John Curtis, the proprietor of a clothing store and a staunch Republican. This rather ordinary man inspired Adams to write a glowing testimony to the virtues of the Massachusetts middle class. Adams noted that Curtis, who lived in his neat, comfortable house with his intelligent wife and his one daughter, was quiet and well mannered. "This is the type of a class which are scarcely to be found outside of New England," the Massachusetts Congressman maintained; they constitute the great buttress of our Republican organization."[46]

Adams' faith in the middle class' devotion to Republicanism was shared by most of his colleagues. For the middle class understood the dignity of free labor, was jealous of its free institutions and respected the moral influence of the pulpit and the press. It suffered neither from the corrupting influences of great wealth nor from the degradation of poverty and ignorance. The Republicans' most enduring nightmare was that their diverse enemies--those on

either end of the economic spectrum--might coalesce to provide a united front of greed and immorality. Republicans anticipated a national alliance of "the Cambridge scholar, the Southern slave-driver, and the Chicago bully." On the local level they feared the "timid capitalists of Beacon Street joining hands with the roughs of North Street and Pig Alley," the ruffled shirts working with the no-shirts. The large cities were the most likely place such an unholy alliance would emerge; for there lived large numbers of "dependent, ignorant, vicious classes" as well as "silver spoon aristocrats." Republicans were well aware that they had never carried a majority in Boston. Sumner commented that the proslavery sentiment of the cities almost justified Jefferson's sentiment that they were sores on the body politic.[47]

Throughout the summer, Republicans watched as their opponents--especially those in Boston--attempted to organize a fusion ticket. Ineffectual divided, these anti-Republicans had some chance for success if they combined. Their historical model was the Coalition of 1850 which had driven the Whigs from power and had ushered in a new era of political life in Massachusetts. Many upper-class gentlemen overcame their long-standing distaste for the Democrats in the face of what they perceived to be a national emergency. The Democratic administration--bad as it might be--was a known quality, unlike the uncertainties of Republicanism. Edward Everett, in particular, became a strong supporter of a coalition with the Democrats; at least "there is a savor of nationality about the Democratic party," he maintained. Noting that the Democrats had muted their traditional economic radicalism, the Massachusetts business community was receptive to cooperation.[48]

Many Democrats reciprocated in their desire for a fusion ticket. The Pilot even offered to join with former Know-Nothings to oppose the Republican

menace. "When a house is on fire," its editor wrote, "all the neighbors, without distinction of race or faith, rush toward it, to save life and property." Even after the three anti-Republican parties selected candidates for governor in early autumn (Bell-Everetts, Amos Lawrence; Douglas Democrats, Erasmus D. Beach; Breckinridge Democrats, Benjamin Butler), there was hope for agreement on a common ticket. Both Beach and Lawrence were eager to withdraw in favor of a suitable alternative.[49]

But the bitter feud among the Democrats destroyed the possibility of a common gubernatorial candidate or a united slate of presidential electors. Douglas men were enraged by the administration's ruthless purge of the post offices and custom houses. Caleb Cushing further antagonized them with speeches that urged the South to resist by any means a Lincoln victory. Benjamin Butler, believing that a Republican victory was inevitable, argued that the primary objection of administration Democrats ought to be the preservation of their organization. Consequently, he worked to frustrate fusion by antagonizing potential allies. One of Butler's prime targets was Amos Lawrence whom he attacked as John Brown's treasurer. And when the Boston Herald--noted for its numerous advertisements by "no cure, no pay" physicians--endorsed Douglas, Butler dismissed it as a "venal and venereal sheet."[50]

Though the three factions could not agree on state-wide candidates, there was fusion in several Congressional districts and in many local races. The most important combination was in Boston. In one district, anti-Republicans supported Democrat Erastus Bigelow--inventor of the power loom and founder of the carpet business that still bears his name--to oppose Congressman Alexander Rice. In the second Boston district Whig industrialist William Appleton stood against incumbent Anson Burlingame. The advocates of fusion argued that Boston would be judged by the men that it sent to Congress and that her current

representatives were ill-equipped to work in the city's interests. Their "one idea policy" drove away business patrons, destroyed the home market, and provoked non-intercourse movements in the South. The Anti-Republicans argued that the balance of power in the next Congress would lay with Southerners, and that they would be unlikely to listen to a Republican's appeal for assistance to Massachusetts' industry. Appleton's candidacy most clearly resembled the coalition that Republicans had long dreaded. When the Herald recommended this millionaire manufacturer to its Irish readers, it was more than many Republicans could bear. Burlingame, a former Know-Nothing whose political career had addressed itself to the anxieties of Boston's native-born middle class, responded with a vigorous attack on Appleton's wealth and his low born supporters.[51]

Another important contest involving a fusion candidate occurred in the Worcester Congressional district. There, the anti-Republicans supported incumbent Eli Thayer, referred to by his critics as "the Benedict Arnold of Massachusetts Republicanism." Thayer, the moving force behind the Emigrant Aid Society, had once been a respected figure among antislavery circles, but, once in Congress, he began to support Douglas' popular sovereignty. He voted for the admission of Oregon without explicit prohibition of slavery and opposed a Republican effort to repeal the New Mexico slave code.[52]

Thayer defended his record vigorously, arguing that he was not obligated to treat the party platform like the Scriptures. But Worcester County was the most antislavery region in Massachusetts and its Republicans were determined to purge themselves of this "King of Squatters Sovereignty." At their district convention, only eight of the 146 delegates voted for Thayer's renomination. The leaders of the Massachusetts party, Adams, Sumner, and Wilson,

came to Worcester to speak against the apostate. Sumner, especially, relished the task as a way of purifying the party's ranks. He warned the district's voters that Thayer's record as their representative had made them "parties to an odious crime" and urged them to elect the Republican nominee, Goldsmith Bailey.[53]

VI

On November sixth, Massachusetts Republicans enjoyed a landslide triumph. Lincoln received 106,533 votes, about sixty-three percent of the ballots cast. Douglas trailed with 34,370 votes, Bell received 22,332, and Breckinridge 6,105. In virtually every area of the Commonwealth, outside of Boston, the Republicans received a substantial majority of the votes--more than ninety percent in some homogeneous rural communities. Despite predictions that Andrew's radicalism would antagonize many conservative voters, the Republican gubernatorial candidate came within two thousand votes of Lincoln and captured sixty-two percent of the vote. In Boston, Lincoln polled only forty-seven percent, but received a plurality over each of his opponents. The city's mercantile community generally supported Bell; its Irish remained loyal to Douglas. The only compensation for the anti-Republicans was William Appleton's narrow victory over Burlingame.[54]

In the thirty years prior to 1860, Massachusetts had voted for the winning candidate in only two presidential elections. She had been alienated from the policies of the national government during most of these years and few of her leading men had served in important federal posts. But with the election of Lincoln, Massachusetts' relations with the national government would take an abrupt turn. As a leading Republican state she would have new influence in

Washington; her antislavery statesmen would now be eligible for offices of public trust. The power of the national government which previously had upheld slavery could now be used to promote the interests of the free working man. Massachusetts Republicans were determined that this opportunity not be lost.

CHAPTER VII

CONGRESSMAN ADAMS AND GOVERNOR ANDREW

During the month of November, Massachusetts Republicans, intoxicated by their victories, refused to concede the significance of the events that were unfolding in the Cotton States. They were in no frame of mind to recognize the existence of a real national crisis. Most Republicans believed the campaign argument that their party's victory would entail no threat to the Union. To accept the premise that the election of a Republican president in itself could create political chaos, would be to question the very validity of the party and to strip the election triumph of its sweetness.

On the evening of November 9--the very day that South Carolina had voted to hold a secession convention--Massachusetts Republicans crowded into Boston's Music Hall to celebrate the coming of the new administration. Henry Wilson was one of the principle speakers, and as he went to the podium he undoubtedly reflected upon the long years and ceaseless effort he had committed for this moment. At such a time he was disposed to be neither modest nor moderate: "Tonight, thanks be to God, we stand with the Slave Power beneath our feet. That haughty power which corrupted the Whig party, strangled the American party, and used the Democratic party as a tool, lies crushed to the dust and our heel is upon it." Charles Slack, a leader of the paramilitary Boston Wide-Awakes, gave a speech rife with belligerency. He warned that, if the Southern "farce" threatened the inauguration of Lincoln, he and his men would "resume our arms and we will see him triumphantly borne to his post." But neither Slack nor any other Republican present that

evening suggested that anything had happened--or was likely to happen--that required reaction from their party. Anson Burlingame remarked that the Southern Congressmen resigning their seats were like men biting off their own noses: "There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent this."[1]

With engaging irony, Massachusetts Republicans glorified the constitutional system that settled conflicts through elections rather than through violence. Speaking in Concord, Sumner asserted that the past election would be a lesson to the world: "It will be good news to Garibaldi in Italy, good news to the French now subjected to imperial powers, good news to English reformers." The Republican victory--one "not of the cartridge but of the ballot-box"--was another step in the peaceful and orderly progress of civilization. Republicans generally believed that Southerners would accept the election of Lincoln as legally valid and with it the Republicans' anti-extensionist position on slavery. Many hoped that sectional antagonisms over slavery would now subside. As naive as these hopes appear from the perspective of historical hindsight, it should be remembered that Democrats had earlier been given to similar expectations. Pierce and Buchanan had anticipated that the antislavery North would accept the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the Dred Scott decision as the final solution to the territorial question.[2]

Given these premises, it is not surprising that during November Republican leaders urged that Southern hostility be allowed to run its own course. Temporarily Southerners might be maddened by disappointment, but the fever would soon dissipate. At worst secession would be confined to South Carolina, which would establish itself as a contemptible republic in the Latin American mold. Republicans believed they had no responsibility save that of avoiding provocations that could aid the demagogues of disunion. The Advertiser aptly

summarized this position: It rests with the Union-loving men of the South itself to hold their section to its duty. Republicans were certain that Southern Unionists would rise to the occasion.[3]

Massachusetts' anti-Republicans, who had warned for months that a victory for its adversaries would spell disaster for the Union, were quick to perceive the reality of the secession movement. Some like Caleb Cushing justified the South's actions. In a speech at his native Newburyport, Cushing claimed the Republicans were attempting to reduce a white-man's country of co-equal states "to the infernal depths of a black, red, or yellow consolidated Republic." Referring to Wilson's recent speech, Cushing argued that, though Massachusetts might be under the heal of abolitionist fanatics, the South would rightly resist "until the soil of all sections was drenched with blood." But for most Massachusetts Democrats, Cushing's speech represented the treason they had fought at the Charleston convention. They blamed Breckinridge men like Cushing for causing Lincoln's victory and, hence, for the crisis which the election had created. Some of Douglas' Massachusetts supporters--among them the Boston Herald-- were not unhappy to see their most vocal antagonists depart from Congress.[4]

But the great majority of Democrats and Old Whigs dreaded disunion. As November progressed and five Southern states called secession conventions, conservatives took no pleasure in the vindication of their predictions. Their commercial interests, abandonment by their Southern friends, and genuine devotion to the Union, precluded satisfaction. Perhaps these anti-Republicans also felt a pang of guilt. They had so long warned of the unconstitutional abolitionist principles of the "Black Republicans" that they may well have played a role in pushing their Southern friends over the brink of secession.

Now the Hunkers argued that Lincoln's views on slavery were essentially those of the Whigs and that the Republicans had obscured this fact during the campaign merely to keep the radicals in line. As a Westerner, Lincoln was as different from Massachusetts Republicans as Henry Clay was from William Lloyd Garrison. Edward Everett was among those taking this position. If the South remained in the Union it would have nothing to fear. "It is the standing policy of the Republicans," he observed, "to be ostentatiously Constitutional at Washington and save their ultraism for electioneering use at home."[5]

Massachusetts conservatives urged the South to join with its Northern allies and retain control over Congress. In this way Lincoln's office would be empty of real power. It was especially important that anti-Republicans retain control of the Senate which could thwart the appointment of a radical cabinet. Conservatives argued that, presented with firm Congressional opposition, Republicans would drop their antislavery rhetoric in return for possession of an intact government. According to one Boston merchant, the Republicans would soon be saying: "Damn <u>our</u> principles, give us <u>your</u> offices." Democrats and Unionists hoped that the Republican coalition would fracture in the crucible of the secession crisis. To this end the conservative press emphasized every disagreement which arose among their opponents, every sign of compromise or hesitation. Sometimes they invented differences where none existed. Thus in mid-November, when Lincoln remarked that Republicans should hold no harsh feelings against those who voted against him, the <u>Courier</u> trumpeted the incident under the banner "Massachusetts Republicanism Thoroughly Ignored." The paper argued that to conform to Lincoln's views, Massachusetts Republicans would have to deny votes to Negroes, forbid intermarriage, segregate

the public schools, and repeal the Personal Liberty law.[6]

II

The conservative strategy was aided by an escalating commercial panic which was engulfing the entire Northeast. Boston's merchants--timid in the best of times--had visions of their imminent ruin. Would the cotton supply be terminated? Would Southerners repudiate their debts? Would the South now deal directly with Europe? Like their peers throughout the North, the Massachusetts commercial community responded to these unsettling questions by calling in debts, holding on to hard currency, and refraining from new ventures until their questions were answered. As a result, borrowers had to pay from twelve to eighteen per cent interest as the specie reserve of Boston's banks shrank to dangerously low levels. By December first there was widespread fear that the Bank of England might suspend specie payments to the United States, an action that could precipitate a disaster far worse than the calamitous panic of 1857.[7]

Despite these alarming signs, Boston did not suffer from the financial chaos that affected New York. The Springfield Republican attributed this to the fact that there was "more speculation, more recklessness, and more thoughtlessness on Wall Street than on State Street." But a more likely explanation was that the Massachusetts economy was not so thoroughly dependent on the Southern trade as New York's. On the Boston stock market Massachusetts' banks and railroads lost little value, though few shares were traded. The stock of several leading textile companies dropped from fifteen to thirty per cent, but this decline represented fear for the future rather than current distress. In December the New England mills were able to purchase huge quantities of cotton at prices that were actually lower than they had been the month before.

Though a few mills ran on half or three-quarters time, there were no major failures and no widespread unemployment. Most mills enjoyed heavy orders from the West and were able to pay shareholders their regular dividends. Merchants in the export trade found their ships filled with Western grain due to the poor harvests in Europe. But to the shoe industry, already suffering from a serious depression, the secession crisis was a further blow. The Boston Commercial Bulletin reported that during the closing weeks of the old year "scarcely a hammer struck" in the Massachusetts shoe towns.[8]

Thus conditions varied in the Massachusetts economy during December. Certainly business was not as prosperous as in normal times, but neither was it in a state of collapse. The atmosphere was one of apprehension, and this uncertainty bode ill for Republicans. Conservatives offered visions of a ruined New England--its factories competing with the pauper labor of Europe, its ships rotting at their wharves, its streets filled with unemployed workmen, all because of the fanaticism of antislavery agitators. In a heated address Caleb Cushing asked his commercial audience:

> Have your stocks fallen?
> Have you no market?
> Do you have to pay two per cent
> per month for the use of money?

All these evils, he suggested, were the result of Republican intransigence over slavery.[9]

Such rhetoric brought heavy pressure on Republican Congressmen to compromise with the South. Henry Gardner, writing to Charles Francis Adams, inaccurately portrayed the economic situation in Boston as worse than 1857 and warned that the panic would "engulf everyone who owns or owes anything." Another correspondent warned Adams that soon the value of New England real estate would

be but one-third its present value. Adams, himself, knew that times were tight. The empty federal treasury was unable to pay full Congressional salaries and Adams was hard pressed to meet his mortgage payment on some Boston property. But responding to a mill owner who urged compromise, Adams advised that the money panic "is sheer fright and has no necessary connection with the political struggle. People must eat and drink and wear clothes in any event." He predicted that the manufacturer would soon rehire the workers he had discharged. Adams' comments were representative of the Republican view of the panic. But though they might argue that all the economic difficulties stemmed from unscrupulous speculators and that the "bonds of commerce" would withstand any crisis, Republicans recognized that if the economy should worsen, they would be in serious political jeopardy.[10]

At the height of the economic panic, Boston's Garrisonian abolitionists scheduled a meeting to commemorate the anniversary of John Brown's execution. Many Bostonians, who feared that they would spend a cold, hungry winter of unemployment, saw the abolitionists as an obvious target to vent their frustrations. Vehement editorials in the local pro-Southern press encouraged these antipathies. The Pilot suggested that Andrew Jackson's threat to hang traitors had settled the Nullification Crisis. Would not the silencing of treasonous abolitionists settle the current difficulty? Leading Republicans such as Wilson and Andrew recognized the hazard of such a gathering, declined invitations to attend, and urged its sponsors to cancel their plans. Massachusetts' Governor-elect, fearing violence, wrote that the meeting was "uncalled for, wrong, and in fact a crime in the present aspect of our public affairs." Republican newspapers had agreed not to report the proceedings.[11]

But the abolitionists continued with their plans; and on the afternoon of December 3, the John Brown meeting convened in a crowded Tremont Temple. Among those in attendance were one hundred blacks, including Frederick Douglass and J. Sella Martin, Boston's foremost Negro cleryman, and white reformers such as Frank Sanborn, James Redpath, and Parker Pillsbury. Also present were men whose sympathies did not often lead them to attend such events: wealthy Salem merchant, William C. Rogers; Watson Freeman, the marshal who had arrested Sanborn at Concord; Christopher Plunkett of the Customs House; and Amos Lawrence. Merchants, clerks, Irish laborers--men who were anxious to let the South know that the Garrisonians did not speak for Boston--filled a substantial majority of the seats.[12]

The anti-abolitionists, leading cheers for Virginia's Governor Wise while they waited for the proceedings to begin, were apparently well-organized. When the Reverend Martin opened the meeting by calling for Sanborn to assume the chair, the "broadcloth rowdies" put forth Richard S. Fay, a Lynn businessman, and declared him chairman. Fay lashed out at the abolitionists and pointing at the blacks in the audience warned that, if the crisis continued, white men would "hang these gentlemen as high as Haman." Fay drew from his pocket a series of prepared resolutions which declared sympathy with the South and asserted that Bostonians had too long allowed demagogues to disturb the peace of the city. "They have become a nuisance," he declared, "which in self-defense shall hencetoforward be summarily abated." As he spoke the mob roared its approval.

Frederick Douglass elbowed his way to the podium and tried to speak. "I know your masters," he shouted to the anti-abolitionists; "I have served the

same masters as yourself." A counting-house clerk in the front row cursed the speaker as a "nigger." "If I were a slave-driver and got hold of that man for five minutes," Douglass exclaimed hotly, "I would let more light through his skin than ever got there before." "He said the naked truth," replied Fay, "for the Negro slave-driver is the most cruel in the world." Douglass retorted: "Just as a Northern dough-face is more contemptible than a Southern slaveholder." Fighting broke out in the audience as Sanborn, taunted as a "white negro," tried to speak. The manager of the Temple feared for the safety of the building and summoned the police, who restored order by ejecting Sanborn and Douglass.

Later in the day the abolitionists reassembled in a Negro church on Joy Street. Wendell Phillips remarked how fitting it was that they should find refuge there. He denounced the city government for failing to provide protection, but noted that "we abolitionists are accustomed to live without a government." Lydia Maria Child applauded so passionately that she snapped her wedding band. The meeting passed resolutions against the afternoon mob of "merchants and other well-dressed people," and condemned the Boston police. John Brown, Jr., sporting a brace of pistols, urged the abolitionists to resist their antagonists with force; but when the assembly disbanded the participants slipped out a back door. For outside the building were a thousand persons, some drunk and throwing bricks, others chasing and beating passing Negroes, and still others urging that the church be burnt to the ground. Despite the violence, the Boston police made only one arrest, seizing a Negro boy who had tried to prevent whites from breaking the windows on his house.[13]

"The Abolitionists Squelched by the Conservative Masses of Boston Who Desire to be No Longer Misrepresented." Under this headline, the Boston Post

of December 4 reported the events of the previous day. Conservatives approved of the suppression of the meeting as proof that the city had no love for Brown and that it was willing to defend Southern interests. In times of crisis, they argued, preservation of social order took precedence over free speech. "Violence is often just," the Pilot remarked. Republicans were aghast at what had happened. Such incidents only bolstered Southern predictions that secession would create a breakdown of law and order in Northern cities. This would encourage the South to believe that the North would be unable to withstand the challenge of the coming winter. The abolitionists would gain by becoming martyrs to the cause of free speech and the Hunkers would portray themselves as defenders of the Massachusetts economy. Only the Republicans and their strategy of cooly weathering the political storm would lose.[14]

During December, Massachusetts Republicans faced a series of municipal elections which their antagonists sought to turn into referendums on compromise with the South. Anti-Republicans hoped conservatives who had supported the Republicans in the presidential election would regret their votes and repudiate the party that had caused the current panic. A harbinger of their strategy was a run-off election for state representative from Middlesex County. On November 6, the contest had ended in a tie; but in the special election of November 26, the conservative fusion candidate defeated the Republican, and captured sixty-two per cent of the vote.[15]

Anti-Republicans in Boston agreed on a strong mayoral candidate in Joseph Wightman, a manufacturer of "philosophical apparatus," who was the Democratic chairman of the city's Board of Alderman. This fusion arrangement marked an

abrupt departure from the traditional alignment of Boston municipal politics. In the past the "Parker House Clique"--a committee of merchants--chose a candidate to run against the Democratic organization. But in the current crisis both factions were willing to put their differences aside. As Wightman noted, it was essential that the "metropolis of New England" demonstrate to the country that "the great heart of her citizens is sound and conservative." When the Republicans nominated Moses Kimball--a strong anti-slavery man who had once voted to deny Daniel Webster the use of Faneuil Hall--the issues were clearly drawn. The Post declared that a vote for Wightman would be a vote against making Boston "the headquarters of Negro meetings, a Negro militia, and the advocates of John Brown's raid."[16]

The anti-Republican tactic proved successful. On December 10, Wightman defeated Kimball handily. The Republicans, who had received forty-seven percent of the Boston vote a month earlier, fell to thirty-nine percent. Other Massachusetts cities--Worcester, Springfield, New Bedford, Lynn, and Newburyport--all of which had given Lincoln a majority, elected non-Republican mayors. The impact of such perennial local issues as taxes and "grogshops," as well as the presence in some cities of "Citizens" and Temperance tickets, make it difficult to draw any clear inference from these elections. And Republicans reassured themselves by remembering that their true supporters lived in the countryside. But clearly these elections did strengthen the hand of those seeking to undermine the Republican position. Along with the financial panic and the recent violence in Boston, they added a real burden to the Massachusetts Congressional delegation in the early weeks of their new session at Washington.[17]

III

The Republicans who gathered for the second session of the Thirty-sixth Congress labored under conditions that were unique in the history of American politics. Belonging to a minority party, they controlled neither the House nor the Senate. A hostile administration would control the executive branch for another three months. Forged as a party of dissent, united more by common antipathies than by common goals, they had little experience in positive government. Nevertheless, because they had made an obscure associate from the West the president-elect, the nation's attention turned to their Congressional caucus for some solution to the sectional crisis.

Massachusetts' Congressmen, as well as their colleagues from other states, were now unsure of the exact nature of events that confronted them. Were they witnessing the disintegration of the Republic? Or were Southerners trying to win by bluff what they could not achieve by the ballot? Were they at a crucial junction in the history of the nation or merely repeating the old cycle of confrontation and compromise? Massachusetts Republicans were less certain in December than they were immediately after the election, but they held to certain premises. They remained suspicious of the South's motives, especially when they read statements like that of Mississippi's A. H. Handy who wrote that "secession is not intended to break up the present government, but to perpetuate it . . . Our plan is for the Southern States to withdraw from the Union for the present, to allow amendments to the Constitution to be made guaranteeing our rights." Republicans also hoped that secession would remain limited to the deep South. These states would be inherently unstable outside the protection of the Union as they attempted to contend with their

large servile populations. Few Republicans would miss their hot-blooded representatives in Congress.[18]

From the Massachusetts perspective the most critical problem was in Washington rather than in Charleston. Henry Adams, who had accompanied his Congressman father to the capital, reported the conditions to his brother in Boston. The people of the city were in a state of panic, believing that either Southerners would attack or the slaves would revolt. "In any contingency," young Adams wrote, "they feel sure of being ruined or murdered." Massachusetts Republicans feared that in such an atmosphere their tender-hearted colleagues might forfeit the substance of their well-earned victory. Likewise, traitors within the Buchanan administration might destroy the capacity of the government before Lincoln's inauguration.[19]

The Massachusetts Congressional delegation was proud of its own firmness. Eli Thayer would plead for compromise, but his colleagues no longer considered him a member of their party. Alexander Rice might wobble under pressure from his Boston merchant constituency; but on the whole Massachusetts' Congressmen were concerned with their colleagues from other states. With the exception of Republicans from Vermont and Wisconsin, few appeared to possess the Puritan steadfastness necessary for the occasion. "Things are in a terrible state here," Henry Dawes wrote his wife. "Our people are shaking at the knees and there is a great danger that the Republican party will split all to pieces before the fourth of March." He expressed his contempt for those who chattered their teeth and shook in their boots, but assured his wife that "with the toothache and corns I find it very difficult to do either." The problem with his weak-kneed associates, Dawes concluded, was that they lacked character.[20]

Republicans listened with ears of stone when Buchanan delivered his address on the sectional crisis. The aging President denied the legality of secession but disavowed any authority to prevent it. The Republicans were far more interested in the intentions of their president-elect; and until they received some indication of his views, most were content to agree on a policy of "respectful and fraternal silence." But this policy of silence left public attention free to focus on those who urged compromise. On December 11, John J. Crittenden--hoping to fill the place of his fellow Kentuckyian, Henry Clay--proposed a comprehensive program for peace which demanded that Republicans abandon the central tenants of their Chicago platform. Senator Crittenden urged a perpetual guarantee for slavery in the South, the repeal of all personal liberty laws, and Congressional approval of human bondage in all territories south of the Missouri Compromise line, presently held or "hereafter acquired." In the House of Representatives Eli Thayer resurrected the old panacea of popular soveriegnty. He urged that no more territories be acquired and that those presently held be allowed to deal with slavery as they wished. Finally, in a December 17 letter to Thurlow Weed (reported five days later in the New York Tribune) Lincoln made known his opposition to Crittenden's proposals. This strengthened the hand of those opposed to concessions, but still left Republicans without a positive program. Congress had established two forums to seek a resolution to the crisis: a committee of thirteen in the Senate and a committee of thirty-three in the House. But when these two bodies convened in mid-December, their Republican members remained divided and leaderless.[21]

Massachusetts Republicans were delighted when Speaker of the House Pennington chose Charles Francis Adams to be the Commonwealth's representative

on the Committee of Thirty-three, the House's vehicle for sectional mediation. They were certain that unlike Eli Thayer (who had lobbied for the appointment) Adams would remain true to Republican principles. His antislavery credentials were impressive; along with Wilson and Sumner he was an acknowledged leader of the Massachusetts party. He had been in the thick of the anti-Texas fight, had edited the antislavery Whig, and had been the Free-Soil nominee for vice-president in 1848. But though Adams was popularly identified with the radical wing of the party--largely because of his close relationship with Sumner--his reputation as a radical was largely undeserved. "I wish I could be an entire abolitionist," he once wrote, "but it is impossible. My mind will not come down to the point." Adams was attracted to antislavery not by the plight of the slave, but by attacks on the civil liberties of white men. The mobbing of Garrison, the murder of Elijah Lovejoy, and the silencing of his own father in the petition crusade all had great impact on him. But, on most social issues, Adams was a dedicated conservative. He had fought against the abolition of both capital punishment and imprisonment for debt. He was suspicious of the Coalition of 1850 and opposed the loco-foco constitution of 1853. And he inherited from his father a tenacious nationalism that was notably absent from most of the Massachusetts radicals.[22]

Adams never forgot the presidential blood that flowed in his veins. A childhood at St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, an adolescence in the White House, left him with a sense of distance from the common man. He disciplined himself with standards of probity difficult to imagine in the age of Watergate. But he was bitterly frustrated that he had not done more to uphold the Adams name. During the 1840's and 1850's his antislavery views precluded a federal

appointment; at the same time he was reluctant to appear too grasping in the pursuit of elective office. Nevertheless, he did serve five terms in the Massachusetts legislature and accepted the Free Soil vice-presidential nomination as an honor which placed him "somewhat near the level of my fathers."[23]

During most of the 1850's Adams withdrew from politics to devote his attention to his grandfather's papers. In 1858, local Republicans offered him the nomination for Congress. He accepted and won the election easily. But the fifty-two year old freshman Congressman was not happy in a capital which he described as an "abomination of desolation." In April 1860, he expressed his frustrations in his journal: "I feel as if I ought to be more useful and yet the opening to such an effort does not appear. I feel as if more was expected of me than to be a silent member and yet I cannot enter into a miserable scramble for the floor to talk about little things." Adams saw his appointment to the Committee of Thirty-three as an outstanding opportunity to make his mark. With some justification, he believed himself to be one of the most able members of the House and hoped that through the committee he could give the floundering Republicans the leadership they needed.[24]

Initially, Adams' response to the secession movement had been indistinquishable from many of his colleagues. "Let them secede from Congress long enough to enable the Republicans to establish their authority in the federal government," he wrote, "and the whole game is played." Even after the committee had begun its work, Adams retained his belief that the crisis was manufactured merely to frighten the North and that the South would soon accept the legitimacy of the Lincoln government. He was adamantly opposed to a constitutional amendment that would guarantee the perpetual existence of slavery.

"To sanction such a change," Adams wrote, "in this, the nineteenth century, in the face of the civilized world would be a degree of moral degradation which I would not accept even at the cost of the Union." Furthermore, he believed that any retreat from the Chicago platform would only encourage further confrontations in the future.[25]

Adams' first concern with his fellow Republican committee members was that they might prove to be excessively pliable. He strongly dissented when eight of the Republicans supported a resolution calling upon Congress to grant concessions "promptly and cheerfully" to the South whether or not their grievances were just. This was rhetoric to be sure, but for Adams it was rhetoric that would only encourage the secessionists further. Adams likewise opposed a series of measures--similar to Crittenden's--put forward by Representatives Rust of Arkansas and Nelson of Tennessee.

But Adams came to see the importance of preventing Southern unity. The Cotton States alone would be incapable of self-government; but with the support of the upper South--especially Virginia, Maryland, and Kentucky--an independent slave-holding confederacy would be a formidable antagonist. Adams consulted closely with William Seward during the early weeks of the secession crisis and they both agreed that it was essential to keep the Border States within the Union until after Lincoln's inauguration. They hoped that, once the new president was safely in office, the crisis would subside as Southerners recognized that he had no aggressive intentions.[26]

On December 20, Henry Winter Davis, a Marylander with Know-Nothing antecedents, offered a proposal to the committee which--in Adams' words--"gravelled" the other Southern members like "a cannon shot clear through the line." Davis proposed to avoid the territorial question entirely by admitting

New Mexico to immediate statehood. This would grant to the South all the territory south of the Missouri Compromise line which they had demanded, but would not open land "hereafter acquired" to slavery. Adams was cool to the plan at first, but after conferring with John S. Watts, a judge who had lived in New Mexico for several years, he saw its merits. Watts convinced him that New Mexico was totally unsuited for slave labor and that secessionists, aware of this, would refuse the offer. Thus, Davis' proposal would fit neatly into the Seward-Adams strategy of dividing the South, and would expose the fact that the secessionists were not interested in the territorial question but were after political power. It could serve as the Republican answer to the Crittenden compromise, allowing the party to appear conciliatory without sacrificing the substance of the Chicago platform. On December 29, as the most distinguished Republican on the committee, Adams formally sponsored the proposal. He received the backing of eight of the committee's fourteen Republicans. More significantly, two representatives from the slave states supported him, laying the way for the breach in the Southern ranks for which Adams had hoped.[27]

Adams would achieve his tactical victory at a heavy psychological price. Although a few of his Massachusetts colleagues supported him (notably Wilson, Train, Delano, and Rice) most of Adams' friends were shocked that he would endorse such a concession. Frank Bird bluntly accused him of selling out Republican principles and warned him of the isolation he would bring upon himself. "Of all your truest friends," he wrote, "there is not one, with possibly the exception of Andrew, who does not condemn the proposition to admit New Mexico with a constitution allowing slavery." E. L. Pierce was even more unkind as he expressed his contempt for trimmers and reminded Adams

of an incident from his grandfather's life. It had been one of the great days of John Adams' life when, during his stay in Philadelphia, John Dickinson--who had lacked the courage to support independence--turned to avoid looking him in the eyes. "An Adams never won fame in making compromises," Pierce cruelly taunted.[28]

For Adams the most painful criticism of all came from his son, Charles Francis, Jr. The younger Adams was bewildered by what appeared to him as an abrupt reversal of his father's antislavery stance. As he walked the streets of Boston he saw dark expressions on the faces of his friends and heard them curtly wonder if it were possible to send a firm man to Congress. He and his brother John engaged Faneuil Hall and planned to denounce his father's position unless an explanation was quickly forthcoming. He pleadingly asked his father if he, too, were going down Webster's unhappy path. Was Henry Winter Davis some kind of sorcerer that he could convince an Adams to support a measure that struck at the very vitals of Republican doctrine? The son warned his father against pursuing a compromise "which must wholly cast me off from you." Adams was able to convince his son of the wisdom behind the strategy, but not without a strain on the family ties. "I see you have faith even as a grain of mustard seed," Adams wrote his son. "I regret this more for your own sake than for mine."[29]

Adams wrote numerous letters in an attempt to justify his course to friends at home. He explained his attempt to buy time for Lincoln and his hope of exposing the hypocrisy of the South. He argued that Southern hostility to the New Mexico plan proved that it offered them nothing they did not have by the Compromise of 1850. He chided his correspondents for not recognizing that true statesmen did not stand equally stiff on great issues and little

points and assured them that his commitment to the plan was temporary and that he would abandon it once his objective of dividing the South was achieved. But Adams' ultimate argument was to lay his reputation on the line. As he told one Massachusetts radical: "it will be necessary for my friends to trust me, on the strength of my former life." To another he allowed a tone of self-pity to emerge. "It is a matter of regret to me, he wrote, "that after twenty years of service in support of the principles of freedom, the larger part of the time at the sacrifice of all expectations of mere political advancement, any of my friends should entertain doubts of my fidelity."[30]

Despite his best efforts, Adams changed few minds with these appeals. During the early winter his support came almost exclusively from conservative Republicans like the editor of the Advertiser and--to Adams' embarrassment--from Bell-Everetts. But with the exception of William S. Robinson, who wrote a friendly article in the Springfield Republican, and John Andrew whose support remained private, the Massachusetts radicals continued their feverish attack on Adams and his New Mexico proposal. On one level it is difficult to understand the bitterness of the radicals' response, for Adams' objectives were essentially the same as theirs. For example, in a letter to Charles Sumner, William Claflin, the president of the Massachusetts Senate, denounced Adams for abandoning Republican principle. He asserted that he would prefer to see the dissolution of the Union before yielding to the South's demands. Then he summed up the feelings of his radical associates: "They would like to save Virginia, Missouri, and Maryland, but do not care for the rest." Of course, this distinction between the upper and the lower South was precisely at the heart of Adams' strategy. But the radicals' rage at Adams went deeper than a mere difference over tactics.[31]

The Massachusetts radicals shared many of the traits of the Garrisonians. Moral perfectionists, they were inflexible when they believed matters of sin were involved. Their first commitment was to the extirpation of immorality rather than to the governing of a pluralistic society. They differed from the Garrisonians in that they were willing to seek political remedies to moral ills; for the most part, they were not pacifists. Furthermore their keystone was not the immediate abolition of slavery, but barring its extension to the West with an eye to its eventual extinction. But having seized on the territorial question as their fundamental principle, the radicals adhered to it with a tenacity worthy of the most militant abolitionist.

The November election had been the radicals' great vindication. They refused the contention that the source of the Republican victory had been complex and varied; for them it was a simple referendum on the extension of slavery. Lincoln's triumph, in Sumner's words, meant simply that all the outlying territories, "so immense in extent, and destined to the support of unknown millions, shall be consecrated to Freedom, so that the vast outstretched soil shall never know the footprint of a slave." Thus when Adams--whom the radicals considered one of their own--offered to make a large section of this territory into a slave state, they attacked him not as one who had made an error in political judgment but as an apostate. "I have never experienced a more painful wrench than that caused by the intelligence that Mr. Adams proposes to surrender New Mexico to slavery," wrote a Northampton woman to Sumner. "For God's sake send me something contradictory." E. L. Pierce wrote the Senator in a similar vein: "If ever I had occasion to feel about you as I do about Adams, I should feel I had lost the use of my faculties." Adams'

argument that he neither wanted nor expected the South to accept his proposal did not help him with the radicals. They argued that it was morally debilitating to make an offer one was not willing to accept.[32]

One casualty of the secession winter was the old friendship between Adams and Sumner. The bachelor Senator dined with the Adams family on Sundays and emjoyed their civilized companionship. But as the political divisions grew, the once-pleasant conversations became heated. Adams was annoyed with Sumner's intransigence as Sumner was with Adams' conciliation. The Massachusetts Congressman began to speculate that the Brooks attack had affected Sumner's ability to reason, and observed that the Senator appeared to welcome the rush to civil war with a "grim satisfaction." "The more I see of Sumner's political course," he wrote, "the more I become convinced of his inability to act a real part on this great stage of human affairs." The two men clashed over a proposed modification in the Fugitive Slave Law. Adams urged the change but Sumner would accept nothing less than total repeal of the obnoxious statute. This added to Adams' suspicions. "He seldom studies the relation of measures," the Massachusetts Congressman wrote. "The question here is not how good the bill is in itself, but how it compares with the present Fugitive Slave Law." On January 12, Seward gave a speech which, though short on specific proposals, was heavy with conciliatory phrases and extravagant praise for the Union. Adams liked the speech; not unexpectedly, Sumner did not. After listening to the Senator's harangue against it, Adams lost his patience. "Sumner," he exclaimed, "you don't know what you're talking about. Yours is the very kind of stiff-necked obstinacy that will break you down if you persevere." Relations between the two old friends were never again the same.[33]

IV

As Massachusetts radicals began to regard Adams as a fallen angel, they looked toward their new governor, John Andrew, as a source of unimpeachable firmness. E. L. Pierce expressed these parallel sentiments in a letter to Sumner. He grieved over Adams' apostasy but rejoiced in Andrew's inauguration. "A man was wanted for the hour," Pierce wrote, "and God sent him." But Adams and Andrew were in closer harmony than Pierce or the other Sumnerites realized.[34]

Shortly after the November election, Andrew had suffered a stroke of apoplexy, the disease that would end his life prematurely in 1866. But following a painful, primitive operation known as "plugging," the indomitable Andrew was on his feet and eager to play his role in the unfolding national drama. He hurried to Washington to confer with the Massachusetts delegation and discover the drift of events and found the city seething in rumors and fears. The men he talked with told of armed men drilling in the suburbs and government employees who boasted openly that Lincoln would never be inaugurated. Many Republicans believed that high officials in the Buchanan administration--especially Secretary of War, John B. Floyd--were sabotaging the ability of the government to defend the capital.[35]

Andrew sought out James Mason, the Virginian whose Senate committee had recently interrogated him on the Harpers Ferry raid, in order to measure the South's commitment to secession. Mason told him bluntly that Southerners would never live under an antislavery national government and that the dissolution of the Union was inevitable. Perhaps, the Senator suggested, the country could be reconstructed, but only when the Northern states agreed to accept

slavery within their own borders. For Andrew this was confirmation not only of the reality of disunion but also of the imminence of war. This realization led him to appreciate the wisdom of Adams' strategy of accommodating the Border States; for surely if they remained loyal, the fate of the Cotton States was sealed. Though Andrew did not publically endorse the New Mexico proposal, he and Adams came to a confidential working arrangement that would soon prove important.[36]

One issue on Andrew's mind was the Personal Liberty Law, the Massachusetts statute that impeded the recovery of fugitive slaves. Massachusetts conservatives were agitating for its repeal and Andrew wanted Adams' views on the response which Republicans ought to give. Andrew received the answer he had wanted, for Adams believed that the laws were of small importance in the sectional dispute and that the state should hold the line on the issue. When Andrew returned to Boston he was enraged to discover that Banks was planning to deliver an unprecedented valedictory address in which he would sum up the achievements of his administration and offer advice on the national crisis. Many of Banks' conservative friends had urged him to use this opportunity to force his successor's hand. When the outgoing governor spoke on January 3, he urged the legislature to repeal the Personal Liberty Law which he denounced as unwise and unconstitutional.[37]

But Banks, off to make his fortune in Chicago, was unlikely to influence Andrew. In the previous few days, President Buchanan, to the surprise of most Republicans, had showed his resolution by upholding Major Anderson's move to Fort Sumter and by reconstructing his cabinet with solid Unionists. If a doughface like the "Old Public Functionary" could muster some courage, Andrew felt he could do no less. After completing the routine portion of his January

inaugural address, the new governor turned to the matters which his audience had come to hear. He referred sarcastically to Banks' veto of the Negro militia bill, and warmly defended the Personal Liberty Law. He denied that the Massachusetts statute was subject to the opinions of other states: "It is a naked question of right between private persons, and of duty between the Commonwealth and its subjects." Massachusetts, he declared, was blameless for the events which were shaking the Union. The sole source for the crisis was the reactionary elements in the South who would not accept defeat in an honest election. "Those who declare they will not live peacefully within the Union," he warned darkly, "do not mean to live peaceably out of it."[38]

On the same day that he delivered his inaugural address, Andrew received an alarming letter from Adams. Written at the request of Seward, the letter warned the new governor of a turn in the crisis. "It is beyond a doubt," Adams wrote, "that the revolutionists have determined to take forcible possession of the Government at Washington before the fourth of March, and perhaps within thirty days." The Congressman urged that Massachusetts immediately ready its militia to defend the capital and that on January 8--the anniversary of the Battle of New Orleans--the state fire one hundred guns in honor of Andrew Jackson and the latest national hero, Major Anderson. Adams explained that this demonstration could serve to rally the patriotism of all parties. But Adams also warned that these requests not be traced to him or to anyone in Washington lest Maryland and Virginia interpret them as aggressive acts. "The proceedings should emanate spontaneously from the States, and not be traced to suggestions from this quarter," he urged.[39]

Andrew would strictly respect Adams' request for confidentiality. As a result, the two men, though in active collaboration, would appear to be on

very separate courses. Radicals considered Andrew "firm," conservatives felt he was "incendiary;" likewise observers labeled Adams "statesmanlike" or "vacillating" according to their politics. Few knew how inappropriate their classifications were. Andrew immediately set to work making Massachusetts ready for war. He sent couriers through a raging snowstorm to inform the other New England governors of the threat to the capital and urged them to join with Massachusetts in preparing their militias. He issued orders for the military salute, telling his friends that it was necessary to get the people "accustomed to the smell of gunpowder."[40]

Sharp entrepreneurs recognized that a profit might be made in the increasing militancy. "CIVIL WAR IMPENDING," read the advertisement in one Boston paper: "Are you familiar with the use of arms? If not you can be taught at the Rifle and Pistol Gallery over Morgan's Billiard Room at Bowdoin Square." The Boston fencing club turned from foils and epees to a class in military drill. At the same time there was a considerable fear that the state might be left without sufficient arms. Many believed that the Secretary of War had emptied the armory at Springfield and sent the muskets to the South. On January 8, popular belligerency increased when South Carolina artillerymen fired on the Star of the West, a federal steamer sent to reenforce Fort Sumter. Many believed war had begun. "Now let the laws against treason be enforced," exclaimed the Haverhill Gazette. "The secessionists have danced, let them pay for the music."[41]

Andrew shared the assumption that war had begun and immediately offered the services of the Massachusetts militia to Winfield Scott, the highest ranking general in the United States army. Scott rejected the offer, calling it premature and adding that he was embarrassed to have such a proposal come

to him rather than to the President. But Andrew pursued his objective of preparing Massachusetts for any emergency. He was assisted in this end by the state's Adjutant General, William Schouler, the editor of the Atlas and Bee and an important political figure in his own right. During the waning days of the Banks' administration, Schouler had drafted a plan by which the state's active militia (numbering about 5,500 men) would become the nucleus of an army that would suppress rebellion. This plan became the heart of a proclamation issued by Andrew, known as General Order Number Four. Under its provisions each militia officer was to examine his roll and determine the number of men he had available for active duty. If his company was below strength he was to fill the vacancies; he was not to grant discharges. He was to drill and uniform his men and ready them for a call by the President.[42]

There was some opposition to Andrew's order. The Courier called it the first step toward a military despotism; the paper claimed that Andrew's real motive was to purge the militia of those who differed with him and use it to silence opposition in Massachusetts' cities. One militia company, the Salem Light Artillery, refused to comply with the directive, arguing that it was illegal to coerce a state to remain in the Union. But for the most part the militia hastened to respond, and Massachusetts became one of the first Northern states to prepare itself for war.[43]

Five days after he issued General Order Number Four, Andrew sent a message to the Massachusetts legislature indicating that he wished to make a significant presentation. In 1859 when Theodore Parker departed for Italy, knowing that he would never return home, he left an old musket in a fireproof room of the State House for safekeeping. The weapon had belonged to his grandfather,

captain of the Minutemen that had fought the British at Concord bridge; it had fired one of the first American shots in the War of Independence. Parker had willed the relic to the Commonwealth and asked that it be placed in the Senate Chamber as a symbol of the state's heroic past. Andrew recognized the symbolism that the musket held at a moment when Massachusetts men were readying themselves as "Minutemen of '61" to save the nation's capital.

Andrew later confessed that, as he drafted his address to the session of the legislature which would accept the musket, his feelings overwhelmed him: "I sat down, yielded to a perfect tempest of emotions, and wept as I had not done for years." One spectator reported that cold chills ran over him as Andrew exhorted his audience to be faithful to Massachusetts traditions. "And if in any degenerate hour Massachusetts should falter or quail," the Governor exclaimed, "may some weird hand beat the old drum that hangs beneath the root-tree of the Senate, give aim to this arm which spoke for liberty on the morning of the 19th of April, '75, and may it march before the conquering hosts of rekindled patriotism and reinvigorated purpose." As he finished his speech, Andrew--who until recently had considered himself a pacifist--raised the musket and kissed its barrel.[44]

CHAPTER VIII

THE ABOLITIONISTS' VICTORY

Andrew's emotional presentation of the Parker heirloom reflected a mutuality of sentiment between Massachusetts' radical Republicans and abolitionists that too often has been overlooked. Historians--following the arguments of Republicans who feared identification with unpopular agitators--have emphasized the differences between the two groups, often to the point of obscuring their true relationship. To be sure the Garrisonians were disunionists who refused to vote because they believed that, by participating in an election under the Constitution, they would acknowledge its authority over them. They were suspicious that all politicians, even those of the Liberty, Free Soil and Republican parties, were tainted by the institutions within which they contended. It is equally true that even the most radical Republican reminded his constituency--at least at election time--that he was not an abolitionist.

But disagreement--even violent disagreement--is not necessarily a sign that the parties involved do not hold many values in common. Certainly Republicans argued vigorously among themselves. And few quarrels were conducted with the vituperation that marked those within the abolitionist movement itself. Indeed, it may be argued that, under certain circumstances, the bitterness of a controversy increases as the opinions of participants converge.

In their calmer moments, both the radical Republicans and the abolitionists recognized that they were working for similar goals and that the work of each was indispensable. Charles Follen aptly described this relationship

in a letter to Sumner. "While you are seeking this (the advancement of anti-slavery principles) partly through the medium of politics, we Abolitionists are working for it by direct instruction and appeal. We honor and value your position and I feel sure that you appreciate ours." Both groups agreed that slavery was a moral and economic disaster for the entire nation. They also shared a mutual distaste for large cities, the Catholic church, and commercial greed. Some Republicans had a foot in each camp. "I am a Republican who is also an abolitionist," declared Frank Bird who chaired the 1857 disunion convention at Worcester. "Liberty first and Union afterwards, if need be," he declared; "Or Liberty out of the Union and over the Constitution, if it must be." Sumner had many friends such as Howe, Stearns, and the Childs who were active abolitionists; and Andrew's legal work kept him in close contact with all elements of the antislavery cause. On many occasions radical Republicans and abolitionists shared the platform at public meetings.[1]

Garrison saw the rise of the Republicans as a sign that popular opinion was turning against slavery. During the 1850's he increasingly reprinted the addresses of leading Republican politicians as if to demonstrate his approval. "If there were no moral barrier to our voting and we had a million ballots to bestow," he wrote during the Fremont campaign, "we should cast them all for the Republican candidate." Such sentiments created additional friction within the already badly fragmented abolitionist movement. Abbey Kelley Foster criticized Garrison for becoming "Republicanized" and even chided Wendell Phillips for being soft on Republicanism. By 1860 Foster and her husband Stephen formed the nucleus of a political antislavery

movement that sought to oppose the Republicans at the polls. Little came of their efforts; though it must have been a strange experience for Garrison to be critiziced by political abolitionists as a compromiser. For his part, Garrison accused the Fosters of being "unjustly severe" on the Republicans, and disapproved of any project that might siphon off votes.[2]

In a letter to Parker Pillsbury, Garrison wrote that the Republicans were "the hope of the country.". By this he meant neither their political leadership nor their principle of non-extension. But he expressed confidence in the party's following which he believed embodied "the intelligence, virtue, moral sentiments, and political antislavery feeling of the North." Garrison argued that the party was but a manifestation of the impact that he and his allies had made upon Northern sentiment. The genius of the people would continue to rise until Republican politicians adopted abolitionism or were turned aside for men who had. Still a disunionist, Garrison retained his belief that the Constitution was a document "saturated with the blood of human bondage." As the election of 1860 approached, he became convinced that an apocalyptic moment was at hand. While the issue was ostensibly the further extension of slavery, there was in fact a greater struggle which "must ripen into more decisive action." The South was growing more desperate, more savage, more criminal; "all of this," Garrison believed,"is a sign that the end is rapidly approaching." The Republicans would win the presidential election, the Union would dissolve, and slavery--no longer shielded by the Constitution--would perish. Garrison was particularly encouraged by the nomination of Andrew who represented "the highest phase of political antislavery feeling as yet developed."[3]

Lydia Maria Child also placed great faith in a Republican victory. "If you will enclose the monster," she wrote Sumner, "we will kill him." Her criticism of the party was in the same vein as that of the radical Republicans. Thus, she was enraged when moderates failed to rally to Sumner after his "Barbarism of Slavery" address. And her estimate of Wilson was very much like Sumner's. "He has borne brave and able testament to the truth," Child wrote, but he was forever "looking into the immediate effect on some party, or some measure, not to the ultimate and universal effect on the character and motives of the country." She would later share Sumner's rage at Adams' apostasy.[4]

Wendell Phillips was more vocal in his criticism of Republicans than either Garrison or Child. He even chided Sumner and Wilson although he recognized them as "the very best specimens of the Republican mind." "Have they ever avowed their purpose to seek, as a distinctive end, the abolition of slavery?" Phillips argued that the abolitionist's mission was still what it had been thirty years earlier--to create a climate of public opinion in which public men could openly call for the end of slavery. "We have not emancipated William H. Seward, much less the black slave," said Phillips, incensed at the New York Senator's comment that John Brown was rightly hanged. He did not believe that Seward actually meant what he had said but rather that his presidential ambition had required it. It was Phillips' goal to create an environment in which Seward could speak the truth. Phillips read Lincoln's nomination as a repudiation of Seward's pre-convention temporizing. Lincoln, he believed, was not necessarily "better" than Seward, though he was "cleaner." But when Phillips discovered that Lincoln had once proposed an emancipation bill for the District of Columbia which included a provision for the return of fugitive slaves, he

indignantly labeled the Republican candidate the "Slave Hound of Illinois." Lincoln, he argued, would be willing to hunt slaves "so long as the Union, the party, and the White race seem to need it."[5]

At one point before the 1860 election, Phillips had argued that it would be better for the antislavery cause if Lincoln lost. The Republicans, he suggested, who agitated when they were out of power, would be more likely to compromise when they were in office. But after Lincoln's victory, Phillips was jubilant. "For the first time in history the slave has chosen a President of the United States," he told an audience in Tremont Temple. He retained his low opinion of Lincoln whom he now described as a "pawn on the political chessboard." But "with fair effort," he declared, "we may soon change him for a knight, bishop, or queen, and sweep the board." Lincoln will appear to govern, Phillips predicted, but he will only reign; "Lincoln is in place, Garrison in power." Phillips was also enthusiastic over the Massachusetts election, and here he had high praise for the Republican victor. For the first time in memory, he declared, the governor of Massachusetts will be a "frank, true, wholesouled, honest MAN."[6]

The Massachusetts abolitionists clearly believed that the Republican victory was their victory as well. This conviction extended to the dispensation of political offices. Garrison felt free to ask Andrew to find a clerkship in the Customs House for a friend, and Phillips told Sumner that his nephew would like a consulate in Chile. David Lee Child wanted an appointment himself in Portugal. In addition abolitionists offered political advice which often mirrored that of Sumner's own political circle. Garrison, for example, displayed the same shock and disappointment at Adams for his New Mexico plan, and Howe expressed his regret when Andrew decided to send

a delegation to the Washington peace convention. When the Personal Liberty Law was threatened, Phillips went before a legislative committee and delivered a long, eloquent defense. The Massachusetts abolitionists now considered themselves as men with access to those in power.[7]

II

Many years after the Civil War, Oliver Johnson, Garrison's close associate on the Liberator, reminisced about the turbulent days of the secession crisis. It was the moral influence of the Garrisonians, he asserted, that prevented the Republicans from bending under the pressure of the moment and submitting to the South's demands. In explaining the nature of this influence, Johnson recalled that in the early days of the movement he and his colleagues wondered why the antislavery men who were elected to Congress found it difficult to "keep their footing" once they went to Washington. They finally recognized that "popular idolatry of the Constitution" was the cause. Between what the Constitution required in the way of the protection of slavery and what it forbade in the way of opposition, there was very little ground on which an antislavery man could stand. "Under such conditions," Johnson maintained,

> Congress became a sepulcher, where free souls could hardly draw a breath of life. If Sumner, and Wilson, and Chase and Hale did breath and do noble work there, it was only because they found a way to break through the web which the Constitution wove around them . . . . That they were able to do this may have been owing largely to the influence of the Garrisonian movement in diminishing popular reverence for the Constitution.[8]

Many conservatives would have agreed with Johnson's evaluation. When Caleb Cushing spoke of a band of "drunken mutineers" who had seized the Massachusetts ship of state, he was referring not merely to those who had

won elective office but also to those whom he believed lay behind their success. Conservatives feared the impact of radical agitation on those basic pillars of orderly society--respect for the Constitution and love for the American Union. This fear was one of the motive forces behind their disruption of the John Brown meeting at Tremont Temple.

Though indignant at the violation of their civil liberties, the abolitionists considered the Tremont riot a great victory. "The storm seems to howl more fearfully than ever," wrote Maria Wescott Chapman, "but it is a comfort to have it raging where the North can see and understand." From the earliest days of their movement, the abolitionists recognized that the issue of free speech was their strongest card. Northern whites who had been slow to comprehend the brutality of Negro slavery had more readily understood the Congressional gag laws or the murder of Elijah Lovejoy. The Liberator thanked the rioters for demonstrating so clearly "the incompatibility of the slaveholding spirit, as well at the North as in the South, with the freedom of speech and Republican institutions." The riot occasioned Phillips to make one of his most eloquent comments on the nature of a free government. "Governments exist to protect the rights of minorities," he declared. "The loved and the rich need no protection . . . . The community which dares not protect the humblest and most hated member in the free utterance of his opinions . . . is only a gang of slaves." When Phillips finished this address a phalanx of friends escorted him through hostile streets to his home.[9]

The secession winter was an exhilarating season for the Massachusetts abolitionists. Thirty years had passed since the Liberator had first opened its doors--thirty years of struggle against overwhelming odds. This

small band of moral reformers had fought the forces of organized religion, and political authority, the wealth and respectability of the commercial interests, and (in Garrison's words) "the universal brutality and ruffianism of the country." Garrison reflected that, during these thirty years, he and his associates had been the targets of popular scorn and violence and were branded heretics and fanatics. They had been mobbed, misrepresented, injured in business, cut off from all preferments. Half the states in the Union had declared them outlaws. But now their work was vindicated. The Union which had upheld slavery was disintegrating. In the chaos that would ensue the South itself would abolish slavery and humbly beg to rejoin the North in a free society. "At last the covenant with death is annulled, and the agreement with hell broken," Garrison exclaimed. "Hail the approaching jubilee, ye million who are wearing the galling chain of slavery; for, assuredly, the day of your redemption draws nigh."[10]

But concern for personal safety tempered the jubilation. Abolitionists heard rumors of a secret organization, pledged to preserve the Union by silencing antislavery agitators. They saw in the advertising columns of the Courier drawings of bundled sticks which were said to call conspirators to meet. Certainly the Courier was leading a campaign of vilification against Wendell Phillips. Its editors had always detested Phillips as a traitor to his class, as one who squandered his Ciceronean talents on base ends. His speeches, the paper declared, were like tripe and onions served on a silver platter. The Unionists asked Bostonians to view the abolitionists from the Southern perspective. What if Roman priests incited the Irish to poison the families they served? What if Southern incendiaries

urged workers to burn factories or raid banks? And on the day before the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society was to hold its annual meeting, the Courier warned that, unless city officials halted the licentious gathering, embittered citizens would take the regulation upon themselves.[11]

Garrison's concerns increased when he heard that clairvoyant Mary Ann Johnson had foreseen a plot to murder Phillips. The editor of the Liberator took the warning seriously and questioned her husband, Oliver, as to the time and place the assault would occur. Howe and Pierce formed a bodyguard--"voluntary police," they called it--which followed the embattled orator through the streets and slept before his door. After one inflammatory speech it took a posse of a hundred men to get Phillips to his home on Exeter street. Phillips began to carry a revolver and one friend asked him if he would use it if a mob burst into his house. Yes, the reformer replied, "just as I would shoot a mad dog or a wild bull."[12]

Mobs disrupted abolitionist meetings in several towns during the secession winter. In Westfield, Massachusetts, anti-abolitionists put pepper on the meeting-house stove to drive out agitator C. C. Burleigh; later they burned the building to the ground to ensure that he would not return. In Philadelphia, the mayor told George W. Curtis that he could not speak safely in his city. Mobs prevented abolitionists from speaking in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and in Syracuse, Auburn, and Albany, New York. The new mayor of Boston, Joseph Wightman, virtually invited the city's anti-abolitionists to attack the January meeting of the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society. In a letter that was reproduced in the Boston newspapers, Wightman refused the abolitionists' request for police protection and informed the superintendent of the Tremont Temple that he and the

officers of the Anti-Slavery Society would be held responsible for any disturbance.[13]

A motley group filled the Temple on January 24, 1861: Breckinridge men and Negroes, rum sellers and ministers, pickpockets and ladies, teamsters, Garrisonians, Bell-Everetts, brokers, thieves, and state officers, waited with anticipation as the meeting began. Fearful for the safety of the women, the organizers of the meeting had them enter by a private passage. Young abolitionists with arms guarded the podium. Francis Jackson began the proceedings with a letter from the ailing Garrison. The absent leader reminded his followers that "the best abolition harvests" came from meetings that were violently disrupted. As Jackson read, he was interrupted by the "broadcloth rowdies" in the audience who shouted "Down with the nigger" and cheered for South Carolina, John Bell and Charles Francis Adams. (Sumner's friends would make note of this. "He has earned his laurels," wrote Lydia Maria Child. "It is to be hoped that the spirits of his father and grandfather were not there to listen.") Some of the rioters in the gallery threw down cushions while others sang the favorite ballad of the Massachusetts Hunkers: "Tell John Andrew, John Brown's dead."[14]

James Freeman Clarke and Ralph Waldo Emerson tried to speak over the tumult; the latter blamed his inability to be heard on the foreign antecedents of the mob. Edmund Quincy, treasurer of the society, echoed this theme. "I guess the Irish boys here will earn their holiday pretty well," he said. "Perhaps they are glad to be excused from sweeping out their masters' shops." Higginson cried over the disturbance and baited his antagonists as men who would "drag out and persecute the negro because they do not dare meet a white man." Only one speaker--Wendell Phillips--was

able to finish his prepared address. The anti-abolitionists raised an enormous howl when he came to the podium, but Phillips' tactics showed him for the master publicist that he was. "I remember once, ten years ago in Faneuil Hall," he shouted, "when we stood on the platform for two hours and did not utter a word--and it was the best meeting we ever held." Then he pointed to the reporters in the first row. "These pencils will do more to create public opinion than a hundred thousand mobs. While I speak to these pencils, I speak to a million men. We have the press of the country in our hands. Whether they like us or not, they know that our speeches sell their papers." Then he lowered his voice and spoke so that only the reporters could hear him. The mob in the galleries, curious as to what Phillips was saying, yelled at him to speak louder. He complied and finished his speech without interruption.[15]

But after Phillips finished, the mob reignited, and silenced the speakers who came to the podium. Phillips and his bodyguard slipped out the back door to ask Governor Andrew to quell the rioters with militia. Phillips was confident Andrew would comply. "You know what I think of Lincoln," he told a friend; "but Andrew I know well and I do not believe mob law will be allowed to rule while Andrew is governor." But Phillips would be disappointed. Andrew was wary that Mayor Wightman ("a concentrated mob himself," the governor thought) had refused to act in order to trap him in an illegal act. The governor had just issued General Order Number Four, and was aware that critics charged it was a move to suppress urban conservatives. To use the militia now would only lend plausibility to the accusation; it might cause a bloddy confrontation that could weaken the state's ability to rescue Washington. Andrew took a copy of the

Massachusetts statutes from his desk and handed it to Phillips. Show me a law that gives me authority to use the militia without a request from the mayor, he asked. Phillips argued that protection of free speech was an inherent power of the governor; but Andrew only replied, "show me the statute." After the meeting, Phillips angrily returned to Tremont Temple. "I will never again speak to Andrew as long as I live," he exclaimed bitterly.[16]

Andrew sent two of his aides to urge Wightman to preserve order at Tremont Temple. The mayor warned against any interference in city affairs; but not to appear derelict in his duty, he called in a police captain and, in the presence of Andrew's aides, ordered him to arrest anyone disrupting the antislavery meeting. But when the Governor's men left, the mayor ran after the captain and changed his instructions. The police were to break up fights but were not to discourage anyone from harassing the abolitionists.[17]

As the afternoon progressed the scene in Tremont Temple degenerated into total chaos. Finally Wightman appeared, and as he walked to the podium, anti-abolitionists cheered him enthusiastically. He announced that he had received a letter from the trustees of the Temple asking him to clear the hall. Unhappily for the mayor, one of the trustees was at his side and promptly branded Wightman's statement a lie. In truth they had requested the mayor to protect their property and silence the rioters. The meeting adjourned for supper; but when the abolitionists returned in the evening, they found the doors locked and police barring the way. Citing an anonymous threat to murder Phillips, Wightman declared that there would be no more antislavery meeting that day.[18]

During the next few days the police raised little objection as rowdies attacked Negroes and threw rocks through antislavery windows. A crowd milled before Tremont Temple to prevent the abolitionists from returning and harassed passers-by with long hair or beards. ("Excess in each," explained the Post, "being regarded as the badge of a philanthropist.") A small band of abolitionists met in the offices of the Anti-Slavery Society, but Quincy urged them to adjourn quickly as "the mob may get here before we finish."[19]

"They might as well think of extinguishing fire with alcohol," wrote Lydia Child of the "Orthodox mob" that had disrupted the antislavery convention. The mid-winter assaults had assisted the society in its fund drives to such an extent that one Republican paper suggested that they "could afford to hire the Courier to get up a mob every year." Radical Republicans now believed that incidents like these made compromise less likely and that, in particular, this violence would help save the Personal Liberty Law. One Massachusetts legislator who had been present at the riot stated that, though he had never considered himself one before, he was now willing to be called an abolitionist. Along with sixty-eight colleagues, he sponsored a resolution to allow the use of the State House for the anti-slavery convention.[20]

Failure of the police to suppress the rioters ignited the anti-Boston sentiment of rural Massachusetts. Nothing could arouse the country folk like a mob of cotton clerks and Irishmen. "Boston is always on hand when there is any mean, dirty Union-saving to be done," the Hampshire Gazette indignantly stated, "but she has never disgraced herself more than on the present occasion." Rural Yankees had long deplored (and perhaps envied)

the drunkenness, gambling, and prostitution of the city and feared its impact on their own sons and daughters. Wendell Phillips defined the nature of this concern: "Do you say that the people of the country towns have no interest in the streets of Boston? You tempt the virtue, melt the resolution, and corrupt the morals of the Commonwealth." Most scandalizing to Boston's critics was the open manner with which illegal activities were conducted. Though state law strictly forbade liquor shops, the Boston police rarely interfered with their business. The state made the law, was their attitude; let the state enforce it.[21]

In fact, many Republicans were advocating that the state should enforce the law in Boston. Even before the riots, a number of legislators had argued that Massachusetts should adopt a metropolitan police system which would put the Boston police under the direct authority of a state agency. According to one supporter, New York had recently adopted such a plan and had enjoyed great success; "Mulligan is no more the terror of Broadway." Given Boston's composition--and especially as the Irish population grew--it was unlikely that Republicans would ever control her government. Thus many believed the metropolitan police proposal to be the only way to reform the Commonwealth's capital. The January riots--which gave rural legislators visions of Hunker mobs storming the State House--lent impetus to the plan.[22]

A legislative committee convened in February to investigate the Boston police and their behavior during the riots. Of particular concern to the Republican members were rumors of a national conspiracy which sought to create such disturbances in order to impair the military capacity of the North. "Warrington" warned his readers to be vigilant. "People generally

treat the affairs as a mere outbreak of rowdy young men," he wrote. "They are very mistaken. It was part of the Southern rebellion. The Northern cities are full of secessionists and traitors." He cited Caleb Cushing, George B. Loring, and New York mayor Fernando Wood as being among the leaders. John Murray Forbes reported that he had heard of huge sums of money collected in the commercial districts to suppress antislavery. And George Hayes, the superintendent of Tremont Temple, warned that Boston conservatives wanted to forbid any meeting "in advance of the Crittenden stripe."[23]

The committee investigated a letter, written by a Boston politician, that appeared in a Georgia newspaper. In it Lucius Slade, a provisions dealer and one of the two Democrats in the state Senate, urged Georgians to remain in the Union, promising that abolitionists would no longer disturb their institutions. "A John Brown meeting cannot be held in Boston now, any more than it could be in Atlanta," he asserted. "We have got a most powerful organization here." Slade assured the Georgians that his association of merchants and working men would silence the agitators and return fugitive slaves even if blood ran in the streets. The committee also heard that merchant Richard Fay had pledged his $600,000 fortune for the suppression of the abolitionists and that he had received instructions from Secretary Floyd. Witnesses alleged that distiller Jonas French had hired sailors to join the mob and that Representative Cornelius Doherty had directed an attack on Phillips' house. These men--along with Amos Lawrence, whom the abolitionists believed was the real ringleader behind the mob--were summoned to appear before the investigators. As with the Harpers Ferry committee, Lawrence was able to avoid the summons; but the others reluctantly appeared.[24]

The committee obtained little information from these recalcitrant witnesses. If a conspiracy existed, none would admit it. They testified that the Courier's mysterious emblems were but sticks representing the thirty-three states of an intact Union. Some acknowledged membership in a secret organization but insisted that its purpose was merely social. They described the mob at Tremont Temple as nothing but "a good natured crowd." Despite a strong minority dissent, the committee reported against the metropolitan police bill. The legislators had little love for the Boston police, but they retained respect for the tradition of local control over municipal institutions. But the investigation had its effect. One of Andrew's aides wrote that the threat of the bill ("it hangs by a hair of Mr. Phillips' head") forced the police to become more respectful of free speech. J. Sella Martin, the Negro minister, believed that the hearings had prevented a purge of American officers in favor of Irish. And in April the legislature gave the governor some control over Boston mobs. Now he could dispatch the militia on the request of twelve aggrieved citizens.[25]

III

In the aftermath of the anti-abolition riots, Boston's blacks--some of whom nursed wounds--reflected upon their status in the Puritan Commonwealth. In some respects, they were among the most fortunate of America's Negroes. Unlike their peers in most Northern states, they enjoyed virtually all the legal rights of whites. They could vote, own property, testify in court, and ride in any railroad car for which they could pay the price of a ticket. In the twenty years before the Civil War, the legislature had

taken several steps to uphold Negro legal equality, including repeal of the law against intermarriage and the banning of segregated schools. When in 1859, Secretary of State Lewis Cass, citing the Dred Scott case, denied a passport to a Massachusetts black, the Commonwealth issued one in its own name. Increasingly the rights which the state guaranteed on paper were transformed into reality. Thus two Worcester barbers in 1860 became Massachusetts' first black jurymen.[26]

In part, the favored position which Massachusetts blacks enjoyed was due to their small numbers. The census of 1860 listed only 9,643 blacks in the entire state, a figure that represented less than one percent of the population and that was unlikely to unnerve white supremacists. Furthermore, the proportion of blacks in the population had diminished in every census Massachusetts had taken since the colonial period. In the absence of any widespread fear that blacks would become a dominant force in Massachusetts society, abolitionists and radical Republicans were able to convince many citizens--especially those in rural areas--of the evils of racial discrimination. But blacks themselves were an important force in the removal of the vestiges of legal segregation. In the relative freedom of the Bay State, a small but viable community of prosperous and articulate blacks arose to spearhead the struggle for equality.[27]

This small group of ministers, proprietors, and professionals spawned several memorable agitators. Among the first was Daniel Walker, a dealer in second-hand clothes, who shocked the Union in 1829 with his appeal for armed resistance to slavery. Less violent was William Nell an accountant who also wrote for the Liberator. Nell lead a boycott of the Boston public schools that began in 1849 and lasted until segregation ended several years

later. Allied in the same effort was Robert Morris, a one-time errand boy, who studied with abolitionist lawyer Ellis Gray Loring, and was admitted to the Massachusetts bar. Morris and Sumner challenged the legality of Boston's segregated schools before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and were instrumental in prodding the legislature into action. Similarly, blacks in the 1840's resisted the segregation of railway coaches. Conductors had to enlist the support of white passengers to eject Frederick Douglass and Charles Lenox Remond (the black president of the Essex Anti-Slavery Society) when they refused to move to the Jim Crow car. The companies finally decided that it was simpler to discontinue segregation than to attempt to enforce it.[28]

But it was in resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law that the militancy of the Massachusetts Negro found its most significant expression. When the law passed in 1850, some fled to Canada; but a larger number banded together for self-protection. In Springfield, John Brown enlisted forty-four blacks into his League of Gileadites. They signed an oath and pledged that they would shoot to kill anyone attempting to return a fugitive to slavery. In Boston, Lewis Hayden, a clothier with connections to the Republican party, was a leader of the Vigilance Committee which helped many fugitives escape from bondage. Perhaps their greatest moment was in 1851 when fifty blacks burst into a Boston courthouse, rescued the fugitive Shadrach, and whisked him away to Canada.[29]

The leaders of the Massachusetts black community showed little interest in the fledgling pan-Africanism of Martin Delany and Henry Highland Garnett. J. B. Smith, a black New Bedford minister, was the leading

Massachusetts pan-African spokesman; but when he promoted a cotton-growing colony in Central Africa, he found more interest among white members of the Emigrant Aid Society than among fellow blacks. Among the outspoken anti-colonizationists was John S. Rock. One of the most remarkable men of his times, Rock at various times taught himself medicine, dentistry, and law. Rock asserted that blacks would never allow whites to drive them from the United States. He reminded blacks and whites alike of the record of the black man in the American Revolution. "This is our country as well as yours," he argued. "We have won our rights here, not only by incessant toil but by shedding our blood in its defense." Pride in the Negro's military accomplishments marked a difference between many Massachusetts blacks and Garrison. The blacks might admire and respect Garrison but they could not accept his views on non-resistance. They adopted a policy of militancy to counteract the popular stereotype that they were docile and submissive. And they sought to engender self-respect through pride in blackness. It was the whites, they argued, that were morally degraded by their complicity in slavery. Rock asked his brethren to contrast "the fine, tough muscular system, the rich beautiful color, the full broad features of the Negro with the delicate physical organization, wan color, and lank hair of the Caucasian."[30]

But it would be mistaken to suggest that most Massachusetts blacks were prosperous and self-confident individuals like Rock and Morris, or that they could avail themselves of the legal rights which the Massachusetts legislature had granted them. Most blacks were inarticulate and impoverished, trapped in ghettos which, if smaller, were no less oppressive than those of the twentieth century. Ante-bellum Boston knew the far side of

Beacon Hill--the side away from the Common--as "Nigger Hill," and there the majority of blacks lived a precarious existence. Most worked in positions that made them dependent on white patronage and thus were hesitant to join the vocal minority in demanding social equality.[31]

Oscar Handlin, in Boston's Immigrants, argued that the city's blacks enjoyed higher socio-economic status than the Irish. He bases this on the occupational statistics of the census returns in which Irish workers almost exclusively list themselves as laborers, while Negroes classified themselves under a variety of trades. But Handlin fails to recognize that the census reflected the stated occupation of an individual rather than his ability to pursue it. Many blacks undoubtedly faced the experience of Frederick Douglass who, though a skilled caulker, worked as a common laborer on the wharves of New Bedford for half the wage of his trade. And during the decades before the Civil War, Irish were edging blacks out of the positions which they once held. Rock spoke to this point on the anniversary of the death of Boston's black martyr, Crispus Attucks. The blacks were losing their places, he said, because the Irish could live on less than any American. Once there were black stevedores all along the Boston wharves, but now there were few left. A black mechanic was more likely to find work in Charleston, South Carolina, than in Charlestown, Massachusetts; and woe be it to an educated black in Boston. "The colored man who educates his son, educates him to suffer," he proclaimed.[32]

As the election of 1860 approached, Massachusetts blacks looked at the Republicans with ambivalent feelings. On the one hand they had great respect for men such as Sumner and Andrew who had worked to end

discrimination in the Commonwealth. The legislative record of the past decade indicated that antislavery politicians could also show concern for blacks at home. Furthermore, blacks were naturally attracted to a party that was suspicious of its own antagonists, the Irish immigrants. But blacks were enraged when Governor Banks vetoed the bill dropping the color bar in the militia, and they were well aware of the racist elements within the Republican party. The Liberator copied a specimen of Republican negrophobia in its "Refuge of Oppression" section. "What shall be done with the darkies?" the Springfield Republican asked; they were not wanted in the free states and should return to Africa. Indeed, the editor remarked, the fact that Negroes were not eager to leave a society that refused to accept them as social equals proved they lacked Anglo-Saxon self-respect.[33]

Two influential blacks from outside the state called on voters to reject the Republicans. Frederick Douglass urged Negroes to cast their ballots for Gerrit Smith's radical abolitionist ticket; and H. Ford Douglas, a black abolitionist from Illinois, told a massive July fourth meeting at Framingham that Lincoln was no better than John C. Calhoun. But John Rock took a more moderate attitude. He freely praised Republicans for their work against the expansion of slavery, but warned that "they only go against slavery so far as slavery goes against their interests." He argued that there was a substantial difference between the position of the New England Republicans and those in the West, though he worried that the former might lower their antislavery standards in the interest of party harmony. A number of blacks were active in the Massachusetts party. Rock, himself, had once placed second in the balloting for the Republican

nomination to a seat in the state House of Representatives. Lewis Hayden would receive a position at the State House for his efforts in behalf of the Republicans. Others formed Wide-Awake battalions and paraded in support of the Lincoln ticket. Their reception in white communities can be gauged by a reporter's account of a march in Chelsea. They were "hardly molested," he reported, as mud and brickbats were thrown on only two or three occasions.[34]

Whatever their attitudes before the November election, blacks, like white abolitionists, perceived that secession could advance their cause. And lacking the pacifistic scruples of the Garrisonians, they could look with enthusiasm to a war that might break the shackles of slavery. War could be the theater for blacks to demonstrate their courage and to dispute at the point of a bayonet the myth of their docility. Earlier, John Rock had prophesied this moment. "Sooner or later," he maintained, "the clashing of arms will be heard in the country and the black man's services will be needed." A force of a million blacks enthusiastically bearing arms, Rock argued, would be a force that white men would be "bound to respect." In mid-December, when Union-loving whites held a prayer meeting in Tremont, blacks rushed in and shouted that the nation would have no peace until it had done justice for all its people. It was a warning that few whites heeded.[35]

But if blacks saw opportunities in the crisis, they were also painfully aware of the dangers. The mob spirit which had bloodied Negro heads in Boston was but one manifestation of a more insidious threat. The compromise advocated by conservatives struck deeply at the lives of Northern blacks. Even radical Republicans and white abolitionists could not appreciate the

blacks' foreboding. The Personal Liberty Law might seem a small thing to whites who could argue that it was rarely invoked; but to a black man it was a guarantee that a slave catcher would not seize him as a likely field hand. The security that blacks felt was not in the employment of the law but in its very presence. When some Republicans suggested that the law be repealed as a gesture of conciliation to the South, blacks felt so much closer to bondage. Virginia's call for a peace conference in Washington was similarly ominous: white politicians could meet behind closed doors and barter away the rights of the black man.[36]

In the eyes of Massachusetts blacks the gravest threat was the proposed Crittenden compromise and the widespread support which it had gathered in the Commonwealth. Not only would it expand the domain of slavery and guarantee its existence in the Southern states, Crittenden's plan would also require the Northern states to repeal their personal liberty laws and deny blacks the right to vote. Agitated, Massachusetts blacks gathered at the Joy Street church to discuss their response. George T. Downing, a substantial caterer, warned that the compromise was a prelude to an effort to deport all free blacks. The North, he feared, "would sacrifice the whole race of colored people to save the Union." J. B. Smith warned his associates not to rely on whites to deliver them through the crisis, but to ready themselves for their own defense. One woman emotionally cried out that she hated the white man worse than a dog. Those attending the meeting petitioned the legislature to reject the Crittenden proposals and grant blacks "the most absolute equality in every respect." They concluded their appeal in defiance: "We will never be driven from the United States by any compulsion!"[37]

CHAPTER IX

GOD AND MASSACHUSETTS

During the secession crisis, the Massachusetts clergy was as determined as any group within the Commonwealth to influence the course of events. Such participation came naturally; for during the ante-bellum years they had pressed their views on temperance, immigration, slavery, and all the issues which attracted concern. Though it is a moot question whether the clergy molded opinion or merely echoed the sentiments of those who owned the pews, it is unquestionably true that their pronouncements on public issues are an important source through which to understand the popular mind of the nineteenth century. In the conflicts over slavery and disunion, the divisions among the Massachusetts Protestant clergy reflected those in society at large. Characteristic of the polarity that existed in the Puritan Commonwealth were the views of two Boston ministers, Nehemiah Adams and James Freeman Clarke. Their positions indicate the boundaries within which the debate was conducted.

Salem-born and educated at Harvard and Andover Seminary, Nehemiah Adams became the pastor of Boston's Essex Street Congregational Church in 1834. This stern neo-Calvinist ministered to his fashionable parish for almost half a century and became an important figure with the American Tract Society and the Board of Foreign Missionaries. He gained a local reputation for his vigorous attacks on Unitarianism, a sect whose doctrine he considered blasphemy against Christ. But in the 1850's Adams discovered the abolitionists as his new foe and acquired a notoriety that carried well beyond the provincial interest in his theological disputes.

Indeed, Adams and many Boston Unitarians would discover that they shared many assumptions about the antislavery movement.[1]

Adams had disliked abolitionists for their unsettling methods and for their attack on established religion, and as early as the 1830's he had worked to minimize their influence within the Congregational Church. But until he visited the South, Adams had never expressed affection for the institution of slavery; in 1854 he had even joined the clerical opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Shortly afterward, however, he journeyed to Georgia for his health and discovered in the slave society many qualities which--as a conservative perplexed by the rapid changes he saw in Boston--he found attractive. After the trip, he wrote A South-Side View of Slavery, a book that was widely read and that won him a sobriquet that he carried to his grave.[2]

From the moment that "South-Side" Adams walked off his boat in Savannah, he was impressed by the order which slavery maintained. A black baggage handler came up to the Northern visitor, tipped his hat, and politely asked if he could help. "What a contrast," Adams reflected, "to that troop at the Albany landing on our Western Railroad." He noticed that Savannah's streets were quieter than those of Boston, and attributed this to a curfew that required blacks to be home by eight o'clock. Adams enthusiastically endorsed this manner of social control and suggested that the Northern states prevent their working men from "unrestrained and promiscuous roving." Adams described himself as a "lover and friend of the colored race." But it is quite clear that he loved the Negro more because he loved the Irish less. Believing that every society required a mudsill class to carry out its menial tasks, Adams preferred that it consist of

Protestant blacks under restraint than Catholic Irish at liberty. In the South, "respectable, well-dressed, well-behaved colored men" served as laborers, rather than Irish--a people for whom Adams expressed his utter repugnance. There were no mobs of laborers in the South, no foreign paupers lounging at public expense. Southerners did not suffer from unruly foreigners who moved into American neighborhoods and assailed the sensibilities of decent families, forcing them to move.[3]

Adams also noted that the South lacked the "popular delusions and fanaticisms"--spirit rapping, second-adventism, Mormonism, and of course abolitionism--which he so detested in his own society. The North, he wrote, suffered from "active but unrestrained minds" which erected folly into doctrine and held in contempt that which was sacred. But the South avoided this "spawn of errors" largely because of the control which slavery kept over the lower classes. How often in the North did one see a Christian master reading the Bible to his laborers in order to foster correct beliefs? Adams disliked some aspects of slavery, especially the slave trade with its disruption of families; and he believed that the Fugitive Slave Law was overly harsh. But he argued that for blacks, freedom in Boston was not necessarily better than slavery in Charleston, and that abuses should not obscure the positive aspects of slavery. He blamed the agitation of the abolitionists for impeding efforts to correct slavery's defects.[4]

During the secession crisis, Adams doubled his efforts to combat the antislavery movement. He reissued A South-Side View of Slavery and hastily wrote another tract supporting the Southern institution. The new work, The Sable Cloud, which Adams had the misfortune to publish only days before the firing on Fort Sumter, omitted his earlier reservations about slavery.

A novel of sorts, the book portrayed slaves who wore kid gloves and carried red morocco Bibles and an abolitionist who protested Southern-bound geese flying over Bunker Hill. Adams argued that an institution that made gentle Uncle Toms out of savage cannibals had the blessing of God and that Negroes owed their services in payment for receiving the blessings of civilization.[5]

From his Essex Street pulpit, Adams warned of the disaster that would occur if the Union were dissolved. The Union, he proclaimed, was the ark of social order; without it, society would have little stability. God lay behind the authority of the Constitution and neither the North nor the South would have peace outside of it. Adams urged that the North accept the scriptural truth that slavery was not sinful and halt the agitation of abolitionist fanatics.[6]

Among those Adams had in mind when he criticized "abolitionist fanatics" was his old antagonist, James Freeman Clarke. When A South-Side View of Slavery first appeared, no review was more devastating than that which Clarke wrote for the Christian Examiner. Clarke argued that Adams' errors stemmed from his "Orthodoxism," and that he was a prime example of how the iron armour of dogma could make the heart turn cold and narrow. He might know the "difference between tweedle-dum and tweedle-dee in theology," Clarke asserted, but he could not understand that it was wrong to hold a man in chains. Adams was concerned more with the evils of Unitarianism than with the immorality of slavery; he opposed a Christian Union with dissenting denominations but waxed sentimental over the bonds between North and South.[7]

Clarke attended Harvard only a few years after Adams; but his experience at Cambridge was not that of a beleaguered Orthodox Trinitarian in a heterodox environment. As a liberal Unitarian, Clarke enjoyed the fresh intellectual tides of the 1820's. His Harvard acquaintances included Emerson and Palfrey; his major influence was William Ellery Channing. After leaving the Divinity School, Clarke took a post at the Unitarian Church of Lexington, Kentucky, where he saw slavery for the first time. Unlike Adams, he valued freedom over order and believed that the essential lesson of Protestantism was the primacy of private judgment over church authority. There was nothing in the system of human bondage that attracted him; "I learned my anti-slavery lessons from slavery itself," he later wrote, "and from the slaveholders around me."[8]

While still in Kentucky, Clarke dreamed of returning to Boston to create a new kind of church, one he hoped would speak "more to conscience than to intellect, more to instinctive reason than to speculative understanding." In 1841, with the help of Channing, he opened his Church of the Disciples. Unlike other Boston Unitarian churches, the new society was organized on the voluntary principle, by contributions rather than the sale of pews. Clarke wanted a church that was as free and open on Sunday as the Boston Common.[9]

Clarke also wanted his church to be more than merely a church of Unitarians. Opposed to dogmas that separated men, he emphasized the similarities among Christians rather than their differences. He allowed Trinitarians to speak from his pulpit, a remarkable gesture for a Unitarian in antebellum Boston. Clarke was concerned with gathering a congregation based on

"a coincidence of practical purpose" rather than on doctrinal unity. The Church of the Disciples held regular meetings on such topics as peace, slavery, prison and educational reform, inviting lecturers such as Phillips, Andrew, Howe, Mann, and Samuel May. Clarke himself opposed the Mexican War, helped fugitive slaves, and admired John Brown. Though not a Garrisonian--because he believed in using the political system and was temperamentally opposed to Garrison's divisiveness--Clarke remained on good terms with the city's abolitionists. In addition, he had close ties to the Boston black community and strongly defended them against their detractors. Thus it is not surprising that Boston's leading Unitarian clergymen--whose parishes included the city's wealthiest and most conservative citizens--should consider Clarke's church to be little more than a "piratical flag."[10]

Like his conservative counterpart Adams, Clarke actively preached and pamphletered during the secession crisis. He exhorted his fellow citizens to stand firm and remain loyal to their antislavery principles. Declaring that blacks had as much right as anyone to the protection of the law, he wrote a passionate defense of the Personal Liberty Law. In December, he had demurred at attending the John Brown meeting. But after that assembly was disrupted, he eagerly addressed the January meeting of the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society. Free speech was a cherished right for a minister who had spent his lifetime fighting dogma. Free speech, Clarke declared--his voice rising over the clamor of the anti-abolitionists--was the only difference between the Austria of the Hapsburgs and Massachusetts.[11]

Clarke strongly advocated that the Southern states be allowed to secede peacefully. Nineteenth-century Christianity, he declared, would not allow a brothers' war. And the masses of the Northern people would reject the unprincipled demands which was the price for the continuation of the Union. Clarke believed that there was little basis for accord between Massachusetts and the states of the lower South. The latter had abandoned the principles of the American Revolution and had lapsed into a hopeless despotism. He looked forward to the creation of a new Union of the Northern states--one which would be so strong that no one would attack it, so just that it would attack no one else. At various times, Clarke differed on whether the Southern states needed national consent before they left the Union and whether they could retain federal property within their boundaries. On at least one occasion he suggested that the new slave-holding confederacy be permitted to take Washington. But during the crisis Clarke was consistent in his belief that the Union was dissolved; greed and timidity had sealed its fate. Had the North resisted the Slave Power ten or fifteen years earlier, the nation could have lived in freedom, prosperity, and Union. Now Northern firmness was equally essential, but only prosperity and freedom could be reclaimed.[12]

II

Though Adams and Clarke were influential figures, neither was representative of his denomination. For Unitarians tended to be social conservatives, while Orthodox Congregationalists--along with other evangelical Trinitarians--were generally receptive to social reform. The various New England denominations did not separate merely along theological lines; they also drew

upon different social classes. One could often tell a man's religion by the toughness of his palms. And when he occupied his pew on Sunday morning he did not leave his politics behind. But the structure of ante-bellum Massachusetts Protestantism is complex and requires further description in order to explain the Commonwealth's response to the events of 1861.[13]

Rationalism and conservatism dominated Massachusetts Unitarianism and made it the religion of the acquisitive commercial class. There were, of course, dissenters from this path. Emerson and Parker found the Unitarian creed lifeless and ventured into Transcendentalism. Others like Clarke, Higginson, and Samuel May, though theologically less heterodox, championed radical social reform. But for the most part Massachusetts Unitarians were social and political conservatives who expected ministers to conform to their narrow views. May, for example, found himself without a parish for disobeying this unwritten rule. Ante-bellum New England Unitarianism was often called "Liberal Religion;" but it was liberal only measured against the hoary doctrines of Calvin rather than against the world in which its members lived.

The Unitarian parishes of Boston were easily the wealthiest congregations in New England. It was the Unitarian churches that leading Whigs such as Webster and Everett, and industrialists like the Lowells and the Appletons attended. When Harriet Beecher Stowe arrived in Cambridge she discovered that the Harvard trustees and professors were all Unitarians and "the elite of wealth and fashion crowded Unitarian churches." The ministers were themselves gentlemen, their salaries several times those of

their peers in other denominations. They enjoyed the prestige of belonging to the inner circle of power. Octavius Frothingham, whose father Nathaniel was among the most noted of this ministerial group, wrote that it required the strength of a saint to turn one's back on such privileges and champion reform. In the towns and smaller cities, the Unitarian congregations followed a similar, if more modest, pattern. Their members consisted of the mobile upper-middle class--bankers, merchants, and manufacturers--men who had the least to fear from the new industrial system. Few laborers, mechanics, or farmers belonged to their churches.[14]

For Massachusetts Unitarians, the Harvard tracts on moral philosophy took the place of papal bulls. Invariably their academics identified God with the causes of Whiggery and Union. Although the theology of Unitarianism emphasized the primacy of human reason, the Harvard philosophers opposed the freedom of individual conscience on matters of society. "In the ordinary course of things," wrote Harvard President James Walker, "I cannot help thinking public opinion to be a safer ruler than the conceit of private judgment." The "public opinion" that Walker and his associates heeded was limited to a very narrow base.[15]

Massachusetts Trinitarians were often social and political antagonists of the Unitarians. Their churches attracted the great majority of the native-born middle class. As a result, their politics were Republican and their sentiments antislavery. During the ante-bellum period, the theology of the major Trinitarian denominations--the Methodists, Baptists, and Congregationalists--grew closer until it merged into what was virtually a united evangelical faith. By mid-century, most Congregationalists and

Baptists had abandoned Calvinsim and now resembled closely the Arminianism of the highly successful Methodists. During the great revival of 1858 the three sects cooperated in the harvest of souls for Christ. The spirit of Christian perfectionism and millennialism accompanying this great upsurge in religious activity fostered great interest in social reform. Churchmen looked more to ethics and less to doctrine as they espoused the cause of the poor, the ignorant, and the enslaved. As Timothy Smith has noted in Revivalism and Social Reform, these evangelical ministers were well aware that personal sin often had communal roots. Their restless enthusiasm and their habit of "reducing complex matters to simple terms" enabled them to "cut through the dilemmas that held other Christians back from the campaign to free Negroes." In the 1850's New England clergymen asserted themselves on public issues in a way they had not done since the Revolution.[16]

Of course, there was no unanimity on these issues. The Congregationalists--heirs of the original Puritans--were arrayed into Old School and New School factions. The Old School retained much of its Calvinism and the New School enthusiastically embraced the new evangelicalism. The denomination avoided formal rupture only because its diffuse organization allowed men of varying opinions to stay within the fold. Attitudes toward reform tended to follow theological principles. Parsons Cooke, a Lynn minister and editor of the Old School Boston Recorder, believed this was because the New School relied on "independent reasoning and philosophical speculation" rather than scrupulously following the Bible. Cooke argued that, unlike New School advocates who ignored the Bible when it differed from their theories of society, Calvinists followed the Scriptures wherever they led.[17]

The Old School argued that Christian ministers should draw a wide line between politics and religion. As Cooke declared, the pulpit ought not be turned into "a grand electionary theater." But Cooke and his allies were inconsistent on this point. Once they had been active supporters of colonization, and they continued to promote temperance campaigns. The reform movements which they opposed were those they could not control and which threatened their notions of social stability. Thus they despised the Garrisonians who, with their anti-clericalism and anti-Sabbatarianism, divided churches, diverted money from "Christian programs," and espoused such heresies as women's rights. It was not "promiscuous combinations" like antislavery societies, Old School clergymen argued, but the Gospels as expounded by the ministry that was "God's chosen instrument for removing men from all sin."[18]

The Old School justified its varying attitudes toward temperance and antislavery. It maintained that drunkenness was a malum in se (a sin which in itself denied entrance into heaven), but that slaveholding was not. Though Nehemiah Adams' support of slavery was rare even among the Old School, some Congregationalists argued that because neither Christ nor his Apostles preached against slavery that they likewise should remain silent. The Christian's duty, they insisted, was to bring both master and slave into the Church. God would resolve slavery in His own way.[19]

If the Old School was the Congregationalism of Boston and Andover, the New School flourished in the Massachusetts countryside. Abolitionist lecturers who found the churches of the commercial cities closed to them were welcomed by rural congregations, many of whom had passed resolutions affirming "no fellowship with slaveholders." Still, Garrisonianism was

suspect among many antislavery clergymen, because of the Liberator's stand against participation in the political process. The evangelical clergy, anxious to reassert the church's temporal influence, strongly believed in joining politics and prayer. The Congregationalist, a periodical reflecting the views of the reform-minded New School, accused conservative ministers and Garrisonians of falling into parallel errors. Conservatives, who urged silence on slavery, would strip the church of its moral authority and deprive it of a great influence over the minds of men. Garrisonians, by having Christians reject political action, would leave the nation in the hands of infidels. Let atheism prevail in the government, warned Lynn minister John Moore, and our doom is sealed.[20]

New School Congregationalists did not necessarily accept the doctrine that slaveholding was an absolute malum in se. They argued that there could be instances where an individual involuntarily became a master or remained so through ignorance. But slavery itself was a "great dark, damning sin" which blackened the entire South, and slaveholding was primae facie evidence that an individual had set himself outside Christian charity. The Congregationalist denounced all those who would graft onto the Bible "wild and wicked theories" whether they be infant damnation, predestination, or the justification of slavery. Antislavery Congregationalists admitted that the Apostles had not preached against bondage, but asserted that human progress allowed for a new approach. The Apostles lived in a heathen society and were aliens with no hand in public affairs; nineteenth-century Americans lived in a Christian society, were citizens and voters, and thus "part and parcel of . . . the power that oppresses."[21]

Similar to the New School Congregationalists in their attitudes toward slavery and reform were Massachusetts' Methodists and Baptists. Methodism was popular among the skilled workingmen of the towns and cities and particularly strong among the Commonwealth's shoemakers. With its insistence of the availability of salvation for all men, Methodism had long been in the forefront of the reformist tradition of American Protestantism. But the antislavery of the Methodist General Conference waxed and waned during the early nineteenth century, and the antipathy between those of differing views increased until 1844 when it divided into Northern and Southern churches. Still, New England Methodists--who were strongly antislavery--found that even the new Northern church contained a conservative element that urged compromise as a way to maintain fellowship with co-religionists in the Border States. The New England Conference, speaking through its organ Zion's Herald, condemned "church saving" much in the way that radical Republicans condemned "Union-saving." "Church saving is unchristian business," the paper asserted. "If firm adherence to right severs it, God will bless the division. The pure uncompromising character of primitive Methodism must be preserved."[22]

Edited by Daniel Wise, Zion's Herald became a strong advocate of church leadership in secular affairs. "Political action is moral action," the Herald declared. The church must take the lead in reforming society lest "adversaries of Christ" seem more interested in the welfare of mankind. Gilbert Haven, a Boston evangelist who later became a bishop, threw down the gauntlet to his fellow ministers: "The temple of our national life has become defiled. Woe to that priest who is dumb before the defilers."

Under such leadership New England Methodism decreed that slaveholding placed the master outside Christian fellowship and denied him the benefit of Christ's atonement.[23]

Massachusetts' Baptists adopted similar positions. Once the region's quintessential dissenters, they joined the mainstream of New England Protestantism after the disestablishment of the Congregational Church. Except for the doctrine of infant baptism, they became virtually indistinguishable from New School Congregationalists. Like the New School they had abandoned the husk of Calvinsim and joined in the evangelical ferver of the great revivals. The organ of Massachusetts Baptists, The Christian Watchman and Reflector, though more cautious than Zion's Herald, also advocated reform and antislavery. The work of the church, it argued, was more than merely assisting individuals to salvation; it included the creation of a world which lived by God's laws. The Watchman questioned the efficacy of ending intercourse with slaveholders, but it recognized that slavery impeded the creation of "God's Kingdom in America." By denying the divinity of all men, slavery was an outrage to the sufferings of Christ.[24]

III

The social attitudes of Massachusetts clergymen conditioned their responses to secession. Conservative ministers watched the dissolution of the Union with a sense of despair. They believed that secession, an affront to law and order, threatened the basic stability of their society. They argued that government was an institution with divine sanction and that

Christians were obligated to submit to the Constitution as they were to follow the precepts of the Bible. William Stearns, president of Amherst College, outlined this view in a sermon delivered on January 4, the National Fast Day. God was the supreme magistrate of every social organization, Stearns declared: having created mankind, He then created government. Rebellion against a legally constituted government, was nothing less than rebellion against God. Conservatives like Stearns had obviously traveled far from the theories of social compact that had justified the American Revolution.[25]

Other conservatives argued that secession was a threat to the survival of Protestantism. According to the Recorder, only Britain and the United States stood in the way of papal domination of the world. If the United States disintegrated, a coalition between the Pope and other European Catholic despots would attack Britain. The consequences of such an event would be far graver than the continuation of Southern slavery. The Recorder asked if freedom for a few million Africans was worth the spiritual slavery of all mankind. James Walker also viewed disunion as a threat to America's spiritual health; but he believed its source to be internal. The country, he warned, was "fast becoming a conglomeration of all nations with no common ties to bind us." Becoming dangerously heterogeneous and without a unity of purpose, Americans directed their energies toward material ends and turned their backs upon God's commands. Disunion, which would destroy the only national institutions which our people possessed, would only hasten this tendency.[26]

The conservative clergy believed that "church-hating, Bible-hating, minister-hating abolitionists" lay behind the nation's agony. According

to Frederick Dan Huntington, a former Unitarian lately ordained in the Episcopal Church, unchristian attitudes toward the South had angered God. The conservatives argued that if agitators were silent and provocative statutes like the Personal Liberty Law repealed, the crisis would pass. But although conservative ministers enthusiastically endorsed compromise, many would use force to keep the South within the Union should conciliation fail. Indeed, talk of coercion was more common among conservative clergymen than among their more radical counterparts. Parsons Cooke warned that disunion would destroy the nation's credit and reminded his readers of the money that the national government had paid for Florida and Louisiana. It was impossible for the South to leave in peace: "You not only carry with you your own property, you go in such a way to set fire to the house when you vacate." Cooke acknowledged that no state could be made to send representatives to Congress, but he insisted that the revenues be collected and that federal laws be enforced. President Stearns argued in a similar vein. He compared the Union to a partnership in which one man contributed a ship, another a warehouse, a third a shop, and a fourth capital. Certainly, he argued, none of them had the right to suddenly withdraw his property and bankrupt the firm. Stearns prepared his audience for the prospect of war. God works in mysterious ways, he asserted; He has used the murderous passions of man to advance His own benevolent ends. Every man must prepare to play his role in the unfolding drama.[27]

While conservatives mourned, reformist ministers rejoiced over the election of Lincoln. For those who thought in millennial terms, this victory was clearly a step toward the regeneration of America. In a Thanksgiving

Day sermon in Cambridge, Gilbert Haven assured his congregation that they would see the beginning of a new Union. "For years we have been a by-word and a hissing among nations," he declared; our name has been associated around the world with chattel slavery. But the transformation of our government will inspire the world. Mexico and South America, which once feared we meant to reduce them to slaves, will now rush to become our disciples. Europe will imitate us in government and religion. And the prosperous North shall soon bestow its gifts of energy, culture and piety to the benighted South. "No distant prophecy of millennial glory is this," Haven assured. "The day is right at hand. It has already dawned."[28]

Despite this prediction, Haven and other reformers soon recognized that the nation must ready itself for a severe test. Haven, for one, was willing to go to war rather than allow the Union to dissolve and lose an opportunity for spiritual advancement. He asserted that even Jesus advocated the use of force in exceptional circumstances. Many evangelical ministers extolled the importance of "Christian manliness" and lectured on the possibilities of "Progress by Convulsion." Luther shook Europe like an earthquake, one Congregationalist noted, and only after bloody civil wars did the English Puritans and the American colonists forge their own freedom. Some antislavery churchmen echoed the conservative sentiment that government was ordained by God, and that Christians were required to uphold it. The Watchman and Reflector wrote that secession could lead to anarchy with counties seceding from states, towns from counties, and wards from towns. Better the despotism of Napoleon, the editor asserted, than the lawlessness of a Mexican state.[29]

Yet many antislavery ministers questioned the wisdom of fighting to preserve the Union. Zachary Eddy told his Northampton congregation that, while the laws of nations would justify a war against the secessionists, the law of God forbade it. He graphically portrayed the evils which a civil war would bring: the closing of schools and libraries, the decay of religion, "vice in its coarsest forms," flowering regions turned to deserts. The crisis came from the Lord, Eddy insisted, and men should accept it with pious acquiescence. It was God's design that there should be more than one republic in the territory where the United States now stood; "else why should two dissimilar and incompatable social systems --two distinct nationalities indeed--have been suffered to grow up?"[30]

The Massachusetts clergy frequently expressed the view that North and South were irreconcilably different. They asserted that the North represented piety and virtue, and South sin and degradation. Some like Gilbert Haven argued that this disparity gave the North an obligation to uplift its Southern brethren. But others believed that the slave states only contaminated the remainder of the Union. Thus one Plymouth clergyman described the Southern states as "members already monstrosities, and never firmly bound to the real body" which "waste its strength, cripple its energies, and make it a loathsome deformity in the sight of heaven and earth." Another minister, speaking in Dorchester, echoed the Garrisonian argument that the Union was disfigured by its compromises with slavery. "All compromise with wrong," he preached, "to secure whatever ends, to avert whatever peril, is inexpedient as it is unjustifiable." Separation, though economically difficult, would be a small price to pay for freedom from complicity in slavery.[31]

Many antislavery clergymen saw the secession crisis as retribution for national sin. An Orthodox minister in Watertown warned his parishioners that God would turn the nation upside down to wipe out its corruptions and worldliness. He noted a connection between complicity in slavery and "our atheistic code of trade and traffic." Godless ambition, lust for place, abuses of trust, were all becoming characteristic of important segments of the population. From the perspective of their small, rural parishes, evangelical ministers could clearly see the bond between the "Lords of the Lash" and the "Lords of the Loom."[32]

Many of these earnest Protestants believed that excessive fidelity to the Union impeded loyalty to God. Nationalism, like materialism, could become a substitute for religion, a rival to Christianity. Most New England ministers felt more comfortable with parochial institutions rather than national ones. Inter-sectional commerce and distant politicians dominated the Union; but on the local level the greatest influences were men of known piety, family ties, and the parish church. "We have glorified the Union more than God," wrote Gail Hamilton, a regular contributor to the Congregationalist. Charles Beecher denounced those who made God into the image of their choosing and would worship any fetish from a Union to an onion. Such men, he declared, could justify anything. They would cast infants into the fire to please Moloch or sell men to please South Carolina.[33]

During the secession crisis, Henry Ward Beecher--Charles' famous brother --spoke frequently in Boston. Though minister to a Brooklyn parish, he remained New England's most popular preacher and received an enthusiastic response when he denied that there was virtue in "Union for the sake of Union." "Even squirrels know enough not to hoard nuts after the meat was

out," he exclaimed at a well-attended Boston lecture. He compared the original Union to an alabaster box which contained the precious ointments of Justice, Humanity, Liberty, and Rectitude.

> And so long as these precious qualities are in it, I love it for their sakes. But when the alabaster box has emptied out the ointment, I do not care what hand breaks the box--it is good for nothing after the ointment is gone. The idea of maintaining the Union for beggarly sake of Union! Union for honor, Union for truth, Union for vigor in liberty, Union for power in free institutions, Union for humanity and greater growth--for that I would sacrifice almost anything in life. But Union without liberty, Union without humanity, is but the corpse of my friend, and not his living and soul-inspired body. Bury the corpse when the soul has gone out of it. Don't keep it to stink above ground.

Others contended that, while Union meant strength, strength could be used for evil as well as for benign ends; strength could kill as well as give life. The Italians were uniting in the cause of liberty; but Americans had used the power of their Union to extend slavery and hunt down helpless fugitives.[34]

The views expressed by these Massachusetts clergymen had a significant impact on the Commonwealth's Republicans. Indeed, it may be fair to say that evangelical, reformist Protestantism--with its dislike of commercialism, Catholicism, and slavery--was inseparable from Massachusetts Republicanism. These Protestant divines could find no virtue in substantive compromise with the South because they saw nothing of value for which to compromise. They believed that, should the Union disintegrate, New England would fall back on its greatest resource--the character of its people. Henry Ward Beecher argued that those who believed New England depended on its factories, banks, and commerce were mistaken. Burn down New England's buildings and her people would rebuild better ones. New England had no need to save the Union with cotton bandages.[35]

III

In its teachings on slavery and the Union, Massachusetts Catholicism maintained a staunchly conservative position. Though not the monolith of Protestant fears, the ante-bellum Catholic Church clearly lacked the diversity of New England Protestantism. If many of its priests and intellectuals were Yankee Catholics, most of its communicants were Irish. If diocesan censorship was milder than it would be in a later age, the ecclesiastical organization of the Catholic Church allowed its leaders to speak with an authority missing among Protestant denominations. And the Church's rank-and-file--mainly peasants and their children--displayed an obedience toward authority quite unlike the independence of the Protestant Yankee.[36]

It was among middle- and lower-class Protestants that antagonism toward Catholics was greatest. Upper-class Protestants--those who controlled industry and held to conservative opinions--often found Catholicism an institution they could tolerate. They did not compete with the Irish newcomers for either employment or homes; in many cases they made their fortunes off the immigrants' inexpensive labor. There were also social affinities between the commercial elite and the Catholic Church. Upper-class Bostonians frequently sent their daughters to Catholic seminaries for their education. John Fitzpatrick, Boston's bishop from 1846 to 1866, was a frequent companion of Lodges, Cabots, and Lymans. Upper-class Protestants did not fail to notice the Church's own social conservatism, for unlike many Protestant denominations it eschewed agitation for social reform. Mill owners saw Catholicism as an important instrument of social control in the developing

industrial cities. Corporations often assisted in the construction of Catholic churches because they attracted labor and channeled their workers into acceptable directions. With its hierarchial organization, its clear lines of authority, the Catholic Church was organized much like the factory itself. The Catholic emphasis on obedience to authority was good socialization for the mills of Lawrence and Lowell.[37]

But it was the very qualities that made Catholicism acceptable to the upper class that made lower-status Protestants see the Church as a threat to their way of life. Anti-democratic and anti-reformist, Catholicism seemed intricately linked to corporate capitalism and slavery. There would be no convent-burnings after the infamous Charlestown riot of 1834, and the dramatic success of the Know-Nothings would quickly subside after 1855. But there remained on the eve of the Civil War deep antagonisms between Massachusetts' Protestants and Catholics.[38]

The Irish Catholics were Massachusetts' most tightly knit ethnic group. Indeed they intermarried with native Protestants less than did the Commonwealth's Negroes. The Irish Catholic birthrate was the highest of any group in the state; by the 1850's some observers were predicting that Massachusetts would soon have a Catholic majority. Yankees increasingly noticed the physical presence of the Roman Church. During Bishop Fitzpatrick's reign the diocese acquired four Boston churches formerly belonging to Protestant sects, a development repeated elsewhere in the state. "Upon the graves of the Puritans have they layed their corner stones and founded their altars," the Newburyport Herald complained, as it observed that the grandest church in town was now Catholic.[39]

Catholics continued to see themselves as an embattled minority. They resented the use of the Protestant Bible in the Commonwealth's schools and the exclusion of priests from such public institutions as poor houses and hospitals. They protested the absence of their peers on the Boston police force and the refusal of the legislature to grant a charter--much less funds--to Holy Cross College. And they accused Protestant charitable organizations of snatching Catholic children and placing them in homes where they would be lost forever to their original faith.[40]

But if New England Protestants harassed their Catholic neighbors, Catholics were themselves insensitive to the anxieties which their presence aroused. Protestant anti-Catholicism produced a scurrilous literature of seduction in the confessional and infanticide in the convent which Richard Hofstadter has aptly called "the pornography of the Puritans." But Massachusetts Catholics showed that they could hate no less passionately. The Pilot--the newspaper of the Boston Irish community--published anti-Protestant harangues that equalled the nativists for irrationality and invective.[41]

The publisher of the Pilot, Patrick Donahue, was born in County Caven, Ireland, in 1811 and emigrated to Boston with his laborer father at the age of ten. Starting as a printer's devil for the Columbian Sentinel, Donahue worked his way through the printing business with the tenacity of such Protestant successes as Henry Wilson and Nathaniel Banks. He purchased Boston's tottering Catholic journal and transformed it into the most popular Catholic publication in the country.[42]

Both Protestants and Catholics recognized that Donahue's Pilot--though not formally controlled by the see of Boston--spoke for the Commonwealth's

Catholic community. In his role as spokesman, Donahue adopted a policy of contention toward the Protestant majority rather than conciliation. He vigorously opposed Catholic assimilation into Massachusetts' Protestant culture. With whom would the Catholics assimilate? Donahue sarcastically asked; with the Methodists, one of the three kinds of Baptists, or perhaps, "the anti-Bible, anti-marriage, promiscuous intercourse folks?"[43]

Donahue taunted Protestants where they were most sensitive. For over two decades Irish immigrants had been replacing the native-born in many areas of low income employment, especially domestic service. Rural Protestants were displaced by Irish girls who worked for lower wages. But the Pilot had its own interpretation for the shift in the work force. Middle-class women feared that Protestant girls with their inferior moral training, would seduce their sons and husbands. Thus they preferred to employ virtuous Catholic girls who would not offer such temptation. Donahue also played upon Protestant fear of Catholic domination. He exulted in the birth rate among the Irish and reported that, although the foreign-born were only twenty percent of the population, they accounted for forty percent of the marriages. These statistics, Donahue proclaimed, pointed to the end of the Anglo-Saxon era in Massachusetts and the beginning of a Catholic majority. "The reason why Americans of Anglo-Saxon blood do not marry," he continued, "is an unwillingness to labor for the support of a family, as the happiness to be derived from a family will not compensate them for the self-denial required." Protestant women did not appreciate the nobility of giving birth to an immortal soul; their husbands generally were impaired by pre-marital debauchery.[44]

For Catholics, American Protestantism was a kind of theological anarchism. They argued that denominational chaos was merely the inevitable result of the rejection of the True Church. Protestants, the Pilot asserted, believed in "the right of every human being to make a religion for himself." Catholics saw an intimate connection between religious heresy and social reform. "Whenever you find a free soiler," wrote the Pilot, "you find an anti-hanging man, a woman's rights man, an infidel frequently, a bigoted Protestant always, a red Republican, a fanatical teetotaler, a believer in mesmerism, Rochester rapping, and in every devil but the one who will catch him." Catholics were well aware that Massachusetts antislavery was heavily laced with nativism. Knowing that they shared common antagonists with the South, their politics gravitated towards men sympathetic to the Southern cause.[45]

The American Catholic hierarchy took a conservative stand on slavery. Archbishop Hughes of New York, whose archdiocese included Massachusetts, clearly stated that slavery, in itself, was not a sin. He taught that, while it was sinful to reduce men to slavery, the Church did not require an owner to return an enslaved people to its primitive condition. All the Church required was that the master treat his property with Christian kindness. The Pilot argued that the only solution to the dilemma of slavery was for all Americans to accept the authority of the Catholic Church. Through its influence the slave would eventually be elevated to freedom. Donahue gave no indication of how long this process might take.[46]

The hierarchy believed that its teachings on slavery could prevent the divisions that had plagued the Protestant denominations. As a persecuted minority, Catholics could not affort to fragment their strength. They

also hoped that their hostility to abolitionism would be taken as a patriotic gesture. Like immigrants in other periods of stress, antebellum Catholics sought to demonstrate through fierce loyalty to national institutions that they were as "American" as the native-born. After the Harpers Ferry raid, the Pilot proudly noted that none of the conspirators were of Irish ancestry. Indeed, Brown and his cohorts were all of Puritan ancestry; they were enemies of the Catholic Church and men who had helped to turn New England into a "moral and political bedlam." Brown represented the ultimate Protestant, the reincarnation of a Puritan Roundhead who defended his fanaticism through the heretical principal of private interpretation of the Scriptures. The Pilot argued that Brown was but a tool in a British plot to impair the strength of its greatest commercial rival.[47]

But Massachusetts Catholics found themselves in a paradoxical situation: for their unswerving loyalty to national institutions made them even more unpopular within the state. Most Massachusetts Protestants had little use for those who placed devotion to the Union above all else. A good example of the Catholics' dilemma occurred during the Anthony Burns affair in 1854. A company of Catholic militia, thinking they were acting patriotically by enforcing a federal statute, aided in the return of the fugitive slave. But in the eyes of the Protestant majority, they were acting in behalf of an authority that was as obnoxious and nearly as alien as themselves. Antislavery men grew anti-Catholic as they saw Catholics oppose reform and Catholics grew anti-abolitionist as they saw antislavery men become anti-Catholic. Both sides were caught in a cycle of distrust that seemed endless.

Antagonism between Protestants and Catholics continued unabated during the secession crisis. At a Saint Patrick's Day dinner Hugh O'Brien, the president of Boston's Charitable Irish Society, criticized the extremism of Massachusetts' Protestantism. Anti-Catholicism and anti-Southernism, he said, were the Commonwealth's parallel evils. Puritan fanatics could launch a vulgar inquisition into an inoffensive convent or a violent raid against a peaceful Southern town. The Two-Year Amendment and the Personal Liberty Law were twin blights on Massachusetts' reputation. Other Catholics argued that Massachusetts Protestants had never been friends of the Union. The Commonwealth had refused to send troops outside her boundaries in the War of 1812 and had flirted with disunion at the Hartford Convention. She had threatened to secede over the annexation of Texas and had given only grudging support in the Mexican War. Irish-Americans agreed that their own record had been far more loyal.[48]

Catholics hoped that their actions during the secession crisis would demonstrate their loyalty to the Union. Donahue believed that the Church, as one of the few remaining national institutions, might play an important role in bringing about a re-united nation. The Union, he declared, was one of God's noblest handiworks and true Christians were obligated to work for its preservation. In January, President Buchanan proclaimed a National Fast Day and asked all citizens to pray for reconciliation. Many Protestant churches scorned the request. (Charles Beecher's congregation called it a "Bull of Excommunication for political adversaries.") But Bishop Fitzpatrick ordered every parish to celebrate the Mass and pray for the preservation of the Union. The Pilot would offer this as proof of the greater patriotism of the Catholics.[49]

The Pilot expressed its sympathy for the Southern position. The slave states, it maintained, had been driven to their desperate act by the continuing aggression of Northern fanatics. Donahue continued to argue that Southern slaves received adequate care and that they were better kept in bondage than released to compete with white working men. Catholics gave enthusiastic support to the Crittenden proposals as an equitable solution to the sectional dispute. But the Pilot had only hostility for secession and compared it to Satan's rebellion against God. Donahue foresaw that peaceful disunion was impossible. He predicted that clashes over trade and fugitive slaves would be inevitable. Thus he became an advocate of both compromise and coercion--compromise if it were possible, but coercion in preference to the disintegration of the government. With the seizure of Fort Moultrie, he believed the South had crossed the Rubicon, and he bitterly denounced Buchanan for failing to defend the national flag. Catholics could have but one course, Donahue maintained; they must "stand by the Union, fight for the Union, and die for the Union."[50]

CHAPTER X

THE CONSERVATIVE OFFENSIVE

Massachusetts looked to Mammon as well as to God during the secession winter. But as the division between North and South widened, the economic panic--so ominous in November--appeared to diminish. According to the Springfield Republican, the news of South Carolina's secession was received with "an advance in stocks, a reduction in the rates of interest, and an improved state of business generally." Though the Republican's enthusiasm was somewhat overstated, it was true that by mid-January many stocks were close to their pre-election values and that banks had returned to comfortable specie levels. Interest rates, though still high, were no longer exorbitant.[1]

A few Massachusetts mills slowed production--not because they lacked either orders or raw materials, but to avoid being caught with large stockpiles should a serious depression ensue. In Lowell and the other industrial cities a few workers were discharged and some were placed on an eight-hour day, but the majority of the factory operatives continued their long hours of drudgery as if there were no sectional crisis. At the same time the mills continued to pay their semi-annual dividends. By February, the deteriorating political situation actually stimulated some areas of the Massachusetts economy, as Southern merchants made large orders of Northern goods to beat an impending Southern tariff. And those involved in the manufacture of arms and the outfitting of ships had more business than they could handle.[2]

Some Massachusetts businessmen continued to believe that their financial destruction was imminent. One such individual was I. E. Carver, a

Bridgewater manufacturer of cotton gins. Carver reported that his long-time Southern customers would no longer deal with a man from Massachusetts and that he would have to leave the state to avoid bankruptcy. He told Governor Andrew that merchants like himself "will leave the homes and the graves of their fathers with as much regret as was ever experienced by a returned Negro."[3]

But by the first of the year such dire predicitions were rare even among conservatives. Many businessmen recognized that talk of a depression could easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Amos Lawrence was among those who believed that the worst of the panic was over. "There can be no general suffering here at present," he reported to Crittenden. There was a hint of disappointment in Lawrence's note, for he warned the Kentucky Senator that the improving economy would lessen the pressure for political compromise.[4]

The improving economy was indeed a godsend for the Republicans. Had Northern cities degenerated into chaos--as Southerners hoped they would--the Republican position would have been untenable. But most Massachusetts Republicans had believed from the first that the panic was artificially contrived by speculators anxious to buy up undervalued stocks and by conservatives seeking to create political mischief. Republicans condemned papers like the Courier and the New York Herald for publishing stories that were unreasonably alarmist. Some radical Republicans engaged in economic saber rattling of their own. They warned the Boston commercial community that their policy of appeasement would be considered as giving comfort to the nation's enemies; Westerners might launch their own boycott of disloyal Bostonians. When the state legislature defeated a bill that would allow an increase in the capital

stock of the Granite Bank, Senator Whitney implied that the action was punishment for State Street's worship of King Cotton.[5]

Republicans argued that even if the North and South divided permanently that the two sections would continue to carry on normal commerce. Trade would transcend both national boundaries and political antagonism. Lacking industry, finance, and even the capacity to feed itself, the South would have no alternative but to continue her traditional patterns of exchange. She could neither eat nor wear the cotton she produced. Republicans, who believe that Southerners were ignorant of the value of labor, had little fear that they could effectively compete in those areas hitherto monopolized by the North. In reply to a suggestion that the South might establish its own cotton mills, the Atlas and Bee brusquely replied that "they would no more know what to do with them then the Hottentots would know how to navigate one of the Cunard steamers."[6]

But Massachusetts Republicans prepared a variety of arguments in the event that the Southern trade was suspended. Some asserted that austerity would be healthy for New Englanders who had become fat in prosperity and who had lost contact with their roots. Venison, salmon, and cod-fish were excellent foods, and even the old-fashioned Massachusetts meal of brown bread and beans was highly nutritious. According to this sentiment, New England would lose little if the artificial aristocracy of money was deflated. Others argued that Massachusetts had little need for the Southern trade. Most of the state's trade was with the West, and if the port of New Orleans were closed additional commerce would come by rail to eastern cities.[7]

But the cotton supply did concern Massachusetts. Southern politicians had long boasted that King Cotton could halt the economy, not only

of the North, but of the entire world. Much as twentieth-century Americans are enraged by the power of Arab oil sheiks, ante-bellum New Englanders resented the influence which Southerners had over their lives. But Massachusetts Republicans had an answer to the problem: cotton may be king, they claimed, but its kingdom was no longer confined to the South. During the secession winter, Republican journals were filled with articles on the development of cotton culture around the world. They warned the South that, by raising doubts as to its reliability as a supplier, it was inviting the development of rival producers. Republicans pointed to India, Egypt, and Latin America as potential sources. But two areas struck their imagination as both economically viable and politically attractive. Charles Francis Adams, Jr., wrote in the Atlantic that Africa would make "cotton, and not her children, her staple export in the future." Others looked to the development of Haiti. Not only could the Negro republic provide a bountiful supply of cotton, it could also absorb the runaways who would cross the Ohio River once secession nullified the Fugitive Slave Act. Republicans relished the prospect that a black republic could become the downfall of the slave-cotton economy of the South.[8]

A number of Republicans hoped to eliminate the need for cotton altogether. Their plan for Northern economic independence was based on fibrilia--a cotton-like substance made of flax. The principle promoter of this scheme was Stephen Merril Allen, a former Massachusetts legislator who had patented a machine that he claimed could cottonize two tons of flax a day. He asserted that New England farmers could grow flax for four cents per pound, and that his machine could make it into a cotton-like fiber for an additional four cents. The delivered substance, ready for

spinning, would be less expensive than cotton. By January 1, Allen had a small factory in operation demonstrating the feasibility of his plan.[9]

Some considered the new process the most powerful antislavery weapon short of war. Charles Winslow wrote his friend Andrew that "Southern planters are wholly unaware of the cloud that is gathering and soon to break upon their system of agriculture and slave labor." Allen himself saw fibrilia as a national panacea. He reasoned that the fundamental cause of the current crisis was the economic imbalance of the sections. The South had become totally dependent on cotton; the North had ignored agriculture and turned to manufacturing. As a result each sought to control the national government and maintain its superiority at the expense of the other. Fibrilia would stimulate agriculture in the North, forcing the South to diversify its economy and abandon slavery.[10]

Allen hoped that fibrilia could restore Massachusetts to a simpler and purer age. Speaking to a group of Massachusetts legislators, he reminded them of their youth when every home contained a spinning wheel. But now the cottage industries had died and middlemen stood between producer and consumer, consuming the profits and creating an unwholesome class system. Allen argued that flax raised on the New England farm and fibrilia produced in home manufactories could re-establish the dignity of the individual producer. Fibrilia could strike a blow against the two great enemies of free labor--the slaveholder and the mill owner. Many Republicans--Governor Andrew among them--supported Allen's fibrilia project. Congressman Alexander Rice displayed a piece of flax cotton in the House of Representatives and warned his Southern colleagues that

secession would only hasten its development. Even Amos Lawrence, though he obviously had little desire to turn cloth-making back into a cottage industry, was interested in the fibrilia process. Allen's scheme proved to be infeasible, but for a time it served as a Massachusetts' answer to the dictates of King Cotton.[11]

II

The most perceptive and self-interested among the Massachusetts industrialists believed that, despite a probable increase in cost and temporary disruption in shipments, cotton would continue to find its way into the New England mills. Nathan Appleton, who described himself as the largest holder of textile manufacturing stock in the country, wrote that if there was cotton in the world New England money would get it. The major concern of Massachusetts capitalists was not that they would be ruined but that their expansionist plans would be unfulfilled. For these men the Union represented an economic empire with extensive markets, cheap and plentiful raw materials, and the promise of greater things to come. Unlike most small town Republicans whose limited horizons and provincial concerns rarely went beyond the borders of the Commonwealth, commercial men were keenly aware of the economic benefits of the Union. "It is sad to see this powerful glorious nation," wrote Appleton, "in the midst of unparalled prosperity, shattering itself into fragments and all out of an impractical idea, a nonentity concerned with slavery." As the political crisis grew deeper, Massachusetts businessmen drew together in an effort to preserve the compact that offered them so much.[12]

On February 5, Massachusetts conservatives filled Faneuil Hall to

testify to their love for the Union. They were relieved that on the previous day Virginia had rejected secession; but they were well aware that while they were applauding patriotic addresses in Boston, representatives of the six seceded states had met in Montgomery, Alabama, to form a Southern confederacy. The Faneuil Hall gathering proclaimed that it loved the Union second only to God. J. Thomas Stevenson, a merchant-politician, called upon antislavery men to sacrifice their reputations for consistency to serve the common good. Leverett Saltonstall described the Union in terms that his audience was certain to understand. United, the nation could support fifty times its present population. It could clothe and feed the world; it had stores of iron, lead, silver, gold, and coal that would last "for untold ages." Soon American ships could carry the commerce of the entire globe. But Saltonstall warned that disunion would ruin America's greatness, for England would seize upon her rival's troubles to retain her hegemony. The centrifugal effects of secession would quickly hit the North. Pennsylvania would demand a tariff and New York free trade; it would become impossible to maintain a union between the Atlantic and Pacific states. Soon the nation would fragment into a score of impotent republics, "worse than the petty municipalities of Germany." And with the Union would go "our wealth, our power, our means of doing good."[13]

Edward Everett was not present at the Faneuil Hall meeting, but his absence reflected no indifference to the perils of the moment. As one of the foremost exponents of American nationality, Everett was crushed as he watched the country disintegrate. He found the contrast with events in Italy particularly humiliating. The United States was once an exemplar of orderly self-government, while Italy had suffered alternately from

anarchy and tyranny. But under Garibaldi and Cavour, Italy was changing. "It is humiliating to reflect," Everett wrote, "that while the Italians are healing the wounds of ages and coming together, we are so soon flying asunder." For one who had long insisted that the American Constitution was the glory of the world, Everett showed little faith that it would weather the secession crisis. He regretted that the United States did not have a parliamentary system which could resolve the issue by a change in ministers. The British, he thought would never tolerate a minority administration like Lincoln's for four years. Privately he suggested that Congress clothe General Winfield Scott with dictatorial powers. In peaceful times, Everett wrote, there was safety in a multitude of counsellors, but in times of danger the country needed "the patriotic energy of one."[14]

Everett felt abandoned by his former Southern allies who now rushed headlong into secession. "Cannot our Southern friends be persuaded to proceed more deliberately?" he wrote plaintively to Crittenden; "they give us no time for healing counsels to take effect--nor do they consider in what a position they place their friends here." Everett's feelings were shared by many men with long political and commercial dealings with the South. Men who had risked unpopularity by defending Southern institutions, who had offered their Southern friends credit, hospitality, and even their daughter's dowry, could not understand why their efforts at conciliation were met with indifference and hostility.[15]

Some anti-Republicans became bellicose toward the South. This was particularly true of Douglas Democrats who still carried the political scars of the Charleston convention. Wrapping themselves in the mantle of Jackson, these Democrats often outdid Republicans in their demands

for enforcement of federal laws. Benjamin Butler also adopted this position. Though he had supported Jefferson Davis for the presidential nomination, he now urged Buchanan to treat as traitors the commissioners sent by South Carolina to Washington. Butler later met these men, who told him that if Massachusetts sent troops to quell secession he would need twice as many to put down rebellion at home. Butler bluntly replied that if Massachusetts troops marched south they would not leave a single traitor behind--"unless he is hanging on a tree."[16]

However, many Massachusetts conservatives feared coercion as much as they feared disunion. Their vision of the Union was incompatible with any compulsion to remain within the fraternity of states. How could a nation based on the will of the governed rule a people subdued by military force? "If the Union cannot be preserved but by a war of extermination, "wrote Harvard professor Joel Parker, "it is far better that it should be dissolved." Victory in a brothers' war would be as bitter as defeat. But whether conservatives loved the Union so much that they would fight or loved it too much to soil it with blood, they were united in their determination to force the Republicans to compromise with the South.[17]

III

The conservatives hoped to open the breach that increasingly separated moderate and radical Republicans. Robert Winthrop even speculated that this policy might suceed in defeating Lincoln in the electoral college. Everett assured a Southern friend that if the South were only patient the Republican party would disintegrate. The growing dispute over Massachusetts' Personal Liberty Law provided an opportunity for

the conservatives; for Banks and Andrew had disagreed sharply on the issue and their respective speeches had left bitter feelings in both wings of the Republican party. It was inevitable that the debate should be heated, as the statute's history was closely intertwined with the Commonwealth's antislavery struggle.[18]

By 1861 there was no single personal liberty law but rather a series of statutes and amendments that curbed the ability of a master to recover his fugitives in Massachusetts. The earliest among them dated back to 1843 and merely forbade state officials from assisting in the capture of slaves or using Massachusetts jails for their detention. Conservative Republicans would later emphasize the fact that Democrat Marcus Morton had signed this bill into law. Not until after the turmoil of the Burns affair did sentiment against slave-hunting force stronger legislation. The return of Burns to slavery was a watershed in Massachusetts' attitude toward slavery and the federal government. As a result, the Know-Nothing legislature passed a law, over Governor Gardner's veto, that virtually nullified the severe 1850 Fugitive Slave Act. This personal liberty law imposed heavy penalties on any Massachusetts official who aided in the return of a fugitive slave and forbade any Massachusetts judge from holding a federal office that would require him to execute the Fugitive Slave Act. In addition, it granted to alleged fugitives the right of habeas corpus and trial by jury.[19]

The report of the legislative committee that drafted the law reveals the sentiments behind this new defense of personal liberty. It asserted that, when Massachusetts was asked to violate the fundamental principles of the federal Constitution as well as her own, she would

re-assert her rights as an independent state. "She cannot forget that she had an independent existence and a Constitution before the Union was formed," the committee maintained. The Massachusetts Constitution secured to all its citizens the rights of trial by jury and habeus corpus. These essential elements of her liberty she had never bartered away; "she will not suffer them to be wrested from her by any power upon earth."[20]

In 1856, conservatives led by Charles Hale worked to repeal the laws; they were on the verge of success when Brooks' brutal assault on Sumner intervened. Radicals argued convincingly that repeal at such a time would be a rebuff to the injured Senator. In 1858 the law's penalties were slightly reduced; but the following year an amendment required county sheriffs to remove fugitives from federal custody and forbade federal officers from reclaiming a suspect whom a jury had declared a free man. Early in 1860 radicals in the legislature made a strong, though losing, effort to pass a law freeing any slave setting foot on Massachusetts soil.

Anti-Republicans argued that the Personal Liberty Laws demonstrated Republican willingness to override the Constitution and threaten social order. Caleb Cushing drew an analogy to demonstrate the subversive nature of the law. Suppose, he said, your wife attended some abolition meetings and "got some pretty large notions in her head." She leaves you, takes your child and apprentice, and goes to Maryland. "What if Maryland had a personal liberty law that frustrated your attempts to force her to return?" Cushing asked. Harvard Professor Joel Parker argued that the Massachusetts law proved antislavery men no longer gave their allegiance to the government of the United States but considered

it "a kind of foreign jurisdiction." Other conservatives maintained that Massachusetts Republicans had repudiated one of the basic compromises that had made the Constitution possible. The South would not have entered the Union without the fugitive slave clause. Massachusetts, by ratifying the Constitution, had given its sacred oath to enforce it. By its attempts at nullification, Massachusetts gave the Southern states a legitimate reason to declare the partnership dissolved. The Post declared that, by enacting the Personal Liberty Laws, Massachusetts was more in rebellion against the Constitution than South Carolina.[21]

Conservatives mounted a movement for repeal when Lemuel Shaw, the venerable Chief Justice of Massachusetts' highest court, agreed to head a petition challenging the laws' constitutionality. The December petition, sponsored by many of the state's most distinguished lawyers, urged the legislature to revoke the laws "for the sake of the sacredness of the Constitution" and for "social order and domestic peace." Repeal, its supporters argued, could give great strength to the cause of the Southern Unionists.[22]

Conservative Republicans, led by Charles Hale, supported repeal. Hale and his allies, emphasized the laws' Know-Nothing origins, and denied that they formed part of responsible Republican Party doctrine. Lincoln and the entire party, they declared, were pledged to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law regardless of how obnoxious it might be. Benjamin F. Thomas, a former justice of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts and a supporter of Lincoln, published a well-circulated pamphlet on the Personal Liberty Laws. "Incapable of substantial legal good," he wrote, "they do much political and moral evil." For whether the laws were constitutional or not, secessionists used them as a pretext for

treason. Charles Rogers' Boston Journal bitterly criticized Andrew's intransigence on the issue. It accused him of lavishing his solicitude upon the hypothetical chance that a black might be returned to the South. The governor's real responsibility, this Republican paper argued, was to avoid a civil war; his first concern should be with "the helpless women and children of his own race."[23]

Some Republicans hoped to find a compromise position that would avoid the appearance of capitulation to Southern demands. They wanted the laws submitted to the courts for a ruling on their constitutionality. But the proposal languished in the absence of a case; for the very presence of the laws discouraged attempts to recover fugitives in Massachusetts. Moderates suggested that the legislature pass a "Declaratory Act" affirming that the Personal Liberty Laws were not intended to impede the deliverence of bona fide slaves. Others urged compensating slave owners as an alternative to the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act in Massachusetts.[24]

Still, the Personal Liberty Laws were not without their unconditional supporters who accused compromisers of a shallow allegiance to freedom. The Atlas and Bee vigorously attacked the Springfield Republican for its suggestion that the laws be repealed. Would Samuel Bowles like it if he were seized and dragged before an officer who made twice as much for deciding against him than for setting him free? Under those circumstances would he consider the law "useless?" John Andrew defended the laws in ringing terms, reminding his audience of the state's obligation to protect even its most "obscure and friendless inhabitants." And Sumner argued that saving the Union by repealing the Personal Liberty Laws was like rescuing a floundering ship by throwing overboard a jewel of little weight

but great value.[25]

As the forces for repeal gathered strength, the radicals began to mobilize. When the Rhode Island legislature revoked its Personal Liberty Law on January 25, their anxieties heightened. Robinson and Bird, along with a number of other Sumnerites, established a tabloid called the Tocsin to firm up the radical position. Paraphrasing Garrison, they placed on the masthead the defiant announcement that they were Republicans "Who are in Earnest and Who will be Heard." Sumner wrote a long letter to Henry Pierce that was passed around the legislature. After warning that repeal would only encourage the secessionists to bolder acts, he referred to his assault by Brooks. "It was once said that the assault on me saved the law. If this were so it consoles me for much that I have suffered." He told Pierce that he would gladly suffer for it again.[26]

The radicals noted that since the enactment of the laws the Commonwealth had enjoyed peace; the Vigilance Committee had dissipated through inactivity. Recalling that it had cost Boston $10,000 to return Sims to slavery, supporters of the Personal Liberty Law argued that repeal would only invite a new round of costly riots and arrests. Furthermore, it was important that state officials be enjoined from enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act lest they lose the respect and confidence of the community. Radicals also maintained that under the Constitution it was a state responsibility to regulate the return of fugitives and to ensure that no free man be sacrificed to slavery. Inherent in this responsibility was the mandate that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."[27]

Frank Sanborn claimed that the Personal Liberty Laws had helped

free him from the federal marshal at Concord. Without the law, Sanborn maintained, "white citizens of the Commonwealth have little security for their persons." And Andrew planned a dramatic presentation before the legislative committee that would look into the question of repeal. Writing to Sumner, he revealed his strategy: "I have arranged to have our 'Ida May' and a large number (say ten to twelve) of other handsome and bright freed slaves, exhibited before the Committee, as persons touching whom kidnappers might get up full 'records' and ex-parte affidavits . . . . A live man! woman! child!--these are great arguments to human hearts."[28]

By mid-February both sides were anxious to strike a bargain. Conservatives were disappointed by Adams' refusal to support the movement for repeal and recognized that the anti-abolition riots had played into the hands of the law's supporters. They were now willing to settle for any change that could be heralded as a gesture to the South. Radicals feared that Lincoln might express opposition to the Personal Liberty Laws, and were anxious to dispose of the issue before his inauguration. The compromise forged by the legislative committee provided for only modest alterations in the statute. It restricted to the Massachusetts Supreme Court the power to issue writs of habeas corpus in fugitive slave cases, permitted claimants of alleged fugitives to testify, and allowed the militia to quell any riot associated with the attempted return of a slave. But the core of the Personal Liberty Laws remained, and radicals applauded the committee's assertion that every man on Massachusetts soil was prima facie free and that nothing in the Constitution prevented the state from protecting its citizens from unjust seizure. Though they preferred to leave the laws untouched, the radicals had won a victory over those who

wanted to appease the South.[29]

IV

The attack upon the Personal Liberty Laws was only part of the conservatives' offensive. Virtually all the Massachusetts anti-Republicans agreed that the Crittenden Compromise was the key to sectional peace. In December, the Senate's Committee of Thirteen had refused to endorse the proposals, but during January Crittenden campaigned for a national referendum on compromise. The Massachusetts conservatives sought to assist the Kentuckian by pressuring their Congressional delegation into conciliation. A committee headed by Lawrence, Everett, Benjamin Curtis, and William Appleton, launched a massive drive to secure signatures to a pro-Crittenden petition; and in Boston, Mayor Wightman ordered the city's police to canvas every residence for supporters. Collecting over 22,000 signatures from around the state, the Union Committee delivered its flag-draped roll of petitions to Washington in February. Crittenden presented them to the Senate, arguing that they represented a great revolution in popular sentiment. He noted that in the town of Scituate which had cast 350 votes in the presidential election, the petition had gathered 328 names. In Ballardsville, a manufacturing hamlet with but forty-four votes, forty-one persons had signaled their support for compromise. And of Boston's 19,000 voters, the Senator claimed that 14,000 had supported his proposals.[30]

If Crittenden's assertions were accurate, the petition indeed would have represented a substantial force. But its validity can be questioned on at least two grounds. First, many of those who signed the document

later claimed that they believed they had endorsed only a general plea for compromise; others had assumed that the Crittenden proposals merely provided for the restoration of the Missouri Compromise. Secondly, antislavery men asserted that the petitions were filled with fraudulent signatures, and that the sponsors had paid two dollars for every name acquired. John Murray Forbes reported that he had overheard a boy complain that he only had the chance to sign the petition fourteen times. And Garrison complained that his name appeared on the list along with those of Wendell Phillips and the deceased Theodore Parker.[31]

"Warrington" condemned the petition as a farce; its sponsors he likened to men administering a bread pill to the invalid Union. Sumner, replying to Crittenden on the Senate floor, suggested that the signers were ignorant of the proposals they had approved. Crittenden was very popular in Massachusetts, Sumner maintained, and many people were willing to endorse anything that had the sanction of his respectable name. A few days later Sumner introduced his own anti-compromise petition. Though much smaller than Crittenden's, the Massachusetts Senator insisted that it represented the true spirit of the Commonwealth, which could only be found "away from the paving stones."[32]

But pro-Sumner Republicans had more to worry about than merely the relative size of petitions. Crittenden supporters hoped to attract the support of conservative Republicans by identifying themselves with Charles Francis Adams. Everett, Winthrop, and Saltonstall made every effort to cultivate the Massachusetts Representative to their cause and to blur the public distinction between Adams' New Mexico proposal and the more sweeping Crittenden plan.

Adams, however, was aware of the conservatives' strategy and he

was determined to frustrate it. "The Bell-Everett people mean nothing but mischief," he told Richard Henry Dana. "They laud me in the same breath that they recommend the Crittenden compromise which I denounce." In mid-January Adams had abandoned the New Mexico proposal, believing that it could no longer be used to divide the South. But by the end of the month he was once again willing to promote immediate statehood for New Mexico; now it would serve to divide Northern conservatives. The New Mexico scheme would give Republicans of the Advertiser school an alternative to the Crittenden compromise and keep them from becoming the cart behind the Bell-Everett horse. By supporting Adams, conservative Republicans could express their desire for peace without repudiating the Chicago platform.[33]

One of Crittenden's amendments created special problems for Massachusetts conservatives: slavery would be protected not only in existing territories, but also in those "hereafter acquired." Such open-ended wording troubled even the Bell-Everetts, though they tried to dismiss it as a merely abstract question. But Republicans pushed hard on this phrase which they denounced as a "bounty on filibustering." Henry Pierce argued that, as it was the propensity of the Anglo-Saxon to acquire additional land, future territorial conflicts would be inevitable. And Richard Henry Dana predicted that the provision would result in "a whole string of Floridas," with white populations equal to South Boston but with power in the Senate equal to New York.[34]

Despite these obstacles, conservatives were encouraged when Virginia invited all the states to send representatives to Washington in early February to discuss ways of promoting sectional peace. They hoped that the "Washington Peace Convention" could become a vehicle for the adoption

of the Crittenden compromise. But the first task for the Massachusetts conservatives was to prod their state into sending a delegation. For when the conference opened on February 4, Massachusetts was unrepresented.[35]

Massachusetts Republicans were divided over the Virginia invitation. Most radicals opposed participation in any meeting called for the purpose of compromise. Frank Bird warned that attendance would be the first step toward total abandonment of principle. William S. Robinson denounced the convention as "irregular if not revolutionary," and argued that, as Virginia had invited states that were willing to offer "adequate guarantees" for the security of slavery, Massachusetts was not included. Even some Republicans of a moderate stripe had little use for the convention. "There is nothing to settle, but whether there is a government or not," wrote Richard Henry Dana.[36]

Initially, Andrew shared these sentiments. He advised Ohio governor William Dennison to refrain from sending any delegates, at least until after Lincoln's inauguaration. But Andrew retained his ability to be strategically flexible while remaining ideologically rigid. He recognized that rejecting Virginia's offer to talk was hardly the way to keep the Border States in the Union. However futile the convention might be, a month of speeches might fill the time remaining until inauguration and help the Republicans take office with the capital intact. Another consideration forcing Andrew's hand was the concern that the Commonwealth's conservatives might send their own delegation to represent Massachusetts. One group, meeting at the Merchants' Exchange, had already resolved that "the people" should appoint their own delegates if the governor and the legislature refused.[37]

With the exception of Sumner, the entire Massachusetts Congressional

delegation believed that the state should attend the conference. "If the meeting be a treasonable one," Adams wrote the governor, "the Massachusetts delegates would, of course, be able to expose it to the country. If not, they would appear to take some interest in any proposition to reconcile differences. I am much afraid that absence would confirm the charge of indifference." Even Sumner was not irreconcilably opposed to sending representatives, though he remained adamant that Massachusetts remain an example of steadfast principle. If Massachusetts yielded "one hair's breadth," he feared, other states would yield a mile. He wrote that while he would not advise that the state attend, he would not stand in the way.[38]

Andrew angered some radicals when he recommended to the legislature that it authorize him to select a delegation, and furthermore, that it refrain from issuing instructions to oppose the Crittenden proposals. But the governor precluded any possibility that Massachusetts might endorse compromise at the Washington Convention by appointing a commission with unbending antislavery views. Conservatives were enraged at the selection, but Sumner was delighted when he saw the list and discovered that there was "not a single weak joint" on it. To lead the delegation Andrew chose George Boutwell, John Murray Forbes, and Lieutenant-Governor John Z. Goodrich. The other members were Andrew's own law partner, Theophilis P. Chandler, who recently had urged a preventative war to "drive the ruffians into the Gulf of Mexico;" Charles Allen, an old Free-Soil warrior of the 1840's; Francis Crowinshield, former Speaker of the Massachusetts House; and Richard P. Waters, a "stiff-backed" Republican from Beverly.[39]

The delegation met Sumner's expectations. They offered no substantive

suggestions at Washington, drew out the proceedings as much as possible, and voted against virtually every proposal before the assembly. George Boutwell, who became the principle Massachusetts spokesman, declared belligerently that if the Union could not be saved without providing new guarantees for slavery, it was not worth saving. If secession continued, he warned, "we shall march our armies to the Gulf of Mexico, or you will march yours to the Great Lakes." The convention's final resolutions, prepared in the last days of February, closely resembled Crittenden's. The Massachusetts delegation duly opposed them, but was unconcerned that they had passed. As Goodrich cheerfully assured Andrew: "The recommendations of the Convention have no moral weight whatever they might be." Congress rejected the proposals soon after the convention disbanded, and with their failure died the hope for political compromise. Massachusetts Republicans rejoiced at the occasion.[40]

CHAPTER XI

THE MINUTEMEN OF 1861

Conservatives were not surprised by the obstructions which Massachusetts Republicans placed in the path of compromise. In a bitter editorial, the Courier lamented that no other free state nurtured such disloyalty--especially among its clergy, its intellectuals, and its women--as Massachusetts. The paper regretted that, while Massachusetts felt "fervid and vehement" passion toward personal liberty, it cared little for the Union. Massachusetts' bond to the Union was self-interest rather than sentiment--a careful calculation of the advantages which the national attachment might bring to the state. The Post expressed a similar opinion. It argued that Massachusetts and South Carolina were fundamentally alike and that they had done more than any other states to disrupt the Union. One was the birthplace of abolitionism, the other of nullification; but both had eaten fruit from the tree of disunion.[1]

Massachusetts Republicans hotly disputed any question of their national loyalty. But there was more truth to the conservative argument than Republicans would admit. Behind their refusal to offer substantive concessions to the South was the conviction that some things were more important than the preservation of the Union. Most Republicans would save the Union if it was within their power--but only if the cost was minimal. They believed that the sacrifice of antislavery principle, party integrity, and personal pride was too great a price for the continuation of a united nation. "Save the Union if it can be done with honor," William Claflin advised Henry Dawes, "but save your honor anyhow."[2]

There were, of course, differences among Massachusetts Republicans.

Some conservatives, especially those in the eastern section of the state, displayed a reverence for the Union that was barely distinguishable from the Webster Whigs. The Newburyport Herald voiced this sentiment when it declared that "not since the days of primeval chaos" had a people been so free and happy as Americans under the protection of the Federal Union. The Constitution worked so well, the Herald declared, that it was almost as if "heaven had made us a self-regulating community." In order to preserve the Union, the Herald was willing to accept the Crittenden compromise.[3]

But the unwavering Unionism of Webster and Choate, though it lived on in the oratory of Everett, was no longer the dominant emotion of Massachusetts. The Webster Whigs had clothed the Union with powers greater than that of a mere political organization. Recognizing that the United States lacked the institutions which gave stability to other societies--a royal family, ancient traditions, a national church--conservatives had given the Union the mystical attributes of divinity. Paul Nagel discussed this phenomenon in his study of American nationalism, One Nation Indivisible. He saw the sanctification of the American Union as the response of an apprehensive people "to the questions of order and security, purpose and achievement, glory and honor." The Union was a Gestalt, far greater than the several states that comprised it. But when Massachusetts Republicans discussed the value of the Union, they rarely did so in transcendental terms. They believed that the Union held value, but that its merits were specific and tangible. Republicans appreciated the freedom which it gave to trade and travel within the United States without the constant barriers that one found in Europe. They recognized that the Union promoted peace among the sections and provided

a common shield against foreign aggression, and that it embraced a common legal and political tradition. Republicans respected the Constitution as the heritage of an honored generation of heroes and as one of the world's foremost political documents.[4]

But unlike those who defined their identity in national terms, Bay State Republicans thought of themselves as citizens of Massachusetts or as New Englanders. Like Southerners, their primary allegiance was to their state and region rather than to the United States. In this they differed from the nationalistic Republicans of the West. For New England had a long history and a tradition that on the eve of the Civil War was more than three times the age of the Union under the Constitution. By contrast, the West had no such heritage, and was in fact the offspring of the federal government. It was natural that a Westerner would think of himself first as an American rather than as an Ohioan or Illinoisan. Western Republicans like Lincoln held a different perspective of the Union than men like Charles Sumner and Henry Wilson.

Hans Kohn has written that the North pursued the Civil War "for the maintenance of imperial Union against the principle of self-determination." Such a characterization is hardly applicable to Massachusetts Republicans; they had formed their party in protest against large institutions--the Catholic Church, huge factories, and the growing cities--which threatened local control and personal responsibility. They had fought the extension of federal authority in the 1850's when those in power had sought to expand slavery; and this experience had left them with a fear of the corruption of power. One of their arguments against the Crittenden proposals was that it would give the federal government authority over the states which it formerly did not have.[5]

During the secession winter, Massachusetts Republicans carefully weighed the value of the Union against the cost of Southern demands. Generally the Union came out wanting, with some Republicans asking if it had substance enough to save. One country paper noted that there was "a want of nationality among our people" and suggested that no political connection could unite people as disparate as New Englanders and cotton planters. Perhaps, it suggested, the Union was an artificial device that had served a purpose during the early days of continental independence, but whose usefulness had passed. It had lasted seventy-two years--far longer than many other governments in the world; like all the works of man, it was mutable. Other Republicans noted that the United States lacked many of the traditional trappings of a nation; there were few institutions that welded North and South into a common bond. The country had no national capital in the manner of London or Paris. Washington served as a seat of government, but not as a national focus for commerce or culture. Indeed, Massachusetts Congressmen had always dreaded their return to Washington, a raw and unfinished city, permeated with the odor of Southern slavery. More than one Republican had suggested that Washington was a place the North could cheerfully abandon.[6]

Some Massachusetts Republicans asserted that the Union was based on dishonorable compromise and that it forced the North to fulfill unconscionable obligations. The Hampshire Gazette deplored the Constitutional provisions which made the North enforce laws "purposefully designed to be irritating and humilitating to all our ideas of self-respect and manhood." Even Charles Francis Adams, though imbued with the nationalism of his father, admitted that the Constitution forced the North to shelter an institution which it would otherwise repudiate. Massachusetts Republicans

generally believed that slavery survived only because the Union had preserved it. Outside the Constitution, Southern slavery would be doomed.[7]

Some Massachusetts Republicans ridiculed William Seward for "making a fetish out of the Union" when the New York Senator gave an emotional, patriotic address on January 12. Others, like the editor of the Traveler, sympathized with Seward's sentiments but suggested that he "threw pearls before swine" when appealing to the South. Massachusetts' deeply-rooted anti-Southernism crucially affected the state's response to the secession crisis. Many believed that the South was a benighted region which regularly indulged in unspeakable atrocities in order to uphold slavery. Even moderate newspapers like the Springfield Republican and the Boston Evening Transcript often read like Theodore Weld's Slavery As It Is, leading subscribers to presume that Southerners were beyond redemption.[8]

Massachusetts newspapers reported the continual harassment of Northern whites who traveled beyond Mason and Dixon's line and suggested that impeccable proslavery credentials were needed to venture into the South. In the months before the Civil War, Massachusetts read that travelers' luggage was opened and searched, that teachers were expelled for Republican sympathies, and that visitors to Mount Vernon encountered insults and hostility. One account told of a Massachusetts citizen expelled from Alabama when a letter from Sumner was discovered in his trunk; another reported that a man in Virginia was made literally into a "Black Republican" when a mob seized him and covered him with printer's ink. As the secession crisis grew darker so did the nature of the atrocities which Massachusetts journals published. In February, the Traveler

reported that Southerners had seized two Northern artisans, denounced them as abolitionists, and hanged them. The case of Joseph Ribero attracted particular attention. A carpenter working in Savannah, Ribero allegedly said that Lincoln's election would mean the end of slavery. For this crime, outraged Georgians shaved his head, ordered slaves to lash him, and threw him on a Boston-bound ship. The press, noting that the assailants had taken away Ribero's tools, urged "friends of freedom" to help him secure employment. Republicans argued that such incidents proved that Southerners had violated one of the basic principles of the Union--that an American citizen should receive the protection of any state he visited. One rural legislator asserted that a Massachusetts man would be more secure in the Barbary States than in Virginia. Others believed that Northerners would be safer traveling in a separate Southern confederacy under a United States passport.[9]

During the secession winter, Massachusetts Republicans repeated their now-familiar arguments about the squalor of Southern civilization. At a time when healing words were needed to avert dissolution, Republican contempt took on an added dimension. Many New Englanders believed that the South languished in ignorance and illiteracy, that they needed "an army of primers and elementary text books," and that their society was "an inversion of the ordinary rules of morality." Owning slaves had made Southerners incapable of living under republican government. In the eyes of many Yankees the South was both odious and alien, comparable to Turkey with its polygamy or India with its suttee. Some in Massachusetts looked for additions from the North to replace the departed states. "Canada will rush to our embrace," exclaimed John Alley before the House of Representatives. Sumner and Andrew both welcomed such an exchange.[10]

II

Historians have tended to discount the sincerity of Republicans who, during the secession crisis, called for peaceable disunion. David Potter, for example, has argued that all public men were well aware that the only real options during the winter of 1860-61 were compromise or war. Those who urged that the South be allowed to leave the Union in peace did so only when the immediate alternative was compromise. Faced with a choice of disunion and war, they chose war. Potter is correct in noting that Republicans who urged peaceful separation at the outset of the crisis grew more bellicose as the winter proceeded. But he is engaging in a hindsight not available to the men of 1861 when he suggests that compromise and war were the only possible results. Acquiescence to peaceable secession in 1861 only appears fanciful when viewed through the patriotic dust swept up by the war-time North, anxious to clothe the cause of the North with divinity. One fact seems clear: if the Massachusetts population truly loved the Union, they would not have tolerated the disparaging comments by their politicians, journalists, and preachers. Most Massachusetts men would not shed their blood for the abstract virtues of the American Union. Many clearly entertained the idea of peaceful separation.[11]

The pages of the Springfield Republican trace the evolution of the idea of peaceable secession. During November this influential mouthpiece of moderate Republicanism argued that the principles of representative government forbade coercing any state to remain within the Union. It noted that, while some politicians still glorified the Union "with a drapery of eloquent and patriotic phrases," the masses no longer believed

its preservation to be of "infinite consequences." The citizens of the free states, it argued, were not about to fight to keep the slave states from departing.[12]

By December, the Republican focused upon the process of secession. It still maintained that the slave states were free to leave; South Carolina could "re-annex herself to the kingdom of Dahomey" if she wished. But the paper insisted that the Southern states leave the Union in a constitutionally acceptable way. They should petition Congress if they wanted to break the national tie. But until they received the assent of a majority of the states, their actions constituted rebellion. Under such conditions, presidential action could not be considered coercion but merely enforcement of the law. The Republican reminded its readers of the expense which the entire nation had borne in the acquisition of Louisiana, Texas, and Florida; before they could leave the Union, compensation was due. But the Republican still hoped that separation could be accomplished orderly. When South Carolina announced that it would send commissioners to Washington to discuss the federal property within her borders, the paper interpreted it as a positive sign.[13]

But as it became clear that the commissioners were issuing demands rather than negotiating, Bowles' Republican became incensed. It was intolerable, it declared, that the squalid republic of South Carolina should try to dictate to the rest of the nation. The Republican's rage increased when Southerners occupied Fort Moultrie. It considered the firing on the Star of the West to be a declaration of war: "The rebellion at Charleston must be crushed out; Major Anderson must be reinforced; the other forts in the harbor must be taken and held." The Republican

insisted that the nation would face "anarchy and social confusion," if Southern lawlessness was not suppressed. But it still argued that it was this lawlessness and not disunion per se that was the peril.[14]

Nineteenth-century New Englanders strongly believed that a society could remain healthy only so long as its citizens took responsibility for their actions and honored their obligations to others. It was natural that they should think of the relationship among the states in much the same terms. The Union was not so much an indivisible or immutable institution as it was a community of members, bound by common laws. The community could survive the departure of individual members, but it could not survive the destruction of its laws. Massachusetts Republicans, who most strongly embodied this attitude, feared that illegitimate secession could become a threat to law and order throughout the nation. This fear, combined with their belief that the South was growing increasingly belligerent, lead them to prepare for war.[15]

As the secession winter progressed Republican journals as far apart as the Traveler and the Tocsin came to believe that Civil War was inevitable. "If you cannot have peace with it in the Union," the Tocsin remarked about the South, "by the same token and more so, you cannot out." Republicans catalogued the conflicts that would inevitably arise between the rival confederacies. In the area of trade alone, the potential for confrontation was ominous. What would happen when the South attempted to restrict the traffic on the Mississippi? Or when smugglers used the slave states as a haven to pass untaxed goods into the North? To protect

their economy, the free states would raise a substantial force sealing off the long border that once had been as open as a county line. The two confederacies, believing it their destiny, would attempt to expand into Latin America; inevitably they would clash in Mexico and Cuba. The North could not allow the South to re-open the barbaric trans-Atlantic slave trade. But what would happen when the United States hanged a Southern citizen for slaving? And what would the North do when Southerners executed a citizen of the United States as an abolitionist? Peoples so inimical could not live peaceably as neighboring republics. Let us meet the issue now, at the point of a bayonet, James Stone wrote his friend Sumner, "rather than leave it an unhappy legacy for my children."[16]

As the prospect of war came closer, many appeared willing to face it. Peleg Chandler warned an audience at the Music Hall against the "temptations of peace." He asserted that one must inquire into "the quality of what is called peace" before assuming it is preferable to war. He told the story of a pacifist who denounced all recourse to arms and who used the Mexican War as a particularly odious example. "What would you do if you were a Mexican?" he was asked. "I'd fight to the last gasp," came the reply. The Adams sons were caught up in the same martial spirit. Henry, who wrote of his desire to join "some Cromwell type of Massachusetts regiment," believed that it would benefit the Northern cause if Anderson and his command were murdered in cold blood. His brother Charles talked of making Southern whites "eat the pie of humility" and handing them over to their slaves. In the Senate, Henry Wilson spoke of those who were preparing for the coming struggle: "farmers who till their own fee-simple acres . . . mechanics whose hands are skilled by art . . . laborers who

recognize no master but Almighty God." And Emerson predicted that 2,000 Concord men of Wilson's description could march at an instant's notice.[17]

Massachusetts Republicans agreed that the South would be no match for aroused Yankees. With a wary eye on both its slaves and its white mudsill, the planter class would be unable to resist the massed forces of the North. The Advertiser noted that Tennessee's Andrew Johnson had suggested that "it is better to keep the North to quarrel with, than to quarrel among ourselves." Republican newspapers offered historical evidence that New England had won the War for Independence while the South had played the role of slacker. A report that South Carolina had ordered her Palmetto flags from a Boston manufacturer was the occasion for considerable mirth. Republicans argued that Southerners would have to fight with Northern arms and wear Northern clothes with Northern buttons; they would use lead dug in Illinois, cast into bullets in New York, and propelled by Connecticut powder.[18]

But despite the bluster of the Republican newspapers, Massachusetts' political leaders were worried lest the state be caught unprepared. Andrew, working through January to ready the Commonwealth for war, relied heavily upon his correspondents in Washington and particularly upon Sumner. Moderates believed that Sumner was a dangerous influence. Charles Francis Adams wrote that the Senator was "full of stories of conspiracies" and suspected that he looked forward to bloodshed," and Henry Adams believed the Massachusetts Senator to be "the most frightened man in Washington." But at times Sumner could be a moderating force. Urged by Bird in early January to issue a call for Northern mobilization, Sumner replied that the government could defend the capital with the forces at its disposal.[19]

Sumner became a confidant of Edwin Stanton, Buchanan's new Attorney-General. The two met furtively at night; and Stanton, whose imagination was among the most active in the capital, would relay tales of treason in high places. Believing that he had a window on the activities of the administration, Sumner hastened to convey the information to Andrew. On January 26, he warned that Washington would be attacked before Lincoln's inauguration. Alarmed by Sumner's reports, Andrew asked the Senator to call on Buchanan and discover why he had failed to answer Massachusetts' offer of military aid. The harried President insisted that the movement of Northern troops would only foster hostilities. But Sumner pressed him. "What else can Massachusetts do for the good of the country?" the Senator asked. "Adopt the Crittenden proposition," Buchanan replied. Ending the conversation, Sumner asserted that Massachusetts would rather sink below the ocean and become a sandbank than accept such dishonorable demands.[20]

Sumner was not the only Massachusetts Congressman working to ferret out conspiracy. Henry Dawes was one of five members of a House committee charged with investigating reports that armed rebels were gathering near the capital. He too was in contact with Stanton and received notes which the Attorney-General clandestinely left at prearranged locations. And Henry Wilson belonged to an informal vigilance committee which sought to prevent interference with the counting of the electoral votes in February. Like Sumner, he believed that war was imminent, though he thought that Massachusetts' major contribution would be money rather than men.[21]

Andrew brought these reports to the Massachusetts legislature and urged its members to take action. He was particularly insistent that the state's militia law, which limited the number of men actively enrolled to

5,000, be amended so that he could enlist all the troops he believed necessary. On February 4, the legislature went into an unusual secret session from which reporters and the public were barred. The members heard little that had not been rumored in the press; but dark hints by the Republican leadership that fighting could erupt at any time convinced them to assent to the Governor's requests. Andrew received authority to raise the troops he wanted and an emergency fund of $100,000 to cover the expense. However, the Republican legislators were reluctant to bail out the bankrupt Democratic administration, and deferred a request to guarantee $2,000,000 in federal bonds. On the same day Virginia voters rejected immediate secession. Shortly afterwards, the Dawes committee reported that it could discover no evidence of an organized conspiracy within the District of Columbia; and in mid-February the counting of the electoral votes took place without incident. Each of these events brought some respite from the anxiety. But Massachusetts' Congressmen agreed that they only had postponed the inevitable clash. There would be no need for troops before March 4; but after the inauguration, conflict was certain.[22]

Many Massachusetts Republicans had acquired a low opinion of Abraham Lincoln in the months after the presidential election. Samuel Bowles, for one, thought he was a "simple Susan." New Englanders sometimes tried to cover their embarrassment with the president-elect by patronizing the simplicity and openness of Westerners; but clearly they were displeased with the rustic manners of their new leader. Adams feared that Lincoln lacked the "heroic qualities" that were necessary at such a time and interpreted his actions during the crisis as a sign of vacillation.

"I am much afraid," Adams wrote as he followed Lincoln's progress from Springfield to Washington, "that in this lottery we have drawn a blank."[23]

But Lincoln's inaugural address raised his stature among Massachusetts Republicans. Virtually every faction of the party, from the Advertiser to the Bird Club, applauded it. Adams was grateful that the President had endorsed the Constitutional amendment that would forbid interference with slavery in the states. Though opposed by a majority of his Massachusetts colleagues, Adams had supported the measure; and he hoped that Lincoln's statement would silence those who had criticized him. But even Sumner was happy with the address for its unwillingness to compromise basic Republican doctrine. Using Napoleon's famous simile, he called it "a hand of iron and a velvet glove." Republicans were greatly relieved that inauguration day had passed. Many believed that, with the party in control of the government, serious danger was ended. "Again we have a government," John Goodrich exclaimed to Andrew; "the inaugural is delivered and already the beat of the public pulse begins to indicate returning national health."[24]

The inaugural also unleashed a great scramble for office. Massachusetts' leading Republicans were deluged with requests for patronage. Many of the appeals were desperate, coming from men who claimed that the economic difficulties brought on by the secession crisis made them unable to feed their families. Others were from former officeholders who had lost their posts for refusing to uphold the proslavery policies of the Democratic administrations. All proclaimed their loyalty to the Republican party, recorded their past services, and asserted that they should share in the fruits of the victory. In these appeals the larger

issues of war and peace, of union and discord, of slavery and freedom, are lost in the pursuit for places in the Boston Customs House.[25]

Massachusetts had hoped for a place in the new cabinet. The most likely candidate was Charles Francis Adams for the Treasury post; but the controversy over his recent political course made his appointment impossible. The matter was sealed when Lincoln gave New England's cabinet seat to Gideon Welles of Connecticut. Adams and Sumner were both candidates for the Court of St. James, a rivalry that could have further divided Massachusetts Republicans. Adams went to London, but Sumner was assuaged when he became the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, a post that he would make exceedingly important in the coming years.[26]

It was the competition for more prosaic offices that created the greatest friction. Old-line antislavery men were jealous at those who lately had climbed onto the Republican bandwagon; and the editors and publishers of Republican newspapers demanded a reward for their past services. "I am tired, sick, and unhappy," Sumner wrote Longfellow in mid-March. "My rooms are full from early morning till midnight with office seekers." There is reason to believe, however, that Sumner enjoyed his role as Massachusetts' chief spokesman on federal patronage. It was only human that he, who for so long had been excluded from the inner circles of Boston and Washington, should appreciate his new influence. The appointment of a Boston Postmaster and a Port Collector was particularly important; for together they controlled hundreds of positions. Republicans relished their dominion over these offices which were so important to the commercial life of Massachusetts' capital city. Pressing the claims of one candidate, Theophilis Chandler, Andrew

crowed that State Street would have to "take off its hat to him." "We must be bold. We must use power where we have it," the Governor maintained. Chandler, he argued, would not be afraid "to use his proper influence" to promote the Republican cause. Andrew was determined to punish his antagonists within the Republican party. Thus he urged that Charles Hale, who wanted to be postmaster of Boston, be cut off from all preferments. And he wrote directly to Lincoln to warn that Nathaniel Banks was unworthy of consideration for any post. As a rebuke to Boston for its coolness to Republican principles, Andrew and Sumner arranged for its leading posts to go to men from outside the city.[27]

III

The Charleston batteries that opened fire on Fort Sumter on April 12, abruptly ended the argument over whether the seceded states should be allowed to depart in peace. With unanimity, Massachusetts citizens sprang to their muskets, their bank accounts, and their Bibles, to lend assistance to the Northern cause. Men of all parties proclaimed their determination to suppress the rebellion and punish those who had instigated the conflict. There was no suggestion from any quarter that there was an alternative to war. For the sake of honor and manhood the agressive Southern act would be answered.

If all men recognized the inevitability of the events that were unfolding, Massachusetts was not without those who received the news from South Carolina with foreboding. "Mr. Lincoln has plunged us into war," Adams wrote. He doubted the President's ability to lead and worried about the fate of his own sons. "We, the children of the third and fourth generations," he reflected, "are doomed to pay the penalties of the

compromises made by the first." Sumner was no less appalled by the opening of hostilities. "Alas!" he wrote Longfellow, "that I, loving peace, should be called to take such great responsibility in a dreadful ghastly civil war." He lamented that the nation had not chosen the road of amicable separation.[28]

But other Republicans did not share these regrets. They eagerly prepared to punish the South, not merely for firing on one fort, but for a train of abuses that extended back for decades. The deep-seated hostility against the alien slave society raised the emotions of the post-Sumter days to a fever pitch. Some hotspur Yankees talked of turning South Carolina into a desert and sowing its fields with salt. Confident of their own superiority, they believed the task would be completed before summer's end. Massachusetts Republicans also calculated that the manner in which the war had begun was to their advantage. With the onus on the South, their cause would be strengthened. Even the Boston Recorder thanked God for allowing the North to begin the struggle with a clear conscience.[29]

The Garrisonians recognized that, despite its attendant horrors, the war could bring about the abolition jubilee. Garrison himself urged supporters to hold their criticism on the conduct of the administration. "There must be no needless turning of popular violence upon ourselves," he warned. Abolitionists must practice circumspection to avoid divisions in the North. He was confident that the war--which some fought only to save the Union--would turn into a war that would free the slaves. Phillips, who on April 9 had urged that Massachusetts not fight to keep the slave states within the Union, recanted after the firing on Sumter. For the first time in his life, he told a massive crowd, he was proud to

stand beneath the emblem of the national government. "Today the slave asks but a sight of this banner, and calls it the twilight of his redemption; today it represents sovereignty and justice." Blacks were no less enthusiastic. They crowded into a Boston Baptist church to pledge 50,000 troops if the color bar on enlistment were lifted.[30]

Conservatives were likewise ready to prosecute the war. Everett argued that defeating the rebels was the only way to save the country from "general anarchy and confusion." The Courier's motto was "Our County, Right or Wrong." Though it blamed Lincoln for bringing on the war and denounced those who talked of reducing Charleston to ashes, the paper urged every citizen to support the federal government. At Boston's Jackson Club the members proclaimed that, despite their sympathy for the South, they would fight to sustain the Constitution. The commercial community was also eager to prove its loyalty. Boston's banks loaned $3,500,000 to the federal treasury and gave substantial aid to the Massachusetts mobilization. The operators of railroads and steamship lines offered to transport troops; and counting houses promised to continue their clerks' salaries while they were off at war. Some merchants appeared relieved that the period of ambiguity was over. "Anything like certainty, even with an unfavorable result," the Commercial Bulletin explained, "is better than a period of suspense."[31]

Amos Lawrence was among those to offer his services to the government. In the days after Sumter, he urged his friends in the Border States to rally their people for the Union. He warned Crittenden that the North "is becoming one great army" and that Kentucky would be "saved or ruined in proportion as she supports or refuses to support the government." If the Border States remained loyal, Lawrence wrote, a purely

sectional war could be avoided. But if they went with the Confederacy, the North would invade the South and destroy slavery.[32]

Massachusetts citizens showed their enthusiasm for the war effort in a variety of ways. Ladies wore the tricolor on their dresses and made flannel shirts and bandages for the departing troops. "Here are my two sons," one woman in Marblehead cried out; "I am sorry I have not more to go." When a ship from Savannah arrived in Boston flying a secessionist flag, a mob forced the crew to take it down and then ripped it into pieces. Northampton's Zachary Eddy, who had earlier enumerated the evils of war, now welcomed the conflict as a time for national regeneration. "History has always recognized something Divine in national enthusiasm," he told Hampshire County volunteers. "The conflagration of patriotism . . . is kindled by the breath of God."[33]

On April 15, Henry Wilson notified Andrew that Massachusetts' initial military quota was 1,200 men. The Governor chafed that the number was so low, but he immediately set to work answering the call. His earlier preparations payed handsome dividends as militiamen moved rapidly into Boston from every corner of the state. The sense of urgency was due not only to the prospect that rebel troops might be marching on Washington, but to a determination that Massachusetts must place the first troops in the field. Andrew did not overlook the politics of mobilization. He commissioned young conservatives as a way to bind their merchant fathers to the success of the war. And he placed Benjamin Butler in charge of the state's troops to diffuse the charge that the conflict would be fought along partisan lines.[34]

Thousands streamed into Boston on April 17, to watch the Sixth Regiment depart for Washington. Andrew reviewed the troops from the State

House steps. Avoiding controversy, he spoke but briefly and exhorted the soldiers to defend the flag and return it with honor. The Sixth became the first armed regiment to arrive in Washington's defense. But before they reached the capital, they also became the first to shed blood. On April 19--the anniversary of the Battle of Lexington--Massachusetts soldiers, passing through Baltimore, fought a mob of secessionist sympathizers and suffered four casualties. Rage was mingled with pride when the news reached Boston. Demands that Baltimore be raised to the ground coincided with praise for the Massachusetts troops. "Everybody in Massachusetts seems to be contratulating himself that he is a citizen of such a state," wrote "Warrington."[35]

And so the men of Massachusetts marched off to war. United by their determination to defeat the Confederacy, they were divided in their motives. Many, lured by the bright uniforms and the spirit of the bands, had little notion of why they were fighting, but were glad to join this new adventure and leave a dull life behind. Yet others had firm intentions. Some went because they wanted to free the slaves, some to save the Union, and some to serve the South its "pie of humility." Few suspected that long years would intervene before peace returned to the nation or the terrible cost in lives and twisted bodies that the war would exact. Neither did they realize that the war would hasten the demise of the Massachusetts they were leaving. For the Massachusetts of the farmer and artisan, of enthusiastic reform, of Anglo-Saxon Protestant dominance, would become a distant memory in the post-war world. For the moment, however, Massachusetts' men might think of themselves as "Minutemen of 1861" off to defend their way of life from an alien threat.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. Abstract of the Census of Massachusetts, 1860 (Boston, 1863), 300-311; Josiah G. Holland, History of Western Massachusetts, 2 vols. (Springfield, Mass., 1855), II, 261; Lester Earl Klimm, The Relation Between Certain Population Changes and the Physical Environment in Hampden, Hampshire, and Franklin Counties, Massachusetts, 1790-1925 (Philadelphia, 1933).

2. Percy W. Bidwell, "The Agricultural Revolution in New England," American Historical Review XXVI (July 1921), 683-702.

3. Margaret Richards Pabst, "Agricultural Trends in the Connecticut Valley Region of Massachusetts, 1800-1900," Smith College Studies in History XXVI (1940), 1-54; Statistical Information Relating to Certain Branches of Industry in Massachusetts for the Year Ending June 1, 1855 prepared by Francis De Witt (Boston, 1856), 640-642; Abstract of the Census of Massachusetts, 1860, 57.

4. Pabst, "Agricultural Trends," 1-54; Statistical Information . . . of Industry in Massachusetts for . . . 1855, 640-642.

5. Eighth Annual Report of the Secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Agriculture for 1860 (Boston, 1861), 292-93; [Josiah G. Holland], "Farming Life in New England," Atlantic, August 1858, 341. See also New England Farmer, March 1860, 114-15.

6. George Hillard, "Why the Massachusetts Farmer Should Be Content," in Abstract of the Returns of the Agricultural Societies of Massachusetts for 1860, ed. Charles L. Flint (Boston, 1861), 53.

7. John C. Bartlett, "Profits of Farming," in Abstract of . . . Agricultural Societies . . . for 1858 (Boston, 1859), 45; New England Farmer, January 1861, 26-27; John L. Russell, "Agriculture and Art," Abstract of . . . Agricultural Societies . . . for 1860, 3.

8. Springfield Republican, January 22, 1861; Theodore Parker, "The Material Condition of the People of Massachusetts," in Parker, Social Classes in a Republic (Boston, 1907), 206-7, 212, 245-7, 249. This sermon was originally published in the Christian Examiner, July 1858. The nineteenth-century approach to statistics was unsophisticated; and Parker failed to realize that, due to the flow of young people into towns, the farming community had an older population base.

9. New England Farmer, January 1857, 20; Springfield Republican, January 5, 1861; New England Farmer, June 1859, 251; Henry F. Durant, "The Dignity of Labor," in Abstract of . . . Agricultural Societies . . . for 1860, 59-61; New England Farmer, May 1859, 243.

10. Holland, "Farming Life in New England," 335-337, 240.

11. George Boutwell, "The Duty of the Farmer to His Calling," in Abstract of . . . Agricultural Societies . . . for 1859, 23. See also Rufus P. Stebbins, "Agriculture in the Public Schools," in Ibid., 10-19.

12. Caroline F. Ware, The Early New England Cotton Manufacture (Boston, 1931), 7-65, 200-227; Donald B. Cole, Immigrant City: Lawrence, Massachusetts, 1845-1921 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1963) 17-25; Vera Schlakman, "Economic History of a Factory Town: A Study of Chicopee, Massachusetts," Smith College Studies in History XX (1935), 50-52.

13. Ware, Cotton Manufacture, 200-17; Stephen Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City (New York, 1971), 60-61. On female mill workers, see also Hanna Josephson, The Golden Threads (New York, 1949).

14. Cole, Immigrant City, 33. An indication of the changing position of the mill worker can be seen in the relative wages paid to operatives and teachers in the twenty years before the Civil War. In 1840, a female operative received an average monthly wage of $11.75; teachers received $12.75. In 1860, operatives received $13.23 (a decline in real wage) while teachers' salaries had risen to $22.00. See Howard Gitelman, "The Waltham System and the Coming of the Irish," Labor History VIII (Fall, 1967), 238; Ware, Cotton Manufacture, 260-68. See also John Coolidge, Mill and Mansion: A Study of Architecture and Society in Lowell, Massachusetts, 1820-1865 (New York, 1942; reprinted, New York, 1967).

15. Oscar Handlin, Boston's Immigrants (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), 60-78.

16. Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress, 13-43; Peter Knights, The Plain People of Boston (New York, 1971), 57-62. Howard Gitelman, "No Irish Need Apply: Pattern and Response to Ethnic Discrimination in the Labor Market," Labor History XIV (Winter, 1973), 56-68.

17. "Charities of Boston," North American Review, July 1860, 157; Ware, Cotton Manufacture, 244-46; Schlakman, "Factory Town," 145.

18. Cole, Immigrant City, 26-29.

19. Abstract of Census . . ., 1860, 283; Statistical Information . . . of Industry in Massachusetts (1856), 634-9; Carol D. Wright, Comparative Wages, Prices, and Cost of Living (Boston, 1889), 61,156.

20. Blanche Evans Hazard, The Organization of the Boot and Shoe Industry in Massachusetts Before 1875 (Cambridge, Mass., 1921).

21. Paul G. Faler, "Workingmen, Mechanics and Social Change: Lynn, Massachusetts, 1800-1860," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1971), 47, 61-63, 68-69, 88-101.

22. Ibid., 128-202.

23. Ibid., 294-5, 308-349.

24. Ibid., 210-270.

25. Thomas H. O'Conner, Lords of the Loom: The Cotton Whigs and the Coming of the Civil War (New York, 1968), 28-51; Schlakman, "Factory Town," 38-44; Josephson, Golden Threads, 96-177.

26. Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, in Max Lerner, ed., The Portable Veblen (New York, 1967), 84.

27. Ronald Story, "Class Development and Cultural Institutions in Boston, 1800-1870: Harvard, the Atheneum, and the Lowell Institute," (Ph.D. dissertation, Stony Brook, 1972).

28. Ibid., 70-190.

29. Ibid., 123, 207; Sarah Forbes Hughes, ed., Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes, 2 Vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1899), II, 16.

30. Edward L. Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner, 4 vols. (Boston, 1877-1893), III, 5,9.

31. Frederic Cople Jaher, "Nineteenth Century Elites in Boston and New York," Journal of Social History VI, (Fall, 1972), 32-77; Paul Goodman, "Ethics and Enterprise: The Values of a Boston Elite, 1800-1860," American Quarterly XVIII (Fall, 1966), 437-51.

32. William Lawrence, The Life of Amos A. Lawrence (Boston, 1888), 50; Robert C. Winthrop, "Memoir of Hon. Nathan Appleton," Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society V (1861), 305.

33. O'Connor, Lords of the Loom, 42-57.

Chapter II.

1. Kinley J. Brauer, Cotton Versus Conscience: Massachusetts Whig Politics and Southwestern Expansion, 1843-1848 (Lexington, Kentucky, 1967), 7-29.

2. O'Conner, Lords of the Loom, 35; Robert F. Dalzell, Jr., Daniel Webster and the Trial of American Nationalism, 1843-1852 (Boston, 1973), 100-102.

3. Pierce, Sumner, III, 7-8, 120; David Donald, Charles Sumner and the Coming of the Civil War (New York, 1960), 120-28.

4. Brauer, Cotton Versus Conscience, 7-29; Arthur K. Darling, Political Change in Massachusetts, 1824-1848 (New Haven, 1925), 251-260. Governor Morton's message of 1840, summarized in these pages, is a good statement of the Democratic position.

5. O'Conner, Lords of the Loom, 60-61; Brauer, Cotton Versus Conscience, 49-76.

6. George F. Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years, 2 Vols. (New York, 1903), I, 24-28.

7. Martin B. Duberman, Charles Francis Adams, 1807-1886 (Boston, 1961), 94-96.

8. Brauer, Cotton Versus Conscience, 110-134; Duberman, Adams, 87-138.

9. Pierce, Sumner, III, 105-106; Hoar, Autobiography, I, 134.

10. Pierce, Sumner, III, 111-157; Dalzell, Webster, 113-117; Brauer, Cotton Versus Conscience, 170-180.

11. Pierce, Sumner, III, 179; Brauer, Cotton Versus Conscience, 206-243; Duberman, Adams, 139-157.

12. Dalzell, Webster, 152-53, 192-206.

13. David D. Van Tassel, "Gentlemen of Property and Standing: Compromise Sentiment in Boston in 1850," New England Quarterly XXIII (September 1950), 313; The Poetical Works of John Greenleaf Whittier (Boston, 1882), 179; Dalzell, Webster, 214-216.

14. Van Tassel, "Gentlemen of Property," 317-319; Dalzell, Webster, 214-216; Pierce, Sumner, III, 204-208.

15. William G. Bean, "Party Transformation in Massachusetts, with Special Reference to Antecedents of the Republican Party, 1848-1860" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard, 1922), 62-115; Richard Henry Abbott, "Cobbler in Congress: the Life of Henry Wilson, 1812-1875" (Ph.D. dissertation, Wisconsin, 1965), 70-85; Fred Harvey Harrington, Fighting Politician: Major-General Nathaniel Prentiss Banks (Philadelphia, 1948) passim; George S. Boutwell, Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, 2 vols. (New York, 1902), 119-120.

16. Bean, "Party Transformation," 77-108.

17. Pierce, Sumner, III, 209.

18. Harold Schwartz, "Fugitive Slave Days in Boston," New England Quarterly XXVII (June. 1954), 191-212; Austin Bearse, Reminiscences of Fugitive Slave Days in Boston (Boston, 1880), is by a member of the Vigilance Committee and includes a list of members; Henry Steele Commanger, Theodore Parker, Yankee Crusader (Boston, 1947), 214-222;

Leonard W. Levy, "The Sims Case: the Fugitive Slave Law in Boston," Journal of Negro History XXXV (January 1950), 39-74; William S. Robinson, "Warrington" Pen-Portraits (Boston, 1877), 193-194.

19. Commonwealth quoted in Bean, "Party Transformation," 89; Robinson, "Warrington", 203-205; Donald, Sumner, 248.

20. O'Conner, Lords of the Loom, 98; Pierce, Sumner, III, 363-66.

21. Robert F. Lucid, ed., The Journals of Richard Henry Dana, 3 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), II, 628-37; Samuel Shapiro, "The Rendition of Anthony Burns," Journal of Negro History XLIV (January 1959), 34-51. For a contemporary view of the incident, see Charles Emery Stevens, Anthony Burns: A History (Boston, 1856).

22. O'Conner, Lords of the Loom, 94; Eli Thayer in his History of the Kansas Crusade (New York, 1889) explains the conservative nature of the Kansas movement.

23. William G. Bean, "Puritan Versus Celt, 1850-1860," New England Quarterly VIII (1934), 70-89; John R. Mulkern, "The Know-Nothing Party in Massachusetts" (Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1963).

24. Mulkern, "Know-Nothing Party," 143-45; Bean, "Party Transformation," 284-88.

25. Bean, "Party Transformation," 279-82. Though the 1855 legislature supported the proposals for disenfranchisement, the Massachusetts Constitution required that two successive legislatures pass an amendment and that it then be submitted to a popular vote. When the bill reached the referendum stage in 1859, the restriction had been reduced to a two-year waiting period after naturalization. The "Two-Year Amendment" was solidly supported by the voters.

26. Stevens, Burns, 218-244; Mulkern, "Know-Nothing Party," 136-139.

27. Abbott,"Wilson,"134-139.

28. Mulkern, "Know-Nothing Party," 85-89, discusses upper-class disdain for the Know-Nothings. See also Duberman, Adams, 197-204, 207-211; Frank Otto Gatell, John Gorham Palfrey and the New England Conscience (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 95-105; Samuel Shapiro, Richard Henry Dana, Jr., 1815-1882 (E. Lansing, Mich., 1961), 223-226.

29. Henry Wilson initially joined the 1854 "Republican" movement and became its candidate for governor. But, shrewd politician that he was, Wilson perceived the American party's appeal, withdrew his candidacy, and supported Gardner. See Abbott, "Wilson," 107-114.

30. Pierce, Sumner, III, 425-524, contains the fullest account of the attack on Sumner and its impact on Massachusetts.

31. Mulkern, "Know-Nothing Party," 248-267. For the Fremont campaign, see George S. Merriam, Life and Times of Samuel Bowles, 2 vols. (New York, 1885).

32. Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War (New York, 1970), 11.

33. Harrington, Banks, 38-42; Robinson, "Warrington," 220-226.

Chapter III

1. Boston Evening Transcript, October 18, 1859; Boston Courier, October 18, 1859.

2. Boston Evening Transcript, October 18, 1859.

3. Franklin B. Sanborn, "John Brown in Massachusetts," Atlantic, April 1872, 421-432; Stephen B. Oates, To Purge This Land With Blood: A Biography of John Brown (New York, 1970) 54-59, 73-75, 181-97, 202-204. Brown's speech to the Massachusetts legislature is in Sanborn, The Life and Letters of John Brown, Liberator of Kansas and Martyr of Virginia (Boston, 1891), 372-73.

4. Brown's rifles were manufactured by the Massachusetts Manufacturing Company of Chicopee. The Boston Journal of October 26, 1859, correctly noted that it was not the New England Emigrant Aid Society but the Massachusetts State Kansas Committee--a far more radical group--who gave the rifles to Brown. This distinction, however, was generally ignored. See the Boston Evening Transcript, October 21, 1859, for a conservative Republican defense of the Emigrant Aid Society. The most comprehensive study of Brown's Massachusetts abettors is Jeffrey Stuart Rossbach, "The Secret Six: A Study of the Conspiracy behind John Brown's Raid"(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1974.)

5. Boston Atlas and Daily Bee, October 20, 21, 1859; Springfield Republican, October 20, 1859.

6. Boston Evening Transcript, October 19, 1859; Atlas and Bee, October 21, 1859; Boston Advertiser, October 24, 1859; Boston Traveler, October 21, 1859.

7. Springfield Republican, October 20, 1859.

8. Embellished newspaper accounts claimed that one of Brown's sons had died from "brain fever" due to this experience. John Brown, Jr. had suffered a mental breakdown following the ordeal, but he was very much alive after Harpers Ferry. See Newburyport Herald, October 21, 1859.

9. Boston Evening Transcript, October 29, 1859; Boston Journal, October 28, 1859.

10. Courier, October 28, 1859; Walter Harding, The Days of Henry Thoreau (New York, 1965), 417-419.

11. Charles Francis Adams Diary, November 4, 1859, Adams Family Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.

12. Abbott, "Wilson," 32 and passim.

13. Henry Wilson, History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America, 3 vols. (Boston, 1872-77), II, 257-8; Abbott, "Wilson," 62-125.

14. Henry Wilson to Charles Sumner, September 1, 1853, quoted in Abbott, "Wilson," 104. See also Abbott, "Wilson," 78, 180.

15. U. S. Congress, Report of the Select Committee of the Senate on the Harper's Ferry Raid, 36th Congress, 1st session, 1860, 140-41.

16. Wilson, Slave Power, II, 593.

17. Abbott, "Wilson," 180.

18. Boston Post, October 20, 1859.

19. Boston Journal, October 20, 1859; Courier, October 24, 27, 1859; Post, October 1, 20, 28, 1859.

20. Courier, October 20, 22, 1859; Post, December 1, 1859.

21. Post, November 2, 1859.

22. Courier, October 20, November 2, 1859; Atlas and Bee, October 20, 1859.

23. Democrats and Whigs did nominate fusion tickets in three of the four Senate districts in Boston, winning two. See Atlas and Bee, November 9, 1859. On Butler see Benjamin Butler, Butler's Book (Boston, 1892); and Howard P. Nash, Stormy Petrel: The Life and Times of General Benjamin F. Butler (Rutherford, N. J., 1969).

24. Post, October 28, 1859; Darling, Political Change in Massachusetts, traces the transformation of the Massachusetts Democratic party from a reformist organization to a conservative supporter of slavery.

25. Post, November 7, October 11, 1859.

26. Atlas and Bee, October 20, 1859.

27. Post, November 4, 8, 11, 1859.

28. Boston Journal, November 7, 1859; Worcester Transcript, November 5, October 26, 1859; Springfield Republican, October 22, 1859.

29. The Atlas and Bee carried the "American Republican" masthead. See Atlas and Bee, October 18, November 7, 1859. The fight over the Bible in the public schools is discussed in Robert H. Lord, John E. Sexton, Edward T. Harrington, History of the Archdiocese of Boston, 3 vols. (New York, 1944), II, 574-75, 582-606.

30. Springfield Republican, October 21, 1859.

31. Worcester Transcript, November 8, 1859; Post, November 10, 1859; Boston Evening Transcript, November 8, 1859.

Chapter IV

1. Henry Greenleaf Pearson, Life of John A. Andrew, 2 vols. (Boston, 1904), I, 20-21; Peleg W. Chandler, Memoir of Governor Andrew, with Personal Reminiscences (Boston, 1880), 78-82.

2. Pearson, Andrew, I, 31-36, 42, 57.

3. Pearson, Andrew, I, 72-92.

4. Oswald Garrison Villard, John Brown, 1800-1859: A Biography Fifty Years After (New York, 1910), 485; Springfield Republican, November 1, 1859; Worcester Transcript, November 1, 1859; John Andrew to George Hoyt, October 26, 1859, Andrew Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society; Hoyt to Andrew, October, 1859, Andrew Papers; Pearson, Andrew, 98-99.

5. Charles Francis Adams to Andrew, November 6, 1859, Adams Papers; Charles Francis Adams Diary, November 7, 1859, Adams Papers; Samuel Bowles to John Andrew, November 16, 1859, Andrew Papers.

6. Boston Evening Transcript, December 3, 1859; Atlas and Bee, December 3, 1859; Samuel Gridley Howe to Andrew, January 11, 1860, Andrew Papers; Franklin B. Sanborn, Recollections of Seventy Years, 2 vols. (Boston, 1904), I, 187-88.

7. Sanborn, Recollections, I, 189-91; Sanborn to Thomas W. Higginson, December 20, 1859, and Andrew to Higginson, December 23, 1859, both in Higginson Papers, Boston Public Library.

8. Pearson, Andrew, I, 21; [Albert G. Browne], Sketch of the Official Life of John Andrew as Governor of Massachusetts (New York, 1869), 58-60; Andrew to William Greene (n.d.), in Pearson, Andrew, I, 101-104.

9. Pearson, Andrew, I, 104; Liberator, November 25, 1859.

10. Villard, Brown, 498-99.

11. Boston Traveler, November 5, 1859.

12. Worcester Transcript, November 26, 1859; Congregationalist, December 9, 1859; Atlas and Bee, December 3, 1859; (Worcester) Massachusetts Spy, December 7, 1859. Garrison was specific on the level of sainthood which he believed Brown attained. He refused to rank him with Jesus, Paul, Peter, or John, but placed him with Moses, Joshua, Gideon, and David. See Liberator, November 25, 1859.

13. Atlas and Bee, October 21, 22, 24-26, 1859.

14. Boston Journal, November 19, 1859; Springfield Republican, December 3, 1859. Catholics saw Brown as the spirit of fanatical and dogmatic Puritanism. See p. 198 below.

15. This view of the South, though probably most prevalent in New England, was common throughout the North. See Eric Foner, Free Soil, chapter 2.

16. Springfield Republican, October 24, 1859; Massachusetts Spy, November 2, 1859; Worcester Transcript, October 31, 1859.

17. Boston Evening Transcript, Dec. 17, 1859; Massachusetts Spy, November 30, 1859; Atlas and Bee, October 28, 1859.

18. Courier, November 26, 1859; Springfield Republican, October 31, 1859. Not all Republicans gloated at the South's discomfiture. The Newburyport Herald, though sympathetic to Brown, reminded its readers of an incident forty years earlier when townfolk had acted much like the Virginians. A nocturnal arsonist who had terrorized Newburyport for several weeks was discovered to be a mere boy. Though they regretted it later, the residents demanded that he be executed. The Herald suggested that this episode taught that any community which feels itself threatened will act without mercy. Newburyport Herald, December 1, 1859.

19. John L. Thomas, The Liberator: William Lloyd Garrison (Boston, 1963), 398-9; Oates, To Purge This Land, 185-86.

20. Liberator, October 26, December 16, 1859. This was essentially the same position that Garrison had taken in 1831 after the Nat Turner insurrection at Southampton, Virginia. While refusing to justify the actions of the slave revolutionaries, he argued that "of all the men living . . . our slaves have the best reason to assert their rights by violent measures." See Thomas, Liberator, 134-36.

21. Tilden G. Edelstein, Strange Enthusiasm: A Life of Thomas Wentworth Higginson (New Haven, 1968), 221; James Redpath, Echoes of Harper's Ferry (New York, 1869), 311-313; John Greenleaf Whittier, Poetical Works (Boston, 1882), 313.

22. Whittier to Garrison, January 15, 1860, William Lloyd Garrison Papers, Boston Public Library.

23. Wendell Phillips, "The Lesson of the Hour," in Redpath, Echoes of Harpers Ferry, 43-66.

24. Parker Pillsbury to Mrs. E. F. Eddy, November 2, 1859, Antislavery Collection, Boston Public Library; Oliver Johnson to Garrison, November 21, 1859, Garrison Papers; James Freeman Clarke to Sumner, December 22, 1859, and George Luther Stearns to Sumner, March 10, 1860, both in Charles Sumner Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard.

25. Thomas Wentworth Higginson to his mother, October 27, 1859, in Edelstein, Strange Enthusiasm, 221.

26. "Plea for Captain John Brown," in The Writings of Henry David Thoreau, 20 vols. (Boston, 1906), IV, 409-440.

27. Springfield Republican, November 3, 1859; Thoreau, Writings, IV, 418; Gilbert Ostrander, "Emerson, Thoreau, and John Brown," Mississippi Valley Historical Review XXXIX (March 1953), 713-725.

28. Correspondence Between Lydia Maria Child and Governor Wise and Mrs. Mason of Virginia (New York, 1860); Liberator, November 11, November 25, 1859; Helene G. Baer, The Heart is Like Heaven: The Life of Lydia Maria Child (Philadelphia, 1964), 249-53.

29. Thomas, Liberator, 390-95.

30. Atlas and Bee, November 4, December 19, 1859; Liberator, December 9, 1859.

31. Boston Evening Transcript, December 2, 1859; Springfield Republican, December 3, 1859; Boston Post, December 3, 1859; Bradford Torrey and Francis H. Allen, eds., The Journal of Henry David Thoreau, 14 vols. (Boston, 1949) XIII, 15.

32. The vote in the Senate was eleven to eight against adjournment. Boston Post, December 3, 1859; Boston Evening Transcript, December 2, 1859.

33. Atlas and Bee, December 3, 1859; Liberator, December 9, 16, 1859.

34. Liberator, December 16, 1859. Commemorative services were held in many other cities and towns in Massachusetts. Perhaps the largest outside Boston was held in Worcester. There Higginson condemned Massachusetts for letting Brown die. Among the speakers was W. W. Rice, an antislavery politician who, on December 12, was elected mayor of Worcester. See Massachusetts Spy, December 7, 1859.

35. Boston Post, December 3, 1859; Boston Evening Transcript, December 2, 1859.

36. George Frederickson, The Black Image in the White Mind (New York, 1971), 101-107, talks about "romantic racism" among the abolitionists. See Higginson's speech in Liberator, May 28, 1858.

37. Wendell Phillips, "The Lesson of the Hour," in Redpath, Echoes of Harper's Ferry, 59-60.

38. Boston Post, December 3, 1859.

39. Liberator, December 9, 1859.

Chapter V

1. Boston Post, December 2, 1859.

2. Boston Post, December 3, 1859.

3. Courier, October 21, 29, November 26, 1859.

4. Boston Evening Transcript, December 8, 1859; Boston Post, December 9, 1859.

5. Boston Evening Transcript, December 8, 1859; Edward Everett Diary, December 8, 1859, Everett Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.

6. Paul R. Frothingham, Edward Everett: Orator and Statesman (Boston, 1925) is the standard biography of Everett.

7. Frothingham, Everett, 104-106.

8. Ibid., 49-50, 180-85.

9. Ibid., 343-62.

10. Everett Diary, October 28, 1859. Everett's patriotic lectures on Washington are incorporated in his Life of Washington (Boston, 1860).

11. Everett to Robert Winthrop, November 13, 1859, and Everett to Hiram Powers, December 13, 1859, both in Everett Papers. The concern over "statues knocked over" refers to the controversy over the proposal to place a statue of Daniel Webster on the grounds of the State House. The abolitionists were furious at the prospect.

12. Boston Evening Transcript, December 8, 1859.

13. Ibid. Antislavery journalists were incensed by Everett's sensational image of impaled babies. An editor of the Boston Traveler noted that there were no blacks at the Saint Bartholomew's Day massacre. See Redpath, Echoes of Harper's Ferry, 252-3.

14. Claude M. Fuess, The Life of Caleb Cushing, 2 vols. (New York, 1923), I, 40-41, 153, 157-257.

15. Ibid., I, 288-330.

16. Ibid., II, 3-81; Brauer, Cotton Versus Conscience, 170-76.

17. Fuess, Cushing, II, 3-81, 194-95.

18. Ibid., II, 152-57.

19. Boston Post, December 9, 1859; Fuess, Cushing, II, 238-40.

20. Boston Advertiser, December 9, 1859; Atlas and Bee, February 21, 1860; Massachusetts Spy, January 7, 1860; Springfield Republican, December 14, 1859; Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 1st session, 128. Wilson's statements are misleading. Boston re-elected mayor F. W. Lincoln, reluctantly supported by the Republicans who could not find a winning nominee of their own. Lincoln was the candidate of the "Parker House Clique"--a group of wealthy Whig merchants--and a supporter of the Faneuil Hall Union meeting.

21. Donald, Sumner, 348-52; Abbott, "Wilson," 189-90.

22. Springfield Republican, December 8, 1859; Charles Francis Adams to Henry Adams, January 16, 1860, and Charles Francis Adams to M. M. Fisher, January 21, 1860, both in Adams Papers; Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 1st session, 146-48.

23. E. R. Hoar to Sumner, January 12, 1860, and Frank Bird to Sumner, January 12, 1860, both in Sumner Papers; Bird to C. F. Adams, January 23, 1860, Adams to Bird, January 27, 1860, both in Adams Papers.

24. Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 1st session, 12.

25. Elias Nason and Thomas Russell, Life and Public Services of Henry Wilson (Boston, 1876), 267-69.

26. Wilson to John Andrew, January 27, 1860, Andrew Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.

27. Springfield Republican, January 27, 1860; Wilson to James Freeman Clarke, January 29, 1860, Clarke Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard.

28. Henry Wilson, Slave Power, II, 601-604; Wilson to Higginson, December 24, 1859, Higginson Papers; Wilson to Andrew, December 17, 1859, Andrew Papers.

29. O'Conner, Lords of the Loom, 102-104; Ralph V. Harlow, "The Rise and Fall of the Kansas Aid Movement," American Historical Review XLI (October 1935), 1-25.

30. Lawrence, Amos A. Lawrence, 125; Oates, To Purge This Land, 186; Amos A. Lawrence to Jefferson Davis, December 22, 1859, Lawrence Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.

31. Lawrence to Henry A. Wise, October 26, 1859, Lawrence Papers.

32. Lawrence, Draft of Undelivered Speech dated December 8, 1859, and Lawrence to E. J. Morris, December 9, 1859, both in Lawrence Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.

33. Jacob Collamer to Lawrence, December 29, 1859, and Lawrence to Jefferson Davis, December 22, 1859, both in Lawrence Papers.

34. Worcester Transcript, November 15, 1859; Boston Evening Transcript, November 15, 1859.

35. Worcester Transcript, November 16, 18, 1859; Boston Post, November 19, 24, 1859; Acts and Resolves Passed by the General Court of Massachusetts (Boston, 1859), chapter 291, p.641.

36. Wilson to Andrew, January 27, 1860, Andrew Papers; C. F. Adams Diary, February 3, 1860, Adams Papers.

37. U. S. Congress, Report of the Select Committee of the Senate on the Harper's Ferry Raid, 36th Congress, 1st session.

38. Pearson, Andrew, I, 111; Andrew to Sumner, March 3, 1860, Sumner Papers; Charles Sumner: His Complete Works, 20 vols. (Boston, 1900), VI, 81-88.

39. C. F. Adams Diary, March 9, 12, 1860; A. G. Browne to Sumner, March 22, 1860, J. P. Blanchard to Sumner, March 22, 1860, and Samuel E. Sewell to Sumner, March 21, 1860, all in Sumner Papers.

40. Sanborn, Recollections, I, 208-224, gives an account of the arrest. For contemporary reports, see Atlas and Bee, April 5, 1860; Boston Evening Transcript, April 4, 1860; and Springfield Republican, April 7, 1860.

41. Boston Evening Transcript, April 4, 1860. The vote on a preliminary reading was 142-70; but the resolution was never given final approval because the case was settled so quickly by the courts.

42. Boston Evening Transcript, April 4, 6, 1860. The court's decision can be found in Sanborn, Recollections, I, 212-217.

43. The Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Edward Waldo Emerson and Waldo Emerson Forbes, eds., 10 vols. (Boston, 1909-14), IX, 266; Boston Evening Transcript, April 5, 1860.

44. Boston Evening Transcript, April 9, 1860; Sumner, Works, VI, 100; Sanborn to Sumner, April 9, 1860, Sumner Papers; Newburyport Herald, April 7, 1860; "Warrington" in Springfield Republican, April 7, 1860; Boston Post, April 9, 1860.

Chapter VI

1. Hale's career and views are best gleaned from the files of his Boston Advertiser. See also "Warrington's" column in the Springfield Republican, January 6, 1860.

2. Atlas and Bee, January 4, 1860.

3. Boston Evening Transcript, March 22, 1860; Atlas and Bee, March 29, 1860.

4. Lincoln to Theodore Canisius, May 17, 1859, in Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1953), III, 380.

5. Edward L. Pierce, Letter of E. L. Pierce Containing Important Statistics in Regard to the Foreign Vote (Boston, 1857); Atlas and Bee, May 23, 1860. The Springfield Republican of May 27, 1860, blamed the Democrats for enactment of the Two-Year Amendment.

6. Pilot, January 21, 1860.

7. Worcester Bay State, quoted in Liberator, January 21, 1860.

8. Atlas and Bee, January 13, 14, 1860.

9. Boston Herald, February 23, 1860; Lynn Bay State, March 1, 1860. Orestes Brownson noted that "the middle class is always a firm champion of equality when it concerns humbling a class above it, but it is its inveterate foe when it concerns elevating a class below it." Foner, Free Soil, 23.

10. Springfield Republican, February 21, March 7, 17, 1860. See also Atlas and Bee, February 24, 27, 1860.

11. Pilot, March 3, 1860; Boston Post, February 21, March 1, 3, 1860. The Springfield Republican ridiculed the Post's argument: "The Southern girls are not going barefoot because Lynn boys think Negroes have souls as well as soles." Springfield Republican, March 7, 1860. See also Boston Herald, February 22, 1860; Lynn Bay State, March 8, 1860.

12. Boston Evening Transcript, February 7, 1860; Atlas and Bee, February 23, 1860; Charles Francis Adams Diary, January 19, 1860, Adams Papers.

13. Springfield Republican, May 10, 1860.

14. E. L. Pierce to Charles Francis Adams, May 1, 1860, Adams Paper. See also E. L. Pierce to Sumner, April 11, 1860, Sumner Papers.

15. Charles Francis Adams to E. L. Pierce, May 3, 1860, Charles Sumner Pierce Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard; Pierce, Sumner, III, 604. See also J. Z. Goodrich to Henry Dawes, April 17, 1860, Dawes Papers, Library of Congress; Frank Bird to Sumner, April 3, 1860, and E. L. Pierce to Sumner, April 28, 1860, both in Sumner Papers.

16. Harrington, Banks, 48; W. O. Bartlett to Banks, May 4, 1860, Banks Papers, Library of Congress; Springfield Republican, May 9, 11, 1860. Bowles tried to create interest in a Banks-Lincoln ticket. See Springfield Republican, April 28, 1860.

17. Harrington, Banks, 41-53; Donald, Sumner, 343; Frank W. Bird, Review of Governor Banks' Veto of the Revised Code on Account of Its Authorizing the Enrollment of Colored Citizens in the Militia (Boston, 1860). Banks' second veto message is printed in Atlas and Bee, March 27, 1860. On the anti-Banks sentiment at the Massachusetts Republican Convention, see E. L. Pierce to C. F. Adams, March 10, 1860, Adams Papers; Edward Hamilton to Banks, May 9, 1860, Banks Papers.

18. John Murray Forbes to Nassau Williams, Sr., June 18, 1860, in Sarah Forbes Hughes, ed., Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1899), I, 183-4; William B. Hesseltine, ed., Three Against Lincoln: Murrat Halstead Reports the Caucuses of 1860 (Baton Rouge, La., 1960), 167-70.

19. Amos A. Lawrence to John J. Crittenden, January 6, 1860, and March 31, 1860, both in Crittenden Papers, Library of Congress; Amos Lawrence, Memo to the Secretary of the Washington Union Committee, February, 1860, Lawrence Papers.

20. John Williams to Lawrence, March 26, 1860. See also Samuel Hooper to Lawrence, January 29, 1860, and Emory Washburn to Lawrence, March 26, 1860, all in Lawrence Papers.

21. Lawrence to William Appleton, April 25, 1860, Lawrence Papers; Everett to John P. Kennedy, May 17, 1860, Everett to A. H. Dawson, October 25, 1860, Everett to William Everett, June 10, May 15, 1860, Everett to Washington Hunt, May 14, 1860, and Everett to Robert Bonner, May 12, 1860, all in Everett Papers; Everett to Crittenden, May 28, and June 6, Crittenden Papers; Boston Evening Transcript, October 25, 1860.

22. William Appleton Diary, September 5, 1860, Massachusetts Historical Society; Courier, November 3, 1860.

23. See, for example, George Hillard's speeches printed in the Boston Evening Transcript, September 6, 1860, and in the Newburyport Herald, October 10, 1860. Resolutions of the Constitutional Union ratification meeting in Boston Evening Transcript, June 2, 1860.

24. Wilson quoted in Boston Evening Transcript, September 11, 1860; Andrew in Boston Evening Transcript, September 6, 1860.

25. Springfield Republican, May 11, 1860; Atlas and Bee, September 13, 1860.

26. Roy Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy (New York, 1948) is detailed on the politics of the Buchanan Administration and the division of the Democratic Party.

27. Emerson, Journals, IX, 257; Halstead, Three Against Lincoln, 99, lists the votes of the Massachusetts delegation.

28. Post, June 25, 1860; Halstead, Three Against Lincoln, 245; R. S. Spofford to Cushing, June 2, 1860, Cushing papers, Library of Congress.

29. Boston Evening Transcript, June 25, 1860.

30. Butler to Cushing, July 19, 1860, Cushing papers; Pilot, July 7, 1860. The papers supporting Breckinridge were the Boston Post, New Bedford Times, Banstable Patriot, Salem Advocate, Essex Democrat, and Lowell Advertiser. For examples of the reports Cushing was receiving, see William B. Pike to Cushing, July 7, 1860, Jonathon F. Cook to Cushing, July 24, 1860, and H. G. Sleeper to Cushing, August 21, 1860, all in Cushing papers.

31. Boston Post, July 30, June 11, 1860. On the reception given the Breckinridge men, see Boston Post, May 15, 16, 1860; Boston Evening Transcript, May 14, July 7, 1860; Boston Herald, May 15, 1860.

32. Boston Herald, July 11, 1860; Pilot, July 7, 1860; Boston Evening Transcript, July 18-20, 1860. Irish support of Douglas undoubtedly was not hurt by the nativist claim that Douglas was a Roman Catholic. See Atlas and Bee, June 25, 1860.

33. Boston Post, June 25, 1860; Springfield Republican, June 22, 1860.

34. Donald, Sumner, 352-57; Sumner to Henry L. Pierce, June 29, 1860, Pierce papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University; "The Barbarism of Slavery" can be found in Sumner, Works, VI, 113-237.

35. Ibid., 131-35, 144-46, 152-3.

36. Springfield Republican, June 6, 1860; M. M. Fisher to C. F. Adams, June 18, 1860, Adams papers; C. F. Adams Diary, June 4, 1860. See also Advertiser, June 6, 1860, and Traveler, June 8. Sumner's letter to Pierce quoted in Laura White, "Sumner and the Crisis of 1860-61," in Avery Craven, ed., Essays in Honor of William E. Dodd (Chicago, 1935), 141.

37. Bird to Sumner, June 14, 1860, E. L. Pierce to Sumner, June 13, 1860, W. S. Robinson to Sumner, June 16, 1860, all in Sumner papers; Donald, Sumner, 357-63.

38. Springfield Republican, July 14, 1860.

39. C. R. Train to Henry Dawes, August, 1860, Dawes papers, Library of Congress. See also Springfield Republican, August 25, 28, 1860. On Sumner's role see Pearson, Andrew, I, 119-21, and Donald, Sumner, 363-65. Also Sumner's speech at the Massachusetts Republican Convention in Boston Evening Transcript, August 29, 1860; and A. G. Browne to Bird, August 28, 1860, Charles Sumner Bird Collection, Houghton Library.

40. Springfield Republican, August 30, September 1, 1860.

41. Pilot, September 8, 1860; Courier, November 5, 1860.

42. Wilson to Dawes, September 22, 1860, Dawes papers; Andrew to Charles F. Winslow, September 7, 1860, Winslow Diary, September 4, 6, 1860, Winslow to James A. Dix, September 15, 1860, all in C. F. Winslow papers, Massachusetts Historical Society; Hingham Journal, September 8, 1860; Advertiser, September 8.

43. Sumner, Works, VII, 26-40; Andrew to Jonathon Bourne, September 6, 1860,in Boston Evening Transcript, September 8, 1860.

44. Springfield Republican, October 20, 1860; Advertiser, September 7, 1860; Atlas and Bee, October 29, 1860; Newburyport Herald, quoted in Liberator, June 15, 1860.

45. Atlas and Bee, August 2, September 5, 1860; Liberator, August 10, 1860; Springfield Republican, September 7, 1860; Nason and Russell, Henry Wilson, 276-284.

46. Charles Francis Adams Diary, October 31, 1860.

47. T. P. Chandler, speech at Brookline, in Advertiser, September 29, 1860; Springfield Republican, November 5, 1860; Atlas and Bee, October 10, 30, 1860; Sumner, Works, VI, 346.

48. Everett to Mrs. Charles Eames, June 29, 1860, Everett to Washington Hunt, July 21, 1860, both in Everett papers; see also Advertiser, August 23, 1860, and George Lunt to Amos A. Lawrence, January, 1860, Lawrence papers.

49. Pilot, September 29, 1860. See also Post, August 29, September 10, 1860; Salem Advocate, August 28, 1860; Erasmus Beach to Lawrence, October 17, 1860, Lawrence papers.

50. Pilot, October 29, 1860; Atlas and Bee, November 3, 1860; Edward Everett to William Everett, October 1, 1860, Everett papers; Butler to Cushing, September 10, 1860, Cushing Papers; Post, September 24, 1860; Butler to Lawrence, October 9, 1860, Lawrence papers; Boston Herald, October 6, 1860.

51. Courier, November 2, 3, 5, 1860; Post, November 3, 1860; Atlas and Bee, October 24, 30, 1860.

52. Boston Journal, November 2, 1860.

53. Dawes to P. E. Aldrich, May 13, 1860, Dawes papers; Massachusetts Spy, August 8, September 26, October 3, 1860; Sumner, Works, VII, 62. The letters of Worcester Republicans testify to their antipathy to Thayer. See J. D. Baldwin to Sumner, October 29, 1860, Edwin Byrnnes to Sumner, October 22, 1860, both in Sumner papers. Also P. E. Aldrich to Dawes, August 9, 1860, Dawes Papers, and Edwin Byrnnes to Andrew, September 24, 1860, Andrew Papers.

54. Massachusetts, Secretary of the Commonwealth, Returns of Votes, 1860, Microfilm copy in Library of University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Chapter VII

1. Abbott, "Wilson," 197; Advertiser, November 10, 1860.

2. Advertiser, November 7, 1860; Sumner, Works, VII, 77; see also Boston Evening Transcript, November 9, 1860.

3. Advertiser, November 12, 1860; for similar opinions, see Springfield Republican, November 10, 1860; and Boston Evening Transcript, November 13, 1860.

4. Post, November 28, 1860; Boston Herald, November 15, 21, 1860.

5. Courier, November 10, 1860; Post, November 15, 1860; Everett to Henry Holland, November 11, 1860, Everett Papers.

6. Post, November 10, 15; Courier, November 10, 12, 15; W. Raymond Lee to Cushing, Cushing Papers.

7. The following data on Boston's banks come from the Advertiser and Boston Commercial Bulletin, November - December, 1860. July figures from Advertiser, July 25, 1860.

Holdings of Boston Banks, 1860

(in millions of dollars)

	specie	deposits
July	5.3	19.7
November 7	4.9	20.1
November 14	4.8	19.6
November 21	4.5	19.3
November 28	3.9	17.9
December 5	3.5	17.3
December 12	3.5	17.1
December 19	3.5	17.3

8. Springfield Republican, December 10, 1860. For information on the impact of the crisis on manufacturing, see Springfield Republican, November 19, December 1, 8, 15, 1860; Boston Evening Transcript, November 20, 1860; Commercial Bulletin, November 24, December 1, 8, 15, 1860; Advertiser, November 23, 24, 1860. Reference to shoe towns in Commercial Bulletin, December 15, 1860. Philip S. Foner described the New York economy in Business and Slavery (New York, 1941).

The following figures represent the quoted prices of Massachusetts' leading enterprises on the Boston stock market, before and after the election of Lincoln. All figures from the Advertiser.

Boston Stock Market, 1860

Merchants' Bank	July 30	103-3/4	December 4	100
Bank of Commerce	July 16	108-3/4	December 8	103
State Bank	July 23	70-3/4	December 10	65
Webster Bank	July 30	109-3/4	December 8	103
Boston and Providence R.R.	July 26	108	December 7	106
Boston and Maine R.R.	July 30	109-1/2	December 5	110
Old Colony R.R.	July 24	107-1/2	December 4	105-1/2
Boston and Worcester R.R.	July 26	108	December 10	106-1/4
Appleton Manufacturing	July 19	1110	December 6	1005
Atlantic Cotton Mills	July 19	940	December 6	800
Bates Manufacturing	July 30	113-3/4	December 12	97
Chicopee Manufacturing	July 26	347-1/2	November 26	280
Lowell Manufacturing	July 26	740	December 13	610
Massachusetts Cotton Mills	July 16	967	December 24	795
Merrimack Manufacturing	July 23	1242-1/2	December 29	1070

9. Courier, December 3, 7, 11, 1860; Commercial Bulletin, December 1, 1860; Post, December 13, 1860.

10. Henry J. Gardner to C. F. Adams, December 10, 1860, Caleb Stetson to C. F. Adams, December 15, 1860, C. F. Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., December 7, 15, 1860, M. H. Simpson to C. F. Adams, December 7, 1860, C. F. Adams to Simpson, December 9, 1860, all in Adams Papers. See also articles in Boston Evening Transcript, November 17, 27, 1860, and Atlas and Bee, November 15, 22 and December 3, 1860.

11. Pilot, December 1, 1860. See also Courier, November 10, 1860. The Post, December 1, 1860, denounced the John Brown meeting as "a severe test of the forebearance of this community" but warned that interfering with it would play into the hands of the abolitionists. Atlas and Bee, December 5, 1860; Charles F. Winslow Diary, November 30, 1860, Winslow Papers.

12. "Warrington" in the New York Tribune, December 5, 1860, quoted in "Warrington" Pen Portraits, 247; Boston Evening Transcript, December 3, 1860; Courier, December 4, 1860; Liberator, December 7, 1860; Post, December 4, 1860.

13. Baer, The Heart Is Like Heaven, 261; Boston Evening Transcript, December 4, 1860; Liberator, December 7, 1860; Atlas and Bee, December 7, 1860.

14. Post, December 4, 1860; Courier, December 4,5, 1860; Pilot, December 15, 1860. New York Herald quoted in Atlas and Bee, December 5, 1860.

15. Boston Evening Transcript, November 27, 1860.

16. Post, December 11, 1860; Boston Evening Transcript, November 30, 1860. See also Pilot, December 8, 1860; Boston Evening Transcript, November 13, 20, 30, 1860.

17. Post, December 10, 11, 1860; Springfield Republican, December 4, 14, 20, 1860; Courier, December 14, 1860.

18. Boston Evening Transcript, December 24, 1860; Advertiser, December 1, 1860; Springfield Republican, December 27, 1860.

19. Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., December 18, 1860, Adams Papers.

20. Henry Dawes to Ella Dawes, December 9, 1860, Dawes Papers. See also Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., December 9, 1860, Adams Papers.

21. Crittenden's proposals were first made public in New York Tribune, December 11, 1860. Thayer's speech in Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd session, December 12, 1860, 76-77. David Potter in Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis (New Haven, 1942), refers to this period as an "interregnum in the party." See pp. 75-111. See also Kenneth M. Stampp, And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis, 1860-61 (Baton Rouge, La., 1950), 63-82.

22. C. F. Adams Diary, December 23, 1837, quoted in Duberman, Adams, 64.

23. C. F. Adams Diary, August 10, 1848, quoted in Duberman, Adams, 151. "The road to honor," Adams wrote, "if any such will ever be given to me, is not likely to be through Executive patronage, least of all whilst wielded by the hand which possesses it in America." C. F. Adams Diary, October 8, 1841, in Duberman, Adams, 76.

24. C. F. Adams Diary, April 6, 16, 1860.

25. C. F. Adams Diary, November 12, December 20, 1860. See also C. F. Adams Diary, December 13, 15, 1860; C. F. Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., December 7, 1860; C. F. Adams to Erastus Hopkins, December 15, 1860; and C. F. Adams to Richard Henry Dana, December 23, 1860, all in Adams Papers.

26. C. F. Adams Diary, December 3, 13, 1860; Journal of the Committee of Thirty-Three, House of Representatives, 36th Congress, 2nd session, Report no. 31, 7-8; Duberman, Adams, 227-248.

27. C. F. Adams Diary, December 20, 25, 1860; Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., December 26, 1860, Adams Papers.

28. Frank Bird to C. F. Adams, January 6, 1861 and E. L. Pierce to C. F. Adams, December 29, 1860, both in Adams Papers. Pierce's article appeared in the Atlas and Bee, January 9, 1861, signed by "a legal gentleman well known in Norfolk county." See also E. L. Pierce to Sumner, January 8, 1861, Sumner Papers.

29. Charles Francis Adams, Jr. to C. F. Adams, December 28, 1860; C. F. Adams, Jr. to mother, December 28, 1860; C. F. Adams to C. F. Adams, Jr., December 30, 1860, all in Adams Papers.

30. C. F. Adams to Bird, January 2, 1861; C. F. Adams to E. L. Banfield, January 13, 1861. See also C. F. Adams to Horace Gray, Jr., December 30, 1860; C. F. Adams to E. L. Pierce, January 1, 1861; C. F. Adams to John Murray Forbes, December 31, 1860; C. F. Adams to W. S. Robinson, January 5, 1861; C. F. Adams Diary, January 1, 5, 1861, all in Adams Papers.

31. Advertiser, January 1, 1861; William Claflin to Sumner, January 4, 1861, Sumner Papers.

32. Sumner, Works, VII, 78; Sara Lyman to Sumner, December 31, 1860, E. L. Pierce to Sumner, January 8, 1861, both in Sumner Papers. E. L. Pierce to C. F. Adams, December 31, 1861, Adams Papers.

33. C. F. Adams Diary, December 18, January 6, 13; Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., January 17, 1861, all in Adams Papers.

34. E. L. Pierce to Charles Sumner, January 8, 1861, Sumner Papers. In January, Pierce told Andrew that he and Sumner were "the only perfect men left that I know of." E. L. Pierce to Andrew, January 8, 1861, Andrew Papers.

35. E. L. Pierce to Sumner, December 15, 1860. See also Pearson, Andrew, I, 133-6; Henry Adams, The Great Secession Winter (New York, 1958), 7-8.

36. Andrew to C. F. Adams, January 18, 1861, Adams Papers. Charles Francis Adams, Jr., wrote his father on December 29, 1860, that he had talked with Andrew on his return from Washington, and that the governor approved of the New Mexico plan. "That cheered me up amazingly," Adams, Jr. wrote.

37. See letter from Richard S. Fay (leader of the anti-Brown riot) to Banks, December 6, 1860, Banks Papers. Banks' speech in Post, January 4, 1861. Henry Pierce's response is in Atlas and Bee, January 4, 1861.

38. Acts and Resolves Passed by the General Court of Massachusetts for 1861 (Boston, 1861), 583-4, 586-90.

39. C. F. Adams to Andrew, January 4, 1861, Andrew Papers.

40. Pearson, Andrew, I, 143; William Schouler, A History of Massachusetts in the Civil War, 2 vols. (Boston, 1868), I, 18-19. See also William Schouler to Andrew, January 8, 1861, Andrew Papers. Andrew tried to keep these missions secret but word of them soon spread. See Boston Journal, January 11, 1861; and letters by Erastus Fairbanks, Governor of Vermont, to Andrew, January 11, 19, 1861, both in Andrew Papers.

41. Boston Journal, January 2, 1861. See speeches by Senator Wilson and Representative Delano in Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd session, 107, 210. The Springfield Republican, January 2, 1861, claimed that 125,000 muskets were sent to the South; but on January 7, the paper reported that 120,000 remained: "The Northern boys who go South and mop out the traitors will not be at a loss for tools to do it with."

42. Andrew to Winfield Scott, January 12, 1861, and Scott to Henry Wilson in Wilson to Andrew, January 15, 1861, both in Andrew Papers. See also Robert E. McGraw, "Minutemen of '61: The Pre-Civil War Massachusetts Militia," Civil War History XV (June, 1966), 101-115.

43. Courier, January 21, 1861; Salem Advocate, January 26, 1861. See also Post, January 23, 1861.

44. Pearson, Andrew, I, 152-53; Atlas and Bee, January 28, 1861; Boston Evening Transcript, January 23, 1861.

Chapter VIII

1. Charles Follen to Sumner, February 7, 1861, Sumner Papers; White, "Sumner and the Crisis," 138; Jane Pease and William Pease, "Confrontation and Abolitionism in the 1850's," Journal of American History LVIII (March, 1972), 923-37.

2. Francis Jackson Garrison and Wendell Phillips Garrison, William Lloyd Garrison, 1805-1879: The Story of His Life, Told by His Children, 4 vols. (New York, 1889), III, 447; Abbey Kelley Foster to Stephen Foster, December 4, 1857, Abbey Kelley Foster to Wendell Phillips, June 24, 1859, both in Foster Papers, American Antiquarian Society, Worcester; Liberator, March 30, June 15, September 28, 1860. See also Alma Lutz, Crusade for Freedom: Women in the Anti-Slavery Movement (Boston, 1968), 265-70. Foster had solicited funds for the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society from Republicans and then had branded them as "the most dangerous obstacles of the antislavery cause." Garrison labeled this behavior as "neither honest or wise." Garrison to A. K. Foster, September 8, 1859, Garrison Papers.

3. Garrison to Parker Pillsbury, June 3, 1859, Garrison Papers; Garrison to J. Miller McKim, October 21, 1860, Garrison Papers; Garrison's speech at Framingham in Liberator, July 20, 1860; speech at American Anti-Slavery Society in Liberator, May 18, 1860. See also Liberator, September 7, 1860; Garrison to Wendell Phillips Garrison, August 9, 1860; Garrison Papers. Garrison had friends enough in the Republican party to receive an invitation to a Republican torch-light parade and an effusive letter from Sumner expressing gratitude for Garrison's long service against slavery. See Rev. John T. Sargent to Garrison, October 15, 1860, and Sumner to Garrison, September 9, 1860, both in Garrison Papers.

4. Lydia Child to Sumner, April 4, 1860, June 17, 1860, Sumner Papers. See also Child to Congressman Signey Egerton, July 6, 1860, Miscellaneous Bound Letters, Massachusetts Historical Society.

5. Liberator, June 8, June 27, August 24, 1860.

6. Wendell Phillips, Speeches, Lectures, and Letters, James Redpath, ed. (Boston, 1894), 294-5, 299, 303-5.

7. Garrison to Andrew, March 8, 1861, Andrew Papers; Phillips to Sumner, April 2, 1861, and Child to Sumner, March 23, 1861, both in Sumner Papers. See also Phillips to Andrew, January, 1861, Andrew Papers; Garrison to Andrew, February 28, 1861, in Garrison to Sumner, April 6, 1861, Sumner Papers. On the abolitionists' political advice, see Garrison to Sumner, February 25, 1861, Sumner Papers; Howe to Bird, January 30, 1861, Howe Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard. Andrew told Garrison his advice was always welcome: March 5, 1861, Garrison Papers.

8. Oliver Johnson, William Lloyd Garrison and His Times (London, 1882), 338-9, 346. See also James B. Stewart, "Aims and Impact of Garrisonian Abolitionists, 1840-1860," Civil War History XV (September 1969) 197-209.

9. Maria Wescott Chapman to Mrs. E. P. Nichol, December 10, 1860, Anti-Slavery Collection, Boston Public Library; Liberator, December 7, 1860; Phillips, Speeches, 344; Boston Evening Transcript, December 17, 1860.

10. Liberator, January 4, 1861; Phillips' speech, Liberator, January 25, 1861.

11. Courier, December 18, 19, 1860, January 23, 1861.

12. Garrison to Oliver Johnson, January 11, 1861, Garrison Papers. This letter also appears in the Garrison family's Life of Garrison, IV, 3-4, but the passage in which Garrison shows his respect for Mrs. Johnson's revelations is omitted. Howe to Sumner, January 20, 1861, Howe Papers, Houghton Library; E. L. Pierce to Sumner, February 10, 1860, Sumner Papers; Phillips to Samuel May, December 27, 1860, Anti-Slavery Collection, Boston Public Library; Boston Evening Transcript, January 21, 1860; Carlos Martyn, Wendell Phillips: The Agitator (New York, 1890), 310. Phillips also owned one of John Brown's pikes. See George W. Smalley, Anglo-American Memories (New York, 1911), 98-99.

13. Liberator, January 18, 1861; George W. Curtis to C. F. Norton, December 19, 1860, Curtis Papers, Houghton Library; James McPherson, The Struggle for Equality: Abolitionists and the Negro in the Civil War and Reconstruction (Princeton, 1964), 44-45.

14. Atlas and Bee, January 25, 1861; Lydia Maria Child to Sumner, January 28, 1861, Sumner Papers; Baer, The Heart Is Like Heaven, 147-50; Liberator, February 1, 1860; Boston Evening Transcript, January 24, 1860.

15. Atlas and Bee, January 25, 1860; Boston Evening Transcript, January 24, 1860; Liberator, February 1, 1861; Irving H. Bartlett, Wendell Phillips: Brahmin Radical (Boston, 1961), 226-234.

16. Pearson, Andrew, I, 150; Smalley, Anglo-American Memories, 90, 101-102; Boston Evening Transcript, February 2, 1861; Horace Sargent to Andrew, January 23, 1861, Andrew Papers.

17. Pearson, Andrew, I, 151; R. E. Apthorp to Sumner, January 30, 1861, Sumner Papers.

18. Boston Evening Transcript, January 25, 1861; Advertiser, January 25, 1861; Liberator, February 1, 1861.

19. Post, January 26, 1861; Boston Evening Transcript, January 25, 1861.

20. Lydia Maria Child to Sumner, January 28, 1861; Springfield Republican, February 18, 1861; Z. K. Pangborn to Andrew, January 27, 1861, Andrew Papers; Atlas and Bee, January 26, 1861; Boston Evening Transcript, January 26, 1861. Conservative Republicans were horrified by the implications of the riot. "It is a red letter day in the calendar of abolitionism," the Advertiser wrote, "when it can be said that its arguments have to be answered by force." Advertiser, January 25, 1861.

21. Hampshire Gazette and Northampton Courier, January 29, 1861. See also editorials of Reading Gazette, and Worcester Spy, in Liberator, February 8, 1861, and of New Bedford Republican-Standard, in Liberator, February 22, 1861.

22. Thomas A. Dunham to W. S. Robinson, January 25, 1861, Robinson Scrapbooks, I, 3, Rare Book Department, Boston Public Library; Atlas and Bee, January 21, 22, 28, 1861; Boston Evening Transcript, January 22, 1861; Dedham Gazette, January 26, 1861.

23. Springfield Republican, February 1, 1861; John Murray Forbes to Andrew, January 26, 1861, Andrew Papers; Boston Evening Transcript, February 15, 1861.

24. Slade's letter originally appeared in the Georgia Literary and Temperance Gazette, January 3, 1861; it was published in the Boston Journal, January 11, 1861, and Liberator, February 8, 1861. See Courier, February 27, 1861; Atlas and Bee, February 20, 1861; and Boston Evening Transcript,

February 19, 20, 26, and March 12, 1861 for committee testimony.

25. Horace Sargent to Andrew, January 21, 1861, Andrew Papers; Boston Evening Transcript, March 13, 1861, and Atlas and Bee, April 1, 9, 11, 1861.

26. Christian Examiner, March 1859; Atlas and Bee, April 25, 1860; Liberator, June 15, 1860. Leonard F. Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790-1860 (Chicago, 1961), is the most comprehensive treatment of the legal status of ante-bellum Northern blacks.

27. Massachusetts Negroes, 1765-1860

	1765	1790	1800	1810	1820	1830	1840	1850	1860
Negro Population	4979	5463	6452	6737	6740	7045	8669	9064	9842
Percentage of Total Population	2.2%	1.5%	1.5%	1.5%	1.3%	1.2%	1.2%	.9%	.8%

Population figures from Abstract of the 1860 Massachusetts Census, 289, 334.

There was also a substantial decrease in the relative size of the black population in Boston from 3.1% in 1830 to 1.3% in 1860. See Knights, Plain People of Boston, 29.

28. Louis Ruchames, "Race and Education in Massachusetts," Negro History Bulletin XIII (December 1949), 53-59; Ruchames, "Jim Crow Railroads in Massachusetts," American Quarterly VIII (Spring, 1956), 61-75; Ruchames, "Race, Marriage, and Abolitionism in Massachusetts," Journal of Negro History XL (July 1955), 250-273; Donald M. Jacobs, "The Nineteenth Century Struggle over Segregated Education in the Boston Schools," Journal of Negro Education XXXIX (Winter, 1970), 76-85; Carleton Mabee, "Negro Boycott in the Boston Public Schools," New England Quarterly XLI (September 1968), 341-361. William Wells Brown has biographical material on Boston blacks in his The Black Man, His Antecedents, His Genius, and His Achievements (Boston, 1865). The only historical study of the Boston black community is thin and dated: John Daniels, In Freedom's Birthplace: A Study of Boston's Negroes (Boston, 1916).

29. Benjamin Quarles, Black Abolitionists (New York, 1969), 237; Oates, To Purge This Land, 73-75; see also William H. Siebert, "The Underground Railroad in Massachusetts," Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society XLV (1935), 25-100.

30. J. B. Smith to Sumner, June 7, 1860, Sumner Papers. See the account of a sparsely attended meeting on African civilization chaired by Smith in Boston Journal, November 3, 1859. A sketch of Rock appears in Brown, The Black Man. See also Quarles, Black Abolitionists,

224-5, 234; Liberator, February 3, August 10, 1860. Frederick Douglass accused Nell, Remond and other Massachusetts blacks of being "catspaws" of Garrison, but the evidence would indicate otherwise. See also Pease and Pease, "Boston Garrisonians and the Problem of Frederick Douglass," Canadian Journal of History II (1967), 39.

31. For example see Remond's speech in the Liberator, March 12, 1858, where he laments the lack of black support for the antislavery and anti-discrimination struggle.

32. Handlin, Boston's Immigrants, 60-70; Frederick Douglass, My Bondage and My Freedom (New York, 1855; reprint ed., Chicago, 1970), 271-72; Liberator, March 16, 1860. There is no detailed study of the displacement of blacks by the Irish in Boston; but for a model study of a similar phenomenon in Philadelphia, see Theodore Hershberg, "Free Blacks in Antebellum Philadelphia: A Study of Ex-Slaves and Socio-Economic Decline," Journal of Social History V (Winter, 1971-72). James Freeman Clarke argued that there were more trades open to Irish than to blacks. See Clarke's "The Free Colored Population of Massachusetts," Christian Examiner, March 1859, 354-55.

33. Liberator, January 20, August 31, 1860.

34. Liberator, February 3, 1860; Springfield Republican, November 4, 1859; Atlas and Bee, October 4, 1860; Lewis Hayden to Sumner, June 11, 1860, Sumner Papers.

35. Liberator, March 12, 1858; Springfield Republican, December 15, 1860. Frederick Douglass also believed that American blacks would benefit from fighting to suppress the secessionists. See his Boston speech in James McPherson, The Negro's Civil War (New York, 1965), 14-15.

36. Liberator, February 22, 1861. See J. Sella Martin's address to the Joint Committee on the Personal Liberty Laws in Atlas and Bee, January 30, 1861.

37. Liberator, February 22, 1861; Post, February 15, 1861.

Chapter IX

1. For biographical information on Nehemiah Adams see F. A. Warfield, Ministries That Never End (Boston, 1878); Dictionary of American Biography, I, 93-4.

2. Robert C. Senior, "New England Congregationalists and the Anti-Slavery Movement, 1830-1860" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale, 1954), 88; Nehemiah Adams, A South-Side View of Slavery (Boston, 1855).

3. Adams, South-Side View, 15, 24-25, 41-48.

4. Ibid., 46, 58.

5. Adams, The Sable Cloud: A Southern Tale with Northern Comments (Boston, 1861), 32-61, 135, 179-87.

6. Advertiser, December 1, 1860; Courier, January 5, April 6, 1861.

7. Christian Examiner, January 1955, 136-49.

8. James Freeman Clarke, Anti-Slavery Days (New York, 1884), 72; Clarke, Autobiography, Diary, and Correspondence, Edward Everett Hale, ed. (New York, 1891), 81-93.

9. Clarke to Margaret Fuller, March 18, 1836, in Clarke, Autobiography, 115.

10. Clarke, Autobiography, 135-170; Octavius Brooks Frothingham, Boston Unitarianism, 1820-1850: A Study of the Life and Work of Nathaniel Langdon Frothingham (New York, 1890), 60-61, 196-8. Clarke's basic theological view is presented in his Orthodoxy: Its Truth and Errors (Boston, 1866).

11. Tocsin, January, 1861; Liberator, February 1, 1861.

12. Clarke, Secession, Concession, or Self-Possession: Which? (Boston, 1861); Clarke to Sumner, December 8, 1860, Sumner Papers; Clarke, Autobiography, 270; Clarke's sermon of April 4, 1861, is in Atlas and Bee, April 6, 1861.

13. Church membership is a difficult statistic to decipher due to the varying-requirements for membership; but the following statistics give some indication of the relative size of the most important denominations in Massachusetts. Figures from Statistics of the United States in 1860; Compiled from the Original Returns and Being the Final Exhibit of the Eighth Census (Washington, 1866), 408-9.

	Number of Churches	Accommodation	Value
Baptist	270	108,148	$2,106,960
Congregationalist (Orthodox)	501	254,689	$4,689,735
Methodist	295	107,808	$1,530,682
Roman Catholic	88	74,225	$1,867,750
Unitarian	158	87,255	$2,665,316

14. Daniel Walker Howe, The Unitarian Conscience: Harvard Moral Philosophy (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970), 8; Richard Eddy Sykes, "Massachusetts Unitarianism and Social Change: A religious Social System in Transition, 1780-1870" (Ph.D. dissertation, Minnesota, 1966), 83, 234-45, 158-61.

15. Howe, Unitarian Conscience, 296. See also chapters on "Unitarian Whiggery" and slavery, pps. 205-235 and 270-300.

16. Timothy Smith, Revivalism and Social Reform in Mid-Nineteenth Century America (New York, 1958), 204. Charles C. Cole, The Social Ideas of the Northern Evangelists (New York, 1954) covers similar themes but is less useful.

17. Boston Recorder, March 7, 1861.

18. Recorder, January 17, 1861; Recorder, February 13, 1854, quoted in Smith, Revivalism and Social Reform, 150; Parsons Cooke, Moral Machinery Simplified (Andover, Massachusetts, 1839), quoted in Senior, "New England Congregationalists," 92-93.

19. Parsons Cooke in Recorder, April 14, 1861. Moses Stuart, a scholar at the Andover Seminary, was probably the leading exponent of this view. See his Conscience and the Constitution (Boston, 1850). Also, Senior, "New England Congregationalists," 212-214.

20. Congregationalist, January 13, April 27, 1860; Atlas and Bee, February 2, 1860. But even antislavery ministers could be jealous of rivals. Thus the Congregationalist, September 16, 1859, argued that antislavery preaching should be done by "judicious, patient, long-continued, pastoral effort, rather than by the occasional and spasmodic eloquence of an agent."

21. Congregationalist, August 12, 1859, January 18, 1861. See also letter rebuking Parsons Cooke in Recorder, April 4, 1861.

22. Zion's Herald, March 21, 1861; William Warren Sweet, The Methodist Episcopal Church and the Civil War (Cincinatti, 1912); Charles B. Swaney, Episcopal Methodism and Slavery (Boston, 1926).

23. Zion's Herald, November 28, 1854, July 7, 1851, quoted in Smith, Revivalism and Social Reform, 155, 205; Gilbert Haven, National Sermons (Boston, 1869), 179; Zion's Herald, December 21, 1859.

24. Christian Watchman and Reflector, March 26, 1857, quoted in Smith, Revivalism and Social Reform, 152-3; Watchman and Reflector, December 19, 1859; William G. McGloughlin, New England Dissent, 1630-1833: Baptists and the Separation of Church and State (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971), II, 1263-77; Henry S. Burrage, A History of the Baptists in New England (Philadelphia, 1894).

25. Boston Traveler, January 16, 1861. Stuart W. Chapman in "The Protestant Campaign for the Union," (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale, 1939) discusses this "divine right of government" theory at great length and argues that it prevailed generally among the ante-bellum Protestant clergy. I would suggest that, before the war, only conservatives subscribed to this view. After the bombardment of Sumter, others seized upon it as justification for fighting a war they supported on other grounds.

26. Recorder, December 8, 1859, December 27, 1860; Post, January 5, 1861.

27. Courier, January 5, 1861; Recorder, December 13, 1860; Congregationalist, February 15, 1861; Traveler, January 16, 1861.

28. Haven, National Sermons, 197-212.

29. Haven, National Sermons, 197-212; G. M. Randall, Christian Manliness (Boston, 1860); Congregationalist, March 29, 1861; Watchman and Reflector, February 14, 21, 1861. It should be noted that the latter two journals were not consistent in their Unionism. The Watchman and Reflector on November 29, 1860, wrote of the Union that "there is not enough of it left to be worth preserving at such a sacrifice of manhood." And the Congregationalist, December 14, 1860, asserted that "it is better to be a province in chaos, even--with His smile--than temporarily to be the proudest empire on the globe, through conduct He may a while permit, but in the end must curse."

30. Zachary Eddy, Shall It Be Peace or War? (Northampton, Massachusetts, 1861), 15-18. See also Jacob Manning's sermon in the Traveler, April 4, 1861, and Orville Dewey, A Sermon Preached on the National Fast Day at the Union Green, Boston (Boston, 1861).

31. R. Tomlinson, "The Nation's Trial," in Atlas and Bee, February 16, 1861; Nathaniel Hale, "Fast Day Sermon," in Liberator, January 25, 1861.

32. S. R. Dennim, "Fast Day Sermon," in Traveler, January 29, 1861; Thomas Baldwin Thayer, The Glory and Fall of Tyre (Boston, 1861).

33. Congregationalist, January 4, 1861; Charles Beecher, "A National Crisis," in Atlas and Bee, February 23, 1861.

34. Springfield Republican, November 18, December 1, 1860; Congregationalist, January 4, 1861. See also sermons by A. L. Stone in Traveler, January 4, 1861; Edwin H. Nevin in Atlas and Bee, January 19, 1861; Congregationalist, January 11, 1861.

35. Henry Ward Beecher, "The National Prospect," in Atlas and Bee, February 6, 1861.

36. Donna Medwick, Boston Priests, 1848-1910 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1973), emphasizes the diversity of ante-bellum Massachusetts Catholic thought.

37. Robert H. Lord, John E. Sexton, and Edward T. Harrington, A History of the Archdiocese of Boston, 3 vols. (New York, 1944), II, 404, 461, 480, 533-44; Ray Allen Billington, The Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860 (New York, 1938), 68-70.

38. See John R. Mulkern, "The Know Nothing Party in Massachusetts," (Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1963); William G. Bean, "Puritan vs. Celt: 1850-1860," New England Quarterly, VII (1934), 70-89.

39. Lord et al, History of the Archdiocese, II, 472; Handlin, Boston's Immigrants, 177; Newburyport Herald, November 3, 1859.

40. Lord et al, History of the Archdiocese, II, 576-82, 588-98, 624-28, 656; Pilot, January 7, June 2, 9, July 7, 1860.

41. Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style In American Politics (New York, 1967), 21.

42. Mary A. Frawley, Patrick Donahoe (Washington, D.C., 1946); James B. Cullen, The Story of the Irish in Boston (Boston, 1889), 227-230.

43. Pilot, July 24, 1858.

44. Pilot, February 18, 1860, January 30, 1858. Donahoe also wrote that Protestants were guilty of "the practice of interfering with nature" and other debaucheries "no less sinful which cannot be named here." Pilot, January 30, 1858.

45. Pilot, July 19, 1858; Pilot, 1851, quoted in Madeleine Hooke Rice, American Catholic Opinion in the Slavery Controversy (New York, 1944), 100.

46. Pilot, May 5, June 23, 1860. See pastoral letter of 1852 plenary council in Rice, American Catholic Opinion, 64.

47. Pilot, November 19, 1859, December 3, 10, 1859, January 7, 1860.

48. Pilot, February 2, March 30, 1861.

49. Atlas and Bee, December 29, 1860; Pilot, December 29, 1860, January 19, 1861; Memoranda, January 4, 1861, Archives of the Catholic Archdiocese of Boston.

50. Pilot, December 8, 22, 1860, January 5, 12, February 2, 16, 1861.

Chapter X

1. Springfield Republican, December 24, 1860. The Advertiser and the Commercial Bulletin are the best sources for information on specie, stocks, and interest. The Boston Evening Transcript and Springfield Republican provide information on business closings. According to the Commercial Bulletin, January 19, 1861, money for favored parties was down to 7-8 percent in Boston while it was still 8-9 percent in New York.

2. Boston Evening Transcript, February 27, 1861; Springfield Republican, February 15, 1861; The Lowell Courier and Journal, December 21, 1860, reported on three Lowell mills. The Lowell Carpet Company had laid off 60 of its 1100 workers; the Prescott and Merrimack companies were both in full production. David Donald in Charles Sumner and the Coming of the Civil War, p. 269, writes that "Sumner was unmoved by the appeals from the Boston mercantile community, hard hit by the cutting off of Southern cotton;" but the evidence shows that no such economic disaster had occurred.

3. I. E. Carver to C. F. Adams, January 7, 1861, Adams Papers. See also the article by "A Leading Boston Merchant" in Commercial Bulletin, February 7, 1861.

4. Amos A. Lawrence to Crittenden, January 12, 1861, Crittenden Papers, Library of Congress.

5. Atlas and Bee, November 15, 22, 1860, February 18, 25, 1861.

6. Springfield Republican, December 15, 1860, January 1, 1861; Boston Evening Transcript, November 17, 26, 1860; Atlas and Bee, February 16, 1861. See also Charles Francis Adams, Jr., "The Reign of King Cotton," Atlantic, April 1861, 451-65. The Atlas and Bee, November 13, 1860, pointed out that the value of cotton produced in the United States was only $100 million, while hay was valued at $150 million, corn $200 million, and livestock $150 million.

7. Congregationalist, December 28, 1860; Springfield Republican, February 16, 1861; Boston Evening Transcript, February 9, 1861; Commercial Bulletin, January 16, 1861.

8. C. F. Adams, Jr., "King Cotton," 460-61; "T" in Atlas and Bee, February 11, 1861. See also Boston Journal, December 1, 1860; Springfield Republican, January 12, 1861; Boston Evening Transcript, January 18, February 5, 1861; Advertiser, February 8, 1861; Commercial Bulletin, December 15, 1860, January 16, February 2, 1861. Republicans complained about the quality of the cotton shipped from the South. The Lowell Courier and Journal, November 23, 1860, reported that one recent bale contained 670 pounds of cotton and 230 pounds of sand. The sand was ruining the textile machinery.

9. [Stephen M. Allen], Fibrilia: A Practical and Economical Substitute for Cotton (Boston, 1861); Springfield Republican, February 6, 9, 1861; Boston Evening Transcript, February 11, 1861; New England Farmer, January, February, 1861.

10. C. F. Winslow Diary, November 30, 1860, Winslow Papers; Winslow to Andrew, December 23, 1860, January 28, 1861, Andrew Papers. See also John W. Sullivan to Andrew, February 2, 1861, and Edwin Coburn to Andrew, February 5, 1861, Andrew Papers.

11. Allen, Fibrilia, 178; Allen's address before the Legislative Agriculture Society is in New England Farmer, March, 1861. Rice's speech in Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd session, appendix, 272-76; A. L. Carney to Amos A. Lawrence, February 19, 28, 1861, and Edward Smith to Amos A Lawrence, March 6, 1861, both in Lawrence Papers. By March, Winslow had written to Andrew to tell him that fibrilia would not work. Winslow to Andrew, March 3, 1861, Andrew Papers.

12. Nathan Appleton to William B. Pringle, January 7, 1861, and Appleton to "RJM", April 5, 1861, both in Appleton Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.

13. Courier, February 6; Boston Evening Transcript, February 5, 1861.

14. Edward Everett to Sidney Brooks, November 30, 1860, Everett Papers; Caleb Cushing to J. J. Henry, November 2, 1860, Cushing Papers; Everett to Sir Henry Holland, January 21, 1861, Everett to R. K. Call, December 31, 1860, and Everett to Mrs. Charles Eames, December 31, 1860, Everett Diary, January 30, 1861, all in Everett Papers.

15. Everett to Crittenden, December 23, 1860, Everett Papers. See also Cushing to J. L. Carey, January 17, 1860, Cushing Papers; Nathaniel Appleton to unnamed person in Charleston, S.C., in Boston Evening Transcript, January 2, 1861.

16. The Boston Herald was rabidly anti-secessionist. Its editorial of February 8, 1861, opposed the Crittenden proposals. Jessie A. Marshall, ed., Private and Official Correspondence of General Benjamin F. Butler During the Period of the Civil War, 5 vols. (Norwood, Mass., 1917), I, 6-13; Butler's Book, 150-51; Traveler, January 4, 1861.

17. Courier, February 6, 1861; Edward Everett to William Everett, January 7, 1861, Everett Papers; Joel Parker, Personal Liberty Laws (Boston, 1861), 49.

18. Robert Winthrop to Edward Everett, November 21, 1860, Everett to Col. William Byrd, November 20, 1860, both in Everett Papers.

19. See Parker, Personal Liberty Laws, passim; Norman L. Rosenberg, "Personal Liberty Laws and the Sectional Crisis," Civil War History XVII (March 1971), 215-44.

20. Parker, Personal Liberty Laws, 29.

21. Post, January 17, 1860; Boston Evening Transcript, March 27, 1860; Advertiser, December 7, 1860; Richard Henry Dana to Dawes, December 11, 1860, Dawes papers; Parker, Personal Liberty Laws, 47.

22. Boston Evening Transcript, December 18, 1860.

23. Charles Hale to Amos A. Lawrence, December 14, 1860, Lawrence Papers; Boston Journal, January 7, 1861. See also Advertiser, November 10, 1860, January 9, 10, 1861; Springfield Republican, November 17, 24, December 1, 1860; Benjamin F. Thomas, A Few Suggestions upon the Personal Liberty Law and Secession (Boston, 1861).

24. Speech by Representative Wrightman of Chelmsford in Boston Evening Transcript, January 7, 1861; George Morey to Charles Francis Adams, January 5, 1861, Josiah Quincy to C. F. Adams, February 21, 1861, both in Adams Papers; John Murray Forbes to Sumner, February 28, 1861, Sumner Papers.

25. Atlas and Bee, November 21, 1860; Acts and Resolves of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for 1861, 581; Sumner to Henry L. Pierce, January 29, 1861, Pierce Papers.

26. James Stone, Henry Pierce, Howe, and Stearns were active in backing the Tocsin; see Bird to Adams, January 28, 1861, Adams Papers. Laura White, in "Sumner and the Crisis of 1860-61," p.67, reports that she was unable to locate any copies of the Tocsin, and the Union List of Serials does not refer to the journal. However, there is a complete edition of the Tocsin in Volume II of the William S. Robinson Scrapbooks at the Boston Public Library. See also Sumner to Henry Pierce, January 29, 1861, Pierce Papers; Albert G. Browne to Sumner, January 22, 1861, D. W. Alvord to Sumner, January 23, 1861, in Sumner, Works, VII, 183.

27. Tocsin, January, 1861, February 16, 1861; Remarks of Edward L. Pierce before the Committee of the Legislature of Massachusetts on the General Statutes Relation to Personal Liberty at the Hearing of February 3, 1861 (Boston, 1861). See also Atlas and Bee, February 4, 1861.

28. Worcester Spy, November 28, 1861; Pearson, Andrew, I, 60.

29. James Lawrence to C. F. Adams, February 12, 1861, Adams Papers; Peleg W. Chandler, to Andrew, February 9, 11, 1861, Andrew Papers; E. L. Pierce to Sumner, February 10, 14, 1861, Sumner Papers; "Warrington" in Springfield Republican, February 16, 1861; Atlas and Bee, February 20, 1861; Tocsin, February 25, 1861; Post, February 21, March 16, 1861; Andrew to Bird, April 9, 1861, Autograph File, Houghton Library.

30. Post, January 21, 1861; Atlas and Bee, January 28, 1861; Springfield Republican, February 4, 1861; Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd session, 862.

31. My examination of this petition in the National Archives tends to confirm these suspicions. Among the Boston signatures, which account for over half the names gathered, there are several pages which appear to be in a single hand. Some names appear again and again. See the several letters on this subject in Sumner, Works, VII, 209-212. Also Charles L. Fessenden to Sumner, February 27, 1861; Thomas Bailey to Sumner, February 15, 1861, both in Sumner papers; Caleb Stetson to C. F. Adams, February 18, 1861, Adams Papers; E. R. Tinker to Dawes, February 10, 1861, Dawes Papers; Pearson, Andrew, I, 155; Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd session, 985.

32. Springfield Republican, January 24, 1861; Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd session, 995.

33. William Appleton to C. F. Adams, February 7, 1861, Adams Papers; Leverett Saltonstall, Speech in Boston Post, February 2, 1861; C. F. Adams to Richard Henry Dana, February 9, 1861, and C. F. Adams to Andrew, February 8, 1861, both in Adams Papers.

34. Courier, February 3, 1861; Post, February 8, 1861; Everett to Crittenden, December 23, 1860, Everett Papers; Henry Pierce, speech in Massachusetts legislature, Atlas and Bee, January 29, 1861; Dana speech reported in Boston Journal, February 12, 1861. A. B. Ely explained that the "hereafter acquired" clause prevented his paper, the Traveler, from supporting the Crittenden compromise: A. B. Ely to Crittenden, January 26, 1861, Crittenden papers; A. B. Ely to Amos A. Lawrence, January 22, 1861, Lawrence Papers.

35. The most complete account of the Washington Peace Conference is Robert Gray Gunderson, Old Gentlemen's Convention (Madison, Wisconsin, 1961).

36. Bird to Andrew, January 31, 1861, in Pearson, Andrew, I, 158; Tocsin, February 4, 1861; Atlas and Bee February 1, 1861; Springfield Republican, February 1, 1861; Dana to C. F. Adams, January 29, 1861, Adams Papers.

37. George Morey to Andrew, January 29, 1861, Andrew Papers; Amasa Walker to Sumner, February 4, 1861, Sumner Papers; William Claflin to Sumner, February 2, 1861; Advertiser, February 3, 1861; Springfield Republican, February 2, 1861; Traveler, February 2, 1861.

38. C. F. Adams to Andrew, January 28, 1861, Andrew Papers; Sumner to Andrew, January 26, 1861, Andrew Papers. See also C. F. Adams Diary, January 28, 29, 1861, Adams Papers; Wilson to Andrew, January 29, 1861, Andrew Papers.

39. Sumner to Andrew, January 28, 1861, Andrew Papers; Everett to William Everett, February 18, 1861, Everett Papers; Springfield Republican, February 7, 1861; Atlas and Bee, February 6, 1861; T. P. Chandler to Andrew, January 6, 1861, Andrew Papers.

40. Boutwell's speech is in Lucius E. Chittenden, A Report of the Debates and Proceedings in the Secret Session of the Conference for Proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Held at Washington, D. C. in February, A.D., 1861 (New York, 1864), 98-102; George Boutwell, Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, 2 vols. (New York, 1890), I, 279-82; Goodrich to Andrew, February 7, 8, 11, 12, 16, 1861, Andrew Papers; Goodrich to E. L. Pierce, February 28, 1861, Pierce Papers; Forbes to Andrew, February 15, 1861, Andrew Papers; Forbes to Sumner, February 28, 1861, Sumner Papers.

Chapter XI

1. Courier, January 17, 1861; Post, January 2, 1861.

2. William Claflin to Henry Dawes, February 6, 1861, Dawes Papers. Claflin could have saved his ink, for Dawes felt the same way. See Henry Dawes to Ella Dawes, December 14, 1860, Dawes Papers.

3. Newburyport Herald, December 10, 1860, February 21, 1861.

4. Paul Nagel, One National Indivisible: The Union in American Thought (New York, 1964), 9. Richard Henry Dana is a good example of a Republican who weighed the value of the Union during the secession winter. He believed that the Union represented peace, civilization, the development of the continent, and the founding of free states. Its preservation justified even "the most painful legal duty of rendering back a fugitive slave." But Dana did not believe that the Union was worth "any substantive political or territorial concession to the Slave Power." See Dana to C. F. Adams, December 26, 1860, Adams Papers.

5. Hans Kohn, American Nationalism (New York, 1957), 106; see speech by Daniel Gooch, Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd session, appendix, 261-4.

6. Hampshire Gazette, March 14, 1861; Traveler, January 23, February 6, 1861.

7. Hampshire Gazette, November 20, 1860; C. F. Adams speech in Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd session, appendix, 124-27. But not all anti-slavery men believed that disunion would advance their cause. John Weiss, for example, wrote that "there can be no development of a great emancipating plan without the North . . . I cannot bear the idea of losing all moral and practical hold upon those slaves." Weiss to Sumner, December 19, 1860, January 26, 1861, Sumner Papers.

8. Springfield Republican, February 9, 1861; Traveler, January 15, 1861.

9. Transcript, January 31, November 14, 1860; Springfield Republican, February 4, November 13, 14, 1860; Advertiser, October 15, 1860; Traveler, February 11, 1861; Atlas and Bee, November 20, 1860, February 5, 1861. On November 22, 1861, the Atlas and Bee reported that Ribero was offered work "at fair wages" in Boston.

10. Boston Evening Transcript, December 31, 1860, February 14, 1861; Charles Francis Adams, Jr., "King Cotton"; Boston Journal, January 8, 1861; Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd session, 583-6; Laura White, "Charles Sumner and the Crisis of 1860-61," 156-60; Gardner Brewer to Sumner, January 30, 1861, Sumner Papers; Traveler, January 19, 1861; Lowell Courier and Journal, November 30, 1860.

11. David M. Potter, Lincoln and His Party, 51-57; Potter, "Horace Greeley and Peaceable Secession," Journal of Southern History VII (May 1941), 145-59.

12. Springfield Republican, November 13, 14, 15, 22, 28, December 3, 1860.

13. Springfield Republican, December 8, 12, 15, 1860.

14. Springfield Republican, December 28, 1860, January 2, 12, 21, February 6, 23, March 2, 14, 1861.

15. See Phillip S. Paludan, "The American Civil War Considered as a Crisis in Law and Order," American Historical Review LXXVII (October 1971), 1013-1034. Paludan argues along similar lines. He also asserts that for ante-bellum Americans, government was not "them" it was "us." I would argue that from the New England perspective this sentiment applied not to the national government but to state and local government.

16. Tocsin, February 7, 1861; Traveler, January 31, 1861, February 9, 1861; Atlas and Bee, February 20, 1861; James Stone to Sumner, December 17, 1860, Sumner Papers.

17. Boston Evening Transcript, February 28, 1861; Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., January 8, 17, 1861, Charles Francis Adams to Henry Adams, December 28, 1860, both in Adams Papers; Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd session, February 21, 1861, 1088; Emerson to Sumner, February 27, 1861 in Letters of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Ralph L. Rush, ed., 6 vols. (New York, 1939), V, 241.

18. Advertiser, December 21, 1860; Atlas and Bee, December 27, 1860; John Murray Forbes to C. F. Adams, January 20, 1861, Adams Papers. The Boston Evening Transcript, January 29, 1861, argued that, during the Revolution, Massachusetts provided one patriot soldier for every 5.7 inhabitants and that in South Carolina the ratio was one to forty-five.

19. C. F. Adams Diary, January 16, 1861, Adams Papers; Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., January 17, 1861, Adams Papers; Bird to Sumner, January 6, 1861, and Sumner to Bird, January 9, 1861, both in Sumner Papers; Sumner to Andrew, January 17, 1861, Andrew Papers.

20. Sumner to Andrew, January 26, 28, 1861, Andrew Papers; Andrew to Sumner, January 30, 1861, Sumner Papers; Sumner to Andrew, February 3, 1861, Andrew Papers; Boston Evening Transcript, February 5, 1861; Henry Wilson, "Black and Stanton," Atlantic, October 1871, 464-75; Henry Wilson, "Edwin M. Stanton," Atlantic, February 1870, 234-8.

21. Henry Dawes, "Washington the Winter Before the War," Atlantic, August 1893, 162-67; Wilson to William Schouler, February 1, 1861, Schouler Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society. Andrew also received reports from Henry Lee, Jr., a military aide whom he had sent to Washington. See Lee to Andrew, February 2, 1861, Andrew Papers.

22. Boston Evening Transcript, February 2, 1861; Springfield Republican, February 7, 1861; Atlas and Bee, February 4, 1861; Schouler, Massachusetts in the Civil War, I, 24-29; Harrison Ritchie to Andrew, February 6, 8, 1861, Andrew Papers; Sumner to Andrew, February 5, 1861, Andrew Papers; Dawes, "Washington the Winter Before the War," 164; George Morey to Adams, February 17, 1861, Adams Papers; Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Febraury 13, 1861, Adams Papers.

23. Bowles to Dawes, February 26, 1861 in Merriam, Bowles, I, 318; John Andrew to Abraham Lincoln, January 20, 1861, Andrew Papers; C. F. Adams Diary, February 16, 1861.

24. C. F. Adams Diary, March 4, 1861, Adams Papers; Donald, Sumner, 384; Goodrich to Andrew, March 4, 1861, Andrew Papers; "Warrington" in Springfield Republican, March 9, 1861; Advertiser, March 5, 1861.

25. The Andrew and Sumner Papers for March and April, 1861 are filled with these appeals.

26. Andrew to Wilson, March 11, 1861; Wilson to Andrew, March 14, 1861, both in Andrew Papers; C. F. Adams Diary, March 19, 1861.

27. Sumner to Longfellow, March 16, 1861, Longfellow Papers, Houghton Library; Donald, Sumner, 384-6; Andrew to Sumner, March 4, 11, 1861, Sumner Papers; Andrew to Lincoln, January 20, 1861, Andrew Papers; Atlas and Bee, April 6, 1861; F. W. Palfrey to Sumner, April 2, 1861, Sumner Papers; E. L. Pierce to Sumner, April 2, 1861, Sumner Papers, Houghton Library.

28. C. F. Adams Diary, April 15, 18, 1861; Sumner to Longfellow, April 17, 1861, Longfellow Papers.

29. Atlas and Bee, April 13, 1861; Boston Recorder, April 25, 1861.

30. Garrison to Oliver Johnson, April 19, 1861, Garrison Papers; Liberator, April 19, 26, 1861.

31. Everett to H. A. Wise, April 18, 1861, Everett Papers; Courier, April 13, 17, 18, 1861; Commercial Bulletin, April 13, 20, 1861; Atlas and Bee, April 18, 1861; Post, April 16, 1861.

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