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The Greek origins of the idea of revolution.

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
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THE GREEK ORIGINS OF THE IDEA OF REVOLUTION

A Dissertation Presented

by

GEOFFREY MORRISON

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 1983

Department of History

To George and Theodora Kirk



Geoffrey Morrison
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ABSTRACT

The Greek Origins of the Idea of Revolution

(May 1983)

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Directed by Winfred Bernhard

Among all the concepts of political philosophy which have been studied by modern western intellectual historians "revolution" is one of the few never to have received a thoroughly empirical and diachronic linguistic analysis. Its modern history from the Renaissance to the present is well known, but its history in the medieval and ancient periods is only imperfectly understood, while its pre-history--the semantic elements from which it and its linguistic relatives were composed--has never been explored.

This dissertation has four objects: first, to define and explore the semantic fields of the Greek root $*(\underline{f})_{\epsilon\lambda}$ from which the modern English word "revolution" and its cognates, ancient and modern, were derived; second, to catalogue all those Greek roots which convey the image or the idea of circular or cyclical movement and to suggest the parameters of their semantic fields; third, to define and explore the semantic fields of the three Greek roots from the catalogue-- $*_{\kappa\upsilon\kappa\lambda-}$, $*_{\pi\epsilon\lambda-}$, and $*_{\tau\epsilon\lambda-}$ --which are related to the $*(\underline{f})_{\epsilon\lambda}$ of "revolution" through their common ancestor

in the Indo-European root *quel; and fourth, to illustrate the capacity of the discipline called "historical linguistics" to locate the social origins of our modern languages' most abstract terms and thereby to serve as a bridge between the often competing fields of intellectual and social history.

A NOTE ON TRANSLATION

All translations from Greek are by the author. Whenever Greek passages are either long enough, important enough or both, to be included in block quotation, the English translation appears immediately below the Greek passage in the same block format. Whenever Greek passages are retained within the lines of the text of the dissertation, the English translations appear immediately after the Greek passages and are placed between brackets. Throughout, Greek poetry is rendered as English poetry; Greek prose by English prose.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A Note on Translation		v
INTRODUCTION	The Apologia of Philosophy for the Novelty of the State	1
CHAPTER I	The Problem Delimited: Historical and Anhistorical Dimensions to the Idea of Revolution	23
CHAPTER II	Philology as the Archaeology of Knowledge: The Case of "Revolution"	27
CHAPTER III	Images of Circular Movement in Ancient Greek: A Catalogue of the Data	47
CHAPTER IV	ΚΥΚΛΟΣ: The Image of the Circle in Greek Literature	51
CHAPTER V	-ΠΟΛΟΣ: Putting the Circle in Motion	69
CHAPTER VI	ΤΕΛΟΣ: The Image of the Moving Circle: Greek Ideas of War and Public Office; Fate, Doom, and Divinity	94
CHAPTER VII	ΤΕΛΟΣ: The Image of the Moving Circle: A Theory of Its Social Origins	134
CHAPTER VIII	Summation: The Contribution of Greek Experience to the Idea of Revolution	152
NOTES		162
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY		178

APPENDIX A	A Brief Commentary with Selected Bibliography on Linguistics, Psycho- linguistics and Sociolinguistics	202
APPENDIX B	'Cyclical' Time in Modern Historiography	207
APPENDIX C	An Excursus on Greek Verbs Meaning 'To Be'	211
APPENDIX D	A Brief Comment on the Chadwick- Palmer Debate Over the Mycenaean <u>Tereta</u>	214

So what is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, anthropomorphisms - in short an aggregate of human relations which, poetically and rhetorically heightened, become transposed and elaborated, and which, after protracted popular usage, poses as fixed, canonical, obligatory. Truths are illusions whose illusoriness is overlooked.

Nietzsche, Truth and Falsehood in an Extra-Moral Sense (1873)

I N T R O D U C T I O N

THE APOLOGIA OF PHILOSOPHY FOR THE NOVELTY OF THE STATE

Revolution in the history of the West is not confined to modern times. In theory as well as in fact revolution is half the fabric of our culture. It is older than "original," predating as it does the most ancient scraps of historical languages. It is the warp through which the philosophers, of nature as well as of politics, have run the woof of "cosmos," "civilization," and the "state." Revolution is the primordial communal fact against which have been directed the prohibitions of religion and the codes of justice. It is the primary theoretical problem to which the Western philosophical tradition, especially in political theory, has directed its dreams of order, visions of stability, and schemes of law. Revolution is neither an anomaly nor an aberration in our culture. It is the constant among the intellectual variables. Revolution is the question to which philosophy proposes answers.

This dissertation claims to lay the empirical foundations for those claims. It uses the methods of historical linguistics (what in the nineteenth century was called comparative philology) to retrieve those human experiences which gave birth to circular, cyclical, and finally "revolutionary"

ways of looking at and conceiving life in the world. It assumes that an investigation of human experience by means of the words born from that experience is the only reasonably reliable way - if indeed there is any way at all - to trace how ideas move through history; and assumes, furthermore, that any question presuming to touch upon a problem in Western political philosophy must focus on the Greeks - that is, on the language of the Greeks. Finally, the dissertation argues that the so-called "Great Books" tradition in Western philosophy can only mislead us in any examination of the origins of ideas in Western culture. The reason for that is the simple fact that most of the philosophers, and many others among the class of intellectuals, stood in a dissenting relationship to the "traditional" Greek societies. The judicial murder of Socrates, not to mention all the other exiles of various "free-thinkers" like Euripides before and after the execution of Socrates, should remind us of that fact, if we should ever need reminding. To some degree or other, the philosophers were hostile to the values, beliefs and attitudes of their countrymen; they saw their work as intellectual and moral reform, or at least as admonition. When we consult their works for insight into the societies they lived in, we must not forget that we are reading critics of those societies - and critics who are not above misrepresentation. In no field is this truer than in political philosophy. From Plato on, the

philosophical critics of real societies have been concerned to justify the "state," that ideal construction of the philosophical mind which would bring order and harmony out of (alleged) turmoil and chaos. The sum of these ideal constructions over the past twenty-five hundred years - what we now call the "tradition" of Western political philosophy - constitutes the most formidable barrier there is to thinking about not only what the organization of the human community ought to be, but also what the (various) organizations of historical societies actually were before the philosophers entered upon the scene. To no problem of political philosophy does the "Great Books" tradition act as more of an obstacle to understanding than to the origin of that constellation of images and ideas in politics we label, "revolutionary." Accordingly, this dissertation proposes to commence, for the sake of intellectual history, a kind of archaeological "dig" under that formidable obstacle to thought which we call the "tradition" of Western philosophy. The tools for the dig will be provided by the discipline known as comparative linguistics. The object is to sink a sondage through the layers of foundation upon which the Great Books tradition in political philosophy so serenely sits.

Before beginning our project in intellectual archaeology, however, let us survey the obstacle itself. Let us ask: why are the substance and form of the ideal

constructions of the philosophers so uniformly contrary to the "revolutionary" foundation on which they sit? In particular, why does the Great Books tradition in political theory not recognize revolution as the central problem for political thought? In modern times at least, what accounts for this situation is the ubiquity of the myth of the state and the pervasiveness of the fear of anarchy. Both the ubiquity of the one and the pervasiveness of the other are best explained by the triumph of industrial and technological biases in the academic market of idées fixes. "Systems paradigms," "functional modalities," "verification criteria" - these and all the other innumerable clanking, mechanical neologisms coined in the last two centuries from intellect's encounter with the new order of industrial economy - reveal an accommodation which with rare exceptions grants the very thing most needing criticism. Social science assumes "society" and the "state." It considers "change," "variation," and especially "revolution" as always problematical, usually dangerous, and probably pathological. Such an intellectual accommodation to the new order of the industrial economy ignores the history of the very languages it uses. It does not appreciate the twin facts that the vocabularies of the state and its various institutions developed relatively late not only in modern Europe (not before the fifteenth century) but also in ancient Rome (not before the first century B.C.) whose imperial institutions, and the vocabulary

developed to designate them, provided the models for the analogous political phenomena in the modern period. As this dissertation will establish beyond a reasonable doubt, at least in the case of ancient Greece, the vocabulary of change, and especially of revolutionary change, dominated the thinking of ancient peoples in nearly all the divisions and areas of their respective cultures before the triumph of Christianity. To the ancients, change was normal, revolutionary change the true model of justice; to them, the state was the aberration, its justice the very thing needing justification. They were too close to the origins to forget that while the state need not necessarily be a monster among the varieties of human community, it is at least a novelty and always an experiment - a more or less useful expedient among the immemorial practices of human living together. Modern social science is largely innocent of such awareness, whether offered by history or by language.

Ignorance of historical fact is not enough, however, to explain social science's loyalty to the reality and to the idea of the "state." For that, we must look to the origins of the state itself. Social science serves the state because, like the other academic disciplines which serve it, the only alternatives to service are intellectual isolation, professional ostracism, and silence. Having by now successfully outlived for the most part the memory of its original, ancient novelty, and having perfected the

methods of force and concentrated the instruments of violence for the purpose of channeling the human propensities for envy, greed, and malice, the various historical states have succeeded in either enlisting or drafting corps of apologists to make look right what was merely novel. In the West the process began among the Greeks in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. in response to the spread of serfdom among freemen, a social crisis which deepened and accelerated with the rise of a money economy. The "philosophers" emerged shortly thereafter. The majority shunned the new "politics"; others, like Pythagoras, attempted radical and what we would call "utopian" social reform, resorting to new religions or at least new rituals for moral justification of the reform; a few, like Solon, agreed to play with fire and try to reconcile the old habits of life and thought with the new political facts. Both states and philosophers emerged, then, out of the breakup of the traditional "archaic" societies of ancient Greece. They were at first suspicious of one another, however, despite their common ancestry. Those who were at least suspicious of the new states, and ultimately embraced their claims, became what even contemporaries called "sophists"; those who presumed to maintain a degree of independence, and ultimately preferred exile, or worse, to a loss of critical distance, became what we consider "philosophers." But the difference in degree of

of their attachment to the new states cannot conceal their familial resemblance when seen through the eyes of the earlier traditional societies which the states supplanted. The sophists would have the new "citizens" imagine how to succeed in any real state he happened to live in; the philosophers how he might succeed in imagining an ideal state worth being a citizen of. The common parents - the historical states - are taken for granted. As far as the relation of intellectuals to their states or to ideal states is concerned, nothing essential has changed since those early centuries. For two and one half millenia political philosophy has provided the apologia for the aristocratic, agricultural state; in just the last century and a half its heir, social science, has provided the apologia for the bureaucratic technological state. Social (and political) science, then, suffers a subservience to the state which is merely deeper than that of the ancient sophists and pre-socratic philosophers and their multifarious epigones in the centuries since. Having now accepted remuneration from the state as well as assumed the necessity at least for ideal states, social science has guaranteed its own assimilation to the state's collective myth. Indeed, social science is now the thing it set out to be - "statism" become self-conscious.

Modern historians and political philosophers have done somewhat better. As long as history in the West remained

to some degree Christian, it displayed in practice traces of that original suspicion of and even antipathy for actual states by which the communities of the early Christians were so memorably distinguished, and it maintained in theory a residual skepticism toward the claims of actual states which was based in the final analysis on the conviction that not everything may be rendered unto Caesar. Similarly, the revival of secular history in the Renaissance, far from glorifying the state as an ideal or as an abstraction, encouraged an even greater because more rational suspicion of real states. States as actually constituted and ruled were the objects of a criticism amounting often to scorn and derision for their proven vulnerability to passion and fortune; and states as ideally constituted and ruled were imagined as remedies for human weaknesses and worldly chance, not as goods in themselves. Historians in the tradition of the Renaissance did not glorify the state. They merely recommended better states. By the middle of the nineteenth century at the very latest Christian and Renaissance history, which displayed more essential similarities than differences on this matter, had sunk to virtual antiquarian curiosities. Christian history, having been intellectually as well as politically and morally vitiated by the two centuries of blood and horror consequent upon the Protestant Reformation, took refuge beginning with Vico in philosophies of history and theories of progress; while Renaissance secular history,

unable after the excesses of the French Revolution successfully to combat the charge that the best state of the enlightened philosophical imagination had proven worse in practice than the worst state of the real world had ever been portrayed in theory, took refuge in social "science," romantic primitivism, or both. When the same minds encompassed both traditions, a new history emerged, a history whose newness consisted precisely in the abandonment of suspicion and skepticism directed toward real and ideal states. In a mind like Hegel's where the Christian impulse dominated, the movement of human affairs called "history" became not just a metaphor but the very avenue for salvation, and the ideal of the state became a religion. In a mind like Saint-Simon's where the Renaissance impulse dominated, the failure of eighteenth century radical and revolutionary reform not only took on the character of a fall from grace but the attempt at regaining paradise led to systematic fantasies of utopia, and religion entered in disguise upon its present career in politics. In both, the assimilation of residual Christianity to enervated secularism produced the modern ideal of the state - an entity beyond the reach of an already emasculated criticism.

These four disciplines - sociology, political science, history, and political philosophy - despite the difference in degree of their respective attachments to real and ideal states, share a common reason for their attachments. That

reason is fear of anarchy. It is a very old story. For the more than two millenia between Plato and Popper Western thinkers almost without exception have been horrified by the prospect of an unregulated human activity and haunted by fantasies of aggression and violence. The perennial assumption has been that the state is the only alternative to chaos. All the systems of religion, philosophy, ethics, and psychology have been obsessed with it. There have been

dissenting voices to be sure: in the Greco-Roman world Protagoras, Epicurus, and the Stoics in their less hypocritical moments; among the Jews and the Christians (ancient and modern) the wide range of radical zealots and wild-eyed millenarians; in modern Europe Rousseau, Nietzsche, Freud (when he chose not to repress his occasional optimism), and of course Marx; and in America Jefferson, Thoreau, and Emerson at their dreamiest. Their dissents, however, always sounded the note of mauvaise foi because all were protected to some degree by states if they were not actually involved in statecraft. The emergence in the twentieth century of a deep anxiety over political hypocrisy and the corresponding concern for individual "authenticity," especially among artists and intellectuals, resulted in part from the democratization of this old dissenting attitude toward the state, an attitude which spread, ironically, precisely as modern states were spreading worldwide those very means of material comfort which made political anxiety and individual

authenticity possible.

What has distinguished this fear of anarchy among Western thinkers is its psychological irrationality and its historical groundlessness. Despite the fact that human beings living in anarchy has never been observed except where the breakdown of historical states has occurred, Western thinkers have not only judged anarchy to be the worst disease to which historical states are susceptible. They have also projected anarchy onto human groups living outside the reach or beyond the control of the state. Depending on whatever bias was fashionable at the time, anarchy has been attributed to "barbarians," "primitives," and "natives," outside the state and to cults, sects, and parties within it. The attribution is always in disparagement. That these groups display more numerous and far stricter rules of conduct (if only to survive hostile states or their agents and sympathizers) is a fact which has rarely deterred the political systems-builders. The depth of their fear and the extent of its historical groundlessness points to a partly psychological explanation. The expression of the fear of anarchy may be to the conscious mind of the political thinker in society what the repression of fear of violent anger is to his unconscious mind as an individual. At both levels, conscious and unconscious, the fear is infantile in its origin.

There is, however, a more objective though hardly less

controversial explanation. While the imagined horrors presumed to attend upon anarchy have always provided political philosophers and other theorists with an important impetus for the justification of real and ideal states, this irrational and infantile impetus inevitably dissolved before the intractable fact that examples of anarchy have been difficult to construe even where they are presumed to exist. The political philosophers' fevered fantasies concerning the obverse of their controlled, ordered, and "rational" states foundered upon the rock of historical fact. Where does one find historical examples of the imagined enemy? Where is a case of anarchy to be found in history apart from historical states? Where is there an instance of anarchy which is not a result of the breakdown of an actual state? These questions pose a dilemma for the intellectual historian. Is the two thousand year old tradition of philosophical loyalty and service to the state - to both real and ideal states - to be attributed to pathology alone? Or perhaps to pathology in some combination with the will to vicarious power? The history of political philosophy in the West suggests a less subjective explanation. The fear in the philosophical literature is only a particularly emotional side issue, perhaps even a red-herring; it is a tactical diversion designed to distract attention from the real enemy, an enemy in equal measure to the psyches of the political philosophers and to the rulers they serve.

That enemy is the idea and the corresponding reality of revolution. Most philosophers in the West have been unable to accept the idea that revolutionary change characterizes not only the products of nature, an idea they have often entertained, but also the living arrangements of humanity. Almost every system of state, nearly every theory of politics (even the Marxist), has amounted to an attempt to stop at last the wheel of revolutionary change and to make of human affairs and the human community a realm of order, stability, predictability, and control. Enlisting the adult's fear of death and his corresponding resentment of youth and new births, the vast majority of political thinkers have imagined either communities without change, or communities whose mode of change is different from the revolutionary change allegedly characteristic of nature, and have consequently propounded the alternative theories of "evolution" and "progress." But whether the philosophers imagined an immortal, changeless society, or a regularly evolving or progressing one, the conception of human affairs to which they are all proposing alternatives is revolution. The greatest philosophers have not denied it. Plato confronted head on the Eleatic theory of eternal recurrence; the Christian Fathers, especially Augustine, fought to the finish against the ideas of the "wicked who dance in circles"; the Renaissance historians, especially Machiavelli, agonized over the prospect of humanity ground under the wheel of

fortune; Hegel and Marx spent their intellectual lifetimes - with diametrically opposite results to be sure - refuting revolutionary with dialectical thinking. (It is not Marx but Trotsky who with his notion of the "permanent revolution" is the most consistently revolutionary of modern political thinkers. His only rival for that title is Thomas Jefferson with his notion of "revolution every twenty years.") In these philosophers anarchy was always a secondary problem. The central intellectual challenge - comprising the acid test of political theory - was the primordial fact and the primitive idea of revolution.

The reason for this (unacknowledged) primacy of revolution among the problems of political philosophy is that only revolutionary thinking confronts political philosophy on its home territory - the claim to justice. Revolution is itself, like the ideal states of the philosophers, a species of order. For most human communities before the rise of the historical states revolutionary thinking was the precise opposite of the imagined anarchy of the philosophers, was itself the very image of order and a way of conceiving eternal and predictable change. Philosophy was born, and continued to thrive, as a rebuttal to revolutionary notions and impulses not to anarchic ones. In fact, philosophy proposed an astonishingly new idea of justice. It imagined a new order of living together in the world. It conceived this new idea, the state, and presented it

as the embodiment as well as the agent of a new justice. It offered not merely order, predictability, intelligibility, and control. Revolutionary images and practices of justice had done that. What the new philosophy offered in addition was quiet, calm, repose, immutability, eternity. It entertained seriously the one idea which conceptions of revolutionary change always denied, and indulged the one fantasy revolutionary thinking discouraged - that is, individual immortality. Philosophy postulated a piece of existence free from change and change's most radical expression - death. Indeed, philosophy defined "existence" in precisely that way. It encouraged in adults the infant's dream of "being forever." Philosophy, philosophical states, and philosophical justice are all rooted finally in the rational cultivation of radical narcissism.

In sum, revolution is not generally recognized by the established academic disciplines of sociology, political science, history, and philosophy as the central problem of Western intellectual and political experience because, first, the fear of anarchy, expressed or implied, remains a dominant - and diversionary - impulse in modern thinking about human affairs and second, because the states which wield power, drawing upon the apologias of the political philosophers which have been penned on their behalf in the last two and a half thousand years, have simply outlived or outlasted - where they have not obliterated or confused

- the memory of the archaic and largely preliterate arrangements of human affairs. The discoveries of modern "dissenting" academic disciplines - archaeology, anthropology, and philology, despite their admission to the privileges of the Western universities in the early twentieth century as collective "in-house" gadflies, have not yet subverted to any measureable degree the loyalty of political theorists to actual states, or to the idea of the state. This peculiar resistance of political philosophy to ancient and non-Western historical fact cannot be explained alone by the fact that Western political thinkers are unaware or ignorant of the evidence provided by these disciplines. A certain culture-conditioned neglect and ignorance has something to do with it to be sure. But the fundamental reason for the resistance is that modern practitioners of political philosophy are virtually immune to conceiving human ways of living together outside the categories of "state" and "society." Indeed, it is the most substantial of the many substantial triumphs of "statism" that it has rendered its own apologists practically incapable of imagining human life outside the confines of the terms they themselves have coined. The very youth of philosophy, its admitted historicity, ought to serve as a standing caution to such anachronistic thinking. The caution, however, usually goes unheeded (even where it is comprehended) because many political theorists have confused vulgar historicism, which they rightly

condemn as a poor and silly thing, with historical thinking; and because they have sometimes forgotten that intellect's search for truth, which is the presumed career of philosophy, does not mean that any particular historical philosophy has in fact captured it. Consequently, in their defense of philosophy against historicism political theorists often end up adopting the tactics of their opponents: they falsely identify the quest for universal truth concerning the best arrangements for human living together with particular philosophers' conceptions of it. On this question of the best arrangements for human living together, a question which since Plato has been misconceived as the question of the "state," political philosophers betray their historicism in their neglect of or refusal to consider the proposition that "political" thinking, to the extent that it is circumscribed by the categories and terminologies of the state, is not a universal thing, a phenomenon of the real. Indeed, each generation of political philosophers and other theorists draws its portraits of pre-civilized, pre-literate, and archaic humanity along the lines of "state" and "society." The inevitable distortion resulting from this anachronistic - and historicist - way of thinking not only ignores and misrepresents contrary data, it also misconstrues the affirmative data which do support theories of state-like and society-like phenomena in early human communities.

The problem for political philosophy is to find (not

invent) a vocabulary which does not assume or prejudge the thing needing investigation. The task is to find languages - historical languages - which are, or possess elements, anterior or exterior to historical states. The task would be made easier for the theorist working within the Western political tradition if he could locate such a language, or languages within his own Indo-European language group whose ancient dialects are the ancestors of his own modern discourse. Succeeding at this double task - of locating an historical language anterior or exterior to historical states and one which is also within the Indo-European language group which linguistically underlies nearly all aspects of Western literate culture - would permit the political theorist to resist the hidden and probably mistaken analogies usually drawn between historical societies and historical states and pre-civilized, pre-literate, and archaic communities. It would allow him successfully to avoid the thoughtless retrojection onto archaic humanity of ideas which serve only to add antiquarian and filiopietistic rationalizations to modern Western man's peculiar ways of living and thinking.

The dissertation which follows proposes to locate just such a language within the Indo-European language group. It chooses to investigate Greek (and to a far lesser extent Latin) for evidence of how "authority" was conceived before the rise of the historical Greek city-states. The choice of Greek rather than either or both of the other two prime

candidates for the role of data base in such an investigation - Celtic or Sanskrit - was made not only because the author can claim some degree of expertise only in the classical languages and is only a bare beginner in Celtic, Sanskrit, and Indo-European philology in general, but also because the best way of demonstrating that the "statism" of the philosophical tradition in the West is a radical novelty is to show that the very language which holds pride of place in that tradition attests to an earlier way of conceiving the arrangements of human living together in which "revolutionary" images and practices dominate. Indeed, the dissertation argues that the Greek language preserved into late classical and Hellenistic times words, and word-fragments, whose "fossil" usages and meanings, based on the collective experiences of archaic Greek life, reveal early Greek attitudes toward what we would now, quite misleadingly, call "political authority" which are profoundly different from those displayed in the apologias of the philosophers - even those of the Greek philosophers - especially Plato, who began the process which continues to this day of obscuring the novelty of the state and its institutions. This dissertation contends, in short, that the archaic Greek attitude toward their arrangements of human living together was characterized by what we would now call "revolutionary" thinking.

The dissertation begins with an Introduction which

poses the problem of the degree of "historicity" in the idea of revolution. Historical analysis may not in the end be the only, or the best, way of approaching the idea. Chapter One then takes up the English word "revolution" as a convenient point of departure for getting at the older images of circular motion expressed by the Greek root * /f/ελ. The discussion hopes to demonstrate by the force of example how the method of philology can come to the aid of intellectual history in its effort to understand the social experience behind the idea which gave birth to the word(s). Chapter Two reviews the entire range of those Greek and Indo-European roots suggesting the image of circular motion which must be thoroughly examined if a definitive history, rather than a summary review, of the Greek origins of the idea of revolution in Western culture is ever to be written. Chapter Three discusses the most obvious candidate for analysis from the range of roots conveying the image of circular movement. Κύκλος has not exactly been neglected by scholars in the past, but this chapter shows how, and why, the words and the human experiences it reveals are something of a "blind alley" for the purposes of writing the intellectual history of the idea of revolution. Chapters Four, Five and Six take up *πελ and *τελ, the linguistic first cousins of * /f/ελ and *κύκλος discussed earlier. Chapter Four discusses the group of the *πελ -derivatives which are more numerous and show up in Greek literature

connected with more, and more varied, aspects of communal life than the derivatives of any of the other "revolutionary" roots (with the possible exception of *περ, which is not discussed in this work). Chapter Five attempts to thread its way through the semantic labyrinth composed by the various usages of τέλος and the other Greek words derived from the root *τελ. With the *τελ group, we see images of circular motion sublimated to ideas of "revolutionary" movement. In this linguistic group, abstractions and concepts clearly connected with religion and what later came to be known as "politics" appear for the first time among the derivatives of the Indo-European *quel-family. The problem with these religious and "political" concepts is that their semantic connection with the image of "revolving" contained in their common *τελ root is not clear. Chapter Six, therefore, attempts a theory of the "semantic bridge" - the underlying "life experience" - which united the image of circular motion conveyed by the root with Greek religious and "political" ideas of "doom," "fate," and "divine authority." Finally, Chapter Seven summarizes the results of the linguistic investigation into this problem in intellectual history. It argues that the principal meanings and connotations of the Greek words, word-fragments, and roots discussed in the preceding chapters constitute the distant but lineal antecedents to those modern notions of "revolution" which reappeared so dramatically and consequentially

in the history of the West in the eighteenth century.

C H A P T E R I

THE PROBLEM DELIMITED: HISTORICAL AND ANHISTORICAL DIMENSIONS TO THE IDEA OF REVOLUTION

It is neither a fact of nature nor a datum of experience that repetition occurs in cycles. Instead, the cycle, which is the image of the rotating circle put forward as a model of recurrence, is one of the great achievements of the human imagination, a brilliant poetic sublimation, a projection of what can be seen onto what cannot, of what is visible onto what is abstract, of the actual onto the ideal. In comparison with that achievement, the late, literary extension of the metaphor to the field of politics, which has resulted in our concept of "revolution," must be judged a wholly derivative and relatively easy affair. The extent and significance of the achievement, for good and for ill, has been appreciated only in the twentieth century when the binary computer and the science of statistics demonstrated the fact that the most sophisticated series of repetitions has simply nothing to do, either literally or figuratively, with "cycles" or "circles." Repetition and recurrence are just as easily conceived in a line as in a circle; indeed, the line is not only the preferred but, for the technology of computer "software," the necessary model of recurrence.¹ Whenever we now employ such phrases as "the

cycle of the seasons," "periods in the affairs of men," or "revolutionary ages," we are indulging in metaphors of circular movement for abstract ideas which our statistical science and our technology tell us is at best irrelevant - that is, we are attributing a quality, in this case circular movement, to a phenomenon, in this case the idea of repetition, which has no necessary connection to it. Statistics does not even condescend to judge the image "wrong": it simply holds that the image has no place among those questions concerning the repetition of phenomena for which answers may be given according to the laws of statistics.

Statistics and computer technology may well have administered the coup de grâce to cycles as the metaphor of repetition and recurrence, but the intellectual historian has to deal with two conventional facts. First, cyclical metaphors have hardly dropped from the vocabularies of those presuming to talk about repetition and recurrence, in the sciences no less than in the humanities; second, such metaphors have been around for a good long time - roughly 4,000 years, give or take a millenium depending upon which human community one starts counting from. Consequently, the intellectual historian is inevitably led to the question: even if the image of the rotating circle as the model of recurrence is and always was unnecessary, where did it come from in the first place and why does it persist?

The answer may not lie primarily in intellectual history, academically speaking. Jungian psychologists have already admitted the circle to the elect company of the pre- or subconscious archetypes of the mind;² Piaget-inspired developmental psychologists, somewhat more cautious than the Jungian purists, have claimed at least a phase for the growth in the child of geometric perception and acuity;³ and the new tribe of psycholinguists, taking a cue from Freud himself who late in life predicted that the great frontier between unconscious motives and conscious desires in the individual and between individual behavior and group behavior lay hidden somewhere in the structures of language,⁴ has claimed to discover the circular nature of certain grammatical transformations.⁵ All these endeavors underscore the risk the intellectual historian - indeed any historian - runs if he ignores the abstruse and even esoteric by-ways of the natural and social sciences. The historical element, properly speaking, may in the end be the least important factor in the phenomenon.

In any case, whatever may turn out to be the just proportion between the scientific and the merely historical - between, if you will, the real and the "actual" - factors composing any particular idea, the historian must proceed as if some insight is to be gained from the pursuit of (alleged) illusions, delusions, irrelevancies and other follies and chimeras. In the case of the idea of revolution, the

principal questions are: Where did the idea of cyclical recurrence come from? What were the human experiences which inspired its formulation? How did the idea of cyclical recurrence pass over time into the field of politics to bequeath to us the concept of "revolution"? Where did the image of the revolving circle in "cyclical" thinking come from? In short, how do we account for the "revolution" in revolution?

C H A P T E R I I

PHILOLOGY AS THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE: THE CASE OF "REVOLUTION"

Let us begin with the word. The English "revolution" is derived from revolutio, a late Latin neologism first coined for the arcane and esoteric vocabulary of astrology to describe the journey of the soul through the rounds of its various incarnations,⁶ and later adapted by early Christian writers, especially St. Augustine, to describe the drama of salvation - the progress of the human soul in its procursus from God, through creation, and back to God.⁷ The word first appeared in a vernacular language, as rivoluzione, and in connection with secular rather than theological or metaphysical thought, when Antonio Villari used it in his Chronica of 1355 to describe the familial and factional intrigues of early Renaissance Rome. By the time of Machiavelli, Guiciardini and Nardi the word had become an almost common designation for any change in public or private life which was unforeseen, unpredictable, or fortuitous.⁸ Since revolutio had not ceased during the Middle Ages to be part of the vocabulary of astrology and magic, it is hardly surprising that when the occult sciences joined classical Roman antiquity in the cultural renaissance in Italy after the mid-fourteenth century, revolutio should eventually pass into the new rational science of astronomy.

Copernicus' De Revolutionibus Orbium Caelestium of 1543 bequeathed to our word "revolution" that mythical aura which the Latin word had enjoyed in the vocabulary of the occult. Indeed, the popularity of the new sciences, and especially of astronomy, is directly related to the belief, a belief held even more firmly by the astronomers themselves than by their educated public, that the new mathematical formulae of astronomy would produce a sounder foundation for the theory and practice of astrology.⁹ The partly fortuitous confluence during the Renaissance of the assimilation of revolutio to politics and secular affairs, the renewed popularity and subsequent long-term vogue of the occult sciences, and the birth of rational astronomy out of mystical astrology, produced by the seventeenth century that peculiar association of disparate meanings which we now recognize as inextricable components of the word's modern sense. When Hobbes in his Behemoth and Clarendon in his History of the Rebellion¹⁰ used the word, they initiated for political science and for history that usage of "revolution" which we in the twentieth century recognize as our own. All this, in broad outline at least, is well known.¹¹

Most intellectual historians have suspended their inquiries at this point, satisfied that they have reached the intellectual Pillars of Hercules when they come across a linguistic precedent from the classical languages. Their satisfaction is unfortunate. Every polysyllabic word from

Greek and Latin is a compound of simpler, less subtle and more concrete elements, and every one has already become by the time we encounter it in ancient usage a highly refined and elaborated abstraction from more sensuous original images. These original images and the facts of human life they were intended to express constitute the fundamental repository of historical meanings. Consequently, the inquiries of an intellectual historian are not complete until the linguistic abstractions which are the main objects of his investigations have been resolved into their constituent semantic elements and these elements examined for whatever degree of historical truth may be derived from them.

The province of scholarship devoted to such examinations is commonly called "philology." In the century between Winckelmann and Müller the word designated a compendium of rather amorphous, eclectic, unsystematic, and even ad hoc procedures for analyzing and interpreting linguistic data.¹² These procedures were as various and as divergent as the questions they were employed to answer. Those scholars who undertook emendation were expected to show that quality of simple erudition without which no interpretation of texts could safely be undertaken; such erudition has constituted the core of the philological enterprise since the Renaissance. Those scholars interested in textual interpretation were expected to demonstrate, in addition to linguistic erudition, those qualities of imagination and

intuition without which no informed speculation could be made in those areas where empirical data were either incomplete or missing altogether. Finally, those scholars interested mainly in linguistic theory were expected to show at least a minimal commitment to the canons of scientific and philosophical method, if only to be able better to avoid the temptations to nationalism and racism in an intellectual discipline as susceptible to those prejudices as historical linguistics.

All three qualities - erudition, imagination, and commitment to science and philosophy - were presumed to be necessary to philological study. Of course, no one expected philologists or any other scholars not to demonstrate individual intellectual strengths and weaknesses along with personal intellectual proclivities and even biases. No one expected philologists to show linguistic merits in equal proportion. After the death of Saussure in the early twentieth century, however, such a catholicity in the qualities expected of philologists has succumbed to the same neo-scholasticism which has so thoroughly alienated the other contemporary academic disciplines from their original parents, philosophy and science. Modern scholars in linguistic studies show no fewer personal intellectual biases or proclivities than their nineteenth century predecessors. The change consists in the modern scholastics' tendency to raise biases and proclivities to the rank of systems. Theory

and even ideology now prevail in the place of ad hoc investigation. Perhaps the change is an improvement, but it is not beyond a reasonable doubt that historical (diachronic) or universal (synchronic) truth has been advanced by the change.

The historian who presumes, consequently, to use the findings of philology, or any other modern academic discipline for that matter, to explore a problem in intellectual history must be prepared to insist on the privilege of relying on the data gathered by specialists even as he resists their several claims for the epistemological status of their theories or the scientific status of their methods. For the historian to insist upon less would be to admit that history should not be attempted until the controversies within the scholastic specialisms have been resolved. On the other hand, the historian who proceeds in the face of substantive and methodological controversies among the specialists must state openly the standards whereby he chooses some data and methods over others. Eclecticism, after all, must contain some rule or rules of exclusion.

This study of the Greek origins of the idea of revolution is eclectic in its procedures for interpreting linguistic data. Its methods do not pretend to conform to the theoretical stipulations of any single school of historical linguistics. It professes to adopt the findings and to accept the methods of modern (classical) philology only

so far as those findings and methods are uncontroversial. Wherever controversies exist in either, this study will try to avoid them altogether or, if that is impossible, to resolve the controversy at issue according to the accepted methods of textual interpretation in the discipline of intellectual history. Modern philologists and other historical linguists may find the eclecticism of the intellectual historian hopelessly unsystematic. The intellectual historian may answer the charge only by repeating the methodological tenet central to the discipline of intellectual history since the 1940s. That tenet holds that a word, line, or passage in a text is not understood alone by internal criticism - by an exclusive concentration on what is now called the "intertextuality" of a text's diction, syntax, grammar, meter, etc. The word, line, or passage in question must also be examined in the light of external criticism - by a broad study of what might be called the text's "contextuality" in economics, politics, culture, and history in general. The species of scholarly eclecticism calling itself "intellectual history" maintains that meaning, at any level of human written discourse, is best established by considering data from every field in the historical era which produced it, irrespective of the contemporary academic specialty which presumes to oversee it.¹³

Even in intellectual history, however, eclecticism has its limits. This study attempts to conform to two

general limitations in the use of historical linguistic data. First, it is empirical. This does not normally need to be said. Empiricism in history has been taken for granted since the days of Ranke, and intellectual historians in this century have not deviated from their brethren in the other branches of history on this point. An affirmation of empiricism must be made here, however, because a large percentage of modern scholarship in philology amounts to (more or less) intelligent theory and informed speculation, resting precariously on a narrow base of empirical linguistic evidence. This study adheres to the proposition that one word, one line, one passage from an extant text is worth more to sound historical inquiry than the soundest speculative or theoretical statements made by linguistic specialists concerning the ninety percent of the ancient classical literature which has failed to survive into the modern world. In short, this study will eschew as much as possible the argument from silence. Perhaps the texts of the ancient languages extant in our time are not truly representative of the entire literature as the ancients themselves knew it in the days, say, of the Alexandrian library. But for that matter, perhaps even that entire literature, with all its vast repertoire of conventional, formulaic and even ritualistic expressions, is not truly representative of the ancient languages as they were actually spoken at any time or place in their world. No intellectual historian

who recognizes the wide disparity between the spoken and the written word in modern languages would ever doubt the truth in these cautionary reservations. However, historical inquiry which attempts to proceed empirically may admit such reservations only as limitations on all intellectual inquiry. For practical purposes, it must deal with the linguistic data which have actually survived, and it must insist in the face of the criticism of the linguistic specialists that the burden of proof requires of these very same specialists either explicitly contrary empirical data, conclusively contrary arguments based on that data, or both. For these reasons, this study rests on a reading of the standard classical texts and accepts as authoritative the etymologies and semantic glosses offered by the standard lexica except in instances of significant controversy. For Latin, this study relies on A. Meillet and A. Ernout, Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Latine (Paris, 4th ed., 1959); A. Walde, Lateinisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch (Heidelberg, 1930-1950); and Mason Hammond, Latin, A Historical and Linguistic Handbook (Cambridge, Ma., 1976). For Greek, it relies on Pierre Chantraine, Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Grecque (Paris, 1968); H. Frisk, Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch (Heidelberg, 1960 and 1970) 2 vols.; and E. Boisacq, Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Grecque; Études dans les Rapports avec les autres Langues Indo-Européennes (Heidelberg, 4th ed., 1950). These

lexica are assumed here to represent a threshold of consensus among modern philologists on questions of morphology and semantics. Wherever this study deviates significantly from that consensus, the deviation is acknowledged.

Second, this study is sociological, broadly speaking. It disclaims that sense of "sociological" as understood by academic sociology and that sense familiar to classicists presently enrolled in any of the several schools of "structuralism," especially of the French variety. It claims only to point out the elementary but largely inconspicuous connections between certain families of words and the social experiences which produced them. In pointing out these connections this study assumes that the findings of archaeology, anthropology, and art history are at least equal in importance with linguistic data for the illumination of ancient social history. It affirms the intellectual historian's article of methodological faith that an interpretation of a word, line, or passage of a text supported by even one fact from another type of data base, like archaeology or anthropology, is historically more sound than any interpretation supported by even a score of additional linguistic parallels drawn from other texts. The probability of attaining historical truth increases, it maintains, as language artifacts are critically examined in conjunction with historical artifacts from outside the realm of language. This kind of comparative method practiced by intellectual

historians (which is an interdisciplinary approach not to be confused with the comparative method of the historical linguists as exemplified by Henry M. Hoenigswald's Language Change and Linguistic Reconstruction [Chicago, 1960]) is hardly unknown to philologists. Indeed many of them were practicing the comparative method known to present-day intellectual historians long before the modern discipline of intellectual history - or modern comparative historical linguistics for that matter - was invented. Among classicists who are trained in areas outside of linguistics, three have served as methodological guides for this dissertation. Jane Ellen Harrison's Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion (Cambridge, 1903), John Chadwick and Michael Ventris' Documents in Mycenaean Greek: Three Hundred Selected Tablets from Knossos, Pylos, and Mycenae (Cambridge, 1956) and Chadwick's The Mycenaean World (Cambridge, 1976); and J.-P. Gu  pin's The Tragic Paradox: Myth and Ritual in Greek Tragedy (Amsterdam, 1968) rarely permit linguistic data or linguistic arguments to serve alone as the ground on which hypotheses are formed or conclusions on controversial questions drawn. Linguistic data and linguistic arguments are constantly measured against relevant data and arguments from the fields of archaeology, anthropology, and art history. The theories of these scholars may in fact turn out to be wrong, but their works have the advantage of a broad empirical base whose elements are available for further

testing and analysis.

Among the works of classicists, or philologists, who have made similar sojourns into ancient social history but who have lacked expertise in either archaeology, anthropology or art history to supplement their linguistic erudition Walter Burkert's Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism (Cambridge, Ma., 1972) E.L. Minar, trans., and Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual (Berkeley, 1979) are outstanding for the theoretical caution as well as the empirical care with which scanty linguistic data are used to reconstruct a probable or likely account of an otherwise irretrievable historical era. An equal degree of empirical care, but unfortunately not an equal degree of theoretical caution, distinguishes the work of Émile Benveniste whose principal work, Indo-European Language and Society (London, 1973) Elizabeth Palmer, trans., offers the intellectual historian a gold mine of valuable hints and suggestions concerning the probable or likely structure of the social institutions of the (largely pre-historic) Indo-European tribes to which the historical Greek and Roman tribes were distantly related. Benveniste's work cannot be considered as authoritative as the works already mentioned in the area of ancient social history because its hypotheses are based solely on linguistic data (including reconstructions) and linguistic arguments. It is wholly "intertextual." His statements about the structure of Indo-European social

institutions may be correct, but they cannot now be, or at least until now have not been, subject to critical confirmation or rejection in the light of data from outside linguistics. Benveniste was a student, and remains a disciple, of Antoine Meillet. The intellectual historian who would use linguistic data keeps to safer ground when he relies on the discreet and cautious conclusions of Meillet's Linguistique Historique et Linguistique Générale (Paris, 2nd ed., 1926, 1936), Introduction à l'Étude Comparative de la Langue Indo-Européennes (Paris, 8th ed., 1953) and Aperçue de l'Histoire de la Langue Grecque (Paris, 7th ed., 1965) in the technical areas of Greek and Latin morphology and semantics rather than follow Benveniste into the stratosphere of sociological speculation concerning the Indo-Europeans, no matter how soundly those speculations may be based on linguistic erudition.

Let us now conduct our intellectual history of the ancient origins of the idea of revolution along the lines indicated above. What are the facts of human social life behind the late Latin neologism revolutio? The word is formed from the far more common revolvo, which is itself merely a compound of volvo. The crucial social fact underlying their respective linguistic histories is that neither word ever rose very far above its original homely significations. Volvo, which means "to roll," or "to make to roll," and revolvo, which means "to roll back," "unroll," or

"unwind," are rarely employed to express any experience more complex than to roll out bread dough or to set a wagon in motion.¹⁴ Revolvo begins to be employed in the minimally sublimated sense of "to repeat" or "to return" only with the Augustan age.¹⁵ The usage of the two words shows the special Roman genius for the concrete.

Far more revealing of the human life and communal experience which led to our modern conception of "revolution" is the history of the Greek cognate of the Latin volvo. εἰλῶ (or εἰλέω), ἑλλῶ (or εἰλλῶ), along with their derivatives like ἡλίσσω and the noun ἥλιξ (English "helix"), all find their common origin in the Indo-European root *quel, and the Greek *(ϕ)ελ meaning "to twist, turn, or roll."¹⁶ Greek usage suggests two candidates for the basic experience behind these words. The verbs in this linguistic family regularly express the action of surrounding the body with something, with clothing or armor or perhaps something more immaterial, even "spiritual." A random example of this most concrete usage for "putting on" a thing occurs at Iliad Book 17, 492-93:

τὼ δ' ἔθ' οὖς βήτην βοέης εἰλυμένω ὤμους
αὔησι στερεῇσι

and the two of them went straight out, wrapping
their shoulders in cow-skin shields...

The word is just as regularly applied to gods who are protecting mortals by surrounding them with clouds, mists,

auras, and other concealing devices. Observing the overpowering military prowess, the ἀρετή of the Greek hero Diomedes, the Trojan Pandar wonders:

εἰ δ' ὅ γ' ἀνὴρ ὃν σῆμι, δαΐφρων Τυδέος υἱός,
οὐχ ὅ γ' ἄνευθε θεοῦ τάδε μαίνεται, ἀλλὰ τις ἄγχι
ἔστηκ' ἀθανάτων, νεφέλη ἐλύμένος ὦμους...

if he is the man I think he is, the son
of brilliant Tydes, not without the aid of god
does rage consume him, but near stands some immortal,
wrapping a cloud around his shoulders...

Iliad 5, 184-186

Nor is the image limited to things which surround the body as protection; the hero may just as well be surrounded by danger or enveloped in fatal wounds. When Zeus' favorite, Sarpedon, has been slain and his body repeatedly punctured by spears and arrows, the poet comments:

οὐδ' ἂν ἔτι φράδμων περ ἀνὴρ Σαρπηδόνα δτον
ἔγνω, ἐπεὶ βελεέσσι καὶ αἵματι καὶ κονίησιν
ἐκ κεφαλῆς εἴλυτο διαμπερὲς ἐς πόδας ἄκρους.

nor could any man however shrewd descry
god-like Sarpedon, since with arrows, blood,
and dust his body head to foot was covered...

Iliad 16, 637-740

Even nature, or more precisely, a nature spirit or δαίμων gets into the act. Homer uses an active transitive form of the verb to express how the river-god, who is protecting the Scamander from passage by the forces of the Achaians, will surround Achilles in drowning water and sand if he pushes too far toward Troy:

...καὶ δὲ μὲν αὐτὸν
εἰλύσω ψάμαθουσιν...

...and he himself
I shall surround with sand...

Iliad 21, 316-319

Equally common is the application of members of this word-family to the maneuvers of an entire army, either as it moves forward toward the enemy or as it retreats from him. Apollo, warning Achilles not to be carried away by his own fury for battle, reminds him that the Trojan enemy has already escaped behind the city walls:

ἦ νῦ τοι οὔτι μέλει Τρώων πόνος οὐς ἐφόβησας,
οὐδ' ἄρ' ἐστὶν ἄστυ ἄλυν, σὺ δὲ δεῦρο λιάσθης...

Why, you've given up the fight against the Trojans you routed:
They retreat to the city while you are tarrying here.

Iliad 22, 11-12

And again Hector, criticizing his companion Polydamas for recommending that the Trojans once again retreat before the attacks of the Achaeans, says:

Πολυδάμα, σὺ μὲν οὐκέτ' ἐμοὶ φίλα ταῦτ' ἀγορεύεις,
ὅς κ' ἐλέει κατὰ ἄστυ ἀλῆμεναι αὐτοὺς ἰόντας.

Polydamas, no longer are you giving sound advice,
By recommending retreat behind the city walls.

Iliad 18, 286-287

Just as ancient as these military applications for the members of the Greek word-family derived from the root **(F)el*, but more common perhaps in the Odyssey than in the Iliad, are the images expressing the early Greek

pastoral and viticultural ways of life. Certain members of this Greek word-family regularly describe the action of the winepress, the grazing patterns of cattle and the conspicuous, curving feature of their horns. In Homer the pastoral images concerning cattle are a constant source of inspiration for both short and extended similes for the prowess of heroes in battle. For example:

οὐδ' ἄν πω τότε γε Τρῶες καὶ φαίδιμος Ἕκτωρ
τείχεος ἐρρήξαυτο πύλας καὶ μακρὸν ὄχῃα,
εἰ μὴ ἄρ' υἱὸν ἑὸν, Σαρπηδόνα μετέτα Ζεὺς
ῥωσεν ἐπ' Ἀργείοισι, λέονθ' ὥς βουσὶν ἔλιξιν.

Only with great difficulty would Hector and
the Trojans have reached the walls' gate and great
lock-bar
had not wily Zeus dispatched his son, Sarpedon,
against the Argives, a lion among the curved-horn
cattle.

Iliad 12, 290-293

Later uses extend the application of these images of twisting, turning, or "surrounding" to the new experiences of an expanding and increasingly sophisticated culture. Naturally, the old images survive along with the new (e.g., Sophocles, Ajax, 374-376). A metaphorical "bridge" between the concrete images expressed by the $\ast(\mathcal{F})$ ελ-derivatives in Homer and the abstract uses of them in the tragedians and the later prose writers may perhaps be seen in Pindar's 8th Isthmian Ode:

τὸ δὲ πρὸ ποδῶς
ἄρειον ἀεὶ (σκοπεῖν)
χρῆμα πᾶν. δόλιος γὰρ αἰὼν ἐπ' ἀνδράσι κοῖναιται,
ἐλίσσων βίου πόρον.

...but better
always to notice what lies before
one's foot, for time, the sneak, hovers over mankind
winding life's passage.

Pindar, Isthmian 8, 11-15

It is certainly unsafe, in any case, to try to specify the exact chronological order, or the precise manner of linguistic development through which the members of this word-family were applied to new experiences. The evidence itself is not so unequivocal that it permits an exact linguistic mapping. The process of poetic abstraction is already very conspicuous in Aeschylus. By the first half of the fifth century the family of $*(F)\epsilon\lambda$ -derivatives has already been projected into heaven. In his last, tormented cry for justice, Prometheus invokes his mother earth and sky, and asks:

ὦ μητρὸς ἐμῆς σέβας, ὦ πάντων
αἰθῆρ κοινὸν φάος εἰλίσσων,
έσορᾷς μ' ὥς ἔκδικα πάσχω;

O Holy Mother, O Heaven,
Revolving the common light of all creation,
Do you see how I suffer Injustice?

Aeschylus, Prometheus, 1192-93

Aeschylus' association here of this image of winding, circling, or turning, with phenomena of the heavens may well have been borrowed from the contemporary liturgy of the cult of Orpheus, a liturgy which was apparently rich in such imagery.

κέκλυθι τηλεπόρου δύνης ἐλικαύγεα κύκλον
οὐρανίαις στροφάλιξι περίδρομον αἶεν ἐλίσσων,
ἄγλαῖ Ζεῦ Διόνυσε, πάτηρ πόντου, πάτηρ αἴης,
ἦλκε παγγενέτορ παντάλολε χρυσεόφεγγες

Hearken to the shining orb of the far-reaching
whirlwind,
Winding through the spinning heavens his perpetual
course,
Shining Zeus-Dionysus! Father of sea, father of air -
Sun! - gleaming, gold-bearing begetter of all.

Otto Kern, Orphicum Fragmentum, Fr. 236

In any case, by mid-fifth century the vocabulary of the
*(F)ελ-derivatives had gone from the pastures to the heavens
and back to the mind of man. In the following example
Sophocles is clearly using the participle of ἐλίσσω to ex-
press a mental or psychological phenomenon.

τοιαῦθ' ἐλίσσων ἦνυτον σπουδῇ βραδύς
χοῦτως ὁδὸς βραχεῖα γίγνεται μακρά.

Turning these things over [in my mind]
I made haste slowly:
Thus did the short road become a long one.

Sophocles, Antigone, 231-232

Finally, the fact that Euripides uses the same participle
a generation later to express the human capacity for preva-
rication and lies, indicates the extent to which the word-
family has passed from concrete images into metaphor:

πατέρα μὲν σὸν ἐκπαγλούμενος,
σὸν δ' οὐκ ἐπαινῶν σύγγονον, καλοῖς κακοῖς
λόγους ἐλίσσων...

He spoke from the two sides of his mouth at once,
Praising your father but neglecting your brother,
Spinning fair words with foul.

Euripides, Orestes, 889-892

In sum, what is important about the etymologies of the Latin volvo and the Greek εἰλω and their relatives for the history of the idea of "revolution" is the fact that the most abstract, refined and elaborate images of turning, winding, twisting, and revolving which we find in so-called "classical" usage are, linguistically speaking, complex sublimations of primitive perceptions of curling motion and circular movement which are traceable originally from the specific human experiences of seasonal wandering with cows, sheep, and other livestock and to military maneuvering. The linguistic data point to social patterns which characterized the communal life of these Aegean descendants of the Indo-European peoples. Whether or not an actual continuity persisted in these social patterns of communal life between the Greek tribes, as they first appear to our historical view, and their more ancient Indo-European forebears is a question which must be left to the speculative tendencies of the linguistic sociologists and to the future empirical work of archaeologists and anthropologists in the south Russian heartland of the Indo-European dispersion. At present very few safe statements can be made, one way or the other, concerning continuity or divergence in patterns of social life between historical Greeks and proto-historical Indo-Europeans. All that can be safely said is that concerning Greek images of "revolutionary" movement the Greek pastoral and military experiences are regularly

and often expressed by words of ancient Indo-European linguistic lineage whose roots convey the image of circling, winding, rolling or rotating motion. Among those words the group derived from the Greek root $*(F)\epsilon\lambda$ amounts to just a small part. We must now turn to some of the others.

C H A P T E R I I I

IMAGES OF CIRCULAR MOVEMENT IN ANCIENT GREEK: A CATALOGUE OF THE DATA

Philological analysis of the modern word "revolution" proves remarkably fruitful in revealing the social history - the concrete facts of human communal experience - of those ancient peoples who developed and passed on to us the complex images and metaphors of change which occurs "in circles." The foregoing discussion, however, is merely a rehearsal of the subject and the method of investigation. Happily for the intellectual historian, the sum of the derivatives of the Greek root $*(\text{F})\epsilon\lambda$ hardly exhausts the repertoire of circular images in Greek and Latin. There are more than a half-dozen Indo-European roots whose derivatives express circular or revolving motion. In addition to $*(\text{F})\epsilon\lambda$, Greek derived three more roots from the ancient Indo-European *quel: they are $*\kappa\upsilon\kappa\lambda$ - from which $\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\kappa\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ and its linguistic relatives are derived; $*\pi\epsilon\lambda$ from which $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omega$, $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$, $\pi\omicron\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\omega$, etc. are derived; and $*\tau\epsilon\lambda$ from which $\tau\epsilon\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\omega$, $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\omega$, $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\theta\omega$, etc. are derived. Five more Indo-European roots contributed images of such motion to Greek. From the Indo-European $*streb(h)$ evolved the Greek root $*στρεπ-$ which produced the linguistic family of $\sigmaτρέφ\omega$, $\sigmaτροφέ\omega$, $\sigmaτρωσά\omega$, $\sigmaτροβέ\omega$, etc.; from the Indo-European *trep (or perhaps *trekw [*treq] or *trokw [*troq]) evolved the Greek root $*τρεπ-$ which

produced the linguistic family of τρέπω, τραπέω, τροπόω, etc.; from the Indo-European *ghoro(s) evolved (probably) the Greek root *χορ- which produced the linguistic family of χορεύω and χορός, and perhaps also χορέω; from an as yet undetermined Indo-European root, and through an as yet also undetermined Greek root emerged the Greek family of words including δυνέω, δῦνος, δύνη, etc.; and finally, from the Indo-European root *per evolved the Greek root *περ- which produced a truly awesome vocabulary including the prepositions περί, παρά, πρό, the adverbs πέρα, πέραν, πέρην, etc., and the verbs περάω, περαίνω, πεύρω, πευράω, πέρνημι, πορίζω, πορεύω, and πόρω.

Among these roots the Indo-European *quel and its Greek descendants are the most obvious candidates for analysis; they indeed constitute the subject of this "summary review." But a comprehensive history of the Greek contribution to the idea of revolution in Western culture will require a full analysis of the entire field of linguistic data surveyed above. That full analysis would present the following main outlines. Greek *στρεπ- and *τρεπ- provided the largest number of words after the combined contributions of *κύκλ-, *(f)ελ-, *πελ-, and *τελ-. Semantically speaking both *στρεπ- and *τρεπ- are close to *(f)ελ: The sense of "whirling" is especially strong in the former, while in the common use of both the sense in the verbs of the "middle voice" - that is, where manifest action is impulsive (coming from within) rather than propulsive (coming from without)- is very strong. More important still, these two Greek roots, especially *στρεπ-, are commonly employed to

describe how Justice - Δίκη - moves through the cosmos.

This is evident from even a cursory look at Aeschylus or Pindar, but also is to be seen in the texts of the pre-Socratic philosophers and Orphic cult literature. The three remaining roots are narrower in their semantic fields and more specialized in their uses. Greek *χορ - provided a vocabulary intimately bound up with "rural" transhumance and later with agriculture. Its members became semantically specialized rather early, and their only important "sublimated" forms are connected with the ritual circle dances of the various Greek Dionysian festivals. The semantic family of δύνος and its relatives is by far the obscurest. Until its etymological history is established only one point can be safely made: in regular Greek usage, whether at the level of the δύνος of material culture or the δύνη of speculative philosophy, the semantic field displays an unmistakable aspect of violence. Finally, the development of the root *περ - from the Indo-European *per is, along with the *τελ < *quel history discussed here, not only the most complex, semantically speaking, but its implications for the history of Greek thought in particular and of Western thought generally are perhaps the most profound of all the word-families mentioned. Its history remains one of the great, unwritten chapters in the story of Western thought. That history must account for three broad semantic phenomena. First, how and why did a word-group whose oldest associations

are with notions of intensity and excess in some thing or activity (like περισσός) assimilate the image of the (revolving) circle as in περί? Second, how did these two images then produce those various manifestations of what we now call "linear" thinking in such words as περᾶω and πόρος. Third, how did the three ideas of excess and intensity, circularity, and linear pervasion unite semantically to provide Greek with one of its major conceptions of Fate, the πεπρωμένον ἔστι. That future historical study of the development of *περ < *per will go a long way to explain how it was possible that "linear" conceptions, especially the philosophers' notion of the λόγος, could emerge out of Greek "circular" or "revolutionary" thinking.

C H A P T E R I V

KYKΛΟΣ: THE IMAGE OF THE CIRCLE IN GREEK LITERATURE

Intellectual historians - including classicists, philosophers, and political scientists - have not failed to notice the importance of at least some of these word-groups, especially of κύκλος and its relatives. If modern students of political revolutions and their rhetoric have ever thought to trace concepts of revolution further back in history than the late Latin revolutio, they have invariably come across the Greek historian Polybius' famous ἀνακύκλωσις in Book VI of his Histories. The scholarly literature on this concept in political philosophy is hardly inconsiderable,¹⁷ but the modern discovery, or rediscovery, of this first fully articulated concept of revolutionary change in nature, history, and politics has often seduced scholars into analytic complacency. Mesmerized by the concept's justly famous simplicity, elegance, and clarity, they have treated Polybius' image as the distillation, or culmination, of intellectual developments transmitted along the line of the Greek schools of philosophy. Especially those scholars employing the method of Begriffesgeschichte have discussed ἀνακύκλωσις as if the history of Greek thought from the pre-socratic philosophers was sufficient to explain the origin as well as the mode of expression of Polybius' concept.¹⁸ They

have failed sufficiently to consider the possibility that Polybius owes his revolutionary imagery far more to the reservoir of circular imagery at the level of "popular" culture than to the direct line of intellectual influence from Plato to himself. There can be no serious doubt of course that Polybius knew his own philosophical forebears, especially Plato and Aristotle. Their ideas, even in some cases the precise expression of their ideas, reappear everywhere in Polybius' work, and not just in Book VI.¹⁹ Such influences explain, however, only the expression - the clarity, simplicity, and eloquence of the style - and not the origin of the content of Polybius' ideas. For that, we must look not just, or even primarily, to Polybius' philosophical forebears but to the culture of his personal forebears in Greece and to his acquaintances at Rome. The cultural "bridge" between Greece and Rome was, of course, the Greek language itself; and if modern intellectual historians are to understand how revolutionary imagery became a permanent acquisition of Western thought, and especially of Western political thought, they must understand in broad outline the relation of Polybius (and indeed of all his philosophical predecessors and successors in the ancient world) to the great reservoir of revolutionary imagery in their common Greek culture.

A summary of the Greek usages of κύκλος and its relatives will begin to suggest the depth of that reservoir.

The word is derived from the Indo-European *quequlo-s, meaning "wagon" or "cart," which is itself related to the Indo-European root *quel, to "turn." Since from this root the English word "wagon" is derived along with the Germanic line of the Indo-European language group, we have before us an ancient example of synecdoche - that is, a word in which a quality or property of a part of a thing is used to express the essential quality of the whole. (To use a modern example: when we say that the regatta consisted of "fifty sail," we mean that the expedition consisted of fifty complete ships, not that it possessed only sails.)

The κύκλοι, the wheels, came to be used as the easy signification of the cart, wagon, or vehicle to which they were attached. (A modern American indulges precisely the same linguistic usage when he expresses a desire to own his own "set of wheels.") The concrete image of the wheel is the most common use of κύκλος in Homer, and usually pertains to the chariots of the warrior-heroes (see Iliad 5.722; 18.375; 20.280; and 23.340). The second most common image in Homer is the circle of warriors fighting with the enemy for the armor of a fallen companion, or the circle of hunters who are surrounding their prey. Describing the *melée* of Achaeans and Trojans around the body of the fallen Patroclus, Homer compares the configuration of the struggling warriors to a group of tanners standing in a circle to stretch a hide:

ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἄνῆρ ταύροιο βοῶς μέγαλοιο βοείην
 λαοῖσιν δῶν τανύειν, μεθύουσιν ἀλοιφῇ
 δεξάμενοι δ' ἄρα τοῦ γε διασταύτες τανύουσιν
 κυλκός, ἄφαρ δέ τε ἱκμάς ἔβη. δύνει δὲ τάλουφῇ
 πολλῶν ἐλκόντων τάνυται δέ τε πᾶσα διαπρό
 ὥς οἱ γ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα νέκυν ὀλίγη ἐνὶ χώρῃ
 εὔλκεον ἀμφοτέρου·

As when a man gives the fat-soaked hide of a great bull
 To his workers to stretch, and they take it and stand
 Round in a circle and pull, and at last the moisture
 dries
 And the fat penetrates from so much pulling, and the
 hide
 Is stretched full out, so they dragged the body
 Back and forth across that small space in opposite
 Directions.

Iliad 17, 389-395

The image is applied as often to the hunt. Describing Penelope's distress as she ponders the plots of her suitors, Homer compares her to a surrounded lion:

ὅσσα δὲ μερμήριξε λέων ἀνδρῶν ἐν ὑμύλῳ
 δείσας. ὅπποτε μιν δόλιον περὶ κύκλον ἄγωσι,
 τόσσα μιν ὀρμαίνουσιν ἐπήλυθε νήδυμος ὕπνος.

In the way a fear-struck lion trapped in a crowd of men
 Twists about as the men surround him in a devious
 Circle, so a deep sleep enveloped her as she
 Pondered...

Odyssey IV, 791-794

The one concrete image of the circle which is unmistakably associated with what we would consider a "political" situation occurs when Homer describes the physical dispositions of gods and men as they sit in their councils or public assemblies. Of the numerous examples of this usage of κύκλος in Homer perhaps the most famous - and certainly the most artistically self-conscious - is the description

of the council of elders emblazoned on the shield of Achilles:

λαοὺ δ' ἀμφοτέρουσιν ἐπήπιον, ἀμφὶς ἀρωγού.
 κήρυκες δ' ἄρα λαὸν ἐρήτυον. οἳ δὲ γέροντες
 ἦατ' ἐπὶ ξεστοῦσι λίθοις ἱερῶ ἐνὶ κύκλῳ,
 σκήπτρα δὲ κερύκων ἐν χέρσ' ἔχον ἡεροφώνων.

And people were speaking for both parties as
 counsellors

And the heralds restrained the people while the elders
 sat

On polished stones in a circle holding the staves
 In their hand while they spoke...

Iliad 18, 502-505

Almost as common in Homer, and certainly more so in Hesiod, is the use of κύκλου to signify the eyes of men or beasts (Odyssey 9.106-107ff.; Theogony 62, 139, 144). This poetic device of using the shape of the eyes to stand for the eye itself is also common among the lyric poets and even among the pre-socratic philosophers (e.g., Parmenides, frag. 10.4; and Empedocles, frag. 84.8), and by the fifth century κύκλος as an epithet of the eye has become a virtual cliché. Sophocles has a special fondness for it (Philoctetes 1354-1356; Antigone 966ff.; Oedipus Rex 1266-1269; Oedipus at Colonus 694-706).

In the fifth century κύκλος became, quite naturally, a common designation of the choral dance in Greek drama and its adjectival form a common, if somewhat redundant, modifier of the choral dance pattern itself. (See generally Euripides Alcestis 499; Xenophon Economist; Aeschines Against Ctesiphon 232; and especially Aristophanes, e.g., Frogs

440-444, and Clouds 331-334.)

In sum, Homer and Hesiod, and the lyric poets and the dramatists, to the extent that they were following the tradition of the first two, testify to four principal areas of human activity to which κύκλος and its relatives were regularly applied. Those areas were military maneuvering, aristocratic hunting, public deliberation and consultation, and finally, ritual dancing. (The use of κύκλου to designate the eyes seems to be a purely poetic phenomenon without conspicuous social origins or implications. It is a simple visual image, apparently unconnected with a social activity.) More ancient than these four activities, yet perhaps providing the social foundation for all of them, is the immemorial pattern of Indo-European seasonal pastoralism, for which the wagon or wheeled cart provided the indispensable means for mobility. The remains of these carts - and even toy models of them - have been unearthed regularly by archaeologists in the twentieth century across the wide range of the Indo-European homeland in the south Russian steppe.²⁰ Whatever may have been the avenues of influence among these activities in the formation of the historical Indo-European languages remains a mystery. That is to say, whether the wheels on the wagon or chariot provided the image for circular motion in other areas of human activity, or whether one of those other activities - ritual dancing perhaps - provided the image, or perhaps even the idea, for the

others - these questions of origin and influences are not now answerable through linguistic analysis alone. Perhaps one day archaeology will come to language's assistance. Until then, however, what can be safely said is that four areas of human activity, all connected with a seasonal pastoral way of life, constituted the ground of human experiences upon which language created the images of circularity expressed by κύκλος and its relatives.

The process whereby these original images became metaphors of ever more abstract and complex human conceptions is clearer than their origins. Surprisingly, κύκλος does not become a common or popular designation for celestial phenomena until relatively late; it is missing from Homer and Hesiod. As an epithet for the sun or the moon it does not appear until the fifth century. Aeschylus has Prometheus invoke the "circle of the all-seeing sun" to witness his suffering at the hands of Zeus and the other Olympians:

ὦ δῖος αἰθήρ, καὶ ταχύπτεροι πνοαὶ
 πόταμου τε πηγᾶν, ποντίων τε κυμάτων
 ἀνῆριθμον γέλασμα, παμμητόρ τε γῆ,
 καὶ τὸν πανόπτην κύκλον ἡλίου καλῶ.
 ἴδεσθέ μ', οἷα πρὸς θεῶν πάσχω θεός.

O Holy Heaven, and swift-winged wind,
 River-rapids and fathomless laughter
 Of the Ocean-waves; O, Earth, Mother of all,
 And the all-seeing circle of Sun, I call:
 Look at me - a god! - I suffer evil from the other gods.

Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, 88-92

Sophocles has his guard for the unburied body of Polynices employ the phrase λαμπρός ἡλίου κύκλος almost casually to

express "high noon":

χρόνον τὰδ' ἦν τοσοῦτον, ἔστ' ἐν αἰθέρι
μέσῳ κατέστη λαμπρὸς ἡλίου κύκλος
καὶ καῦμ' ἔθαλπε...

...and in the middle
Of heaven stood the sun's brilliant disk
And his rays beat down upon us.

Sophocles, Antigone, 415-417

Euripides extends the image to the period of time marked
by the full moon:

κύκλος δὲ πανσέληνος ἠκόντιζ' ἄνω
μηνὸς διχήρης...

Above, the moon's circle reached full compass
Dividing month from month...

Euripides, Ion, 1147-1148

Moreover, the religious cults which took their inspiration
from the (mostly) mythical Orpheus, and the speculations
of the still quasi-religious cosmologists now commonly call-
ed pre-socratic philosophers - both active by the middle
of the sixth century - are rich in this as in other types
of circular imagery. While a late sixth century devotee
of an Orphic mystery cult in Thurii in southern Italy prays
that his soul may fly from the "circle of grievous suffering"
which is this world to the company of the immortal gods:

καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼν ὑμῶν γένος ὄλβιον εὔχομαι εἶμεν
ἀλλὰ με Μοῦρ(α) ἐδάμασσε καὶ ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ ἄλλοι
(***) καὶ ἀστεροβλήτα κεραυνὸν.
κύκλου δ' ἐξέπταν βαρυπενθέος ἀργαλέοιο...

For I pray that we may remain a pious family,
 But Moira and the other immortal gods yoked
 And bound me to the circle of grievous suffering

Diels-Kranz, Orpheus B 18 (I,16,10-13)

the roughly contemporary Heraclitus of Ephesus recorded, if he did not invent, the first usage of the word "wheel" to designate what we now recognize as the mathematician's "circle":

Εὐνὸν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ πέρας ἐπὶ κύκλου
 περιφερείας

For the beginning and the end are a common point on the periphery of the circle.

Diels-Kranz, Heraclitus B 103 (I,174,2)

Neither Orphic ritual liturgy nor pre-socratic philosophy, however, is a safe guide to the images and metaphors common to the popular culture of the Greeks. There is no evidence that Orphism entered Greece before the sixth century, and its religious organization and practices were certainly a departure from convention;²¹ while the very argument that the pre-socratics invented "philosophy" as we have come to know it in the West presupposes their sociological as well as their intellectual novelty.²² In judging the extent and depth of revolutionary (or any other) imagery in ancient Greece, the linguistic evidence provided by the Orphic cultists and the pre-socratic philosophers can do little more than mislead. It is rather the fifth century dramatists who reveal that κύκλος has entered the linguistic reservoir of popular culture. When Sophocles has Neoptolemus ask

his father why he is gazing on "the circle above":

τί παραφρονεῖς ἄν; τί τὸν ἄνω λεύσσεις κύκλον;

Is your mind wandering again? Why are you
Gazing at the circle [of the heavens] above?

Sophocles, Philoctetes, 815

the modern reader may safely conclude that κύκλος has become a common, and even proverbial, expression for the "sky" or "heaven." When Ajax decides that it is right to defer to the traditional leaders of Argos from the house of Atreus, arguing by analogy from the hierarchical order of heaven

τουγάρ τὸ λοιπὸν εἰσόμεσθα μὲν θεοῖς
εὔκειν, μαθησόμεσθα δ' Ἀτρεΐδας σέβειν.
ἄρχοντές εἰσιν, ὥσθ' ὑπεικτέον, τί μὴν;
καὶ γὰρ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ τὰ καρτερώτατα
τιμαῖς ὑπεύκει. τοῦτο μὲν νιφοστιβεῖς
χειμῶνες ἐκχωροῦσιν εὐκάρπῳ θέρει.
ἐξίστατα δὲ νυκτὸς αἰανῆς κύκλος
τῇ λευκοπώλῃ φέγγος ἡμέρᾳ φλέγειν.

From now on I shall learn to yield to the gods,
And reverence the Atreidai, for they
Our leaders are whom we must know to obey:
What's the alternative? Even the forces of
Nature are quick to submit. Snow-swept winter
Retires before fructifying summer,
And the disk of immortal night retreats before
The horse-drawn fire of day.

Sophocles, Ajax, 666-673

the modern reader may correctly infer that κύκλος as a constituent element of the order of the cosmos has already entered the language of popular culture as a metaphor for political activity. Finally, when Euripides puts into the mouth of a messenger a speech parts of which are more self-consciously lyrical than the choruses which even in their own day were

famous for their lyricism (Ion 1147-48 quoted supra, p. 78), the reader may justly conclude that the category of celestial imagery, of which κύκλος and its relatives was by this time such an intimate part, had in fact become a dramatic stock-device introduced de rigueur to meet the expectations of an audience thoroughly accustomed to metaphor.

From the dramatists the image passed into the prose writers. Herodotus must be given credit for having first applied the image to human affairs without, as in the dramatists, either an explicit or implicit reference to cosmic or mystical speculation. He is certainly familiar with the older, mystical usage (Histories I, 131):

οἱ [Περσας] νομίζουσι Διὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ ὑψηλότατα
τῶν ὀρέων ἀναβαίνοντες θυσίας ἔρδειν, τὸν κύκλον
πάντα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ Δία καλέοντες.

The Persians go up to the highest summits of the mountains to sacrifice to god, for they invoke Zeus as if he were the entire orbit of heaven.

Herodotus, Histories I, 131

but he also brought the image back down to earth from the divine ether by imagining the affairs of men in the image of the κύκλος. He virtually invented the now time-worn phrase, "the cycle in the affairs of men." Narrating the story of Cyrus the Great's encounter with the fierce Massagetae on his northern Bactrian border, Herodotus puts into the mouth of Croesus, once the opponent and now the attendant and advisor of the Great King, a speech intended to dissuade

him from adopting a course of action for which only the immortals could hope for success:

ὦ βασιλεῦ...εἰ μὲν ἀθάνατος δοκέεις εἶναι
καὶ στρατιῆς τοιαύτης ἄρχειν, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη
πρῆγμα γνώμας ἐμῇ σοὶ ἀποφαίνεσθαι. εἰ
ἔγνωκας ὅτι ἄνθρωπος καὶ σὺ εἶς καὶ
ἐτέρων τοιῶνδε ἄρχεις, ἐκεῖνο πρῶτον μάθε
ὥς κύκλος τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἐστὶ πρηγμάτων,
περιφερόμενος δὲ οὐκ ἔῃ αἰεὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς
εὐτυχέειν.

O King...if you think you and your soldiers are immortal, there is hardly any point in my speaking my views; but if you would recognize that even you are one man among the other men you lead, then understand this primary fact: there is a cycle in human affairs which, as it turns, does not allow them to continue to prosper forever.

Herodotus, Histories I, 207

Cyrus followed Croesus' advice and won an initial victory against the Massagetae, but the wheel of human affairs continued to turn and soon after Cyrus was defeated and himself killed at their hands. To Herodotus, then, the history of history owes, along with so much else, the notion that change in the course of human affairs, propelled by the force of chance (τύχη, fortuna), occurs in circles.

With Herodotus' Histories, κύκλος has become part of the stock of circular imagery used to describe human affairs. In Plato we find κύκλος applied to every aspect of life - from the human to the cosmic and to everything and to every spirit in between. The mythological passages in his middle dialogues and large portions of his late dialogues - especially the cosmological fantasy Timaeus²³ - are exceptionally

rich in uses of κύκλος and its compounds. (See generally Republic 617a; Symposium 190a; Phaedo 72b; Laws 898a; Statesman 296c; and Timaeus 36b-39e.)

The intellectual historian who hopes to get a better understanding of Polybius' ἀνακύκλωσις by examining the underlying popular imagery contained in the ancient historian's own language must not conclude from the virtual embarras de richesse offered by κύκλος that he has discovered in that word alone the substratum of Polybius' revolutionary imagery. Such a conclusion is premature. Κύκλος and its linguistic family display a semantic ambiguity which makes them dubious candidates for the role of explaining the source of revolutionary imagery in either Polybius or in Greek thought generally. The semantic ambiguity pertains to movement. The nominal (κύκλος) and adjectival (κυκλιός, ἄ, ὄν) forms are generally static and not dynamic images: that is, the circles do not necessarily move; they do not necessarily revolve or rotate. This fact is demonstrated by a comparison of κύκλος and κυκλιός with their compounds and with their verbal and adverbial forms. In Homer and Hesiod the fact that κύκλος is, by itself, usually motionless is shown by compounds like κυκλοτερής (κύκλος plus an adjectival form of the verb τεύρω , meaning to "rub hard" or "press"). The thing described as κυκλοτερής is presumed to be made into a curved, circular, or rounded shape by some act of bending through pressure. That is to say, a verb stem must be appended

to the κύκλος in order to make it move. (See generally Iliad 4.124-125; Odyssey 17.208-210; Hesiod, The Shield of Achilles 207-209.) Nor is the distinction ignored by the later writers. Herodotus observes it in his account of the Hyperborean notion of Ocean flowing around an Earth which herself is round, as if drawn by a compass:

οἱ Ωκεανόν...ρέοντα γράφουσι πέριξ τὴν γῆν,
ἐοῦσαι κυκλοτερέα ὡς ἀπὸ τόρνου...

They write that Ocean flows around the Earth,
which is circular as if drawn by a compass.

Herodotus, Histories IV, 36.2

Among the philosophers the need to put the κύκλος in motion is regularly recognized. (See generally Empedocles B 26.1 περιπλομένοιο κύκλοι; 27.4 Σφαῖρος κυκλοτερῆς; 45 κυκλοτερές...φῶς in Diels-Kranz; Plato, Phaedo 72b γιγνόμενα ὥσπερ ἐκ κύκλου περιιόντα; Aristotle, On the Cosmos 391^b22 κυκλοφορουμένης.

Similarly, the verbs κυκλέω, κυκλώ and nearly all their prepositional compounds are new forms in the fifth century. The novelty of these verbs and their compounds is underscored by the fact that only one appears in Homer:

κυκλήσομεν ἐνθάδε νεκρός
βουσὶ καὶ ἡμιόνοισιν

And we shall gather the bodies circling the field
with our oxen and mules...

Iliad VII, 332

Again, it is apparently Sophocles who took the lead in the process of poetic abstraction from the concrete and parti-

cular to the abstract and even metaphysical. The simple, visual images are hardly lacking in Sophocles, of course (see Ajax 19 and Antigone 226), but his metaphoric expressions reveal that the idea of the "moving circle" was evolving from the visual toward the conceptual. In a chorus of the Electra the poet explicitly associates this moving circle with the idea of time and of repetition consisting of equal, yet alternating, segments making a sequence:

πολλὰ κυκλοῦσι νύκτες ἡμέραι τ' ἴσαι

Many are the days and nights which circle about
in equal numbers.

(l. 1365)

and in a fragment (871) the poet associates the moving circle with fate as it revolves along the inexorable course of the gods:

οὐμὸς ἀεὶ πότμος ἐν πυκνῷ θεοῦ τροχῷ κυλεῖται.

On god's thick wheel my fate revolves forever.

Sophocles, Fragment 871

Euripides is particularly fond of the lengthened form, κυκλόω (See Orestes 1379, Iphigenia in Aulis 775, Cyclops 462, and The Bacchantes 1066) and of κύκλος in prepositional compounds. Indeed, only three of these compounds precede him: Aeschylus coined the word ἀμφικυκλόομαι (Persians 458) Sophocles the word ἐπικυκλέω (ἐπὶ πῆμα καὶ χαρὰ πᾶσι κυκλοῦσι, Trachiniae 130) and Herodotus the seemingly redundant περικυκλόω (Histories VIII, 78) to signify the encirclement of an enemy.

By the fourth century κύκλος and its various compounds have become so common that the image of the revolving circle is used as a shorthand designation for ordinary, everyday human affairs: τὰ ἐγκυκλία constitute the business one does every day as one "makes the rounds" of the city (See Isocrates, Nicocles, 22: ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις τοῖς καθ' ἡμέραν γιγνομένοις Epicurus, Letter to Pythocles, 85, and Fragment LVIII, τὰ ἐγκυκλία καὶ πολιτικὰ; Aristotle, Politics 1263^a 21, πρὸς τὰς διακονίας τὰς ἐγκυκλίου), while the lengthened form, τὰ ἐγκυκλήματα came to express the idea of "moveable property" (which in modern French is expressed by meubles).

The proper conclusion to be drawn from these linguistic data is that the attachment of the word κύκλος to the image of revolutionary, or circular, movement - an attachment which is at the very heart of Polybius' ἀνακύκλωσις - is largely an invention of the fifth century, and of the late fifth century at that. The image of the revolving κύκλος as an expression of change in any area of human experience does not precede the Athenian "classical" period. If the several uses of κύκλος in the Orphic texts and among the speculations of the pre-socratic philosophers are to be admitted as an exception, the intellectual historian must keep clearly in mind the fact that neither group had much influence on the "popular mind" until the Hellenistic period because their audiences were always small, usually elite, and sometimes in a dissenting, if not outright subversive, relation-

ship to the surrounding popular culture. Those modern historians who would argue for the centrality of "cyclical thinking" in the ancient pagan Greek mentality from the evidence provided by κύκλος and its relatives are leaning their argument on a very thin reed. The oldest uses of κύκλος are very simple, and almost always static; the image did not, because it could not, serve as a metaphor for change until the idea of the κύκλος "in motion" was developed, an idea which does not emerge until well into the second half of the fifth century. The dynamic significance of κύκλος does not appear until the dramatists, especially Euripides, and only becomes common in the fourth century. On the other hand, those modern historians who have questioned the pervasiveness of cyclical thinking in the ancient world²⁴ are misled by their procedural assumption that the linguistic family of κύκλος exhausts the reservoir of revolutionary imagery from which an ancient author like Polybius might draw his inspiration. In fact, κύκλος and its family comprises only a very small part of such imagery in Greek. Far and away the largest part is comprised of word-families which have not, by and large, contributed such dramatic neologisms as Polybius' ἀνακύκλωσις to the common stock of revolutionary or cyclical conceptions transmitted to Western political philosophy. To these more obscure images we must turn if we are to be able to appreciate the extent of circular, cyclical, or revolutionary metaphors in the mentality of

the ancient Greek world.

CHAPTER V

- ΠΟΛΟΣ: PUTTING THE CIRCLE IN MOTION

Twice we have moved from the most highly abstract words back to the simple images of which they are composed. We have moved from the modern "revolution" back to its immediate Latin antecedents, revolutio, revolvo, and volvo, to their Greek cognates ἀνελύω, and εἰλύω, and finally to their common Indo-European root *quel, meaning "to turn," "rotate," or "spin." Similarly, we have looked back from the ancient ἀνακύκλωσις, which as a neologism in Polybius' Histories was as complex a conception in his day as "revolution" is in our own, to its immediate Greek root in κύκλος and finally to its Indo-European root *quel meaning "to turn." Along the way we have made two very important discoveries. First, κύκλος and its linguistic family, upon which most intellectual historians have laid their claims to the ubiquity of "cyclical" thinking in ancient Greece, are images which remained in their earliest forms largely static and motionless, displayed little abstraction or sublimation before the middle of the fifth century, and achieved linguistic sophistication only among groups of "intellectuals" (the pre-socratic philosophers) or among religious "cultists" (the so-called Orphics) who were not representatives of the mainstream of ancient Greek thought. Second, the deri-

vatives of the two Indo-European roots $*(F)\epsilon\lambda$ and $*\underline{q}uel$, especially in their early uses in Homer, Hesiod, and the lyric poets, reveal a strong connection with ancient pastoral and military ways of life - with, generally, the phenomenon of "transhumance" among the proto-historical Indo-European peoples of the present-day south Russian steppe north of the Black Sea.

Let us now reverse our method and, dispensing with the strictly archaeological approach of analyzing complex words into their simpler components in order to reveal the more concrete realities embedded in their historical texture, proceed to take up directly those Indo-European roots which express circular or revolving movement of any kind and trace how Greek developed from them specific images, metaphors, symbols, and concepts. This approach will prove beyond any reasonable doubt both that the Greeks were saturated with circular and revolutionary ways of thinking in all areas of life - least of all in the perception of time as "cyclical" and most of all in their notions about what we call "politics"; and that the historical source of these "revolutionary" metaphors was a pattern of specific phenomena associated with "transhumance" - that semi-pastoral and semi-agricultural way of life which was practiced for millenia by the Indo-European peoples before they began their great dispersal in the middle of the third millenium and which continued, certainly to a gradually diminishing

degree, into historical times, and which has persisted according to Fernand Braudel in isolated areas of the Mediterranean basin well into the twentieth century.²⁵

Intellectual historians who have grounded their arguments for the "cyclical" conception of time in Greek thought on κύκλος and its compounds have neglected their data base by two-thirds. The Indo-European root *quel not only produced the Greek root *κύκλος but also the roots *πελ, *τελ, and, as we have already seen, *(F)ελ. Each root taken separately not only contributed more words, in absolute numbers, than did κύκλος, but the words thus contributed were of much more common and extensive usage. They were not the mere mental playthings of intellectual elites or religious cultists, but were used by everyone in everyday speech.

From *πελ was derived πέλω and πέλομαι whose regular meaning is "to come into existence," "to become," "to be."²⁶ Just as εἶλω²⁷ assimilated the idea of "going about," of "going to and fro" to its original image of circling or winding motion, so πέλω and πέλομαι have assimilated the idea of "being" or more properly of "becoming" to their original root images of revolving or circling motion. Unlike εἶλω, however, πέλω and πέλομαι have by historical times lost that original independent signification of circular movement through physical space. The spatial image of circling movement has already been thoroughly absorbed in Homer's time by the more abstract notions of "being" and

"becoming." In short, long before Greek literature commenced its career with Homer, certain words for expressing the ideas of existence (being) and development (becoming) had been grounded upon the spatial image of "circling about." On the other hand, the frequentative verb forms *πολέω*, *πολεύω*, and *πολέομαι* and their various compounds have all retained, at least to some degree, the sense of circular or revolving motion which *πέλω* and *πέλομαι* have lost. In poetic usage from Homer to the dramatists *πολέω* and *πολεύω* both mean "to turn over the soil" or simply "to plow" (Hesiod, Works and Days, 462: ἔπευ πολεῖν; Sophocles, Antigone, 341: ὕππευ γένει πολεῦων). In expressions closer to conversational usage, the frequentative forms mean "to go about," "to range over," or "to come round to." When Homer tells how Achilles in his anger refused either to attend war councils or to join in the fight against the Trojans:

οὔτ' ποτ' εἰς ἀγορὴν πωλέσκετο κυδάνειον
οὔτε ποτ' ἐς πόλεμον...

Neither would he turn up at the assembly of nobles,
Nor ever turn out to muster for battle...

Iliad I, 490-491

the poet is using *πωλέσκετο* precisely as we would say in English that someone refused to "turn up" for town meeting or to "turn out" to muster for military duty. And when the poet has Telemachus complain to an elder of Ithaca that his mother's suitors do not first come to her father Ikaros

as was traditionally expected by the Greek aristocratic rules of protocol, but instead "come round every day" to Penelope's own house:

οἱ δ' εἰς ἡμέτερον πωλεύμενοι ἥματα πάντα

Odyssey II, 52

the poet is using the image of "coming round" precisely as we do in English to express the idea of paying regular visits. Similarly these Greek verbs express the notion of "going about" or of "making the rounds" of a place. Homer uses πολεύειν to mean simply "to go about one's business in town" (Odyssey Book XXII, 223: κατὰ ἄστυ πολεύειν).

Aeschylus employs πολεῖ to create the image of a Bactrian officer attached to the Persian fleet marooned and walking about on a small island after the naval disaster at Salamis:

Τενάγων τ' ἀριστεύς βακτρούων ἰθαγενῆς
θαλασσόπληκτον νῆσον Αἰάντας πολεῖ

The noble-born Bactrian, Terragon,
Walks about a sea-swept island.

Aeschylus, Persians, 306-307

While Euripides uses the verb in a virtually colloquial usage: "Why are you hanging around here?" asks Death of Apollo in Alcestis (l. 29), and in the Orestes uses the same word to express a casual stroller or loiterer who has momentarily come up to "hang around" the door of Electra's house:

τίς ὁδ' ἄρ' ἀμ-
φι μελάθρον πολεῖ σὸν ἀγρότης ἀνὴρ;

Who is this man, this farmer, hanging around
your doorpost?

Euripides, Orestes, 1269-1270

Nor is the usage of this revolving imagery to express the idea of "going about" merely fortuitous or coincidental. That it is the spatial aspect, the circular shape, pattern, or configuration of the movement, and not the bare fact of movement itself, which is emphasized in the *πελ verbs is confirmed by the fact that Greek possesses other words for expressing movement in a haphazard or random fashion, words which do not specify direction or the shape or pattern of movement. The most important of these words are πλάζω, πλανάω and their various relatives. In Homer, πλανόωνται is used of animals who leave the path or road (Iliad XXIII, 321: ἵπποι δὲ πλανόωνται ἀνὰ δρόμον) [And the horses wandered off the road]). In later writers, the word family is employed to designate both a wandering, irregular motion through physical space, and a discursive, misled, or even misleading motion in the realm of mental or psychological phenomena - of thoughts, motives, and intentions.²⁹ What is significant about this word-group in Greek is its regular usage in expressing the notion of aimlessness, or directionlessness, whether "aim" or "direction" is conceived as movement in a circle, or movement along a more linear path (e.g., τυγχάνω and ὀρέγω). No matter how loosely πολέω, πολεύω, and πωλέομαι are translated as "to go about," "to wander," or

"to range over," the *πελ root always emphasizes the core image or circular movement through physical space.

The prepositional compounds formed from the *πελ root retain, and even underscore, the original spatial image - even sometimes to the point of redundancy. One of the most touching episodes in the Odyssey occurs when Penelope, hearing the poet Phemios sing for his audience a doleful song about the unhappy homecoming of the Greeks and being reminded once again of her own share in that grief, asks him to choose another theme for his improvisations. Telemachus opposes his mother, counseling fortitude in the face of a theme which was then proving itself popular by its novelty and because it was just then "making the rounds":

τούτῳ δ' οὐ νέμεσις Δαναῶν κακὸν οἷτον αἰεῖδεν.
τὴν γὰρ αἰδοῖν μᾶλλον ἐπικλείουσ' ἄνθρωποι,
ἢ τις ἀκουόντεσσι νεωτᾶτη ἀμφιπέληται.

There is no sin in his singing the sad fate of the
Danaans
For men applaud that song most recently making the
rounds.

Odyssey I, 350-352

ἀμφιπέλομαι occurs only this once in Homer, but by the end of the fifth century the notion that a thing, or an idea, is au courant or à la mode because it is "making the rounds" or is in "general circulation" has become the main signification of the *πελ root prefixed by ἐπῶ. The verb ἐπιπολάζω and the adjective ἐπιπολαῖός, ὄν regularly mean that something, or someone, is fashionable or popular. Xenophon speaks

of the arrogance which was presently fashionable among the young at Athens as opposed to the young at Sparta (The Constitutions of the Lacedaemonians 3, 2: τοῖς τηλικούτοις...ὕβρις ἐπιπολάζει); Plato mentions the gossip or chit-chat then making the rounds of the fashionable intellectual circles in Athens (Achiochus, 369d: ἐκ τῆς ἐπιπολαζούσης τὰ νῦν λεσχηνεία); and Aristotle notes the intellectual sufficiency of discussing only those versions of happiness among the general populace which possessed a modicum of sense (Nicomachean Ethics 1095a: ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν τὰς δόξας ματαλότερον ὥς ἔστιν, ἵκανον δὲ τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινα λόγον. [While it is perhaps somewhat wasteful to review all opinions (on the nature of Happiness) it is certainly sufficient to consider those opinions which now commonly circulate and make some pretense to sense.]). From the notion that a thing or an idea is fashionable or popular because it was "making the rounds" it was easy, especially for a self-righteous orator, to associate fashionableness with superficiality. Isocrates uses the adjective ἐπιπολαῖος to designate an education which is merely mediocre:

τὸν γὰρ ἔχοντα τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν εὐρεῖν καὶ μαθεῖν
καὶ πονῆσαι καὶ μνημονεῦσαι δυναμένην, τὴν δὲ
φωνὴν...ἔτι δὲ τὴν τόλμαν...τίς οὐκ οἶδεν
ὅτι τυχὼν ὁ τοιοῦτος παιδείας μὴ τῆς
ἀπηκριβωμένης, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐπιπολαίου καὶ πᾶσι
κοινῆς, τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη ῥήτωρ οἷος οὐκ οἶδεν
εἶ τις τῶν Ἑλλήνων νέγονεν;

Consider the man who has a mind with the capacity for research and learning, for discipline and

remembering...and also a good speaking voice and self-confidence: who does not realize that such a man, even without formal education and with only a common run-of-the-mill education, might become an orator the likes of which no Greek has ever seen.

Isocrates, Antidosis (XV) 189-190

Demosthenes, in a not altogether ingenuous and certainly puritanical protreptic on morality, uses the same adjective to designate pleasures and pastimes which are common - therefore vulgar - therefore unseemly:

τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐμὸν ἦν ἔργον εἶπεῖν ἃ σοὶ
 συμφέρειν ἡγοῦμαι πεπραχθαι, σὸν δὲ βουλευσασθαι
 περὶ αὐτὸν. προσήκει δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς
 ζητοῦντας οἰκείως πρὸς σέ διακεῖσθαι, μὴ τὰς
 ἐπιπολαίους ἡδονὰς καὶ διατριβὰς ἀγαπᾶν, μὴδ'
 ἐπὶ ταύτας προσκαλεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ φιλοπονεῖν
 καὶ σκοπεῖν ὅπως τὸν σὸν βίον ὡς λαμπρότατον
 καταστήσουσιν.

Now while my interest has been to say what course of study I think will bring you the best advantage, you yourself must decide the matter. Moreover, it is appropriate that those who seek your friendship and intimacy neither themselves settle for superficial pleasures and amusements nor recommend them to you, and that they be careful enough of you to be on the lookout for how they might make your life as brilliant as possible.

Demosthenes, Erotic Essay (LXI) 56

However, the oldest compound of ἐπύ and πολέω is less colloquial. When Homer has Odysseus tell King Alkinous how Calypso urged him finally to leave her "as the eighth year rolled around" (Odyssey, Book 7, 261: ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ ὄγδοον μου ἐπιπλόμενος ἔτος ἦλθεν), the poet has employed a word which connects a spatial image of circular, or revolving, movement usually used to signify the more mundane movements of men

and animals to the idea of commencement of a new year. In this connection ἐπιπλόμενος projected onto heaven an image which elsewhere had been employed to describe the motion of "going about" on earth. The word thereby provides Greek with one of the earliest - perhaps even the first, although this cannot be proven - metaphors of "cyclical time." This expression for the passage of time is continued by Hesiod (Theogony 493 and The Shield of Achilles 87: ἐπιπλομένων ἐνλαυτῶν) and thereafter became a cliché in Greek.

The same phenomenon of poetic sublimation is apparent in the even earlier forms of πέλομαι prefixed by περύ. The περιπλομένοι ἐνλαυτοῦ are merely more graphic images for the ἐπιπλομένοι ἐνλαυτοῦ - for the years which "roll around" in their passage (See generally Iliad XXIII, 833; Odyssey, Book 1, 16; Hesiod, Works and Days, 386; and Theogony, 184). In both compounds, in all their significances, the *πελ root, which originally signified circular motion among men, animals and things on earth, has been abstracted into heaven. Most important of all for the history of the image of revolutionary movement or circular motion in ancient Greek thought - concerning conceptions of time or of anything else - these two compounds and their relatives are more common in Greek than all the compounds of κύκλος taken together, the pre-socratic texts and the Orphic fragments not excepted. If intellectual historians are to understand to what extent and in what ways the ancient Greeks were

influenced by "cyclical," "revolutionary," or "circular" modes of thinking, at least a rough estimate of the distribution of these images in Greek must be established if any sound - that is, empirically based - conclusions are to be drawn.

The most common fifth and fourth century appearances of this περί compound continue the Homeric spatial image of circular movement, and once again the image is grounded on terra firma. Περιπολέω, like the uncompounded πολέω, πολεύω, and πωλέομαι means generally "to go round" or "to go about." Sophocles puts the word into the mouth of the messenger who describes the psychotic behavior of Oedipus before the door of the room where Jocasta has retired to hang herself:

βοῶν γὰρ εἰσέπεισεν Οἰδίπους, ὃν οὐ
οὐκ ἦν τὸ κεύνης ἐκθεάσασθαι κακόν,
ἀλλ' εἰς ἐκεῖνον περιπολοῦντ' ἐλεύσομεν.

Oedipus rushed in shouting we knew not what,
And we stared at him as he rushed madly round.

Sophocles, Oedipus the King, 1251-1253

Euripides has Orestes use the word to describe his wanderings through Greece, pursued by the furies of his mother, before reaching Taurus:

ἐλθὼν δὲ σ' ἠρώτησα πῶς τροχηλάτου
μανίας ἂν ἔλθοιμ' εἰς τέλος πόνων τ' ἐμῶν,
οὓς ἐξομόχθουν περιπολῶν καθ' Ἑλλάδα.

I came to you asking how I might attain the
Consummation of my madness and my pains,
Which I've labored for, wandering the lands of Greece.

Euripides, Iphigenia in Taurus, 82-84

while a guard-captain to King Rhesus uses the word when he thinks he has seen a couple of "prowlers stalking about" his camp:

λεύσσω δὲ, φῶτε περιπολοῦνθ' ἡμῶν στρατόν
 πυκνῆς δὲ ὄρφνης.

I saw two men prowling round our camp
 Through the deep darkness...

Euripides, Rhesus, 773-774

Although Plato, Aristotle, and the later Greek philosophers quite understandably refine the celestial projection bequeathed by Homer and Hesiod (e.g., Plato, Timaeus, 41a ff.; Aristotle, Fragments, 10; Epicurus, Letter to Pythocles, 112), the image remained generally "earthbound" and largely reserved for the military vocabulary. At Athens and at Sparta, περίπολος was a "scout," "guard," or "watchman," or some other type of military policeman who patrolled round a camp or fortification (e.g., Thucydides, Book 4, 67-68, 92); a περιπόλιον was the fortification itself, some "station" or "guardhouse"; the περιπολάρχης was the commander or captain of the περίπολοι; and περιπολεῖν was the verb designating the activity of "making the rounds" or "going on patrol." (Xenophon, On Expenses and Revenues, Book 4, 52; Isocrates, Panegyricus 145). The connection between these concrete military experiences and the forms of περί plus πολέω employed by the Greeks to express their spatial aspect is too obvious to need much comment. Indeed, the military experiences were so common, and their corresponding spatial image of

circular movement so taken for granted, that Plato felt free to assimilate the military image to the celestial metaphor taken from Homer by describing all that has soul as "patrolling" the heavens:

πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου,
πάντα δὲ οὐρανὸν περιπολεῖ, ἄλλοι' ἐν ἄλλοις
εἶδεσι γιγνομένη...

Soul, in her entirety, has the care of everything
soulless,
And she polices all heaven appearing in various forms...

Plato, Phaedrus, 246b

Compounds formed from * πελ - derivatives prefixed by ἐν (ἐμ) constitute an important family of Greek words concerning trade and commerce. When we say in English that money, goods, and merchandise are "in circulation" a Greek of the fifth and fourth centuries, especially if he came from one of the maritime cities, would understand exactly what we were talking about. Ἐμπολή and ἐμπόλημα are the common Greek nouns for "merchandise," "freight," or "cargo"; an ἐμπολεύς is the common name for a merchant, or more generally, a "trafficker" in any kind of goods; ἐμπολαῖος, α, ον the regular adjective describing something or someone concerned with commercial traffic; and ἐμπολᾶν the usual verb for expressing the activity of getting, procuring, or otherwise dealing in commodities or other merchandise, and metaphorically, for expressing the notion of "having to do" with someone or something in the course of one's daily affairs.³⁰

Interestingly enough, nineteenth century philologists incorrectly linked ἐμπολᾶν to the older Greek verb πωλεῖν, meaning "to get by exchange or barter," or simply "to buy (and sell)"; and inferred, again mistakenly, that ἐμπολή and ἐμπόλημα were whatever things (or persons) were bought and sold.³¹ That the Greeks themselves made the same mistake in associating these words is virtually certain.³² This modern case of mistaken linguistic identity, which is certainly understandable enough if the Greeks made it themselves, might have been avoided had the history of Greek trade and commerce been kept in mind while the linguistic history was being researched. During the so-called "Dark Age" in Greece after 1,000 B.C. almost all exchange was by truck and barter. "To give and take" is certainly the oldest meaning of πωλεῖν, a meaning with very ancient religious connotations and very primitive psychological associations, all of which may point to ancient and probably immemorial social organization and mores among the proto-historical Indo-European tribes.³³ On the other hand, the word-group including ἐμπολή, ἐμπολεύς, ἐμπολᾶν, etc., hardly antedates the fifth century; its pervasiveness thereafter reflects the inter-city and overseas trade which had begun its revival in the late eighth century. The words emphasize not the traffic in goods and merchandise, but the traffic of goods and merchandise into (and out of) the various cities. The semantic emphasis in this family of words is not on sale

and purchase but on movement and distribution - on traffic. And that traffic was imagined moving, as the * πελ root indicates, in a circular pattern. Consequently, the Greeks bequeathed to Western thought the idea that when things or people move about for the purposes of commerce, they move "in circles"; in a word, they "circulate." Modern lexicons still confuse these distinctions between purchase and sale on the one hand and movement and distribution on the other. The rendering of ἐμπολή and ἐμπόλημα as "goods" or "merchandise" is ambiguous at best; the rendering as "freight" or "cargo" is certainly closer to the mark. But perhaps the best translation is "imports," the ἐμπολεὺς being, consequently, the "importer." If the semantic emphasis in these compounds has been mistaken in the past, it may be because the normal Greek verbs for import (and export) are formed from other roots: ἐισάγειν and ἐισκομύζειν are the Greek equivalents of the English "import," and ἐξάγειν of "export." Perhaps then it was only natural that classical philologists living in the classic bourgeois century would be misled by the circumstantial fact that πωλεῖν and ἐμπολᾶν are morphologically quite close, that the usual Greek verbs for import and export are not derived from the * πελ root, and that the words associated with ἐμπολᾶν were so regularly used to express the notions of sale and purchase as well as movement and distribution. Nevertheless, other linguistic evidence should have raised suspicions about the correctness

of the etymological connection. Several of the Hellenistic and later variants clearly underscore the aspect of movement and distribution over the aspect of sale and purchase. The Hellenistic neologisms ἐμπόλησις and ἀπεμπόλησις, and ἀπεμπόλητης, meaning respectively "the process of trafficking in a thing," "the act of divesting oneself, or getting rid of, some person or thing," and the person who acts as a "seller" or "dealer," or as we say in English a "middleman" in commercial transactions, are only circumstantially connected with sale and purchase.³⁴ And most tellingly, Euripides coined a word which clearly reveals the aspect of movement at the heart of the πολέω compounds. His apparent neologism παρεμπολῶντος (as if from παρεμπολᾶν), seems to contradict the connection with the idea of sale and purchase, and can, in its context, only mean "to bring in" or "import surreptitiously":

εἰκὸς γὰρ ὀργὰς θῆλυ ποιεῖσθαι γένος,
γάμους παρεμπολῶντος ἀλλοίους πόσει.

It's natural for a wife to make a stink when
The husband plays around with other women.

Euripides, Medea, 909-910

The force of the παρὰ conveys not only the moral idea of circumspection, deceit, and underhandedness, but also the physical act of Jason's bringing in his γάμους ἀλλοίους "round by the side (door)," as if he were "smuggling" them into his house and into his bed.³⁵

A more common - and more ancient - group of words is

formed from πολέω prefixed by ἀμφύ, a group whose members convey, virtually without exception, the idea of someone's service to or attendance upon another person, or on a thing, an animal, or even a divinity. The image at the heart of the idea is always the action of "moving around" or "being busy round about" the person or object of care. In Homer, the adjective ἀμφύπολος, when used as a substantive, designates someone in some variety of domestic service, a service always connoting dependence and involuntary servitude. This domestic ἀμφύπολος is remarkable precisely because it lacks semantic specificity: that is to say, the object of service or care is not located within the word itself.

The force of the *πελ root in the word conveys the image of the pattern of the physical movements of the servant as he (or she) "goes round doing" the assigned task, while the force of the prepositional suffix ἀμφύ conveys the idea of "alternating work" tasks: an ἀμφύπολος, then, is a person who "goes round" "doing one thing and another," two notions which, taken together suggest that the servant is "at the beck and call of the master." The poet regularly uses the word to signify a household servant, as, for example, in the Iliad when Priam orders his ἀμφυπόλου to wash his hands in preparation for the ritual to be performed for the burial of Hector:

Ἢ ρά, καὶ ἀμφύπολον ταμίην ὄτρυν' ὁ γεραίος
 χερσὶν ὕδωρ ἐπιχεῦαι ἀκήρατον. ἦ δὲ παρέστη
 χέρνυβον ἀμφύπολος πρόχόον θ' ἅμα χερσὶν ἔχουσα.

And then the old man asked the servant girl to pour
Clear water over his hands; and she stood alongside
Holding the pitcher in her own...

Iliad XXIV, 302-304

or when in the Odyssey Athena, in the shape of Mentor, introduces herself to Telemachus as a long-time friend of his grandfather, Laertes, who is now so old that he needs constant attention:

τον οὐκέτι φασὶ πόλινδε
ἔρχεσθ' ἀλλ' ἀπάνευθεν ἐπ' ἄγροῦ πῆματα πάσχειν
γρηὶ σὺν ἀμφιπόλῳ, ἧ οἱ βρῶσύν τε πόσιν τε παρτιθεῖ...

No longer does he come to town, they say, but back
At home endures his woes, attended by an old
Slave woman who sets out his meat and drink...

Odyssey I, 189-192

Among later writers the substantive designates a priest or priestess in attendance upon the shrine or temple of some divinity (See Euripides, Iphigenia in Taurus and Fragment 982). When employed as an adjective in the attributive position ἀμφύπολος is a common epithet of Aphrodite. Its usual modern translation as "ministering to" or "attending on" is too bland in this connection with the goddess. Whenever the poets use the word to describe her, there is always present in the context the pejorative sense of her constant - and unwanted - meddling in human affairs. When Sophocles has his chorus of women from Trachis say ἡ δ' ἀμφύπολος κύπρις ἄναυδος φανερά / τῶνδ' ἐφάνη πράκτωρ (The Women of Trachis, 860) the chorus' state of lamentation requires that we translate the lines not as "the Cyprian Goddess, ministering in silence"³⁶ or

as "that silent / handmaiden, Cyprian Aphrodite," but
as:

That busybody Aphrodite!
Though silent, clearly she is
The doer of these deeds.

When used as an adjective in the predicative position
ἀμφύπολος, ov means simply a person, or more frequently a place
much frequented or visited. For example, the τύμβον ἀμφύπολον
in Pindar's First Olympian Ode (93) is obviously what we
would now call a "shrine of pilgrimage."

The domain of the verbs ἀμφιπολεύω (and -έω) is more
extensive. A human being may, as we have seen, be engaged
in serving his, or her, superior, but even the chthonic
δαίμονες may serve their superiors in the spirit world (e.g.,
Hesiod, Works and Days, 803-804: ἐν πέμπτῃ γὰρ φάσιν Ἑρινύας ἀμφι-
πολεύειν Ὀρκον γέζομενον, τὸν Ἑρὶς τέκε πῆμ' ἐπιόρκους. ; and
Empedocles, Fragment 41: ἥλιος μέγαν οὐρανὸν ἀμφιπολεύει). But
while spirit creatures like the Harpies might give the dau-
ters of Pandareus as slaves to the hateful Erinyes (Odyssey,
Book XX, 78: καὶ' ῥ' ἔδοσαν στυγέρησιν ἐρινύσιν ἀμφιπολεύειν),
most such employments remained somewhat closer to the human
world. Ἀμφιπολεύειν and ἀμφιπολεῖν regularly designate the acti-
vity of herding cows, grooming or stabling horses, or ten-
ding orchards or gardens. Odysseus uses the word to sound
out his old, unsuspecting father by asking him why Laertes,
his "master," does not take as good care of his servant
as the servant takes care of the master's orchard:

ὦ γέρον, οὐκ ἀδαημονύη σ' ἔχει ἀμφιπολεύειν
 ὄρχατον, ἀλλ'... ἅμα γῆρα
 λυγρὸν ἔχεις αὐχμεῖς τε κακῶν ἀεικέα ἔσσαι
 . . .
 τεῦ δμῶς εἰς ἀνδρῶν; τεῦ δ' ὄρχατον
 ἀμφιπολεύεις;

Dear Sir, no disability has overcome your
 Garden tending, but...not old age alone
 Lies upon you: But filthy and decrepit clothes
 You wear...

Whose serf are you? Whose garden do you tend?

Odyssey XXIV, 244-257

while Penelope, in what is certainly the most delicate uses
 of ἀμφιπολεύειν in Homer, tells how her own renown as a woman
 is made greater and fairer by having her life "attended"
 by such a man as Odysseus:

εἰ κεινός γ' ἐλθων τὸν ἐμὸν βίον ἀμφιπολεύου
 μεῖζον τε κλέος εἴη ἐμὸν καὶ κάλλιον οὕτως.

If he would come and serve my life attentively,
 So much more famous and revered would that life be.

Odyssey XVIII, 254-255

Finally, and perhaps most important of all for the
 social history of Greece, is the varied and diverse group
 of words formed from -πολος used as a suffix. In all the
 principal areas of Greek life - in the agricultural and
 pastoral modes of production, in military affairs, in reli-
 gion, and in politics - the -πολος compounds express the
 idea of human activity "centered round" a specific object
 or class of objects. In the area of agriculture, the adject-
 ive τριπόλος indicates a field plowed three times over,
 that is, a field plowed in each of the three seasons before

the fall seed-sowing. (See Iliad, Book XVIII, 542-543:
 πείραν ἄρουραν, εὐρεῖαν τρίπολον; Odyssey, Book V, 125-127:

ὥς δ' ὅπ' ὅτ' Ἰασίωνι εὐπλόκαμος Δημήτηρ,
 ᾧ θυμῷ ἐξασα, μύγη φιλότῃτι καὶ εὐνῇ
 νειῶ ἐνὶ τρίπολῳ...

And so it was when with Iasion for whom
 She yielded to love, Demeter lay in a thrice-plowed
 field,
 Newly made for a wedding bed...

Odyssey V, 125-127

(See Hesiod, Theogony, 969-971.) In the realm of pastoral
 herding, an αἰπόλος (αἶξ compounded with -πολος) was a goat-
 herder (Odyssey, Book XX, 173: Μελάνθιος αἰπόλος...αἰγῶν),
 the αἰπόλιον his herd of goats (Iliad, Book XI, 691: αἰπόλια αἰγῶν),
 the activity of herding goats found expression - rather
 late in Greek - in the verb αἰπολεῖν (Theocritus VIII, 85:
 αἰπολέοντα), while any of the range of activities characteri-
 zing the life of an αἰπόλος was designated αἰπολικός (Theocri-
 tus I, 56). So also with the herder of cattle, the βουκόλος
 (βοῦς compounded with κ(π)ολος), references to which are
 very numerous throughout the entire chronological range
 of Greek literature (e.g., Iliad, Book XIII, 571: βουκόλοι
 ἄνδρες; Odyssey, Book XI, 293: βουκόλοι ἀγροῦνται; Aeschylus,
The Suppliants, 557-558: ἰκνεῖται δὴ συνουμένα βέλει / βουκόλου
 περόεντος; Herodotus, Histories, Book IV, 108-119: the story
 of Harpagus; Plato, Ion, 540c: βουκόλος δοῦλος; etc.) The
 βουκολία or βουκολίον was the herd of cattle, and βουκολεῖν the
 activity of tending cattle, and βουκολικός the character,

first of any one or any thing associated with cattle herding, and then of that special meter of poetry, the "bucolic," which celebrated that pastoral way of life. Similarly, from the Greek word for sheep - οἷς - was formed the substantive, οἰοπόλος, whose original meaning was undoubtedly "shepherd," but had by Homer's day re-asserted its adjectival function to express the notion that a place was "lonely" or a person "solitary" or "alone." The semantic connection between the shepherd and the solitary nature of his occupation is self-evident. By the fifth century the solitary character of the work had so overshadowed the work itself, that Euripides felt free to coin a verb - οἰοπολεῖν (Cyclops, 74) - meaning "to wander" or "to roam about alone."

In the realm of military affairs, there are at least two -πολος compounds of some significance. The first is ἵπποπόλος, the Greek equivalent of the American "cowboy" - that is, in his capacity as stable-hand, horse-breaker, and sometime warrior, and not, as the English word suggests, as "cowhand." In Homer, the ἵπποπόλοι were usually associated with Thrace and were not considered members of the class of the "Homeric" warriors or heroes. The reason was that the Thracian horsemen fought on horseback, a practice which the Homeric heroes considered demeaning: they used the horses instead to pull their chariots from which they dismounted for single combat on foot. Homer is certainly aware, in any case, that the Thracian ἵπποπόλοι constituted the first

"cavalry corps" in Greek military history. The second word of some importance is πυρπόλος, which designated the soldier, or servant who lights, tends, or guards a campfire or beacon fire, a πυρπόλημα. "To light" or "to keep watch" over a fire was the common meaning of the verb πυρπολεῖν throughout Greek history (e.g., Odyssey, Book X, 30; Aristophanes, Bird, 1580; Xenophon, Cyropedia, Book 3, 25, etc.), while its more specialized meaning as the military tactic, or device of "putting the torch to" a building, village, town, or city, was all too familiar to the Greeks of the ancient world.

By far the largest number of -πολος compounds in Greek appears in the realm of religion. Anyone moving round an altar or any other sacred spot in order to perform sacrifices was θυηπόλος; the place or spot itself became θυηπόλος, ον; (Aeschylus, Persians, 202-203: σὺν θυηπόλῳ χεοῦ / βωμὸν προσέστην; Euripides, Iphigenia in Aulis, 746: σὺν Κάλχαντι τῷ θυηπόλῳ; etc.) and to perform such sacrifices was θυηπολεῖν (Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 262: εὐνγγέλλοισιν ἐλπίσιν θυηπολεῖς ; Euripides, Trojan Women, 330: ἀνάκτορον θυηπολῷ ; Plato, Republic, 364e, etc.). A chief priest in attendance at any religious ceremony was the ἱεραπόλος (Pindar, Maiden Song 1, 5-6: μάντις ὡς τελέσσω / ἱεροπόλος), while the caretaker, or "custodian," of a temple was a ναοπόλος (Hesiod, Theogony, 990-991: Ἀφροδίτη... μιν ζαθέους ἐνὶ νηοῦς / νηοπόλον νύχλον ποιήσατο), as was anyone who haunted round about temple precincts (Pindar,

Fragment 51: ναοπόλον μάντιν δαπέσδοισιν ὁμοκλέα). The religious enthusiast who, moving round about in an agitated and presumably inspired trance, undertook divination in order "to pronounce prophecies" - μαντιπολεῖν (Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 979: μαντιπολεῖ δ' ἀκέλευστος ἄμισθος ἁοιδά) - was called a μαντιπόλος (Euripides, Hecuba, 121). The enthusiast who was concerned "to read the entrails of birds" - οἰωνοπολεῖν - plying his trade as augur, was called οἰωνοπόλος (Iliad, Book I, 69: Κάλχας θεστορύδης, οἰωνοπόλων ὃχ' ἄριστος; Aeschylus, Suppliants, 55: εἰ δε κυρεῖ τις πέλας οἰωνοπόλων; Pindar, Paeon 4, 30: δέμενον οἰωνοπόλον γέρας), while the man who knew how to read the meaning of dreams was called the ὄνειροπόλος (Iliad, Book I, 63); and Herodotus, Histories, Book I, 128).

Finally there are several important -πολος compounds which belong to the realm of what we now loosely call "politics." The Βουκολεῖον at Athens (βοῦς compounded with κ(τ)όλος) was the official residence hall of the ἄρχων βασιλεύς, certainly one of the oldest and, even in imperial Athens, one of the most prestigious if not very powerful public offices (Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, 3, 5). The term is a forceful reminder that the Athenians never forgot entirely the ancient pastoral origins of their society, despite their recent embarkation upon a maritime and commercial way of life. The office of judge, δικασπολία, especially in the field of criminal law, was executed or administered by learned elders who were designated δικασπόλοι (e.g., Iliad, Book I, 236-238:

νῦν αὖτέ μιν [σκηπτρον] ὕψος Ἀρχαίων / ἐν παλάμῃς φερέουσιν δικασπόλοι,
οἱ τεθέμιστας / πρὸς Δίος εἰρύεται.). They were judges who went
around from village to village throughout the countryside
administering the criminal law - δική. These δικασπόλοι had
their exact counterparts in the nineteenth century American
"circuit court riders" (via the "circuits" of the English
"judges of assizes") who brought the procedures of criminal
justice to an equally rural and certainly more dispersed
population in the American "far west."

C H A P T E R V I

ΤΕΛΟΣ: THE IMAGE OF THE MOVING CIRCLE:
GREEK IDEAS OF WAR AND PUBLIC OFFICE;
FATE, DOOM, AND DIVINITY

The third source of "revolutionary" imagery derived from the Indo-European root *quel is the Greek root *τελ . In analyzing the family of words derived from this root, the intellectual historian who is concerned to establish the human experience expressed through language must proceed with extreme caution. The landscape is littered in this case with linguistic booby-traps, a fact which makes analysis especially hazardous and the drawing of inferences from linguistic data about Greek social life and experience - let alone Greek "thought" - uncommonly dangerous. There are four principal difficulties. The first is morphological. That is, the forms of the words - practically speaking, their spelling - is no sure guide to their derivations: words spelled alike may not necessarily belong to the same etymological group, nor do words spelled differently necessarily belong to different etymological groups. The second difficulty is etymological. That is to say, the derivations of these words is largely hypothetical and wholly provisional: not only are these words only tentatively derived from Greek roots, *τελ₁ and *τελ₂ , whose distinction is a matter of assumption only, but the second

of these roots is only tentatively derived from the Indo-European root *quel. The third difficulty is semantic.

That is to say, the meanings of these words are not only so diverse and even opposed to one another that they seem to have no apparent connection with each other, but also the meaning of each word in the group displays only the most tenuous semantic connection with its own (alleged) Greek root.³⁸

Moreover, underlying all these difficulties - their sufficient "cause," if you will - is the fact that all the words in question, including many of their compounds, appear in Homer. Many intellectual historians, especially among those who practice the discipline of Begriffesgeschichte would be surprised to hear this fact cited as a difficulty. They assume that if an idea can be traced back to Homer, then not only has its pedigree in Greek culture been established, but also an intellectual license has thereby been conferred for pursuing the idea through the rest of later Greek literature. In the case of the family of *τελ derivatives, however, nothing could be more misleading. The license for this method of intellectual history might be granted if the morphological, etymological, and semantic problems associated with this family of words could be sorted out from the evidence of their usage found in Homer. They have not been. The problem is precisely Homer's status as the point of departure for the history of Greek literature

- the veritable ἀρχή of Greek culture. Nothing precedes him except the sketchy Mycenaean "shopping lists" recorded in the Linear B script.³⁹ Consequently, since all these *τελ derivatives in all their wide diversity appear in Homer - and appear, as the old saying goes, like Athena "born full-grown from the head of Zeus" - it is next to impossible to discover from the evidence provided by the Homeric texts themselves how this family of words had diversified into all the forms - and with all the separate meanings - which they display there. For once, the Iliad and the Odyssey as the literary pillars of Hercules are as much hindrance as help.

What, then, is the intellectual historian to make of this recondite and esoteric material? The first thing is not to make too much of it. That is to say, etymological theories offered to explain the wide semantic diversity of this word group must be taken with several substantial grains of salt. At present, there is a consensus among philologists that while most of the members of this word group are derived from the Greek root *τελ (itself derived from the Indo-European root *quel meaning to "turn" or "rotate") some others in the group may be derived from a postulated second Greek root, *τελ₂ meaning "to rise up" or "to support."⁴⁰ From this (postulated) root may be formed the family of words in Greek consisting of τέλλω (aorist transitive τεῦλα and τεῦλασθαι) meaning "to accomplish" (in the

active voice), and "to make to rise up" (in the middle voice and *τλάω (aorist transitive ταλάσσαι and τλῆναι) meaning "to bear," "suffer," or "endure." The second Greek root - *τελ₂ - is postulated wholly on semantic grounds: that is, philologists have as yet been unable to find any connection in meaning between the words suggesting the image of "turning" and those suggesting the image of "rising up." Morphologically speaking, however, there is no insuperable obstacle to deriving the entire vocabulary from one *τελ root meaning "to turn" or "to rise up." This possibility has been resisted, however, and the postulate of the two Greek roots put forward because, as John Chadwick has pointed out, an etymology cannot be established upon "a guess that two superficially similar words have a common origin": rather, "etymology must proceed on philology's cardinal principle that the words compared must have either identical meanings or at least meanings close enough for it to be plausibly shown how one has developed from the other."⁴¹ No such plausible connections, let alone identical meanings, have so far been found among the members of the family of the *τελ derivatives. Consequently, the intellectual historian who would attempt to investigate language as a source of revolutionary imagery in Greek must begin with those words which unquestionably retain, transmit, or otherwise display the image of revolving motion. Like the philologist, moreover, he must not yield to the temptation

of offering as fact those theories which, even though they enjoy the status of a consensus, have been put forward only because - and indeed precisely because - clear semantic connections have yet to be established.

The second thing the intellectual historian must do is to contribute to establishing these connections wherever historical data suggest them. Since "the cardinal principle" of philology is semantic correspondence, any data which might point to the connection(s) between words which are usually considered widely disparate in meaning may help to narrow the range - or at least shorten the list of words - over which theory has to extend the cover of a second possible root. In the present case, historical data exist whose interpretation may lessen, if not eliminate, the need to postulate a second *τελ root to account for the multifarious meanings of the *τελ word group. The data come from the ritual and cult practices of archaic Greek religion, whose performances may go a long way toward establishing how a spatial pattern, or figure, of "turning," "rotating," or "revolving" provided the image underlying the highly metaphorical and abstract notions expressed by the *τελ derivatives in Homer.

Let us begin with the *τελ derivatives which are clearly identical with, or plausibly connected to, the image of "turning," "rotating," or "revolving motion" conveyed by the Indo-European *quel root. As with the Greek

derivatives of the $*(f)ελ$ and $*πελ$ roots, many words are taken from Greek archaic experience with agriculture and military life. The point at the end of a furrow where a Greek plowman turned his team of oxen or mules in order to begin a new furrow was called a τέλσον.⁴² In the Iliad Homer depicts the god Hephaistos emblazoning on the shield of Achilles the very moment when such a plowman, having turned his team around in preparation for making the next path, stops long enough to take refreshment:

Ἐν δ' ἐτίθεν [Hephaistos] νειὸν μαλακὴν, πύειραν ἄρουραν,
 εὐρέϊαν τρίπολον...
 οἱ δ' ὀππότε στρέψαντες ἰκοῖατο τέλσον ἀρούρης,
 τοῖσι δ' ἔπειτ' ἐν χερσὶ δέπας μελιηδέος οἴνου
 δόσκειν ἀνὴρ ἐπὶών. τοῖ δὲ στρέψασκον ἀν' ὄγμους,
 ἴεμεναι νειοῖο βαθείης τέλσον ἰκέσθαι.

And on it Hephaistos emblazoned a wide field, soft and
 moist
 From new plowing...
 And when the plowmen had reached the end of the field
 and turned
 The team around, a man approached and gave them sweet
 Wine; they then turned back their teams along the
 furrow
 And made new deep cuts until they reached the other
 side.

Iliad XVIII, 541-547

It can be no mere coincidence that the passage begins with a reference to the wide "thrice-plowed" - that is, "thoroughly plowed" - field. The presence of τρίπολον along with two appearances of τέλσον (not to mention the presence of στρέψαντες, στέψασκον, and δυνέοντες) underscores the intimacy of the connection in Greek thought between certain activities associated with agriculture and images of circular movement.

Τέλειον is considered by most philologists as a thematic enlargement of the more common τέλος ,⁴³ the meaning of which, in its most concrete and tactile sense, is "turnpost in a racecourse" - especially the turnpost at what the Greeks considered the "finish line." There are many references to these races in Homer - both chariot and foot races - which to the military way of life were a combination of recreation, relaxation, and religious ritual.⁴⁴ Hesiod has the image of the Homeric footrace in mind when he advises Perses to avoid violence, since Justice always overtakes it at the finish line:

...ὁδὸς δ' ἐτέρῃφι παρελθεῖν
κρείσσων ἐς τὰ δίκαια. Δίκη δ' ὑπὲρ ὕβρις ἔσχει
ἐς τέλος ἐξελθοῦσα...

Better is the path that passes the other side,
For Justice outstrips Hubris coming to the finish line.

Hesiod, Works and Days, 216-218

Bacchylides follows Homer's concrete image in his own description of Pherenicus, the chestnut stallion that carried Hieron of Syracuse to victory in the horse race at Olympia in 476 B.C.:

οὐπω νιν ὑπὸ προτέρων
ἔππων ἐν ἀγῶνι κατέχρανεν κόνις
πρὸς τέλος ὀρνυμενον.

Never did the dirt from any of the
Lead horses in the race every besmirch him
As he strained for the finish line.

Bacchylides, Epinicean Ode V, 43-45

The fact that the image of "rounding a turnpost" had already

been assimilated by the fifth century to the metaphor of "winning a race" by crossing a "finish line" is clearly shown in a couplet of Pindar's fourth Isthmian Ode, where the poet, composing a variation on the old homily that one ought not to judge a man happy until his life is over, writes that one's luck cannot be reckoned good or bad until the race is over:

ἔστιν δ' ἀφάνεια τύχας καὶ μαρναμένων
πρὶν τέλος ἄκρον ἰκέσθαι.

Among contenders Chance remains unknown
Until the final round is reached.

Pindar, Isthmian IV, 31-32

To resolve Pindar's metaphor: just as the runner cannot cross the finish line before he has rounded the last "turnpost," so the outcome of any race is not revealed until the runner has successfully passed the last turn of chance. From this metaphoric usage of τέλος as the finish line just beyond the turnpost it must have been an easy step (metaphorically speaking) for a Greek to imagine the τέλος as the "prize" awaiting the first runner to cross that finish line. Pindar took just that step:

Δόρυκλος δ' ἔφερε πυγμᾶς τέλος.

And Doryclus carried off the boxing prize.

Pindar, Olympian X, 67

Sometimes, the prize at the end of the finish line was a bit unconventional, at least by fifth century standards. Pindar relates the story of the daughter of Anaeus whom

her father placed at the finish line of a race and awarded as the τέλος for the first man to run up to her and touch her robe:

...ποτὶ γραμμᾷ μὲν αὐτὰν στήσσε
κοσμήσεις τέλος ἔμμεν ἄκρον,
εἴτε δ' ἐν μέσσοις ἀπάγεσθαι, ὅς ἂν πρῶτος θορῶν
ἀμφὶ οἱ χάνειε πέπλους.

...and then he placed her at the finish line
Presenting her as the principal prize;
And in their midst he said, whoever first would run
And touch her skirts would lead her home.

Pindar, Pythian IX, 117-120

And from this equation of the prize with the finish line which was crossed to win a race, it was only a somewhat greater metaphorical step to equate the prize with the more abstract notion of "result" or "outcome" of which the prize was merely the tangible expression. Bacchylides imagines the goddess Victory dispensing "results" - for defeats as well as for victories - in the same way prizes were awarded:

Νύκα γλυκύδωρε...
ἐν πολυχρύσῳ δ' Ὀλύμπῳ
Ζηνὶ παρὰ σταμένα
κρίνεις τέλος ἀθανάτου -
σιν τε καὶ θνατοῖς ἀρετᾶς.

Victory...
On gold-strewn Olympus
You allot the prizes for virtue
To mortals and immortals alike.

Bacchylides, Ode X, 1, 4-7

Nor were the prizes, or results, restricted to athletic competitions: life too is a field where the gods dispense τέλη. Pindar cannot imagine the goddess Moira (Fate) ever

granting to any mortal a happiness which is whole or complete:

φυῶν δ' ἕκαστος διαφέρομεν βιοτὰν λαχόντες,
ὁ μὲν τὰ, τὰ δ' ἄλλοι, τυχεῖν δ' ἐν ἀδύνατον
εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπασιν ἀνελόμεν. οὐκ ἔχω
εἰπεῖν, τίνα τοῦτο Μοῦρα τέλος ἔμπεδον
ᾤρεξε...

For each man differs from every other by the nature
of the life he gets.

One gets this life, others that one: but it is
impossible

For any one to meet with perfect happiness.

Nor can I say to whom Fate extends my lasting prize.

Pindar, Nemean VII, 54-57

Although τέλος does not appear in Homer as any kind of turnpost - either of the agricultural type (a meaning probably supplied by τέλσον) or of the competitive type (a meaning supplied by γέρας and ἀέθλον), it is next to impossible to resist the inference that the sense of "turning," "rotating," or "circling" around some thing or some place is the essential visual image, or spatial pattern underlying all the uses of τέλος , its various forms, and its compounds, not only in the fifth century poets, but in Homer as well. Philologists have not resisted drawing that inference, arguing that though the evidence is scanty, the semantic connection is clear.⁴⁵

The evidence is far more substantial concerning the connection of τέλος with military affairs, properly speaking. In Homer, the word usually means a "squadron" or "detachment" of a larger military force (e.g., Iliad IX, 730: δόρπον ἔπειθ'

ἐλόμεσθα κατὰ στρατὸν ἐν τελέεσσιν [And then we went to mess, the entire army by squadrons.] and Iliad XVIII, 298). Sometimes the word designates the "duty" or special assignment which the squadron has been given to perform. To be stationed as "campguards" or "lookouts" was considered so important a duty for any τέλος of Achaeans before Troy that it earned the epithet ἱερός - sacred (Iliad, Book X, 54-57: ἐγὼ δ' ἐπὶ Νέστορα δῖον / εἴμι, καὶ ὀτρυνέω ἀνστήμεναι, αἳ κ' ἐθέλῃσιν / ἐλθεῖν ἐς φυλάκων ἱερὸν τέλος ἥδ' ἐπιτεῦλεν [And I shall go for divine Nestor and prod him awake / to come to the sacred band of guards and give them their / Orders...]). Both senses - of squadron, and of that unit's particular assignment or duty - persisted throughout ancient Greek history. (E.g., Herodotus, Histories I, 103: speaking of the Median King, Cyaxares, who reportedly πρῶτός τε ἐλόχισε κατὰ τέλεα τοὺς ἐν τῇ Ἀσίῃ ... [was the first to organize his forces in Asia into squadrons...]; Euripides, Rhesus, 311: πολλοὺ μὲν ἱππῆς, πολλὰ πελταστῶν τέλη; and Thucydides, Book II, 42, speaking of the Athenians who divided their fleet and its command κατὰ τέλη στρατηγῶν προστεταγμένοι ...)).

The semantic connection between the martial τέλος or τέλη and the image of circular or rotating motion would seem to lie in the patterns of their movements across a terrain: τέλος may convey the image of a file of troops as it twists and turns in its various maneuvers. The context of the word's usage strongly suggests this interpreta-

tion. Homer describes Odysseus and Diomedes wading through the gore of battle to engage a perhaps "encircling" file of Thracians who were approaching them:

τὼ δὲ βάτην προτέρω δὶά τ' ἔντεα καὶ μέλαν αἶμα,
αἶχα δ' ἐπὶ θρηκῶν ἀνδρῶν τέλος ἴξον ἰόντες.

And the two went forward through the armament and gore
And came upon a file of Thracian warriors.

Iliad X, 469-470

Aeschylus has his chorus in the Persians relate how their kings were traditionally arrayed for battle:

πολλοῖς ἄρμασιν ἐξορμῶσιν,
δύρρυά τε καὶ τρίρρυμα τέλη.
φοβεράν ὄψιν προσιδέσθαι

In files of four and six horse chariots
They drove out,
A sight fearful to behold.

Aeschylus, Persians, 46-48

Finally, Thucydides refers on several occasions to the "curved lines" of warships which were formed just prior to engagement in battle (e.g., I, 48). A parallel with ἰλή suggests itself. Just as ἰλή would seem to convey the image of a "whirling," "rolling," or "turning" maneuver in battle by the company of men composing the ἰλή, so τέλος may convey the image of a "circling" or "rotating" maneuver performed by the men composing the τέλος. Thus, τέλος would be semantically related to its root in *τελ as ἰλή to its root in *(F)ελ.

The martial references in the repertoire of τέλος also

go a certain way toward accounting for those uses of the word - a use new in the fifth century - in connection with public office and civil government, and with the power and authority to execute or fill those offices. The historians use τέλος to signify any one, or any group, in possession of public office of any type (Herodotus, Histories III, 18 and 36, IX, 106; Thucydides I, 10 and 52, IV, 15; and Xenophon, Anabasis II, 6-4). In this usage the historians only followed the lead of the poets. Pindar employs τέλος to designate the presidency of the Council of Tenedos whose recent occupation by Aristagoras is the occasion of the poet's "intallation ode" (Ninth Nemean Ode, 9), and Sophocles uses the expression ἐν τέλει - "in office" - so often that one must conclude that the expression had become common coin by the middle of the fifth century (Ajax, 135, Agamemnon to Odysseus: κλύειν τὸν ἐσθλὸν ἄνδρα χρὴ τῶν ἐν τέλει; Philoctetes, 925-926: τῶν γὰρ ἐν τέλει κλύειν / τὸ τ' ἐνδύκον με καὶ τὸ συμφέρον πολεῖ; See also Philoctetes, 385 and Antigone, 66). Even in the first half of the fifth century, however, the expression has already acquired a portion of its later currency. Aeschylus uses it to mean simply "the government." (Seven Against Thebes, 1030: Creon's messenger concludes the reading of his master's decree with τοιαῦτ' ἔδοξε τῷδε / Καδμεύων τέλει).

Intimately connected with τέλος as public office is τέλος meaning the "authority" to hold or the "power" to

execute such an office. This meaning also gained currency only in the fifth century. Examples of this meaning of τέλος in Homer are few, and those few quite questionable. (E.g., Iliad, Book XVI, 630: ἐν γὰρ χερσὶ τέλος πολέμου, ἐπέων δ' ἐνὶ βουλῇ.) The first use of τέλος which might plausibly be rendered as "authority" appears in Hesiod in connection with the immortal gods:

ἐν τοῖς γὰρ τέλος ἐστὶν ὁμῶς ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε.

Among them lies the power of good and evil alike.

Hesiod, Works and Days, 669

The Boeotian poet's association of the word with a divine rather than a merely human capacity is echoed by Semonides (Ode 1.1) at the turn of the sixth century (τέλος μὲν Ζεὺς ἔχει..πάντων ὅσ' ἐστὶ). and continues straight through the line of the fifth century tragedians. In every case but one, the authority or power designated by τέλος belongs to some god or spirit. In the Prometheus Bound Hephaistos speaks of Violence and Force as exercising a commission from Zeus which possesses τέλος - "authority" - and therefore cannot be resisted:

Κράτος, Βίαιε, σφῶν μὲν ἐντολῇ Διὸς
ἔχει τέλος δὴ κούδεν ἐμποδῶν ἔτι.

Power and Force, through you Zeus' will
Reaches consummation, and nothing now obstructs it.

(11. 12-13)

In the Seven Against Thebes the chorus speak of Apollo as the son of Zeus who possesses the awesome and holy power

to decide a battle's outcome -

παῦ Διὸς, ὅθεν
πολεμόκραντον ἄγνὸν τέλος ἔχει

O, child of Zeus, who holds
The sacred power of battle's war-fulfillment.

Aeschylus, Seven Against Thebes, 161-162

- and most emphatically of all, in the Suppliant Women,
the chorus describes Zeus not only as "lord of lords" and
"most blessed of the blessed," but also in his might as
"the most powerful of the powerful":

ἄναξ ἀνάκτων, μακάρων
μακάριστε καὶ τέλεων
τελειότατον κράτος, ὄλβιε Ζεῦ...

Lord of lords, most blessed
Of the blessed,
Most powerful of the powerful,
Happy Zeus!

Aeschylus, Suppliant Women, 524-526

Many ideas may separate Aeschylus and Euripides, but this
divine character of τέλος is not one of them. In his Orestes
Euripides depicts Zeus in terms which would be perfectly
unimpeachable to the judgment of the older poet:

τέλος ἔχει δαίμων βοοτοῖς
τέλος ὅπα θέλει
μεγάλα δέ τις ἂ δύναμις

His holy spirit holds dominion over mortals
Authority for whatever purpose he wishes:
And great is his power.

Euripides, Orestes, 1545-1547

Even the exception proves the rule. When Oedipus invokes
a curse on both his sons for their failure to help him in

his agony, he asks the gods not to exercise their authority to decide the outcome of the battle, but, in this case where Oedipus' two sons are fighting for control of Thebes, to transfer that power of decision to himself:

ἀλλ' οἱ θεοὶ σθινὸν μήτε τὴν πεπρωμένην
ἔρυν κατασβέσειαν, ἐν δ' ἐμοῦ τέλος
αὐτοῦ γένοιτο τῆσδε τῆς μάχης πέρι...

May the gods never extinguish their fateful
Feud, but let the outcome of their battle
Lie with me.

Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, 422-424

Clearly, τέλος is a function which under most circumstances only a god or δαίμων can exercise; for a mortal to exercise it remains only a heart-felt wish. Not until the fourth century does the idea of authority or power designated by the (nominative) τέλος become "secularized." (E.g., Isaeus 4, 11, and Aristotle, Politics, 1322b13 and Book VI generally).

What are we to imagine were the connections for a Greek of the "classical" period among τέλος meaning a squadron or some other unit of a military force, τέλος meaning the authority or power of a god, and finally the authority or power exercised by men in the institution of the polis? To the modern mind the hypothesis that τέλος meaning "public office" and (human) "authority" is connected historically to the Homeric τέλος meaning squadron seems logical enough. The argument would go something like this. First, since every unit in an army - every ὀλή and τέλος had some kind

of commander - an ἄρχων who was usually a king, βασιλεὺς - we are justified in expecting that the word for the unit of command, whose duties - τέλη - were the responsibility of the commander, became the word for the duty itself, or for what we might call the commander's commission - his "office." If this development occurred in Greek military history, it would hardly represent the first or only instance of metonymy in their experience; the names for civic institutions in many of the Greek states were taken from their archaic military past and adapted to new pacific arrangements. In fact, however, there is no empirical connection in this case. No variant of τέλος meaning "squadron commander" or his specific "duty" appears in Homer, or in any later Greek writer, for that matter. The second step in the argument would have required that τέλος meaning (human) "authority" be semantically derived from τέλος meaning "public office." Such a derivation is true only for the period embraced by the fifth and fourth centuries. The evidence flatly contradicts, however, any attempt to connect the fourth century use of τέλος to an alleged τέλος meaning a commander's "office" in Homer. Just the reverse development is the actual case: the word for the office emerged from the word for authority to hold power, since the former does not emerge, as we have seen, until the fifth century, while the latter, which is restricted to the company of immortals, must go back long before Homer.

Here, then, is the central problem presented by the linguistic data. If τέλος meaning, in the fifth century, "public office" and, in the fourth century, meaning human "authority" is not an example, or only a marginal one, of a Homeric military term adapted to the new institutions of the Greek polis, from what source in Greek experience and language are we to derive these terms? Let us review the remainder of the principal meanings of τέλος to see if we can locate the image, and the experience behind the image, from which the ideas of public office and human authority might historically be derived.

The evidence from Homer, Hesiod, and the early lyric poets reveals two broad "families" of usages for τέλος, which correspond to two stock phrases. The first is τέλος πολέμου, a generally unequivocal expression which means the "temporal end" or "point of termination" of war and fighting (e.g., Iliad, Book III, 290-291: αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ ἔπειτα μαχήσομαι εἵνεκα ποινῆς / αὔθι μένων, ἥος κε τέλος πολέμου κυχέω [Now I too shall fight for the ransom, remaining here / Until I've reached my duty's end.]), or more commonly war's "issue," "outcome," or "result." (Iliad, Book XVI, 630: ἐν γὰρ χερσὶ τέλος πολέμου; Book XX, 100-101: εἰ δὲ θεός περ / ἴσον τεύκειεν πολέμου τέλος [But if God would just hold in balance the outcome of war...]; Hesiod, Theogony, 637-638: οὐδέ τις ἦν ἔριδος χαλεπῆς λύσις οὐδὲ τελευτὴ / οὐδετέροις ἴσον δὲ τέλος τέτατο πολέμου. [From their bitter strife there was neither respite nor

/ Result for either side, but the issue of the war was drawn / Evenly...]). Τέλος as a boundary marker of time for aspects of human life other than war is rare in Homer. (See however, Iliad, Book IX, 56: οὐ τέλος ἔκκεο μύθων). The second stock phrase in Homer is τέλος θανάτοιο , a far more abstract and ambiguous expression, conveying a related but distinct "family" of meanings. In this usage τέλος binds closely together three sets of ideas. The first set consists of the ideas of "perfection," "completion," and "fulfillment"; the second of the ideas of "fated death" and "doom"; the third of those conceptions of "divine authority" whereby "fated death" and "doom" are administered to mortals. Which of the three sets of meanings takes historical precedence over the others may remain impossible to determine empirically. But if we apply the historical "law of metaphor" - that the meanings of words evolve from the concrete to the abstract and from the particular to the general - we may reasonably speculate that the first set of meanings of τέλος is the latest because they are the most abstract and general, while the other two meanings are older because they are somewhat more concrete and particular. Between the two "older" meanings no precedence can be established, because the notion of "fate" in τέλος makes the word no less metaphorical than the idea of "authority." In short, the notions of "fated death" and the divine authority to impose it are older than the ideas of "perfection" and "fulfillment." Odysseus may

believe that there is no greater fulfillment in life than the "good will" (εὐφροσύνη) which a community derives from enjoying good food, good wine, and good poetry together -

οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ γέ τί φημι τέλος χαριέστερον εἶναι
ἢ ὅτ' εὐφροσύνη μὲν ἔχη κατὰ δῆμον αἰδοῦ

And I for one think nothing comes round to us more Pleasant than when joy pervades the population...

Odyssey IX, 5-6

- and he may ask for the fulfillment of his prayers (Odyssey Book XVII, 496: Εἰ γὰρ ἐπ' ἀρῇσιν τέλος ἡμέτερῃσι γένοιτο); and

Hera may boast that Zeus' word will not reach fulfillment (Iliad, Book XIX, 107: ψευστήσεις. οὐδ' αὖτε τέλος μύθῳ ἐπιθήσεις).

In most cases, however, τέλος in Homer is simply a synonym for death (θανάτος). Priam understands all too well that only Zeus and the other immortals know on whom "the death which is fated" shall fall:

Ζεὺς μὲν που τό γε οἶδε καὶ ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ ἄλλοι,
ὅποτέρῳ θανάτοιο τέλος πεπρωμένον ἐστίν.

Zeus and the other immortal gods know on whom And how the death which is fated shall fall.

Iliad III, 308-309

On the Achaean side, Achilles sums up not only his own dilemma, but that also of every Homeric hero eager for glory who would trade a long life without fame for a short one with imperishable renown:

μήτηρ γὰρ τέ με φησι θεὰ θέτις ἀογυρόπεζα
διχθαδίας κῆρας φερέμεν θανάτοιο τέλοςδε.
εἰ μὲν κ' αὖθι μένων Τρώων πόλιν ἀμφιμάχομαι,

ᾤλετο μὲν μοι νόστος, ἀτὰρ κλέος ἄφθιτον ἔσται.
 εἰ δέ κεν οὔκαδ' ἔκωμι φύλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν,
 ᾤλετό μοι κλέος ἐσθλόν, ἐπὶ δῆρ' οὖν δέ μοι αἶων
 ἔσσεται, οὐδέ κε μ' ὤκα τέλος θανάτοιο κιχείη.

My mother, the silver-footed Thetis, tells
 Me that I carry a double destiny toward death:
 If I stay here fighting around the city of Troy,
 My return to home is ruined as my fame is won;
 But if to the dear land of my fathers I return,
 My noble name decays even as my years grow
 Long, and swift death fails to overtake me.

Iliad IX, 410-416

The idea of "fated death ordained by the gods" is the meaning of τέλος from which all others must take their semantic point of departure. (See also Iliad, Book XI, 451; XIII, 602; and Odyssey, Book V, 326 and XXIV, 124.)

In the centuries between Homer and the Attic dramatists the three sets of meanings surrounding τέλος were secularized and generalized. Human beings were imagined as sharing in the dispensation of τέλη through the institutions of the city-state, especially the criminal law courts and the public assemblies. The Homeric τέλος - the "fated death ordained by the gods" - gradually, though never completely, yielded to the less "terminal" and more humane verdicts or decisions voted by mortals. At the beginning of this process the old meanings are still ascendant. Mimnermus still imagines two black Keres holding the twin τέλη of burdensome old-age and death itself over the lives of mortals:

... κῆρες δὲ παρεστήσασι μέλαιναί,
 ἥ μὲν ἔχουσα τέλος γήραος ἀργελέου,

ἡ δ' ἑτέρη θανάτου...

...and two black keres stood by:
One holding the doom of painful age,
The other the doom of death.

Mimnermus, Elegy 2, 5-7

And Aeschylus sees the old Homeric τέλος θανάτου as the divinely inspired result of that conflict whose chief cause is wealth:

διήκει δὲ καὶ πόλιν στόνος
στένουσι πύργοι,
στένει πέδον φύλανδρον. μένει
κτεάνα δ' ἐπιγόνους,
δι' ὧν αἰνομόροι[s]
δι' ὧν νεῖκος ἔβα
[καὶ] θανάτου τέλος

Wailing pervades the city;
The battlements groan;
The land weeps for her sons.
There remains the wealth of their children
On account of which ill fate arose;
Then strife came
And the doom of death.

Aeschylus, Seven Against Thebes, 900-906

But by the beginning of the fifth century τέλος shows signs of demystification and humanization. Aeschylus' Eumenides shows this development very clearly. When Orestes, following the advice of Apollo his patron and sponsor in murder, takes refuge in Athens at the temple of Athena, he is prepared to face the pursuing Furies in "fair trial" - πρόσκειμαι δῶμα καὶ βρέτας τὸ σὸν, θεά / αὐτοῦ φυλάσσω ἀναμένων τέλος δίκης [Goddess, I approach your house and statue: / Holding fast to these, I await the decision of justice.] (242-243); but

after the Furies concede to Athena "the adjudication of the case: - αἰτίας τέλος (431) - they begin to fear (rightly) that she may not uphold their traditional view of justice - ἐς τὸ πᾶν δὲ σοι λέγω / βωμὸν αὔδεσαι δίκας. / μηδέ μιν / κέρδος ἰδὼν ἀθέω ποδὶ λᾶξ ἀτί/σης. ποιῶν γὰρ ἐπέσται. [Above all else I say to you: revere the altar of justice. / Neither trample it with a goddess' heel for some expedient. / Vengeance is there to pay. / Immutable is Fate.](538-544) -and will fail to dispense "the proper sentence" for the crimes Orestes has committed - κύριον μένει τέλος (542). Even Apollo predicts such an outcome and is portrayed as virtually gloating over the distress which Orestes' acquittal will cause his chthonic enemies - σύ τοι τάχ' οὐκ ἔχουσα τῆς δίκης τέλος / ἐμεῦ τὸν ἰὼν οὐδὲν ἐχθροῦσον βαρύν [When you no longer determine the outcome of justice / Your bile will be harmless to your enemies.] (729-730). Elsewhere in Aeschylus a clear distinction is drawn between the divine τέλος and the human τέλη - between if you will a "final" and "efficient" causes. When the daughters of Danaos ask their father which way the decision went in the assembly at Argos concerning their petition for refuge and asylum from the sons of Egyptus - ἔνισπε δ' ἡμῖν ποῦ κεκύρωται τέλος / δήμου κρατοῦσα χεῖρ ὅπῃ πληθύνεται [But tell us which way the decision went. / Which show of hands resolved the case?](603-604), he answers that while the citizens of Argos assented to the arguments of their king in favor of granting the asylum, it was really Zeus who ordained the

decision - δημηγόρους δ' ἤκουσεν εὐπιθῆς στροφᾶς / δῆμος Πελασγῶν.
 Ζεὺς δ' ἐπέκρουεν τέλος [The Pelasgians heard the speakers' wily
 / Tongue-turning, but Zeus decided the outcome.](623-624).
 By the poet's inclusion of both senses of τέλος in the same
 passage he is showing himself making a conscious effort
 to justify and to rationalize the new idea of human secular
 authority by imagining it as merely the immediate extension,
 or the worldly agency, of the divine will. After Aeschylus,
 the religious and mystical senses of τέλος quickly decline.
 By the fourth century its religious sense has been complete-
 ly subordinated to its secular uses, and is best rendered
 as "final verdict in a court of law" (e.g., Plato, Laws,
 761e, 767a, 768b, and 957b).

The foregoing analysis of the various meanings of
 τέλος is confirmed by a similar semantic analysis of other
 words in the *τελ group. The noun τελευτή conforms so close-
 ly to the first semantic "family" of τέλος that we must
 consider the possibility that the word was coined for metri-
 cal reasons alone. In a majority of cases its uses belong
 to the first semantic "family" of τέλος, meaning the "tempo-
 ral end" or "termination" of some phenomenon. (See the
 adverbial expressions ἐς τελευτήν, Homeric Hymn to Dionysus,
 29; Hesiod, Works and Days, 333; Sophocles, Oedipus at Colo-
 nus, 1223; and ἐς τελευτῃ, Aeschylus, Seven Against Thebes,
 936; and Pindar, Seventh Olympian Ode, 26; and also Iliad,
 Books VII, 104 and XIV, 787; Hesiod, Theogony, 638; Sophocles,

Women of Trachis.) Less often, τελευτή belongs to the second "semantic family" of τέλος meaning the "end," "outcome," or "result" of some phenomenon. (See Iliad IX, 625; Odyssey Book I, 249; Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 745; and Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, 1198.) Only rarely does τελευτή display any of the second "family" of meanings of τέλος : it is used only once to mean "fated death" (Hesiod, Shield of Achilles, 357), and it seems to lack entirely the connotation of divine "authority" or "power."

The verbs τελέω and τελευτάω on the other hand rarely display the simple meaning of "temporal end" or "termination," but regularly convey the meaning of divine "authority" or "power." A review of the uses of these verbs from Homer to Euripides reveals that their fundamental meaning is "to execute (and thereby fulfill) the will, design, or intention of a god." Only rarely are the words employed of men acting on their own behalf, and independent of some divine agency. This specific religious context of the *τελ verbs may be summed up with a few examples. The archetypal use of τελέω occurs when a god or some other divinity gives assurance that he, or she, will do what he, or she wills. Thus, Zeus reassures the sea nymph Thetis that he will grant her wish concerning her son Achilles, and not execute the fate of Troy until he has rejoined the fighting:

ἐμοῦ δέ κε ταῦτα μελήσεται, ὅφρα τέλεσσω

What I put my mind to, that I shall accomplish.

Iliad I, 523

Similarly, Athena to Achilles:

ὣδε γὰρ ἐξερέω, τὸ δὲ καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται

For as I speak, so shall it be accomplished.

Iliad I, 213

Thus also Aphrodite to Hera:

...τέλεσαι δέ με θυμός ἄνωγεν,
εἰ δύναμαι τέλεσαι γε καὶ εἰ τετελεσμένον ἔστίν,

...My heart commands me to do it
If I am able - and if it is fated to be done.

Iliad XIV, 195-196

Even mortals understand that it is some god and not themselves, who brings major events to pass. Phoenix tries to shake Achilles' resolve to stay out of the fighting between the Trojans and the Achaeans by reminding him of the curse which the gods fulfilled for his father, Amyntor, against his own recalcitrant son: θεοὺ δ' ἐτέλειον ἐπαράς (Iliad Book IX, 456); while Achilles himself, watching the retreat of the Achaeans before the triumphant Hector, and worrying if the fateful events had taken place - ἃ δὴ τετελεσμένα ἦνεν - which his mother had prophesied would signal the death of his friend, Patroclus, prays that his premonition may remain "unfulfilled":

ὦ μοι ἐγὼ...
μὴ δὴ μοι τελέσῃσι θεοὺ κακὰ κήδεα θυμῷ
ὥς ποτέ μοι μήτηρ διεπέθραδε...

Ah me...

May the gods not fulfill my heart's anxieties
As my mother prophesied...

Iliad XVIII, 6, 8-9

The son of Peleus never forgets, however, that whatever he or any other mortal may desire is not necessarily what god will do:

ἀλλ' οὐ Ζεὺς ἄνδρεσσιν νοήματα πάντα τελευτᾷ.

But Zeus does not fulfill all the intentions of men.

Iliad XVIII, 328

And Achilles' great rival on the Trojan side, Hector, points out to the two contending armies locked in a stalemated battle that Zeus may even refrain from fulfilling his own resolves - his ὅρκια - if it suits his purposes.

ὅρκια μὲν Κρονίδης ὑψίζυγος οὐκ ἐτέλεσσεν,
ἀλλὰ κακὰ φρονέων τεκμαίρεται ἀμφοτέρουσι.

Kronian Zeus on high does not fulfill his oaths:
We find him plotting evils for both sides round about.

Iliad VII, 69-70

Even the poet echoes the sentiments of his heroes on this point. Not only does Zeus accomplish what he wishes - ὣδε γὰρ ἠπεύλησα Κρονοῦ παῖς, τέλει περ [What the son of Kronos threatened, this he does.] (Iliad, Book VIII, 415) - but the fulfillment of his will applies to the very episode which is the subject of the poet's songs:

Διὸς ἐτελείετο βουλή,
ἐξ οὗ δὴ τὰ πρῶτα διαστήτη ἑπίσαντε
Ἀτρεΐδης τε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς.

...Zeus' will was fulfilled
 From the first time the two stood in confrontation
 Atreus' son, the lord of men, and god-like Achilles.

Iliad I, 5-7

In light of the plurality of gods and goddesses on Olympus and of spirits inhabiting earth and ocean, there are, naturally enough, severe conflicts between τέλη.

Poseidon is more than a little annoyed by the fact that his brother's aid to the Trojans continuously prevents Achaean victory. As he watches another Trojan attack upon the Achaean ships, the sea god can hardly believe Zeus will allow such an attack to succeed:

ὦ πόποι ἦ μέγα θαύμα τόδ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν δρῶμαι
 δεινόν, ὃ οὐ ποτ' ἐγὼ γε τελευτήσεσθαι ἔφασκον
 Τρῶας ἐφ' ἡμετέρας ἰέναι νέας.

Oh no! Indeed a great and awful thing I see
 With my own eyes - what I never thought would happen -
 The Trojans attack their ships.

Iliad XIII, 99-101

Similarly, the interminable domestic squabbling between Zeus and Hera underscores the potential for conflict between divine τέλη. Despite his wife's vehement arguments, Zeus announces that he will abide the promise he made to Thetis to arrest Achaean victory over the Trojans until Achilles' anger against Agamemnon has been assuaged:

...οὔτ' ἄρ' ἐγὼ παύω χόλον οὔτε τιν' ἄλλον
 ἀθανάτων Δανοῖσιν ἀμυνέμεν ἐνθάδ' ἑάσω,
 πρὶν γε τὸ Πηλεΐδαο τελευτηθῆναι ἐέλδωρ...

Neither will I stifle my anger, nor any
 Other immortal allow to defend the Danaans

Before the desire of the son of Peleus is filled.

Iliad XV, 72-74

Moreover, mortals in Homer themselves realize that their own actions are only the worldly agencies - the "efficient causes" - of divine τέλη. This relationship between divine will and human action is clearest in connection with the sacrifices and ritual performances of priests and other religious men. Agamemnon accuses Calchas, the chief priest in the Achaean expedition to Troy, of having never in his entire career as a servant of the gods prophesied anything decent or "accomplished through inspiration" anything noble:

μαντὶ κακῶν, οὐ πώ ποτέ μοι τὸ κρήγυον εἶπας.
αἰεὶ τοι τὰ κακ' ἐστὶ σύλα φρεσὶ μαντεύεσθαι,
ἐσθλὸν δ' οὔτε τί πω εἶπας οὔτ' ἐτέλεσσας.

Seer of evils! Never have you spoken fair words.
Always evil things your mind is quick to prophesy.
And nothing good have you ever done or spoken.

Iliad I, 106-108

Agamemnon vows to his fellow warrior Teucer that the leader of the Achaeans will succeed in destroying Troy if that success has already been given him by the τέλος of Zeus and Athena:

σοὺ δ' ἐγὼ ἐξερέω ὥς καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται
αἶ κέν μοι δώῃ Ζεὺς τ' αἰγίοχος καὶ Ἀθήνη
Ἰλίου ἐξαλαπάξαι ἐϋκτίμενον πολίεθρον

This I'll say to you, and even so shall it be,
If Zeus the bearer of the aegis and Athena
Shall give me this strong-built citadel to sack.

Iliad VIII, 286-288

In fact, the ability, capacity, power, or talent of any mortal to act or accomplish any thing at all is really the manifestation of a divine gift. Mortal nature is the embodiment of a divine τέλος. The relation of Odysseus to Athena is instructive here. Homer imagines the goddess as covering the head and shoulders of her favorite mortal with "a graceful appearance" in the same way a sculptor, inspired by Hephaistos, overlays a silver statue with gold:

ὥς δ' ὅτε τις χρυσὸν περιχεύεται ἀργύρῳ ἀνὴρ
 ἕδρις, ὃν Ἥφαιστος δέδασεν καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη
 τέχνην παντοίην, χαρίζεντα δὲ ἔργα τελεύει,
 ὥς ἄρα τῷ κατέχευε χάριν κεφαλῇ τε καὶ ὤμοις.

As when an artisan overlays silver with gold,
 A man Hephaistos taught and Pallas Athena
 Every kind of skill, and all his work turns out well,
 So grace Athena laid upon his head and shoulders.

Odyssey VI, 232-235

The poet represents the divine origin of this graceful appearance as conspicuous to other mortals. That Odysseus' capacity to perform noble deeds is the gift of some divinity is clear to his Phaeacian hosts. Over him

Ἀθήνη
 θεσπεσίην κατέχευε χάριν κεφαλῇ τε καὶ ὤμοις,
 καὶ μιν μακρότερον καὶ πάσσοντα θῆκεν ἰδέσθαι,
 ὥς κεν φαίηκεσσι φίλος πάντεσσι γένουτο
 δεινός τ' αἰδοῦός τε, καὶ ἐκτελέσειεν ἄεθλους
 πολλούς, τοὺς φαίηκες ἐπειρήσαντ' Ὀδυσῆος.

...Athena

A wondrous grace then laid upon his head and shoulders.
 To observation she made him taller and broader
 That loved by all Phaeacians he might become;
 And, awesome and revered, he might perform many
 Tests of strength they might assign him...

Odyssey VIII, 17-23

In short, there is no human action apart from a divine τέλος.

The proper conclusion to be drawn from this review of the uses of the verbs τελέω and τελευτάω in Homer is that they conform in general to the three sets of meanings in the second semantic "family" of the noun τέλος. That is to say, τελέω and τελευτάω usually signify the three closely-related divine activities of "ordaining death," of "authorizing" or "prescribing" either that doom or some other less terminal destiny, and of "completing," "perfecting," "consummating," or otherwise "fulfilling" some divine plan, intention, or design - some immortal τέλος. To be sure, there are a not inconsiderable number of uses of τελέω, and τελευτάω in Homer where mortals accomplish some plan or intention and no Olympian or other deity is either conspicuously at hand or even remotely present. We must not be misled, however, to construe these uses as exceptions to the semantic rule governing the *τελ verbs. It is possible that some of these uses constitute early evidence for that process of secularization which has clearly begun to overtake these words by the middle of the fifth century.

The possibility is not very likely, however. The reason is that Homer never portrays his warrior-heroes as acting or thinking about their own actions apart from divine purposes. The poet always sees them - and he portrays them as always seeing themselves - as the instruments of the Olympian gods or some other activating divinity. It is

not a mere poetic conceit when Homer makes his heroes address each other as θεοειδής , or θεοεἶκελος- as the "godlike" this and the "godlike" that. The communities of the Homeric warriors conceive that one of their members is "like" a god precisely because his capacity for action, his power of getting things done, is seen as the immediate agency not of his own mortal and personal will but of the divinity whose τέλος he executes.

We have now accounted for the commonest meanings of τέλος and its principal relatives in Homer, and have thereby discovered the "divine" origin of the fifth century conception of "public office" and the fourth century idea of "political authority." To sum up: from the Homeric idea of a "divine power to act," which in its most common and concrete manifestation signified a divine authority to impose a death-sentence (τέλος θανάτου) on mortals - though never restricted to that one form of action - evolved the fifth century conception, especially in Aeschylus, of a "public office" which a mortal may occupy (ἐν τέλει) but whose exercise is a sacred trust given by the gods, and the fourth century idea of "human authority" in the realm of politics. Historically speaking, until the turn of the fourth century most Greeks, including educated Greeks, conceived of divine authority as the origin of and the sanction for human activity. Philologically speaking, the attempt to derive any of the metaphorical or abstract meanings of the *τελ group

in the writers from Homer to Euripides from the more concrete meanings like τέλος as military squadron or τέλοον as turnpost oversimplifies the semantic situation to the point of falsification. The most concrete and particular meanings of τέλος appear "cheek by jowl" with the most abstract and general. The intellectual historian may only assume the operation of "the law of metaphor" for the members of the *τελ group in Homer; he may not prove it.

The present effort at consulting this word family as a means of analyzing the Greek contribution to the idea of revolution halts before this wide semantic chasm in the linguistic data. On the one hand are concrete images of "turning," "rotating," and "circling about" contained in the *τελ vocabulary with their irreducible root drawn from the Indo-European *quel; on the other hand, a large majority of words in this vocabulary express highly abstract religious and mystical notions which display no apparent connection with the underlying Indo-European root. If the explanatory function of historical analysis - or indeed of any method of analysis - is "to save the appearances" of the phenomena, such a phenomenon in the realm of ideas is not satisfactorily explained until all its constituent elements have been located and their relations to one another accounted for. If the contribution of the *τελ vocabulary in Greek is to offer any help in understanding the idea of revolution in Western culture, some semantic bridge or

common ground must be found which can unite the concrete and specific meanings in the word group with the abstract and general. How, then, might the immediate visual images of "rotating," "turning," and "circling about" be connected with the ideas of "doom," "divine authority," and "fulfillment"? What was the common ground of these words in Greek life and experience?

Let us return to Homer and Hesiod. In each there appears a usage of a member of the *τελ group which points the way toward a resolution of our semantic problem. The twenty-third book of the Iliad concerns the games held by Achilles in honor of his dead friend, Patroclus. One of these games was the chariot race, in which the poet portrays the young Antilochus, son of Nestor, exercising his special excellence (ἀρετή) for horsemanship by defeating the older and more experienced drivers like Diomedes and Menelaus through his possession and utilization of "crafty intelligence" - his μῆτις.⁴⁷ The poet also sings the ἀρετή of horses. Their merits in relation to one another do not show up on the first leg of the racecourse,

Ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ πύματον τέλεον δρόμον ὠκέες ἵπποι
 ἄψ' ἐφ' ἄλός πολυῆς, τότε δὴ ἀρετή γε ἐκάστου
 φαίνεται'...

But when the swift horses ran the course's home stretch
 Back toward the grey sea, then the virtue of each
 Appeared...

Iliad XXIII, 373-375, 768-

Most translators have rendered the first of these lines

as follows: "...but when the swift horses were running the last leg of the course..."⁴⁸ The rendering of τέλειον as "were running" is incorrect. It is a makeshift designed by the translators to convey what, to their minds, is the more important half of a double meaning. Homer's πύματον τέλειον δρόμον is an example of a semantic syncopation which combines two distinct ideas to form a single phrase. The new phrase retains parts of both original constituent images and dispenses with other parts. In this case, θεῖν πύματον δρόμον meaning "to run the last lap of a race course" has been syncopated with τελεῖν πύματον τέλος or τελεῖν πύματον τέκμωρ, meaning "to round the last turnpost." Πύματον meaning the "furthest" or "last" part (of some phenomenon) is the element common to both images which has been retained in Homer's actual phrase; δρόμον meaning "race course" is thereby forced to do double duty in Homer's actual phrase by standing both for itself and for the missing τέλος or τέκμωρ from the second of the two syncopated images; and finally τελεῖν meaning "to make a turn" is forced to do double duty in Homer's phrase by standing both for itself ("to turn") and for the missing θεῖν. Thus, Homer's actual phrase has sacrificed logical clarity for poetic vigor - a not uncommon practice in poetry. The logic inhering in the syncopation, however, is recoverable by analysis: the two syncopated images express the idea that "when the swift horses had rounded the farthest turnpost and were running the last lap of the

race course, then the excellence of each horse showed itself." The standard translations sacrifice Homer's poetic vigor with its accompanying semantic ambiguity to the modern non-Greek reader's need for clarity. What are lost in such translations are the two images τέλος / τέκνωρ and the specific, and perhaps even original, meaning of τελεῖν. The poet has dispensed with the first - probably because he thought the image sufficiently conveyed by the verb τελεῖν (This is the reason why τέλος and not τέκνωρ is the likelier candidate for the missing word.) The translators have dispensed with the second - probably because they believed that by rendering τελεῖν as if it were θεῖν they were conveying Homer's principal sense, even if they thereby obliterated the second. In short, Homer has merely dropped a word (probably τέλος) whose meaning is already conveyed in the verb τελεῖν while the translators have dropped the "root" meaning of the word which actually appears in the text. It is precisely the "revolving," "turning," or "circling" image in τέλειον which has been lost in the shuffle between Homer and his translators.

The significance of these types of uses of τελεῖν in Homer lies precisely in their visual concreteness. Here we see in a verb of the *τελ group a specificity which matches that of some of the nouns in the group. No longer are we considering such sophisticated abstractions as "fated doom," "divine authority," or "completion," "fulfillment,"

or "consummation." Instead, we are looking at concrete images to which the abstract and sublimated metaphors are somehow related in human experience. A parallel development in the history of πέλω and πέλομαι is instructive (supra at 71ff). Just as the specific visual image of "turning," "rotating," or "circling about" conveyed by the Greek root *πελ from the Indo-European *quel has been lost, evidently long before Homer's day, and the two verbs assimilated to the far more abstract notions of "being" and "becoming,"⁴⁹ so we witness in these uses of τελεῖν in Homer the last vestiges of a concrete image which, centuries before, may have been quite common but now is on the verge of being lost to sight and are about to become assimilated to metaphors and symbols which only the mind's eye can see.

Our conclusion that these uses of τελεῖν in Homer preserve the old, and probably original, image of "turning" and "circling" movement derived from the Indo-European root *quel gets support from another linguistic quarter. The adjectives τελής (-εσσα, -εν) and τέλειος (-α, -ον) which are identical in every respect except form, have undergone mistranslations similar to those of τελεῖν. In Homer, the word usually appears in the stock phrase τεληέσσας ἑκατοῦβας, which translators usually render⁵⁰ as the "sacrificial offering of a hundred-lot of cattle at its full complement of one hundred" or somewhat less commonly as sacrifices of such cattle which are "full-grown" or are "perfect because

they are without spot or blemish." The connection between the notions of "full complement," "full-grown," and "perfect" in this case and the underlying image of rotating or circular movement in the *τελ root is not unfamiliar to English speakers. When we "round off" fractions to the nearest "whole" numbers, or when we invite one more person to our parties in order to "round out" or reach "the full complement" of our guest lists, we are making the same semantic connections between a visual image and an idea of perfecting which Homer makes when he employs τελέεις . For us as for him, "turning," "rotating," or "rounding" expresses the idea of "perfecting," "completing," or "fulfilling." (Perhaps it is well to remind ourselves at this point that there is no empirical evidence for the view that the image of the circle in Greek thought is the source of that semantic connection. The idea of the circle as the perfect geometric shape is itself derivative, since it does not predate Pythagoras, whose earliest possible floruit is two centuries after Homer (See supra, pp. 77-78 and footnote 22). The notion that the circle is "perfect" is derived from images like τεληέσσας ἑκατόμβας, not the other way round.) In Hesiod, the adjective appears in another stock phrase Ὠκεανοῦ τελέεντος ποταμοῦ which translators have rendered as "Ocean, the perfect river."⁵¹ Unfortunately, the connection between the idea of "perfect" and the image of rotating motion is violated by such a highly metaphorical translation - a semantic

violation made all the more puzzling, if not reprehensible, because the entire repertoire of Greek cosmogonical myths, and not just Hesiod's version in the Theogony, testifies to the fact that Ocean is the great River-God who flows "around" the earth and thereby protects κόσμος from χάος.⁵² The idea of perfection is not precluded, of course, from the sense of the word. But the mistake of the translators lies in their obliterating, or at least obscuring, the semantic ambivalence inherent in τελέεις. The same mistake is made when the phrase τελέεντες οἰωνοῦ in the Homeric Hymns is rendered as "the birds whose flight provides sure omens."⁵³ Surely the expression means, primarily, "the birds which circle overhead"; and only secondarily does the phrase connote auguries which are certain. Indeed, the auguries were considered sure and certain - "perfect" - because the flight paths of the οἰωνοῦ were circular in shape.

Here, in these scattered special usages in Homer and Hesiod, we have located the spatial image, the concrete pattern, which underlies the many abstract and metaphorical meanings in the immense repertoire of the *τελ vocabulary. For a Greek, the image of turning, rotating, or circular motion is not only associated with, but is actually the source of, those religious ideas which modern translators render as "completion," "fulfillment," and "accomplishment"; "doom" and "fated death"; "divine authority" and "divine power." Precisely how and why the Greeks made the connec-

tions between all these disparate senses within the *τελ group may lie forever beyond the grasp of a strictly empirical demonstration, but from circumstantial evidence - from the data provided by the history of Greek religious practices - it is at least possible to locate the general field of human experience to which the various meanings refer.

C H A P T E R V I I

ΤΕΛΟΣ: THE IMAGE OF THE MOVING CIRCLE: A THEORY OF ITS SOCIAL ORIGINS

The chapter which follows offers a theory of the semantic field of the family of Greek words derived from *τελ. It is an original theory, a sociological hypothesis, not to be found in either the standard lexica or the secondary philological literature. The theory points to a specific area of ancient Greek communal experience as the probable or likely locus for most of the meanings of the words in the *τελ vocabulary. The theory purports to resolve most of the semantic disparities and contradictions within that vocabulary. It does not presume to enter any area of technical controversy, especially in the field of morphology. Consequently, it has nothing to say one way or the other on the question of the alleged existence of a *τελ₂ root in Greek; the theory pertains only to those words which are conceded by all informed opinion to belong to the Greek *τελ₁, derived from the Indo-European *quel meaning to turn, rotate, spin, or revolve. Moreover, the theory frankly denies any interest in the contemporary scholarly debate over the τέλος μισθοῦ , judging that discussion to be a minor skirmish at the margins of the semantic field composed of the members of the *τελ group as a whole. However the question of the τέλος μισθοῦ is resolved in the end, that

resolution will not significantly affect the outcome of the central semantic problem presented by the *τελ vocabulary. Making allowances for these two exceptions, the theory claims to have located an area of human experience which can account for - can "save the appearances of"- the broad range of disparate meanings which the members of the *τελ group display in the extant literature.

What experience in Greek life displays some phenomenon whose expression in language is aptly conveyed by visual images of turning, rotating and circular motion through space? The answer to this most elementary question, one which philologists have apparently forgotten to ask in their efforts to explain the semantic field of this word-group, cries out from nearly every Greek text concerned with religious ceremonies. The τελ in τέλος and in all its linguistic relatives may have been the act of circling or turning around, or rotating about some sacred object or spot in the course of a religious ceremony. The τέλος was perhaps a specific element, a defined phase, in the conduct of the ceremony of worship or any other cult observance. It may have been one of those elements in a festival or ceremony concerned with the movement of priests and participants around an altar, temple, or some other sacred object. It was, therefore, perhaps a type of going about, a βάδισμα, whose more common representatives in the extant literature are the procession - the πομπή; the revel - the κῶμος;

and the circle dance - the χορός. Speaking theoretically, a τέλος could have been, for a Greek, that episode or moment in the conduct of a religious ceremony or festival - a ἑορτή - when the priests and the participants had finished with the generally stately πομπή, or the enthusiastic κῶμος, and proceeded in a conspicuously circular pattern around an altar or temple. This species of βάδισμα in all likelihood may have constituted the very act of consecration preceding the actual sacrifice. Nearly all Greek cults and ceremonies manifested this specific pattern of worship. Perhaps all did so at one time.⁵⁴ Such were the Eiresione, and the Oschophoria the carrying of a bough of olive and grapes respectively wreathed with wool around the town to promote fruitfulness, at the festival of the Pyanepsia during the month Pyanepsion; such was the Bouphonia, the ritual of the "ox-murder" which required that the bull be driven round the altar before his sacrificial death on it, conducted at the festival of the Dipolieia during the month of Skirophorion; such too were the χοροί, the choruses which originally danced round the smoking remains of a slaughtered bull as it burned on the θυμέλη, the altar at the center of the orchestra at the opening of the festival of the Dionysia. These examples, taken only from the calendar of Attic festivals, could be greatly multiplied were we to consider the religious festivals of Greece as a whole.⁵⁵ Moreover, the history of cult practices in the rest of the

Mediterranean basin beyond the borders of the Greek-speaking states provides overwhelming circumstantial evidence both for the ubiquity of this special element of religious festivals and ceremonies and for the identification of these defined phases in the ceremony, these τέλη, with their parallels and analogues in Greek ritual.⁵⁶ In these primitive and archaic communities throughout the Mediterranean region the circular or revolving pattern of the religious ceremony originally concerned human and animal sacrifice alone, but as religious practices were refined and elaborated, the choice of the victim might change, substitutions made, and the ultimate end ameliorated, but the spatial pattern of the ritual may have remained the same. In the course of Greek religious history - and long before any sustained intellectual contact with the civilizations of Mesopotamia or Egypt - such patterns of encircling movement, taken from religious cult and ceremony, were sublimated, projected up into heaven, attributed to the designs of the gods, assigned to nature in the way living things grow and inanimate objects move, and eventually brought back down to earth and "humanized" to account for the activity of the intellect and the movement of ideas. Along some such historical, and semantic, route the concrete, visual image of turning, rotating, and circling movement may have travelled its immemorial course of continuous abstraction until it issued at last in the still semi-mystical cosmologies of the pre-

socratic philosophers, the ontological speculations and the teleological theories of Plato and Aristotle and the rudimentary political science of Polybius.

Beyond this "circumstantial" historical evidence provided by the history of Greek, and Mediterranean, religion, what specific linguistic data taken from the Greek language supports such a theory concerning the meaning of the *τελ vocabulary? Most important is the fact that, in some uses, τέλος and its somewhat younger relative τελετή, mean simply "sacred ceremony." The oldest use of τέλος in this sense appears in Homer and applies to the ritual of marriage, the τέλος γαμοῦ. (E.g., Odyssey, Book XX, 73-74: εὔτ' Ἀφροδίτη δῖα προσέειπε μακρὸν Ὀλύμπῳ / κούρης αἰτήσους τέλος θελεροῦ γάμου... [And then Aphrodite bounded up to high / Olympus, requesting the ceremony of marriage.]). The later poets are also familiar with this sense. Sophocles' messenger in the Antigone reports to the chorus of Theban elders that King Creon witnessed the suicide of his own son over the already dead body of his betrothed and was thereby forced to attend a "frightful nighttime nuptial in the halls of Hades":

κεῖται δὲ νεκρὸς περὶ νεκρῷ, τὰ νυμφικὰ
τέλη λαχὼν δεύλαιος εἶν Ἄιδον δόμους...

There they lie, corpse embracing corpse,
A frightful night-time nuptial in the halls of Hades.

(ll. 1239-1240)

And earlier in the Eumenides of Aeschylus, the poet portrays the goddess Athena trying to placate the anger of the Furies

over having been tricked out of their blood revenge against Orestes by offering them the prospect of universal praise and recognition as the patron divinities of marriage and childbirth:

πολλῆς δε χώρας τῇσδ' ἔτ' ἀκροθύνια
θύη πρὸ παίδων καὶ γαμηλίου τέλους
ἔχουσ' ἔς αἰεὶ τόνδ' ἐπαινέσεις λόγον.

From this bounteous land forever more you'll
Receive this first fruits sacrifice at the feasts
Of childbirth and marriage, and praise this speech.

Aeschylus, Eumenides, 834-836

And finally, the scholiast's comment on τέλους in this passage seems to be conclusive on the meaning of τέλος in this ceremonial sense. Preliminary ceremonies (προτέλεια) were offered to the Erinyes because "marriage is a sacred ceremony":

ὥς προτέλεια θυόντων Ἀθηῆναι ταῦς
Ἐρινύσι. τέλος δὲ ὁ γάμος.

As preliminaries to the sacrifice [these were offered] by the Athenians to the Erinyes: for marriage is a sacred ceremony.

Scholiast on above

The Greeks certainly recognized other τέλη than the τέλος of marriage. Moreover, the fact that the word usually appears in the plural indicates that the Greeks generally conceived of a τέλος as the sum of discrete τέλη, of "sacred acts," carried out in the course of a ceremony's performance. The poets and playwrights are certainly conscious of these distinctions. They know that there is a τέλος of propitia-

tion, a τέλος of initiation, of consecration, of commemoration, and of civic induction, to name just a few. Each of these ceremonies was composed of the "sacred acts" necessary to accomplish the desired result in relation to the gods concerned. Atossa, the wife of one failed Persian conqueror and the mother of another, stands before an altar with sacrifice-bearing hands in order to conduct the rites, the τέλη, which will propitiate the spirits that have visited her in her dreams with premonitions of disaster for her son:

...σὺν θυηπόλῳ χερὶ
βωμὸν προσέστην, ἀποτρόποισι δαίμοσιν
θέλουσα θύσαι πέλανον, ὧν τέλη τάδε.

...with sacrifice-bearing hands
I approached the altar, hoping to offer a cake
To the averting spirits; for these are their rituals.

Aeschylus, Persians, 202-204

Several of Pindar's Odes refer to the normal ceremonies of ritual propitiation. The poet accounts for the success of Theoron of Acragas in the chariot race at Olympia by pointing to the attention paid by him and his family in the past to strictures of religious worship:

Εμμένιδαίς
θήρῳ τ' ἐλθεῖν κῦδος...
ὅτι πλείσταισι βροτῶν
ξευνίαις αὐτοὺς ἐποίχονται τραπέζαις,
εὐσεβεῖ γυνῆμα φυλάσσοντες μακάρων τελετάς.

...To the Emmenidae
And to Theoron come glory...because they bring
Goodwill to their households by a hospitality of
Table superior to all mortals,
In reverent piety preserving the rights of the Blest.

Pindar, Olympian 3, 37-41

A line from a lost play of Aeschylus expresses the chill which a candidate feels at his rite of initiation into the (Eleusinian?) mysteries:

ἔφριξ' ἔρωτι τοῦδε μυστικοῦ τέλους

I got goose-bumps from this mystical ceremony to love.

Fragment 387

Many passages from Euripides and Aristophanes indicate that τέλος and τελετή were regularly used in the fifth century to designate the special ceremonies accompanying the initiation into the mysteries of Dionysus, Orpheus, and Aesclepius (E.g., Aristophanes, Frogs, 340, 1032; Wasps, 121; Peace, 413-420; Euripides, Iphigenia in Tauris, 958-960; Bacchae, 237-238.) Sophocles is familiar with a τέλος of consecration when new altars and new ceremonies are established for a god. He portrays Heracles as doing precisely that:

ἀκτὴ τις ἔστ' Εὐβοίης, ἔνθ' ὀρίζεται
βωμοὺς τέλη τ' ἐγκάρπα Κηναίῳ Διί.

There was a crag on Euboia. There I
Set up altars and first-fruit sacrifices
To Cenean Zeus.

Sophocles, Women of Trachis, 237-238

Heracles was considered a "founding father" of many such τέλη. Pindar portrays him as establishing the boxing matches at Olympia (Tenth Olympian Ode, 50-54). However, sometimes the gods can set up their own τέλη. Dionysus certainly requires the leave of no mortal to do so:

εἰς τήνδε πρῶτον, ἦλθον Ἑλλήνων πόλιν,
 κάκειῦ χορεύσας καὶ καταστήσας ἐμὰς
 τελετάς, ἵν' εἴην ἐμφανὴς δαύμων βροτοῖς.

To this Greek city first I came, and there
 I danced and set up my rituals that
 My divinity were manifest to man.

Euripides, Bacchae, 18-20

And while there is a τέλος of dedication to which dead
 heroes are conceived as offering their armor to Zeus as
 an acknowledgement that it was his τέλος that decided their
 fate in battle -

ἐπὶ ἑπτὰ λοχαγοῖ γὰρ ἐφ' ἐπὶ πύλαις
 ταχθέντες ὕσσι πρὸς ὕσους ἔλιπον
 Ζηνὶ τροπάλῳ πάγχαλκα τέλη...

Against seven gates seven captains
 Equal heaps of armor set in order
 Gold-covered gifts to Zeus, the defeat-defeater.

Sophocles, Antigone, 141-143

- there is also a τέλος of commemoration in which the immor-
 tal gods return the complement by establishing rites of
 remembrance for dead men:

οὔ ποτ' ἔτι σεμνὰ τιθενοῦνται τέλη
 θνατοῖσιν...

The goddesses set up sacred rights to
 The dead...

Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, 1050-1051

In short, Greek religion consisted of as many ceremonies
 - that is, collective τέλη - as there were human needs,
 hopes, desires and aspirations addressed to the gods or
 other immortal spirits, and each festival or ceremony con-
 sisted of the repertory of "sacred acts" whose proper and

complete performance a worshipper expected would achieve or fulfill his hope, or desire.⁵⁷ These uses of τέλος and τελετή would be greatly multiplied were we to consult the prose writers.

To the notion of τέλος as "sacred act" the Greeks may have connected the idea of τέλος as sacred obligation, task, duty, or service. This usage is clearly a religious counterpart or analogue to the notion of τέλος as a military duty or assignment. Indeed, we may even suggest now with some confidence that the latter was originally conceived by the Greeks as a wartime manifestation of the former. That is to say, the organization of the armies of the Homeric warrior-heroes may well have been established along lines either parallel to those of religious festivals or ceremonies or at least laid out and "consecrated" by them. The circumstantial evidence for such a view is substantial: the religious functions of the Homeric βασιλεῖς, and the subordination of all these kings to their chief μάντις or ἱεροπόλος are well known (e.g. Agamemnon to Chalkis). It is not inconceivable, then, that τέλος meaning "military detachment" or "squadron" was imagined by the Greeks as a martial analogue to the τέλος of the religious ceremony; each may have been a specific element in a large group activity sanctioned by religion. The idea that would unite these two manifestations of τέλος is the notion of religious duty and service. In any case, there is no denying that τέλος can mean "duty"

and "service" throughout the range of Greek literature.

Cassandra realizes that her powers of prophecy are a gift of Apollo given to her to be performed "in his service":

μάντις μ' Ἀπόλλων τῶνδ' ἐπέστησεν τέλει.

Apollo set me up, a prophet in his service.

Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 1202

Pindar imagines that, having already - and often - sung the glory of Delos, Apollo will not begrudge the poet the additional hymn he is about to sing to the glory of the Isthmos. Pindar proposes to offer both, in fact, as "a sacred service to the god":

εἴξον ὠπολλωνίας. ἀμφοτεράν τοι χαρίτων σὺν
θεοῖς ζεύξω τέλος.

O, island of Apollo, yield! I shall yoke
Both hymns of praise to the service of the gods.

Pindar, Isthmian 1, 6

Naturally, this use of τέλος as duty or service became "secularized" with the passage of time. In the course of the fifth century the word is assigned to human duties and obligations. It may remain an open question whether or not the word has been secularized by Aeschylus at that tense moment when Clytemnestra, believing that she is the human embodiment of avenging Dikē, chides her slaves for failing promptly to perform their duty of spreading the royal red carpet for Agamemnon to walk on. The slaves' τέλος, she most certainly thinks, is owed to herself as a divinely

appointed agent of Justice:

δμωλαί, τί μέλλεθ', αἷς ἐπέσταλται τέλος,
πέδον κελεύθον στορνύναι πετάσμασιν;

You there! Slave girls to whom this duty is
Assigned: Why do you hesitate to spread these
Rugs upon the path?

Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 908-909

Clearly too there is some ambiguity still in the third play
of the Oresteia at that moment when the Furies use the word
to indicate the duty of the Athenian jurymen to count the
votes they have cast in the trial of Orestes for matricide:

ἐκβάλλεθ' ὥς τάχιστα τευχέων πάλους,
ὅσοις δικαστῶν τοῦτ' ἐπέσταλται τέλος.

Roll out the pebbles quickly from the jar,
You among the jury whose task this is.

Aeschylus, Eumenides, 742-743

But by the time of Euripides, this word for "sacred service"
has begun to lose its religious connotations. In the mouth
of one of the mothers composing the chorus of suppliant
women at Eleusis, ἄπνυα τέλη mean the worrisome night-watches
which mothers sometimes must make over the beds of their
children:

ὦ, ὦ
ποῦ δὲ πόνος ἐμῶν τέκνων,
ποῦ λοχευμάτων χάρις;
τροφαί τε ματρὸς ἄπνυα τ' ὀμμάτων τέλη,
καὶ φίλαι προσβάλλαι προσώπων;

O, what distress!
Where have my pains for my children gone?
Where the maternal ministrations and sleepless vigils
And tender kisses cheek to cheek?

Euripides, The Suppliant Women, 1135-1138

Even so, this sense of τέλος was never completely secularized; it always retained some of its original religious connotation of duty or service to a god or some divinity. In his last play, the constantly-secularizing Euripides returns to the ritual source of the *τελ group: those mortals who observe the τελεταὶ established by the gods lead a blessed and happy life:

ὦ μάκαρ, ὅστις εὐδαίμων
τελετὰς θεῶν εἰδὼν
βιοτὰν ἀγλστεύει...

O blessed one, whoever observes
The ordinances of the gods,
His spirit leads a consecrated life...

Euripides, Bacchae, 72-74

In short, while τέλος can sometimes mean the entire sacred ceremony, or ritual - as in τέλος γάμοιο - the singular form usually means a particular moment, specific element, or defined phase in the larger and more comprehensive ceremony which Greek usually designates in the plural as τέλη or τελεταί.

All this linguistic data, however, if it proves anything, may prove too much. The fact that two members of the *τελ vocabulary actually mean "ritual," "festival," or "ceremony," and the fact that nearly all such festivals in Greece displayed at least some phase where the general βάδισμα differentiated itself into a pattern of circular movement around an altar, temple, or some other sacred object - these two facts only suggest that in this case we are

seeing an example of that common linguistic process of metonymy whereby a word for the part came to stand for the whole. Τέλος and τελετή meaning sacred ceremony or festival only indicate how extensively the image had pervaded Greek religious thinking and practice. But what is needed, in addition, in order to pin down the abstract and various meanings of τέλος in Homer are not only generalized data from the history of Greek religion which merely point to the diffusion of the image, but also specific data from that history which point to the particular experience in the conduct of a Greek ritual where the notions severally but indiscriminately attached to τέλος in our modern lexica, may be seen in their original association. Can we find, then, any specific ceremony or rite - some historical τέλος or τελετή - where the image of circular, turning or rotating movement is unmistakeably associated with the Homeric ideas of "fated death," "doom," "divine authority," and "completion," "consummation," and "fulfillment"?

The very formulation of the question points to the answer. The general type of Greek ceremony which combines all these disparate senses of τέλος is the primitive annual rite of the expulsion and slaying of the consecrated φαρμακός - the "scapegoat." The rite pervaded the societies of the ancient world,⁵⁸ and was familiar, as anthropologists tell us,⁵⁹ to societies outside the Western world and even in the agricultural districts - which means the vast majority

of districts - in early modern Europe.⁶⁰ All the historical manifestations of the practice share features which amount to a virtual "structure" or "type" for such ceremonies. An individual, usually a criminal or some other kind of outcast or pariah, is chosen; then, the evils, sins, and anxieties of the community are projected onto that individual; finally, the individual is physically expelled from the territory of the community, taking its evils, sins, and anxieties with him. There are many variations on the general pattern.⁶¹ The *φαρμακός* may be an inanimate object or collection of objects, or it may be an animal, a plant, or a human being, either male or female. The actual expulsion - the *ἐξέλασις* or perhaps *πομπή* in its original primitive connotation⁶² - may display any number of spatial patterns of movement.⁶³ And the scapegoat may suffer any one of several "fates," of which the primitive one was certainly death.

For the purpose of this study the center of attention must be the manifestations of this practice among the ancient Greeks and their neighbors, and the specific episode of the general ritual in which a circular or turning pattern of movement may be seen. To repeat our central question: what is the human experience which manifests itself in visual patterns of circular or turning movement? In many of the Greek states and at Rome as well the essential act of consecration in the ritual of the *φαρμακός* consisted of

driving the victim round about the precincts of the village or city, or perhaps around the outer walls of the city. This species of βάδισμα within the ceremony as a whole may have been, according to our theory, the very τέλος in the τελετή: that is to say, it was the driving of the φαρμακός around the districts of the village, town, or city, or around their walls, or perhaps around the fields, temples or altars of their territories so that the sins, evils, and anxieties lurking in every corner of the community might be collected in the body of the scapegoat which first suggested to the mind of the observers the image of the "going round" as central to the ceremony. Consequently, in order to express this spatial pattern in a visual image, those observers may well have chosen a word conveying the appropriate image. That word perhaps was τέλος.

Moreover, the performance of this ritual goes a long way toward explaining the far more abstract ideas of accomplishment, consummation, and fulfillment. We have already seen (supra at 119-122) in the simple case of the competitors in a race, that τέλος meaning "turnpost" led quite naturally to the idea of τέλος as "finish-line." The idea was that the competitors must round the last turnpost before they could finish the race. Just so in the ritual of the φαρμακός. The ceremony of expiatory expulsion - the ἐξέλασις - was not complete - fulfilled - until the φαρμακός had been forced to make the rounds of the village, town, or city,

collecting all the sins of the community. The ceremony was not consummated until the scapegoat, having had projected onto him every evil spirit lurking about, was at last expelled from the territory of the society. When he had crossed the last portion of the communal space, he was quite literally pushed over the boundary. This was, if you will, the "finish-line" of the expulsion ceremony, the end of the τέλος in the τελετή.

In this ceremony too we have the explanation of τέλος meaning "fated death" or what translators now render as "doom." In many cases the last sacred act, the last τέλος in the τελετή of expulsion, was the killing of the φαρμακός. At the very moment when he was driven across the boundary of the communal space, or when he had completed his circumvalation of fields, altars, or temples, he was thrown from a cliff or had his throat cut. This was the truly terminal τέλος, the primitive religious archetype behind the Homeric τέλος θανάτοιο.

Finally, the ceremony of the ἐξέλασις goes a long way toward explaining why the τέλος found in the extant Greek literature usually connotes divine authority and power. In the historical Greek states the φαρμακοί were conceived as substitutes for their kings, and there is plenty of evidence indicating that in archaic times the scapegoat had been the king himself.⁶⁴ Sometimes he was chosen to be king precisely in order to fill that one communal function.⁶⁵

The scapegoat was imagined to possess divine authority and power because in him were collected a host of immortal spirits - admittedly evil and sinful, or baleful ones - whose very presence made the *φαρμακός* sacred - *δαυμόνιος* if not exactly *ἱερός* . Indeed, the efficacy of the scapegoat in fulfilling the function of the expiation makes sense only if he is imagined as having become "filled" with spirit - that is, conceived as *ἔνθεος* with the immortal spirits of the community. Some scholars even trace the origin of the gods on Olympus to these very real ceremonies of expiatory expulsion.⁶⁶

C H A P T E R V I I I

SUMMATION: THE CONTRIBUTION OF GREEK EXPERIENCE TO THE IDEA OF REVOLUTION

We have now completed our survey of the semantic fields encompassed by the four Greek derivatives of the Indo-European root *quel. Let us review the principal findings in each of the four "quadrants" on our semantic compass in order to appreciate better the major contributions of these word groups to the idea of revolution in Western culture.

From κύκλος comes the smallest and the best known contribution. It had only just begun its career of intellectual abstraction in the sixth century with the pre-socratic philosophers and the Orphic cultists - both "dissenting" minorities in Greek culture who were thought to be odd by their own contemporaries. As abstractions, κύκλος and its relatives became popular only with the dramatists and poets of the fifth century. Its original semantic fields comprised the principal communal activities of the archaic Indo-European tribe - semi-nomadic and pastoral transhumance, military maneuvers, aristocratic hunting, and patriarchal governance. The specific images involved in each of these activities were the wheel (of carts and chariots), the band of huntsmen with spears and nets surrounding a quarry, and the circle of elders sitting in council. Between the time

of Hesiod and Herodotus, and probably with a major influence from Mesopotamian cosmology and astrology at the close of the Persian Wars near mid-fifth century, these images based on the κύκλος were projected up into heaven to describe the movement of heavenly bodies, and from the further development and elaboration of this astral imagery in the hands of the Hellenistic astronomers and astrologists, the semantic field of κύκλος entered the mainstream of what we call "Western" culture, and bequeathed to the idea of revolution in modern times those peculiar connotations of celestial - and even cosmic - regularity and inevitability which we find first in the Italian historians and in the still semi-mystical calculations of Copernicus and Kepler.

From the Greek root $*(F)\epsilon\lambda$ comes a vocabulary with considerably richer associations. Its original semantic fields are certainly narrower than κύκλος: its vocabulary center predominantly on the pastoral and martial aspects of the early Greek communities; it has little to do with hunting and nothing to do with governance. Its associations, however, are much more vital - even frenetic - than the κύκλος vocabulary. Whereas the image of the κύκλος remains remarkably static until the verb forms appear in the sixth and fifth centuries, the image of the ἑλγή is movement itself: κύκλος merely presents a shape to our contemplation, a static inscription in space; the $*(F)\epsilon\lambda$ vocabulary on the other hand signifies the very movement which inscribed that space.

The career of the underlying image in this word group from Homer to Herodotus reveals, both morphologically as well as semantically, how the discreet image of "revolving" entered Hellenic, Hellenistic, and then Western culture. Its career accounts precisely for the "revolution" in revolution. Moreover, the regular association of the $*(f)\epsilon\lambda$ vocabulary with military activity - an association which marked an immense semantic field signifying the physical movements whereby death and destruction were dealt out to enemies in combat - goes a long way toward explaining why the later and more abstract members of the word group, including our own modern "revolution," always suggest the element of violence. If the modern mind has concluded that "a revolution is not a dinner party," as Chairman Mao is reputed to have said, we may safely trace the origin of this sanguinary association to the bloody world of the Greek warrior-heroes.

From the third Greek root, $*\pi\epsilon\lambda$, comes a vocabulary which both combines the breadth of the semantic field of $\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\kappa\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ with the semantic richness of the $*(f)\epsilon\lambda$ family, and constitutes in sheer numbers a repertoire of words greater than the $\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\kappa\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ and the $*(f)\epsilon\lambda$ families combined. The $*\pi\epsilon\lambda$ root provided Greek with representatives in all the areas of archaic Greek life covered by the $\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\kappa\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ and the $*(f)\epsilon\lambda$ word groups, and in several other important areas besides. The $*\pi\epsilon\lambda$ vocabulary extends to the fields of pastoralism, nomadism, and transhumance generally; it extends to agricul-

ture and viticulture; it extends to hunting and to warfare; to nascent commerce and to the novel institutions of that innovation the Greeks called the πόλις; and finally, to that area of human life which was considered by most Greeks to be the most important of all - to ritual and religions. Philologically speaking, the members of the *πελ group are generally characterized by that sense which Greek expresses in the "middle voice." Whereas κύκλος and its relatives are nearly all static - "passive" in the non-technical meaning of that term - and convey their image independent of the subject, whose relation to it is usually contemplative; and whereas the *(F)ελ family is essentially active and transitive, presupposing a subject who acts upon an object by executing a revolving, circling, or rotary movement; the *πελ family occupies a "middle" ground, syntactically and semantically speaking. That is to say, the activity of the subject affects himself as much as, and indeed precisely to the extent that, he affects an object. It is for this reason that so many of the nouns in the *πελ group designate a living, animate agent as he moves or propels himself in a turning, circling, or rotating pattern, and why so many of the verbs are used most commonly in the middle voice. The career of the *πελ group from Homer to Herodotus - a career whose semantic catholicity is unrivalled by any of the other Greek roots which convey images of cir-

cular motion - underscores the pervasiveness of "revolutionary" images and metaphors in Greek life and thought.

Throughout the entire course of ancient Greek history, and long after the assimilation and sublimation of these words to the abstruse and esoteric ancient systems of cosmology, astrology, philosophy, and "science," which began in earnest in the Hellenistic age, the members of the *πελ group retained their archaic connections with the more down to earth human and communal activities of agriculture, warfare, politics, and religion. This feature of pervasiveness of the *πελ group in Greek explains why, at the level of ideas and concepts if not of historical phenomena and facts, it has been next to impossible in modern times even to imagine, let alone to talk about, revolution in human communities apart from "the social question."

Finally, from the Greek root *τελ comes a vocabulary whose semantic field - although it is at once the narrowest in linguistic "area" of the four quadrants on the compass of the Indo-European *quel and yet within that area is also the most diverse, complex and consequently the most resistant to analysis - provides perhaps the profoundest insights into how "the Greek mind" related its experiences in the mundane activities of agriculture and military life to its most abstract, mystical, and always religious notions of death, fate, and authority. The underlying image of turning, circling, or rotary movement in this word group expresses

itself in its most concrete and specific forms in the image of the boundary mark around which a Greek farmer turned his team of oxen or mules when plowing, and in the image of the turnpost around which the competitors in races run. We may not conclude in this case, however, that these concrete expressions from agriculture and warfare constituted the word group's original semantic field. Moreover, we cannot reconstruct a linguistic career for the *τελ group because the full range of that career confronts us already in Homer fully developed and complete. The *τελ group is already τελέεις at the dawn of Greek literature. The appearances of members of the group in the extant literature from Homer to Herodotus constitute, philologically speaking, a mere footnote - though an admittedly important one - to the already highly abstract and "philosophical" uses in the epic tradition. Consequently, the most important feature of this word group for the history of the idea of revolution in Western culture is its very antiquity. Its semantic career reached its full maturity before Homer, and from that simple fact we must conclude that the images and ideas we find associated with it in the Iliad and the Odyssey must have undergone a development lasting many centuries during the Greek archaic period. During the course of that shadowy pre-history we must assume that words like τέλος, τελέω, and τελέεις were imagined by these "proto-Greeks," and later by that indigenous "Pelasgian" population which they

subdued, as appropriate expressions for those specific elements in religious ritual which presented to the observer the image of circular motion; that the specific τέλος within the larger religious ceremony or festival became the word designating the rite as a whole or as a type of religious performance; that this "type" of performance was originally undertaken in connection with the most primitive chthonic divinities who were the patrons of agriculture and the dead, and not at first with the distant and aloof Olympians; that the performer of these τέλη, whose function was to placate, propitiate, or otherwise pacify these dark spirits, was at first the "leader" of the community, the chief elder, the king - the βασιλεῦς; that during times of crisis - of warfare, plague, famine, or some other episode of natural catastrophe the king himself acted as a θασμακός, a scapegoat, who, because of his frequent spiritual intercourse with the gods of the community during more normal times, contained in his person sufficient divine authority, power, efficacy or potency to ward off calamity by his offering of himself as a sacrifice to propitiate the apparently offended communal deities; and finally, that his τέλος, that is, his ritual, fated death, became institutionalized in the religious calendars of many Greek communities, was reenacted on a regular and usually annual basis, the king as θασμακός sometimes being ritually killed, other times killed only in effigy, and sometimes killed only symbolically, as a kind

of spiritual prophylactic against periodic disaster, and at last became through time and many alterations and embellishments in matters of detail an almost joyous observance and commemoration of an antique ancestral custom whose primitive significance was only dimly remembered through the reassuring mediation of literature and art, through the combined influence, that is of etiological myths and the vicariously enjoyed catastrophes of Dionysian tragedy.

These most peculiarly Greek associations of ideas derived from one of their inherited images of turning, circling, or revolving motion are pregnant with analytical possibilities for the student of modern ideas about revolution. If ever analysts of historical revolutions have thrown up their hands in frustration over the effort to understand certain recalcitrant psychological data in the rhetoric of revolutions and revolutionaries - the endless appeals to "the public good," or "the people"; the insistence on the role of "the leader" or "the revolutionary elite"; the decidedly mystical notion of "the martyrs of the revolution"; or the conviction that the health of any community requires "a revolution every twenty years" or that "the tree of liberty is watered with the blood of tyrants" - if ever these ideas have defied even logical, let alone historical, analysis,⁶⁷ perhaps students of modern ideas concerning revolution could do no better than to turn their attention to those historical moments when specific

images of revolutionary movement, inherited through millenia of linguistic usage whose ancient significations are recoverable by modern methods of linguistic analysis, are employed by revolutionaries, or the observers of revolutions, to characterize the nature and motives of the phenomenon at hand. As long as revolutions continue to occur among predominantly agricultural societies, as were the American, French, Russian and Chinese revolutions; as long as there exists an essentially "pagan" or "heathen" substratum of popular religious ideas and superstitions below the level of the "official" religions and ideologies; and as long as the rhetoric of revolution is formed from the Indo-European stock of inherited revolutionary imagery, then the example of the development of revolutionary imagery in Greek culture will continue to provide historical enlightenment.

NOTES

1. The phenomenon of repetition, or recurrence, is perhaps the central leitmotif of Douglas R. Hofstadter's now famous Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (New York, 1979). Taking its cue from Godel's discovery of the recursion of mathematical systems, Hofstadter plays the idea of recursive structures through a half-dozen fields of human activity, including art, music, philosophy, and computer science. For explicit discussion of models of recurrence and repetition see "Introduction: A Musico-Logical Offering" at 24-27; Chapter V, "Recursive Structures and Processes" at 149-50; Chapter X, "Levels of Description, and Computer Systems" at 287-96; and Chapter XIII, "Bloop and Floop and Gloop."

2. C.G. Jung, Man and His Symbols (London, 1964). The idea of the archetype, both as an alleged fact of psychic economy and as a tool of psychic analysis, is lucidly presented in Jolan Jacobi, Complex/Archetype/Symbol in the Psychology of C.G. Jung (New York & London, 1959; 1971) Ralph Manheim, trans. The so-called "Jungian" approach to human psychic life and development is recapitulated in Erich Neumann, The Origins and History of Consciousness (New York & London, 1959; 1970) R.F.C. Hull, trans., and the idea of the circle as a pre-conscious archetype in the human mind is presented in The Great Mother: An Analysis of the Archetype (Princeton, 1955; 1963) Ralph Manheim, trans. by the same author.

3. From the immense corpus of Jean Piaget, the essential works on his idea of the "circular reaction" stage in the development of the human infant are The Origin of Intelligence in Children (New York, 1952) and Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood (New York, 1962) C. Gattegno and F.M. Hodgson, trans., especially Ch. I, "The First Three Stages..." pp. 6-29. The corpus of commentary on Piaget's work is growing with his popularity. On the idea of the "circular reaction" phenomenon see John H. Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget (Princeton, 1963) especially Ch. 2 "Basic Properties of Cognitive Functioning ...The Concept of Schema," pp. 52-58 and Ch. 3, "The Sensory-Motor Period: General Development...Functional Variants and the Primary Circular Reaction" pp. 92-94; "The Secondary Circular Reaction," pp. 101-109; and Herbert Ginsberg and Sylvia Oppen, Piaget's Theory of Intellectual Development (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1979) especially Ch. 2, "Infancy" pp. 34-36; 43-36; 56-58.

4. Freud's notion that the study of the human capacity for language would ultimately provide the link between individual and group psychology was a by-product of the debate with Jung over the status of symbols. In order to counter

the quasi-Platonic and unempirical idealism of Jung's "archetypes," Freud was compelled to elaborate his view on the origins of all aspects of language, not just symbols, in the negotiations for sex among individuals in the human group. See Freud's "The Unconscious" (1915) SE, XIV, 166-204 and Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1915) SE, XV-XVI, especially Lecture X, "Symbolism in Dreams." Of course, Freud's interest in the phenomenon of language was life-long. Aphasia as well as hysteria contributed to his discovery of the unconscious; psychoanalytic therapy is unimaginable without the "talking cure"; and his later studies of art and artists presupposes a theory of the function of language. The only adequate study of Freud's contribution to what is now fashionably called "psycholinguistics" is John Forrester, Language and the Origins of Psychoanalysis (New York, 1980). See also Émile Benveniste, "Remarks on the Function of Language in Freudian Theory" in Mary Elizabeth Meck ed., Problems in General Linguistics (Miami, 1971) pp. 65-75; Kenneth Burke, "Freud and the Analysis of Poetry" 45 American Journal of Sociology (1939-40) pp. 391-417; Marshall Edelson, Language and Interpretation in Psychoanalysis (New Haven & London, 1975); Juilius Laffal, "Freud's Theory of Language," 33 Psychoanalytic Quarterly pp. 157-75; Bonnie E. and Norman S. Litowitz, "The Influence of Linguistic Theory on Psychoanalysis: A Critical, Historical Survey," 4 International Review of Psychoanalysis, pp. 419-448; Patrick J. Mahoney, "Freud in the Light of Classical Rhetoric," 10 Journal for the History of the Behavioral Sciences (1974), pp. 413-25; Jacques Lacan, The Language of the Self: The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis (Baltimore, 1968) A. Wilden, trans.; and Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation (New Haven, 1970) D. Savage, trans.

5. See Appendix A: A Brief Comment with Select Bibliography on Linguistics, Psycholinguistics and Sociolinguistics.

6. The idea of revolution cannot be understood without a thorough acquaintance with the history of astrology and the occult sciences. Not only the word "revolution" itself, but many of its semantic associations - like the idea of inevitability and regularity - were transmitted to Western European culture through the medium of these popular superstitions. While the official culture of the late Roman Empire was decaying, astrology and the occult sciences survived and even retained some of their ancient vitality.

The essential studies concerning the transmission of this popular element into Western culture are Auguste Bouche-LeClerq, Histoire de la divination dans l'antiquité (Paris, 1879-82), 4 vols.; Brian P. Copenhagen, Symphorien Champier

and the Reception of the Occultist Tradition in Renaissance France (Lawrence, Kan., 1972); Franz V.E. Cumont, Astrology and Religion Among the Greeks and Romans (New York & London, 1912); and A. J. Festugière, La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste: Vol. I: L'astrologie et les sciences occultes (Paris, 2nd ed., 1950). See also Don Cameron Allen, The Star-Crossed Renaissance: The Quarrel About Astrology and Its Influence in England (Durham, N.C., 1941); David Amand, Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque (Louvain, 1945); Frederick Henry Cramer, Astrology in Roman Law and Politics (Philadelphia, 1954); Mark A. Graubard, Astrology and Alchemy: Two Fossil Sciences (New York, 1953); Herbert Leventhal, In the Shadow of the Enlightenment: Occultism and Renaissance Science in Eighteenth-Century America (New York, 1976); Charles A. Mercier, Astrology in Medicine (London, 1914); David Purgiee, "Astrology," Dictionary of the History of Ideas, Vol. 1, pp. 118-26; Wayne Shumaker, The Occult Sciences in the Renaissance: A Study in Intellectual Patterns (Berkeley & London, 1972); Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic (New York, 1971), especially chs. 10-12, "Astrology," pp. 283-385; Daniel P. Walker, Spiritual and Demonic Magic; From Ficino to Campanella (London, 1958; 1969; 1975), especially Ch. 2 "Ficino's Astrological Music" pp. 12-24; and Theodore O. Wedel, The Medieval Attitude Toward Astrology, Particularly in England (New Haven, 1920).

7. For revolutio in Saint Augustine, see Lewis and Short, full citation in Note #14.

8. For the use of rivoluzione in the Renaissance Italian historians see Felix Gilbert, "Revolution," Dictionary of the History of Ideas, Vol. 4 (New York, 1968, 1973).

9. See especially Thomas S. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought (Cambridge, Ma. & London, 1957). See also Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800 (London, 1949); A.C. Crombie, Augustine to Galileo (Cambridge, Ma., 1952); J.L.E. Dreyer, A History of Astronomy from Thales to Kepler (New York, 2nd ed., 1953); Lynn Thorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental Science (New York, 1923-41); and Frances Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (London, 1964).

10. Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth; or an Epitome of the Civil Wars of England, from 1640 to 1660 (London, 1969) F. Tonnies ed., p. 214; Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England (Oxford, 1888) Book XVI.

11. See for example, Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York, 1963), Ch. 2, "The Meaning of Revolution"; Arthur

Hatto, "Revolution: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term," 58 Mind (October, 1949) pp. 495-517; and Melvin J. Lasky, Utopia and Revolution: On the Origins of a Metaphor (Chicago & London, 1976), especially Chs. 5 and 6.

12. This discussion of the history of historical linguistics is based on Malcolm Crick's work on that subject, Explorations in Language and Meaning; Toward a Semantic Anthropology (New York, 1976). See also J.-C. Chevalier, "Les ideologues et le comparativisme historique," In Memoriam Friedrich Diez; Proceedings of the Colloquium for the History of Romance Studies (Amsterdam, 1976) pp. 175-95; Henry M. Hoenigswald, "Intentions, Assumptions, and Contradictions in Historical Linguistics," Current Issues in Linguistic Theory (Bloomington, Ind., 1977) pp. 168-94; Hilary Henson, British Social Anthropologists and Language (Oxford, 1974); Dell Hymes, ed., Studies in the History of Linguistics: Traditions and Paradigms (Bloomington, Ind., 1974); and Language in Culture and Society; A Reader in Linguistics and Anthropology (New York, 1964), especially the two articles by Paul Thième; Alan R. Keiler, ed., A Reader in Historical and Comparative Linguistics (New York, 1972); E.F.K. Koerner, Ferdinand de Saussure: Origin and Development of His Thought in Western Studies of Language: A Contribution to the History of Linguistics (London, 1973); "1876 as a Turning Point in the History of Linguistics," 4 Journal of Indo-European Studies (1976) pp. 333-53; "The Importance of Linguistic Historiography and the Place of History in Linguistic Science," 14 Foundations of Language (1976) pp. 541-47; Winfred P. Lehman, ed. and trans., A Reader in Nineteenth Century Historical Indo-European Linguistics (Bloomington, Ind., 1967), and "Saussure's Dichotomy Between Descriptive and Historical Linguistics," Directions for Historical Linguistics: A Symposium (Austin, Texas, 1971) Yakov Malkiel, ed., pp. 3-20; Maurice Leroy, Les grands courants de la linguistique moderne (Brussels & Paris, 1963); Antoine Meillet, Linguistique historique et linguistique générale (Paris, 2nd ed., 1926-1936); Robert Lee Miller, The Linguistic Relativity Principle and Humboltian Ethno-Linguistics: A History and Appraisal (The Hague, 1968); Christine Mohrman et al., eds., Trends in European and American Linguistics, 1930-1960 (Utrecht, 1963); Herman Parret, ed., History of Linguistic Thought and Contemporary Linguistics (Berlin, 1976); Holger Pedersen, Linguistic Science in the Nineteenth Century; Methods and Results (Cambridge, Ma., 1931); Robert H. Robins, A Short History of Linguistics (Utrecht, 1967); and "History of Linguistics," 5 Anthropological Linguistics (1963).

13. The modern discipline of intellectual history is nowhere near as homogeneous as the discussion above may seem to suggest. The validity of the claim to a "methodological tenet central to intellectual history" rests on the word alone. The discipline has been divided since its establishment in the early 1940s between those who practiced mainly internal and those who practiced primarily external criticism of texts. The debate between the "intertextualists" and the "contextualists" has often been heated but neither side has ever denied the intellectual legitimacy of the opposing method. The debate has been over the relative weight to be accorded each method and the proper balance to be struck between them. Both sides have admitted the necessity of both approaches in some degree or other to sound historical scholarship. For the history of this debate see Robert Darnton in his "Intellectual and Cultural History in Michael Kammen, ed., The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States (Ithaca, 1980). See also George Boas, The History of Ideas (New York, 1969); Thomas Bradsdorf, "Lovejoy's Idea of Idea," 8 New Literary History (1977) pp. 195-211; Charles F. Delzell, ed., Continental Symposium on the Future of History (Nashville, Tenn., 1977), especially the article by Paul K. Conkin, "Intellectual History: Past, Present and Future," pp. 111-33; John Dunn, "The Identity of the History of Ideas," 43 Philosophy (1968) pp. 85-104; Arthur A. Ekirch, American Intellectual History: The Development of the Discipline (Washington, D.C., 1973); Felix Gilbert and S.R. Graubard, eds., Historical Studies Today (New York, 1972), especially the article by Gilbert, "Intellectual History: Its Aims and Methods," pp. 141-58; Felix Gilbert, John Higham, and Leonard Krieger, eds., History: The Development of Historical Studies in the United States (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965); John C. Greene, "Objectives and Methods of Intellectual History," 44 Mississippi Valley Historical Review (1957) pp. 58-74; John Higham and Paul K. Conkin, eds., Wingspread Conference on New Directions in American Intellectual History (Baltimore, 1979); John Higham, "Beyond Consensus: The Historian as Moral Critic," in Writing American History: Essays on Modern Scholarship (Bloomington, Ind., 1970); Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," 8 History and Theory (1969) pp. 3-53; Robert A. Skotheim, American Intellectual Histories and Historians (Princeton, 1966); and generally, Hayden V. White, "Tasks of Intellectual History," 53 The Monist (October, 1969) pp. 606-30.

14. Lewis & Short, E.A. Andrew's A New Latin Dictionary (New York, 1879, 1907); R.C. Palmer et al., eds., Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford, 1968) Fascicle VII, pp. 1649-50; and A. Meillet et A. Ernout, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine: Histoire des mots (Paris, 1959).

15. See Livy, Histories, Book 34.5; Horace, Epodes, 2,1,233.
16. See Meillet and Ernout, Note 12 above, and Pierre Chantraine, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque (Paris, 1968).
17. See the bibliographies in F.W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius (Oxford, 1957-1979) 3 vols., Vol. 3 and especially in Paul Pedech, La méthode historique de Polybe (Paris, 1964) which contains many nineteenth century works.
18. The best example of this type of approach to Polybius, in English, is G.W. Trompf, The Idea of Historical Recurrence in Western Thought; From Antiquity to the Reformation (Berkeley & London, 1979), Ch. 1 "The Polybian Anacyclosis or Cycle of Governments," and Ch. 2 "Polybius and the Elementary Models of Historical Recurrence in the Classical Tradition," pp. 4-115.
19. F.W. Walbank (see Note 17) has drawn the sensible conclusion from this point. Rejecting the idea of any direct influence from either Plato's Republic or Politics or Aristotle's Ethics, or from any of the organized "schools" of philosophy in the centuries immediately preceding his own, Walbank speculates that the idea of ἀνακύκλωσις Polybius "probably took...over directly from the eclectic, philosophical source of a popular culture..." p. 658. We need not, however, go so far as Walbank when he concludes that "in the form in which [Polybius] presents it, the cycle has so many traditional elements that the immediate source is probably past recovery," p. 644. We may concur in the qualification "immediate," but the very nature of "traditional elements," especially when it comes to literature, makes recovery eminently practicable. That is precisely what philology and historical comparative linguistics are all about. We may never know what texts Polybius studied or was familiar with but we can certainly surmise the character of the cultures he grew up and lived in by an analysis of the languages he spoke. This is the great advantage of Paul Pedech's study (see Note 15); see also T.H. Cole, "The Sources and Composition of Polybius VI," 13 Historia (1964) pp. 440-44; J.A. Foucault, Recherches sur la langue et le style de Polybe (Paris, 1972); Kurt von Fritz, The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity: A Critical Analysis of Polybius' Political Ideas (New York, 1954), especially Ch. 4 "The Cycle of Constitutions and the Mixed Constitutions" pp. 60-95; and F.W. Walbank, Polybius (Berkeley & London, 1972).
20. See especially Stuart Piggott, Ancient Europe, From the Beginnings of Agriculture to Classical Antiquity: A Survey (Edinburgh, 1965) pp. 93ff.

21. The best short account in English is W.K.C. Guthrie, The Greeks and Their Gods (Boston, 1950) Ch. XI, "The Orphics," pp. 307-32. See also by the same author Orpheus and Greek Religion (London, 1935). The scholarly literature on the problem of Orpheus and Orphism is vast. Among the most accessible are William C. Greene, Moirai: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought (Cambridge, Ma., 1944, 1963), especially Ch. III "Orthodoxy and Mysticism," pp. 47-88; Pierre Boyance, Le culte des muses chez les philosophes grecques (Paris, 1937); Ivan M. Linforth, The Arts of Orpheus (Berkeley, 1941); Louis Loulinier, Orphée et l'orphisme à l'époque classique (Paris, 1955); Herbert S. Long, A Study of Metempsychosis in Greece from Pythagoras to Plato (Diss., Princeton, 1948); Jane E. Harrison, Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion (Cambridge, 1903), Chs. IX-XII, pp. 455-659; and Martin Nilsson, Opuscula (Lund, 1952) Vol. 2, pp. 628-83, "Early Orphism and Kindred Religious Movements."

22. Far and away the best discussion of this "sociological" aspect of early Greek philosophy is Walter Burkert, Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism (Cambridge, 1972) E.L. Minar, Jr., trans. Burkert's work amounts to a (re)discovery and reappraisal of the English "myth and ritual" interpreters of Greek literature - the so-called "Cambridge School" including Jane E. Harrison, Gilbert Murray, A.B. Cook and Francis M. Cornford. Burkert has acknowledged this legacy, and has indeed brought his enormous Germanic learning to its defense and elaboration, in his recent Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual (Berkeley & London, 1979). In the earlier work, however, Burkert is concerned with the intimate, confused relationship between Greek religious mysticism and the growth of rational science - a question which aligns him more with the interests of Francis Cornford than with any of the other members of the Cambridge School. Cornford's From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation (Cambridge, 1912) may safely be considered the first important attempt to gain insight into the origins and the content of Greek philosophy by using the analytical techniques provided by anthropology and sociology. See on Cornford, Geoffrey Morrison, "Λόγος γυνόμενος ; Francis Cornford's Philosophical Romance, From Religion to Philosophy" (unpublished). See Francis M. Cornford, "Mysticism and Science in the Pythagorean Tradition," 16 Classical Quarterly (1922) pp. 137-50 and 17 ibid. (1923) pp. 1-12; Principium Sapientiae: The Origins of Greek Philosophical Thought (Cambridge, 1952); Werner Jaeger, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers (Oxford, 1947); Charles H. Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology (New York, 1960); "Religion and Natural Philosophy in Empedocles' Doctrine of the Soul," 42 Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (1960) 180-87; G.S. Kirk

and J.E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts (Cambridge, 1957), Ch. 1, "The Forerunners of Philosophical Cosmogony," Section 5, "Orphic Cosmogonies," pp. 37-48; E.L. Minar, Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory (Baltimore, 1942); J.A. Philip, Pythagoras and Early Pythagoreanism (Toronto, 1966); J.E. Raven, Pythagoreans and Eleatics (Cambridge, 1948); Gregory Vlastos, "Theology and Philosophy in Early Greek Thought," 2 Philosophical Quarterly (1952) pp. 97-123.

23. See Francis M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato (New York & London, 1937), especially on "Circles in the World Soul" (Timaeus, 36B-D) pp. 72-93.

24. See Appendix B: 'Cyclical' Time in Modern Historiography.

25. See his The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (New York, 1972) Sian Reynolds, trans., Ch. 4 "Transhumance and Nomadism," pp. 85-102.

26. Liddell-Scott-Jones; see πέλω , πέλομαι .

27. Liddell-Scott-Jones; see εῖλω , etc.

28. See Appendix C: An Excursus on Greek Verbs Meaning 'To Be.'

29. Liddell-Scott-Jones; see πλανάω , πλάνος , ον .

30. Liddell-Scott-Jones; see ἐμπολαός , ον .

31. Liddell-Scott-Jones; see πωλέω , ἐμπολάω , etc.

32. See for example the uses by Sophocles and Herodotus of ἐξεμπολάω ; Philoctetes 303, Antigone 1036, and Histories II, 11; and the uses by Euripides and Xenophon of ἀπεμπολάω : Ion 131, Cyclops 257, and Symposium 8.21.

33. See Chantraine, πωλέω . For the semantic field of πωλέω see also Émile Benveniste, Indo-European Language and Society (London, 1973) E. Palmer, trans., pp. 108-12, 291; and for the fundamental notions of "give and take" which underlay the ancient Indo-European sense of "purchase and sale" see generally Section III, "Purchase." See also Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Function of Exchange in Archaic Societies (London & New York, 1954) I. Cunnison, trans.

34. Liddell-Scott-Jones, s.v. ἐμπόλησις .

35. A.W. Verrall, ed., Medea (London, 1883, 1926) "Notes," pp. 91-2.
36. R.C. Jebb, ed. and trans., Trachiniae (Cambridge, 1892) pp. 128-9.
37. "The Women of Trachis," Michael Jameson, trans., in David Green and Richmond Lattimore, eds., The Complete Greek Tragedies (Chicago, 1959) Vol. II, p. 309.
38. See Chantraine on τέλλομαι , τέλλω , τέλομαι , and τέλος , pp. 1101-03.
39. By far the most even-handed and judicious treatment of the whole range of immensely complicated questions of morphology and semantics presented by the Linear B texts is L.R. Palmer's The Interpretation of Mycenaean Greek Texts (Oxford, 1963) whose comprehensive bibliography, pp. 381-402, provides a sure guide to the history of the major controversies and dilemmas in the field up to the book's date of publication. The essential points of the Linear B problem are set out in John Chadwick and Michael Ventris, Documents in Mycenaean Greek: Three Hundred Selected Tablets from Knossos, Pylos, and Mycenae (Cambridge, 1956). Chadwick has written a brief account of the great linguistic achievement of his colleague Michael Ventris in The Decipherment of Linear B (Cambridge, 2nd ed., 1967), and Saul Levin has written a general critique of the Ventris-Chadwick method in The Linear B Decipherment Controversy Re-examined (New York, 1964). Palmer remains to this day, however, the surest guide to the subject.
40. Again, see Chantraine on τέλλω and τέλος . Liddell-Scott-Jones is clearly inadequate on this entire problem. All the entries under members of the *τελ group need to be re-written.
41. John Chadwick, The Mycenaean World (Cambridge, 1976), p. 86.
42. On the morphological problems presented by τέλσον see Chantraine, p. 1103.
43. For the evidence contra see V. Pisani, "Sul valore di telson ed oeka," 18 Athenaeum N.S. (1940) 3-10.
44. The best account in English of the role of athletics in Greek life, especially its religious aspect is E. Norman Gardiner's Greek Athletic Sports and Festivals (London, 1910). See also his Athletics of the Ancient World (Oxford, 1930), especially Ch. III, "Athletics and Homer," pp. 18-27.

Ch. IV, "Athletics and Religion," pp. 28-52, Ch. IX, "The Stadium and the Footrace," and Ch. XVII, "A Greek Athletic Festival," pp. 222-29; and Harold A. Harris, Greek Athletes and Athletics (London, 1964), especially Ch. 3, "Athletics in the Epic Tradition," pp. 48-63 and Ch. 4, "The Events of Greek Athletics - Running," pp. 64-77.

45. See Chantraine, s.v. τέλος and sources cited therein. For the fullest recent discussion see Z. Philip Ambrose, "The Homeric Telos," 43 Glotta (1965) pp. 38-61.

46. This was the line of argument pursued by M.A. Bayfield in his article "On Some Derivatives of Telos" in 15 Classical Review (1901) pp. 445-47. Bayfield was one of the first scholars to see that τέλος displayed some connection with the idea of "authority" and that accepted renderings of its derivatives like τελε(υ)ος as "accomplishment" or "religious rite" were insufficient.

47. See generally Marcel D  tienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society (Sussex, Eng., 1979), Ch. I, "The Plots of Cunning...Antilochus' Race," pp. 11-27.

48. Richmond Lattimore, trans., The Iliad of Homer (Chicago & London, 1951), p. 460.

49. In fact, a member of the *τελ group has followed precisely the same line of semantic development as τέλω not πέλωμαι. See πέλεθω in Liddell-Scott-Jones and Chantraine.

50. Liddell-Scott-Jones, s.v.  κατομβή.

51. See Hugh G. Evelyn-White, ed. and trans., "Theogony," line 544 in Hesiod, The Homeric Hymns and Homeric (London & New York, 1914, Loeb Classical Library), p. 97. Richmond Lattimore is not only more sensible but provides a nearly perfect compromise of meanings with his rendering..."Ocean the completely encircling river..." in his Hesiod (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1965), p. 137.

52. See generally the entries under "Oceanus" in Robert Graves, The Greek Myths (Harmondsworth, 1955) 2 vols., and the ancient sources cited therein.

53. See H.G. Evelyn-White, ibid., p. 403.

54. Discussion of these fundamental features in the conduct of Greek religious rituals must begin with Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City (1864; 1973), because he was

one of the first scholars to take seriously the minutiae of the rites. See especially Book I, Ch. III, "The Sacred Fire," Ch. IV, "The Domestic Religion"; Book III, Ch. II, "New Religious Beliefs," Ch. VI, "The Gods of the City," Ch. VII, "The Religion of the City," and Ch. VIII, "The Rituals and the Annals." For detailed descriptions of Greek cult practices, see generally Lewis Richard Farnell, The Cults of the Greek States (Oxford, 1896-1909) and F. Sokolowski, Lois sacrées des cités grecques (Paris, 1969).

55. Descriptions of the performances of the rites in the cults of Attica can be found in H.W. Parke, Festivals of the Athenians (Ithaca, 1977). For an account of the conduct of the Eiresione see Ch. 4, "Pyanepsion," pp. 73-94; the Bouphonia, Ch. 12 "Skirophorion," pp. 156-69, and the Dionysia, Ch. 9, "Elaphebolion," pp. 125-36. For the crucially important Dionysia see also J.-P. Guépin, The Tragic Paradox: Myth and Ritual in Greek Tragedy (Amsterdam, 1968), Ch. V, "Animal Sacrifice and the Dionysia," pp. 16-18; François Robert, Thymélé (Paris, 1939); A.W. Pickard-Cambridge, The Theatre of Dionysus at Athens (Oxford, 1946) and The Dramatic Festivals of Athens (Oxford, 1953). The view that a circular βάδισμα around the altar of a temple or sacred spot constitutes the very act of consecration is rendered conclusive by a report of the ancient commentator Euanthius on the origins of drama:

Comoedia fere vetus ut ipsa quoque tragoedia
simplex carmen, quemadmodum iam diximus, fuit,
quod chorus circa aras fumantes nunc spatiat,
nunc revolvens gyros, cum tibicine concinebat.

(in Guépin, The Tragic Paradox, cited above)

Evidence for the cult practices of other Greek states which bears on this point may be found in Farnell and Sokolowski, cited in Note 55. See also Arthur Bernard Cook, Zeus: A Study in Ancient Religion (Cambridge, 1914-1940) 3 vols.; John Boardman and D.C. Kurtz, Greek Burial Customs (New York, 1971); Joseph Fontenrose, Python: A Study of Delphic Myth and its Origins (Berkeley, 1959); Jane E. Harrison, Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion (Cambridge, 1903) especially Chs. 2 and 3; and Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion (Cambridge, 1912, 1927), especially Ch. 5, "Totemism, Sacrament and Sacrifice," and Ch. 6 "The Dithyramb, The Spring Festival and the Hagia Triada Sarcophagos"; G. Van Hoorn, Eleusis and the Eleusinian Mysteries (Princeton, 1961); Martin P. Nilsson, Greek Popular Religion (New York, 1941), Ch. 2 "Rural Customs and Festivals"; and R.F. Willets, Cretan Cults and Festivals (London, 1962).

56. On the parallels - sometimes amounting to analogues - between Greek and Mediterranean and Near Eastern cult practices see especially Theodor Gaster, Thespis: Ritual, Myth and Drama in the Ancient Near East (New York, 1950), and W. Warde Fowler, Roman Festivals (1899) and The Religious Experience of the Roman People (London, 1922). Cross-cultural studies are notoriously dangerous because they require expertise in all the areas in which comparisons are to be made and logical rigor in the criteria defining differences and similarities. Few scholars succeed at both. Two who have done better than most are Mircea Eliade and E.O. James. Although Eliade's work covers a vast field of concerns, drawing data from many non-Western as well as Western cultures, and ancient as well as modern and contemporary religions, his central interest is religious thought, especially myth. His central work is The Myth of the Eternal Return; or Cosmos and History (Princeton, 1954) W.R. Trask, trans. See also Myth and Reality (New York, 1963) W.R. Trask, trans., and The Sacred and the Profane; The Nature of Religion (New York, 1957) W.R. Trask, trans. James' concern, on the other hand, is with religious practices, with rites, rituals and performances and the similarities and differences between them. It is not too much of an oversimplification to say that whereas Eliade is a "functionalist" in his presentation of the "role" of myth-making in the human mind, James is a "structuralist" who is content to observe order and recurrent patterns in the conduct of religious performances. In this case the French and English intellectual proclivities are reversed. James' major works are Sacrifice and Sacrament (London, 1962); The Origins of Sacrifice (London, 1933); and Seasonal Festivals and Feasts (London, 1961). The twentieth-century concern with comparative histories of religion, and the particular methods such inquiries employ, would be unthinkable without James G. Frazer's encyclopedic The Golden Bough (Cambridge, 1890; 3rd ed., 1907-1913, 12 vols.). Whatever methodological naïveté Frazer's volumes may display, they still constitute a gold mine of basic information and observation on certain large patterns of recurring religious phenomena. Contemporary studies in the history of religion would not be where they are without him. Nevertheless, both his data and his methods have been often amended even if not exactly superceded. On any question, of method or substance, touching upon the comparative history of religions the intellectual historian must rely upon seven scholarly journals: they are Revue de l'Histoire des Religions, the Archiv für Religionswissenschaft, and its successor Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte (post-1948), The Journal of Religion and its successor The Review of Religion (post-1936), Numen: International Review for the History of Religions and its supplementary series, the Inter-

national Bibliography of the History of Religions.

57. See Appendix D: A Brief Comment on the Chadwick-Palmer Debate Over the Mycenaean tereta.

58. The best short account of the evidence for scapegoat ceremonies in the ancient Greek world is Walter Burkert, Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual (Berkeley & London, 1979) Ch. 3, "Transformations of the Scapegoat" pp. 59-83.

While anthropologists had for some time been informing the educated European public about such phenomena as the scapegoat ceremony in so-called "primitive" non-Western cultures, scholarly reports of similar social practices among the pious ancient Jews and glorious Greeks provoked shock, surprise, and embarrassment. Classical scholars joined the chorus of clerics in righteous indignation. The first such report, W. Robertson Smith's Lectures on the Religion of the Semites (Edinburgh, 1889) convinced Scottish university authorities that they had been justified for their earlier dismissal of Smith from the University of Edinburgh. Smith took refuge from the puritans in Cambridge, where it was fashionable to wink at apostasies from Christianity which were politely presented, but where any breach in the veneration of the sacred classical texts of Greece and Rome was barely tolerated. The academic howl which James G. Frazer, a friend and one-time disciple of Smith's at Cambridge, set off when he published the first edition of The Golden Bough in 1890 has only in the last two decades died down to a grumble. There remains, even in the 1980s, an antiquarian, filiopietistic strain among classicists - and even within the minds of otherwise sensible individuals - especially among those brought up at the knee of German philosophical idealism or British imperialism that cannot forgive anthropological debunking of "the glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome." See generally, James G. Frazer, The Golden Bough, Part IV, "The Scapegoat" (London, 1913), especially Ch. 3, pp. 152-54 and Ch. 4; Jane Harrison, Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion (Cambridge, 1903), Chs. 2 and 3 and Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion (Cambridge, 1912) especially Ch. 5 "Totemism, Sacrament and Sacrifice," pp. 118-57 and Ch. 7 "The Origin of the Olympic Games, a Chapter Contributed by F.M. Cornford," pp. 212-59; Gilbert Murray, The Rise of the Greek Epic (Oxford, 1907), pp. 11-15, 130-40 and Appendix A "The Pharmakoi and Human Sacrifice," pp. 317-21; Oliver R. Gurney, The Hittites (Harmondsworth, 1952) Ch. 7 "Religion," pp. 132-69; Max Pulver, "Jesus' Round Dance and Crucifixion According to the Acts of St. John," in Joseph Campbell, ed., Papers from the Eranos Year-books (New York, 1956) Vol. 2, pp. 169-93, especially at

p. 174ff.; Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger; An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (Harmondsworth, 1970); Proceedings of the XIth International Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions (Leiden, 1969) Vol. 2 "Guilt and Pollution and Rites of Purification," especially pp. 47-86; and Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Myth et tragedie en grèce ancienne (Paris, 1972), Ch. 6 "Chasse et sacrifice dans l'Orestie d'Eschyle" pp. 133-58; and J.-P. Guépin, The Tragic Paradox: Myth and Ritual in Greek Tragedy (Amsterdam, 1968).

59. On the general character of the scapegoat ceremony as a species of ritual sacrifice, see the now classic essay by Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, Sacrifice: Its Nature and Functions (Paris, 1898; London, 1964) W.D. Halls, trans., especially Ch. 3 "The General Functions of the Sacrifice" at p. 50. See also René Girard, Violence and the Sacred (Paris, 1972) P. Gregory, trans., Ch. 1 "Sacrifice" and Ch. 2 "The Sacrificial Victim," pp. 1-60; Mircea Eliade, From Primitives to Zen: A Thematic Sourcebook of the History of Religions (New York, 1967), Ch. 3 "Man and the Sacred," Section C, "Types of Sacrifice," pp. 201-28 on Greece and Rome; Jean Cazeneuve, Sociologie des rites, tabou, magie, sacré (Paris, 1971).

60. Wilhelm Mannhardt's Wald- und Feldkulte (Berlin, 1875-77) 2 vols. and Mythologische Forschungen (Strasbourg, 1884) remain the point of departure for any discussion of the survivals of pagan religion in early modern Europe. For the continuation of the scapegoat tradition despite the official conversion to Christianity see Pierre Riché, La vie quotidienne dans l'empire carolingien (Paris, 1973), Part IV, Ch. 1 "Les croyances et la tonalité religieuse," pp. 215-26 and William A. Chaney, The Cult of Kingship in Anglo-Saxon England: The Transition from Paganism to Christianity (Manchester, 1970), Ch. 3, "The Sacrificial King," pp. 86-120, especially pp. 113-20. The popularity of a kind of "domesticated" or "tamed" scapegoat ritual in the agricultural districts of Europe at least until the end of the eighteenth century constitutes one of the major discoveries (or perhaps "rediscoveries") of contemporary social historians, especially in France, who are following in the line of research on popular culture inaugurated by Michelet and exemplified by Burckhardt. See Emmanuel LeRoy Ladurie, The Peasants of Languedoc (Urbana, Ill., 1974) J. Day, trans., Part II, Ch. 5, "Witches, Sabbaths, and Revolts," pp. 203-10; Montaillon; The Promised Land of Error (New York, 1978) B. Bray, trans., Ch. 19, "Religion in Practice," pp. 306-30; and Carnivals in Romans (New York, 1979) M. Feeney, trans., Chs. 7 and 8, pp. 175-248; see also Peter Burke, Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe (New York,

1978) and Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic (New York, 1971).

61. See generally Burkert, Frazer, Harrison, and Guépin cited in Note 59.

62. J. Harrison follows the suggestion of R.A. Neil that a common root underlies the Greek πομπή and the Latin pontifex (from pons, etc.) and that the latter is a religious official who conducts πομπαί; Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion, p. 152. More specifically the pontifex is the leader of the ἐλάσις. But see Ernout-Meillet s.v. pons, pontis and Chantraine s.v. πέμπω for the etymological difficulties involved with these words.

63. See generally Burkert and Harrison cited in Note 59.

64. See generally Frazer, Burkert and Harrison cited in Note 59, and the Cornford and Murray contributions to Harrison's Themis.

65. Scholars have long realized that among all the possible functions of sacrifice in general the royal self-sacrifice was a major, if not precisely the essential, function of kingship in ancient and archaic communities. See Sydney H. Hook, ed., Myth, Ritual and Kingship: Essays on the Theory and Practice of Kingship in the Ancient Near East and Israel (Oxford, 1958) and Joseph Campbell, The Masks of God: Primitive Mythology (New York, 1959) Ch. 4, "The Promise of the Immolated Kings," pp. 151-69. See also I. Engnell, Studies in Divine Kingship in the Ancient Near East (Uppsala, 1945); E.E. Evans-Pritchard, The Divine Kingship of the Shilluk of the Nilotic Sudan (Cambridge, 1948); Henri Frankfort, Kingship and the Gods (Chicago, 1948); A.R. Johnson, Sacral Kingship in Ancient Israel (Cardiff, 1956); and the work of E.O. James on sacrifice and sacrament generally.

66. See Harrison, cited in Note 59 and Francis M. Cornford From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation (Cambridge, 1912). The thesis that the religious beliefs and practices of archaic and ancient peoples provided the images whose sublimated forms as metaphors and symbols coalesced into the systems of divine mythology and rational philosophy is the one enduring contribution of the so-called "myth and ritual" school of classical philology. The methodology and the "program" of this school has been formulated most systematically by the anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn in his "Myths and Rituals: A General Theory," XXXV Harvard Theological Review (1942) pp. 45-79. For a critical appraisal of the methodology and the program, at least in the field of "classics," see Joseph Fontenrose, The Ritual

Theory of Myth (Berkeley & London, 1971). Jane E. Harrison, the "Great-Mother" of the English branch of this school of thought, won a warm appreciation from a classical historian usually concerned with less (more?) esoteric subjects, like economics: see Moses I. Finley, The Use and Abuse of History (New York, 1971, 1975), Ch. 6, "Anthropology and the Classics," pp. 102-19.

67. See generally Michael Walzer, Regicide and Revolution: Speeches at the Trial of Louis XVI (London, 1974).

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Lexica, Commentaries, and Studies of Problems and Methods
- II Classical and Indo-European Historical Linguistics:
The History of Historical Linguistics
- III The History of Greek Religion and Its Relation to
Early Greek Philosophy
- IV Ancient Near Eastern Religion: The History of the
Institution of the Priest-King
- V The Idea of Revolution: Theories and Intellectual
Histories
- VI Modern Intellectual History: Problems and Methods
- VII The History of Astrology in Western Thought and Culture
- VIII Miscellaneous

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APPENDIX A

A BRIEF COMMENTARY WITH SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY ON LINGUISTICS, PSYCHOLINGUISTICS AND SOCIOLINGUISTICS

Noam Chomsky's theory of the "cyclical application of [grammatical] transformations," like many of the other notions of this philosopher of language is now undergoing intense review and criticism. The theory itself is presented in Language and Mind (New York, enlarged edition, 1972), Essay 3: "Linguistics Contributions: Present," pp. 24-64. See also Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Ma., 1965), Ch. 3 "Deep Structure and Grammatical Transformations," pp. 128-47; Topics in the Theory of Generative Grammar (The Hague, 1966), Ch. 3 "The Theory of Transformational Generative Grammar," pp. 51-75; and Studies on Semantics in Generative Grammar (The Hague, 1972), Ch. 3 "Deep Structure, Surface Structure, and Semantic Interpretation," pp. 62-119. Chomsky himself cites John R. Ross, On the Cyclic Nature of English Pronominalization (The Hague, 1967) as both inspiration and confirmation of his own theory. A general critique of the theory is offered by Gilbert Harman in his review of Language and Mind reprinted in Harman, ed., On Noam Chomsky: Critical Essays (New York, 1974), pp. 201-18. See also Ian Robinson, The New Grammarians' Funeral: A Critique of Noam Chomsky's Linguistics (Cambridge & New York, 1975). For a powerful critique of the ration-

alist strain in the discipline of linguistics as a whole see Roy Harris, The Language Myth (New York, 1981).

An overview of the relatively new field of "psycholinguistics" is offered by Charles E. and Helen S. Cairns, Psycholinguistics: A Cognitive View of Language (New York, 1976), especially Ch. 5 "Psycholinguistics as a Psychological Discipline," pp. 95-111; Eve V. and Herbert H. Clark, Psychology and Language: An Introduction to Psycholinguistics (New York, 1977), especially Ch. 14 "Language and Thought"; Hans Hormann, Psycholinguistics: An Introduction to Research and Theory (Berlin, 1971), H.H. Stern, trans., especially Ch. 8 "The Philosophical Background to Modern Psycholinguistics," pp. 148-63 and Ch. 15 "The Influence of Language on Man's View of the World"; Joseph H. Kess, Psycholinguistics: Introductory Perspectives (New York & London, 1976), especially Ch. 2 "Theoretical Foundations," pp. 11-45, and Ch. 5 "Language and Society," pp. 105-31; Ch. 4 "Language, Culture, Thought, and Universality," pp. 81-103 contains a brief and lucid review of the central debate over whether language is primarily determined by culture (the so-called Sapir/Whorf hypothesis) or by genetics (Piaget/Vygotsky theory of linguistic universals) - the newest round in the ancient debate over "nature or nurture." Sol Sapota and Jarvis R. Bastian, eds., Psycholinguistics: A Book of Readings (New York, 1961); and Insup Taylor, Introduction to Psycholinguistics (New York, 1976).

There is very little consensus in the field of psycholinguistics because it contains all the ideological "fault lines" inherited from its two parents who were, and remain today, deeply divided over questions of method and aim.

Consequently, the character of any book in the field depends immediately on the psychological and linguistic biases held by the practitioner, and the answers to the great question concerning the function of language to the human individual and the human group are as various as the possible combinations of schools of psychology and schools of linguistics. The history of this subject is truly labyrinthine. See Julia M. Penn, Linguistic Relativity Versus Innate Ideas: The Origins of the Sapir-Whorf Hypotheses in German Thought (The Hague, 1972); Rik Pinxter, ed., Universalism Versus Relativism in Language and Thought: Proceedings of a Colloquium on the Sapir-Whorf Hypotheses (The Hague, 1976); Klaus Riegel and George C. Rosenwald, eds., Structure and Transformation: Developmental and Historical Aspects (New York, 1975), especially Ch. 1., K.F. Riegel, "Structure and Transformation in Modern Intellectual History," pp. 3-24; Ch. 7, A.L. Blumenthal, "Psycholinguistics: Some Historical Issues," pp. 135-52; Ch. 10, Wilbur A. Hass, "Pragmatic Structure of Language: Historical, Formal and Developmental Issues," pp. 193-214; James H. Starn, Inquiries into the Origin of Language: The Fate of a Question (New York & London, 1976); and Ch. 1 above, Note 8 with bibliography on

the history of historical linguistics. With the modern scholarly fad for specialization we now see emerging the even newer sub-disciplines of "sociolinguistics" and "linguistic anthropology." See M.A.K. Halliday, Language as Social Semiotic: The Social Interpretation of Language and Meaning (London, 1978), especially Ch. 1 "The Sociolinguistic Perspective," pp. 3-59, and Ch. 2, "A Sociosemiotic Interpretation of Language," pp. 60-100; R.A. Hudson, Sociolinguistics (Cambridge & London, 1980), especially Ch. 3 "Language, Culture, Thought," pp. 73-105; Charles E. Osgood, William H. May, and Murray S. Miron, Cross-Cultural Universals of Affective Meaning (Urbana, Ill., 1975), especially Ch. 7 "Issues in Method and Theory," pp. 335-414; Gillian Sankoff, The Social Life of Languages (London, Eng., 1980); E.W. Ardener, ed., Social Anthropology and Language (London, 1971), especially Ardener, "Social Anthropology and the Historicity of Historical Linguistics," pp. 209-41; B.N. Colby, Ethnographic Semantics: A Preliminary Survey, 7 Current Anthropology (1966), pp. 3-32; Malcolm Crick, Explorations in Language and Meaning: Towards a Semantic Anthropology (New York, 1976); Ernest Gellner, Words and Things (Harmondsworth, 1968); J. Gumperz and Dell Hymes, eds., Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethnography of Communication (New York, 1972); H. Henson, British Social Anthropologists: A History of Separate Development (Oxford, 1974); Dell Hymes, "Notes Toward a History of Anthropological

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Hundred Years of Anthropology (Cambridge, Ma., 1968), pp.
153-264.

APPENDIX B

'CYCLICAL' TIME IN MODERN HISTORIOGRAPHY

The only even close to adequate discussion of the scholarly debate on this subject is Arnolfo Momigliano, "Time in Ancient Historiography," in his Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography (Middletown, Conn., 1977), pp. 179-204. The debate began in earnest, as Momigliano points out, not among historians properly speaking, but among twentieth-century Christian theologians who were anxious to find essential differences between the "mind of Israel" and the "mind of Hellas" in an effort to establish the cultural distinctiveness of the Bible and the biblical tradition - even in its Greek New Testament. This intellectual program of so-called neo-orthodox theologians attempted to find fundamental differences in ideas between Greece and Israel: the idea of time was just one of those ideas. What Momigliano does not appreciate, however, is why the theologians so easily and quickly focused on time as a central idea distinguishing Hebrews from Hellenes. The explanation for that would require a special study on the antiquarian interest in ancient and medieval number mysticism, and indeed in the mystic nature of mathematics generally during those periods. The geometric circle remained, from the dawn of mathematics to the dawn of modern astronomy more a religious than a philosophical conception. The neo-

orthodox Christian theologians were in the direct line of intellectual descent from their Christian forebears whose interest in astrology and the occult was, especially in the period 1450-1750, intimately connected with their orthodox and "official" mysticism. The twentieth century debate is merely the latest round in that perennial fascination Christians have felt for their one-time rivals and long-time enemies, the pagan - and especially the classical pagan - mystics. Among those works which assert the centrality of "cyclical thinking" in the ancient pagan world see A. Cornelius Benjamin, "Ideas of Time in the History of Philosophy," in J.T. Frazer, ed., The Voices of Times (New York, 1966), pp. 8-15; Émile Brehier, "Quelques Traites de la Philosophie de l'Histoire dans l'Antiquité Classique," XIV Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuse (Strasbourg, 1934) at p. 40; François Chatelet, La Naissance de l'Histoire (Paris, 1962); Oscar Cullman, Christ and Time (Philadelphia, 1950) F.F. Filson, trans.; T.Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek (London, 1960); Tom F. Driver, The Sense of History in Greek and Shakespearian Drama (New York, 1960), especially Ch. 2 "Hellenic Historical Consciousness: The Equilibrium of Nature," pp. 19-38; Erich Frank, Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth (New York, 1945) especially pp. 67ff.; Bernhard A. van Gröningen, In the Grip of the Past (Leiden, 1953); W.K.C. Guthrie, In the Beginning: Some Greek Views of the Origins of Life and the Early State of

Man (London, 1957), Ch. 5 "Cycles of Existence," pp. 63-79; Karl Löwith, Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History (Chicago, 1949), especially Ch. 9 on St. Augustine's rebuttal of (alleged) pagan cyclical theory, pp. 160-73; Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History (London, 1949); Henri-Claude Puech, "Gnosis and Time," in Ralph Manheim, trans., Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks (New York, 1956) Vol. 2, pp. 38-84; Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of History (New York, 1936); Stephen E. Toulmin and June Goodfield, The Discovery of Time (London 1965); and Z. Zarwinski, L'Évolution de la Notion du Temps.

Besides Momigliano's essay cited above, the only other scholar seriously to question the view that the ancients possessed a generally cyclical conception of time is James Barr in his Biblical Words for Time (London, 1962) especially Ch. 2 "The Current Contrast of Greek and Hebrew Thought," pp. 8-20.

The present study necessarily but reluctantly supports the majority opinion. Necessarily, because the ancient Greeks (and Romans later) did in fact possess a cyclical view of time - after the rise of philosophy and the renewed contact with Mesopotamia which marked the beginning of the Hellenistic Age. Cyclical views of time were clearly becoming fashionable after the turn of the third century B.C. Reluctantly, because the majority are simply wrong in their account of how and when cyclical thinking became common

among the Greeks. Such thinking was late in the classical Greek world: it was still a novelty with Aeschylus as this study shows. Thinking with circular or revolutionary images was, however, virtually pre-historic; and such imagery came to pervade every area of Greek life before it was borrowed by the philosophers for their cosmological purposes. In short, time was the last conception in Greek thought to be "taken over" by revolutionary or circular imagery. The majority in the debate over the question of "cyclical thinking" about time is right - for the wrong reasons; the minority is wrong on the question, but right in its criticism of the majority. From such paradoxes scholarly progress is slowly made.

APPENDIX C

AN EXCURSUS ON GREEK VERBS MEANING 'TO BE'

One of the great unwritten chapters in the history of Western thought is how our notion of "being," which in its intellectual development is an elaboration of the Greek εἶμι (sum) and the Latin esse, prevailed over other notions of "being" in the ancient world. The fact is that the Greek εἶμι (sum) is only one among at least four words which we translate as "to be"; the others are πέλεσθαι , τρέπεσθαι , and τέλεθειν . What is crucial to that unwritten history is that only εἶμι (sum) does not possess an image of turning or revolving in its base. For the vast majority of Greeks before the rise of philosophy - and among the uneducated for long after that - "being" was regularly conceived as movement, and especially as movement of a rotating or circular kind. The poets preserve the memory of this way of thinking. Πέλεσθαι , τρέπεσθαι , and τέλεθειν were certainly linguistic archaisms in the classical fifth and fourth centuries, appropriate only for drama and lyric poetry, but just as with Shakespeare and Milton for modern English speakers, what are quaint archaisms to contemporaries were common usage in an earlier day. Εἶμι (sum) has no semantic priority in Homer or Hesiod, and is only slightly more important than the other words meaning to be in later poets. We must conclude that "archaic Greeks" conceived

of "being" very differently from their descendants in the fifth and later centuries. Why did εἶμι (sum) prevail over the other verbs? The answer lies of course in the birth of philosophy in the sixth century and the rise of prose writing in the fifth. Εἶμι (sum) was chosen by Anaximander and the later cosmological philosophers precisely because it was the one verb which was void of any suggestion of movement. The choice was dictated by the philosophical project itself: the claim that there existed things (or ideas) which are real because they are unchanging would hardly prosper if the very word used to convey the claim contained an image of movement. Εἶμι (sum) displaced the more commonly used archaic πέλεσθαι , τρέπεσθαι , and τέλεθειν because the philosophers were trying to purge language itself - especially the philosophic language - of any words which would connect "being" or "reality" with "movement" or "change." Plato was, of course, the culmination of this process; and all later philosophy, including political philosophy, has found it next to impossible to imagine a sense of being different from that inherited from Plato. And it is certainly a tribute to Plato's success, and of the intellectual power - I am tempted to say tyranny - of Western philosophy generally that it has so regularly, generation after generation, bewitched its practitioners that they fail to see that the philosophical notion of "being" was something of a novelty among the older conceptions; later it

had usurped the role of the commoner "revolutionary" images of "being."

Practitioners of philosophy may be forgiven their loyalty to the founder, but historians ought to have displayed a more critical acumen. They have not. Histories of Western thought talk about the pre-socratic philosophers, Plato, and Aristotle as if they were representatives of the majority of Greek thought. This has been one of the great, and perennial, mistakes of modern Western historiography. These philosophers were in a dissenting relationship to their societies; they were so far from being representative of it that we may even claim the opposite: they were its subverters. That is the core of truth behind all the lies leveled against Socrates. The "tradition" from Pythagoras to Plato is not a Greek tradition of thought: it is the first "Western" tradition. In modern times only Nietzsche has appreciated this fact about the relationship of Greek philosophy to Greek culture. Historians in the last decade of the twentieth century are just beginning to catch up with him. See generally, The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music (1872).

APPENDIX D

A BRIEF COMMENT ON THE CHADWICK-PALMER DEBATE OVER THE MYCENAEAN TERETA

Τέλος and τελετή meaning "rite" or "sacred ceremony" lead one to suspect that there may be a noun of agency meaning "the man who conducts the τέλος or τελετή," or simply, "priest." Such a word in fact exists: it is τελεστής which Liddell-Scott-Jones render, not surprisingly, as "initiating priest," "initiator," or "priest." The problem with thus connecting semantically τελεστής with τέλος and τελετή is that while the latter must be far older than Homer (supra pp. 113-16) the former is both rare and late in its usages. There is only one instance of its use before the Christian era, on an Elean inscription of the sixth century B.C., and it is limited to the attending officials of the Eleusian Mysteries and the related cults of Dionysus. Such τελεσταί were among the favorite targets of the early Christian apologists. The etymological connection would appear, then, strained at best.

Still, it has been made, and made by no less an authority than John Chadwick and in the context of a very important philological issue. In Mycenaean Linear B there appears the word te-re-ta which is morphologically equivalent to the later Greek τελεστής. Chadwick and Michael Ventris had first rendered the word as "baron," but later, when

that proved too misleading, Chadwick followed the suggestion of W.E. Brown ("Land Tenure in Mycenaean Pylos," 5 Historia [1956] pp. 385-400) and adopted the rendering of te-re-ta as "initiating priest" ("Potnia," 5 Minos [1957] pp. 109-11). The Brown-Chadwick rendering has been criticized by L.R. Palmer who quite understandably wondered "if it is legitimate to project so late and peculiar a usage of the word τελεστής into the second millenium B.C.," and reminding his colleagues that "in the determination and identification of this word we must...insist upon [the] basic methodological point that diagnosis through textual analysis must precede the ransacking of the lexicon for possible equivalents." (The Interpretation of Mycenaean Texts [Oxford, 1963] pp. 193, 191).

Chadwick and Brown may indeed have committed a philological faux pas in their eagerness to find continuity between Linear B and later Greek, but Palmer himself confused the matter further by offering an explanation of te-re-ta which radically and unnecessarily isolates the word and severs it from possible semantic connections with later members of the Greek family of τέλος . All agree that te-re-ta must mean "the man of the τέλος ," (Palmer, pp. 192-95), but Palmer proceeds to render it more specifically as "the man of the (divine) service" and to connect that elaboration with the postulated *τελ₂ Indo-European root which is supposed to produce the Greek root *τλάω and the

infinitive τέλλειν . Thus Palmer semantically connects te-re-ta to the idea of "to hold" or "to uphold" with the additional connotations of "to bear" and "to suffer." His ground for making this suggestion is the context of te-re-ta in the Mycenaean tablets. Since te-re-ta is apparently a type of "lessee," usually of land but not necessarily, who enjoys a status halfway between slaves, do-e-ro-i ("dedicated persons") and the ranks of nobility, the various e-ge-ta-i, Palmer concludes that te-re-ta designates someone who holds a responsibility or obligation to members of the classes both below and above him.

This explanation is at once ingenious, plausible, and unnecessary. The present study of revolutionary imagery in Greek, and the pages devoted to τέλος in particular, point to a more plausible explanation of te-re-ta which both preserves Palmer's "sociological" insights from the context of the tablets and dispenses with the need to connect te-re-ta with the postulated *τελ₂. Even if we grant Palmer's sociological explanation of te-re-ta as a term related to "tenant farming" and land holding, his rendering makes the word far too abstract and sophisticated - even legalistic - in light of the relatively simple and concrete words in the Mycenaean vocabulary. It is doubtful at least if any of the Mycenaean words is as intellectually sophisticated as Palmer makes out te-re-ta to be. Given the "primitiveness" of these texts and their "shopping list"

character, it is far more likely that te-re-ta is connected with a simple and concrete image taken from daily life and experience. Is it not more plausible that the word is connected semantically with *τελ₁ and means simply "the man who goes round about" some business? Palmer himself insists that the word is not confined in use to land tenure and farming, although that usage is naturally dominant in an agricultural society. We may conclude, then, that the Mycenaean te-re-ta and the later Greek τελεστής originally meant "one who goes round about his business," whatever that business may have been. It was a term of "occupational livelihood" much like those designating the types and ranks of tradesman in the European medieval guild system. (One immediately recalls the large number of Greek compounds of -πολος, such as ἀμφιπόλος, which mean "to go round about in service or attendance" (see supra, pp. 100-12). Furthermore, we may hazard the guess that the conspicuous semantic differences between the members of the *πελ- and the *τελ- word-groups in later Greek express an ancient underlying class distinction. Whereas nouns of agency in the former group, like ἀμφιπόλος or θυηπόλος usually designate someone in the slave or servant class, or in the case of military and religious life in the position of attendants or subordinates, the adjectives in the latter group (there are no nouns of agency) generally describe someone in a position of authority or power (see supra pp. 117-44).

Let us now admit Palmer's "sociological" explanation of the class status of the te-re-ta. Could it be that he was in Mycenaean times a "freeman" engaged in his occupation, while the later Greek ἀμειπόλος or θυηπόλος was a slave, servant, or subordinate of some kind who was legally required to attend upon the Greek equivalent of the te-re-ta-i and the e-ge-ta-i? Could it be that the Mycenaean word, te-re-ta, has dropped out of the language of Homer's day under the pressures of time and radically changing social circumstances? In any event, if, as Palmer maintains, the te-re-ta is "the man of the τέλος," who is engaged in some (legally recognized) occupation, usually connected with agriculture, we are led irresistibly to recall the agricultural τέλσον of later Greek, and more specifically, the scene on the shield of Achilles where the archaic Greek farmers are portrayed as:

as they perform the tasks required by their respective occupations. It is a distinct pattern of movement open to observation. Once again, it is the visible spatial image which semantically unites these two members of the *τελ - group. The tenant farmer went around his fields with his team of oxen and plow; the much later τελεστής went round about the τελεστεῖον when he initiated the τελοῦμενοι into the saving knowledge of the sacred mysteries at Eleusis (cf. Plato, Phaedrus, 249 c).

