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Perceiving justice and locating causality : the effects of outcome valence, perspective, and privilegedness.

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<https://doi.org/10.7275/gjht-9w90> https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1483

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PERCEIVING JUSTICE AND LOCATING CAUSALITY:
THE EFFECTS OF OUTCOME VALENCE, PERSPECTIVE, AND PRIVILEGEDNESS

A Dissertation Presented

by

Richard Paul Mack

Submitted to the Graduate School

of the

University of Massachusetts

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 1977

Department of Psychology

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
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
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
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
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A B S T R A C T

Perceiving Justice and Locating Causality: The Effects of Outcome Valence, Perspective, and Privilegedness

(May, 1977)

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The purpose of this study was to examine different questions related to the notion that people are perceived as typically getting what they deserve. More specifically, respondents were asked to estimate the likelihood that people receive deserved (just) and undeserved (unjust) outcomes. It was also examined whether these estimates were affected by the desirableness of the outcome (desirable vs undesirable), the perspective of the respondents (oneself as the recipient vs someone else as the recipient), and the privilegedness of the respondents (students from two exclusive colleges vs disadvantaged people of Hispanic origin).

Three hypotheses were considered: the just world, self-serving, and hedonistic justice hypotheses. The just world hypothesis predicts that only the deservingness of the outcome will effect the estimates made by the respondents. The self-serving hypothesis predicts that both the desirableness and to whom the outcomes happen influence the likelihood estimates. Finally, the hedonistic justice

hypothesis contends that the deservingness of the outcome, its desirableness, and to whom it happens, all have an effect on the estimates made by the respondents.

The data were collected by questionnaires. In addition to the likelihood estimates of the various types of outcomes indicated above, a second section of the questionnaire obtained measures of causal attributions. These attribution measures indicate the degree to which respondents perceive outcomes as being caused by the recipient himself or by some external agent.

In general, the results demonstrate that people are perceived as more often getting what they deserve than not getting what they deserve, regardless of whether the outcomes are desirable or undesirable. Females report themselves as more likely than others to get what they deserve, while males do not differ across perspectives. Although both the privileged and underprivileged respondents do not differ on their estimates of the occurrence of deserved outcomes, the underprivileged respondents report undeserved outcomes as more likely to occur than do privileged respondents. In general, causal attributions were more often made to personal than to environmental sources. Finally, those respondents that perceive people as highly likely to get what they deserve are more likely to make personal attributions of causality than respondents who perceive people as less likely getting what they deserve.

It was concluded that neither the just world, self-serving, nor hedonistic justice hypotheses could readily account for the results. Instead, it was suggested that people may be motivated to

perceive control over their outcomes, rather than motivated to perceive their outcomes as necessarily deserved or desirable. Also, discussed are sex differences, deservingness as a moral and psychological issue, and possible ways to improve upon the present study.

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

	<u>Page</u>
ABSTRACT	iv
LIST OF TABLES	ix
LIST OF FIGURES	x
 CHAPTER	
I INTRODUCTION	1
II PERCEIVED JUSTICE: A CRITICAL REVIEW	7
The "Just World" Hypothesis	7
The Self-serving Hypothesis	17
III THE HEDONISTIC JUSTICE HYPOTHESIS	23
Limitations of Previous Research	23
The Hedonistic Justice Hypothesis	24
Do Privileged and Underprivileged People Differ in their Perceptions	29
IV EXPERIMENTAL PREDICTIONS	31
Predictions from the Just World Hypothesis	32
Predictions from the Self-serving Hypothesis	33
Predictions from the Hedonistic Justice Hypothesis	35
V METHOD	39
Respondents	39
Experimental Design	40
Construction of Items and Questionnaires	41
Independent Manipulation of Types of Events	44
English and Spanish Questionnaire Versions	46
General Procedure	47
VI RESULTS	49
Background Characteristics	49
Perceived Likelihood of Outcomes	52
Locus of Causality	66

CHAPTER

	<u>Page</u>
VII DISCUSSION	75
The Deservingness and Desirability of Outcomes	76
Recipients of Outcomes	78
Perceiving Control through Perceiving Justice	83
Self-interest Versus Morality	
Methodological Considerations and Future Research.	95
REFERENCES	101
APPENDICES	105
FOOTNOTES	139

LIST OF TABLES

<u>TABLE</u>	<u>Page</u>
1. Personal Characteristics of Privileged and Underprivileged Respondents	50
2. Summary of Analysis of Variance for the Perceived Likelihood of Justness and Valence according to the Respondents' Perspective, Sex, and Privilegedness . . .	53
3. Mean Perceived Likelihood of the Justness and Valence of Outcomes	54
4. Mean Perceived Likelihood of Just and Unjust Events with Positive and Negative Outcomes	56
5. Mean Perceived Likelihood of Just and Unjust Outcomes for Privileged and Underprivileged Respondents	63
6. Mean Perceived Likelihood of Outcomes across Valence, Sample, and Perspective	64
7. Summary of Analysis of Variance for Attributions of Causality	65
8. Mean Locus of Causality Scores for Actors and Observers for Positive and Negative Outcomes	68
9. Mean Locus of Causality Scores for PJ Ranks, Valence of Outcomes, and Respondent's Privilegedness	70
10. Correlations between Perceived Justice (PJ) and Locus of Causality (LOC) Scores	72
11. Mean Locus of Causality Scores for Males and Females across Valence of Outcomes	73

LIST OF FIGURES

<u>FIGURE</u>		<u>Page</u>
1.	Conditions Defining Perceived Justice and Injustice . . .	3
2.	Eight Types of Justice-relevant Situations	5
3.	Perceived Likelihood of Just and Unjust Events by Actors and Observers	58
4.	Perceived Likelihood of Just and Unjust Events across Actors and Observers and Males and Females	59
5.	Perceived Likelihood of Just and Unjust Events with Positive and Negative Outcomes by Males and Females . . .	61
6.	Locus of Causality for Male and Female Respondents across Actor and Observer Perspectives	71

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Justice and injustice are of personal importance to the lives of all people, everyday, and not only to those who occupy legal, political, or philosopher roles. Issues of justice and injustice are debated on the streets, at work, in the courts and on the floor of the Senate. The concern is whether or not people get what they deserve; do considerate people have their considerations returned or are they taken advantage of and abused? Does the hard worker receive his due promotion or is he passed by because the boss has a nephew who needs employment?

It seems obvious that our perceptions of the world as a just or unjust place should have an impact upon the way we think, the feelings we experience, and how we interact with those around us. Thus, perceptions of the world as a just or unjust place may effect not only the private experiences of the individual, but also the public arena of interpersonal relations. Before addressing specific issues, however, let us define what we mean by justice and injustice from a social psychological perspective.

Working Definitions of Perceived Justice and Injustice

In its most general form, perceived justice refers to a situation when an individual is perceived as getting what he deserves and/or deserving of what he gets (cf. Lerner, 1970). Injustice, then, is

represented by a situation when the individual is perceived as not getting what he deserves and/or not deserving of what he gets.

According to these definitions, it is important to note that just and unjust outcomes are not merely represented by positive and negative consequences respectively. That is, positive outcomes are not always just and negative outcomes are not always unjust. In order for an outcome to be classified as either just or unjust one must consider the context within which that outcome occurs; the context being the "input" associated with the outcome. Figure 1 specifies two general conditions of perceived justice and injustice.

This figure indicates that when a person's input is favorably evaluated (e.g., one's "kindness") and the outcome received by that person is positive (e.g., another's "gratitude"), the situation is perceived as just. Likewise, an unfavorably evaluated input (e.g., one's "unkindness") associated with a negative outcome (e.g., another's "resentment") is also perceived as just. In contrast, injustice is perceived when the evaluation of the input is favorable (e.g., "kindness") but the outcome is negative (e.g., "resentment") or when the input is unfavorably evaluated (e.g., "unkindness") but the outcome is positive (e.g., "gratitude").

In the present paper, a just outcome is defined as one in which the person is perceived as getting what he deserves and/or deserving of what he gets--an appropriate alignment between the input and the outcome. On the other hand, an unjust outcome is defined as one in which the person is perceived as not getting what he deserves and/or not

deserving of what he gets—an inappropriate alignment between the input and the outcome.¹

Statement of the Problem

It is contended that social psychology has examined perceived justice from a narrow, and perhaps over-simplified perspective. Systematic theorizing about perceived justice has been largely limited to research situations involving (a) injustice, with (b) negative outcomes, (c) for some other person, as perceived by an outside observer. Conspicuously little attention has been given to situations that are (a) just, (b) have positive outcomes, or which (c) happen to oneself.

It is felt that by examining a larger variety of situations a more accurate assessment of current theorizing can be made. Further, an appreciation for the potential complexities involved in perceiving justice and injustice should become more salient.

In the present study eight types of situations are explored by varying (a) the Justness of the situation (just or unjust outcomes); (b) the Valence of the situation (positive or negative outcomes); and (c) the Perspective on the situation (actor or observer) (see Figure 2). "Justness" here refers to the deservingness of the outcome. "Valence" pertains to the desirability of the outcomes. Finally, "Perspective" describes the viewer's point of reference; either looking at one's own situation (the actor's perspective), or at someone else's situation (the observer's perspective).

Two samples are also compared in the present study. One sample consists of college students, which, for the most part, represent a

P e r s p e c t i v e	Types of Outcome			
	Just		Unjust	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
Actor (self)				
Observer (other)				

Figure 2. Eight types of justice-relevant situations

relatively privileged sector of the American population. The other sample consists of members of a disadvantaged minority group which has not typically enjoyed the same privileges as the college students. This comparison is a check on previous research which had employed almost exclusively college students (cf. Rubin and Peplau, 1975).

Finally, the relationship between perceiving justice and making attributions of responsibility is examined. In spite of the fact that these two processes seem tied together (see Chapter II), little if any systematic work has been done on this relationship.

To summarize, the theorizing on perceived justice seems to take too narrow a viewpoint. The present research systematically manipulates the Justness, Valence, and Perspective of situations; hopefully providing a more comprehensive analysis of perceived justice. Two samples are compared to examine the generalizability of social psychological theorizing, as well as the possibility of previous results being an artifact of the sample employed. Finally, the relationship between perceiving justice and perceiving responsibility is examined.

C H A P T E R I I

PERCEIVED JUSTICE: A CRITICAL REVIEW

This chapter critically reviews the literature on perceived justice. In the review both theoretical and empirical literatures are discussed. The theoretical positions are stated, their pertinent research reviewed, and their limitations highlighted.

The "Just World" Hypothesis

Do people believe they live in a "just world" or an "unjust world?" In other words, do people believe they usually get what they deserve, or do they believe they are recipients of arbitrary and change outcomes? Lerner (1965, 1970, 1974, and 1975) and his associates (Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lerner & Matthews, 1967; and Simmons & Lerner, 1968) have attempted to answer these types of questions. From their work, they have proposed that people have a "need" to believe in a "just world." Lerner (1970) suggests:

We want to believe we live in a world where people get what they deserve or, rather deserve what they get. We want to believe that good things happen to good people and serious suffering comes only to bad people. In the same vein, we want to believe that people who work hard will get what they deserve, what they have earned and worked for . . . if . . . [unjust] things can happen, what is the use of struggling, planning, and working to build a secure future for oneself and family? No matter how strongly our belief in an essentially just world is threatened by such incidents, most of us try to maintain it in order to continue facing the irritations and struggles of daily life. This is a belief we cannot afford to give up if we are to continue to function (p. 207).

How does this "need" develop? According to Lerner (1971), children are socialized to develop "personal contracts" to forego small immediate gratifications for larger ones at a future time. This willingness to delay, however, must be based on the belief the individual will indeed eventually receive the larger gratifications. That is, in order for the "personal contract" to be viable, the individual must come to believe that people get what they deserve. Since an adult's life presumably requires many incidents of delaying gratifications, it becomes important to believe that people get what they deserve.

To perceive an "unjust world" is threatening. By perceiving the outcomes that others receive as deserved, there is a "consensual validation" of one's own belief that the world is indeed a "just" place. Thus, when confronted with an instance of injustice, and the opportunity to restore "actual" justice is not available, the individual is motivated to cognitively distort the situation to at least perceive it as just. This distortion process results in people being perceived as getting what they deserve (i.e., an appropriate alignment of inputs and outcomes).

By holding the belief in a "just world," people provide a predictable quality to their lives. There is a sense of security in knowing that what one deserves, one is likely to receive. Such a belief also implies that people have some control over their fates. Through correct actions people receive desired outcomes, and for having good intentions they are rewarded. Similarly, incorrect actions result in failure, and those with unkind intentions suffer for their iniquity.

Evidence supporting the "just world" hypothesis. Does the research indicate that outcomes are typically perceived as deserved? Do people distort their perceptions in order to perceive inputs and outcomes as appropriately aligned? Are the "just world" predictions true under certain conditions but not true under others? Attempts will be made to answer these and similar types of questions throughout this chapter.

In order for inputs and outcomes to be perceived as appropriately aligned, the "just world" (JW) hypothesis predicts that recipients of positive outcomes should be evaluated more favorably than recipients of negative outcomes. Lerner (1965) had subjects observe two people working on a joint task. These observers were informed that one of the two "workers" had been arbitrarily selected to be paid money, while the other worker would get nothing. The observers were also told the "workers" were unaware of any payments. In spite of the arbitrary assignment (i.e., neither necessarily deserved their outcomes) of who would be paid, the observers rated the paid worker as more creative and as exerting greater effort on the task than the unpaid worker.

Other research has shown that when observers were unable to alter the undeserved-negative outcomes of victims, those victims were derogated (Lerner & Simmons, 1966). This derogation of victims occurred even when the observers themselves had previously been treated unjustly (Simmons & Lerner, 1968). Lincoln and Levinger (1972) demonstrated that when observers believed they could improve the fate of a victim,

the victim's rating was enhanced. But again, when observers believed they could not improve the victim's fate, devaluation of the victim occurred.

The perceived alignment of inputs and outcomes is achieved not only by enhancing and devaluing recipients of positive and negative outcomes respectively, but also by attributing behavioral antecedents as inputs. According to Lerner (1975, p. 5) ". . . people can 'deserve' outcomes in at least two ways: by what they do--their behavior--or by who they are--their personal attributes." Lerner and Matthews (1967) found that when observers were provided with a behavioral explanation for the victim's misfortune, there was no devaluation of the victim's character. In other words, with the behavioral cause available, the situation was already perceived as just (i.e., the outcome was already aligned with the behavioral input) and there was no need to seek a characterological explanation for the outcome the victim received.

Accidents are threatening situations; they are laden with uncertainty and unpredictability. To reduce threats of unpredictability, and to perceive inputs and outcomes as aligned, the JW hypothesis suggests that accident victims should be perceived as responsible for their misfortunes. Walster (1966) found that victims of accidents were often held as responsible for what happened to them. Furthermore, in her study, she found a tendency to assign more responsibility as the severity of the accident's outcome increased. Shaver (1970) failed to find more responsibility with "severe" than with "mild" accidental outcomes, but consistent with cultural expectations, older victims were

perceived as more responsible than younger victims. Walster's (1966) results, however, were replicated by Phares and Wilson (1972). These authors reported greater attributions of responsibility with "severe" accidents than with "mild" accidents, and, reasonably enough, more responsibility was assigned when the person was clearly the cause of the accident than when the situation was ambiguously described.

To summarize, the research reported in this section appears to support the proposition that individuals tend to perceive people as deserving what they get. That is, characterological and behavioral inputs were aligned with the recipient's outcomes. The above research, however, represents only one of several types of situations. With the exception of one study (Lerner, 1965), the above situations had observers responding with respect to others who were the recipients of negative outcomes. Several important questions remain. Would we find comparable results if the others were recipients of positive rather than negative outcomes? What if oneself was the recipient? Would people align their own inputs with their own outcomes? Would this alignment take place for negative as well as positive outcomes? The next section addresses itself to these questions.

Evidence inconsistent with the "just world" hypothesis. The literature shows inconsistent results when observers view others receiving undeserved-positive outcomes. Recall, Lerner (1965) reported that observers rated the paid worker as more creative and exerting more effort on the task than the unpaid worker. Thus, both workers were perceived as getting what they deserved. A study by Shaw and

Skolnick (1971), however, found different results. Their study indicated that observers of accidents involving positive outcomes for the recipients were less likely to attribute responsibility for those positive outcomes, than were observers of accidents involving negative outcomes. Apsler and Friedman (1975) found that only a minority (20%) of their observer-subjects rated fortuitously rewarded people higher than nonrewarded people.

These results indicate that observers align inputs with outcomes when the outcomes are negative, but not when they are positive. The possibility therefore exists that the observers are not attempting to perceive the situations as just. Perhaps the attributions are a direct result of the outcome's valence (positive vs. negative) and not due to considerations of deservingness. So far it is possible the results "supporting" the JW hypothesis may have occurred because unjust outcomes and negative outcomes were confounded.

Do people align their own inputs and outcomes in the same way they do for others? This takes us into the perspective issue; are there actor-observer differences in perceiving outcomes as just and deserved? According to the JW hypothesis, individuals prefer to see people receive outcomes that are just. This is assumed to be true whether oneself or some other is the recipient. Lerner and Simmons (1966, p. 203) have argued: "To maintain the belief that there is an appropriate fit between effort and outcome, the person must construe this as a relatively 'objective' belief--that applies to everyone . . ." Lerner (1971) elsewhere writes

If the person becomes aware that someone else—who lives in and is "vulnerable" to the same environment--has received undeserved suffering or failed to get what he deserved, the issue must arise as to whether the person himself can trust the environment. The value of his "personal contract" becomes questionable. Obviously, then, if it is to his advantage to maintain his contract he will be motivated to believe that he lives in (or to create) an environment in which each person's fate corresponds to what he deserves (p. 8).

In other words, by believing the world is just for other people, support is provided for believing it is also just for oneself. Therefore, in order to maintain the belief that people get what they deserve, both actors and observers should make attempts at perceiving alignments between the inputs and outcomes of people.

Two areas of research render questionable the prediction that actors align inputs and outcomes in an attempt to perceive their outcomes as deserved. The first area is represented by research using "quasi-actors"; that is, observers which approach the actor's perspective such that the victim's outcomes are in some way relevant to the observer. The second area involves situations where the person himself (i.e., the actor) is the direct recipient of the outcome.

Generally, "quasi-actors" do not align inputs with outcomes for recipients of undesirable outcomes. Shaver (1970) found that when subjects role played the positions of accident victims, they assigned less responsibility and recommended more leniency than when they did not assume that role. Adelman et al. (1974) gave instructions to subjects which either "induced empathy," "inhibited empathy," or directed their attention to the "emotional cues" of a victim who

received an undeserved-negative outcome (the "emotional cues" instructions were those employed in most of Lerner's research. These researchers found that the "inhibiting" and "emotion" instructions resulted in a devaluation of the victim. In contrast, the "empathy" instructions resulted in the observers (i.e., quasi-actors due to their "empathy" instructions) enhancing the evaluation of the victim. If it can be assumed that the "empathy" instructions induced the subjects to take the recipient's perspective, it appears that actors--at least "quasi-actors"-- may not make attributions in the same manner as observers.

Perhaps in the above two studies the instructions implicitly "told" the subjects how to respond. A study by Chaiken and Darley (1973), however, is less vulnerable to such a demand characteristic criticism. These experimenters had two subjects observe two experimental confederates working together on a task. On this task each worker had a particular role. Toward the end of the task an "accident" occurred which presumably had negative consequences for one of the two co-workers. The subjects were then informed they were also going to work on this task together, and were assigned to one of the two roles they had previously observed. Before going to do the task the subjects were asked questions, some of which were pertinent to the cause of the "accident." The results showed that subjects who were assigned to the victim's role did not devalue the "victim," but rather assigned responsibility to the "perpetrator." In contrast, subjects assigned to the "perpetrator's" role blamed the victim. The results from Shaver's (1970), Aderman et al.'s (1974), and Chaiken and Darley's (1973) studies

suggest that the JW hypothesis is not a good predictor when the injustice done to the victim is in some way involving to the observer.

Clearly, the most involved condition is the actor's perspective; that is, to be the direct recipient of the outcome. It is to that research we now direct the discussion.

Research employing the actor's perspective provides little evidence that recipients of negative outcomes perceive themselves as responsible for those outcomes. In the first of two studies, Apsler (1972) found that subjects who were "randomly assigned" to an unpleasant psychological test showed more antagonism toward the psychology department's policy of experimentation than subjects who were assigned to a less unpleasant task. In his second study, participants in the military draft lottery who received numbers that indicated they were likely to be drafted reported greater antagonism toward the policy of conscription than those who were unlikely to be drafted. The results from both these studies may be interpreted to indicate that actors blame sources other than themselves for their own misfortunes.

Rubin and Peplau (1973), using the same draft lottery participants as Apsler (1972), attempted to test the notion that actors who strongly believed in a "just world" (High JWs) would be more likely to devalue themselves after receiving an undesirable draft lottery number than those who believed less strongly in a "just world" (Low JWs). Their results showed recipients of undesirable draft lottery numbers held themselves in lower regard (i.e., lowered self-esteem) than

recipients of desirable lottery numbers. However, High JWs were no more likely to have lowered self-esteem than Low JWs after their misfortunes. The authors suggest their results may simply indicate a "spillover of affect" such that people who are happy generally feel good about themselves and those who are unhappy generally feel bad about themselves.

So far our review has examined quasi-actor and actor perspectives with respect to negative outcomes. Let us now turn to situations involving positive outcomes. Streufert and Streufert (1969) found that team members assumed credit for success by attributing their good fortune to decisions made by their team rather than to "chance" factors or "characteristics of the environment." It seems, then, that actors with positive outcomes do align their inputs with their outcomes. These results are consistent with the JW hypothesis. Less direct support comes from Rubin and Peplau's (1973) study. Recall, they found that draft lottery participants who received favorable numbers had an increase in self-esteem (i.e., self-enhancement). As previously noted, however, these authors suggested the increase in self-esteem may simply reflect a "spillover of affect."

What does the literature review to this point indicate? Can any general statements be made? First, the JW hypothesis does not invariably receive support; that is, individuals did not consistently perceive people as getting what they deserved. We found that inputs and outcomes were perceived as aligned when observers viewed others receive negative outcomes (e.g., Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lerner &

Matthews, 1967; Simmons & Lerner, 1968; Walster, 1966; and Phares & Wilson, 1972), and when actors themselves were recipients of positive outcomes (e.g., Streufert & Streufert, 1969; and Rubin & Peplau, 1975). On the other hand, inputs and outcomes were not perceived as aligned when observers reacted to others who received positive outcomes (e.g., Shaw & Skolnick, 1971; and Apsler & Friedman, 1975) and when quasi-actors and actors received negative outcomes (e.g., Shaver, 1970; Aderman et al., 1974; Chaiken & Darley, 1973; and Apsler, 1972).

These results suggest a self-serving motive rather than a justice motive. That is, observers see others as causing their own misfortunes but not their good fortunes, while actors assume responsibility for their good but not their bad outcomes. Obviously, the JW hypothesis fares best in research situations upon which it was developed—observers viewing others receive negative outcomes. It seems necessary, however, to turn elsewhere to seek an adequate explanation when all data is considered. One candidate is a self-serving hypothesis.

The Self-Serving Hypothesis

The Self-Serving hypothesis, like the "Just World" hypothesis is motivational in nature. The bases for the motivations, however, differ for the two positions. According to the JW hypothesis, there is a motive to perceive people as getting what they deserve; such that favorable intentions and actions are rewarded and unfavorable ones punished. In contrast, the Self-Serving (SS) hypothesis proposes

that individuals are motivated to perceive themselves, regardless of their perspective, as highly likely to be recipients of desirable outcomes and unlikely to be recipients of undesirable ones. Although several writers have discussed self-serving processes (e.g., Heider, 1958; Walster, 1966), Shaver (1970) provides a synopsis of these processes:

. . . when a situation has "affective significance" for the perceiver, the resultant attribution will depend on the facts of the situation and on the perceiver's own wishes. A perceiver faced with what other would consider a uniformly negative appraisal of his character or abilities will attribute the failing not to himself--as would objective observers--but to external factors . . . [self-serving attributions are] limited to circumstances in which some aspect of the perceiver's character--his blameworthiness or his self-esteem--is threatened. It can also exist when there is a threat to physical safety. When confronted by a physically threatening situation, the perceiver's defensive [i.e., self-serving] attribution often embodies a distortion of the probability that he could be injured (p. 112)

Both the JW and SS hypotheses predict that attributional errors are often made by attributors, albeit for different reasons. According to the JW hypothesis they are made in order to perceive the world as a just place. For the SS hypothesis, they are made to maximize the perceived likelihood that desirable things will happen to oneself and minimize the perceived likelihood that undesirable things will happen.

Another major distinction between the JW and SS hypotheses involves one's Perspective on the situation. People are assumed to be self-serving and not other-serving. Actors and observers should, therefore, respond differently to situations depending on the Valence of the outcomes. Such predictions and data supporting the SS hypothesis will now be reviewed. The reader should note that the SS hypothesis accounts for results which the JW hypothesis fails to predict.

Evidence supporting the self-serving hypothesis. In this section we will examine the four types of situations previously reviewed: (1) observers responding with respect to recipients of negative outcomes; (2) observers responding with respect to recipients of positive outcomes; (3) quasi-actors and actors with respect to their own negative outcomes; and (4) quasi-actors and actors with respect to their own positive outcomes. For each type of situation the prediction of the SS hypothesis will be made followed by supportive research.

Self-serving observers are motivated to minimize the perceived likelihood that they themselves could be recipients of undesirable outcomes. To do so, they should perceive victims of negative outcomes as in some way causing their own misfortunes, and not causal sources (e.g., environmental factors) which could also affect the observer's own fate. Clearly, observers devalue (Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lerner & Matthews, 1967; and Simmons & Lerner, 1968) and attribute responsibility (Walster, 1966; and Phares & Wilson, 1972) to recipients of negative outcomes.

The second type of situation involves observers responding to recipients of desirable outcomes. Self-serving observers are motivated to maximize the perceived likelihood that they themselves will receive desirable outcomes. This can be accomplished by attributing causality for those desirable outcomes to environmental sources. By doing so those outcomes may also be perceived as likely to occur for oneself. If observers were to perceive the other's positive outcomes as solely due to the other's inputs (i.e., his personal characteristics or actions),

it would decrease the perceived likelihood that oneself as an observer would be the recipient of those outcomes.

Again, research previously cited is consistent with the above prediction. Shaw and Skolnick (1971) found that observers made more environmental attributions when outcomes for others were positive than when they were negative. Apsler and Friedman (1975) reported that only 20% of their observers rated arbitrarily rewarded recipients' performances as superior to those who were not rewarded. In other words, 80% of their observers attributed responsibility to "chance" or "other reasons" when the outcomes were positive. Clearly, the reactions of observers to both the desirable and undesirable fates of others are consistent with the predictions from the SS hypothesis.

Is this hypothesis predictive when oneself is the recipient of the outcome? Let us now turn to an examination of the actor's perspective. A self-serving actor wants to minimize the perceived likelihood of undesirable outcomes. Therefore, whenever he is the recipient of a negative outcome, causal attributions should be made which minimize the perceived likelihood of that negative outcome recurring. If the individual were to consider himself as responsible for his negative outcomes it would not be self-serving. That is, perceiving oneself as typically the cause for one's own misfortunes suggests they would be perceived as likely to recur. If the actor were to attribute responsibility to environmental sources, however, he should decrease the perceived likelihood of negative outcomes recurring relative to the perceived likelihood of their recurrence if oneself were regarded as

the cause. It is predicted, then, that actors will tend to make environmental attributions (i.e., not perceive inputs and outcomes aligned) whenever they are recipients of negative outcomes.

Research previously cited supports this prediction. Not only do actors deny self-responsibility when the outcomes are negative (e.g., Apsler, 1972) but observers who are induced to approach the actor's perspective (i.e., quasi-actors) avoid assigning responsibility to the recipient (e.g., Shaver, 1970; Chaiken & Darley, 1973; and Aderman et al., 1974).

The last situation to be examined involves actors receiving positive outcomes. Self-serving actors want to maximize the perceived likelihood that positive outcomes will recur. By attributing responsibility to themselves for their desirable outcomes, actors support the perception that the positive outcomes will be likely to recur. On the other hand, by attributing the outcomes to an environmental causal source, one should decrease the perception they will recur. Generally, then, by attributing responsibility to oneself, the actor is increasing the perceived likelihood of positive outcomes relative to their perceived likelihood if the environment was regarded as the cause. Therefore, actors should assume personal responsibility when their outcomes are desirable. Indeed, Streufert and Streufert (1969) found team members attributed more responsibility to themselves than to "chance factors" when their teams were successful.

Although there is considerable support for the predictions of the SS hypothesis, there are results which seem to be inconsistent with it. We will briefly review that research in the next section.

Evidence inconsistent with the self-serving hypothesis. Contrary to predictions from the SS hypothesis, Feather and Simon (1971) found that actors attributed both success and failure to external causes, rather than the predicted self-attributions with positive outcomes and environmental attributions whenever the outcomes were negative. Beckman (1973) reported that teachers accepted more responsibility for their students' failure (presumably a failure for themselves) than for their students' successes. Lastly, Apsler and Friedman (1975) failed to find actor-observer differences. About 20% of their actors and observers rated the "performances" and "personal characteristics" of rewarded recipients as superior to those who were not rewarded. The remaining 80% of actors and observers both attributed the outcomes to "chance" or "other reasons."

To summarize, the SS hypothesis fares much better than the JW hypothesis. It accounts better for data involving both positive or negative outcomes from either the actor or the observer perspective. In contrast, the JW hypothesis accounts only for observers viewing recipients of negative outcomes and actors themselves receiving positive outcomes.

CHAPTER III

THE HEDONISTIC JUSTICE HYPOTHESIS

The data reviewed in the previous chapter were, for the most part, more consistent with the Self-Serving than the "Just World" Hypothesis. Nevertheless, it is contended by the present writer that people entertain motives of deservingness as well as self-servingness. This chapter proposes a synthesis of a justice motive and a self-serving motive.

Limitations of Previous Research

The literature reviewed in Chapter II indicated that the kinds of results obtained depended upon who the recipient of the outcome was (actor or observer) and the valence of those outcomes (positive or negative). Although this literature was primarily concerned with the issue of perceived justice, it is interesting to note that the justness of outcomes were not clearly manipulated in that literature. For the most part, subjects were presented with situations which could be construed as involving undeserved outcomes. For example, they were exposed to situations where the outcomes were due to lottery drawings (Apsler, 1972; and Rubin & Peplau, 1973), "chance" factors (Lerner, 1965; and Lerner & Simmons, 1966), or accidents (Walster, 1966; Phares & Wilson, 1972; and Aderman et al., 1974).

Nowhere in the literature reviewed were subjects presented situations that clearly had inputs and outcomes appropriately aligned. In other words, subjects were not presented situations which were clearly just. This absence of just situations in the literature is most likely a result of the dependent variables employed. The unjust situations used in the research were ambiguous; that is, the input was left unspecified, and it was the subject's task to provide it by making evaluations of, or attributions to, the recipient and/or the environment. In the case of just situations this is difficult to do because the inputs and outcomes have to be clearly specified in those situations presented to the subjects. Obviously, such situations almost "demand" that the subjects' attributions merely reflect the information given in the manipulations. Indeed, Kelley (1971a) has noted that events must be sufficiently ambiguous for perceivers to make their own interpretations.

Later in this paper a dependent variable is suggested which provides the opportunity to examine situations involving both just and unjust outcomes.

The Hedonistic Justice Hypothesis

This hypothesis is based upon the belief that people attend to both the outcome's deservingness and its valence. Thus, the Hedonistic Justice (HJ) hypothesis adopts selected assumptions from the JW and the SS hypotheses. Additional assumptions must be made, however, which provide connecting links between those assumptions from these two

hypotheses.

The HJ hypothesis maintains that perceptions are directionally biased by the individual's motives. More specifically, it is assumed that (1) overall, people are motivated to perceive outcomes as deserved rather than undeserved; (2) overall, they are also motivated to perceive people as having a higher likelihood of positive than negative outcomes; and (3) deserved outcomes and positive outcomes are of greater importance for oneself than for other people.

Additional assumptions must be made, however, which specify the relationships between those assumptions listed above. Thus, the fourth assumption is that the motive toward maximizing the perceived likelihood of positive outcomes and minimizing the perceived likelihood of negative outcomes takes precedence over the motive to perceive people as getting what they deserve. In other words, the desirability of an outcome has more significance to the individual than its deservingness. For example, regardless of the individual's perspective he would be motivated to perceive an unjust-positive outcome over a just-negative one.

The fifth and final assumption may seem contradictory to the first assumption. However, it should be noted that it is conditional on the outcome's valence and the respondent's perspective. It is assumed that in certain circumstances (depending upon the valence of the outcome and the respondent's perspective) individuals may be motivated to perceive injustice over justice. Let us briefly review these "special" circumstances.

The first case is represented by actors who are recipients of negative outcomes. Obviously it is to the actor's advantage not to perceive himself as the cause of his misfortunes. Actors should, therefore, perceive unjust-negative outcomes as more likely than just-negative ones. The second case where injustice should be perceived as more likely than justice is when observers view others who are recipients of positive outcomes. If the other's positive outcomes are perceived as undeserved and environmentally caused, it increases the likelihood that oneself may also be the recipient of such outcomes. Therefore, observers should perceive unjust-positive outcomes as more likely than just-positive ones.

Briefly, the HY hypothesis maintains that people are generally motivated to perceive justice as more likely than injustice and positive outcomes as more likely than negative ones. Further, justice and positive outcomes are generally more important for oneself than for other people. Also, the valence of outcomes are more important than the deservingness of those outcomes. Lastly, under specific circumstances (see above), people are motivated to perceive undeserved outcomes as more likely than deserved ones.

Supporting research: A pilot study. It was previously mentioned that the literature lacks situations where just outcomes had been manipulated by the researcher. This absence, it was suggested, was most likely an artifact of the dependent variables that had been used. In order to examine just outcomes, a pilot study was performed which employed a dependent variable that could readily be applied in

both just and unjust situations, from either an actor's or observer's perspective. More specifically, respondents in either actor or observer perspectives were asked the Perceived Likelihood that just and unjust outcomes occurred.

Method. Undergraduate residents of a coed dormitory were given questionnaires. The ten items in the questionnaire were selected from Rubin and Peplau's (1975) Just World Scale. Five items represented just situations and five represented unjust situations.

Half of the respondents were given the "actor" version of the questionnaire. This version instructed the people to respond to the items with respect to themselves and also had the items worded in the first person singular. The other half of the respondents had "observer" versions. In this version the people were instructed to respond with respect to other people, and the items were reworded by replacing "I" with "people".

The Perceived Likelihood measures were obtained by having the respondents rate each item on a 6-point scale as to whether that item was "generally true" or "generally untrue". This measure indicated the Perceived Likelihood that the events described by the items were believed to occur.

The general procedure involved putting the questionnaires in the mailboxes of all the residents of the dormitory. At least thirty "actor" and thirty "observer" questionnaires were distributed. After the questionnaires were completed, they were returned to a box in the Head of Residence office. The questionnaires were collected one week

after they were distributed.

Results and Discussion. Fifteen "actor" and 15 "observer" questionnaires were returned; however, the highest scoring individual from each of these groups was eliminated because of their marked deviation from the other scores. Thus, the statistical analysis was based upon 14 respondents from each of the Perspectives.

A one-between and one-within mixed design analysis of variance was used for tests of significance. The between subjects variable was the respondent's Perspective (actor vs. observer) and the within subject variable was the Justness of the items (just vs. unjust). The results demonstrated that, overall, just events were perceived as more likely than unjust events ($F_{1,26} = 8.38, p < .01$). There was also a trend for just outcomes to be perceived as more likely for oneself than for others, and unjust outcomes as more likely for others than for oneself ($F_{1,26} = 2.90, p < .10$). These results are consistent with the HJ hypothesis--first, people perceived justice as more likely than injustice, and second, just outcomes tend to be perceived as more likely for oneself than for others.

Unfortunately the valence of the outcomes were not systematically manipulated in this pilot study. It was, therefore, impossible to examine the other predictions of the HJ hypothesis. Nevertheless, this pilot has demonstrated two important things: (1) the HJ hypothesis is a viable predictor; and (2) the Perceived Likelihood Measure provides a way for examining not only unjust outcomes but also just ones.

In the next chapter, predictions from the JW, SS, and HJ hypotheses will be made with respect to the Perceived Likelihood measure. Thus, we will have a direct comparison of these three hypotheses in a single study, based upon the same measure. Before doing so, however, let us briefly review one more issue: the perceptions of justice by privileged and underprivileged people.

Do Privileged and Underprivileged People Differ in their Perceptions?

Do both privileged and underprivileged individuals perceive the world as a place where people typically get what they deserve? The results demonstrating the tendency to perceive outcomes as just, have for the most part been obtained from a relatively privileged group of people--college students. Perhaps the socio-economic backgrounds of this group provided life experiences which corresponded relatively closely to the belief that people get what they deserve. Material resources were generally available to reward them when they exhibited those traits and actions deemed deserving. Perhaps, their parents, with sufficient opportunities and concern with child rearing, withheld rewards or administered punishment when the traits and actions displayed were unfavorable. Further, socializing agencies outside of the home, such as schools and the entertainment media, presented a picture of a "just world." In other words, these people came from environments where the "personal contract" was viable.

Could we expect less fortunate people, such as members of an underprivileged minority groups, to have similar perceptions? Within such a group, material rewards were perhaps less available, and the frustrations of poverty, unemployment, discrimination, and insecurity may have interfered with concentrated attention to the appropriation of due rewards and punishments. Also, environmental norms may have encouraged immediate rather than delayed gratifications--if a resource is scarce, take it when you can get it!

Briefly, differences in life experiences may result in privileged and underprivileged people perceiving different degrees of justice. Although individual differences have been demonstrated, results comparing college and noncollege subjects have been equivocal (cf. Rubin & Peplau, 1975).

C H A P T E R I V

EXPERIMENTAL PREDICTIONS

This chapter outlines the predictions from the Just World, Self-Serving, and Hedonistic Justice Hypotheses. These predictions are made with respect to two measures: (1) the "Perceived Likelihood" that certain types of events occur; and (2) the attributed "Locus of Causality" for outcomes the people receive. Before stating the specific predictions, however, some comment on the distinctions between, and the purposes of, these two measures seems necessary.

The Perceived Likelihood measure indicates the extent to which people are perceived as getting what they deserve (justice) or not getting what they deserve (injustice). These measures examine people's perceptions that positive or negative inputs are aligned (or not aligned) with positive or negative outcomes. There is no necessary causality in the Perceived Likelihood items; they merely indicate whether the inputs and outcomes are, or are not, aligned. The purpose of these items is to measure the respondent's estimate that various types of events occur.

The Locus of Causality measure indicates the perceived "reasons" for, or causal sources of, outcomes. In a sense, the respondents are asked to provide the inputs given certain outcomes. These inputs (or causal sources) can be either personal (i.e., due to the person) or environmental (i.e., due to reasons other than the person).

Predictions from the Just World Hypothesis

In this section we will briefly outline some assumptions and predictions from the Just World hypothesis. The predictions are made first with respect to the Perceived Likelihood measures, and then the Locus of Causality measures.

Perceived likelihood measure. The JW hypothesis maintains that people are motivated to perceive the world as a just place. As a result, cognitive activities are directed toward perceiving people as getting what they deserve.

- a. Therefore, just events should be perceived as more likely than unjust events ($J > U$).

Justice and injustice can involve either positive or negative outcomes. The JW hypothesis, however, maintains the primary motivation lies in perceiving outcomes as deserved and not in perceiving them as necessarily positive or negative.

- b. Therefore, the perceived likelihoods of positive and negative outcomes are not expected to differ ($P = N$).

There is no motivation postulated toward perceiving deserved and undeserved outcomes as being necessarily positive or negative; but that justice, in general, is perceived as more likely than injustice in general.

- c. Therefore, both just-positive and just-negative events should be perceived as more likely than unjust-positive and unjust-negative ones ($JP = JN > UP = UN$).

Further, this hypothesis maintains that individuals are motivated to perceive other people as also living in a "just world." Such perceptions support the belief that oneself is living in a just world.

- d. Therefore, both actors and observers should perceive just events as more likely than unjust events ($JA = JO > UA = UO$).

For both actor and observer perspectives the primary motivation is to perceive outcomes as deserved and not necessarily as positive or negative.

- e. Therefore, the perceived likelihood of positive and negative outcomes should not differ across actor and observer perspectives ($PA = PO = NA = NO$).

and

- f. Just-positive and just-negative events should be perceived as more likely than unjust-positive and unjust negative events from either perspective ($JPA = JNA = JPO = JNO > UPA = UNA = UPO = UNO$).

Locus of causality measures. According to the JW hypothesis individuals are motivated to perceive people as getting what they deserve. One method of doing this (as previously reviewed) is to perceive people as responsible for the outcomes they receive. On the other hand, environmentally caused outcomes are not necessarily perceived as deserved.

Therefore, actors and observers in situations involving either positive or negative outcomes should show a strong tendency to make personal rather than environmental attributions of causality.

Predictions from the Self-Serving Hypothesis

Perceived likelihood measure. According to the SS hypothesis, individuals are motivated to maximize the Perceived Likelihood of positive outcomes and minimize the Perceived Likelihood of negative outcomes for

themselves. There is no necessary motivation to perceive people as recipients of deserved outcomes.

- a. Therefore, the perceived likelihoods of just and unjust events are not expected to differ ($J = U$).

but

- b. Positive outcomes should be perceived as more likely than negative outcomes ($P > N$).

There is no motivation postulated to perceive positive or negative outcomes as being necessarily just or unjust, but only that positive outcomes are perceived as more likely than negative ones.

- c. Therefore, both just-positive and unjust-positive events should be perceived as more likely than just-negative and unjust-negative events ($JP = UP > JN = UN$).

Further, the SS hypothesis assumes the individual is self-servingly and not other-servingly motivated with respect to the outcome's Valence; while no attention is directed towards the outcome's deservingness.

- d. Therefore, the perceived likelihood of just and unjust events should not differ across actor and observer perspectives ($JA = JO = UA = UO$).

but

- e. The perceived likelihood of positive and negative outcomes across perspectives should have the following order: (1) actor-positive; (2) observer-positive; (3) observer-negative; and (4) actor-negative ($PA > PO > NO > NA$).

Finally, the deservingness of outcomes are not assumed to have any effect upon their perceived likelihoods. Rather, only the outcome's Valence and to whom it happens is assumed to have an effect upon the Perceived Likelihood measures.

- f. Therefore, the perceived likelihood of situations should have the following order: (1) just and unjust actor-positive; (2) just and unjust observer-positive; (3) just

and unjust observer-negative; and (4) just and unjust actor-negative ($JPA = UPA > JPO = UPO > JNO = UNO > JNA = UNA$).

Locus of causality measure. According to the SS hypothesis, it is self-serving for actors to see themselves as responsible for their positive outcomes; outcomes should be perceived as more likely to recur if oneself is seen as responsible for their cause. It is not self-serving, however, to perceive oneself as responsible for negative outcomes. In the case of observers, it is self-serving to perceive others' positive outcomes as environmentally caused and not limited to the actions and/or characteristics of that person being observed. In contrast, it would be self-serving to see others as responsible for their negative outcomes.

Therefore, personal attributions should be made when actors receive positive outcomes and observers view others receive negative outcomes. In contrast, environmental attributions should occur when actors receive negative and observers view positive outcomes.

Predictions from the Hedonistic Justice Hypothesis

Perceived likelihood measures. The HJ hypothesis assumes that people are motivated to perceive outcomes as deserved rather than undeserved.

- a. Therefore, just events, overall, should be perceived as more likely than unjust events ($J > U$).

This hypothesis further assumes that people are motivated toward maximizing the Perceived Likelihood of positive outcomes and minimizing the Perceived Likelihood of negative outcomes.

- b. Therefore, positive outcomes, overall, should be perceived as more likely than negative outcomes ($P > N$).

Although people are assumed to be motivated to perceive justice over injustice and positive outcomes over negative outcomes, the Valence of an outcome is more important than its deservingness.

- c. Therefore, when considering the Justness and Valence of events together, their perceived likelihood should have the following order: (1) just-positive; (2) unjust-positive; (3) just negative; and (4) unjust-negative ($JP > UP > JN > UN$).

Further, the deservingness of outcomes are more important with respect to oneself than with respect to others.

- d. Therefore, when considering the Justness of events and the Perspective on those events together, their perceived likelihood should have the following order: (1) just-actor; (2) just-observer; (3) unjust-observer; and (4) unjust-actor ($JA > JO > UO > UA$).

Similarly, the Valence of outcomes are more important for oneself than for others.

- e. Therefore, when considering the Valence of outcomes and who receives those outcomes together, their perceived likelihood should have the following order: (1) positive-actor; (2) positive-observer; (3) negative-observer; and (4) negative-actor ($PA > PO > NO > NA$).

Finally, the HJ hypothesis assumes that under specific circumstances people are motivated to perceive undeserved outcomes as more likely than deserved ones. Briefly, actors should not be motivated to perceive themselves as deserving negative outcomes. This suggests that actors should perceive unjust-negative outcomes as more likely than just-negative ones. Observers, on the other hand, should be motivated to perceive others' positive outcomes as a result of environmental factors.

This way the observers themselves are also possible recipients of those desirable outcomes. Thus, observers should perceive unjust-positive outcomes as more likely than just-positive ones.

- f. Therefore, considering the Justness, Valence, and Perspective of events, their perceived likelihood should have the following order: (1) just-positive actor; (2) unjust-positive actor; (3) unjust-positive observer; (4) just-positive observer; (5) just-negative observer; (6) unjust-negative observer; (7) unjust-negative actor; and (8) just-negative actor (JPA > UPA > UPO > JPO > JNO UNO > UNA > JNA).

Locus of causality measure. The HJ hypothesis, for the most part, makes the same assumptions as the SS hypothesis with respect to attributing causality. Although the motive to maximize desirable and minimize undesirable outcomes is the primary motive, there are also considerations of the deservingness of those outcomes.

Therefore, strong personal attributions should be made when the outcomes are positive for actors and negative for observers. In contrast, moderate environmental attributions (due to a counter-acting motive to perceive deservingness) should be made when the outcomes are negative for actors and positive for observers.

A summary of all the predictions from the three hypotheses are in Appendix I.

The Relation Between the Perceived Likelihood and Locus of Causality Measures

The Perceived Likelihood measure indicates the extent to which people perceive that inputs and outcomes are appropriately (or inappropriately) aligned. In much of the literature reviewed the assignment of responsibility to the person for his outcome has been assumed to be the

process by which the perceived alignment was formed. However, people can be perceived as getting what they deserve, not because of a causal link between inputs and outcomes, but because the environment in some way "provides" the alignment.

Nevertheless, the present writer believes that assigning responsibility is the modal method for aligning inputs and outcomes as had been assumed in the literature previously reviewed. The Locus of Causality measure provides the opportunity to test this assumption.

It is predicted that people who perceive the world as highly just will be more likely to make personal (and less likely to make environmental) attributions of causality than people who perceive the world as less just.

C H A P T E R V

METHOD

Questionnaires were constructed from which the predictions of the Just World, Self-Serving, and Hedonistic Justice hypotheses could be tested. One set of items in the questionnaire was designed to represent different sorts of events which systematically varied the Justness and Valence of these events, along with the respondent's Perspective. The respondents' ratings on the perceive occurrence or likelihood of these various events were obtained. A second set of items in the questionnaire measured the tendencies of respondents to attribute causality for the recipients' outcomes to either the environment or directly to the person. The pattern of results obtained from both of these measures provides evidence as to which of the above hypotheses is most tenable. The last section of the questionnaire contained items that obtained a rough indication of the respondent's socio-economic status.

Respondents

Two samples were used in the study. One sample consisted of eighty college students. The other sample consisted of 80 members of a disadvantaged minority group.

Privileged sample. The "privileged" respondents were students from Amherst and Smith colleges. Eighty respondents were used from

psychology classes at the two schools. The participants received experimental credits for completing the questionnaires. Forty respondents were randomly administered the Actor version and forty the Observer version of the questionnaire. Of the 27 male respondents in the privileged sample, 13 received the Actor and 14 the Observer versions. Of the 53 females in this sample, 27 completed the Actor version of the questionnaire and 26 the Observer version. The average age for males and females were 19.93 and 20.09 years respectively.

Underprivileged sample. The underprivileged respondents were Puerto Ricans living in New England. None of these respondents had a college education. Eighty respondents were recruited through various agencies in Connecticut and Massachusetts which were involved in aiding members of the Spanish-speaking community. The participants were paid two dollars after completing the questionnaire. Forty respondents were randomly administered the Actor version and forty the Observer version of the questionnaire. Of the 54 males in this sample, 26 responded to the Actor version and 28 to the Observer versions. Of the 26 females, 14 received the Actor and 12 the Observer versions. The average age for underprivileged males was 20.35 years and for females 20.14 years.

Experimental Designs

Perceived likelihood measures. A three-between and two-within subjects mixed design was used to assess the respondents' reports of how likely various kinds of events were perceived to occur. The between-subject variables were the Sample from which the respondent was drawn (privileged vs. underprivileged), the respondent's Perspective

(actor vs. observer), and Sex (male vs. female). The within-subject variables were the Justness (just vs. unjust) and Valence (positive vs. negative) of the event's outcome.

Locus of Causality measures. A four-between and one-within subjects mixed design was employed in the examination of the respondents' attributions of causality. The between-subject variables were the respondent's Rank (high vs. low) on a Perceived Justice Score, the Sample (privileged vs. underprivileged) from which he/she was drawn, their Perspective (actor vs. observer) and Sex (male vs. female). The within-subject variable was the Valence (positive vs. negative) of the event's outcome.

Construction of Items and Questionnaires

Each respondent was given a thirty-six item questionnaire. Twelve of the items were constructed to measure the perceived likelihood that various kinds of events were perceived to occur. A second set of twelve items measured where respondents tended to locate causality. Lastly, twelve items requested information about the respondent's background.

Perceived Likelihood items. These items measure the likelihood that respondents perceive inputs and outcomes to be aligned or not aligned. They are aligned when both the inputs and outcomes are positive or both are negative. They are not aligned when one is positive and the other is negative. Thus, items representing just events have the inputs and outcomes aligned. Items representing unjust events do

do not have the inputs and outcomes aligned.

In order to account for the possibility that the perceived likelihood of any given event may be unique to the theme (e.g., favorability of evaluations, grades in school, etc.) of that event, each item theme was systematically varied in its Justness, Valence, and Perspective. Thus, for each of the 12 item themes there were eight variations: (1) Actor Just-Positive; (2) Actor Just-Negative; (3) Actor Unjust-Positive; (4) Actor Unjust-Negative; (5) Observer Just-Positive; (6) Observer Just-Negative; (7) Observer Unjust-Positive; and (8) Observer Unjust-Negative. Taken together, 12 item themes x 2 levels of Justness x 2 levels of Valence x 2 Perspectives results in 96 total items. See Appendices IIA and IIB for the English and Spanish versions of these items respectively.

Each item was rated on a six-interval scale. These intervals were labeled: Extremely True, Generally True, Somewhat True, Somewhat Untrue, Generally Untrue, and Extremely Untrue. Ratings going from Extremely True through Extremely Untrue on these items represented decreases in the Perceive Likelihood of that event occurring.

Locus of Causality items. The same twelve item themes used in the Perceived Likelihood items were employed with the Locus of Causality items. The Valence and Perspective of each item Theme were systematically varied. There were, then, four variations for each Theme: (1) Actor-Positive; (2) Actor-Negative; (3) Observer-Positive; and (4) Observer-Negative. Taken together 12 item Themes x 2 Valence levels x 2 Perspectives results in a total of 48 Locus of Causality items. See Appendix IIIA and IIIB for the English and Spanish versions of the items

respectively.

On each item two alternative choices were provided, one alternative attributes causality of the item's outcome to the person, and the other alternative attributes causality to environmental factors. The more often respondents chose personal causes over environmental causes, the greater their tendency to perceive people as personally responsible for their outcomes.

Background characteristic items. A third set of items in the questionnaire obtained rough estimates of the respondent's socioeconomic status. "Actual" and "Perceived" (i.e., compared to the "average" person) estimates of their parent's income and educational levels, as well as their own educational levels, were requested. Also obtained were the respondents' age, sex, and self-ratings of "perceived opportunities." These items are shown in Appendices IVA and IVB.

Construction of questionnaires. There were four Forms of questionnaires. Each Form was constructed by randomly assigning without replacement the item Themes to the various types of events. For the perceived Likelihood items, Appendix V demonstrates the characteristic of each form: (A) Actor and Observer questionnaires had the same themes assigned to the same type of events within each form; (b) no one Theme was repeated within each Form; (c) each Form had three Themes within each type of event; and (d) no Theme was represented more than once in the same type of event between Forms.

On the Locus of Causality items the following characteristic of each Form can be noted: (a) Actor and Observer questionnaires had the

same Themes assigned to the same type of events within each Form; (b) no one Theme was repeated within each Form; (c) each Form had six Themes within each type of event; and (d) no one Theme was represented in the same type of event between Forms.

For the Background Characteristic items the four questionnaire Forms had the same twelve items. Thus, there were no differences between Forms on these items.

Lastly, in each Form, the Perceived Likelihood and Locus of Causality items were randomly ordered within their respective parts of the questionnaire.

Independent Manipulation of Types of Events

Justness of events. Items were manipulated to represent "just" and "unjust" events. Just items describe situations where an individual gets what he deserves, while unjust items are represented by situations where the individual does not get what he deserves. The item's justice (or injustice) was established in either one of two ways: (1) having the item directly state that the individuals "deserve" (or do not deserve) what happens to them; or (2) by aligning (or not aligning) the favorability of the individuals' inputs (e.g., his personal characteristics and/or behaviors) with the Valence of their outcomes.

To establish whether the items were perceived as representing just and unjust situations, judges were asked to rate them on a six-point just-unjust scale. The means and standard deviations for the 12 items themes across all types of events are shown in Appendix VI. With

the higher scores indicating just ratings, it is clear that just items were rated as more "just" than unjust items. Furthermore, as Appendix VI indicates, this occurred regardless of whether the items' outcomes were positive or negative, and regardless of whether they referred to one-self (i.e., actor's perspective) or to other people (i.e., observer's perspective).

Valence of outcomes. Each event described in the items had either a positive or a negative outcome. Positive outcomes were represented by pleasant or desirable circumstances, such as receiving "good grades," "favorable evaluations," or "receiving love." In contrast, negative outcomes were represented by undesirable circumstances such as receiving "bad grades," "unfavorable evaluations," or "not receiving love." Generally, if given the choice between positive and negative outcomes, the individual would prefer the former and avoid the latter. No independent ratings of the items' Valences were obtained, in that that outcomes of the items appear clearly desirable or undesirable.

Perspective of respondents. The respondents were instructed to refer to the items with respect to themselves (Actors) or to other people in general (Observers). Thus, the Actor's perspective was established by instructing the respondents to react to the items with respect to themselves. Further, the items in the Actor version were worded in the first person singular "I." In the Observer's version, the respondent was instructed to refer to the items with respect to other people in general. Items in this perspective were reworded by replacing the first person singular pronoun "I" with a third person plural noun (e.g., "people,"

"students," "children"). See Appendices VIIA and VIIB for the English instructions and VIIIC and VIID for the Spanish instructions used to establish the Perspectives.

English and Spanish Questionnaire Versions

The questionnaires had two translations: English and Spanish. The purpose of the Spanish version was to accommodate those respondents of the Underprivileged Sample (i.e., the Hispanic people) who were not fluent in English.

The questionnaire was first written in English and then translated into Spanish. Three research assistants worked together on the translation: one of the assistant's native language was Spanish, and another had studied in Spain for a year. All three were fluent in Spanish. The translations of the instructions and items were done more according to their "spirit" and "meaning" than direct, literal interpretations. Several drafts of the translations were made. After each draft they were given to native (mostly staff members of the agencies where respondents were eventually recruited) Spanish people to be retranslated into English and/or revisions made of problem areas, as seen by these people. The third revision was used as the form administered to the respondents.

Tests were made of the comparability of the two translations. Perceived Justice (PJ) Scores (see p. 69 of the "Results" section for an explanation of this score) of underprivileged respondents that took the English translations were compared with those who took the Spanish

translations. The analysis, including both actor and observer questionnaires, showed no difference in the PJ Scores between those who took the English and Spanish translations ($t=.81$, $df=78$; two tailed test). With actor and observer questionnaires analyzed separately there was again no significant difference between the English and Spanish translations ($t=1.99$ and $t=.39$, $df=38$; two tailed tests. $p > .05$).

These tests indicated the underprivileged respondents taking the English version did not differ from those taking the Spanish translation. These results further suggest there is little or no effect due to the language of the questionnaire taken by the respondents.

General Procedure

Privileged sample. Participants in this sample were members of psychology classes at Smith and Amherst Colleges. The questionnaires were administered during the scheduled class hour. After the questionnaires were distributed, the respondents were asked to read the introductory page and then continue through the questionnaire until they had completed it. Any questions concerning the instructions were dealt with on an individual basis between the respondent and the person administering the questions. If any questions about the items were asked, the respondent was encouraged to mark the answer he/she thought was best. Respondents were also requested to check each page to be certain they had responded to all the items. Finally, as each questionnaire was returned to the administrator, each page was quickly checked for any omissions.

Two week after all the data were collected, two of the three

classes that took the questionnaire were given a written debriefing as to the purpose of the questionnaire.

Underprivileged sample. Participants in this sample were recruited through various agencies in the Spanish-speaking community which were designed to assist Hispanic people. The questionnaires were administered in groups ranging in number from five to about fifteen. The author and one of the three bilingual research assistants was present during the administrations of the questionnaires.

Participants were given the choice of responding to either the English or Spanish translations of the questionnaire. They were encouraged to take the translation with which they would feel most comfortable. As with the privileged sample, the respondents were asked to read the introductory page, the instructions, and to continue through the questionnaire until it was completed. Questions concerning the instructions and items were taken by the bilingual research assistant. The assistants were instructed to respond to these questions in the same manner described for the privileged respondents. Again, as each questionnaire was returned the pages were checked for omissions. Finally, questions were answered and the respondents were paid two dollars.

CHAPTER VI

RESULTS

The results of this study are reported in three sections. First, we examine the respondents' ratings of their "actual" and "perceived" background characteristics. Second, we consider the respondents' tendencies to perceive people as getting what they deserve (justice) or not getting what they deserve (injustice), along with their perceptions that people receive desirable (positive) or undesirable (negative) outcomes. In this section the effects of the respondents' Perspective, Sex, and Privilegedness are examined. Third, we review data on attributions of causality to personal vs. situational sources. This data is also examined with respect to the respondents' Perspective, Sex, and Privilegedness.

Background Characteristics

What were the backgrounds of the respondents? Part C of the questionnaire obtained ratings on background characteristics. These ratings were intended to provide rough indications of the respondents' socio-economic conditions. The privileged and underprivileged samples are compared in Table 1.

F-values showed that the two samples differed significantly ($p < .001$) on all the characteristics except Age. These results indicate that members of the privileged sample reported higher family

TABLE 1

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVILEGED AND UNDERPRIVILEGED RESPONDENTS

Item	Mean Score	
	Privileged	Underprivileged
<u>Actual Background</u>		
Average Age of Sample's Respondents	20.03 years	20.29 years
Family's Income	4.14 (\$12-16,000 per year)	1.49 (below \$4,000 per year)
Father's Education	4.93 (most fathers completed college)	1.86 (few fathers had some high school)
Mother's Education	4.54 (most mothers completed college)	1.58 (few mothers had some high school)
Own Education	4.00 (attending college)	2.22 (most had some high school)
<u>Perceived Background</u>		
Perceived Opportunities	4.31 (more than the average person)	2.91 (nearly the same as the average person)
Perceived Family's Income	3.76 (above the average family)	2.22 (below the average family)
Perceived Father's Education	4.04 (above the average male)	2.32 (below the average male)
Perceived Mother's Education	3.92 (above the average female)	2.32 (below the average female)
Perceived Own Education	3.86 (above average)	2.96 (nearly average)

Note: The two samples differed significantly ($p < .001$) on all characteristics except age.

incomes, and higher education levels both for themselves and their parents, than did members of the underprivileged sample. Further, the privileged respondents perceived their family's incomes, education levels, and opportunities as significantly higher than those perceived by the underprivileged respondents (all F-values had $p < .001$). It should be noted, however, the background characteristics between the two samples tended to have smaller "perceived" differences than "actual" differences.

Background characteristics were also examined with respect to the sex and perspectives of the respondents. Females rated higher than males their mother's educational level ($F_{1,150} = 9.59$; $p < .002$), and also perceived themselves as having more opportunity to live a satisfying life than did males ($F_{1,150} = 5.62$; $p < .032$). Males and females did not differ on any of the other background characteristics. Finally, respondents who completed the "actor" version of the questionnaire did not differ on any of the characteristics from those who completed the "observer" version.

To summarize, both samples reported "actual" and "perceived" backgrounds which were quite different, although the differences of their "perceived" backgrounds tended to be smaller than the actual differences. Both samples were comparable in their ages. Lastly, the background characteristics of males, females, actors, and observers for the most part did not differ significantly,

Perceived Likelihood of Outcomes

It was noted earlier that outcomes of events can vary both in Justness (from just to unjust) and in Valence (from positive to negative). This section examines whether just outcomes are perceived as more likely than unjust outcomes, and if positive outcomes are perceived to occur more frequently than negative ones. We will also see if the Justness (i.e., deservingness) of an outcome is more important to the individual than its Valence (i.e., desirability). It is also important to examine the recipients of these outcomes. Thus, the respondent's Perspective, Sex, and Privilegedness will be examined.

The results in this section are based upon a three-between and two-within analysis of variance (see Table 2). The between subjects variables are the Perspective (actor vs. observer) and Sex (male vs. female) of the respondents, and the Sample (privileged vs. underprivileged) from which the respondent is drawn. The within subject variables are the Justness (just vs. unjust) and Valence (positive vs. negative) of the recipients' outcomes.

Justness and valence of outcomes. Which of the three hypotheses, the Hedonistic Justness (HJ), Just World (JW), or Self-Serving (SS), is best able to predict the results? According to the HJ hypothesis, the outcome's Justness and Valence are both important. Briefly, this hypothesis predicts just outcomes should be perceived as more likely than unjust ones, and positive outcomes as more likely than negative ones. In addition, since the Valence of outcomes are assumed to be of more importance than their Justness, both just- and unjust-positive

TABLE 2

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD
OF JUSTNESS AND VALENCE ACCORDING TO THE RESPONDENTS'
PERSPECTIVE, SEX, AND PRIVILEGEDNESS

Source of Variance	DF	MS	F
Between Variables			
Sample (A)	1	285.72	44.02 p<.001
Perspective (B)	1	7.30	
Sex (C)	1	18.90	1.13
AB	1	1.68	2.91
AC	1	.77	
BC	1	4.84	
ABC	1	1.19	
Error	152	6.49	
Within Variables			
Justness (D)	1	1365.41	187.14 p<.001
AD	1	166.76	
BD	1	20.36	22.86 p<.001
CD	1	1.21	2.79 p<.097
ABD	1	9.95	
ACD	1	3.59	1.36
BCD	1	48.74	
ABCD	1	.02	6.68 p<.011
Error	152	7.30	
Valence (E)	1	104.34	20.88 p<.001
AE	1	8.97	
BE	1	1.76	1.80
CE	1	11.29	2.26
ABE	1	20.61	4.13 p<.044
ACE	1	.45	
BCE	1	15.54	
ABCE	1	.05	3.11
Error	152	4.99	
DE	1	166.67	32.69 p<.001
ADE	1	1.41	
BDE	1	3.24	
CDE	1	19.12	3.75 p<.055
ABDE	1	13.62	
ACDE	1	11.54	2.67
BCDE	1	15.95	2.26
ABCDE	1	7.29	3.13
Error	152	5.10	1.43

outcomes should be perceived as more likely than just- and unjust-negative outcomes. The JW hypothesis predicts only that just outcomes will be perceived as more frequent than unjust ones regardless of their Valence. Finally, the SS hypothesis focuses on the Valence of the outcomes and not their Justness. According to this hypothesis, positive outcomes should be perceived as more likely than negative ones.

To test these predictions, separate scores were computed for the Perceived Likelihood of just, unjust, positive, and negative outcomes. These scores were computed by adding the individual's six item scores for each of these four types of outcomes. Each score had a possible range of 6 to 36; the higher the score, the higher the Perceived Likelihood of that type of outcome.

Table 3 indicates that just outcomes were perceived as more likely than unjust outcomes ($J > U$), and positive outcomes as more likely than negative ones ($P > N$). The analysis of variance in Table 2 shows these differences to be highly significant for both Justness ($F_{1,152} = 187.14$; $p < .001$) and the Valence ($F_{1,152} = 20.89$; $p < .001$) of the outcomes. Thus, people were reported as more likely to be recipients of deserved than undeserved, and desirable than undesirable outcomes.

TABLE 3

MEAN PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD OF THE
JUSTNESS AND VALENCE OF OUTCOMES

Type of Outcome		Mean
Justness	Just	25.62
	Unjust	19.64
Valence	Positive	23.51
	Negative	21.77

To this point we have examined the Justness and Valence of outcomes separately. The items in the questionnaire, however, described events in which the Justness and Valence of the outcomes occurred together; this provides the opportunity to examine whether the Valence of the outcome (i.e., its desirability) is more important than its Justness (i.e., deservingness). To do this, scores were computed by adding the respondents' three item scores for each of the just-positive, just-negative, unjust-positive, and unjust-negative outcomes. The scores for each of these types of outcomes had a possible range of 3 to 18; the higher scores indicating a higher Perceived Likelihood of that type of outcome.

The results show that the outcome's Justness was more important than its Valence; both just-positive and just-negative outcomes were perceived as more likely than unjust outcomes of either valence (see Table 4). However, Table 4 also shows that just-positive outcomes were

perceived as more likely than just-negative ones, but that unjust outcomes of either valence were perceived as equally likely ($JP > JN > UP = UN$). Generally, these results indicate that people are typically perceived as getting what they deserve, especially when they deserve desirable outcomes ($F_{1,152} = 32.69; p < .001$). For example, a person's good deeds (misdeeds) are more often noticed and rewarded (punished) than not, and good deeds are more often rewarded than misdeeds are punished.

TABLE 4

MEAN PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD OF JUST AND UNJUST
EVENTS WITH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE OUTCOMES

Justness of Outcomes	Valence of Outcomes	
	Positive	Negative
Just	13.88 ^a	11.83 ^b
Unjust	9.62 ^c	9.64 ^c

Note: Cell means with different letters are significantly different ($p < .01$ by Neuman-Keuls test).

Which of the three hypotheses fares the best? No one of them was able to predict all the results obtained. The HJ hypothesis was supported by the fact that both the Justness and Valence of the outcomes had significant effects. However, its assumption that the outcome's desirability (i.e., Valence) is more important than its deservingness (i.e., Justness) was not confirmed. Instead, the deservingness of the outcome was more important than its desirability (JP and $JN > UP$ and UN). Nevertheless, desirable outcomes were more important than undesirable ones when they were deserved ($JP > JN > UP = UN$). The JW and

SS hypotheses fared less well; neither predicted that both the deservingness and desirability of the outcomes would have an influence on the Perceived Likelihood measures,

Recipients of outcomes. Do people in different positions and roles perceive their outcomes similarly or differently? This section will focus on three general questions: (1) are outcomes perceived differently if oneself is the recipient (actor's perspective) than if someone else is the recipient (observer's perspective); (2) do males and females perceive outcomes differently; and (3) does one's degree of privilegedness affect the perceptions of outcomes?

Actors vs. observers: The HJ, JW, and SS hypotheses make predictions with respect to only the first of the above three questions. According to the HJ hypothesis, just outcomes should be perceived as more likely for oneself than for others and unjust outcomes as less likely for oneself than for others. Similarly, positive outcomes should be reported as more likely for oneself than for others and negative outcomes as less likely for oneself than for others. The predictions of the SS hypothesis focus only on the outcome's Valence; positive outcomes should be perceived as more likely and negative outcomes less likely for oneself than for others. Finally, the JW hypothesis predicts no differences between actor and observer perspectives.

Figure 3 indicates there was only a trend to perceive just outcomes as more likely and unjust outcomes as less likely for oneself than for others ($F_{1,152} = 2.79$; $p < .097$). Furthermore, the direction of this trend was entirely due to the perceptions of female respondents as




Figure 3. Perceived Likelihood of just and unjust events by actors and observers




Figure 4. Perceived Likelihood of Just and Unjust Events across Actors, Observers, Males, and Females

indicated by the Perspective x Sex x Justness interaction ($F_{1,152} = 48.74$; $p < .01$). Figure 4 shows only females reported just outcomes as more likely for themselves than for others, and unjust outcomes as less likely for themselves than for others ($p < .01$ by Neuman-Keuls test). Males reported no differences between themselves and others-- although there seems to be a nonsignificant trend for males to perceive fewer just and more unjust outcomes for themselves than for others.

Do actors and observers differ with respect to the Valence of outcomes? Our results indicate that positive outcomes were perceived as more likely to occur than negative outcomes ($F_{1,152} = 20.88$; $p < .001$) regardless of whether oneself or some other person was the recipient ($F < 1$). Furthermore, this was true for both males and females ($F_{1,152} = 3.11$; $p < .08$).

The HJ hypothesis made one other prediction concerning the actor and observer perspectives. Rather than detailing this complex prediction here (see Appendix I for the specific prediction), let it be sufficient to say that the respondents' perspective had no significant effect upon the joint operation of the outcome's Justness and Valence ($F < 1$). Respondents perceived both themselves and others as typically receiving just outcomes, especially when those just outcomes were positive.

Males vs. females: It has already been noted that females perceive justice as more likely for themselves than for others, while males perceived no differences between themselves and others. There was a trend toward one other sex difference; females tended to perceive




Figure 5. Perceived Likelihood of Just and Unjust Events with Positive and Negative Outcomes by Males and Females

just-negative outcomes as less likely than did males, and males tended to perceive both unjust-positive and unjust-negative outcomes as more likely than did females (see Figure 5). The analysis of variance in Table 2 shows this Sex x Justness x Valence interaction to approach statistical significance ($F_{1,152} = 3.75; p < .055$).

In spite of the above differences, members of both sexes were actually quite comparable. Both males and females perceived just outcomes as more likely than unjust outcomes, and positive outcomes as more likely than negative ones. Also, both sexes perceived no differences between themselves and others with respect to the Valence of outcomes.

Privileged vs. underprivileged: Does one's degree of privileged-ness affect the Perceived Likelihood of certain types of outcomes? For the most part, the privileged and underprivileged samples had quite comparable results. Both samples perceived just outcomes as more likely than unjust outcomes, and positive outcomes as more likely than negative ones. Females from both samples reported just outcomes as more likely and unjust outcomes as less likely for themselves than for others.

There were, however, some differences between the two samples. As Table 5 shows, the two samples did not differ on the perceived occurrence of just outcomes, but they did differ on the perceived occurrence of unjust outcomes. More specifically, the underprivileged sample reported a greater likelihood of unjust outcomes than did the privileged sample. The analysis of variance in Table 2 shows this Sample x Justness interaction to be highly significant ($F_{1,152} = 22.86; p < .001$).

TABLE 5

MEAN PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD OF JUST AND UNJUST OUTCOMES
FOR PRIVILEGED AND UNDERPRIVILEGED RESPONDENTS

Respondent's Sample	Justness of Outcomes	
	Just	Unjust
Privileged	25.31 ^a	16.93 ^b
Underprivileged	25.93 ^a	22.35 ^c

Note: Cell means with different letters are significantly different ($p < .01$ by Neuman-Keuls Test).

The sample from which the respondent came had one other significant effect (see Table 6). It was found that privileged respondents perceived a greater occurrence of positive than negative outcomes both for themselves and for others. In contrast, underprivileged respondents perceived that only positive outcomes for themselves were more likely than negative outcomes for others. It is also interesting to note the underprivileged sample reported a greater likelihood of both positive and negative outcomes than did the privileged sample.

TABLE 6

MEAN PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD OF OUTCOMES ACROSS
VALENCE, SAMPLE, AND PERSPECTIVE

Respondents'		Valence of Outcomes	
Sample	Perspective	Positive	Negative
Privileged	Actor	22.88 ^a	19.83 ^b
	Observer	21.78 ^a	20.10 ^b
Under-privileged	Actor	24.88 ^c	23.85 ^{cd}
	Observer	24.63 ^{cd}	23.30 ^d

Note: Cell means with noncommon letters are significantly different ($p < .01$ by Neuman-Keuls Test).

To summarize, the Perceived Likelihood measure yielded the following interesting results: (1) just outcomes were perceived as more likely than unjust outcomes ($J > U$); (2) positive outcomes were reported as more likely than negative ones ($P > N$); (3) just outcomes of either valence were perceived as more likely than unjust outcomes of either valence (JP and $JN > UP$ and UN); (4) just-positive outcomes were perceived as more likely than just-negative ones while there were no differences between unjust-positive and unjust-negative outcomes ($JP > JN > UP = UN$); (5) this was true for both perspectives ($JPA = JPO > JNA = JNO > UPA = UPO = UNA = UNO$); (6) females perceived just outcomes as more likely for themselves than for others and unjust outcomes as less likely for themselves than for others ($JAF > JOF > UOF > UAF$), while males reported their own and other's outcomes similarly ($JAM = JOM > UAM = UOM$); and (7) both samples reported more just than unjust outcomes, but under-

TABLE 7

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR
ATTRIBUTION OF CAUSALITY

Source of Variance	DF	MS	F
Between Variables			
PJ-Rank (A)	1	20.31	13.14 p<.001
Sample (B)	1	5.17	
Perspective (C)	1	.17	3.35 p<.070
Sex (D)	1	.01	
AB	1	1.12	1.33
AC	1	2.06	
AD	1	1.35	
BC	1	.01	
CD	1	5.19	3.36 p<.069
ABC	1	2.07	
ABD	1	.06	1.34
ACD	1	.07	
BCD	1	.79	
ABCD	1	.07	
Error	120	1.55	
Within Variables			
Valence (E)	1	40.89	33.43 p<.001
AE	1	1.28	
BE	1	2.30	1.05
CE	1	1.23	1.88
DE	1	7.23	1.01
ABE	1	2.85	5.92 p<.017
ACE	1	.14	
ADE	1	1.47	2.33
BCE	1	.55	
BDE	1	.72	1.20
CDE	1	1.49	
ABCE	1	.99	1.22
ABDE	1	3.47	
ACDE	1	.27	2.84
BCDE	1	2.28	
ABCDE	1	8.18	1.86
Error	120	1.22	6.69 p<.011

privileged respondents perceived more unjust outcomes than the privileged respondents.

Locus of Causality

What "reasons" do people give for the outcomes they receive? Are people attributed with personal responsibility for their outcomes, or are situational factors perceived as the cause? Are there differences when the outcomes are positive rather than negative? Do people perceive their own outcomes as occurring for different reasons than the outcomes of others? These are some of the questions we will focus on in the present section.

The results from this section are based upon a four-between and one-within analysis of variance (see Table 7). The between subjects variables are the respondents' PJ Ranks (high vs. low), Perspectives (actor vs. observer), Sex (male vs. female), and the Sample from which he/she was drawn (privileged vs. underprivileged). The within subject variable was the Valence (positive vs. negative) of the recipient's outcomes.

Predicted vs. obtained results. According to the HJ hypothesis people will make strong personal attributions of responsibility if an outcome is positive for themselves (actor's perspective) and negative for others (observer's perspective), and weak situational attributions if the outcomes are negative for themselves and positive for others. The SS hypothesis makes parallel predictions to those of the HJ hypothesis, but that both the personal and the situational attributions are predicted

to be strong. The JW hypothesis predicts that both actors and observers will make strong personal attributions regardless of the outcome's valence.

To test these predictions Locus of Causality (LOC) scores were developed for each respondent. These scores were computed by adding the number of times the respondent chose a personal cause (scored as "1"), rather than a situational cause (scored as "0"), for a given outcome's occurrence. Since there were twelve items for each respondent, the LOC score had a possible range of 0 to 12, with scores below six indicating the tendency to make situational attributions and scores above six indicating more personal attributions. Since half of the twelve items had positive outcomes and the other half negative outcomes, the scores ranged from 0 to 6 when the valence of the outcomes was a variable included in the analysis.

The results in Table 8 show that actors and observers did not differ. That is, people reported themselves and others as equally responsible for the outcomes they received. Although people were generally perceived as personally responsible for both their positive and negative outcomes (i.e., all cell means were above "3"), they were perceived as more responsible for their positive than their negative outcomes.

TABLE 8

MEAN LOCUS OF CAUSALITY SCORES FOR ACTORS AND
OBSERVERS FOR POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE OUTCOMES*

Valence of Outcomes	Respondent's Perspective	
	Actor	Observer
Positive	4.82 ^a	4.86 ^a
Negative	4.01 ^b	3.99 ^b

*Means are based on 0 to 6 scale.

Note: Cell means with different letters are significantly different ($p < .01$ by Neuman-Keuls Test).

Clearly, the absence of an interaction between the respondent's perspective and the outcome's valence ($F_{1,152} = 1.01$; $p < .317$) was inconsistent with both the HJ and SS hypotheses. On the other hand, the absence of this interaction (i.e., the consistent attributions to personal rather than situational sources) seems to support the JW hypothesis; however, the obtained differences between positive and negative outcomes tends to argue against it. Since no firm conclusions can now be made, let us turn to some additional analyses.

Causal attributions by high and low PJs. Do people who report that justice is highly likely to occur differ in their causal attributions from people who report justice as less likely to occur? We will now examine whether respondents who score high with respect to perceiving justice differ in their attributions of responsibility from those who score lower.

Respondents were categorized as either "High" or "Low" on the basis of a Perceived Justice (PJ) Score. Each respondent's PJ Score was computed by adding just item scores (i.e., the Perceived Likelihood of just outcomes) with the inverse of the unjust item scores. Thus, the higher the reported likelihood of just outcomes and lower the likelihood of unjust outcomes, the higher the PJ Score. Since each respondent rated twelve items on 1 to 6 interval scales, the possible range of the PJ Scores was 12 to 72. The sixteen respondents with the highest PJ Scores in each group (i.e., privileged-actor, privileged-observer, underprivileged-actor, and underprivileged-observer groups) were classified as High PJs. Those with the lowest sixteen PJ Scores in each group were categorized as Low PJs. Since the middle eight PJ Scores in each group were eliminated, there were 128 (as opposed to all 160) respondents represented in the analysis.

Table 9 shows that respondents who had high PJ Scores were more likely to perceive people as personally responsible for their outcomes received (i.e., had higher LOC scores) than respondents who had low PJ Scores ($F_{1,120} = 13.14; p < .001$).

TABLE 9

MEAN LOCUS OF CAUSALITY SCORES FOR PJ RANKS, VALENCE OF OUTCOMES, AND RESPONDENT'S PRIVILEGEDNESS

Variable	Level	Mean
PJ Rank	High	9.50
	Low	8.19 **
Valence of Outcomes	Positive	4.84
	Negative	4.00 **
Respondent's Privilegedness	Privileged	9.14
	Underprivileged	8.55 *

*p < .07

**p < .001

The above results indicate a relationship exists between perceiving people as getting what they deserve and perceiving them as personally responsible for their outcomes. How strong was this relationship? To assess this, correlations were computed between the PJ and LOC scores across a variety of categories (see Table 10).

Clearly, there was a significant positive relationship between the PJ and LOC Scores, such that increasing perceptions of justice by respondents was associated with increasing attributions of personal (rather than situational) responsibility to the recipients of outcomes. Although this association was true for all categories of respondents, it was significantly stronger for males than for females ($Z = 2.05$; $p < .023$), and tended to be stronger for the privileged than the underprivileged respondents ($Z = 1.71$; $p < .055$).




Figure 6. Locus of Causality for Male and Female Respondents across Actor and Observer Perspectives

TABLE 10
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCEIVED JUSTICE (PJ) AND
LOCUS OF CAUSALITY (LOC) SCORES

Variable	Level	r Value
PJ Rank	High	.25
	Low	.36
Respondent's Privilegedness	Privileged	.58*
	Underprivileged	.34
Perspective	Actor	.39
	Observer	.53
Sex	Male	.65 **
	Female	.39
All Respondents		.45

Note: All correlations were significant at least at the .05 level.

*p < .055

**p < .023

Males vs. females. Previously we noted that males and females differed on the Perceived Likelihood of just and unjust outcomes when the respondent's perspectives were considered. Are there sex differences on the LOC measure? As Figure 6 suggests, females tended to attribute more personal responsibility to themselves than to others for outcomes received. In contrast, males tended to attribute less personal responsibility to themselves and more to others. The analysis of variance in Table 7 shows this Perspective x Sex interaction to approach statistical significance ($F_{1,120} = 3.36; p < .069$).

Males and females differed in one other respect; males perceived people as equally responsible for their positive and their negative outcomes, while females perceived people as more personally responsible for positive than negative outcomes (see Table 11). This Valence x Sex interaction was statistically significant ($F_{1,120} = 5.92$; $p < .011$).

TABLE 11

MEAN LOCUS OF CAUSALITY SCORES FOR MALES AND
FEMALES ACROSS VALENCE OF OUTCOMES

Valence of Outcomes	Sex of Respondent	
	Male	Female
Positive	4.59 ^b	5.09 ^{ab}
Negative	4.18 ^a	3.83 ^b

Note: Cell means sharing a common letter are significantly different ($p < .01$ by Neuman-Keuls Test).

Privileged vs underprivileged. How do privileged and underprivileged people compare on their tendencies to make personal and situational causal attributions? The mean LOC scores comparing these two samples are shown in Table 9. Although these means failed to differ at an acceptable level of statistical significance, privileged respondents tended to be more likely than underprivileged respondents to perceive people as personally responsible for their outcomes ($F_{1,120} = 3.35$; $p < .070$).

To summarize, the LOC data yielded the following interesting results: (1) people perceived both themselves and others as more often responsible than not responsible for the outcomes they receive; (2) males perceived people as equally responsible for their positive and negative outcomes, but females perceived them as more responsible for positive than negative outcomes; (3) respondents who perceived justice as highly likely (High PJs) more readily perceived people as personally responsible for their outcomes than respondents who perceived justice as less likely (Low PJs); (4) females tended to perceive themselves as more personally responsible for their own outcomes than others were for theirs, while males had a tendency to assign less responsibility to themselves and more to others; (5) privileged respondents tended to perceive people as more personally responsible for their outcomes than did the underprivileged respondents; and (6) neither the HJ, JW, nor SS hypotheses received unequivocal support.

CHAPTER VII

DISCUSSION

In this final chapter we will attend to two general types of questions. The first set of questions refers to the perceived character of the outcomes. Are they typically perceived as justified and deserved or as capricious and arbitrary? Are desirable outcomes perceived as more likely to occur than undesirable ones? Does it make any difference whether oneself or someone else is the recipient of the outcomes? A second set of questions attends not to the character of the outcomes, but rather to the character (or motives) of the people who perceive those outcomes. Do there seem to be motives toward perceiving outcomes as deserved rather than undeserved, and desirable rather than undesirable? Is there as much concern about what other people receive as what oneself receives? Are there indications that people are guided by a moral sense of fairness or perhaps by a more base motive of self-interest? By attempting to answer both of these general types of questions, a more accurate picture of how people perceive the world and why they perceive it as they do, may be obtained.

The present discussion is subdivided into the following areas: the deservingness and desirability of outcomes, the recipients of outcomes, perceiving control through perceiving justice, self-interest versus morality, and methodological considerations and suggestions for research.

The Deservingness and Desirability of Outcome

It is assuring to see hardworking people receive their due promotions and those with noble intentions held in high esteem. Likewise, it seems only right that lackadaisical workers remain in less attractive positions and those with unkind intentions be held in disrespect. In one way or another these outcomes seem just and deserved. But what about the enthusiastic student who studies unrelentingly only to receive a mediocre grade, or the indifferent father who receives the unconditional admiration of his son? Where is the fairness in these types of situations? Somehow these people do not seem to deserve what they are getting. We are left with a feeling that things are not as they should be; something is wrong; something must be changed.

Do people see their lives in this assuring light; where they are more likely than not to get what they deserve? The results of the present study indicate that just outcomes were reported as more likely to occur than unjust outcomes (cf. Table 3, p. 54). In other words, people were typically perceived as getting what they deserve.

As several writers have pointed out (e.g., Lerner, 1970; and Rubin & Peplau, 1975), people are sometimes the recipients of deserved and sometimes the recipients of undeserved outcomes. These writers note that the incidence of undeserved suffering alone should verify the fact that we do not live in a world where people necessarily get what they deserve. Perhaps it is this fact that undeserved outcomes often do occur, that the motivation to at least perceive the world as a just place arises.

Let us now consider the desirability of outcomes. Whether an outcome is positive or negative seems to be an even more basic attribute than its deservingness. By definition, desirable outcomes are preferred and undesirable ones rejected.

If we assume, as we did with the deservingness of outcomes, that motives may bias perceptions in ways which enhance the attractiveness of the world, it would be expected that positive outcomes would be perceived as more likely than negative ones. Indeed, our results demonstrated that this was the case; positive outcomes were reported as more likely to occur than negative ones (cf. Table 3, p. 54).

Given that both positive and negative outcomes can be either deserved or undeserved, we can ask which of the outcome's aspects (i.e., its desirability or its deservingness) is more important than the other. Our results indicated that the outcomes's Justness was more important than its Valence. More specifically, just-positive outcomes were perceived as more likely than just-negative ones; but both of these were perceived as more likely to occur than unjust outcomes of either valence ($JP > JN > UP = UN$). According to these results, then, it seems that individuals are more strongly motivated to perceive people as getting deserved outcomes than perceiving than as necessarily receiving positive ones.

A study performed by Schmitt and Marwell (1972) also indicates that an outcome's deservingness may be more important than its valence. They found that when subjects were given the opportunity to either remain in an unjust situation with a relatively large reward or choose

a just situation where the outcomes were equitable but smaller, they chose the latter. In other words, their subjects were willing to forego large outcomes in order to receive just outcomes. Let us now briefly consider whether there are differences due to the person's perspective, sex, or privilegedness.

Recipients of Outcomes

Do people in different positions and roles view outcomes in the same ways or differently? In this section we will examine whether one's own outcomes are viewed differently than the outcomes that others receive. As we will see, perspective differences are closely tied to the sex of the perceiver. Our discussion, therefore, will also compare males and females. Finally, we will examine whether people from a privileged sector of the American population perceive outcomes differently from those who are less fortunate.

Actors vs. observers. Do people perceive the world as more just for themselves (i.e., actor's perspective) than for other people (i.e., observer's perspective), or more just for others than for themselves? Previous research suggests that actors and observers often differ in their perceptions. For example, it has been demonstrated that actors tend to perceive their own behavior as situationally determined, while observers perceive the behavior of others as dispositionally (personally) initiated (e.g., Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Storms, 1973; and Regan & Totten, 1975). These results suggest that actors see things as happening to themselves rather than because of themselves. In contrast,

it appears that observers perceive things as happening because of rather than to people. Of interest here is whether there are actor-observer differences, not in the perceived causes of behavior, but with respect to the perceived causes of the outcomes that people receive.

At first glance, the results seem to indicate that an individual's perspective may not be of major importance. There was only a trend to perceive oneself as receiving more just and fewer unjust outcomes than others (cf. Figure 3, p. 58). Further, the direction of this trend was totally due to the responses of females (cf. Figure 4, p. 59). Males reported no differences in the perceived likelihood of justice across the two perspectives. In contrast, females reported justice as more likely for themselves than for others, and injustice more likely for others than for themselves.

With respect to the valence of outcomes, it was found that positive outcomes were perceived as more likely to occur than undesirable ones, regardless of whether oneself or some other was the recipient (i.e., $PA = PO > NA = NO$). Finally, the individual's perspective had no effect on the relative importance of the outcome's deservingness and desirability; both actors and observers perceived just outcomes as more likely than unjust ones, especially when the just outcomes were positive (i.e., $JPA = JPO > JNA = JNO > UNO = UNA = UPO = UPA$).

How do we account for the overall absence of an influence by the individual's perspective? The possible argument that the different instructions and items for the actor-observer perspectives were insufficient to induce the intended perspectives seems untenable; there was

a significant perspective effect for females. Likewise, it cannot simply be argued the JW hypothesis, which contends the individual's perspective should have no effect, accounts for the results. The fact that females did respond differently with respect to themselves and others is contrary to this hypothesis. What we did find, however, was an indication that differences due to one's perspective may be closely tied to the sex of the perceiver.

Males vs. females. Let us now turn to a brief review of the results comparing males and females. For the most part, there were no extensive differences between males and females. Both sexes perceived just outcomes as more likely than unjust ones. Also, positive outcomes were reported as more likely than negative outcomes by both males and females.

In two instances, however, males and females did differ. First, females had a tendency to perceive just-negative outcomes as less likely to occur than did males, while males tended to perceive undeserved outcomes of either valence as more likely to occur than did females (cf. Figure 5, p. 61). The second difference between males and females brings us back to the perspective issue. Recall, males perceived justice as equally likely to occur for others as for themselves. In contrast, females reported that justice was more likely to occur for themselves than for other people (cf. Figure 4, p. 59).

Privileged vs. underprivileged. Do fortunate people and those less fortunate perceive their outcomes differently? To what extent do diverse personal experiences accentuate perceptions that are assumed to

be influenced by motives? This section examines whether two groups with differing backgrounds perceive their outcomes differently.

The backgrounds of our two samples differed extensively. The annual household incomes of the privileged respondents were in the \$12,000-16,000 range. Most of their parents had completed college and they were all in college themselves. In contrast, the annual incomes of the underprivileged respondents were most often below \$4,000. Most of their parents and themselves had not completed high school. Although these two samples perceived their own backgrounds differently, the "perceived" differences were not as great as the "actual" differences (cf. Table 1, p. 50). More specifically, the differences between the "perceived" incomes and education levels were smaller than the differences between the "actual" incomes and education levels for the two samples. These results are consistent with previous findings (e.g., Warner et al., 1949) that people tend to regard themselves toward the middle ranges of socio-economic categories.

How do our two samples regard themselves with respect to the justice in their lives? Although both samples perceived just outcomes as more likely than unjust ones, the underprivileged sample did report a greater occurrence of unjust outcomes than the privileged sample (cf. Table 5, p. 62). Interestingly, the results were not symmetrical with just outcomes perceived as less likely by underprivileged than by privileged respondents.

The two samples differed in one other respect. The privileged respondents perceived both themselves and others as more likely to be

recipients of positive than negative outcomes. The underprivileged respondents reported that positive outcomes were more likely for themselves than negative outcomes were for others (cf. Table 6, p. 63). Also from Table 6 it can be seen that the underprivileged sample reported a greater likelihood of both positive and negative outcomes than did the privileged sample. Surprisingly the underprivileged sample reports more positive outcomes than the privileged sample. Perhaps these differences are due to the higher perceived occurrence of unjust outcomes (which are also positive or negative outcomes) by the underprivileged respondents; essentially, the high scores for positive and negative outcomes by underprivileged respondents have been inflated by their high scores for unjust outcomes.

In spite of these two differences between the privileged and underprivileged samples, one is left with the overall impression they perceive their outcomes similarly. First, both perceive just outcomes as more likely than unjust outcomes. Second, both samples perceive people as more likely to be recipients of positive outcomes than negative ones. Third, males and females from both samples have comparable results. More specifically, both privileged and underprivileged males perceive justice as equally likely for themselves and for others, while females from both samples report more justice for themselves than for others.

Given the results reviewed to this point, what can be inferred about the motives that people may have? First, it is obvious that none of the hypotheses provide an adequate account of the results. The Just

World Hypothesis found support in a greater perceived likelihood of just than unjust outcomes, but was contradicted by the outcome's valence also having an effect. In contrast, the Self-Serving Hypothesis was supported by positive outcomes being perceived as more likely than negative outcomes, but not by just outcomes perceived as more likely than unjust ones. The Hedonistic Justice Hypothesis was upheld by the higher perceived occurrences of just outcomes and positive outcomes than unjust and negative ones. Contrary to this hypothesis, however, the deservingness of the outcomes seemed to be more important than whether they were positive or negative. It is this last result which invites speculation, and perhaps a way to integrate most of the data found in the present study.

Perceiving Control Through Perceiving Justice

Overview. Our speculation here involves the possible relationship between perceiving justice and perceiving control. Why should people be motivated to perceive the world as a place where outcomes are usually deserved outcomes? According to the JW and HJ hypotheses, a "just world" is essentially a predictable world; a place where certain outcomes tend to follow from certain inputs. Both theoretical (e.g., Festinger, 1954; and Heider, 1958) and empirical (e.g., Pervin, 1963; and Lanzetta & Driscoll, 1966) literatures suggest that predictable situations are preferred to unpredictable ones. Supposedly, being able to predict events and outcomes implies an understanding of "how things work;" given input X, outcome Y will follow. Perhaps, if one maintains

the belief of being able to "understand how the world works" there results the impression of being able to control it.

Kelley (1971b) has presented a similar argument about control, or at least the perception of control.

. . . attribution processes are to be understood, not only as a means of providing the individual with a veridical view of his world, but as a means of encouraging and maintaining his effective exercise of control in that world... If this view is correct, a consideration of control, and especially of the particular problems of control that face the socially interdependent human, should afford a basis from which to "deduce" the various aspects of the attribution process, both the more and the less rational (p. 22).

If a "just world" is one where the outcome Y is closely associated with the input X, a "controllable world" is one where if I desire Y, I will do the behavior (or demonstrate the attribute) X; but if I do not desire Y, I will not do the behavior (or eliminate the attribute) X. In other words, a "just world" can be construed as a "controllable world" where one can obtain desired outcomes and avoid undesired ones.

The essence of the present argument is that people are motivated to perceive their outcomes as deserved because it also implies they may be able to control these outcomes. Is there any evidence in the present study that when outcomes are perceived as just they are also perceived as controllable? Whenever one considers the Perceived Likelihood and Locus of Causality data together, the evidence is relatively convincing that when outcomes are perceived as just they also tend to be perceived as controllable.

If our reasoning is correct, since the respondents perceive outcomes as more often just than unjust, they should also perceive people as more often having, than not having, control over what happens to them. It would also be expected that those who see the world as highly just (High PJs) should perceive greater control than those who see the world as less just (Low PJs). Indeed, the Locus of Causality (LOC) data showed that respondents were more likely to make personal attributions (i.e., perceive recipients as personally responsible for their outcomes) than situational attributions (i.e., perceive environmental--uncontrollable--factors as the cause). Further, High PJs made more personal and less situational causal attributions than Low PJs.

This desire for control interpretation provides a satisfying explanation for the greater perceived likelihood of just-negative outcomes over unjust-positive and unjust-negative ones. If a negative outcome is received and it is perceived as deserved, it should also be perceived as changeable by altering the input. On the other hand, if an outcome is perceived as unjust (i.e., not aligned with, or not a function of, the input) there is little one can do to maintain it (in the case of positive outcomes) or eliminate it (in the case of negative outcomes). Clearly, it is to the individual's well being to perceive outcomes as just (and potentially controllable) regardless of their valence. As to why just-positive outcomes were perceived as more likely than just-negative ones ($JP > NJ$), there is no readily available answer. But, again, this is consistent with the LOC data which indicated that people were perceived as more personally responsible for

their positive than their negative outcomes (cf. Table 9, p. 70).

To summarize, in this section we have attempted to tie together the perception of justice and the perception of control. We have noted a consistent relationship between the perception of justice and perceiving people as personally responsible for their outcomes: (1) just outcomes were reported as more likely than unjust ones the same as personal responsibility was chosen as more often the cause of an outcome than environmental factors; (2) High PJs perceived people as more personally responsible for their outcomes than Low PJs; and (3) as just-positive outcomes were perceived as more likely than just-negative ones ($JP > NJ$), people were reported as more often responsible for their positive than their negative outcomes. We must now ask whether this interpretation remains viable when the perspective, sex, and privilegedness of the respondent is considered? Let us now direct the discussion toward an examination of this issue.

Additional evidence. As previously noted, there was no significant differences between actors and observer on the Perceived Likelihood measures when males and females were considered together. That is, the results indicated only a trend to perceive oneself as receiving more just and fewer unjust outcomes than others. Similarly, the Locus of Causality (LOC) data showed that actors and observers did not differ; respondents reported themselves and others as equally responsible for the outcomes they received (cf. Table 8, p. 68).

Recall, however, that perspective differences were demonstrated when male and female respondents were compared. More specifically, males had no differences on the Perceived Likelihood measures across the two perspectives. In contrast, females perceived justice as more likely for themselves than for others, and injustice as more likely for others than for themselves. If it is assumed that people perceive control through perceiving outcomes as deserved, these results seem to indicate that males perceive others as having relatively the same amount of control over outcomes that they themselves have. Females, on the other hand, seem to perceive themselves as having more control than others. The LOC data lends support to this reasoning; females tended to attribute more personal responsibility to themselves for their own outcomes than they assigned to others for their (cf. Figure 6, p. 71). It is unclear why males tended to report more personal responsibility for others than for themselves (rather than the expected equal amounts)--there is, however, a slight tendency for males to perceive justice as more likely for others than for themselves.

If these results do indicate a greater perceived control of outcomes by females for themselves than they perceive others as controlling their outcomes, the reader may find these results contrary to intuition. By returning to Figure 4 (p. 59) we find even more surprising results. Although both male and female actors perceived just outcomes as equally likely to occur, male actors perceived a greater incidence of unjust outcomes than did female actors. This suggests a net effect that males perceive less control over their own outcomes than females

perceive over their own outcomes. Again, the LOC data seems to support this contention; females tended to perceive themselves as more personally responsible for their outcomes than did males (cf. Figure 6, p. 71).

These results are surprising in several respects. First, they seem contrary to stereotyped beliefs about men and women. The male role has been assumed to be more assertive and action-oriented than that of the female. Parsons and Bales (1955) have argued that males are socialized into an "active" role and females into a "passive" role. It is these types of stereotypic roles that the Women's Movement has attempted to dispell; roles that are attributed to women not only by men, but also by women to themselves.

A second reason these results are unexpected is because of previous findings in the social psychological literature itself. Feather (1969) reported that females scored higher in feelings of inadequacy and made more external attributions of causality than males. Females also expressed lower initial confidence than males that they would succeed in solving anagrams. Deaux et al. (1975) found that males were more likely than females to play games of skill than games of chance and luck. Furthermore, males persisted to play the skill games longer than did females; perhaps males had greater confidence that they would eventually be successful. In general, previous research suggests that males perceive more control--or at least a greater ability to achieve success--over their outcomes than do females.

How can we account for the inconsistent results between the present study, where females seem to perceive greater control than did males over their outcomes, and the other data which indicates males perceive more control? One difference between the present and the other research is the type of situations from which the data was obtained. The other studies seemed to use situations or tasks which could be viewed as "masculine" in nature. For example, Feather's (1969) subjects worked on a "problem-solving task;" Wyer et al. (1975) had people respond to "achievement situations;" and Feldman et al. (1974) had subjects respond with respect to an "intellectual task". If, as Horner (1972) has suggested, females actively avoid success in male dominated tasks and situations, it would be expected that they would rate themselves as being less competent or having less control in these types of situations than would males. On the other hand, it would be expected that females would view themselves as more competent, or having greater control, on "feminine" tasks.

Were the sex differences in the present study an artifact of the types of situations represented on the questionnaire? A brief examination of some of the items were made in order to test this possibility. Although the items, for the most part, seem relatively free to sex-typing, two items which could most likely be perceived as "masculine" (items on school grades and traffic accidents) and two as "feminine" (items on love and consideration) were examined. Males and females did not differ across the two types of items. That is, the males' perceived likelihood ratings were the same for themselves and

and for others across both "masculine" and "feminine" items. Females showed comparable ratings across the items categorized in the two genders. In conclusion, it seems unlikely the sex differences were an artifact of the items used on the questionnaire.

If these sex differences are not a function of characteristics inherent in the items, it seems appropriate to examine more closely the characteristics of the respondents themselves. Rather than going far afield to account for these differences between males and females, it is believed that some data in the present study may at least partially clarify this issue.

Recall, the data on background characteristics indicated a few differences between the male and female respondents used in this study. One difference, however, seems particularly interesting; females perceived themselves as having more opportunity to live satisfying lives than did males (Table 1, p. 50). More specifically, females perceived themselves as having ". . . somewhat more opportunities than the 'average' person. . ." to live a satisfying life. Males reported ". . . about the same number of opportunities as the 'average' person . . ." to live a satisfying life.

Let us assume that the perception of more opportunities for a satisfying life is in some way related to perceiving greater opportunity to exert control and choice over one's outcomes. After all, if there is a perceived control of outcomes, one would be expected to maximize those outcomes which bring the most satisfaction and minimize those which would bring the least. If this assumption is correct, it would be

expected that females would report themselves as more likely than others (i.e., the "average" person) to receive just outcomes and less likely than others to receive unjust outcomes. Also, since males perceive their opportunities about the same as the "average" person, they should report the occurrence of justice as roughly comparable for themselves and for others. These results were in fact obtained (cf. Table 4, p. 56). With respect to the LOC data, it would be expected that female actors would assume more personal responsibility for their outcomes than would male actors. The LOC data indicated a strong trend in the predicted direction (cf. Figure 6, p. 71). Finally, the positive relationship between perceived opportunity and Perceived Justice (i.e., PJ Scores) is indicated by a small but significant correlation between these two scores for privileged respondents ($r = .18$; $p < .05$). Although there is no significant correlation between these two scores for the underprivileged respondents, the relationship is in the predicted direction.

Although the sex differences in perceived opportunities provides at least a speculative basis for understanding the sex differences on the perceived likelihood and LOC data, how do we account for these perceived opportunity differences? It cannot be argued the results were true for one sample but not the other; both privileged and underprivileged females say themselves as having more opportunity to live a satisfying life than the "average" person. Likewise, there were parallel results on the perceived likelihood and LOC data for respondents of both samples when analyzing their perspective and sex. The sex differences are obviously not tied to socio-economic differences. It is

interesting to note, however, that a vast majority (if not all) of the respondents were unmarried. Perhaps Bernard's (1972) observations that single females are more satisfied with their lives than married females, and single males are more dissatisfied than married ones, provides a starting point for further speculation.

So far, we have noted a parallel in results between the perceived likelihood and LOC data whenever the respondent's perspective and sex were considered. Let us briefly examine whether the comparison of privileged and underprivileged respondents continues to lend support to the notion that perceiving outcomes as deserved may indicate they are also perceived as controllable.

The most interesting difference between the two samples was the finding that underprivileged respondents reported a greater occurrence of unjust outcomes than did the privileged respondents. These results suggest that underprivileged people may sense less control over their outcomes than more privileged people. As would be predicted, the LOC data indicated that underprivileged respondents had a strong tendency to perceive people as less often personally responsible for their outcomes than did privileged respondents (cf. Table 9, p. 70). In line with this, Rotter (1966) has reported that people from lower socio-economic levels perceive their outcomes (rewards) as more externally controlled than people from higher socio-economic levels.

Throughout this section it has been argued that outcomes are typically perceived as deserved because it implies those outcomes may be controlled. Evidence reviewed has shown a parallel between perceiving

them as controllable. By highlighting the issue of control a more satisfying and parsimonious explanation of the data is provided than by either the Hedonistic Justice, Just World, or Self-Serving Hypotheses.

Self-Interest Versus Morality

Throughout this discussion section the argument has been presented that the perception of justice and the perception of control are closely bound together. The assumptions have been made that a "just outcome" is one that is aligned with (or follows from) a given input, and a "controllable outcome" is one that changes when the input is changed. Thus, if one maintains the belief that inputs and outcomes are typically aligned, one should also believe that changing the inputs will lead to changes in outcomes. Obviously, it is in the individual's own interest to (believe that he can) attain desirable outcomes and avoid negative ones by changing inputs.

But has this analysis taken a biased view of people? Perhaps it is not the motive to control outcomes which leads to the desire to perceive justice, but rather a motive to see the world as a fair place. In other words, there may be little or no self-interest involved, but rather a desire to see some "higher" moral principle attained. Indeed, Schwartz (1975) has argued that altruistic acts, sacrifices, and selfless expressions of benevolence are indicators of "Humanitarian Norms."

There may be people who organize their lives around principles which have a "true" moral base, or at least believe themselves to be doing such--after all, the attainment of that desired moral principle

is itself self-satisfying. The vast majority of people, however, probably behave in ways that appear to be morally based, but are actually costumes to disguise self-interest. The intent, here, is not to depict man as a deceptive creature, rather, it is society that designs these costumes in the forms of laws, rules, religions, etc., for people to wear. Baier (1975) maintains that moral principles exist only where people live in societies where there are established ways of behavior. He writes

The answer to our question, "why should we be moral?" is therefore as follows. We should be moral because being moral is following rules designed to overrule reasons of self-interest whenever it is in the interest of everyone alike that such rules should be generally followed (p. 29).

At this point it seems useful to make the distinction between short-term self-interest and long-term self-interest. A person who is operating under a short-term self-interest wants immediate gratification; that is, there is a resistance to forego present desirable outcomes and/or endure present undesirable ones for greater and more desirable outcomes at some future time. In contrast, with long-term self-interest there is a sacrifice during the present for a bounty at some later time. For example, work hard now (input) so that you will get a better job (outcome); save your money (input) in order that you may retire in comfort (outcome), or the meek (input) shall inherit the earth (outcome). In spite of the fact that long-term self-interest is in one's self-interest, we are left with an impression that society regards it as more virtuous or admirable (i.e., "moral") than short-term self-interest.

Why should societies advocate long-term over short-term self-interest, and how does this relate to the issue of justice? Briefly, a place where everyone pursued only immediate gains, followed every whim, or had no regard for future consequences, would be unpredictable, chaotic, and anarchic. Obviously, the society's survival is at stake in such a disruptive atmosphere; it is, therefore, in its advantage to encourage long-term self-interest. To make long-term self-interest appear viable, however, people must also believe that society functions in a just manner. That is, in order for people to delay immediate gratifications for larger ones at a future time, they must believe that people do indeed eventually get what they deserve--justice.

In summary, it has been argued that what may appear to be morally based behavior, may in fact be "disguised" self-interest. The disguise lies in the delay of the gratifications. Further, it was suggested that this delay is encouraged by society to help maintain itself, and that believing the world to be a just place provides a viable "reason" as to why it is feasible to delay gratifications.

Methodological Considerations and Future Research

In this section we will briefly discuss a few issues which may render some aspects of the present study questionable. In doing so, the problem will be stated, the viability of the criticism reviewed, and possible improvements suggested.

Perhaps the most conspicuous criticism of the present research stems from the fact that questionnaires were used as the means of data collection. The employment of questionnaires typically raises some longstanding questions: (1) did the respondents indicate their true beliefs on the questionnaires or were their answers misrepresentations of what they actually believe; (2) were there some things unique to the questionnaire-taking sessions which encouraged one way of responding over some other ways; (3) would similar results be found if different items were used; and (4) do people in their everyday lives actually perceive the world as represented by our results?

Although more questions could be raised, they would most likely also indicate that the issues at hand are those of the questionnaire's internal and external validity. The present study, however, is no more subject to such criticism than most questionnaire research, or for that matter, some laboratory (or experimental) research. In fact, there are certain features in this study which attempt to minimize the possibility of such criticisms. First, all the Perceived Likelihood (PL) items were rated by judges. These ratings indicate the extent to which each item describes just or unjust situations (see Appendix VI). From these judges' ratings it is clear that the just items describe just events and the unjust items describe unjust events. Further, this is true for items which have positive outcomes and for those which have negative outcomes across both actor and observer perspectives. Secondly, in order to account for the possibility that the PL rating of any item was unique to the theme (e.g., grades in school, receiving consideration)

of that item, each theme was systematically varied in its Justness, Valence, and Perspective. Thus, for each of the twelve themes there were eight variations (see p. 42). Third, since there were 96 different events represented in the study (i.e., 12 themes x 8 variations of each theme), there is obviously more generalizability than if only a few situations were represented, as is true in most laboratory research.

In summary, although the present study is subject to the typical criticisms levied against questionnaire-type research, there are certain features about this study which argue for the viability of the method employed.

Other potential criticisms lie in the comparison of the privileged and underprivileged samples. On a methodological level, it may be argued that the use of two translations, English and Spanish, led to the samples having different results. That is, the sample differences were in the translation of the items themselves and not a function of different beliefs between the two samples. Recall, however, it was previously reported that no significant differences were found between the Hispanic people which took the Spanish version of the questionnaire and the Hispanic people which responded to the English version (see p. 47). This suggests that the sample differences were not due to translation differences.

Again comparing samples, on a more interpretive level however, we cannot confidently conclude the samples differ solely because of differences in their privilegedness. The samples also differed on

factors such as cultural backgrounds and familiarity with responding to questionnaires. Further, the underprivileged respondents were paid two dollars for their services, while the college students were given experimental credits. In light of these differences between the two samples, in addition to differences in their privilegedness, it seems we must remain reserved in our conclusions.

A third area of possible criticism involves the relationship between the Perceived Likelihood (PL) items and the Locus of Causality (LOC) items. Recall, the results indicated that increasing perceptions of justice by respondents were associated with increasing attributions of personal (rather than situational) responsibility. The fact that the 12 PL items on each questionnaire had the same item themes (e.g., grades in school, traffic accidents, etc.) as the 12 LOC items may be an issue of concern. It is possible the respondents attempted to align their responses on the LOC items with those on the PL items. For example, if the respondents rated the "people who give love" are highly likely to "receive love" on the PL item, they may have felt that in order to be consistent, they should choose the alternative that the "people had given love themselves," rather than the alternative that "others are quite often affectionate" on the LOC item. This attempt to be consistent from the PL to the LOC items, however, is only a criticism if the respondents had formed an hypothesis, and were basing their answers on this hypothesis.

There are several ways to eliminate the above problem. One obvious method would be to have a long time interval between responding to the PL items and the LOC items. Such a time interval would reduce the possibility of recalling earlier responses, and thus make it more difficult to be consistent from the PL to the LOC items. A second, and perhaps better method, would be to use different item themes in the PL section of the questionnaire than those used in the LOC portion. This method would eliminate any attempt to be consistent from one set of items to the other, because there would be nothing to have to be consistent with. A third method, similar to the second, would be to replace the LOC items with a scale, such as Collins' (1974) I-E scale, whose measures are conceptually comparable to the LOC items.

Throughout this discussion it has been argued that in order for people to maintain the belief that outcomes can be controlled, they must also believe that inputs and outcomes are typically aligned. In a sense we have placed the motive for control of outcomes in a more important position than the motive to perceive outcomes as deserved; that is, in order to make the possibility for control more viable, the belief that outcomes are typically deserved is adopted.

The order of control first and justice second is merely assumed. One could argue for the opposite order in which the primary motive is to perceive inputs and outcomes as appropriately aligned, and the secondary result is that they are thereby perceived as controllable. A third possibility is that one does not affect the other in any direct manner, but that respondents who perceive outcomes as typically

deserved also perceive people as typically personally responsible for their outcomes. The data from the present study shows a positive correlation between perceiving responsibility (LOC scores) and perceiving justice (PL scores). Therefore, we can only conclude that perceptions of control and justice tend to vary together, and not that there is any causal link between the two. The next obvious step in research is to experimentally manipulate the perception of control to examine the changes in the perceived likelihood of justice, and vice versa. Such research should provide a clearer picture of the causal link (if any exists) between the two.

Finally, our discussion has focused on the control of outcomes. It has been argued that outcomes are perceived as changeable when the inputs are changed. There is an entirely new issue, however, when one considers whether or not inputs are perceived as controllable. For example, to what extent do people perceive their behavior as being under personal versus situational control (cf. Jones & Nisbett, 1971)? Also, are one's attributes such as good or bad intentions and envy or sympathy perceived as being under personal control? It seems evident that the extent to which the inputs are viewed as controllable or not should influence the extent to which outcomes are perceived as under personal control.

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APPENDIX I

SUMMARY OF PREDICTIONS FOR THE JUST WORLD, SELF-SERVING, AND HEDONISTIC JUSTICE HYPOTHESES

Variable	Hypotheses		
	Just World	Self-Serving	Hedonistic Justice
Justness (A)	J > U	J = U	J > U
Valence (B)	P = N	P > N	P > N
Perspective (C)	---	---	---
AB	JP = JN > UP = UN	JP = UP > JN = UN	JP > UP > JN > UN
AC	JA = JO > UA = UO	JA = JO = UA = UO	JA > JO > UO > UA
BC	PA = PO = NA = NO	PA > PO > NO > NA	PA > PO > NO > NA
ABC	JPA = JNA = JPO = JNO > UPA = UNA = UPO = UNO	JPA = UPA > JPO = UPO > JNO = UNO > JNA = UNA	JPA > UPA > UPO > JPO > JNO > UNO > UNA > JNA
J (just outcomes)	P (positive outcomes)	A (actor's perspective)	
U (unjust outcomes)	N (negative outcomes)	O (observer's perspective)	

APPENDIX IIA

ENGLISH VERSION OF PERCEIVE LIKELIHOOD ITEMS

CONDITION	ITEM	
1. JPA	When I deserve favorable evaluations I usually receive them.	
JNA	When I deserve unfavorable evaluations I usually receive them.	
UPA	When I don't deserve favorable evaluations, I nevertheless usually receive them.	
UNA	When I don't deserve unfavorable evaluations, I nevertheless usually receive them.	
JPO	When people deserve favorable evaluations they usually receive them.	
JNO	When people deserve unfavorable evaluations they usually receive them.	
UPO	When people don't deserve favorable evaluations, they nevertheless usually receive them.	
UNO	When people don't deserve unfavorable evaluations, they nevertheless usually receive them.	
2. JPA	If I have "lucky breaks," I have usually done something to earn my good fortune.	
JNA	If I have "unlucky breaks," I have usually done something to earn my misfortune.	
UPA	If I have "lucky breaks," I have usually done nothing to earn my good fortune.	
UNA	If I have "unlucky breaks," I have usually done nothing to earn my misfortune.	
3. JPA	If I drive carefully, I am less likely to get hurt in traffic accidents than if I drive carelessly.	
JNA	If I drive carelessly, I am more likely to get hurt in traffic accidents than if I drive carefully.	
UPA	If I drive carelessly, I am no more likely to get hurt in traffic accidents than if I drive carefully.	
UNA	If I drive carefully, I am no less likely to get hurt in traffic accidents than if I drive carelessly.	
JPO	If people drive carefully, they are less likely to get hurt in traffic accidents than if they drive carelessly.	
JNO	If people drive carelessly, they are more likely to get hurt in traffic accidents than if they drive carefully.	
A (Actor)	J (Just)	P (Positive)
O (Observer)	U (Unjust)	N (Negative)

CONDITION	ITEM
UPO	If people drive carelessly, they are no more likely to get hurt in traffic accidents than if they drive carefully.
UNO	If people drive carefully, they are no less likely to get hurt in traffic accidents than if they drive carelessly.
4. JPA	When I received high grades in school, it was likely I had studied.
JNA	When I received low grades in school, it was unlikely I had studied.
UPA	When I received high grades in school, it was nevertheless still unlikely I had studied
UNA	When I received low grades in school, it was nevertheless still likely I had studied.
JPO	When students receive high grades in school, it is likely they have studied.
JNO	When students receive low grades in school, it is unlikely they have studied.
UPO	When students receive high grades in school, it is nevertheless still unlikely they have studied.
UNO	When students receive low grades in school, it is nevertheless still likely they have studied.
5. JPA	By and large, I deserve the good things that happen to me.
JNA	By and large, I deserve the bad things that happen to me.
UPA	By and large, I don't deserve the good things that happen to me.
UNA	By and large, I don't deserve the bad things that happen to me.
UPO	By and large, people deserve the good things than happen to them.
JNO	By and large, people deserve the bad things that happen to them.
UPO	By and large, people don't deserve the good things that happen to them.
UNO	By and large, people don't deserve the bad things that happen to them.
6. JPA	When my parents rewarded me, it was typically for good reasons.
JNA	When my parents punished me, it was typically for good reasons.
UPA	When my parents rewarded me, it was rarely for good reasons.
UNA	When my parents punished me, it was rarely for good reasons.
UPO	When parents punish their children, it is typically for good reasons.
JNO	When parents punish their children, it is typically for good reasons.
UPO	When parents reward their children, it is rarely for good reasons.
UNO	When parents punish their children, it is rarely for good reasons.

CONDITION	ITEM
7. JPA	My good deeds are often noticed and rewarded.
JNA	My misdeeds are often noticed and punished.
UPA	My misdeeds are often unnoticed and unpunished.
UNA	My good deeds are often unnoticed and unrewarded.
JPO	A person's good deeds are often noticed and rewarded.
JNO	A person's misdeeds are often noticed and punished.
UPO	A person's misdeeds are often unnoticed and unpunished.
UNO	A person's good deeds are often unnoticed and unrewarded.
8. JPA	Often I benefit through endeavors of my own.
JNA	Often I suffer through faults of my own.
UPA	Often I benefit through no endeavors of my own.
UNA	Often I suffer through no faults of my own.
JPO	Often people benefit through endeavors of their own.
JNO	Often people suffer through faults of their own.
UPO	Often people benefit through no endeavors of their own.
UNO	Often people suffer through no faults of their own.
9. JPA	If I plan ahead, things usually go well for me.
JNA	If I fail to plan ahead, things rarely go well for me.
UPA	If I fail to plan ahead, things usually go well for me anyhow.
UNA	If I plan ahead, things rarely go well for me anyhow
JPO	If people plan ahead, things usually go well for them.
JNO	If people fail to plan ahead, things rarely go well for them.
UPO	If people fail to plan ahead, things usually go well for them anyhow.
UNO	If people plan ahead, things rarely go well for them anyhow.
10. JPA	If I give love, I generally receive love.
JNA	If I withhold love, I rarely receive love.
UPA	If I withhold love, I nevertheless generally receive love.
UNA	If I give love, I nevertheless rarely receive love.
JPO	If people give love, they generally receive love.
JNO	If people withhold love, they rarely receive love.
UPO	If people withhold love, they nevertheless generally receive love.
UNO	If people give love, they nevertheless rarely receive love.
11. JPA	When I am honest, I usually get my way.
JNA	When I am "sneaky," I rarely get my way.
UPA	When I am "sneaky," I usually get my way.
UNA	When I am honest, I nevertheless rarely get my way.
JPO	When people are honest, they usually get their way.
JNO	When people are "sneaky," they rarely get their way.
UPO	When people are "sneaky," they usually get their way.
UNO	When people are honest, they nevertheless rarely get their way.

CONDITION

ITEM

12. JPA When I am considerate, I typically have my consideration returned.
- JNA When I am inconsiderate, I typically have my inconsideration returned.
- UPA When I am inconsiderate, I nevertheless rarely have my inconsideration returned.
- UNA When I am considerate, I nevertheless rarely have my consideration returned.
- JPO When people are considerate, they typically have their consideration returned.
- JNO When people are inconsiderate, they typically have their inconsideration returned.
- UPO When people are inconsiderate, they nevertheless rarely have their inconsideration returned.
- UNO When people are considerate, they nevertheless rarely have their consideration returned.

APPENDIX IIB

SPANISH VERSION OF PERCEIVE LIKELIHOOD ITEMS

CONDITION	ITEM
1. JPA	Cuando merezco favorables evaluaciones usualmente yo las recibo.
JNA	Cuando merezco desfavorables evaluaciones usualmente yo las recibo.
UPA	A pesar de que no merezco favorables evaluaciones normalmente yo las recibo.
UNA	A pesar de que no merezco desfavorables evaluaciones normalmente yo las recibo.
JPO	Las gentes generalmente reciben favorables evaluaciones cuando ellos se las merecen.
JNO	Las gentes generalmente reciben desfavorables evaluaciones cuando ellos se las merecen.
UPO	La mayoría de las veces las gentes a pesar de que no merecen favorables evaluaciones las siguen recibiendo.
UNO	La mayoría de las veces las gentes a pesar de que no merecen desfavorables evaluaciones las siguen recibiendo.
2. JPA	Si tengo, "buena suerte" normalmente es porque yo he hecho algo para ganármela.
JNA	Si tengo, "mala suerte" normalmente es porque yo he hecho algo para ganármela.
UPA	Si tengo "buena suerte" normalmente yo no he hecho nada para ganármela.
UNA	Si tengo "mala suerte" normalmente yo no he hecho algo para ganármela.
JPO	Si las gentes tienen "buena suerte" normalmente es porque ellos han hecho algo para ganársela.
JNO	Si las gentes tienen "mala suerte" normalmente es porque ellos han hecho algo para ganársela.
UPO	Si las gentes tienen "buena suerte" normalmente no han hecho nada para ganársela.
UNO	Si las gentes tienen "mala suerte" normalmente no han hecho nada para ganársela.
3. JPA	Si conduzco con cuidado, las probabilidades de herirme en los accidentes de tráfico son menos que si conduzco sin cuidado.
JNA	Si conduzco sin cuidado, las probabilidades de herirme en los accidentes de tráfico son más que si conduzco sin cuidado.

CONDITION

ITEM

- UPA Si conduzco sin cuidado, las probabilidades de herirme en los accidentes de tráfico son iguales que si conduzco con cuidado.
- UNA Si conduzco con cuidado, las probabilidades de herirme en los accidentes de tráfico son iguales que si conduzco sin cuidado.
- JPO Si las gentes conducen con cuidado, las probabilidades de herirse en los accidentes de tráfico son menos que si ellos conducen sin cuidado.
- JNO Si las gentes conducen sin cuidado, las probabilidades de herirse en los accidentes de tráfico son más que si conducen con cuidado.
- UPO Si las gentes conducen sin cuidado, las probabilidades de herirse en los accidentes de tráfico son iguales que si conducen con cuidado.
- UNO Si las gentes conducen con cuidado, las probabilidades de herirse en los accidentes de tráfico son iguales que si conducen sin cuidado.
4. JPA Cuando recibí buenas notas en la escuela probablemente fue porque estudié.
- JNA Cuando recibí malas notas en la escuela probablemente fue porque no estudié.
- UPA Cuando estaba en la escuela, recibía buenas notas a pesar de que probablemente no estudiaba.
- UNA Cuando estaba en la escuela, recibía malas notas a pesar de que probablemente estudiaba.
- JPO Cuando los estudiantes reciben buenas notas en la escuela es porque probable ellos had estudiado
- JNO Cuando los estudiantes reciben malas notas en la escuela es porque probable ellos no hayan estudiado.
- UPO Los estudiantes reciben buenas notas en la escuela a pesar de que probablemente no hayan estudiado.
- UNO Los estudiantes reciben malas notas en la escuela a pesar de que probablemente que han estudiado.
5. JPA Generalmente, yo me merezco las cosas buenas que me pasan.
- JNA Generalmente, yo me merezco las cosas malas que me pasan.
- UPA Generalmente, yo no me merezco las cosas buenas que me pasan.
- UNA Generalmente, yo no me merezco las cosas malas que me pasan.
- JPO Generalmente, las gentes se merecen las cosas buenas que les pasan.
- JNO Generalmente, las gentes se merecen las cosas malas que les pasan.
- UPO Generalmente, las gentes no se merecen las cosas buenas que les pasan.
- UNO Generalmente, las gentes no se merecen las cosas malas que les pasan.

CONDITION

ITEM

6. JPA Cuando mis padres me premiaron era tipicamente por buenas razones.
 JNA Cuando mis padres me castigaron era tipicamente por buenas razones.
 UPA Cuando mis padres me premiaron era raramente por buenas razones.
 UNA Cuando mis padres me castigaron era raramente por buenas razones.
- JPO Cuando los padres premian a los hijos es tipicamente por buenas razones.
 JNO Cuando los padres castigan a los hijos es tipicamente por buenas razones.
 UPO Cuando los padres premian a los hijos is raramente por buenas razones.
 UNO Cuando los padres castigan a los hojos es raramente por buenas razones.
7. JPA Mis buenos hechos frecuentamente son notados y premiados.
 JNA Mis malos hechos frecuentamente son notados y castigados.
 UPA Mis malos hechos frecuentamente no son notados ni castigados.
 UNA Mis buenas hechos frecuentamente no son notados ni premiados.
- JPO Los buenos hechos de una persona frecuentamente son notados y premiados.
 JNO Los malos hechos de una persona frecuentamente no son notados ni castigados.
 UPO Los malos hechos de una persona frecuentamente no son notados ni castigados.
 UNO Los buenos hechos de una persona frecuentamente no son notados ni premiados.
8. JPA Yo frecuentamente me beneficio a través de mis propios esfuerzos.
 UNA Yo frecuentamente sufro a través de mis propias faltas.
 UPA Yo frecuentamente me beneficio sin mis propios.
 UNA Yo frecuentamente sufro sin haber cometido ninguna falta.
- JPO Las gentes frecuentamente se benefician a través de sus propios esfuerzo.
 JNO Las gentes frecuentamente sufren a través de sus propias faltas.
 UPO Las gentes frecuentamente se benefician sin sus propios esfuerzo.
 UNO Las gentes frecuentamente sufren sin causa de sus propias faltas.
9. JPA Si yo adelanto mis trabajos usualmente éstos me salen bien.
 JNA Si yo no adelanto mis trabajos estos raramente me salen bien.
 UPA A pesar de que yo adelanto mis trabajos éstos normalmente me salen bien.
 UNA A pesar de que yo adelanto mis trabajos éstos raramente me salen bien.

CONDITION

ITEM

- JPO Si las gentes adelantan sus trabajos usualmente éstos les salen bien.
- JNO Si las gentes no adelantan sus trabajos éstos raramente les salen bien.
- UPO A pesar de que las gentes no adelantan sus trabajos éstos normalmente les salen bien.
- UNO A pesar de que las gentes adelantan sus trabajos éstos raramente les salen bien.
10. UPA Si yo doy amor generalmente recibo amor.
- JNA Si yo me guardo el amor raramente recibo amor.
- UPA A pesar de que las guardo el amor raramente recibo amor.
- UNA A pesar de que doy amor raramente recibo amor.
- JPO Si las gentes dan amor generalmente reciben amor.
- JNO Si las gentes se guardan su amor raramente reciben amor.
- UPO A pesar de que las gentes se guardan si amor generalmente reciben amor.
- UNO A pesar de que las gentes dan amor raramente reciben amor.
11. JPA Cuando soy honesto usualmente consigo lo que deseo.
- JNA Cuando soy traposo raramente consigo lo que deseo.
- UPA A pesar de ser traposo usualmente consigo lo que deseo.
- UNA A pesar de ser honesto raramente consigo lo que deseo.
- JPO Cuando las gentes son honestas usualmente consiguen lo que desean.
- JNO Cuando las gentes son tramposas raramente consiguen lo que desean.
- UPO A pesar de que las gentes son tramposas usualmente consiguen lo que desean.
- UNO A pesar de que las gentes son honestas raramente consiguen lo que desean.
12. JPA Cuando soy considerada con los demás, típicamente recibo consideración.
- JNA Cuando soy desconsiderada con los demás, típicamente recibo desconsideración.
- UPA A pesar de que soy desconsiderada con los demás raramente recibo desconsideración.
- UNA A pesar de que soy considerada con los demás raramente recibo consideración.
- JPO Cuando las gentes son considerados unas con otras típicamente ellas reciben consideración mutuamente.
- JNO Cuando las gentes son desconsiderados unas con otras típicamente ellos reciben desconsideración mutuamente.
- UPO A pesar de que las gentes son desconsideradas unas con otras raramente ellos devuelven desconsideración mutuamente.

CONDITION

ITEM

UNO A pesar de que las gentes son consideradas unas con otras
 raramente ellos reciben consideración mutuamente.

APPENDIX IIIA

ENGLISH VERSION OF ATTRIBUTED LOCUS OF CAUSALITY ITEMS

CONDITION	ITEM
1. PA	When I am given favorable evaluations, it is typically because I deserve them.
NA	Others generally give me the benefit of the doubt. When I am given unfavorable evaluations, it is typically because I deserve them.
PO	Others rarely give me the benefit of the doubt. When people are given favorable evaluations, it is typically because. They deserve them.
NO	Others generally give them the benefit of the doubt. When people are given unfavorable evaluations, it is typically because. They deserve them.
	Others rarely give them the benefit of the doubt.
2. PA	When I have "lucky breaks" they tend to happen because Of things beyond my control.
NA	Of something I have done. When I have "unlucky breaks" they tend to happen because Of things beyond my control.
PO	Of something I have done. When people have "lucky breaks" they tend to happen because Of things beyond their control.
NO	Of something they have done. When people have "unlucky breaks" they tend to happen because Of things beyond their control.
	Of something they have done.
3. PA	If I avoid traffic accidents, it would be most likely because Of the improved safety designs on new highways. I am a careful driver.
NA	If I have traffic accidents, it would be most likely because Of the failure to improve safety designs on new highways. I am not always a careful drive.
PO	If people avoid traffic accidents, it would be most likely because Of the improved safety designs on new highways. They are careful drivers.
NO	If people have traffic accidents, it would be most likely because Of the failure to improve safety designs on new highways. They are careless drivers.

- | CONDITION | ITEM |
|-----------|---|
| 4. PA | If I got high grades in school, it would be because
I had studied my subjects.
The grading standards were easy. |
| NA | If I got low grades in school, it would be because
I had not studied my subjects.
The grading standards were difficult. |
| PO | If students get high grades in school, it is probably because
They have not studied their subjects.
The grading standards are difficult. |
| NO | If students get low grades in school, it is probably because
They have not studied their subjects.
The grading standards are difficult. |
| 5. PA | When good things happen to me, it is typically because
Good or bad things happen regardless of what I do.
I have worked to attain them. |
| NA | When bad things happen to me, it is typically because
Good or bad things happen regardless of what I do.
I haven't tried hard enough. |
| PO | When good things happen to people, it is typically because
Good or bad things happen regardless of what they do.
They have worked to attain them. |
| NO | When bad things happen to people, it is typically because
Good or bad things happen regardless of what they do.
They haven't tried hard enough. |
| 6. PA | As a child, I was rewarded because
Generally speaking, I was well behaved.
My parents felt obligated to reward me. |
| NA | As a child, I was punished because
Generally speaking, I was not well behaved.
My parents felt obligated to discipline me. |
| PO | Children are rewarded because
Generally speaking, they are well behaved.
People feel obligated to reward their children. |
| NO | Children are punished because
Generally speaking, they are not well behaved.
Parents feel obligated to discipline their children. |
| 7. PA | If my deeds are rewarded, it is probably because
Other people are typically kind to me.
I am in some way deserving. |
| NA | If my deeds are unrewarded, it is probably because
Other people are typically self-centered.
I am in some way undeserving. |

- | CONDITION | ITEM |
|-----------|--|
| PO | If a person's deeds are rewarded, it is probably because
Other people are typically kind to them.
They are deserving. |
| NO | If a person's deeds are unrewarded, it is probably because
Other people are typically self-centered.
They are undeserving. |
| 8. PA | When I benefit, it is typically because
I have done the right things.
Of a lucky streak. |
| NA | When I suffer, it is typically because
I have done the wrong things.
Of an unlucky streak. |
| PO | When people benefit, it is typically because
They have done the right things.
Of a lucky streak. |
| NO | When people suffer, it is typically because
They have done the wrong things.
Of an unlucky streak. |
| 9. PA | When things go well for me, it is most likely because
Good luck happened to prevail.
I planned ahead. |
| NA | When things do not go well for me, it is most likely because
Bad luck happened to prevail.
I did not plan ahead. |
| PO | When things go well for people, it is most likely because
Good luck happened to prevail.
They planned ahead. |
| NO | When things do not go well for people, it is most likely because
Bad luck happened to prevail.
They did not plan ahead. |
| 10. PA | If I receive love, it is probably because
Others are quite often affectionate.
I have given love myself. |
| NA | If I do not receive love, it is probably because
Others are not usually affectionate
They had given love themselves. |
| NO | If people do not receive love, it is probably because
Others are not usually affectionate.
They had not given love themselves. |
| 11. PA | Whenever I get my way, it is most likely because
I have been fair to others.
Getting my way is often a matter of good luck. |

CONDITION

ITEM

- NA Whenever I fail to get my way, it is mostly because
I have not been fair to others.
Not getting my way is often a matter of bad luck.
- PO Whenever people get their way, it is mostly because
They have been fair to others.
Getting your way is often a matter of good luck.
- NO Whenever people fail to get their way, it is mostly because
They have not been completely fair to others.
Not getting your way is often a matter of bad luck.
12. PA If I am treated with consideration, it is probably because
I have been considerate to others.
People tend to care about other people.
- NA If I am treated with inconsideration, it is probably because
I have been inconsiderate to others.
People tend to look out only for themselves.
- PO If people are treated with consideration, it is probably because
They have been considerate to others.
People tend to care about other people.
- NO If people are treated with inconsideration, it is probably because
They have been inconsiderate to others.
People tend to look out only for themselves.

APPENDIX IIIB

SPANISH VERSION OF ATTRIBUTED LOCUS OF CAUSALITY ITEMS

CONDITIONS	ITEMS
1. PA	Cuando recibo evaluaciones favorables, típicamente es porque Yo las merezco.
NA	Otras me dan ocasión a la duda. Cuando recibo evaluaciones desfavorables, típicamente es porque Yo las merezco.
PO	Otras no me dan ocasión a la duda. Cuando las gentes reciben evaluaciones favorables, típicamente es porque Ellas las merecen.
NO	Otras generalmente les dan ocasión a la duda. Cuando las gentes reciben evaluaciones desfavorables, típicamente es porque Ellas las merecen.
	Otras normalmente no les dan ocasión a la duda.
2. PA	Cuando tengo "buena suerte," suele sucederme por Cosas que están fuera de mi control.
NA	Alguna cosa que he hecho. Cuando tengo "mala suerte," suele sucederme por Cosas que están fuera de me control.
PO	Alguna cosa que he hecho. Cuando las gentes tienen, "buena suerte," suele sucederles Por cosas que están fuera de su control.
NO	Porque ellas han hecho alguna cosa. Cuando las gentes tienen, "mala suerte," suele sucederles Por cosas que están fuera de su control.
	Porque ellas han hecho alguna cosa.
3. PA	Si yo eludo accidentes de tráfico, probablemente es porque Las autopistas ya están mejores planeadas con seguridad.
NA	Yo conduzco con cuidado. Si yo estoy en accidentes de tráfico, probablemente es porque Las autopistas no eran planeadas con seguridad.
PO	No conduzco siempre con cuidado. Si las gentes eluden accidentes de tráfico, probablemente es porque Las autopistas ya están mejores planeadas con seguridad.
	Conducen con cuidado.

CONDITIONS

ITEMS

- NO Si las gentes estan en accidentes de tráficos, probablemente es porque
Las autopistas no estaban planeadas con seguridad.
No conducen con cuidado.
4. PA Si yo recibí buenas notas en la escuela, probablemente era porque
Estudíé much.
Las reglas de dar notas eran muy fáciles.
- NA Si yo recibí malas notas en la escuela, probablemente fue porque
No estudié bastante.
Las reglas de dar notas eran muy difícil.
- PO Si los estudiantes reciben buenas notas en la escuela, probablemente es porque
Ellos estudian bastante.
Las reglas de dar notas son fáciles.
- NO Si los estudiantes reciben malas notas, probablemente es porque
No estudian bastante.
Las reglas de dar notas son dificiles.
5. PA Cuando las cosas me van bien, normalmente es porque
La suerte está conmigo.
Las he planeado con tiempo.
- NA Cuando las cosas no me van bien, normalmente es porque
La suerte no estaba conmigo.
No las he planeado con tiempo.
- PO Cuando las cosas les van bien a las gentes, normalmente es porque
La suerte está con ellos.
Han planeado con tiempo.
- NO Cuando las cosas no les van bien a las gentes, normalmente es porque
La suerte estaba con ellos.
No han planeado con tiempo.
6. PA Cuando era niño, me premiaban porque
Generalmente, me comportaba bien.
Mis padres se sentian obligados a premiarme.
- NA Cuando era niño estabe castigado porque
Generalmente, me comportaba bien.
Mis padres se sentian obligados a castigarme.
- PO A los niños se les premian porque
Generalmente, se comportan bien.
Los padres se sienten obligados a premiarles.
- NO A los niños se les castigan porque
Generalmente, no se comportan bien.
Los padres se sienten obligados a discipoinarles.

CONDITIONS

ITEMS

7. PA Si mis hechos están premiados, probablemente es porque
Otras gentes normalmente me tratan bien.
De alguna manera soy merecedora de ellos.
- NA Si mis hechos no están premiados, probablemente es porque
Otras gentes normalmente sólo se interesan por si mismos.
De alguna manera no soy merecedor de ellos.
- PO Si los hechos de una persona están premiados, probablemente
es porque
Otras gentes normalmente le tratan bien.
De alguna manera es merecedora de ello.
- NO Si los hechos de una persona no están premiados, probablemente
es porque
Otras gentes normalmente sólo se interesan por si mismo.
De alguna manera no es merecedora de ello.
8. PA Cuando beneficios, típicamente es porque
He hecho las cosas correctas.
Es debido a mi buena suerte.
- NA Cuando sufro, típicamente es porque
He hecho las cosas incorrectas.
Debido a mi mala suerte.
- PO Cuando las gnetes reciben beneficios, típicamente es porque
Han hecho cosas correctas.
Es devido a su buena suerte
- NO Cuando las gentes sufren, típicamente es porque
Han hecho las cosas incorrectas.
Es dibido a su mala suerte.
9. PA Cuando me suceden cosas buenas, típicamente es porque
La suerte estabe conmigo.
Las he trabajado para obtenerlas.
- NA Cuando las cosas no me van bien, normalmente es porque
La suerte no estabe conmigo.
No las he planeado con tiempo.
- PO Cuando las cosas les van bien a las gentes, normalmente es porque
La suerte está con ellas.
Han planeado con tiempo.
- NO Cuando las cosas no les van bien a las gentes, normalmente es
porque
La suerte no está con ellas.
No han planeado con tiempo.
10. PA Si yo recibo afecto, probablemente es porque
Usualmente las gentes son muy cariñosas.
Yo he dado afecto.
- NA Si no recibo afecto, probablemente es porque
Usualmente otras gentes no son cariñosas.
Yo no he dado afecto.

CONDITIONS

ITEMS

- PO Si las gentes reciben afecto, probablemente es porque
Usualmente otras gentes son cariñosas.
Ellos han dado afecto.
- NO Si las gentes no reciben afecto, probablemente es porque
Usualmente otras gentes no son cariñosas.
Ellos no han dado afecto.
11. PA Si consigo lo que deseo, normalmente es porque
He sido justo con otras personas.
El conseguir lo que deseo es cuestión de buena suerte.
- NA Si no consigo lo que deseo, normalmente es porque
No he sido justí con otras personas.
La falta de conseguir lo que deseo es cuestión de mala suerte.
- PO Si las gentes consiguen lo que desean, probablemente es porque.
Han sido justo con otras personas.
El conseguir lo que desean es una cuestión de buena suerte.
- NO Si las gentes no consiguen lo que desean, probablemente es
porque
No han sido justo con otras personas.
El conseguir lo que desean es una cuestión de buena suerte.
12. PA Si soy tratado con consideración, probablemente es porque
He sido considerado con las demás.
Las gentes tienden a preocuparse por los demás.
- NA Si no soy tratado con consideración, probablemente es porque
No he sido considerado con las demás.
Las gentes tienden a preocuparse solamente por ellos.
- PO Si las gentes son tratadas con consideración, probablemente
es porque
Ellos han sido considerados con los demás.
Las gentes tienden a preocuparse por los demás.
- NO Si las gentes no son tratadas con consideración, probablemente
es porque
Ellos no han sido considerados con los demás.
Las gentes tienden a preocuparse solamente por ellos mismos.

APPENDIX IVA

ENGLISH VERSION ITEMS FOR "ACTUAL" AND PERCEIVED
BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS

ALTHOUGH YOUR ANSWERS ON THIS QUESTIONNAIRE ARE ANONYMOUS,
WE WOULD LIKE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

1. What is your age? _____

ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS MARK AN "X" BESIDE THE CORRECT ANSWER.

2. What is your sex? _____ Male _____ Female

3. When you were growing up, what was the annual income of your household?

- _____ Less than \$4,000 per year
- _____ \$4,000 to \$7,999 per year
- _____ \$8,000 to \$11,999 per year
- _____ \$12,000 to \$15,999 per year
- _____ \$16,000 or more per year.

4. If you compare your family's income with the "average" American family's income, do you see it as . . .

- _____ Much below average
- _____ Somewhat below average
- _____ Average
- _____ Somewhat above average
- _____ Much above average.

5. Estimate the amount of education your father had.

(Mark an "X" beside the highest level
he completed.)

- _____ Completed elementary school
- _____ Some high school
- _____ Completed high school
- _____ Some college
- _____ Completed college
- _____ Post-graduate degree
- _____ I do not know.

6. Compared to the "average" male in America, how would you rate your father's educational level?

- _____ Much below average
- _____ Somewhat below average
- _____ Average
- _____ Somewhat above average
- _____ Much above average
- _____ I do not know.

7. Estimate the amount of education your mother had.

(Mark an "X" beside the highest level she completed.)

- ☐ Completed elementary school
- ☐ Some high school
- ☐ Completed high school
- ☐ Some college
- ☐ Completed college
- ☐ Post-graduate degree
- ☐ I do not know.

8. Compared to the "average" female in America, how would you rate your mother's educational level?

- ☐ Much below average
- ☐ Somewhat below average
- ☐ Average
- ☐ Somewhat above average
- ☐ Much above average
- ☐ I do not know.

9. What is your father's occupation? _____

10. What is the amount of your education?

(Mark an "X" beside the highest level you have completed.)

- ☐ Completed elementary school
- ☐ Some high school
- ☐ Completed high school
- ☐ Some college
- ☐ Completed college
- ☐ Post-graduate degree
- ☐ Other (Please specify): _____

11. Compared to the "average" person of your own age and sex in America, how would you rate your educational level?

- ☐ Much below average
- ☐ Somewhat below average
- ☐ Average
- ☐ Somewhat above average
- ☐ Much above average.

12. Compared to the "average" person, how would you rate yourself on the number of opportunities you have had to live a satisfying life?

- ☐ Many more opportunities than the "average" person
- ☐ Somewhat more opportunities than the "average" person
- ☐ About the same number of opportunities as the "average" person
- ☐ Somewhat fewer opportunities than the "average" person
- ☐ Many fewer opportunities than the "average" person.

APPENDIX IVB

SPANISH VERSION ITEMS FOR "ACTUAL" AND PERCEIVED
BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS

AUNQUE SUS RESPUESTAS EN ESTE QUESTIONARIO SON ANONIMAS,
NOS GUSTARIA SABER LA SIGUIENTE INFORMACION.

1. Cuantos anos tiene ud.?

EN LAS PREGUNTAS SIGUINETES MARQUE UD. UNA "X" A LADO DE LA RESPUESTA CORRECTA.

2. Sexo: _____ hombre _____ mujer

3. Cuando era nino, cuantos eran los ingresos economicos que su familia recibia anualmente.

- _____ Menos de \$4,000 al ano
- _____ \$4,000 a \$7999 al ano
- _____ \$8,000 a \$11,999 al ano
- _____ \$12,000 a \$15,999 al ano
- _____ \$15,000 o más al ano.

4. Comparando los ingresos en su familia con la familia "promedia" Americana, ud. lo ve como . . .

- _____ Muy debajo del promedio
- _____ Algo debajo del promedio
- _____ Promedio
- _____ Also más alto del promedio
- _____ Mucho más alto del promedio.

5. Calcule ud. cuánta educación ha tenido su padre. (Ponga una "X" a lado del nivel más alto que ha terminado.)

- _____ Terminó la escuela primaria
- _____ Algo de la escuela secundaria
- _____ Terminó la escuela secundaria
- _____ Algo de la universidad
- _____ Terminó la universidad
- _____ Título post-graduado
- _____ No lo sé.

6. En comparasion al hombre "promedio" en los Estados Unidos, como calcularia el nivel de educación de su padre?

- _____ Muy debajo del promedio
- _____ Algo debajo del promedio
- _____ Promedio
- _____ Algo más alto del promedio
- _____ Mucho más alto del promedio
- _____ No lo sé.

7. Calcule ud. cuánta educación ha tenido su madre. (Ponga una "X" a lado del nivel mas alto que ella ha terminado.)
- ☐ Terminado la escuela primaria
 - ☐ Algo de la escuela secundaria
 - ☐ Terminada la escuela secundaria
 - ☐ Algo de la universidad
 - ☐ Terminada la universidad
 - ☐ Título post-graduado
 - ☐ No lo sé.
8. En comparasión a la mujer "promedia," en los Estados Unidos como calcularia el nivel de educacion de su madre?
- ☐ Muy debajo del promedio
 - ☐ Algo debajo del promedio
 - ☐ Promedio
 - ☐ Algo más alto del promedio
 - ☐ Mucho más alto del promedio
 - ☐ No lo sé.
- 9.Cuál es la ocupacion de su padre? _____
10. Cuánta educación ha tenido ud.? (Ponga una "X" al lado del nivel mas alto que ha terminado.)
- ☐ Terminado la escuela primaria
 - ☐ Algo de la escuela secundaria
 - ☐ Terminado la escuela secundaria
 - ☐ Algo de la universidad
 - ☐ Terminado la universidad
 - ☐ Título post-graduado
 - ☐ Otro (Por favor especifique _____)
11. En comparasión a la persona "promedia" de su propia edad y sexo en los Estados Unidos como calcularía su nivel de educación?
- ☐ Muy debajo del promedio
 - ☐ Algo debajo del promedio
 - ☐ Promedio
 - ☐ Algo más alto del promedio
 - ☐ Mucho más alto del promedio.
12. En comparasión a la persona "promedia" como calcularía el numero de oportunidades que ud. ha tenido para tener una vida satisfecha?
- ☐ Muchas más oportunidades que la persona "promedia."
 - ☐ Algunas más oportunidades que la persona "promedia."
 - ☐ Mas o menos igualdad de oportunidades que la persona "promedia."
 - ☐ Algunas oportunidades menos que la persona "promedia."
 - ☐ Muchos menos oportunidades que la persona "promedia."

APPENDIX V

RANDOM ASSIGNMENT WITHOUT REPLACEMENT OF ITEM THEMES
TO CONDITIONS AND QUESTIONNAIRE FORMS*PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD ITEMS
Type of Outcome

I T E M F O R M S		J+	J-	U+	U-
	A	10	2	12	8
		9	1	4	5
		7	6	3	11
		1	7	6	3
B		11	8	9	10
		5	4	2	12
		12	10	5	6
C		2	11	8	9
		4	3	1	7
		6	5	11	1
D		3	9	7	4
		8	12	10	2

LOCUS OF CAUSALITY ITEMS
Type of Outcome

+		-	
6	1	9	11
2	4	5	12
7	3	8	10
12	9	1	2
5	10	7	4
8	11	6	3
6	1	9	11
2	4	5	12
7	3	8	10
12	9	1	2
5	10	7	4
8	11	6	3

*These assignments are for both Actor and Observer questionnaires

Note: These numbers represent the item theme numbers in Appendices IIA, IIB, IIIA, and IIIB.

APPENDIX VI
MEAN RATINGS BY JUDGES OF ITEM THEMES*

ITEM THEMES	ACTOR				OBSERVER			
	JUST		UNJUST		JUST		UNJUST	
	POS	NEG	POS	NEG	POS	NEG	POS	NEG
1. Evaluations	5.57 (0.53)	5.86 (0.38)	1.71 (0.49)	1.86 (1.21)	5.71 (0.76)	5.57 (0.53)	2.14 (2.04)	1.00 (0.00)
2. Luckiness	5.57 (0.53)	5.57 (0.53)	1.29 (0.48)	1.14 (0.38)	4.83 (1.94)	4.83 (1.94)	1.67 (0.82)	1.83 (1.60)
3. Accidents	5.83 (0.41)	5.50 (0.84)	1.50 (0.84)	1.17 (0.41)	5.71 (0.76)	5.14 (1.86)	2.00 (1.83)	1.29 (0.76)
4. School Grades	5.67 (0.52)	5.67 (0.52)	1.83 (1.17)	1.67 (0.82)	5.67 (0.82)	5.50 (1.22)	1.33 (0.52)	1.67 (1.21)
5. + or - Things	5.57 (0.79)	5.29 (0.76)	2.00 (1.83)	1.71 (1.50)	5.17 (1.17)	4.00 (2.45)	1.17 (0.41)	1.83 (2.04)
6. Reward Children	5.67 (0.52)	5.83 (0.41)	1.33 (0.52)	1.67 (0.82)	5.50 (1.22)	5.33 (1.64)	1.33 (0.51)	1.17 (0.41)
7. Deeds	5.33 (1.63)	5.83 (0.41)	1.17 (0.41)	1.17 (0.41)	5.57 (1.13)	5.86 (0.38)	1.43 (0.53)	1.14 (0.38)
8. Endeavors	5.83 (1.63)	5.17 (0.98)	1.67 (1.03)	1.50 (0.84)	5.86 (0.38)	6.00 (0.00)	2.29 (1.98)	1.71 (1.89)
9. Planning Ahead	5.86 (0.38)	5.43 (0.79)	1.43 (0.53)	2.00 (1.83)	5.83 (0.41)	5.00 (1.54)	1.67 (0.82)	1.17 (0.41)
10. Give-Receive Love	5.67 (0.52)	5.50 (0.55)	1.50 (0.84)	1.50 (0.55)	6.00 (0.00)	5.00 (2.00)	1.67 (1.21)	1.00 (0.00)
11. Honesty	5.50 (0.84)	5.50 (0.55)	1.33 (0.52)	1.67 (1.21)	5.50 (0.55)	5.67 (0.52)	1.83 (1.60)	1.00 (0.00)
12. Consideration	5.83 (0.41)	6.00 (0.00)	2.16 (2.04)	1.67 (0.41)	5.86 (0.38)	5.28 (1.89)	1.14 (0.38)	1.43 (1.13)

* The higher the mean score the more that item was rated as a "just" item.

APPENDIX VIIA
ENGLISH VERSION OF GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

LIFE EXPERIENCES QUESTIONNAIRE

This questionnaire is part of an extensive investigation of people's personal experiences. Generally, the study is concerned with the relationship between what people do and what happens as a result of their actions. Before pursuing more specific questions, we have to understand the usefulness of the items in our questionnaire

You can help us by reading the instructions very carefully, and answering the items as frankly as possible. It is the honesty of your answers with which we are concerned. There are no "right" or "wrong" answers; we only want to know what you have observed to be generally true.

APPENDIX VIIA (cont.)

ENGLISH-ACTOR VERSION OF INSTRUCTIONS
FOR PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD ITEMS

On the following pages you are given descriptions of situations in which you already have found, or may find, yourself. Some of the statements are best read several times to make sure you understand them clearly.

After you understand the statement, please respond to the scale beneath that statement. Place an "X" in the space which best indicates what you believe is likely to be true.

EXAMPLE

When I am trusting of others, I usually get along well with them.

_____	:	<u> X </u>	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____
EXTREMELY		GENERALLY		SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT		GENERALLY		EXTREMELY
TRUE		TRUE		TRUE		TRUE		TRUE		TRUE

Or, instead you may answer:

_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	<u> X </u>	:	_____
EXTREMELY		GENERALLY		SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT		GENERALLY		EXTREMELY
TRUE		TRUE		TRUE		TRUE		TRUE		TRUE

Please base your answers on what you think is true for yourself in your own experience. By basing your answers on your own experiences they should be more accurate. People have more information about what happens to themselves than what happens to other people.

It is also important that your answers do not indicate what you think should happen, but rather what you think is most likely to occur.

IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THESE INSTRUCTIONS,
PLEASE DIRECT THEM TO THE PERSON ADMINISTERING THIS
QUESTIONNAIRE.

IF YOU HAVE NO QUESTIONS, TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE AND BEGIN.

APPENDIX VIIB (cont.)

ENGLISH-ACTOR VERSION OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR
LOCUS OF CAUSALITY ITEMS

On the following pages are instructions about events that may occur to you, or may already have occurred. While these statements are in some ways similar to those in the previous section, as you will see, they are also in some ways different.

Please complete each statement yourself by choosing one of the two endings we have provided. That is, after reading each statement, mark an "X" beside the ending which you think is most true.

EXAMPLE

When I do not get along well with people, it is probably because

 X of the way that I treat them.

 they haven't been very kind to me.

Or, instead, you may answer:

 of the way that I treat them.

 X they haven't been very kind to me.

Although you may not fully agree with either ending that is provided, just mark the one which you think is better or more likely to be true. Do not indicate what you think "should" be true, but rather what you think is most likely to be true.

As in Part A, base your choices on what you think happens to yourself.

IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THESE INSTRUCTIONS, PLEASE
DIRECT THEM TO THE PERSON ADMINISTERING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.

IF YOU HAVE NO QUESTIONS, TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE AND BEGIN.

APPENDIX VIIB (cont.)

ENGLISH-OBSERVER VERSION OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR
PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD ITEMS

On the following pages you are given descriptions of situations in which people have already found, or may find, themselves. Some of the statements are best read several times to make sure you understand them clearly.

After you understand the statement, please respond to the scale beneath that statement. Place an "X" in the space which best indicates what you believe is likely to be true.

EXAMPLE

When people are trusting of others, they usually get along well with them.

_____	:	X	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____
EXTREMELY		GENERALLY		SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT		GENERALLY		EXTREMELY
TRUE		TRUE		TRUE		TRUE		TRUE		TRUE

Or, instead, you may answer:

_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	_____	:	X
EXTREMELY		GENERALLY		SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT		GENERALLY		EXTREMELY
TRUE		TRUE		TRUE		TRUE		TRUE		TRUE

Please base your answer on what you think is true for other people. By basing your answers on other people's experiences, your answers should be more accurate. We can be more objective about what happens to other people than what happens to ourselves.

It is also important that your answers do not indicate what you think should happen, but rather what you think is most likely to occur.

IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THESE INSTRUCTIONS, PLEASE
DIRECT THEM TO THE PERSON ADMINISTERING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.

IF YOU HAVE NO QUESTIONS, TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE AND BEGIN.

APPENDIX VIIB (cont.)

ENGLISH-OBSERVER VERSION OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR
LOCUS OF CAUSALITY ITEMS

On the following pages are statements about events that may occur to people, or already have occurred. While these statements are in some ways similar to those in the previous section, as you will see, they are also in some ways different.

Please complete each statement yourself by choosing one of the two endings we have provided. That is, after reading each statement, mark an "X" beside the ending which you think is most true.

EXAMPLE

When people do not get along well with others, it is probably because

 X of the way they treat the others.

 the others were initially unkind to them.

Or, instead, you may answer:

 of the way they treat the others.

 X the others were initially unkind to them.

Although you may not fully agree with either ending that is provided, just mark the one which you think is better or more likely to be true. Do not indicate what you think "should" be true, but rather what you think is most likely to be true.

As in Part A, base your choices on what you think happens to other people.

IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THESE INSTRUCTIONS, PLEASE
DIRECT THEM TO THE PERSON ADMINISTERING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.

IF YOU HAVE NO QUESTIONS, TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE AND BEGIN.

APPENDIX VIIC

SPANISH VERSION OF GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

QUESTIONARIO DE LAS EXPERIENCIAS DE LA VIDA

Este cuestionario es una parte de una investigación extensiva de las experiencias personales de las gentes. Generalmente, el estudio se trata de las cosas que pasan a las gentes. Antes de seguir con las preguntas más específicas, hay que entender que los elementos en los cuestionarios son muy importantes.

Ud. puede ayudarnos al leer las instrucciones cuidadosamente y al responder lo más francamente posible. Es la sinceridad de sus respuestas lo que realmente nos importa. No hay respuestas "correctas" ni "incorrectas;" solamente queremos saber lo que ud. ha observado como verdad en general.

APPENDIX VIIC (cont.)

SPANISH-ACTOR VERSION OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR
PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD ITEMS

En las páginas siguientes ud. va a encontrar descripciones de situaciones en las cuales ya ha experimentado, o que va a experimentar por sí mismo. A veces hay que leer las declaraciones varias veces para poder entenderlas mejor.

Después de comprender la declaración, por favor, responda en la escala que está debajo de esa declaración. Ponga una "X" en el espacio que indique lo mejor que ud. cree que probablemente es verdad.

EJEMPLO

Cuando confío en los demás, normalmente me llevo bien co ellos.

	:	X	:		:		:		:	
SUMAMENTE		GENERAL-		ALGO		ALGO		GENERAL-		SUMAMENTE
VERDAD		MENTE		VERDE		FALSO		MENTE		FALSO
		VERDAD						FALSO		

O, en cambio ud. puede responder:

					X
SUMAMENTE	GENERAL-	ALGO	ALGO	GENERAL-	SUMAMENTE
VERDAD	MENTE	VERDAD	FALSO	MENTE	FALSO
	VERDAD			FALSO	

Por favor base sus respuestas en lo que ud. cree que es verdad para ud. mismo en sus propias experiencias. Al basar sus respuestas en sus propias experiencias éstas deben ser mas precisas. Las gentes tienes más información sobre lo que les pasa a ellos mismos que a lo que le pasa a los demás.

También es importante que sus respuestas no indiquen lo que ud. cree que debe pasar. Sino que lo que ud. cree que tiene más probabilidades de suceder.

SI UD. TIENE ALGUNA PREGUNTA SOBRE ESTAS INSTRUCCIONES, POR FAVOR DIRIGASE A LA PERSONA QUE ESTA A CARGO DE ESTE QUESTIONARIO.

SI NO HAY PREGUNTAS, PASE A LA PAGINA SIGUINETE Y COMIENCE A CONTESTAR.

APPENDIX VIIC (cont.)

SPANISH-ACTOR VERSION OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR
LOCUS OF CAUSALITY ITEMS

En las páginas siguientes hay declaraciones sobre los eventos que le pueden ocurrir a usted o que le han ocurrido ya. Sin embargo estas declaraciones son en alguna forma parecidas y en otra diferentes a las que usted había visto en secciones anteriores.

Por favor complete por sí mismo cada una de éstas declaraciones escogiendo una de las dos finales que le hemos dado. Quiere decir que, después de cada declaración debe marcar con una "X" al lado de la frase que usted cree que es la verdadera.

EJEMPLO

Cuando no me llevo bien con las gentes, probablemente es por

X La forma que yo les trato.

_____ Que ellos no han sido muy amables conmigo.

0, en cambio usted puede contestar

_____ La forma que yo les trato a ellos.

X Que ellos no han sido muy amables conmigo.

Aunque usted no esté completamente de acuerdo con ninguna de las respuestas finales que se le ha dado, lo que puede hacer es marcar solo una de las que usted crea que está más cerca de ser la verdadera. No indique lo que usted cree que "debe" ser la verdad, sino indique lo que se aproxima a la verdad.

Como en la parte A, base las respuestas en lo que usted piense que le puede ocurrir a usted mismo.

SI TIENE ALGUNA PREGUNTA SOBRE ESTAS INSTRUCCIONES, POR FAVOR,
PREGUNTE A LA PERSONA QUE ESTA ENCARGADA DE ESTE TRABAJO.

APPENDIX VIID

SPANISH-OBSERVER VERSION OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR
PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD ITEMS

En las páginas siguientes ud. va a encontrar descripciones de situaciones en las cuales las gentes ya han experimentado o en las cuales van a experimentar por sí mismos. A veces hay que leer las declaraciones varias veces para poder entenderlas mejor.

Después de comprender la declaración, por favor responda ud. en la escala que estaba debajo de ésa declaración. Ponga una "X" en el espacio que indique lo mejor que ud. cree que probablemente es verdad.

EJEMPLO

Cuando las gentes confían en los demás, generalmente es porque ellos se llevan bien entre sí

	:	X	:		:		:		:		:	
SUMAMENTE		GENERAL-		ALGO		ALGO		GENERAL-		SUMAMENTE		
VERDAD		MENTE		VERDAD		FALSO		MENTE		FALSO		
		VERDAD						FALSO				

0, en cambio ud. puede responder

	:		:		:		:		:	X	:	
SUMAMENTE		GENERAL-		ALGO		ALGO		GENERAL-		SUMAMENTE		
VERDAD		MENTE		VERDAD		FALSO		MENTE		FALSO		
		VERDAD						FALSO				

Por favor base la respuesta sobre lo que ud. cree que es verdad para los demás. Al basar las respuestas en las experiencias de los demás, sus respuestas deben ser más precisas. Nosotros podemos ser más objetivos sobre lo que pasa a los demás que sobre lo que nos pasa a nosotros mismos.

También es importante que las respuestas no indiquen lo que ud. cree que debe pasar, sino lo que ud. cree que tiene mas probabilidades de suceder.

SI UD. TIENE ALGUNA PREGUNTA SOBRE ESTAS INSTRUCCIONES, POR FAVOR DIRIGASE A LA PERSONA QUE ESTA A CARGO DE ESTE QUESTIONARIO.

SI NO HAY PREGUNTAS, PASE A LA PAGINA SIGUIENTE Y COMIENCE A CONTESTAR.

APPENDIX VIID (cont.)

SPANISH-OBSERVER VERSION OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR
LOCUS OF CAUSALITY ITEMS

En las páginas siguientes hay declaraciones sobre los eventos que les pueden ocurrir a las gentes, o que les han ocurrido ya. Sin embargo éstas declaraciones son en alguna forma parecidas y en otra diferentes a las que usted había visto en secciones anteriores.

Por favor complete por sí mismo cada una de éstas declaraciones escogiendo una de las dos finales que le hemos dado. Quiere decir que, después de cada declaración debe marcar con un "X" al lado de la frase que usted cree que es la verdadera.

EJEMPLO

Cuando las gentes no se llevan bien unas con otras, probablemente es por

 X La forma en que tratan a los demás.

 Que los demás no han sido amables con ellos.

 0 , en cambio puede contestar

 La forma en que tratan a los demás.

 X Que los demás no han sido amables con ellos.

Aunque usted no esté completamente de acuerdo con ninguna de las respuestas finales que se le ha dado, lo que puede hacer es marcar sólo una de las que usted crea que esta más cerca de ser la verdadera. No indique lo que usted cree que "debe" ser la verdad, sino indique lo que se aproxima a la verdad.

Como in la parte A, base sus respuestas en lo que usted cree que le puede ocurrir a las gentes.

SI TIENE ALGUNA PREGUNTA SOBRE ESTAS INSTRUCCIONES, POR FAVOR,
PREGUNTE A LA PERSONA QUE ESTA ENCARGADA DE ESTE TRABAJO.

Footnotes

1. These definitions of perceived justice and perceived injustice are consistent with various social psychological treatments of what may be called actual justice. Stouffer *et. al.* (1949) found that soldiers expressed dissatisfaction when there was a discrepancy between what they thought they should receive and what they actually received. Heider's (1958) balance theory suggests that people prefer to perceive positive correlations between an individual's personal characteristics (e.g., virtue) and the nature of the outcome received (e.g., happiness). The concept of "distributive justice" (Homans, 1961) maintains that people work toward a proportional relationship between investments and outcomes. Adam's (1965) equity theory claims that people not only "actually" (try to) maintain an appropriate relationship between investments and outcomes, but also may cognitively distort the relationship in order to "perceive" it as just.

