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Proper names, beliefs, and definite descriptions.

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**FIVE COLLEGE
DEPOSITORY**

PROPER NAMES, BELIEFS, AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS

A Dissertation Presented

By

THOMAS CHARLES RYCKMAN

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

September 1984

Department of Philosophy

Thomas Charles Ryckman



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
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
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
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Dedicated, with love, to

Susanne Burgess Ryckman

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Herbert Heidelberger and I discussed my dissertation as late as a month before his untimely death. I have no doubt that I would be a better philosopher had he lived. More than any single person, he made me understand how important it is to ask and try to clearly answer two questions about a given thesis. First, exactly what is the thesis? Second, what arguments are given to support it? Once, after I told him that I thought a particular guest lecture was "great," he proceeded--repeatedly, and in a variety of ways--to ask me those two questions. I was surprised to discover that I did not know the answers. It is a lesson I have never forgotten.

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Bonney Deres typed the final copy. She accepted the job on fairly short notice, and has met every schedule with time to spare. With her, I have benefited from working with someone who is well-acquainted with the

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ABSTRACT

Proper Names, Beliefs, and Definite Descriptions

September 1984

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This dissertation investigates issues raised by these two questions: (i) what kinds of propositions are ordinarily expressed by uses of sentences that contain proper names; and (ii) what kinds of beliefs are ordinarily on the minds of speakers when they use sentences that contain proper names? It develops a new view about the connections between beliefs, linguistic behavior, and propositional content, one that explicitly denies that the kinds of propositions typically expressed by uses of such sentences are the objects of the beliefs typically on the minds of the speakers who use them.

Chapter I presents both the Millian and the the description theories of proper names, and reviews the advantages and disadvantages of each.

Chapter II critically evaluates Dummett's defense of the description theory against the Modal Objection.

Chapter III introduces Kripke's puzzle about beliefs and proper names. it shows that Kripke's puzzle is not solved by the theory of proper names recently presented by Devitt. It critically evaluates the "consistency solutions" proposed by Chisholm, Harrison, Noonan, and Over.

Chapter IV continues the discussion of Kripke's puzzle. It critically evaluates the "inconsistency solution" proposed by Marcus. It

examines a commentary on the puzzle by Lewis. Finally, it presents an "inconsistency solution" based on views suggested by the Lewis commentary.

Chapter V compares my view about the connections between beliefs, linguistic behavior, and propositional content to the "naive view" and the "Russellean view." It applies my view to solve two major problems for the Millian theory of proper names.

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CHAPTER I

TWO THEORIES OF PROPER NAMES: THE MILLIAN THEORY AND THE DESCRIPTION THEORY

Our uses of proper names and the sentences in which they occur give rise to at least two philosophically significant questions. First, what kind of proposition, singular or general, is expressed by an ordinary use of a sentence that contains a proper name?¹ Second, what kind of belief is ordinarily on the mind of a speaker when he uses a sentence that contains a proper name? A theory of the meaning of proper names will attempt to answer the first question; that is, will attempt to say what kinds of propositions are ordinarily expressed by uses of sentences that contain proper names. A central thesis of this dissertation is that we have been ill-served by our failure to observe the distinction between these two questions and misled by the assumption that when we answer the first question we have, thereby, also answered the second question.

Section One

There are two major kinds of theories of the meaning of proper names. A given theory is a Millian theory if it entails that ordinary uses of name sentences express singular propositions.² A given theory is a description theory if it entails that ordinary uses of name sentences express general, or qualitative, propositions.³

According to the Millian theory, a proper name means what it refers to.⁴ Whatever it means to say that a name means what it refers to, there is widespread agreement that it entails two significant theses. First,

that a name means what it refers to, is held to entail that names which co-refer are everywhere substitutable both salva veritate and salva significatione. After all, if names mean what they refer to, then names that refer to the same thing mean the same thing. Second, that a name means what it refers to, is held to entail that when an apparent proper name lacks a referent, uses of sentences in which it occurs do not express propositions, lack propositional content, and do not say anything either true or false. After all, if the meaning of a proper name is its referent, then a name with no referent is a name with no meaning.

These two theses of the Millian theory are the source of its three major problems. These problems have led philosophers to seek alternatives to the Millian theory. This, in turn, led to the development of the description theory.

The first of these problems is the problem of significant (or non-trivial), true, identity sentences. Sentences

(1) Hesperus is Hesperus,

and

(2) Hesperus is Phosphorus,

differ in cognitive significance. A speaker who is disposed to assent to (1) need not be disposed to assent to (2). According to Gottlob Frege (1975), (1) is not cognitively significant, whereas (2) is cognitively significant.

This raises a problem for the Millian. For, according to the Millian theory, since 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' codesignate, sentences (1) and (2) express the same proposition, have the same propositional content, and say the same thing. In cases where the sentences involved express

different propositions, the Millian could always account for differences in cognitive significance by means of differences in propositional content. However, when, as in the case of (1) and (2), the sentences involved (purportedly) express the same proposition, such an account is unavailable. In fact, one could argue from the standard explanation--from a divergence in cognitive significance, to a divergence in propositional content--to the conclusion that (1) and (2) do not express the same proposition, despite the fact that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' codesignate. The Millian theory leaves us in need of an explanation of how sentences like (2) can be both true and cognitively significant.

It is useful to regard the problem of significant, true, identity sentences as a species of the more general problem of the apparent failure of the substitutivity of codesignating proper names. This general problem derives from evidence which is usually taken to show that, contrary to the Millian theory of meaning, codesignating proper names are not everywhere interchangeable both salva veritate and salva significatione. Such evidence is of two kinds, and one of the two is parasitic on the other.

The first kind of evidence is that a speaker who is disposed to assent to such as sentence as

(3) Hesperus is visible

may not be disposed to assent to, indeed may be disposed to dissent from, such a sentence as

(4) Phosphorus is visible,

in spite of the fact that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' codesignate.

Arguing from the usual explanation of such phenomena, philosophers have

concluded that (3) and (4) do not express the same proposition.

The second kind of evidence is that speakers sometimes report on the doxastic state of others by saying such things as 'S believe that Hesperus is visible and does not believe that Phosphorus is visible.' If such reports are ever true, then, according to a very natural analysis of belief ascription sentences--namely: 'S believes that ϕ ' is true if and only if the belief relation relates the designatum of 'S' to the proposition expressed by ' ϕ '--then one and the same person may believe the proposition expressed by (3) but not believe the proposition expressed by (4). Again, such evidence would seem to prove that (3) and (4) do not express the same proposition.

The second kind of evidence is parasitic on the first kind of evidence in as much as one's evidence that such reports are true is that speakers who are disposed to assent to sentences like (3) need not be disposed to assent to, indeed are often disposed to dissent from, sentences like (4).

The third major problem for the Millian theory is the problem of apparently true, negative existential sentences. Sentence

(5) Pegasus does not exist

certainly seems true; nevertheless, if the Millian theory is true, (5) does not express any proposition. This is because 'Pegasus' lacks a referent and the Millian theory entails that sentences containing non-referring names do not express propositions. Therefore, unless the Millian is prepared to say that a sentence like (5) can be true even though it fails to express a (true) proposition, he must hold that (5) is not true.

Another problem for the Millian theory is raised by such sentences as

(6) Pegasus has wings,

and

(7) Pegasus does not have wings.

It is reasonable to think of (7) as the denial of (6), and to maintain that one of the two is true and the other false. According to the Millian theory, however, since 'Pegasus' lacks a referent, neither (6) nor (7) expresses a proposition; and, therefore, unless the Millian is willing to say that sentences like (6) and (7) can have truth-values without expressing propositions, he must concede the counter-intuitive result that neither (6) nor (7) is either true or false.

Section Two

The description theory was developed to solve these three problems. According to a "standard version" of the description theory, when a speaker uses a proper name, he associates it with some definite description.⁵ According to the standard version of the description theory of the reference of proper names, the referent, if any, of a given use of a proper name is the object, if any, designated by its associated definite description.⁶ According to the standard version of the description theory, the proposition, if any, expressed by a given use of a sentence that contains a proper name is the proposition, if any, its user would express were he to use the sentence that results from the sentence he in fact used when the name it contains is everywhere (therein) replaced by its associated definite description. This standard

version of the description theory admits solutions to each of the three problems described above.

According to the description theory, a speaker who assents to

(1) Hesperus is Hesperus

but not to

(2) Hesperus is Phosphorus

does so because he associates 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' with different definite descriptions. Suppose, for example that he associates the name 'Hesperus' with the definite description 'the celestial body called the Evening Star' and the name 'Phosphorus' with the definite description 'the celestial body called the Morning Star.' Then, according to the description theory, if he were to use (1) he would use it to express the proposition expressed by

(1') The celestial body called the Evening Star is the
celestial body called the Evening Star,

and if he were to use (2) he would use it to express the proposition expressed by

(2') The celestial body called the Evening Star is the
celestial body called the Morning Star.

For such a speaker, (1) and (2) do not express the same proposition.

This allows the description theorist to give the standard account of why such a speaker assents to (1) but not to (2): he assents to (1) because he believes the proposition he would use it to express and he does not assent to (2) because he does not believe the proposition he would use it to express. In this way the description theory explains the difference in cognitive significance between (1) and (2).

The description theory also explains apparent failures of substitutivity. As in the case of (1) and (2), a speaker who assents to

(3) Hesperus is visible

but not to

(4) Phosphorus is visible

does so, according to the description theory, because he associates 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' with different definite descriptions. Such a speaker may use (3) to express the proposition he would express were he to use

(3') The celestial body called the Evening Star is visible, but use (4) to express the proposition he would express were he to use

(4') The celestial body called the Morning Star is visible.

Thus, according to the description theory, such a speaker may assent to (3) because he believes the proposition he would express were he to use (3), but not assent to (4) because he does not believe the proposition he would express were he to use (4). Apparently, the description theory explains why coreferential proper names are not interchangeable both salva veritate and salva significatione.

According to the description theory,⁷ when a speaker uses sentence

(5) Pegasus does not exist,

he associates the proper name 'Pegasus' with some definite description, say, 'the winged horse of greek mythology,' and he thereby expresses the proposition he would have expressed had he used

(5') The winged horse of greek mythology does not exist.

One need then only refer to a theory of definite descriptions, such as Bertrand Russell's,⁸ for an account of how sentence (5) can express a

proposition, and a true proposition at that, even though its grammatical subject, 'the winged horse of greek mythology,' does not designate anything. In this way, while it may not completely eliminate the problems caused by negative existential name sentences, the description theory at least subsumes them under problems we already have quite independent of our theory of proper names.

The description theory offers a similar solution the the problems raised by sentences which contain so-called "non-referring names." According to the description theory, a speaker who says

(6) Pegasus has wings

associates 'Pegasus' with some definite description, say, 'the winged horse of greek mythology,' and thereby expresses the proposition he would express were he to say

(6') The winged horse of greek mythology has wings.

Similarly, if such a speaker were to say

(7) Pegasus does not have wings,

he would express the proposition he would express were he to say

(7') The winged horse of greek mythology does not have wings.

Again, the description theorist then refers to his theory of definite descriptions for an explanation of how (6') and (7') can express propositions even though 'the winged horse of greek mythology' does not designate anything.

Section Three

The major problems confronting the description theory have been stated in articles by Saul Kripke⁹ and Keith Donnellan,¹⁰ among others.¹¹ The objections involve theses common to most description theories of proper names. First, there is the thesis that speakers who use proper names associate them with definite descriptions. Following Donnellan, we will say that such a description backs the speaker's use of the name he used, and I shall refer to this thesis as the "Backing Description Thesis." Second, there is the thesis that the proposition a speaker expresses by his use of a given name sentence is the proposition he would express were he to use the sentence that results from substituting the name's backing description for the name everywhere the name occurs in the original name sentence. I will call this the "Synonymy Thesis."

The No Description Objection to the description theory is directed at the Backing Description Thesis. Kripke, Donnellan, and David Kaplan, among others, have claimed the speakers often use proper names without being able to supply definite descriptions to serve as backing descriptions. In fact, it seems possible to construct cases where the speaker does not have enough information to be in a position to supply a backing description. Such a case would refute the Backing Description Thesis.

The second major objection is the Wrong Description Objection. It takes one of two forms. One form involves cases where a speaker associates the name he uses with a definite description that fails to designate anything--this despite the intuition that his use of the name

did refer to something. The other form involves cases where a speaker associates the name he uses with a definite description that designates a certain object--this despite the intuition that his use of the name referred to a certain other object. We will consider one version of each form of the Wrong Description Objection.

Suppose that our speaker says

(8) Russell authored "On Denoting,"

and that he associates the name 'Russell' with the definite description 'the author of The Principia.' According to the description theory of reference, the referent, if any, of his use of 'Russell' is the person, if any, designated by the description 'the author of The Principia.' According to the description theory of meaning, when he said (8), our speaker meant what he would mean were he to say

(8') The author of The Principia authored "On Denoting."

Of course, such a speaker's backing description does not designate anything; The Principia had two authors. Therefore, if the description theory of reference is true, our speaker's use of 'Russell' lacked a referent. Kripke and Donnellan have maintained that such a speaker does succeed in referring to something. On a standard analysis of definite descriptions, sentence (8') is false; it asserts, among other things, that The Principia had but one author. Therefore, if the description theory of meaning is true, our speaker expressed a false proposition when he used (8). Kripke and Donnellan would argue that such a speaker expressed a true proposition when he used (8). If Kripke and Donnellan are right, then this form of the Wrong Description Objection refutes the description theory.

To consider the other form taken by the Wrong Description Objection, we will suppose that our speaker uses (8) while associating the name 'Russell' with the definite description 'the author of The Tractatus.' According to the description theory of reference, our speaker referred to Wittgenstein and, according to the description theory of meaning, our speaker meant what he would mean were he to say

(8'') The author of The Tractatus authored "On Denoting," and, so, spoke falsely. Kripke and Donnellan would say that each result is counterintuitive. If they are right, this form of the Wrong Description Objection apparently refutes the description theory.

The third objection is the Modal Objection. There are two kinds of modal objection: alethic and epistemic. We shall consider both kinds through a single example. Suppose that our speaker says,

(9) If Aristotle existed, then Aristotle was a philosopher, and that he associates the name 'Aristotle' with the definite description 'the last great philosopher of antiquity.' Our intuitions inform us that what our speaker says is both contingently true (here is the alethic notion) and true a posteriori (here is the epistemic notion). According to the Synonymy Thesis, however, when our speaker used (9), he expressed the proposition he would express were he to use

(9') If the last great philosopher of antiquity existed, then the last great philosopher of antiquity was a philosopher.

In contrast with (9), (9') is both necessarily true and true a priori.¹² Therefore, contrary to the Synonymy Thesis, when our speaker used (9) he did not express the proposition he would have expressed had he used (9').

The final objection is the Attitude-Context Objection. It trades on a feature of the description theory discussed by Russell in this passage

from his lectures on logical atomism:

When a person uses a word, he does not mean by it the same thing as another person means by it. . . . Take, for example, the word 'Piccadilly.' We, who are acquainted with Piccadilly attach quite a different meaning to that word from any which could be attached to it by a person who had never been to London: and, supposing that you travel to foreign parts and expatiate on Piccadilly, you will convey to your hearers entirely different propositions from those in your mind. (1956, p. 195-196)

According to Russell, unless they agreed to do so in advance, it would be a coincidence for two speakers to associate the same backing descriptions with the names they use. If Russell is right about this, and there is little reason to think he is not, then, if the Synonymy Thesis is true, it would be a coincidence for two speakers to express the same propositions with the name sentences they use.

Now, suppose that Jones has been to London and seen Piccadilly. To Smith, Jones says

(10) Piccadilly is very busy.

Later, recalling this incident, Smith says to a third party

(11) Jones believes that Piccadilly is very busy.

Smith has never been to London. He associates the name 'Piccadilly' with the definite description 'the place represented by these [his] mental images.' The images in question were originally acquired many years past, while watching a travelogue, and episode Smith has long since forgotten. According to the Synonymy Thesis, when Smith said (11), he expressed the proposition he would have expressed had he said

(11') Jones believes that the place represented by these [Smith's] mental images is very busy.

It would certainly be a coincidence if (11') were true, and we may safely assume that it is false. Still, (11) is true. Furthermore,

Jones's utterance of (10) is good evidence for the claim Smith makes when he says (11); however, Jones's utterance of (10) is not good evidence for the claim Smith would make were he to say (11'). Such results seem incompatible with the Synonymy Thesis.

Faced with such results, one might try to reformulate the Synonymy Thesis. A natural reformulation is: when a speaker uses a name sentence, he expresses the proposition he would express were he to use the sentence that results when: (i) every name in his sentence that does not occur in the that-clause of an attitude ascription sentence embedded in his sentence is replaced by the definite description he associates with it; and (ii) every other name in his sentence is replaced by the definite description associated with it by the subject of the immediate attitude ascription sentence in which it occurs. According to this formulation of the Synonymy Thesis, when Smith says

(11) Jones believes that Piccadilly is very busy,

he expresses the proposition he would express were he to say

(11'') Jones believes that the-F is very busy,

where 'the-F' is the definite description Jones associates with 'Piccadilly.' Like (11), (11'') will be true. This formulation of the Synonymy Thesis might seem to avoid the Attitude-Context Objection.

However, it raises a myriad of problems.

Suppose that Smith says

(12) Plato believed that Socrates was wise.

One problem for the second formulation of the Synonymy Thesis is raised by the possibility that Socrates was not called 'Socrates' by Plato or any of their contemporaries, and that either no one was called 'Socrates'

or that Plato used 'Socrates' as a name for someone he regarded as rather slow witted.¹³ If the second formulation of the Synonymy Thesis is true, then in the case where no one, not even Socrates, was called 'Socrates,' Smith fails to express any proposition by his use of (12). If the Synonymy Thesis as presently formulated is true, then in the case where Plato used 'Socrates' as a name for someone he had little regard for, Smith succeeds in expressing a proposition by his use of (12); however, the proposition he expresses is false. Either result is unacceptable.

Another problem for the second formulation of the Synonymy Thesis involves the apparent presupposition that there is a definite description which is the definite description to be substituted for a name that occurs in an attitude context. Suppose, for example, that Plato really did use 'Socrates' as a name for Socrates. At various times in his life Plato probably associated a variety of different definite descriptions with the name 'Socrates.' Furthermore, let us assume that just once in his life Plato was misinformed about Socrates, and, as a result, just once associated the name 'Socrates' with a definite description that does not designate Socrates. Now, which of the many definite descriptions that Plato associated with the name 'Socrates' is the definite description that Plato associated with the name 'Socrates'? The answer, of course, is that none of the many is, strictly speaking, the one. Apparently, then, we need some way of choosing one from among the many, and it is difficult to think of a non-arbitrary way of making the choice. We could decide to regard the definite description Plato associated with 'Socrates' in the majority of cases as "the right one." But maybe no single one of the many fills the bill. Perhaps one was associated more

than any of the others, although not in the majority of cases. We could regard the most associated as "the right one." But there could be ties or an extremely close second or even third. Perhaps number of times associated is too crude a measure, and we should look for the one definite description Plato regarded as the most significant one. Of course there could still be ties, or, failing that, a close second or third. One could resort to Searle's strategy (perhaps conceived for other purposes) of using the disjunction of all associated definite descriptions.¹⁴ This might work in the case of (12); however, suppose that, rather than (12), Smith says

(13) Plato believed that Socrates was a fool,
and that the one definite description which Plato associated with 'Socrates' that did not designate Socrates designated someone who Plato thought was a fool. In such a case, under the present proposal, Smith's use of (13) would express a true proposition. That seems wrong. Finally, we might try to solve the problem with (12), and avoid the problem with (13), by appealing to the conjunction of all associated definite descriptions. This strategy would fail, however, if, as we are assuming, Plato just once associated a definite description with 'Socrates' that does not designate Socrates. For then, the conjunction of all associated definite descriptions would not designate anything. Unless we can decide which of the many definite descriptions is "the right one," the second formulation of the Synonymy Thesis leaves us at a loss when it comes to saying what Smith means when he uses sentence (12).

The second formulation of the Synonymy Thesis also runs into problems with regard to the evidence a speaker has for the claims he makes when he

uses an attitude ascription sentence whose that-clause contains a proper name. Consider the evidence Smith might have for the claim he makes when he uses sentence (12). First, Smith could have evidence that Plato said or otherwise produced a token of something that translates either as 'Socrates was wise' or as something that entails that Socrates was wise. The Dialogues could be regarded as this kind of evidence. Second, Smith could have evidence from a third party, for example Aristotle, that Plato believed that Socrates is wise. We regard this as good evidence because we assume that it is ultimately grounded in the first kind of evidence. For our present purposes, let us assume that Plato really said or wrote (something that translates as) 'Socrates was wise' and that Smith has good evidence that this is so. Now, unless Smith knows what definite description Plato associated with 'Socrates' when Plato said 'Socrates was wise,' and we will assume that he does not, there is no general proposition, q , such that q is expressed by a sentence of the form 'The-F was wise' and because Smith has good evidence that Plato said 'Socrates was wise' Smith has good evidence that Plato believed q . Really, given his evidence that Plato said 'Socrates was wise,' all Smith has evidence for is the claim that there is a general proposition, q , such that q is expressed by a sentence of the form 'The-F was wise' and Plato believed q . So, when Smith says

(12) Plato believed that Socrates was wise,

if he means what he would mean were he to say

(12') Plato believed that the-F was wise

(where 'the-F' is the definite description, if any, that Plato associated with the name 'Socrates'), then Smith is making a claim that he is not

entitled to make. Nevertheless, when Smith uses (12) he is making a claim that his evidence entitles him to make. Apparently, then, when he uses (12), Smith does not express the proposition he would express were he to use (12'). This shows that the second formulation of the Synonymy Thesis does not succeed in avoiding all of the problems that the first formulation has with attitude ascription sentences.

A final problem with the second formulation of the Synonymy Thesis is generated by sentences like

(13) Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle believed that Zeno was wise.

Our intuitions inform us that when Smith uses sentence (13) he expresses a true proposition, and one that attributes a common belief to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. But, unless Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle associated the same definite description with the name 'Zeno,' the second formulation is unable to specify the propositional content of Smith's use of sentence (13). It is implausible that all three philosophers associated the same definite description with the name 'Zeno,' and we will assume that they did not. As an alternative to reformulating the Synonymy Thesis still another time, let us consider the strategy of treating (13) as short for the following conjunction:

(13') Socrates believed that Zeno was wise, Plato believed that Zeno was wise, and Aristotle believed that Zeno was wise.

If (13) is just a truncated version of (13'), then, if the second formulation of the Synonymy Thesis is true, when Smith used sentence (13) he meant what he would mean were he to use

(13'') Socrates believed that the-F was wise, Plato believed that the-G was wise, and Aristotle believed that the-H was wise,

where 'the-F,' 'the-G,' and 'the-H' are the respective definite descriptions Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle associated with the proper name 'Zeno.'

This strategy carries all the burdens of the second formulation of the Synonymy Thesis and has the additional disadvantage of not preserving our intuition that Smith's use of (13) expresses a proposition that attributes a shared belief to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

The preceding discussion clearly indicates that the second formulation of the Synonymy Thesis is no better suited to handle attitude ascription sentences than is the first formulation of the Synonymy Thesis.

Section Four

Each of the rival theories of proper names faces serious challenges. The Millian theory faces the problems generated by significant, true, identity sentences; apparent failures of the substitutivity of codesignating names; negative existential sentences; and non-referring proper names. The description theory is confronted by the No Description, Wrong Description, Modal, and Attitude-Context objections.

In this dissertation neither the No Description Objection nor the Wrong Description Objection receive the attention that is given to the Modal Objection. (The Attitude-Context Objection is discussed in Chapter V.) The No Description Objection purports to show that there are cases where, contrary to our pre-theoretic intuitions, but according to the description theory, no proposition is expressed by a speaker's use of

a name sentence. The Wrong Description Objection purports to show that there are cases where our intuitions inform us that a speaker's use of a name sentence expresses a proposition which is not about the object the description theory says the proposition he expressed is about. There are a variety of strategies that a determined description theorist might combine in an attempt to show that these "deviant" cases--cases where the speaker either lacks a description or has a wrong description--are very rare, so rare as to suggest that we should consider retaining any apparent intuition they deviate from.¹⁵

In this regard, the Modal Objection is quite different. It purports to show that the description theory is always at odds with certain of our pre-theoretic intuitions. For, according to the Modal Objection, the description theory never correctly identifies the (kind of) propositions we express by our ordinary uses of name sentences. This holds, according to the Modal Objection, even when the speaker backs his use of a name by a correct definite description.

Another reason for giving the Modal Objection more attention is that attempts to rebut it have generated considerably more literature than the combined literature generated by attempts to rebut either the No Description Objection or the Wrong Description Objection. Many philosophers explicitly endorse some form of Michael Dummett's defense against the Modal Objection.¹⁶ In contrast, there is no single, widely held, and clearly stated defense against either the No Description Objection or the Wrong Description Objection.

In Chapter II of this dissertation, defenses of the description theory against the Modal Objection are stated, explained, and critically

evaluated. Considerable attention is devoted to Dummett's¹⁷ defense. The conclusion is reached that none of the various defenses, Dummett's included, is acceptable.

Having considered, and rejected, an attempt to defend the description theory against the Modal Objection, we shift our attention to objections to the Millian theory. The Millian theory faces two kinds of problems. One kind of problem facing the Millian theory involves the theory's apparent mis-identification of the propositions expressed by uses of certain sentences. This kind of trouble is generated by the problem of significant, true, identity sentences and by the more general problem of the apparent failure of the substitutivity of coreferential names. For, according to the Millian theory of meaning, uses of sentences

(1) Hesperus is Hesperus

and

(2) Hesperus is Phosphorus

express the same proposition. Many philosophers maintain that there is overwhelming evidence that this is not so. The second kind of problem facing the Millian theory involves the theory's apparent inability to specify propositions to be the propositions expressed by uses of certain kinds of sentences. This is the trouble raised by negative existential sentences and by sentences that contain non-referring names. For, according to the Millian theory of meaning, uses of sentences

(5) Pegasus does not exist,

(6) Pegasus has wings,

and

(7) Pegasus does not have wings,

fail to express propositions. Many philosophers hold that there is an abundance of evidence to the contrary. We will concentrate on the first kind of problem for the Millian theory.

Recently, Kripke¹⁸ posed a puzzle about belief and proper names. According to Kripke, a solution to his puzzle will shed light on the general problem of the apparent failure of substitutivity of coreferential names. The problem of significant, true, identity sentences is a species of the general problem of the apparent failure of substitutivity of coreferential names. If Kripke is right, and a solution to his puzzle does shed light on these problems, then his puzzle is germane to our concerns. For, if we discover a solution to Kripke's puzzle, we may thereby discover a solution to one of the two major problems confronting the Millian theory.

In Chapter III Kripke's puzzle about belief and proper names is stated and explained. In addition, several proposed solutions to Kripke's puzzle are presented and critically evaluated. The conclusion is reached that none of the proposed solutions is acceptable.

In Chapter IV the outline of a solution to Kripke's puzzle is presented. The solution is based on a view about the connection between belief, linguistic behavior, and propositional content that is suggested by certain remarks David Lewis¹⁹ makes in his commentary on Kripke's puzzle.

In Chapter V, solutions consistent with the Millian theory are presented to the problem of significant, true, identity sentences and to the problem of the apparent failure of the substitutivity of codesignating names. They are based on the view used to solve Kripke's

puzzle. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the relative merits of that view and its rival (from Chapter IV).

To conclude this introductory chapter, let us consider certain other assumptions and restrictions that will guide this inquiry.

I will assume that there are basically two kinds of propositions: singular and general. I will assume that normal assertive utterances (or uses) of declarative sentences (of English) express propositions and are either true or false in virtue of the truth or falsity of the propositions they express. I will assume that belief is a 2-place relation, one that holds between persons and propositions. I will assume that sentences of the form 'S believes that ϕ ' are true (at possible world w) if and only if (at w) the object (actually) designated by 'S' stands in the belief-relation to the proposition (actually) expressed by ' ϕ '. I will assume that there are possible worlds and that it makes sense to talk about the truth or falsity of propositions (and, derivatively, of uses of sentences that express them) relative to, or at, possible worlds. Finally, I will assume that if objects x and y are distinct and F is a uniquely identifying set of properties such that (i) it is possible that x exemplifies every member of F , and (ii) it is possible that y exemplifies every member of F , then, if w is a world wherein x exemplifies every member of F and w' is a world wherein y exemplifies every member of F , then w and w' are distinct.

This inquiry is restricted by the following methodological principle: accept no view that entails that there are essences and that we are acquainted with, or express, essences when we use proper names to refer to things. Some philosophers, Roderick Chisholm²⁰ and Lewis,²¹ come to

mind immediately, have expressed strong reservations about any such view. I am interested in seeing how much of what needs to be done in this area can be done without resort to such entities.

Notes

¹I will assume that there are at least two kinds of propositions: general, or qualitative, propositions and singular, or particular, propositions. I will also assume that singular propositions do, and that general propositions do not, have individuals—for example, rocks, trees, planets, and people—as constituents. The general/singular distinction, as applied to propositions, is widely used and reasonably clear. I will assume that it is clear enough for me to appeal to it in what follows.

²Keith Donnellan, Saul Kripke, and Ruth Barcan Marcus, among others, favor the Millian theory of meaning.

³Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Peter Strawson, John Searle, Diana Ackerman, Roderick Chisholm, Michael Dummett, and Alvin Plantinga, among others, favor, or favored, the description theory of meaning.

⁴The following characterization of the Millian theory borrows from many other characterizations, but, most notably, from the one given in Kripke (1979).

⁵Like the preceding characterization of the Millian theory of meaning, this characterization of the description theory of meaning draws on many sources. One of the clearest is that given in Kripke (1980).

⁶In a departure from terminology handed down from Russell, with the help of David Kaplan (1975), we shall speak of proper names as referring, of definite descriptions as denoting, and of both proper names and definite descriptions as designating.

⁷In this respect, Frege's treatment differs from the Russellean treatment described here. For Frege, 'exists,' like 'believes' and quotation marks, induces an oblique context. In this regard, Leonard Linsky wrote:

He [Frege] does not explicitly deal with the matter [i.e., the matter of negative existential name-sentences] . . . [but] . . . we can construct the Fregean account of negative existentials in natural languages which was presented in chapter 1. According to this account, 'exists' induces an oblique (ungerade) context and in the proposition 'Pegasus does not exist', 'Pegasus' denotes what is ordinarily its sense. (1977, p. 38)

⁸As given in Russell (1910, 1975).

⁹In Kripke (1979, 1980).

¹⁰In Donnellan (1966, 1972) .

¹¹Interesting reviews of some of the basic objections to the description theory may be found in Salmon (1981, p. 23-32) and in Devitt (1981, p. 13-23).

¹²At least it is both necessarily true and true a priori on one of two interpretations offered by a standard theory of definite descriptions: its so-called "small scope" reading. It also has a "large scope" reading which is neither necessarily true nor true a priori. Michael Dummett (1973, 1981) has fashioned a defense of the description theory that exploits this fact. That defense is considered in detail in Chapter II.

¹³This is suggested by a version of the Wrong Description Objection in Kripke (1980, p. 68-70).

¹⁴This is similar to the "cluster of descriptions" view presented in Searle (1967).

¹⁵Two strategies come to mind. One, which has received surprisingly little attention, is briefly discussed by Castaneda (1979, p. 155). He tries to explain why speakers who do have backing descriptions are unable to specify them on demand. Another is to rely on descriptions which mention the name-type of the name-token used. This approach is suggested by the theory of descriptions presented by Harrison (1982), which is discussed in Chapter II. and again in Chapter III.

¹⁶For example: Leonard Linsky (1977), Brian Loar (1981), Harold Noonan (1981), and Steven Schiffer (1977).

¹⁷In Dummett (1973, 1981).

¹⁸In Kripke (1979).

¹⁹In Lewis (1981).

²⁰In Chisholm (1981).

²¹In Lewis (1981).

CHAPTER II

DUMMETT'S DEFENSE OF THE DESCRIPTION THEORY AGAINST THE MODAL OBJECTION

In this chapter we will consider responses to the Modal Objection to the description theory--responses that try to preserve some version of the description theory of the meaning of proper names.¹ The greater part of the chapter is devoted to developing and evaluating Dummett's² response; however, four other responses are briefly considered.

Section One

Before we consider the responses to the Modal Objection, we review both that part of the description theory it purportedly refutes and the basic strategy behind it.

The Modal Objection purportedly refutes the description theory of meaning. The description theory of the meaning of proper names consists of two theses. First, there is the Backing Description Thesis: when a speaker uses a proper name, he associates it with a definite description. Second, there is the Synonymy Thesis: when a speaker uses a sentence that contains a proper name, he expresses the proposition he would express were he to use the sentence that results when the name is replaced by its associated definite description everywhere it occurs in his sentence.³ By way of an illustration, suppose that our speaker associates the proper name 'Aristotle' with the definite description 'the last greater philosopher of antiquity' when he says 'Aristotle was a philosopher.' According to the description theory, when he used

'Aristotle was a philosopher,' he expressed the proposition he would have expressed had he used 'The last great philosopher of antiquity was a philosopher.'

The various versions of the Modal Objection typically involve such modal properties as: being true at w, being false at w, being necessarily true, and being possibly true (where w is a specific possible world). The strategy is to show, by appeal to our pre-theoretic intuitions, that the name sentence under consideration and the description sentence it is allegedly synonymous with do not share all of the same modal properties. It is reasonable to hold that two sentences are synonymous only if they share all of the same modal properties. Thus, if the name sentence and its associated description sentence do not share all of the same modal properties, they are not synonymous.

By way of illustration, let w_1 be a possible world where both Aristotle and Plato exist; where Plato was the last great philosopher of antiquity; and where Aristotle was not a philosopher. It is reasonable to maintain that as we use them 'Aristotle was a philosopher' is false at w_1 and 'the last great philosopher of antiquity was a philosopher' is true at w_1 . So it follows that 'Aristotle was a philosopher' is not synonymous with 'The last great philosopher of antiquity was a philosopher,' even when the person using the former associates 'Aristotle' with 'the last great philosopher of antiquity.'⁴

Section Two

There are several ways to respond to the Modal Objection that do not require the respondent to abandon the description theory of meaning.

One way is to deny that 'Aristotle was a philosopher' and 'The last great philosopher of antiquity was a philosopher' do not share all of the same modal properties. Since 'The last great philosopher of antiquity was a philosopher' is true at w_1 , this response requires its proponent to maintain that 'Aristotle was a philosopher' is true at w_1 . Part of Dummett's response to the Modal Objection includes this response. However, Dummett does not maintain that this reply is generally applicable. He seems to hold that it works only for certain names and their associated definite descriptions; the balance of what he says suggests that he regards such name-description pairs as rare exceptions. To say that they are the rule, rather than the exception, flies in the face of contemporary philosophical opinion and wide-spread, pre-theoretic intuitions. Therefore, although we shall consider it in more detail when we take up Dummett's response, until then, we will assume that this response is unacceptable.

A second way to respond is to maintain that speakers do not associate proper names with definite descriptions (which express properties) that involve (the properties expressed by) the predicates of the sentences they use when they use names. According to this response, the preceding version of the Modal Objection rests on the faulty assumption that our speaker associated 'Aristotle' with 'the last great philosopher of antiquity' when he said 'Aristotle was a philosopher.' Necessarily,

something is the last great philosopher of antiquity only if it is a philosopher. According to this response, when he said 'Aristotle was a philosopher,' our speaker must have associated 'Aristotle' with some other definite description. Such a definite description as 'the founder of the Lyceum' might fill the bill.

There are at least two major problems with this response. One is that many people, philosophers in particular, associate 'Aristotle' with definite descriptions that are necessarily satisfied by an object only if the object is a philosopher. When we introduce Aristotle to our students, we are prone to say things like 'Aristotle was a philosopher.' It is difficult to reconcile this response with our own behavior. A second problem is that it is easy to imagine cases where the response's restriction is almost certainly violated. We introduce Aristotle to our students by saying 'Aristotle was the last great philosopher of antiquity.' Later that day one of them tells a friend about Aristotle, saying 'Aristotle was a philosopher.' It is difficult to imagine the student associating 'Aristotle' with a definite description that is not necessarily satisfied by an object only if the object is a philosopher--especially when our student is ignorant of how careful he must be in order to avoid the Modal Objection. We will assume that this response is untenable.

The three responses that remain are all (either) stated (or discussed in the literature) in terms of the technical notion of rigid designation. Before we consider these responses, it will be to our advantage to see what rigid designation comes to.

The expression "rigid designator" was introduced into the contemporary philosophical lexicon by Kripke. In Naming and Necessity (1980a), Kripke said:

Let's call something a rigid designator if in every possible world it designates the same object, a nonrigid or accidental designator if that is not the case. (p. 48).

Later, Kripke (1980a) wrote:

Although the idea is now a familiar one, I will give a brief restatement of the idea of rigid designation, and the intuition about names that underlies it. Consider:

(1) Aristotle was fond of dogs.

A proper understanding of this statement involves an understanding of both the (extensionally correct) conditions under which it is in fact true, and the conditions under which a counterfactual course of history, resembling the actual course in some respects but not in others, would be correctly (partially) described by (1). Presumably everyone agrees that there is a certain man--the philosopher we call 'Aristotle'--such that, as a matter of fact, (1) is true if and only if he was fond of dogs. The thesis of rigid designation is simply--subtle points aside--that the same paradigm applies to the truth-conditions of (1) as it describes counterfactual situations. That is, (1) truly describes a counterfactual situation if and only if the aforementioned man would have been fond of dogs, had that situation obtained. (Forget the counterfactual situations where he would not have existed.) (p. 6)

Kripke gives us two accounts of rigidity. The first goes as follows: a term, 'd,' rigidly designates an object, x, if and only if (i) 'd' (actually) designates x; (ii) for any possible world, w, if x exists at w, then 'd' designates x at w; and (iii) for any possible world, w, and object, y, if 'd' designates y at w, then y is x. The second account of rigidity goes like this: a term, 'd,' rigidly designates an object, x, if and only if (i) 'd' (actually) designates x; and (ii) for any sentence form, ' ϕ ()', ' ϕ (d)' is true at a possible world, w, where x exists if and only if at w x has the property being a y such that ϕ (y). Kripke

regards these two accounts as (at least extensionally) equivalent; so shall we.

Two things about these accounts are worth noting. First, neither entails that a singular term is a rigid designator only if it is a proper name. For all these accounts say, demonstratives and indexicals might be rigid designators. Furthermore, according to these accounts, certain definite descriptions (provided they designate) are rigid designators. Provided there is a number two, the definite description 'the even prime number' is a rigid designator.

A second thing to notice about the above accounts is that, when we talk about what a singular term designates (or the truth-value of a sentence) at a world, we do not mean to be talking about the designatum of the term (or the truth-value of the sentence) as it is used by that world's inhabitants. Instead, we are talking about the designatum of the term (or the truth-value of the sentence) as we use it to designate an object in (or make an assertion about) that world. When we want to talk about the designatum of a term (or the truth-value of a sentence) at a world, as used by that world's inhabitants, we will say so explicitly.

Kripke tells us that proper names are, but that most (if not all) of the definite descriptions their users associate with them are not, rigid designators. 'Aristotle was a philosopher' is false at w_1 because, at w_1 , Aristotle is not a philosopher. 'The last great philosopher of antiquity was a philosopher' is true at w_1 because at w_1 the last great philosopher of antiquity, namely Plato, is a philosopher. Kripke would say that 'Aristotle was a philosopher' and 'The last great philosopher of antiquity was a philosopher' fail to have all the same modal properties

because the singular term that occurs in the former is, whereas the singular term that occurs in the latter is not, a rigid designator.

One of the three remaining responses to the Modal Objection focuses on a class of definite descriptions which--the respondent seems to think--derive their rigidity from the names they are associated with because they make reference to, or are about, those names. This response is the basis for a version of the description theory recently proposed by Bernard Harrison (1982) in his article "Description and Identification."

According to Harrison, one advantage of his version of the description theory, over rival versions of the description theory, is that his, unlike its rivals, accommodates the intuition that proper names are rigid designators. This, he claims, is because this theory restricts the definite descriptions that a speaker may associate with the names the speaker uses to a class of rigid definite descriptions. Harrison calls members of this special class of definite descriptions "referentially-identifying descriptions."⁵ To evaluate Harrison's claim, I will consider one such description and show that it is not a rigid designator.⁶

According to Harrison, the following definite description, his favorite example of a referentially-identifying description, is a rigid designator:

D: [The] woman whose name S saw inscribed in the register.
Harrison sets D codesignative with the proper name 'Pamela Andrews'; 'Pamela Andrews' is the name S saw inscribed in the register. Let a be the person D designates. We will consider the following sentences:

(1) Pamela Andrews is from Bristol,

and

- (2) The woman whose name S saw inscribed in the register is from Bristol.

Because 'Pamela Andrews' rigidly designates a, sentence (1) is true at a world where a exists just in case, in such a world, a is from Bristol. If D rigidly designates a, then sentence (2) is true at a world where a exists just in case, in such a world, a is from Bristol.

In specifying possible worlds w_2 , w_3 , and w_4 , we will assume that a really is, but that Ackerman, Anscombe, and Marcus really are not, from Bristol.

w_2 is a possible world like the actual world except that in w_2 S looks at a different register, one bearing the name 'Diana Ackerman' at the place where the register S in fact looked at bears the name 'Pamela Andrews.' In w_2 , as in the actual world, the name 'Diana Ackerman' designates Diana Ackerman. Sentence (2) is false at w_2 ; sentence (1) is true at w_2 .

w_3 is a possible world like the actual world except that in w_3 the name S sees on the register is 'Elizabeth Anscombe,' it having been entered on the register at the place where S actually saw the name 'Pamela Andrews.' In w_3 , as in the actual world, the name 'Elizabeth Anscombe' designates Elizabeth Anscombe. Sentence (2) is not true in w_3 ; sentence (1) is true at w_3 .

w_4 is a possible world like the actual world except that the inhabitants of w_4 use the name 'Pamela Andrews' as a name for Ruth Barcan Marcus. (The claim that proper names are rigid designators in no way entails that the name 'Pamela Andrews' could not have been given to Ruth

Barcan Marcus.) Sentence (2) is not true at w_4 ; sentence (1) is true at w_4 .

We have examples to support the contention that Harrison's referentially-identifying description, D, is not a rigid designator. In the passage that follows, Harrison explains why he takes D to be rigid:

[Consider] "[The woman] whose name S saw [inscribed] in the register" . . . there is no element of direct description capable of characterizing different individuals in different possible worlds. The name in the register either has a bearer or it does not; but if it does, then that individual, and no other, is the individual which the description . . . picks out in all possible worlds. Of course, S might have seen a different name in the register; but then the description would simply pick out a different [person], equally rigidly. (Harrison, 1982, pp. 322-323)

Harrison makes two major claims in the preceding passage. The first claim is that D is free of elements capable of characterizing different individuals in different possible worlds. Against this claim, I have described three worlds where D picks out a different woman from the woman it in fact picks out. This is possible because D is capable of the same variations as

D': The woman who is named by the token S saw inscribed in the register S looked at.

D' contains no fewer than three elements capable of the sort of variation Harrison says D is free of; they are: 'the register S looked at,' 'the token S saw inscribed in the register S looked at,' and 'the woman who is named by the token S saw inscribed in the register S looked at.'

Harrison's first claim exhibits a simple technical misunderstanding of definite descriptions.

The second of the two major claims made in the above passage is that in a world where S saw a different name in the register, D would rigidly

pick out a different woman. w_3 is such a world; therefore, Harrison's second claim commits him to the claim that in w_3 D rigidly designates a different woman, namely Elizabeth Anscombe. Part of this claim, that in w_3 D designates Elizabeth Anscombe, is true; moreover, it shows that D is not a rigid designator. However, the claim that in w_3 rigidly designates Elizabeth Anscombe is both false and no help to Harrison.

The claim is no help to Harrison because, even if true, it would establish only that D has this property: being possibly rigid, whereas Harrison means to show that D is rigid; that is, D has this property: being rigid. The two properties are distinct and the former does not entail the latter.

The claim (i.e., that in w_3 D rigidly designates Elizabeth Anscombe) is false: when I specified w_3 , I neither said nor implied that D is rigid in w_3 . I neither said nor implied that D "loses" a property it actually has (i.e., being non-rigid) or that it "acquires" a property it actually lacks (i.e., being rigid). Of course, one could specify as possible world exactly like w_3 except that D is rigid; however, this would merely serve to show that D is possibly rigid. Harrison's second claim reveals a philosophical misunderstanding.

We may conclude that D is not a rigid designator. Similar reasoning will show that none of the referentially-identifying descriptions Harrison uses to illustrate his theory is a rigid designator.

A fourth response to Modal Objection is exhibited by the theory of proper names proposed by Alvin Plantinga (1978) in his article "The Boethian Compromise." Therein, Plantinga proposed that we restrict the definite descriptions speakers associate with proper names to definite

descriptions that are rigid designators. (This view is not Harrison's. Harrison proposes that we restrict the associated definite descriptions to referentially-identifying descriptions; then he claims that referentially-identifying descriptions are rigid designators. Plantinga proposes that we restrict the associated definite descriptions to definite descriptions that are rigid designators.)

To see how this response is supposed to work, let us suppose that 'd' is a definite description that rigidly designates Aristotle; and that, when our speaker says 'Aristotle was a philosopher,' he associates 'Aristotle' with 'd.' According to the description theory, our speaker's use of 'Aristotle was a philosopher' is synonymous with 'd was a philosopher.' Since 'd' rigidly designates Aristotle, 'd was a philosopher' is true at world w_1 if and only if at w_1 Aristotle is a philosopher. Like 'Aristotle was a philosopher,' 'd was a philosopher' is false at w_1 . So this response apparently avoids one version of the Modal Objection.

Plantinga's view is really much more elaborate than the preceding discussion suggests. However, because we are going to rule this response unacceptable, we will not digress to explain its added complexities. We avoid further discussion of this response for two reasons.

First, there are strong, apparently decisive, objections to this response. These have been stated in recent articles by Diana Ackerman⁷ and David Austin,⁸ and in a talk by Kripke.⁹ These objections pose serious difficulties to any theory similar to Plantinga's.

Second, the claim that speakers associate proper names with definite descriptions that are rigid designators apparently commits us to the view

that (there are essences and) we are acquainted with essences when we use proper names. (An essence is the sort of property that would be expressed by a rigid definite description. Where x is an object and F is a property, F is an essence of x if and only if necessarily, if x exists, then x has F ; and necessarily, for any y , if y has F , then y is x .) Some philosophers, Chisholm¹⁰ and Lewis¹¹ are examples, have expressed doubts about the plausibility of a theory that carries such a commitment. We are interested in seeing whether or not the description theory can be saved in such a way that does not commit us to the view that (there are essences and) we are acquainted with essences when we use proper names.

We are now in a position to state the central question we are considering in this chapter. It is:

Short of requiring that speakers use proper names only when they associate them with definite descriptions that are rigid designators, is there an acceptable response to the Modal Objection?

One response has not yet been considered. It is Dummett's. That response is the topic of the balance of this chapter.

Section Three

We will consider issues raised in a contemporary philosophical dialogue. The dialogue's major participants are Kripke and Dummett; Leonard Linsky plays a noteworthy supporting role.

The underlying issue of the dialogue is whether or not Frege and Russell were correct in their analyses of the meanings of ordinary proper names. The primary focus of the dialogue is the claim that proper names are synonymous with the definite descriptions their users associate with

them when they use them. Kripke initiated the dialogue, in Naming and Necessity (1980a), by arguing that proper names are not synonymous with their associated definite descriptions. In Frege: Philosophy of Language (Dummett, 1973), Dummett argued that Kripke's arguments do not establish Kripke's conclusion; in Names and Descriptions (Linsky, 1976), Linsky offered arguments strikingly similar to Dummett's.¹² In his preface to Naming and Necessity, Kripke replied to Dummett. Recently, in The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy (Dummett, 1981), Dummett replied to Kripke's reply.

I will state and explain the major arguments and counter-arguments that structure this dialogue. I will argue that Dummett's defense of the claim that proper names are synonymous with their associated definite descriptions is unacceptable both because it fails to preserve our intuitions about sentences that contain proper names and because it runs into special problems with negative existential sentences, non-referring proper names, and belief ascription sentences.

Initially, we limit the scope of our inquiry by restricting ourselves to just those cases--real or imagined--where speakers who use the proper name 'Aristotle' associate it with the definite description 'the last great philosopher of antiquity.' We will consider the thesis that the proper name 'Aristotle' is synonymous with the definite description 'the last great philosopher of antiquity.' Our first argument against this thesis is similar to arguments Kripke gives in Naming and Necessity.

If 'Aristotle' is synonymous with 'the last great philosopher of antiquity,' sentence

- (3) Necessarily, if Aristotle existed, then Aristotle was a philosopher

is synonymous with sentence

- (4) Necessarily, if the last great philosopher of antiquity existed, then the last great philosopher of antiquity was a philosopher.

Sentence (3) seems false. After all, Aristotle could have existed and died in early childhood, having never taken up philosophy. Sentence (4) is open to two non-equivalent interpretations. It contains a definite description, and definite descriptions induce scope-ambiguities. The two non-equivalent interpretations of sentence (4) are formally represented by

$$(4') \quad \underline{L}([ixGx]: Ey (y=x) \rightarrow [ixGx]: Px)$$

and

$$(4'') \quad [ixGx]: \underline{L}(Ey (y=x) \rightarrow Px).$$

(Where 'L' is a typographical variant of 'L,' and 'M,' which appears later, is a typographical variant of 'M.' 'Px' formally represents 'x is a philosopher' and 'Gx' formally represents 'x is a last great philosopher of antiquity.') (4') formally represents the narrow-scope interpretation of (4); it is true. (4'') formally represents the wide-scope interpretation of (4); it is false. If the Synonymy Thesis is correct, and (3) is synonymous with (4), then (3) should be no less ambiguous than (4). However, unlike (4), (3) is unambiguously false; unlike (4), (3) does not have a true interpretation. Therefore, the Synonymy Thesis is false.

Dummett and Linsky have responded to the above sort of argument. Their responses are very similar, and we will treat them as a single response.¹³ The response has two parts. We turn now to the first part.

Against Kripke, Dummett and Linsky maintain that, even if the preceding argument were successful in refuting the thesis that 'Aristotle' is synonymous with 'the last great philosopher of antiquity,' there are similar theses about proper names and their associated definite descriptions for which similar arguments fail. For example, Dummett and Linsky claim that the thesis that 'Saint Anne' is synonymous with 'the mother of Mary' is not refuted by such an argument.

To see why Dummett and Linsky think this is so, consider

- (5) Necessarily, if Saint Anne existed, then Saint Anne was a mother

and

- (6) Necessarily, if the mother of Mary existed, then the mother of Mary was a mother.

An argument similar to the one above, but designed to refute the thesis that 'Saint Anne' is synonymous with 'the mother of Mary,' would depend upon the claim that (5) is, but (6) is not, unambiguously false. Dummett and Linsky agree that (6) is not unambiguously false and also that (5) has a false interpretation. However, both maintain that (5) also has a true interpretation. According to Dummett and Linsky, (5), like (6), has two non-equivalent interpretations. Thus we find Dummett claiming:

there is . . . an equally clear sense in which we might rightly say, 'Saint Anne cannot but have been a parent.' . . . (Dummett, 1973, p. 113)

Similarly, Linsky writes:

Consider the statement, 'It is necessary that Saint Anne is a mother' (more colloquially, 'Saint Anne could not but be a mother'). It is certainly true in one sense. (Linsky, 1977, p. 55)

If Dummett and Linsky are right about this, then we are not yet entitled

to conclude that 'Saint Anne' is not synonymous with 'the mother of Mary.'

We will consider two replies to this part of the response to our original argument. The replies are: first, to argue that, even if (5) is ambiguous, it is not ambiguous in the "same way" as (6); and, second, to deny that (5) has a true interpretation.

If we adopt the first reply, we need to do two things. First, we need to explain what is meant by saying that (5) is not ambiguous in the same way as (6). Second, we need to explain how (5)'s not being ambiguous in the same way as (6) affects the issue at hand.

All parties to this dispute agree that (6) is ambiguous and that the ambiguity in (6) is a scope-ambiguity. The non-equivalent interpretations of (6) are formally represented by

$$(6') \quad \underline{L}([ixMx]: Ey (y=x) \rightarrow [ixMx]: M_{1x})$$

and

$$(6'') \quad [ixMx]: \underline{L}(Ey (y=x) \rightarrow M_{1x}).$$

(Where 'Mx' represents 'x is a mother of Mary' and 'M_{1x}' represents 'x is a mother.') (6'), which represents the narrow-scope interpretation of (6), is true; (6''), which represents the wide-scope interpretation of (6), is false. Dummett and Linsky aver that (5), like (6), has two non-equivalent interpretations and that the ambiguity in (5) is a consequence of the (alleged) fact that proper names, like definite descriptions, induce scope-ambiguities.

They recommend

$$(5') \quad \underline{L}([s]: (Ey (y=s) \rightarrow [s]: M_{1s}))$$

to represent the narrow-scope interpretation of (5), and

(5'') [s]: $\underline{L}(Ey (y=s) \rightarrow M_{1s})$

to represent the wide-scope interpretation of (5).

To say that (5) is not ambiguous in the same way as (6) is to deny that (5') and (5'') represent legitimate, non-equivalent interpretations of (5), legitimate in the same way that (6') and (6'') are legitimate non-equivalent interpretations of (6); that is, to deny that the ambiguity in (5) is a scope-ambiguity.

Certain passages of Naming and Necessity could be taken to suggest that Kripke holds that, in addition to the metaphysical, or logical, sense of 'necessarily,' there is an epistemic sense of 'necessarily.'¹⁴ Citing this semantic ambiguity, Kripke could hold that (5) is true only if the occurrence of 'necessarily' therein is taken to express an epistemic modality, and false if not. Kripke could then offer sentence

(5''') It is a priori that if Saint Anne existed, then Saint Anne was a mother

as a true interpretation of (5). He could then maintain that, when we restrict ourselves to interpretations of (5) and (6) where 'necessarily' expresses an alethic modality, (5) has just one interpretation, a false one, but (6) has two non-equivalent interpretations. One could argue from this difference in (5) and (6) to the denial of the thesis that 'Saint Anne' is synonymous with 'the mother of Mary.'

The argument would go as follows. When we restrict ourselves to just the alethic sense of 'necessarily,' sentence (5) is unambiguously false. However, it is not the case that, when we restrict ourselves to just the alethic sense of 'necessarily,' sentence (6) is unambiguously false. If, when we restrict ourselves to just the alethic sense of 'necessarily,' sentence (5) is, but sentence (6) is not, unambiguously false, then

sentence (5) is not synonymous with sentence (6). Finally, because 'Saint Anne' is synonymous with 'the mother of Mary' only if sentence (5) is synonymous with sentence (6), we conclude that 'Saint Anne' is not synonymous with 'the mother of Mary.'

This is the first way for Kripke to reply to Dummett and Linsky. Let us now consider the second way.

Kripke can always reject the claim that (5) has a true interpretation. He could maintain that, strictly speaking, (5) is unambiguously false. He would then be free to give an argument, like our original argument, against the thesis that 'Saint Anne' is synonymous with 'the mother of Mary.'

An obvious problem for this reply is that it conflicts with the sincere testimony of Dummett and Linsky that, as they understand (5), it has a true interpretation. If Kripke were to reply in this way, he would have to explain why some philosophers mistakenly claim that (5) has a true interpretation.

Such an explanation can be given in terms of (5'''). Kripke could maintain that philosophers who, like Dummett and Linsky, say that there is a sense in which (5) is true, do so because they have confused it with (5'''). If (5''') is true, it would be quite natural for one who confused (5) with (5''') to say that (5) is true.

We should pause to note that the two replies, though similar, are distinct. Both involve sentence (5'''). The first reply regards (5''') as a true interpretation of (5), the second reply does not. According to the second reply, (5) does not have a true interpretation and those who think it does do so because they mistake it for (5'''). The second reply

would permit us to argue that 'Saint Anne' and 'the mother of Mary' are not synonymous, in the very same way that we argued that 'Aristotle' and 'the last great philosopher of antiquity' are not synonymous. The first reply would not. It would require us to argue that when we restrict ourselves to the alethic sense of 'necessarily,' (5), but not (6), is unambiguously false. This, in turn, allows us to conclude that (5) and (6) are not synonymous; and, therefore, that it is not the case that 'Saint Anne' is synonymous with 'the mother of Mary.'

Dummett and Linsky anticipate that Kripke will adopt the second of the two replies above. Let us see what they have to say against it.

Linsky writes:

If a similar account can be given of the Saint Anne and Homer cases, he [i.e., Kripke] will have protected his main thesis about proper names against the threatened counterexamples. I wish to emphasize the condition expressed in the antecedent in the preceding conditional; I doubt that it can be met. (Linsky, 1977, pp. 62-63)

This is all Linsky has to say against the second reply. He is doubtful that Kripke can give an adequate account of this epistemic sense of 'necessarily.' However, Linsky does nothing more than express his doubts; he gives no argument to persuade us to share them. Let us turn to Dummett.

Dummett attacks the second reply in the following passages:

Kripke . . . wants to give an entirely different explanation of the phenomena when it relates to proper names. In this case, he acknowledges no role for the notion of scope: and so he explains the ambiguity by saying that we are concerned, under the two interpretations, with different modal notions, different kinds of possibility. (Dummett, 1973, p. 115)

. . . we have one and the same phenomenon occurring both for proper names and definite descriptions. . . . In the case of definite descriptions, Kripke explains the phenomenon in

terms of the notion of scope. For proper names, on the other hand, he considers the notion of scope inapplicable, and therefore invokes a distinction between two kinds of possibility. (Dummett, 1973, p. 116)

Dummett apparently holds that the second reply violates two related methodological maxims. The first maxim prohibits multiplying ambiguities beyond necessity.¹⁵ The second maxim recommends that a single kind of phenomenon receive a single kind of explanation.

The second reply does not violate the first maxim; it does not multiply ambiguities beyond necessity. Dummett would explain the alleged ambiguity in (5) in terms of scope-ambiguities allegedly induced by proper names. So, he explains the alleged ambiguity in (5) in terms of an ambiguity already required to explain other phenomena. If the second reply postulates an ambiguity, where one is not already required, then it multiplies ambiguities. If it multiplies ambiguities to explain something already adequately accounted for in terms of some antecedently available device, then it multiplies ambiguities beyond necessity. However, the second reply explains the alleged ambiguity in (5) in terms of the already available distinction between kinds of necessity. The second reply does not multiply ambiguities; therefore, it does not multiply ambiguities beyond necessity. The second reply does not violate the first maxim. Furthermore, unless we are certain that Dummett's explanation is correct, and this is by no means obvious, we cannot be certain that this is not a place where, if we did multiply ambiguities, we would be multiplying them beyond necessity.

It is by no means clear that the second reply violates the second maxim. It is by no means clear that the second reply ignores the recommendation that a single kind of phenomenon receive a single kind of

explanation. This is because it is by no means clear that the alleged ambiguity in (5) and the ambiguity in (6) are examples of the same kind of phenomenon.

If (5) is ambiguous, then there is a sense in which the ambiguities in (5) and (6) are examples of the same kind of phenomenon: both are cases of ambiguity. But so are (6) and

(7) Jones is going to the bank.

Nevertheless, there is a clear sense in which (6) and (7) are not examples of the same kind of phenomenon. The ambiguity in (6) is a scope-ambiguity, a kind of "syntactic ambiguity." (7) is ambiguous because it contains a word, namely 'bank,' which has more than one sense; the ambiguity in (7) is a "semantic ambiguity." Until we are certain that the alleged ambiguity in (5) is a syntactic ambiguity, rather than a semantic ambiguity, we cannot say for certain that (5) and (6) are examples of the same kind of phenomenon, in the sense of "same kind of phenomenon" intended in the second maxim. If Dummett assumes that (5) and (6) are examples of the same kind of phenomenon, in the intended sense, then he has begged the question against the second reply.

Let us summarize our findings regarding the first part of the response Dummett and Linsky give to our original argument. They claim that a similar argument fails to refute the thesis that 'Saint Anne' is synonymous with 'the mother of Mary.' They say that this is because

(5) Necessarily, if Saint Anne existed, then Saint Anne was a mother

is not unambiguously false. We formulated two replies to this response. The first reply is that, although (5) has a true interpretation given by

(5''') It is a priori that if Saint Anne existed, then Saint Anne was a mother,

when we restrict ourselves to interpretations of (5) where 'necessarily' is taken to express an alethic modality, (5) is unambiguously false. The second reply is that (5) is, strictly speaking, unambiguously false, and that those who think it has a true interpretation do so because they confuse it with (5'''). We considered two objections to this reply and found neither very compelling. We are left with two rival explanations for the alleged ambiguity in (5). So far, nothing has been said to suggest that one is better than the other.

Even if this part of the response were successful, it would not undermine the original argument against the synonymy of 'Aristotle' and 'the last great philosopher of antiquity.' It is designed to demonstrate that such an argument cannot be generalized to show that proper names are never synonymous with definite descriptions. Indeed, there may be a class of proper names which are synonymous with their associated definite descriptions. Dummett offers one in 'Saint Anne'; Linsky concurs and offers a second in 'Homer' (and 'the author of the Iliad and the Odyssey'). This meager supply can be of little consolation to anyone who claims that proper names are always synonymous with their associated definite descriptions. Let us consider the second part of the response to our original argument.

Recall the original argument. Sentence

(3) Necessarily, if Aristotle existed, then Aristotle was a philosopher

is unambiguously false, sentence

- (4) Necessarily, if there was a last great philosopher of antiquity, then the last great philosopher of antiquity was a philosopher

is not. Therefore, contrary to the thesis that 'Aristotle' is synonymous with 'the last great philosopher of antiquity,' (3) and (4) are not synonymous.

Dummett and Linsky note that

$$(4'') \quad [ixGx]: \neg \underline{L}(Ey (y=x) \rightarrow Px),$$

which represents the wide-scope interpretation of (4), is, like (3), unambiguously false. With this in mind, they modify the original Synonymy Thesis. The original Synonymy Thesis is that a speaker who uses ' $\phi(N)$ ' expresses the proposition he would express were he to use ' $\phi(d/N)$,' where 'd' is the definite description he associates with the name 'N.' The modified Synonymy Thesis is that when such a speaker uses ' $\phi(N)$,' he expresses the proposition he would express were he to use ' $\phi(d/N)$,' where ' $\phi(d/N)$ ' is interpreted so that 'd' does not fall within the scope of any modal operator in ' $\phi(d/N)$.'¹⁶ Let us see how our original argument fares against the modified Synonymy Thesis.

Unlike the original Synonymy Thesis, the modified Synonymy Thesis does not entail that (3) and (4) are synonymous. Instead the modified Synonymy Thesis entails that (3) and the interpretation of (4) formally represented by (4'') are synonymous. Our original argument depended on the claim that (3), unlike the sentence it was said to be synonymous with, is unambiguously false. Because (4'') is unambiguously false, such an argument will fail against the modified Synonymy Thesis.

Note that, in modifying the original thesis, Dummett and Linsky have conceded a point to Kripke. They have conceded that the original

argument refutes the original Synonymy Thesis. However, the modified Synonymy Thesis preserves much of what some find attractive about the original thesis: through the meanings of certain sentences in which they occur, the meanings of proper names are accounted for in terms of the meanings of their associated definite descriptions.

This concludes the first round of the dialogue between Kripke and Dummett.

Section Four

Kripke initiates the second round of his dialogue with Dummett in his preface to Naming and Necessity. Therein, Kripke writes:

It has been asserted that my own view itself reduces to a view about scope, that the doctrine of rigidity simply is the doctrine that a name, in the context of any sentence, should be read with a large scope including all modal operators. This latter idea is particularly wide of the mark; in terms of modal logic, it represents a technical error . . . [(8)] and [(9)] [stated below] are simple sentences. Neither contains modal or other operators, so there is no room for any scope distinctions. No scope convention about more complex sentences affects the interpretation of these sentences. Yet the issue of rigidity makes sense as applied to both. My view is that 'Aristotle' in [(8)] is rigid, but 'the last great philosopher of antiquity' in [(9)] is not. No hypothesis about scope conventions for modal contexts expresses this view; it is a doctrine about the truth-conditions, with respect to counterfactual situations, of (the propositions expressed by) all sentences, including simple sentences.

This shows that the view that reduces rigidity to scope in the manner stated is simply in error. (Kripke, 1980a, pp. 11-12)

The argument from Kripke's Preface involves the truth-values of sentences

(8) Aristotle was fond of dogs

and

(9) The last great philosopher of antiquity was fond of dogs, relative to the possible world, w_1 , partially specified as follows: at w_1 , Aristotle and Plato exist, Aristotle did not go into philosophy, Plato was antiquity's last great philosopher, Aristotle was not fond of dogs, and Plato was fond of dogs.¹⁷ Sentence (8) is false at w_1 , since Aristotle is not fond of dogs at w_1 . Sentence (9) is true at w_1 . If the modified Synonymy Thesis were true, then (8) would be synonymous with (9). If (8) were synonymous with (9), then (8) and (9) would be logically equivalent. If (8) and (9) were logically equivalent, then there would be no possible world relative to which (8) is false and (9) is true. But w_1 is such a world. Therefore, the modified Synonymy Thesis is false.

Dummett's response to the argument from Kripke's Preface rests on Dummett's views about the connection between semantic theories for natural language, the data such theories must preserve, and our pre-theoretic intuitions.¹⁸ In this regard, Dummett writes:

Since Frege, philosophers engaged in logical analysis have usually proceeded, as he did, in two stages. The first stage is to transform sentences of the natural language into what Quine calls a 'regimented' form; the second is to construct a semantic theory whose direct application is to the regimented language. The semantic theory states how each sentence of the regimented language is determined, in accordance with its composition, as true or as false; it indirectly assigns truth-conditions to sentences of natural language in virtue of the mapping of those sentences on to the regimented ones. The entire analysis is to be judged successful or unsuccessful by whether the truth-conditions thus indirectly assigned to sentences of natural language accord with our intuitive understanding of those sentences. The regimentation cannot be judged correct or incorrect in isolation: it has no significance on its own, but only as supplying the syntactic forms to which we formulate the semantic theory as applying. (Dummett, 1981, p. 574)

As characterized by Dummett, the semanticist's job is a two-step procedure. First, certain sentences of English are formally represented in a given formal language by certain well-formed formulae of that formal language. Where ϕ is a sentence of English and χ is a well-formed formula of the formal language, a translation procedure is specified. It may be thought of as yielding sentences of the form:

' ϕ if and only if χ '.

In such as case χ represents ϕ . Second, truth-conditions are directly assigned to the well-formed formulae of the formal language. A formal semantics is given. Where is as above, the semantics will issue sentences of the form:

' χ ' is true if and only if ψ ,

where sentence ψ is a direct specification of the truth-conditions of the formula χ . ψ is then taken to be an indirect specification of the truth-conditions of the original English sentence ϕ . The entire project is a success just in case, for every ϕ involved, our intuitions about ϕ accord with sentences of the form:

' ϕ ' is true if and only if ψ '.

Dummett steadfastly maintains that the only relevant intuitions--the only intuitions the semantics must accommodate--are our pre-theoretic intuitions. A theory which fails to preserve such intuitions must be rejected or revised.

Dummett points out that we must consider two rival accounts of sentences like

(8) Aristotle was found of dogs

and

(10) Deutero-Isaiah died in infancy.

In this regard, Dummett writes:

Two strategies are possible. One is to appeal once more to the mechanism of scope. On this account, the expression 'Deutero-Isaiah' is, like 'the author of the prophecy', to be represented in the regimented language by the term 't', whose denotation in possible worlds we have already considered. The regimented versions of 'Deutero-Isaiah died in infancy' and of 'The author of the prophecy died in infancy' will then be the same, namely 'D(t)'. This is not say that 'Deutero-Isaiah' and 'the author of the prophecy', considered as expressions of natural language, behave, on this account, in exactly the same way. Sentences containing 'Deutero-Isaiah' demand to be understood in such a way that, in regimenting them, the term that represents 'Deutero-Isaiah', namely 't', is given the widest possible scope. Hence, 'Deutero-Isaiah might have died in infancy' must be regimented as $\{\lambda x. \Diamond(x)\}(t)$; it does not admit the regimentation $\Diamond D(t)$.

Alternatively, we may represent 'Deutero-Isaiah' by a distinct term 'd' of the regimented language, which is stipulated in the semantic theory to be a rigid designator, i.e., to denote in every possible world the object identical with the actual referent of 'Deutero-Isaiah' (or of 't'). In this case, 'Deutero-Isaiah might have died in infancy' may be regimented as $\Diamond D(d)$; as Kripke remarks, this sentence will have the same truth-conditions as $\{\lambda x. \Diamond(x)\}(d)$. (Dummett, 1981, p. 577)

Thus, according to Dummett, (10) can be formally represented either by

(10') $D(d)$

or by

(10'') $\{\lambda x. D(x)\}(iyAy)$.

Where 'd' is stipulated to be rigid designator and 'iyAy' is interpreted as an incomplete symbol a la Russell: 'iyAy' will not be a rigid designator. (We will let 'Ax' represent 'x is an author of the prophecy.' Dummett uses 't' as a metalinguistic variable which takes expressions with the semantic properties of definite descriptions as values.)

Dummett maintains that no relevant datum—no pre-theoretic intuition about sentence (10)—supports representing (10) as (10') (which he regards as Kripke's analysis of (10)) rather than as (10'') (which is his own analysis of (10)¹⁹). Thus Dummett writes:

Which of the two analyses ought we to prefer? Linguistic intuition will not help us here, at least in so far as it relates to the truth-conditions of sentences of natural languages, since both analyses ascribe exactly the same truth-conditions to such sentences. (Dummett, 1981, p. 577)

Along these same lines, Dummett would maintain that no relevant datum supports representing

(8) Aristotle was fond of dogs

as

(8') $F(a)$

rather than as

(8'') $\{\lambda y.D(y)\}(ixGx)$.

Now, according to the modified Synonymy Thesis, for a speaker who associates 'Aristotle' with 'the last great philosopher of antiquity,' English sentences of the form

$\ulcorner \phi(\text{Aristotle}) \urcorner$

are synonymous with the wide-scope interpretations of English sentences of the form

$\ulcorner \phi(\text{the last great philosopher of antiquity/Aristotle}) \urcorner$.

The wide-scope interpretations of sentences of the form

$\ulcorner \phi(\text{the last great philosopher of antiquity/Aristotle}) \urcorner$

are adequately represented in our formal language by formulae of the form

$\ulcorner \{\lambda x.\phi(y)\}(ixGx) \urcorner$.

Dummett maintains that no relevant datum supports representing (8) as

(8') rather than as (8'') and that no relevant datum supports representing (10) as (10') rather than as (10''). In addition, he makes the more sweeping claim that no relevant datum supports representing sentences of the form

$$\ulcorner \phi(\text{Aristotle}) \urcorner$$

by a formula of the form

$$\ulcorner \phi(a) \urcorner$$

rather than by formula of the form

$$\ulcorner \{\lambda y. \phi(y)\}(\iota x Gx) \urcorner.$$

Formula of the form

$$\ulcorner \{\lambda y. \phi(y)\}(\iota x Gx) \urcorner$$

represent the wide-scope interpretations of English sentences of the form

$$\ulcorner \phi(\text{the last great philosopher of antiquity/Aristotle}) \urcorner.$$

Therefore, if Dummett's general claim is correct, no relevant datum will show that the truth-conditions for English sentences of the form

$$\ulcorner \phi(\text{Aristotle}) \urcorner$$

differ from those for the wide-scope interpretations of English sentences of the form

$$\ulcorner \phi(\text{the last great philosopher of antiquity/Aristotle}) \urcorner.$$

So, Dummett would maintain that no relevant datum shows either that

(8) Aristotle was fond of dogs

is not synonymous with the wide-scope reading of

(9) The last great philosopher of antiquity was fond of dogs
(which is formally represented by (8'')) or that

(10) Deutero-Isaiah died in infancy

is not synonymous with the wide-scope reading of

(11) The author of the prophecy died in infancy
(which is formally represented by (10'')). If Dummett's general claim is correct, no relevant datum will serve as the basis for an argument from a divergence of truth-conditions to the denial of the modified Synonymy Thesis.

Kripke would doubtless agree with Dummett that if no relevant datum favored representing sentences of the form

$\ulcorner \phi(\text{Aristotle}) \urcorner$

by formulæ of the form

$\ulcorner \phi(a) \urcorner$

rather than by formulæ of the form

$\ulcorner \{ \lambda y. \phi(y) \} (ix Gx) \urcorner$,

then his modal arguments do not refute the modified Synonymy Thesis.

Nevertheless, Kripke maintains that there is datum against representing (8) as (8'') and, by default, in favor of representing (8) as (8'). For according to Kripke, a theory of names must be adequate to the apparent intuition that (8) is false at w_1 , (8') is false at w_1 , and (8'') is true at w_1 .

Dummett is apparently willing to concede the point that (8') is false at w_1 and (8'') is true at w_1 . For he writes:

The choice between them [i.e., the two analyses] may seem important, however. On the second analysis, the regimentation 'D(d)' of 'Deutero-Isaiah died in infancy' is true with respect to any possible world v such that 'D(x)' is true of i with respect to v . In such a world 't' will not of course denote i , but may denote some other object j of which 'D(x)' is not true with respect to v . On the first analysis, however, the regimentation of 'Deutero-Isaiah died in infancy' will be 'D(t)', and this will be false with respect to v . (Dummett, 1981, p. 578)

The first analysis is of course Dummett's analysis of (10), namely (10''). The second analysis is (10'), the analysis Dummett attributes to Kripke. The point of the passage is that there is a world relative to which (10') and (10'') differ in truth-value. Dummett would almost certainly concede the same technical point about (8') and (8''), and acknowledge that (8') is false, whereas (8'') is true, at w_1 .

However, although Dummett will concede the "technical point" that (8') and (8'')--as well as (10') and (10'')--differ in their world-relative truth-values, he would deny that it thereby follows that (8'') is an unacceptable analysis of (8) or that (10'') is an unacceptable analysis of (10). Putting the issue in terms of (10) and its rival analyses, Dummett rejects the notion that the divergence in world-relative truth-values in (10') and (10'') is evidence that one of them is better suited to represent (10) than the other because Dummett holds that a semantic theory need not accommodate Kripke's apparent intuitions about the world-relative truth-value of (10) (or of (8)). In this regard, Dummett writes:

This argument leaves it obscure at which level it is intended to apply: at that of our intuitions concerning sentences of natural language, or at that of our regimentations of those sentences and the semantic theory we present as governing them. At the latter level, it is certainly correct. Let \underline{v} be a world in which the individual who in fact composed the prophecy died in infancy, but in which someone else composed the very same prophecy. Then, on the first of the two analyses discussed above, 'Deutero-Isaiah died in infancy' is represented by 'D(t)' which is false with respect to \underline{v} , whereas, on the second analysis, it is represented by a sentence 'D(d)' which is true with respect to \underline{v} . . . Kripke's argument is irrelevant if it is concerned only to make this point, which is indeed a "technical" one. It has force only if it be held that, among the linguistic intuitions to which a logical analysis is to be held responsible, there are ones which bear, not upon the

absolute truth or falsity of what we say, but upon its truth or falsity with respect to hypothetical circumstances. (Dummett, 1981, p. 581)

The preceding passage identifies the basic disagreement between Dummett and Kripke. Kripke claims to have as an intuition

(K) (8) is false at w_1 .

Dummett denies that he has any such intuition and refuses to count (K) as part of the data a theory of names must preserve. Against admitting (K) as datum, Dummett writes:

We do, indeed, have (faltering) intuitions as to the truth or falsity of modalized sentences of natural language; but these are not here to the point, since both analyses rate 'Deutero-Isaiah might have died in infancy' as true. Truth or falsity with respect to possible worlds is a very different thing from the truth or falsity of counterfactual conditionals. For one thing, a sound judgement that, if Jones had attended the meeting, he would have proposed a vote of censure on the chairman, does not amount to a judgement that it would have been impossible for Jones to attend the meeting without proposing a vote of censure; its truth therefore does not demand that 'Jones proposed a vote of censure' is true with respect to every possible world with respect to which 'Jones attended the meeting' is true. For another thing, we may judge a counterfactual statement to be correct without committing ourselves to accepting the antecedent as stating a genuine possibility. The notion of truth-value with respect to possible worlds is a technical one, which may or may not admit a coherent explanation, but it belongs to the semantic theory rather than to that understanding of our own language which is datum for such theory. (Dummett, 1981, pp. 581-581)

Dummett appears to have two reasons for refusing to admit (K) as datum. First, Dummett holds that claims about the world-relative truth-values of sentences make reference to the theoretical entities--possible worlds--of the theory under consideration; and, therefore, are not part of the data the theory must preserve. Second, Dummett holds that our beliefs about the world-relative truth-values of sentences are not generally clear and consistent; and, therefore, are generally unreliable.

Let us consider the force of Dummett's second reason against admitting (K) as datum.

Each of the following states of affairs is compatible with Dummett's claim that our beliefs about the world-relative truth-values of sentences are not generally clear and consistent: (i) a recognizable subset of such beliefs both contains only beliefs which are clear and mutually consistent and includes (K); and (ii) an identifiable subset of native speakers of English both contains only members who espouse nothing but clear and mutually consistent beliefs about such matters and includes Kripke and others who claim (K) as an intuition. So long as either of (i) and (ii) are live options--and nothing Dummett has said suggests that they are not--we would be rash to dismiss (K) on the basis of Dummett's claim that such beliefs are not generally clear and consistent. We should not conclude from what Dummett actually asserts in this regard that (K) should not be counted as datum. Let us see what can be said for admitting (K) as datum despite its apparent reference to possible worlds.

(K) involves apparent reference to possible worlds; that is, to the theoretical entities of possible worlds semantics. To see what force this has against counting (K) as datum, two things must be considered. First, we must see whether or not it is "bad philosophy" to test a theory against our beliefs about its theoretical entities. Second, we must inquire whether or not (K) admits of a reformulation which avoids apparent reference to possible worlds but which still "argues" against the modified Synonymy Thesis.

It is far from obvious that it is "bad philosophy" to test a theory against our beliefs about its theoretical entities. If we are realists

about our theories and their ontological commitments, then, if we find ourselves quantifying over possible worlds, we must acknowledge that we think such things exist. We must acknowledge that there are possible worlds, even if we immediately try to "reduce" them to entities we were already committed to. (For example, by saying that possible worlds are really just maximal, consistent sets of propositions.)

When we discover that we are committed to possible worlds, it does not seem unreasonable to consider their relations to things we were already committed to. It does not seem unreasonable to form beliefs about how possible worlds relate to such things as sentences, or propositions, and truth-values. So, our philosophical curiosity compels us to pose questions like, 'Is (8) true at w_1 ?' When we think we have an answer—say, that (8) is false at w_1 —we would be irresponsible if we refused to apply our answer in order gain further information about the things the answer involves. Therefore, applying our answer in the hope of deciding between rival analyses of (8) does not sound like "bad philosophy." In fact, quite the reverse is true: to arrive at an answer and then refuse to apply it sounds like a much better recipe for "bad philosophy." In the face of these considerations, we would be hasty to conclude, simply from the fact that (K) involves apparent reference to possible worlds, that (K) should not be considered when we try to decide between competing analyses of (8). Dummett, who would have us reject (K), owes us a better explanation of why we should than the one he has provided.

There is a reformulation of the apparent intuition Kripke appeals to in his Preface which avoids reference to possible worlds and which

retains the force of (K) against the modified Synonymy Thesis. One such formulation is:

(K') Had Aristotle existed, not been fond of dogs, and not been a philosopher, and had Plato existed, been fond of dogs, and been the last great philosopher of antiquity, then, as we use (8), (8) would be false.

(K') is a perfectly legitimate contrary-to-fact conditional. It makes no reference to possible worlds. Kripke would doubtless agree that he has (K') as an intuition and would regard it as a reasonable reformulation of the apparent intuition he appeals to in his Preface.

Semantic theories, like other theories in philosophy or in the sciences, should not restrict themselves to what is the case. They must also be responsive to questions about what could have been the case or could still be the case. They must answer questions of the form, 'How are S and T related?' In addition, they must answer questions of the form, 'How would S and T be related if such-and-such obtains?' Letting 'S' and 'T' take sentences and truth-values as their respective values, (K') is an answer to one such question; and, therefore, (K') appears to be perfectly legitimate datum. It is not, however, datum that Dummett's analysis preserves. For, according to Dummett's analysis, (K') is false; whereas (K) is true according to the analysis Dummett attributes to Kripke. Apparently, in (K') we have admissible datum which supports Kripke's case against the modified Synonymy Thesis.

Assuming that Dummett would still defend the modified Synonymy Thesis, he has just two options: (i) deny that (K') is admissible datum; and (ii) offer a substitute formulation of (K') which both captures the apparent intuition Kripke appeals to and comes out true according to Dummett's analysis. Let us consider the second option.

Dummett might propose to capture the apparent intuition Kripke appeals to with the following:

(D) Had Aristotle existed, not been fond of dogs, and not been a philosopher, and had Plato existed, been fond of dogs, and been the last great philosopher of antiquity, then, it would not be the case that Aristotle was fond of dogs.

(D) is true under both analyses. If (D) better captures the apparent intuition that Kripke appeals to than (K'), then we can no longer be sure that (K') is admissible datum against the modified Synonymy Thesis.

In discussing his apparent intuition, Kripke reports:

. . . it is a doctrine about the truth-conditions, with respect to counterfactual situations, of (the propositions expressed by) all sentences, including simple sentences.
(Kripke, 1980, p. 12)

Kripke would almost certainly deny that (D) does a better job than (K') of capturing the apparent intuition he appeals to in his Preface. That intuition is about sentence (8) and the truth-value it would have had a certain state of affairs obtained. (This is stated in the passage quoted above on page 31.) (K') has the appropriate subject matter; (D) does not. (D) is not about sentence (8), nor is it about a truth-value. (D) is not a faithful rendering of the apparent intuition Kripke appeals to.

To defend the modified Synonymy Thesis, Dummett must say that (K') is not admissible datum. Dummett must deny that (K') is among his intuitions and maintain that Kripke is confused or mistaken when he claims that (K') is among his intuitions. Dummett could then hold that we have reached an impasse, that Kripke's modal arguments are, at best, inconclusive, and that now is the time to consider the other ways in which description theories of meaning are superior to the sort of theory Kripke seems to favor. Dummett could remind us that descriptions

theories, in contrast with their Millian rivals, deliver clean solutions to the problems of negative existential sentences, non-referring names, and significant, true, identity sentences.

In reply Kripke could hold fast to (K'), and maintain that it does represent a genuine intuition, one which would be accepted by native speakers of English who are not committed to certain theories about proper names. In addition, Kripke could remind Dummett of the problems generated for description theories by the No Description Objection and the Wrong Referent Objection. He could also recall problems descriptions theories have with belief ascription sentences: namely, deciding which descriptions--the speaker's or the alleged believer's--should be substituted for proper names which occur in the that-clauses of such sentences. Finally, Kripke could point out special new problems raised for Dummett's Synonymy Thesis by negative existential sentences, non-referring names, and belief ascription sentences. These new problems are discussed below.

We may assume that the following sentence is true:

(12) Sherlock Holmes does not exist.

So, it is reasonable to expect that the following sentence also be true:

(13) Possibly, Sherlock Holmes does not exist.

Nevertheless, according to the modified Synonymy Thesis, (13) should be formally represented by

(13') $\{\lambda x.M(-\exists y y=x)\}(\iota zHz),$

where 'Hx' formally represents 'x is a Holmesizer.' Since entails the existence of a Holmesizer, (13') is false. Apparently, then, a description theory which incorporates the modified Synonymy Thesis does

not handle negative existential sentences as cleanly as one might have hoped.

The description theory is praised for its apparent success in handling the problems raised by sentences that contain non-referring names. Many description theorists would regard the following sentence as true:

(14) Either $2+2=4$ or Sherlock Holmes is a detective.

Thus, it is reasonable to expect them to also hold that the following is true:

(15) Possibly, either $2+2=4$ or Sherlock Holmes is a detective. After all, (15) merely asserts the possibility of a disjunctive state of affairs one of whose disjuncts necessarily obtains. Nevertheless, according to the modified Synonymy Thesis, (15) must be formally represented by

(15') $\{\lambda x. \underline{M}(2+2=4 \vee Dx)\}(iyHy),$

where 'Dx' formally represents 'x is a detective.' Like (13'), (15') entails the existence of a Holmesizer; and, therefore, like (13'), (15') is false. So it appears that a description theory based on the modified Synonymy Thesis will have its own problems with non-referring names.²⁰

Description theories have been praised for their success in accommodating alleged truths like

(16) Smith believes that Sherlock Holmes is a detective.

(16) seems open to two non-equivalent representations:

(16') $\{\lambda x. Bs, Dx\}(iyHy)$

and

(16'') $Bs, \{\lambda x. Dx\}(iyHy),$

where 'Bx, y' formally represents 'x believes that y.' (16') is unacceptable. It entails the existence of a Holmesizer. Description theories are also often credited for their treatment of apparently true sentences like

(17) Smith does not believe that Hesperus is Phosphorus.

But, like (16), (17) seems to admit two non-equivalent formalizations, namely:

(17') $\{\lambda x. \{\lambda y. Bs, x=y\}(izP_{1z})\}(ix_1H_1x_1)$

and

(17'') $\neg Bs, \{\lambda x. \{\lambda y. x=y\}(izP_{1z})\}(ix_1H_1x_1),$

where 'H₁x' represents 'x is a Hesperizer' and 'P₁x' represents 'x is a Phosphorizer.' However, if (17) really is true, it would be a mistake to represent it by (17'), since (17') is false. This suggests that the modified Synonymy Thesis must be amended to require that the second place of formuli representing belief ascription sentences--and attitude ascription sentences in general--is occupied by closed sentences of the representing formal language. (16'') then becomes the only acceptable rendering of (16), and (17'') becomes the only acceptable rendering of (17).

This treatment of (16) and (17) suggests that sentence

(18) Possibly, Smith believes that Sherlock Holmes is a detective

should not be represented by

(18') $\{\lambda x. \underline{M}(Bs, Dx)\}(iyHy),$

but rather by

(18'') $\underline{M}(Bs, \{\lambda x. Dx\}(iyHy)).$

This is well and fine, especially in light of the fact that (18') entails the existence of a Holmesizer; still it does present a problem. Strictly speaking, the modified Synonymy Thesis requires that (18) be represented by (18'), not (18''). For (18') represents the reading of (18) (the Holmesizer/Sherlock Holmes) where the scope of 'the Holmesizer' includes all modal operators. Of course discretion is the better part of valor, and, so, the modified Synonymy Thesis must be "remodified" to allow (18'') to represent (18).

The remodified Synonymy Thesis is that a speaker who uses ' $\phi(N)$ ' and who associates the name 'N' with the definite description 'd' expresses the proposition he would express were he to use ' $\phi(d/N)$,' where ' $\phi(d/N)$ ' is interpreted so that: (i) every occurrence of 'd' in ' $\phi(d/N)$ ' that is not in a that-clause of some attitude ascription sentence in ' $\phi(d/N)$ ' is read with a scope that includes all modal operators in ' $\phi(d/N)$ '; and (ii) every other occurrence of 'd' in ' $\phi(d/N)$ ' is read with a scope that does not exceed, but which includes all modal operators in , the sentential component of the that-clause in which it occurs. According to the remodified Synonymy Thesis, (18) is to be represented by (18''), but by (18').

This move is independently motivated. We are operating under the assumptions that propositions are the objects of beliefs and that the that-clauses of belief ascription sentences name the propositions allegedly believed (i.e., the propositions expressed by the sentential components of such that-clauses). Traditionally, formal expressions like 'Dx' (and "English expressions" like 'that x is a detective') have been taken to designate propositional functions, not propositions.

Philosophers who trade in propositions and who ply their trade in terms of formal languages traditionally hold that only the closed sentences of their formal language (represent expressions of English which) designate propositions. So the representations required by the remodified Synonymy Thesis bring Dummett's project more in line with our assumptions and a long standing tradition.

Despite its apparent advantages, even the remodified Synonymy Thesis has problems with belief ascription sentences. Consider this sentence:

- (19) Possibly, Aristotle was not a philosopher, Plato was the last great philosopher of antiquity, and Aristotle believed that Aristotle was a philosopher.

(19) is about a counterfactual situation in which Aristotle has a certain false belief about himself. According to the remodified Synonymy Thesis, (19) is to be formally represented by:

$$(19') \{ \wedge x. \{ \wedge y. \overline{M}(-Px \ \& \ y = izGz \ \& \ Bx, \{ \wedge x_1. Px_1 \} (iy_1 Gy_1)) \} (iz_1 Rz_1) \} (ix_2 Gx_2),$$

where 'Px' represents 'x is a philosopher' and 'Rx' represents 'x authored The Republic.'²¹ (19') is not an acceptable representation of (19). For (19') is not about a counterfactual situation in which Aristotle has a false belief about himself. (19') is about a counterfactual situation in which Aristotle has a true belief about Plato. Therefore, like the modified Synonymy Thesis it is meant to replace, the remodified Synonymy Thesis has special problems when it comes to belief ascription sentences.

Where ' $\phi(N)$ ' is a sentence which contains the proper name 'N' and contains no modal operators, we generally think that 'Possibly, $\phi(N)$ ' expresses the proposition which asserts the possibility of the proposition expressed by ' $\phi(N)$.' We think that ' $\phi(N)$ ' expresses a

proposition which attributes the property of being an x such that $\phi(N)$ to the referent of 'N,' or to the-F (where 'the-F' is the definite description associated with the name 'N'). Dummett seems to think the same about ' $\phi(N)$ '; however, he does not think that 'Possibly, $\phi(N)$ ' expresses the proposition which asserts the possibility of the proposition expressed by ' $\phi(N)$.' Instead, Dummett thinks that 'Possibly, $\phi(N)$ ' expresses a proposition which attributes the property of being an x such that possibly $\phi(x/N)$ to the referent of 'N,' or to the-F.

Dummett's understanding of 'Possibly, $\phi(N)$ ' is an essential part of his project. For this understanding of 'Possibly, $\phi(N)$ ' is what guarantees that the description substituted for 'N' gets interpreted with a scope which includes all modal operators in 'Possibly, $\phi(N)$.' However, this understanding of 'Possibly, $\phi(N)$ ' is also what gives rise to the problems presented above. Other description theories can avoid these problems by taking advantage of the fact that 'Possibly, $\phi(N)$ ' (or 'Possibly, $\phi(\text{the-F}/N)$ ') admits an interpretation which does not entail the existence of the referent of 'N,' or of the-F. On such a reading, 'Possibly, $\phi(N)$ ' expresses the proposition which asserts the possibility of the proposition expressed by ' $\phi(N)$.' Such a reading is not available to a description theory of meaning based on the modified Synonymy Thesis. Indeed, the modified Synonymy Thesis entails that if ' $\phi(N)$ ' entails the existence of the referent of 'N,' or of the-F, then so does 'Possibly, $\phi(N)$.'

We now know that a description theory which includes the modified Synonymy Thesis will have special new problems dealing with negative existential sentences, non-referring proper names, and belief ascription

sentences. We also know that in (K') Kripke has an apparent intuition which is inconsistent with the modified Synonymy Thesis, an intuition which I share. Of course Dummett could reject (K'); however, we know that his stated reasons against admitting (K') (or (K)) as datum are either inconclusive or open to serious objection. We have also examined an alternative formulation of Kripke's apparent intuition--one that is consistent with the modified Synonymy Thesis--and found that it does not have the appropriate subject matter.

On the basis of these considerations, while acknowledging that they might not be decisive enough to dissuade the die-hard description theorist, I conclude that the Modal Objection gives us additional good reasons to withhold acceptance from the description theory of meaning and take another look at the Millian theory of meaning.

Notes

¹The basic objections to the description theory are reviewed in Chapter I.

²Dummett's initial response to the Modal Objection appeared in Frege; Philosophy of Language (1973). It was modified in light of Kripke's replies; the modified version appears in The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy (1981).

³We will say that, as used by such a speaker, the original name sentence and its corresponding description sentence are synonymous; and, for brevity, that the two sentences are synonymous.

⁴According to the description theory, speakers back their uses of proper names with definite descriptions. On a given occasion of its use, a name's associated definite description is its backing description. A crude test for determining what description a speaker is using to back his use of a name is given by the following: 'D' backs S's use of 'N' (at time t) if (at t) S is disposed to respond, 'N is (was) D,' to the question, 'Who (what) is (was) N?'

⁵Roughly, a definite description is a referentially identifying description if and only if it is about a singular term or an act of reference.

⁶But for a few stylistic changes, this discussion of Harrison is taken directly from Ryckman (in press).

⁷Ackerman, 1979.

⁸Austin, 1983.

⁹Kripke, 1980b.

¹⁰See Chisholm, 1981, pp. 54-55.

¹¹See Lewis, 1981, pp. 286-287.

¹²Several philosophers, Loar, Noonan, and Schiffer come readily to mind, rely on Dummett's basic strategy in their sketchy defenses of the description theory against the Modal Objection.

¹³Linsky's response is virtually identical with that given in Dummett (1973).

¹⁴Kripke's views about the contingent a priori are stated in Kripke (1980a, pp. 54-57 and 79). Kripke holds that a person who rigidly fixes the reference of a name 'N' by a definite description 'the-F' is in a position to know a priori that if N exists, then N is the-F. Suppose that Dummett insists that, as we use it, the reference of the name 'Saint Anne' is rigidly fixed by the definite description 'the mother of Mary.' Kripke could then allow that we are in a position to know a priori that if Saint Anne existed, then Saint Anne was the mother of Mary. He could then allow that we are also in a position to know a priori that if Saint Anne existed, then Saint Anne was a mother. Kripke could then maintain that if (5) has a true interpretation, it is the interpretation given by (5''').

¹⁵One finds Kripke endorsing this very maxim in "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference," (1977, p. 267-268).

¹⁶We need to insure that 'Necessarily, Aristotle was the last great philosopher of antiquity' does not come out true according to the modified Synonymy Thesis. Let

EXP the last great philosopher of antiquity(\emptyset (Aristotle))

be

' ϕ (Aristotle),'

when ' ϕ (Aristotle)' contains no occurrences of 'the last great philosopher of antiquity,' and let

EXP_{the last great philosopher of antiquity(ϕ (Aristotle))} be the interpretation of ' ϕ (Aristotle)' that results when every occurrence of 'the last great philosopher of antiquity' in ' ϕ (Aristotle)' is read with a scope that does not exceed any modal operator in ' ϕ (Aristotle),' when ' ϕ (Aristotle)' contains one or more occurrence of 'the last great philosopher of antiquity.' The modified Synonymy Thesis should be understood so that ' ϕ (Aristotle)' is synonymous with the interpretation of 'EXP_{the last great philosopher of antiquity(ϕ (Aristotle))}(the last great philosopher of antiquity/Aristotle)' that results when 'the last great philosopher of antiquity' is read with a scope that includes every modal operator in 'EXP_{the last great philosopher of antiquity(ϕ (Aristotle))}(the last great philosopher of antiquity/Aristotle).'

In this way, 'Necessarily, Aristotle was the last great philosopher of antiquity' is not supposed to be synonymous with the wide-scope reading of 'Necessarily, the last great philosopher of antiquity was the last great philosopher of antiquity,' which is true. Rather, according to the modified Synonymy Thesis, 'Necessarily, Aristotle was the last great philosopher of antiquity' is synonymous with the wide-scope reading of 'Necessarily, there was exactly one last great philosopher of antiquity and the last great philosopher of antiquity was it.' That is, according to the modified Synonymy Thesis, 'Necessarily, Aristotle was the last great philosopher of antiquity' is synonymous with the

narrow-scope reading of 'There was exactly one last great philosopher of antiquity and necessarily, it was the last great philosopher of antiquity.' This sentence is false.

¹⁷_{w₁} was partially specified early in this Chapter.

¹⁸From this point on, the response we are considering is Dummett's. Linsky may or may not favor Dummett's position.

¹⁹Where (10'') formally represents:

(11) The author of the prophecy died in infancy.

²⁰Description theories and Millian theories alike have troubles with "names of fictional entities." The point here is that Dummett's defense against the Modal Objection raises special new problems for such names.

²¹The rationale behind this reading is given in Note 16 above.

CHAPTER III

KRIPKE'S PUZZLE ABOUT BELIEF: CONSISTENCY SOLUTIONS

In a recent article, "A Puzzle About Belief" (1979), Saul Kripke presents a puzzle about belief and proper names. This chapter and its successor are about Kripke's puzzle. In this chapter the puzzle is presented and explained. In addition, we will examine a recently developed theory of proper names and show both that the solution it offers to the standard versions of the problem of the apparent failure of the substitutivity of codesignating names does not extend to Kripke's puzzle and that this leads to additional problems for the theory.¹ Finally, four proposed solutions to the puzzle are stated and critically evaluated.²

Section One

Kripke states the puzzle in terms of the following example. This example is about Pierre and Pierre's dispositions toward certain sentences of French and English. While living in France, Pierre is a competent, monolingual speaker of French. As a result of the testimony of his monolingual French speaking peers, Pierre is disposed to assent to the sentence

(1) Londres est jolie.

Later, Pierre moves to an ugly section of London. There he learns English "on the street," by observing the behavior of others, and without the benefit of a translation manual. He is not told that 'Londres' and

'London' name the same city, nor that Frenchmen call the city that surrounds him 'Londres.' His new friends call it 'London.' Pierre is soon a competent speaker of English and he remains a competent speaker of French. As they frequent only its uglier parts, his new friends have little regard for London. On the basis of the testimony of his new friends, as well as that of his senses, Pierre is disposed to assent to the sentence

(2) London is not pretty.

For similar reasons, he is not disposed to assent to the sentence

(3) London is pretty.

In fact, Pierre is disposed to dissent from (3). He remains disposed to assent to (1).

Kripke concentrates on the connections between Pierre's dispositions toward sentences (1), (2), and (3) and certain natural principles about belief, language use, translation, and truth. Certain of our interests are better served by continuing the story of Pierre to consider his dispositions toward sentences

(4) Londres is London,

(5) Londres is not London,

(6) London is London,

and

(7) London is not London,

both before and after he discovers that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate.³

It is natural to expect that a reasonable person in Pierre's situation, with Pierre's dispositions, will not be disposed to assent to

(4). We will assume that this is so; in fact, Pierre is disposed to dissent from (4). In addition, we will assume that Pierre is disposed to assent to (5) and to (6). We will assume that Pierre is not disposed to assent to (7). We will also assume that when Pierre learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, he will become disposed to assent to (4), will no longer be disposed to assent to (5), will remain disposed to assent to (6), and will remain ill-disposed to assent to (7).

It is important to note that there is nothing puzzling about this example. The story of Pierre is perfectly coherent; the events described above might well have occurred. Kripke gets a puzzle only when he applies certain principles about belief, language use, translation, and truth to elements of this example.

The first of the principles that Kripke employs is a disquotation principle. Kripke presents his disquotation principle as follows:

Let us make explicit the disquotational principle presupposed here, connecting sincere assent and belief. It can be stated as follows, where 'p' is to be replaced, inside and outside all quotation marks, by an appropriate standard English sentence: "If a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to 'p,' then he believes that p." (1979, p. 248-249)

To help illustrate what he means by "appropriate standard English sentence," Kripke adds:

The sentence replacing 'p' is to lack indexical or pronominal devices or ambiguities. (1979, p. 249)

In addition to a disquotation principle in English, for sentences of English, Kripke needs an analogous principle in French, for sentences of French. In this regard he writes:

We have stated a disquotation principle in English, for English sentences; an analogous principle, stated in French

(German, etc.) will be assumed to hold for French (German, etc.) sentences. (1979, p. 250)

A third principle Kripke uses to generate his puzzle is a "strengthened disquotation principle"; he presents as follows:

A normal speaker who is not reticent will be disposed to sincere assent to 'p' if and only if he believes that p. (1979, p. 249)

In addition to the principles above, Kripke uses

. . . a form of the Tarskian disquotation principle for truth: for each (French or English) replacement for 'p' infer "'p' is true" from 'p,' and conversely. (1979, p. 277)

Finally, Kripke uses the following principle of translation:

If a sentence of one language expresses a truth in that language, then any translation of it into another language also expresses a truth (in that other language). (1979, p. 250)

Now, if the story of Pierre were a true story, Pierre's assent to

(1) Londres est jolie,

in conjunction with the French version of Kripke's disquotation principle, the French version of the Tarskian disquotation principle, the principle of translation, and the English version of the Tarskian disquotation principle, would entail that Pierre believes that London is pretty. We have already said that Kripke's story of Pierre is a perfectly coherent story. With this in mind, so that we can avoid the sort of cumbersome subjunctive locution employed above, we will assume that Kripke's story of Pierre is a true story. Pierre's assent to (1), in conjunction with Kripke's principles, entails that Pierre believes that London is pretty. Pierre's assent to

(2) London is not pretty,

in conjunction with Kripke's disquotation principle, entails that Pierre

believes that London is not pretty. Pierre's not being disposed to assent to

(3) London is pretty,
in conjunction with Kripke's strengthened disquotation principle, entails that Pierre does not believe that London is pretty. Pierre's not being disposed to assent to

(4) Londres is London,
in conjunction with Kripke's strengthened disquotation principle, entails that Pierre does not believe that Londres is London. Pierre's being disposed to assent to

(5) Londres is not London,
in conjunction with Kripke's disquotation principle, entails that Pierre believes that Londres is not London. Pierre's being disposed to assent to

(6) London is London,
in conjunction with Kripke's disquotation principle, entails that Pierre believes that London is London. Finally, Pierre's not being disposed to assent to

(7) London is not London,
in conjunction with Kripke's strengthened disquotation principle, entails that Pierre does not believe that London is not London.

Recall that when Pierre learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, he becomes disposed to assent to (4), is no longer disposed to assent to (5), remains disposed to assent to (6), and is still not disposed to assent to (7). This, in conjunction with Kripke's principles, entails that, once he learns that 'Londres' and 'London'

codesignate, Pierre comes to believe that Londres is London, no longer believes that Londres is not London, continues to believe that London is London, and continues not to believe that London is not London.

We hold that belief is a two-place relation, one that relates persons to propositions. We hold that when we say that S believes that ϕ we are asserting that S stands in that relation to the proposition expressed by our use of ' ϕ .' A belief is the state of affairs of a person standing in the belief-relation to a given proposition. The object of a given belief is the proposition that person believes. Finally, we hold that two beliefs are inconsistent if and only if there is no possible world wherein both of the belief's objects are true (at one and the same time).

We are committed to the claim that Pierre believes both a proposition--the proposition expressed by 'London is pretty'--and also its denial--the proposition expressed by 'London is not pretty.' Hence, we are committed to the view that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. But, according to Kripke, this presents us with "insuperable difficulties" (1979, p. 257). He writes that:

We may suppose that Pierre, in spite of the unfortunate situation in which he now finds himself, is a leading philosopher and logician. He would never let contradictory beliefs pass. And surely anyone, leading logician or no, is in principle in a position to notice and correct contradictory beliefs if he has them. Precisely for this reason, we regard individuals who contradict themselves as subject to greater censure than those who merely have false beliefs. But it is clear that Pierre, as long as he is unaware that the cities he calls 'London' and 'Londres' are one and the same, is in no position to see, by logic alone, that at least one of his beliefs must be false. He lacks information, not logical acumen. He cannot be convicted of an inconsistency: to do so would be incorrect. (1979, p. 257)

We may safely assume that, apart from those beliefs involved in Pierre's dispositions toward sentences (1) through (7), Pierre does not

have inconsistent beliefs. According to Kripke, it is wrong to conclude, from what he has said about Pierre, that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs.

If we consider Pierre's behavior, Kripke's claim seems quite plausible. Pierre seems perfectly rational. Pierre seems to draw the sorts of conclusions any other rational person would draw, were he to find himself in Pierre's situation. A rational person who assents to

(1) Londres est jolie,

and

(2) London is not pretty,

would dissent from

(4) Londres is London.

It is also clear that, to the extent that Pierre can compare his beliefs, no amount of introspective comparison will help him detect an inconsistency among them. Furthermore, Pierre does not draw the sorts of wild conclusions apparently available to a person who takes both p and $\neg p$ as premises; a person with inconsistent beliefs apparently has such premises at his disposal. Yet, we do not find, nor would we expect to find, Pierre running through the streets of London declaring, say, that the moon is made from Carl Sagan's old sneakers.

Still, Pierre's behavior and Kripke's principles commit us to the conclusion that Pierre believes both that London is pretty and that London is not pretty; that is, to the conclusion that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. Together with the fact that it seems wrong to say that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs, this constitutes the first element of Kripke's puzzle. A solution must tell us what beliefs Pierre exhibits

by his assents to (1) and (2), and say whether or not those beliefs are inconsistent.

In addition to the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty, we are committed to the conclusion that Pierre does not believe that London is pretty. Thus, we seem to be committed to an outright contradiction. This is the second element of Kripke's puzzle. A solution to this part of the puzzle will explain why we are not really committed to this contradiction.

We are also committed to the conclusion that before he discovered that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, Pierre did not believe that Londres is London, did believe that Londres is not London, did believe that London is London, and did not believe London is not London. In addition, we are committed to the conclusion that once he discovered that the two names codesignate, Pierre began to believe that Londres is London, ceased to believe that Londres is not London, continued to believe that London is London, and continued not to believe that London is not London. This seems well and fine. After all, if we were to report on the change in Pierre's doxastic state, citing his behavior toward sentence (4), we would say that when Pierre discovered that the two names codesignate, he acquired a new belief.

However plausible this seems, it is unacceptable. Recall that we are presently committed to the Millian theory of the meaning of proper names. According to the Millian theory, since 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, sentences (4) and (6) express the same proposition. So, when we report that upon discovering that the two names codesignate, Pierre acquired a new belief--the belief that Londres is London--we must

be mistaken. For Pierre already believed that London is London, and the proposition that London is London is the proposition that Londres is London.

This is the third element of Kripke's puzzle. A solution will say what, if any, new beliefs Pierre acquired (or old beliefs he discarded) when he discovered that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate; that is, will say what, if any, new beliefs are exhibited by Pierre's change in behavior with regard to sentences (4) and (5).

At this point, one might be tempted to say that there is nothing puzzling about all of this; that the situation described leaves us with many options, each of which eliminates any puzzling results. To see that things are not quite this simple, we shall consider four basic options. Let us confine our attention to the beliefs, or disbeliefs, attributed to Pierre as a result of his dispositions toward sentences

(1) Londres est jolie,

(2) London is not pretty,

and

(3) London is pretty.

According to Kripke, we have four basic ways of sorting out Pierre's doxastic state. We can maintain:

. . . that at the time we no longer respect this French utterance ('Londres est jolie'), that is we no longer ascribe to him the corresponding belief; that we do not respect his English utterance (or lack of utterance); that we respect neither; that we respect both. (Kripke, 1979, p. 258)

The first of Kripke's four options is to refuse to conclude, on the basis of Pierre's assent to

(1) Londres est jolie,

that Pierre believes that London is pretty. Against this option, Kripke writes:

It is undeniable that Pierre once believed that London is pretty—at least before he learned English. For at that time, he differed not at all from countless of his countrymen, and we would have exactly the same grounds to say of him as of any of them that he believes that London is pretty: if any Frenchman who is both ignorant of English and never visited London believed that London is pretty, Pierre did.

Should we say that Pierre, now that he lives in London and speaks English, no longer believes that London is pretty? Well, unquestionably, Pierre once believed that London is pretty. So we would be forced to say that Pierre has changed his mind, has given up his previous belief. But has he really done so? Pierre is very set in his ways. He reiterates, with vigor, every assertion he has ever made in French. He says he has not changed his mind about anything, he has not given up any belief. Can we say that he is wrong about this? If we did not have the story of his living in London and his English utterances, on the basis of his normal command of French, we would be forced to conclude that he still believes that London is pretty. (Kripke, 1979, p. 256)

The second of Kripke's four options is to refuse to conclude, on the basis of Pierre's assent to

(2) London is not pretty,

that Pierre believes that London is not pretty; and to refuse to conclude, on the basis of Pierre's dissent from

(3) London is pretty,

that Pierre does not believe that London is pretty. Against this option, Kripke writes:

His French past aside, he [i.e., Pierre] is just like his friends in London. Anyone else, growing up in London with the same knowledge and beliefs that he expressed in England, we would undoubtedly judge to believe that London is not pretty. Can Pierre's French past nullify such a judgment? Can we say that Pierre, because of his French past, does not believe that [London is not pretty]? Suppose an electric shock wiped out all is past memories of the French language, what he learned in France, and his French past. He would then be exactly like his neighbors in London. He would have the same knowledge, beliefs,

and linguistic capacities. We then presumably would be forced to say that Pierre believes that London is ugly if we say it of his neighbors. But surely no shock that destroys part of Pierre's memories and knowledge can give him a new belief. If Pierre believes that (London is not pretty) after the shock, he believed it before, despite his French language and background. (1979, p. 257)

The third of Kripke's four options is to refuse to conclude, on the basis of Pierre's assent to

(1) Londres est jolie,

that Pierre believes that London is pretty; to refuse to conclude, on the basis of Pierre's assent to

(2) London is not pretty,

that Pierre believes that London is not pretty; and to refuse to conclude, on the basis of Pierre's dissent from

(3) London is pretty,

that Pierre does not believe that London is pretty. Against this option, Kripke writes:

If we would deny Pierre, in his bilingual stage, his belief that London is pretty and his belief that London is not pretty, we combine the difficulties of both previous options. We would still be forced to judge that Pierre once believed that London is pretty but does no longer, in spite of Pierre's own sincere denial that he has lost any belief. We also must worry whether Pierre would gain the belief that London is not pretty if he totally forgot his French past. (1979, p. 257)

Kripke's final option is to conclude, on the basis of Pierre's assent to

(1) Londres est jolie,

that Pierre believes that London is pretty; and to conclude, on the basis of Pierre's assent to

(2) London is not pretty,

that Pierre believes that London is not pretty. (Presumably, we are to refrain from concluding, on the basis of Pierre's dissent from

(3) London is pretty,

that Pierre does not believe that London is pretty.) This is the option which Kripke says raises "insuperable difficulties." This option commits us to the view that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. As we have already seen, Kripke thinks that this is unacceptable.

Unless Kripke is mistaken in his assessment of these options, there is no "easy way" to avoid this puzzle. That, in fact, is one major thesis of the article wherein the puzzle was presented. Therein, Kripke wrote: "... my main thesis is a simple one: that the puzzle is a puzzle" (1979, p. 239). Once he presents the puzzle, and discusses the four options considered above, Kripke continues, saying:

Each possibility seems to lead us to say something either plainly false or even downright contradictory. Yet the possibilities appear to be logically exhaustive. (1979, p. 258-259)

Since there is no easy way to avoid Kripke's puzzle, we will consider what other philosophers have said about it and some of the issues it raises. We shall first examine the impact of the puzzle on Michael Devitt's recently developed theory of proper names. We argue that the puzzle refutes Devitt's theory. We shall then consider various "solutions" to the puzzle. The "solutions" we consider in this chapter are united by the fact that each is designed to preserve the claim that Pierre does not have inconsistent beliefs. We argue that each solution is unacceptable.

Section Two

Recently, in his book, Designation (1981), Devitt presented a causal theory of the reference and meaning of proper names. Devitt includes a proposal for the truth-conditions for belief ascription sentences.

We will consider Devitt's theory to the extent necessary to explain its solution to a standard version of the problem of the apparent failure of the substitutivity of codesignating names. We will then see that this solution does not work for Kripke's puzzle. Finally, we will examine a problem raised for Devitt's theory by its failure to solve Kripke's puzzle.

In fairness to Devitt, it should be noted that he never explicitly discusses Kripke's puzzle. Still, as we will see, he has clear commitments with regard to the issues it raises.

We will approach Devitt's theory through its application to the truth-conditions for sentences. We first consider his truth-conditions for simple sentences that contain no "intensional" verbs. We then consider Devitt's truth-conditions for belief ascription sentences.

According to Devitt,

[a token of] 'Nana is a cat' is true if Ex ([that token of] 'Nana' Des x & [that token of] 'cat' App x). (1981, p. 241)

Designation (abbreviated 'Des') is a relation that holds between a name-token and an object when, and only when, that token's underlying d-chain is grounded in that object. A token's underlying d-chain is the d-chain that figures causally into the production of that token. A d-chain is a special kind of causal chain running back from the production of a token, possibly through the production of prior tokens of the same name-type, to

the object in which the d-chain is grounded. A grounding is a naming ceremony, initial baptism, or dubbing. As far as application (abbreviated 'App') is concerned, a token of 'cat' applies to x exactly if x is a cat; this is an oversimplification, but it has no bearing on issues we will encounter.

By way of an illustration, suppose that I say 'Nana is a cat.' According to Devitt, what I've said is true if and only if, via a d-chain, my token of 'Nana' designates a cat. That was fairly painless. Things get considerably more complex, however, when it comes to Devitt's truth-conditions for belief ascription sentences.

For Devitt, the canonical of a de dicto belief ascription sentence is

S believes/N is F.

He states the truth-conditions for such sentences in terms of this example sentence

(30) Tom believes/Cicero is an orator.

According to Devitt, a token of

(30) is true if and only if Ex Ey Ez ([that token of] 'Tom' Des x & [that token of] 'Cicero' Spec y & [that token of] 'orator' Spec x & [that token of] 'believes' App x and (y, z). (1981, p. 242)

Designation is as before. To fully understand Devitt's truth-conditions for tokens of (30) we must see what he means by specification (abbreviated 'Spec') and how he understands the locution '"believes" App to x and (y, z).' We consider specification first.

Devitt's book contains a glossary of special terms. Under 'specification' one finds:

The relation that holds between an expression in a proposition attitude context and the mechanism of reference, or

sets of mechanisms, it [i.e., the expression] refers to [in that context]. (1981, p. 278-279)

In the book's text, Devitt says

We can sum up our discussion of specification as follows: A name in an opaque context specifies the d-chains in the same causal network as those underlying that name. This will be d-chains involving the name and its normal referent. (1981, p. 243)

Specification is a relation that holds between a term-token and its mechanism (or, when the term is general, sets of mechanisms) of reference. A name-token's mechanism of reference is the causal network of d-chains that contains that token's underlying d-chain. Hence, a name-token specifies the causal network of d-chains which contains its underlying d-chain.

Devitt employs his designation/specification distinction to much the same purpose that Frege employed his reference/sense distinction. For Devitt, the semantically significant contribution of a name, in a non-intensional context, is its designation, the thing it designates; whereas the semantically significant contribution of a name, in an "intensional" context, is its specification, the thing it specifies. We will call what a name-token specifies its "Devitt-sense." Names specify their Devitt-senses and (for name-tokens) Devitt-senses are causal networks.

Names are not the only terms that specify. Indeed, Devitt holds that a token of (3) is true only if its token of 'orator' specifies something. Without going into what expressions other than names specify, for this has no bearing on issues we will be considering, let us say that x is the Devitt-sense of a given token if and only if that token specifies x.

Names specify causal networks. We will take the notion of a causal network as primitive, subject to two requirements. First, we want to

allow that causal networks (and the d-chains they contain), like television networks and grapevines, expand: where N_1 and N_2 are causal networks, it might be the case that N_1 is N_2 even though the set, D_1 , of d-chains in N_1 at time t_1 is a proper subset of the set, D_2 , of d-chains in N_2 at time t_2 , where t_1 is earlier than t_2 . Second, we hold that causal network N_1 is identical with causal network N_2 if and only if, where D_1 is the set of d-chains in N_1 and D_2 is the set of d-chains in N_2 , (i) every member of the union of D_1 and D_2 is grounded in the same object; (ii) every member of the union of D_1 and D_2 underlies a token of the same type; and (iii) every member of the union of D_1 and D_2 was grounded in the same naming ceremony. The reasons for insisting on these requirements are best considered later. We turn now to the locution "believes" App x and (y, z).'

Where a proper name 'N' specifies y and a predicate 'F' specifies z, the expression '(y, z)' designates the "Devitt-proposition" expressed by the subject-predicate sentence 'N is F.' Suppose that Smith says 'Tom believes that Cicero is an orator.' Provided his token of 'Tom' designates Tom, what Smith said is true if and only if his token of 'believes' applies to Tom and the Devitt-proposition expressed by his token of 'Cicero is an orator.' Generally, a token of 'believes' applies to x and (y, z) if and only if the Devitt-proposition (y, z) is among x's beliefs.

To summarize Devitt's truth-conditions for a token of (30), we may say: a token of (30) is true if and only if the Devitt-proposition expressed by that token of 'Cicero is an orator' is among the beliefs of

the person designated by that token of 'Tom.' We turn next to Devitt's account of belief.

Devitt would "like" to maintain that a Devitt-proposition *p* is among the beliefs of a person *x* if and only if *x* has assented to a token of '*p*.' This simple account of belief raises some problems. Devitt introduces one of these problems, along with his proposed solution, in the following passage:

The view that thoughts are attitudes (believing, desiring, and so on) to sentences needs qualification. [Daniel] Dennett has pointed out that most of the things we believe about, say, New York or salt, we never actually entertain because they are too obvious and boring. Indeed, we have more beliefs than we could ever entertain, for we have an infinite number. The solution is to claim that it is core-thoughts that are attitudes to sentences. Only they are represented in the mind. Thought in general is explained dispositionally. Thus a person believes all the obvious consequences of his core-beliefs. I shall ignore this qualification in what follows. (1981, p. 77-78)

Later, in the course of stating the truth-conditions of or belief ascription sentences, Devitt reminds us that they must accommodate this never truly "ignored" qualification:

Daniel Dennett forced a qualification in the view that the objects of propositional attitudes were sentences in the language of thought, for most of the attitudes we have we never entertain. So if Tom's belief is not a "core-belief," there will be no token of 'Cicero is an orator' in his mind to which he stands in the appropriate relationship. Rather, he will be disposed to be so related to a token of 'Cicero is an orator' by his core-beliefs. I must modify the statement of truth conditions of (30). What I have said [so far] applies only to core-beliefs.

If (30) is true but Tom does not have the required core-belief, then he will be in the appropriate relationship to other sentence tokens, some including [tokens of] 'Cicero' and some including [tokens of] 'orator,' which would dispose him to be in that relationship to a token of 'Cicero is an orator' were he to entertain one; Cicero's being an orator is an obvious consequence of his core-beliefs. (1981, p. 237-238)

(Note that the statement of the truth-conditions for (30) given above is Devitt's modified statement of its truth-conditions.)

A Devitt-proposition p is among person x 's core-beliefs if and only if either (i) x has assented to a token of ' p ' or (ii) there is a ' q ' such that ' q ' expresses the same Devitt-proposition as ' p ' and x has assented to a token of ' q .' A Devitt-proposition p is among person x 's beliefs if and only if either (i) p is among x 's core-beliefs or (ii) there are Devitt-propositions q_1, \dots, q_n such that q_1 is among x 's core beliefs and \dots and q_n is among x 's core-beliefs and p is an (obvious) consequence of $q_1 \& \dots \& q_n$. A person believes all the obvious consequences of his core-beliefs.⁴

The problem of the apparent failure of the substitutivity of codesignating proper names is usually stated in terms of such name-pairs as 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus,' and 'Cicero' and 'Tully.' Devitt's theory affords him a solution to such versions of the problem; however, it does not yield a solution to Kripke's puzzle. Let us first see how Devitt would handle the puzzle of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus.'

Let us suppose that Pierre uses both 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' to designate the planet Venus, but that he does not realize that he uses them to codesignate. One evening we ask Pierre to consider the sentences

Hesperus is visible,

Phosphorus is not visible,

and

Phosphorus is visible.

Pierre assents to the first and second sentences. He dissents from the third sentence. We conclude that Pierre believes that Hesperus is

visible, that Pierre believes that Phosphorus is not visible, and the Pierre does not believe that Phosphorus is visible.

By concluding that Pierre believes that Hesperus is visible and that Pierre believes that Phosphorus is not visible, we have apparently committed ourselves to the view that Pierre both believes a proposition and also believes its denial--that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. By concluding that Pierre believes that Hesperus is visible and that Pierre does not believe that Phosphorus is visible, we have apparently committed ourselves to a contradiction.

According to Devitt, when we say that Pierre believes that Hesperus is visible, what we say is true if and only if Pierre believes the Devitt-proposition expressed by our token of 'Hesperus is visible.' Also, according to Devitt, when we say that Pierre does not believe that Phosphorus is visible, what we say is true if and only if it is not the case that Pierre believes the Devitt-proposition expressed by our token of 'Phosphorus is visible.'

We have seen that, according to Devitt, the Devitt-proposition expressed by our token of 'Hesperus is visible' is identical with the Devitt-proposition expressed by our token of 'Phosphorus is visible' only if the Devitt-sense expressed by our token of 'Hesperus' is identical with the Devitt-sense expressed by our token of 'Phosphorus.' According to Devitt, the Devitt-sense expressed by our token of 'Hesperus' is identical with the Devitt-sense expressed by our token of 'Phosphorus' only if our tokens of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are codesignating, cogrounded tokens of the same name-type. They are codesignating, but it is unlikely that they are cogrounded, and it is certain that they are not

of the same type. In this way, Devitt's theory permits him to deny each of the following: that our tokens of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' have the same Devitt-sense; that our tokens of 'Hesperus is visible' and 'Phosphorus is visible' express the same Devitt-proposition; and that in saying that Pierre believes that Hesperus is visible and that Pierre does not believe that Phosphorus is visible, we are committed to a contradiction. By a similar line of reasoning, Devitt can reject the claim that in saying that Pierre believes that Hesperus is visible and the Pierre believes that Phosphorus is not visible, we are committed to the view that Pierre has inconsistent, or contradictory beliefs.

Devitt has a solution to the puzzle of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus.' Whether or not his solution is acceptable depends in part on the merits of his theory. We will not consider the merits of the theory. Rather, we will show that Devitt cannot give a similar solution to Kripke's puzzle.

At bottom, Devitt's solution to the puzzle of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' rests on his claim that because our tokens of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are not codesignating, cogrounded tokens of the same type, our tokens of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' do not have the same Devitt-sense. An analogous treatment of Kripke's puzzle must rest on the analogous claim about tokens of 'Londres' and 'London.' That is, to give a solution to Kripke's puzzle, Devitt must maintain that because tokens of 'Londres' and 'London' are not codesignating, cogrounded tokens of the same type, tokens of 'Londres' and 'London' do not have the same Devitt-sense.

Devitt actually has a view about the Devitt-sense of 'Londres' and 'London.' Along with other important parts of his theory, it is

presented in the following passage:

I talk of d-chains as being part of "the same causal network." Is anything more required for this than that they concern the same name and same object? The discussion suggests there is: they must be linked into networks arising from the same grounding (including same naming ceremony or suitable substitute). And this seems intuitively correct here. Suppose there are two distinct communities which never communicate with each other, but both communities by chance giving the same name to an object. Could an opaque belief statement, including a name token arising from one naming, be confirmed by an expression of belief including a name token arising from another? The situation is so unusual that we may have no clear pretheoretical intuitions about it. However, it does seem that if we are to preserve the point of opaque belief, we must rule that the statement is not confirmed by such an expression.

The case of the two communities raises the matter of attributions of beliefs to those who speak another language. Names that travel across language present no problems. However, some names get distorted on the journey: 'London' becomes 'Londres.' We have, therefore, to be liberal about what we count as the same name. Nevertheless, this liberality cannot stretch to allow tokens which do not stem from networks with the same groundings to be the same. We cannot allow that foreigners who do not have even a distorted version of the name 'Everest' could ever (opaquely) believe that Everest is hard to climb. For if we allow that they could, how could we deny that (30) is true if Tom assents to 'Tully is an orator' but dissents from 'Cicero is an orator'? (Devitt, 1981, p. 239-240)

In the above passage, Devitt tells us that two name-tokens specify the same causal network (i.e., have the same Devitt-sense) exactly when they are codesignating tokens of the same type whose underlying d-chains are grounded in the same naming ceremony. This is the source of our earlier account of the identity conditions for causal networks. This is the point of Devitt's 'Everest' example. Two communities, X and Y, use tokens of 'Everest' to designate one and the same mountain. Prior to time *t* there was no (significant) causal connection between the two communities. At time *t* a member, *x*, of community X overhears a member, *y*, of community Y say 'Everest is tall.' *y* has used 'Everest' to refer

to the very mountain *x* and other members of community *X* use 'Everest' to refer to. Nevertheless, according to Devitt, *x* would be saying something false if he were to return to his community and issue the following report: 'y believes that Everest is tall.' This is because, according to Devitt, the Devitt-sense *x* would thereby express by his use of 'Everest' would not be identical with the Devitt-sense *y* expresses by his uses of 'Everest.' Since, the two communities have never causally interacted, the causal network specified by *y*'s tokens of 'Everest' cannot be the causal network specified by *x*'s token of 'Everest.'

Devitt also makes it clear that one speaker's token of a name sentence can express the same Devitt-proposition as another speaker's token of the same name sentence type. So we can speak of the proposition typically expressed by tokens of a sentence type. This is why I insisted that causal networks (and the d-chains they contain) be allowed to grow over time.

Finally, the preceding passage contains Devitt's view about the Devitt-sense of 'Londres' and 'London.' Devitt holds that typical tokens of 'Londres' and 'London' are codesignating, cogrounded tokens of the same name-type. They specify the same causal network; and, therefore, they have the same Devitt-sense. This means that Devitt cannot give a solution to Kripke's puzzle analogous to his solution to the puzzle of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus.' Such a solution would depend on the claim that because tokens of 'Londres' and 'London' are not codesignating, cogrounded tokens of the same type, tokens of 'Londres' and 'London' do not express the same Devitt-sense. Devitt explicitly rejects this claim.

Let us consider a consequence of Devitt's view about the Devitt-sense of 'Londres' and 'London.' Pierre expressed the same Devitt-proposition by his use of

(1) Londres est jolie

that we would express by our use of

(3) London is pretty,

were we to say, 'Pierre believes that London is pretty.' By Devitt's own admission, the Devitt-proposition typically expressed by tokens of (1) is identical with the Devitt-proposition typically expressed by tokens of (3). Among Pierre's core-beliefs are the Devitt-proposition typically expressed by tokens of (1) (i.e., the Devitt-proposition typically expressed by tokens of (3)) and the Devitt-proposition typically expressed by tokens of

(2) London is not pretty;

Pierre has assented to (1) and (2). These are contradictory Devitt-propositions; and, therefore, unless there is a Devitt-proposition, *p*, such that *p* is not an obvious consequence, for Pierre, of the Devitt-propositions expressed by typical tokens of (2) and (3), according to Devitt's own theory, it follows that Pierre believes every Devitt-proposition.

Of course, Pierre does not believe everything. He is certainly not disposed to assent to every sentence he understands. Devitt's theory fails to solve Kripke's puzzle, and its failure to do so raises a problem for Devitt's views about belief.

We will consider an objection to the preceding discussion. One sympathetic with Devitt might object that Devitt was simply mistaken--too

generous--when he allowed that 'Londres' and 'London' are codesignating, cogrounded tokens of the same type. Devitt could solve Kripke's puzzle and avoid the conclusion that Pierre believes everything by denying that either 'Londres' and 'London' are cogrounded or that 'Londres' and 'London' are of the same name-type.

We should not be swayed by this objection. In the first place, even if 'Londres' and 'London' are not in fact codesignating, cogrounded tokens of the same type, they could have been. We could concoct an example like the one about Pierre and his dispositions, but which involves codesignating, cogrounded tokens of the same type. In which case, Kripke's puzzle would still arise. (As a matter of fact, Kripke states a version of his puzzle which does involve codesignating, cogrounded tokens of the same type.⁵) In the second place, if we speculate about Devitt's motivation for allowing that 'Londres' and 'London' express the same Devitt-sense, the most reasonable answer is that he did so because he wanted to allow that a typical Frenchman who assents to (1) and a typical Englishman who assents to (3) exhibit a common belief. Fregean theories make it unlikely that this is so, and, in this regard, if Devitt were to succeed, his theory would better accord with our ordinary intuitions. However, if Devitt were to maintain that 'Londres' and 'London' do not express the same Devitt-sense, he would have to deny that a typical Frenchman who assents to (1) and a typical Englishman who assents to (3) exhibit a common belief.

To close, let us summarize the basic moves Devitt must make to avoid the problems raised by Kripke's puzzle. One is to modify "his" account of what it is for two tokens to have the same Devitt-sense. Another is

to modify his solution to the objection Dennett raised against his original account of belief. A third move is to give a plausible account of 'obvious consequence'⁶—one that permits a solution to Dennett's problem but which also explains why we neither find, nor expect to find, Pierre racing through the streets of London proclaiming that the moon is made of Carl Sagan's old sneakers.

Section Three

In a recent article, "Names and Belief" (1981), Harold Noonan presented a version of the description theory of proper names and proposed a solution to Kripke's puzzle. Noonan maintains that it is a mistake to conclude, on the basis of Pierre's assent to

(1) Londres est jolie,

that Pierre believes that London is pretty. He says we are right to conclude, on the basis of Pierre's assent to

(2) London is not pretty,

that Pierre believes that London is not pretty. If Noonan is right about this, then we are not committed to the view that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs, nor are we committed to the contradictory conclusion that Pierre both does and does not believe that London is pretty.

According to Noonan, the critical step in Kripke's move from Pierre's assent to (1) to the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty is the step from

(C) 'Pierre crois que Londres est jolie' is a truth of French,
to

- (D) 'Pierre believes that London is pretty' is a truth of English.

Noonan correctly notes that the move from (C) to (D) rests on Kripke's translation principle together with the assumption that

- (E) Pierre believes that London is pretty translates

- (B) Pierre crois que Londres est jolie.

As far as Noonan is concerned the guilty part is the assumption that (E) translates (B); he never questions the translation principle. So we find him claiming:

. . . the assumption that (E) translates (B) in the strict sense of translation which is intended by Kripke, and which has to be employed in the principle of translation if the argument is to entail that Pierre has contradictory beliefs is false. (1981, p. 105)

To summarize: According to Noonan, we cannot generate a puzzle because the move from (C) to (D) is illicit; the move from (C) to (D) is illicit because it depends on the false assumption the (E) translates (B). We need to see why Noonan thinks that (E) does not translate (B).

Noonan avers that (E) does not translate (B) because,

. . . (B) and (E) differ in subject matter, the former contains a reference to the French word 'Londres' where the latter contains a reference to the English word 'London.' (1981, p. 105)

Noonan holds that for an English sentence S to (strictly) translate a French sentence S', S and S' must have the same subject matter; they must be about all the same things. This seems reasonable. In addition he holds that (E) and (B) differ in subject matter. So, Noonan's attempt to solve Kripke's puzzle rests on his claim that (E) and (B) have different subject matter.

This seems wrong. (E) and (B) seem to be about all and only the same things: Pierre, the belief-relation, and the proposition that London is pretty. Contrary to what Noonan says in the above passage, neither (E) nor (B) is about a proper name.

So much for a strict and literal reading of Noonan's case against translating (B) as (E). Perhaps Noonan's position can be reformulated so as to appear less implausible.

Noonan never really says so, but his case against the assumption that (E) translates (B) might turn on this truth-conditions for belief ascription sentences. Noonan holds that, where S is a speaker, S's use of

'Ralph believes that Tully denounced Catiline' may be true if either:

- (i) For some α , 'Tully' expresses α in Ralph's idiolect and Ralph believes that [α denounced Catiline]

or

- (ii) For some α , 'Tully' expresses α in S's idiolect and Ralph believes that [α denounced Catiline].
(Noonan, 1981, p. 99)

Where ' α ' designates a sense expressed by some definite description, 'the-F', and '[α denounced Catiline]' designates the proposition that the-F denounced Catiline. This suggests the following treatment of Kripke's claim that Pierre believes that London is pretty:

Kripke's use of 'Pierre believes that London is pretty' is true if either:

- (i) For some α , 'London' expresses α in Pierre's idiolect and Pierre believes that [α is pretty]

or

- (ii) For some α , 'London' expresses α in Kripke's idiolect and Pierre believes that [α is pretty].

Let us tentatively assume that Noonan's truth-conditions are correct. A similar set of truth-conditions could be given for Kripke's use of 'Pierre crois que Londres est jolie'; however, unlike the account of Kripke's use of (E), the account of Kripke's use of (B) would make reference to the word 'Londres.' In this way, Noonan's account of the truth-conditions of (B) is about the word 'Londres'; whereas his account of the truth-conditions for (E) is about the word 'London.' This is beginning to sound familiar. All Noonan needs now is the not-unreasonable claim that (E) (strictly) translates (B) only if (E) and (B) have the same truth-conditions (or intertranslatable truth-conditions). Interpreted in this way, Noonan's case seems more plausible.

This discussion indicates that Noonan's solution to Kripke's puzzle depends on Noonan's truth-conditions for belief ascription sentences. This is unfortunate for Noonan because his truth-conditions are provably false.

Suppose that Brown associates 'London' with 'the most famous dog'; for Brown the sense of 'London' is the sense of 'the most famous dog.' Applying Noonan's truth conditions for belief ascription sentences, we discover that if Pierre believes that the most famous dog is pretty, then Brown's use of (E) is true, regardless of what other beliefs Pierre might have. This seems incorrect.

Suppose that Pierre associates 'London' with 'the most famous dog'; for Pierre the sense of 'London' is the sense of 'the most famous dog.' Applying Noonan's truth-conditions for belief ascription sentences, we discover that if Pierre believes that the most famous dog is pretty, then

Brown's use of (E) is true, regardless of what other beliefs Pierre might have. This, too, seems incorrect.

On the basis of this discussion, we conclude that Noonan has failed to explain why (E) does not translate (B). Since his proposal for solving Kripke's puzzle depends on the claim that (E) does not translate (B), we have no reason for accepting his proposal. Noonan has not solved Kripke's puzzle.

Section Four

D. E. Over proposes a solution to Kripke's puzzle in "On Kripke's Puzzle" (1983). Over tries to show that Pierre's linguistic behavior and Kripke's principles do not commit us to the conclusion that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. Toward this end, Over maintains that although Pierre's assent to

(2) London is not pretty

(in conjunction with Kripke's principles) commits us to the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is not pretty, Pierre's assent to

(1) Londres est jolie

(even in conjunction with Kripke's principles) does not commit us to the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty.

According to Over, Kripke's inference from Pierre's assent to (1) to the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty is defective because

. . . Kripke misuses the translation principle. (Over, 1983, p. 253)

In the passage that follows, Over explains how he would handle Pierre's uses of 'Londres':

Suppose . . . that Pierre . . . spends a short time in Paris. He returns to London on a train via the new channel tunnel. . . . He boards the train in Paris. . . . The sophisticated train (very fast) soon stops at a station where Pierre sees a sign with the label 'Londres,' put there for the benefit of French visitors. Pierre says

So this is Londres. I've always wondered where Londres was. A pity I don't have time to look around--I must go to London as soon as possible.

. . . Assuming the disquotation and translation principles . . . [we] infer:

Pierre believes that this is London.

But it is clear that, if we were sitting beside Pierre on this occasion, we would reject [this] as false . . . Pierre believes that this is not London, and he believes that this is Londres. These are the beliefs which explain his behavior, and we are not tempted to say that he has inconsistent beliefs. But we would not be able to explain his behavior, and we would have to hold that he had inconsistent beliefs, if we followed Kripke and translated Pierre's use of 'Londres' as 'London.' (Over, 1983, p. 253-254)

In Over's example, Pierre assents to 'This is Londres.' Let us assume that Pierre also assents to 'This is not London.' Over recommends that we conclude, on the basis of Pierre's assent to 'This is Londres,' that Pierre believes that this is Londres, but not that Pierre believes that this is London. (This is easier to understand if we assume ourselves to be present when Pierre arrives in London.) Over would have us conclude, on the basis of Pierre's assent to 'This is not London,' that Pierre believes that this is not London, but presumably not that Pierre believes that this is not Londres.

Over's treatment of his own example suggests his treatment of Kripke's puzzle. Over recommends that on the basis of Pierre's assent to

(1), we conclude that Pierre believes that Londres is pretty, but not that Pierre believes that London is pretty. Over recommends that on the basis of Pierre's assent to (2), we conclude that Pierre believes that London is not pretty, but not that Pierre believes that Londres is not pretty.

Let us summarize Over's response to Kripke's puzzle. Over wants to avoid the conclusion that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. So he tries to block the inference to the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty; he has nothing to say against the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is not pretty. He claims that the inference to the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty depends on the false assumption that Pierre's uses of 'Londres' must be translated as 'London.' Finally, in place of the belief that London is pretty, Over recommends the belief that Londres is pretty as the belief exhibited by Pierre's assent to (1).

There are at least two major problems with Over's treatment of Kripke's puzzle. First, the move from Pierre's assent to (1) to the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty has nothing to do with translating Pierre's uses of 'Londres' as 'London.' So, Over's attempt to block the move fails. Second, if we follow Over's recommendation and conclude that Pierre believes that Londres is pretty and that Pierre believes that London is not pretty, we are still committed to the conclusion that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs; in fact, we are saying that Pierre believes what Kripke's original inferences led us to say he believes. Let us attend to the point about translation.

The only step in the move from Pierre's assent to (1) to the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty that involves a translation of 'Londres' as 'London' is the step, via the principle of translation, from

'Pierre crois que Londres est jolie' is a truth of French
to

'Pierre believes that London is pretty' is a truth of English.
At this point in the derivation one is translating one sentence--as used by Kripke, or us, or the person performing the derivation--to another sentence. Pierre's use of 'Londres' is not involved; we are not translating Pierre's use of 'Londres.' Nothing about Kripke's derivation requires that Pierre ever used or assented to either of the sentences involved in the translation. Over has simply misunderstood Kripke's inference to the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty. We now turn to the point about inconsistent beliefs.

Nowhere in the article where Over proposes his solution to Kripke's puzzle does Over even so much as hint that he intends to employ a special interpretation either of proper names or of belief ascription sentences. As a matter of fact, he gives every indication of intending that this solution is compatible with a Millian theory of the meaning of names; for he writes that his examples and his proposed solution,

. . . do not establish that 'Londres' and 'London' have Fregean senses and are not rigid designators. (1983, p. 255)

This is all quite puzzling, because, according to the Millian theory and our standard interpretation of belief ascription sentences, when we say that Pierre believes that Londres is pretty we are saying exactly what we are saying when we say that Pierre believes that London is pretty. If

the belief that London is pretty, together with Pierre's other beliefs, shows that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs, then so does the belief that Londres is pretty. Pierre's beliefs are every bit as inconsistent, when characterized by Over, as when "derived" by Kripke.

We conclude that Over has failed on two scores. First, he has failed to block the inference to the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty. Second, he has failed to recommend, as the belief exhibited by Pierre's assent to (1), a belief any less troublesome than the one we already have.

Section Five

In The First Person (1981) Roderick Chisholm claims that he can accommodate the conclusions that Pierre believes that London is pretty and that Pierre believes that London is not pretty, and avoid the conclusion that Pierre thus stands convicted of harboring inconsistent or contradictory beliefs. In his attempt to solve Kripke's puzzle, Chisholm invokes his own views about proper names, his analysis of belief, and his account of belief ascription sentences.

We have assumed that propositions are the objects of beliefs and that when say that S believes that p we are, thereby, asserting that the belief-relation--a two-place relation that relates people and propositions--relates S to the proposition that p; that is, relates S to the proposition expressed by 'p.' Chisholm rejects this account as it applies to our beliefs about particulars, or as it applies to the beliefs we express by means of referring singular terms. To understand

Chisholm's solution to Kripke's puzzle, we must first understand certain features of the view Chisholm adopts in place of the view we have assumed.

Chisholm holds that a person x can directly refer to, or have a belief directly about, no one but x. He holds that whenever a person x refers to something other than x, x does so only indirectly, and then only in virtue of having referred directly to x. Chisholm holds that whenever a person x has a belief about a y distinct from x, the belief is merely indirectly about y, and directly about x. According to Chisholm our beliefs about things other than ourselves are mediated through our beliefs about ourselves.

Chisholm's theory is stated in terms of the following primitive doxastic locution:

The property of being F is such that x directly attributes it to y.

Chisholm holds that a person x can directly attribute a property to y only if y is x. For Chisholm, our beliefs directly about ourselves are our direct attributions of properties to ourselves. For example, my belief that I am alive is my direct attribution of the property of being alive to myself (provided it is one of my beliefs directly about myself). If a person x attributes a property to y, and y is diverse from x, then that attribution is indirect rather than direct; moreover, x succeeds in attributing a property to such a y only if x thereby attributes a property to x. Chisholm tells us that x indirectly attributes a property F to y if and only if there is a relation R such that x bears R uniquely to y and x directly attributes to x (i.e., x self-attributes) this property: $\lambda z [Eu (zRu \ \& \ \forall u' (zRu' \rightarrow u' = u) \ \& \ Fu)]$. For Chisholm,

beliefs indirectly about things are indirect attributions of properties to them. For example, Jones's belief that Smith is tall just is Jones's indirect attribution of the property of being tall to Smith. Jones might indirectly attributed being tall to Smith, when Smith is the person standing directly in front of Jones, by directly attributing this property to himself: $\lambda x [E y (y \text{ is the person standing in front of } x \ \& \ y \text{ is tall})]$.

When Chisholm states his theory's primitive doxastic locution, he adds:

The letter 'F' is schematic and may be replaced by any predicative expression having a property as its sense. (1981, p. 28)

This comment is significant because it involves one of Chisholm's principle theses: namely, that an account of reference and intentionality can be given in terms of a purified theory of properties. What a purified theory of properties is can perhaps best be understood by contrasting it with a "non-purified" theory of properties. A non-purified theory of properties entails that every well-formed predicative expression expresses a property. According to such a theory, 'is a dog' expresses the property of being a dog, 'is a unicorn' expresses the property of being a unicorn, 'is identical with London' expresses the property of being identical with London, and 'is a round square' expresses the property of being a round square. According to Chisholm's purified theory, the first two expressions, 'is a dog' and 'is a unicorn,' express properties, but the last two expressions, 'is identical with London,' and 'is a round square,' do not. Chisholm maintains that a predicative expression succeeds in expressing a property only if it can

be paraphrased so as to eliminate any reference to a particular. Accordingly, unless 'is identical with London' can be paraphrased so as to eliminate reference to London, 'is identical with London' does not express a property. (Chisholm would likely maintain that 'is identical with London' does not admit of such a paraphrase.) Chisholm also holds that although properties need not be exemplified, properties are exemplifiable. Since it is impossible for something to be both round and square, the expression 'is a round square' expresses a property only if it expresses an impossible (i.e., unexemplifiable) property. Accordingly, 'is a round square' does not express a property.⁷

Chisholm's views about properties are important for us for two reasons. First, when we evaluate Chisholm's treatment of Kripke's puzzle (and modifications of Chisholm's explicit statement of his treatment), we will want to verify that they are acceptable to Chisholm. Second, if 'is identical with London' expresses a property, that property will be an essence of London; and we want to at least try to solve Kripke's puzzle in a way that does not commit us to the view that (there are essences and) we are acquainted with essences when we use proper names. It may be that a solution to Kripke's puzzle commits us to essences; however, until we have good reasons for thinking that we need essences to solve the puzzle, we will reject any solution that resorts to essences.

We are not in a position to consider Chisholm's treatment of Kripke's puzzle. Recall that Pierre's behavior toward

(1) *Londres est jolie*,

in conjunction with Kripke's principles, forces us to conclude that

Pierre believes that London is pretty, and also that Pierre's behavior toward

(2) London is not pretty,
in conjunction with Kripke's principles, forces us to conclude that Pierre believes that London is not pretty. On our reading of belief ascriptions, we must conclude that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs: he believes both a proposition and its denial. Chisholm says that Pierre does not have contradictory or inconsistent beliefs. According to Chisholm, Pierre does not believe both a proposition and its denial; rather, according to Chisholm the conclusions that Pierre believes that London is pretty and that Pierre believes that London is not pretty, when properly understood, are about Pierre's self-attributions of non-contradictory (or consistent) properties. Thus Chisholm writes:

If we interpret the two sentences: 'Pierre believes that London is pretty' and 'Pierre believes that London is not pretty' in accordance with this principle, it becomes obvious that they do not attribute contradictory beliefs to Pierre. The first sentence is true in virtue of the fact Pierre attributes to himself the property of being such that the thing he usually uses 'Londres' to designate is pretty. And the second sentence is true in virtue of the fact that he attributes to himself the property of being such that the thing he usually uses 'London' to designate is pretty.⁸ (1981, p. 67)

Chisholm holds that we can truly say that Pierre believes that London is pretty because Pierre self-attributes property F_1 : $\lambda x [E y (x \text{ normally uses 'Londres' to designate } y \text{ and } y \text{ is pretty})]$. In addition, Chisholm holds that we can truly say that Pierre believes that London is not pretty because Pierre self-attributes property F_2 : $\lambda x [E y (x \text{ normally uses 'London' to designate } y \text{ and } y \text{ is not pretty})]$. Pierre could exemplify both F_1 and F_2 at one and the same time: his self-attribution of both F_1 and F_2 is neither contradictory nor inconsistent. F_1 and F_2

are (apparently) purified properties; neither seems to require reference to any particular. However, Chisholm's treatment of these ascriptions is unacceptable. This is because the ascriptions could be false even if Pierre self-attributes both F_1 and F_2 . This can be illustrated by an example involving F_1 .

Suppose that Pierre thinks he uses 'Londres' to designate something pretty, when in fact he either never uses 'Londres' or uses 'Londres' to designate the neighbor's pretty cat. In this case Pierre self-attributes F_1 ; nevertheless, Pierre might not believe that London is pretty.

This example shows that F_1 is not such that if Pierre self-attributes it, then it is plausible to say that he believes that London is pretty. The problem with F_1 seems to be that Pierre can self-attribute F_1 even though he either never uses 'Londres,' but thinks he does, or does use 'Londres' to designate something (pretty), but something other than London.

Perhaps there is another property such that if Pierre self-attributes it, then we may say that Pierre believes that London is pretty. One property that might work is F_3 : $\lambda x [E y (x \text{ normally uses 'Londres' to designate } y \text{ and } y \text{ is pretty and in } x\text{'s culture 'Londres' is normally used to designate } y)]$. Perhaps with F_3 Chisholm could exploit the fact that Pierre lives in a culture where 'Londres' is used to designate London. However, another example will show that F_3 will not do.

Suppose that Pierre wakes up one morning, and sees, left over from the preceding evening's word game, the word 'Londres.' He is still a very sleepy fellow. He says to himself, 'Surely "Londres" is a name.' He pronounces it a couple of times, being pleased by the sound, and says,

'I must be in the habit of using "Londres" to designate something pretty.' He continues to say the name, until he finally concludes, 'Indeed, like others in my culture, I must be in the habit of using "Londres" to designate something pretty.' In this case Pierre self-attributes F_3 ; nevertheless, Pierre might not believe that London is pretty.

The problem with F_3 is much the same as that with F_1 : Pierre can self-attribute F_3 even though he never uses 'Londres' (as a name for London). What we need is a property the self-attribution of which links Pierre with 'Londres' and London, and 'Londres' with London in some appropriate way. Suppose we try F_4 : $\lambda x [E y (x \text{ normally uses 'Londres' to designate } y \text{ and } y \text{ is pretty and in } x\text{'s culture 'Londres' is normally used to designate London})]$. The proposal we are considering is that we may truly say that Pierre believes that London is pretty because Pierre self-attributes F_4 . With regard to the belief that Pierre exhibits by his assent to (2), this proposal's counterpart is: we may truly say that Pierre believes that London is not pretty because Pierre self-attributes property F_5 : $\lambda x [E y (x \text{ normally uses 'Londres' to designate } y \text{ and } y \text{ is not pretty and in } x\text{'s culture 'Londres' is normally used to designate London})]$. Is it reasonable to say that Pierre's belief that London is pretty comes to nothing more or less than his self-attribution F_4 and that Pierre's belief that London is not pretty comes to nothing more or less than his self-attributing F_5 ? Surely it is not.

There are two good reasons to reject this version of Chisholm's treatment of Kripke's puzzle. First, F_4 and F_5 are not purified properties. Each involves reference to London. Therefore, this proposal

is unacceptable to Chisholm and apparently resorts to essences. Second, it is reasonable to hold that Pierre does not self-attribute both F_4 and F_5 . For if Pierre did, he would stop assenting to (1) and (2). This is because he would be worried that his assents to (1) and (2) were misleading his auditors into thinking that he had contradictory or inconsistent beliefs. But Pierre has no such worries. So he does not self-attribute both F_4 and F_5 . The conclusions--that Pierre believes both that London is pretty and also that London is not pretty--are not supported by Pierre's self-attributions of F_4 and F_5 .⁹

We have considered Chisholm's treatment of Kripke's puzzle and also two versions of Chisholm's treatment of Kripke's puzzle. Each is unsatisfactory. No doubt other versions can be concocted. However, rather than considering them here, we conclude our discussion of Chisholm's work on Kripke's puzzle with a summary of what a "Chisholmian" solution to Kripke's puzzle must do. Such a solution must specify two properties F and G such that; (i) it is reasonable to say that Pierre self-attributes F ; (ii) it is reasonable to say that Pierre self-attributes G ; (iii) it is reasonable to say that if Pierre self-attributes F , then he believes that London is pretty; (iv) it is reasonable to say that if Pierre self-attributes G , then he believes that G ; (v) both F and G are purified properties; and (vi) Pierre would not be inconsistent to self-attribute both F and G . This is a tall order. Until it is filled, we may conclude that Chisholm has failed to solve Kripke's puzzle.

Section Six

In a recent article, "Description and Identification" (1982), Bernard Harrison presents a version of the description theory of proper names and proposes a solution to Kripke's puzzle. We will state, explain, and critically evaluate Harrison's proposed solution.

Harrison claims that,

The solution to Kripke's puzzle . . . is . . . that Pierre believes of London that it is an ugly city, and of the name 'Londres' that it names some other city or other which, as a matter of fact, is pretty. The two beliefs, having different objects, in no way contradict one another. (1982, p. 338)

Harrison clearly intends to avoid the conclusion that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. According to Harrison, when Pierre assents to

(1) Londres est jolie,

Pierre exhibits the belief that 'Londres' names a pretty city.¹⁰ Also, according to Harrison, when Pierre assents to

(2) London is not pretty,

Pierre exhibits the belief that London is not pretty. These two beliefs are neither contradictory nor inconsistent; and, therefore, if Harrison is right, Pierre's linguistic behavior does not convict him of an inconsistency.

To understand how Harrison would avoid the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty, we need to see how Harrison uses the words 'object' and 'content.' As Harrison uses the word 'object,' the object of a belief is the thing the proposition believed attributes a property to. As Harrison uses the word 'content,' the content of a belief is the property the proposition believed thus attributes. For

example, suppose that Jones believes that Smith is tall; Jones believes the proposition that Smith is tall. That proposition attributes the property of being tall to the person Smith. As Harrison uses the words 'object' and 'content,' Smith is that belief's object and being tall is its content.

Harrison rejects the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty. Kripke derived that conclusion from Pierre's assent to (1) and certain principles. Harrison, who recommends that we dismiss that conclusion, must say where Kripke's derivation breaks down. He tries to do just that in this passage:

The weak point in the argument which generates Kripke's paradox is thus the disquotation principle, and what is wrong is that it fails to distinguish between direct and indirect beliefs about an individual . . . disquotation gives us the content, but not the object of a belief. (1982, p. 337-338)

Remember that Harrison favors the description theory of names. He holds that unless a speaker has "actual epistemic contact"¹¹ with a given thing he cannot have a belief directly about that thing; that is, he cannot have a belief whose object is that thing. For Harrison, a belief is directly about a given thing if and only if that thing is that belief's object. If Jones believes that Smith is tall, Jones has a belief whose object is Smith; Jones's belief is directly about Smith. But suppose that Jones only believes that the man next door is tall, and not that Smith is tall, where Smith is the man next door (to Jones). Then Jones does not have a belief whose object is Smith; he does not have a belief directly about Smith. Rather Jones's belief is indirectly about Smith and directly about the house next door.

Now, suppose that Jones has had no actual epistemic contact with

Smith, but that Jones says 'Smith is tall' while associating the name 'Smith' with the definite description 'the man next door.' Kripke's disquotation principle informs us that Jones believes that Smith is tall. But, according to Harrison, this is wrong. He explains why he takes this position in the following passage:

Belief . . . is an epistemic relation, and hence belief about an individual does require actual epistemic contact with the individual in question. If I know only that there exists a mountain called 'Chimborazo' which is tall, but not which mountain it is, then I am not in a position to entertain any belief about the actual mass of stone and vegetation called 'Chimborazo' but only a belief about the word 'Chimborazo.'
(1982, p. 337)

So, according to Harrison, a necessary condition for a person *x* to have a belief directly about an object *y*—a belief whose object is *y*—is that *x* have actual epistemic contact with *y*.¹³ Disquotation, when it involves a name sentence, correctly informs us of both the object and the content of a belief only if the believer has actual epistemic contact with the name's referent. Otherwise it does not give us the correct object, but only the correct content.

If Jones says, 'Smith is tall' but has never had actual epistemic contact with Smith, then, according to Harrison, the most we can infer is that Jones believes that the man next door is tall. The object of that belief is the house next door; its content is the property of being (inhabited by a man who is) tall. Disquotation, however, informs us that Jones believes that Smith is tall. That belief's object would be Smith; its content would be the property of being tall. Again, according to Harrison, without actual epistemic contact, disquotation yields the wrong object but the "right" content.¹⁴ We can now return to Kripke's puzzle.

While in France, when he assented to (1), Pierre lacked actual epistemic contact with London. Disquotation tells us that Pierre believes that London is pretty. But, by Harrison's lights, this is wrong. Since Pierre lacks actual epistemic contact with London, he cannot have a belief whose object is London. Harrison reports that the belief Pierre in fact exhibits by his assent to (1) is the belief that 'Londres' names a pretty city. The content of this belief, given by disquotation, is the property of being (the name of) a pretty city. The object of this belief, not given by disquotation but by Harrison's tacit assumption that Pierre associates 'Londres' with the French translation of 'the city named "Londres",' is the word 'Londres.' Once in London, Pierre has actual epistemic contact with London. So, when Pierre assented to (2), he exhibited his belief that London is not pretty. In the case of Pierre's assent to (2), disquotation yields both the correct content and the correct object of the exhibited belief.

We have seen how Harrison would block the move from Pierre's assent to (1) to the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty. We have also seen what belief Harrison recommends as the belief behind Pierre's assent to (1). We will now consider two objections to Harrison's proposed solution. I will suggest a way for Harrison to respond to the first of these two objections. I regard the second objection as conclusive evidence that Harrison's proposal is unacceptable.

The first objection goes as follows. Once Pierre is in London he has actual epistemic contact with London. For if not, disquotation errs when it tells us that Pierre believes that London is not pretty. Pierre

continues to assent to (1). This fact, together with Kripke's other principles and the fact that Pierre now has actual epistemic contact with London, yields the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty. Therefore, Harrison is committed to the view that Pierre has contradictory beliefs.

I formulate the following reply for Harrison. When, subsequent to his move to London, Pierre assents to (1), he does so on the basis of dispositions he formed when he was in France. Those dispositions were acquired before Pierre had actual epistemic contact with London and they survive the journey to London. Therefore, the belief Pierre exhibits by his assent to (1), once he is in London, is the same belief he exhibited by his assent to (1) before he arrived in London. That belief did not have London as an object; and, therefore, the belief exhibited by Pierre's current assents to (1) does not have London as an object. So, Pierre does not believe that London is pretty.

This reply would force Harrison to modify his views about disquotatation and actual epistemic contact. Let us assume that the details of such a view could be worked out; moreover, let us assume that Harrison can give a reasonable account of actual epistemic contact. Despite our generosity, Harrison's solution is unacceptable. This is because we would still be able to show that any acceptable version of Harrison's view will protect the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is not pretty if and only if it issues the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty. This can be illustrated by considering the following simple modification of Kripke's original story about Pierre.

The modified story is like Kripke's original story after the time that Pierre moved to the ugly section of London. It differs from the original story in that in the modified story Pierre moves from a French speaking section of London. His contact with London before his move is every bit as direct and intimate as his contact with London after the move. Therefore, Pierre has actual epistemic contact with London after his move if and only if he has actual epistemic contact with London before his move. Hence, Pierre's assent to (2) exhibits his belief that London is not pretty if and only if his assent to (1) exhibits his belief that London is pretty.

How might Harrison respond to this objection? Recall that Harrison is a description theorist. He might maintain that we are right: if Pierre has actual epistemic contact with London when he assents to (2), then Pierre has actual epistemic contact with London when he assents to (1); and, therefore, if Pierre has actual epistemic contact with London, he believes that London is pretty if and only if he believes that London is not pretty. Harrison might go on to say that since this would convict Pierre—who we know has consistent beliefs—of having inconsistent beliefs, it follows that Pierre does not have actual epistemic contact with London, either before or after he moves.

Of course, if Harrison were to adopt this position he would lose the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is not pretty. This is because, according to Harrison, Pierre cannot believe that London is not pretty unless he has actual epistemic contact with London. This conforms to my original claim. I claimed that any acceptable version of Harrison's modified view protects the conclusion that Pierre believes

that London is not pretty just in case it also issues the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty. Perhaps Harrison would reply that Pierre's beliefs are not really directly about London but are, instead, directly about areas, parts, portions, or sections of London. If he were to make this move, he would sacrifice the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is not pretty; Harrison says that Pierre does believe that London is not pretty. Furthermore, it is by no means clear that the sacrifice would be worth the gain. For a version of Kripke's puzzle could always be generated for an area, part, portion, or section of London. After all, London is nothing more than an area, part, portion, or section of Greater Metropolitan London.

Looking back over this chapter, it is clear that the philosophers whose views we have discussed have a considerable stake in the claim that Pierre has consistent beliefs. Kripke says that it is a mistake to say that Pierre is guilty of an inconsistency. Devitt's theory of the meaning and reference of proper names flounders on the discovery that it is committed to the view that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. Finally, the various philosophers whose proposed solutions we have considered all mean to avoid the conclusion that Pierre's beliefs are inconsistent.

Kripke's contention that it is a mistake to convict Pierre of having inconsistent beliefs is based on two related considerations. First, no matter how much Pierre compares his various beliefs, so long as he is unaware that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, Pierre will not be able to detect any inconsistency. Second, Pierre will not draw the sorts of conclusions readily available to one who has premises p and $\neg p$ at his disposal--even if we tell him that every proposition is entailed by an

inconsistent set of propositions.

It would be a mistake to conclude, from the failure of several proposed solutions based on the claim that Pierre's beliefs are not inconsistent, that Pierre's beliefs are inconsistent. Nevertheless, the failure of such solutions should give us pause: perhaps Pierre's beliefs are inconsistent. In the chapter that follows, we abandon our tacit assumption that Pierre does not have inconsistent beliefs.

Notes

¹The theory refuted is one presented by Michael Devitt (1981).

²The solutions are given by Roderick Chisholm (1981), Bernard Harrison (1982), Harold Noonan (1981), and D. E. Over (1983).

³We will assume that (4) and (5) are sentences of English.

⁴It is interesting to note that this account of belief leaves Devitt with the problem of saying what it is for a person to cease believing something. Such an explanation is not given in Devitt (1981).

⁵This is the 'Paderewski' example given by Kripke (1979, p. 265-266).

⁶I have taken 'consequence of' to mean 'logical consequence of.' This may not be Devitt's intended meaning. He may be using 'consequence of' to mean 'dispositional, or causal, consequence of.' If so, he owes us an account of what it is for one Devitt-proposition to be a dispositional consequence of another Devitt-proposition, or set of Devitt-propositions. As the story of Pierre is presented, we do not expect every Devitt-proposition to be a dispositional consequence of the set of all Devitt-propositions that Pierre believes. But had we concluded that Pierre believes that London is pretty on the basis of an assent to sentence (3), rather than sentence (1), we would expect every Devitt-proposition to be a dispositional consequence of the set of all Devitt-propositions that Pierre believes. Yet, in the two cases all and only the same Devitt-propositions are believed by Pierre. This suggests that something is amiss with the notion of one Devitt-proposition being a dispositional consequence of another Devitt-proposition, or set of Devitt-propositions.

⁷Chisholm sets forth his purified theory of properties in his book, The First Person (1981, p. 5-9).

⁸The principle Chisholm is referring to is:

If it can be correctly said of a person S in English that 'he believes that a is F' (where 'a' occupies the place of a proper name and 'F' the place of a predicative expression), then S has a belief which could be expressed in his language in such a way that its English translation could be paraphrased as 'a is F,' wherein the name replacing 'a' is the English version of a certain proper name in S's language. (1981, p. 64)

We can say that Pierre believes that London is pretty and not violate this principle.

⁹It looks like F_4 and F_5 can be used to generate a puzzle like Kripke's original puzzle. Putting the question to Pierre in French--by using a French predicative expression--Pierre will say he self-attributes F_4 . But, if we put the question to him in English--by using an English predicative expression--Pierre will deny that he self-attributes F_4 . At this point, it's easy to imagine Kripke asking, 'Does Pierre, or does he not, self-attribute F_4 ?'

¹⁰Harrison holds that when a speaker, S, uses a proper name, 'N,' S associates 'N' with a definite description which either makes reference to 'N' or makes reference to an act of reference to the referent of 'N.' This is why, in the examples we consider, we find Harrison using definite descriptions which contain proper names as the definite descriptions backing uses of proper names.

¹¹Harrison neglects to explain what he means by 'actual epistemic contact.' His notion of actual epistemic contact is similar to Russell's notion of direct acquaintance. However, Harrison's notion of actual epistemic contact is not identical with Russell's notion of direct

acquaintance. Harrison allows that Pierre has actual epistemic contact with London but Russell would not have allowed that Pierre has direct acquaintance with London. Let us say that Pierre has actual epistemic contact with London provided he either sees, touches, hears, tastes, or smells (a part of) London.

¹²It is because Harrison typically uses definite descriptions that contain the proper names they back that he says that the belief's object is a proper name.

¹³Harrison needs to explain what happens to Pierre's belief that London is not pretty if Pierre leaves London for the weekend and ceases to have actual epistemic contact with London. If Pierre's beliefs directly about London are not lost, then Harrison's views about the connection between actual epistemic contact and direct belief are violated. Yet, it seems odd to say that Pierre loses all his beliefs (and hence his knowledge) directly about London as a consequence of going for a drive through the English countryside, and (as we may reasonably assume he must) that he regains such beliefs (and knowledge) upon his return.

¹⁴This is obviously false. Strictly speaking, when disquotation fails to correctly identify the object of a given belief, it is likely to fail to correctly identify that belief's content. When it fails to correctly identify a given belief's object, disquotation really just "helps" us determine that belief's content.

CHAPTER IV

KRIPKE'S PUZZLE ABOUT BELIEF: INCONSISTENCY SOLUTIONS

In the preceding chapter, several attempts to solve Kripke's puzzle were critically evaluated. Each attempt preserved the consistency of Pierre's beliefs. So, there is a significant sense in which the chapter was dominated by the assumption that Pierre's beliefs are not inconsistent. That assumption is now dropped. Indeed, I will maintain that Pierre believes both that London is pretty and that London is not pretty; and therefore, that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs.

Kripke gave two related reasons for rejecting the view that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs.¹ First, Pierre is apparently unable to infer all that such beliefs would entail. For example, if Pierre believes both that London is pretty and that London is not pretty, then he believes two propositions which jointly entail, say, that New York is pretty; nevertheless, we do not expect Pierre to be able to infer that New York is pretty. Second, Pierre is apparently unable to detect any inconsistency among his beliefs. No matter how much introspective comparison occurs and no matter how carefully Pierre thinks about his beliefs, he will not come to see that his beliefs are inconsistent.

Because I hold that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs, I must deal with Kripke's assertion that such a view is mistaken. In this chapter, two articles on Kripke's puzzle, and related issues, by Ruth Barcan Marcus are considered.² An explanation of why there is nothing wrong with saying that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs is constructed on the basis of things Marcus says in the two articles. It is argued that such an

explanation is unacceptable. A commentary on Kripke's puzzle by David Lewis is then considered.³ The general outline of a solution to Kripke's puzzle, developed from certain things suggested by what Lewis says, is presented. My solution comes complete with an explanation of why there is nothing wrong with the view that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs.

Section One

Ruth Barcan Marcus discusses Kripke's puzzle in two recent articles: "A Proposed Solution to a Puzzle about Belief" (1981) and "Rationality and Believing the Impossible" (1983).

On the basis of Pierre's assents to

(1) Londres est jolie

and

(2) London is not pretty,

Marcus concludes that Pierre believes that London is pretty and that Pierre believes that London is not pretty. She acknowledges that this commits her to the view that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. Marcus argues that it is a mistake to conclude, from Pierre's withheld assent to

(3) London is pretty,

that Pierre does not believe that London is pretty. She modifies Kripke's disquotation principle so that Pierre's assent to

(5) Londres is not London

does not yield the conclusion that, before he learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, Pierre believes that Londres is not identical with London. (Her modified disquotation principle allows her to retain the

conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty and the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is not pretty.) Finally, Marcus would prohibit inferring from Pierre's refusal to assent to

(4) Londres is London,

that before he learns that the two names codesignate Pierre does not believe that Londres is London.

Kripke gave two related reasons for holding that Pierre should not be convicted of harboring inconsistent beliefs. First, to the extent that Pierre can compare his various beliefs, no matter how good a logician he is, no amount of introspective comparison will help Pierre detect any inconsistency among his beliefs. Second, no matter how good a logician Pierre is, he will not draw--in fact it would be a surprise if he did draw--the kinds of conclusions available to someone who possessed inconsistent premises, even if he is told flat out that any proposition is entailed by an inconsistent set of propositions. A proposed solution which entails that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs but which fails to ease our worries--worries shared by Chisholm, Devitt, Harrison, Kripke, Noonan, and Over--about saying that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs is at best only half complete.⁴ It is one thing--an easy thing at that--to assert that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. It is quite another thing--a far more difficult thing--to explain why there is nothing wrong with saying that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs.

Marcus denies that Pierre believes everything. There are certain propositions that Marcus says Pierre does not believe. She is aware of Kripke's claim that Pierre does not have inconsistent beliefs. She does not say why she thinks it is worth pointing out that Pierre does not

believe the propositions she says he does not believe. So, we cannot be certain that she denies that Pierre believes what she denies that he believes in response to Kripke's claim that Pierre does not have inconsistent beliefs. Nevertheless, it is in our interest to see if a response to Kripke can be crafted from her remarks.

Among other things, Marcus contends that despite the fact that Pierre is disposed to assent to both

(5) Londres is not London

and

(8) Londres is pretty and London is not pretty,

Pierre believes neither that Londres is not identical with London nor that Londres is pretty and London is not pretty. Of course, Pierre's assents to (5) and (8), in conjunction with Kripke's disquotation principle, entail that Pierre believes that Londres is not identical with London and that Pierre believes that Londres is pretty and London is not pretty.⁵ Marcus tries to avoid these, and similar, results by replacing Kripke's disquotation principle with one of her own.

Recall that Kripke presented his disquotation principle as follows:

Let us make explicit the disquotational principle presupposed here, connecting sincere assent and belief. It can be stated as follows, where 'p' is to be replaced, inside and outside all quotation marks, by any appropriate standard English sentence: "If a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to 'p,' then he believes that p." (1979, p. 248-249)

In place of Kripke's disquotation principle, Marcus recommends:

Again assuming that assent is sincere and reflective, if (i) a normal speaker assents to 'p' and (ii) 'p' is a sentence of English and (iii) p is possible, then he believes that p. (1981, p. 505)

Since (5) and (8) express impossible propositions, we cannot go via Marcus's disquotation principle from Pierre's assents to (5) and (8) to the conclusions that Pierre believes that Londres is not identical with London and that Pierre believes that Londres is pretty and London is not pretty. Marcus recommends her disquotation principle over Kripke's because hers, unlike his, accords with the following principle (which she calls "Principle C"):

C: If x believes that p, then p is possible. (1981, p. 505)

If Principle C is true, then it is quite easy to explain why Pierre does not believe every proposition: 'According to Principle C there are constraints on what one can believe. One cannot believe an impossible proposition. Therefore, despite the fact that certain impossible propositions are entailed by the set of propositions Pierre believes, they are not propositions he believes. So, it should come as no surprise that Pierre does not believe everything. Given that he believes both that London is pretty and that London is not pretty, since he does not believe that Londres is not identical with London, it should come as no surprise, and we should not worry about saying, that Pierre does not believe, say, that New York is pretty.'

This explanation has at least three major problems. First, Principle C is the basis for this explanation and Marcus has failed to give us good reasons for thinking that Principle C is true. Second, Principle C yields some counter-intuitive results. Third, it is by no means clear that this explanation succeeds in mollifying our legitimate fears about attributing inconsistent beliefs to Pierre. We turn first to the problem of warrant.

We want to know why there is nothing wrong with saying that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. The account before us is based on Principle C. Marcus makes her case for Principle C in the passage below:

Suppose that someone were to claim that he believes that Hesperus is not identical with Phosphorus or that Tully is not identical with Cicero, or that Londres is not identical with London where in those contexts of use the names of the "pairs" in question do . . . refer to the same thing. It is my (non post-hoc) intuition that on discovery that those identities hold, and consequently that the associated name pairs name the same thing, I would not say that I had changed my belief or acquired a new belief to replace the old, but that I was mistaken in claiming that I had those beliefs to begin with. After all, if I had believed that Tully is not identical with Cicero, I would have been believing that something is not the same as itself and I surely did not believe that, a blatant impossibility, so I was mistaken in claiming to have the belief. (1981, p. 505)

The preceding passage falls short of giving us good reasons for thinking that Principle C is true. We can easily accept what Marcus actually asserts in the passage--that she never believed any one of three propositions--and still consistently hold: (i) that Marcus believed, or believes, other impossible propositions; (ii) that we, or others, believed, or believe, the three impossible propositions that Marcus mentions; and (iii) that we, or others, believed, or believe, still other impossible propositions.

Marcus claims to have an intuition about how she would react in certain situations. It is by no means clear that there is a sound argument from this reported intuition to the conclusion that Marcus never believed any of the three impossible propositions she mentions, let alone to Principle C. Perhaps an argument with Marcus's reported intuition as a premise and with the claim that Marcus never believed, say, that Londres is not identical with London as a conclusion can be fashioned.

Perhaps we could use that argument as a blueprint in constructing an argument with Principle C as its conclusion. But, this is sheer speculation. Marcus has not provided such arguments; moreover, she has given us very little, if anything, that will help us to develop such arguments.

Not only does the preceding passage fail to give us good reasons for thinking that Principle C is true, it also raises serious problems for Marcus's own position on Pierre's beliefs. For it is reasonable to suppose that a person who would deny that he ever believed that Londres is not identical with London, upon discovering that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, would also deny that he believed both that London is pretty and that London is not pretty, upon discovering that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate. Furthermore, it is hard to imagine a plausible, non-question begging response to the claim that the first denial is no better evidence of non-belief than the second denial. Therefore, if Marcus does have evidence, based on her reported intuition, that Pierre does not believe that Londres is not identical with London, then we have equally good evidence that Pierre does not believe both that London is pretty and that London is not pretty.

We have reached two conclusions about the evidence Marcus presents for Principle C. First, we have concluded that there is no clear connection between that evidence and Principle C. Second, we have concluded that if the evidence Marcus presents for Principle C undermines the claim that Pierre believes that Londres is not identical with London, then it jeopardizes the claim that Pierre believes both that London is pretty and that London is not pretty. From the question of evidence for

Principle C, we turn to problems raised by Principle C.

Marcus never discusses the intended modal status of Principle C; however, in order for Principle C to have any interesting application to Kripke's puzzle it must be such that if it is true, then it is necessarily true. For if Principle C is a mere contingent truth, it has the status of an accidental generalization. It would lack any of the explanatory power Marcus might hope to attribute to it and Marcus would have to concede that although Pierre (supposedly) does not believe that Londres is not identical with London, in a possible situation similar to the one Pierre is in, save for the fact that Principle C is false, Pierre would believe that Londres is not identical with London. This is one reason for thinking that Principle C's intended modal status is one of necessary truth.

Marcus seems committed to the view that Principle C is a necessary truth. She likens possibility as a constraint on the objects of belief on a par with truth as a constraint on the objects of knowledge. This much is clear from the following passages:

It is generally held that if someone knows that p, then as contrasted with belief, p is the case in that epistemological subject's world. p obtains, p is actual, or, if we use "true" for propositional contents as well as sentences, p is true. A basis for that claim is the widely shared intuition that if someone claimed to know that p, he would say, on discovering that p did not obtain, was not actual in his world, was not, if you like, true, that he was mistaken in claiming to know that p. His clinging to his knowledge claim on the known falsity of p (on the knowledge that the state of affairs does not obtain) would be seen as a conceptual or linguistic confusion.

The analogy between this intuition about belief claims [i.e., the one Marcus reports she has in the passage quoted on page 130 above] and the more universally accepted ones about knowledge is close. Just as a condition for knowing that p is that p obtains, so a condition for believing is

C. If x believes that p, then possible p. (1981, p. 504-505)

It is necessarily true that if a proposition p is an object of knowledge, then p is true. By an analogy that Marcus encourages, it would seem to be the case that if Principle C is true, then it is necessarily true that if a proposition p is an object of belief, then p is possible.

On the basis of the two considerations above we will assume that Principle C is true only if it is necessarily true. This raises a series of related problems.

If Principle C is true, it is necessarily true. If Principle C is necessarily true, then, since it is impossible that Londres is not identical with London, it is impossible that Pierre believes that Londres is not identical with London. Therefore, no one, not even Pierre, ever believed, or ever could believe, that Pierre believed that Londres is not identical with London. Furthermore, if Principle C is true, no one ever believes that someone could believe an impossible state of affairs. In fact, if Principle C is true, it is impossible to believe that someone can believe an impossibility.

These results are counter-intuitive, to say the least. This is especially so in light of something Marcus acknowledges: namely, that it is prima facie true that we do sometimes believe the impossible. Marcus concedes this much in the following passage:

. . . all evidence seems to support the claim that the necessary falsehood of 'p' does not preclude believing that p. Mathematical conjecture, it is argued, are, if false, necessarily so; yet some mathematical conjectures, purportedly believed by competent mathematicians who do not suffer from conceptual confusion, have subsequently been demonstrated to be false. If one accepts (as I do) the principle that logically irreducible identity sentences (i.e., sentences where the names flanking the identity sign are proper names) are, if true,

necessarily so, then there are basic, non-complex examples that support the claim that we can believe the impossible, or, as I prefer to put it, that we can enter into the belief relation with an impossible state of affairs. For what is described by a false identity sentence is an impossibility, metaphysically speaking. (1983, p. 322-323)

Thus, if Principle C is true, the proposition that we sometimes believe impossible propositions is prima facie true, and perhaps even known by us to be prima facie true, even though it is never in fact believed. This is also quite counter-intuitive; Marcus owes us an explanation of how a proposition could be known to be prima facie true and still not be a possible object of belief.

It looks like we can use what we know about Principle C to lead Marcus into a trap. Suppose Pierre behaves just like Marcus says she would behave had she discovered that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, having earlier claimed to believe that Londres is not identical with London. Suppose, that is, that Pierre says he was mistaken to have claimed to believe that Londres is not identical with London. But, when Pierre says he was mistaken when he claimed to believe that Londres is not identical with London, it would seem to follow that he is right only if he mistakenly believed that he believed that Londres is not identical with London. Yet, if Principle C is true, Pierre never believed that he believed that Londres is not identical with London; and, so, Pierre never mistakenly believed that he believed that Londres is not identical with London. Apparently, then, Pierre would be mistaken to report that he mistakenly believed that he believed that Londres is not identical with London. (Just as Marcus would be mistaken were she to report that she mistakenly believed that she believed that Londres is not identical with London.)

Marcus can counter as follows: 'I am not committed to the view that Pierre mistakenly believed that he believed that Londres is not identical with London. Rather, I am committed to the view that Pierre mistakenly claimed that he believed that Londres is not identical with London. This does not entail that Pierre stood in the belief-relation to the proposition that he believed that Londres is not identical with London. Instead, it entails that Pierre stood in some other positive epistemic relation--say thinking or conceiving--toward the proposition that he believed that Londres is not identical with London; that is, that Pierre mistakenly thought or conceived that he believed that Londres is not identical with London. That is why he claimed to believe that Londres is not identical with London. Indeed, we often err and use "believers" when it would be more accurate to use either "thinks" or "conceives." You can think or conceive an impossibility, but you cannot believe one.'

This response has two problems. First, it is obvious to one who has been present when Marcus has plied this response that it is counter-intuitive--it has received nothing even remotely like universal consent; in fact, the opposite is true. With this response we have reached a point where Marcus is defending Principle C by an appeal to a distinction where there is no genuine difference. Second, a puzzle just like Kripke's original puzzle can be generated about thinking and conceiving. For Marcus's defense of Principle C to work, she must explain how Pierre can think that London is pretty and think that London is not pretty without also coming to think that New York is pretty. Therefore, for Marcus's defense of Principle C to succeed, she must explain a phenomenon

strikingly similar to the one Principle C was originally supposed to help explain.

We pay a heavy price for Principle C. It saddles us with counter-intuitive results and its defense leads to puzzles similar to Kripke's original puzzle. Now that we know something about the cost of Principle C, let us see what we get for the price we pay. Let us consider the strength of the proposal that it supports.

Kripke says that it is a mistake to convict Pierre of an inconsistency. Marcus, who says that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs, must explain why Pierre will not infer what his beliefs entail. If Pierre has inconsistent beliefs, then he has at his disposal premises which, when taken together, entail every proposition. But Pierre will not assent to every sentence; for example, Pierre will not assent to

(7) London is not London,

and Marcus explicitly denies that he believes that London is not identical with London.

Principle C is supposed to help us explain why Pierre does not believe that London is not identical with London. Our explanation runs as follows: 'According to Principle C, there are constraints on what one can believe. Pierre cannot believe an impossible proposition. Therefore, despite the fact that Pierre believes both that London is pretty and that London is not pretty he does not believe that London is not identical with London. So, contrary to Kripke, it should come as no surprise that Pierre will not come to believe everything.'

We already know that there are many sentences which Pierre will assent to but which, if Principle C were true, would not express objects

of his beliefs. This undermines Principle C, the principle upon which the preceding explanation is built; however, beyond that it does not undermine the explanation. In Principle C Marcus has a principle she could appeal to in order to explain why Pierre does not believe everything. However, the preceding explanation is unsatisfactory, for there are many sentences Pierre will not assent to but which express propositions Pierre would be free to believe even if Principle C were true.

Suppose that Pierre is told that if London is pretty, then New York is pretty. As a result he acquires the disposition to assent to

(9) If London is pretty, then New York is pretty.

This, in conjunction with Marcus's disquotation principle, entails that Pierre believes that if London is pretty, then New York is pretty.

Putting this new belief together with his old belief that London is pretty, Pierre "should" be able to infer that New York is pretty. But Pierre may not believe that New York is pretty. Certainly, we would not expect him to assent to

(10) New York is pretty.

Pierre may have no beliefs about New York, save his belief that if London is pretty, then New York is pretty and what he is prepared to infer from it and his other beliefs.

Neither Principle C nor anything Marcus says in support of Principle C explains why Pierre is unable to infer that New York is pretty. The proposition that New York is pretty is a contingent proposition, and it is entailed by a pair of propositions that Marcus would agree that Pierre believes. In addition, the proposition that New York is pretty is a

consequence of two propositions that Marcus asserts that Pierre believes: namely, the proposition that London is pretty and the proposition that London is not pretty. Therefore, although Principle C might help explain why Pierre does not believe that London is not identical with London--despite his willingness to assent to a sentence that expresses it and despite the fact that it is entailed by his beliefs--we still lack an explanation for Pierre's inability to infer that New York is pretty.

Putting aside problems for Principle C, we will consider an attempt to repair the preceding explanation. In place of the original explanation, we shall consider the following: 'Although a person can come by reason to believe any logical consequence of each of his beliefs, taken individually, it is not the case that a person can come by reason to believe any logical consequence of every subset of the set of all things that he believes. For example, a person might believe a proposition, p , and also its denial, $\neg p$, and still be unable to infer all that he could infer if he believed their conjunction, p and $\neg p$. If this were correct, then Pierre could believe both that London is pretty and that London is not pretty but be unable to infer all that their conjunction entails. Of course, if Pierre did believe their conjunction--if he did believe that London is pretty and London is not pretty--then he could infer all that it entails. It entails that New York is pretty. Here is where Principle C comes into play. For, if Principle C were true, Pierre would not believe that London is pretty and London is not pretty, despite the fact that he will assent to a sentence that expresses it. This is because the proposition that London is pretty and London is not pretty is impossible. Therefore, we should not be surprised that Pierre is unable to infer that

New York is pretty. Pierre does not believe any proposition that entails that New York is pretty.'

One problem for the preceding explanation is its dependence on Principle C. Still, troubles with Principle C aside, the explanation is unacceptable. It is not unacceptable so much for what it says as for what it fails to say. The explanation does not explain the phenomenon we find puzzling; it codifies it. We know that Pierre is unable to infer that New York is pretty. We want to know why Pierre is unable to infer that New York is pretty. We want to know why, despite the fact that it is entailed by things he believes, Pierre is unable to infer that New York is pretty. The explanation is really nothing more than a generalization drawn from cases like Pierre's. In this way it is (at best) analogous to a scientific law. We want something analogous to a scientific theory--we want something that explains such generalizations.⁶

A solution to Kripke's puzzle which ascribes inconsistent beliefs to Pierre must explain why Pierre is unable to infer that New York is pretty (and why Pierre is unable to detect any inconsistency among his beliefs). We have tried, and failed, to develop an acceptable explanation based on what Marcus says about Kripke's puzzle. It appears that Marcus does not have an acceptable explanation. We may conclude that she has not solved Kripke's puzzle.

Section Two

David Lewis considers Kripke's puzzle in "What Puzzling Pierre does not Believe" (1981). Lewis discusses Kripke's puzzle in terms of the

following sentences:

- (L1) Pierre believes that London is pretty
- (L2) Pierre believes that London is not pretty
- (L3) He [i.e., Pierre] cannot be convicted of an inconsistency; to do so would be incorrect.

Lewis writes:

To solve the puzzle would be to show how [(L1)], [(L2)], and [(L3)] are compatible. (1981, p. 284)

Rather than trying to solve Kripke's puzzle, Lewis argues for two major claims. These claims involve sentences (L1), (L2), and (L3); in addition, they involve the following sentences:

- (L4) 'Pierre believes that F(A)', where A is an ordinary proper name and F is an easily understood predicate, ascribes to Pierre a belief whose object is the proposition (actually) expressed by 'F(A)'
- (L5) This proposition [i.e., the proposition expressed by 'F(A)'] holds at exactly those possible worlds where the thing which is (actually) denoted by A has the property which is (actually) expressed by F
- (L6) Beliefs are jointly inconsistent if there is no possible world where the propositional objects hold true together.

We will consider Lewis's two claims. However, before we do, it is important that we take a closer look at (L3). Owing to the occurrence of the phrase 'convicted of' therein, (L3) admits of two significantly different interpretations. They are

- (L3') It is a mistake to conclude that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs,

and

- (L3'') It is a mistake to conclude that because Pierre has inconsistent beliefs that Pierre is doxastically culpable.

Suppose that Kripke's puzzle involves a situation where Pierre's beliefs

are inconsistent, but where Pierre's failure to spot the inconsistency is, in some reasonable sense, beyond his control--is something Pierre should not be held responsible for. In such a case (L3') would be false but (L3'') would be true. Indeed, I shall maintain that Pierre is in such a situation. Pierre has inconsistent beliefs, but he is in no way blameworthy. In addition, I will maintain that (L1) and (L2), as well as (L4), (L5), and (L6) are true. As we are about to see, this puts me at odds with Lewis.

The first claim that Lewis tries to establish is that

The case of Pierre refutes this analysis [i.e., the set consisting of sentences (L4), (L5), and (L6)]. (1981, p. 284)

By this, Lewis apparently means that the set consisting of (L1) through (L6) is inconsistent. According to Lewis, (L1), (L2), and (L3) are all true. He intends to demonstrate that at least one of (L4), (L5), or (L6) is false.

Let us consider the line of reasoning behind Lewis's first claim. Lewis holds that (L1), (L2), and (L3) are true. If (L1) is true, then if (L4) is true, Pierre believes the proposition actually expressed by the sentence 'London is pretty.' Similarly, if (L2) is true, then if (L4) is true, Pierre believes the proposition actually expressed by the sentence 'London is not pretty.' Now, if (L3) is true, if (L6) is true, and if Pierre believes the proposition expressed by 'London is pretty' as well as the proposition expressed by 'London is not pretty,' then there is a possible world where both the proposition expressed by 'London is pretty' and the proposition expressed by 'London is not pretty' are true. If there is such a world, then if (L5) is true,⁷ there is a world where London both is and is not pretty. Of course, there is no such world,

since the properties of being pretty and being not pretty are (assumed to be) mutually exclusive; and, therefore, if, as Lewis holds, (L1), (L2), and (L3) are true, then one of (L4), (L5), or (L6) is false.

It is important to realize that Lewis's argument is valid only if (L3) is interpreted as (L3'), and invalid if (L3) is interpreted as (L3''). If (L3) is interpreted as (L3''), rather than as (L3'), then we are not entitled to claim that if (L3) is true, and if (L6) is true, and if Pierre believes both the proposition expressed by 'London is pretty' and the proposition expressed by 'London is not pretty,' then there is a possible world where both propositions are true.

Lewis, who claims that Kripke's puzzle refutes the analysis given by (i.e., the set consisting of) (L4), (L5), and (L6), reads (L3) as (L3'). I shall maintain a position opposed to Lewis in this regard. I shall maintain that Lewis's argument is unsound either because (L3) is false--as when it is interpreted as (L3')--or because the argument is invalid--as when (L3) is interpreted as (L3''). However, Lewis is certainly right about this much: if (L1), (L2), and (L3') are true, then one of (L4), (L5), or (L6) is false.

The second claim that Lewis makes is that "the refuted analysis"--the set consisting of (L4), (L5), and (L6)--fails to account for the truth of (L1). In this regard, Lewis writes:

Let us stick to the case of Pierre, and consider whether the refuted analysis accounts even for the truth of [(L1)]. I say it does not. (It likewise fails to account for the truth of [(L2)]). Pierre does not have as an object of his belief the proposition (actually) expressed by 'London is pretty'. For there is a possible world which fits Pierre's beliefs perfectly--it is one of his 'belief-worlds'--at which that proposition is false.

I have in mind a world where the beautiful city Pierre heard about was not London but Bristol. Imagine a world just like ours until very recently (except to the extent that it must differ to fit Pierre's misconceptions about earlier history, if any). Then the beautification of Bristol was undertaken, and at the same time it was renamed in honor of Sir Ogdred Londer. The French called this beautiful city 'Londres'; they spoke often of its beauty, and all they said was true. In due course Pierre heard of the beauty of Bristol, lately called 'Londer' in England and 'Londres' in France, and he came to assent sincerely to 'Londres est jolie'. What happened at his end was just like what happened at the real world.

While Bristol was beautiful, London fell into decay. The better parts were demolished—copies were sometimes built in Bristol, alias 'Londer'—and only the slums remained. London became ugly through and through. Also, nothing of consequence happened there. The French had little occasion to speak of the place under any name, and indeed it never was mentioned in Pierre's presence. It was to this place that the unfortunate Pierre was made to go. Again, what happened at the end of Pierre's encounters with London was just like what happened at the real world.

This world fits Pierre's beliefs perfectly. For all he believes, it might every well be the world he lives in. Tell him and show him all about it, claiming that it is the real world; he will never be at all surprised; unless it surprises him to find that he has been right in all his beliefs without exception. Nothing he believes—no propositional object of his belief—is false at this world.

However, the proposition (actually) expressed by 'London is pretty' according to [(L5)]... is false at this world. 'London' denotes London and 'is pretty' expresses the property of being pretty, and this is a world where London... is present and is not at all pretty. (1981, p. 286)

I hold with Lewis that (L1) is true. (So is (L2).) Now, if (L4) is true, then, since (L1) is true, at the actual world, w_r , Pierre believes the proposition actually expressed by 'London is pretty.' According to Lewis, at w_b , the Bristol-is-beautiful-world Lewis describes, Pierre believes everything he believes at w_r . If this is so, then at w_b Pierre believes the proposition actually expressed by 'London is pretty.' Also, according to Lewis, everything Pierre believes at w_b is true at w_b . If

so, and if at w_b Pierre believes the proposition actually expressed by 'London is pretty,' then the proposition actually expressed by 'London is pretty' is true at w_b . But, if the proposition actually expressed by 'London is pretty' is true at w_b , then, if (L5) is true, w_b is a world where London is pretty. Of course, London is not pretty at w_b . Thus Lewis maintains that one of (L4) or (L5) is false.

Lewis notes that (L6) plays no role in his argument and says that he has no quarrel with (L6).⁸ At bottom, Lewis is trying to show that one of (L4) or (L5) is false.

This conflicts with the view I intend to defend. I am, therefore, obliged either to point to a flaw in Lewis's reasoning or to dispute one of Lewis's premises. The reasoning is flawless. I agree with Lewis that (L1) is true. I also agree with Lewis that everything that Pierre believes in w_b is true at w_b . I reject Lewis's claim that Pierre believes everything in w_b that he believes in w_r . Pierre does believe every general, or qualitative, proposition in w_b that he believes in w_r , but he does not believe every proposition in w_b that he believes in w_r . I shall maintain that Pierre believes certain singular propositions—for example, the singular proposition that London is pretty—in w_r that he does not believe in w_b .

So the preceding derivation depends on two claims; the two claims jointly entail that everything that Pierre believes in w_r is true at w_b . The first claim is that Pierre believes everything in w_b that he believes in w_r . The second claim is that everything Pierre believes in w_b is true at w_b .

In support of the claim that Pierre believes everything in w_b that he believes in w_r , Lewis writes of Pierre's experiences in France at w_b ,⁹

What happened at his end was just like what happened at the real world. (1981, p. 286)

And of Pierre's experiences in London at w_b ,

Again, what happened at Pierre's end of his encounters with London was just like what happened at the real world. (1981, p. 286)

The claim that Pierre believes everything in w_b that he believes in w_r is supported by the fact that Pierre's experiences in w_b are—at least from Pierre's perspective—qualitatively indistinguishable from his experiences in w_r . For if his experiences are thus indistinguishable, it is hard to see what could give rise to divergent beliefs. Anyone who disputes the claim that w_b is one of Pierre's belief worlds, but who accepts the claim that everything Pierre believes in w_b is true at w_b , must explain how, despite the qualitative indistinguishability of Pierre's experiences in the two worlds, Pierre's beliefs in w_b can differ from his beliefs in w_r .

I hold that Lewis is correct with regard to Pierre's qualitative beliefs: w_b is one of Pierre's qualitative belief worlds. Pierre believes every qualitative proposition in w_b that he believes in w_r . This is because his experiences in w_b are qualitatively indistinguishable from his experiences in w_r . Still, in both w_r and w_b , Pierre has certain kinds of non-qualitative beliefs. I will need to explain why qualitative indistinguishability of experience does not guarantee that Pierre has all and only the same non-qualitative beliefs in w_b that he has in w_r .¹⁰

In support of the claim that everything Pierre believes in w_b is true at w_b , Lewis writes:

This world fits Pierre's beliefs perfectly. For all that he believes, it might very well be the world he lives in. Tell him and show him all about it, claiming that it is the real world; he will never be at all surprised, unless it surprises him to find that he has turned out to be right in all his beliefs without exception. Nothing he believes--no propositional object of his belief--is false at this world. (1981, p. 286)

Let Pierre wander through w_b . Let him discover all there is to know about w_b . At no time will Pierre see fit to discard any of his beliefs. Apparently, everything Pierre believes at w_b is true at w_b .

Once he has presented his alleged counterexample, Lewis entertains several objections to his line of reasoning. One of these objections together with Lewis's reply are of special interest to us. That objection and Lewis's reply are contained in the passage that follows:

Objection. The counterexample world is not a world that fits Pierre's beliefs. For Pierre believes that London is pretty, whereas the counterexample world is one where London is not pretty. I reply by posing a dilemma. When we characterize the content of belief by assigning propositional (or other) objects, are we characterizing an inner, narrowly psychological state of the believer? Are beliefs in the head? Or are we characterizing partly the believer's inner state, partly the relations of that state to the outer world? If it is the latter, the objection may succeed; however, Kripke's puzzle vanishes. For if the assignment of propositional object characterizes more than the believer's inner state, then there is no reason to suppose that a leading philosopher and logician would never let contradictory beliefs pass, or that anyone is in principle in a position to notice and correct contradictory beliefs if he has them. Anyone is in principle in a position to notice and correct a state of the head which can be characterized by assigning contradictory propositional objects, but why should philosophical and logical acumen help him if the trouble lies partly outside? As soon as we accept the consistency of Pierre's beliefs as datum--as I did, on Kripke's invitation--we are committed to the narrowly psychological conception of belief and its objects. (I would like to think that this is what Kripke intended in instructing us to consider belief *de dicto*.) But on the narrowly psychological conception, the counterexample world does fit Pierre's beliefs, as witness the fact that it would not at all surprise him to be persuaded that the world was just that way. (1981, p. 288-299)

The objection is quite simple: w_b is one of Pierre's belief worlds only if everything Pierre believes in w_r is true at w_b ; however, since in w_r Pierre believes that London is pretty and the proposition that London is pretty is false at w_b , w_b is not one of Pierre's belief worlds. As noted above, the claim that w_b is one of Pierre's belief worlds is jointly entailed by the claims that Pierre believes everything in w_b that he believes in w_r and that everything Pierre believes in w_b is true at w_b . By his reply, Lewis suggests that he takes the objection as a threat to the former claim, not to the latter claim. Lewis says nothing new--nothing he has not already said--about the claim that everything Pierre believes in w_b is true at w_b . Henceforth, we will assume that Lewis is concerned with the claim that Pierre believes everything in w_b that he believes in w_r .

Lewis responds to the above objection by asking us to reflect on "what we are doing when we characterize the content of belief by assigning propositional objects" (1981, p. 288). He suggests that there are two basic alternatives. The first alternative is that when we characterize belief by assigning propositional objects, we are "characterizing an inner, narrowly psychological state of the believer" (1981, p. 288). The second alternative is that when we characterize belief by assigning propositional objects, "we are characterizing partly the believer's inner state, and partly the relations of that inner state to the outer world" (1981, p. 288). Lewis then traces the implications of each alternative.

According to Lewis, if the first alternative is correct, then "the counterexample world does fit Pierre's beliefs" (1981, p. 288); if the

first alternative is correct, the objection fails. Again, according to Lewis, if the second alternative is correct, then "the objection may succeed; however, Kripke's puzzle vanishes" (1981, p. 288).

We have reached the crucial point in Lewis's commentary on Kripke's puzzle. Before we continue, a word of caution is in order. We will soon see why Lewis maintains both that if the first alternative is correct, w_b is one of Pierre's belief worlds and that if the second alternative is correct, then, although the objection may succeed, Kripke's puzzle vanishes. It is, however, important to realize that I am not so much interested in interpreting and developing Lewis's position as I am in solving Kripke's puzzle. Lewis is neither committed to nor responsible for anything I say when I develop a position based on what is suggested by what he says. Bearing this in mind, let us see what Lewis says.

Lewis maintains that to solve Kripke's puzzle one must show that the following are compatible:

(L1) Pierre believes that London is pretty,

(L2) Pierre believes that London is not pretty,

and

(L3) He [i.e., Pierre] cannot be convicted of an inconsistency; to do so would be incorrect.

Lewis says that when we characterize the contents of beliefs by assigning them propositional objects, we are doing one of two things--what I have been calling the first alternative and the second alternative. He claims that if the first alternative is correct, then w_b is one of Pierre's belief worlds; and, therefore, that one of the following is false:

(L4) 'Pierre believes that $F(A)$ ', where A is an ordinary proper name and F is an easily understood predicate, ascribes to

Pierre a belief whose object is the proposition (actually) expressed by 'F(A)',

- (L5) This proposition [i.e., the proposition (actually) expressed by 'F(A)'] holds at exactly those possible worlds where the thing which is (actually) denoted by A has the property which is (actually) expressed by F.

Lewis allows that if the second alternative is correct, the objection to his argument by (alleged) counterexample may succeed. Finally, he claims that if the second alternative is correct, then Kripke's puzzle vanishes; that is, there is no longer any need to show that (L1), (L2), and (L3) are compatible--since one of them, namely (L3), may be regarded as false.

What are these two alternatives? They are rival views about what kinds of propositions we believe and what kinds of beliefs we attribute when we use belief ascription sentences whose that-clauses have name sentences for sentential components. To explicate the two alternatives, I will make use of the distinction between general, or qualitative, propositions and singular, or individual, propositions. The first alternative is the view that the objects of belief are qualitative propositions and that we use belief ascription sentences whose that-clauses have name sentences for sentential components to attribute beliefs whose objects are qualitative propositions. The second alternative is the view that the objects of beliefs may be either qualitative propositions or singular propositions and that (typically) we use such sentences to attribute beliefs whose objects are singular propositions.

Lewis apparently favors the first alternative. He does, after all, claim that one of (L4) or (L5) is false. He holds both that if the first alternative is correct, then w_b is one of Pierre's belief worlds and that

if w_b is one of Pierre's belief worlds, then, if (L1) is true (and he says it is), one of (L4) or (L5) is false.

I shall hold that the second alternative is correct. Lewis allows that if the second alternative is correct, then the objection to his claim that w_b is one of Pierre's belief worlds (and, therefore, to his attempt to demonstrate that one of (L4) or (L5) is false) may succeed. Lewis claims that if the second alternative is correct, then Kripke's puzzle vanishes--presumably because we no longer need to hold that (L1), (L2), and (L3) are compatible.

It is clear by now that our interests will be served if we consider these three statements from Lewis's reply: (i) if the first alternative is correct, then w_b is one of Pierre's belief worlds (and, therefore, since (L1) is true, one of (L4) or (L5) is false); (ii) if the second alternative is correct, then the objection may succeed; and (iii) if the second alternative is correct, then Kripke's puzzle vanishes.

We begin with the claim that if the first alternative is correct, then w_b is one of Pierre's belief worlds (and, therefore, since (L1) is true, one of (L4) or (L5) is false). I hold with Lewis that (L1) is true (at w_r). If the first alternative is correct, then (L1) is true at w_r in virtue of one of Pierre's qualitative beliefs. Pierre believes every qualitative proposition in w_b that he believes in w_r . This appears to follow from the qualitative indistinguishability of Pierre's experiences in the two worlds. If the objects of belief are qualitative propositions, then Pierre believes everything in w_b that he believes in w_r . So it appears that if the objects of belief are qualitative propositions, then everything Pierre believes at w_r is true at w_b ; that

is, w_b is one of Pierre's belief worlds. If w_b is one of Pierre's belief worlds, then (if (L1) were true at w_b) (L1) would be true at w_b in virtue of the same qualitative belief that "makes" it true at w_r . If both (L4) and (L5) were true and if (L1) were true at w_b , then w_b would be a world wherein London is pretty. But London is not pretty at w_b ; and, therefore, if the first alternative is correct, w_b is one of Pierre's belief worlds and, since (L1) is true, one of (L4) or (L5) is false.

We have verified the first of the three statements in Lewis's reply. Let us consider the second statement: if the second alternative is correct, then the objection to Lewis's argument by (alleged) counterexample may succeed.

To say that if the second alternative is correct, then the objection may succeed is tantamount to saying that if the second alternative is correct, then w_b may not be one of Pierre's belief worlds. (I shall regard the modal expression in this claim as one expressing epistemic, rather than metaphysical, possibility.)

I shall maintain that if some of Pierre's beliefs are non-qualitative beliefs of a particular sort, then the qualitative indistinguishability of Pierre's experiences in the two worlds is no guarantee that he has all the same beliefs in the two worlds.¹¹ He may have qualitatively indistinguishable experiences and yet not believe exactly the same singular propositions. If so, and if the second alternative is correct, then w_b may not be a world wherein Pierre believes everything he believes in w_r , despite the qualitative indistinguishability of his experiences. Therefore, if the second alternative is correct, even though everything

Pierre believes at w_b is true at w_b , w_b may not be one of Pierre's belief worlds.

We have considered one way of defending the second of these statements in Lewis's reply. Let us consider the third statement: if the second alternative is correct, then Kripke's puzzle vanishes.

Recall that, according to Lewis, to solve Kripke's puzzle one must show that (L1), (L2), and (L3) are compatible. We have a puzzle just so long as we seem committed to the view that (L1), (L2), and (L3) are true and also to the view that they are inconsistent. Lewis seems to favor one kind of solution: interpret (L1) and (L2) in such a way that (L1), (L2), and (L3) are not inconsistent. (This leads him to reject the conjunction of (L4) and (L5).) He favors the first alternative and prefers that (L1) and (L2) be understood so that their truth does not entail that Pierre believes both a proposition and its denial. I favor the second alternative and I wish to retain both (L4) and (L5). This means that I cannot pursue the sort of solution that Lewis prefers. I favor a second kind of solution. I will maintain: that (L1), (L2), and (L3) are incompatible--when (L3) is interpreted as

(L3') It is a mistake to conclude that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs;

that (L1), (L2), and (L3) are not incompatible--when (L3) is interpreted as

(L3'') It is a mistake to conclude that because Pierre has inconsistent beliefs that Pierre is doxastically culpable;

and that although (L3'') is true, (L3') is false. If we are in a position to reject the claim that (L3) is both true and inconsistent with

(L1) and (L2), then we no longer have a puzzle; it will have vanished, dissolved, or been solved.

I will interpret the claim that if the second alternative is correct, then Kripke's puzzle vanishes so that it depends on the claim that if the second alternative is correct, then we no longer have reason to think that (L3') is true.

When Lewis claims that Kripke's puzzle vanishes under the second alternative, he adds the following by way of an explanation:

For is the assignment of propositional objects characterizes more than the believer's inner state, then there is no reason to suppose that a leading philosopher and logician would never let contradictory beliefs pass, or that anyone is in principle in a position to notice and correct contradictory beliefs if he has them. Anyone is in principle in a position to notice and correct a state of the head which can be characterized by assigning contradictory objects, but why should philosophical and logical acumen help him if the trouble lies partly outside? (1981, p. 288-289)

Lewis holds that if the second alternative is correct, then we no longer have reason to believe that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. This suggests that he would agree that if the first alternative is correct, then we have reason to believe that Pierre does not have inconsistent beliefs.

I shall maintain that when we reason from our beliefs, we reason only from either our qualitative beliefs or our own personal beliefs; and that when we reason via propositions, the propositions that we reason from are either qualitative propositions or our own personal propositions. A belief is qualitative when its object is a qualitative proposition. A proposition, *p*, is personal to *x*, or is one of *x*'s personal propositions, if and only if *p* is a singular proposition, *x* is an individual constituent of *p*, and nothing else is an individual constituent of *p*.

A belief is personal to x, or is one of x's personal beliefs, provided its object is one of x's own personal propositions.¹² The singular proposition that Ronald Reagan is wise is one of Reagan's personal propositions--Reagan is its unique individual constituent. It is not one of George Bush's personal propositions—it does not have Bush as a constituent. Although the singular proposition that Reagan is older than Bush has Reagan as a constituent, it is not one of Reagan's personal propositions because it also has Bush as a constituent. For similar reasons, it is not one of Bush's personal propositions. The proposition that all men are mortal is no one's personal proposition because it is not a singular proposition.

When we reason from our beliefs, we reason only from either our qualitative beliefs or our own personal beliefs; we do not reason from our non-qualitative, non-personal beliefs. If the set of beliefs we reason from is inconsistent, we are, at least in principle, in a position to detect the inconsistency.¹³ However, if the set of beliefs we reason from is consistent, then, even if the set of all of our beliefs is inconsistent, we are not, even in principle, in a position to detect the inconsistency.

As noted above, Lewis seems to hold that if the first alternative is correct, then we have reason to believe that (L3') is true. If the first alternative were correct, and if Pierre had inconsistent beliefs, then, since we reason from our qualitative beliefs, Pierre would be in a position to detect the inconsistency. This is because, if the first alternative were correct, the inconsistency would be among Pierre's qualitative beliefs. But, as Kripke says, Pierre cannot detect any

inconsistency. Therefore, if the first alternative were correct, and if we reason from our qualitative beliefs, then, since Pierre is unable to detect any inconsistency, we would need to conclude that Pierre does not have inconsistent beliefs. If the first alternative were correct, then Pierre's inability to detect any inconsistency among his beliefs, would be reason to conclude that he does not have inconsistent beliefs.

If, however, the second alternative is correct, it would be a mistake to conclude, from Pierre's inability to detect any inconsistency, that Pierre does not have inconsistent beliefs. This is because, if the second alternative is correct, the inconsistency could be among Pierre's non-qualitative, non-personal beliefs; it could be among those of his beliefs he does not reason from. The singular proposition that London is pretty and its denial, the proposition that London is not pretty, are contradictory. If, as we think they are, they are the objects of Pierre's inconsistent beliefs, then the inconsistency is not one that Pierre is, even in principle, in a position to detect. The second alternative admits them as possible objects of beliefs. But they are not among the beliefs that Pierre can reason from, for they are not among Pierre's qualitative or personal beliefs.

If the second alternative is correct and if I am right about the propositions we reason with, then Pierre can have undetectable, inconsistent beliefs. If Pierre can have undetectable, inconsistent beliefs, then the fact that he is not in a position to spot any inconsistency, is not a reason to think that (L3') is true. Therefore, if the second alternative is correct and if I am right about the propositions that we reason with, then, since there is no longer any

reason to think that each of (L1), (L2), and (L3') is true, Kripke's puzzle has vanished.

We have examined one way of defending the third statement from Lewis's reply. In so doing, we have discovered a solution to at least one of the three parts of Kripke's puzzle. Prior to concentrating exclusively on Kripke's puzzle, let us return to the two major claims that Lewis makes in his commentary. The first of Lewis's two major claims is that Kripke's puzzle refutes the analysis given by (L4), (L5), and (L6). The second major claim is that (L4) and (L5) fail to account for the truth of (L1).

When Lewis asserts that (L4) and (L5) do not account for the truth of (L1), he sets out to prove that if (L1) is true, then one of (L4) or (L5) is false. Let us simply take Lewis's second claim to be the claim he attempts to prove: if (L1) is true, then one of (L4) or (L5) is false.

The discussion above clearly indicates where, according to my view, Lewis's attempt to prove this claim goes astray. I hold that despite the fact that everything Pierre believes at w_b is true at w_b we need not conclude that w_b is one of Pierre's belief worlds. For we need not agree that Pierre believe everything in w_b that he believes in w_r even though his experiences in the two worlds are qualitatively indistinguishable. My view allows me to retain both (L4) and (L5), even though I agree with Lewis about the truth of (L1).

(Let us agree that) I believe that Socrates is wise. The object of my belief is the non-personal, singular proposition that Socrates is wise. Given the mediacy of my connections with Socrates, it should be clear that there is a possible world which is, at least from my perspective,

qualitatively indistinguishable from the actual world but where Socrates never existed. In such a world, I remain disposed to assent to 'Socrates is wise,' and retain all of my actual qualitative and personal beliefs. It makes little sense to say that in such a world I believe the singular proposition that Socrates is wise; in fact, there is little reason to think that such a proposition--a proposition partly constituted by Socrates--even exists at such a world. If the inhabitants of such a world use the name 'Socrates' to designate someone, then, at such a world, the belief exhibited by my disposition to assent to 'Socrates is wise' is a belief whose object is some singular proposition I may not actually believe. For these reasons, I deny that qualitative indistinguishability of experiences guarantees identity of non-qualitative, non-personal beliefs.

When Lewis says that Kripke's puzzle refutes the analysis offered by (L4), (L5), and (L6), he proceeds by arguing that if (L1), (L2), and (L3) are true, then one of (L4), (L5), or (L6) is false. Let us simply take Lewis's first claim to be the conjunctive claim that (L1), (L2), and (L3) are true and if (L1), (L2), and (L3) are true, then one of (L4), (L5), or (L6) is false.

I wish to retain (L4), (L5), and (L6). As previously noted, (L3) admits two distinct interpretations:

(L3') It is a mistake to conclude that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs,

and

(L3'') It is a mistake to conclude that because Pierre has inconsistent beliefs that Pierre is doxastically culpable.

According to my view, although it is true that if (L1), (L2), and (L3') are true, then one of (L4), (L5), or (L6) is false, (L3') is not true. Also according to my view, although it is true that (L1), (L2), and (L3'') are true, it is not true that if (L1), (L2), and (L3'') are true, then one of (L4), (L5), and (L6) is false. My view allows me to reject the conclusion that one of (L4), (L5), or (L6) is false.

Lewis and I reach different conclusions about issues raised by Kripke's puzzle. This is because we hold opposing views about what kinds of beliefs people have and the function of belief ascription sentences whose that-clauses have name sentences for their sentential components. We do, however, seem to agree about the implications of the two views.

Section Three

Let us consider, one part at a time, each of the three parts of Kripke's puzzle. I shall explain how my view can be applied to each part.

The first part of Kripke's puzzle involves Pierre's dispositions toward sentences

(1) Londres est jolie

and

(2) London is not pretty.

Pierre assents to each sentence and, so, we conclude that he believes both that London is pretty and that London is not pretty. He has inconsistent beliefs. He believes both the singular proposition that London is pretty and its denial, the proposition that London is not pretty. Kripke cited two related reasons when he said it is a mistake to

convict Pierre of any inconsistency. First, Pierre is not in principle in a position to spot any inconsistency. Second, Pierre will not infer all that is entailed by the conjunction of the two inconsistent propositions (I say) he believes. Since I hold that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs, I must explain why there is nothing wrong with saying that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs.

I hold that when we reason from our beliefs, we reason from those of our beliefs that are either qualitative beliefs or our own personal beliefs. The set of beliefs that Pierre reasons from is not inconsistent. The inconsistency lies among Pierre's non-qualitative, non-personal beliefs, and that is why he is unable to spot the inconsistency. It is a mistake to think that he is unable to spot any inconsistency because there is none.

This also explains why Pierre will not infer all that is entailed by the pair of contradictory propositions I say he believes. They are neither qualitative nor personal to Pierre. Hence, according to my view, they are not among the premises Pierre reasons from. Little wonder, then, that he will not infer all that they jointly entail.

Kripke's claim that it is a mistake to convict Pierre of any inconsistency may be understood in at least two ways. Understood one way, Kripke is right: Pierre has done nothing doxastically blameworthy; he has neither reasoned incorrectly nor neglected to keep a tidy inventory of what he believes and what his beliefs entail—he has done the best he can do. Understood another way, Kripke is mistaken: Pierre does have inconsistent beliefs.

The second part of Kripke's puzzle involves Pierre's dispositions toward sentences

(1) Londres est jolie

and

(3) London is pretty.

Pierre assents to (1) but he dissents from (3). His assent to (1) leads us to conclude that he believes that London is pretty. His dissent from (3) leads us to conclude that he does not believe that London is pretty. It cannot be the case that Pierre both does and does not believe that London is pretty. Since I accept the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty, I must explain why, in spite of his dissent from (3), it is a mistake to conclude that Pierre does not believe that London is pretty.

If Pierre's decision to dissent from (3) were based on his having considered and deemed false the singular proposition that (3) expresses, then it would be unreasonable not to conclude, from his dissent, that he does not believe that London is pretty. However, he did not decide to dissent from (3) as a result of such reasoning. The proposition that London is pretty is not a qualitative proposition, and it is not one of Pierre's personal propositions. As such, it does not enter into Pierre's deliberations. It cannot be a part of Pierre's reasons either for assenting to (1) or for dissenting from (3). To explain why Pierre has the dispositions he has toward (1) and (3), we must make reference to propositions that Pierre can reason with.

Pierre has the personal belief that the city his friends call 'Londres' is pretty. That personal belief leads him to conclude that (1)

is true and, so, he assents to (1). In addition to his personal belief that the city his friends call 'Londres' is pretty, Pierre has the personal belief that the city his friends call 'London' is not pretty. That personal belief leads him to conclude that (3) is false and, so, he dissents from (3). His decision to dissent from (3) did not stem from his having considered and rejected the singular proposition it expresses.

My view allows me to reject the conclusion that Pierre does not believe that London is pretty, despite Pierre's dissent from (3). In this way it avoids the contradiction that Pierre's behavior seemed to commit us to.

Because I deny that Pierre's dissent from (3) commits us to the conclusion that he does not believe that London is pretty, I am committed to rejecting Kripke's strengthened disquotation principle. Kripke presented that principle as follows:

A normal speaker who is not reticent will be disposed to sincere assent to 'p' if and only if he believes that p. (1979, p. 249)

I must explain why I do not accept this principle.

Kripke calls this principle a strengthened biconditional version of his disquotation principle. I have no doubts that we need something like the weaker disquotation principle: a principle to license the move from dispositions to assent to attributions of belief. But it is a mistake to think we need the "other half" of the strengthened principle: the half implying that belief (held by a speaker who understands the relevant sentence) will manifest itself in assent.

If our dispositions to assent to sentences were always based on reasoning about the propositions they express, then some principle moving

from belief to assent would be called for. However, our dispositions toward name sentences are usually not based on reasoning about the propositions they express. Rather, our dispositions toward name sentences are based on reasoning that involves either qualitative propositions or our own personal propositions. Therefore, when we are considering name sentences and the propositions they express, although we may allow both that withheld assent is evidence of a lack of belief and that dissent is evidence of a disbelief, it would be a mistake to allow either that withheld assent is a guarantee of a lack of belief or that dissent is a guarantee of a disbelief.

The third part of Kripke's puzzle involves Pierre's dispositions toward the following sentences, both before and after he learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate:

- (1) Londres est jolie,
- (2) London is not pretty,
- (3) London is pretty,
- (4) Londres is London,
- (5) Londres is not London,
- (6) London is London,
- (7) London is not London,

and

- (8) Londres is pretty and London is not pretty.

Before he learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, Pierre assents to (1), (2), (5), (6), and (8), and he dissents from (3), (4), and (7). Using Kripke's principles, we infer from Pierre's assents that before he learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, Pierre

believes: that London is pretty; that London is not pretty; that London is not identical with London; that London is identical with London; and that London is pretty and London is not pretty. Using Kripke's principles, we infer from Pierre's dissents that before he learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, Pierre does not believe: that London is pretty; that London is identical with London; and that London is not identical with London.

When Pierre learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, his assent/dissent dispositions will be modified. He will reconsider his dispositions toward (1), (2), and (3). He will acquire a disposition to assent to (4). He will acquire a disposition to dissent from (5). He will continue to assent to (6) and to dissent from (7). Finally, he will acquire a disposition to dissent from (8). A solution to Kripke's puzzle must say what, if any, new beliefs Pierre acquires, or old beliefs he discards, once he discovers that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate.

According to my view, before Pierre learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, he believes each of the singular propositions expressed by (1), (2), (5), (6), and (8). He has inconsistent beliefs. Despite Pierre's dissents from (3), (4), and (7), before he learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, Pierre believes each of the singular propositions expressed by (3), (4), and (7). Each of (3), (4), and (7) expresses a singular proposition expressed by some sentence Pierre assents to. (3), for example, expresses the same singular proposition as (1), and Pierre believes the singular proposition expressed by (1).

'But,' one might object, 'Pierre dissents from (3), (4), and (7). He has reasons for doing so. Finally, he does not believe that he believes

the propositions that they express.'

This is all quite correct. Pierre has, what seem to him to be, good reasons for dissenting from (3), (4), and (7), and he does not believe that he believes the propositions that they express.¹⁴ Pierre dissents from (3) because he believes that the city his friends call 'London' is not pretty. Given his belief that the city his friends call 'London' is not pretty, he certainly has good reasons to believe that (3) expresses a false proposition, and (so far as we know) he has no reason to believe that he believes any false proposition that it might express. Pierre dissents from (4) because he believes both that the city his friends call 'Londres' is pretty and that the city his friends call 'London' is not pretty. He has reasons for believing that (4) expresses a false proposition, and he has no reason to think that he believes any false proposition if might express. Finally, Pierre dissents from (7) because he believes, say, that 'London' and 'London' "codesignate." He has reason to think that (7) expresses a false proposition, and no reason to think that he believes any false proposition it might express.

We have considered Pierre's doxastic state before he learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate. Let us now consider what happens once he discovers that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate.

When Pierre learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, he will: reconsider his dispositions toward (1), (2), and (3); withdraw his assent from (5) and (8); continue to assent to (6); acquire a disposition to assent to (4); and continue to dissent from (7).

Pierre will reconsider (1), (2), and (3) because he believes: that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate; that if 'Londres' and 'London'

codesignate, then (1) is equivalent to (3); and that if 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, then (2) is equivalent to the denial of (1). He also has reason to believe that if he believes both the proposition expressed by (1) and the proposition expressed by (2), then he has inconsistent beliefs. Since he does not want to have inconsistent beliefs, he will set about deciding whether or not London is pretty (or whether or not there is a sense in which one and the same city can be both pretty and non-pretty).

Pierre will withdraw his assent from (5) (alternatively, from (8)) because he now believes both that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate and that if 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, then the proposition expressed by (5) (alternatively, by (8)) is false.

Pierre will remain disposed to assent to (6) because he has been given no reason to believe that it expresses a false proposition (and he still has reason to believe it expresses a true proposition). He will acquire a disposition to assent to (4) because he now believes both that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate and that if 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, then (4) is equivalent to (6).

Finally, Pierre will remain disposed to dissent from (7) because he has been given no reason to believe that it expresses a true proposition (and he still has reason to believe that it expresses a false proposition).

Before he learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, Pierre believes the singular propositions expressed by (1), (2), (5), (6), and (8); he has inconsistent beliefs. Subsequent to his discovery that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, Pierre will withhold his assent to

(1) and (2). Until he straightens things out, it would be premature to say that he believes the singular proposition that London is pretty or that he believes the singular proposition that London is not pretty. He will be disposed to dissent from (5) and will not otherwise behave as if Londres is not identical with London; and, therefore, based on what we know about Pierre, we conclude that he stops believing the singular proposition that Londres is not identical with London. He continues to believe the singular proposition that London is London. Finally, since Pierre is no longer disposed to behave as if Londres is pretty and London is not pretty, and no longer assents to (8), we conclude that he no longer believes the singular proposition that Londres is pretty and London is not pretty.

In Chapter IV, I said that a solution to Kripke's puzzle must explain what, if any, new beliefs Pierre acquires (or old beliefs he discards) when he discovers that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate. I have now done just that.

I have said that (before he learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate) Pierre believes both that London is pretty and that London is not pretty; and, therefore, that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. I have explained why, if the second alternative is correct, and if we reason only from either our qualitative or our personal beliefs, there is nothing wrong with holding that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. I have explained how we can avoid the contradiction entailed by Pierre's dispositions toward (1) and (3) together with Kripke's principles. Finally, I have explained what happens to Pierre's doxastic state when he learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate. In doing these things, I

have given the general outline of a solution to Kripke's puzzle.

Notes

¹In Kripke (1979, p. 257-258). In private conversation Kripke confirmed that these are his reasons for saying that Pierre does not have inconsistent beliefs.

²In Marcus (1981, 1983).

³In Lewis (1981).

⁴These views were discussed in the preceding chapter.

⁵We are assuming that (5) and (8) can count as sentences of English.

⁶There is another problem for this explanation. Had we reasoned to the conclusions that Pierre believes that London is pretty and that Pierre believes that if London is pretty, then New York is pretty via Pierre's assents to English sentences, we would expect him to be able to infer that New York is pretty. But, we reasoned to the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty via his assent to a French sentence, and do not expect him to be able to infer that New York is pretty. The explanation at hand offers nothing to account for this difference in expectations. But, in light of the fact that Pierre's beliefs are the same in both cases, an acceptable explanation must account for such a difference.

⁷Of course, this does not follow from (L5); it follows when the semantics Lewis has in mind are extended, in the usual way, to handle negations.

⁸In Lewis (1981, p. 286).

⁹It should be clear from these two passages that Lewis has Pierre in w_b . Of course, Lewis's own "official view" is that Pierre is not in w_b ,

rather one of Pierre's counterparts is in w_b . Lewis is careful to present his case so that it does not depend on his own official view.

¹⁰This is taken up on page 156.

¹¹The sort of non-qualitative beliefs I have in mind are beliefs whose object are singular propositions which are not personal to the believer. This is discussed in detail starting on page 153. The claim itself is considered on pages 156.

¹²We might want to allow that a proposition, p , is personal to a person, x , (at his current time, t , and in his current location, l), just in case (i) p is a singular proposition and (ii) either (a) x is the sole individual constituent of p or (b) either x and t , or x and l , or x , t , and l are the sole individual constituents of p .

¹³Suppose that Pierre says, 'I am wise,' and that he sees a man, dubs him 'Peter,' judges him unwise, and says, 'Peter is not wise,' when, unbeknownst to Pierre, he is the man he is seeing. Apparently, Pierre believes both that he is wise and that he is not wise. As I have characterized personal beliefs, Pierre seems to have inconsistent personal beliefs; nevertheless, Pierre is in no position to spot the inconsistency.

Such an example points out a defect in my characterization of a personal belief. A belief can be non-personal even though its object is one of the believer's own personal propositions, but only the believer's personal propositions can be objects of his personal beliefs. In addition to having one of the believer's own personal propositions for its object, a personal belief is a belief such that its believer is disposed to use sentence ' $\phi(I)$,' where ' $\phi(I)$ ' is a sentence that contains

at least one occurrence of the personal pronoun 'I,' contains no other non-descriptive singular terms that designate the believer, and is such that if used by the believer, it would express the personal proposition which is the belief's object.

By this definition, one of Pierre's two beliefs, namely his belief that he is not wise, is not a personal belief. Pierre is not disposed to assent to 'I am not wise.' As such an example does not enter into the issues we are discussing, I will continue to use the original definition in the main body of the text.

¹⁴That is, for example, Pierre does not believe this: that he believes the proposition that (3) expresses. It is not to say that Pierre does not believe this: that he believes the proposition that London is pretty.

CHAPTER V

BELIEF, LINGUISTIC BEHAVIOR, AND PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT

In this chapter three views about the connection between belief, linguistic behavior, and propositional content are compared: what I call "the naive view,"¹ what I call "the Russellean view," and my own view. I show how the view I hold can be applied to the problem of significant, true, identity sentences and to the problem of the apparent failure of the substitutivity of codesignating names. Finally, I explain why I prefer my view, and the solution it affords to Kripke's puzzle, to the sort of view, and solution, that Lewis apparently favors.

Section One

Each of the three views about the connection between belief, linguistic behavior, and propositional content consists of two theses. According to the naive view, when a speaker uses a name sentence, and thereby succeeds in expressing a proposition, the proposition he expresses is a singular proposition partly constituted by the object(s) designated by the name(s) contained in the sentence he uses. Also according to the naive view, such a speaker says what he says because he believes the singular proposition he thereby expresses; that very proposition was directly involved in the deliberations that led him to use the sentence he used.

According to the Russellean view, when such a speaker uses a name sentence, he thereby expresses some qualitative proposition, not a

singular proposition. Also according to the Russellean picture, such a speaker says what he says because he believes the qualitative proposition he thereby expresses.

I hold that when such a speaker uses a name sentence, he thereby expresses a singular proposition partly constituted by the object(s) designated by the name(s) contained in the sentence he uses. In addition, I hold that such a speaker says what he says because of his qualitative and personal beliefs; and not because he believes the singular proposition he thereby expresses. The singular proposition he expresses played no role in the deliberations, reasonings, or thought processes that led him to use the sentence he used.

The naive view and the Russellean view are at odds over both the propositions speakers express by their uses of name sentences and the propositions on the mind of speakers when they use name sentences. I agree with the naive picture about the propositions speakers express by their uses of name sentences, and I agree with the Russellean picture about the beliefs on the minds of speakers when they use name sentences.²

Note that, despite their disagreement over both the propositions speakers express by their uses of name sentences and the propositions on the mind of speakers who use name sentences, the naive view and the Russellean view agree about this: when a speaker uses a name sentence he does so because he believes the proposition he thereby expresses. Against the naive view and the Russellean view, I hold that it is generally not the case that when a speaker uses a name sentence, he does so because he believes the proposition he thereby expresses.

Recall that, in Chapter I, I said that our uses of name sentences generate two distinct questions: First, what kind of proposition, singular or qualitative, is expressed by an ordinary use of a sentence that contains a proper name? Second, what kind of belief is ordinarily on the mind of a speaker when he uses a sentence that contains a proper name? Each of the three views offers its own answer to each of these questions. Recall that I also maintained that we have been ill-served by our failure to observe the distinction between the two questions and misled by the assumption that when we answer the first question we have, thereby, also answered the second question. That distinction is carefully preserved under the view I favor, and I have explicitly denied that when we answer the first question we have, thereby, answered the second question.

Our tendency to conflate the two questions is what gives force to at least two of the major problems for the Millian theory of names. These are the problem of significant, true, identity sentences and the problem of the apparent failure of the substitutivity of codesignating names.

Section Two

The problem of significant, true, identity sentences is of interest to us for two reasons. First, it is one of the major problems confronting the Millian theory of names. Second, when Kripke raised his puzzle about belief, he explicitly linked the puzzle to the general problem of the apparent failure of substitutivity of codesignating names--which problem may be regarded as the genus of which the problem of

significant, true, identity sentences is a species.³ A solution to Kripke's puzzle might, therefore, be expected to have application to these problems.

Suppose that Smith is our speaker, and that Smith assents to

(1) Hesperus is Hesperus

but dissents from, or withholds assent to,

(2) Hesperus is Phosphorus.

According to the Millian theory, since 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' codesignate, (1) and (2) express the same proposition. Still, (1) and (2) seem to differ in cognitive significance. (1) is (nearly) cognitively insignificant, or trivial, whereas (2) is cognitively significant, or non-trivial. Even one so sympathetic to the Millian theory as Kripke concedes as much, when he writes:

My view [is] that the English sentence 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' could sometimes be used to raise an empirical issue while 'Hesperus is Hesperus' could not. (1980a, p. 20)

The problem confronting the Millian is this: to explain how two sentences which express the same proposition can differ in cognitive significance.

This problem is especially acute when the Millian theory is teamed with the naive picture of the connection between belief, linguistic behavior, and propositional content. According to the explanation most naturally recommended by the naive picture, when Smith assents to (1), he does so because he believes the singular proposition that (1) expresses; and, also according to the naive picture, when Smith dissents from, or withholds his assents to (2), he does so because he does not believe the singular proposition that (2) expresses. This sort of explanation seems

adequate when the sentences involved express different propositions; however, it collapses when, as in the case of (1) and (2), the sentences in question express the same proposition. The Millian needs a better explanation.

A better explanation is offered by my view. According to my view, two sentences can express the same singular proposition, or have the same propositional content, even when the reasons sufficient for a speaker to assent to the one are not sufficient for the same speaker to assent to the other. Smith need only acquire the nearly trivial qualitative belief that the celestial body called 'Hesperus' is the celestial body called 'Hesperus' to be ready to assent to (1). But he will not assent to (2) until he acquires such a qualitative belief as the belief that the celestial body called 'Hesperus' is identical with the celestial body called 'Phosphorus.' This second qualitative belief is far more significant than the first one. When we understand that we assent to sentences which express singular propositions only because of our qualitative (or personal) beliefs, we can see our way toward being Millians while at the same time acknowledging that sentences like (1) and (2) differ in cognitive significance. The cognitive significance of sentences that express singular propositions is to be understood in terms of the qualitative (or personal) beliefs required for sincere, reflective assent. The qualitative (or personal) beliefs required for sincere, reflective assent to (1) are far less significant than the qualitative (or personal) beliefs required for sincere, reflective assent to (2).

My view suggests a promising approach to the problem of significant, true, identity sentences. Let us now see how it applies to the general

problem of the apparent failure of substitutivity of codesignating names.

Since the problem of significant, true, identity sentences is a special case of the problem of the apparent failure of substitutivity, it is reasonable to expect: (i) that the phenomena involved in the two kinds of cases is similar; (ii) that the explanation offered by the naive picture fails for similar reasons; and (iii) that the explanation given in terms of my view is similar to the one already given in the case of significant, true, identity sentences.

Let us suppose that Smith is our speaker and that Smith is disposed to assent to

(3) Hesperus is visible,

but disposed to dissent from, or withhold assent to,

(4) Phosphorus is visible.

According to the Millian theory, since 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' name the same thing, (3) and (4) express the same proposition. The problem facing the Millian is this: to explain how two sentences which express the same proposition could be such that a speaker who is disposed to assent to the one is not disposed to assent to the other. Clearly, this problem is similar to the problem posed by significant, true, identity sentences.

The explanation most naturally suggested by the naive picture goes as follows. Smith is disposed to assent to (3) because he believes the singular proposition that (3) expresses. He is not disposed to assent to (4) because he does not yet believe the singular proposition it expresses. As in the case of significant, true, identity sentences, this explanation gets by when the sentences involved express distinct singular

propositions. But, as in the case of significant, true, identity sentences, the explanation collapses when, as in the case of (3) and (4), the sentences involved express the same proposition. Again, the Millian is in the market for a better explanation.

Such an explanation is provided by my view. According to my view, a person's reasons for assenting to (3) may differ from his reasons for assenting to (4), despite the fact that (3) and (4) express the same proposition. Once Smith acquires the qualitative belief that the celestial body called 'Hesperus' is visible, he will be ready to assent to (3); still, he need not be ready to assent to (4). Smith will withhold his assent to (4) until he acquires such a qualitative belief as the belief that the celestial body called 'Phosphorus' is visible. Certainly, a person could come to believe that the celestial body called 'Hesperus' is visible without thereby coming to believe that the celestial body called 'Phosphorus' is visible. The view adopted here allows us to explain apparent failures of substitutivity without forsaking the Millian theory. Such apparent failures are merely apparent, and not genuine, failures of the substitutivity of codesignating proper names.

The view I hold points the way toward solutions of the problems raised by significant, true, identity sentences and by apparent failures of substitutivity. My view suggests that certain well-known puzzles involving belief and proper names result from our failure to realize that we use belief ascription sentences to perform two distinct, though related, functions. First we use belief ascription sentences to characterize the mental state of the (alleged) believer, to name the

propositions he has before his mind, the propositions he reasons with. This is the normal function of belief ascription sentences whose that-clauses name qualitative propositions. Second, we use belief ascription sentences to say something about the way in which the (alleged) believer's mental state connects with, hooks into, or matches up to objects in the world. This is the normal function of belief ascription sentences whose that-clauses name singular propositions.

We have shown a tendency to let our thinking about beliefs whose objects are qualitative (or personal) propositions influence our thinking about beliefs whose objects are singular (non-personal) propositions. For example, we think that a person who has inconsistent qualitative (or personal) beliefs is, at least in principle, in a position to detect the inconsistency. This influences our thinking about beliefs whose objects are singular (non-personal) propositions. Hence, when a speaker affirms both that Hesperus is visible and that Phosphorus is not visible and we think he is not, even in principle, in a position to see that he has inconsistent beliefs, we conclude that he does not have inconsistent beliefs. This, in turn, leads us to conclude that, contrary to the Millian theory of the meaning of proper names, (3) and (4) express different propositions. If, however, my view is correct, we need not accept either conclusion. For, according to my view, when a speaker performs a speech act using a sentence that expresses a singular proposition, he does so because of his qualitative (or personal) beliefs.

If the position developed here is correct, then some of what has been taken for data that decisively refutes the Millian theory can be regarded as data that must be taken into account in reforming our views about the

connection between belief, linguistic behavior, and propositional content. We must not take it for granted that when speakers use sentences that contain proper names, they do so because they believe the singular propositions they thereby express. The belief on the mind of a speaker when he uses a sentence that contains a proper name is rarely, if ever, a belief whose object is the singular proposition he thereby expresses.

Section Three

In Chapter IV, we considered two radically opposed views about what kinds of propositions people believe and the function of belief ascription sentences whose that-clauses contain proper names. According to the view (apparently) favored by Lewis, the objects of beliefs are qualitative propositions and such belief ascription sentences are ordinarily used to attribute qualitative beliefs. In my view, we believe both personal and non-personal singular propositions, in addition to qualitative propositions, and such belief ascription sentences are ordinarily used to attribute non-qualitative (non-personal) beliefs. In this section, I will explain why I prefer my view to its rival.

I have the following intuition: that there are two possible worlds w_1 and w_2 , and a person, x , such that: x inhabits both w_1 and w_2 ; for x , w_1 and w_2 are qualitatively indistinguishable; everything x believes at w_1 is true at w_1 ; but not everything x believes at w_2 is true at w_2 . I prefer my view over its rival in part because my view does, whereas its rival does not, preserve this intuition.

Because w_1 and w_2 are qualitatively indistinguishable for x , x has all and only the same qualitative beliefs in w_1 and w_2 . Since w_1 and w_2 are qualitatively indistinguishable for x , and every qualitative proposition x believes at w_1 is true at w_1 (recall that everything x believes at w_1 is true at w_1), every qualitative proposition x believes at w_2 is true at w_2 . If the view Lewis prefers were correct, then, since x could believe only qualitative propositions, and every qualitative proposition x believes at w_2 is true at w_2 , everything x believes at w_2 is true at w_2 .

In this way the view Lewis prefers is hostile to my reported intuition. My view is not. It allows that x believes both personal and non-personal singular propositions. Therefore, while all of x 's qualitative beliefs are true at w_2 it does not follow that everything x believes at w_2 is true at w_2 .

I also have an intuition about the role played by singular propositions in our understanding and evaluation of uses of belief ascription sentences whose that-clauses contain proper names. Suppose that Jones uses this sentence:

(5) Smith believes that Hesperus is visible,
to issue a report on Smith's doxastic state. I have the following intuition about Jones's use of (5): when Jones used (5), what he said is true if and only if Smith has as an object of one of his beliefs a proposition which is true if and only if the singular proposition that Hesperus is visible is true. My intuition assigns the singular proposition that Hesperus is visible a central role in our understanding and evaluation of Jones's use of (5).

This is not to deny that when so understood such reports may be either misleading or incomplete. They may be misleading in that they give rise to false expectations. They may be incomplete in that they leave out some significant information.

For example, suppose that Jones is speaking to Brown when Jones uses (5). In my view, Jones thereby attributes to Smith a belief whose object is the singular proposition that Hesperus is visible. If Brown understands and accepts what Jones had said, Brown will attribute the same belief to Smith. Suppose that Smith does not believe that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' codesignate, and that he is disposed to assent to

(3) Hesperus is visible

but not to

(4) Phosphorus is visible.

Brown knows that the two names codesignate; however, he does not know that Smith does not believe that they codesignate. He expects Smith to be disposed to assent to (3) and to (4).

In this way, Jones's report has given rise to a false expectation. There is a sense in which the report is misleading. If Jones is aware that Smith does not believe that the two names codesignate and also believes that Brown is not, then Jones should complete his report by adding that information. This in no way suggests that my intuition about our understanding and evaluation of Jones's use of (5) is defective. Any information Jones adds to fill in his report will be consistent with his attributing to Smith a belief that has as its object a proposition that

is true if and only if the singular proposition that Hesperus is visible is true.⁴

It is by no means clear that my view's rival can be developed in a way that preserves this intuition. My view preserves it directly. This is another reason why I prefer my view.

It is far from clear that my view's rival can be developed in a way that avoids every version of the Attitude-Context Objection.⁵ Any number of qualitative beliefs might give rise to a person's linguistic behavior. The view Lewis favors must be developed so that a person who attributes a belief somehow selects and expresses (one of) the correct qualitative proposition(s) among the many that might have given rise to the behavior which is the attribution's basis. Perhaps a bit of semantic machinery can be devised to make the truth-conditions of a belief ascription made in a carefully described situation dependent on (one of) the correct qualitative proposition(s). But, if the view Lewis favors were correct, people who report on the beliefs of others would somehow manage to select and express (one of) the correct qualitative propositions. A semantic device which succeeded in identifying (one of) the correct qualitative proposition(s) would not thereby explain how we do it. Yet, if the view Lewis favors is correct, we do it often and with little effort. I favor my view over its rival in part because (unlike its rival) my view clearly avoids the Attitude-Context Objection, and also in part, because (unlike my view) its rival requires that we frequently exercise skills I think we lack.

The final reason I favor my view over its rival is that unlike its rival, my view admits solutions to Kripke's puzzle and related problems

which preserve the Millian theory of proper names. If the description theory is false--and we have reasons to think it is--then, until a new theory comes along, the Millian theory is the only theory we have.

Notes

¹The naive view is discussed in some detail in Stalnaker (1979, p. 1-5).

²In this regard, Russell wrote:

. . . the thought in the mind of a person using a proper name correctly can generally only be expressed explicitly if we replace the proper name by a [definite] description. (1912, p. 54)

³See Kripke (1980a, p. 251, 253-254, and 267).

⁴An opponent might counter that Jones could very well follow his use of (5) with a use of

(6) But Smith does not believe that Phosphorus is visible.

My intuition is so strong that I would conclude either that Jones has inferred too much from Smith's withheld assent to (4) or that Jones's should be interpreted non-literally. I would ask him what he meant, and hope that he would not say, 'I meant just what I said.'

⁵See Chapter I, page 11.

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