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Latin American diplomacy and the Central American peace process : the Contadora and Esquipulas II cases.

Mary Kathryn Meyer
University of Massachusetts Amherst

LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PEACE PROCESS: THE CONTADORA AND ESQUIPULAS II CASES

A Dissertation Presented

by

MARY KATHRYN MEYER

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Approved as to style and content by:

Howard J. Wiarda, Chairperson

Eric Einhorn, Member

Paul Dosal, Member

George Suizner, Department Head
Department of Political Science

For my mother and father, in loving memory

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ABSTRACT

LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PEACE PROCESS: THE CONTADORA AND ESQUIPULAS II CASES

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MARY KATHRYN MEYER, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA

M.A., UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA

PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by: Professor Howard J. Wiarda

The purpose of this study is to examine the Contadora and Esquipulas phases of the Central American peace process of the 1980s as inter-related case studies that provide important insights into the interests, capabilities, and limits of contemporary Latin American diplomacy and foreign policy making. By reconstructing and analyzing the diplomacy of the regional peace process, this study seeks to understand why it persisted for as long as it did despite tremendous political obstacles and expectations of failure. This study shows that the peace process is rooted in the diplomatic traditions of Latin America, but it emerged and persisted because of the development of the new interests, capabilities, and diplomatic innovations of several Latin American states.

To understand the lessons of the Central American peace process, this work opens with the study of the traditions and historical development of Latin American diplomacy through the 1970s and up to the emergence of political crisis and war in Central America. Then it focuses on reconstructing the significant phases

and diplomatic events of the Contadora and Esquipulas peace processes and examines their central documents. Finally, it analyzes the specific foreign policy interests, capabilities, and contributions of four states actively involved in the peace process, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica, in order to understand the nature of contemporary Latin American diplomacy and its import to both the persistence of the peace process and the future of inter-American relations.

This study's primary level of analysis is at the inter-regional level, focusing on Latin American diplomacy, however, factors at the systemic and societal levels of analysis also receive considerable attention. The data used comes from both primary and secondary sources and includes interviews by the author with several Nicaraguan and Costa Rican diplomats actively involved in the peace process, including former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, who won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. In the end, this study seeks a deeper understanding and appreciation of the foreign policy interests and diplomatic capabilities of our Latin American neighbors.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On January 8 and 9, 1983, the foreign ministers of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama met on the Panamanian island of Contadora to discuss several issues of mutual concern, but the focus of their talks centered on the deteriorating political and military situation in Central America. After having developed growing interests in and ties to the isthmian region during the 1970s, the four states meeting at Contadora had become alarmed at the deepening civil wars and political violence in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala in the early 1980s. Not only were these internal conflicts becoming increasingly bloody; they also threatened to spill over national borders. Increased numbers of refugees, emerging border conflicts, and the growing militarization of the region with the help of outside powers meant that the region's civil conflicts were taking on ominous international dimensions. The renewal of the cold war and a reassertive United States in its traditional sphere of influence complicated the regional crisis while the peacekeeping mechanisms of the Organization of American States (OAS), which was itself in crisis, were incapable of dealing with Central America's deepening wars. The four foreign ministers meeting at Contadora called on the Central Americans to find some framework for negotiations to resolve their internal and inter-state conflicts. Before long, this call for dialogue and peace evolved

into an ongoing peace process that persisted through the end of the decade.

The Central American peace process that emerged after January 1983 had three major phases. The first was the Contadora phase, lasting from January 1983 to April 1987. In this phase, the Contadora Group countries (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama) persisted in their efforts to encourage and mediate negotiations aimed at containing and resolving the Central Americans' conflicts. Through the Contadora peace process, the Contadora Group states sought to provide a shelter of diplomacy in the midst of war so that the Central Americans could find a formula for regional peace and demilitarization. The Contadora Group mediated the negotiation of three different versions of an agreement --the Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America-- aimed at achieving these goals despite insurmountable obstacles, including the hostility of the United States, the intransigence and stalemate of the Central Americans, and the serious economic and debt crises the Contadora Group states faced in the 1980s. The Contadora Group's persistence in the face of these obstacles provides significant lessons about the foreign policy interests, political will, and diplomatic skills of these states. While other studies of the Contadora peace process have focused on explaining why it failed, we will try to understand why it persisted for so long and how it laid the groundwork for the subsequent phases of the Central American peace process.

The second phase of the regional peace process, the Esquipulas phase, overlapped Contadora as it emerged with the inauguration of

Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo in January 1986. Its highpoint came in August 1987 at the second formal summit meeting of the five Central American presidents in the small town of Esquipulas, Guatemala, a town known historically as the destination of pilgrimages by the faithful seeking miracles from its Black Christ. If the second Esquipulas summit was not exactly miraculous, it was successful in finally producing an agreement, inspired by Costa Rica's President Oscar Arias, that allowed the five Central American presidents to embark on a new process of internal national reconciliations, democratization, and regional peace and cooperation. While fulfilling all the commitments of the Esquipulas II agreement --the Esquipulas II Procedure for Establishing a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America-- would prove difficult, those commitments (among other factors) facilitated the internal process of national reconciliation, cease fire talks, and democratization that eventually led to the end of the contra war in Nicaragua in 1990. The diplomatic commitments of the Esquipulas II summit and its five subsequent presidential summits also played a role (along with other factors) in bringing the Salvadoran government and its revolutionary opposition to yet a third negotiating table under the auspices of the United Nations secretary general's office, culminating in a cease fire agreement in El Salvador's long civil war in January 1992.

The third phase of the Central American peace process takes us outside of the realm of inter-state diplomacy as it centers on the

internal peace processes of the individual Central American states, particularly those of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and (less successfully) Guatemala. The analysis of this phase will have to await future research. Instead, the focus of this study is on the emergence, persistence, and meaning of the Latin American diplomatic response to the inter-state conflicts in Central America in the 1980s. More specifically, the purpose of this study is to examine the Contadora and Esquipulas phases of the Central American peace process as inter-related case studies that provide insights into the interests, capabilities, and limits of contemporary Latin American diplomacy and foreign policy making.

The Contadora and Esquipulas phases of the Central American peace process are rooted in the traditions of Latin American diplomacy. These traditions include the nineteenth century practice of diplomatic unity in the face of threats from outside powers and the twentieth century challenges by Latin American states to United States hegemony and interventionism in the circum-Caribbean region. The diplomacy of the Central American peace process also stems from divergent interests between Latin American states and the United States over the uses of the Organization of American States (OAS) and from longstanding weaknesses of OAS mechanisms of conflict resolution when significant U.S. interests were involved. Existing studies of the Central American peace process (the vast majority of which focus on the Contadora phase alone) fail to take this diplomatic history into account --to their detriment.

Beyond these traditions, the Contadora and Esquipulas peace processes also indicate several innovations in contemporary Latin American diplomacy and new lessons for understanding the role of Latin American states in regional and world affairs. The Contadora peace process developed out of the desire of the Contadora Group states to protect their emergent subhegemonic interests in the circum-Caribbean region that were based on growing economic, political, and cultural ties. Contadora also represents an increased willingness and capacity of the Contadora Group states to play a more active role in regional and international affairs. If the multilateralism of the Contadora process was not entirely new, the persistent and skillfull diplomacy of the Contadora states throughout the complex negotiating process was. The Contadora Group states were able to persuade the Central Americans to embark on regional talks and kept them involved for several years. Even though the political stalemate between the Central Americans over verification procedures and timetables for demilitarization prevented the finalization of the Contadora Act, the Contadora states succeeded in keeping open the political space for dialogue and the peaceful resolution of conflict in a region rent by war and pressured by outsiders for bigger military build-ups. That political space allowed the Esquipulas phase of the peace process to emerge.

It is unlikely that the Esquipulas phase of the regional peace process could have emerged without the previous mediation efforts of the Contadora Group states and their continued support for regional

peace talks. But the Esquipulas phase, which has yet to be studied seriously in North America, also provides new lessons about the nature of contemporary regional diplomacy. Guatemala's President Cerezo initiated a new forum for discussion by inviting the Central American presidents to face-to-face meetings in Esquipulas. Costa Rica's President Arias later presented a new and simpler plan for regional peace (leaving Contadora's complex demilitarization talks for the future) that the five presidents themselves could negotiate successfully. Several more presidential summits followed the Esquipulas II meeting. The summit diplomacy of the Esquipulas phase was an unprecedented and innovative means by which the Central American presidents could come to know and respect each other, understand each other's positions, and find a workable formula for achieving regional peace and cooperation.

To understand these and other lessons of the Central American peace process, we will study the traditions and historical development of Latin American diplomacy through the 1970s and up to the emergence of the regional peace process. We will then reconstruct the significant phases and events of the Contadora and Esquipulas peace processes and analyze their central documents. Finally, we will analyze more closely the foreign policy interests, capabilities, and contributions of four states actively involved in the peace process --Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica-- in order to understand the nature of contemporary Latin American diplomacy and its import both to the persistence of the peace process and to the future of inter-American relations.

Our historical analysis will devote particular attention to the factors at three levels of analysis that have influenced events. Our primary focus is at the inter-regional level and our primary interest is Latin American regional diplomacy. In other words, we hope to understand how Latin American states have related to each other at the regional level, both historically and during the Central American peace process. Yet factors at two other levels of analysis are also important for our study and will receive attention. Following James Rosenau's (1976) classification, these are the systemic (or international) and the societal (or domestic) levels of analysis. At the systemic level we will consider the international political factors that have influenced events and shaped Latin American diplomacy over the years, including threats from European powers during the formative nineteenth century, relations with the United States as it emerged as a regional and international power, and relations within regional and international organizations such as the OAS and the United Nations. This level will also be important for understanding the role of U.S. policies toward Central America during the 1980s and the Contadora Group's diplomatic response to them. At the societal level, we will try to understand the internal or domestic political factors that have shaped both the foreign policy making process and ultimately the diplomacy of the states involved in the peace process. By devoting attention to these three levels of analysis, we hope to gain a fuller understanding of the emergence, persistence, and meaning of the Central American peace process.

The data used and analyzed in this study come from both primary and secondary sources, but a special effort has been made to include and at times favor the writings of Latin Americans. Indeed, in recent years there has been a virtual explosion of works from Latin America on the region's foreign policy and diplomacy (e.g., Muñoz, ed., 1988, 1987, 1986; Puig, ed., 1984; Hirst, 1987; Tomassini, 1981; and others). The richness of this material is in itself an excellent topic for study, and parts of a preliminary analysis are provided in Chapters IV and VIII. These Latin American works are also good sources for information on regional events and actors (and often documents) not readily available in the United States. Beyond these works, the primary sources used in this study include the writings and speeches of nineteenth and early twentieth century political figures from both Latin America and the United States as well as treaties and other historical public documents focusing on pre-World War II inter-American relations. Most of these sources can be found in collections or anthologies published in Latin America or the United States (see e.g., Alvarez, 1924; Lecuna and Bierck, 1951; Dozer, 1966; Gantenbein, 1950).

Primary sources relating to more recent events, particularly the Central American peace process, include numerous documents (communiques, information bulletins) produced by the Contadora Group, the three versions of the Contadora Act, and the Esquipulas II Procedure. These and other official sources can be found in various North American and Latin American collections (e.g., Bagley et al, 1985; Muñoz, ed., 1988;) or in Latin American periodicals

(e.g., Revista del Pensamiento Centroamericano, Relaciones Internacionales, and Integración Latinoamericano). More importantly, valuable interviews by this author with several Central American diplomats actively involved in the peace process, such as Alejandro Bendaña, José León Talavera, and Dennis Torres in Managua in June 1990, and Luís Guillermo Solis and President Oscar Arias in San José in January 1991, provide crucial first-hand insights into the Contadora and especially the Esquipulas phases. Other primary sources include newspapers (especially the New York Times) in the United States and Central America that further document regional events and the course of the peace process during the 1980s.

Secondary sources used tend to focus on the more historical aspects of our topic, but along with trying to favor the Latin American voice, special attention has been devoted to including the "classics" of Latin American or inter-American history, such as Atkins, (1989) Gil (1971), Inman (1965), Karnes (1976), Langley (1985), Munro (1964), Perkins (1966), Pérez (1983), Ronning (1963), Schmidt (1971), Schneider (1958), Slater (1970), and Woodward (1976). The secondary sources relating to the Contadora process, such as Bagley and Tokatlian (1987), Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, eds., (1985) and Drekonja-Kornat (1985), are cited mainly for the specific dates or other hard to find data on events and to provide the reader with citations of alternative studies relating to the course of the early years of the Contadora peace process. Finally, other secondary sources on the Contadora phase of the peace process, particularly by North Americans, such as Bagley (1986),

Arnson (1987), Purcell (1985), Farer (1985), Goodfellow (1987), Karl (1986), and others, are used as much for their negative views on the prospects for Contadora's success as for the information on the peace process they contain. For indeed, as noted above, most North American works on the Contadora phase of the peace process seek to explain how or why the Contadora mediation was failing. Few seemed interested in explaining how or why it was persisting.

Thus, in the coming chapters, our study will proceed in the following way. In Chapter II, the formative period of Latin American diplomacy from the 1820s through the 1880s will be studied. We will see how and why nineteenth century Latin American diplomacy turned repeatedly to the use of multilateral conferences --or congresses-- aimed at protecting the weak states of the region from great power intervention. In Chapter III, the period between 1889 and the 1930s will be covered. Of special interest here is the development of Latin American views and diplomatic responses to U.S. policies in the circum-Caribbean region during the transformation of the Monroe Doctrine from a defensive policy statement to a rationale for intervention. Moreover, we will also study the development of inter-American institutions and conferences during this period and related Latin American diplomacy to press for the U.S. acceptance of the non-intervention principle, which finally came with the Good Neighbor Policy in 1933. We will also find that earlier in this century, three Latin American states undertook a mediation effort (the ABC Mediation) that provides a little studied but interesting precedent for the Contadora mediation.

In Chapter IV, the post-World War II period of inter-American relations will be studied with special attention devoted to the rise and demise of the OAS system. We will see how divergent interests between the United States and Latin America over the nature of the OAS system (i.e., both the OAS and Rio Pact institutions) created early weaknesses that limited its ability to resolve the region's conflicts, especially when U.S. cold war interests were involved. Aside from a brief period in the early 1960s, the OAS system was never as solid as it seemed, creating a degree of dissatisfaction by Latin Americans that led to several attempts to reform its institutions in the each of the post war decades. Moreover, by the mid 1970s this dissatisfaction (along with other factors) led several Latin American states to turn to other international forums to press their foreign policy interests (namely, economic development and reduced dependency). In the process, these states developed a new presence in international affairs, a new foreign policy activism, and new diplomatic skills. The inability of the OAS system to deal with the emerging political and military crises in Central America in the early 1980s and the increased propensity of some Latin American governments to coordinate their foreign policy strategies and work outside the OAS system to secure their interests are directly relevent to the emergence of the Contadora peace process in 1983.

In Chapter V, we will look at the emergence of political violence and civil war in Central America in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. With deep roots in the past and revolutionary

implications, the civil wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala were soon caught up in the reemergent cold war of the time. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the regional and extra-regional players that were involved and their respective positions on the deepening political and military crises in Central America. We will also see how international calls for peace in the region led to the first meeting of the Contadora peace process.

In Chapters VI and VII, we will reconstruct and analyze the course of the Central American peace process from the first Contadora meeting in January 1983 through the Esquipulas summits. The Contadora phase can be broken down and studied in five stages: (1) Initial Optimism and the Constitution of the Contadora Framework for Peace (January 1983-January 1984); (2) The First Draft of the Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America (February-October 1984); (3) The Second Draft of the Contadora Act (November 1984-December 1985); (4) Stalemate and the Third Draft of the Contadora Act (January-June 1986 and beyond); and (5) the transition to the Esquipulas phase. The Esquipulas phase will be considered in two stages: (1) The Arias Plan and the Esquipulas II Procedure, and (2) the Post Esquipulas II summits.

In Chapter VIII our focus shifts to analyzing and comparing the particular foreign policy interests and diplomatic capabilities of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica. We will look more closely at the emergence of a greater international activism by these states since the 1970s and the related development of diplomatic skills that were significant in driving the peace process

onward during the 1980s. We will also compare the contributions and limits of these states as they participated in the Contadora and Esquipulas phases. Of special interest here is gaining some insights into these states' foreign policy making processes and evaluating their degree of exercising what Puig (1975/76) has called "relative autonomy." Finally, in Chapter XI, we will discuss the lessons of the Central American peace process for understanding the nature of Latin American diplomacy in the 1980s as well as the implications for the inter-American system into the 1990s. By proceeding in this way, it is hoped that we can gain a deeper understanding and appreciation of the foreign policy interests and diplomatic capabilities of our Latin American neighbors.

CHAPTER II

NINETEENTH CENTURY FOUNDATIONS OF LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC UNITY

> "I shall tell you with what we must provide ourselves in order to expel the Spanish and to found a free government. It is union, obviously; but such a union will come about through sensible planning and well-directed actions rather than by divine magic."
> Simón Bolívar, from the "Jamaica Letter," September 6, 1815.[1]

The Contadora and Esquipulas peace processes constitute important and meaningful examples of Latin American diplomatic initiative, expertise, and concertación (harmonization) in the face of what the participating states perceived to be a series of foreign threats to their national interests and security. Yet contrary to the assertions of some observers and participants,[2] the Contadora and Esquipulas diplomatic initiatives were not the first such examples. In fact, there is a long history of active Latin American diplomatic solidarity and cooperation when confronted with foreign military threats and interventionism from outside powers. This diplomatic history of Latin American unity in the face of foreign threats is tangled up with the seemingly contradictory Bolivarian aspirations of continental confederation versus the absolute independence and sovereignty of individual Latin American states during the nineteenth century. In this chapter, we shall attempt to untangle the Bolivarian meaning of Latin American

unity, show its decidedly foreign affairs orientation, and tell the story of Latin American diplomacy during the formative nineteenth century.

Spanish-American Confederative Ideas at Independence

The idea of unity to win the independence and defend the sovereignty of the emerging sister republics in Spanish America was integral to the labor of the independence movement itself. By 1810 arguments stressing the consanguineous bonds between Spanish-Americans were well-established in many provincial capitals, where calls for unity and confederation to create a great American "family of brothers" inflected the incipient creole nationalism. For independence leaders like the Chilean Juan Egaña, the Honduran José Cecilio del Valle, and many others, ties of blood and identity rooted in a common history of conquest and colonial tutelage, strengthened by common bonds of language, religion, law, social custom, and a shared perception of the uniqueness of el pueblo americano: All seemed to bind the restive Spanish-American provinces into natural political union (Moreno Pino, 1977: 33, 37; Davis, 1977a: 69-70).

In addition to such inward-looking arguments based in the presumed consanguinity of the emerging sister republics, Juan Egaña and others also developed the argument that Spanish-American union was necessary for the mutual defense against European attacks. This more outward-looking consideration was

particularly strong in Santiago de Chile, where one member of the governing junta, Juan Martínez de Rosas, argued in his Catecismo Político Cristiano (1810) for the confederation of the Spanish colonies of South America in order to expel all foreign domination. Meanwhile, another Chilean document of 1810, the Declaración de los Derechos del Pueblo de Chile, called for a congress of the nations of America[3] for their organization and strengthening, and looked forward to the day when "America's voice, meeting in congress...and speaking to the rest of the world, would impose respect" (Moreno Pino, 1977: 33, 36-37).

After 1810 both arguments served to unify South American independence forces in the political and military campaigns against Spain. But as the final independence battles drew near in the early to mid-1820s, centrifugal forces also appeared to disprove the assumption that the former colonial provinces shared unbreakable bonds of natural kinship and community. After centuries of administrative and commercial centralization by Spain, the reality was that isolated provincial capitals, each with distinct identities and interests, had already begun their separate albeit difficult experiments with self-government. Large distances, imposing geographical barriers, and poor communications systems between the provinces served to promote provincialisms and parochial jealousies. Political differences concerning the best form of government (i.e., republicanism vs. monarchism; unitarism vs. federalism) and the power of local caudillos also contributed to these centrifugal

forces, revealing deep internal political and class divisions both within and between provinces as well as chronic political instability.

For Simón Bolívar, such factionalism and its related civil disturbances posed serious threats to completing the project of independence. Unity was everything for the Liberator, as he stressed in his famous Angostura address to the Second National Congress of Venezuela in February of 1819; but the unity he championed at Angostura was clearly national in character. There he asked the Venezuelan congress to consider abandoning its federal constitution which, he argued, had resulted from "the ill-considered pleadings of those men from the provinces who were captivated by the apparent brilliance of the happiness of the North American people, believing that the blessings they enjoy result exclusively from their form of government rather than from the character and customs of the citizens" (in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 180). Instead Bolívar proposed a constitutional plan for a unitary republican form of government that could enhance political equality among citizens and achieve political stability for Venezuela.

> All our moral powers will not suffice to save our infant republic from this chaos unless we fuse the mass of the people, the government, the legislation, and the national spirit into a single united body. Unity, unity, unity must be our motto in all things. The blood of our citizens is varied: let it be mixed for the sake of unity. Our Constitution has divided the powers of government: let them be bound together to secure unity. Our laws are but a sad relic of ancient and modern despotism. Let this monstrous edifice crumble and fall; and, having removed even its

> ruins, let us erect a temple to Justice; and, guided by its sacred inspiration, let us write a code of Venezuelan laws (in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 191-92).

Here Bolívar the Law-Giver sought to build a viable sovereign republic whose integrity would no longer be threatened by domestic factionalism and civil unrest; here, as elsewhere in South America in the next few years, he sought to eliminate the institutionalized sources of internal factions and political unrest in order to establish fully autonomous national governments. But there was another important dimension to his strident pleas for unity both within his native Venezuela and elsewhere: Bolívar the Liberator knew that continuing domestic political division and anarchy only served the interests of Spain and other European powers seeking to restore imperial control over Spanish America, thus postponing the day of real national independence for the infant sister republics.

Painfully aware of this danger, Bolívar spent several years campaigning, both politically and militarily, for the domestic and geopolitical unity of the Spanish American nations. To accomplish the latter Bolívar championed several different plans of "confederation" for the sister republics of Spanish America.

The first and furthest implemented was the decade-long "union" of Gran Colombia, comprising present-day Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador. Just six months after his Angostura address, Bolívar led a successful military campaign in Colombia, defeating royalist forces at the decisive Battle of Bocaya. With Colombian independence thus assured, a new constitution for

the "United States of Colombia" was promulgated in December, 1819, joining Colombia and Venezuela in a "pact of union" that would also include the province of Quito after the latter's liberation. By the summer of 1822, when Quito and Guayaquil formally joined the confederation, Gran Colombia encompassed essentially the same territory as that of the former colonial Viceroyalty of New Granada circa 1800. Bolívar seemed to have held high hopes that this union[4] could produce "a new nation composed of Venezuela and New Granada." News of its dissolution after Venezuela's secession in early 1830 was clearly an important source of bitterness in the last few months of his life. But as Simon Collier (1985: 408-412) points out, Bolívar was acutely aware throughout the decade of its rocky existence that the "union" would not last. Moreover, the primary reason for its creation and existence, its raison d'être, seems to have been less an experiment in creating a new national or supranational identity than a geopolitical answer to weakness in the face of ongoing foreign threats. As early as 1813, Bolívar wrote that in northern South America "'two different nations...will appear ridiculous. Even if Venezuela and New Granada were united, this would only just make a nation capable of inspiring due and decorous consideration in others.'"

This concern with appearances on the world stage and the weaknesses rooted in the "'multiplicity of sovereignties'" in Spanish America was central to the Liberator's calls for unity. The "pact of union" was something "'presented [to] the world'"

so that the world --specifically Europe-- would take "Colombians" seriously. Gran Colombia was created out of military and diplomatic necessity (Collier, 1985: 408).

Bolívar's second plan of confederation --or union, or league (like others in the early nineteenth century, Bolívar was never very clear or consistent in his terminology for these plans except that, in this case, the term "federation" was not to be used in public discourse)-- was a short-lived scheme conceived in 1826 but never implemented. It was proposed and discussed by Bolívar[5] in the context of growing political unrest in Gran Colombia and related military threats from the Holy Alliance. To put down such factions and check the danger of European-supported monarchism, Bolívar proposed a federal union of Gran Colombia, Peru and newly independent Bolivia (formerly Upper Peru), named in honor of the Liberator. The "Bolivarian Constitution," drafted by Bolívar himself, would have been adopted by each member state to create a federal government composed of a president or "Supreme Chief," who would tour the provinces and visit each state at least once a year, a vice president, and three chambers (Bolívar to Santander, May 7, 1826, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 585-593; Collier, 1985, 407). Each state in the confederation would manage its internal affairs "in agreement, however, with the other states" (Bolívar to Sucre, August 18, 1826, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 634). The government of each state "will continue to be vested in the President and Vice President and their Chamber and Senate,

respecting all matters affecting religion, justice, civil administration, national economy --in short, <u>everything but</u> foreign affairs, war, and the Federal treasury" (emphasis mine; Bolívar to Sucre, May 12, 1826 in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 590-591). However, political factionalism in Gran Colombia was too far advanced, and the idea of such a supranational union was soon politically dead (Collier, 1985: 406-407). Perhaps the idea also seemed superfluous at the time given the fact that Bolívar's third plan of Latin confederation, the 1826 Congress of Panama, was already under way.

The Congress of Panama

The Congress of Panama is generally held to be one of the most famous --and unsuccessful-- examples of the Spanish American attempts to create an ongoing union or federation of the newly independent states. For many it remains the mythic symbol of a Bolivarian ideal that would present to the world a Latin American giant state with a supranational identity. However even Bolívar had rejected the possibility of creating such a state as grandiose and utopian. Indeed, in his famous "Jamaica Letter" of September 6, 1815, which is considered the primary source of inspiration for his confederal experiments and for the Congress of Panama eleven years later, Bolívar wrote:

> [f]or a single government to infuse life into the New World; to put into use all the resources for public prosperity; to improve, educate, and perfect the New World, that government would have to possess the authority of a god, much less the knowledge and virtues of mankind" ("Jamaica Letter," in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 116).

Bolívar went on to reject the popular arguments heard elsewhere stressing the consanguinous bonds of origin, language, custom and religion that could unite the new states. Rather, he argued a Montesquieuèsque or Rousseauan line of thought stressing the "climactic differences, geographic diversity, conflicting interests and dissimilar characteristics" that divided the new states one from the other. Yet Union --"through sensible planning and well-directed actions rather than by divine logic"-- was what was needed "in order to expell the Spaniards and found a free government" ("Jamaica Letter," in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 118; 121).

> How beautiful it would be if the Isthmus of Panama could be for us what the Isthmus of Corinth was for the Greeks! Would to God that some day we may have the good fortune to convene there an august assembly of representatives of republics, kingdoms, and empires to deliberate upon the high interests of peace and war with the nations of the other three-quarters of the globe. This type of organization may come to pass in some happier period of our regeneration. But any other plan, such as that of l'Abbé St. Pierre, who in laudable delerium conceived the idea of assembling a European congress to decide the fate and interests of those nations, would be meaningless" ("Jamaica Letter," in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 118).

Of course, after the news of the 1815 Congress of Vienna reached the New World and after three other European

"congresses" were held by 1822, the Abbé St. Pierre's eighteenth century plan for a "union" of sovereign states to found a system of "perpetual peace" no longer appeared quite so "delerious." In fact, the Congress of Vienna and the emerging European Concert System constituted a more pertinent model for the Bolivarian project of a "Congress" at Panama than, as is often assumed, the federal congress of the North American union. Moreover, the very nature and outcomes of the European congresses between 1815 and 1826 prompted the Latin American states to counter with their own Congress for their mutual protection. In order to understand this important point, we must briefly expain the nature of l'Abbé St. Pierre's plan for "perpetual peace" and its partial realization by European powers in the early nineteenth century.

L'Abbé St. Pierre's five point plan for "perpetual peace" was to establish a collective security system among the European sovereigns to replace the seventeenth century balance of power system, which he considered merely a "system of war." To accomplish this, the Abbé proposed the creation of a permanent "congress" to arbitrate and mediate disputes between sovereigns. His plan also called for the disbanding of national armies in favor of a multinational force that would provide for the mutual defense against outside threats. The creation of such a European "body politic" would respect and protect the actual possessions and the sovereignty of each member state. Such a "general alliance" and "permanent society" based on the

principle of arbitration would eliminate the pretexts for war found in the European balance of power system. The idea was not so much to create a supranational state as it was to constitute a collective security system and to institutionalize the principle of arbitration in settling interstate disputes (St. Pierre, 1974). L'Abbé had lobbied hard in the salons of the European sovereigns at the time of the Treaty of Utrecht (1715) to gain support for his plan, and an essay by Rousseau helped to popularize the Abbé's plan in the latter part of the eighteenth century. One hundred years after the Treaty of Utrecht, the sovereigns of Europe created a short-lived version of l'Abbé's plan with the Concert system originating in the Congress of Vienna of 1815.

The European "congresses" of the early nineteenth century (e.g., Congress of Vienna, 1815; Congress of Aix-La-Chapelle, 1818; Congress of Laibach, 1821; Congress of Verona, 1822) had originated in the collaboration of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia against France during the Napoleanic wars. At the Congress of Vienna, this Quadruple Alliance called for "meetings at fixed periods...for the purpose of consulting upon their common interests." The "Holy Alliance" was also formed in 1815 within this emerging concert system by the Austrian, Prussian and Russian monarchs. France became an active member of the concert in the 1818 Congress of Aix-La-Chapelle. Differences soon emerged within the system over how to handle anti-monarchical revolts in Spain, Italy, and elsewhere as the

Holy Alliance sought to use the European congresses as its anti-revolutionary instrument (Hartmann, 1973: 177; Claude, 1984: 25).

Although the European congresses never became "fixed" (Great Britain stopped attending them after the 1822 Congress of Verona and a balance of power system reemerged in Europe), they served as powerful examples to Latin Americans of the ways in which sovereign states might coordinate their common interests in foreign affairs, construct a bloc of power, and arbitrate the questions of war and peace. More importantly, it was precisely the existence and power of the Holy Alliance, its anti-republican use of the congresses, and its support of the Spanish monarchy's attempts to reconquer its former colonies that posed the most serious threat to the independence of the new Latin American republics in the early 1820s.

Thus as Bolívar and other Spanish American statesmen developed plans for the Congress of Panama, the goal was not to follow the North American example of creating a "national" legislative body to govern a tight federal union. The Congress was not meant to constitute the "national assembly" of a giant state. Rather, the Congress of Panama was meant to follow the European example of coordinating matters of foreign policy and mutual defense in order to answer the common threat to independence posed by one of the products of the European congresses, the Holy Alliance. As Bolívar put it in a letter to

Francisco de Paula Santander, Vice President of Colombia, in January 1825,

> The great sovereigns of Europe themselves have been obliged to gather in congresses in order to establish cordial and friendly relations among their respective states. As long as they relied on diplomatic negotiations only, discord kept them apart. They formed a congress and composed their differences; now they are invincible. It would seem that we, being nothing, as we are only in the process of being born, should not hesitate for a moment to follow their example (in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 462).

As chief of state of Gran Colombia, Bolívar began to lay the groundwork for such a Spanish-American congress in 1822. He first sent diplomatic envoys to other parts of Spanish America with treaties of alliance in the face of continuing European military threats. His emissary to Mexico, don Miguel Santa María, found an eager ally in the Mexican Minister of Internal and Foreign Affairs, Lucás Alamán, who would later play an important role in nurturing the goal of Latin American diplomatic unity. The two signed a treaty of Union, League and Perpetual Confederation in October 1823 (essentially a treaty of defensive alliance) which was soon ratified by their respective governments. Bolívar's emissary to South American capitals, don Juaquín Mosquera, was also successful in persuading first Peru (in 1822), then Chile, and finally Buenos Aires to sign similar treaties; however, a political turn of events in Chile and rising isolationist sentiment in Buenos Aires at the time prevented the latter two states from ratifying the alliance treaties.[6] Bolívar's diplomatic emissaries had also extended

his invitation to the signatories of these treaties to hold an eventual congress (Moreno Pino, 1977: 38-39; Salcedo-Bastardo, 1977: 92, 95).

On the eve of the defeat of Spanish forces at the important Battle of Ayacucho in early December, 1824, Bolívar issued a circular to the "Governments of the Other Republics of America" reiterating his earlier invitation to hold a congress of plenipotentiaries in Panama, "or some other point agreed upon by the majority ...that should act as a council during periods of great conflicts, to be appealed to in the event of common danger, and to be a faithful interpreter of public treaties when difficulties arise, in brief, to conciliate all our differences" (Circular, December 7, 1824, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 457).

Continued Spanish American unity was important to prevail against Spain, but appearances mattered most. Meeting in a congress in Panama was a condition for survival for the weak.

> This Congress must serve us at least for the first ten or twelve years of our infancy, even though it should dissolve forever following that period. It is my feeling that we will live on for centuries if we can survive the first dozen years of childhood. First impressions last forever (Bolívar to Santander, January 6-7, 1825, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 461-62).

Bolívar not only sought to create an image of unity to ensure survival; he also wanted the Congress to project an image of strength to convince the Holy Alliance that any further attempts at reconquest were futile. Arms and bilateral diplomacy were

important, but so was the spectacle of a Spanish American Congress.

> The fact that all Europe is against us and that all America is devastated makes quite an appalling picture....It seems politic, therefore, for us to enter into friendly relations with the gentlemen of the Alliance, using dulcet and persuasive words, in order to discover their latest decisions and to gain time. With this end in view, I believe that [Gran] Colombia, which has taken the lead in foreign affairs, should be able to undertake some move through her agents in Europe. While this is being done, the rest of America, meeting at the Isthmus, can present itself in a more imposing manner (Bolívar to Santander, March 8, 1825, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 479.

Though addressed to the "Governments of the Other Republics of America," Bolívar's formal invitation to the Congress of Panama was originally limited to the states that had ratified the earlier bilateral treaties of alliance. It was the Colombian Vice President, Francisco de Paula Santander, who extended the invitation to Chile, Argentina, and the United Provinces of Central America.[7] Bolívar had opposed extending the invitation to Haiti, Brazil and the United States. He believed that the Congress should be limited only to the Spanish-speaking nations of America in order to enhance the "homogeneity, compactness and solidity" of the league. He believed further that it should be limited to those nations having republican forms of government (thus excluding Haiti[8] and Brazil) in order to prevent any influence of the Holy Alliance (Moreno Pino, 1977: 38-39; Salcedo-Bastardo, 1970: 360; Bolívar to Santander, June 7, 1825, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1955: 507-08).

As for the United States, Bolívar wished to exclude it on the grounds that it lacked "continental solidarity," given its neutrality during the war with Spain, and because it seemed to pursue its "own selfish interests." Moreover, Bolívar feared that admitting the United States to the Congress might create trouble with Great Britain, which, considering the latter's break with the Holy Alliance, he expected would be the protector of the Spanish American league. Courting Great Britain's recognition, favor, and protection was crucial to Bolívar's strategy of checking the threats of the Holy Alliance. Great Britain was also emerging as Spanish America's leading trade partner at the time (Bolívar to Santander, March 8, 1825, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 479; Bolívar to Santander, October 21, 1825, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 543; Bolívar, "Views on the Congress of Panama," February 1826, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 561-62; Bushnell, 1987: 147).

Nevertheless, the governments of Colombia and Mexico extended the invitation to the United States, and two months before the Congress opened, Bolívar expressed his approval that the U.S. had decided to send an envoy.[9] Yet the United States mission to the Congress of Panama never participated. One of the two U.S. delegates died en route and the other, John Sergeant, failed to arrive until after the Panama sessions had closed[10] (Wilgus and D'Eça, 1963: 385; Moreno Pino, 1977:39; Bolívar to Revenga, Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 8, 1826, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 585; Bushnell, 1987: 147).

Likewise, Brazil was finally invited to the Congress of Panama but its delegate never arrived, presumably because Brazil was not interested in helping to strengthen Spanish America (Atkins, 1989:177). Great Britain and the Netherlands were invited to send observers, largely due to Spanish American hopes for favorable trade relations with the two, and delegations from both states were present at the Congress. Paraguay was never invited (Moreno Pino, 1977: 40; Davis, 1977a: 72; Bushnell, 1987: 147; Boersner, 1986: 110).

The long-awaited Congress of Panama finally opened on June 22, 1826.[11] Over the course of the next three weeks of the early Panamanian summer, the plenipotentiaries held ten meetings and worked to produce four interrelated diplomatic instruments. The first and most central was the Treaty of Perpetual Union, League and Confederation, which established a defensive alliance based on the principle of collective security and provided for other principles of cooperation within the league, such as conciliation and arbitration. Related to this treaty were two agreements to create a multinational army and navy of 60,000 men, with each nation providing a set quota. Mexico, which vied with Colombia for leadership in the league, was to supply more than half of the 60,000. Finally, given the torrid summer heat and the uncultivated surroundings they found in Panama, the delegates agreed to move the site of the Congress to Tacubaya, outside Mexico City, where they would meet to continue their diplomatic work every two years. The Congress then adjourned on

July 15, 1826 so that the plenipotentiaries could escape the summer heat and seek ratification of the agreements in their respective countries (Moreno Pino, 1977: 40; Salcedo-Bastardo, 1970: 360; Wilgus and D'Eça, 1963: 385; Davis, 1977a: 73).

Only Colombia ratified the accords of Panama, and even Bolivar opposed this ratification. In a letter to the Colombian delegate to the Congress of Panama, General Pedro Briceño Méndez, Bolívar expressed his immediate disapproval of the treaties based on two problems. First, he opposed the relocation of the assembly to Tacubaya on the grounds that it would come to be dominated by the "already disproportionate" influence of Mexico, and possibly by the United States. Second, Bolívar considered the terms of the convention on troop contingents "futile and ineffective" as well as dangerous; its provisions for cavalry strength were "contrary to all the principles of the art of warfare." More importantly, "[t]he convention does not even regard [a foreign] invasion as being serious unless it involves over 5,000 men, and aid will be rendered in such cases only. This condemns certain countries to inevitable occupation." Bolívar noted that there was "unanimity of opinion" about these matters throughout the other South American republics and urged that the treaties not be ratified pending his return to Bogota for more detailed discussions (Bolívar to Briceño Méndez, September 14, 1826, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 637).

Other factors were at work that led to the failure of ratification of the Panama accords. Despite Bolívar's concerns with the dangers of the military convention, it appears that by the second half of 1826 and thereafter, few perceived a credible European military threat to Spanish American independence. Though such a threat had seemed important when the invitations for the Congress were sent out in December, 1824, the defeat of Spanish forces at Ayacucho that same week turned out to be decisive. While sporadic military skirmishes had continued, by mid-1826 independence seemed assured. Like Great Britain, even France had long foresaken the imperial cause of the Holy Alliance and, through the Polignac Memorandum of 1923, had promised the British not to intervene by force in Spanish America (Davis, 1977a: 46, 59, 70).

Beyond this changed international situation, Moreno Pino (1977: 41) argues that, due to the diplomatic and political inexperience of the Congress delegates, the four Panama accords failed to win approval because they were legally tied too closely together: widespread misgivings about the military convention meant that the entire package of agreements had to be opposed --or revised at a later date. The package was too much too late for the member states to support.

Finally, internal factors in several states prevented even the revision, much less the ratification, of the Panama accords. The government of Mexico tried twice to get its congress to ratify the treaties, but political insurrections

prevented it. Gran Colombia, which soon came to loggerheads with Peru, was on the verge of dissolution, and civil war in Central America beginning in 1827 prevented ratification there. Independence had been won but internal unrest, so common to newly independent states and fueled by an emerging caudillismo and Liberal-versus-Conservative factionalism in almost every Spanish American republic in the late 1820s, left Bolívar and his dream of a united Spanish American league in disarray (Moreno Pino, 1977: 41-42; Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: xxii; Atkins, 1989: 178).

Insofar as no permanent league of Spanish American states was legally created, the Congress of Panama was a failure. However, its failure is a qualified one. Although its agreements were set aside, the Congress provided an important precedent for and useful symbol of Spanish American diplomatic unity in the face of foreign military threats during the rest of the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth. The Congress of Panama at least laid the groundwork that facilitated the holding of subsequent Latin American diplomatic congresses as the preferred means of addressing certain common foreign affairs concerns. Liberals, diplomats, and experts in international law tended to continue to embrace the notion of Spanish or Latin American unity to meet the threat of foreign interventionism. As the nineteenth century wore on, these proponents of Latin American diplomatic unity were also able to develop a body of international legal principles, if not law,

renouncing the use of force and stressing arbitration as a means to settle international disputes. A brief overview of these developments during the rest of the nineteenth century is important for understanding the nature of Latin American diplomacy and inter-American relations in the twentieth century.

Latin American Congresses After Panama

In the late 1820s and 1830s, the government of Mexico led the effort to reanimate Bolívar's project of a Spanish American league, both to adopt a common policy of defense against further European intervention and to carry out common negotiations for diplomatic recognition by Spain. Invitations for congresses at Tacubaya were sent out in 1831, 1834, 1836, 1838, 1839, 1840 and 1842, but these Mexican efforts proved to be in vain. In spite of any empathy for Mexico's problems with Texas, other Latin governments were suspicious of Mexico's bid for leadership, especially after it independently negotiated its recognition by Spain in 1835. Moreover, growing political instability throughout Spanish America in the 1830s made foreign policy a low priority for the region's troubled governments, many of which came to be dominated by conservative military caudillos little interested in the largely liberal project of unionism. The outbreak of the Mexican-American War (1846-1848) brought an end to Mexico's leadership in promoting the confederative idea;

however, the war did contribute to renewed concern over foreign interventionism elsewhere in Latin America, particularly in Peru (Inman, 1965: 20-21; Nuermberger, 1940: 32; Moreno Pino, 1977: 42).

Immediate interest in holding a second "American Congress" grew among the Andean republics in 1847 when they were presented with the threat of a military expedition organized in Europe by the exiled president of Ecuador, General Juan José Flores. With 2,000 Spanish and British mercenaries, General Flores sought to oust the Liberal government and support the conservative cause in Ecuador and elsewhere. In Colombia, there also existed the fear that General Flores would use his forces in a filibustering venture in Panama.[12] With Flores' threat to the Andean republics, a growing suspicion of imperialist ventures in Central and South America, and the Mexican-American War, the government of Peru issued the formal invitations for the "American Congress," which was held in Lima from December 1847 to March 1848 (Inman, 1965: 21-22; Moreno Pino, 1977: 45-46; Davis, 1977a: 100; Nuermberger, 1940: 32, 35).

The governments of Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and Chile responded positively to the Peruvian invitation and participated in the Congress. The government of Colombia had issued an unauthorized invitation to the United States, but this was soon retracted by the conference organizers because of the Mexican-American War.[13]

Over the course of three months, the Congress delegates met informally several times a week to draft four separate treaties. The first and most central was the Treaty of Confederation, whose purpose was to "sustain the sovereignty and independence of all and each one, to maintain the integrity of their respective territories, to assure in them their dominance and soveriegnty, to refuse to consent that they should be permitted to suffer outrage or offense" (in Atkins, 1989: 178). The Treaty embraced the collective security principle by outlining the duty of reciprocal assistance with land and naval forces to defend against foreign threats to the political independence or territorial integrity of its members. It also provided for regular meetings of a congress of plenipotentiaries, renounced the right of conquest, and called for the peaceful resolution of conflicts according to specified procedures. The other treaties included a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, aimed at facilitating trade through a preferential customs union, a Postal Convention, and a Consular Convention, addressing such issues as political asylum, reciprocal duties in cases of civil struggles, and an interest in the codification of international law (Atkins, 1989: 178; Moreno Pino, 1977: 46).

Other American states, including the United States, were invited to subscribe to these treaties; but after British port authorities in Jamaica broke up Flores' expedition and after the Mexican-American War had ended, interest in the confederation

waned. Only the Consular Convention was eventually ratified by the states that participated in the Congress of Lima. It would become the only agreement produced by the Spanish American congresses ever to enter into force[14] (Atkins, 1989: 178; Nuermberger, 1940: 35).

If the threat of foreign adventurism seemed to ease by 1849, it re-emerged by the mid-1850s, prompting renewed unionist sentiment and several significant examples of joint Spanish American diplomatic activity. This time, however, concern came to focus on the expansionist tendencies of the North Americans.

In late 1854, the Ecuadoran government signed a commercial convention with the United States minister granting generous concessions for the exploitation of guano on the Galapagos Islands. Allegations of the establishment of a U. S. protectorate over the islands stirred concern in Peru and especially in Chile, where anti-Yankee sentiment had been growing.[15] The skilled Chilean Foreign Minister, Antonio Varas, succeeded in persuading Ecuador to renounce the convention by offering a new Chilean-Ecuadoran commercial treaty as well as a mutual assistance pact against "all piratical and filibustering expeditions." The latter was requested by the Liberal Ecuadoran government after it became alarmed that General Flores had taken up residence in Lima. Varas was able to diffuse tensions between Ecuador and Peru by including the latter in the discussions for such a pact in the Spring of 1856. Out of these discussions emerged a draft of the Continental Treaty (also

known as the Tripartite Treaty) and a tentative plan for a new American congress (Inman, 1965: 25; Nuermberger, 1940: 33-39).

The Continental Treaty provided for the convening of a congress of plenipotentiaries three months after the exchange of ratifications of its members. The congress was to be a consultative body with the "right and power to offer its mediation...in the event of differences arising among the contracting states." It was prohibited from involving itself with "the intestine commotions, internal movements or agitations" of the member nations, but the signatories were pledged to assist whenever any state was threatened by "piratical expeditions or aggressions." The treaty affirmed the preservation of independence of each state, the non-recognition of cession of territory except by mutual agreement, the prohibition of amassing troops on frontiers for invasion, and the existence of an American international law. Like the 1848 conventions, the treaty also sought to promote commercial expansion by seeking a uniform customs system with reduced tariffs, uniformity of monetary systems and weights and measures, rules of navigation and shipping, and postal reform. It also included articles encouraging the diffusion of education and extending generous privileges to members of the learned professions. Peru was charged with the responsibility of inviting other Spanish American governments to subscribe to the treaty after it was signed by the representatives of Chile,

Ecuador, and Peru on September 15, 1856[16] (Nuermberger, 1940: 43-46; Inman, 1965: 25; Moreno Pino, 1977: 46-47).

By that time, however, William Walker's infamous filibustering campaign in Nicaragua was well under way. This North American adventurer held a dubious claim to Nicaragua's presidency after defeating the conservative government's forces in 1855. The other Central American states, led by Costa Rica, soon united in a military campaign against Walker.[17] An incident involving the reception of Walker's diplomatic envoy to the United States, Augustín Vigil, by the Pierce Administration in May 1856 convinced many Latin Americans that the U.S. officially supported Walker. This unfortunate incident not only prompted the signing of the Continental Treaty; it also caused a flurry of diplomatic protests by outraged Latin governments and produced several other joint Latin American diplomatic responses.

Immediately after the Vigil incident, an invitation was issued by Venezuela, where unionist sentiment had reemerged, for an American congress on the isthmus of Panama.[18] A short time later, in November, 1856, the Latin American diplomatic corps in Washington held a two-day conference at the Peruvian legation to discuss the Walker filibuster. Unaware of the terms of the Continental Treaty and acting without instructions from home governments, the ministers of seven Spanish American states[19] signed a <u>sub spe ratis</u> treaty providing for a plan of alliance and confederation and calling for a new American congress in

Lima. Independently of these efforts, Costa Rican envoys seeking aid from Chile and Peru to fight Walker invited all the Spanish American republics to an American congress at San José. One of the Costa Rican envoys had also suggested to Mexico that it revive the treaties drafted at the Congresses of Panama and Tacubaya; soon, Mexico offered itself as the site for a "great American congress," arguing that its proximity to the U.S. made it the first line of defense against Yankee expansionism (Nuermberger, 1940: 41-42, 47-51; Moreno, 1928: 114-115).

With so many different calls for an American congress in response to the Central American crisis, it became difficult to coordinate anything except the idea that some such congress should be held. The government of Peru focused on fulfilling its responsiblity of inviting other Latin American states to subscribe to the Continental Treaty. Colombia, Argentina and Brazil all expressed reservations to some of the terms of the treaty while Venezuela, Mexico, and Bolivia focused on one of the various other calls for an American congress. Nevertheless, by June 1857, Peru's envoy to Central America, Pedro Gálvez, had persuaded Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua to sign the Treaty.[20] By that time, however, William Walker had been routed (in May) by Costa Rican President Juan Rafael Mora, who led a united Central American military campaign to defeat Walker. The "Great National War" of the Central American states revived a sense of unity as well as the idea of re-establishing the Central American federation.[21] But with Walker defeated and

an official U.S. disapproval of his filibuster, the stifled internal struggles between Liberals and Conservatives soon resurfaced in Central America and elsewhere. With the foreign threat removed, this third polycentered movement for a Spanish American union fell apart and the Continental Treaty was officially shelved by its sponsors on September 14, 1857[22] (Nuermberger, 1940: 54-55; Karnes, 1976; Moreno, 1928).

Yet this phase of the congress movement in Latin America and its related diplomatic activity was not a complete failure. Latin American diplomatic and military aid did help to defeat Walker, and both the Continental Treaty and the sub spe ratis pact drafted in Washington caused the United States to take notice of the potential power of a Spanish American league. As the U.S. minister to Peru, J. Randolph Clay, warned the Peruvian government in the summer of 1857, the ratification of both treaties would have presented

> the singular spectacle of a Union of all the Nations of the Western Hemisphere, exclusive of the United States. And the only...cause of such exclusion would be that the nations signing the treaties had formed themselves into a league to control the power of the United States[23] (quoted in Nuermberger, 1940: 53).

Moreover, the Continental Treaty would remain an important instrument and point of departure in the next movement for a Spanish American congress in the early 1860s.

In March 1861, Spain annexed the Dominican Republic in a bid to reassert its imperial claims in the Western Hemisphere. The Peruvian Foreign Minister, José Fabio Melgar, protested the

annexation and called on the American republics to unite in opposition. In October of the same year, France, England and Spain signed the Convention of London, providing for their joint intervention in Mexico to force the collection of debts.[24] Once again the Peruvian foreign minister sent a circular to other Spanish American republics urging a uniform response to growing European interventionism. Peru also tried to gain United States support in opposing these threats, but the U.S. Civil War prohibited North American participation (Frazer, 1948: 378-379; Frazer, 1949: 321; Inman, 1965: 26; Davis, 1977a: 109).

After French military forces began a march from Vera Cruz to Mexico City in April 1862, the Peruvian minister to the United States called a conference of the Spanish American diplomatic corps based in Washington. Like their counterparts six years earlier, the representatives from Peru, Chile, Mexico, Colombia, and the two men representing the five Central American states wrote a document calling for a convention that would constitute the "international law of the Americas," guarantee the sovereignty of the Spanish American states, and provide for the collective security of its members. Meanwhile, the Peruvian minister to Mexico, Dr. Manuel Nicolás Corpancho, had no trouble persuading the anxious Mexican government to accede to the 1856 Continental Treaty, as stipulated in a bilateral treaty of amity and alliance signed in June, 1862. This Peruvian attempt to re-invigorate the Continental Treaty was not as successful elsewhere in Latin America, where it was generally held to be

inadequate.[25] Nevertheless, with strong domestic support[26] the Peruvian government continued to plan for a diplomatic conference in Lima to aid Mexico in its war against France (Davis, 1977a: 109; Frazer, 1948: 382-384, 386).

Then in early 1863, under the pretext of a "scientific expedition," Spanish warships established themselves in Peruvian waters off the Chincha Islands. The true purpose was to force Peru into settling old financial claims with Spain and, failing that, to seize the guano-rich islands and exploit its riches as payment. Alarmed at Spain's expanded imperial ventures, the Peruvian government sent out invitations for a new American congress. Once Spain occupied the Chincha Islands and began to mine their guano, Chile and other neighboring states responded positively to the invitation, both by aiding in the war against Spain and by agreeing to hold the International Congress of American States (also known as the Second Lima Congress), which opened on November 14, 1864 (Davis, 1977a: 121-2; Inman, 1965: 27; Frazer, 1949: 335).

Distinguished delegates from Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador attended the congress. Unlike past congresses, even Argentina took part through its respected participant-observer, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento. Two issues were on the conference agenda: The Spanish aggression in capturing the Chincha Islands and the formation of a permanent American union. As for the first issue, the congress drew up a warning to the admiral of the Spanish fleet stating that the

aggression against Peru constituted a threat to all the Americas, and that if friendly relations with Spain were to be maintained, he would have to withdraw promptly from the Chinchas. But the war continued. A joint Chilean-Peruvian fleet inflicted important losses on the Spanish, but the war finally ended due to political changes back in Spain that reversed its imperial ambitions. After a treaty between Spain and Peru was signed in January of 1865, the Spanish fleet was withdrawn and the financial claims against Peru were declared paid by the sale of the Peruvian guano. Spanish forces withdrew from the Dominican Republic in the same year (Inman, 1965: 28; Frazer, 1949: 335-36, 341; Davis, 1977a: 123).

With the crisis over, the international congress in Lima turned to its second agenda item, the establishment of a permanent American union. Four treaties were negotiated resembling those of the previous congresses. The Treaty of Union and Defensive Alliance sought to guarantee the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the union members through the principle of collective security. It also provided for a congress of plenipotentiaries every three years. The second treaty, On the Conservation of Peace, called upon the signatories to settle all differences by peaceful negotiation or, failing that, by arbitration. It specifically cited boundary disputes, a nagging (and growing) source of conflict between Latin American states throughout the ninetennth century, as a matter for negotiation or arbitration. The third treaty

was another postal convention designed to improve communications between the members, and the last was another Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, similar to those of the past (Frazer, 1949: 339-341, 343-344; Moreno Pino, 1977: 47; Inman, 1965: 28).

The congress held its last meeting on March 13, 1865. None of the treaties were ever ratified. As in the past, after the Chincha crisis had been resolved[27] some delegates began to lose interest in the conference. As in the past, reservations surfaced in some states over the specific terms of the treaties while in other states, domestic political differences re-emerged. In Peru and Bolivia, civil unrest forced both governments to table the treaty ratifications. The President of Chile argued in his national legislature that pacts of union between American states would be ineffective until the individual nations were more stable and could provide for their own defense. The Colombian government voiced the opinion heard elsewhere that the Spanish American states should not form alliances that might limit their autonomy or involve them in other states' domestic or foreign conflicts (Frazer, 1949: 344; Inman, 1965: 28; Moreno Pino, 1977: 47).

The Second Lima Congress ended with a lasting sense of failure. After 1865, the Latin American states abandoned efforts to create a Bolivarian union and instead turned their attention to developing several principles and codes of international law. Several Latin American legal conferences were held in the latter part of the nineteenth century,

including the Congress of Jurists at Lima from 1877 to 1879, the Bolivaran Congress at Caracas on arbitration in 1883, and an important congress on private international law in Montevideo in 1888-1889. Latin American diplomats also worked hard to gain international acceptance of arbitration as a remedy for resolving disputes at the Hague conferences in the 1890s and pressed for acceptance of the Drago Doctrine, formulated by the Argentine Luís Drago, which stated that debt or economic claims never give rise to a legal right to intervene by force in another country. But the idea of creating a uniquely Spanish American union of states faded into the past (Atkins, 1989: 179-180; Inman, 1965: 31; Davis, 1977b: 12).

Conclusion

Why did the Latin American states fail to establish a permanent Congress after so many attempts? The answer to this question partly depends on the standards by which one judges nineteenth century Latin American diplomacy. It is true that the statesmen failed to build the necessary institutional machinery that would drive an ongoing union of states, yet it is clear that calling diplomatic congresses to defend against real foreign threats was the preferred, accepted, and repeated means of countering such threats. The <u>idea</u> was "institutionalized." The exercise of Spanish American diplomatic solidarity in

seeking collective security agreements to block European or North American adventurism was at least strong enough to convince Latin statesmen that it was a natural, useful, and seemingly effective means for individually weak states to respond to the threat of intervention. Whether these congresses actually deterred aggression or caused foreign powers to cease their interventions is, for our purposes, less important than the fact that many Latin American states apparently believed that such diplomatic unity provided them with some effective means of defense.

Moreover, the holding of such high-level diplomatic congresses was still an innovation in the history of international relations. If the Europeans failed to institutionalize their congresses into a "permanent" system in the nineteenth century, we should not hold the Latin American states to a different standard.

The Latin American congresses of the nineteenth century must be appreciated as more than just ad hoc meetings. They constitute the critical points in the development of Latin American diplomatic history and diplomatic style. They represent a series of steps towards multilateralism in international affairs aimed at preserving the peace and progress of member states. They were tools that allowed individually weak Latin American states to develop a degree of strength from unity. Moreover, these congresses also had agendas that went beyond dealing with the immediate threat of foreign

intervention. The diplomats at the congresses recognized the need for increased interstate cooperation and harmonization of their foreign policies not only to meet threats of aggression, but also to promote commerce and development for the member states. Finally, these congresses also mark the Latin American contribution to the development of general codes of public international law and international legal remedies to resolve conflicts, especially those of mediation and arbitration. The treaties negotiated at the congresses show a clear commitment to each of these themes.

Nevertheless, it is true that once signed by the diplomats, the treaties produced by the congresses failed to receive ratification by most of the participating states. These failures sometimes resulted from reservations over certain details of the treaties often followed by calls for further negotiation. Sometimes interstate rivalries or disputes over border questions interferred. But the failure of treaty ratification appears to be mostly due to the chronic internal instability of nineteenth century Latin American governments. Liberals tended to support such diplomatic activity while conservatives tended to balk at the Bolivaran notion of collective security and foreign policy cooperation against the European monarchs. Whatever temporary cooperation may have existed between Liberals and Conservatives to defend national interests against foreign aggression, once such threats were

removed, Liberals and Conservatives could resume their internal power struggles, thus upsetting the ratification process.[28]

Related to but going beyond the chronic instability and weakness of Latin governments in the nineteenth century, there is another explanation for the seeming failure of institutionalizing the Latin congresses into a true international organization in the four decades after the Congress of Panama. Not only were international organizations as we know them today as yet unknown, but there existed no clear and accepted hegemon among the Latin states to play the role of leader and guarantor of such a regime. The strongest states of the region, Brazil and Argentina, had remained mostly aloof from the congress movement, thus foregoing the opportunities to lead it. Mexico had tried to play a leadership role until the mid-1840s, and later Peru came close to playing such a role after that. Occassionally other states vied for the leadership role in furthering the Bolivaran project. The jockeying for leadership roles by Lima, Mexico, Colombia and Chile may have also stirred nationalistic jealousies elsewhere, helping to stalemate the ratification process. The polycentered movement for a congress that was never realized in the mid-1850s clearly suggests that a clear and accepted hegemon was lacking.

In any case, as we know from the work of Keohane and Nye (1977) and Keohane (1984) on the study of complex interdependence and international regimes, without a clear and accepted hegemon to lead and support the institutionalization of

international cooperation, an ongoing international organization will problably not emerge. Indeed, it was not until the United States joined in and proffered its conception of a Pan-American system that the machinery capable of driving an inter-American organization was built. To be sure, differences soon surfaced within the Pan-American system over its leadership, ends, principles, and means. Latin American statesmen continued to try to develop the legal and diplomatic themes of earlier times, especially the principles of non-intervention and arbitration and the desire for economic development, while North American statesmen sought to institutionalize various versions of the Monroe Doctrine. It is this phase of Latin American diplomatic relations to which we turn in the next chapter.

ENDNOTES

1. Emphasis in original. Reprinted in Lecuna and Bierck (1951: 121), which is a two volume collection of Bolívar's prolific writings.

2. In recent interviews in Nicaragua, former Foreign Ministry spokesperson Alejandro Bendaña and Foreign Ministry advisor Dennis Torres both asserted that the Contadora process was the "first time" that Latin American countries had come together to defend the principle of non-intervention.

3. Such a "congress" was not necessarily limited to the Spanish-American nations, unlike other proposals of the time (infra).

4. The exact constitutional nature of this union is beyond the scope of this study, however Collier (1985) stresses that "it is inaccurate to speak, as many historians do, of a Colombian federation."

5. In letters to Colombian Vice President Francisco de Paula Santander and General Antonio José de Sucre in May and August of that year (see Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 585-593, 633-634).

6. O'Higgins fell in Chile, and in Buenos Aires there existed a certain mistrust of Bolívar along with isolationist sentiments.

7. Argentina, however, did not accept the invitation and did not attend the Congress (Wilgus and D'Eça, 1963: 385; Davis, 1977a: 71). The United Provinces of Central American was the longest-lived example of Latin federation, lasting from 1824 to 1837, and at least on paper it was perhaps the tightest. However, it was not one of Bolivar's federation schemes. It emerged in 1824, when the five colonial provinces of Central America broke away from Mexico almost three years after Mexico's independence from Spain. During the colonial period, the five provinces had been tied administratively to the Vice Royalty of New Spain (Mexico). After news of Mexican independence arrived in Central America, the provinces had little choice but to remain tied to the new Mexican "empire" under Iturbide. The idea of independence from Spain had not been a popular one among the powerful landowners in the isthmus. After Iturbide's policies became intolerable, the Central Americans broke away and formed the United Provinces, thus

attempting to maintain the political ties and identity of the colonial period. But parochial jealousies and politico-ideological differences soon tore the confederation apart. It was formally dissolved in 1837. Numerous subsequent attempts to reunify during the nineteenth century always ended in failure. These attempts at reconfederation are not dealt with in this chapter because the whole experience can be seen as the falling apart of a political entity (nation?) rather than diplomatic attempts at presenting a common, defensive front towards the rest of the world through the congress movement, which is the focus of this chapter. For excellent histories of this "nation divided," see Woodward (1985) and Karnes (1976).

8. Haiti was also explicitly excluded by Bolívar because of the race of its people.

9. There was quite a debate in the U.S. Congress as to whether or not it should attend the isthmian congress. Strong sentiments of neutrality in foreign affairs and a Jeffersonian mistrust of "entangling alliances" helped to delay the U.S. decision to send delegates, who were instructed by Secretary of State Henry Clay to reject any Spanish American attempt to create an "amphictyonic council invested with power finally to decide controversies between the American states or to regulate in any respect their conduct" ("Instructions of Secretary of State Clay to the U.S. Delegates to the Congress of Panama," May 8, 1826, in Alvarez, 1924: 157; see also Davis, 1977a: 73).

10. Harold Eugene Davis (1977a: 73) states that Sergeant had not yet left for Panama when it was learned that the Congress had adjourned to Tacubaya, Mexico (infra), where "he found only a frustrated rump meeting of the conference, which had no support from home governments."

11. Mexico, Peru (including Bolivia), Gran Colombia (including present-day Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador and Panama), the United Provinces of Central America (composed of present-day Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras and Costa Rica) were all in attendance as were the observers from Great Britain and the Netherlands (Moreno Pino, 1977: 40).

12. This possibility prompted the Colombian government to sign the Bidlack Treaty of 1846 with the United States guaranteeing freedom of transit across the isthmus (Davis, 1977a: 100; Inman, 1965: 24).

13. Mexico could not attend because of the war. Argentina had accepted the invitation but then failed to participate. Venezuela and Brazil declined their invitations to the Congress (Inman, 1965: 22-23; Atkins, 1989: 178).

14. Moreno Pino (1977: 46) states that none of these treaties were ratified; Inman (1965: 24) and Wilgus and D´Eca (1963: 385) state that only Colombia ratified the Consular Convention.

15. Anti-Yankee sentiment had been growing in Chile because of the devastation of Chilean trade with California after 1849 and because of incidents of harsh treatment of Chilean nationals by Yankee vigilantes in California (Nuermberger, 1940: 43).

16. The United States minister to Peru, J. Randolph Clay, tried to block ratification in Peru by using the Peruvian press to argue the U.S. position and then circulated copies on the floor of the Peruvian legislature (Nuermberger, 1940: 46).

17. William Walker had been hired by business rivals of Cornelius Vanderbilt, who had built a lucrative transit route from the east coast of the United States through Nicaragua and on to California, thus cashing in on the Gold Rush of the early 1850s. Walker´s mission was to undercut Vanderbilt´s monopoly and secure another route; however, Walker had an agenda of his own: To claim another slave state for the United States. Walker was sent to aid the rag tag liberal army in Nicaragua against the conservative government, which had granted Vanderbilt the concessions for his trans-isthmian route. Walker soon emerged as the head of the liberal rebel army and eventually defeated the government´s army. Before long, Walker emerged as "President" of Nicaragua and embarked upon a crash program of North Americanization, including declaring English the official language and re-legalizing slavery.

The other Central American states, led by Costa Rica´s President Mora, formed a united army to dislodge the filibusterer from the isthmus. The "Great National War" briefly revived a sense of national unity among the Central Americans that had all but died after the break-up of the United Provinces of Central America in the 1830s (see endnote 7). After the fateful Battle of Rivas, Walker surrendered to Mora´s multinational army at San Juan del Sur in May 1857 and was turned over to the captain of a U.S. warship who sent him back to New Orleans. Walker made subsequent attempts to return to Nicaragua and reclaim "his" post as president. In his last attempt, he was captured by British forces off Honduras which turned him over to the Honduran government. Walker was promptly tried and executed. The U.S. government did not support Walker, however suspicions were raised in Latin America over the adventures of this and other filibusters in the circum-

Caribbean region. For more on this episode, see Woodward (1985) and Karnes (1976). See also the fascinating Juan Santamaría Museum in Alajuela, Costa Rica, for a pictoral history of and artifacts from the "Great National War" against Walker.

18. In Venezuela and Colombia, support had been growing in some circles to recreate Gran Colombia and include Central America in the confederation. Ecuador, however, preferred to support the plan of the Continental Treaty (Nuermberger, 1940: 42).

19. Ministers representing Peru, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Guatemala attended the conference (Nuermberger, 1940: 47).

20. Costa Rica signed the Continental Treaty in early February, 1857; Guatemala in late April, 1857; El Salvador and Nicaragua signed on June 18. As noted in endnote 17, William Walker surrendered at San Juan del Sur in May, 1857 (Nuermberger, 1940: 50, 52; Karnes, 1976: 141).

21. Although it was the conservatives, especially the Guatemalan dictator Rafael Carrera, who generally succeeded in blocking previous Liberal efforts to recreate the Central American federation, during the Walker filibuster in Nicaragua, it was conservatives in Costa Rica, Guatemala and Nicaragua who embraced the "national" cause of union against the "liberal" Yankee filibusterer (see Karnes, 1976).

22. Even among its sponsors, Liberal versus Conservative squabbles in their national legislatures prevented ratification of the Continental Treaty in Peru and Chile. Only Ecuador had both signed and ratified the treaty (Nuermberger, 1940: 49; Inman, 1965: 26).

23. As early as November, 1856, Minister Clay began work in opposition to the Continental Treaty in Peru and even accused Brazil of aiding the "conspiracy" of Chile and Peru to form an alliance against the "ambitions and incursions of the United States" (Nuermberger, 1940: 46-47).

24. By December the three powers had established their occupation of the customs house at Vera Cruz. England and Spain later dropped out of the intervention, leaving French forces to carry out the plan of installing a European monarch to rule Mexico.

25. There were mixed feelings in Latin America, both about the nature of the French intervention in Mexico and the best means to address the threat. Guatemala's General Carrera argued that Mexico's civil wars and irresponsibility had brought the intervention on itself; he also was believed to be supportive of the French project of installing a monarchy there. Other Central American states, especially Costa Rica, were far more alarmed, fearing their own subjection to a new Mexican empire. The French intervention in Mexico and the Spanish annexation of the Dominican Republic also seemed rather distant threats to countries like Argentina and Chile, both of which initially supported more bilateral diplomacy with the Europeans rather than attempt another ill-fated alliance (Frazer, 1948: 384-387).

26. There was a strong solidarity movement in Peru with the Mexican cause. The press urged a boycott of French imports and citizens formed solidarity organizations, like the Sociedad de los Defensores de la Independencia Americana de Lima, which raised money to aid wounded Mexican soldiers in the war against France (Frazer, 1948: 387).

27. The French intervention in Mexico remained a source of concern, but after the U.S. Civil War ended, the United States used its diplomatic and military pressure against France to help rid Mexico of the French-installed monarchy of Maximillian (Davis, 1977a: 110).

28. One wonders how the diplomats and foreign ministers regarded the status of these signed but unratified treaties. Was there ever any de facto implementation? For example, were the 1865 Postal Convention or the agreements to share statistical data complied with by any state despite the failure of ratification? Or were these conventions totally ignored once internal politics prevented ratification? More research is needed in this obscure area of Latin American international relations and foreign policy.

CHAPTER III

LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM

> "We owe it therefore to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and [the European] powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this Hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety....[W]ith the governments who have declared their independence, and have maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration, and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling them in any other manner, their destiny, by any European power, in any other light, than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States."
> President James Monroe's Statement to the United States Congress, December 2, 1823.[1]

The Pan-American Union and The Monroe Doctrines

The government of the United States tended to remain aloof from the various nineteenth century Spanish American attempts to form a diplomatic and defensive union of states. The United States shared with Latin American liberals the idea that the New World republics were uniquely different from the decaying monarchies of Europe, and the "Two Spheres" concept developed early in the North American national consciousness. However, the Washingtonian and Jeffersonian pronouncements against permanent, inveterate, and entangling alliances became the cornerstone of early U.S. foreign policy and precluded serious participation in the Bolivaran projects of union to the south.

Instead the United States developed an early foreign policy of neutrality,[2] particularly with regard to the interstate political and military conflicts of Europe. This foreign policy of neutrality was elaborated in President James Monroe's address to Congress on December 2, 1823: The United States would not interfere in European political affairs just as the European powers were expected not to interfere in American political affairs. But if the European powers ever attempted to recolonize or manipulate the newly independent states of the Western Hemisphere, the United States would interprete this as a threat to its own national security. President Monroe's statement to Congress, which only much later would come to be known as the Monroe Doctrine,[3] was a unilateral policy statement seeking to defend the national interests and security of the young North American republic vis-a-vis European powers. It did not pledge any U.S. aid or support to other American states for the mutual defense of their independence. It also recognized the continued colonial status of other European territories in the circum-Caribbean region, such as Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Jamaica (Atkins, 1989: 112-115; Moreno Pino, 1977: 72-73; Boersner, 1986; Whitaker, 1954; Langley, 1989).

Preoccupied with its land expansion westward during the rest of the nineteenth century, the United States government tended to deal with the states of South America on limited, bilateral, and mainly commercial terms. Nineteenth century U.S.-Mexican relations are an important exception to this generalization, with the Mexican-American War (1846-1848) playing an important role in the

development of the ideology of Manifest Destiny[4] and the U.S. land expansion westward. Moreover, through the mid-nineteenth century there were factions in the United States who urged greater official U.S. participation in Spanish American diplomatic affairs while filibusterers and private entrepreneurs, such as William Walker, John L. O'Sullivan, Cornelius Vanderbildt and others, became intensely involved in the affairs of Latin American states in the circum-Caribbean region.

Nevertheless, it was not until the western frontier was closing in the 1880s that the United States government officially began to turn its attention southward to expand its commercial ties and promote commercial opportunities with the rest of the hemisphere. The need for raw materials for industrial expansion and the search for new markets for its industrial goods were becoming all the more important given intense European (and especially British) competition. In the 1880s both the United States and many Latin Americans shared a growing concern over increased European economic investments in the Western Hemisphere and over Europe's imperialistic tendencies there as well as in Africa and Asia. In the United States, this concern was manifested in a growing sentiment of "Pan-Americanism," which stressed the presumed geographic ties and political affinities of the New World republics.

One of the better known Pan-Americanists in the 1880s was James G. Blaine, who served as the U.S. Secretary of State in two different administrations. In 1881, Secretary Blaine issued

invitations to all the Latin American states (save Haiti) for an international conference in Washington. With immediate concern over the outbreak of the War of the Pacific (1879-1882 between Chile, Peru, and Bolivia), Secretary Blaine intended for the conference to consider ways to prevent war as well as improve commercial relations in the Americas. After President Garfield's assassination, however, President Chester Arthur replaced Secretary Blaine and rescinded the conference invitations. Nevertheless, the U.S. Congress maintained an interest in Blaine's ideas and sent a mission to Latin America to study commercial opportunities in the region. In 1888, the Congress passed a resolution authorizing President Grover Cleveland to call another international conference to address commercial matters as well as to consider a plan of arbitration to settle international disputes in the Americas. The president acquiesced and invitations for the Pan-American conference were sent out. It was James Blaine, reinstated as Secretary of State under the new administration of President Benjamin Harrison, who presided over the First International Conference of American States, which opened in Washington on October 1, 1889 (Moreno Pino, 1977: 75-76; Peck, 1977: 167; Inman, 1965: 33-34; Atkins, 1989: 116).

All of the Latin American states except the Dominican Republic sent delegates to the conference.[6] Over the next six and a half months, until April 18, 1890, Secretary Blaine ably ran the seventy sessions of the conference and nurtured his pan-American vision of a hemisphere of friendship and cooperation. The first fifteen sessions focused on the general organization of the conference and

on developing its procedural rules,[7] which would establish useful precedents for future meetings. The delegates then turned their attention to the two principal agenda items: The expansion of inter-American commerce and the development of a plan of arbitration (Inman, 1965: 40; Moreno Pino, 1977: 75; Atkins, 1989: 116; Peck, 1977: 167-168; Boersner, 1986: 194-195).

The Latin American delegations were most interested in discussing the plan of arbitration and related political matters, such as those relating to extradition, the juridical rights of foreigners (including the Calvo principle), and the proscription of the right of conquest. The conference approved a treaty providing for the voluntary arbitration of international disputes which eleven states signed, but no state ratified the treaty before its deadline of May 1, 1891.[8]

The United States was most interested in discussing the commercial matters on the conference agenda, especially measures to form an inter-American customs union. The conference passed various resolutions concerning improved transportation and communications services, uniform customs and commercial regulations, monetary and exchange controls, patents and copyright protection, and international sanitation measures; yet these agreements received few ratifications (Peck, 1977: 168; Inman, 1965: 43, 45).

Little came of the U.S. goal of creating a hemispheric customs union except for one lasting agreement that created the International Union of American Republics. This rudimentary regional organization including both the United States and Latin

American states was created to gather, publish, and distribute commercial statistics and related information from and for its members. The Union's permanent organ, the Commercial Office of American Republics, was housed in the U.S. State Department under the supervision of the U.S. secretary of state. With $36,000 put up by the United States for its operations in the first year, the Commercial Office began publishing a periodic bulletin and soon concerned itself with a wider range of questions relating to the economic life and growth of its members[9] (Moreno Pino, 1977: 76; Atkins, 1989: 205; Peck, 1977: 168; Inman, 1965: 45-46; Boersner, 1986: 194-195; Inter-American Institute, 1966: xxi).

It took eleven years for a second International Conference of American Republics to be held in Mexico City (1901-1902), but two more conferences followed at four-year intervals after that (in Rio de Janeiro, 1906, and Buenos Aires, 1910). It thus appeared that the Pan-American movement gained ground in the first decade of the twentieth century. However, at each of these three inter-American conferences, clear differences emerged between Latin American states and the United States over the structure and control as well as the purpose of the fledgling regional organization.

Differences over the structure of the organization focused on the tight control of the U.S. State Department over the Commercial Bureau, which was renamed and reorganized as the International Bureau of American Republics at the Mexico City conference in 1902. The Bureau was restructured to include Latin American diplomats accredited to the United States in its directorship, however the

U.S. secretary of state continued to be its *ex officio* head. Governments without *de jure* recognition by the United States or those without diplomatic representation to Washington could not participate in the International Bureau. These rules fueled growing criticism at subsequent conferences by Latin American states because it was not clear whether the International Bureau was an international diplomatic organ administering a hemispheric union of equals or merely a technocratic appendage of the U.S. State Department, which sought to control and define "Pan-Americanism" on its own terms.

The United States blocked Latin American demands to change these rules until well into the 1920s. However, after the 1906 conference in Rio de Janeiro, the International Bureau was given an expanded secretarial role for the next inter-American conference. At the 1910 conference in Buenos Aires, the Bureau's structure was again a topic of debate, but all that could be agreed was to rename it the Pan American Union after a new building of the same name was donated by Andrew Carnegie in Washington to house this administrative organ of the Union of American Republics (Moreno Pino, 1977: 168-172; Atkins, 1989: 205-207; Inter-American Institute, 1966: xxii-xxiv).

Renaming the Pan American Union was the only success of the 1910 conference. As Peck (1977: 172) summarized it, "[t]he spirit of Pan Americanism, which had never been hardy, almost expired at this conference." By that time, not only had differences over the structure and control of the Union by the United States become deep,

but disagreement over the purpose of the regional organization became clearer.

The United States had continued to see the regional union as a means to improve U.S.-Latin American commercial relations and to consolidate U.S. commercial advantages in the region at the expense of European capital. As heads of the organization's young secretariat, the U.S. secretaries of state were able to focus the agenda items of these early inter-American conferences on such apolitical issues a commercial relations, settlement of financial claims, the study of the codification of international law, and the secretariat's own institutional and procedural development. The Latin Americans, however, were more interested in political and security issues. In the tradition of the nineteenth century, Latin American states thought that the purpose of the International Union of American Republics was to ensure the sovereignty of its members and develop peaceful, juridical means to settle inter-state disputes. Commerce was a second-order issue compared to the protection of sovereignty against interventionist threats from outside powers. But by 1910, it was the United States, not European powers, that increasingly seemed to pose the principal threat to the sovereignty of at least the circum-Caribbean states.

Between 1895 and 1910, Latin Americans had grown increasingly concerned over the considerable expansion of U.S. interests in and power over the circum-Caribbean region. In 1895, U.S. Secretary of State Richard Olney articulated the new U.S. attitude toward the region in his instructions to the U.S. minister to London, who was

involved in arbitrating a border dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela. His instructions contained what would come to be called the "Olney Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine:

> Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.... It is...master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers (in Gantenbein, 1950: 348).

Three years later, in 1898, the United States intervened in the Cuban war for independence from Spain and suddenly found its military forces occupying the former Spanish colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. As Philip S. Foner (1972) put it, the era of United States imperialism was born.

Within five years, the administration of Theodore Roosevelt had implemented the Platt Amendment, which made Cuba a virtual protectorate of the United States, and had secured the "independence" of Panama from Colombia under similar terms in order to begin the construction of a transisthmian canal. Then, in response to political and financial instability in the Dominican Republic in 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt declared his famous corollary to the Monroe Doctrine to justify U.S. military and economic intervention in that island nation:

> Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power (in Gantenbein, 1950: 362).

Here the United States claimed not only the right but also the duty to intervene by force in unstable Caribbean states and exercise international police power in the hemisphere. After this, the United States increasingly turned to its marines to advance its growing security interests and enforce its new authority in the circum-Caribbean region.

Thus United States policy toward Latin America by 1910 operated on two seemingly contradictory tranjectories. On the one hand, the United States tried to promote its conception of friendly "Pan Americanism" and use the fledgling inter-American institutions to increase the commercial unity and cooperation of the region. On the other hand, the United States increasingly used its marines unilaterally and aggressively to excercise its new-found military and financial power at the expense of the sovereignty of many circum-Caribbean states, including Cuba, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and soon several others.

Not surprisingly, U.S. interventionism through military force and financial control had produced considerable resentment and opposition in Latin America. As early as 1901, at the Second International Conference of American States, the Latin Americans urged the United States to accept the principle of non-intervention.[10] The United States opposed the resolution and was able to push the intervention issue off the agenda of subsequent conferences. Moreover, U.S. interventionism inspired many Latin American essayists, poets, and statesmen to articulate a growing anti-Yankee sentiment throughout Central and South America. Few

writers could match the angry anti-interventionistic verse found in Nicaraguan poet Rubén Darío's poem "To Roosevelt" (Darío, 191?). But many other Latin American writers[11] eloquently pointed out the hypocrisy of "Pan Americanism" and condemned Theodore Roosevelt's twisting of the Monroe Doctrine into a unilateral claim of hegemonial police power over the hemisphere.

Several essayists even came to identify multiple Monroe Doctrines. The Chilean diplomat Marcial Martínez (1913: 302) compared the Monroe Doctrine to a medal: On one side was President Monroe's "simple and wise declaration," and on the other "the aspirations and schemes ... of imperialism, or Napoleonism, of the United States in this hemisphere." The Mexican diplomat and sociologist Carlos Pereyra (1914: 47-50; 1959) found at least three Monroe Doctrines, "perhaps there are others," each progressively more aggressive than the former and each serving only United States' interests, not those of Latin America. Still others, like the Colombian diplomat Santiago Pérez Triana (1914: 324) and former Argentine President Roque Sáenz Peña (1914: 345-352), argued that the original Monroe Doctrine be extended to prohibit not just European but also North American interventionism in Latin America. Only in this way could true pan-American friendship and trust prevail in the hemisphere.

Despite mounting Latin American criticism, U.S. interventionism in the circum-Caribbean region became even more aggressive in the 1910s. Eager to exercise its growing military power and convinced of its moral and political superiority, the Wilson administration

turned increasingly to the use of gunboat diplomacy and initiated prolongued military occupations in several other Caribbean states, including Mexico (1914), Haiti (1915), and the Dominican Republic (1916). Like Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson was impatient with the political instability of the weak states of the region.[12] Wilson also held the traditional Monrovian concern about the possibility of European intervention in the states of the region, especially after the Panama Canal opened and war broke out in Europe in 1914. Grounded or not, fears of a European military threat to expanded U.S. interests in the circum-Caribbean region after 1914 prompted the Wilson administration to rely increasingly on the marines as its principal policy instrument.

Latin American hostility to Wilson's gunboat diplomacy and prolongued U.S. military occupations in Cuba, Panama, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Haiti was strong enough to prevent any further inter-American conferences[13] until well into the 1920s and preclude continental solidarity in the course of World War I.[14] But the Latin American diplomatic response to U.S. hegemony and interventionism in the circum-Caribbean also took more positive forms in the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s. During this period, both within and outside of the pan-American institutions, a new kind of diplomatic activism by several Latin American states emerged and sought to challenge the power of the United States through various diplomatic mechanisms while pressing the United States to accept the principle of non-interventionism in inter-American affairs. The Latin American diplomatic activism of this period is important for

understanding the subsequent development of the principles and institutions of the inter-American system.

Latin American Diplomatic Challenges to U.S. Hegemony and Interventionism, 1914-1933

The ABC Mediation

Between 1914 and 1933, several Latin American states jointly used various legal and diplomatic means to challenge the United States' presumed right of intervention in the circum-Caribbean region. The first of these diplomatic challenges came in the wake of the U.S. intervention in the Mexican Revolution in 1914, when three of the stronger Latin American states, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, offered their good offices to mediate the military conflict between the United States' and Mexican forces.

The events of the Mexican Revolution had deeply interested President Woodrow Wilson since his first days in office and he personally handled much of U.S. policy toward Mexico. Wilson opposed General Victoriano Huerta's claim to power after the assassination of Mexican President Francisco Madero and his vice president. Instead, in the country's bitter civil war, Wilson supported the constitutionalist forces led by Venustiano Carranza against General Huerta's federalist forces.

In April 1914, two incidents occured in close succession that drew U.S. marines into direct conflict with General Huerta's forces. The first incident involved the arrest of a group of marines on April 9 that had disembarked from its ship in Tampico

in search of fuel without the permission of the local authorities. The matter was soon cleared up and the men were released, but the U.S. admiral demanded an official apology and the salute of the U.S. flag by Huerta's forces, which controlled the port city. Huerta refused these demands. President Wilson responded by announcing a naval blockade of Mexico's coasts to cut off arms shipments to Huerta's forces and by asking Congress for the authority to use military force in Mexico if it became necessary.

Before the Congress could act the second incident occured. On April 20 another U.S. ship at the port of Veracruz discovered that a German ship was about to deliver arms for General Huerta's forces. On orders from President Wilson in the early morning hours of April 21, the U.S. ship's admiral launched a violent attack on Veracruz and landed 1,000 marines who fought both Mexican troops and civilians to capture the town's customs house. Later that day, Henry Cabot Lodge led the effort in the U.S. Senate to authorize the use of force against Huerta and urged an even fuller U.S. intervention into Mexico. Reinforcements of another 3,000 marines soon followed to pacify the town and establish the U.S. military occupation of Veracruz (Guerrero Yoachám, 1966: 56-61; Serrano Migallón, 1981: 42-45; Peck, 1977: 174-157).

Throughout Latin America, the public reacted with shock and angry condemnations of the U.S. intervention. Many feared the outbreak of war between the two countries. In Washington, the Argentine minister to the United States, Rómulo S. Naón, initiated a proposal to his Brazilian and Chilean counterparts that the three

states offer their good offices to mediate the international conflict between the United States and Mexico. Within four days of the intervention, on April 25, 1914, the three South American diplomats sent a note on behalf of their governments to the U.S. Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, and to General Huerta with the offer of mediation "to serve the interests of peace and civilization in our continent and with the desire of avoiding any further bloodshed...." A similar note was sent to Venustiano Carranza on April 28 (Guerrero Yoachám, 1966: 70, 74-74; Gantenbein, 1950: 572).

The offer of mediaton by the ABC powers, as they were called by the press at the time, won the praise of statesmen, diplomats and the publics throughout the Americas and Europe. Argentina, Brazil and Chile were the most stable and advanced states in Latin America at the time and were emerging actors on the international scene. Wary of encouraging revolutionary ideas in their own countries, none of them approved of the bloody revolutionary conflict in Mexico; but they were even less favorably disposed to leaving the U.S. intervention unanswered. The primary interest of the ABC powers in the mediation effort was to prevent a larger war through total U.S. intervention in the Mexican civil war and to arrange for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Veracruz, but they also had an interest in promoting negotiations among Mexico's warring factions in order to pacify its violent civil conflict.[15] However, the intransigence of the Wilson administration and the complicated

internal situation of Mexico's civil war prevented the mediation effort from achieving all of these goals.

The Wilson administration viewed the offer of mediation as a perfect opportunity to arrange the removal of General Huerta, set up a provisional government under U.S. influence, and support certain moderate reforms that would circumvent more radical demands for change in Mexico. President Wilson immediately sent a confidential memo outlining this plan to the ABC diplomats along with the official U.S. acceptance of the mediation offer (Guerrero Yoachám, 1966: 71-72).

General Huerta initially answered that he preferred to bring the matter of the U.S. intervention before the International Court at the Hague, but international pressure persuaded him to agree to the ABC mediation. He also saw the boost to his claims of legitimacy that might be gained by being a party to the talks, despite the official U.S. position of refusing to recognize his government. As for the constitutionalists, Carranza's position was initially positive, agreeing "in principle" that the international conflict between the United States and Mexico should be settled through mediation. But after the ABC powers sought a cease fire from all three parties, Carranza made it clear that he in no way considered the internal civil conflict between Mexicans as a legitimate subject of the mediation. It would instead constitute as much of a violation of Mexican sovereignty as the landing of foreign troops. Frustrating the careful preparations of the ABC diplomats and thwarting Wilson's plan to negotiate the removal of Huerta in

favor of a constitutionalist provisional government, Carranza removed the constitutionalists from any direct part in the mediation[16] (Guerrero Yoachám, 1966: 71-72; 76-77).

Thus handicapped, the ABC mediation opened in Niagara Falls, Canada, on May 20, 1914 and officially lasted until July 1. Four sessions were held in which various proposals were drafted and rejected by either the United States or the ABC powers to remove Huerta, establish some type of provisional or interim government, and withdraw U.S. troops from Veracruz. The main difference in these proposals had to do with the nature of the provisional government to be established. The Wilson administration insisted that it be headed by a member of the constitutionalist party --but not by Carranza[17]-- while the ABC mediators, in accordance with the Mexican Constitution of 1857, proposed that a provisional junta be formed with one Huertista, one constitutionalist, and two neutrals who would then call for new presidential and congressional elections. Another difference was that the U.S. insisted that the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Veracruz was an issue to be negotiated by the United States and a new provisional government whereas the main ABC proposal stipulated that the withdrawal of troops begin fifteen days after the formation of a provisional junta and end within thirty days. In any case, the United States succeeded in focusing the discussions on the internal political matter of establishing a new government rather than on the international conflict between the United States and Mexico.

Meanwhile, Carranza continued to reject the discussion of Mexico's internal problems by outside powers (Guerrero Yoachám, 1966: 137-142).

The intransigence of both Wilson and Carranza frustrated the ABC mediators to the point that they feared the complete failure of the mediation. In a final attempt to save whatever international prestige they had won by extending their good offices, the ABC mediators drafted a protocol that resolved very little but represented the most that could be agreed. A provisional government would somehow be organized by the Mexicans themselves; the United States and the ABC states would recognize such a government immediately; the United States government would renounce any claims to a war indemnity; the provisional government would declare a political amnesty, and it would negociate the creation of international commissions to settle private claims of foreigners for damages sustained during the civil war. The agreement made no mention of a U.S. troop withdrawal from Mexican soil. The protocol was signed by the U.S. representatives on July 1, 1914, and on July 3 Huerta's representatives sent the protocol to the Mexican Congress for ratification, which came on July 11. With this meager outcome, the ABC mediators proclaimed success and ended the mediation conference (Guerrero Yoachám, 1966: 144-149).

The final protocol provided General Huerta with a face-saving means to give up his claim to power and leave Mexico by July 16. It also pledged the United States to respect the interim government that followed. Within a month, an interim government negotiated the

surrender of federalist forces to the constitutionalists and turned over power to Carranza by August 20. But it was not until November 23, 1914, that the United States began to withdraw its forces from Veracruz, a decision which appears to have had little if anything to do with the ABC mediation efforts[18] (Guerrero Yoachám, 1966: 152-153; Serrano Migallón, 1981: 52-54.

Despite its limited outcome, most observers of the time and since then have agreed that the ABC mediation probably prevented a wider war or deeper intervention by the United States and that it frustrated President Wilson's plan to install a constitutionalist government of his liking (Guerrero Yoachám, 1966: 156-170). But the greater significance of the ABC mediation is that it was a joint diplomatic effort by three leading Latin American states to challenge the United States' presumed right of intervention in the civil war of a circum-Caribbean state. The marine occupation of Veracruz and the threat of another war between the United States and Mexico had prompted Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, in the absence of inter-American peacekeeping machinery, to act together to limit and try to resolve an inter-American crisis through diplomacy. The participation of Argentina and Brazil in the mediation was in itself significant insofar as both states had traditionally remained aloof from earlier Spanish American multilateral diplomacy. Now they led the joint mediation effort, which would remain an important precedent in establishing the principle of the peaceful resolution of conflict in inter-American affairs (Guerrero Yoachám, 1966: 170).

The ABC mediation is also important because it illustrates the emergence of an ABC power bloc in the early twentieth century[19] which acted to check the expanding power of the United States and assume leadership in asserting "Latin American" interests in hemispheric affairs. Moreover, the mediation effort itself helped to strengthen the ties of this power bloc and made it a kind of counterpoise in the southern cone to North American power in the hemisphere.[20] Even Theodore Roosevelt recognized in his 1922 autobiography that

> [t]he great and prosperous civilized commonwealths, such as the Argentine, Brazil, and Chile, have advanced so far that they no longer stand in any position of tutelage toward the United States. They occupy toward us precisely the position that Canada occupies. Their friendship is the friendship of equals for equals (Roosevelt, 1922: 506).

Finally, the ABC mediation won for the three states sufficient diplomatic prestige to bolster their new position and underscore their emerging power interests in hemispheric and international affairs. The diplomatic leadership and prestige goals of these states (but especially Argentina) would remain important once the inter-American conferences resumed in the 1920s, as would the issue of U.S. interventionism in the circum-Caribbean region.

Latin American Diplomatic Challenges to U.S. Interventionism Within the Pan American Institutions

The experience of the ABC mediation did not deter the Wilson administration from launching other interventions and new military occupations in the smaller circum-Caribbean states, such as Haiti

in 1915 and the Dominican Republic in 1916 (see e.g., Munro, 1964; Schmidt, 1971; Calder, 1984; Langley, 1989, 1985; Perkins, 1966; Pérez, 1983). However, it did cause U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing to advise Wilson against further intervention in Mexico or, at the very least, to avoid using the word "intervention." Among other reasons, Lansing recognized that "American intervention in Mexico is extremely distasteful to all Latin America and might have a very bad effect upon our Pan-American program" (in Gantenbein, 1950: 587).

Indeed, the United States' Pan-American program was stalled until 1923, when the Fifth Inter-American Conference --postponed since 1914-- was finally held in Santiago, Chile. Unlike the previous inter-American conferences, the Latin American states successfully placed several political and security issues on the agenda of the Santiago meeting. There were few substantive results of the conference, but three of its achievements were important.

First, the Pan American Union was again restructured, this time removing the U.S. secretary of state as its ex officio head and providing for the election of its president. The second and most substantive product of the conference was the approval of the Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts Between the American States, better known as the Gondra Treaty (named after its author, a former president of Paraguay, Manuel Gondra). This treaty was the first positive attempt of the Latin American states to create an obligatory procedure to settle potential military conflicts. Any controversy not settled through diplomatic channels or arbitration

was to be submitted to an ad hoc five member commission of inquiry. The disputants were pledged to abstain from any hostile acts, both while the commission investigated the controversy and for a period of six months after the commission made its report. Although the commission's report had no juridical force and the Gondra Treaty established no effective means for settling a conflict once military action had begun, it nevertheless provided for a cooling off period to prevent military conflict between states. It also created two permanent commissions, one in Montevideo and one in Washington, to receive and transmit requests for invoking the commissions of inquiry (Moreno Pino, 1977: 79; Peck, 1977: 185; Inter-American Institute, 1966: xxv; Garner, 1966: 56; Gondra Treaty in Gantenbein, 1950: 731-736).

The third important occurrence of the 1923 Santiago conference was an unusually frank discussion of the Monroe Doctrine. Several Latin American delegations, led by Colombia, asked the United States for a definition of the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine. Not only was the presumed right of intervention claimed by the Roosevelt Corollary openly being questioned for the first time in an inter-American conference; also at issue was the relationship of the young inter-American organization to the League of Nations. By 1923 most Latin American states[21] actively participated in the League, which they saw as another potential counterweight to U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. However, the U.S. refusal to join the League and Article XXI of the League's Charter mentioning the existence of the Monroe Doctrine created doubts in many minds as to the

usefulness of the League in protecting Latin American states from the unilateral exercise of U.S. power. Argentina had even proposed an amendment at the League's first assembly that would have eliminated the Charter's reference to the Monroe Doctrine, but that proposal was tabled[22] (Moreno Pino, 1977: 79; Williams, 1971: 75; Peck, 1977: 181, 184).

In Santiago, the U.S. delegation answered the Latin American request by stating simply that the Monroe Doctrine was "originally and essentially" a national policy not subject to international debate or definition[23] (Moreno Pino, 1977: 79). Later that year, in a speech commemorating the centennial of the Monroe Doctrine, U.S. Secretary of State Charles Evan Hughes reiterated this position by stressing that because "the policy embodied in the Monroe Doctrine is distinctively the policy of the United States, the government of the United States reserves to itself its definition, interpretation, and application"[24] (in Gantenbein, 1950: 387).

The Latin American states were dissatisfied with this response because it failed to renounce the interventionist claim of the Roosevelt Corollary or re-establish the original anti-interventionist premise of President Monroe's message to Congress. In this atmosphere of growing Latin American impatience with and hostility toward continuing U.S. interventionist policies in the circum-Caribbean, the issue of intervention became the central focus of the next two inter-American conferences.

At the Sixth Inter-American Conference held in Havana in 1928, the debate over the intervention issue was so rancorous that the

minutes of the meeting had to be rewritten (Connell-Smith, 1966: 155). Led by Argentina, the Latin American delegations demanded that the United States accept the principle of non-intervention as formulated during a meeting of the Commission of American Jurists in the previous year. The formula stated simply, "No State has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another." U.S. Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes flatly refused this formula, countering with what had become a familiar U.S. argument stressing the international legal right to protect the lives and property of its citizens (Moreno Pino, 1977: 80; Williams, 1971: 81-82; Peck, 1977: 187-188):

> What are we to do when government breaks down and American citizens are in danger of their lives?... Of course, the United States cannot forego its right to protect its citizens. International Law cannot be changed by the resolutions of this conference[25] (in Williams, 1971: 82).

Beyond the rancorous and unresolved showdown over the non-intervention principle, the Havana conference did pass several important resolutions, including one to study and codify American international law and one to hold a special inter-American conference on arbitration and conciliation. By December 1928, the special conference was convened in Washington and produced the General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation, which extended the scope of the Gondra Treaty, and the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration and Protocol of Progressive Arbitration. These agreements condemned war as an instrument of national policy and

sought to develop inter-American methods for the pacific settlement of disputes. They were eventually signed and ratified by most members of the pan-American system and would comprise the central albeit limited peace-keeping structures of the system into the next decade (in Gantenbein, 1950: 737-751; Moreno Pino, 1977: 80-81; Peck, 1977: 188).

The 1928 Havana conference was also successful in reforming the membership and representation rules of the Pan American Union, dropping the old and controversial requirement that only those diplomats accredited to Washington could participate in the Union. But despite its successes, the Havana conference is best remembered for its heated debate over the intervention issue. Yet official U.S. attitudes toward intervention were beginning to change. In December 1928, the U.S. Under-Secretary of State J. Reuben Clark[26] issued his "Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine," which repudiated the Roosevelt Corollary as an invalid interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine and separated the "right of intervention" from the underlying security principle of Monroe's message to Congress. In other words, the Clark Memorandum did not repudiate the "right of intervention" *per se*, but disconnected it from the Monroe Doctrine. The Clark Memorandum was not made public until 1930, but with the diplomatic showdown between Latin America and the United States in Havana and the writing of the Clark Memorandum, the year 1928 marks the beginning of the end of this era of unilateral U.S. military interventionism in the circum-Caribbean region (Clark, 1928: 115-122; Perkins, 1966: 83; Connell-Smith, 1966: 157-158).

The Seventh Inter-American Conference was held at Montevideo, Uruguay in 1933 and marks the beginning of a new period of inter-American relations. The conference produced several notable agreements,[27] but its most important achievement was the unanimous approval of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. This convention not only defined the existence, personality, juridical equality, and recognition of the state, but it also included in Article 8 a non-intervention principle that went even further than the failed 1928 resolution by stating, "No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another" (in Gantenbein, 1950: 759-763; Inter-American Institute, 1966: xxvi; Moreno Pino, 1977: 82; Finan, 1977a: 200; Williams, 1971: 76, 96).

By agreeing to this convention and accepting its non-intervention principle,[28] Franklin D. Roosevelt demonstrated his commitment to implementing his "Good Neighbor Policy," which he had announced in his inaugural address in March 1933. Just two days after the Seventh Inter-American Conference closed, President Roosevelt reiterated this commitment in a speech to the Woodrow Wilson Foundation by stating "the definitive policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention" (in Gantenbein, 1950: 166). Franklin Roosevelt thus began to implement a policy he had outlined in his 1928 article on U.S. foreign policy that appeared in Foreign Affairs, where he stressed the need to "renounce the practice of arbitrary intervention in the home affairs of our neighbors." "Single-handed intervention by us in the internal affairs of other nations must end; with the cooperation of

others we shall have more order in this hemisphere and less dislike" (Roosevelt, 1928: 586, 585).

Although it was foreshadowed in the Clark Memorandum and in the Hoover administration's decision to end the U.S. marine occupation of Nicaragua, the Good Neighbor Policy was a significant break with past U.S. policy by explicitly repudiating the armed interventions and occupations of the previous decades (Curry, 1979).[29] Moreover, these interventions had not only created ill-will among Latin Americans toward the United States; with the onset of the Great Depression, such military interventions and occupations had also become costly at home, both economically and politically. In fact, the Good Neighbor Policy became the foreign policy complement to Roosevelt's New Deal policies by easing the financial drain on the United States and facilitating economic recovery through trade in the face of rising economic nationalism throughout Latin America. As Secretary of State Cordell Hull explained in his speech to the Seventh Inter-American Conference at Montevideo,

> My government is doing its utmost, with due regard to the commitments made in the past, to end with all possible speed engagements which have been set up by previous circumstances. There are some engagements which can be removed more speedily than others. In some instances, disentanglement from obligations of another era can only be brought about through the exercise of some patience. The United States is determined that its new policy of the New Deal --of enlightened liberalism-- shall have full effect and shall be recognized in its fullest import by its neighbors. The people of my country strongly feel that the so-called right of conquest must forever be banished from this hemisphere and, most of all, they shun and reject that right for themselves. The New Deal indeed would be an empty boast if it did not mean that" (in Gantenbein, 1950: 164).

Thus, between 1933 and 1936 the Roosevelt administration disengaged the United States from direct control over the circum-Caribbean region. The administration ended the long marine occupation of Haiti as well as the financial receiverships over Haiti and Dominican Republic; it also abrogated the Platt Amendment with Cuba and negotiated a new canal treaty with Panama. Of course, in the place of the marines, long-standing dictators like Anastacio Somoza in Nicaragua, Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, and Rafael Trujillo in Dominican Republic soon rose to power through the national guard organizations previously created and trained during the U.S. occupations. Nevertheless, the Roosevelt administration moved to reorient U.S. policy toward Latin America along more multilateralist and cooperative lines and began to construct a hemispheric security regime based on the principle of collective security.

As if to prove its break with the past, in 1936 the Roosevelt administration renewed its commitment to the non-intervention principle by signing without reservation the Additional Protocol on Non-Intervention, a document containing the most sweeping non-intervention clause yet:

> The High Contracting Parties declare inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the Parties (in Gantenbein, 1950: 778).

The Additional Protocol on Non-Intervention was just one of several important agreements produced by the Special Conference on

the Maintenance of Peace held in Buenos Aires in 1936. The immediate concern of this conference was the devastating Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay (1928-29, 1933-38);[30] however, the rising concern over the rumors of war in Europe also played an important part. The special conference's other agreements included resolutions on the limitations of armaments and on the "humanization" of war, treaties on Good Offices and Mediation and on the Prevention of Controversies, a Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation, and Reestablishment of Peace, and a Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation. These agreements would come to constitute the foundations of a new security regime for the hemisphere based on the principle of collective security (see Gantenbein, 1950: 771-780).

This nascent collective security regime was given a procedural basis at the Eighth International Conference of American States held in Lima in 1938. The "Declaration of Lima" established a mechanism of consultation of foreign ministers to discuss any matter that threatened the peace, security, or territorial integrity of any American republic and thus gave effect to the principles of continental solidarity and security. The new hemispheric security regime received further elaboration at the three special Meetings of Consultation of Foreign Ministers held during World War II (in Panama, 1939; Havana, 1940; Rio de Janeiro, 1942) and at the special Chapultepec Conference on the Problems of War and Peace held in Mexico in March, 1945 (see Chapter IV). These moves toward building an inter-American security regime culminated in the 1947 Conference

for the Maintenance of Peace and Continental Security held in Rio de Janeiro, which produced the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, better known as the Rio Treaty (see Chapter IV) (Moreno Pino, 1977: 84-89; Finan, 1977b: 223; Gantenbein, 1950: 785-815).

Conclusion

During the 1930s, Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy went a long way toward rescuing the Pan-American vision that almost died in 1910. In words and actions, the Roosevelt administration convinced most Latin Americans that the era of U.S. interventionism --or what Marcial Martínez had called "Napoleonism"-- was over and that a new era of hemispheric cooperation and solidarity based on mutual respect had begun.[31] The change in U.S. policy may have had more to do with the United States' weakened condition as a consequence of the Great Depression and related domestic politics than with any specific diplomatic pressure exerted by the Latin American states.[32] Yet the heated discussions of the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine and the principle of non-intervention at the inter-American conferences of the 1920s and early 1930s clearly indicated the necessary diplomatic path to take if the United States wanted to improve its hemispheric relations and strengthen inter-American institutions.

The effect of Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy was to set the stage for widespread hemispheric cooperation during World

War II and to earn the good will and political capital necessary to develop new inter-American institutions during and immediately after the war. However, just when it seemed the United States had learned how to deal with its Latin American neighbors as respected equals and partners, the United States emerged as a global superpower and developed a new vision of its role and interests in the post-1945 international system. As Bryce Wood (1985) has shown, the United States then began to dismantle the Good Neighbor Policy.

ENDNOTES

1. Quoted in Atkins (1989: 114).

2. I believe it is incorrect to characterize nineteenth century U.S. foreign policy as "isolationist." Like many former colonies, after achieving independence the United States was interested in developing trade and commercial relations with other states, especially those of Europe. The search for and development of such commercial ties can hardly be characterized as "isolationistic;" nor can the Mexican-American War and the expansion westward. Rather, in order to develop commerce with as many European states as possible, the United States was interested in developing a policy of neutrality with regard to the political and military conflicts in Europe, not in cutting itself off entirely from any intercourse with Europe. Early U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis the balance of power politics of Europe was remarkably similar to the contemporary policy of non-alignment by Third World states.

3. President Monroe's statement to Congress was virtually forgotten until President Polk restated it in the 1840s; after that, it was at best associated with the political platform of the Democratic Party. It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that it acquired the status of a "doctrine."

4. "Manifest Destiny" was a term coined by a journalist and sometime filibusterer in Cuba, John L. O'Sullivan. In an 1845 editorial concerning the question of Texas and looming war with Mexico, O'Sullivan asserted that Providence itself had given the United States both the right and duty to overspread the continent from ocean to ocean and expand the territory of the United States, previous treaties with the Europeans, Mexicans, and Native Americans notwithstanding. Social darwinist themes were interwoven into the ideology of Manifest Destiny, which claimed that the so-called "lesser races" would inevitably have to pass away (or be uplifted) through the inevitable spread of white "civilization" westward. These themes also played a role in the U.S. expansion across the Pacific Ocean and into the circum-Caribbean region in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For an excellent and engaging analysis of the racial themes and the ideology of U.S. foreign policy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Michael Hunt (1989).

5. In 1890, the U.S. Census Bureau officially declared the western frontier "closed." Yankee territorial expansion across the continent had been achieved.

6. After a six week, 6,000 mile train ride around the East Coast and to Chicago intended to impress the conference delegates with U.S. prosperity and publicize the conference among the North American public, Secretary Blaine opened the conference with an address that stressed the spirit of friendship, law, and cooperation that should prevail between the American states (Inman, 1965: 40).

7. Twenty-one articles on procedure were approved, including rules on voting, languages used, procedures on resolutions, amendments, committee structure and organization, etc. (Inman, 1965: 40).

8. The government of Chile opposed any plan for the compulsory arbitration of territorial disputes given the Tacna-Arica dispute resulting from the War of the Pacific. This opposition forced the conference to adopt the weaker treaty providing for only voluntary arbitration. Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, the United States, Venezuela and Uruguay signed the treaty. The delegates from Argentina, Costa Rica, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru did not sign the arbitration treaty, however they did vote in favor of its adoption (Inman, 1965: 44).

9. Almost all of the Latin American states became members of the International Union of American Republics in 1890 except for the Dominican Republic and Chile, which finally joined in 1892 and 1899 respectively. Cuba and Panama would also become members soon after their nominal independence in 1902 and 1903 respectively (Moreno Pino, 1977: 76). However, the issue of membership of governments not recognized by the United States would soon become a divisive issue (infra).

10. Ever since the First Inter-American Conference in 1889-90, the Latin Americans pressed for a resolution barring intervention to protect foreigners based on the Calvo Doctrine, but the United States refused (Williams, 1971: 75).

11. For an excellent and fascinating collection of original essays by both North Americans and Latin Americans on the history and nature of the Monroe Doctrine, see Alejandro Alvarez, ed. (1924). James W. Gantenbein's (1950) collection of U.S. government documents, speeches, and inter-American treaties is another excellent collection of original documents focusing on U.S.-Latin relations referred to in this chapter.

12. President Wilson developed two controversial types of responses. On the one hand, the Wilson administration developed a strict policy of non-recognition of governments coming to power by force or other extra-constitutional means. In this sense, Wilson was a strict constitutionalist. However,

many perceived a certain bias in the way the non-recognitions policy was used against nationalistic leaders and in favor of those amenable to U.S. interests. On the other hand, President Wilson responded to instability in the circum-Caribbean region, especially in the weakest states, by intervening militarily, establishing U.S. marine occupations under military governorships, and more often than not forcing those states to adopt a constitution written by U.S. envoys.

13. The Fifth Inter-American Conference was scheduled for 1914 in Santiago, Chile, but the intervention issue and the outbreak of World War I caused its postponement until 1923 (Peck, 1977: 184). There was a special pan-American Financial Conference held in Washington in May 1915 to discuss the economic problems created by the war in Europe, however little was accomplished at this conference (Peck, 1977: 178).

14. Very little in the way of hemispheric solidarity or cooperation occured during World War I, when most Latin American states formulated their own policy positions toward the European war. Latin states that joined the United States in declaring war on the Central Powers were those heavily influenced by the United States: Brazil, Cuba, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. States that only broke diplomatic relations with the Central Powers were Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay. States that declared neutrality in the war were those that either actively challenged U.S. hegemony in the hemisphere or those that were least influenced by the United States: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Venezuela. Argentina even went so far as to try to call an inter-American conference against the United States (Peck, 1977: 177-179).

15. Even before the U.S. intervention, the Argentines had sounded out the Brazilians and Chileans about the possibility of offering their good offices to the warring parties in Mexico to end the civil war. All three states maintained neutrality in the civil war (Guerrero Yoachám, 1966: 74-75).

16. Nevertheless, Carranza did send diplomatic envoys, including José Vasconcelos, to Washington and to Buffalo, New York to keep track of the proceedings in Niagara Falls and to relay messages.

17. Wilson did not think Carranza was capable of governing (Guerrero Yoachám, 1966: 113, 125).

18. The withdrawal did not end U.S.-Mexican conflicts, which continued throughout the revolutionary period. U.S. forces again intervened in 1916 in pursuit of Pancho Villa.

19. Norman Bailey (1967: 58) has referred to this bloc as a "condominium hegemony" which emerged in the 1880s and lasted until the mid 1920s, when Chile's relative power position declined as a result of internal instability. See also Atkins (1989: 39).

20. Guerrero Yoachám (1966: 156-167, 170) cites at length several assessments by Latin and North American observers at the time that praised the ABC mediation as opening a new era of diplomacy and defining a new meaning for "Pan-Americanism" while earning for the ABC states a new prestige and power in international and hemispheric affairs.

21. Peru and Bolivia ended their participation in the League in 1921 after the League failed to consider the Tacna-Arica dispute, but both states returned to the League in 1929 once the dispute was resolved (Peck, 1977: 181).

22. After this failed attempt, Argentina stopped actively participating in the League although it officially remained a member. Argentina and other Latin American states (including Costa Rica) tried again in 1928 to get the League to clarify its position toward the Monroe Doctrine, especially after the United States refused Latin demands to renounce interventionism at the Sixth Inter-American Conference in Havana (infra). The League responded that Article 21 was not intended to extend the scope or confirm the validity of the Monroe Doctrine. This new position permitted the League to begin to play a role in hemispheric conflicts after fighting broke out between Bolivia and Paraguay over the Chaco territory (see note 30 below) (Peck, 1977: 183; Garner, 1966).

23. This position of the unilateral nature of the Monroe Doctrine as a national policy was shared by many previous administrations. President Taft's Secretary of State, Elihu Root, once stated that "[s]ince the Monroe doctrine is a declaration based upon the nation's right of self-protection, it cannot be transmuted into a joint or common declaration by American states or any number of them." President Wilson reiterated this position by stating that "The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States on her own authority. It always has been maintained and will be maintained upon her own responsibility" (quoted in a speech by Charles E. Hughes, in Gantenbein, 1950: 388).

24. Hughes also stressed that the Monroe Doctrine "is not a policy of aggression; it is a policy of self-defense.... It still remains an assertion of the principle of national security" (in Gantenbein, 1950: 386). This is the earliest official use of the term "national security" that I have come across in my research.

25. After Hughes' rejection of the non-intervention principle, it was referred back to the Commission of American Jurists for "further study" (Moreno Pino, 1977: 80).

26. J. Reuben Clark was Under-Secretary of State from 1928 to 1929, Ambassador to Mexico from 1930 to 1933, and served as a member of the U.S. delegation to the Seventh Inter-American Conference at Montevideo in 1933 (Dozer, 1966: 115).

27. The Seventh Inter-American Conference produced conventions on Political Asylum, the Teaching of History, and on the Nationality of Women (!) as well as ninety-five resolutions on such matters as economic, commercial, and tarrif policy, commercial arbitration, the further codification of American international law, promotion of tourism, good offices and mediation, agrarian reform and many others (Inter-American Institute, 1966: xxvi; Moreno Pino, 1977: 83; Gantenbein, 1950: 751-765).

28. It should be noted that the United States attached a reservation to the convention focusing on the problems of definition and interpretation related to Article 8. For some observers (i.e., Williams, 1971: 96; Moreno Pino, 1977: 82) this reservation left the door open to future U.S. interventionism in accordance with "the law of nations generally recognized." Nevertheless, the reservation stressed that "no government need fear any intervention on the part of the United States under the Roosevelt Administration" (in Gantenbein, 1950: 763).

29. The marine occupation of the Dominican Republic had ended in 1924 due largley to its unpopularity in the United States, however the United States maintained a military presence there through the training of the Dominican National Guard. The U.S. also maintained its financial receivership over the country until the Roosevelt administration. Moreover, Curry (1979: 10) argues that during the Hoover administration, "the threat of intervention [in the Dominican Republic] was held out as a possible if unwanted measure to discourage developments regarded as inimical to the interests of the United States or certain of its citizens." These threats of U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic during the Hoover administration led Curry to insist that "a Good Neighbor Policy for the western hemisphere did not emerge before 1933....At no time during his tenure did Hoover commit his administration to a policy of non-intervention in Latin America....Roosevelt was prepared to commit the United States to non-intervention; Hoover was not. And therein lay the difference" (Curry, 1979: 1, 9).

30. The Chaco War was a bitter territorial dispute between Bolivia and Paragua over territory (the Chaco) thought to contain substantial amounts of petroleum but that was otherwise useless land. The Roosevelt administration participated in two multilateral attempts to mediate the bloody conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay between 1928 and 1938. Both Argentina and Brazil as well as Peru and the League of Nations competed with each other and with the United States over the Chaco War mediation efforts, each apparently pursuing diplomatic and prestige goals in South America by calling for and supporting the peaceful resolution of the war. A particularly intense diplomatic rivalry developed between the United States and Argentina over the mediation efforts, but U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull skillfully courted the favor of Buenos Aires by showing unusual deferrence toward Argentina's diplomats. Aside from the continued diplomatic activism of Argentina and Brazil and their diplomatic competition with the United States in trying to settle this and other South American conflicts (e.g., the Peruvian-Colombian dispute over Leticia in 1933 and an Ecuadoran-Peruvian border dispute in 1941), the Chaco War mediation is beyond the scope of this chapter. See Garner (1966) for a good account of the Chaco War mediation. See also Finan (1977a: 191-198; 215-219).

31. Other tests of the new U.S. commitment to the non-intervention principle at the time are the U.S. acquiessence to the Bolivian and Mexican petroleum expropriations in 1937 and 1938 respectively.

32. While the focus of this chapter has been on U.S.-Latin diplomatic relations up to World War II and the diplomatic response of Latin American states to U.S. interventionism in the circum-Caribbean region, it should be noted that in Nicaragua, the guerrilla war waged from 1927 to 1932 by Augusto César Sandino against the U.S. marine occupation played a significant role in persuading the Hoover administration to end that occupation (see Macauley, 1967). Domestic opinion and the onset of the Great Depression were also factors that led to the end of that war.

CHAPTER IV

THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AFTER WORLD WAR II

The Emergence of the OAS System

The pan-American system began a new phase of organizational consolidation and development with the special Chapultepec Conference on the Problems of War and Peace in 1945. Organized by the Mexican government, the conference's agenda included consideration of the future of the pan-American system in light of the creation of the United Nations Organization and discussion of ways to strengthen both the regional organization and the economic health of the hemisphere.[1] The conference's Resolution IX, entitled "Reorganization, Consolidation, and Strengthening of the Inter-American System," introduced certain immediate reforms in the structure of the Pan American Union and initiated a move to consolidate the various juridical and institutional mechanisms of the pan-American system into a more formal and permanent regional organization.

Along with an "Economic Charter of the Americas" and other resolutions of an economic nature, the Chapultepec Conference also adopted Resolution VIII, known as the "Act of Chapultepec," which reaffirmed certain basic inter-American principles including the sovereignty, equality, and independence of states, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the principles of collective security and regional solidarity in the face of acts of aggression. With

these principles in mind, the "Act of Chapultepec" called for the development of a mutual defense treaty for the American states.

Such a treaty was signed at the 1947 Conference for the Maintenance of Peace and Continental Solidarity held in Rio de Janeiro. As indicated in Chapter III, this new Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or the Rio Pact (also Rio Treaty), represented the culmination of the decade-long development of the collective security principle along side the Good Neighbor Policy in inter-American affairs. The Rio Pact became a ready model for the United States in formulating its other post-war mutual defense pacts such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), signed in 1949 (Moreno Pino, 1977: 87-89; Inter-American Institute, 1966: xxix-xxx; in Gantenbein, 1950: 816-819).[2]

In 1948, at the Ninth Inter-American Conference held in Bogota, the move to restructure the pan-American system as called for by Resolution IX of the Chapultepec conference culminated in the signing of the Charter of Bogotá, which created the Organization of American States out of the older Pan-American institutions. The Ninth Inter-American Conference also adopted the Pact of Bogotá, or the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, which mentioned, consolidated, and was meant to supercede all previous inter-American instruments aimed at the pacific settlement of disputes[3] (Puig, 1983: 13; Inter-American Institute, 1966: 77).

Thus, between 1945 and 1948, the legal and institutional framework for the post-war regional organization was rebuilt, largely with the mortar of pan-American good-will left by the Good

Neighbor Policy. But after 1948, divergent U.S. and Latin American interests and the chill of the emerging cold war led to cracks in the edifice which weakened its long-term ability to function.

In the late 1940s and through the 1950s, it became clear that the relative interests of Latin American states and the United States in the new OAS system (viz., the OAS and the Rio Treaty institutions)[4] were reversed from what they had been at the origin of the pan-American movement in 1889. For the United States, security concerns in the hemisphere had become primary during World War II and remained so with the emergence of the cold war. To the extent that the inter-American system mattered at all to policy-makers in Washington given their new preoccupation with developing containment policies for Europe and Asia, the new inter-American institutions were taken to represent an undisputed anti-communist regional bloc that supported U.S. ideological and strategic leadership in the global cold war (Williams, 1971: 48; Wilson, 1975: 53).

While many Latin American states shared the anti-communist focus of U.S. containment policy, after the signing of the Rio Pact in 1947 the most crucial issue for their post-war foreign policies and for the reformed regional organization was to promote economic development. Even at the 1947 Rio Conference, Mexican Foreign Minister Jaime Torres Bodet expressed the view of many Latin American delegates that raising the living standards of the masses was as important an obligation as providing for mutual defense (Finan, 1977d: 259). With the security of the hemisphere provided

for in the Rio Pact, most Latin American governments looked to the OAS as a mechanism to promote regional economic development. They also looked to the United States to offer a Marshall Plan for the hemisphere, but this hope was soon dashed. The limited economic development assistance[5] provided to the region during the 1950s and U.S. insistence on the role of private loans and private foreign direct investment as the motor for development became major points of contention during the first decade of the OAS (Wilson, 1975: 54-55; Williams, 1971: 66).

The U.S. stance on development policy also clashed with the approaches of several Latin American reformers and/or populists in the 1940s and early 1950s. Leaders like Rómulo Betancourt in Venezuela, Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia and José Figueres Ferrer in Costa Rica, Juan José Arévalo and Jácobo Arbenz[6] in Guatemala, and several others had admired Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal policies and sought to devise Latin variations to promote their countries' economic development through public capital and a significant state role. Their economic, social, and political reform programs soon got them into trouble with domestic elites and eventually aroused suspicions in the United States. Once the cold war got under way, Latin American keynesianism (or state capitalism) and economic nationalism, combined with a tolerance of left wing political parties by some of these reformers, led to growing concerns from poliy makers in Washington who tended to interpret such orientations in stark cold-war terms.

Beyond the contention over economic aid and the new ideological constraints of the late 1940s and 1950s, there was the related yet distinct problem of the United States' new global superpower status and its meaning for hemispheric relations. Despite the theoretical or legal equality of the American states, now codified in the Charter of the OAS and the Rio Treaty, the reality of U.S. super power and its new leadership role in the international system soon led to the re-emergence of old problems in the inter-American system. While some Latin American states saw the OAS as a mediating mechanism between the United States and Latin America, others saw it once again as a tool for the United States to control Latin America according to U.S. hegemonic interests.

Indicative of Latin American suspicions of U.S. dominance over the reformed regional organization is the fact that several Latin American states delayed their ratifications of the OAS Charter for four or more years after its signing in 1948. For example, Cuba and Peru delayed ratification until 1952; Chile until 1953; Guatemala and Uruguay until 1955; and Argentina delayed ratification until 1956. Only three states, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and Mexico, ratified the OAS Charter within one year of its signing. By contrast, all signatories to the Rio Treaty except Guatemala had ratified the treaty within three years of its signing in 1947, and most states --fifteen of them-- had ratified it within one year.[7] The 1948 companion to the OAS Charter, the Pact of Bogota, likewise failed to attract the enthusiasm of the American states. Seven states signed the Pact with reservations, and by 1966, only ten

states had bothered to ratify it.[8] The few ratifications and numerous reservations attached to this formal system of pacific settlement of disputes meant that the Pact of Bogotá has never been used (Inter-American Institute, 1966: 77-80, 347, 382, 387-398; Puig, 1983: 13; Scheman, 1988: 66; Martz, 1977: 181-182).

It thus appears that after 1948 inter-American solidarity was beginning to weaken and that from its inception the OAS felt the strains of diverging interests between the United States and Latin America. The fine cracks in the OAS system became apparent in 1954 with the Tenth Inter-American Conference held in Caracas in March -- the last such conference ever to be held[9]-- and with the ensuing political crisis in Guatemala in June.

The OAS System and the Cold War

The Guatemala Crisis, 1954

United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles personally attended the Caracas conference just long enough to ensure passage of the famous Resolution XCIII, the "Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States." This declaration was aimed against the government of Jácobo Arbenz in Guatemala, which was increasingly seen as communist-oriented by the U.S. press and policy-makers in Washington.[10] The declaration stated that

> the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement, extending to this hemisphere the political system of an extracontinental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for a Meeting of Consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties (in Inter-American Institute, 1966: 131; emphasis added).

Aware that it was directed against the Arbenz government and wary of unilateral action by the United States, the Latin American delegations insisted on amending Dulles' resolution by inserting the requirement of calling for "a Meeting of Consultation to consider the adoption of" appropriate action.[11] Under both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty, a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers was the mechanism through which political and collective security issues were to be discussed and decided. In times of crisis or when it was otherwise impossible for the region's foreign ministers to assemble, the Council of the OAS (COAS) could act as the system's provisional organ of consultation.

Along with trying to prevent any unilateral U.S. action against Guatemala, several Latin American delegations also challenged the cold war orientation of Secretary Dulles' resolution and introduced amendments stressing the need to address the economic, social, and political problems within the hemisphere that gave rise to communist movements in the first place. But Secretary Dulles' maneuvers at the conference succeeded in leaving such amendments to be incorporated into a separate resolution (XCV) entitled "Declaration of Caracas." According to Richard H. Immerman (1982: 149), Dulles

even went so far as to threaten economic reprisals to ensure passage of Resolution XCIII. The Latin American delegations reluctantly[12] went along with Secretary Dulles' declaration in the hopes of then inducing him to consider Latin requests for economic development aid.[13] However, Secretary Dulles returned to Washington once his resolution was passed, leaving the remaining U.S. delegation with the task of dealing with those requests (Ronning, 1963: 73-74, 82; Wilson, 1975: 55-57; Williams, 1971:49; Immerman, 1982: 148-149; Wood, 1985: 171; Connell-Smith, 1974: 212-214).

A short time later, in June 1954, events in Guatemala produced the first cold war crisis of the OAS system. A small insurgent army of anti-communist Guatemalans, armed and trained by the CIA in Nicaragua and Honduras, launched an attack on Guatemala with the purpose of overthrowing the Arbenz government by force. Although it had not yet ratified the OAS Charter, the Arbenz government called on its two peacekeeping mechanisms, the Council of the OAS (COAS) and the Inter-American Peace Committee, to investigate the acts of aggression launched from the territory of Guatemala's neighbors. Due to deliberate obstructive efforts by the United States, the OAS machinery was slow to respond to this request, leading the Arbenz government to appeal directly to the United Nations Security Council. There the United States disingenuously argued for the "primacy" of the OAS in dealing with the regional crisis. In accordance with Secretary Dulles' Resolution XCIII, the Rio Treaty was then invoked by ten member states, who demanded that the Organ of Consultation meet "`for the purpose of considering all aspects of

the danger to the peace and security of the continent resulting from the penetration of the political institutions of Guatemala by the international communist movement....'" (Wood, 1985: 192; Connell-Smith, 1974: 215-219; Inter-American Institute, 1966: 132; Wilson, 1975: 56; Ronning, 1963: 73-74).

Rather than acting as the provisional Organ of Consultation, which it has the power to do in the event of crisis under the Rio Treaty, the COAS called for a full Meeting of Foreign Ministers to discuss the situation.[14] But before the Meeting of Foreign Ministers could be assembled, Arbenz resigned, turning the government over to his Chief of the Armed Forces, Colonel Carlos Enrique Díaz, on June 27. A short time later, the COAS met to consider the new situation in Guatemala and postponed the Meeting of Foreign Ministers _sine die_. The leader of the CIA-sponsored insurgency, Colonel Castillo Armas, soon emerged as the head of a new military junta that was recognized by the United States on July 13, 1954 (Wilson, 1975: 56; Inter-American Institute, 1966: 89-90, 131-132; Ronning, 1963: 73-74; Immerman, 1982: 173-174; Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1983: 216; Wood, 1985: 192; Connell-Smith, 1974: 212-217).

Many Latin American governments saw the U.S. hand in events and considered the coup to be an intervention by the United States in the domestic affairs of Guatemala, contrary to the principles of the OAS Charter. Juan Perón's Argentina, whose bilateral relations with the United States had seemingly improved with the development of the cold war by establishing its anti-communist credentials,

nevertheless insisted that the coup in Guatemala was only the beginning of renewed interventions by the United States in Latin America and expressed its deep concern about such affairs (Wood, 1985: 116-121). The congresses of Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile denounced the U.S. intervention in Guatemala as aggression, as did the Ecuadoran government. Even pro-U.S. moderates throughout Latin America reacted strongly against the United States, while anti-yankee demonstrations swept across Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela (Ronning, 1963: 75, 82; Williams, 1971: 47; Schlessinger and Kinzer, 1983: 188-189).

In the wake of the 1954 coup in Guatemala, many Latin Americans grew critical of the United States' use of the OAS as an instrument of the cold war and of its use of the cold war as a justification for renewed U.S. interventionism. Not only were the non-interventionist and multilateralist principles of the Good Neighbor policy abandoned, but the credibility of the OAS was seriously eroded. As Bryce Wood (1985: 198) has shown, "[t]he dismantling of the Good Neighbor policy and the enfeeblement of the OAS began simultaneously in 1954" (Díaz-Callejas, 1985: 125; Wilson, 1975: 55; Connell-Smith, 1974: 218-221).

Implications for the OAS System

In the decade following the Guatemala coup, there were more indications that several Latin American states were unhappy with the structures of the OAS system and the nature of inter-American relations. The Latin Americans continued to look for support for regional economic development from the OAS, but it was not until the very end of the 1950s that some movement was made in this direction. In 1958, Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek proposed his "Operation Pan America," aimed at promoting regional economic development and raising living standards. In the same year, after Vice President Nixon's difficult Latin American trip (which was punctuated by several anti-U.S. demonstrations), the Eisenhower administration began to reexamine U.S. economic policy toward the region. Soon the OAS Council of Foreign Ministers set up the Committee of Twenty-One (formally, the Special Committee to Study the Formulation of New Measures for Economic Cooperation), which met for the first time in late 1958 to study Kubitschek's proposal and discuss the recommendation from the region's foreign ministers for the establishment of an inter-American financial institution to promote development. The Cuban Revolution may have provided further incentive for action on the economic front. At the second meeting of the Committee of Twenty-One in the spring of 1959, Fidel Castro proposed that the U.S. finance a $30 billion "Marshall Plan" for Latin America. In any case, on December 31, 1959, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) was established with

significant U.S. support. It was the world's first regional multilateral lending agency aimed at promoting the economic and social development of its members (Atkins, 1989: 233-234; Connell-Smith, 1974: 224-225).

Despite this movement to improve regional economic relations at the end of the 1950s and into the 1960s (infra), the United States continued to view the OAS as primarily oriented toward security issues. However Latin dissatisfaction with the OAS system's peace keeping and conflict resolution mechanisms remained chronic through the 1950s and well into the 1960s. The central document focusing on the peaceful resolution of conflict, the 1948 Pact of Bogotá (or the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement) continued to lack ratifications, apparently because of its compulsory nature. A move to revise the treaty to meet the various objections or reservations of states began in 1954 after the Guatemalan coup, but this move petered out by 1957. There was also a suggestion to create an inter-American Court of Justice in 1954 as a mechanism to settle disputes, but this proposal died in 1964 after only eight states had bothered to express their views on the idea (in Inter-American Institute, 1966: 80-82). These failures left the Council of the OAS and the Inter-American Peace Committee as the main peacekeeping of the OAS.

Yet the discomfort with these mechanisms after 1954 was evident in the repeated revision of the Inter-American Peace Committee's statutes in the 1950s and 1960s. Created in 1940, the Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC) had remained intact as a special agency of the OAS after 1948. It was a vehicle by which

traditional methods or procedures of peaceful settlement of disputes, such as investigation, mediation, conciliation, and good offices, could be suggested to parties in conflict. The committee played a useful and often important role in investigating and reporting on the numerous conflicts involving the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic and other circum-Caribbean conflicts between 1948 and 1956.[15] In fact, most of the interstate conflicts referred to the OAS between 1948 and 1956 went to the IAPC as a semi-formal organ of investigation. In 1956, there was an attempt to formalize and institutionalize the committee's role in peaceful settlement, but the effort backfired. Among its new statutes was the new requirement that both parties to a conflict consent to the committee's action. This apparently made the IAPC unattractive to OAS members, as no cases were submitted to it for the next three years.

In 1959 an effort was made to save the IAPC at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers in Santiago, Chile. The IAPC's functions were expanded to include investigations into (1) methods to prevent intervention, aggression, or overthrows of governments from abroad; (2) the relationship between human rights violations and dictatorship to political tensions affecting hemispheric peace; and (3) the relationship between economic underdevelopment and political instability. These points reflected the concerns of the Latin American ministers meeting in Santiago with the problems of human rights and economic underdevelopment that seemed to be behind the conflicts involving the Trujillo

dictatorship in the Dominican Republic and the recent fall of the Batista dictatorship in Cuba. The IAPC was also given the authority to act "at the request of governments or on its own initiative" (in Inter-American Institute, 1966: 84-85). After this expansion of the IAPC's functions and authority, it again became active in investigating various inter-American conflicts[16] until 1966, when its expanded authority was taken away (infra) (Inter-American Institute, 1966: 83-91; Slater, 1969: 502-503; Scheman, 1988: 67-69, 81-84; Puig, 1983: 14-15).

Despite this activity of the IAPC, the conflicts it investigated between 1948 and 1964 tended to be the chronic yet politically safe conflicts involving the relatively weak states of the circum-Caribbean and usually centered on the issue of the use of territory by bands of exile groups to overthrow another government.[17] However, as in the 1954 coup in Guatemala, the IAPC and related OAS peace-keeping machinery were powerless to settle peacefully the more serious political and military conflicts of the inter-American system, especially those in which United States' interests were involved. The more serious political and military conflicts tended to be addressed through the mechanisms of the Rio Pact. But the Rio Treaty was a collective security instrument, not an instrument for the resolution of political conflicts. For the Latin Americans, invoking the Rio Treaty was considered very serious business, meaning that a clear act of military aggression had been committed and that some form of collective sanctions would have to be imposed (Slater, 1969: 501). To resolve <u>political</u> conflicts, the

Latin American states tended to prefer to invoke the OAS peace-keeping machinery, beginning with the convocation of a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers under Article 39 of the OAS Charter.

For the United States, given the centrality of the cold war in shaping its foreign policy agenda in the 1950s and 1960s, invoking the Rio Treaty became the preferred means for introducing and addressing its East-West security concerns in the hemisphere, especially through the treaty's ambiguous Article 6. This article was an open-ended provision for action by the Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty in cases where a state faced "aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America" (in Inter-American Institute, 1966: 378). This article was flexible enough to bring virtually any matter that could be termed a "threat" to the peace and security of the hemisphere under the purview of the Rio Treaty, whether an actual aggression had occured or not. The inadequacy of the OAS system's peace-keeping machinery in conflicts involving United States' interests and the divergence of Latin American and United States' views about the proper uses of the OAS Charter vs. the Rio Treaty can be seen in the cases of the Dominican Republic and Cuba between 1960 and 1965.

The Cuban And Dominican Cases, 1960-1965

In the wake of the fall of Batista in Cuba and worsening U.S.-Cuban relations in 1960, the United States began to paint events in Cuba in a cold war tint, but not all of the Latin American states saw red. Instead, most Latin governments were more concerned about the excesses of the Trujillo dictatorship in the Dominican Republic and its involvement in a recent assassination attempt against Venezuela's President Rómulo Betancourt. In June 1960, the Venezuelan government invoked the Rio Treaty against Trujillo's attack, and the Sixth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers was convoked in San José, Costa Rica to investigate Venezuela's charges. After condemning the Dominican Republic for its "aggression" and "attack" against Venezuela, the majority of the Latin American foreign ministers favored the imposition of collective economic and diplomatic sanctions, in accordance with the Rio Treaty's provisions, against the Trujillo regime. But the United States opposed collective sanctions in this case and advocated instead OAS-supervised elections in the Dominican Republic. The Latin American majority view on sanctions prevailed, resulting in the first example of collective sanctions being imposed by the members of the OAS system against one of its own members found to have committed an act of aggression[18] (Slater, 1970: 8; Ronning, 1963: 77; Wilson, 1975: 60; Scheman, 1988: 76; Connell-Smith, 1974: 229-230).

At the same Meeting of Consultation, the United States also tried to introduce an anti-Castro resolution but the attempt failed. The Latin American ministers did not see the mechanism of the Rio Treaty as applicable to the Cuban case and argued instead that the OAS was the proper venue for discussing political controversies between the United States and Cuba. Immediately following this meeting, in August 1960, the United States convoked the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, this time under Article 39 of the OAS Charter. Still assembled in San José, the United States tried to convince the Latin Americans to pass a resolution condemning the Cuban government for its growing ties to the Soviet Union. The United States even held out the carrot of $600 million in economic aid[19] to win support for its resolution (Ronning, 1963: 78).

But the majority of the Latin American ministers were not prepared to go along with the United States in this case. Instead, a much weaker resolution was passed, entitled the "Declaration of San José," which only condemned "extra-continental intervention" in the Americas and rejected "attempts by the Sino-Soviet powers to make use of the political, economic or social situation of any American state" (in Wilson, 1975: 61). The resolution made no mention of Cuba.[20] In fact, the Mexican delegation insisted on adding a "Statement" to the declaration stressing "`that in no way is it a condemnation or a threat against Cuba, whose aspirations for economic improvement and social justice have the fullest support of

the Government and the people of Mexico'" (in Connell-Smith, 1974: 230; Ronning, 1963: 78; Wilson, 1975: 61; Scheman, 1988: 77).

Lacking majority suppport for its growing antipathy for Castro, the United States acted unilaterally by implementing a CIA plan to invade Cuba with a force of counter-revolutionary Cuban exiles in the hopes of sparking a popular uprising against Castro. After the bitter failure of the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961, the old debate about interventionism between Latin America and the United States resumed. Although several Latin American governments did not like the course the Cuban Revolution was taking, most Latin Americans considered the Bay of Pigs invasion to be an illegal U.S. intervention only too reminiscent of the 1954 CIA operation in Guatemala (Wilson, 1975:62).

In response to the course of the Cuban Revolution and spurred by the political fallout of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the Kennedy Administration went forward with a new strategy of containment in Latin America. Kennedy deepened the U.S. commitment to the region's economic development that emerged at the end of the Eisenhower administration by announcing his Alliance for Progress. This multilateral program was designed to provide $20 billion in development assistance over a ten-year period and encourage social and political reforms in order to promote economic growth, liberal democratic government, and peaceful change in the hemisphere. For the United States, the Alliance's economic aid, reform, and related counter-insurgency training programs were both a way to revitalize inter-American economic and political relations and a strategy to

prevent any future radical revolutions in Latin America. The Latin American governments embraced the Alliance for Progress enthusiastically: Finally, after some sixteen years, their post-war requests for a "Marshall Plan" for Latin America were being answered by the United States. The charter of the Alliance for Progress[21] was signed at the Uruguayan seaside resort of Punta del Este on August 17, 1961 by all of the members of the OAS except Cuba. The United States had made it clear that it would provide no funds for Cuba as long as its revolutionary government maintained its ties with the Soviet Union. The government of Peru, backed by a number of other delegations, also proposed the inclusion of an anti-Castro political clause in the Alliance's charter, but this proposal was voted down by the rest of the conference (Connell-Smith, 1974: 233; Wilgus and d'Eça, 1963: 411-412).

Before long, however, the Latin American votes in the OAS system began to shift in favor of the United States' position on Cuba, despite the continued divergence of a significant bloc of Latin American states. In January 1962, the Colombian and Peruvian governments charged Cuba with supporting subversive activities that threatened the peace and security of the Americas. Colombia invoked the Rio Treaty and called the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers to discuss what collective measures could be taken against Cuba. The United States led the hard-line position, which urged collective action under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and sought to expel the revolutionary Cuban government from the OAS system because it had "identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist

government." Mexico, along with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia,[22] led the soft-line or legalist position, which challenged the applicability of the Rio Treaty to the situation, debated the nature of the Cuban government, defended the principles of non-intervention and self-determination, and opposed the expulsion or exclusion of any member state on the grounds that neither the OAS Charter nor the Rio Treaty made any provisions for such an action. It was Haiti's move from the soft-line to the hard-line position that assured the fourteenth vote[23] for the two-thirds majority needed to exclude the "present government" of Cuba from participation in the OAS system. The meeting also decided to impose an arms embargo against Cuba (Atkins, 1989: 224; Wilson, 1975: 62-63; Connell-Smith, 1974: 236-237; Scheman, 1988: 77).

Ten months later, in October 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis prompted an emergency meeting of the Council of the OAS as the provisional organ of consultation under the Rio Treaty. The United States called on the COAS to discuss the crisis and decide on collective action. With proof of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, the United States persuaded the Latin American delegates that the missiles represented an extra-continental intervention in the Americas. The Latin Americans overwhelmingly --but not unanimously-- passed the U.S.-sponsored resolution calling for the naval blockade of Cuba; Brazil, Mexico, and Bolivia abstained. Near the end of the naval blockade, Argentine and Venezuelan naval units joined U.S. forces in enforcing the blockade (Wilson, 1975: 64-65; Finan, 1977c: 254).

In the case of the Missile Crisis, the vast majority of Latin American states agreed that the situation was not merely a political or ideological conflict between the United States and Cuba but that it presented a clear security threat for the hemisphere and came under the purview of the Rio Treaty's provisions for collective action. There was strong inter-American agreement on this use of the Rio Treaty by the United States. The immediate outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the apparent strengthening of inter-American solidarity against this projection of Soviet military power in the hemisphere. Interestingly, the medium- to long-term outcome was the Latin American move toward making Latin America a nuclear-free zone, which culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in February 1967[24] (Atkins, 1989: 337-338).

For the next year and a half after the Missile Crisis, Latin American majority support for the United States' position against Cuba continued; it even grew once the March 1964 military coup in Brazil added that state's vote to the anti-Castro column of the OAS system. A short time later the system took its final step in isolating the Cuban government through collective sanctions under the Rio Pact. In July 1964, the Venezuelan government called the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers after it charged Cuba with aggression in the form of aiding a group of Venezuelan revolutionaries. An investigating committee appointed by the COAS had corroborated the Venezuelan charges, thus clearing the way for the Meeting of Consultation to discuss what collective action under the Rio Treaty would be taken. The foreign ministers meeting in

Washington, D. C. condemned Cuba, and, by a vote of fifteen to four, imposed tough new sanctions against Cuba requiring the severance of consular and diplomatic relations and the suspension of all trade and sea transport with the island nation. Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay opposed these sanctions, but in the end all states except Mexico eventually severed relations with Cuba (Wilson, 1975: 66-67; Scheman, 1988: 77).

Thus, between 1960 and 1964, fairly strong differences between Latin American states and the United States over the nature of the Cuban Revolution and the proper uses of the Rio Treaty began to narrow. By early 1962, the United States had succeeded in convincing a two-thirds majority of Latin American states that its conflict with Cuba should be understood in an East-West security context rather than a North-South political context and that the Rio Treaty rather than the OAS Charter was the appropriate venue for action. Yet a significant group of Latin American states continued to oppose the U.S. campaign to isolate and punish the Cuban government for its revolutionary direction until the Cuban Missile Crisis later that year. The Crisis brought near unanimous Latin American support for the United States' position. But then the issue was not so much about U.S. power in the hemisphere as it was about the indisputable introduction of an extra-hemispheric power's nuclear arsenal. The OAS system appeared to be its strongest in response to the Missile Crisis and in its immediate aftermath. The collective security provisions of the Rio Treaty and even the original precepts of the Monroe Doctrine seemed to be vindicated.

After the Missile Crisis, even more states --though not all-- came to support the U.S. position on Cuba and the use of the Rio Pact against Cuban adventurism, especially once the Venezuelan government charged Cuba with aggression in 1964, resulting in the imposition of final economic and political sanctions against Castro's government.

Several factors had facilitated this shift within the OAS system toward greater if not unanimous Latin American support for the U.S. position on Cuba and for the use of the Rio Treaty against Cuba. Vastly improved U.S.-Latin American economic relations as a consequence of the Alliance for Progress economic aid programs had a positive spill-over effect for politico-security relations. Moreover, the political shift against Cuba involved other political and security factors: The emergence and growth of guerrilla movements either inspired or supported by revolutionary Cuba in several Latin American states; the anti-revolutionary fears of elites and militaries throughout Latin America; the stepped-up security assistance and counter-insurgency training programs sponsored by the United States as part of the Alliance for Progress; and the eight military coups overthrowing constitutionally elected but unstable goverments in Latin American between 1961 and 1964.[25] Beyond the Cuban Missile Crisis, all these factors played a role in bringing East-West security concerns to bear on hemispheric political events and in creating inter-American support for using the OAS system to implement U.S. containment policies in the hemisphere. But it soon became clear that this inter-American solidarity was more fragile than it seemed.

A new political and military crisis in the Dominican Republic tested the OAS system in the spring of 1965; but in the end, the system's anti-Castro consensus could not withstand the stress. In late April, a few Dominican army units attempted a coup against the unpopular head of the country's junta, Donald Reid Cabral. The uprising soon gained popular support, with many favoring the return to power of former President Juan Bosch. Bosch had been elected president in OAS-supervised elections in late 1962, but was overthrown by the military in September 1963, just seven months after taking office. As the 1965 uprising's pro-Bosch sentiment became stronger, anti-Bosch factions in the military with the support of the U.S. embassy decided to resist the "revolution" actively.[26] A brief but violent civil war ensued. Within a few days the U.S. embassy asked Washington to intervene on the side of the anti-Bosch forces to help restore law and order. The United States immediately responded by landing 400 marines, but soon over 20,000 more U.S. troops were sent to the Dominican Republic with the purpose of preventing "a second Cuba" (Slater, 1970; 9-38; Wilson, 1975: 67; Williams, 1971: 116; Finan, 1977d: 263).

Latin American reactions to the United States' military intervention in the Dominican Republic ranged from amazement to outrage. Anti-yankee protests erupted throughout Latin America while anti-intervention protests were lodged by Latin governments in the OAS and the United Nations. The governments of Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela --then among the most respected and stable civilian governments in the region-- were most critical of the

United States' intervention. The Chilean government requested that the COAS convoke a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers under Article 39 of the OAS Charter, thus engaging the OAS peace-keeping mechanisms --not the Rio Treaty's-- to discuss the intervention (Wilson, 1975: 68; Atkins, 1989: 222; Scheman, 1988: 78).

It is interesting that Chile did not invoke the Rio Treaty against the United States' intervention. In the previous year, following the 1964 Panamanian flag riots,[27] Panama became the first member state to invoke the Rio Pact against the United States. After the Inter-American Peace Committee had failed to resolve the U.S.-Panamanian conflict, which came to focus on the issue of negotiating a new canal treaty, Panama's request to invoke the Rio Treaty against the United States was approved by the COAS by sixteen votes; only Chile opposed the request, while Panama and the United States were not eligible to vote. Acting as the Rio Treaty's provisional organ of consultation, the COAS set up a special committee to try to resolve the conflict.[28] In this case, the Rio Treaty was used as a mechanism for conflict resolution rather than collective security (Wilson, 1975: 65).

In the case of the Dominican invasion, Chile's preference for working through the OAS Charter's mechanisms for conflict resolution was again manifested, and the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, this time under Article 39 of the OAS Charter, began its first session in Washington on May 1, 1965. The four states most critical of the U.S. invasion introduced resolutions

condemning the U.S. violation of the non-intervention principle and requesting the U.S. withdrawal from the Dominican Republic. But the United States moved quickly to try to multilateralize its military action. It introduced a resolution to create an Inter-American Peace Force to occupy the Dominican Republic and maintain order until new elections could be held. A heated debate followed, but in the end the resolution passed by a vote of fourteen to five. Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay voted against the resolution; Venezuela abstained. Included in the fourteen votes that made up the necessary two-thirds majority to pass the resolution was the vote of the Dominican representative whose government had been overthrown by the pro-Bosch supporters. A Brazilian general became commander of the ad hoc peace-keeping force, with the U.S. commander in the Dominican Republic becoming his deputy. By late May, Latin American troops from Brazil, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay began to arrive, totaling some 1,750 troops in addition to the 23,000 U.S. troops in the "Inter-American" peace-keeping force (Wilson, 1975: 68; Finan, 1977d: 263; Williams, 1971: 91-92).

With only seven per cent of the total forces, the Latin American contingent participating in the occupation of the Dominican Republic barely qualified the peace-keeping forces as "multilateral." Yet the United States apparently felt confident enough to propose the establishment of an inter-American peace-keeping force on a more permanent basis, arguing that the lack of such a force had been a long-standing weakness in the OAS system's peace-keeping machinery. But the reputation of the OAS was already falling

precipitously after the organization had failed to reverse, prevent, or even verbally condemn a U.S. intervention reminiscent of an earlier era. Instead the OAS had been used to legitimate the intervention. Almost overnight Latin Americans once again became wary of yankee interventionism and weary of the United States' use of inter-American institutions to serve its own narrow interests. Latin American opposition to the U.S. proposal for a permanent inter-American peace-keeping force was overwhelming by late 1965. Even the military governments of Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil opposed the idea (Slater, 1969: 500; Williams, 1971: 91-92; Wilson, 1975: 69).

The stresses produced by the Dominican crisis were costly both to the United States and the OAS system. As one writer summarized it,

> Among the...costs [of the Dominican intervention] was an upsurge of anti-Americanism in world and Latin American public opinion. Furthermore, the Alliance for Progress suffered a severe loss of image at the time. U.S. moves to strengthen the OAS's collective capabilities were reversed, leading to its weakening at Buenos Aires in 1967. The hopes for an inter-American peacekeeping force were obviated for the foreseeable future. The entire inter-American system was called into question and U.S. self-interest in pursuit of its continued viability set back at least a decade (Williams, 1971: 99).

Indeed, the cracks that were evident in the OAS system in 1954 had only been papered over with the anti-Castro consensus between 1962 and 1964. But they became fissures too deep to repair after the 1965 Dominican intervention. Isolated moves before 1965 to reform the OAS system to make it stronger gave way to a broader

reform movement after 1965 that succeeded only in further weakening the system's ability to address political conflicts, especially those involving the United States. As Manger (1968) has argued, after 1965, the OAS became increasingly "depoliticized" as Latin American states left it to deal with technical matters while they increasingly turned to other international forums for presenting and pressing their international political interests.

Redefining Inter-American Relations

The economic, socio-cultural, political and military relationships making up the inter-American system underwent important transformations after the Dominican intervention of 1965. By inter-American system we mean the complete set of relationships and institutions linking the states of the hemisphere in various ways and of which the OAS system (defined here by the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty) is only a part. Pressures to reform the OAS system beginning in the 1950s and strengthening in the early 1960s had indicated that many were not happy with its structure; after the Dominican intervention the movement to reform the OAS system indicated that many were not happy with the structure of power within the inter-American system as a whole. Beginning in the mid- to late-1960s and continuing into the 1980s, the Latin American states pursued a variety of new paths in their foreign relations in order to redefine the structure of inter-American relations and

revise the nature of Latin American participation in international politics.

Reforming the OAS System

Before 1965, the various proposals to reform and strengthen the OAS system had included strengthening the initiative and role of the Council of the OAS in the pacific settlement of disputes so as to avoid action through the Rio Treaty,[29] increasing the political role and authority of the General Secretary, and resurrecting some form of the Inter-American Conference as a regular, high-level meeting between the member states. After the Dominican crisis, however, the support for strengthening the political role of the OAS reversed itself. Instead, in three OAS Charter-reform conferences, held in Rio de Janeiro in the fall of 1965,[30] Panama in the spring of 1966, and Buenos Aires in early 1967, the Latin American majority grew increasingly determined to minimize the political role of the OAS. This reform movement culminated in the Protocol of Amendment to the 1948 Charter of Bogotá, which was signed in Buenos Aires in February 1967 (Slater, 1969: 502; Dreier, 1968; Manger, 1968).

The Buenos Aires Protocol abolished the moribund Inter-American Conference and replaced it with a General Assembly. As the new supreme organ of the OAS, the General Assembly meets annually to decide the organization's general policy. It may discuss any matter and it coordinates the work of the other organs. It approves the OAS budget, elects the General Secretary and his or her Assistant,

and oversees the work of the General Secretariat. Rather than strengthening its political role, no substantive changes were made in the limited, non-administrative role of the General Secretary, whose term of office was reduced from ten to five years by the reforms.[31] Even more significant of the orientation of the reform movement, the name of the Pan American Union was formally changed to the more technocratic "General Secretariat" (Manger, 1968: 7, 11; Dreier, 1968: 483; Atkins, 1989: 210-212).

The Buenos Aires Protocol also redesignated the Council of the OAS as the Permanent Council of the OAS. Previously considered the "hub" of the organization, its authority was reduced and placed on a par with three other organs now raised to council level: the Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IAECOSOC), and the Inter-American Council for Education, Science, and Culture (IACESC). No longer the executive organ of the OAS, the primary role of the Permanent Council became that of peacekeeping, with the assistance of the Inter-American Committee on Peaceful Settlement (formerly the Inter-American Peace Committee). However, the authority of both organs over pacific settlement was actually curtailed by the reforms. As William Manger (1968: 6) lamented,

> eliminating the verbiage and analyzing the essentials, the Council is reduced to a channel of communication. It can receive a request for its good offices from one party to a dispute and transmit it to the other. It can function, however, only if both parties agree to avail themselves of its facilities. If one refuses the tender of good offices, the Council shall limit itself to submitting a report to the General Assembly.

The Council has no power to initiate peacekeeping actions on its own. The Council also serves as a preparatory committee for the General Assembly and it may still serve as the Provisional Organ of Consultation in emergency situations until the Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers can assemble (Dreier, 1968: 483-485; Manger, 1968: 5-7; Atkins, 1989: 210-212).

There was no statutory change in the Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, however its relative importance was reduced by the yearly meetings of the new General Assemby and by the elevation to council level of the IAECOSOC and the IACESC (Manger, 1968: 9; Dreier, 1968: 483; Atkins, 1989: 210-212). Along with the other structural changes, the elevated status of these latter two councils reflected the overwhelming interest of the Latin American majority to refocus the OAS system on economic and development issues rather than political and security issues. The Charter reforms went into effect in February 1970, after two-thirds of the member states had ratified the Protocol of Buenos Aires (Martz, 1977: 177; Wilson, 1975: 70).

These reforms had scarcely entered into force in 1970 when a second movement to reform the OAS system emerged. The immediate causes of this second reform movement stemmed from Latin American dissatisfaction with the Nixon administration's protectionist foreign economic policies after 1971[32] as well as the continued hard-line position of the United States against Cuba. At the second and third OAS General Assembly sessions in 1972 and 1973, a proposal to hold an OAS conference to reconsider Cuban participation in the OAS

was supported by a plurality of Latin American states, many of which had already begun to re-establish economic and diplomatic relations with Cuba. However the United States insisted that a two-thirds vote of the OAS membership would be necessary to reverse both the 1962 decision to exclude the revolutionary government from the organization and the 1964 decision to impose diplomatic and ecomonic sanctions.

Other issues exacerbating friction between the United States and Latin America in the early 1970s included widespread Latin resentment over the U.S. refusal up to that point to negotiate a new Panama Canal treaty that would transfer "effective sovereignty" of the canal to Panama as well as Latin resentment over the political and economic power of U.S.-based transnational corporations. At the 1973 OAS General Assembly session, all of these issues led several Latin American states to criticize strongly what they perceived to be continued U.S. political exploitation and domination of the OAS. Some even went so far as to call for a strictly Latin American alternative to the OAS (an idea that continues to attract adherents). Instead, the majority supported a resolution to create the Special Committee to Study the Inter-American System and to Propose Measures for Restructuring It (CEESI, by its Spanish acronym), which began its work in Lima in June, 1973 (Wilson, 1975: 76-79; Atkins, 1989: 126-127, 208-209; Lowenthal, 1987: 39; Martz, 1977: 177).

After nearly two years of work, the CEESI submitted its Final Report to the OAS General Assembly. The focus of CEESI's reform

proposals centered on the Rio Treaty, and in May 1975, the General Assembly passed a resolution convoking a special conference of plenipotentiaries to amend the security pact. The conference was held in San José, Costa Rica in July of that year. The proposed amendments to the Rio Treaty included the following:

> --Allowing an absolute majority rather than a two-thirds majority to rescind collective measures taken by the organization in order to prevent a minority from "tryannizing" the organization;
>
> --Clarifying the definition of an "act of aggression" in accordance with the United Nations' definintion in order to prevent the political uses of the Rio Treaty, as was possible under the original and controversial Article 6; and
>
> --Adopting a completely new Article 11 that called for "collective economic security" as a preventive means to maintain peace and order in the hemisphere. The United States adamantly opposed this article, which CEESI had considered one of its most important recommendations (Martz, 1977: 177-180).

The conference made no changes in the mechanisms for the pacific settlement of disputes, such as they were, for this was considered an area too sensitive to touch.

Coincidental to the San José conference, the Sixteenth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers convened on July 25 to consider the question of continued sanctions against Cuba. After continuous day and night sessions, the meeting adopted the Freedom of Action Resolution, which allowed states party to the Rio Treaty the freedom "'to normalize or conduct in accordance with the national policies and interests of each their relations with the Republic of Cuba.'" Even the United States supported this resolution (Martz, 1977: 178).

After its adoption by the San José conference, the 1975 Protocol of Amendment to the Rio Treaty was sent to the member states for ratification. By that time, however, interest in the OAS system was at an all time low, and the moves to reform it faded. The Protocol never received enough ratifications to enter into force. Likewise, the drafts of other instruments produced by this second reform movement, such as the Draft Convention on Cooperation for Development, the Draft Convention on Collective Economic Security for Development, and other draft amendments to the OAS Charter, all languished and became dead issues for lack of interest in the late 1970s and into the 1980s[33] (Martz, 1977: 180-183; Atkins, 1989: 209).

The OAS reform movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s indicated significant Latin American dissatisfaction with the structure and focus of the OAS system. The reforms reflected both a certain impatience with continued U.S. domination of the system and a longstanding Latin American interest in refocusing the regional organization on economic and development issues rather than political and security issues. Indeed, by the late 1960s more and more Latin American states were defining their "national security" in markedly economic and development-oriented terms.

Most writers analyzing the reform period and contemporaneous to it, such as Dreier (1968), Manger (1968), Slater (1969), Wilson (1975), and Martz (1977), saw Latin American "nationalism" or "economic nationalism" as the underlying cause or impetus for the reform movements. In fact, "nationalism" and/or "economic

nationalism" seem to have become the conventional North American explanation for Latin American challenges to U.S. power and to the OAS system. While there may be an element of truth to this assessment, it seems too simplistic (especially without further analysis). "Nationalism" and "economic nationalism" seem to be headings too broad in which to classify the Latin American diplomacy of the time, much of which had come to stress economic integrationism and multilateral foreign policy coordination on many issues.

Instead it seems more correct to explain the reform movements as part of a larger transformation in Latin American diplomacy based on an enhanced desire and capacity of certain Latin American states to define and act on their own conceptions of "national interest." We will consider this assertion below and examine it more fully in Chaptr VIII. For now it is enough to recognize that divergent interests underscored the Latin American disillusionment with the OAS system, which was dominated by U.S. cold war interests and thus constrained in serving Latin American development interests. The tinkering with the OAS peacekeeping mechanisms in the 1950s and 1960s indicates the discomfort of Latin American states with the institutional "fit" of the regional organization, while the broader reform movements after 1965 show the degree of disillusionment with the system as a whole. The U.S. rejection of the second reform movement's emphasis on "collective economic security" resulted in the virtual abandonment of the OAS system for anything but the most technical of issues in the 1970s and into the 1980s. Instead, Latin

American diplomacy turned to other international forums and developed new foreign policy orientations that could better serve the particular national interests of Latin American states.

Reorienting Latin American Diplomacy

Ever since the 1945 Chapultepec Conference (if not before) it had been clear to many Latin American states that their fundamental national interest was economic development. But by the mid to late 1960s, it became increasingly clear that national economic development was limited by the condition of dependency in which these states were caught.[34] After the Latin Americans formed the Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA) as a specialized United Nations agency in 1951, the studies produced by Raúl Prebisch and his associates at ECLA were important in showing the unfavorable trade ralationship experienced by Latin America in the international political economy and its its negative effect on Latin American development.

ECLA's work led to the development of dependency theory, which was widely accepted in Latin America by the late 1960s and early 1970s (if not earlier) and which indicated certain policy prescriptions at both the domestic and international levels aimed at lessening Latin America's economic dependency and underdevelopment. At the international level, such policy prescriptions included tariffs to protect infant industries, multilateral commodity

agreements, regional economic integrationism, and the diversification of trading partners (if not of the goods traded). These policies received considerable attention by Latin American states in the 1960s and 1970s, albeit with varying degrees of success. Thus with ECLA's studies as a spur, Latin America acquired its own intellectual framework for analyzing the international political economy, Latin America's place therein, and various policy alternatives available to Latin American states.

At the same time, Latin American diplomats were also acquiring important practical experience in multilateral diplomacy through many different forums outside of the OAS system. Partly through the existence of ECLA and partly through the early dissatisfaction of Latin American states with the OAS system after 1948, Latin American diplomacy turned increasingly to the United Nations and its various agencies as alternative forums for pursuing economic development interests. Latin American participation in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was especially significant by the mid 1960s, both economically and politically. Within UNCTAD, certain Latin American states, notably Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and others sought to play a leadership role among Third World states, the vast majority of which had only recently gained political independence. More importantly, within UNCTAD, Latin American states rediscovered the usefulness and potential bargaining power of speaking with one voice in international forums by forming the Comisión Especial de Coodinación Latinoamericana (CECLA).

CECLA was originally created as a coordinating mechanism to unite the positions of Latin American states participating in the 1964 UNCTAD I Conference. It soon became an ongoing caucusing group of Latin American foreign ministers aimed at developing common policies with regard to international economic negociations in various fields (commerce, investment, technology transfer, etc.) and in various international forums (UNCTAD, GATT, the IMF and World Bank, the European Economic Community, and even within the OAS) (Aftalión, 1975: 539; Drekonja Kornat, 1982: 46; Atkins, 1989: 198-199).

While the OAS reforms were being debated, CECLA became an increasingly important collective instrument for Latin American diplomacy. In May 1969, a CECLA meeting at a Chilean seaside resort produced the "Consensus of Viña del Mar," a document sent by CECLA to the Nixon administration voicing Latin American grievances with U.S. foreign economic policies and signaling the need for the United States to recognize the "'distinctive personality of Latin America'" (Connell-Smith, 1974: 36). Similarly, CECLA sent another document called the "Manifesto of Latin America" to the United States in September 1971 protesting the Nixon administration's New Economic Policy as unfair to the countries of Latin America (Aftalión, 1975: 543). Neither of these two documents had much of an effect on the United States. While the Nixon administration showed some willingness to improve the "special relationship" and open a "new dialogue" between the U.S. and Latin America, little of substance was actually achieved[35] (Atkins, 1989: 198; Lowenthal, 1987: 38).

By contrast, CECLA's efforts to establish a closer relationship with Europe were more successful. At its meeting in Buenos Aires in June 1970, CECLA produced the "Declaration of Buenos Aires," which was addressed to the European Economic Community (EEC) and expressed the Latin American interest in establishing a "special relationship" with the EEC. The EEC responded by declaring 1971 as the "Latin American Year." More substantively, a mechanism for consultation and negotiation between the two regions was set up and a series of high-level meetings were held between 1971 and 1975. Although the results were less than what tha CECLA had hoped, this initiative did have positive results. Initial contacts were made between the EEC and the young Andean Group (which had formed a regional economic integration pact partly inspired by the success of the EEC), and several new non-preferential commercial agreements were signed between the EEC and individual Latin states, namely Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay. European trade and diplomatic exchanges with Latin America intensified after 1975 (Drekonja Kornat, 1982: 47; Aftalión, 1975: 557-558; Tanner, 1986: 95-96).

In spite of some differences between the economically more advanced nations and the rest of the members of CECLA over economic policy positions, and despite some rivalry between the larger states for leadership within it, CECLA's meetings did produce a high degree of Latin unity and coordinated positions on a number of economic issues (Atkins, 1989: 199). The caucusing group was so successful that in 1975 it was reconstituted in a more institutionalized and expanded form. At the initiative of Mexican President Luís

Echevarría and Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez, the Sistema Económico Latinoamericano (SELA) was created to replace CECLA as the Latin American regional caucus.

According to its Charter, SELA is "an organization for consultation, coordination, and joint economic and social promotion." Like its predecessor, SELA is a political arrangement designed to enhance the international bargaining power of its members by formulating common regional positions in the North-South dialogue. SELA itself is not an economic integration scheme but it does support integrationism. Unlike CECLA, SELA includes participation by Cuba as well as many English-speaking Caribbean states, but it continues to exclude the United States. SELA's principle organ is the Latin American Council, composed of ministers who meet at least once a year. The Council's decisions are not binding: Member states are only obligated to multilateral consultations. SELA has a permanent secretariate headquartered in Caracas, Venezuela and a secretary general who serves a four-year term. The organization is supported by budget contributions assigned to members based on their relative ability to pay (Atkins, 1989: 199-200; Finan, 1977e: 265-266; Drekonja Kornat, 1982: 53-54).

In addition to these examples of Latin American multilateral diplomacy outside of the OAS system, several other important examples should be noted. Beginning in the early 1960s and inspired both by the work of ECLA and the success of the European Common Market, several regional economic intergration schemes were undertaken by Latin American states. With roots in several

agreements in the 1950s (and in the old confederal experience of the region), the five Central American states (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) created the Central American Common Market (CACM) in 1960. The CACM united its members in seeking the gradual realization of a customs union and the promotion of regional industrialization. Its first ten years were largely considered successful in contributing to increased economic growth for its members and promoting intra-regional trade, however the region's economic and political problems in the 1970s and 1980s have seriously hampered the CACM's success ever since (Atkins, 1989: 186-188).

Also in 1960, the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) was formed to promote free trade between its eleven members.[36] LAFTA proved to be a disappointment. Differences in the levels of development between the members were an important source of problems for eliminating tariffs, and LAFTA became virtually moribund in 1968. However, some of its members were unwilling to abandon integration and signed the Andean Pact in 1969. The Andean Pact created a common market among its members (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and, after 1973, Venezuela) that successfully eliminated tariffs between its members on schedule and instituted a common external tariff by 1976. The Pact also adopted a comprehensive regional industrialization policy and a foreign investment code. In the mid 1970s and again in the early 1980s, the Andean Pact ran into economic and political problems, however the

goal of economic integration has not been abandoned by its members (Atkins, 1989: 192-194).

Most recently, the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI) was created in August 1980 and entered into force in March 1981. ALADI superceded the moribund LAFTA and established a new juridical basis for economic integration among its members. Its long-term goal is to establish a region-wide Latin American common market. It seeks to address some of the problems of its predecessor, such as permitting greater negotiation and operational flexibility than LAFTA and permitting certain regional tariff preferences based on members' levels of development. Throughout the 1980s, the members of ALADI continued to renegotiate the old agreements of LAFTA and negotiate new ones, however the 1980s proved to be a very difficult period for Latin American economic growth and regional trade. ALADI's success remains to be seen. (Atkins, 1989: 196-197).

For our purposes, the ultimate success of these various economic integration schemes is less important that the fact that they were undertaken at all and that they provided Latin American states with ongoing experiments in multilateral diplomacy, from the highest levels to the more technocratic levels, outside of the OAS system. Other examples of Latin American multilateral diplomacy through the 1970s and 1980s would have to include the increasing number of Latin American states joining the Non-Aligned Movement as well as several ad hoc meetings of Latin American foreign ministers and several formal and informal presidential summits. In fact,

presidential inaugurations have recently become important meeting points for Latin American civilian leaders, and various multilateral declarations and diplomatic initiatives have been born at such meetings.

Thus, over the past three decades, Latin American diplomats have gained valuable experience in multilateral forums and has established multiple channels of communication between states, both within and outside of Latin America. With this situation, the institutions of the OAS system became less and less important to Latin American international relations.

Meanwhile, beginning in the 1960s but especially in the 1970s and 1980s, there has been an explosion of new Latin American institutes and think tanks (usually associated with national universities) devoted to the study of international relations from a Latin American perspective. Beginning with Mexico's Departamento de Estudios Internacionales del Colegio de México in 1959 and Brazil's Instituto Superior de Estudios Brasileros founded in the same year, there has been an important movement within Latin America to stop simply importing and translating North American theories of international relations without any Latin adaptation. Instead, in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela, Latin American academics and political analysts have been elaborating ECLA's intellectual framework, developing Latin American perspectives on international relations, and training personnel who can then move into government

service as part of the diplomatic corps (Drekonja Kornat, 1982: 42; Perina, 1985; Tomassini, 1985; Tomassini, 1980; Muñoz, 1980).

Even more significant, the various national institutes focusing on the study of international relations throughout the region have established important contacts with each other through the creation of the Programa de Estudios Conjuntos sobre las Relaciones Internacionales de América Latina, known by the acronym RIAL, in 1977.[37] The brainchild of one of Latin America's foremost students of international relations, Luciano Tomassini, RIAL sponsors multinational meetings and seminars, studies, publications, and other joint activities aimed at exchanging ideas, theories, and perspectives on Latin American international relations and foreign policy (Tomassini, 1985). With this development of knowledge in the field of international relations in Latin America, combined with the practical experience gained by Latin American diplomats in the past few decades, many Latin American states have developed their desire and capacity to identify and assert their particular national interests in international affairs. They have found the institutions of the OAS system inadequate for pressing and meeting their political interests in international and inter-American affairs. They have found the inter-American system (sensu latto) too confining to satisfy their contemporary economic and political national interests.

Conclusion: The Central American Crisis and the Crisis of the Inter-American System

By the late 1970s the OAS system had reached its weakest point. The decade of the 1970s had brought an important reorientation of Latin American diplomacy away from the OAS system. Latin American foreign policies had turned increasingly toward developing new multilateral contacts with Europe, Japan, other Third World states, and among the Latin American states themselves (Tomassini, 1975). The United States was no longer the sole or even the principal pole toward which Latin American states turned in pursuit of their foreign policy goals. And throughout the 1970s, those goals focused on trying to reduce Latin American dependency on the United States and diversify Latin political and economic relations.

The OAS system had also lost its reliability and usefulness for the United States after 1970 as the latter's previous two-thirds majority was no longer assured. Despite the pronouncements of the Nixon administration about the need to rebuild the "special relationship" between the United States and Latin America, the reality was that for most of the 1970s, U. S. policy toward Latin America and the regional organization was one of benign neglect.[38] The Carter administration had gone a long way toward improving U.S.-Latin American relations (while expending a great deal of domestic political capital) by signing and securing the ratification of the Carter-Torrijos Panama Canal Treaties in 1977 and 1978. However, the rickety institutions of the OAS system could no longer serve (if

they ever really did) as a mediating mechanism between U. S. and Latin American political differences.

This became clear in June 1979 when the United States called for a special Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers to discuss the revolutionary crisis in Nicaragua. In a last minute effort to preserve the Nicaraguan National Guard in the face of defeat by the revolutionary Sandinista Front, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance presented a plan calling for the resignation of President Anastacio Somoza, the creation of a government of national reconciliation, and the formation of an OAS peacekeeping force to be sent to Nicaragua to enforce a ceasefire. The plan was resoundingly rejected by all of the Latin American foreign ministers except Somoza's and was widely criticized as a thinly veiled intervention in Nicaragua's civil war (Blachman et al, 1986: 300).

The triumph of the Sandinista revolution in July 1979 --with significant anti-Somoza support coming from the governments of Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Panama and others-- was followed in October by a military coup carried out by junior officers in El Salvador. The coup had held some promise of needed reforms for Central America's smallest and most populous country, but increasing repression from the military and security forces led the more reform-minded members of the new junta to resign within a few months. El Salvador soon found itself engulfed in a bitter civil war.

The United States responded to these revolutionary challenges in its "backyard" with alarm. In the last months of the Carter administration and the first months of the Reagan administration,

the containment policies of an earlier era were dusted off and put into place to prevent the spread of revolution in the troubled isthmus. The Reagan administration was especially convinced that the emerging political crises in Central America were best understood and addressed in the context of the re-emerging East-West conflict. The new administration vowed to draw the line against what it perceived to be the spread of communism in the isthmus. Its policies focused on increasing U. S. economic and security assistance to anti-communist governments in Central America and on increasing political, economic, and military pressures on the new government in Nicaragua.

These policies would soon bring about the active diplomatic opposition of several other Latin American states, which perceived the origins and nature of the civil crises in Central America in quite different terms. Led by Mexico and Venezuela, the civilian governments of Latin America tended to see the revolutionary unrest in Central America rooted in a history of poverty, social iniquity, and dictatorship. Alarmed at the consequences of the vast militarization of the region and fearful of the threat of a direct U. S. military intervention in the early 1980s, these states initiated an ongoing process of negotiations aimed at rescuing the Central American crises from the East-West conflict. With the weakened OAS system in shambles, particularly after the Falklands/Malvinas Islands war, the Latin American diplomatic response to the civil and military crises of Central America was to promote the emergence of an ongoing peace process outside of the OAS

system through which the Central Americans could find a peaceful resolution to their inter-state and domestic conflicts. As we will see in the following chapters, the Contadora and Esquipulas phases of this peace process represent significant developments for understanding Latin American diplomacy and the nature of inter-American relations in the 1980s.

In Chapter II, we have seen how Spanish American diplomacy in the nineteenth century repeatedly turned to multilateral congresses in order to present an image of unity in the face of foreign threats of intervention. In Chapter III, we have seen how the inter-American institutions tying the United States and Latin America together in a regional organization were created and how they developed along side the debates about the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine and the issue of interventionism in inter-American relations. In the present chapter, we have seen how the goodwill produced by the anti-interventionist Good Neighbor Policy eroded with the onset of the Cold War and how divergent interests in the OAS system promoted the chronic weakness of its mechanisms for peacekeeping and conflict resolution. We have also seen how, after 1965, Latin American dissatisfaction with the distribution of power in the inter-American system led to new orientations and multilateral experiments in Latin American diplomacy aimed at increasing Latin American autonomy vis-a-vis U. S. foreign policy interests. Each of these lessons in the history of inter-American relations has an important bearing on the political relations

between the United States and Latin America in the 1980s. The diplomatic challenge of the Contadora and Esquipulas peace processes to U.S. policy toward Central America is rooted in this history.

ENDNOTES

1. The Chapultepec Conference, held in February and March 1945, was technically not one of the Inter-American conferences organized through the Pan American Union. Nevertheless, it concerned itself with the future structure of the regional organization. A third major agenda item was to study methods to hasten an end to World War II and, in perticular, the problem of Argentina's failure to join the rest of the hemisphere up to that point in breaking relations with Nazi Germany (Moreno Pino, 1977: 87; Inter-American Institute, 1966: xxix).

2. The Rio Pact, along with other original documents and treaties focusing on inter-American relations and U.S. policy toward Latin America, can be found in Gantenbien's 1950 collection.

3. The Bogotá Pact mentioned in Article LVIII and meant to consolidate and supercede each of the following: the Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts between the American States (Gondra Treaty) (1923); the General Convention of International Conciliation (1929), the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration (1929), the Protocol of Progressive Arbitration (1929); the Additional Protocol to the General Convention for Inter-American Conciliation (1933); the Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation (Saavedra Lamas Pact) (1933); the Convention to Coordinate, Extend, and Assure Fulfillment of Existing Treaties between the American States (1936); the Treaty on the Prevention of Controversies (1936); and the Inter-American Treaty of Good Offices and Mediation (1936). These instruments remain in force for those states not party to the Bogota Pact (Puig, 1983: 13-14; Inter-American Institute, 1966: 396).

4. In this chapter, the terms "OAS System" and "inter-American system" are not necessarily synonymous. By OAS System, as noted in the text, we mean the institutions set up by the OAS Charter and the Rio treaty, which are closely interrelated. By inter-American system (sensu latto), we mean the entire set of economic, socio-cultural, political and military relationships existing between the nations of the hemisphere, and of which the OAS system is a subset.

5. In 1951, the United States extended military aid to Latin America, but economic development aid remained scarce until later in the decade. The United States had been providing EX-IM Bank loans to Latin America since 1940 to facilitate trade, however, the Latin Americans wanted more development aid.

6. Jácobo Arbenz remains a controversial figure, representing for some a politician who, if not himself a communist, allowed significant communist influence in his government and his agrarian reform program (Schneider, 1958). For others, Arbenz represents a reformer and populist whose intentions were "to further the development of Guatemala into a capitalist state, as he specifically stated in his inaugural address" (Calvert, 1985: 78). Richard Immerman (1982: 63) adds that in his inaugural address, Arbenz stated "that the basic policy of his administration would be `to convert Guatemala from a country bound by a predominantly feudal economy into a modern, capitalist one.´ He would encourage private initiative, he would encourage the accumulation of private capital, and he would encourage the influx of foreign investments and technology. This was virtually the same program announced by Arévalo at his inauguration. If there were any differences, it was that Arbenz went even farther than Arevalo in accentuating the role of government in supervising this modernization."

7. The OAS Charter received sufficient ratifications (two-thirds) to enter into force in December, 1951; the Rio Treaty received sufficient ratifications (also two-thirds) to enter into force in December, 1948.

8. By 1982, thirteen states had ratified the Pact of Bogota (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay), but several of these did so with reservations. El Salvador, which had ratified the Pact much earlier, withdrew its ratification in 1973 as a result of its conflict with Honduras (Scheman, 1988: 66, 89).

9. The Eleventh Inter-American Conference was supposed to have been held in Quito, Ecuador in 1959 or 1960; however, political instability within Ecuador and the politics of an old border dispute between Ecuador and Peru prevented it. As John C. Dreier (1968: 478) has noted, "[t[he inability of the OAS to overcome political obstacles to the holding of this conference" was "in itself a demonstration of one of the shortcomings of the Organization." After the Tenth Inter-American Conference, hemispheric meetings were replaced by the Meetings of Consultation of Foreign Ministers under either the OAS Charter or the Rio Treaty, as the case might be. As will be shown, the Meetings of Consultations of Foreign Ministers were called to deal with political or security emergencies within the OAS system.

10. As noted in endnote 6, Arbenz´s political orientation and that of his government remain controversial. The Arbenz government did encourage the participation and support of leftist parties, including the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT), which he

legalized in 1952, as well as the trade unions, which did have communist leadership. Ronald Schneider's 1958 work, Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1954, argues that the PGT had substantial influence in the labor movement, in the government bureeaucracy, and over other leftists parties in Guatemala, and that by 1953, it was "in a position to shape government policies and determine the course of national affairs to an extent greater than that of any communist party outside of the Soviet orbit" (Schneider, 1958: 37-38). However, Richard Immerman (1982: 184-185) notes "The Communists promoted the agrarian legislation, worked hard on the literacy campaigns, and defended the rights of workers according to the Labor Code. They also supplied much needed administrative assistance. But they did not formulate the legislation, nor did they control the votes in Congress." Calvert (1985: 78) adds that the PGT "had only four congressmen and no representative in the cabinet and only a few positions in government, none of them `sensitive.'"

Instead, Immerman (1982: 186) and others (i.e., Schlessinger and Kinzer, 1983) have argued that Arbenz "was a middle-class reformer who depended on the middle class for his survival. The 1944 revolution originated as a middle-class movement, and its character never changed." Yet the cold war atmosphere and the McCarthyism of the time led policy makers in Washington (and the Unitd Fruit Company) to interpret the Arbenz government and its policies as communist dominated, which led to the CIA operation PBSUCCESS to overthrow Arbenz. For our purposes, the precise character of the Arbenz government is less important than the fact that the United States decided that Arbenz had to go and carried out various hostile policies, including a covert operation, that led to his overthrow. Our interest here is the Latin American diplomatic reaction to U.S. policy and the impact this had on the OAS system.

11. Dulles' original resolution simply called for "appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties" (Wood, 1985: 171).

12. According to C. Neale Ronning (1963: 74), the strongest supporters of Dulles' declaration were the delegations from the dictatorships of Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela, Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Batista in Cuba, and Odría in Peru.

13. According to Connell-Smith (1974: 220), in 1954, Latin American states were interested in "higher and more stable prices for their raw materials; larger credits for the industrialisation (sic) of their countries; United States perticipation in a new international bank concerned exclusively with their economic development; and encouragement in their plans for establishing a Latin American common market."

14. COAS also called on the Inter-American Peace Committee to investigate the situation, but it never made it to Central America.

15. For example, the IAPC was involved in investigating and defusing the following circum-Caribbean conflicts between 1948 and 1956: Cuba-Dominican Republic, 1948; Haiti-Dominican Republic, 1949; Caribbean area (Caribbean Legion activities), 1949; Cuba-Dominican Republic, 1951; Colombia-Peru (Haya de la Torre controversy), 1953-1954; and Cuba-Dominican Republic, 1956 (Inter-American Institute, 1966: 83-91).

16. The IAPC's activities between 1959 and 1964 included: Haiti-Cuba, 1959; Venezuela-Dominican Republic, 1959; Ecuador-Dominican Republic, 1960; Venezuela-Dominican Republic, 1960; Mexico-Guatemala, 1961; Peru-Cuba, 1961; Nicaragua-Honduras, 1961-1963; Panama-U.S., 1964 (Inter-American Institute, 1966: 91).

17. See notes 15 and 16.

18. The sanctions lasted until 1962 (Wilson, 1975: 60). Eventually, after Trujillo's assassination in 1961, the OAS moved on the U.S. proposal for OAS-sponsored elections in 1962.

19. According to Connell-Smith (1974: 232), the U.S. promise of aid was related to the groundwork laid late in the Eisenhower administration toward implementing Operation Pan America and later deepened through the Alliance for Progress.

20. According to Wilgus and d'Eça (1963: 426), the conference also set up a Committee of Eleven to try to bring about a reconciliation between the United States and Cuba. I have not yet been able to find any information about the membership, work, or outcome of the committee.

21. The formal title was "The Charter of Punta del Este, Establishing an Alliance for Progress within the Framework of Operation Pan America" (Connell-Smith, 1974: 233).

22. As Connell-Smith (1974: 236) notes, these six states accounted for over half of Latin America's total population.

23. The Rio Treaty's Article 17 requires that decisions by the Organ of Consultation be taken by a two-thirds majority vote (Atkins, 1989: 222; Inter-American Institute, 1966: 379).

24. In 1961, the government of Brazil had proposed that Latin America be made a nuclear-free zone in a draft-resolution presented to the UN General Assembly, but the UNGA never voted on the resolution. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the presidents of Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico signed a declaration stating their support for a treaty that would create such a zone. After the 1964 military coup in Brazil, Mexico took the lead in this effort. Through the work of Mexico's deputy foreign minister, Ambassador Alonso García Robles, a draft treaty was soon prepared and presented to the other Latin American states for their adherence. García Robles later received the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts (Atkins, 1989: 337-338).

25. G. Pope Atkins (1989: 125) notes that "from 1961 to 1963 military coups overthrew constitutionally elected governments in seven Latin American countries." With the Brazilian coup of 1964, there were at least eight such coups between 1961 and March 1964.

26. Bosch had been elected in December 1962 to replace the governing civilian/military junta that emerged after Trujillo's assassination in 1961. See Slater (1970: 24-31) for the role of the U.S. embassy in encouraging the Dominican military to unite and forcibly resist the rebellion. The United States considered Bosch weak, emotionally unstable, and untrustworthy (Slater, 1970: 11-12).

27. The Panamanian Flag Riots erupted after U.S. high school students in the Canal Zone refused to allow the flying of the Panamanian flag alongside the U.S. flag, despite a 1963 agreement to that effect between the U.S. and Panama. When the riots broke out between U.S. and Panamanian students, U.S. troops were called on to restore order. Shots were fired and several Panamanians were killed and wounded.

28. An agreement by the two states to "revise" the Canal Treaty was finally made, culminating eventually in the Carter-Torrijos Treaties of 1977.

29. As indicated above, there was a certain Latin American hesitancy to use the Rio Treaty in situations of political and ideological conflicts. In practice, invoking the Rio Treaty both highlighted the impotence of the OAS mechanisms of pacific settlement and heightened the crisis atmosphere surrounding inter-American political and ideological conflicts.

30. The 1965 Charter reform conference in Rio de Janeiro had originally been scheduled for June of that year, but was postponed until November because of the Dominican crisis (Wilson, 1975: 70).

31. The General Secretary may be elected to a second five-year term under the Charter reforms.

32. To deal with the problems of stagflation in the U.S. economy, which was also felt by Latin American economies, the Nixon administration surprised everyone in August 1971 by removing the U.S. dollar from the gold standard (thus abandoning the Bretton Woods monetary regime) and imposing a surcharge on all imports, which hit Latin America particularly hard. At the same time, the U.S. Congress opposed increased U.S. economic aid to the region. For their part, the Latin Americans not only criticized the new protectionist policies of the U.S. but also chafed at the strings tied to U.S. aid and grew increasingly resentful of the economic and political power of U.S. transnational corporations (Atkins, 1989: 126-127; Lowenthal, 1987: 39).

33. A third attempt to amend the OAS Charter ocurred in 1984-85, culminating in the Protocol of Cartagena, signed on December 4, 1985. This reform movement included both political and economic reforms. The economic reforms focused on consolidating Chapters VII through IX of the OAS Charter under one Chapter VII, entitled "Integral Development." The essence of these reforms was to promote the economic, social and cultural development of the region and multilateral economic cooperation. These reforms also specified the duties of states to pursue development and the norms for transnational corporations in the region. I have not yet been able to find any information about the political reforms. Beyond this, these mid-1980 reforms are not really within the scope of this chapter or thesis and will have to be studied further in a separate research project. Significantly, even Atkins' otherwise comprehensive 1989 study of inter-American relations makes no mention of the Cartagena meeting or of any amendments to the OAS Charter in the 1980s.

34. Theotônio dos Santos (1970: 232) provides an excellent definition of dependency which informs our use of the term: "By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is <u>conditioned by</u> the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development" (emphasis added).

35. The Nixon administration's foreign policy was oriented toward other international and foreign policy problems, such as the Vietnam War negotiations, detente with the USSR and China, the tensions in the Middle East, etc. For the most part, Latin America mattered very little to the Nixon administration with the exception of its role in the undermining and overthrow of the Allende government in Chile. After Latin American protestations, the administration did show some willingness to compromise in certain foreign economic policy issues but (as noted in note 31) the U.S. Congress was apparently unwilling to go along with Latin demands on these issues (Atkins, 1989: 198-199; Lowenthal, 1987: 38-40).

36. The founding members of LAFTA were: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. Colombia and Ecuador joined LAFTA in 1961; Venezuela joined in 1966; Bolivia joined in 1967. LAFTA only sought to eliminate trade barriers among its members; it did not impose a common tarrif with the rest of the world (Atkins, 1989: 192-194).

37. According to Tomassini (1985: 213), RIAL's membership included some twenty-four centers of research throughout Latin America in 1984, such as: Mexico's Colegio de México, the Centro de Estudios Económicos y Sociales del Tercer Mundo (CEESTEM), and the Centro de Investigaciones y Docenía Económica (CIDE); Costa Rica's Escuela de Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad Nacional; Venezuela's Instituto de Altos Estudios de América Latina de la Universidad Simón Bolívar; Colombia's Universidad de los Andes and the Fundación de Estudios del Desarrollo (FEDESARROLLO); Ecuador's Escuela de Ciencias Internacionales de la Universidad Central de Ecuador; Peru's Grupo de Analysis del Desarrollo (GRADE) and the Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales (CEPEI); Chile's Instituto de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Chile, the Corporación de Investigaciones Economicas Latinoamericanas (CIEPLAN) and the Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo (CED); Argentina's Universidad de Belgrano and the Area de Relaciones Internacionales de FLASCO; Uruguay's Centro Latinoamericano de Economía Humana; and Brazil's Universidad de Brasilia, the Conjunto Universitario Candido Mendes, the Universidad Católica de Rio de Janeiro, the Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Sociales, and the Instituto Universitario de Pesquisas de Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ).

38. Important exceptions to this generalization include U. S. policy toward Chile, 1970-1973 and the Carter Administration's human rights policy.

CHAPTER V

CENTRAL AMERICA IN CRISIS: POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC PRELUDES TO THE CONTADORA CALL FOR PEACE

> We have an interest in creating and supporting democratic states in Central America capable of conducting their political and economic affairs free from outside interference. Strategically, we have a vital interest in not allowing the proliferation of Cuba-model states which would provide platforms for subversion, compromise vital sea lanes and pose a direct military threat at or near our borders. This would undercut us globally and create economic dislocation and a resultant influx to the U.S. of illegal immigrants.
>
> National Security Council, April 1982[1]

> The Central American and Caribbean revolutions are, above all, the struggles of poor and oppressed peoples to live better. To say they are something else and to act as if they were is counter-productive: you finish up achieving what you wanted to avoid.
>
> Mexican President José López Portillo, February 1982[2]

In the late 1970s, the countries of Central America entered into a period of economic, social, and, for some, political crisis that lasted throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. Neighboring states with economic and political interests in the troubled isthmus understood the causes and remedies of these crises in different ways. After the successful armed revolution that ousted Nicaraguan dictator Anastacio Somoza Debayle in July, 1979, and after the growing revolutionary activity and civil violence in El Salvador and Guatemala in 1980, United States policy makers increasingly

interpreted events in Central America as part of a larger, renewed global struggle between East and West. With global security interests at stake and with escalating rhetoric of the cold war, Washington moved to "draw the line" in Central America and reassert its influence over a region traditionally considered part of the United States' "backyard." With the view that Cuban and Soviet interference laid at the heart of Central America's political upheavals, Washington developed containment-oriented policies for the region in the early 1980s. From economic and military aid for allies to covert operations and shows of force for adversaries, Washington developed and used a wide range of foreign policy tools to reassert and protect traditional U.S. interests in the region.

As these policies unfolded, however, other states neighboring Central America developed their own interpretations of the causes of the region's crises and moved to develop their own foreign policy tools to assert and protect their interests. Emerging sub-hegemons such as Mexico and Venezuela as well as other states with growing ties to the region, such as Colombia and Panama, became more and more concerned over the deepening violence in Central America and the related militarization of the region by outside powers of both East and West. After several isolated attempts during 1981 and 1982, these four neighboring states issued a joint call for peace in Central America in January, 1983, that developed into an ongoing diplomatic process aimed at the peaceful resolution of the region's conflicts.

The Contadora peace process (so named for the Panamanian island where the foreign ministers of the four countries first met) did not appear spontaneously in 1983. It emerged in response to a specific regional and international context. Before we can study the course of the Contadora peace process, we must look briefly at the political situation in Central America as well as the international context faced by the region in the late 1970s and early 1980s which spurred Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama to undertake their diplomatic quest for peace. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to review events of the late 1970s and early 1980s to help situate the emergence of the Contadora peace process. It is not meant to be a comprehensive analysis or explanation of the causes of political violence in Central America.

Changing Times

Beginning in the mid 1970s, the countries of Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) faced emerging economic, social, and political crises that would deepen and attract the world's attention in the 1980s. The isthmian economies had experienced dynamic growth during the 1960's industrialization process, thanks largely to the success during that decade of the Central American Common Market (CACM) as well as the related Alliance For Progress programs. Between 1960 and 1970, Central America's industrial sector had grown by 8.4 per cent, to

17.5 per cent of its GDP in 1970, while the region's GDP grew at an average annual rate of 7.67 per cent for the decade[3] (Torres Rivas, 1988: 143; Newfarmer, 1986: 215-216; Booth and Walker, 1989: Tables 2 and 4). Despite this important growth and diversification of the region's economy through import-substitution industrialization policies during the 1960s, Central America's exports to the world market continued to be made up of traditional agricultural products: Coffee, bananas, sugar, cotton, and beef. This continued dependence on primary products for Central America's export earnings resulted in a situation of deteriorating terms of trade in the mid-to-late 1970s, especially after the OPEC oil shocks of 1973-74 and 1978-79. Import prices rose by 38 per cent between 1976 and 1982 while Central America's exports lost their purchasing power[4] (Newfarmer, 1986: 215-216).

To make matters worse, the 1969 "Soccer War" between El Salvador and Honduras brought about the stagnation of the CACM in the 1970s. In this nationalistic war based in demographic and economic frustrations in both states, the actual fighting was relatively brief thanks to OAS peacekeeping procedures <u>and</u> the significant mediation efforts of the other three Central American states, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Costa Rica, whose diplomats worked to save the Common Market. However, Honduras cancelled its membership in the CACM in 1971 and tense relations between Honduras and El Salvador persisted throughout the 1970s (Martz, 1975). Thus, both the exhaustion of import-substitution industrialization and the stagnation of the CACM after the 1969 "Soccer War" contibuted to the

deterioration of the region´s economies in the 1970s, with per capita GDPs and per capita incomes falling markedly[5] (Cepeda and Pardo, 1987: 5; Newfarmer, 1986: 215-216; Booth and Walker, 1989: Tables 2 and 4).

Beyond its impressive growth during the 1960s, Central Aemrica´s industrialization process also contributed to important domestic social changes. These included increased urbanization and the growth of new urban sectors, such as industrial elites and workers --as well as the urban unemployed and underemployed--, all of whose economic and political interests diverged from the region´s traditional agrarian elites. Increased landlessness for the region´s rural poor also marked the 1960s and 1970s, depite limited attempts at land reform under the Alliance For Progress (Cepeda and Pardo, 1987: 5; La Feber, 1984: 145-195).

With the deterioration of traditional economic and social structures came growing demands on the political systems of the region for the accomodation of new interests. New social groups and new political movements emerged in Central America in the 1960s and 1970s, signalling pressures for change. However, in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala in particular, the traditionally elitist and exclusionary political systems resisted demands for change. Specifically, the Somoza regime in Nicaragua became more brutal and greedy; El Salvador´s military frustrated a democratic election held in 1972 and turned more brutal and repressive; and Guatemala´s centrist civil/military regime of the early 1970s became much more brutal later in the decade. The turn to political repression by

these states to quell emerging opposition groups often served to fuel the growing discontent and helped to polarize these already divided societies. By the late 1970s, several of the fledgling guerrilla groups that had emerged in the 1960s and early 1970s had grown into formidable revolutionary forces, both in spite of and as a partial consequence of the often indiscriminating counter-insurgency strategies carried out by these states. In short, as the region's economic situation deteriorated after the first OPEC oil shock and as social and political discontent expanded, political violence also grew. As the 1970s drew to a close, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala all faced serious economic, social, and political crises (La Feber, 1984; Hamilton et al, 1988; Booth and Walker, 1989: 52-53, 154; Cepeda and Pardo, 1987: 5-6; Valero, 1985: 132-133; Diskin and Sharpe, 1986; Gilbert, 1986; Trudeau and Schoultz, 1986).

By the end of the 1970s, the international political context had also changed for the Central American states. As discussed in Chpater IV, the inter-American system had undergone important changes in the 1960s and through the 1970s. Some of these changes were due to the changing domestic political scene in the United States and the related search for a new U.S. role in the world after Vietnam; others were the result of the new diplomatic assertiveness and relative foreign policy autonomy of certain Latin American states (Puig, 1976). Both would be significant for the Central American states in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

In the United States, the Vietnam War and its aftermath, the course of U.S.-Soviet detente policies, and the effects of the Watergate scandal all contributed to the breakdown of the post-World War II foreign policy consensus on containment policy and to a resurgence of congressional participation in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. Significantly, beginning in the Ford administration Congress passed legislation requiring that U.S. economic and especially military aid to Third World nations be tied to the human rights situation in the recipient countries rather than cold war criteria. Under the Carter administration, the goal of supporting human rights internationally was one of the few foreign policy goals that enjoyed some measure of bipartisan consensus and it soon became the centerpiece of the Carter foreign policy. Yet this policy led to tensions between the United States and certain Latin American states whose human rights situations were poor. For the governments of El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala in the mid-to-late 1970s, the new U.S. human rights policy was an important break with the past (Schoultz, 1987; Kirkpatrick, 1979; Crabb and Holt, 1984: 187-212; Leogrande et al, 1986: 298).[6]

Another important change in the inter-American context for the Central American states was the negotiation, signing, and ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties (or the Torrijos-Carter Treaties for the Latin Americans). Although the ratification by the U.S. Senate was a difficult and rancorous process[7] reflecting a deep division within the U.S. over this symbol of U.S. know-how and power, the new treaties seemed to indicate a new U.S. relationship

with Latin American countries, pledging a new respect for their regional interests and autonomy --human rights not withstanding.

As a spur to the treaty negotiations, which stalled between 1974 and 1977, Panamanian President General Omar Torrijos Herrera had successfully united Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, and Costa Rica in the Panamanian cause to gain back the canal through the Acta de Contadora. Signed in 1976 by all five states after a meeting on Panama's Contadora Island, the Acta pledged these states to contribute to and encourage the negotiation process between the United States and Panama. This display of diplomatic unity by these five states --the original "Contadora Group" (though they did not use this name at the time)-- was a significant manifestation of their new interests and growing assertiveness in regional foreign policy issues. The Panama Canal Treaties were finally signed on September 7, 1977, at the OAS with all the continent's heads of state present[8] and the members of the "Contadora Group" prominent among them (Cepeda and Pardo, 1987: 6-7; Bell, 1984: 10; Atkins, 1989: 332-334).

This growing foreign policy assertiveness of certain Latin American states on regional issues would have important consequences for Central America in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Not only was Panama's Torrijos seeking to play a leadership role in regional affairs and in U.S.-Latin American relations; so too was Mexico's José López Portillo, Venezuela's Carlos Andres Pérez, and Colombia's Julio César Turbay. Mexico's new petroleum findings in the 1970s, combined with the two rounds of petroleum price increases which

benefitted both Mexico and Venezuela, encouraged both states to widen their regional foreign policy activism in the mid-to-late 1970s. Central America and the Caribbean became important new foci of their foreign policy interests. As Cepeda and Pardo (1987:6) explain it, in the late 1970s

> Venezuela and Mexico came to play an increasingly deciding role [in Central America]. They augmented their levels of credit, collaborated in development banks for the zone, increased their diplomatic actions, and perceived that there were national interests at stake which they began to defend through foreign policies of greater profile (translation mine).

In the 1980 Pact of San José, Venezuela and Mexico guaranteed the subsidized sale of petroleum to Central American and Caribbean states and loaned back some of the income in the form of development aid. Thanks to this Program of Cooperation through the Pact of San José, Venezuela and Mexico joined the ranks of hemispheric aid donors to Central America (Drekonja-Kornat, 1985: 24; La Feber, 1984: 215-216).

Finally, the Central Americans also witnessed the foreign ministers of the Andean Pact nations, led by Venezuela and Colombia, taking an interest in the deepening Nicaraguan civil conflict in late 1978 and 1979. The new diplomatic activism of the Andean foreign ministers included various declarations calling for Somoza's resignation as well as opposition in the OAS to the Carter administration's failed attempt to create a multinational peace-keeping force in Nicaragua. It culminated in the Andean ministers' recognition of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) as a belligerent force against the Somoza dictatorship on June 16,

1979 and in their mediation between the FSLN and Somoza on the eve of his fall from power. This diplomatic activism, which paralled that of the original "Contadora" countries, was important in denying continued legitimacy to Somoza and in weakening the already ambivalent efforts of the United States to prevent the FSLN from coming to power (Cepeda and Pardo, 1987: 7-8; Bell, 1984: 10; Atkins, 1989: 195-196).

Central America in Crisis and the Crisis of U.S. Hegemony

By the end of the 1970s, the Carter administration's human rights policy provided evidence that the so-called "hegemonic presumption" (Lowenthal, 1976) still existed, albeit in a more liberal and perhaps attenuated form. Yet, after the fall of Somoza, many in the United States had come to fear and argue that U.S. hegemony in the circum-Caribbean region had greatly and dangerously eroded, citing the "give away" of the Panama Canal and the "abandonment" of Anastacio Somoza as proof. A conservative group known as the Committee of Santa Fe was perhaps the most articulate in stating this view. In its 1980 report, A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties, the Committee warned that

> America is everywhere in retreat....Even the Caribbean, America's maritime crossroad and petroleum refining center, is becoming a Marxist-Leninist lake. Never before has the Republic been in such jeopardy from its exposed southern flank. Never before has American foreign policy abused, abandoned, and betrayed its allies to the south in Latin America (Committee of Santa Fe, 1980: 2).

What seems to be more accurate is that U.S. hegemony over the circum-Caribbean region had not really eroded; rather, the growing strength and "relative autonomy" (Puig, 1975) of certain Latin American states had become significant by the late 1970s. The new foreign policy interests and capabilities of countries like Mexico, Venezuela, Panama, and even Colombia in Central America and the Caribbean had become significant political and diplomatic realities that the Central American states and the United States now had to face. As the isthmus experienced deepening economic, social, and political crises, it also faced an international context that included the continued presence of the United States as the traditional hegemon as well as the new presence of neighboring states with active, subhegemonic interests in the region.[9] The test of these competing hegemonic interests would develop in the 1980s as the United States sought to reassert its traditional hegemony over Central America while Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama sought to exercise and maintain their sub-hegemonic interests.

In 1980, political polarization and violence deepened markedly in Central America. In El Salvador, a coup by reform-minded junior military officers in October 1979 brought widespread hopes for an improved political situation. However, after January 1980, the military and civilian junta began to drift to the right. Growing death squad violence sponsored by El Salvador's ultra right political sectors and military factions, along with the inability of the new junta to do much to stop the violence, led to the resignations in early 1980 of the more moderate and leftist civilian

members of the junta. Román Mayorga, the Rector of the Central American University, and Guillermo Ungo, the leader of El Salvador's Social Democratic Party, both resigned from the junta in January;[10] in March, Christian Democratic civilians Hector Dada and Rubén Zamora resigned. Only the more conservative Christian Democrat Jose Napoleon Duarte stayed on in an admirable but futile attempt to institute reforms and moderate the growing political violence. Instead, death squad activity, political repression, and growing revolutionary guerrilla activity in El Salvador only deepened as the country sank into full-blown civil war (Diskin and Sharpe, 1986: 56-59; See also Baloyra, 1982; Montgomery, 1982; Armstrong and Shenk, 1982).

In Nicaragua, 1980 brought growing tension bewteen the leftist Sandinista Front[11] and the more moderate and conservative business-oriented members of the revolutionary coalition that had ousted Somoza in July 1979. In April 1980, the FSLN unilaterally undertook a reorganization of the governing revolutionary Council of State by adding more seats for the FSLN-related popular organizations. This move alienated the more conservative members of the council and resulted in the resignations of Violeta Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo. With the mediation efforts of U.S. Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo, the political crisis was contained after the FSLN made conciliatory gestures to the more conservative private sector business groups represented by COSEP, the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (Consejo Superior de la Empresa Privada). However, by November 1980, Robelo, COSEP, and others made up an

emerging anti-Sandinista political coalition. Meanwhile, former Somoza national guardsmen began to organize and train with the help of Argentine military advisors in Guatemala and Honduras in the hopes of removing the Sandinistas from power through an armed counter-revolution. This group constituted the core of what would later be called the "contras" (for contrarevolucionarios) and would soon begin to carry out hit and run attacks against FSLN targets inside Nicaragua (Gilbert, 1986: 96-98; Kornbluh, 1987: 25; Dickey, 1986: 91; Pastor, 1987: 367-368).

In Guatemala in 1980 a new cycle of political repression and violence under General Romeo Lucás García was gaining momentum.[12] In the cities, the government's repression included arrests without charges, kidnapping, torture, and murder, and targeted the leaders of Guatemala's centrist parties,[13] labor union leaders, university professors, and student leaders. In rural areas, the army unleashed a new counter-insurgency campaign that soon came to focus on the indigenous communities in the highlands of western Guatemala, where revolutionary guerrilla groups hade successfully increased their activities and built up their support. A brutal civil war with ethnic or racial as well as socio-economic lines once again engulfed Guatemala (Aguilera Peralta, 1981; Trudeau and Schoultz, 1986: 36-40; Aguilera Peralta, 1988: 156-157; Booth and Walker, 1989: 86-94).

In very broad terms, the Carter administration's policy toward these regional political crises in 1980 was to begin to increase U. S. economic and military aid to the government of El Salvador,[14] continue to try to moderate the course of the Nicaraguan revolution

with both positive and negative economic and political tools,[15] and maintain a cut-off of U.S. aid to Guatemala due to the severe human rights abuses there. But U.S. foreign policy setbacks elsewhere, such as the Iranian hostage ordeal, the effects of a second round of OPEC price increases (particularly the related economic stagflation), the Mariel immigration crisis, and the Soviet war in Afghanistan all contributed to a growing sense of "America under siege" within the United States. During the last year of the Carter administration, more traditional cold war and geostrategic considerations reemerged in U.S. foreign policy making. Meanwhile, more conservative political candidates successfully manipulated a growing xenophobic attitude during the 1980 election year and reinjected cold war rhetoric into the American public discourse. Detente died in the last year of the Carter administration and was buried with the election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980. The U.S. foreign policy agenda returned to the security of more familiar strategic concerns as the cold war was reborn and the United States sought to reassert its more traditional interests in the circum-Caribbean region.

During its first two years in office, the Reagan administration sought to redefine the ends and means of U.S. foreign policy away from its renderings of the 1970s. Both ideology and a renewed global strategic vision shaped the administration's interpretation of events in world politics. From the new administration's perspective, after years of setbacks, the United States was once again confronted with a global struggle against aggressive Soviet

communism. Central America was perceived as being a current target of Soviet-sponsored subversion. The region's revolutionary ferment had its origins in Soviet, Cuban, and now Nicaraguan interventionism.[16] El Salvador would be the "test case" against further communist expansion in the hemisphere, requiring increased U.S. economic aid to that besieged government and stepped-up military aid and advice to strengthen and professionalize the Salvadoran military in its counter-insurgency campaign against the formidable FDR-FMLN (Democratic Revolutionary Front-Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation) (Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 18; Cepeda and Pardo, 1987: 12; Diskin and Sharpe, 1986: 50-87; Blackman, et al, 1986: 295-328; Pastor, 1987: 360-365; Weinraub, 1983: 1,4; Schoultz, 1989).

The new administration also sought to support the Guatemalan military in its efforts to neutralize the country's growing guerrilla groups. However congress resisted the administration's efforts to renew U.S. military aid to the brutal military regimes of Generals Romeo Lucás García (1978-1982) and Efraín Ríos Montt (1982-1983).[17] Thus, the Guatemalan military's counter-insurgency campaigns generally remained peripheral to the Reagan administration's containment policies during its first term (Trudeau and Schoultz, 1986: 37-39, 44-45; Pastor, 1987: 360-369).

However, Nicaragua became the primary focus of the Reagan administration's new policies of containment and, eventually, rollback.[18] The administration initially took the position that the Sandinista government needed to be pressured into abandoning its support for revolution or subversion against its neighbors,

especially in El Salvador. During its first two years, the administration would develop the full range of diplomatic tools, including force, to create such containment pressures in Nicaragua. The Reagan administration's diplomatic pressures included a hostile rhetorical campaign against the Sandinista government --to which the Sandinistas responded in kind--, the announcement of the cut-off of all future U.S. economic aid in April 1981, the blocking of financial credits and loans from multilateral banks such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank during 1982 and beyond,[19] and hopelessly mixed signals from U.S. diplomats about the prospects for normalized bilateral relations. For example, it took the Reagan Administration seven months to send a new ambassador, Anthony Quainton, to Managua after Lawrence Pezzullo left the post in August 1981. Meanwhile, at Pezzullo's request, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Enders, travelled to Managua to hold discussions on August 12 and 13, 1981, with the Sandinista government on U.S.-Nicaraguan relations.

The "Enders Talks" seemed to open the door to improved relations, and some follow-up correspondance did take place in September between the two governments. However, for Nicaragua's ambassador to the United States, Arturo Cruz, and other inexperienced Nicaraguan diplomats, Enders' initial presentation of the U.S. position for improved relations sounded "like the conditions of a victorious power" rather than an opening negotiating position (Gutman, 1984: 4, 10). Not only did the United States reiterate its demand that Nicaragua end its material and logistical

support to El Salvador's FMLN[20] if economic aid were to be renewed. It also insisted that Nicaragua limit the size of its military to between 15,000 and 17,000 soldiers and eventually reduce it to under 10,000; the U.S. also demanded that Nicaragua send back the new weapon systems it was receiving from France and the Soviet Union that its neighbors did not possess (Gutman, 1984: 7; Walker, 1985).

More mixed signals came in the follow-up correspondance to the Enders Talks in September. As Gutman (1984: 7) explains it,

> the administration sent a draft of a unilateral declaration promising vigorous enforcement of U.S. neutrality laws regarding Nicaraguan exiles. But in an example of clumsy timing, a notice was attached saying that remaining economic aid to Nicaragua had been canceled.

Enders sent another draft of a proposed joint declaration on non-intervention shortly thereafter. It would have committed the United States not to use, threaten, or acquiesce in the use of force against Nicaragua if Nicaragua pledged the same to its neighbors. However, two days later, on September 18, the Reagan administration announced plans to hold a joint naval exercise with Honduras in October. Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto Brockman expressed his government's concerns about the meaning of such exercises. Soon thereafter, the Enders' initiative broke down without any other draft documents on security issues, cultural exchanges, and economic aid ever being presented. The mixed diplomatic signals produced growing mutual distrust, missed opportunities, and deteriorating relations between the United States and Nicaragua (Gutman, 1984: 3-9; Bagley et al, 1985: 22-32, documents 1.8-1.13; Bendaña, 1990).

Military tools and shows of force were also developed to create containment pressures against Nicaragua. By the summer of 1981, the Reagan administration openly supported the appearance of contra training camps in Florida, Texas, and California, despite U.S. neutrality laws. The administration had also authorized the CIA's moves to take over the training and funding of the Honduran-based contras from their Argentine advisors and to unite the two main contra organizations, the Honduran-based September 15 Legion and the Miami-based Nicaraguan Democratic Union, under one anti-Sandinista banner, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN)[21] (Knornbluh, 1987: 23-27; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 18; Pastor, 1987: 360-369; Cepeda and Pardo, 1987: 13; Dickey, 1986; Chamorro, 1987).

By the end of 1981, the National Security Council had approved a $19 million program of covert action against Nicaragua, ostensibly to interdict arms trafficking from Nicaragua to Salvadoran guerrillas, and President Reagan had sent Congress a "finding" stating that such covert activity was in the national interest. Soon thereafter, in March 1982, contra attacks in Nicaragua increased in their frequency and destructiveness. In response, the Sandinista government declared a state of emergency and mobilized troops along the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The "covert" war was by then well under way (Goodfellow, 1987: 146; Kornbluh, 1987: 24-25; Pastor, 1987: 366-367).

Honduras became a key player in the Reagan administration's containment strategy in Central America and the stage for Washington's new shows of force in the region. Largely ignored by

Washington prior to the 1980s, Honduras quickly became a strategic center of U.S. military and intelligence operations in the region. Its geographic location, bordering Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala and possessing a long Caribbean coastline in the north, as well as its strongly anti-communist military and civilian leadership provided the Reagan administration with the opportunity to increase dramatically U.S. military capabilities in the region. As part of its policy to reassert U.S. military power in the region in its first few years in office, the Reagan administration sponsored a rapid U.S. military build-up in Honduras. The build-up included a nine-fold increase in U.S. military aid to the Honduran military between 1981 and 1983, the establishment of numerous new U.S. military bases and training centers, the construction or improvement of several new airfields, the building of advanced radar stations operated by the U.S. military and the CIA, the trebbling of U.S. military advisors in Honduras, the building of roads and other infrastructure to support the new military facilities, and the establishment of contra base camps near the Nicaraguan border (La Feber, 1984: 309; Sheperd, 1986: 131-133; Gold, 1987: 43).

But perhaps the most significant example of the Reagan administration's early attempts to reintroduce shows of force in its regional containment policy was the holding of numerous ongoing military exercises with the Honduran military. The first joint U.S.-Honduran military exercises took place in October 1981 near the Nicaraguan border and the Caribbean coast. Their frequency and duration increased substantially in the following years.[22] These

shows of force sent different political messages to different audiences in the region. To U.S. allies, such as the governments of El Salvador, Honduras, and (later) Costa Rica, the exercises signalled a renewed U.S. military preparedness and willingness to resort to force if necessary to protect both U.S. interests and allies who might call for help. To U.S. adversaries, such as the governments of Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union as well as the revolutionary FDR-FMNL in El Salvador, the exercises could be seen as threatening a U.S. military invasion in order to stop and punish any advances in the spreading of radical revolution in the region[23] (Sheperd, 1986: 133-134; Gold, 1987: 50; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 18).

For other regional actors, however, the military exercises, their associated military build-up in Honduras, the stepped-up military aid to the Salvadoran government, the emerging contra policy, and the bellicose rhetoric of the Reagan administration all produced growing concerns. The governments of Mexico, Costa Rica, and Venezuela were already concerned about the civil conflicts and political violence in El Salvador and Guatemala and about the effects such violence was producing in the region, such as a growing refugee problem for neighboring states and a further damper on regional trade during the deepening global recession. However, as the Reagan administration's reassertive Central American policy unfolded during 1981 and 1982, these states became increasingly alarmed at the growing militarization of the region and what they perceived to be the growing risk of a region-wide war.

Calling For Peace

Mexican President José López Portillo led the neighboring states in challenging the growing militarization of the region as inappropriate and in calling on the Central Americans themselves to solve their conflicts peacefully. In early May, 1981, López Portillo called on Honduras and Nicaragua to hold discussions to ease their emerging border tensions. López Portillo personally mediated the discussions held on May 13 between Honduran President General Policarpo Paz García and Nicaraguan junta leader Commander Daniel Ortega in El Guasuale, Nicaragua. The talks succeeded in improving relations between the two governments for a time (Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 19; Karl, 1986: 275).

Shortly thereafter, López Portillo and Venezuelan President Luís Herrera Campíns issued a joint statement urging international mediation to resolve the Salvadoran civil war. In August, Mexico succeeded in winning French support for its position on El Salvador when French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson and Mexican Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda issued a joint declaration on El Salvador and submitted it to the United Nations Security Council on August 28. The Franco-Mexican Declaration on El Salvador recognized the FDR-FMLN as "a representative political force" that "should participate in instituting the mechanisms of rapprochement and negotiation required for a political settlement of the crisis" in El Salvador. This call for a negotiated settlement between government and armed opposition also appealed to the international community to

work within the framework of the United Nations to protect the civilian population and to promote a peaceful settlement and national reconciliation in El Salvador (Karl, 1986: 411, fn. 30; Franco-Mexican Declaration, 1981: 152-153; Goodfellow, 1987: 146).

During 1982, more calls for peace emanated from actors both within and outside of Central America, with Mexico continuing to lead the way. In a speech during a visit to Managua on February 21, Mexican President López Portillo called for a broad process of negotiations to bring peace to El Salvador, reduce tensions between Nicaragua and its neighbors, and improve U.S. relations with Nicaragua and Cuba. Mexico could "serve as a bridge between the polarize forces" in such a negotiation process. In presenting his proposal, López Portillo stressed that the "dramatic convulsions" affecting Central America were the result of the region's own "misery, tyranny and oppression;" they could not and should not be placed "into the terrible dichotomy of East against West or capitalism against socialism" (Riding, 1982c: 8; Riding, 1982b: 9).

Throughout March and April, the Mexican government continued to pursue its peace initiative. However, a cool reaction from Washington towards Mexico's involvement, a still-born attempt by the five Central American heads of state to hold a summit meeting,[24] the outbreak of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands War in late April, and a chilled diplomatic exchange between the United States and Nicaragua throughout the spring[25] all contributed to the failure of the Mexican peace initiative. On May 9, López Portillo gave up his mediation attempt, arguing that he had done all he could ("Central

Americans...," 1982: 10; Crossette, 1982: 6; "A Meeting of Five Latin Leaders...," 1982: 3; "Mexico Giving U.S. Latin Plan Details," 1982: 5; Riding, 1982a: 12; Goodfellow, 1987: 147).

At the same time that López Portillo announced his peace initiative, Nicaraguan junta leader, Daniel Ortega, also proposed a five-point peace plan. The plan proposed new talks with the Reagan administration, joint border patrols with Honduras and Costa Rica, non-aggression pacts between Nicaragua and its neighbors, a commitment to follow a non-aligned foreign policy, and a pledge to maintain political pluralism and a mixed economy as well as to hold elections in 1985 (Riding, 1982b: 9; Riding, 1982c: 8). Nothing of substance came from this proposal except for the terse diplomatic exchanges between Nicaragua and the United States in the spring of 1982.[26]

The calls for peace in Central America continued. At the inauguration of Costa Rican President Luís Alberto Monge in May 1982, six leaders of the region expressed their concern over the regional arms race and called for its reversal[27] (Mexican-Venezuelan Declaration, 1982: 155). In June, the Honduran government proposed the formation of a working group of the Central American nations to study the regional crises (Cepeda and Pardo, 1987: 23). Meanwhile the Venezuelan government of Luis Herrera Campins bacame even more interested in seeing a negotiated settlement in El Salvador after elections there in March for a constituent assembly removed the allied Christian Democrats and brought important gains for the ultra-right-wing ARENA party. The Falklands/Malvinas Islands War also

contrubuted to the Venezuelan government's distancing from the U.S. position on Nicaragua (Chace, 1982: 31; Karl, 1986: 281-284).

As the Venezuelan government increasingly looked for strategies to promote peace in the troubled isthmus and moved down the same path as Mexico, the two states began to coordinate their diplomacy more closely. On September 7, 1982, Presidents López Portillo and Herrera Campíns sent a letter to President Reagan expressing their concern "over the events which seriously threaten the peace between Nicaragua and Honduras, and furthermore peace in Central America." Known as the "Mexican-Venezuelan Declaration," the letter pointed out the "geographic considerations" as well as the economic[28] and political interests the two states shared in Central America. They urged an end to the "actual and worrying" military escalation in the region as well as the "support, organization, and emplacement of former Somocista guards" in Honduras. Finally, they called for "the conclusion of a global agreement that may provide true peace between Nicaragua and Honduras, and which will bear a positive result in a framework of world tensions and confrontations" (Mexican-Venezuelan Declaration, 1982: 153-155; Goodfellow, 1987: 148).

One month later, on October 4, 1982, a special meeting was held in San José, Costa Rica, that created a new coalition of states seeking to promote peace and democracy in the circum-Caribbean region. A founding declaration creating the Forum Pro Peace and Democracy was signed by Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, and the United States; Dominican Republic and Panama attended the meeting as observers only. The Forum Pro Peace

and Democracy formally embraced electoral democracy, respect for human rights, national development, economic integration, regional arms control, and the principle of non-intervention. It dedicated itself to studying the Central American crises and the various peace proposals that had emerged for the region. The Forum was the successor to the still-born Central American Democratic Community, which was an attempt ten months earlier by Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and the United States to form a regional democratic bloc opposed to the revolutionary Sandinista government in Nicaragua (Declaration of San José, 1982: 155-160).

The Forum's decidedly anti-Sandinista and pro-U.S. orientation ended up alienating the new administration of Colombia's President Belisario Betancur Cuartas. Since his inauguration on August 7, 1982, Betancur had begun to distance himself from his predecessor's more pro-U.S. positions on foreign policy. After the formation of the Forum Pro Peace and Democracy, Betancur's foreign minister, Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo, told his Mexican and Venezuelan counterparts that Colombia would have endorsed the September 7 Mexican-Venezuelan Declaration if only Colombia had been consulted. At the same time, Panama also backed away even further from the Forum (Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 19-20; Hoge, 1982: 6). The stage was set for a new regional coalition to form.

On December 3, 1982, President Betancur underscored the different vision his government had of the crises in Central America compared to the Reagan administration. In his toast to President Reagan, who briefly visited the Colombian capital that day,

President Betancur sharply criticized U.S. policies in Central America and urged an end to all foreign intervention there in order to prevent the region from becoming trapped in the East-West conflict. Betancur was clearly echoing the Mexican and Venezuelan positions on the region and shared their growing fears that a region-wide war might explode (Weisman, 1982: 1).

Within a few days, Mexican President José López Portillo called for a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Latin "democracies" of the region to discuss the deteriorating situation in Central America. In a conscious attempt to create a Latin alternative to the pro-U.S. Forum Pro Peace and Democracy, and taking up the mantel of Latin miltilateralism championed by Pamana's Omar Torrijos until his death in 1981, López Portillo specifically called on Colombia, Panama, and Venezuela to meet with Mexico at the earliest possible date. The four states chose January 8 and 9, 1983, as the date for such a meeting. They also chose as its location the island of Contadora, where six years earlier they had gathered to support Panama in its canal negotiations with the United States. Although Costa Rica had been a part of that original Contadora-based diplomacy in the late 1970s, it was agreed that Costa Rica should now be considered as one of the parties to the regional crises, especially considering its serious border tensions with Nicaragua, its active participation in the Forum Pro Peace and Democracy,[29] and the pro-U.S. positions of its President, Luís Alberto Monge and its Foreign Minister, Fernando Volio Jiménez. Thus, by the end of 1982, the members of a reconstituted "Contadora Group" prepared to discuss

their growing concerns over the worsening regional crisis (Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 20; Drekonja-Kornat, 1985: 26; Bell, 1984: 10; Karl, 1986: 284).

Political and Diplomatic Preludes to the Contadora Call for Peace

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Central America entered into a period of economic, social, and political crisis that attracted the attention of many political actors around the world. The surrounding states most affected by the regional crises developed active diplomatic responses to secure their regional interests. United States policymakers came to view the region's crises as having significant reverberations in the renewed East-West conflict of the 1980s. They acted to reassert traditional U.S. hegemony over the region, thus renewing the Monroe Doctrine's prohibition of what was perceived to be extra-hemispheric interference in the troubled countries of the isthmus. The United States developed a set of policies designed to contain the spread of armed revolution in the region. Yet the region's militarization and political violence deepened.

Increasingly alarmed by the deteriorating regional situation, other neighboring states urged negotiations as the best path to ease tensions and resolve conflicts in the region. Led by Mexico and Venezuela, emerging regional subhegemons vying for regional leadership, and later joined by Colombia and Panama, which also sought leadership roles in the circum-Carribean region, these states

acted to defend their status and interests in Central America as the isthmus entered into crisis. Yet, facing severe economic crises themselves by 1982, these states individually had limited capabilities in influencing the isthmian states to resolve their domestic and inter-state conflicts peacefully; nor could they singly challenge the containment policies of a resurgent United States. But together, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama might be able to pave the way for the diplomatic alternative of negotiations as the road to peace in Central America.

ENDNOTES

1. Reprinted in the New York Times. See National Security Council (1983: 16).

2. Quoted in Riding (1982c: 8).

3. This growth of the region's GDP is a weighted average. Yet the weighted average annual GDP per capita in Central America for the 1960s was only 3.68%, reflecting a high rate of population growth for the period. These regional figures are my own calculations based on the (1986) dollar amounts of GDP and GDP per capita for each Central American country for the years 1960 and 1970 found in Booth and Walker (1989: Table 2). Using these same figures and using 1980 as well, the growth rates of GDP and GDP per capita for each Central American country between 1960 and 1970 and between 1970 and 1980 are as follows:

COUNTRY	1960-1970		1970-1980	
	GDP	GDP/capita	GDP	GDP/capita
Costa Rica	7.8%	2.7%	7.3%	3.1%
El Salvador	7.3%	2.4%	3.7%	0.89%
Guatemala	7.1%	3.5%	7.3%	2.6%
Honduras	7.1%	2.6%	7.0%	2.2%
Nicaragua	9.5%	5.58%	0.35%	-2.3%

Special thanks to Linda (Hudgins) Lucas, Economics Professor at Eckerd Colege, for showing me how to calculate these rates of growth and weighted averages.

The marked drop in GDP and GDP per capita growth rates for El Salvador and Nicaragua in the 1970s lends support to Booth and Walker's (1989) thesis that poverty or deprivation alone is not a sufficient cause of the emergence of conditions for revolution. Rather, a sharp deterioration in the economy, wages, and living standards of the population --and the population's awareness of this deterioration and of increasing socio-economic inequalities-- are related to the emergence of such conditions. James C. Davies (1971) developed a similar thesis after studying the great revolutions of the modern period. According to Davies' thesis, "Revolution is most likely to occur when a long period of rising expectations and gratifications is followed by a period during which gratifications (socioeconomic or otherwise) suddenly drop off while expectations (socioeconomic or otherwise) continue to rise. The rapidly widening gap between expectations and gratifications portends revolution....[T]he greatest portion of people who join a revolution are preoccupied with tensions

related to the failure to gratify physical (economic) needs and the need for stable interpersonal (social) relationships" (Davies, 1971: 133). A marked increase in political repression --or a marked drop off of political freedom-- can also play a role in this situation. The sharp deterioration in economic and political "gratifications" in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala in the 1970s satifies both Booth and Walker's and Davies' theses on conditions for revolution.

4. According to Newfarmer (1986: 216), Central America's "export prices rose at a less rapid rate than import prices after 1977, and actually fell after 1980....Even though output per capita rose by seven percent in volume terms --24 percent absolutely-- between 1976 and 1982, income per capita was actually much lower because exports had lost their purchasing power." See also Booth and Walker (1989: 147-152, Tables 1 to 6).

5. See Endnote 3 concerning GDP per capita growth rates.

6. It should be noted that Congress took the lead in developing the new U.S. policies on human rights beginning in the early 1970s, not President Carter, and that Central America was of concern to Congress at the time. There is also a great deal of debate over the consistancy of the Carter administration in implementing and enforcing the human rights policy. Critics on the right, such as Jeane Kirkpatrick (1979), argue that President Carter improperly abandonned repressive authoritarian allies on the right such as the Shah of Iran and Anastacio Somoza because of their human rights records while failing to condemn totalitarian regimes on the left, whose human rights violations are qualitatively and quantitatively worse. Critics on the left argue that the Carter administration focused primarily on Latin American states due to the traditional "hegemonic presumption" of the United States toward the region but failed to apply the policy evenly to other regions. Still others point out that during the last two years of the Carter administration, there was a marked backtracking on human rights issues as the administration shifted more to the right and certain cold war security interests resurfaced after the Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

7. See Crabb and Holt (1984: 75-97) for a good discussion of congressional debates and the struggle between Congress and the President over the Panama Canal Treaties; see also Atkins (1989: 332-334).

8. There was also a protocol to the neutrality treaty (The Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal) signed by most other Latin American states (Atkins, 1989: 332).

9. See Chapter VIII for a more developed analysis of the foreign policy interests and capabilities --and the "relative autonomy" -- of the Contadora Group states.

10. As Diskin and Sharpe (1986: 56) note, "Both [Mayorga and Ungo] had close ties to the Foro Popular (Popular Forum), a moderate coalition of center and left parties, important unions, and popular organizations."

11. The FSLN included a rather wide-ranging array of groups on the left, from anti-yankee nationalists to liberal and radical catholics; from social democrats to marxist-leninists (like Tomas Borge). Interestingly, the FSLN did not include the Nicaragua's traditional communist party.

12. Most of Guatemala's history since Independence (and before) is marked by political repression, political and ethnic violence and military dicatorship as well as corruption and electoral fraud. General Romeo Lucás García came to power after fraudulent elections in 1978 and served until 1982 when a coup brought General Efraín Ríos Montt to power. A born-again evangelical and staunchly anti-communist, Ríos Montt presided over a period of even greater repression and violence in rural areas, where whole villages were massacred in the military's counter-insurgency campaign. The violence became so bad that some observers began to use the word "genocide" to describe the military's campaign. Others began to create dark plays on words with Guatemala's name: E.g., "Guatebala" (bala = Spanish for "bullet"); and "Guatepeor" (mala = Spanish for "bad;" peor = Spanish for "worse").

13. As Trudeau and Schoultz (1986: 37) note, "Guatemala's two centrist-reformist political parties, the Social Democrats (PSD) and the United Front of the Revolution (FUR), were crushed following the 1979 assassinations of their leaders, former Foreign Minister Alberto Fuentes Mohr and former Guatemala City Mayor Manuel Colóm Argüeta, respectively. The grassroots leadership of the center-right Christian Democrats was decimated --150 murders of party organizers in 1980 and 1981 served to silence all but a handful of party activists."

14. Despite serious human rights abuses, the Carter administration gambled that by aiding Duarte, a second radical revolution in Central America could be averted and El Salvador's murderous ultra-right wing coul be reigned in. Electoral politics, the recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the prolonged Iranian hostage ordeal, and personnel changes in the Carter administration all contributed to the development of a more traditional containment-oriented approach toward El Salvador during 1980.

15. As Elliott Abrams pointed out to the New York Times in January 1983 when he was serving as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights: "One should always recall the fundamental change in American attitudes toward Nicaragua and El Salvador took place in the last period of the Carter Administration. It was under the Carter Administration that aid to Nicaragua was stopped and that military assistance to El Salvador was started." In actual fact, U.S. aid to Nicaragua did not end until the Reagan administration's decision in April 1981, however it is true that the Carter administration began military aid to El Salvador. See previous endnote.

16. According to Lars Schoultz (1987), the beliefs of policy-makers in the Reagan administration about the causes of revolutionary instability in Central America were divided between the ideologues and the more pragmatic moderates and liberals. The former saw external causes, specifically Soviet and Cuban subversion and interventionism, as the sources of the region's revolutionary instability. The latter believed that the causes of the revolutionary movements in the region had indigenous roots based largely in the region's poverty and inequality. Some of this latter group believed that the resulting instability presented a serious security threat to U.S. interests that benefitted the Soviets and Cubans, while others believed such instability did not present a security threat to the United States.

17. After having become an international pariah for its human rights abuses under General Ríos Montt, the Guatemalan military under General Mejía Víctores (August 1983-January 1986) promised a democratic opening and held elections for a Constituent Assembly in 1984 and national elections in the fall of 1985. The U.S. Congress permitted limited U.S. economic and military aid to resume to Guatemala in 1984 (Trudeau and Schoultz, 1986: 45).

18. Though championed by some hardliners in the administration from the beginning, "rollback" in Nicaragua would not officially become a policy goal in President Reagan's first term. Nevertheless, the October 1983 invasion of Grenada demonstrated the administration's propensity for "rollback" if strategically feasible. Moreover, the administration's contra aid policy was oriented toward rollback, despite the official positions that the contras were first necessary to stem the alleged flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador and then, during President Reagan's second term, to force the Sandinistas to negotiate a peace agreement.

19. It has been estimated that between 1981 and 1984, the U.S. blocked some $200 million in noncommercial multilateral development credits to Nicaragua. See Gilbert (1986: 105).

20. This demand was one of the first expressed by the Reagan administration after coming to office as a condition for continued U.S. aid to Nicaragua. According to Gilbert (1986: 99-100) and Pastor (1987: 365), the Nicaraguan government did stop its supply of arms to the FMLN by March 1981; however, the Reagan administration cut off all U.S. aid to Nicaragua on April 1, 1981 anyway.

21. The administration's moves to take over the funding and training of the contras began in March 1981 when President Reagan sent his first "finding" to Congress authorizing CIA covert operations in Central America to interdict arms trafficking to leftist guerrillas. The FDN was founded in Guatemala City on August 10, 1981. Its leadership was dominated primarily by former officials of Somoza's National Guard and was heavily dependent on the CIA. Another more independent contra group known as ARDE (Democratic Revolutionary Alliance) was founded in Costa Rica in Spetember 1982 by two former members of the Sandinista government, Eden Pastora and Alfonso Robelo. Although the CIA did aid ARDE between 1982 and 1984, Eden Pastora refused to follow the CIA's agenda to join ARDE with the FDN. After a suspicious assassination attempt on Pastora's life at a May 1984 press conference in La Penca, Costa Rica, carried out by members of the FDN and possibly sanctioned by the CIA, Alfonso Robelo broke with Eden Pastora and joined the FDN with half of ARDE's troops. By 1986, the rest of Pastora's troops had been lured away by the CIA to join the FDN and Pastora retired from guerrilla life (Kornbluh, 1987: 26; Pastor, 1987: 367; Dickey, 1986; Chamorro, 1987).

22. Shepherd (1986: 133-134) identifies three stages in the development of the exercises during President Reagan's first term. The first stage lasted from October 1981 to February 1983 and was made up of several relatively brief exercises. The second stage began in August 1983 and lasted for six months. Known as "Big Pine II," these exercises were "the longest set of U.S. military exercises ever held." At their peak, they involved over five thousand U.S. troops in Honduras and over sixteen thousand more on nearby naval ships and planes. The third stage began in April 1984 with the "Granadero I" exercises, which were held close to both the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan borders. These exercises included the participation of Salvadoran troops. Similar joint military exercises would continue during President Reagan's second term as well.

23. In response to objections by Nicaragua to the first set of military exercises in the region in October 1981 (known as "Oceanic Adventure '81"), U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas O. Enders denied that the exercises were in any way

"directed at Nicaragua nor do they constitute a threat to Nicaragua....I can assure you that the October naval exercise includes no amphibious landing" (in Bagley et al, 1985: 29, Document 1.12).

24. On February 25, 1982, within hours of President Reagan's speech to the OAS unveiling his Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) aid program, the leaders of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama agreed to meet in San José, Costa Rica, to discuss solutions to the Central American conflicts and other matters of common interest. The government of Guatemala, however, refused to attend the summit after learning that Nicaragua would be present. On the following day, a Costa Rican Foreign Ministry Spokesperson announced that the meeting was indefinitely suspended ("Central Americans Call a Parley," 1982: 10; "A Meeting of Five Latin Leaders...," 1982: 3).

25. From April 10 through July 1, 1981, the United States and Nicaragua exchanged proposals for improved bilateral relations. The exchange began with a verbal eight-point proposal from U.S. Ambassador Quainton that was similar to the Enders' proposals of the previous August. The Sandinista government responded with a written thirteen-point counterproposal which was followed by another round of written correspondance between the two governments. However a rather terse and inflexible tone characterized the correspondance, and the diplomatic exchanges collapsed. Goodfellow (1987: 147-148), Chace (1982: 31), and Gutman (1984: 11-12) all suggest that the verbal eight-point U.S. proposal was not serious to begin with and was meant only to serve public opinion purposes. For the texts of most of this diplomatic exchange, see Bagley et al (1985: 32-42, documents 1.14 to 1.16).

26. See endnote 25.

27. The Mexican-Venezuelan Declaration of September 7, 1982 (155) mentions a "...Declaration of San José, Costa Rica of May 8, 1982, adopted during the inauguration of the Costa Rican President, Luís Alberto Monge,..." in which six leaders of the region expressed their concerns over the regional arms race and the need for regional arms reductions, peace, and democracy. Unfortunately, the names or countries of the six leaders who signed the document are not identified by the Mexican-Venezuelan Declaration, and I have not been able to find other references to it. This Declaration of San José should not be confused with the October 4, 1982 declaration that created the Forum Pro Peace and Democracy.

28. The letter specifically mentioned the 1980 San José Pact's Program of Cooperation For Central America, through which Mexico and Venezuela provided oil subsidies and developmental aid to the region (supra).

29. Indeed, Costa Rican Foreign Minister Fernando Volio played an active role in helping to create the Forum Pro Peace and Democracy.

CHAPTER VI

THE CONTADORA INITIATIVE FOR PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA

> "Among the illusions of law, there are some that distinguish themselves by being discrete, and this occurs with mediation. It develops simply, without boastfulness or exhuberant performance. It walks in the shadows, without casting shadows on anyone...and in the shade of its sobriety, it influences as advice and not as a mandate."
> --José Luís Bustamante Rivera, Peruvian Jurist[1]

On January 8 and 9, 1983, the foreign ministers of Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama met to discuss various foreign policy issues of mutual concern. The four foreign ministers held their meetings on the Panamanian island of Contadora, less than fifty miles from the Pacific mouth of the Panama Canal. Their agenda included discussions of the deepening trade and debt crises that their countries were facing as well as the perceived growing hostility of the United States toward compliance with the Carter-Torrijos Panama Canal Treaties. But the most central issue of concern to the ministers meeting on the island of Contadora was, as they put it, the "complex panorama existing in Central America." The deepening civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala, the expanding counter-revolutionary violence against Nicaragua along with border conflicts between Nicaragua and its neighbors, the rising numbers of Central American refugees produced by the regional violence, and the

shared and growing fear of a direct U.S. military intervention into one or more of these escalating regional conflicts all compelled the four ministers at Contadora to issue a call to the Central American states to embark on regional peace talks (Contadora Group, 1983a: 164-166).

Within three months, these four foreign ministers held their first formal meeting with their Central American counterparts in what would become an ongoing process of dialogue, mediation, and negotiations between the five Central American states. The four mediating states (Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama) soon adopted the name "Contadora Group." Over time, they developed a political and diplomatic framework for mediating and resolving Central America's violent conflicts that became known as the Contadora peace process. By building such a framework for ongoing negotiations with the Central American states, the Contadora Group sought to rescue the Central American conflicts from the reemerging East-West conflict and to create a political space in which the isthmian states could find an indigenous diplomatic alternative for resolving their disputes. Rather than watching the Central Americans march down the path of deepening militarization, which seemed to lead only to the increased military involvement of extra-regional powers and a greater chance of a region-wide war, over a five-year period the Contadora Group tried to build a shelter of diplomacy that encouraged and eventually permitted the Central American states to find their own formula for peace in the region.

At various points, the Contadora process appeared to be blocked or deadlocked, especially after its first eighteen months. Indeed, all along, but especially after 1985, the demise and failure of the Contadora peace process was announced over and over by many outside observers, such as Bagley (1986), Bagley and Tokatlian (1987), Arnson (1987), Castro (1985), Cepeda and Pardo (1987), Díaz Lacayo (1988), Purcell (1985), Drekonja-Kornat (1985), Farer (1985), Goodfellow (1987), Karl (1986), Morales (1985), Pastor (1985), the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (1984) and in many editorials (see, e.g., "Seis meses...," 1986; "Contadora pasa...," 1985, etc.). Yet Contadora always seemed to prove the naysayers wrong. Phoenix-like, it always seemed to revive at the most fateful moments. The Contadora process persisted in the face of enormous obstacles because the Contadora Group states saw their own national security interests at stake in the violent crises shaking Central America. An analysis of the specific foreign policy interests of the Contadora states (and others) in undertaking and maintaining the Contadora peace process will follow in Chapter VIII. In this chapter and the next, we shall reconstruct the events and analyze the politics of the Central American process in its two major phases, Contadora and Esquipulas.

The Contadora peace process can be broken down into five stages. In this chapter, we shall focus on the first two: (1) Initial Optimism and the Constitution of the Contadora Framework for Peace (January 1983-January 1984), and (2) The First Draft of the Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America

(February 1984-October 1984). In the next chapter, we shall focus on its subsequent stages and the emergence of the Esquipulas II phase: (3) Roadblocks and the Second Draft of the Contadora Act (November 1984-December 1985); (4) Stalemate and the Third Draft of the Contadora Act (January 1986-January 1987); and (5) From Contadora to Esquipulas II (January 1987-January 1988).

Initial Optimism and the Constitution of the Contadora Framework for Peace, January 1983 to January 1984

At the end of their January 1983 meeting on Contadora Island, which was not reported by the New York Times, the foreign ministers[2] from Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama issued an Information Bulletin summarizing the content of their talks and the extent of their concerns. Beyond the deepening trade and debt crises caused by the "recessive tendency of the world economy" and the "use of discriminatory legal devices...found" in the execution of the Panama Canal Treaties, the principal part of the Information Bulletin focused on Central America. It stressed the ministers' growing concerns over the risk of foreign military intervention in the region's worsening conflicts. The ministers reminded "all states" (presumably throughout the world) of their "international obligations" to abstain from the use or threat of force and warned against any kind of foreign interference or action that "could worsen the situation and create the danger of a general conflict

which could extent throughout the region." Moreover, the ministers explicitly rejected as "highly undesirable" the classification of the conflicts in Central America as East-West confrontations.

The Information Bulletin also called on the Central American states to embark on regional peace talks. While invoking the principles of non-intervention and self-determination, the Contadora ministers expressed their states' interests in seeing the Central American states find a framework for dialogue and negotiations. They stressed "the advantage of involving the valuable contributions and necessary support of other Latin American countries in those efforts." The ministers further evoked traditional Bolivaran ideals of Latin solidarity by calling for greater Latin American consultation and cooperation in addressing common problems. But they added a more contemporary note to these ideals --and further underlined their rejection of the reemergent Cold War-- by urging increased Latin American participation in the Non-Aligned Movement and other international Third World fora (Contadora Group, 1983a: 164-166).

Several factors contributed to converting this initial call for peace into a peace initiative by the states that would soon be called the Contadora Group. The supportive responses of the international community in the following months provided inportant encouragement to the call for peace. Messages of recognition and support were increasingly sent to the Contadora Group from the governments of Spain (which also offered to play a role in any peace process), Portugal, Sweden, France, Argentina, Egypt, Ecuador, Peru,

Brazil, and others as well as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Socialist International (Volio, 1985: 46-47; Darnton, 1983: A14).

Washington's immediate response was to send UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick to Central America in early February. In San José, Costa Rica, she discussed the Contadora call for peace with President Luís Alberto Monge. After visiting El Salvador, Ambassador Kirkpatrick recommended increased U.S. military aid to that government against what she described as a large Soviet effort there. Later that month, Washington announced the beginning of new U.S.-Honduran military exercises known as Big Pine I. Then, on March 10, 1983, President Reagan asked Congress for an emergency military and economic aid package of $298 million for Central America, including $110 million in military aid for El Salvador. Meanwhile, stepped-up contra attacks and armed clashes in northern Nicaragua were being reported and the U.S. role in the expanding "covert" war was becoming increasingly public. At the end of March 1983, Mexico's ambassador to the United Nations once again called for peace talks in the region (Volio, 1985: 49; Meislin, 1983: A1; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 22; Weinraub, 1983a: A7; Weinraub, 1983b: A1; Weinraub, 1983c: A1; Riding, 1983a: A5).

As for the Central Americans, a week after Ambassador Kirkpatrick's February visit, the foreign ministers from the three closest allies of the United States in the region, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras, met in San José to discuss the status of the U.S.-sponsored Forum pro Peace and Democracy. On March 5, these states seemed to respond to the Contadora call for dialogue by

announcing their plans to hold a meeting on regional peace. The planned meeting would include Nicaragua and Guatemala but not the United States; however, such a meeting never materialized (Volio, 1985: 49; Meislin, 1983: A1, A12; "Central America," 1983: 4).

Instead, the dynamic personal diplomacy of Colombian President Belisario Betancur in early April re-energized the Contadora call for peace. Taking up the role of "peace ambassador," Betancur visited Mexico, Venezuela, and Panama as well as Costa Rica to urge that regional peace talks be undertaken as soon as possible. On April 11 the Contadora Group states decided to send their foreign ministers immediately to Central American capitals where, as a group, they met with each state's president and foreign minister. They ended their mission in Guatemala City on April 13 where they announced that the first, ground-breaking joint meeting between the four Contadora foreign ministers and their five Central American colleagues was scheduled for April 20-21 in Panama City (Drekonja-Kornat, 1985: 27-28; Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 166-167; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 22; "Four Latin Officials...," 1983: A10).

This First Joint Meeting of the region's nine foreign ministers laid an important foundation for the building of a diplomatic framework for peace in Central America. According to the Contadora Group's Information Bulletin after it ended, the meeting's purpose was focused on "bringing about a constructive dialogue and establishing effective communication aimed at reducing tensions and laying the foundations of a stable and lasting peace in the region."

The Contadora ministers also spoke of the "common purpose of bringing about detente and promoting peaceful coexistence" (Contadora Group, 1983b: 167-168). To these ends, the meeting provided an opportunity for each of the Central American states to air their views and differences over the nature of the problems facing the region. From these discussions, the Contadora Group ministers identified the problems that they thought required the most attention; namely,

> the arms race, arms control and reduction, the transfer of armaments, the presence of military advisors and other forms of outside military assistance, actions aimed at destabilizing the internal order of other countries, threats and verbal aggression, warlike incidents and frontier tensions, the violation of human rights and individual and social guarantees, and the grave economic and social problems which are at the heart of the region's present crisis (Contadora Group, 1983b: 167).

The meeting also produced agreement in principle on the procedures of consultation and negotiation to be followed by the Central American states in the future. A second joint meeting of the nine foreign ministers was scheduled for the following month of May, again in Panama City. Although nothing of more substance was achieved at this first meeting, it was an important preparatory meeting that laid the groundwork for more. It took place on the fifteenth floor of the Banco Central de Panama, which became the headquarters of the subsequent Contadora mediation efforts (Contadora Group, 1983b: 166-168; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 22-23; Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 167).

The Second Joint Meeting of the nine foreign ministers took place on May 28-30, 1983. This meeting produced three significant outcomes in translating the initial Contadora call for peace into the Contadora peace initiative. First, in talks that the Contadora Group ministers described as frank, lengthy, and fruitful, the agenda items for future discussion were organized and subdivided into four categories: Conceptual framework issues, political and security problems, economic and social objectives, and machinery for the implementation and monitoring of any possible agreements reached.

Second, and even more significant than this increased formalization of agenda items for future discussion, was the creation of the Technical Group. The purpose of the Technical Group was to coordinate the work of the incipient peace process by studying various problems and proposals relating to regional peace, gathering information, providing technical support for the ministers and country negotiating teams, proposing procedures for dealing with identified problems, and preparing the agendas of future Contadora meetings. The Technical Group was made up of the vice ministers for foreign relations from all nine states and it began its work on June 21, 1983. Bagley and Tokatlian (1987: 24) note that Mexico came to play a leadership role within the Technical Group from the beginning, given its relatively large and sophisticated diplomatic staff as well as the dynamism and activism of Mexican Foreign Minister Bernardo Sepúlveda Amor. Nevertheless, this multilateral technical support mechanism developed its own dynamic. It worked

hard during June and July to keep Nicaragua in the emerging peace process and to prevent Panama's National Guard from pressuring its government to break relations with Nicaragua and Cuba. Significantly, the formation of the Technical Group represents the beginning of the institutionalization of the Contadora peace process (Contadora Group, 1983c: 168-170; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 23-24; Drekonja-Kornat, 1985: 28-29; Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 168-169).

The third significant outcome of the Second Joint Meeting was a decision by the Contadora Group to maintain its special Commission of Observers, which was formed earlier in the month to investigate border incidents between Costa Rica and Nicaraua. In response to a Costa Rican request before the Organization of American States (OAS) to form a multinational peacekeeping force along its border with Nicaragua, Bagley and Tokatlian (1987: 23) report that there was a tacit agreement to bypass the OAS. In fact, the Permanent Council of the OAS was never convoked and the matter was passed directly to the Contadora Group (Rojas Aravena, 1990: 152-153). The Contadora Group created a civilian body of representatives from the four Contadora states to investigate and diffuse the bilateral border tensions. The observer commission presented its report to the Contadora ministers at the Second Joint Meeting with several recommendations for improving Costa Rican-Nicaraguan relations. The Contadora Group's decision to maintain its support and extend the mandate of its observer commission, as well as the Group's related endorsement of a proposal that the two countries form a joint

bilateral commission[3] to resolve their conflicts, contributed to the growing optimism about and momentum of Contadora's mediation efforts. As Bagley and Tokatlian (1987: 23) explain it, noticeably improved relations between Managua and San Jose through the efforts of the observers commission, along with decreased contra activities based in Costa Rica as the U.S. abandoned its support for the independent contra leader Edén Pastora,[4] combined to "raise hopes that Contadora could perform a useful peacekeeping role even without deploying troops." Thus, with its agenda more formalized and with its creation of mechanisms for technical support and conflict resolution, the Contadora Group had begun to build a framework for ongoing peace talks among the Central Americans (Contadora Group, 1983c: 168-170; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 23; Castro, 1985: 14; Drekonja-Kornat, 1985: 29; Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 167-168; Rojas Aravena, 1990: 152-153).

Despite the work that had been accomplished by the Contadora Group foreign ministers through the end of May 1983, there was still something tentative about the peace initiative. The Contadora Group states had from the beginning stressed the responsibility of the Central American states themselves to embark upon peace talks. Meanwhile, the Honduran-based contra attacks against Nicaragua had grown in frequency and seriousness while the civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala continued to grow even more bloody. The United States moved to increase its military and economic aid to its allied governments in the region while the regional economic and debt crises had become more severe, both for the Central Americans

and for Mexico and Venezuela. In this atmosphere, the obstacles for establishing an ongoing peace process were many.

However, in an important meeting in July, the Contadora states pledged their commitment to continue building a framework for ongoing negotiations. In an unprecedented[5] summit meeting of four Latin American heads of state, the presidents of each of the four Contadora Group countries met in Cancún, Mexico, on July 17, 1983. At the end of their summit, the four presidents issued the "Cancún Declaration," which opened with a note of urgency and alarm over the situation in Central America:

> [W]e were all deeply concerned at the speed with which [the situation] was deteriorating, as evidenced by an escalation of violence, the progressive mounting of tensions, frontier incidents, and the threat of a flare-up of hostilities that might spread. All this, combined with the arms race and outside interference, creates a tragic setting affecting the political stability of the region and ruling out any progress and consolidation of institutions responsive to the democratic yearning for freedom, social justice and economic development (Contadora Group, 1983d: 171).

Through the Cancún Declaration, the Contadora presidents expressly addressed the "international community" which, they stressed, faced the dilemma "of either resolutely supporting and strengthening the path of political understanding by offering constructive solutions or passively accepting the accentuation of factors which could lead to extremely dangerous armed confrontations." The presidents rejected the use of force as "an approach that aggravates the underlying tensions," and cited "the basic principles of coexistence among nations" as the only viable path towards peace. They reiterated that the Central Americans

themselves "must shoulder the primary responsibility" in resolving the region's conflicts.

Nevertheless, in the most significant point of the Cancún Declaration, the four heads of state pledged their own political will to continue their efforts for peace and implicitly challenged the Central Americans to do the same. They acknowledged that the broad international support that had followed the Contadora Group's initial call for peace had "inspired" and "impelled" the Group to persist in its endeavors. By summoning and pledging their political will to continue their governments' mediation efforts, Presidents Miguel de la Madrid (Mexico), Belisario Betancur (Colombia), Luís Herrera Campíns (Venezuela), and Ricardo de la Espriella (Panama) infused the mortar necessary to build a solid framework for ongoing peace talks. The Cancún Declaration closed by issuing an appeal to the international community, to all American states, and to those "states with interests in and ties to the region" for support in the Contadora Group's search for peace (Contadora Group, 1983d: 170-174).

The five Central American states formally endorsed the Cancún Declaration at the Third Joint Meeting of the Contadora and Central American foreign ministers, held shortly afterwards, from July 28 to 30, 1983. The Central Americans also manifested their political will to pursue a peace process by presenting specific proposals, one of which was made by Nicaragua and another of which was made by the other four states. The nine ministers meeting in Panama City agreed to study the proposals and resume their talks within a month. On

August 25 and 26, the Technical Group met to prepare for the Fourth Joint Meeting scheduled for September 7 to 9, 1983 (Contadora Group, 1983e: 174-176; Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 170-171).

Meanwhile, Colombian President Betancur personally set out to arrange talks between the United States and El Salvador's leftist opposition. Several meetings were held between July 31 and September 29 between special U.S. envoy to Central America, Ambassador Richard Stone, and FDR-FMLN representative Rubén Zamora. Nothing of substance was achieved by the talks (Drekonja-Kornat, 1985: 29). However, the very fact that they were held is evidence that the momentum for the use of diplomacy rather than force had gained important ground by the summer of 1983.

There were other signs that the Contadora peace initiative had had an impact on the regional crisis in general and on United States policy toward Central America in particular. Not only were the Central American foreign ministers talking to each other and the United States with the FDR-FMLN. Ambassador Stone's very appointment as a special diplomatic envoy to the region was evidence that the Reagan administration was under some pressure to manifest its support for regional peace talks. Richard Stone's appointment was announced on April 28, 1983, following President Reagan's address to a joint session of Congress asking for support for his military and economic aid package for Central America (Smith, 1983a: A1; Weisman, 1983a: A1, A12). Stone's credentials as a former Senator from Florida and a conservative Democrat could

enhance President Reagan's bid for bipartisan support from a congress beginning to question the administration's Central American policy.[6]

Indeed, with the growing momentum of --and international support for-- the Contadora initiative, as well as growing domestic and congressional opposition to the increasingly public "covert" contra war, the Reagan administration was beginning to experience difficulties in winning support for its Central American policy in the late spring and early summer of 1983. There were also important divisions over policy within the administration itself, both between ideologically-oriented political appointees and more moderate careerists and between the State Department on the one hand and the White House, the Department of Defense, and the CIA on the other (Gwertzman, 1983: A3; Smith, 1983b: A4). The firing of Thomas Enders as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs at the end of May and his replacement by the more tractable Langhorn Motley at the end of June gave further evidence that the administration's Central American policy was having internal trouble.[7] Moreover, bipartisan support had been eroding since Ambassador Kirkpatrick's trip to the region and needed shoring up. Senators Henry Jackson and Charles MacMathias soon sponsored a senate resolution creating a bipartisan commission to study U.S. policy toward the region, and at the beginning of July, the Reagan administration named Henry Kissinger as its chair. After its members were sworn in on August 10, the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America set out to study and rationalize U.S.

policy toward the troubled region. Meanwhile, after a bitter debate at the end of July --and in an important blow to the administration's policy--, the House voted 228-195 to cut off all covert aid to the contras through the first "Boland Amendment"[8] (Tolchin 1983: A3; Halloran, 1983: A2; Weisman, 1983b: A1; Clines, 1983: A1; "Kissinger Panel Meets...," 1983: A3; Roberts, 1983: A1; Leogrande, 1987: 206).

Within this context of growing congressional and other domestic opposition to the Reagan administration's Central American policy, the momentum generated by the Contadora Group during the late spring and summer led to a successful and significant meeting of the Contadora Group foreign ministers and their Central American colleagues in early September. Meeting together in Panama for the fourth time, from September 7 to 9, 1983,[9] the nine foreign ministers adopted an important document known as the "Document of Objectives." This text consolidated the various proposals and viewpoints previously drawn up by the Forum pro Peace and Democracy, by Nicaragua, and by the Contadora Group. While not a formal treaty, the Document of Objectives was a kind of blueprint for the future of the negotiations process. Indeed, it identified and formalized the objectives of the Contadora diplomatic initiative as well as the means through which those objectives could be met (Contadora Group, 1983f: 176-180).

Composed in two parts, the Document of Objectives opened by invoking the principles of international law that should guide the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Central America. The first part

of the document also identifies the sources of tension in the region, including "the presence of foreign military advisors and other forms of foreign military interference," as well as the regional arms race and arms traffic, the use of the territory of some states to destabilize others, and the region's "unjust economic, social and political structures." The first section ends by underscoring the "need for a political agreement [that favors] dialogue and understanding" and that can "put into effect the mechanisms that will be able to ensure the peaceful coexistence and security of the Central American peoples" (Contadora Group, 1983f: 177-178).

The second section of the Document of Objectives lists the specific goals and enumerates the essential "action mechanisms" needed to achieve peace in the region. Indeed, at this point in the document, it becomes clear that the Contadora Group was concerned that the emerging peace process be not just the articulation of fine and noble words but the realization of meaningful and viable actions. Each of the twenty-one points in the listing of objectives begins with a verb in its infinitive form. The list of objectives includes the following actions, among others: "to promote" (detente, confidence, national reconciliations); "to respect" ((human rights); "to take measures" (guaranteeing representative, pluralistic, and diverse democratic systems); "to halt" (the arms race); "to prohibit" (foreign military bases and interference); "to eliminate" (the presence of foreign military advisors, the arms traffic); "to work" (for economic development and cooperation);

etc. In order to implement these action objectives, the document self-consciously and explicitly calls for the creation of several "action-mechanisms" of various kinds, including: mechanisms of democracy (i.e., elections); internal mechanisms to prevent arms trafficking between states; mechanisms for direct communication to prevent and resolve border incidents; mechanisms of economic integration; mechanisms for technical cooperation for investment and trade projects; and mechanisms to ensure the establishment of adequate systems of verification and control (Contadora Group, 1983f: 178-179).

Despite the Contadora Group's concern for action, finding the minimum consensus that permitted the acceptance of the Document of Objectives by the Central Americans was relatively easy compared to the next step of getting them to implement the document's action-objectives. The task seemed even more difficult when, less than a month later (on October 3), the United States sponsored a meeting between General Paul Gorman, then head of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in Panama, and the defense ministers of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama aimed at reviving the defunct Central American Defense Council (CONDECA)[10] ("Three Nations Agree...," 1983: A7; Maira, 1985: 383). Three weeks later, on October 25, 1983, the United States carried out its invasion of Grenada with the countries fo the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). Both the move to revive CONDECA without inviting Nicaragua[11] and the invasion of Grenada seemed to place the nascent Contadora peace process in jeopardy. Both events added to fears

that the United States might plan an invasion of Nicaragua if asked by the other Central American states ("Three Nations Agree...," 1983: A7; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 28; Drekonja-Kornat, 1985: 31; Maira, 1985: 383; Asenjo, 1985: 262).

Instead, however, both events ended up strengthening the Contadora Group's resolve to execute the Document of Objectives and continue building a framework for negotiations. The Contadora Group states led the censuring of the U.S. invasion of Grenada in the OAS and the United Nations. They also stepped up their diplomatic efforts both within and outside of the OAS to keep the Central Americans committed to the Contadora process. For example, Drekonja Kornat (1985: 31) reports that Panamanian Vice President Jorge Illueca personally worked hard to prevent the revival of CONDECA. Meanwhile, the Contadora Group prepared a plan outlining a schedule and procedures to begin talks on limiting the regional arms build-up and arms trafficking. In mid-November, the Contadora Group presented the plan in the form of a resolution to the Thirteenth OAS General Assembly, where it was approved unanimously[12] (Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 172-173; Kinzer, 1983: A7; Smith, 1983d: A3; "Peace Pact Urged...," 1983: A3; Smith, 1983e: A12; Karl, 1987: 285-286, Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 28).

By this time, however, changes of direction in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Guatemala had also contributed to Contadora's positive momentum. Despite the decision to revive CONDECA without including Nicaragua and despite costly contra activities in the fall of 1983, including the CIA-directed minings of Puerto Sandino in September

and October, the Sandinista government manifested its compliance with the Document of Objectives in several politive ways. It presented a peace proposal to the Contadora Group in mid-October entitled "Juridical Foundations to Guarantee International Peace and Security of the States of Central America" (Nicaragua, 1983: 60-83; Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 171). The proposal included four draft treaties. The first addressed improving bilateral relations with the United States; the second was a bilateral treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation with Honduras; the third proposed a peaceful solution to the Salvadoran civil war; the fourth was a multilateral draft treaty addressing the maintenance of peace, security, friendship, and cooperation among all the Central American states (Nicaragua, 1983: 60-61; "Nicaragua Presents...," 1983: A10; Gilbert, 1986: 119).

Beyond this, the Nicaraguan government also began to implement policies designed to meet the objections of its domestic and international critics. It eased press censorship and restrictions on the political opposition; it announced the moving up of national elections to November 4, 1984, as well as an amnesty for Miskito Indian prisoners and contra guerrillas (but not the contra leadership). Finally, before the year was over, the government asked some Salvadoran rebel leaders and over one thousand Cuban teachers and military advisers to leave the country (Gilbert, 1986: 119-120; Drekonja-Kornat, 1985: 31; Yopo, 1985: 237).

In Costa Rica, an important change of direction in the nation's foreign policy was announced in November, forcing the resignation of

Foreign Minister Fernando Volio Jiménez. Despite a stated policy of neutrality in the Central American conflicts, Costa Rica's growing economic crisis after 1980 had forced the nation's leaders to depend increasingly on Washington for aid. Moreover, powerful conservative business leaders opposed the policy of neutrality and embraced U.S. policies against Nicaragua. A heated internal debate emerged over the government's closer relations with Washington, its strained relations with Managua, and its inability to maintain a consistently neutral foreign policy stance. Foreign Minister Volio was especially pro-Washington. He was resentful of the Contadora Group, which had both excluded Costa Rica and supplanted the Forum pro Peace and Democracy, where Volio had played an important role. He took a confrontational stance with Contadora and a hard line against Managua. Other top officials in President Luís Alberto Monge Alvarez' government aided the contra organizations that were based in northern Costa Rica while the government officially did little to close the contra camps (Eguizábal, 1990: 204-205; Rojas Aravena, 1990: Volio Jiménez, 1985; Asenjo, 1985a: 301, 310; Bell, 1984: 10; Edelman and Kenen, 1989).

Nevertheless, by the late summer and fall of 1983, there was a growing sense of insecurity in San José which the Monge administration began to address. The country's continued economic crisis, its growing refugee problem, its divisive internal debate over foreign policy, and its sense that Costa Rica had lost its image as an autonomous international actor all laid the groundwork for a change of direction in foreign policy. As the Monge

administration came to see it, "Costa Rica is not part of the Central American problem, but Central America is part of Costa Rica's problems."[13] The government's concern over Washington's attempt to revive CONDECA[14] and its alarm after the Grenada invasion only served to reinforce President Monge's decision to strengthen his government's neutrality in Central America's conflicts. In a solemn ceremony on November 17, 1983, President Monge announced his decision to introduce a constitutional amendment proclaiming Costa Rica's "perpetual, active, and unarmed neutrality." Shortly thereafter, the confrontational Volio Jiménez resigned and Carlos José Gutiérrez assumed the post of Foreign Minister.[15] According to several public opinion polls at the time, the proclamation of neutrality won the support of the vast majority of Ticos.[16] Nevertheless, the Monge administration continued to stress that Costa Rica belonged to the "Western democracies" and had a "political and ideological partiality" to the same. This subtle difference between strict neutrality in the Central American conflicts and politico-ideological alignment with the United States would often make it difficult for the Monge administration to maintain an image of independence in foreign policy vis-a-vis Central America. Yet, at the end of 1983 and into 1984, Costa Rica seemed to be reversing its slide into compliance with U.S. policy in the region (Rojas Aravena, 1990: 83, 129-133, 141, 156; Asenjo, 1985a: 304, 312; Eguizábal, 1990: 204-207; García y Gomáriz, 1989: 31).

A similar change of direction in foreign policy was occurring in Guatemala as well. Despite the Reagan administration's efforts to intensify negotiations for CONDECA after the Grenada invasion, the Guatemalan government under Brigadier General Oscar Humberto Mejía Víctores began to lose interest in the idea and distance itself from the Reagan administration's regional policy. A continued congressional prohibition on renewing U.S. military aid to Guatemala due to a poor human rights situation there may have had something to do with Mejía Víctores' waning support for CONDECA (Chavez, 1983: A14; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 28). However, Guatemala's more independent military was acting with a different agenda. Maira (1985: 383) and Asenjo (1985c: 262) note that Guatemala backed away from the U.S. effort to revive CONDECA because it feared that the Honduran military, which had received extensive military aid from the United States, would come to dominate the organization and undermine Guatemala's claim to regional leadership. Moreover, General Mejía Víctores was looking to undertake an important change in the country's foreign policy direction in order to reverse the country's international isolation.

With Guatemala's guerrilla groups virtually crushed after a brutal three-year counter-insurgency campaign and with a persistent economic crisis, the time was ripe for Mejía Víctores to begin to discuss moves towards democratization and to rebuild the country's ties with the rest of the world. By improving relations with Mexico, by strengthening its ties with the Contadora Group and the other Central American states, and by cultivating new relations

within the United Nations and the OAS, Guatemalan foreign policy took a decided turn away from the Reagan administration's agenda in Central America. On December 16, 1983, General Mejía Víctores clarified the direction in which his government had been moving since coming to power the previous August by formally announcing Guatemala's neutrality in the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran conflicts. Not only had the government backed away from its previous support for the contras; Foreign Minister F. Andrade Díaz Durán even made a trip to Managua where he assured the Sandinista government that Guatemala would not allow the installation of foreign military bases and that the Guatemalan military would not participate in U.S.-sponsored military exercises. The country was well on its way towards implementing a strict policy of neutrality which it would maintain for the next several years (Meza et al, 1987: 49; González Davison, 1989: 19-21.

These moves by the governments of Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Guatemala in the fall of 1983 contributed to Contadora's positive momentum and permitted the elaboration of Contadora's plan for building a diplomatic framework for peace talks.[17] That plan reached its fruition at the Fifth Joint Meeting of the Contadora Group and Central American foreign ministers held on January 7 to 9, 1984, the first anniversary of the Contadora Group's original call for peace. At this meeting,[18] the Central American foreign ministers adopted a document entitled "Norms for the Implementation of the Commitments of the Document of Objectives," hereinafter referred to as the Norms for Implementation (Contadora Group, 1984a:

180-183). Together with the Document of Objectives, the Norms for Implementation can be read as the constitution of the Contadora peace process.

The Norms for Implementation derives its name from the fact that the document explicitly enumerates norms that would guide the work of the nine states seeking a Central American peace agreement. The list of norms is even more formalized, precise, and authoritative than the twenty-one points found in the Document of Objectives. The Norms for Implementation reorganizes the twenty-one points into three interrelated but distinct sets of topic: Security Issues, Political Issues, and Economic and Social Issues. The norms under the heading of "Security Issues" include some new specifications, such as the decision to compile an inventory of all military forces in the region, including bases, troops, and armaments, in order to reduce and balance their numbers within "reasonable" limits. A census of all foreign military advisors and personnel is also requisitioned in order to fix a schedule for their reduction and eventual elimination from the region. The norms under the security heading also resolve to identify and eradicate the "irregular forces"[19] seeking to destabilize states in the region as well as all forms of support, promotion, or financing of such groups.

Like these security norms, the norms under the headings of "Political Issues" and "Economic and Social Issues" go farther than previous Contadora documents in specifying the details of the work to be accomplished by the Central American governments on their own

and in subsequent phases of the negotiations process. The norms for Political Issues include the promotion of national reconciliations, the respect for human rights, the strengthening of the region's electoral processes and popular participation, and the creation of a climate of political trust between the governments of the region to contribute to a reduction of tensions. The Economic and Social norms focus on cooperation in aiding the region's refugees and facilitating their voluntary repatriation, promoting economic integration and intraregional trade, encouraging economic and social development programs with the support of international commissions (such as ECLA), foreign aid and joint ventures, and establishing "fair economic and social structures" that promote democracy and ensure rights to employment, education, health care, and cultural expression (Contadora Group, 1984a: 181-182).

The Norms for Implementation also addresses the Contadora Group's continued concern for action-mechanisms by formalizing and expanding the power of the Technical Group. Its new powers included coordinating the activities of the peace process, overseeing the progress made in the implementation of the norms, and reporting to the ministerial meetings on the work being accomplished. Moreover, the Norms for Implementation created three working commissions, each of which was commissioned to address one of the three main issue areas delineated by the document (i.e., a Political Commission, a Security Commission, and an Economic and Social Commission). These working commissions were empowered to study proposals, make recommendations, draft legal projects for negotiations, and prepare

verification and control procedures within their issue areas. Each working commission was composed of up to two representatives from each of the nine states participating in the Contadora process. They were given deadlines for preparing their work schedules (February 29, 1984) and for completing their studies, legal projects, and recommendations (April 30, 1984) to the Technical Group, which would in turn report to the nine foreign ministers (Contadora Group, 1984a: 181-183).

The Norms for Implementation is a significant document for several reasons. It represents the culmination of one year's diplomatic work by the Contadora states and answers their original call for a framework for negotiations for the Central American states. It represents the full transformation of the Contadora call for peace into an ongoing and active negotiating process by actually creating mechanisms geared toward producing a regional peace agreement. It also represents a conscious effort by the Contadora states to redefine the regional political arena rather narrowly. In setting forth the guidelines to be followed by the working commissions, the document explicitly rejects any "foreign advice, whether from private individuals or from representatives of international organizations" unless it is "previously accepted by consensus" (Contadora Group, 1984a: 183). This guideline thus implicitly defines the five Central American states and the four Contadora Group states as the exclusive set of regional actors involved in the Contadora peace process. It is an immanently political statement in that it implicitly rejects the occassional

attempts of the United States and some of its Central American allies to call for the use of OAS mechanisms to deal with the Central American crises. Moreover, this rejection of unsolicited advice from "extra-regional" actors seems to be directed at the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (or the Kissinger Commission), whose report on U.S. policy toward Central America was scheduled to be sent to President Reagan and published within two days of this joint meeting of Contadora.

Although space limitations preclude an extensive analysis of the findings of the Kissinger Commission's Report, it is useful to consider some of its points as they relate to the Contadora process. The Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America seeks to define U.S. national security and geopolitical interests in Central America and make policy recommendations for the United States. The report clearly frames Central America as a crisis area of vital concern to U.S. security. It places the region's crises squarely in an East-West context by naming "Sandinista-Cuban-Soviet subversion" as a fundamental and direct threat to U.S. security in the region. The report identifies the means considered most appropriate to protect U.S. security interests, including an economic aid program of $8 billion to friendly Central American governments over a five-year period and an emergency two-year military stabilization program of $400 million in counter-insurgency and civic action assistance to El Salvador, along with other tools of military force intended to promote stability in the region (National Bipartisan Commission, 1984: 53; 101-103).

Significantly, the range of diplomatic tools recommended by the Kissinger Commission did not include Contadora. In fact, the report devotes only passing attention to the work accomplished up to this point by the Contadora and Central American states. After outlining the Commission's policy recommendations concerning economic and security issues in the rest of the report, Chapter 7 addresses "The Search for Peace." In this nineteen page chapter, there in only a one page section on "The Contadora Group."[20] This brief section begins with two paragraphs that do not even mention the Group or its peace process, but announce instead the "strong interest" of the United States in encouraging the Central American states themselves "to assume the responsibility for regional arrangements" and develop "an independent system of relations, backed up by commitments of U.S. economic resources, diplomatic support, and military assistance." Thus in structural terms, the report implicitly defines the Contadora Group as outside of or foreign to the interests of the Central American countries and peripheral to any eventual regional agreement that, "to be lasting[,]...must be able to count on U.S. support." These two initial paragraphs close with the paradigmatic statement that any arrangement among the Central Americans themselves must "provide both for verification of compliance and penalties for violation" (National Bipartisan Commission, 1984: 119).[21]

Once the report finally does mention the "four neighboring Contadora countries," it politely acknowledges the "constructive" role these "key Latin American nations" have played in "helping to

define issues," but then casts doubts about the ability of the Contadora states to work together, given their lack of "extensive experience" in this regard. Moreover, the report notes that the "interests and attitudes of these four countries are not identical," implying the existence of weakening divisions within the Contadora Group vis-a-vis its members' individual commitments to the peace process. While it may have been too early to judge realistically, the report thus seems to discount the possibility that the Contadora states shared a significant national security interest of their own in promoting peace talks and preventing further militarization in the region that overrode any other differences that might exist between them (National Bipartisan Commission, 1984: 120).

The report then disassociates U.S. interests from those of the Contadora states, whose interests "do not always comport with our own," and concludes that "the United States cannot use the Contadora process as a substitute for its own policies." Instead, the Kissinger Commission Report refers to its own "Framework for Regional Security," which is presented in the chapter section immediately before that on Contadora. This "framework" is a very general ten-point outline that summarizes the larger set of policy recommendations presented in the report as a whole and indicates the place of negotiations in that larger framework: As only one diplomatic tool among several to achieve "security" in Central America (National Bipartisan Commission, 1984: 117-118).

Significantly, the report describes its ten-point framework as "fully consistent with the Contadora Program." However, the

Kissinger Commission Report fails to foreswear the use of military force. In fact, the Commission endorses U.S. support to the contra organizations as "one of the incentives working in favor of a negotiated settlement" with the "Sandinistas now in authority in Managua." Elsewhere the report argues that "military measures are needed to shield economic and social programs" (National Bipartisan Commission, 1984: 120, 84). In short, the Kissinger Commission Report consistantly speaks of military force as a legitimate and "essential adjunct to diplomacy"[22] while, as we have seen, the Contadora Group insists that military force is a significant source of Central America's worsening climate of tension that must be eliminated from the region.

With the virtual simultaneous appearance of Contadora's Norms for Implementation and the Kissinger Commission's Report to the President, the international community had two clearly articulated alternatives for understanding and dealing with Central America's crises.[23] Significantly, in Latin America only former Costa Rican Foreign Minister Fernando Volio Jiménez, Nicaraguan contra leader Adolfo Calero, and Salvadoran Foreign Minister Fidel Chávez Mena publicly embraced the Kissinger Commission Report (Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 174-175; Kinzer, 1984a: A10). On the contrary, the Archbishopric of San Salvador stated that the Kissinger Commission "erred completely" in calling for more U.S. military aid to the region, a position soon echoed by Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid ("Salvadoran Leader..., 1984: A19; Meislin, 1984a: A3). In early February, other Latin American

presidents from Argentina,[24] Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Panama as well as the prime minister of Spain --all attending the inauguration of Venezuela's new president, Jaime Lusinchi-- signed the "Declaration of Caracas" through which they pledged their full support to the Contadora process (Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 175; Morales, 1985: 47). At the end of February, the Contadora Group foreign ministers met again and reaffirmed their commitment to the peace process (Contadora Group, 1984c: 186-187). The Contadora process seemed well on its way toward challenging U.S. policy toward Central America and the further militarization of the region.

The First Draft of the Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America, February 1984-October 1984

Within weeks of signing the Norms for Implementation, the newly created working commissions began their work of studying, preparing, and drafting sections of a peace agreement.[25] By the end of February 1984, when the working commissions submitted their planned work schedules to the Contadora Group ministers, there were over one hundred technical advisors and diplomats in Panama participating in the Contadora peace process (Goodfellow, 1987: 149; Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 175-176). For its efforts up to this point, the Contadora Group was reportedly nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in March 1984 (Drekonja-Kornat, 1985: 36).

As the working commissions began their work, the broader political context of the peace process underwent small but

ultimately significant changes. By early April, disclosures of the CIA's involvement in the continued mining of Nicaragua's harbors renewed the domestic and international debates over the Reagan administration's Central American policies. While the administration sought to implement the Kissinger Commission recommendations and redoubled its efforts to win more U.S. aid to allies in Central America, the Nicaraguan government asked the UN Security Council to discuss the minings. With the U.S. veto of any such discussion, Nicaragua initiated a suit against the United States before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The administration responded by announcing that it would not accept the court's jurisdiction on disputes relating to Central America for the next two years. While the U.S. Senate condemned the CIA minings,[26] both the House and the Senate balked at approving any new U.S. aid, especially military aid, to Central America. Both houses also opened new debates concerning the use of covert activities in Central America, the CIA's role in Nicaragua, and the administration's new position concerning the ICJ (Ayres Jr., 1984: A4; Gwertzman, 1984: A1; Taubman, 1984a: A1; Smith, 1984: A12; Drekonja-Kornat, 1985: 33-34).

Sensing that its policy was in trouble at a time when presidential primaries were getting under way, the Reagan administration sought to cultivate a show of support and solidarity among Central American countries friendly to the United States Meislin, 1984b: A3). New joint military exercises with Honduras were moved up three weeks to April 1 (coinciding with an unexpected

shake-up in the leadership of the Honduran armed forces[27]). The Reagan administration successfully courted Costa Rica's favor when border clashes between the Nicaraguan army and the Costa Rican civil guard[28] led to increased tensions between those two governments. After recalling its ambassador to Managua, Costa Rica turned to the United States to request emergency security assistance, a request that was warmly received by the Reagan administration (U.S. Department of State, 1984; Asenjo, 1985a: 305). Costa Rica's marked drift away from its policy of neutrality in the spring of 1984 was also manifested in its participation in a mid-April meeting with El Salvador and Honduras in which the three states issued a communique demanding that Nicaragua explain its military relation with other countries and end its arms build-up through Cuba and the Soviet Union (Drekonja-Kornat, 1985: 33). Although both Costa Rica and Honduras would vacilate occassionally, this triangular alliance between Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras (rooted in the now defunct Forum pro Peace and Democracy) against Nicaragua became the Reagan administration's trump in silencing some of its domestic critics and in blocking Contadora's success in later months.[29]

The potential effectiveness of this new triangular alliance in blocking Contadora's success became apparent at the Sixth Joint Meeting of Foreign Ministers on April 30 to May 1, 1984. At this meeting, the reports and recommendations of the three working commissions were due; however, this aspect of the meeting was overshadowed by the position taken by Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras against Nicaragua. Echoing their earlier communique, the

three states took the offensive by challenging Nicaragua to agree to disclose information on its armed forces. They proposed that the Inter-American Defense Board (as opposed to some other entity created by Contadora) be responsible for verifying such disclosures. Further, they called on Nicaragua to reduce its military strength and to stop the exportation of subversion to its neighbors (Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 29). In this atmosphere, no peace agreement could be concretized at the meeting. The Mexican government later charged that the meeting was sabotaged by the three Central American allies who had at one point tried to boycott it[30] ("Obstruction of Contadora...," 1984: A12). Nevertheless, the Contadora Group was able to get Costa Rica and Nicaragua to agree to set up a new multilateral border commission to try to reduce tensions along their common border. Costa Rica's ambassador soon returned to Managua (Drekonja-Kornat, 1985: 33; Asenjo, 1985a: 305-306).

After the disappointing Sixth Joint Meeting, Mexico stepped up its efforts to promote a concerted foreign policy position of Latin American states both toward U.S. policies in Central America and toward the crisis of debt faced by Latin America that had now reached staggering proportions.[31] President de la Madrid personally took the lead, overshadowing his capable foreign minister Sepúlveda. In a mid-May trip to Washington, President de la Madrid bluntly criticized U.S. policy in Central America. He asked President Reagan to enter into bilateral talks with Nicaragua and to support the Contadora process. In addressing a joint session of

Congress, the Mexican president urged that Central America not be placed into the East-West conflict and warned against "the illusion of the effectiveness of force" (Clines, 1984a: A1, A4; Clines, 1984b: A14; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 30).

Significantly, after attending the inauguration of José Napoleón Duarte in El Salvador in early June, Secretary of State George Shultz flew on to Managua for brief discussions with Daniel Ortega (Kinzer, 1984b: A22). Soon thereafter, the United States and Nicaragua began a series of bilateral meetings in Manzanillo, Mexico. The Manzanillo Talks lasted until January 1985 after nine meetings had been held between special U.S. envoy to Central America Harry Schlaudeman[32] and Nicaraguan Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Hugo Tinoco (Goodfellow, 1987: 150-151). Although the Manzanillo Talks were ultimately fruitless,[33] their commencement in June did contribute to renewed optimism about the Contadora process in the summer and early fall of 1984.

Another new source of optimism for the Contadora Group was a certain weakening of U.S.-Honduran relations by June and July. After an unexpected coup within the leadership of the Honduran military at the end of March, the new armed forces chief, General Walter López Reyes, accused his ousted predecessor, General Gustavo Alvarez Martínez, of having compromised Honduras' "pacifist and democratic" principles. He called for limits on new military spending and for renewed dedication to a peaceful resolution of the region's conflicts. He also proved to be less cooperative with the U.S. contra policy and less supportive of the U.S. attempt to

undertake joint Salvadoran and Honduran military programs. Observers noted that under General López, the Honduran military was seeking to renegotiate "the terms of its bargain with the Reagan team, not the bargain itself" (Shepherd, 1986: 150, emphasis in original). Nevertheless, Honduras' new stance did force the Reagan administration to reassess its policy toward the Honduran military[34] (Meislin, 1984c: A19; Taubman, 1984b: A4; Shepherd, 1987: 146-150). The triangular alliance between Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras that had blocked the peace process at the end of April had deteriorated within six weeks, providing Contadora with a clear road to new progress.

The Contadora Group seized the opportunity for new progress by completing a draft agreement that it formally presented to the five Central American states on June 9 and 10, 1984. The Contadora Group ministers personally set out on a tour of Central American capitals to discuss the draft agreement and invite feedback from the Central Americans ("Contadora Group's Envoy...," 1984: A6; Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 177). In the next few months, the Central Americans conveyed their observations, objections, and suggestions to Contadora's Technical Group;[35] in turn, the Contadora Group ministers evaluated the Central American views and revised the draft agreement (Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 178). At the Seventh Joint Meeting of Foreign Ministers on September 7 to 9, 1984, the Contadora Group ministers presented a revised peace agreement to their Central American counterparts as ready for signing.

The Revised Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America was a long and detailed peace agreement that sought a comprehensive resolution to the region's conflicts (Contadora Act, 1984). After invoking various principles and instruments of international law, the Contadora Act articulates a comprehensive project that defines peace and cooperation in Central America as dependent on three interrelated sets of commitments for each Central American state. First come the Political Commitments (Chapter I), which include provisions for national reconciliations and political amnesties, the respect for human rights and judicial independence, and the promotion of pluralistic and fully participatory electoral systems as well as cooperation between the region's five national parliaments. The Political Commitments also include a pledge to promote regional detente and to abide by this regional solution to conflicts "in the face of foreign pressures and interests."

The Contadora Act then presents the Security Commitments (Chapter II), which provide for the demilitarization of the region. Specifically, the security provisions include: The prohibition of all international military maneuvers and the ending of those in progress within thirty days of signing the Act; an end to the regional arms race by prohibiting any new weapons systems and beginning negotiations on the control and reduction of current inventories and troop levels; the elimination of all foreign military bases and training schools within six months of signing the Act and setting a schedule for the gradual withdrawal of all foreign military advisors; an end to intra- and extra-regional arms

trafficking; and the prohibition of all forms of support to "irregular forces," such as the contras and other guerrilla groups, as well as their disarming and the dismantling of their bases.

The Contadora Act presents these demilitarization commitments as necessary both to end the local armed conflicts and to free up the economic resources for equitable development projects without which a viable peace is impossible. Hence, the commitments in the economic and social areas (Chapter III) provide for the promotion of regional economic integration and development projects, the strengthening of regional trade and financial arrangements, the improvement of employment and health standards, and the protection of the region's refugees (Contadora Act, 1984). Reconciliations, demilitarization, and integrated development then are the requisites for real peace and security in the region as posited by the Revised Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America.

The Contadora Act also reflects the Contadora Group's continued concern for actions rather than just fine words. This concern is manifested first in the very title of the document. The Contadora peace process produced an "Act," not simply a treaty, agreement, covenant or charter. More substantively, the Contadora Act provides for the creation of new mechanisms to implement the commitments made. It seeks to establish three independent committees or commissions corresponding to the three issue areas addressed by the Act to evaluate, verify, and follow up compliance with the Act's provisions. The most important of these is the Commission for the Verification and Control of Security Issues,[36] which would be made

up of four members proposed by the Contadora Group from states "with recognized impartiality and a genuine interest in contributing to the solution" of the region's crises. The Verification and Control Commission was given extensive investigating responsibilities and would report to the Central American ministers of foreign affairs[37] (Contadora Act, 1984).

No Central American foreign minister was quite prepared to sign the Revised Contadora Act at the Seventh Joint Meeting for their governments, but it was clear that the Contadora Group was pressing for signatures in the near future. Soon afterwards, the government ot Guatemala announced its willingness to sign the Act while Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras all expressed their conditional approval. The Reagan administration initially voiced favorable words of approval for the Revised Contadora Act, with Secretary of State Shultz calling it "an important step forward." In a letter to the foreign ministers of the European Community, Shultz conveyed his approval of the Act's conditional acceptance by Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras, and argued that Nicaragua had rejected "key elements of the draft, including those dealing with binding obligations to internal democratization and to reductions in arms and troop levels" (Quoted in Goodfellow, 1987: 149; and Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 30-31; Asenjo, 1985a: 310-311).

The Reagan administration and others were thus caught off guard when, just two weeks later, the Nicaraguan government announced that it would sign the Revised Contadora Act provided that no further changes be introduced and that the United States sign the Protocol

attached to the end of the Act promising support for the terms of the agreement, in particular, a halt to support for the contras[38] (Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 31). With Nicaragua's surprise announcement, the Reagan administration was put on the defensive and sought to extricate itself from its earlier approval of the Revised Contadora Act. The administration first argued that the Revised Act was only a draft agreement intended for further negotiations, a contention strongly disputed by the Contadora Group (Omang, 1984a: A7; Taubman, 1984c: A3; Greenberger, 1984: 36; "U.S. Version...," 1984: A24).

In its more substantive objections, the administration argued that the Act's timetables for some provisions were imbalanced in Nicaragua's favor. Most importantly, U.S. officials found problems with the Act's verification procedures, and raised questions as to how the proposed Verification and Control Commission would be funded, how its reports would be submitted, how complaints of violations would be handled, and how violations would be punished (Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 32). This issue of verification would remain an important one for the Reagan administration, given its deep skepticism about Nicaraguan compliance with any agreement.

Despite Nicaragua's diplomatic coup, which favorably impressed the participants of the joint Contadora-European Economic Community meeting in San José, Costa Rica, at the end of September,[39] the Reagan administration was able to persuade its Central American allies to reconsider the terms of the Revised Contadora Act

(McCartney, 1984: 3). As Bagley and Tokatlian (1987: 34) explain it,

> To regain the diplomatic offensive, the Reagan administration hastily arranged a series of consultations with its closest allies in Central America in late September. In early October, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras all publicly agreed that, despite the previous year-and-a-half of negotiations and their own tentative acceptance, changes along the lines suggested by the United States were needed. They then scheduled a meeting in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, for October 19, 1984, four days after Contadora's formal deadline for the submission of final proposed changes, to draw up their new amendments.

The United States was thus able to rebuild the triangular alliance against Nicaragua and block the successful culmination of Contadora's efforts in this second phase of the peace process. The meeting in Tegucigalpa produced a counter-proposal known as the Tegucigalpa Draft --a proposal Venezuelan statesman Carlos Andrés Pérez later dubbed the "Contadora Anti-Act" ("el antiacta de Contadora") (Castro, 1985: 10). Among other points, the counter-proposal sought to regulate rather than eliminate international military exercises and foreign military bases; it replaced Contadora's formula on reducing arms and troop levels based on each country's defensive requirements with a formula of military parity among all Central American states; it excluded the Contadora Group from the process of choosing the neutral countries invited to form the Verification and Control Commission; finally, the Tegucigalpa Draft proposed the elimination of consensual decision-making based on unanimity and substituted instead a majority vote among the Central American countries. Although the Guatemalan foreign

minister attended the meeting, he did not sign the Tegucigalpa Draft. In fact, Guatemala, like Nicaragua, announced its willingness to sign the Revised Contadora Act (Asenjo, 1985a: 311). From this point on, the triangular alliance of Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras would be known as the Tegucigalpa Group (Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 34; Castro, 1985: 10-11; Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 178; Farer, 1985: 71-72; Asenjo, 1985a: 311; Goodfellow, 1987: 150-151; Valero, 1985: 140).

The second phase of the Contadora peace process was thus brought to an abrupt close with the Tegucigalpa Draft on October 20, 1984. Since its beginnings in the weeks following the signing of the Norms for Implementation, this second phase of the peace process had been marked by positive steps forward in the drafting of a peace agreement with only one important but temporary obstacle in the late spring of 1984. During this phase, the determination and technical competence of the Contadora Group to finalize an agreement were clearly evident. However, in this phase, it also became clear that the Contadora Group faced three political problems in its conceptualization of the peace process. First, it overestimated the Tegucigalpa Group states' foreign policy autonomy and/or their interest in finding a peaceful resolution to the region's conflicts. Second, as the Kissinger Commission noted, no viable peace agreement could be reached without the participation and support of the United States. This became particularly clear in the Contadora Act's provisions to end international military maneuvers, eliminate foreign military bases and foreign military advisors from

the region, and to prohibit support to irregular forces in the region. Finally, the Contadora Group ran into the Reagan administration's active opposition to a Contadora-sponsored peace that was perceived as being contrary to U.S. security interests in the region. Indeed, in a secret National Security Council document dated October 30, 1984, and later leaked to the press, the Reagan administration was proud of its success in having "effectively blocked Contadora Group efforts to impose" the Revised Contadora Act.

> Following intensive U.S. consultations with El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica, the Central Americans submitted a counter-draft to the Contadora states...[that] shifts concern within Contadora to a document broadly consistent with U.S. interests. ...We have trumped the latest Nicaragua/Mexican efforts to rush signature of an unsatisfactory Contadora agreement....Contadora spokesmen have become notably subdued recently on prospects for an early signing...although the situation remains fluid and requires careful management (Washington Post, 1984: A?).

The Contadora Group spokepersons may have become more subdued after the appearance of the Tegucigalpa Draft, but the Group was not deterred in its commitment to the peace process. It would continue to challenge U.S. policy toward the region and promote a Latin American diplomatic alternative for the Central Americans for the next three years and beyond.

ENDNOTES

1. "Entra las ilusiones de derecho, hay algunas que se señalan por ser discretas de suyo, y ésto ocurre con la mediación. Se desenvuelve sencillamente, sin jactancia ni exhuberancia de actuación. Camina por la sombra, sin hacer sombras a nadie...y en la penumbra de su sobriedad, influye como consejo y no como mandato." Quoted in López Contreras (1988: 94). Translation mine.

2. The foreign ministers attending the meeting on Contadora Island were: From Mexico, Lic. Bernardo Sepúlveda Amor; from Colombia, Dr. Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo; from Venezuela, Dr. José Alberto Zambrano Velasco; and from Panama, Juan José Amado III. The Panamanian President Ricardo de la Espriella T. and Vice President Jorge Illueca met with the foreign ministers. Colonel Manuel Noriega, who had recently been promoted from intelligence to Chief of the General Staff of the Panamanian National Guard also attended the first foreign ministers' meeting on Contadora (Bagley et al, 1985: 164; "Panama Summit...," 1983: 4-5).

3. The observer commission visited San José and Managua as well as the border areas between May 22-26, 1983 (Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 168). According to Nils Castro (1985: 12, 14), the Contadora Commission of Observers recommended that a mixed commission of Costa Ricans and Nicaraguans be created as a mechanism to resolve bilateral conflicts, either directly or with the help of the Contadora Group. The mixed commission was finally created in the spring of 1984 (infra). The Commission of Observers also proposed that Costa Rica and Nicaragua set up a demilitarized zone along their border. The two states finally agreed to this proposal in talks between their viceministers in Paris during 1984. Costa Rica's political right opposed both proposals and lacked confidence in Contadora.

4. According to Bagley and Tokatlian (1987: 23), U.S. support for Edén Pastora and his Costa Rican-based contra organization, ARDE (Democratic Revolutionary Alliance), decreased during 1983 due to Pastora's independent agenda from that of the CIA. Consequently, as 1983 wore on, contra activities on the Costa Rican front "declined noticeably while Honduras emerged as the focal point of contra operations; thus tensions between Managua and San José were eased somewhat."

5. The summit was unprecedented because never before had a group of Latin American heads of state met on their own without the bidding or presence of an outside power such as the United States.

6. However, Stone's work as a lobbyist for the right-wing military government of Guatemala after losing his 1980 Senate reelection campaign raised many questions by liberal democrats in Congress about his effectiveness as a special diplomatic envoy and about the sincerity of the Reagan administration in pursuing a diplomatic track toward Central America (Smith, 1983a: A1; Treaster, 1983: A7).

7. Enders' removal on May 27, 1983, is just one example of the power of the White House ideologues over Central American policy at the time. By no means a liberal, and always professional, White House officials had accused Enders of being too conciliatory toward the leftist opposition in El Salvador. His fall from grace came after he opposed the release of a document by the Departments of State and Defense accusing Cuba of expanding its activities in the region in conjuction with Nicaragua and Salvadoran guerrillas ("Reagan Is...," 1983: A1). Enders was later reassigned as Ambassador to Spain (Darnton, 1983: A3).

8. H.R. 2760, also known as the Boland-Zablocki Bill, prohibited direct or indirect funding of military or paramilitary operations against Nicaragua; however, it did include a provision for $80 million in military aid to "friendly" Central American governments to interdict the alleged arms traffic between Nicaragua and leftist guerrillas in the region. This provision was meant to placate the Reagan administration, which had claimed that U.S. support and training of the contras was meant to stop the alleged arms traffic and had asked for $80 million in aid to the contras to do so. H.R. 2760 was never taken up by the Republican-controlled Senate, but the House persisted in its attempt to end the covert contra war, culminating in the addition of the Boland Amendment to the FY1984 Intelligence Authorization bill in October and the Defense Appropriation bill in November. The Boland Amendment prohibited any U.S. government funds to be used, directly or indirectly, to overthrow the government of Nicaragua, thus effectively blocking U.S. aid to the contra organizations until non-lethal aid was resumed in the fall of 1985. The Senate finally acquiesced to the terms of the Boland Amendment in June, 1984 (Leogrande, 1986: 205-207).

9. This Fourth Joint Meeting of Foreign Ministers was delayed because of a military coup in Guatemala in August which ousted General Efraín Ríos Montt (Drekonja-Kornat, 1985: 30).

10. CONDECA became moribund after the 1969 "Soccer War" broke out between El Salvador and Honduras.

11. Costa Rica was invited to send observers to the CONDECA meeting, but in an emerging effort to distance itself from the United States (infra), the Monge administration rejected the invitation (Blachman and Hellman, 1986: 175).

12. The General Assembly also adopted a resolution in support of the Contadora Group's efforts, the Cancún Declaration, and the Document of Objectives on November 18, 1983 (OAS, 1983: 245-246). It is also interesting to note that, at the same time, OAS Secretary General Alejandro Orfila resigned from his post 18 months before the end of his second five-year term, citing U.S. neglect of Latin America and the ineffectiveness of the OAS. Salvadoran minister and Christian Democrat Fidel Chávez Mena was elected interim president to replace Orfila (Smith, 1983c: A1; Atkins, 1989: 212). Chávez Mena was serving as foreign minister under the brief administration of President Alvaro Magana (1982-1984). More recently (spring 1991), he has served as head of El Salvador's Christian Democratic Party.

13. This statement was made in a speech to the United Nations by Costa Rica's UN Ambassador Fernando Zumbado on November 11, 1983 (Rojas Aravena, 1990: 141). Ambassador Zumbado voted in favor of the UN resolution condemning the U.S. invasion of Grenada, contrary to his instructions from San José (Asenjo, 1985a: 301).

14. See endnote 11.

15. Volio resigned on November 30, 1983. However, several weeks earlier Volio was already clearly "outside the loop" as a government working group began to develop the neutrality statute without Volio's participation and when President Monge travelled to Mexico to strengthen bilateral ties without Volio's company. Carlos José Gutiérrez had previously been Monge's Minister of Justice and chaired the working group that studied and developed the new neutrality statute (Rojas Aravena, 1990: 129-133, 156).

16. Rojas Aravena (1990: 83) reports that the Consultatora Interdisciplinaria en Desarrollo as well as the Ministry of Information and Communications carried out public opinion polls showing "la inmensa mayoría de la población apoya la política de neutralidad." He also cites an article in Le Monde Diplomatique that noted that 79% of the population supported neutrality. Unfortunately, Rojas Aravena does not give the date of the article. The Conservative Social Christian party

was able to block Monge's constitutional amendment in the congress in the following years, but Monge remained committed to the new neutrality policy (Rojas Aravena, 1986: 309-310). Nevertheless, as will be seen, the Monge administration still had a difficult time maintaining its neutrality in the ideological field, but the administration's new policy did lead to a tougher attitude against the contra camps based in northern Costa Rica for a while.

17. Little is known about whether any similar moves were contemplated by El Salvador, which remained politically close to Washington and heavily dependent on U.S. military and economic aid. The government of Honduras also remained close to the U.S. but denied charges that it was "obstructionistic" within Contadora ("Latin Group Renews...," 1983: A4; Herrera Caceres, 1983: A22).

18. This meeting was the twelfth time the Contadora Group foreign ministers had met and the fifth time they had met with the five Central American ministers (Contadora Group, 1984a: 180).

19. By "irregular forces" the Contadora documents up to this point seem particularly concerned with the CIA-supported contra organizations. However, the term is just vague enough to include some if not all of the leftist guerrilla groups operating in Central America. In this case, the status of El Salvador's revolutionary guerrilla organization, the FMLN, is unclear. On the one hand, Mexico at least had long recognized the FMLN as a legitimate force with belligerent rights in El Salvador's civil war (cf. Chapter V). Moreover, the FMLN's organization and the scope of its control over Salvadoran territory by the end of 1983 meant that it was hard to qualify the FMLN as an "irregular force." On the other hand, to keep the peace process alive and keep the Salvadoran government involved, some kind of equivalency had to be established between the contras and the FMLN. That equivalency would become even more important after El Salvador's March 1984 presidential elections, when Christian Democrat José Napoleón Duarte was elected. After his inauguration, Venezuela would play an important role in supporting Duarte's Christian Democratic government within the Contadora process. But throughout 1983 and in eaarly 1984, the ARENA-dominated government of Alvaro Magaña had few international supporters, contributing to the FMLN's international image of legitimacy which the Nicaraguan contra organizations never enjoyed.

20. This section begins half way down page 119 and ends half way down page 120 of the Report.

21. On page 117, the Report offers U.S. technical assistance and advice in verification procedures.

22. Significantly, the Kissinger Commission Report did not resolve the question as to whether military force was to be used for "containment" or "rollback" of the Nicaraguan revolution.

23. Interestingly, Contadora's Norms for Implementation received little attention in the United States compared to the controversy and partisan debate generated by the conclusions of the Kissinger Commission Report. For example, throughout the month of January 1984, the New York Times ran just two articles about the Contadora meeting where the Norms were signed. Only one of the two specifically reviewed the content of the Norms, and this was a short article in which only the "key provisions" of the document were mentioned. The other article focused on Nicaragua's expectations for the document's implementation in light of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua ("Latin Peace Plan...," 1984: A6; "Nicaragua Says...," 1984: A13). In contrast, during January 1984 the Times ran twenty-five news stories on the Kissinger Commission Report and its political fallout (see New York Times Index 1984, 1985: 693).

24. Two days later in a meeting in Bogota with President Betancur, Argentina's new civilian President Raúl Alfonsín reiterated Argentina's support for Contadora (Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 175).

25. For a list of the original members of each working commission, see Contadora Group (1984b: 183-186).

26. The Republican-controlled Senate's condemnation of the CIA's mining of Nicaragua's harbors was seen at the time as one of the most serious blows to the Reagan administration's foreign policy yet and severely damaging to the administration's efforts to win bipartisan support for its Central American policies (Smith, 1984: A12).

27. At the end of March 1984 all the heads of the Honduran Armed Forces were removed except for the commander of the Air Force. The crisis was apparently as much a surprise to the U.S. as to everyone else, especially considering the emergence of new strains between the United States and Honduras by early June (Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 177; Meislin, 1984c: A19).

28. The clashes occurred between late February and early May 1984 over the activities of the Costa Rican-based contra organization, ARDE. By this time, the split between ARDE's leaders Edén Pastora and Alfonso Robelo was well under way, with Robelo favoring the CIA's agenda of combining and coordinating ARDE's efforts with those of the FDN contras based in Honduras and Pastora resisting the CIA's control (see

Chapter V, endnote 21). In a secret Department of State memo subsequently leaked to the press, the State Department recommended approving and increasing Costa Rica's request for security assistance from $7 million to $9.6 million in order to bring about "a significant shift from the [Government of Costa Rica's] neutralist tightrope act, and push it more explicitly and publicly into the anti-Sandinista camp." By supporting Costa Rica's request and thus courting its favor, the secret memo noted that "[w]hile there is some chance ARDE operations may be shifting to Honduras as part of its evolving, more cooperative arrangements with the FDN, a shift in attitude by Costa Rica could keep open the southern front" (Department of State, 1984: 284-285). The Costa Rican government was not exactly innocent in all of this. Its failure to expel ARDE and close the southern front was related to a bribery scandal in which the CIA reportedly gave ARDE hundreds of thousands of dollars that were used to bribe senior government officials in San Jose and members of Costa Rica's rural guard in the areas of ARDE's operations (Brinkley, 1984: A1; Hopfensperger, 1986).

29. The triangular alliance between Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras emerged briefly at the Sixth Joint Meeting, dissolved, and then reemerged in October 1984 and lasted (with fluctuations) until May 1986, when a new mix of Central Amerircan presidents redirected their state's diplomacy. During its existence, the triangular alliance against Nicaragua gave the Reagan administration some basis to claim that U.S. allies in the region supported U.S. policies against Nicaragua and rejected Nicaragua's claims that its military build-up was the result of legitimate self-defense. The alliance also served to blick teh finalization of a Contadora treaty considered undesireable to U.S. interests, as we will see.

30. The United States was apparently behind a move to postpone the meeting. Secretary of State George Shultz asked the Mexican Foreign Minister to postpone the meeting in mid April; after that, there was a "war of rumors" that the meeting would be postponed ("Obstruction of Contadora...," 1984: A12).

31. President de la Madrid's efforts and those of other Latin American leaders with regard to the growing debt crisis led to several important multilateral meetings on the Latin debt, culminating in the June 20, 1984, meeting in Cartagena, Colombia, and the formation of the so-called Cartagena Group. Attended by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, the Cartagena meeting sought to coordinate Latin American negotiating strategies toward industrialized countries in setting a framework to refinance Third World debt. The

Cartagena Group stopped short of forming a debtor's cartel, but its members did agree to meet frequently to "reflect together" on the debt crisis and they set up a rotating secretariate to do so (Riding, 1984a: D1; Schumacher, 1984a: D1; Schumacher, 1984b: A1; Atkins, 1989: 261-262).

32. Schlaudeman replaced Richard Stone as the Reagan administration's special envoy to Central America on March 1, 1984, after Stone resigned. "Personality clashes" between Stone and then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Langhorn Motley was the reason for Stone's mid-February resignation according to news reports at the time (c.f., Molotsky, 1984: A8; "Career Envoy...," 1984: A4). A career diplomat, Schlaudeman was the executive director of the Kissinger Commission.

33. It is not clear whether the Reagan administration took the Manzanillo talks seriously. The State Department insisted that the talks were serious; however, critics have argued that the talks were used as a ploy to get Congress to support the administration's aid program for Central America and to silence critics of administration policy toward the region during the 1984 presidential campaign. It is suspicious that the talks were unilaterally broken off on January 18, 1985, shortly after Daniel Ortega was inaugurated as president and shortly before President Reagan's reinauguration (Taylor, Jr., 1985: A1).

34. This leadership change within the military did not affect the civilian personnel in the Honduran government. President Suazo Córdova, whose power had been overshadowed by that of General Alvarez Martínez, retained his position. In the morning after the military coup, President Suazo was reportedly advised not to oppose it or he would go too. While this coup represented a temporary crisis in U.S.-Honduran relations, the Honduran military remained committed to maintaining good relations with the United States (Shepherd, 1986: 146-147, 150).

35. The Technical Group, it will be remembered, was made up of the vice ministers of foreign affairs of each of the nine states participating in the Contadora peace process. Its coodinating function was to oversee the details of the work of the working commissions and to report back to the ministerial meetings as well as prepare the agenda of the ministerial meetings.

36. The other two were an Ad Hoc Committee for Evaluation and Follow-Up Regarding Political Commitments and Refugees and an Ad Hoc Committee for Evaluation and Follow-Up Procedure of Commitments on Economic and Social Matters (Contadora Act, 1984: 207-210).

37. It is not clear from the document, but the Contadora Group may have had itself in mind to serve on this commission.

38. As Bagley and Tokatlian (1987: 31) summarized it, by agreeing to sign the Revised Contadora Act, the Nicaraguan government was agreeing to make important concessions, such as expelling all Soviet-bloc military advisers, ending all arms imports, reducing the size of its army and of its arms inventory, ending all support for El Salvador's FMLN, beginning a dialogue with the Nicaraguan political opposition, and permitting on-site inspections by Contadora's Verification and Control Commission. In return, not only would the United States and the other Central American states have to end support for the contras; they would also have to end all joint military maneuvers within thirty days, close all U.S. military bases within six months, and suspend all U.S. military aid programs in Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica.

39. The two-day conference (on September 28 and 29, 1984) in San José between the European Community's twelve foreign ministers and the nine foreign ministers from the Contadora process focused on cooperation between the two regions. The European ministers endorsed the Contadora Act as the "best opportunity" for stability in Central America and tied cooperation between the regions to an early signing of the Act (Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 178; Castro, 1985: 10; Le Moyne, 1984a: A5; Le Moyne, 1985b: A7). Asenjo (1985a: 311) notes that this endorsement and the conference itself was "sin duda la más importante manifestación de apoyo extraregional recibido por el Grupo de Contadora." The meeting also proposed the strengthening of integrationism in the isthmus, the creation of a mechanism to stabilize the region's export prices, and the establishment of a multinational fund to finance regional investment projects (Valero, 1985: 141). At least two more conferences between the EC, the Contadora Group, and the Central American foreign ministers were held in Luxembourg (November 11-12, 1985) and Guatemala (February 9-10, 1987) (Tercera Conferencia de Ministros..., 1987: 465-474).

CHAPTER VII

FROM CONTADORA TO ESQUIPULAS II

The time for Peace has come.
--Oscar Arias Sánchez
February 15, 1987[1]

Over the next two and a half years, the Contadora Group states persisted in their efforts to provide a shelter of diplomacy in which to mediate Central America's violent political crises. Two more versions of the Contadora Act were discussed and presented to the Central Americans for signing during 1985 and 1986. Despite new diplomatic support from other Latin American states, however, the obstacles to finalizing an acceptable Contadora treaty were many. Each positive step forward in the peace process met with frustration or disappointment. From the end of 1984 through the early months of 1987, the Contadora states struggled to keep the peace process alive. But in August 1987, the Central Americans unexpectedly agreed to a new formula and answered the Contadora call for peace in their own voice. A new procedure for establishing peace in Central America was found. The time for peace had come.

In this chapter we shall continue to follow the course of the Contadora peace process through its difficult years of 1985 and 1986. We shall then trace its transformation into the Esquipulas phase of the Central American peace process with the signing of the Esquipulas II Procedure for Establishing a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America in August 1987.

The Second Draft of the Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America, November 1984 to December 1985

The emergence of the Tegucigalpa Group was a serious setback for the Contadora peace process, and the Tegucigalpa Draft complicated the search for a formula for peace. In November 1984, the Contadora Group ministers sent a report to the United Nations general secretary[2] admitting the idea of incorporating some of the Tegucigalpa Group's observations into the Contadora Act insofar as they contributed to giving the Act greater precision. However, they rejected any modification of the substantive points and political balance reached by the Act (Talavera, 1990; Castro, 1985: 11). Nevertheless, during this difficult third phase of the Contadora peace process from November 1984 through December 1985, the Contadora Group was forced to look for a compromise agreement between the security provisions of the Revised Contadora Act and the Tegucigalpa Draft in order to keep the peace process alive. But the road to the Second Revised Contadora Act was strewn with important obstacles that threatened the life of the peace process all along the way.

On the second anniversary of its original call for peace, the Contadora Group met in Panama to reiterate its willingness to continue its mediation efforts and called on the Central Americans to fulfill the commitments of the Document of Objectives. However, the difficult stalemate that had developed between the Central Americans in the fall of 1984 was complicated further by the controversial Urbina Lara asylum case. In December 1984, the

Sandinista government refused to allow Costa Rica's grant of political asylum to Nicaraguan José Manuel Urbina Lara, who had holed up in the Costa Rican embassy in Managua. Relations between the two governments deteriorated rapidly. Costa Rica announced its withdrawal from the Contadora process while the case was pending and called on the Permanent Council of the OAS (PCOAS) to examine the controversy. Significantly, on January 18, 1985, the PCOAS referred the case to the Contadora Group, instructing Costa Rica and Nicaragua to resolve the case through Contadora's good offices (Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 179-180). As Nils Castro (1985: 11) notes, this decision renewed Contadora's mission, but it also distracted Contadora from its main purpose and embroiled the Contadora Group in this obtrusive bilateral conflict. The conflict prevented the holding of the Eight Joint Meeting of foreign ministers scheduled for February 14 due to a boycott by the Tegucigalpa Group. The conflict was finally resolved in early March, but it had cost the Contadora process three months and had sharpened the differences between the Tegucigalpa Group, Nicaragua, and the Contadora Group.[3]

Another setback for the Contadora Group as it began its third year was the break-off of the Manzanillo talks between the United States and Nicaragua as well as the suspension of talks between the Salvadoran government and the FDR-FMLN. At their second anniversary meeting, the Contadora Group ministers noted the importance of the Manzanillo talks and urged their continuation as well as those recently begun in El Salvador by President José Napoleón Duarte.

Within ten days of the Contadora Group's meeting, the United States announced it was breaking off the Manzanillo talks, asserting that it was appropriate and useful to do so while the Contadora process was under way (Castro, 1985: 11; Taylor Jr., 1985: A1).

In El Salvador, President Duarte had campaigned for his office the previous spring on a platform that included seeking a political solution to the country's civil war. In early October of 1984, President Duarte found the political space to try to fulfill this campaign promise.[4] In a surprise move, he used his October address to the United Nations to invite the FDR-FMLN to the town of La Palma for talks on the search for peace. The talks were held one week later, on October 15, 1984, as thousands of Salvadorans made a pilgrimage to La Palma in support of the talks. The two sides agreed to set up a joint commission that would get an internal peace process under way and discuss ways to humanize the deadly air war. They also agreed to meet again, but the second meeting at Ayaguala on November 30 was less fruitful. By the end of the year, the political space that President Duarte had tried to sieze had closed up. The resurgent opposition of the country's political and military ultra-right wings against any accomodation with the revolutionary left, the FDR-FMLN's unrealistic demands for the time, and the re-election of President Reagan all combined to pre-empt the incipient political dialogue. Throughout 1985 and beyond, a political solution to El Salvador's civil war would not be a viable alternative for the beleaguered Duarte goverment (Diskin and Sharpe, 1986: 70-74, 81-85; Karl, 1988: 184-185; Crahan, 1988: 233).

In addition to these setbacks in the early months of 1985, there were still others that seemed to cut the ground from under the Contadora peace process. With renewed self-confidence after its stunning re-election victory, the Reagan administration stepped up its efforts to implement its Central American policy. In addition to a renewed rhetorical campaign[5] focusing on Nicaragua during the first five months of 1985, the administration moved to block consideration of a Nicaraguan loan request at the Inter-American Development Bank and undertook a new push for contra aid. The administration also promised an increase in its military and economic aid to Honduras in February and March and began new joint U.S.-Honduran military exercises from mid-February through early May. On April 30, President Reagan announced to Congress that he would impose a full trade embargo against Nicaragua within the week. In May, the administration also stepped up its security assistance to Costa Rica after yet another serious border incident between that country and Nicaragua. With the contra war escalating and the Reagan administration playing hard-ball, the obstacles to reaching a peace agreement among the Central Americans seemed higher than ever (Boyd, 1985a: A1; Brinkley, 1985a: A1; Engelberg, 1989: A1; "North Trial...," 1989: 3; Gold, 1987: 41, 48; Meislin, 1985: A9; Brinkley, 1985b: A3; "Vatican Questions...," 1985: A8; Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 183; Christian, 1985: A1; Valero, 1985: 144).

Nevertheless, both in spite of and because of all these setbacks, the Contadora Group moved to get the peace process back

on track. A meeting of the Contadora Technical Group took place in Panama on April 11 and 12, 1985. Although nothing was done to reconcile the conflicting security provisions in the Contadora Act and the Tegucigalpa Draft, the nine vice-ministers did reach a consensus on the creation and basic structure of the three verification and follow-up mechanisms on political, security, and economic and social matters proposed in the Revised Contadora Act. This confidence-building effort opened the door to another meeting of the Technical Group on May 14-17, when discussions were finally opened on the security provisions that had deadlocked the peace process for seven months. These discussions continued at the end of May in a special meeting in Bogota (Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 182-183; Valero, 1985: 143-144).

Although the peace process seemed to be getting back on track in the late spring of 1985, tensions between the United States and Nicaragua, which had by this time become the most public focus of conflict in Central America, had reached their nadir in May and June. The new U.S. trade embargo, President Ortega's controversial trip to Moscow, and President Reagan's hard-hitting push for renewed contra aid all moved the U.S. House of Representatives to reverse itself from a vote in April and approve $27 million in non-lethal aid to the contras on June 12. At the same time, the House also rejected a further extension of the Boland Amendment (Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 36; Leogrande, 1987: 208-212; Arnson, 1987: 133-134).

Yet another meeting of the Technical Group had been scheduled for June 18 and 19. But with the U.S. Congress moving toward a renewal of contra aid, Nicaragua sought to add this issue to the agenda of the meeting as it opened. Nicaragua sought an official repudiation of the U.S. contra aid policy by the nine vice-ministers before discussing the other agenda items. However, the Tegucigalpa Group diplomats opposed this outright while the Contadora Group diplomats took the position that it was too late to change the established agenda. Nicaraguan Vice Minister Victor Hugo Tinoco walked out of the meeting, which was thus aborted. Although the Nicaragua vice president traveled to the capitals of the Contadora states soon thereafter to express Nicaragua's willingness to continue working within the Contadora process, the peace process again seemed on the verge of collapse (Castro, 1985: 12; Meza et al, 1987: 54; Valero, 1985: 145-146).

Significantly, throughout the first half of 1985, the Contadora Group had begun to receive new diplomatic encouragement and support for its efforts from some of the new civilian governments coming to power in South America. This new support had been foreshadowed throughout 1984 by Argentine President Raúl Alfonsín, whose first major foreign policy initiative was to declare his support for the Contadora process in February 1984, just two months after his inauguration (Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 175). Thirteen months later, President Alfonsín spoke out forcefully in favor of the non-intervention principle and in support of dialogue between the United States and Nicaragua as he met President Reagan

at the White House (Boyd, 1985b: A5). Meanwhile, the March 1985 inaugurations of Uruguayan President Julio María Sanguinetti and Brazilian President Jose Sarney provided significant occassions for the Contadora Group and Central American presidents and foreign ministers to meet informally to try to reopen their dialogue and get the peace process back on track. These inaugurations also provided the opportunity for other Latin American governments to express their support for the peace process (Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 181).

But after the aborted Technical Group meeting in mid-June and the U.S. Congress's final decision to resume nonlethal contra aid in mid-July, the new civilian governments in South America decided to lend their active diplomatic support to the Contadora peace process. At the presidential inauguration of Peru's Alan García on July 27, 1985, the new civilian presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay agreed to form the Contadora Support Group (also known as the Lima Group) in order to help the Contadora Group inject new life into the peace process. The formation of the Support Group was formally declared through the Cartagena Communique, issued at the end of a meeting on August 23-25 between the eight foreign ministers of the new Support Group and the Contadora Group in Cartagena, Colombia (Valero, 1985: 149-150; Comunicado de Cartagena, 1985).

The Cartagena Communique is marked by a dour tone and expresses the deep concern of the eight foreign ministers over the still worsening situation in Central America. The eight foreign ministers

noted that time had become a critical factor, and they explained that the Support Group had been formed to provide a "mechanism" of diplomatic information, consultation, and support to the prompt conclusion and signing of the second draft of the Contadora Act then being prepared. The two groups underlined their view that the escalating regional conflict increasingly threatened their own national security interests, both by diverting the necessary attention and resources away from the problems of the deteriorating economic situation and the debt crisis throughout Latin America and by what they perceived as the growing threat of a generalized war that would have "grave consequences for the whole hemisphere." Indeed, the eight foreign ministers meeting in Cartagena warned that without a peaceful settlement in Central America, the regional conflict "will affect the political and social stability of all of Latin America" (Comunicado de Cartagena, 1985).

The significance of this very serious statement and of the Support Group's endorsement of the Contadora peace process as "the only viable path to achieve peace and reestablish harmony and cooperation between the Central American states" should not be underestimated.[6] The members of the Support Group brought an important political and moral force to the peace process. Despite their economic crises in the 1980s, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay are among the most developed and powerful states of Latin America. Together with the Contadora Group states, they represent nearly 85% of the population of Latin America (Pardo García-Peña, 1987: 214). Moreover, the four Support Group states had only

recently returned to civilian rule afters years of military dictatorship which sought to silence and depoliticize individuals or groups deemed subversive to the security of the state (O'Donnell, 1979). The Support Group states thus represent the emerging struggle in Latin America to re-institute democratic processes and national reconciliations in the face of long-held military power and supremacy. The decision of these new civilian govenments to support the Contadora process signified a commitment to the goals of pluralism, cooperation, and development in the hemisphere and a rejection of the militarized national security doctrines promoted through the dictates of cold war anti-communism.

As the Support Group began its diplomatic lobbying efforts, the Reagan administration's new Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Elliott Abrams,[7] called a special meeting of U.S. ambassadors to Central America and Belize to discuss the potential impact of the Support Group. Abrams lumped the Support Group together with U.S. adversaries in the region by asserting that it was "necessary that we develop an active diplomacy in order to hinder the attempts at Latin American solidarity that could be directed against the U.S. and its allies, whether these efforts are initiated by the Support Group, Cuba, or Nicaragua" (Babcock, 1985: A1, A18; also quoted in Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 37). Indeed, administration hard-liners like Abrams had come to see both the Support Group and the Contadora Group as simply anti-U.S. and therefore pro-Sandinista, thus precluding any serious accomodation of the peace process.

Meanwhile, the Contadora Group had finished preparing a second draft of the Contadora Act which was presented to the Central Americans at the Eighth Joint Meeting of the nine foreign ministers on September 12, 1985, the first such meeting to be held in nearly a year (Valero, 1985: 150). This version of the Contadora Act focused on meeting some of the objections of the United States and the Tegucigalpa Group to the security and verification provisions of the September 1984 draft. Thus, the differences between the two drafts are found mainly in Part I, Chapter III ("Commitments on Security Affairs"), Part II ("Commitments on Execution and Follow-up"), and Part III ("Final Dispositions"), with only occassional, minor additions or rewordings in the other chapters addressing the political and economic and social matters. Nevertheless, the September 1985 Act does include a new article (1F) in Part I, Chapter I ("General Committments") which obliges the Central American governments to respect "the right to practice free trade," a clear but diplomatic reference to the U.S. trade embargo against Nicaragua.

With regard to the security provisions, the September 1985 Contadora Act continued to call for an end to the regional arms race and arms trafficking, the prohibition of support for irregular forces and for acts of terrorism, subversion, or sabotage in the region, the establishment of a regional system of direct communication to diffuse tensions, and the removal of foreign military bases and advisors from the region. But unlike the September 1984 Act, the new draft established a deadline of six

months for the removal of foreign military bases and advisors.[8] It also provided for a two-phased process of negotiating regional arms control and reductions to begin after the signing of the Act. The September 1985 Act did not oblige the immediate cessation of international military maneuvers, but it did attempt to regulate their size, duration, and location with a view to their eventual cessation.

With regard to provisions on verification and follow-up (Part II), the new Contadora Act spelled out changes in the structures of the verification mechanisms that reflected the consensus reached on this issue the previous May. The new Act also added a new article addressing the financing of the verification mechanisms through the creation of a Fund for Peace in Central America.[9] Several other provisions were added to the document to specify the functions of the Verification and Control Commission on Security Matters. The new Act also specified with more precision the timing and final modalities of implementing the Act in Part III ("Final Dispositions") (Contadora Act, 1985; Contadora Act, 1984).

The Contadora Act presented to the Central Americans in September 1985 was thus a more precise and in that sense a stronger document than the previous one. Nevertheless, three substantive issues continued to divide the Central Americans. The open-ended process and unresolved formulas for negotiating regional arms control and arms reductions divided Nicaragua and the Tegucigalpa Group,[10] as did the continuation of international military maneuvers permitted by the Act. The third issue centered on the verification,

execution, and follow-up provisions of the Act. Although there was a consensus on the structure of the verification mechanisms, there remained some ambiguities as to just what those mechanisms were supposed to verify and how they would go about it. Related to this point, differences also existed on the timing of the execution of the Act, with Nicaragua arguing that all of the Act's provisions should enter into force simultaneously with the signing of the Act while El Salvador and Honduras wanted a delay of six months after signing.[11] The nine foreign ministers meeting in Panama agreed to try to resolve these issues in a special 45-day permanent negotiating session by the Technical Group to begin on October 7 in order to finalize the 1985 Contadora Act. All other substantive points of the Act were considered finalized (Cardenal Chamorro, 1985a: 846-849; Cardenal Chamorro, 1985b: 926; Valero, 1985: 150; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 37).

Little was accomplished by the talks, which were marked by the intransigence of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras (Cardenal Chamorro, 1985a: 847). On November 11, the Nicaraguan government announced that it could not sign the Contadora Act as it then stood. While one hundred of the Act's provisions were acceptable to Nicaragua, seventeen relating to security matters were not, including the continuation of international military maneuvers, premature cuts in Nicaragua's armed forces, the lack of a specific requirement for a halt to U.S. aid to the contras, and the absense of a means to oblige U.S. compliance with the Act[12] (Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 37; Kinzer, 1985: A8). In a letter to the

presidents of the Contadora Group and Support Group states, President Ortega clearly placed the onus for Nicaragua's decision on the United States, arguing that, given the escalating contra war, the minimum basic conditions for guaranteeing Nicaragua's security did not exist. "Such conditions will only be able to exist to the extent that the United States government undertakes effective, concrete, and real commitments that permit Nicaragua to accept a level of military development that does not entail a risk for its national security" (Ortega, 1985: 878).

The nine foreign ministers met for a ninth time on November 19 to 21 as the 45-day negotiating session drew to a close. They agreed to create yet another mechanism --a technical and administrative secretariate for the execution and follow-up of the Act. However, the differences on the security provisions remained. In essence, in trying to meet most of the security concerns lodged by the Tegucigalpa Group and the United States the previous fall and thus keep the peace process alive, the Contadora Group had presented a new Contadora Act that tilted against Nicaragua's security concerns. Despite the efforts of the vice-ministers and ministers of foreign affairs in October and November, the new diplomatic stalemate could not be resolved (Cardenal Chamorro, 1985a: 847; Cardenal Chamorro, 1985b: 926; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 37).

That stalemate was not the last setback that the Contadora peace process experienced in 1985. In what appeared to be an attempt to address Nicaragua's concerns at their November 19-21 meeting, the nine foreign ministers agreed to a proposal by the

Contadora Group to introduce a resolution to the UN General Assembly urging the reopening of bilateral talks between Nicaragua and the United States as a show of support for Contadora. But before the resolution came to the floor, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Vernon Walters, successfully lobbied the Tegucigalpa Group ambassadors to the UN as well as those from Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama to object to parts of the resolution. The three Contadora Group ambassadors removed the proposed resolution from the General Assembly without informing Mexico and introduced another resolution eliminating the points to which the United States objected (such as a paragraph expressing concern over continued joint military maneuvers and explicit references to U.S. policy in Central America). Nicaragua then objected to the passing of any resolution that did not contain an explicit reference to the United States, and the whole project failed. Yet a third resolution was introduced at a special economic commission of the UN General Assembly by Mexico, Peru, Algeria, and Nicaragua. This resolution focused on the U.S. trade embargo against Nicaragua and urged that it be revoked. Despite U.S. efforts to amend and defeat it, this resolution eventually passed[13] (Cardenal Chamorro, 1985b).

With even the Contadora Group in disarray,[14] and frustrated by its lack of success in finalizing the Contadora Act, it seemed that the peace process was virtually dead. This perception was reinforced in December when Costa Rica proposed that any further talks be suspended for five months to await the upcoming changes of government in Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica. Nicaragua

seconded the proposal (Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 37; C.G.R., 1986: 467; "Latin Peace Effort...," 1985: A13; "Latin Peace Meetings...," 1985: A3). Thus closed a very difficult year and fruitless third phase of the Contadora peace process, with prospects for the future looking excedingly grim.

Stalemate and the Third Draft of the Contadora Act January to June 1986 and Beyond

On the third anniversary of the original call for peace on Contadora Island, the eight foreign ministers of the Contadora Group and the Support Group met in Caraballeda, Venezuela, to reaffirm their commitment to seeking peace in Central America. They urged that serious negotiations resume as soon as possible and stated in clear terms the principal bases they saw necessary to establishing ongoing peace in Central America. The "Caraballeda Message" of January 12, 1986, stressed the necessity of a Latin American solution to Central America's conflicts. "This means that the solution of Latin American problems should arise from and be ensured by the region itself so that the area is not placed into the East-West world strategic conflict." With the added voices of the Support Group, this was the strongest rejection yet of the imposition of cold war logic in Central America as well as the clearest assertion of Latin America's diplomatic primacy in resolving the region's conflicts (Mensaje de Caraballeda, 1987: 610-613; 611).

The Caraballeda Message reiterated the principles that had guided the peace process up to this point and been articulated in all previous Contadora documents (i.e., self-determination, non-intervention, territorial integrity, pluralistic democracy, demilitarization, non-support of irregular forces, respect for human rights, etc.). The eight foreign ministers also offered their good offices "to foster resumption of the talks between the governments of the United States and Nicaragua....Respectful negotiation between them, with mutual and equitable concessions, is a condition for regional detente." The Caraballeda Message stressed that such negotiations were necessary to prevent "grave risks to Latin American peace and stability" (Mensaje de Caraballeda, 1987: 612).

Two days later, on January 14, 1986, Marco Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo was inaugurated as the first elected civilian president of Guatemala in nearly twenty years.[15] President Cerezo's first successful diplomatic initiative was to hold an impromptu summit on January 15 and persuade the other four Central American presidents assembled for his inauguration to endorse the Caraballeda Message. On January 16, the five states' foreign ministers signed the Guatemala Declaration for their governments, embracing both the "principles and propositions formulated at Caraballeda as well as the actions proposed to restart the peace process" (C.G.R., 1986: 467, translation mine; Yopo, 1987: 326; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 40-41; Goodfellow, 1987: 152). Once again, at its seemingly bleakest point, the Contadora peace process found renewed political will to sustain its continuation.

Yet despite new hopes and a flurry of diplomatic activity by the Contadora diplomats, 1986 would prove to be as frustrating as the previous year. Armed with the Caraballeda and Guatemala declarations, the eight foreign ministers from the Contadora and Support Groups travelled to Washington. After being refused a meeting with President Reagan, the eight ministers met with Secretary of State George Shultz on February 10 and asked for an end to U.S. aid to the contras to allow the peace process to progress. They also asked for a reopening of bilateral talks with Nicaragua[16] ("Latin Ministers..., 1986: A7; C.G.R., 1986: 467; García and Gomáriz, 1989: 34; Omang, 1986a: A9; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 41; Goodfellow, 1987: 152). News reports later revealed that in early February, the State Department had proposed that a positive gesture be made to Nicaragua as a show of support for the Contadora process, however the White House and the Defense Department had rejected the idea (Omang, 1986b: A25). Instead, on February 25, 1986, the Reagan administration submitted its request to congress for $100 million in new contra aid for the second half of FY 1986 and all of FY 1987 (LeoGrande, 1987: 213; Arnson, 1989).

The eight foreign ministers of the Contadora and Support Groups met again in Punta del Este, Uruguay, on February 26-28. Once again they urged an end to contra aid and reiterated both the need and capacity for Latin America to resolve its problems without outside interference (C.G.R., 1986: 467). LeoGrande (1987: 214-215) notes that this new willingness of the eight Contadora foreign ministers to criticize U.S. aid to the contras openly --as opposed to a

previous diplomatic circumspection in naming United States policy as an obstacle to peace-- seems to have played a role in the mid-March defeat of President Reagan's contra aid request by the House of Representatives. The administration's previous argument that the Contadora Group states were privately more supportive of U.S. policy than they could publicly acknowledge lost credibility in the House in early 1986 with the new assertiveness of the eight Contadora foreign ministers. Nevertheless, the Senate narrowly passed the administration's request a week later. The issue of $100 million in new contra aid was not dead.

On April 5-7, 1986, the first joint meeting of all thirteen foreign ministers from the Contadora Group, the Support Group, and the Central American states was held in Panama to reopen discussions on finalizing the Contadora Act. But despite the renewed effort, the meeting failed to break the previous diplomatic stalemate. The only change of positions since the previous fall was that the Contadora Group was willing to discuss a Mexican proposal that the thirteen ministers ask the United States to halt new aid to the contras in order to give the peace process time to finalize and implement the Contadora Act. However, the Tegucigalpa Group refused to discuss the proposal; Nicaragua refused to discuss finalizing the Contadora Act without first approving the proposal. The meeting broke up with only one questionable agreement having been reached.[17] In the final communique, all the ministers except Nicaragua's agreed to Venezuela's proposal to set June 6, 1986, as the final deadline for the Central Americans to sign the Contadora

Act (Talavera, 1990; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 41; Goodfellow, 1987: 152; García and Gomáriz, 1989: 34; C.G.R., 1986: 468; Volman, 1986; LeMoyne, 1986c: A4; LeMoyne, 1986a: A4).

Shortly thereafter, the Tegucigalpa Group states announced their willingness to sign the September 1985 draft of the Contadora Act by the new deadline, thus placing the onus on Nicaragua for blocking the success of the peace process. Nicaragua maintained its position that it was willing to sign the Act by June 6 provided that "North American aggression has ceased," thus placing the onus for the stalemate on the U.S. contra aid policy. The United States had by this time taken the public position that its policy of aiding the contras was necessary to force the Sandinistas to comply with the conditions of any peace agreement, including national reconciliation talks between the Sandinista government and the contras. The Nicaraguan government refused the legitimacy of the contras (calling them "mercenaries" for the United States) and rejected any suggestion of negotiating with them (Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 42; C.G.R., 1986: 468; Omang, 1986c: A23; Weinraub, 1986: A4).

However, the contras were not in much of a bargaining position in April and May of 1986. The contras suffered from a divided leadership, a lack of military success, and charges of corruption in the use of the previous $27 million in non-lethal U.S. aid. Moreover, the International Court of Justice was soon expected to decide Nicaragua's case against the United States in Nicaragua's favor and declare the contras illegal (Omang, 1986c: A23). These factors, along with the hopeful diplomatic activity of the Contadora

process, led some in the State Department and on Capitol Hill to reconsider the Contadora Act as a viable alternative to the contra strategy.

While the White House redoubled its efforts to push for its $100 million contra aid package, the administration's new special envoy to Central America, Ambassador Philip Habib,[18] spent a week in Miami trying to get the three contra factions to form a more cooperative, civilian-run organization. Success here could both enhance the contras' credibility on Capitol Hill and improve their chances for a place in national reconciliation talks in Nicaragua if the Contadora Act were signed. However, Ambassador Habib soon found himself the center of controversy. On May 22, Representative Jack Kemp (R-NY) called on President Reagan to fire Habib, charging that the career diplomat was selling out both the contras and U.S. interests (Omang, 1986e; Omang, 1986f).

The controversy stemmed from a letter by Habib to a member of congress dated April 11 that explained U.S. aid to the contras would cease "on signature" of a verifiable agreement honored by Nicaragua. Although the letter had cleared the proper channels in the State Department, Kemp and other contra policy supporters interpreted it to mean a threat to U.S. policy, which had stressed the continuation of contra aid until after Nicaraguan compliance with any peace treaty could be verified. Asserting that Nicaragua would not honor any agreement, Kemp went so far as to charge that Habib's letter had "potentially set the stage for a new Central American Yalta." On the other hand, liberals in congress --and

diplomats in Latin America-- welcomed the apparent shift in policy. In an effort at damage control, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Elliott Abrams, noted President Reagan's "full confidence" in Habib but explained that Habib's letter was "in error" and "imprecise." The word "implementation" should have been used instead of "signature" (Omang, 1986f; Bagley, 1986: 17; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 42-43).

The controversy gave further evidence of deep divisions within the administration over U.S. policy at a crucial time for the peace process. In fact, the controversy emerged on the heels of bitter feuding between the State Department and the Defense Department over the possibility and implications of the signing of the Contadora Act. On May 20, the New York Times published the details of a Defense Department study that, as the Times headline put it, "...Predicts Big War If Latins Sign Peace Accord" (Gelb, 1986: A4). The Pentagon study questioned whether Nicaragua would ever comply with the Contadora Act and speculated that if the Act were signed and Nicaragua then violated it for three years, "an effective containment program" would require "a protracted commitment" of at least 100,000 U.S. troops and up to $8.5 billion a year. The State Department, which had prepared its own study[19] on the costs of verifying the Act's provisions throughout Central America, immediately challenged the study and stated that it was "an internal study written under contract" and had "no standing as a U.S. Government document." Fred C. Iklé, the conservative Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the sponsor of the Pentagon's

study, rejected this charge as "plain wrong" (Omang, 1986c: A 23; Omang, 1986d: A35; Gwertzman, 1986: A1, A5).

The alarmism of the Pentagon's study and the conservative backlash over Habib's role both revealed and contributed to a certain momentum for the peace process that made finalizing the Contadora Act seem both possible and likely by mid-May. Why else would the conservatives go to such lengths to discredit the Act? Jeane Kirkpatrick joined the conservative chorus against the Contadora Act in an editorial in the Washington Post on May 26. She also spoke of Yalta and raised the spectre of Nicaraguan non-compliance. The Contadora Act should be opposed because "[c]ommunists don't comply:"

> All the experience of the post war years proves that, in dealing with communist states, compliance poses the principal problem....The greatest difficulty [of a Contadora Treaty] is compliance. Compliance cannot be negotiated (Kirkpatrick, 1986: A21).

The strong conservative opposition to the Contadora Act closed off the more moderate diplomatic track of the State Department. The Reagan administration could not give the Contadora Act a chance to work.

However, while the debate in the United States focused on prospects for Nicaraguan compliance, the other Central American states faced other realities that affected the outcome of the peace process. Each of the five states had indicated its willingness to sign the Act, yet as the June 6 deadline approached outside pressures and domestic politics led to important obstacles. In Honduras, the government may have begun to feel U.S. pressure not to

sign the Act, but the Hondurans had a reason of their own. While Honduran domestic opinion was divided concerning the U.S. contra policy generally, most Hondurans shared concerns about the future of the thousands of armed contras left on Honduran soil if the Act were signed. The Contadora Act made no provision for the repatriation of the contras. In El Salvador, President Duarte faced a powerful military intent on continuing to prosecute the counter-insurgency war with U.S. support. In Costa Rica, a significant change of government brought Oscar Arias Sánchez to power on May 8. President Arias had committed himself to fulfilling his campaign promises of restoring real Costa Rican neutrality in the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran conflicts and working for peace in the region. President Arias' new foreign policy direction, including his public opposition to support for the contras and his decision to close the contra camps remaining in Costa Rica,[20] began the weakening of the Tegucigalpa Group triangle, leaving El Salvador and Honduras alone in clear alignment with U.S. policy toward the region. Instead, Arias joined Guatemala's President Cerezo in the neutral middle ground between El Salvador and Honduras on the one hand and Nicaragua on the other. Relations between Washington and San José cooled (LeMoyne, 1986b: A3; Hopfensperger, 1986; Arias, 1991; García and Gomáriz, 1989: 34; Weiner, 1986: 73; C.G.R., 1986: 469).

This realignment of Costa Rica may have contributed to the alarm of U.S. conservatives over the Contadora Act's prospects, especially as a special summit meeting approached between all five Central American presidents at the end of May. But, despite the

fears of U.S. conservatives, Costa Rica's renewed neutrality did not necessarily mean it would automatically side with Nicaragua against the United States, as the presidential summit would show.

The Central American presidential summit was called and organized by Guatemala's President Cerezo as a follow-up meeting to his inaugural initiatives the previous January. On May 25 and 26, the five Central American presidents met in Esquipulas, Guatemala, to discuss both the Contadora Act and a proposal by President Cerezo to create a Central American parliament that he hoped could spur a new integration effort among the five states. Without the Contadora Group states, the Support Group, or the United States in attendance, the five presidents were free to speak frankly and get to know each other's positions in a more intimate setting. This was the first time Presidents Cerezo, Arias, Azcona, Duarte, and Ortega met with each other; significantly, it would not be the last.

By the end of their summit, the presidents had agreed in principle to Cerezo's proposal for a regional parliament and agreed to meet again at Esquipulas within a year. However, they were not able to resolve their remaining differences on the Contadora Act. In fact, the summit meeting included an apparently rather lively discussion of the legitimacy of Nicaragua's 1984 elections and the government's democratic credentials since the imposition of a state of emergency in October 1985.[21] The issue of democratization was a new one for the peace process raised by Arias; national reconciliation was another raised by both Arias and Azcona. Both issues opened up discussion of the "Political Commitments" in the

Contadora Act that had been considered finalized. In their final communique, the five presidents requested an extension of the June 6 deadline from the Contadora Group in order to carry out further negotiations on the still outstanding issues of arms control, verification, and now national reconciliations (Arias, 1991; Ford, 1986: 10; Weiner, 1986: 73; C.G.R., 1986: 469; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 44; García and Gomáriz, 1989: 34).

On the day after the summit closed, a two-day meeting of Contadora's Technical Group opened in Panama in a last minute effort to negotiate closure for the Contadora Act. As the meeting began (on May 27), Nicaragua offered a new arms control proposal to break the deadlock on this issue.[22] Yet the diplomats were unable to resolve the disparate positions of the Central Americans. Significantly, there was further evidence of the break-up of the Tegucigalpa Group as Costa Rica joined Guatemala and Nicaragua in seeking to end international military maneuvers. Moreover, El Salvador joined Guatemala and Nicaragua in opposing limits on national militia forces (Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 44). The impasse prevailed, and the self-imposed June 6 deadline arrived without a signature.

Yet the Contadora Group persisted. On June 6 it unexpectedly offered a third --and what it called its final-- draft of the Contadora Act to the Central Americans and vowed to continue its mediation efforts. Rather than try to resolve the divisive arms control issues before signature, the new draft called instead for a second process of arms control negotiations to begin after the Act

entered into force. The new Act specified the stages that second process should take in great detail.[23] The new draft also called for the immediate suspension of all international military maneuvers in the region but permitted their resumption if the parties failed to reach any agreement in the new arms control negotiations process.[24] The June 6 Draft also proposed new features on verification, including a Latin American secretariate, an International Corps of Inspectors, and an Advisory Body to help the Verification and Control Commission for Security Matters discharge its responsibilities and to facilitate communication between the commission and the Central American states. The functions of these bodies and of the Verification and Control Commission itself were also spelled out in great detail. The considerable care taken in elaborating the verification provisions reflected the Contadora Group's attempt to address past U.S. objections to this aspect of the Contadora Act and incorporate the State Department's recommendations[25] in these matters. Most of the other provisions of the Act remained the same as the previous September 1985 draft, including an immediate end to the support of "irregular forces" and a dismantling of their bases (Contadora Act, 1986; Contadora Act, 1985; Ford, 1986: 9; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 44-45; Goodfellow, 1987: 154).

Within a week, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras had rejected the third version of the Contadora Act. All three states cited problems with the verification provisions of the Act, but the open-ended arms control issue was also an important factor.

Guatemala, however, remained open to the new version and stressed its continued support for the Contadora process. Guatemalan Foreign Minister Mario Quinonez reaffirmed his country's neutrality and insisted that it would "not form any bloc with any country or group of countries designed to lead to the isolation" of Nicaragua (Ford, 1986: 9).

For its part, the Nicaraguan government announced its willingness to accept the new version of the Act on June 20. While the new Act was more favorable to Nicaragua than the September 1985 draft, Nicaragua was unquestionably moved by the upcoming vote in the U.S. House of Representatives on contra aid. That vote was finally held on June 26, and in a dramatic reversal of its position from the previous March, the House narrowly approved President Reagan's $100 million contra aid request. The Senate would soon follow.[26] Within a month's time, the palpable hopes and fears that a Contadora agreement was within reach had given way to a renewal of the contra war. The Contadora process suffered its most severe blow.

From Contadora to Esquipulas: The Arias Plan and the Esquipulas II Agreement

Despite the serious setback to the peace process presented by the contra aid vote, the Contadora Group and the Support Group characteristically vowed to continue their work. Goodfellow (1987: 154-155) notes that immediately following the House vote, Contadora

negotiators at the UN commented stoically that Contadora had "'reached the end of a chapter, not the end of its work.'" Indeed, the Contadora Group and the Support Group, which had begun to act as one and were increasingly referred to as the "Group of Eight," persisted in their mediation efforts. At his inauguration on August 8, the new Colombian president, Virgilio Barco Vargas, urged that the Contadora states revive the stalled talks. The other seven Contadora presidents, all in attendance, agreed (Riding, 1986: A2). At the end of October, the senior deputy foreign ministers of the Group of Eight met in Mexico City to discuss the stalled peace process.[27] In its November meeting, the General Assembly of the OAS passed a declaration recognizing the Contadora Group's efforts and offered the support of the OAS in the search for peace. In December, border incidents between Nicaragua and Honduras as a result of the stepped-up contra war led to the formation of a mission of diplomats from the Group of Eight, the UN, and the OAS to tour the five Central American capitals and try to reanimate the peace process. This effort, combined with the political fall-out from the first revelations of the Iran-Contra scandal in November, led to a series of meetings between December 1986 and April 1987 in which the Contadora Act was again discussed. However, the same difficulties in reaching a final agreement remained: Arms control, verification, and now internal democratization and national reconciliations all stood in the way of finalizing the Contadora Act, especially in light of the escalating contra war ("Meeting of the Contadora Group," 1986: A6; García and Gomáriz, 1989: 34-35).

Events in the international and regional arenas through the end of 1986 and into 1987 were leading to a transformation of the peace process. The Contadora phase of the Central American peace process was drawing to a close. The escalating contra war added a new urgency to resolving the regional conflicts, and the Iran-Contra scandal was beginning to undermine U.S. policy toward the region. However, while these realities presented certain opportunities to the Group of Eight, the Central Americans found the Contadora process hopelessly stalemated. Guatemala's President Cerezo and Costa Rica's President Arias had begun to look for alternative paths to peace since their respective inaugurations. Indeed, this emerging new phase of the regional peace process can be traced to Cerezo's impromptu summit with his colleagues at his January 1986 inauguration. Working separately at first, Cerezo and Arias looked for a truly Central American initiative to resolve their region's violent conflicts (Solis, 1991). In early 1987, Cerezo pressed for holding a second Central American presidential summit, as had been agreed at Esquipulas in May 1986, to accelerate the formation of a Central American parliament that could revive regional integrationism and cooperation. At the same time, Arias was preparing a text that he hoped could be the basis of a new regional agreement. The so-called "Arias Plan" was made public on Feburary 15, 1987.

The formal document was entitled "A Time for Peace: Procedure for Establishing a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America." It was presented to the presidents of Guatemala, Honduras, and El

Salvador who were invited to San José for the occassion. In a 1991 interview, President Arias explained that he recognized a certain anti-Ortega climate and he preferred that Ortega hear about the plan alone in Managua. Ortega was not originally against the plan, though he later aired some opposition. El Salvador and Honduras originally had many reservations. The presidents agreed to study the plan and put off discussing it until the second presidential summit at Esquipulas tentatively scheduled for late May 1987 (Arias, 1991; Kinzer, 1987: A16).

President Arias' "Procedure" was based on the philosophy that authentic peace in Central America could come about only through democratization and national reconciliations by the Central Americans themselves. Arias viewed the Contadora Act as being flawed because it was too "ambitious" and "complex" in its goal of reducing and balancing the region's armed forces. Moreover, the Contadora project was "exotic," coming not from the Central Americans but from other Latin American countries, some of whose democratic credentials were weak. "How could countries like Mexico and Panama teach us about democracy, liberty, and peace in Central America?" After waiting to see what might become of the Contadora process in the wake of the $100 million contra aid vote, Arias decided at the end of 1986 that the time was ripe for preparing a <u>Central American</u> peace plan from a country that <u>did</u> have democratic credientials. Rather than the question of regional arms control, the Arias Plan emphasized democracy as a condition for peace and peace as a condition for development (Arias, 1991).

President Arias' proposal contained only ten points. The first focused on national reconciliations based on political amnesties and dialogue between the government and unarmed oppositions groups within each country. Each government was also supposed to create a National Commission for Reconciliation and Dialogue to accomplish these objectives and oversee their compliance within each country. The second point called for immediate cease fires between belligerent groups in the countries with such violence once the domestic political dialogue began. The third and fourth points dealt with democratization through the lifting of censureship and other controls on free political debate as well as the guarantee of free elections according to the constitutional calendars of each country. The plan also included a provision for eventual region-wide elections to a regional parliament as proposed by President Cerezo.

Point five called on the Central American states to ask outside states to suspend their respective military aid programs to the region. This petition, along with another asking the region's irregular forces to abstain from receiving such aid, was to occur simultaneously with the signing of the Procedure. The sixth point obliged each Central American country to prohibit the use of its territory by groups seeking to destabilize neighboring states. Point seven called for negotiations on regional arms control in the spirit of Contadora to begin sixty days after the signing of the Procedure. Points eight and nine focused on the issues of verification and evaluation of compliance with the agreement. Point

eight created a Follow-up Committee composed of the secretaries general of the UN and the OAS as well as the foreign ministers of the Group of Eight countries to oversee compliance (along with the National Commissions for Reconciliation and Dialogue). Point nine called for a meeting of the Central American presidents within six months of signing the agreement to evaluate the progress made in implementing the Procedure. The final point called for future economic and cultural agreements aimed at promoting regional development and stressed that the points contained in the Procedure "form a harmonious and indivisible whole" ("Procedimiento...." 1987a: 423-426).

The unexpected appearance of this new peace plan created mixed reactions. President Arias said that his initiative received a great deal of support from throughout Latin America, including the Contadora countries (Arias, 1991). Indeed, at their April 1987 meeting, the Group of Eight ministers decided to table further consideration of the third Contadora Act until they knew the results of the second summit of Central American presidents at Esquipulas which was now scheduled for June 25-26, 1987 (García and Gomáriz, 1989: 36). Arias found the reaction from most of Western Europe to be more skeptical, given the EC's previous support of Contadora, "and of course Mrs. Thatcher was totally against it" (Arias, 1991). Reaction in the United States was also mixed. On the one hand, Congress responded favorably with the Senate's vote of 97-1 to endorse the peace plan in mid-March. On the other hand, officials in the Reagan Administration either minimized the significance of

the plan or criticized it for not making sufficient demands on Nicaragua (Sciolino, 1987: A11). Choosing his words carefully, President Arias stated that he found the Reagan administration's reaction to be "support through exhortation that was not sincere. ...Basically they kept trying to undermine my efforts" (Arias, 1991).

The Reagan administration's pressures on Arias after March 1987 included a slowdown in the disbursement of economic aid already approved by Congress,[28] a delay in appointing a new ambassador to San José, and the imposition of restrictions on some of Costa Rica's exports. Moreover, in a June visit to Washington, President Arias and a close advisor were given "a severe 65-minute lecture on his mistakes" by top White House and administration officials (Volman, 1987: 5). The administration also pressured the other Central American presidents to oppose any plan that did not meet U.S. views and security interests in the region. Ambassador Habib personally delivered this message in a tour of Central American capitals in mid-June, soon before the second Esquipulas summit. In the wake of this tour, President Duarte asked the other Central American presidents for a last minute postponement of the summit. Despite initial objections from Nicaragua and Costa Rica, it was finally agreed to postpone the summit until August 6-7 and to hold a meeting of foreign ministers at the end of July or early August to prepare for it. There were also reports that contra leaders wanted to attend the summit and that the Reagan administration supported the idea. However, top officials from both Costa Rica and Guatemala rejected

the idea as "totally out of the question" and "outrageous" (Volman, 1987: 5; Arias, 1991; Honey and Avirgan, 1987: 220-221; Kinzer and Pear, 1988: A1, A14; "Costa Rica Is Different," 1988).

Despite Duarte's folding under pressure, which cost him some prestige in the region, Washington's pressures on the other Central American presidents proved to be counterproductive. Volman (1987:5) notes that both Arias and Cerezo became more determined to maintain independent positions from Washington. Even Honduras seemed to be moving away from its pro-Washington stance. By the end of June, the Reagan administration's position had weakened considerably in the wake of the Iran-Contra congressional hearings and the failure of the contras to achieve any serious military successes with their $100 million dollars. In a last minute effort to influence the outcome of the Central American summit, President Reagan and House Speaker Jim Wright offered their own peace plan for the region on August 4 (Lemoyne, 1987a: A7). After such a hard line position for so long, the Reagan-Wright plan was a mixed signal that surprised and confounded the Central American leaders; but it did not deter them. (Arias, 1991; Solis, 1991; Bendaña, 1990; Torres, 1990).

The Esquipulas II summit meeting was tense (Arias, 1991). Diplomatic aides at the meeting and other observers said it opened with the presidents arguing and trading insults, but then they got down to work (Bendaña, 1990; Solis, 1991; Sarti, 1990). The foreign ministers presented the presidents with a report of their work at their meetings on August 3-4. The report identified the approved points, the disapproved points, and the points for further

discussion. Very few points were already approved; almost all fell in the other two categories. Arias said this troubled him because he saw that an agreement would be difficult to reach. Nevertheless, the presidents were able to resolve many of their differences and began to build a consensus. Arias "forced" them to continue the meeting until they found agreement on the remaining issues. The most troubling issues had to do with the timing of certain provisions and the question of "simultaneity" as well as verification. Arias said he remembered a tactic Franklin Roosevelt had reportedly used and tried to use it at Esquipulas: He tried to prevent a break in the meeting until there was a final agreement. Arias said he feared that a break would allow Ortega and the others to consult with their home governments, thus undermining the consensus reached thus far. Nevertheless, there was a break in the meeting after 2:00 a.m., but it soon resumed and a final agreement was reached by 4:00 a.m. on August 7, 1987 (Arias, 1991).

The Esquipulas II Procedure for Establishing a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America differed somewhat from Arias' original plan, reflecting the bargaining that had taken place between the presidents; however, its basic outline remained the same. After invoking various documents produced by the Contadora process (including the June 1986 Act) as its guides, the Esquipulas II Procedure contains eleven points plus a brief section entitled "Final Dispositions." As in the original plan, the first point addresses "National Reconcilation," however it deals with the sections on "Dialogue" and "Amnesty" in reverse order and adds a

third and expanded section spelling out the composition and internal verification responsibilities of the "National Reconciliation Commissions." The second point is retitled "Exhortation for Cessation of Hostilities" and urges those governments facing armed insurgencies to take all "necessary actions" to reach a cease fire "within a constitutional framework."

The third and fourth points of the Esquipulas II Procedure continue to address "Democratization" and "Free Elections" respectively, but some of the wording is changed. The governments now "commit themselves to push for an authentic democratic, pluralistic, and participatory process" that includes full freedom for television, radio and the press as well as full freedom of speech, assembly, and campaigning for political parties. A new paragraph adds that all states of exception should be ended and full contitutional guarantees should be reestablished. There are only a few minor changes with regard to the paragraphs on free elections, however there is a new paragraph specifying the need for the Central American governments to ratify a treaty on the formation of the regional parliament before elections for it can be held.

Points five and seven differ markedly in their wording from the Arias Plan while point six ("Non-Use of Territory to Attack Other States) remains virtually the same. Point five ("Cessation of Aid to Irregular Forces or Insurrectional Movements") calls on the five Central American governments to seek an end to all outside military, logistical, financial and propagandistic aid to the region's irregular forces and insurgent groups. An important exception is to

allow for outside aid for the peaceful resettlement of the members of such forces or groups. Point seven is completely retitled and rewritten. "Negotiations on Security, Verification, Oversight, and Arms Control" specifically calls for the continuation of negotiations on the 1986 Contadora Act's security provisions as well as the means for disarming the region's irregular forces willing to lay down their arms.

The last four points of the Esquipulas II Procedure are significantly different from the Arias Plan. In an entirely new provision, point eight addresses the protection and eventual repatriation of "Refugees and Displaced Persons." The provision focusing on regional economic development and cooperation became the ninth point of the Procedure ("Cooperation, Democracy, and Liberty for Peace and Development") while the tenth now contains the provisions on "International Verification and Follow-up." The presidents agreed to create an International Verification and Follow-up Commission made up of the secretaries general of the UN and OAS, the foreign ministers of the Group of Eight plus the foreign ministers from the five Central American states. There was apparently some discussion about allowing the Central Americans alone to be responsible for verifying compliance with the Procedure, but Nicaragua insisted on including the participation of the eight Contadora states (Bendaña, 1990).

The eleventh point was entirely new and spelled out the "Calendar of Implementation of Commitments." It named the Central American foreign ministers as constituting an Executive Commission

that would begin to develop the procedures and mechanisms for implementing the various provisions within fifteen days of the signing of the agreement. Ninety days after signature (i.e., on November 7, 1987), the key provisions on amnesties, cease fires, democratization, cut-off of aid to irregular forces, and non-use of territory would all enter into force. The International Verification and Follow-up Commission was scheduled to begin its analysis of compliance at 120 days after signature (i.e., December 7) and present its report to a third summit meeting of the Central American presidents at the 150 day mark (i.e., January 7, 1988). In its "Final Dispositions," the Procedure again stressed the indivisibility of its provisions ("Procedimiento...," 1987b).

The success of the Esquipulas II summit seemed to surprise everybody. After four and a half years of diplomatic hopes, frustrations, and stalemates, the Central Americans finally found their own diplomatic voice and political will to answer the Contadora Group's original call for peace. The Esquipulas II agreement was both literally and figuratively a procedure the war-weary Central Americans could follow to rebuild mutual trust and to establish internal peace processes based on the goals of national reconciliations and democratization. Nevertheless, there still remained a great deal to be worked out at the national levels, and carrying out the various steps of the Esquipulas Procedure in each country would prove to be difficult and sometimes impossible.

Although the agreement was supposed to apply to all five Central American countries, its application to Nicaragua and to a

lesser extent El Salvador became the prime focus of subsequent public attention. In Nicaragua, the Sandinista government initially rejected holding any direct talks with the contras until they laid down their arms; the contra leadership, with U.S. support, initially demanded direct negotiations with Managua but refused to lay down their arms until democratic conditions existed in Nicaragua (Mannion, 1987a: 2A; Mannion, 1987b: 2A). Yet at the end of the first ninety days when the key provisions of the Esquipulas agreement were supposed to take effect (November 7), Managua reversed its position and agreed to begin cease fire talks with the contras through the intermediary of Nicaraguan Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo. Two rounds of talks took place in December 1987 before breaking down, but Managua's recommitment to the talks followed in January (Rohter, 1987: A19; Bennett, 1988: 1, 14). Thus began the complex process of internal peace-making in Nicaragua.

In El Salvador, the FDR-FMLN agreed to President Duarte's invitation to begin talks soon after the signing of Esquipulas II, however it refused to accept the Esquipulas II agreement _per se_ (Mannion, 1987c: 6A; Mannion, 1987b: 2A). Two meetings were held in October but at the beginning of November the FDR-FMLN broke off the talks to protest the killing of a human rights official (LASA, 1988: 11; LeMoyne, 1987b: A6). Ending the Salvadoran civil war would prove to be a long and arduous process stretching over the next four years. In Honduras, the most difficult parts of the Procedure to implement would be those provisions relating to the continued use of Honduran territory by the contras as a base of operations and the

continued supply of aid to the contras. In Guatemala, the National Reconciliation Commission was criticized for not including a wider range of political views and for failing to engage in an effective reconciliation process in a country still scarred by political violence. In Costa Rica, a National Reconciliation Commission was formed and unexpectedly discovered some problems with arbitrary arrests, lengthy detentions without trial, and other violations of individual rights. The commission soon began to act as an ombudsman to address these problems ("The Central American Accord...," 1987: A6; LASA, 1988: 8, 14, 19-20).

On January 15, 1988, the five Central American presidents held their third formal summit as agreed in the Esquipulas II Procedure to receive the report of the International Commission on Verification and Follow-up on compliance. The report was mixed. The presidents agreed to continue their efforts to implement the Esquipulas II Procedure, but they disbanded the verification commission and charged the foreign ministers' Executive Commission with its tasks. Nevertheless, Nicaragua asked the Group of Eight and the secretaries general to constitute a special verification team to re-evaluate the new measures Managua agreed to make to comply with the Esquipulas treaty (LASA, 1988: 22). That team would continue to play an important role in Nicaragua's subsequent domestic peace process.

An examination of next phase of the Central American peace process as it came to focus on the internal dynamics of conflict resolution within the individual countries (especially Nicaragua and

El Salvador) is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this study. Such an examination will have to wait until the future. For the present, it is important to note that summit meetings of the five Central American presidents would become regular occurrences over the next several years in order to keep the spirit, if not the letter, of the Esquipulas II Procedure alive. In fact, Central American presidential summitry after January 1988 produced important international commitments that helped to drive the internal peace process onward in Nicaragua and to a lesser extent in El Salvador. Specifically, five more summits between February 1989 and June 1990 deserve brief mention as part of the Esquipulas phase of the Central American peace process.

Central American Summitry after January 1988: Fulfilling the Spirit of Esquipulas

After the January 1988 summit (the third formal summit since the first Esquipulas meeting in May 1986), informal meetings at the inaugurations of other civilian presidents in Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela during 1988 and into 1989 allowed the Central American presidents and their foreign ministers to maintain their regional dialogue in the face of uncertainty and remaining obstacles (i.e., lack of consensus on future verification procedures and continued U.S. pressures to undermine the viability of Esquipulas II) (Arias, 1991; Solis, 1991; Bendaña, 1990). With the continued help of the Contadora Group states, especially the new presidents of Mexico and

Venezuela (Carlos Salinas de Gortari and Carlos Andrés Pérez respectively), the groundwork was laid for the fourth formal summit of Central America's presidents on February 13-14, 1989 at Costa del Sol, El Salvador. This summit meeting is noteworthy for President Ortega's public commitment to continue Nicaragua's process of democratization and move up the country's constitutionally mandated 1990 national elections from November to February, thus scheduling the elections to take place within the year. Moreover, the five presidents reiterated their call for an end to all outside aid to the region's irregular forces and urged that all such groups in the region participate in their country's national reconciliation processes. Significantly, they also agreed to have their foreign ministers undertake meetings with the UN secretary general to find acceptable verification mechanisms for the region's demilitarization (Arias, 1991; Solis, 1991; Bendaña, 1990; Opazo Bernales and Fernández V., 1990: 282-283).

This last commitment soon bore fruit at the fifth regional summit in August 1989 in Tela, Honduras. It was the first presidential summit attended by El Salvador's new President, Alfredo Cristiani (ARENA), who had succeeded Duarte earlier that summer. But Presidents Ortega and Azcona took center stage in Tela as the two worked out agreements to bring about contra demobilization and an end to the contra war.[29] Indeed, the Tela meeting was one of the most significant of all the post-Esquipulas II summits and perhaps of the entire Central American peace process. After years of negotiations within the Contadora and Esquipulas phases, the five

Central American leaders finally agreed to neutral verification and peace keeping mechanisms focusing on the demobilization and repatriation of the contras.

Specifically, two mechanisms under the auspices of the UN and the OAS were created at Tela. The offices of the secretaries general of the UN and OAS directed the International Verification and Support Commission (CIAV) and charged it with administering all the details relating to the implementation and oversight of the contra demobilization and repatriation. The top diplomats of the CIAV were Spaniards Francese Vendrell and Hugo de Cela. The CIAV was aided by a UN peace keeping force named ONUCA (United Nations Organization in Central America), which was installed in Honduras and Nicaragua in December 1989. ONUCA included the participation of technical advisors and troops from Canada, West Germany, Spain, Brazil, Ireland, Venezuela, and Colombia (Solis, 1991; Bendaña, 1990; Opazo Bernales and Fernández V., 1990: 337-341).[30] The Tela summit had set into motion a significant process of international verification and peace keeping that facilitated the end of the contra war.

More presidential summits followed. A sixth regional summit in Coronado, Costa Rica, was hastily called in December 1989 to discuss the deteriorating situation in El Salvador. In November, the FMLN had launched a new offensive in the capital city and government forces responded with aerial bombardments of civilian neighborhoods. News of the shocking murders of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter added to the urgency for

action. The presidents urged the Salvadoran government and the FMLN to arrange a cease fire and reopen discussions; they also suggested that the functions of the CIAV be broadened to oversee the demobilization of the FMLN. Nothing concrete came of this summit, and the peace process inside El Salvador would be slow to emerge. However, it is significant that the region's presidents turned to what was becoming a common occurance --face-to-face meetings-- to address another difficult aspect of the regional peace process.

In early April, 1990, the seventh formal summit was held in Montelimar, Nicaragua. It was the last summit for Presidents Ortega and Arias and the first for Honduras' new President, Rafaél Callejas. In their final communique, the presidents recognized and applauded the clean February elections in Nicaragua and positive arrangements for the peaceful transition of power from the Sandinista government to the winning opposition. They also asked the United Nations to take the necessary steps to complete the final demobilization of the contras in the coming weeks. While several inportant issues remained unresolved, especially the continued war in El Salvador and renewed political violence in Guatemala, the Montelimar summit represents a culmination of the Esquipulas phase of the Central American peace process. Future regional summits, such as the eighth meeting in mid June 1990 in Antigua, Guatemala, would focus on regional economic issues and begin yet a new phase of diplomacy for the Central Americans (Medina, 1990: 2A).

These five summits after January 1988, along with their preparatory meetings by the region's foreign ministers, kept alive

the commitment to peace undertaken by Central American presidents at the Esquipulas II summit. They provided important opportunities for the region's presidents and top diplomats to get to know each other on a more personal basis, to speak frankly, and to come to understand each other's positions and constraints (Solis, 1991; Arias, 1991; Bendaña, 1990). Never before had all five Central American presidents met in face-to-face meetings, particularly not in the midst of regional wars. By working out their regional dialogue during the Esquipulas phase, the presidents created a dynamic of public diplomacy and mutual support (albeit not all of it positive) that vastly improved the region's inter-state relations and laid the groundwork for future regional cooperation in the political and economic spheres. The regional summits also played an important role in keeping Nicarauga's and El Salvador's internal peace processes on track, even if those processes followed their own dynamics.

Of course, beyond these summits, there were other important factors at both the domestic and international levels that facilitated the region's internal peace processes, but many of these factors had also been present at the Esquipulas II summit. The weakened Central American policies of the Reagan administration in the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal, the waning of the cold war and improved U.S.-Soviet relations after 1987, and the persistent efforts of the Contadora countries in promoting the continuation of the regional peace process all allowed the war-weary Central Americans to find their own formulas for peace. Moreover, the more

active role of the UN and OAS after 1989 in facilitating the end of the contra war and the new role of UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar in mediating El Salvador's internal peace process after 1990 were significant in building the confidence needed for peace to emerge in Nicaragua and El Salvador. In a symbolic ceremony in Nicaragua on June 9, 1990, representatives of the contras formally laid down their arms in the presence of Nicarauga's new President, Violetta de Chamorro, and ONUCA forces[31] ("Entrega simbólica...," 1990: 1). After that, the mediation of El Salvador's peace process eventually shifted to the UN secretary general's office, culminating finally in a cease fire agreement between the government and the FMLN guerrillas in January 1992. While the emergence of peace in Central America would not have been possible without these and other factors, it was the political determination and commitment of the Central American presidents themselves that reclaimed the time for peace.

Conclusion

The diplomatic stalemate that developed with the Tegucigalpa Group's counterproposal to the 1984 Contadora Act continued through 1985 and into 1986. The Contadora Group, joined later by the Support Group, persisted in its attempts to mediate discussions between the Central American states and resolve differences arising from the region's violent conflicts. Two new versions of the

Contadora Act were prepared and discussed, however the complex security and verification provisions never found agreement. The $100 million contra aid package approved in the summer of 1986 was probably the most serious setback in the entire Contadora process. Nevertheless, the Contadora countries vowed to continue their diplomacy.

Changing political realities at the regional and international levels created new opportunities for the states involved in the peace process. New presidents in Guatemala, Honduras, and especially Costa Rica during 1986 contributed to a new regional dynamic. President Arias' moves not only led to the break up of the Tegucigalpa Group but by the end of 1986 he also forced the closing of the remaining contra camps on Costa Rican soil. Then at the beginning of 1987, President Arias presented a simpler ten-point alternative to the stalemated Contadora Act. With the help of President Cerezo and the support of the Group of Eight, the Arias Plan became a viable step toward reaching a regional peace agreement. The added troubles of the Reagan administration's Central American policies by the summer of 1987 created the additional political space needed to allow the Central Americans to find agreement at the Esquipulas II presidential summit. The Central American presidents recommitted themselves to the Esquipulas II Procedure over and over after 1988, thus facilitating the continuation of the internal peace processes in Nicaragua and El Salvador and building the foundation for greater regional cooperation in the future.

The Contadora phase of the Central American peace process created and supported a diplomatic shelter that permitted peace talks in Central America for over four years. But in the Esquipulas phase, President Arias found the way to set the Central Americans on their own paths to peace. Like the leaders of the Contadora Group states, President Arias had real national security interests in pursuing an active diplomacy aimed at finding a peaceful way out of the region's violent conflict. These interests are the focus of the following chapter.

ENDNOTES

1. "La Paz reclama su hora." This brief phrase is actually quite difficult to translate, losing a great deal in the translation. An acceptable but still awkward literal translation would be "Peace reclaims its hour" (or "moment"); this rendering retains "peace" as the subject actively demanding (even seizing) its moment. A looser and better sounding English translation (and the one ude here) is "The time for peace has come," but the active voice is lost. The phrase appears over and over in President Oscar Arias´ speech, "A Time for Peace" (Una hora para la paz), with which he presented his peace plan in February 1987. The repetition of the phrase in the speech is quite powerful and moving. See "Procedimiento ..." (1987a: 420-422). All translations of material from Spanish to English in this chapter are my own.

2. The Contadora Group had been keeping the secretaries general of the UN and OAS apprised of the progress of the peace process since its beginnings.

3. At the inauguration of Uruguay´s President Julio María Sanguinetti on March 1, 1985, Daniel Ortega announced to Colombian President Betancur that Nicaragua was willing to turn the case over to the Contadora Group. Four days later, Urbina Lara arrived in Bogotá from Managua. On March 9, Urbina Lara announced his intention to go to Costa Rica and join the contras there, but at that point, the Costa Rican government refused his request for political asylum. Instead, the governments of Spain, Italy, and Guatemala offered him asylum (Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo García-Peña, 1985: 181).

4. Although both the Salvadoran right-wing and the Reagan administration opposed any negotiations that would give the FDR-FMLN legitimacy and/or a significant share of power, Duarte was able to find some political space in early October 1984 to gamble on increasing his own base of support and improving the Christian Democrats´ chances in upcoming legislative elections. This political space was briefly opened through several internal and external political circumstances. These included: A new concern among some of the more pragmatic officers of the Salvadoran army for the war-weariness of their combat officers and the low morale of their draftees as precluding a clear military victory in the five year civil war; pressures from more moderate political groups for a negotiated settlement, especially in light of hopes in early October that the Revised Contadora Act might be finalized; and the opening of the final month of the U.S. presidential campaign. President Duarte seized the opportunity to offer a dialogue with the FDR-FMLN in his UN address. Within a week, on October 15, the La Palma talks were held, four days before the

Tegucigalpa meeting of October 19-20 and on the same day as the Contadora Group's deadline for final revisions to the Contadora Act (Diskin and Sharpe, 1986: 81-85; Karl, 1988: 184-185; Crahan, 1988: 233).

5. The Reagan administration's rhetorical campaign included statements in April claiming that the Contadora states and Pope John Paul II supported U.S. policy in Central America. The Contadora states and the Vatican's embassy in Washington denied these claims and accused the administration of misrepresenting their positions (Meislin, 1985: A9; Brinkley, 1985b: A3; "Vatican Questions...," 1985: A8).

6. Bagley (1986: 12) and Bagley and Tokatlian (1987: 36) insist on underestimating the significance of the Support Group by stating that "[t]he basic role of the Support Group countries was symbolic, designed to demonstrate Latin American solidarity with the Contadora process..." But the Support Group symbolized more than this, and its contribution to the peace process was more than symbolic.

7. Langhorn Motley had resigned from the post at the end of April, 1985. Elliott Abrams had come to the post after serving as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Shenon, 1985: A19).

8. The September 1984 Act had only called for a schedule for their gradual withdrawal.

9. Each Central American state would contribute equal shares to the peace fund, which would be administered by them and the Contadora Group. Contributions to the fund from other states, international organizations, and other sources would also be accepted (Contadora Act, 1985: 76).

10. The Tegucigalpa Group continued to insist on an absolute parity of the five states' armed forces whereas Nicaragua and the Contadora Act envisioned arms reductions that would take into account the specific security threats faced by each state. Trying to arrive at such a formula would prove to be one of the most impossible efforts of the Contadora process.

11. The 1985 Act stipulated that it would enter into force eight days after the date of the deposit of the fifth Instrument of Ratification (Contadora Act, 1985: 77).

12. The Protocol attached to the end of the Contadora Act (all versions) was to be open to all outside states to sign pledging their support of the agreement, but it was not considered strong enough to oblige U.S. compliance with the treaty's provisions.

13. The vote was 83 in favor, 4 against, and 37 abstentions (Cardenal Chamorro, 1985b: 927-928).

14. Their frustration with the diplomatic stalemate affected the bilateral relations of some of the members of the Contadora Group in other ways as well. For example, tensions between Colombia and Panama increased in December after the forced repatriation of undocumented Colombians by the Panamanian government. Colombia's President Betancur was also frustrated by this time with his own domestic peace process after the M-19 guerrillas stormed the Colombian Palace of Justice in November 1985. Colombian troops responded, resulting in over 100 dead. There were allegations that some of the weapons used by the M-19 had come from Nicaragua, leading to deteriorating relations between the two governments. Increased tensions between the two governments were exacerbated further as their territorial dispute over the San Andrés islands flared up once again (Cepeda and Pardo, 1987: 50-54). See also the chapter section on Colombia in Chapter VIII.

15. Almost two weeks later, on January 27, 1986, José Azcona Hoyos was inaugurated as the new president of Honduras. This was the first peaceful and constitutional transfer of power from one civilian president to another in Honduras since 1933 (Ansejo, 1987: 353).

16. It was this event and President Reagan's diplomatic rebuff that inspired me to choose the Contadora process as the topic of this dissertation.

17. The agreement was "questionable" because of the lack of unanimity given Nicaragua's opposition to setting this deadline and because by setting a "final" deadline the Contadora process may have been setting itself up for failure (infra). Nevertheless, there seemed to be a concern for trying to beat the expected House of Representatives' second vote on the $100 million contra aid package later in June.

18. Ambassador Habib, a career diplomat with a distinguished record as a mediator, became the administration's third special envoy to Central America, replacing Harry Schlaudeman, in March 1986 (Weinraub, 1986: A4). By appointing this able and respected diplomat, the administration was temporarily able to diffuse charges that it was not serious about finding a diplomatic solution to the conflicts in Central America, especially in light of the administration's daring $100 million contra aid request. The Habib appointment and the postponement of a second House vote on the aid package from late April to late June are evidence of the uphill battle the administration faced in winning the contra aid package in the spring ("Vote on Military Aid...," 1986).

19. As Bagley and Tokatlian (1987: 45) explain it, the State Department study, entitled "Essential Elements of Effective Verification," "estimated that it would cost $40 million annually and require 1,300 permanent observers to ensure compliance. Start-up costs would be $9.2 million, including $8 million for vehicles." The study drew on the verification experience of the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt.

20. This new foreign policy direction also won the disapproval of the Reagan administration. In an interview with President Arias on January 14, 1991, he recounted a story about the Reagan administration's initial reaction to his new direction. Arias had stated in a public interview (with John McLaughlin) that "If I were President Reagan, I'd use money for Central American economic development and not for" his existing policies in the region. Arias stated that it soon became clear that the U.S. was bothered by this ("...se molestaron mucho por ésto"). "It bothered the U.S. so much that a few days before [my inauguration] I saw that no one was coming from Washington. Only some members from the U.S. embassy would attend." Arias added that soon after his inauguration, a personal visit by Vice President George Bush to Arias' home led to a better understanding and somewhat improved relations between the two governments...for a time (Arias, 1991).

21. The cause for the discussion was related to a refusal by the other four presidents to use the word "democratic" with regard to Nicaragua in their final communique (Cepeda and Pardo, 1987: 53).

22. As Bagley and Tokatlian (1987: 44) explain it, Nicaragua "offered a list of possible offensive arms reductions, including aircraft, tanks, large mortars, artillery, and rocket launchers....[I]n many quarters, this new Nicaraguan proposal was interpreted as an important conciliatory gesture that modified Managua's past refusal to discuss disarmament as long as the United States continued to support the contras."

23. The Act would enter into force eight days after the deposit of the fifth ratification. The complex stages and timetable of the new arms control negotiations process outlined in Chapter 3, Section II of the third Contadora Act are as follows: (1) Immediate suspension of new arms acquisitions. (2) Within fifteen days, each state must submit its inventories of weapons, bases, and troops to the Verification and Control Commission (VCC). (3) Within sixty days, the VCC must complete its technical studies and recommend maximum force limits for each country. (4) Within the next thirty days, the parties must establish the maximum limits of arms, bases, and troops along with timetables for their reductions. If the parties fail to reach such an agreement, the recommendation of the VCC

would provisionally take effect and a new time limit for these negotiations would be set. (5) Unless otherwise agreed, the parties would have a total of 180 days to complete an agreement on maximum arms limits. (6) If no such agreement is reached, the parties may suspend implementation of commitments on international military maneuvers, foreign military bases, and foreign military advisors. (7) Guidelines for setting maximum force limits are sensitive to each states' security needs and are not based on absolute parity. (8) Finally, the 1986 Act includes a new provision at the end of this section prohibiting "the transit, stationing, mobilization [etc.] of foreign armed forces" that could threaten "the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of any Central American state" (Contadora Act, 1986: 229-233, 253).

24. Both Bagley and Tokatlian (1987: 45) and Goodfellow (1987: 154) state that the June 6 draft postponed resolving the problem of joint military exercises. However, the draft is quite clear in requiring the suspension of international military maneuvers for the first ninety days after the Act's entry into force while the arms control negotiations proceed. The suspension of maneuvers may continue beyond that until an arms control agreement is reached. Moreover, international military maneuvers with non-Central American states would be prohibited once the arms control agreement was reached (Contadora Act, 1986: 226-229).

25. See endnote 19 concerning the State Department's study on the estimated costs and modalities of verifying the Contadora Act's provisions.

26. The vote was a slim 221 to 209 in favor of the administration's contra aid proposal. The Senate had already approved a slightly different version of the aid package and formally approved the final version on August 13, 1986 by a vote of 53 to 47. For a detailed analysis of this and other contra aid legislation in Congress, see LeoGrande (1987: 218-219) and Arnson (1987).

27. The Mexico meeting of the Group of Eight took place as the U.S. announced plans to offer Honduras new advanced jet fighters (Kinzer, 1986 : A6). Gwertzman (1986) notes that the offer was a reversal of U.S. policy of not being the first to introduce advanced fighter planes into Central America.

28. Writing in September 1987 from San José (where they live), Martha Honey and Tony Avirgan (1987: 220), state "No U.S.-appropriated funds have been disbursed to Costa Rica during the past six months. An embassy official puts the amount withheld at $85 million, while Costa Rican and U.S. Congressional officials say the total is $140 million." The slowdown in U.S.

aid continued after the signing of the Esquipulas agreement. President Arias stated that the Reagan administration's pressure through the aid slowdown "was never very direct; it was always a bit subtle....Washington kept attaching more conditions for new aid. But the national press was talking about a cut off of aid" (Arias, 1991). Other sources in the U.S., including a segment on 60 Minutes in November 1988 also reported financial and other pressures against Costa Rica in the wake of President Arias' peace initiative "Costa Rica is Different," 1988; Kinzer and Pear, 1988).

29. The degree of U.S. influence on the outcome of the Tela summit (and others) is unkown and requires further research. It is likely that the more pragmatic Bush administration used quiet diplomacy to encourage the peace process along at this point, even if the administration's public commitment to the continuation of contra aid remained significant. None of the Central Americans I interviewed in June 1990 and January 1991 indicated a U.S. role in facilitating the post-Esquipulas summits or the end of the contra war in Nicaragua. Instead, it appears from the available evidence that the political space had widened and the Central Americans took advantage of it.

30. By early June 1990, the presence of the CIAV and ONUCA in Nicaragua was ubiquitous and impressive. Anyone travelling in Nicaragua at the time could not help but be impressed by the reassuring presence of the white ONUCA and CIAV vehicles as the country prepared for the formal disbanding of the contras. It should be noted that this was the first time the United States did not object to an explicit UN insertion into the region's political affairs and carried out a peacekeeping action in the hemisphere. Perhaps this cooperation is where the behind-the-scenes role of the United States in support of the regional peace process can be found.

31. Despite the formal ceremony, there were reports that the contras did not in fact turn in all their arms (Entrega simbólica..., 1990: 1). Since June 1990, some former contras and others frustrated at the country's difficult economic situation have tried to reorganize. The so-called "re-contras" have carried out some attacks in the country, where peace remains precarious.

CHAPTER VIII

LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICIES: COMPARING INTERESTS, CAPABILITIES, AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PEACE PROCESS

> "...So I return to my theme: America is an electrical machine, every part of which is set in motion when any one of its parts receives a shock.... We must be ready to come to [our neighbors´] aid especially, as any disorders in those nations will doubtless spread to ours."
> Simón Bolívar to Francisco de Paula Santander, January 6-7, 1825.[1]

From the Contadora Group´s initial call for peace to the signing of the Esquipulas II Procedure For Establishing a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America, the Central American peace process offers important lessons for the study of Latin American diplomacy and foreign policy. In this chapter, we seek to understand better why some of the states involved in the peace process came to participate in it in the way that they did. Space limitations and reliable information preclude us from examining all of the states involved in the peace process. Thus we will analyze and compare the particular foreign policy perspectives, interests, capabilities, and contributions (both positive and negative) of the most significant actors in the peace process: Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia from the Contadora Group states and Costa Rica from Central America. Through this comparative analysis, we also hope to acquire a general

and comparative sense of the diplomatic and foreign policy making establishment (viz., actors, institutions and processes) within these states. Although some of our conclusions will be more impressionistic than others, this study is intended to serve as a point of departure for identifying gaps in information and indicating the direction of future research and analysis of comparative Latin American diplomacy and foreign policy making.

A few general remarks about the study of Latin American foreign policy making is in order before looking at these states. The nature of the literature remains limited and, as it were, underdeveloped. In fact, it was not until the 1970s that studies focusing on foreign policies of Latin American states began to appear. Prior to that appearance --and even afterwards--, the literature on Latin America's international relations usually came in the form of diplomatic histories. Some diplomatic histories were (and are) so sweeping that little could be learned about the foreign policy making process in any one particular state (e.g., Moreno, 1928; Rippy, 1938; Zea, 1960; Davis, Finan and Peck, 1977; Boersner, 1986; Karnes, 1976). Other diplomatic histories took the case study approach, focusing on one particular country. This rendered some insights into the foreign policy making behavior of some states, such as Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil (which have tended to be overstudied), but it ignored other states, focused on outcomes rather than processes, and precluded much comparative analysis or theoretical development. Diplomatic histories of the inter-American system have been more numerous, but they have tended to focus on

U.S. interests and predominance in the system and/or on U.S.-Latin American relations, with little attention to Latin American interests or Latin-Latin relations (e.g., Burr, 1967; Mecham, 1965; Connell-Smith, 1966; Connell-Smith, 1974; Gil, 1971; Inman, 1965; Moreno Pino, 1977; Kryzanek, 1985; Martz and Schoultz, 1980).

In the late 1960s and 1970s, Latin America became the focus of new studies with more theoretical interests. In the field of international relations, Latin America became one of several regions of interest with regard to studying the integration experience (Nye, 1967; Haas, 1975; Schmitter, 1972). However, the studies on integrationism in Latin America were often more interested in the implications for international relations theory-building and less in the implications for building theories about Latin American foreign policy orientations and decision-making.

More importantly, the appearance of both the field of comparative foreign policy and dependency theory in the United States has had an important yet somewhat contradictory impact on the study of Latin American foreign policy per se. Following their increased participation in the international system, some Latin American states were finally studied as international actors with their own interests, capabilities, and behaviors (e.g., Bailey, 1967; Atkins, 1977; Davis and Wilson, et al, 1975; Astiz, 1969; Fontaine and Theberge , eds., 1976; Cochrane, 1978; Hellman and Rosenbaum, 1975; Ferris and Lincoln, 1984). Yet the dependent status of Latin American states in the international system meant that, in the end, their foreign policy choices were circumscribed.

Indeed, some proponents of the dependency school would go so far as to argue that most, if not all, of the Latin American states are so severly limited in their foreign policy choices due to their dependency on the United States that there is no point to studying the foreign policy making process in those states because that process is located in Washington.[2] Such an understanding of dependency theory is useless in explaining how and why the dependent Contadora states actively and persistently challenged U.S. policy in Central America for such a prolongued period, nor can it explain how and why the highly dependent ministates of Central America found -- and carried through--their own diplomatic formula for peace.

The most dynamic and insightful students of Latin American foreign policy have been the Latin Americans themselves. In the 1970s and 1980s, significant theoretical and comparative studies of the foreign policies of Latin American states have come out of Latin America and have contributed a great deal to understanding the "new role" that Latin America has been playing in international politics in the past few decades (Drekonja-Kornat and Tokatlian, 1983; Maira, ed., 1985; Muñoz, 1980; Muñoz, ed., 1988; Puig, ed., 1984; Perina, 1985; Tomassini, 1975; and many others). Indeed, as we have seen in Chapter IV, there has been a significant growth in the number of Latin American research institutes and "think tanks" devoted to the study of Latin America's international relations parallelling the increased foreign policy activism of a number of Latin American states. The studies produced by Latin American researchers have focused on the nature of dependency[3] and its implications for both

domestic and foreign policy. However, they have also developed the study of such concepts as "heterodoxical autonomy" (Puig, 1975/76), "peripheral autonomy" (Jaguaribe, 1979), and "bargaining power" (poder negociador) (Aftalión, 1975) within a context of dependency. Such studies suggest that there are degrees of dependency and hence reciprocal degrees of autonomy that a state might exercise. The relative autonomy[4] of a state in its domestic and foreign policy decisions will depend on the nature and degree of its dependency in the international system. The more active states in the international system give evidence of enjoying relatively more autonomy than passive or merely reactive states. Indeed, Guadalupe González G. (1984: 444) notes that to assess the room for maneuver and bargaining power --or relative autonomy-- of a medium power, it is best to study the patterns of action in its foreign policy rather than to try to evaluate the bases of power that sustain it.

Latin American students of international relations have also shown a marked interest in the concept of "complex interdependence" developed by Keohane and Nye (1977), Keohane (1984), and many others (see e.g., Tokatlian, 1983). Although it is often more implicit than explicit, this interest seems related to two issues relevant to Latin America's foreign relations. On the one hand, understanding interdependence among first world states means understanding better the nature of the contemporary international system, which is necessary for any state in formulating its foreign policy realistically. On the other hand, if even first world states experience sensitivities and vulnerabilities towards each other and

exercise varying degrees of power in different issue areas at different times, then the line between interdependence and dependence becomes blurred. At the very least, the autonomy of interdependent first world states becomes attenuated and relative, depending on the issue area, the domestic and foreign policy agenda, and the capabilities (among other variables) of those states.

This has important implications for dependent states in Latin America that aspire to lessen their dependency and join the ranks of the interdependent. The distance to travel appears reduced, and there may even be issue areas in which the more advanced dependent states can already exercise relative autonomy approaching that of some first world states. Moreover, if dependent Latin American states cooperate with each other and pool their resources in a particular issue area, they might be able to exercise a still greater degree of power or relative autonomy vis-a-vis first world states. These hypotheses seem to underlie the research of Latin American writers who have maintained both a theoretical and practical interest in Latin American regional cooperation (concertación) and economic integration schemes (e.g., Bitar, 1985; Maldonado, 1987; Puig, 1987). They are also shared by those interested in the diversification of Latin America's ties to Europe and other regions (e.g., Tanner, 1986; Van Klaveren, 1988) as strategies for lessening the effects of dependency on the United States and widening the range of foreign policy choices available to Latin American states.

Gerhard Drekonja-Kornat (1983: 16-17) has identified a group of states that, in the early 1980s, showed a high international profile and hence a marked degree of autonomy in their foreign relations: Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela along with the special case of Cuba and the new cases of Nicaragua and Grenada. For Drekonja-Kornat, these states, and especially the first four, represent the outcome of an important learning process or "apprenticeship" in Latin America's foreign relations over the previous three and a half decades and signify the emergence of a "new Latin American foreign policy." Though still far from an ideal model of Latin foreign policy, this new foreign policy behavior of Latin American states is marked by the following characteristics:

1. A greater degree of autonomy marked by a redefinition of relations with the United States in which the Latin American state accepts the risks of political disagreement with Washington;

2. a high level of cooperation with other Latin American states and active participation in SELA (Sistema Económico Latinoamericano); the elimination of geopolitical border conflicts between these states;

3. a high degree of geographical diversification of foreign diplomatic and/or commercial relations, including ties with western Europe, Africa, and the Middle East;

4. a high level of participation in Third World fora, including the Non-Aligned Movement;

5. a stronger negotiating position based on better training of diplomatic and technical cadres;

6. a higher level of technological advancement and economic development;

7. a high degree of predominance of the Foreign Ministry in the formulation of foreign policy;

8. increased openness to international trade, but with it, a high degree of foreign debt (Drekonja-Kornat, 1983: 17-19).

The high foreign debt of these Latin states is a "vulnerability" of the new Latin American foreign policy and diminishes some of their previously acquired bargaining power (Drekonja-Kornat, 1983: 19-20). Yet Drekonja-Kornat remains convinced that the "new Latin American foreign policy" is a fact of international life and represents the slow but clear transformation of the international economic and political order into one in which Latin America will play a more dynamic, creative, and powerful role (Drekonja-Kornat, 1983: 22-23).

Juan G. Tokatlian (1983) is more pessimistic and highly critical of the assertion that there is anything "new" about Latin America's foreign relations. He notes that the designations "middle income country" and "medium power" to which the new foreign policy is supposed to apply are poorly conceptualized notions that gloss over a country's dependent status and fail to account for the peculiarities of its dependent role in the international political economy (e.g., the nature and degree of extroversion of its economy, the extent of control of foreign capital over the dynamic sectors of the economy, the role of the state in capital accumulation, the domestic distribution of wealth and resources, etc.). Moreover, Tokatlian sees no clear pattern emerging in the foreign policies of such states or even within any particular such state. Finally, he questions whether dependent states, no matter how advanced, can ever really exercise true autonomy and independence and he warns of confusing "relative autonomy" with the real thing (Tokatlian, 1983: 175,182-183). By contrast, Juan Carlos Puig (1975/76: 10) reminds

us that "it is practically impossible that there exist in reality absolute situations of dependency or autonomy."

Beyond these theoretical discussions, the rest of the recent literature on Latin American foreign policies has focused on specific case studies and occassionally comparative studies. This part of the literature is primarily descriptive, with some level of dependency taken as a given. These case studies tend to focus on the chronological development of policies carried out by a particular president or presidential administration. Thus most of these case studies tend to be of the diplomatic history genre and usually fail to examine the details of the policy making process. Occassionally, a case study will make reference to domestic power groups that have influenced some aspect of a state's foreign policy, however studies of Latin American foreign policy making at the bureaucratic politics level are sorely lacking. In a very general study, Carlos J. Moneta (1987) found that, in most cases, the foreign policy making subsystem in Latin American states suffers from contradictions and inadequacies that seriously harm those states' interests in the international system. He urges that the foreign policy making process be modernized, professionalized, and opened up; however, he fails to provide concrete examples from specific countries. By contrast, Ester Lozano de Rey and Pilar Maurlanda de Galofre published an exceptional 1982 study of the Colombian foreign policy making process that gives an interesting look into the structure and functioning of the Colombian foreign ministry as well as other institutions and actors that influence the

country's foreign policy. But this case study is a rare gem. Another important gap in the case study literature has to do with the recruitment process of a country's diplomatic corps. Few case studies mention the role of academic institutions in providing analysis and training personnel for the foreign policy making process, so it is virtually impossible to assess the sophistication and professionalism of a country's diplomats beyond mere reputation. More studies of the type and quality of Lozano de Rey and Maurlanda de Galofre's are needed.

With this brief look at the literature, we can now turn to our comparative analysis of the foreign policy perspectives, interests, capabilities, and contributions of the four most active states in the Central American peace process from 1983 to 1988. While recognizing the gaps in the case study literature, we can still try to piece together an understanding of foreign policy ends and means of these states in their diplomatic search for peace.

The Contadora Group States

General Remarks

By undertaking and persisting in their efforts to build a diplomatic framework for peace talks among the Central Americans, the most active states making up the Contadora Group --Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia -- manifested many of the characteristics of Gerhard Drekonja-Kornat's definition of the "new Latin American

foreign policy" (Drekonja-Kornat, 1983). These states also gave evidence of exercising heterodoxical or relative autonomy in international and regional politics, albeit in varying degrees (Puig, 1975/76; Tokatlian, 1983: 177).

These states share a diplomatic history of being weak and dependent states vulnerable to the regional hegemon --in most cases, Britain in the nineteenth and the United States in the twentieth centuries. Moreover, their own preoccupations with internal instability in the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries meant that their foreign relations were usually passive or, at most, reactive. However, in the past thirty years or so, depending on the country, these states have become increasingly active in regional and international politics. This new international activism is the result of both the increased internationalization of their economies as their development processes have progressed and the related need to do a better job of representing their state's interests in the international system. Hence their continued but altered dependency has required a more active and effective foreign policy orientation.

Today these states are classified as Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs). Quite different from the image of poverty-stricken "banana republics," these states are middle income states whose economies are being transformed by the industrialization process. Although the peasantry, the rural economy, and traditional exports are still important, the development strategies pursued by

these states in the past few decades have resulted in the significant growth of urban centers within which some heavy industry along with manufacturing, services, and non-traditional exports have also grown as important sectors of the economy.

Despite this rosey picture and their graduation from the status of "lesser developed country" (LDC) to that of NIC, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia are still structurally dependent and thus quite vulnerable to adverse global economic conditions. Indeed, the 1980s were particularly rough economically and financially for these states. The global recessions of 1979 and 1982 led to severely depressed regional trade, high unemployment, high inflation, and of course the crisis of debt that plagued Latin America after 1982. Sol Linowitz (1988/89) and others have noted that as a result of the debt crisis and its associated austerity policies, Latin America as a whole has lost a full decade of development. More recent observations suggest that living standards in many countries have fallen to those of thirty years ago. It is therefore very significant that these Contadora Group states undertook their diplomatic mediation efforts in Central America <u>after</u> the debt crisis was well under way and maintained their efforts througout the difficult decade of the 1980s.

These Contadora Group states share several similarities and differences with regard to their general foreign policy orientations and their interests in the Central American conflicts. All three countries share a foreign policy tradition that emphasized legalism, the principles of international law, and the Bolivaran ideal as the

means for protecting national sovereignty. Still salient today, this diplomatic tradition has come to focus on national economic development as the key to lessening dependency and promoting national sovereignty. Although these states have varying degrees of "participation" in Drekonja-Kornat's notion of the "new Latin America foreign policy," they all have shown growing propensities and abilities to take an activist role in regional and international politics in recent years. They have shown greater political will, self-confidence, and the ability to experiment with new initiatives in dealing with each other, the United States, and other international actors. Moreover, each has manifested aspirations for a leadership role in the region as well as in third world fora. The president remains pre-eminent in foreign policy decision making in each state, but, with the exception of Colombia, there seems to have been a growing professionalization and sophistication of the foreign ministries in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy as a result of this new international activism (or "apprenticeship," to borrow Drekonja-Kornat's term).

With regard to their foreign policy interests in Central America, it is significant to note that each of these Contadora states had initiated recent apertures to Central America (and the Caribbean), creating growing economic as well as political and cultural interests in the region. Hence all had economic and political tools available to coax the Central Americans along in the peace process, at least in the beginning. With regard to the Central American conflicts, these three Contadora states shared the

view that underdevelopment and social injustice were at the root of the region's political instability and violence, and all seemed to agree that the old order must pass in Central America. Yet they held differing ideas about exactly what the new order in the region should look like. Nevertheless, all rejected the imposition of the East-West conflict on the region's troubles and the related growing militarization of the isthmus from whatever quarter. All manifested a strong concern that the region's conflicts could escalate to the point of regionalized war and further endanger their own national security interests --namely, the fear of being drawn into such a conflict and having to choose sides; the stress of receiving even more refugees from the region; the continued stagnation of regional trade hindering economic recovery; and so on.

Thus, at a general level, there were many similar foreign policy reasons for these Contadora states to undertake the building of a framework for peace talks in Central America. We can now study each country's specific foreign policy motivations, interests, and contributions to the Central American peace process.

Mexico

Mexico is one of the states identified by Drekonja-Kornat as participating in the "new Latin American foreign policy" during the early 1980s and can even be said to be a model. However, the country did not become such a model easily, and it is doubtful whether it remains such today. Despite an early bid for a leadership role in the Latin congress movement (see Chapter II),

Mexico settled into a rather defensive and isolationistic attitude towards the world for most of the nineteenth century. Not only was the country preoccupied with chronic internal political strife after its independence; it also suffered the humiliation of a costly war with the United States and an imperial French intervention within a span of twenty years. Indeed, Mexico's struggle to establish and defend its sovereignty during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries defines the character of its foreign relations during that period and beyond.

After the Mexican Revolution, the country's foreign policy continued to take second place to the government's internal political projects, and the geopolitical reality of neighboring an emergent power like the United States meant that this bilateral relationship would dominate Mexico's limited diplomatic agenda. It was not until the 1960s that Mexico began to take a more active interest in regional and world politics and broaden its foreign policy agenda. At the beginning of 1960, President Adolfo López Mateos embarked upon a tour of South America. Soon thereafter, Mexico was invited to join the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) as a founding member and joined in signing the Montevideo Treaty in February (Rico, 1987: 122).

Mexico's new interest in regional economic integration was the first step in the development of a more active and assertive foreign policy. As noted in Chapter IV, during the 1960s Mexico challenged and resisted United States' efforts to isolate Cuba from the OAS system and, in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Mexico took the

lead in negotiating a regional treaty declaring Latin America to be a nuclear free zone, culminating in the 1968 Treaty of Tlatelolco (Atkins, 1989: 337-338; González G., 1984: 447). Mexico also increased its activism in the United Nations and made its first serious efforts toward establishing closer economic ties with Central America at this time. In fact, under the López Mateos and Gustav Díaz Ordaz administrations, several new ventures were undertaken between Mexico and Central America, such as efforts to increase trade relations, promote Mexican investment in the isthmus, and create of a line of credit in the Bank of Mexico for the Central American Bank of Economic Integration (Rico, 1987: 123). Nevertheless, Mexico's international role in the 1960s remained cautious, limited, and generally accepting of the regional and international status quo (González G., 1984: 447).

This role began to change significantly in the 1970s. The stagnation of Mexico's import-substitution development model, the crisis of legitimacy of the political system after 1968, and the apparent lack of interest on the part of the United States to give Mexican exports preferential access to the protected U.S. market all played a role in spurring a change in Mexico's foreign policy orientation. President Luís Echeverría's administration developed a new foreign policy both in style and substance. Punctuated by a strident nationalistic rhetoric, its main features included strengthened political and ideological support for national liberation movements and leftist governments in Latin America, an explicit identification of Mexico's interests with those of the

Third World, a bid to play a leadership role in the call for a New International Economic Order in the UN General Assembly, and an active search for new markets as well as new sources of capital and technology. Despite this new diplomatic assertiveness, however, a growing trade deficit and foreign indebtedness in the early 1970s[5] underscored the fact of Mexico's continued dependency and the limits of its objective bases of power (González G., 1984: 450-452).

After 1976, the López Portillo administration pursued a more pragmatic and measured foreign policy without abandonning the desire to play a leadership role in regional and third world fora. This administration was able to stabilize the economy in the short term by signing an agreement with the IMF, but it also benefitted in the longer term from the new discoveries and production of petroleum at a time when oil prices were high. Thus by 1978-1979, Mexico's economic power had increased, its status as a medium power was strengthened, and its room for autonomous action in regional and international politics was opening up as well. With Mexico's top diplomat, Jorge Castañeda, taking over as Foreign Minister, Mexico sought to develop petroleum as a tool of a new foreign policy "based on traditional principles, but adjusted to present realities" (González G., 1984: 454-456). Mexico joined Venezuela in creating the Program of Energy Cooperation for Central America and the Caribbean through the Pact of San José in August 1980.

Thus, as the decade of the 1980s opened, Mexico had become a significant regional and international actor. Its general foreign policy goals and interests were clear: Promoting national economic

development was the primary national interest --indeed, the primary national security interest (Aguayo Quezada, 1991: 62). An active foreign policy and a capable diplomatic corps were essential to this goal. By enhancing the country's bargaining power and its status as a medium power, Mexico could lessen its dependency and ensure its ability to act with relative autonomy in the international system. Related goals included maintaining a leadership role in Latin America and the third world without jeopardizing cordial relations with the United States, diversifying the country's economic relations with other regions of the world, promoting new avenues for Latin American cooperation, and continuing to defend the principles of international law --especially those concerned with national sovereignty, such as non-intervention and self-determination.

The new centrality of foreign policy and Mexico's new international activism has meant that the nature of the foreign policy making process has become more important. Presidential leadership and initiative have remained significant in Mexico's foreign policy process; however, since Castañeda, the Mexican foreign minister has come to exercise a significant degree of leadership on his own account. Indeed, many observers have credited Bernardo Sepúlveda Amor, Foreign Minister under President de la Madrid, with a significant role in keeping the Contadora peace process going. As an institution, the Mexican foreign ministry has also been generally credited with developing a high level of diplomatic sophistication and experience over the years which was crucial to the institutionalization and functioning of the Contadora

process (González G., 1984: 466; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 24; Valero, 1985: 131; Van Klaveren, 1985b: 42).

As of 1983, Mexico had at least eight research institutes devoted to the study of some aspect of international relations[6] (Drekonja-Kornat and Tokatlian, 1983: 557). Although there has been no known study of this question, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the creation of these institutes has had a positive influence on Mexico's recent foreign policy activism and the recruitment of capable diplomats to the foreign ministry. However, Guadalupe González G. (1987: 255-258) has noted that the increased sophistication and expertise of the Mexican foreign ministry have come about primarily with regard to politico-diplomatic matters, while acquiring the technical skills necessary for an active and aggressive foreign economic policy continues to be a problem. Moreover, during the 1980s, there has been a tendency toward the "feudalization" of foreign policy decision making, with politico-diplomatic matters remaining within the foreign ministry but foreign economic policy matters being increasingly controlled by governmental agencies charged with internal economic and development policies.[7] Bureaucratic rivalries and turf battles have emerged. Nevertheless, in the context of the Central American peace process, it is clear that by the early 1980s and after, the Mexican foreign ministry had developed significant diplomatic skills to both undertake and maintain its diplomatic effort.

As for its role in the Central American peace process, participants and observers alike have agreed that Mexico's

leadership and dedication were central to the creation and persistance of Contadora (Talavera, 1990; Bendaña, 1990; Solis, 1991; Arias Sánchez, 1991; Valero, 1985; Volio, 1985; Karl, 1986). Like the other Contadora Group states, Mexico had specific national security interests at stake in Central America. Since the López Portillo administration if not before, Mexico had deliberately sought to increase its economic and political role in Central America and had consequently developed subhegemonic interests in the region. With its emerging "sphere of influence" in turmoil, Mexico could not ignore the regional crises. Moreover, as of late 1982, between 25,000 and 35,000 refugees from Guatemala and another 6,000 to 12,000 from El Salvador had fled to Mexico (Meislin, 1983a: A10). Heightened border tensions with Guatemala[8] were an unwelcome effect of the regional violence and threatened the stability of Mexico's troubled southern states. The economic burden of caring for these and more refugees at a time when Mexico was feeling the first effects of the debt crisis was also a problem. Disrupted trade with Central America further contributed to a difficult economic situation and jeopardized the prospects for economic recovery (Van Klaveren, 1985b: 40-43, 48; Karl, 1986: 274, 277).

But a peaceful border and economic ties with Central America were not the only interests at stake for Mexico. The government also found itself confronted by a resurgent United States seeking to reassert its hegemony over its traditional sphere of influence. Wishing to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States which it knew it could not win, the Mexican government was nevertheless

alarmed by the possibility that U.S. policies toward the region would lead to a regionalized war forcing Mexico, at the very least, to choose sides. Moreover, and unlike the United States, the Mexican government did not perceive revolution per se in the region as a threat. On the contrary, Mexico turned to its own revolutionary history and its traditional defense of the principle of self-determination as guides to its Central American policy.

By late 1982, the Mexican government's objectives in Central America became clear: To work to impede the regionalization of war that could lead to the "Lebanonization" of Central America; to defend the principles of self-determination and non-interventionism; to support the emergence of nationalist governments committed to reforms aimed at eliminating the causes of the region's political and economic crises; and to develop an alternative to U. S. policies in Central America through a collective effort involving other Latin American states (Van Klaveren, 1985b: 41-42). The formation of the Contadora Group and the development of the Contadora peace process served these ends well.

Along with the energy of Foreign Minister Sepúlveda and other Mexican diplomats to keeping Contadora going, Mexico played an important role in the peace process with regard to Nicaragua. Its largely sympathetic attitude towards the Sandinista government encouraged Managua that its interests would not be ignored, thus keeping Managua involved in the peace process. Indeed, the Sandinista government considered Mexico to be its most helpful and trusted advocate in the peace process (Bendaña, 1990; Talavera,

1990). Mexico's cautious and proper relations with Guatemala played a role in encouraging the latter's continued participation and neutrality in the peace process. Mexico's political influence with the other Central American states was less clear. The members of the Tegucigalpa Group at different times expressed some concern and/or resentment towards what they perceived to be Mexico's subhegemonic interference in their affairs (Purcell, 1985: 88; Volio, 1985: 46). Yet maintaining good relations with Mexico had its benefits.

Mexico had some potential economic influence with the Central Americans, given its regional financial presence, joint economic ventures, and petroleum subsidies with Venezuela through the Pact of San José (Maira, 1985: 381). However, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser (1988: 109) argues that neither Mexico nor Venezuela used their economic tools to force a successful conclusion to the Contadora process. Mexico apparently had guaranteed Nicaragua's foreign debt and became a major aid donor in an effort to prevent Managua's slide toward greater radicalization (Karl, 1986: 275). But by late 1984 and 1985, it became clear that Mexico's own economic and debt crises precluded greater use of its economic tools to influence the Central Americans. In fact, Mexico temporarily suspended petroleum supplies to Nicaragua and Costa Rica in 1984 and 1985 because they were behind in their payments. But rather than being a "punitive" measure against them, the suspension was the result of Mexico's own economic difficulties and the short term considerations of officials in PEMEX and the Ministry of Finance, not the Foreign Ministry.

Nevertheless, the suspensions did cost Mexico some influence with these countries and contributed to an erosion of Mexico's prestige in the region (González G., 1987: 258-259; Karl, 1986: 275).

By 1986 the economic and debt crises had clearly taken their toll on Mexico. Declining oil prices and shrinking markets along with growing debt[9] weakened Mexico's international position and forced a more cautious foreign policy. Moreover, relations with the United States deteriorated markedly during 1986[10] and contributed further to a lower international profile (Meyer, 1987: 70-71, 74; Meyer, 1988; Millor Mauri, 1986; González G. 1987). Nevertheless, the De La Madrid administration remained steadfast in its support for the Contadora process. Indeed, given Mexico's weakened position, concertación, or multilateral policy coordination with other Latin American states, became more important than ever, both with regard to Central America and the debt crisis. The Mexican government's interests and objectives in Central America had not changed; peace in Central America remained crucial to Mexico's long term economic recovery and its short term national security interests. Mexico remained committed to supporting a peaceful resolution to the regional conflicts even if it could not find a way to reinvigorate Contadora during the second half of 1986. Though cautious at first, Mexico came to embrace the Arias Plan as the best way out of Contadora's stalemate and it participated in the International Verification and Follow-up Commission set up by the Esquipulas Procedure. Mexico's role in the Central American peace process was thus vindicated and its diplomatic prestige salvaged.

Venezuela

Venezuela is also one of the states Drekonja-Kornat identified as participating in the "new Latin American foreign policy" in the early 1980s. But like Mexico, Venezuela had a long history of passivity in its foreign relations. Domestic instability preoccupied its early governments while the country's limited economic opportunities brought little interest from outside powers. The country was able to avoid the concentration of its trade with any one outside power and also escaped incurring much foreign debt until late in the nineteenth century. Occassional border conflicts with its neighbors and the promotion of immigration represent the extent of Venezuela's foreign relations in the nineteenth century. In the early twentieth century, the centralizing dictator General Juan Vincente Gomez finally brought a measure of political stability to the country and promoted the develpment of the petroleum industry through concessions to foreign investors. By 1926, petroleum accounted for half of the country's export earnings while North American capital had acquired a preponderant position in the oil industry. Nevertheless, Venezuela's foreign relations remained limited, and it is really not until the post World War II period --and especially since the post 1958 democratic period-- that Venezuela can be said to have a clear foreign policy orientation (Báez Cabrera, 1984: 542-545; Boersner, 1983: 400-401).

The foreign policy principles and orientations that developed after 1958 were foreshadowed in the brief revolutionary junta that first brought Rómulo Betancourt to power from 1945 to 1947. In

1958, ten years after the Marcos Pérez Jiménez' military dictatorship had overthrown his elected successor, Rómulo Gallegos (1948), Betancourt and the Acción Democrática (AD) party returned to power and set Venezuela on a foreign policy course that sought to promote democratic government in the hemisphere and spur national economic development. Both themes led Venezuela out of its traditional foreign policy passivity and into a more activist stance regionally and globally. Support for democracy in the hemisphere was both a matter of principle and security for the new democratic and reformist Betancourt administration. The "Betancourt Doctrine" refused recognition of governments coming to power by force after 1959 and sought to create a hemispheric front that would oppose the surviving military dictatorships in the region, such as the Trujillo, Somoza, and Duvalier dictatorships among others. The doctrine was not initially applied to revolutionary Cuba, but as the Castro regime moved further to the left and as it came to support armed struggle in Venezuela, relations between the two governments deteriorated. The Betancourt administration broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1961 and supported the 1962 vote to suspend Cuban participation in the OAS. Despite this coincidence with U. S. policy, the Betancourt Doctrine rejected unilateralism and U.S. interventionism. Betancourt protested the U.S. role in the Bay of Pigs invasion and his successor, Raúl Leoni, led the rest of Latin America in condemning the 1965 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic. Although it was the centerpiece of Venezuela's foreign policy throughout the 1960s, the Betancourt Doctrine lost some of

its rigor in the 1970s and gave way to the principle of support for ideological pluralism in the hemisphere (Wilgus and D'Eça, 1963: 233; Boersner, 1983: 404-408; Báez Cabrera, 1984: 549-552).

The joint goal of promoting the nation's economic independence and industrial development was the other important theme of Venezuela's new democratic governments, and petroleum was seen as the means to achieve it. A measure of economic nationalism and a concerted effort by Venezuela's progressive leadership to "sow the petroleum" in order to finance the country's industrialization process led the state to seek to regain authority over the foreign controlled petroleum industry. The international dimension of this new effort included Venezuela's initiative to create the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960, which drew the country far outside the western hemisphere and into contact with the oil rich states of the Middle East. This new multilateralism expanded into other arenas as well. During the 1960s, Venezuela played an active role in the formation and strengthening of the Group of Seventy-Seven and, in 1964, became one of the first Latin American states to become an observer-member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Venezuela also took an active interest in the creation of the Andean Pact, however it delayed joining the organization until February 1973[11] (Báez Cabrera, 1984: 550; Boersner, 1983: 406-407; Atkins, 1989: 194).

Under both the Christian Democratic (COPEI) administration of Rafaél Caldera and the Adeco administration of Carlos Andrés Pérez in the 1970s, Venezuela's foreign policy continued along the path of

greater international activism. The Caldera administration based its foreign policy on the notion of "international social justice" and played an active role in the G-77's demand for a New International Economic Order. North-South politics became much more important than East-West politics, given the period of detente between the superpowers and a certain disillusionment with Washington's apparent indifference towards Venezuela's development goals. Although it did not participate in the OPEC embargo against states supporting Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Venezuela did welcome the 400% increase in petroleum prices at a time when Venezuela's import-substitution industrialization policies had reached their limits and new capital was needed to consolidate and accelerate its economic development (Boersner, 1983: 407-409; Baez Cabrera, 1984:551-553; Karl, 1986: 278-279).

Venezuela's new oil wealth in the mid 1970s gave the country's leadership both the means and the self-confidence to exercise greater bargaining power vis-a-vis industrialized countries and more autonomy in its foreign policy. The Pérez administration continued to play an active role in the third world demand for a New International Economic Order and moved to increase Venezuela's presence in the circum-Caribbean region. Indeed, by the mid 1970s, Venezuela was beginning to play a subhegemonic role in the region. Not only were public and private Venezuelan investments in the Caribbean and Central America increasing (Maira, 1985: 381), but Caracas moved to extend its economic aid to the region. As early as 1974, Venezuela began a program of supplying subsidized petroleum to

the poorer states of the circum-Caribbean, foreshadowing the 1980 Pact of San José with Mexico (Karl, 1986: 279). Also in 1974, Venezuela implemented an aid program to Central America and Panama designed to withhold coffee exports in order to stabilize coffee prices (Aftalión, 1975: 549).

Venezuela's new presence in the circum-Caribbean region was felt in other ways as well. The Pérez administration reestablished relations with Cuba and developed a positive relationship with Havana. It maintained a cordial relationship with Panama's Omar Torrijos and led hemispheric support for Panama's position in the canal negotiations with the United States. It played a role in preventing a 1978 military coup in the Dominican Republic and it supported Belize in its claims against Guatemala. It collaborated closely with Mexico --the other aspiring regional subhegemon-- in encouraging multilateral cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean aimed at increasing the region's economic and political autonomy (Boersner, 1983: 409; Karl, 1986: 279). In short, Caracas developed an active economic and political presence in the circum-Caribbean region in the mid to late 1970s that tied the region's fortunes (and misfortunes) to those of Venezuela.

Caracas also played a significant role in aiding the Nicaraguan opposition to overthrow Anastacio Somoza. Ties between the AD and Nicaraguan opposition leaders (such as Arturo Cruz, Edén Pastora and others) as well as the old animosity for Somoza since the days of Betancourt were important reasons for Venezuela's involvement, but the extent of its support for the Nicaraguan opposition was

unprecedented. The Pérez administration coordinated a massive arms supply operation with Panama and Costa Rica to Somoza's opposition. By late 1978 and early 1979, this arms program became the primary source of weapons for the Sandinistas (Karl, 1986: 280). However, presidential elections in Venezuela brought the opposing Christian Democratic (COPEI) party's candidate, Luís Herrera Campíns, to power in March 1979, and with him a significant (and rare for Venezuela) partisan change of foreign policy took shape. Concerned about his Christian Democratic counterparts in a post-Somoza Nicaragua, Herrera Campíns cooled Venezuela's support for the Sandinistas and conditioned Venezuelan economic aid to the Sandinista government's commitment to democracy. Between 1979 and 1981, Caracas continued to provide some $150 million in credits and donations to encourage the moderation of the Sandinista government, but in 1981, Caracas ended its economic aid and cut Nicaragua off from its subsidized petroleum, ostensibly until Managua paid its bills (Karl, 1986: 281). Caracas also increased its involvement with Christian Democratic and other opposition forces inside Nicaragua. Likewise, Herrera Campíns came to the aid of fellow Christian Democrat (and personal friend) José Napoleón Duarte in El Salvador, who was the sole remaining civilian in the governing junta after January 1980.

The coincidence of Herrera Campíns' position towards Nicaragua and El Salvador with that of the United States should not be taken as evidence of a lack of autonomy on Venezuela's part, as Tokatlian (1983: 180) suggests. Indeed, Herrera Campíns reversed his position toward El Salvador after Duarte lost the March 1982 elections to the

right wing ARENA's gains. Moreover, Herrera Campíns was one of the most outspoken critics of the U.S. position in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands war. The course of events in 1982 and the growing militarization of Central America led the Herrera Campíns government to resume a closer coordination of its regional policy with Mexico, leading to the Mexican-Venezuelan Declaration of September 1982 urging President Reagan to undertake negotiations with Nicaragua and end U.S. support to "former Somocista guards" in Honduras[12] (Karl, 1986: 283-284).

Herrera Campíns' policy reversals do suggest, however, a lack of institutional strength on the part of the foreign ministry in the formulation of Venezuela's foreign policy. Stated differently, it appears that presidential leadership and the idiosyncracies of the person in office continue to be more important in formulating Venezuela's foreign policy than is the foreign ministry. Báez Cabrera (1984: 553) has noted, without elaboration, that despite having developed skilled negotiators and diplomats, especially in the field of oil politics, Venezuela has not been able to "multiply its administrative capacities in a form corresponding to the accelerated multiplication of its financial resources," especially in the case of foreign policy. Moreover, Karl (1986: 280) notes that the Venezuelan foreign ministry, "a traditionally weak bureaucracy," had "suffered from the concentration of power in the presidency that had occurred during the Pérez years" (see also Wilhelmy and Vio, 1986: 111). Herrera Campíns continued to

circumvent the ministry and relied on "informally placed COPEI party irregulars" in carrying out his foreign policies.

Wilhelmy and Vio (1986: 112-113, 116) note that there is a juridical basis for presidential supremacy in foreign policy in the Venezuelan system, but they add that the constitution has also created a significant role for former presidents in continuing to shape the country's foreign policy. After leaving office, former presidents become senators for life, thus prolonging their leadership status. The president "finds himself immersed, whether he wants it or not, in the permanent dispute for national leadership brought on by the ex-Presidents," and this dispute is especially significant in the field of foreign affairs. Thus, unlike Mexico, it appears that Venezuela has not yet developed a more autonomous foreign ministry with a measure of institutional influence over the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. However, like Mexico, the Venezuelan foreign ministry does suffer from the added problem of competition with other ministries (i.e., the Ministry of Energy and Mines, the Ministry of State for Economic Cooperation, the Institute of Foreign Trade, and others) for authority over the various spheres of Venezuela's foreign relations .

It is also important to note that, at the societal level of analysis (Rosenau, 1976), public opinion in the Venezuelan democracy appears to have played a role in the foreign policy orientation of the president. At the very least, beyond party politics, public opinion appears to set limits to the range of variation in the country's foreign policy. Herrera Campíns' early Central American

policies drew heavy public criticism and debate for being too close to Washington and too interventionistic in Nicaraguan and Salvadoran politics. Representing a more conservative faction of the Christian Democrats, Herrera Campíns faced a rare lack of consensus on his initiatives, eventually even from within his own party. Bipartisanship has been the rule in Venezuelan foreign policy since 1958. Thus domestic politics also played a role in forcing Herrera Campins to moderate his Central American policies in 1982 and into 1983, when campaigns for national elections got under way (Karl, 1986: 282-283; Medina, 1985: 72, 75). By returning to regional collaboration with Mexico and the non-intervention principle, the Herrera Campíns administration found the Contadora initiative to be the best course to follow in protecting Venezuelan interests in Central America. After February 1984, the new president, Jaime Lusinchi (AD), continued to follow a more bipartisan and pragmatic Central American policy and played an important moderating role within Contadora (Medina, 1985: 76; Wilhelmy and Vio, 1986: 113).

Given this confluence of factors influencing Venezuela's foreign policy in the early to mid 1980s, the country's interests in Contadora were as extensive as Mexico's, but they were also somewhat more moderately stated. Like Mexico, Venezuelan economic ties to Central America had become significant; thus the region's peace and stability were considered important for Venezuela's economic security, particularly in the context of deteriorating regional trade and falling oil prices in the wake of the global recession and the Iran-Iraq War.[13] Venezuela also was concerned about the

generation of refugees from the regional political violence, however it did not face the kind of refugee burden faced by Mexico. Also like Mexico, Venezuela did not want to see a return to U.S. military interventionism in the region and came to fear that military escalation could lead to a region-wide war. Venezuela shared Mexico's rejection of the East-West conflict as the underlying source of the region's problems and sought to limit its imposition. However, unlike Mexico, Venezuela tended to see Nicaragua's policies as well as those of the United States as exacerbating the East-West dimension of the regional conflicts. Caracas was critical of the Sandinistas' democratic credentials and more cool than Mexico to Managua's concerns in the peace process. Indeed, Nicaraguan diplomats involved in the peace process viewed Venezuela as far less helpful or sympathetic than Mexico (Bendaña, 1990; Torres, 1990; Talavera, 1990). Nevertheless, Venezuela did oppose the U.S. trade embargo against Nicaragua. After José Napoleón Duarte's return as president of El Salvador after May 1984, Caracas tended to balance Mexico's support of Nicaragua's positions with its own support of Duarte's positions (but not necessarily those of the United States) within the Contadora process. Caracas also encouraged Guatemala's active neutrality in Contadora (Wilhelmy and Vio, 1986: 134, 139-140).

Thus, Venezuela had clear economic and political interests that it sought to secure through its involvement in Contadora. Moreover, Venezuela's Contadora policy was guided by the consensus principles of regional solidarity, the peaceful --and regional-- solution of

disputes, non-interventionism, self-determination, representative democracy, human rights and ideological pluralism (Wilhelmy, 1987: 94-95). Its capabilities and contributions to the peace process were important and complemented those of Mexico. Venezuela's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, career diplomat Germán Nava Carrillo, was recognized by international observers as playing a very active role in Contadora's Technical Group while other Venezuelan diplomats with experience at multilateral consensus building have been described as "invaluable" in Central America (Medina, 1985: 82; Karl, 1986: 278). Moreover, Venezuela brought its international prestige as a stable democratic republic and credible regional and international actor to the peace process. The country's election to the UN Security Council in 1985 for a term from 1986 to 1988 was an indication of its continued international prestige and an important boost to its role in the peace process (Wilhelmy and Vio, 1986: 116; Bras, 1988: 72).

Unfortunately, the economic difficulties Caracas began to face after 1983 meant that its economic tools, especially petroleum, became less useful than they might have been otherwise. Venezuela could no longer use its petroleum as a bargaining tool with the United States, and, like Mexico, it lost important leverage over the Central Americans when it was forced to cut back its subsidized oil sales in 1986. Yet by that time, Venezuela's economic and domestic political situation was still better than Mexico's or Colombia's, and it was Caracas that rose to inject new life into the stalled peace process by sponsoring the successful Caraballeda meeting of

the Contadora Group and the Support Group in January of 1986 (Wilhelmy and Vio, 1986: 120-122, 131; Wilhelmy, 1987: 95-97). Finally, Venezuela's cooperation with Mexico and Colombia within Contadora paralleled cooperation on other issues, such as the debt crisis as well as petroleum policy with Mexico and border conflicts with Colombia. Indeed, Presidents Lusinchi and Betancur (Colombia) developed a personal friendship that strengthened bilateral relations and downplayed more traditional bilateral conflicts between the two countries (Wilhelmy and Vio, 1986: 137; Hazleton, 1984)).

On balance, Venezuela was a central player and moderating force in the formation and continuation of the Contadora process. However by 1986, it was clear that Caracas was frustrated with the lack of progress[14] as well as the adverse economic and political situation it faced. Caracas thus welcomed the signing of the Esquipulas II Procedure and participated in the International Verification and Follow-up Commission, which was based in Caracas. With this new phase of the peace process under way, Caracas maintained its commitment to regional multilateralism and policy coordination by agreeing with the other Contadora Group and Support Group states in late 1986 to continue to meet periodically to discuss other issues of common concern, such as the debt crisis (Brás, 1988:73). Yet the economic crisis and related domestic political fall-out forced Caracas to make the domestic political scene the focus of its attention. Like Mexico, Venezuela had found both the scope and the limits of its relative autonomy in the 1980s.

Colombia

Colombia is not one of the states identified by Drekonja-Kornat (1983) as participating in the "new Latin American foreign policy." In fact, in 1984 he concluded that Colombia remains "partially outside of the Latin American mainstream in foreign policy matters" (Drekonja-Kornat, 1984: 340). However, during the administration of President Belisario Betancur (1982-1986), Colombian foreign policy did manifest many important changes from its traditional low-profile orientation and seemed to be headed towards a new regional activism similar to Mexico's and Venezuela's.

Like Venezuela, Colombia's early aspirations of diplomatic leadership at the time of the Congress of Panama and its role in subsequent Latin congresses easily gave way to a preoccupation with domestic political problems in the course of the nineteenth century. Yet an awareness of the geopolitical importance of its Panamanian province to any future transisthmian canal and a jealous concern for protecting its sovereignty led Colombia to develop skillful ways of playing off the European powers against one another. As the United States' growing power in the circum-Caribbean region displaced the European presence there at the end of the nineteenth century, Colombian governments found themselves increasingly unable to withstand Washington's bid to undertake unilateral construction of a canal.[15] The Colombian senate's angry rejection of the Hay-Herran Treaty (1903) as being too one-sided led Theodore Roosevelt to support a plan for a revolt that led to Panamanian independence (Roosevelt, 1922). The traumatic

dismemberment of Panama from Colombia in November 1903 led Bogota to give up its Caribbean identity and withdraw from the Caribbean stage (Ferrill, 1959: 249; Drekonja-Kornat, 1984: 317-319; Van Klaveren, 1985a: 158).

Washington's role in Panama's independence brought about a strong Colombian resentment toward the new regional hegemon until the United States moved to repair relations and compensate Colombia for its loss during the Wilson administration, culminating in the Urrutia-Thompson Treaty (1921/22). By this time, Colombia's President (and former Foreign Minister) Marco Fidel Suárez was developing a new attitude towards Washington that set bilateral relations on a much more friendly course. President Suárez summarized his new foreign policy orientation towards the United States in the brief phrase respice polum, or "look to the North Star," indicating Colombia's willingness to be pulled into the U.S. orbit[16] and follow U.S. leadership in the hemisphere. President Suarez' dictum became the guiding principle of Colombia's foreign policy for the next fifty years. After World War II, Colombia was a dependable supporter of the United States in the OAS (whose first secretary general was Colombian Alberto LLeras Camargo) and in the UN (Colombia was the only Latin American country to send troops to fight in Korea). However, a decade of civil war beginning in 1948, the conservative bipartisanship of the National Front after 1958, and a guerrilla insurgency beginning in the 1960s contributed to the low international profile of Colombian governments (Drekonja-Kornat, 1984: 320-323; Atkins, 1989: 61).

Nevertheless, in the late 1960s, economic problems led Colombia to begin to look to its Andean neighbors and participate in the Andean Pact's regional economic integration plan as a founding member. The government also opened trade doors to Europe and Asia. This new trade policy proved successful in diversifying the country's trade partners and its exports[17] and created an advantageous accumulation of international reserves to finance development (Drekonja-Kornat, 1984: 326-330; Van Klaveren, 1985a: 162). In 1975, President Alfonso López Michelsen was reportedly able to turn down bilateral financial aid from the United States.

With this enhanced bargaining position during the mid 1970s, President López Michelsen began to implement a new foreign policy orientation that, while not as daring as that of Mexico or Venezuela, nevertheless shared some of the same characteristics. His administration (1974-1978) sought to distance itself from Washington and expand diplomatic relations with more states around the world, including reopening relations with Cuba in 1975. It also participated in the discussions for a New International Economic Order and joined Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Panama in the "first" Contadora Group's support for a new U.S.-Panamanian canal treaty. López Michelsen's successor, President Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978-1982), continued this new direction in foreign policy through the first half of his administration. President Turbay personally visited Yugoslavia in July 1979 to strengthen new bilateral relations and two months later sent an observer delegation to the Non-Aligned Movement's meeting in Havana. Moreover, the Turbay

administration supported the "politicization" of the Andean Pact when the latter recognized the Sandinista opposition as having belligerent status. However, despite its initial support for the anti-Somoza oppostition, the Turbay administration was taken aback when the Sandinista government registered its claim to the San Andres Islands in 1980. Colombia rejected the claim and bilateral relations grew tense (Drekonja-Kornat, 1984: 326-330; Cepeda Ulloa, 1985: 127).

By 1981, several factors led the Turbay administration to make some significant changes in its foreign policy orientation. Tensions with Nicaragua, a deteriorating situation in El Salvador, the growing challenge of Colombia's own guerrilla groups, and the adverse effects of the global recession on the country's exports all contributed to Turbay's shift back towards closer cooperation with Washington. Relations with Cuba were suspended in March 1981, Colombia backed off a bit from the Non-Aligned Movement, and Turbay publicly criticized the Franco-Mexican Declaration on Central America. Moreover, with trade falling by 12% in 1981 from the previous year, Colombia seemed to have reached the limits of its export-led growth strategy. The Turbay government was hardpressed to find new markets for Colombia's exports. It was as this point that Colombia "rediscovered" its Caribbean identity and turned to the circum-Caribbean region as the locus of its new economic and political aspirations (Drekonja-Kornat, 1984: 330-333; Van Klaveren, 1985a: 158).

Despite Turbay's realignment with U.S. policy in the region, Colombia's exclusion from the Reagan administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative development program complicated Turbay's trade goals. Nevertheless, President Turbay set out to make Colombia yet another regional power in the circum-Caribbean. Bogotá moved to develop new instruments to increase its influence with the governments of the region, such as technical and scientific cooperation, economic and financial aid, joint ventures, and provisions of Colombian coal. In early 1982, Colombia negotiated its way into the Nassau Group, a "club" of regional powers composed of Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and the United States, aimed at better coordination of the members' foreign aid programs in the circum-Caribbean (Pardo García-Peña, 1988: 100). Thus accepted as the "fifth" regional power, Colombia's new Caribbean policy was paying off. Yet its interests in regional stability and its reading of the deteriorating situation in Central America (as well as its position in the Falklands/Malvinas Islands conflict) continued to coincide with those of the United States (Drekonja-Kornat, 1984: 336-337; Hoge, 1982: 6; Cepeda Ulloa, 1985: 130).

Such was not the case with Turbay's successor, Belisario Betancur Cuartas, who set Colombia's foreign policy orientation in yet a new direction. Betancur was elected on a strong platform of peace amid the public's fears of growing political violence related to Colombia's guerrilla groups, the government's counter-insurgency campaign, and emergent narco-terrorism. Betancur's domestic peace plan consisted of an amnesty for all guerrillas willing to lay down

their arms and rejoin a more open political process as well as an effort to negotiate cease fires with the four major guerrilla groups. This domestic peace strategy had a crucial international dimension. In order to gain the confidence of the guerrilla groups --and to pre-empt any international support those groups might seek from Cuba or Nicaragua-- Betancur launched an active diplomatic offensive that sought to project Colombia's international autonomy and promote peace in Central America. He backed away from close relations with Washington, and moved to improve relations with Cuba (but refrained from reestablishing full diplomatic relations due to the public opposition of the Colombian military). He also applied for the nation's full membership in the Non-Aligned Movement, making Colombia the one hundredth member of the organization (Hoge, 1982: 6; Van Klaveren, 1985a: 158, 173-175; Cepeda Ulloa, 1985: 131-132). Moreover, Betancur sought to play an active leadership role in Latin America, both by hosting the first Latin conference on debt in Cartagena (June 1984) and by participating actively in Contadora. Indeed, Betancur became perhaps the most significant force in transforming the Contadora Group's initial call for peace into an ongoing peace process. His domestic peace process depended on it.

Not only did Betancur notify Mexico and Venezuela that he supported the 1982 Mexican-Venezuelan Declaration but he politely admonished the two for not having included Colombia in their consultations. After January 1983, Betancur's personal diplomacy within Contadora won him strong support both at home and abroad. In April 1983 and again in July, Betancur played a central role in

mediating among the Central Americans to get them to consider entering into peace talks. But his mediation efforts did not end there. Betancur succeeded in getting the U.S. special envoy, Ambassador Richard Stone, to meet with a representative of El Salvador's FDR-FMLN in Bogota. Betancur also played a significant role in encouraging the La Palma talks between President Duarte and the FDR-FMLN in the fall of 1984, and he tried, less successfully, to mediate differences between the Sandinista government and opposition candidate Arturo Cruz in preparing for the November 1984 elections. Unlike Mexico's leaders, he did not shy away from publicly criticizing the United States as well as Cuba and the Soviet Union for their roles in internationalizing and escalating the region's conflicts, and he insisted that the Contadora Act contain an additional protocol to be signed by all three powers spelling out their legal obligations to support the implementation of the Act. Betancur's firm commitment to the peace process and his even-handed mediation efforts contributed to the widely held perception that he was an "honest broker" in the search for peace. Domestically, Betancur's peace strategy paid off with the signing of cease fire agreements with Colombia's four guerrilla groups in March and August 1984 (Van Klaveren, 1985a: 160-161; Cepeda Ulloa, 1985: 139-141, 144; Chernick, 1988: 80).

In addition to his personal prestige, Betancur had other tools to use to encourage the Central Americans to continue along in the peace process, thanks to the new regional aid programs developed by the previous administration. But Betancur went further. He

committed Colombian economic aid to Central America through CADESCA (Comité de Acción de Apoyo al Desarrollo Económico y Social de Centroamérica), which was created within SELA through the Contadora process in December 1983. Moreover, Betancur devised a new plan of direct economic aid to the region in March 1984 that granted tariff preferences to Central American exports to Colombia (Van Klaveren, 1985a: 159).

Unfortunately, by the end of 1984 and into 1985, Colombia's economy was in serious trouble. Like Mexico and Venezuela, Colombia was losing its economic tools to encourage progress in the Contadora process.[18] Moreover, Betancur was losing domestic support as his domestic political and economic policies began to unravel. The most serious political setback was the take-over of the Palace of Justice in November 1985 by the M-19 guerrillas and the bloody attack to dislodge them by the military. With the domestic peace process discredited and the Contadora process stalemated, Betancur was forced to moderate Colombia's aspirations for regional leadership. The Central American peace process remained important, both to salvaging some prestige for Colombia's foreign policy and to deterring more guerrilla violence, but Betancur had clearly lost the political initiative to a deteriorating domestic situation (Chernick, 1988: 92; Cepeda Ulloa, 1986).

His successor, President Virgilio Barco (1986-1990), faced continued domestic troubles, including an increasingly bloody drug war. However, foreign policy was not abandonned even if it took a more pragmatic line. Barco remained committed to Contadora and

later to the Esquipulas II agreement. Colombia participated directly in helping to sponsor a dialogue between the FDR-FMLN and the Salvadoran government in October 1987 under the Esquipulas Procedure. Contrary to expectations, Barco maintained some distance from the United States, especially with regard to Central America, anti-drug strategies, and the U.S. veto power in the Inter-American Development Bank. Yet there were areas of agreement with Washington, such as the reestablishment of the international coffee agreement and the extradition issue. Barco also continued Colombia's participation in the Group of Eight and other Latin American efforts at foreign policy coordination in specific issue areas (e.g., debt) as a means to improve the country's diminished bargaining power. As a further means to that goal, Barco set out to reform the country's foreign ministry (Pardo García-Peña, 1987 and 1988; Tokatlian and Pardo, 1988).

The wobbling of Colombia's foreign policy since the mid 1970s between its traditional low-profile alignment with Washington and its more recent ambition for autonomy and regional leadership is the result of several factors, both foreign and domestic. However, the nature of Colombia's foreign policy making subsystem, particularly the weak institutionalization of its foreign ministry, seems to be one of the more important factors of this variation. Colombia's foreign policy suffers from "fractionalization" even more than is true in Mexico or Venezuela. For decades, Colombia's foreign ministry has been removed from negotiating the country's international coffee agreements, ceding to the powerful Fondo

Nacional de Café and FEDECAFE (Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia) all responsibility in representing and selling the country's main export in the international market. In the late 1960s, Colombia's new trade policy vis-a-vis the Andean Pact and other regions was supported by the creation of several state-owned enterprises and agencies that remained outside of the foreign ministry. Colombia does not suffer from a lack of técnicos or professionals with experience in multilateral commercial relations, but these people are generally not found in the foreign ministry (Drekonja-Kornat, 1984: 337-340; Lozano de Rey and Marulanda de Galofre, 1982: 91-99).

Within the foreign ministry, a paltry budget, insufficient archival material, a lack of systematic policy analysis, and ineffectual advisory bodies are serious structural problems. Efforts to fix these problems, including a program to improve the training of diplomatic cadres with the help of France since the 1970s, have so far had limited success due to the persistence of clientelism. These problems have further limited the participation of the ministry in the decision-making process (Lozano de Rey and Marulanda de Galofre, 1982: 60-71, 76-77; Drekonja-Kornat, 1984: 339).

These institutional weaknesses have contributed to the predominance of presidential initiative in Colombia's foreign policy. Yet in addition to idiosyncratic variables, various factors at the societal level of analysis appear to shape the president's foreign policy agenda. Aside from the participation of the powerful

coffee and commercial interests, Colombia's trade unions and military seem to exercise a veto power on the orientation of the country's foreign policy. Beyond these limits, Colombia's foreign policy does not seem to have a clearly defined ideology or set of principles, giving the president a degree of latitude in this regard. The two main political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, tend not to divide along the lines of principle or ideology in foreign policy (nor in domestic policy for that matter), but instead share a generally pro-West and pro-trade outlook. They tend to adapt their different policy positions according to national or international circumstances, their relative roles as government or opposition, and the winds of electoral politics. It remains to be seen whether the Patriotic Union, a new party created by former guerrilla members of Colombia's FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia) and the older communist party, will have an impact on defining the non-commercial principles and goals of Colombia's foreign policy more clearly.[19] Yet this party's interests would likely be checked by the still substancial influence of pro-U.S. sectors in the country's political spectrum. Finally, public opinion has traditionally played a very limited role in influencing the country's foreign policy due to a general lack of popular interest (Lozano de Rey and Marulanda de Galofre, 1982: 74-83; Drekonja-Kornat, 1984: 339-340).

Of the three Contadora Group states studied, Colombia clearly has the least advanced foreign policy making process. However, Colombia has shown at various times since the late 1960s that it has

an interest in taking a more active role in regional and international politics and that it can find the political space to pursue its foreign policy interests. Unfortunately, its domestic economic and political crises in the late 1980s, especially the more recent emergence of narco-terrorism and the power of the drug cartels, have created obstacles to the development of the country's foreign policy potential.

Dependency and Relative Autonomy in Central America: The Costa Rican Case

The five states of Central America are highly dependent, with extroverted economies that are vulnerable to international economic conditions. Their history is marked by great power dominance and intervention in their internal affairs, with Great Britain playing the role of hegemon in much of the nineteenth century and the United States playing that role in the twentieth. Central America's history is also marked by repeated failed attempts to reconstitute the ill-fated political union (the United Provinces of Central America) that existed from 1924 to 1838 (Moreno, 1928; López Mora, 1984; Karnes, 1976). The most recent attempt at regional integration occurred through the Central American Common Market, but this experiment resulted in increased economic dependence on the United States and fell apart in the wake of the 1969 "Soccer War" between El Salvador and Honduras (Nye, 1967; López Mora, 1984; Martz, 1975).[20]

With the (qualified) exception of Nicaragua, Central America's dependence on the United States during the 1980s for its economic, political, and military viability is widely accepted as a given. Yet as we have seen in Chapters VI and VII, this dependency of the Central American states on Washington has not always meant an automatic subordination to or acceptance of U.S. policies. Even the highly dependent states of Central America have been able to identify their own interests and find the political space in which they can pursue those interests. It would be going too far argue that the Central American states have the ability to exercise anything like the relative autonomy exercised by the more powerful Latin American states. Indeed, the Central Americans for the most part lack the critical (viz., anti-status quo) perspective of emergent regional powers like Mexico or Venezuela, much less the relative economic power and technical skills of such states, to exercise a large degree of freedom of maneuver in their domestic and foreign policies. As López Mora (1984: 300-301) notes, the Central American states have traditionally followed a conservative foreign policy oriented toward supporting the international status-quo and U.S. leadership. Moreover, their foreign ministries suffer from a low degree of professionalism, a high degree of clientelism, and a high degree of subordination to the president (or other chief executive).

This conservative foreign policy orientation and supremacy of the chief executive in foreign policy decision making often make it difficult to identity the room for maneuver a particular Central

American state may actually have in its foreign relations. A coincidence in foreign policy between a dependent state and its hegemon does not mean that the dependent state has no other choices or that its foreign policy positions are dictated by the hegemon. Yet it is not until a dependent state gives evidence of a divergence with the hegemon that one can begin to identify and assess the degree of political space and/or autonomy available to that state. Guatemala gave evidence of a fair degree of foreign policy independence from Washington through General Mejía Víctores' neutrality policy after the fall of 1983. Does this mean that Guatemala did not have the political space available to exercise such independence before the overthrow of General Ríos Montt, or only that Ríos Montt chose not to exercise much independence from Washington? El Salvador and Honduras could easily be classified as the two most dependent Central American states on Washington during the 1980s, but as we saw in Chapters VI and VII, they occassionally showed some divergence from Washington's preferences in the peace process, especially when they signed the Esquipulas II Procedure. This suggests that they possess some (albeit a limited) degree of independence in their foreign policies, even if they usually agreed with Washington's policies. Revolutionary Nicaragua found and sought to create more political space in which to exercise its international (and domestic) autonomy, but it "went too far" for the Reagan administration's interests and was forced to pay a price.

In the case of Costa Rica,[21] we find a country that seemingly re(dis)covered a degree of autonomy that was eroding in the early

1980s. Although Costa Rica is rather atypical of its Central American neighbors in terms of its economic, social, and political characteristics, it provides interesting lessons of the foreign policy potential of Central American states. The Costa Rican case suggests that even a dependent country facing a serious economic crisis can define and implement its own definitions of national interest and national security, despite some of Washington's pressures to the contrary.

Unlike its troubled neighbors, Costa Rica possesses a stable democracy and relatively decent living standards for its people. The lack of a powerful landed oligarchy and two liberal reforms periods in the 1880s and 1920s helped to promote the early emergence of democratic institutions. A brief civil war in 1948 brought yet another reformer to power, social democrat José Figueres. Before turning power back over to the winner of the 1948 elections (over which the civil war was fought), Figueres nationalized the banks and abolished the country's military. Without a military to feed, Costa Rican governments after 1949 were able to invest in the country's economic development and social welfare. By the 1970s, Costa Rica boasted of one of the highest literacy rates in the western hemisphere, along with excellent health care and adequate housing. Costa Rica also had a large array of autonomous state enterprises and institutions that comprised the country's welfare state and that employed managers and professionals in the growing middle class (Edelman and Kenen, 1989).

Costa Rica's foreign policy orientation had always been somewhat aloof from its less fortunate neighbors, however the country did participate in the Central American Common Market (CACM) in the 1960s. The faltering of the CACM after 1969, combined with the emergence of detente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union contributed to Costa Rica's moves toward universalizing its foreign relations. In 1972, it was the first Central American country to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR, and in 1975 Costa Rica initiated consular relations with Cuba. Costa Rica also began to expand its relations with Europe and Japan while also strengthening its relations with the rest of Latin America, especially Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia. The main reason for this new internationalism was to promote trade and gain access to new markets for Costa Rica's exports, coffee and bananas. Costa Rica did not identify with nor participate in the third world call for a New International Economic Order and it remained outside the Non-Aligned Movement, although it did attend the 1979 and 1981 Non-Aligned meetings as an observer. It is important to note that the country's new internationalism was guided by Foreign Minister Aldo Facio, who served two presidential administrations for an unprecedented eight years (López Mora, 1984: 299-300; Rojas Aravena, ed., 1990: 15; Rojas Aravena, 1990: 54; Solis, 1991).

Despite Costa Rica's diplomatic and commercial opening to the socialist bloc and despite its particular version of state capitalism and social welfare programs, Costa Rica identified itself as a member of the western capitalist world. The anti-communist and

strongly democratic credentials of its leaders (including Jose Figueres, who remained a powerful political figure in Costa Rican politics until his death in 1990) led Costa Rica to maintain a clear alignment with the western liberal democracies. Nevertheless, Costa Rica played an important role in supporting the FSLN in its overthrow of Anastacio Somoza. As noted elsewhere, the Carazo administration (1978-1982) participated in supplying arms to the FSLN, allowed the FSLN to find refuge on Costa Rican soil, and joined the rest of Latin America in opposing the United States' moves in the OAS to remove Somoza without a Sandinista victory.

By 1982, the honeymoon between the Ticos and the new Sandinista government in Nicaragua ended. Growing public disenchantment with the course of Nicaragua's revolution was reinforced when Edén Pastora, a previously popular figure in Costa Rica, announced his break with the FSLN and his decision to fight Managua in April, 1982. In May, the newly inaugurated President Luís Alberto Monge faced the presence of growing numbers of anti-Sandinista combatants on Costa Rican territory. Pastora's fighters, combined with those of another former Nicaraguan junta member, Alfonso Robelo, began offensive military operations against Nicaragua from their bases in Costa Rica in April, 1983, leading to serious border conflicts and an increased sense of Costa Rican vulnerability (Edelman and Kenen, 1989: 270-271).

President Monge faced a difficult domestic and international situation. Domestic opinion was largely against support for the Sandinistas but it was also turning against support for the contras

based on Costa Rican soil (Solis, 1991). Yet an increasingly vocal right wing did favor support for the contras and the United States' contra aid policy. Moreover, like the rest of Latin America after 1982, Costa Rica found itself in the midst of a difficult economic situation. The global recession severely hurt the country's export-led growth strategy and the nation soon faced the largest per capita debt burden in all of Latin America. Costa Rica's welfare state was in crisis. Credit from private international banks was tight, but Washington was willing to help. Total bilateral aid from the United States to Costa Rica increased from $15.26 million in 1981 to $53.83 million dollars in 1982. It more than quadrupled the following year, increasing to $218.72 million in 1983 (Solis, 1990: 39, table 1; Rojas Aravena, 1987a: 56). More aid came from the IMF. But the flood of US and IMF aid to Costa Rica did not come without strings. It was conditioned on government austerity measures, including the privatization of the numerous autonomous state enterprises. The aid --including security assistance-- was also used to pressure the Monge administration to support Washington's policies in Central America. However, the costs of completely deteriorated relations with Nicaragua were too high. It was in this context that President Monge proclaimed Costa Rica's "active, perpetual, and unarmed neutrality" in Central America's military conflicts and "ideological alignment" with Washington in the region's political conflicts (see Chapter VI).

The neutrality policy was difficult to maintain, especially given Monge's otherwise close political and economic relations with

Washington through the end of his term (Solis, 1990: 44-45). However, Monge was not completely beholden to Washington. He could draw on the support of the Contadora Group states and of the Europeans, thanks to the ties Costa Rica's previous administrations had cultivated in the 1970s. Monge actively joined all of the Latin American initiatives on debt, thus reaffirming Costa Rica's ties with the rest of Latin America. Moreover, he toured twelve European capitals in June 1984, winning promises of economic and political support from them as well as the Economic Community. In September, he hosted the unprecedented conference of foreign ministers from the EC, the Contadora Group, and the five Central American states in San José (Asenjo, 1985a: 310-311). This conference has been called "the most important manifestation of extraregional support received by the Contadora Group" (Asenjo, 1985a: 311). It was also very important support for Monge's neutrality policy. But as the Contadora process developed its stalemate in 1985, Monge found it harder to maintain Costa Rican neutrality. Conversely, Monge's participation in the Tegucigalpa Group helped to prolong Contadora's diplomatic stalemate.

Despite the difficult balancing act between Washington and Contadora, the neutrality policy had the support of the vast majority of Ticos (Solis, 1991). In February 1986, the Costa Ricans ratified their support of neutrality by voting for another member of Monge's National Liberation Party, Oscar Arias, to succeed him. Arias had campaigned on a platform of "peace and neutrality", and his significant electoral victory[22] gave him the support to carry it

out (Rojas Aravena, 1986: 311-312; Rojas Aravena, 1987b: 283-285). Within four months of his inauguration, he moved to close once and for all the contra camps that remained on Costa Rica's northern border with Nicaragua. Soon after that, as we have seen in Chapter VII, President Arias began to develop his plan for peace in Central America.

President Arias has stated that his peace plan was not intended to be a challenge to the United States (Arias, 1991). His Chief of Staff of the Foreign Ministry, Luís Guillermo Solis, went on to explain that the peace plan's conceptual design was not to limit U.S. options --nor for that matter Nicaragua's-- even if in practice it did ended up doing so. The plan was also not a rejection of Contadora per se. The Arias Plan "was a specific attempt by Costa Rica to propose a negotiated way out and guarantee democratic stability in an international context of great diplomatic stalemate" (Solis, 1991). Arias and his advisors saw Costa Rica's own national security at stake. Vulnerable to the region's violent conflicts, but unwilling to give up nearly four decades of democratic stability without a military, diplomacy was Costa Rica's only means to secure the country's interests. Moreover, peace in Central America was necessary not only to protect the country's territorial integrity and political stability; it was also necessary for the country's long term economic recovery.

The economic and political pressures that the Reagan administration placed on Costa Rica, both after Arias presented his peace plan and after the signing of the Esquipulas II agreement,

were difficult, especially in light of the country's continued economic and debt crises. But those pressures did not deter Arias from his goal. After the signing of Esquipulas II and until the end of his term, Arias actively and consistently opposed further U.S. military aid to the contras in order for the peace process in Nicaragua to proceed. In response, the Reagan admininstration could not appear to be too hostile toward Arias considering the international prestige that his diplomatic success had brought him (including the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize). Beyond this, the reasons explaining why Arias was able to move beyond Monge's neutrality policy and accomplish what the Contadora process could not are unclear. On the one hand, it could be that Arias was simply a stronger leader than Monge, and thus was more willing and able to pursue what he saw as being in Costa Rica's national interests --whether that conflicted with Washington's interests or not. On the other hand, the weakening of the U.S. position as a result of the Iran-contra scandal and President Reagan's lame-duck period may have reopened the political space Arias needed to assert his country's interests. It is likely that both idiosyncratic differences and this changed international context[23] played important roles in Arias' ability to move beyond Monge's cautious and sometimes contradictory neutrality policy.

Costa Rica's foreign policy experience in the early to mid 1980s suggests that other factors are also important in defining the country's foreign policy orientation and implementing its policies. The president and his top advisors continue to be predominant in

shaping the country's foreign policy. According to Luís Guillermo Solis (1991) only about ten people "made" Costa Rica's foreign policy under the Arias administration. Structurally, the foreign ministry continues to be a weak bureaucracy with limited professional expertise and significant clientelism. Yet the emergence of international relations programs at Costa Rica's universities in the 1970s, including the School for International Relations at the Universidad Nacional in Heredia, may contribute to a greater preparation and training of professional diplomatic cadres in the future. Luís Guillermo Solis is an example of the country's growing ability to connect the academic analysis of international relations to government service.[24]

The country's two major political parties seemed to have developed clear and distinct forign policy orientations during the 1980s. The positive side of this difference is that voters had a clear choice in the 1986 national elections; the negative side is that bipartisanship in foreign policy was not possible, at least with regard to Central America. The center-right Partido Unidad Social Cristiana (PUSC) was able to block Monge's constitutional amendment on neutrality in the congress from early 1984 to the end of his term. It has also blocked ratification of the agreement to create a Central American parliament as envisioned by Guatemala's President Cerezo.

Beyond the party structures, public opinion plays an important role in Costa Rica's foreign policy. It provided one of the brakes on President Monge's slide towards Washington when an increasingly

vocal but small right wing pushed for support for the Costa Rican-based contras and for Washington's policies. Public opinion then supported Monge's subsequent neutrality policy. In Costa Rica's healthy democracy, the voting public chose the "peace and neutrality" candidate and reelected a PLN administration in 1986 despite a difficult economic situation, although later in his administration, Arias came under some public criticism for paying too much attention to foreign affairs[25] and not enough to the economic crisis. Unlike Mexico and Colombia, in Costa Rica, the level of the public's interest and participation in foreign policy debates is relatively high, yet there persists a certain aloofness and isolationistic sentiment toward the rest of Central America. Despite their problems, the Ticos have every reason to be proud of their stable and peaceful democracy when compared to the tragic violence of their neighbors.

Summary

By analyzing the foreign policies of four of the leading states involved in the Central American peace process, we have found that each of them acted not out of some altruistic or idealistic commitment to peace. All had real national security interests at stake in the region. All were concerned about the effects of the region's wars on their own political and economic stability. All

found their interests in conflict with those of the United States. All had effective political skills they could use to keep the peace process going. All faced difficult economic crises that limited their power to secure their interests, yet --with the possible exception of President Monge in Costa Rica-- those crises did not deter them from persisting in their diplomatic efforts. Despite the frustations and the obstacles, the foreign policy making systems of these states found the political space and kept it open for the diplomacy of peace.

ENDNOTES

1. From Lecuna and Bierck (1951: 463).

2. Such a position was held by several well-known Latin Americanists, including Ralph Lee Woodward, attending Panel 15 of the April 1990 SECOLAS Conference in Tampa, Florida, who would not agree that even some of the Central American states can exercise some degree of autonomy in their foreign policies. In discussions with other proponents of dependency theory, some have argued that even the more advanced Latin American states cannot exercise autonomy in their foreign policies. Such a view is embraced by Tokatlian (1983) and others.

3. Juan Carlos Puig (1975/76: 9) offers us a useful definition for our purposes in his discussion of depencency, "heterodoxical autonomy," and "secessionist autonomy": "The phenomenon of dependency exists as an asymetrical relationship between the dominant state and the dependent state when the dominant one has the capacity to restrict the alternatives of action and decision which would have otherwise and in principle been at the disposition of the dependent one and the capacity to impose on its dependent decisions that it otherwise would not have adopted." (Translation mine.)

4. Juan G. Tokatlian (1983: 177) summarizes the definition of "relative autonomy" in the following way: "From the non-Marxist perspective, `relative autonomy´ appears as a determined capacity of the State to make its particular interests explicit in the international scene insofar as it possesses the means, resources, and/or instruments to exercise that power, leading to decisions that do not indicate an unrestricted subordination to the behavior patterns imposed by the global superpowers. Thus the State is placed in a kind of `throne´ from which it observes and analyzes the international picture, and after an `independent´ rationalization of its possibilities and limitations, costs and benefits, potentialities and probabilities of action, decides to intervene (or not) internationally in such a way that its `national interests´ (and not those of groups or sectors) are not affected, or if they are, that they are secured or expanded." (Translation mine.)

5. Guadalupe González G. (1984: 453-454) notes that between 1970 and 1976, Mexico´s trade deficit increased from one billion to three billion dollars while its foreign debt grew from four to twenty billion dollars. Foreshadowing what was to come in the

1980s, Mexico's economic crisis in 1976 meant a 40% devaluation of the peso, a falling GNP growth rate, the stagnation of private investment, capital flight, and a loss of faith in the political system.

6. These institutes, all located in Mexico D.F., are: Centro de Estudios Economics y Sociales del Tercer Mundo (CEESTEM); Centro de Estudios Internacionales at El Colegio de Mexico; Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos; Centro de Investigacion y Docenia Economicas (CIDE); Centro Latinoamericano de Estudios Estrategicos (CLEE); Facultad de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico; Grupo de Trabajo Sobre Relaciones Internacionales at the Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLASCO); and Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales (ILET), which was scheduled to move to Buenos Aires (Drekonja-Kornat and Tokatlian, 1983: 557).

7. González G. (1987: 257) notes that this loss of power over foreign economic policy by the foreign ministry became especially significant after forced budget cuts in July 1985 closed the Subsecretariate for Economic Affairs within the foreign ministry. Although this office's responsibilities were redistributed to other parts of the foreign ministry, Gonzalez G. fears that the loss of a specialized office will put the foreign ministry at a disadvantage in determining foreign economic policy and, contrariwise, domestic and foreign economic policy will be made without politico-diplomatic interests being sufficiently taken into account.

8. In April, 1984, an attack against a Guatemalan refugee camp based in Chiapas near Mexico's border with Guatemala resulted in six deaths. The Mexican government sent a formal note of protest to the Guatemalan government whose army was apparently involved in some way in the attack. The Guatemalan government denied any connection between its army and the raid. The two governments tried to resolve the conflict and Mexico decided to move the estimated 46,000 refugees to new camps in the Yucatan (Van Klaveren, 1985: 48; Karl, 1986: 274).

9. In 1986, Mexico's foreign debt had reached $100 billion while income from its petroleum exports had fallen to $8 billion, about half of what it had been just four years earlier (Meyer, 1987: 70-71). Moreover, between 1982 and 1987, Mexico payed $73 billion dollars in interest on its foreign debt without being able to lower the amount of the principle (Meyer, 1988: 52).

10. The deteriorating bilateral relationship between Mexico and the United States included increasingly vocal criticism by the Reagan administration of Mexico's political system and U.S. Ambassador John Gavin's close relations with Mexico's

conservative opposition party, Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), as well as differences over stopping drug traffficking and over Central America.

11. Atkins (1989: 194) reports that Venezuela postponed joining the Andean Pact due to opposition from the country's industrialists, who feared the ending of protection of their expensive industries. The Agreement of Cartagena forming the Pact entered into force on October 16, 1969; Venezuela became a member on February 13, 1973. Nevertheless, Boersner (1983: 406) notes that the Venezuelan government followed the creation of the Pact with great interest.

12. The Mexican-Venezuelan Declaration (1982) was a letter from Mexican President López Portillo and Venezuelan President Herrera Campíns to President Reagan expressing concern at the U.S. role in the growing militarization and tension between Honduras and Nicaragua. It was dated September 7, 1982. See Chapter V for more on the context of the letter.

13. Venezuela's economic crisis began to emerge in 1983, with falling petroluem exports and prices as well as declining non-petroleum exports and increasing debt (Wilhelmy and Vio, 1986: 120-121; Wilhelmy, 1987: 87-94).

14. It was Venezuela that persuaded the other Contadora states to impose the deadline of June 6, 1986, for the signing of the third Contadora Act.

15. The canal had been started in the 1880s by a French company headed by Ferdinand de Lesseps, but bankruptcy and other problems brought construction to an end in 1889 with only one third of the canal completed.

16. Between 1913 and 1929, U.S. investment in Colombia increased by almost thirteen thousand percent while U.S.-Colombian trade quintupled (Drekonja-Kornat, 1984: 320-321).

17. By 1976-1978, the European Common Market bought 32.8% of Colombia's exports, thus surpassing the United States (32.7%) as the principle destination of the country's exports. Exports to Latin America more than doubled between 1961-63 (6.5%) and 1976-78 (13.2%). In 1974, coffee accounted for only 44% of Colombia's exports, although by 1980 it was back up to 59.5%. Colombia's other exports included hydrocarbons, agricultural products, flowers, textiles, fungicides, cement, paper, and other products. Drekonja-Kornat (1984: 326, 333) cites the Banco de la República and the Inter-American Development Bank, as the source of the trade statistics.

18. Colombia had been able to avoid incurring much debt since the late 1960s due to its successful trade strategy and its healthy

accumulation of international reserves. However, continuous trade deficits since 1981 had depleted the country's international reserves; despite Colombia's good credit rating, the Latin American debt crisis made new credit hard to find. The Betancur administration had resisted turning to the IMF, largely for domestic political reasons. In 1966, Colombia faced balance of payments difficulties and was pressured by the IMF to implement a currency devaluation. A similar devaluation four years earlier had brought serious economic and political consequences which the government of Carlos LLeras Restrepo (1966-1970) wanted to avoid. The government successfully resisted the IMF and instead sought to combine regional integration (i.e., the Andean Pact) with export promotion to solve its economic problems. This successful challenge to the IMF was an important precedent symbolizing Colombian autonomy which Betancur could not ignore (Drekonja-Kornat, 1984: 325; Van Klaveren, 1985a: 163).

Betancur began to implement his own "austerity measures," by slashing the government budget, restricting imports from its Andean and Central American neighbors, devaluing its currency gradually, and opening the country up to foreign direct investment. These policies were costly at both the domestic and international levels (Van Klaveren, 1985a: 163-165). Then, in October 1984, it was discovered that a Colombian delegation in Washington had been secretly meeting with the IMF to discuss the terms of a possible loan agreement. The ensuing domestic criticism signaled the end of Betancur's political honeymoon. As one observer put it, "it was the end of autonomy in the economic field....Foreign policy was left without any economic support" (Cepeda Ulloa, 1986: 210). For more on Colombia's 1966 disagreement with the IMF, see the essay by Richard L. Maulin in Ferguson (1972).

19. In 1986 and again in 1990, the Unión Patriótica (UP) participated in national elections and won several seats either alone or in alliance with the Liberal party. According to Chernick (1988: 86) the FARC used the existing political machinery of the Colombian communist party to form the UP. Unlike the M-19 guerrillas, the FARC continued to honor its cease fire agreement achieved during Betancur's peace process.

20. Despite a history of parochial elite jealousies and the more recent emergence of popular nationalisms that have prevented effective political and/or economic integration, a Central American identity persists in the region. An example of the persistence of this somewhat supranational identity is that the automobile license plates and many other official stamps in the region state the country name as well as "Centroamérica" (e.g., "Costa Rica, Centroamérica").

21. Space (and time) limitations preclude a full study and comparison of all the Central American countries' foreign policy making orientations and structures. Unfortunately, for now we will have to focus on one case, Costa Rica, which presents some interesting lessons about the foreign policy potential of highly dependent states in the region. Guatemala would also make an interesting case study of this question, however my knowledge of Costa Rica is more direct after having spent a total of over five weeks there (in June 1990 and January 1991) doing research. Consequently, my primary and secondary sources on Costa Rica's foreign policy in the 1980s are richer than my sources for Guatemala.

22. Arias won the election by 52.3% to 45.8% against his opponent Rafael Angel Calderon, the candidate from the Partido Unidad Social Cristiana (PUSC) (Rojas Aravena, 1987b: 284). Calderon and the PUSC were perceived as being anti-Contadora and anti-neutrality. The PUSC had blocked Monge's effort to pass a constitutional amendment making permanent neutrality the law of the land since the end of 1983. In its formal 1986 campaign platform, the PUSC Programa de Gobierno critiqued Monge's neutrality policy by arguing that "'permanent neutrality is not synonymous with peace but in reality is a synonym for defenselessness, which provokes abuse and leads to violence.'" It critiqued Contadora as weakening the inter-American system, "'thus endangering the future of our nation'" (Rojas Aravena, 1986: 309-310). Elsewhere Rojas Aravena (1987b: 284) notes that this victory for the National Liberation Party (PLN) broke the tradition of alternation in power of these two principal political parties.

23. It should also be noted that by 1987, other important changes in the international context included the emergence of political and economic reforms in the Soviet Union after Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985. The new orientation of the USSR may have encouraged Arias and the other Central American leaders to believe that Moscow was not or was no longer the regional threat that was once believed.

24. Luís Guillermo Solis is both an academic and served as one of Arias' top advisors in the position of Chief of Staff (Jefe de Gabinete) of the Foreign Ministry, which has both administrative and political functions (Solis, 1991). After leaving the foreign ministry in 1990, Solis returned to academia and teaches at both the National University in Heredia and the University of Costa Rica outside of San José. The School of International Relations at Costa Rica's National University publishes a fine trimestral journal, Relaciones Internacionales.

25. Arias was also said to have gotten a "big head" once he won the Nobel Peace Prize.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

The Central American Peace Process, 1983-1988

The Central American peace process from 1983 to 1988 was the result of a variety of historical and contextual political factors: The Bolivaran tradition of Latin solidarity in the face of perceived threats to security; the historical weakness of the inter-American system's formal mechanisms of conflict resolution and the breakdown of the OAS; the deepening of civil and interstate violence in Central America; the increased diplomatic activism and relative autonomy of emerging Latin American regional powers; the reemergence of the cold war and the resurgence of U.S. claims to hegemony in the circum-Caribbean region. All these factors came together in the early 1980s in such a way that the four Contadora Group states, moved by concerns for their own interests and stability as well as their desire to play a larger international role, undertook an active experiment in multilateral diplomacy that unfolded and persisted for well over four years.

This Latin American diplomatic response to civil and interstate conflicts in Central America evolved into an ongoing peace process that sought to promote peace and cooperation in Central America. The Contadora phase of this peace process provided an informal but persistent mechanism of mediation for the Central American states that allowed them to undertake and maintain joint discussions on

their most difficult political, socio-economic, and security conflicts. The Contadora peace process ultimately came to focus on the negotiation of an ambitious demilitarization of the region through a complex arms reduction and arms control regime. Unable to find an acceptable formula for achieving and verifying such demilitarization while still guaranteeing the security of the Central American states, particularly in light of continued military assistance programs and pressures from states outside of the isthmian region, the Contadora process gave way to a new peace initiative originating from within Central America itself that ultimately answered the Contadora Group's original call for peace between the Central American states. The Esquipulas II agreement was a less ambitious but still highly significant step towards achieving peace and cooperation in Central America.

The Central American peace process we have analyzed should be understood as one ongoing process with two phases, the Contadora phase and the Esquipulas phase. The Contadora phase created the diplomatic space from which the Esquipulas phase emerged. Indeed, it is unlikely that the Esquipulas summits of May 1986 and August 1987 could have occurred at all had it not been for the previous diplomatic work of the Contadora states. The Contadora Group and later the Support Group were able to place and keep the possibility of regional peace and detente on the agenda of the Central American states. Moreover, the ongoing meetings and informal contacts established between the Central American diplomats during the Contadora phase proved to be important opportunities for coming to

understand each others' political realities and positions (Talavera, 1990). Unfortunately, the Central American diplomats were limited in what they could accomplish during the Contadora phase given the difficult positions of their presidents and the complex economic, political, and military contexts these dependent states faced at the time. At the very least, Contadora's persistent mediation efforts helped to diffuse the more serious border incidents that threatened to trigger a wider regional war; at most, Contadora facilitated the emergence of proposals from Guatemala's President Cerezo and Costa Rica's President Arias to gather all five Central American presidents together at Esquipulas, Guatemala, to find their own way out of the political conflicts that divided them.

In this study, we have sought to examine the emergence and development of the Contadora and Esquipulas phases of the Central American peace process as case studies that shed light on the interests, capabilities, and limits of contemporary Latin American diplomacy and foreign policy. It is only by understanding those interests, capabilities, and limits that one can explain the persistence of the Contadora Group's efforts to mediate peace talks and demilitarization among the Central American states. We have sought to investigate the emergence, persistence, and meaning of the Contadora process as both a Latin American political response to disfavored U.S. policies in Central America as well as a manifestation of the new diplomatic activism, multilateralism, and relative autonomy increasingly found in the foreign policy strategies of leading Latin American states. Finally, we have also

tried to understand the effects of this diplomacy on the Central American states themselves as they passed through one of the most violent decades of their troubled history.

The Contadora Group states (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama) persisted in their diplomatic efforts because it was in their interests to do so. These states needed peace and cooperation in Central America in order to protect their economic interests in the face of the global recession and the debt crisis that plagued Latin American economies during the 1980s. These economic interests included the need to re-invigorate inter-regional trade and protect the recent investments of the Contadora Group states in Central America as well as the requirement for debt relief while billions were spent for war. More importantly, the Contadora Group states had significant political interests at stake. Their new leadership roles and sub-hegemonic interests in the circum-Caribbean region were challenged by the active reassertion of U.S. hegemony in the region. The unilateral and militaristic policies developed by Washington in its traditional sphere of influence along with its reintroduction of cold war logic conflicted with the Contadora Group's prescriptions for promoting regional stability and claims to regional leadership. Indeed, the United States' hegemonic resurgence and its policies toward Central America during the 1980s upset the distribution of power and authority that had evolved there in the previous decades as the Contadora Group states developed their own sub-hegemonic presence, interests, and diplomatic activism in the region.

While these economic and political interests gave the Contadora Group states the political will to persist in their mediation efforts, their diplomatic skills and foreign policy activism of recent years gave them the capabilities to sustain their regional diplomacy, despite the serious stalemates among the Central Americans that developed along the way. The diplomatic "apprenticeship" the Contadora states undertook since the 1950s and 1960s as their economies became increasingly internationalized provided them with a cadre of diplomats experienced in complex multilateral negotiations. The complexity of the Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America, particularly the security and verification provisions, attests to the sophistication and seriousness the Contadora diplomats brought to their work. Moreover, their growing economic and political contacts with Central America in the 1960s and 1970s as their foreign policy strategies became increasingly active gave the Contadora Group states significant influence and useful tools to help keep the Central American states involved in the peace process.

By 1985 the difficult economic and debt crises had placed clear limits on the economic tools available to the Contadora states while U.S. military and economic aid packages to the region continued to increase. Nevertheless, by that time the Contadora diplomats had built a solid framework for regional negotiations and the mediation of bilateral conflicts that even the OAS deferred to. But throughout the Contadora phase of the peace process, it was clear that by pooling their diplomatic resources and complementary

political influence among the Central American states, the Contadora Group's multilateralism in and of itself became a significant political tool to offset the unilateral power of the United States in the isthmus. In this sense, the stalemate that developed between the Central Americans during the Contadora phase of the peace process was in many ways a stalemate between the United States and the Contadora Group states over the relative capabilities of each to shape the outcome of the regional crises. The Contadora Group became a counterpoise to the United States and the Contadora framework created the diplomatic space for the Central Americans to consider finding their own way out of their conflicts.

The Contadora Phase, 1983-1987: Success or Failure?

The Contadora phase of the Central American peace process has been judged a "failure of diplomacy" by Bagley (1986) and most other observers. This assessment is based on the fact that no version of the Contadora Act was ever signed by the five Central American states. But seeing through the finalization of a Contadora peace treaty among the Central Americans became a goal of the Contadora Group only after the Central Americans agreed to the Norms for Implementation of the Document of Objectives in January 1984. One year earlier, in its original call for peace in Central America, the Contadora Group simply called on the Central Americans to find some way of resolving their domestic and international conflicts peacefully. There is no clear evidence that the Contadora Group states set out from the very beginning to set up an ongoing peace

process and oversee the negotiation and signing of a regional peace agreement.

The Contadora peace process developed slowly. It was not until the Cancún Summit in July 1983, six months after the original call for peace, that the Contadora Group presidents committed themselves to offering their good offices and to playing the role of mediator to facilitate talks among the Central Americans. This commitment came about only after the Central Americans had indicated their interest in holding such talks. The Document of Objectives of September 1983, which the Central Americans helped to draft, formally identified the fundamental problems that would have to be addressed while the Norms for Implementation created the blueprint for future negotiations aimed at developing a regional treaty. Given its modest beginnings, the fact that the Contadora process developed and persisted as it did for over four years is an important diplomatic success for the Contadora Group states, especially considering the obstacles and frustrations they faced at nearly every turn as the peace process developed. Indeed, these obstacles and frustrations propelled the Contadora process onward.

Not only did the diplomacy of the Contadora Group succeed in getting the Central Americans to talk to each other; it also played a significant and successful role in mediating border tensions in the region. These mediation efforts helped to prevent border incidents related to the U.S.-supported contra war from escalating into full-scale war between Nicaragua and its neighbors. This fact should not be underestimated. The border incidents were widely

regarded as flash points that could ignite a larger regional war and trigger a full U.S. military intervention. The Contadora Group and Support Group's statements from the Cartagena Communique to the Caraballeda Message clearly expressed this concern. High-ranking diplomats from Nicaragua, such as José León Talavera and Alejandro Bendaña, and from Costa Rica, such as Luís Guillermo Solis, have stated in interviews that they believe the main contribution and success of the Contadora process was to deter and prevent the United States from launching a full-scale military intervention in Central America (Talavera, 1990; Bendaña, 1990; Solis, 1991). Whether Contadora actually did help deter any possible intervention or not is less important than the fact that this was an apparently widely held belief among those involved in the peace process.

Another supposed failure of the Contadora process is that it did not directly involve the United States, which was after all one of the major players in the region's conflicts. Echoing the Kissinger Commission's view, by failing to involve the United States, it is argued that the Contadora process was doomed to failure. One variation of this argument is that the Contadora Group (and later the Support Group) neglected to lobby the U.S. congress sufficiently and thus could not temper U.S. policy toward Central America (Aguilar Zinser, 1988: 108). These points seem to have validity until one looks closely at the principles and underlying logic of the Contadora process and the foreign policy orientation of the Contadora Group states. At least four inter-related principles guiding the Contadora process both explain and necessitated (from

Contadora's perspective) the exclusion of the United States from the peace talks:

1. **Contadora's Rejection of the East-West Conflict:** In their many documents, the Contadora Group, and later the Support Group, rejected the logic of the East-West conflict and the Reagan administration's arguments that the Central American crises originated from Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan adventurism. The Group of Eight worked hard to eliminate East-West politics and rhetoric from the peace process so as not to sidetrack the goal of seeking peace and cooperation (indeed, detente) among the Central Americans. Given the U.S. policy orientation, if the United States had been invited to play a direct role in the negotiations, the Contadora Group would logically have had to invite Cuba and the Soviet Union as well. Such a peace process would have been as unwieldy as it was improbable. The Contadora Group did not set out to mediate the global East-West conflict; it sought only to get the Central Americans talking to each other.

2. **Regional Solution to Regional Problems:** This idea was the most important underlying principle of the Contadora process, and it appears over and over in the Contadora documents. It flows logically from Contadora's rejection of the East-West Conflict and defines the Central Americans, with the help of the Contadora Group states, as the exclusive set of "regional" actors able to resolve the isthmian crises, leaving the United States on the outside. It asserts that by working together, Latin American states --including the weak states of Central America-- can resolve their own problems without the interference of non-regional states. This idea is also the contemporary reiteration of the old Bolivaran themes of Latin solidarity and mutual support in the face of foreign interference.

3. **Relative Foreign Policy Autonomy:** Although this notion was not explicitly stated in any of the Contadora documents, it clearly guided the work of the Contadora Group and is related to the previous idea. It asserts that even dependent states lying within the traditional sphere of influence of a world power have some degree of autonomy in their foreign policy decisions. Such states have only to look for it and use it. In other words, sovereign states, even dependent ones, are capable of resolving their problems and do not have to ask the permission of the hegemon to follow a particular foreign policy or undertake a particular diplomatic initiative. Dependent states still have a range of foreign policy

choices available to them, potentially even a rejection of the hegemon's foreign policy agenda. Implicit here is also Contadora's rejection of the unilateral and belligerent U.S. reassertion of its exclusive claim over its traditional sphere of influence.

4. **The Non-Intervention Principle:** This principle is stated in virtually every document produced by the Contadora process. It is not only a central principle of the Contadora process; it is also a guiding principle of the Contadora Group states' foreign policies as well as a principle that Latin America fought hard to incorporate into the inter-American system earlier in this century. Just as this principle was used by Contadora to try to delegitimize any actual or potential intervention by the United States in Central America (or by the Central Americans in each other's internal affairs), it also required the Contadora Group states not to interfere in U.S. politics in any but the most diplomatic of ways. The U.S. congress knew of the Contadora process, which did have some influence on congressional debates on contra aid. The Contadora process was also known at least to the attentive public in the U.S. and its existence had some effect on public opinion. Moreover, the Contadora presidents and diplomats did seek to persuade the Reagan administration to give the peace process a chance to work, but were rebuffed by administration hard-liners more than once. Of course, the Contadora Group was sometimes perceived as interfering in the domestic affairs of the Central American states, particularly through its attempt to seek an end to civil wars and promote respect for political pluralism and human rights in El Salvador and Nicarauga, but the Contadora Group states apparently did not see those efforts as interference, only mediation.

The first three of these principles guiding the Contadora peace process explain why the Contadora Group did not seek to involve the U.S. directly in the peace process; the fourth principle explains why the Contadora Group (and Support Group) did not become heavily involved in lobbying Capitol Hill. <u>The logic of the Contadora process was to focus on the Central Americans themselves and to encourage them to find their own way of resolving their conflicts</u>. The Contadora process sought to open a political space in which the

Central Americans could choose diplomacy rather than war. By erecting a framework for negotiations, the Contadora Group ensured that the Central Americans had other foreign policy options from which to choose.

As for the Central Americans, the fact that they could not agree on any of the three versions of the Contadora Act is due to a number of reasons. Susan Purcell (1985) has argued that some of the Central Americans resented pressure from the Contadora Group to hold negotiations and sign a peace agreement. While it is clear that former Costa Rican Foreign Minister Volio resented Contadora, the evidence among the other Central Americans is inconclusive. Occassionally all of the Central American states expressed some dissatisfaction with the Contadora process; but all remained involved in it and no one forced them to participate. Moreover, the Central American states were able to use the peace process to further their foreign policy interests and objectives.

For example, Nicaragua was able to neutralize some of the Reagan administration's anti-Sandinista rhetoric and gain some international support through its participation in Contadora. It was also able to ensure some of its interests within the peace process by threatening to withdraw from it. Honduras was able to extract more aid from the United States by manipulating its commitment to the peace process, as it did after General Alvarez Martínez was ousted in the spring of 1984. It also faced the difficult question of what would become of the thousands of contras based in the country if a regional peace agreement were reached.

Costa Rica could not afford to withdraw from the Contadora process given its own international reputation as a peace-loving nation and President Monge's difficulty in maintaining the neutrality policy. Guatemala's participation in the peace process facilitated first the military government's and then President Cerezo's attempts to reverse Guatemala's international isolation and improve its international reputation. Finally, the peace process offered President Duarte some room to maneuver against the Salvadoran military's goal of total victory in the civil war and against U.S. pressures for the same.

Put simply, there were important reasons for each of the Central American states to participate in the Contadora peace process. All had interests to protect and none wanted to be blamed for its failure. Yet (with the possible exception of Guatemala) all of the Central American states were being pressured in opposing directions by the Contadora Group and Support Group on the one hand and by U.S. policies on the other. Instead, led by Presidents Cerezo and Arias, the five states found the diplomatic space opened by the Contadora process and a changing international context to fashion their own procedure for peace and cooperation in Central America.

The Esquipulas Phase, 1986-1988 and Beyond

Emerging from within the Contadora process, the beginning of the Esquipulas phase of the Central American peace process can be traced to the inauguration of Guatemala's President Vinicio Cerezo

in January 1986. Indeed, President Cerezo deserves more credit than he has received publicly for his role in sponsoring first the impromptu summit of Central American presidents at his inauguration and then the two formal summits at Esquipulas in May 1986 and August 1987. At his inauguration he persuaded the other presidents to reaffirm their commitment to the Contadora peace process by endorsing the Caraballeda Message and agreeing to hold a more formal summit at which they could discuss Cerezo's proposal for a regional parliament. Despite their continued lack of agreement on the Contadora Act, it is significant that the new mix of presidents at the first Esquipulas summit could commit themselves to study further this proposal for an isthmian parliament aimed at reviving regional integrationism. Such a project could not become a reality without peace in the region and without a commitment to regional cooperation. After February 1987, President Arias' peace plan upstaged Cerezo's initiative, but the two leaders ended up working together to achieve success at the second Esquipulas summit.

The signing of the Esquipulas II Procedure to Establish a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America was a major accomplishment for the five Central American presidents. By focusing on mutual support for democratization, national reconciliations, and an end to outside aid to irregular forces, the Esquipulas Procedure was a less complex document than the Contadora Act and therefore easier to accept. Implementation would prove more difficult. The Esquipulas II Procedure incorporated both Cerezo's proposal for a regional parliament and Contadora's project of continued negotiations for

regional demilitarization and arms control. However, in the years following the Esquipulas II summit, neither of these two provisions would be implemented as envisioned by the agreement. By late 1991, Costa Rica remained the sole Central American country that had not ratified the treaty creating the isthmian parliament. The goal of continuing arms control talks under the auspices of Contadora had petered out in 1988 as other aspects of the Esquipulas agreement awaited implementation and a new president was elected in the United States. After January 1988, the implementation of the Esquipulas Procedure limped along with uneven compliance records and serious political obstacles. Prolongued civil war in El Salvador, continued U.S. aid to the contras still based in Honduras, and the shrinking of the already restricted political space in Guatemala all raised serious questions about the real effectiveness and success of the Esquipulas II agreement in and of itself.

Despite these and other serious problems in implementing the Esquipulas II Procedure, the Esquipulas phase of the Central American peace process should not be judged a failure. Its most significant and innovative achievement was calling the five Central American presidents together in face-to-face meetings to discuss their conflicts and to work out a formula for achieving regional peace and cooperation they thought they could live with. This achievement led to at least five more formal summits over the next three years in which a real personal dynamic of mutual respect and commitment to cooperation developed between the five Esquipulas presidents and eventually their successors (Solis, 1991). From the

San José summit of January 1988, when the presidents reaffirmed their commitment to the Esquipulas Procedure; through the Tela (Honduras) summit of August 1989, when Honduras and Nicaragua found acceptable international verification and support mechanisms to oversee the demobilization of the contras; to the Antigua (Guatemala) summit in June 1990, when the region's five presidents turned their attention away from war and towards regional economic cooperation: The post-Esquipulas summits --and the preparatory and support meetings of the foreign ministers-- marked a new development in Central American diplomacy that increases the prospects for deeper regional cooperation in the future.

Of course, there were significant external reasons for the successes of the Esquipulas phase of the peace process. Not only had the Contadora process created the space in which Esquipulas could emerge. Important changes in the United States and in U.S.-Soviet relations further opened the political space for the Central Americans to find their own way. The revelations of the Iran-Contra scandal in the fall of 1986 marked a turning point for the Central American peace process. The scandal weakened the Reagan administration's position and facilitated the Central Americans' serious consideration of President Arias' peace plan in the spring and summer of 1987. The failure of the contras to achieve any significant military gains with their $100 million in U.S. aid further opened the political space for success at the Esquipulas II summit. These setbacks in U.S. policy created a certain ambiguity in the Reagan administration's position towards the Arias Plan that

encouraged the five Central American presidents to forge their own formula for peace (Solis, 1991).

The Central Americans interviewed for this study noted that this ambiguity in the U.S. position continued to grow through the end of the Reagan administration and into the Bush administration. On the surface at least, many of the old policies continued through 1988 and into 1990: Prolongued U.S. aid and rhetorical support for the contras, a continued hard-line rhetoric against the Sandinista government along with the maintenance of the U.S. trade embargo, and continued military and economic aid to the Salvadoran government. However, with the election of George Bush, a new pragmatism emerged in U.S. policy along with a willingness to repair U.S.-Latin American relations and inter-American institutions. At the same time, the winding down of the cold war and a new understanding between the superpowers on regional conflicts after 1987 vastly reduced the East-West dimensions of Central America's crises. These international changes presented clear opportunities for the Central American presidents to maintain their commitment to the spirit if not the letter of Esquipulas; they also permitted the post-Esquipulas summits to forge ahead and new peace initiatives to emerge. With continued international support --from the Group of Eight, the United States, the OAS and the UN-- the Central Americans eventually succeeded in resolving their most violent civil and inter-state conflicts. The signing of the UN-sponsored cease fire agreement in El Salvador in January 1992 represents the culmination

of the Central American peace process begun nine years earlier. The Contadora Group's original call for peace has been answered.

Contadora, Esquipulas, and the Future of the Inter-American System

The Central American peace process represents both continuity and change for the inter-American system. It was rooted in the Bolivaran traditions and historical development of Latin American diplomacy. The Contadora phase of the peace process was especially reminiscent of Latin America's nineteenth century practice of regional consultation and defensive solidarity in the face of perceived foreign military threats. The Contadora process also echoed the experience of the ABC powers' mediation efforts between the United States and factions in Mexico's civil war earlier in this century.

More importantly, the Central American peace process of the 1980s recalled the history of divergent interests between the United States and the leading Latin American states in the inter-American system for most of the past century. In much of the post World War II period, this divergence --indeed, the identity crisis of the OAS over whether it was an organization to promote hemispheric security in the cold war or regional economic cooperation and development--led to the structural dysfunction of the OAS. After the 1982 South Atlantic War, the breakdown of the OAS seemed complete. The unilateralism of the Reagan administration and the renewal of the

cold war during the 1980s meant that the OAS system could not guarantee hemispheric security nor promote economic development to relieve the hemisphere's economic and debt crises. For the deepening crises in Central America, the OAS surely could not provide real conflict resolution, for which OAS mechanisms had always been weak. With divergent perspectives and interests in the Central American crises from those of Washington, the Contadora Group undertook its mediation efforts.

Beyond its roots in the past, the Central American peace process represented the outgrowth of a new Latin American diplomacy for both the Contadora and the Central American states. More active, more capable, more autonomous, the Contadora Group states sought to secure their new regional interests by coordinating their positions, pooling their resources, and developing an ongoing process of multilateral mediation. The focus of this multilateral diplomacy soon spread beyond Central America and led to new multilateral initiatives addressing regional debt and economic recovery that involved still more Latin American states. This new diplomacy brought a proliferation of diplomatic contacts, both formal and informal, between the Group of Eight, the Central Americans, and other Latin American states. Most significantly, it brought the civilian presidents of Latin America together on numerous occassions during the 1980s. At both formal working summits and through informal meetings at their colleagues' inaugurations, presidential summitry played an important role in

both the Contadora and Esquipulas phases of the peace process. This marked a significant innovation in Latin American diplomacy.

The Central American peace process provides important lessons for the nature of contemporary inter-American relations but also raises new questions for future research. The peace process illustrates the increased Latin American ability to identify and act on national interests, even if they conflict with those of the United States. It also suggests that the Central Americans underwent their own diplomatic apprenticeship during the 1980s. It remains to be seen what long term effect the peace process will have on the diplomatic capabilities of the Central American states. It is clear that much more systematic research needs to be undertaken on the foreign policy subsystems of the Central American states to understand the extent of change the peace process may have brought to the region's diplomatic capabilities, but this promises to be a fascinating topic for future research.

The Central American peace process also shows us that Latin American solidarity and multilateral action can lead to finding room for maneuver to protect certain foreign policy interests, despite the continued dependency of these states. This dependency still subjects Latin America's foreign policies to real constraints in the international system. No study of Latin American foreign policy or diplomacy can ignore the international context in which the Latin Americans act. But even within those constraints, it is clear that Latin American states can coordinate their foreign policies, pool their diplomatic resources, and share the political risks to ensure

their relative foreign policy autonomy within the international and inter-American systems. Research into the Latin concertación on the debt crisis during the 1980s which grew out of the Contadora diplomacy would provide more useful insights into this area of contemporary Latin American diplomacy.

Finally, the Central American peace process demonstrates the need for the United States to take Latin American states and their foreign policy interests more seriously. Divergent interests between the United States and Latin America can no longer be ignored for very long because the Latin Americans will act to ensure their interests. The Bush administration has been able to repair much of the damage to the inter-American system during the 1980s by working with Latin America, not against it. The OAS has even undergone something of a revival since 1989 with Bush's more pragmatic and multilateral style. In Central America, particularly in the contra demobilization and later in the Salvadoran peace process, the OAS and UN played significant roles --with both U.S. and Latin support-- that deserve more detailed study. In Panama and Haiti, OAS delegations have sought to use diplomacy first to mediate political solutions to anti-democratic coups.

These positive developments in the inter-American system should not obscure the fact that divergence between U.S. and Latin American interests can reemerge. After all, Latin American states and the United States still have very different levels of economic development and very different roles in the international system. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the cold war now finally

over, the possibility of new North-South issues coming to dominate the agenda of inter-American relations is greater. Moreover, Latin policies that conflict with the United States can no longer be interpreted as "anti-U.S." and therefore "pro-Moscow." This development may allow the Latin American states more room for maneuver in their foreign and domestic policies. And despite improved U.S.-Latin relations, it is unlikely that Latin American states will confine their foreign policies to the western hemisphere. Even the Central Americans will continue to cultivate relations with the European Community while the leading Latin states will continue to play an active role in the United Nations.

As in the pre-cold war era of U.S.-Latin relations, we can expect that Latin American states will most likely be willing to work with the United States and cooperate on regional issues, particularly those relating to economic development, if at all possible. But Latin American states will continue to resist unilateralism by the United States and will expect to be treated as good neighbors. The leading Latin American states have the diplomatic capacity to assert their own interests and defend them. This is what the Central American peace process was all about.

FIN

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