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Plato's early theory of knowledge.

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
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PLATO'S EARLY THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

A Dissertation Presented

By

DAVID L. CONROY

Submitted to the Graduate School of the

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PLATO'S EARLY THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

A Dissertation


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
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
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July

1974

PLATO'S EARLY THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

July, 1974

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I present a theory about Plato's views on knowledge in his earliest dialogues and use that theory to provide a philosophical interpretation of the second half of the dialogue on sophrosyne, the Charmides. I begin with a discussion of Plato's motives for writing the Charmides and present a general interpretation of the dialogue as a whole. In Chapter III I present a number of general principles about the nature of knowledge and justify the attribution of these principles to Plato at the time that he wrote the Charmides. In Chapter IV I use these principles to present a formal analysis of Socrates' arguments in the latter part of the Charmides, 167B - 175D. I argue that Socrates' arguments are valid and comprise a rational inquiry into philosophical problems that are important for Plato. In Chapter V I critically examine the views on these matters expressed in John Gould's The Development of Plato's Ethics.

I argue that Plato held that there are many different kinds of knowledge and that each kind of knowledge is a faculty (dynamis) that has a pair of contrary qualities as its objects. A person knows a pair of qualities if and only if he has the faculty of knowledge that has

these qualities as its objects. For example, someone knows health and disease just in case he has the faculty of medical knowledge. If a person has a faculty of knowledge he is able to recognize the presence or absence of the objects of that faculty wherever they might occur. Persons who have faculties of knowledge are consistently able to speak and act correctly in matters pertaining to the objects of their knowledge. Each kind of knowledge has a beneficial result, and possessors of that kind of knowledge are able to produce that result. Persons who know a pair of qualities, and only these persons, are able to recognize whether or not someone knows these qualities. Finally, persons who have a faculty of knowledge have moral authority over others in matters pertaining to the objects of that faculty.

I argue that the philosophical purpose and structure of Charmides 167B - 175D are functions of four things: Plato's desire to find a kind of knowledge that would properly order the state, the idea that a faculty of knowledge that has knowledge and ignorance as its objects might be such a kind of knowledge, views of Plato's about kinds of faculties other than faculties of knowledge, and Plato's acceptance of the principles about knowledge presented in Chapter III. The idea under examination in this passage is that a person with a faculty of knowledge that had knowledge as its object would be able to distinguish persons who know particular objects from those who do not. Such a person would be in a position to ensure that each task of importance to the state would be performed only by those persons who

had the appropriate kind of knowledge. On the basis of views about kinds of faculties other than faculties of knowledge, Socrates validly argues at 167B - 169A that it is doubtful that there can be such a faculty as knowledge of knowledge. On the basis of some of the principles presented in Chapter III, Socrates validly argues at 170A - 171E that a person with knowledge of knowledge will not be able to distinguish knowers from non-knowers in a way that will enable him to properly order the state. At 171D - 175D Socrates assumes that the possessor of knowledge of knowledge will have the abilities that the arguments at 170A - 171E have proven that he does not have, and argues that there are yet further reasons for believing that he cannot bring about an ideal state. Consequently we are able to see why the idea examined in the latter part of the Charmides was attractive to Plato, and what his reasons were for rejecting it. Since there is ample evidence that the Guardians of the Republic have some sort of knowledge of knowledge, my concluding chapter contains a brief discussion about what sorts of assumptions made about the hypothetical possessor of knowledge of knowledge in the Charmides are not made about the Guardians.

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C H A P T E R I

INTRODUCTION

I shall present a theory about Plato's views on knowledge in his earliest dialogues and use that theory to provide a philosophical interpretation of the second half of the dialogue on sophrosyne, the Charmides. I begin with a discussion of Plato's motives for writing the Charmides and present a general interpretation of the dialogue as a whole. In Chapter III I present a number of general principles about the nature of knowledge and justify the attribution of these principles to Plato at the time that he wrote the Charmides. In Chapter IV I use these principles to present a formal analysis of Socrates' arguments in the latter part of the Charmides, 167B - 175D. I argue that Socrates' arguments are valid and comprise a rational inquiry into philosophical problems that are important for Plato.

Since Plato's views on knowledge are among the most important and influential doctrines developed in the history of philosophy, it is remarkable that his earliest sustained discussion of a topic in epistemology has rarely been examined in detail by students of Plato's thought. Books devoted to the entirety of Plato's work set forth brief synopses of the Charmides, discursively comment upon particular passages, speculate upon the purpose of the dialogue, and hurry on to discuss the major dialogues of Plato's middle and later periods.¹ Contemporary work on Plato's theory of knowledge virtually ignores the Charmides.² T. G. Tuckey's essay, Plato's Charmides is a detailed passage by passage commentary upon the dialogue. However,

perhaps because Tuckey was killed before he completed the manuscript, his essay does not contain a theoretical explanation of the philosophical doctrines examined in the Charmides. Thus one may read for pages in his book, noting comments on particular passages that one agrees or disagrees with, and not find a sustained defense of a general claim about the philosophical nature of the dialogue. Although his comments are often interesting, Tuckey does not present any general position that would be appropriate to evaluate in this dissertation. In The Development of Plato's Ethics John Gould presents a theory of knowledge which he attributes to Socrates and argues that the Charmides is Plato's examination of that theory. In Chapter V I critically examine Gould's views. Two recent papers on passages in the Charmides by Thomas Rosenmeyer and Robert Wellman are discussed in Chapter IV.

My aim is not to record and comment upon statements made in the texts I shall examine, but to understand the way in which Plato thought about the nature of knowledge. It seems to me that modern readers cannot acquire such an understanding merely by reading the dialogues; we find statements about knowledge that seem to us to be paradoxical or plainly false and we do not find passages that readily explain why Plato would assert such statements. There are a number of statements that are asserted as if they are obviously true that do not seem obviously true to us. Still other statements are asserted as if they had been proven while we look in vain for premises that entail them. Since it is unreasonable to suppose that the dialogues Plato authored are collections of random remarks that are made without reason or

rational purpose, we must assume that these superficially inexplicable statements are consequences of unstated beliefs and conceptual presuppositions that differ from our own ways of thinking about knowledge. In Chapter III I formulate into general principles the beliefs and presuppositions which I believe underly Plato's statements about knowledge in the early dialogues.³ In the succeeding chapter I show how the statements about knowledge in the Charmides can be seen as logical consequences of these general principles.

I shall argue that Plato held that there are many different kinds of knowledge and that each kind of knowledge is a faculty (*dynamis*) that has a pair of contrary qualities as its objects. A person knows a pair of qualities if and only if he has the faculty of knowledge that has these qualities as its objects. For example, someone knows health and disease just in case he has the faculty of medical knowledge. If a person has a faculty of knowledge he is able to recognize the presence or absence of the objects of that faculty wherever they might occur. Persons who have faculties of knowledge are consistently able to speak and act correctly in matters pertaining to the objects of their knowledge. Each kind of knowledge has a beneficial result, and possessors of that kind of knowledge are able to produce that result. Persons who know a pair of qualities, and only these persons, are able to recognize whether or not someone knows these qualities. Finally, persons who have a faculty of knowledge have moral authority over others in matters pertaining to the objects of that faculty.

In Chapter IV I argue that the philosophical purpose and structure

of Charmides 167B - 175D are functions of four things: Plato's desire to find a kind of knowledge that would properly order the state, the idea that a faculty of knowledge that has knowledge and ignorance as its objects might be such a kind of knowledge, views of Plato's about kinds of faculties other than faculties of knowledge, and Plato's acceptance of the principles about knowledge presented in Chapter III. The idea under examination in this passage is that a person with a faculty of knowledge that had knowledge as its object would be able to distinguish persons who know particular objects from those who do not. Such a person would be in a position to ensure that each task of importance to the state would be performed only by those persons who had the appropriate kind of knowledge. On the basis of views about kinds of faculties other than faculties of knowledge, Socrates validly argues at 167B - 169A that it is doubtful that there can be such a faculty as knowledge of knowledge. On the basis of some of the principles presented in Chapter III, Socrates validly argues at 170A - 171C that a person with knowledge of knowledge will not be able to distinguish knowers from non-knowers in a way that will enable him to properly order the state. At 171D - 175D Socrates assumes that the possessor of knowledge of knowledge will have the abilities that the arguments at 170A - 171C have proven that he does not have, and argues that there are yet further reasons for believing that he cannot bring about an ideal state. Consequently we are able to see why the idea examined in the latter part of the Charmides was attractive to Plato, and what his reasons were for rejecting it. Since there is ample

evidence that the Guardians of the Republic have some sort of knowledge of knowledge, my concluding chapter contains a brief discussion about what sorts of assumptions made about the hypothetical possessor of knowledge of knowledge in the Charmides are not made about the Guardians.⁴

Footnotes to Chapter I

¹F. Schleiermacher, Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato; A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, p. 46-57; Paul Shorey, What Plato Said, p. 100-105; George Grote, Plato and Other Companions of Socrates, Vol. I, p. 482-501; T. Gomperz, The Greek Thinkers, Vol. 2, p. 300-307; Paul Friedlander, Plato, Vol. 2, p. 67-81; Constantin Ritter, The Essence of Plato's Philosophy, p. 45-46; I. M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, Vol. 1, p. 211-214.

Non-philosophical aspects of the Charmides have been the subject of many illuminating discussions and comments. Throughout the secondary literature on the dialogue one may find insightful suggestions about its dramatic structure and Plato's characterizations of the three principal speakers. Several classic scholars have presented valuable accounts of the concepts of sophrosyne and episteme in the writings of Plato, his predecessors, and contemporaries. For these matters see Helen North, Sophrosyne; Tuckey; Gould; Friedlander; and Paul Desjardin, unpublished ms. on the Charmides. When work on my dissertation was nearly completed I discovered J. C. B. Gesling's Plato, which contains a clear and interesting discussion on the differences between the Greek 'episteme' and the English 'knowledge'.

²See, for example, the books and articles cited in Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays, Vol. 1, Gregory Vlastos (ed.); and Jaakko Hintikka, [2]. Professor Hintikka's latest paper on Greek epistemology, [3], notes the importance of the principle employed at Charmides 170A.

³Questions about the chronological order in which the dialogues were written are an intractable problem that confronts any attempt to understand Plato's thought. Although my views do not deviate significantly from the usually accepted opinions, they ought to be stated since they have influenced my reconstruction of Plato's early views on knowledge. I chronologically order the dialogues prior to the middle period in this sequence:

- i. Apology.
- ii. Charmides, Laches, Lysis, Crito, Ion, Euthyphre, Hippias Minor.
- iii. Meno, Gorgias, Protagoras, Euthydemus.

I do not assume any particular order for the dialogues in the latter two groups. Except for a few references to Hippias Major and Alcibiades Minor, I shall not refer to dialogues of doubtful or confirmed

inauthenticity.

⁴I thank the members of my dissertation committee, Chairman John Brentlinger, Vere Chappell, Gareth Matthews and Robert Dyer, for their many helpful comments and criticisms on earlier drafts of this dissertation. I also wish to acknowledge a debt of personal gratitude to Rosemary Danner and Edward Hougen.

CHAPTER II

PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF CHARMIDES

In this chapter I discuss Plato's motives for writing the Charmides. I briefly mention some of his reasons for writing a dialogue on sophrosyne, for choosing the particular persons who participate in the dialogue, and for choosing the first five things sophrosyne is defined as. My remarks are confined to motives that are peculiar to the Charmides, and not to motives that are common to dialogues of this period. I also present a paradox concerning the dialogue's interpretation. Finally, I offer an explanation for the last two definitions of sophrosyne. I explain why Plato chose those two definitions and why he examines them in the way that he does. My purposes in this chapter are to introduce and explain some general features of the Charmides that distinguish it from other dialogues of Plato's early work and to set forth and explain my own position on the dialogue's general interpretation.

The Platonic corpus is an inquiry into the good for human beings. I understand Plato's principal goal to be to answer the question Socrates poses in Book I of the Republic: "What is the right way to live?" Plato believed that a philosophical understanding of sophrosyne would contribute considerably to this goal. He says in the Charmides,

sophrosyne must be a good if it makes those good in whom it is present, and makes bad those in whom it is not. (161A. As the Republic and the Laws indicate, Plato valued sophrosyne highly throughout his life.)

Helen North has shown in her splendid book (Sophrosyne: Self-

Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature) that authors of Plato's cultural heritage universally regarded sophrosyne as a desirable human quality. It is unfortunate that 'σωφροσύνη' has no equivalent in English, since the virtue this word names is surely remarkable. Its original or basic meaning is soundness or healthiness of mind, and Plato's predecessors (see North, Ch. 1-3) included as part of its meaning such things as self-knowledge, self-control, modesty, shame, not exceeding the boundary between gods and men, endurance of hardship, good order in the community, and the avoidance of unsuitable conduct. Heraclitus held that sophrosyne was the greatest virtue. (Fragment 112, DK). Xenophon tells us that Socrates not only inquired into the nature of sophrosyne, but also that he exemplified and encouraged others to exemplify the virtue. (Memorabilia: Bk. I, ch. 1-3; Bk. IV, ch. 3). As North argues,

It would be possible to show that [Socrates] is for Plato an exemplar of all four cardinal virtues; but there can be little doubt which virtue is most "Socratic," and the recognition of Socrates as the σωφρων ἀνὴρ is often vitally important to the total impact of a dialogue, notably the Charmides, Symposium, and Phaedrus. Socratic sophrosyne has three principal facets: self-knowledge, the sophron eros, and what Socrates' admirers called enkrateia ("self-control") or autorkeia ("self-sufficiency, independence"). (P. 152-3)

Since Socrates, Plato's predecessors and contemporaries, and Plato himself all regarded sophrosyne as a highly prized moral virtue, it is natural that Plato should regard it as a proper object of philosophical inquiry.

Although I do not believe that we may determine exactly what they were, Plato must have had specific reasons for choosing Chaerephon, Charmides, and Critias as the persons Socrates talks with in the dialogue. Chaerephon was apparently notable for lacking *sophrosyne*, or at least certain aspects of it. At Apology 21A, Socrates describes him as 'τφoδpός'. This is correctly translated as impetuous, though it also carries the suggestions of violence and excessiveness. At Charmides 153B, Socrates describes him as 'μανικός', a term used by Xenophon as the antithesis of *sophrosyne*. (Mem., Bk. I, Ch. 1.). At Charmides 157D Critias tells Socrates that Charmides excels all other young men in temperance. At Mem., Bk III, Ch. 7, Xenophon reports a conversation (presumably at a time later than the dramatic date of the Charmides) in which Socrates says that Charmides is a man of worth and it is foolish for him to be ashamed to speak in public.² Both Charmides and Critias were members of the group who seized power during the reign of the Thirty, and both fell in battle when the democrats returned in 403. They are surely among those relatives of Plato's whose political behavior is repudiated in Letter VII. It is likely that as a youth Charmides exemplified the immature form of *sophrosyne* mentioned at Laws 710A, and that he failed to have the virtue as an adult.

Xenophon claimed (Mem., Bk. I, Ch. 2) that Critias was able to control his immoral inclinations for as long as he associated with Socrates, and became thoroughly intemperate only after they were no longer companions. Their relationship then became strained; Socrates

publicly "observed that 'Critias seemed to him to have some feeling like that of a pig, as he wished to rub against Euthydemus as swine against stones'", and Critias tried to legally prohibit Socrates from discussing philosophy with the young. (Mem., Bk. I, Ch. II, 29-38). Philostratus (Lives of the Sophists, Bk. I, 16; see also Mem., I, II, 12) says of Critias, "In cruelty and in blood-thirstiness he outdid the Thirty....it seems to me that he is the worst of all the men who have gained a reputation for wickedness." Critias wrote a great deal, little of which is preserved. In one noteworthy fragment, he praises Spartan youth for their temperate drinking habits. (The Older Sophists, edited by R. K. Sprague, p. 251-2)

From what little is known about the lives of the three men Socrates talks with in the Charmides, it is evident that they lacked aspects of sophrosyne which Socrates exemplified. Consequently, we must assume that Plato intentionally chose them to be speakers in the dialogue for dramatic purposes. Some of these purposes are obvious. The opposition of temperate and intemperate men lends itself well to the dialogue form, and Charmides personally exemplifies the characteristics he falsely identifies with sophrosyne. However, there is one feature of the Charmides that I find completely puzzling. Plato does not use the Charmides to disassociate emphatically and unambiguously the moral decline of Critias and Charmides from their relationships with Socrates early in their lives. Since it is generally accepted that one of Plato's intentions in the early dialogues is to defend Socrates' character and actions, the omission of such a defense in the Charmides

is certainly a paradox.³

Each of the first three definitions Plato considers; quietness, modesty, and minding one's own business; were qualities traditionally associated with sophrosyne.⁴ As such, it is not surprising that Plato should choose to examine them. The motives for the fourth definition, sophrosyne is the doing of good things, are more complex. While Plato and other writers of his tradition would hardly deny that the temperate man will do good things, this definition does not single out sophrosyne from other moral virtues or from accidentally or non-morally doing good things. Socrates' objection, that Critias has left out the fact that the temperate man will know that he is acting temperately (and, in a sense, know himself), brings the discussion back to a traditional conception of sophrosyne that Plato wants to analyse in detail.

At 164D Critias claims that the inscription at Delphi, 'γνῶθι σεαυτόν' is an injunction to be temperate, and identifies knowing oneself with sophrosyne. Under Socrates' questioning, the definition changes from self-knowledge to the knowledge that knows itself and the other knowledges (knowledge of knowledge). Socrates and Critias then agree that the man who has knowledge of knowledge

will know himself and will be able to examine what he knows and does not know, and in the same way he will be able to inspect other people to see when a man does in fact know what he knows and thinks he knows, and when again he does not know what he thinks he knows, and no one else will be able to do this. And being temperate and temperance and knowing oneself amount to this, to knowing what one knows and does not know. (167A)⁵

Plato's acceptance of Socrates' doctrine that virtue is knowledge is surely part of his motivation for considering definitions of sophrosyne that claim it is a kind of knowledge. The fifth definition, self-knowledge, is again something traditionally associated with sophrosyne. However, at 166E and 167A the sixth and seventh definitions introduce novel concepts that are not to be found in the writings of Plato's predecessors. It seems to me that these definitions may be traced to four sources: Plato's desire to find the philosophical foundations for the ideal community, some of Plato's theoretical beliefs about the nature of knowledge, Plato's appreciation of Socrates' ability to recognize ignorance, and Plato's acceptance of a version of the doctrine that virtue is knowledge. This is the version that Nicias says he has often heard Socrates say,

Everyone of us is good with respect to that in which he is wise and bad in respect to that in which he is ignorant. (Laches 194D).

I suggest that the reason Plato examines the last two things sophrosyne is defined as is that he thought that they might be kinds of knowledge which would enable their possessor to govern states properly. I suggest that it seemed initially plausible to him that a person with knowledge of knowledge would be able to order the state properly, and that upon close examination he determined that the idea would not work out.

At Charmides 171D Socrates says

If, as we assumed in the beginning, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know (and that he knows the former but not the latter) and were able to investigate another man who was in the same situation, then it would be of the greatest benefit to us to be temperate. Because those of us who had temperance would live lives free from error and so would all those under our rule. Neither would we

ourselves be attempting to do things we did not understand--rather we would find those who did understand and turn the matter over to them--nor would we trust those over whom we ruled to do anything except what they would do correctly, and this would be that of which they possessed the knowledge.⁶ And thus, by means of temperance, every household would be well-run, and every city well-governed.

This passage implies that a necessary condition for a well-governed state is that each person act only in accordance with knowledge and does not act on the basis of ignorance. It would be a fallacy of composition to say that this is implied by the passage quoted from the Laches, but it is a view that that passage surely suggests.

Socrates says that a person who knows what he and other people do and do not know will be able to order his state so that it satisfies this condition. Here there are a number of unstated and undefended pre-suppositions that must hold if Socrates' claim is to be correct.

However, the claim is partially justified by two of Plato's theoretical views about knowledge (see Chapter 3): knowers act rightly and have moral authority in matters that they have knowledge of. I believe that Plato's appreciation of Socrates' abilities at exposing ignorance led him to think that it was possible for there to be a kind of knowledge which was capable of distinguishing knowledge from ignorance. Two of his other theoretical views, each kind of knowledge has a pair of opposite qualities as its objects and knowers can determine if the objects of their knowledge are present or absent in things they may inhere in, suggested to him that knowledge of knowledge and ignorance would have this ability. I suggest that this is why Plato desired to examine

knowledge of knowledge, and why he has Socrates say that knowledge of knowledge entails knowing what people do and do not know. This kind of knowledge may with some plausibility be linked to sophrosyne, since its possessor will have some self-knowledge and, in a reasonable sense, mind his own business.

The often noted parallels in Plato's writings between medical knowledge and moral and political knowledge are present in the Charmides. At 156E - 157C Socrates reports with approval the medical theory of the Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis. This theory not only holds that the health of a person's soul is a necessary condition for the health of the whole person, but that proper treatment of any diseased part of the body also requires treatment of the soul. I suggest that Plato used several features of this theory of medical knowledge in formulating the conceptions of political knowledge that Socrates discusses at the end of the Charmides.⁷

I suggest that Plato thought that just as the doctor's knowledge of the health of the vital parts of the body enables him to produce the health of the whole person, the possessor of knowledge of knowledge would be able to use his knowledge of the vital parts of the community, the individuals who possess different kinds of knowledge, to produce the well-being of the whole community.

At Charmides 167B - 175D Plato critically examines this idea. He argues for three conclusions which each entail that knowledge of knowledge will not be able to bring about an ideal community. He argues that knowledge of knowledge is not possible, that it does not entail that

its possessor has the ability to know what he and other people do and do not know, and that it will not produce happiness. Most of my dissertation is devoted to articulating Plato's arguments for these three conclusions, especially the second. In Chapter 4 I shall argue that these arguments succeed; on the basis of theoretical principles he held, Plato was justified in drawing the conclusions that he does.

In this chapter I have offered explanations for general features of the Charmides that distinguish it from other dialogues of Plato's early period and have presented my own views on the dialogue's general interpretation. In the next chapter I shall try to articulate the way in which Plato thought about knowledge at the time that he wrote the Charmides by attributing to him a number of epistemological principles.

Footnotes to Chapter II

¹In this chapter I follow the popular belief that dialogues such as the Charmides consist of the examination of a specific number of discreet definitions. In fact some definitions are offered as alternative or more fully developed versions of earlier definitions, and some definitions are formulated by a variety of different expressions. (cf. Charmides 164D - 167B)

²This aspect of Charmides' personal character is certainly being represented in the Charmides when Socrates refutes his second definition, "temperance seems to me to make people ashamed and bashful, and so I think modesty must be what temperance really is." (160E - 161E). Charmides is a participant in Xenophon's Symposium (see IV, 29-33) and at Symposium 222B Alcibiades says that Charmides tried to make Socrates his beloved.

³Xenophon, with considerable detail, defended Socrates against the accusation that he had corrupted Critias (Mem., Bk. I, Ch. 2). There is a passage at Charmides 157E - 158B where Socrates glowingly describes the virtues of Charmides' ancestors. Since these persons were also the ancestors of Plato and Critias, it may be that Plato's treatment of the principal speakers of the Charmides was affected by family loyalties. If this is so, then his loyalties must have changed by the time he wrote Letter VII.

⁴See North, Arthur Adkins: Merit and Responsibility, and Victor Ehrenberg: "Polypragmosyne: A Study in Greek Politics."

⁵Though they are not so distinguished in the text, for the purposes of this chapter I shall consider self-knowledge, knowledge of knowledge, and knowing what you and others do and do not know, as separate definitions of sophrosyne.

⁶Here and elsewhere I have used "knowledge" to translate "ἐπιστήμη" in those places where Sprague uses "science." Although this sometimes leads to awkward English, it is more uniform and accurate. In several places, which I have usually noted and explained, I have altered her translation to eliminate misleading expressions and one or two significant errors. I would like to thank Professor Sprague for sending me a prepublication copy of her new translation of the Charmides and Laches. It is much more accurate than the translations of Lamb and Jowett, and several of the references in her footnotes to the text were quite helpful.

⁷I want only to claim that there is a parallel between these two kinds of knowledge, not to claim that a theoretical conception of one

chronologically preceded and influenced the development of the theoretical conception of the other. Since apparently nothing else is known about the persons Socrates refers to at 156E, it may be that the views Socrates expresses are of Plato's own invention. A discussion of the relationship between ancient medical theory and ancient philosophy, which argues that philosophical theories influenced medicine and not vice versa, may be found in Ludwig Edelstein's "Ancient Philosophy of Medicine." (Ancient Medicine: Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein) Edelstein does not refer to the Charmides.

CHAPTER III

PLATO'S EARLY THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Introduction

During my initial studies of the Charmides my reaction was similar to that of most modern students of the dialogue; Socrates' arguments about knowledge of knowledge from 167B to 175D seemed to be bewildering and paradoxical. I did not understand why Plato was presenting these arguments, what the premises and conclusions meant, why he thought the premises were true, and why he thought the premises supported the conclusions he asserted. Since I was certain that the Charmides must not only have made sense to Plato, but also that Plato must have thought that the issues discussed in the dialogue were important, I was faced with the task of reconstructing certain aspects of the way in which Plato thought when he wrote the dialogue. It seemed to me that by carefully studying the Charmides and Plato's other early dialogues I might be able to articulate a number of general principles which are such that if one assumes that Plato held these principles, then one can see the Charmides as a rational inquiry into important philosophical problems.

In this chapter I present the principles about knowledge that I use in my attempt to explain the Charmides. I offer textual evidence to justify the attribution of those principles to Plato. In the next chapter, especially sections 3 and 4, I present a number of valid formal arguments which have as their conclusions each of the claims about knowledge that Socrates asserts in the text. The premises of these

arguments consist of general premises introduced in this chapter, further principles that may be derived from those principles, particular premises that Socrates assumes in the course of his arguments, and previously proven conclusions. If we assume that a conceptual framework may be at least partially represented by a collection of general principles, then there is a conceptual framework from which Socrates' conclusions can be seen to be natural consequences. Since there is, as I shall argue in this chapter, a good deal of evidence to show that Plato subscribed to this collection of principles, the attribution of these principles to Plato enables us to have some understanding of why the Charmides is the way that it is.

It is important to note that the relationship between the principles attributed to Plato in this chapter and the evidence that I offer for them is not that of a deductive argument. Many commentators have said that some of the forms of inference I employ in this chapter are fallacious. Calling them "forms of misinterpretation," Richard Robinson has named, clearly stated, and criticized two forms of inference that I employ:

...misinterpretation by abstraction : Your author mentions X, and X appears to you to be a case of Y; and on the strength of that you say that your author 'was well aware of Y', ...Because you have abstracted Y from X, you assume that your author did so too....insinuating the future, that is to say, of reading into your author doctrines that did not become explicit until later. (Plato's Earlier Dialectic, p. 2-3. In the discussion of the second form of inference Robinson refers only to cases of reading into an author doctrines that are explicit in a subsequent author, but Robinson's remarks on p. 5 indicate that his criticisms are to apply also to inferences made from Plato's later dialogues to his earlier dialogues.)¹

Instances of the argument forms Robinson discusses are correctly criticized if they are intended to be deductive arguments. However, some instances of these argument forms may be such that the premises inductively justify the conclusions. To put it in a very crude and oversimplified schema, I claim that sets of premises such as

1. In his early period Plato asserted of several F's that they are G.
2. In his early period Plato did not assert of some F that it was not G.
3. In his middle period Plato asserted that all F's are G. inductively justify claims such as
4. In his early period Plato accepted the view that all F's are G.

Moreover, sets of premises like the above are not the only sort of non-deductive justification that claims such as 4. may have. Propositions may also be justified by their explanatory power. If a set of propositions enables us to give a rational explanation for something that has previously been unexplained, or enables us to give a better explanation than has previously been given, then that fact is some evidence for accepting that set of propositions. In Chapter IV I argue that the principles I attribute to Plato enables us to have a detailed, precise, and coherent explanation of a passage in the Charmides that has not been previously so explained. When this claim is added to sets of premises such as 1. - 3., the arguments in favor of claims such as 4. become much stronger. It seems to me that such

arguments become strong enough to warrant tentative acceptance of their conclusions.

It is appropriate to remark here that the standards Plato thought we should employ in evaluating the truth of philosophical claims may differ in some respects from those of contemporary philosophers. At Hippias Minor 366B Socrates says

And every man has power who does that which he wishes at the time when he wishes. I am not speaking of any special case in which he is prevented by disease or something of that sort, but I am speaking generally, as I might say of you that you are able to write my name if you like.

Several of the principles I attribute to Plato appear to be open to obvious counterexamples. A shoemaker whose tongue has been cut out does not have the power to utter true statements about the objects of his knowledge. Socrates' remark in the Hippias Minor suggests that these principles are not intended to apply to persons who have been disabled by natural causes.

Section 1

In this section I try to explain what Plato thought knowledge was when he wrote the early dialogues. I shall begin by discussing those aspects of this topic that I believe are relatively clear, and conclude by proposing hypotheses to explain aspects that seem to me to be relatively obscure.

Knowledge is knowledge of something. There are many different kinds of knowledge, and that which each of them is of I shall call the object of that kind of knowledge. Each object known is known by one and only one kind of knowledge. Each kind of knowledge knows one and only one object.² A person knows an object if and only if he has the kind of knowledge which has that object as its object. We may formulate these views by means of the following principles.

- 1a. For any object x, there is one and only one kind of knowledge k which has x as its object.
- 1b. For any kind of knowledge k, there is one and only one object x which is the object of k.
- 1c. For any person p and any object x, p knows x if and only if there is a kind of knowledge k which has x as its object and p has k.

At Charmides 165C, Socrates says to Critias

...if knowing is what temperance is, then it clearly must be some sort of knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) and must be of something, isn't that so?

Yes - of oneself, he said.

Then medicine, too, I said, is a knowledge and is of health?

At 166A Socrates continues

I can point out to you in the case of each one of these knowledges what it is a knowledge of, this being distinct from the knowledge itself. For instance, the art of calculation, of course, is of the odd and even....And again, the art of weighing is an art concerned with the heavier and lighter, (see also Charmides 168B, 168D, 171A, Laches 194E, Euthydemus 295B, Republic 476E)

From these passages it is evident that when he wrote the early dialogues that Plato believed that each kind of knowledge was of something. His belief in the one to one correlation of kinds of knowledge and their objects is evident in these passages,

...he will know the healthy by medicine, but not by temperance, and the harmonious by music, but not by temperance, and housebuilding by that art, but not by temperance, and so on, (Charmides 170C)

Each separate art, then, has had assigned to it by the deity the power of knowing a particular occupation (ἐργον)? I take it that what we know by the pilot's art we do not know by the art of medicine as well.... And what we know by the medical art we do not know by the builder's art as well...and so it is with all the arts? What we know by one of them, we do not know by another (Ion 537C-D, see also Charmides 175A, Ion 538A, Republic 477C, 478B)

Now with me the mark of differentiation is that one art means the knowledge of one kind of thing, another art the knowledge of another, and so I give them their respective names....Does that seem true to you of all the arts--that, necessarily, the same art makes us know the same, another art not the same, but if it really is another art, it must make us know something else? (Ion 537D, 538A. These principles are employed at Charmides 170C, 170E. See also Republic 438C-3, 477C, 478A. These principles also seem to underlie the discussion at Gorgias 449D-451D.)

Knowledge exists in the souls of knowers. At Charmides 157A Socrates says, "It is a result of such words that temperance [later said to be a kind of knowledge] arises in the soul and when the soul acquires and possesses temperance, it is easy to provide health both

for the head and for the rest of the body." At Euthydemus 295E, Dionysodorus and Socrates have this exchange, "Do you know what you know by means of something, or not? I know it by means of the soul, I said." (See also Hippias Minor 373A, 375E - 376, and Protagoras 314B).

What are the natures of the different kinds of knowledge and of their objects? Since my dissertation is on knowledge, I shall not deal with the metaphysical issues this question raises. The usual view that metaphysical doctrines do not appear in Plato's writings until the middle dialogues, or at least until the dialogues I have placed at the end of the early period, cannot easily be reconciled with such passages as Charmides 158E-159A, 161A809, 168B2-4, 168D1-3, 168E3-7, 168E10-11, Laches 191D-192B, 198D-199B, Lysis 217C-E, Euthyphro 5D, 6D, 6E, 11A, and Hippias Minor 375D-E. R.E. Allen has argued that some of these passages indicate that Plato held a primitive version of the theory of Forms. John Brentlinger has argued that some of these passages show that Plato was influenced by the Anaxagorean doctrine of Immanent Properties.³

Passages in Aristotle's Metaphysics (987B, 1078B, 1086B) suggest that Socrates held metaphysical doctrines which differed from those of Plato's mature thought. If this is correct, then it is possible that some of the passages I cited may be attributable to metaphysical views of Socrates or to an acceptance of those views by Plato in his youth. Because these issues are complicated and important, an adequate discussion of them requires a study of dissertation length. Consequently

I shall avoid these issues as much as possible. The concept that the theory I propose relies on in a metaphysical way is that of δύνamis. This concept is the subject of J. Souilhe's book, Etude sur le terme Δύναμις dans les dialogues de Platon. A discussion of dynamis which contains a summary of Souilhe's work may be found in F.M. Comford's Plato's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 234-8.

Each kind of knowledge has a faculty (δύνamis) which is of some object or set of objects. Plato's belief in this is evident in the Charmides and Laches, suggested in Hippias Minor and Ion, and explicitly asserted in the Republic. At Charmides 167C - 169A Socrates attempts to prove that a knowledge which knows itself and the other knowledges cannot exist. In the course of the argument he asserts the following two claims.

is this knowledge a knowledge of something and does it have a certain faculty of being something?

[Critias]: Yes it does. (168C)

the very thing which has its own faculty applied to itself will have to have that nature towards which the faculty was directed, won't it? (168D, See also 168E, 169A)

Since Socrates applies these principles to a wide variety of relations besides knowledge of knowledge, it seems evident that he held a general principle to effect that anything that is of something has a dynamis which enables it to be of that thing. To use one of Socrates' examples (168B), the greater has a certain faculty of being greater than something - presumably than something less. Because Plato seems to have held this principle in a general form, and because he applies it to knowledge of knowledge, it is reasonable to assume that

Plato believed that every kind of knowledge has a faculty which is of the objects of that kind of knowledge. He certainly holds this view in the Republic,

We ordinarily say, do we not, that each of the arts is different from the others because its power or function is different? (346A)

Shall we say that faculties, powers, abilities, are a class of entities by virtue of which we and all other things are able to do what we or they are able to do? ...In a faculty I cannot see any color or shape or similar mark such as those on which in many other cases I fix my eyes in discriminating in my thought one thing from another. But in the case of a faculty I look to one thing only-that to which it is related and what it effects, and it is in this way that I come to call each one of them a faculty, and that which is related to the same thing and accomplishes the same thing I call the same faculty, and that to another I call other....To return, then, my friend, said I, to science or true knowledge, do we say that it is a faculty and a power, or in what class do you put it?

Into this, he said, the most potent of all faculties. (477C-D, see also 438C-E.)

This also seems to be the view of the Laches.

At 192B Socrates asks,

what faculty is it which, because it is the same in pleasure and in pain and in all the other cases in which we were just now saying it occurred, is therefore called courage? (See also Hippias Minor 375D and Ion 532C)

In the Republic it is quite clear that the only thing that distinguishes different faculties of knowledge is that they are of different objects. Considered only in themselves and not as they are related to their respective objects, or in terms of the effects that they produce, different faculties of knowledge are indistinguishable. I believe that this is also the view of the Charmides,

the temperate man will know that the doctor has some knowledge, but in order to try and grasp what sort it is, won't he have to examine what it is of? Because each knowledge has been defined, not just as knowledge, but also by that which it is of?

By that, certainly.

Now medicine is distinguished from the other knowledges by virtue of its definition as knowledge of health and disease. (171A)

Here it is evident that Socrates is claiming that what distinguishes different kinds of knowledge are their different objects.

Hence, each instance of each kind of knowledge has a dynamis that is related to certain objects. At this point a question arises about the coherence of Plato's views. If each dynamis that knows objects is indistinguishable from every other dynamis that knows objects, why is medical knowledge of different objects than musical knowledge? If the faculty, considered in itself, is the same in both cases, how can the two faculties be of different objects? Moreover, Socrates' remarks at Republic 477C suggest that every sort of faculty, and not just faculties of knowledge, are indistinguishable when they are considered in themselves. Why then should the faculties and of greatness be of different objects? There are several ways to resolve this difficulty; argue that Plato did not hold that indiscernables are identical, argue that faculties and their objects are conceptually indissoluble complexes, or argue that faculties have individuating qualities that humans are incapable of recognizing. Although the first two suggestions may be true, I shall argue for the latter since it has some direct textual justification. At Republic 438C Socrates says,

I only mean that as knowledge becomes the knowledge not of just the thing of which knowledge is but of some particular kind of thing, namely, health and disease, the result was that it itself became some kind of knowledge and this caused it to be no longer simply knowledge but, with the addition of the particular kind, medical knowledge. (See also Ion 537C.)

Socrates' remarks here indicate a way of resolving the problem so that Plato's views may be given a coherent interpretation. I suggest that we construe knowledge as being a kind of faculty that is distinct from other kinds of faculties, and each kind of knowledge as having a distinct property that human beings are not capable of recognizing. The faculties of greatness, medical knowledge, and musical knowledge will all be distinct; but human beings will be able to distinguish between these faculties only if they determine that they are related to different objects. In the cases of faculties that accomplish something (which may include every kind of faculty), they may also need to distinguish between the effects of those faculties. It seems to me that the most natural thing to do is to assume that each kind of faculty has some individuating quality. The faculty of medical knowledge, for example, has the quality medicalness.

I have attributed to Plato the view that someone can recognize that something is or is not a particular kind of faculty only if that person can recognize what the objects of that faculty are. Thus, recognizing that someone has or lacks a particular kind of knowledge requires that one bear some epistemological relation to the objects of that kind of knowledge. The evidence of the Charmides indicates that the only person who can have this relation to those objects is the person who has the

kind of knowledge that is of those objects. At Charmides 171 Socrates considers how someone is to be tested to see if they have medical knowledge or not:

It follows that the man who wants to examine medicine should look for it where it is to be found, because I don't suppose he will discover it where it is not to be found,...Then the man who conducts the examination correctly will examine the doctor in those matters in which he is a medical man, namely health and disease....And he will look into the manner of his words and actions to see if what he says is truly spoken and what he does is correctly done....But without the medical art, would anyone be able to follow up either of these things? [Critias replies:] Certainly not.

Earlier in this section I attributed to Plato the view that a person had a particular kind of knowledge just in case he knew the object of that kind of knowledge. In section three of this chapter I shall argue that a person knows an object just in case he has the ability to recognize the presence or absence of that object wherever it might occur. Consequently we may formulate the view I wish to attribute to Plato by the principle:

- 1d. For any person p and any kind of knowledge k , if someone is such that p knows whether or not he has k , then any object of k is such that for any thing p examines, p will know whether or not that thing has that object.

Formally:

$$(x)(y)\{[Kx \ \& \ Py \ \& \ (Ez)(yK(zHx) \vee yK(zLx))]\supset (w)\{wOx \supset (u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHw) \vee yK(uLw))]\}\}$$

Characterizing the nature of the objects of knowledge is as uncertain a task as characterizing knowledge itself. (My remarks here also apply to knowledge insofar as it is an object of knowledge.) It seems to me that the objects of knowledge can also be viewed as instances of the concept of dynamis. The concept may not only be used in the sense

of being a faculty of something, but also in the sense of causal power. A man is healthy if he has the quality health. The view that qualities are understood as causal entities in the early dialogues is held by many different authors, (see Allen, Brentlinger, Teloh.) The principal evidence is Lysis 217D, where Socrates argues that white things are white because of the presence of whiteness. Additional evidence is at Charmides 161A, where Socrates says "Temperance must be good if it makes those good in whom it is present and makes bad those in whom it is not." (See also Critias' speech at 169E).

There are two problems encountered in trying to specify the objects' of the different kinds of knowledge. First, are the objects of knowledge a single quality, the presence and absence of a single quality, a pair of opposites, or, in some cases, more than two qualities? There is textual evidence to support each interpretation. At Charmides 168D Socrates says,

the very thing which has its own faculty applied to itself will have to have that nature (τὴν οὐσίαν) towards which the faculty was directed, won't it? I mean something like this: in the case of hearing don't we say that hearing is of nothing else than sound?

Here, and in passing in many other passages (for example, Charmides 170C), Socrates speaks of faculties in general, or of particular kinds of knowledge, as being of a single quality. In other passages he includes the non-presence of the quality:

would it then, I said also be a knowledge of the absence of knowledge (ἀνεπιστημότης) if it is knowledge of knowledge.

Of course, he said. (Charmides 166E)

The objects of knowledge are frequently specified as a pair of

opposites, "medicine is distinguished from the other knowledge by virtue of its definition as knowledge of health and disease."

Charmides, 171A, see Gorgias 495E-496C, Republic 438E) Finally, at Crito 47C there is a contextual implication that moral knowledge may have more than two objects, "in questions of justice and injustice, and of the base and the honorable, and of good and evil, which we are examining, ought we to follow the opinion of the many and fear that, or the opinion of the one man who understands the matters," (see also Crito 48A).

I do not see how one could determine with certainty what Plato's views were on this matter. He may have held that there is no single way of specifying the objects of knowledge, or he may have held that one of the first three mentioned is the literal truth and that the other ways of speaking about the objects of knowledge are reducible to that one. Though my reasons are hardly compelling, I shall adopt the view that each kind of knowledge is related to a single pair of opposites. It is surely reasonable to view Socrates' remarks in the Crito as being a consequence of his doctrines that virtue is knowledge and all the virtues are one. If a man cannot have one virtue without having them all, then the man who has the knowledge that is of justice and injustice will also have the kinds of knowledge that know good, evil, the base, and the honorable. Although I shall often refer to knowledge as having a single object as a matter of convenience and brevity, I prefer the view that knowledge has two objects on the grounds that

Socrates frequently and firmly asserts this of particular kinds of knowledge. Correlatively, I suggest that his frequent mention of only one object is done so for purposes of brevity. It is for reasons of ontological parsimony that I do not adopt the view that the presence and non-presence of a quality are the objects of knowledge. It just seems to me that the non-presence of something is something that does not exist. When the doctor recognizes the non-presence of health in Charmides' head, he does not recognize the presence of the quality of the non-presence of health, he just recognizes that health is not present. (I do not wish to identify the recognition of the non-presence of a quality with the recognition of its opposite. At Lysis 216D Socrates says that some things are neither good nor evil. Presumably the possessor of moral knowledge is able to recognize the non-presence of both good and evil in these things.)

In the case of arts such as the herdsman's it might be argued that its objects are cattle, not qualities. Passages such as Euthyphre 13A-C surely suggest this. But here we must distinguish between the things upon which some kinds of knowledge bestow care, and the things towards which those faculties of knowledge are directed. Medicine has health and disease as its objects; and cares for the body because that is the thing in which these qualities inhere. If this distinction were not made, then we would have to say that the art of doctor and the arts of trainers were identical since they would have the same object. In such cases the distinction may be preserved by saying that each of

these arts cares for the body, but the objects known by the trainers are qualities such as strength and weakness or swiftness and slowness.

(Dialogues that repeatedly discuss medical knowledge, Charmides and Laches, discuss the arts of the trainers separately. cf. Laches 185B and Charmides 159C)

Section 2

I attribute to Plato the principles

- 2a. Each kind of knowledge has a product.
- 2b. For any person p and any kind of knowledge k , if p has k then there is a product e which is the product of k and p is able to produce e .

I use the term product in a very broad sense: anything that might benefit anyone. Examples of products mentioned in the early dialogues include such things as houses, food, health, strength, safety at sea, victory at war, the well-being of animals, the well-ordering of cities and households, the excellence of men and citizens, the well-being of souls, works of art, and perhaps memories and well-formed sentences. (respectively, Euthyphro 13B, 14A, 13D, Gorgias 452B, Charmides 173B, Euthyphro 14A, 13B, Charmides 171E, Apology 20B, Crito 47D, Protagoras 313D, Hippias Minor 369A, and Charmides 159A.) There is considerable evidence that indicates that Plato held this view. In speaking of arts that care for animals, Socrates says,

Well, then, has not all care the same object? Is it not for the good and benefit of that on which it is bestowed? For instance, you see that horses are benefited and improved when they are cared for by the art which is concerned with them. (Euthyphro 13B)

After naming the results produced by the doctor, shipwright, and builder, Socrates demands that Euthyphro tell him what result is produced by the art that serves the gods. (13E) At Euthydemus 291E he names the results of medicine and farming, and asks Crito to name

the result of the kingly art. The way in which Socrates makes these demands indicates he is appealing to the general principle that each kind of knowledge has a product. Plato explicitly affirms this principle in the Republic:

And does not each art also yield us benefit that is peculiar to itself and not general, as for example medicine health, the pilot's art safety at sea, and the other arts similarly? (346A)

However, a passage in the Charmides suggests that Plato may not have held the principle in his earliest dialogues. After pointing out that medicine, housebuilding, and the other arts each have a product, Socrates says

So you ought to give an answer on behalf of temperance, since you say it is a science of self, in case you should be asked, 'Critias, since temperance is a science of self, what fine result does it produce which is worthy of the name?' Come along, tell me.

Critias: But, Socrates, he said, you are not conducting the investigation in the right way. This science does not have the same nature as the rest, anymore than they have the same nature as each other, but you are carrying on the investigation as though they were all the same. For instance, he said, in the arts of calculation and geometry, tell me what is the product corresponding to the house in the house-building and the cloak in the case of weaving and so on-one could give many instances from many arts. You ought to point out to me a similar product in these cases, but you won't be able to do it.

Socrates: And I said, you are right.... (165E)

Elsewhere I shall argue that Plato did not intend the reader to accept Critias' claim that temperance has no fine result. (Chapter 5, p.186)

But Socrates apparently accepts Critias' claim that calculation and geometry do not have a product. A few sentences later Socrates mentions

the art of weighing, which is similar to the mathematical arts in that it does not seem to have a product. My opinion is that Plato did hold the principle that each kind of knowledge has a product in spite of these apparent counterexamples. Unfortunately, there is no evidence in the earliest dialogues to indicate that Plato held the view he held in the Republic: the mathematical arts produce certain virtues in the soul (572). The view of the Republic is suggested at Protagoras 356D and Gorgias 508A, and at Euthydemus 290C. Socrates says that mathematicians are like hunters: they capture or discover things. It is surely possible that when he wrote the Charmides Plato either did not believe that the mathematical arts had a product or that he suspended judgement on the matter. At any rate, for someone who does not share my opinion, the evidence I have cited surely supports the restricted principle

- 2c. For any person p and any kind of knowledge k , if k is not one of the mathematical arts and p has k , then there is a product e which is the product of k and p produces e .

It is clear that Plato did not hold the principle

Every product is the result of some kind of knowledge.

At Apology 22B Socrates says "So I soon found that it is not by wisdom that the poets create their works, but by a certain instinctive inspiration, like soothsayers and prophets, who say many fine things, but understand nothing of what they say."

At Republic 346A Socrates says

And does not each art yield us benefit that is peculiar to itself and not general, as for example medicine health, the

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pilot's art safety at sea, and the other arts
similarly? (See also 477C)

There seems to be no evidence that Plato did not hold this view in
earlier dialogues, and a good deal of inductive evidence to indicate
that he did hold this view in those dialogues. Consequently, we may
tentatively attribute to Plato the principle

- 2d. Each kind of knowledge has a product had by no
other kind of knowledge.⁵

Section 3

I attribute the following principle to Plato,

- 3a. For any person p and any object x , any y is such that if p examines y then if y has x , p knows y has x , and if y does not have x , p knows y does not have x ; if and only if there is a kind of knowledge k which has x as its object and p has k .

Formally:

$$(x)(y)\{ (Px \ \& \ Oy) \supset \{ (z)\{ xEz \supset [(zHy \supset xK(zHy)) \ \& \ (zLy \supset xK(zLy))] \} \} \supset (Ew)(Kw \ \& \ yOw \ \& \ xHw) \}$$

The clearest instance of this principle is at Charmides 170A,

Supposing that there is a knowledge of knowledge, will it be anything more than the ability to divide things and say that one is knowledge and the other not?

No, it amounts to this.⁷

Another example of it is at Gorgias 464A,

Well, is there such a thing as a condition which seems to be good, but really isn't? Here's an illustration of what I mean: there are many people who seem to be in such good health that it isn't easy for anyone except a physician or a trainer to perceive that they are not.

An example of knowers who know what they know and what they do not know

in a sense different than that discussed in the Charmides is at

Republic 376.

This is another trait that you will see in the dog. It is really remarkable how the creature gets angry at the mere sight of a stranger and welcomes anyone he knows, though he may never have been treated unkindly by the one or kindly by the other...the only mark by which he distinguishes a friendly and an unfriendly face is that he knows the one and does not know the other;

I believe that the principle is a presupposition behind some of Socrates' remarks in the Euthyphro

Socrates: And do you mean to say, Euthyphro, that you think that you understand divine things and piety and impiety so accurately that, in a case such as you have stated, you can bring your father to justice without fear that you yourself may be doing something impious?

Euthyphro: If I did not understand all these matters accurately, Socrates, I should not be worth much--
Euthyphro would not be any better than other men. (4D)

Socrates: ...I want to know what is characteristic of piety which makes all pious actions pious. You said, I think, that there is one characteristic which makes all pious actions, and another characteristic which makes all impious actions impious. (6D)

I take it that Socrates' presupposition is that a person who has knowledge of piety is able to determine whether something has piety or does not have piety, and this person can do this because he can recognize that the thing has or lacks some characteristic. The watchdogs can determine who is the friend and who is the stranger because they recognize that the first is known to them and the second is not. After asking Laches to tell him what constitutes courage wherever it might occur (Laches 191D), Socrates says

if someone should ask me 'Socrates, what do you say it is which you call swiftness in all these cases,' I would answer him that what I call swiftness is the power (*δυναμιν*) of accomplishing a great deal in a short time, whether in speech or in running or in all other cases. (192A-B)

In these passages Socrates relies on the principle that those who know something (Laches says that he knows what virtue is at 190C) are able to discern the presence of that thing wherever it occurs. There is also the suggestion that the knower bears this relation to the object known because the knower knows that each thing which has the object has a power (*δυναμιν*) of a particular sort and the knower can recognize this

power. Thus it suggests that health, and perhaps disease also, is a dynamis of a particular sort. (It may be thought that it is difficult to conceive of the quality the watchdogs recognize, "being a person unknown to me" as a power, but the concept of dynamis includes both passive and active qualities of a thing. (cf. Republic 507C8) Hence the description of the watchdogs is not incompatible with this suggestion.)

Although this principle easily fits arts like medicine, music, and mathematics, it is not clear how it applies to arts like house-building or weaving. Being able to distinguish houses from non-houses is not an ability that is peculiar to the housebuilder. Socrates does say that the knower will be able to distinguish good and bad actions in matters pertaining to the objects of his knowledge, (Ion 538A, 540D-E, Charmides 171B) but doctors have this ability in addition to their ability to distinguish health from disease. It may be that the house-builder, perhaps like modern building inspectors, has the ability to distinguish the well-built house from the poorly built house. This distinction between the two sorts of houses is made at Gorgias 514C, but the ability to draw the distinction is not there said to be peculiar to the house-builder.

Section 4

I attribute to Plato the principle

- 4a. For any person p and any object x, if there is a kind of knowledge k which has x as its object and p has k, then p is able to utter consistently true statements about matters pertaining to x.

Charmides 171B says that if we test someone for knowledge in a given subject, we should see if they speak truly about that subject.

then the men who conduct the examination correctly will examine the doctor in those matters in which he is a medical man, namely health and disease....And he will look into the manner of his words and actions to see if what he says is truly spoken and what he does is correctly done,

At Hippias Minor 366D, Socrates and Hippias agree that the wisest is best able to tell truths,

Socrates: And being as you are the wisest and ablest of men in these matters of calculation, are you not also the best?

Hippias: To be sure, Socrates, I am the best.

Socrates: And, therefore, you would be the most able to tell the truth about these matters, would you not?

Hippias: Yes, I should.

And at Gorgias 450A Socrates says that "the art of medicine make s men capable of comprehending and speaking about the sick." At Charmides 166C-D, Socrates says to Critias

how could you possibly think that even if I were to refute everything you say, I would be doing it for any other reason then the one I would give for a thorough investigation of my own statements-the fear of unconsciously thinking I know something when I do not.

I take it that Socrates is assuming that if his statements are refuted,

then he does not have knowledge. At Gorgias 506A he warns his listeners

if anyone of you thinks that any statement of mine is contrary to the truth, he should take issue with me and refute it. For it is by no means from any real knowledge that I make my statements: it is, rather, a search in common with the rest of you, so that if my opponent's objection has any force, I shall be the first to admit it.

Finally, at Laches 190C Socrates says "And what we know, we must, I suppose, be able to state?"

Perhaps because Plato thought it was obviously true, there is not a great deal of explicit textual evidence for the interpretation that the knower speak truths consistently. Nevertheless, at Hippias Minor 366E Socrates says

would you not be the best and most consistent teller of a falsehood, having always the power of speaking falsely as you have of speaking truly, about these same matters, if you wanted to tell a falsehood, and not to answer truly? Would the ignorant man be better able to tell a falsehood in matters of calculation than you would be, if you chose? Might he not sometimes stumble upon the truth, when he wanted to tell a lie, because he did not know, whereas you who are the wise man, if you wanted to tell a lie would always and consistently lie?

Socrates argues that just as the knower is best able to speak truly voluntarily, he is also best able to speak falsely voluntarily. He further argues that the knower will be best able to lie consistently; unlike the ignorant, he is not likely to accidentally tell the truth. Since Socrates parallels the powers of speaking truly and speaking falsely, I assume that he would also claim that the knower is best able to speak truly consistently. This claim is not in the text, but I cannot

imagine why Plato would deny it.

It may be that in the early dialogues Plato did not hold that the ability to utter truths consistently is a sufficient condition for knowledge. The view that poets, rhapsodes, prophets, and the priests and priestesses of religious oracles utter truths without knowledge is most explicitly stated in the Meno,

Socrates: ...diviners and prophets say many things truly, but they do not know what they say.

Meno: So I believe.

Socrates: And may we not, Meno, truly call those men "divine" who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word?

Meno: Certainly.

Socrates: then we shall also be right in calling divine those whom we were just now speaking of as diviners and prophets, including the whole tribe of poets. (99C)

At Apology 21B Socrates says "When I heard of the oracle I began to reflect: what can the god mean by this riddle?....It cannot be that he is speaking falsely, for he is a god and cannot lie." And at 22A "So I soon found that it is not by wisdom that the poets create their works, but by a certain instinctive inspiration, like sooth-sayers and prophets, who say many fine things, but understand nothing of what they say." (The Ion is not, as is commonly supposed, a simple and straight-forward development of this view. There Socrates applies this view not only to poets and rhapsodes but also to Ion's abilities to speak about both Homer as poet and Homer as a speaker of truths about the things known by particular kinds of knowledge.) It is not clear if

Plato thought that such people uttered truths consistently (although Euthyphro claims that everything he has foretold has come true, Euthyphro 3C.), but there does not seem to be anything that rules out this possibility. Hence, it is questionable if we may take the utterance of truths to be a sufficient condition for knowledge. (In two dialogues, the Charmides and the Laches, seers are spoken of as if they had knowledge. In the Charmides Socrates introduces it as hypothetical assumption (173C) to advance the discussion and does not assert that seers have knowledge. In the Laches Nicias asserts that the seers have knowledge. Since Plato's Athenian readers would know that Nicias' reliance on seers was partly responsible for the failure of the expedition to Sicily, we cannot assume that Nicias' assertion is Plato's as well.)

In the dialogues of the middle period Plato says things about the abilities of knowers to speak about the objects of their knowledge which would distinguish what they say from the mere utterance of true statements about these objects. At Phaedo 76B Simmias affirmatively answers Socrates' question "Can a person who knows a subject thoroughly explain what he knows?" (see also Republic 531E.) That knowers have the ability to give rational accounts of what they know is suggested by Socrates' report of Zalmoxis' medical theory (Charmides 156D-157C) and his criticisms of the poets at Apology 22B. Perhaps Plato held in the dialogues that the ability to utter true statements of this sort was a sufficient condition for knowledge. This seems to be the position taken

in the Gorgias:

I say that cooking is not an art, but a knack, because it is unable to give an account of the nature of the methods it applies and so cannot tell the cause of each of them. (465A)

Tentatively, I attribute this principle to Plato

- 4b. For any person p and any object x , if p is able to give a rational account of matters pertaining to x , then p knows x .

Section 5

In this section I justify the attribution of the following principle to Plato:

- 5a. For any person p and any object x , if there is a kind of knowledge k which has x as its object and p has k , then p consistently acts rightly in matters pertaining to x .

I shall cite those passages to support the general claim that knowledge implies right action, justify the inclusion of consistency condition, explain why the converse of this principle may not hold, and then give a partial account of what "acts rightly" means.

At Charmides 171B Socrates makes these remarks:

Socrates: then the man who conducts the examination correctly will examine the person who is alleged to be a doctor in those matters in which he is a medical man, namely health and disease.

Critias: So it seems.

Socrates: And he will look into the manner of his words and actions to see if what he says is truly spoken and what he does correctly done?

Critias: Necessarily.

According to Socrates, the man who conducts the examination correctly will rely upon the principle

If a man has the faculty of medical knowledge then he will speak truly and act correctly with respect to health and disease.

Since Socrates is using medicine merely as an example to make a general claim about tests for the presence of any kind of knowledge, and since P implies both Q and R implies that P implies Q , we may infer,

for any person p and any object x, if p has the faculty of knowledge which has x as its object, then p acts correctly in matters pertaining to x.

Another example of this principle is in the Hippias Minor:

Socrates: And tell me, Hippias, are you not a skillful calculator and arithmetician?

Hippias: Yes, Socrates, assuredly I am.

Socrates: And if someone were to ask you what is the sum of 3 multiplied by 700, you would tell him the true answer, in a moment, if you pleased.

Hippias: Certainly I should. (366C)

Socrates and Hippias would assent to the principle:

If someone has the faculty of calculation, then he can calculate numbers correctly.

Finally, at Euthyphro 13C Socrates says:

...you see that horses are benefitted and improved when they are cared for by the art which is concerned with them....And dogs are benefitted and improved by the huntsman's art and cattle by the herdsman's.

Presumably, these animals are benefitted because their caretakers, who each have a kind of knowledge, act correctly.

The view that the knower acts rightly with consistency is explicit at Euthydemus 280A:

Socrates: So wisdom makes men fortunate in every case, since I don't suppose she would ever make any sort of mistake but must necessarily do right and be lucky-otherwise she would no longer be wisdom.

We finally agreed (I don't quite know how) that, in sum, the situation was this: if a man had wisdom he had no need of any good fortune in addition.

This view is implicit in the Crito. At 44D Socrates says of the multitude that "they act wholly at random." Later Socrates asks Crito

of the man who is in training, "But if he...respects...what the many say, who understand nothing of the matter, will he not suffer for it?" He and Crito agree that the man's body would be disabled. Since this is contrasted with strict adherence to the advice of the expert, we may presume that actions in accordance with his advice are not random and are consistently correct.

I believe that this last passage indicates that Plato may not have held the principle:

For any person p and any object x , if p consistently acts rightly in matters pertaining to x , then there is a faculty of knowledge k which has x as its object and p has k .

Socrates says that the man who is in training "must act and exercise, and eat and drink in whatever way the one man who is his director, and who understands the matter, tells him; not as others tell him."

(46B) If the athlete follows his trainer's advice, he will consistently act rightly with respect to health, disease, strength, and weakness, without having the faculties which know those objects. This indicates that Plato did hold that:

5b. For any person p and any object x , if p consistently acts rightly in matters pertaining to x , then there is a kind of knowledge k and there is a person q which are such that x is the object of k and q has k and p follows the advice of q in matters pertaining to x .

In the cases where the knower and the actor are the same person, we may say that a man is following his own advice.

What does "acts rightly in matters pertaining to x " mean? One thing that is clear is that it does not entail acting rightly in the

broad senses of actions that are morally right or actions that are beneficial on the whole. Nicias mentions cases in which such an inference would not hold, and a vivid particular example is given in the Republic.

Nicias: ...Do you suppose, Laches, that when a man's recovery is more to be feared than his illness, the doctors know this? Or don't you think there are many cases in which it would be better not to get up from an illness? Tell me this: do you maintain that in all cases to live is preferable? In many cases, is it not better to die?

Laches: Well I agree with you on this point at heart.
(Laches 195C; cf. Gorgias 511E-512A)

Socrates: ...until the time of Herodicus, the sons of Asclepius had no use for the modern coddling treatment of disease. But Herodicus, who was a gymnastic master and lost his health, combined training and doctoring in such a way as to become a plague to himself first and foremost and to many others after him.

Glaucon: How?

Socrates: By lingering out his death. He had a mortal disease, and he spent all his life at its beck and call, with no hope of a cure and no time for anything but doctoring himself. Every departure from his fixed regimen was a torment; and his skill only enabled him to reach old age in a prolonged death struggle. (Republic 406)

Without his knowledge Herodicus would not have been able to prolong

his life. Hence, in some sense, his actions were right actions.

However, it is clear that they were not right in the sense that they were beneficial on the whole. It is not so clear that his actions were morally wrong, at least in the sense that a doctor might use his knowledge to murder a patient. (Plato may be referring to this at

Statesman 209B.) However, Plato surely thought that Herodicus was capable of acting otherwise, and praises Asclepius for acting in accordance with the view that "Treatment would be wasted on a man who could not live in his ordinary round of duties and was consequently useless to himself and to society." (Republic 407) I am not sure if we should attribute to Plato the view that doctors who coddle patients because they are ignorant of this are committing actions that are morally wrong. If Plato did hold this view, or if he equated moral rightness with that which benefits on the whole, then a man may act rightly on the basis of knowledge without acting in a way that is morally right. But, the available evidence does not enable us to determine this point with certainty.

I think that the best way to interpret the notion of right action that is common to the actions performed on the basis of knowledge is to say that an action is right insofar as it is conducive to bringing about a certain end. We might formulate the relevant principle as:

- 5c. For any person p and any object x, p acts rightly in matters pertaining to x if and only if there is a kind of knowledge k which has x as its object and there is a product e which is the product of k and p's actions are conducive to bringing about e.

A passage from the Gorgias indicates that Plato did hold this principle:

Socrates: Consider: will a good man, whose speeches are for the maximum improvement of his fellows, say anything at random? Will he not always have some definite end in view? Just as all other craftsmen keep their eye on the task at hand and select and apply nothing at random, but only such things as may bring about the special form he is bent upon effecting. Consider, if you like, painters and architects

and shipwrights and any other craftsman you please; each one of them disposes every element of his task in a fixed order and adjusts the parts in a suitable and harmonious scheme until the whole has been constituted as a regularized and well-ordered object. And so it is also, of course, with the rest of the craftsmen, including those we just mentioned, who occupy themselves with the human body, trainers and physicians; they too, I presume, direct their efforts towards regularizing and harmonizing the body. (Gorgias 503E - 504.) (This view of actions performed on the basis of knowledge is suggested in Socrates' report of Zalmoxis' criticism, "this...is the very reason why most diseases are beyond Greek doctor, that they do not pay attention to the whole as they ought to do, since if the whole is not in good condition, it is impossible that the part should be." Charmides 156E.)

Given these remarks, I believe that Socrates would hold that the craftsmen's actions in matters pertaining to their trade are right if they serve to bring about the product of their trade, and wrong if they do not do so. As I have formulated it, the principle does not say that only persons who have knowledge may act rightly, since the Crito indicates that non-knowledgeable persons under the command of a knower may act rightly.

There is an additional feature of Plato's views on knowledge that I have been unable to assimilate very well into the theory presented in this chapter. As the textual references noted below bear out, Plato often distinguishes (and not always in the same way) between persons who have superlative knowledge in a certain area and persons who have an inferior sort of knowledge in the same area. The theory I have presented is incomplete in that I only note this distinction and do not present an explanatory account of it. One way in which the distinction might be marked off is by the following principle:

- 5d. For any person p and any kind of knowledge k, if p has k, then p non-defectively has k if and only if p acts in accordance with certain part-whole causal principles to produce k's product.

I have used the expression "non-defectively has k" to distinguish the superlative sort of knowledge from the inferior sort. Plato mentions this distinction frequently in the late dialogues (Phaedrus 268-71, Laws 720B, 857C, 902D, 903C, perhaps at Timaeus 88D, see also Philebus 55C ff., and Republic 443-4.), it has an important role in the Gorgias (465A, 503E, 506E, 508A) and is the basis of the discussion of Greek medicine at Charmides 156B - 157C. It is evident from the latter passage that the better sort of doctor knows the causal relations that the health of the parts of the person bear to the health of the other parts of the person and to the health of the whole man. This view is extended to other kinds of knowledge at Gorgias 503E. Although remarks in the Phaedrus suggest that the piecemeal sort of knowledge is not knowledge at all, Plato elsewhere (Laws 720B and 857C) accords it some status, as he does to the doctors that are the subject of Zalmoxis' criticism.

It would be nice if I could provide some explanatory account of the knowers' knowledge of the relevant part-whole relations, but I do not see how this can be done. I conjecture that the distinction between these two kinds of knowledge, as well as the distinction between knowledge and ignorance, is an instance of a distinction Plato draws in the Timaeus,

...a distinction should be made between those causes which are endowed with mind and are workers of things fair and good, and those which are deprived of intelligence and

always produce chance effects without order or design. (46E)

Non-defective knowledge, as a causal power, consistently and rationally acts rightly and speaks truly to produce its beneficial results.

Piecemeal knowledge and ignorance act randomly and produce beneficial results by chance.

Section 6

In this section I shall argue that Plato held the principle

- 6a. For any person p and any object x , p knows x if and only if any person q is such that if p examines q , then p knows whether or not q knows x .

Charmides 171B - C is the principal evidence for this claim. In the course of an argument which proves that the man who has knowledge of knowledge will not be able to distinguish the true doctor from the pretender, Socrates says,

Then the man who conducts the examination correctly will examine the doctor in those matters in which he is a medical man, namely health and disease.

So it seems.

And he will look into the manner of his words and actions to see if what he says is truly spoken and what he does is correctly done?

Necessarily.

But without the medical art, would anyone be able to follow up either of these things?

Certainly not.

No one, could do this, it seems, except the doctor-not even the temperate man himself. If he could, he would be a doctor in addition to his temperance.

At 171C Socrates concludes by saying that the temperate man will not be able to "recognize any other genuine practitioner whatsoever, except the man in his own field, the way other craftsmen do." Socrates says that knowers, and only knowers, can recognize when another person has the same kind of knowledge they have. In this passage Socrates does not explicitly say that knowers will be able to recognize when someone

does not have the kind of knowledge they have. However, there are two good reasons for believing that he holds this also. The first is that he subsequently gives two accounts of what benefits would follow if knowledge of knowledge did have the abilities he has proven it does not have, and in both of them he indicates that ignorant pretenders would be recognized.

If temperance really ruled over us and were as we now define it, surely everything would be done according to knowledge: neither would anyone who says he is a pilot (but is not) deceive us, nor would any doctor or general or anyone else pretending to know what he did not escape our notice. (173A-B, see also 171D.)

Secondly, at the end of the dialogue, Socrates says that they have agreed to this position even though they have not discussed it:

we made this concession in the most prodigal manner, quite overlooking the impossibility that a person should in some fashion know that he does not know at all - because our agreement amounts to saying that he knows things he does not know. And yet, I think, there could be nothing more irrational than this. (175C)

I should note one problem with the attribution of this principle to Plato. It is possible to interpret the early dialogues in a way that attributes to Plato the following three propositions:

1. Anyone is such that if Socrates examines him and he does not know the objects of moral knowledge, then Socrates knows that he is ignorant of those things.
2. Socrates does not have moral knowledge.
3. No one has moral knowledge.

The principle I have attributed to Plato is incompatible with the conjunction of these three statements. My own view is that it is incorrect to attribute 2., and consequently 3. also, to Plato. This

controversy is both interesting and notorious, but since an adequate discussion of it would be very lengthy, I shall not enter into it here.

The passage quoted from the Charmides indicates how knowers determine if other people know or do not know the same things that they know. The doctor determines if another man has medical knowledge by seeing if the man speaks truly and acts rightly with respect to health and disease. The same view is held in the Ion. (See 531D-E, 538A, 540D-E.) We may formulate this position by means of the following three principles:

- 6b. For any person p and any object x, p knows x if and only if any person q is such that if p examines q, then p knows whether or not q acts rightly and speaks truly in matters pertaining to x.
- 6c. For any object x, any two persons p and q are such that p knows that q knows x if and only if p knows that q acts rightly and speaks truly in matters pertaining to x.
- 6d. For any object x, any two persons p and q are such that p knows that q does not know x if and only if p knows that q neither speaks truly nor acts rightly in matters pertaining to x.

At the end of this section is a proof that the principle I attributed to Plato at the beginning of this section follows from the above three principles.

A passage from the Republic indicates how it is that knowers are able to determine if someone speaks truly and acts rightly.

Consider then with regard to all forms of knowledge and ignorance whether you think that anyone who knows would choose to do or say other or more than what another who knows would do or say, and not rather exactly what his like would do in the same action. (350A)

It may be that Plato thought that the examiner tests for truth and

right action by seeing if the examinee says and does the same things he would say and do.

We now encounter a difficulty with Plato's theory, as I have presented it. Each of the above principles may be counterexampled if we assume that there are persons, such as poets and those who act on the advice of experts, who lack knowledge and yet consistently speak truly or act rightly. It seems to me that we should assume that Plato believed that examining experts would be able to distinguish between such persons and fellow experts. It seems clear that the distinguishing mark is the ability to offer an explanation. At Apology 22B Socrates says

So I took up the poems on which I thought that they had spent the most pains, and asked them what they meant, hoping at the same time to learn something from them. I am ashamed to tell you the truth, my friends, but I must say it. Almost any one of the bystanders could have talked about the works of these poets better than the poets themselves. So I soon found that it is not by wisdom that the poets create their works but by a certain instinctive inspiration, like soothsayers and prophets who also say many fine things, but understand nothing of what they say.

A plausible model for such an explanation may be found in Socrates' report of Zalmoxis' medical theory. Zalmoxis is unlike the poets and the athletes mentioned in the Crito in that he can explain why he says and does certain things in matters pertaining to health and disease. He can explain how the health of a part of the body is dependent upon the health of other parts of the body and upon the health of the whole person (he is said to have explained this to Socrates) and presumably he can also explain how the things he says and does fit in with his

medical theory. It would seem that being able to offer explanations of this sort is a sufficient condition for knowledge; a condition that cannot be met by a person whose speech is inspired or whose actions are directed by an expert. Consequently, the notions of true speech and right action employed in the above principles should be given a strong interpretation so that they include the ability to explain what one says and does.

There is one passage in the Laches and one in the Gorgias which appear to contradict the views of the Charmides and the Ion. In both passages there is contextual presupposition that non-experts, namely the participants in the discussion, could recognize that other people had certain kinds of knowledge.

Socrates: Then, in keeping with what I said just now, how would we investigate if we wanted to find out which of us was the most expert with regard to gymnastics? Wouldn't it be the man who had studied and practiced the art and who had had good teachers in that particular subject?

Melesias: I should think so.

.....

Laches: What's that Socrates? Haven't you ever noticed that in some matters people become more expert without teachers than with them?

Socrates: Yes, I have Laches, but you would not want to trust them when they said they were good craftsmen unless they should have some well-executed product to show you--and not just one but more than one. (185B, E. See also Gorgias 514A-E.)

In the passages from the Laches and the Gorgias Socrates does not mention examining the person's words or actions; he says that we would determine that the person had knowledge by assessing their teachers, training, and

products. He also presupposes that non-experts may properly make such assessments. Although these passages do represent a prima facie contradiction to the views of the Ion and the Charmides, it seems to me that there is a reasonable way to explain away the difficulty. I suggest that in the Gorgias and the Laches that Socrates is speaking informally, and yielding to the popular view so that he may proceed to discuss other matters. Correlatively, in the theoretical discussions of the Charmides and the Ion, I suggest that Socrates is saying what Plato literally believes: only experts can recognize other experts. In the theory I have presented I have not incorporated the additional methods one may use to recognize experts that Socrates mentions in the Laches. I have not done this merely because they are not mentioned in the Charmides. I do not want to deny that Plato thought that an expert might assess another person's teachers, training, and products when he tries to determine if that person is a fellow expert.

1. $(x)(y) \{ xKy \equiv (z) \{ xEz \supset [(xK(zAy) \& xKzSy) \vee (xK(zLAy) \& xK(zLSy))] \} \}$
2. $(x)(y)(z) [xK(yKz) \equiv (xK(yAz) \& xK(ySz))]$
3. $(x)(y)(z) [xK(yLKz) \equiv (xK(yLAz) \& xK(yLSz))]$

4. aKb

C.P. Asmpt.

5. aEc

C. P. Asmpt.

6. $\neg aK(cKb) \& \neg aK(cLKb)$

Red. Asmpt.

7. $aKb \equiv (z) \{ aEz \supset [(aK(zAb) \& aK(zSb)) \vee (aK(zLAb) \& aK(zLSb))] \}$

U.I., 1.

8. $(z) \{ aEz \supset [(aK(zAb) \& aK(zSb)) \vee (aK(zLAb) \& aK(zLSb))] \}$

M.P., 4., 7.

9. $aEc \supset [(aK(cAb) \& aK(cSb)) \vee (aK(cLAb) \& aK(cLSb))] \text{ U.I., 8.}$ 10. $(aK(cAb) \& aK(cSb)) \vee (aK(cLAb) \& aK(cLSb)) \text{ M.P., 5., 9.}$ 11. $aK(cKb) \equiv (aK(cAb) \& aK(cSb)) \text{ U.I., 2.}$ 12. $\neg (aK(cAb) \& aK(cSb)) \text{ M.T., 6., 11.}$ 13. $(aK(cLAb) \& aK(cLSb)) \text{ D.S., 10., 12.}$ 14. $aK(cLKb) \equiv (aK(cLAb) \& aK(cLSb)) \text{ U.I. 3.}$ 15. $aK(cLKb) \text{ M.P. 13., 14.}$ 16. $\Box \text{ 15., 6.}$ 17. $\neg (\neg aK(cKb) \& \neg aK(cLKb)) \text{ Red. S.P., 6-16.}$ 18. $aK(cKb) \vee aK(cLKb) \text{ DeM., D.N., 17.}$ 19. $aEc \supset (aK(cKb) \vee aK(cLKb)) \text{ C.P. S.P. 5-18.}$ 20. $(z) [aEz \supset (aK(zKb) \vee aK(zLKb))] \text{ U.G. S.P. 5-19.}$ 21. $aKb \supset (z) [aEz \supset (aK(zKb) \vee aK(zLKb))] \text{ C.P. S.P. 4-20.}$ 22. $(z) [aEz \supset (aK(zKb) \vee aK(zLKb))] \text{ C.P. Asmpt.}$ 23. $\neg aKb \text{ Red. Asmpt.}$ 24. $aKb \equiv (z) \{ aEz \supset [(aK(zAb) \& aK(zSb)) \vee (aK(zLAb) \& aK(zLSb))] \}$

U.I., 1.

25. $\neg (z) \{ aEz \supset [(aK(zAb) \& aK(zSb)) \vee aK(zLAb) \& aK(zLSb)] \}$

M.T., 23., 24.

26. $(Ez) aEz \& -[(aK(cAb) \& aK(cSb)) \vee (aK(cLAb) \& aK(cLSb))]$

Q.N., Imp., DeM., 25.

27. $(Ez) [aEz \& -(aK(cAb) \& aK(cSb)) \& -(aK(cLAb) \& aK(cLSb))]$

DeM., 26.

28. $aEc \& -(aK(cAb) \& aK(cSb)) \& -(aK(cLAb) \& aK(cLSb))$

E. I. Asmpt.

29. $aK(cKb) \equiv (aK(cAb) \& aK(cSb))$ U.I., 2.

30. $-aK(cKb)$ M.T., 28., 29.

31. $aK(cLKb) \equiv (aK(cLAb) \& aK(cLSb))$ U.I., 3.

32. $-aK(cLKb)$ M.T., 28., 31.

33. $-aK(cKb) \& -aK(cLKb)$ Conj., 30., 32.

34. $-(aK(cKb) \vee aK(cLKb))$ DeM., 33.

35. $aEc \supset (aK(cKb) \vee aK(cLKb))$ U.I., 22.

36. $-aEc$ M.T., 34., 35.

37. \boxtimes 28., 36.

38. \boxtimes E. I. S.P., 28-37.

39. aKb Red. S.P., 23-38.

40. $(z) [aEz \supset (aK(zKb) \vee aK(zLKb))] \supset aKb$ C.P. S.P., 22-39.

41. $aKb \equiv (z) [aEz \supset (aK(zKb) \vee aK(zLKb))]$ Equiv., 21., 40.

42. $(x) (y) \left\{ xKy \equiv (z) [xEz \supset (xK(zKy) \vee xK(zLKy))] \right\}$ U.G.S.P. 4-41.

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Section 7

I believe that Plato accepted the principles:

7a. For any person p and any object x, it is legitimate for p to exercise power over others in matters pertaining to x if and only if p has the kind of knowledge which has x as its object.

and 7b. For any person p, and any object x, it is rational for someone to accept the authority of p in matters pertaining to x if and only if p has^o the kind of knowledge which has x as its object.

At Crito 47 Socrates says:

Does a man who is in training, and who is serious about it, pay attention to the praise and blame and opinion of all men, or only of the one man who is a doctor or trainer?

Crito: He pays attention only to the opinion of the one man.

.....

Socrates: ...And Crito, to be brief, is it not the same in everything? And, therefore, in questions of justice and injustice, and of the base and the honorable, and of good and evil, which we are now examining, ought we follow the opinion of the many and fear that, or the opinion of the one man who understands these matters (if we can find him), and feel more shame and fear before him than before all other men? For if we do not follow him, we shall corrupt and maim that part of us which, we used to say, is improved by justice and disabled by injustice.

and then goes on to deny that "life is worth living when that part of us which is maimed by injustice and is benefitted by justice is corrupt." It is clear from this passage that we should accept the authority of those who know. (See also Euthyphre 5A, Charmides 171D, and Euthydemus 291C.) That we should not accept the authority

of those who do not know, at least in morals, is a conclusion Socrates is trying to establish. A premise of the argument for this conclusion is that we should not follow the advice of those who do not have medical knowledge. It does not follow as a matter of logic that he holds this view of every kind of knowledge. However, I do not see why he would reject parallel arguments about the arts of the general, the pilot, the shipwright, and many others. In each case, following the opinions of the ignorant may cause us harm, and hence ought to be avoided.

At Lysis 209B-D there is this exchange,

In these matters, then you [Lysis] are allowed to do as you please; you may write whichever letter you like first, and whichever you like second. And in reading you enjoy the same liberty. And when you take up the lyre; neither father nor mother, I imagine, hinders you from tightening or loosening such strings as you choose, or from playing with your fingers or stick, as you may think proper. Or do they hinder you in such matters?

Oh dear, no!

What in the world, then, can be the reason, Lysis, that in these matters they don't hinder you, while in the former [mule-driving, charioteering, spinning wool] they do?

I suppose it is, Socrates, because I understand the one and don't understand the former.

Oh! That's it, is it, my fine fellow? It is not, then, for you to be old enough that your father is waiting in all these cases, but on the very day that he thinks you are wiser than he is, he will hand over to you himself and his property.

.....

And the Athenians? Will they, do you imagine, hand over to you their matters directly they perceive that you are wise enough to manage them?

Yes, I expect so.

If Lysis does not have knowledge of charioteering, it is not right for him to take the reins during the race. If he has knowledge of households, it is right for him to assume authority over his father's property. That the legitimacy of this authority extends to persons as well is evident from Socrates' claim that Lysis' father will put himself under his son's control.

Examples of the principles attributed to Plato in this chapter:

- 1a. Harmony is the object of one and only one kind of knowledge.
- 1b. Musical knowledge has one and only one object.
- 1c. Zalmoxis knows health just in case he has the kind of knowledge that has health as its object.
- 1d. If Zalmoxis knows whether or not someone has medical knowledge, then anything Zalmoxis examines is such that Zalmoxis knows whether or not that thing has the object of medical knowledge.

- 2a. Carpentry has a product.
- 2b. If Zalmoxis has medical knowledge, then he is able to produce the product of medical knowledge.
- 2c. If Critias has a kind of knowledge that is not one of the mathematical arts, then Critias is able to produce the product of that kind of knowledge.
- 2d. Seamanship has a product that no other kind of knowledge has.

- 3a. & 3b. Zalmoxis has the kind of knowledge that has health as its object just in case anything he examines is such that he knows whether or not it has health.

- 4a. If Milo has the kind of knowledge that has strength as its object, then he is able to speak truly consistently about strength.
- 4b. If Charmides is able to give a rational account about matters

pertaining to swiftness, then he knows swiftness.

- 5a. If Herodicus has the kind of knowledge that has health as its object, then he consistently acts rightly in matters pertaining to health.
- 5b. If Milo consistently acts rightly in matters pertaining to strength, then someone (possibly Milo himself) has knowledge of strength and Milo follows that person's advice in matters pertaining to strength.
- 5c. Solon acts rightly in matters pertaining to justice just in case there is a kind of knowledge that has justice as its object and Solon's actions are conducive to bringing about the product of that kind of knowledge.
- 5d. If Zalmoxis has medical knowledge, then Zalmoxis has the superlative sort of medical knowledge just in case he acts in accordance with certain causal part-whole principles to produce the product of medical knowledge.
- 6a. Damon knows harmony just in case any person he examines is such that he knows whether or not that person knows harmony.
- 6b. Damon knows harmony just in case any person he examines is such that he knows whether or not that person acts rightly and speaks truly in matters pertaining to harmony.
- 6c. Zalmoxis knows that Herodicus knows health just in case Zalmoxis knows that Herodicus speaks truly and acts rightly in matters pertaining to health.

6d. Critias knows that Socrates does not know health just in case
Critias knows that Socrates neither speaks truly nor acts
rightly in matters pertaining to health.

7a. It is legitimate for Critias to exercise power over others in
matters pertaining to justice just in case he has the kind of
knowledge that has justice as its object.

7b. It is rational for someone to accept Lysis' authority in matters
pertaining to health just in case Lysis has the kind of
knowledge that has health as its object.

Informal interpretation of predicates, relations, and constants:

Ox	x is an object
Kx	x is a kind of knowledge
Px	x is a person
xOy	x is an object of y
xKy	x knows y
xHy	x has y
xLy	x lacks y
xEy	x examines y
xK (yHz)	x knows y has z
xK (yLz)	x knows y lacks z
xK (yAz)	x knows y consistently acts rightly in matters pertaining to z
xK (ySz)	x knows y consistently speaks truly about matters pertaining to z
xK (yLAz)	x knows y does not consistently act rightly in matters pertaining to z
xK (yLSz)	x knows y does not consistently speak truly about matters pertaining to z
xK (yKz)	x knows y knows z
xK (yLkz)	x knows y does not know z
xKByz	x knows y by z
t	the temperate man
D	the doctor
k	knowledge
kk	knowledge of knowledge
h	health
J	justice
m	medicine
p	politics
G	goodness
E	evil
A	the afterlife

Footnotes to Chapter III

¹I should point out that I do not claim that at the time that he wrote the Charmides that Plato was aware of the principles I attribute to him in this chapter. Given the present amount of evidence we have concerning Plato's beliefs, it is unlikely that that question may be resolved. I claim that Plato is committed to these principles in the sense that the coherence of his views and the validity of his arguments presupposes his acceptance of them.

²Strictly speaking, this is not accurate. I shall argue later that each kind of knowledge has as objects a pair of contrary qualities. The abbreviation I employ here does not alter the structure of Plato's theory. It does simplify the presentation of that theory and eliminates a considerable amount of tedious detail in the formal analysis of the arguments of the Charmides. Although I shall often speak of a kind of knowledge as if it knew an object, this is of course to be understood as an abbreviated way of saying of a person who possesses a kind of knowledge that he knows an object. At the end of this chapter is a list containing an example of each of the principles I attribute to Plato.

³R.E. Allen, Plato's Euthyphro and the Earlier Theory of Forms. J. Brentlinger, "Incomplete Predicates and the Two-World Theory of the Phaedo." The latter approach is suggested by W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas. See Also John Rist, Eros and Psyche, Henry Teloh, "Self-Predication or Anaxagorean Causation in Plato," and T.G. Rosenmeyer, "Plato and Mass Words."

⁴It would be more accurate to use a connective that is stronger than material implication. I have no position to argue about what sort of entailment logic would best formulate Plato's views on conceptual truths, so I shall use the truth functional connective for purposes of simplicity and convenience. I have deviated from the notation usually employed for expressions denoting relations in order to make the meaning of the formalization of these principles immediately intelligible to the reader. A more conventional notation might use "Gxyz" for "x knows that y has z," "Hxyz" for "x knows that y lacks z," "Ixyz" for "x knows that y knows z," "Jxyz" for "x knows that y consistently acts rightly in matters pertaining to z," and so on for the other epistemological relations. At the end of this chapter is an informal interpretation of the predicates, relations, and constants I employ in formalizing the arguments of Plato's that I discuss in this dissertation.

⁵It may be that the product of each kind of knowledge is identical with the object of that kind of knowledge. The relationship that holds in medicine, its product is health and its objects are health and disease, may hold for each kind of knowledge. Hintikka, [3], argues that Plato and other Greek thinkers tended to identify the objects and products of faculties, but stops short of claiming that any philosopher actually accepted this identification. It seems to me to be an open question as far as Plato's early thought is concerned; I cannot think of any evidence which indicates that he did not identify the objects and products of knowledge.

⁶A briefer version of this principle that I shall often use later is 3b.

$$(x)(y)\left\{(Px \& Oy) \supset \left\{(z)\left\{xEz \supset [(zHy \ xK(zHy)) \& (zLy \ xK(zLy))]\right\} \equiv (Ew)(Kw \& yOw \& xHw)\right\}\right\}$$

⁷At Hippias Major 304D-E Socrates says
 ...how can you know whose speech is beautiful of the
 reverse - and the same applies to any action whatsoever -
 when you have no knowledge of beauty?

⁸It ought to be noted that since persons who do not have knowledge of some object are unable to recognize others who do have knowledge of that object, they will not know whose authority it is rational for them to accept.

C H A P T E R I V

ANALYSIS OF CHARMIDES 167B - 175D

Introduction

In the previous two chapters I have presented a general introduction to the Charmides and developed a theory about Plato's views on knowledge in the early dialogues. In this chapter I will present an interpretation of Charmides 167B - 175D. In Sections 3 and 4 of this chapter I shall make extensive use of the theory of knowledge attributed to Plato in Chapter III.

I choose to begin my discussion of the Charmides at 167B because it is the place where Socrates begins his examination of the idea that knowledge of knowledge is a kind of knowledge that will enable its possessor to properly order the state. Up to 166C the dialogue is an examination of definitions that identify *sophrosyne* with concepts traditionally associated with it. At 166C Critias shifts his position from a claim that *sophrosyne* is knowledge of oneself to the claim that it is the only knowledge which knows itself and the other knowledges. After a dramatic interlude there is this exchange:

Would it then, [Socrates] said, also be a knowledge of the absence of knowledge, if it is a knowledge of knowledge?

Of course, [Critias] said.

Then only the temperate man will know himself and will be able to examine what he knows and does not know, and in the same way he will be able to inspect other people to see when a man does in fact know what he knows and thinks he knows, and when again he does not know what he thinks he knows, and no one else will be able to do this. And being temperate and temperance and knowing oneself amount

to this, to knowing what one knows and does not know.
Or isn't this what you say?

Yes, it is, he said. (166E - 167A.)

Socrates' questions not only mark a sharp change in the dramatic structure and philosophical direction of the dialogue, they also introduce a novel analysis of *sophrosyne* that is not to be found in the writings of Plato's predecessors. Although the conception of *sophrosyne* developed here is attributed to Critias, it is doubtful that it had its origins with persons other than Plato and Socrates. The personal and political importance of recognizing what we and others do and do not know is one of the most important and original themes of the early dialogues, and it is natural that Plato should desire to find its epistemological foundations. Since the entire rest of the philosophical discussion is devoted to examining knowledge of knowledge, the concept must have had a strong attraction for Plato and seemed to him to be of considerable importance. Consequently, the place where Socrates begins his examination of knowledge of knowledge is a suitable place to begin my discussion of the Charmides.

Socrates' examination may be divided into three parts. From 167B to 169A he argues that knowledge of knowledge is not possible. From 170A to 171C he argues that the possessor of knowledge of knowledge will not have the abilities claimed for him by Critias at 167A. Socrates then argues that even if knowledge of knowledge existed and had a full range of epistemological powers, including the ones he has argued it does not have; it will still be unable to bring about the

ideal state. Section 1 of this chapter is devoted to the first part of Socrates' examination, Sections 3 and 4 to the second part, and Sections 5 and 6 to the third part. Section 2 discusses the passage at 169D-E, where Critias claims that the possessor of knowledge of knowledge will know himself.

One salient difference between my treatment of the Charmides and those that are to be found in the secondary literature on the dialogue is that I have made extensive use of the techniques of formal logic. This approach has a number of advantages over exclusive reliance on traditional methods of interpretation. The first is that it considerably facilitates discussion of the often debated topic of the validity of Plato's arguments. Since it is one of my major theses that Plato's arguments are valid, I am able to support my position by actually presenting valid formal arguments whose conclusions are claims Socrates asserts and whose premises are statements for which there is evidence to believe that Plato accepted. This provides a strong rejoinder to those commentators who have claimed that some of Plato's arguments in this passage are fallacious.¹ Secondly, this approach lacks a good deal of the ambiguity that most interpretations of Plato suffer from. When a commentator describes one of Plato's arguments in a few sentences of a natural language, there are usually at least a half dozen distinct formal reconstructions of the argument that are roughly compatible with that description. When a commentator briefly describes each member of a set of arguments, and then makes general claims about that set of arguments, the task of carefully examining his interpre-

tation of Plato becomes an elaborate enterprise in its own right. The precision that is engendered by the techniques of formal logic is also advantageous because it facilitates critical evaluation of the interpretation I present. There is one passage that I know of where my interpretation does not quite match up with what the text says (170B11), and it sticks out like a sore thumb. The subtlety of the difficulty is such that I probably would not have noticed it if I had used an informal approach. Since my formal reconstruction of each step of Socrates' reasoning from 170A to 171C requires that I give a complete representation of the premises employed and their relationships to the claims Socrates asserts, the reader is readily able to evaluate the extent to which my interpretation of the arguments is successful.

Finally, the techniques of formal logic considerably assist my exposition and justification of my position on Plato's method and purpose in the second half of the Charmides. I claim that he is rationally examining the idea that knowledge of knowledge is a kind of knowledge that will enable its possessor to properly order the state. In the secondary literature on the Charmides there are numerous general claims about the dialogue, but except for John Gould, whose views I shall examine in the next chapter, no author makes a serious attempt to show how his general thesis enables one to have a detailed and comprehensive understanding of the dialogue. In Sections 3 and 4 of this chapter I argue that each of Socrates' claims about the epistemological power of knowledge of knowledge are consequences of a certain way of thinking about knowledge. I am able to justify this claim

by giving formal proofs to show how his claims follow from general principles that articulate this way of thinking about knowledge. I am able to provide an interpretation of the philosophical aspects of this passage, 170A - 170C, and its preceeding and succeeding passages, by attributing to Plato a collection of motives and philosophical beliefs. Thus this chapter constitutes an explanation of the material it discusses. It is unfortunately not a complete explanation. A theory about a dialogue of Plato's would be complete if it answered every good question a student of Plato's thought might ask about the dialogue. Even within the limited aspects of the Charmides I seek to explain, it will be evident to the reader that I have not provided answers to many important questions. In a sense this is a fortunate consequence of the methods I employ; it enables one to have a clearer apprehension of the shortcomings of my interpretation and the features of Plato's thought that stand in need of explanation.

Section 1: 167B - 169A

Charmides 167B - 169A has been given a curious sort of treatment in the literature: it has not been seen as having an important and integral function in the dialogue. When it has not been virtually ignored, the passage is treated as a joke, as irrelevant to the purposes of the dialogue, as a tedious and pointless exercise in analogy, and as being based upon a logical mistake or philosophical misconception of Socrates.² But given Plato's dramatic and philosophical genius, we must initially regard these claims with a good deal of skepticism. The passage ought to be approached with the presumption that Plato believed that important philosophical issues are under discussion, and that these issues have an essential relevance to the dialogue as a whole.

There are a number of good reasons for accepting this presumption. The passage is a sustained, detailed, and lengthy argument for a single conclusion. The argument is put forward by Socrates, and the argument is referred to several times at the end of the dialogue (172C, 175B). Plato very carefully tells the reader what the passage tries to show: that it is doubtful that knowledge of knowledge is possible. With equal care, he points out that while the passage has not proven that knowledge of knowledge is impossible, serious problems have been raised and we are not justified in assuming that it is possible. I suggest that this carefulness indicates that Plato was seriously concerned with the issues under discussion in the passage. Finally, the issue being considered, the possibility of knowledge of knowledge,

is immensely important for Plato. Knowledge of knowledge is required for the ideal of moral knowledge he is trying to find in the Charmides. The Guardians of the Republic use their knowledge of the knowledge of non-philosophers to order the state. In the Apology Socrates says that he is unique among the citizens of Athens because he knows the limits of his own knowledge. Moreover, in the Charmides, Socrates is using his own moral knowledge to care for the soul of Charmides. Just as the doctor cares for the body because that is the thing in which the qualities of health and disease inhere, the man with moral knowledge cares for the soul because it is the thing that is just or unjust, courageous or cowardly. Given Socrates' doctrine that virtue is knowledge, the possibility of the moral education of one person by another is a special case of the possibility of knowledge of knowledge. Thus, the claim that Socrates tries to refute, that knowledge of knowledge is possible, bears upon philosophical issues that are important for Plato.³

In the first part of this section I shall present three different ways of reconstructing Socrates' general argument strategy at 167B - 169A. I should emphasize that I am not trying to set forth Socrates' actual argument or even his actual argument strategy. I only wish to show that each general way of interpreting the argument is such it does not convincingly prove that knowledge of knowledge is impossible. I also wish to show that Socrates does present grounds which support that conclusion, hence he is justified in concluding that it is doubtful that knowledge of knowledge exists. In the latter part of this section

I shall argue that Plato had certain theoretical and factual beliefs in virtue of which it was both natural and reasonable for him to accept those premises which support the conclusion that knowledge of knowledge is impossible.

Socrates' examination of the possibility of knowledge of knowledge begins at 167B11.

Well, [Socrates] said, wouldn't the whole thing amount to this, if what you said just now is true, that there is one knowledge which is not of anything except itself and the other knowledges and that this same knowledge is also a knowledge of the absence of knowledge,

Yes, indeed, [Critias said].

Then see what an odd thing we are attempting to say, my friend - because if you look for this same thing in other cases, you will find, I think, that it is impossible [ἀδύνατον εἶναι]

Socrates' subsequent argument will be clarified if different senses of 'ἀδύνατος' are distinguished at the outset. One sense corresponds roughly to our notion of conceptual impossibility, as including and being broader than mathematical impossibility. Just as we would argue that there cannot be a greatest number or a location that is north of itself, Plato argues that there cannot be a greater (and gives similar arguments for the relations of double, more, heavier, and older) which is greater than itself and all great things. This sort of impossibility is termed "absolutely impossible" (ἀδύνατα παντάπαστι [168E]). In this sense of impossibility, Socrates is unable to prove that knowledge of knowledge is impossible. However, he suggests that someone other than himself may be able to decide if knowledge of knowledge is possible or not. This decision would

apparently be based upon considerations about a kind of possibility that is distinct from the one I have termed "conceptual impossibility."

You observe then, Critias, that of the cases we have gone through, some appear to us to be absolutely impossible, whereas in others it is very doubtful if they could ever apply their own faculties to themselves? And that magnitude and number and similar things belong to the absolutely impossible group, isn't that so?

Certainly.

[But again, with hearing and sight, or in the further cases of motion moving itself and heat burning itself]⁴ - all cases like this also produce disbelief in some, though perhaps there are some in whom it does not. What we need, my friend, is some great man to give an adequate interpretation of this point in every detail, whether no existing thing can by nature apply its own faculty to itself but only towards something else, or whether some can, but others cannot. We also need him to determine whether, if there are things that apply to themselves, the knowledge which we call temperance is among them. (168E-169A)

In addition to the things that are absolutely impossible, Socrates apparently rejects the possibility of reflexive loves, fears, desires, wishes, and opinions, and strongly doubts the possibility of a reflexive hearing, vision, motion, or heat. Whether or not he is using the same or different senses of "possibility" in each case seems to be an undecidable question. I shall assume that in these cases Socrates is using "impossibility" in a vague sense that is distinct from the sense I have termed "conceptual impossibility."

Symbolically formulated, when Socrates doubts that there is anything similar to knowledge of knowledge, he doubts that anything satisfies this sentence:

$$(Ez)(Ex)\left\{(Ez)(R_{xz}) \ \& \ (y)[(Ew)(R_{yw}) \supset R_{xy}] \ \& \ (u)\left\{[(Et)(R_{ut}) \ \& \ u \neq x] \supset (v)(R_{uv} \supset \neg R_{xv})\right\}\right\}.$$

Is there a thing which is R, bears R to everything that is R, and does not bear R to anything that the other things that are R bear R to?⁵ "And would you say that there was a love of such a sort as to be a love of no fine thing but of itself and the other loves?" (167E)

Is there a knowledge which knows itself and the other knowledges and does not know what those knowledges know? (Socrates follows that part of the definition of temperance which says that it is knowledge of the absence of knowledge in the first two cases, mentioning a vision of the lack of vision and a hearing of the lack of hearing, and then drops it. This condition does not figure importantly in this passage, and I shall omit discussion of it. It represents one of several arguments that Socrates does not give, which, if one accepts arguments by analogy, he could present to show that knowledge of knowledge is a strange thing. How could one hear deafness, or be taller than the absence of tallness?) Socrates' doubt of this principle is evident from the fact that he considers, and has Critias reject, the existence of a wide variety of things that might exemplify it.

There are three different ways in which Socrates' argument may be reconstructed: as a deductive argument, an inductive argument, or an argument by analogy.⁶ For purposes of simplicity, I shall say that anything that satisfies the sentence Socrates doubts has property P. The presentation of these argument strategies has been further simplified by eliminating the modal terms "possible" and "impossible." The conclusion I represent Socrates as arguing for is stronger than the conclusion he asserts at the end of the passage. I do this because Socrates is

considering the stronger claim in the course of his argument (cf. 168A10-13) and then concludes by saying that it is doubtful that knowledge of knowledge exists. I interpret the dramatic structure of the passage to be an attempt to establish the stronger claim, and the conclusion to be an assertion of the weaker claim that has actually been established.

The argument by analogy is

- A. 1a) A wide variety of things do not have property P.
- 2a) Knowledge of knowledge is like these things.
- 3a) Knowledge of knowledge does not have property P.

Aside from the fact that this is an argument by analogy, Socrates does not really prove the first premise. For some of the things they consider, he does not prove or even flatly assert that they lack the property, but only says that it is doubtful that they have it. Consequently, this is a very weak argument. The argument by induction is

- B. 1b) A wide variety of things were examined and none of them had property P.
- 2b) Knowledge of knowledge does not have property P.

Here again the premise itself has not been firmly established, and does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion. A reasonable inference from 1b) is 3b): it is probable that knowledge of knowledge does not have property P. This is the conclusion Socrates ultimately asserts, and it is supported by his premises.

Finally, the argument may be reconstructed as a deductive argument:

- C. 1c) For any general⁷ property Q, if one kind of thing has property Q, then there will be other kinds of things that have property Q.
- 2c) It is not the case that any kind of thing other than knowledge of knowledge has general property P.
- 3c) It is not the case that knowledge of knowledge has P.

This argument is valid, but both of the premises are doubtful. As with the corresponding premise in the other arguments, 2c) has not been firmly established. 1c) has two sorts of weaknesses. From a dramatic standpoint, Critias has claimed earlier (165E, 166B-C) that knowledge of knowledge has the unique general property of being related to itself. Secondly, to use some prosaic language, it is not obvious that there cannot be things that operate according to laws of their own. The sun, as a heat that burns itself, and the soul, as a thing that moves itself, might seem to Athenian readers of the dialogue to be plausible candidates for entities with unique powers.

The weaknesses in each of the three general argument strategies I have presented reflect legitimate doubts one might have about Socrates' argument in this passage. Presumably, Plato was aware of at least some of these problems, and consequently he has Socrates deny that the conclusion has been proven. Nevertheless, Plato must have thought that it was natural and rational to doubt the possibility of knowledge of knowledge. The strength of the arguments I have presented is due to the fact that knowledge of knowledge does bear important similarities to the things it is compared to, and Plato felt that he had good reasons for rejecting the possibility of these other things.

Instantiated to the cases Socrates refers to as absolutely impossible, the principle he doubts produces the absurdities that there are things which are greater than themselves, double themselves, more than themselves, heavier than themselves, and older than themselves.

The correlative absurdities Socrates draws, "if it were actually greater than itself, it would also be less than itself," follow from obviously true principles like:

(x)(y) if x is greater than y, then y is less than x.

Outright contradictions, not drawn by Socrates, follow from equally obvious principles:

(x)(y) if x is greater than y, then it is not the case that y is greater than x.

The important similarity that these relations bear to knowledge of knowledge is that they have a dynamis in virtue of which they are of something.

[Socrates:] Come on then: is this knowledge a knowledge of something and does it have a certain faculty of being 'of something'?

[Critias:] Yes, it does.

And do we say the greater has a certain faculty of being greater than something?

Yes, it has. (168B)

Socrates' arguments about the faculties he terms "absolutely impossible" seem convincing to modern readers. His rejection of the possibility of another class of faculties seems quite puzzling. He and Critias have this exchange about psychological faculties:

And do you think that there is any desire that is a desire for no pleasure but for itself and the other desires?

Certainly not.

Nor indeed any wish, I think, that wished for no good but only for itself and the other wishes.

No, that would follow.

And would you say there was a love of such a sort as to be

a love of no fine thing but of itself and the other loves?

No, he said, I would not.

And have you ever observed a fear that fears itself and the other fears, but of frightful things fears not a one?

I have never observed such a thing, he said.

Or an opinion that is of itself and other opinions but opines nothing that others opinions do?

Never. (167E-168A)

To us at least, a discussion of these faculties seems to require a more detailed treatment than Plato presents. It seems not only possible, but occasionally actual, that someone could desire desires, wish for wishes, love loves, fear fears, and have opinions about opinions. A claim that it is impossible for someone to desire all desires surely cannot be rejected or accepted without some serious deliberation. However, Plato makes his claims as if they were immediately obvious.

Except for case of opinion, which I do not have an explanation for, I suggest that these claims do seem obviously true to Plato because he had a different conception of psychological attitudes than we do. I believe that Plato accepts at face value claims implicit in Socrates' statements:

- a) Every desire is a desire for some pleasure
- b) Every wish is a wish for some good
- c) Every love is a love for a fine thing (ἔρως καλοῦ)
- d) Every fear is a fear of a frightful thing.⁸

Using the concepts and terminology Socrates introduces at 168B and 168D, the above statements can be seen as consequences of these psycho-

logical principles:

- a¹) The faculty of desire is directed towards the quality of pleasure
- b¹) The faculty of wish is directed towards the quality of goodness
- c¹) The faculty of love is directed towards the quality of beauty
- d¹) The faculty of fear is directed towards the quality of frightfulness.

My claim is that Plato believed that being directed towards these particular qualities is an essential or defining characteristic of these psychological attitudes. I shall use a vague term and describe these principles as "conceptual presuppositions."

If they are conceptual presuppositions, then it is clear why Critias readily denies the existence of a wish that wishes no good, but only itself and the other wishes. If wishing is always wishing for a good, then there cannot be a wish which does not wish for a good. However, we now come to a further problem: Why cannot wishes be good, desires pleasurable, love beautiful, and fear frightful? It surely is not obvious that a love which loves all loves does not have as the object of its love, only things that are beautiful. On my interpretation of the argument, Socrates surely needs the premise that love is not a beautiful thing. There is an extremely good reason for attributing this presupposition to him; he holds it in the Symposium:

"desire and love have for their objects things or qualities which a man does not at present possess but which he lacks" (200E)

If the object of love is beauty, then a love which loved itself would have to have beauty. But according to the Symposium, love must lack the thing it loves. (It should be noted that this is presented as a

conceptual truth. It develops from the passage in which love is said to be love of something in the way that father is father of something.)

If Plato held a theory like this when he wrote the Charmides, then it is conceptually obvious that there cannot be a love which loves itself and the other loves. But since Agathon requires an argument to be convinced of one of the premises for this claim, why doesn't Plato give a more detailed explanation in the Charmides? The reason for this is probably that it would involve too great a digression in an already complicated dialogue.

This explains why Plato rejects the existence of the first four psychological faculties. More importantly, it provides further explanation for why Plato believed reflexive psychological relations to be problematic. The Symposium passage suggests that at 167E Plato is dealing with problems that were extremely important for him. He believes in the cases of desire, love, and surely wish also, that the principle at 168D,

the very thing which has its own faculty applied to itself will have to have that nature towards which the faculty was directed.

simply does not hold. Plato may well hold a similar view about fear. The analysis of the desire for health at Symposium 200 can be used as a model for an analysis of a man's fear of disease. The man who is diseased might be said to fear disease only in the sense that he fears his continued possession of it in the future or that he fears a future consequence of his having disease now. The man who does directly fear disease is the healthy man who lacks it. Consequently, if we only fear

things that we do not now possess, and a fear of fear must have the quality towards which fear is directed, there cannot be a fear of fear. Convincing evidence that Plato accepted just such an analysis at the time he wrote the Charmides is at Laches 198B-C:

...fear is the expectation of a future evil--or isn't this your opinion too, Laches?

Very much so, Socrates.

You hear what we have to say, Nicias: that fearful things are future evils, and the ones inspiring hope are either future non-evils or future goods.

Here it is clear that we can only fear things that we do not possess.

The exchange about opinion is a passage that I do not know how to interpret. A principal difficulty is that in this case, unlike any of the others, Plato does not say what thing ordinary opinion is directed towards. A variety of speculative interpretations are possible if one considers different ways of employing different interpretations of Plato's views on opinion and its relation to knowledge in the Meno and the Republic. Since developing such speculations here would be lengthy, complicated, and not directly relevant to my purposes, I shall forego a discussion of different ways in which the passage might be interpreted.

Socrates considers perceptual relations in two passages. The first is at 167C-D:

...Consider, for instance, if you think there could be a kind of vision that is not the vision of the things that the other visions are but is the vision of itself and the other visions and also of the lack of visions, and although it is a type of vision, it sees no color, only itself and the other visions. Do you think there is something of this kind?

Good heavens, no, not I.

And what about a kind of hearing that hears no sound but

hears itself and the other hearings and non-hearings?

Not this either.

Then take all the senses together and consider if you think there is a sense of the senses and of itself but that senses nothing which the other senses sense.⁹

I can't see that there is.

At 168D Socrates states the principle

...The very thing which has its own faculty applied to itself will have to have that nature towards which the faculty was directed...

and goes on to argue

...in the case of hearing don't we say that hearing is of nothing else than sound?

Yes.

Then, if it actually hears itself, it will hear the sound which it possesses in itself? Because otherwise it would not do any hearing.

Necessarily so.

And vision, I take it, O best of men, if it actually sees itself, will have to have some color? Because vision could certainly never see anything that has no color.

The point of the last two arguments is clear: Socrates believes that it is absurd to believe that a vision could have a color or a hearing could produce a sound. (Socrates does not mention another consequence of the same argument: if hearing of hearing is hear the other hearings, then they too will have to have a sound.) I believe that in the first two arguments Socrates is relying on presuppositions stated in the last two arguments: Vision can only be of a color and hearing can only be of a sound. Hence there cannot be a vision that sees no color or a hearing that hears no sound. These two arguments

draw an absurdity from the third condition of the principle Socrates doubts: $(\exists x)(\exists y)\{(\exists z)(R_{xz}) \& (y)[(\exists w)(R_{yw}) \supset R_{xy}] \& (u)\{[(\exists t)(R_{ut}) \& u \neq x] \supset (v)(R_{uv} \supset \neg R_{xv})\}\}$.

and the second pair of arguments draw an absurdity from the second condition.

Unless he is merely claiming that we do not have any reason for supposing there there is a special faculty of perception that senses the other senses, I do not see why Socrates immediately rejects the possibility of a sense of the senses. The soul would seem to be a good candidate for such an entity; it might sense itself, sense each of the senses, not itself sense what they sense, and sense that one or more of the senses was not functioning.¹⁰

I have little to say about the last two reflexive faculties Plato considers:

...or in the further cases of motion moving itself and heat burning itself--all cases like this also produce disbelief in some, though perhaps there are some in whom it does not. (168E)

I conjectured earlier that the self-moving motion was the soul and the heat that burns itself was the sun.¹¹ The second is only a guess, but the first has some plausibility, due to Plato's later views and the fact that the Charmides is explicitly concerned with the well-being of Charmides' soul.

I have argued that Plato believed that he had good reasons for rejecting the existence of many of the reflexive faculties considered at 167B - 169A. Since the claims that these faculties do not exist

inductively and analogically support the claim that it is doubtful that knowledge of knowledge exists, Plato's argument is valid. In the next section I shall discuss Critias' argument that the possessor of knowledge of knowledge will know himself, and in succeeding sections discuss Socrates' examination of the benefits of knowledge of knowledge.

Section 2: 169 D-E, Does Knowledge of
Knowledge Imply Self-Knowledge?

The most important passage of the Charmides, 169D-172A, considers whether or not a particular kind of benefit is to be derived by the possession of knowledge of knowledge. This benefit is first described by Socrates at 168A:

Then only the temperate man will know himself and will be able to examine what he knows and does not know, and in the same way he will be able to inspect other people to see when a man does in fact know what he knows and thinks he knows, and no one else will be able to do this. And being temperate and temperance and knowing oneself amount to this, to knowing what one knows and does not know.

170A - 171C is strictly a consideration of whether or not the abilities mentioned by Socrates will in fact be had by the possessor of knowledge of knowledge. Assessing the extent to which these abilities actually are beneficial is a distinct problem taken up in subsequent passages of the dialogue.

In the passage quoted above Socrates gets Critias to agree that the temperate man, (defined as the man with the knowledge that knows itself, the other knowledges, and the absence of knowledge), and only the temperate man, will:

1. Know himself (167A1)
2. Be able to examine what he knows and does not know (167A2) and determine what he knows and does not know (167A8)
3. Be able to examine other people and determine, of the things that they think they know, whether or not they know them. (167A3-6)

In the passage to be discussed in this section, 169D-E, Socrates apparently accepts the first claim. The following two sections of this chapter will consider Socrates' refutations of the second claim at 170A-D and the third claim at 170E-171C.

Following the inconclusive discussion about the possibility of knowledge of knowledge at 167B-169A, Socrates advances the discussion by assuming that this kind of knowledge is possible, and asks how

is it any more possible to know what one knows and does not know? We did say, I think, that knowing oneself and being temperate consisted in this?

169E Yes indeed, [Critias] said, and your conclusion seems to me to follow, Socrates, because if a man has a knowledge which knows itself, he would be the very same sort of man as the knowledge which he has. For instance, whenever a person has speed he is swift, and when he has beauty he is beautiful, and when he has knowledge he is knowing. So when a person has a knowledge which knows itself, then I imagine he will be a person who knows himself.

It is not this point, [Socrates] said, on which I am confused, that whenever someone possesses this thing which knows itself he will know himself, but how the person possessing it will necessarily know what he knows and what he does not know.

The problem Socrates raises is the subject of the subsequent argument. I want to here consider the argument by which Critias infers that the person who has the knowledge which knows itself will know himself and discusses why Socrates apparently accepts this inference. I think it would be a mistake to spend a great deal of time trying to articulate the logical structure of Critias' argument. The traditional interpretation, which I substantially subscribe to, is that Plato portrays Critias as a dilettante at sophistry.¹² As the

dramatic incidents of the dialogue amply demonstrate, his primary concern is not to find out the truth about virtue, but to maintain his reputation as a man with intellectual talents. He surely does not have the verbal or intellectual abilities had by Prodicus, Gorgias, Protagoras, Euthydemus, and Dionysidorus. Critias' two lengthy and confusing speeches at 163B-C and 164C-165B, and the confidence with which he puts forth unexamined statements, are intended to contrast with the careful step by step inquiry of Socrates. I do not suggest that we should not examine carefully what Critias says, but I do claim that we should not expect his assertions to have an underlying theoretical coherence of the sort that I have attributed to Socrates' questions and statements. Consequently I shall give a brief description of Critias' argument in which I accuse him of committing an obvious fallacy. (In a note I have sketched out some of the problems involved in interpreting his argument.) I shall not present an explanation of what he means by his premises or his conclusion, since the dialogue repeatedly and explicitly shows that he does not know the meaning of his own assertions.

Critias claims that a person who has the knowledge which knows itself will be a person who knows himself. He relies upon a general principle which sanctions the unobjectable¹³ inferences that a person who has speed is swift, a person who has beauty is beautiful, and a person who has knowledge is knowing.¹⁴ I suspect that Critias would agree that a person who has the knowledge which knows health will be in the position of knowing health. If this is the appropriate model for his argument, then he can legitimately infer that a person who has

the knowledge which knows itself will be in a position of knowing a knowledge that knows itself. Since there does not seem to be anything in the general principle, whatever it is, or in the expression "knowledge which knows itself" about knowledge of oneself, Critias cannot validly infer that the individual with the knowledge that knows itself, will know himself. Indeed, it is hard to see what would lead him to even try to draw such an inference. Perhaps he understood the inference as something like this: A man with the self-knowing knowledge will know himself. "Self-knowing knowledge" is an alternative way of expressing "knowledge which knows itself" and, with a different meaning, "self-knowledge." On this interpretation, the argument is a slippery equivocation worthy of Euthydemus or Dionysodorus. Perhaps Critias is being portrayed as someone who is unsuccessfully attempting to emulate the sort of sophistry displayed in the Euthydemus. At 163D there is the suggestion that he has unsuccessfully tried to imitate Prodicus.

After Critias' argument, Socrates says:

It is not this point, I said, on which I am confused, that whenever someone possesses this thing which knows itself he will know himself, (169E).

Strictly speaking, this does not even entail that Socrates accepts Critias' conclusion. Someone will not be confused about a principle when they see that it is false and know why it is false. However, the context suggests that Socrates does accept Critias' conclusion without questioning it. The purpose of his remark, that he is not confused, is to enable him to avoid examining the conclusion and the argument in favor of it so that he may deal with the issue he is interested in:

whether or not the possessor of knowledge of knowledge will know what he knows and what he does not know.¹⁵ The dramatic effect of the statement is that it teases the reader. Critias' conclusion is hardly self-evident, and it is perplexing that Socrates should readily assent to it. At no place in the Charmides or any other dialogue is there a detailed discussion of self-knowledge. Consequently, it is impossible to determine with certainty what Plato thought self-knowledge was when he wrote the Charmides.¹⁶ My own view is that Plato did not have a theoretical understanding of self-knowledge at this period of his life. Since the direct evidence on which to base a judgement about Critias' inference is meager, I shall forego a discussion of it. However, I do want to note that there is a reasonable prima facie ground for doubting that Plato accepted the view that knowledge of knowledge implies self-knowledge. There is surely more to a person (or even to his soul; if Plato accepted the view of the author of Alcibiades Minor, that a person is identical with his soul, then self-knowledge would be knowledge of the soul,) than his knowledge or ignorance, and knowledge of knowledge will not enable him to know these things. It is of course possible to argue that Socrates is using the expression "know himself" in a weak way in this passage; so that it means only that the knower of knowledge will have some knowledge of himself. On such a reading, the inference is legitimate. As I shall argue later, the person who has knowledge of knowledge may know that he has that kind of knowledge, and he will know that he has or lacks other kinds of knowledge (though he will not know what kinds of knowledge

they are). But given that self-knowledge has been introduced by reference to the inscription at Delphi, it is implausible to assume that it should be given such a limited interpretation in this passage.

Thomas Rosenmeyer has argued that Plato accepted as valid Critias' inference that the man who has the knowledge which knows itself will know himself.¹⁷ Rosenmeyer says

The suggestion to be advanced here is as follows: the convertibility of $\gamma\upsilon\omega\tau\iota\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ and $\gamma\upsilon\omega\tau\iota\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\upsilon\tau\eta\varsigma$ shows that $\gamma\upsilon\omega\tau\iota\varsigma$, or better, as Socrates puts it, $\tau\omicron\ \gamma\iota\gamma\upsilon\omega\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\nu$, is not only the abstractly conceived activity of knowing, but the totality of all knowing, or rather the totality of all knowers-having-knowledge....in the present passage of the Charmides, Plato does not, whatever the reason, distinguish sharply between the sum total of all conceivable knowers-having-knowledge ("collective") and the act of all knowers as distinct from their persons ("abstraction"). (P. 91)

Rosenmeyer argues that in Greek a certain class of terms, a subset of mass words called "nexus-substantives," are multiply referential in that they may signify one or more of the following: an abstract entity or quality, a thing having this quality, the class of things having this quality, and the members of the class of things having the quality. (P. 43) He says

The area of reality signified by the mass-word is larger and more comprehensive than modern meticulousness would allow; it embraces both class and member, both entity and group, both thing and mass, both concrete act and abstraction. Hence knowledge in the Charmides is both an act of knowledge and knowledge in the abstract, it is both the thing known and the class of all knowers. (P. 94)

Rosenmeyer does not explicitly show how the multiply referential character of the terms for knowledge explains why Plato accepted

Critias' inference, but his remarks indicate how this may be done.

When Critias says that a man has knowledge of knowledge, he means at least the following: the man has the abstract quality knowledge of knowledge, the man knows the abstract quality knowledge, the man knows the class of all knowers, and the man knows the members of the class of all knowers. The last clause is the important one: since the man is a member of the class of all knowers, he will know himself.

If Rosenmeyer's views on the semantics of Greek are correct, there is a sense of knowing oneself in which the inference is valid. I shall not discuss his views on Greek; I wish only to point out that the sense of self-knowledge Rosenmeyer proposes is similar to the weak interpretation I have discussed above, and requires that we attribute a fallacious argument to Critias.

When Critias says that the definition of *sophrosyne* is the inscription at Delphi, the natural response is to assume that he means self-knowledge in some deep and profound sense. Consequently, when Critias claims that the man who has knowledge of knowledge knows himself, he seems to be inferring that the man has some deep and profound knowledge of himself. It is natural to suppose that he is doing this, and such an inference is as fallacious on Rosenmeyer's views as it is on my own. Since the man knows himself because he knows the members of the class of knowers, the knowledge he has of himself in virtue of this fact is presumably no greater than his knowledge of other knowers. Rosenmeyer does not say what this knowledge amounts to, and it is difficult to formulate a plausible account of what it might be.

If we say that all knowers are such that the man who has knowledge of knowledge knows that they are knowers, we must assume that the man is personally acquainted with every knower in the world. Perhaps the man's relation to the members of the class of knowers is that he can recognize that they have knowledge if he becomes acquainted with them. Since he is acquainted with himself, he recognizes that he has knowledge.¹⁸ This is surely not the sort of self-knowledge referred to by the Delphic inscription, and consequently requires that we attribute a fallacious argument to Critias.

On the interpretation I have offered, Critias' claim that Sophrosyne is the only knowledge which is both of the other knowledges and of itself (166C) is a shift from his position that it is self-knowledge (164D). Robert Wellman has argued that the two positions are the same:

knowing oneself is one with knowing itself since 'oneself' and 'itself' refer to knowing rather than a substantive entity on the one hand and a body of knowledge or science on the other. The object of knowing is identical in both cases: the act of knowing. (p. 111, "The Question Posed at Charmides 165A-166C")

It seems to me that the principle difficulty with this view is its claim that knowing oneself is knowing an act of knowing. Wellman's argument for this claim is dubious, and the position itself is open to a serious objection. His argument consists of two premises, both of which are plausible but do not imply his conclusion. Wellman says

the problem of searching for a suitable definition of sophrosyne clearly becomes a question of the possibility of knowing the mind in certain of its functional aspects. (p. 110) ...Socrates conceived of the soul primarily as a principle of intellectual and moral activity. (p. 111)

These remarks suggest the plausible view that sophrosyne involves

knowing some of the functional activities of the soul. But if we accept this line of thought, knowing oneself would seem to be knowing all of the functional activities of one's own soul, and the knowledge that is of itself and the other knowledges seems to be knowing the knowing activities of the souls of all knowers. Even if knowledge of activities can be reduced to knowledge of acts, there does not seem to be much overlap between the two kinds of knowledge, let alone an identity. Self-knowledge implies knowledge of activities related to one's own opinions, emotions, and appetites; and knowledge of knowledge implies knowing the knowing activities of other people. Wellman's view does permit us to say that the 'oneself' and 'itself' in knowing oneself and knowing itself refer to the same sorts of things (acts or activities) but it does not show that they refer to the same thing.

Secondly, for Socrates self-knowledge surely involves knowledge of one's own ignorance. Hence, part of what is referred to by the 'oneself' in 'knowing oneself' is ignorance. Since ignorance is not itself an act of knowing, the objects of self-knowledge must include things that are not acts of knowing.

Section 3: 170A-D

At 170A-D Socrates presents a refutation of Critias' claim that the possession of knowledge of knowledge entails that one knows what one knows and what one does not know. In this argument Socrates makes a number of claims and inferences which are not justified solely on the basis of premises he and Critias have agreed upon. However, I shall argue that Socrates' arguments are valid, provided certain enthymematic premises are adjoined to the premises mentioned in the text.¹⁹ These additional premises are, or are directly based upon, the theoretical principles about the nature of knowledge that I attributed to Plato in Chapter IV. 170A-D begins with this exchange:

Socrates: Supposing that there is a knowledge of knowledge, will it be anything more than the ability to divide things and say that one is knowledge and the other is not?

Critias: No, it amounts to this. (170A7-A10)

The interpretation of the second half of the Charmides is complicated by the fact that Socrates sometimes speaks of the different kinds of knowledge and of other faculties as if they existed by themselves, and sometimes as they exist when they are possessed by persons. In the passage quoted above he speaks of the abilities of knowledge of knowledge, while his argument concerns the abilities of a person who possesses knowledge of knowledge. Consequently, I shall formulate Socrates' statement as it applies to a person's possession of knowledge of knowledge. I interpret the statement to mean:

If the temperate man examines a person, then if the

person has knowledge the temperate man will know he has knowledge, and if the person lacks knowledge, then the temperate man will know the person lacks knowledge.

Symbolically formulated, the claim is

$$(x) \{ (Px \ \& \ tEx) \supset [(xHk \supset tK(xHk)) \ \& \ (xLk \supset tK(xLk))] \}$$

This claim is a consequence of a general principle about knowledge

that I have attributed to Plato: $(x)(y) \{ (Px \ \& \ Oy) \supset \{ (Ez)(Kz \ \& \ yOz \ \& \ xHz) \equiv (w) \{ xEw \supset [(wHy \supset xK(wHy)) \ \& \ (wLy \supset xK(wLy))] \} \} \}$

and the assumption that the temperate man is a person²⁰ who has knowledge of knowledge, and the object of knowledge of knowledge is knowledge (A proof is on pagelll.) The interpretation I offer does not include a condition that is suggested by the text: knowledge of knowledge is only the ability to divide things and say that one is knowledge and the other is not. It is clear that this restriction does not apply to persons who have knowledge, since there is overwhelming evidence that they also have productive and verbal abilities. It may be that Plato thought that all of the abilities had by a knower are in some way explainable solely by the fact that his faculty of knowledge enables him to make distinctions about the objects of that faculty. This is an extremely interesting question. Unfortunately, I do not see how such an explanation might be constructed nor have I found any evidence that Plato believed that an explanation of this sort might be given. Consequently I have not offered any hypothesis to explain the relationship between the primitive ability to make distinctions and the other abilities Plato attributes to those who know.

Socrates' next statement (170A11-B3) raises two problems for an interpretation of this passage. The first is that there are two different texts for his statement. In Burnet's text the words for knowledge are in the dative:

ΤΑΥΤὸν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη ὑγίεινός,
καὶ ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη δικαίου;

Sprague translates this as:

"And is it the same thing as the science and absence of science of health, and as the science and absence of science of justice?"

The text of Schanz (in the Loeb edition) has the words for knowledge in the nominative:

ΤΑΥΤὸν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη ὑγίεινός,
καὶ ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη δικαίου;

Lamb translates this as:

"Now, is science or lack of science of health the same as science or lack of science of justice?"

Burnet's text seems to be closer to the sense of the passage, since Socrates' next statement indicates that he has intended to distinguish knowledge of knowledge from medicine and politics. However, we are left with perplexing definitions of medicine and politics.

Medicine is the knowledge and absence of knowledge of health.

Politics is the knowledge and absence of knowledge of justice.

Since Plato usually says things like

Medicine is distinguished from the other knowledges by virtue of its definition as knowledge of health of disease (171A).

it is surprising that he does not here use an expression like "know-

ledge of the presence and absence of health."

One plausible interpretation is to say that Plato is saying that medicine and politics are imperfect sciences: doctors have knowledge of some areas of health but not others. We would be inclined to view this as true, but it is surely perplexing to suggest that Plato thought that the knowledge which was knowledge of justice does not have complete knowledge of justice. ("For there is no defect or error at all that dwells in any art." Republic 342B) In any event, Socrates' main point is clear; knowledge of knowledge is distinct from the knowledges that know health and justice. Symbolically formulated, his claim is

$$(Ex)(Kx \ \& \ hOx \ \& \ x \neq kk) \ \& \ (Ey)(Ky \ \& \ jOy \ \& \ y \neq kk)$$

On page 112 is a proof that the first conjunct of this claim follows from the general principles that each kind of knowledge has one and only one object and the premises that some kind of knowledge has health as its object and health is distinct from knowledge. (The proof of the second conjunct parallels that of the first.)

Socrates next identifies the kinds of knowledge he has distinguished from knowledge of knowledge as medicine and politics:

One is medicine, I think, and the other politics, but we are concerned with knowledge pure and simple.
(170B4-5)

These claims follow from the previous one by means of premises to the effect that whatever knows health is medicine and whatever knows justice is politics. $((x)[(Kx \ \& \ hOx) \supset x = m] \text{ and } (y)[(Ky \ \& \ jOy) \supset y = p])$

Socrates goes on to argue

Therefore, when a person lacks this additional knowledge

of health and justice, but knows knowledge only, seeing that this is the only knowledge he has, then he will be likely, both in his own case and that of others, to know that he has a knowledge that is of something. (170B7-11)²¹

In this statement Socrates claims that the temperate man will know, of himself and other persons who have knowledge, that they have knowledge of something. With appropriate enthymematic minor premises and the principle about the abilities of knowledge of knowledge introduced at 170A7, one can easily prove that the temperate man knows that he and other people have knowledge. (see page 113)

However, I am unable to deduce what the text literally says from the theoretical principles I have attributed to Plato. The text says that the temperate man knows that he and other people have knowledge of something. It seems to me that here Plato is importing one of his own theoretical views about knowledge into his theory of what individuals know. Since Plato believes that all knowledge is knowledge of something, he assumes that since the temperate man knows that he and other people have knowledge, he will know that they have knowledge of something. Unfortunately, I do not see how the theory I have attributed to Plato can express this inference.²²

At 170B11-C4 Socrates says

"And how will he know whatever he knows by this means of knowledge? Because he will know the healthy by medicine, but not by temperance, and the harmonious by music, but not by temperance, and housebuilding by that art, but not by temperance, and so on..."

The proof of these claims requires the introduction of the notion of knowing an object by means of something into the theory that I attribute

to Plato. This is easily done by means of the following principle:

for any person p , any object x , and any kind of knowledge y , p knows x by y if and only if x is the object of y and p has y .

On page 114 is a proof that Socrates' claim that the temperate man does not know the healthy by means of knowledge of knowledge follows from this principle and prior premises and conclusions. (The proofs for the music and housebuilding cases are parallel.) A proof of Socrates' general claim that the temperate man does not know by knowledge of knowledge any object other than knowledge is on page 115.

Socrates and Critias then have this exchange

But by temperance, if it is merely knowledge of knowledge, how will a person know that he knows the healthy or that he knows housebuilding?

He won't at all.

Then the man ignorant of this won't know what he knows, but only that he knows.

Very likely.

Then this would not be being temperate and would not be temperance: to know what one knows and does not know, but only that one knows and does not know--or so it seems. (170C6-D3)

In this passage Socrates argues that knowledge of knowledge is not knowing what one knows. The formalization of the argument and the subsequent argument about knowing what others know requires the introduction of the notion of knowing what someone knows. I propose the following principle:

$$(x)(y)(z)[xK(yKz) \equiv (Eu)(Ku \ \& \ zOu \ \& \ xK(yHu))]$$

This says that x knows that y knows z if and only if there is a kind

of knowledge u that has z as its object and x knows that y has u .

The temperate man knows that the doctor knows health just in case he knows that the doctor has medical knowledge.

In this passage I understand Socrates to be claiming that although the temperate man is able to recognize that he has particular kinds of knowledge, his knowledge of those faculties is not sufficient to enable him to know what those faculties are of. Since he does not know what those particular faculties are of, he does not, in virtue of knowledge of knowledge,²³ know what it is he knows.

It seems to me that the key to understanding why Socrates infers this claim is a statement he makes in the Republic:

In a faculty I cannot see any color or shape or similar mark such as those on which in many other cases I fix my eyes in discriminating in my thought one thing from another. But in the case of faculty I look to one thing only--that to which it is related and what it effects, and it is in this way that I come to call each one of them a faculty, and that which is related to the same thing and accomplishes the same thing I call the same faculty, and that to another I call other. (477C.)

I take it that two of the things being claimed in this passage are

being able to distinguish or identify two faculties implies that one is able to distinguish or identify the objects of those faculties.

being able to recognize that something is a faculty implies that one is able to recognize that it is related to some object and that it produces some effect.

Three ways in which someone may have knowledge of a faculty, knowing that it is a faculty, knowing that it is the same kind of faculty as some other faculty, and knowing that it is not the same kind of

faculty as some other faculty, require knowledge of the object of the faculty. It seems to me that each of these three ways of knowing a faculty is implied by knowing what kind of faculty something is. If I know that something is a faculty of medical knowledge, then I know it is a faculty. If I know that a and b are faculties of musical knowledge, then I know that they are distinct faculties. Consequently, recognizing what kind of faculty something is implies having at least some knowledge of the objects of that faculty. Plato's acceptance of this latter claim in the Charmides, at least with respect to faculties of knowledge, is evident from 171A,

the temperate man will know that the doctor has some knowledge, but in order to try and grasp what sort it is, won't he have to examine what it is of?

Moreover, in the Charmides Plato holds that the kind of knowledge required to find out what it is that some particular faculty knows, is the knowledge of that object had by the person who possesses that particular faculty (171B). We may paraphrase this view about how one recognizes what particular faculties are into the recognition of some person's possession of some particular faculty by this principle

$$(x)(y)\{[Kx \ \& \ (Ez)(yK(zHx) \vee yK(zLx))]\supset (w)\{wOx\supset (u)[yEu\supset (yK(uHw) \vee yK(uLw))]\}\}$$

This principle says that knowing that someone has, or that someone lacks, a particular kind of knowledge implies being able to recognize the presence or absence of the object of that kind of knowledge. The conclusion Socrates draws at 170C7, it is not the case that the temperate man knows that he knows the healthy, follows from this principle and previously introduced principles and premises. (The proof is on page 116.)

Socrates' other conclusion, it is not the case that the temperate man knows that he knows housebuilding, follows by a parallel argument.) Socrates seems to imply at 170C10 that he has proven a more general claim: no object is such that the temperate man will know that he knows it. Strictly speaking, this claim in its completely general form does not follow from the principles I have attributed to Plato, and it seems to me that we should not attribute it to Plato. At 171C Socrates says that the temperate man is like other persons who have knowledge; he is able to recognize when other people have the same kind of knowledge that he has. If the temperate man or the doctor are able to recognize when other people know knowledge or health, I do not see why we should assume that Plato believed that they could not recognize that they themselves know these objects. Consequently, I attribute to Socrates the restricted conclusion that the temperate man will not know, of any object other than knowledge, that he knows it. The proof of this claim is on page 117 .

At 170D1-3 Socrates concludes:

Then this would not be being temperate and would not be temperance: to know what one knows and does not know, but it seems only that one knows and does not know.

Socrates has not argued that the temperate man will not know what he does not know, but the claim follows from the general principles I have used to elucidate the argument he has given. (On page 118 I prove the more general claim that for every object except for knowledge, no one is such that the temperate man will know that they do not know it.) In his conclusion Socrates does not deny the original

definition of temperance as knowledge of knowledge. The conclusion he draws presupposes this definition, since he asserts that temperance is not knowing what one knows and does not know because he has shown that knowledge of knowledge is not knowing what one knows and does not know.

$$1. (x)(y) \{ (Px \& Oy) \supset \{ (Lz)(Kz \& yOz \& xHz) \supset (w) \{ xEw \supset [(wHy \supset xK(wHy)) \& (wLy \supset xK(wLy))] \} \} \}$$

$$2. Pt \& K_{kk} \& kO_{kk} \& tH_{kk} \& Ok$$

$$3. Pa \& tEa$$

C.P. asmt.

$$4. (Pt \& Ok) \supset \{ (Ez)(Kz \& kOz \& tHz) \supset (w) \{ tEw \supset [(wHk \supset tK(wHk)) \& (wLk \supset tK(wLk))] \} \} \quad \text{U.I., 1.}$$

$$5. (Ez)(Kz \& kOz \& tHz) \supset (w) \{ tEw \supset [(wHk \supset tK(wHk)) \& (wLk \supset tK(wLk))] \} \quad \text{M.P., 2., 4.}$$

$$6. (Ez)(Kz \& kOz \& tHz) \quad \text{E.G., 2.}$$

$$7. (w) \{ tEw \supset [(wHk \supset tK(wHk)) \& (wLk \supset tK(wLk))] \} \quad \text{M.P., 5., 6.}$$

$$8. tEa \supset [(aHk \supset tK(aHk)) \& (aLk \supset tK(aLk))] \quad \text{U.I., 7.}$$

$$9. (aHk \supset tK(aHk)) \& (aLk \supset tK(aLk)) \quad \text{M.P., 3., 9.}$$

$$10. (Pa \& tEa) \supset [(aHk \supset tK(aHk)) \& (aLk \supset tL(aLk))] \quad \text{C.P. S.P. 3-9.}$$

$$11. (x) \{ (Px \& tEx) \supset [(xHk \supset tK(xHk)) \& (xLk \supset tK(xLk))] \}$$

U. G. S.P. 3-10.

$$1. (x) \{ Kx \supset (Ey) \{ Oy \ \& \ yOx \ \& \ (z) [(Oz \ \& \ zOx) \supset z=y] \} \}$$

$$2. (Ex)(Kx \ \& \ hOx)$$

$$3. kOkk \ \& \ k \neq h \ \& \ Oh \ \& \ Ok$$

$$4. \neg(Ex)(Kx \ \& \ hOx \ \& \ x \neq kk) \quad \text{Red. asmt.}$$

$$5. (x) \neg(Kx \ \& \ hOx \ \& \ x \neq kk) \quad \text{Q. N., 4.}$$

$$6. (x) [\neg(kx \ \& \ hOx) \vee x = kk] \quad \text{DeM., 5.}$$

$$7. (x) [(kx \ \& \ hOx) \supset x = kk] \quad \text{Imp., 6.}$$

$$8. ka \ \& \ hOa \quad \text{E.I. asmt. (2.)}$$

$$9. (ka \ \& \ hOa) \supset a = kk \quad \text{U.I., 7.}$$

$$10. a = kk \quad \text{M.P., 8., 9.}$$

$$11. ka \supset (Ey) \{ Oy \ \& \ yOa \ \& \ (z) [(Oz \ \& \ zOa) \supset z=y] \} \quad \text{U.I., 1.}$$

$$12. (Ey) \{ Oy \ \& \ yOa \ \& \ (z) [(Oz \ \& \ zOa) \supset z=y] \} \quad \text{M.P., 8., 11.}$$

$$13. Ob \ \& \ bOa \ \& \ (z) [(Oz \ \& \ zOa) \supset z=b] \quad \text{E.I. asmt. (12.)}$$

$$14. (Oh \ \& \ hOa) \supset h=b \quad \text{U.I., 13.}$$

$$15. h=b \quad \text{M.P., 3., 8., 14.}$$

$$16. kOa \quad \text{ID. 3., 10.}$$

$$17. (Ok \ \& \ kOa) \supset k=b \quad \text{U.I., 13.}$$

$$18. k=b \quad \text{M.P., 17., 16., 3.}$$

$$19. k=h \quad \text{ID., 15., 18.}$$

$$20. \quad \quad \quad 19., 3.$$

$$21. \quad \quad \quad \text{E.I., S.P., 13-20.}$$

$$22. \quad \quad \quad \text{E.I., S.P., 8-21.}$$

$$23. (Ex)(Kx \ \& \ hOx \ \& \ x \neq kk) \quad \text{Red. S.P., 4-22.}$$

1. $(x) \{ (Px \ \& \ tEx) \supset [(xHk \supset tK(xHk)) \ \& \ (xLk \supset tK(xLk))] \}$
2. $Pt \ \& \ P_D \ \& \ tEt \ \& \ tE_D \ \& \ tHk \ \& \ _DHk$
3. $(Pt \ \& \ tEt) \supset [(tHk \supset tK(tHk)) \ \& \ (tLk \supset tK(tLk))] \quad \text{U.I., 1.}$
4. $(tHk \supset tK(tHk)) \ \& \ tLk \supset tK(tLk) \quad \text{M.P., 2., 3.}$
5. $tK(tHk) \quad \text{M.P., 2., 4.}$
6. $(P_D \ \& \ tE_D) \supset [(_DHk \supset tK(_DHk)) \ \& \ (_DLk \supset tK(_DLk))] \quad \text{U.I., 1.}$
7. $(_DHk \supset tK(_DHk)) \ \& \ (_DLk \supset tK(_DLk)) \quad \text{M.P., 2., 6.}$
8. $tK(_DHk) \quad \text{M.P., 2., 7.}$

$$1. (x)(y)(z) \{ (Px \ \& \ Oy \ \& \ Kz) \supset [xKByz \supset (yOz \ \& \ xHz)] \}$$

$$2. Pt \ \& \ Oh \ \& \ K_{kk} \ \& \ m \neq kk \ \& \ (x) [(Kx \ \& \ hOx) \supset x=m]$$

$$3. tKBh_{kk}$$

Red. Asmpt.

$$4. (Pt \ \& \ Oh \ \& \ K_{kk}) \supset [tKBh_{kk} \supset (hO_{kk} \ \& \ tH_{kk})] \quad \text{U.I., 1.}$$

$$5. tKBh_{kk} \supset (hO_{kk} \ \& \ tH_{kk}) \quad \text{M.P., 2., 4.}$$

$$6. hO_{kk} \ \& \ tH_{kk} \quad \text{M.P., 5., 3.}$$

$$7. (K_{kk} \ \& \ hO_{kk}) \supset kk=m \quad \text{U.I., 2.}$$

$$8. kk=m \quad \text{M.P., 2., 6., 7.}$$

$$9. \quad \quad \quad 2., 8.$$

$$10. -tKBh_{kk}$$

Red. S.P., 3-9.

$$1. (x)(y)(z)\{(Px \& Oy \& Kz) \supset [xKByz \equiv (yOz \& xHz)]\}$$

$$2. (x)\{Kx \supset (Ey)\{Oy \& yOx \& (z)[(Oz \& zOz) \supset z=y]\}\}$$

$$3. K_{kk} \& Ok \& kO_{kk} \& Pt$$

$$4. (Ex)(Ox \& x \neq k \& tKBx_{kk})$$

Red. asmt.

$$5. Oa \& a \neq k \& tKBa_{kk}$$

E.I. asmt.(4.)

$$6. K_{kk} \supset (Ey)\{Oy \& yO_{kk} \& (z)[(Oz \& zO_{kk}) \supset z=y]\} \quad \text{U.I., 2.}$$

$$7. (Ey)\{Oy \& yO_{kk} \& (z)[(Oz \& zO_{kk}) \supset z=y]\} \quad \text{M.P., 3., 6.}$$

$$8. Ob \& bO_{kk} \& (z)[(Oz \& zO_{kk}) \supset z=b] \quad \text{E.I. asmt.(7.)}$$

$$9. (Ok \& kO_{kk}) \supset k=b$$

U.I., 8.

$$10. k=b$$

M.P., 3., 9.

$$11. a \neq b$$

ID. 5., 10.

$$12. (Oa \& aO_{kk}) \supset a=b$$

U.I., 8.

$$13. \neg(Oa \& aO_{kk})$$

M.T., 11., 12.

$$14. \neg Oa \vee \neg aO_{kk}$$

DeM., 13.

$$15. \neg aO_{kk}$$

D.S., 5., 14.

$$16. (Pt \& Oa \& K_{kk}) \supset [tKBa_{kk} \supset (aO_{kk} \& tH_{kk})] \quad \text{U.I., 1.}$$

$$17. tKBa_{kk} \supset (aO_{kk} \& tH_{kk})$$

M.P., 3., 5., 16.

$$18. aO_{kk} \& tH_{kk}$$

M.P., 5, 17.

$$19. \boxed{\times}$$

15., 18.

$$20. \boxed{\times}$$

E.I. S.P., 8-19.

$$21. \boxed{\times}$$

E.I. S.P., 5-20.

$$22. \neg(Ex)(Ox \& x \neq k \& tKBx_{kk})$$

Red. S.P., 4-21.

$$23. (x)\neg(Ox \& x \neq k \& tKBx_{kk})$$

Q.N., 22.

$$24. (x)[\neg(Ox \& x \neq k) \vee \neg tKBx_{kk}]$$

DeM., 23.

$$25. (x)[(Ox \& x \neq k) \supset \neg tKBx_{kk}]$$

Imp., 24.

1. $(x)(y)\{[Kx \& (Ez)(yK(zHx) \vee yK(zLx))]\supset (w)[wOx \supset (u) yEu \& (yK(uHw) \vee yK(uLw))]\}$
2. $(x)\{Ox \supset (y)\{yKx \equiv (u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHx) \vee yK(uLx))]\}$
3. $(x)\{Ox \supset (y)(z)[yK(zKx) \equiv (Eu)(Ku \& xOu \& yK(zHu))]\}$
4. $Oh \& (x)(hOx \supset x=m) \& (x)(tKx \supset x=k) \& h \neq k$
5. $tK(tKh)$ Red. asmt.
6. $Oh \supset (y)(z)[yK(zKh) \equiv (Eu)(Ku \& hOu \& yK(zHu))]$ U.I., 3.
7. $(y)(z)[yK(zKh) \equiv (Eu)(Ku \& hOu \& yK(zHu))]$ M.P., 4., 6.
8. $tK(tKh) \equiv (Eu)(Ku \& hOu \& tK(tHu))$ U.I., 7.
9. $(Eu)(Ku \& hOu \& tK(tHu))$ M.P., 5., 8.
10. $Ka \& hOa \& tK(tHa)$ E.I. asmt.(9.)
11. $hOa \supset a=m$ U.I., 4.
12. $a=m$ M.P., 10., 11.
13. $Km \& hOm \& tK(tHm)$ ID. 12., 10.
14. $tK(tHm) \vee tK(tLm)$ Add., 13.
15. $(Ez)(tK(zHm) \vee tK(zLm))$ E.G., 14.
16. $[Km \& (Ez)(tK(zHm) \vee tK(zLm)) \supset (w)\{wOm \supset (u)[tEu \supset (tK(uHw) \vee tK(uLw))]\}$ U.I., 1.
17. $(w)\{wOm \supset (u)[tEu \supset (tK(uHw) \vee tK(uLw))]\}$ M.P., 13, 15, 16.
18. $hOm \supset (u)[tEu \supset (tK(uHh) \vee tK(uLh))]$ U.I., 17.
19. $(u)[tEu \supset (tK(uHh) \vee tK(uLh))]$ M.P., 13., 18.
20. $Oh \supset (y)\{yKh \equiv (u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHh) \vee yK(uLh))]\}$ U.I., 2.
21. $(y)\{yKh \equiv (u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHh) \vee yK(uLh))]\}$ M.P., 4., 20.
22. $tKh \equiv (u)[tEu \supset (tK(uHh) \vee tK(uLh))]$ U.I., 21.
23. tKh M.P., 19., 22.
24. tKh E.I. S.P., 10-23.
25. $tKh \supset h=k$ U.I., 4.
26. $h=k$ M.P., 24., 25.
27. \boxtimes 4., 26.
28. $\neg tK(tKh)$ Red. S.P., 5-27.

1. $(x)(y)\{[Kx \& (Ez)(yK(zHx) \vee yK(zLx))]\supset (w)\{wOx \supset (u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHw) \vee yK(uLw))]\}\}$
2. $(x)\{Ox \supset (y)\{yKx \equiv (u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHx) \vee yK(uLx))]\}\}$
3. $(x)\{Ox \supset (y)(z)[yK(zKx) \equiv (Eu)(Ku \& xOu \& yK(zHu))]\}$
4. $(x)(tKx \supset x=k)$
5. $Oa \& a \neq k$ C.P. asmt.
6. $tK(tKa)$ Red. asmt.
7. $Oa \supset (y)(z)[yK(zKa) \equiv (Eu)(Ku \& aOu \& yK(zHu))]$ U.I., 3.
8. $(y)(z)[yK(zKa) \equiv (Eu)(Ku \& aOu \& yK(zHu))]$ M.P., 5., 7.
9. $tK(tKa) \equiv (Eu)(Ku \& aOu \& tK(tHu))$ U.I., 8.
10. $(Eu)(Ku \& aOu \& tK(tHu))$ M.P., 6., 9.
11. $Kb \& aOb \& tK(tHb)$ E.I. asmt., (10.)
12. $tK(tHb) \vee tK(tLb)$ Add., 11.
13. $(Ez)(tK(zHb) \vee tK(zLb))$ E.G., 12.
14. $[Kb \& (Ez)(tK(zHb) \vee tL(zLb))]\supset (w)\{wOb \supset (u)[tEu \supset (tK(uHw) \vee tK(uLw))]\}$ U.I., 1.
15. $(w)\{wOb \supset (u)[tEu \supset (tK(uHw) \vee tK(uLw))]\}$ M.P., 11, 13, 14.
16. $aOb \supset (u)[tEu \supset (tK(uHa) \vee tK(uLa))]$ U.I., 15.
17. $(u)[tEu \supset (tK(uHa) \vee (tK(uLa)))]$ M.P., 11., 16.
18. $Oa \supset (y)\{yKa \equiv (u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHa) \vee yK(uLa))]\}$ U.I., 2.
19. $(y)\{yKa \equiv (u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHa) \vee yK(uLa))]\}$ M.P., 5., 18.
20. $tKa \equiv (u)[tEu \supset (tK(uHa) \vee tK(uLa))]$ U.I., 19.
21. tKa M.P., 17., 20.
22. tKa E.I. S.P., 11.-21.
23. $tKa \supset a=k$ U.I., 4.
24. $a=k$ M.P., 22., 23.
25. \square 5., 24.
26. $\neg tK(tKa)$ Red. S.P., 6-25.
27. $(Oa \& a \neq k) \supset \neg tK(tKa)$ C.P.S.P., 5-26.
28. $(x)[Ox \& x \neq k] \supset \neg tK(tKx)]$ U.G.S.P., 5-27.

1. $(x)(y)\{[Kx \ \& \ (Ez)(yK(zHx) \vee yK(zLx))]\supset (w)\{wOx \supset (u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHw) \vee yK(uLw))]\}\}$
2. $(x)\{Ox \supset (y)(z)[yK(zLKx) \equiv (Eu)(Ku \ \& \ xOu \ \& \ yK(zLu))]\}$
3. $(x)\{Ox \ \ (y)\{yKx \equiv (u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHx) \vee yK(uLx))]\}\}$
4. $(x)(tKx \supset x=k)$
5. $\neg(x)[(Ox \ \& \ x \neq k) \supset (y)\neg(tK(yLKx))]$ Red. Asmpt.
6. $(Ex)\neg[(Ox \ \& \ x \neq k) \supset (y)\neg(tK(yLKx))]$ Q.N., 5.
7. $\neg[(Oa \ \& \ a \neq k) \supset (y)\neg(tK(yLKa))]$ E.I. asmpt.(6.)
8. $Oa \ \& \ a \neq k \ \& \ \neg(y)\neg(tK(yLKa))$ Imp., DeM., D.N., 7.
9. $(Ey)(tK(yLKa))$ Q.N., D.N., 8.
10. $tK(bLKa)$ E.I. asmpt., (9.)
11. $Oa \supset (y)(z)[yK(zLKa) \equiv (Eu)(Ku \ \& \ aOu \ \& \ yK(zLu))]$ U.I., 2.
12. $(y)(z)[yK(zLKa) \equiv (Eu)(Ku \ \& \ aOu \ \& \ yK(zLu))]$ M.P., 8., 11.
13. $tK(bLKa) \equiv (Eu)(Ku \ \& \ aOu \ \& \ tK(bLu))$ U.I., 12.
14. $(Eu)(Ku \ \& \ aOu \ \& \ tK(bLu))$ M.P., 10., 13.
15. $Kc \ \& \ aOc \ \& \ tK(bLc)$ E.I. asmpt.(14.)
16. $tK(bHc) \vee tK(bLc)$ Add., comm., 15.
17. $(Ez)(tK(zHc) \vee tK(zLc))$ E.G., 16.
18. $[Kc \ \& \ (Ez)(tK(zHc) \vee tK(zLc))]\supset (w)\{wOc \supset (u)[tEu \supset (tK(uHw) \vee tK(uLw))]\}$ U.I., 1.
19. $(w)\{wOc \supset (u)[tEu \supset (tK(uHw) \vee tK(uLw))]\}$ M.P., 15, 17, 18.
20. $aOc \supset (u)[tEu \supset (tK(uHa) \vee tK(uLa))]$ U.I., 19.
21. $(u)[tEu \supset (tK(uHa) \vee tK(uLa))]$ M.P., 15., 20.
22. $Oa \supset (y)\{yKa \equiv (u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHa) \vee yK(uLa))]\}$ U.I., 3.
23. $(y)\{yKa \equiv (u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHa) \vee yK(uLa))]\}$ M.P., 8., 22.
24. $tKa \equiv (u)[tEu \supset (tK(uHa) \vee tK(uLa))]$ U.I., 23.
25. tKa M.P. 21., 24.

26. $tKa \supset a=k$

U.I., 4.

27. $a=k$

M.P., 25., 26.

28. ☒

27., 8.

29. ☒

E.I. S.P., 15-28.

30. ☒

E.I. S.P., 10-29.

31. ☒

E.I. S.P., 7-30.

32. $(x)[(0x \ \& \ x \neq k) \supset (y) \neg (tK(yLKx))]$ Red. S.P., 5-31.

Section 4: 170D - 171E

Socrates next turns to the temperate man's knowledge of other people; does he know what they know and what they do not know? This part of the argument is much easier to discuss, since it assumes only that the temperate man has knowledge of knowledge and not that he has other kinds of knowledge as well. Socrates draws his conclusion immediately:

Nor, when another person claims to know something, will our friend be able to find out whether he knows what he says he knows or does not know it. But he will only know this much it seems, that the man has some knowledge; yes, but of what, temperance will fail to inform him.
(170D5-9)

Socrates is entitled to draw the conclusion at this point because it follows from the general principles he employed in the argument about the temperate man's knowledge of himself. (See page 111 , Section 3, and page 130) The subsequent passage 170E1-171C11, is a step by step argument for the same conclusion drawn at 170D5-7. Why does Socrates give a detailed argument for a conclusion he has already legitimately drawn? The answer, I suggest, is that Plato had a very clear idea of the methods a person employs in testing another person for knowledge, and did not have a clear conception of how a person tests himself for knowledge.

The second argument gives a description of how a purported expert is to be examined by someone other than himself. Plato presents a concrete illustration of his theoretical views, showing that only someone with medical knowledge, and not the person with knowledge of knowledge,

will be able to distinguish the genuine doctor from the pretender. Plato presents this illustration because it is dramatically a much more convincing argument.

There are two reasons why Plato does not give an illustrative argument in the case of the temperate man's knowledge of himself. An illustrative argument would require the explicit assumption that the temperate man also be a doctor. As I earlier argued, Plato was committed to the very reasonable view that doctors know that they know the healthy. Thus it would have been absurd for Plato to argue that the temperate man did not know that he knew the healthy. However, it would have been very difficult and tedious to argue for the true conclusion that he does not know that he knows the healthy by means of knowledge of knowledge. Moreover, the presentation of this argument would have left Socrates open to the charge that he was engaged in idle logic-chopping that had no practical importance. On Plato's view everyone knows what they know, and Socrates could merely conclude that the first condition of Critias' definition (the four conditions are knowing what you know, knowing what you do not know, knowing what others know, and knowing what others do not know) does not capture something peculiar to one kind of knowledge.

The second reason is that it would have been very difficult to describe how the temperate man would go about examining himself. It is virtually a tautology to say that Plato's model for the examination of knowledge claims is the examination of one person by another. The dramatic structure of every early dialogue (except, perhaps, the Hippias

Minor and the Crito) is such that people find out things about themselves by being examined by Socrates. To describe the temperate man's examination of himself would seemingly require the description of an inner monologue (or at least something that parallels the description of the examination at 171B), something foreign to Plato's dramatic methods. (Although the Apology contains several statements in which Socrates describes his own self-reflections.) I do not think Plato would have been content to describe someone examining himself unless he could give a real explanation of how and why we are able to learn things about ourselves by thinking about ourselves. To do this requires at least a sophisticated and complicated theory of psychology, which I presume Plato did not have when he wrote the Charmides. As I suggested earlier, I do not think that Plato, at this time, had worked out a coherent conception of knowledge of the self.

Socrates begins the illustrative argument at 170E1:

So neither will he be able to distinguish the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the man who really is one, nor will he be able to make this distinction for any of the other experts. Let us consider the matter this way . If the temperate man or anyone else whatsoever is going to tell the real doctor from the fake. How will he go about it? He won't, I suppose, engage him in conversation on the subject of medicine, because what the doctor knows, we say, ²⁴is nothing but health and disease, isn't that so?

Yes, that is the case.

But about knowledge the doctor knows nothing, because we have allotted precisely this function to temperance alone.

Yes.

Neither will the doctor know anything about medicine since

medicine is a knowledge.

171A True.

In the first sentence Socrates illustrates the conclusion drawn at 170D5-7 with an example. Since the temperate man will not know what other people know and what they do not know, he will be unable to distinguish the genuine doctor from the person who pretends to be a doctor. He then generalizes the claim and says that the temperate man will be unable to distinguish the true from the false claimant to any kind of knowledge.²⁵ In his previous remarks Socrates referred to the people who were to be examined by the temperate man as people who "think they know" or "claim to know." Here he shifts to people who "pretend to know." Plato's reason for this transition is that it is dramatically effective in showing the relevance of his theoretical discussion to practical affairs. While Plato believes that the more serious and important enterprise is showing people that they do not know what they think they know, he also knows that most people do not recognize this as a major problem. However, no one wants to be deceived, and everyone regards the detection of deceivers, especially in medicine, as an enterprise that would benefit the community. The dramatic irony of this passage is fairly heavy. Critias claims to have knowledge of knowledge. Socrates, who is pretending to be a doctor, is showing that Critias does not know what he thinks he knows. The last clause of the sentence states in general form Socrates' claim about the doctor: The temperate man will be unable to distinguish the genuine possessor of some kind of knowledge from the pretender.

Before discussing the subsequent claims Socrates makes in the passage quoted, I should like to comment on two things he says in the paragraph at 170E.

if the temperate man or anyone else whatsoever is going to tell the real doctor from the false, how will he go about it?

The phrase I have underlined indicates that Socrates' subsequent remarks about how putative experts are to be examined may be understood in a perfectly general way. They apply not only to the way in which the temperate man ought to examine others, but also to how anyone should go about assessing another's claim to knowledge. Socrates also remarks,

He won't I suppose, engage him in conversation on the subject of medicine, because what he knows, we say, is nothing but health and disease.

I take it that this sentence tacitly claims that at least one of the things we ought to do to assess a person's claim to knowledge is to examine them in conversation. Socrates is claiming that it would be a mistake to talk to the doctor about medicine, not that it would be a mistake to examine him by talking to him. Later he says that what we should talk to him about is what he claims to know, health and disease. (171B3-9) (I stress this point because of Gould's vehement assertion that claims to knowledge are assessed only by examining both word and deed.)

Socrates' second argument for the claim that the temperate man will not know what other people know and do not know begins with three claims. They are,

1. The temperate man will not engage the doctor in

conversation about medicine, because the doctor knows only health and disease.

2. About knowledge the doctor knows nothing, because knowing something about knowledge is the function of temperance alone.
3. The doctor does not know anything about medicine, since medicine is a kind of knowledge.

The claim that the doctor knows nothing but health and disease follows from the assumption that medicine is the only kind of knowledge the doctor possesses. (see page 131) The claim that the doctor knows nothing about knowledge follows immediately from claim 1),²⁶ but Socrates draws the inference from the premise that only temperance knows knowledge. Consequently, the argument Socrates actually uses should be based upon the premise that only knowledge of knowledge may know knowledge. This argument is presented on page 132. Socrates next argues that the doctor knows nothing about medicine, since medicine is a kind of knowledge.²⁷ This argument is reconstructed on page 133 .

Socrates continues his illustrative argument at 171A2-B2

However, the temperate man will know that the doctor has some knowledge, but in order to try and grasp what sort it is, won't he have to examine what it is of? Because hasn't each knowledge been defined, not, not just as knowledge, but also by that which it is of?

By that, certainly.

Now medicine is distinguished from the other knowledges by virtue of its definition as knowledge of health and disease.

Yes.

It follows that the man who wants to examine medicine should look for it where it is to be found, because I don't suppose

he will discover it where it is not to be found, do you?

Certainly not.

Each of the claims made in this passage either exemplify or are entailed by claims and principles previously introduced. The first claim, $\text{tK}(\text{pHk})$, was proven in Section 3. The second claim is that if the temperate man is to find out what kind of knowledge the doctor has, he must find out what the objects of that kind of knowledge are. This corresponds to a consequence of an earlier introduced principle: A necessary condition for knowing that the doctor has medical knowledge is knowing that the doctor knows health. (see page 134) Socrates' third claim, each kind of knowledge has an object that is not the object of any other kind of knowledge, follows from general principles introduced earlier. (see page 135) The third claim and premises introduced earlier entail Socrates' fourth claim: Medicine is the only kind of knowledge that has health as its object. (see page 137) I understand Socrates' last claim to be a consequence of his second and third claims: If the temperate man is to find out if the doctor has medical knowledge, then he must find out if the doctor knows those objects which are known only by that kind of knowledge. (see page 138) The next claim Socrates makes

Then the man who conducts the examination correctly will examine the doctor in those matters in which he is a medical man, namely health and disease.
(171B3-5)

follows from the two previous claims. The next exchange is

And he will look into the manner of his words and actions to see if what he says is truly spoken and what he does

is correctly done?

Necessarily.

But, without the medical art, would anyone be able to follow up either of these things?

Certainly not. No one, in fact, could do this, it seems, except the doctor--not even the temperate man himself. If he could, he would be a doctor in addition to his temperance. (171B7-C3)

I understand Socrates' statement "without the medical art, would anyone be able to follow up either of these things?" to mean

$$(x)[xLm \supset \neg(Ey)(xK(ySh) \vee xK(yLSh) \vee xK(yAh) \vee xK(yLAh))]$$

Generalizing, we have the principle

$$(x)(y)\left\{ (Kx \& yOx) \supset (z)[(Ew)(zK(wSy) \vee zK(wLSy) \vee zK(wAy) \vee zK(wLAy)) \supset zHx] \right\} \quad 28$$

Earlier I used this passage to justify the claim that Plato held that knowers, and only knowers, could conduct these examinations in every case. However, the passage also indicates that knowers are the only persons who can conduct these examinations in any case. Given this principle, it follows that since the temperate man does not have medical knowledge, he will not know whether or not the doctor speaks truly or acts rightly in matters pertaining to health. This conclusion together with the principles

$$(x)(y)(z)[xK(yKz) \equiv (xK(ySz) \& xK(yAz))] \quad \text{and}$$

$$(x)(y)(z)[xK(yLKz) \equiv (xK(yLSz) \& xK(yLAz))]$$

enable us to infer the conclusion that the temperate man does not know whether or not the doctor knows health. (see page 139)

In his concluding paragraph Socrates says

The upshot of the matter is, then, that if temperance is only the knowledge of knowledge and the absence of knowledge, the temperate man will be able to distinguish neither the doctor who knows the particulars of his

art from the man who does not know them but pretends or supposes he does, nor will he recognize any other genuine practitioner whatsoever, except the man in his own field, the way other craftsmen do. (171C5-11)

In addition to his conclusion about the limitations of the temperate man's knowledge, Socrates asserts two new claims in this paragraph. He claims that experts, and only experts will be able to recognize each other, and claims, as a particular instance of the first claim, that the temperate man will be able to recognize other possessors of knowledge of knowledge. Part of Socrates' first claim, $(x)(y)[(Ez)(xKzKy) \supset xKy]$ follows from principles previously introduced. There are two ways to prove this, and the proofs are given on pages 140 and 141. The other part of Socrates' first claim, $(x)(y)(z)[(xKz \& yKz \& xEy) \supset xK(yKz)]$, follows from the principle $6a'. (x)(y)[xKy \equiv (z)[xEz \supset (zKy \supset xK(zKy)) \& (zLKy \supset xK(zLKy))]]$. (See page 142.) This principle is equivalent to the principle introduced in Chapter 3, Section 6; $6a. (x)(y)[xKy \equiv (z)[xEz \supset (xK(zKy) \vee xK(zLKy))]]$ if one also assumes the principles $R1. (z)(y)[(Ex)(xK(zKy)) \supset zKy]$ and $R2. (z)(y)[(Ex)(xK(zLKy)) \supset zLKy]$. The evidence presented in Chapter 3 clearly supports $6a'$. as well as $6a$. Propositional theories of knowledge interpret the position $R1.$ and $R2.$ represent (instantiated to this example) as

If x knows that z knows y , then z knows y is true.

However, in the theory I have presented the object of x 's knowledge is not a true proposition, but simply y 's knowing z . Hence $R1.$ and $R2.$ should be interpreted not as claiming that knowledge implies truth, but that knowledge implies reality or existence. Although there are some

grounds for attributing R1. and R2. to Plato (which I discuss at the end of Chapter 5), I have not attributed these principles to him because I have not needed to use it in order to interpret the Charmides.

1. $(x)(y)\{[Kx \& (Ez)(yK(zHx) \vee yK(zLx))]\supset (w)\{wOx \supset (u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHw) \vee yK(uLw))]\}\}$
2. $(x)\{Ox \supset (y)\{yKx \equiv (u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHx) \vee yK(uLx))]\}\}$
3. $(x)\{Ox \supset (y)(z)[yK(zKx) \equiv (Eu)(Ku \& xOu \& yK(zHu))]\}$
4. $(x)(tKx \supset x=k)$

5. $0a \& a \neq k \& b \neq t$ C.P. asmt.
6. $tK(bKa)$ Red. asmt.
7. $0a \supset (y)(z)[yK(zKa) \equiv (Eu)(Ku \& aOu \& yK(zHu))]$ U.I., 3.
8. $(y)(z)[yK(zKa) \equiv (Eu)(Ku \& aOu \& yK(zHu))]$ M.P., 5., 7.
9. $tK(bKa) \equiv (Eu)(Ku \& aOu \& tK(bHu))$ U.I., 8.
10. $(Eu)(Ku \& aOu \& tK(bHu))$ M.P., 6., 9.
11. $Kc \& aOc \& tK(bHc)$ E.I. asmt., (10.)
12. $tK(bHc) \vee tK(bLc)$ Add., 11.
13. $(Ez)(tK(zHc) \vee tK(zLc))$ E.G., 12.
14. $[Kc \& (Ez)(tK(zHc) \vee tK(zLc))]\supset (w)\{wOc \supset (u)[tEu \supset (tK(uHw) \vee tK(uLw))]\}$ U.I., 1.
15. $(w)\{wOc \supset (u)[tEu \supset (tK(uHw) \vee tK(uLw))]\}$ M.P., 11, 13, 14.
16. $aOc \supset (u)[tEu \supset (tK(uHa) \vee tK(uLa))]$ U.I., 15.
17. $(u)[tEu \supset (tK(uHa) \vee tK(uLa))]$ M.P., 11., 16.
18. $0a \supset (y)\{yKa \equiv (u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHa) \vee yK(uLa))]\}$ U.I., 2.
19. $(y)\{yKa \equiv (u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHa) \vee yK(uLa))]\}$ M.P., 5., 18.
20. $tKa \equiv (u)[tEu \supset (yK(uHa) \vee yK(uLa))]$ U.I., 19.
21. tKa M.P., 17., 20.
22. tKa E.I. S.P., 11-21.
23. $tKa \supset a=k$ U.I., 4.
24. $a=k$ M.P., 22., 23.
25. \boxtimes 5., 24.
26. $-tK(bKa)$ Red. S.P., 6-25.
27. $(0a \& a \neq k \& b \neq t) \supset -tK(bKa)$ C.P. S.P., 5-26.
28. $(x)(y)[(Ox \& x \neq k \& y \neq t) \supset -tK(yKx)]$ U.G. S.P., 5-27.

$$1. (x)[(Kx \ \& \ D^Hx) \supset x=m]$$

$$2. hOm$$

$$3. (x)\{Kx \supset (Ey)[yOx \ \& \ (z)(zOx \supset z=y)]\}$$

$$4. (x)(y)[xKy \equiv (Ez)(Kz \ \& \ xOz \ \& \ yHz)]$$

$$5. D^Hka$$

C.P. asmt.

$$6. D^Hka \equiv (Ez)(Kz \ \& \ aOz \ \& \ D^HHz)$$

U.I., 4.

$$7. (Ez)(Kz \ \& \ aOz \ \& \ D^HHz)$$

M.P., 5., 6.

$$8. Kb \ \& \ aOb \ \& \ D^Hb$$

E.I. asmt.(7.)

$$9. (Kb \ \& \ D^Hb) \supset b=m$$

U.I., 1.

$$10. b=m$$

M.P., 8., 9.

$$11. Kb \supset (Ey)[yOb \ \& \ (z)(zOb \supset z=y)]$$

U.I., 3

$$12. (Ey)[yOb \ \& \ (z)(zOb \supset z=y)]$$

M.P., 8., 11.

$$13. cOb \ \& \ (z)(zOb \supset z=c)$$

E.I. asmt.(12.)

$$14. aOb \supset a=c$$

U.I., 13.

$$15. a=c$$

M.P., 8., 14.

$$16. hOb$$

I.D., 2., 10.

$$17. hOb \supset h=c$$

U.I., 13.

$$18. h=c$$

M.P., 16., 17.

$$19. a=h$$

I.D., 15., 18.

$$20. a=h$$

E.I. S.P., 13-19.

$$21. a=h$$

E.I. S.P., 8-20.

$$22. D^Hka \supset a=h$$

C.P. S.P., 5-21.

$$23. (x)(D^Kx \supset x=h)$$

U.G. S.P., 5-22.

$$1. (x) \{ O_x \supset (Ey) [xOy \ \& \ (z)(xOz \supset z=y)] \}$$

$$2. O_k \ \& \ kO_{kk}$$

$$3. O_k \supset (Ey) [kOy \ \& \ (z)(kOz \supset z=y)] \quad \text{U.I., 1.}$$

$$4. (Ey) [kOy \ \& \ (z)(kOz \supset z=y)] \quad \text{M.P., 2.3.}$$

$$5. kOa \ \& \ (z)(kOz \supset z=a) \quad \text{E.I. asmt.(4.)}$$

$$6. kO_{kk} \supset kk=a \quad \text{U.I., 5.}$$

$$7. kk=a \quad \text{M.P., 2,6.}$$

$$8. (z)(kOz \supset z=kk) \quad \text{ID., 5.,7.}$$

$$9. (z)(kOz \supset z=kk) \quad \text{E.I.S.P., 5-8.}$$

$$1. (z)(kOz \supset z=kk)$$

$$2. (x)(y) [xKy \equiv (Ez)(Kz \ \& \ yOz \ \& \ xHz)]$$

$$3. (x) [(Kx \ \& \ {}_D Hx) \supset x=m] \ \& \ m \neq kk$$

$$4. {}_D Kk \quad \text{Red. asmt.}$$

$$5. {}_D Kk \equiv (Ez)(Kz \ \& \ kOz \ \& \ {}_D Hz) \quad \text{U.I., 2.}$$

$$6. (Ez)(Kz \ \& \ kOz \ \& \ {}_D Hz) \quad \text{M.P., 4.,5.}$$

$$7. Ka \ \& \ kOa \ \& \ {}_D Ha \quad \text{E.I. asmt.(6.)}$$

$$8. (Ka \ \& \ {}_D Ha) \supset a=m \quad \text{U.I., 3.}$$

$$9. a=m \quad \text{M.P., 7.,8.}$$

$$10. kOm \quad \text{ID., 9.,7.}$$

$$11. kOm \quad \text{E.I. S.P., 7-10.}$$

$$12. kOm \supset m=kk \quad \text{U.I., 1.}$$

$$13. m=kk \quad \text{M.P., 11.,12.}$$

$$14. \boxed{\times} \quad \text{3.,13.}$$

$$15. -{}_D Kk \quad \text{Red. S.P., 4-14.}$$

$$1. (x)(\mathcal{D}Kx \supset x=h)$$

$$2. \neg Kh$$

$$3. \neg(x)(Kx \supset \neg \mathcal{D}Kx)$$

Red. asmp^t.

$$4. (Ex) \neg (Kx \supset \neg \mathcal{D}Kx)$$

Q.N., 3.

$$5. (Ex)(Kx \ \& \ \mathcal{D}Kx)$$

Imp., DeM., D.N., 4.

$$6. Ka \ \& \ \mathcal{D}Ka$$

E.I. asmp^t. (5.)

$$7. \mathcal{D}Ka \supset a=h$$

U.I., 1.

$$8. a=h$$

M.P., 6., 7.

$$9. Kh$$

ID., 6., 8.

$$10. Kh$$

E.I. S.P., 6-9.

$$11. \boxed{\times}$$

2., 10.

$$12. (x)(Kx \supset \neg \mathcal{D}Kx)$$

Red. S.P., 3-11.

$$1. (x)(Kx \supset \neg \mathcal{D}Kx)$$

$$2. Km$$

$$3. Km \supset \neg \mathcal{D}Km$$

U.I., 1.

$$4. \neg \mathcal{D}Km$$

M.P., 2., 3.

$$1. (x)(y)(z)[xK(yKz) \equiv (Ew)(Kw \& zOw \& xK(yHw))]$$

$$2. (x)\{Kx \supset (Ey)[yOx \& (z)(zOx \supset z=y)]\}$$

$$3. aK(bHc) \& Kc \quad \text{C.P. asmt.}$$

$$4. Kc \supset (Ey)[yOc \& (z)(zOc \supset z=y)] \quad \text{U.I., 2}$$

$$5. (Ey)[yOc \& (z)(zOc \supset z=y)] \quad \text{M.P., 3., 4.}$$

$$6. dOc \& (z)(zOc \supset z=d) \quad \text{E.I. asmt. (5.)}$$

$$7. Kc \& dOc \& aK(bHc) \quad \text{conj., 3., 6.}$$

$$8. (Ew)(Kw \& dOw \& aK(bHw)) \quad \text{E.G., 7.}$$

$$9. aK(bKd) \equiv (Ew)(Kw \& dOw \& aK(bHw)) \quad \text{U.I., 1.}$$

$$10. aK(bKd) \quad \text{M.P., 8., 9.}$$

$$11. dOc \& aK(bKd) \quad \text{conj., 6., 10.}$$

$$12. (Ew)(wOc \& aK(bKw)) \quad \text{E.G., 11.}$$

$$13. (Ew)(wOc \& aK(bKw)) \quad \text{E.I. S.P., 6-12.}$$

$$14. (aK(bHc) \& Kc) \supset (Ew)(wOc \& aK(bKw)) \quad \text{C.P. S.P., 3-13.}$$

$$15. (x)(y)(z)[(xK(yHz) \& Kz) \supset (Ew)(wOz \& xK(yKw))]$$

$$\text{U.G. S.P., 3-14.}$$

1. $(x) \{ Kx \supset (Ey) [yOx \ \& \ (z) (zOx \supset z=y)] \}$
2. $(x) \{ Ox \supset (Ey) [xOy \ \& \ (z) (xOz \supset z=y)] \}$
3. $(x) [(Ey) (xOy) \supset Ox]$

4. Ka

C.P. asmt.

5. $-(Ey) \{ yOa \ \& \ (z) [(Kz \ \& \ z \neq a) \supset -yOz] \}$

Red. asmt.

6. $(y) \{ yOa \supset -(z) [(Kz \ \& \ z \neq a) \supset -yOz] \}$

Q.N., DeM., Imp., 5.

7. $Ka \supset (Ey) [yOa \ \& \ (z) (zOa \supset z=y)]$

U.I., 1.

8. $(Ey) [yOa \ \& \ (z) (zOa \supset z=y)]$

M.P., 4., 7.

9. $bOa \ \& \ (z) (zOa \supset z=b)$

E.I. asmt. (8.)

10. $bOa \supset -(z) [(Kz \ \& \ z \neq a) \supset -bOz]$

U.I., 6.

11. $-(z) [(Kz \ \& \ z \neq a) \supset -bOz]$

M.P., 9., 10.

12. $(Ez) (Kz \ \& \ z \neq a \ \& \ bOz)$

Q.N., Imp., DeM., D.N., 11.

13. $Kc \ \& \ c \neq a \ \& \ bOc$

E.I. asmt. (12.)

14. $(Ey) (bOy)$

E.G., 13.

15. $(Ey) (bOy) \supset Ob$

U.I., 3.

16. Ob

M.P., 14., 15.

17. $Ob \supset (Ey) [bOy \ \& \ (z) (bOz \supset z=y)]$

U.I., 2.

18. $(Ey) [bOy \ \& \ (z) (bOz \supset z=y)]$

M.P., 16., 17.

19. $bOd \ \& \ (z) (bOz \supset z=d)$

E.I. asmt. (18.)

20. $bOc \supset c=d$

U.I., 19.

21. $c=d$

M.P., 13., 20.

22. $bOa \supset a=d$

U.I., 19.

23. $a=d$

M.P., 9., 22.

24. $a=c$

ID., 21., 23.

25. ☒

24., 13.

26. ☒

E.I.S.P., 19-25.

27. \boxtimes

E.I.S.P., 13-26.

28. \boxtimes

E.I.S.P., 9-27.

29. $(Ey)\{yOa \ \& \ (z)[(Kz \ \& \ z \neq a) \supset -yOz]\}$ Red. S.P., 5-28.30. $Ka \supset (Ey)\{yOa \ \& \ (z)[(Kz \ \& \ z \neq a) \supset -yOz]\}$

C.P.S.P., 4-29.

31. $(x)\{Kx \supset (Ey)\{yOx \ \& \ (z)[(Kz \ \& \ z \neq x) \supset -yOz]\}\}$

U.G.S.P., 4-30.

$$1. (x) \{ Kx \supset (Ey) \{ yOx \ \& \ (z) [(Kz \ \& \ z \neq x) \supset -yOz] \} \}$$

$$2. (x) \{ Kx \supset (Ey) [yOx \ \& \ (z) (zOx \supset z=y)] \}$$

$$3. hOm \ \& \ Km$$

$$4. Ka \ \& \ a \neq m \quad \text{C.P. asmpt.}$$

$$5. Km \supset (Ey) \{ yOm \ \& \ (z) [(Kz \ \& \ z \neq m) \supset -yOz] \} \quad \text{U.I., 1.}$$

$$6. (Ey) \{ yOm \ \& \ (z) [(Kz \ \& \ z \neq m) \supset -yOz] \} \quad \text{M.P., 3, 5.}$$

$$7. bOm \ \& \ (z) [(Kz \ \& \ z \neq m) \supset -bOz] \quad \text{E.I. asmpt. (6.)}$$

$$8. (Ka \ \& \ a \neq m) \supset -bOa \quad \text{U.I., 7.}$$

$$9. -bOa \quad \text{M.P., 4., 8.}$$

$$10. Km \supset (Ey) [yOm \ \& \ (z) (zOm \supset z=y)] \quad \text{U.I., 2.}$$

$$11. (Ey) [yOm \ \& \ (z) (zOm \supset z=y)] \quad \text{M.P., 3, 10.}$$

$$12. cOm \ \& \ (z) (zOm \supset z=c) \quad \text{E.I. asmpt. (11.)}$$

$$13. hOm \supset h=c \quad \text{U.I., 12.}$$

$$14. h=c \quad \text{M.P., 3., 13.}$$

$$15. bOm \supset b=c \quad \text{U.I., 12.}$$

$$16. b=c \quad \text{M.P., 7., 15.}$$

$$17. h=b \quad \text{ID., 14., 16.}$$

$$18. h=b \quad \text{E.I.S.P., 12-17.}$$

$$19. -hOa \quad \text{ID., 9-18.}$$

$$20. -hOa \quad \text{E.I.S.P., 7-19.}$$

$$21. (Ka \ \& \ a \neq m) \supset -hOa \quad \text{C.P.S.P., 4-20.}$$

$$22. (z) [(Kz \ \& \ z \neq m) \supset -hOz] \quad \text{U.G.S.P., 4-21.}$$

$$23. hOm \ \& \ (z) [(Kz \ \& \ z \neq m) \supset -hOz] \quad \text{conj., 3., 22.}$$

1. $(x)(y)(z)[(xK(yHz) \ \& \ Kz) \supset (Ew)(wOz \ \& \ xK(yKw))]$
2. $(x)\{Kx \supset (Ey)\{yOx \ \& \ (z)[(Kz \ \& \ z \neq x) \supset -yOz]\}\}$
3. $Km \ \& \ (x)\{Kx \supset (Ey)[yOx \ \& \ (z)(zOx \supset z=y)]\}$
4. $tK(DHm)$ C.P. asmt.
5. $(tK(DHm) \ \& \ Km) \supset (Ew)(wOm \ \& \ tK(DKw))$ U.I., 1.
6. $(Ew)(wOm \ \& \ tK(DKw))$ M.P., 3., 4., 5.
7. $aOm \ \& \ tH(DKa)$ E.I. asmt.(6.)
8. $Km \supset (Ey)\{yOm \ \& \ (z)[(Kz \ \& \ z \neq m) \supset -yOz]\}$ U.I., 2.
9. $(Ey)\{yOm \ \& \ (z)[(Kz \ \& \ z \neq m) \supset -yOz]\}$ M.P., 3, 8.
10. $bOm \ \& \ (z)[(Kz \ \& \ z \neq m) \supset -bOz]$ E.I. asmt.(9.)
11. $Km \supset (Ey)[yOm \ \& \ (z)(zOm \supset z=y)]$ U.I., 3.
12. $(Ey)[yOm \ \& \ (z)(zOm \supset z=y)]$ M.P., 3., 11.
13. $cOm \ \& \ (z)(zOm \supset z=c)$ E.I. asmt.(12.)
14. $bOm \supset b=c$ U.I., 13.
15. $b=c$ M.P., 14., 10.
16. $aOm \supset a=c$ U.I., 13.
17. $a=c$ M.P., 7., 16.
18. $a=b$ ID. 15., 17.
19. $a=b$ E.I.S.P., 13-18.
20. $(z)[(Kz \ \& \ z \neq m) \supset -aOz]$ ID., 10., 19.
21. $(z)[-(Kz \ \& \ z \neq m) \vee -aOz]$ Imp., 20.
22. $(z)-(Kz \ \& \ z \neq m \ \& \ aOz)$ DeM., 21.
23. $-(Ez)(Kz \ \& \ z \neq m \ \& \ aOz)$ Q.N., 22.
24. $-(Ez)(Kz \ \& \ z \neq m \ \& \ aOz)$ E.I.S.P., 10-23.
25. $aOm \ \& \ -(Ez)(Kz \ \& \ z \neq m \ \& \ aOz) \ \& \ tK(DKa)$ conj., 7., 24.
26. $(Ey)[yOm \ \& \ -(Ez)(Kz \ \& \ z \neq m \ \& \ yOz) \ \& \ tK(DKy)]$ E.G., 25.
27. $(Ey)[yOm \ \& \ -(Ez)(Kz \ \& \ z \neq m \ \& \ yOz) \ \& \ tK(DKy)]$ E.I.S.P. 7-26.
28. $tK(DHm) \supset (Ey)[yOm \ \& \ -(Ez)(Kz \ \& \ z \neq m \ \& \ yOz) \ \& \ tK(DKy)]$ C.P.S.P., 4-27.

1. $(x)(y)\{(Kx \ \& \ yOx) \supset (z)[(Ew)(zK(wSy) \vee zK(wLSy) \vee zK(wAy) \vee zK(wLAy)) \supset zHx]\}$
2. $Km \ \& \ hOm \ \& \ \neg tHm$
3. $(Km \ \& \ hOm) \supset (z)[(Ew)(zK(wSh) \vee zK(wLSH) \vee zK(wAh) \vee zK(wLAh)) \supset zHm]$ U.I., 1
4. $(z)[(Ew)(zK(wSh) \vee zK(wLSH) \vee zK(wAh) \vee zK(wLAh)) \supset zHm]$ M.P., 2., 3.
5. $(Ew)(tK(wSh) \vee tK(wLSH) \vee tK(wAh) \vee tK(wLAh)) \supset tHm$ U.I., 4.
6. $\neg(Ew)(tK(wSh) \vee tK(wLSH) \vee tK(wAh) \vee tK(wLAh))$ M.T., 2., 5.
7. $\neg tK(DSh) \ \& \ \neg tK(DLSH) \ \& \ \neg tK(DAh) \ \& \ \neg tK(DLAh)$ Q.N., U.I., DeM., 6.
8. $(x)(y)(z)[xK(yKz) \supset (xK(ySz) \ \& \ xK(yAz))]$
9. $(x)(y)(z)[xK(yLKz) \supset (xK(yLSz) \ \& \ xK(yLAz))]$
10. $tK(DKh) \supset (tK(DSh) \ \& \ tK(DAh))$ U.I., 8.
11. $\neg tK(DSh) \vee \neg tK(DAh)$ Add., 7.
12. $\neg(tK(DSh) \ \& \ tK(DAh))$ DeM., 11.
13. $\neg tK(DKh)$ M.T., 10., 12.
14. $tK(DLKh) \supset (tK(DLSH) \ \& \ tK(DLAh))$ U.I., 9.
15. $\neg tK(DLSH) \vee \neg tK(DLAh)$ Add., 7.
16. $\neg(tK(DLSH) \ \& \ tK(DLAh))$ DeM. 15.
17. $\neg tK(DLKh)$ M.T., 14., 16.

1. $(x)(y)\{[Kx \ \& \ (Ez)(yK(zHx) \vee yK(zLx))]\supset (w)\{wOx \supset$
 $(u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHw) \vee yK(uLw))]\}\}$
2. $(x)(y)(z)[xK(yKz) \equiv (Eu)(Ku \ \& \ zOu \ \& \ xK(yHu))]$
3. $(x)\{Ox \supset (y)\{yKx \equiv (u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHx) \vee yK(uLx))]\}\}$
4. $(x)[(Ey)(xOy) \supset Ox]$

5. $(Ez)(aK(zKb))$ C.P. asmt.
6. $aK(cKb)$ E.I. asmt.(5.)
7. $aK(bKc) \equiv (Eu)(Ku \ \& \ bOu \ \& \ aK(cHu))$ U.I., 2.
8. $(Eu)(Ku \ \& \ bOu \ \& \ aK(cHu))$ M.P., 6., 7.
9. $Kd \ \& \ bOd \ \& \ aK(cHd)$ E.I. asmt.(8.)
10. $aK(bHd) \vee aK(bLd)$ Add., 9.
11. $(Ez)(aK(zHd) \vee aK(zLd))$ E.G., 10.
12. $[Kd \ \& \ (Ez)(aK(zHd) \vee aK(zLd))]\supset (w)\{wOd \supset (u)[aEu \supset$
 $(aK(uHw) \vee aK(uLw))]\}\}$ U.I., 1.
13. $(w)\{wOd \supset (u)[aEu \supset (aK(uHw) \vee aK(uLw))]\}$ M.P., 9, 11, 12.
14. $bOd \supset (u)[aEu \supset (aK(uHb) \vee aK(uLb))]$ U.I., 13.
15. $(U)[aEu \supset (aK(uHb) \vee aK(uLb))]$ M.P., 9., 14.
16. $(Ey)(bOy)$ E.G., 9.
17. $(Ey)(bOy) \supset Ob$ U.I., 4.
18. Ob M.P., 16., 17.
19. $Ob \supset (y)\{yKb \equiv (u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHb) \vee yK(uLb))]\}$ U.I., 3.
20. $(y)\{yKb \equiv (u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHb) \vee yK(uLb))]\}$ M.P., 18, 19.
21. $aKb \equiv (u)[yEu \supset (yK(uHb) \vee yK(uLb))]$ U.I., 20.
22. aKb M.P., 15., 21.
23. aKb E.I.S.P., 9-22.
24. aKb E.I.S.P., 6-23.
25. $(Ez)(aK(zKb)) \supset aKb$ C.P.S.P., 5-24.
26. $(x)(y)[(Ez)(xK(zKy)) \supset xKy]$ U.G.S.P., 5-25.

1. $(x)(y) \left\{ (Kx \ \& \ yOx) \supset (z) [(Ew) (zK(wSy) \vee zK(wAy) \vee zK(wLSy) \vee zK(wLAy)) \supset zHx] \right\}$
2. $(x)(y)(z) [xK(yKz) \equiv (xK(yAx) \ \& \ xK(ySx))]$
3. $(x)(y)(z) [xK(yKz) \equiv (Eu) (Ku \ \& \ zOu \ \& \ xK(yHu))]$
4. $(x)(y) [xKy \equiv (Ez) (Kz \ \& \ yOz \ \& \ zHx)]$
5. $(Ez) (aK(zKb))$ C.P. asmt.
6. $aK(cKb)$ E.I. asmt.(5.)
7. $aK(cKb) \equiv (Eu) (Ku \ \& \ bOu \ \& \ aK(cHu))$ U.I., 3.
8. $(Eu) (Ku \ \& \ bOu \ \& \ aK(cHu))$ M.P., 6., 7.
9. $Kd \ \& \ bOd \ \& \ aK(cHd)$ E.I. asmt.(8.)
10. $(Kd \ \& \ bOd) \supset (z) [(Ew) (zK(wSb) \vee zK(wAb) \vee zK(wLSb) \vee zK(wLAB)) \supset zHd]$ U.I., 1.
11. $(z) [(Ew) (zK(wSb) \vee zK(wAb) \vee zK(wLSb) \vee zK(wLAB)) \supset zHd]$ M.P., 9., 10.
12. $aK(cKb) \equiv (aK(cSb) \ \& \ aK(cAb))$ U.I., 2.
13. $aK(cSb) \ \& \ aK(cAb)$ M.P., 6., 12.
14. $aK(cSb) \vee aK(cAb) \vee aK(cLSb) \vee aK(cLAB)$ Simp., Add., 13.
15. $(Ew) (aK(wSb) \vee aK(wAb) \vee aK(wLSb) \vee aK(wLAB))$ E.G., 14.
16. $(Ew) (aK(wSb) \vee aK(wAb) \vee aK(wLSb) \vee aK(wLAB)) \supset aHd$ U.I., 11.
17. aHd M.P., 15., 16.
18. $Kd \ \& \ bOd \ \& \ aHd$ Conj., 9., 17.
19. $(Ez) (Kz \ \& \ bOz \ \& \ aHz)$ E.G., 18.
20. $aKb \equiv (Ez) (Kz \ \& \ bOz \ \& \ aHz)$ U.I., 4.
21. aKb M.P., 19., 20.
22. aKb E.I.S.P., 9-21.
23. aKb E.I.S.P., 6-22.
24. $(Ez) (aK(zKb) \supset aKb)$ C.P.S.P., 5-23.
25. $(x)(y) [(Ez) (xK(zKy)) \supset xKy]$ U.G.S.P., 5-24.

1. $(x)(y) \{ xKy \equiv (z) \{ xEz \supset [(zKy \supset xK(zKy)) \& (zLKy \supset xK(zLKy))] \} \}$
2. $aKc \& bKc \& aEb$ C.P. asmt.
3. $aKc \equiv (z) \{ aEz \supset [(zKc \supset aK(zKc)) \& (zLKc \supset aK(zLKc))] \}$ U.I., 1.
4. $(z) \{ aEz \supset [(zKc \supset aK(zKc)) \& (zLKz \supset aK(zLKc))] \}$ M.P., 2., 3.
5. $aEb \supset [(bKc \supset aK(bKc)) \& (bLKc \supset aK(bLKc))]$ U.I., 4.
6. $(bKc \supset aK(bKc)) \& (bLKc \supset aK(bLKc))$ M.P., 2., 5.
7. $bKc \supset aK(bKc)$ Simp., 6.
8. $aK(bKc)$ M.P., 2., 7.
9. $(aKc \& bKc \& aEb) \supset aK(bKc)$ C.P.S, P., 2-9.
10. $(x)(y)(z) [xKz \& yKz \& aEy \supset xK(yKz)]$ U.G.S.P., 2-10.

Section 5: 171D - 173D

In this section I shall present my interpretation of Charmides 171D-173D. At 171D Socrates concludes the argument in which he proves that the temperate man will not know what he knows and does not know and will not be able to determine if others know what they claim to know or if they do not know what they claim to know. He then tells Critias the beneficial consequences that would follow if someone did in fact have these powers:

- 171D Then, Critias, he replied, what benefit would we get from temperance if it is of this nature? Because if, as we assumed in the beginning, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know (and that he knows the former and not the latter) and were able to investigate another man who was in the same situation, then it would be of the greatest benefit to us to be temperate. Because those of us who had temperance would live lives free from error and so would all
- 171E those under our rule. Neither would we ourselves be attempting to do things we did not understand--rather we would find those who did understand and turn the matter over to them--nor would we trust those over whom we ruled to do any thing except what they would do correctly, and this would be that of which they possessed the knowledge. And thus, by means of temperance, every household would be well-run, and every city well-governed, and so in every case where
- 172A temperance reigned. And with error rooted out and rightness in control, men so circumstanced would necessarily fare admirably and well in their doings and, faring well, they would be happy. Isn't this what we mean about temperance, Critias, I said, when we say what a good thing it would be to know what one knows and what one does not know?

This is certainly what we mean, he said.

But now you see, I replied, that no knowledge of this sort has put in an appearance.

I see that, he said.

Socrates' argument in this passage is fairly straightforward. If knowledge of knowledge has the powers Critias has attributed to it, then its possessor will be able to determine if he and other people, for any kind of knowledge, have that kind of knowledge. Hence, in any area over which he has control; his life, his family, or his state, he will be able to have every task performed by only those people who have the appropriate kind of knowledge. If he or another person lacks the kind of knowledge that is needed for some purpose, he will be able to recognize the person who does have that knowledge and appoint him to perform the work. From this Socrates infers both that every household and city will be well-run and that men will be happy.

It should be noted that the argument has several unquestioned presuppositions. The first is that the temperate man will have the economic or political power necessary to appoint the particular experts, and that the experts will perform the tasks he appoints them to. Secondly, Socrates presupposes that there will be people who have knowledge in every area in which knowledge might be needed, and that there will be as many experts as are needed in each area. Thirdly, it presupposes that no one will interfere with the temperate man's ordering of his life, household, and state. His activities will not be overcome by forces from within or without. Fourthly, it presupposes that each expert will have the material resources and political power needed to perform his task. Finally, Socrates pre-

supposes that the activities of each expert are properly coordinated. Work will be done at the right times and places and in the right amounts. Tasks that directly and indirectly interlock will be properly harmonized. This last presupposition is important because it may well be related to the "knowledge of the whole" property that Plato believed distinguished Thracian doctors from Greek doctors.

At 172B Socrates conjectures

172C Well then, I said, is this the advantage of the knowledge of knowledge and the absence of knowledge, which we are now finding out to be temperance, that the man who has this knowledge will learn whatever he learns more easily, and everything will appear to him in a clearer light since, in addition to what he learns, he will perceive the knowledge? And he will examine others on the subjects he himself knows in a more effective fashion, whereas those without the knowledge will conduct their examinations in a weaker and less fruitful way. And are not these, my friend, the kind of benefits we shall reap from temperance? Or are we regarding it as something greater, and demanding that it be greater than it really is?

This passage's status as a conjecture is clear from the facts that the suggestions in it are neither examined nor mentioned later at the conclusion of the dialogue when Socrates sums up the course of the argument. (175B-D). The passage serves the immediate dramatic purpose of providing an interlude between Socrates' claim that the rule of a powerful form of knowledge of knowledge would enable men to fare well and be happy (172A1-4) and his own examination of that claim. However, the role of this passage in terms of the dialogue as a whole is much greater than just this. The purpose of the part of the Charmides that this conjecture occurs in is to determine the

benefit that is produced by knowledge of knowledge. One colossal sort of benefit has been examined and rejected. At 172B Socrates suggests two other benefits that knowledge of knowledge might produce:

- 1) facility at learning and clarity of apprehension
- 2) facility at examining others on subjects that one knows oneself

It is significant that these benefits should be linked with knowledge of knowledge and temperance because the first personal trait is distinctly Charmides' and the second is distinctly Socrates'.

At 157D Critias tells us

Then you must know that....not only does Charmides have the reputation of being the most temperate young man of the day, but that he is second to none in every thing else appropriate to his age.

At 159-160B Socrates and Charmides examine the definition "temperance is a sort of quietness" by reviewing the activities that Charmides engages in as a young man. They agree that facility in learning is more admirable than difficulty in learning. (159D) If Charmides is second to none in this activity, then presumably he is someone who learns whatever he learns more easily than others.

At 171C Plato claims that anyone who possesses a certain kind of knowledge will be able to recognize when someone else has that kind of knowledge. At 175B he suggests

that the man who has knowledge of knowledge....will examine others on subjects he himself knows in a more effective fashion, whereas those without the knowledge will conduct their examinations in a weaker and less fruitful way.

This may be interpreted in several different ways. The doctor who also has knowledge of knowledge may

1. be superlative at testing whether or not someone is a doctor.
2. not only be able to test whether or not someone is a doctor in the ordinalry manner, but also be able to conduct the examination so that it brings about additional benefits.
3. be able to conduct examinations on the subject of medicine which are beneficial, but are not for the purpose of testing whether or not the examinee has knowledge of health and disease.

or 4. be able to do all three of the above.

Given the standard views about the nature of Socratic elenchus and the assumption that Socrates does have moral knowledge, it is clear that he exemplifies these special abilities.

I suggest that at 172B Plato is conjecturing that knowledge of knowledge and the absence of knowledge, not proven to be impossible but proven to have no power beyond the domain of knowledge, may be a faculty which accounts for the exceptional abilities of both Charmides and Socrates. Both facility at learning and facility at conducting inquiries into knowledge may be reasonably described as knowledge of knowledge. It is not implausible to link these distinct personal qualities with *σωφροσύνη*, since Plato remarks at Laws 710 that *σωφροσύνη* has both a mature and an immature form.

On the interpretation of Socrates' conjecture that I have offered the suggestions being advanced at 172B are ones that Plato would have thought worthy of serious examination. Unfortunately, I do not know

why these suggestions are merely put forward as conjectures, and not critically examined and either affirmed or denied. It may be that Plato did not take them up in the Charmides because that dialogue was already complicated enough.

From 172C5 to 173A9 there is a genuine interlude in the argument. Socrates hypothetically grants the two claims he has previously challenged.

1. it is possible to know knowledge²⁹
 - and 2. it is possible to know what one knows and does not know.
- He then says

And, having granted all these things, let us investigate more thoroughly whether, if it is like this, it will benefit us in any way. Because what we were saying just now about temperance being regarded as a great benefit (if it were like this) in the governing of households and cities, does not seem to me, Critias, to have been well said.

In what way, he asked.

Because, I said, we carelessly agreed that it would be a great good for men if each of us should perform the things he knows and should hand over what he does not know to those others who do. (172D)

...Because truly, even if there were no doubt that temperance is like this, it appears in no way clear to me that it does us any good. (172E)

I would like to discuss several important dramatic aspects of this passage. The first concerns Plato's claim that the discussion following this passage will expose some strange features of knowledge of knowledge.

....perhaps we have been demanding something useless. I say this because certain odd things become clear

about temperance if it has this nature. 17204-6

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,
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You certainly say some queer things, Socrates, Critias said.

By the dog, I said, they seem queer to me too, and that is why, when I became aware of this a moment ago, I said that some strange things would come to light.... 172E3-6

What Socrates means by the first remark quoted is far from clear.

I take him to be referring to the claim he is about to try and prove: Even if temperance is knowledge of knowledge and knowing what you know and what you do not know, it will not enable us to fare well and be happy and hence it will be useless. I believe Plato's reason for claiming that some strange things will come to light is that he recognizes that he is about to deny something that seems to be quite plausible:

1. If everyone performs only the things they know and have others that do know perform the things that they themselves do not know, then everyone will fare well and be happy.

It is important to recognize that the status of 1) is different from that of

2. Temperance is modesty.

or

3. Knowledge of knowledge is possible.

Athenian readers of the Charmides might be initially surprised that Socrates would challenge 2), but Plato certainly does not regard the result of Socrates' examination of that part of the traditional conception of temperance as strange or queer. Plato expects his readers to accept

his premises; temperance is always admirable, modesty is sometimes admirable and sometimes not, and then to soberly accept the logical consequences of Socrates' argument. The result of Socrates' examination is strange only to those who have not thought out the consequences of beliefs they already hold. In a different sense, the discussion of 3) brings to light some strange statements. Surely it is strange to consider whether or not there is a hearing that hears itself, other hearings, and the lack of hearings; and also produces a sound of its own. But part of the reason these strange statements are made is that Critias has shifted from a definition of temperance as knowledge of the self to the definition that claims (in part) that temperance is the knowledge that knows itself. (166C) The latter definition attributes a quality to temperance that certainly seems strange, and it is the examination of just this point that prompts Socrates to make the strange statements about hearing and the other relations. Moreover, when Socrates says that it is very unlikely that these faculties exist, it is reasonable to assume that the sentiments of the reader are with him. He does not urge anyone to accept paradoxical or strange consequences.

But now 1) is hardly a strange statement in itself, and it certainly is not an equation of superficially similar concepts like 2). It is neither a conventional maxim, like "minding ones own business," nor is it a spur of the moment response to a twist in the argument, like "temperance is self-knowledge." Its antecedent, even to contemporary readers, evokes a vision of well-ordered households and

communities. (A vision to be described shortly in Socrates' dream at 173A.) To have each person perform the tasks he knows how to perform and turn over to others who know how to perform them, things that he himself does not know, certainly seems like a good thing. The converse of 1), that this is a necessary condition for a state whose members are happy and fare well, is one of the fundamental principles of the Republic. Given Socrates' glowing description of the state ordered by the possessor of knowledge of knowledge, it seems natural for the reader to follow, with Critias,³⁰ Socrates' earlier (172A) claim that knowledge of knowledge will produce an admirable and happy life.

I suggest that the passage from 172C to 173D displays, in the person of Socrates, an intellectual parallel to Socrates' control of his sexual passion when he catches a glimpse of Charmides' naked body.

And when Critias said that I was the person who knew the remedy and he turned his full gaze upon me in a manner beyond description and seemed on the point of asking a question, and when everyone in the palaestra surged all around us in a circle, then my noble friend, I saw inside his cloak and caught on fire and was quite beside myself. (155C)

As with the vision of Charmides after a long military campaign, the vision of the well-ordered state after the lengthy abstract argument elicits a passionate response from Socrates:

And with error rooted out and rightness in control, men so circumstanced would necessarily fare admirably and well in all their doings and, faring well, they would be happy. (172A)

At the beginning of the dialogue Socrates restrains his passion for Charmides' external beauty, and begins an examination of Charmides'

soul. He finds, contrary to the views of the many, that Charmides lacks the kind of knowledge which will enable him to fare well and be happy. At the end of the dialogue, Socrates restrains his passion for the apparent beauty of a state ordered by knowledge of knowledge, subjects it to an intellectual examination, and finds that it too is wanting in the kind of knowledge that will enable it to fare well and bring happiness to its citizens.

The parallel helps to explain a number of specific aspects of the dramatic structure of 172C-173A. The first is his claim that strange things are about to come to light. The strange consequence, that the state ordered by knowledge of knowledge will not be the ideal state, parallels the result of Socrates' examination of Charmides. Charmides is said to by all to be foremost in temperance (157B), yet we find out that the sort of temperance he has (an immature form that may be related to the kind of temperance discussed at Laws 710) is not the sort that will enable him to conduct his life or his state properly. The parallel also helps to explain this comment:

I think I am making a fool of myself, I said, but all the same it is necessary to investigate what occurs to us and not to proceed at random, if one is going to have the least care for oneself. (173A)³¹

Many people, in ancient Greece and today, would regard Socrates as a fool for talking about abstract matters of philosophy with Charmides and Critias, instead of trying to seduce such a sexually desirable youth. Just as he is not satisfied by Charmides' physical beauty, Socrates is not satisfied by the state ordered by knowledge of knowledge.

This too may seem foolish, unless one accepts his views on the preeminent need for moral guidance. Finally, since Socrates believes our foremost concern should be the welfare of our souls (Apology 30B), his statement that we should investigate every point that occurs to us if we have the least concern for ourselves, surely suggests a parallel with 154D.³²

Socrates said, By Heracles, you are describing a man without an equal--if he should happen to have one small thing in addition.

What's that? asked Critias.

If he happens to have a well-formed soul, I said....

Critias' response to this, "He is very distinguished in that respect too," parallels his ready acceptance of Socrates' initial claim that the state ruled by the possessor of knowledge of knowledge will be a state in which men fare well and are happy.

Following the dramatic interlude, Socrates presents his dream.

Listen then, I said, to my dream, to see whether it comes through horn or through ivory. If temperance really ruled over us and were as we now define it, surely everything would be done according to knowledge, neither would anyone who says he is a pilot (but is not) deceive us, not would any doctor or general or anyone else pretending to know what he does not know escape our notice. This being the situation, wouldn't we have greater bodily health than we do now, and safety when we are in danger at sea or in battle, and wouldn't we have dishes and all our clothes and shoes and things skillfully made for us, and many other things as well, because we would be employing true craftsmen? And, if you will, let us agree that the mantic art is knowledge of what is to be and that temperance, directing her, keeps away deceivers and sets up the true seers as prophets of the future. I grant that the human race, if thus equipped, would act and live in a knowledgeable way--because temperance,

watching over it, would not allow the absence of knowledge to creep in and become our accomplice. But whether acting according to knowledge would make us fare well and be happy, this we have yet to learn, my dear Critias. (173A-D)

Save for two points, this is essentially an elaboration of Socrates' earlier (171D) claim that if knowledge of knowledge has the powers the argument has shown that it does not have, then the state will be well-ordered in the sense that each task would be performed only by knowledgeable agents. However, he reasserts his doubt that in such a state men will fare well and be happy; even if there is a kind of knowledge which is knowledge of the future and the temperate man is able to find a person who has this kind of knowledge. (Plato's views on knowledge by prophecy is surely as obscure subject; it is a problem that I shall not pursue.)

The second point that should be noted is a deliberate ambiguity in Socrates' final clause:

ΤΟΥΤΟ Δὲ οὕτω δυνατόν ἐστι μανθάνειν. ὃ φίλε Κριτίαν.

He is drawing a parallel between the abilities or powers of the participants in the dialogue and the abilities or powers of the possessor of knowledge of knowledge. Socrates believes that he and Critias have been unable to achieve the proper end of their discussion, finding a kind of knowledge which has the ability to achieve the proper ends of the community.

Section 6: 173D - 175D

The remaining part of Socrates' inquiry, 173D6-175D8, contains some of the most puzzling arguments in the Charmides. Some of the arguments appear to be fallacious, and the motivation for many of Socrates' remarks is obscure. I do not claim to have an explanation for many important aspects of this part of the dialogue. However, the analysis of the Charmides that I have developed so far will provide the basis for an interpretation which explains the general structure and rationale of Socrates' argument and enables us to interpret several apparently obscure claims.

Following Socrates' report of his dream, Critias and Socrates have this exchange:

But on the other hand, Critias said, you will not readily gain the prize of faring well by any other means if you disdain knowledge.

Instruct me on just one more small point, I said, of what is this knowledge you speak of? Is it of shoemaking?

173E Good heavens no.

Of Bronze working, then?

Certainly not.

Then of wool or wood or some similar thing?

Of course not.

Then I said we no longer keep to the statement that the man who lives according to knowledge is happy. Because those who live in the ways we mentioned are not admitted by you to be happy, but rather you seem to me to define the happy man as one who lives according to knowledge about certain specific things.

I think that we should assume that at 173D7 Critias is not using "ἐπιστημῶν" to refer specifically to knowledge of knowledge. Otherwise, Socrates' question, "Of what is this knowledge?", would have to be given the absurd interpretation "What is knowledge of knowledge, knowledge of?" At the conclusion of the passage quoted, Socrates claims to have refuted the statement, 1. Anyone who lives according to knowledge is happy; by having presented several counter examples to it. The carpenter lives according to knowledge, and Critias, Socrates says, has admitted that such a person is not happy. (It should be noted that Critias' admission of this point is not recorded anywhere in the dialogue.)

From the nature of Socrates' examples it seems clear that principle 1. should be understood in a very broad sense; perhaps something like:

- 1a) Anyone who lives any part of his life in accordance with any kind of knowledge at all, will be happy.

A shoemaker who used his knowledge to make shoes, and had no other aspect of his life ruled by knowledge (that he or his ruler had) might well counterexample 1a).

An alternative way of interpreting 1) is something like:

- 1b) Anyone who lives in such a way that every aspect of his life is ruled by knowledge, will be happy.

Since this is, or is similar to, the claim Socrates has just said he intends to challenge, one initially tends to read 1) with this interpretation in mind. But this reading of 1) is doubtful for two reasons. First, the examples Socrates enthymematically refers to, unhappy craftsmen, would not counterexample 1b) unless he also claimed

that every other aspect of their lives was somehow ruled by knowledge.

Critias' abrupt replies indicate that this latter assumption is not being made. Secondly, Socrates goes on to say

you seem to me to define the happy man as one who lives according to knowledge of certain specific things. (175E8-9)

This move in the argument is most naturally understood as a narrowing down of 1a). As a modification of 1b) it would be pointless, since if a life ordered by every kind of knowledge is unhappy, then it would seem that a life according to some kinds of knowledge would be so also.

Socrates continues by suggesting to Critias the sort of man whose knowledge might produce happiness:

And perhaps you mean the person I mentioned a moment ago, the man who knows what all future events will be, namely the seer. Are you referring to this man or some other?

Both to this one, Critias said, and another.

Which one? Socrates said, Isn't it the sort of man who, in addition to the future, knows everything that has been and is now and is ignorant of nothing? Let us postulate the existence of such a man. Of this man I think you would say that there was no one living who was more knowledgeable.

Certainly not.

There is one additional thing I want to know: which one of the knowledges makes him happy? Do all of them do this equally?

No, very unequally, he said. 173E9-174A12

There are several problems in interpreting this passage. First, since Socrates is ostensibly trying to show that a state ordered by

knowledge of knowledge is not one in which everyone fares well and is happy, it is puzzling that he tries to determine what it is that a single person must have to make himself happy. It may be that what is required for the happiness of a single person in an unordered state, might not be necessary in a well-ordered state. A second more specific problem is that it is not at all clear exactly how much knowledge is had by the man Socrates is talking about. Initially, he seems to be considering a person who has only the knowledge of the seer. At 174A2, Critias says that he is referring to this man when Socrates says to him, "Are you referring to this man or some other?" Critias also says he is referring to someone else, and does not demur when Socrates suggests that this other person is "the sort of man who, in addition to the future, knows everything that has been and is now and is ignorant of nothing." Although it does not seem to be important, it should be noted that Critias has apparently agreed that two kinds of people will be happy, the seer and the person who has the seer's knowledge and also knowledge of past and present events. Socrates, however, examines only the second case. Apparently, his remarks are intended to apply to the first case also.

It is far from clear what is meant by the phrase "and is ignorant of nothing." (καὶ μεδὲν ἄγνοος) On the basis of its immediate context, it would appear that Socrates is emphasizing that the man Critias is referring to is ignorant of no events; past, present, or future. However, on the basis of his subsequent remarks, Socrates

might be interpreted as hypothesizing that the man has every kind of knowledge; arithmetic, medicine and so on.

there is one additional thing I want to know: which one of the knowledges makes him happy? Do all of them do this equally?

No, very unequally, he said.

Well, which one in particular makes him happy? The one by which he knows which one of the things are and have been and are to come? Will it be the one by which he knows checker playing? ...or calculation?... or...health? 174A9-174B8

As I understand it, 174B indicates that Socrates is assuming that the hypothetical man has every kind of knowledge and is trying to find out which of them brings him happiness. The conclusion of this line of questioning is,

But the most likely case, [Socrates] said, is that by which he knows what?

By which he knows good, he said, and evil. 174B10-12

One feature of this passage that deserves comment is the discussion of the extent to which different kinds of knowledge contribute to the happiness of the hypothetical possessor of every kind of knowledge. Although the remarks are vague, we may note the following points,

1. Different kinds of knowledge make a very unequal contribution to happiness (174A12)
2. One particular kind of knowledge is primarily or totally responsible for happiness (174B1)
3. Some kinds of knowledge may make little or no contribution to happiness. (174B1-5)
4. Some kinds of knowledge may make a significant

contribution to happiness. (174B9-10)

5. Knowledge of good and evil is most likely the kind of knowledge that produces happiness (174B11-13)

These few remarks leave a number of interesting questions unanswered. Is the possession of knowledge of good and evil by itself sufficient for happiness, or must we also possess some or all of the other kinds of knowledge? Do some kinds of knowledge make absolutely no contribution to happiness? What is the relationship between the claims about the contribution of different kinds of knowledge to one person's happiness and the contribution that different kinds of knowledge, when possessed by different people, might make to the happiness of everyone in the community? One thing about this passage that is puzzling, and that I do not know how to explain, is that at 174A2 Critias says that seer is happy and at 174B5 apparently denies that this kind of knowledge will make a person happy.

Following Critias' claim that it is knowledge of good and evil that makes a person happy, Socrates exclaims:

You wretch, said I, all this time you've been leading me right round in a circle and concealing from me that it was not living according to knowledge that was making us fare well and be happy, even if we possessed all the knowledges put together, but that we have to have this one knowledge of good and evil. Because, Critias, if you consent to take away this knowledge from the other knowledges, will medicine any the less produce health, or cobbling produce shoes, or the art of weaving produce clothes, or the pilot's art any the less prevent us from dying at sea or the general's art in war?

They will do it, just the same, he said.

But my dear Critias, our chance of getting any of

these things well and beneficially done will have vanished if this is lacking.

You are right.

Then this knowledge, at any rate, is not temperance, but that one of which the function is to benefit us. And it is not a knowledge of knowledge and the absence of knowledge but of good and evil. So that, if this latter one is beneficial, temperance would be something else for us. (174B10-174D7)

Socrates claims to have produced the refutation of the thesis that living according to knowledge of knowledge will make us fare well and be happy. Here Socrates shifts from talking about knowledges possessed by one individual that will make or fail to make him happy, to knowledges possessed by members of a community whose collective use will make some or all members of the community happy. (174C)

In a superficial sense Socrates' argument in this passage is clear.

1. The kind of knowledge that benefits us=knowledge of good and evil.
2. Knowledge of good and evil≠knowledge of knowledge and the absence of knowledge.
3. The kind of knowledge that benefits us≠knowledge of knowledge and the absence of knowledge.

In a deeper sense, it is hardly clear why Socrates thinks that knowledge of good and evil is the one and only one kind of knowledge that will enable people to fare well and be happy. Unlike knowledge of knowledge, we are given no hints about how he conceives of the power of this kind of knowledge; how it is to interact in a beneficial way with other things. He may hold that possession of this kind of knowledge alone is not sufficient for a happy life or happy community.

Presumably, kinds of knowledge of the sort mentioned at 174C are necessary for happiness. But what is it about knowledge of good and evil that makes it the essential condition for happiness?

One plausible suggestion is that this kind of knowledge, like the knowledge of good doctors, has knowledge of the whole:

In keeping with this principle, they plan a regime for the whole body with the idea of treating and curing the part along with the whole....just as one should not attempt to cure the eyes apart from the head, nor the head apart from the body, so one should not attempt to cure the body apart from the soul. And this, he [Zalmoxis] says is why most diseases are beyond the Greek doctors, that they do not pay attention to the whole as they ought to do, since if the whole is not in good condition, it is impossible that the part should be. [156C-E]

This suggestion is fertile with possibilities. Several leading ones are:

1. Knowledge of good and evil can coordinate the parts of the state to produce goodness and stave off evil.
2. Knowledge of good and evil provides a political extension of Zalmoxis' medical theory. Just as one cannot cure the eyes without treating the head and the body without treating the soul, one cannot cure the man without treating the community of which he is a part.
3. The medical analogy is important in another respect. The objects of the doctor's knowledge, strictly speaking, are only health and disease. But he uses this knowledge to manipulate things that are not objects of his knowledge, eyes, heads, etc. If this is theoretically acceptable, then it is also theoretically acceptable for the man who has knowledge of good and evil to use his knowledge to manipulate things that are not objects of his knowledge, e.g., other people's knowledge, to produce good and evil.

If we accept this analysis of the knowledge of good and evil, then the rationale for final part of the argument becomes clear. If

knowledge of good and evil has knowledge over the state in the way that Thracian doctors have knowledge over humans, then, for political purposes, knowledge of knowledge becomes superfluous. Socrates gets Critias to admit that knowledge of knowledge has no benefit:

174E But why should not this [temperance] be beneficial? [Critias] said. Because if temperance really is a knowledge of knowledge and rules over the other knowledges, then I suppose it would rule over this knowledge of the good and would benefit us.

And would this knowledge make us healthy, I said, and not the art of medicine? And would it perform the tasks of the other arts rather than each of them performing its own task? Didn't we protest solemnly just a moment ago that it is a knowledge of knowledge and absence of knowledge only and of nothing else? We did, didn't we?

It seems so, at any rate.

Then it will not be the craftsman of health?

Certainly not.

175A

Because health belonged to some other art, didn't it?

Yes, to another.

Then it will be of no use, my friend. Because we have just awarded this work to another art, isn't that so?

Yes indeed.

Then how will temperance be useful when it is the craftsman of no useful thing?

Apparently it won't be any use at all, Socrates.

Socrates goes on to point out that the definition of temperance as knowledge of knowledge is thereby refuted, since temperance is a fine thing and knowledge of knowledge has been shown to be useless. The use I have made of Zalmoxis' medical theory in interpreting Socrates' final

remarks receives some support from an argument Nicias gives in the

Laches:

He [Laches] thinks a doctor's knowledge of the sick amounts to something more than being able to describe health and disease, whereas I think their knowledge is restricted to just this. Do you suppose, Laches, that when a man's recovery is more to be feared than his illness, the doctors know this? Or don't you think there are many cases in which it would be better not to get up from an illness? Tell me this: do you maintain that in all cases to live is preferable? In many cases, is it not better to die? (195C. The argument is extended to other craftsmen at 195D. See also Gorgias 519A and Republic 406.)

Nicias' point is that each of the particular craftsmen lacks the sort of knowledge that would enable him to guide his actions in a morally proper way. If the possessor of knowledge of knowledge ruled the state, he would be able to ensure that each task was performed only by persons who had the appropriate kind of knowledge. However, since he would not know good and evil, he would be unable to provide the moral guidance that is required if the craftsmen are to work in a way that is always morally beneficial. Since such a state will frequently have the undesirable consequences Nicias refers to, it will not be the ideal state. If Plato is relying on this point at the end of the Charmides, then he is justified in rejecting knowledge of knowledge as the ideal form of political authority. Since the point is explicitly made in a dialogue written at the same time as the Charmides, it is not implausible to suppose that it motivated his third set of arguments against the idea that the possessor of knowledge of knowledge would be able to properly order the state.

In this chapter I have argued that Charmides 167B - 174D is a

rational inquiry into issues that are important for Plato. In the next chapter I shall critically examine an alternative account of the conception of knowledge in the early dialogues that is used to give a different interpretation of the Charmides.

Footnotes to Chapter IV

¹Tuckey, p. 61, Gould, p. 39, Cohen, p. 167ff., and apparently Richard Robinson, Essays in Greek Philosophy, p. 27.

2.

See Cohen, p. 167, Wellman, p. 112, R.K. Sprague's note to this passage in her edition of the Charmides, p. 81.

³I should point out that I do not suppose that the same assumptions made about the hypothetical possessor of knowledge of knowledge in the Charmides were also made by Plato about the Guardians or about Socrates' unique abilities. First, the hypothetical possessor of knowledge of knowledge is said to know only knowledge. Secondly, Plato's views on knowledge, and consequently on knowledge of knowledge, surely had undergone considerable development by the time he wrote the Republic. Thirdly, I suspect that the Charmides might have been an unsuccessful attempt by Plato to understand Socrates' unique abilities. Socrates was plainly capable of recognizing the ignorance of himself and others, and the Charmides fails to find a kind of knowledge which would explain how someone could do this.

⁴The bracketed expression is Lamb's translation for 'Ἀκοὴ δ' αὖ καὶ ὄψις καὶ ἔτι γε κίνησις αὐτὴν κινεῖν, καὶ θερμότης κάλει, Sprague's

"Again, that hearing or vision or, in fact, any sort of motion should move itself, or heat burn itself,"

misleadingly suggests that hearing and vision are motions that move themselves. This does not seem to be in the text, and it obscures that fact that the problem with the hearing that hears itself is not that it may be self-moving, but that it is reflexive.

⁵A problem involved in formulating this principle is that Socrates speaks of the things he talks about both as relations and properties; e. g., something is both a love and a love of beauty. Since it is clear that something is a love (and similarly for the other things he talks about) just in case it is a love of something, I have used relational statements such as "(Ez)(Rxx)" in lieu of predicate statements. A somewhat more accurate but less elegant approach to this problem is to say that Socrates doubts the principle

$$(EP)(ER)(Ex)\{(y)[Py \equiv (Ez)(Ryz)] \& Px \& (w)(Pw \supset Rwx) \& (u)[(Pu \& x \neq u) \supset (v)(Ruv \supset \neg Rxv)]\}$$

⁶The arguments presented represent very general argument strategies. Since each argument strategy may be exemplified by a number of different

and plausible interpretations of Socrates' argument, and the strategies may be combined with each other to give other plausible interpretations of Socrates' argument, there are probably dozens of ways in which the argument at 167B - 169A may be interpreted. Since I only wish to make the general claims that the argument is rational and bears upon issues that are important for Plato, I shall not try to determine which way of reconstructing Socrates' actual argument is most faithful to the text.

One interesting way of interpreting the argument may be developed from a suggestion of Richard Robinson's. (Plato's Earlier Dialectic, p. 39.) We first claim that there are inductions, based upon the initial claims about love of loves, double of doubles, hearing of hearings, etc., to these claims:

1. It is impossible for mathematical relations to have property P.
2. It is impossible for psychological relations to have property P.
3. It is impossible for perceptual relations to have property P.
4. It is improbable that members of a certain class of physical relations (of which motion and heat are examples) have property P.

We then claim that there is an inductive inference from 1.-4. to

- A. It is improbable that anything has property P,

and then a deductive inference to

- B. It is improbable that there is a kind of knowledge that has property P.

⁷Some distinction between kinds of properties is essential for this argument. Nothing besides medical knowledge is of health and disease, and presumably Socrates would not want to infer that medical knowledge does not have the property of being of health and disease. (cf. Republic 454B).

⁸I follow the text in ignoring the distinction between desiring something because it is believed to be pleasurable and desiring it because it actually is pleasurable. I do not list opinion, since its object is not given in the text.

⁹The bracketed expression replaces Sprague's "...see if there is any one of them that..." She believes that Socrates is referring to one of the five senses in his passage; Lamb, Jowett, and I believe

that Socrates is referring to a hypothetical sixth sense. Aside from not having textual justification and not following the pattern established by Socrates' other examples, Sprague's translation attributes a straightforward contradiction to Socrates. He would, in effect, be asking Critias if one of the five senses perceives nothing that any of the five senses perceive.

¹⁰At Theaetetus 185 Socrates argues for the conclusion that "the mind contemplates some things through its own instrumentality, others through the bodily faculties." This assuredly is not the same position as the one rejected in the Charmides, but it does suggest that a sense of the senses would not be inconceivable to Plato, and is a possibility that might have been seriously considered.

¹¹Harold Cherniss (Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, p. 433-437,) mentions this passage in a discussion of Plato's later views on the soul; and the existence of the form of fire, a "self-existent fire," is accepted at Timaeus 51 and doubted at Parmenides 130B.

¹²See Tuckey, p. 15; North, p. 155; Vlastos 4, p. 229.

¹³The inferences are unobjectionable in a prima facie sense. They are objectionable if one holds metaphysical views which entail things like:

x's having beauty is compatible with x's having more ugliness than beauty,

or x's having beauty is compatible with x's being beautiful in one respect and ugly in other respects.

¹⁴I do not see how to formulate a single principle which covers all three of these inferences, let alone an inference which uses

x has the knowledge which knows itself

as a premise. "(x)(x has ϕ implies x is ϕ ing)" covers the knowledge example, but is not straightforwardly applicable to beauty and seems to sanction a false inference if "speed" is substituted for " ϕ ". "(x)(x has ϕ -ness implies x is ϕ)" can sanction modified versions of the first two inferences, but I do not see how it could be applied to the third inference.

¹⁵Critias' argument is in fact an irrelevant response to Socrates' request that he explain how the possession of knowledge of knowledge

implies that one will know what one knows and does not know. (168D) Since that argument is not an answer to his question, Socrates is justified in not discussing it and insisting that Critias deal with the issue he has raised. Since I claim that the argument is irrelevant to the main purposes of this passage, it might be fairly asked why Plato should have included it in the dialogue. It serves the dramatic purpose of showing that Socrates will not permit the discussion to be subverted by irrelevant responses to his questions. Secondly, I think that Plato is deliberately attempting to puzzle the reader into recognizing that self-knowledge is itself a philosophically problematical concept. Critias' argument is so facile that one immediately doubts his conclusion, and this doubt naturally extends to all of the remarks about self-knowledge. As it is, the Charmides is already the most complicated of the early dialogues. Since self-knowledge is such a difficult, complicated, and paradoxical problem for Plato, it is probable that he did not wish to enter into a discussion of it in this dialogue. The passage at 169E is a way of indirectly indicating to the reader that self-knowledge, as well as knowledge of knowledge, is a concept in need of examination.

¹⁶In the middle dialogues there is a well-developed account of what a person is. Hence, if one assumes that Plato thought self-knowledge was possible, one would have some basis on which to construct a theory about what Plato thought self-knowledge was when he wrote these later dialogues. The Guardians' application of their knowledge of Goodness upon themselves is explicitly affirmed at Republic 540A.

¹⁷"Plato and Mass Words," p. 90. Rosemeyer also claims that Plato accepts the converse inference: a person who knows himself also has knowledge of knowledge. Since this inference is not made in the text, I shall forego a discussion of it.

¹⁸If this is Rosemeyer's view, then on different grounds he has reached the same interpretation I have. However, he does not attribute to the possessor of knowledge of knowledge a recognition of his own ignorance. Rosemeyer's linguistic approach to Plato's terminology does not (and presumably is not intended to) explain why Socrates insists that knowledge of knowledge must also be related to the absence of knowledge.

¹⁹I use "enthymeme" to refer to an argument that has at least one unstated premise and "enthymematic premise" to refer to an unstated premise of an enthymeme.

²⁰In subsequent arguments I shall omit the condition that says that knowers are persons.

²¹The text of the latter part of this sentence is
 ὅτι μὲν τι ἐπίσταται καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τινα ἔχει, εἰκότως
 ἂν γινώσκουσι καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

²²The inference is $(x)(y)[xK(yHk) \rightarrow xK(Ez \wedge yKz)]$. The reason that it cannot be introduced into the theory is that it requires that we attribute propositional knowledge to the temperate man.

²³A very confusing problem with the argument at 170B-D is that Socrates makes contradictory assumptions about the hypothetical possessor of knowledge of knowledge. The assumptions are

- 1) The only knowledge he possesses is knowledge of knowledge
- 2) He possesses kinds of knowledge (medicine, music, and housebuilding) in addition to knowledge of knowledge.

Assumption 1) is explicitly made at 170B8. Assumption 2) is implicitly made at 170C1: "he will know the healthy by medicine, not by temperance,...." The second assumption is required for there to be any point to the exchange at 170C6-10:

But by temperance, if it is merely knowledge of knowledge, how will a person know that he knows the healthy or that he knows housebuilding?

He won't at all.

If assumption 2) were not made, then the claim that the person did not know that he knows the healthy would follow simply from the fact that he did not know the healthy, and not from the limitations of knowledge of knowledge.

The reason these contradictory assumptions are made is that one of Socrates' conclusions, the temperate man does not know what he knows, is false. I shall later argue that it is reasonable to attribute to Plato the view that everyone knows what they know. (I do not attribute to Plato the view that everyone knows what they do not know.) On Plato's view the doctor knows that he knows the healthy, and he knows this not by knowledge of knowledge, but because he has the faculty of medical knowledge. If the temperate man is also a doctor, he will know that he knows health, but he will not know it because he has knowledge of knowledge. Socrates assumes that the temperate man has only knowledge of knowledge and considers whether this alone will enable him to know what he knows. I shall shortly argue that he validly concludes that it will not. Assumption 2) is made for dramatic plausibility and assumption 1) is made for brevity.

Assumption 1) may be avoided if one introduces the notion of 'x knows that y knows z by w', but this is cumbersome and would require a good deal of explanation to eliminate its ambiguity. Fortunately, I have managed to reconstruct Socrates' arguments in a way that avoids assumption 2) but does not use the pointless way of reasoning mentioned above.

²⁴The bracketed phrase is Jowett's translation for
 $\neg \text{K} \epsilon \psi \acute{\omega} \mu \epsilon \theta \alpha \quad \delta \epsilon \epsilon \kappa \tau \acute{\omega} \gamma \alpha \varsigma$

Sprague's "And let's see what follows:" misleadingly suggests that Socrates' subsequent remarks are intended to logically follow from things he has previously said. Actually, he goes on to argue for the same point as his previous argument, but in a different way.

²⁵Socrates ignores three cases in making this claim. The first is a mere oversight, since he later (171C) says that the possessor of knowledge of knowledge will be able to recognize experts in his own field. He also ignores two interesting cases. If someone is totally ignorant and claims to know something, it seems that the temperate man will know that the person does not have the kind of knowledge he says he has. The principle sanctioning such an inference is

$$(\text{x})(\text{y})[\text{xK}(\text{yLk}) \supset (\text{z})(\text{Kz} \supset \text{xK}(\text{yLz}))].$$

In the unabbreviated version of the theory I have presented the temperate man is also capable of recognizing the presence or absence of ignorance. If a person possessed every kind of knowledge, then the temperate man would know that he was ignorant of nothing. In this case it would seem that he would be able to infer that the person had any kind of knowledge he claimed to have. The principle sanctioning this inference would be

$$(\text{x})(\text{y})[\text{xK}(\text{yLl}) \supset (\text{z})(\text{Kz} \supset \text{xK}(\text{yHz}))].$$

These principles may be adjoined to the theory I have presented if one believes that Plato thought that persons would automatically make the inferences they sanction. It should be noted that adding these principles to the theory requires the modification of a principle that is presently in the theory. The principle

$$(\text{x})(\text{y})\{[\text{Kx} \ \& \ (\text{Ez})(\text{yK}(\text{zHx}) \vee \text{yK}(\text{zLx}))] \supset (\text{w})\{\text{wOx} \supset (\text{u})[\text{yEu} \supset (\text{yK}(\text{uHw}) \vee \text{yK}(\text{uLw}))]\}\}$$

would need to be replaced by

$$(\text{x})(\text{y})\{[\text{Kx} \ \& \ [(\text{Ez})(\text{Ew})(\text{yK}(\text{zHx}) \ \& \ \text{Kw} \ \& \ \text{zLw}) \vee (\text{Eu})(\text{Ev})(\text{yK}(\text{uLx}) \ \& \ \text{Kv} \ \& \ \text{zHv})] \supset (\text{w})\{\text{wOx} \supset (\text{u})[\text{yEu} \supset (\text{yK}(\text{uHw}) \vee \text{yK}(\text{uLw}))]\}\} \ \& \ .$$

Several of the conclusions earlier drawn would also have to be

modified to account for the two exceptions noted above:

$$(x) \{ (0x \ \& \ x \neq k) \supset (y) [(Ez)(Kz \ \& \ yLz) \supset \neg tK(yKx)] \} \quad \text{and}$$

$$(x) \{ (0x \ \& \ x \neq k) \supset (y) [(Ez)(Kz \ \& \ yHz) \supset \neg tK(yLKx)] \} .$$

The conclusions say that for objects of knowledge not identical with knowledge, if someone is not totally knowledgeable then the temperate man will not know what the person knows and if someone is not totally ignorant, then the temperate man will not know what the person does not know.

- 26
- 1) $(x)(DKx \supset x = h)$
 - 2) $k \neq h$
 - 3) $DKk \supset k = h$ U.I., 1.
 - 4) $\neg DKk$ M.T., 2., 3.

27 Again, Socrates does not employ a simpler argument that is available to him:

- 1) $(x)(DKx \supset x = h)$
- 2) $m \neq h$
- 3) $DKm \supset m = h$ U.I., 1.
- 4) $\neg DKm$ M.T., 2., 3.

28 This also requires the obviously true principle: $(x)(y)(\neg xLy \supset xHy)$.

29 Actually, what he earlier doubted was the existence of the knowledge that knows itself and the other knowledges. On the theory I have presented these are equivalent, since one can know knowledge if and only if one has a faculty of knowledge that is directed towards the quality of knowledge.

30 But of the other hand, [Critias said, you will not readily gain the prize of faring well by any other means if you eliminate scientific action (...ἐκ τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν ἀπομάκρυναι)
(173D)

31 Sprague translates the last clause as "if we are going to have the least care for ourselves." In the text the pronoun is 'αὐτοῦ'.

32 This parallel is suggested again at 173D9 where Socrates' request "Instruct me on just one more small point," initiates an inquiry that tries to find out what kind of knowledge produces happiness.

CHAPTER V

CRITIQUE OF THE VIEWS OF JOHN GOULD

In The Development of Plato's Ethics John Gould presents a theory of moral knowledge which he believes was held by Socrates. He employs that theory to give an interpretation of the Charmides. Gould's reconstruction of Socrates' views is original, illuminating, and carefully presented. In the first part of this chapter I shall examine and criticize Gould's interpretation of Socrates' beliefs about the nature of moral knowledge and the way in which a person's claim to possess that knowledge is to be assessed. In the latter part of this chapter I shall argue that Gould has incorrectly interpreted Plato's philosophical intentions in the Charmides and has incorrectly analysed the logical structure of the arguments in that dialogue.

Gould's presentation of his position ought to be liberally quoted:

Socrates, starting from the parallel that has often been drawn in the history of ethics, between the moral agent and the artist or craftsman, arrived, I believe, at the hope that the moral agent might learn to direct his actions in accordance with the same assured and acceptable procedures which the artist adopts to produce his concrete works; that is, in general terms, that he might achieve some 'technique' of moral decision making and behavior, not so much in the sense of a set of rules, as of an intense personal conviction, evinced in his day to day actions. (p. x.)

Briefly what I wish to suggest is this. In putting forward the thesis that ἀρετή is only to be obtained by ἐπιστήμη, Socrates was not asserting that ἀρετή necessarily results from a personal apprehension of the nature of good and evil (still less, of Good and Evil), but that for the achievement of ἀρετή what is required is a form of moral ability comparable in some respects to the creative or artistic ability of potters, shoemakers, and the like; that the ἐπιστήμη which Socrates envisaged was a form of knowing how, knowing

that is, how to be moral. (p. 7. The underlined words are italicized in Gould's book.)

...the meaning of *ἐπιστήμη* as Plato inherited it, was the traditional equivalence of the word with *how*. It was upon this equivalence, already built into the fabric of linguistic usage, that Socrates constructed his theory of moral ability, in suggesting that the practical competence of the professional craftsmen was the ideal at which men in general should aim when faced with the moral problems of daily life. (p. 31.)

As we shall see, the basic meaning of several Greek words for the concept of knowledge seems to be that of knowing how. In any case, although I am by no means sure that the distinction between the two modes of knowing the other mode is knowing that was as clear to Socrates and Plato as the following pages may inevitably suggest, I am convinced that the Socratic proposition that we are now discussing is far better understood in the light of the earlier usage, going back to Homer and beyond, than in the misleading light of a later attachment to intellectual or contemplative theories of the mind, which stem mainly from the subsequent work of Plato and Aristotle. (p. 7.)

In his Introduction, Gould issues a warning to the reader:

...the purpose of the first chapter is to rediscover the meaning of Socrates' dictum that 'Virtue (*ἀρετή*) is knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*)'. Now the word 'knowledge,' in current English, most commonly denotes awareness of facts; I cannot believe that this was what the Greek word *ἐπιστήμη* meant for Socrates. I have used here Professor Ryle's careful distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'; but this distinction or dichotomy is already at least inherent in the meaning of 'know,' whereas an examination of the evidence shows that the two, to us different, meanings were at one in the Greek word. Thus in attempting to redress the balance of interpretation, I am forced into a reconstruction of Socrates' ideas which still, I am well aware, contains an ineradicable element of distortion. (p. xii.)

The problem seems to be this: Gould provides a great deal of evidence to show that there is in Greek a traditional equivalence between *ἐπιστήμη* and *τέχνη*, and argues that both are more closely

paralleled in English by 'knowing how' than by 'knowing that.' But, the English expression 'knowing how' is not an exact equivalent to either of the Greek expressions. $\epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\mu\eta$ does occasionally at least denote 'knowing that' (Gould cites several instances in writers prior to Plato) and there are many instances of 'knowing how' in English which are not comparable to the knowledge of a craftsman, (for example, knowing how to tie a necktie). Of the knowing how and knowing that distinction, Gould remarks, "It has been used as a tool of investigation, a heuristic method employed to fit together the pieces of the Platonic jig-saw puzzle into a new picture. We can hardly be surprised if it does not fit exactly." (p. 30)

This is a very murky subject. Fortunately, Gould's theory can be assessed without going deeply into the relationship between Ancient Greek and Modern English. Gould's primary purpose in arguing that $\epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\mu\eta$ is not equivalent to 'knowing that' is a psychological one. Gould believes that modern readers impose an intellectualist conception of knowledge,¹ such as that attacked by Ryle in The Concept of Mind, upon the texts of early Greek philosophy. Gould uses linguistic evidence to discredit this interpretation of Socrates' thought and to suggest to the modern reader that some sort of non-intellectualistic conception of knowledge is more appropriate. With these claims I have no quarrel. What I argue is that Gould's replacement for the "official theory" is not faithful to the textual evidence. Gould's suggestion is not that the Socratic conception of $\epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\mu\eta$ is equivalent to an English speaker's conception of knowing how, but that it is based upon

the τέχνη of the Athenian craftsmen.² This claim may be examined independently of Gould's criticisms of traditional commentary upon the subject. I believe that this general thesis is correct, in the sense that Plato had the same theoretical model for moral knowledge as he had for practical knowledge. However, Gould interprets ἐπιστήμη as being a certain kind of ability, and I understand it as being a faculty (δύναμις) that has a pair of qualities as its objects. The person who has a particular faculty of knowledge may well have a number of practical abilities, but I believe that we should also attribute to him certain verbal and cognitive abilities as well.

My principal objections to Gould's interpretation of the early dialogues are to his position on the way in which claims to possess knowledge, especially moral knowledge, are justified. He states his position on page 20,

...knowing how has not the objective status of knowing that, where this implies awareness of existing facts. There is only one way in which a man's claim to know how to act can be accepted or rejected, and that is by inspection of the observable actions of such a man and those actions themselves can only be accepted or rejected. There seems to be no question in these early dialogues of looking for an objective justification for moral behavior: the assumption appears to be that moral behavior (the phrase is not heavily 'loaded') justifies itself, and that the problem is how to achieve it. Whether or not this is accepted, there can be no doubt that ἐπιστήμη is to be evinced in action: it is not some separate state of mind.

There is nothing so far to suggest that ἐπιστήμη is in any way to be understood either as contemplation of moral truth or as 'the appreciation of universal science.' It represents rather a moral assurance, perhaps without objective justification, but sufficient to make action follow. Its existence is to be ascertained by inspection of the actions themselves, not by some feat of mental surgery, designed to discover whether 'knowledge' is really 'present.'

On the basis of Gould's remarks in the first passage quoted, I believe that we may attribute the following three positions to him:

1. Socrates did not seek objective justification for moral behavior.
2. Socrates believed that moral behavior justifies itself.
3. Socrates believed that moral knowledge was evinced in a person's actions, and not in the person's state of mind.

On the basis of the last sentence quoted I believe that we should also attribute to Gould the position that

4. Socrates believed that a person's claim to moral knowledge could only be ascertained by examining the person's actions, and not by examining his state of mind. (I assume that the latter phrase is what is meant by "some feat of mental surgery.")

One of the most damaging texts for Gould's general theory, and for claims 2., 3., and 4., in particular, is the Euthyphro. In that dialogue Euthyphro gives Socrates a full description of his action, the prosecution of his father, and the circumstances surrounding that action. Socrates, upon hearing the description, still considers it to be an open question as to whether or not Euthyphro has acted knowledgeably.

And do you mean to say, Euthyphro, that you think that you understand divine things and piety and impiety so accurately that, in a case such as you have stated, you can bring your father to justice without fear that you yourself may be doing something impious? (4E)

When Euthyphro cites his action to support his claim to be knowledgeable, Socrates emphatically rejects this as being sufficient to determine the issue.

What I asked you, my friend; was, What is Piety? and you have not explained it to my satisfaction. You only tell me that what you are doing now, namely, prosecuting your father for murder, is a pious act. (6D)

In a third passage, Socrates says that an examination of the action itself is not sufficient to prove that Euthyphro is knowledgeable.

Come, then, my dear Euthyphro, please enlighten me on this point. What proof have you that all the gods think that a laborer who has been imprisoned for murder by the master of the man whom he has murdered, and who dies from his imprisonment before the master has had time to learn from the religious authorities what he should do, dies unjustly? How do you know that it is just for a son to indict his father and to prosecute him for murder of such a man? Come, see if you can make it clear to me that the gods necessarily agree in thinking that this action of yours is just; and if you satisfy me, I will never cease singing your praises for wisdom. (9a)

Further evidence against Gould's theory is in the Apology where Socrates describes himself examining individuals in conversation, and not as examining the actions of these individuals.

I went to a man who was reputed to be wise, thinking that there, if anywhere, I should prove the answer wrong, and meaning to point out to the oracle its mistake, and to say, "You said that I was the wisest of men, but this man is wiser than I am." So I examined the man - I need not tell you his name, he was a politician - but this was the result, Athenians. When I conversed with him I came to see that, though a great many persons, and most of all himself, thought that he was wise, yet he was not wise. Then I tried to prove to him that he was not wise, though he fancied that he was. By doing so I made him indignant, and many of the bystanders. So when I went away, I thought to myself, "I am wiser than this man; neither of us knows anything worth knowing....(21C. The same point may be found in Socrates' description of his conversations at Hippias Minor, 369D.)

That an individual's knowledge lies in something apart from their actions and products is also shown at Apology 22B and Ion 532C.

After the politicians, I went to the poets, tragic, dithyrambic, and others, thinking that there I should find myself manifestly more ignorant than they. So I took up the poems on which I thought that they had spent most pains, and asked them what they meant, hoping at the

same time to learn something from them. I am ashamed to tell you the truth, my friends, but I must say it. Almost any one of the bystanders could have talked about the works of these poets better than the poets themselves.

...it is plain to everyone that not from art and knowledge comes your power to speak concerning Homer. If it were an art that gave you power, then you could speak about all the other poets as well.

Far from believing that moral behavior justifies itself, in the Crito Socrates justifies his own moral behavior by an appeal to general moral principles. He says

I am still what I always have been - a man who still will accept no argument but that which on reflection I find to be the truest. (46C)

His action is based upon principles such as

We should set the highest value, not on living, but on living well. (48B)

We ought never to act unjustly. (49B)

A man ought to carry out his just agreements. (49E)

and It is impious to use violence against your father or your mother; and much more impious to use violence against your country. (51C)

The assessment of the first claim is difficult. What counts as objective justification? Following the $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\chi\eta$ analogy thesis, the claim seems plainly false. If we ask a shoemaker why he tans his leather in a certain way, and he replies that his teacher told him to do it this way, that he had always done it this way in the past with excellent results, and he then uses the leather to make a beautiful pair of sandals; it seems plain that his behavior is perfectly justified. If Socrates sought to justify moral behavior in the same manner, then he sought

objective justification. When Gould speaks of justification, however, his models are mathematical claims ("there can be no 'axiomatization' in ethics," p. 19) and a comparison of a knowing that claim with the facts:

knowing how has not the objective status of knowing that, where this implies awareness of existing facts.
(p. 20)

Gould denies the view that Socrates sought the definitive, universal truth, and holds that

Philosophy is achievement of certainty, and certainty, as Socrates meant it, is the inward agreement of one with another's views, only to be achieved in 'ad hominem' conversation, only to be expressed in action. (p. 23)

I think that it is true that Socrates did seek some sort of "inward agreement," the Crito being a perfect example of this. What I question is that this is all Socrates sought.

One way to justify our behavior is to appeal to the sanction of an expert. The taking of medicine is justified if done so on the recommendation of a doctor. In the Crito, Socrates claims to seek the same sort of justification for his own moral behavior.

Socrates: Does a man who is in training, and who is serious about it, pay attention to the praise and blame and opinion of all men, or only of the one man who is a doctor or a trainer?

Crito: He pays attention only to the opinion of the one man.

Socrates: Then he ought to fear the blame and welcome the praise of this one man, not of the multitude?

Crito: Clearly.

Socrates: Then he must act and exercise, and eat and drink in whatever way the one man who is his director, and under-

stands the matter, tells him; not as others tell him?

Crito: that is so.

.....

Socrates: And, Crito, to be brief, is it not the same in everything? And, therefore, in questions of justice and injustice, and of the base and the honorable, and of good and evil, which we are now examining, ought we follow the opinion of the many and fear that, or the opinion of the one man who understands these matters (if we can find him), and feel more shame and fear before him than before all other men? For if we do not follow him, we shall corrupt and maim that part of us which, we used to say, is improved by justice and disabled by injustice. (47B-D)

Socrates: Then, my good friend, we must not think so much of what the many will say of us; we must think of what the one man who understands justice and injustice, and of what truth herself will say of us. (48A)

It seems to me that if we are acting with objective justification in the first case Socrates cites, then we are also acting with objective justification in the second. Since Socrates is seeking to follow the opinion of this one (albeit hypothetical) man, then he is seeking objective justification for his action.

There is a further aspect of Gould's theory that I shall discuss briefly. Gould says

From the standpoint of external justification, ἐπιτελής, as we might expect, may be paralleled by the English phrase 'morally certain,' defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as 'so sure that one is morally justified in acting upon the conviction.'...An excellent commentary on Plato's conception of certainty (and its claim to be 'truth') may be found in a passage of Kierkegaard's Journals: 'What is truth but to live for an idea? Ultimately everything must rest upon a postulate; but the moment it is no longer outside (a man), and he lives in it, then and only then does it cease to be a postulate for him.' Considered

from the point of view of an outside observer this represents the essence of Socratic *ἐπιστήμη* : from within it is the conviction of knowing how to act. (p. 21)

... *ἐπιστήμη* now appears as an inward and decisively personal moral conviction (analogous perhaps, though we must be aware of being misled by the connotations of the word, to the Christian 'faith'). It is personal, as knowing how inevitably is; inward because it is not the subsuming of the individual into a universal and objective principle.... Though *ἐπιστήμη* is conviction, it is conviction based on a genuine presence of intelligent ability. (p. 24)

I am not clear as to exactly what Gould's claim that the Socratic *ἐπιστήμη* is certainty or conviction amounts to. It may be that Socrates thought that the person who had moral knowledge would have these qualities, but I do not think that he would have regarded them as essential features of this knowledge. In the early dialogues there is a marked contrast between the treatment accorded to Ion, Hippias, and Euthyphro, and that given to Crito, Laches, and Nicias. The former display much more certainty and conviction than the latter, and Socrates accords much more respect to the more circumspect conversationalists. If Socrates has such certainty about his beliefs, or has the certainty about the correctness of his actions that the experienced craftsman does, then why in the Crito does he carefully re-examine his "former arguments"? (46B) The evidence indicates that Socrates placed no special emphasis on certainty and conviction.

Having examined some aspects of Gould's theory about Socrates' views on moral knowledge, I shall now examine the way in which Gould uses that theory to interpret the Charmides. Gould argues that Plato's own study of moral knowledge began with an examination of Socrates'

teachings.

One of the most significant indications of the meaning of ἐπιστήμη as Plato inherited it, was the traditional equivalence of that word with τέχνη. It was upon this equivalence, already built into the fabric of linguistic usage, that Socrates constructed his theory of moral ability, in suggesting that the practical competence of professional craftsmen was the ideal at which men in general should aim when faced with the moral problems of daily life. But we find, already in the early dialogues, certain doubts about the limits within which this analogy could be applied. (p. 31)

Gould argues the Charmides, Hippias Minor, and Book I of the Republic, are Plato's demonstrations of the limitations of Socrates' analogy. I shall argue that Gould is wrong in claiming that "the main purpose of the Charmides is to mark off those respects in which the analogy cannot be literally applied to the field of moral decisions." (p. 38) In previous chapters I have developed an alternative interpretation which I believe is more comprehensive, accurate, and detailed. In this chapter I shall argue that Gould's general thesis about the Charmides leads him to misinterpret the particular passages of the dialogue that he discusses.

Gould begins his analysis of the Charmides by providing an interpretation of Socrates' objections to Critias' third definition, σωφροσύνη is self-knowledge. (164D) He says

Socrates' first objection turns on the fact that if this form of ἐπιστήμη is assumed to be akin to the other forms, it is unique in having no ἔργον (concrete product). Critias replies to this that Socrates is on the wrong track: 'the nature of this knowledge is not the same as that of the other forms.' (165E) There is, we now see, a limit to the validity of the analogy between σωφροσύνη and productive techniques....It is the first hint, the first of many, that we are at last brought up against the inherent

limitations of a specific professional skill, and therefore of the analogy between moral skill and such techniques. The first distinction indicates that moral skill has no tangible product, such as the production of buildings or health. (p. 38)

The text for Socrates' objection is

Yes, I'm thinking, said [Socrates]. Well, if knowing is what temperance is, then it clearly must be some sort of knowledge [ἐπιστήμη] and must be of something, isn't that so?

Yes - of oneself, Critias said.

Then medicine, too, I said, is a knowledge and is of health?

Certainly.

Now, I said, if you should ask me, If medicine is knowledge of health, what benefit does it confer upon us and what does it produce?, I would answer that it conferred no small benefit. Because health is a fine result for us, if you agree that this is what it produces.

I agree.

And if you should ask me about housebuilding, which is knowledge [ἐπιστήμη] of building houses, and ask what I say it produces, I would say that it produces houses, and so on with the other arts. [τὰν ἄλλων τεχνῶν] So you ought to give an answer on behalf of temperance, since you say it is a knowledge of self, in case you should be asked, Critias, since you say temperance as a knowledge of self, what fine result does it produce which is worthy of the name? Come along, tell me.

But, Socrates, he said, you are not conducting the investigation in the right way. This knowledge does not have the same nature as the rest, any more than they have the same nature as each other, but you are carrying on the investigation as though they were all the same. For instance, he said, in the arts [τεχνῶν] of calculation and geometry, tell me what is the product corresponding to the house in the case of housebuilding and the cloak in the case of weaving and so on - one could give many instances from many arts. You ought to point out to me a similar product in these cases, but you won't be able to do it.

And I said, You are right.... (165C-166A)

There are two ways in which Gould's interpretation of Socrates' argument might be formulated. The first is based upon the just quoted claim that the analogy is between "crafts and the productive techniques" and the second is based upon the subsequent claim that "behind all these conclusive disproofs lies the premise that temperance is analogous, exactly and in all respects, to the other techniques." (p. 38)

- A. 1. Temperance is a moral skill.
- 2. Moral skills are just like the productive arts.
- 3. Every productive art has a fine result.
- B. 1. Temperance is a moral skill.
- 2. Moral skills are just like the arts.
- 3. Every art produces a fine result.

A contradiction will follow from both of these arguments if Socrates' challenge to name the fine result produced by temperance cannot be met.³

I shall argue that neither A. nor B. accurately represents Socrates' argument. Critias replies to Socrates' challenge by claiming that some non-productive arts do not have a fine result. Since this claim is compatible with all of the premises of A., and Socrates accepts the claim as an objection to his argument, A. cannot be an accurate interpretation of his argument. Critias' claim is incompatible with one of the premises of B.; but the rejected premise is 3., not 2., which is the premise Gould claims is being disproven. Consequently, Gould has not shown that the purpose of this passage is to challenge an

analogy between moral skills and practical arts. Moreover, it seems to me that there is no need to assume that this analogy is being used as an enthymeme in this passage. The argument may be formulated with just two premises:

1. Temperance is a kind of knowledge.
2. Each kind of knowledge has a fine result.

Nevertheless, Gould's interpretation is attractive in that it provides an answer (a negative answer) to the question left hanging, "Does temperance produce a fine result?" It seems to me grossly implausible to suggest that Plato believed that moral knowledge did not have a fine result, and I shall give an argument based upon the dramatic structure of the dialogue to show that Plato did not intend the reader to accept Critias' negative answer to this question.

First, Plato knew that the Athenian reader, before reading the Charmides, would uncritically regard temperance as a desirable personal quality. This attitude towards temperance is reinforced by Socrates' control over his sexual passion at 155D,

And when Critias said that I was the person who knew the remedy and he turned his full gaze upon me in a manner beyond description and seemed on the point of asking a question, and when everyone in the palaestra surged all around us in a circle, then, my noble friend, I saw inside his cloak and caught on fire and was quite beside myself. And it occurred to me that Cydias was the wisest love-poet when he gave advice on the subject of beautiful boys and said that "the fawn should beware lest, while taking a look at the lion, he should provide part of the lion's dinner," because I felt as if I had been snapped up by such a creature. All the same, when he asked me if I knew the headache remedy, I managed somehow to answer that I did.

And by Critias' description of Charmides,

Let me tell you, though, that Charmides not only outstrips his contemporaries in beauty of form but also in this very thing for which you say you have the charm; it was temperance wasn't it?

Yes, indeed it was, I said.

Then you must know that not only does he have the reputation of being the most temperate young man of the day, but that he is second to none in everything else appropriate to his age. (157D)

The ostensible purpose of the dialogue is for Socrates to produce temperance in the soul of Charmides and thus cure his headaches. The method employed is based upon the medical theory of the Thracian kind Zalmoxis:

...the soul is the source both of bodily health and bodily disease for the whole man, and these flow from the soul in the same way that the eyes are affected by the head. So it is necessary first and foremost to cure the soul if the parts of the head and of the rest of the body are to be healthy. And the soul, he said, my dear friend, is cured by means of certain charms, and these charms consist of beautiful words. It is a result of such words that temperance arises in the soul, and when the soul acquires and possesses temperance, it is easy to provide health both for the head and for the rest of the body. (156E-157A)

Here it is not only implied that temperance is desirable, but Socrates also explains the fine results that follow from its possession. Finally, prior to 165E we are told seven times in the dialogue that temperance is admirable (159C, 159D (twice), 160C (twice), and 160E (twice)). (See also 158B) It is used as a major premise in rejecting Charmides' first two attempts to define temperance.), three times that temperate men are good (160E (twice), 161A), and Critias' first

definition, temperance is doing good things (163E) is rejected on grounds unrelated to temperance's goodness.

Now, when Critias is unable to say what fine result temperance has, and indicates that it does not have one, I submit the Athenian reader would just be damn puzzled. In the medical theory of Zalmoxis Plato has provided a plausible solution to this puzzle; temperance produces health in the soul which in turn engenders health in the body. In effect, the very question Critias does not answer is, "If all the knowledges are like medicine, which produces the fine result of health, then if temperance is a knowledge, what fine result does it produce?"

It seems to me that Plato's dramatic intent is to pose a puzzle for the reader, and have the reader solve it with an answer Plato has previously provided. This answer, moreover, conforms to one of the traditional meanings of σωφροσύνη. (North, pp. 46, 95, 153-5 in reference to the Charmides, Tuckey, p. 5.) I conclude that Gould's interpretation of Socrates' first objection is incompatible with the text, and with the logical and dramatical structure of the passage.

Gould argues that 166A-169A provides further support for his interpretation:

Has it then some object of attention external to itself, as numbers in the case of arithmetic?
No, Critias replies; here again we have come upon a distinguishing mark of σωφροσύνη: 'your inquiry has brought you up against the very thing which marks off self-control from every other skill (ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ)'. (166B) Socrates accordingly points out that there is no other mental activity which is self-regarding. Yet its apparent uniqueness is not allowed to rule out this

theory of the nature of $\sigma\omega\phi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota$: 'It will certainly be strange if it exists after all, but we should not yet insist that it does not exist. We must still pursue the inquiry into whether it does.' (169A) This remark is characteristic of the Charmides. Throughout the dialogue apparently conclusive disproofs of the theory that $\sigma\omega\phi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota$ is a form of skilled mental activity are set aside: this in itself should make it clear that the main purpose of the work is to mark off those respects in which the $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\eta\varsigma$ analogy cannot be literally applied to the field of moral decisions. For, behind all these conclusive disproofs, lies the premise that $\sigma\omega\phi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota$ is analogous, exactly and in all respects, to the other techniques. (p. 38)

Without going into a detailed analysis of Socrates questions about the possibility of a reflexive kind of knowledge, we can see that the analogy is not at stake in this passage. Socrates compares knowledge of knowledge to vision, hearing, a sense of the senses, desire, wish, love, fear, opinion, being greater than, being the double of, being more than, being heavier than, being older than, being a magnitude, being a number, motion, and heat. Since none of these are forms of practical knowledge, it is clear that Socrates is not here trying to distinguish knowledge of knowledge from the knowledge of the craftsmen.

Having reached an inconclusive result in the examination of the possibility of $\sigma\omega\phi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota$ as Critias has defined it, Socrates next considers whether or not it is beneficial. Gould's interpretation of the ensuing discussion is that

Once again the argument turns upon the assumption that $\sigma\omega\phi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota$ is on all fours with the other varieties of technical ability. On this assumption it proves to be useless. (p. 39)

In the Charmides, as we have seen, the conclusion stands

that *ἡγεμονία*, if we regard it as some specific form of technical skill and apply the analogy quite literally, will be entirely useless. It should, I think, be abundantly clear that the implication we should discover in this is that the analogy between the techniques and morality cannot be applied to the letter, at least in the respects which we have seen discussed in the Charmides. (p. 41)

Here again a cursory examination of the passage in question, 170A-176A, indicates that the *τέχνη* analogy is not under examination. What is shown to be useless in this passage is not *ἡγεμονία*, but what Critias has defined *ἡγεμονία* as: knowledge of knowledge. Plato points this out twice after Socrates has concluded his arguments:

I don't suppose that the thing we have agreed to be the finest of all would have turned out to be useless if I had been of any use in making a good search. But now we have got the worst of it in every way and are unable to discover which one of existing things the lawgiver gave this name, temperance. (175B. See also 175D-E. The discussion about the possibility of a reflexive kind of knowledge concludes at 169A-C with Socrates expressing reservations about Critias' identification of *ἡγεμονία* and knowledge of knowledge.)

Secondly, one of the things that knowledge of knowledge is compared to is knowledge of justice (170B), which is not a form of practical knowledge. This would be a pointless comparison if the *τέχνη* analogy were being questioned. Thirdly, a major part of Socrates' argument shows that the possessor of knowledge of knowledge is like the possessors of other kinds of knowledge in that he is unable to recognize if someone has a kind of knowledge he lacks, and can only recognize someone who has the same kind of knowledge he has. (171C) It is difficult to see why Plato would explicitly point this out, if

his major purpose in this passage is to show that knowledge of knowledge is unlike other kinds of knowledge.

I believe that we should conclude that Gould's theory about Socrates' conception of knowledge is seriously incomplete and that his interpretation of the Charmides is not correct. Since there are difficulties with my own theories on both of these subjects, I have considerable sympathy for Gould's admission that his attempt to "reconstruct Socrates' ideas...contains an ineradicable element of distortion." The considerable value of Gould's book lies in the fact that he did attempt to theoretically reconstruct and explain the ideas that are present in the dialogues, and did not merely comment and exposit upon the texts.

It is appropriate at this place to compare Gould's position with my own. Gould has been frequently criticized for his claim that the conception of knowledge in the early dialogues is only that of knowing how, and not propositional knowledge, knowing that.⁴ However, as Gould's critics have pointed out, he is certainly right in claiming that some sort of knowing how is part of Plato's conception of knowledge in these dialogues, and it would be well to indicate how I have captured this feature of Plato's views.

I argued in Chapter III, Section 5, that Plato held that a necessary condition for knowing a certain object is consistently acting rightly in matters pertaining to that object.⁵ The few contemporary philosophers who have discussed our conception of knowing how have generally agreed that in some sense it involves being able to do the

relevant tasks,⁶ and the principle I attributed to Plato in Chapter III captures this.

The criticism that Gould has neglected the propositional aspect of Plato's early views on knowledge has been forcefully argued by Gregory Vlastos:

Try the "know how" sense in this sentence and see what you can make of it: "to fear death is nothing but to think oneself wise while one is not; for it is think one knows the unknown" (Ap. 29A). And there is more at issue here than mere linguistics. Think of the doctrine Socrates is expounding. If "virtue is knowledge" meant that "for the achievement of arete what is required is a form of ability," Socrates would be saying here that people fear death only because they do not have the ability not to fear it, and what could be more trivial than that? Or, to continue the citation from Gould, "ability, comparable in some respects to the creative or artistic ability of potters, shoemakers, and the like;" the analogy with the practical arts, if dragged in here, would imply that the reason we fear death is that we have not acquired skill in meeting it, and what could be farther from Socrates' thought? What Socrates wants us to understand is that we have mistaken beliefs, we think we know death to be a great evil, greater than disgrace, if so much as know our ignorance, our fear of death would leave us. There is no getting away from "intellectualism" here.

It is also difficult to see how Gould's interpretation may be fruitfully applied to Socrates' examination of the epistemological powers of knowledge of knowledge in the Charmides. Gould's approach can be applied in a general way by saying that the temperate man does not have the ability to distinguish genuine doctors from pretenders, while doctors do have this ability. But on Gould's approach this is all we are permitted to say of these people, we cannot say of two persons, "a knows that b knows health." The Charmides amply demonstrates that Plato thought that such knowledge was possible, and Gould's interpre-

tation does not account for this.

It may be thought that the passage from the Apology is a problem for my own views, but the theory I have presented may easily be adapted to provide an intuitively natural interpretation for Socrates' statement. First, it is necessary to quote a larger portion of the passage from which Vlastos' quotation is taken,

For to fear death, my friends, is only to think ourselves wise without really being wise, for it is to think we know what we do not know. For no one knows whether death may not be the greatest good that can happen to a man. But men fear it as if they knew quite well that it was the greatest of evils. (Apology 29A. See also 40B-42A.)

Here Socrates is arguing that none of the persons present knows whether or not death (actually, given his subsequent remarks, he seems to be referring to the afterlife) is a great evil or a great good. His reason for this claim seems to be that none of the persons present has experienced the afterlife. Earlier I argued that the sufficient conditions for someone's knowing that something has a certain quality, x knows y has z , are

1. y has z
2. x examines y
3. x has the faculty of knowledge that has z as its object.

I did not argue that these were necessary conditions for knowledge because I did not need to do so in order to interpret the Charmides and because there is little direct textual evidence to justify the attribution of this position to Plato. However, the Apology passage suggests that 2. is a necessary condition for knowledge. If this is correct, we may interpret the argument Socrates gives there as

1. If any person knows that something has or lacks some quality, then that person has examined that thing.
2. No person present has examined the afterlife.
3. No one present knows whether or not the afterlife is good or evil.

Thus the passage that presents a problem for Gould's position may easily be assimilated into the theory I have presented. It is a perfectly reasonable (it is also formally valid, see the last page of this chapter,) argument that no one knows whether or not the afterlife is good or evil since no one has examined it.

It is also worthwhile to consider if the other two sufficient conditions for knowledge may also be assumed to be necessary conditions. Passages such as

...If anyone should ask you, "Gorgias, is there such a thing as a false belief and a true [ἀληθὴς] belief?" I [Socrates] imagine that you would say that there is.

Yes.

Well then, is there both a false and a true [ἀληθὴς] knowledge?

Certainly not. (Gorgias, 454D.)

and

[Socrates:] If someone knows the way to Larisa, or where you will, and goes there and guides others, will he not guide rightly and well?

Certainly.

Well, what of one who has never been there, and does not know the way; but if he has right opinion as to the way, won't he also guide rightly?

Certainly.

And so long as he has right opinion about that which the

other has knowledge, he will be quite as good a guide as the one who knows, although he does not know, but only thinks, what is true (Meno 97A-B.)

and the absence of evidence to the contrary have suggested to Plato's commentators that in the early dialogues he held the view that knowledge implies truth. This is usually understood to mean that objects of knowledge are true propositions. However, in the theory that I have developed I have argued that for Plato knowledge is either a relation between persons and qualities or a relation that obtains between persons, things in general, and qualities. On this view the objects of knowledge do not have truth values, they simply are. Hence we may attribute to Plato the principle

$$R3. (x)(y)[(Ex)(zK(xHy)) \supset xHy]^8$$

" $x\lambda\eta\theta\eta\varsigma$ " may mean "real" as well as "true," this is entirely compatible with the passages in the Gorgias and the Meno. Moreover, it enables us to give a much less paradoxical interpretation of the Meno passage than the propositional interpretation is committed to.⁹ There the example of knowledge Socrates discusses is "someone knows the way to Larisa." At least in a prima facie sense it seems that the object of this person's knowledge is the way to Larisa, not a proposition or conjunction of propositions. Consequently the objects of his knowledge can only be construed as having a truth value if we impose onto the text some reduction schema for explaining "knows the way" expressions in terms of "knows that" expressions. (Except for one sense of "knowing how," Hintikka proposes that such reduction schemas for each epistemological term may be given in [1].) However, such an imposition is unnecessary if we assume that Plato held that

knowledge implies the existence or reality of what is known,
rather than the truth of what is known.

Finally, the theory I have attributed to Plato would gain a considerable amount of internal cohesion if it is also reasonable to attribute to him the principle $(x)(y)[(Ez)(xK(zHy)) \supset (Ew)(Kw \& yOw \& xHw)]$. For example, does knowing that someone has health imply that one has the faculty of medical knowledge? The chief difficulty involved in attributing this view to Plato is not that there is countervailing evidence (as far as I can tell there is none), but that it seems to us to be so implausible that it is difficult to believe that Plato held it. It does not seem to us that one has to be a doctor in order to know that a man who is foaming at the mouth and whose skin is covered with red blotches is diseased. However, if Plato held that knowing implies being able to give a rational explanation and also held that other faculties, such as opinion, had less reliable powers of recognition, then it does not seem so implausible to attribute this view to him.

1. $(x)(y)[(Ez)(xK(yHz) \vee xK(yLz)) \supset xEy]$

2. $-(Ex)(Px \& xE_A)$

3. Pb

C.P. asmpt.

4. $(x) \neg (Px \& xE_A)$

Q.N., 2.

5. $(x)(Px \supset \neg xE_A)$

DeM., Imp., 4.

6. $Pb \supset \neg bE_A$

U.I., 5.

7. $\neg bE_A$

M.P., 3., 6.

8. $(Ez)(bK(AHz) \vee bK(ALz)) \supset bE_A$

U.I., 1.

9. $-(Ez)(bK(AHz) \vee bK(ALz))$

M.T., 7., 8.

10. $(z)(\neg bK(AHz) \& \neg bK(ALz))$

Q.N., DeM., 9.

11. $\neg bK(AHG) \& \neg bK(ALG)$

U.I., 10.

12. $\neg bK(AHE) \& \neg bK(ALE)$

U.I., 10.

13. $\neg bK(AHG) \& \neg bK(ALG) \& \neg bK(AHE) \& \neg bK(ALE)$ Conj., 11, 12.

14 $Pb \supset (\neg bK(AHG) \& \neg bK(ALG) \& \neg bK(AHE) \& \neg bK(ALE))$

C.P.S.P., 3-13.

15. $(x)[Px \supset (\neg bK(AHG) \& \neg bK(ALG) \& \neg bK(AHE) \&$

$\neg bK(ALE))]$

U.G.S.P., 3-14.

Footnotes to Chapter V

¹Gould's statement of this theory ought to be quoted in full.

My first task, however, is to give an account of the 'official theory,' as we might term it, of what is meant by saying that *ἡ ἀρετή* is a matter of *ἐπιστήμη*. Moral virtue, Socrates is supposed to have claimed, is to be achieved only by an understanding of the moral truths of the universe, that is by an intellectual insight into the nature of right and wrong. It is presumed that he believed that knowledge of moral facts involved morally correct behavior and conversely, that wrongdoing is caused by intellectual ignorance of the same moral facts. According to this view, the situation of the moral man behaving morally is for Socrates somewhat the same as the explanation we often put forward of a chess player playing an intelligent game of chess: he is able to act as he does, because in his mind, he knows 'the rules of the game,' because he possesses the theoretical equipment required for correct practice. The *ἐπιστήμη* denotes the successful conclusion of a process of ethical theorizing, necessarily prior to morally acceptable behavior; the sense of *ἐπιστήμη* is cognitive or, to adopt Professor Ryle's terminology, some form of knowing that. (p. 4)

²In his book Eros and Psyche John Rist presents a number of criticisms of Gould's view. Unfortunately, many of Rist's criticisms are vitiated by a neglect of this distinction. Gould would be in complete agreement with Rist's claim that "the true *τέχνη* is morally obliged in so far as he is a *τέχνη* to look to the good of the object of his *τέχνη* ; the man who merely 'knows how' is under no such obligation." (p. 119, Eros and Psyche) and would argue that it does not refute the view that he actually attributes to Socrates. Rist correctly criticizes Gould's theory for failing to explain the fact that in the early dialogues knowledge is conceived of as having an object, but these criticisms are unfortunately embedded in an attempt to show that "'knowing that' is, in the mind of the Platonic Socrates, prior to 'knowing how'". (p. 137)

³To formally derive a contradiction the second premises must be read as claiming that moral skills are productive arts, or, equivalently,

that moral skills have every property shared by all the productive arts. If A. and B. are to be understood merely as arguments by analogy, contradictions do not follow from the premises of A. and B. and the claim that temperance does not have a fine result. On this interpretation of Gould's analysis of the argument, the intent of Socrates' objection is not to refute premise 2, but to raise a doubt about it.

⁴Vlastos [4], Hintikka [2], Runciman, Rist.

⁵I also argued (Chapter III, Section 4) that knowers are able to utter true statements consistently about the objects of their knowledge. The passages cited in support of that claim seem to indicate that being able to speak rightly is also a part of what we might say is Plato's conception of knowing how. This is a respect in which our conception of knowing how does not match up with Plato's; since we would say that someone who properly repaired automobiles with consistency knew how to do so, even if he uttered many false statements about the proper functioning of automobiles. Gould falsely claims that for Plato knowing how is evinced only in action (p. 20); it may be that he has been misled by imposing our own conception of knowing how onto the early dialogues.

⁶Ryle, Brown, Scheffler, Hintikka [1]. Scheffler (p. 93) points out that knowing how cannot simply be explained in terms of being able, since a person may know how to drive a car even if his arm is broken. As the passage I cited from the Hippias Minor (see Introduction to Chapter III) indicates, this does not pose a problem for the interpretation of Plato's views.

⁷Vlastos [4], p. 228. Hintikka, [2], p. 3, and Runciman, p. 12, accept this criticism. I think that Gould's critics are right in claiming that the passage from the Apology is damaging to Gould's position, but the passage does not show that his general approach is erroneous. Gould says

I am concerned, not with problems of authorship, but with the original intention of a number of passages whose unity of conception is not likely to be denied. (p. 3)

If the conception of knowledge is different than that of the dialogues proper, a defender of Gould's approach could argue that the Apology is a report of Socrates' beliefs and that the dialogues reflect Plato's own views. He would then argue that no evidence has been presented which would show that the knowing how conception of knowledge is not the view of the early dialogues.

⁸In the cases of simple direct objects, we should employ a predicate

signifying that the object is real or exists: $(x)[(Ey)(yKx) \supset Rx]$.

⁹Vlastos ([1], footnote 1) claims that the sort of knowledge under consideration in the Meno is propositional knowledge. He presents a very interesting and detailed interpretation of Socrates' discussion with the slave boy, but does not discuss Socrates' example at 97A.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

I have tried to contribute to our understanding of Plato's thought by presenting a theory about his earliest views on knowledge and an interpretation of the philosophical inquiry in the second half of the Charmides. My general thesis is that it is a rational examination of the idea that knowledge of knowledge is a kind of knowledge that will enable its possessor to properly order the state. Contrary to the views of some commentators, I claimed that Charmides 167B - 169A is a sound investigation of an issue that is important for the purposes of the dialogue and for Plato's political thought. I argued that Plato believed that he had good reasons for denying the existence of a wide variety of reflexive faculties, and that these grounds provided a legitimate non-deductive basis for doubting the existence of knowledge of knowledge. At Charmides 170A - 171C Socrates argues that the possession of knowledge of knowledge does not entail knowing what oneself and others do and do not know. I claimed that Socrates' arguments were natural consequences of a certain way of thinking about knowledges. This claim was supported by representing Plato's epistemological framework by a number of general principles, and presenting a series of formally valid arguments which had these principles as enthymematic premises and each step of Socrates' reasoning as conclusions.

At 171D - 173D the reader finds out what has been the principal motivation for Plato's inquiry. Socrates twice describes the political

benefits that would follow if knowledge of knowledge did exist and did entail that its possessor had the ability to determine what he and others did and did not know. Such a person would be able to ensure that each task of importance to the state would be performed only by persons who had the appropriate kind of knowledge. Although this seems to be a considerable benefit, at 173D - 175D Socrates argues that it is not sufficient to bring about an ideal state. His reason is that this can only be done by the kind of knowledge that has good and evil as its objects. A passage in the Laches may help us to understand Plato's motives for presenting this latter argument. At Laches 195 Nicias argues that the knowledge of a doctor is limited to health and disease; it does not include the proper objects of fear. His argument presumes that a doctor may use his skills to keep a person alive when it is better to let the person die. It would seem that a state of the sort Socrates describes at Charmides 171D - 173D, where each task is performed only by those who know, will lack the moral guidance needed to prevent the sort of consequences Nicias alludes to. It is evident from Gorgias 519A that Plato believed that other particular kinds of knowledge might be inappropriately deployed; "With no regard for self-control or justice they stuffed our state with harbors and docks and walls...." Since there is no guarantee that the activities of knowers in a state ruled by knowledge of knowledge will be properly regulated, Plato is justified in claiming that knowledge of knowledge is not the ideal form of political knowledge.

It is appropriate to consider here Plato's later views on the three

features of knowledge of knowledge discussed in the Charmides: its possibility, epistemological powers, and political authority. There are several good reasons for believing that he thought that knowledge of knowledge was possible at the time that he wrote the Republic. The first is a remark made in Book X about a person who reports that he has met someone who knows every craft,

our tacit rejoinder must be that he is a simple fellow, who apparently has met some magician or sleight-of-hand man and imitator and has been deceived by him into the belief that he is all-wise, because of his own inability to put to the proof and distinguish knowledge, ignorance, and imitation. (598D. See also Phaedrus 247D.)

Presumably, if some persons may be criticized for being unable to distinguish the presence or absence of knowledge, it is possible for some persons to have this ability. Secondly, in the Republic Socrates considers the suggestion that the Good, an object of knowledge, might be identified with knowledge. (505) He rejects this suggestion, but not on the grounds that knowledge of knowledge is impossible. The third and most obvious reason for supposing that Plato believed that knowledge of knowledge was possible at the time that he wrote the Republic is that it is evident that the Guardians will have it. The proper ordering of the state requires that the Guardians produce knowledge, distinguish it from ignorance, and recognize which persons have which kinds of knowledge. Since the hypothetical possessor of knowledge of knowledge in the Charmides lacks at least the latter quality, it is worth considering how he differs from the Guardians.

The crucial assumption in the Charmides is that the temperate man knows only knowledge; he is unable to recognize which persons know

or do not know other objects of knowledge because he himself does not know those objects. It would be easy to argue that the Guardians are able to recognize what they and others do and do not know because they are acquainted with every form, but I have been unable to find a passage in the Republic where Plato explicitly asserts this claim. Plato does assert that the Guardians have a passion for every sort of knowledge, but when he speaks of what they know, apart from mathematics, he tends to refer to moral and aesthetic forms exclusively. Since it is not explicitly asserted that the Guardians know the forms of Health and Bed, it does not seem to me that we should assume that they are able to distinguish between carpenters and doctors in the manner suggested by the Charmides. However, it does seem that the Guardians will be able to recognize what kinds of knowledge persons have in virtue of their knowledge of aesthetic and moral forms. At 601D Plato says

Now do not the excellence, the beauty, the rightness of every implement, living thing, and action refer solely to the use for which each is made or by nature intended?

Since the Guardians are able to distinguish these virtues wherever they might occur, it is clear that they will be able to distinguish well made products from results produced by ignorant persons. If the Guardians are to be able to use this knowledge as a criterion to distinguish which persons know which things, they must also be capable of recognizing what kind of thing the products are instances of and which persons produced them. The latter sort of epistemological relation is presupposed in the Charmides, since the examiners are assumed to know

who is uttering the words and committing the actions they are examining; and there is no evidence that Plato has given up this pre-supposition in the Republic. (For my purposes I am ignoring the problem of how it is possible for the Guardians to have any knowledge of the world of Becoming. Plato does say that the Guardians will be able to recognize each instance of beauty; and I am here considering whether or not they will have similar abilities towards instances of things such as musical knowledge.) In the cases of things that are manufactured or cared for, Plato seems to assume in both the early and middle dialogues that non-experts are able to recognize what they are instances of. Thus the Guardians will be able to recognize that some things are both beautiful and beds or ugly and horses. Since there is ample evidence that Plato holds that only knowers can consistently produce beautiful products, the Guardians will be able to recognize which persons have the knowledge that produces those products. It is somewhat more difficult to see how this suggestion about how the Guardians are able to recognize experts may be applied to doctors, since in the Gorgias Plato says that non-experts are unable to recognize in every case when someone is healthy. If the Guardians are unable to distinguish healthy individuals from diseased individuals, then it is difficult to see how they will be able to recognize which persons are able to produce health. I suggest that this difficulty may be overcome if we suppose that the Guardians know that health is a necessary condition for beauty and disease is a sufficient condition for ugliness.

If this supposition is granted, we may assume that Guardians may examine a collection of medical patients, determine the extent to which their abilities to perform the functions proper to them have been restored, and thus determine whether or not the person who has treated them has medical knowledge.

If this is a tenable interpretation of the Guardians' knowledge of knowledge, we can see that two of the positions of the Charmides have been given up. The first is the position that experts may be recognized only by persons who know the same things that they do. The second is that the Guardians' ability to know what they and others do and do not know relies upon methods suggested in the Laches and Gorgias, examining a person's products; and not the methods stipulated in the Charmides, examining a person's speech and actions. (It ought to be noted that my suggestion about the Guardians' abilities does not preclude the use of the methods of the Charmides. If they are able to recognize that someone's speech and actions are beautiful and recognize what matters the person is concerned with, then it seems that they will know that the person has knowledge of those matters.)

Plato's early view that the ideal kind of political knowledge is knowledge of the good and not knowledge of knowledge is clearly held in the Republic. At 508E the Good is said to be distinct from knowledge and at 540A Plato says that the Guardians are required to "turn upward the vision of their souls and fix their gaze on that which sheds light on all, and when they have thus beheld the good itself they shall use it as a pattern for the right ordering of the state and the citizens and themselves throughout the rest of their lives."

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