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## **Species life in Marx and Durkheim : its import as an ideology for women in contemporary society.**

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SPECIES LIFE IN MARX AND DURKHEIM: ITS IMPORT AS  
AN IDEOLOGY FOR WOMEN IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

A Dissertation Presented

By

ZILLAH RUTH EISENSTEIN

Submitted to the Graduate School of the  
University of Massachusetts in  
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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
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
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
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## INTRODUCTION

The theoretical perspective one adopts helps to construct and/or limit possibilities about one's life-- and this is even more true when, as typically is the case, the perspective one adopts is shared by those others with whom one habitually interacts. To some degree, then, an inadequate theoretical perspective can sustain patterns of life that are incomplete. And this general point about the connection between the theories we hold, the possibilities they provide or inhibit, and the lives we live, applies with particular force to the condition of women in contemporary society.

The vocabulary one adopts, in part, reflects the theoretical perspective to which one is committed. This is true of the vocabularies in ordinary life and the vocabularies of the social sciences. In contemporary society the vocabulary typically applied to women assumes that she has a special need for security, order, passive contentment. Woman is described as ". . . gentle, loving, unaggressive, tender, modest, giving, patient, naive, simplistic, irrational, instinctual, intuitive, home-centered."<sup>1</sup> When drawn together in a

<sup>1</sup> Dana Densmore, "Sex Roles and Female Oppression," (Boston: New England Free Press, n.d., p. 5. Also Judith Bardwick and Elizabeth Douvan, in "Ambivalence: The Socialization of Women," in Vivian Gornick and Barbara Moran, eds., Women in Sexist Society, (New York: Basic Books, 1971), list the often quoted adjectives used to describe women: ". . . dependence, passivity, fragility, low pain tolerance, non-aggression, non-competitiveness, inner orientation, interpersonal orientation, empathy, sensitivity, nurturance, subjectivity, intuitiveness, yieldingness, receptivity, inability to risk, emotional liability, supportiveness." (p. 147.)



list, these terms seem superficial and trivial; it hardly seems possible that many actually hold the views about women which this vocabulary implies. But indeed, I will argue, this vocabulary reflects a well articulated theoretical perspective--the theory of anomie as it was enunciated by Emile Durkheim. And that while this perspective does express widely held views about the needs and limits of women in contemporary society, it precludes the consideration of human potentialities in women.

Other vocabularies are today sometimes applied to persons--perhaps more often to men; and these other vocabularies too reflect different theoretical orientations. Bypassing here those which reflect Hobbesian and Freudian perspectives, I will juxtapose the theory of anomie to the theory of alienation. My overriding purpose will be to ask how woman is viewed from within the confines of each, and the consequence these conceptions have for conceiving of women as persons. I will then present a set of considerations designed to show that the alienation perspective is, on the whole, and on balance, the richer framework for understanding women and for forging a response to their circumscribed condition. Women need an ideology and the alienation perspective provides the appropriate and correct starting point for that ideology.

My task is made somewhat more difficult by the fact that many contemporary social scientists have tacitly converted what was classically a dispute of consequence between well articulated theoretical perspectives dealing with differential assessments about human capacities into a muddle of common views called the "alienation-anomie" syndrome. Typically, the theories of Marx and

Durkheim are stripped of the concerns which sharpened their theoretical debate and the social scientists in question then adopt without argument, the more conservative side of Durkheim's theory. Sometimes, indeed, they do this while using the language of alienation. My decision to examine the theories of Durkheim and Marx directly and comparatively flows from my view that this is the best way to come to grips with the underlying issues of human potentiality in complex, modern societies.

I will begin, then, with an examination of Durkheim's theory of the moral order, drawing attention where pertinent, to the differences he sees between the actual and possible life styles of men and women. I will then consider these same issues in the writings of Marx, exploring especially his theory of the "species life."

Since the differences between Marx and Durkheim turn to some extent on differences in the model of "person" development assumed, I devote the third chapter to an examination of this difficult issue. How did Marx and Durkheim seek to vindicate their models of development? How do contemporary social scientists face these questions? How should we face them? I will discuss the theory of human "needs" in this context, asking to what extent it provides an adequate basis for judgments of this sort.

I will then apply the results of this exploration to the understanding of women in contemporary society, arguing that though the anomie paradigm is more generally applied to the condition of women, the alienation model is more appropriate and fruitful. It reveals hidden sources of discontentment and anger;

it exposes new prospects for growth and development; it renders its proponents more conscious of the extent to which established vocabulary and theories circumscribe the life of the contemporary woman.

## CHAPTER I

### EMILE DURKHEIM: PRIORITIES OF THE MORAL ORDER

Everything which is a source of solidarity  
is moral, everything which forces man to take  
account of other men is moral. . .

Emile Durkheim

Being a more instinctive creature than man,  
woman has only to follow her instincts to  
find calmness and peace.

Emile Durkheim

Durkheim's conception of the individual and the relationship existing between the individual and society is at the root of his theory of morality and societal organization. The condition of the moral order, and of anomie, express varied relationships which man can experience in society. The pivotal position and significance of the moral order, anomie and conceptions of the individual, in Durkheim's theory may be clarified by a thorough explication of his views of "man's 'needs'." It is hoped, that through these discussions, one can begin to construct a viable idea of a "preferred person" within Durkheim's thought. The ideal of a person expresses a sense of priority for the "moral" life. Later, Marx's view of the person in "species life" will be examined in light of Durkheim's treatment of the moral order.

Such an analysis of the individual in society, the moral order, Durkheim's statements on needs, his conception of the moral person as well as his treatment



of women, are all necessary if one is going to try to assess the theory of anomie as a valid statement of societal problems and examine it as a theoretical vehicle for understanding the person in contemporary society.

### The "Individual and 'Society' "

With conceptions of the individual (most often referred to as views of human nature) at the root of political theory, it seems most appropriate to begin with an examination of Durkheim's picture of the individual. Not until one is clear about his conceptual treatment of "man in 'society' " can one understand his broader theory. Students of Durkheim have written that he maintains that the individual is a "social being for whom the society of other persons is a necessary and natural environment."<sup>1</sup> In support of this view, although somewhat refined, Durkheim states in his Rules of Sociological Method:

It has not been proved at all that the tendency to gregariousness has been an inherited instinct of the human species from its beginnings. It is much more natural to consider it a product of social life, which was slowly developed within us; for it is a fact of observation that animals are or are not gregarious according to whether their habits oblige them to live a common life or to avoid it.<sup>2</sup>

However, even this example may express a tension in Durkheim's thought [since] gregariousness is often treated on some level as instinctual behavior

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<sup>1</sup>Harry Alpert, Emile Durkheim and His Sociology. (New York: Russell & Russell Inc., 1961), p. 137.

<sup>2</sup>Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, ed., George Catlin, (New York: Free Press, 1938), p. 107.

necessary to survival rather than as a socially learned phenomena. This tension between the "natural" as opposed to the "sociological" reappears throughout Durkheim's discussions of egoistic tendencies and the theory of anomie, as well as his treatment of women. This is not to deny the major thrust of Durkheim's perspective which is social as well as historical,<sup>3</sup> but to note a serious problem at the base of his thought.

According to Durkheim, often times psychological states which are the consequence of social phenomena are designated mistakenly as determining social phenomena.

Thus a certain religious sentiment has been considered innate in man, a certain minimum of sexual jealousy, filial piety, paternal love, etc. And it is by these that religion, marriage, and the family have been explained.<sup>4</sup>

History has shown Durkheim believes, that these are not inherent in the essence of man. The tendencies noted above may even be lacking altogether. "These sentiments then, result from the collective organization and are not its basis."<sup>5</sup> And to the extent particular tendencies derive from the society ". . . his nature does not remain constant throughout history; it is modified with societies."<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>For instance, Durkheim's treatment of suicide is social and historical. He notes the causes of suicide as particular to specific societal arrangements as well as studies them historically in terms of the different stages of development in society. See, Emile Durkheim, Suicide, (New York: Free Press, 1951).

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 107.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, (New York: Free Press, 1933), p. 403.

Durkheim's societal and historical view of man's essence encompasses the idea of potentiality.

To say that innate characteristics are for the most part very general, is to say that they are very malleable, very flexible, since they can assume very different forms . . . potentialities constitute man.<sup>7</sup>

However, the potential which Durkheim appears to be the most preoccupied with is that of man's potential to become self-seeking, or egoistic. It is important to discuss this dimension of Durkheim's thought because he is to be distinguished here from the innate drive theory of Hobbes or Freud. But the distinction cannot be as clear as one might like it to be. Sometimes he discusses egoistic drives as societally initiated (e.g., as a result of an unregulated economy) but other times he treats them as though they are universal qualities regardless of time or place. The discussion of egoistic inclinations in Durkheim is of key importance because it reflects upon the larger problem of the relationship between man and society.

The individual is seen in this sphere as a bundle of passions in need of constraining forces. "In neither the organic nor the psychological constitution of man is anything to be found which sets a boundary to such propensities."<sup>8</sup> The specific egoistic tendency dealt with by Durkheim is greed, and this is discussed in relation to the industrialized economic society. Curbs and controls are to be set up because "human nature is substantially the same among all men in its

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<sup>7</sup>Emile Durkheim, Education and Sociology, (Glencoe Illinois: Free Press, 1965), p. 84.

<sup>8</sup>Emile Durkheim, "On Anomie," in C. W. Mills, ed., Images of Man, (New York: George Braziller Inc., 1960), p. 450.

essential qualities. It is not human nature which can assign the variable limits necessary to our needs."<sup>9</sup>

So far it has been stated that Durkheim conceives of man as primarily social and historical and therefore flexible and changing; although man does have egoistic tendencies. Basically when Durkheim speaks of "man's nature," he says he means by this what man is essentially in society and not what he is in terms of some inherent make-up. But I see a serious tension in the view that man is social and historical which underlines Durkheim's theory, and his view of the underlying constancy of man as egoistic and self-interested. Durkheim constructs the view that order and constraint are necessary to social life from this view of man as plagued by self-seeking tendencies. I feel uneasy, therefore, with the privileged status extended the necessity of social constraint. The necessity for constraint becomes a "constant" in Durkheim, as will be seen when the ideal of the moral order is analyzed. One rather expects him to treat it as a flexible need, which would be consistent with a social and historical framework. There is a serious tension between saying that the individual unfolds and is modified in society which implies a flexibility to man and on the other hand assuming egoistic tendencies as a dominant characteristic of the individual, almost devoid of social impact. The tension derives from whether man as egoistic, viewed as a bundle of passions, is a social phenomena or whether it is inherent in man's nature.

John Horton explains the relationship of the individual and society in

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<sup>9</sup>Op. cit., Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, p. 247.



Durkheim's thought as homo duplex; "part egoistic, anarchistic and self seeking, part moral in so far as he is regulated and constrained by society."<sup>10</sup> But this neat distinction aids us little in finding out where the lines are to be drawn.

Durkheim's division, though murky, between the socially developed, and innate characteristics, appears somewhat mechanical in relation to his statement of social man. For example, Durkheim does discuss in his Professional Ethics and Civic Morals innate characteristics of the individual. "It is unreasonable and contrary to the character of mankind that things should not be taken possession of."<sup>11</sup> Marshall Clinard writing on Durkheim states that "Durkheim considered one of the innate desires of man to be ambition to achieve unattainable objectives."<sup>12</sup>

On the other hand, often when Durkheim speaks of the problem of passion-like or egoistic behavior, it is related to the economic sphere of society. In other words, it is the society which stimulates and further develops the tendencies in individuals for self-seeking. The problem of anomie which is directly tied to the problem of endless desires and expandable tendencies is rooted in the economic system for Durkheim. "The fact is that there (in the world of commerce and industry) a state of disturbance and of anomie is constant, and so to speak normal."<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>John Horton, "The Dehumanization of Anomie and Alienation: A Problem in the Ideology of Sociology," British Journal of Sociology, 15 (1964), p. 290.

<sup>11</sup>Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 131.

<sup>12</sup>Marshall Clinard, "The Theoretical Implications of Anomie and Deviant Behavior," in Marshall Clinard, ed., Anomie and Deviant Behavior, (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 11.

<sup>13</sup>Op. cit., Durkheim in C. W. Mills, p. 458.

In other terms self-seeking flourishes within certain economic systems.

Anthony Giddens in Capitalism and Modern Social Theory notes the blending of emphasis in Durkheim while emphasizing his social and economic perspective.

It is true that Durkheim anchors egoistic needs in the biological (i.e., pre-social) structure of the individual organism; but he nevertheless makes it clear that egoism is also in large part a product of society--the impulse to self-advancement, for instance, is as much a creation of modern society for Durkheim as it is for Marx.<sup>14</sup>

One is, therefore, left with three possible alternatives to the explanation of egoism in Durkheim. At different points he seems to adopt each of the three.

(1) That the economic sector is a major element in the development of egoism; that the endless passions and desires originate in the economic sector. Or, (2) the individual is "egoistic" through some inherent quality which is allowed to run loose because of the structure of industrialized society. (3) A third alternative is that the individual has egoistic tendencies which are developed and prodded by the economic system. I think that Durkheim's position is a somewhat uneasy mixture of (2) and (3).

In conclusion, the discussion about Durkheim's treatment of egoistic man reflects, I think, the unresolved inconsistencies in his discussion. On the one hand egoistic tendencies are an outgrowth of a social order without clearly defined rules, as is stated in the theory of anomie. As a result individuals aim at objectives for themselves which are unattainable and even when attained are still unsatisfying. On the other hand it would be totally consistent with his stated views

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<sup>14</sup> Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory; An Analysis of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 225.

(reflecting a social and historical perspective) if Durkheim saw anomie not as a result of insufficient rules or the lack of their internalization (which posits the individual needing constraint and order) but instead as an outcome of a society which practiced and supported the wrong rules. Unless, that is, he sees the crux of the problem of egoism as inherent to the internal structure of the individual. Let me explain what I mean by the wrong rules.

Capitalism operates, Durkheim agrees, upon a set of rules; the rules of laissez-faire individualism and competition. Presumably a capitalist society can be stable; yet its guiding ethic leads to anomie. The problem is not the absence of rules to structure behavior, but rather that the organizing rules of behavior (i.e., competition) may be a major cause, once internalized and accepted, of the condition of anomie; of individual self-seeking.

If Durkheim focused his interpretation in this direction he would be led to a theory which emphasized the necessity of changing the societal rules of operation as opposed to trying to institute rules to limit the individual.

The point I wish to make is somewhat elusive but nevertheless important. Durkheim slides away from a social and historical perspective at key points (sometimes only to be noted in terms of the priorities he sets). In his treatment of needs and the related theory of anomie, as will be shown, he does not carry through with his own analysis. This is especially true in the case of his analysis of women.

He has rooted his treatment of egoism partially in society, and to this extent it is a "particular" phenomena, and partially (this varies in degree) in an innate need theory which lends it "universal" status. But as the three possible

explanations I construct show, the relation between the particular and universal status is confused.

The language of egoism has been used as such not because I think it lends clarity to the issues at hand but because it appears in the literature of Durkheim. The problem with the egoism-altruism distinction is that in a non-anomic social order people cannot be captured either by the category of egoism or altruism. The distinction is not helpful if one is trying to grasp the difficult relationships between people in given social situations or as social beings who prize ties to others. For ". . . in the pursuit of most characteristically human goals it is impossible to separate out a part that is the consulting of my own interest and a part that is devoted to the needs of others."<sup>15</sup> Social living will involve the broader interdependency of reciprocating relationships.

In my social life I cannot but be involved in reciprocal relationships, in which it may certainly be conceded that the price I have to pay for self-seeking behavior is a loss of certain kinds of relationships. But if I want to live a certain kind of life, with relationships of trust, friendship, and cooperation with others, then my wanting their good and my wanting my good are not two independent discriminable desires . . . I have one desire to live in a certain way, which cannot be characterized as a desire for my good rather than that of others.<sup>16</sup>

For Durkheim, the "individual" is not an isolate, comprehensible outside of the social ties which help to constitute his life. In a non-anomic social order, he is neither fully egoistic nor altruistic; nor is he adequately understood as a mix of both. He is a socialized being, motivated to follow the norms of his society because those

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<sup>15</sup> Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, (New York: MacMillan, 1966), p. 186.

<sup>16</sup> Alasdair MacIntyre, "Egoism and Altruism," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed., Paul Edwards, (1967), p. 466.



norms have become part of him. But the individual, under certain social arrangements, is capable of a narrow egoism--an egoism which makes him suffer at the very time he ignores the needs of others. These themes emerge more clearly in a consideration of anomie.

### Problem of Anomie

Durkheim's theory of anomie is rooted in the view of the "passionate" individual prodded by the economic system. Anomie reflects both the (1) relations between the individual and the society as well as incorporates (2) the "need" assessments which derive from his initial conceptions of man.

It is interesting to note that most of the discussion of anomie in Durkheim is either directly tied to a discussion of the anomic division of labor or anomic suicide. Anomie is then almost always defined as integral to one or the other of these social phenomena. Anomic division of labor is a result of rapid economic growth without the development of the necessary regulatory apparatus. When the relations of the organs are not regulated they are in a state of anomy.<sup>17</sup> Production is unbridled and unregulated.<sup>18</sup> Anomic suicide ". . . has to do neither with too much integration, nor too little, but it is a result of the crises of societies."<sup>19</sup> Anomic suicide differs from egoistic and altruistic suicide in its

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<sup>17</sup>Op. cit., Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, p. 368.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 370.

<sup>19</sup>Emile Durkheim, Suicide, (New York: Free Press, 1951), p. 153.

"dependence, not on the way in which individuals are attached to society, but on how it regulates them."<sup>20</sup>

Anomie, often termed as lawlessness or rulelessness, derives not only from the society.<sup>21</sup> It often is the result of the individual failing to internalize the rules which are to structure his life. Anomie operates as a two-pronged concept, with man and his needs on the one side, and the organized society on the other. This is not to deny, but rather to emphasize the interrelationship between man and his society; although this relationship is not always clear, nor constant.

Anomie is created in the economic sector where the customary limits and boundaries are lacking because of the capitalist ethic of greed and gain."<sup>22</sup>  
 "The state of rulelessness (dereglement) is further heightened by the fact that human desires are less disciplined at the very moment when they would need a stronger discipline."<sup>23</sup> Anomie is then tied to the conception of man needing constraint as much as it is to the expansion and loosening of "customary" limits.

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<sup>20</sup> Robert Bierstedt, Emile Durkheim, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966), p. 154.

<sup>21</sup> Anomie as defined by the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, as quoted in the Division of Labor, originally applied to the disregard for divine law. Later it came to mean lawlessness, or rulelessness. See op. cit., Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, (p. ix). As a positivist Durkheim seems to ignore the distinction between a law and a rule as indicative of quite different processes; hence, anomie applies to both lawlessness and rulelessness.

<sup>22</sup> Herbert McClosky and John Schaar, "Psychological Dimensions of Anomy," American Sociological Review, 30 (February 1965), p. 15.

<sup>23</sup> Op. cit., Durkheim in C. W. Mills, ed., p. 456.

So, Durkheim, who saw economic expansion and development as furthering the individual's bottomless abyss, concluded that "the entire morality of progress and perfection is thus inseparable from a certain amount of anomy."<sup>24</sup>

Durkheim discusses varied social relationships as resulting in anomie.

The following construct allows one to organize most of Durkheim's study of anomie.

Anomie exists when the relation between       a      ,  
and       b      , results in condition       c      ,  
creating       d      , with effect       e      , on the  
society and the individual.

In the above (a) could be: rapid economic growth, industrial revolution, unregulated division of labor; (b) is a constant, it is the individual in need of constraint, an individual with indefinitely expandable desires and the impossibility of satisfaction without limits; (c) is: unclear boundaries, lack of order, lack of solidarity, rulelessness, lack of social integration; (d) is: competitiveness, status seeking, concentration on consumption, economic ethic of greed and gain; (e) is: the disintegration of society, weak conscience collective, lawlessness. Hence, one reading of the construct is:

Anomie exists when the relation between rapid economic growth,  
and man, results in condition of rulelessness, creating economic  
greed and gain, with the effect of a weak conscience collective,  
on the society and the individual.

The entire set of relationships involves a causal flow and encompasses the theory of anomie; "a" and "b" cause conditions "c," "d," and "e."

Besides the objective social conditions and relationships above, anomie involves whole sets of assumptions about the individual's needs. This conception

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<sup>24</sup> Op. cit., Durkheim, Suicide, p. 247.

of the nature of the individual which is built upon his statement of needs and desires necessitates a concern with constraining the individual. The three most basic assumptions built into the theory of anomie therefore are: 1) man has endless desires and will always be striving for what he does not already have, 2) the individual cannot limit his desires himself, and 3) constraint and order are necessary and therefore valued for the "happy" life.

Durkheim's assessment of needs and desires has serious implications for what he sees as the necessary arrangements between man and society. If man was not viewed as having indefinitely expandable desires the social condition of anomie would not be posed as a problem. The description of the objective social conditions of a capitalist society are not sufficient for a theory of anomie. Without Durkheim's view of the individual and his needs one might find some of his descriptions of capitalist economy conducive to a partial discussion of alienation. It is the opposing conceptual views of the individual which is one of the most significant differences between Durkheim and Marx and their theories of anomie and alienation. In other words, integral to the theory of anomie is the picture of the individual developed by Durkheim as well as a description of the society.

Durkheim's ideas about needs are crucial to the theory of anomie as well as to his view of the moral order. Hence, his statement on needs calls for examination in terms of our later discussions.

### Needs and the Theory of Anomie

It is first important to examine the language Durkheim uses to talk about human needs. This does not mean that the problems which arise out of the

discussion of human needs are simply terminological. But before the conceptual issues can be dealt with it is necessary to be clear how the language is used.

The problem with the discussion of "need" in Durkheim is that he often appears to slide or jockey back and forth among the terms "need," "desire," "passion," and "appetite." He sometimes equates these terms, and this equation lends support to the view of a rather irrational or non-rational being. It also confuses distinctly individual processes.

In the Division of Labor, Durkheim distinguishes biological needs as non-expandable, from other needs which he generally views as endlessly expanding. "Everyone recognizes that the needs of the body are limited, and that, consequently, physical pleasure cannot increase indefinitely."<sup>25</sup> Quoting Rabier from his Lecons de Philosophie, I, Durkheim writes: "Hunger is satisfied with a determined quantity of food; reason cannot be satisfied with a determined quantity of knowledge."<sup>26</sup>

In Suicide, Durkheim also distinguishes between individual and animal needs because man's needs are not dependent solely upon his body; "a wider margin is left for the free combinations of the will."<sup>27</sup> "A more awakened reflection suggests better conditions, seemingly desirable ends craving fulfillment."<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Op. cit., Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, p. 238.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 479.

<sup>27</sup> Op. cit., Durkheim, Suicide, p. 247.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.



Once Durkheim leaves the ordered objective "need" realm of animal life we find him using a vocabulary reflecting the notions of subjective irrational feeling-- "appetites," "desiring," "craving."

Durkheim indirectly defines need in the Division of Labor.

As we go forward, however, work becomes a permanent occupation, a habit, and indeed, if this habit is sufficiently strengthened, a need.<sup>29</sup>

Need then is largely defined in relation to what one has become accustomed to, or socialized towards, but this does not grasp its meaning totally. Need is partly what we have become accustomed to for Durkheim, but more than that. We could be accustomed to beatings, but not need them in any sense. So a need must also be a tendency or inclination toward some state which, if not fulfilled, leaves us unsatisfied or frustrated. Hence, for Durkheim a need is something we aim at and this is partly because of socialization (thus, we are accustomed to it) and something we gain satisfaction from.

The development of habits (needs) and tastes appears as a social and historical process. To appreciate new developments and goods one has to develop new tastes and desires. The new tastes and habits develop as a process of socialization.<sup>30</sup> If one infers from the earlier statement that needs partially derive from socialized patterns one can conclude from the above that needs also will develop in relation to new goods. In other words one can construct from Durkheim's loose discussion of needs, desires, and habits, that new goods will further stimulate

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<sup>29</sup> Op. cit., Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, p. 394.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 240.



new needs in an ongoing process.<sup>31</sup>

Then, truly as the conditions of life are changed, the standard according to which needs were regulated can no longer remain the same; for it varies with social resources . . .<sup>32</sup>

Social resources reflect the level of material development in the society. It is important to note that thus far the discussion of need, tastes, and habits is largely linked to the realm of material goods. However, Durkheim does not seem to be self-conscious of this and although he links these desires with societal forces (to a degree), he also grants them at points a universal status.

In Suicide Durkheim more fully discusses his conception of need, as desire, or passion, or feeling.

It is not human nature which can assign the variable limits necessary to our needs. They are thus unlimited so far as they depend on the individual alone. Irrespective of any external regulatory force, our capacity for feeling is in itself an insatiable and bottomless abyss.<sup>33</sup>

"Wants," "needs," and "passions" are used loosely and interchangeably by Durkheim. "Thus the more one has the more one wants, since satisfaction received only stimulates instead of filling needs."<sup>34</sup> He continues to say that, ". . . the passions first must be limited. Only then can they be harmonized with the faculties and satisfied."<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>31</sup>For a systematic analysis of needs as social and historical within the economic sector one must move to Marx.

<sup>32</sup>Op. cit., Durkheim, Suicide, p. 253.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 247.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 248.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

The above quote on "passions" echoes his statement on "needs." "No living being can be happy or even exist unless his needs are sufficiently proportional to his means."<sup>36</sup> If you want to be happy you must limit your aspirations, since Durkheim presumes a shortage of means. To be happy you must learn to need what you can have.<sup>37</sup>

In Saint Simon and Socialism, Durkheim continues his equation of need and appetite.

. . . a need or appetite in a living being can be explained only if it secures some satisfaction for the being who experiences it. But an appetite that nothing can appease can never be satisfied.<sup>38</sup>

From this loose use of the terms "need," "desire," and "appetite," it seems plausible to infer from the statement: "no matter how one acts, desires have to depend upon resources to some extent; actual possessions are partly the criterion of those aspired to,"<sup>39</sup> that desires are terminologically interchanged with "needs." Hence, "needs" are seen as expanded by habitual expectation of objects in relation to resources and actual possessions. Durkheim further

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<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 246.

<sup>37</sup>It is apparent that needs have to be sufficiently proportioned to means, rather than means being proportioned to individual needs, because the means, as part of the social structure, act as a limiting constraint for Durkheim. The individual need structure is a limitless abyss.

<sup>38</sup>Emile Durkheim, Socialism and Saint Simon, (Ohio: Antioch Press, 1958), p. 197.

<sup>39</sup>Op. cit., Durkheim, Suicide, p. 254.

supports this view when he states that superfluity extends "needs" indefinitely.<sup>40</sup>

"The less one possesses the less he is inclined to extend endlessly the range of his wants."<sup>41</sup>

As stated previously, I think that much of the discussion pertaining to needs in Durkheim (as presented so far) presents needs as largely tied to materialistic concerns. And it is these needs for acquisition that are endlessly manipulable.

Durkheim's position is that needs which are stimulated endlessly by the economic system must be controlled because the individual by himself is incapable of limiting his "passions." His muddled treatment of needs leads to his generalizing about all needs as endless, requiring external regulation. This necessity of controlling the individual is at the root of Durkheim's dualistic conception of the individual and society. Society is in a transcendental relation to man.

Society can be interpreted transcendently and extrinsically as an entity different from and morally superior to individual men; or it can be interpreted immanently as the extension of men, the indwelling of men.<sup>42</sup>

In trying to assess Durkheim's treatment of needs it seems to me that one must examine the relationship he posits between man and society in terms of the way his needs are defined and developed. Although Durkheim often poses the dualistic view of man and society he does not appear to conceive of a societal "interest," in opposition to the individual's needs, and this seems to be the

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<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

<sup>41</sup>Op. cit., Durkheim in C. W. Mills, ed., p. 456.

<sup>42</sup>Op. cit., John Horton, p. 289.

source of further trouble. I agree with the position that needs are defined societally. But this seems incomplete in and of itself. Societies have their own priorities and "interests" and these may be, and often are in conflict with individual's needs. It is in society's interest to restrain man's needs to the established order. In other words, needs are limited by the established order, by those with interests in already existing arrangements. Then, it seems to me that needs, to the extent they are developed through a social framework are structured by the "established interests" in a given society, and are not endlessly expandable. Their expandability rests upon two elements. The first, as already mentioned, is that materialistic needs expand in relation to the interests of the ruling elements in society, and it is not in their interests to stimulate endless needs because severe discontent would most likely result. Secondly, needs can be expanded only as far as social resources exist to stimulate them.

An unlimited desire suggests material desires. It is beyond the reasonable purview of human behavior. It is a desire which no amount of 'x' can satisfy. The idea of an unlimited desire, --"as much 'x' as one can get"--as boundless desire, is inadequate to the extent that individuals live in society and are products of the confines and limitations of those systems. Besides, to the extent man is rational there are bounds to his needs, and desires.

Desires are limited by the forces of everyday life. The point is not that individuals do not have aspirations, but that they do not have endless desires, needs, wants. However, their inevitable expansion is at the crux of Durkheim's theoretical framework.

It is possibly necessary here for Durkheim to distinguish between an unlimited number of desires and desires with unlimited objects.

To the extent that men are rooted in actual social arrangements, their aspirations and desires have focal points. To conceive of man's need structure as a bottomless abyss is to view him in a vacuum, with no points of contact with reality. The tension one finds in Durkheim is that much of his social theory is based on the position that man's needs are forever expandable and therefore constraint must be exercised to create some level of moral order. The ironic dimension of Durkheim is that he partially ties man's endless desires to societal forces acting upon him but he also partially treats needs in terms of the egoistic natural tendencies of man.

Because of the tension within his own thought he seems to exclude the role of social forces acting in terms of privileged interests. Such concerns are excluded by his very definition of needs. He, therefore, cannot view the fact, that it is not in the interests of the ruling elements to develop needs without any sense of limitation to them, as valid. He would then see that the endless development of needs could only breed widespread discontent and the possibilities of social unrest for those in power. This would be contrary to the purposes of those with vested interests in existing arrangements.

And besides, interestingly enough, Durkheim expresses himself that most men live according to their established means. Most adjust "successfully" to existing society,

It will be said that it is not always sufficient to make men content, that there are some men whose desires go beyond



their faculties. This is true, these are exceptional and, one may say, morbid cases. Normally, man finds happiness in realizing his nature; his needs are in relation to his means.<sup>43</sup>

If man's desires are extended beyond his means only infrequently, why does Durkheim construct a sociological theory which posits that most men are desirous of more than they have? and construct a moral theory on the necessity for solidarity and constraint? He draws at times universal tendencies from a condition which is specific by his own definition to certain social and economic conditions. The universal tendencies appear to derive from his initial conception of man.

Another major conceptual difficulty in the treatment of "needs," which the terminological interchanges between desire, need, habit, etc., are only symptomatic of, is that Durkheim at no point makes a clear distinction between real or false needs. For instance, if he made this distinction between real and false needs, he might have seen that false needs were most often related to his discussions of materialistic desires, i. e., endless abysses and infatuations. But as it is, Durkheim only hints at this faintly. "There is, then a normal intensity of all our needs, intellectual, moral, as well as physical, which cannot be exaggerated."<sup>44</sup> In Saint Simon and Socialism, Durkheim hints at a distinction between real and false need, or possibly, need and want, but he states clearly that a need is never without cause which negates the differentiation.

To be sure, we can be certain in advance that the remedies are not precisely those sought by the systems, just as the drink

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<sup>43</sup>Op. cit., Durkheim, Division of Labor, p. 376.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 240.



demand by a feverish patient is not necessarily what he needs. Still, the needs that he does feel do not cease to serve as some guide to treatment. They are never without cause, and sometimes it is best to satisfy them.<sup>45</sup>

Durkheim does not assess needs as definitively false and therefore harmful as a guide to treatment.

In order for one to uncover the conception of "person" which operates in Durkheim and to state which are the most valued needs of man, one must become involved in a discussion of the moral life. So far the discussion of needs has been largely tied to materialistic concerns and to a lesser extent to man's egoistic tendencies. And hence, these needs are viewed as boundless. The moral order, derives from the concern that boundaries must be set to limit human needs. The derivative needs of order, constraint, solidarity, all contribute to the life of morality. These are termed derivative needs because they flow from the initial conception of man, which is a blend of "natural" and social phenomena, held by Durkheim.

### The Moral Order as Resolution

The moral life creates the happy life for Durkheim. Life is seen as perpetual unhappiness unless the proper controls are developed and internalized. His ultimate commitment is to the happy life which reaches fruition through the moral order.

Let us first quickly examine what Durkheim means by happiness, because of the direct relationship it has to the moral life.

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<sup>45</sup> Op. cit., Durkheim, Socialism and Saint Simon, p. 9.

According to Joseph Neyer<sup>46</sup> Durkheim perceived the uniqueness of the quality of unhappiness that is associated with freedom. "For men to be contented with their lot what is needed is not that they have more or less but that they be convinced they have no right to more."<sup>47</sup> Durkheim associated happiness with order and controlled relations. That is why anomie was conceived as a state of normlessness. "No living being can be happy or even exist unless his needs are sufficiently proportioned to his means."<sup>48</sup>

To be sure, once these needs are excited they cannot be suspended without pain. But our happiness is no greater because they are excited.<sup>49</sup>

Happiness coincides with a healthy state, and both happiness and the healthy state are equated with the "mean" activity. It is not a function of more or less pleasures (material goods, etc.) but a function of satisfaction that one has no right to more.

It appears fairly certain that happiness is something besides a sum of pleasures. It is a general and constant state accompanying the regular activity of all our organic and psychical functions.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>Joseph Neyer, "Individualism and Socialism in Durkheim," in Kurt Wolff, ed., Essays on Sociology and Philosophy by Emile Durkheim, et al, (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 58.

<sup>47</sup>Op. cit., Durkheim, Socialism and Saint Simon, p. 200.

<sup>48</sup>Op. cit., Durkheim, Suicide, p. 246.

<sup>49</sup>Op. cit., Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, p. 275.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 243.

Pleasure is seen as momentary in distinction from happiness which is a more sustained condition. Therefore, happiness can be maintained over time with the proper organization of society.

A genuine regimen exists, therefore, although not always legally formulated, which fixes with relative precision the maximum degree of ease of living to which each social class may legitimately aspire.<sup>51</sup>

The class division of society is then a functional arrangement for Durkheim.

Individuals in the middle and lower classes become bounded by the social circumstances which engulfs them.

This relative limitation and the moderation it involves makes men contented with their lot while stimulating them moderately to improve it; and this average contentment causes the feeling of calm, active happiness, the pleasure in existing and living which characterizes health for societies as well as for individuals.<sup>52</sup>

A society organized around the priorities of happiness will therefore control for "insatiable" desires. Stability and order become the privileged concerns in Durkheim's thought, as opposed to commitments to freedom and the development of human capacities, as in Karl Marx. This may be tied somewhat to Durkheim's belief that there is a significant difference in individual's capacities for growth. This is not so for Marx. But primarily, it is within the context of man's rulelessness, that rules become fundamental to "human happiness."

The problem of ordered, solidary relationships is best expressed in

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<sup>51</sup> Op. cit., Durkheim, Suicide, p. 249.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 250.

Durkheim's Division of Labor.<sup>53</sup> It is here that the connections between happiness, needs, and the moral order are established.

According to Durkheim the division of labor develops as the segmental structure disappears;<sup>54</sup> as mechanical solidarity is transformed to organic solidarity.

The division of labor varies in direct ratio with the volume and density of societies, and, if it progresses in a continuous manner in the course of social development, it is because societies become regularly denser and generally more voluminous.<sup>55</sup>

In the past, mechanical solidarity was responsible for the moral order. The cohesiveness of society derives from the collective similarity within its parts. The homogeneity of society is the source of its solidarity, and therefore its morality. As society changes through history it begins to differentiate and specialize. Durkheim sought an explanation for the "needed" cohesiveness which was lacking.<sup>56</sup> It is to this end that his discussion of organic solidarity is directed.

<sup>53</sup>The abnormal functions of the division of labor are examined as well. The abnormal forms are noted as, 1) forced division of labor; when the occupational distribution does not follow the distribution of talent, 2) when the functional activity of each worker is insufficient, and, 3) the anomic division of labor. It is interesting to note that these forms of abnormal division of labor parallel closely the description of the division of labor as stated by Marx. See op. cit., Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, Book Three, Chapters 1, 2, and 3.

<sup>54</sup>Op. cit., Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, p. 256.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 262.

<sup>56</sup>For this discussion see Joachim Israel, Alienation from Marx to Modern Sociology, (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1971), as well as op. cit., Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society.

In organic solidarity relations between individuals do not derive from similarity but from social differentiation of function. Solidary relations form as a result of the way different functions complement each other.<sup>57</sup> As society moves from its segmental stage the division of labor serves to integrate society through fulfilling the role of the common conscience, lending solidarity through the interdependence of function it perpetuates, and creates a moral order by developing a dependency between the individual and society.

It makes individuals solidary. . . not only because it limits the activity of each, but also because it increases it. It adds to the unity of the organism, solely through adding to its life. At least, in its normal state, it does not produce one of these effects without the other.<sup>58</sup>

The division of labor increases the individual's activity and in this way creates a fuller unity.

But if the division of labor produces solidarity it is not only because it makes each individual an exchangist as the economists say; it is because it creates among men an entire system of rights and duties which link them together in a desirable way.<sup>59</sup>

This system devises an orderly regularized structure to operate within. Then, the "division of labor unites at the same time that it opposes; it makes the activities it differentiates converge; it brings together those it separates."<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>57</sup>The equation of the individual and the "function" that the individual performs results from Durkheim's priorities with the performance of tasks necessary to the development of the moral order.

<sup>58</sup>Op cit., Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, p. 395.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 406.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., p. 276.



The social solidarity created is at the foundation of the moral order. "Social solidarity is a completely moral phenomenon . . . "61 And since the "divisions of labor becomes the chief source of social solidarity, it becomes at the same time the foundation of the moral order."62 Durkheim's key statement is this:

Everything which is a source of solidarity is moral, everything which forces man to take account of other men is moral, everything which forces him to regulate his conduct through something other than the striving of his ego is moral, and morality is as solid as these ties are numerous and strong. 63

Morality for Durkheim appears as a "system of rules of conduct."64

And the primary characteristic of these rules of conduct is that they enunciate the fundamental conditions of social solidarity. Solidarity, and morality involve order and harmony. Order is established through relations of authority. "Authority in its relation to man, not only buttresses moral life; it is moral life."65

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<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 401.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 398.

<sup>64</sup>Emile Durkheim, Sociology and Philosophy, (New York: Free Press, 1953), p. 35.

<sup>65</sup>Robert Nisbet, Emile Durkheim, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 151.

Involved in Durkheim's conception of the moral life is his view of an ideal of a person. The concerns with authority, order and calm remain.

Although it is important to note that both Durkheim's and Marx's discussions of morality and species being, respectively, are at the heart of their models of persons, it is interesting to view a fundamental difference in the way these conceptions relate to the authors ideas on "persons." Durkheim's conception of morality is much more closely tied to his discussion of needs than is Marx's conception of species being. The moral order is organized to meet human needs, and in this sense derives from them, whereas species being reflects upon the potentialities of the individual as opposed to the manifested needs of the human being. The moral order is derived from the human needs of solidarity, interdependence, order and control. The emphasis here is not on potentiality as will become evident. The discussion of morality is more attuned to concerns of human happiness than human development.

Durkheim and Marx agree that man is a social being. "And indeed, man is man only because he lives in society. Take away from man all that has a social origin and nothing is left but an animal on a par with other animals."<sup>66</sup> However, they view the relationship between individuals and the individual and society differently. It is the nature of this relationship which reflects the meaning of morality in Durkheim. It is, therefore, important to clarify the way persons are related to one another and to society in his thought.

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<sup>66</sup>Op. cit., Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, p. 60.

Durkheim sees man in a dependent relationship to society.

Because the individual is not sufficient unto himself, it is from society that he receives everything necessary to him, as it is for society that he works. Thus is formed a very strong sentiment of the state of dependence in which he finds himself.<sup>67</sup>

So one estimates oneself as a part of a whole . . . as an "organ of an organism."

Durkheim does peripherally mention a concern with individual's

"autonomy." "One cannot give oneself too completely to others without abandoning oneself."<sup>68</sup> And he states further that:

To be a person is to be an autonomous source of action. Man acquires this quality only in so far as there is something in him which is his alone and which individualizes him . . .<sup>69</sup>

However, he appears to give priority to the necessity for solidary relations.

. . . the most complete relation which can exist between a thing and a person is that which makes the former entirely dependent upon the latter.<sup>70</sup>

Durkheim believes that as society becomes extended and concentrated the individual becomes freer to his own detriment. The common conscience of the organic solidarity loses its hold. And it is in this way that the social division of labor "lifts the collective yoke" off of the individual. However, the division of labor does not isolate the individual because one relates to several

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<sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 228.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., p. 239.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p. 403.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p. 117, [The emphasis is my own.]

functions within any given procedure.

The division of labor, presumes that the worker, far from being hemmed in by his task, does not lose sight of his collaborators, that he acts upon them, and reacts to them.<sup>71</sup>

Durkheim does not see the division of labor as fostering an incompleteness in the individual. He finds no tension between the regulation and the development of the individual.

It is because this special structure allows society to enclose the individual more tightly, holding him strongly attached to his domestic environment and consequently, to traditions and finally contributing to the limitation of his social horizon, it also contributes to make it concrete and defined.<sup>72</sup>

He does not view man as dissected by the division of labor. Specialization and differentiation are the key to the solidarity necessary for the ordered life.

Why would there be more dignity in being complete and mediocre, rather than in living a more specialized, but more intense life, particularly if it is thus possible for us to find what we have lost in this specialization, through our association with other beings who have what we lack and who complete us?<sup>73</sup>

Durkheim feels that specialization develops individuality and also is conducive to a sense of completeness through social association and cohesion.

Harry Alpert in discussing Durkheim's treatment of the individual, focuses on the sacred element of the individual in the organic division of labor. However, it rather seems as though the individual has not become more

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<sup>71</sup>Ibid., p. 372.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., p. 302.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., p. 403.

important but that his function, as specialization, has. In the discussion of the mechanical division of labor it is stated that each organ has its own characteristics, yet, the more marked the individuality of the parts, the greater is the unity of the organism.<sup>74</sup> Individuality here means specialization, not the development of the uniqueness of the individual. It seems that when society evolves from mechanical to organic solidarity functional specialization occurs, and not the development of the potentiality of the person, as person.

In light of the above discussion it seems possible that autonomy is expressed for Durkheim simply as the outgrowth of specialization. The relations which derive from the differentiation of tasks create the controlled atmosphere necessary to the moral order. If we try to distinguish between the autonomous and non-autonomous person it would be that the former is able to limit his needs and desires while the latter is driven to unachievable ends. One becomes autonomous in this sense through a system of differentiation and specialization. Through such networks one learns to function within boundaries. Such individuals, not driven by inner compulsions, would be autonomous within Durkheim's system and would therefore be important to solidary and moral relations.

The key to Durkheim's belief that the division of labor creates unity is the balance between the individual's dependency on society and his individuality (specialization), his autonomy. The critical question becomes whether or not this relationship between autonomy and dependency is balanced. Dependency (through differentiation) appears to be an integral part of autonomy, for

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<sup>74</sup>Ibid., p. 182.



Durkheim, with all priorities given in the direction of the ordered, solid, moral life.

In Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, he states that "the human person forms part of the physical and social milieu; he is bound up with it and his autonomy can be only relative."<sup>75</sup> Durkheim's statement on autonomy deals with the difficult relationship of the individual in his society. However, one can question whether he has captured the proper essence of the relationship. The connection between man and society need not be conceived in terms of dependence, but rather in terms of an exchange or reciprocating interaction.

Durkheim's conception of education constructs autonomous individuals as those who relate to moral and solidary behavior. This appears to be in conflict with commitments toward human development. In Education and Sociology he speaks of the necessity to educate children to accept their roles as they are given. They must learn to accept the idea of circumscribed tasks and limited horizons.<sup>76</sup>

Society can survive only if there exists among its members a sufficient degree of homogeneity; education perpetuates and reinforces this homogeneity by fixing in the child, from the beginning, the essential similarities that collective life demands.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>75</sup>Op. cit., Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, p. 68.

<sup>76</sup>Steven Lukes, "Anomie and Alienation," in Laslett and Runciman, Philosophy, Politics and Society, 3rd Series; (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1967), p. 141.

<sup>77</sup>Op. cit., Durkheim, Education and Sociology, p. 70.

The idea that one fulfills a determinate function is in conflict with a view which focuses upon the potentialities of the individual, as we shall see.

The importance of solidarity, functional interdependence, and specialization create tensions when posed against the view of person as free and experimenting. To the extent that morality for Durkheim is tied to the idea of solidarity as created in the division of labor, his conception of morality may also be exclusive of free and deliberative human beings. The necessity for constraint and solidarity which derives from his conception of needs and desires exclude such possibilities.

It has so far been posited that Durkheim's concern with the moral life is tied to his commitments to a solidary and ordered existence, rather than with the development of potential capacities in persons. In other words morality is important in that it circumscribes the individual and cements the society. These are the priorities in distinction from how it could stimulate individual growth and press for social change.


Durkheim then does have outlines of an ideal of a person which can be derived from his discussion of the moral life, (including his treatment of education and autonomy) which derives from the ideal of mechanical solidarity. However, it appears that this discussion of morality derives largely from his treatment of needs. And to the extent that it does it is difficult for it to encompass the idea of human possibility.

If morality is defined by the human and societal needs of solidarity and regularity, etc., it is limited to those needs (as well as the conditions which

develop the needs) which have already been manifested. Hence, that which men tend towards, in terms of objects in a specific society, which is the partial determination of a need for Durkheim, appear endless. Constructed from this are the derivative needs necessitating order, control, and security. Because the moral order basically reflects only these tendencies the perspective which assesses society in terms of the moral order becomes extremely limited in scope. After all needs are social and historical to a considerable extent for Durkheim and this means they can only express tendencies within society as opposed to the full range of human potentialities.

Even if one views Durkheim's treatment of egoistic desires as innate tendencies (or as initially this) the narrowness of the moral order as a standard for appraising societal arrangements still holds. For one still is working from manifested drives or needs, as opposed to standards of development not fully or necessarily manifested in felt needs.

Below is the construction of Durkheim's morality as a set of relationships. It expresses the closed circle which excludes a futuristic model of individual development.



If society develops or prods the desires for multiple acquisitions, of what value is it to assess the individual in terms of the need to curb the desires? Besides Durkheim's illicit shifting from society to individual (which has been discussed in relation to the place of egoism in Durkheim's thought) the internal structure of the question leads to a closed circle. Durkheim's conception of "needing" man is at the foundation of the moral order and, therefore, defines it. The moral order becomes the activity of the resolution of needs; for security, order, and control.

Within Durkheim's framework the moral order does not deal with what men could be outside of the ordered, stable, relation. This is not, however, to say the moral order cannot be employed in a critical sense. After all, it is against the moral order as ideal<sup>78</sup> that anomie is posed as a problem. But involved in anomie as in the moral order, is the theory about man; that his needs are bottomless, and therefore controls are necessary, and valued as "good." This again shows on what level the critical eye is to operate. Both anomie and the

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<sup>78</sup>The ideal society for Durkheim is the society bound by mechanical, as opposed to organic solidarity. His Division of Labor deals with the problem of the changing nature of order in that he wishes to organize society so that it will approach his lost ideal. This position elaborates further my contention that Durkheim's sense of ideal is limited to that which has already been established. After all, mechanical solidarity is a historical phenomena. Durkheim's sense of ideal, therefore, clearly is not utopian in meaning. "But we shall attain this ideal only after observing reality, and separating it from the ideal. But is it possible to proceed otherwise? Even the most excessive idealists cannot proceed in any other fashion; for the ideal rests on nothing if it does not keep its roots in reality." See Emile Durkheim, op. cit., The Division of Labor in Society, (p. 34).

moral order are too closely tied to the discussion of needs. Barrington Moore calls Durkheim a critical conservative, his historical perspective alone saving him from a complete acceptance of whatever is.<sup>79</sup>

In all of the discussion so far the terms man and individual have been used interchangeably. This is because Durkheim has been speaking of men. Women are excluded from his discussions of needs and the related theory of anomie.

### The Sexes and the Moral Order

The process of the development of the moral order has historical origins for Durkheim. He used the history of the conjugal society to show the moral effect of the division of labor between man and woman. By this method he attempts to show how the division along sex lines provides solidarity for the society. One has first to understand the way persons need one another in Durkheim, which differs significantly from Marx. In both theories the "other" person is crucial; but in different ways for different ends.

Precisely because man and woman are different, they seek each other passionately . . . only those differences which require each other for their mutual function can have this quality. In short man and woman isolated from each other are only different parts of the same concrete universal which they reform when they unite. In other words the sexual division of labour is the source of conjugal solidarity, and that is why psychologists have very justly seen in the separation of the sexes an event of tremendous importance in the evolution of emotions.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>79</sup>Barrington Moore, Jr., Political Power and Social Theory, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1958), p. 134.

<sup>80</sup>Op. cit., Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, p. 56.



In discussing the differentiation between man and woman, Durkheim states that historically there are fewer differences anatomically and, therefore, fewer resulting differences in the division of labor. For example, he speaks of the greater differentiation in brain sizes that has developed over time, believing that man's brain size has enlarged to a greater degree than woman's.

Historically, the slighter differentiation between the sexes posed a problem for Durkheim. "The state of marriage in societies where the two sexes are only weakly differentiated, thus evinces conjugal solidarity which is itself very weak."<sup>81</sup> Through history, as differences become more stark, the solidary relationship increases.

The union of two people has ceased to be ephemeral; it is no longer an external contact, temporary and partial, but an intimate association lasting, often even indissoluble during the whole lifetime of the two parties.<sup>82</sup>

It is interesting to note here the shift from Durkheim's earlier position that historically, mechanical solidarity (which is the model that he works from) was an outgrowth of homogeneous and like characteristics within society. In order for Durkheim to construct moral relations between men and women he must find a new source of solidarity, and this is so because of the differences he declares exists between them. Therefore, he shifts on the question of women, and discusses the lack of differentiation (historically) as problematic. Men and women were less capable of solidary relations when sexual differentiation was not as

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<sup>81</sup>Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid.

significant. Durkheim specifically speaks of brain sizes here. He acknowledges with discomfort that women are moving into literary and artistic fields. However, he holds that "even in this sphere of action, woman carries out her own nature and her role is very specialized, very different from that of man."<sup>83</sup>

For Durkheim there are significant differences between men and women both in their existing orientations and their potential, for example, to experience anomie. Women are seen largely in terms of their affective capabilities while men are viewed more in terms of their intellectual capacities. Both, however, as they are conceived by Durkheim are partial people. The relationship between man and woman is solid because of this very incompleteness. Their differentiation creates their dependency on the other. The paradigm case for Durkheim of the moral life is the case of partial people, incomplete beings, finding their completion outside of themselves. Instead of interdependence between complete persons the relationship becomes one of dependence through deficiency. "It suggests two beings mutually dependent because they are each incomplete, and translates this mutual dependence outwardly."<sup>84</sup> The question of whether two complete persons would still "need" each other is never dealt with or even questioned.

This division of labor is moral for Durkheim because the needs of order, harmony and social solidarity are moral. This sexual division of labor, and Durkheim extends this analysis to the social division of labor, is important because

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid., p. 60.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., p. 61.

through it one individual is linked to another. "Only those differences which require each other for their mutual fruition can have this quality."<sup>85</sup>

Morality flows from partial persons fulfilling each other through ties of mutual dependence.

Durkheim views marriage as an important institution for the maintenance of the moral order. Its importance derives from the regulating effects it has on man. However, it does not operate in the identical manner for women.

For women are regulated and controlled by "nature." It is the man who necessitates marriage by "needing" restraints placed upon his desires.

Marriage regulates the life of passion for men.

This is the function of marriage. It completely regulates the life of passion, and monogamous marriage more strictly than any other. For by forcing a man to attach himself forever to the same woman it assigns a strictly definite object to the need for love, and closes the horizons.<sup>86</sup>

Durkheim does not conceive of women as passionate, although one expects her to be conceived as such, as a result of her definition as an "affective" being.

Speaking generally, we now have the cause of that antagonism of the sexes which prevents marriage favoring them equally: their interests are contrary, one needs restraint and the other liberty.<sup>87</sup>

The woman has less need of marriage because she is constrained internally and does not, therefore, need the external controls of marriage.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., p. 56

<sup>86</sup>Op. cit., Durkheim, Suicide, p. 270.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 274.

It is supposed to have been originated for the wife to protect her weakness against masculine caprice. Monogamy, especially, is often represented as a sacrifice made by man of his polygamous instincts, to raise and improve woman's condition in marriage. Actually, whatever historical causes may have made him accept this restriction, he benefits more by it. The liberty he thus renounces could only be a source of torment to him.<sup>88</sup>

Durkheim's discussion of women accepts stark differences between men and women and he understands the characteristics of women to be "inherent" in her "nature." He states in the Division of Labor, that women live significantly different existences from man. "Woman carries out her own nature, and her role is very specialized, very different from that of man."<sup>89</sup> The differences in the lives they live have left women largely separate from the movement of civilization.<sup>90</sup> He concludes that women are much less involved in collective life than men.

Today among cultivated people the woman leads a completely different existence from that of the man. One might say that the two great functions of the psychic life are thus disassociated, that one of the sexes takes care of the affective functions and the other of intellectual functions.<sup>91</sup>

The above is a description of the way Durkheim views women as operating

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<sup>88</sup>Ibid., pp. 275-276.

<sup>89</sup>Op. cit., Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, p. 60.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p. 247.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., p. 60.

within society. Such an account does no more than describe existing situations. It reflects the biases of the social system.

Any evaluation of what ought to be woman's position in society should involve one in much more than mere description. However, Durkheim does not distinguish between description (as explanation) and justification when dealing with the question of women. He explains woman's condition at the same time he justifies it because woman's position and the role she plays is the inevitable conclusion of her initial design and biological nature for him. The inequities and differences in life style which he describes as the woman's fulfillment of her "nature" are used to collapse explanation and justification. Durkheim considers the present arrangements to be natural and therefore justified.

Although Durkheim accepted the societal perspective and studied anomie as a social phenomena in terms of his general theory he believes women are by "nature" inherently constrained and ordered and, therefore, incapable of endless desires. Women are excluded from the theory of anomie and its inclusive statement of needs. The reason I do not say that women are free from, and above anomie instead of incapable of it is because Durkheim's initial view of women is that she is abysmally simple minded. He has no higher ideals for her development due to the fact that she is free of anomie. Her simplicity, which spares her endless cravings, "spares" her also from a deliberative life.

Again we see, although in much more flagrant form the tension in Durkheim's thought. This time it is the denial of a sociological perspective. It is ironic



that a sociologist should deal with men's needs at least partially as a condition of their social and economic surroundings, see that women by their social sexual role are largely subject to quite different social and economic conditions, and then conclude that the observed differences between men and women are due to some inherent difference in the underlying permanent nature of women. By his own description of women's lack of collective living she could not be open to the same degree of socialization as men, in terms of needs and desires. Such an explanation would be thought to logically flow from his own perspective. Rather than viewing woman as ordered by social pressures from childhood on to find a mate and marry, he chooses to view her condition as pre-social, necessary to her essential make-up, a natural phenomena.

Nisbet has written of Durkheim that as a sociologist he rejected biologism.

He was negative toward analytical individualism, toward the idea of progress, and toward biologism, which means the tendency to reduce social phenomena to biological phenomena, to explain social events in terms of individual, biologically founded motivation. <sup>92</sup>

But clearly Durkheim reduces the explanation of women in society to biological phenomena.

When one takes account of the strain in Durkheim's social theory which emphasizes egoism as an inherent tendency, it is clear that Durkheim still does not resign himself to egoistic behavior. For Durkheim, the egoistic tendencies of men, biologically rooted, are to be corrected and constrained by socialization processes. But for women, the causal stream flows in another direction: A

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<sup>92</sup> Joachim Israel, op. cit., p. 134.

woman's biology spares her anomie, but that very biology impedes her capacity for development and individuality.

Women's sexual needs have less of a mental character because, generally speaking, her mental life is less developed. These needs are more closely related to the needs of the organism, following rather than leading them, and consequently find in them an efficient restraint. Being a more instinctive creature than man, woman has only to follow her instincts to find calmness and peace.<sup>93</sup>

The difference between men and women is this: Men are too complex and, therefore, need constraint and rules. Women are so placid that they are inherently constrained. Durkheim has different theoretical methods for creating peace and security for men and women. The starting points are quite different although the end results appear to be somewhat similar. Women by "nature" are ordered, while men are ordered by society, through marriage and the division of labor.

In discussing women in relation to the incidence of suicide Durkheim states:

. . . her sensibility is rudimentary rather than highly developed. As she lives outside of community existence more than man, she is less penetrated by it; society is less necessary to her because she is less impregnated with sociability. She has few needs in this direction and satisfies them easily with a few devotional practices and some animals to care for, the old unmarried woman's life is full. If she remains faithfully attached to religious traditions and thus finds ready protection against suicide, it is because these very simple social forms satisfy all her needs.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>93</sup>Op. cit., Durkheim, Suicide, p. 272, [The emphasis is my own].

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., p. 215, [The emphasis is my own].

As for man, because he is viewed as more complex and involved, to the degree he is a social animal, "he can maintain his equilibrium only by finding more points of support outside himself."<sup>95</sup> The moral order is established via marriage and the division of labor (i.e., sexual and work) on the one hand and by the natural serenity of women on the other hand.

From the above discussion one can conclude that Durkheim excludes women from his social theory. 1) The conception of women's needs as "naturally" limited excludes them from Durkheim's larger theoretical schema of endless and manipulable desires. 2) His theory of anomie is rooted in a view of man differentiated from the placid woman. 3) The view of a natural woman is in clear contradiction with his earlier commitments, although fluctuating, to a social and flexible individual.

However, the ultimate organization of the moral order requires the sexual division of labor. Women is, therefore, necessary to the solidary relationship formed through this division, and through marriage. Hence, woman remains a part of the arrangements necessary to the moral life. Women are otherwise excluded from Durkheim's theoretical formulations. She herself is not theoretically constructed as an active force within the moral life. Her importance is in its creation and its sustenance.

Men and women both are in the end assessed in terms of their relation to the moral order. If man, or woman is to be seen in terms of their potential for growth or creativity or human excellence, one will have to move outside of the

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<sup>95</sup>Ibid., p. 216.

framework Durkheim has constructed. The priorities are not organized as such within his moral order.

## CHAPTER II

## KARL MARX: HUMAN POTENTIALITY IN THE THEORY OF ALIENATION

The various shaping of material life is of course in every case dependent on the needs which are already developed, and both the production and the satisfaction of these needs is an historical process.

-Karl Marx

From the character of this relationship follows how much man as a species being, as man, has come to be himself and to comprehend himself; the relation of man to woman is the most natural relation of human being to human being.

-Karl Marx

Having examined the pivotal position Durkheim's discussion of need plays within the theory of anomie and the conception of the moral order I now want to move to an analysis of Marx's competing ideology about "Mensch"<sup>1</sup> and society. In Durkheim an unresolved tension was uncovered between his treatment of universal needs, as tendencies in man, and their particularistic definition

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<sup>1</sup>For the purposes of this discussion the German word "Mensch" will be used for Marx's use of the word "man." "Mensch" in its generic sense means human being, either man or woman, although it does have a masculine gender. Marx's ideas apply to both men and women in terms of his formulation of them and therefore should be discussed whenever possible by a language which expresses this concern. However, when the ideas which I am trying to express become confusing as I try to write equally of men and women I revert back to male dominated language. Hopefully, at least the root ideas may then be communicated. Therefore, with the exception of the use of "Mensch" the structure of the male dominated language remains the same.



as molded in and through society. As a result the moral order primarily becomes the resolution of the needs for security, order and the controlled life.

Marx, however, is crucial to our analysis in that his treatment of the individual is clearly a result of a social and historical perspective. This involves Marx in a descriptive analysis of the individual (also through a theory of needs) as social, cultural and historical. He, however, does not limit his appraisal of human development to the "needs" generated by existing society. But even Marx's discussion of needs goes beyond the limited description of "Mensch" in society. Through his model of species being he is able to express a differentiation in the quality of needs. He is able to speak of real as opposed to manipulated need; crude as opposed to human, need. The conception of species being not only allows critical analysis, as we shall see, but it poses a model of human possibility which I will discuss as human development.

It is important to note though that although species being functions theoretically as an ideal, in some sense expressing human potentiality, and therefore is not limited to social and historical phenomena, it is through social and historical processes that species being develops to fruition. When I pose the concern with potentiality as distinct from a social and historical perspective this is not to deny the fact that human potential, for Marx, develops in and through social and historical settings. Marx is not tied to and limited by existing and pre-existing arrangements. Hence, societal arrangements and history do not set up the outer limits for his theoretical framework.

It is this dynamic relationship which Marx poses that I want to explore:

1) "Mensch" as a "needing" animal; as a product of society and history, and

2) "Mensch" as a species being as a universal possibility resulting from societal and historical change, expressing the potential capacities of human development. This analytic distinction is not meant to dichotomize Marx's thought, since the species being is not totally devoid of needs. More broadly speaking, Marx's theoretical framework integrates descriptive analysis and normative appraisals. For example, as will be shown, alienation is descriptive of a series of relationships within the capitalist system, indicative of society and history. But involved in the very description of alienation is the appraisal that one is alienated from his species being, which is not indicated by the society itself, but by Marx's conceptual framework.

"Mensch" as a needing animal is primarily limited to the view of how the individual actually functions in the labor process, as a product of social and historical forces. The individual becomes separated from his productive capacities and other fellow human beings, and is described as such. "Mensch" as a species animal reflects the theoretical conceptions of human possibility; the contrast model to alienating society.

The question I want to explore here is if Marx's treatment of needs is relative to society and, therefore, plastic, how does Marx derive his radically critical stance? The answer is uncovered in the examination of the relationship between the concept of species being and the theory of alienation. As will be shown, in order that the condition of alienation be described as such Marx must first pose the condition of non-alienation (species life).

I will elaborate upon the dimension of human possibility in Marx through treating species being in terms of its specific import for deriving a model of a person. There are only fragments of such an ideal because Marx himself spoke seldomly on an individual level. His model was species life.

### Theoretical Foundations of Alienation

One cannot begin to understand the theory of alienation without an underlying understanding of Marx's social and historical view of "Mensch." These positions are at the base of his theory and one's feelings about them as initial assumptions reflect upon the acceptance or rejection of the theory of alienation. "The theory of alienation is based on a certain theory of man; therefore the interpretations of the origin of alienation and of the way to overcome it depend upon the theory of man from which they start."<sup>2</sup> The theory of "Mensch" laying the foundation of Marx's view of alienation is that the human being is social, historical and laboring. "Mensch," society and history receive their dynamic dimensions through Marx's theory of labor. The conceptual web which Marx forms, as well as the interconnections which develop through "activity" between the social, historical and laboring dimensions of "Mensch" makes it difficult to analyze these elements separately.

Viewing the human being as an historical animal involves the idea of

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<sup>2</sup>Ivan Svitak, Man and His World -- A Marxian View, (New York: Delta, 1968), p. 123.

"Mensch" as laborer because Marx saw "history as man's action and labor."<sup>3</sup>

The individual labors in order to meet his needs and, hence, it is through labor that he molds his "nature" to fulfill his needs. "Man's needs are historical and the pursuit of their satisfaction is historical development."<sup>4</sup>

The process of labor is social as well as historical. One individual by himself cannot meet his needs, especially since one of the most important needs is for other human beings. "Mensch" must cooperate with others to meet his physical needs.<sup>5</sup>

"Mensch" as laborer is the individual working in relation to others. Therefore, labor is social activity and the laborer is social while he works with others. In working socially "Mensch" controls nature by meeting and developing new needs. It is in this sense that the laboring "Mensch" is historical as well as social.

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<sup>3</sup>Loyd Easton and Kurt Guddat, eds., Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 27.

<sup>4</sup>Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 73.

+ <sup>5</sup>Marx's discussion of the "need for others" is differentiated from his other treatments of need in that he appears to lend it a universal quality. There are two meanings of the phrase "need for others" in Marx. As we shall see later it derives from the model of species being and in this sense reflects human potentiality and at the same time it reflects itself as a necessity for survival.

History involves the changing means of production<sup>6</sup> organized around the meeting of needs and the development of new needs. The human being's history differs from that of animals because through one's labor one can alter one's own "nature" (as needs).

History is not only the story of the satisfaction of human needs but also the story of their emergence and development.

Whereas animal needs are constant and determined by nature, man's needs are social and historical, i.e., determined in the last resort by man himself.<sup>7</sup>

Marx saw historical progress in the emancipation and growing control of "Mensch" from and over nature.<sup>8</sup> At the same time, however, Marx's philosophy of history has been said to be his theory of alienation. Marx's theory of history understands the individual to master nature through labor and at the same time the individual is mastered by external forces.

When Marx speaks of the human nature of "Mensch" he is speaking of "Mensch" in society and as a part of history. It does not signify inherent tendencies within the individual, devoid of social impact.

Marx was opposed to two positions: the unhistorical one that the nature of man is a substance present from the very beginning of history, and the relativistic position that man's nature has no inherent quality whatsoever and is nothing but the reflex of social conditions.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>Alasdair MacIntyre, Marxism and Christianity, (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), p. 62.

<sup>7</sup>Op. cit., Shlomo Avineri, p. 79.

<sup>8</sup>Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, ed., E. J. Hobsbawn, (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 13.

<sup>9</sup>Adam Schaff, Marxism and the Human Individual, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970), p. 88.



Marx's view of the human being as a social individual constructs the individual as developing in and with society, as primarily a societal product. Secondly, the phrase "'Mensch' as social" can also be understood to mean that "Mensch" needs other "Menschen." The idea of social in Marx's writing signifies that "Mensch" a) reflects his social environment, as well as b) needs others to survive. But it is also prescriptive in that it reflects c) the need each has of others for species life.<sup>10</sup>

"Mensch" is to be conceived of in relation to society and not in isolation from it.

Society does not consist of individuals; it expresses the sum of connections and relationships in which individuals find themselves. . . . Man A is not a slave as such. He is a slave within society and because of it.<sup>11</sup>

If the individual is viewed as an integral part of the society in constant relation to the forces within society, it eliminates an "a priori" conception of the essence of "Mensch." Man "A" would not be viewed as a slave because of some individual inadequacy but as a result of established social institutions which allow and justify slavery. Within Marx's perspective one cannot construct in abstraction a view of the individual without the appropriate discussion and placement of the individual in society.

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<sup>10</sup>T. B. Bottomore, ed., Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), p. 62.

<sup>11</sup>Karl Marx, The Grundrisse, ed., David McLellan, (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 76.

It is important, however, to note that the above discussion is not meant to categorize Marx as a mere relativist, although some Marxist scholars characterize him as such. Istvan Meszaros states that Marx:

Denies that man is an essentially egoistic being, for he does not accept such a thing as a fixed human nature (or, indeed, a fixed anything). In Marx's view man is by nature neither egoistic nor altruistic. He is made, by his own activity, into what he is at any given time.<sup>12</sup>

The above is incomplete in that Marx does adopt a "fixed" standard, a standard to discriminate between true and false consciousness and between the alienated and fulfilled life. To the extent that Marx indicts existing arrangements he cannot be a pure relativist.

Let us now examine the actual problem of alienation so that we can come more clearly to see how the model of human development, expressed through the idea of species being, operates in Marx's thought. It is the theory of alienation which expresses the interrelationship between "Mensch" as a historical being and "Mensch" as potentiality.

### The Problem of Alienation

Alienation, then, is a social condition rooted in a series of relationships which are ultimately assessed in terms of their relation to creative labor and species life. It will eventually be shown that it is through creative labor that species consciousness is realized.

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Istvan Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation, (London: Merlin Press, 1970), p. 148.

Before exploring the idea of species life, it is useful to have a broad understanding of the problem itself. Alienation for Marx resides "in the concrete relationship between man and his products."<sup>13</sup> However, it is important to see that Marx's discussion of alienation is not limited to the worker, or the proletariat as a class. Although his treatment of alienation is rooted in the worker's relation to his product, to the process of production, to other "Menschen," and to his species being, these relations as well become relations of private property, commodity production, and wage labor. These relations of private property and commodity production involve more than the worker. The capitalist is also directly involved.

First it has to be noted that everything which appears in the worker as an activity of alienation, of estrangement, appears in the non-worker as a state of alienation, of estrangement.<sup>14</sup>

The discussion of alienation as presented by Istvan Meszaros is helpful in explaining that both worker and employer are involved in the relations of alienation. He has interpreted the theory of alienation as a condition arising from a set of second order mediations. The second order mediations are private property,

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<sup>13</sup>Op. cit., Avineri, p. 98.


<sup>14</sup>Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, ed., D. Struik, (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 119. According to Avineri, op. cit., the proletariat for Marx represents the paradigm case of the human condition within capitalist society. George Lukacs in his History and Class Consciousness, (London: Merlin Press, 1968), also states that the proletariat's alienation is different in kind but that all human beings are alienated in modern society. The worker's alienation is only more stark because there is no facade of mental labor or responsibility. The difference is that the worker is faced with the alien commodity, while the capitalist is not.

the division of labor and exchange. These clearly affect both employer and worker; they relate to private property through exchange.

Man's productive activity cannot bring him fulfillment because the institutionalized second order mediations interpose themselves between man and his activity, between man and nature and between man and man.<sup>15</sup>

In other words, "Mensch" is forced to relate to "Mensch" through exchange, rather than labor, or through private property rather than nature. These mediations "interpose themselves between man and his activity and prevent him from finding fulfillment in his labor, in the exercise of his productive (creative) abilities, and in the human appropriation of the products of his activity."<sup>16</sup> The theory of alienation extends from the division of labor and the relationships created between "Mensch" in labor to his products to other "Menschen" and his species being through to the second order of phenomena resulting from these relationships. These second order relations or mediations, build on private property and exchange.

The non-mediated, or non-alienated form of human relationship is when "Mensch" is in a reciprocating triad with his labor and the forces of "nature," as demonstrated below.





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<sup>15</sup>Op. cit., Meszaros, p. 83.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 78.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 104.

In the alienated form, the triad of "Mensch" controlling nature through one's labor is replaced by the relations of "Mensch," property and labor, which end in an antagonistic relationship between property and labor.



M-Mensch  
 P-Private Property and its owner  
 L-Wage Labor and worker  
 AN-Alienated Nature  
 AI-Alienated Industry

18

In The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx discusses at length the alienation of "Mensch" from his product and the process of production and the consequences of this estrangement as the alienation of "Mensch" from other "Menschen" and from his species being. More specifically, alienation is seen in:

1) The relation of the worker to the product of labor as an alien object exercising power over him. This relation is at the same time the relation to the sensuous external world, to the objects of nature, as an alien world economically opposed to him.<sup>19</sup>

2) The relation of labor to the art of production within the labor process. This relation is the relation of the worker to his own activity as an alien activity not belonging to him. . . .<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 108.

<sup>19</sup> Op. cit., Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 111.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.



The result of the above relations turns:

3) Man's species being, both nature and his spiritual species property, into a being alien to him, into a means to his individual existence. It estranges from man his own body, as well as external nature and his spiritual essence, his human being.<sup>21</sup>

And these relations culminate with the following consequence.

4) An immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labor, from his life activity, from his species being, is the estrangement of man from man. When man confronts himself, he confronts the other man.<sup>22</sup>

In terms of the problem of alienation the estrangement from one's product of labor becomes intertwined with the separation from the labor process, the art of production itself.

1) This aspect of alienation reflects the laborer's side of commodity production. The worker's life exists outside of him. He confronts his labor as a stranger.

The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labor becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him independently as something alien to him and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him.<sup>23</sup>

The more one produces, the more the world becomes filled with alien objects.

Instead of a worker with control over his productive capacities he becomes an

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 114.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 108.

"objectless" being. In present society ". . . the creations of objects (objectification, i.e., production) instead of helping man to realize himself causes alienation . . ." <sup>24</sup> The division of capitalist and worker creates the conditions under which "Mensch" is not free to produce without making himself a slave.

. . . the worker sinks to the level of a commodity and becomes indeed the most wretched of commodities; that the wretchedness of the workers is in inverse proportion to the power and magnitude of his production; that the necessary result of competition is the accumulation of capital in a few hands, and thus the restoration of monopoly in a more terrible form . . . ending in society as two classes -- the property owners and the propertyless workers. <sup>25</sup>

As the worker's work activity is mechanized his labor power also is translated into a commodity <sup>26</sup> because it becomes purchasable and salable and, therefore, a pure element of exchange. <sup>27</sup> Labor, as a commodity, becomes a clear expression of alienation. "Labor power, therefore, is a commodity, neither more nor less than sugar. The former is measured by the clock, the latter by the scale." <sup>28</sup>

In Capital Marx speaks of the conversion of products into commodities and therefore the resulting conversion of men into producers of commodities.

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<sup>24</sup>Op. cit., Avineri, p. 102.

<sup>25</sup>Op. cit., Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 106.

<sup>26</sup>Marx defines a commodity as an object outside the individual, as a thing which satisfies human wants of some sort or another, in Capital, I, (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 35.

<sup>27</sup>Op. cit., Marx, Grundrisse, p. 59.

<sup>28</sup>Karl Marx, "Wage Labour and Capital" in Marx-Engels Selected Works, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), p. 79.

Relations become commodity relations as opposed to human relations. The exchange of products replaces the social interchange among persons.<sup>29</sup> The fact that capitalism produces commodities is not what distinguishes it from other modes of production, "but rather the fact that being a commodity is the dominant and determining characteristic of its products,"<sup>30</sup> is its distinctive characteristic.

The products are no longer controlled by the worker, or recognized by him as his. It is the separateness of the products, as opposed to the integral relation of worker and product, which defines the worker's existence.

2) The second element in Marx's discussion of alienation involves the act of production, or the process of production. It involves the producing activity itself. In terms of the actual activity of production it becomes difficult not to treat the relationship between "Mensch" and his labor and the process of production as integral to one another. It would be difficult to assess alienation as rooted in the relation of worker to product without including the process involved in the creation of the product. "The product is after all but the summary of the activity of production. If then the product of labor is alienation, production itself must be active alienation, the alienation of activity, the activity of alienation."<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Op. cit., Marx, Capital, I, p. 72.

<sup>30</sup> Karl Marx, Capital, III, (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 879.

<sup>31</sup> Op. cit., Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, p. 110.

The process of production is external to the worker in much the same way that the product is external. The work process confronts the worker as pre-established and autonomous. The worker then finds the work process "already pre-existing and self-sufficient, it functions independently of him and he has to conform to its laws whether he likes it or not."<sup>32</sup>

3) and 4) The effects of the above conditions result in the alienation of "Mensch" from his species being<sup>33</sup> and therefore "Mensch" is separated from "Mensch." The species life, then, must be the unalienated life, and the key to understanding alienation is to grasp the ideal of species life to which it refers.<sup>34</sup>

Species being involves the consciousness of oneself and one's species relations. In other terms species being could be expressed as a collective self-

<sup>32</sup>Op. cit., Lukacs, p. 89.

<sup>33</sup>Marx's use of species being can be traced back to Ludwig Feuerbach. For Feuerbach the individual is incomplete without others. He spoke in The Essence of Christianity, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957), of species being in terms of the consciousness of oneself as a member of the species. "Consciousness in the strictest sense is present only in a being to whom his species, his essential nature, is an object of thought. The brute is indeed conscious of himself as an individual--and he has accordingly the feeling of self as common centre of successive sensations--but not as a species . . ." (p.1.)

<sup>34</sup>Adam Schaff sees species being as used in the four following ways within Marx's thought: 1) Species being meaning social being, 2) as a being constituting a specimen of the species, 3) as a being engaged in a conscious life activity, and 4) as a being which corresponds to the model of man. See Adam Schaff, Marxism and the Human Individual, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970), p. 82. I do not think that these are four separate or distinct meanings of species being. They all are involved in the concept, but in an interrelated fashion. Consciousness and social living are integrally related for Marx. His model of "Mensch" as species being is related and combined with (1), (2), and (3).

consciousness. This necessitates being aware that others share qualities with you, and that these qualities cannot be shared by humans and animals but only among human beings. "Mensch" experiences things completely his own which he does not share with animal life. "Mensch" is a species being (Gattungswesen) because "Mensch" is:

distinguished from animals not by "consciousness" as such, but by a particular kind of consciousness. Man is not only conscious of himself as an individual; he is also conscious of himself as a member of the human species, and so he apprehends a "human essence" which is the same in himself and in other men.<sup>35</sup>

Consciousness of one's species being involves awareness of oneself in relation to others. A species being then is ". . . a being whose essence does not coincide directly with its individuality."<sup>36</sup> In the German Ideology Marx states that "the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each separate individual. In its reality it is the ensemble (aggregate) of social relations."<sup>37</sup> "Mensch" is, hence, the totality of his social connections and this involves not only the involvement with others, but the consciousness of these connections. For Marx this would be the consciousness of one's species ties. Consciousness becomes an integral part of the interaction between persons because ". . . man's relation to himself only becomes for him objective and actual through his relation to other men."<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>35</sup>Op. cit., Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in Bottomore, p. 13. [The emphasis is my own.]

<sup>36</sup>Op. cit., Meszaros, p. 81.

<sup>37</sup>Karl Marx, German Ideology, (New York: International Publishers, 1947), p. 198.

<sup>38</sup>Op. cit., Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 116.



Consciousness distinguishes "Mensch" from animals and therefore "Mensch" "apprehends a human essence which is the same in himself and in other men."<sup>39</sup> The self-consciousness of the individual can be transformed into the self-consciousness of "nature" within him, and this develops into awareness of his species being.<sup>40</sup>

But man knows himself, he is conscious of himself. Whereas in other beings, the natural instincts and energies manifest themselves in isolation and unconsciously, they are united in man, he is aware of them . . .<sup>41</sup>

A difficulty with the discussion of species consciousness in Marx is his use of it to distinguish "Mensch" from animal. This is seen in a previous quotation when he states that consciousness in and of itself does not distinguish "Mensch" from "animal," but it is species consciousness which does so. In some "ideal" sense this distinction is valuable. However, in capitalist society where species consciousness is most often replaced by an atomized individualistic consciousness, what distinguishes man from animal? I do not think he means to collapse the distinction between "Mensch" and animal in non-species relationships (i.e., capitalist society) but he does not construct a picture of societal life that is apart from animal life involving conscious life experience, and yet not species consciousness. I would think that consciousness would distinguish human and animal life in all societies and that species consciousness is a possible distinction

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<sup>39</sup>Op. cit., Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in Bottomore, p. 13, footnote 2.

<sup>40</sup>Op. cit., German Ideology, p. 103.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 102.

only within non-alienated societies. The model of species being operates as only a possibility and not as actual human fruition.

Species being is the model of what is possible for "Mensch" in the unalienated society. His creative relation to his products, to his work and to others can develop a species consciousness. This set of relationships mentioned is the actual activity of species life.

Species being expresses what is possible as opposed to what already exists and in this sense expresses an ideal. However, it is no "utopian" ideal in that it can be realized for Marx through revolutionary activity. "Through revolutionary activity one becomes conscious of the collective roots of his Being."<sup>42</sup> Revolutionary activity pushes the possibility of species life to become an actuality. Through history and praxis the "potential" becomes "reality" via the activity of the proletariat.<sup>43</sup>

Species being expresses the universal dimension of "Mensch," while class existence can only express the partial aspect of "Mensch." Species "Mensch" has a unity with himself and with others and, hence, is able to form a community of fellow human beings. The partial existence of class society excludes such possibilities.

The idea that the human being creates objects through his labor, the view of labor as a social process, as well as the notion of labor as conscious activity are all important to the conception of species being.

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<sup>42</sup>James Glass, "Marx, Kafka and Jung: The Appearance of Species Being," Politics and Society, II (Winter, 1972), p. 256.

<sup>43</sup>The posing of species existence against class existence is elaborated on by James Glass, ibid., pp. 256-264.

One of the major distinguishing elements between "Mensch" and animal is the idea of productive, objectifying labor. This is integrally related to his previous discussions of "consciousness." "The object of labor is therefore, the objectification of man's species life . . ." <sup>44</sup> and it is, hence, logical to believe that in tearing away from individuals the object of their production, one tears away from them their species life." <sup>45</sup>

In alienated labor the worker sees himself in isolation from others.

"Mensch" then conceives of the "others" as strangers, rather than part of his species life. Instead of seeing himself in others he only sees the other "Mensch."

Marx extends his discussion of species being and, therefore, the problem of alienation to the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen," in On the Jewish Question. Marx deals here with how he thinks society is organized around a conception of the individual which ignores and perverts the very idea of species being. In his critical examination of the "Rights of Man," he rejects the accepted usage of the specific "rights" of "liberty," "property," "equality" and "security."

"Liberty," as discussed in the declaration views the individual as atomistic and isolated. "Liberty as a right of man is not based on the association of man with man but rather on the separation of man from man." <sup>46</sup> The right of

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<sup>44</sup>Op. cit., Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 114.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

<sup>46</sup>Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in Guddat and Easton, eds., Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 235.

property, Marx also views as a right to self-aggrandizement with the acquisition of possessions as the privileged value. "The right of property is thus the right to enjoy and dispose of one's possessions as one wills, without regard for other men and independently of society."<sup>47</sup> Equality, Marx views as "the equal right to liberty,"<sup>48</sup> which theoretically treats the individual as a "self-sufficient nomad." According to Marx, security guarantees the state of alienation. It protects liberty and property.

In essence, the values underlying the organization of society presuppose an atomistic human being. They become an integral part of the societal condition of alienation.

Thus none of the so-called rights of man goes beyond the egoistic man, the man withdrawn into himself, his private interest and his private choice, and separated from the community, as a member of civil society. Far from viewing man here in his species being, his species life itself--society rather appears to be an external framework for the individual, limiting his original independence.<sup>49</sup>

In order to help sort out the crucial dimensions of alienation, I have designed the construct below. It reveals the pivotal position of species being within the theory of alienation.

Alienation exists when the relationship between \_\_\_\_\_ a \_\_\_\_\_,  
and \_\_\_\_\_ b \_\_\_\_\_, established in \_\_\_\_\_ c \_\_\_\_\_, prevents the  
ability to do, be or have, \_\_\_\_\_ x \_\_\_\_\_.

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<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 236.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 237.

The elements applying to "a" and "b" are divided into two separate groups.

Some of the elements for "a" and "b" apply to "Mensch" in the labor process: the others apply to the relations between an activity and the institutions in society. The elements in "a" and "b" flow respectively from "a" to "b".

1. "Mensch" in the labor process.

<u>"a"</u>	<u>"b"</u>
worker	product (object)
worker	labor (activity)
proletariat	capitalist
worker	worker

2. Relations between activities and institutions.

<u>"a"</u>	<u>"b"</u>
property	use of nature by "Mensch"
wage labor	needs
exchange or consumption	creation of false needs

Elements from group one and two should not be interchanged. Elements for group "c" can be work, political economy and commodity production. Elements for group "x" can be humanly free, creative through labor, social "Mensch." These are all partial statements of the entire notion of species being. "X" in its largest meaning is species life itself.

When one fills out the construct alienation stands as a series of social relationships. For example: Alienation exists when the relationship between wage labor and needs, established in political economy undermines the ability



to be creative through labor. Or: Alienation exists when the relationship between private property and the use of nature by "Mensch," established in political economy, prevents species life. Or: Alienation exists when the relationship between worker and product, established in commodity production, prevents the ability to be a species being.

As this construct shows, species being (as "x") is vital to the theory of alienation in that it poses the necessary contrast model to a series of social relationships already existing. The social and economic conditions alone do not encompass the theory of alienation. Marx's model of human capacity is built into the conceptual web. Alienation has a social and historical aspect and a dimension that stands outside or above particular social arrangements. In other words, alienation is said to exist because a series of relations (social and historical) make un-alienated (species) life impossible. The mere description of a set of relationships does not necessitate the conclusion that alienation exists in any specific instance. A whole set of assumptions about "Mensch" are involved here as is a model about a preferred style of life.

We saw for Durkheim that need statements and the moral order formed a tightly woven circle limiting the ideal of the moral order to the resolution of the needs for security, order and the controlled life. Needs are clearly unable to operate as such for Marx. Marx's treatment of needs is severely differentiated from the ideal of species life. For support of this position let us move to an examination of the analysis of need in Marx.

The Vocabulary of "Needs" in Marx

Alienation, we have seen, is more than a social and historical view of "Mensch" in that species being which is integral to the theory focuses upon human possibility. (This is not to deny that the fruition of species being is through social and historical processes, e.g., revolutionary activity.)

I would like to support further the above claim by showing how Marx's theory of human needs cannot in and by itself express either his concern with human potentiality or his critical stance. This will involve uncovering Marx's own definition of needs as reflective of society in terms of the society's stage of development. And as Marx's treatment of needs is studied it will become evident that he does not bestow the same validity to all the needs he identifies. He terms some needs true, others false; some human, while others are termed crude. And such distinctions cannot be made unless he has an external standard of evaluation. If human needs are thoroughly flexible and completely relative, how could one distinguish a need as true or not on the basis of the felt need itself? One could not. For instance, if Marx assessed needs as merely inclinations toward given objects he would be unable to distinguish among them, on the basis of needs themselves. He, therefore, must have external criteria for evaluation.

Species being is not derived from expressed needs as is its closest parallel in Durkheim's theory--the moral order. In alienated society there may be no need (inclination toward) for creative labor and yet this is a part of the model of species being. This is not however to say that needs (as reflective of society) are not related to the model of species being. For instance, the "need

for others" is at once both a product of social necessity and a part of potential social community necessary to species life.<sup>50</sup> It seems as though Marx is inconsistent in his terminology when he speaks of the necessity of "others" as a need, because he treats this necessity as a universal quality. Needs are at all other times for him reflective of particular societies and historical processes. Although his language may not express it clearly, I think that the "necessity for other beings" can be explained as involving two dimensions: 1) a condition necessary for survival (the gathering of food, shelter, clothing) and, 2) as a partial model of a preferred social form integral to the concept species being. The "needing of others" is used by Marx to express both reality (necessity as actual) and possibility, in terms of an ideal form of human relationship.

Because the idea of species being is not simply derived from manifested needs it is able to operate as a contrast model to existing societal tendencies expressed through individual needs. We shall see that it is through Marx's discussion of needs that he develops a systematic attack on the political economy. From where does the force of such criticism come? Clearly not from the needs themselves which not only reflect but structure society. Let us then examine Marx's appraisal of human needs to see how the model of species being operates to

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In Marx's discussion of Feuerbach in the German Ideology, op. cit., he treats the notion of "being social" as persons needing one another. "Feuerbach's whole deductions with regard to the relation of men to one another goes only so far as to prove that men need and always have needed each other." (p. 33) In the "Theses on Feuerbach," Marx states that "the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations." See, Adam Schaff, A Philosophy of Man, (New York: Delta, 1963), p. 26.

guide the appraisal.

An examination of the usage of need in the German Ideology, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, the Grundrisse, the Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, and Capital, volume 1, will uncover Marx's view of need in relation to 1) its social and historical dimensions in terms of origin, 2) the mode of production, 3) the capitalist's definition of the worker's need, and 4) the idea of a "state need." Durkheim is unable to make distinctions between needs such as expressed in 3) and 4) because of his basic reduction of the moral order to a set of felt human needs. The critical stance which is evident in the following discussion reflects the underlying commitments of Marx to a different form of social and human organization, i.e., species being.

Marx states clearly in Capital, volume 1, that workers have needs which are defined by the level of social advancement of the society. Needs reflect the level of the development of production which involves economic, technological and social advancement. Wants are also reflective of such processes for Marx,<sup>51</sup> and at several key points he uses need and want interchangeably.

The labourer needs time for satisfying his intellectual and social wants, the extent and number of which are conditioned by the general state of social advancement.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Contemporary distinctions between "needs" as a constant, universal, a-social, quality and "want" as a flexible more pliable notion clearly will not apply to Marx. For Marx, both "need" and "want" are flexible phenomena, open to society and history. Although he does seem to use need and want interchangeably at times, and would be amenable to the notion that all needs are wants at some stage; I hesitate to say that he would hold the position that all wants are at some point needs.

<sup>52</sup> Op. cit., Marx, Capital, I, p. 232. [The emphasis is my own.]



Categories most often thought of as physical necessities are also defined and tempered in relation to the stage of historical development. Physical needs appear to be defined culturally.

His natural wants such as food, clothing, fuel and housing vary according to the climatic and other physical conditions of his country. On the other hand, the number and extent of his so-called necessary wants, as also the modes of satisfying them, are themselves the product of historical development and depend therefore to a great extent on the degree of civilization of a country, more particularly on the conditions under which, and consequently on the habits and degree of comfort in which, the class of free labourers has been formed.<sup>53</sup>

Natural and necessary wants (expressing the same phenomena) as reflective of biological necessity (food, clothing, housing) are contingent to a great degree on the historical development of a country. For instance, the less developed a society the fewer nutrients define a balanced diet. The more technologically developed the society the larger the differentiation there is between what is necessary for survival and what is necessary for comfortable living. In the United States three balanced meals are defined as necessary (although this does not mean that all, or most people have this) whereas in Bangladesh water and a bowl of rice are defined as a necessary diet.

Marx also discusses the relationship between needs and the mode of production in the German Ideology. History is then seen as the development of the productive forces, necessary to the process of society.

But life involves before everything else, eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 171.

<sup>54</sup>Op. cit., Marx, German Ideology, p. 16.



Marx further states that the needs that are already established structure the social and historical processes. Needs, once established, begin to define possibilities. They become self-sustaining.

The various shaping of material life is of course in every case dependent on the needs which are already developed, and both the production and the satisfaction of these needs is an historical process.<sup>55</sup>

In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx discusses the idea of "manipulated need," termed as "imaginary appetite"; an example of an imaginary need being the need to possess. He as well distinguishes between "crude need" and "human need." "Crude need," viewed as the inhuman and unnatural, "human need" is shown in its relation to private property. Crude need is the debasement of human need.

Subjectively, this is partly manifested in that the extension of products and needs falls into contriving and ever calculating subservience to inhuman, unnatural and imaginary appetites. Private property does not know how to change crude need into human need.<sup>56</sup>

Marx makes clear that private property and the necessity of capital are givens within the context of the political economy. "But the worker has the misfortune to be a living capital, and therefore a capital with needs--one which loses its interest and hence its livelihood, every moment it is not working."<sup>57</sup> The political economy defines human needs in terms of its own requirements and it therefore

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<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 71.

<sup>56</sup>Op. cit., Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 147. [The emphasis is my own.]

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., p. 120.

counts as much upon the refinement of needs as it does upon their crudeness.

The political economy defines the worker's needs along these narrow lines.

. . . political economy knows the worker only as a working animal--as a beast reduced to the strictest bodily needs.<sup>58</sup>

Crude need prevails and bodily needs are redefined into subsistence needs by the capitalists within the context of the capitalist society. Crude need structures the worker's situation because he is forced to live on a subsistence level. He earns enough to barely have his family eat and he must work long hours to secure even this. According to Marx's analysis, in a society structured by crude need, human beings suffer from fatigue and malnutrition. This is an example on an initial level of the debasement of the human needs for nutritional food, leisure and rest.

The minimum limit of the value of labour power is determined by the value of the commodities, without the daily supply of which the labourer cannot renew his vital energy, consequently by the value of those means of subsistence that are physically indispensable.<sup>59</sup>

The condition of necessity, or subsistence defines need within the political economy.

The value of labour power is determined by the value of the necessities of life habitually required by the average labourer. The quantity of these necessities is known at any given epoch of a given society and can, therefore be treated as a constant magnitude.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 73.

<sup>59</sup> Op. cit., Karl Marx, Capital, I, p. 173.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., p. 519.

Hence, within the political economy there is only one need that is recognized for the worker, and that is that he, or she, be able to work.

The cheat-thief, swindler, beggar and unemployed; the starving, wretched and criminal workingman--these are figures who do not exist for political economy but only for other eyes, those of the doctor, the judge, the grave-digger and bumbailiff, etc.: such figures are specters outside its domain. For it, therefore, the worker's needs are but one need--to maintain him whilst he is working in so far as may be necessary to prevent the race of labourers from dying out.<sup>61</sup>

"Mensch" is seen merely as worker and as a worker he only has crude needs defined by the political economy as a subsistence life.

Marx finds such treatment detrimental to the development of human beings. His conception of "Mensch" as a human being capable of species relations outside the present political economy has him constantly posing "Mensch" as worker within capitalist society against "Mensch" as human being potentially capable of species relations.

Marx continues to examine the relationship between the mode of production and "human wants" in detail in his Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy. Although the discussion employs the language of "want" it is clearly indicated that the discussion extends to "needs" as well.

It is clear that while production furnishes the material object of consumption, consumption provides the ideal object of production, as its image, its want, its impulse, and its purpose. It furnishes the object of production in its subjective form. No wants, no production. But consumption reproduces the want.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>61</sup>Op. cit., Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 121.

<sup>62</sup>Karl Marx, "Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy," in David Horowitz, ed., Marx and Modern Economics, (New York: Modern Reader, 1968), p. 30.

Hence, production is in the position of developing and defining human wants. Although Marx uses the language of wants here, I think this discussion is understood most clearly as an explication of the development of manipulated need, or false need.

According to Marx, as "wants" are further refined by production they necessitate further production. It is this relationship between wants and production which Marx calls "consumptive production."<sup>63</sup> "Production creates the material as the outward object of consumption, consumption creates the want as the inward object, the purpose of production."<sup>64</sup> The mode of production creates new wants (false needs) as it organizes to satisfy old ones. People and products are in a consumer relationship as each is developed with the other in mind. But there is not a one to one relationship here. The priorities are with production; the false needs (manufactured wants) must be created as a necessary force for production, but these needs are most often not met. Capitalist society for Marx develops needs which it can not meet.

As demonstrated in the above, Marx deals with human need in terms of its social and historical origin via relationships with the mode of production and the political economy in general. In quotations taken from The Critique of Political Economy, the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, the German Ideology, and Capital, Marx uses the terms "natural wants," and "human need"

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<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid.

to apply to the concept of need as authentic or "real" need. These authentic needs for Marx include food, housing, clothing, social living. They express only in a partial degree his broader model of species being. He uses "imaginary appetite," "want," and "crude need" to apply to false or manipulated need. These appear to be tied to interests manufactured by the political economy. In his discussion of need one sees that he distinguishes between reality, as manipulated need in political economy and potentiality as "human need" reflective of species being. Clearly, species being functions throughout the discussion of need as that model of social life which would be in tune with "human needs." Without such a model the conceptual distinctions Marx makes between needs could not be drawn.

Although Marx may be somewhat loose in his terminology on the question of needs, he clearly does make a distinction between real and manipulated need. Even within the realm of "real" need Marx accounts for differences in the way it may manifest itself due to societal forces. For example, hunger is seen as a "real," or "natural" need, according to Marx, although there are different kinds of hunger.

Hunger is hunger; but the hunger that is satisfied with cooked meat eaten with fork and knife is a different kind of hunger from the one that devours raw meat with the aid of hands, nails and teeth.<sup>65</sup>

"Needs," in Marx, whether they be related to the worker, the mode of production, or "productive consumption," reflect the social and historical dimension of their origin. Social distinctions are even drawn in relation to the "real" (as authentic) need of hunger. However, several statements by Marx in

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<sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 30.



relation to his treatment of need raise the question as to what degree needs are social and historical and, therefore, manipulable. In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts Marx writes:

This estrangement manifests itself in part in that it produces sophistication of needs and of their means on the one hand, and a bestial barbarization, a complete unrefined, abstract simplicity of need on the other . . . even the need for fresh air ceases for the worker.<sup>66</sup>

. . . it actually reaches the point where it spares man the need of either fresh air or physical exercise.<sup>67</sup>

These statements seem to pose the idea of a totally flexible individual. The view of "Mensch" as completely molded by external forces leaves room for total dehumanization.

It is not only that man has no human needs--even his animal needs cease to exist. The Irishman no longer knows any need now but the need to eat, and indeed only the need to eat potatoes--and scabby potatoes at that, the worst kind of potatoes.<sup>68</sup>

The political economy debases the individual to the point that the worker needs neither enjoyment or activity. "He (the capitalist) changes the worker into an insensible being lacking all needs, just as he changes his activity into a pure abstraction from all activity."<sup>69</sup> In the political economy, "self-renunciation,

<sup>66</sup>Op. cit., Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 148.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 150.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., p. 149

<sup>69</sup>Ibid.

the renunciation of life, and of all human needs, is its principle thesis."<sup>70</sup>

The above treatment by Marx interprets the presence of a need in terms of the consciousness of the need. For example, when the workers are no longer conscious of their needs, the needs themselves disappear. In other words, when the conscious desire ends for fresh air, the need ends. In the above quotations, the consciousness of one's needs appears to be directly tied to their being "felt" and to the possibility of their fulfillment. In essence, then, when the worker eats nothing but potatoes, and learns to expect nothing but potatoes, he no longer needs anything but potatoes. A similar approach applies to Marx's statement on travel. "If I have no money for travel, I have no need--that is no real and self-realizing need--to travel."<sup>71</sup> Because the travel can not be actualized, it is no longer a need.

For Marx, in order for a need to be classed as such there must be a) some level of consciousness in regard to an end, and b) there must be some possibility of fulfilling it. "For Marx 'need' refers to the desire one feels for something, usually something which is not immediately available."<sup>72</sup> It involves a conative state, a desire or tendency toward something.

The above explanation of the use of need in Marx as a totally pliable concept defines "Mensch" as a completely socialized product. The problem arises not

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p. 150.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p. 108.

<sup>72</sup> Bertell Ollman, Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 77.

in the conceptualization of "Mensch" as a social animal, but in terms of the dimensions and impact society levels on "Mensch." Does the classification of "Mensch" as a social animal mean that he is completely plastic, with his needs created by the society which nurtures him? There are statements in Marx which can lead one to interpret his conception of "Mensch" as totally pliable and, therefore, open to severe social manipulation; that the worker becomes passive in the light of social and economic pressures. However, there seems to me to be more of an overriding commitment to the position that "Mensch" is an active force within society. Afterall, he has a constant and underlying commitment to the possibilities of human potential which undergirds his whole criticism of political economy. If "Mensch" were conceived by him as totally plastic where would his commitment to the possibilities of human development stem from? We have seen him move outside the relativist position as he makes distinctions between needs. If "Mensch" and his needs are only what society and history make them the differentiation among needs which Marx speaks of would be impossible to construct.

Although it has not been discussed yet, one familiar with Marx's thought might think that the discussion of false consciousness lends support to the view that "Mensch" is not totally pliable, in that a true consciousness is possible. However, the discussion relating to false consciousness does not prove too helpful when dealing with the question of the manipulability of human need in Marx because Marx's conception of false consciousness relates to the idea of class consciousness. Class consciousness is distinguished from individual

consciousness because it primarily involves being conscious about being a member of a class. It is not consciousness about individual needs; "but it is, on the contrary, the sense, become conscious, of the historical role of the class."<sup>73</sup> However, if "Mensch" were completely manipulable on the question of individual needs how could there ever be the possibility of revolutionary consciousness? Even though this also ~~expresses~~ itself as a class phenomena, "Mensch" still must stand apart from the social and historical manipulating forces of the political economy for revolutionary consciousness ever to appear. This is not to involve us in the substantive issue of the possibility of revolutionary consciousness, but rather to expose the incompatibility within the same theory, of a language of needs as completely open to total manipulation and the idea of revolutionary consciousness.

If it is plausible to say that Marx posits "Mensch" as an active force in social activity and also has a conception of human potential (which operates as an ideal of sorts not limited by social and historical arrangements) then I question the terminology used by Marx in his discussion of need. It would seem more accurate to speak of the "worker's no longer wanting, fresh air although they might really need it." "Workers may no longer want relationships to other "Menschen," but they may still need them. The assessment of need in these two cases is in terms of the model of species being. Needs are assessed in relation to species life; person "a" needs "x" in order to experience species life. Marx's assessments stand outside "need" and in the model of the un-alienated

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<sup>73</sup>Op. cit., Lukacs, p. 73.

society.

### Further Outlines of the Un-Alienated Person

My initial discussion of species being only begins to point toward Marx's model of human development. Now that it is clear that a model of human potentiality does operate within Marx's theory of alienation, which cannot be captured by a language of needs, I want to further explore his notion of human development. His model can be more fully assessed in terms of his treatment of creative labor as it assists species consciousness.

Creative labor in its integral relationship with species being expresses potentialities within human development, while alienated labor and isolation express reality for Marx.

Through the process and objectification of labor one becomes conscious of his "species being." Without the activity of labor species being cannot be actualized. It is the necessity to form social ties for the development of a consciousness about one's life and activity which supplies the standard for criticism of a political economy which alienates "Mensch" from his product and the process of production, and from other "Menschen." As capitalist society perverts social relationships species consciousness is not possible. However, it is the model of species being which is the very idea active in the assessment of the existing condition. Therefore, Marx may say that well developed "rich human beings" have certain needs, deriving from the broader model of species being, whereas the alienated person may not.



The rich human being is simultaneously the human being in need of a totality of human manifestations of life--the man in whom his own realization exists as an inner necessity, as need.<sup>74</sup>

The conception of a person which is reflected through Marx's model of species being and creative (objectifying) labor is one of the 1) social character of the human being, 2) the creative element through the objectification of labor, and 3) the dimension of consciousness, or a conceptual apparatus which distinguishes "Mensch" from animals.

Marx expresses the meaning of species being sometimes through the use of the term "natural," and hence a series of "natural" relationships are postulated which encompass its meaning.

From the character of this relationship follows how much man as a species being, as man, has come to be himself and to comprehend himself; the relation of man to woman is the most natural relation of human being to human being. It therefore reveals the extent to which man's natural behavior has become human, or the extent to which the human essence in him has become a natural essence--the extent to which his human nature has come to be nature to him. In this relationship is revealed too, the extent, to which, therefore, the other person has become for him a need--the extent to which he in his individual existence is at the same time a social being.<sup>75</sup>

This direct, natural, and necessary relation of person to person is the relation of man to woman. In this natural species relationship man's relation to nature is immediately his relation to man, just as his relation to man is immediately his relation to nature--his own natural destination.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>74</sup>Op. cit., Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 144.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., p. 134.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid.

The interesting use of "natural" in relation to species being is noted here because it is also used somewhat differently by Marx. Nature is most often seen as integral to, but at the same time in conflict with, the individual. Marx in the Grundrisse discusses labor, the ultimate in human activity, as the appropriation of nature to human wants. Labor molds nature. Nature is socially mediated and society is mediated through nature.<sup>77</sup>

But "nature" in this context is to be overcome, to be controlled.

Nature is not only an immense material present under all human social conditions of existence in all its modes of appearance, but also a potential, whose extensive or intensive actualization takes place according to the measure of the existing level of the forces of production.<sup>78</sup>

Marx's treatment of "natural" is quite different when he is expressing species relations. Marx has been quoted at length to expose this difference. In the earlier quote Marx states that man and woman are involved in species relations when the "natural" and the human combine; and they combine when the individual acknowledges the need for other persons. In other words, man and woman reflect the species relation because they need one another. They become socially conscious beings. They become necessary to one another. From this discussion of Marx one concludes that he is speaking of natural as meaning necessity. But for Marx, as I have mentioned, the "needing" of others is more than necessity. It is what ought to be.

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<sup>77</sup> Alfred Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, (London: New Left Review, 1971), p. 79.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., p. 162.

On this level "natural" involves for Marx living in relation to and with a consciousness of others. Nature does not mean "the accepted flow of events"; but rather, a preferred style of living.

Necessity derives from the fact that "Mensch" cannot survive without others. Beyond this level of necessity--needing food, shelter and clothing, and the others who make it possible--is the model of social consciousness and social ties. Species beings must incorporate both levels of social existence. In this way the model of species being, which reflects concerns of human potentiality within an alienated society, is itself in structure a combination of the forces of reality and possibility. Species being in its own conceptual structure combines what is and what possibly can be. In this sense also it is no utopian ideal. (Earlier I stated that species being is not a utopian ideal because it can be achieved through revolutionary activity.) Social living and social consciousness are perverted under the conditions of alienation so that social "Mensch" is no longer a reality, and only a possibility.

It is to this extent that species being moves outside the statement of existing needs. Otherwise the problem of consciousness as necessary to the recognition of "need" would enter into the discussions of alienation, and it does not. For example, if species being could be completely explicated by a discussion of need in Marx, alienation would become dependent upon the individual's consciousness of his alienation. But in Marx, as has been shown through the earlier construct, alienation is an objective condition rooted in a series of social relationships, existing regardless of the awareness of the individual, because of the model of human development used.

The idea of potentiality and human development are focused upon in Marx's discussion of "Mensch" as laborer. The very idea of "Mensch" as laborer is crucial to the idea of species being. The individual becomes a social being through labor and differentiates himself from the animal world by conscious creation of objects. This view of labor as creative and purposive is contrasted throughout Marx against alienated labor.

It is within the discussions of "Mensch" as creative laborer that one finds Marx's concerns with human development outlined, though sketchily. According to Marx the objectification of labor is anthropologically necessary. The idea of objectification is that one's labor must be concretized through the creation of "objects." He discusses the uniquely human property of labor throughout his works. In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, he speaks of human labor as the re-affirmation of oneself.

. . . for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he contemplates himself in a world that he has created.<sup>79</sup>

In Capital, volume 1, labor is discussed as conscious creation, which distinguishes human labor from animal labor.

We presuppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it as reality. At the end of every labour process we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>79</sup>Op. cit., Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 114.

<sup>80</sup>Op. cit., Marx, Capital, I, p. 178.

"Mensch" concretizes life in a conscious manner through labor and this is, then, a major source for his creativity.

The animal is one with its life activity. It does not distinguish the aim itself. It is its activity. But man makes his life activity itself an object of his will and consciousness. He has a conscious life activity . . . <sup>81</sup>

"Mensch" is distinguished from animal life by his level of reflection and consciousness involved in the laboring process. The creation of things through labor involves "Mensch" in the act of creation and development. "Labour's realization is its objectification."<sup>82</sup> The objective world becomes friendly through the labor process.

. . . it is only when the objective world becomes everywhere for man in society the world of man's essential powers--that all objects become for him the objectification of himself, become objects which confirm and realize his individuality, become his objects; that is man himself becomes the object.<sup>83</sup>

In the Grundrisse, Marx states that "work is a positive creative, activity."<sup>84</sup> Marx's involvement with the question of productive labor relates to his concern with "man's world shaping capacity,"<sup>85</sup> his labor creating ability. He defines labor in Capital as the ability of "Mensch" to mold and shape nature to human concerns.

<sup>81</sup>Ernst Fischer and Franz Marek, The Essential Marx, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 31.

<sup>82</sup>Op. cit., Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 108.

<sup>83</sup>Robert Freedman, ed., Marxist Social Thought, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), p. 286.

<sup>84</sup>Op. cit., Marx, Grundrisse, p. 126.

<sup>85</sup>Op. cit., Avineri, p. 153.



Labour is in the first place, a process in which both man and nature participate and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material relations between himself and nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature's productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature.<sup>86</sup>

Creative labor involves both mental and physical capacities for the worker. In order to labor one uses his hands, and in order to conceive of the project to be created one must engage in thought.

By labour power or capacity for labour is to be understood the aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing in a human being which he exercises whenever he produces a use-value of any description.<sup>87</sup>

This view of labor as objectifying, in that it involves the laborer in object creating activity which realizes a previous mental conception of the object, is Marx's view of unalienated, creative labor. It is a major source of developing human potential.

It is necessary to note here, however, that Marx uses the term "objectification" in two ways in his writings.<sup>88</sup> One way has just been discussed as the truly human element of creation in labor. Objectification is seen here as the resolution of alienation. The other way it is used by Marx is to mean

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<sup>86</sup>Op. cit., Marx, Capital, I, p. 177.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

<sup>88</sup>Because of the distinction in Marx between objectification as creativity and objectification as alienation, it is important to distinguish between "Lebensausserung" as the manifestation of life and "Lebensentausserung" as the alienation of life. This distinction is noted by Istvan Meszaros, op. cit., p. 91.

alienation itself. Here, objectification is alienation in capitalist society.<sup>89</sup>

Objectification, therefore, which is a necessary characteristic of all labour (involving the transference of labour power to the object which is created by it) becomes in capitalism, identical with alienation.<sup>90</sup>

In On the Jewish Question, Marx also discusses objectification through religion as alienation. In religion one objectifies one's essence through an alien being. In this sense too, objectification can mean alienation.

To disregard the distinction between objectification and alienation in Marx is to lose the entire impact of his concern with labor as creativity. If labor was not important to the development of persons, i.e., the tapping of human capacities, why be concerned about a condition of alienation? Afterall, it is creative labor (as a partial statement) that workers are alienated from. It is also through creative labor that one becomes conscious of one's species being, since unalienated labor requires working with others as well as necessitates a deliberativeness related to the product.

It is in Marx's further discussion of the laborer that one finds fragments related to a model of a person. Such concerns arise as he criticizes prevailing labor conditions. The model of creative labor and species life operate in the assessments he makes, as they do throughout, about alienation.

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<sup>89</sup> Hegel always equated alienation and objectification. They were not distinct processes for him.

<sup>90</sup> Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory; an analysis of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 12.

In Capital Marx speaks of the intellectual needs of the workers and poses these against the society's view of what is intellectually necessary for the laborer.

The labourer needs time for satisfying his intellectual and social wants, the extent and number of which are conditioned by the general state of social advancement.<sup>91</sup>

The problem of the development of intellectual capacities in workers is noted briefly in his "Theses on Feuerbach" in the German Ideology. Here he discusses the division of labor as the division of material and mental labor. He notes the problem of the division of physical and mental activity for the laborer. The division of labor "only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and mental labour appears."<sup>92</sup> The integration, or rather the separation of thought and action derives from the problem of alienated labor.

. . . because the division of labour implies the possibility, nay the fact that intellectual and material activity--enjoyment and labour production and consumption--devolve on different individuals, and that the only possibility of their not coming into contradiction lies in the negation in its turn of the division of labour.<sup>93</sup>

The result according to Marx is that there appears a class of "thinkers" while other laborers are forced to be involved in mindless physical activity. It is not until there is an integration of both thought and activity that the capacities of individuals are truly being tapped.

Hence, the isolation of physical activity from mental involvement results in alienating labor. The "truly" human quality which develops through the

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<sup>91</sup>Op. cit., Marx, Capital, I, p. 232.

<sup>92</sup>Op. cit., Marx, German Ideology, p. 20

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., p. 21.

objectification of labor is that of consciousness, viewed as the development of thought processes. Mindless physical activity does not develop consciousness of one's species being nor is it creative labor in Marx's terms. The possibility of creative labor as well as species life create the theoretical framework which makes it possible to indicate alienating labor for severing human processes.

The theoretical framework of Marx which poses the ideas of human potentiality (through creative labor and species being) extends to both men and women. Marx, unlike Durkheim does not have differential theories about their areas of competence. He never seeks to justify social and economic inequalities between men and women on the basis of biological difference. As we shall see though, Marx does seem to believe that there are significant differences in physical strength between men and women and from this he justifies the division of labor along sex lines.

Although Marx's statement on women is limited in depth his thought is important to us because of his commitment to uncover tensions between species life and alienated forms of social experience. Marx's theoretical framework which poses existing conditions against other possible forms of social organization is valuable for an analysis of women. It is also the model of species life itself which is valuable in constructing a model of human development to contrast with existing life styles of women, as we shall see in the later chapters.

### Species Life and Women

Marx's discussion of women centers largely around the analysis of the "bourgeois" family. He is critical of the bourgeois family in its oppressive

arrangements towards the woman, especially in relation to her economic oppression and familial servitude. Most of his writings dealing with the question of women are directly related to the alienated conditions resulting from marriage within a capitalist society. However, Marx did in his early years write on questions concerning the family in such a way that one is lead to believe that he, in principle, was not opposed to marriage as an institution. This may be why he never questioned the basic division of labor along sex lines, especially within the family.

When Marx wrote his article for the Rheinische Zeitung, "On a Proposed Divorce Law," he was approximately twenty years old. At that time he had not, of course, written his Paris Manuscripts, the Communist Manifesto, or the German Ideology, all of which later contain partial statements on the question of women and the institution of marriage. These later statements on marriage deal with a description and criticism of the practice of "bourgeois" marriage, whereas the earlier statement in the Rheinische Zeitung speaks of marriage as potentially a kind of species relationship.

In his article "On the Divorce Laws" he states in agreement with Hegel that "implicitly and in accordance with its concept, marriage should be indissoluble but only implicitly, that is, only in accordance with its concept."<sup>94</sup> In other words, so long as marriage remains an ethical arrangement it is indissoluble. In accord with the seriousness in which he thought about marriage he finds the Prussian divorce laws too numerous and frivolous.

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<sup>94</sup>Karl Marx, "On a Proposed Divorce Law," in Guddat and Easton, eds., op. cit., p. 140.



It is self-evident of course, that neither the capricious will of the legislator nor the capricious will of a private person, but only the essence of the matter, can decide whether a marriage is dead or not for it is well known that a declaration of death depends on the facts of the case and not on the wishes of the parties concerned. But if in the case of physical death you demand precise and unmistakable proofs, must not a legislator lay down a moral death only after the most incontestable symptoms? <sup>95</sup>

Marx sees the ending of a marriage partnership as the ending of a moral relationship. It involves a serious breach of faith in the social relationship. However, just what Marx means by "incontestable symptoms of moral death" in terms of the marriage relationship is not made clear.

For Marx, divorce is much more than the separation of two people. It is the breaking of commitments not only between the man and woman but within the family, as it affects the children.

They think only of the two individuals and forget the family. They forget that nearly every dissolution of a marriage is the dissolution of a family and that the children and what belongs to them should not be dependent on arbitrary whim even from a purely legal point of view. <sup>96</sup>

This view of marriage as an ethical relationship involving the family provides the contrast model for his later writings in 1844 and 1848. For Marx, the relationship between man and woman as paradigmatic of species relations reflects this sense.

From the character of this relationship follows how much man as a species being, as man, has come to be himself

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<sup>95</sup>Eugene Kamenka, Ethical Foundations of Marxism, (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 33.

<sup>96</sup>Op. cit., Marx, "On a Proposed Divorce Law," in Guddat and Easton, eds., p. 139.

and to comprehend himself; the relation of man to woman is the most natural relation of human being to human being.<sup>97</sup>

The direct and necessary relations between persons is the relationship between man and woman in species life. The idea of obligation and responsibility in human relationships as reflective of species relations never disappears in Marx's writing. It is after all a key part of species living and therefore a part of the model posed against the bourgeois family.

Marx never denounces or restates his views on divorce, and this may be because he thought ethical relationships in marriage were in principle possible outside of alienated society. However, in alienated society where marriage relationships reflect dehumanized relations between "things" as opposed to persons, divorce does not represent the severing of human ethical relationships. It merely means the end of an economic and often, exploitative, arrangement.

Let us now examine Marx's discussion of the bourgeois family. Marx makes clear in the quote below from the Communist Manifesto that the family relation has been reduced to a mere money relation.

The bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrument of production. On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based? On capital, on private gain. . . . The bourgeois clap-trap about the family and education, about hallowed co-relation of parent and child, becomes all the more disgusting the more, by the action of modern industry, all family ties among the proletarians are torn asunder, and then children transformed into simple articles of commerce and instruments of labour.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>97</sup>Op. cit., Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 134.

<sup>98</sup>Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto, (Chicago: Gateway Press, 1954), pp. 48, 49.

The relations of private property become the mode of exchange. The development of these bourgeois priorities transform the social relations in the family, and the family which Marx sees as the only social relationship becomes a subordinate need.<sup>99</sup> The concerns of private property and possession pervade man-woman relations. "The species relations itself, the relation between man and woman, etc., becomes an object of commerce. The woman is bought and sold."<sup>100</sup> The mentality of "having" twists species relationships into those of ownership and domination; and marriage into prostitution.

Finally, this movement of opposing universal private property to private property finds expression in the animal form of opposing to marriage (certainly a form of exclusive private property) the community of women in which a woman becomes a piece of communal and common property . . . Just as woman passes from marriage to general prostitution, so the entire world of wealth (that is, of man's subjective substance) passes from the relationship of exclusive marriage with the owner of private property to a state of universal prostitution with the community.<sup>101</sup>

Because Marx sees the problem of women as arising from their status as mere instruments of production, he thinks that ". . . the abolition of the present system of production must bring with it the abolition of the community of women springing from that system, i.e., of prostitution, both public and private."<sup>102</sup> But this analysis seems inadequate, as does Marx's acceptance of the division of labor between men and women along sexual lines, especially

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<sup>99</sup>Op. cit., Marx, German Ideology, p. 17.

<sup>100</sup>Op. cit., Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in Guddat and Easton, eds., p. 246.

<sup>101</sup>Op. cit., Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 133

<sup>102</sup>Op. cit., Marx, Communist Manifesto, p. 50.

within the family. He never questions the assignment of women's capacities along these lines. Further analysis of these questions will wait until the later chapter dealing specifically with the question of women.

As stated earlier, the specific importance of Marx for the analysis of existing theoretical constructions pertaining to women is not limited to his actual statements on the problem, which are inadequate. Rather, it is his theory of alienation, his model of species being, the conception of labor as creativity, which point toward a model of a person which is valuable in the examination of the relationships between theory and practice, for women as well as for men.

One is not limited to descriptions of existing practices within Marx's framework. The major concern is with assessing present arrangements in terms of the individual's potential for development. The priorities for social change are intermeshed with assessments that alienation prevails. His view of social and historical "Mensch" excludes the treatment of conditions as outgrowths of inevitable tendencies. This analysis will be valuable in the balance of the discussion.

## CHAPTER III

## ON APPRAISING STANDARDS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

It has been argued so far that Durkheim's view of the moral person is largely tied to (and limited by) his theory of human needs, whereas, Marx's model of species being is not. I want to discuss how contemporary behavioral social science literature alters the use of the concept of need and builds its models of development from such need analysis. Representative samples of the contemporary research into the problem of alienation and anomie will be shown to reflect the equation between need fulfillment and human development; or between need statements and an ideal of a person. And this equation will be shown to be faulty.

If needs cannot function in a justificatory manner in relation to a model of persons one is still left with the problem of justifying that model. The Marxian framework of alienation and the model of species being will be chosen here above Durkheim's perspective of anomie and the moral order, as supplying the most valid model of human development. I will deal with the Marxian perspective through an examination of the consequences of both their frameworks as well as provide an explication of a model of persons which can and does derive from the priorities set from Marx's thought.

This chapter will lay the foundations for the next which will demonstrate



how the discussion of "needs" in relation to the question of women in industrial society is an inadequate way of approaching the topic. If the problem of women within society is limited to the discussion of needs it limits a woman's self understanding to the constructions accepted by society at large. To be oriented merely to meeting the felt needs of women is to bind women to the present organization and definition of their lives. To deal with the question of the potentiality of women as persons, one must move to the concerns expressed by Marx in the language of "species being."

### Alienation, Anomie and the Theory of Needs

Most contemporary American social scientists who have seriously considered the theme of alienation and anomie have tended to think in principle at least, that, these competing theories could be clarified and tested through empirical inquiry into human needs.<sup>1</sup> I will discuss these approaches here pointing to their deficiencies, and suggest the beginnings of an approach for dealing with these issues more adequately.

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<sup>1</sup>In the contemporary literature dealing with alienation and anomie there has been a collapsing of the two competing theories. Although I will be examining the treatment of alienation, the same arguments hold for anomie. For other contemporary literature on anomie and alienation see, Wendell Bell, "Anomie, Social Isolation and the Class Structure," Sociometry, 20 (June, 1957), pp. 105-116; R. H. Brookes, "The Anatomy of Anomie," Political Science, 3 (1951), pp. 44-51; John Clark, "Measuring Alienation Within A Social System," American Sociological Review, 24 (December, 1959), pp. 849-852; Dwight Dean, "Alienation: Its Meaning and Measurement," American Sociological Review, 26 (October, 1961), pp. 753-758; Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1955); Harold Laswell, "The Threat to Privacy" in Robert MacIver, ed., Conflict of Loyalties, (New York: Harper & Row, 1952); Simon Marcson, ed., Automation, Alienation and Anomie, (New York: Harper & Row, 1970); Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, (New York: Free Press, 1968); Gwynn Nettler,

The discussions of alienation by Amitai Etzioni, Arnold Kaufman and Erich Fromm,<sup>2</sup> draw heavily upon a theory of needs and, therefore, will be treated as paradigmatic of the social scientist's treatment of alienation. Christian Bay,<sup>3</sup> although he has no explicit theory of alienation does have a clearly stated position on needs which is quite similar to Etzioni's treatment, and, therefore, will be examined here. I will deal with Bay and Etzioni together because they present a more complete picture of the perspective I am examining than when dealt with separately. While Etzioni ties needs to the theory of alienation, Bay more explicitly deals with the meaning of "needs." Although I find the above social scientists deficient in their models of development (via need theory), it is important to distinguish their discussions of alienation from

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"A Measure of Alienation," American Sociological Review, 22 (December, 1957), pp. 670-677; Richard Schacht, Alienation, (New York: Doubleday, 1971); Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," American Sociological Review, 24 (December, 1959), pp. 783-791; Leo Srole, "Anomie, Authoritarianism and Prejudice," American Journal of Sociology, 62 (July, 1956), pp. 63-67.

<sup>2</sup>See, Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Processes, (New York: Free Press, 1968), epilogue, pp. 617-667; Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1955); and Arnold Kaufman, "On Alienation," Inquiry, 8 (Summer, 1955), pp. 141-165.

<sup>3</sup>See, Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudo Politics," in Charles McCoy and John Playford, eds., Apolitical Politics, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1967), and his more recent article "Needs, Wants, and Political Legitimacy," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1 (1968), pp. 241-260. In his article "The Cheerful Science of Dismal Politics," in Theodore Roszak, ed., The Dissenting Academy, (New York: Pantheon, 1968), pp. 208-230, he makes a plea for orienting political theory more closely to human needs.

a merely psychological analysis.<sup>4</sup>

The "psychological" view of alienation does not focus on the triadic relations involved in the classical formulation, which are: a) a given set of social arrangements, b) the lives of individuals and c) a valid ideal of human development. Rather it reduces the problem to one of personal adjustment and personalized discontent. For example, I experience dissatisfaction in my work, but you may not in the same role. My dissatisfactions are unique to me; they are not implicated in the role of worker qua worker. Social phenomena are turned into isolated experiences and are, therefore, thought not to flow from a social structure in which all are implicated but rather from an individuated experience within a set of roles. Most often when one deals with alienation in terms of its triadic relationship one begins to deal on another level with 1) the roots of the problem, 2) the effects or consequences of the problem, 3) and the remedies. Such a view avoids the tendency to deal in isolation with person's felt grievances, anxieties, and frustrations.

I want to now examine those theorists who, when dealing with the question of alienation avoid some of the above problems. As we shall see shortly, Christian Bay, Amitai Etzioni and Arnold Kaufman are weakest in their treatment of a valid ideal of human development. One does not grasp the full sense of

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<sup>4</sup>For statements of the psychological view of alienation see, John P. Clark, "Measuring Alienation Within a Social System," American Sociological Review, 54 (December, 1959), pp. 849-852; Dwight Dean, "Alienation: Its Meaning and Measurement," American Sociological Review, 26 (October, 1961, pp. 753-758; Eric and Mary Josephson, eds., Man Alone: Alienation in Modern Society, (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962); Gwynn Nettler, "A Measure of Alienation," American Sociological Review, 22 (December, 1957), pp. 670-677; and Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," American Sociological Review, 24 (December, 1959), pp. 783-791.

my criticism by accusing them of psychologizing the use of alienation because they do deal with social structure as it relates to individual manifestations of the problem. However, one shifts away from the social structure and the already implicit model of persons because of Etzioni's treatment of need and Kaufman's language of "satisfaction." This emphasis is best examined and criticized as an outgrowth of need theory rather than under the more elusive title of psychologism.

It is important to note that even though Etzioni and Kaufman implicitly treat alienation in its triadic form there have been considerable shifts from its classical meaning. But let us first examine their analysis of the problem.

For Etzioni alienation means "a social situation which is beyond the control of the actor and, hence, unresponsive to his basic needs."<sup>5</sup> Alienation is then seen as remediable if the social structure is made more responsive to these human needs<sup>6</sup> although there is an,

. . . irreducible source of alienation in the tension among these needs--responding fully to one, such as the need for security, is incompatible with fully responding to others such as the need for variety and creativity.<sup>7</sup>

Etzioni's view is that there are autonomous, basic human needs, irrespective of society, culture or history. And these autonomous needs provide a standard against which specific social arrangements can be appraised.

Theories without a conception of human needs (which have specific attributes of their own) are open to a conservative interpretation,

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<sup>5</sup>Amitai Etzioni, "Basic Human Needs, Alienation and Inauthenticity," American Sociological Review, 33 (December, 1968), p. 879. [The emphasis is my own.]

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 880.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 879.



of individuals and groups that are expected to adapt to the society as it is. Theories which assume autonomous human needs provide an independent basis with which to compare societies to each other, as more or less consonant with basic human needs, and they lead one to expect pressure to change existing societies and cultures toward more responsive ones.<sup>8</sup>

The theory of needs functions here as the theory of species being does in Marx. Need is no longer seen as a social and historical phenomena as it was for Marx and to some extent for Durkheim, but is seen as a-cultural and a-social; ". . .that there is a universal set of basic human needs which have attributes of their own which are not determined by the social structure, cultural patterns or socialization processes."<sup>9</sup>

The priorities of the behavioral mode create likenesses in Amitai Etzioni's and Christian Bay's conception of need. Need for Etzioni is clarified in terms of need deprivation; "that the person can be denied a specified kind of experience only at the cost of an ultra-personal tension."<sup>10</sup> Ultra-personal tension is judged in terms of malaise, no matter how vague.

Bay's concept of need, also operationalized, is defined similarly. "'Need' might initially be defined as referring to any urge or drive or behavior tendency whose satisfaction benefits the organism and the person."<sup>11</sup> However, for

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 878. [The emphasis is my own.]

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 871.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Christian Bay, "Needs, Wants and Political Legitimacy," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1 (1968), p. 242.



empirical "exactness" he modifies this definition because the "formulation is much too vague for purposes of empirical utility . . ." <sup>12</sup>

Bay also equates the treatment of needs with a model of person.

We cannot get much further toward an adequate normative theory of government, as Hobbes taught us, without a model of man, or at least a conception of priorities among man's most pressing needs. <sup>13</sup>

He arrives at an "operational" definition of needs defined as "any behaviour tendency whose continued denial or frustration leads to pathological responses." <sup>14</sup>

Bay moves then, from dealing with need as benefiting the person, to dealing with it in terms of pathological responses, and this shift involves a reconstitution of the earlier classical concerns of Durkheim and Marx. Because of the concerns of empirical utility, Bay whittles down the dimensions he will handle in relation to need. Bay has difficulty explicating "pathological"; instead he settles for several indicators of the term . . . suicide, psychosis, severe neuroses, severe addiction to alcohol and drugs. <sup>15</sup>

Bay's effort to operationalize the concept need is misleading because the definition of what constitutes a pathological response smuggles in a normative claim. What constitutes mental and social health and sickness is not simply an issue that can be resolved by examining the empirical facts without Bay's employment of an implicit normative model of health.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 242.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., pp. 243-244.

Need is denied its sociological roots by dealing with it in relation to its manifestations as individualized, atomized symptoms. Bay deals with pathological behavior by inferring that his indicators are representative of such behavior and further inferring that this is linked to the question of "need deprivation." His use of pathological behavior as inferring need deprivation is further troublesome because of the multiple causes involved in many of his indicators. A human being could easily suffer from several forms of this behavior and the reasons involved might sometimes be unrelated to "need deprivation." By definitional fiat he sets up his behavioral mode.

If by definition, pathological responses are linked to our hypothetical construct of "need," then it makes sense to assume that the most obviously and grossly pathological kinds of behavior indicate that relatively crucial needs have been denied or frustrated.<sup>16</sup>

Bay himself notes some of the disadvantages of his position. First, he notes the problem that needs cannot be readily recognized until after pathological behavior has been manifested. A more serious way of stating this criticism is that Bay does not deal with the realm of needs, but rather with unmet needs. A need in Bay's language becomes very vague in meaning because it only means the lack of tension, or the presence of alcoholism, or some other form of deviant behavior. It has no positive force. Besides, the idea that all pathological behavior derives from need deprivation appears problematic at best. There are a maze of intervening elements to be accounted for. And

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 243.

because no explicit standard of personal development is functioning, it becomes impossible to say that such negative behavior results from the manifestation of false or manipulated needs.

This leads to the second major criticism of Bay. His scheme does not involve an explicit model of personal development, although an implicit one deriving from a view of mental health operates. To the extent that most of his inquiry is in relation to needs he spends little time trying to construct a view of person separate and apart from his treatment of needs. Bay adopts Maslow's hierarchy of needs as inclusive of a model of person; but it operates only within the framework of tension reduction.

Needs are construed by Bay, Etzioni, and Maslow as conative dispositions.<sup>17</sup> The assumption is that needs are an intrinsic part of human nature and not a product of one's society and history as both Durkheim and Marx posit. People then need, (i.e., have drives toward) affection, security and love independent of any societal conceptualization of goals and purposes. There is a sharp move away from the classical concerns of Marx, here.

So long as models of development operate illicitly, explicit standards of evaluation remain problematic. Hence, Bay and Etzioni deal with unmet need as vague malaise and tension. But what happens when the question is person

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<sup>17</sup> Maslow's hierarchy of needs involves 1) physical, biological needs, 2) safety needs, 3) affection or belongingness needs, 4) self-esteem needs, and, 5) self-actualizing or developing needs. See: Abraham Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, (New York: Van Nostrand, 1968), and his article, "A Theory of Human Motivation," Psychological Review, 50 (1943), pp. 370-396.

development and not simply need fulfillment? This creates a problem; for "under some conditions human beings may not need, in any sense of need as a behavioral tendency, to develop their deliberative capacities to a high pitch."<sup>18</sup> What I am posing here is the theoretical possibility of having "tension free" people who can still be deficient in terms of human development. The largest problem here is that if there is no "tension" one assumes that all needs are met. And yet it may be the case that an individual is perfectly content and we might still have good reason to say that conditions are not totally acceptable. Contentment and satisfaction are paralleled here with tension reduction but this implies that the tension free life is the only life to be prized.

One wonders about the counter example. Is it not possible to have one's needs met and still experience levels of tension? According to Bay's and Etzioni's definition of need it is not possible because tension results from an unmet need. However, I would have to argue that the meeting of needs may sometimes increase levels of tension. Developed individuals are not necessarily tension free.

Arnold Kaufman in his discussion of alienation moves further than the social scientists who limit their theory of needs to behavioral inclinations, or urgings. That is, need is not equivalent for Kaufman, to an urging or conative disposition of any sort currently experienced by the person. For person "x" might not yearn, etc., for state 'A' and yet find it satisfying upon experiencing

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William Connolly, "Comment on Bay," Inquiry, 14 (Autumn, 1971), p. 239.



it. This is quite different from Bay and Etzioni, even though the final criterion is similar. Kaufman's treatment of alienation conceives of possible satisfactions for which there are not urgings. The problem here derives from the vocabulary of "satisfaction."

In Kaufman's discussion alienation can involve feelings, and/or beliefs as they arise out of particular social conditions. To make this point he distinguishes between belief and awareness. "Clearly a person can believe something without being aware of it--for if what he believes is false in what sense is he aware of anything?"<sup>19</sup>

Kaufman speaks of alienation in the following manner. "To claim that a person is alienated is to claim that his relationship to something else has certain features which result in avoidable discontent or loss of satisfaction."<sup>20</sup> Although Kaufman seems to say that alienation need not involve consciousness of feeling his conception of alienation does involve manifested conscious behavior, that is discontent or loss of possible satisfaction.

The language of satisfaction is problematic in and of itself because it does not grasp the idea of a model of human development.<sup>21</sup> However, Kaufman does

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<sup>19</sup>Arnold Kaufman, "On Alienation," Inquiry, 13 (Summer, 1965), p. 144.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 143.

<sup>21</sup>Paul Diesing and Paul Piccone criticize Kaufman's language of satisfaction. According to them, "Kaufman's basic difficulty is that he thinks in terms of a psychological theory of satisfactions and frustrations, desires and aversions, wants and needs, while the concept of alienation is part of an entirely different theory, a theory of self-realization." See Paul Diesing and Paul Piccone, "Kaufman on Alienation," Inquiry, 10 (Summer, 1967), p. 208.



move further than Etzioni in grasping portions of the theory of alienation.

Kaufman acknowledges the dimensions of alienation which involve the "notion of a human being as a deliberative creature, as one potentially capable of exercising intelligent control over his own destiny."<sup>22</sup> At the same time that Kaufman stresses the "moral dimension" of alienation he also uses a language of the utilitarian school stressing the importance of satisfactions. And the idea of satisfaction functions more in line with the idea of tension reduction or a happy bliss than with the concerns of say, developing deliberative capacities. For the latter may require a certain degree of tension.

According to Kaufman, if a person seeks something, but once attained it does not bring satisfaction, then the individual did not know what he really wanted. Real wants, or needs then, are measured in terms of the satisfaction they supply. If needs are met, there will be satisfaction, and when there is sufficient satisfaction there is not alienation.

The whole point of discussing alienation for Kaufman is to describe an undesirable situation which is subject to remedy.<sup>23</sup>

Though we are in a position to claim that what he thought he wanted was not what he really wanted, we are not in a position to describe what he does really want except in terms of the almost empty formula, whatever would satisfy his yearnings (or cravings, or painful feelings).<sup>24</sup>

However, that which is most satisfying is often not related to the larger concerns of human growth. Drugs are often satisfying and they also are often at the root

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<sup>22</sup>Op. cit., Kaufman, p. 151.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 156.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

of the expression of alienation, not the resolution of it.

It appears then that many contemporary social scientists treat "need" in a behavioralized form as tension reduction or in relation to the language of satisfaction. The ideal of species being is dropped from contemporary discussions of alienation.

Their constructions have taken the form of viewing the individual in terms of a hierarchical need structure which assumes that the total development of a person is accounted for within the need structure.<sup>25</sup> Attempts also have been made to justify certain human rights from the assumption of certain human needs.<sup>26</sup> Behavioral concerns have caused conceptual shifts from Marx and Durkheim so that need is defined as tension reduction or felt tendency.

As I have argued, the classical theory of alienation develops out of a theory of "Mensch" centered in a distinct historical and social perspective. Marx's theory of human needs derives from the social and historical framework. And it is through the activity of "Mensch" as laborer that history and society progress and needs are formulated and reformulated. The above perspective, within the context of capitalist society becomes the theory of exploitation and commodity production. Contemporary social science literature transforms this theoretical framework into a loose perspective structured by need as behavioral inclination. One is at this point dealing with indicators as opposed to the conceptual clarification of need.

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<sup>25</sup>Maslow's hierarchical need structure is an example of this. See Maslow, "Theory of Human Motivation," *op. cit.*

<sup>26</sup>See, Christian Bay, "Foundations of the Liberal Make-Believe" *Inquiry*, 14 (Autumn, 1971), for this discussion of deriving human rights from human needs.

### Needs and the Model of Person

In order to clarify the issues raised one must deal with the structure of the concept "need." In this way the problem of assessing needs is clarified. It seems most useful to me to deal with need in its verb form (as opposed to as a noun). When "needs" are studied as verb forms they cannot be viewed as self-justifying. The construct which best expresses this form is, "A" needs "x" in order to do, or be "y".<sup>27</sup> In this triadic scheme, "a" is the agent, "x" is what is needed, and "y" is the objective or end state. For example: "A" needs a hammer to drive a nail; "A" needs a creative work life to develop as a deliberative being. One makes choices in terms of the end state desired; "y" is clearly the crucial element. If need is viewed in its verb form its use in contexts specifically pertinent for alienation and anomie is assessed always in relation to "y," the model of a person derived from species being or the moral order.

The dependency of "x" in relation to "y" makes need a relational concept in

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<sup>27</sup>A similar construct is that of the triadic relationship of freedom as explicated by Gerald MacCallum, Jr., in "Negative and Positive Freedom," in Anthony de Crespigny and Alan Wertheimer, eds., Contemporary Political Theory, (New York: Atherton, 1970). The triadic relationship involves freedom of something, from something, to do or not do or become or not become something. (p.109) "Whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in question, it is always freedom from some constraint or restriction on, interference with, or barrier to doing, not doing, becoming, or not becoming something." (p. 109) It is interesting to note that most differences about what freedom is, are really differences about what persons are. "It would be far better to insist that the same concept of freedom is operating throughout and that the differences, rather than being about what freedom is, are for example, about what persons are, and about what can count as an obstacle to or interference with the freedom of persons so conceived." (p. 114.)

that "x" cannot be evaluated in isolation from "y." "Need," therefore, cannot be used as a justification for action in isolation from the goals or purposes it is connected to. Need, functioning here in its verb form clearly shows how if "y" were read as species being or person neither could be equated with need, because need within this framework is a means to that end. Needs are assessed in terms of end states, not vice versa.

Now, I previously argued that in Marx "need" is often assessed in relation to the idea of species life. The richest use of the verb form of "need," in my opinion is the analysis of alienation with its instrumental ties to species being. The usage Marx tacitly adopts fits the construct proposed here, i.e., the worker "A" needs creative work "b" to achieve species life "c." In other words, his conception of alienation involves the assessment of certain needs as harmful or necessary to the development of species being.<sup>28</sup> For instance, the form "A" needs "x" in order to bring about "y" can be read as: A human being needs ties of mutuality to other human beings in order to foster (or experience) species life. Marx could just as easily state and has stated, that the human being needs creative labor in order to bring about species being. And this construct also enables the

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Agnes Heller is one of the few Marxists who deals with the question of "needs" in her paper "Theory and Practice: Their Relation to Human Needs," delivered at the Conference for the Study of Political Thought, Spring, 1971. She differs from the need theorists previously reviewed in her commitment to a social and historical orientation to needs. Secondly, she distinguishes between alienated human needs, human needs proper and existential needs, whereas needs are treated in an undifferentiated manner, i.e., tension reduction, by Bay and Etzioni. The problem with Heller is that she never spells out a justification for differentiating among needs which is independent of the needs themselves.



assessment that the human being does not need continuous consumptive activity to bring about species life.

It is also important to recognize that Marx first deals with needs socially, which is to deal with the origin and derivation of the need. He then assesses these need statements in relation to the ends they serve, as "y." For Marx the goals and purposes needs serve derive from "Mensch" as species being living in an historical society. Marx, then, deals with the origin and justification of needs.<sup>29</sup>

Brian Barry in his book Political Argument also argues that "need" is not itself a justificatory principle and that one must move to the "ends" involved before any assessment can be made, "No special account has to be taken of 'need' . . . the only interesting questions arise in connection with the ends."<sup>30</sup> Need then is never an independent justificatory principle. It presupposes some end, or some standard by which we can assess if something is a necessary means or not. "Whenever someone says 'x is needed' it always makes sense to ask

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<sup>29</sup> Although Marx is unique in his two pronged approach to needs he does have problems in his usage of need, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. There are times when he does not treat needs within the verb framework, although I find this the exception to the rule. There are points at which he states that when consciousness of a need does not exist, the need no longer exists. His model here could be stated as "a" needs "x" in order to relieve felt suffering. This has been interpreted by Bertell Ollman, in Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), as ". . . man not only has needs, he feels them. They exist in him as felt drives, as wants." (p. 77.) However, this interpretation is in clear conflict with Marx's recognition that one can be alienated and not be aware of it. For Marx, remember, alienation is a condition which can be separate and apart from individual consciousness.

<sup>30</sup> Brian Barry, Political Argument, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 49.



what purpose it is needed for."<sup>31</sup> Once the end is given, which in our case is the idea of species being or the model of a person, it becomes an objective matter to find out what conditions are necessary to bring it about.<sup>32</sup>

In this triadic relationship it is "y" which demands examination. However, it remains largely undercover within an atmosphere of "operational exactitude."<sup>33</sup> However, if "y" is not clearly stated it becomes impossible to make informed judgments. Only when "y" is explicitly noted can informed choices be made. "A nudist does not need clothing, and a person who has decided to commit suicide does not need food or shelter."<sup>34</sup>

If assessments about needs must wait for evaluation in terms of the ends they are connected to, then, the statement "x" needs "y" does not automatically lead to the position "x" ought to have "y." Before a certain need can be assessed and recommended for resolution or not, one first must assess it in terms of the ends given, which are in some sense separate from the need itself. Thus, the statement that a woman needs to marry or to have children cannot be properly assessed until the ends and purposes of her life style are justified. Only when such a justification is provided can the woman's needs be evaluated as real or false.

In the treatment of "need" as 1) simply something people try to get, it does not necessarily follow that if "a" needs "x", "a" ought to have "x." However,

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<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 48.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Op. cit., Bay, p. 242.

<sup>34</sup>Paul Taylor, "Need Statements," Analysis, 19 (April, 1959), p. 107.

"need" seen as 2) something which is a means to an end which is worth having, (species being, etc.) does connote the assessment that "a" ought to have "x". Or at least it is more plausible; it may indeed be thought to be trivial since it involves a normative claim itself. Kai Nielsen must be employing the second usage when he argues that it is logically odd to say "a" needs "x" but "a" ought not to have "x." Nielsen rejects the position that the relation between "a" needing "x" and saying that "a" ought to have "x" is purely contingent.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, for Nielsen it is a "linguistic logical oddity" to say someone has a need for "x" but they ought not have it because there is a logical relationship between fundamental human needs and moral appraisals.<sup>36</sup>

"Need" seen as 1) simply something people try to get, limits contemporary behavioral social science literature because it does not allow one to criticize socialized behavioral tendencies on the grounds that "real needs" are not being satisfied. Usage 2) of course does allow this, but leaves as problematic just how one is to establish what ends are worth having. The distinction of real and false need is made here in terms of that which is worth having or not worth having because they do or do not yield ends that are worth attaining. Such distinctions are possible only in terms of ends.

Contemporary social scientists treat need as a noun; expressed as behavioral tendencies toward the object. The same limitations press now in terms of contemporary need analysis as they did in evaluating Durkheim's social thought.

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<sup>35</sup>Kai Nielsen, "On Human Needs and Moral Appraisals," *Inquiry*, 6 (1963), p. 171.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 175.

If one limits oneself to need analysis is he not limited to the present constructions of society? Need, seen as felt behavioral tendency, limits itself to the society and history of the time and runs the "risk of celebrating uncritically those inclinations cultivated by dominant socialization processes . . ."<sup>37</sup> One becomes locked into the circular process of analyzing and supporting society as it exists, or as it has existed.

Let me summarize my discussion of needs in terms of Durkheim and Marx as reflecting a social and historical perspective on needs as opposed to the a-historical view of contemporary social scientists. Durkheim and Marx are seen here as historical relativists, but at the same time, human nature objectivists (as opposed to behavioral social scientists who are human nature relativists). "Mensch" unfolds through history; but the ideal state of the moral order or species being is not defined by society and history in and of itself. These are objective end states only partially expressed through historical relativism. Therefore, the statement of needs, for Marx especially, is only a partial statement of individual potentiality, as species being.<sup>38</sup>

For both Marx and Durkheim needs express concrete historical relationships.

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<sup>37</sup>William Connolly, "On Interests in Politics,: unpublished paper, p. 15, to be published in Politics and Society, 1972.

<sup>38</sup>One could speak of need as potentialities which do not exist in all societies and none the less are a base from which to criticize society to the extent that the felt needs people are socialized with fail to reflect these potentialities now possible in this state of historical development. But I think that "need" has been too closely tied to the tradition of conative dispositions for it to be extended meaningfully to the conception of potentiality. "Needs" to me are the paradigm case of historical relativity; whereas, potentiality is tied more to an objective human nature.

Marx posits a cross cultural standard of human development in order to assess these historical relationships. But Etzioni, typifying contemporary social science alters this relationship. He treats needs themselves as a-historical and a-cultural. He uses needs as the standard for assessing social arrangements. He runs the risk, therefore, of justifying existing arrangements by assessing social processes in terms of the ends generated by the society itself. The problem here is not in the a-historical, a-cultural stance, but rather with the illicit shifting of the concept need to encompass concerns which are never clearly stated.

Marx's discussion of needs treats them as socially developed and therefore, relative to time and society while Bay and Etzioni treat need as an innate characteristic.<sup>39</sup> (Durkheim is an uneasy mixture of the two.) The language of tension reduction which views needs as universal examines needs in isolation from societal impact. Needs viewed as universal (as innate and unchanging as opposed to relative) operate in a self-justificatory manner in relation to their own validity.

Behavioral need analysis excludes the standard of human development which is so crucial for Marx in the assessment of need in relation to both the capacities of the individual and the possibilities for society. "Need" as a critical concept loses much of its import in the same way anomie and alienation have (in their

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<sup>39</sup> Marx systematically analyses the development of needs in and through society. Etzioni poses instead the idea of innate need. However, there seem to be problems with his discussion. For example, one of the primary needs Etzioni speaks of is "recognition" which, in my opinion, is a highly social need; its formation reflects societal definition. There is a difference between saying individuals need others and that they need recognition. The very idea of recognition is defined by the society.

contemporary usage) because need explicated as a noun with no movement to the concept of person excludes the possibilities of the potentialities of the human being.

When there is no visible tension, alienation is assumed not to exist. But this assumption collapses all the distinctions Marx makes. The problem of false consciousness would account for a tension free individual who still may be alienated, however unlikely the combination may be. The distinction between real and false needs would also explain the "happy automaton." If alienation is measured in terms of a lack of development in relation to the ideal of a person then alienation will be said to exist when species life does not exist.

What they lack, though is the ability to choose reflectively among alternative courses of conduct, to act responsibly, to express the complex reactive attitudes of love, resentment, grief, guilt, remorse, and outrage which we associate with the social life of the human being.<sup>40</sup>

To the extent that the concerns of species being are lacking in contemporary treatment of both alienation and need we are limited to a behavioralized static conception of "Mensch."

In conclusion one can see that need functions in contemporary need and alienation literature primarily, 1) a-socially and a-historically, 2) as an individual innate concept manifested in terms of tension reduction, behavioral inclination or felt-tendency, 3) and primarily as a noun devoid of the integral relationship between "x" and "y," as needs and ends.

One can see then that need analysis in its contemporary guise circumscribes

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<sup>40</sup>Op. cit., Connolly, p. 13.



attempts to develop models or criteria for assessing established society. If need analysis of this sort cannot supply a theory of motivation, a conception of a person, or a justification for such a conception, the choice between Durkheim's and Marx's models of persons cannot be vindicated through need analysis. In other words, if needs themselves can only be judged or weighed as valid or not in terms of a given purpose or end, they evidently cannot be used to justify these ends. Hence, to further evaluate the competing models of human development we shall turn to an examination of the consequences of both Durkheim's and Marx's thought.

### Consequences of Models of Persons

If the models of species being and the moral order cannot be appraised adequately by reference to a theory of autonomous needs, how should we proceed here? What does each model allow you to understand and what does it ignore? What kind of people do Marx and Durkheim value, and how would one choose between the models of human persons that they present?

Perhaps one's answer to these questions ultimately expresses commitments which are not fully amenable to confirming or disconfirming tests. But that does not mean that evidence, arguments and reasoned speculation cannot help to shape, sharpen and justify these commitments. There are, in my judgment, reasoned explanations related to the consequences of thought that can be given in defense of Marx's theory, as opposed to Durkheim's before one moves to the level of ultimate commitments. If one believes that appropriate standards can be set up for the judgment of one model of human development against another then it

becomes important to construct an argument based on the relevant reasons.

A reasoned case can be made so long as underlying commitments to purposes and goals are made explicit. Whether the reasons will be accepted as a justification is another, although connected, question. Reasoned arguments can be set up about privileged values, although this is far from saying that the choice can be made in terms of "objective" criteria.<sup>41</sup>

Let us now examine the consequences of Durkheim's and Marx's root assumptions.

If one accepts Durkheim's view of the importance of solidarity and morality in relation to the needs of security and order one must first be clear as to one's position on the value of security and order as human goals. Involved in making this decision is one's position on the issues of whether 1) "Mensch" is social, 2) needs are socially derived, and 3) the distinction between real and false needs is valid. All of these issues impinge on one's attitude toward the necessity of security. As we saw earlier, each is involved decisively in Durkheim's theory of anomic. For instance, Durkheim's ideal of a person gives priorities to the concerns of order and security. But one cannot make a judgment as to whether this is a valid ideal of a person unless one first takes a position on whether this is a "real need," because needs and the model of person in Durkheim

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<sup>41</sup>Barrington Moore, Jr., in "Tolerance and the Scientific Outlook," in Wolff, Moore, Marcuse, Critique of Pure Tolerance, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), supports the validity of such enterprises. Moore states that "the problem of evaluation, like that of objective knowledge becomes one of trying to discover if there are some aspects of what is loosely called the human situation that might provide a suitable point from which to argue . . . the introduction of a subjective component does not lead to purely arbitrary results." (p. 66)

are equatable.

The lack of a distinction between real and false needs causes serious problems for Durkheim's social theory and it infects his model of person via his theory of needs. (He really does not have a theory of needs, but a loose set of ideas about them.) Durkheim ends up distinguishing very weakly among needs (except for the fact that the needs of security, order, and control are in some sense givens). His idea of insatiable or endless desires stated in his theory of anomie are at the root of the moral model of person. They condition his entire theory.

Marx, however, poses the distinction between manipulated and real needs<sup>42</sup> and it then becomes possible to decipher which needs seem endless by their own design. Such manipulated or abstract needs as private property and possession are considered inherently insatiable with the only limits to them those created by the "states" interest. It is these needs which Durkheim to a large degree proceeded to generalize about. "Actual human needs and appetites, whether internal or external, can in fact, be stilled whereas there is nothing to limit an

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<sup>42</sup> Marx not only makes the distinction between real and manipulated need but he traces the development of manipulated needs through commodity production. Property values and the accumulation of capital (manipulated need) oppose human values (real needs) in the political economy. Marx also becomes involved in posing the needs of the worker against the need of the state (the capitalists). Durkheim does not deal with this level of distinction because he basically accepts the idea of hierarchy. He does not conceive of a state interest in conflict with the workers' need. Needs are insatiable for Durkheim. However, real needs are not insatiable. But he does not treat needs as such. Then again, Marx wants to change the society to deal with curbing the development of false needs. His concern is not with controlling the individual but with ending the insatiable desires of changing the society.

abstract need."<sup>43</sup>

For example, one might conclude, in contrast to Durkheim that security and order are "false" needs (at least in the way Durkheim conceptualizes them) in relation to the total picture of the individual. In other words, one might believe that security and order may be worthwhile sometimes and to some degree, but not merit the priority they receive in Durkheim.

One seriously wonders who it is that Durkheim generalizes about, because I can see the goal of security in conflict with other desired ends human beings hold. To the extent "Mensch" is a conscious thinking being (Durkheim accepts and even fears this) he may and often does seek new adventures and involvements and alternatives. Why do people yearn to move? to travel? to read about other cultures? to experiment with the unknown? to marry more than once? Because humans are curious; because they change, and there are no guarantees they will want the same things tomorrow as today. Evidence of these capacities in individuals can be seen throughout history through different social movements, and today it is demonstrated to some degree by the Women's Liberation Movement.

Durkheim poses quiescent security against the view of the unrestrained individual. But the occurrence of security and choices among alternatives need not be opposites. One can feel secure in the struggle to master and develop one's potential which involves the seeking out of alternatives, if he or she chooses this.

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<sup>43</sup> Istvan Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation, (London: Merlin Press, 1970), p. 176.



People who accept Durkheim's view of the necessity for security and order do not often include themselves among those who have these needs. Sometimes men exempt themselves and decide that it is women who have these needs. In general, theorists of security think it must be the other person who operates within these confines, or should operate within them.

One can begin to test the acceptability of Durkheim's theory, then, by posing the following questions: Would I accept Durkheim's constraints as a guide for my own life? To the extent that I would not, what distinguishes me, basically, from the members of a "lower" class, from women, or from other groups whom I view as appropriately guided by these limits? And, what makes these claimed differences justify proposed differences in life style and development?

If given the choice, would I enroll my child in a highly disciplined school with a philosophy of education which required an extremely slow pace so that the child would not become confused by the newness of material, or would I register the child in a class which tapped his or her utmost resources? For those given the choice, I think, they usually operate with some regard for their potentiality and for the potentiality of those close to them.

Most of the time then when one speaks of the importance of an ordered, controlled life style structured by strict role orientations one is speaking of others; the other individual. How many individuals would choose to live within a strict hierarchy if there was no chance at all that they could get "to the top"?

The above discussion relates to Marx's conception of the human being as an object creating creature, as creative. If "Mensch" is viewed as potentially



creative, then it appears plausible that this creativity should receive the proper prodding. One can extend Marx's discussion of labor to encompass the human qualities of "Mensch." These would involve his or her consciousness, conceptual abilities, and the capacity for alternative thinking. According to Marx this dimension of "Mensch" develops through the free activity with others, where curiosity is even encouraged. Once you grant the human being his purposiveness (seen specifically through one's labor according to Marx) and capacities for thought (evidenced through language and human progress) it appears that one would be denying "Mensch" his distinctive character if one did not encourage these dimensions. Afterall a person has intentions and purposes and should be allowed an effort at identification.<sup>44</sup> This conception of "Mensch" "determines what man is on the basis of what he really can be tomorrow."<sup>45</sup>

Durkheim works from the position that "Mensch," through his capacities for "thought," is capable of building alternative actions and hence new possibilities. As a matter of fact Durkheim's theory is structured around the fear that "Mensch" might construct too many alternatives and hence experience anomie. Therefore, "Mensch" must have limits placed upon his endless desires to create new horizons. Durkheim fears the thought capacities of "Mensch" while Marx sees it more fully as a force in the development of the individual and society.

The one thing that Durkheim did not account for is that to the extent the individual is conscious and can reason, to that extent, he or she can handle more than a one-dimensional world. Alternatives need not boggle his or her mind and

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<sup>44</sup> See Bernard William's treatment of this in his article "The Idea of Equality" in Joel Feinberg, ed., Moral Concepts, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

<sup>45</sup> Herbert Marcuse, Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 155.

create a situation of anomie. On the same plane, it is an oversimplification to think that you can construct a neat hierarchy of functions and purposes which the individual will blindly accept. Individuals can think of alternative arrangements.

As people reflect more they question the organization of society and their place in it. If they see it as a mere product of the society; then they may want to change it. And this idea of necessity must be eventually undermined by the growth of people's reflective consciousness about their role, still more when it is combined with the thought that what they and the others have always thought about their role in the social system was the product of the social system itself . . .<sup>46</sup>

One must decide whether an individual's thought process gives him greater control over the forces of his world or whether it nourishes these boundless desires which hold him captive within a state of anomie. It seems to me that the mental capacities of "Mensch" make it possible for the individual to deal actively with society and not be passively defined by existing needs, i.e., security, order and calm. The thought processes which Durkheim fears as creating endless desires are the very thought processes which can and have been used to create patterns of order.

Along a related line let us now examine Durkheim's view of the person as discussed in terms of his view of morality. For Durkheim, as we have already seen, the paradigm case of the moral relation is the relation of dependence between men and women. Durkheim's morality assumes partial people, each dependent upon one another for completion. In his view there are stark

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<sup>46</sup> Op.cit., Williams, p. 161.

differences between men and women stemming from the division of intellectual and affective capacities which necessitate this pooling into one. The relation between man and woman is moral because it is ordered. The woman, according to Durkheim, could never live a moral life independent of the social ties relating her to male intellectual dominance.

Durkheim's belief in the severe differentiation in capacities between men and women necessitates the above conception of moral relations, as well as his belief in hierarchical order. Marx, however, would find such a view of moral life most problematic, because he poses an underlying equality between men and women. There is then no reason to establish relations of dependence, based upon an inequality between the sexes. The relationships of dependence would not only be suspect in and of themselves but would be suspect in terms of breeding further societal inequalities and exploitation. Reciprocal relations displace dependent relationships based on inequality in Marx's ideal of species life.

Durkheim's discussion of morality leads to a justification of inequality if one does not posit it within one's premise. When a person is partial and another is needed for one's completion, it is inevitable that inequality will arise. "One cannot be a dependent and still an equal . . ." <sup>47</sup> Inequality will arise also because society will weigh and value the roles of men and women differently. Specifically in Durkheim's instance, the man, as intellectual, is most highly valued and therefore attains more status and power.

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<sup>47</sup> Kate Millett, Sexual Politics, (New York: Doubleday, 1970), p. 125.

The two sexes are necessary to each other, but this necessity has never brought about a condition of reciprocity between them . . . women don't make exchanges or agreements on an equal footing.<sup>48</sup>

On what basis does Durkheim justify this position of reconciling women to a life ordered by decisions she herself does not make, being viewed as incapable of such activity? The justification of his view falls upon the weak argument of "natural" design.<sup>49</sup> It is woman's natural make-up which structures her resulting life-style for Durkheim.

The question of the development of potential deliberativeness cannot be raised within Durkheim's framework because the woman is not conceived in terms of mental capacities. To the extent Durkheim denies her this he denies her her uniquely human quality of creative activity and thought processes. Marx's counterpart which will be developed more fully shortly, is that human existence should be committed to the development of human capacities to encourage deliberative life styles.

Earlier I said that certain concerns related to persons are more privileged than others and that at some point the choice between the Durkheimian and Marxian models of thought become a matter of ultimate commitment. However, I am not sure that we have arrived at that point yet. My point here is that the idea of "moral" relationships is usually assigned to only certain prized forms of activity.

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<sup>48</sup>Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, (New York: Bantam Books, 1952), p. 401.

<sup>49</sup>The root assumptions about "woman's nature," if not accepted, call these moral relations between man and woman into serious question. But this will be dealt with in detail in the chapter on women.



Whether one accepts exploitation as the assessment of the outcome of Durkheim's position or not, one is still left with the dilemma of posing the relations of inequality between man and woman as a moral relation. Inequality is not conceptually linked to the idea of morality. And for it to be justified as moral, the unequal relations have to be based on some defensible reason, like competence. If one rejects the biological inequality between man and woman which Durkheim posits then on what basis does one justify the definition of moral relationships as unequal, hierarchic, ordered relations? There seems to be no justification; only the incompetence of the woman rooted in "natural design" is provided as a justification.

Imagine a society in which the few social relationships people were involved in were based on a form of dependence. Each relates to others in terms of some specified role or function. Responsibilities are clearly outlined. The work each does is not measured in terms of creativity but rather in relation to the amount of solidarity it creates through the interdependence of the workers.

Would it surprise you if you were told that the society was stagnant and resistant to necessary change? After all this society does not sound conducive to experimentation with new ideas, whether in medicine or social planning. One might then logically assume that this is not really a description of how everyone in the society operates. There must be some who lead and make the decisions. But if some are exempted from the ordered life because they (after all someone must) handle the difficult freedom involved in decision making and choice, why can't all be (except for the mentally retarded or deranged)? One should not find it hard to accept that most humans have the potential to deal with the choices and



alternatives which make life exciting if they accept the idea that "Mensch" is both a thinking animal and a social animal.

But here we are involved with a model of persons which has been insinuated into our discussion but not yet explicitly stated and defended.

### Model of Person as an Outgrowth of Species Life

The concerns with human possibility are articulated through the median of an accepted model of person. The discussion here will in no sense be complete or final. However, as problematic as it may be to state a model of persons an implicit or explicit conception of person operates at the base of formulations and assessments about individuals and society and, therefore, should be stated as self-consciously as possible. Because I am a social and historical being my model of persons will reflect ideological commitments which are not fully immune to social and individual limitations.<sup>50</sup>

A serious additional problem is the limitation of the language itself. Because there is a paucity of literature which deals with the meaning of species life or a model of person development language has not developed to adequately deal with such ideals. Furthermore, the male structured language will make the discussion about persons appear to be primarily about men. Since this is entirely contrary to my purpose, I will use the term "person."

The ideal of a person defended here is, to a significant degree, rooted in Marx's conception of species being. To the extent that species being is a view

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<sup>50</sup>See, Alasdair MacIntyre, Against the Self-Images of the Age, (New York: Schocken, 1971), Chapter one, for a discussion of the role of ideology in individual thought,

of "Mensch" in the non-alienated society, the view of person is tied to the openness of human possibilities. The ideal of person focuses on the tension between presently organized society and the capacities for development in human beings. Persons, as are species being, are conceived of here in terms of what human beings may be, or can be, but not necessarily what they are. With the emphasis on the individual developing through and in work, the model of a person will incorporate the notions of purposive activity as well as aspects important to social community.

To be involved in a life of persons one has to experience a) labor as a creative process or as "purposive rational action," b) critical thinking involving the exercise of consciousness of one's interests, goals, and purposes, and c) social living which includes the consciousness of others integrated with group experiences, forming a sense of human community. Because thinking and especially critical thought involves the exchange and examination of ideas, and both language and the exchange of ideas necessitate other people, both group experiences and active thought processes involve one another. Creative productive activity is not isolated activity, as we have already discussed. Hence, it does appear that the three dimensions involved in the ideal of a person are interrelated and interdependent.

a) Labor as creative activity has already been discussed at length, for it is through objectifying labor that the individual becomes conscious of his species being, in Marx.<sup>51</sup> The individual through his work experience can be self-objectifying.

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<sup>51</sup>Stuart Hampshire in Thought and Action, (New York: Viking Press, 1959), Jurgen Habermas in Toward a Rational Society, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968),

More broadly stated, consciousness must be integrated with the activity of one's life, and one's work is the defining activity of one's existence.

Labor in itself is purposive behavior in relation to its objectifying dimension. It involves the person in conceiving the object, in deliberating about the creation of it in relation to others, and in this way it becomes conscious activity. The very idea of the integration of thought and action is involved in the view of person as an object creating being. "Thinking and being are thus no doubt distinct, but at the same time they are in unity with each other."<sup>52</sup> Creative labor is an important paradigm case for the discussion of persons because it not only involves the individual's own consciousness and purposiveness towards himself, others, his product as well as the process, but it necessitates the integration of thought and action. Creative labor clearly seems a crucial link to species consciousness because in alienated labor one is severed from all the above relations.

b) Critical thinking which involves the consciousness of one's interests, goals and purposes is termed as such because it may and often does require the rejection of other statements of what one's own interests, needs, and purposes are. It involves the exercise of consciousness which necessitates individual choices specifically in relation to one's goals and purposes. Thought here includes the ability to question established arrangements, to consider alternatives

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and Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), who deals with the importance of individual active participation; as the concretization of the individual's ideas.

<sup>52</sup> Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophie Manuscripts of 1844, (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 138.

to them, to ascertain how these arrangements look when questions are raised and alternatives considered.

One may wonder why it is important to deal with the idea of "Mensch" as a critical thinker. The reason is that it begins to point toward the problem of conceiving the human being as a social animal. It points to the incompleteness of this view. Marx did not deal per se with the individual as a "mental," thinking being in an explicit self conscious form. It may be as a result of this that he overplayed at times the societal pressures on the individual as noted in his discussion of total manipulation. Clearly, the more tied and manipulated the individual is by society the less he or she reflects upon his or her own thought capacities in terms of his (or her) goals and purposes. Although Marx notes this tendency clearly he also always maintains the possibility of revolutionary consciousness and the necessity for social change. These two tendencies reflect the problem of social and historical "Mensch." How does one become reflective or conscious of one's own ends as a social being?

Thought and language are necessarily social. But there are at the same time different levels of consciousness and deliberativeness which allow one to reflect upon one's ideas to different degrees. What is it that prevents the individual from totally reflecting the surrounding society? I think the answer is because he or she is a thinking animal and potentially a critically thinking animal. Thought, although a social process itself, can stand apart from societal and historical pressures and be reflective of that which it is a product of.

Marx in the 18th Brumaire has written that:



Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.<sup>53</sup>

Clearly then, when I speak of the person in terms of the capacity for critical thought I do not mean to imply that this is a process devoid of society and history. But I do mean to say that it does allow one to see the person as an active force in the struggles of his or her time. This interpretation of the person in relation to society holds that the person is not a mere reflection of his or her society, but can as well reflect upon the forces which operate.

Reflection is possible because the person conceptualizes as well as interprets his surroundings. The construction and use of concepts is part of the thought process of "Mensch." Concepts help us conceive and delimit reality. "He can begin endlessly to question and to criticize the vocabulary and the forms of language which he has learnt always to use in considering alternative ends of action."<sup>54</sup> To the extent that concepts derive much of their meaning from larger theories, they allow one to draw upon relationships and inferences which become a vehicle for understanding relationships between ideas and activity.<sup>55</sup> The active

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<sup>53</sup> Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 15.

<sup>54</sup> Op. cit., Hampshire, p. 268.

<sup>55</sup> For Marx language was an element of thought itself. As Karl Marx states in the German Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1947), "language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness, as it exists for other men, and for that reason is really beginning to exist for me personally as well; for language, like consciousness only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men." (p. 19.) Also see Denis Lawton, Social Class, Language and Education, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), for his treatment of language as integral to social consciousness.



role conceptual thought can play is that concepts can create reality as well as reflect it. The person can construct "realities" other than that which one experiences. "Beliefs and ideas influence social life; and social life influences beliefs and ideas. There is a two way causality."<sup>56</sup>

The problem of where manipulation or socialization ends and a reflective conceptual structure or consciousness begins still exists. The relationship between individual consciousness and socialization processes is a highly complex problem. This was a key problem for Marx. The answer lies at the root of the difficult interrelationship between individual consciousness and social pressures which I cannot broach at this point.

There is evidence, however, in support of the thesis that "Mensch" is capable of reflective critical thought processes. If the individual could not conceive of alternate life styles there could be no Women's Liberation Movement, there could have been no Civil Rights Movement, or the Black Panthers. Consciousness of the possibilities for social change would be impossible.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Alasdair MacIntyre, "A Mistake About Causality in Social Science," in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society, 2nd Series, (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962), p. 49.

<sup>57</sup> According to Juliet Mitchell in Woman's Estate, (New York: Pantheon, 1971), the development of a critical consciousness would be possible within society. The forces at work create more than one dimensional results. As Mitchell states: "Expanding the consciousness of many (for the sake of expanding consumerism) does mean expanding their consciousness. And the products of this expanded consciousness are more elusive than those of the factory conveyor belt." (p. 31.) The values related to the free market of free choice can rebel in their own terms. The media can manipulate one to buy the whitest wash, but the T. V. screen also brings you Vietnam.

It is the aspect of a person as a critically thinking being which can open up the closed circle of Marcuse.

The social system is not something given in history, but is a social object that is selectively interpreted and is actively conceptualized by men in the here and now; it is seen as the product of the interaction of "subject" and "object."<sup>58</sup>

Thought processes are part of the potential of any given individual, unless mentally deranged or retarded. The problem arises when this potentiality is ignored or perverted, as in the case of alienation or false consciousness. The ideal of a person then involves the prospects of a conscious human being deriving from the possibility of thought, deliberation, imagination and those activities which allow the person to be an active element in defining his goals and purposes.

Closely tied to the ideal of person as a critically thinking animal is the related activity of choice. If the person can construct ideas actively out of what otherwise would be passive experience he or she starts to create the possibility of choice. Choice follows from certain levels of consciousness. Human activity involves purposes, reasons, and goals. Therefore, when choice is not involved in what we do, most often neither is there consciousness about one's purposes or goals.

Person's ends and purposes must be clearly stated in order to be able to make choices which will push one toward an outward development.

The more explicit a man is in formulating to himself the ends of his action, and the grounds upon which his decisions rest, the more he is aware of himself as having made choices that are always subject to revision.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>58</sup>Alvin Gouldner, "Review of History and Class Consciousness," New York Times Book Review, (July 18, 1971), p. 4.

<sup>59</sup>Op. cit., Hampshire, p. 267.

To the extent persons "act" they always have ends.<sup>60</sup> "Their action is goal oriented and their practical reasoning concerns both the proper ends of action and the appropriate means for achieving those ends."<sup>61</sup> Purposive action involves the choice between alternatives. "Purposive rational action realizes defined goals under given conditions."<sup>62</sup>

It is important to note that I am not saying that the element of choice is always incorporated into the lives of all people. An alienated person is deficient in this respect; but it is involved in the ideal of a person.

Once consciousness of ends and goals are incorporated into the model of a person, as well as the resulting activity of choice which results from the choosing of ends, one is dealing with the idea of conflict. Conflict is viewed here as a positive dimension in the life of persons. After all it is through conflict, let us say around ideas, that one becomes more self-conscious of his or her own ideas. Differences normally arise when choices between alternatives are to be

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<sup>60</sup>The combination of the concerns of both the model of species being and the language involved with "human action" is fruitful in that it focuses upon the specific quality of social consciousness and social living as well as providing clarity about purposes, goals, and aims. Marx only begins in his theory of labor to deal with the question of human action. Of course, for those who conceive of Marx as an economic determinist this analysis will be troublesome, but the trouble lies in their classification of Marx. Further conscious treatment of this area of human action is done by Alasdair MacIntyre in his Self-Images Against the Age, *op. cit.*; Peter Winch in The Idea of A Social Science, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958); Charles Taylor in "Neutrality in Political Science" in Laslett and Runciman, eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society, (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1967) and Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review of Metaphysics, 25 (September, 1971), pp. 3-51.

<sup>61</sup>Robert Paul Wolff, Poverty of Liberalism, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 167.

<sup>62</sup>Op. cit., Habermas, Toward A Rational Society, p. 92.

made. Through the conflict which arises in these instances one often becomes clearer about his or her own goals or purposes. Choices about human purposes will most often involve conflict because they reflect decisions arising out of alternative schemes. Conflicts not only arise out of differences about goals, but differences relating to entire value systems as well as differences of sex and age, and economic class.

✓ Durkheim would not be able to accept this position because of his underlying commitment to the need of order and security for the human individual. Although Marx is committed to the development of persons he never directly discusses the positive force of conflict except in relation to class conflict. With the abolition of classes comes the resolution of conflict. It is because of the potential element of human choice that I have to differ with Marx in his belief of the "genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man, (as) the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence . . ."<sup>63</sup> Marx's difficulty in handling the problem of consciousness leads to a deflected treatment of the individual as "thinking" and therefore a choosing animal experiencing conflicts other than class conflicts.

c) The last aspect of the ideal of a person involves the importance of social living, as species life, or the dimension of social community. The view here is that persons are social<sup>64</sup> and that they therefore require relationships

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<sup>63</sup>Op. cit., Marx, p. 135.

<sup>64</sup> However, most discussions of "persons" do not focus upon the social dimension of the concept. P. F. Strawson in Individuals, (New York: Doubleday, 1959), says that "person" is a social concept but the meaning of social is limited here. He discusses in Chapter three of Individuals that consciousness of being a person implies that the individual is aware of other persons. He further states



with others for their total development. These relationships between persons involve certain levels of obligation and responsibility toward one another.

. . . it may certainly be conceded that the price I have to pay for self-seeking behavior is a loss of certain kinds of relationships. But if I want to have a certain kind of life, with relationships of trust, friendship and cooperation with others, then my wanting their good and my wanting my good are not two independent discernible desires.<sup>65</sup>

If one aims at a life lived in relationship with others, one must take the "others" into account in a systematic way. Hence, a life which involves a social consciousness means that the "other" persons must always be viewed as important to the group experience. Social living then would involve the concept of social responsibility; a person's actions therefore being accountable to those with whom they live. Durkheim would be able to accept this--but for different ends. The reciprocating responsible life for him would be instrumental in implementing the solidary life rather than a creative experimental life-style.

The above conception of person rules out the treatment of persons as things. "Things are pre-empted for individuals own purposes, whereas a person cannot be used to serve someone's ends. There is an unconditional worth and respect

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that we see each other as persons "if we think first of the fact that we act and act on each other, and act in accordance with a common human nature." (p. 109) This dimension of "social" seems to merely mean that in order for one to consider himself a person, he must identify those around him as persons also. Strawson seems to think that "person" is a social concept in as much as it is a generalizable notion. The idea of "other" is involved in the preconception of an individual seeing himself as a person, but the "other" is in no way conceived as necessary to one's life in terms of the uniqueness or richness of social community.

<sup>65</sup> Alasdair MacIntyre, "Egoism and Altruism", Encyclopedia of Philosophy ed., Paul Edwards, 2 (1967), p. 466.



extended to persons, which is never extended to things."<sup>66</sup>

Species consciousness involves a different level of awareness than one experiences in alienated society. This different level of consciousness embraces the idea of a collective unity;<sup>67</sup> a sense of community with others. Feelings of concern, of trust or friendship arise. One becomes involved in "meaningful participation in a community of fellow human beings."<sup>68</sup>

It has been made clear in the earlier chapter on Marx that species relations are the truly human relations which culminate out of a shared consciousness and social experience. But clearly, feelings of love or hate or friendship need not always arise out of species living, although they do always arise from social experiences. Species living expresses a higher level of development. Obviously the process of blaming, exhorting, admiring, or esteeming takes place within a social community with some level of fundamental ties. Otherwise such communication would be impossible.

An emotion term like "shame" can only be explained by reference to other concepts which in turn cannot be understood without reference to shame. To understand these concepts we have to be in a certain experience, we have to understand a certain language, not just of words, but also a certain language of mutual action and communication, by which we blame, exhort, admire, esteem each other.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Arthur Danto, "Persons", Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed., Paul Edwards, 6 (1967), p. 110.

<sup>67</sup> James Glass, "Marx, Kafka and Jung: The Appearance of Species Being," Politics and Society, 2 (Winter, 1972), p. 258.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., p. 266.

<sup>69</sup> Op. cit., Taylor, Review of Metaphysics, p. 13.

But this level of activity is not uniquely indicative of unalienated as opposed to alienated society. These relations can involve species relations but do not do so by definition. Within capitalist enterprises individuals can be blamed and admired; blaming and admiring can be alienated activity.

The development of the species character of human existence is more than persons living together. It involves living together in a socially responsible way; taking cognizance of the "other" person. Each must live up to his or her commitments which includes living with a concern for others. Species relations reflect a higher order conceptual field which reflects the concerns of social justice and social responsibility. The feelings that "men desire, yearn, love, want, hope, need, aspire, hate, shun . . ." <sup>70</sup> distinguish communal "Mensch" from isolated individual. But the commitment to social justice or social responsibility distinguishes a possible pattern for the development of species "Mensch."

If one posits the varied human relationships on a continuum, species relations will be the highest form of social community possible, while atomized class society will be the lowest. One moves from casual to intimate relations here. At the same time the community is developing the individuals involved are growing, and experiencing truly human relationships. Species relationships do involve commitments and responsibility; but these operate as guarantees for necessary freedom in distinction from Durkheim's concerns with solidary order.

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<sup>70</sup> Op. cit., Wolff, p. 168.

It should be clear from the above discussion dealing with the model of a person that need analysis does not begin to deal with the issue of the potentiality of "Mensch." The alienated individual may not express through behavioral inclination or tension that he is dissatisfied. He may indeed not be. However, I would want to say that this individual has not developed in terms of his species capacities.

### A Possible Justification for Species Being

Why is species being vindicated here as the form of human activity one should try to attain? Clearly it is not because people are always inclined toward it in any behavioral sense. And it is not the most easily attained mode of life. Therefore, let us explore the possibility that individuals would choose to be species beings if they could experience that life.

The problems which arise with this approach are not as a result of the choice criterion itself but rather with related questions. The first problem arises when one tries to judge whether the experiencing of alternatives has been adequate prior to choosing. It becomes difficult to assess whether a given individual has been "fully immersed" in competing and different experiences. One is to be exposed to a wide range of information before choices are to be made, but how does one know if the information has been adequate or basically comprehended? In other words, if person "x" chooses life style "z" after examining and experiencing situations "a," "b," and "c," and "z" how does one know if these alternatives were wide ranging enough to make a valid choice? How does one test to know if person "x" has really immersed himself or herself

in the different experiences?

The above discussion leads one towards the other major problem which is: Is it really the same person choosing in these cases? Afterall, in order to truly experience competing life styles one must immerse oneself in a variety of situations, and the question is whether this emersion does not in the end change the original human being. One does not walk in and out of a social situation which involves an entire conceptual set in the same way one walks in and out of a doorway.<sup>71</sup> Does a real involvement in competing social situations require a different mental set or at least a tremendously self-conscious sense of one's own perspective? And would this not change the way one looks at things; or the way one viewed things previous to the expanded information?

Let me elaborate by way of an example. If I was asked whether I condoned exploitative relations, specifically in this case, slavery, I would answer no. Very often the question is then filled out further to read: if you knew of a relationship between two people "A" and "B," where "A" was dominated by "B," but "A" was happy, would you still be adamant in your condemnation of it? Of course the classical example of this is the happy slave, and the inference here is that the slave has chosen his position.

When the assessment of the person as "happy" is brought in one often assumes that this implies a certain degree of choice. The point here is that the individual's happiness may not really be indicative of varied alternatives. The "choice" to remain a slave may not be a reflective choice. The slave even when exposed to

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<sup>71</sup>See, Taylor, "Interpretations and the Science of Man," op. cit., and Connolly, on "Interests in Politics," op. cit.

differing experiences may be unable to choose reflectively, because of his total socialization into his role. Here again we are confronted with the problem of 1) trying to evaluate the value of alternatives granted the socialized being as well as 2) dealing with the issue of whether he can really experience these alternatives. The contemporary example often given is of the prisoner who does not want his newly won freedom. First I think it is important to note that this is the exception to the rule; otherwise prisons would not need their guards. However, in this case the prisoner cannot judge the value of freedom within the conceptual set of prisoner. Once he is educated again to value freedom he most likely will not choose imprisonment. But then again, is this the same man choosing as before his re-education?

It is posited here that once individuals are allowed, as well as prepared, to experience other situations ( $S$  and  $S_1$ ) they are in a position to choose more reflectively.<sup>72</sup>  $S$  and  $S_1$  represent two competing social situations here inclusive of conceptual baggage as well as actual life styles. I am assuming here that anyone who would choose to be a slave or who would choose a life of exploitation would do so out of false consciousness resulting from a lack of information or a lack of awareness of competing alternatives or experience.

Although I do think the problems related to the activity of choice are troublesome, I still think that the process of choice is important to the justification of the model of a person. It is a possible way in which the ideals that characterize species life can be vindicated.

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<sup>72</sup> See, Steven Lukes, "Alienation and Anomic" in Laslett and Runciman, eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society, 3rd series, (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1967).



## CHAPTER IV

## ANOMIE AND ALIENATION AS THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES FOR WOMEN

Thus far I have examined two classical perspectives which purport to explain the relationship of the individual to society as well as provide models of development. I have examined the role "needs" play in the anomie framework of Durkheim and the alienation framework of Marx. I have argued that need theory is insufficient in both theories to provide us with a comprehensive understanding of social life. Only by elaborating a model of persons will any perspective be able to provide us with both prescriptive and descriptive standards by which to comprehend complex social reality.

The ultimate purpose of my excursion into the anomie and alienation paradigms was to provide us with a framework for the understanding of women. This concluding chapter will focus again upon the two perspectives, but with particular emphasis upon their relevance for the understanding of woman in contemporary society. I will examine both contemporary and classical versions of these frameworks and will finally conclude that the alienation perspective buttressed by a clear statement of the ideal of persons is the only approach that is able to provide us with a sound understanding of the issue of women as persons.

### Women in the Anomie Perspective

The anomie perspective of Durkheim connects a series of claims to the conception of a person, as ideal. It also presents the tightly woven assumptions of woman's biology and sexuality and the resulting derivative needs. It is important to remember that women are excluded from the condition of anomie by Durkheim although the end state of the ideal moral person is the same for both men and women. That is, although men and women are understood initially within different frameworks, man as embroiled in a market society leading to rootlessness, woman as passive and submissive by "nature," the end state of moral solidary relations is seen as the ideal fulfillment for both. The moral man has internalized the rules of the society. His existence is ordered and stable, whereas woman more fully derives her ordered moral condition from her biological make-up. The ideal person for Durkheim is in a passive relationship with society because of Durkheim's overriding concerns with stability, security and moral dependence.

Without explicating Freud's position on women, Durkheim's framework is distinguished here from the "biology as destiny" argument, via his discussion of human needs. Although he often resembles Freud in his treatment of women, Durkheim does deal with woman's needs as they relate to his model of a person and the question of the moral order.

### Woman as Biological and Sexual Beings

Although Durkheim's general theory does contain a theory of needs which distinguishes it from cruder forms of biological determinism, most conceptions

of woman today are tied very closely to a stereotypical view which derives from the anomie paradigm, and which perceives women as sexual beings who are bound by their biology and their "nature." Women are further tied to their biology as they are defined and described in terms of it and as needs are derived from it.

Much contemporary literature in the anomie mold binds women to the limits of their bodies. A developmental scheme for women which involves freedom or experimentation is noticeably lacking. Rather, women are viewed as "naturally" passive. Durkheim sees women as secure in their passivity whereas contemporary anomie theory treats them as needing further social constraints. These necessary constraints can be attained through marriage and the fulfillment of the "female role." They are seen as important for the "secure" life, and the secure life is viewed as the good life.<sup>1</sup>

The needs of security which derive from the dependence nurtured by the sexual role of both woman and mother, and the resulting economic dependence feed into the derivative need of marriage.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Oftentimes those who discuss the problem of women within an anomie paradigm really stray from the classical meaning of anomie and adopt a mixture of classical and contemporary ideas. They retain the classical statement of needs, those of security and order, but adopt a psychological, subjective dimension, different from that of Durkheim's treatment of anomie. Woman, as anomic in contemporary theory is therefore abstracted from her social context, (the economic and sexist surroundings). Therefore, the study of women, especially by psychologists is with an over-emphasis on innate characteristics rather than with the objective social conditions of the surrounding society.

<sup>2</sup> As Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex, (New York: Bantam Books, 1952), notes, marriage basically is conceived in terms of the security which it provides. "Thus what bourgeois optimism has to offer the engaged girl is certainly not love; the bright ideal held up to her is that of happiness, which means the ideal of quiet equilibrium in a life of immanence and repetition." (p. 421.)

For these writers women are largely determined by their biology or sexuality; their "determinate function" deriving from the fact that they are the child bearers. Woman's purposes are defined in terms of her function as a sexual being. Her biology serves to limit the way what she does can even be conceived or understood.

Women, then, are viewed as "dependent, passive, fragile, subjective, emotional, unable to take risks."<sup>3</sup> For Freud, woman's passivity is rooted in her biology because the vagina is the passive recipient. From the sexual contours of woman's bodies to the biological states of pregnancy, menopause, and menstruation, contemporary writers move easily to descriptions of women as passive, weak, and tender, although they might not always agree with the "specific" arguments of Freud. Possible life styles are constructed from these assessments; as different anatomies define different needs which inhibit the concerns with woman's potential. From the biological assessment of passive and fragile woman one derives the needs for order and security. If woman is viewed as dependent she needs someone else to depend upon. If woman is passive, someone else must be active. If woman is subjective and emotional someone else must bring the objective and rational into her life.

This conception of women has made its way into notions of mental health

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<sup>3</sup>Judith Bardwick and Elizabeth Douvan "Ambivalence: The Socialization of Women," in Vivian Gornick and Barbara Moran, eds., Woman in Sexist Society, (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 147. This kind of language partially derives from the sexual-biological view of women as well as constructs the view of women as sexual-biological beings. It not only reflects a view of woman, it begins to define how women will be conceived in the future. The language becomes active in prescribing certain life styles as distinctly "feminine."

in which a "healthy" woman differs substantially from a "healthy" man. Theoretical schema are differentiated according to sex. As Inge and Donald Broverman argue:

a double standard of health exists wherein ideal concepts of health for a mature adult, sex unspecified, are meant primarily for men, less so for women.<sup>4</sup>

. . . the concepts of health for a sex unspecified adult and for a man will not differ, but that the concepts of health for women will differ significantly from those of an adult.<sup>5</sup>

"Man" and "adult" seem to be synonymous in the above, whereas woman appears to be differentiated significantly from the idea of "adult."

For instance, among these items, clinicians are more likely to suggest that healthy women differ from healthy men by being more submissive, less independent, less adventurous, more easily influenced, less aggressive, less competitive, more excitable . . . their feelings easily hurt . . . more emotional . . . This constellation seems a most unusual way of describing any mature, healthy, individual.<sup>6</sup>

The idea of a woman's "nature" has a self-justifying role to play. Woman's nature as it is defined in the anomie perspective presupposes a whole set of needs which differ from men's, ranging from the physical to the mental arena. The resulting organization of society which is structured to meet these needs is justified by the very fact that it is organized to meet the needs of woman. These needs (which derive from the treatment of women as biological-sexual beings)

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<sup>4</sup>Inge Broverman, Donald Broverman et al., "Sex Role Stereotypes and Clinical Judgments of Mental Health," Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 34 (1970), p. 2. These findings were a result of a survey which Inge and Donald Broverman et al., conducted themselves. The questionnaire which tested the sex-role stereotyping was distributed among practicing clinicians.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.



structure society. As a result society deals with women as biological-sexual beings. Needs in this sense become self-justifying and self-sustaining.

Although often in the actual practice of their lives men do not have fulfilling jobs and are not able to tap their potential, they are at least viewed as having a potential and as requiring a life with purpose, aims and goals. Such an approach allows for a critical analysis of the man's situation where it fails to tap the potential or offer a purpose. Women, however, are viewed with purposes biologically and sexually defined and therefore as having no potential as persons independent of these. On this model despite changes in social structure the essential role of women would remain impervious to change. Society cannot therefore be criticized for failing to allow women's development since she is thought to be biologically motivated and defined. A social and historical perspective is necessary (although not sufficient) if a critical base is to be developed.

For example, most often the inequalities between men and women are justified by explaining their biological differences which eventually lead to the positing of psychological differences, and these culminate in turn, in the conclusion that man is better prepared to handle the difficulties which life may present. This leads to the inequalities which are inevitable when one person is allowed to become more "complete" than another. But biological differences cannot alone account for social inequalities. Issues of society and history must be accounted for.

#### Strength, Sex Differentiation, and the Role of Inequality

There are several approaches that might be taken to assess the relevance

of biology as the determiner of appropriate sexual roles. First, using the example of differentials in strength, one might question the extent to which there is a significant difference between the sexes with regard to physical ability.

We might well begin with a very suggestive quote from a black slave, Sojourner Truth, whose life suggests the irrelevance of sexual differentiation on the basis of strength:

The man over there says women need to be helped into carriages and lifted over ditches, and to have the best place everywhere. Nobody ever helps me into carriages or over puddles, or gives me the best place--and ain't I a woman? Look at my arm! I have ploughed and planted and gathered into barns and no man could head me--and ain't I a woman? I could work as much and eat as much as a man--when I could get it--and bear the lash as well! And ain't I a woman. I have born thirteen children and seen most of 'em sold into slavery, and when I cried out with my mother's grief--none but Jesus heard me--and ain't I a woman?<sup>7</sup>

As Truth would have it, women are capable of carrying great burdens and suffering severe pain. Even if the strongest man is stronger than the strongest woman, women obviously possess enough strength and ability to be involved in a variety of tasks now denied to them. And besides, in terms of average strength, differentials are not as great as they are made out to be between man and woman. It is seriously open to question whether women are as weak as often described and if when they are it is not as much a reflection of social pressures as biological make-up.

One may speculate that if the delicate woman of the Victorian age suddenly found herself in the position of slave, she would soon lose her societally developed

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<sup>7</sup> Eleanor Flexnor, Century of Struggle, (New York: Antheneum, 1959), pp. 90-91.

delicacy and instead develop her physical capacities in the interest of survival.

Yet, even if one posits that there remains a modest (or significant) difference in strength between male and female, one must still ask if this difference (to whatever degree it exists) should serve as the basis for determining appropriate models of human development. This question takes on even greater importance in a society whose technology has attempted to define human strength, of both male and female, as irrelevant for the performance of most important and valued positions.

In a technologically advanced society it is impoverished to limit possibilities for human beings to the forces of "nature." Societies are organized for the very purpose of controlling and molding "nature" to human designs. However, given the extent to which women's "frailties" are continually discussed, one would think that physical strength was a key to "success" in highly industrialized societies.<sup>8</sup> However important strength might have been in primitive societies, it is clearly not a key factor in the technocratic or programmed societies described by Galbraith's New Industrial State,<sup>9</sup> or Alain Touraine's Post-Industrial Society.<sup>10</sup>

A technological society by definition reflects the mastery of "nature" towards

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<sup>8</sup> Juliet Mitchell in Woman's Estate, (New York: Pantheon, 1971), discusses the role "woman's physical abilities" (or disabilities) play in socialist thought through an examination of Bebel, Engels, Lenin and Marx.

<sup>9</sup> John Kenneth Galbraith, New Industrial State, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967).

<sup>10</sup> Alain Touraine, The Post Industrial Society, (New York: Random House, 1971).

conscious ends. The entire discussion of labor which has been presented so far via Marx, has dealt with labor as ". . . an indication of man's growing awareness of his confrontation with and differentiation from nature."<sup>11</sup> The idea of creation through technological forces is expressed by the notion that through labor, "Mensch" molds nature into the preferred forms thought necessary. "Mensch" is within this view not limited by his nature or the natural surroundings, because through social forces he combines to control his life, in whatever measure.

And yet, for those who believe in the existence of a "woman's nature," the idea of controlling one's life even in the narrow terms of one's biology is dropped. Societal forces, as technology, play no active role in defining or redefining biology (as "nature") for related life styles of women. There is no differentiation between "nature" and human "possibility" here. Biology defines possibilities; woman's body, therefore, defines all.

Finally, the one question I have not completely dealt with yet is whether "natural" differences between male and female, if we concede that they exist, should be used as guidelines either to what is necessary or to what is "good" as related to possible models of human development. There are two steps involved in dealing with this dimension of "natural." First one has to define and explain what it is that is meant by natural and secondly one must then ask,

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<sup>11</sup>Shlomo Avineri, "Labor, Alienation, and Social Classes in Hegel's Realphilosophie," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (Fall, 1971), p. 10.

or argue that what is natural is good.<sup>12</sup>

Often, when the "natural" is invoked, we are left in the dark as to whether it is meant as an explanation, a recommendation, a claim for determinism, or simply a desperate appeal, as if the "natural" were some sort of metaphysical glue that could hold our claims or values together.<sup>13</sup>

When dealing with the question of women such concerns with an elaboration and justification of "natural" are dismissed; that which is, is seen as natural, and that which is natural, is good.

Biological differences clearly have led to social and economic inequality. The question is however, when should difference lead to inequality? Within this question one should distinguish between asking whether biological differences must be assessed as biological "inequalities" as well as asking whether biological differences must result in social and economic inequalities.

As Kate Millett notes "male supremacy" does not reside alone in physical strength or biological make-up, but rather in a value system which is semi-autonomous of such considerations.

The heavier musculature of the male, a secondary sexual characteristic and common among mammals, is biological in origin but it is also culturally encouraged through breeding, diet and exercise. Yet it is hardly an adequate category on which to base political relations within civilization. Male supremacy like other political creeds, does not finally reside in physical strength but in the acceptance of a value system which is not biological.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Christian Pierce, in "Natural Law Language and Women," Woman in Sexist Society, op. cit., p. 160, elaborates on the concept "natural" for its implications for the issue of women.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Kate Millett, Sexual Politics, (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1970), p. 27.



Inequality is evidently rooted in social rules; society evaluates differences as inequalities via the standards that are established. Hence, biological differences between men and women are evaluated societally as biological inequalities.

Even once such assessments are made this by no means automatically justifies resulting artificial inequalities.<sup>15</sup>

Although the above discussion is not limited to that of the United States I want to demonstrate my point through an example drawn from contemporary American society. American society is not organized around or structured by the values which prize "the richness of difference." The United States has difficulty in valuing difference in terms of the richness of its uniqueness. The consequence is, if people are different, inequality is then assumed. The reason for this is because one right way of "being" is viewed as the best way to be. Hence, Blacks, Chicano's, women, children, old people, are all unequal in terms of this restrictive ideal. Each is not regarded as important in relation to their unique qualities as well as their universal human capacities. For instance, what

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<sup>15</sup> See, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men," in The First and Second Discourses, ed., Robert Masters, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), Rousseau clearly distinguishes between societal and natural inequalities in the "Origin of Inequality." He states: "I conceive of two sorts of inequality in the human species: one, which I call natural or physical, because it is established by nature and consists in the differences of ages, health, bodily strengths, and qualities of mind or soul; the other, which may be called moral or political inequality, because it depends upon a sort of convention and is established, or at least authorized, by the consent of men. The latter consists in the different privileges that some men enjoy to the prejudice of others, such as to be richer, more honored, more powerful than they, or even to make themselves obeyed by them." (p. 101.)

happens instead is that because certain body structures are valued as aggressive and therefore good (i.e., the penis) in the man, the woman's body structures must be less valued; hence, biological differences come to be assessed in terms of inequality. Differences are converted into inequalities of status, educational opportunity, etc., when there is one restrictive model which all individuals are suppose to try to attain; and that is to be White, Anglo Saxon Protestant, young and male. In a society with one restrictive ideal, inequality is the outgrowth of difference. Women then become variations on a theme of inequality.

If it were not for the acceptance of this one model biological differences between men and women would be assessed as simply that--differences. They certainly would not be used as a justification for the inequality between men and women or the necessity for severely divergent life styles.

This is not to say that inequalities do not justifiably occur through and in society, as opposed to "natural" or biological differences of sex or race. In other words, there may be relevant differences which justify different rights and obligations. For instance, a parent's greater competence in making certain decisions justifies his or her authority, in certain respects, over the child. The point I wish to make here though is that inequalities of this sort are acceptable in so far as they are limited to particular areas of competence. However, when inequalities become cumulative they begin to define life styles which are detrimental to at least one of the individuals involved in the relationship, because inequalities result which cannot be reasonably justified.

For example, from the difference that person "X" is bigger or taller than the average individual one can justifiably account for the inequality of treatment

which provides "X" with more food. Cumulative inequalities arise, however, and are not justifiable, when person "X's" size becomes the judge of decisions which have no direct bearing upon it. Person "Y" may be extremely intelligent (which differentiates him or her from other individuals not as gifted) and therefore is able to get an extremely creative and interesting job, which is unequal treatment because most people would not describe their job as such. However, "Y's" competence justifies her right to the job (although it does not justify that others should be forced to do mundane work). It is the cumulative inequalities which are unjustifiable in this case; "Y" not only has an interesting job, but the salary is extremely high, and therefore "Y" enjoys a privileged status, etc. Cumulative inequalities result in that "Y's" life-style could be described as privileged.

On the same plane, man's greater strength (to the extent it exists) justifies carrying loads that need to be carried, or justifies the sharing of the load. The question of differential strength, however, should not be related to justifying sources of authority.

Although I have stated that particular relations of inequality can be justified as the valued criteria are brought to bear on the individual instance, I do not mean to say that justification automatically flows from the explanation. After all, there are cases when explanation will not invoke a justification because general reasons and principles may be supplied for differential treatment such as in the case of sexism and racism. In such cases the common humanity and equality between persons is undermined and ignored.<sup>16</sup> My ultimate commitment here is to

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<sup>16</sup>See, Bernard Williams, "The Idea of Equality," in Joel Feinberg, Moral Concepts, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 151-154.

the point that individuals are equal in one respect which overrides any differences (except possibly mental derangement) and that is in terms of their right to experience the full range of alternatives society can provide or they can develop in community with others. Relations which ignore or subvert this human quality cannot be justified.

My argument thus far has three dimensions. First I see the biological differences between the sexes, as manifested for example by differences in strength, as primarily a result of socialization, and therefore less innate than generally assumed. Second, I have argued that differences in strength and physical ability, even if they do exist, are not as important in an advanced society whose technology has been dedicated to freeing both sexes from the limits of "nature." This includes the position which some hold that states that although woman has a "basic nature" (inclusive of different anatomies, needs and potentials), it is changeable and can be molded by technological advances and social conditions. And finally, that inequalities must be rooted in relevant criteria if they are to be justified. The inequalities attributed to women in relation to men are most often not. Societal inequalities which ignore the human capacities of some, can never be justified.

### Woman as Sexual in Feminist Thought

Despite my arguments about the irrelevance of biology it is interesting to note that these same factors extensively define portions of the literature which argue for the liberation of women. One can see all too clearly that conceptions of women, even by feminists themselves, too often reflect socialization patterns as



severe pressures of the societies in which they live. Let me explain further what I mean here. Particular statements within the literature of the Women's Movement reflect the conception of woman as sexual rather than woman as a person; a species being. I think that to the extent a good portion of the contemporary women's literature reflects this view of woman as sexual being, and there are many variations upon this theme, it arises out of (although it does move beyond) the anomie paradigm to a much greater extent than one would expect.

Germaine Greer, for example, speaks of feminism, in part, as the movement towards free love and sexual liberation.<sup>17</sup> According to Greer one should abandon marriage and replace it with sex, for the more sex you have the richer you are. Integral to this idea is Greer's conception of "spontaneous association,"<sup>18</sup> which is the ideal form of social relations for her. Spontaneous association keeps things alive and moving. "Lovers who are free to go when they are restless always come back; lovers who are free to change remain interesting."<sup>19</sup> It seems to me that although spontaneity is an important part of the way individuals interact together it is only a partial description of preferred social interaction. Spontaneity seems to describe relations encountered by sexual beings; rather than expressing the full sense of relations between species beings.

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<sup>17</sup>See, Germaine Greer, The Female Eunuch, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970-71).

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 240.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 242.



Dana Densmore, also a writer of the Women's Movement, states the problem with this view of woman as sexual.

The articulated assumption behind this misunderstanding is that women are purely sexual beings, bodies and sensuality, fucking machines. Therefore freedom for women could only mean sexual freedom.<sup>20</sup>

Shulamith Firestone, who accepts the Freudian perspective in some degree, in her Dialectic of Sex, tries to construct a dialectic of sex, because she sees the key problem of modern life as sexuality. Sex classes for Firestone are derived directly from the biological reality that men and women are different. The difference in and of itself is not the basis of the sex class system but the domination of one group by another which arises from it is.<sup>21</sup> From the differentiation of who gives birth flows the resulting inequalities.

Because Firestone sees women as sexual beings, the feminist revolution is seen as a sexual revolution. She defines the program for the feminist revolution as "freeing women from the tyranny of their reproductive biology,"<sup>22</sup> which will result in their economic independence and self-determination as women and children become totally integrated into society.<sup>23</sup> Production and reproduction would be organized to be non-repressive.

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<sup>20</sup>Dana Densmore, "Independence from the Sexual Revolution," in Notes from the Third Year: Women's Liberation, (Ohio: Bell & Howell, 1972), p. 58. Write to Bell and Howell, Drawer "E," Wooster, Ohio, 44691 for copies.

<sup>21</sup>Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for a Feminist Revolution, (New York: Bantam Books, 1970), p. 8.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 206.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., pp. 238 and 239.

The birth of children to a unit which disbanded or recombined as soon as children were physically able to be independent, one that was meant to serve immediate needs rather than to pass on power and privilege (the basis of patriarchy is the inheritance of property gained through labour) would eliminate the power psychology, sexual repression and cultural sublimation.<sup>24</sup>

In the same way that I find Durkheim's biological treatment of women deficient I also find both Greer and Firestone lacking. Their treatment of women is clearly different than Durkheim's; they have moved from his analysis of passive biological being to woman as an active, aggressive, sexual being. But this analysis is still limited to the conception of woman as primarily sexual. Woman is still restricted by her body; her mind is ignored.

The options that are considered by Greer and Firestone are already loaded. The first is the view rejected, of woman as girl, and girl as passive sexual object. The second, which is chosen to replace this view of passive being, is woman as active sexual aggressor. Sex becomes actively creative for woman. What has happened here is that we have moved from the view of woman as "passive sexuality" (Durkheim) to the conception of woman as sexually creative and aggressive, (comparable to Hobbes). Firestone and Greer start to move us out of the Durkheimian framework but place us in a Hobbesian perspective instead. By affirming the opposite of the anomic perspective they reveal the extent to which that model sets the terms within which they think. This may be an historically necessary state in order to discard the constraints of the puritan ethic. But it does not encompass the full sense of what it means

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<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 241.

for women to be persons. It should be evident by now that if one follows this route one by-passes the concerns reflected in the alienation perspective.

If one is to deal with the idea of human development and potentiality one has to move to the concerns with persons; to move to the concerns of the total integration of one's thought and activity. Dana Densmore notes how the concern with "persons" is deflected by the everyday language used.

The language wasn't constructed around concepts like person, a word that can include man and woman without differentiation, as if they were the same class of beings. And we don't think of them that way now. That's why it sounds strange.<sup>25</sup>

If woman, as sexual, provides an insufficient analysis for the question of women, then it appears that one has to move to a framework which encompasses a model of person which involves purposive activity and human potentiality. The key element here is not that women are sexual animals but that they can be complete persons only in terms of the integration of their thought and action.

### Anomie and Women in Contemporary Social Science Literature

I have discussed the deficiencies of the sexual-biological view of women, as expressed by Durkheim as well as the variations on his theme. But now I want to examine the validity of the theory of anomie for the study of women in contemporary society. If one adopts Durkheim's theoretical framework but drops his biological assumptions about women, then women will experience anomie as

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<sup>25</sup>Dana Densmore, "Speech is the Form of Thought," The Female State, 4 (March, 1970), p. 14.

men do when they confront the appropriate situations. This move allows one to ask whether Durkheim's specific assumptions relating to the condition of anomie can encompass the varied problems of women today. In other words, does Durkheim's view of happiness as moral solidarity and ordered, secure, relationships help one in constructing possible explanations of the unrest and discontent of women today and does it generate as well a model of development for women?

In contemporary terminology "status inconsistency" is one manifestation of anomie.<sup>26</sup> Women then are often said to experience anomie as a result of experiencing inconsistent self-identities. For example, a woman who is highly educated but works at a mundane, unskilled job could be said to experience status inconsistency. She is aware of her unprivileged status as woman and the drudgery of her work, yet she knows that she is judged differently in terms of her advanced education. Conflicts arise in such positions, as women are assessed according to different and contradictory standards. They are said to experience anomie because of these inconsistent roles.

Consider, in this light, Gerhard Lenski's treatment of the anomie perspective as it directly pertains to women in contemporary society. Although I will be primarily discussing Lenski's treatment of women he also conceptualizes

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<sup>26</sup> See, Irving Goffman, "Status Inconsistency and Preference for Change in Power Distribution," American Sociological Review, 22 (1957), pp. 275-281; Gerhard Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status," American Sociological Review, 19 (1954), pp. 405-413, and his "Social Participation and Status Crystallization," American Sociological Review, 21 (1956), pp. 458-464, as well as Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966).



men within the anomic paradigm, but somewhat differently. For Lenski, men and women are both conceived in anomic terms, as is paradigmatic of much of the social science literature, while the difference between them is that men are viewed as more independent and aggressively self-interested than women.

Lenski's basic position is that there has been considerable improvement in the status of women in modern times, although not to the level of full equality. In agrarian societies the status of woman reflected the status of her husband<sup>27</sup> while in industrial society woman's position has changed rapidly from this view of mere appendage. Hence, it is no longer feasible to view women as merely dependents of some male.<sup>28</sup> According to Lenski, opportunities are now open outside of the roles of wife, daughter and dependent kinswoman. "Virtually all occupations are now open to them and they enjoy complete equality with respect to the rights of property."<sup>29</sup> With such an assessment of woman in society Lenski is concerned to find out why women have "failed to achieve" full equality. His answer involves woman in 1) family responsibility, 2) biological factors such as "pregnancy, menopause, and menstruation (which) still prove handicaps in the intense competition for the more rewarding jobs"<sup>30</sup> and 3) the concern with security.

Because women know there is a much less risky and much more promising route to rewards, most stop striving for

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid., Lenski, Power and Privilege, p. 111.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 403.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 405.



success in the world of economics and politics, and compete instead in the marriage market and the world of the family.<sup>31</sup>

Lenski discusses marriage as a style of life chosen by women; but clearly he does not employ my criteria of reflective choice here.

Despite the fact that modern feminists are often critical of this choice, they cannot ridicule it. It offers almost as many opportunities for attaining rewards as competition in the man's world, and the probabilities of success are far, far greater.<sup>32</sup>

Lenski does not think that the inequalities between men and women will decrease because women will continue to "choose" marriage for the security it renders in an uncertain male world. As for the element of choice, it may be that women are free in their choice of a husband (though this is not always true because of race and class barriers). However, the choice of whether to marry or not is largely influenced by a society which has little place for unmarried women. As for Lenski's prior assumption that women are driven by the desire for security, one could as easily posit woman's desire for creativity.

Although Lenski says that full equality in agrarian societies is not realized for women, it is not as a result of biological or intellectual incapacity that they remain unequal. Social conditions make it extremely difficult for them to attain it.<sup>33</sup> However, in discussing reasons for the unequal status of women in industrial society one of the reasons given is biology, particularly, menopause,

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<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

pregnancy, and menstruation. The argument is backwards. One expects his argument to be the other way around; that in agrarian societies biological differences might cause inequalities whereas in industrialized societies such differences can be technologically controlled. But this has already been discussed, so let us rather look at Lenski's position that it is woman's desire for security which will keep her from gaining full equality with men. According to Lenski women will prefer marriage with the security it provides rather than seek full equality in the economic and political world. Marriage creates an economic security and provides no more stultifying a life style than many males are forced to lead.

It is significant that the most serious charge militant feminists now make is that the role of housewife is intellectually stultifying, but most women seem to realize that this same charge could, with equal validity, be directed against most male occupations.<sup>34</sup>

However, the idea of security in marriage becomes increasingly fallacious as divorce rates rise. Besides, Lenski has a very particular marriage in mind, and nevertheless draws broad generalizations from it.

By an advantageous marriage, a woman may obtain half interest in a very substantial income, entree to exclusive circles, and leisure to do most of the things she wishes.<sup>35</sup>

(1) An advantageous marriage to Lenski is clearly one with substantial economic security, and this limits his discussion to begin with. (2) He speaks of the woman gaining half-interest in a substantial income but one wonders what "interest" means here. Most often the woman becomes an economic dependent. (3) Lenski

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<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 426.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 405. [The emphasis is my own.]

also speaks of entrance into exclusive circles but it is clearly the man's entrance, the woman again is appendage. Exclusive circles again connotes that this is a privileged marriage. (4) The idea of leisure of which he speaks is a myth to most working class families and even to a large portion of middle class women. (5) Lenski mentions leisure in relation to having time to do what one wishes. But without some sense of one's development, what does one wish for?

Hence, for Lenski marriage matches the attractions of a career. He works within the anomie paradigm as he chooses security as his cherished value as opposed to human development. Lenski is content with present arrangements because he sees woman as satisfied in the "secure" roles organized for them through marriage.

The explanation for this apparent paradox lies in the family system which, as noted previously, makes it possible for most women to attain their goals, through marriage as easily as most men can attain theirs through work and political activity.<sup>36</sup>

It is on this basis that Lenski predicted in 1966 that the feminist movement had lost its vigor.

This probably explains why the feminist movement has lost most of its vigor; for the vast majority of women, the battle of equality has been won.<sup>37</sup>

In 1972, one can say that Lenski's theory did not predict appropriately the future developments of women's priorities. The feminist movement has escalated and marriage as it is presently conceived is under serious scrutiny. Marriages

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<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 426.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.

have always supplied differential amounts and kinds of security; some marriages provide none. But the rejection of the present sexist system cannot be understood within the confines of the anomie paradigm itself.

Before laying to rest the much acclaimed virtue of security, let us examine it as Germaine Greer handles it. Greer, in the Female Eunuch, dismisses the importance of the value of security. Security largely means boredom, because it implies the status quo. "Security is when everything is settled, when nothing can happen to you; security is the denial of life."<sup>38</sup> Oftentimes this is what security does mean. But security as boredom at the same time is clearly an upper-class conception of the idea.

Although theoretically security appears as a socially approved and valued "need" in actuality society is not organized to really satisfy this "need" by providing secure relationships. In other words, women may not become quite bored, because even if married (the so-called haven of security) there is always the fear of divorce (which is a one in three possibility today). Ideologically, security is of top priority in terms of the way women are socialized but the social relationships which are offered to women often do not actualize such relations.

But the above is still insufficient in terms of analyzing the "need" of security or order. Possible ways to analyze the prevalence of the "need" of security are: 1) Society nurtures the need for security in women to help maintain the present arrangements of marriage and motherhood and earning capacities. Women then, desire security to the extent they are social beings.

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<sup>38</sup>Op. cit., Greer, p. 237.



2) Although there are pressures toward the "secure" life some women who have developed the capacities for critical thought choose differently. They therefore direct their lives towards purposes and goals which often necessitate risk or conflict. 3) Thirdly, one can question the very idea of security, as Greer does, but it seems as though it would be most fruitful to do so not in terms of simply the dimension of boredom, but rather in terms of possibilities for freedom in relationship to developing as persons.

The anomie perspective does partially express certain dimensions of woman's problems to the extent that women are social and historical beings and therefore reflect societal needs. Since the anomie paradigm is rooted in need analysis it reflects upon socialized woman. One of woman's largest problems is that she becomes locked inside a definition of self which is defined in terms of external pressures. Women then are seen as needing marriage, aggressive husbands, and several children, in the specific sense. In the general sense woman is seen as needing stable and secure relationships. The anomie perspective of individuals focuses upon them in terms of their wants and needs and to the extent women have been socialized into their roles and want them. They reflect the tendencies of the society. In other words the condition of anomie may reflect the problem of normlessness because the individual has been socialized for instance, to accept authority relationships as necessary. Hence, some women may feel insecure when not married, due to societal pressures which teach one to expect certain routines from life, while others may not.

As stated throughout, if one's conception of a person is limited to manifested needs it becomes impossible to make distinctions between real and false needs.



One then becomes locked within the societal framework created at the time. Needs as integral to the whole process of productive-consumption become invalid standards for assessment. "Women don't get what they need, they are compelled to need what they can get."<sup>39</sup> The needs which are developed within society--for order and security and harmony--are insufficient to analyze society with because they are self-perpetuating. A society develops those needs which will perpetuate its stability.

The anomie perspective via the phenomena of status inconsistency continues to be deficient as an explanation which can foster an understanding of the problem of women in contemporary society. It seems to be able to express (in a limited way) the problems of only a few particular cases, such as highly educated middle class housewives (although not all) and let us say, Black professional women.

The example of the middle class educated housewife can reflect the problem of status inconsistency. The expected criterion is present in that the middle class housewife is often educated far above the tasks which she performs. However, necessary to the occurrence of status inconsistency is a level of consciousness about the conflict between women's capabilities (specifically education) and her actual life style. In other words, for the middle class housewife who is well socialized into her role, and who does not realize that her worth is inconsistently appraised (she may not even be aware of her own worth), no problem of anomie exists. Two women, hence, can occupy the same social roles; however, only the one who is conscious of her condition as woman in conflict with her societal

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<sup>39</sup>Evelyn Reed, Problems of Women's Liberation, enlarged ed., (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1971), p. 83.

value, can be said to suffer from status inconsistency or anomie. To this extent assessments of status inconsistency are limited to the dimension of consciousness.

It is important to note that even for the middle class housewife who is aware of her conflicting roles, status inconsistency is only a partial expression of the problem she faces. The conflicts which arise are dealt with only as a first approximation of the problem. She may feel undervalued. Conflicts exist between education and motherhood. She feels berated, shortchanged, or used. But these feelings are only a partial expression of the problem, because they do not encompass a model of human development. Status inconsistency describes a problem but provides faulty possibilities for its resolution. As a theory it incorporates descriptions of societal conditions as well as descriptions of the individual but it does not have a developed model of person.

There are also biases clearly involved in the notion of status inconsistency. What of the economic classes of women who are unable to partake in any of the privileged activities of society, i.e., higher education. There simply may be no role conflict for these women because their oppression is consistent. This is an expression of cumulative inequality. For Durkheim himself states that the poor or "lower classes" are not subject to anomie.<sup>40</sup> A "Black," "poor," "woman," may not suffer from anomie in that her roles are consistently

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<sup>40</sup> Emile Durkheim, Suicide, (New York: Free Press, 1951), p. 250 discusses how the "lower" classes are bounded in such a way by those above them that there is little room for the expansion of desires which lead to anomie.

oppressive; but I would want to say that she is alienated unless she lives the life of a developed person.

Anomie will also often not exist in women because they do not experience unclear roles. Their roles are most often too narrowly and clearly defined and, therefore, they do not experience the freedom necessary to attain the consciousness and education before status inconsistency can become a problem.

And even when there is a resolution of role conflict, for the privileged few who can experience it, I would still want to say that alienation remains a problem. Why? Because the resolution of anomie does not reflect upon the presence of a life of developed human beings. The educated professional woman may resolve the problem of status inconsistency and may still be alienated. One might have an ordered self-conception and still be far from experiencing species life. After all, one might have clear life goals as stemming from one's biological role as mother, and hence not be able to develop other aspirations. One then may not have experienced the richness of community or creative activity with others.

### Social Needs and History

At the same time one rejects Durkheim's view of woman one can begin to construct an alternative framework which allows one to understand women as social and historical beings. At the same time one constructs such a perspective for the analysis of women one is able to draw upon historical evidence

which contradicts prevailing conceptions of women.<sup>41</sup>

This involves one in much the same way Marx was involved in trying to understand the phenomena of needs within a given society. Such an analysis rejects the idea of a static woman's "nature" (as reviewed earlier). Woman rather becomes a part of the active process between individual and society.

The "myths" which are an intermixture of the social and historical interpretations of women's nature change as society changes. Society reflects upon woman in terms of its own needs. For example, as the needs of society have reduced the number of wanted births women's "natures" become defined somewhat differently. As overpopulation has become a more serious problem women's roles have had to be somewhat modified; she cannot be the breeder of large families. Society is still molding the balance according to its needs. The family remains intact along with the woman's role as mother. One is mother to fewer, that is the only change. In other words, woman's partial separation from having large families is rooted more closely to the historical

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<sup>41</sup>For discussions elaborating upon or using a social and historical perspective in relation to women, see: Judith Hole and Ellen Levine, Rebirth of Feminism, (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971); Frederick Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, (New York: International Publishers, 1942); Evelyn Reed, Problems of Women's Liberation, (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1971); Dee Ann Pappas, "On Being Natural," in Sookie Stambler, Woman's Liberation: Blueprint for the Future, (New York: Ace Books, 1970). For historical studies of women see: Eleanor Flexnor, Century of Struggle, (New York: Antheneum, 1959); William O'Neill, Everyone Was Brave, (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1969); Aileen S. Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965).



phenomena of overpopulation than the concern with personhood.

To survive we must stop making babies at the current rate and this can only be accomplished by breaking the ancient stereotypes of man the warrior, woman the breeder.<sup>42</sup>

Obviously, then, even the recognition that female roles are social and historical does not necessarily lead to a focus of woman as persons. It may merely lead to a redefinition of a new role for women based upon changing societal needs, without ever coming to grips with the concerns of species being. One must, then add to the social and historical perspective an ideal of human development for women by which one can assess particular historical developments.

Then, to understand meaningfully the present relationships between women and society one has to examine the need structure of society in terms of the model of persons which expresses women's potentialities. The construct "A" needs "X" in order to bring about "Y" can reflect such an analysis of needs in relation to purposes and goals. In terms of women, specifically, if "Y" represents security the construct would read: Woman needs marriage in order to bring about security. However, once "Y" is changed to read as species being or developed person, "woman needs 'X'" would read as: woman needs creative activity involving consciousness of goals and aims, exercise of choice, and/or other persons in order to experience human community. Once the model of a

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<sup>42</sup>Gore Vidal, "In Another Country," New York Review of Books, 17 (July 22, 1971), p. 12.



person is brought to bear upon the question of women one must no longer stay within the confines of manifested societal needs, one moves to the potentialities of species life.

The anomie paradigm does not incorporate a model of development for women. It instead privileges the interests of the status quo and, hence, perpetuates the myth of woman's role by reinforcing woman's manifested needs (i.e., security). This view is not only internally deficient but is brought into further question by woman's history itself.

Woman's own history challenges the anomie interpretation of women as passive and in need of security. Many of the struggles for human dignity of women challenged the order and security of their own lives. It was against the imposed submissive life that the Feminists fought. Ida Wyler, an English Feminist writes:

For two years of wild and sometimes dangerous adventure, I worked and fought alongside vigorous, happy, well adjusted women who laughed instead of tittering . . . I slept on hard floors . . . we often were tired, hurt and frightened, but we were content as we had never been content before.<sup>43</sup>

In the United States in New York and Philadelphia, in 1909-1910, women were active in organizing and supporting union strikes for more human working conditions. The Shirtwaist Strike involved organization and commitment by working class women who had the least security of any group in society. Women workers who were actively involved in union activity were often beaten by police and harassed on the job.

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Betty Freidan, The Feminine Mystique, (New York: Dell, 1964), p. 92.

The conditions of women workers in the early 1900's were crude and often dangerous to human health. They demonstrated and made their grievances known. Working conditions, however, remained most demanding.

But the grievances remained--low, unequal wages, the long hours, the indignities inflicted by foreman and employers--and the unremitting, sporadic, unsuccessful attempts to organize against them also continued.<sup>44</sup>

Clearly it cannot be that these hard working women in the sweat shops of the 1900's are best described as gentile and passive.

Women also played a large role in the struggle against slavery especially in relation to the underground railroad.

Harriet Tubman was then thirty years old. She became a "conductor" on the Underground Railroad. During a period of ten years she made nineteen journeys into slave territory and brought back more than 300 men, women and children. "Moses," they called her, a magic name among slaves planning to take the dangerous journey northward.<sup>45</sup>

In woman's history there has been the feminist movement, there have been strikes organized by women as well as women's involvement in Abolitionists. The disparate purposes of the different movements are not at issue here. The issue is, that despite the need structure which society manipulates women to accept, there are those who rebel against it. The fact is, is that there were and are activities which challenge the societal statement that women need order and security and calm and that challenge reaches to the foundation of the anomie paradigm.

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<sup>44</sup>Op. cit., Flexnor, p. 141.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 96.

Women in the Alienation Perspective<sup>46</sup>

If the preceding discussion is in any way persuasive then it appears that to understand the problem of women in contemporary society one has to move outside the anomie paradigm to a framework which encompasses questions about human development. The alienation perspective provides such a foundation through the conception of species being which provides both a critical stance and a commitment to the ideal of human possibility.

The terms alienation paradigm are used here to express the model of human development through species being that poses a model of human fruition. This model involves further commitments to the importance of creative labor as purposive activity, the integration of thought and action, and the value of rich social ties developed through social community.

The two ways in which the alienation perspective can apply to women are through: 1) a set of priorities which are posed as important for the development

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<sup>46</sup> Although the alienation perspective does pose a model for human development, Marx's treatment of women in terms of any specific attention is limited. As Juliet Mitchell notes in Women's Estate, *op. cit.*, "He retained the abstraction of Fourier's conception of the position of women as an index of general social advance. This in effect makes it merely a symbol--it accords the problem a universal importance at the cost of depriving it of its specific substance." (p. 78.) He also basically accepts the division of labor along sex lines in that he never questions the very conception of "woman's work." The problem of women rather becomes deflected in his analysis of the bourgeois family. This, however, does not undermine the value of the alienation perspective which poses human alienation against the counter example of species being which expresses human possibility for men and women together. Species being becomes the contrast model to sexist society; which reflects rigid prescriptions about human possibility along sex lines.

of species beings (as posing a model of human development for women), and 2) woman's own involvement in the alienated life. The first dimension is of major concern here and I will deal with it in terms of the outlines of the model of person constructed earlier. The second dimension is important in that contemporary treatment of alienated women reflects conceptual shifts away from the classical, Marxian concerns with society to a psychologized, personalized use of it.

To a large extent, the individualized contemporary usage of alienation drops the important model of human development (as directly related to species life) in the same way contemporary interpretations of anomie (as status inconsistency) do. This problem resides in the fact that contemporary social science literature dealing with alienation is primarily limited to an implicit need theory, or need theory with only implicit models of human development expressed.

For example, writing specifically about women, alienation is seen as referring "to the disintegration of our very selves and personalities which occur when we are powerless."<sup>47</sup> The author sees the problem of the destruction of female sexuality as a special case of alienation. "If alienation is the destruction of self which ultimately leads to schizophrenia, the widespread alienation of females from their own sexuality is a kind of rampant mental illness at the base of our experience which we must recognize for what it is."<sup>48</sup> Extreme alienation

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<sup>47</sup>Linda Phelps, "Death in the Spectacle: Female Sexual Alienation," in Liberation, 16 (May, 1971), p. 24.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

is then considered schizophrenia. The problem of women's alienation as is dealt with here is that it is conceived of as an individual case of mental health, instead of as a social and historical phenomena.

To limit the discussion of alienation to the dimensions of schizophrenia appears most problematic. Alienation is not seen as a condition flowing from a social system in which many are implicated (e.g., the typical housewife, the typical worker) but it has been individuated into a personal experience of frustration or hostility. Secondly, it refers only to the persons' felt grievances, and anxieties and excludes references to limitations placed on one's possibilities for development, which she might not, and obviously does not in this case recognize. To define alienation in terms of schizophrenia is to lose the entire set of relationships between the individual, society, labor and species being. One, therefore, loses the potential for development actualized through such relationships.

If one believes that alienation is rather best discussed as a series of relationships established within society, of which the individual is an active part then I think the statements below (using the construct developed in chapter two) express the dimensions of alienation more adequately for women. They clearly locate woman within her place of work as well as relate woman to the pressures of her society through her relationship to needs.

For instance, the statements of women's alienation can read as follows:

Alienation exists when the relationships between woman and work, established in the home or place of work, prevents the ability to become a person.

Alienation exists when the relationship between woman and needs, established in society, prevents the ability to know or experience species life.



I would at this point like to further discuss alienation as it exists when women's potentiality is curtailed because of the relationship which prevails between her labor and herself in her place of work.

Labor, when it is creative, according to Marx, is done for itself and not merely for the satisfaction of another need. It is to be productive in and of itself for the individual involved.

In contrast to this view is the fact that most women are involved in work which is non-creative; work is not conceived of as a self-creative process. "Money is undoubtedly the largest incentive for married women to go out to work. Three out of every four women interviewed gave this as the main reason for having a paid job."<sup>49</sup> Although more and more women are working this does not reflect changes in the work situation itself nor does it reflect related changes about views of women in terms of work being a necessary part of a fulfilling life. It rather seems to be more a product of social and historical circumstance. When the man, as the main provider in most families, can no longer provide adequately for his family, the woman in the house must find some kind of supplementary (often temporary) work.<sup>50</sup> Most of these women find jobs in factories or as secretaries. This work is not geared to the development of the individual; nor is it seen as necessary to be so organized.

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<sup>49</sup>Viola Klein, Britain's Married Women Workers, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 36.

<sup>50</sup>Woman's labor is often treated as a stop-gap measure during difficult financial periods. As Greer notes in the Female Eunuch, op. cit. "Female employment in Britain and the United States displays the same basic character, that of an inert, unvalued, though essential force, considered as temporary labor, docile, ignorant and unreliable." (pp. 112-113.)

However, this does not mean that women do not wish for creative and productive work. The following is a quote from a secretary which supports the view that many women do not have, but desire creative work. "I think that people like and need productive work, and when we're not allowed any, we make up games to make what we have to do seem productive."<sup>51</sup>

The above discussion is not to imply by my emphasis of concern with women that men are able always to experience creative work. Alienation on assembly lines extends cross sex lines.<sup>52</sup> But the point I do wish to make is that most often if a concern is shown at all in terms of the necessity of a rewarding work situation for the development of individuals, this concern is extended to men and not to women. This may best be expressed through the often noted statement that a man, without "work," is aimless." A job is seen as necessary for the man, where it most often is not for women. Although the concerns with creative labor as expressed through the alienation perspective are seldomly applied to both men and women in terms of everyday language as well as social science literature (as demonstrated through Lenski) when they are applied, they are applied to men.

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<sup>51</sup> Judith Ann, "The Secretarial Proletariat," in Robin Morgan, ed., Sisterhood is Powerful, (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 93.

<sup>52</sup> There is a varied literature which deals with the question of alienation in work-life. See, Ely Chinoy, Automobile Workers and the American Dream, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955); Georges Friedmann, Industrial Society, (New York: Free Press, 1955); John Goldthorpe, et al., The Affluent Worker 1, 2, 3, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968-9); Richard Hamilton, Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967); David Lockwood, The Blackcoated Worker, (London: Unwin University Books, 1958); Charles Walker and Robert Guest, The Man on the Assembly line, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952).

And whether or not the concerns involved in alienation are theoretically applied to women, women do experience conditions of alienation. However, until women are conceptualized as persons, in terms of the necessity of labor and objectification, they will not be viewed as alienated in the work situation; in the home as well as outside of it. If her work is not assessed partly in terms of its connection to her development one cannot view either the lack of creative labor in a woman's life or a poorly organized work situation as detrimental to her human growth. Such a view of woman stunts the growth of a critical stance which is necessary if present conceptual molds as well as work arrangements are to be changed.

Theoretical views of women reflect her incorrectly. Although she often is engaged in serious work she is viewed as a non-worker.<sup>53</sup> It is an insufficient and incorrect analysis to assess women as non-workers. Women do work. The assumptions which underly the theoretical treatment of women as non-workers are factually incorrect. Over half the female population works outside the home and almost all, but the very rich, work within their own homes. Everyday language denies these obvious facts as it conceives of workers as men; although women work, women are not viewed as workers.

Hence, it is unacceptable to conceptualize women as though they do not have a relationship to work situations. First, because women are workers in order to examine and assess the relationship one must initially acknowledge the connection. Secondly, even if this were not the case, if work is an integral part of becoming a purposive being, and if women are to be persons, then women should

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<sup>53</sup>See, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Women and Economics, (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1966).

be understood in terms of their potential as creative purposive beings. Present work relationships are alienating and should be assessed as such. But such conclusions cannot be drawn until woman is seen as (a) potential person and (b) actual worker.

If persons develop through creative labor as the concretization of their ideas and purposes, then it must be incorporated in the conception of person as it is extended to women. Only then can women be understood as alienated in their work as well as estranged from their species being.

Starting from the premise that women do work, one finds that almost all have engaged at one time or another in the labor termed housework. One sees that most women's involvement in such work is contrary to the purposes of human development because it is alienating labor, and only unalienated labor promotes species life.

One of the problems with the work that women perform in the home is that it is not conceived of as work. This parallels the treatment of women as non-workers.

In sheer quantity, household labor, including child care, constitutes a huge amount of socially necessary production. Nevertheless, in a society based on commodity production, it is not usually considered "real work" since it is outside of trade and the market place.<sup>54</sup>

In a society where money determines value, "women are a group who work outside the money economy. Their work is not worth money, and it is therefore

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Margaret Benston, "The Political Economy of Women's Liberation," (Boston: New England Free Press, 1969), p. 15.



valueless, it is therefore not even real work."<sup>55</sup> Women's housework has no market value and therefore is judged as having only slight importance in terms of valued work.

According to Marx, one affirms oneself through the active creation through labor. However, woman's work within the home is not related to active creation, she produces nothing.

Thus woman's work within the home gives her no autonomy; it is not directly useful to society, it does not open out on the future, it produces nothing. It takes on meaning and dignity only as it is linked with extent beings who reach out beyond themselves, transcend themselves, toward society in production and action.<sup>56</sup>

Housework can best be described as monotonous and boring; ". . . she makes nothing, simply perpetuates the present."<sup>57</sup> Lenin wrote of housework:

You all know that even when women have full rights, they still remain factually downtrodden because all housework is left to them. In most cases housework is the most unproductive, the most arduous work a woman can do. It is exceptionally petty and does not include anything that would in any way promote the development of the woman.<sup>58</sup>

Besides the repetition and routine that women face in housework, the work that woman performs in her home (or in another's home) is often done in isolation from others. "The development of the modern family meant the breakdown of a large integrated society into small self-centered units."<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>56</sup>Op. cit., Simone de Beauvoir, p. 430.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., p. 425.

<sup>58</sup> Juliet Mitchell, "Women, The Longest Revolution," (Boston: New England Free Press, 1966), p. 7.

<sup>59</sup>Op. cit., Firestone, p. 86.



Historically the extended family was the family unit. Women then were not so isolated and alone in the work they performed. But today woman works mainly by herself and although part of her work most regularly involves caring for children, young children do not provide the kind of reciprocating relationship which promote complete friendships. Within the present organization of the family, women can be simultaneously surrounded by her young children and still feel isolated.

Oftentimes it is said that housework could not be oppressive because the woman is "her own boss." However, the more fundamental point which must be reckoned with is that one kind of labor that does not need a director, or boss, is isolated labor.

Her work is private and because it is private and for no other reason, it is unsupervised . . . the freedom of the housewife is her isolation.<sup>60</sup>

Labor in order that it can lead to species consciousness must be social. The isolation of women cuts her off from others and therefore from herself. Alienation ensues, as these conditions combine with the fact that housework is an objectless activity. Nothing is created. Things are only done to be redone again.

Unalienated labor is labor performed in concert with others. Being that woman's potentials cannot develop in isolation from social community, housework as it presently is organized is detrimental to the growth of women as persons.

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<sup>60</sup> Op. cit., Mitchell, Woman's Estate, p. 161.

Women workers are not limited to the sphere of housework. Women work, as well, outside the home as secretaries as well as factory workers. Such work is alienating. Factory work is most often described as alienating labor. Sometimes the alienation of women is greater than men's because women are assigned the most menial and routinized jobs. Woman is viewed either as not capable of more, and/or not "needing" more,

Most of the jobs in the plant were like mine, a series of the same ten or so motions all day. All the men I knew who were factory workers admitted that the women had the worst jobs . . . <sup>61</sup>

Women have the most debilitating jobs and are paid less because their jobs demand less skill. Monotonous work is not seen as detrimental or bothersome to women, in the eyes of men. Her social training seems to fit her for her monotonous work in their eyes. Juliet Mitchell quotes a male worker's feelings about women who work in his factory.

Now a woman, she's good, the job doesn't matter to her, she's not interested, her hands work, she chats to her neighbor but she doesn't look from side to side as a man does. <sup>62</sup>

To the extent that women's labor is (1) "forced," that is performed for the satisfaction of a particular need, (2) non-creative in that it is not object creating (instead of designing or building a house, she cleans it) and, therefore, routinous and boring and (3) isolating, organized largely according to separate

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<sup>61</sup> Jean Tepperman, "Two Jobs: Women Who Work in Factories" in Robin Morgan, ed., Sisterhood is Powerful, op. cit., p. 117.

<sup>62</sup> Op. cit., Mitchell, Woman's Estate, p. 128.

family units, women labor but are not involved in creative or productive work. If women are viewed conceptually as persons their work should come to encompass "purposive rational action."<sup>63</sup>

Thus, it is within the framework of alienation as rooted in the relations between woman, and labor, society and species being that the problem of persons becomes clear. The discussion relating to alienation and women does not relate to "feeling" or "consciousness" or "vague urging." Rather alienation exists as a condition which can be recognized in terms of the absence of species life. There can be a condition of alienation because there is an objective condition of non-alienation.

#### Women as Persons in Durkheim and Marx

So far I have dealt with the question of alienation and women as it connects to the issue of labor. At this point I want to turn to the more general issue of the fundamental importance of the model of persons one adopts.

In order for women to be involved in a life of persons they have to experience (a) labor as creative productive activity, (b) critical thinking which presupposes a rich set of ties to others and an awareness of one's interests, goals, and purposes, and (c) social living or a consciousness of others involving group experiences.

All of these dimensions are dealt with (to differing degrees) within the theory of alienation, whereas the anomie paradigm excludes some and adjusts

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<sup>63</sup>See, Jurgen Habermas, Toward A Rational Society, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970) for a discussion of labor as "purposive, rational action."

others to more narrowly defined limits. (a) Durkheim excludes women from the view that labor is an important, creative, process because he sees women as limited by "nature." He does not view her in the active process of refining and redefining nature through labor. For that matter, Durkheim does not discuss labor as an important objectifying process for men either. The division of labor is seen as important primarily in terms of creating solidary relations through specialization and dependence for the maintenance of organic solidarity. And labor is not assessed as creative in and of itself. Hence, the division of labor which prevails is valued as moral for the solidary relations it nurtures, while for Marx labor is valued for itself as a self-defining activity.

(b) The importance of critical thinking as it involves consciousness necessitating choice in terms of goals and purposes is treated in Marx only in a limited way. Although his own work assumed critical thought as a starting point he never deals with its development on an individual level. Nevertheless the idea of critical thinking (as critical consciousness) is necessary to his idea of revolutionary consciousness, and his concern with social change. Durkheim's thought operates more out of a distrust of individual's capacities to project their own goals and purposes and desires. He is preoccupied with circumscribing the possibilities of limitless and endless desires as opposed to creating the conditions for critical thought so that individual's real interests, purposes and goals can be defined, and individual choice be realized.

Therefore, in terms of this aspect of the model of a person Durkheim is quite inadequate and Marx limits his treatment in that he never deals squarely with the issue of individual's goals or purposes as they might relate to human choice.

Despite the neglect of this dimension in Marx and Durkheim, the criterion of choice is of key importance for a life of persons for women. The process of choice is most often involved in the assessment of an activity as worth-while or meaningful or not. When choice is eliminated for women, and it automatically is when one is defined by one's biology, what one does loses import in terms of the standard of creative activity. The point is that the kind of needs women are said to have do not primarily involve voluntary, planned, goal-directed behavior. Women do not choose, in any meaningful sense of the term, their life purposes and goals, i.e., childbirth and feeding and child care.<sup>64</sup> Purposes and goals are rather assigned to women. The consciousness and the involvement with choosing one's purposes, which is a necessary element in the lives of persons, is lacking.

(c) The importance of social experience and social consciousness is deeply interwoven with (a) creative labor and (b) creative thinking. However, women find themselves severed from human relationships as they are isolated in their homes and as the perimeters of their life activity are defined within their individual families. To be a part of a community, and to feel a part of one, means that women have to become involved with other people in common projects. The contemporary family structure is most often not conducive to this sense of community, especially for the woman. Her relationships to others within the

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<sup>64</sup>See, Mary Ellman, Thinking about Women, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1968), for her statement on childbirth as non-creative activity in that it is often involuntary. "At the same time, this idealization of childbirth obscures the distinction between involuntary and voluntary achievement which we depend upon in describing any achievement as creative." (p. 63.)



family are not those of mutuality and equality of burdens and rights. Usually the woman is economically dependent on her husband and her children are dependent on her for her "motherly" functions. These relationships of dependence, although the fiber of the moral community for Durkheim, hinders the full development of women in terms of the priorities of a life of personhood.

Marx's view of species life requires a consciousness and an activity which necessitates social involvement and social responsibility. What is unique about persons is that they can in some ideal sense operate with a consciousness of concepts like social justice and social responsibility. Such a life style does express a tension in Marx's thought. It is a tension, however, which I think can be dealt with most effectively in terms of the actual practice of one's life. And that is: How does one integrate a life of freedom with commitments to others? How does one live freely with responsibility?

Species relations exist to the extent that the persons involved are needed by one another for each other's fruition. They need one another as whole persons, and not as merely sexual partners. This needing of others is in Marx's tradition of whole beings sharing together. The conception of woman as species being (social) is thereby differentiated from Durkheim's conception of morality (through dependence), which results from partial selves. Partial selves do not lead to a consciousness about their relationship to themselves, to others, or the society. What is at issue here is the kind of human relationship which allows one to be conscious of her relationship to others as well as to her aims and purposes.

The anomie and alienation perspectives present varied conceptions of the individual and therefore different views of human society. One moves from Durkheim's discussions of what is to Marx's ideas about what is possible. In present society when there is dissatisfaction with woman's position voiced through the Women's Liberation Movement it seems more than reasonable to view the alienation paradigm as more likely to handle the questions connected to conditions and desires for social change.

The possibilities of creating community, the abilities to handle conflict and cooperation, the seeking of new situations, all arise out of the alienation paradigm. The anomie view poses the idea of passivity, the concern with stable expectations and the internalization of roles and customs. When one chooses between the applicability of these perspectives in handling the important issues of the day, these are some of the concerns to be reckoned with. I clearly believe that the alienation thesis helps us to understand the issues with a greater scope, poses a higher model of development, one which I would choose for myself and my friends, and makes possible the development of a person who is better equipped to deal with the changeability and conflict of modern society.

### Conclusions: Theoretical Perspectives of Women

My primary task has been to show that Durkheim's view of persons, even when women are not treated as intrinsically inferior, is insufficient as a model of development for women in contemporary society and that one must move to the concerns expressed in species being in Marx for an appropriate model. I have argued throughout that the alienation paradigm provides the more valid ideal

of human development and the more insightful conception of how to foster that development.

However, we have also seen that the anomie perspective persists in its deficient treatment of women as it continues to structure the theoretical foundations of everyday language, as well as the social science literature. The alienation perspective is seldom applied in contemporary social science literature and when it is, it is used in formulations about men. Women are most often not seen as reflecting alienation (as viewed through the discussion of women workers) because they are not viewed in terms of their developmental capacities.

Even within the anomie perspective itself there are competing interpretations of what it means to be a person, for men and women. Both men and women may be conceived in terms of the necessity of security but the content of what it means to be secure for men and women is notably different. Security for a woman will be defined as a good marriage or a husband with a stable job. For the man it is defined as a good job (although this usually means good pay instead of creative work). Such conceptions are inadequate for both men and women, however, security as it is defined for the woman turns her into a dependent being.

The differentiation in conceptual molds, witnessed through everyday language, between men and women sometimes cannot be expressed through the anomie/alienation distinction and is, therefore, best expressed through the opposition of the Durkheimian and Hobbesian framework. This language expresses man as aggressive, self-interested and competitive,<sup>65</sup> as opposed

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<sup>65</sup> This same description applying to most individuals appears in Marx, although he attributes it to the atomistic market economy rather than to an Hobbesian

to the everyday language used to describe women as docile, passive and subjective. Most often the differentiation of the qualities of man and woman within this dimension by-passes the concerns of the alienation model. Neither man nor woman is discussed in terms of their creativeness or species powers; woman is passive, and man is aggressive. Some women Liberationists themselves then adopt the Hobbesian framework as their replacement for deficient theoretical conceptions already applied to women. Again the concerns raised by the concept species being are excluded.

In conclusion, I have treated the issue of women as a problem of philosophy as well as society, a problem of theory, as well as practice. The conceptual framework applied to women is important because it defines and/or limits one's life style; theoretical frameworks define possibilities.

Plato's view of the tripartite nature of man resulted in a society with a parallel organization. Rousseau's conception of man made possible the general will. Marx's conception of the nature of "Mensch" involved the ideal of species being. And the conception of woman also structures the possibilities for her life. That is why it has been the position of this paper that women should be viewed within a framework which allows for the development of their most human capacities. This means that women cannot be sufficiently comprehended through the anomie paradigm, which functions within the limitations of need analysis, and conceives of woman as a sexual-biological being. Rather, women can more

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conception of human nature. See, C. B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, Hobbes to Locke, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962).

fruitfully be understood, theoretically, as persons within the alienation paradigm. She then is viewed in terms of her potential development. The ideal of a person becomes a theoretical reality and a contrast model is therefore available to pinpoint areas of needed social change.



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