

1-1-1974

Political socialization and political education : an analysis, a critique, and a proposal.

Robert Quinn Parks
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation

Parks, Robert Quinn, "Political socialization and political education : an analysis, a critique, and a proposal." (1974). *Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014*. 1894.
<https://doi.org/10.7275/4zva-md62> https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1894

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.



312066013583133

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND POLITICAL EDUCATION:
AN ANALYSIS, A CRITIQUE, AND A PROPOSAL

A Dissertation Presented

By

Robert Quinn Parks, Jr.

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

April

1974

Major Subject Political Science

(c) Robert Quinn Parks, Jr., 1974
All Rights Reserved


POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND POLITICAL EDUCATION:
AN ANALYSIS, A CRITIQUE, AND A PROPOSAL

A Dissertation Presented


By

Robert Quinn Parks, Jr.


Approved as to style and content by:



William E. Connolly, Chairman of Committee



Jerome King



Howard Gadlin



Glen Gordon, Department Chairman

April, 1974

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the assistance and patience of my wife, Yoko, and my children, Bobby, David, and Lisa, during the period in which this work developed. I would also like to thank those many friends and teachers who have contributed so much to my education.

Political Socialization and Political Education:
An Analysis, A Critique, and
A Proposal (April, 1974)

Robert Q. Parks, B. A., Marquette University

Directed by: William E. Connolly

The subject laid out for study is the development of men's capacity to reason in political life. Most of the relevant literature in contemporary political science has adopted a distinctive framework built upon the concept of "political socialization". This framework, however, and even the conceptualization of political socialization, has been influenced by a conformity perspective. This conformity perspective on socialization involves a way of looking at and talking about human development that omits any important reference to the exercise of judgment or to the growth of the capacity to reason. Individual social development is the product of molding forces and pressures.

Our critique of this conformity interpretation is built upon the idea that the basic point of the term socialization is to pick out those social processes which lead to the capacity to use reason in social life, to understand and care for others in a social order. Political socialization involves bringing people to the point of being able to participate intelligently in a society's political practices.

Failure to build upon this point about the connection between socialization and the use of reason has led to two related developments in the political science literature: a potentially harmful focus on conformist behavior, and a failure to investigate the character or conditions of the higher development of political thinking.

We then suggest that the further development of political reasoning can be understood as political education. Political education covers those processes by which citizens develop a capacity for reflective political thought. Politically educated citizens will be capable of recognizing others as persons, as potentially capable of citizenship of the highest level. Framing a critical view of the public interest and acting on the basis of self-accepted principles will involve promoting the equal opportunity of all to develop their capacities as citizens.

The researches of cognitive-developmental psychologists provide one potentially fruitful framework for the understanding and explanation of the successes of political socialization and political education. But the character of the higher achievements of political thinking must be explored further. It is suggested here that the reflectiveness of mature political thought be taken as a central achievement. And the explanatory framework of the develop-

mental psychologists must be revised to include a more specifically sociological component. For the developmentalists have failed to recognize the ways in which the concepts involved in the development of socio-political thought are imbedded in the structure of social and political life.

Finally, we argue that political education ought to be promoted in complex and changing modern industrial societies. The task at hand is the exploration of those institutional and structural transformations which will provide the conditions for political education and a fully developed citizenry.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PART I. POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
AND POLITICAL EDUCATION

Chapter

| | |
|---|----|
| I. INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| Freedom and Reason in Modern Society | |
| Human Capacities and Social Practices | |
| Political Science and Human Development | |
| II. "POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION" IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCIENCE | 18 |
| Terminological and Conceptual Discontinuities | |
| Two Views of an Emerging Debate | |
| The Conformity Perspective and the Developmental Perspective | |
| III. THE CONCEPT OF SOCIALIZATION IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL SCIENCE | 43 |
| Origins of the Concept of Socialization | |
| Socialization and Conformity: An Exposition | |
| IV. THE CONCEPT OF SOCIALIZATION: A CRITIQUE AND A CLARIFICATION | 57 |
| V. EDUCATION AND SOCIALIZATION | 74 |
| The Concept of Education | |
| Socialization, Education and Political Science | |

PART II. DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
AND POLITICAL EDUCATION

| | |
|---|----|
| VI. DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN EXPOSITION . . . | 96 |
| Introduction | |
| General Characterization of the Cognitive Developmental Approach | |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Piaget: Levels of Cognitive Development | |
| Kohlberg: Levels of Moral Development | |
| VII. DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN ASSESSMENT (I) | 119 |
| Introduction | |
| The Character of Mature Thought | |
| Cognition, Affect, and the Unity of Mental Development | |
| VIII. DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN ASSESSMENT (II) | 147 |
| Introduction | |
| The Explanation of Development | |
| From Thought to Action | |
| IX. TOWARD A THEORY OF POLITICAL EDUCATION . . . | 174 |
| Political Education and the Development of Political Thinking | |
| Toward a Theory of Political Education | |
| Conclusion | |
| APPENDICES | |
| I. Kohlberg's Definition of Moral Stages . . . | 207 |
| II. Relations Between Piaget Logical Stages and Kohlberg Moral Stages | 209 |
| FOOTNOTES | 210 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 234 |

PART I. POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
AND POLITICAL EDUCATION

C H A P T E R I

INTRODUCTION

Freedom and Reason in Modern Society

From the first, this study should be understood as a contribution within the tradition of critical social theory. Mention of two characteristics of critical theory will perhaps clarify part of this broader intent, as well as suggest certain lines of development I have not pursued and certain references which have been left more to tacit understanding than explicit statement. The first characteristic is a commitment to seek new possibilities for freedom and reason in the process of human and social change.¹ A second characteristic of critical social inquiry is a certain reluctance to pay undue heed to rigid disciplinary boundaries shaping much academic work today. In this section of the Introduction I will pursue briefly the themes of freedom and reason in modern society. In the third section, I will return to the question of disciplinary boundaries and the approach of political science to the problems pursued in this study.

A number of significant works appearing in the post-war period have focused on the social conditions of personal freedom, integrity, and autonomy - such as Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom;² T. W. Adorno, et al, The Authoritarian Personality;³ Christian Bay,

The Structure of Freedom;⁴ and Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man.⁵ These studies have begun with the problem - often focused in terms of the experience of Fascism in the West - of how men can, apparently willingly, give up their personal and political freedom.⁶ Put another way, the problem is how men can come to use and recognize the value of freedom. One current of thought on this problem, developed here, is that the capacity to reason reflectively about the social world is crucial to securing and expanding the dimensions of personal freedom in the modern world.

Liberal Interpretations of Reason and Freedom. Any serious diagnosis of modern society - its structure, problems and internal dynamics - must at some point come to grips with the fact of extensive bureacratization through massive organizational complexes. Such bureaucrati- zation is often viewed in liberal thought as an increasing "rationalization" of society. Certain assumptions about the nature of man and his capacities have facilitated the movement of liberal thought toward a reconciliation of this vision of increased "rationalization" with the values supposedly served by a market economy and a competitive polity.

One primary value to be served by these competitive institutional arrangements is individual freedom. And one

important supporting assumption about the individual is his rationality. Freedom is said to be well served when competitive arrangements offer the individual multiple options for action in satisfying his wants. And the test of rationality is often taken to be the degree to which actions taken are appropriate as means to the end envisioned - the satisfaction of wants. These goals, freedom and rationality, are also seen as mutually reinforcing. Rational action is facilitated by competition to offer suitable options for individual want satisfaction. And individuals whose reasoning is finely honed to instrument their wants are the foundation of progress in a competitive society. This image of man and society has been an immensely persuasive one in the modern western world, shaping the interpretive frameworks of a long line of liberal thinkers. It has also, no doubt, had some shaping influence on the manner of development of modern society. For example, in the logic of this interpretation it is but a short step from the characterization of the rational entrepreneur to the vision of the rational organization and the bureaucratic society. Each is geared to the efficient selection of means appropriate to its end.

Critique of Liberal Interpretations of Reason and Freedom. There are at least two critiques of western capital-

ist societies which challenge the adequacy of this liberal interpretative framework. The first, rooted in Marx's political economy, points to the dissociation of human needs from the goals of production when labor is exploited in the profit system. When money is the end and the means in the exchange process, the rational calculations of the capitalist lead to social irrationality through economic and political crises. The second type of critique also finds an increasing social irrationality threatening, rooted in an absence for individuals of important group ties intermediary between basic social units and the huge organizations dominating our society. This is the critique of mass society. The absence of intermediary ties threatens the individual with pervasive anxiety, and threatens the society by providing fertile ground for extremist movements.

Both of these critiques hinge to some degree on a critique of the notion of individual rationality dominant in liberal thought. That notion is quite clearly stated by Bertrand Russell:

Reason has a perfectly clear and precise meaning. It signifies the choice of the right means to an end that you wish to achieve. It has nothing whatever to do with the choice of ends.⁷

The critique which provides the foundation for my analysis is not a critique of reason per se, but of this rather narrow interpretation of rationality. It is inadequate

ultimately because it obscures and misconstrues the places of reason and passion in the determination of action.

Before moving to a formulation of this wider notion of rationality, let us see how it figures in a critical understanding of modern society. C. Wright Mills finds that men today are increasingly unable to tie their self-conceptions, drawn from a narrow personal milieu, into a vision of world history - the arena for the social structural changes which affect their lives. We find ourselves in a society increasingly "rationalized" by bureaucratic organizations, which, however, may be "a means of tyranny and manipulation, a means of expropriating the very chance to reason, the very capacity to act as a free man."

The increasing rationalization of society, the contradiction between rationality and reason, the collapse of the assumed coincidence of reason and freedom - these developments lie back of the rise into view of the man who is 'with' rationality but without reason, who is increasingly self-rationalized and also increasingly uneasy.⁸

What is it that Mills is trying to formulate by presenting the apparent paradox of a "contradiction between rationality and reason" or "the man who is 'with' rationality but without reason"? What is behind the "collapse of the assumed coincidence of reason and freedom"?

The first step in clarifying this critique is to

note that Mills is contrasting the "formal rationality" of bureaucratic organizations with the "substantive reason of men whose independent reasoning would have structural consequences for their societies, its history and for their own life fates."⁹ In modern society increasing numbers of men are "with" the "formal rationality" of bureaucratic and hierarchical organizations which shape and dominate them, but without the "substantive reason" which would allow them to shape their own lives. And it is the former type of rationality which may stunt the development of the latter - thus the contradiction between rationality and reason.

How, then, can we clarify further this notion of "substantive reason" and relate it to Russell's narrower definition of reason? The difficulties with the narrow interpretation arise first of all when we note that any course of action considered as a means, can from another perspective be seen also as an end. The goal of my previous action could have been to make this subsequent course of action available to me as an option. And, likewise, any end could also be considered as a means to another end. That the deliberations of reason have nothing whatever to do with the goals of human action, as Russell's formulation implied, is less plausible in this light. As John Dewey has observed:

Means and ends are two names for the same reality. The terms denote not a division in reality but a distinction in judgment 'End' is a name for a series of acts taken collectively - like the term army. 'Means' is a name for the same series taken distributively - like this soldier, that officer. To think of the end signifies to extend and enlarge our view of the act to be performed. It means to look at the next act in perspective, not permitting it to occupy the entire field of vision.¹⁰

This understanding of the relativity of the means-end distinction allows us to move toward a formulation of the notion of reason which will be comprehensive of Russell's definition as well as Mill's idea of "substantive reason". As proposed by Dewey, we can distinguish between a "wide and narrow use of reason" in deliberation.

The latter holds a fixed end in view and deliberates only upon the means of reaching it. The former regards the end in view in deliberation as tentative and permits, nay encourages the coming into view of consequences which will transform it and create a new purpose and plan.¹¹

We can see now that this distinction does not point to a hard and fast logical feature of the concept of reason, but brings out certain variable features contained within the idea. An inquiry directed toward an understanding of this distinction will not be purely conceptual clarification, nor purely empirical research. It will pose a question of the following type: What is there for us to mean by this understanding of the variable features of the notion of reason? Such an inquiry is suggested by some of the

important threads of analysis pursued in this study. It is proposed that the distinction, the variation between narrow and wide uses of reason, be understood developmentally; that the distinction be filled out by attention to the research of developmental psychologists. Along this line, we propose, in Part II, that the distinction be framed as a difference between "instrumental rationality" (or the cognitive-developmental psychologists' operational thought) and "reflective rationality" (or formal thought). This will be our interpretation of how men could be "with" (instrumental) rationality in a bureaucratic ethos, but without (reflective) "substantive reason".

And our interpretation of the "collapse of the assumed coincidence of reason and freedom" sensed by Mills is more clearly set now. A characteristic liberal interpretation of freedom would be that one is free to the extent that he is not prevented from doing what he wants. The critique of this formulation often hinges on the superficial understanding of the relation between wants and persons embodied in the restrictive or narrow notion of reason. Mills, in his critique, clearly draws on his broader idea of "substantive reason".

Freedom is not merely the chance to do as one pleases; neither is it merely the opportunity to choose between set alternatives. Freedom is, first of all, the chance to formulate the available choices, to argue over them - and then, the opportunity to

choose. That is why freedom cannot exist without an enlarged role of reason in human affairs. Within an individual's biography and within a society's history, the social task of reason is to formulate choices, to enlarge the scope of human decisions in the making of history.¹²

Reason is essential to the expansion of personal freedom because wants, or the ends of action, are in a sense shaped in the process of reflecting on different ways of viewing the alternatives. Obstacles to the development of the capacity for reflective reasoning are also, then, constraints on individual freedom.

Human Capacities and Social Practices

This introductory section should have conveyed to the reader at this point my dominant concern with the conditions for the development of reflective reason. How can we more adequately study the growth of reason as a central component of personal autonomy and human freedom? But this is, in a sense, only half of this study. The whole of Part I is devoted to a clarification of the study of "socialization" and "education". What, one might ask, is the connection?

The matter is quite complex, and the bulk of my thinking on this is spread through a number of passages in this study. What I would like to do here is to present a capsule of the argument. We can begin by noting that in Mills' statement of the relation between "substantive

reason" and "freedom" (pp. 8-9), he speaks of "the social task s of reason". The tasks he is referring to are related to the involvement of the individual in the shaping of his world, the reflective participation in activities by which he can have an impact on the course of social change and thus on the course of his own life. Thus the "social task of reason" is a task relative to an achievement; and the achievement is the development of social projects by which the individual can connect his personal life to public issues of social structure. The exploration of this web of connections is, I would argue, one side of an adequate social psychology. The question is, how are the capacities developed in the course of social life related to the maintenance or transformation of social practices. The other side of social-psychological inquiry revolves around the question of how the varieties of prevailing social practices relate to the development of these human capacities. Before I tie these notions to "socialization" and "education", let me briefly clarify the ideas of "human capacities" and "social practices".

Questions about human nature I take to be questions about the character of human capacities. And questions about social structure I take to be questions about social practices. At the root of this terminology is a distinction between the manner in which the human organism is capable of performing, and the specific dimensions of the

performance. This distinction is analogous to that between talent in dancing and doing a jig or the tango. Talent can be expressed in the skilled performance of any number of specific types of dance. But one with little talent can still dance. In the same way, there are certain human capacities which lie behind the specific practices embodied in a social structure.

A crucial capacity of this sort is the capacity for rational or intelligent action. At a basic level, this is the capacity to organize one's purposes in a coherent way. With the acquisition of language, children are able to symbolically represent their goals. And with a higher development of reason, we can become capable of reflecting upon a variety of ways of formulating our goals and conceiving possible activities as related to these goals.

Now how do these ideas figure in the study of "socialization" and "education"? The study presented here pursues the second side of social-psychological inquiry, the question of how social practices relate to the development of man's rational capacities. It is not an empirical study, but an essay in clarification. I propose and attempt to clarify one approach to this problem. Toward this end, Part I deals with the study of "socialization" and "education" in contemporary social science. These two concepts, it is argued, capture the achievement

of certain levels of social reasoning. Understanding the concepts this way clarifies what it is that social practices promote in the course of human development. Social practices are thus conceived of critically, as potentially related to the tasks necessary for the achievement of socialization and education.

Part II continues the clarification of how social practices relate to the development of man's rational capacities. It is proposed that the study of individual mental growth by the cognitive-developmental approach helps us to understand what there is for us to mean by Dewey's distinction between narrow and wide uses of reason in deliberation. However, a thorough assessment of the major works by cognitive-developmental psychologists will show, it is suggested, that they have virtually ignored the other half of the problem of social psychology. They have failed to pursue their studies with an adequate theory of social structure. Such a theory would allow them to see how levels of mental development are implicated in the social structure - for example, Mills' idea of a bureaucratic ethos in which men are "'with' rationality but without reason".

This failure is reflected, I argue, in an inadequate theory to explain mental development. "Participation", for example, is mentioned by one prominent developmental

psychologist (and by social theorists in the critical tradition as well) as a general factor which promotes mental development. But "participation" is far too general a notion to explain specific levels of mental development. Participation in a culture which views dreams as the arrival of spirits will not help a child see dreams as mental phenomena. Nor will participation in planning his organization's Christmas party help the bureaucrat develop the capacity to connect his personal troubles to public issues, to recognize what policies are in his interest, and thus to understand how he can affect his own life. What is needed, I suggest, is an understanding of the specific social practices which will promote mental development, or the development of rational social and political thought. The categories for the formulation of such an explanatory theory will be drawn from a critical theory of social structure. And the framework for such a study is provided by the concepts of socialization and education.

Political Science and Human Development

The second characteristic of critical social inquiry which I mentioned as throwing light on the approach of this study was a commitment not to allow too much to be written into the disciplinary boundaries sanctioned by contemporary university life. Insofar as these boundaries

sanctify presumptions about the institutional autonomy of the economic or political or social spheres of life, they are rejected. And while there can be a genuine division of interests among students of social life, the critical social theorist recognizes the necessity of drawing together the most fruitful insights in all fields. My concern here will be with the problem of the bearing and fruitfulness of studies of individual mental development as part of a theory of the development of political thinking.

In particular, this study grew out of a dissatisfaction with the way the problem of human development has been handled in political science, under the general rubric of "political socialization". Most common among these studies are those which survey specific attitudes and beliefs of children about surface features of contemporary political life. When attention is moved from surface opinion to basic features of political thought, the approach is usually to simply tie an opinion to the basic function it serves within the individual psyche. And when more basic features of political life enter into the questioning, the focus is generally on simple measures of approval or disapproval of the government. What we fail to find, for the most part, is a critical vision of the conditions, the socio-political practices,

which promote the development of citizens' capacities for reasoned and reflective political thought.

About the notion of "political thought" to be developed here, I would argue that our vision of politics surely ought to extend beyond purely governmental decisions. Politics includes other institutional and structural features of society involved in shaping the lives of broad segments of the population. And when referring to political practices as promoting or hindering citizen development, I will likewise be drawing on a rather broad notion of politics.

Decisions taken by modern governments do not merely provide a framework for the operation of autonomous social forces. Nor are they best viewed as merely regulating or refining interactions among semi-autonomous economic, political and social spheres. Instead, we view the sphere of potential government decision as a crucial element in the process of creating an institutional life responsive to (and responsible for) all citizens. And a prime concern in the development of an institutional life responsive to human needs and respectful of human rights ought to be the development of a citizenry capable of taking responsibility and acting responsibly in political life. Urie Bronfenbrenner, in his study of child rearing in the U. S. and the U. S. S. R., has formulated this criterion as "the

concern of one generation for the next."

How can we judge the worth of a society? . . . If the children and youth of a nation are afforded opportunity to develop their capacities to the fullest, if they are given the knowledge to understand the world and the wisdom to change it, then the prospects for the future are bright. In contrast, a society which neglects its children, however well it may function in other respects, risks eventual disorganization and demise.¹³

I begin with the thesis that most academic students of the political aspects of human development have failed to come to grips with an essential question: what sorts of social and political practices will be adequate to the task of providing the conditions which promote responsible citizenship - citizenship based upon a reflective understanding of the nexus of personal life and social history? My argument will be that a failure to adequately conceptualize the process of human development and characterize its outcomes is at the root of this situation. The development of hypotheses geared to this question may be fruitfully pursued, I contend, by treating conceptual development as an essential aspect of human development. Conceptual development is viewed as a process of developing a progressively more complex and integrated framework of concepts for interpreting and acting in the world. I want to focus on the development of those conceptual capacities necessary to grasp and act responsibly toward the most

complex and most fundamental features of political life.

Thus, my work is about concepts: about the understanding of human development as conceptual development; and about the theoretical concepts used to comprehend this process of human development. I take the latter problem first, and present a discussion and critique of "political socialization" as a concept for organizing such inquiry, and a clarification of "socialization" and "education" as guides to our concerns with human development. Then, in Part II, I focus on one approach to human development, the cognitive-developmental theory, which does view the process in such a way as to highlight the emergence and importance of concepts as tools of understanding.

C H A P T E R I I
"POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION" IN CONTEMPORARY
POLITICAL SCIENCE

Terminological and Conceptual Discontinuities

In the decade or so since the term was first introduced, the study of "political socialization" has become a major subfield within the discipline of political science.¹⁴ No other field of political inquiry has expanded so rapidly, at least in terms of the number of political scientists identifying it as a major interest.¹⁵ But this growth, in interest and in the number of studies published as contributions to our understanding of "political socialization", has not been an even growth. It has been accompanied by its own methodological difficulties, first of all. But even as major works are appearing which tackle these methodological difficulties, the importance of disputes centering around the concept of "political socialization" itself are increasingly being recognized.¹⁶ As David Easton and Jack Dennis note, "there are many ways of describing the processes to which the word socialization is presumed to refer, and each description helps to predetermine the kinds of data examined, the modes of analysis applied to them, and even their final interpretation."¹⁷

If we were to attempt to characterize the actual

intellectual currents in the field or subdiscipline of political science called "political socialization", it could not be done in neat phrases like "contrasting approaches" or "contending camps" or even "coherent debates". While significant empirical work has been done and continues to appear in scholarly journals, the actual intellectual state of the field is terminological chaos and conceptual confusion. I intend to offer a remedy. But I would like to first sketch briefly some of the dimensions of the problem of terminological discontinuity.

Almost invariably, an introduction to the study of political socialization covers two points. First, we are reminded that the study of the political aspects of human learning and development has a respectable history, ranging from the works of Plato and Aristotle, through Rousseau and DeToqueville, to the researches of Charles Merriam and his associates.¹⁸ These studies are generally said to deal with "civic education", or "citizenship education" or "political education". And second, the roots of the modern behavioralist approach are exposed by mention of the first studies developing the terminology of "political socialization".

"Civic education" studies have fallen on hard times. The "behavioral movement" in political science has brought an increasing absorption in quantitative empirical

methodology, approaching at times a new "methodism".¹⁹ As Richard Dawson grants in his survey of political socialization literature, "The contemporary rigor, systemization, and method through which questions about political socialization are posed and researched . . . involve new techniques and constitute a new conceptualization."²⁰ These new conceptualizations of the political learning process are built upon the attempt to expunge all value implications from the theoretical notions used to guide political research. "Civic education" was apparently viewed as too much laden with the values and normative concerns of earlier theorists.

Another factor in the disrepute of "political education" studies is related to a connotation of intentional instruction or indoctrination which the term has acquired for some. Michael Oakeshott's attempt to rescue the term is prefaced by the following comment:

The expression "political education" has fallen on evil days; in the willful and disingenuous corruption of language which is characteristic of our time it has acquired a sinister meaning. In places other than this it is associated with softening of the mind, by force, by alarm, or by the hypnotism of the endless repetition of what was scarcely worth saying once, by means of which whole populations have been reduced to submission.²¹

Behavioral political scientists have retained a range of referents for the term "political socialization" broader

than the notion of intentional, organized instruction. Fred Greenstein makes this contrast between narrow and broad meanings of political socialization:

Narrowly conceived, political socialization is the deliberate inculcation of political information, values, and practices by instructional agents who have been formally charged with this responsibility. A broader conception would encompass all political learning, formal and informal, deliberate and unplanned, at every stage of the life cycle, including not only explicitly political learning but also nominally nonpolitical learning that affects political behavior²²

All of this would seem to indicate a fairly consistent and open terminological and conceptual shift within the discipline of political science, from the traditional-normative study of "political education", to the behavioralist study of "political socialization". The term "political socialization", and by implication the corresponding shift in conceptual concerns, is connected, then, with the emergence in the 1960's of a field of specialization "coequal with such venerable subdivisions as Constitutional Law and International Politics."²³

But even as the boundaries of the field are being secured, the need is felt to locate and elevate its intellectual progenitors. This is the second typical part of an introduction to the study of "political socialization". Herbert Hyman's book, Political Socialization, is nearly

always acclaimed. The introductory passage in an article by Greenstein is not atypical.

"Political Socialization" is a growth stock. The phrase seems never to have appeared in print before 1954, at which time it was introduced more or less in passing in the chapter on voting in the first edition of The Handbook of Social Psychology. This terminology was still exotic in 1959, when a book by Herbert Hyman entitled Political Socialization was published: as the book made clear, by that date not a single piece of research had been self-consciously carried out under the 'political socialization' rubric, even though many research findings relevant to the topic could be extracted from the often quite fugitive literature on the development of children's social orientations.²⁴

While Hyman's book came out in 1959, it is rarely noted that in 1957 David Easton conceptualized the process of political learning as "politicization".

As each person grows up in a society, through a network of rewards and punishments the other members of society communicate to and instill in him the various institutionalized goals and norms of that society. This is well known in social research as the process of socialization. Through its operation a person learns to play his various social roles. Part of these goals and norms relate to what the society considers desirable in political life. The ways in which these political patterns are learned by the members of society constitute what I call the process of politicization. Through it a person learns to play his political roles, which include the absorption of the proper political attitudes.²⁵

This is merely a terminological difference, to be sure. For in his cooperative research with Robert Hess, Easton adopts the term "political socialization" to cover the

same view of the political aspects of learning and development.²⁶ The conceptual content being unaltered, the shift in terminology might have been influenced by the growing currency of "political socialization", or by the divergence in this conceptualization from previous attempts to attach a meaning to the term "politicization". The following definition of "politicization" is offered, for example, by Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan in their widely known work, Power and Society.

Conduct is politicized in the degree that it is determined by consideration of power indulgence or deprivation of the self by the other.²⁷

Here politicization would be the transforming of social relations into power relations, rather than, as Easton viewed it, the inculcation of the dominant political norms and values. Lasswell and Kaplan draw on the notion of power motivated activity. Easton's most recent book, on the other hand, reinstates the term "politicization" within the conceptual framework of "political socialization" and gives it the sense of becoming politically aware. Children in the political System, by Easton and Jack Dennis, identifies four major processes involved in early political socialization, one of which is termed 'politicization'. Here, a child who is thoroughly politicized "has become aware of the presence of an authority outside of

and more powerful than the family."²⁸

Easton's shift from the term 'politicization' to 'political socialization' as a generic category should cause no discomfort to those who wish to move quickly to identifying empirical gaps in the literature, or to bringing data to bear on divergent hypotheses generated by theoretical reflection on a process whose main dimensions have been agreed upon. Any number of studies could be cited which note a fairly wide range of definitions of political socialization, and then select one "for present purposes" in order to get on with the business at hand.

But Easton's terminological shift to the mainstream in the early 1960's culminated in 1969 with a general critique of all previous conceptualization of political socialization. This explicit departure is made because earlier definitions "typically refer to phenomena that we consider too variable to include with confidence in the basic description of political socialization."²⁹

Consider now the further discomfort which might be felt, by one attempting to gain acquaintance with the dominant debates and camps in the field, when it is discovered that Easton's former collaborator, Robert Hess, now rejects not only the term but also the concept of political socialization itself.

The concept of political socialization is no longer adequate as a tool for understanding the political behavior of the young or for studying the processes through which it is acquired.³⁰

It is also noteworthy that the term "political education" and "civic education" have not in fact been dropped from the vocabularies of "political socialization" researchers, despite any possible "sinister meaning", value connotations or empirical imprecision which might be adduced. Fred Greenstein uses the term freely, and apparently often interchangeably with 'political socialization'.³¹ A survey of literature by Richard Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, on the other hand, identifies 'political education' as a sub-type of political socialization. It is, for them distinguished first of all as a transmission of specifically political orientations, and secondly as an intentional or deliberate process.³²

Others, such as Robert Pranger and Christian Bay, have made contributions to distinguishing the spheres of political education and political socialization processes. They have not considered them as alternative terms to cover a single process of political learning and development. They are seen rather as the names of alternative and competing processes or modes of communication within a political culture.³³

It appears that the terminological and conceptual

variations may reflect an incipient intellectual chaos. Closer to the truth may be the observation that social conflict has produced deeper questions and deeper divisions among those reflecting on human nature and society. Robert Hess suggests such a process in relating that when he adopted the term political socialization for research in the late 1950's,

One feature of the political life of pre-adults was a general lack of fervor and conflict over political issues and problems In that tranquil atmosphere, the concept of political socialization seemed singularly apt. Since then, the political life of the youth of this country has changed in dramatic ways.³⁴

Most of the authors I have cited recognize that their choice of terms is not arbitrary. We cannot divorce ourselves entirely from considerations of the historical accretions of meaning which become attached to our terms. Nor can we ignore the current vocabularies of the social sciences. Intellectual progress, even sanity, weigh against each choosing a technical and idiosyncratic meaning for his terms. But few have recognized and confronted the deep-rooted assumptions about man and society which influence the choice of conceptual content in the process of explication.

From this brief survey we can at least conclude that some order must be brought to this area of study if communication between competing views is to be possible.

Two Views of An Emerging Debate

Some of the difficulties in explicating the concept of "political socialization" can be attributed to factors such as the very rapidity of growth of interest in the topic, or the time lag between the borrowing of a concept and an understanding of the various disciplinary and theoretical contexts from which it was torn in the process of importation. These could be seen as temporary problems to be worked out with increasing interdisciplinary sophistication and expanded research. This view is summarised by Fred Greenstein:

Conditions of rapid growth are bound to generate a certain amount of confusion The confusion about political socialization begins with the very meaning of the phrase: there seem to be at least four prevailing usages, and some of the contestation on the general merits of political socialization inquiry appears to be of the blind-men-and-the-elephant variety, with the debating parties disagreeing on the implicit referents of their terms rather than on empirical grounds.³⁸

On Greenstein's usage, which is common among "political socialization" theorists, "political education" is taken as an alternative term to cover the same phenomena. The debate is thus terminological and the real issues largely "empirical".

The "elephant" story aside, Greenstein might be saying that our concepts are "open" in the sense that there is a range of possible empirical research necessary

prior to a full characterization of the phenomenon in question. It is here, he admonishes, that disagreements should focus. But while it is true that our concepts are open in this sense, they are also "open textured" in the sense that they are imbedded in a larger system of tacit rules and meanings.³⁹ It is this larger system of meanings that we refer to as a theoretical perspective or framework. If a theoretical or conceptual framework is taken as a given, as unquestioned, then, the fruitfulness of a concept is indeed wholly an empirical matter. A different perspective emerges, however, when we focus on the theoretical framework itself.

Greenstein's "blind-men-and-the-elephant" analogy is a singularly inappropriate one for his purposes. He wants to argue that the current disputes over the fruitfulness of different explications of "political socialization" amount to nothing more than a definitional quibble. Explanatory fruitfulness can only be determined by hard empirical research, he admonishes us. What he fails to note is that the blind men are engaged in a quibble about how to describe an "elephant", not how to explain it. The story does illustrate an important point: that phenomena can in principle be classified in an indefinite number of ways. But imagine now that the fourth blind man took Greenstein's advice and moved immediately to

empirical research, in order to explain how this tree-like creature moves. (The fourth blind man is touching the elephant's leg.) Certainly we can see that his initial characterization has involved empirical assumptions which render his task ludicrous. He will not, for example, investigate "slithering" mechanisms; nor will he have any inclination to give an account in terms of "walking"; for "tree-like" is equivalent to "one-legged".

What we can draw from this fable is the lesson that phenomena can be classified in an indefinite number of ways. Concepts, embedded as they are in theoretical frameworks, involve one in a particular characterization of the phenomenon in question, thus closing off an indefinite number of descriptive possibilities. And this partial closure of our concepts involves the importation of empirical assumptions into explanatory research.

While in Greenstein's view, "political socialization" and "political education" are alternative terms to cover the same phenomenon, Christian Bay applies the terms to what he sees as crucially different phenomena. Elaborating on a distinction made by Robert Pranger,⁴⁰ Bay views "political socialization" studies as capturing "the ways in which established political norms are implanted on nonsuspecting youngsters, who by and large become molded toward accepting what exists, rather than educated

toward questioning and judging the present and seeking better ways for the future."⁴¹ "Political education", on the other hand, is directed toward "equipping us to seek and promote the best political order."⁴² According to Pranger's formulation, the aim of "political education" is to produce "the free man armed with enough political sophistication to participate in politics as a person with the capacity for independent judgment, despite the pressures from political socialization."⁴³

As I have said, we want to find a way of understanding these terminological and conceptual divergences which will bring some clarity to this area of inquiry. A good part of this task of clarification is philosophical. But the possible contributions of philosophy to the debate are almost totally unexplored, and the few contributions which have been made are largely ignored in the political science literature. When Richard Peters was preparing an analysis of the concept of education in 1963, he was "unable to unearth any previous attempt to demarcate the concept of 'education'."⁴⁴ And there is, to my knowledge, no explicitly philosophical clarification of the concept of socialization, and only a small number which pay any serious notice to the complexities of the concept.⁴⁵ The terrain is thus largely unexplored, and I offer my comments with some hesitancy. They can be

judged fruitful, I believe, if they aid in the two main tasks I have set for this work: first, a critique of the currently accepted concept of political socialization; and secondly, an attempt to assess one possible approach to the study of political education.

The kernel of my thesis about "socialization" and "education" can be introduced in two parts. First, the use given to a wide range of concepts, including "socialization" and "education", is governed to a large extent by complex webs of normative commitments which I will refer to as a "conformity perspective" and a "developmental perspective".⁴⁶ Alternative readings of these two terms, "socialization" and "education", are shaped by the commitments involved in these two perspectives. In the next section of this chapter we will lay out briefly the crucial tenets of the "conformity" and "developmental" perspectives. In the following chapters I will show how certain uses of "socialization" and "education" are related to these perspectives. I will argue that since the conformity perspective closes off important empirical questions, it may have undesirable results for political inquiry and for political life.

The second part of my thesis about "socialization" and "education" is an attempt to clarify a more prominent feature of the debate, the question of "aims". I will be

arguing first that the normative component of each concept is bound up in the different level of human development it picks out. In order to clarify this dimension of these concepts we turn in Part II to an assessment of "cognitive-developmental" psychology. The criteria which different processes and activities must meet, if they are to contribute to "socialization" or "education" are tied to the achievement of different levels of rationality in the course of mental development.

We will turn now first to the perspectives which I have labelled "conformity" and "developmental", and then in the next three chapters to a clarification of the concepts of "socialization" and "education".

The Conformity Perspective and the Developmental Perspective

We have looked at some terminological and conceptual discontinuities which have plagued the political science literature on learning and development. There has been, in general, a failure to probe into the sources of these surface differences. Just as the clash and clang of issue conflict in the governmental arena may divert attention from submerged issues, so also in the intellectual arena some of the most significant incipient challenges to prevalent conceptions of political socialization may be lost in the heat of contest over minor points. The debates

within the political socialization literature generally range only through matters of research strategy and methodology, and fail to touch on fundamental assumptions and perspectives. Fred Greenstein, as we have seen, takes up the criticism that political socialization studies operate with a pervasive conservative bias and dismisses it quickly as either a simple misunderstanding or a definitional quibble.⁴⁷ But if definitional differences have important ramifications, we cannot dismiss them as trivial.

Every discussion of politics carries with it a conception of human nature - a psychology and a philosophy of man. This is true regardless of the priority one gives to the understanding of whole political systems as an aim or focus of study. As Robert Lane has noted,

Classical political theorists relied, implicitly or overtly, on assumptions regarding the plasticity, socialibility, fearfulness, ambition, conscience of mankind. Sophisticated modern political theorists, more conscious of the many dimensions of human nature, may turn to the theories of contemporary psychology and psychiatry to inform their doctrines and make their conceptions more plausible.⁴⁸

This, surely, must be a recognized premise of any empirical study of political socialization or political education. But in choosing a particular psychological theory, we may close off certain questions and possibilities relating to human capacities and abilities. Political scientists who

remain aware of this, without denying the need for empirical research, would do well to consider the warning announced by Sigmund Koch.

That modern psychology has projected an image of man which is as demeaning as it is simplistic, few intelligent and sensitive non-psychologists would deny. To such men - whether they be scientist, humanist or citizen - psychology has increasingly become an object of derision But for the rest, the mass dehumanization process which characterizes our time - the attenuation of the capacity for experience - continues apace. Of all fields in the community of scholarship, it should be psychology which combats this trend. Instead, we have played no small role in augmenting and supporting it.⁴⁹

Psychologists and philosophers have engaged in reflection on their perspectives on human nature, but political scientists have not often drawn on this type of thought in assessing the psychological dimensions of their research. Without endorsing his precise assessment, we can cite Carl Rogers' attempt to come to grips with this dimension of research.

Each current psychology has its own implicit philosophy of man. Though not often stated explicitly, these philosophies exert their influence in many significant and subtle ways. For the behaviorist, man is a machine, a complicated but nonetheless understandable machine, which we can learn to manipulate with greater and greater skill until he thinks the thoughts, moves in the directions, and behaves in the ways selected for him. For the Freudian, man is an irrational being, irrevocably in the grip of his past and of the product of that past, his unconscious.

It is not necessary to deny that there is truth in each of these formulations in order to recognize that there is another perspective. From the existential

perspective, from within the phenomenological internal frame of reference, man does not simply have the characteristics of a machine; he is not simply a being in the grip of unconscious motives; he is a person in the process of creating himself, a person who creates meaning in life, a person who embodies a dimension of subjective freedom He is able to live dimensions of his life which are not fully or adequately contained in a description of his conditioning or of his unconscious.⁵⁰

The last sentence in this passage is important. The claim is made that certain explanatory theories in psychology close off descriptive possibilities, and that these descriptive possibilities may be linked to the perspective on man which underlies and merges into empirical research. Failure to recognize this possibility of closing off descriptive avenues and thus possibilities for empirical research has contributed to the confusion about the concepts of socialization and education as frameworks for research.

The perspective on human learning and development which prevails in the "political socialization" literature will be called the "conformity perspective". And the perspective built up by competing views which advocate the study of "political education" will be called the "developmental perspective". These perspectives can be characterized in terms of a broad set of ideas which influence the selection of research problems, the selection of theoretical frameworks from the psychological and sociological sciences, the analogies and metaphors

selected in making interpretations of research plausible to the research community, and the view taken of the consequences of research for social and political life. The Conformity and Developmental perspectives are in one sense ideal types. No single author explicitly and consistently adheres to all the positions on major questions relating to learning and development. But the issues and positions do constitute a fairly coherent set of clues as to an author's image of man.

Each of these perspectives involves, first of all, a broad view of how man does and can relate to his world and how fulfillment, realization or personal meaning is achieved in the course of his life. A general view of the alternatives is laid out by Silvan Tompkins.

Is man the measure, an end in himself, an active, creative, thinking, desiring, logging force in nature? Or must man realize himself, attain his full stature, conformity to, a norm, a measure, an ideal essence basically independent of man?⁵¹

Tompkins traces the ideas which "resonate" with these two positions in mathematics, the philosophy of science, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, art, educational theory, psychology, etc. In the psychological and sociological literature on learning and development, this issue is frequently interpreted as dealing with assumptions about the source of "initiative" in these processes.⁵² But it is important to note that there are clearly different views

about the nature and criteria of human fulfillment. Assumptions are made about what is and is not worthwhile in the products of learning and development. But in actual research, these assumptions are not always made explicit. The conformity perspective, as we shall see, suffers from an "Ostrich complex", denying, when challenged, that any normative commitment preceeds or is supported by its empirical presumptions. Both the conformity and the developmental perspectives grant that we must postulate certain human capacities which are required if there is to be any social life at all. Where they differ is in how we are to characterize these capacities.

1. The Conformity Perspective. Finding the measure and fulfillment of men given outside of, and beyond them, the conformity perspective sees man as a passive recipient of those beliefs, values, etc. in terms of which we specify his behavior. The capacities given in the character of human existence are displayed in the molding of man by social stimuli and his adaptability in the face of social demands connected with the stability, continuity and survival of the group. Man, in other words, is the passive recipient of societal norms and values connected with these goals; and these norms and values are impressed by its agents on his mind or geared into his behavior patterns. Human capacities are specified in terms

of a metaphor of malleability or plasticity. And this often amounts to the view that man's uniqueness lies in his capacity to be trained or conditioned to fit into existing societal patterns.

In taking conditioning or training as paradigm cases of learning, conformity theorists typically adopt explanatory notions which can be assimilated metaphorically to the ideas of collision and manipulation. At the explanatory level, these theorists often involve themselves in a language of material force and mechanistically conceived causal laws. Agency or assertiveness is attributed to the "other", not to a "self". In the explanation of human behavior, agency moves to the fringes of attention. The whole landscape becomes a collection of passive, plastic objects, or at least it is the "other" who becomes the source of assertion and decision. As the environment impacts upon the organism, its malleability is indicated by the emergence of responses which correlate with (are a function of, reducible to, conform to, caused by, etc.) the initial stimuli. If there are purposes gleaned in his pattern of conduct, they are not in any irreducible sense his purposes, the purposes of an agent and definitive of his capacities; for mind is seen as a more or less direct reflection of environmental agency.

The man who emerges from these learning processes

is seen as a direct reflection of social forces, past and present. His actions appear to be calculable as an equilibrium point among vectors of differing direction and intensity. Social groups and organizations provide us with the social cues, expectations and pressures that imbue a pattern of life with coherence. And social practices involve actions which we are led to view "as if" they were our own.

2. The Developmental Perspective. The conformity perspective as we have seen, takes the capacities of man to be unchangingly specified in the minimal requisites for social functioning. While the content of what is learned may change, the manner of coming to grips with the social world (i.e., conformity) is set in an image of unchanging human nature. The developmental perspective, however, views man's nature in terms of the progressive development of his capacities, or qualitative changes in his mode of acting in the world. And it is in the framework of these changing capacities that man seeks his fulfillment. In loving and hating, creating and transforming, risking and protecting, appreciating and resenting, in all these activities man defines and, as he develops his capacities, redefines the dimensions of his human fulfillment.

The developmental perspective thus offers a characterization of man in terms of capacities which can

be developed. These human capacities may be understood outside the context of any contribution to social functioning. The development of human capacities may contribute to social stability, or social transformation, or they may not contribute at all to the structural properties or functional capacities of the social system. Instead of seeing man as the passive target of environmental impress, this perspective sees man as actively structuring the perception and knowledge of his world. And his activity is essential in the development of qualitatively new modes of acting, new capacities. This is not by any means a postulate which involves denying the influence of the social environment on human learning and development. It is rather a claim that exchanges between human beings and the social world are interactive exchanges.

Human capacities, human ways of performing, are captured by notions which relate together the specific beliefs etc. of an agent, one who chooses, decides, intends - one who in other words is the source of an assertive point of view. One of these ways of characterizing human capacities from a developmental point of view is in terms of rationality, and it is this capacity which will be of particular concern in this paper. Viewing man in terms of the development of essential capacities does not involve the claim that men can ever become totally

self-conscious or able to reflect critically on all aspects of their situation at one time. But the development of one's capacity for reflective reason can enhance the ability to step back from a situation with apparently "given" alternatives and reconsider the alternatives in light of values which transcend the practices structuring the situation. Habits of mind and established practices become less entrenched. And the emergence of new perspectives and possibilities need not bring one to the brink of confusion and panic, but can provide challenges to the most human and humane activities.

C H A P T E R I I I

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIALIZATION IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL SCIENCE

Origins of the Concept of Socialization

Only a small amount of attention has been given in the last decade or so to the definition of the term "socialization". A full understanding of the intellectual history of the term is beyond the scope of this section. It would involve a treatment of the practical and theoretical concerns of many thinkers through the centuries who have written of the process under a different label; a consideration of the social, political and intellectual climate in which the term first acquired conceptual significance; and an exceptional cross-disciplinary competence, sufficient to grasp the core concerns of sociology, psychology, and anthropology in the process.⁵³

We will look here first at the origin of the term, and then at the meaning it had for the scholars who first attributed to it a broad theoretical importance. What questions did they ask? What issues led them to focus on and fill out a conception of socialization? Theory is developed in response to questions we ask about reality. And, as Dennis Wrong reminds us, "Forgetfulness of the questions that are the starting point of inquiry leads us

to ignore the substantive assumptions 'buried' in our concepts and commits us to a one-sided view of reality."⁵⁴

The term "socialization", like most others developed as concepts for the social sciences, was used in ordinary discourse long before being appropriated as theoretically significant by sociologists and psychologists. There seem to have been three important early usages.⁵⁵ First of all, the term was used as a political-economic concept - in the sense of subjecting to collective (or governmental) ownership or control, as when socializing the economy refers to establishing collective ownership of the means of production. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, "to socialize" can mean "to establish or develop according to the theories or principles of socialism." In a second usage, socialization captured the idea of a universalizing of culture, overcoming differences, or creating moral and political unity among all men. A third use of "socialize", noted by the OED as early as 1828, gave it the sense of "to render social, to make fit for living in society".

The first two types of uses noted above were both present in the literature of the social sciences through the first decades of this century. In the edition of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences published in 1938, the article on "Socialization" dealt with the first type of use, as a concept of political economy. In 1921,

Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess wrote that "Socialization, when that word is used as a term of appreciation rather than description, sets up as the goal of social effort a world in which conflict, competition and the externality of individuals, if they do not disappear altogether, will be diminished that all men may live together as members of one family."⁵⁶ And in 1939 Park seemed to be drawing on both the political-economic and socio-cultural uses when he wrote of "the progressive socialization of the world, that is, the incorporation of all the peoples of the earth in a world-wide economy, which had laid the foundations for the rising world-wide political and moral order."⁵⁷ Both of these uses of the term involve developmental notions, i.e. they point to standards or conditions which may or may not be achieved. A task is indicated, and this is related internally to an achievement which serves as the fundamental criteria of the associated processes.

Socialization and Conformity: An Exposition

In turning to the third, early lexical, definition of socialization, "to render social, to make fit for living in society," we must note first a crucial ambiguity which appears in refining this definition. Unless one carefully attends to the distinctions we find in the

ordinary uses related to this definition, it is not clear whether the important reference is to the beliefs etc. which are necessary if there is to be any society or social life at all, or to the beliefs etc. which are required of a child by "the special milieu for which he is specifically destined."⁵⁸ It is my thesis that the most fruitful explication will root itself firmly in reflection on the core idea of what is necessary for there to be any social life, or what is presumed by the notion of man as a social animal. Indeed, John Clausen notes that the first sociological usage of the term "appears to have derived from the concern of early sociologists with the problem of how society is possible."⁵⁹ Socialization is an apt term for organizing reflection on this question, for in its central uses it captures a ground-level vision of human rationality. That is, the most important achievement picked out is the achievement of a basic ability to reason, through language, in achieving a coherent organization of purposes.

But with the growth of a "scientific sociology" modeled on the natural sciences, the central implication of socialization has become "that the individual is induced in some measure to conform willingly to the ways of his society or of the particular group to which he belongs."⁶⁰ In other words, where the definition "to

render social" can be interpreted along the lines of what is required for there to be any social life, or as what is required in a specific social order, the social sciences pursued primarily the latter sense of the term. This course of inquiry is not inappropriate as long as we recognize the crucial link between these two aspects of socialization. However, when these investigations are pursued from the conformity perspective, the link with the more fundamental sense of socialization is cut. My critique begins with the failure to attend to the development of those human capacities required in any society. I want to argue that any such inquiry into the requirements of a specific social order must not lose touch with the more fundamental question of the requirements of any social order. We must not lose sight of the basic human capacities whose development is presupposed by the idea of a human society.

The same issue of the American Journal of Sociology in which Park referred to "the progressive socialization of the world" contained an article by John Dollard, in which socialization was defined as "the process of training a human animal from birth on for social participation in his group."⁶¹ From this time, the conformity perspective has prevailed in most thinking about the empirical fruitfulness of the notion of socialization. Three features of

Dallard's definition are noteworthy. First, socialization is itself taken to be a process, rather than indicating criteria which processes such as training, instructing etc. must meet if they are to be referred to as socialization. Second, the process is equated with training, and it is one feature of this notion that the criteria of success is not given in the activity itself. Socialization is thus made to imply a method of achieving extrinsic ends. And third, these extrinsic ends are specified by the beliefs etc. of a particular group.

Dollard also noted at that time a dichotomy that has dominated thinking about the assumptions and hypotheses of a theory of socialization.

The 'child development' movement is closely allied to the study of socialization. The trouble with this conception is that it implies that development is more or less automatic, granted certain conditions, while the socialization concept pictures development as occurring only under pressure and sometimes heavy pressure.⁶²

The language of both "heavy pressures" and "automatic development", calls to mind a vocabulary of mechanisms, when in fact he is speaking, we must presume, of human beings.

The "official certification" of the conformity perspective on socialization came with Irvin Child's 1954 review article in the Handbook of Social Psychology.⁶³

Child defined socialization as "the whole process by which an individual born with behavioral potentialities of an enormously wide range, is led to develop actual behavior which is confined within a much narrower range - the range of what is customary and acceptable for him according to the standards of his group."⁶⁴

I cannot deal here with the factors which led to a narrowing of the types of usage given to the term socialization. One could almost say it became a cross-disciplinary paradigm for socio-psychological research. And it should be noted that this development was accompanied by a vast expansion of the amount of research done under the rubric of "socialization", as well as a multiplication of the disciplinary and theoretical perspectives which competed to establish which were the most important problems to solve in expanding our understanding of "socialization".

Irvin Child's 1954 review of the relevant literature for the Handbook of Social Psychology, titled "Socialization", also gave the term something like an official status as designating a field of inquiry in a broad sense.⁶⁵ Many social scientists have taken this "field of inquiry" status of the term as warrant for omitting a definition of the term. But repeatedly one finds further statements about what socialization "is" or what it "means" scattered throughout the pages of these researches.⁶⁶ Thus, one ambiguity of the term lies in its use, on the one hand,

in a general or broad sense to designate a field of inquiry, and, on the other hand, to narrow down the specific conception of socialization to make it as compatible as possible with the authors' commitments on basic theoretical issues.

Other terms have been employed in the past, and are used today, to refer to what is now called socialization - in the broad sense of the designating a focus of interest. Child rearing, enculturation, education, occupational preparation, role learning, etc. are examples of terms which could be used to pick out a relevant aspect of social reality. But the assumptions and implications of each terminology varies, as a certain conceptual boundary is established in use. In the case of socialization, the original theoretical question to which its scientific conceptualization from the conformity perspective constituted a response was not "how is society (or group life) possible?"⁶⁷ but rather, "how is it that an infant acquires the behaviors (beliefs etc.) of the specific group or society in which he was born?"

"Education" is treated as virtually synonymous with "socialization" by these authors in many cases (e.g. Greenstein, as we noted above). When it is distinguished explicitly it is generally in terms of two rather ambiguous criteria: Education is taken to imply a more

formal and a more explicitly intentional or directed learning process. In this case, education can be viewed as a particular type of socialization, and socialization as a particular type of training. Both terms thus are taken as picking out processes and activities directed towards ends external to the processes themselves.

At the individual level, human learning and development are treated as adjustment to the demands of group life, the receiving of group or societal norms and values. At the social system level, the focus is on the shaping and molding of man by his society, and the effect of these processes, in turn, on social cohesion and stability. And insofar as it is admitted that human beings are capable of satisfaction or frustration, fulfillment or misery - that men can find one form of life in some sense better than others - this fulfillment or satisfaction comes through conformity to socially defined behavior patterns.

At the individual level, a view of man as essentially passive, plastic and malleable is most typical of attempts to apply the principles of behaviorist learning theory to social learning. And at the system level, this view of man is most typical of structural-functional theorists. This latter is the perspective of Alex Inkeles when he specifies the elements of a sociological view of man.

Man's 'original nature' is seen largely in neutral terms, as neither good nor bad If it does not quite treat him as a 'tabula rasa', modern sociology, nevertheless, regards him as a flexible form which can be given all manner of content.

Socialization, the process of learning one's culture while growing out of infant and childhood dependency, leads to internalization of society's values and goals. People come to want to do what from the point of society they must do. Man is, therefore, seen, in his inner being, as mainly moral, by and large accepting and fulfilling the demands society makes on him Locked into a network of social relationships, dependent on others for support and cooperation, he responds to external pressures which again push him to act mainly in accord with the norms and standards characteristic of society in his time and place.⁶⁸

Here we have an explicit formulation of several of the theses of the conformity perspective, and definition of socialization in terms of conformity. Man is viewed, first of all, as malleable and plastic, "a flexible form which can be given all manner of content." Man is also seen as the passive recipient of cultural, societal, and group norms and values. The fundamental motivation to conform to the demands of society, to engage the cultural, social and group norms of his environment (captured by the process term "internalization"), is found in a characterization of man as an acceptance-seeker, "eager to earn the good will and approbation" of others in his network of social relationships. And the language of mechanism and manipulation is clearly applied when he speaks of

"external pressures which . . . push him to act"

Elsewhere Inkeles states that "the objective of socialization is to produce competent people, as competence is defined in any given society"; and the "aspects of competence" he deals with in this article "are precisely those which one requires either to continue as part of, or attain to a position in, middle-class America."⁶⁹

And Inkeles' use of the term is not at all atypical, for there is no question, in the following quotations, about the intention to pick out the molding of children to a very specific form, getting them to conform to what is acceptable in a particular society.

Socialization consists of those patterns of action or aspects of action which inculcate in individuals the skills (including knowledge), motives and attitudes necessary for the performance of present or anticipated roles.⁷⁰

The socialization process . . . is the process by which people are developed into social system members, who carry in their heads as cathexes, cognitions, and evaluations the culture of the system.⁷¹

From the sociological point of view, socialization refers to the process whereby individuals acquire the personal system properties - the knowledge, skills, attitudes, values, needs and motivations, cognitive, affective and conative patterns - which shape their adaptation to the physical and sociocultural setting in which they live.⁷²

We may define socialization as the process by which someone learns the ways of a given society or social group so that he can function within it.⁷³

Socialization is the learning of patterns of behavior which are conventional in the society.⁷⁴

But the conformity perspective has not captured the entire range of literature dealing with the empirical study of human learning and development. For example, the "symbolic-interactionist" school of sociology and social-psychology, built up around the works of C. H. Cooley, W. I. Thomas and G. H. Mead, has kept alive a mode of discourse which challenges the assumptions of the conformity perspective. This literature characteristically draws on a language of choice, decision and purposive activity. Usage of the term "socialization" retains the important sense of becoming a human, i.e., social, being - getting children to the point where they are able to grasp and communicate about the basic rules of social life. One textbook in this tradition, for example states that "the child becomes socialized when he has acquired the ability to communicate with others and to influence and be influenced by them through the use of speech."⁷⁵

Some sociologists in the conformity school, on the other hand, have explicitly recognized a moral quality of man which sets him off from society in a way that can hardly be captured by mechanistic notions of engendering conformity of passive organisms to an intransigently external social order. Ralf Dahrendorf, for example notes that "this moral quality of man detaches him in principle from all claims of society."⁷⁶ This aspect of human

development is not, however, open to social research for Dahrendorf; for "what sociological theory does not tell us about man is his moral quality." But perhaps social science is limited in this way, on Dahrendorf's view, because of the restrictive notion of "science" he and others adopt. Dahrendorf continues:

Scientifically it may be plausible and useful to interpret the educational process as the socialization of the individual, but morally it is crucial that the individual be capable of holding his own against the claims of society.⁷⁷

We will quote now another passage from Dahrendorf which makes clear how he interprets the implications of the moral quality of man for sociological theory.

Now the assumption that man behaves as homo sociologicus makes possible a general explanatory proposition; that a person in a situation of role conflict will always choose the role with which the stronger sanctions are associated This is an example of "good" sociological theory All this is true even though the role conformity assumed by the theory is "unrealistic", in the sense that there are many people who do not behave in the manner postulated here. If we should now try to make our assumption "realistic", the entire theory would fall to pieces. The following statement would clearly be more "realistic": "'In the face of the role conflict, many people (perhaps 60 per cent) are inclined to prefer the role with which the stronger sanctions are associated; others (say 25 per cent) behave in accordance with moral principles without regard to social sanctions; and some (say 15 per cent) react to role conflicts with complete resignation or passivity.'" Such a statement is all very well, but it can no longer be used to explain anything.⁷⁸

In making his proposition more "realistic", what Dahrendorf has done is to specify the types of reasons for an action which constitute the context for decision of various individuals. While this more "realistic" proposition might not explain what Dahrendorf is intent on explaining, because it is not in general form, it is not devoid of explanatory significance. Within a developmental perspective, one might formulate a proposition such as: a person who has reached a stage of moral development in which right and wrong are defined in terms of external sanctions, will always choose the role with which the stronger sanctions are associated. And more importantly, propositions such as the following can be formulated: social conditions X will facilitate the development of persons who behave in accordance with moral principles, rather than merely responding to external sanctions.

We need a more adequate explication of the concepts of socialization and education for organizing and guiding investigations such as these. As we turn to this task, we present a critique of the interpretation of "socialization" in terms of conformity, and a clarification of the primary sense of the term - development of those capacities required of human beings if there is to be any social life at all.

C H A P T E R I V
THE CONCEPT OF SOCIALIZATION: A CRITIQUE
AND A CLARIFICATION

The danger in the pattern of the analysis of socialization in terms of molding a child's essentially malleable mind lies in a tacit promotion of conformity for conformity's sake. The analysis is guided by the restrictive conception of what the scientific study of man ought to be like which emerged under the influence of positivism; and the failure here reflects on this program. In order to see where the fault in this analysis lies we must look at the empirical questions which cannot but fail to emerge, and the tacit normative commitments which cannot be avoided by social scientists who view socialization as conformity-training.

First of all, as we noted earlier, "socialization" is viewed as the name of a process or activity. Frequently it is taken to imply that socialization is a method, distinguished from formal teaching or instruction.⁷⁹ The result of treating socialization as a process is to sever the conceptual connection with any human achievement. This supposedly preserves the "scientific" value neutrality of social science, for the connection with what is learned through this method is an external, wholly empirical one. Any particular beliefs, values, etc. could be learned

through this method, and the study of this process ventures no normative criteria as to what is to be included. But when we speak of a man's beliefs, attitudes, values, etc., we are not citing his essential capacities. Instead, these terms specify the categories by which we distinguish his specific performances. If, on the other hand, by "socialization" we pick out an achievement - the achievement of those mental capacities which warrant the claim to be a social human being - then the application of the term involves certain normative judgments. The achievement is, I want to suggest, the capacity to reason, to organize one's purposes through communication in a public order.

Now there is a certain kernal of truth in the conformity interpretation. That is, basic social rules must also be the rules of some particular society. However, while it is true that societies will specify these rules differently, there must be some such rules. It has been argued by several contemporary philosophers, for example, that any society must have rules about not injuring others, caring for the young, and the distribution of goods; and these rules presume the centrality of notions of truth-telling, consideration of interests and justice.⁸⁰ It is the capacity to grasp and apply these rules in the conduct of life that is captured by the notion of rationality. There are in addition, as Alasdair

MacIntyre notes, "some commonsense beliefs (about day and night, the weather and the material environment generally) which are inescapable for any rational agent,"⁸¹ And it is this achievement of rationality, necessary to the persistence of any social order, which is central to the criteria of socialization.

John Clausen comes close to noting this essential connection with rationality in the following passage.

Deviance may be a consequence of deviant socialization experiences - that is, of socialization to deviant norms, or of the individual's emotional or rational rejection of norms. Nothing is explained by saying that an individual is 'unsocialized' unless the nature of the deficiencies in his socialization can be specified. Conversely, conformity in itself is not evidence of successful socialization. Neither the rigidly conforming neurotic nor the person who conforms without being committed to group goals can be regarded as an ideal product of socialization.⁸²

In considering the possible meanings of "unsocialized", Clausen notes four alternatives. The first alternative, "socialization to deviant norms", is on the face it contradictory. This type of confused statement is not infrequent in the literature, and the source of confusion is the attempt to treat socialization as the name of a process which is externally related to its outcome. But this attempt clearly comes to grief when we look at the implications of picking out "unsocialized" behavior. For it is perverse to maintain that unsocialized behavior could be the

successful outcome of a socialization process. But let us overlook this for the moment and ask what the socialization theorist might be trying to convey by implying a connection between socialization and deviant behavior. The answer, of course, is that in distinguishing between dominant and deviant socialization, the hope is to avoid the charge that "socialization" has an inherent conservative or status quo bias. Socialization may be to dominant or deviant norms, and is not centrally connected to the stability of a particular social order (although it is still interpreted as the learning of particular social beliefs or norms). The attempt must ultimately fail however. Given the notion that socialization is externally related to a particular set of norms (and also the presumption that learning the particular beliefs and norms of some group is implied), socialization may be characterized as dominant relative to one group, deviant at a second level, dominant in a third order of social participation, etc. The characterization as dominant or deviant is wholly arbitrary: unless, that is, the beliefs etc., of a particular social order are reinstated covertly as an implicit normative criterion. In the latter case, of course, characterizing a learning process as "socialization" does indeed imply a crucial connection with the stability of that social order.

The fourth alternative suggested by Clausen as an interpretation of "unsocialized" - rational rejection of norms - is also implausible. We would hardly say of a young man who, with a clear mind, sound reasons and a coherent argument, commits himself to a non-violent refusal of induction into the military, that he is "unsocialized". It could be implied, of course, that his position has been influenced by "deviant socialization" - participation in a social group which rejects loyalty to war-making organizations or rejects war under any aegis. However, aside from the difficulties with the notion of "deviant socialization" noted above, this interpretation is counter to the thrust of "rational rejection of norms" as implying a self-conscious and autonomous decision.

In the other two cases, "incomplete or inadequate communication of norms," and "emotional. . . rejection of norms", we are getting closer to the heart of the central criteria of socialization. I cannot take up here a full analysis of the many faces of these interpretations. But I can point out that in the latter case ("emotional . . . rejection of norms") it would be important to distinguish between being "overcome by emotion" and acting out of, for example, jealousy. When we say someone is overcome with emotion, we imply his vision is clouded, that his grasp of the situation is unclear;⁸³ and in this case

I don't think we would speak of "unsocialized" behavior. The link with rational behavior is not severed, but rather the field of action is blurred. When a husband pleads in court, however, that he killed his wife in a fit of jealousy, he is claiming that he could not help doing what he knows clearly he did. He acted without regard to reason and calling this "unsocialized" behavior would not be inappropriate.

Although Clausen's suggestions about the possible meanings of "unsocialized" miss the mark, I believe, in the passage we are discussing he does suggest two cases which bring us closer to its central meaning: "Neither the rigidly conforming neurotic nor the the person who conforms without being committed to group goals can be regarded as an ideal product of socialization." The behavior of the "rigidly conforming neurotic" does not exhibit understanding of how his behavior fits into the social context - the pattern of behavior is fixed in regard to some point in his past. This suggests that the capacity to understand the basic features of the social context is an important part of what we convey by the idea of "socialized" behavior.

But what of "the person who conforms without being committed to group goals"? This case suggests a second important criterion of socialization. A person must not

merely be brought to the point of understanding the basic requirements of an ongoing social life; he must also be committed in some sense to the implications of his behavior, its consequences for group life. He must stand committed to his behavior in the sense of taking responsibility for its consequences vis a vis the group, from the point of view of the group itself.

Thus, in the case of both the rigidly conforming neurotic and the person who conforms without commitment, it is implied that the intelligent organization of behavior necessary for social life in this context, and its articulation through reason and communication, is absent. "Socialization", then, picks out, in its primary sense, the tasks (activities and processes) involved in getting human beings to the point where their behavior exhibits an understanding of and commitment to the basic requirements of social life.⁸⁴

But this interpretation will still be somewhat unclear until we face squarely the complexity introduced by application of the term to cover social learning through the whole life-cycle. I do not want to argue that such a usage is necessarily inappropriate, but it does seem to me that we must be especially cautious here. The clearest cases of socialization in this primary sense are drawn from experiences with young children. For example, the

young child who constantly attacks his companions may be deemed "unsocialized"; while socialization will lead him to understand and act on the premise that social life just cannot proceed on the basis of constant aggression. It is clear here that by "social life" we do not mean only the child's particular group of companions; it refers to the requirements of any group life.

Applications of the term to cases of social learning later in the life cycle are built upon this primary sense of "socialization". We might say, for example, that a junior executive had been socialized to his role in the organization. Now it is clear that we are not speaking of any organization, but of this organization in particular. How do the criteria of understanding of and commitment to the requirements of any group life carry over into this derivative use of socialization?

The complex of beliefs associated with the organizational life of executives can be divided roughly into two categories. There are, first, those basic norms which are essential to the existence and character of the organization; for example, making a profit in the case of a business organization. Second, there are many relatively specific (and possibly conflicting) rules which are interpretations of these norms in terms of the problems confronted in ongoing organizational life. Socialization

of a junior executive occurs when he is brought to understand the specific rules of the organization in terms of its basic norms or purposes; his intelligent application of the rules exhibits an understanding of and commitment to the more basic purposes of the organization. So we interpret socialization in specific organizations, institutions, professions, etc., in terms of learning the intelligent application of rules of social interaction from the point of view of the goals or purposes of the organization etc. The criteria of understanding and commitment are retained. With young children, the development of social understanding and commitment hinges crucially on the development of the capacity to reason, in the basic sense of influencing others and being influenced by them, through language, in the organization of his purposes and the selection of actions. With this derivative sense of socialization in later life, the capacity to reason in this instrumental sense (the means-end sort of selection of actions in light of the goals of the group) is presumed.

There is an additional conceptual point to be made about the primary sense of socialization. It is, I believe, a logical feature of this notion that we would not say that one chooses to be socialized. A child who begins to cooperate with his companions rather than conflict with

them constantly has not chosen to recognize the futility of conflict. It is hardly so self-conscious an accomplishment. He has simply recognized it in the course of his interactions, helped along perhaps by the admonishments of his parents. And while we might call behavior connected with many forms of mental illness "unsocialized", it would be odd to say that a mental patient chooses to be socialized. This points to the basic level of rationality implied. A socialized person is capable of selecting means to his ends with at least the minimum required attention to the basic necessities of the social context. But to say that a person is being socialized does not seem to convey the idea that he is being brought to self-consciously conceptualize and choose to account for these basic requirements of social life. The explanation for this is that it is precisely this capacity to choose self-consciously in social interaction which is the achievement of socialization. One could hardly utilize a capacity he had not yet developed.

We would not normally say of a young man who takes a new job or pursues professional studies that he chooses to be socialized according to the norms and beliefs of the organization or profession.⁸⁵ It is not a specific activity or process, like training or instruction which he may indeed choose. It is rather a standard which

activities may move one toward. Socialization, then, picks out certain criteria which social processes like training and instruction must meet.

While a medical student would choose to be instructed in anatomy rather than choosing to be socialized to the norms of the profession, at some point he may be told that he has been socialized - that his actions reflect an understanding and concern for the profession which was not earlier present. Or others might point out that the lack of change in his behavior indicates failure of socialization. If he has a developed capacity for rational reflection on the success or failure of his "socialization" - for putting this in perspective of his larger social world - he might be gratified or disappointed. On reflection he might approve of these basic norms and their interpretation, or critically appraise these norms which he does now understand as themselves irrational. But this capacity for critical reflection and appraisal is a further achievement in the development of reason which, we will argue presently, is part of what is picked out by the notion of being an educated person.

While it would be quite odd to say that a baby or a neurotic chooses to be socialized, there is a subsidiary sense in which one can submit himself or engage willingly in processes which, he recognizes, may result in

socialization. If a blue collar worker is given a responsible management position (e.g. the television character Arnie Nuvo), his union's shop steward may say that he will be "socialized". Here socializing picks out the idea that the worker will be faced with the problem of rational behavior in the context of a different group with distinct interests. Its correct application in this context is based on the truth of a counterfactual condition such as, if he were to maintain the same view of what is in the interest of the workers, his actions would exhibit a certain incoherence, rooted in inconsistent beliefs about the appropriate action to take in situations related to union-management disputes. In accepting a management position, the worker would be committing himself to engage in activities which he may recognize would involve socialization in some sense, though he might disagree about the implication of socialization in this particular context. Part of what he might communicate by arguing that socialization would not have this particular result is his incredulity that he could commit himself to opposing the interests of the workers. He might envision himself rigorously supporting the norms of comportment, committing himself to the goal of efficiency and profit, and yet slyly supporting the interests of his former compatriots when a conflict of

interests arose in maneuvering to avoid the need to take a position in situations of conflict.

Part of what is implied by socialization in the basic sense of becoming a human (i.e., social) being is that being on the inside of normal social life involves caring about others, respecting them as persons who have a distinct point of view and a place of rational participation in some social order.⁸⁶ The criterion of caring for the point of view of others in a social order carries over into subsidiary uses, where we imply that one cares that the group should exist and is not impervious to the central focus or goals of the group. Thus, to assert that after a period of time our worker-manager has not come to commit himself to the ascendancy of management over worker interests in situations of conflict, is to go some way toward defeating the claim that he has been socialized. We might want to say that he is not fully socialized.

These criteria of understanding and commitment have been discussed from the point of view of the achievement aspect of "socialization". But they carry over also to the task aspect. Thus while instructing and training might contribute to socialization, neither conditioning nor mindless drill would be included;⁸⁷ for part of what we communicate by the notions of conditioning and drill is

precisely the lack of intelligent participation of the subject with concern for meeting standards of rationality implicit in a successful outcome.

If we are correct in connecting the proper application of the term "socialization" to the achievement of the basic rational capacities required for participation in any social order - through the criteria of understanding and caring for the standards implicit in the basic rules of social intercourse - then I think we have gone some distance toward supporting Alasdair MacIntyre's argument that "a logical dichotomy between facts and values must break down."

For to characterize actions and institutionalized practices as rational or irrational is to evaluate them. Nor is it the case that his evaluation is an element superadded to an original merely descriptive element. To call an argument fallacious is always at once to describe and to evaluate it The social scientist is, if I am right, committed to the values of rationality in virtue of his explanatory projects in a stronger sense than the natural scientist is. For it is not only the case that his own procedures must be rational; but he cannot escape the concept of rationality in his inquiries.⁸⁸

This commitment to rationality is the tacit normative commitment which, at the beginning of this section, I suggested was obscured by those social scientists who view socialization as the name of a conformity-training process. In uncovering this commitment we also bring to view the empirical questions which I asserted cannot but fail to

emerge on the conformity interpretation. Socialization cannot be just "learning" of any sort, linked as it is to the notion of achieving a basic rationality. If socialization were to be viewed as "learning" of any sort, it would have to be taken as failing to distinguish between coming to hold rational and irrational beliefs. Preserving these distinctions allows us to keep open for empirical research questions about whether getting on the inside of a particular social order leads to securing a grip on rational behavior in a new social order - to socialization, in other words - or to the dissipation of the coherence of one's beliefs insofar as they are related to action in this social context.

It might be objected that in a "scientific" context, closing off some of the distinctions implicit in the variety of ordinary uses is unavoidable and/or often disirable. But this objection fails if I have successfully captured the most important criteria of the concept of socialization. For I have argued that the very point of having distinct concepts such as "learning", "socialization", and "education", is to separate out different standards which must be met for applying the terms to the results of different activities and processes. In other words, there is an achievement implied by the notions of socialization and education, and the most important

function of these terms is to capture these achievements as they are exemplified through processes and activities associated with learning and mental development.

The sort of achievement indicated by the notion of socialization, connected as it is with the notion of rationality, rules out processes which involve presenting a subject with incomprehensible or incoherent ideas, or engaging him in mindless conformity for conformity's sake. This is, at least, in some sense and to some unknown degree, necessary for the persistence of any social order. No rational parent, so far as I know, would seriously set out to make such demands on his child from the time he is an infant. And it is on this ground - that we must value the achievement of the rationality exhibited in social life if there is to be any social life at all - that the case for my explication of the concept of socialization must rest.

There is no canon of "science", aside from the commitment to rationality alluded to by MacIntyre, which forbids the organization of inquiry around a conception of socialization as conformity-training. Still, this focus involves, as we have seen, a neglect of the task of explaining how some activities and processes connected with the learning lead to the securing of a basic level of rationality, while some do not. They may fail to

C H A P T E R V

EDUCATION AND SOCIALIZATION

The Concept of Education

We have already gone a long way in the last chapter toward a clarification of the concept of education. For education is a concept of the same type as socialization, and is connected with the development of reason through the same criteria of understanding and commitment.⁸⁹ For the most part we need only capsulize Richard Peters' analysis, which, so far as I am aware, holds the field of philosophical clarification of the concept of education to itself. But before I introduce Peters' analysis of the concept of education, I want to introduce two passages, by different authors, which will help set the framework for the remaining portion of this inquiry. First, Professor John Anderson points to two currents of thought on education:

The classical and the utilitarian views of education are distinguished as employing intrinsic and extrinsic criteria, the one considering education in its own character, as the development of thinking or criticism, the other considering it in its contribution to something else, subordinating it in this way to the non-educational and running the greatest risk of distorting its character. For clearly there can be no subject or field of study which is utilitarian in itself, whose character resides in what it produces or helps to produce, and this applies as much to science as to any other study⁹⁰

Here Anderson points to a crucial connection between "education" and "the development of thinking or criticism". We will be introducing Peters' more refined criterion of "cognitive perspective" as a way of illuminating the connection in a moment. But MacIntyre elaborates on the importance of critical thinking as an educational achievement. I quote at length from his intriguing and forceful argument.

Our aim ought to be to help people to discover activities whose ends are not outside themselves; and it happens to be of the nature of all intellectual inquiry that in and for itself it provides just such activity. The critical ability which ought to be the fruit of education serves nothing directly except for itself, no one except those who exercise it.

About critical ability I want to stress three things. First it is the antithesis of that acceptance of wants, tastes and prejudices as given facts which so disfigures our society. For critical activity involves the testing of any claim to knowledge or understanding at the bar of some impersonal, rational criterion Secondly, critical ability is something each has to acquire for himself Thirdly, to have seen this is to see that the element of universality in all criticism is perfectly compatible with specialization. The unity of criticism lies in the fact that all understanding and all knowledge is a matter of concepts and to that degree philosophical; and that all understanding and all knowledge is acquired as dependent upon its own past intellectual background and is to that degree historical But there is something more important still about critical activity. It is not the activity of isolated individuals. It is always exercised inside an academic tradition which is the tradition of some particular society. Unless critical standards claim social recognition, criticism is untrue to its own claims to universal allegiance. But a condition of this is precisely the refusal to make criticism the prerogative of an elite We are all equal before the

impersonal standards of reason and there is no brother of whom we are not the keeper. Thus intellectual standards and democratic community need each other.⁹¹

In this long passage a number of themes emerge which will be important for drawing together the overall direction of this inquiry. They are: 1) the possibility of suspending a direct instrumental relation to one's wants, of gaining a certain detachment from them; 2) the idea of education as a personal achievement, or an achievement, as we will argue in Part II, connected with an individual's development as a person; 3) the important link between education and conceptual development; 4) the social and historical rootedness of a tradition of critical thought; and 5) the kernel of an argument showing the intertwining of value commitments associated with the notions of "education" and "democracy". The first four of these themes will figure importantly in our assessment, in Part II, of the potential contributions of a cognitive-developmental psychology to the study of political education. We turn now to the concept of "education".

Peters' analysis of the concept of education can be introduced through his own capsule statement of his thesis.

My thesis is not that 'education' refers to any special sort of process which might be equated with instruction, training or drill, rather that it

encapsulates three basic criteria which such processes must satisfy. Neither instruction alone, nor training alone, could properly be so described. For both training and instruction might be in futile things like opium-taking Furthermore, instruction might consist in presenting inert ideas which are incomprehensible to children, whilst training might approximate to mindless drill⁹²

The criteria implicit in the central cases of education are:

- (1) that 'education' implies the transmission of what is worth-while to those who become committed to it;
- (2) that 'education' must involve knowledge and understanding and some kind of cognitive perspective which are not inert;
- (3) that 'education' at least rules out some procedures of transmission, on the grounds that they lack wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the learner.⁹³

The first two of these criteria refer to the achievement aspect of the concept of education. This achievement aspect is more elaborately captured in the following summary:

- (1) An educated man is one whose form of life - as exhibited in his conduct, the activities to which he is committed, his judgments and feelings - is thought to be desirable.
- (2) Whatever he is trained to do he must have knowledge not just knack, and an understanding of principles. His form of life must also exhibit some mastery of forms of thought and awareness which are not harnessed purely to utilitarian or vocational purposes or completely confined to one mode.
- (3) His knowledge and understanding must not be inert either in the sense that they make no difference to his general view of the world, his actions in it and reaction to it or in the sense

that they involve no concern for the standards imminent in forms of thought and awareness, as well as the ability to attain them.⁹⁴

This last summary sets forth the achievement aspects of education most clearly implicit when we speak of an "educated person". This, Peters indicates, is "shorthand for summarizing our notion of a form of life which is worthwhile enough to deserve being handed on from generation to generation."⁹⁵ But this usage is of relatively recent origin.

A little research in the O. E. D. reveals that the notion of "educated" as characterizing the all-round development of a person morally, intellectually and spiritually emerged only in the nineteenth century Though before the nineteenth century there had been the ideal of the cultivated person who was the product of elaborate training and instruction, the term "an educated man" was not the usual one for drawing attention to this ideal. They had the concept but they did not use the word 'educated' quite with these overtones.⁹⁶

The main idea embodied in this use is that certain social activities should lead to the development of desirable qualities in someone.

Other uses of the term education and its derivatives differ in certain respects from what is conveyed by the idea of an "educated person". For example, to indicate the variety, we may speak of making educated guesses or hiring professional educators; of the educative effect of certain

activities, or the influence of education on economic development; of Amish education, or American education or socialist education; and of primary, secondary and higher education. I cannot go into special features of these many uses, some of which are clearly peripheral to our concerns here. But we can note certain of these features in order to get a better view of the concept of political education to be proposed.

Some of these uses of the term "education" tend to view education as a manner of achieving ends which are extrinsic to the activity itself. It would not be at all logically odd to speak of the affects of education on industrial development, or to refer to Amish education where some external link to the passing on of Amish traditions is suggested. What we want to point to, in these utilitarian and social-economic uses of "education", is that by separating too sharply the achievement aspects of the notion there is a danger of promoting or tacitly supporting the grip of conformist ways of thinking. As in the case of socialization, viewing education as a process draws attention away from the essential goals of education. As Peters notes,

In the context of the planning of resources it may be unobjectionable to think of education as something in which a community can invest; in the context of a theory of social cohesion education may

be harmlessly described as a socializing process.⁹⁷

But he warns that "these descriptions are both too general and too embedded in a dangerous dimension; for they encourage a conformist or instrumental way of looking at education."⁹⁸ These descriptions are rendered from the point of view of a spectator who attempts to suspend his grasp of the goals of educational activities. But getting at what is essential to and distinctive in the notion of education involves grasping a relatively specific type of human achievement. When we speak of the "influence of education on economic development" it may be all too easy to confuse the effects of institutionalized training with the goals of education. And the problem with uses such as "Amish education" is the implication that an educated Amish person is distinctive in being Amish and not being educated. In this case the achievement aspect of education is tied to the passing on of particular social practices rather than to the full development of human capacities. Where possible, it would be better to substitute phrases like "the socialization to Amish traditions," which may occur partly in Amish schools.

The fact that specialized institutions are often seen as carrying the burden of promoting education has affected the character of these uses of the term. The

fact that we call these institutions "educational" should not obscure the fact that some, if not most, of what goes on within them may not have an educative effect on the young people populating them. And, likewise, we cannot limit the notion of educational or educative processes to formal institutional activities, separated by physical and social barriers from the rest of the world. Those educational theorists who speak of "education in the streets" or "schools without walls" are not, at least in this respect, confused about the concept of education. And, most importantly in the context of this inquiry, public policies of many kinds, and even political activity itself, can clearly promote the development of citizens as educated men. The extent to which this is possible in different political contexts - for example in the context of American state-monopoly capitalism as opposed to a socialist system - is an important question. But the thrust of our inquiry would be lost if we do not keep clearly in mind that it is an open question. The purpose of Part I of this paper is, in a sense, to contribute to this cause by bringing out the point of keeping it an open question. Exactly how institutionalized or non-institutionalized activities can be educative can be seen more clearly when we turn to the "cognitive perspective" aspect of education.

While education is not tied to the effects of special institutions, it is usually thought of as an intentional activity, or an activity whose connection with the aims of education is fairly clear. As Peters notes,

People often say things like 'It was a real education to travel with my neighbor.' This usage is an exception to the obvious criterion that education is something that we consciously contrive for ourselves or for others.⁹⁹

To summarize, the concept of education specifies certain criteria which activities or processes must meet. The activities picked out are not necessarily the domain of specialized institutions, but can be a part of any set of institutionalized or non-institutionalized practices. The possibility of conscious control of or engagement in these activities is however, implied. The criteria of these activities are connected with the development of human capacities in the passing on of a form of life. The aim or achievement implied is bound up in the idea of the development of reason.

The distinctiveness of the notion of an "educated person" flows from the higher levels of the development of reason implied, indicated by Peters in the achievement of "cognitive perspective". Part of what is meant by this is that "being educated implies the possession of knowledge, but rules out mere knowledge, in that it also

requires understanding of principles"100 And part of the meaning of cognitive perspective seems to be attached to the idea of overcoming the disciplinary specialization implicit in calling someone a trained mathematician or scientist or cook, and yet recognizing that "we can . . . ask the further question whether such people are educated men."101 The core of Peters' notion of "cognitive perspective" is, I believe, that a man who is highly trained, but not educated "has a limited conception of what he is doing."

He does not see its connection with anything else, its place in a coherent pattern of life. It is, for him, an activity which is cognitively adrift.102

These aspects of "cognitive perspective" can be summed up, perhaps, in terms of the high levels of conceptual development implied by this distinction between training and education. It is a degree of development in one's conceptual grasp of the world that allows him to apply intelligently those principles imminent in his activities which point beyond their narrow functional aspects toward their role in the shaping of a coherent pattern of life. But such a formulation covers over some ambiguities; and the reader might note a difference in nuance in turning back to MacIntyre's interpretation of pinnacle of educational achievement in critical thought. We mentioned

there in a footnote that Peters is far more cautious and concerned to avoid the implication of mere criticism in talk about critical thought. MacIntyre presents a sharp contrast between critical thought and "that acceptance of wants, tastes and prejudices as given facts which so disfigures our society." (Above, pp. 75-76) Peters, however, is satisfied to note a certain "fluidity of wants."¹⁰³ And there are other concepts which have been taken as capturing this higher level in the development of reason which is promoted by educational processes, such as, for example, "autonomy". In Part II of this paper, I want to propose that the idea of the "reflectiveness" of high levels of rational thought be pursued as part of what can be seen as a middle ground between MacIntyre's emphasis on the shaping of a form of life and Peters' emphasis on putting it in perspective. And we will be looking at the way in which a "cognitive-developmental" psychology can be fruitful in filling out this notion of reflection.

But before we turn to this second part of our inquiry, let us bring together the main comments made on the concepts of socialization and education, and sketch in a preliminary way what we would be looking for in a study of political socialization and political education.

Socialization, Education, and Political Science

The political beliefs and orientations of citizens are important both to the polity and to the individual citizen. The social processes involved in the development of these orientations are connected also with the development of capacities for social and political reasoning. It is this latter development which gives political beliefs and orientations an openness, flexibility and integration which is important for individual satisfaction and social cohesion in a changing society. It is the importance of this development of reason which leads us to call for careful attention to the distinctions between, as well as the common processes associated with, political socialization and political education.

The notions of "socialization" and "education" are linked through their mutual connection with the idea of reason and its development. The point or sense of these concepts is derived from the particular interpretations or specifications of the criteria of understanding and commitment. This mutual link with the development of reason in social life makes the connections between the concepts quite complicated. Some uses of each term overlap into the conceptual territory of the other, creating difficult to handle borderline areas. I want to pursue the argument here that certain distinctive uses of

each term ought to be incorporated into any study of political socialization or political education.

One of the overlapping uses of the two terms has already been noted when we mentioned the idea of Amish education. Part of what we might mean by this could be conveyed just as well by speaking of the socialization to Amish traditions in Amish schools. The same point holds for Catholic education or American education. This comes out clearly when we think of the point someone might make that he received an American education at school and Polish education at home.

Another area of overlap is highlighted when we speak of "social education" or "social aims of education." Part of what we might convey by this is a general deepening of a child's understanding of the social world around him, and a refinement of the skills of social interaction. The term socialization could also be applied to these activities without stretching its point.¹⁰⁴

But this overlapping should not lead to the idea that the two notions can be assimilated to one another. It is the distinctive uses of the terms, and the point conveyed by these uses, which are most important. The primary sense of socialization is becoming a social human being, capable of organizing and executing one's purposes through interaction with others in a social order. And the

primary sense of education, built on the understanding and commitment presumed in social participation, points to the achievement of a capacity to put one's activities in perspective; and, importantly in this context, to reflectively appraise different facets of one's social participation, and to view social forms in critical perspective.

A different sort of argument could be made against this position, drawing on the broadest possible sense of socialization. Socialization is becoming human in a social world. So socialization in its broadest sense is all encompassing: the introduction of the child to a heritage of all types of knowledge. Since the development of children's minds can occur only through some sort of interaction with this social world of knowledge, it could be said that education is a form of socialization.¹⁰⁵ While this interpretation builds on the indisputable truth that all learning occurs through participation in a social world, it is inadequate for two reasons. First, this interpretation of "socialization" is far too broad to provide a useful framework for empirical research. Peters' comment on this proposal makes a similar point:

All education can be regarded as a form of socialization in so far as it involves initiation into public traditions which are articulated in language and forms of thought. But this description is too general

in that it fails to mark out the differences between education and other forms of socialization.¹⁰⁶

And second, the very breadth of this notion of socialization obscures the basic sense of becoming a rational human being. The acquisition of irrational beliefs from one's social environment leading to mental instability, could still be viewed as socialization on this interpretation. It would also, then, be quite impossible to give any specific sense to the term "unsocialized".

It would be more appropriate to the basic sense of each concept to view socialization as a precondition to the engagement in educative activities. This proposal meets the requirements of common usage, first of all. Unless socialization has proceeded far enough in the child's early years, it would be said that he is unready for school education. Or unreasonable defiance of a classroom teacher would be viewed as unsocialized behavior, and would interfere with educational activities in the classroom. But besides being in accord with common sense, this proposal also makes good theoretical sense. For example, this interpretation helps us to organize our thinking and research in a way that brings out the changing capacity of the child to formulate and choose among alternative courses of action. The logical feature of "socialization" that makes it inappropriate to say that a child "chooses" to be socialized can help focus our

attention on the fact that the categories for choice are given in a social world that is as yet outside his grasp. Once on the "inside" of a social order, however, the opportunity arises for him to consciously pursue the complexities of his cultural heritage through education. And at some point, he will be capable of choosing self-consciously to pursue an education or to contrive educative experiences or activities for himself or for others. In other words, we can choose to become educated, but not to be socialized; and this feature of these concepts focuses our research efforts around the conditions for the development of capacities for rational thought and choice.

So my argument is that socialization should be viewed as a precondition to education. But we must add a qualification about socialization in its derivative sense of initiation into the social practices of particular institutions, organizations, etc. The most appropriate locution here is "socialization to" some sphere of social life.¹⁰⁷ Socialization to some particular social sphere may be educative in the sense of contributing to development of perspective on one's social activities. For example, socialization to the norms of a government regulative agency may help a businessman gain perspective on the somewhat different norms which he had earlier accepted in

corporate life. But the connection here is a loose one; and this is part of the reason for retaining the separate concept of education to pick out activities with a closer empirical connection with the development of reflective reason.

With this in mind, we can interpret more clearly C. Wright Mills' observation that many people in modern society are "'with' rationality" but without "substantive reason". We can say that many have been socialized to the norms of large bureaucratic organizations. But their activities do not lead to a perspective on their personal lives and the social world that will tie their personal troubles to issues of social change. The very organizations whose actions produce the disruptions of social change may in fact be preventing the development of substantive reason by its employees. The activities of work life may be restrictive of mental exercise rather than educative. And the intervention of these organizations in political life may be preventing public policies which would promote educative activities of all types. The most important of educative activities then would be "political education".

But whether or not this theory is correct, we can now at least give a fairly definite sense to the concepts of "political socialization" and "political education".

First of all, "political socialization" can be

understood as picking out the activities and processes which bring people to the point of being able to participate intelligently in a society's political practices. It is an initiation into the rules of political activity which brings out the rationale or dominant purposes served through the established political framework. Consider a youngster who distributes campaign literature for the candidate for elective office, on the belief that the candidate is to be appointed and is trying to drum up business through advertising. Clearly he has not been led to grasp the rationale of his activity in terms of competitive elections for public office.

This interpretation of political socialization is not a step back toward the conformity perspective. It is not a process of training in established political behaviors, but involves activities which lead to a grasp on the principles of political life in a particular society. In the first place, the rules of political practice require intelligent application to particular circumstances. For example, as the political socialization of our young person who distributed campaign literature proceeds, he might be called to work in a congressman's Washington office. His charge is to welcome and aid any people from the home constituency that show up in the office. When he applies this rule rigidly, to the letter, even to the

extent of aiding the campaign manager of the Congressman's opponent in the coming election, we would certainly want to say that his socialization to electoral politics is incomplete, for lack of understanding. Or if he understood the implications of aiding a lobbyist in defeating his Congressman's bill, and yet did so, we could say his socialization to the norms of congressional politics was incomplete, for lack of commitment. In addition to intelligent application of rules to particular circumstances, political socialization leads to the capacity to interpret conflicting rules or guidelines in terms of the overriding organizational rationale of one's activities. And the criteria of understanding and commitment, not conformity, elucidate this judgmental capacity as well.

One final point to note about "political socialization" is that socialization here is taken in its derivative sense. Political understanding and commitment are not essential to becoming, at a basic level, a social being capable of acting on reason in social life.

"Political education," finally, picks out those activities and processes which bring people to the point where they are capable of reflecting on and critically appraising established political practices. It does not apply to merely getting people to criticize. Nor does it imply that we can be reflective all the time or in

all matters. A critique may or may not emerge from reflection on features of our political life; but if it does, it should be a reasoned critique, pointing to alternative principles and new practices for political life. The rules, priorities and even the goals of established political life can, at this level of development, be viewed in terms of new possibilities. No longer limited in his rational capacities to the intelligent application and interpretation of given rules, a politically educated person can explore the possibilities for expanding the dimensions of politics.¹⁰⁸ And exploring these possibilities can be viewed as an important part of responsible citizenship, an important dimension of commitment to creating a form of life in which human needs are satisfied, human rights are expanded, and political education through participation is made available to all.

The first part of this inquiry is now complete. We have attacked the problem of how to conceptualize human development in a politically relevant way. The first task was to sort out uses of the term socialization along broad criteria suggested as a conformity perspective and a developmental perspective. The conformity interpretation of socialization was criticized as cutting out a vital sense of socialization as the development of basically rational human beings, and thus tacitly

yielding to a promotion of molding people for blind conformity. A developmental interpretation of the concepts of socialization and education was proposed, and their bearing on issues of citizenship was suggested. The next part of this study moves to an analysis of cognitive-developmental psychology, which can help to fill out our preliminary idea of the achievements of political socialization and political education.

PART II. DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
AND POLITICAL EDUCATION

CHAPTER VI

DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN EXPOSITION

Introduction

1. We have seen in Part I that the aims of political socialization and political education are distinct. The study of political socialization brings out the achievements involved in acting rationally within and in terms of the norms of a given political framework. And the achievements of political education point to the development of the capacity to step back from this framework through the reflections of reason, and appraise it in perspective. Political socialization and political education are distinct, then, but are also mutually linked to the capacity for rational thought and action. A major advantage of this analysis - as opposed to the treatment of socialization and education as the names of processes - is that it leaves open questions about the extent to which particular social structures and public policies promote the development of reason through socialization and education.

What I want to do in Part II is to suggest a possible course of study toward a theory of political education. It is a suggestion that the approach to developmental psychology of Jean Piaget and Lawrence

Kohlberg will aid us in filling out the empirical dimensions of the processes involved in the achievements of socialization and education. We need a more complete sense for the kinds of changes that occur as mental development proceeds, and the Piaget-Kohlberg approach may help. The assessment of this approach attempts, first, to clarify further the achievements of mature thought picked out by the concept of education. The second part of the assessment tries to show that a developmental approach to political education requires a more specific explanatory theory than that offered by Piaget or Kohlbert; a theory which is tied into a theory of social structure. In the concluding chapter, an example of research in developmental political psychology is discussed, and is evaluated in terms of its relevance to the conceptual framework of political education. Finally, we offer a view of why and how political education ought to be promoted.

2. Any discussion of the cognitive-developmental approach must make choices about the best way to present and talk about it. The effort here is informed by a desire to draw on both "philosophical-normative" and "psychological-empirical" inquiries.

Philosophical understanding has attended primarily to the elaboration of conceptual distinctions. But their

usefulness for the scientific interpretation of human behavior is hindered by the failure to fill in empirical facts, especially those about conceptual development. Psychological investigations, on the other hand, often fail to make adequate conceptual distinctions. The attitude taken here is that the cognitive-developmental approach is informed in its descriptive enterprise by some important and too often neglected distinctions. The clarification of the significance of these distinctions, however, is aided by analysis in which philosophers specialize.

In discussing the cognitive-developmental approach I will be taking Piaget and Kohlberg as representatives.¹⁰⁹ Piaget has dealt primarily with children's responses to theoretical questions, where "theoretical" is contrasted with "practical"; and Kohlberg has dealt primarily with children's responses to practical questions. This distinction is clarified by Peters.

(With theoretical questions) no issue of doing anything or changing anything is settled by answering them. The issue is about what is the case or why it is so or when something happened. Practical questions, on the other hand, are concerned with what ought to be the case, with reasons for action This realm of discourse has its own distinctive concepts such as 'ought', 'right', 'desirable', 'worthwhile', and 'good' as well as its own distinctive features for answering questions which are raised.¹¹⁰

Political discourse involves an intermingling of both types of questions (as is also the case with educational issues). Coming to a judgment on political questions requires treatment of both theoretical and practical issues. And reflective and rational political discourse is an individual and social achievement which can only be had if we become clear about the whole multi-faceted phenomena of mental development.

Failures of understanding and problems of assimilation have accompanied the over-sharp drawing of disciplinary boundaries between psychology and the social sciences. While philosophers and psychologists are now beginning to see the need to attend in a self-conscious manner to the description and justification of the full development of human capacities, they often seem to be wearing intellectual blinders when the problem arises of connecting these ideals of development to their realization in the actual socio-political world. For the developmental psychologist, this may be connected with a failure to clarify the character of mature social thought and the conditions for its development. For the philosopher it may be the result of a rather uncritical faith in our "liberal society". As C. Wright Mills assesses the state of that tradition, "the ideals of liberalism have been divorced from any realities of modern social structure

that might serve as the means of their realization."¹¹¹

The order of exposition will be as follows. First, we will give a general characterization of the cognitive-developmental approach - the basic hypothesis pursued by Piaget and Kohlberg - and a summary statement of the stages of mental development they have postulated (Chapter 6). The next two chapters will involve a sympathetic but critical assessment of their theories, dealing with the characterization of mature thought (Chapter 7), the explanation of development, and the relation between modes of thought and social action (Chapter 8).

General Characterization of the Cognitive- Developmental Approach

The core achievements of the cognitive-developmental approach can be referred to as descriptive. Piaget has forcefully reminded us that characterization of the products of mental development is closely bound up with the type of explanation of development offered. But the explanatory side of his theory is somewhat undeveloped.¹¹² The crucial element of this descriptive contribution is the doctrine of stages of mental development. The organizing "hypothesis" or main thrust of the work of Piaget and Kohlberg is the view that mental development can best be comprehended as a qualitative transformation of cognitive structures in an invariant and culturally universal

sequence. Discussing separately the terms of this hypothesis will give us an outline of the main tenets of the stage theory.¹¹³

1. Cognitive Structure. A stage of mental development is posited on the basis of a coherence or organization among actions and patterns of action. It is the underlying "thought-organization"¹¹⁴ which is the basis for attributing stages. The distinction between structure and content is a useful device for understanding this point. There can be wide variation in the content, or specific thoughts and actions of children at a certain age, but by comparing their thought to that of older and younger children, a certain type of mode of thought emerges as characteristic of that age.

2. Structural Transformation. Mental structures (types or modes of thought) change with age.¹¹⁵ This change can best be seen not as a gradual, incremental accretion of actions or types of action (schemata), but rather as a total alteration (transformation) of the basic character or underlying organization of thought.

3. Qualitative Transformation. The idea of structural change as transformational is required by two further characteristics of stages. They are first of all "structural wholes", more or less complete and balanced (equilibrated) organizations of thought. Secondly, these

structural wholes are qualitatively different from one another.

4. Hierarchical Integration. A mental structure does not disappear when a higher form of thought is achieved. Rather it is reintegrated into the succeeding structure even while its character is transformed. The earlier structure is in one sense part of the "matter" upon which the new structure operates. One stage thus takes the character of pre-requisite to the succeeding stage.

5. Invariant Sequence. The positing of an invariant sequence of stages in mental development is one of the most difficult and intriguing claims of the developmentalists. It involves a number of assertions and qualifications. The stage must appear in an unchanging and constant order, so that stage A appears in every child before stage B. This invariant sequence also forms a logical order, in that the logical character of the concepts available at stage B presumes the attainment of stage A concepts. It is not necessary that all individuals, or even all "normal" adults, achieve the final stages. Some may be fixated at a lower level, while others may achieve a higher mode of thought in one content area but not in another

6. Culturally Universal. The distinction between structure and content is the basis of the assertion that while content may vary with culture, there are universal structural elements in mental life. Where the later stages have not been achieved in a culture, it is said that they would follow the same invariant sequence if the conditions facilitating further development were to appear.

From this core stage theory we will be focusing primarily on the invariance of the sequence of stages which is posited for all cultures. But with our outline of these stages we will discuss the Piaget-Kohlberg position in two related areas: the conception of mature thought at the final stage of development; and the notions introduced to explain development.

7. Mature Thought. It is recognized among the developmentalists that investigators will differ somewhat in their descriptions of mature thought. This is a crucially important interpretative enterprise, if the full implications of this approach are to be brought out. For the characterization of this mature thought sets the stage and casts the characters for the related tasks of explaining this development, and justifying its promotion. Each successive stage is said to be more differentiated (to embody conceptual distinctions built upon those of the

previous stage) and complex, and more integrated. The main feature of this final form of thought is thus a general and more stable equilibrium between the thinker and his world.

8. Explanation of Development. The type of explanation offered by the cognitive developmental approach has been characterized as interactionist. This term designates a manner of relating together the explanatory factors and notions used. As we said, it is important to understand the manner of describing and interpreting mental development in order to grasp the significance of this type of explanation. An eclectic statement that full explanation of mental growth requires an account of both biological and environmental factors, distinguished in terms of their quantitative significance, would not be an interactionist position. For the primary task the developmentalist sets for himself is understanding the genesis of mental structures which are qualitatively distinct. The question about the genesis of structures is approached by the developmentalist by positing an interaction between the active structuring of the world by the child and the given structure of the environment. An account which attributes mental structures to one of these types of factors alone is said to be inadequate.¹¹⁶

It is especially important to understand the role

of experience with the environment, if the implications of this approach for social and political theory are to be drawn out. I quote here from Kohlberg.

In summary, an interactional conception of stages differs from a maturational one in that it assumes that experience is necessary for the stages to take the shape they do as well as assuming that generally more or richer stimulation will lead to faster advances through the series involved. It proposes that an understanding of the role of experience requires: (1) an analysis of universal features of experienced objects (physical or social), (2) analysis of logical sequences of differentiation and integration in concepts of such objects, and (3) analysis of structural relations between experience-inputs and the relevant behavior organization.¹¹⁷

Before we move to an exposition of the stages of mental development outlined by Piaget and Kohlberg, it is necessary to introduce two further distinctions. Both Piaget and Kohlberg accept the thesis that every judgmental act has both cognitive and affective aspects. These are two facets of what is essentially the same phenomena of human intelligence in operation. Another distinction which is tacitly made in their studies between judgments made about the physical world and those made about the interpersonal or social world.

Piaget's studies have focused primarily on the development of the child's conception of the physical world, although in one seminal work he dealt with moral judgments.¹¹⁸ And he has been primarily occupied with the

identification of cognitive stages and sub-stages, rather than the affective aspect, which is interpreted as structural tension and transition. Kohlberg, on the other hand, has studied primarily moral development, also in terms of its cognitive rather than affective-emotional components.¹¹⁹

Both Piaget and Kohlberg have identified broad periods or levels of development, with a varying number of stages and sub-stages. Their interpretations are usually drawn from clinical type interviews with children of varying ages. (Some of Piaget's later studies have involved both verbal and nonverbal responses; and Kohlberg has been engaged in longitudinal as well as cross-sectional studies.) The attempt is made to discover whether qualitative differences in the mode of thought (or type of judgmental criteria) can be found. What follows is a sketch of the main characteristics of the stages proposed, first by Piaget for general cognitive development, and then by Kohlberg for moral development.¹²⁰ The purpose of this summary is to show the sense and pattern of these developmental theories, and to fill out the meaning and application of the basic developmental framework outlined above.

Piaget: Levels of Cognitive Development

Ontogenetic development is divided into three broad periods or levels by Piaget, with a number of sub-periods or stages. The Levels are:

1. The Level of Sensory-Motor Intelligence (0-2 years).
2. The Level of Preparation for and Organization of Concrete Operations (2-11 years).
3. The Level of Formal Thought (11-15 years).

In the first of these periods the child acts directly on the world around him. But in the second and third levels, he operates also on a different plane of reality, the representational or symbolic. At the beginning of each level, as the child achieves in crude form a new set of cognitive skills, his actions are "egocentric". This egocentrism is relative to the full elaboration of these cognitive skills, but it also marks off from the previous level a qualitatively new way of structuring intelligent action. This egocentrism indicates a disequilibrium between two functions of intelligence; those of assimilating reality to existing schemas,¹²¹ and accommodating these schemas to reality when assimilation is impossible. As the egocentrism of each level is overcome, a relatively stable equilibrium is achieved. But only in the third level is a fully stable equilibrium achieved, an equilibrium in which objectivity and full reversibility of thought are elaborated.

1. The Level of Sensorv-Motor Intelligence (0-2 years). At this level, the basic manner of relating to the world is by way of direct perceptual and motor activity. The infant's first actions are reflexive. The egocentrism here is complete, for the self and the world are totally undifferentiated. In the course of this period, objects are gradually seen as interrelating in the direct way as entities. As a correlate of the independence attributed to objects in their interaction, the world of objects takes on an independence from the self. The growing gap between the self and the world is part of a decentering process. Eventually different features of different objects are distinguished, and the self likewise becomes multifaceted or autonomous on this plane of direct action. This process of detachment of self and world prefigures a sense of spatial, temporal and causal dimensions, and the child becomes capable of imitation and play. The coherence of action, or equilibrium, achieved at the sensory-motor level around age 2 is one of direct action on the world. But it is enriched by a growing ability to symbolize.

2. The Level of Preparation for and Organization of Concrete Operations (2-11 years). At this level, there is cognitive operation on concrete reality by means of symbolization and symbol manipulation. Language develops

and becomes a prime tool for dealing with concrete problems. This level is divided into two stages:

- A. Preoperational Thought: the stage of irreversible direct representation (2-7 years).
- B. Concrete Operation Thought: the stage of reversible direct representation (7-11 years).

At first, in the "Preoperation" period of preparation, the language and thought of the child are egocentric. He is tied to his own viewpoint. And while he has vague intuitions about the intentions and perspectives of others, he is unable to take the role of the other or understand it in a coherent way. His attention is centered, and his reasoning is frequently distorted by thinking only about the surface features of phenomena. Thinking here can be seen as prelogical, and one of its main characteristics is its "irreversibility". This is demonstrated by the inability, for example, to understand that the quantity of water in a tall, thin glass is conserved when its surface qualitative appearance is transformed by pouring the water into a shorter and wider glass. Here is the way John Flavell introduces the notion of reversibility of thought (which is achieved only in the second stage of this concrete representational level): "a cognitive organization is reversible, if it is able to travel along a cognitive route (pursue a set reasonings, follow

a series of transformations in a display, etc.) and then reverse direction in thought, to find again an unchanged point of departure (the beginning premise, the original state of display, etc.)"122

In the "Concrete operational" stage, the child achieves a coherent and integrated cognitive system on the concrete representation plane. He overcomes the egocentrism of the initial pre-operational stage. Through the decentering of his reasoning process, he is now able to balance or compensate in understanding a process by reversing a line of reasoning. He is now able to see, for example, that added width in a water glass compensates for a loss in height. Also, in overcoming the egocentrism of the first stage, the child develops a richer capacity for taking roles in concrete situations. And finally, he begins to extend his thought from the actuality of the concrete situation toward an understanding of its potentialities.

But there are limitations still in this level of thought, relative to the problem-solving achievements of formal thought. The cognitive activity of the child is still oriented towards immediate and concrete reality; he still begins his reasoning process with the actual situation, seeing its potentialities as a function of the various given descriptions. Descriptions of objects and

events in terms of mass, weight, length, etc. are logically related; but they are dealt with one at a time. The whole system of descriptions under which he comprehends these events are never assessed as a whole in terms of theories. Formal or theoretical thinking becomes possible at the next level, where the child achieves a greater degree of detachment from the descriptions which were previously accepted as direct representations of reality.

3. The Level of Formal Thought. In the final level of cognitive development, reality is still dealt with in terms of internal manipulation of symbols. But the child, or adolescent, is no longer limited to operating with symbols which represent a concrete reality content. In addition to these first-order operations he can now perform second-order operations. The first-order descriptions or symbolizations are now treated not as direct representations of reality, but as conditionals. And the operations he performed with these symbols are now seen as part of a total set of all logically possible operations. Thought here is completely reversible. Succinctly stated, concrete reality can now be seen as a special case of the possible.

This is a qualitatively new type of detachment or conditional dissociation from concrete reality. The initial forays into hypothetical or theoretical thought are marked again by a certain egocentrism. But it is

possible, gradually, to achieve objectivity. This can occur when the cognitive structures of formal operational thought are in equilibrium. Flavell gives the following paradigm case of how the adolescent thinks, or can think, at his cognitive "best":

He begins by organizing the various elements of the raw data with the concrete-operational techniques of middle childhood. These organized elements are then cast in the form of statements or propositions which can be combined in various ways. Through the method of combinational analysis he then isolates for consideration the totality of distinct combinations of these propositions. These combinations are regarded as hypotheses, some of which will be confirmed and some infirmed by subsequent investigation. Is it true that A elicits X? If so, does B also? Is it true that A produces X only when B is absent? Such are the hypothetical questions which make up the domain of the possible in such problems: and the adolescent views his task as that of determining the actual shape of things by successively putting them to empirical test.¹²³

Kohlberg: Levels of Moral Development

Most of Piaget's studies that have contributed to this theory of mental development have dealt with such categories as space, time, number and causality. Little of his energy has been spent studying the development of categories of practical reason, although one of his early books, The Moral Judgment of the Child, broke some new ground in this area. One of the most thorough and persistent elaborators of the developmental approach to moral judgment in the United States is Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg's

theory postulates somewhat more tightly defined stages than Piaget's original work in the area of moral judgment. And while Piaget placed considerable emphasis on peer group interaction in explaining upward stage movement, Kohlberg broadens this to focus on general role-taking opportunities.

A number of the dimensions of moral judgment studied by Piaget are really matters of content rather than cognitive form. An example is the dimension of responsiveness to peer, as opposed to adult, expectations. While Piaget hypothesizes this dimension as part of his autonomous stage, his rationale for deriving this from a consideration of cognitive form is vague and unconvincing. There is nothing more cognitively mature to preferring a peer than an adult While Piaget attempted to define two stages of moral judgment (the heteronomous and the autonomous), extensive empirical study and logical analysis indicate that his moral stages have not met the criteria of stages he proposes . . . as his cognitive stages do.¹²⁴

Kohlberg's methods of study are similar to those employed by Piaget. In an interview, he presents a child with a moral dilemma; i.e., he describes a situation in which someone is called on to make a morally relevant decision. After finding out what the person in the story did, the child is asked, "Should he have done it?" and "Why?" One of Kohlberg's favorites is the following conflict involving the values of property and human life.

In Europe, a woman was near death from cancer. One drug might save her, a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The druggist

was charging \$2,000, ten times what the drug cost him to make. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No". The husband got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. Should the husband have done that? Why?¹²⁵

Kohlberg presents his results generally in the form of a summary of the stages discerned. He does not tie his stages to age-norms, which in any case are merely guides for developmental analysis. But he holds that his stages define: (A) culturally universal components of morality; (B) coherent modes or structures of moral judgment; and (C) a logically invariant sequence (i.e., the order of progression could not be different). The evidence he presents to support this claim is methodologically somewhat more sophisticated than Piaget's, and includes a study of moral judgment development among Taiwanese peasants.¹²⁶ The summaries often vary in minor detail from one article to the next, but the following summary attempts to present the general outlines of Kohlberg's stage framework.¹²⁷ (See also Appendix A, "Kohlberg's Definition of Moral Stages".) Its purpose is to familiarize the reader with some of Kohlberg's basic distinctions and terminology.

Kohlberg's studies have led him to distinguish

three basic levels of moral development: first, a preconventional level; second, a conventional level; and third, a postconventional, principled or autonomous level. Within each of these general levels of moral thinking, two structural stages are distinguished. In the preconventional level, moral value is interpreted in terms of the physical or hedonistic consequences of action. The major difference between stage 1 and stage 2 children is that stage 2 subjects have achieved a basic notion of fairness as reciprocity. The stage 1 child is attentive primarily to differentials of power, status or possessions, rather than to exchange in terms of the different needs people have. In response to the dilemma of whether to steal the drug to save a life, the stage 1 subject might typically rest his judgment on factors such as the cost of the drug or the damage done in the process of stealing it, or the likelihood of going to jail. In contrast, a stage 2 child might point out that Heinz wants his wife to live, or that he may need her to help him someday, or that the druggist needs to make a profit. Unilateral deference to superior power gives way here to a naively egoistic and egalitarian judgment of the external consequences of actions.

The conventional level of moral thought overcomes the egoism of stage 2 in resting moral judgment on the

degree to which an action conforms to the expectations of others and supports the basic dimensions of one's social order. Stage 3 involves an orientation toward pleasing and helping others, doing what is approved by them, and is often referred to as a "good boy-nice girl" orientation. The "others" who define right and wrong performance of roles are usually those whose expectations are most prominent in the child's social environment. Stage 4 is referred to as "the law and order orientation" or an "authority and social-order maintaining orientation". In this stage the social order is seen as a value in itself, somewhat distinct from the persons whose expectations make it immediate to him. One does his "duty" and upholds a general respect for authority. Whereas a stage 3 subject might judge the drug stealing case in terms of saving face or gaining the approval of his family, the stage 4 child will invoke notions of honor, duty and the importance of maintaining the social order, including its laws.

There are two critical limitations to these four types of moral thought, and these limitations emerge most clearly with stage 4 judgments. Stage 4 thought does not clearly recognize obligations to persons outside the particular social order of the subject; and it provides no clear guides to the creation of new norms or laws, no perspective adequate to guide participation in a changing

social order. The postconventional level of thought is constituted by stages which represent structures of thought adequate to overcoming these limitations. Moral values and principles are accepted apart from an individual's identification with his social order, and they are viewed as valid regardless of whether they are held by significant persons or groups in his society. The first such structure of thought, stage 5, is a "contractual legalistic orientation". In this stage, obligations are framed in terms of freely made agreements and contracts. Emphasis is placed upon procedural rules for reaching agreement and results in a "legal point of view". In the case of stealing a drug to save a life, considerations such as the appropriateness of pertinent laws and procedures would take deliberation beyond the level of simple maintenance of the social order. The final stage in the sequence is termed "the universal ethical principle orientation". Whereas stage 5 thinking is bound to consideration primarily of concrete rules and norms of a society, stage 6 involves the structuring of thought around universal ethical principles - at the most general level, the principle of justice. The formal properties of law (universality and impartiality) are extended to the whole domain of a person's moral relations. Decisions of conscience are made on the basis of self-chosen principles

which are abstract and ethical in nature. Arguments about the stealing of a drug to save a life would be framed in terms of the principle of respect for human life and personal standards of conscience such as honesty.

Now before launching into an assessment of the fruitfulness of the cognitive-developmental approach for the study of political education, one last bit of ground work must be laid. The question is, how is the relation between the stages of moral judgment and stages of cognitive-development conceived? Kohlberg's answer is that there is a parallelism or isomorphism between general cognitive development and moral development: cognitive maturity is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for moral judgment maturity.

The relation of moral judgment to intellectual development is suggested by the fact that our stage definitions assume that Piagetian concrete operations are necessary for conventional (Stage 3 and 4) morality and that formal operations are necessary for principled (Stage 5 and 6) morality While formal operations may be necessary for principled morality, one may be a theoretical physicist and yet not make moral judgments at the principled level.¹²⁸

We turn now to the task of assessing the merits and limitations of developmental psychology, and its potential contribution to the study of political education.

CHAPTER VII

DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN ASSESSMENT (I)

Introduction

The assessment offered here, and in the next chapter, can advance only a small portion of the way toward a definitive judgment on the fruitfulness of the cognitive-developmental approach for the study of political education. I have approached the task of assessment in a critical, but sympathetic and, hopefully, constructive manner.¹²⁹

The distinctions which are brought out so clearly by developmental psychology provide a useful framework for research. Political judgment overlaps with moral judgment in many ways. And we should expect to find distinctions similar to that between a conventional morality and a principled moral code when we look at the types of reasons or mode of thinking which supports or underlies the political judgments of the population. This is, in fact, similar to the core distinction we have drawn between the achievements of political socialization and the achievements of political education.¹³⁰

The fruits of this approach will effectively challenge, I believe, those who view man and the science of man from the conformity perspective, investigating what is essentially a conformity-training process under

the rubric of "socialization". The developmentalist's understanding of the explanatory task, and its relation to normative inquiry differs considerably. The concepts which guide research are philosophical or normative rather than behavioral. And empirical research results are said "to help clarify and define an ultimately adequate, universal and mature conception of morality."¹³¹ But there is no thought of abandoning analytic and empirical rigor. The approach, in fact, should prove more satisfying in the understanding and explanation of many facets of social and political life. But in order to bear this fruit, the developmentalist's notion of the character of a full-blown explanation needs to be pulled out of the narrower confines of a psychologist's treatment. For a view of the common and universal dimensions of mental development is not complete without explicit ties to the character of an individual's involvement in social and political life.

There is an important connection between the points made in the two preceeding paragraphs, which can be advanced in a preliminary way here. That is, while many of the distinctions made by developmentalists can aid in formulating a justifiable ideal of human development,¹³² we are left with an inadequate conception of how this ideal might be realized in particular societies with their

historically rooted structural characteristics. For example, Kohlberg claims that the development of dream concepts follows the same invariant sequence in an Atayal village on Formosa as in America, but that during the Atayalan adolescence there is a "regression" to concepts held by younger children. This is accounted for as "cultural learning", for "the culture can 'reverse' the sequence by specific training."¹³³ Now the question might arise as to how to prevent this reversal and move Atayal youngsters back toward a conception of dreams as internal and immaterial mental phenomena, and away from the "regressive" equation of the soul, the dream, and ghosts. Would it be a task for formal educational institutions, or some other institutional device attenuating the hold adults have over adolescents - their leverage for training? But as soon as we consider the question in this light it must be recognized that any such measure would involve tampering with the myths which provide the social fabric with structure and continuity. We would be looking, in other words, for a point of leverage which would involve more or less fundamental transformation of the Atayal culture and social structure. These broader social implications of the approach seem somewhat opaque to most developmental psychologists. It would be the task of a theory of political education to tie the

ideals of human development picked out by the concept of education to a theory of social structure. Only from that point can we develop an adequate idea of how to promote political education.

The comments which follow are pursued under three headings: 1) the character of mature thought (this chapter); 2) the explanation of mental development; and 3) from thought to action (chapter 8). It will be apparent not only that many of the points made could be pursued profitably in greater detail, but also that many of the points made separately have a close bearing on one another.

The Character of Mature Thought

This section is divided into three parts. First, we present a critical assessment of Kohlberg's theory of moral development. Since practical questions (in the sense of "practical" introduced above, pp. 98-99) are so intimately involved in the reasonings behind political judgment, it is important to understand more precisely how Kohlberg's theory taps into this dimension of thought. Next, with a broader view of the dimensions of socio-political judgment in hand, we consider Piaget's (and Kohlberg's) treatment of the unity in mental development. In what sense must we make reference to a unifying feature of mature thought? And what can we say about mature socio-

political thought in terms of its "reversibility" or "objectivity"? Finally, we conclude this section with a brief treatment of what we take to be a central feature of mature thought - its reflectiveness.

We have looked at the broad theoretical framework of the cognitive developmental approach, and at the specific stage sequence postulated by Kohlberg for moral development. The postulates of the theory Kohlberg proposes to account for the stages of moral development can be summarized as follows:

There are, (A) stages of moral development, which represent (B) cognitive-structural transformations in conception of self and society. These stages (C) represent successive modes of "taking the role of others" in social situations, so that (D) the social-environmental determinants of development are the opportunities for role taking. Moreover, (E) the child actively structures his perceived environment, so that (F) moral stages and their development represent the interaction of the child's structuring tendencies and the structural features of the environment, leading to (G) successive forms of equilibrium in interaction. This equilibrium is conceived as (H) a level of justice, with (I) change being caused by disequilibrium, where (J) some optional level of match or discrepancy is necessary for change between the child and the environment.¹³⁴

We now want to consider what is involved in treating stages of moral development as "level[s] of justice", and mature moral thought as a "justice structure".¹³⁵ There are two types of criticism to be offered of the way Kohlberg has formulated or interpreted this theory. The

outline of stages he postulates seems acceptable enough in being rooted in empirical evidence; but the claims about morality put forward - not clearly rooted in evidence and ultimately philosophical-normative claims about morality - must be questioned. The first type of criticism, which I will only outline briefly, deals with the adequacy of the characterization of (mature) morality per se, as bound univocally to the concept of justice. The question is whether morality is not conceived of too restrictively. The second type of criticism - which is in a sense the converse of the first - asks whether Kohlberg's interpretation of morality is adequate to the logical features of many virtues which we would want to include in a full-blown conception of the development of practical reason. (This line of thought is pursued in the next section, "Cognition, Affect, and the Unity of Mental Development.") The two approaches to criticism are united in the idea that human development is best treated not just as conceptual development (with a single concept, justice, at the pinnacle), but as the development of reason (rationality) or modes of reasoning with and through concepts.

The first set of criticisms to be dealt with come from the point of view of the moral philosopher. The deliberations behind the critique flow from posing the question, "Is Kohlberg prescribing a morality?"¹³⁶ A

persistent criticism of Kohlberg is that he has not spelled out clearly enough the postulated logical relations between the concepts at different stages. For example why is it that a "punishment orientation" is logically prior to a "reward" or "instrumental" orientation. Kohlberg has gone some way in a recent article toward spelling out these logical relationships more clearly.¹³⁷ But especially at the higher levels, it becomes clear that Kohlberg's theory not only makes claims about logical priority, but also "has built into it claims about the relative worth of the stages as ways of moral thinking."¹³⁸ How, then, does Kohlberg interpret these claims of worthwhileness?

Justice, including the notions of equality and reciprocity, is given priority by Kohlberg as the central feature of mature moral thought. And the "justice structure" which emerges at stage 6, it is argued, can be judged more adequate or better according to the criteria -advanced by the formalists in moral philosophy - of increased prescriptivity and universality (or universalizability). And these standards are internal, so the argument goes, to the notion of what morality is.

The general criterion we have used in saying that a higher stage's mode of judgment is more adequate than a lower stage is that of morality itself, not of conceptions of rationality or

sophistication imported from other domains.¹³⁹

These formalist claims have never been without serious challenge.¹⁴⁰ But the task of taking up this challenge directly is beyond the scope of this paper or the competence of the writer. Instead, I will note some of the difficulties others have pointed to.

1. One question which arises is whether justice can stand alone as a principle in dealing with moral problems. It can be argued, for example, that the criteria of equality and reciprocity (equality in exchange) are too formal. For they do not discriminate between the various respects in which people could be treated equally. One could attempt to wreak equal harm on others without violating the formal notion of equality. William Frankena, for example, finds it necessary to appeal to two principles of morality: justice and benevolence. "The area of justice is part of morality, but not the whole of it. Beneficence, then, may belong to the other part of morality, and this is just what seems to be the case to me."¹⁴¹

2. Another line of argument questions whether Kohlberg's theory deals adequately with the moral virtues picked out by concepts of character traits. Richard Peters notes the "inadequacy in Kohlberg's treatment of the content of morality as manifest in virtues such as

courage, compassion, sincerity and the like."

He dismisses character-traits because the work done on honesty showed that it was situation specific and an unreliable predictor of what children would do over a range of circumstances. But he never enquires whether this might be specific to a trait such as honesty. He never examines the marked differences between them and what he calls principles.¹⁴²

Peters suggests that the learning of habits, even when they are not fully understood, may be an important part of what is required in developing a rational, principled moral code. This argument is parallel to the position taken in Part I of this work, that political socialization, though not issuing in a reflective understanding or perspective on political life, may be seen as a prerequisite to political education.

3. A further, related, question can be raised about the notion of objectivity in morals. Kohlberg connects the logical criteria of reversibility to the reciprocity of justice and to the universalizability of moral judgments. Alasdair MacIntyre (as one among those who have questioned the possibility of generating a list of [formal] defining characteristics of morality) notes that universality of application is involved in conceiving of any type of rule. He argues then that "there is nothing specific to moral valuation in universalizability and in so far as moral valuations are not expressions of rules

they are not universalizable."

A whole range of cases can be envisaged where moral valuations are not universalizable. At the one extreme would be those instances where in adopting a moral position someone consciously refrains from legislating for others, although they might have done so More commonly, however, nonuniversalizable judgments occur when a man finds that the concept of 'duty' has limits which render it useless in certain situations of moral perplexity This is the case with what the theologians call 'works of supererogation' To say of a man that he did his duty in performing a work of supererogation is to contradict oneself Such a man might legitimately say 'I have taken so-and-so as what I ought to do,' and here his valuation cannot, logically cannot, be universalized.¹⁴³

I want to refrain from entering into this arena of debate about the meaning of morality and the type of criteria proper to distinguishing moral from other types of discourse. I will grant that a fully developed moral person may act on principle, and that his type of judgment differs in an important qualitative sense from conventional judgments which hinge on "doing the done thing." There is in other words, a developmental dimension to the distinction between traditional and principled moral codes which comes out in considering how it is that people can come to act on self-accepted (autonomous) principles.¹⁴⁴

What I want to follow up on is the more general consideration of what types of concepts enter into practical discourse - on what there are reasons for doing or for bringing into being. I want to ask whether there are

not at least some practical concepts - important in the political discourse and the political judgments which provide the flesh and bones of political life - which do not share the central characteristic that Kohlberg ascribes to mature moral thought (and Piaget to formal thought) - i.e. reversibility (or universalizability). In dealing with this question, we will also be indirectly calling into question Kohlberg's judgment that the criterion of mature social-moral thought is tied to a single concept like justice and not to a more general dimension of rationality.

We might consider such concepts as courage and integrity, or autonomy and creativity, or being critical and displaying foresight. For example, a man might find good reason to act courageously in a situation in which he could not demand it of others, or see it as their duty also - an act of supererogation as MacIntyre noted above. Richard Peters has suggested viewing these higher-order traits of character as examples of human excellence which we find admirable, but which do not necessarily call forth approval in a moral sense.¹⁴⁵ For they refer to the manner in which something is done rather than precisely what it is that is done (i.e. they indicate a development of human capacities). We may disapprove of the specific activities in question, such as robbing

trains or having a joke at someone else's expense. And yet we may retain some "sneaking admiration" for the excellence displayed in the enterprise - such as courage and foresight in the first case or creativity and critical acumen in the second.

Similar notions come to mind when we consider the range of interpersonal relationships which we enter into and develop during the normal course of life. In these relationships certain "reactive" attitudes and feelings, to which we attach great importance, emerge - such as gratitude, resentment, forgiveness and love. It is these notions I will consider in the next section.

But first I want to note that these two types of notions - character traits and reactive attitudes - share one feature in common. It is that they are connected intimately with what it means to be a "person". As Peters develops this idea:

Being a person is connected conceptually with having what I call an assertive point of view, with evaluation, decision and choice, and with being, to a certain extent, an individual who determines his own destiny by his choices. It is connected, in other words, with reason in its various aspects. We are all persons in that normally we have a potentiality for developing such capacities to a considerable degree.¹⁴⁶

The criterion of development which we want to propose as appropriate to the sphere of social and

political judgment is that of reflective rationality. To deliberate reflectively on political questions involves considering or treating others as more or less developed persons who are capable of more fully developing the capacities which mark them as persons - that is the more "intellectual" excellences like critical thinking and foresight, the richness of "affective" life brought out in forgiveness and love, as well as those virtues which lie on the border, such as integrity and courage. Political discourse and judgment involves (to anticipate the argument in the next section) concepts such as these (i.e. autonomy, resentment, courage, etc.) which are not necessarily "reversible" in the Piaget or Kohlberg sense. These notions are connected, on the one hand, to the development of reason, and on the other hand, to the idea of being a person.¹⁴⁷

Cognition, Affect, and the Unity of Mental Development

I want to consider now the distinctions which were introduced earlier between cognitive and affective aspects of mental life, and between social and physical spheres of judgment. My comments are based upon a reading of the final section of an article Piaget first published in 1940, "The Mental Development of the Child."¹⁴⁸ In this

article we find one of his rare attempts to deal with both cognitive and affective aspects of the thought of adolescents.

Piaget's essential thesis is that cognition and affect are two aspects of the same phenomenon. Concepts for dealing with the physical world or the interpersonal-social world are similar in having this "double aspect". David Elkind summarizes the position as follows:

By and large Piaget would seem to be a double-aspect theorist. From this point of view, motivation and cognitive structure are not separate entities, but are rather different sides of the same thing The cognitive systems termed "personality" and "self" do not differ in this respect. If they differ from other cognitive systems - such as those dealing with the physical world - then it is in terms of their content, not their mode of operation.¹⁴⁹

What is interesting (or troubling) about this article (and other treatments by Piaget and Kohlberg) is that Piaget speaks of a parallelism and interaction between cognitive and affective/social development.

Exactly parallel to the elaboration of the formal operations and the completion of the construction of thought, adolescent affectivity asserts itself through the development of the personality and its injection into adult society Now this personal system cannot be constructed prior to adolescence, because it presupposes the formal thought and reflexive constructions we have just discussed.¹⁵⁰

To summarize the difficulty which might be thought to arise here, we can ask: is Piaget postulating an over-

lapping of the cognitive/affective and physical/social distinctions, so that affect asserts itself solely in the sphere of judgments about the physical world? I raise this point of interpretation only to deny it, as Piaget definitely would. But the manner of exposition could lead to misinterpretation of Piaget's theory of mental life, along the lines of what Richard Peters finds common in child development textbooks.

In most books on child-development, "development" is divided into physical, intellectual, social, moral and emotional aspects, as if social and moral development were devoid of "intellect", as if morality and the use of intellect were free from passion, and as if emotional development was separable from thought and social awareness. This indefensible type of classification should surely be scrapped and replaced by a more logical division into forms of thought and awareness, each of which has its affective aspect.¹⁵¹

But Piaget has no such intentions, for he holds fast to the position that "personal schemas, like all others, are both intellectual and affective." He continues,

We do not love without seeking to understand, and we do not even hate without a subtle use of judgment. Thus when we speak of 'affective schemas', it must be understood that what is meant is merely the affective aspect of schemas which are also intellectual.¹⁵²

The theory can best be conveyed by pointing to the dialectical interaction, in mental development, between application in the social and physical spheres. The thrust

of Piaget's treatment of the sensory-motor stage seems to revolve around the development of certain mental skills (with cognitive and affective aspects) in dealing with the physical world. And he is sufficiently dialectical to allow that certain social experiences and concepts are crucial to the development and elaboration of certain level of thought in the physical sphere. For example, in speaking of the adolescent's "new capacity to orient himself toward what is abstract and not immediately present . . . but which . . . is indispensable instrument in his adaptation to the adult social framework . . . ," he says "there is no doubt that this is the most direct and, moreover, the simplest manifestation of formal thinking."¹⁵³

The point of interpretation is, I hope, settled. But two more points must be made. First, there is an important and intimate connection between the affective aspects of mental life and the development of interpersonal-social concepts. This connection comes through clearly when we look at those "reactive" attitudes and feelings which emerge in participative interpersonal relationships. Second, we are still faced with the problem of finding ways of describing the overall character of the levels in the development of mental life. In the article mentioned earlier ("The Mental Development of the

Child"), Piaget frequently refers to the "reversibility" and "reflectiveness" of formal thought, but these terms do not appear at all in the discussion of social/affective development. I want now to look at how Piaget conceives of the unity in mental development, and defend this conception in modified form. The necessity of modification will come out when we look at certain important features of reactive interpersonal attitudes.

In the article we are considering, Piaget offers the following insight into the threads of continuity and discontinuity in the mental life:

In conclusion, let us point out the basic unity of the process which, from the construction of the practical universe by infantile sensorimotor intelligence, leads to the reconstruction of the world by the hypothetico-deductive thinking of the adolescent, via the knowledge of the concrete world derived from the system of operations of middle childhood. We have seen how these successive constructions always involve a decentering of the initial egocentric point of view in order to place it in an ever-broader coordination of relations and concepts, so that each new terminal grouping further integrates the subject's activity by adapting it to an ever-widening reality. Parallel to this intellectual elaboration, we have seen affectivity gradually disengaging itself from the self in order to submit, thanks to the reciprocity and coordination of values, to the laws of cooperation. Of course, affectivity is always the incentive for the actions that ensue at each new stage of this progressive ascent, since affectivity assigns value to activities and distributes energy to them. But affectivity is nothing without intelligence. Intelligence furnishes affectivity with its means and clarifies its ends In reality, the most profound tendency of all human activity is progression towards equilibrium. Reason, which

expresses the highest forms of equilibrium, reunites intelligence and affectivity.¹⁵⁴

Reason, rational action, or rationality in mental life - these, then, are the phenomena which have this double aspect of cognitivity and affectivity, intellectuality and emotionality. Piaget has been engaged in the description and clarification of the characteristics of different levels or types of rationality. This is the thread of continuity in mental development.

But because Piaget finds a fundamental coherence or structuring of the reasoning processes of a child at a certain level of thought, he must also account in his descriptions for discontinuities in the development of reason.¹⁵⁵ This development involves, in other words, qualitative transformations in the mode of reasoning. Piaget offers a rich variety of concepts for getting at the essential characteristics of rationality at the level of mature or formal thought. In different places he has said that mature thought is detached, objective, equilibrated, reversible and reflective. Piaget himself has noted that these are different perspectives or conceptual tools for getting at the essential characteristics of the reasoning processes.

What I want to propose here is first of all, that the "reflectiveness" of mature socio-political thought be

taken as central to its understanding, and as the central cognitive criterion of political education. And I will present, in the remainder of this section, the rudiments of a philosophical argument that mature socio-political thought cannot be "reversible" and "objective" in quite the same sense indicated by Piaget. To do this we must return to a consideration of the "reactive" interpersonal attitudes we have mentioned, and the sense in which they may enter into mature "reflectively rational" thought.

These attitudes and feelings (e.g., resentment and gratitude, forgiveness and love, hate and hurt feelings) are "reactive" in the sense that they depend on the attitudes and feelings of other human beings toward us.¹⁵⁶ These feelings have at their core a view of the good-will or malevolence which others have toward us. And they point to "the very great importance that we attach to the attitudes and intentions of other human beings, and the great extent to which our personal feelings and reactions depend upon, or involve, our beliefs about these attitudes and intentions."¹⁵⁷

Now, to return to our central problem, the characterization of mature (or formal) thought, we find that Piaget attaches importance to two achievements which find expression in reflectiveness of thought. Formal thought is, first of all, thinking about thought. It

implies a sort of detachment attained when the direct operations on concrete reality are themselves represented and operated on in propositional form. Secondly, in formal thought there is a reversal of relations between the real and the possible. Piaget and Inhelder sum up these two features as follows:

Formal thinking is both thinking about thought (propositional logic is a second order operational system which operates on propositions whose truth, in turn, depends on class, relational, and numerical operations) and a reversal of relations between what is real and what is possible (the empirically given comes to be inserted as a particular sector of the total set of possible combinations).¹⁵⁸

It is the second sense of reflectiveness that I want to consider - the quality which assigns the real to a "mirror-reflective" relation to an empirically discoverable subset of the logically possible. I want to argue that the feature of formal thought which Piaget ties to this sense of reflectiveness - its reversibility and, to some extent, its objectivity - cannot be characteristic of those social attitudes and feelings we have called "reactive". And it is at least doubtful whether any mature thought about social phenomena can be reversible and objective in quite the sense that Piaget attaches to these terms. The argument follows from three points.

1. The reactive aspect of these interpersonal attitudes is not simply a mirror reflection. Rather, there

is an indefinite series of reflections. For in forming my beliefs about others, there is more than just an account made of their beliefs about me. We consider also their beliefs about my beliefs about them, and so on.

2. In thinking reflectively about and forming beliefs about this series, we are not just detached observers (although there is a sense, captured by the notion of role-taking, in which a certain detachment is necessary to grasping the perspective of the other and attempting a coordination). Rather, we are participants, and thus in an important sense these attitudes are non-detached. It is conceivable that this participative attitude can be suspended, but as Strawson notes, "a sustained objectivity of interpersonal attitude, and the human isolation which that would entail does not seem to be something of which human beings would be capable, even if some general truth were a theoretical ground for it."¹⁵⁹

3. We are not just participants tout court in social life, but participants in relationships whose fabric is dependent on specific beliefs about others and their attitudes. Because of this, new information or a change of beliefs may alter (sever or deepen) a relationship in such a way that it can never be the same again. But at this point our thinking about this relationship is in a

sense irreversible. The ramifications of a change in belief can alter the whole interpretative framework. One cannot reverse his thought and think about what it was like "when she loved me," when new information alters his belief about what was before the core of his interpretative framework - i.e. when he learns that she was deceiving him all along. We are not framing "hypotheses" in forming beliefs about others in these relationships, but something more like hedging our bets in the risk of investment in human social life. But however our bets are hedged, they cannot be totally withdrawn in the way a disconfirmed hypothesis can be discarded.

I conclude, then, that an important range of concepts about interpersonal relations, tied to the notion of being a person, point to a certain irreversibility of mature thought about social life.¹⁶⁰ And I would hold that many character trait concepts, tied to both the social conditions presumed by the process of public discourse and to the idea of developing one's capacities as a person, are similarly applied reflectively without the implication of reversibility.

Charles Taylor comes to similar conclusions after a somewhat different argument.

Reversibility implies a grasp of things as systems which can undergo a coherent set of transformations as ideally manipulable entities; and

connected with this it implies that we abstract from their significance for us in so coming to grips with them. But an objective understanding of our feelings or our relations with others can have neither of these features.¹⁶¹

Taylor emphasizes the affective or striving aspect of interpersonal relations, speaking of the working through of a tension-filled relationship in imagination, or play-acting, in order to better grasp its significance.

As we come to see the hidden sources of tension in a relationship, for instance, we can put it in perspective; and with this we alter the relationship in some degree, so that its past form can become unrecoverable in its entirety; and by this I mean not just that we cannot return to it in fact, but that we cannot even get a clear grasp intellectually of a return path; in other words, our thought here is "irreversible". Here, of course, the significance is a shared significance. To attempt to treat it as an object, which can be examined in abstraction from our involvement in it, is itself to stand back from this sharing, and hence alter the relationship We cannot become disintricated enough from these situations of involvement to dominate them as manipulable objects, and hence objectivity here has to mean something else; it can only mean that we come to put them into perspective.¹⁶²

Here we arrive at our conclusion about Piaget's and Kohlberg's conceptions of mature social thought: it cannot be reversible and objective in exactly the sense which they seem to intimate by those terms. It is for this reason that I have chosen the reflectiveness of mature social thought as an essential characteristic. In our assessment, then, there remains only the further clarifi-

cation of what we mean by the reflectiveness of mature social thought.

We are interested primarily in the reflectiveness of practical reasoning, which involves questions of what there are reasons for doing and what there are reasons for bringing into being. Let me begin by putting forward the core claim I want to clarify as a defensible view of what is involved in reflective practical reasoning. The claim is that when a reflectiveness of practical thought is attained, the crucial achievement is the ability to formulate new alternatives for action outside of a given framework of norms and goals; and to reconcile or choose among conflicting aims or courses of action in a principled and autonomous manner. It is not a choice of means to a given end, as in conventional (or instrumentally rational) thought, where, according to Kohlberg, the ends are given in the social mores and sustained by justification in terms of upholding the social order. Rather, in reflective thought one is able to deliberate on the ends of action, to hold them up and view them from many angles or perspectives. And, most importantly, there is an awareness that since we are crucially implicated participants in social life, actions can have qualitatively different results. We become aware that choice among ends which have qualitatively different results is, in effect, choice of a future self. We become

capable of understanding and choosing among alternative personal ideals and forms of life. Reflective rationality involves, then, holding up different ends or aims of action and asking what the reasons are for doing this in terms of what kind of self and society there are reasons for bringing into being.

The distinction I have drawn between instrumental and reflective rationality resembles that made by Dewey (noted in Chapter I) between "wide and narrow use of reason" when we deliberate, that is, rehearse in imagination various competing possible lines of action.

The latter holds a fixed end in view and deliberates only upon means of reaching it. The former regards the end in view in deliberation as tentative and permits, may encourage the coming into view of consequences which will transform it and create a new purpose and plan Deliberation is not an attempt to do away with this opposition of quality by reducing it to one of amount as with utilitarian rational calculation. It is an attempt to uncover the conflict of aims in its full scope and bearing In short, the thing actually at stake in any serious deliberation is not a difference in quantity, but what kind of a person one is to become, what sort of self is in the making, what kind of a world is making.¹⁶³

We can see now how developmental psychology is tied to the developmental perspective. For with the achievement of mature reflective thought - with the ability to gauge in imagination possible self-transformations, and to accept the irreversible altering of relationships which

may arise from this achievement of perspective - we are capable of viewing others as agents, as persons with an assertive point of view who are also potentially capable of acting to control their destiny, to enrich their emotional lives and to develop their higher order capacities. Another connection is that in thinking reflectively about oneself and others as persons capable of developing their capacities to a high degree, the question of the possibility of wide scale human development arises. That is, in what sort of society is the development of human excellences - fully developed, reflective persons - possible, and how might this society come into being. The question is, basically, how to create a rational society. To speak of a rational society is not to specify what particular aims might be pursued by members of the society or the specific social practices shaping the form of life considered desirable. It is only to say that it would be capable of providing conditions for the full development of reflectively rational citizens. This type of thinking might be called utopian in the modern sense that what ought to be - the good society - is intimately connected with a view of how it might be brought into being.¹⁶⁴ We can sum up by saying that reflectively rational social and political thought involves at least four components: 1) a view of

human excellence, tied to the notion of persons and their full development; 2) a view of the rational society; 3) a theory of society and social change; 4) a moral point of view (which attempts to refine the principles used to deal with conflicts arising in the achievement of human excellence - the full development of reason, and the rational society).

Let me conclude by pointing out that this proposed criterion of mature socio-political thought ("reflective rationality") is normative in two senses. It is normative, first of all, because the stages of mental development (the development of reason) are picked out from a particular angle or perspective. The distinction between instrumental and reflective rationality is but one of many criteria which could be proposed for better coming to grips with the qualitative structural development of practical reason. Just as I have given reasons for rejecting "reversibility" as a major developmental criterion in this sphere, so also may further empirical and conceptual inquiries force a revision of this notion of "reflectiveness". This criterion is normative in a second, related, sense also. For if it is to pick out a significant feature of mental life, it stands in need of justification. That is, if it proves an empirically fruitful and conceptually clear notion, the question arises as to how much reflectiveness

ought to be promoted for what proportion and segment of the population, and how this ought to be done. This is the moral component of the developmental perspective. As Taylor puts it, a developmental criterion is normative because "concepts of successful maturity are the basis of arguments concerning how we should live."¹⁶⁵ A tentative attempt to justify this criterion is presented in the concluding chapter of this study.

CHAPTER VIII

DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN ASSESSMENT (II)

Introduction

In the preceeding chapter, two central points emerged about the enterprise of constructing a developmental political psychology geared to the study of political education. The first is a general point about the fundamental character of Piaget's developmental psychology. It was pointed out that Piaget has been engaged in the task of reconstructing the ontogenetic development of reason or rationality. I argued further that the highest level of rationality in socio-political thought is best characterized in terms of its reflectiveness; that the development of practical reason is intimately connected with the notion of a person; and that a certain human excellence is apparent in the emotional life and character of individuals who attain a perspective on life through reflection. The second point is that an understanding of reflective social and political thought requires recognition of the participative character of social relations. Actions are tied not just to the beliefs of the agent, but to his beliefs about others' beliefs, and how he figures into their beliefs, etc. It is the shared significance of behavior which warrants describing it as action. And it

is this participative character of social life which requires qualifying the sense in which social thought can be reflective - i.e. it cannot always be reversible in the way reasoning about physical objects can be.

In this chapter I want to proceed by showing how this second point is related to the explanations offered by Piaget and Kohlberg for advance in levels of rationality with ontogenetic development, and to the claims made by Kohlberg concerning the explanation of action. I will be trying to lay the basis for the argument that the categories of a theory of social structure enter at crucial points in an explanatory theory of political education.

The Explanation of Development

Developmental psychologists have, on a number of occasions, been criticized for "ignoring the social dimension" in their inquiries. This attack might be seen as rooted in a misunderstanding of the tasks developmental psychologists have set themselves, or in a disagreement about the characterization of the phenomena to be investigated,¹⁶⁶ or in a more basic disagreement about the character of a "science" of psychology and its epistemological underpinnings. But this criticism has also been advanced by some philosophers sympathetic to the developmental perspective who are concerned with the interpretation of Piaget's work. For example, Stephen Toulmin

comments on "conservation" studies, in which it is found that the "preoperational" child cannot understand that an identical quantity of water is contained in a tall, thin glass and a short, fat one:

The experimenters seemingly ignored the socially determined - not to say conventional - character of the tasks they invited the child to perform, notably, the ambiguities in their linguistic expressions. (A young child can hardly be expected to guess intuitively by what exact standards, and in terms of what particular criteria, his interrogators intend him to deal with the ambiguous question, "Is there 'more' in the one container than in the other, or the 'same' amount in both?"; and we have no right to be surprised if his resulting behavior is, by our standards, inconsistent.¹⁶⁷

In this section I want to follow up on this last criticism, and show how the "ambiguity" of the concepts which guide social practice, or the "inconsistency" of their criteria of application, may be related to the explanation of mental development. I will consider the development of reflective socio-political thought and how far the explanatory schemes of Piaget and Kohlberg take us toward an understanding of its development.

Before we proceed, I want to state a central theme of my argument. In speaking of human development as the development of persons (or potential persons), and in segmenting that development into a scheme of levels of rationality, I assume that the explanation offered must

take into account the specific features of the level of reasoning to be explained. Because of this, no general explanation can be offered to account for all the transformations in mode of reasoning which can be observed during the course of ontogenetic development. More specifically, it is important to distinguish between the factors which can be cited to explain the achievement of instrumental rationality (operational thought, conventional morality) and those cited in accounting for the development of reflective rationality (formal thought, principled morality). Instrumental rationality can be viewed as the use of reason in the minimal sense of what is required if there is to be any social-institutional life at all. It is the achievement picked out by socialization to the basic principles of social life, through induction into conventional forms of thought and social practices. Here we are speaking of the ability to grasp ends or purposes, fit an action to that end as a means of its attainment, and to regulate this conduct by reasons available in public discourse.¹⁶⁸ Because socialization is an achievement, and failure is possible, an explanation of successful socialization must make reference to the specific social practices which led to this achievement. A general description of the type of factor involved in explaining socialization - such as role-taking opportunities - is possible.¹⁶⁹ But

because the opportunity to take certain roles in certain circumstances could hinder or fail to promote socialization, it is necessary to specify the character of successful practices in explaining the achievement of socialization.

When we are attempting to account for the development of the ability to reason reflectively, it is also necessary to cite the role of specific social institutions or traditions. Why is this so? First of all, the capacities or abilities which are expressed in any type of reasoning cannot be exercised apart from some practices such as those in which we find them exemplified. We must reason about something, and practical reason cannot be exercised outside the context of some question about actual practices¹⁷⁰ In the case of instrumental reasoning, the practices involved relate to the capacities required for some minimum level of functioning in any society. The explanatory role of social experience cannot then involve picking out features of social practice which distinguish one society from another.

In turning to the explanation of the development of reflective rationality, however, we do not find this type of reasoning in all societies. Where it is found, it may be recognized in practices which may vary from one society to another, according to the specific beliefs and ideals of the people. Critical thinking, autonomy, and creativity may be recognized in very different practices, but they

are not at all necessarily connected with the minimal requirements of social life. So it is these specific practices - institutions, traditions, structural features of society - which must be cited as necessary preconditions for the development of reflective rationality. I believe that some such distinction as this is implicit in the explanatory schemes offered by Piaget and Kohlberg. However, they have failed to develop this point, and this I believe is one of the major weaknesses in their theories. To correct this deficiency would move them in the direction of a more adequate social psychology.

1. Piaget and the Explanation of Mental Development.

In the comments introducing the last chapter, we said that the distinctions employed by developmental psychologists like Piaget and Kohlberg - the phenomena they identify - provide an important and useful framework for research. But it was implied that in order to provide an explanatory theory with real fruitfulness for social scientists several important tasks remain. I want to focus here on two interrelated tasks which have remained peripheral to the endeavors of developmental psychologists. The first difficulty is that the explanatory theory is constructed at a very high level of abstraction, with attention focused on identifying the types of factors important in development. Flavell's comments bear on this point:

The system is obviously descriptive in the sense that it has over the years provided a wealth of detailed information on the changing characteristics of cognition in the course of ontogenetic development. Less obviously it also purports to explain the changes it describes. Piaget recognizes with the rest of us that age is a vehicle for causes rather than a cause in itself; nonetheless the "real" causes are not systematically varied at the experimental level in Piaget's studies (although attempts are made to identify them theoretically) and hence few predictive statements are made.¹⁷¹

It is necessary, then, to get at the specific practices which promote mental development.

The second task is to interpret these "real" causes in ways that can be made relevant to the questions which have priority for social scientists, especially those bearing on social structure and social change. Flavell further indicates how a psychologist might conceive of this task.

In effect, every time Piaget discovers a new cognitive form and describes its development the stage is set immediately for further experimentation: to find out of what social and individual variables the new form might be a function, i.e., socioeconomic background, general intelligence, familial environment, personal adjustment, and so on.¹⁷²

Let us now turn to Piaget's explanatory framework. Earlier we said that cognitive-developmental psychologists offer an "interactionist" explanation of development. This is a term through which the developmentalist hopes to convey his attempt to avoid the a priorism of the maturationists and the crude empiricism of the environmentalists: the

first type of explanation tends to posit mental structure without genesis and the second tends to view development as genesis without structure (to use Piaget's aphorisms). Development, the genesis of mental structures (modes of thought), is to be accounted for as due to the interaction of an actively structuring organism and his environment.

Piaget goes further than this, to the extent of identifying four general factors which must be included in any adequate account of ontogenetic development.¹⁷³ Each of these factors is conceived of as a complex of conditions which is necessary, but not by itself sufficient, for development. The four factors are: 1) "organic growth and especially the maturation of the nervous system and the endocrine systems"; 2) "exercise and . . . acquired experience in the actions performed upon objects (as opposed to social experience)"; 3) "social interaction and transmission"; and 4) "a process of equilibrium . . . in the sense . . . of self-regulation".¹⁷⁴

It is the third type of factor that is of importance here.¹⁷⁵ I want to note in particular that the social experience involved in ontogenetic development is of two types, "social interaction" and "transmission". The first type, "social interaction", corresponds on the one hand to the experience of confronting other selves in a social order. This results in attaining the capacity to take the

role of the other, or cooperate. So, on the other hand, "social interaction" corresponds to the preconditions for developing from sensory-motor intelligence to operational thought (instrumental reason).

The second type of social experience, referred to as "transmission" by Piaget, has a more ambiguous status. One form of transmission, "school-teaching" is cited as a factor in the explanation of ontogenetic development.¹⁷⁶ But on the next page, Piaget states that "Any explanation of the child's development must take into consideration two dimensions: an ontogenetic dimension and a social dimension (in the sense of the transmission of the successive work of generations)."¹⁷⁷ It is this sense of "transmission" which is of greatest importance to social scientists, and which is almost totally unexplored by developmental psychologists. For the "successive work of generations" includes not only "school-teaching", but also the institutional and structural features of a society which emerge historically out of previous social forms. An explanation of the ontogenetic development of socio-political thought which excludes these factors cannot, in its turn in the circle of human sciences, provide a satisfactory conception of the human constructions which these successive social forms represent. Only by exploring this sense of "social experience" will we find the

institutional and social-structural preconditions for development from conventional-operational thought to principled-formal thought, from instrumental to reflective rationality. The social scientist may be interested in the relationship between the different modes of thought and the construction, maintenance and transformation of specific social forms. But this task can proceed only as a complement to an adequate understanding of how these social forms relate to (facilitate or hinder) the development of forms of thought.

2. Kohlberg's Explanatory Framework. We noted earlier that Kohlberg proposes to account for the role of experience in moral development in terms of certain universal structural features of the environment, and the relation between specific experiences and the child's mental structure. In the interpretation of social experience, Kohlberg places great emphasis on role theory. The universal structural features of the social environment he identifies, "the fundamental inputs stimulating moral development," are referred to as "role-taking opportunities."¹⁷⁸ This is basically a specification of Piaget's "social interaction" factor. The minimal capacities for social-moral life are established in all societies because "all societies are alike in the sheer fact of having systems of defined complementary role expectations."¹⁷⁹ Thus role-taking

opportunities are required if there is to be any social life, and social institutions constitute the framework for providing these opportunities on a continuing basis. Role-taking opportunities are a minimal condition for moving to the conventional moral level.¹⁸⁰ Kohlberg also generalizes this notion of role-taking opportunities, and makes the further claim that "All societies have the same basic institutions of family, economy, social stratification, law and government." These institutions have, he says, "certain transcultural functional meanings" in spite of "diversity in the detailed definition of these institutions."¹⁸¹

An important part of Kohlberg's theory is the claim that "the 'normal' course of social experience leads to progression through the sequence" of stages, while "specific forms of experience, like jail, may have a 'regressive' effect."¹⁸² Kohlberg himself cites statistics which should lead to questioning this claim. In a study of middle class urban boys in three nations (U. S. A., Taiwan and Mexico), Kohlberg concluded that "moral Stage 4 is the dominant stage of most adults."¹⁸³ Another study by Kohlberg and his colleagues found that only 57% of their subjects over 45 years old had attained formal operational thought.¹⁸⁴ Certainly, the "normal" course of social experience cannot be said to be sufficient for the

transition to reflective thought.

But we do not need to rely solely on statistics to throw doubt on the adequacy of Kohlberg's conception of the role of social experience in development. There are, I think, good theoretical reasons. We will look now at how Kohlberg views the "sequence of groups or institutions" in which a child participates in the course of progress through the stages of thought. In order to get a fuller flavor of Kohlberg's treatment, I quote at length.

The first group, the family, has received the most attention in socialization theories. From our point of view, however, (1) family participation is not unique or critically necessary for moral development, and (2) the dimensions on which it stimulates moral development are primarily general dimensions by which other primary groups stimulate moral development, i.e., the dimensions of creation of role-taking opportunities The second group in which the child participates is the peer group While peer-group participation appears to be stimulating of moral development, its influence seems better conceptualized in terms of providing general role-taking opportunities rather than as having very specific and unique forms of influence.

A third type of participation presumed important for moral development is that of participation in the secondary institutions of law, government and, perhaps of work. One index of differential opportunities for participation in the social structures of government and of work or economy is that of socioeconomic status. It is abundantly clear that the lower class cannot and does not feel as much sense of power in, and responsibility for, the institutions of government and economy as does the middle class. This, in turn, tends to generate less of a disposition to view these institutions from a generalized, flexible and organized perspective based on various roles as vantage points. The law and the government are perceived quite differently by the child if he feels a sense of

potential participation in the social order than if he does not.¹⁸⁵

My critique is as follows. In each case of social participation, Kohlberg abstracts from the specific influence of a social structural or institutional facet of social life in order to return to his notion of "general role-taking opportunities". But since "social" is defined by Kohlberg as "the distinctively human structuring of action and thought by role-taking,"¹⁸⁶ this amounts to nothing more than citing "social experience" as a type of factor in development. In terms of Piaget's division, it is "social interaction" without transmission of the successive work of generations. One exception will be noted in the quote above. Kohlberg speaks of "socioeconomic status" as an index not only of role-taking opportunities, but also of a "sense of potential participation in the social order." But how is this idea to be given full concrete meaning in an explanation if all institutions (except, e.g., jail, which has a regressive influence) are stripped of their specific features which might be cited as promoting or fixating development?¹⁸⁷

Part of the problem I believe, can be found in the quantitative interpretation given to the notion of "role-taking opportunities". Special features of institutions which might make for moral progress are reduced to

quantity of communication and sheer amount of role-taking opportunities.

Participation is partially a matter of sheer interaction and communication in the group, since communication presupposes role-taking. In addition, the centrality of the individual in the communication and the decision-making structure of the group enhances role-taking opportunities. The more the individual is responsible for the decision of the group, the more must he take the roles of others in it While leadership roles might be expected to require more role-taking than follower roles, it is also likely that "democratic leadership" requires more role-taking than "autocratic leadership" on the part of both leader and follower¹⁸⁸

Institutions, groups and relationships are conceived as distinguishable, then, in terms of the quantity of role-taking going on, and presumably that is connected with the opportunities for role-taking available. The special character, or qualitative difference between various relationships, groups or institutions is reduced to differences in quantity of role-taking opportunities. But how could it conceivably be fruitful to distinguish the essential character of institutions such as marriage, slavery and bureaucracy in terms of the amount of role-taking opportunities?¹⁸⁹ Kohlberg might reply that the distinction is only for explanatory purposes, for understanding the role of the institution in stimulating development, and not for classificatory purposes. This reply may seem plausible, but I want to argue that

certain essential and distinguishing features of institutions can be important in the explanation of development - features which bear on the opportunities of social participants not only to take roles, but also to construct new roles,¹⁹⁰ to probe in a manner conducive to reflection on what one really wants.¹⁹¹

Ernest Gellner argues that the concepts and institutions in a society are interrelated.¹⁹²

Concepts and beliefs are themselves, in a sense, institutions among others; for they provide a kind of fairly permanent frame, as do other institutions, independent of any one individual, within which individual conduct takes place. In another sense they are correlates of all the institutions of a society; and to understand the working of the concepts of a society is to understand its institutions.¹⁹³

And he adds in a footnote:

It is, however, very important not to misunderstand this point. For it is not true to say that to understand the concepts of a society (in the way its members do) is to understand the society. Concepts are as liable to mask reality as to reveal it, and masking some of it may be a part of their function.¹⁹⁴

In offering an example to illustrate his argument, Gellner asks us to imagine a society in which the word "boble" is applied to characterize people.

Research reveals that bobleness or bobility is attributed to people under either of the following

conditions: (a) a person who antecedently displays certain characteristics in his conduct, say uprightness, courage, and generosity, is called boble. (b) any person holding a certain office, or a certain position, is also ipso facto described as boble.¹⁹⁵

Bobility-(a) appears to be a descriptive term (descriptive of a character trait), while bobility-(b) is an ascription, not dependent on the characteristics of the person in question. But the people in this society do not distinguish two concepts, bobility-(a) and bobility-(b). So it appears we have a case of a concept with multiple and incoherent criteria for its application.

Gellner wants to point out that incoherent concepts - or concepts with inconsistent criteria - can be socially functional, that there can be "social control through the employment of absurd, ambiguous, inconsistent or unintelligible" concepts and doctrines.¹⁹⁶

Bobility is a conceptual device by which the privileged class of the society in question acquires some of the prestige of certain virtues respected in that society, without the inconvenience of needing to practice them, thanks to the fact that the same word is applied either to practitioners of those virtues or to occupiers of favored positions. It is, at the same time, a manner of reinforcing the appeal of those virtues, by associating them, through the use of the same appellation, with prestige and power. But all this needs to be said, and to say it is to bring out the internal logical incoherence of the concept - an incoherence which, indeed, is socially functional.¹⁹⁷

And likewise "social change may occur through the replacement of an inconsistent doctrine or ethic by a better

one."¹⁹⁸ Social change thus may conceivably result when a person notices the incoherences of doctrines or concepts, and attempts to reform the institutions which justify them; or "it may be that it invariably is a discontented segment of society, a new rising class for instance, which exploits those incoherences."¹⁹⁹

It is thus one side of the social-psychological dialectic to view the role of reflection in discerning these inconsistencies and moving to maintain or transform the institutions they justify. The other side, of importance here, is involved in the search for social conditions, relationships, and institutions which provide the conditions for reflection - the openness to (expectation of, demand for, etc.) want probing and role-construction. For the identification of these social conditions is necessary for an explanation of the development, beyond minimal socially required level of operational thought, of reflective rationality.

I think some insight can be gained into the sociological deficiency of Kohlberg's theory if we note that he has been attentive primarily to the debate with those who view socialization from the conformity perspective. On this view, as we saw earlier, the direction of mental change was distinguished in terms of conflicting categories of conformity and deviance,

support and alienation, etc. Kohlberg wants to show a universal dimension of moral development, which goes beyond an equation of morality with mores. Thus he writes:

These findings contrast with many sociological notions as to how group memberships determine moral development. It is often thought that the child gets some of his basic moral values from his family, some from the peer group, and that these basic values tend to conflict with one another. Instead of participation in various groups causing conflicting developmental trends in morality, it appears that participation in various groups converges in stimulating the development of basic moral values, which are not transmitted by one particular group as opposed to another While various people and groups make conflicting immediate demands upon the child, they do not seem to present the child with basically conflicting or different stimulation for general moral development. 200

If my critique to this point has been coherent, it should be clear that I would claim against Kohlberg that the particular demands made on a child or an adult may be conducive to developmental failures - fixation or regression - rather than provide stimulation for moral development. Basic moral values and moral development might not be promoted by one particular group to the exclusion of others. But it is the effect of engagement in particular institutions, or even the impact of widespread social practices, that is important in impeding or promoting development.

But it should be clear by now that Kohlberg's account of the explanation of development, particularly

of the transition to reflective thought, is deficient on at least two counts. First, there is a failure to include the historical dimension of social life, the imbeddedness of relationships, groups, institutions and traditions in the "successive work of generations."²⁰¹ Second, there is a failure to grant qualitatively distinct structural features of society a different role in promoting different levels of development.

I ought to note here, in anticipation of objections from developmental psychologists, that Kohlberg does not limit his understanding of the role of experience in moral development to "universal features of experienced objects (physical or social)." In addition to this and to logical analysis of concepts, he proposes "analysis of structural relations between experience-inputs and the relevant behavioral organization". He calls this a theory of "structural conflict and structural match." This type of theory is required for precisely the reasons that we have advanced in criticism of his sociological explanatory ideas. An analysis of the "role-taking opportunities" universally available in societies, he says, is a specification of "the general belief that the more the social stimulation, the faster the rate of moral development." However, "these theories do not account for specific transitions from stage to stage or to eventual fixation

at a particular stage."202

The problem of moral change would appear to be one of presenting stimuli which are both sufficiently incongruous as to stimulate conflict in the child's existing stage schemata and sufficiently congruous as to be assimilable with some accommodative effort.203

The reason why this addition to the theory fails to satisfy my critique is that it separates the sociological and psychological notions advanced to account for development: "role-taking opportunities" on the one hand, and "cognitive stimulation" on the other. It involves a reduction of the qualitatively distinct institutional features of society (which emerge in an historical perspective on social structure) to quantitatively interpreted role-taking notions, and the reinsertion of these qualitative-structural features at the individual psychological level. It is not just that the "successive work of generations" is ignored, but this separation also leads to untenable assertions about the social conditions of development: for example, that the progression from stage to stage is not promoted by the teaching of adults, but is aided rather by optional "cognitive stimulation". Richard Peters effectively criticizes the adequacy of these assertions:

It looks . . . as if Kohlberg's thesis about the impossibility of adults bringing about conceptual

development by teaching is either false or a conceptual truth. It is false if a normal nonrestrictive concept of "teaching" is being employed; for it is manifestly the case that the children's understanding can be accelerated by a variety of processes such as presenting them with examples and so on. Kohlberg may call this "cognitive stimulation", but most people would call it "teaching". It is a conceptual truth if a restricted concept of "teaching" is being employed, which rules out the processes by means of which adults help to get the child into a position where he can grasp a principle.²⁰⁴

With the separation of social and individual-psychological explanatory notions, such confusions seem to me inevitable.

From Thought to Action

We must also ask now what positive fruit comes from this assessment? What paths of inquiry remain, on the terrain mapped out by the developmental perspective? As we indicated earlier, there are two approaches to developmental study, each with a somewhat different set of questions. We can view social practices as conditions which relate to the development of rational capacities; or we can view the levels of thought and judgment attained and sustained in different social practices as conditions for the maintenance or transformation of social life. For our purposes this means that we can study the development of modes of socio-political thought and view social practices as conditions of this development; or we can study socio-political institutions and practices, considering the explanatory role of the levels of thought or

types of belief (as opposed to specific beliefs and belief systems) available to members of the society. While these inquiries have come to be separated in the modern study of man, they are in fact crucially interrelated. Each approach involves assumptions about the direction and possible results of the other. Since I have chosen to pursue the first, "psychological" side of developmental studies, I shall note here some of the grounds on which I base my belief in the fruitfulness of a developmental approach to the "sociological" side.

In line with his emphasis on role-theory, Kohlberg interprets the relation between level of thought and moral action in terms of the "definition of the situation" by the subject. The way in which an individual defines a situation will have a bearing on what course of action he chooses.

While moral judgment maturity is only one of many predictors of action in moral conflict situations, it can be a quite powerful and meaningful predictor of action where it gives rise to distinctive ways of defining concrete situational rights and duties in socially ambiguous situations. The causal role of moral judgment appears to be due to its contribution to a "cognitive" definition of the situation rather than because strong attitudinal or affective expressions of moral values activate behavior.²⁰⁵

A number of empirical studies have been done and the results point to the explanatory power of developmental

postulates. Kohlberg notes studies in which a considerably larger percentage of subjects at the principled level refrained from cheating when left unsupervised. In a college group, while 42% of the "conventional" subjects cheated, only 11% of the "principled" subjects did so. And with a sixth grade sample, while 83% and 67% of the "pre-moral" and "conventional" subjects (respectively) cheated, 80% of the "principled" subjects did not.²⁰⁶

In another study of students who listened to speeches outside of Sproul Hall before its occupation during the free speech movement at Berkeley, it was found that about 80% of the Stage 6 subjects and 50% of the Stage 5 subjects actually sat in, but only 10% of the Stage 3 and 4 did so.²⁰⁷

This type of study can also point the way toward advance in the explanations offered for the actions of individuals whose position exposes them to conflicting or inconsistent social pressures. "Status inconsistency" and "cross-pressure" hypotheses have been advanced to account for the behavior of individuals in these situations.²⁰⁸ According to Lenski, for example, people regularly exposed to social situations made ambiguous by their inconsistent status are likely to "react against the existing social order and the political system which undergirds it." The theory is based on the supposition that "an individual

with consistent statuses or ranks has a natural tendency to think of himself in terms of that status or rank which is highest, and to expect others to do the same," while others "have a vested interest in doing just the opposite, that is, in treating him in terms of his lowest status or rank." "Since each regards his own point of view as right and proper, and since neither is likely to view the problem in a detached, analytical fashion, one, or both, are likely to be frustrated, and probably angered by the experience."²⁰⁹ Presumably, it is the frustration and anger which are seen as a cause of the tendency to blindly "react against" the socio-political order. But if we take seriously Kohlberg's finding that "affective-situational forces are less determining of moral decisions at the principled than at the conventional level,"²¹⁰ political discontent might be seen as neither a blind response to frustration, nor a mere "reaction against" what exists. To the extent that an individual is capable of rational reflection on his social situation, he is more likely to be able to reconcile conflicting social expectations and demands, to apply self-accepted and consistent principles in an ambiguous situation. Politically, this could mean, for example, that voting would reflect consistent recognition of one's interests, rather than

a discharge of emotion as a result of stress. And with a recognition of the interests of others implied in the development of moral principles, political action could be seen as directed toward transforming those structural features of society which generate inconsistent pressures and impede the development of reflective thought. For at this level one is capable of envisioning a more rational society and recognizing that the "emotional" responses of others can be tied to the failure of a changing society to present this change as an object of rational assessment and control. The crucial assumption in Lenski's theory - that individuals with inconsistent status will not be capable of "detached, analytical" reflection on their situation - must clearly be taken as a variable feature of social life.

And finally, developmental postulates could quite plausibly be applied to larger problems of socio-historical development, although almost no such study which specifically ties in with developmental psychology has been done to date. For example, if Kohlberg is correct in asserting that principled thought and judgment are basically "law-making" perspectives, we can ask what portion (per cent? segment?) of a population must be capable of reflectively rational thought before constitutional government is possible, as opposed to universal application of

formalistically codified customs, or the looser system of arbitrators in tribal disputes.²¹¹

At this point, I hope it can be said that we have sustained the argument tentatively presented at the beginning of this exercise in critical but sympathetic assessment. We said that the distinctions brought out, the achievements implicit in developmental stage criteria, provide a useful framework for research on political education. Political education picks out activities fostering an achievement of excellence in political thought and action which is deemed desirable. And the framework of empirical research provided by developmental psychology can aid in filling out the formulation of a justifiable ideal of human development. Such an ideal, we have suggested, is the development of those capacities for reflectively rational thought which are essential for full development as an autonomous person.

But the approach to the explanation of ontogenetic development²¹² which has been offered to date has not recognized the importance of historically rooted structural characteristics of societies. We have thus been left also with an inadequate conception of how political education might be promoted, within or through the transformation of particular societies.

In the next chapter, I want to review some work

which has been done in applying developmental psychology, and also to show that the goal of political education can be justified even if one does not accept autonomy as a personal ideal.

C H A P T E R IX

TOWARDS A THEORY OF POLITICAL EDUCATION

Political Education and the Development of Political Thinking

It is my belief that political education ought to be promoted to a far greater extent than is now the case. Our schools and other media of instruction now devote more attention to political socialization than most nations. But political education is still either misunderstood or neglected. We must begin to establish more directly the case for political education and push forward the argument that it ought to be promoted. But before we can make this argument here, we must separate out a distinct but related question: "Should a capacity for reflective socio-political thought be promoted?" What is the relationship between these two questions?

1. Richard Peters' analysis of the concept of "education" shows it to indicate the development of desirable qualities in someone, and the extension of the depth and breadth of his knowledge in the passing on of a form of life. In summarizing the conditions for the correct application of the term "education", this analysis distinguishes a value criterion and a cognitive criterion. That is, the activities promoted through education must be

considered valuable, and they must lead to a growth of knowledge and understanding. Both of these types of criterion are internally or conceptually connected with the notion of education.²¹³ But specification of the cognitive criterion admits of normative dispute. Just what do we mean by the achievements of knowledge or reason implied in the notion of an educated person? And why do we pick out these achievements in one way rather than another?

The specification of the cognitive criterion which we have proposed for "political education" is the development of reflective political thought. As we noted at the conclusion of Chapter 6, this notion of reflectiveness is normative in two senses. It is, first of all, normative in the developmental sense of laying down the outcome of a sequence of stages in political thought. But from a different perspective, it is also normative in the sense of bringing out and focusing on one aspect of an inter-related set of achievements in political thought. Other criteria would shape our vision of mature political thought somewhat differently. Focusing on this second normative aspect of the criterion of reflectiveness will allow us to note that there are other interpretations of the cognitive criterion of education. We can then see the point of justifying our focus on the reflectiveness

of political thought as the criterion of political education. And this justification should shed light on the question "why should political education be promoted?"²¹⁴

Before we approach this question directly, I want to look briefly at Michael Oakeshott's understanding of political education. Here we will see a somewhat different interpretation of the cognitive criterion of education; and this will help us to get a better perspective on the task of evaluating reflective political thought. We will look first at Oakeshott's interpretation of political education, and then at the main contrast model to which he opposes this interpretation.²¹⁵

2. In order to engage in political activity, Oakeshott points out, it is necessary to understand a society's traditional manner of attending to its common affairs. The initiation into a traditional manner of behavior is nearly all-important for Oakeshott; but it is most definitely not seen by him as a straightforward and explicit process of training. Above all, political education is a matter of imparting the potentials for good judgment within a tradition; and in this one cannot be trained. It can come only from teaching, observation, and practice in exploring the potentials of a given tradition. Education, for Oakeshott, is

the process of learning, in circumstances of direction and restraint, how to recognize and make something of ourselves. Unavoidably, it is a two-fold process in which we enjoy an initiation into what for want of a better word I will call "civilization", and in doing so discover our own talents and aptitudes in relation to that civilization, and begin to cultivate and use them.²¹⁶

The sort of knowledge and sort of education appropriate to politics is "knowledge, as profound as we can make it, of our tradition of political behavior."²¹⁷ "The fruits of a political education will appear in the manner in which we think and speak about politics and perhaps in the manner in which we conduct our political activity."²¹⁸

Reaping of these fruits of political education will involve, then, a more profound understanding of political activity and a more thorough understanding of our own political tradition. The cognitive achievement of political education is specified only this far - that it involves a more profound and thorough understanding of a tradition of political activity. Profundity and thoroughness of understanding does not carry us too far in getting a grasp on the cognitive dimension of political education. But we can perhaps get a better view of Oakeshott's argument by looking at the position he is most concerned to defeat.

Oakeshott argues most strongly against an "ideological style of politics". Ideology, on his interpretation, is merely an abridgment of tradition. The error in ideological

politics is that ideology is "regarded as the sole guide relied upon"²¹⁹ in political activity. It is a defective understanding of political activity because of the "sort of knowledge and sort of education" it proposes as sufficient for political activity. "For it suggests that a knowledge of the chosen political ideology can take the place of understanding a tradition of political behavior."²²⁰ In terms of the framework of concepts I have developed here, we can see that Oakeshott is at least arguing against an understanding of political education which fails to recognize the essential connection with the prerequisite political socialization - that reflective thinking about politics requires that one should have already grasped the accepted practices of ongoing political society.

What sort of knowledge is appropriate to this ideological style of politics, according to Oakeshott? "What is required in the first place, is knowledge of the chosen political ideology - a knowledge of the ends to be pursued, a knowledge of what we want to do." And what sort of education is appropriate?

Moreover, the appropriate sort of education will be an education in which the chosen political ideology is taught and learned, in which the techniques necessary for success are acquired, and (if we are so unfortunate as to find ourselves empty-handed in

the matter of an ideology) an education in the skill of abstract thought and premeditation necessary to compose one for ourselves. The education we shall need is one which enables us to expound, defend, implement, and possibly invent a political ideology.²²²

3. Our critique of Oakeshott's interpretation of political education begins with his understanding of ideological politics. We are particularly concerned now with the cognitive criterion of education associated with an ideological style of politics. Part of the thrust of Oakeshott's critique is against those who advocate political activity based on a reflective grasp on principles - and this latter is the position taken in this paper. The point I want to develop is that our understanding of reflective political thought is not equivalent to his characterization of "ideology": our understanding of principles is not subject to the criticisms implied in Oakeshott's discussion.

A central point of the notion of critical reflection is to move away from an understanding of our wants and purposes as immutable givens in our lives, taken on once and for all in our initiation into social life. But adopting an ideology is represented by Oakeshott as merely learning and being taught what we want to do. Only if we happen not to have an ideology conveniently at hand does a "skill of abstract thought and premeditation" enter

the picture.²²³ Rather than being central to an understanding of ideological thought, skill in abstract deliberation is required only through the accident of special circumstances. Reflective thinking, as we understand it, does require skill in abstract thought. But this skill is seen as an aspect of a capacity to put things in perspective - the perspective necessary to the formulation and reformulation of coherent and satisfying goals. This type of formulation of the cognitive achievement of education is omitted from Oakeshott's analysis of an "ideological style of politics". Since on his view a capacity for abstract thought is not essential to ideological politics, his critique might be taken as a warning that political socialization ought not to be narrow, confining and rigidly held to an explicit manifesto or summary of a society's political practices. Without a further specification of what is implied by the discovery, cultivation and use of our talents and aptitudes (see his definition of education, pp. 176-177), it is hard to see that a more profound and thorough knowledge of traditional practices would actually be an educational achievement.

Oakeshott sees principles as abridgments of tradition which are erroneously treated as independent of the practices of the society. But we have not treated principles in this way (although Kohlberg's interpretation

of principles may be subject to this critique). Principles are merely second order rules which are appealed to in justifying the rules embodied in social practices.²²⁴ They do indeed grow out of a society's way of life, and are not independent in the sense of being given from heaven, or merely thought up in no context whatever. But they do give to those persons capable of principled thought a certain potential independence from particular rules or practices.

Ultimately, the difficulty might be traced to Oakeshott's ambiguous notion of tradition. On this, we can note J. G. Pocock's perceptive comment that "If the abridgement of tradition is ideology, the criticism of tradition may be history."²²⁵ It is the principled criticism of tradition which the capacity for reflective political thought holds open as a possibility. In a world so clearly beset with social changes, men can only make history by developing this capacity.

Oakeshott offers a critique of ideology as an "abstract" abridgement of the "flow of sympathy" bound up in a traditional manner of doing things. We are reminded here of our own critique of a conception of "formal thought" in the social sphere which does not recognize the participative character of many social concepts, bound up as they are in our important social relationships. We can

also note our own critique of Kohlberg's conception of mature moral thought as a "justice structure," abstracted from a principle such as "benevolence" which picks out a "flow of sympathy" to other persons.

Whether or not we share Oakeshott's evaluations of these "abridgements of tradition" is in one sense irrelevant, then. For it is a somewhat different notion of a capacity for reflective political thought - necessary to effective and critical participation in modern political life, I will be arguing presently - that has been our main concern. But it is instructive to use Oakeshott's views on ideology as a jumping off point in our evaluation of reflective political thought. Oakeshott grants the possible virtues of ideology in specific contexts.

In certain circumstances an abridgement of this kind may be valuable; it gives sharpness of outline and precision to a political tradition which the occasion may make seem appropriate. When a manner of attending to arrangements is to be transplanted from the society in which it has grown up into another society (always a questionable enterprise), the simplification of an ideology may appear as an asset.²²⁶

4. In what circumstances would we count the capacity for reflective thinking about society and politics an asset? I would like to argue that some degree of achievement in reflective reasoning is essential to all

participants in the political life of modern industrial societies. And the highest possible degree of development in reflective political thought is essential for a democratic society in which all citizens can participate in shaping the course of social change toward the creation of desirable and satisfying forms of life.

To preface this argument, we can note first that men can and do take up images of ideal forms of life for themselves.²²⁷ These ideals may be taken whole and crudely from various given patterns of life - in the way one might acquire the habit of repeating a maxim on personal behavior to children. Or they may be developed reflectively in the course of one's experiences. They may be pursued vigorously or left on the sidelines of life. A person may have only one or many such ideals. And for one person, various ideals may be persistent or fleeting, consistent or conflictng. I have in mind ideals which pick out forms of character in a social context;²²⁸ such as a life given over to relentless devotion to duty, or personal honor, or steadfast courage, or integrity, or personal autonomy. All of these notions of an ideal form of life I have mentioned pick out personal achievements. The higher achievements of reason enter into some of these ideals - autonomy, for example. The notion of autonomy pulls the capacity for reflective reason into a vision of

a satisfying ideal of individual life. Other ideals may be connected in different ways with various achievements of reason.

The justification for the promotion of reflective political thought could be pursued in the context of a justification for the pursuit of an ideal such as personal autonomy. My analysis has, in fact, drawn on the notion of autonomy at various points. At the outset of this essay, we introduced C. Wright Mills' idea that the development of substantive reason is essential to personal freedom in the modern world. And the notion of freedom advanced by Mills and other in the critical tradition draws on the ideal of autonomy. Choice of these ideals is ultimately a matter of personal commitment.

But we need not be committed only to one ideal of life. Consistently or coherently or not, we can draw on a number of these visions in shaping our lives. And it is possible to place positive value on a society which permits and encourages adherence to many different ideals of life. And this latter position is consistent with personally promoting a single ideal.²²⁹ I want to direct my comments here to the role of reflective reason in a complex and changing society in which a number of such ideals have persistent adherents. And I would suggest that most modern industrial societies meet this description.

We can ask what the social consequences might be if important social practices were engaged in merely out of habit, in a wholly unreflective and uncritical manner.²³⁰ Social practices and institutions allow members of a society to have their needs met, and facilitate the accomplishment of their purposes. These practices might in fact be important in establishing a framework in which the needs and wants of individuals may be met, and satisfying forms of life shaped. But these practices may be engaged in without the understanding necessary to get a sense of their social importance. They may be thought unimportant merely because they are not thought about. The manner of practice is habitual and unreflective. Practices may become insulated from whatever capacities for reflection that may develop, and the effect on the development of these capacities in the sphere of social thought may be stultifying. In certain circumstances, however, the rigidity of the unreflective manner of acting may be revealed, with potentially harmful consequences for the individuals and the society.

In the first place, conflict between generations may develop when the older generation can no longer convey the sense of importance of these practices. The younger generation may tend to discard them easily or resist their adoption. And the rigidity of the practice of the older

generation, and its inability to justify what it has never reflected on, may be taken as evidence that the practice is not merely irrelevant, but stupid and without value.

Technological and other types of changes may also threaten a society's capacity to provide satisfying forms of life for its members. These changes may alter or eliminate the rationale of certain social practices or institutions. With the loss of inclination or ability to understand and reflect on the socially important purposes of certain behavior patterns, practices may fail to adapt to new circumstances. And without this guidance and control, there may be recurrent crises.

My purpose is not to describe modern industrial societies, nor to predict eventual catastrophe. The purpose of these comments is to point out certain social tendencies which can be illuminated by the distinction between the conformist potential of conventional-instrumental social thought and the potential for understanding through the development of the capacity for reflective thought. Once illuminated, I think these possibilities for conflict and crisis constitute a persuasive argument for promoting reflective political thought.

Conflict and crisis may indeed jar some out of habitual modes of behavior. But crises are hardly the

way in which capacities for reflective thought may be developed to the fullest possible extent. Only in stable contexts can a refined and regularized inclination to reflection be developed.²³¹ Social crises open up possibilities; but precisely because they are extraordinary circumstances, their potentials may be lost. The loss may be accounted again in terms of the capacity of men to connect the problems and troubles of their ordinary lives with larger social developments. The possibilities for formulating ways of achieving a satisfying pattern of life through reflection connect in this way with the possibilities for understanding and shaping social life - through initiation of a younger generation and through acting on issues of social change.

If, then, we can take the "reflectiveness" of social thought as a valuable achievement of in the development of men's reasoning capacities, we are justified in taking it as a specification of the cognitive criterion of political education. And we can conclude that political education ought to be promoted; for it is a conceptual truth that political education is the development of desirable qualities in someone. The question about whether political education ought to be promoted has sense only in particular contexts where the promotion of political education could conflict with the realization of other

values.

Before I make a few concluding speculations on how political education might be promoted, I want to comment on the framework for research set out by this notion of political education.

Toward a Theory of Political Education

1. There are two quite general ways of approaching the research problems of a theory of political education. (I include the prerequisite political socialization in my reference to research toward a theory of political education.) The first is straightforward empirical research. This research would be geared to the formulation and testing of hypotheses about the social practices, institutions and policies which promote political socialization and political education. Developmental psychology may, as I have suggested, be a useful framework for posing these empirical questions. But other theoretical formulations should be drawn on to complement, enrich or modify the Piaget-Kohlberg developmental framework.

Conceptual analysis can also be an important complement to developmental research on political education. The key concepts of political life can be analyzed developmentally in order to clarify the achievements of political socialization and political education. What types of concepts are available at different levels of sociali-

zation and education, and what are the logical prerequisites for use of political terms at different conceptual levels? Our analysis leads us to expect that certain types of uses of the term "interest", for example, would be available to a politically educated person, but not to someone who was only socialized to a passive citizen role.

These studies will move toward an explanation of the successes and failures of political socialization and political education in different social contexts. We must diagnose the type of political thinking which prevails at different age levels and among different segments of the population. People live their political lives within a particular conjunction of institutions and traditions. As we begin to refine our characterizations and classifications of different types of political thought we will find that they indicate varying levels of thought and also varying challenges and opportunities to engage in politics. A diagnosis of types of political thinking is then both a characterization of a level of political thought and a description of the institutions which have shaped it. The way in which a child deals with the political opinions of his parents, for example reveals the type of thinking of which he is capable, as well as the type of family which has fostered his capacities.

But we must at some point get outside of the given

dimensions of a person's thought in order to develop an explanatory theory of political education. There must be an interplay between the diagnosis of political thought and a theory of structure in social and political life.

The flow from past to future in social life is not just a fluid transmission of traditions. There are changes in the structure of social life. Some are gradual, some abrupt. But in the midst of these changes people's lives may become filled with discontents, anxieties, or "troubles" whose source they cannot locate in their own narrow milieu. The diagnosis of political thought of these individuals may point to a deficiency in political socialization or a failure of political education. The former type of deficiency might be seen where the political traditions of an ethnic group impinge in new ways on national political practices. And a failure of the latter sort might be the diagnosis when a local community's political practices seem unable to comprehend new issues thrust on it by suburbanization. But whatever the diagnosis of individual political thought, we can have a full explanatory theory only by appealing to the categories of a social theory which can help us see the connections among different institutions and practices, and the sources of change.

The theory of social structure would be a critical

theory, in the sense that we want to view social conditions in terms of the promotion of citizen development through political socialization and political education. A critical theory of social structure opens up questions about whether the interests of citizens become policy issues - in Mills' terms, whether "personal troubles of milieu" become translated into "public issues of social structure". In this way it connects with a theory of political education which opens up questions about the capacity of a citizen to formulate and conceptualize policy alternatives in terms of what is in his interest. Even if crucial issues are raised, citizens may be unable to grasp their scope and their implications for his life. But even so, the raising of important issues of social change may be seen as an essential dimension of the political education of a society.

2. I want to conclude this section with an analysis of a recent research effort which may prove to mark a significant step toward a theory of political socialization. I am referring Robert W. Connell's book, The Child's Construction of Politics.²³² Connell's book is based on interviews with 119 children, aged 5 to 16, from the suburbs of Sydney, Australia. He is concerned with portraying the political ideas of these children, and interpreting the social bases of their political commit-

tments. But the primary thrust of the work is developmental, drawing on the Piagetian framework in investigating "the development of the child's relationships with the large scale social world and his reasoning about it." He asks: "How do children construct interpretations of the political world as they grow up, and how do they come to adopt stances towards it?"²³³ I cannot do justice to this book by a full review of its findings. Instead, I want to give an example from Connell's work to show how this perspective on the development of political thought can elucidate problems in other areas of political research. And then I will discuss the relationship of this work to the framework for research on political education proposed here.

Divergent interpretations of the relationship between a voter and his party choice have been offered by political scientists in recent years. On the one hand, there has been an effort to identify those social and psychological variables which most clearly predict a voter's party choice. One of the strongest predictors of party choice has been found to be the party choice of one's family, and particularly his parents.²³⁴ One interpretation of this finding has portrayed party allegiance as an unthinking reaction to external pressures, a non-rational (or possibly irrational) impulse to

conformity. Others, such as V. O Key, have surveyed the data on party realignments for support of the argument "that voters are not fools," and that party allegiance is a fairly rational alignment of votes with the voters' interests.²³⁵

A recent article by Arthur Goldberg²³⁶ has attempted to combine elements of both positions, with the argument that "certain sociological determinants, specifically group norms regarding party identification, may upon examination, prove to be rational guides to action."²³⁷ But Goldberg's argument, as Connell points out, does not account for the first formation of party preferences; and it is here that Connell's inquiry enters the debate.

Connell points out that the first indication of party preference is usually made before the child is capable of making means-end calculations about social groupings.²³⁸ It is necessary for the child to have a view of party choice as open to reasoning before he can see a political party as a means. The path to successful political socialization is toward the reasoning capacities necessary to see a connection between a party as a means and policy as a goal.

Connell finds three types of cases where family influence enters into the party preference of the child. And although Connell does not put the matter this way, I

believe these cases can be laid out in a pattern according to the degree of success in political socialization to a system of party competition. The first type of case is "simple correspondence", where a "child mentions a family preference, and gives his own as the same, but does not give family choice as a reason for his own."²³⁹ The interviews show that the child is not making independent calculations on grounds for party preference. He is taking the name of a party from his parents along with other attitudes and opinions, in a rather unthinking manner. The second type of case points to family loyalty as a basis for party choice. The children may "consciously pick the same party to express their solidarity with their parents."²⁴⁰ We see here the beginning of a type of political thought where it is relevant to give some sort of reason for party preference, even though it is grounded socially only in the narrow sphere of family ties. In a third group of cases, parental opinion is given as a reason for party choice, and thus as a ground for the child's own judgment.

In these cases, we may say, the children adopt a party preference on the authority of their parents' opinions. But it is authority of a particular kind, the kind C. J. Friedrich had in mind when he defined authoritative communications as those "which are capable of reasoned elaborations." Indeed the way these children talk is precisely described by the quotation which Friedrich uses as the epigraph for

his chapter on authority: 'He who believes upon authority, entertains the opinion, simply because it is entertained by a person who appears to him likely to think correctly on the subject.'²⁴¹

The point here is that, while the child is not yet capable of connecting parties with policies in a reasoned manner, he is aware that his parents are capable of giving the types of reasons that are relevant to party choice. The next step in the processes leading to socialization would involve the ability to handle for himself the type of discourse that connects reasons for policies with reasons for party choice. The path is open for this development in a way that it is not yet open for the children in the first or second group cases.

How, then, are we to explain the formation of the child's first party preference? Connell rejects a general explanation that party preference has an unconscious, emotional basis, rooted in the psychological process of identification.

Identification cannot in more than a few cases be regarded as the main base of party preference; diffuse family loyalty as a motive is probably widespread and accords better with the character of the children's commitments; considering what grounds the children have for judgment, we can explain their agreement with their parents as the result of quite reasonable acts of political choice. These last two explanations are compatible with each other . . . , but they need not apply together.²⁴²

Adapting this line of argument to our own framework, we can see why explanation in terms of family loyalty does not conflict with the latter explanation. What we have in Connell's three types of cases are diagnoses of the types of political thought available to children; diagnoses which draw on the idea that there is a possible pattern of development in political socialization towards a capacity to reason about party choice in terms of policy preferences. A full explanation of the successes, lack of success and failures involved in each diagnosis would require a broader investigation of the social life of the child. For example, if a child says that he prefers one party because "it's just sort of a family thing",²⁴³ an explanation in terms of family loyalty is incomplete without an account of her parent's level of political thought. If the parents are themselves incapable of reasoning about party choice, if they too see it as a "family thing", we may begin to suspect a failure to socialize the child to the norms embodied in the ongoing political institutions. But if this is not the case, and the child is rather young and at a low level of general mental development, then our diagnosis would more likely fit into an explanation of lack of success in terms of the level of thought available to the child. My point is that we must distinguish a diagnosis of political thought from an

explanation of party commitments; and the latter explanatory endeavor is intimately connected with an explanation of the development of political thought, in that in both we are led into an investigation of the specific features of the social world of the child.

Connell sums up the implications of his findings for the interpretation of party choice, as follows:

The 'reaction' interpretations of party choice . . . represent the child's adoption of a party as politically irrational, in essence not a political act at all. But the discussion of children's party preferences has not faced the question of rationality squarely, for it has not included an analysis of what the children think parties are and what grounds they might have for choosing between them. We may well ask whether their expressed preferences are not reasonable acts of political choice, given the grounds for choice available to them.²⁴⁴

I would now like to make a few more general comments on Connell's work, and how it relates to the framework for study of political socialization and political education presented here. His evaluation of research carried on under the rubric of "political socialization" is similar to the critique of the conformity interpretation of socialization offered here.

Studies of children's political beliefs that have been preoccupied with problems of "political socialization" have produced distorted accounts of the development largely because they have failed to recognize and account for the conscious creative activity of the children themselves in the development of their own beliefs The basic approach has

been to think of the development of beliefs as a matter of induction into certain social norms, common patterns of beliefs or shared attitudes, which are necessary for the well-being or stability of the political system that the children are entering. This two-fold preoccupation with induction into norms and the stability of systems runs through most of the "political socialization" studies.²⁴⁵

The alternative put forward by Connell is to treat the development of political beliefs "not as a mechanical function or input of a system, but as a contingent, historical process."²⁴⁶ This is exactly the view presented in this paper - that the development of political thought should be treated as "a contingent, historical process", a development of the child's reasoning capacities in interaction with his social and political world.

A fully developed concept of "political socialization" is not presented by Connell as a framework for his research. But much of his effort is guided by a notion of the full development of a child's "political outlook". The notion of "political outlook" thus serves as an achievement term, and the criteria of a political outlook resemble closely the criteria of understanding and commitment we have proposed for "political socialization". A political outlook has been achieved when a child's thinking about the political world exhibits "a degree of inner coherence and conviction."²⁴⁷ It involves "personal sets of attitudes and stores of information" and "reasonably

coherent structures of belief."²⁴⁸

While Connell does at times hint at a concern for achievements of political thinking beyond political socialization, his work is less helpful here. For one thing, he interviews no children over the age of sixteen; and at this point political socialization would not be secured, nor would politically educative influences be likely to have had a great impact yet. The only development he discusses which moves beyond what we would call political socialization, is ideological thinking. But on the subject of ideological thinking he is quite ambivalent.

Connell first of all notes the achievements of political thought which lay the basis for ideology - an achievement that points beyond instrumental social rationality towards formal reasoning. The two bases of ideology are "the capacity to wield abstract social concepts, and the recognition of whole societies as a subject of argument"; and these capacities "appear and become common in adolescence."²⁴⁹ His further comments point to two developments within this type of thought. The first is toward a formal and self-conscious theory of society which, he says, "is not a regular stage in the development of political beliefs."²⁴⁹ But here he does suggest that it is an achievement rooted in the stimulation

provided by specific social contexts. "It seems that the emergence of personal ideology in middle adolescence is very much a social product, both in the sense that it requires a strong stimulus from others and in the sense that the content of ideology is derived from the political tradition of groups the person moves in."²⁵¹ His evaluation of this development is, however, quite disparaging: there is no particular reason to promote this type of thinking, because "An informal outlook is quite enough to hold one's end up in a conversation, which, bar voting, is as far as most adults ever involve themselves in politics."²⁵²

The second type of development is implicit in the resounding call for the liberation of political imagination with which he concludes his book.

. . . a group representative of the mass of the people is growing towards adult involvement without sign of the kind of practical imagination which would let its members generate plans of action to deal with the political problems they recognize. Perhaps the really important means of social control through influence on the development of political ideas is exactly this: that the society fails to liberate because it does not stimulate political imagination. The children trek around inside the boundaries of conventional politics; they will not move outside them without special stimulus; and until they do, the established political order is safe - for want of challenge.²⁵³

I would suggest that this last description be seen as a developmental step beyond thinking in terms of a

formal, self-conscious theory of society. A theory of society, after all, is presumed by the capacity to generate plans to deal with social problems. How could one develop a plan to deal with a social problem without any notion of the institutional or structural causes of the problem? And the features of formality and self-consciousness which Connell finds distasteful may be seen as features of an egocentric form of this phase of development. Viewed in this way, however, Connell's evaluation of ideology would be deficient. For it may be that political imagination develops within and grows out of such ideological thinking. How, then, could we reject ideology in favor of an outlook which is sufficient merely "to hold one's end up in a conversation"? One might, of course, have qualms about widespread fixation of thought at this level. But within the framework of a theory of political education, we would be reminded to pick out the desirable possibilities as well as the potential fixations in a form of thought.

We can summarize our comments on Connell's significant work by saying that he has laid the empirical basis for a fruitful theory of political socialization. It is an empirical basis for a theory because his work, like Piaget's, is largely descriptive. A full explanatory theory must be rooted in a historical understanding of the

specific structural features of society which shape each child's development. And his argument goes astray, I believe, at the critical point where we would recommend the study of political education; the point where the child recognizes the need for a theory of social structure and social change in order to gain perspective on the political world.

Conclusion

We can now rehearse the course of this study, recapitulate its major points, and draw out some of the implications for political life of this approach to the study of political socialization and political education.

We began with the thesis that freedom in the modern world is constrained by the failure of our institutions to develop men's social and political imagination. Lacking the imagination to break out of the conventional formulations of the issues and alternatives of political life, many are unable to connect their personal troubles with possibilities for political action. Such imaginative achievements are the fruit of a capacity to hypothesize, to see the real world of social beliefs and practices as one of many possible worlds.

The subject laid out for study was the development of men's capacity to reason in political life. We were looking for a conceptual framework which could provide

the basis for a theory of the development of political thinking. Most of the relevant literature in contemporary political science has adopted a distinctive framework built upon the concept of "political socialization". This framework, however, and even the conceptualization of political socialization, has been influenced by a conformity perspective. This conformity perspective on socialization involves a way of looking at and talking about human development that omits any important reference to the exercise of judgment or to the growth of the capacity to reason. Individual social development is the product of molding forces and pressures.

Our critique of this conformity interpretation was built upon the idea that the basic point of the term socialization is to pick out those social processes which lead to the capacity to use reason in social interaction, to understand and care about others in a social order. A tacit normative commitment to some particular social order is inevitable unless recognition is given to the internal connection between socialization and the development of human capacities. It is the social reasoning capacities of the child which are particularly important with the concept of socialization. Use of the concept implies a normative commitment to rationality; and it is this commitment which is obscured by social scientists

who view socialization as the name of a process of learning any beliefs whatever. Socialization is not the name of a process. Rather, it picks out activities and processes which contribute to the achievement of the capacity to reason and act rationally in social life. Political socialization involves bringing people to the point of being able to participate intelligently in a society's political practices. Failure to build upon this point about the connection between socialization and the use of reason has led to two related developments in the political science literature: a potentially harmful focus on conformist behavior, and a failure to investigate the character or conditions of the higher development of political thinking.

We then suggested that the further possible development of political reasoning can be understood as political education. Political education covers those processes by which citizens develop a capacity for reflective political thought. There is bound to be controversy about the concept of education, because of its connection with the development of reason. This capacity enters in different ways into explication of different ideals of personal life, such as "autonomy" or "duty". And as people choose and seek to promote different ideals through political education, the particular understanding of the achievements

of reason bound up in their ideals will shape the use of the notion of political education.

But whatever the personal ideals pursued, politically educated citizens will be capable of recognizing others as persons, as potentially capable of citizenship of the highest level. Framing a critical view of the public interest and acting on the basis of self-accepted principles will involve promoting the equal opportunity of all to develop their capacities as citizens. The task at hand then becomes the exploration of those institutional and structural transformations which will provide the conditions for political education and a fully developed citizenry. The researches of Piaget, Kohlberg and Connell provide a basis for understanding and explanation of the successes of political socialization and political education. But we must continue to explore further the various ways of refining our specifications of these achievements and of building an explanatory framework relevant to the ongoing socio-historical process.

We have argued that political education ought to be promoted in complex and changing modern industrial societies. Implicit in my discussion of Connell's work was the idea that political education cannot easily take hold until the full scope of social life faces the youth with social and political responsibilities. The needs and

possibilities for a politically responsive world can only be recognized when people are made responsible for acting in the midst of conflicting demands. It would seem to me that the main course of political education must be in the world beyond formal schooling. "In an industrial society, the school for citizenship can only be in the midst of our industrial endeavors, located wherever we perform our work and practice our profession."²⁵⁴ What we require is institutions and forms of organization that are open and flexible in the face of reasoned challenges to the habitual way of doing things. Such institutions can promote, sustain and provide arenas for the development of the reflective capacities of the citizenry. And we also need to press in the larger political world for policies and policy issues which will highlight this politically educative potential in our institutional life. To do this would be to take seriously the challenge of political education.

APPENDIX I

Definition of Moral Stages²⁵⁵

I. Preconventional Level.

At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors), or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages:

Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being stage 4).

Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the market place. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.

II. Conventional Level.

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages:

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy - nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is

much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention - "he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice".

Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

III. Postconventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level.

At this level there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles, and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level again has two stages:

Stage 5: The social-contract legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights, and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinions". The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view", but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the American Government and Constitution.

Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.

APPENDIX II

Relations between Piaget Logical Stages
and Kohlberg Moral Stages²⁵⁶

(all relations are that attainment of the logical stages is necessary, but not sufficient, for attainment of the moral stage)

| Logical Stage | Moral Stage |
|---|---|
| <u>Symbolic, intuitive thought</u> | <u>Stage 0</u> : The good is what I want and like. |
| <u>Concrete operations, Sub-stage 1</u> | <u>Stage 1</u> : Punishment-obedience orientation. |
| Categorical classification | |
| <u>Concrete operations, Sub-stage 2</u> | <u>Stage 2</u> : Instrumental hedonism and concrete reciprocity. |
| Reversible concrete thought | |
| <u>Formal operations, Sub-stage 1</u> | <u>Stage 3</u> : Orientation to interpersonal relations of mutuality |
| Relations involving the inverse of the reciprocal | |
| <u>Formal operations, Sub-stage 2</u> | <u>Stage 4</u> : Maintenance of social order, fixed rules, and authority. |
| <u>Formal operations, Sub-stage 3</u> | <u>Stage 5A</u> : Social contract, utilitarian law-making perspective. |
| | <u>Stage 5B</u> : Higher law and conscience orientation. |
| | <u>Stage 6</u> : Universal ethical principle orientation. |

NOTES

Chapter I

1. This interpretation of the critical tradition in social thought leans most heavily on the work of C. Wright Mills, particularly in The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959) and "Liberal Values in the Modern World," in Power, Politics and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills, edited by I. L. Horowitz (New York: Ballantine Books, 1963), pp. 187-195. See also Norman Birnbaum, Toward a Critical Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971); Albrecht Wellmer, Critical Theory of Society (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971); Juergen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971). Social theories are often divided into those which interpret society from the perspectives of consensual values which integrate society, on the one hand, and social conflict rooted in coercion and manipulation on the other hand. Critical theory would ordinarily be associated with the latter category. This distinction, however, and the associated categories for the analysis of social structures, will not be developed here.

2. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1941).

3. (New York: Harper and Row, 1950).

4. (New York: Atheneum, 1965).

5. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

6. On the importance of the example of Fascism in political science, see Peter Euben, "Political Science and Political Silence," in P. Green and S. Levinson (eds.), Power and Community (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 3-58, at pp. 10-14.

7. Human Society in Ethics and Politics (London: Allen and Unwin, 1954), p. 8.

8. Mills, The Sociological Imagination, p. 169. A similar distinction between "functional rationality" and "substantial rationality" is developed by Karl Mannheim in Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1940), pp. 51-57.

9. Ibid., p. 174.
10. Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Modern Library, 1950), p. 36.
11. Ibid., p. 215.
12. Mills, The Sociological Imagination, p. 174.
13. Urie Bronfenbrenner, Two Worlds of Childhood: U. S. and U. S. S. R. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), p. 1.

Chapter II

14. The first use of the term also designates it as a field of inquiry. See Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1959).

15. Fred Greenstein notes: "In the fourth edition of the Biographical Directory of the American Political Science Association, which appeared in 1961, there is no reference to the study of political socialization as a specialization within political science. But in the 1968 fifth edition of that work, Political Socialization (now adorned with initial capital letters) had been elevated to the status of a field - coequal with such venerable subdivisions as Constitutional Law and International Politics. Moreover, the extraordinary total of 767 members of the association listed Political Socialization as one of their specialities - many more, for example, than those who listed the time-honored topic of Public Opinion." "A Note on the Ambiguity of 'Political Socialization': Definitions, Criticisms, and Strategy of Inquiry," Journal of Politics 32 (November, 1970), pp. 969-970.

16. See, for example, Ibid.; Roberta S. Sigel, "Political Socialization: Some Reflections on Current Approaches and Conceptualizations," Paper presented to the American Political Science Association, Annual Meeting, New York, September, 1966; and David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), Chapters 1 and 2.

17. Ibid., p. 6.

18. See Plato, The Republic; J. Burnet (ed.), Aristotle on Education (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967); J.-J. Rousseau, Emile; A. DeToqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1945); and Charles Merriam et al. The Making of Citizens (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931).

19. See Sheldon Wolin, "Political Theory as a Vocation," American Political Science Review 63 (December, 1969), pp. 1062-1082.

20. "Political Socialization," in James A. Robinson (ed.), Political Science Annual V. 1 (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), p. 5.

21. "Political Education" in M. Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1963), p. 112.

22. "Political Socialization," in D. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 551.

23. Greenstein, "A Note on the Ambiguity of 'Political Socialization'," p. 969.

24. Ibid.

25. "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," in W. J. Crotty et al. (eds.), Political Parties and Political Behavior (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1966), p. 39. Emphasis mine. This article originally appeared in World Politics 9 (April, 1957), pp. 383-400.

26. See, for example, David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "The Child's Political World," Midwest Journal of Political Science 6 (August, 1962), pp. 229-246.

27. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 145.

28. p. 392.

29. Ibid., p. 9.

30. "The Acquisition of Feelings of Political Efficacy in Pre-Adults," in Gilbert Abcarian and John W. Soule (eds.), Social Psychology and Political Behavior (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1971), p. 60.

31. Compare the definitions quoted above (p. 21) from Greenstein's Encyclopedia article, with the two definitions of "civic education" found in his "Postscript on the Educational Implication of Political Socialization Research," the sole addition to the second revised edition of Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969). The broader conception of "civic education", he says, "is the one that has emerged from the recent research on political socialization." (p. 177)

32. Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969), pp. 76-77.

33. Robert Franger, The Eclipse of Citizenship (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968); Christian Bay, "Human Development and Political Orientations: Notes Toward a Science of Political Education," in Abcarian and Soule (eds.), Social Psychology and Political Behavior, pp. 149-182.

34. "The Acquisition of Feelings of Political Efficacy in Pre-Adults," p. 59.

35. This appears to be roughly the position of Fred Greenstein in Children and Politics 2nd ed.

36. This is the position of Dawson and Prewitt in Political Socialization, noted above, p. 25.

37. See the writings of Robert Franger and Christian Bay cited in note #33 above.

38. "A Note on the Ambiguity of 'Political Socialization'," p. 970.

39. See Friedrich Waismann, "Verifiability," in A. G. N. Flew (ed.), Logic and Language (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1965).

40. The Eclipse of Citizenship, p. 44.

41. "Human Development and Political Orientations," p. 174.

42. Ibid.

43. The Eclipse of Citizenship, p. 44.

44. "What is an Educational Process?" in R. S. Peters (ed.),

The Concept of Education (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), p. 1.

45. I can refer the reader only to P. A. White, "Socialization and Education," in R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and R. S. Peters (eds.), Education and the Development of Reason (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972); and John Clausen, "Introduction", Chapter 1 of John Clausen (ed.), Socialization and Society (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968).

46. Charles Taylor has argued that there is an inherent normative bias to all empirical social inquiry. For the empirical assumptions involved in the partial closure of our concepts may undermine certain normative commitments. It is not merely the case that empirical and normative inquiry must be pursued side by side, and in the end integrated. Rather, the two enterprises are crucially bound together. For example, since the empirical content of our notions of "man" and "society" preclude a society of children, the thought that perhaps there ought to be only children in the world is so thoroughly undermined that it is difficult to fathom the immature conceptual system in which such a commitment may be a real and perhaps disturbing possibility. If this thesis about the normative supports generated by explanatory concepts is true, then the concepts shaped for inquiry may in turn partially reflect prior normative commitments. See Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds.), Philosophy, Politics and Society, Third Series (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967), pp. 25-57.

47. "A Note on the Ambiguity of 'Political Socialization'," p. 973.

48. Robert E. Lane, "Political Character and Political Analysis," in N. Smelser and W. Smelser (eds.), Personality and Social Systems (New York: Wiley, 1963), p. 479.

49. "Psychology and Emerging Conceptions of Knowledge as Unitary," in T. W. Wann (ed.), Behaviorism and Phenomenology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 37-38.

50. "Toward a Science of the Person," in Ibid., p. 129.

51. "Left and Right: A Basic Dimension of Ideology and Personality," in R. White (ed.), The Study of Lives (New York: Atherton, 1963), pp. 391-92.

52. See, for example, Jack Dennis, "Major Problems of Political Socialization Research," Midwest Journal of Political Science 12 (February, 1968), pp. 85-114. "Another, perhaps more fundamental problem connected to the general domain of the political learning process concerns whether the phenomena in question are better characterized in terms expressing learner initiative, socializer initiative, or something more neutral." (p. 107)

Chapter III

53. "A major problem has been the difficulty in integrating sociological, anthropological, and psychological conceptions of the social-learning process. Historically, the systematic study of socialization has its roots in all three fields; psychology focusing on the development of individual characteristics relevant to social behavior as well as on the basic processes through which these behavioral tendencies are learned, sociology concentrating on characteristics of specific groups or institutions in which socialization occurs and on the common social skills acquired by individuals in varying contexts, and anthropology viewing socialization from the standpoint of the broader culture, which helps to determine the overall boundaries of socialization experiences." David A. Goslin, "Introduction," Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), p. 1.

54. "The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology," in Neil J. Smelser and William Smelser (eds.), Personality and Social Systems, p. 68.

55. This discussion is indebted to John Clausen's analysis of the origins, early uses and development of the concept of socialization. Many of the quotations which follow are cited from this source. See his "Introduction" and "A Historical and Comparative View of Socialization Theory and Research," Chapters 1 and 2 in Socialization and Society.

56. Introduction to the Science of Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921), p. 496. Cited in Clausen, "Introduction," Socialization and Society.

57. Robert E. Park, "Symbiosis and Socialization: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Society," American Journal of Sociology 45 (1939), p. 23.

58. Emile Durkheim, Education and Sociology (New York, 1956), p. 71. For a reference to Durkheim's distinction, see P. A. White, "Socialization and Education," p. 115.

59. "Introduction," Socialization and Society, p. 4.

60. Clausen, Ibid.

61. "Culture, Society, Impulse and Socialization," American Journal of Sociology, 45 (1939), p. 60. Cited in Clausen, Socialization and Society, p. 25.

62. Ibid.

63. Irvin Child, "Socialization," in G. Lindzey (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology V. 2 (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 655-692.

64. Ibid., p. 655.

65. Ibid.

66. In the 1968 edition of the Handbook of Social Psychology, the article on "Socialization" by Edward Zigler and Irvin Child omits any working definition of the term.

67. John A. Clausen, "Introduction," Socialization and Society, p. 4.

68. What is Sociology? (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 50.

69. "Social Structure and the Socialization of Competence," Harvard Educational Review (Summer, 1966), p. 256. Cited J. P. White, "Socialization and Education," p. 122.

70. D. F. Aberle, "Culture and Socialization," in F. L. K. Hsu (ed.), Psychological Anthropology: Approaches to Culture and Personality (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1961), p. 387.

71. Harry C. Bredemeier and Richard M. Stephenson, The Analysis of Social Systems, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), p. 61.

72. Alex Inkeles, "Social Structure and Socialization," in D. Goslin (ed.), Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, pp. 615-16.

73. Frederick Elkin, The Child and Society (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 4.
74. Dale B. Harris, "The Socialization of the Delinquent," Child Development 19 No. 3 (September, 1948), p. 143.
75. A. R. Lindesmith and A. L. Strauss, Social Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968; 3rd ed.), p. 234.
76. "Sociology and Human Nature," in Essays in the Theory of Society (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, 1968), p. 101.
77. Ibid., pp. 101-102.
78. Ibid., p. 93.

Chapter IV

79. "In modern usage, then, 'socialization' may refer to a particular content - social skills and attitudes (as distinct from academic ones) - or to the method necessary to get children to acquire these. What this method is, is not very clear except that it is to be understood negatively as not-instruction." White, "Socialization and Education," p. 118.
80. White, "Socialization and Education," pp. 119-21. Reference is made here to P. F. Strawson, "Social Morality and Individual Ideal," Philosophy (1961); P. Winch, "Nature and Convention," Proc. Arist. Soc. (1960); and H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961), Chapter 9.
81. "Rationality and the Explanation of Action," in Against the Self-Image of the Age (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), p. 253.
82. "Introduction," Socialization and Society, p. 10.
83. See Richard Peters, "Emotions and the Category of Passivity," Proc. Arist. Soc. 61 (1961-62), pp. 117-34.
84. These are also criteria proposed by Peters for the concept of education. For "education" he proposes additional criteria, as we will see. This analysis also follows Peters' suggestion that we analyze concepts like "education" as tasks relative to achievements. See, for example, his

"What is an Educational Process?"

85. On the relation between beliefs and roles, see G. Cohen, "Beliefs and Roles," Proc. Arist. Soc. (1966-67), pp. 17-34.

86. On the notion of a "person" see Part II of this paper, pp. 130-31.

87. See Peters, "What is an Educational Process?" for a clarification of these task-criteria.

88. "Rationality and the Explanation of Action," p. 258.

Chapter V

89. I am indebted to Richard Peters' illuminating analysis of the concept of education for an understanding of these criteria.

90. Quoted in Alasdair MacIntyre, "Against Utilitarianism," in T. H. B. Hollins (ed.), Aims in Education: The Philosophic Approach (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964), pp. 18-19. Citation is not given.

91. MacIntyre, "Against Utilitarianism," pp. 19-20. Richard Peters is less enthusiastic about this rendering of cognitive criteria of "education". "Critical thought . . . is a rationalistic abstraction without a body of thought to be critical about. The problem of the teacher is to pass on a body of knowledge in such a way that a critical attitude towards it can also develop. If too much emphasis is placed on critical thought, the danger is that all processes of education will be conceived too much in terms of what is necessary for a critical attitude to emerge." "What is an Educational Process?" p. 19.

92. "Education as Initiation," in R. D. Archambault (ed.), Philosophical Analysis and Education (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), p. 100.

93. Peters, Ethics and Education (Oakland, N. J.: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1967; abridged American edition), p. 20.

94. Peters, "What is an Educational Process?" p. 9.

95. Ibid., p. 6.

96. Peters, "Education and the Educated Man," in R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and R. S. Peters (eds.), Education and the Development of Reason (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1972), p. 9.

97. "Education as Initiation," p. 98.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.

100. Peters, "What is an Educational Process?" pp. 6-7.

101. Peters, "Education as Initiation," p. 98.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid., p. 109.

104. White's essay, "Socialization and Education," is devoted to an elaboration on this idea of socialization as promoting the "social aims of education." My comments differ from White's interpretation where he sees "socialization" as promoting the capacity to critically appraise social life. It appears to me that this is stretching the sense of socialization. The capacities for reflective appraisal of social life are a distinctive part of the achievement of education. I have profited from and am in basic agreement with much of his interpretation, however.

105. This is basically Durkheim's position. For a discussion of this point, see White, "Socialization and Education," pp. 113-117.

106. "Education as Initiation," pp. 89-90.

107. The following recent works on political socialization have taken this expression to cover the dimensions of their inquiries: Jack Dennis (ed.), Socialization to Politics: A Reader (New York: Wiley, 1973); Dean Jaros, Socialization to Politics (New York: Praeger, 1973).

108. See Henry Kariel, The Promise of Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

Chapter VI

109. The theories of Piaget and Kohlberg have much in common, for Kohlberg has drawn heavily on Piaget's work. But both of them are best set in the context of a larger tradition of inquiry which goes back at least to the works of J. M. Baldwin, John Dewey and G. H. Mead, and is related to the "symbolic-interactionist" school in social psychology.

110. Ethics and Education, p. 111.

111. "Liberal Values in the Modern World," p. 189.

112. See R. S. Peters, "Freud's Theory of Moral Development in Relation to that of Piaget," British Journal of Educational Psychology, 30 (1960), pp. 250-258. Assessing Piaget's theory of moral development, Peters comments: "Given that some such [stage] transition sometimes occurs, much more needs to be established about the conditions which favor or retard it." (p. 252)

113. For an elaboration of these points, see Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization," in D. Goslin (ed.), Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, pp. 347-480; and Jean Piaget and Baerbel Inhelder, The Psychology of the Child (New York: Basic Books, 1969). Among secondary accounts, see especially John Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1963).

114. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 353.

115. Age is only a somewhat imprecise index of structural change, not its cause.

116. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 353.

117. Ibid., p. 356.

118. The Moral Judgment of the Child (New York: The Free Press, 1965).

119. There is some confusion in the terminology adopted here. One finds references to "interpersonal-affective" or "social-emotional" development in these studies. The cognitive-affective distinction is framed in terms of the fit between a cognitive structure and the experiences which

provide the framework for action. The tensions generated by an imperfect fit provide the energy, or reasons, for assimilating the experience to the structure or accommodating the structure to include new features introduced by the experience. The distinction between judgments about the physical and social worlds is, on the face of it, much more clear cut. Social judgments, however, involve conceptions of the self, and the tensions introduced by new social experiences can make social thought highly affective. There may be a tendency, then, to see the development of social judgments as distinctively tied to affective-emotional life. These questions are discussed further in the next chapter.

120. A few words should be said about the validity or accurateness of these summaries. Piaget's writings are extremely complex and recalcitrant to attempts at summary exposition. In addition, the terminology adopted and specific stage divisions have varied somewhat over the years. I have drawn heavily on the excellent exposition by Flavell (The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget), who also offers a justification for this type of summary. "The question arises as to whether the collection of diverse cognitive traits listed in the preceeding sections can be pulled together under some sort of unifying succinct description. As would be anticipated, Piaget himself considers them as multiple expressions of a single, cognitive orientation rather than as a string of unconnected attributes. Actually, one could do a fair job of conveying this unity by the simple expedient of choosing almost any one of the characteristics described and showing how it implies each of the others Thus the choice of a 'unifier' is to a large extent arbitrary." (pp. 161-62) The purpose of the exposition which follows is to add some flesh to the skeletal outline of claims made by cognitive-developmental psychologists.

121. Schemas are approximately equivalent to concepts on the level of representational intelligence.

122. The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget, p. 159.

123. Ibid., p. 206.

124. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 375.

125. Ibid., p. 379.

126. Ibid.

127. For example, Stage 2 is referred to one time as "naive egoist" and another time as "instrumental relativist"; and a recent article divided stage 5 into 5A and 5B. This summary draws on a number of Kohlberg's writings, including the following: "Stage and Sequence"; "Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of the Platonic View," in Nancy F., and Theodore R.Sizer (eds.), Moral Education (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); "From Is to Ought," in T. Mischel (ed.), Cognitive Development and Epistemology (New York: Academic Press, 1971); "The Child as Moral Philosopher," in Psychology Today (September, 1968). A wide range of the different aspects of moral judgment are used by Kohlberg in coding the different levels and stages. (See "From Is to Ought," p. 166.) I have given here only a general summary without distinguishing these different aspects.

128. "Stage and Sequence," p. 391. See also Appendix II, "Realtions Between Piaget Logical Stages and Kohlberg Moral Stages."

Chapter VII

129. Essays in the volume Cognitive Development and Epistemology, edited by T. Mischel, have been most useful in this task. This volume compiles papers presented by philosophers and psycholosits on common themes relating to developmental psychology.

130. This distinction, as elaborated in Chapter V, hinges on the achievement of a critical perspective on the norms of political life with political education.

131. Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," pp. 152-53.

132. I am not arguing that the characterizations of mature thought generated from interviews are self-justifying. Rather as Kohlberg claims, the descriptions, distinctions, characterizations and clarifications of both enterprises will each aid the other at certain points. See Chapter 9 of this work.

133. "Stage and Sequence," p. 358.

134. Paraphrased from Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," pp. 183-84.

135. Ibid., p. 195.

136. This is the title of one of the sections of Richard Peters' assessment of Kohlberg's theory, "Moral Development: A Plea for Pluralism," in T. Mischel (ed.), Cognitive Development and Epistemology, p. 273.

137. "From Is to Ought," pp. 195-213.

138. William P. Alston, "Comments on Kohlberg's 'From Is to Ought'," in T. Mischel (ed.), Cognitive Development and Epistemology, p. 273.

139. Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," p. 215.

140. For recent critique, see Alasdair MacIntyre, "What Morality is Not," in Against the Self-Images of the Age (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), pp. 96-108. For a discussion of whether and how the question might be decided between this "monarchical" view and other views, see W. B. Gallie, "Liberal Morality and Socialist Morality," in Philosophy, Politics and Society 2nd Series (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962), pp. 116-133.

141. Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 36.

142. "Education and Human Development," in R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and R. S. Peters (eds.), Education and the Development of Reason, p. 509. Peters expands on this critique in his "Moral Development: A Plea for Pluralism."

143. "What Morality Is Not," pp. 99-100.

144. See R. S. Peters, "Reason and Habit: The Paradox of Moral Education," in W. R. Niblett (ed.), Moral Education in a Changing Society (London: Faber, 1963).

145. "Education and Human Development," p. 511.

146. Ibid., p. 512.

147. The connection is elaborated by Peters in Ethics and Education. He concludes: "To have the concept of a person is to see an individual as an object of respect in a form of life which is conducted on the basis of those principles which are presupposition of the use of practical reason." (p. 137)

148. Reprinted in Six Psychological Studies by Jean Piaget (New York: Random House, 1967) edited by David Elkind. This

discussion is equally applicable to the interpretation of Kohlberg's work.

149. "Editor's Introduction" in Ibid., p. xiv.
150. Jean Piaget, "The Mental Development of the Child," pp. 64-65.
151. "'A Recognizable Philosophy of Education': A Constructive Critique," in Perspectives on Plowden (New York: Humanities, 1969), p. 5.
152. Jean Piaget, Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood, p. 207. Quoted in John Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget, p. 81.
153. Quoted in Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget, p. 223.
154. "The Mental Development of the Child," pp. 69-70. Emphasis mine.
155. The notion of rationality advanced here depends on a sense of the relative coherence of reasons in a belief system as compared with previous or subsequent levels, and not with an absolute standard tied to the truth-value of beliefs. Dewey, in Human Nature and Conduct, says that "reasonableness is in fact a quality of an effective relationship among desires rather than a thing opposed to desire." (p. 194.) Alasdair MacIntyre and Brian Barry defend similar notions of rationality, put to the service of different arguments. For MacIntyre, see "Rationality and the Explanation of Action," and "Is a Science of Comparative Politics Possible?" in Against the Self-Images of the Age. For Barry, see Political Argument (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), "Rationality as Consistency," p. 3.
156. The characterization of these attitudes is drawn from P. F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," in P. F. Strawson (ed.), Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 71-96.
157. Ibid., p. 75.
158. B. Inhelder and J. Piaget, The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence (New York: Basic Books, 1958). Cited in Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget, p. 223.

159. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," p. 84.
160. I leave open here the question of how adequate "reversibility" is as a characterization of all mature thought about the physical world. Certainly it applies more neatly in this sphere. But in what sense could Galileo, his inquisitors aside, simply reverse his thought and truly arrive at a geocentric frame of reference?
161. "What is Involved in a Genetic Psychology?" in T. Mischel (ed.), Cognitive Development and Epistemology, p. 412.
162. Ibid., p. 413.
163. Human Nature and Conduct, pp. 215-17.
164. See George Kateb, Utopia and Its Enemies (New York: The Free Press, 1963).
165. "What is Involved in a Genetic Psychology?" p. 415.

Chapter VIII

166. For example Leonard Berkowitz's criticism along these lines of Piaget's theory of moral development is surely connected with his definition of moral values as "evaluations of action believed by Members of a given society to be 'right'." The Development of Motives and Values in the Child (New York: Basic Books, 1964), p. 44.
167. "The Concept of 'Stages' in Psychological Development," in T. Mischel (ed.), Cognitive Development and Epistemology p. 31. See also D. W. Hamlyn, "Logical and Psychological Aspects of Learning," in R. S. Peters (ed.), The Concept of Education, pp. 24-43.
168. See R. S. Peters, "Education and Human Development," pp. 514-15. This is part of what is presumed by being able to view oneself and others as persons, as sources of assertion as to what there are reasons for doing. The availability of reasons in public discourse presumes also that agents are capable of using language symbolically rather than merely instrumentally. On this distinction, see Toulmin, "Concepts and the Explanation of Behavior," in T. Mischel (ed.), Human Action: Conceptual and Empirical Issues (New York: Academic Press, 1969), p. 81.

169. Peters has argued that most forms of mental illness can be related to failures of rationality at this basic socially required level. See "'Mental Health' as an Educational Aim," in T. H. B. Hollins (ed.), Aims in Education, pp. 71-90.

Piaget emphasizes a particular feature of social life - peer group interaction - while Kohlberg offers a generalized notion of "role-taking opportunities", as universal aspects of social life to be included in an account of mental development, and moral development in particular. But it has been suggested by W. P. Alston that such factors as these may need to be supplemented by the requirement that an internalization of rules accompanied by a special emotional intensity (such as described by Freud as the establishing of the superego) is necessary for moral development. I do not intend to argue here whether the particular features identified by Piaget and Kohlberg are wholly adequate. See Alston, "Comments on Kohlberg's 'From Is to Ought'," pp. 278-79.

170 For a related argument, see P. H. Hirst, "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge," in R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and R. S. Peters (eds.), Education and the Development of Reason.

171. The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget, p. 36.

172. Ibid., p. 420.

173. See "Conclusion: Factors in Mental Development," in The Psychology of the Child, by Jean Piaget and Baerbel Inhelder.

174. Ibid., pp. 154-56.

175. The fourth factor, "equilibration", is also of interest and merits treatment I cannot give it here. T. Mischel suggests it is a distinct type of theoretical notion, without empirical content, which can be translated in logical terms as something like a "desire to know". Alasdair MacIntyre has discussed an asymmetry between the explanation offered for rational and for irrational beliefs which might bear on the status of "equilibrium" as an explanatory notion. He says that an explanation of rational beliefs ends with clarification of the norms of reasoning which governed formation of the belief; and the history of those norms can reveal only preconditions for their adoption, not necessary and sufficient conditions. In any case, it may be important to differentiate the status of "equilibration"

in relation to the other factors cited in an explanation. See MacIntyre, "Rationality and the Explanation of Action," and T. Mischel, "Piaget: Cognitive Conflict and Motivation of Thought," in T. Mischel (ed.), Cognitive Development and Epistemology.

176. The Psychology of the Child, p. 156.

177. Ibid., p. 157.

178. "Stage and Sequence," p. 199.

179. Ibid., p. 398. Included, here, would be established child-rearing practices.

180. There are, of course, other conditions, such as maturation, physical experience, etc., and perhaps linguistic capacity. And role-taking opportunities would figure, likewise, in the development of thought about the physical world.

181. "Stage and Sequence," p. 397. The attribution of functional meaning to institutions hinges, it seems to me, on the part they play in developing and maintaining minimal capacities for social life in a population. The interpretation of functionalists like Marion Levy seems to support this position. See Alex Inkeles, "Society, Social Structure, and Child Socialization," in Clausen (ed.), Socialization and Society. The task of reducing all institutions to this "common functional meaning" has not, however, been successfully carried through. And the example Kohlberg chooses is ill-suited to his purpose: "As an example, while the detailed prescriptions of law vary from nation to nation, the form of 'law' and the functional value of its importance and regular maintenance are much the same in all nations with formal law." Ibid. Besides the obvious point that the class of "nations with formal law" is not inclusive of all societies, it should be noted that it is the principled level of morality, not the minimal conventional level, which Kohlberg terms a "law-making" perspective.

182. "Stage and Sequence," p. 388.

183. Ibid., p. 384.

184. D. Kuhn, J. Langer, and L. Kohlberg, "The Development of Formal-Operational Thought: Its Relation to Moral

Judgment," unpublished paper, 1971, cited in L. Kohlberg and C. Gilligan, "The Adolescent as a Philosopher: The Discovery of Self in a Postconventional World," Daedalus (1972), p. 1065.

185. "Stage and Sequence," pp. 399-400.

186. Ibid., p. 398.

187. Part of the problem with Kohlberg's (and other developmental psychologists') explanatory program is his almost exclusive focus on successful mental development. This may be partly due to the mode of cross-sectional research on age-groups designed to elucidate achievements rather than diagnose failures. It has been commented that, quite opposite to the Piaget-Kohlberg approach, Freud's theory of mental life is primarily helpful in elucidating the character of failure in social and moral development. Perhaps a synthesis of these two theories would mitigate the weaknesses and bolster the strengths of each approach. See David H. Jones, "Freud's Theory of Moral Conscience," Philosophy (1966), pp. 34-57; and R. S. Peters, "Freud's Development in Relation to that of Piaget."

188. "Stage and Sequence," p. 399.

189. A slave, while limited as to the types of communication permissible with significant others in his environment, has sufficient opportunity to grasp the idea of others. It is in fact the mark of extreme oppression and degradation that slaves may come to view themselves as their masters' do-as objects, worthless in themselves, to be manipulated by others.

190. See Turner, "Role-Taking: Process Versus Conformity," in A. Rose (ed.), Human Behavior and Social Processes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962), pp. 20-40.

191. On "real wants" and want-probing institutions, see John R. Champlin, "On the Study of Power," Politics and Society (November, 1970), pp. 91-111.

192. It seems also that the conceptual coherence attained in the development of reason and the rationality of social-institutional life would be interrelated.

193. "Concepts and Society," in Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis, D. Emmet and A. MacIntyre (eds.), (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1970), p. 115.

194. Ibid., footnote 1.
195. Ibid., p. 139. The historical parallel elucidated by this example can be noticed by reading "noble" in place of "boble".
196. Ibid., p. 141.
197. Ibid., p. 140.
198. Ibid. Presumably "better" means here - at least in part - more coherent or consistent.
199. Ibid., p. 146.
200. "Stage and Sequence," p. 402.
201. Any appearance of a distinctively conservative argument here ought to be dispelled by Pocock's reminder: ". . . in confrontations between conservatives and radicals the awareness of history is by no means all on one side. If the abridgement of tradition is ideology, the criticism of tradition may be present more complex than mere transmission." "Time, Institutions, and Action: An Essay on Traditions and their Understanding," in P. King and B. C. Parekh (eds.), Politics and Experience (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 223. On this account, Piaget's use of the term transmission to suggest an historical dimension ought to be questioned.
202. "Stage and Sequence," p. 402.
203. Ibid.
204. "Moral Development: A Plea for Pluralism," p. 244.
205. "Stage and Sequence," pp. 396-97.
206. Ibid., p. 395. Another interesting experimental situation is the Milgram obedience test, in which "the subject is faced with disobeying the rules formulated by an authority figure who is seen as violating the rights of another individual." "In this situation the experimenter orders the subject to give an increasingly severe electrical shock to a stooge 'learner' who has agreed to participate in a nonsense-syllable learning experiment. In this study, only the Stage 6 subjects would be expected to question the authority's moral right to ask them to

inflict pain on another. Stage 5, "social contract" subjects, would tend to feel the victim's voluntary participation with foreknowledge released them from responsibility to him while their agreement to participate committed them to comply. As expected, 75 per cent of a small group (6) of Stage 6 subjects quit as compared to only 13 per cent of the remaining 24 subjects at the lower moral stages." Ibid.

207. N. Haan, M. B. Smith, and J. Block, "The Moral Reasoning of Young Adults: Political-Social Behavior, Family Background and Personality Correlates," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (November, 1968), pp. 183-201.

208. e.g. Gerhard Lenski, Power and Privilege (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966); Irving Goffman, "Status Consistency and Preference for Change in Power Distribution," American Sociological Review 22 (1957), pp. 275-81; S. M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1963).

209. Power and Privilege, p. 87. Emphasis mine. This is similar to the example of "good" sociological theory presented by Ralf Dahrendorf in his essay "Sociology and Human Nature," discussed above in Chapter 2, pp. 54-56.

210. "Stage and Sequence," p. 396.

211. An example of the latter case, the iqurramen among Moroccan Berbers, is discussed by Gellner in "Concepts and Society,"

212. We have not considered the more specifically sociological side of developmental theory - phylogenetic development. For a suggestion in this regard, see I. Copi, "The Growth of Concepts," in P. Henle (ed.), Language, Thought and Culture (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The University of Michigan Press, 1958), pp. 25-48.

Chapter IX

213. See Peters, "Education and the Educated Man," in P. H. Hirst, R. F. Dearden, and R. S. Peters (eds.), Education and the Development of Reason.

214. Strictly speaking, it is a conceptual truth that education is desirable. But this is not to say that in all

circumstances the promotion of educational activities is desirable. The value criterion of education establishes a prima facie case that education should be promoted. An argument for the desirability of promoting the development of reflective political thought is called for because I want to argue that political education is desirable for most people in modern industrial societies.

215. I am dealing here with Oakeshott's essay, "Political Education," in Rationalism in Politics. For the limited purposes of this section it will not be necessary to consider Oakeshott's other writings.

216. "The Study of Politics in a University," in Rationalism in Politics, p. 304.

217. Oakeshott, "Political Education," p. 128.

218. Ibid., p. 133.

219. Ibid., p. 122.

220. Ibid., p. 122. Emphasis added.

221. Ibid., p. 117.

222. Ibid. Emphasis added.

223. The peculiar way in which Oakeshott inserts the term "premeditation" into his discussion of ideology might lead one to believe he has in mind an analogy with the legal definition of murder: ideology is the wrongful killing of tradition with knowledge aforethought. "The contention we are investigating is that attending to the arrangements of a society can begin with a premeditated ideology" ("Political Education", p. 118.)

224. See Richard Peters, "Michael Oakeshott's Philosophy of Education," in P. King and B. C. Parekh (eds.), Politics and Experience, pp. 60-61.

225. "Time, Institutions and Action: An Essay on Traditions and their Understanding," p. 223.

226. Oakeshott, "Political Education," p. 122.

227. This discussion draws on P. F. Strawson's treatment of individual ideals in "Social Morality and Individual Ideal."

228. Strawson does not restrict himself in this way.
229. Cf. Strawson, "Social Morality and Individual Ideal."
230. This line of argument is developed from a reading of Richard E. Flathman, "Obligation, Ideals and Ability," in J. R. Pinnock and J. W. Chapman (eds.), Political and Legal Obligation (New York: Atherton, 1970), pp. 89-115.
231. By "stable contexts" I do not mean to imply an absence of political conflict. What I intend to convey is that one's pattern of life cannot be constantly under threat from outside and uncontrolled forces; and that, at a minimum one's life and physical well-being cannot be in constant danger.
232. Melbourne: Melbourne University press, 1971. The title was "chosen for the analogy with Piaget's celebrated works on the child's construction of the physical world." (p. 3)
233. Connell, The Child's Construction of Politics, pp. 1 and 3.
234. See A. Campbell et al. The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1964); and M. K. Jennings and R. Niemi, "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child," American Political Science Review 63 (March, 1969), pp. 5-25.
237. Ibid., p. 5.
238. See The Child's Construction of Politics, pp. 65-84.
239. Ibid., p. 67.
240. Ibid., p. 81.
241. Ibid., p. 72. Citation from C. J. Friedrich, Man and His Government (New York, 1963), p. 218.
242. Ibid., p. 83.
243. Ibid., p. 72.
244. Ibid., p. 81.
245. Ibid., pp. 233 and 234.

- 246. Ibid., p. 235.
- 247. Ibid., p. 90.
- 248. Ibid., p. 89.
- 249. Ibid., p. 91.
- 250. Ibid., p. 93.
- 251. Ibid., p. 91.
- 252. Ibid., p. 91.
- 253. Ibid., p. 240.
- 254. Kariel, The Promise of Politics, p. 63.

Appendices

- 255. Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," pp. 164-65.
- 256. L. Kohlberg and C. Gilligan, "The Adolescent as a Philosopher," p. 1072.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aberle, D. F. "Culture and Socialization," in F. L. K. Hsu (ed.), Psychological Anthropology: Approaches to Culture and Personality (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1961).
- Adorno, T.W., et al. The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper and Row, 1950.
- Alston, William P. "Comments on Kohlberg's 'From Is to Ought'," in T. Mischel (ed.) Cognitive Development and Epistemology (New York: Academic Press, 1971), pp. 269-284.
- Barry, Brian. Political Argument. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965.
- Bay, Christian. The Structure of Freedom. New York: Atheneum, 1965.
- Bay, Christian. "Human Development and Political Orientations: Notes Toward a Science of Political Education," in G. Abcarian and J.W. Soule (eds.) Social Psychology and Political Behavior (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1971), pp. 149-182.
- Berkowitz, Leonard. The Development of Motives and Values in the Child. New York: Basic Books, 1964.
- Birnbaum, Norman. Toward a Critical Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.
- Bredemeier, Harry C., and Richard M. Stephenson. The Analysis of Social Systems. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1962.
- Bronfenbrenner, Urie. Two Worlds of Childhood: U.S. and U.S.S.R. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970.
- Campbell, Angus, et al. The American Voter. New York: Wiley, 1964.
- Champlin, John R. "On the Study of Power," Politics and Society (November, 1970), pp. 91-111.
- Child, Irwin. "Socialization," in G. Lindzey (ed.) The Handbook of Social Psychology, V.2, (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 655-692.

- Clausen, John (ed.). Socialization and Society. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968.
- Cohen, Gerald. "Beliefs and Roles," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1966-67), pp. 17-34.
- Connell, Robert W. The Child's Construction of Politics. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1971.
- Copi, Irving M. "The Growth of Concepts," in P. Henle (ed.) Language, Thought and Culture (Ann Arbor, Mich. : The University of Michigan Press, 1958), pp.25-48.
- Dahrendorf, Ralf. "Sociology and Human Nature," in Ralf Dahrendorf, Essays in the Theory of Society (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1968).
- Dawson, Richard. "Political Socialization," in James A. Robinson (ed.) Political Science Annual, 1966, V.1. (Indianapolis, Ind. : Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), pp. 1-84.
- Dawson, Richard and Kenneth Prewitt. Political Socialization. Boston, Mass. : Little, Brown and Co., 1969.
- Dennis, Jack. "Major Problems of Political Socialization Research," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 12 (February, 1968), pp. 85-114.
- Dennis, Jack (ed.). Socialization to Politics: A Reader. New York: Wiley, 1973.
- Dewey, John. Human Nature and Conduct. New York: Modern Library, 1950.
- Dollard, John. "Culture, Society, Impulse and Socialization," American Journal of Sociology, 45 (1939), pp. 50-63.
- Durkheim, Emile. Education and Sociology. New York: The Free Press, 1956.
- Easton, David. "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics, 9 (April, 1957), pp.383-400.
- Easton, David and Jack Dennis. Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969.
- Easton, David and Robert P. Hess. "The Child's Political World," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 6 (August, 1962), pp. 229-246.

- Elkin, Frederick. The Child and Society. New York: Random House, 1960.
- Elkind, David. "Editor's Introduction," in Six Psychological Studies by Jean Piaget (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. v-xviii.
- Euben, Peter. "Political Science and Political Silence," in P. Green and S. Levinson (eds.) Power and Community (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 3-58.
- Flathman, Richard E. "Obligations, Ideals and Abilities," in J.R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (eds.) Political and Legal Obligation (New York: Atherton Press, 1970), pp. 89-115.
- Flavell, John. The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget. Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1963.
- Frankena, William. Ethics. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963.
- Fromm, Erich. Escape From Freedom. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1941.
- Gallie, W.B. "Liberal Morality and Socialist Morality," in Peter Laslett and W.G. Runciman (eds.) Philosophy, Politics and Society, second series (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962), pp. 116-133.
- Gellner, Ernest. "Concepts and Society," in D. Emmet and A. MacIntyre (eds.) Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1970), pp. 115-149.
- Goffman, Irving. "Status Consistency and Preference for Change in Power Distribution," American Sociological Review, 22 (1957), pp. 275-281.
- Goldberg, Arthur. "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification," American Political Science Review, 63 (March, 1969), pp. 5-25.
- Goslin, David A. (ed.). Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969.
- Greenstein, Fred. Children and Politics. 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969.
- Greenstein, Fred. "A Note on the Ambiguity of 'Political Socialization': Definitions, Criticisms, and Strategies of Inquiry," Journal of Politics, 32 (Nov., 1970).

- Greenstein, Fred. "Political Socialization," in D. Sills (ed.) International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 551-555.
- Haan, N., M.B. Smith, and J. Block. "The Moral Reasoning of Young Adults: Political-Social Behavior, Family Background and Personality Correlates," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 10, No. 3, (November., 1968), pp. 183-201.
- Habermas, Jurgen. Knowledge and Human Interests. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.
- Hamlyn, D.W. "Logical and Psychological Aspects of Learning," in R.S. Peters (ed.) The Concept of Education (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), pp. 24-43.
- Harris, Dale B. "The Socialization of the Delinquent," Child Development, 19 (September, 1948).
- Hart, H.L.A. The Concept of Law. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.
- Hess, Robert D. "The Acquisition of Feelings of Political Efficacy in Pre-Adults," in G. Abecarian and J.W. Soule (eds.) Social Psychology and Political Behavior (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1971), pp. 58-78.
- Hirst, P.H. "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge," in R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst, and R.S. Peters (eds.) Education and the Development of Reason (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 391-414.
- Hyman, Herbert. Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior. New York: The Free Press, 1959.
- Inhelder, Baerbel, and Jean Piaget. The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence. New York: Basic Books, 1958.
- Inkeles, Alex. "Social Structure and Socialization," in D. Goslin (ed.) Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 615-632.
- Inkeles, Alex. "Social Structure and the Socialization of Competence," Harvard Educational Review, 36 (Summer, 1966), pp. 265-283.

- Inkeles, Alex. "Society, Social Structure, and Child Socialization," in J. Clausen (ed.) Socialization and Society (Boston: Little-Brown and Co., 1968), pp. 73-129.
- Inkeles, Alex. What is Sociology? Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
- Jaros, Dean. Socialization to Politics. New York: Praeger, 1973.
- Jennings, M. Kent, and Richard Niemi. "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child," American Political Science Review, 62 (1968), pp. 169-184.
- Jones, David H. "Freud's Theory of Moral Conscience," Philosophy, 41 (1966), pp. 34-57.
- Kariel, Henry. The Promise of Politics. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966.
- Kateb, George. Utopia and Its Enemies. New York: The Free Press, 1963.
- Key, V.D. Jr. The Responsible Electorate. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966.
- Koch, Sigmund. "Psychology and Emerging Conceptions of Knowledge as Unitary," in T.W. Wann (ed.) Behaviorism and Phenomenology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 1-41.
- Kohlberg, Lawrence. "Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of the Platonic View," in Nancy F. and Theodore R. Sizer (eds.) Moral Education (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 56-83.
- Kohlberg, Lawrence. "The Child as Moral Philosopher," Psychology Today (September, 1968), pp. 25-30.
- Kohlberg, Lawrence. "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with it in the Study of Moral Development," in T. Mischel (ed.) Cognitive Development and Epistemology (New York: Academic Press, 1971), pp. 151-235.
- Kohlberg, Lawrence. "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization," in David A. Goslin (ed.) Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research (New York: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 347-480.

- Kohlberg, Lawrence and Carol Gilligan. "The Adolescent as Philosopher: The Discovery of the Self in a Post-Conventional World," Daedalus (1972), pp. 1051-1086.
- Lane, Robert E. "Political Character and Political Analysis," in N. Smelser and W. Smelser (eds.) Personality and Social Systems (New York: Wiley, 1963), pp. 466-480.
- Lasswell, Harold, and Abraham Kaplan. Power and Society. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.
- Lenski, Gerhard. Power and Privilege. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.
- Lindesmith, A.R., and A.L. Strauss. Social Psychology. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968.
- Lipset, S.M. Political Man. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1963.
- MacIntyre, Alasdair. "Against Utilitarianism," in T.H.B. Hollins (ed.) Aims in Education: The Philosophic Approach (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964), pp. 1-23.
- MacIntyre, Alasdair. "Is a Science of Comparative Politics Possible?" in Alasdair MacIntyre, Against the Self-Images of the Age (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), pp. 260-279.
- MacIntyre, Alasdair. "Rationality and the Explanation of Action," in Alasdair MacIntyre, Against the Self-Images of the Age (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), pp. 244-259.
- MacIntyre, Alasdair. "What Morality is Not," in Alasdair MacIntyre, Against the Self-Images of the Age (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), pp. 96-108.
- Mannheim, Karl. Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1940.
- Marcuse, Herbert. One Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964.
- Mills, C. Wright. The Sociological Imagination. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.

- Mills, C. Wright. "Liberal Values in the Modern World," in Power, Politics and the People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills (New York: Ballantine Books, 1963), pp. 187-195.
- Mischel, T. "Piaget: Cognitive Conflict and Motivation of Thought," in T. Mischel (ed.) Cognitive Development and Epistemology (New York: Academic Press, 1971), pp. 311-355.
- Oakeshott, Michael. "Political Education," in Michael Oakeshott Rationalism in Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1963).
- Oakeshott, Michael. "The Study of Politics in a University," in Michael Oakeshott Rationalism in Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1963).
- Park, Robert E. "Symbiosis and Socialization: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Society," American Journal of Sociology, 45 (1939), pp. 1-25.
- Park, Robert E. Introduction to the Science of Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921.
- Peters, Richard S. "Education and Human Development," in R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst, and R.S. Peters (eds.) Education and the Development of Reason (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 501-520.
- Peters, Richard S. "Education and the Educated Man," in R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst, and R.S. Peters (eds.) Education and the Development of Reason (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 3-18.
- Peters, Richard S. "Education as Initiation," in R.D. Archambault (ed.) Philosophical Analysis and Education (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), pp. 87-111.
- Peters, Richard S. "Emotions and the Category of Passivity," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 61 (1961-1962), pp. 117-134.
- Peters, Richard S. Ethics and Education. Oakland, New Jersey: Scott Foresman and Co., 1967.
- Peters, Richard S. "Freud's Theory of Moral Development in Relation to that of Piaget," British Journal of Educational Psychology, 30 (1960), pp. 250-258.

- Peters, Richard S. "'Mental Health' as an Educational Aim," in T.H.B. Hollins (ed.) Aims in Education (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964), pp. 71-90.
- Peters, Richard S. "Michael Oakeshott's Philosophy of Education," in Preston King and B.C. Parekh (eds.) Politics and Experience (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 43-63.
- Peters, Richard S. "Moral Development: A plea for Pluralism," in T. Mischel (ed.) Cognitive Development and Epistemology (New York: Academic Press, 1971), pp. 237-269.
- Peters, Richard S. "Reason and Habit: The Paradox of Moral Education," in Isreal Scheffler (ed.) Philosophy and Education (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1966), pp. 245- 261.
- Peters, Richard S. "'A Recognizable Philosophy of Education': A Constructive Critique," in Perspectives on Plowden (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), pp. 1-20.
- Peters, Richard S. "What is an Educational Process?" in R.S. Peters (ed.) The Concept of Education (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), pp. 1-23.
- Piaget, Jean. The Moral Judgement of the Child. New York: The Free Press, 1965.
- Piaget, Jean. Plays, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood. New York: Norton, 1951.
- Piaget, Jean and Baerbel Inhelder. The Psychology of the Child. New York: Basic Books, 1969.
- Piaget, Jean. Six Psychological Studies. New York: Random House, 1967.
- Pocock, J.G. "Time, Institutions and Action: An Essay on Traditions and Their Understanding," in Preston King and B.C. Parekh Politics and Experience (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968).
- Pranger, Robert. The Eclipse of Citizenship. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968.
- Rogers, Carl. "Toward a Science of the Person," in T.W. Wann (ed.) Phenomenology and Behaviorism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 109-132.

- Russell, Bertrand. Human Society in Ethics and Politics. London: Allen and Unwin, 1954.
- Sigel, Roberta. "Political Socialization: Some Reflections on Current Approaches and Conceptualizations," Paper presented to the American Political Science Association, Annual Meeting, New York, September, 1966.
- Strawson, P.F. "Freedom and Resentment," in P.F. Strawson (ed.) Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 71-96.
- Strawson, P.F. "Social Morality and Individual Ideal," Philosophy, 36 (January, 1961), pp. 1-17.
- Taylor, Charles. "Neutrality in Political Science," in P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman (eds.) Philosophy, Politics and Society, Third Series (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967), pp. 25-57.
- Taylor, Charles. "What is Involved in a Genetic Psychology?" in T. Mischel (ed.) Cognitive Psychology and Epistemology (New York: Academic Press, 1971), pp. 393-416.
- Tomkins, Silvan. "Left and Right: A Basic Dimension of Ideology and Personality," in R.W. White (ed.) The Study of Lives (New York: Atherton, 1963), pp. 388-411.
- Toulmin, Stephen. "The Concept of 'Stages' in Psychological Development," in T. Mischel (ed.) Cognitive Psychology and Epistemology (New York: Academic Press, 1971), pp. 25-60.
- Toulmin, Stephen. "Concepts and the Explanation of Behavior," in T. Mischel (ed.) Cognitive Psychology and Epistemology (New York: Academic Press, 1971), pp. 71-104.
- Turner, Ralph H. "Role-taking: Process Versus Conformity," in Arnold Rose (ed.) Human Behavior and Social Processes (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin Co., 1962), pp. 20-40.
- Waismann, F. "Verifiability," in A.G.N. Flew (ed.) Logic and Language (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1965), pp. 122-151.

- Wellmer, Albrecht. Toward a Critical Theory of Society.
New York: Herder and Herder, 1971.
- White, P.A. "Socialization and Education," in R.F. Dearden,
P.H. Hirst, and R.S. Peters (eds.) Education and
the Development of Reason (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 113-131.
- Winch, Peter. "Nature and Convention," Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society (1959-1960), pp. 231-252.
- Wolin, Sheldon. "Political Theory as a Vocation," American
Political Science Review, 63 (December, 1969),
pp. 1062-1082.
- Wrong, Dennis. "The Oversocialized Conception of Man in
Modern Sociology," in N. Smelser and W. Smelser
(eds.) Personality and Social Systems (New York:
Wiley, 1963), pp. 68-79.

