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Philosophical foundation of Chinese political ethics.

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PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CHINESE POLITICAL ETHICS

A Dissertation Presented

By

Yun-Tong Pan

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

August 1973

Major Subject Political Science


PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CHINESE POLITICAL ETHICS


A Dissertation


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
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August 1973

To My Parents

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Northampton, Massachusetts
August 15, 1973

Yun-Tong Pan

ABSTRACT

Philosophical Foundations of Chinese Political Ethics

(August 1973)

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Directed by: Dr. Felix E. Oppenheim

This study attempts a systematic philosophical analysis of various metaethical theories advanced by prominent Chinese political philosophers in answer to the question whether it is possible to demonstrate that certain basic principles of political ethics are objectively either true or false, independently of subjective moral commitments, and if so, by what method. Like their counterparts in the West, Chinese political philosophers have given various, and often conflicting, answers to this question.

The principal objective of this study is, not to make an original contribution to metaethics, nor to give a historical account of the development of these political philosophies, but to provide an analytical interpretation and

a critical understanding of different Chinese political philosophies which are often grouped under Confucianism, Neo-Confucianism, Moism, Taoism, Legalism, Socialism, and Communism. Various answers to the question are illustrated by the works representing these schools of thought. But they are organized, not historically, but systematically.

I have tried to give an accurate presentation of these various political philosophies, but I have not confined myself to the presentation of a summary of these philosophies. I am convinced that only one of these conflicting views is correct, and I have stated my criticisms of all others, in the belief that they will perhaps serve to stimulate further discussions among the students of Chinese political philosophy and thereby indirectly help to increase our understanding of this crucial problem.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Statement of the Problem

Is it possible to demonstrate that certain basic principles of political ethics are objectively either true or false, independently of subjective moral commitments, and if so, by what method? Or are they expressions of the speaker's subjective moral attitude, preference or commitment which cannot be either true or false? These are enduring questions in the metaethics of politics which many Chinese no less than Western political philosophers have attempted to answer, explicitly or implicitly. They are questions, not of normative ethics, but of metaethics of politics or philosophy of political ethics because they deal with moral principles of politics, not directly, but as an object of philosophical analysis. "Meta-ethics does not propound any moral principles or goals for action, except possibly by implication; it consists entirely of philosophical analysis."¹

In spite of their importance in philosophical inquiries and in spite of the impressive strides made by analytic phi-

losophy in the last several decades, there is no systematic analysis of the answers provided by major Chinese political thinkers, either in English or in Chinese. Among the growing literature on Chinese philosophy, there are two books by prominent twentieth century Chinese philosophers whose titles suggest that they may cover the subject. But neither does. One of them, The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China by Hu Shih has little to say about the above problem.² The other, Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy (in Chinese) by Mou Tsung-san deals almost exclusively with the metaphysics of Immanuel Kant and some Chinese philosophers, though the author promises in his preface to "open a new frontier in metaethics."³ Even in a monumental work like the eight-volume Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which deals with the philosophies of more than fifteen Chinese philosophers, one cannot find a careful analysis of the competing theories advanced by some of them in answer to these questions. The absence of such an analysis in the Encyclopedia which examines in detail the metaethical problems of Western philosophers is perhaps not an oversight of its editor or an accidental omission on the part of its contributors.

It seems to be a reflection of the lack of interest of scholars in Chinese philosophy and the state of scholarship in this particular area. I therefore propose to attempt, for the first time as far as I can ascertain from my research, a systematic analysis of the answers advanced by various Chinese political thinkers.

B. The Nature of the Proposed Analysis

The theories which I shall examine do not belong to normative ethics, for they do not advocate specific moral principles of politics. These theories deal with the cognitive status of these normative principles, that is, whether and how these normative principles of politics can be shown to be objectively true or false. They therefore belong to metaethics of politics in general and to epistemology of political ethics in particular.

In their attempt to answer this epistemological question, many moral philosophers have found it necessary to deal, explicitly or implicitly, with one or more of the following problems in metaethics: (1) The meaning of value

terms such as 'good' and 'evil' and of moral terms such as 'right' and 'wrong'. Do they stand for some "natural" or "nonnatural" properties? Or do they function to express the speaker's moral attitude toward, or his commendation or condemnation of, a certain kind of action or state of affairs?

(2) The nature and function of ethical statements in which these and similar ethical terms occur. Are moral statements a subclass of factual statements? Or do they perform a function drastically different from factual statements? (3) The criteria of validity of ethical judgments. Can ethical judgments be justified in any objective way similar to those in which factual judgments can be justified? If not, can they be shown to be valid by some other methods? The answers each philosopher gives to these questions will determine into which of the metaethical schools he should be classified.

C. Some Difficulties

This proposed attempt will not be an easy one. First of all, being the first attempt in the area of Chinese political philosophy, I am forced, in a sense, to wander in the

dark with little, if any, guiding light. There is no existing work on Chinese political philosophy which may serve as a guide to this study. Secondly, to find out the answers given by Chinese thinkers, it is necessary to read the un-indexed, and often voluminous, collections of original works. Third, these works in most cases fail to separate empirical, ethical, metaethical, and metaphysical arguments. Since most of their answers were not set forth in methodical philosophical treatises and their metaethical views were often far from unequivocal, one of the main tasks of this study is the interpretation of their views in the light of modern metaethical categories. As students of political philosophy are well aware, it is not easy to interpret even Western political philosophies, especially of the past, in the language of modern analytic philosophy and place them into the various metaethical categories I shall mention. For example, Thomas Hobbes' writings contain many passage which, taken by themselves, would classify him into each of the three metaethical categories. He may be classified as an intuitionist because he spoke of natural law in the following terms:

A law of nature, lex naturalis, is a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.⁴

He appears to take a naturalist view when he asserts that "all men agree on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way, or means of peace...are good; that is to say, moral virtues; and their contrary vices, evil. Now the science of virtue and vice is moral philosophy; and therefore the true doctrine of the laws of nature, is the true moral philosophy."⁵ Hobbes, however, contradicts these cognitivist views and affirms the metaethics of noncognitivism in the following passage:

But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves.⁶

The writings of John Stuart Mill present a similar problem. As an exponent of the definist theory that 'good'

means 'happiness' and 'x is desirable' means the same as 'x is desired', Mill must be classified as a cognitivist. His cognitivist view is brought out in statements such as:

The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it.... In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it.... No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.⁷

But as pointed out by Felix E. Oppenheim, Mill "comes at least close to taking the noncognitivist position" when he asserts that "questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof. Whatever can be proven to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof," and that "the method ... of ethics can be no other than that of art," as distinguished from science.⁸

It is even more difficult to interpret and classify

Chinese political philosophies, especially the pre-modern ones this way, without risking the accusation of placing them in a modern Procrustean bed. I do not wish to minimize the difficulties involved in such an undertaking. It cannot be denied that the linguistic and cultural differences between East and West are indeed great and that Chinese political philosophers rarely think and speak in terms which are familiar to the students of modern analytic philosophy.

To recognize these differences and difficulties, however, is not to subscribe to the thesis that it is impossible to classify various political philosophies of Chinese thinkers into modern metaethical categories or that it is futile to apply the methods of modern analytical philosophy to the study of Chinese political philosophy. While it is true that the metaethical theory of any well-known Chinese political philosopher differ from that of any great Western political philosopher in some respects, it is false to conclude that they are unique in all respects. For example, it cannot be denied that there are some Chinese political philosophers who, like some of their counterparts in the West, maintain that certain basic principles of political ethics can be

known to be objectively true or false on the basis of moral insight. Similarly, there are political philosophers in China as well as in the West who claim that normative principles of politics can be derived from factual generalizations. For the purpose of this study, these similarities are significant because they are relevant to the question whether and how basic normative principles of politics can be shown to be objectively true or false.

Moreover, I believe it is well worthwhile to apply the concepts of modern analytical philosophy to the study of Chinese political philosophy because they are in my judgment excellent tools for arriving at an analytical understanding, a critical assessment, and a comparative perspective of different systems of Chinese political philosophy.

It might be objected that the language used by some Chinese philosophers does not distinguish explicitly 'is' and 'ought'. The reply is that if we apply these modern metaethical concepts we must make this distinction regardless of the actual language used by them.

D. The Original Works and Translations

In the long history of Chinese political philosophy, many Chinese political thinkers have advanced various answers to the question of this study. It is however impossible for a study of this nature to include all "great" political philosophers. In the selection of the works of Chinese political thinkers to be discussed, I have been guided by two considerations. First, the works must provide explicit, or at least implicit, arguments for one or the other of the alternative metaethical views. And it is for this reason that I shall not consider the philosophy of Confucius even though it has influenced many of the philosophers covered in this study. The only reliable source of his philosophy, the Analects of Confucius, contains few metaethical arguments which are relevant to the topic of this study. Second, these works must be widely known to the educated Chinese in general and to the students of Chinese political philosophy in particular. In fact, many of the works cited in this study were, and some still are, required readings at various levels of Chinese education. Some of

the ethical and metaethical doctrines contained therein received the official blessing when they were regarded as correct theories in such competitive public examinations as the college entrance examination or the civil service examination. For example, the Book of Mencius and the Great Learning, together with other Confucian Classics, were the basis of the civil service examinations from 1313 to 1905. The influence of Chu Hsi's political philosophy is exemplified by the fact that in 1313 an imperial decree ordered that his and Ch'eng I's commentaries on the Four Books and the Five Classics be the standard official interpretations and the basis for the civil service examinations. Sun Yat-sen's San Min Chu I or the Three Principles of the People is a required reading at colleges and universities in the Republic of China and is a subject in its civil service examinations. In the People's Republic of China almost everyone who can read is expected, if not required, to study a certain portion of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung.

A further difficulty is that the authenticity of some ancient texts used in this study has been challenged by many scholars. I have spent an enormous amount of time reading

contradictory arguments on this matter, but have decided against making any reference to them in order to save space and to avoid distraction from the main issue of this inquiry. For the purposes of this study, it is not of vital importance to decide (if it can be decided at all) whether a work attributed to a thinker is in fact his own work. I maintain in this study that a certain metaethical view is expressed in a book that bears the name of a thinker or in a book attributed to him. However, I shall not make use of any material which has been proven conclusively to be an interpolation.

As a study to be written in English, I wish that there were accurate translations of all the original works used in this study. Unfortunately, only a limited number of translations are available, and they are often inadequate for a philosophical analysis that demands precision in rendering original works. With the exception of the official translation of the works of Mao Tse-tung which requires relatively few corrections, I have found it necessary to translate the passages cited in this study myself. However, I have benefitted greatly from the available translations. To give due

credit to the translations which I have consulted and to provide a guide to those who wish to explore further, I have indicated these translations in footnotes. In this connection, I must mention an excellent collection of translations which I have consulted from time to time but have mentioned specifically in footnotes only in a few instances. It is A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy by Wing-tsit Chan.⁹

Translating Chinese philosophical works into English proves to be a difficult task. Many Chinese philosophical terms have no adequate synonyms in English. For example, 'tao' (道) literally means 'way' or 'path'. It has been used to designate empirical laws of things and human affairs, a rational means to a given end, and various basic principles of political ethics similar to the "law of nature" in Western philosophy. It has been translated as the 'Way' or the 'Truth' or 'Tao'. Similarly, it is almost impossible to find a synonym for li (理), a key term of Neo-Confucianism. It has been translated variously as 'law', 'reason', 'order' or 'principle'. These and some other terms are so complicated in their meanings that they cannot be adequately translated or transliterated into English without some explanations.

I shall therefore devote some space to clarify the meanings of these terms at appropriate places.

E. Value-cognitivism and Its Denial

The various and often conflicting theories which have been advanced by both Chinese and Western political philosophers in answer to the question whether or not certain basic principles of political ethics can be shown to be objectively true or false may be divided into two categories: value-cognitivism and value-noncognitivism.

i. Value-Cognitivism

The metaethical theory of value-cognitivism affirms that basic moral principles are, and can be shown to be, objectively true or false. But how the goodness of a state of affairs and rightness of a political action can be known is answered differently by the two schools of value-cognitivism: intuitionism and naturalism. Value-cognitivists of different schools or even the same school also often differ as to what basic normative principles of politics are objectively true or false.

Naturalism. Naturalism in general holds that certain moral principles can be shown to be true or false because "moral judgments just state a special subclass of facts about the natural world"¹⁰ or because moral principles can somehow be reduced to true descriptive generalizations. According to William K. Frankena,

many philosophers have sought to show that certain moral and other value judgments are actually rooted in fact or, as it used to be put, in "the nature of thing".... One who follows this line of thought, however, seems to be committed to claiming that ethical and value judgments can be derived logically from factual ones, empirical or nonempirical.¹¹

In contrast to this simpler form of naturalism, a more sophisticated form of naturalism, known as the definist theory, holds that "ethical terms can be defined in terms of non-ethical ones, and ethical sentences can be translated into nonethical ones of a factual kind."¹² In other words, it holds that "an ethical or value judgment simply is an assertion of a fact--that ethical and value terms constitute merely an alternative vocabulary for reporting facts."¹³ For example, 'good' is said to mean the same as 'what is conducive to pleasure'. Given this definition, judgments about the good-

ness of actions or states of affairs are factual judgments about the quantity (and/or quality) of pleasure they produce. 'Good' or 'right' has also been defined to mean 'what is desired or approved' by the majority, by the 'experts' or by the speaker. Given this definition, judgments about goodness or rightness are again factual judgments.

If either form of naturalism is correct, then ethical judgments can be justified by empirical investigation just as ordinary factual statements can.

Intuitionism. Intuitionism holds that certain basic moral principles are true, and they "can be seen to be true by any person with the necessary insight. According to this view, a person who can grasp the truth of true ethical generalizations does not accept them as the result of a process of ratiocination; he just sees without argument that they are and must be true, and true of all possible worlds."¹⁴

Some intuitionists agree with definists that ethical terms stand for properties of things. However, intuitionists

deny that the properties referred to by words like "good" and "ought" are definable in nonethical

terms. In fact, they insist that some of these properties are indefinable or simple and unanalyzable, as yellowness and pleasantness.... But they are not natural or empirical properties as are pleasantness and yellowness. They are of a very different kind, being non-natural or non-empirical and, so to speak, normative rather than factual.... According to this view, as for the definists, ethical and value judgments are true or false; but they are not factual and cannot be justified by empirical observation or metaphysical reasoning. The basic ones, particular or general, are self-evident and can only be known by intuition; this follows, it is maintained, from the fact that the properties involved are simple and non-natural.¹⁵

Different schools of intuitionism, however, disagree with one another about how the quality of goodness and rightness in general and the quality of political goodness and rightness in particular can be known. As we shall see, intuitionists like Lao Tzu and Mencius maintain that the quality of goodness and rightness can be known, not by the five senses which every normal human being possesses, but by a moral sense which, according to Mencius, all men are endowed with at the time of birth, or, according to Lao Tzu, can be attained by most, if not all, after arduous efforts in accordance with his prescription.

Some intuitionists hold that religious insight is a

valid method to prove the truth or falsity of basic principles of political ethics. A third group of intuitionists maintains that certain normative principles of politics are known to be true, not by moral or religious insight, but by rational insight. According to Chu Hsi, the most influential leader of the "rationalistic school" of Neo-Confucianism, reason with the aid of other faculties "necessarily knows" what is objectively right or wrong.

ii. Value-Noncognitivism

Value-noncognitivism holds that "basic ethical principles have no cognitive status; they cannot be known to be either true or false because they are not true or false; and they are neither true nor false because they do not affirm or deny that something is the case."¹⁶

Noncognitivists maintain that ethical terms such as 'good' or 'evil' and 'right' or 'wrong' do not designate any property, and ethical judgments in which these and similar ethical terms occur are not statements that assert or deny that something is the case. If moral statements neither affirm nor deny that something is the case, then they cannot be either true or false. In the words of Alfred Jules Ayer,

one of the most influential exponents of this view (which is known as "the emotive theory of value"),

in saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong, I am not making any factual statement, not even a statement about my own state of mind. I am expressing certain moral sentiments.... It is worth mentioning that ethical terms do not serve only to express feeling. They are calculated also to arouse feeling, and so to stimulate action. Indeed some of them are used in such a way as to give the sentences in which they occur the effect of commands.... If a sentence makes no statement at all, there is obviously no sense in asking whether what it says is true or false.¹⁷

For example, the term 'wrong' in the statement 'killing under x condition is wrong' and the 'right' in the statement 'killing under x condition is right' express the speaker's approval or disapproval of killing under a certain circumstance. The disagreement between those who maintain the former position and those hold the latter is, according to Charles L. Stevenson, a "disagreement in attitude."¹⁸ They may agree on all relevant facts about a specific case of killing and yet still disagree as to the rightness or wrongness of the action. Some of them may maintain that human life should not be taken under any circumstances. Others

may argue that human life, whether actual or potential, may be taken if it is necessary, for example, to protect the life of the mother, to prevent the pain of old age, to promote the welfare of the family (or state), to maintain the purity of race, etc. Noncognitivists maintain that

Fundamental moral disputes cannot be resolved in any objective way, and fundamental moral claims cannot be inductively established or deductively proven or demonstrated in any other way. Morality is not a matter of knowledge.¹⁹

More recently, noncognitivists have come to emphasize the prescriptive aspect of ethical language. According to them, ethical language performs the function of commending or condemning a certain action or kind of action. It gives advice or guides action. R. M. Hare, a representative spokesman for this prescriptive theory holds that

the primary function of the word 'good' is to commend.... When we commend or condemn anything, it is always in order, at least indirectly, to guide choices, our own or other people's, now or in the future.²⁰

Unlike the emotive theory which emphasize the attitude-expressing and attitude-evoking aspect of moral language, the

prescriptive theory stresses the social function of ethical statements. "What makes an utterance normative is precisely its dynamism, its trigger function; a normative utterance is an utterance that guides conduct and molds or alters attitude."²¹

F. Plan of the Proposed Analysis

This study is organized according to the metaethical theories of various Chinese political philosophers and not according to the chronological order of their appearance in history.

In Chapter Two, I will analyze Chinese political philosophers who subscribe to the metaethics of intuitionism based on moral, religious, and rational insights. Next, I will take up thinkers representing two forms of naturalism. In Chapter Four, I shall examine value-noncognitivism in Chinese political philosophy. In the concluding chapter, I shall give a brief summary of this analysis and its implications.

Evidently, my purpose is not to make an original contribution to metaethics. I propose to apply the methods of

analytic philosophy to the study of a particular area of Chinese political theory, namely, political ethics. My objective is to provide an analytic interpretation and a critical understanding of different Chinese political philosophies which are often grouped under Confucianism, Neo-Confucianism, Moism, Taoism, Legalism, Socialism, and Communism.

In this effort, I shall try to give an accurate presentation of these philosophies and state my criticisms. I am convinced that only one of the conflicting metaethical theories can be correct. To present these conflicting theories without stating which I consider the correct one is, it seems to me, to shrink from making a judgment in this matter. A statement of my criticism perhaps will also serve to stimulate further discussions among the students of Chinese political philosophy and thereby indirectly help to increase our understanding of this crucial problem. To this end, I believe it is worthwhile to state my views in this analysis.

C H A P T E R I I

INTUITIONISM AS THE FOUNDATION OF POLITICAL ETHICS

The metaethical theory of intuitionism holds that basic ethical terms such as 'good' or 'right' stand for "non-natural properties" which are simple, indefinable or unanalyzable. According to this theory, ethical statements and value judgments can be objectively true or false because they are statements asserting these properties or ascribing these properties to things. Intuitionists maintain that the quality of goodness or rightness, unlike natural properties such as yellowness and pleasantness which can be known by sense experience, can only be apprehended by a certain kind of intuition. Consequently, basic principles of political ethics can be known to be objectively true or false, not by empirical observation, but by insight.

Intuitionists, however, differ with one another about the kind of intuition which enables men to attain true moral knowledge. In this chapter we shall examine the political philosophies of some eminent Chinese intuitionists who maintain that certain basic normative principles of politics can

be known to be objectively true by moral or religious or rational insight.

A. Based on Moral Insight

i. Lao Tzu (老子)

Lao Tzu (b. 570 B.C.?), the founder of Taoism, has been classified as a naturalist by most authors. Such a classification, however, is based on his ethical position rather than on his metaethical position. To eliminate this confusing and misleading designation, he may be called an ethical naturalist and a metaethical intuitionist.

Lao Tzu's Ethical Principles. Lao Tzu is an ethical naturalist in the sense that he advocates the moral principle that men ought to follow the Tao or Way of Nature by leading a simple, "natural," and primitive way of life. This is the consensus of more than fifteen authors whom I have consulted. However, no single Chinese equivalent for the word 'ought,' one of the most important "trade marks" of an ethical-normative statement in Western philosophy, occurs in the entire book of the Lao Tzu. His moral principles, like those of

some Western philosophers, are couched in the form of empirical generalizations, often using terms having a laudatory connotation. He says, for example,

Man patterns himself after [the Way of] the Earth,
The Earth patterns itself after Heaven,
Heaven patterns itself after Tao (Way),
Tao patterns itself after Nature.¹

Grammatically, this passage looks and sounds like "the young men in the United States pattern their hair style after the Beatles'." The grammatical appearance, however, is deceptive. The latter sentence is empirical because it contains only descriptive terms: The verb 'pattern' is used to describe the making or fashioning of their hairs according to the hair style of the Beatles. The same word 'pattern' and 'the Way of the Earth,' 'Heaven' and 'Nature' in Lao Tzu's statement are not used in the empirical sense, but in a normative-ethical sense. The 'Tao' or 'Way' refers to those, and only those, ways which, in Lao Tzu's judgment, are good and which men ought to imitate. The verb 'pattern' is being used to prescribe that men ought to act according to the Way or Tao which is good rather than to describe that men actually

do so. The word 'pattern' is a translation of the Chinese word fǎ (法) or 'law'. According to Chinese and English dictionaries, 'law' means, among other things, a binding rule of conduct, and 'pattern' means "something regarded as a normative example to be copied" or "a model accepted or proposed for imitation." As a verb, as it is used in the passage quoted, it means to act according to the pattern or law, which, in this context, is the Tao of the Earth, Heaven, and Nature. Thus, the whole passage acquires a normative character.

One of the favorite techniques employed by all Chinese moral philosophers except a few modern moralists is to put their own moral principles into the mouth of the Sage(s) or to present their own normative principles of politics in the form of historical statements to the effect that they were the political ethics of the ancient sages. Since the Sage (who usually remains unidentified) is regarded as the perfect moral model for all men in Chinese culture, an evocation of his words or actions, actual or alleged, becomes in effect a Chinese way of stating indirectly that acting this way is right. Thus, when Lao Tzu says that "the Sage manages the

affairs of non-action (wú-wéi, 無為, literally inactivity) and practices the teaching of quietude,"² it is unmistakable to the Chinese reader that he is exhorting all men, especially all rulers and government officials, to practice the teaching of quietude. This reading is supported by his assertion that "the good man is (which here means: ought to be) the teacher of the bad," and that "the man of superior virtue practices non-action, and he does so without ulterior motive; the man of inferior virtue takes action, and he does so with ulterior motive."³ The Sage is, of course, a "good man" and a man of "superior" virtue.

According to Lao Tzu, wú-wéi or "non-action" is the Tao of Nature. It does not mean "inactivity" in the literal sense but rather taking no action that is contrary to the Way of Nature. To practice "non-action," therefore, means to follow the Way of Nature. The teaching of quietude is an application of the principle of "non-action" in the area of education in the broad sense of the term, and is intended by Lao Tzu to counter the rival doctrine which stresses the active study of language, books and techniques of argumentation.

If the Way of Nature is good and "non-action" is the Way

of Nature as Lao Tzu maintains, then a ruler who practices "non-action" is a good ruler. This is his conclusion. He pronounces that the best ruler is the one who knows the Tao and follows it by doing the least governing.

The best of all the rulers is the one whose
existence the people are barely aware of.
The next best is one who is loved and praised.
The next is one who is feared.
The next is one who is despised.
When there is not enough faith in others,
They will have no faith in him.
With great concern, [the best ruler] values his
own words.
When his task is accomplished and work done,
The people all say, "He is natural (tzu-ján, 自然)."4

His ideal society is a small state in which the people, who have few desires, little knowledge and no ambition, lead a peaceful, inactive, and simple way of life.⁵ Lao Tzu therefore condemns any conscious attempt by men to interfere with the Way of Nature and what he believed to be the "natural way of life." To advocate any non-Taoistic moral principles is to make such an attempt. He is particularly critical of the basic Confucian moral principles such as "humanity," filial piety, and "righteousness," and the basic Confucian values such as wisdom and loyalty. He declares that they are the

products of degeneration following the fall of men from the "natural way of life."⁶

Moral Insight and the Tao. But what is Tao? And how it is known? Lao Tzu used the term 'tao' in two different senses without distinguishing them, namely the normative and descriptive senses.

Tao (道) literally means the way or path by which people reach their destination, or through figurative usage the method or means by which men accomplish their objectives. 'Tao' in this sense is a descriptive term. When Lao Tzu claims that non-action or non-interference is the best way to a simple and peaceful life, he is using 'tao' in this descriptive sense.⁷

'Tao' in the moral sense involves the intrinsic moral judgment that a certain way of life or a certain course of action ought to be followed for its own sake by all men or by all men with certain characteristics under certain circumstances, such as policy-makers in their public life. When Lao Tzu says that all men ought to follow the Tao of Nature by leading a "natural" way of life, not as a means to some other end, but as an end in itself because it is desirable

for its own sake, he is using 'tao' in the normative sense. To distinguish the two senses of 'tao', I shall use small letters for the descriptive and capital letters for the normative sense.

Lao Tzu takes Tao as something not unlike Plato's Form. He says,

There is something (wù, 物) undifferentiated
and yet complete in itself.
It existed before Heaven and Earth.
Soundless and shapeless, it stands alone and
does not change.
It prevails everywhere and is free from danger.
It may be considered as the mother of the universe.
I do not know its name,
I styled it Tao.
And in the absence of a better word named it Great.⁸

Tao as the mother of the universe may remind Western readers of Platonic Ultimate Reality in contradistinction to the illusory world of phenomena.⁹ While Plato maintains that the Form of Goodness is "perfectly real" and "perfectly knowable,"¹⁰ Lao Tzu holds that "Tao is a thing which is elusive and vague. Elusive and vague, yet there is in it a form (hsiàng, 象). Elusive and vague, yet there is in it a thing (wù, 物)." ¹¹

Tao is not only elusive and vague, it cannot even be adequately discussed. For Lao Tzu insists that "The Tao that can be talked about is not the eternal Tao."¹² Even so, he dwelled on Tao at great length. If this seems paradoxical to some students of Lao Tzu's philosophy, it is because they equate the difficulty of putting the true eternal Tao into conventional language with the impossibility of knowing the Tao. While Lao Tzu admitted the inadequacy of language, he holds that the Tao is not beyond the reach of certain men with special faculties.¹³

The question is by what faculty? The following passage provides his answer.

Without stepping beyond one's doors,
 One can know the world.
 Without peeping through one's window,
 One can see (chièn, 見) the Tao of Nature.
 The further one goes,
 The less one knows.
 Therefore the sages know without travelling,
 Apprehend (ming, 名) without looking,¹⁴ and
 Accomplish without any action.¹⁵

Lao Tzu used the term 'see' to refer to the discovery of the Tao of Nature. His conclusion that the sages "apprehend without looking" suggests, however, that the Tao is not dis-

covered by the use of our eyes. Since the passage quoted does not refer to sense perception, Lao Tzu can only be understood to be "seen" by some sixth or moral sense. This interpretation is supported by the way he described the "thread of Tao" or the essence of Tao. It reads,

We look at it but cannot see it;
 Its name is the Invisible.
 We listen to it but cannot hear it;
 Its name is the Inaudible.
 We grasp it but cannot get it;
 Its name is the Subtle.
 These three cannot be further inquired into;
 They therefore fuse into one.
 Its upper part is not bright,
 And its lower part not obscure.
 Infinite and boundless,
 It cannot be given any name.
 It returns to nothingness.
 This is called the shape without a shape,
 The form (hsiang, 象) without substance.
 This is called the vague and elusive.
 Go toward it and we cannot see its head;
 Follow it and we cannot see its back.¹⁶

And in another passage he said, "The words uttered by Tao are insipid and flavorless. We look (shih, 視) at Tao, but it cannot be seen.¹⁷ We listen to it, but it cannot be heard. Yet if you use it, it is inexhaustible."¹⁸

Since the Tao is invisible, it can only be apprehended

by the moral sense. Even this moral sense is not available to all. Only the moral sense of those who have attained the "utmost vacuity" and "genuine quietude" can "see" the true Tao.¹⁹

ii. Mencius (孟子) and Wang Yang-Ming (王陽明)

In contrast to Lao Tzu's position that true moral intuition is available only to those who have attained the utmost vacuity and genuine quietude, Mencius (372-289 B.C.), the founder of what is known as the idealistic school of Confucianism, maintains that all men possess innate knowledge of right and wrong and the innate ability to do what is right. He uses the theory of innate knowledge to establish the intrinsic rightness of acting according to the principle of humanity (or benevolence) and righteousness (or justice), and relies on descriptive definitions of value terms as well as empirical generalizations to establish the normative principle that certain human dispositions, traits of character or feelings are good and ought to be cultivated. The former is a form of intuitionism and the latter represents a type of naturalism. In this section I shall examine his version

of intuitionism; his version of naturalism will be discussed in the following chapter.

Innate Knowledge of Moral Principles. Mencius defines innate knowledge and innate ability in the following terms:

The ability possessed by men without having been acquired by learning is innate ability (liáng-néng, 良能), and the knowledge possessed by men without deliberation is innate knowledge (liáng-chih, 良知). Children carried in the arms all know to love their parents, and as they grow they all know to respect their elder brothers. To have affection for parents is humanity (jién, 仁, benevolence), and to respect elders is righteousness (ì, 義, justice). These are universal in the world without exception.²⁰

In other words, Mencius maintains that all men are endowed with the knowledge of right and wrong and they have the natural tendency to act according to what is right, which, for Mencius, means acting according to the principles of humanity and righteousness. This interpretation is confirmed by another key passage:

All men have the hsin (心, literally, heart) of compassion; all men have the hsin of shame and dislike; all men have the hsin of humility and reverence; and all men have the hsin of right and wrong. The hsin of compassion is humanity; the hsin of shame and dislike is righteousness; the

hsin of humility and reverence is propriety (lǐ, 禮); and the hsin of right and wrong is wisdom (chih, 智). Humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are not gilded onto us from without; we inherently possess (kù-yǐ, 固有) them. [People do not know this because] they have not reflected upon this matter.²¹

Hsin (心) literally means 'heart'. It is often rendered as 'feeling'. But neither 'heart' nor 'feeling' is an adequate translation of what Mencius intended to say. What he means by this word is the natural disposition to know what is right and wrong. The hsin is therefore the seat of innate moral knowledge, at least when it functions as "the heart of right and wrong," although Mencius did not say so explicitly. Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529), a leader of the idealistic school of Neo-Confucianism who reaffirmed the Mencian metaethical position, unequivocally identifies the hsin with the innate knowledge.

The hsin of right and wrong knows without deliberation and it can do so without having acquired it by learning. This is what is called innate knowledge.²²

The hsin or heart in this moral sense cannot be rendered as 'feeling'. In Wang Yang-ming's words,

Sentiment (ì, 心) and innate knowledge must be clearly distinguished. All that ideas (nièn, 心, includes thoughts, desires, etc.) which arises in response to things are called sentiment. A sentiment may be right or wrong. That which is capable of knowing the right and wrong of a sentiment is called innate knowledge. If you follow the innate knowledge, nothing can be wrong.²³

In this sense, Mencius' hsin, like the heart for Jean-Jacques Rousseau,²⁴ is the source, or "the root" in Mencian terms,²⁵ of man's ethical knowledge.

According to Mencius, men ought to act in accordance with the moral principles known to them through their innate knowledge. Since he believes that all men possess both innate knowledge of right and wrong and the innate ability to do what is right, he condemns those who refuse to acknowledge the validity of the true moral principles and those who refuse to act accordingly.

Men have these Four Beginnings [of humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom] just as they have their four limbs. When a man, who has these Four Beginnings, proclaims that he cannot practice them, he is robbing himself. He who proclaims that his ruler cannot practice them is robbing his ruler.²⁶

In his judgment, the major function of government ought

to be to create and maintain an environment conducive to the fullest development of the Four Beginnings or Four Virtues. Economic measures, educational systems, and basic welfare programs deemed necessary for the goal were spelled out in some details by Mencius.²⁷

According to Mencius, political authority should be placed in the hands of those who have developed these virtues and who have the ability and will to practice the "kingly way" or "the way of the true king" (wáng-tào, 王道), which, in contrast to "the way of the hegemonic tyrant" (pà-tào, 霸道), contains the principles of humane or benevolent government (jén-chèng, 仁政).²⁸ His argument is: "I have not heard of one who bent himself [i.e., violated the true moral principles], and yet was able to straighten others; how much less of one who disgraced himself and yet rectified the whole world."²⁹

iii. Objections to Intuitionism Based on Moral Insight.

The intuitionism of Lao Tzu, Mencius and Wang Yang-ming affirms that basic ethical terms refer to certain non-natural properties whose objective existence can be known by moral

insight. If basic ethical terms referred to certain non-natural properties as they maintained, then it would be self-contradictory for a man to affirm that an action or a state of affairs has one of the non-natural properties specified by one of them and deny that it is good, or to maintain that something which does not have any of the non-natural properties they have specified is good. It cannot be denied, however, that there are people who maintain that something which does not have any of the properties specified by Lao Tzu, Mencius and Wang Yang-ming is good. For example, hedonists maintain that happiness (or pleasure) is intrinsically good. The intuitionists of course deny that hedonists (and all those who do not have moral insight) can have the true knowledge of goodness. They assert that moral insight is the only method to gain the true knowledge of goodness. This position, however, makes ethical judgments unverifiable to all who deny that intuition is a source of objective knowledge.

Those who affirm that something has the alleged non-natural property specified by one of the three intuitionists and deny that it is good or right are in effect challenging

the validity of one intuition by another intuition. This is an instance of conflicting intuitions which cannot be settled by appealing to moral intuition. For what if A claims to know with absolute certainty that to promote his own greatest good by leading a "natural way of life" regardless of what may happen to other people is intrinsically right and ought to be done, whereas B claims to know with equal absolute certainty that to love all men including his enemy is intrinsically right and that government ought to take all necessary actions to promote the welfare of all? While it is possible to test the validity of a claim that one is able to see something which is not seen by others because he has reached a certain altitude, there is no way to test whether one has seen the Tao with his moral sense. The so-called "truth serum" or "lie detecting machine" will not be able to help, for most, if not all, moral philosophers of this school honestly believe that they have eliminated selfish desires, attained "utmost vacuity," and maintained "genuine quietude" in accordance with Lao Tzu's instruction, and that they have really "seen" the true Tao. As an honest and convinced moral philosopher, each can be expected to

claim that those who disagreed with him have not seen the true Tao, and he alone or he and those who agreed with him alone have seen the genuine Tao. But this type of argument amounts to nothing more than a claim of the subjective certainty of his own intuition without proving in any way the validity of the moral "statement" in question.

In the similar situation, Mencius and Wang Yang-ming cannot legitimately question the validity of those who intuited the basic moral principles which differ from their own moral principles, for both have maintained, as we have seen, that all men possess innate moral knowledge. Mencius attempts to solve the problem of conflicting intuitions by four types of argument. First, he declares that his serious moral opponents, such as Mo Tzu and Yang Chu, are "birds and beasts (ch'ín-shòu, 禽獸)" implying that they are not men who, according to his own theory, possess innate moral knowledge.³⁰ It is an easy way out, but no arbitrary declaration, however, can deny the biological fact that his moral opponents are men. Second, he maintains that a man may abandon or lose his innate knowledge.³¹ If so, Mencius may claim that the moral insights of certain men are false. But this argument

contradicts his assertion that all men have the same innate moral knowledge. Even if we were to accept the contention that all men originally had such a knowledge but some of them lost it thereafter, we are not provided with any objective criterion by which to determine who has and who has not lost his innate moral knowledge. Third, Mencius also speaks of the quantitative differences in the development of the Four Virtues, including the "heart of right and wrong." In regard to them, he says,

Some men have twice as much as others, some five times as much, and some to an incalculable amount, because some men did not develop their natural endowments to the fullest extent.³²

It is not clear whether Mencius intends to say that there are quantitative differences in the development of man's innate moral knowledge.

Wang Yang-ming, who, as already pointed out, shares Mencius' metaethical position, denies any differences in man's innate knowledge. He asserts that

The innate knowledge is in the heart of all men and without differences between the sage and the blockhead. The whole world, past and present,

has it in common. If the gentlemen of the world only devote themselves to the extension of the innate knowledge, then they shall be able to share with all the universal right and wrong, share their likes and dislikes in common, look upon other people as their own, look upon the country as their own family, and look upon Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things as one body. To seek a world without order, then, will not be possible.³³

If Mencius does indeed implicitly claim that men differ in the development of their innate knowledge, the question then is whether an objective measurement of its development is possible. Mencius did not provide, and he could not have provided, any objective method to measure the development of man's innate knowledge. In the absence of an objective criterion, competing claims of what is right and wrong cannot be objectively settled on the ground of differences in the development of the contestants' innate moral knowledge.

Fourth, both Mencius and Wang Yang-ming also resorted to the argument that man's innate knowledge may be obscured by selfish desires.³⁴ Our criticisms of Lao Tzu apply also to this position. Furthermore, by declaring that his moral rivals were obscured by selfish desires,³⁵ Wang Yang-ming pronounces in effect that a man's innate knowledge is unob-

structed if, and only if, it knows that the principles of humanity and righteousness are the true moral principles. Since these principles are Wang Yang-ming's (and Mencius') own moral principles, this means simply, "you have the unobstructed innate moral knowledge if, and only if, you agree and accept my moral principles."

Since Lao Tzu, Mencius, and Wang Yang-ming all fail to provide any objective, i.e., intersubjective, criterion by which to decide the truth and falsity of competing moral insights, I conclude that their moral insights do not yield objective ethical knowledge.

B. Based on Religious Insight: Mo Tzu ($\frac{4}{2}$ })

One of the most striking contrasts between the history of Chinese and Western political thought is the fact that there are few prominent political philosophers among religious leaders or theologians in the former, with the exception of Mo Tzu (468-376 B.C.?), the founder of Moism as a religion as well as a school of philosophy. Moism was one of the greatest schools of philosophy in ancient China which

provided a serious if relatively temporary challenge to Confucianism from the fifth to the third century B.C.

Universal Love and Condemnation of War. The keystone of Mo Tzu's religion as well as his philosophy is the will of Heaven (i.e., the will of an anthropomorphic God).

The will of Heaven is to me like the compass to the wheelwright and the square to the carpenter. The wheelwright and the carpenter use the compass and square to measure all circles and squares in the world, saying, "that which agrees with the standard is right, and that which does not is wrong." Now the writings of the scholars and gentlemen of the world are too numerous to be loaded in carts and the doctrines and speeches they have produced are too numerous to be enumerated. They try to persuade the feudal lords above and various minor officials below. But as to humanity and justice, they are far, far off the mark. How do I know? I say: I have found the shining standard (fǎ, 法, law, i.e., the will of Heaven) in the world to measure them.³⁶

The will of Heaven is Mo Tzu's moral compass and square with which he measures "the governing activities of kings, feudal lords and other officials above, the myriad people of the world below, and literature, doctrines and debates."³⁷ It is the standard of good and evil, right and wrong. To him, that which is in accord with the will of Heaven is good, and

that which is not is evil.³⁸

According to Mo Tzu, the will of Heaven enjoins universal love and forbids wars. He has defended his basic moral principles on at least five different grounds, of which only one may be properly said to be based on religious insight. Since he used all five grounds to "demonstrate" that these principles were the will of Heaven, I shall examine all of them.

By universal love (chien-ai, 兼愛) Mo Tzu means loving all men without distinction, not only in the sense that every man ought to love all others equally regardless of their biological and social relationships with him, but that he loves all others to the same degree and the same way as he loves himself. His principle of universal love enjoins everyone "to love others as he loves himself,"³⁹ and "to regard other people's countries as his own, regard other people's families as his own, and regard other people's bodies as his own."⁴⁰ He therefore condemns those who "know only to love their own states, family, and body" and not those of others. He did so because they would have violated the will of Heaven, which "wants men to mutually love and

benefit one another, and does not want them to mutually hate or injure one another."⁴¹

If the will of Heaven enjoins all men to act according to the principles of mutual love and mutual benefit, and forbids mutual hatred and mutual injury, then wars, especially offensive wars, are clear violations of the will of Heaven. While it may be argued that a nation may out of love go to war against another nation to "liberate" the people therein from brutality, oppression, inhuman treatment, etc., the inevitable killing of the people constitutes serious injury to the very people who die in the process. In a famous chapter entitled "Condemnation of War," he forcefully argued that

Killing one man constitutes an injustice and [the killer] must receive a death sentence. According to this doctrine, killing ten men increases the injustice by tenfold and [the killer] must receive ten death sentences; killing a hundred men increases the injustice by a hundredfold and [the killer] must receive a hundred death sentences. In all these cases, the gentlemen of the world all know to condemn it and declare, "It is unjust!" Now, when it comes to the greatest of all injustice, the invasion of another nation [which involves the killing of even more men], they do not know to condemn it. Instead, they praise it and declare, "It

is just!" Indeed, they do not know it is unjust. They therefore recorded their words to be handed down to posterity. If they know that it is unjust, how could we explain their recording of such injustice to be handed down to posterity?⁴²

The question, however, arises whether there is a "will of Heaven" in the first place, and if so, how can we be sure that a specific moral principle or a specific set of moral principles is the will of Heaven. This was the very question Mo Tzu attempted to answer.

Knowing the Will of Heaven. For an orderly discussion, Mo Tzu's answers may be divided into five categories.

(1) The existence of an anthropomorphic God can be established by what the people see and hear. If there is to be the will of Heaven, the existence of an anthropomorphic God must be established. But how? According to Mo Tzu, it can be established by what the common people actually "see and hear." He asserts that

throughout the world, the way to ascertain the existence or non-existence of something is to use, as a testing standard, what the eyes and ears of the common people actually know: If they have actually heard it and seen it, then we must assume that it exists; if they have never heard or seen it, then we must assume that it does not exist.⁴³

He challenges those who have any doubt about the existence and the will of supernatural beings, including that of an anthropomorphic "Heaven" (God), to go to some villages or communities and ask. He then proceeds to produce stories from "annals" and various "historical records" to prove his contention.

The assertion is so patently false it is unlikely that Mo Tzu means the "seeing" or "hearing" of the common people in the literal sense. Mo Tzu appears to maintain that the common people believe in the allegation of some people, presumably with some special ability, to the effect that they have seen an anthropomorphic God and heard His will. If so, he is no longer defending his case on ground (1) but on (2) or (3) discussed in the following pages.

(2) The deeds of sage-kings "prove" the existence of an anthropomorphic God. Since Mo Tzu was fully aware of the fact that many of his contemporaries maintained that "the eyes and ears of the multitude cannot be trusted and are insufficient to settle doubts,"⁴⁴ he asked whether the words and deeds of the ancient sage-kings could be accepted as a standard in such matters. His own answer is: "Men who are

above average all say, 'The sage-kings of the Three Dynasties of antiquity are sufficient to be a standard (fǎ, 法, law)!"⁴⁵ He then went on to cite examples from oaths, declarations, decrees, books, etc., which, according to his interpretation, show that the sage-kings must have believed in the existence of supernatural beings. He cites sacrifices offered by them on various occasions as an evidence to support his contention. "If there are no spirits and gods," he asks, "then why would [sage-]King Wu divide sacrificial duties [among feudal lords]?"⁴⁶

Contrary to Mo Tzu's contention, neither the offering of sacrifices nor the allocation of sacrificial duties proves that the offerers really believed in the existence of supernatural beings, much less that they do exist. The offerers could be simply following the tradition or playing politics. Even if the sage-kings truly believed that there were supernatural beings, their belief cannot be used to prove their existence. While belief may furnish a basis of evidence for propositions, their truth depends, not on subjective belief, but on intersubjectively ascertainable evidence.

(3) The wise know the will of Heaven by their religious

insight. Mo Tzu uses yet another, and for this section a central, argument that there are some people who, by their special ability, know the existence, will, and power of supernatural beings. These men are called chih-chě (知者 or 知者), which literally means the knower.⁴⁷

According to the "Moist Canons" and the "Discourses on the Canons," which Liang Ch'i-ch'ao attributes to Mo Tzu and Hu Shih to Neo-Moists,⁴⁸ the first chih (知) "is the meeting of a man's intelligence and things, thereby enabling him to describe their forms and shapes, as in seeing."⁴⁹ In other words, it is knowledge derived from sensory experience. The second chih (知), which is composed of chih (知, to know or perceptual knowledge) and hsin (心, mind) is no longer found in any of the existing Chinese dictionaries. In the "Moist Canons" it is defined as "an insight (ming, 明, also means clear or understanding)."⁵⁰ It is further explained as "discourses on things by a man's intelligence (chih, 知, which should read chih, 智, wisdom) and his knowledge of them is distinct, as in insight (or understanding)."⁵¹ To know in this manner is to know precisely in a way described by the Chinese ideogram: To know by mind.

Apparently, the wise such as the sage-kings of antiquity mentioned in (2) and Mo Tzu himself "see" or "know" the existence, will, and power of an anthropomorphic God, not through perception of the regular five senses, but through insight of their minds. For if they know through their five senses, all the people with the five senses should also be able to know them. Since the insight of the wise has a religious overtone, and since Mo Tzu is the founder of Moism as a religion, it seems justifiable to characterize their insight as religious insight, even though Mo Tzu himself did not use the term.

Two examples from the Mo Tzu will serve to illustrate this line of argument and its problems. He asserts that

Upon examining the reason why the world was brought to order, it is known that only when the Son of Heaven (i.e., emperor) was able to unify the concepts of right (i.e., 義, also justice and righteousness) throughout the world, was the world brought to order. If the people all identify with the Son of Heaven but not with Heaven, then calamity is not yet removed. The frequent whirling winds and bitter rains nowadays are the punishments of Heaven on the people for their failure to identify themselves with Heaven.⁵²

Mo Tzu's claim that these phenomena were the punishments

meted out by Heaven was based, not on the sensory experience of the phenomena, but on religious insight, an insight which allegedly enables the wise to "know" what is beyond and behind the visible phenomena.

In the area of politics, the claim is even more sweeping. Mo Tzu claims that "Heaven" (in the sense of an anthropomorphic God) not only enacts basic moral principles for rulers to follow, but also carries out His will by rewarding those who are faithful and punishing those who defy His commands. Specifically, he claims that Heaven "made (shih, ~~le~~)" the ancient sage-kings "to have the honor of being the Son of Heaven and the wealth of the world" because "they love universally those whom I ["Heaven"] love; they benefit universally those whom I benefit," and "made" the "wicked kings" of antiquity "unable to live out their lifespan and survive their generations" because "they discriminate and hate those whom I love; they injure alternately those whom I benefit."⁵³

The question is how can we be sure that "Heaven" actually "made" such rewards and punishments? Confucianists have persistently maintained that the same sage-kings were

rewarded, not because of their obedience to the will of Heaven, but because of their cultivation and faithful practice of humanity and righteousness based on a clear distinction of five different relations, i.e., between father and son, ruler and minister, husband and wife, elder and younger brothers, and between friends.⁵⁴ They claimed that it was the magnetic moral force of these men, not an anthropomorphic God, that turned the people toward them like all the stars turning toward the polar star, and bent the people like the wind blowing across the grass.⁵⁵

If religious insight is the only means by which men can apprehend the existence, will, and power of an anthropomorphic God and the true moral principles, then the knowledge of these matters is available only to those who are endowed with true religious insight. Agnostics, atheists, and most of the faithful religious followers can never hope to have any knowledge of these same matters. In fact, they have no way of knowing whether or not those who claim to have true religious insight do indeed possess such religious insight, for it takes another religious insight to know whether it is the case. And whenever there are conflicting religious in-

sights, a third religious insight is needed to determine whose insight is the correct insight. But this is to beg the question whether this new, third insight itself is a correct insight. Different religious leaders and followers have disagreed, often violently, on what was the true will of God and whose God was really in command. If all of them considered themselves true believers, none can be expected to accept the claim of others. But this means that whether something is true or not depends upon faith, i.e., whether you believe in it or not, and not on objectively verifiable evidence.

(4) The authority of books. Mo Tzu also speaks of the "three laws (san-fǎ, 三/法)"⁵⁶ or "three criteria (san-piǎo, 三/表)"⁵⁷ of distinguishing truth from falsehood (ch'íng-wèi, 行/偽), which should read chen-wèi, 真/偽), the right from the wrong, and the benefits from the harm, without specifying whether the tests of truth apply only to factual assertions, or only to normative assertions, or to both. Nevertheless, he may be interpreted as taking the position that the three criteria are the tests of the objective validity of basic moral principles, including the basic moral

principles derived from religious insight.

One of these three criteria is "the books by the ancient kings."⁵⁸ Mo Tzu repeatedly urges all parties to verify (cheng, 徵) their contentions by looking into the books by the ancient sage-kings.⁵⁹ He implicitly assumes that statements made in these books are sufficient to prove or disprove a moral principle as objectively true. In fact, he even called these books the basic laws (hsien, 憲), not only in the sense that they are the basic laws of the land, but also in the sense that they are the basic laws of moral truth.⁶⁰

These books, however, were written by men, and as long as men are fallible, statements made in these books or any other book could be mistaken. Even if the authors were the wise, as Mo Tzu maintained, statements in their books cannot be accepted as true unless they can be verified by independent criteria.

(5) The beneficial consequences "prove" that the principle of universal love is true. Mo Tzu also maintains that the net outcome produced by the practical application of a basic moral principle is a test of its truth. Accord-

ing to him, if the net outcome is "beneficial to the state and the people," it is true; if not, false. It is one of his major contentions that following the will of Heaven by practicing universal love and desisting war has brought about, and will continue to bring about, "the good order under law, the harmony of the myriad people, the wealth of the nation, sufficient supply of material, and a state in which all the people have warm clothes, hearty meals, convenience and tranquility without anxiety."⁶¹ This, he asserts, is not only "beneficial" to the state and the people, but also to "Heaven" and spirits.⁶² And this is what God wants for Himself and for the people.⁶³

I do not accept such a pragmatic criterion of truth. If desirable consequences produced by the practical application of a norm were a valid test of its truth, then we would have to accept as true, for example, superstitions employed by many parents and rulers in primitive societies (and by some parents in this scientific age too) to prevent pre-marital sexual relations, which Mo Tzu considered undesirable,⁶⁴ if they produce the desirable consequences, as many of them did in pre-modern societies. Superstitions, i.e., unfounded

beliefs, however, cannot be true whatever consequences they produce.

Analytically, "x has beneficial consequences" contains an empirical assertion that x has the consequences specified in the context of the discussion, and a value judgment that the consequences are "beneficial." The empirical assertion is a hypothesis which may be either true or false. Whether the same alleged consequences are "beneficial" or not depends on each speaker's personal value system. According to value-noncognitivism, there is no objective criterion by which one may decide whether the consequences are objectively beneficial. Thus, the same consequences regarded as beneficial by Mo Tzu may be regarded as harmful by someone who believes that all men ought to pursue their own interest regardless of the consequences to others.

I conclude, therefore, that Mo Tzu's religious insight does not provide an objective criterion by which one may determine the truth of fundamental principles of ethics in general and of political ethics in particular.

C. Based on Rational Insight: Chu Hsi (朱熹)

Chu Hsi (Chu Yüan-hui, 1130-1200) is generally considered to be the greatest synthesizer of Confucian philosophy as a whole and the most prominent leader of the "philosophy of principle (lǐ-hsueh, 理學)" or what is known as the rationalistic school of Neo-Confucianism. According to Wing-tsit Chan, he "has had a greater impact on Chinese, Korean, and Japanese thought than any other Confucianists" except Confucius and Mencius.⁶⁵

As a leading Confucianist, his ethical principles were basically the same as other Confucianists, including Mencius and Wang Yang-ming whose ethical principles we have introduced in the previous section. In brief, the principle of humanity (jén, 仁) is still the kingpin of his moral system. He said "humanity is the perfect virtue of the original mind" and "is the first of all goodness; righteousness, propriety, and wisdom all come from it."⁶⁶ In other words, humanity is not only one of the Five Constant Virtues (wǔ-ch'áng, 五常, namely, humanity, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and faithfulness) but also the foundation of all goodness.

Like Mencius and Wang Yang-ming, Chu Hsi maintains that political authority should be given to the men who have developed these virtues, and the chief function of government ought to be to create and maintain an environment conducive to the fullest development of these virtues.

The most significant difference between Chu Hsi's philosophy and that of other Confucianists lies not in his basic moral principles, but in his metaethics and metaphysics. In contrast to Mencius and Wang Yang-ming who maintain that moral insight leads to the knowledge that the principles of humanity and righteousness are objectively true, Chu Hsi holds that the objective validity of these same moral principles is apprehended by rational insight after an "investigation of things (kó-wù, 格物)."

Two Senses of Li. As noted, Chu Hsi's philosophy is known as the "philosophy of li." "What is right," he maintains, "is the li of Nature (t'ien-lǐ, 天理) and what is wrong is in violation of the li of Nature."⁶⁷ The immediate question which must be answered is: What is li and how it is known?

The first question may appear to be a simple one at

first glance, but it is not, for Chu Hsi did not make a careful and systematic effort to define what he meant by li, which has been translated variously as 'law', 'reason', 'order' or 'principle'. His conception of li appeared in his commentaries on Confucian Classics, on the works of his masters, and in his letters in reply to questions posed by his friends, students, and critics (which have been collected under various titles totalling more than fifteen thousand pages).

According to Chu Hsi, "all things have li; li is not outside of things or affairs."⁶⁸

Between Heaven and earth, there are li and ch'i (氣, material force, sometime translated as ether). Li is the Tao (道, Way) that is above physical form (h'ing-erh-shang, 理之上, i.e., without physical form) and is the source from which things are produced. Ch'i is the instrument (ch'i, 器) that is below physical form (h'ing-erh-hsia, 理之下, i.e., with physical form), and is the implement whereby things are produced. Therefore, men and things at the time of their creation must be endowed with this li to have their nature, and they must be endowed with this material force to have their physical form. While the nature and physical form are not outside of the single body, the distinction between Tao and ch'i (器, instrument) is very clear and must not be confused.⁶⁹

Chu Hsi's idea of li and ch'i is similar to Aristotelian distinction of form and matter. Li is an incorporeal yet objective constitutive element of any man or thing. Li, however, also means a true moral principle or the totality of true normative principles which ought to govern certain kinds of human action. He argues, for example,

Before a thing exists, there is first its li. For example, before there is any ruler and minister, there exists already the li of the ruler and the minister; before there is any father and son, there exists already the li of the father and the son. It is not that originally there was no such li and that it is only after there were ruler and minister, father and son that tao-li (道理, Way and principle, i.e., moral principle) was put into them.⁷⁰

It must be clear by now that Chu Hsi uses li in two different senses without making any distinction: (1) 'Li' designates the objective principles or laws governing the existence and activities of men and things. It may be called wù-lǐ (物理) or principles of things (which is also the Chinese equivalent for 'physics'). (2) 'Li' is an ethical principle that ought to govern human actions, human relations, and the relations between men and nature.

This double meaning of li has its origin in the linguistic ambiguity of the Chinese language. Li in Chinese means, in addition to principle, reason, tao or way, nature, proper, pattern, and right, among other usages. Li in combination with other Chinese characters form such important terms as physics (wù-lǐ, 物理, literally the principles of things), rationality (lǐ-hsing, 理性, a combination of li and nature, rational nature), idea or ideal (lǐ-hsiang, 理想, thinking based on principle or reason), moral principle (ì-lǐ, 義理, right reason or righteous principle, or tào-lǐ, 道理, which combines way and principle to mean literally the principle of Way or Tao), Principle of Nature (t'ien-lǐ, 天理, also means Principle of Heaven, i.e., Law of Nature) and truth (chen-lǐ, 真理, true or genuine principle). A term so central to his philosophy and yet so ambiguous in its meaning can only add confusion to a theory which is not known for clarity. With explanation and qualification, 'principle' seems to be the closest English equivalent for li, as used by Chu Hsi and other Neo-Confucianists.⁷¹

The question is how such a principle is known, and whether or not Chu Hsi has successfully demonstrated that

what is prescribed by li can be shown to be objectively true.

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Knowing Li. According to Chu Hsi, to know li in both descriptive and prescriptive senses one must fulfil two conditions: (1) He must eliminate various obstructions from his mind so that the mind will be in the position to know li. (2) He must engage in what he called "the investigation of things."

(1) Purification of mind as a necessary condition to know li. Chu Hsi maintains that all men are endowed with reason (li, 理 or li-hsing, 理學) and "wisdom" (chih, 智, intellective faculty) which, according to him, is "that by which the principles of right and wrong are known."⁷² Although all men have the natural endowments to know li, they are not therefore necessarily conscious or fully conscious of the empirical as well as moral principles of things, just like the possession of eyes does not entail automatic and clear vision of visible objects. Human minds, like human eyes, may be obscured by various obstructions.

The main obstructions of the mind are emotions and material or selfish desires.⁷³ Most of these may be put under

the general heading of "human desires," which, according to Chu Hsi, "need not involve indulgence in music, sex, material things and profit, or extravagance in dwelling, sight-seeing and travel; a slight failure of what is in the mind to maintain what is right constitutes human desires."⁷⁴

To eliminate these obstructions, Chu Hsi prescribes a process of purifying the mind through moral cultivation of seriousness, sincerity, single-minded concentration, and above all, "the investigation of things."⁷⁵ When this is done, then the mind will be in a position to know the principles in things, for "the mind is like a mirror. If there is no obstruction of dust, then the original substance [of the mind] will naturally become clear (tzu-ming, 至明) and will be able to reflect things that come to it."⁷⁶ Chu Hsi's claim is not limited to the mind's ability to accurately "reflect" visible phenomena, as the following example may suggest, but extended to include its ability to "see" clearly what is right and wrong, in a manner that seems to bear a striking resemblance to the Thomistic "light or reason."⁷⁷

Once the mind is brilliantly luminous, then it will naturally see (tzu-ján chièn-té, 自然見得) that this affair has this principle and this thing has this principle. Indeed, how could one deny that man's mind is brilliantly luminous when he declared forthwith "right" upon seeing another man who had done right, and knew forthwith that it was wrong upon seeing another man who had done wrong.⁷⁸

Chu Hsi even claims that certain moral principles will become "self-evident" to the mind when it is purified. He declares,

As long as one follows the Principle of Nature without an iota of selfish idea, certain moral principles (lún-lǐ, 倫理) will then become self-evident (tzu-míng, 自明). They are not artificially made up by man; they are so by nature.⁷⁹

(2) "Investigation of things" as a necessary condition to know li. Chu Hsi's theory on the purification of mind must not be considered in isolation from another necessary condition of knowing true moral principles, namely "the investigation of things." Unlike Lao Tzu and Wang Yang-ming who claim that the moral sense or the innate knowledge alone is sufficient to apprehend the true moral principles, Chu Hsi does not claim that reason alone is sufficient to apprehend these moral principles. The true moral principles

can be apprehended by reason only through investigating concrete things. This is explicitly stated in his commentary on the Great Learning, a Confucian classic which he helped to make a required text in Chinese education from early fourteenth to the twentieth century:

The meaning of the expression "The perfection of knowledge depends upon the investigation of things (kó-wù, 格物)" is this: If we wish to extend our knowledge to the utmost, we must approach things and exhaust (ch'íung, 窮, i.e., to investigate thoroughly) their principles. For the intelligence of the human mind (jén-hsin chih líng, 人心之靈) has, without exception, the ability to know, and all things in the world without exception have their principles. It is only because these principles are not yet exhausted that man's knowledge is incomplete. For this reason, the first step in the education of the adult is to instruct the learner to approach all things in the world on the basis of the principles he already knows, and investigate further so that he may reach the ultimate. After he has exerted himself in this way for a long time, he will one day suddenly achieve a penetrating understanding (huo-ján kuan-t'ung, 豁然貫通). Then none of the exterior and interior, the essence and the coarse parts of the multitude of things will remain unreached, and the total substance and the great functioning of the mind will be perfectly luminous (ming, 明, clear and intelligence). This is called "things investigated" (wù-kó, 物格, the investigation of things has been done); this is called the perfection of knowledge.⁸⁰

The significance of this passage in Chu Hsi's meta-ethics is best summarized by himself in his concluding remark: It "contains the essence of comprehending goodness."⁸¹

Three Questions. For the purposes of this inquiry, we need to take up three basic questions.

(i) Chu Hsi contends that purification of mind is analogous to removing dust from the eyes and mirrors, or removing foreign matter from the water, which, like the mind, is said to be pure by nature.⁸² These analogies are misleading. For, while it is possible to objectively determine what constitutes the "dust" in the eyes or on the mirror and the "foreign matter" in the water, there is no objective criterion to determine what constitutes the "dust" or the "foreign matter" of the mind. The "dust" and the "foreign matter" of the mind refer of course not to physical matter but to "alien," "unnatural," "improper," "corrupting" or "harmful" ideas, all of which amount to morally wrong ideas. In Chu Hsi's terminology, these morally wrong ideas are "human desires." This is unequivocally stated in his contention that "a slight failure of what is in the mind to maintain what is right constitutes human desires," as

quoted earlier. Since men differ in their views on what is right, purification of mind, i.e., the removal of "human desires," means the removal of different ideas to men of different moral persuasion. It is therefore impossible to objectively determine whether a man has met Chu Hsi's first necessary condition to know the true moral principles.

(ii) More basic to Chu Hsi's central contention is the question whether it is possible to gain objective moral knowledge by what he misleadingly called "the investigation of things." What he means by "the investigation of things" is not an empirical investigation, as the term seems to suggest. He means the apprehension by the "intelligence of the human mind" of empirical and moral principles, which, according to him, are "above physical form" and exist within things, by approaching these things, as distinct from Lao Tzu's method of sitting in one's own study to apprehend Tao "without looking" or the method of the "rectification of mind" advocated by the idealistic school of Confucianists or meditation advocated by the Buddhist.⁸³ While the li to be investigated, or more accurately, to be "penetrated" include empirical principles in some cases, Chu Hsi's primary

emphasis is on the "penetrating understanding" of "the right and wrong of human affairs" or "the li of what ought to be" within every thing and every human affair.⁸⁴

Obviously, these moral principles cannot be derived from an objective investigation of things. I agree with Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's criticism of Chu Hsi's theory on "the investigation of things" that an objective investigation of things can only yield the [empirical] principles of things (wù-lǐ, 物理) in the natural world; nothing relating to good and evil and other valuational issues can come out from such an investigation.⁸⁵ (Chu Hsi's contention must be differentiated from the simple form of naturalism which holds that normative principles of politics can be derived from descriptive generalizations. See Chap. III, B, i-iii.)

(iii) But what if moral contestants, who claim to have fulfilled Chu Hsi's necessary and sufficient conditions, apprehended by their "wisdom" (reason) conflicting moral principles to be true moral principles? Chu Hsi falls back on the theory of self-evidence as the last recourse.

Self-evidence (t'zu-míng, 自明) in Chinese literally means "naturally" clear without proof or argument. The

character "evidence" or "clear" is formed by combining the character "sun" and the character "moon." It suggests that something is unquestionably clear, as if it were under the sun and the moon.

Chu Hsi, however, fails to distinguish between self-evidence in the logical and the psychological sense. A statement is logically self-evident if its denial results in self-contradiction. Such a proposition is analytic, i.e., the predicate is contained in the subject. Chu Hsi did not explicitly employ this type of argument.

Psychological self-evidence means that the denial of a normative principle is inconceivable by anyone in a given period of time. It is difficult to imagine any basic moral principles to be psychologically self-evident, for the very fact that they are discussed or defended implies the absence of total agreement. There were too many Taoists, Moists, Buddhists and other non-Confucianists in Chu Hsi's day to prevent him from making a claim of self-evidence in this sense. Even if he did, it does not prove that such a moral principle is true. A statement is not made true by the fact that someone claims that it is true or by the fact that it

is accepted as self-evidence.

Chu Hsi's version of self-evidence is a much more moderate one. In the absence of an established term, his version of self-evident principle may be called a conditional self-evident principle. It is conditional because he claims that the moral principles he has enumerated will become self-evident to those, and only to those, who have fulfilled the necessary and sufficient conditions to know li. In theory, these moral principles can be self-evident to all, if they fulfill the necessary and sufficient conditions, which, in his view, all men are capable of doing, even though they may not actually do so.

According to Chu Hsi, all men have in themselves his basic moral principles. How do we know? "The most reliable evidence," he maintains, "is to be found in the source of their manifestation."⁸⁶ He asserts that

from the feeling of compassion, we necessarily know (pi-chih, 惻隱) that there is humanity [in man's nature]; from the feeling of shame and dislike, we necessarily know that there is justice [in man's nature]; from the feeling of humility and reverence, we necessarily know that there is propriety [in man's nature]; and from the feeling of right and wrong, we necessarily know that there is wisdom [in man's nature]. If originally there

were no [moral] principles within man, how can there be such manifestations without? From what is manifested without, we therefore necessarily know that there are [moral] principles within man. This cannot be false.⁸⁷

Taken together with his repeated assertion that these moral principles will become self-evident to those who have fulfilled the necessary and sufficient conditions mentioned earlier, it is possible to interpret the expression "necessarily know" in the passage to mean that the four moral principles are self-evident to all of them. It is not clear, however, whether it must be taken to mean that it is self-evident in the psychological sense or in the logical sense. If Chu Hsi means the former, we need only point out that the "feeling of compassion," for example, has been claimed to be an acquired or learned feeling and not part of human nature, or an extension of self-love and not an expression of benevolence. Instead of being an expression of a true moral principle, Lao Tzu considered the feeling of compassion a symptom of the degeneration from the Tao, that is, the true moral principle. These and similar arguments are some of the standing refutations of the contention that

these moral principles are self-evident in the psychological sense.

How does Chu Hsi respond to those who intuited non-Confucian moral principles? Here is an example:

There is still a kind of people who proclaim that their minds are brilliantly luminous, but [according to Chu Hsi] have never illuminated and seen various affairs and things. Brilliant luminosity like this provides no help to the problems in this world. Nowadays the Buddhists proclaim that their minds are brilliantly luminous and yet, with regard to the father and the son, they do not know what is called affection (ch'in, 親); and, with regard to the ruler and the minister, they know not what is called justice. To say that this is brilliant luminosity is to confuse the Tao (Way).⁸⁸

Such a proclamation, of course, is not a demonstration or proof. The Buddhists could, and indeed did, charge that Chu Hsi simply could not "see" the true moral principles because he had not overcome his carnal desires. Chu Hsi draws an analogy between the Buddhist position and those who make the claim that a river was empty without even trying to dip their hands into water to "see" (t'an-k'an, 探看) whether their hands were cold and wet.⁸⁹ Chu Hsi's criticism would have been justified, if the problem were one of determining

whether there was water in the river, and if so, whether the water was warm or cold. The question, however, was about what he called "the true moral principles."⁹⁰ And there is no moral water into which moral philosophers can dip their metaethical hands.

Chu Hsi, however, is correct in one sense when he asserts that we "necessarily know" that there are humanity, justice, propriety, and wisdom in man's nature. This conclusion follows necessarily not from self-evident principles nor from the observable manifestations of human nature which he described variously as the clue (tuan, 端, or hsü, 杪, literally the tip of a thing) of man's original substance (pén-t'í, 本體) or the physical form materialized from "the principle of man's nature (h'ing-chih-lí, 性理)," but from certain descriptive generalizations in combination with the following definitions: 'humanity' means the same as 'the hsin (心, "heart" which for Chu Hsi means also "feeling") of compassion'; 'justice' is synonymous with 'the hsin of shame and dislike'; 'propriety' is defined as 'the hsin of humility and reverence'; 'wisdom' is defined to mean the same as 'the hsin of right and wrong'. It must be

pointed out here that Chu Hsi is understood by many students of Chinese philosophy to maintain the above definitions, even though he did not explicitly say so in his writings.⁹¹ The literary style of Chinese philosophers in the last two thousand years worked against this type of expression. A typical definition in Chu Hsi's writings and most philosophical works in Chinese takes the following form: "The heart of compassion [pause] humanity." The pause (where a correct English sentence requires a verb but a Chinese sentence of a good literary style does not) is understood variously to mean 'is' or 'means' or 'implies'. Thus, our sample sentence is translated by Wing-tsit Chan as "The feeling of commiseration is what we called humanity"; by Derk Bodde as "The feeling of commiseration is human-heartedness"; and by James Legge as "The feeling of commiseration implies the principle of benevolence."⁹² The first translation makes the sentence a definition, the second a value-judgment, and the third a questionable assertion of a rather ambiguous logical relationship.

Given these definitions and given the fact that men do have these feelings in the relevant situations, Chu Hsi's

conclusion is "necessary" in the sense that the conclusion cannot be logically otherwise. But the conclusion is "necessary" by definition. A different conclusion will necessarily follow from a different definition. For example, given the definition that 'faintheartedness' means the same as 'the hsin of compassion' or 'the hsin that cannot bear to see the sufferings of others' and given the fact that men do have these feelings in the relevant situations, then we "necessarily know" that there is 'faintheartedness' (not humanity) in man's nature.

Chu Hsi attempts to show by his conclusion that it is objectively right for men to cultivate the "hearts" or feelings specified and to practice the principles of humanity, justice, propriety, and wisdom. The conclusion derived from the other definition has an unfavorable connotation. It suggests that the "heart" or feeling specified should not be cultivated. Logically, Chu Hsi's conclusion does not prescribe that men ought to do one thing rather than another. If the terms 'humanity' and 'faintheartedness' seems to have the prescriptive force of a moral directive, it is because they are value-words with favorable and un-

favorable connotations respectively. Both of them refer to the same feeling of compassion. The only difference between the two is a verbal difference, that is, a difference in word rather than in content. Neither term adds any factual information to the descriptive generalization that men are capable of such feeling. The speaker selects either 'humanity' or 'faintheartedness' to express his approval or disapproval of the feeling and attempts to influence his listener to adopt similar attitudes by means of these expressions. This, however, is to advocate a certain moral principle by a definitional fiat, which is analytic, empty, and arbitrary.

To obtain the prescriptive force of a moral directive, Chu Hsi must prove that the feelings specified or by definition 'humanity', 'justice', 'propriety' and 'wisdom' are objectively good or right. Chu Hsi has not proved that they are objectively good or right. They cannot be proved to be objectively good or right because whether they are good or right is a matter of subjective moral judgment. For example, one may affirm that all men have a feeling of compassion in a certain situation and advocate, without self-contradic-

tion, that all parents ought to harden the hearts of their children, either as a means to survival or success in life in this world of relentless competition and national or class hostility. In fact, a feeling of compassion toward a certain kind of people has been condemned as a "wrong" feeling. It is well-known that during the relatively short history of human civilization, countless numbers of those who have had a feeling of compassion for the "enemy" or even merely the "innocent" children of the "enemy" of various political, religious, and moral doctrines have been condemned (many to death) by the "true believers" for having such a "misguided, wrong" feeling of compassion.

To sum up, like many rationalists in the West, Chu Hsi maintains that reason is the "substance" from which all things derive their being and the underlying "principle" that determines the nature of all things. It is the giver of the descriptive as well as moral "laws" of the universe. Reason is also the faculty of intuition by means of which men apprehend the "substance," the "principle," and the descriptive as well as moral "laws." All of this is a sheer speculation. Chu Hsi's rational insight has not proved

that there are objective moral principles in men and things and that his basic principles of political ethics are objectively true.

C H A P T E R I I I

NATURALISM AS THE FOUNDATION OF POLITICAL ETHICS

The metaethical theory of naturalism agrees with intuitionism that certain basic moral principles can be known to be objectively true, but denies that they can be known to be true by the alleged moral or religious or rational insight. Naturalism in general holds that ethical statements are, or can somehow be reduced to, true descriptive statements and can, therefore, be shown to be true or false in the way ordinary factual statements can.

According to one version of naturalism, ethical judgments follow from factual statements (such as the nature or relations of things). In contrast to this version of naturalism, a more sophisticated form of naturalism holds that normative principles can be derived, not from factual statements alone, but from a descriptive definition of some basic ethical terms together with a descriptive generalization. This form of naturalism is known as the definist theory. Like intuitionism, it holds that ethical terms stand for some objective properties, but interprets them as standing for "natural" properties. If basic ethical terms can be

adequately defined in descriptive terms (e.g., 'good' means the same as 'happiness'), then the truth of an ethical statement can in principle be verified by empirical method.

A. Based on Descriptive Definitions of Value Terms:

Hsün Tzu (荀子)

Among the major Chinese philosophers concerned with politics, Hsün Tzu (c.313-238 B.C.), the founder of the naturalistic school of Confucianism, is the only thinker who explicitly uses definist arguments. He maintains,

All men in the world, past and present, have meant by 'good' uprightness, civility, peace [and] order (ch'eng lí p'ing ch'ih, 正理平治) and by 'evil' partiality, maliciousness, violence [and] disorder (p'ien hsien p'ei luan, 偏險亂). This is the difference between good and evil.¹

The above definition of 'good' and 'evil' in the Chinese text may be given several interpretations. For example, Wing-tsit Chan translates them as "true principles and peaceful order" and "imbalance, violence, and disorder" respectively.² Burton Watson renders the definition of 'good' as "that which is upright, reasonable, and orderly"

and 'evil' as "that which is prejudiced, irresponsible, and chaotic."³

Regardless of which interpretation one eventually decides to take, Hsün Tzu's defining characteristics of 'good' and 'evil' contain both evaluative and descriptive terms. For example, the word 'uprightness' in the definition does not refer to a physical posture; it refers to the moral correctness of an action. In the context of his Confucian philosophy, "uprightness and civility" might refer to courtesy, humility, loyalty, faithfulness, propriety, or righteousness. "Partiality and maliciousness" might refer roughly to the contrary of uprightness and civility. For example, injuring or robbing the weak by the strong is regarded by Hsün Tzu as violating the principles of uprightness and civility, and according to his definition evil.⁴ Similarly, doing violence to or shouting down the few by the many is regarded by him as violating the same principles and according to his definition objectively evil.⁵ But these are moral judgments with which non-Confucianists often disagree. Unless the properties, in virtue of which an action or a state of affairs is said to be good or evil, are stated in

descriptive terms, a definition of 'good' and 'evil' cannot be considered a naturalistic definition.

In Hsün Tzu's political philosophy, 'good' means primarily "peace and order" and 'evil' means primarily "violence and disorder." This is a definition in descriptive terms. In this sense, Hsün Tzu's definition is naturalistic. Given this definition and given the descriptive generalization that certain things, actions, or states of affairs are conducive to "peace and order" or "violence and disorder," it is logical to conclude that the things, actions, or states of affairs specified are good or evil.

A substantial proportion of Hsün Tzu's writings is devoted to the kind of descriptive generalizations just mentioned. He maintains that, in order to survive, men must live in a society. But "a society without the rules of social distinction will lead to contention. Where there is contention, there will be disorder."⁶ Why? Because "men are born with desires. If these desires are not satisfied, they cannot but seek some means to satisfy themselves. If there are no limits to their seeking, there will inevitably be war (cheng, 爭). Where there is war, there will be dis-

order."⁷ Like Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Hsün Tzu maintains that similarities of human desires and the scarcity of the supply of things desired by various classes of people in a society cause war and disorder, in the absence of adequate political authority and appropriate rules of social distinction. In Hsün Tzu's words, a society is a place in which

different classes of people live together and seek the same things by different methods. They have the same desires but different degree of knowledge.... Both the wise and the stupid have the things they approved of. But what they approved of are not the same, and here the wise and the stupid differ.... People desire and hate the same things. Their desires are many, but things are few. The scarcity of things inevitably leads to war (cheng, 爭, struggle).⁸

They differ, however, as to the means by which political order can be established. Hobbes maintains that the conclusion of a social contract, in which all men in a given geographical location mutually agree to give up all but the most basic rights (e.g., the right of self-defense) and to submit to whatever positive laws the newly-established sovereign might enact, is the only rational way out of the state of nature which is a state of war of all against all.

Hsün Tzu holds that only the strongest, wisest, and the most discriminating men can extricate the people (presumably most of them, if not all) from violence and disorder which, according to his definition, are what "all men" have meant by 'evil' and bring about peace and order which are what "all men" have meant by 'good'. Hsün Tzu concludes that "therefore, only these men should become the Son of Heaven,"⁹ that is, the ruler of a society. These strongest, wisest, and most discriminating men are known as the sages in Hsün Tzu's philosophy. According to him, they are the men who have "complete mastery of the moral principles of human relationships,"¹⁰ and the men who have created the rules of proper conduct (li, 禮) and the standards of justice (i, 義) which are indispensable means to the survival of man and the peace and tranquility of a society.¹¹

For the purposes of this analysis, the main question is: Is it adequate to define the value terms 'good' and 'evil' by the descriptive terms 'peace and order' and 'violence and disorder' respectively? If this definition were adequate, it would be self-contradictory to maintain that something which is not conducive to peace and order is good,

or that something which is evil. It cannot be denied, however, that there are people who have meant by good or evil something other than the properties specified by Hsün Tzu's definition. Hedonists, for example, have maintained that 'good' means pleasure or happiness. It is also possible to affirm that something has one of the properties Hsün Tzu defined as 'good' and deny, without self-contradiction, that it is good. For example, a revolutionary who denies that peace is desirable in a society he works to overthrow is not contradicting himself.

The Doctrine of the "Rectification of Names." Hsün Tzu has an additional argument for his naturalistic definition, namely the doctrine known as the "rectification of names (ch'eng-ming, 正名)." This well-established literal translation designates a Confucian theory dealing with such diverse problems as the origin, function, meaning, logical principles and proper uses of Chinese language. To avoid unnecessary confusion created by the term 'name' and to focus attention on the immediate issue, I shall use 'rectification of definitions' to designate Hsün Tzu's theory of correct definition.

The word ch'eng in the rectification of definitions literally means 'correct' or 'right' as a noun and 'to set aright' or 'to set straight' as a verb. The very concept of the rectification of definitions implies a claim that there are correct definitions and, hence, that incorrect definitions can be "rectified."

What then are the criteria of correct definitions? Hsün Tzu maintains that whether the meaning of a word is correct or not is to be determined by whether it has the sanction of convention, or, in the absence of a convention, the sanction of a true king. He asserts,

words (míng, 名, literally means 'names') have no inherent correctness. The correctness is given by convention (yüeh, 約, agreement). When the convention is established and the custom is formed, they are called correct words. Those words which are contrary to the convention are called incorrect words. Words have no inherent corresponding substance (shíh, 實). The substantive meanings attached to words are given by convention. When the convention is established and the custom formed, they are called words with substantive meanings (shíh-míng, 實名). There are words which are inherently good. Words which are direct, easy to understand, and consistent are called good words.¹²

It is clear from this statement that Hsün Tzu recog-

nized the arbitrariness of stipulative definitions, at least at the initial stage when an expression is first introduced. There is no inherent contradiction in naming, for example, what we called 'small' today by the symbol 'large', or 'right' by the symbol 'wrong', or 'good' by the symbol 'evil', although a symbol too similar to others (hence, making it difficult to differentiate it from others) or a symbol that will take hours to write cannot be called a "good word" in the sense that it is not very practical. Nor is there any inherent contradiction in attaching substantive meaning (in the sense of denoting substances or natural properties) such as "peace and order" or pleasure to the word 'good', and "violence and disorder" or pain to the word 'evil'. Hsün Tzu maintains, however, that once a word with a specific meaning becomes a usage sanctioned by convention, it becomes a "correct" definition. To Hsün Tzu, convention is a criterion of what constitutes a correct definition.

Now, if value terms such as 'good' and 'evil' have no inherent meanings, as Hsün Tzu correctly maintained, then the definition that "good means peace and order" must be

taken as an author's own proposal as to how he wants to use the word 'good'. As such, even if everyone in a given society (or in the world) came to accept the definition, the definition itself still cannot be said to be either correct or incorrect. Hsün Tzu's definition of good and evil, however, has never attained the status of a universal convention (either within a given society or the world as a whole) during any given period of time. As we have shown, naturalists disagree among themselves as to the meaning of good.

The time of Hsün Tzu, according to his own account, was a time in which "the sage-kings have passed away, the observance of [established] definitions have become lax, strange terms have arisen, words and their substantive meanings have been confused, and the distinction between right and wrong has become unclear."¹³ He was not prepared to wait passively for the state of affairs to take its own course and accept whatever convention might eventually emerge. He therefore introduced, without explicitly saying so, a new criterion of correct definitions, namely, the definitions sanctioned by a true king. In his words,

Should a [true] king appear, he would certainly follow old words and create new ones. This being the case, [1] the reasons for having words, [2] the causes for the similarities and differences in words, and [3] the fundamental principles of instituting words, must be carefully examined.¹⁴

The language of this passage does not specifically point out that the meanings of ethical terms sanctioned by a true king should be accepted as the correct meanings. But the laudatory term "[true] king," his purpose of examining these three problems in the chapter entitled "Rectification of Names," and the ensuing discussions on these problems leave no doubt that the meanings sanctioned by a true king should be accepted as the correct meanings, especially if they were instituted according to the principles he laid down in the chapter entitled "Rectification of Names." It is difficult to see how the approval (or disapproval) of a true king can change in any way the logical status of Hsün Tzu's definition of good and evil which, as we have shown, is not very fruitful.

I conclude therefore that Hsün Tzu has not demonstrated that his naturalistic definition of good and evil is an adequate definition.

B. Based on Empirical Generalizations

In addition to the definist theory we have discussed, there is another type of naturalism which holds that moral principles can be derived from descriptive generalizations without the assistance of a descriptive definition of ethical terms. This type of naturalism became a dominant school of metaethics in China in the early twentieth century when the new elite of Chinese intellectuals embraced enthusiastically the "scientific method" imported from the West. This school of political thinkers claim explicitly that their political doctrines are true because they are derived from the scientific laws of human evolution or of history. The belief that normative principles can be derived from empirical generalizations, however, has a long history in Chinese political philosophy. Part of Mencius' metaethics represents this type of naturalism in the traditional period. The political philosophies of Sun Yat-sen and Mao Tse-tung provide its modern versions.

i. Mencius

Unique Nature of Man and Moral Principles. In contrast to Hsün Tzu who defines 'human nature' as what is given at the time of birth and cannot be learned or acquired by effort, Mencius means by 'human nature' (h'sing, 性) the inborn nature which makes a creature a man and distinguishes him from all other animals. According to Mencius, "that whereby man differs from animals (ch'in-shòu, 禽獸, literally the birds and beasts) is slight," but of great importance.¹⁵ These unique inborn characteristics of man are "the heart of compassion," "the heart of shame and dislike," "the heart of humility and reverence," and "the heart of right and wrong."¹⁶ He maintains that all men "inherently possess" a heart with the aforementioned dispositions; "they are not gilded onto them from without."¹⁷ The following case is said to illustrate that "all men have a heart which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others," that is, all men have a heart of compassion:

When men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they all have a feeling of alarm and sympathy, not because they want to gain friendship

with the child's parents, nor because they seek the praise of their neighbors and friends, nor because they dislike the reputation [of inhumanity if they did not rescue the child].¹⁸

From the premise that the specified psychological dispositions are the characteristics which set man apart from all other animals, Mencius concludes that "a man without the heart of compassion is not a man, a man without the heart of shame and dislike is not a man, a man without the heart of humility and reverence is not a man, and a man without the heart of right and wrong is not a man."¹⁹ Accordingly, he declares that Yang Chu and Mo Tzu are animals, because

Yang advocates each man for himself; this is kingless (wú-chūn, 無君, i.e., the denial of allegiance due to the king). Mo advocates universal love; this is fatherless (wú-fù, 無父, i.e., the denial of special affection due to the father). He who is fatherless or kingless is an animal (ch'in-shòu, 禽獸, birds and beasts).²⁰

Obviously, Mencius cannot be interpreted to mean by the above conclusion that a man cannot be called a man in the biological sense of the word if he does not possess the psychological dispositions he has specified. What he means by

the above conclusion is that a man who fails to preserve and develop his unique inborn nature of man is morally bad. To Mencius, the fact that these psychological dispositions are the characteristics which distinguish a good man from a bad man and animals entails that these dispositions ought to be preserved and developed. Consequently, judgments about the moral rectitude of actions become judgments about whether or not they are in harmony with the unique nature of man, and judgments about the morality of political institutions and public policies become judgments about whether they are conducive to the development of the unique nature of man.

Objections to Mencius' Naturalism. Mencius' arguments must be criticized on three levels: The adequacy of his definition of 'human nature', the validity of his assertion of man's unique inborn characteristics, and the possibility of deducing normative principles from factual premises.

First, to ask the question "What is the nature of man?" is to ask what are the specifically human characteristics. A valid answer to the question must provide a descriptive generalization of the characteristics which distinguish the creature called "man" from other animals. The nature of man

therefore consists of those properties whose presence would prompt men of different moral persuasions to use the term "man" to refer to the creature, and whose absence would stop them from doing so. To answer the question by saying that a man is a creature with the psychological dispositions he specified is certainly not an adequate answer. For even if the answer were to be limited to the area of human dispositions, they are not limited to those mentioned by Mencius. The Li Chi (禮記, Book of Rites, a Confucian classic), for example, lists seven inborn dispositions:

What are human feelings? They are the seven which men are capable of without learning: joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, dislike, and desires.... Man's great desires lie in drinking, eating, and [relations between] man and woman.²¹

If these dispositions are inborn, as many psychologists seem to agree, then it is arbitrary to exclude them from the definition of human nature. It is one thing to call a creature a man because he possesses certain characteristics which are the common features of a species, and quite another to say that certain dispositions are good dispositions which make a man a true man. The former is a factual assertion and

the latter is a value judgment. Mencius seems to have confused the factual question "What makes a creature a man?" with the moral question "What characteristics make a man a good man?" The term 'human nature' becomes a valuational term masquerading as a descriptive one when it is used exclusively to designate what the author himself believed to be the characteristics of a good man.

Second, it is questionable that the psychological dispositions specified by Mencius are unique to man and inborn in them. It is a well-known fact that non-human primates, elephants, and tigers have shown a remarkable natural disposition to love their own babies. If this can be taken as an expression of compassion, then the "heart of compassion" is not a unique human trait. The dispositions to feel shame and dislike, humility and reverence, and right and wrong appear to be unique to the human species. But studies on various primitive societies indicate that these dispositions are not inborn; they are acquired dispositions which men learn from "moral education" both at home and in school, and from their social existence.

Finally, it is impossible to deduce moral and valuation-

al principles from factual premises. Valid logical deduction simply makes explicit what is implicitly contained in the premises. Consequently, it is logically impossible to deduce from a factual premise or a set of factual premises which does not contain what ought to be done a conclusion which does. Thus even if the factual assertion that all men have a heart of compassion were true, it does not entail that the heart of compassion ought to be preserved and developed, let alone that a specific kind of compassion (e.g., the kind advocated by Mencius and not the kind advocated by Mo Tzu) ought to be developed. Indeed, it is not self-contradictory to affirm that all men have a heart of compassion and advocate that, for their own good or for their nation or for the human race as a whole, they ought to toughen their hearts to face all kinds of challenge in this world. This criticism applies also to his naturalistic arguments for the cultivation of other allegedly unique inborn dispositions of man.

ii. Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙)

In contrast to Mencius' attempt to derive normative

principles of politics from "human nature," modern Chinese naturalists, who embraced enthusiastically empiricism and some form of historicism of the West, attempt to derive basic principles of political ethics from the law of history. As modern examples of naturalism, I shall examine in this and the following sections two most representative and most influential naturalistic theories in the twentieth century China: the political philosophy of Sun Yat-sen and that of Mao Tse-tung.

The basic political doctrines of Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), the founding father of the Republic of China, are known as San Min Chu I or the Three Principles of the People. In the simplest terms, these doctrines stipulate that the Chinese ought to struggle for the survival of the Chinese nation within an independent and "democratic" nation-state in which the people share in common all material things essential to livelihood. According to Sun Yat-sen, these basic moral principles of politics can be derived from the law of history which can be scientifically verified.

People's Struggle for Survival Is the Motive Force of History. According to Sun Yat-sen, history follows a defi-

nite course. The course of history is determined by man's struggle for survival which includes both spiritual and material factors. "People's struggle for survival, not material forces, is the center of gravity in history."²²

The reason why all men from the antiquity to the present have exerted their ability is simply because they desire to survive. And it is because of mankind's struggle for uninterrupted survival that society has the unceasing evolution. Therefore, the law of social evolution is mankind's struggle for survival. Mankind's struggle for survival is the cause of social evolution.²³

Men's struggle for survival, however, does not imply that there are irreconcilable or inevitable conflicts between different classes of men. Sun Yat-sen admits that interests of different classes of people within a society do come into conflict sometimes, but he maintains that irreconcilable conflict and class war are not normal, but pathological phenomena of social evolution. In his words,

Class war is not the cause of social evolution; it is a disease developed in the course of social evolution. The cause of the disease is man's inability to survive, and the result of the disease is war. What Marx saw in his studies of social problems was the diseases of social evolution; he did not see the basic principle of social evolu-

tion. Therefore, Marx can only be called a social pathologist; he cannot be called a social physiologist.²⁴

Why? Because most people are intelligent enough to know that in order to survive, they must live in a society, and a society survives and "progresses through mutual adjustments of major economic interests in the society rather than through the clashes of these major economic interests."²⁵ In other words, a great majority is willing to cooperate and adjust their relations with others because they know it is to their mutual interest to do so.²⁶

The Principle of People's Livelihood. The Principle of People's Livelihood (Mín-sheng chǔ-ì, 民生主義) is generally considered as "the most fundamental principle" of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People and "the philosophical foundation" of his political doctrines.²⁷ The fact that he expounded his theory of history and outlined the ideal society in his lectures on the Principle of People's Livelihood seems to justify such an interpretation. The question is: What does he mean by "people's livelihood?" According to Sun Yat-sen,

Min-sheng (people's livelihood) is the livelihood of the people, the existence of society, the welfare of the nation, and the life of the masses.²⁸

Clearly, the exact meaning of "people's livelihood" is not enhanced by this definition. However, from his assertion that "the problem of man's struggle for survival is the same thing as the problem of people's livelihood,"²⁹ the term "people's livelihood" may be interpreted to mean the same as people's struggle for survival.

Sun Yat-sen maintains that people's livelihood "is the center of politics, the center of economics, and the center of all historical movements."³⁰ From this descriptive generalization, he concludes that "we must recognize people's livelihood as the center of social history. And when we have made a thorough investigation of the central problems of people's livelihood, we shall have the solution of the social problem."³¹ In other words, scientific investigation can lead not only to the discovery of the laws of politics, economics, and history, but also to the "solution" of social problem.

According to Sun Yat-sen, equalization of land and

governmental "regulation" of private capital are the scientific solutions to, or the scientific "methods" to settle, the social problem of people's livelihood in China.³² The social problem of people's livelihood is completely solved when a faithful implementation of these two "solutions" ushers in a new period of communism (k'ung-ch'ān, 均產, literally common ownership of property).³³ From this, Sun Yat-sen concludes,

Therefore, communism is the highest ideal of social reconstruction. The Principle of People's Livelihood [which according to Sun Yat-sen, "is communism,"] which the Kuomintang advocates is not only the highest ideal, it is also the motive force of society and the center of all historical movements.³⁴

In fact, Sun Yat-sen went even further to claim that "the true Principle of People's Livelihood," i.e., the state in which the Principle of People's Livelihood has been carried out, "is the World of Great Harmony (tà-t'ung shìh-chièh, 大同世界, Chinese equivalence of Utopia, an ideal popularized by K'ang Yu-wei) which Confucius hoped for" and is the state in which "people not only share in common properties but also all things and powers."³⁵

Sun Yat-sen's scientific solutions to the social problem of people's livelihood have thus become the ideal society which ought to be realized here in this world.

The Principles of Nationalism and Democracy. Sun Yat-sen believes that nationalism and democracy are necessary means to man's survival and to the realization of the ideal society in the twentieth century. He argues that as long as China is not independent, free from foreign control, free from "alien" domination of the Manchu government, and free from the ambition of powerful men who wanted to become the emperor, it is not only impossible to realize the ideal society, the very survival of the Chinese people is also threatened.

Sun Yat-sen maintains that "nationalism is that precious thing which enables a state to develop and a nation to perpetuate its existence."³⁶ For the rise and fall of a nation is not determined merely by the "natural forces" but by "a combination of natural and human forces.... Man-made power may rival the work of nature and the work of man may excel that of nature. Of those man-made forces, the most potent are political and economic forces. They have a

greater influence on the rise and fall of a nation than the forces of nature."³⁷

He asserts that the political and economic oppressions of foreign imperialism "have made it impossible for social enterprises in China to develop and have deprived the common people in China of their opportunity to survive."³⁸ He declares,

In view of the law (tào-lǐ, ~~道~~ ^理, the way and principle) of national survival from the past to the present, if we want to save China and to insure the permanent existence of the Chinese nation, we must promote Nationalism.³⁹

According to Sun Yat-sen, nationalism is the instrument by which the Chinese can prevent the destruction of their country and the extinction of the Chinese nation.⁴⁰ National survival, in turn, is the necessary condition of the survival of clan and family.⁴¹ And the survival of clan and family is the necessary condition of the survival of man as an individual.

What the Chinese ought to desire is also what all men naturally desire.

All of us are unwilling to see the extermination

or failure of our nation; we all want to see that our nation will continue to survive and succeed. This is the natural thought (t'ien-ján ssu-hǎng, 天孫思想) of mankind.⁴²

Men's struggle for survival prompted them to form a society. But a society can exist only if there is some form of political power to control and manage public affairs. Democracy, which Sun Yat-sen defined as a system in which "the people have the power to control and manage the affairs of the people,"⁴³ is conceived by him as an "instrument" of human survival. This power has been organized and exercised in four different forms in four different periods of human history. We are now in the fourth period in which "the people are struggling against their monarchs and kings.... In this period, the power of the people is steadily increasing. We therefore call it the period of democracy."⁴⁴

Sun Yat-sen maintains that democracy is inevitable "because with the rapid advance of civilization, people have greatly increased their knowledge and developed a great consciousness."⁴⁵ It is an inevitable development in the evolution of political system.

Since the beginning of human history, the kind of power employed in politics has inevitably varied according to the circumstances and tides of the age.... The world tide flowed from theocracy to monarchical autocracy, and from monarchical autocracy to democracy; now it has flowed to democracy, and there is no way to stem the tide.⁴⁶

He insists that "no human power can thwart or hasten" the development of democratic ideas and democracy.⁴⁷ Democracy is inevitable.

A Critique of Evolutionary Naturalism. Similar to the economic determinism of Karl Marx which he criticized, the most apparent dilemma of an evolutionary naturalist like Sun Yat-sen is: if all men naturally desire the survival of their own nation (or race), even if it means the destruction of other nations, and if human power cannot either prevent or hasten the emergence of democracy in China as Sun Yat-sen maintained, then what is the point of advocating nationalism and democracy? The factual assertion in either case is false. There have been various kinds of internationalists who desire, not the survival of their own nation, but the survival of a specific class of people such as the people of the same religious faith, political conviction, or

economic class. Sun Yat-sen himself seems to admit this fact indirectly when he criticizes widespread cosmopolitanism among the Chinese and deplores the "loss of nationalism in China."⁴⁸ His exhortation that "we, whose ancients also had democratic ideas, must adopt democracy if we wish lasting order and peace for China, security and happiness for the people, and to follow the tide of the world,"⁴⁹ implies, not the inevitability, but the possibility of preventing or hastening the establishment of a "democratic" system of government in China.

Sun Yat-sen appears to be correct in his assertion that all men, or at least most men most of the time, do desire to survive, and that human survival requires different political organizations in different circumstances. But does it follow that, given the conditions that existed in China in his days, the Chinese ought to adopt his Three Principles of the People if they desire to survive? If his Three Principles were necessary instruments of self-preservation for each and every Chinese, then it would be irrational for any Chinese not to adopt these principles. The term 'people' which he used so often, however, is misleading. It tends to give the

impression that he is talking about the survival or extinction of all the Chinese. It cannot be denied, however, that the political system he urged the Chinese to overthrow did permit many Chinese to survive. And to bring about his political system by revolutionary method necessarily requires the sacrifice of some Chinese. Neither is a case of the survival or extinction of all.

In fact, the survival of an individual does not necessarily depend on the survival of his own "nation" or clan or family. Many Jews, Poles, and Indians whom Sun Yat-sen used as examples in his argument survived and continue to survive without their own nation-state or ethnic nationalism. Many war orphans have also survived without the protection of their original families or clans.

Furthermore, if most men most of the time do in fact desire their own survival, it does not follow from this that they also desire at the same time the survival of all other men of their own nation. Those who desire their own survival could adopt any of the following normative positions:

- (1) Any man whose survival is threatened has the moral right (or obligation) to seek his own survival by whatever means,

including seeking survival in a foreign country. (2) Any man whose survival is threatened has the moral right (or obligation) to seek foreign intervention to end such a threat. (3) Any man whose survival is threatened has the moral right (or obligation) to support whatever form of government which will protect his survival and national independence, including a system that permits slavery and a system that puts a substantial proportion of its population in concentration camps. (4) Any man whose survival is threatened has the moral right (or obligation) to struggle for the survival of the greatest number of his own people within an independent, democratic nation-state even if it requires the sacrifice of his life.

Sun Yat-sen rejects the first three normative positions and maintains that the only "scientific solution" to the problem of people's livelihood is the fourth position. Clearly, his commitment to the moral principles of nationalism and democracy leads him to reject the first three. The survival of the nation and the preservation of democracy, however, may be incompatible under a certain circumstance. It is not inconceivable that under a certain circumstance

some form of dictatorship is the only form of government that can preserve the survival of the nation. If one is committed to national survival, as Sun Yat-sen was, it will be irrational for him to be committed to democracy at the same time.

Sun Yat-sen, however, is not simply trying to derive from his descriptive generalizations the normative principle that the Chinese ought to establish a government (of any form) which is able and willing to protect the bare physical existence of the Chinese nation. He wants to derive from his descriptive generalizations the normative principle that the Chinese ought to establish a government which is "a government of the people, by the people, and for the people, that is, a state belonging to the people, government controlled by the people, and benefits enjoyed in common by the people."⁵⁰ This government ought to aim, not merely at the physical survival of the people, but at "freeing all the people from the suffering caused by the unequal distribution of wealth and property, and enabling them to enjoy security and happiness," and at realizing a state in which "the people not only share in common properties, but also all other

things and powers."⁵¹ Neither the fact that most men most of the time desire their own survival nor the fact that most men most of the time desire the survival of their nation entails that they ought to aim at their own or someone's or everyone's survival, let alone that they ought to aim at the happy, utopian survival of all the Chinese people Sun Yat-sen prescribed. Indeed, a government elected by democratic process may decide by the majority principle to adopt capitalism rather than socialism. To insist on socialism in such a situation implies the rejection of democratic principles. This is an example of advocating simultaneously ends which are not just competing but actually conflicting. It is of course possible that the Chinese people, or a majority of them, may one day subscribe to all three normative principles and carry out their commitments. But this eventuality does not prove that these normative principles are therefore objectively true; it simply removes the irrationality of advocating incompatible goals.

Sun Yat-sen's normative doctrines are of great political significance. The desire of self-preservation is biologically instinctive. Nationalism in the sense of national

self-preservation and national independence is favored more or less universally by all statesmen and public opinion at the present stage of human history, due at least in part to the systematic cultivation of this mentality by every nation-state. Today almost all politicians advocate or pay lip service to democracy and greater economic equality. Indeed, a study sponsored by UNESCO reported in 1951 that "probably for the first time in history, democracy is claimed as the proper ideal description of all systems of political and social organization advocated by influential proponents."⁵²

But none of these facts make the pursuit of these goals objectively right or wrong. Human beings still have a moral choice between life and death; and death is by no means always less desirable than life (e.g., "give me freedom or give me death"). Nations have a moral choice among the following alternatives: self-preservation within an independent state, merger with other nations, surrender of their independence to become satellite states, imperialistic expansion, and world government. Democracy (regardless of how ever one defines it) and socialism are at best a genuine

moral commitment of some people in both democratic and non-democratic states. In conclusion, it seems fair to point out that Sun Yat-sen's philosophical framework appears to rest upon a relatively weak foundation of naturalism.

iii. Mao Tse-tung (毛澤東)

Dialectical Materialism and Political Ethics. Like Sun Yat-sen, Mao Tse-tung (b. 1893), a founding member of the Chinese Communist Party and its chairman since 1935, also attempts to find a scientific basis for his basic moral principles of politics. But unlike Sun Yat-sen who maintains that man's struggle for survival is the motive force of history, Mao Tse-tung holds that the development of opposing forces within things themselves and between things is the motive force of the development of the universe in general and of the development of human history in particular. He maintains,

According to materialistic dialectics, changes in nature are due chiefly to the development of the internal contradictions in nature. Changes in society are due chiefly to the development of the internal contradictions in society, that is, the

contradiction between productive forces and the relations of production, the contradiction between classes and the contradiction between the old and the new; it is the development of these contradictions that pushes society forward (ch'ién-chin, 前进) and gives the impetus for the supersession of the old society by the new.... It [material dialectics] holds that external causes are the condition of change and internal causes are the basis of change, and that external causes become operative through internal causes.⁵³

Mao Tse-tung agrees with Marx and Engels that "these contradictions inevitably lead to different kinds of social revolution in different kinds of class society."⁵⁴ According to Mao Tse-tung, "the contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation and the contradiction between feudalism and the great masses of the people are the basic contradictions in modern Chinese society," which in the 1930's and 1940's, was a "colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal" society.⁵⁵ These contradictions and their intensification "must inevitably" result in the growth of revolutionary movements.⁵⁶

But what kind of social revolution? According to Mao Tse-tung, the nature of China's socio-economic system "decides (ch'ieh-ting, 决定)" that the Chinese revolution must

be divided into "two stages": the new bourgeois-democratic revolution and the proletarian-socialist revolution.⁵⁷ In fact, the official translation renders this passage to read:

Clearly, it follows from the colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal character of present-day Chinese society that the Chinese revolution must be divided into two stages. The first step is to change the colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal form of society into an independent, democratic society. The second is to carry the revolution forward and build a socialist society.⁵⁸

The nature of China's socio-economic system also "determines (kuei-tìng, 規定)" the "targets," "tasks" (jèn-wù, 任务, mission or public duty) and "motive forces" of the Chinese revolution.⁵⁹ According to Mao Tse-tung, the "targets" of the Chinese revolution "are imperialism and feudalism," and its "main tasks are to strike at these two enemies, to carry out a national revolution to overthrow foreign imperialist oppression and a democratic revolution to overthrow feudal landlord oppression."⁶⁰ The poor peasants are "the biggest motive force" of the Chinese revolution and the proletariat (wú-ch'ān chieh-chí, 无产阶级, literally propertyless class) is its "basic motive force."⁶¹

Mao Tse-tung maintains that the Chinese revolution is a

new democratic revolution because

it is no longer a revolution of the old type led by the bourgeoisie with the aim of establishing a capitalist society and a state under bourgeois dictatorship. It belongs to the new type of revolution led by the proletariat with the aim, in the first stage, of establishing a new-democratic society and a state under the joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes. Thus this revolution actually serves the purpose of clearing a still wider path for the development of socialism.⁶²

Mao Tse-tung's descriptive generalizations of the inevitable historical development are not intended simply as an explanation of the past and the present and a prediction of the future, they are meant to be "the guide to action." Like Sun Yat-sen, Mao Tse-tung believes that basic moral principles of politics can be derived from the laws of history. He maintains that Marxism, which he holds to be "the most correct, scientific and revolutionary truth, born out of and verified by objective reality,"⁶³

teaches that in our approach to a problem, we should start from objective facts, not from abstract definitions, and that we should derive (chǎo-ch'u, 找, literally find out) our guiding principles, policies and measures from an analysis of these facts.⁶⁴

Thus, from the descriptive theory that contradictions in a society inevitably lead to a certain kind of revolution and from the factual generalization that the Chinese society is a "colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal" society with the basic contradictions between imperialism and the Chinese nation and between feudalism and the great masses of the people, Mao Tse-tung derives the normative principle that the Chinese revolution ought to be carried out and that it ought to be carried out in two stages, namely, the new bourgeois-democratic revolution and the proletarian-socialist revolution.

Similarly, from the descriptive generalization that "there is no 'ism' in the world that transcends utilitarian considerations; in class society there can be only the utilitarianism of this or that class," Mao Tse-tung derives the normative principle that "we [the writers and artists at the Yen-an Forum on Literature and Art] are [which means ought to be] proletarian revolutionary utilitarians and take [which means ought to take] as our point of departure the unity of the present and future interests of the broadest masses, who constitute over 90 per cent of the population,"

and that " a thing is good only when it brings real benefit to the masses of the people."65

A Critique of the Metaethics of Historical Determinism.

If one wants to demonstrate that a normative principle is true because it can be derived from other statements, as Mao Tse-tung does, one must establish that the premises involved are true and that the inference is valid. One of the premises from which Mao Tse-tung derives his normative principles is the Marxist version of historical determinism.

Historical determinism holds that the past, present, and future course of history is determined by laws which cannot be altered by human volition. Social and ideological phenomena are "reflections" of objective material conditions.⁶⁶ It follows that the development of the new bourgeois-democratic revolution and the proletarian-socialist revolution in China is beyond human control.

Mao Tse-tung's attempt to derive normative principles of politics from historical determinism involves a dilemma similar to Sun Yat-sen's attempt to derive his basic principles of political ethics from evolutionary determinism: he needs descriptive generalizations which are true to serve

as his premises; but if they were true, then it would become pointless to advocate the normative principles which he attempted to deduce from the factual premises. Specifically, if new democratic revolution and socialist revolution are by historical necessity bound to happen, and if history has assigned the "task" (or "mission") of these revolutions to the Communists, as Mao Tse-tung argues, then what is the point of urging every party member to strive to "complete China's bourgeois-democratic revolution (the new democratic revolution) and to transform it into a socialist revolution when all the necessary conditions are ripe,"⁶⁷ and to "win over" or to "unite, according to varying circumstances, with all classes and strata that can take part in the revolution"?⁶⁸ Indeed, the very act of urging the Communists to follow the specified courses of action presupposes that they are not bound by historical necessity to follow them. They can do something else.

Another criticism can be made against any attempt to derive normative principles of politics from historical determinism. A logical conclusion consists merely of assertions making explicit what is already contained in the prem-

ises. To derive the normative conclusion that a certain class of people (e.g., the proletariat) ought to carry out the socialist revolution because it is historically inevitable, one needs a major premise that the proletariat ought to bring about whatever is historically inevitable. But this is an absurd principle, for it enjoins a certain people to do precisely what they are bound by historical necessity to do. Moral principles can be applied to human beings only to the extent to which they have a choice between at least two alternative courses of action.

Mao Tse-tung, however, has denied this interpretation of historical determinism on several occasions. He maintains that, in the relations between the productive forces and the relations of production, between theory and practice, and between the economic base and the superstructure, "in certain conditions, such aspects as the relations of production, theory and the superstructure in turn manifest themselves as the principal and decisive factors (tso-yung, ~~tsung~~, literally function or activity)."⁶⁹ He asserts in unequivocal terms that

When the superstructure (politics, culture, etc.)

obstructs the development of the economic base, political and cultural changes become principal and decisive. Are we going against materialism when we say this? No. The reason is that while we recognize that in the general development of history the material determines the mental and social being determines social consciousness, we also--and we indeed must--recognize the reaction of mental on material things, of social consciousness on social being and of the superstructure on the economic base. This does not go against materialism; on the contrary, it avoids mechanical materialism and firmly upholds dialectical materialism.⁷⁰

Some of the superstructure can even transform themselves into material forces. Mao Tse-tung asserts that "once the correct ideas characteristics of the advanced class are grasped by the masses, these ideas turn into a material force which changes society and changes the world."⁷¹ Indeed, a combination of correct ideas, correct leadership, and the availability of people is said to be capable of performing "every kind of miracle." According to Mao Tse-tung,

Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, as long as there are people, every kind of miracle can be performed.... We believe that revolution can change everything...⁷²

It is perhaps unfair to take the expression "every kind

of miracle can be performed" literally and argue that it must then be possible to perform a "miracle" to change the future course of history. But the above assertions do constitute a denial of historical determinism which he claims to be a scientific truth verified by objective reality. They reject the dichotomy of the determinants of history into two mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive classes: the material factor and the superstructure. Mao Tse-tung maintains in effect that both the material conditions and the superstructure are the determinants of history. The material conditions are "principal and decisive factors" in certain conditions; the superstructure is the "principal and decisive" factor in some other situations. They together constitute the sufficient conditions of any historical event. If this modified version of "materialism" sounds more plausible, it also admits that man's deliberate choice and action can influence the course of history. Men are therefore no longer bound by historical necessity, at least "in certain conditions," to carry out a certain revolution.

Mao Tse-tung also maintains at one point that Marxism-Leninism is "a weapon" to fight both foreign and domestic

enemies.⁷³ It "is the science which leads the revolutionary cause of the proletariat to victory."⁷⁴ In other words, it is the means to the end to which he and his followers have committed themselves. Since Mao Tse-tung considers himself a Marxist theorist, his assertion should also apply to his own theory. If so, Mao Tse-tung is merely making the empirical assertion that the course of action he prescribed is the means to

change a China that is politically oppressed and economically exploited into a China that is politically free and economically prosperous.... to change the China which is being kept ignorant and backward under the sway of the old culture into an enlightened and progressive China under the sway of a new culture.⁷⁵

It is also the means to "create the conditions in which classes, state power and political parties will die out very naturally and mankind will enter the realm of Great Harmony (tà-t'ung ching-i, 大同世界)," that is, "a society based on public ownership, free from class exploitation and oppression."⁷⁶ These states of affairs are what Mao Tse-tung and his followers desired to create; he does not establish that they are objectively desirable or good.⁷⁷

C H A P T E R IV

NONCOGNITIVISM AS THE FOUNDATION OF POLITICAL ETHICS

We have seen in the preceding two chapters how some representative Chinese political thinkers belonging to the two schools of value-cognitivism have attempted to demonstrate that certain basic principles of political ethics are intersubjectively true. We have found that neither the intuitionists nor the naturalists among them have successfully proven their case. We shall now turn to Chinese philosophers who may be classified as value-noncognitivists. It must be pointed out from the outset that there are few noncognitivists among the well-known Chinese thinkers, and of these few, only one (Han Fei Tzu) is a major political thinker. Han Fei Tzu, however, did not work out a systematic metaethical theory. Like its counterpart in Western philosophy, noncognitivism as a systematic metaethical theory has been worked out by philosophers who have had only a secondary interest in political problems. But, as we shall see, these Chinese noncognitivists have not developed a kind of logical analysis similar to the one advanced by

David Hume or a form of syntactical analysis carried out, for example, by R. M. Hare.

i. Chuang Tzu (莊子)

In many studies on Chinese philosophy, Chuang Tzu (b.369 B.C.) and Lao Tzu are mentioned together as the founders of Taoism, and their philosophies are classified as a kind of "naturalism." This classification, again, is based, not on their metaethical positions, but on their ethical and to a lesser degree metaphysical views. At the metaethical level, Lao Tzu is an intuitionist and Chuang Tzu is a value-noncognitivist.

Chuang Tzu, however, is better known as one of the greatest prose writers and "mystics" in Chinese history. According to the last chapter (which may not have been written by Chuang Tzu himself) of the book that bears his name, Chuang Tzu is said to believe that "the world was sunk in a muddy water and it was impossible to address it in sober language."¹ He therefore resorted to bombastic language, outlandish terms, unbridled fancies, and various kinds of allegory to illuminate his theory.² The book contains many

dialogues of well-known Chinese thinkers. These dialogues, however, must be taken, not as a record of actual events, but as expository discourses invented by Chuang Tzu.

Moral Judgments Express Subjective Preferences. Both Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu advocate a natural way of life and a laissez faire government. But unlike Lao Tzu who maintains that the principle involved can be proved to be objectively true, Chuang Tzu holds that moral judgments express subjective preferences which cannot be either true or false.

According to Chuang Tzu, the heart (hsin, 心), which is the seat of all feelings, "presides (ssu, 主), also command or arbitrate) over question of right and wrong."³ But unlike the proponents of the theory of innate knowledge such as Mencius and Wang Yang-ming who maintain that moral judgments made by the "heart of right and wrong" are objectively true, Chuang Tzu holds that judgments as to the rightness or wrongness of an action and goodness or badness of an object are expressions of subjective "preference and dislike." They therefore cannot have intersubjective validity in the way descriptive statements are true or false. Like David Hume who regards value judgments as expressions of subjective

feeling which "lies in yourself, not in the object,"⁴ Chuang Tzu maintains that "value (k'uei, 貴), also worth, noble or honor) lies within yourself and it is not diminished by external changes."⁵ With regard to moral judgments he states the same position indirectly in the following passage:

Right and wrong (shih-fei, 是非) are what I mean by feelings (ch'ing, 情, sentiments). By a man without feelings I mean one who does not permit his preference and dislike (hao-wu, 好惡) to do internal damage to his body, but rather follows [the way of] nature and does not try to artificially add anything to life.⁶

The words 'shih-fei' have several meanings. In the moral context, they mean rightness or wrongness of an action, or to right an action in the sense of justifying it or to wrong an action in the sense of condemning it.⁷ The moral feelings are, of course, not restricted to preference and dislike. For example, Chuang Tzu maintains that "dislike and desire, joy and anger, grief and happiness--these six are the burdens of virtue."⁸

Right and Wrong Cannot be Determined by Any Arbiter. If all men agreed as to what is right and wrong, and good and evil, then there would be no need for moral argument. The

problem is that, in Chuang Tzu's words, "there is no publicly accepted right in the world, and each man rights his own right."⁹ He points out that some moral philosophers affirm as right what other philosophers regard as wrong, and condemn as wrong what others uphold as right. He says,

There are the rights and wrongs of the Confucianists and Moists, each school affirming as right what the other regards as wrong and affirming as wrong what the other regards as right.¹⁰

The question is: Is it possible for anyone to decide who is objectively right or wrong? Chuang Tzu gives a negative answer. According to him, it is impossible "to form judgments of right and wrong without first having an established [moral point of] view."¹¹ To determine whose moral judgment is right and whose moral judgment is wrong, the third party must make a moral judgment as to the rightness or wrongness of the action in question. On the basis of this judgment, the third party affirms as right the moral judgment which is in agreement with his own and condemns as wrong the moral judgment which is in disagreement with his own. Thus, like the moral judgments of the disputants, the judgment as to the rightness or wrongness of the disputants'

moral judgments is an expression of an arbiter's subjective moral preference. The agreement of two or more subjective moral preferences does not make their common moral preference objectively right. In his words,

Suppose you and I have had a [moral] argument in which you won and I lost [e.g., according to a panel of judges], are you necessarily right and I necessarily wrong? Or if I won and you lost, am I necessarily right and you wrong? Or are we both partly (huò, ~~à~~, also probably) right and partly wrong? Or are we both wholly right or wholly wrong? Since you and I cannot have a mutual and common understanding [of what is right and wrong], others are certain to be in the dark. Whom shall we ask to decide which of us is correct? Shall we ask someone who agrees with you to decide? But if he already agrees with you, how can he decide which of us is correct? Shall we ask someone who agrees with me? But if he already agrees with me, how can he decide which is correct? Shall we ask someone who disagrees with both of us? But if he already disagrees with both of us, how can he decide which is correct? Shall we ask someone who agrees with both of us to decide? But if he already agrees with both of us, how can he decide which is correct? Apparently, then, neither you nor I nor anyone else knows which is correct.¹²

Infinity of Moral Criteria. Moral judgments are not only expressions of subjective preference, the criteria which may be adopted by various moral agents as the yard-

stick of what is morally right, wrong, good, bad, obligatory, etc., are in theory infinite in number. Chuang Tzu asserts that "[what may be regarded as] right is an infinity; [what may be regarded as] wrong is an infinity."¹³ The same action, therefore, may be regarded as right and wrong at the same time by two moral agents who have adopted different moral criteria. Even the same moral agent may regard the same action as right at one time and wrong at another, when he changes his moral point of view. Chuang Tzu dramatizes this changing moral attitude in the following story:

Ch'u Po-yu has lived for sixty years and has changed sixty times. There was not a single instance in which what he affirmed as right in the beginning he did not in the end denounce as wrong. So, there is no telling whether what he now calls right is not what he called wrong during the past fifty-nine years.¹⁴

The question is: Can moral criteria be said to be either true or false? According to Chuang Tzu, the adoption of a specific moral criterion, like the adoption of a specific criterion of physical relations such as 'this' and 'that' or 'great' and 'small', is a logically arbitrary decision. A moral criterion, therefore, cannot be said to be

either true or false. This basic thesis is stated in the following obscure language:

There is nothing which is not 'this' (shih, 是, which also means morally right) and there is nothing which is not 'that' (pi, 彼).... It is because of the right that there is the wrong, and it is because of the wrong that there is the right.... 'This' is also 'that' and 'that' is also 'this'. 'This' has a standard of right and wrong, and 'that' also has a standard of right and wrong. So, is there really an objective 'this' and 'that'? Or is there really no objective 'this' and 'that'?¹⁵

Chuang Tzu maintains that there is no action which is objectively right or wrong. There is no object or state of affairs which is objectively good or evil. He had the Spirit of the North Sea say that "from the point of view of Tao [that is, from Chuang Tzu's point of view], things themselves have no value or worthlessness (k'uei-chien, 貴賤, also means nobility and baseness)."¹⁶ The rightness or wrongness of an action and the goodness or badness of an object are always relative to the subjective moral criteria of moral agents. Since moral criteria are theoretically infinite in number, any action may be regarded as right by one of the moral criteria and wrong by another. The same applies also

to judgments as to the goodness or badness of an object or a state of affairs. He points out,

From the point of view of preference (ch'u, ~~好~~, also means taste or inclination or interest), if we regard a thing as good because it is regarded as such [by someone], then among the myriad things in the world there is nothing which is not good; if we regard a thing as bad because it is regarded as such [by someone], then among the myriad things in the world there is nothing which is not bad.¹⁷

Two examples from Chuang Tzu's writings will illustrate his theory. To those who place highest value in life, survival under whatever condition is more desirable than death. But to those who value, say, freedom more than anything else, it is perfectly rational for them to demand: "Give me freedom or give me death." In a similar spirit, Chuang Tzu employed the words of an old skull in his dream to dramatize that death could be preferable to a certain kind of life. The skull, according to Chuang Tzu, was unwilling to regain life and return to his parents, wife, children, and neighbors because "among the dead, there are no rulers above, no subjects below, and no works of the four seasons. Free and unrestrained, they take heaven and earth as spring and autumn. Even the happiness of a ruler cannot exceed our hap-

piness.¹⁸

There are of course people who maintain that men ought to "take life as the basis and use knowledge as the guide to calculate right and wrong."¹⁹ And there are many people who agreed with such a moral principle. But what does it prove? Chuang Tzu maintains that the agreement among them does not prove in any way that the moral principle is objectively true. In his words, "they are like the summer cicada and the little dove who agreed with each other on what they had in common."²⁰ Their biological conditions and the limited scope of their experience have prevented them from understanding "why anyone [such as a fabulous bird of enormous size called p'eńg (鶡)] desires to travel ninety thousand miles to the south?"²¹ The fact that they cannot understand why some people value something which appears to be totally incomprehensible to them is, of course, not a valid reason to claim that their own moral principle is objectively true.

Similarly, according to a certain moral criterion, thieves, who are often condemned as the men without any moral principle in a society in which property right is a basic value, may be said to be men of high moral principle. In

response to the question "Does the thief too have Tao [i.e., moral principle]?" Robber Chih says in part,

Making a wild guess on the location of hidden treasures within a house is sageliness; being the first one to enter is courage; being the last to get out is righteousness; knowing whether or not a job can be done is wisdom; and dividing up the spoil equally is benevolence. No one in the world had ever succeeded in becoming a great robber if he did not possess all these five [virtues].²²

The point is: whether something is good or bad, or whether an action is right or wrong, or whether a man is virtuous or not is always relative to the subjective moral criteria of moral agents. The adoption of a specific moral criterion, however, is a matter of subjective preference. Moral criteria and moral judgments, therefore, cannot be intersubjectively true or false.

ii. Han Fei Tzu (韓非子)

Han Fei Tzu (d. 233 B.C.), a prince of the state of Han, is known as the synthesizer of the three tendencies within the "legalist school" of thought who welded together the elements of power (shih, 勢) emphasized by Shen Tao

(Shen Tzu, 申子, 350-275 B.C.?), statecraft (shih, 刑) emphasized by Shen Pu-hai (申不害, d. 337 B.C.), and law emphasized by Kuan Chung (管仲, d. 645 B.C.) and Shang Yang (Kung-sun Yang or Lord Shang, 商鞅, d. 338 B.C.) to form a coherent legal theory.²³ He and Li Ssu (李斯, d. 208 B.C.), the first Prime Minister to the First Emperor of the first Empire of China, were students of Hsun Tzu, who, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, was the leader of "naturalistic Confucianism" in ancient China. Han Fei Tzu's political theory, which was probably shared by Li Ssu, was believed by many scholars to have contributed to the unification of China for the first time in 221 B.C. and the dictatorship of the Ch'in Dynasty (221-206 B.C.). Han Fei Tzu, however, fell a victim to an intrigue concocted by his jealous classmate Li Ssu and was forced to commit suicide in 233 B.C.²⁴

Han Fei Tzu's philosophy has been characterized as Taoistic (i.e., intuitionistic) by some scholars and positivistic (i.e., noncognitivist) by others. His writings do contain statements which, if taken by themselves, appear to justify both characterizations. But when we consider his philosophy as a whole, Han Fei Tzu must be classified as a

noncognitivist.

The Meanings of Tao in Han Fei Tzu's Philosophy. Like many political philosophers we have considered in this study, Han Fei Tzu, too, refers frequently to 'tao,' a term which, as used by various Chinese philosophers, bears a striking similarity to the term 'law of nature' in Western political philosophy. Han Fei Tzu begins the chapter entitled "The Tao of the Ruler" with the following words,

Tao is the beginning of the myriad things and the criterion (chí, 尺) of right and wrong. The enlightened ruler therefore holds fast to the beginning in order to understand the origin of the myriad things, and studies the criterion in order to know the clue of good [and evil, success] and failure (shàn-pài, 善敗, literally good and failure or evil).²⁵

Taken by itself, it may be interpreted to mean a cognitivist view that 'tao' is the objective criterion of right and wrong.

Like Mencius who speaks of "the Tao of the true king" (wáng-tào, 王德), Han Fei Tzu, too, makes frequent references to "the tao of the ruler" (chǔ-tào, 主德). For example, he asserts that "the tao of the ruler of men is to treasure tranquility and reservation."²⁶ He maintains at

one point that

The sage who makes laws in the state must [be willing to] act contrary to the prevailing opinions of the age and follow the tao and virtue (tào té, 道德, also mean moral principle). He who knows agrees with the principle of justice but disagrees with the custom of the time; he who does not know disagrees with the principle of justice but agrees with the custom of the time. If throughout all-under-heaven those who know are few, then the principle of justice will be disapproved.²⁷

Again, this passage may be taken to mean that there are certain objective principles of justice which command the ruler to act in a certain way and that these principles can be known, presumably, through some kind of intuition. Mencius would have subscribed to this view.

This cognitivist interpretation, however, is neither consistent with the main thesis of Han Fei Tzu's political theory nor with the arguments in the passages from which the above quotations are taken. In contrast to value-cognitivists who use 'tao' to refer to a certain moral principle which they claim to be objectively true, Han Fei Tzu's 'tao' refers, in the broad sense of the term, to descriptive laws of things and human affairs, or, in the narrower sense, to

the most effective means to a given end. This interpretation is supported by his explication of the meaning of 'tao' in a chapter in which Han Fei Tzu advances his interpretations and commentaries on Lao Tzu's doctrines. He maintains that

Tao is that by which all things become what they are and is the basis of all principles. Principles are the patterns (wén, 文) according to which things are completed, and tao is the whys and wherefores of the completion of all things. Therefore it is said, "Tao is that which puts things in order."²⁸

'Tao' in this broad sense comprises all descriptive laws of things and human affairs. In its narrower sense, 'tao' refers to various ways or roads (which are the literal meaning of 'tao') to a certain state of affairs. Han Fei Tzu is using 'tao' in this narrower sense when he asserts that "those who follow tao and principles in their undertaking never fail to succeed," and

those who discard tao and principles and take arbitrary actions, though they have the honor and power of the Son of Heaven [i.e., ruler] and feudal lords on the one hand and possess the wealth of I Tun, T'ao Chu and Pu Chu on the other, will eventually lose their subjects and ruin their

financial resources. The masses of the people who discard tao and principles lightly and take arbitrary actions easily do not know their profound impact on their own misfortune and happiness...²⁹

The chapter entitled "The Tao of the Ruler" is not a discourse on the 'way' to become a virtuous sage-ruler, but a discourse on the principles and methods by which "an average ruler" or even "a mediocre ruler" can become a successful ruler. In a language which will recall Machiavelli's The Prince, Han Fei Tzu argues that "the ruler will enjoy success" if he, among other things, "treasures tranquility and reservation," "does not reveal his desires," "does not reveal his intentions," and "discards his likes and dislikes."³⁰

By a successful ruler Han Fei Tzu meant a ruler who has accomplished three things. First, he is safe and free from deception, manipulation and usurpation of his ministers and subjects. Second, he has brought about and maintained peace and order in his state. Finally, he has built a state which is strong enough to discourage and defend itself against foreign invasion. He maintains that all of

these can be most effectively accomplished, not by a government of virtuous man advocated by Confucianists and Moists, but by a government of law which enacts, promulgates, and codifies a system of laws and enforces it with rewards which are dependable and generous enough to make people think that it is profitable to have them, honors attractive enough to make people feel proud to have them, punishments inescapable and severe enough to make people afraid of them, and condemnations (hǔi, 毀) repugnant enough to make people feel ashamed to receive them.³¹ Han Fei Tzu argues that such a system is the most dependable and effective system because men "desire wealth, nobility, self-preservation, and longevity of life," and dislike "poverty, lowliness, death, and untimely ending of life."³² But due to the increase of population, there is a scarcity of the supply of goods desired by the people.³³ In such a situation, the "two handles," namely reward and punishment, become "the regulators of life and death, and power is the capital to master (shèng, 勝, literally to win or overcome) the masses."³⁴

Similarly, 'tao' means the road to success when he asserts "that the masses of the people want success but meet

with failure is a result of their ignorance of tao and principles and their unwillingness to ask the knowers and listen to the able."³⁵ The same is true when he speaks of "the tao to political order,"³⁶ "the tao to disorder,"³⁷ and "the tao of self-preservation and long life."³⁸

In all these cases, Han Fei Tzu maintains that a ruler or a man ought to take a specific road or follow a specific course of action, not because it is intrinsically good or right to do so, but because it is the road or the course of action that will lead to the end he desired. In other words, Han Fei Tzu's 'tao' is not a principle of political ethics which is objectively true but a principle of rational action which is useful to a man who wants to attain certain purposes, such as self-preservation, peace and order, or preservation of political power. According to Han Fei Tzu, questions of rationality must be settled, not by speculative assertion, but by empirical evidence (ts'an-yên, 參驗).³⁹

Han Fei Tzu's Refutation of Cognitivism. Han Fei Tzu appears to maintain in a statement cited earlier that there are certain principles of justice which can be known to be objectively true through some sort of intuition. Han Fei Tzu,

however, explicitly excludes intuition as a method to gain reliable knowledge. He maintains that "a priori knowledge consists of arbitrary conjectures (wàng-ì-tù, 妄意度) without any evidence (yüan, 緣, trace or causal connection)."40 According to Han Fei Tzu, "to affirm with certainty (pì, 必) anything without corroborating evidence is foolish, and to use anything which cannot be affirmed with certainty as a proof is knavish (wǔ, 誣)."41 Taking these two quotations together, Han Fei Tzu may be interpreted to maintain the position that the empirical method is the only source of reliable knowledge. Since all "subtle and speculative theories," including Confucianism and Moism, assert that basic moral principles are true without corroborating evidence, Han Fei Tzu declares, in rather harsh language, that they are "the philosophies of fools and knaves."42

Han Fei Tzu's view on the logic of moral judgments is less explicit. He states at one point that

Men, on the whole, regard each other as right if their [matters of] acceptance and rejection are in common, and as wrong if their [matters of] acceptance and rejection are different. Now what the ministers commend (yü, 譽, praise) is what the ruler regards as right--this is called "acceptance in common." What the ministers condemn

(hùi, ~~悔~~, blame) is what the ruler regards as wrong--this is called "rejection in common." It has never been heard that people who have their [matters of] acceptance and rejection in common oppose each other.⁴³

It is not clear whether it is meant to be a factual statement or an analysis of the logic of moral judgments. The statement is consistent with Han Fei Tzu's "economic interpretation of history" as well as his noncognitivism. Taken as a descriptive generalization, it may be interpreted to mean that moral judgments often reflect the economic interests of moral agents and those who have common economic interests tend to agree with one another in their moral judgments. This is not an argument against value-cognitivism. A value-cognitivist may claim that some of the moral principles adopted by a certain economic class or social group are demonstrably true and others demonstrably false.

The passage may be taken to mean that moral terms such as 'right' and 'wrong' express speakers' moral sentiments of approval ("acceptance" and "commendation") and disapproval ("rejection" and "condemnation"), respectively. To regard those who have the similar moral sentiments of approval and disapproval as right is then simply a specific instance

of expressing speakers' "acceptance" of their moral judgments. But this in effect is to accept or approve their own moral sentiment.

Han Fei Tzu calls all moral principles in which 'right' and 'wrong' and other moral terms occur "private good" (ssu-shàn, 私善, or personal good) or "private justice" (ssu-i, 私義) in contradistinction to "public" good or "public justice" (kung-i, 公義).⁴⁴ "Private" moral principles are by implication subjective. They therefore cannot be objectively true. "Public" good and "public justice" are not meant by Han Fei Tzu to be objectively good or objectively just either. The term 'public' is employed by Han Fei Tzu to designate any moral principle which is legal. The distinction between "public" and "private" justices, therefore, is not between what is objectively just and what is subjectively just (there is no principle which is objectively just) but between what is and what is not sanctioned by positive laws. What is legally right may, of course, be regarded as morally wrong. Han Fei Tzu admits this fact when he says,

The ruler makes laws and regards them as the standard of right. But nowadays most ministers

exalt their wisdom. They condemn the law as wrong and regard their wisdom as right.⁴⁵

Han Fei Tzu maintains that "a purpose of enacting laws and decrees is to abolish private [moral principles]. Once laws and decrees prevail, private moral principles (ssu-tào, 私道) will fall."⁴⁶ The ruler ought to establish a "government under law," not because he is morally obligated to do so, but because it is the only dependable, effective and therefore rational means to the ends he desires, namely, peace, security and independence. Like Thomas Hobbes, Han Fei Tzu maintains that citizens ought to comply with all the laws which are "codified in books, kept in governmental offices, and promulgated among the people,"⁴⁷ regardless of whether or not they approve of them, not because it is a moral obligation of citizens but because it is the only rational course of action, in view of their desire for "wealth, nobility, self-preservation, and longevity of life" and their desire to avoid "poverty, lowliness, death, and untimely ending of life" cited earlier.

In conclusion, Han Fei Tzu may be described as a political scientist who adopted the metaethics of noncognitivism

and devoted most of his attention to empirical research on how to establish and maintain peace and independence under a monarchical form of government in an age he characterized as "the age of great struggles."⁴⁸ Han Fei Tzu, however, did not develop his basic noncognitivist arguments into a systematic metaethical theory.

iii. The Missing Links

It will be of interest to note in this connection that Chinese noncognitivists have not advanced any argument similar to David Hume's classical rebuttal of value-cognitivism that it is impossible to derive an "ought or an ought not" conclusion from "is" or "is not" premises.⁴⁹ The absence of Humean argument in Chinese philosophy may be regarded as a consequence of linguistic practice. For more than two thousand years, the educated Chinese have regarded omission of the verb from a certain sentence as a correct, or even good, literary style. Most philosophical works in Chinese are full of sentences without verbs. If sentences are without 'is' and 'ought', it is almost impossible for a noncognitivist to discover from a syntactical analysis that a value-

cognitivist has derived an "ought or an ought not" conclusion from "is" or "is not" premises. (This is not to imply that there was no ought-sentence in the Chinese language. The Chinese language was fully capable of such an expression had the philosophers wished to emphasize this distinction.)

This linguistic practice seems to have hampered, too, the development of a linguistic philosophy which clearly differentiates the logical behavior of moral language from that of descriptive language. A language which does not provide a striking contrast between ought-sentences and is-sentences in philosophical writings is not conducive to the development of such a philosophy.

The way Chinese philosophers deal with words and their meanings also tends to blur the distinction between descriptive language and moral language. What is designated as a term or word in Western philosophy is commonly designated as a 'name' (míng, 名) by Chinese philosophers. A word in Chinese therefore carries with it a connotation which is akin to 'in name only'. The meaning attached to a word is called 'shih' (實), which has been translated variously as

'substance', 'actuality', 'reality', or 'idea' in the Platonic sense of the word.⁵⁰ From this linguistic usage, most of the Chinese philosophers who have anything to say about words and their meanings have come to maintain that words stand for certain realities or 'ideas' which are perfectly real. According to Confucianists, if a man has a certain 'name' such as king, minister, father, son, etc., he has the moral obligation to live up to the 'idea' of king, minister, father, son, etc. According to this theory, certain moral rights and moral obligations follow from certain 'names'. Thus, in reply to an inquiry about government by Duke Ching of Ch'i, Confucius said literally, "King king, minister minister, father father, son son,"⁵¹ which means: "Let the king be a [true] king, the minister a [true] minister, the father a [true] father, [and] the son a [true] son." The first word in each case is being used in a descriptive sense, i.e., whoever is in fact a king, minister, father or son. The second word in each case is being used in a normative sense, i.e., it refers to the speaker's ideal king, minister, father, or son, or what a good king, minister, father or son ought to be. It assumes that there is a single

moral 'idea' of what a king, minister, father or son ought to be and the moral 'idea' is objectively true because it is the "correct meaning" of each term. According to this Confucian doctrine, a moral philosopher who subscribed to a non-Confucian moral principle is a man who does not understand the "correct meaning" of the terms 'king', 'minister', 'father', 'son', etc., and he is so in spite of all evidence to the contrary. Chinese noncognitivists, however, have not developed a systematic linguistic philosophy to refute this Confucian theory.

C H A P T E R V

CONCLUSIONS

This study began with the question: Is it possible to demonstrate that certain basic principles of political ethics are objectively true or false, independently of subjective moral commitments, and if so, by what method? Value-cognitivists give a positive answer, but differ among themselves as to the contents of these principles and the methods by which they are known to be true or false. Value-noncognitivists give a negative answer to the question. A careful examination of the arguments advanced by Chinese political philosophers has inclined me to believe that the metaethics of cognitivism in any of its varieties is untenable and that value-noncognitivism is the correct metaethical theory.

By means of a careful analysis of the nature and function of ethical judgments, value-noncognitivism strips all intrinsic ethical principles of the cloaks of truth and falsity, of divine sanction, of the mystery of various alleged insights, and of the title of scientific law, and returns them to their subjective human origin. It affirms that all

basic normative principles of politics are the subjective moral commitments of their advocates.

It must be reiterated that value-cognitivists and value-noncognitivists differ only as to the cognitive status of intrinsic ethical judgments. Value-noncognitivism does not deny the possibility of value-commitments, and does not deny that extrinsic value-judgments are true or false. Since there is no logical connection between metaethical theories and any normative political doctrine, value-noncognitivists maintain that men are logically free to adopt any basic principles of political ethics. Of the two Chinese value-noncognitivists considered in this study, Chuang Tzu subscribed to the basic principles of laissez faire government, disapproving any governmental interference with the natural transformation of things. Han Fei Tzu committed himself to a centralized monarchical system aiming at the maintenance of independence, peace and order by means of codified laws enforced by generous rewards and severe punishments. (To advocate a form of government or to subscribe to a way of life is not the same as claiming that the principle involved can be proved to be objectively true.) The history of West-

ern political thought, too, shows that various combinations have in fact been maintained. Among intuitionists, Plato considered absolute government of the philosopher-king to be objectively the best form of government, and John Locke maintained that a democratic government which confined itself to the protection of basic rights was the government in accordance with natural law. Among naturalists, John Stuart Mill was not as extreme a proponent of laissez faire as Herbert Spencer. Among noncognitivists, Thomas Hobbes advocated an absolute form of government, Bertrand Russell supported liberal democracy, and Jean-Paul Sartre (one of the most influential existentialists whose metaethical view might be considered noncognitivist) became a Marxist.

In this connection, it is only fair to admit that noncognitivism as a metaethical theory does not provide any moral guidance. It cannot because it is not a normative theory concerned with determining and recommending how the law-makers and government officials ought to conduct their public affairs or how men ought to act in their capacity as citizens. Conversely, neither a frontal assault nor a sniping attack on a noncognitivist's moral commitment or politi-

cal preference constitutes a valid refutation of noncognitivism.

Noncognitivists and cognitivists agree that extrinsic value-judgments are not value-judgments but empirical statements which assert that something is good because it is conducive to a certain end. To settle a dispute between conflicting extrinsic value-judgments, the parties concerned need relevant empirical evidence. It does not involve the validity of the epistemological theory of value-cognitivism or value-noncognitivism.

Noncognitivists maintain that judgments of rationality can, in principle, be true or false. The question of rationality is relevant to some basic moral commitments and the courses of action adopted to attain basic moral commitments. For example, to commit oneself (or a government) to an end which cannot be accomplished by whatever means available or by whatever means that can be devised according to the available information, or to two or more mutually incompatible ends are instances of irrationality. The question of rationality also applies to the choice of a course of action or policy in terms of value-commitments. A choice is

rational if an actor or a government chooses a course of action whose net expectable outcome is at least as valuable to him (or the government) as any other available alternative. In all these cases, the question of rationality must be settled on the basis of empirical evidence and logical principles. For this purpose, it is not necessary to presuppose that basic ethical principles are objectively either true or false.

Finally, the affirmation of value-noncognitivism does not imply the denial of the possibility of empirical knowledge. Empirical knowledge consists of those empirical hypotheses which are verified by observational evidence. They are not abstract properties apprehended by various kinds of intuition or arbitrary definitions stipulated by moral philosophers.

Many opponents of value-noncognitivism have found it unsatisfactory. They confessed that they were haunted by the consequences, real or imaginary, of a metaethical theory which affirms "self-determination" on the question of basic principles of political ethics. They found it difficult to accept that what appears to their subjective value-feeling

to be the most abominable normative principle of politics and what is subjectively certain to them to be the most praiseworthy and true 'Tao' are equally subjective value-commitments, no more no less. Some of them even appeared to favor some form of moral dictatorship over those who, in their minds, were morally "underdeveloped" or "misguided."

Value-noncognitivists are aware of the agony of uncertainty which some people seem to suffer in a world of moral self-determination, but they admit that they do not have any magic formula for them. They hope that a better understanding of the nature and function of basic principles of political ethics will help them to face the challenge of the uncertainty, diversity, and conflicts of men's moral commitments. Some value-noncognitivists like Chuang Tzu also hope that an awareness of the subjective nature of moral commitments will bring about an attitude of tolerance and humility among men, thereby making it easier for them to live together in peace. In the light of what men have done to one another in the past, it is a hope that cannot be entertained with a great degree of certainty. Apparently men will have to work for it.

N O T E S

CHAPTER I

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5. Ibid., xv (p.173).
6. Ibid., vi (pp.149-150).
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11. Frankena, op.cit., pp.79-80.
12. Ibid., p.81.
13. Ibid., p.83.
14. Harrison, Jonathan, "Ethical Objectivism," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, op.cit., III, 72.
15. Frankena, op.cit., p.86.
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17. Ayer, Alfred Jules, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1946), pp.107-108.
18. Stevenson, Charles L., Ethics and Language (New Haven:

- Yale University Press, 1944), see especially chapters 1 and 2.
19. Oppenheim, op.cit., p.26.
 20. Hare, R. M., The Language of Morals (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1952), p.127.
 21. Nielsen, Kai, "Ethics, Problems of," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, op.cit., Vol. III, 129.

CHAPTER II

1. Lao Tzu, The Lao Tzu (老子), SPPY edition (see Bibliography for full title and publication information), ch. 25.
2. Ibid., ch. 2.
3. Ibid., chs. 27 and 38, respectively.
4. Ibid., ch. 17.
5. Ibid., ch. 80.
6. Ibid., ch. 18. See a similar statement in ibid., ch. 38.
7. See for example ibid., chs. 3 and 37.
8. Ibid., ch. 25. Italics added.
9. R. B. Blakney actually drew this comparison. See his The Way of Life: Lao Tzu (New York: Mentor Books, 1955), p.38.
10. Plato, Republic, various editions, 476, 507-508.
11. Lao Tzu, op.cit., ch. 21.
12. Ibid., ch. 1.
13. D. C. Lau maintains that Taoists "look upon the Tao as unknowable." See his Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963), p.20.
14. The word míng (名) means 'name' but it is interchangeable with ming (明) which means illuminated, illumined, clear or understanding.
15. Lao Tzu, op.cit., ch. 47. Italics added.
16. Ibid., ch. 14. Italics added.
17. Pù-tsú chièn/pù-tsú wén (不見/不見) literally mean insufficient to be seen or heard, presumably because of the size and volume.
18. Lao Tzu, op.cit., ch. 35.
19. Ibid., ch. 16.

20. Mencius, The Mencius, SPPY edition, 7A:15.
21. Ibid., 6A:6.
22. Wang Yang-ming (王陽明, private name Wang Shou-jen, 王守仁), Yang-ming ch'üan-shu (陽明全集, Complete works of Wang Yang-ming), SPPY edition, 2:30a. See also 2:24a which emphasizes the nonacquired nature of the innate knowledge. He said that the "heart is naturally able to know" right and wrong.
23. Ibid., 6:12a.
24. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Emile, V and Discourse on Inequality, various editions.
25. Mencius, op.cit., 7A:21.
26. Ibid., 2A:6.
27. Ibid., 1A:3,7; 3A:3; 7A:22 provided some outstanding examples.
28. The major difference between a true king and a hegemon, according to Mencius, is that the former "practices humanity with virtue," while the latter "uses forces to make a pretence at humanity." Ibid., 2A:3. See also 1A:1,5,7; 2A:5; 3A: 3,4; 7A:13. Mencius maintains that "only the benevolent ought to be in high stations. To have the unbenevolent in high station is to spread their wickedness among the masses." Ibid., 4A:1.
29. Ibid., 5A:7.
30. Ibid., 3B:9.
31. The same view is also expressed in ibid., 6A:8, where he speaks of the "lost of good heart (liang-hsin, 良心, also means conscience."
32. Ibid., 6A:6.
33. Wang Yang-ming, op.cit., 2:30a.
34. Mencius, op.cit., 7B:35; Wang Yang-ming, op.cit., 1:5a. See also 1:2a, 19a and 3:3a.
35. Wang Yang-ming, op.cit., 2:20b-21a; 3:12b-13a.
36. Mo Tzu, The Mo Tzu in Sun I-jang (孫詒讓), Mo Tzu hsien-ku (墨子閑話, Explanation and commentary on the Mo Tzu), HSMT edition (see Bibliography for full title and publication information), 26:122. See also 27:128-129 for a similar statement. The second number is a new continuous pagination in the HSMT edition. Hereafter cited as the Mo Tzu.

37. Ibid., 27:129.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., 14:63.
40. Ibid., 15:65.
41. Ibid., 4:12.
42. Ibid., 17:81-82. See also chs. 18-19.
43. Ibid., 31:139. See also 36:169.
44. Ibid., 31:145.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., 31:146.
47. In ancient texts, chih (知), which means to know or knowledge in the general sense of the word, is interchangeable with chih (智) which means wise, wisdom or intelligence. This is the reading of Pi Yuan, whose interpretation was accepted by Sun I-jang in his authoritative Mo Tzu h'sien-ku. See ibid., 19:89; 27:127 for examples. But this is not a very satisfactory translation because it does not make explicit the epistemological significance of the two words, 知 and 智.
48. Hu Shih, The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1968 from 1922 Shanghai edition), pp.60, 83; Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (梁啟超), Mo Tzu h'sieh-an (墨子學案, A study on the Mo Tzu) (Taipei: Chung-hwa Books, 1957[1936]), p.7.
49. Mo Tzu, op.cit., 42:203.
50. Ibid., 40:190-191.
51. Ibid., 42:203.
52. Ibid., 11:46.
53. Ibid., 26:120-121.
54. See for example, Confucius, Lún-yü (論語, Analects of Confucius), SPPY edition, 2:1; 12:11 and Mencius, op.cit., 3A:4; 3B:9.
55. Analects, op.cit., 2:1; 12:19.
56. Mo Tzu, op.cit., 36:169; 37:172.
57. Ibid., 35:164.
58. Ibid., 36:169.
59. This term is used in ibid., 36:169.
60. Ibid., 35:164-165.
61. Ibid., 27:124.
62. Ibid., 27:127-128.
63. Ibid., 27:124.

64. Ibid., 31:150.
65. Chu Hsi and Lu Tsu-ch'ien, comp. (Wing-tsit Chan, trans.) Reflections on Things at Hand, The Neo-Confucian Anthology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), xxxvi.
66. Chu Hsi (朱熹) and Lu Tsu-ch'ien (呂祖謙), comp. Chin-ssu lü (近思錄), Reflections on things at hand, SPY edition, 1:7b and 1:12a, respectively. Hereafter cited as Reflections. See also Chu Hsi, Chu Tzu tà-ch'üan (朱子大全, Complete works of Chu Hsi, SPY edition, 32:17a. Hereafter cited as Complete Works.
67. Chu Hsi, Chu Tzu ch'üan-shu (朱子全書, Complete works of Chu Hsi), 1714 edition, 2:2a.
68. Reflections, op.cit., 1:7a. See also 1:6a.
69. Complete Works, op.cit., 58:4b. See also 46:24a-25a.
70. Reflections, op.cit., 1:13b. Italics added. See also Chu Hsi (Li Ching-te, 蔡靖德, comp.), Chu Tzu yü-lèi (朱子語類, Classified conversations of Chu Hsi) (Tokyo: Chiu-bun Press, 1970 edition based on 1270 and 1473 editions), 95:18b (3868). The number in the parentheses is the new continuous pagination given in the 1970 edition. Hereafter cited as Classified Conversations.
71. For the evolution of li as a philosophical concept and its meanings, see Wing-tsit Chan, "The Evolution of the Neo-Confucian Concept of Li as Principle," in Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies, New series, IV, 2 (Feb. 1964), pp. 123-149, and T'ang Chün-i (唐君毅), Chung-kuo ché-hsueh yüan-lün (中國哲學原論, The origin and development of Chinese philosophy) (Taipei: Jen-shen Press, 1966), chs. 1-2.
72. Complete Works, op.cit., 55:1a and 67:15b.
73. See his commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean in the Four Books (Szu-shu chí-chü, 四書集注), SPY edition, 1a-b; Reflections, op.cit., 2:18b; 5:1a; Classified Conversations, op.cit., 11:8b (332), 12:3b-4a (326-327), 14:11b (418), 60:4a (2263), 98:11a (4001); and Complete Works, op.cit., 67:18a-b; 76:21b.
74. Complete Works, op.cit., 37:14b-15a.
75. Ibid., 47:8b, 19a; 48:25b; his commentary on the Great Learning (Tà-hsüeh, 大學) in the Four Books, op.cit., 1a-2a; 4b-5b.
76. Complete Works, op.cit., 49:9b; 67:16b-18a.

77. Aquinas, St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, various editions, I-II, Q.91, A2.
78. Classified Conversations, op.cit., 12:8b-9a (332-333).
79. Ibid., 126:6a (4827).
80. His commentary on the Great Learning in the Four Books, op.cit., 5a. Italics added.
81. Ibid., 11a.
82. Complete Works, op.cit., 49:9b; 67:16b-18a.
83. For his rejection of these methods see ibid., 48:26a; 54:6b-7b; 72:42a-46a.
84. See his commentary on the Great Learning in the Four Books, op.cit., 5a and Complete Works, op.cit., 32:20a; 49:3b; 72:44b.
85. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (梁啟超), Wang Yang-ming chih hsing hó-i chih chiào (王陽明知行合一之教, Wang Yang-ming's teaching on the unity of knowledge and action) (Taipei: Chung-hwa Books, 1958 [1936]), p.22.
86. Complete Works, op.cit., 58:22a. See also his commentary on Mencius, 2A:6 in the Four Books, op.cit., where he spoke of the feelings specified in the following quotation as the observable clue (tuan, 端, or hsü, 緒) of man's nature, which, according to him, is nothing but li.
87. Complete Works, op.cit., 58:22a. In this context, Chu Hsi uses 'heart' and 'feeling' interchangeably. See ibid., 52:33b and 56:14b.
88. Classified Conversations, op.cit., 12:9a (333).
89. Ibid., 67:27b (2670). See also 126:8a (4831) which gives the same argument but with a variation in a few words.
90. Complete Works, op.cit., 59:27b.
91. Chu Hsi's commentary on Mencius, 6A:6 in the Four Books, op.cit., and his remarks in Complete Works, op.cit., 56:13a and 58:21b-23a suggest that he maintains such definitions.
92. Chan, Wing-tsit, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, op.cit., p.54; Fung Yu-lan (Derk Bodde, tr.) A History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. I (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1952), p.121; Mencius (James Legge, tr.) The Works of Mencius (Chinese Classics 2) (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1895), 6A:6. Italics in the

first two quotations added; italics in the third in original.

CHAPTER III

1. Hsün Tzu (compiled by Wang Hsien-ch'ien, 王先謙), Hsün Tzu chí-chiěh (荀子集解, Collected explanations on the Hsün Tzu, HSMT edition, 23:293. The first number refers to chapter and the second to the new continuous pagination in the HMST edition. Hereafter cited as Hsün Tzu.
2. Chan, Wing-tsit, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, op.cit., p.131.
3. Hsün Tzu, (tr. by Burton Watson), Hsün Tzu: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p.162.
4. Hsün Tzu, op.cit., 23:293.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 9:105.
7. Ibid., 19:231.
8. Ibid., 10:113.
9. Ibid., 18:216.
10. Ibid., 21:271.
11. Ibid., 2:14 and 23:290.
12. Ibid., 22:279.
13. Ibid., 22:276.
14. Ibid.
15. Mencius, op.cit., 4B:19. See also 6A:3 in which Mencius distinguishes the "nature" of man from the "nature" of ox and the "nature" of dog.
16. Ibid., 6A:6.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 2A:6.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 3B:9.
21. Li Chi (禮記, Book of Rites), SPPY edition, 22:2b.
22. Sun Yat-sen, Kúo-fù ch'üan-chí (國父全集, Complete works of the founding father) (Taipei: Chung-yang wén-wù kung-ying she, 1965), I,128. Hereafter cited as Complete Works. Cf. Sun Yat-sen (Frank W. Price, tr.) San Min

- Chu I, The Three Principles of the People (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1929), p.383. Hereafter cited as Price.
23. Ibid., I, 131. Cf. Price, 391.
 24. Ibid.
 25. Ibid.
 26. Ibid., I, 130-131; Price, 390-391.
 27. Ts'ui Tsai-yang (崔載陽), "San Min Chu I te ché-hsüéh chi-ch'ü" (三民主義的哲學基礎, The philosophical foundation of the Three Principles of the People) in Chang Chi-yun (張其昀), ed., San Min Chu I yen-chiu lùn-wén chí (三民主義論文集, Symposium of the researches in the Three Principles of the People) (Taipei: kúo-fáng yen-chiu yllan, 1965), pp.13-15. This is not to say that the followers of Sun Yat-sen have placed the highest priority on this principle in real politics.
 28. Sun Yat-sen, Complete Works, op.cit., I, 122; Price, 364.
 29. Ibid., I, 132; Price, 394-395.
 30. Ibid., I, 136; Price, 406.
 31. Ibid., I, 136; Price, 407.
 32. See his Principle of People's Livelihood, Lecture 2, esp., ibid., I, 137 and 139; Price, 409 and 416.
 33. Ibid., I, 139-148; Price, 416-444.
 34. Ibid., I, 139; Price, 416.
 35. Ibid., I, 148. Cf. Price, 444.
 36. Ibid., I, 20; Price, 55.
 37. Ibid., I, 11; Price, 29-30.
 38. Ibid., I, 19; Price, 53.
 39. Ibid., I, 4. Cf. Price, 11.
 40. Ibid., I, 5, 19 and 25; Price, 12, 54 and 70.
 41. Ibid., I, 40; Price, 116-117.
 42. Ibid., I, 25. Italics added. Cf. Price, 72.
 43. Ibid., I, 51; Price, 151-152.
 44. Ibid., I, 55; Price, 166.
 45. Ibid., I, 55; Price, 166.
 46. Ibid., I, 58-59. Italics added. Cf. Price, 177-180.
 47. Ibid., I, 91; Price, 273. See also I, 59; Price, 179-180.
 48. Ibid., I, 20-26; Price, 55-76.
 49. Ibid., I, 57. Cf. Price, 171.
 50. Ibid., I, 148; Price, 444.

51. Ibid., I, 148. Italics added. Cf. Price, 443-444.
52. Democracy in a World of Tensions, UNESCO, Paris, 1951, p. 527. Cited in Henry B. Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p.21. Italics added.
53. Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-tung hsuan-chí (毛澤東選集, Selected works of Mao Tse-tung) (Peking: Jén-min ch'u-pán shè, 1964), one volume Chinese edition, pp. 290-291, and Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961-1965), I, 314. Italics added. The letter C will be used hereafter to refer to the Chinese edition and the letter E to the official English translation.
54. Ibid., C305; EI, 328.
55. Ibid., C625, 627; EII, 313, 315.
56. Ibid., C626; EII, 313-314.
57. Ibid., C659. See also C641-646; EII, 326-331.
58. Ibid., EII, 342. Italics added.
59. Ibid., C632; EII, 319.
60. Ibid., C627 and C631; EII, 315 and 318.
61. Ibid., C638 and 639; EII, 324 and 325.
62. Ibid., C661; EII, 344.
63. Ibid., C819; EIII, 41. See also C281; EI, 305.
64. Ibid., C855; EIII, 74. Italics added.
65. Ibid., C866; EIII, 85.
66. For the generalizations, see ibid., C294; EI, 317 and C656-657; EII, 340.
67. Ibid., C644; EII, 330.
68. Ibid., C637; EII, 323 and C640; EII, 325.
69. Ibid., C314. Italics added. Cf. EI, 336.
70. Ibid., C314; EI, 336.
71. Mao Tse-tung, Where Do Correct Ideas Come From? (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), p.1.
72. Mao Tse-tung, op.cit., C1516; EIV, 454.
73. Ibid., C1474; EIV, 412.
74. Ibid., C822; EIII, 43.
75. Ibid., C656; EII, 340.
76. Ibid., C1474; EIV, 412 and 423.
77. If we accept the revised version of "materialism" or the "weapon" thesis as an interpretation of Mao Tse-tung's position, then he is no longer open to the

criticisms given earlier of historical determinism. In either case, he is merely making an empirical assertion. Neither of them entails any normative principle of politics or proves that his basic principles of political ethics are objectively true.

CHAPTER IV

1. Chuang Tzu (compiled by Kuo Ch'ing-fa, 郭慶藩), Chiăo-chêng Chuang Tzu chí-shih (校正莊子集釋), Collated collected explanations of the Chuang Tzu, HSMT edition, 33:1098. The first number refers to chapter and the second to the new continuous pagination in the HSMT edition. Hereafter cited as Chuang Tzu. Cf. Burton Watson, tr., The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p.373.
2. Ibid., 33:1098; Watson, pp.373-374.
3. Ibid., 2:51. Cf. Watson, p.37.
4. Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature in Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy. Edited with an Introduction by Henry D. Aiken. New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1948. Book III, Part I, Sec. 1 (p.42).
5. Chuang Tzu, op.cit., 21:714. Cf. Watson, p.226.
6. Ibid., 5:221. Italics added. Cf. Watson, pp. 75-76.
7. In the other contexts, they mean that something "is" or "is not" the case, or a statement is "true" or "false."
8. Chuang Tzu, op.cit., 23:810; Watson, p.259.
9. Ibid., 24:838. Cf. Watson, p.267.
10. Ibid., 2:63. Cf. Watson, p.39.
11. Ibid., 2:56. Cf. Watson, p.39.
12. Ibid., 2:107. Cf. Watson, p.48.
13. Ibid., 2:66. Cf. Watson, p.40.
14. Ibid., 25:905. Cf. Watson, p.288.
15. Ibid., 2:66. Cf. Watson, pp.39-40.
16. Ibid., 17:577. Cf. Watson, p.179.
17. Ibid., 17:578. Cf. Watson, p.180.
18. Ibid., 18:617-619. Cf. Watson, pp.193-194.
19. Ibid., 23:807. Cf. Watson, p.258.
20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., 1:9; Watson, p.30.
22. Ibid., 10:346. Cf. Watson, pp.108-109.
23. Han Fei Tzu (Ch'en Ch'i-yu, 陳奇猷; comp.) Han Fei Tzu chih-shih (韓非子集解, Collected explanations of the Han Fei Tzu), HSMT edition, chs. 40 and 43. Hereafter cited as Han Fei Tzu. For English translation, see W. K. Liao, tr., The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu (London: Arthur Probsthain, 1939 and 1959), Hereafter cited as Liao.
24. Ssu-ma Ch'ien (司馬遷), Shih Chi (史記, Records of the Historian), SPY edition, Vol. 63, 9b.
25. Han Fei Tzu, op.cit., 5:67. Italics added. The first number refers to chapter and the second to the new continuous pagination in the HSMT edition. Cf. Liao, op.cit., I, 30-31. This reading is based on Ch'en Ch'i-yu's interpretation.
26. Ibid., 5:68. Cf. Liao, I, 34.
27. Ibid., 14:248. Italics added. Cf. Liao, I, 124-125.
28. Ibid., 20:365. Cf. Liao, I, 191.
29. Ibid., 20:343. Cf. Liao, I, 177.
30. Ibid., 5:67-69; Liao, I, 31-35.
31. Ibid., 48:997. Cf. Liao, II, 259 and 49:1052; Liao, II, 283-284. For Han Fei Tzu's definition of law, see ibid., 38:868; Liao, II, 188 and 43:906; Liao, II, 212.
32. Ibid., 20:343. Cf. Liao, I, 177. See also 14:245; Liao, I, 118 and 49:1075; Liao, II, 295.
33. Ibid., 49:1041; Liao, II, 276-277.
34. Ibid., 48:996. Cf. Liao, II, 258.
35. Ibid., 20:345. Cf. Liao, I, 178.
36. Ibid., 45:934; Liao, II, 229.
37. Ibid., 48:1007; Liao, II, 265.
38. Ibid., 20:345; Liao, I, 179.
39. For example, see ibid., 5:67; Liao, I, 31 and 14:245; Liao, I, 117 and 48:1017; Liao, II, 265-267.
40. Ibid., 20:338. Cf. Liao, I, 174. See also 21:409; Liao, I, 221 where he quotes a passage from the Lao Tzu that reveals Lao Tzu's intuitionism. But Han Fei Tzu's remarks have nothing to do with intuitionism.
41. Ibid., 50:1080. Cf. Liao, II, 299.
42. Ibid., 49:1058; Liao, II, 288 and Ch'en Ch'i-yu's footnote 35 on p.1064.

43. Ibid., 14:245. Cf. Liao, I, 116-117.
44. Ibid., 19:311; Liao, I, 167 and 45:935; Liao, II, 230.
45. Ibid., 19:310-311. Cf. Liao, I, 166-167.
46. Ibid., 45:946. Cf. Liao, II, 235.
47. Ibid., 38:868; Liao, II, 188.
48. Ibid., 49:974; Liao, II, 252.
49. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, op.cit., Book III, Part I, Sec. 1 (Hafner's edition, p.43).
50. For example, see The Analects of Confucius, op.cit., 12:11; 13:3, Hsün Tzu, op.cit., 22:279, Mo Tzu, op.cit., 19:88; 42:211 and 45:250. For further discussion, see Hu Shih, The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China, op.cit., pp. 46-52, 67-68, 159-169, 179-181.
51. The Analects of Confucius, op.cit., 12:11.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

Abbreviations:

- SPPY Ssù-pù pèi-yào (四部備要, Essentials of the Four Libraries) edition, published by Chung Hwa Book Company first in 1927 and reprinted in 1937 and 1965. SPPY in this study refers to the 1965 reprint edition which includes 610 clothbound volumes and a volume of bibliography and contents.
- HSMT Chung-kúo hsléh-shù míng-tzu (中國學術名著, China's famous scholarly works) edition, published by World Books Company, Taipei, Taiwan.

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